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EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



CANADA

January 1957

Vol. 9 No. 1

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Department of External Affairs
Ottawa, Canada

Authorized as Second Class Mail, Post Office Department, Ottawa.

OTTAWA, CANADA

Canada and the United Nations

The Middle East Crisis

WHEN the General Assembly of the United Nations met on November 12 to commence its 11th regular session, one of the most urgent problems before it was the crisis in the Middle East. The Special Emergency Session of the Assembly, at its concluding meeting two days earlier, had adopted a resolution placing the Middle East question on the provisional agenda of the regular session as a matter of priority.⁽¹⁾

While the crisis was among the issues being most actively discussed by the delegates during the opening days of the 11th session, no further formal action was taken by the Assembly until November 24. In the interim the Secretary-General had visited Cairo to discuss with Egyptian authorities arrangements for implementation of the resolutions passed by the Special Emergency Session on November 2, 4 and 7 regarding the United Nations Emergency Force and the re-opening of the Suez Canal. Meanwhile the Commander of the Force, Major-General E. L. M. Burns, had been proceeding with the organization of the United Nations Emergency Force. The first advance units of the Emergency Force arrived in the Canal zone near Ismailia on November 15, and thereafter its growth progressed rapidly.

On November 20 the Secretary-General submitted to the General Assembly a report on the UN Emergency Force outlining the discussions he had held in Cairo with the Egyptian Government. This report set forth in an aide-memoire the principal results of these discussions, amounting to an understanding with the Egyptian authorities on the basis for the presence and functioning of UNEF in Egypt. It also gave some details of the build-up of the Force up to that time.

On the same date Mr. Hammarskjold placed before the Assembly a report on the implementation of that part of the cease-fire resolution passed by the Special Emergency Session on November 2 which has urged, *inter alia*, that as soon as the cease-fire became effective, steps should be taken to restore freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal. The Secretary-General had discussed this matter with Egyptian authorities in Cairo and had given them an assurance that the United Nations would seek to provide assistance in clearing the Canal. Mr. Hammarskjold asked the General Assembly to give him authority to negotiate agreements with salvage firms in countries "outside the present conflict", and proposed that a survey of the work required should be undertaken without delay by experts within the United Nations technical assistance programme, in conjunction with representatives of the firms approached.

(1) A report on the Special Emergency Session is given in "External Affairs" for November 1956.

The Secretary-General's two reports were the subject of a resolution submitted to the General Assembly on November 24 and co-sponsored by Canada, Colombia, India, Norway, the United States and Yugoslavia. This resolution noted with approval the understanding between the Secretary-General and the Egyptian Government on the basis for the presence and functioning of UNEF in Egypt. It also expressed approval of the progress made by the Secretary-General regarding arrangements for clearing the Suez Canal, and authorized him to proceed with the negotiation of agreements so that clearing operations might go forward without delay. This resolution was adopted by the Assembly without a dissenting vote, although nine states abstained.

On the same day the General Assembly approved a resolution, proposed by twenty Asian and African delegations, which recalled previous Assembly resolutions calling for withdrawal of foreign forces from Egyptian territory; noted that withdrawal of those forces had not been carried out; and reiterated previous exhortations to France, Israel and the United Kingdom to withdraw their forces "forthwith". The Belgian Delegation had proposed an amendment to this resolution calling for replacement of the operative portion by a paragraph taking note of the withdrawal of forces which was already under way, and urging that completion of withdrawal be expedited. This amendment was, however, lost, as only 23 states, including Canada, supported it, 37 voted against, and 18 abstained. The twenty-power resolution subsequently was adopted by a vote of 63 in favour, 5 opposed and 10 abstentions (including Canada).

Canada's Attitude

In explaining to the General Assembly Canada's attitude toward the Asian-African resolution and the six-power resolution dealing with the Secretary-General's reports, the Chairman of the Canadian Delegation, Mr. L. B. Pearson, made the following statement:

There are two draft resolutions before the Assembly, one of which my Delegation has the honour to sponsor, along with the Delegations of Colombia, India, Norway, the United States and Yugoslavia (A/3386); but, before saying a few words about that draft resolution I should like to comment on the draft resolution contained in document A/3385, which deals with compliance with previous resolutions which have been passed by the Assembly on the question of withdrawal of forces from Egypt.

It seems to me that this draft resolution, at the present time—and I emphasize "at the present time"—is unnecessary because steps are being taken to bring about the withdrawal in question. Indeed, that withdrawal has begun; we believe that it will soon be completed, and we expect that to be done. We believe also that one way of expediting that process which has begun would be to do our work here quickly and satisfactorily in setting up a United Nations Force, with functions which are agreed on, under the authority of the United Nations and of the United Nations only—a matter which is dealt with in the second draft resolution, which I hope will receive, and very quickly receive, the endorsement of the General Assembly.

The withdrawal, as we see it, has begun. Now, resolutions reiterating previous resolutions are, I think, useful and often necessary when the

original resolution of the Assembly has been treated with contempt and has been defied, as is the case with the United Nations resolution on Hungary. But when a resolution deals with a matter on which action has begun in compliance with a former resolution, and when that compliance is under United Nations supervision, then I do not think, myself, that reference to the former resolution is positively helpful in achieving the objective which we have in mind. Indeed, it often merely takes up the time of the Assembly which, as in this case, could be surely used for the task of bringing about a settlement, the creation of an atmosphere within which progress could be made to such a settlement, and expediting the solution of practical problems, such as the clearing of the Suez Canal and the maintenance there of freedom and security for navigation for all countries.

It seems to me that the draft resolution which we have the honour to sponsor with other delegations (A/3386) is designed for this purpose. It "Notes with approval the contents of the *aide-memoire* on the basis for the presence and functioning of the United Nations Emergency Force in Egypt, as annexed to the report of the Secretary-General"—and I hope that we can give that approval to the *aide-memoire*. It is important, however, in giving that approval, to know what we are approving.

What are the functions of this United Nations Emergency Force? Those functions and the task—and it is a very difficult task indeed which confronts the Force—have been laid down by resolutions of the General Assembly, and they are found also in the Secretary-General's second and final report, which has been approved by the Assembly. The basic resolution for these purposes is that which we adopted on 4-5 November (A/RES/394), which states that the functions of this Force are "to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all"—and I emphasize the word "all"—"the terms of the resolution of the General Assembly of 2 November 1956" (A/RES/390). In that latter resolution, as representatives will remember, provision is made for a cease-fire, for a prompt withdrawal of forces, and also—and this is no time to forget this provision—"that all Member States refrain from introducing military goods in the area of hostilities and in general refrain from any acts which would delay or prevent the implementation of the present resolution". And in paragraph 4 of that resolution we have this provision, namely, that, upon a cease-fire, steps are to be taken to reopen the Suez Canal and restore freedom of navigation.

Later, by resolution A/RES/395 of 7 November, the Assembly approved certain principles for the organization and functioning of the United Nations Emergency Force and those principles were stated in certain paragraphs of the Secretary-General's report (A/3302) which was attached to the resolution.

There is very strong, enthusiastic support in my country for this Force—but only as a United Nations Force, under United Nations control, and as an effective and organized Force which can do that job that has been given to it and which, if it can do that job, may be the beginning of something bigger and more permanent in the history of our Organization: something which we have talked about at United Nations meeting for many years, the organization of the peace through international action. Therefore, it is important that this Force should be so constituted and so organized that it will be able to do the work that it has been given to do and thereby set a precedent for the future.

It is also important that the principles on which the Force is to operate are sound. What are these principles? They have been laid down for us in the Secretary-General's report. The Force must be fully independent, in



RCAF Photo

END OF THE LINE

C-119's of the RCAF's 435 Transport Squadron line the tarmac at Abu Suweir airport in Egypt after a flight from the UN staging area in Naples, Italy. The Flying Boxcars have just disembarked a platoon of Finnish soldiers, part of that country's contribution to the United Nations Emergency Force, and are already being refueled for the return flight to Naples.

At mid-January the composition and strength of the national components of the UN Emergency Force were as follows: Brazil: 530; Canada: Army 789, R.C.A.F. 350; Colombia: 527; Denmark: 389; Finland: 257; India: 954; Indonesia: 593; Norway: 471; Sweden: 354; Yugoslavia: 783.

regard to its functions and its composition, of the political situation of any single member. The United Nations alone controls it and is responsible for it.

I agree, of course, that the Force—in the circumstances and on the basis of which it was set up, could not operate in the territory of a country without the consent of that country. That is why we are happy that Egypt has given that consent in principle and I am sure that we all agree that, in giving that consent to the constructive and helpful move, no infringement of sovereignty is involved. It is rather an example of using national sovereignty to bring about peace and security and a political settlement through United Nations action.

The control, then, of this Force is in the hands of the United Nations and must remain there. Otherwise it would not be a United Nations Force but it would be merely a collection of national forces, each under the control of its own Government and serving in another country with the consent of and under conditions laid down by that country. That, I am sure, would be unacceptable to most of the Governments in this Assembly.

Having said that, however, I do agree that the Secretary-General should certainly consult with the Government of the country in which the Force is serving, on all matters of any importance that affect it; also, as we understand it, the Force is to remain in the area until its task is completed, and that would surely be for the determination of the United Nations itself. It operates according to the principles as we understand them, where it is necessary to operate in order to accomplish its task, certainly between the opposing Powers to prevent conflict from recurring. As the Secretary-General has said in his report, its functions can be assumed to cover an area extending roughly from the Suez Canal to the armistice demarcation lines, and in that area to facilitate and aid the establishing and securing of peaceful conditions, as an indispensable prerequisite to a just and agreed political settlement.

Surely we must not for one moment lose sight of that objective. It seems to me that it is high time that we began the process of achieving it through United Nations action, because at best the achievement is going to be a long and difficult undertaking.

So I venture to repeat that we should without unnecessary delay get on with the business before us, the constitution and the functioning of this Force, which has been made possible by the cessation of hostilities, and with the clearance of the Canal.

The draft resolution to which I am referring, in paragraph 2,

Notes with approval the progress so far made by the Secretary-General in connexion with arrangements for clearing the Suez Canal as set forth in this report; (A/3386).

We cannot make much more progress unless we pass this draft resolution. Then there is paragraph 3, which is as follows:

Authorizes the Secretary-General to proceed with the exploration of practical arrangements and the negotiation of agreements so that the clearing operations may speedily and effectively be undertaken.

That paragraph is, of course, without prejudice to the allocation of costs and, of course, it is without prejudice to the normal procedures of the United Nations in dealing with expenditures.

So I suggest that our immediate task, now that the process of withdrawal has begun, is to back up the Secretary-General in the terrific undertaking we have imposed on him. His industry and his intelligence deserve our full support. We have faith in him, as he has faith in the good faith of those he is dealing with. We hope, therefore, that we can help him with his work, that we can get ahead with that work in this Assembly instead of having to listen to long, distorted propaganda diatribes such as the one to which we have just had to listen—speeches we have already heard three or four times, which do not improve but, indeed, deteriorate with age.

However, this is not a time for recrimination among those who are anxious to find a solution for the problems with which we are faced. It is not a time for recrimination between delegations who are anxious to get ahead with this work. It is a time for restoration; first, the restoration of the sovereign rights of Egypt over all of its territory by the withdrawal of foreign forces from that Egyptian territory. It is a time for the restoration of free passage for all through the Suez Canal. It is a time, above all, for restoration, not of the situation which because of the failure of all of us at the United Nations and elsewhere has brought about this critical situation, but for the restoration of peace, security and decent conditions of life in an area of the world which has not seen such conditions for many years."

Financing of Force

On November 26 the Assembly adopted a resolution dealing with interim financing arrangements for the United Nations Emergency Force and authorizing the Secretary-General to establish a special UNEF account in an initial amount of \$10 million to which funds for meeting expenses of the Force should be credited and from which payments for that purpose should be made. The resolution also provided for interim financial operating arrangements, pending adoption of more permanent arrangements as might be decided upon by the Administrative and Budgetary Committee of the General Assembly. The vote

on this resolution was 52 in favour (including Canada), 9 opposed and 13 abstentions, with five members absent.

On December 20 the Administrative and Budgetary Committee of the Assembly adopted a resolution pursuant to the Assembly's resolution of November 26 dealing with the allocation of payment of the expenses of UNEF. This resolution, which was co-sponsored by 25 states including Canada, provided that the expenses of the Force should be borne by the United Nations, and that the first \$10,000,000 of such expenses should be apportioned among the Member states in accordance with the scale of assessments for contributions to the United Nations' annual budget for 1957. The resolution, which was approved by a vote of 57 in favour, 8 opposed and 9 abstentions, also established a committee of 9 states—Canada, United States, Soviet Union, India, El Salvador, Chile, Liberia, Ceylon and Sweden—to examine the question of apportionment of expenses of the Force in excess of \$10,000,000. On the following day, December 21, it was endorsed by the General Assembly. At the end of the year the nine-member Committee had not yet submitted to the General Assembly the report on UNEF financing called for by the resolution.

Hungary⁽¹⁾

After action by the Security Council to condemn Soviet military intervention in Hungary had been vetoed by the U.S.S.R., the matter was referred to the Second Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly, convened from November 4 to 10. The Assembly passed four substantive resolutions on Hungary, calling for withdrawal of Soviet forces and free elections in Hungary, admission of UN observers, contributions of food and medical supplies, and aid to refugees. The Special Session also placed the Hungarian question on the provisional agenda for the General Assembly's regular session as a matter of priority.

A few days after the Kadar Government's programme had been announced from Moscow, the Hungarian authorities rejected the request for UN observers to enter Hungary but submitted a list of relief and medical supplies that were urgently needed. The Soviet Union ignored the Assembly's call for withdrawal of Soviet forces. Meanwhile reports of deportations of young Hungarians aroused world opinion and the Hungarian question was again brought before the General Assembly. The Cuban Delegation introduced a resolution raising the deportation issue and urging compliance with the resolutions passed by the Special Session.

In a statement to the Assembly on November 19, Mr. Pearson said that the Soviet Government must bear full and final responsibility for frustrating an impartial investigation by UN observers; he contrasted the ready co-operation with United Nations resolutions by the United Kingdom and France in the Middle East with the obduracy of the Soviet Union in Hungary; and he asked that questions of ideology and power politics not be permitted to interfere with distribution of medical supplies, food and clothing to the Hun-

(1) See "External Affairs" November 1956 and December 1956.

garian people. Mr. Pearson termed Russian denials of the deportations as "hollow and false" and concluded by saying:

The Canadian Delegation has given strong support to the other United Nations decisions designed to help the Hungarian people, and we shall also wholeheartedly support the present draft resolution dealing with the cruel deportation of men, women and children from their native land. We can pray that by focussing the spotlight of world opinion on this cruel and inhuman operation we may help to bring to an end the martyrdom of a brave people.

Although Imre Horvath, the Hungarian Foreign Minister, and Mr. Shepilov, the Soviet Foreign Minister, spoke of "the white terror" in Hungary and of UN "interference" in Hungarian domestic affairs, the Cuban resolution was adopted on November 21 by a majority vote of 55 in favour (including Canada) to 10 against (Soviet bloc and Yugoslavia) with 14 abstentions.

Meanwhile the Indian Delegation, with the support of Ceylon and Indonesia, had also taken the initiative in introducing a resolution referring to the reports of deportations and calling on Hungary to admit United Nations observers. The Indian resolution was passed by a vote of 57 in favour (including Canada), 8 against (Soviet bloc with the significant exception of Poland, which abstained) and 14 abstentions (including Yugoslavia).

The Soviet bloc was isolated once again in the voting on a United States resolution appealing for contributions from member states to assist the UN High Commissioner's office in a co-ordinated programme of assistance to Hungarian refugees. This resolution was carried by an overwhelming vote of 69 to 2 with 8 abstentions. The two delegations opposing were Hungary and Rumania. Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Sudan, the Ukraine and the Soviet Union abstained.

On November 30, the Secretary-General reported that Hungary had still not complied with the Assembly's request for the admission of the three UN observers named by Mr. Hammarskjold on November 12—Judge O. Gunder- sen, of Norway, Mr. A. Lall, of India and Mr. A. Lleras, of Colombia; that all his efforts to persuade the Hungarian Government to admit his representatives had been of no avail, and that he himself had offered to go to Budapest but had not yet received a favourable reply. Thirteen member countries then co-sponsored a resolution noting the failure of the U.S.S.R. and Hungary to comply with the provisions of the Assembly's previous resolutions and recommending that the Secretary-General immediately dispatch his observers to the borders of Hungary. Before the matter came to a vote, the Hungarian Government announced that it would be willing to have the Secretary-General visit Budapest "at a later date appropriate for both parties". The Secretary-General suggested December 16-18 as a reasonable time for the visit, but these dates were subsequently rejected as unsuitable by the Kadar Government. Meanwhile the resolution was pressed to a vote and was carried by a majority of 54 to 10 with 14 abstentions. Mr. Roch Pinard, heading the Canadian Delegation in the absence of Mr. Pearson, spoke in support of the resolution.

The continuing obstructive attitude of the Soviet and Kadar Governments, as exemplified by Budapest's rejection of the Secretary-General's offer to visit Hungary, led to a strong protest from the United States Delegation and to the introduction on December 10 of a further resolution (see below) which gained the sponsorship of 20 member countries. India, together with Burma, Ceylon, and Indonesia, introduced an alternative resolution less condemnatory in tone which suggested that the Secretary-General might pursue his inquiries in Moscow. A brief resolution to give the Secretary-General discretionary authority to deal with the problem was introduced by Austria.

Debate on the Hungarian question continued in the General Assembly and with few exceptions the delegates roundly condemned the U.S.S.R. for its repressive action in Hungary. The Indian Delegate, Mr. Krishna Menon, while acknowledging that the Hungarian people wanted Soviet forces to withdraw completely from their country, supported conciliation rather than condemnation. The Kadar Government's delegate did not vote since he had withdrawn from Assembly discussions of the Hungarian issue as a gesture of protest over UN "interference". On December 12, the 20-power resolution, with an Austrian amendment, was adopted by a vote of 55 in favour, (including Canada) 8 against and 13 abstentions (the Arab states, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Yugoslavia and Finland). As revised, the resolution recommended that the Secretary-General "take any initiative that he deems helpful in relation to the Hungarian problem in conformity with the principles of the Charter and the resolutions of the General Assembly". In view of the vote and the amendment, the Indian and Austrian draft resolutions were withdrawn.

During the first week in January, Philippe deSeynes, United Nations Under-Secretary, was permitted to visit Hungary, accompanied by a three-man team of experts on agricultural and industrial matters. The visit was made without fanfare to discuss only relief and economic problems—not politics—with Hungarian officials.

On January 5, the Secretary-General submitted a further report on the Hungarian situation to the General Assembly. He pointed out that the observers selected by him, Messrs. Gundersen, Lall and Lleras, had been able to collect "only a fringe of material" on the Hungarian uprising because of the lack of co-operation of the governments directly concerned. Mr. Hammarskjold suggested that the Assembly might wish to establish an ad hoc investigating committee to take over the functions of the three observers and "serve as an organ of the General Assembly for continued observation of developments in relation to Hungary".

New Resolution

As a sequel to the Secretary-General's report, a new United States resolution was introduced in the Assembly, co-sponsored by 24 member states including the United Kingdom, France and Canada. The resolution provided for a Special Committee composed of the representatives of Australia, Ceylon, Denmark, Tunisia and Uruguay, "to investigate and to establish and maintain

direct observation in Hungary and elsewhere, collecting evidence and receiving information, as appropriate, in order to report its findings to the General Assembly". One of the sponsors' motives in proposing the Special Committee was to offer an opportunity for a reasonable hearing under United Nations auspices for Hungarian refugees such as Mrs. Anna Kethly, the Social Democratic leader who had been a Minister of the Nagy Government. Speaking for the Canadian Delegation, Mr. G. Légaré, M.P., remarked how many "individuals and governments who love freedom and hate tyranny" had provided money, supplies and a warm welcome for Hungarian refugees. In contrast, the U.S.S.R. and the Kadar régime had treated with contempt the recommendation of the UN Assembly. Mr. Légaré concluded: "There must be no abating of the concern of the UN about the situation created by the brutal and bloody intervention of Soviet armed force in the internal affairs of a small neighbour".

The 24-power resolution was adopted on January 10 by a sweeping majority of 59 to 8 (Soviet bloc minus Hungary) with 10 abstentions (Afghanistan, Egypt, Cuba, Finland, India, Jordan, Saudi-Arabia, the Sudan, Syria and Yugoslavia). The Cuban Delegate abstained because he had favoured introducing a stronger resolution that would have recommended expulsion of Hungary from the United Nations. Even before the resolution was passed, the Kadar Government had announced its opposition to this "unprecedented interference" in the internal affairs of Hungary, a UN initiative "obviously inspired by the United States".

The Special Committee is to submit the results of its investigations and hearings to the present session of the General Assembly.

80th Member

The General Assembly unanimously adopted on December 18 a resolution approving the recommendation of the Security Council that Japan be admitted to membership in the United Nations. The resolution was sponsored by 51 nations, including five permanent members of the Security Council and Canada. Japan is the 80th country to become a member of the United Nations.

Special Political Committee

At its meeting of December 18, the General Assembly agreed without a vote to a recommendation of the Sixth (Legal) Committee changing the Assembly's Rules of Procedure to provide for the establishment of the Special Political Committee (formerly the Ad Hoc Political Committee) on a permanent basis.

Elections

The General Assembly on December 7 elected the Philippines to the seat on the Security Council from which Yugoslavia had announced its intention of retiring on December 31, 1956 in accordance with an understanding reached with the Philippines last year in order to break a deadlock in the voting. The

Philippines were elected on the first ballot, receiving 51 votes, Czechoslovakia received 20 votes, and Afghanistan, Syria and Yugoslavia one vote each.

In Plenary Session on December 19, elections were held to fill the non-permanent seats of the Security, Economic and Social, and Trusteeship Councils, which became vacant at the end of 1956. Colombia, Iraq and Sweden were elected as non-permanent members of the Security Council for two-year terms beginning January 1, 1957 replacing Belgium, Iran and Peru.

Six members of the Economic and Social Council were named for three-year terms beginning January 1, 1957. Of this group, Pakistan, the U.S.S.R. and the United Kingdom were re-elected, and Mexico, Poland and Finland were elected to replace Czechoslovakia, Ecuador and Norway.

India and Haiti were re-elected as non-administering countries on the Trusteeship Council for three-year terms beginning January 1, 1957.

On November 28, the Sixth Committee of the United Nations voted to increase the membership of the International Law Commission from fifteen to twenty-one seats.

The Sixth Committee also came to an informal agreement that of the six new seats, one should be filled by an Eastern European country, one by a Western European country and three by Afro-Asian countries. The remaining seat is to be allocated in rotation to a Latin American and a Commonwealth country. It was decided that a Latin American would occupy this seat during the immediately forthcoming term and that a Commonwealth representative should be chosen for the term commencing in 1962.

Following the adoption by the General Assembly of the Report of the Sixth Committee, elections to the enlarged ILC were held on December 18, 1956 and the following members were elected on the first ballot: Spiropoulos (Greece), Pal (India), Nervo (Mexico), Scelle (France), Amado (Brazil), Edmonds (U.S.A.), Garcia-Amador (Cuba), Zourek (Czechoslovakia), Fitzmaurice (U.K.), Tunkin (U.S.S.R.), El-Khoury (Syria), Daftary (Iran), Bartos (Yugoslavia), El-Eriam (Egypt), Sandstrom (Sweden), Yokota (Japan), Ago (Italy), Khoman (Thailand), Hsu (China), François (Netherlands), Verdross (Austria).

NATO Ministerial Meeting

At the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, held in Paris from December 11 to December 14, 1956, Canada was represented by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, and the Minister of National Defence, Mr. Ralph Campney. The Canadian Ministers were assisted by the Permanent Representative of Canada to the North Atlantic Council, Mr. L. D. Wilgress, by the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, General Charles Foulkes, and by officers of the Permanent Delegation in Paris and of the Departments of External Affairs, National Defence, Finance and Defence Production.

It had been anticipated that this December meeting would be of special importance because:

- a) It was fairly generally held that international developments since the death of Stalin had reduced, though not removed, the threat of all-out military aggression. While these changes had not diminished the need for collective military defence, NATO had to determine whether and how they should be reflected in its strategic military planning.
- b) Events in the Middle East had among other things obviously affected the consultative process between the three major powers of the Alliance, whose co-operation is essential to the maintenance of that superior military strength which is one of the main justifications of NATO.
- c) Finally, the Council had just received the report prepared by the Committee of Three Ministers which it had appointed in May 1956 to advise on ways and means to improve and extend NATO co-operation in non-military fields.

Military Questions

As they normally do at the end of each year, the Ministers first surveyed the military capabilities of the Alliance, and assessed the progress achieved during 1956. The situation was found generally encouraging, and the Council noted with particular approval the efforts made by NATO military authorities to provide NATO forces with new modern weapons.

The most important step taken by the Council in the military field was the approval of a directive for future military planning which would take into account NATO's most recent estimates of Soviet intentions and capabilities, and the various types of new weapons available for NATO defence. This directive does not in fact call for any fundamental change in the NATO strategic concept. It re-affirmed that NATO, a defensive Alliance, should have sufficient land forces in Europe to act as a shield against any sudden aggression, adequate air and naval forces to retaliate against the aggressor, nuclear weapons for use in the event of overt Soviet military aggression, and the ability to deal locally with situations short of all-out war such as infiltrations, incursions and limited hostile actions.

Consideration was also given to the increasing cost of defence, and to the problems involved in trying to maintain large conventional forces to deal with limited attacks, in addition to forces equipped with tactical nuclear weapons.

International Situation Reviewed

As this Council meeting was concerned primarily with the non-military activities of NATO, the review of the international situation, with the recent events in Hungary and the Middle East as background, assumed considerable importance. The Ministers were quick to agree that the present turmoil in Eastern Europe presented dangers to the Alliance, and that great care should be exercised by all NATO governments not to interfere with the evolutionary process towards freedom in the satellites. While registering shock and revulsion at the course of events in Hungary, the Council members welcomed recent developments which gave reason to hope that in due time the apparent loosening of the Soviet grip over the Eastern European satellites would mean greater freedom for the people of these countries to choose the government they want. The Ministers reaffirmed the conviction of their governments that the United Nations should continue its efforts, through pressure of world public opinion, to induce the Soviet Union to withdraw its forces from Hungary and to right the wrongs done to the Hungarian people. The Council was, however, anxious to avoid any impression that NATO wished to arouse active opposition, or otherwise to intervene directly in the affairs of the Eastern European countries.

The fact that the Council devoted a significant part of its discussions to political developments outside the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty constituted an important departure from earlier practices. The decision to discuss these situations reflected an increasing awareness that the stability, security and well-being of an area such as the Middle East are essential to the maintenance of world peace, which in turn is a matter of direct concern to the Atlantic Community.

It was, of course, agreed that it would be inappropriate for NATO to consider assuming special responsibilities in areas not covered by the Treaty. But there was evidence that NATO members may be less reluctant than before to discuss developments outside the NATO area when they have an impact on the Atlantic Alliance. It was within this context that it was agreed in the Council to emphasize the need for rapid progress in clearing the Suez Canal in conformity with the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly, and for pressing ahead with the restoration of the Canal to full and free operation. The Ministers were also in full agreement in endorsing, as the basis on which a lasting settlement should be worked out, the six principles agreed upon by the United Nations Security Council on October 13 as basic requirements in any settlement of the Suez question.

Although this exchange of views on current political issues did not—and was not expected to—lead to the formulation of a common policy on all these matters between all NATO governments, it did succeed in bringing out more clearly the broad outlines of what should be the main objectives of the Atlantic Alliance in the world of today. The review of the international situation helped considerably in re-establishing the mutual understanding which had existed before the Middle East developments, and in laying down a basis on which to resume and to pursue constructive and close co-operation.



REPORT PRESENTED

The Report of the Committee of Three on non-military co-operation in NATO was presented at the Ministerial Meeting held in Paris December 11-14, 1956. Committee members are, from left to right above, Mr. Halvard Lange, Foreign Minister of Norway; Mr. Gaetano Martino, Foreign Minister of Italy; Mr. L. B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada.

Committee of Three Report

The report prepared by the Committee of Three Ministers, Mr. Martino of Italy, Mr. Lange of Norway and Mr. Pearson, was generally well received by the other governments, and considered as an important landmark in the development of NATO activities in the non-military field. The report was not only approved in principle by the Ministers, but all its recommendations were accepted; in that sense, therefore, the recommendations in the report are now binding on the Permanent Council which has been invited to consider them in the light of comments made by governments. The Secretary-General has also been invited to draw up for consideration by the Council such further specific proposals as may be required for the implementation of these recommendations. The Canadian delegation welcomed the Council's decision that the report be made public.

In the report the three Ministers attempted to deal with all the non-military fields in which NATO can make a useful contribution. The most important, of course, is that of consultation among NATO governments and the report stressed the need for members of the Alliance in present circumstances to develop common policies by full and timely consultation on issues of common concern. The report recognizes that new institutional arrangements or organizational changes would not in themselves meet this need, nor are they necessary; what is needed is sustained political willingness to form policies through consultation, in order to develop courses of action which will

take into account the common interests of the members of the Alliance. If this can be achieved, the North Atlantic Alliance, which is so essential to the protection of Canadian interests, embracing as it does our closest neighbours and friends, can grow in strength and effectiveness. It is the hope of the Canadian Government that the Committee of Three Report will assist NATO in developing further the habit of thinking and acting in concert, so that it can meet and overcome critical situations as they develop.

Another important recommendation concerned the differences which may arise between members of the Alliance. The Council recognized that NATO members must do everything possible to eliminate conflicts among themselves, if they are to preserve the unity and strength essential for continuous co-operation in military and non-military fields; as a result of the report, the Secretary-General has now been empowered to initiate or to facilitate a number of procedures which should assist in the settlement of such disputes and differences between members of the Organization.

The report also recommended that NATO members promote cultural co-operation among their peoples by all practical means in order to strengthen their unity and develop maximum support for the Alliance.

Conclusions

Summing up the achievements of this NATO ministerial meeting, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Pearson, made the following statement to the Press on his return to Ottawa:

It was in my opinion the most important Council meeting which we have had, both because of the circumstances in which it met after a period of strain on the Alliance and because we laid down principles of co-operation and consultation in the non-military field—which if followed could remove much of the risk of the kind of differences which we have recently experienced. It was also important in that it showed that NATO was not hesitant about discussing the effect on the Alliance of developments outside the NATO area. These developments are, of course, not for NATO discussion alone—or indeed NATO consideration alone—but they are important for the Atlantic coalition which at this session of the North Atlantic Council faced up to their implications.

The appointment of Mr. Paul-Henri Spaak to the Secretary-Generalship of the Organization, in succession to Lord Ismay, which is to take effect next April, lent added significance to the approval accorded the recommendations of the Committee of Three for wider authority and powers for the Secretary-General, whose office now becomes a political as well as an administrative one. The selection of a political personality such as Belgium's Foreign Minister also underlined the new era into which NATO is entering with a new emphasis on non-military co-operation as an essential complement to continued co-operation in defence.

TEXT OF FINAL COMMUNIQUE

The North Atlantic Council met in Ministerial Session from 11th to 14th December, under the Chairmanship of Professor Gaetano Martino, Foreign Minister of Italy, and took decisions that will strengthen the military and non-military co-operation of the Alliance.

2. In the meeting just ended, the Ministers drew from the experience of past divergences in the policies of NATO members the confirmation of the necessity for all members to develop effective political consultation and co-operation. They reaffirmed their determination to work together in unity and friendship to achieve the aims of the Alliance and to strengthen the Alliance in all its aspects as an indispensable agency for security and peace.

3. As a major forward step in the development of NATO in the non-military field, the Council approved the recommendations of the Committee of Three in their report to the Council. In doing so, the Council approved wider and more intimate consultation among the member states on political matters. The Council also approved arrangements to aid in the settlement of disputes among member states on political matters. The Council also approved arrangements to aid in the settlement of disputes among members and adopted measures for strengthening the organization of NATO internally and for further co-operation between members in certain economic and cultural fields. The report has been released by the Committee of Three.

4. The Council reviewed the international situation, discussing frankly the problems which confront the Atlantic Alliance. In the course of this discussion Ministers, realizing that their views were in general agreement, decided that the detail should be worked out by continuous consultation in the Council in the months ahead.

5. The Atlantic Alliance is primarily concerned with the threat to the security of the NATO area. The Council discussed the threat which Soviet penetration into the Middle East would present for NATO. In view of the fact that the security, stability and well-being of this area are essential for the maintenance of world peace, the Council agreed to keep developments in this area under close and continuing observation.

6. The Council members emphasized in particular the need for rapid progress in clearing the Suez Canal in conformity with the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly of 2nd November last. The Ministers further stressed the urgent need for initiating and pressing to a conclusion negotiations through the good offices of the United Nations with a view to restoring the Canal to full and free operation. They endorsed, as the basis on which a lasting settlement should be worked out, the six principles agreed upon by the United Nations Security Council on 13th October. They also agreed on the urgent need to bring about, through the United Nations, a permanent political settlement between Israel and the Arab States, including an equitable solution of the Arab refugee problem. The need for adequate support for economic development of the area was recognized.

7. The Council Members have followed the course of events in Hungary with shock and revulsion. The brutal suppression of the heroic Hungarian people stands in stark contrast with Soviet public professions. The Council reaffirmed the conviction of its Member Governments that the United Nations should continue its efforts, through the pressure of world public

opinion, to induce the Soviets to withdraw their forces from Hungary and to right the wrongs done to the Hungarian people. The peoples of Eastern Europe should have the right to choose their own governments freely, unaffected by external pressure and the use or threat of force, and to decide for themselves the political and social order they prefer.

8. The Ministers examined the implications for NATO of Soviet policy and actions in Europe and elsewhere. In the light of their assessment of Soviet policy they were in full agreement on the need to face up to any threat which would endanger the security and freedom of the Atlantic Community. In this connection, the Council approved a directive for future military plans, taking into account the continued rise in Soviet capabilities and the various types of new weapons available for NATO defence. The concept of forward defence in NATO strategy will be maintained. The Council considered the Report on the 1956 Annual Review and approved force goals for 1957, 1958 and 1959.

9. The Council expressed their deep regret at the decision of Lord Ismay to retire this spring as Secretary General of the Organisation and paid tribute to his distinguished services to the Alliance. Mr. Paul-Henri Spaak, the Foreign Minister of Belgium, was appointed as Lord Ismay's successor.



CANADIAN-GERMAN AIR TRAINING AGREEMENT

The Department of External Affairs announced December 19 that the Federal Republic of Germany had concluded arrangements with the Government of Canada for the training in Canada of 360 aircrew to man a number of F86 Sabre aircraft allotted to the Federal Republic under mutual aid arrangements and a further number of aircraft to be purchased in Canada. The Federal Republic of Germany agreed to reimburse the Canadian Government for the cost of maintaining the NATO air training establishment for an additional period of several months to complete the training of the German aircrew. The trainees were expected to commence training in Canada some time in 1957 and it was anticipated that the training would be completed by approximately April 1959.

Mr. Nehru Visits Ottawa

THE Prime Minister of India, Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru, accepted the invitation to visit this country which was extended to him earlier last year by Prime Minister St. Laurent, and was in Ottawa from the late evening of Friday, December 21 to Sunday, December 23.

His Excellency the Governor General, the Right Honourable Vincent Massey, C.H., invited the Prime Minister of India to be his guest at Government House. Mr. Nehru's daughter, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, the Secretary-General of the Ministry of External Affairs, Mr. N. R. Pillai, and Mr. M. O. Mathai, Mr. Nehru's personal secretary, also stayed at Government House.

The Governor General entertained at dinner in the Prime Minister's honour on Saturday, December 22, and on the same day Prime Minister St. Laurent was host at luncheon at 24 Sussex Street. Prior to the departure of Mr. Nehru and his party for London on December 23, the High Commissioner for India, Dr. M. A. Rauf, held a reception in Mr. Nehru's honour.



PRIME MINISTERS MEET

Seen above with Prime Minister St. Laurent during their recent visit to Canada are Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India, and Mr. Nehru's daughter, Mrs. Indira Gandhi.

During his visit Prime Minister Nehru was interviewed on a special CBC television programme by Mr. Edgar McInnis, President of the Canadian Institute for International Affairs. He also held a press conference in the Parliament Buildings.

India's Foreign Policy

Replying to a question from Mr. McInnis about India's policy of non-alignment, the Prime Minister said in part:

... I think in any event the only policy open to India by history, tradition, habit and by virtue of its new independence was the policy she has pursued and it is totally immaterial what government functioned in India. Every government would have done that. But there is something more to that. All that we learnt from Mr. Gandhi in the course of our own struggle for independence, translated to the international sphere, leads to this conclusion. We really would be false to our own traditions and to our own method of achieving national independence if in the international sphere we followed a policy of military pacts and alliances. . . .

... I do not think any sensible person in India has the slightest fear of any major attack from the big countries. So far as other countries are concerned, say in Asia, eastern or western, well, it is conceivable their case is somewhat different from India's. But any kind of attack, even on a small country, as things are, would probably lead to a major war. Therefore you really have to consider it in the context of a possible major war, and no country is going to take the risk of a major war today unless somehow by accident it is forced into that. Anyhow, my point is that we have arrived at a stage now when on the one hand every one wants to put an end to the idea of a major war, because of atomic weapons which will destroy a good part of the world, and further realises that a minor war may lead to a major war. Therefore, minor wars should also be avoided. Well, if this is so, it also follows that the atmosphere and the climate of war should be avoided apart, of course, from removing the causes. Now I think that this cold war business is totally and absolutely illogical once you decide not to have war.

Canadian-Indian Relations

Discussing Canadian-Indian relations at the press conference, Mr. Nehru said in part:

... We have found that Canada has shown a greater appreciation of the reality of today in Asia and that I think is one reason why we have got on so well with Canada. Although we have differed in regard to many matters there has been this basis, coming closer to each other and understanding each other more. I would, therefore, say that in the conflicts of the world today Canada has performed a very important service in being in some ways a link between the growing countries of Asia and Europe and the Americas. . . .

... We have also in our own way tried to bring understanding and to be some kind of a bridge or link. So, because Canada and we, at any rate, try to do so, that has also brought us together in being a common factor. We have no problems between India and Canada. We are interested, all of us, in problems of the world, so the problems of the world were discussed between two friends, without any conflict. I suppose it was more a question of emphasis. Mr. St. Laurent emphasised one aspect; I emphasised another, and so we were trying to clarify, trying to understand the situation in all its aspects.

The Commonwealth

Replying to questions about the effect on the Commonwealth of the recent crisis in the Middle East, Mr. Nehru said:

... the Commonwealth suffered a severe shock undoubtedly. It survived it. So far as some of us were concerned in India, this did not lead us to think that the Commonwealth association was not good enough, or

should be broken. I never thought so, in spite of the grave differences of opinion. Certainly some people in India, some important people, even suggested that the Commonwealth association was doing no good, but we are firmly of the opinion—and we discussed this in our parliament some days ago—and declared quite clearly that we wished the Commonwealth association to continue because we thought that in spite of differences it was an association helping mutual understanding, a measure of co-operation and the larger causes of peace in the world; also there are so many what may be called disruptive tendencies in the world that I, for my part, am not prepared to break up any kind of an association or bridge that there is. . . . The Commonwealth somewhat changed its character eight or nine years ago, more so seven years ago when India became a republic and yet continued in the Commonwealth. That itself was a novel feature, a republic being in the Commonwealth. Now, of course, Pakistan is also a republic and is in the Commonwealth. That showed a certain adaptability, flexibility of the Commonwealth, which I think is a great virtue; in these times of transition it can adapt itself to changing conditions. If you think in terms of all the countries of the Commonwealth having more or less similar policies in regard to most things, then, I would say that is not so because they do pursue different policies, as also common policies, both. But I think the major virtue of the Commonwealth has been that while following different policies sometimes, they keep in touch with each other; consult each other, and therefore try to adapt themselves to each other's policies as far as possible. I think that friendly bridge and an attempt to co-operate, even though they may not have the same policies, in the end is more important than a rather artificial unity policy. . . . the Commonwealth way of dealing with each other, that is, a friendly approach, and trying to understand each other and try to co-ordinate as far as possible their policies and yet have complete freedom to adopt any line of action a country thinks fit and proper, is the kind of way which can really be expanded to cover any country in the world, or all the countries. It is peaceful and co-operative co-existence in spite of difference.



EXCHANGE OF NOTES

Seen from left to right above during the Exchange of Notes at Colombo in connection with Canada's gift of \$2,000,000 to Ceylon under the Colombo Plan are Mr. J. J. Hurley, Canadian High Commissioner to Ceylon, Mr. Paul Martin, Minister of National Health and Welfare, and the Hon. S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, Prime Minister of Ceylon.

External Affairs in Parliament

STATEMENTS OF GOVERNMENT POLICY

The purpose of this section is to provide a selection of statements on external affairs by Ministers of the Crown or by their parliamentary assistants. It is not designed to provide a complete coverage of debates on external affairs taking place during the month.

In the Speech from the Throne at the opening of the 5th Session of the 22nd Parliament on January 8, 1957 the Governor General said, in part:

The international scene continues to be characterized by instability in the Middle East and in Eastern Europe.

My Ministers remain convinced of the need to maintain the basic unity of the Commonwealth and the reality of the Western alliance, to contribute effectively to the supervision of the cessation of hostilities between Israel and Egypt under the authority of the United Nations and to the achievement of a lasting settlement of Middle East problems.

Visits to Canada in the last few weeks by the Prime Ministers of Ceylon and India have been conducive to a renewed strengthening of the bonds which unite the peoples of the Commonwealth in their constant aim to co-operate in the pursuit of peace, liberty and progress.

An encouraging advance is being made, as evidenced by the latest Ministerial Meeting of the Council, in the development of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the non-military as well as in the military field. My Ministers remain strongly convinced of the need to maintain the North Atlantic Treaty as the keystone of the defence of the Western nations.

In the Middle East Canadian servicemen, as part of the United Nations Emergency Force proposed by Canada at the General Assembly of the United Nations, are performing valuable tasks in the interest of world peace.

The United Nations has served to focus world opinion on the brutal repression of the heroic Hungarian people in their endeavour to throw off the yoke of the Soviet imperialism. The vast humanitarian problems that have arisen as a result of Soviet intervention require the joint efforts of many countries. Through the United Nations, the Red Cross, and in cooperation with the Government of Austria, this country is playing its part in relieving suffering and re-settling the refugees.

The entrance into Canada of Hungarian refugees has been greatly facilitated and free transportation provided from Austria to new homes in this country. Already thousands of these Hungarians have been welcomed to Canada and we look forward to receiving thousands more during the winter and spring. There are also substantially increasing numbers of immigrants from the British Isles arranging to proceed to Canada this year.

Recent events have confirmed my Ministers' belief in the importance of seeking solutions to international problems through the United Nations and of upholding by all practical and constructive means the principles of the United Nations Charter. My Ministers also believe, however, that

while making every effort to achieve these long term goals, the Western nations must remain strong and united in their defences and in their diplomacy in order that aggressive action against them will be prevented and international tension can be lessened.

Excellent progress is being made in our national economic development. Expansion is evident in every part of Canada. Rapid strides are being made in opening up and utilizing our natural resources and in our industrial and urban growth. Employment has reached unprecedented levels. Once again we have been blessed with good crops. External trade was considerably greater last year than during any previous year. Canadians in almost every part of the country have been enjoying the benefits of this invigorating economic climate.

Foreign Policy Review

The following review of Canada's position in international affairs was given in the House of Commons January 14 by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson:

... Recent events, especially events in the Middle East, have emphasized to all Canadians the importance and the responsibilities of Canadian foreign policy, even in respect of far away areas where there may seem to be few direct Canadian interests but where the paramount interests of all in peace and war are often involved. These events have also brought about, not only widespread public discussion of the decisions that we have made and may have to make, but also a reassessment of the principles which have underlined our policies and the factors which influence them. It has, I think, Mr. Speaker, been confirmed, if confirmation was necessary, that our foreign policy must be Canadian, based on Canadian considerations, Canadian values and Canadian interests, the greatest of which, however, apart from freedom itself, is peace. But a Canadian policy, in this day and age, is not necessarily the same as an independent policy. There is no country in the world today, even the most powerful, which in the preservation of peace and security can afford the luxury of, or run the risk of, a policy of independence in foreign affairs, in the sense that independence means isolation from one's friends or immunity from the effect of their decisions and their actions.

We should not, of course, and we do not, automatically or unhesitatingly follow the policy of the United States or the United Kingdom or any other country. Nevertheless, we cannot, and I suggest we should not, make our own decisions and our own policies without being influenced by, without taking into consideration, the policies of the United Kingdom or the United States or those of our other friends and allies with whom we are associated. No country is in a better position to appreciate the necessity and indeed, if you like, the opportunities of interdependence in the realm of foreign policy than Canada, situated as we are on the North American Continent but being an active member, as we are also, of the Commonwealth of Nations, NATO and the

United Nations and trying to play a responsible part in all those associations. We are, of course, a free and a sovereign state, but freedom and sovereignty do not mean for us, or for other nations, either isolation or immunity; unless we abandon all of our national and international responsibilities, and perhaps not even then. It seems to me evident, then, that Canadian foreign policy must be influenced by various factors which we can and indeed which we often try to modify, but which we ignore at our peril.

These principal factors, I suggest, are four in number. The first is our membership in the Commonwealth of Nations, four-fifths of the people of which are now Asian, 443 million out of 530 million. Action by any of the Commonwealth nations which seems likely to foster and strengthen the ties which bind us together is almost certain to deserve, and certainly should receive, our support. The reverse, of course, is also often true.

The Commonwealth Association

In actual practice, there have been over the last 10 years or so since World War II very few international occasions when we have not been on the side of Great Britain; the centre of our Commonwealth. But the rarity of dissenting occasions stems not from our automatic acceptance of the policies of Great Britain but from the fact in the vast majority of international questions our interest and hers have happily been almost invariably identical. When that does not happen we, of course, regret it deeply and we do our best to reconcile our differences without delay and without recrimination. We experienced such regret indeed to the point of distress when we differed, not perhaps in objectives but in methods and procedures, with the United Kingdom on certain occasions at the United Nations Assembly meeting last autumn in connection with the Suez crisis. The Commonwealth was indeed deeply split on that

issue and our relief was therefore correspondingly great, a relief shared in full measure by the Asian members of the Commonwealth, where the separation pressures were most intense, when this danger to the Commonwealth was removed by the Anglo-French decision to accept the cease-fire resolution of the United Nations Assembly. So the Commonwealth association remains strong and close. The friendly, informal and frank exchange of views in a sincere effort to reach agreement on all matters of common concern goes on, and the Commonwealth continues to play its invaluable and constructive role in today's troubled world; a role for which the whole world has reason to be grateful.

Mr. Churchill: What nations of the Commonwealth would have left the Commonwealth had the British and French not abided by the resolution of the United Nations?

Mr. Pearson: There is evidence, strong evidence, which I and others have received, to suggest that if the fighting in Egypt between Anglo-French and Israeli forces and Egyptian forces had continued and if the United Nations Assembly cease-fire resolution had been repudiated or rejected, the pressures in regard to separation from the Commonwealth in certain Asian members of the Commonwealth would have been so great that it would have been indeed very difficult to resist them. We have had evidence to that effect both from New Delhi and from Karachi.

Mr. Churchill: Has that not been denied by both Ceylon and India?

Mr. Pearson: This has been questioned, I believe, in Ceylon, including the Prime Minister. Mr. Speaker, I am giving my opinion on the basis of information which I have received from the highest authorities in the Government of India. I am not suggesting, Mr. Speaker—and in my earlier statement on this I think I made it clear in the House I did not suggest—those pressures affected what we sometimes call the old members of the Commonwealth, but they certainly did affect those new members which, as I have just said, constitute four-fifths of the population of the Commonwealth.

It seems to me that this Commonwealth association, which all its members wish to preserve, to be of enduring value must strive for the widest possible areas of agreement between its members. It seems to me also that the limits of such areas, though not often expressed, may be pretty clearly discerned. Whether or not we speak of it, there are certain fundamental things that unite the governments and the peoples of the Commonwealth: freedom, personal and national; parliamentary democracy and the supremacy of the individual over the state. There is also a certain basis of morality in political action to which Commonwealth members are by tacit consent expected to adhere. Such a basis can easily be disregarded, on the other hand, by those who do not share our Commonwealth beliefs and our ways of doing things. They

have, for instance, often been and are being disregarded by the Soviet Union in Hungary; but the barbaric luxury of this type of conduct is not open to us. Indeed, it is completely foreign to us and that is one reason, perhaps a main reason, why we can and must work together in the Commonwealth. It is more important than ever for us at this time to strengthen within the Commonwealth our will to work together in defence of these principles; for very significant events are now about to occur in the Commonwealth, as significant perhaps as those which took place 10 years ago when India, Pakistan and Ceylon became members.

We often also, Mr. Speaker, speak of the Commonwealth as a bridge, as it is, between Asia and the West; and perhaps it would not be inappropriate at this moment if I expressed my own feeling of gratitude for what the Minister of National Health and Welfare (Mr. Martin), in his recent trip to Asia, has done to strengthen that bridge. If there is such a bridge, it has been made possible by the accession of India, Pakistan and Ceylon, which was in its turn the result of an act of constructive abdication by the United Kingdom to India in 1947. Now, this evolving process is about to shift to Africa. On March 6 next we shall welcome a new member into the Commonwealth, the state of Ghana, at present known as the Gold Coast. It will be the first native African member, and its progress as an independent nation inside the Commonwealth will be watched with great interest throughout Africa and Asia, and also in the West and by the Soviet Union.

Ghana will probably be the first of a series of new members to emerge from the Continents of Africa and Asia. It may be that by 1960 and 1962 the Commonwealth will include also Malaya, Nigeria, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and nearer home the Caribbean Federation.

Thus the process of what I might call creative withdrawal continues to the special credit and indeed to the glory of the heart and centre of the Commonwealth, the United Kingdom. As has been said, "The smaller the Empire the greater the Commonwealth." New nations arise from former colonial territories to take their place among the free democracies of the world. As an older member of the Commonwealth Canada is proud, I am sure, to assist in welcoming these young countries, as they attain independence, to our growing family and to assure them of our friendship and our support.

United Nations

A second factor influencing Canadian foreign policy, Mr. Speaker, is the United Nations, now going through a testing period that will have far-reaching effects on its future as an organization effective for the promotion of international peace, security and justice.

It should, I think, be clear to us that so long as we try to discharge our obligations we

have accepted under the United Nations Charter we must by that fact accept some limitation on our complete independence in international affairs. There are now 80 members in the United Nations Assembly with widely varied resources, traditions and political experience. The Assembly's decisions which are, after all, merely recommendations and not laws, although this is sometimes forgotten, necessarily involve a great deal of give and take. We cannot expect always to have our own way on matters which are decided by the wisdom, or if you like the unwisdom, of a majority of 80 sovereign states with differing interests, differing loyalties and unfortunately with different conceptions of peace and justice.

The activities of the United Nations Assembly in recent weeks in regard to the Middle East have given us some ground for hope that the organization can be used effectively and swiftly in bringing about a cessation of hostilities, though it remains to be seen whether it will be as effective in bringing about a just settlement of the issues that brought about those hostilities. That will be for the United Nations a more important and I suspect a more difficult task. We can take satisfaction over what has already been done in the Assembly, but recent developments have raised in our minds some questions regarding its future and I want to mention one or two of these.

In the first place, Mr. Speaker, we have become more aware than we were previously of the gap between responsible and irresponsible membership; between the membership of those democratic countries such as the United Kingdom and France who are loyal members of the organization and as such take heed of its recommendations and those totalitarian despots such as the Soviet Union which treat such recommendations with contempt when they cut across their own national policies.

This has led to a demand in some quarters that somehow or other the United Nations Assembly should take action to enforce effectively its own recommendations. This of course ignores the fact that such compulsory enforcement procedure through the Assembly is not in accordance with the terms of the Charter as drafted; and also that resolutions that may be passed by an irresponsible majority in the Assembly may be such that we ourselves would find great difficulty in accepting them and the enforcement of which we would in certain circumstances resist.

Mr. Diefenbaker: What does the Minister mean by irresponsible?

Mr. Pearson: Well, I mean by exercising the right of membership in an irresponsible fashion against the principles of the Charter which was accepted by all members. This leads to another question which causes some anxiety in our minds, and that is the growing tendency in the Assembly, which is of course facilitated by the one-state one-vote principle, and regardless of the powers of

state, to force through, by sheer voting strength, resolutions that are impractical and at times quite unreasonable. In reverse, there is the power of a minority of one-third plus one to prevent reasonable and useful resolutions of the majority which we may consider ourselves to be both practical, reasonable and desirable.

Therefore, Mr. Speaker, in a very real sense the effectiveness of this unique instrument for the preservation of peace, the United Nations Assembly, rests with a majority of small nations now operating at least to some extent in blocs. If the group veto or the bloc veto in the Assembly, irresponsibly exercised, replaces the single-power veto in the Security Council, the larger body will soon become as futile as on so many occasions the smaller body has become. I suggest therefore that each member of the Assembly has now a greater duty than ever before to exercise its rights with a clear and unprejudiced understanding of their implications for the future of the organization and for international peace and security. If they do it in that way they will be showing a sense of responsibility.

The need for a constructive and moderate approach to complex political and economic problems without which the General Assembly will not be able to function effectively and may not even survive can be illustrated, this is only one illustration, by the attitude taken by some members of the Assembly to what are called the colonial powers. Incidentally, those who use that term at the United Nations often exclude from its meaning the greatest colonial power of all and the one which exercises that power in the most arbitrary and tyrannical fashion, the Soviet Union. The old colonialism is disappearing inevitably and, if the process is orderly, desirably; but that is all the more reason why those countries which still have direct responsibilities for non-self-governing territories should not be made to feel at the United Nations or elsewhere that they are oppressors to be deprived arbitrarily of their rights or indeed their reputations. The actual fact is that these countries for the most part have been leading participants in the great twentieth century experiment of bringing national consciousness and self-government to peoples who have never known them before.

There is another danger, Mr. Speaker, which faces the Assembly of the United Nations, the tendency to forget that while the world organization can perform and is performing, as I see it, an indispensable role it is no substitute for the national policies of its members. It reflects those policies, it influences them, but it rarely creates them. I think it is wrong, even dangerous, to suggest that it does or to try to replace the necessity of hammering out wise and constructive policies among one's friends merely by a resort to high-sounding moral platitudes at the Assembly. As Mr. Dean Acheson put

it the other day, "Nothing more comes out of the United Nations than we put into it."

I think it is also wrong to rely on United Nations decisions only for a particular area or a particular situation. It should be remembered that if governments are to use the United Nations when they consider it in their interest to do so, and ignore it on other occasions when they find it a less convenient instrument for their purposes, the organization will be very greatly weakened indeed and will be open to the criticism of being merely an agency for power politics. I am not suggesting that these things have happened at the United Nations but I am suggesting that we should watch carefully to see that they do not happen.

Recently the Assembly took a very important step indeed in extending its functions into the field of security after the Security Council itself became powerless in that field through the exercise of the veto. I refer, of course, to the Emergency Force which was set up to supervise and secure a cessation of hostilities. Now, Mr. Speaker, the immediate value of this force which now numbers, incidentally, about 5,500 of whom over 1,100 are Canadians, in respect of the specific emergency which brought it into being has I think been well established. Its continuing value in helping to bring about and maintain peaceful conditions and security in the area in which it operates remains, of course, to be proven. I myself think it should be of a great value for this purpose also, provided it remains genuinely international in control, composition and function, and providing also that its limitations are recognized, especially that it is a voluntary organization which must act strictly within the terms of resolutions which are only morally binding and which must be passed by two-thirds of the Assembly in each case. But even within these limitations the United Nations force can, I think, play an important part in bringing about an honourable and enduring political settlement in the Palestine and Suez area.

We have been discussing the possibilities of such a settlement with friendly governments in recent weeks and it seems to be the general view among members of the United Nations that the present atmosphere, charged as it is with fears and suspicions which have been exacerbated by recent armed conflicts is not at the moment conducive to the kind of discussion and negotiation which would have to precede such a settlement. I think perhaps we have to accept that position. But if, however, the passions and the bitterness of fighting must be given time to recede, that does not, as I see it, mean we can safely sit back and let nature take its course. There may be some reason for delay; there is none for indifference or for indefinite avoidance by the United Nations of a responsibility which is inescapable: to make peace in the area, without which the ceasefire would not have any permanent value.

While the political climate of the Middle East is maturing toward the time when conditions will be more appropriate for a comprehensive settlement it is essential, I think, for the countries of the region, and indeed for us all, that there should be no return to the former state of strife and tension and conflict on the borders; that security should be maintained and, indeed, guaranteed. I suggest that for this purpose there will be a continuing need during the period until a political settlement is achieved for the stabilizing international influence that the Emergency Force is now exercising. And this essential stabilizing role might well require the continuing presence of a United Nations force along the boundary between Egypt and Israel; perhaps also for a time in the Gaza strip and, with the consent of the states involved, along the borders between Israel and her other Arab neighbours, though that of course would require a further resolution from the United Nations Assembly.

It seems to me that some such United Nations supervision might help to ensure the security of the nations concerned which is so vital if they are to approach with the necessary confidence negotiations toward a comprehensive solution of their conflicts.

Not only, Mr. Speaker, in my view, must the borders be made secure between Israel and her neighbours; so must freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal and in the Gulf of Aqaba. As the Canal will soon be open to traffic again it is, I think, very important indeed to press on with discussions which have already begun at the United Nations so that the control of the operation, maintenance and development of the Canal will be in accordance with the six principles agreed on at the Security Council last September—I think it was last September. Events since that time, far from weakening the validity of these principles, have strengthened that validity and I think it is now more important than ever that the operation of this essential international waterway be—and I quote from one of these principles—"insulated from the politics of any one nation" and that the United Nations recognize and confirm that fact.

This is a problem which is right on top of us at the United Nations Assembly now, and it must be solved satisfactorily or there will be further trouble in that area. It is obvious of course—I think it is obvious, though I wish it were not—that the Soviet Union will do its best to prevent such an agreed solution on terms satisfactory both to the users of the Canal and to Egypt. Moscow has already shown that its policy is to trouble these waters and to fish in them.

Looking further ahead, the experience of the United Nations in respect of the Suez crisis, especially the necessity for hasty improvisation, underlines, I think, the desirability and the need of some international police force on a more permanent basis. We have recognized this need in the past. We

have expressed that recognition at the United Nations and elsewhere as recently as in the General Assembly before the recess and we have done all we could to translate that necessity into reality, but for one reason or another it has never been possible for the United Nations, except in the special and limited cases of Korea and the Middle East, to have armed forces at its disposal; the reason for that I will not go into at this time.

Mr. Fulton: Is it the view of the Canadian Government that the United Nations Emergency Force should be assigned a stabilizing role in connection with the Suez Canal?

Mr. Pearson, Well, Mr. Speaker, there are possibilities for that if such a role is needed, but if there is agreement between the users of the Canal and the Government of Egypt which would in its turn provide for a satisfactory means of resolving the dispute over the use of the Canal it might not be necessary, for any outside United Nations force to be present on the Canal while that agreement is in effect. I think the best thing to do is to wait and see how these discussions work out.

This present Emergency Force in the Middle East is a unique experiment in the use of an international police agency to secure and supervise the cease-fire which has been called for by the General Assembly. Why should we not, therefore, on the basis of this experience—the experience we have gained by the operation and establishment and organization of this force—consider how a more permanent United Nations machinery of this kind might be created for use in similar situations as required?

What the United Nations now would seem to need for these limited and essentially police functions is perhaps not so much a force in being as an assurance that members would be prepared to contribute contingents when asked to do so, to have them ready and organized for that purpose; with some appropriate central United Nations machinery along the lines of that which has already been established for this present Emergency Force.

The kind of force we have in mind would be designed to meet situations calling for action, intermediate if you like, between the passing of resolutions and the fighting of a war, and which might incidentally have the effect of reducing the risks of the latter. It would not, however, as I see it, be expected to operate in an area where fighting was actually in progress; it would be preventive and restoratory rather than punitive or belligerent.

It is not possible to determine in advance what would be required in any emergency, but surely members through the proper legislative processes could take in advance the necessary decisions in principle so that should the occasion arise the executive power could quickly meet United Nations requests for assistance which had been approved by it. In doing so we would be making at least some progress in putting international action behind international words.

NATO

The third factor that has a bearing on our independence in foreign policy is NATO, our membership in which gives us, not only the assurance of a strong and collective defence if we are attacked but, even more important, is our strongest deterrent against attack. Since I last had occasion to speak on foreign affairs in the house a NATO Council meeting of very considerable importance has taken place in Paris.

The meeting took place in Paris from December 11 to December 15. Ministers from each of the NATO countries met in Paris. My colleague the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Campney) and I represented the Canadian Government at this meeting. In addition to the annual stocktaking of NATO's defence plan and the approval of a directive for future military planning, secret of course, which took into account both economic and atomic capabilities, we had what we considered to be useful discussions of the general international situation, particularly on the impact on the alliance of developments in the Middle East and Eastern Europe.

In these discussions we devoted more time than usual to political developments outside of what is described as the NATO treaty area. That merely reflected the increasing awareness of the NATO governments that the security, stability and well-being of an area like the Middle East, to quote one example, is essential to the maintenance of world peace, which in turn is the matter of primary concern to the NATO members.

A significant aspect of this recent meeting was the evident desire on the part of all members to strengthen the non-military side of NATO; as we increasingly realized that relations between the Western alliance and the Soviet have become a contest in terms of political judgment and action; of economic and industrial power, and not merely a contest in military strength. Having said that, it would be unwise not to add that it was recognized at our Council meeting that events in Hungary and the use of naked military force there by the Soviet Union—which use might have had far-reaching effects—these events have underlined the absolute necessity of maintaining also our military defensive strength as we become more and more preoccupied with the political and economic aspects of the struggle. As has been said by so many people so many times, we have to continue to do both.

It was to these problems of non-military co-operation confronting the alliance that the Committee of Three Report addressed itself. That report, which has been made public, was submitted to the Council and its recommendations were accepted by the Council members. Apart from maintaining defensive military strength the most important need of the NATO alliance in the present circumstances is for the development of common policies, as essential to that unity, which is important, as strength itself. The Committee

of Three Report recognized this, also that new institutional arrangements or organizational changes or changes in structure would not in themselves meet this need.

What is required, and this is easier to say than to bring about, is a sustained will and desire on the part of member governments to work out through consultation policies which will take into account the common interests of the members of the alliance. If that is not done and if national factors alone prevail in the formulation of policy, then the alliance will have great difficulty in surviving. Certainly it will not develop beyond a purely military arrangement which will disappear if and when the fears and emergencies of the present lessen and disappear.

The most powerful member of our NATO coalition, and as recent history has perhaps demonstrated the only one which now has the economic and military power to enable it to discharge fully truly world-wide responsibilities, is the United States. Within the last few days the Administration in Washington has proposed to Congress an increased acceptance of those responsibilities in the middle East in what is called the Eisenhower doctrine.

I do not think it would be appropriate for me to discuss in detail a proposal of the United States Government which is now before Congress and concerning which differences of opinion have already appeared, but I think I can say without impropriety that the ideas behind this doctrine are welcomed by this Government as evidence of the increased interest of the United States in the Middle East in terms of both defence and economic aid for the development of the area. It seems to me important that those two things go together there as elsewhere.

Mr. Dulles, in quoting the President's declaration to a Congressional Committee, has warned, and I think the warning is a good one, that no single formula will solve all the problems in the Middle East and that there is no single panacea for them. Nevertheless it is quite obvious I think that those proposals have very important implications which have been very well put in my view by the Washington correspondent of the Winnipeg Free Press, and I quote from one of his articles as follows:

The American Government, once Congress has given its expected approval,—

Or perhaps as I should say "if Congress gives its expected approval."

—will be committed to a solemn and unprecedented obligation in the Middle East. It will be pledged to use force if necessary to protect that region from Russia or from any state responsive to Russia's pressures.

Then Mr. Freedman went on to say this:

That is the ultimate commitment. There can be none greater. It has been defined in this challenging form to prevent Russia from believing that the eclipse of British and French influence allows it to bring the Middle East under Moscow's control.

Mr. Stewart, (Winnipeg North): Does that doctrine not suggest there is a danger of by-passing the United Nations?

Mr. Pearson: I do not think so. It has been said that the principles and the procedures envisaged in this doctrine are the same as those which prompted Anglo-French intervention in the Suez crisis last October. But I doubt whether that deduction will be borne out by the text of the Presidential declaration which contains the following points, and some of these bear on the particular point raised by my friend the hon. member for Winnipeg North: (1) any assistance against aggression would be given only at the request of the state attacked; (2) any obligation to give such assistance is restricted to overt aggression by any nation controlled by international communism; (3)—and this is of some importance—any measures taken must be consistent with the Charter of the United Nations and with any action or any recommendations of the United Nations; and I take it that would mean either positive or negative action by the United Nations.

Mr. Green: Does that mean that action is taken first and then the United Nations acts afterwards or just what does it mean?

Mr. Pearson, I think I had better stick to the wording of the declaration. You know what happened in the case of Korea, Mr. Speaker. Certain action was taken by one member of the United Nations. But within half an hour or an hour, I forget which—within a very short time—the matter was referred at once to the Security Council and this action was before Security Council for confirmation or otherwise.

Mr. Green: That is only because Russia was absenting herself.

Mr. Pearson: True, confirmation was received only because Russia absented herself from the Security Council. But we now have a procedure by which, when action is vetoed in the Security Council, the Assembly can be called together within twenty-four hours and the matter referred to the Assembly, as was done indeed last October.

The fourth point is that the measures to be taken or envisaged would be "subject to the overriding authority of the United Nations Security Council in accordance with the charter".

Then, Mr. Speaker, I think I should also point out—and this is of some importance—that the declaration does not deal with conflict between non-communist states in the Middle East nor does it deal with communist subversion brought about by non-military means.

Welcome as is this indication of the acceptance by the United States of a direct and immediate responsibility for peace and economic progress in the Middle East, even more welcome to a Canadian would be the full restoration of close and friendly relations between London, Paris and Washington in respect of that area, and the strengthening of their co-operation generally.

Perhaps we in Canada are particularly conscious of the desirability and the need of this result. For that reason I think we would all want to give particularly wholehearted support, especially at this time, to one sentence from President Eisenhower's State of the Union Message last Thursday when he said this:

America, alone and isolated, cannot assure even its own security. We must be joined by the capability and resolution of nations that have proved themselves dependable defenders of freedom. Isolation from them invites war.

I think it is hardly necessary to add in this house that no people in the world have proved themselves more "dependable defenders of freedom" than have the British.

Co-operation in the Commonwealth of Nations, in the United Nations and in NATO—all this—is important, indeed essential. But nothing is more important in the preservation of peace and the promotion of progress than is an enduring and solid friendship as the basis for co-operation and unity between the United Kingdom, France and the United States. The recent NATO Council meeting in Paris—and this may have been almost its most important achievement—began the process of restoring and strengthening that co-operation after the strains and interruptions to it brought about by the Suez crisis. It is essential that this process should continue.

We now have a great opportunity to profit from the unhappy experiences of the recent past by taking steps to ensure that those experiences will not be repeated.

Perhaps I should not close, Mr. Speaker, without at least mentioning—and there will be time only to mention it—a fourth factor which bears strongly on the formulation and execution of Canadian foreign policy. I refer to the fact that we are a neighbour of the United States on the North American Continent.

Canadian-U.S. Relations

On our relations with the United States my colleagues and I have often spoken over the last few years. I think we have made it abundantly clear that our acknowledgement of the United States as the inevitable and indispensable leader of the free world does not at all imply automatic agreement with all its policies. I have even been told by some of my friends below the line that we have a tendency to make this fact almost unnecessarily clear. On the other hand, it seems to me to be difficult to imagine a really critical situation in international affairs, one which involved final questions of war or peace, on which we should be likely to diverge very widely from the attitude of our neighbours. If we had to, for Canadian purposes, we would certainly be in a most uneasy position. For us in Canada, therefore, to formulate and try to follow foreign policies which do not take into account the closeness of all the ties which link us—and must do so—with the United States, would surely be nothing but unrealistic and unprofitable jingoism. The time when we can comfortably enjoy this particular form of national indulgence seems to me to have long since disappeared.

In our relations, then, with the Commonwealth, with the United Nations, with NATO, and with the United States, we have the fullest liberty to propose, to persuade, to advise, to object; and this liberty I can assure you, Mr. Speaker, we have used and shall use whenever a Canadian interest requires it. We will not, however, be using this freedom for the benefit of our country if we try to secede or weaken from our international commitments or if we try to ignore or take away from the geographic and economic facts of life on this continent. Membership in the international associations to which we belong undoubtedly brings us nationally very great advantages in terms of security and progress. The national advantages are, however, coupled with international responsibilities. I think, Mr. Speaker, that Canada's record in the discharge of those responsibilities over the years has been a good one and I am sure it will continue to be so.

Statement by Prime Minister

Speaking in the House of Commons on January 9, Prime Minister St. Laurent reported to the Members of Parliament on his recent conversations on international affairs with President Eisenhower, of the United States, and Prime Minister Nehru, of India. Excerpts from the Prime Minister's remarks follow:

... I was very happy to have this confidential chat with the President which occurred on the eve of Mr. Nehru's visit. I said to the President quite frankly that I believed he and Mr. Nehru at the present time were probably . . . the two most influential statesmen in the world, the two statesmen whose influence radiated the most widely in the free world at this time. I said, "Of course, I am not saying anything about China be-

cause I have never been behind the bamboo curtain and I do not know Mr. Chou En-lai, but I do know, or at least I think I know from my own personal observation, that Mr. Nehru is a statesman of whom, whether or not they will admit it openly, all Asians are proud. They are proud of his stature in the world at this time, and his attitudes, even for those who will not state that they fully agree with them, are attitudes which have an influence on their thinking." I believe the same is true of the President of the United States. The personal attitudes of the President of the United States are attitudes that radiate throughout the free world, and whether or not we always agree with all of them our thinking is always influenced to a degree by the attitudes which are thus adopted by him.

I asserted with conviction that Mr. Nehru was just as anti-communist as Mr. Eisenhower was, although in India there was not the same fear of dangers imminent from communism that Senator McCarthy had in the United States; that there might not always be the same approaches to the proper methods of counteracting what influences might be exercised by communism; but that it should not be forgotten that the background of the United States or the North American Continent was not the only background against which we should set up and appraise the attitudes of other people throughout the world outside of the North American Continent.

I think this is something that we all have had to learn. Human nature and the essential aspirations of human nature are very much the same all over the world, but the background against which you have to place the attitudes of different people must be the background of their own civilization, of their own tradition and ancestral habits and ways of thinking and of acting. I am quite happy to report to the House that I got the very distinct impression, when Mr. Nehru visited us after his visit to the United States, that he was very much better satisfied with his last visit than he had been with the visit he made in 1949.

The hon. member [Mr. Diefenbaker] speaks of a conference of France, the United States and the United Kingdom. It would be important and it is important that their actions be conducive to the same general results for the benefits of free people all over the world as they have to such a great degree in the past years and perhaps even in the past century. But there are other peoples in the world, and if we want to have peace in the world there must not be strife, there must not be misgivings, and there must not be mistrust or suspicion among the leaders of any of the other nations.

We have to try to behave in such a way that we will not be looked upon with suspicion and misgiving. Many hon. gentlemen saw and heard Mr. Nehru being interviewed by Mr. McInnes on the Sunday afternoon preceding his departure from Ottawa. I had the privilege of seeing him almost immediately afterward at the reception at the home of the High Commissioner for India and I complimented him and told him that I hoped a lot of people in the United States enjoyed seeing him on the screen and of having the opportunity of appreciating his discussion with Mr. McInnes.

I told him that I must remind him that he had reminded me that the terrestrial globe might look different to one sitting on the north pole than it would to someone sitting at the equator. I told him that I had accepted that as a reason for his, and his people's, approaching some problems somewhat differently from our own people. I said that the aspect of the international situation at the present time might appear somewhat different to us in Ottawa and to Mr. Eisenhower and his colleagues in Washington than it would to Mr. Nehru and his colleagues in New Delhi.

I said that there did not seem to be any suggestion that India was going to be the ultimate target of any aggression which might be undertaken, but that so long as there were these terrible agents of destruction at the disposal of us in the free world and of those behind the iron curtain we had to be sure that those behind the iron curtain who might be—I do not think they are apt to be for a very long period—actual aggressors should be convinced that if there was aggression there would be inevitable retaliation which would do to the aggressor at least as much damage as they might do to the nation attacked.

If there was to be that kind of aggression it did not seem improbable that the ultimate target would be the United States and that the way to the United States would be on a path which led through Canada and that we intended to have that path in such condition that it could not be used for aggression without serious damage to those using it and that if it was used, no matter how rapid or how unexpected the aggression was, there would still be inevitable retaliation which would do as great damage to the aggressor as he might have caused.

We agreed that the likelihood of going to war with these terrible implements of destruction was not great, but that there was still a possibility. Because of that possibility we felt that the free nations must remain in such a position that possible aggressors would realize that retaliation would be inevitable and the result would unfortunately be a great degree of mutual destruction.

Mr. Nehru had suggested that military alliances appeared to him to be adding to the international tension because they appeared to denote a warlike attitude. I told him that unfortunately for us we were in such a position that we had to maintain military alliances as long as there was any possibility of aggression with the use of these new weapons because we ourselves did not have them. In our military alliances the tasks had been distributed and we could count, and possible aggressors knew this, upon the fact that these weapons were at the disposition of the United States.

I was saying all this to him, not to criticize his attitude but to ask him to feel that we also could rationalize our conduct, that we had what appeared to us to be very good reasons for maintaining these alliances and not adopting the view taken by him that there might be less international tension. We felt that the tension which existed was necessary as a deterrent against the use of any of these terrible instruments.

Canada's Contributions to United Nations

EACH member of the United Nations (and at the present time 80 states belong to it) is required to pay an annual membership fee, usually called an assessment, which represents the country's share of the normal administrative expenditures of the Organization. Last year Canada's share was \$1.6 million, representing 3.63 per cent of the United Nations administrative budget of approximately \$48.6 million.

Canada also pays an annual fee for membership in each of the ten United Nations Specialized Agencies, which are the chief instruments through which members of the United Nations pool their efforts and resources to help achieve higher standards of living, full employment and conditions of economic and social progress throughout the world. In 1956 the total of Canada's assessments for membership in these Agencies was about \$1.4 million.⁽¹⁾

In addition to the assessments for the regular budgets of the United Nations and its Specialized Agencies, member states have been requested each year to contribute to special programmes of assistance designed to overcome certain acute problems and serious deficiencies which exist in various materially under-developed areas of the world. As money for these special programmes is not available through the regular budgets of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies, it has to come from "extra budgetary funds", i.e. those obtained from voluntary contributions made by member states. At the present time the United Nations is sponsoring four of these special programmes—the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), the United Nations Refugee Fund (UNREF) and the United Nations Expanded Technical Assistance Programme (ETAP).

As is understandable, political and security questions before the United Nations are widely publicized in newspapers, magazines, over the radio and on television. Not much public attention is given, however, to the quiet, valuable and constructive work of the Specialized Agencies and that done under the four special programmes, which continues steadily with little fanfare and few newspaper headlines. Through these agencies and programmes the member countries of the United Nations endeavour to conquer the timeless enemies of mankind—hunger, malnutrition, illiteracy and illness—and thus to raise the world's living standards and, perhaps, contribute indirectly to political stability. In this aspect of United Nations work there has never been much assistance or co-operation from the communist countries.

A short description of the four special programmes for which the United Nations solicits voluntary contributions is given below, together with a statement of Canadian contributions to these programmes.

UNICEF

The United Nations Children's Fund was created by the General Assembly in December 1946 to conduct emergency relief activities for the special benefit of children and adolescents of countries which were the

⁽¹⁾ These figures do not include Canada's contributions to the capital of two of the Specialized Agencies, the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

victims of aggression, for children and adolescents in countries which had been receiving relief from the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, and for child health purposes generally. In 1953 the General Assembly decided to continue the Fund for an indefinite period. The emphasis in its operations has in consequence shifted to long-range projects such as the building up of children's health and welfare services, child feeding, and related undertakings. The Fund is at present conducting operations in 95 countries and territories, mainly in under-developed countries in Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America. Last year there were 283 UNICEF-aided projects, a large proportion of which were concerned with the eradication of malaria, the control of yaws and tuberculosis, and similar basic health programmes.

Since its establishment, contributions have been given to UNICEF on a voluntary basis by governments and individuals in 118 countries and territories (countries receiving aid are required to equal or better the funds allocated to them). As of December 31, 1955 the total contributions and pledges had amounted to about \$185,000,000, of which \$170,000,000 constituted governmental contributions. The annual budget has been continually expanding and UNICEF officials hope to raise a sum in the neighbourhood of \$20,000,000 for operations during 1957.

Canada has contributed substantially to UNICEF since its inception, its initial contribution, made in 1947, being \$5,200,000. The total donated to the Fund by the Canadian Government will have reached \$10,675,000 by the end of 1957; this amount includes the \$650,000 pledged, subject to Parliamentary approval, for 1957. In addition to these governmental contributions there have been private contributions resulting from organized campaigns in Canada and totalling about \$1,500,000.

UNRWA

The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East was established by the General Assembly in December 1949 to provide for the relief and resettlement of about 950,000 refugees left homeless by the hostilities in Palestine in 1948. The Agency was charged with the task of co-operating with local governments in direct relief and works programmes in the Middle East, and of consulting with those governments on measures to be taken until such time as international assistance for relief and works programmes would no longer be available or until such time as the refugees would be able to exercise the choice between repatriation and compensation offered to them by resolutions of the General Assembly.

Political considerations have impeded the various plans for solving the Palestine refugee problem. In particular, the refugees have been reluctant to take any action leading to resettlement in countries in the area other than Israel since they feel this might prejudice their position with regard to repatriation or compensation. A programme of temporary employment which was first proposed proved unworkable, and a plan for reintegration, which was intended to resettle the bulk of the refugees by the end of 1955, proved unacceptable to the refugees. At present, the implementation of two major resettlement projects which would place about 200,000 refugees on land made cultivable by irrigation in the Yarmuk-Jordan Valley and Western Sinai is held up by political difficulties. It is clear that the Palestine refugees will continue to be an international charge until such time as there is a settlement of the major differences between Israel and the Arab States.

Up to June 30, 1956 expenditures by UNRWA and its predecessor, United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees (established in December

1948), totalled about \$218 million. By far the larger part of this sum has been spent on direct relief, even though the cost of maintaining the refugees at a subsistence level is only about \$27 *per capita* per year. Canada has been the fourth largest contributor to the Agency, following the United States, the United Kingdom and France. Recently Canadian pledges have been in the neighbourhood of \$500,000 annually, and approval by Parliament of a contribution of \$750,000 for the 18-month period ending December 31, 1957 will bring the total amount contributed by Canada for the period 1948-57 well over the \$5 million mark.

UNREF

A refugee is defined by the United Nations as a person who has left the country of his normal residence because of fear of persecution. At the end of the Second World War the number of refugees in Europe was close to 2.2 million people. By the beginning of October 1956 this number had been reduced either by emigration, re-establishment in the country of present asylum, or voluntary return to original homes, to about 300,000 persons. Most of these 300,000 European refugees were in Austria, Germany, Greece and Italy. Those still living in refugee camps numbered 70,000, and included many aged, sick or physically handicapped persons who are known as "hard core" refugees.

Canada has aided United Nations refugee work since 1947. Immediately after the Second World War this work was carried on by the International Refugee Organization (IRO) and between the years 1947 and 1951 Canada contributed approximately \$19 million to that Agency and to the interim agencies which assumed some of IRO's work in 1951 and 1952. IRO was terminated in 1952 when the refugee problem in Europe had become more manageable and the great post-war urgency had passed. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, whose office had been established in 1950, then took over IRO's task of settling and assisting refugees, and was charged with the administration of the United Nations Refugee Fund. Canada continued to support the Fund, contributing a total of \$450,000 to it during the period 1952-1956. Subject to the approval of Parliament, Canada will, in addition, contribute \$200,000 to the regular 1957 budget of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, who is endeavouring over a four-year period (1955-58) to find some permanent solution for this tragic and pitiable European refugee problem.

During recent weeks the work of the High Commissioner for Refugees has been vastly increased by the great influx to Austria of refugees from Hungary. To meet this great emergency the Canadian Parliament at its special session in November made a special contribution of \$1 million to Hungarian relief, of which \$250,000 has been allotted to UNREF.

ETAP

The United Nations and the Specialized Agencies all have technical assistance programmes financed out of these regular budgets. In 1950 the General Assembly set up the Expanded Technical Assistance Programme to be supervised by the Technical Assistance Committee of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and administered by the Technical Assistance Board. Since its inception ETAP has been financed by voluntary contributions from countries willing to assist in a very real and active way the economically less-developed countries of the world. Canada's gifts to ETAP, which complement Canadian contributions to the Colombo Plan, provide a continuing expression of Canada's willingness to co-operate internationally to try to raise standards of living and improve economic conditions in the less-fortunate areas of the world.

During the years 1950-56, Canada has given a total of \$7.2 million to ETAP. In 1957 Canada will contribute, subject to the approval of Parliament, an additional \$2 million, representing an increase of more than 10 per cent over the amount given in 1957. To enable the Technical Assistance Board to plan ahead with some surety of continued support, and in order to help the recipient countries to co-ordinate their development programmes, Canada and a number of other states have furthermore stated their intention to contribute, subject to the approval of their legislatures, to the Expanded Programmes for the years 1958 and 1959 amounts of a similar magnitude to those contributed by them in 1956. Canada's contribution to ETAP is now the third largest, ranking after those of the United States and the United Kingdom; on a *per capita* basis Canada is the highest contributor. The \$2 million pledged for 1957 represents an annual gift of 13.2 cents by each person living in Canada. Other countries giving more than 9 cents for each of their inhabitants are Denmark (13 cents), Norway (11.2 cents), Sweden (9.16 cents) and the United States (9.5 cents).

It may be of interest to examine how ETAP will use the \$31 million which has been pledged by 71 states for the Expanded Programme in 1957. The Economic and Social Council has approved the allocation of the bulk of this \$31 million to five agencies as follows: (1) approximately \$5.5 million will go to the World Health Organization (WHO) to help that Specialized Agency to accelerate its work of training health workers, to provide more demonstration clinics, and generally to speed up its programme aimed at improving standards of health; (2) about \$5 million will go to another Specialized Agency, UNESCO, to help it improve the level of elementary education in under-developed areas, to improve cultural contacts between nations, and to promote research in basic scientific problems; (3) another Specialized Agency, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), which is concerned with increasing the productivity of the land, forests and fisheries as well as improving their products, will receive the largest amount of all, over \$8¼ million; (4) the International Labour Organization (ILO) will be allotted \$3½ million to assist it in carrying on its effective and valuable programme of improving work skills and in increasing the productivity of labour; (5) and finally, the United Nations Technical Assistance Administration (UNTAA), which has as its Director-General a Canadian, Dr. H. L. Keenleyside, will receive \$6½ million. UNTAA provides advanced training in public administration, in welfare services, and in various scientific pursuits for many scholars and fellows from the less technically developed areas of the world.

Over the years Canadian spokesmen have repeatedly stressed the desirability of using United Nations machinery for providing or supervising technical assistance to the less-developed areas. Canada is gratified that ETAP, by contributing to the sum of technical knowledge and the dissemination of that knowledge, is bringing about some improvement in the standard of living of people who can benefit from such assistance and will thus be in a position to increase their own contribution to the international community. ETAP also helps to promote mutual understanding and goodwill among all the 71 countries which actively take part in this world-wide programme of service.

To sum up, in 1956 Canada paid \$3,000,000 in membership fees or assessments to the United Nations and to the United Nations Specialized Agencies. Last year Canada also gave voluntarily to the four special United Nations programmes an additional sum of more than \$3 million. Thus Canada's total contributions for United Nations work in 1956 amounted to more than \$6 million.

Economic Review, 1956

THE following are excerpts from the year-end review of Canada's economy by Mr. C. D. Howe, Minister of Trade and Commerce and Minister of Defence Production.

The economic upswing of 1955 has continued with sustained vigour throughout the current year. The result has been a period of accomplishment in many ways without equal in Canadian history. In the brief space of two years, overall physical output has risen by about one-sixth. This is the equivalent in dollar terms of roughly six Canadian wheat crops or one-third the output of the entire North American automobile industry.

More fundamental even than the rise in output has been the tremendous strides toward further development of Canada's resources and widespread additions to productive capacities generally. Industries based on the newly developed resources of oil, natural gas, iron ore and uranium have continued their meteoric advance, and now hold positions of ever-increasing prominence in both national and continental markets. Production of these key materials within our own borders adds tremendously to Canada's industrial stature and to the solidity of the economy. Yet, outlays in these fields, though large, constitute but a minor part of the overall volume of resources directed toward expansion of capital facilities. Capital expansion in 1956 has been proceeding, not only on a broader scale, but is actually increasing at a more rapid rate than at any previous time in the post-war period. Opportunities for new investment in Canada have become increasingly attractive, not only to Canadians but to business interests the world over. Industrial growth has, therefore, been facilitated by a record inflow of capital in the form of both direct investment in specific undertakings and security purchases, attracted by prospective yields in the Canadian market. This external participation in Canada's development has been a key factor in sparking the currently high rate of expansion. At the same time the accompanying capital inflow has provided the means to pay for the tremendous upsurge in imports needed to service this expansion.

With the aid of this influx of resources from abroad, the substantial step-up in capital outlays has been achieved alongside a continuing rise in exports and a further improvement in the living standards of Canadians. Moreover, in the face of a generally strong demand situation, increased imports and a strong Canadian dollar have helped to counteract upward pressure on prices. Although the consumer price index has been rising for some months, the rate of increase has been moderate and of about the same magnitude as that occurring in the United States. In short, increased foreign participation in Canada's development has made possible a rate of growth which, to achieve otherwise, would have involved substantially more dislocation in our business life and extensive sacrifices on the part of Canadian consumers . . .

Foreign Trade

Canada's unparalleled expansion of the past year has been taking place against a background of sustained prosperity in other parts of the Western World and expanding international trade. Production levels in

the United States and in Western Europe rose less rapidly in 1956 than in the preceding year, but international trade in these areas and elsewhere moved steadily upward. In these circumstances external markets for Canada's goods have continued to grow.

On the basis of ten month figures, it now appears that merchandise exports will approximate \$4.85 billion for the full year, 12 per cent higher than in 1955. Larger shipments of wheat account for more than one-third of this increase. Wheat shipments this year are the highest since the banner sales of 1952, despite difficulties arising from the United States surplus disposal program. Crude petroleum exports now exceed \$100 million annually, a four-fold increase from the preceding year, and foreign sales of iron ore have risen from \$100 million to approximately \$160 million. Other items which have contributed significantly to the increase in total sales include newsprint, copper, chemicals and aircraft. Lumber has been the only major export commodity to show a significant decline.

Merchandise imports have increased from \$4.7 billion in 1955 to approximately \$5.8 billion in 1956, nearly twice as much as exports. This heavy influx of goods from abroad reflects the tremendous upsurge in demand, particularly for expansion purposes. Accordingly, most of the increase in imports has consisted of machinery and equipment, steel and other industrial materials needed for the production of capital goods. Imports of consumer items have risen also but on a more moderate scale. By and large the increase in imports has not prevented an expansion in the business handled by domestic producers. A major portion of the increase in shipments from abroad has consisted of items not made in Canada or of requirements in excess of the productive capacities of domestic industries. In those lines most subject to foreign competition, such as textiles, electric appliances and industrial machinery, shipments from Canadian factories have, in most cases, kept pace with the upward trend of imports.

As regards the geographic pattern of Canada's foreign trade in 1956, sales to and purchases from the United States have both increased roughly in proportion with the change in overall exports and imports. In the United Kingdom, the measures designed to restrain excessive internal demands have had the intended effect of holding down imports, and Canada's sales to that country have remained at about the level of the previous year. On the other hand sales of British goods in Canada have risen by more than one-fifth, thus providing a significant measure of support to the foreign balance position of the United Kingdom. Elsewhere in the Commonwealth, intensified import controls in Australia and New Zealand have reduced Canada's exports in these markets. A notable development in Canada's trade with other overseas countries has been the substantial increase in sales to and purchases from Germany and Japan. Canada retains a large favourable balance with each of these countries. Canada's trade with Iron Curtain countries has, for the first time, assumed significant proportions with the sale in 1956 of nearly 40 million bushels of wheat in this area.

Balance of Payments

The sharper increase in imports than in exports has resulted in a much greater imbalance in Canada's commodity trade. In addition, higher costs for shipping, travel and various other items have added to the non-merchandise deficit. Canada's deficit on all current transactions for the first three-quarters of 1956 rose to an annual rate of more than \$1¼ billion. This is more than one-fifth of total current receipts. This current deficit has been met by an inflow of capital funds of about the same magnitude, while there has been little change in official holdings of gold and U.S. dollar

reserves. The capital inflow in the latter half of the year has in fact tended to exceed the deficit on current account causing a firming in the external value of the Canadian dollar which toward the end of the year has been selling at a premium of close to 4 per cent on the U.S. dollar.

The imbalance in Canada's current external account is directly attributable to the stepped-up pace of industrial expansion. This growth is being achieved through increased reliance on financial and physical resources from abroad. The inflow of capital funds on the one hand and larger imports on the other provide the means whereby this foreign participation in Canada's growth is brought about.

Notwithstanding the size of the current deficit, the underlying soundness of Canada's external financial position is evidenced by the high cost to non-residents of Canadian dollars for investment in Canada. This position is further re-inforced by the current expansion in export industries and in other capacity which will provide domestic sources for goods now imported. . .

The Year Ahead

The Middle East crisis and other recent international events have introduced new elements of uncertainty into the world trade situation, the effects of which are not now discernible. Apart from these influences, the pressure of world demand on Canada's principal export materials is not presently as strong as a year ago. Nevertheless foreign markets for these commodities, with one or two exceptions, remain reasonably firm. In addition, expanded capacity in export industries will increase the volume of supplies available. The diversion of large quantities of Western Hemisphere oil to Europe will entail a further substantial rise in Canada's exports of petroleum, although distribution facilities will limit the extent of this movement. In addition much larger quantities of uranium concentrates will be moving into export channels during the coming year. More moderate increases will probably be realized in sales of a number of other commodities. Given sustained prosperity in the United States, total exports will continue at a high level.

Free Trade Area in Western Europe

PRIME MINISTER LOUIS S. ST-LAURENT issued in November the following statement on behalf of the Government in connection with the suggestion that the United Kingdom might join a free trade area embracing most of Western Europe:

The Canadian Government has been informed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the President of the Board of Trade of the proposal under consideration by the Government of the United Kingdom which would involve the United Kingdom entering a Free Trade Area in Western Europe along with France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, Germany and Italy (who are considering the establishment of a full Customs Union among the six of them), and other countries of Western Europe. The entry by the United Kingdom into such a free trade arrangement with European countries would entail the removal by defined stages of its customs duties on the products of such countries in return for reciprocal action on their part toward United Kingdom products. The United Kingdom proposes that this arrangement would not apply to foodstuffs, feeds, beverages or tobacco. In that event such advantages as are now accorded by the United Kingdom to imports of these types of products from other Commonwealth countries would not be affected.

Even with the exclusion of such products, the changes in United Kingdom and European trading relations involved in the carrying out of these proposals would present a number of problems for Canadian trade with the countries concerned. The various possible effects upon Canada's trade and upon our existing trade arrangements will require detailed study by the Government and thorough discussions with the other Governments concerned.

It will be important that the carrying out of these proposals proceed according to a definite programme and on a firm time-table and be accompanied by appropriate internal economic policies. The proposed new arrangement will have its most beneficial effects if it is brought into being with a minimum of discrimination against the trade of other countries and if the expansion of mutually advantageous trading relations with other countries is encouraged.

If the proposals are carried through with determination, and at the same time the countries concerned proceed forthrightly with the removal of other trade barriers between themselves, and also against other countries as they are already pledged to do, it should be possible to surmount any difficulties which may be created and to increase the flow of trade, and maintain the ties, between this large European area and the rest of the world. On the other hand, a partial development that resulted only in the creation of a new system of intra-European tariff preferences would interfere with trade between Europe and other countries, including Canada, without achieving the positive results which are expected from a full implementing of the plan. Similarly, it would be a matter of concern to us if the pursuit of this European objective, worthy as it is, were to result in an increase in tariffs against non-European countries or in less effort or willingness to reduce the other barriers to the development of competitive multilateral trade, which is the over-riding objective of the Canadian Government and of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

Should the proposals be adopted and successfully carried through by Britain and nations of Western Europe they should increase the economic

strength and prosperity of the peoples of that whole great area and also their sense of solidarity and common purpose even beyond the economic field. Such a result could not fail to be welcomed by Canadians whose security, and cultural and political heritage, as well as economic welfare, have been, and are, so closely linked with that part of the world.



VISIT RECORDED

His Excellency Katay D. Sasorith, right, Deputy Prime Minister of Laos, is seen after signing the Speaker's Book in the Senate during his visit to Ottawa last month. Mr. Keo Viphakone, Counsellor of the Laotian Embassy in Washington, is shown signing the book. With the distinguished visitors is Mr. Paul Bridle, former Commissioner, Canadian Delegation, International Supervisory Commission, Laos.

APPOINTMENTS, TRANSFERS AND RETIREMENTS IN THE CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

- Mr. M. N. J. Gauvreau posted from the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, New Delhi, to Ottawa, effective December 4, 1956.
- Mr. M. H. Wershof appointed Permanent Representative of Canada to the European Office of the United Nations, Geneva. Proceeded to Geneva effective December 5, 1956.
- Mr. J. Fast appointed to the Department of External Affairs as External Affairs Officer 2, effective December 12, 1956.
- Mr. A. E. L. Cannon posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Delegation to the International Supervisory Commissions, Indochina, effective December 14, 1956.
- Mr. H. B. Singleton posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Delegation to the International Supervisory Commissions, Indochina, effective December 16, 1956.
- Mr. J. C. Langley posted from the Canadian Delegation to the International Supervisory Commissions, Indochina, to Ottawa, effective December 19, 1956.
- Mr. H. G. Norman, CMG, Consul General in New York, retired from the Canadian Diplomatic Service, effective December 23, 1956.
- Mr. A. E. Ritchie posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Washington, effective December 30, 1956.
- Mr. M. Gauvin, DSO, posted from the Canadian Delegation to the International Supervisory Commissions, Indochina, to Ottawa, effective November 30, 1956.
- Miss B. M. Meagher posted from the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, London, to Ottawa, effective November 30, 1956.

TREATY INFORMATION Current Action

Bilateral

Federal Republic of Germany

Exchange of Notes respecting the contract for the purchase of F-86 Aircraft, and the training of German aircrew in Canada.

Signed at Bonn September 17 and December 18, 1956.
Entered into Force December 18, 1956.

United States of America

Exchange of Notes concerning proposed navigation improvements to be undertaken in the Detroit River section of the Great Lakes connecting channels.

Signed at Ottawa July 23 and October 26, 1956.
Entered into force October 26, 1956.

Protocol to the Convention for the Protection, Preservation, and Extension of the Sockeye Salmon Fisheries in the Fraser River System signed at Washington on the 26th day of May 1930.

Signed at Ottawa December 28, 1956.

Multilateral

Agreement on the joint financing of certain air navigation services in Iceland.
Signed at Montreal November 28, 1956.

Agreement on the joint financing of certain air navigation services in Greenland and the Faroe Islands.
Signed at Montreal November 28, 1956.

Protocol amending the International Convention for the regulation of whaling signed at Washington on the 2nd day of December 1946.
Signed at Washington November 30, 1956.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



CANADA

February 1957

Vol. 9 No. 2

• EXTERNAL AFFAIRS is issued monthly in English and French by the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa. It provides reference material on Canada's external relations and reports on the current work and activities of the Department. Any material in this publication may be reproduced. Citation of EXTERNAL AFFAIRS as the source would be appreciated. Subscription rates: ONE DOLLAR per year (Students, FIFTY CENTS) post free. Remittances, payable to the Receiver General of Canada, should be sent to the Queen's Printer, Ottawa, Canada.

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Department of External Affairs
Ottawa, Canada

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Canada and the United Nations

THE General Assembly, reconvened in New York on January 2, devoted much of its time during the month to the consideration of the Middle East and Hungarian questions.

With respect to Hungary, the Assembly adopted on January 10, by a vote of 59 in favour (including Canada) and 8 against, with 10 abstentions, a resolution, sponsored by 24 nations, which provided for the creation of a special five-member committee "to investigate and to establish and maintain direct observation in Hungary and elsewhere, taking testimony, collecting evidence and receiving information, as appropriate, in order to report its findings to the General Assembly." The special committee, which is comprised of representatives of Australia, Ceylon, Denmark, Tunisia and Uruguay, was asked to report during the present session of the Assembly. (1)


Middle East Crisis



When the General Assembly adjourned for the Christmas recess on December 21, its deliberations on the Middle East crisis had reached the end of a phase. The UNEF was established at the northern end of the Suez Canal in the area once occupied by Anglo-French forces and was taking over positions in the Sinai Desert from the withdrawing Israeli forces. The Assembly had agreed that in financing UNEF, the first \$10,000,000 should be apportioned among the member states in accordance with the scale of assessments for the 1957 United Nations budget, and that the question of apportioning expenses beyond the first \$10,000,000 should be referred to a nine-nation committee. The Secretary-General, Mr. Hammarskjöld, had proceeded with arrangements for clearing the Canal under the authority given him by the Assembly in its resolution of November 26.

On December 25, the Secretary-General addressed a request to all member states that their governments consider advancing funds to provide the immediate cash needs of the Suez Canal clearance operation.

On January 15, the Secretary-General submitted to the General Assembly a report on the compliance with Assembly resolutions of November 2, 4, 7, and 24 calling for the withdrawal of troops. The withdrawal of Anglo-French forces had been completed, he said, on December 22. The withdrawal of Israeli troops had proceeded by phases. By January 22 the Sinai Desert would be evacuated entirely by Israeli troops with the exception of the Sharm al-Shaikh area, a strip on the western coast of the Gulf of Aqaba ensuring freedom of navigation through the Straits of Tiran and in the Gulf. The attitude of the Israeli Government on the evacuation of the Gaza strip had not been made known to the Secretary-General. The promised degree of withdrawal, however, would enable UNEF to take up positions on the armistice demarcation line from the southern tip of Israel to within a few miles of the Mediterranean coast, where the Gaza strip begins.

(1) See "External Affairs" for January 1957.



- xxxxxxx Armistice line and its continuation along international frontier between Egypt and former mandated territory of Palestine.
-  El Auja demilitarized zone.
- oooooo Line south of which only defensive forces might be maintained by Israel under the armistice agreement.
- - - - - Road east of which only defensive forces might be maintained by Egypt under the armistice agreement.
-  Gaza strip.
- Roads

In the closing paragraphs of his report, which are quoted in full below, the Secretary-General examined points in the General Assembly's resolutions on withdrawal which would still require attention after January 22. These were (a) the requirement that Israel should withdraw from the Gaza strip; (b) the usefulness of having both parties reaffirm their undertakings not only to desist from raids across the armistice demarcation lines but also to take active steps to prevent incursions; (c) the need for greater support by the parties for the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization and the advantages of liaison between that body and UNEF when the latter reached the armistice line; (d) the question of Israel's withdrawal from Sharm al-Shaikh and the right of innocent passage for ships in the Gulf of Aqaba, and (e) the priority which must be given to withdrawal as the first essential phase in developing peaceful conditions. What the Secretary-General said was as follows:

In consequence of the intended withdrawal announced in the latest communication to the Secretary-General from the Government of Israel on 14 January, 1957, "the United Nations Emergency Force on 22 January will reach the armistice demarcation line wherever it follows the north-eastern boundary of the 'Sinai Desert'. At that stage the last two points in operative paragraph 2 of the resolution of 2 November will assume added importance.

One of these points is the request for full observance of the provisions of the armistice agreements. This request makes it clear that the withdrawal of Israel forces must be behind the armistice line as it has been established in the Egypt-Israel agreement. In this context it is to be noted, therefore, that the Israel communication is silent about withdrawal from the Gaza strip which, according to this armistice agreement, falls on the Egyptian side of the armistice demarcation line. Further discussions with the representatives of Israel are required on this point.

The other point which is mentioned together with the request for withdrawal refers to raids across the armistice demarcation lines into neighbouring territory. Such raids are prohibited also in the armistice agreements. The call for general observance of these agreements reinforces the specific request to the parties to desist from raids. The cease-fire assurances given to the Secretary-General by the parties in April and May, 1956 lent further legal solemnity to the relevant articles in the armistice agreements.

The Truce Supervision Organization established under the armistice agreements, as one of its main duties, assists in the prevention of incursions and raids. It is in accord with the call for scrupulous observance of the armistice agreements for the parties to take all appropriate measures to give UNTSO the support necessary to render it fully effective. It is a primary duty of the United Nations Emergency Force to supervise and enforce the cease-fire to which the parties committed themselves in response to the request of the General Assembly in the resolution of November 2. Appropriate liaison should be established between these two United Nations auxiliary organizations. Further consideration may have to be given to the question of the extent to which the Force might assume responsibilities so far carried by the Truce Supervision Organization.

The Secretary-General considers that, in view of the serious developments which have taken place, it would assist the two United Nations organs and facilitate compliance with this specific point in the resolution of 2 November, if the parties were formally to reconfirm their undertakings to desist from raids and to take active steps to prevent incursions. When

full implementation of the request for withdrawal of forces behind the armistice line is ensured, such reaffirmations should, therefore, in the Secretary-General's view, be solicited from all the parties.

The communication of 14 January from the Government of Israel, in making an exception for the Sharm al-Shaikh area as 'the strip on the western coast of the Gulf of Aqaba which at present ensures freedom of navigation in the Straits of Tiran and in the Gulf', indicates that the evacuation of the strip is anticipated, although further conversations with the Secretary-General are suggested in connexion with this evacuation. The area referred to and the islands opposite Sharm al-Shaikh are Egyptian territory, or territory under Egyptian jurisdiction on the basis of an agreement with Saudi Arabia. Under the terms of the General Assembly resolution, the forces should be withdrawn from these territories. The Israel declaration of 8 November stated that Israel would be willing to 'withdraw' its forces from Egypt." (A/3320).

The international significance of the Gulf of Aqaba may be considered to justify the right of innocent passage through the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf in accordance with recognized rules of international law. The Secretary-General has not considered that a discussion of the various aspects of this matter, and its possible relation to the action requested in the General Assembly resolutions on the Middle East crisis, falls within the mandate established for him in the resolution of 4 November.

Like the cease-fire, withdrawal is a preliminary and essential phase in a development through which a stable basis may be laid for peaceful conditions in the area. When the General Assembly, in its various resolutions concerning the recent crisis in the Middle East, gave high priority to the cease-fire and the withdrawal, the position of the Assembly reflected both basic principles of the Charter and essential political considerations.

The Assembly, in taking this position, in no way disregarded all the other aims which must be achieved in order to create more satisfactory conditions than those prevailing during the period preceding the crisis. Some of these aims were mentioned by the Assembly. Others are to be found in previous decisions of the United Nations. All of them call for urgent attention. The basic function of the United Nations Emergency Force, 'to help maintain quiet', gives the Force great value as a background for efforts toward resolving such pending problems, although it is not in itself a means to that end.

It is essential that, through prompt conclusion of the first phases of implementation of the General Assembly resolutions, Member Governments should now be enabled to turn to the constructive tasks to which the establishment and the maintenance of the cease-fire, a full withdrawal of forces behind the armistice lines, a desisting from raids and scrupulous observance of the armistice agreements, should open the way."

Resolution Adopted

The General Assembly took up the discussion of this report on January 17. Twenty-five Asian-African delegations introduced a draft resolution, the operative portion of which noted "with regret and concern" the failure of Israel to comply with the terms of previous Assembly resolutions on withdrawal, and requested the Secretary-General "to continue his efforts for securing the complete withdrawal" of Israeli troops. It also asked him to "report on such compliance" to the General Assembly within five days. As

the debate on this draft resolution continued on January 18, the Chairman of the Canadian Delegation, Mr. L. B. Pearson, made a statement in which he said in part:

Our delegation shares the regret expressed by other Members of the Assembly that a situation has arisen in which compliance with the earlier resolutions on withdrawal has not yet been completed. But we would also regret and be concerned about a withdrawal merely to the old state of affairs. And we recall at this time that the earlier resolutions, in accordance with the terms of which Israel forces are to withdraw, dealt with matters other than territorial withdrawal, but matters which are related to this essential step. Therefore, I hope that the Secretary-General, in his efforts—which we support—to bring about compliance regarding withdrawal will in the further report which he is to make to us give consideration to ways and means of securing and stabilizing through United Nations action the situation after withdrawal has taken place and pending that political settlement which alone can establish real and lasting peace and security in the area.

The twenty-five power resolution came to a vote on January 19 and was adopted by a vote of 74 in favour (including Canada) to two against (France and Israel) with two abstentions (Costa Rica and Cuba).

Secretary-General's Report

When the Assembly resumed debate on the resulting situation on January 28, it had before it the report prepared by the Secretary-General in pursuance of the Assembly's resolution of January 19 and an aide-memoire on Israel's position in the Sharm al-Shaikh area and the Gaza strip transmitted to Mr. Hammarskjold by the Delegation of Israel. The Secretary-General reported that Israel had not fully complied with the Assembly's request for withdrawal. It was still in occupation of the whole western shore of the Gulf of Aqaba, as well as the Gaza strip. In his report Mr. Hammarskjold described under three non-controversial headings the limits within which the United Nations might properly operate:

(a) The United Nations cannot condone a change of the *status juris* resulting from military action contrary to the provisions of the Charter. The Organization must, therefore, maintain that the *status juris* existing prior to such military action be re-established by a withdrawal of troops, and by the relinquishment or nullification of rights asserted in territories covered by the military action and depending upon it.

(b) The use of military force by the United Nations other than that under Chapter VII of the Charter requires the consent of the States in which the Force is to operate. Moreover, such use must be undertaken and developed in a manner consistent with the principles mentioned under (a) above. It must, furthermore, be impartial, in the sense that it does not serve as a means to force settlement, in the interest of one party, of political conflicts or legal issues recognized as controversial.

(c) United Nations actions must respect fully the rights of Member Governments recognized in the Charter, and international agreements not contrary to the aims of the Charter, which are concluded in exercise of those rights.

The Secretary-General observed that the principle embodied in the first of these three points was reflected in the Assembly's various resolutions calling for the withdrawal of troops behind the armistice lines. Expression had been given to the second when UNEF's terms of reference were drawn up. There had been "no intent in the establishment of the Force to influence the military balance in the present conflict and thereby the political balance affecting efforts to settle the conflict". The Force, moreover, was not to have "military functions exceeding those necessary to secure peaceful conditions on the assumption that the parties to the conflict take all necessary steps for compliance with the recommendations of the General Assembly". In conformity with the third point the Assembly in its November 2 resolution had urged the parties to observe their armistice agreement scrupulously.

This agreement gave to Egypt "control" of the Gaza strip, which included responsibility for administration and security. The administration of the area could be legally changed only through settlement between the parties, and the United Nations was thus precluded from accepting even the non-military administration of the Gaza strip which Israel had offered to maintain there. Any widening of United Nations administrative responsibilities in the Gaza strip, beyond the responsibility it already has for the crowded refugee population, would have to be based on agreement with Egypt. The Assembly might recommend a United Nations administration, but it would lack the authority to require compliance. Deployment of UNEF in Gaza would require the consent of Egypt if it were planned to give the Force in this area any broader function than it had already been assigned along the armistice line in the Sinai Peninsula.

The Secretary-General reasserted his belief that a restoration of more stable relations between the parties could be based on a reaffirmation of the first article of the armistice agreement which is a pledge of non-aggression. The reaffirmation should extend to other articles as well. The Secretary-General mentioned in particular articles 7 and 8 of the agreement. Under Article 7 Egypt and Israel are permitted to have only very limited armed forces in the neighbourhood of the Gaza strip and south of it. Article 8 provides for demilitarization of the El Auja zone and stipulates that no Egyptian defensive position facing the demilitarized zone shall be closer than El Ghouseima and Abu Aweigila. These two articles, which were intended to reduce the danger of armed clashes, had been progressively undermined in recent years and were not being fulfilled when the crisis was reached.

The Secretary-General reminded the Assembly that execution of the provisions of the armistice agreement was to be supervised by a Mixed Armistice Commission, over which a senior officer of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization presides. Headquarters of the Mixed Armistice Commission have been at El Auja, the main intersection point for desert roads east of the Sinai Peninsula, in the demilitarized zone on Israel's side of the old Egypt-Palestine border. The functions of UNEF, now being used to secure and supervise the cease-fire, had therefore to be discussed as the way opened up for it to take positions along the armistice line. In this connection the Secretary-General said:

The United Nations Emergency Force is deployed at the dividing line between the forces of Israel and Egypt. The General Assembly concurred in paragraph 12 of the Secretary-General's Second and Final Report

(A/3302) which specifically referred to the deployment of the Force on only one side of the armistice line. On this basis, the Force would have units in the Gaza area as well as opposite El Auja (i.e. in Egyptian territory). With demilitarization of the El Auja zone in accordance with the Armistice Agreement, it might be indicated that the Force should have units stationed also on the Israel side of the Armistice Demarcation Line, at least in that zone. Such deployment, which would require a new decision by the General Assembly, would have the advantage of the Force being in a position to assume the supervisory duties of the Truce Supervision Organization in all the territory where that Organization now functions under the Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel. In both Gaza and El Auja, the functions of the Truce Supervision Organization and the Force would somewhat overlap if such an arrangement were not to be made. As an arrangement of this kind was not foreseen by the Armistice Agreement, it obviously would require the consent of the two parties to that Agreement. Such mutual consent might be given to the United Nations directly, especially since the arrangement would be on an *ad hoc* basis.

UNEF and UNTSO, with their respective responsibilities, should cooperate, he said, in the prevention of incursions and raids across the armistice line.

The Secretary-General reported that the Government of Egypt had informed him of its desire that "all raids and incursions across the armistice line, in both directions", should be brought to an end and that United Nations auxiliary bodies should afford effective assistance to that end.

Finally the Secretary-General addressed himself to the question of Israel's withdrawal from the Sharm al-Shaikh area. The question of the situation in the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran, he said, was not directly related to the present crisis and had been of longer duration. Israel's military action and its consequences should not be elements influencing the solution.

A legal controversy exists as to the extent of the right of innocent passage through straits forming part of the territorial sea of one or more states (in this case Egypt and Saudi Arabia) constituting the sole means of access to the port of another state (in this case Israel's port of Eilat). The Secretary-General believed that in these circumstances rights in relation to the Gulf and the Straits should be exercised with restraint on all sides. Claims to belligerent rights, if asserted, "should be limited to clearly non-controversial situations". A Security Council resolution of September 1, 1951 had denied that the parties to the armistice agreement could claim belligerent rights, such as the right of search or seizure of vessels, which Egypt had exercised and against which Israel had protested. This resolution, the Secretary-General said, was still valid. He pointed out that if the armistice agreement, and especially articles 7 and 8 on limitation of armed forces in certain areas, were to be implemented again, the case against all acts of belligerency "would gain full cogency". With the broader implementation of the armistice agreement, the parties should be asked to give assurances that they will not assert any belligerent rights, including of course belligerent rights in the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran.

On the possible use of UNEF in the Sharm al-Shaikh area the Secretary-General had the following words to say in conclusion:

Israel troops, on their withdrawal from the Sharm al-Shaikh area, would be followed by the United Nations Emergency Force in the same way

as in other parts of Sinai. The duties of the Force in respect of the cease-fire and the withdrawal will determine its movements. However, if it is recognized that there is a need for such an arrangement, it may be agreed that units of the Force (or special representatives in the nature of observers) would assist in maintaining quiet in the area beyond what follows from this general principle. In accordance with the general legal principles, recognized as decisive for the deployment of the United Nations Emergency Force, the Force should not be used so as to prejudice the solution of the controversial questions involved. The UNEF, thus, is not to be deployed in such a way as to protect any special position on these questions, although, at least transitionally, it may function in support of mutual restraint in accordance with the foregoing.

Canada's View

In support of the Secretary-General's position, Mr. L. B. Pearson, head of the Canadian Delegation, said in part during the general debate on January 29:

I suggest, Mr. President, for consideration by the Assembly that certain ideas might be worthy of inclusion in any resolution which we may be discussing. I think that the two parties concerned, Egypt and Israel, should be called upon by this Assembly to observe all the provisions of the 1949 Armistice Agreement and to refrain from all acts of hostility, including the exercise by either party of any claim to belligerent rights. I think that the Secretary-General might be instructed to make arrangements, after consultation with the parties concerned, for the deployment of the United Nations Emergency Force on both sides of the demarcation line and in the Gaza strip, in order that this Force, which is our own creation and which is effectively functioning in the area in the interests of peace and security, might assume the supervisory duties of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization; prevent incursions and raids across the demarcation line, and maintain peaceful conditions along the line. I believe that Egypt and Israel, to assist in this essential work of the UNEF, should be requested to remove from, or limit their military forces in, these areas of deployment which would be defined. I think that the United Nations should be associated with steps to replace the present civilian administration of the Gaza strip and to ensure that that area will not in the future be used as a base or as a target for raids or retaliations. I believe that it would be wise to take appropriate steps to determine legal positions in the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran but that, pending this determination, the parties should be called upon to give assurances that they will not assert or exercise any belligerent rights in these waters or interfere with navigation in them. And then I think that the Secretary-General, on whom we seem to be placing great burdens of responsibility these days, should be authorized to arrange for a unit or units of the United Nations Emergency Force, after the withdrawal of Israeli forces, to be stationed at some point in the Gulf of Tiran to assist in the establishment and maintenance of peaceful conditions in that area. In this connection, Mr. President, may I quote, because I think that this paragraph is important and I agree with it, what Mr. Lodge said yesterday:

We believe that it is essential that units of the United Nations Emergency Force be stationed at the Straits of Tiran in order to achieve there the separation of Egyptian and Israeli land and sea forces. This separation is essential until it is clear that the non-exercise of any claimed belligerent rights has established in practice the peaceful conditions which must govern navigation in waters having such an

international interest. All of this would, of course, be without prejudice to any ultimate determination which may be made of any legal questions concerning the Gulf of Aqaba.

I hope, Mr. President, that the agreed solution can be reached along these lines. The alternative to non-agreement is so threatening to peace and security that we are bound to put forward every effort with sincerity and determination and goodwill to reach an honourable, peaceful and agreed settlement.

Two Related Resolutions

After the general debate of January 28 and 29 informal negotiations took place among interested delegations, as a result of which two related resolutions were put forward on February 1 under the joint sponsorship of seven nations—Brazil, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Norway, the USA and Yugoslavia. The first resolution deplored the non-compliance of Israel with earlier United Nations resolutions asking for withdrawal of Israeli forces behind the armistice line and called upon Israel to complete its withdrawal behind the armistice demarcation line "without further delay". The second resolution was in the following terms:

Recognizing that withdrawal by Israel must be followed by action which would assure progress towards the creation of peaceful conditions.

1. Notes with appreciation the Secretary-General's report and the measures therein to be carried out upon Israel's complete withdrawal;

2. Calls upon the Governments of Egypt and Israel scrupulously to observe the provisions of the 1949 Armistice Agreement;

3. Considers that, after full withdrawal of Israel from the Sharm el-Shaikh and Gaza areas, the scrupulous maintenance of the Armistice Agreement requires the placing of the United Nations Emergency Force on the Egyptian-Israeli Armistice Demarcation Line and the implementation of other measures as proposed in the Secretary-General's report, with due regard to the considerations set out therein with a view to assist in achieving situations conducive to the maintenance of peaceful conditions in the area;

4. Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the parties concerned, to take steps to carry out these measures and to report, as appropriate, to the General Assembly.

Explains Canada's Position

On the following day, February 2, Mr. Pearson said in explaining Canada's position on the two resolutions:

We have before us, as members know, two draft resolutions: one on the immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces and one on arrangements for peace and security in the area to follow such withdrawal.

The Canadian Delegation would have preferred these two draft resolutions to be separate parts of a single draft resolution which could be voted upon separately. Our reason for that view is a simple one. We think that these two matters are interconnected, and what we do about the second will help

or hinder our efforts to bring about effective action in regard to the first—withdrawal. This inter-relationship exists, in our view, not because it will assist Israel in achieving any objective of national policy, but because it will affect the chances of achieving our own objective of peace and security in the area. And that, I take it, is the objective of the Assembly. We do not expect the second draft resolution to result in anything that would not have been desirable if Israeli military action had not taken place.

There is in our minds no question of reward or approval. We do expect a satisfactory second draft resolution to result in the kind of United Nations action that will prevent military action in the future, and we look at this second draft resolution from that point of view, as well as from the point of view of the effect which it will have on the achievement of Israeli withdrawal.

I recognize the force of the reasons that made one draft resolution impossible of acceptance by the necessary majority in this Assembly. I hope that others will realize the force of the argument that the views expressed on the second draft resolution and, even more important, on the meaning of that draft resolution, are bound to influence our feeling about the first.

Our position on these two questions has been stated already and I do not need to repeat it at length.

We agree with the view that there must be a full implementation of the Armistice Agreement of 1949, and that there must be a formal affirmation by the Governments concerned that they desist from raids and incursions across the demarcation line and take active measures to prevent these things happening. The Secretary-General, in his report, has called for these things. But they are not enough. The United Nations must take action to achieve as well as merely to proclaim these objectives; to secure and supervise arrangements to this end.

We have at hand an agency of the United Nations, our own agency, which can be used effectively for these purposes if we so desire. If we do not use it—the United Nations Emergency Force—all our work of last autumn will have been wasted, and our failure will extend far beyond this particular situation and will weaken, perhaps even destroy, the value of this Assembly for the supervision of and making secure the peace. The Security Council, in present circumstances, has become futile for these purposes. Is the Assembly to go the same way? It is for us to decide, and what we do on this occasion may make the decision.

We must, therefore, in any draft resolution which we are considering, such as the one before us, be sure that we are giving the Secretary-General clear and definite authority so that, in the subsequent discussions and consultations which are required, he can make the United Nations and the United Nations Emergency Force effective for the purpose of bringing about action, following withdrawal of Israeli forces. This surely means—at least it seems to us to mean—that agreement should be reached under which UNEF can be used for keeping the peace along the demarcation line and in the Gaza strip, if necessary, and for preventing conflict—and that would be its only possible purpose in that area—in the Gulf of Aqaba or the Straits of Tiran.

We are asking our Secretary-General to take on great and additional responsibilities. I hope that this second draft resolution—

which is not a very long one—is not going to be the straw that will break this camel's back. But it is certainly our duty to give him as clear and precise a mandate as we can so that he can discharge these responsibilities with a minimum of confusion, controversy or delay.

I realize that it is the intention of the authors of this draft resolution to give the Secretary-General the authority necessary to discharge these new responsibilities and to perform this task that is of such vital importance to peace and the United Nations. I know something about the difficulties of the authors of these two draft resolutions in realizing this intention in words that will command the approval of the necessary majority of this Assembly which, after all, cannot act at all without such approval. I know that the representative of the United States, in particular, has made persistent and tireless efforts, which deserve our gratitude, to overcome these difficulties.

But, while the purpose of this second draft resolution deserves and receives the unqualified support of our Delegation, we have had—as I am sure other delegations have had, judging from what I have heard today—some doubts about the language of the draft resolution in one or two places being best suited to achieve this purpose. I would have preferred it to be somewhat more precise and more complete. I think that it would then have been more effective, if its meaning had been clearer, in achieving the two objectives which we all have in mind: immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces and, afterwards United Nations arrangements which, to use the language of the preamble of the second draft resolution, “would assure progress towards the creation of peaceful conditions”.

I realize, of course, that it would have been impracticable to have included in this draft resolution all the details of the actions which we wish the Secretary-General and the United Nations to take. But I had hoped that the principles which we mention might have been somewhat more specific. I realize also that the Secretary-General must be given reasonable freedom of action, room to manoeuvre, in an operation of this kind, which is as delicate as it is complicated and important. But we surely do not wish this freedom to include ambiguous injunctions which might invite differing interpretations and consequent confusion and frustration.

I am assured that my doubts on this score are unnecessary and that the wording of the second draft resolution makes possible the use, for instance, of the United Nations, especially the use of UNEF, for the pacification purposes mentioned by both the representative of the United States and myself in our interventions in this debate on 28 January, and to which he referred again at our meeting this morning. I hope that this can be done, and I have been strengthened in that hope by the statement which we heard from Mr. Lodge this morning.

That statement seems to me to strengthen the validity of the interpretation which we

give to the words of the draft resolution, the aim of which we have wholeheartedly approved from the beginning, but the wording of which, in one or two places, has raised some doubts as to its exact meaning.

I assume, for instance, and I hope that my assumption is correct, that the scrupulous observance of the 1949 Armistice Agreement which is called for in paragraph 2 of the second draft resolution, requires the two Governments concerned to refrain from all acts of hostility, including the exercise by either party of any claim to belligerent rights, specifically in the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran. My assumption on this point seems to me to be supported by the language of paragraphs 27 and 28 of the Secretary-General's report (A/3512), which refers to certain measures that should be carried out—and which, under paragraph 4 of this draft resolution, the Secretary-General is requested by this Assembly to carry out.

In regard to paragraph 3 of the second draft resolution, I take it that the word "other" in the phrase "the implementation of other measures" does not mean the exclusion of UNEF from these other measures by the fact that, under the preceding part of the paragraph, it is to be placed on the demarcation line. I also assume that the words "in the area" at the end of this paragraph include the Sharm el-Shaikh and Gaza areas as well as the area of the demarcation line.

These may seem small points, but many an important resolution—and this is a vitally important resolution—has been ruined by subsequent differences of interpretation and meaning of points which seemed to be small but turned out to be very large indeed, and very ambiguous.

Should Be No Doubt

I think it is especially necessary that there should be no doubt about the meaning of this resolution because if and when it is passed it becomes the Secretary-General's "Bible" as he undertakes the duties based on it.

Our attitude to resolution II, then, has been conditioned by the interpretation I have given above and we think this is a reasonable and acceptable interpretation. The actual authority given the Secretary-General to carry out the provisions of this resolution is to be found in paragraph 4 where he is requested to take steps to carry out the measures which are in his report, which has been before us for some time. In other words, he is to implement his report on the basis of this resolution. It seems to me desirable therefore to recall the measures which are to be carried out by him, because they will be his responsibility.

It seems to me that a careful reading of this report indicates that these measures—some of them would perhaps appear to be conclusions rather than measures—include the following:

First, full respect for, full implementation of and a reaffirmation of the Armistice Agreement of 1949 which remains in force and the

first article of which assimilates the agreement to a non-aggression pact providing for mutual and full abstention from belligerent acts;

Second, the restoration of the legal position of control in the Gaza strip and the recognition that any change in this position—a position which has practical and humanitarian as well as legal aspects—can only be brought about through a settlement between the parties. The Secretary-General recognizes that the deployment of the United Nations Emergency Force in Gaza on any wider basis than its deployment along the Armistice line in the Sinai Peninsula would require the consent of Egypt under the Armistice Agreement. He also points out, however, in his report—and I quote from that report—that "the development of the situation in Gaza may require special attention and may impose added responsibilities on the United Nations" in particular in regard to refugees.

The third measure from this report is the deployment of UNEF on both sides of the demarcation line, to prevent incursions and raids across that line.

Fourth, El Auja to be demilitarized in accordance with the Armistice Agreement and Israeli and Egyptian forces not to take positions in contravention of that agreement;

Fifth, the assumption by the Emergency Force of the supervisory duties of the Truce Supervisory Organization;

Sixth, formal assurance from the parties concerned to desist from raids and to take active measures to prevent incursions;

Seventh, pending determination of the legal position of these waters, innocent passage through the Straits of Iran and the Gulf of Aqaba in accordance with the recognized rules of international law, which passage is not to be interfered with by the exercise of any claim to belligerent rights;

The eighth and final measure which I have drawn from the report is that Israeli troops, on their withdrawal from the Sharm el-Shaikh area are to be followed by UNEF in the same way as in other parts of Sinai. The Force is not to be deployed there, as the Secretary-General points out, in such a way as to protect any special position on controversial questions, although, at least transitionally, it may function—or special United Nations observers may function—in support, and only in support, of mutual restraint and in maintaining quiet.

In these resolutions we are giving the United Nations Emergency Force very important functions in the pacification of the area. Perhaps it is already authorized to perform many of these functions. I agree, for instance, with the representative of Australia that in accepting the Secretary-General's second report on the establishment of the Emergency Force we have already, and with the consent of the Government of Egypt, authorized the Force to help maintain quiet after the withdrawal of non-Egyptian troops and to secure compliance with the

other terms of the resolution of 2 November 1956. Whether the new functions we are suggesting require, in whole or in part, a new resolution of the Assembly is perhaps not very important now because such a resolution is before us, which is designed to remove any doubts on this score. In so far as is necessary, new arrangements will have to be worked out by agreement with Egypt and with Israel.

UNEF Can Be Effective

In this connexion, the scope and the nature of Egypt's earlier consent was brought up yesterday by the representative of Australia and referred to by more than one speaker this afternoon. On that point the Secretary-General made, I think, an important classification yesterday when he said: "To all the extent that movements of the United Nations Force are supposed to follow from the duties of the Force in relation to the cease-fire and withdrawal, the matter... has been regarded as non-controversial as it is covered by Egypt's general consent while, on the other hand, as regards activities of the United Nations Force which would extend beyond what is covered by this consent, an additional consent has been considered necessary".

The Secretary-General also said that whatever may be the legal situation under the Charter regarding consent, "in practice, the consent must obviously be qualified in such a way as to provide a reasonable basis for the operation of the United Nations Force".

I am satisfied myself that the United Nations Force, which has already operated effectively and non-controversially and has given us hope for the future role of the United Nations in the supervision of peace can, if it is given the opportunity and the authority, conduct these new peace supervision operations equally effectively. Absurd suspicions have been cast on this Force by the representative of the Soviet Union and by the representative of Bulgaria, I think it was, this afternoon; absurd suspicions were cast on this Force as an agency for the return of colonialism in a new form to this area. All I can say in this connexion is that the Force is under the control not of any one Power, either here in this Assembly or on the spot, but it is under the control of the United Nations and that it is a Force consisting of important elements from those well-known "colonial Powers" India, Indonesia, Yugoslavia and Finland.

When doubts about this Force are expressed by the countries of the Middle East, I accept the honesty of their doubts although I do not believe that they are justified. I can assure them that as far as our Delegation is concerned—and I am sure that it is true of practically all other delegations that have supported this Force—we have never at any

time conceived of this Force as anything which could remotely be called an occupation force. It is not a national army or a collection of national contingents; it is an emergency force from the United Nations composed of units from countries—the smaller countries—of diverse backgrounds and policies, which is not in a position to enforce its will on any country, nor has it the power to do so under the Charter if it so desired. As a member of our Delegation said last December in his statement in the General Assembly, the United Nations Emergency Force is not an instrument for enforcing a settlement but it can be an instrument to assist in establishing conditions in the area which would be of benefit to both the parties concerned and advantageous to peace and security.

Its peaceful purpose was to assist in the withdrawal of invading forces. We think it can also be used to assist in the maintenance of the Armistice on which both parties have agreed. And I do not see how this function of the United Nations Emergency Force could possibly be considered as one of occupation in any way, shape or form.

Let us not be confused and misled by semantics, either exaggerating or unduly limiting the value and the functions of this Force. Our United Nations Force is in being. It is operating effectively now under the blue flag of peace of the United Nations. It is no threat to the sovereignty of any nation and, whatever we may say here in debate, it expects—and I feel sure that it will receive—the co-operation of the peoples and the governments in the countries in which it operates for one purpose only: the prevention of conflict and the creation of an atmosphere which will make possible a peace settlement.

This Force can do a great new work for peace in the area if we give it the chance. I hope, in spite of the doubts that I have expressed about its ambiguous wording in one or two places and in spite of conflicting views about its meaning, that this draft resolution will give the United Nations and its Emergency Force that chance.

Such a hope will only be realized, however, if, first, Israeli forces are withdrawn and, secondly, if we back up the Secretary-General firmly and constructively in the task we are giving him, a task which I know he will undertake with the energy, sincerity and devotion he has already shown. If we do this, then we can be sure, I think, that the Secretary-General will use the authority we are now giving him and through the Force for peace which we have created ourselves, in a way which will bring about better conditions of security in the area than have existed in the troublous and unhappy past and thereby make an indispensable contribution to the peaceful and just political settlement which must come.

Later on the same day, the two resolutions were put to the vote. The first was approved by 74 votes in favour, (including Canada), to two opposed (France and Israel) with two abstentions (Luxembourg and the Netherlands).

The second resolution was adopted by 56 votes (including Canada) to none against, with 22 abstentions ((including the Soviet and Arab blocs, Israel, France and the Netherlands). Two states—the Union of South Africa and Hungary—were absent.

Meanwhile, in Ottawa the House of Commons in Committee of Supply agreed on February 1 to a special supplementary estimate of \$1 million to provide a "loan to the United Nations Organization to help finance clearing of the Suez Canal". The Government had recommended this advance in response to the Secretary-General's request for loans to an Interim Fund to meet the immediate cash requirements of the clearing operation pending agreement on the general financing programme.

Disarmament

On January 25 the First Committee concluded its Disarmament debate and adopted unanimously a resolution sponsored by the five members of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission—Canada, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States—and by seven other countries—Australia, Brazil, El Salvador, India, Japan, Norway and Yugoslavia. The resolution requests the Disarmament Commission to reconvene its Sub-Committee at an early date and to give prompt attention to the various proposals which have been submitted, a number of which are specified, and to the various views expressed in the debate; it recommends that the Sub-Committee make a progress report by August 1, 1957; and it invites consideration of the advisability of a special session of the Assembly or a general disarmament conference when progress justifies such a meeting.

At the opening of the debate the representative of the United States outlined proposals which are to be presented to the Sub-Committee when it meets in March in London. The six points emphasized in this statement were to the following effect:

- (1) After an agreed date all future production of fissionable materials should be used or stockpiled for non-weapons purposes under international supervision.
- (2) When effective control of future production of fissionable materials exists, nuclear test explosions could be limited and ultimately eliminated. In the interim there might be advance registration and limited international observation of all tests.
- (3) Conventional arms and forces should be reduced, using as a basis of measurement for the first stage the figures of 2,500,000 for the United States and the Soviet Union and 750,000 for France and the United Kingdom, under an effective inspection system which concurrently would be established progressively.
- (4) To ensure that future developments in outer space are devoted only to peaceful purposes, the testing of such objects as intercontinental missiles and artificial satellites should be under international inspection and participation.
- (5) To provide against surprise attack there should be progressively installed inspection systems including mutual aerial reconnaissance and ground control posts.
- (6) An international agency for the regulation of armaments should be installed currently with the beginning of the programme.

The representative of the Soviet Union emphasized the importance of the Soviet proposals of November 17, 1956. He also introduced three draft resolutions. The first proposed the immediate cessation of nuclear tests; the second called for the convening of a special session of the Assembly on the question of disarmament; and the third proposed the enlargement of the Disarmament Commission to include Egypt, India, Poland and a Latin American country and of the Sub-Committee to include India and Poland.

Canada, Japan and Norway co-sponsored a draft resolution which proposed that the Sub-Committee should give particular and urgent attention to the question of establishing, as a preliminary step, a system for the registration with the United Nations of nuclear test explosions. It further proposed that the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation should co-operate with the states concerned in the operation of such a system with a view to keeping the total actual and expected radiation in the world under constant observation.

Canadian Statement

The Canadian position was presented by Mr. L. B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs and Chairman of the Canadian Delegation, in the Committee on January 21, in a statement reading in part as follows:

We are once again engaged in what must seem to many one of the most unrewarding activities of the United Nations, discussing ways and means of reducing arms in a climate of international fear, tension and insecurity. This climate is indeed, and the conditions which produced it, the main reason why, in spite of a rather bewildering array of proposals and counter-proposals, we are still far from our goal of agreement on the major steps of a substantial disarmament programme. I think, however, that we have made some progress to that goal. . . .

On certain fundamentally important matters of principle the position of the major powers concerned is now less-opposed. I have in mind, for example, the fact that the Soviet Government no longer calls for unconditional preliminary banning of nuclear weapons, but recognizes that measures of nuclear disarmament must be related to measures of conventional disarmament. There has also been a lessening of the differences of view as to the levels of forces of the great powers.

On the crucial matter of adequate and effective inspection and control of disarmament measures, the absolutely indispensable condition to an acceptable disarmament agreement, there has likewise been some progress. As a result of the discussions of the past year it is now, for the first time, possible to say that there is general agreement that the international control organization should have representatives established in the territory of the states concerned *before* disarmament actually begins, and that these control officials should remain in place throughout the duration of such disarmament agreement. In its latest proposals, the Soviet Delegation has also apparently accepted at least the

principle of aerial inspection as one of the attributes of the control organization. While it is true that this reference to aerial inspection is by no means without limitations and conditions, we certainly welcome the fact that the Soviet Government has at least agreed, even if only in principle, to such inspection.

It is also my impression that in the last year or so there has been a growing realism in disarmament discussions. There has been considerably less tendency to advance proposals which, like the unconditional banning of the bomb, were recognized even by their advocates as quite unacceptable to other powers involved and were put forward for purposes which had little to do with disarmament or security. I think it is also increasingly recognized and accepted that disarmament measures must contribute to the security of the major powers concerned, and must not weaken the defensive position of one country relative to another. Governments must take very seriously their primary duty to defend their own people, and they must be convinced that disarmament measures are satisfactory from this point of view.

Turning now to the present discussion in the Political Committee, I should like first of all to welcome the moderately worded, businesslike and hopeful statement with which the distinguished representative of the United States opened the debate. I do not wish, at the present time, to go into the detail of the proposals of the United States, although I do wish to welcome this latest contribution to our negotiations. As Mr. Lodge pointed out, further details of these proposals will be developed in the sub-committee, and I would comment now that it seems to the

Canadian Delegation that this new presentation of United States proposals is a valuable step forward in the process of negotiation. As we understand it this is not a rigid, detailed programme of disarmament; it is, rather, a broad outline of the present United States position, realistically stated in the light of all the present conditions, and intended as a basis for further negotiation. . . .

As my Delegation indicated in the general debate at the opening of this Session of the General Assembly, we are prepared to give careful and objective consideration to the latest Soviet proposals. I have already indicated that, so far as it goes, we welcome the new Soviet position on aerial inspection, even though the particular limited application of aerial photography proposed by the U.S.S.R. may involve some serious difficulties, including the implication of the continued division of Germany. The Soviet Government also continues to propose the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons in spite of the fact that according to an explicit statement of the Soviet Delegation itself, it is not, at the present time, technically possible to devise any adequate system for inspecting such a prohibition. Incidentally in view of Soviet attacks on the pacific intentions and the good faith of Western powers, their confidence in the willingness of those powers to make effective such an unconditional, uncontrollable prohibition is as surprising as it is unconvincing. . . .

Nuclear Explosions

I now wish to turn to one particular aspect of the armament question which has become a cause of considerable concern and anxiety to many people. I refer to the effects of atomic radiation and particularly to the possible consequences of nuclear test explosions. In his statement in the general debate at the beginning of this session of the Assembly, the Foreign Minister of Norway proposed that there should be established some system of United Nations registration of nuclear test explosions. In the present debate in the Political Committee we have heard with serious concern and with sympathy the moving remarks of the distinguished representative of Japan. The representative of the United Kingdom also touched on this matter. He suggested that the disarmament sub-committee investigate the possibility of agreeing on the limitation of nuclear test explosions either as part of a disarmament plan or separately. We also have before us the proposal tabled by the representative of the U.S.S.R. calling for a cessation of tests of these weapons.

The Canadian Delegation included some comments on this question in our statement in Plenary in the general debate on December 5, and our position remains as set forth in that statement. While it may not be realistic to propose an immediate ban on all such tests, nevertheless we are of the opinion, after weighing the best scientific evidence available to us—which is by no means complete or conclusive—that the United Nations must

give close and serious consideration to the whole question of nuclear tests. Last year the General Assembly established a scientific committee on the effects of atomic radiation, the duty of which is to keep under close observation the whole problem of the levels of radiation and possible effects on man and his environment. We look to this Committee, as it accumulates the data supplied to it and makes its analyses and assessments, to serve an important role. It could be the source of objective and valid scientific conclusions which could aid all concerned in avoiding decisions or action which might prove harmful.

In any agreement on nuclear tests we must be guided by two considerations: first, the necessity of securing authoritative, accurate information on the effects of such tests, scientifically and objectively determined; and second, the requirement to give reasonable satisfaction to the needs of defence in a dangerously divided world!

In our earlier statement to the Assembly, which I have mentioned, we expressed the hope that the countries concerned might be able to agree on some annual or periodic limit on the volume of radio activity to be generated by test explosions. One of the recommendations of the proposed draft resolution of which I have just spoken is that the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee give prompt attention to the whole problem of measures for cessation or limitation of nuclear test explosions.

There is, however, a further draft resolution before the Committee which deals only with the question of advance registration of nuclear test explosions, that is to say, with the proposal made in Plenary by the Foreign Minister of Norway. This resolution stands in the name of Norway as well as of Japan and Canada.

The proposal incorporated in this resolution is inspired by a belief that it may be better to do now what is possible and feasible with respect to nuclear test explosions, rather than to do nothing at all because it is not possible to take more far-reaching action. If a proposal of this kind can be worked out, we would, for the first time, have moved, if only one step, away from dead centre of this whole problem.

Our resolution recommends that urgent attention be given to establishing, as a preliminary step, a system for registration with the United Nations of nuclear test explosions. The resolution also requests the Secretary-General and the Radiation Committee to cooperate with the states concerned in this registration system with a view to keeping under constant observation the world situation regarding present and expected radiation. This would, I repeat, be only a preliminary step, but I am certain it would be an important preliminary step and I hope that it too will be given most serious consideration.

In conclusion, I hope that all the proposals that have been submitted to this Committee

will be referred for early and effective action to the United Nations Commission which has been set up for that purpose.

I do not need to emphasize to this Committee the gravity of the problem. Man has now developed weapons capable of his own complete destruction.

If he does not bring and keep them under control and, even more important, bring about a state of affairs where their use would be unthinkable and impossible, then life on this planet will indeed soon become—in the words of the English philosopher “nasty, brutish and short”.

Korea

The Korean question appeared as the first item on the agenda of the Political Committee. Two resolutions were introduced, the first dealing with the problem of re-unification of the divided nation and the second with the report of the Government of India concerning ex-prisoners of war who did not wish to be repatriated. This second resolution was sponsored by Ecuador, El Salvador and Venezuela, and expressed gratitude to the Governments of India, Argentina and Brazil “for their valuable co-operation in the settlement of the problem of ex-prisoners of the Korean War”. It was adopted by the General Assembly in plenary session by a vote of 60 in favour, none against, and 10 abstentions.

The resolution on reunification was, however, more contentious. Sponsored by the United States, it reaffirmed that the “objectives of the United Nations are to bring about by peaceful means the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of government and the full restoration of international peace and security in the area”. The resolution further urged that continuing efforts be made to achieve these objectives in accordance with the principles enunciated at the Geneva Conference of 1954 and reaffirmed by the General Assembly at its 8th and 9th sessions. The resolution then requested the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea to continue its work in accordance with existing resolutions and in particular to observe and report on elections throughout Korea”, and called upon all states and authorities to facilitate the Commission in its work. Finally, the Secretary-General was requested to place the Korean item on the provisional agenda for the 12th session.

The Committee, by a vote of 51 in favour (including Canada) 10 against (Soviet bloc and Syria) with 12 abstentions (including India, Ceylon, Cambodia, Burma, Finland, Yugoslavia and Indonesia) invited a representative of the Republic of Korea to participate in the discussion of the main resolution. This representative, however, did not enjoy voting privileges.

During the course of the Committee's discussions, Canada's position was outlined in a statement made by Dr. R. A. MacKay, Canadian Permanent Representative to the UN. After expressing regret that the prospect of a free and united Korea was not much closer than when the subject was last discussed, Dr. MacKay called for an approach which would be practical and flexible and an attitude which would not allow “unreasonable stubbornness to stand in the way of negotiations which might lead to a settlement”. While the UN must insist on strict adherence to certain principles fundamental to unification, it need not be so inflexible with regard to methods; “It is the end result not the means of achieving it which matters”. Rather than being imposed, the settlement will have to be negotiated, he continued. Although such a course of action may be prolonged and frustrating, the process of conciliation and pacification is the most honourable work of the UN and in this work a remarkable degree of success has been achieved in the past.

In seeking to repair the "shattered state of Korea" the Canadian Delegate urged that the UN should not be forever bound by formulas established in the past and that in negotiating a political settlement all those in Korea who must be a party to the settlement should participate in the negotiations even though "we remain duly sceptical of the good faith of the North Koreans". In conclusion, Dr. MacKay stated that the United States resolution seemed consistent with the principles he had outlined. "It urges us to continue looking for a means of achieving the objective of unification; it insists on those fundamental principles which, as I have stated, must be the basis of a settlement; and it does not preclude negotiations for a settlement which should satisfy the legitimate demands of all concerned".

The resolution was adopted by the Committee by a vote of 56 in favour, 8 against (Soviet bloc) and 13 abstentions (Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, Egypt, Finland, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Syria).

During the course of the general debate which followed the resolution's adoption, the Canadian position was frequently quoted with approval and the general tenor of the discussion was one of moderation. The resolution was approved on January 11 by a vote of 57 in favour, 8 against and 9 abstentions.

The text of Dr. MacKay's speech was as follows:

It is a matter of regret to us all, I have no doubt, that the prospect of the unification of Korea into a single free and peaceful state is not much closer this year than when we last discussed the subject. As we have said before, however, we must recognize that it will take time to reduce the tensions and allay the passions which are the inevitable result of so bitter and tragic a conflict. We should not relax our efforts to promote a settlement, but we should not despair because this has not yet been achieved. We may rejoice in fact that the armistice has been maintained and that the Korean people have been able to devote their remarkable energies to the economic rehabilitation and development of their country and—in the South—to hold elections, the results of which prove that there was a vigorous exercise of the right to vote freely. We only wish that it were possible to note with satisfaction economic and political progress in the North as well or even some reflection of the restless hunger for independence which has been a notable feature of many other Communist regimes during the past year. Unfortunately, it is still very difficult to note any thing at all about North Korea, but what little information does reach the light of day is not encouraging.

Last year the Canadian representative made a plea in this Committee for a practical and flexible approach to the problem of unification of Korea. I do not wish to repeat what was said at that time in detail, but I would like to say that my Delegation is as much convinced as it was at that time that the United Nations must not allow any unreasonable stubbornness to stand in the way of negotiations which might lead to a settlement. Stubborn we must be in insisting on certain principles fundamental to unification. This must be a union freely entered into and must establish in the words of the United Nations objectives stated in Geneva, "a unified, independent, and democratic Korea under a representative form of government". The United Nations cannot under any circumstances agree to a union achieved by political subterfuge or one in which the rights of the majority were less than that of a minority. On the means of achieving such a union, however, we need not be so rigid. It is the end result not the means of achieving it which matters.

To achieve the reunification we all so devoutly wish, it seems to us that we must recognize certain inescapable factors of the situation. The United Nations, as the representative of India pointed out yesterday, did not fight in Korea to achieve unification by force; it fought there for the declared purpose of repelling aggression. We are not, therefore, faced with a situation in which we can impose a settlement. The settlement will have to be negotiated just as an armistice was negotiated. Such negotiations are inevitably prolonged and frustrating, but we have had a remarkable degree of success in hammering out under the aegis of the United Nations agreements which have provided a framework for peaceful adjustments and eventual settlements. This is the most honorable work of this United Nations, the process of conciliation and pacification, and we must not back away from it. If there is to be any hope of success, we must make it clear to all concerned that we shall seize any honorable opportunity of seeking a solution and that we are not forever bound by formulas which have been established in the past. Useful work was done at Geneva and some useful work has been done since, but we don't think we should forever stand on a position that the Geneva proposals are a final ultimatum. There are, as I said before, certain things on which we must never yield in any negotiations, the most important of which is that the government chosen for a united Korea truly represent the free choice of all citizens of Korea. However, we should not object if some one should produce new and satisfactory proposals which were not necessarily in strict accordance with what we thought to be the best procedure in 1954. It would certainly have to be a procedure acceptable to this Assembly, but we trust that this Assembly would welcome any procedure which would do the job safely and satisfactorily.

We cannot forget the crime that was committed in Korea by the Communist forces and we could not accept any implications that there is moral—or even substantial—equality between the Republic of Korea and the regime in North Korea. What we are now seeking to do, however, is not to pass an historical judgment but to repair the shattered state of Korea. This is the peacetime phase of the Korean question in which we must deal with the political realities as they exist. It was for these reasons that my Delegation did not wish to oppose the Indian proposal yesterday to admit as observers representatives of North as well as South Korea. Although we remain duly sceptical of the good faith of the North Koreans, we consider that if there is to be unification we shall have to gather into the process of negotiations all those in Korea who must be a party to the settlement.

These are our views on the general principle of achieving a settlement. It seems to us that the resolution proposed by the United States is consistent with these principles. It urges us to continue looking for a means of achieving the objective of unification; it insists on those fundamental principles which, as I have stated, must be the basis of a settlement; and it does not preclude negotiations for a settlement which should satisfy the legitimate demands of all concerned.

South Africa

The Assembly approved two resolutions, recommended by the Special Political Committee, on racial questions relating to the Union of South Africa.

Under the terms of the first resolution, dealing with the question of the treatment of people of Indian origin in South Africa, the Assembly noted "with regret" that the South African Government has not yet agreed to negotiate with India and Pakistan on a solution to this problem, and urged

the parties concerned to enter into such negotiations, appealing in particular to the South African Government to co-operate to this end.

The second resolution concerned problems of race conflict resulting from the South African Government's policies of apartheid. In this resolution, the Assembly deplored the fact that the South African Government "has not yet observed its obligations under the Charter and has pressed forward with discriminatory measures" and called upon the South African Government "to re-consider its position and revise its policies in the light of its obligations and responsibilities under the Charter and in the light of the principles subscribed to and the progress achieved in other multi-racial societies". South Africa was also invited to "co-operate in a constructive approach to this question, more particularly by its presence in the United Nations", and the Secretary-General was requested to communicate "as appropriate" with the South African Government to carry forward the purposes of the resolution.

Canada abstained on both resolutions and the Canadian attitude towards questions of race conflict was explained by Mr. Robert Ford in the Special Committee on January 16.

Mr. Ford said in part:

I should first like to make very clear to members of the committee that we have no sympathy with policies of racial discrimination wherever they may be practised. In reference to the racial situation in South Africa, we have always endeavoured to keep in mind that the Government and people of South Africa are faced by a formidable and difficult racial problem to which there is no quick and easy solution. We in Canada, however, have grave doubts about policies and practices adopted to meet the problems of a multi-racial society which are based on notions of the racial superiority of one group within the society— notions which we believe to be false. It seems to us that discrimination is more likely to aggravate than to solve the underlying problem. We cannot ignore the fact, furthermore, that policies of racial discrimination are inconsistent with the basic principles of human rights which underlie the Charter of the United Nations.

Having said that, I must also explain that, while we have never objected to discussion of the question of race conflict in South Africa by the General Assembly, we have in the past expressed strong doubts regarding the competence and usefulness of action taken by the General Assembly in its efforts to solve this problem. As consideration of this issue continues from session to session without any progress towards the solution of the problem, my Delegation becomes more and more of the opinion that this kind of intervention by the United Nations into matters of domestic concern of a member country not only has grave constitutional implications for this organization, but has little practical value.

As far as we can see, far from bringing about a change in the attitude of the South African Government to its policy of apartheid, United Nations action over the past several years has tended only to harden the attitude of the South African Government and has led to no amelioration of the situation in South Africa, which has surely been the aim of these discussions. United Nations action has, as well, caused the South African Delegation to withdraw from our deliberations. In his statement yesterday, the distinguished representative of Japan reminded us that—to use his words—"the situation thus created is not only harmful to the prestige of the United Nations, but also is paralyzing the peaceful and friendly discussions and jeopardizing as well a sober solution of this particularly delicate problem."

We fully endorse the view of the distinguished representative of Japan, that—and again I quote—“this is certainly not conducive to the creation of international conditions propitious for the furtherance of the principle we stand for.”

The moral opinion of the world may yet have some influence on the Government of the Union of South Africa to moderate its racial policies, but it is evident to us that an organization of sovereign states which does not respect the sovereignty of a member state will make little impression upon a government which chooses to attend to its own affairs without need to the advice of other governments.

CANADA ACCEDES TO UN CONVENTION

The Canadian Delegation to the Eleventh Session of the General Assembly announced on January 29 Canada's decision to accede to the Convention on the Political Rights of Women, and the Instrument of Accession was deposited with the Secretary-General the following day.

The Convention was adopted by the General Assembly at its Seventh Session in 1952 and came into force on July 7, 1954. Canada is the twenty-sixth country to become party to the Convention. Eighteen other countries have signed but not yet ratified it.

The principle of equality of rights for men and women is embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, and the purpose of the Convention is to implement this principle in the field of political rights and public service. It provides that women shall be entitled to vote and be eligible for election, and also to hold public office and exercise all public functions established by national law on equal terms with men and without discrimination.

STATUS OF WOMEN

The General Assembly adopted by a vote of 47 (including Canada) to 2 with 2 abstentions a Convention on the Nationality of Married Women which stipulates that marriage or divorce shall not automatically affect the nationality of the wife and provides for certain privileged naturalization procedures for alien wives. The inclusion of an appropriate territorial clause will allow metropolitan states with dependent territories to accede on behalf of those territories.

The Convention, which was signed on behalf of Canada on February 20, was prepared by the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women on the initiative of Cuba and revised by the Assembly's Third (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural) Committee.

OTHER BUSINESS

The Assembly elected V. K. Wellington Koo, of China, to fill the vacancy in the International Court of Justice caused by the death of Judge Hsu Mo of China, and decided to dispatch a United Nations Commission to French Togoland to examine “the entire situation in the territory resulting from the practical application of the new statute” recently put into force there and “the conditions under which it is being applied”.

Visit to Asia

By Mr. Paul Martin
Minister of National Health and Welfare

ON January 12 I returned to Ottawa from a nine weeks' goodwill tour of some 14 countries in South and South-East Asia and Australasia. From beginning to end—from Manila to Karachi—this 40,000-mile journey was an inspiring and unforgettable experience.

As I look back over the crowded and busy days I have spent in this ancient and colourful part of the world, my mind is filled with many vivid memories: of the endless variety of Asia's climate and terrain; of the ability and determination of its leaders; the friendliness and simplicity of its villagers; the nobility of its historic monuments; the splendor and wisdom of its age-old cultures; and, finally, the rich diversity of its peoples who are united as never before in an epic struggle to build a better life for themselves and for their children.

How It Started

Early last autumn the Prime Minister and my colleagues in the Government asked me to represent Canada at the Ministerial Consultative Conference of the Colombo Plan which was to be held at Wellington, New Zealand, in the first part of December. At the same time it was suggested that I might take advantage of such a long journey to visit many of the countries in South and South-East Asia with which Canada has growing and friendly ties but with which we have not had as close contact in the past as have many other nations whose history is longer than our own. That such a trip could serve other useful purposes was apparent from the outset. It was thought that the visit of a Canadian Cabinet Minister to the Canadians serving on our delegations on the International Supervisory Commissions in Indochina would have an encouraging effect on their morale and would help in focusing considerable public attention in Canada on the useful work they are doing to stabilize the situation in this troubled area. The Canadian Government also recognized that a trip which included visits to the Asian members of the Commonwealth who are now playing a more prominent role in world affairs would provide valuable opportunities for discussion with their leaders and an occasion to inspect Canadian Colombo Plan activities in these countries. As preparations for the trip went forward during October, it gradually became clear that in the light of the strains placed upon relations between certain Commonwealth countries by the Suez crisis, such a visit to member nations of the Commonwealth in Asia and Australasia would take on a significance which could by no means have been fully appreciated at the time the trip was originally conceived.

On a cold and bitter November 11 we set out from Ottawa, journeying westward towards the Pacific through San Francisco to Hawaii, where we inspected the large and impressive naval installations at Pearl Harbour, headquarters of the gigantic Pacific Command of the United States Navy.

Here I was able to have conversations with Rear Admiral Olsen and Rear Admiral Leahy, senior officers of this island-base, and with Governor King of Hawaii. Within a day or so we had touched down on tiny Wake Island and spent a night on Guam before arriving, delayed overnight by a typhoon, in Manila. Because we had been delayed we had to compress our programme into one day, but I was able to have discussions with the President of the Philippines, Mr. Magsaysay, the Minister and the Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Health. The President impressed me as being an able and dynamic figure who is determined to encourage the development of a higher standard of living among his people. An extensive public health programme is an important part of the President's plan. One of the highlights of this all too brief visit was the elaborate marienda dance which was performed for us by workers in the Ministry of Health.

Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos

Our next stop was Indochina where we were to visit the 150 Canadians serving with the International Supervisory Commissions which were set up in the summer of 1954 by the Geneva Conference to supervise the implementation of the Cease-Fire Agreements. The phrase "Indochina" is of course no longer an accurate descriptive term, in that the area previously known as Indochina is now divided into three countries: Vietnam, partitioned by the Geneva Agreement at the 17th parallel into zones now controlled by communist and non-communist governments, containing twenty million people; Cambodia with four million; and Laos with approximately one and a half million. Canada is represented on each of the three International Supervisory Commissions in these countries.

Our first stop was Saigon, the capital of the Republic of Vietnam, which has been established in the southern zone. Here we were privileged to be the official guests of the Vietnamese Government. During our two-day visit I talked with the dedicated and courageous leader of this Government, President Ngo Dinh Diem, who, in the brief space of two years, has with amazing success consolidated and strengthened the position of the Government. One of the great achievements of the Diem Government, which of course has been materially assisted by American aid, has been the re-settlement of a million refugees who fled from Communist North Vietnam in the months immediately following the partitioning of the country in July 1954 to make their homes in the South. It is not easy to appreciate fully the difficulties and problems which the Government faced with this widespread dislocation of its people, and, having visited some of the camps where many of these refugees have been resettled, I was amazed by the degree of success achieved on so large a scale. In Saigon I talked also with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and other Government leaders, as I was privileged to do in almost all of the countries I visited. One of the highlights of our visit to South Vietnam was the opportunity it afforded to meet and talk with the many Canadians serving with the International Commission in Vietnam. The Canadian Delegation is engaged in a task which, while it seldom receives public attention, is nevertheless an excellent example of the effectiveness of a para-military force in action to ensure that peace is maintained in a troubled area of the world where the peace of all of us was threatened some two and a half years ago.



AT PHNOM PENH

HRH Prince Sihanouk received Mr. Martin during his visit to Phnom Penh, capital of Cambodia. Seen above from left to right are Mr. Arthur Menzies, of the Department of External Affairs, Mr. Martin, Mr. Lorne LaVigne, Acting Canadian Commissioner in Cambodia, and HRH Prince Sihanouk.

Our next stop was at Phnom Penh, the capital of the Kingdom of Cambodia. Here I had the opportunity to call on and talk with the Prime Minister, Mr. San Yun, who holds the foreign affairs portfolio as well. I also had an audience with the King and talked with the ex-King and ex-Prime Minister, Prince Sihanouk, who is undoubtedly the most influential political figure in Cambodia. He took great pains to assure me that Cambodia wished to pursue a truly independent and neutral foreign policy.

All of the Cambodians whom I met spoke in the most cordial terms about Canada. They seemed grateful for the role we have played on the International Commission, whose work in Cambodia has been reduced to a bare minimum, in that all the main provisions of the Geneva Agreement for Cambodia have been fulfilled.

Travelling northward over seemingly endless jungles and rice paddies we arrived at Vientiane, the capital of Laos and the headquarters of the third Commission we were to visit in Indochina. Here we spent three days talking with the leading political figures and members of the Commission, and seeing something of the city and its environs. During our visit, negotiations were in progress between the Royal Government under Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma and the dissident Pathet Lao, under his half-brother, Prince Souvannavong. During our first night in Vientiane I was able to have frank discussions with the leaders of the two delegations about the negotiations then going on and the general prospects in Laos.

During our visit to Laos I decided it would be useful to see one of the Commission's teams in action in the field in order better to understand the operations of the military components of these three international bodies. Accordingly, early one Friday morning in November I took off with the Canadian Military Adviser in Laos in a small single-engine plane for Muong Peun, some seventy miles north in the mountains beyond Vientiane. After a hectic flight into perhaps the most forbidding mountain and jungle territory I have ever seen, we visited the International Supervisory Commission Team at Muong Peun, which is in a salient held by Royal Government forces in Sam Neua, a province largely controlled by the Communist-dominated Pathet Lao movement. There are Indian, Canadian and Polish members on this team and their job is to ensure the separation of the forces of the two sides. Their presence is a deterrent to direct military action. This particular military concentration is in as primitive a place as I have ever seen. I was impressed with the orderliness and good humour of our officers who, in view of their location and surroundings, can have very little in the way of comforts of civilization.

Throughout the three countries of Indochina I was able to discuss the Colombo Plan activities which Canada has sponsored, and in Vietnam I talked to the Minister who would be representing his country at the Colombo Plan Conference in Wellington at a later stage in our journey. While Canada has not undertaken any large-scale projects in Indochina under the Colombo Plan as it has on the Indian sub-continent, we have nevertheless been able to provide a useful degree of aid under the Technical Assistance Programme, particularly to the Vietnamese, and to a lesser extent to the Cambodians and Laotians, in fields where we are particularly equipped to do so. Further projects are, of course, being considered as new opportunities develop for us to assist these people. Canada has an added advantage in undertaking this sort of work in Indochina, in that French is the main European language used, and trainees coming to Canada under the Technical Assistance Programme are able to receive instruction in the Province of Quebec.

Thailand, Indonesia and Australia

From Laos we travelled to Bangkok, the large and crowded capital of Thailand, for a brief visit. The fact that we arrived there on a Buddhist holiday necessarily limited the scope of our visit but, with the assistance of the British Ambassador, we were able to have talks with the Minister of Health and the Acting Foreign Minister. The main centre of interest in Bangkok is the Palace after which the Royal Palace in Phnom Penh seems to be modelled. The one in Bangkok includes about eight or nine pagodas, demonstrating the interest in and strength of Buddhism in Thailand.

Djakarta, the capital of Indonesia, was the next stop on our itinerary. We arrived there near the end of November and were welcomed by a number of Ministers and other officials. On the evening of our arrival Prime Minister Sastroamidjojo gave a dinner followed by a performance of native dances. I was able to have further talks in Djakarta with the Prime Minister and a brief but illuminating talk with President Sukarno whom I had met during his visit to Canada last spring. In my talks with the Prime Minister we spoke extensively of the importance of the parliamentary system in Indonesia and I was glad to be able to pay a visit to the Speaker of their Parliament and to see that body in operation during one of its sessions. Towards the close of our visit we drove up into the mountains to spend the night in the Canadian bungalow near Bogor. Formed from volcanic eruptions, the surrounding countryside is the richest looking I have ever seen, and, with efficient irrigation, yields much fruit and great fields of rice. I will never forget the ride to Bogor. There is an almost continuous settlement along the road for the sixty miles which separates Bogor from the capital. On hearing the strident noise of the siren of our police escort, people came out of their houses by the thousands to watch us pass. As I felt the occasion called for some manifestation of our friendship, I waved continually at the crowds, receiving the most friendly acknowledgments. Now and then we would stop; I would go into a house and the Protocol Officer would interpret for me. I was much impressed by the richness and general rural contentment of the countryside which we saw on our drive and which will remain, along with the incredible greenness of the surroundings and the cheerful and friendly appearance of the people, my most vivid memories of Indonesia. It seemed to me that occasions like these, and they were to be repeated later on in another context during our visits to the Indian villages, provided excellent opportunities for a Canadian to demonstrate our true feelings towards these people who may in the past have perhaps received less fortunate impressions of our real attitude towards them.

Our next stop was Australia, which we were to visit twice, before and after the Colombo Plan Conference in Wellington. Canada had taken a position different from that of Australia and New Zealand during the United Nations debate on the Anglo-French intervention in Suez. So it was particularly useful and helpful for me to visit these two valued partners in the Commonwealth at this time for the exchange of views with their governments. I had the opportunity of discussing these matters in question with Mr. Menzies, the Prime Minister, and Mr. Casey, his Minister for External Affairs, and, indeed, on one memorable afternoon with all the members of his Government. Mr. Menzies assured me that notwithstanding what may in particular instances be differences in point of view, one thing that the world could know of Canada was that it spoke as a member of the Commonwealth in the light of what it understood to be its obligations based on no consideration but the good of the Commonwealth and the good of all nations throughout the world.

During the first stage of our Australian visit I had the welcome opportunity to visit the Olympic Games then in progress at Melbourne, to talk and to have dinner on one occasion with members of the Canadian Olympic team, and to spend at least one afternoon in the huge stadium holding upwards of 100,000 people. Melbourne is one of the loveliest cities I have ever seen, and its splendid handling of the Olympic games was a fitting tribute to the organizing ability of the Australians.

In fact, I was tremendously impressed with all that I saw of Australia. Although I had read a good deal about Sydney and had seen pictures of its famous harbour, one has to visit the city fully to realize the vitality and sophistication of the life there. During my visit I was pleased and honoured to be tendered a dinner by the Canadian-Australian Committee to whom I spoke of the intimate relations our two countries enjoy as fellow members of the Commonwealth. Our visit to Canberra, where we met and talked with the Government leaders, I have already mentioned, and our two stop-overs at Darwin gave us a further opportunity to see something of the tremendous development going on in that northern territory.

The Colombo Plan Conference

We arrived in New Zealand on December 3, the day before the opening of the Colombo Plan Conference which was held in the Chamber formerly occupied by the Upper House of the New Zealand Parliament in Wellington. Wellington, a city of 250,000 people, is situated on a fine, well-protected, natural harbour. There are many things in New Zealand to remind one of life in the British Isles. Customs, manners, the structure and design of houses, all clearly have a very strong British character; the people are pleasant, polite, and orderly.

The Conference itself was opened on the morning of December 4 by Prime Minister Holland and its Chairman was the Minister of External Affairs, Mr. MacDonald. In its several sessions, the Conference provided an opportunity for me to state the Canadian position that our interest in this agency was predicated upon the firm belief that the Colombo Plan was one of the best ways of achieving peace through economic and social improvement. I think I can say, whether or not we all agree on the extent of the contributions made so far, that perhaps nothing is more salutary in our time than the fact that the Western nations of the Commonwealth and the United States, in association with the nations in Asia, have now joined together for the purpose of promoting the improvement of the economic and social life of the Asian peoples. It is a hopeful sign for the improvement of international relations between certain nations of the West and that section of the world that it should be possible for nations like Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Great Britain and the United States to share some of their skills and some of their resources with nations whose material standards of life admittedly are not as high as their own. After my talks with many of the ministerial representatives whom I had already seen in their home countries or whom I was to see at a later stage in the tour, I am firmly of the view that to the extent we support and follow our role in the Colombo Plan activities, we will be making an important contribution to the peace of the world. Canada's role in the Plan is very much appreciated and is not suspect anywhere. Next to the United States, we are the major dollar contributor, our contribution being fixed for the present year at some \$34.5 million. From the reports given at the Conference, it is apparent that in South and South-East Asia as a whole, economic and social progress is taking place, although not at a uniform rate in each country which benefits from the plan. It is important to realize, however, that the basic job of reconstruction which is underway in Asia is largely due, and I believe must continue to be due, to the efforts of the people of Asia themselves. Wherever I went I pointed out that so far as Canada is concerned there were no strings attached to our assistance. While we have more material goods than most of the countries of Asia have, they have something which we

should hope to acquire in greater measure—the serenity, judgment and wisdom which can only come from long centuries of civilized existence.

At the close of the Conference we were able to spend a week-end driving through the North Island. In the Rotorua area I visited a village of the original Maori people. There are about 150,000 Maori out of New Zealand's total population of two million and in most parts of the country they have become well integrated into the local population, although it is still possible to find individual Maori villages something like our Indian reserves. Rotorua itself is the centre of a great area of thermal activity. Steam rises everywhere from the bowels of the earth, forming hot pools, and some of the Maori houses have their own private thermal baths. The water in the pools and geysers is two degrees above boiling and the air is thick with steam and the smell of sulphur.

Singapore, Malaya and Burma

Our visits to Singapore and Kuala Lumpur were necessarily brief. The former is a tremendous city, crowded and teeming with people. I was very glad that I had the opportunity to see Singapore, because it is the transportation and commercial crossroads of the Far East. In addition, the projection there of the overseas Chinese problem, of which we saw something in all of the other countries in South-East Asia, gives Singapore an added interest to the Western visitor. I was able to have talks with the Minister of Education whom I had previously met in Wellington, as well as with the Acting Chief Minister, and the Commissioner-General for the United Kingdom in South-East Asia, Sir Robert Scott. Talking to these men gave me considerable insight into the internal security problem in Singapore, and its relation to the similar problem in the Malayan Federation to the North. Our stop in Kuala Lumpur was really too brief to give us any more than a fleeting glimpse of some of the Malay Federation which is so soon to become an independent member of the Commonwealth. Because of this prospective new status for Malaya, it was undoubtedly useful to have had even a brief opportunity of meeting the Ministers who will be helping to guide her future destiny. I was glad to see on the airfield at Kuala Lumpur a Canadian aircraft which is making an aerial survey of Malaya as part of our Colombo Plan programme there.

From Malaya we flew on to Rangoon, the capital of Burma. Here I was able to have useful talks with the Prime Minister, Ba Swe, the Deputy Prime Minister, and the Foreign Minister. One has really to be right on the spot to realize the great force and the tremendous pressures that must face a nation that could be considered a kind of half-way house between India and China. A country of 18 million people dedicated to the principles of Buddhism, Burma serves as a symbol of the kind of forces that are at play all through Asia. Rangoon is an unusual city, much closer than anything we had previously seen to my preconceived notions of what I would find in Asia. Although it was considered to be one of the jewels of the Orient before the Second World War, it took tremendous poundings during this conflict and the marks of destruction are still evident throughout its streets. On the other hand, there are many modern functional buildings reminiscent of the United Nations headquarters in New York. These stand out in sharp contrast to the great Shwedagon Pagoda, whose glistening gold-leaf covered shape looms up like a polished brass school bell in the centre of Rangoon.

The Commonwealth in Asia

The last three weeks of my tour were spent in the three Asian members of the Commonwealth, Ceylon, India and Pakistan. I believe that it was helpful for me to be able to visit these countries at that time because of the strains that had been placed upon the Commonwealth association by the honest differences of opinion its various members expressed over the Suez crisis. In fact, everywhere I went I sought to indicate the value of the Commonwealth of Nations, and this in particular to its Asian members. I sought to impress on their government leaders and on the people too what role they could play in interpreting the attitudes of the members of the Commonwealth to other Asian nations. In India, particularly, I made a point of breaking away as much as possible from the official programmes which had been laid down for me, in order to gain an opportunity to understand the life of this great nation which has often been under-estimated and misunderstood in the West. I found the situation in my conversations with the Prime Ministers of these three countries, Mr. Bandaranaike in Ceylon, Mr. Nehru in India, and Mr. Suhrawardy in Pakistan, that there is on their part a true recognition of the value of the Commonwealth not only as a sensible grouping of nations in this interdependent world but also as an instrument which can and is being used



WITH CEYLON OFFICIALS

Mr. Martin is shown with the Hon. P. H. Wm. de Silva, Ceylonese Minister of Industries and Fisheries, right, and Mr. J. C. W. Nunasinha, M.P., Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Industries and Fisheries. In the background is the fishing trawler "Canadian", built in Canada and supplied to the Ceylon Fisheries Project as Canadian Colombo Plan aid.

to interpret Western opinion in many sections of Asia and vice versa. There may be dissident voices in some of these countries but my judgment would be that for the most part those who at the present time have to do with the conduct of government in those great countries recognize that in the consultations of Prime Ministers and of Foreign Ministers and in the collaboration that takes place in the United Nations the Commonwealth serves as a valuable instrument in a world whose power blocs need to move closer and closer together rather than to diverge on an increasing scale.

I think I can give one further reason for these somewhat optimistic conclusions which I have reached. India, Ceylon and Pakistan are deeply dedicated to the democratic form of government and to the parliamentary process. They have no disposition to accept as efficient or as possible a totalitarian form of government suppressing the kind of freedom out of which political maturity can only grow.

Ceylon, which we visited for a few days before Christmas as the guest of the Government, is a lush tropical island that seems a veritable Garden of Eden. There is, in addition, something cheerful and encouraging about the Ceylonese. I became greatly interested in what I saw of Buddhism there. My conversations with the Prime Minister and with the Governor-General were most informative, and the generous hospitality which we were shown was an indication of the real warmth of feeling which Ceylon has for Canada. I was pleased to have the opportunity to see a great many of the Colombo Plan projects sponsored by Canada in Ceylon. During my visit I turned over three diesel locomotives as part of Canada's Colombo Plan aid to that country. It seems to me that the annual \$2 million contribution which we make there is of some significance in the development of that country, perhaps because the total amounts being spent on development are necessarily of a smaller order in Ceylon than those expended by her larger neighbours. Our visit to the old capital at Kandy afforded us an opportunity to see something of the beautiful tropical countryside and we enjoyed an unusual ride on the backs of two giant elephants.

Altogether I spent ten days in India, ten days which afforded me a new measure of understanding of the Indian people and their approach to world problems. The confidence which I have come to place in India, and in her Prime Minister, Mr. Nehru, was greatly strengthened by my visit. I was particularly moved by what I saw of the efforts towards community development in the villages where over eighty per cent of India's vast population lives. For two days I was privileged to visit several of these in the Punjab district, about one hundred miles from Delhi, moving among the people informally, telling them about the joint efforts which Canada and India are making toward the solution of common international problems. These two days spent in the villages were among the most impressive of my entire trip. I visited several villages but one has to remember that there are nearly half a million of these villages, many of which still continue to bear the form and the character of their, in some cases, centuries-old construction.

I spent several days in and around New Delhi, the Indian capital, where I was able to have talks with many of India's leaders. Prime Minister Nehru returned home from his North American visit during my stay, and I was on hand to greet him when he disembarked from his plane. I had a further



VISIT TO MR. NEHRU

Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India, received Mr. Martin at his residence in New Delhi on December 29, 1956.

opportunity to discuss mutual problems with the Prime Minister the following day, and I found that his talks with President Eisenhower and Prime Minister St. Laurent and Mr. Pearson had been most encouraging. From these and other conversations I had with members of the Indian Government, I have come to the considered conclusion that India will not embrace the communist ideology as it is projected to us from the Kremlin and other sources. I have come away satisfied that, while there may not always be political affinity, there will be what is more important, a sort of spiritual affinity between India and the basic concepts of our civilization in the West.

Other pleasant memories of my visit to India loom prominent. There was the unusual experience of watching Indian jugglers entertain two-score brightly-clad children of Indian employees in the warm sunshine on the lawn of our High Commissioner's residence. Later we had Christmas dinner there along with some seventy other Canadians in Delhi—members of our party and of the staff of the High Commissioner's office with their families. I presented the one hundred and twentieth Canadian locomotive provided to India under the Colombo Plan to the Minister of Transport and on the same day addressed the Indian Council of World Affairs. After Delhi, we flew to Agra where we saw that incomparably beautiful mausoleum, the Taj Mahal. Then we flew across to Bombay, the great westerly port of India, where I visited, among other things, the Canada-India Atomic Reactor Project. The advanced scientific research which is centered in Bombay is most impressive and undoubtedly put India in the forefront of Asian nations in the matter of nuclear research and development.

Pakistan was to be the last country on our official itinerary and we visited both of its provinces, separated as they are by nearly one thousand miles of

Indian territory. In East Pakistan we touched down in Chittagong, where a number of Canadian missionaries have made their home for several years, and stopped a day and two nights in Dacca, the provincial capital, where I signed an agreement providing for Canadian-Pakistani co-operation in the erection of a steam-generating plant at Khulna. Flying from East to West Pakistan we had the unforgettable experience of seeing Mount Everest and other snow-capped peaks in the mighty Himalayan Range. As we were flying above the clouds we had an unobstructed view of the peaks.

Our next stop was Peshawar, on the colourful northwest frontier of Pakistan, where the Canadian Government is engaged on the construction of a tremendous hydro-electric power development, the Warsak Dam project, which is Canada's largest Colombo Plan undertaking to date. There are about one hundred Canadians working on the project who live nearby with their families in a housing development provided especially for them, and I was able to meet and talk with many of them. The following day we drove up the Khyber Pass to the Afghan frontier, and I ventured across the border into the latter country for a few minutes' friendly chat with the Afghan border guards. In Karachi we were warmly received by the President and the new Prime Minister, Mr. Suhrawardy, with whom I was able to have extensive and worthwhile talks in spite of the fact that our visit to Karachi coincided with that of the President of Syria.



ACCEPTS TRIBAL GIFT

Tribal Maliks in Pakistan are shown making the traditional gift of sheep to Mr. Martin when the Canadian Minister visited them during his tour of South and South-East Asia.

Homeward Bound

Our homeward journey took us through Beirut, Malta, Gibraltar and Lajes in the Azores where we made only brief stops. In retrospect, it is difficult to credit the tremendous amount of travelling and visiting with the people we were able to undertake in between our more formal and official engagements. Whatever I was doing, wherever I went in Asia, I spoke of Canada's

friendship with these nations, of the importance we attach to their social and economic reconstruction and to their attempts to improve the health and living standards of their people. I spoke of our belief in the United Nations as an essential instrument for the public discussion of the differences which divide nations and as one which we trust will ultimately resolve in a peaceful way the major problems which divide the world at this time. I made clear our attachment to the Commonwealth and all it stands for. Behind my simple observations was based the pattern which comes from a belief in spiritual values, in individual freedom, as opposed to totalitarian power. I emphasized that the Colombo Plan represents the sort of helpful association we wish to have with the countries of South and South-East Asia. No one can tell whether this mission has had the kind of useful effect which, in moments of deep sincerity, I would like to think possible, but in every instance I did my best to put forward not only the point of view of the Canadian Government but that of all the Canadian people. I have come back not as an expert but more humble than ever in the face of the great problems that stagger mankind in Asia today. I return confident in the belief that if we observe the principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, if we employ the media of adjudication and conciliation instead of force, if we bear in mind at the same time that every country has its own problems and its own way of dealing with them, then, assuming the necessary conditions of good faith, we shall, as mankind has done in the past, surmount the tremendous issues that confront us all.



PAKISTAN POWER STATION

An agreement between Canada and Pakistan by which Canada will contribute \$2,000,000 under the Colombo Plan toward construction of the Goalpara Steam Generating Station near Khulna in East Pakistan was concluded at Dacca, Pakistan, on January 5, 1957.

The agreement was signed for their respective countries by Mr. Paul Martin, Canadian Minister of National Health and Welfare, and Mr. Abdul Kaleque, Pakistan Minister of Labour and Works.

Designed to generate more than 16,000 kw. of electricity which will be used for existing and projected industry in the Khulna area of East Pakistan, the Goalpara Station is expected to be in operation by June 1957. The Canadian aid will be mostly in the form of equipment and will include four generating units and a powerhouse crane. Part of the Canadian equipment has arrived at the site and construction work will commence in the near future.

Other Colombo Plan projects being carried out in East Pakistan with Canadian assistance are the Ganges-Kobadak Power Plant now nearing completion, and the Cacca-Chittagong interconnector and electrical transmission line on which preliminary work is now in progress.

Notes Exchanged on Seaway Project

THE Department of External Affairs has made public the texts of Notes dated November 7 and December 4 which were exchanged by the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the United States Ambassador in Ottawa regarding the dredging to be done in the St. Lawrence River north and South of Cornwall Island.

The following is the text of the press release issued by the Department in conjunction with the texts of the Notes:

Notes Exchanged

The need for dredging in the channels around Cornwall Island arises from the St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Projects, construction of which is now proceeding. Twenty-seven foot dredging is required south of Cornwall Island to complete the deepened navigation channel between Lake St. Francis and the new Grass River Lock near Massena, N.Y. The United States plans for this south channel dredging called for additional dredging in the north channel, because of the provisions in the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 regarding dredging on one side of the boundary which affects the level and flow of the river on the other side. As the north channel lies wholly in Canadian territory, however, the Canadian Government has examined the United States plans for dredging there in relation to the current and possible future requirements for that channel.

In the first place, it is necessary to deepen the north channel to permit deep-draft ships to dock at Cornwall. Historically, that city has been available to all shipping using the St. Lawrence system, and unless the north channel is deepened to twenty-seven feet the deeper draft vessels making use of the new seaway will be unable to serve this growing community.

Secondly, it was considered that any dredging done in the north channel should be designed to fit in with long-term plans for possible Canadian navigation works in this area. It has for some years been the Canadian Government's intention to complete twenty-seven foot navigation works on the Canadian side at Cornwall, if and when it considered that the United States navigation works should be duplicated. This intention was clearly expressed in the Exchange of Notes of August 17, 1954 when the Government also agreed to consult the United States Government before undertaking these works. This position is maintained in the present note, as a twenty-seven foot channel north of Cornwall Island would be an essential part of such Canadian navigation works. It is more economical to dredge a twenty-seven foot north channel now when some dredging must be done, than to wait until the decision to build a Canadian canal and locks at Cornwall is taken. Although the Canadian Government has no intention of building this canal and locks at an early date, it considers it important to maintain the same freedom of action to duplicate that the United States has, subject to the same obligation to consult.

For these reasons, the Canadian Government has decided that the north channel dredging should take the form of a twenty-seven foot navigation channel, rather than the form suggested in the United States plans,

which would have met treaty requirements but served no other useful purpose. The Canadian St. Lawrence Seaway authority will accordingly proceed with the north channel dredging concurrently with that being undertaken in the south channel.

With respect to the south channel, there has been some question as to which entity was to do the various parts of the work, because the division of responsibility had not been clearly defined in previous agreements and arrangements. Because a considerable part of the south channel dredging is in Canadian territory, the Canadian Government has authorized the St. Lawrence Seaway Authority to undertake the dredging of a part of the south channel upstream from the International Boundary.

The engineering arrangements of July 18 mentioned in the Canadian Note provide for an allocation between the two seaway entities of the work to be done in both channels. A substantial contribution to the dredging costs will be made by the Ontario Hydro-Electric Power Commission and the New York State Power Authority. The power entities will themselves do additional dredging in the tailrace immediately below the Barnhart Island powerhouses, and this, together with the channel dredging north and south of Cornwall Island, will lower the tailwater level and increase the head of water which can be developed for power. The benefit from channel dredging is sufficient to justify a substantial payment by the power entities towards the cost of the dredging covered by the July 18 arrangements.

With the allocation of dredging north and south of Cornwall Island, work on the navigation channels in this area may proceed at the start of the next dredging season.

The text of the Note of November 7, 1956 to the Secretary of State for External Affairs from the Ambassador of the United States is as follows:

I have the honor to refer to the Department of State's aide memoire of April 21, 1956, concerning the excavations in connection with the St. Lawrence Seaway in the Cornwall Island channels, and also to discussions which have recently taken place between representatives of our two governments in which it was stated that your government had decided to dredge the channel north of Cornwall Island to a depth suitable for deep-water navigation at the same time that the seaway is dredged in the south channel.

The Government of the United States has given careful consideration to the situation which will exist if the Government of Canada proceeds to carry out its announced plan. While it believes that the proposed Canadian action is not in accord with the agreement which this Government entered into as a result of the enactment of PL-358, 83rd Congress (2nd Session) and with the other arrangements which have been made between our two governments with respect to the St. Lawrence Seaway, the Government of the United States does not wish to delay the construction of the joint Seaway project, in which both governments are mutually interested, and consequently it is bound by events to take cognizance of the *de facto* situation which is created by the decision of Canada to proceed with deep-water dredging in the channel north of Cornwall Island.

In the circumstances, the Government of the United States deems it important to record that the United States reserves all its rights to protect its interests in this matter.

The following is the text of the note dated December 4, 1956 to the Ambassador of the United States from the Secretary of State for External Affairs:

I have the honour to refer to your Note No. 126 of November 7, 1956, and to recent consultations between representatives of our two Governments regarding excavations in the St. Lawrence River north and south of Cornwall Island.

The Canadian Government cannot accept the opinion of the United States Government that the Canadian decision to undertake twenty-seven foot excavations in the Cornwall north channel is not in accord with the exchange of notes of August 17, 1954, or other arrangements between the two countries. In its note of August 17, 1954, the Canadian Government declared its intention to complete twenty-seven foot navigation works on the Canadian side of the International Rapids Section, if and when it considered, after consulting your Government, that parallel facilities were required. The Canadian Government does not propose to complete parallel navigation facilities at Cornwall at an early date. However, it considers that the Canadian right to build such facilities, including twenty-seven foot excavations north of Cornwall Island, was reserved in the 1954 exchange of notes and in the other exchanges of notes and letters on the St. Lawrence projects, whereas these exchanges of notes and letters cover only by implication the navigation excavations in the south channel. Moreover, the north channel excavations will compensate for the south channel excavations and thus serve the purposes of the Boundary Waters Treaty.

Engineers of the two seaway entities met on July 18, 1956, and evolved plans for the excavations in both channels and for the apportionment between the two seaway entities of responsibility for the different parts of the work. The Canadian Government finds that these plans meet the requirements of the Boundary Waters Treaty, and accepts responsibility for the excavations in the north channel and a part of those in the south. The Government has accordingly directed that, as the Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation proceeds with its excavations in the south channel, the St. Lawrence Seaway Authority should concurrently undertake the excavations assigned to it in the July 18 arrangements. It is understood that the two power entities will make a contribution to the costs of these excavations. As the plans envisage that each entity will undertake excavations in the territory of both countries, the Canadian Government is prepared to grant customs and immigration waivers on a reciprocal basis.

FAO Head Visits Ottawa

MR. B. R. Sen, who was elected Director-General of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization in September 1956 following a distinguished career in the diplomatic and government service of India, was in Ottawa from the evening of Thursday, January 24 until the afternoon of Tuesday, January 29.

While in Ottawa he called on the Prime Minister and the Minister of Agriculture and on Ministers or Deputy Ministers of Departments whose interests are associated with the work of FAO: National Health and Welfare, Northern Affairs and National Resources, Fisheries and Trade and Commerce. Mr. Sen also attended meetings of the Interdepartmental FAO Committee.

During his visit, Mr. Sen held a press conference and addressed an open meeting sponsored by the Ottawa branches of the Agricultural Institute of Canada, the United Nations Society, Canadian Political Science Association, the Institute of Public Administration, and the Civil Service Assembly of the United States and Canada.



FAO CHIEF VISITS CANADA

During his recent visit to Ottawa, Mr. B. R. Sen, Director-General of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, paid a visit to Friendship House, a club for students from other lands who are in Canada on Colombo Plan and United Nations scholarships. Mr. Sen is seated, centre, with Mr. H. L. Trueman, head of Foreign Agricultural Relations, Department of Agriculture, and president of the Overseas Friendship Society of Ottawa. From left to right, standing, are Mr. M. Battiah, of India; Mr. E. Sasson, of Israel; Mr. A. M. Joesdet, of Indonesia, and Miss Anjali Sarkar, of India.

NATO AND WESTERN UNITY

An address by Mr. L. B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the American Council on NATO, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York, January 29, 1957.

Lately the world's attention has been centred upon the United Nations, and in this past week or so I personally have been much more involved in United Nations affairs than I have in those of NATO. This, of course, is because we have been trying, through the United Nations, to ease the critical situation in the Middle East. That is an area that may not technically be within the NATO Treaty limits, but what happens there is certainly of vital concern to NATO.

The United Nations is important, very important. I don't think we could do without it. But as long as it remains an imperfect instrument for peace—especially as long as there is a "double standard" in its membership with respect to compliance with its resolutions—NATO is essential as a deterrent and a shield against aggression. I am very glad, therefore, to have this opportunity to meet and talk with a group concerned with the Atlantic Alliance, which remains the effective basis of our policy of collective security, and will remain so until the United Nations can discharge that responsibility on a wider basis.

I'm sure it would be profitable neither to you nor to me, or to enlightenment on the subject, if I were to try to talk about NATO from the military point of view. There is someone here much better qualified than I to do that—in fact, the one person most qualified to do so. So I will confine myself to the non-military aspect of the Alliance, which, if not so immediately important, is basic to the success of NATO.

As a son of the parsonage, I find the tradition of speaking to a text a useful one, and the text I should like to offer tonight is from the Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Co-operation in NATO, which was published last December. The passage appears in the introductory section of the Report, and reads as follows:

The fundamental historical fact . . . is that the nation state, by itself and relying exclusively on national policy and national power, is inadequate for progress or even for survival in the nuclear age. As the founders of the North Atlantic Treaty foresaw, the growing inter-dependence of states, politically and economically as well as militarily, calls for an ever-increasing measure of international cohesion and co-operation. Some states may be able to enjoy a degree of political and economic independence when things are going well. No state, however powerful, can guarantee its security and its welfare by national action alone.

NATO's First Task

If I may be pardoned a certain pride of co-authorship, I believe that passage expresses pretty clearly the basis of NATO and the principles upon which it must live and grow. It leads inevitably to the conclusion that the first task of NATO is to look to its internal strength—military and diplomatic—and to its unity. I would like to go on from there to some more particular thoughts, particularly about unity, without which our strength will not be sufficient. That unity, moreover, must be based on something deeper than defence co-operation alone if it is to survive. As we wrote in our report, "there cannot be unity in defence and disunity in foreign policy. That seems to me to be obvious, but some years of participation in international affairs have led me to the somewhat cynical conclusion that the obvious is often more difficult to implement than the obscure.

Triangular Relationship

The unity of NATO, its cohesion and strength, depend primarily upon the closest possible co-operation between the United States, the United Kingdom and France. They are the heart and soul—and much of the muscle—of the Atlantic Community and it ought to be the task of all of us to work for the maintenance and strengthening of the good relationship between them. There is nothing that I know of in contemporary international affairs which is more important.

The efforts which we continue to make—and rightly—to settle problems in the United Nations are no substitute for, though I hope they will always be complementary to, this other and closer co-operation.

Perhaps a Canadian may be pardoned for showing a special interest in this triangular relationship for we are, in a sense, a part of every side of the triangle.

The United States shares with us the North American Continent. We are linked with her by ties of friendship and neighbourliness, of geography and trade and self-interest. We could not break these links even if we desired, and we would be very foolish if we tried.

Our ties with Great Britain and France have a very special character, evolving from history and tradition and race. We have with them a family relationship of a kind which is easy to feel but hard to describe. It has been driven deep into our national consciousness, into our peoples' feelings. We Canadians have stood side by side with the people of our two mother countries in dark and dangerous days,

in 1914 and 1915; in 1939 and 1940; days when, if they had failed or faltered, freedom throughout the world would have fallen.

We may differ with them—as we have recently in the Suez crisis—not on principles and objectives, but on their methods in trying to solve a particular problem of foreign policy. But our distress when we feel we must so differ makes us all the more conscious of the necessity of keeping those differences to the irreducible minimum.

Canadians feel almost the same distress when there are difficulties and divisions between London and Paris, on the one hand, and Washington on the other; the more so because we know that this kind of difference can have far-reaching consequences from which only the enemies of peace can benefit.

You will realize, then, how strongly we in Canada feel about co-operation between the three great Western powers, in and out of NATO.

Fortunately, such a structure of co-operation does not have to be built from bare ground. There are strong ties between these three countries that existed long before NATO—ties of culture, of blood, and of partnership in war—which we must work hard to strengthen.

This work of building Atlantic unity, however, is not for Governments alone, but for every citizen of all the Atlantic nations. It lays a duty on each of us to try our best to understand the national attitudes, the national problems, and even the national prejudices of our NATO partners, and to keep constantly in mind the over-riding compelling need for working together.

We have had recently in the Middle East an unhappy, indeed an alarming demonstration of what may occur when co-operation breaks down among the three major members of the Atlantic Alliance. I have no intention of going into the record of the divergence of policy that occurred there, but it would be pointless, even harmful, to pretend that it did not happen. We have to face the fact that despite all hopeful progress toward closer unity in recent years, NATO was badly shaken by an important disagreement among certain of its members on the best way of dealing with a critical situation. It is, however, a mistake to brood over the past. It is better to draw the necessary conclusion from this experience so that it will not recur.

Effective Consultation Needed

An obvious lesson is that there needs to be much more effective consultation in NATO on foreign policies in advance of national decisions regarding those policies. I am not suggesting that more effective consultation of this kind will rule out all possibility of divergent policies, any more than it rules out the necessity of a government acting on its own quickly and effectively in a genuine emergency. There will always be some difference of national approach to particular problems in a democratic coalition such as ours, and

there will always be domestic considerations impinging on the requirements for consultation with allies. But if we are to preserve NATO, we cannot afford to let such differences of approach or our pre-occupations with domestic considerations lead to deep division of policy on important matters.

North Atlantic consultation and co-operation, however, leading to the maximum unity of policy—if I may venture to quote again from the Report of the Committee of Three, "will not be brought about in a day or by a declaration, but by creating over the years and through a whole series of national acts and policies, the habits and traditions and precedents for such co-operation and unity. The process will be a slow and gradual one at best, slower than we might wish. We can be satisfied if it is steady and sure. This will not be the case, however, unless the member governments—especially the more powerful ones—are willing to work, to a much greater extent than hitherto, with and through NATO for more than purposes of collective military defence".

It is easy, of course, to profess devotion to the principle of political consultation in NATO. It is difficult, almost impossible, if the necessary conviction is lacking, to convert the profession into practice. Consultation within an alliance means more than exchange of information, though that is necessary. It means more than letting the NATO Council know about national decisions that have already been taken or trying to enlist support for those decisions. It means the discussion of problems collectively, in the early stages of policy formation, and before national positions become fixed. At best, this will result in collective decisions on matters of common interest affecting the alliance. At the least, and this minimum is essential if a coalition is to be maintained, it will ensure that no action is taken by one member without a knowledge of the views of the others. We must keep pressing for the maximum, but I confess there have been occasions recently when I would have been glad to settle for the minimum!

Another lesson we might profitably draw from the Middle East crisis is that events outside the strict geographical area of the North Atlantic Treaty can be of very vital concern to the members of NATO and ought, therefore, to be discussed in a NATO context. Geographical limits cannot be placed upon the process of consultation on national policies. We certainly have had cause to learn this recently if we never knew it before; just as we also know that the NATO circle of consultation and co-operation will not be large enough for many of these questions, and that our NATO circle can never be exclusive.

I have said earlier that the cohesion and strength of NATO depend primarily upon the closest possible co-operation between the United States, the United Kingdom and France, and in what I have just said about consultation, I have been thinking particularly of consultation among these three. They

are the members of NATO with the most to contribute to the Atlantic Community, in both a material and political sense. They carry the heaviest responsibilities and upon them mainly rests the obligation to work together. This is particularly true of the United States because it is the strongest member of the Alliance. In fact, it has been said recently that the United States is the only member that has any substantial freedom to choose its course of action for itself. I think I understand what the author of that remark meant, but I am inclined to doubt if even the United States has very much freedom to choose its own course of action in this narrowing world and in the face of apparently limitless Soviet ambitions. I am fully aware, however, of the crushing weight of responsibility carried by the United States and the other major members of NATO, and I realize how easy it is for those who do not have such great responsibilities to preach about consultation. Let me, however, add just one further point. While the bigger members of NATO may have far more to contribute, militarily and otherwise, than the smaller ones, there is no member we could easily do without. We need them all and we want them all, freely and enthusiastically doing their part to build up Atlantic unity. It is very important, therefore, that the smaller members of NATO have a sense of full participation in the councils of the Alliance and that they are taken into the confidence of the other members to the greatest possible extent. The result, I am sure, will be better than that suggested by a Princeton Professor in the Times this morning when he wrote:

Do not coalitions of this sort (asked the professor) always end by the weaker members of the group trying to cash in on their nuisance value at the expense of the stronger and richer members?

We have good machinery in the NATO Council for this close consultation. We have, I think, made recommendations in our Committee Report by which this machinery can be improved. NATO has an efficient and devoted Secretariat, at the head of which is a man, Lord Ismay, who has provided unselfish, experienced and international leadership of a very exceptional kind which has left us all greatly in his debt. As he leaves NATO, we are indeed fortunate in securing as his successor a dynamic and brilliant statesman, that great European and believer, as well, in Atlantic unity, Paul Henri Spaak.

It is not, however, the machinery which matters so much. It is the will of governments to use that machinery to bring about close co-operation and harmony in the formulation and execution of policy.

If we do not display that *will*, with something of the determination and desire—and even passion—that we show in national affairs, then NATO will weaken and eventually die for it will be solely a military alliance held together only by a common fear and disappearing when that fear disappears or, perhaps, seems to disappear.

A Supreme Test

The Atlantic nations are now facing a supreme test of their capacity to unite. If they fail in this, they may find it difficult to prosper and even survive as free nations. This test is the inescapable result of the tragic experiences of the recent past. Success in meeting it is made the more essential by the awful necessities of a thermo-nuclear future. Can we combine our national strengths, merge our national policies, and modify our national prides and prejudices to meet this test; or will we relax into that anarchical and jealous independence which seems unfortunately to have been the characteristic and dominating feature of sovereign states in modern times, except when they are confronted with great and pressing peril.

Mutual understanding is, I believe, the quality that will help us most in finding the right answer through the greater strength and unity of NATO members—understanding, patience and tolerance, as we try to meet collectively a destiny which in any case will be collective.

This essential understanding between us is hindered by many things; including the differences within the NATO states of power and historical development and tradition. May I mention one way in which these differences reflect themselves and create misunderstanding. Our own two countries, the United States and Canada, have emerged although by different roads, from colonial status; yours by the one which led to battle, ours by the one which led to conference. As two states, covering a great continent, we have no need for living and working space for our people outside our boundaries; therefore, no temptation to absorb other areas for their riches or resources, of which we have an abundance at home. Both historical and practical considerations, therefore, enable us to indulge to the utmost our North American desire for moral satisfaction by sympathizing with and supporting peoples who have just won or are seeking to win national independence from other powers. This is a worthy instinct and one for which we have no reason to apologize. But we should not let it obscure the truth that whatever the defects of colonial policies and practices over the last two centuries may have been (and these defects have undoubtedly existed and sowed the seeds of bitter feelings), the principal powers in Western Europe, "colonial" because of pressures and circumstances that we have not experienced, have contributed very largely to the fact that so large a part of the world has today either attained sovereign power or is about to attain it. Independence movements, whether in Africa or in Asia, have all received much from those European sources of personal and national freedom. We are perhaps too much inclined to associate the word "colonialism" with "exploitation", and too little to recognize the treasures of law and government, of administrative knowledge and of technical skill, which flowed from the

Western European powers to their colonial possessions and which provided the essential foundation and indeed the framework upon which the edifice of sovereign independence could be erected. It may be true that "good government is no substitute for self-government", but it is equally true that only good government can make self-government tolerable, except on the basis of despotism, which does not become freedom merely because the word "National" comes before it.

In regard to this and many other problems arising out of the differing circumstances of

the NATO partners, we should show that understanding which is as important, if not more important in strengthening our coalition than developing techniques of co-operation, certainly than writing reports or making speeches about such co-operation.

The need, then, for NATO, in the military and non-military aspects of co-operation, is as great as ever. Our determination to satisfy that need by our national policies and attitudes should be as great as ever. The difficulties ahead are great. Our resolve to overcome them must be greater.

FURTHER AID TO HUNGARIANS

The Department of External Affairs announced January 31 that the second \$500,000 of the \$1,000,000 voted for Hungarian relief by Parliament in its special session in November will be distributed through the facilities of the Canadian Red Cross Society and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

The Canadian Red Cross will receive \$100,000 for use in its international assistance programme for Hungarian relief which, among other things, covers the provision of aid to refugees in various camps throughout Europe including those in the Netherlands where immigrants to Canada are now located.

The High Commissioner for Refugees, who has been designated by the United Nations Secretary-General to co-ordinate United Nations activities in the field of Hungarian relief, will receive \$400,000.

Of the \$400,000 which will be turned over to the High Commissioner for Refugees, \$250,000 is intended for the use of the Austrian Government to help provide for Hungarian refugees in Austria who are not now covered by the terms of the United Nations-International Red Cross Agreement under which the Red Cross acts as administrator for the United Nations in certain of the refugee camps in Austria.

APPOINTMENTS AND TRANSFERS IN THE CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

- Mr. W. A. Irwin, Canadian Commissioner to Australia, appointed Canadian Ambassador to Brazil. Proceeded to Brazil January 2, 1957.
- Mr. H. Allard, Permanent Representative of Canada to the European Office of the United Nations, Geneva, appointed Canadian Ambassador to Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Haiti. Proceeded to Havana January 17, 1957.
- Mr. J. Fast posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Moscow, effective January 2, 1957.
- Mr. A. Gotlieb appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective January 2, 1957.
- Mr. C. E. Bourbonnière posted from temporary duty at the Delegation of Canada to the United Nations General Assembly, New York, to the Permanent Mission of Canada to the European Office of the United Nations, Geneva, effective January 4, 1957.
- Mr. G. J. L. Choquette posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Tokyo, effective January 10, 1957.
- Mr. J. G. Maranda posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Cairo, effective January 12, 1957.
- Mr. F. C. Finnie transferred from the Delegation of Canada to the North Atlantic Council, Paris, to the Canadian Embassy, Moscow, effective January 12, 1957.
- Mr. G. E. Cox transferred from the Canadian Embassy, Vienna, to the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, London, effective January 22, 1957.
- Mr. L. Couillard posted from the Canadian Embassy, Washington, to Ottawa, effective January 23, 1957.
- Mr. K. J. Burbridge posted from the Delegation of Canada to the North Atlantic Council, Paris, to Ottawa, effective January 23, 1957.
- Mr. G. Ignatieff posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Belgrade, effective January 29, 1957.
- Mr. G. R. Harman posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Legation, Prague, effective January 29, 1957.
- Mr. P. A. Bridle posted from Ottawa to the Delegation of Canada to the North Atlantic Council, Paris, effective December 23, 1956.

CURRENT UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS*

A Selected List

a) Printed documents:

Index to proceedings of the General Assembly. Tenth session, 20 Sept. to 20 Dec. 1955. ST/LIB/SER.B/A.6; Bibliographical Series No. A.6. N.Y., 1956. 95 p. Sales No.: 1956. I.21. \$1.00.

Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly during its First Emergency Special Session from 1 to 10 November 1956. A/3354. N.Y., 1956. 3 p. G.A.O.R.: First Emergency Special Session, Supplement No. 1.

Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly during its Second Emergency Special Session from 4 to 10 November 1956. A/3355. N.Y., 1956. 3 p. G.A.O.R.: Second Emergency Special Session, Supplement No. 1.

* Printed documents may be procured from the Canadian sales agents for United Nations Publications. The Ryerson Press, 299 Queen Street West, Toronto, and Periodica Inc., 5112 avenue Papineau, Montreal or from their sub-agents. Book Room Limited Chronicle Building Halifax; McGill University Book Store Montreal; University of Toronto Press and Book Store, Toronto; University of British Columbia Book Store Vancouver; University of Montreal Book Store, Montreal; and Les Presses Universitaires, Laval, Quebec. Certain mimeographed document series are available by annual subscription. Further information can be obtained from Sales and Circulation Section, United Nations, New York. UNESCO publications can be obtained from their sales agents. University of Toronto Press, Toronto, and Periodica Inc., 5112 avenue Papineau, Montreal. All publications and documents may be consulted at certain designated libraries listed in "External Affairs", February 1954, p. 67.

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. Accounts for the financial year ended 30 June 1956 and report of the board of auditors. A/3211. 18 p. N.Y., 1956. G.A.O.R.: Eleventh session, Supplement No. 6B.

United Nations Visiting Mission to the Trust Territories of Togoland under British Administration and Togoland under French Administration, 1955. Special report on the Togoland unification problem and the future of the trust territory of Togoland under British administration; together with related documents. T/1288. N.Y., 1956. 66 p. Trusteeship Council Official Records: Fifth special session (24 Oct. - 14 Dec. 1955), Supplement No. 2.

United Nations Visiting Mission to the Trust Territories of the Cameroons under British Administration and the Cameroons under French Administration, 1955. Report on the Cameroons under French Administration; together with related documents. T/1240. N.Y., 1956. 52 p. Trusteeship Council Official Records: Seventeenth session (7 Feb. - 6 April 1956), Supplement No. 4.

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. (Conference on the Statute held at Headquarters of the U.N., 20 Sept. to 26 Oct. 1956). IAEA/CS/13. N.Y., Nov. 1956. 45 p.

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International action in Asia and the Far East. Housing, Building and Planning No. 9. ST/SOA/SER./C/9. N.Y., Sept. 1955. 131 p. Sales No: 1955.IV.19.

Records of the First Conference of European National Commissions for Unesco, Aix-en-Provence, 29 May to 2 June 1956. Issued by the French National Commission for Unesco after the close of the Aix-en-Provence Conference. 35 p.

Unesco source book for science teaching. Paris, 1956. 220 p.

Human and Animal Ecology. (Review of research). Arid Zone Research - VII. Paris, 1957. 244 p.

Annual report of the director of the United Nations Relief Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East covering the period 1 July 1955 to 30 June 1956. A/3212. N.Y., 1956. 42 p. GAOR: Eleventh session, Supplement No. 14.

First United Nations Congress on the prevention of crime and the treatment of offenders; Geneva, 22 August-3 September 1955. Report prepared by the Secretariat. A/CONF.6/1. N.Y., Dept. of Economic and Social Affairs, 1956. 103 p. Sales No: 1956.IV.4.

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International classification of hard coals by type. Prepared by the Secretariat of the Economic Commission for Europe. E/ECE/247; E/ECE/COAL/110. Geneva, August 1956. 52 p. Sales No: 1956.II.E.4.

Locomotive boiler water treatment. Report presented to railway sub-committee of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East. Third session, Tokyo, October 1954. E/CN.11/436. Bangkok, 1956. 78 p. Sales No: 1956.II.F.6.

ILO

Co-operation. A workers' education manual. Geneva, 1956. 157 p.

UNESCO

Index translationum. International bibliography of translations. Paris, 1957. 663 p. Price: \$14.00.

XIXth International Conference on Public Education 1956. Paris, Unesco, and Geneva, International Bureau of Education, 1956. Publication No. 176. 158 p.

WHO

Ninth World Health Assembly, Geneva, 8-25 May 1956. Resolutions and Decisions. Plenary Meetings (Verbatim Records). Committees (Minutes and reports). Annexes. Geneva, December 1956. Official Records of the WHO, No. 71. 463 p. Price: \$3.25.

Official Records of the WHO, No. 74. Proposed programme and budget estimates for the financial year 1 Jan.-31 Dec. 1958, with the proposed programme and estimated expenditure for technical assistance for economic development of under-developed countries. Palais des Nations, WHO, Geneva, December 1956. 440 p. Price: \$3.25.

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ICJ

International Court of Justice yearbook 1955 - 1956. N.Y., 1956. 270 p. Sales No: 154.

Admissibility of hearings of petitioners by the Committee on South West Africa. (Advisory Opinion of June 1, 1956). ICJ Pleadings. N.Y., 1956. 93 p. Sales No: 152.

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Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organisation upon complaints made against the Unesco. Advisory opinion of October 23, 1956. N.Y., 1956. 168 p. Sales No: 156.

b) Mimeographed documents:

Development of international travel, its present increasing volume and future prospects. E/2933. 23 November 1956. 157 p.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Action

Bilateral

India

Agreement on the Canada-India Colombo Plan, Kundah Hydro-Electric Power Project.
Signed at New Delhi December 29, 1956.
Entered into force December 29, 1956.

Ceylon

Exchange of Notes supplementary to the Exchange of Notes of July 11, 1952 for the Co-operative Economic Development of Ceylon.
Signed at Colombo December 21, 1956.
Entered into force, December 21, 1956.

United States of America

Exchange of Notes concerning the use of the Haines Cut-off Road by the United States Army for the winter maintenance of the Haines-Fairbanks Pipeline.
Signed at Ottawa January 16, 17, 1957.
Entered into force January 17, 1957.

Pakistan

Exchange of Notes concerning the joint financing and construction by Canada and Pakistan of the Goalpara Steam Generating Plant under the Colombo Plan.
Signed at Dacca January 5, 1957.
Entered into Force January 5, 1957.

Multilateral

Protocol amending the International Sugar Agreement opened for signature at London on October 1, 1953.
Signed by Canada December 17, 1956.

Convention on the Political Rights of Women Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations at its Seventh Session.
Canada's Instrument of Accession deposited January 30, 1957.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



CANADA

March 1957

Vol. 9 No. 3

• EXTERNAL AFFAIRS is issued monthly in English and French by the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa. It provides reference material on Canada's external relations and reports on the current work and activities of the Department. Any material in this publication may be reproduced. Citation of EXTERNAL AFFAIRS as the source would be appreciated. Subscription rates: ONE DOLLAR per year (Students, FIFTY CENTS) post free. Remittances, payable to the Receiver General of Canada, should be sent to the Queen's Printer, Ottawa, Canada.

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Ottawa, Canada

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
Mr. Mollet Visits Canada

AT the invitation of the Government His Excellency Guy Mollet, Prime Minister of France, visited Canada from March 2 to March 4.

Upon his arrival in Ottawa Mr. Mollet laid a wreath at the National War Memorial and signed the Visitor's Book at Government House, after which he was entertained at luncheon by Prime Minister St. Laurent. In the evening Mr. Mollet was guest of honour at a dinner and a reception given by His Excellency Francis Lacoste, Ambassador of France, and Mrs. Lacoste at the French Embassy.

On March 3 Mr. Mollet flew to Quebec City where he was welcomed by the Premier of the Province, by the Mayor, and by the representative of the Lieutenant-Governor. In addition to visiting points of interest in and around the city he attended a reception at Laval University and gave press interviews at the Consulate General of France. Mr. Mollet was also entertained at a dinner in his honour given by the Lieutenant-Governor and Mrs. Fauteux at Bois de Coulonge.

On the last day of his visit Mr. Mollet held a press conference after which he addressed a special joint sitting of Members of the Senate and of the House of Commons in the House of Commons Chamber. Following a luncheon given by His Excellency the Governor General, Mr. Mollet left for Montreal where he attended a civic reception and gave further press interviews before departing for Paris.



During the time spent in Ottawa, Mr. Mollet and his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Christian Pineau, had discussions with Prime Minister St. Laurent and Mr. L. B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs. In giving a report of these discussions to the House of Commons on March 6 Mr. St. Laurent said:

Let me say at once that no formal or informal agreements were concluded between France and Canada during this visit. Mr. Mollet and Mr. Pineau did not come to Ottawa for that purpose. They were paying us an official visit for the purpose of exchanging views on a wide range of topics of importance to both governments. In the course of these discussions Mr. Mollet expressed his point of view and I expressed mine, but we found ourselves in a very wide measure of agreement and I can assure the House that from our point of view the discussions we had with our distinguished visitors were not only very timely but highly satisfactory.

Mr. Mollet has already given the House a general indication of the topics which our discussions covered and these will be found in the transcript of the address he made to the House. I do not think it is necessary that I repeat them. He reported to the House his discussions and even expressed his view about the advantages of this solid basis of the new Franco-German relations; the European atomic energy community, Euratom; common European marketing; the Atlantic Alliance in its political, military and economic aspects; the Algerian problem; the Middle East situation; the future of the Suez Canal; and the prevention of subversive Soviet infiltration into the Arab world. I agree fully with the summary he expressed to the House, which will be found in French on page 1872 of Hansard of March 4 and on page 2 of the translation of those remarks. I quote in part:

"The problems of which I have been speaking to you have been—"

I am reluctant to go into any greater detail than Mr. Mollet did because the conversations were of a confidential character and covered the matters which he enumerated. I can assure the House that we both felt we had had a very useful exchange of views. I think I said in opening my remarks that no agreements or understandings had been reached. The discussions formed the basis, however, of certain things the French Government would be glad if we found it possible to do and to which we promised to give careful and sympathetic consideration.

On the other hand I was informed that the French Government hoped to be placing with my colleague, the Minister of Trade and Commerce (Mr. Howe), in the near future very substantial orders for Canadian wheat.

Mr. Mollet's Address

The text of Mr. Mollet's address in the Commons Chamber is as follows:

Mr. Prime Minister, the words, which you have addressed with so much sincerity and sympathy, to my country, have touched me profoundly and they will go right to the heart of the French people. You have expressed in these words, on such an elevated plane of thought, the significance of my visit here and the nature of the relations, so intimate and direct, which have never ceased to exist between France and Canada since the beginning of your country's history. For all this I should like to offer my warmest thanks, and also for the remarks, so full of friendship, which you have devoted to me personally.

No token of esteem could be more precious to me.

Mr. Speaker, Members of the Houses of Parliament, it is a very great honour for me to be able to transmit, today, to the Honourable Members of the Parliament of Canada the message of warm friendship which my country has asked me to deliver. I should like to do it at this time with all my heart and all my conviction. During these much too brief days which I have spent in your country, I have felt, profoundly, the rare quality of the Franco-Canadian friendship,

the strength of the bonds between us tightened by the battles we have fought side by side during two world wars. In the invitation which you addressed to me I saw a new manifestation of this friendship and I was proud to accept.

In recalling some of the great tasks undertaken by France, Mr. St. Laurent himself prompted me to tell you, in a few words, something of the achievements of French policy, something of our worries and concerns which, I know, are often much the same as your own.

European Union

To achieve the unification of Europe is one of our main objectives. I have striven to establish it upon a solid Franco-German entente, and I have felt a similar determination in Chancellor Adenauer and in the German Government. We were thus able to reach an equitable solution of the problems which had long made relations so difficult between our two countries. Today Franco-German rivalry no longer exists; there is instead a confident co-operation which permits the establishment of ever closer ties.

With the way thus open to a needed European Union, we have been able to make decisive progress in the economic integration of the continent, in bringing to successful conclusion the treaties which will establish the European Atomic Community—EURATOM—and the Common European Market. Their signing will take place within a few weeks.

By EURATOM, the six countries of the European Continent will pool their atomic destinies. Their atomic industry, the expansion of this is already very promising, will be founded immediately on a European basis and may look forward to launching programmes on a scale to which none of them, by itself, could have aspired. As for the Common European Market, it is designed to abolish customs barriers, harmonize social legislation and co-ordinate economic policies in a way that will constitute a vast market of 160 million consumers where the wealth, the merchandise and the people will circulate freely.

You can well imagine that the drawing up of these treaties, which will bind the future of our countries for generations, has been particularly delicate. I am not unaware that your country has expressed certain reservations about some of the clauses of the Treaty of the Common Market. This would not be the place to discuss the details. But the point I should like to stress in particular is that, within a few months, a living and ever developing and expanding reality will have been created, the European Economic Community, the presence of which will profoundly modify present basic conditions. The prospects of commercial exchanges with a united Europe, in full development, will be radically different from those with our isolated countries and, no doubt, will be greatly

expanded. So I beg you to have confidence in the dynamism of the new organizations, so that in its very working and operation, the imperfections you criticize may be corrected.

Europe is the only way for the countries of that continent to recover true independence. It is the only way to guarantee a solid and enduring Atlantic Alliance. The relations between the European and American continents can then develop on the basis of true equality. There is nothing durable in the world, when it is not founded on equality and on free co-operation.

Beyond the iron curtain, the union of the European peoples will also be a symbol of hope for all men, living under oppression, who have not lost their will to liberty.

Two weeks ago, six European prime ministers met in Paris, on the invitation of France, to take a major decision, that of associating with Europe the African territories today linked with Belgium and France.

As soon as it was formed, the European Community decided to play the card of Africa. The industrial power of the whole of Europe will be mobilized to assure the technical equipment and social progress of Africa. I shall not hide that this historic step is largely due to the tenacious insistence of France.

Policy in Africa

The decision which I have just recalled is in line with the new policy that my Government is applying in Africa—a policy which, I fear, too little known outside my own country. Will you permit me to outline it briefly?

We are making almost revolutionary transformations in our overseas territories. The peoples are receiving the right to manage their own affairs democratically within the framework of union with France, to which they have freely consented. On March 31 next, this very month, single college elections will permit the populations of all French Africa to choose their own representatives—in full liberty—in the territorial assemblies which will appoint, in turn, the ministers in charge of administering the territories.

Similar reforms recently led to the creation of the autonomous Republic of Togo, and long discussions in the United Nations on this question have revealed their work and their democratic nature.

France has refused to make a "closed preserve" of the African territories. That is why she has opened their doors to Europe, which will give them their greatest chance. Over the next five years, the European effort in aid of Africa will exceed five hundred million dollars, in addition to a French effort which will, no doubt, exceed two billion dollars.

These figures speak for themselves. They show our resolve to apply in Africa the only possible remedy to those accomplices, blind nationalism and communism; to build a

Eurafrican group, a vast union of free peoples, efficiently helping one another, to their mutual benefit and their common prosperity.

Atlantic Alliance

I reminded you a little earlier that a European union would guarantee the consolidation of the Atlantic Alliance. This consideration weighed heavily in our decision to construct Europe. The Atlantic Alliance is one of the corner-stones of French policy, as it is of the policy of Canada. I should like here to pay homage to the eminent role that the Secretary of State of External Affairs of Canada, Mr. Lester B. Pearson, has not ceased to play in all the work of the Atlantic organization.

Besides its important contribution to the defence of the American Continent, your country—and it is not one of the lesser reasons for our gratitude—has accepted an active part in the defence of the European Continent. To help balance the enormous mass of Soviet divisions, Canada, like the United States and Great Britain, has stationed a part of her armed forces on the European peninsula. The presence of your soldiers on our soil imposes a sacrifice upon you for which I wish to thank you in the name of France. It is of exceptional importance to us.

In fact, in 1914, as in 1939, if there had been some thousands of British, American and Canadian soldiers in Europe, neither William II nor Hitler would have gone to war. They would have known that, from the very first moment, an immense coalition would be raised against them. Today, because of the physical presence of your soldiers, and the British and American soldiers, the Soviet Union cannot have the slightest doubt about the consequences to herself of any aggression. The presence of these soldiers is a type of "deterrent" policy of the Atlantic pact.

The Atlantic Alliance seems to me even more important today than it was eight years ago at the moment of its creation. Also, it imposes, perhaps more than ever, a perfect entente among the allied nations on the strategic and tactical planes. It is necessary that these decisions be taken in common when it comes to effectives and armaments, and if technical developments raise new problems in this domain, they must be resolved in common. I insist upon solemnly recalling these requirements before you.

Algerian Problem

I shall say a few words to you now on a purely French problem but which is such a grave one for us that I want to tell you about it personally. It has to do with Algeria. Your Government in the course of the debate in the United Nations has accorded us the loyal and unfailing support which we have asked of it, and I should like to express to it here the thanks of France.

The Algerian problem, unhappily, is too little known outside of France. In completely good faith, many of our friends think that our policy is nothing more than a manifestation of obsolete colonialism. I shall speak to you quite frankly and quite directly. In my eyes, what is most essential in the Algerian affair is not to maintain the links between Algeria and France. That is far too much in the interests of Algeria to be seriously questioned. The aid which France has given to Algeria since the Second World War, to cite only one figure, represents twice the sum of all the moneys France herself received under the Marshall Plan.

The fundamental element in the Algerian problem is the presence in the country of two groups, each distinct from the other, both important and each indispensable to the life of the other—1,200,000 Algerians of European origin on one side and eight million Moslems on the other.

The Algerians of European origin began to settle there in 1830. They have their families in Algeria and they have their dead. Algeria is their country—their patrie—and, for the most part, it is their toil which has developed its resources. They feel like pioneers, and that is what they are. It is not acceptable that they be oppressed or chased out today by the mass of the Moslems, any more than it is acceptable that they profit by temporary economic advantages to oppress the Moslems. The key to the Algerian problem is to obtain, at one and the same time, full equality of rights for all the inhabitants of Algeria—economic as well as political rights—and the co-existence of the group of European origin and of Moslem origin, without either being able to oppress the other. The first step toward any settlement is that violence cease. Also, France has proposed a "cease-fire" without any political "strings". To settle the general conditions, the French Government is ready to make direct and official contact with those who are fighting.

Within three months of a return to peace free, single college elections will be organized. Each will be able to vote according to his conscience. We invite the democratic nations to send their representatives to Algeria so they may observe the proper procedure of the vote.

It is with these elected representatives of Algeria, whatever their political opinions, that we would discuss the future organization of Algeria. It will result in the agreement of all the interested parties, that is to say, the populations of Algeria and the populations of France.

This is the content of the French program for Algeria. You will agree with me that it conforms to the principles of democracy. The play is now to our adversaries. We offer them a cease-fire. Are they ready to renounce violence? We propose free elections, held under the eyes of representatives of the democratic countries, and immediate discussion

with the elected representatives of the Algerian populations. Why have they refused up to now? France is not discouraged. She will multiply, tirelessly, the efforts to convince all the inhabitants of Algeria of her will to peace and justice.

Middle East

You may be surprised that I have not taken advantage of this political survey to say a few words to you about another problem, namely the situation in the Middle East. Whatever may have been our disagreements at one moment, I must underline the positive character and the extreme usefulness of the initiatives taken by the Canadian Government, how its interventions, always animated by the most friendly spirit, have often been decisive.

An important step has been taken in the Middle East, towards the restoration of an enduring peace, founded on justice and respect for international law, which is the common aim of our countries. France has not been a stranger to the agreements which have been made, and I have the right to say that she has considerably aided in their conclusion.

The retreat of Israel from Gaza and the straits of Sharm-el-Shaik does not constitute an end. The intervention of the United Nations Emergency Force makes it possible to avoid a return, pure and simple, to the original situation. It is indispensable that we profit by its presence to conclude a general peace settlement. A partial or provisional settlement in the Middle East will always be a bad solution. Our peoples will not permit us to allow the situation to deteriorate again as it did in the past eight years when, under the cover of an armistice, the disorders were perpetuated and a state of masked warfare was finally established while, at the same time, the resolutions passed by the United Nations were constantly being violated.

We must attack the basic causes of the tensions in the Middle East. I should like to enumerate for you some of those which seem to me to be the principal ones. Some of them are "geographic" and others are purely "political".

The first of the "geographic" causes is the frontiers of Israel and, in fact, the existence of the state of Israel itself. The conclusion of a peace treaty between Israel and her Arab neighbours, fixing her frontiers and guaranteeing the integrity of her territory, is an absolute necessity. I am very happy that the representatives of the great countries expressed their determination in the General Assembly of the United Nations that this treaty will be interposed as soon as possible. I am happy that the big nations have declared their insistence that free passage of ships in the international waters of the Gulf of Aqaba shall be respected.

The Suez Canal is also one of the "geographic" causes of tension. Its sabotage by Egypt without any military motive to justify it, and the blackmail exercised since then

over the pace of clearing and opening the Canal, shows the little confidence merited by the Government of Egypt. As was stipulated before Security Council, the Suez Canal must be "withdrawn from the political policies of every country and, in particular from that of Egypt. The economic equilibrium of Europe and the countries of South-East Asia cannot depend solely on the goodwill of a commonplace Egyptian dictator.

Still more vital are the causes which I have called "political", and it is upon the attitude which will be taken about them, that will depend the definite settlement of other problems. I am speaking of the pan-Arab manoeuvres of Egypt and the Soviet infiltration of the Middle East.

The pan-Arab dreams of Colonel Nasser are defined with brutal clarity in his book, "The Philosophy of Revolution". He himself has declared his determination to organize around a "hero"—that is the way in which he speaks of himself—a united Arab world "from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf", in order to achieve it, to utilize as a means of pressure on the West, the oil of the Middle East and the geographic position of his own country—that is to say, the Suez Canal. We now know that they were not idle threats.

To denounce pan-Arabism does not signify an attack on the Arab world. Pan-Arabism is not the expression of a people's national feeling. It is, as pan-Germanism and pan-Slavism have been in the past, a myth in whose name a people's independence is attacked.

It is the duty of the free nations to oppose a united front to the subversive actions of pan-Arabism, to see that provocation does not pay, and that there can be no transactions whatsoever which do not respect international obligations. Such an attitude is even more necessary since pan-Arabism is the best vehicle for communist infiltration. Faithful to Lenin's directives, the Soviet leaders are systematically supporting ultra-nationalism. Cairo and Damascus, the sources of pan-Arabism, have thus become the strongest bridgeheads of the U.S.S.R.

From this point of view the declaration of President Eisenhower assumes great importance. The Soviet Union has been, in the past, attentive to such warnings. I shall add that any split in the united front of the free nations, in the Middle East, will be exploited by the Soviet Union. It is therefore our duty to put into effect in this part of the world a concerted, long-range policy.

That is what I have expressed to the Canadian Government, as to the President of the United States, and I believe—let me say I am sure—that my visits will have favoured the first steps.

The problems of which I have been speaking to you have been, as you may imagine, the object of thorough discussions with the

Prime Minister of Canada. I was pleased to note the large area of agreement between us. I am certain that in these next weeks France and Canada will find themselves side by side in the international meetings, in common defence of the same causes and in seeking solutions in harmony with law and justice.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Prime Minister, Members of the Houses of Parliament. In a few hours my friend Mr. Pineau, our assistants and myself will be leaving your magnificent country. The memory of the hours we have spent in it, the memory of the simplicity and fraternal warmth of your welcome, will remain with us. I shall take testimony of it to

the French people. I shall tell them that, in dark days and fair, they can rely on the friendship and the support of this great people in full expansion.

To you, also, I should like to say that you may rely on the French people, and on the youth of France. By their labour they have overcome the destruction of the war, they are confident in the future of their country, they are ready to face the challenging tasks which lie before them—the construction of Europe, the development of the Sahara, the building of Eurafrika. Yes, at your side, in all just and generous undertakings, you will always find "la France éternelle".



Capital Press Service

"EURATOM" COMMITTEE

Shown with several Canadian Government officials in the East Block of Canada's Parliament Buildings are the members of the three-man committee recently set up by the six Western European powers negotiating a nuclear energy pool ("Euratom"). *Left to right:* Professor Francesco Giordani, President of Italy's National Research Council; Mr. W. J. Bennett, President of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited; Herr Franz Eitel, Senior Vice-President of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community; Monsieur Louis Armand, Director General of the French State Railways and President of the Industrial Equipment Committee of the French Atomic Energy Commission; Mr. R. M. Macdonnell, Canada's Deputy Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs; and Mr. R. B. Bryce, Secretary of the Canadian Cabinet.

Canada and the United Nations

Middle East Crisis

Background (1)

Throughout the month of February, the efforts of the United Nations in connection with Middle East problems continued to be concentrated upon efforts to secure Israeli withdrawal from the Sharm al-Shaikh area on the west coast of the Gulf of Aqaba and from the Gaza strip in circumstances which would be conducive to the creation and maintenance of peaceful conditions in the Middle East. These efforts were premised mainly upon two related resolutions which had been adopted by the General Assembly on February 2. The first called upon Israel to complete its withdrawal behind the armistice demarcation line without further delay. The second recognized the view, of which the Canadian Delegation has been a leading proponent, that withdrawal by Israel should be followed by "action which would assure progress toward the creation of peaceful conditions"; called upon Egypt and Israel to observe scrupulously the provisions of the 1949 armistice agreement; and envisaged the deployment of the United Nations Emergency Force on the Egyptian-Israeli armistice demarcation line, and "the implementation of other measures" as proposed in the Secretary-General's report of January 24.

The reference in this second resolution to "other measures" was explicitly interpreted by the Canadian Delegation as including the stationing of the United Nations Emergency Force on both sides of the armistice demarcation line to prevent incursions and raids across the line and maintain peaceful conditions. It was also suggested by Canada that, pending determination of the legal position in the Gulf of Aqaba, the parties should be asked to give assurances that they would not assert or exercise any belligerent rights or interfere with navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran; that a UNEF unit should be stationed near the Straits to assist in maintaining peaceful conditions; and that the Emergency Force should not only be deployed in the Gaza strip but should also be associated with steps to replace the existing civilian administration and to ensure that in future the area would be used neither as a base nor as a target for raids or retaliations.

The Israeli Response

The two resolutions were formally transmitted to the representatives of Egypt and Israel by the Secretary-General on February 3, and the Israeli delegate was asked to report, if possible on the following day, concerning the position of his Government on the resolution calling for completion of Israeli withdrawal. In reply the representative of Israel on February 4 presented to Mr. Hammarskjold an aide-mémoire in which the Israeli Government (a) requested the Secretary General "to ask the Government of Egypt whether Egypt agrees to a full and mutual abstention from belligerent acts, by land,

(1) See "External Affairs" for February 1957.

air and sea, on withdrawal of Israeli troops", and (b) sought clarification as to whether "immediately on the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Sharm al-Shaikh area, units of the United Nations Emergency Force will be stationed along the western shore of the Gulf of Aqaba in order to act as a restraint against hostile acts, and will remain so deployed until another effective means is agreed upon between the parties concerned for ensuring permanent freedom of navigation and the absence of belligerent acts in the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba".

The Secretary-General interpreted the first point raised by the Israeli Government as a request for action by the UN in implementation of the second of the two related resolutions of February 2. Such a request, he argued, could not be entertained until after the withdrawal of Israeli forces in compliance with the first resolution of February 2. Regarding the second point raised in the Israeli aide mémoire, Mr. Hammarskjöld held that "the stationing of the Force at Sharm al-Shaikh under such terms as those mentioned in the question posed by Israel would require Egyptian consent". He maintained that to seek such consent while Israeli forces were still in occupation of Egyptian territory would amount to negotiation under duress.

In conveying his views to the Israeli Delegation, the Secretary-General in turn raised two questions of his own, which he argued should be satisfactorily answered before there could be further consideration of the Israeli aide mémoire. He asked whether it was understood by the Government of Israel that the withdrawal from the Gaza strip must include "elements of administration" as well as military forces, and whether Israel would consent in principle to the stationing of UNEF units on its territory as part of the recommended deployment of forces "on the Egyptian-Israeli armistice demarcation line".

Summing up these and further related exchanges with the Israeli Delegation, the Secretary-General said in a report of February 11 to the General Assembly:

... Thus it is still an open question whether Israel, under any circumstances, accepts full implementation of resolution I, which, as pointed out above, requires withdrawal from the Gaza strip of Israel's civil administration and police as well as of its armed forces. Further, it is still an open question whether Israel accepts the stationing of units of the United Nations Emergency Force on its side of the armistice demarcation line under resolution II, concerning which, in a similar respect, Israel has raised a question which requires clarification of the Egyptian stand. In case Israel were to receive the assurance from Egypt, which it has requested the Secretary-General to ask for as an action in implementation of resolution II, the representative of Israel in his latest communication has stated only that his Government 'would formulate its position on all outstanding questions in the light of Egypt's response'.

The fact that the Government of Israel has not found it possible to clarify elements decisive for the consideration of their requests, has complicated the efforts to achieve implementation of the resolutions of the General Assembly. . . .

The Secretary-General concluded his report of February 11 by asking the Assembly "as a matter of priority" to indicate how it desired him to proceed with further steps to carry out the decisions reflected in its resolutions of February 2.

United States-Israeli Negotiations

While the inconclusive negotiations between the Secretary-General and Israel were taking place, there were intermittent demands from Arab delegations for consideration by the General Assembly of further steps to secure Israeli compliance with the resolution on withdrawal. This pressure was intensified after the report of February 11 was issued; but at this stage a new series of negotiations, this time outside the United Nations, aroused hope that an Israeli decision to withdraw might emerge without further action by the Assembly. On February 11 the State Department formally conveyed to the Israeli Ambassador in Washington, in the form of an aide-mémoire, certain understandings and assurances (which were subsequently made public) regarding the major issues raised by Israel in connection with the United Nations requests for withdrawal from the Gaza strip and the Sharm al-Shaikh area. The aide-mémoire said it was the view of the United States that "the UN General Assembly has no authority to require of either Egypt or Israel a substantial modification of the Armistice Agreement, which . . . now gives Egypt the right and responsibility of occupation". Therefore, it continued, the United States believed "that Israeli withdrawal from Gaza should be prompt and unconditional, leaving the future of the Gaza strip to be worked out through the efforts and good offices of the United Nations". The United States would use its "best efforts" to help to ensure that UNEF moved into the Gaza strip following Israeli withdrawal, and was deployed on the boundary between Israel and the Gaza strip. The aide-mémoire asserted that "the US believes that the Gulf (of Aqaba) constitutes international waters and that no nation has the right forcibly to prevent free and innocent passage in the Gulf and through the Straits giving access thereto". It further declared that, in the absence of some overriding decision to the contrary, the United States, on behalf of vessels of US registry, "was prepared to exercise the right of free and innocent passage and to join with others to secure general recognition of this right". The enjoyment of this right by Israel, the aide-mémoire added, would depend upon its prior withdrawal in accordance with UN resolutions. The view was expressed that "as a precautionary measure" UNEF should move into the Straits area as Israeli forces were withdrawn.

There followed protracted discussions aimed at securing acceptance of the United States assurances as the basis for Israeli agreement to withdraw. Resumption of General Assembly debate on the withdrawal issue was repeatedly postponed in order to await the outcome of the Israeli-United States exchanges.

On February 22 the Secretary-General made a brief statement in the Assembly, outlining arrangements which the United Nations might make to ensure not only security but also efficient administration in the Gaza area after Israeli withdrawal. He said in part:

For example, the arrangement for the use of the United Nations Emergency Force in the area should insure its deployment on the armistice line at the Gaza Strip and the effective interposition of the Force between the armed forces of Egypt and Israel.

Similarly, the assistance of the United Nations and its appropriate auxiliary bodies would be enrolled toward putting a definite end to all incursions and raids across the border from either side. Furthermore, with reference to the period of transition, such other arrangements with the

United Nations may be made as will contribute toward safeguarding life and property in the area by providing efficient and effective police protection; as will guarantee good civilian administration; as will assure maximum assistance to the United Nations refugee program; and as will protect and foster the economic development of the territory and its people.

Demand for Sanctions

A draft resolution sponsored by Afghanistan, Indonesia, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, and the Sudan was introduced in the General Assembly on February 23. It condemned Israel for non-compliance with Assembly resolutions calling for withdrawal of Israeli forces, and called upon all states "to deny all military, economic, or financial assistance and facilities to Israel in view of its continued defiance" of those resolutions.

Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, spoke on this six-power sanctions resolution in the General Assembly on February 26. He summed up the situation facing the Assembly as follows:

... we are confronted with the need to strike a . . . balance between the immediate and primary objective of securing the completion of Israel's withdrawal; and that of achieving this in such a way that withdrawal will be accompanied by helpful and fruitful results. I repeat that we refuse to consider these as unrelated objectives, even though priority in time must be given to the first, withdrawal. We still refuse to believe that they cannot be achieved without adopting proposals for forms of pressure which would be an admission by the Assembly of complete and final failure to solve this problem constructively. Our Delegation does not believe that we should yet admit any such failure. We think that there is still a way of bringing about withdrawal by spelling out the detailed arrangements which would follow, and which would strengthen security and prepare the way for pacification. In its resolution 461 of February 2, the Assembly indicated in general terms the necessity for such arrangements. We should now, before deciding on other measures, follow up that indication with something more concrete and specific.

We think that both parties should be willing to accept any recommendations to this end which are satisfactory to the majority of the members of the Assembly. If Israel refused to withdraw its forces immediately on the passing of such a resolution, she would be taking on a very heavy responsibility indeed and would forfeit our support and invite other measures by the Assembly.

Canadian Suggestions

Mr. Pearson then went on to outline arrangements which he suggested the Assembly should prescribe to follow Israeli withdrawal:

First there should be a firm pledge by the Governments of Israel and Egypt to observe scrupulously the provisions of the 1949 Armistice Agreement. But when we talk about scrupulous observance of the Armistice Agreement, we should mean, not some of its provisions, but all of them. What are they?

First, the establishment of an armistice demarcation line, which is not a political or territorial boundary, but which cannot be changed except by agreement between the two parties. Also the agreement prohibits any form of aggressive action, warlike or hostile acts, if you like, belligerent acts, or resort to force by the land, sea or air forces of either side. They

establish the rights of each side to security and freedom from fear of attack. They do not prejudice or confirm any political or territorial right or claim or boundary, but they do establish Egypt's administrative control over the Gaza strip without giving her any rights of territorial sovereignty there. They provide for the deployment in certain areas on both sides of the demarcation line of defensive forces only, and they define what "defensive" means for this purpose, They provide for the total exclusion of Israeli and Egyptian armed forces from the El Auja demilitarized zone.

Second, the Secretary-General and the Commander of UNEF should make arrangements with the Governments concerned for the deployment of UNEF on the armistice demarcation line. This deployment, which should be made effective with the minimum of interference with civilian life or activity, would be for the sole purpose of putting the force in a position:

- (a) To assume certain duties of the Truce Supervision Organization under the Armistice Agreement between the two states;
- (b) To assist in the prevention of incursions, raids and retaliatory attacks across the armistice line in either direction;
- (c) Generally to maintain peaceful conditions along both sides of the line.

Third, regarding the Gulf of Aqaba and Straits of Tiran, it should be agreed and affirmed that there should be no interference with innocent passage through or any assertion of belligerent rights in the Straits. Israeli troops, on their withdrawal from the Sharm al-Shaikh area, should, as the Secretary-General puts it in his report of January 24, 'be followed by UNEF in the same way as in other parts of Sinai', in order to assist in maintaining quiet in the area and in preventing conflict. This would be in accordance with the purposes already laid down by this Assembly for the Force."

The Gaza Strip

Mr. Pearson then referred at length to "perhaps the most complicated and difficult of the arrangements to be decided", concerning the Gaza strip. After analysing the special problems of this area, he offered the following proposals for its future:

First in priority and essential to all other steps, Israel should withdraw from the Gaza strip. This action would be in accordance with the previous decisions of the Assembly, and implicit in a return to the scrupulous observance of the Armistice Agreement.

At the same time, the Assembly should now provide for effective UN action to ensure that the area would not be used as a base for raids and incursions against Israel after its withdrawal.

I have just spoken about the deployment of UNEF along the demarcation line. In the Gaza strip, this deployment would serve not only as an effective interposition of UNEF between the armed forces of Egypt and Israel, but as a screen against incursions, raids and retaliatory attacks across the line from either side. Furthermore, in a transitional period, UNEF and other appropriate agencies of the UN would be given functions within the Gaza strip which would contribute towards safeguarding life and property, would guarantee good civilian administration, would assure the maximum assistance to the Palestine refugees there, and would protect and foster the economic development of the Gaza strip and its people. . . .

We have here an extremely explosive situation which could very easily get out of control. In this tiny area are crowded over two hundred thousand refugees and a much smaller native population. They are bitter and frustrated, administered by strangers; rebellious, riven by frictions, and in a mood, I have no doubt, to erupt in violence and bloodshed once firm control is removed.

There has already been more than enough murder in the Gaza strip, and the UN cannot be indirectly responsible for more. We owe protection to the refugees and we certainly owe protection to the servants of the UN Relief and Works Agency who have been carrying on so heroically in the face of such obstacles, difficulties and dangers in the Gaza strip. Provision, therefore, must be made for a peaceful transition from the administration of Israel to something no less strong and effective and at the same time more generally acceptable. Such a transition can be effected only by negotiation, and such negotiation, which should be both speedy and thorough, can only be conducted by direct agents of the UN. There is no sense in pretending that, under present circumstances, it could be undertaken between Egyptians and Israelis alone. The good offices of a third party must be interposed, and this can only be the UN.

This is all the more desirable because after Israel's withdrawal, the UN should, in our view and by agreement with Egypt, accept responsibility to the maximum possible extent for establishing and maintaining effective civil administration in the territory; in fostering economic development and social welfare, in maintaining law and order. UNRWA is already there, with an experienced and efficient administrative nucleus. The UN could also provide other help through the UN technical assistance machinery, the resources of its Secretariat, and expert consultants recruited for specific purposes. In this way there would be built up in Gaza, in co-operation with Egypt and with Israel, a UN civil administration.

To co-ordinate and make effective arrangements to this end the Secretary-General might decide to appoint a UN Commissioner for Gaza. Working with the Commander of UNEF and the Director of UNRWA, and after consultation with Egyptian and Israeli representatives as well as with refugee and other local Arab leaders, he could arrange to bring about with all possible speed the replacement of the present Israeli civil administration of the area. In this way, and perhaps in this way only, we should be able to effect the withdrawal of Israel, with order and speed, and in such a manner as to protect the interests of the inhabitants, and of both Egypt and Israel as well.

After the replacement had been completed, this UN Commissioner should, in my view, remain in Gaza where he would have chief responsibility for all UN activities there, including those of UNEF inside the strip. He would be concerned with the supervision of the Armistice Agreement, including maintenance of the cease-fire observers' functions, checking and reporting on alleged incidents of violation. In discharging these responsibilities he would work through UNEF rather than UNTSO, though this would be without prejudice, of course, to the role of UNTSO in the other three armistice agreements.

In view of the status of the Gaza strip, however, as an area not belonging to the sovereign territory of any neighbouring state, any arrangement for the administration of the territory such as that outlined above must be considered as an interim measure pending final agreement as to the proper disposition of the territory. That final agreement is the responsibility of the UN and it should be met and discharged after these interim arrangements have been completed.

In concluding his statement, Mr. Pearson said:

I venture to submit these proposals to the Assembly because I believe they will provide a basis not only for the essential and prior withdrawal of Israeli forces, but for a better and more peaceful state of affairs than that which has existed previously. They may not be perfect proposals, and I realize they will not fully meet the wishes of the two parties to this conflict. This programme is admittedly a compromise, as any resolution based on it would be a compromise. But it is meant to be a constructive compromise, which may lead to further steps that will make for lasting peace. That is the spirit in which it is submitted.

Withdrawal

On March 1, following successive adjournments of the General Assembly debate on the sanctions resolution and further intensive discussions with the United States, the Israeli delegate told the Assembly that the Government of Israel "is now in a position to announce its plans for full and prompt withdrawal from the Sharm al-Shaikh area and the Gaza strip, in compliance with Resolution I of February 2, 1957". The Israeli statement went on to outline certain assumptions on which this decision to withdraw was predicated. Immediately afterward the Secretary-General instructed the Chief of Staff of UNEF, Major General E. L. M. Burns, to make arrangements with General Moshe Dayan, Chief of Staff of the Israeli Army, concerning the measures necessary to effect withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Sharm al-Shaikh and Gaza areas. On March 4 Israel's Foreign Minister informed the General Assembly that full agreement had been reached. The Israeli withdrawal began on March 6 and was completed within a few days.

Commenting on the Israeli decision to withdraw, Mr. Pearson said on March 4 in the General Assembly:

... The dangers and the risks which were inherent in the continued occupation of non-Israeli territory by the armed forces of Israel should now disappear, provided the Israeli withdrawal is followed by appropriate United Nations action. It was in the full recognition of these dangers that Canada joined others in this Assembly in efforts to bring about complete withdrawal of Israel from those areas, but in circumstances that would avoid, and not provide the seeds for, future conflict. We warmly welcome Israel's decision as a right and wise one, and as showing a sense of international responsibility. We feel that certain assumptions and expectations that Israel has mentioned in connection with the completion of her withdrawal are reasonable ones, as we understand them.

After reviewing again his earlier proposals for United Nations action to follow upon completion of the Israeli withdrawal, the Chairman of the Canadian Delegation added:

We have then made progress—encouraging progress—in the solution of this problem. But much remains to be done, and goodwill and understanding will have to be shown by all of us before we can be confident that a final result will be achieved and will bring peace and security to this troubled part of the world.

Cyprus

The island of Cyprus, half as large again as Prince Edward Island, occupies a strategic position in the Eastern Mediterranean, 40 miles south of the Turkish coast and 480 miles from the Greek mainland. Its population of 500,000 is four-fifths Greek, one-fifth Turkish in origin. The island has been administered by the United Kingdom since 1878 and was formally annexed in 1914. In 1923 its status was confirmed by the Treaty of Lausanne to which the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey are parties.

As early as 1931 there were disturbances on Cyprus in favour of ENOSIS or union with Greece. After the Second World War the United Kingdom drew up a new constitution providing for a large measure of self-government but this proposal was rejected by the supporters of ENOSIS, as were similar proposals in 1954. The EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) then emerged as an organization seeking to enforce its demands by violent means. Against it the United Kingdom authorities took stern counter-measures. Tripartite talks (United Kingdom, Greece, Turkey) were held in London in 1955 to consider new constitutional formulae but subsequent discussions with Archbishop Makarios, head of the Greek Orthodox Church in Cyprus, broke down, and in March, 1956 the Archbishop was exiled to the Seychelles Islands for alleged complicity in terrorist activities.

The question of Cyprus was raised at the United Nations in 1954 and again in 1955. On the former occasion the Assembly voted not to consider the question further and on the second occasion decided not to include the item on its agenda.

When the eleventh session of the General Assembly was convened last November a two-part item on the "Cyprus question" was inscribed on the agenda. The Greek Delegation sought UN approval for self-determination for Cyprus; the United Kingdom Delegation charged that terrorism in Cyprus was being supported from Greece.

Meanwhile the British jurist Lord Radcliffe submitted to the United Kingdom Government his constitutional proposals for partial self-government, protection of minority rights, and maintenance of British strategic interests in Cyprus. On December 19, 1956 these proposals were presented to the House of Commons. They were shortly afterwards accepted as a basis for negotiation by the Turkish Government, but were summarily rejected by the Greek Government. It was therefore against a background of stalemate and continued terrorist activity on the part of EOKA that the Cyprus question came up for debate in the First Political Committee of the United Nations General Assembly on February 18, 1957.

Three resolutions were tabled, one by the United Kingdom calling on the Government of Greece "to take effective measures to prevent support or encouragement from Greece for terrorism in Cyprus"; one by the Greek Delegation expressing the wish that "the people of Cyprus be given the opportunity to determine their own future by the application of their right to self-determination"; and a second Greek resolution which would have established a seven-member UN fact-finding committee to investigate the British complaint.

The debate began with three strongly-worded statements by the delegates of Greece, the United Kingdom and Turkey. Speaking for the Greek Delegation, Foreign Minister Averoff held the United Kingdom Government responsible for failing to respect the UN Charter in the case of Cyprus. He denied that the Greek Government was abetting terrorism or seeking to claim Cyprus and he spoke of liberation from the colonial yoke. Commander Noble of the United Kingdom Delegation regretted the quarrel between Greece and the United Kingdom and the weakening of free world defences in South Eastern Europe which he attributed to the Greek ambition for ENOSIS. In his statement Commander Noble charged that terrorism in Cyprus had been officially encouraged by Athens radio and that arms and money had also been provided to EOKA from Greek sources. He pointed out that the United Kingdom has continued to work towards self-government in Cyprus and cited the constitutional proposals of Lord Radcliffe. Mr. Sarper of the Turkish Delegation stated that the inscription of the Cyprus item on the agenda in no way implied the competence of the UN to intervene in Cyprus. He accused Greece of annexationist ambitions, condemned terrorism, and called for a renewal of negotiations among the parties directly concerned.

At an early stage of the debate, Mr. R. A. MacKay, Canada's Permanent Representative to the UN, made a moderate statement supporting the United Kingdom position and hoping for an amicable solution. The text is as follows:

Mr. Chairman, I am reluctant, as I am sure are all of the friends and allies of the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey, to intervene in the debate on this unfortunate subject. But after hearing the speeches made by the distinguished representatives of those three countries in this Committee, and after long study of the problem I feel it necessary to make a few points.

The first, which seems to me obvious, is that the problem of Cyprus is highly complex from the point of view of international law, geography, and ethnic, linguistic, religious and strategic considerations. It is not a question to which any one of us could give a quick and facile answer. Cyprus, in ancient, medieval and modern history, has proved a bone of contention. We must be cautious about suggesting solutions which might stir up further strife, even if this Committee really felt it had the competence to do so.

The second point which stands out in our examination of this question is the inescapable conclusion that the Cypriots would have best served their own good by accepting constitutional development in Cyprus along the lines offered by the United Kingdom Government. In particular, it does seem to us that the off-hand dismissal by the Greek Government of the proposals made by that eminent jurist, Lord Radcliffe, without any serious study, was not an act which could conceivably be described as intended to help towards a solution of the question.

I was sorry to hear some of the charges levelled at the United Kingdom Government by the distinguished Foreign Minister of Greece. We in Canada who know so well the history of the development of the British Empire into a Commonwealth of Nations, find it difficult to believe that any people under British rule would not be able gradually and peacefully to work out their own destinies. We recognize that the Radcliffe constitution and previous offers did not immediately give complete self-government to Cyprus. Indeed in the present circumstances that would be highly unrealistic. But it did give a very great measure of self-government to the people of Cyprus and if this constitution were the point of departure I

think it would direct the peoples of Cyprus, no matter what their origins, towards a better, more peaceful and prosperous existence. And I ask the people of Cyprus to study carefully the history of the development of the Commonwealth of Nations to see if the United Kingdom, having in good faith on both sides started a people on the path to self-government, has ever thwarted it in its subsequent development.

My Government has believed in the past, and continues to do so, that a solution to the problem of Cyprus must be worked out by the parties principally concerned. I do not think the airing of the dispute in this body is likely to help. In addition, we do not think that the continuance of the near state of civil war in Cyprus, and its encouragement from abroad, nor the stirring up of animosity and hatred on racial lines in this small island is the way to solve the problem. It is of the greatest importance for the sincere friends of all three of the disputants in this question that it be settled as quickly as possible with the minimum of public contention. Above all any further deterioration in the relations between Greece and Turkey on the one hand and between Greece and the United Kingdom on the other can only add to the unsettled conditions in the Middle East.

As regards the charges and counter-charges about terrorism in Cyprus, it is clearly difficult to decide when such activity is criminal and when it is heroic. But no matter how one labels it, the end result is misery for the people, and under no circumstances can we condone the aid and encouragement given to these activities from the mainland of Greece. This again surely is a question which can and should be settled amicably by the powers concerned and my Delegation cannot believe that the United Nations can play a useful role in this issue.

Of the other delegates who spoke, Australia, New Zealand, France and Norway were among those supporting the United Kingdom; Syria, Afghanistan, Yugoslavia and Roumania were among those favouring self-determination and many delegations, notably the United States, Pakistan, Ceylon, Iran and Iraq, adopted moderate positions regretting the disagreement over Cyprus and favouring a resumption of negotiations among the principals.

Compromise Resolution

On February 22 Mr. Krishna Menon, the Chairman of the Indian Delegation, introduced and ably supported a compromise resolution that proved to be generally acceptable. The text was as follows:

The General Assembly

Having considered the question of Cyprus,

Believing that the solution of this problem requires an atmosphere of peace and freedom of expression,

Expresses the earnest desire that a peaceful, democratic and just solution will be found in accord with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and the hope that negotiations will be resumed and continued to this end.

The Indian resolution was adopted in the Political Committee by a vote of 76-0, Afghanistan and Panama abstaining. The United Kingdom and Greece then agreed to withdraw their resolutions and Panama also withdrew a draft resolution which had been advanced as a possible compromise.

The resolution on Cyprus, as presented by the First Committee, was adopted by the General Assembly on Feb. 26 by a vote of 55-0. Friends of both Greece and the United Kingdom have welcomed this relatively mild conclusion to the Cyprus debate, which has left the way open for further negotiations and, in the words of the United States delegate, for "quiet diplomacy".

Kashmir

The long-standing Kashmir dispute was brought before the Security Council this year for the first time since 1951.

Despite the work of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) and the efforts of various mediators from 1948 to 1953, India and Pakistan have not been able to reach agreement on the disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir since 1948, when a cease-fire was established between their forces by the United Nations.⁽¹⁾

On January 2, 1957 Pakistan submitted a letter to the Security Council requesting early consideration of the Kashmir question. This document referred to Dr. Graham's report of March 27, 1953 and to the UNCIP resolutions of August 13, 1948 and January 5, 1949 which called for: (a) a cease-fire; (b) the demilitarization of the state; (c) an impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations. The document stated that India had refused, "on one pretext or another", to honour the commitments it had accepted under the two UNCIP resolutions. It also mentioned Pakistan's concern about the Constitution adopted by the so-called Constituent Assembly at Srinagar on October 29, 1956 which, it pointed out, declared Kashmir "an integral part of the Indian Union" and thus contravened the Security Council resolution of March 30, 1951. (The relevant part of this resolution affirms: "that the convening of a Constituent Assembly recommended by the General Council of the all Jammu and Kashmir Conference, and any action that the Assembly might attempt to take to determine the future shape and affiliation of the entire state or any part thereof, would not constitute a disposition of the state in accordance with the above principle"—the principle is that referring to the plebiscite). The letter concluded by asking the Security Council to take "firm and timely action" and by calling for the implementation of the UNCIP resolutions.

On January 16 Malik Firoz Khan Noon, the Pakistan Foreign Minister, presented the case for Pakistan before the Security Council. He urged that the Kashmir area be demilitarized, and that internal security be entrusted to a UN force "which should be introduced into the area at once", prior to the holding of a plebiscite. On January 23 and 24, Mr. Krishna Menon put forward the India side of the case, arguing that the only question the Security Council had to consider was the original complaint against Pakistani aggression brought by India to the Council on January 1, 1948 and that India was under no commitment to allow a plebiscite in Kashmir.

(1) For background see "Canada and the United Nations", 1949.

The United Kingdom, the United States, Australia and Colombia then put forward a resolution reminding the two disputants of UNCIP's recommendation for a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations. The resolution, which also reaffirmed the Security Council resolution of March 30, 1951, was carried on January 24 with ten votes in favour, none opposed, and one abstention (the Soviet Union).

On India's Republic Day, January 26, Prime Minister Nehru announced the formal accession of Kashmir to the Indian Union.


The next development came on February 14 when the United Kingdom, the United States, Cuba and Australia presented a new joint draft resolution to the Security Council. This resolution recalled that of January 24, and the UNCIP resolutions, noted that the demilitarization prior to the holding of a plebiscite had not been achieved, and recommended further consideration of the Pakistan proposal for the use of a temporary UN force in Kashmir. The operative portion of the resolution requested Mr. Gunnar Jarring of Sweden, President of the Security Council, "to examine with the Governments of India and Pakistan proposals which, in his opinion, are likely to contribute to the achievement of demilitarization, or to the establishment of other conditions for progress toward the settlement of the dispute, having regard to the previous resolutions of the Security Council and of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan and bearing in mind the statements of the representatives of the Governments of India and Pakistan and the proposal for the use of a temporary UN force". The resolution also authorized Mr. Jarring to visit the sub-continent for this purpose and requested him to report back to the Security Council as soon as possible, but not later than April 15, 1957. It concluded by inviting the Governments of India and Pakistan to co-operate with Mr. Jarring.

On February 20 this resolution was vetoed in the Security Council by the Soviet Union. Sweden abstained and the other nine members of the Council voted in favour.

Immediately after the vote the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia introduced a resolution which recalled the previous resolutions of the Security Council and UNCIP. The preamble and operative portion of the new resolution remained the same as those of its predecessor, except for the deletion of the references to the use of a UN force. This new draft resolution was adopted by the Security Council on February 21, by ten votes to none, with the Soviet Union abstaining.

Colombo Plan Conference

OPERATIONS of the Colombo Plan during 1956 were reviewed and problems of development in member countries in South and South-East Asia studied at the eighth annual meeting of the Colombo Plan's Consultative Committee held in Wellington, New Zealand, December 4 to 8, 1956. The Consultative Committee, which exercises general supervision over the Plan, is composed of Ministers from member countries who meet each year to exchange views on policy matters and to survey the economic position of the countries of South and South-East Asia, and of the region as a whole.



AT COLOMBO PLAN MEETING

Delegation leaders to the Consultative Committee Meeting of the Colombo Plan are seen outside the Parliament House at Wellington, New Zealand. Mr. Paul Martin, Canada's Minister of National Health and Welfare, is seventh from the right.

The Canadian Delegation to the Wellington conference was led by Mr. Paul Martin, Minister of National Health and Welfare, and included Mr. Nik Cavell, Director of the Colombo Plan Administration in the Department of Trade and Commerce, Mr. A. R. Menzies and Mr. R. Y. Grey, of the Department of External Affairs, Mr. M. P. Carson, Canadian Government Trade Commissioner in Singapore, and Mr. George Carty, of the Department of National Health and Welfare. During the meeting Mr. Martin announced that, subject to Parliamentary approval, a Canadian contribution of \$34,400,000 would be made in the fiscal year of 1957-58 to the Colombo Plan, bringing to more than \$196 million the total of Canada's contribution to the Plan since its establishment in 1950.

In reviewing the workings of the Colombo Plan the Ministers approved the text of the Consultative Committee's fifth annual report which had been considered by officials at meetings held between November 19 and December 1.

The discussions at Wellington were full, frank and cordial and not the least value of the meeting lay in the friendly personal association among the

representatives of the member governments. The communiqué issued at the close of the Consultative Committee meeting noted that in the Colombo Plan region as a whole several significant advances were made in both the planning and execution of economic development programmes during the fifth year of the Colombo Plan.

The communiqué continued:

In 1955-56, there was progress in the development of the area as a whole, although this progress was not uniform. National income continued to rise at a rate slightly in excess of population growth. Most of the Colombo Plan countries in 1955-56 contributed to and benefited from the continued expansion in world industrial production and trade. Agricultural production, on balance showed a little improvement over the previous year; there was an increase in mining output, particularly in petroleum production in the area. Significant progress was made in industrial production as a result of greater utilization of existing equipment and expanded facilities resulting from new investment.

The past year has been, in a measure, a turning point in the progress of the Asian members of the Colombo Plan. Many countries have recently formulated new or renewed national plans and others have given continuing attention to improving the planning and execution of their public investment projects. For 1955-56, the aim was to expend an estimated £791 million on development in the public sector in countries of the area and for 1956-57 it is the intention to raise the level of expenditure by over a quarter. The greater part of this cost of development in the public sector is being provided through the efforts of the people of the area. In addition to governmental development projects, private investment is making an important contribution especially in agriculture and small-scale industries.

In 1955-56 assistance from contributing member governments of the Plan, from international institutions and from other agencies, was greater than in previous years and the rate at which it was used on specific projects was accelerated. External capital assistance in addition to supplementing the countries' own resources has a value of generating further domestic investment. It was recognised that there is an important place for private external investment as a means of obtaining capital inflow, particularly because of the technical knowledge it brings with it and its flexibility.

One of the main obstacles to balanced economic development in the Colombo Plan area is the lack of skilled personnel. Much can be done through capital projects to raise productivity, but without adequate technical skills the fullest use may not be made of new possibilities opened up by higher soil fertility, electric power and new machinery. The main emphasis in improving social services such as health and education, too, must lie with trained staff, helped by modern equipment. For these reasons, successive meetings of the Consultative Committee have stressed the need for the training of students of the area in the more developed countries and the sending of experts to the area. The committee found this year that one of the fruits of the Colombo Plan has been the ability of some countries of the area to send experts to, and receive trainees from their neighbours, and noted that additional opportunities for such intra regional assistance will increase, as development progresses and more experience is obtained.

Since 1950, technical assistance has been extended to approximately 11,000 trainees, while about 4,000 experts have been provided.

The committee took note of the progress reported by the United States on a proposal for a regional nuclear center to be located in Manila. The

United States informed the committee of the future steps to be taken in consultation with the members of the Colombo Plan; it was also indicated that the United States was prepared to contribute approximately \$20 million to the establishment of the Center subject to mutually satisfactory arrangements being worked out with other participating countries. Canada reported on progress in the construction of the Canada-India Reactor. This Reactor is being established at the Indian Atomic Energy Research Centre near Bombay.

Two major aspects of development during the period under review were noted: first, the endeavours of countries to attain higher rates of economic growth while preserving the economic and social stability required to make that growth continuous and its results enduring; and second, the need for flexibility in the execution of plans. In some countries, post-war rehabilitation is still to be completed or other difficulties are still to be overcome, and it is only now that they are beginning to find themselves in a position to formulate development plans. For others, the task is now to move forward from the economic and social basis already provided by their own efforts and by co-operation within the Colombo Plan.

These and other problems in the tasks ahead have been discussed in the Annual Report for 1956, Part I, Chapter II of which is attached. Member governments of the Colombo Plan are confident that their friendly and willing co-operation will continue in facing the difficulties and challenges that lie ahead in the building of a new life for the countries of South and South-East Asia.

SOME TASKS AHEAD

1. The Annual Reports of the Consultative Committee review the general economic situation and development progress and prospects of South and South-East Asia. Such reviews of the past and assessments of the future focus attention on certain problems relating to the future development of the countries of the area which warrant consideration.
2. The 1955 Annual Report, for instance, found wide differences in the economic situation of the countries of the area, that much development work remained to be done, that while the need for external resources remained, the problem of mobilising domestic resources was of paramount importance, and that certain economic problems, common to the region, had been thrown into sharper focus. These issues were broadly stated and drawn out in a necessarily tentative way; only the passage of time would permit more definite conclusions.
3. Another year of experience makes it possible to delineate issues further and draw provisional conclusions regarding some of the problems common to the area. These may be summarized as follows:
 - (a) While further progress in the economic growth of the region has been made in the past year countries have become aware of the increasing need for maintaining flexibility in furthering their development programmes, while consolidating existing gains.
 - (b) In spite of considerable economic growth in past years, the problem of developing sufficient opportunities for productively employing the ever increasing human resources of the area remains.
 - (c) Varying stages and forms of development and the wide range of experience within the region provide new opportunities for co-operation among the countries of South and South-East Asia.

(d) Future development will tend to require more complex and difficult decisions in such matters as the extent to which the fruits of development can and should be devoted to consumption rather than investment, the pattern of investment, and the impact of a country's development programme upon its external situation and the economic life of other countries.

(e) The task ahead will require the mobilization of additional developmental energies in both the public and the private sectors.

(f) While the flow of external resources to the countries in the region has so far been largely in forms of grants, increased opportunities may develop for drawing on foreign private investment and on public and private loans as sources of external capital.

4. The years ahead will require increasing attention to the problems of maintaining flexibility in development programmes while consolidating existing advances and continuing development. For many countries in South and South-East Asia, the economic growth process has involved the planning and programming of resources over long periods of time. The implementation of programmes, however, is dependent upon the availability of requisite resources at the right time, in the right place, and in the right combination. Sometimes these resources are not available because of crop failures, foreign exchange stringencies, and unforeseen shortages of equipment and skilled personnel. Under these circumstances, there is a need for flexibility in programmes. Plans provide a broad framework of overall objectives as flexible guides to future policies and action. Constant vigilance will be required to ensure that appropriate adjustments are made to meet changed conditions. It is also necessary in this connection to refer to the possibility of taking steps towards the building of defences within the economies of the countries of the region to enable them to sustain their development despite short-term upsets like drought, floods etc.

5. Countries in the region may find it necessary to give increasing attention not only to flexibility in the implementation of programmes, but also to the more general problem of consolidating existing achievements while continuing to move forward.

6. Countries of the area also find it necessary to devote increasing attention to creating new opportunities for employing their expanding labour force. Available information tends to indicate that development progress may not be providing employment opportunities commensurate with the growth of the labour force. On the other hand, employment opportunities provided by development may not be fully utilized because of the limited availability of necessary skills and talents in the labour force. Future programmes, recognizing both the social and economic exigencies of the situation, are seeking to devote increased attention to creating additional work facilities for the presently unemployed or under-employed, as well as providing needed training for an expanding labour force. Some countries may seek a partial solution to this current and long-term problem through increased emphasis upon industrialisation and greater labour mobility; others may concentrate on additional work opportunities for under-employed agricultural workers; others may devote a portion of their development efforts to projects employing a great deal of labour. The means and varied possible approaches to resolve this difficult situation will, in the years ahead, provide an additional body of common experience upon which all countries may be able to draw.

7. Development progress in South and South-East Asia provides a wide range of experience differing from country to country. Some countries, for

example, are well advanced in the implementation of long-range development programmes. Others are still engaged in the initial task of assessing resources and determining programme priorities. Continued developmental efforts and progress under differing situations in the countries of the area have produced, in a number of ways, opportunities for interchanges of mutual interest. Some countries have successfully utilised a particular approach or overcome an important obstacle which other countries are about to encounter in some phase of their development. Beginnings have already been made in exchanging experiences in the resolution of particular problems. It is noted, for instance, that one country of the area which has pioneered in community development projects is now responding to the request of another member for assistance in initiating such a programme.

8. Another beginning in the interchange of experience within the area is in the field of training and education. Countries of the area are developing skills and training of interest to each other. This experience is, in many instances, already being shared with others in the area. In some cases, the various experience or techniques developed within the area may have greater applicability and effectiveness than similar experience obtained elsewhere. Out of these opportunities provided by a growing body of economic experience within the area, it may be found that assistance for many of South and South-East Asia's development problems can come from the region itself.

9. The informal consultation which has been pursued for many years in Consultative Committee meetings can further assist in this process. Continuing progress in all countries will provide further ideas and problems which can be exchanged profitably with other member countries. Increasingly, aid-recipient countries of the area are also becoming aid-donor countries, particularly in the field of technical assistance. No clear pattern has emerged as to the ultimate extent or intensity of such mutual co-operation but it appears that an opportunity is present in which all could participate and from which all could gain. It is clear that there is considerable scope for greater regional co-operation in South and South-East Asia.

10. The experience of the past year has confirmed once again the importance of viewing the process of development and implementation of programmes in the broadest possible context. Programmes for expanding economic growth are generally conceived in terms of stated objectives relating to the internal economic situation, such as percentage increases in national income, production targets, employment opportunities, and export availabilities. While in many instances the validity of these objectives is derived from important domestic considerations, their realization is often dependent upon external factors beyond the control of the developing country. Many countries of the area find that effective development therefore requires consideration of the proposed programme in a broad setting. On the one hand, there is the genuine desire on the part of many countries to undertake industrialization in order to utilize locally available material resources and to create new employment opportunities. There is a natural and laudable desire on the part of countries to diversify in order to achieve a balanced economy. On the other hand, there is the problem of equating internal programmes with external resource availabilities in such a way as to achieve objectives without engendering critical balance of payments difficulties. It should be borne in mind that any development programmes which lead to an impairment of the export earnings of a country or the prosperity of its trading partners are likely to be self-defeating in the long run. The past decade has witnessed an increasingly discernible movement towards higher levels of world trade. Development can aid this movement and profit from it. In the years ahead, as the Colombo Plan countries of

South and South-East Asia, with more than one-fourth of the world's population, undertake larger development programmes, the task of considering programmes from the standpoint of both the internal and external impact will become more necessary and, in some instances, more difficult. It is, however, a consideration essential to sound development progress.

11. The review of the past year has focused attention on the all-important relationship between consumption and investment. In the future, as development outlays increase, the maintenance of a balanced relationship between consumption and investment will have greater importance and become increasingly difficult to achieve. Increased consumption is one of the tangible benefits of development and indeed, in a region with very low levels of living, it may be regarded as an important factor in increasing productivity. Too great an increase in investment without a corresponding increase in consumption tends to create strains and stresses which threaten financial stability, particularly in view of the continuing increase in the population of the region. On the other hand, a point can be reached when too great a consumption increase threatens to curtail investment and the future rate of growth. This problem of devising appropriate fiscal and other measures to permit a reasonable increase in both consumption and investment constitutes one of the most difficult tasks for the Governments of the countries of the region.

12. There is no simple solution for resolving the problem posed by the respective roles of consumption and investment. Many countries, as part of the initial phase of development, have encouraged investments which, in one way or another, in agriculture or industry, result in the availability of more consumer goods in the short term. With a relatively sound base they have undertaken expenditure on larger, slower-yielding investment projects with a view to promoting a faster pace of development in the future. This emphasis, however, is not adequate in itself and has to be supplemented by corresponding fiscal and other measures. Such measures have an important bearing on the mobilisation and allocation of resources in a developing country.

13. The task of mobilising resources is a continuing one. Past experience in the area indicates that early emphasis is on mobilising resources for those projects which the government plans and directs, such as roads and other basic facilities. At the same time, it becomes necessary and desirable to maximise the efforts and productivity of all parts of the economy. It is essential, therefore, to bring forth, through training, administrative and financial measures, a more widespread initiative throughout the economy. This kind of initiative can be stimulated by a variety of means, including effective policies on the part of governments. Establishment or installation of basic facilities will support the economic efforts of individuals, groups and communities. Farm-to-market roads, for instance, will provide increased outlets for greater output by the individual producer. The assured availability of power can result in the establishment of industrial facilities by private resources. The availability of adequate financial facilities, or programmes of land reform, can provide incentives for the release of new energies in the agricultural and industrial sectors.

14. Development requires a variety of resources, the greater part of which has necessarily to be mobilized internally by the developing country itself. External capital has, however, made a significant contribution to development by supplying goods and services not available for mobilization domestically in the countries of South and South-East Asia. Capital to the Colombo Plan area has taken the form principally of grants and loans by governments, private foreign investment and loans from international financial

institutions. As economic advances are made in the area, opportunities arise for greater resort to private investment and to private and public lending agencies as sources of external capital.

15. This assessment of the problems and issues of the future which arises out of a review of the past tends to underscore the value of the Consultative Committee as a forum for an annual exchange of views. Experience this year indicates that the desirability of such consultation increases rather than diminishes as development progress is made in South and South-East Asia. The Committee clearly affords increasing opportunities for an increased interchange of experiences on common problems. As the Colombo Plan enters its sixth year, there is renewed courage, confidence and determination to move ahead in the economic betterment of South and South-East Asia. The record of achievement set forth in this Report gives reason to believe that, however great may be the difficulties ahead, they will be overcome.



VISITS IN MEXICO

Mr. D. S. Cole, Canadian Ambassador to Mexico, paid a recent visit to the States of Senalo and Sonora in Mexico's Pacific northwest and to the Mexican territory of Lower California. Seen above from left to right are Mr. C. O. R. Rousseau, Commercial Secretary at the Canadian Embassy; Mr. Cole; Mr. René Goudara, Mayor of Ciudad Obregon, and Mr. S. A. Freifeld, Counsellor at the Canadian Embassy.

Canada in Indochina*

ON July 21, 1954, the Government of Canada was invited by the Geneva Conference on Indochina to designate representatives to serve with those of India and Poland as members of three Commissions to supervise the implementation of the armistice agreements that had been concluded for Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. The Canadian Government accepted this unexpected invitation on July 27. Early in August a meeting of Canadian, Indian and Polish representatives in New Delhi led to the formal establishment of the Commissions in Hanoi, Vientiane and Phnom Penh respectively on August 11.

The Canadian Government did not accept its new responsibilities lightly. It was emphasized in public statements that membership on the three Commissions did not mean that Canada had been called upon to "guarantee or enforce" the cease-fire in Indochina nor did it involve any "military or collective security commitments" not previously undertaken by Canada as a member of the United Nations. The Government was under no illusions about the "magnitude and complexity of the task" but it was asserted,

"We know from experience . . . that just as local conflicts can become general war, so conditions of security and stability in any part of the world will serve the cause of peace everywhere. If, therefore, by participating in the work of these Indochina Commissions, Canada can assist in establishing such security and stability in Southeast Asia, we will be serving our country as well as the cause of peace."

The provision of about 160 carefully selected persons to staff the three Canadian Delegations in the field and a significant number to carry "Operation Indochina" in Ottawa has proved a real and continuing difficulty for both the Department of External Affairs and the Department of National Defence. At every level the military and non-military components of the three Canadian Delegations have had to build up a rather unique pattern of relations which could be maintained only by a high degree of good humour and tolerance for differing traditions and procedures. Relations with the other delegations have not always been easy with persons in each representing different national backgrounds as well as three different foreign policies sometimes labelled neutralism, communism and anti-communism. Not only has involvement in Indochina projected many Canadians into an area of direct conflict between Communists and non-Communists but also one in which the policies of major friendly nations, India, France and the United States, are often divergent and sometimes contradictory. Despite these and other difficulties most of the nearly four hundred Canadians who have served in Indochina have conducted themselves under trying climatic conditions and among strange and often hostile people (Under normal circumstances, nearly half of the Canadians in Indochina are serving in communist-controlled territories of North Vietnam and Northern Laos.) so as to enhance the international prestige of our nation and to provide positive evidence of its increasing maturity in world politics.

*Reprinted from the "International Journal", Vol. XI, No. 4.

Three Major Objectives

Within the framework of the Geneva Agreements, Canadian policy in Indochina has had three major objectives. First, there has been an overriding desire to prevent the resumption of hostilities in the region. In the second place, Canada has attempted to confine her responsibilities in Indochina to a reasonably restrictive reading of the Geneva Agreements. Our representatives have had no desire to play a general good-offices role in the area nor to urge on any of the four Indochinese states any particular measures not explicitly provided for in the various Agreements. In particular, the Canadian position has been that the Vietnam Commission has not within its present terms of reference any responsibilities in connection with the elections to unite the two zones of Vietnam as stipulated in the Final Declaration made by seven of the nine Powers participating in the Geneva Conference. Similarly, Canada has used its influence to prevent the Commissions becoming involved in the border disputes between Cambodia and South Vietnam which have arisen in recent months. Thirdly, Canada has attempted to carry out her obligations in Indochina in such a way as to complicate as little as possible her relations with major friendly powers with interests in the region, notably the United States, France and India. Although our policy has on several occasions diverged from each of these nations, there has been no time at which such disagreements have prevented full and frank discussions of Indochinese problems with the representatives of these powers in Indochina, in Ottawa and in their national capitals.

The "judicial, supervisory and mediatory" work of the three Commissions is often somewhat impeded by the fact that the delegations come from nations with different foreign policy orientations. In a sense, it seems clear from the composition of the Commissions that Canada is expected to "represent" Western and anti-communist interests and our representatives in the field quite naturally do not divest themselves of their cultural background as citizens of a Western democracy. On the other hand the Canadian Government has not interpreted its role in Indochina as requiring it to pursue a course of slavish advocacy of the actions of non-communist powers in the region or an automatic condemnation of all communist actions.

Cambodia has been called the "success story of the Geneva Conference." Unlike South Vietnam and Laos, on whose behalf the respective Agreements were signed by France, the Cambodian Government wielded a significant amount of influence at Geneva and was successful in gaining fairly favourable terms. In particular, the Cambodian Agreement provided that the indigenous communist elements—the Khmer Resistance Forces—should be demobilized on the spot and the political settlement was to consist of these persons being accorded by the Government a full amnesty for their conduct in the past and the opportunity to be accepted into the national community on the same terms as other citizens. In its Fourth Interim Report to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference in October, 1955, the Cambodian Commission declared that by giving the ex-resistants equal rights in the recent national elections the Cambodian Government had discharged its political responsibilities under the Agreement. The Commission is now limited in its functions to the routine duties of checking the passage of war materials and military personnel to and from Cambodia and since December, 1955, has, progressively reduced its strength by the dissolution of inspection teams.

Explosive Situation

The situation in Laos, the most isolated and least-populated of the Indochina states, has remained explosive and a stable armistice has never been attained throughout the nation. Article 14 of the Agreement for the Cessation of Hostilities in Laos provided *inter alia* that "pending a political settlement" the indigenous Communist forces—The Fighting Units of Pathet Lao—should be regrouped in the nation's two northern provinces of Phong Saly and Sam Neua. Article 19 of the Agreement provided that during this transition period each of the parties was to respect the territory under the military control of the other. The Pathet Lao have claimed from the first that the Agreement has given them rights to exclusive control of the whole of the two provinces prior to a political settlement. The Royal Laotian Government has advanced the counter-claim that it has the right to maintain and reinforce the military positions it held at the time the Agreement was signed so long as it does not attack the Pathet Lao. Because of disagreements within the Commission, the Canadian and Polish representatives supporting the broad Royal Laotian Government's and Pathet Lao viewpoints respectively and the Indians unwilling to come down on either side of the dispute, the Commission itself has not given an authoritative interpretation of the rights of the parties under the Agreement. Since August, 1954, Pathet Lao and Royal Laotian Government troops have been in close proximity at several positions in the northern provinces and sporadic fighting has been almost inevitable.

The attempt to attain a stable armistice in northern Laos has been bedevilled from the start by the failure of the parties to progress toward a political settlement which would restore the effective control of the Royal Laotian Government throughout the northern provinces. In a series of political conferences between representatives of the Pathet Lao and Royal Laotian Government which lasted through most of 1955 the Communists made it abundantly clear that they had no real intention of accepting conditions which would result in the demobilization of their forces in Phong Saly and Sam Neua and the subsequent reintegration of ex-members of the resistance into the Laotian national community. The failure of the Pathet Lao to take steps to liquidate the status which under the Geneva Agreements was meant to be a transitional one has embittered relations between the parties and has been the key factor in frustrating the attainment of a stable armistice in Laos. The Royal Laotian Government and the Pathet Lao have entered into a whole series of general and local cease-fire agreements with varying degrees of Commission assistance but each of these arrangements has been based on the assumption that an early political settlement would take place. As prospects for a negotiated political settlement have dimmed, the Royal Laotian Government has become progressively less interested in considering measures providing for an effective separation of the opposing forces which might well lead to a permanent partition of the nation in contravention of the Geneva Agreement.

Canadian policy in Laos for the past year has been based on the recognition that a stable cease-fire in the north was improbable unless and until steps were taken to restore the effective control of the Royal Laotian Government over the northern provinces and that on the basis of past performance the two parties were unlikely to reach such a settlement without decisive Commission action. On May 24, 1955, the then Canadian Commissioner in

Laos, Mr. Léon Mayrand, introduced a draft resolution in the Commission calling for the immediate re-establishment of the Royal Administration in Phong Saly and Sam Neua. Unfortunately, neither the Indian nor the Polish Delegations was willing to support such decisive Commission action. On January 7, 1956, the present Canadian Commissioner, Mr. Paul Bridle, supported a Resolution passed by the Commission with Polish abstention calling upon the parties to enter into negotiations within twenty-eight days with the object of reaching the political settlement envisaged in the Geneva Agreement, including the immediate restoration of Royal Government authority in the northern provinces. The Royal Laotian Government promptly accepted the terms of the resolution and the representatives of the Pathet Lao rejected it.

Officers of the Canadian Army serving in the two northern provinces of Laos have had perhaps a more difficult and frustrating assignment than any of their compatriots in Indochina. This part of the country is rugged and primitive and particularly in the monsoon season, which lasts from June to October, supply by air from Vientiane is uncertain. The major cause of frustration, however, has come from the campaign of harrassment, obstruction and violence against Commission teams by the Pathet Lao. At best, freedom of movement of Commission personnel in Pathet Lao-controlled areas is narrowly restricted and in several recent instances the Communist troops have resorted to physical humiliation and intimidation of team members. Canadian frustration stems also from the fact that while it has proved possible for the Commission to check the passage of war materials to and from parts of the nation under control of the Royal Laotian Government (and the Government has established a commendable pattern of co-operation with the Commission in this respect), there have never been procedures devised to investigate charges that the Pathet Lao in contravention of the Geneva Agreement received substantial military assistance from neighboring Communist North Vietnam.

Vietnam Commission

The purely military phases of the Geneva Agreement for the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam have been implemented in a relatively satisfactory manner and it has been those parts of the settlement which can be classed broadly-speaking as "political" which have most exercised the Vietnam Commission. During the three hundred day period ending on May 18, 1955, the French and Communist troops regrouped on their respective sides of the seventeenth parallel. The fact that the normal administrative fixtures and services were transferred by the outgoing to the incoming military forces in cases where this was necessary with relatively little dislocation was due in large part to the mediation of the International Commission. The supervision of the demilitarized area dividing North and South Vietnam and of war materials and military personnel passing into and out of each zone have proved continuing tasks of the Vietnam Commission. In the latter connection, the problems encountered in North and South Vietnam are very different: whereas almost all men and materials coming into the South do so through a small number of sea-bases and airports at which it has proved possible to establish supervision by Commission teams, military aid coming to North Vietnam will naturally come by land from China and the Commission has never been able to devise a satisfactory system of control of the China-North Vietnam border. An effective cease-fire has been attained in Vietnam, although in the long run

the maintenance of the Armistice may well depend on the reaching of more satisfactory solutions to outstanding political problems between the two Vietnamese regimes than has hitherto been attained.

Some of the most troublesome work of the Vietnam Commission has revolved around the so-called "14(c) cases." Article 14(c) of the Agreement for the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam provided: "Each party undertakes to refrain from any reprisals or discrimination against persons or organizations on account of their activities during the hostilities and to guarantee their democratic liberties." The fact that the Commission has no authority over the legal procedures of either zone, the difficulties inherent in trying to determine whether measures taken against individuals were solely a result of their political activities prior to the cease-fire and the limited resources of the Commission to investigate the very large number of complaints under the Article have made the supervision of its implementation far from satisfactory. The task of the Commission in this regard has been further complicated by the refusal of the Government of South Vietnam, the administration in control of the territory south of the seventeenth parallel, to assume formal legal responsibilities under the Agreement.

One of the persistent concerns of the Vietnam Commission up to July 20, 1955, was supervision of the implementation of that part of the Cease-Fire Agreement which provided that on the three hundred day period after the cease-fire each Vietnamese citizen had the right to decide whether he wished to live in North or South Vietnam. The Communist Government of North Vietnam in its attempt to frustrate this aspect of the Agreement resorted to an apparently co-ordinated campaign of obstruction against persons wishing to move to the South and against the Commission itself. By devising a cumbersome system for exit permits, by failing to provide adequate transport for refugees wishing to leave the North and by resort to physical intimidation of those who wished to change their zone of residence, an atmosphere of "suspicion, fear and rumour" was maintained in which the free movement of persons as provided for under the Agreement was severely hampered. The Communists also denied Commission teams access to refugees in North Vietnam and effective Commission investigation of complaints that persons were being denied the right to choose their zone of residence was impossible. Communist obstructionism also included the presentation to the Commission of about 320,000 petitions from individuals in the North charging that friends and relatives had moved to South Vietnam under pressure. Commission investigation of this kind of charge in which some twenty-five thousand refugees in the South were contacted proved the allegations of pressure to be groundless. In spite of Communist intimidation, 892,876 Vietnamese moved from North to South Vietnam in the period ending July 20, 1955, most of them by means other than those provided by the Communist authorities. The Canadian Delegation deserves great credit for their resolute stand on behalf of those Vietnamese wishing to exercise their right to change their zone of residence. In the Commission's Third Interim Report, a minority Canadian note called special attention to the non-fulfilment of this phase of the Agreement. In the Fourth Interim Report was contained a lengthy and well-documented Canadian minority statement recording Communist obstruction and intimidation of refugees wishing to move to the South and of the obstruction of Commission teams attempting to investigate alleged denials of the right to freedom of movement. Partly as a consequence of the minority Canadian note in the

Third Interim Report the period in which citizens of one zone could opt to move to the other was extended from May 18 to July 20, 1955.

Major Difficulty

One of the major difficulties faced by the Vietnam Commission from the first has revolved around the failure of the Government of South Vietnam to assume formal legal obligations under the Cease-Fire Agreement. The Diem Government did not sign the Agreement and since the time of the Geneva Conference has been openly hostile to the settlement that was concluded by France. The Commission has thus been faced with an anomalous situation in which the French High Command has had legal responsibilities for the implementation of the Agreement in the area south of the 17th Parallel which has been under the control of the Ngo Dinh Diem Administration. The problem became particularly acute in the spring of 1956 when the French Government announced that at the request of the South Vietnam Government the French High Command, the agency through which the Commander-in-Chief of the French Union Forces had discharged his obligations under the Agreement, was to be withdrawn from the South on April 28. Although the Diem Government has offered certain forms of *de facto* co-operation with the Commission, a public statement by Diem on April 6, 1956, made clear that the Government was not at that time willing to assume formal legal obligations under the Agreement. The statement declared that, although South Vietnam was not bound by the Agreement, it would co-operate with the Commission "As an organization working for peace." Diem asserted that he himself was working for the peaceful unification of Vietnam and was prepared to see his country participate in free general elections for that purpose when conditions of real liberty existed in the North. However, the Premier did not retreat from his previous position that his Government would refuse to participate with the Communists in the Joint Commission, which under the Agreement has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of the cease-fire. Although the Canadian Government has long recognized the unsatisfactory and anomalous situation arising from the failure of the Government of South Vietnam to assume formal legal responsibilities under the Geneva Agreement, it has been the Canadian hope that some *ad hoc* solution could be devised so that the cease-fire in Vietnam will be maintained.

Important Evolution

As this is written it is impossible to foresee when the onerous responsibilities assumed by Canada in the summer of 1954 will end. The history of other recent truce commissions in Korea, Israel and Kashmir shows the difficulty of terminating the work of such bodies when the areas in which they operate are still troubled and the Geneva Agreements do not provide any explicit procedure for the dissolution of the Indochina Commissions. Whatever the duration of Canadian responsibilities in Indochina, the spirit in which these responsibilities were accepted and carried out marks an important evolution in the nation's increasing maturity in world politics. It must not be forgotten that only two decades ago most Canadians felt that they lived, internationally-speaking, in a "fireproof house." Today with almost no dissenting voices heard we have moved to a frank recognition that instability anywhere menaces our own interests and have been willing to accept the burdens and frustrations of an onerous assignment in an area of the world as remote as any other from our previous interests and concern.

APPOINTMENTS AND TRANSFERS IN THE CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

- Mr. F. Charpentier, MBE, posted from the Canadian Embassy, Rio de Janeiro, to Ottawa, effective February 2, 1957.
- Mr. G. R. Harman posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Legation, Prague, effective February 8, 1957.
- Mr. J. R. Sharpe posted from Ottawa to the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Colombo, effective February 8, 1957.
- Mr. A. R. Kilgour, MBE, posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Cairo, effective February 13, 1957.
- Mr. S. M. Scott posted from the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Karachi, to Ottawa, effective February 13, 1957.
- Mr. B. M. Williams, Canadian Commissioner, posted from the International Supervisory Commissions, Indochina, to Ottawa, effective February 16, 1957.
- Mr. D. L. Dolan appointed Canadian Consul General at Los Angeles. Proceeded to Los Angeles February 18, 1957.
- Mr. S. Grey appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective February 18, 1957.
- Mr. T. Le M. Carter, MC, appointed Canadian Commissioner to the International Supervisory Commissions, Indochina. Proceeded to Indochina February 22, 1957.
- Mr. E. T. Galpin posted from the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Colombo, to Ottawa, effective February 22, 1957.
- Mr. R. M. Middleton posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Djakarta, effective February 28, 1957.
- Mr. J. B. Seaborn posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Paris, effective February 28, 1957.

CURRENT UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS*

A Selected List

a) Printed documents:

- Special report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East*, covering the period 1 Nov. 1956 to mid-Dec. 1956. A/3212/Add.1. N.Y., 1956. 5 p. GAOR: Eleventh session, Supplement No. 14A.
- United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in the Pacific, 1956*. Report on Nauru; together with related documents. T/1279. N.Y., 1956. 32 p. Trusteeship Council Official Records: Eighteenth session (7 June-14 August 1956), Supplement No. 4.
- Proceedings of the World Population Conference, 1954*. Papers: Vol. III. E/CONF/13/415. 906 p. (Eng.-Fr.-Spanish). Sales No: 1955. XIII.8 (Vol. 111). Price: \$1.50.
- Ibid.* Papers: Vol. IV. E/CONF.13/416. 1073 p. (Eng.-Fr.-Spanish). Sales No. 1955.XIII.8 (Vol.IV). Price: \$1.50.
- Glossary of hydrologic terms used in Asia and the Far East*. Flood Control Series No. 10. Bangkok, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, 1956. ST/ECAFE/SER.F/10. 38 p. Sales No: 1956. IIF.7. Price: \$1.40.

* Printed documents may be procured from the Canadian sales agents for United Nations Publications. The Ryerson Press, 299 Queen Street West, Toronto, and Periodica Inc., 5112 avenue Papineau, Montreal, or from their sub-agents: Book Room Limited, Chronicle Building, Halifax; McGill University Book Store, Montreal; University of Toronto Press and Book Store, Toronto; University of British Columbia Book Store, Vancouver; University of Montreal Book Store, Montreal; and Les Presses Universitaires, Laval, Quebec. Certain mimeographed document series are available by annual subscription. Further information can be obtained from Sales and Circulation Section, United Nations, New York. UNESCO publications can be obtained from their sales agents, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, and Periodica Inc., 5112 avenue Papineau, Montreal. All publications and documents may be consulted at certain designated libraries listed in "External Affairs", February 1954, p. 67.

Housing, Building, Planning: an international film catalogue. ST/SOA/SER.H/5. N.Y., U.N. Dept. of Economic and Social Affairs, 1956. 246 p. Sales No: 1956.IV.8. Price: \$2.50.

ILO

Year Book of Labour Statistics 1956. Sixteenth edition. 503 p. (Eng.-Fr.-Spanish). Geneva, 1956. Price: \$5.00.

b) Mimeographed documents:

GATT

Draft sixth protocol of rectifications and modifications to the texts of the schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 344 p. (Eng.-Fr.) Geneva, March 1957.



TREATY INFORMATION

Current Action

Multilateral

Interim Convention on Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals.

Signed by Canada February 9, 1957.

Convention on the Nationality of Married Women.

Signed by Canada February 20, 1957.

Publication

Canada Treaty Series 1955 No. 17.

Exchange of Notes (February 7, August 2 and 15, 1955) between Canada and Israel respecting the waiving on a reciprocal basis of non-immigrant visa fees.

Canada Treaty Series 1955 No. 18.

Exchange of Notes (September 22, 1955) between Canada and the United States of America regarding a proposal by the United States Government to construct a petroleum products pipeline between the United States Air Force Dock at St-John's and Pepperrell Air Force Base in Newfoundland.

CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVES ABROAD

Country	Designation	Address
Argentina.....	Ambassador.....	Buenos Aires (Bartolome Mitre, 478)
Australia.....	Acting High Commissioner.....	Canberra (State Circle)
".....	Commercial Counsellor.....	Melbourne (83 William St.)
".....	Commercial Counsellor.....	Sydney ("Berger House", 82 Elizabeth St.)
Austria.....	Ambassador.....	Vienna 1 (Kärntnering 5)
Belgian Congo.....	Trade Commissioner.....	Leopoldville (Forescom Bldg.)
Belgium.....	Ambassador.....	Brussels 4 (35, rue de la Science)
Brazil.....	Ambassador.....	Rio de Janeiro (Avenida Presidente Wilson, 165)
".....	Consul and Trade Commissioner.....	Sao Paulo (Edificio Alois, Rua 7 de Abril, 252)
Ceylon.....	High Commissioner.....	Colombo (6 Gregory's Rd., Cinnamon Gardens)
Chile.....	Ambassador.....	Santiago (Avenida General Bulnes 129)
Colombia.....	Ambassador.....	Bogota (Edificio Henry Faux, Avenida Jimenez de Quesada No. 7-25)
Cuba.....	Ambassador.....	Havana (Edificio Ambar Motors, Avenida Menocal No. 16)
Czechoslovakia.....	Chargé d'Affaires a.i.....	Prague 2 (Krákovská 22)
Denmark.....	Ambassador.....	Copenhagen (Trondhjems Plads No. 4)
Dominican Republic.....	Ambassador (Absent).....	Ciudad Trujillo (Edificio Copello 410 Calle El Conde)
Egypt.....	Ambassador.....	Cairo (6 Sharia Rustom, Garden City)
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.....	Trade Commissioner.....	Salisbury (Central Africa Bldg., First Street and Gordon Ave.)
Finland.....	Minister (Absent).....	Helsinki (Borgmasterbrinken 3-C. 32)
".....	Chargé d'Affaires a.i.....	
France.....	Ambassador.....	Paris xvi (72 Avenue Foch)
Germany.....	Ambassador.....	Bonn (Zitelmannstrasse, 22)
".....	Head of Military Mission.....	Berlin (Perthshire Block, Olympic Stadium (British Sector) B.A.O.R.2)
".....	Consul.....	Hamburg 1 (Ferdinandstrasse 69)
Greece.....	Ambassador.....	Athens (31 avenue Vassilissis Sofias)
Guatemala.....	Trade Commissioner.....	Guatemala City (5a Avenida Sud 10-68)
Haiti.....	Ambassador (Absent).....	Port-au-Prince (Route du Canapé Vert, St. Louis de Turgeau)
".....	Chargé d'Affaires a.i.....	
Hong Kong.....	Trade Commissioner.....	Victoria (Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Bldg.)
Iceland.....	Minister.....	Oslo, Norway (Fridtjof Nansens Plass 5)
India.....	High Commissioner.....	New Delhi (4 Aurangzeb Road)
".....	Trade Commissioner.....	Bombay (Gresham Assurance House, Mint Road)
Indonesia.....	Ambassador.....	Djakarta (Djalan Budi Kemuliaan 6)
Ireland.....	Ambassador.....	Dublin (92 Merrion Square West)
Israel.....	Ambassador (Absent).....	Tel Aviv (Farmers' Bldg., 8 Rehov Hakiryah)
".....	Chargé d'Affaires a.i.....	
Italy.....	Ambassador.....	Rome (Via G.B. de Rossi, 27)
Jamaica.....	Trade Commissioner.....	Kingston (Barclays Bank Bldg., King St.)
Japan.....	Ambassador.....	Tokyo (16 Omote-Machi, 3-Chome, Akasaka Minato-ku)
Lebanon.....	Minister (Absent).....	Beirut (Immeuble Alpha, rue Clemenceau)
".....	Chargé d'Affaires a.i.....	
Luxembourg.....	Minister.....	Brussels (c/o Canadian Embassy)
Mexico.....	Ambassador.....	Mexico I, D.F. (Paseo de la Reforma No. 1)
Netherlands.....	Ambassador.....	The Hague (Sophialaan 5 and 7)
New Zealand.....	High Commissioner.....	Wellington (Government Life Insurance Bldg., Custom House Quay)
Norway.....	Ambassador.....	Oslo (Fridtjof Nansens Plass 5)
Pakistan.....	High Commissioner.....	Karachi (Hotel Metropole, Victoria Road)

Peru.....	Ambassador.....	Lima (Edificio Boza, Plaza San Martin)
Philippines.....	Consul General and Trade Commissioner.....	Manila (Ayala Bldg., Juan Luna St.)
Poland.....	Chargé d'Affaires.....	Warsaw (31 Ulica Katowika, Saska Kępa)
Portugal.....	Ambassador.....	Lisbon (Rua Marques da Fronteira No 8)
Singapore.....	Trade Commissioner.....	Singapore (Room E-3, Union Building)
Spain.....	Ambassador.....	Madrid (Edificio España, Place de España 2)
Sweden.....	Ambassador.....	Stockholm (Strandvägen 7-C)
Switzerland.....	Ambassador.....	Berne (88 Kirchenfeldstrasse)
Trinidad.....	Trade Commissioner.....	Port of Spain (Colonial Bldg., 72 South Quay)
Turkey.....	Ambassador.....	Ankara (Müdafaai Huduk Caddesi, No. 19, Cankaya)
Union of South Africa.....	High Commissioner.....	Pretoria (Suite 65, Kerry Bldg., 238 Vermeulen St.)
“ “ “	Trade Commissioner.....	Cape Town (Norwich House Heeren- gracht)
“ “ “	Trade Commissioner.....	Johannesburg (Mutual Bldg., 39 Harrison St.)
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.....	Ambassador.....	Moscow (23 Starokonyushenny Pereulok)
United Kingdom.....	High Commissioner.....	London (Canada House)
“ “	Trade Commissioner.....	Liverpool (Martins Bank Bldg.)
“ “	Trade Commissioner.....	Belfast (36 Victoria Square)
United States of America.....	Ambassador.....	Washington (1746 Massachusetts Ave. N.W.)
“ “	Consul General.....	Boston (532 Little Bldg.)
“ “	Consul General.....	Chicago (Suite 1412, Garland Bldg., 111 North Wabash Ave.)
“ “	Consul and Trade Commissioner.....	Detroit (1035 Penobscot Bldg.)
“ “	Consul General.....	Los Angeles (510 W. Sixth St.)
“ “	Consul General.....	New Orleans (215 International Trade Mart, 124 Camp St.)
“ “	Consul General.....	New York (620 Fifth Ave.)
“ “	Honorary Vice-Consul.....	Portland, Maine (443 Congress St.)
“ “	Consul General.....	San Francisco (400 Montgomery St.)
“ “	Consul General.....	Seattle (Tower Bldg., Seventh Ave. at Olive Way)
Uruguay.....	Chargé d'Affaires a.i.....	Montevideo (1409 Avenida Agraciada, Piso 7°.)
Venezuela.....	Ambassador.....	Caracas (Edificio Pan-American, Puente Urapal, Candelaria)
Yugoslavia.....	Ambassador.....	Belgrade (Proliterskih Brigada 69)
North Atlantic Council.....	Permanent Representative.....	Paris xvi (77, rue d'Auteuil)
*OEEC.....	Permanent Representative.....	Paris xvi (77, rue d'Auteuil)
United Nations.....	Permanent Representative.....	New York (Room 504, 620 Fifth Avenue)
“ “	Permanent Delegate.....	Geneva (16 Parc du Château Banquet)
	Deputy Permanent Delegate	

*Organization for European Economic Co-operation.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



CANADA

April 1957
Vol. 9 No. 4

• EXTERNAL AFFAIRS is issued monthly in English and French by the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa. It provides reference material on Canada's external relations and reports on the current work and activities of the Department. Any material in this publication may be reproduced. Citation of EXTERNAL AFFAIRS as the source would be appreciated. Subscription rates: ONE DOLLAR per year (Students, FIFTY CENTS) post free. Remittances, payable to the Receiver General of Canada, should be sent to the Queen's Printer, Ottawa, Canada.

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Department of External Affairs
Ottawa, Canada

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Egerton Herbert Norman, Ph.D.

1909-1957

Died in Cairo April 4, 1957.

Entering the Department of External Affairs in 1939, Mr. Norman served Canada with distinction in a number of important posts. Appointed Canadian Ambassador to Egypt in September 1956, he immediately became directly concerned in the Middle East events of last autumn. Before going to Cairo Mr. Norman had served from 1953 as High Commissioner to New Zealand. Mr. Norman had also been Acting Canadian Permanent Delegate to the United Nations, and Head of the Canadian Liaison Mission in Tokyo. Born in Japan, Mr. Norman was educated at the Universities of Toronto, Cambridge and Harvard. He is survived by his wife, the former Irene Clark.

Paying tribute to Mr. Norman in the House of Commons April 4, Mr. L. B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs, said, in part: "For 18 years Mr. Herbert Norman served his country as an official of the Department of External Affairs with loyalty, devotion and ability. During that time all his actions served only to confirm and strengthen my faith in and my admiration for him".

The Birth of Ghana

By G. C. McInnes


(Head of the Commonwealth Division, Department of External Affairs, and political advisor to the Special Envoy from Canada to the Ghana Independence Celebrations)

At midnight on March 5-6, 1957 the former United Kingdom colony of the Gold Coast became a free and independent member of the Commonwealth under the name of Ghana.* The proclamation from the Governor, Sir Charles Arden-Clarke, announcing the dissolution of the National Assembly of the Gold Coast had been read with grave imperturbability by the Speaker, Sir Emmanuel Quist, against a mounting roar from outside of turbulent cheering voices, popping fire-crackers, beating drums and twanging automobile horns. The House, with equal imperturbability, remained seated. The members looked, in their magnificent robes of brilliantly woven *kente* cloth, like nothing so much as black Roman Senators. But as soon as the Speaker had finished the members rose and in a great wave of enthusiasm chaired the Prime Minister, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, and carried him on their shoulders out into a great public square. Here in the hushed and breathless night he addressed a crowd of more than fifty thousand Ghanaians and told them that their struggle for freedom was ended and that from now on how they conducted themselves would affect not only Ghana but the whole of Africa.

This mixture of gay and vivid enthusiasm and of responsible sobriety marked all the Independence ceremonies which lasted from March 2 to 10, principally in Accra the capital, but also in other cities and villages throughout the country. They marked the end of colonial rule and the establishment of Ghana as a free and independent nation within the Commonwealth. Less than a week later Ghana was admitted, under the sponsorship of its sister Commonwealth countries, into the United Nations. It was extraordinary to recall that six years prior to this date Dr. Nkrumah had been in jail together with some of the principal members of the present cabinet of Ghana. Equally extraordinary was it to recall that as recently as six months ago serious doubts had been entertained as to whether it would be possible for Dr. Nkrumah's Convention Peoples' Party to compose sufficiently its differences with regional separatist elements in time to make Ghana an independent nation that would be both politically stable and economically viable.

Both the swift but orderly and constitutional march to Independence, and the problems of reconciling separatist tendencies which still remain, are symbolic of the new Ghana. Equally symbolic was the part played by the Governor (now the Governor-General) Sir Charles Arden-Clarke, in supervising the United Kingdom's act of withdrawal which, in the best and greatest traditions of metropolitan tutelage, paved the way for the emergence of a new democratic nation.

*The name of an ancient West African Kingdom on the central Niger. Its flag is three bands of red, saffron and green, with the lodestar of African independence on the saffron field.



Canada Represented

A group of Canadians was privileged to witness these ceremonies as members of the party accompanying Mr. George Prudham, Minister of Mines and Technical Surveys, who had been designated Special Envoy from Canada to the Ghana Independence Celebrations and who, with his wife, represented Canada upon this occasion. The Minister and Mrs. Prudham were accompanied by their elder daughter, Catherine, by the writer, and by three members of Mr. Prudham's secretarial staff, Mr. D. W. Thomson, Mr. Bruce Powe, and Mrs. Kaye Adams. Also present were a party of pressmen which included Mr. Robert Taylor, *Toronto Daily Star*; Mr. Arthur Holland, *Toronto Telegram*; Mr. James McCook, *Ottawa Journal*; Mr. Pierre Chaloult, *Le Droit*, Ottawa; Mr. Michael Maclear and Mr. Robert Crone of the CBC Television Service. The party flew to Accra and back in an RCAF North Star aircraft, following a route Ottawa-Gander-Lajes (Azores)-Dakar (French West Africa)-Accra-Dakar - Gibraltar - London - Keflavik (Iceland) - Goose Bay - Ottawa. Upon arrival in Accra, the party was met by Dr. O. E. Ault, Director of Planning of the Civil Service Commission of Canada, who was in Ghana on a United Nations Technical Mission on manpower requirements; by Sir Robert Jackson, Chairman of the Volta River Preparatory Commission; and by Dr. R. Grimes-Graeme, representing the Aluminum Company of Canada. The hospitality arrangements by the Ghana authorities were both generous and efficient.

The proceedings in Accra had been superbly planned with much foresight by British and Ghanaians combined, and they centred on the presence of HRH the Duchess of Kent, representing The Queen. Other distinguished visitors from over ninety nations and dependent territories included the Vice-President of the United States, Mr. Richard Nixon; the Lord Privy Seal of the United Kingdom, the Rt. Hon. R. A. Butler; the Minister of State Farms for the U.S.S.R., Mr. Benediktov; the Minister of Defence for Australia, Mr. Osborne; the Prime Minister of Tunis, Mr. Bourguiba; Dr. Ralph Bunche representing the Secretary-General of the United Nations; and many others.

Sense of Exhilaration

Even a full enumeration of the many brilliant functions does not begin to do justice to the sense of exhilaration pervading Accra. Among the high points were a festival of drums and dancing by tribal dancers of the Northern Territories, Togoland and Ashanti, and a regatta featuring surf-boats manned by porters of the local lighterage companies. These stalwart manhandled 160-pound bags of cocoa into the boats which then went plunging into the surf powered by eight oarsmen, each wielding three-pronged oars, in a mad race to get to the cargo vessels moored in Accra Roads. There was a convocation at the University of Ghana where the Duchess of Kent was presented with an honorary degree. There were receptions and a garden party given by the Governor-General, Sir Charles Arden-Clarke, and his wife at Christiansborg Castle. This is a stately battlemented building erected by the Danes in the late seventeenth century. The surf breaks at the foot of its whitewashed stone walls and coconut palms wave in the gardens. There was a magnificent State Banquet in the new Ambassador Hotel, which had been especially built for the occasion; and on the morning of March 6, a State Opening by the Duchess of Kent of the first Parliament of Ghana. This was followed the

same evening by a ball at the new State House, which reached its climax when the Prime Minister of Ghana in his *kente* cloth danced a *pas-de-deux* with the Duchess of Kent in diamonds and a superb white ball gown. Nor could one ever forget the memorable moment when the new Freedom Monument was officially illuminated for the first time and a great sigh of delight and approval surged through the expectant African crowd.

The city of Accra, with a normal population of about 135,000, was swollen to over a quarter of a million by the influx of visitors, but the traffic was expertly handled by the militia and the Ghana police. Enormous grandstands had been erected from "Dexion" meccano-type detachable steel bars which, after dismantling, will be used to erect schools, community centres and houses through Ghana. The streets were festooned with scores of yards of bunting, and in the smaller centres the same spirit of festivity was in evidence. The United Kingdom provided three *Valiant* jet bombers and two cruisers, the Australians three *Neptune* bombers, and the Governor of Portuguese Guinea a gunboat.



PRIME MINISTER HONOURED

Mr. George Prudham, Canada's Special Envoy to Ghana Independence Celebrations, presents silver cigarette box to Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, Prime Minister of Ghana. Honourable Kojo Botsio, Minister of Trade and Labour, looks on. In background, Graham McInnes, Department of External Affairs, Canada; A. L. Adu, Department of External Affairs, Ghana.

Occasion was dinner given by Mr. Prudham to Prime Minister of Ghana.

Canadian Envoy Host

The Canadian Special Envoy and Mrs. Prudham attended all the main functions and, in addition, the Minister entertained at two dinners and a reception on behalf of the Canadian Government. On March 7 he gave a reception at the Government Hospitality Bungalow for 140 guests, including cabinet ministers, senior civil servants, members of the business community, church, law, and local Canadians. On March 10 he gave a private male dinner in honour of Dr. Nkrumah and his two senior cabinet ministers, Mr. Kojo Botsio and Mr. K. A. Gbedemah. At this dinner a contemporary Canadian painting* was presented to Dr. Nkrumah on behalf of the Canadian Government and people, while the Prime Minister and his two colleagues received engraved silver cigarette boxes and smaller boxes were given to senior civil servants. Gifts of Canadian maps and sets of Canadian books were also made to the Department of Education and to a number of local hospitals and technical institutes. On March 11 Mr. Prudham gave a small dinner for the Ghanaian aides who had been assigned to the party and presented them with personal gifts in appreciation of their services.

On March 4 Mr. Prudham paid a personal call on Dr. Nkrumah. He presented a letter of introduction from Mr. St. Laurent couched in terms of warm friendship which was reciprocated with equal warmth. Dr. Nkrumah expressed great goodwill towards Canada and voiced the hope that its trade with Ghana would increase. Mr. Prudham also had a brief interview with the Minister of Communications, Mr. Casely-Hayford, who suggested that Canada might be able to help toward improving Ghana's agricultural methods.


On March 8 and 9 the Minister and the male members of his party visited Kumasi, the capital of Ashanti. In contrast to the open Accra plain, the journey was now through hilly, thickly forested country where trees with great buttresses rose two hundred feet into the humid sky, trailing liana vines and giving shelter to the cocoa trees which provide the chief wealth of Ghana. The principal purpose of the call was to pay the respects of the party to the Asantehene, the paramount Chief of the region, Otumfuo Sir Agyeman Prempeh II. He received Mr. Prudham in his palace—a modest whitewashed villa—and was presented with a silver engraved cigarette box. During the visit to Kumasi the party also inspected a sawmill and a gold mine and attended a garden party given by the Chief Regional Officer and a reception by the Kumasi Chamber of Commerce. During their absence Mrs. Prudham officially opened the annual fair of the Accra Women's Institute.

Mr. Prudham and certain members of his party also visited the site of the proposed Volta River Power Project at Ajena, about 75 miles north-east of Accra. The visit was arranged through the courtesy of the Aluminum Company of Canada, Aluminium Limited, and the engineers, Sir William Halcrow and Partners, and was under the guidance of Sir Robert Jackson. The party inspected the new single arch bridge over the Volta River at Kpong and made a brief excursion to Togoland. One member of the party, Mr. Pierre Chaloult, accompanied some members of the Canadian order of the White Fathers up to Tamale, the capital of the Northern Territories, and crossed the border into the French Territory of Haute Volta.

* *Fall Colours, Mount Royal* by Stanley Cosgrove.

Fitting Climax

The general impression of the Canadian party was that the celebrations themselves were a fitting and indeed an exhilarating climax to the swift years of hard-fought negotiation. Undoubtedly political and economic difficulties lie ahead of the new nation. These are principally the necessity to arrive at some reasonable compromise with regional separatists, and to provide for an economy which will be less cripplingly dependent on the vagaries of the world cocoa market. Nevertheless, the impression gained was that the parting between Ghana and the United Kingdom had been made with the greatest goodwill on both sides; that Ghana was very friendly to the West and was likely to remain so, particularly if the West were prepared to recognise and give substance to a reciprocal relationship; and that under the leadership of Dr. Nkrumah, the new nation is likely to follow a policy in which the pursuit of African nationalist ideals will be combined with a responsible regard for the economic well-being of Ghana.



GIFT TO GHANA

Mr. George Prudham, Minister of Mines and Technical Surveys, Canada's envoy to the ceremonies marking Ghana's acquisition of independent status within the Commonwealth, presents a Canadian painting to the Prime Minister of Ghana, Hon. Kwame Nkrumah.

The painting, "Fall Colours Mount Royal", by Stanley Cosgrove, is a gift from Canada to the Government and people of Ghana.

Bermuda Conference

THE Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Mr. Harold Macmillan, conferred with Mr. Eisenhower and with Mr. St. Laurent at meetings held in Bermuda during the latter half of March. Following are the texts of the communiqués which were issued after each meeting:

I

Meeting in Bermuda of the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom

March 21 to March 23, 1957

The President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, assisted by the United States Secretary of State and the British Foreign Secretary and other advisers, have exchanged views during the past three days on many subjects of mutual concern.

They have conducted their discussions with the freedom and frankness permitted to old friends in a world of growing interdependence. They recognize their responsibility to seek to co-ordinate their foreign policies in the interests of peace and justice.

Among the subjects discussed in detail were common problems concerning the Middle East, Far East, NATO, European co-operation, the reunification of Germany, and defense.

The President and the Prime Minister are well satisfied with the results of this conference, at which a number of decisions have been taken. They intend to continue the exchange of views so well begun.

The agreements and conclusions reached on the main subjects discussed at the conference are annexed.

Annex I

1

Recognition of the value of collective security pacts within the framework of the United Nations and the special importance of NATO for both countries as the corner-stone of their policy in the West.

2

Reaffirmation of common interest in the development of European unity within the Atlantic community.

3

Agreement on the importance of closer association of the United Kingdom with Europe.

4

Agreement on the benefits likely to accrue for European and world trade from the plans for the common market and the free trade area, provided they do not lead to a high tariff bloc, and on the desirability that all countries should pursue liberal trade policies.

5

Willingness of the United States under authority of the recent Middle East joint resolution to participate actively in the work of the Military Committee of the Baghdad Pact.

6

Reaffirmation of intention to support the right of the German people to early reunification in peace and freedom.

7

Sympathy for the people of Hungary, condemnation of repressive Soviet policies towards the peoples of Eastern Europe, and of Soviet defiance of relevant United Nations resolutions.

8

Agreement on the need for the speedy implementation of recent resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly dealing with the Gaza strip and the Gulf of Aqaba.

9

Agreement on the importance of compliance both in letter and in spirit with the Security Council resolution of Oct. 13 concerning the Suez Canal and on support for the efforts of the Secretary-General to bring about a settlement in accordance with its provisions.

10

Joint declaration on policy regarding nuclear tests (see Annex II).

11

Agreement in principle that in the interest of mutual defense and mutual economy certain guided missiles will be made available by the United States for use by British forces.

Annex II

1

For a long time our two Governments have been attempting to negotiate with the Soviet Union under the auspices of the United Nations Disarmament Commission an effective agreement for comprehensive disarmament. We are continuing to seek such an agreement in the current disarmament discussions in London. In the absence of such an agreement, the security of the free world must continue to depend to a marked degree upon the nuclear deterrent. To maintain this, effectively continued nuclear testing is required, certainly for the present.

2

We recognize, however, that there is sincere concern that continued nuclear testing may increase world radiation to levels which might be harmful. Studies by independent scientific organizations confirm our belief that this will not happen so long as testing is continued with due restraint. Moreover, the testing program has demonstrated the feasibility of greatly reducing world-wide fall-out from large nuclear explosions.

3

Over the past months our Governments have considered various proposed methods of limiting tests. We have now concluded together that, in the absence of more general nuclear control agreements of the kind which we have been and are seeking, a test limitation agreement could not today be effectively enforced for technical reasons, nor could breaches of it be surely detected. We believe, nevertheless, that even before a general agreement is reached self-imposed restraint can and should be exercised by nations which conduct tests.

4

Therefore, on behalf of our two Governments we declare our intention to continue to conduct nuclear tests only in such manner as will keep world radiation from rising to more than a small fraction of the levels that might be hazardous. We look to the Soviet Union to exercise a similar restraint.


5

We shall continue our general practice of publicly announcing our test series well in advance of their occurrence, with information as to their location and general timing. We would be willing to register with the United Nations advance notice of our intention to conduct future nuclear tests and to permit limited international observation of such tests if the Soviet Union would do the same.

II

Meeting in Bermuda of the Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom and Canada

March 25 and 26, 1957



The Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom and of Canada met in Bermuda on 25th-26th March. Mr. Macmillan was accompanied by the Bermuda Secretary, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. Mr. St. Laurent was accompanied by Mr. C. D. Howe, Minister of Trade and Commerce, and Mr. L. B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs.

In the course of their talks the Canadian Ministers noted with satisfaction the results of the Anglo-American meeting of 21st to 23rd March. They welcomed, in particular, the joint declaration on nuclear tests as a contribution towards an international solution of this problem.

The Ministers discussed the steps which might be taken to secure acceptable settlements of the short-term problems in the Middle East. They also reviewed a number of less immediate political and economic questions in this area.

Views were exchanged on a number of questions concerning Europe and the North Atlantic Alliance. Canadian Ministers expressed their interest in proposals for the closer association of the United Kingdom with Europe. A discussion was held on the consequences for Canadian trade of the plans for a common market and a free trade area in Europe and on other trade and financial questions of common concern to the United Kingdom and Canada.

The Ministers recognised the need to strengthen and improve the working of the United Nations as an instrument for preserving peace with justice.

A contract was approved (see Annex) which will assure over a period of years the supply of uranium needed for the expanded nuclear power programme recently announced by the United Kingdom Government.

A restricted session was held on defence questions.

This meeting has again demonstrated the value of the family relationship between the peoples of the Commonwealth, and the close and continuous co-operation between the Governments of the United Kingdom and Canada. While there may from time to time appear to be differences in their approach or reaction to international developments, the two Governments are confident that their special relationship will always enable them to work together effectively with a constructive purpose.

Annex

During the meeting approval was given to a large-scale contract for the purchase of uranium which will greatly assist in carrying out the expanded nuclear power programme of the United Kingdom. Under this contract the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority will purchase, during the next five years, uranium to the value of about \$115,000,000 from the Canadian Government agency (Eldorado Mining and Refining Limited) which in turn has entered into purchase contracts with Canadian mining companies. This contract has been worked out with the co-operation of the United States Atomic Energy Commission and is similar in terms to the contracts by which that Commission purchases uranium from the same agency.

The Ministers also discussed arrangements to supply United Kingdom requirements of uranium fuel after this five-year period and agreed that further discussions on this matter should proceed between the agencies concerned.



NATO's 8th Anniversary

The following is a statement made April 4 by Mr. L. B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs, on the occasion of the eighth anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty:

Today is the eighth anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, establishing that Atlantic organization on which, through collective association and co-operation, the free world relies for defence. It is good to recall that since NATO's inception in 1949 we have, in partnership with our NATO allies, not only held back the spread of Soviet oppression but also we have built the nucleus of a more permanent and stronger Atlantic community.

The year just terminated has been a busy one for NATO. Studies have been made and measures are now being undertaken to adapt Western defence planning to shifting Soviet tactics, and to the new situation created by the advent of thermo-nuclear weapons. We have again emphasized our determination to make NATO something more than just a mere military alliance, and we have taken positive steps in this direction. Canada has played an important part in NATO's defence organization, and in this connection I would like to express our special appreciation for the loyalty and devotion of our Canadian troops serving in Europe under NATO command. It is they, along with their fellow NATO allies, who bear the immediate burden of holding back aggression and preserving world peace.

I should also like on this occasion to pay tribute to NATO's first Secretary-General, Lord Ismay, who will be retiring this year. The guiding inspiration and the stimulus provided by Lord Ismay during the early and often difficult formative years of the Organization were a symbol and a guarantee of its security and solidarity. Without his devoted service and wise counsel NATO and the defence of the free world would be much less secure.

External Affairs in Parliament

The Middle East

The following statement was made in the House of Commons March 15 by Mr. L. B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs:

... This Middle East problem has been almost continuously before the United Nations Assembly since I spoke to this House on external affairs last November and that consideration by the United Nations I think has helped not only to bring the fighting to an end in that area but to prevent the conflict breaking out again or even worse spreading. . . . The United Nations Assembly of course has its limitations as I have already shown and will try to show again in this discussion. There is no use asking it to do things it cannot do or for which it has no mandate under the Charter. Therefore there is no use blaming it if it does not do the impossible. It is also wrong, as I have said before, to use the United Nations as an excuse for national shortcomings and hesitations or as an escape from national responsibilities even though these should be discussed and when possible discharged through the United Nations.

The United Nations is no substitute for wise national policy or for close co-operation between friends and allies. It supplements, and essentially supplements, but it cannot replace these necessities. There is no particular value therefore in saying, "Let the United Nations do it", unless we accept the obligation to do our best to make that possible by wise national decisions inside and outside the United Nations.

Background of the Crisis

Mr. Speaker, before dealing with some of the details of this problem I would like for a moment to endeavour to put it in perspective.

The problem we have been discussing and trying to solve in New York is merely one aspect of the whole problem of the Middle East. That general problem would be with us if there never had been any trouble over the Suez or over Palestine last October. It comes from the rise of nationalism in the Middle East and from what seems at times to be a morbid preoccupation and suspicion of the people in that area, a suspicion they have of the people who once ruled them; it comes also from the impatience of these people in the Middle East to convert political freedom into economic and social progress and more fundamentally it comes from the pressure especially in Egypt of a rapidly growing population on the productive resources of the country which cannot keep pace with that increased population.

There is also, and we are now getting closer to the immediate difficulties, the bitter and at times seemingly insoluble problem of the

relations between Israel and her Arab neighbours which came to a head in the explosion of last October.

Since that time the United Nations has brought about a cease-fire and has established an agency for securing and supervising that cease-fire. How that was done was discussed in the House last November. Since that time the United Nations has been considering the withdrawal of Israel from Egypt. There has been agreement from the beginning in New York with this withdrawal in principle, but it has been difficult to convert that agreement in principle into one of practice, whether the agreement should be unconditional or whether it should be conditional.

The House will remember that after the withdrawal of United Kingdom and French forces from Port Said last December the forces of Israel also withdrew from all Egypt or Egyptian administered territories except the points Sharm al-Shaikh on the Straits of Tiran and the Gaza strip. Israel for some time was unable to withdraw her forces from those two places without assurances, first, about navigation in the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba and, second, that Gaza was not to be returned to a situation where it could be used as it had been used previously as a base for attack on Israel.

Egypt and the other Arab and a great many Asian states refused to consider at the Assembly any arrangement on these matters, or even at times to discuss them, until a complete withdrawal of Israeli forces had been effected. They refused to agree that the United Nations Emergency Force could be used in any sense as an occupation force. In particular India and Yugoslavia, which were supplying strong and effective contingents to this force, held strong views on that point—and their views are important. The Arab-Asian group also refused to accept at the United Nations Assembly any change in the armistice arrangements of some years ago between Egypt and Israel concerning the Gaza strip while permitting Israel to benefit from other provisions of those armistice arrangements. As for the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran the Arab-Asian group, or most of them, felt that freedom of navigation there would depend on the legal status of the Gulf and the Straits, the waters of which some of them considered to be not international but territorial.

Those two positions were far apart and it would have been difficult for the United Nations to reconcile them even if there had

been a maximum of good will or mutual understanding between the conflicting sides, and it is an understatement to say that there was no such good will.

The Canadian Position

The Canadian position has, I think, been consistent from the beginning. From our very first statement at the United Nations Assembly last November we took the position then and we have maintained it since that the withdrawal of Israeli forces and arrangements following that withdrawal were related and that one could not be discussed or decided without taking into consideration the other.

For us it was not a question of rewarding Israel for something she might have done by force last October; it was not a question of allowing her to lay down formal conditions governing her withdrawal. It was a question of whether we should not take action in our own interest, and in the interest of the United Nations and of peace, to see that the former conditions in that area—conditions of fear, insecurity and conflict—were not restored.

Our Delegation preferred a single resolution to bring this about, with provisions first, for withdrawal and, later in the same resolution, for arrangements to follow withdrawal. We were trying to do that, to draft a programme, and a resolution based on that programme which in our opinion would have been fair to both sides, but we were told it would not be possible to secure the necessary two-thirds majority of the Assembly for any such resolution. The United States was particularly hesitant about the prospects of securing agreement with regard to a resolution of that kind, and we were warned that if we put forward such a resolution, and it failed to secure two-thirds of the votes of the Assembly, the net result would be bad. We did not entirely accept that position, but we did agree that there was no possibility of securing a two-thirds majority for a resolution of that nature if the United States did not actively support it. And in the result, as hon. members know, on February 2 a second resolution, short and not too specific, was passed on arrangements to follow withdrawal.

Israel hesitated to withdraw her forces from Sharm al-Shaikh and the Gaza strip on these vague and somewhat ambiguous assurances which could be and, indeed, were interpreted in different ways by different members of the Assembly.

That delay after February 2 on the part of Israel to withdraw her forces, occasioned by the causes I have indicated, was met by the tabling of an Arab resolution for sanctions, that is, for force to bring about withdrawal. Sanctions can be economic; they can be financial; and, indeed, they can be military. And we ought to know now from the lesson of the League of Nations in the thirties, in connection with the Italo-Abyssinian conflict, that unless there is strong and general agreement to see sanctions through to the end,

even if that end might be military action, and if there is not the necessary willingness to take national action to enforce sanctions, then it is idle, even worse than idle, to consider applying them.

Our position when the sanctions resolution was tabled at the United Nations Assembly was that we were opposed to sanctions as being unjustified, as impracticable, as unlikely to accomplish the purposes which they had in mind, and as a recognition of the failure of negotiations which we thought were premature.

And so we—our Delegation—put forward our own proposals on February 26—certain positive proposals which we thought would accomplish the purpose we had in mind. I will come back to them later; what I am trying to give now is the chronological story of what happened in New York.

After this sanctions resolution was tabled, with no agreement on a resolution of the kind I have indicated with regard to arrangements to follow withdrawal, the matter was moved to Washington for discussions through diplomatic channels between representatives of Israel, the United States and France. As a result of those discussions, Israel was persuaded to withdraw her forces both civil and military from Sharm-al-Shaikh and the Gaza area—not on assurances contained in any Assembly resolution, except that of February 2, but on certain assumptions and expectations which the Government of Israel made at that time and which were announced to the General Assembly.

Israel's "Assumptions and Expectations"

What were these? They are very important in attempting to understand what is going on there now. They were put to the Assembly in a statement by the Foreign Minister of Israel on March 1—these assumptions and expectations. One was that the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran would be considered as international waters, and that there would be free and innocent passage for all shipping through them, and that the United States Government would support this proposition. Second, that the United Nations Emergency Force would move into the Sharm al-Shaikh area and not be moved out of that area until the matter had been considered by the Assembly Advisory Committee of seven. Then in respect of Gaza which was the danger point at the moment, Mrs. Meir laid down these assumptions:

- (a) That on its withdrawal the United Nations forces will be deployed—
That is the withdrawal of the Israeli force.
—in Gaza and that the take over—
And I emphasize the words "take over".
—of Gaza from the military and civilian control of Israel will be exclusively by the United Nations Emergency Force.
- (b) It is further Israel's expectation that the United Nations will be the agency to be utilized for carrying out the func-

tions enumerated by the Secretary-General, namely:—

They were enumerated in one of his earlier reports and he outlined them as follows: safeguarding life and property in the area by providing efficient and effective police protection; as will guarantee good civilian administration; as will assure maximum assistance to the United Nations refugee programme; and as will protect and foster the economic development of the territory and its people.

And then said Mrs. Meir:

(c) It is further Israel's expectation that the aforementioned responsibility of the United Nations in the administration of Gaza—

Not for the administration of Gaza but in the administrations of Gaza.

—will be maintained for a transitory period from the take-over until there is a peace settlement, to be sought as rapidly as possible, or a definitive agreement in the future of the Gaza strip.

And she concluded by saying this:

It is the position of Israel—

And this is important in the context of the present situation.

—that if conditions are created in the Gaza strip which indicate a return to the conditions of deterioration which existed previously Israel would reserve its freedom to act to defend its rights.

These were the assumptions and expectations laid down by the Government of Israel on the basis of which they withdrew, and withdrew very quickly, all their forces, civil and military, from the Gaza strip. When I say they withdrew very quickly I mean that they withdrew with great speed after the decision was made.

The Canadian position with regard to this statement of Mrs. Meir was that, as we understood them, her assumptions and expectations were reasonable. The United States position, as stated by Ambassador Lodge on March 1, is as follows:

... For the most part the declarations constitute, as we understand it, restatements of what has already been said by this Assembly or by the Secretary-General in his reports, of hopes and expectations which seem to us not unreasonable in the light of the prior actions of this Assembly.

This statement of Mr. Lodge was followed by an extremely important communication of March 2 from President Eisenhower to the Prime Minister of Israel which may have been decisive in bringing about the withdrawal. I quote from that letter of President Eisenhower as follows:

It has always been the view of this Government—

That is the Government of the United States.

—that after the withdrawal there should be a united effort by all of the nations to bring about conditions in the area—

That is the Gaza area.

—more stable, more tranquil and more conducive to the general welfare than those which existed heretofore.

Hopes and expectations based thereon were voiced by your foreign minister and others.

Then said President Eisenhower:

I believe that it is reasonable to entertain hopes and expectations and I want you to know that the United States, as a friend of all of the countries of the area and as a loyal member of the United Nations, will seek that such hopes prove not to be in vain.

That is from President Eisenhower's letter of March 2. Mr. Speaker, those are the views as to what should be done. But the terrific responsibility of putting those views into action has been placed largely on the shoulders of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. It is therefore important to try to understand what authority, under the resolutions that we have accepted, the Secretary-General has for that purpose because very much indeed is left to him. We therefore are obliged to fall back on that resolution of February 2 which I have mentioned and leave it to the Secretary-General to interpret that resolution and to implement arrangements based on it. That is going to be difficult for him to do. But if any man can do it, I think it is the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who is a man of devotion, integrity, amazing industry and diplomatic skill and fair mindedness. However, Mr. Speaker, this is not, I admit, too satisfactory a procedure though it may be the best possible that the United Nations Assembly was able to obtain having regard to the fact that a two-thirds majority of the Assembly must be achieved for any resolution.

Responsibilities of the UN

Let us then go back and see what are the responsibilities of the United Nations which the Secretary-General is now to do his best to make effective; and I believe he is leaving tomorrow for the Middle East for that purpose. We stated in this House these responsibilities or these functions as laid down by the General Assembly resolutions, on November 27, beginning I think at page 61 of *Hansard*. We then pointed out in this House that these responsibilities were laid down or outlined in the Secretary-General's report of November 4, which is the guiding document in this matter, especially paragraph 12 of that report. That report can be found on page 13 of the White Paper dealing with the story of the Middle East already tabled in this House. Paragraph 12, the important paragraph of that report which contains the basic terms of reference for the Secretary-General with regard to United Nations responsibility and particularly the functions of the United Nations Emergency Force, reads as follows:

... The functions of the United Nations Force would be, when a cease-fire is being established, to enter Egyptian territory with the consent of the Egyptian Government, in order to help maintain quiet during and after the withdrawal of non-

Egyptian troops, and to secure compliance with the other terms established in the resolution of November 2, 1956.

It is therefore important to remember what were those other terms of the resolution of November 2. They were also given to the House by me in my statement on November 27 and 29 and they are also quoted on page 8 of the White Paper. This resolution of November 2, which is basic in this connection—and it will be recalled that we were criticized by the Official Opposition for not voting against this resolution—includes the following provisions which should be recalled:

1. Urges as a matter of priority that all parties now involved in hostilities in the area agree to an immediate cease-fire and as part thereof halt the movement of military forces and arms into the area;
2. Urges the parties to the armistice agreements promptly to withdraw all forces behind the armistice lines into neighbouring territory, and to observe scrupulously the provisions of the armistice agreements;
3. Recommends that all members refrain from introducing military goods in the area of hostilities and in general refrain from any acts which would delay or prevent the implementation of this resolution;—
And finally:
4. Urges that upon the cease-fire being effective steps be taken to reopen the Suez Canal and restore secure freedom of navigation; . . .

These functions as outlined by the Secretary-General in his report and based on the resolution of November 2 were approved by a resolution of the General Assembly of November 7; and that resolution reaffirms the necessity for a scrupulous observance of the Israeli-Egyptian armistice terms. That reaffirmation was given again by the Assembly in a resolution on February 2, passed by a vote of 56 to nothing, including the votes of the United Kingdom and the United States. This resolution of February 2, this reaffirmation of the scrupulous observance of the armistice terms, also included provisions that the United Nations Emergency Force was to be deployed on the Egyptian-Israeli demarcation line, and for the implementation of other measures included in the Secretary-General's report of a few weeks before, January 24, I think.

This report of January 24 by the Secretary-General, which was endorsed unanimously by the General Assembly and is binding on the Secretary-General because of that unanimous endorsement including the votes of the United Kingdom and the United States, emphasizes that there can be no change in the legal situation under the armistice agreement until the parties to that agreement accept such a change. This report states also that the General Assembly can only recommend; it cannot establish any United Nations administration of Gaza, and that that recommendation, to be effective, would require negotiations with Egypt. Now, there have been no further resolutions laying down the function to be performed by the Secretary-

General in carrying out the earlier resolutions. Therefore, this one of February 2 is decisive in this connection.

Our own position in regard to this matter was made clear on February 26. At that time we took the position that an arrangement to follow the withdrawal of the Israeli forces should be spelled out in a resolution and not merely deduced from the Secretary-General's reports. We put out in considerable detail what we thought should be included in any such plan or resolution. It should include, first, observance of the armistice; second, deployment of United Nations Emergency Force in Gaza on both sides of the armistice line; third, there should be no interference with innocent passage through the Straits of Tiran pending determination of the legal position of those waters; fourth, we made certain proposals for Gaza. This is such an important point on the map at present that I should like to go into that matter, Mr. Speaker, in somewhat more detail in elaborating the proposals we made at the Assembly. It will, I think, if I can go into it in detail, remove some of the misconceptions about this particular problem.

The Problem of Gaza

Legally, as I have stated, responsibility for the civil administration of Gaza, under the Egyptian-Israeli Armistice Agreement of 1949, lies with Egypt. However, in planning for the restoration of civil administration following the withdrawal of Israel forces from the area, we stated our views to the General Assembly at that time—this view was shared by a great many other delegations and indeed I think by the Secretary-General himself—that there were important practical considerations which qualified or should qualify this legal position. We have an extremely explosive situation in a small and crowded area where there are about 300,000 people, and perhaps 260,000 of them are refugees. It should be recognized, we thought, that this situation might very easily get out of control, and accordingly we considered—this was also the feeling of other members of the Assembly—that the United Nations should accept, and Egypt should agree to the acceptance of, responsibility to the maximum possible extent for establishing and maintaining effective civil administration of the Gaza strip. This arrangement, of course would have to be without prejudice to the legal rights of Egypt in the territory under the armistice agreement, and would be provisional, pending final agreement on the proper disposition of Gaza which has never, since the creation of the State of Israel, belonged to the sovereign territory of any state.

The words we used in the Assembly in putting forward this programme are on the record, Mr. Speaker. Perhaps I could quote one paragraph from our statement. On February 26 I said at the Assembly:

After Israel's withdrawal, the United Nations should, in our view and by agreement with Egypt, accept responsibility to the maximum possible extent for estab-

lishing and maintaining effective civil administration in the territory; in fostering economic development and social welfare, in maintaining law and order. The United Nations Relief and Works Administration is already there, with an experienced and efficient administrative nucleus. The United Nations could also provide other help through United Nations technical assistance machinery, the resources of its secretariat, and expert consultants recruited for special purposes. In this way there would be built up in Gaza, in co-operation with Egypt and with Israel, a United Nations civil administration.

We had a resolution drafted which would have put that programme before the Assembly but we did not attempt to bring it forward because, as I have indicated, there was a feeling on the part of certain delegations that it would not get the necessary two-thirds majority.

It is my view, Mr. Speaker, and I hope that this view will prove to be well-founded, that we have now entered a phase in which progress may be made towards the objective of finding a suitable balance between the practical position of the United Nations and the legal position of Egypt in the administration of Gaza, an objective which was sought but never found at the recent session of the Assembly. As I have said, the Secretary-General himself is going to the area tomorrow in search of such an understanding. It is a mission of great responsibility and delicacy, fraught with consequences for the peace of that area. So far as the Canadian Government is concerned, and I am sure so far as this House is concerned, we would not wish to do anything to complicate the Secretary-General's task by anything we might say here. I wish to reiterate, however, that our opinion is that, subject to the legal right of Egypt under the armistice agreement, and until those rights are altered, the United Nations and the United Nations Emergency Force have an important, indeed an essential role to play in the administration of that area.

Any policy or any action or any arrangement whereby the United Nations was refused Egyptian co-operation in the discharge of that role or in which the United Nations was denied a substantive responsibility for carrying out the purpose of ensuring peace and security in the Gaza Strip, any arrangement of that kind which included non-co-operation on the part of the single government most concerned, the Government of Egypt, would be doomed to failure.

Mr. Diefenbaker; Does the Government of Canada recognize the sovereignty of Egypt over the Gaza strip?

Mr. Pearson; No, Mr. Speaker, I have already stated that no single power has sovereignty over the Gaza strip. Under the armistice arrangement between Egypt and Israel, which was endorsed by the United Nations, the responsibility for the civil administration of that strip was placed in

Egypt's hands and that is where it is now legally, under the armistice agreement which has been endorsed unanimously by the recent Assembly of the United Nations. Any effort, however, on any government's part to interfere with the practical necessity of United Nations action in the Gaza strip at the present time would, I think, be inconsistent with the basis of free co-operation which must underlie the discharge of United Nations responsibility in that area. It would deny to the area, and indeed to the people of both Egypt and Israel, the great practical benefits which could develop if the United Nations and its agencies were given a fair chance to make their contribution to the welfare and security of that unsettled region.

Egypt and UNEF

This situation, Mr. Speaker, in the Gaza strip points up, I think, the importance of a clear understanding of the relationship between Egypt and the United Nations Emergency Force, and I should like to say a few words about that.

There have been a good many questions in this House. It is true, I dealt with this matter at some length in the House on November 27, and I also referred to it in the White Paper, on page 13, which I have mentioned.

We have from the very beginning, from the first statement of the Canadian delegate in New York on November 7, underlined the difficulties as well as the importance of this first United Nations Emergency Force. There is great hope in it for the future if it succeeds on this occasion, but it is an experiment and new ground, hard ground at times, is being broken. We have no illusions, and have had no illusions about the problems it would encounter. Cynicism has been expressed by some members in this House about this Force and there have been jibes from some quarters in this House about the nature of Canadian participation in the Force. But whatever the future may hold for this Force, I think it is fair to say that the United Nations Emergency Force has already performed an absolutely indispensable role in securing and supervising the cease-fire, in preventing a recurrence of conflict or the spreading of that conflict when it began.

Some weeks ago, General Burns wrote me a personal letter from his headquarters acknowledging a further contingent of supporting units that were going forward from Canada for the United Nations Emergency Force. In that letter he stated that the Canadians already in the force had made "all the difference in the world in the efficient operation of the administrative side of the military effort". He added that he "just could not have done without them". He also said, Mr. Speaker, that the R.C.A.F. element in his Force had worked long hours in arduous conditions and deserved very great credit for its efficiency and devotion to duty.

There has been some argument about the status of this Force. The Government from the outset has accepted the guiding principle;

included in the Secretary-General's report of last November, and specifically endorsed by the General Assembly, that the United Nations Assembly could not request the Force to be stationed or operate on the territory of a given country without the consent of the government of that country. The rights of sovereignty of the country in the circumstances under discussion could not be infringed upon by other states, even acting through the United Nations Assembly, which has no power in fact so to infringe in contrast with the Security Council, when actions are being taken by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter.

Mr. Nesbitt; Is this resolution not based on the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution, part A?

Mr. Pearson; Yes, Mr. Speaker, all of our action in the United Nations Assembly at the special emergency session dealing with this Middle East crisis was based on the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution of 1950, which gave the Assembly certain functions, and indeed duties in case of deadlock in the Security Council; but while that is true, it does not alter the fact that under the Charter of the United Nations the Assembly can do nothing but make recommendations which have to be carried out by the member states after those recommendations have received two-thirds support in the Assembly.

Last November 5, Mr. Speaker—and this is important in qualifying what I have just said—the Egyptian Government formally conveyed to the Secretary-General explicit acceptance of the General Assembly resolution of that date, which established the United Nations Force to perform the tasks which I have already outlined. Egypt's acceptance of this resolution was a voluntary act, by which the Egyptian Government imposed on itself a qualification upon the exercise of its sovereignty.

This decision was formally conveyed in an aide-mémoire on the basis for the presence and functioning of UNEF in Egypt, an aide-mémoire submitted to the General Assembly by the Secretary-General in his report on November 20, and subsequently noted with approval by the Assembly. In this aide-mémoire, which is also in the White Paper to which I referred, I think on page 20, and therefore before the House for some weeks, the terms of which had been agreed between the Secretary-General and the Egyptian Government, the Government of Egypt declared:

When exercising its sovereign rights on any matter concerning the presence and functioning of UNEF, it will be guided, in good faith, by its acceptance of the general resolution of November 5, 1956.

This is a quotation from the Egyptian communication. And that declaration was balanced in the aide-mémoire by a declaration on the part of the United Nations, through the Secretary-General, and I quote that "the activities of UNEF will be guided, in good faith, by the task established for the

force" in the resolution of the General Assembly, and that—again I quote—"in particular, the United Nations, understanding this to correspond to the wishes of the Government of Egypt reaffirms its willingness to maintain the UNEF until its task is completed".

This, then, Mr. Speaker, is the nature of Egypt's consent to the presence and functioning of the United Nations Emergency Force on Egyptian territory. There has been no infringement on the sovereignty of the Government of Egypt by the action of any other government or governments. But in the arrangements made and in the agreement which I have referred to, the United Nations, which established this Force to do certain tasks, clearly has a right to be consulted as to whether and when these tasks have been discharged, as it would if they were to be extended. From this, it follows in our view, and this is the view of the Secretary-General also, that if Egypt should at any time make a request for UNEF's withdrawal, the appropriate procedure would be for that request to go first to the Advisory Committee on UNEF through the Secretary-General. There it would be discussed by the Committee which was set up for that purpose by the Assembly, and if necessary and desirable the whole matter could then be referred to the full Assembly for decision. And therefore any question of whether UNEF should be withdrawn would become a matter for discussion with and decision by the United Nations. This is this Government's understanding of the procedure which should be followed.

Having said that, however, I should add that if Egypt refused to accept the United Nations view that UNEF's task was still unfinished, and that UNEF should not be withdrawn, Egypt would, in our view, be nullifying its acceptance of the Assembly's basic resolution establishing the Force and laying down its function.

Nevertheless, the Assembly does not have any authority under the Charter of the United Nations to create binding legal obligations on member states, and Egypt, therefore, could not, in the last report, be compelled by the United Nations Assembly to continue to accept any resolution or to co-operate in carrying it out. The Assembly cannot force its view on any state although in certain contingencies the Security Council can attempt to do that.

Mr. Speaker, the Canadian position on this matter has already been stated to the General Assembly, to the Advisory Committee, on more than one occasion and was given to the House on November 27. In case there is any doubt as to what our position is on this matter I will have another opportunity to state it to the Secretary-General and the Advisory Committee either late tonight or tomorrow morning before the Secretary-General leaves for Egypt. These statements which we have already made of our general position should make clear that this is the

stand we are taking and will take in respect of the reinforcements from Canada to UNEF which have recently gone forward. Although I know I am taking up a great deal of the time of the House perhaps I should go into the question of this request for reinforcements which was made some weeks ago, because it is a matter of interest to the House.

Reinforcements for UNEF

The first mention of a reconnaissance squadron for UNEF was on December 4 when our Ambassador in Cairo reported that General Burns was sending a message to the Secretary-General making proposals relating to the Canadian contribution to UNEF. We were told then only that General Burns would find it desirable to have as a combined unit an additional armoured reconnaissance unit or squadron of company size of about 200 men.

Shortly afterwards our Permanent Mission in New York reported that a representative of the Secretary-General had informed them that General Burns had urged that a request for a reconnaissance unit from Canada be pursued, that the reconnaissance squadron was urgently needed to supplement the two mechanized companies from Yugoslavia and would be deployed in Sinai. In the second week of December the Canadian Permanent Mission in New York received a letter from the United Nations formally requesting this additional contribution of the reconnaissance unit to UNEF.

There have been a great many reports of Egyptian objections to the arrival of these Canadian reinforcements. The reports and rumours of these objections will, I feel confident, prove entirely unfounded. I have every hope based on the assurances we have received as recently as the last 24 hours that the Canadian reinforcements will join UNEF in Egypt for duty in the normal way, as indeed I indicated would be the case. I think on March 7, in this House. No interference in this move by any government could be accepted by us as valid and if any attempt to so interfere were successful this would have serious results so far as any further Canadian participation in UNEF is concerned, and therefore it would have serious results for UNEF as a whole. There should be no doubt about this in anyone's mind, but it is a contingency which as I have said I have every reason to believe will not arise based on assurances which have been received.

In taking this position, which I think is a reasonable one, we are concerned about the whole future not only of this particular Force but of the United Nations itself as an agency to facilitate and increase international peace and security. I am sure all of us have nothing but good will for the Egyptian people; we are not participating in any manoeuvres of any kind against them; we are not influenced by anything but a desire to make the United Nations and its agency the United Nations Emergency Force effective for achieving the objectives of the Assembly, the objectives

of securing and supervising a cease-fire and facilitating the establishment of peaceful conditions. In the policy we have been following at the United Nations in these matters our motives are above reproach. Any imputation to the contrary is false and unfair. UNEF is no cloak and will be no cloak for the plans or ambitions of any state or states, and there is no foundation whatever for any suspicions from any source that anyone wishes to use it in that way.

Suez Canal

Mr. Speaker, questions have also been asked about the progress of the clearance of the Suez Canal and I should therefore say something about that. While our attention has been concentrated for several weeks past on efforts to arrange for completion of the withdrawal of Israeli forces and on UNEF this other major enterprise, the clearing of the Suez Canal, has been going forward. The clearing of the Suez Canal under United Nations supervision has been proceeding in accordance with the most optimistic time estimates of the technical officers responsible for its progress. We do not know yet exactly when the resumption of a full flow of traffic will be possible but we are informed that if the present rate of progress is maintained a channel capable of taking ships of more than 25 feet draught will be opened very shortly, in a matter of days. We are told also that the clearing of marginal obstacles and restoration of full navigational facilities has made much better progress than had been originally scheduled, in spite of political difficulties which have understandably attracted so much attention.

As the Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent) told the House last Monday, Canada has acquired a special interest in the steps being taken to reopen the Canal by virtue of the advance—not the gift but the advance on good 'security'—that the Government has made toward the financing of the United Nations clearing operations.

Canada, of course, is not a large user of the Canal but we are naturally anxious, as a trading nation, for the earliest possible resumption of the Suez traffic which is so vital to the economies of the many user states. Our participation in the advances made to the United Nations and the work that this interim financing has made possible was also of particular assistance to the United Kingdom and France at that time, and that was the main reason why we participated in that interim financing; and that is a reason which presumably should commend itself to hon. members opposite.

As hon. members know, certain proposals for provisional operating arrangements for the Canal pending the working out of a permanent regime have been agreed upon between the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States, France and Norway and these proposals have been passed on to the Government of Egypt through the Secretary-General. They are to the effect that the International

Bank or the United Nations itself should act as a neutral agent for receiving Canal tolls of which 50 per cent should be paid to Egypt immediately and the balance held pending determination of its disbursement under a definitive Suez settlement.

As far as I know, the Egyptian Government has not yet given its reply to these proposals but the Secretary-General is in touch with them on the matter and I have no doubt that is one of the questions he will be discussing on his visit to Cairo.

While Canada of course was not involved in the discussions which led up to the formulation of the proposals now before the Government of Egypt, I may say we consider that these proposals are sound and offer a reasonable basis for agreed arrangements under which regular Canal traffic might be resumed, and we hope that early agreement on such arrangements will be possible. The importance of that to us all is obvious. The arrangements that were agreed to last October at the Security Council provide for the free and non-discriminatory and secure transit through the Suez Canal for ships of all states, and in all states I include the State of Israel. We indicated our support for those arrangements in this House last summer.

From what I have said I think it will be clear that our general policy on these matters at the United Nations and elsewhere has been based on the negotiation of differences. Success in such negotiation is not of course possible if through timidity we give in to unwarranted pressures, but on the other hand it is not assisted by abuse of or hissing at any of the governments or personages involved with whom we have to negotiate. Such abuse is an easy escape for emotions, but it hinders rather than helps the search for acceptable solutions which will avoid the use of force. Indeed it often helps to make force unavoidable by provoking wild and angry reactions. Nor is the use of violent language necessarily an indication of either strength or conviction on the part of the person who uses that language.

To state, as has been done, that this Government has said anything or has done anything which would condone the use of force in this or any other matter unless that force is justified as self-defence, individual or collective, under the Charter of the United Nations, is a misrepresentation of our position and is denied by every act and every statement on the record of the United Nations or elsewhere. To attempt to explain some alleged and imaginary change in Canada's attitude toward the use of force in the Middle East by tying that fictitious change to the new Eisenhower doctrine for United States policy in the Middle East is a misrepresentation not only of Canadian policy but of the Eisenhower doctrine itself.

The Eisenhower Doctrine

It has been stated . . . that the United States policy to which I have referred is, and I quote . . .

If there should be communist aggression in the Near East, American troops—acting on their own—would intervene.

That is the end of the quotation. That is also a distortion of the meaning of the Eisenhower doctrine and it does no good to co-operation between friends or to the effort to avoid conflict . . . (The pertinent paragraph of) the Congressional resolution on the subject . . . is as follows:

The United States regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East. To this end, if the President determines the necessity thereof, the United States is prepared to use armed forces to assist any such nation or group of such nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism: provided that such employment shall be consonant with the treaty obligations of the United States and with the constitution of the United States.

That is a paragraph from the resolution. How will the President of the United States determine this necessity? What measures will be put into operation after the determination is made, and how will he do it? Well, the President has already made himself perfectly clear on this point, and I commend his statement to hon. members opposite. Here is his statement to Congress when he submitted his resolution:

These measures would have to be consonant with the treaty obligations of the United States, including the Charter of the United Nations and with any action or recommendations of the United Nations. They would also, if armed attack occurred, be subject to the overriding authority of the United Nations Security Council in accordance with the Charter.

To say that that doctrine, as stated by the President and accepted by Congress, would justify unilateral action by the United States in the Middle East . . . is not a correct interpretation of the United States doctrine. It may have its weaknesses, but that is certainly not one of them. That is one charge, that we have abandoned our earlier position because of an alleged new United States doctrine. This criticism is of course linked with the more general allegation . . . that at the United Nations and elsewhere we have been the chore boy, the satellite, the follower or whatever you wish to call it, of the United States. Well, the record can speak for itself and it is far more impressive as evidence than any gibes can be . . .

Mr. Speaker, in closing I would just like to say that since last October we have done what we could to secure a peaceful, honourable settlement of immediate issues which would pave the way for the solution of the political problems between Israel and her neighbours—a solution which is essential if further conflict is to be avoided, and which

seems so terribly difficult to achieve, unless, of course, one has no direct contact with the problems themselves. At the present moment, as I see it, the essential thing is that both Israel and Egypt should exercise restraint and moderation, and that Egypt should co-operate and not obstruct the United Nations in its efforts to secure and supervise peace and order in the Gaza strip. That is the immediate point of crisis.

Therefore, the Government of Egypt is, I think, in honour bound to co-operate . . . with the United Nations in this task. It is to its own interest to do that . . . to co-operate with the United Nations in this task. That co-operation is essential because the United Nations is operating in a territory in Gaza which legally is under the administration of the Government of Egypt . . .

If the Government of Egypt does not so co-operate, then it may prevent the United Nations not only from taking on new responsibilities for peace and security but from discharging those which the United Nations has already taken on in respect of 250,000 refugees dependent entirely on the United Nations and those which it has already taken on in respect of security at the demarcation

line. From every point of view, therefore, the Government of Egypt should in its own interest as well as in the interest of peace and security give the maximum amount of co-operation to the United Nations in this effort. If it does not do so, I repeat, its action could result in the dissolution of the United Nations Emergency Force entirely and even in the dissolution of the United Nations Relief Works Agency in Gaza, and that would mean chaos. It could result in the Israeli and Egyptian armies facing each other once again in bitterness and hostility, with nothing between them.

Mr. Speaker, I cannot believe that Egypt—even Egypt, let alone any other country—desires that result. I therefore hope that those powers which have the greatest influence—and I am thinking particularly of the United States—will use that influence forcefully through diplomatic channels and any other channels which may be open to them in Cairo and wherever else is necessary, to help avoid such a disaster. So far as this Government is concerned, we will continue to do our best in helping to find a peaceful and just solution for these dangerous and difficult problems.

Statement on Suez

In reply to a question raised in the House of Commons March 21, Mr. L. B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs, made the following statement on a memorandum on the Suez Canal circulated by the Egyptian Government to all governments represented in Cairo:

. . . Last summer, July I think it was, the Government stated its position in this House regarding the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. At that time we indicated our view that Egyptian rights in regard to the operation of the Canal, derived from the sovereignty of Egypt because the Canal goes through Egyptian territory, must be reconciled with the international interest in the Canal recognized, among other things, by the Constantinople Convention of 1888.

We have also expressed our support for the six principles agreed on by the Security Council last October to govern the operation and control of the Canal and any arrangement for that purpose which might be made.

As my hon. friend will know, one of those principles was that this international waterway was to be "insulated from the politics of any one state". Mr. Speaker, we have not weakened in any way in our support for these principles. As I stated the other day in the House, proposals have now been made by the four powers probably most concerned with passage through the Canal to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for the operation of the Canal when clearance is completed. I indicated then what those proposals were. They have been passed by the Secretary-General to the Government of Egypt.

The day before yesterday, I think it was, an Egyptian memorandum was circulated to all governments represented in Cairo with certain proposals governing this matter. This memorandum was tabled this morning, Mr. Speaker.

The memorandum, as we understand it, is not a reply to the four-power proposals I have mentioned, but was presumably issued at this time for negotiation purposes on the eve of the Secretary-General's visit and indeed on the eve of the opening of the Canal.

Since receiving this memorandum, Mr. Speaker, we have discussed the significance of these proposals, which the Egyptian Government itself has indicated are not final proposals, with other friendly governments more concerned than Canada is with navigation through the Canal. While these exchanges of views are going on, and while the Secretary-General is negotiating in Cairo on this subject, we do not feel it would be wise or desirable for Canada alone, and before any other country has done so, to make any formal diplomatic protest as was suggested. Such a protest at this time would not appear to us to be either sensible or effective.

UNEF in Gaza Strip

Questioned in the House of Commons March 22 on the functions of the United Nations Emergency Force in the Gaza strip, Mr. L. B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs, made the following statement:

The legal rights of Egypt in the administration of the Gaza strip derive from the Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel signed in 1949 and confirmed by the United Nations. If these legal rights are ignored or rejected, then the Armistice Agreement is violated. But the United Nations Assembly has affirmed by more than one resolution, including that of February 2 which was carried unanimously, that the Armistice provisions, all of them, should be scrupulously observed.

The responsibilities and functions of the United Nations in the Gaza strip come from Assembly resolutions and are reinforced by the practical necessities of the situation. These responsibilities and functions in our opinion should be accepted by Egypt, which should fully co-operate with the United Nations in their discharge. If Egypt is unwilling to co-operate in this way, then the United Nations' task in Gaza becomes impossible and the matter in our opinion should be referred at once to the United Nations Assembly.


Our position, Mr. Speaker, which has been stated more than once in New York and in this House, is that the United Nations should be associated to the maximum possible extent in the administration of the Gaza strip. I regret that this was not made clear and definite in a resolution of the United Nations Assembly which would have specified the arrangements to follow the withdrawal of Israeli forces. Why that was not done, Mr. Speaker, I attempted to explain a week ago today. It should be recalled also that the United Nations already accepts full responsibility for more than 200,000 Arab refugees in Gaza.

The problem then, as I see it, is to find an acceptable balance in the administration of Gaza between the practical position which the United Nations must take and the legal position of Egypt under the Armistice Agreement. Any such "suitable balance" in particular must give the United Nations that control of internal security in the Gaza strip necessary to enable it to carry out effectively its operations and responsibilities on the demarcation line. So far as the Canadian Government is concerned, UNEF could not be expected to discharge effectively its duty of preventing raids and incursions and maintain peaceful conditions along that line if it were

not in a position to carry out observations or investigations and to exercise necessary control in the strip itself. A satisfactory agreement to this effect is a fundamental prerequisite of the effective continuance of UNEF's role on the demarcation line. If no such agreement is made and kept, there will not only be renewed trouble between Israel and Egypt but the continued operation of UNEF will be prejudiced. Certainly it would be difficult for Canada to continue to participate in the Force under conditions, and we hope those conditions will not materialize, in which it would not be able to discharge satisfactorily the responsibilities given to it by the United Nations Assembly. We have made this position clear more than once to the Secretary-General and to the Advisory Committee in New York as recently as last week.

The Secretary-General is at the moment engaged in very important discussions with the governments immediately concerned. As yet we have had only a preliminary report concerning the discussions which are now going on in Cairo, but that report has been enough to cause us to question the accuracy of certain Cairo press messages about these talks.

I hope, Mr. Speaker, and I am sure the House hopes, that these discussions will clear up the difficulties that face the United Nations in this area. Otherwise the results will be serious for United Nations' action there and perhaps even for peace between the conflicting states. At the conclusion of his talk the Secretary-General will report to the Committee of Seven, of which Canada is a member, which will no doubt then consider in the light of that report whether a meeting of the full Assembly is required.



PRESENTS CREDENTIALS

Newly appointed Canadian Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Mr. George Ignatieff, presents his credentials to Yugoslav President Tito.

UNESCO General Conference



AT UNESCO RECEPTION

Mr. L. W. Brockington, Chairman of Canada's Delegation, chats with Dr. Rajendra Prasad, President of India, at a reception for UNESCO Conference delegates given by the Government of India at New Delhi.

THE first major United Nations conference to be held in Asia, the ninth session of the General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) met in New Delhi, India, from November 5 to December 5, 1956.

UNESCO, as its name implies, is an organization designed to promote international co-operation and exchange of ideas in the fields of education, science and culture. The General Conference is the policy-making body of the Organization and meets every two years to review and approve the programme and budget for the ensuing two-year period.

At the opening of the ninth session, 70 of UNESCO's 77 member states and four associate members were represented. In addition, observers were sent by the Holy See and Iceland and by many governmental and non-governmental organizations concerned with educational, scientific and cultural matters. During the session, Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia were admitted to membership by acclamation.*

The Canadian Delegation, under the leadership of Mr. Leonard W. Brockington, Q.C., C.M.G., LL.D., was composed as follows:

*The Union of South Africa withdrew from the Organization at the end of 1956 so that member states now total 79.

Vice-Chairman: Mr. S. Morley Scott, then High Commissioner for Canada in Pakistan; Delegates: Mr. Lionel Bertrand, M.P. for Terrebonne, Senator Donald C. Cameron, and Dr. F. T. Fairey, M.P. for Victoria, B.C.; Alternate Delegates: Mrs. John Bird (Anne Francis), Journalist; Professor Jean-Charles Falardeau, Laval University; Dr. Leon Lortie, University of Montreal; Mr. John C. Parkin, President, Canadian Arts Council; Mr. Freeman K. Stewart, Executive Secretary, Canadian Education Association; Advisers: Mr. M. G. Clark, Department of Finance, Miss Mary Q. Dench, Department of External Affairs; Secretary: Mr. George Hampson, Office of the High Commissioner for Canada in India.

The Conference was formally convened on November 5 by the President of the previous conference, Mr. Justino Zavala Muniz of Uruguay. Speeches of welcome were extended by Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, the leader of the Indian Delegation, who is Minister of Education, National Resources and Scientific Research, and by Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India. These were followed by an address from the Director-General, Dr. Luther Evans.

Dr. Maulana Azad was unanimously elected as President of the Conference.

Opening at the height of the crises in Egypt and Hungary, conference deliberations reflected a highly-charged political atmosphere, particularly in the general debate in the first ten days of the session. Although the Egyptian and Hungarian developments unfortunately resulted in time and energy being spent on discussion of matters which many delegates considered to be outside the scope of a UNESCO Conference, it is doubtful if apart from a resolution for emergency educational assistance for the victims of these events, (see below) they had any real effect on final decisions regarding the regular programme and budget for 1957 and 1958.

Of greater consequence to conference decisions was an unheralded budget resolution sponsored jointly by Brazil, France, Italy and Spain to increase the proposed spending level by \$1,000,000.

The Programme and Budget prepared by the Director-General for presentation to the Conference provided for an expenditure of \$21,000,000 for 1957 and 1958. It showed a desirable trend in the direction of greater concentration of programme activities than any previous programme and budget. However, with the adoption of the amendment to the budget resolution which brought the spending level to more than \$22,000,000, the Programme Commission was faced with the introduction of a vast number of draft resolutions for a variety of additional projects. In spite of daily morning, afternoon and evening meetings for the last ten days of the Conference, the Commission could not thoroughly examine and debate all proposals put before it. Notwithstanding this inadequate review, most of the resolutions were adopted and the programme has therefore turned again in the direction of becoming diffuse and, to some extent, unplanned.

Conference decisions of importance included the following.

Major Projects

Approval was given to three major projects: (a) Extension of primary education in Latin America through improving teacher training programmes;

(b) Acceleration and increased activity in a well-established project for scientific research on arid lands; (c) Development of mutual appreciation of cultural values of the Occident and the Orient.

While these three projects were actively supported by all states present, the third evoked particular enthusiasm. Although a ten-year project, still in its formative stages with much planning yet to be done, it was generally agreed that it could be of very great importance to the whole world in developing a sense of community through increased knowledge of, and appreciation for, the culture and civilization of other countries.

Emergency Educational Assistance

Unanimous approval was given to a Belgian resolution authorizing UNESCO to spend \$200,000 from its working capital fund "to ensure in close co-operation with the Governments concerned and with the United Nations and appropriate Specialized Agencies that education proceeds uninterruptedly, under satisfactory conditions, for children and young people who have been victims of events in Hungary and Egypt."

Executive Board

The constitution of the Organization was amended to increase the size of the Executive Board from 22 to 24 members.

Management Survey

A proposal to engage an outside group of experts to review the administrative management of the Organization was adopted.

New Bureau for External Relations

On the advice of the United Nations Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary questions, the Conference authorized the setting up of a Bureau of Relations with Member States which would combine the functions of the former Division of Relations with Member States with those of the Technical Assistance Department, thus placing the responsibilities of these two former Divisions of the Secretariat in one administrative unit. This reorganization should facilitate the integration of the programme and administrative aspects of technical assistance with the regular programme and administrative divisions.

Permanent Headquarters

In connection with the new permanent Headquarters for the Organization, now under construction in Paris, the Conference approved additional expenditure of nearly \$1,000,000 on the Secretariat Building and the Conference Hall, and authorized the Director-General to spend up to an additional \$500,000 on these two buildings to meet unforeseen items. It also authorized the construction of a third building to provide accommodation for permanent representatives of Member States, non-governmental organizations and future expansion of the Secretariat.

Tenth Session

The Tenth Session of the General Conference is scheduled to take place in Paris in the autumn of 1958. At that time, the Conference Hall and Secretariat of the Permanent Headquarters will be in use.

Conference Arrangements

All meetings of the ninth session took place in a magnificent conference hall—Vigyan Bhavan—constructed in New Delhi by the Government of India especially for the occasion, but already, since then, the meeting place of several other important international gatherings. The Conference facilities left nothing to be desired. There was a spacious amphitheatre for plenary meetings,—handsomely furnished, air-conditioned, well lighted and equipped with simultaneous translation services in the four working languages of English, French, Russian and Spanish. There were smaller conference rooms equally well designed for meetings of commissions and committees. In addition, there were restaurant facilities and lounges where delegates could relax, read, write or hold informal discussions.

Apart from providing such splendid facilities, the Indian Government and people were untiring and extremely effective in contributing to the comfort, entertainment and educational experience of the visiting delegates. Numerous educational, scientific and cultural programmes, exhibitions and film screenings, both national and international in character, were arranged. Formal receptions and informal social gatherings made it possible for delegates not only to mix with each other, but also to meet Indians in every field of endeavour.



NATO Infrastructure

In a press release issued at NATO Headquarters in Paris on March 26, 1957 it was announced that the North Atlantic Council had recently agreed on a new £225,000,000 (\$600,750,000) NATO Infrastructure Programme, to be undertaken in the course of the next four years.

The word "infrastructure" comes from France, where it has long been used to denote all the work that is necessary before a railway track can be laid, such as embankments, bridges, tunnels, etc. It has been adopted by NATO as a generic term to denote all those fixed installations which are necessary for the deployment or operations of modern armed forces, aerodromes, telecommunications, military headquarters, fuel tanks and pipelines, radar warning and navigational aid stations, port installations, and so forth. Since these installations are designed for common defence, their financing is ensured collectively, each member country assuming its share of the costs.

The first infrastructure programme, primarily for airfield construction, was organized by the Brussels Treaty Powers in 1950. Within the wider framework of NATO, further programmes have been approved for implementation between 1951 and 1961 which will total approximately £1,000,000,000 (\$2,670,000,000).

The achievements of the common infrastructure programme are impressive. They include the construction of more than 150 NATO common infrastructure airfields that can now be used in defence of NATO. An initial

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Canada and the United Nations

General Assembly: February 1-March 8

WHEN the General Assembly, after a four months' session, adjourned on March 8 it authorized the President, Prince Wan Waithayakon of Thailand, to reconvene the Assembly as necessary to consider the two items not yet disposed of on its agenda—the situation in the Middle East and the question of Hungary.

On the recommendation of the Security Council, the Assembly voted unanimously to admit the new African state of Ghana as the 81st member of the United Nations. Following the vote, which was taken on a resolution submitted jointly by Australia, Canada, Ceylon, India, New Zealand, Pakistan and the United Kingdom, the representative of Ghana, Seth Kobla Anthony, was escorted to his seat.

Among the political questions considered by the General Assembly during the period under review were the problems of the Middle East, Cyprus, Algeria and West New Guinea. Details of the discussions on the first two of those items will be found in last month's "External Affairs". The General Assembly considered a resolution on the West New Guinea problem which requested the President of the General Assembly to appoint a three-member Good Offices Commission to assist the Governments of Indonesia and The Netherlands to achieve a just and peaceful solution. This resolution was not adopted, however, as it failed to muster the necessary two-thirds majority.

Economic Questions

Thirteen resolutions on economic items, which had been debated earlier in the Second (Economic) Committee, were approved by the Assembly on February 20 and 26. All of these were supported by the Canadian Delegation.

One of these resolutions, which developed from a Canadian initiative, requested the Economic and Social Council to consider the question of collection of information about economic assistance to under-developed countries, for which the Secretary-General is to prepare a preliminary survey of bilateral and multilateral aid programmes. This resolution was supported by all member countries with the exception of the Soviet bloc countries which abstained.

Although no decision was reached on setting up the controversial Special Fund for Economic Development, the Assembly unanimously approved a resolution asking the Ad Hoc Committee on SUNFED to set forth the different forms of legal framework on which a Fund could be established and statutes drafted, and to indicate the types of projects which might be financed by the Fund.

The Second Committee had earlier rejected a Soviet proposal for calling a world economic conference in 1957, and recommended instead a resolution, subsequently adopted by the Assembly, which urged governments to continue their efforts to reduce trade barriers and looked forward to the establishment of the Organization for Trade Co-operation.

A modified United States resolution concerning the use of surplus food-stuffs to build up national food reserves was adopted unanimously by the Assembly, which requested further study of the FAO report on the question of a world food reserve.

The Assembly approved the expansion of the membership of the Technical Assistance Committee of ECOSOC from eighteen to twenty-four.

Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Questions

On February 20, the Assembly decided to postpone until its next session the study of the item entitled "Recommendations concerning international respect for the right of peoples and nations to self-determination". It unanimously approved a recommendation of the Third Committee to continue its examination of the Draft Covenants on Human Rights at the next session, and adopted a resolution which, *inter alia*, stipulated that the Third Committee "should devote enough time . . . to complete its consideration of the Draft Covenants, if possible, by the end of the thirteenth session, for adoption by the General Assembly at that session". On the Third Committee's recommendation, it was decided "to transmit to the Commission on Human Rights the official records and other documents concerning the important question of measures to be taken with respect to the violation of human rights, discussed by the Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Committee at the eleventh session".

The Assembly also adopted a resolution recommending that ECOSOC consider a long-range programme for the promotion of community development. Another resolution invited states to promote wider cultural and scientific international co-operation and asked UNESCO and other specialized agencies to bring their views on this subject to the attention of the Council.

During its consideration of the ECOSOC report, the Assembly voted to increase the size of the Executive Board of the United Nations Children's Fund from 26 to 30, and to make a change in the constitution of the Board whereby, in future, all members will be designated by the Economic and Social Council from among states members of the United Nations or the Specialized Agencies.

Non-Self-Governing Territories and Trust Territories

On February 20 the General Assembly adopted several Fourth Committee resolutions relating to non-self-governing territories. Approval was given to the report on education prepared by the Committee on Information From Non-Self-Governing Territories; it was recommended that the administering authorities consider, in co-operation with UNESCO, the formulation of plans for various aspects of educational development in the territories; and the Secretary-General was invited to prepare for the fourteenth session of the General Assembly (1959) a report on progress achieved in the territories since the establishment of the United Nations. The Assembly rejected a proposal, submitted by the Fourth Committee, for the establishment of an eight-member ad hoc committee to study the application of the provisions of Chapter XI of the Charter concerning transmission of information on non-self-governing territories in respect of the member states newly admitted to the United Nations.

At its meeting of February 26 the Assembly approved eight resolutions dealing with the question of South West Africa. In one of these, the Secretary-General was requested to explore ways and means of finding a satisfactory solution of the question of the international status of South West Africa. The Assembly once again expressed its view that this territory should be placed under trusteeship, and asked the Government of the United of South Africa to consider and act upon recommendations of the Committee on South West Africa for improving conditions in the territory.

In the course of the same meeting, the Assembly adopted six resolutions on questions arising out of the report of the Trusteeship Council. Under the terms of these proposals, the administering authorities were invited to estimate the period of time required for the attainment of self-government or independence by Trust territories. Other resolutions dealt with travel documents of petitioners; offers by members of the United Nations of study and training facilities for inhabitants of Trust territories; the future of Tanganyika; and hearings of petitioners from the Trust Territory of the Cameroons under French administration.

In a further resolution dealing with the frontier between Somaliland under Italian administration and Ethiopia, the Assembly recommended that the two Governments continue negotiations and report to the twelfth session on their progress.

Administrative and Budgetary Questions

On the recommendation of the Fifth Committee the Assembly approved a budget for 1957 of \$50,815,700; an increase of \$2,008,050 over the previous year. Decisions were taken on the United Nations salary, allowance and benefits system; the scale of assessments; the report of the Economic and Social Council (Chapter XI) on the financial implications of action taken by the Council, which are reflected in the budgetary estimates for 1957; and arrangements for the financing of the United Nations Emergency Force.



(Continued from Page 147)

£125,000,000 (\$333,750,000) programme of communications facilities between NATO countries is now 90 percent complete. By the middle of 1958 the major part of NATO's 9,000 kilometre pipeline and nearly two million ton storage system for petroleum products will have been constructed. A number of the NATO naval facilities are completed or are in final stages of construction.

The new £225,000,000 (\$600,750,000) programme will provide funds for the construction of additional airfields, fuel pipeline systems and storage facilities, and the completion of the naval bases programme. It will make possible the financing of other military installations similar to those of the earlier programmes. It includes also a telecommunications system for NATO commands making use of the latest technical developments such as communications by tropospheric and ionospheric "forward scatter" systems and an early warning radar network. All these projects are designed to improve still further NATO's overall defensive capacity.

APPOINTMENTS AND TRANSFERS IN THE CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

- Dr. P. Panneton appointed Canadian Ambassador to Portugal. Proceeded to Lisbon March 1, 1957.
- Mr. W. P. McLeod posted from the International Supervisory Commissions, Indochina, to Ottawa, effective March 1, 1957.
- Mr. R. A. D. Ford appointed Canadian Ambassador to Colombia. Proceeded to Bogota March 2, 1957.
- Mr. C. E. McGaughey posted from the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, New Delhi, to the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Wellington, effective March 11, 1957.
- Mr. K. J. Burbridge appointed Canadian Consul General at Seattle. Proceeded to Seattle March 14, 1957.
- Mr. A. J. Hicks posted from the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Wellington, to Ottawa, effective March 15, 1957.
- Mr. J. H. Warren appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 5, effective March 15, 1957. Posted from Ottawa to the Delegation of Canada to the North Atlantic Council, Paris, effective March 31, 1957.
- Miss E. L. Hill posted from Ottawa to the International Supervisory Commissions, Indochina, effective March 26, 1957.
- Mr. T. W. L. MacDermot, Canadian Ambassador to Greece, appointed Canadian High Commissioner to Australia. Proceeded to Canberra March 27, 1957.
- Miss B. M. Meagher posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Tel Aviv, effective March 31, 1957.

CURRENT UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS*

A Selected List

a) Printed documents:

- Resolutions*. E/2929/Add.1. N.Y., Jan. 1957. 4 p. Economic and Social Council Official Records: resumed 22nd session (17-21 Dec. 1956), Supplement No. 1A.
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EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



CANADA

May 1957

Vol. 9 No. 5

• EXTERNAL AFFAIRS is issued monthly in English and French by the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa. It provides reference material on Canada's external relations and reports on the current work and activities of the Department. Any material in this publication may be reproduced. Citation of EXTERNAL AFFAIRS as the source would be appreciated. Subscription rates: ONE DOLLAR per year (Students, FIFTY CENTS) post free. Remittances, payable to the Receiver General of Canada, should be sent to the Queen's Printer, Ottawa, Canada.

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
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Algeria

"It is an incontestable historical fact that before the presence of the French no state had imposed its law on Algerian soil."

"Until the French invasion, Algeria was a national political entity, with state institutions exercising all the attributes of sovereignty."

These apparently irreconcilable assertions were made in the course of the debate on the Algerian question in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly on February 4, 1957. The first was made by Mr. Pineau, Foreign Minister of France and French Representative to the 11th Session of the General Assembly. The second was made by Mr. Zeinmedine, Syrian Representative to the 11th Session of the General Assembly and an acknowledged spokesman in the debate for the Algerian nationalist movement. His flat contradiction of the French Foreign Minister's statement (although on a point of little importance to the question at issue) is indicative of the difficulties experienced by successive French governments during the period since the end of World War II in seeking common ground with Algerian nationalists on which to build a mutually satisfactory political structure for Algeria.



Algeria covers an area of 847,000 square miles with a population in the vicinity of 9.5 million. About 90 per cent of the population, however, lives in the 15 per cent of Algeria bounded on the north by the Mediterranean and on the south by high mountains which form the northern limits of the Sahara region. Some 1.2 million of the inhabitants are of European extraction, mostly French. The remainder of the population are mostly Arabs and Berbers.

Early History

It has been said that the history of Algeria is a history of domination by Phoenicians, Carthaginians, Romans, Arabs, Turks and finally French, against a background of tribal conflict. Indeed that part of North Africa which is comprised of Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco has in the course of recorded history been subjected to nine distinct invasions and periods of domination. The first Arab invasion from Syria occurred in the latter part of the 7th Century A.D. and, while Spanish rule was imposed for a time after that, the Arab influence has in the succeeding centuries remained the most marked and enduring.

This Arab influence did not, however, serve to create a unified state. The indigenous Berber tribes who make up some 30 per cent of the population of the area and who, because of their particular form of the Moslem religion, could not be assimilated, maintained their own law and institutions in the interior. Various Berber and Arab tribes exercised control over undefined parts of Algeria though it was, from the 16th Century, nominally part of the Turkish Empire. Indeed the only stable state and regime appears to have been that of the Bey of Algiers who exercised control over a small strip of coast running east and west from the City of Algiers during the period of Ottoman supremacy.

It was these anarchical conditions which made Algeria a haven for the Corsairs of the Western Mediterranean during the 17th and 18th centuries and made Algiers an unofficial headquarters for their piratical activities. However the increasing power of European navies during this period gradually curbed piracy in the Mediterranean and the attack on Algiers by French forces in 1830 was in effect the last of many attacks on pirate strongholds.

French Control

For the first 10 years of French occupation only a narrow coastal strip was kept under control. However, in 1840, faced with constant ferment in the interior which endangered the security of the coastal area, France despatched expeditions which established French control throughout the area and appropriated large tracts of land for cultivation by the French colonists who followed.

Throughout what remained of the 19th Century a vigorous policy of colonization and land reclamation was pursued in Algeria. At first there was large-scale dispossession of the tribes and native groups from their land. This was followed by a period during which attempts were made to introduce some integration of European and native land owners. This attempt proved abortive, however, and a policy of land acquisition was developed by the Algerian-European land owners themselves who in the space of 40 years acquired control in Algeria and a good measure of influence in Paris as well.

From 1848, when the French position in Algeria was firmly secured and acknowledged by legislative act in Paris, until 1870, there was a constant struggle for supremacy between the French military regime in Algeria and the increasingly wealthy and influential *colons*. In 1870 the success of the latter in this struggle was marked by the creation of a "constitution" for Algeria which replaced the military regime by a civil one (the military retained control over the arid Sahara waste) and incorporated Algeria as a part of Metropolitan France. The power of the *colons* was again manifested in 1896 with the issuance of a decree by the French Government which abolished the connection of Algerian services with the various ministries in Paris and permitted the Governor of Algeria to centralize higher administration under his own authority. The principle of Algerian representation in Paris was established, and continued until 1940.

During the first part of the 20th Century periodic outbursts of violence, which were promptly quelled, occurred in various parts of Algeria, but the Moslem population was slow to express itself, either through organized violence or by the formation of organized political parties. Influenced perhaps by the concurrent efforts in Tunisia and Morocco to achieve independence, perhaps by the growth of Arab nationalism in Syria and the growth of Communism in France, the first pan-Arab party was founded in Algeria in 1924. This party existed either openly or under cover from then on. Other political groups, some sympathetic to the French and some advocating autonomy within the French Union, were organized in the years preceding or during the Second World War. Reforms introduced by the French Government in 1944 served only to whet the appetite of the Moslem nationalists for more and more autonomy. Unrest in the Territory increased and during rioting on May 8, 1945 more than 100 Europeans and several hundred Arabs were killed. There followed a series of stern repressive measures during which many thousands lost their lives; the movement towards Algerian autonomy was reversed, and tight controls were once again exercised from Paris.

To deal with a thoroughly unsatisfactory political and administrative situation, the French National Assembly in 1947 adopted the Statute of Algeria which reaffirmed that Algeria was a part of France and established the administrative provinces of Algeria (Bône, Constantine, Oran and Algiers) as Departments of France. Thirty seats were allotted in the National Assembly to be filled in equal proportions by the European and Moslem elements of the Algerian population, and representation in the same proportion was provided for in the French Senate. All Algerians were accorded French citizenship. In addition an Algerian Assembly was established with two colleges—one European and the other Moslem—with authority to vote the Algerian budget and certain other legislative functions.

Elections to the Algerian Assembly which took place in 1948, while satisfactory from the French point of view in the short run, proved catastrophic in longer terms. In the selection of candidates the French authorities exercised their right of approving candidates. The election resulted in the seating of a heavy preponderance of pro-French representatives (41 out of 60). Many Algerian nationalists lost faith in the concept of an autonomous Algeria within the French Union and turned from parliamentary methods to agitation and eventually to terrorism as a means of attaining their goal, ignoring the vast contribution made by France to the development of the Algerian economy and the raising of the living standards of all the inhabitants.

The present Algerian rebellion started in November 1954, and, in spite of all French efforts to quell it, has been increasing ever since with support and encouragement from a number of Arab states.

It is interesting to consider briefly at this juncture the recent history of the two other territories of the Mahgreb, Morocco and Tunisia.

Morocco⁽¹⁾

With the signing of the Treaty of Fez in 1921 Morocco entered into a relationship with France in which, while remaining legally separate, she became a protectorate of France. The practical effort of this agreement was to place control of Moroccan affairs in the hands of a French Resident General, though in theory it was his duty merely to "advise" the Sultan, and "act as intermediary" between the Sultan and foreign powers.

Nationalist opposition to the protectorate status was not long in developing. Abd-el-Krim's revolt in the Rif in 1921 turned a number of Moroccans in this direction, and in 1934, the year in which "pacification" was finally achieved in the area, the "Moroccan Action" movement was formed, calling for Moroccan participation in the country's affairs. Riots and nationalist outbreaks before World War II were fairly common, but were always quelled.

At the end of hostilities in North Africa, new difficulties developed, and in 1944 riots broke out in Rabat and Fez. Two parties were formed, the Istiqlal (Independence) and the Parti Démocratique de l'Indépendance (P.D.I.), both of which advocated Moroccan independence, the latter being less nationalist and more moderate in its aims and methods than the Istiqlal. There followed a number of further nationalist outbreaks, anti-colonial speeches, and other incidents. The situation was complicated by the opposition to the Sultan of some of the tribal chiefs, of whom the most important was El Glaoui, the Pasha of Marrakesh. In 1953, a march on Rabat of Berbers and other tribesmen under the leadership of the Pasha of Marrakesh took place. Within a few days the Sultan, Sidi Mohammed ben Youssef, found himself in forced exile in Madagascar. For this sudden turn of events, he blamed the French at least as much as El Glaoui.

After two years of confusion, demands for the return of the exiled Sultan, and further riots and terrorism, talks began between the French Government and representatives from Morocco and the Istiqlal and other political parties, of El Glaoui and of the French *colons*. As a result of these discussions, ben Youssef was once again recognized as Sultan and returned to Rabat.

In December 1955 an all-Moroccan coalition government was formed in which the Istiqlal, the P.D.I. independents, and a representative of the Jewish minority participated. It was this government which conducted the negotiations with France which finally led to the latter's recognition of Moroccan independence on March 2 of this year. On that date a joint declaration was issued, according to which France recognizes that the Treaty of Fez no longer governs Franco-Moroccan relations, and that Morocco is an independent state. Since then negotiations have been carried on intermittently between the Moroccan and French Governments with a view to settling in detail the areas

(1) See "External Affairs", July, 1956.

of independence and inter-dependence between the two countries. Morocco was admitted to full membership in the United Nations at the 11th Session of the General Assembly.

Tunisia⁽¹⁾

The French protectorate of Tunisia was established in 1881 by the Treaty of Bardo following the capture of Tunis and other key cities by French military forces. Under this Treaty, the Bey of Tunis remained head of the country but delegated control of foreign affairs and general responsibility for defence and internal security to the French Resident Minister and French forces. In 1883 the Treaty of La Marsa defined the internal organization of the French protectorate. In succeeding years a French administration was grafted to the traditional Tunisian institutions, modern communications were introduced and agricultural and mineral resources were developed.

The rise of nationalism in Tunisia may be said to date from 1920 when the Destour or Constitution Party was formed. It asked for moderate political reforms including a legislative assembly. Reforms adopted by the administration did not satisfy the nationalists and in 1934 the more radical Neo-Destour (New Constitution) was organized with Mr. Habib Bourguiba as its leader. This nationalist movement increased steadily in strength, and successive reforms granted by the French from 1947-1952 were not acceptable to Tunisian leaders. Serious rioting early in 1952 marked the beginning of a period of unrest which continued for more than two years. In July 1954 Mr. Mendès-France, then Prime Minister of France, visited the Bey of Tunis and announced that France was prepared to recognize the internal autonomy of Tunisia, reserving only the control of defence and foreign affairs. A Tunisian government formed in August 1954 under Tahar ben Ammar negotiated the Franco-Tunisian Conventions that were signed in Paris on June 3, 1955. These Conventions envisaged a gradual transfer of power over a period of twenty years, throughout which France would remain responsible for Tunisia's defence and external relations. However, the rapid evolution of the situation in Morocco brought Tunisian demands for equal treatment and on March 20, 1956, three weeks after the proclamation of Morocco's independence, Tunisia in turn became an independent state, ending 75 years as a Protectorate of France. Like Morocco, Tunisia has been engaged in negotiations with France regarding the future relationship of the two countries and the arrangements governing French interests in Tunisia. Tunisia also was admitted to the United Nations at the 11th Session of the General Assembly.

Algeria in the UN

Since November 1, 1954, Algeria has been in a state of almost constant open rebellion. At first the number of nationalist extremists was small and they lacked any substantial support from the Algerian population. Disturbances were therefore confined to the Kabylie and Aures Mountains near the Tunisian border. However, local support and support from other Arab countries grew and efforts by two successive French Governments to restore order were without avail. On August 20, 1955 the Algerian nationalists mounted systematic attacks on more than 20 towns in the Department of Constantine.

(1) See "External Affairs", July, 1956.

Hundreds were killed and the French Government found itself faced with a major nationalist revolt with considerable outside support.

At the 10th Session of the United Nations General Assembly (1955) a group of 13 Arab and Asian states sought inscription of the Algerian question on the General Assembly's agenda. This was vigorously opposed by the French Delegation on the grounds that the Algerian conflict was a domestic matter outside the jurisdiction of the United Nations. The General Committee voted against inscription. However, in the General Assembly the co-sponsors of the resolution calling for inscription of the Algerian item spoke strongly in favour of reversing the General Committee's decision and in a dramatic vote the Assembly decided by the narrowest of margins to consider the item. The French Delegation thereupon withdrew from the Assembly, declaring that the United Nations and not France would have to face the consequences of this violation of the United Nations Charter. For the next two months efforts were made to find a compromise formula satisfactory both to France and the Arab-Asian sponsors of the inscription of the Algerian question. In the end an Indian resolution which had the effect of dropping the item from the agenda was adopted, whereupon France returned to the Assembly.

In spite of strenuous efforts on the part of the French Government to bring an end to the rebellion, outbreaks of violence and terrorism continued during 1956. Large numbers of French troops were sent to Algeria in an attempt to "pacify" the area in order that administrative and political reforms could be pursued. Plans to increase the Moslem participation and responsibility in local government, to increase the number of administrative districts and effect decentralization, to effect agricultural reforms and land redistribution and other advances had to be deferred from month to month as acts of sabotage and terror continued to occur throughout the country. Repeated offers by the French for a cease-fire were rejected by the nationalist rebel leaders, who did not conceal their fear that a return to peaceful conditions in Algeria might cause the disintegration of their forces and the loss of much of the active and passive support of the Moslem population. The often-repeated French three point proposal for Algeria (cease-fire, elections, negotiations) was ignored by the rebels, who insisted on a prior commitment by the French Government to recognize the principle of Algerian independence. This nationalist demand was, of course, fortified by the emergence of Tunisia and Morocco as independent states.

In October 1956 there occurred three important events in the Algerian struggle. On October 1, fifteen Arab and Asian states requested that the General Assembly of the United Nations include the Algerian question in the agenda of its 11th Session. Some time later French naval forces intercepted a ship (the *Alhos*) carrying arms from Egypt to the Algerian rebels. This foreign assistance was brought to the attention of the Security Council which, however, took no immediate action on the complaint. Then, on October 21, French military authorities contrived to have an aircraft, flying from Rabat to Tunis and carrying five leaders of the Algerian rebellion, land at Algiers where the nationalist leaders were arrested. This French action produced a violent reaction on the part of the Moroccan and Tunisian Governments, who considered the five to have been under the protection of the Sultan of Morocco whom they had been visiting. Relations between France and the two new countries were all but severed and negotiations which had been going on between them during the summer were broken off.

The French Government, while continuing to maintain that the United Nations was not competent to consider the Algerian question, did not oppose the inscription of the item on the agenda of the 11th Session. Their approach to the Algerian question in the General Assembly was to explain to members the situation, the background, the problems, and France's proposed solution for those problems.

On January 9, 1957, the Prime Minister of France, Mr. Mollet, once more elaborated his Government's policy for Algeria. In essence it was that there should be an immediate cease-fire with elections to follow within three months of the restoration of calm throughout Algeria. Representatives of the Algerian people chosen as a result of this election, which would be by a single electoral college system rather than the double college system of the past, would then negotiate with the French Government on the future organization of Algeria. Mr. Mollet did not go into detail regarding French views on what this organization should be but he made it clear that France was primarily interested in ensuring their neither the Moslem nor the European community in Algeria would, by reason of its numerical or economic superiority, be able to discriminate against the other. In this connection he said:

Let us now examine the principles governing the daily administration of Algerian affairs, which will guide the French Government in the discussion of Algeria's definitive organization. They can be reduced to three:

- To ensure strict equality of rights for all the inhabitants of Algeria, regardless of their origin and religion;
- To ensure the coexistence of the communities which make up Algeria with due respect to their legitimate rights;
- To define Algeria's individual characteristics while maintaining the necessary ties between Algeria and Metropolitan France.

Strict equality of rights, with liberty and justice, is the first requirement of all the inhabitants of Algeria. Each of them already benefits from the guarantees of the French Constitution based on respect for the fundamental liberties, both personal and public. But more is needed. All the inhabitants of Algeria must in actual practice have a fair share of the country's resources, employment opportunities and responsibilities.

The "Algerian debate" opened in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly on February 4. Mr. Pineau gave a long and lucid exposition of the French point of view. He traced the history of Algeria under French rule and dealt in detail with the efforts made by the French Government to improve conditions in Algeria and to achieve an equitable political solution which would take account of the rights of all racial groups in the country as well as the legitimate interests of France. He explained French proposals for the future organization of Algeria and spoke of the French hopes that eventually there might emerge a "Eurafrican" whole. "Europe in its entirety, bringing to Africa its capital and its techniques, should enable the immense African continent to become an essential factor in world politics."

Mr. Pineau was followed by the Syrian delegate who, in a statement almost as long as that of the French Foreign Minister, sought to paint France

as a cynical and domineering colonial master who had destroyed Algerian institutions and reduced the indigenous population to near slavery,

From the statements by various delegations that followed it became apparent—if it had not been from the start—that no majority could be found for resolutions either condemning or applauding France's Algerian policies. The Canadian view in 1955 and 1956 was that the Algerian conflict was essentially a matter of French domestic concern. While it was permissible to discuss the question in the United Nations with France's consent this did not imply that the United Nations was competent to judge the actions of the member principally concerned.

The statement of the Canadian Delegation in the First Committee was delivered on February 8 by Mr. Roch Pinard, Secretary of State. He stated that Canada still doubted the wisdom of discussing a problem which under the Charter fell so clearly within the jurisdiction of a member state. He expressed pleasure that the French Delegation has accepted the opinion of the majority and had agreed to present its views on the problem. It was the opinion of the Canadian Delegation that the French Government was aware of the need to relate its policies to the necessities of a changing world and that it had embarked in a direction which would result in a state of affairs in Algeria that should satisfy the legitimate aspirations of the two main elements in the population. Although Canada had succeeded in working out a harmonious political and social entity in a society composed of races of differing cultural, linguistic and religious backgrounds, it had not done so overnight. Mr. Pinard referred to the immense progress made by France in the last year in granting independence to Tunisia and Morocco and more domestic control to the population of Togoland and colonies in other parts of Africa. He expressed the belief that these accomplishments were proof of French good faith and suggested that the Committee should leave the question of Algeria's future to be worked out by France with the elected representatives of the area in keeping with Mr. Mollet's statement of January 9.

The First Committee eventually reached agreement on a resolution which merely expressed the hope that a solution would be found in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter. This consensus was passed to the General Assembly meeting in plenary session which on February 15 unanimously adopted the following resolution:

The General Assembly,

having heard the statements made by various delegations, and discussed the question of Algeria,

having regard to the situation in Algeria which is causing much suffering and loss of human lives,

expresses the hope that, in a spirit of co-operation, a peaceful, democratic and just solution will be found, through appropriate means, in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the U.N.

Medical Mission To Far East

DURING the first three months of 1957, a group of Canadian medical experts headed by Dr. Wilder Penfield, O.M., of the Montreal Neurological Institute, visited India and other Far Eastern countries to extend the helping hand of professional fellowship in the development of their medical services and health resources. This mission, jointly sponsored by the Canadian Colombo Plan Administration and the governments of the countries concerned, was the first of its kind to be undertaken as a combined operation by India and Canada. It was originally conceived following a tour of India by a group of British physicians, when the Minister of Health for India, the Rajkumari Amrit Kaur, suggested that Canada might be able to provide further stimulus to the progress of medicine in India by sending a team of Canadian specialists to tour that country.



CANADIAN HONOURED

At a special convocation, Delhi University conferred the honorary degrees of Doctor of Laws on Professor Arnold Toynbee, the eminent British historian, and Doctor of Science on Dr. Wilder Penfield, famous Canadian neurologist. Left to right are: Professor Toynbee, Dr. Radhakrishnan, Chancellor of Delhi University, Dr. Penfield and Prime Minister Nehru of India.

The Indian Government requested that, as the British team had consisted mainly of those interested in surgery, Canada should send four Canadian physicians of outstanding qualifications in the area of medicine and medical teaching to lecture at medical colleges and to demonstrate advanced clinical techniques in hospitals. Because of a variety of circumstances, some religious and some social, teaching in India was considered to be unduly didactic and it was felt to be essential that the importance of good bed-side history and examination be stressed by clinical instruction in the teaching programme.

After approval in principle of the project had been given by the Colombo Plan Authorities, the first step was the recruitment of the medical experts. There was no scarcity of material. To the contrary, the problem was, in the main, the designation of so few medical specialists among the many available. Then too, it was essential that those recruited could be relieved of their duties

in their respective institutions for a three months' stay in India and that they be willing to undertake what was fully appreciated would be an arduous and demanding assignment. In the matter of selection of the doctors, it was felt essential that those in the teaching institutions in Canada should have the prior responsibility in naming candidates for the mission and, accordingly, the Association of Deans of Canadian Medical Colleges was invited to co-operate in the formation of the medical team. The response was gratifying and a list of prominent internists and other specialists was soon available.

The next step was to contact those nominated by the Deans to outline, in general terms, the purpose and activities of the mission and to ascertain their willingness to participate. While these negotiations were being carried on, Canadian tuberculosis authorities were invited to participate in the 14th International Tuberculosis Congress, to be held at New Delhi in January 1957. It was urged that a strong delegation to the Congress be sponsored by the Canadian Government in addition to those who would be attending under the auspices of the Canadian Tuberculosis Association.

It was thus decided that two teams would be sent to India, the first the originally envisaged medical group, now to consist of three members, and the second a group of tuberculosis experts. It was apparent that with two such teams making up the overall mission, there should be single leadership for the project as a whole, and Dr. Penfield was nominated. With demands on his time so heavy, it was extremely gratifying that he was willing to undertake the assignment.

The revised structure of the medical mission was submitted to the Indian Government and met with enthusiastic approval. It was agreed that the medical team should carry on as previously planned and visit three medical teaching institutions, to be designated by the Indian health authorities, spending approximately one month at each. In the case of the tuberculosis team, however, its itinerary was to consist first of a week spent attending the International Tuberculosis Congress, and, subsequently, two weeks at each of three centres in India, at which the problem of tuberculosis in that country would be given special study with local authorities responsible for implementing control programmes.

Although Dr. Penfield was to be the nominal leader of the mission, plans for his trip provided for a more or less independent tour and, with a view to taking advantage of his presence in the Far East, it was proposed that, in addition to India, he might also visit Pakistan and Ceylon. Again these proposals were welcomed by the countries concerned. By happy coincidence Dr. Penfield had been invited to present the annual Sherrington Lectures at Liverpool University, and thus his visit to the East was arranged to include a stop-over in the United Kingdom en route to India. His programme in Asia called for a stay of about one month, of which a week would be spent in each of Pakistan and Ceylon, and the remainder in India.

After considerable negotiation and discussion with deans of medical schools in Canada, the personnel for both teams were selected and, when approached, willingly undertook what was to prove to be a rigorous and demanding assignment. Since one of the primary objectives of the mission related to medical teaching in India, it was deemed necessary that one member of the medical team should be a physician who could speak as an expert from knowledge and experience in this area. Accordingly, Dr. Arthur L. Richard, Dean

of the Faculty of Medicine, University of Ottawa, was invited to make a contribution in this respect. As child health and nutrition are important medical problems in India, it was essential to include an expert in both fields, and it was felt that Dr. John F. McCreary, Professor and Head of the Department of Paediatrics at the University of British Columbia, admirably fulfilled these requirements. To round out the medical group, the desirability of conveying to the teaching institutions the most up-to-date information in the field of medical therapy indicated the inclusion of a therapist and, accordingly, Dr. K. J. R. Wightman, Professor and Head of the Department of Therapeutics at the University of Toronto, was invited to participate. Unfortunately, illness made it impossible for Dr. Wightman to make the trip.

Special considerations also motivated the selection of the tuberculosis team. Dr. G. J. Wherrett, Secretary, Canadian Tuberculosis Association, was included for his knowledge of administrative aspects and performance of tuberculosis control programmes in general; Dr. Armand Frappier, Director, Institute of Microbiology and Hygiene, University of Montreal, for his widely recognized contribution in the bacteriological aspects of tuberculosis and B.C.G., and Dr. Cecil G. Shaver, Medical Superintendent, Niagara Peninsula Sanatorium, as an outstanding clinician and director of a tuberculosis institution. As a special contribution, the Canadian Tuberculosis Association provided a fourth member for this group, Dr. Hugh E. Burke, Medical Director, Royal Edward Laurentian Sanatorium, another eminent clinician, being selected. To augment the Canadian Delegation attending the International Tuberculosis Congress, the National Sanatorium Association sponsored Dr. G. A. Wicks, Superintendent, Toronto Hospital for Tuberculosis, Weston, and the Ontario Tuberculosis Association its Executive Director, Mr. E. J. O'Brien.

Helpful Meeting

Before departure, information material regarding medicine and medical teaching institutions in India was obtained and distributed to all members of the mission and the principal objectives were discussed with most of the members personally on separate occasions and by correspondence. The tuberculosis team took off from Dorval on December 27. After an uneventful trip they arrived in New Delhi January 4 and their programme commenced with a week's attendance at the International Tuberculosis Congress. Dr. Richard and Dr. McCreary left Canada on January 3. Dr. Penfield's departure in late January was preceded by a meeting in Ottawa with the Minister of National Health and Welfare, Mr. Paul Martin; the Minister of National Revenue, Dr. J. J. McCann; the Deputy Minister of National Health, Dr. G. D. W. Cameron; and the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Jules Léger. This provided an opportunity for an exchange of views for the guidance of Dr. Penfield, and Mr. Martin, who had just concluded a two months' tour of the Far East, gave Dr. Penfield first-hand information on the countries he was to visit. Dr. and Mrs. Penfield left Montreal January 26 and, after the Sherrington Lectures at the University of Liverpool, proceeded on the Eastern tour, first visiting Pakistan and then India. Dr. Penfield also visited Ceylon as planned.

All members of the mission returned to Canada via the Pacific, spending a few days in Japan en route. The Penfields arrived in Canada in early March, the tuberculosis team shortly afterwards and the medical team in early April. Dr. Frappier, at the invitation of the Japanese Government, remained an

additional ten days in Tokyo to advise on the B.C.G. programme in that country.

Canadian Colombo Plan funds were used to cover the cost of travel to and from the Far East for all members of the designated mission and for honoraria and incidental day-to-day expenses: In India and the other countries the local governments defrayed necessary expenditures for travel, hotel accommodations and related matters. During their stay in New Delhi, Dr. and Mrs. Penfield were the guests of the Canadian High Commissioner to India, Mr. and Mrs. Escott Reid.

The mission was an overwhelming success from several viewpoints. Numerous opportunities were presented to permit stimulation of medical teaching activities in India. As an example of the reception of the Canadian physicians' efforts, it was reported that Dr. Penfield's lectures in Ceylon were extremely interesting to the medical profession and were received with great attention. At two lectures at the Faculty of Medicine in the University of Colombo, the lecture theatre was greatly overcrowded and members of the medical profession and students filled the doorways and sat on the steps and on the floor to listen with a degree of attention that was indeed flattering. Similarly, the efforts of the medical and tuberculosis teams were received with high commendation.

In addition to the more scientific benefits, much was achieved in promoting better relations between members of the medical profession in India and Canada and, in a less tangible way, between the Indian and Canadian people.

In a special communication the Minister of Health for India, the Rajkumari Amrit Kaur, asked to have "her deep sense of gratitude expressed to the Honourable Paul Martin and his colleagues in the Department of National Health and Welfare and to the Canadian Colombo Plan Administration for their co-operation in making these visits possible."

R. G. Riddell Memorial Bursary

An R. G. Riddell Memorial Bursary has been established at the University of Toronto. Mr. Riddell, at the time of his untimely death at the age of 43 in March, 1951, was Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations. In his work in the Department of External Affairs, at many conferences and sessions of the United Nations, and during the last year of his life in the Canadian Permanent Mission in New York, Jerry Riddell made a remarkable contribution to the foreign policy of his country. By his devotion, his imagination, his intelligence, and his warm and sympathetic nature he established a reputation for himself and for Canada in the United Nations from which his country has never ceased to profit.

The Bursary in Mr. Riddell's memory is being awarded this spring for the first time, and is to be given annually "to a student enrolled in the second or third year of an honour course in the Humanities or Social Sciences on the recommendation of the Council of the Faculty of Arts". This Bursary has been established by his widow, who has guaranteed the amount of \$150 each year until the necessary capital has been accumulated to cover the annual payment. If the capital grows to exceed the sum necessary to yield \$150 annually, the award will be increased. The directors of the Bursary have announced that contributions to this open fund (in the form of cheques payable to the University of Toronto) may be sent direct to Mr. W. W. Small, Secretary of the Board, Simcoe Hall, University of Toronto.

Visit to Basutoland

(The High Commissioner for Canada to South Africa, Mr. E. W. T. Gill, recently paid his first visit to Basutoland, one of the British High Commission territories in South Africa, where there are several Canadian religious missions. Mr. Gill's report on this visit is given below.)

ACCOMPANIED by Mrs. Gill I recently paid a short visit to the Canadian missionaries in Basutoland.

The activities of the Roman Catholic missions in that territory have been expanded considerably since they were the subject of reports by my predecessors, Mr. D'Arcy McGreer and Mr. T. W. L. MacDermot. There are now about 40 missions including churches, schools, teacher-training establishments, seminaries, hospitals, and clinics, and a university college, as well as some useful establishments.

These various institutions are operated by priests of the Oblate Order assisted by brothers and sisters of the same order, lay brothers of the Sacred Heart, Grey Nuns and others. The great majority of those engaged in this worthy work are Canadians—220 in all—with a small minority coming from European countries. I gather that the necessary financial support for their undertakings comes largely from Canadian sources.

The population of Basutoland is now about 600,000 and of these more than one-third have adopted the Roman Catholic faith, perhaps something less than one-third have become Protestants, and the rest are still pagan. In the past 40 years the number of Roman Catholics among the Basuto has risen



WITH PARAMOUNT CHIEF
Mr. and Mrs. Gill with M'antsebo Seeiso, Paramount Chief of the Basutos.

from 9,000 to 260,000 and new baptisms are taking place at the rate of about 10,000 per annum.

My wife and I were treated with the utmost cordiality by our fellow Canadians. We stayed in the suite reserved for the Apostolic Delegate at Pius XII College and the Right Reverend J. D. Des Rosiers, O. M. I., Bishop of Maseru, conducted us personally on our visit to various missions in Roma (the headquarters) and the outlying areas. At Roma Junior College, the staff and students were assembled to meet us and Brother Origène, S.C., made an address of welcome. The school band then played "O Canada!" (which they had been practising for several days). Later, at a garden party which was held in our honour, Brother Georges, S.C., assisted by the same band, led in the singing of "Alouette". Thus it may be seen that we were in a thoroughly Canadian atmosphere.

Pius XII College, which is one of two institutions in southern Africa functioning exclusively for the higher education of Africans, has grown in scope and importance. In 1955, it became affiliated with the University of South Africa in Pretoria. Its pupils thus came to be recognized as a distinct group of students of the University for administration and examination purposes. It now has about 65 students from various territories in southern Africa taking courses leading to a B.A., B.Comm., or B.Sc. degree, or to a University education diploma. It has a large capital expansion programme underway, which will permit increased enrolment. The college, the rector of which is Father Guilbeault, O.M.I., formerly of Mattawa, Ontario, does much to make Western civilization better known not only among Africans from Basutoland, but from elsewhere south of the Sahara as well.

Of special interest in showing the primitive conditions under which some of the missionaries work was our visit to St. John the Baptist Mission, Marakabei, situated high up in the Basuto mountains. Before the construction of a road, the Mission was largely dependent on pack mules for supplies and much of the construction materials for the church were taken in by that method. The priest in charge of the Mission is Father Leclerc, O.M.I., and Brother Labrecque, O.M.I., is responsible for the building programme.

I formed extremely favourable impressions of the good work being done in the missionary field by our fellow Canadians and their associates. I was struck by the zeal and devotion of the missionaries on the one hand and by the responsiveness of their pupils on the other. An atmosphere of happiness and serenity pervades throughout and there is a spirit of friendly co-operation in the relationship between Basuto and missionary. There are of course many Basutos who have been prepared in the institutions and have taken their places as priests and nuns beside the white missionaries. The majority of their 700 school teachers are African nuns. The Right Reverend E. G. Mabothona, a Basuto who was prepared for the priesthood at Roma, was a few years ago ordained as Bishop and now heads the Diocese of Leriba. In 1954, he visited Canada and delivered a sermon in French in Notre Dame Cathedral, Montreal.

During the course of my visit, I called to pay my respects on M'antsebo Seeiso, Paramount Chief of the Basutos. She is acting as Regent until her stepson, Bereng Seeiso, who is being educated in the United Kingdom, comes of age. Using the Bishop as an interpreter, she asked me to convey to the Prime Minister of Canada her deep gratitude for the help that her people are receiving from our country.

Towards the close of our stay, we spent a short time in Mazenod, where we inspected the modern printing plant which supplies books and religious literature to the missions. This is under the direction of Father M. Ferragne, O.M.I., who used to lecture at the University of Ottawa. On this occasion, I was able to broadcast over the mission network a brief message of greetings to the missionaries at the outlying posts we were unable to visit.



TUNISIAN ANNIVERSARY

Ambassador Leon Mayrand, special Canadian representative to the celebrations marking the First Anniversary of Tunisian Independence, being greeted by the Tunisian Director of Protocol, General Bahri, upon arrival at Tunis Airport. Tunisia, a former protectorate of France, acquired full independent status on March 20, 1956 and was recognized by Canada as a sovereign state on June 20 of that year. Mr. Mayrand was the first official Canadian representative to visit the new state.

Force For United Nations

By Lester B. Pearson

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PEACE, one might think, is not the sort of human occupation which should normally require supervision. Yet the United Nations, instead of concentrating on more positive and progressive activities, has ever since its inception been engaged in supervising a kind of peace which has been not much more than the absence of fighting—and not always even that. Now policing a peace—or an armistice—can be an essential international function, at times a dramatic one. It cannot be denied that the United Nations has been successful in this function in some important cases. However, action in this field has been largely pragmatic and ad hoc. I believe—and recent events have strengthened my belief—that the time has come when we should seek ways to enable the United Nations to pursue this work in a more organized and permanent way.

The world's alarm last November over events in Egypt—intensified, if that were possible, by the frustrating situation in Hungary—galvanized the General Assembly into establishing a United Nations Emergency Force, an action which until then had not been thought practicable or probable. We must now do everything possible to ensure that this action is successful in achieving the desired results. If we fail in this, a damaging blow—perhaps a fatal one—will be dealt to the whole concept of supervising the peace and avoiding hostilities through the United Nations Assembly. If we succeed, then we must build on that success so that when we are faced in the future with similarly complicated and dangerous situations we can avoid the hasty improvisations of last autumn.

The United Nations was brought into being primarily as a co-operative endeavor on the part of many nations to seek in collective action the security for which mankind hungered and which the facts of life in the modern world denied to each nation individually. To achieve this the founders of the United Nations recognized the necessity of having military forces at its disposal and they wrote into the Charter provisions which they hoped would bring them into being. Over the years, however, these provisions have developed in ways far removed from the intentions of their authors.

Under the Covenant of the old League of Nations, the Assembly and the Council had concurrent jurisdiction over the peaceful settlement of disputes and recommendations of enforcement action. Under the Charter of the United Nations, however, the Security Council has primary responsibility in this field and, within certain well-defined limits, has the power to direct members to take action. The League Covenant made no provision for the compulsory enforcement of its decisions; any decision which might require the use of force could be taken only with the unanimous approval of all members, including the state against which it was to be directed. Every member of the League had the right of veto over collective action. That, of course, was a guarantee of futility.

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The Charter of the United Nations, however, took what was hoped would prove to be a great step forward. The concentration in the Security Council of power to make certain decisions and enforce them gave the new organization immense potential for quick and decisive action—at least in theory. Actually, in the conditions of cold war the veto possessed by each permanent member of the Council was almost as effective in preventing action as if all members had had it.

Despite the dangers inherent in the irresponsible use of the veto, there was hope that the Security Council would prove effective. One reason for hope was that its decisions were to have behind them an overwhelming superiority of armed force deriving primarily from the forces of the Great Powers themselves. In addition, other members of the organization undertook to make armed forces available to the Council, on its call and in accordance with special agreements. These forces were to be organized collectively by the Military Staff Committee of the Security Council, composed of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members.

As early as 1947, however, the Military Committee became deadlocked over the issue of the contributions to be made by the Great Powers themselves to the collective force of the United Nations. Their disagreement merely reflected the general breakup of their wartime co-operation and its replacement by the fears and dissensions of the cold war. With no Great Power agreement it is not surprising that the Military Staff Committee also failed to draw up the special agreements between the Council and other members envisaged under Article 43 of the Charter, and upon which the whole military structure of the United Nations was originally meant to rest. As a result, the United Nations today entirely lacks that particular type of international force envisaged in the Charter.

In spite of its inability to use force to implement its decisions, the Security Council was nevertheless able to intervene with some success in dangerous situations in Iran, Greece, Indonesia, Kashmir and Palestine. Then came the outbreak of hostilities in Korea and a temporary but significant change in the pattern of United Nations action to preserve the peace—a change made possible by two accidents of history. First, the U.S.S.R., with its veto, was absent from the Security Council when the decision to intervene was taken. Second, at the moment of the outbreak of hostilities in Korea a United Nations Commission was on the spot, able to report and advise on the facts of the situation. The U.S.S.R., however, is not likely again to vacate its seat in the Council, and there are many dangerous areas in the world where the United Nations maintains no observation agency. The type of Security Council action against aggression in Korea, therefore, is not likely to be repeated. In any event, the United Nations character of that action was as much symbolic as it was real, because the United States supplied most of the forces and exercised most of the control over them. In so far as the possibility of using the United Nations for collective security was concerned, Korea was both an encouragement and a warning.

By the time of the Korean operation, it had become clear that where an important, not to say vital, political interest of a Great Power was at stake, that Power would not readily subordinate its decision to a collective judgment. Because of this, and because of the veto, the earlier idea of collective security through the Security Council became impossible to realize. To escape from

the dilemma thus created, many members of the United Nations suggested that questions which the Council was unable to resolve might be referred to the General Assembly; and they advocated that other forms of force than that provided for under Article 43 of the Charter be organized to carry out United Nations decisions.

Even earlier, at the very first session of the General Assembly in October 1946, the Canadian delegation had voiced its concern that the Security Council and the Military Staff Committee had failed to make substantial progress towards a conclusion of the special agreements with individual members required to implement Article 43. It urged that these bodies proceed with all possible speed to equip the Security Council with forces.

In the following Assembly of 1947, Mr. St. Laurent, then Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, said: "Nations in their search for peace . . . will not and cannot accept indefinitely and unaltered a Council which was set up to ensure their security, and which, so many feel, has become frozen in futility and divided by dissension. If forced, they may seek greater safety in an association of democratic and peace-loving states willing to accept more specific international obligations in return for greater national security. Such associations, if consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter, can be formed within the United Nations." The provisions of the Charter, he added, "provide a floor under, rather than a ceiling over, the responsibilities of Member States. If some prefer to go even below that floor, others need not be prevented from moving upwards." It was the Canadian hope that such a development would not be necessary. If it were unnecessary it would certainly be undesirable.

As we have seen, however, hopes for ensuring collective security were not fulfilled. The Security Council remained powerless to provide such security and the Assembly was unorganized for this purpose. In view of the undiminished threat from the Soviet Union, which had a preponderance in armed forces and pursued aggressive policies, certain members of the United Nations sought for a regional means of providing for their mutual defense within the framework of the organization. The North Atlantic Treaty, for example, was created and exists only because of the failure to attain a really effective system of collective security on a universal basis.

The search for means to establish a universal system nevertheless continued. Against the sombre background of events in Korea, members of the United Nations reviewed again the collective security machinery available, with the result that in the autumn of 1950 the Assembly adopted a resolution which potentially was of great importance. The Uniting for Peace Resolution, as it came to be called, meant simply that the General Assembly had decided to provide machinery for utilizing certain powers which it already possessed. The resolution did not itself constitute any revolutionary departure in interpreting the Charter; it was conceived simply as a practical measure designed to meet certain situations in which the purposes of the United Nations might be frustrated by the negative attitude of a permanent member of the Security Council. The General Assembly was to be used for security purposes only when the Security Council failed to perform, or was prevented from performing, its primary function. If the Council acted, nothing in the resolution would interfere with its action.

But if the Security Council did not act, what then? Were we to admit frankly the failure of our United Nations peace machinery and fall back entirely upon regional collective security arrangements such as NATO? While filling a gap, these obviously were limited in scope or character. Surely, it was thought, some way could be found for the United Nations to provide a force which would at least halt a drift to war by helping to carry out an Assembly recommendation when the Security Council failed to act. True, according to the Charter the Assembly had no legal power of enforcement and could act only by recommendation. Nevertheless, in terms of persuasiveness and moral force, the Assembly's recommendations, if responsibly conceived and generally accepted (two very weighty provisos), would carry as much weight as those of the Security Council—perhaps more. So why not at least make available some machinery which might carry them out?

Such was the background of the Uniting for Peace Resolution. It provided, among other things, that an emergency session of the Assembly might be called on 24 hours' notice for the purpose of making recommendations if the Security Council had failed to agree on means of resisting a breach of the peace or an act of aggression. It also called for the establishment of a Collective Measures Committee to study methods which might be used to strengthen the collective security machinery. Moreover—and this was a foundation on which we could have built—the resolution recommended that each member state maintain elements within its armed forces for prompt use as United Nations units, and that a panel of military experts be appointed by the Secretary-General for advisory and organization purposes.

The Collective Measures Committee recommended in the resolution was set up and it developed a set of principles designed to help maintain and strengthen the United Nations collective security system through Assembly action. The Secretary-General asked member governments to survey their resources to determine the nature and scope of the assistance they might render and to report on the progress made. The result was discouraging. In all, 37 governments replied to this communication. Simple acknowledgements were received from 15 governments; 8 indicated that they could not participate at all in the projects being studied by the Committee, or gave only limited and conditional acceptance of the measures contemplated; 11 took certain minimum steps (largely in connection with the earmarking of forces for Korea) and gave assurances of active support for the principle of the Uniting for Peace Resolution. The Canadian Government stated that its special force, raised for service in Korea, would be available for whatever action might be necessary anywhere in order to carry out military obligations under the Charter.

By the Uniting for Peace Resolution, the Assembly also provided for a Peace Observation Commission to observe and report on the situation in areas of international tension. So far it has not been used.

As a whole, the efforts of the Collective Measures Committee were sterile. With the General Assembly's adoption of its third report on November 4, 1954, it concluded its work. Another series of studies had been accumulated and now were laid away in files and vaults. The United Nations, nine years after its founding, still had no force at its disposal to implement its decisions—even to "secure and supervise" a cease-fire and armistice.

Nevertheless, the Uniting for Peace Resolution remained on the books; and almost six years later, in November 1956, in circumstances very different

from those contemplated by its authors, it enabled the General Assembly to meet and discuss in emergency special session the serious situation in the Middle East. The Assembly still was ill-prepared to take on responsibilities for "peace supervision" through police action. The Uniting for Peace Resolution recommended the earmarking of forces for its use in peace and police action but nothing had been done. When the need for these forces was upon us we had to embark on an improvised experiment, starting literally from nothing. There was neither precedent nor organization available to the Assembly in carrying out the new responsibility thrust upon it.

In a sense this was due to the unexpected nature of this responsibility. With fighting actually going on and threatening to spread, quick action was required. In the crisis, an Assembly resolution set up a United Nations Emergency Force and authorized the Secretary-General to organize it within 48 hours. Due largely to the devotion, energy and intelligence of the Secretary-General and his assistants, the Force was in fact brought into being at once. This amazing example of international improvisation showed what can be done by the United Nations when the collective will to action is strong and united. Moreover, the Force has so far proved effective for the purpose it was meant to achieve, the securing and supervising of a cease-fire.

Nevertheless, these purposes were very different from those originally contemplated in the Charter. What we faced in the Assembly last November was the necessity of organizing quickly a force, not to fight, but to ensure that fighting would not be resumed. We were trying to implement, if not a new concept of United Nations supervisory action, certainly an enlarged one.

Such a concept has already stirred interest and hope and optimism. Some of this optimism is exaggerated, because it does not take sufficiently into consideration the limitations under which the Assembly must act. There can be no certainty that the U.N.E.F. will complete successfully the tasks that have been or may be given to it. It may fail, either because it does not secure the right kind of collective backing in the Assembly or because it becomes the victim of Middle Eastern politics. If so, the failure will extend far beyond the immediate situation. It will destroy confidence in the effectiveness of the United Nations in the whole field of security. On the other hand, its success might well lead to further steps in developing means to supervise the peace.

Whatever may be the ultimate result, the intervention of the United Nations through an Emergency Force in November 1956 was certainly an indispensable prerequisite to the acceptance of a cease-fire and the subsequent withdrawal of Anglo-French and Israeli forces from Egyptian territory. Its action emphasized, however, the need to be better prepared to meet future situations of a similar kind. Even if governments are unable to give the United Nations a "fighting" force ready and organized to serve it on the decision of the Security Council, they should be willing to earmark smaller forces for the more limited duty of securing a cease-fire already agreed upon by the belligerents. We might in this way be able to construct a halfway house at the crossroads of war, and utilize an intermediate technique between merely passing resolutions and actually fighting.

The first step would seem to be to create a permanent mechanism by which units of the armed forces of member countries could be endowed with the authority of the United Nations and made available at short notice for

supervisory police duties. It is not suggested that the present Emergency Force should become a permanent force or, indeed, that its functions should be extended beyond those laid down in the relevant Assembly resolutions. We should, nevertheless, build upon the experience of this enterprise. Otherwise, I repeat, we shall only go back again to the situation in which we found ourselves last November, when everything had to be improvised, when there was no precedent for making units available, no administrative and financial procedure and no organization to which the Secretary-General could turn in the task given him by the Assembly of putting a United Nations force into a dangerous and delicate situation. We improvised successfully then. We cannot reasonably expect the same degree of success a second time.

We now have at our disposal a body of experience from which can be developed some tentative principles governing the establishment of United Nations machinery and, as required, a Peace Supervision Force. Among these principles—some of which I have already referred to—the following strike me as forming an essential minimum.

Member governments, excluding the permanent members of the Security Council, should be invited to signify a willingness in principle to contribute contingents to the United Nations for purposes that are essentially noncombatant, such as, for example, the supervision of agreed cease-fires and comparable peace supervisory functions.

Since the Security Council is charged with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace, members who have sought and secured election to the non-permanent seats on it would normally be expected to be among those signifying a willingness to contribute contingents to such a force.

For effective organization, there would have to be some central United Nations machinery. The Secretary-General should have a permanent Military Adviser who, with a small staff, might assume responsibility for the direction of other truce supervision arrangements which have been or might be agreed on.

If at any time a Peace Supervision Force were constituted, the Secretary-General would require an advisory committee similar to that which now assists him in connection with the UNEF in Egypt.

While such a force is not primarily a fighting force, it must be capable of defending itself once it is in the field, since the inherent duty of a commander is to preserve the safety of his men. It should also include the necessary administrative and supporting elements to enable it to function effectively as an entity.

A force to deal with a particular situation could be established by a resolution either of the Security Council or of the General Assembly. Presumably it would be associated with efforts made by the United Nations towards assisting in the settlement of the dispute. These efforts in turn could be furthered by a revitalized Peace Observation Commission given real responsibility to investigate disputes. In a sense, a Peace Supervision Force would be an extension in space of the Peace Observation Commission and the subordinate bodies it was expected to produce.

By its very nature such a force would not be expected to fight its way into a country. Indeed, since it would be deployed upon recommendation of the

United Nations, it could enter a country only with the consent of the government of that country. This consent would normally take the form of an agreement between the government concerned and the Secretary-General acting on behalf of the United Nations. To facilitate the negotiation of such agreements, and also to expedite the creation of a force when required, the Secretary-General should be requested to draw up model agreements regarding the financial, administrative and legal procedures which would govern the operations of a Peace Supervision Force. The agreement recently negotiated between the United Nations and Egypt on arrangements concerning the status of the U.N.E.F. in that country would provide a very useful example of what can be done in this regard.

It is my firm conviction that the sort of machinery I have outlined, and the kind of United Nations force that would be expected to function through it, are practicable, are within the competence of the General Assembly, and might be of great value in avoiding, ending or limiting hostilities. The early arrival of a United Nations force of this kind at a scene of emergency would give assurance to the fearful and hope to the despairing. It would act as the United Nations policeman and his watch-dog.

How these arrangements would function would, of course, depend on the circumstances of the particular emergency to be met. Actually, there is nothing so very new in all this. The United Nations has on more than one occasion provided teams of truce observers or supervisors and has now set up an emergency force to enlarge that activity where the danger of renewed fighting, pending the working out of a settlement, required it. A synthesis and systemization of these two concepts would provide a base of departure for the future.

As always, in the last resort, individual governments must determine whether the best laid plans of the United Nations are to succeed or fail. If a plan anything like that which I have outlined is to succeed, governments must, both within and outside the United Nations, follow policies consistent with its objectives and its capabilities. The very least each of our governments can now do, it seems to me, is to draft, in accordance with our respective constitutional processes, whatever measures are required to place us in a better position to support agreed decisions of the United Nations in an emergency. Are we to go on from crisis to crisis improvising in haste? Or can we now pool our experience and our resources, so that the next time we, the governments and peoples whom the United Nations represents, will be ready and prepared to act?

North Pacific Fur Seals Convention

THE North Pacific Fur Seal Conference came to a successful close in Washington on February 9 with the signing of the Interim Convention for the Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seal Herds. The Convention is the result of extensive negotiations by delegations of Canada, Japan, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United States of America, which began discussions on November 28, 1955. Mr. George R. Clark, Deputy Minister of Fisheries who headed the Canadian Delegation to the Conference, and Mr. A. D. P. Heeney, then Canadian Ambassador to the United States, joined on behalf of Canada.

Control Needed

There are about 1,900,000 fur seals in the North Pacific Ocean. Indiscriminate killing of seals would soon reduce their numbers sharply and perhaps jeopardize their existence. This was demonstrated in the late 19th century when the herds, whose numbers in the 1860's had reached almost 2,000,000, fell to about 200,000 head in 1911 after commercial hunters had relentlessly pursued them. Under the four-power Fur Seal Convention of 1911, Canada, Japan, Russia, and the United States prohibited their nationals from hunting the seals at sea. As a result, the populations rose to 1,600,000 by 1941 when the 1911 convention was terminated. Meanwhile during this 30-year period over a million skins were harvested on the breeding islands by the governments having control of them.

The fur seal spends nine months each year at sea, three months on land. Migrating each winter to waters as far south as the latitude of San Francisco and Tokyo, the herds, beginning in June, return to three island groups in the far north—the Pribiloff Islands off Alaska, which harbour about 1,800,000 seals, and the Commander Islands and Robben Island off the Asian coast, which harbour some 100,000 seals. Here they remain for three months on the shingle beaches while the pups are born and are prepared for life at sea, even having to learn to swim during this time. In September the seals begin to leave for their nine-month journey southward. By October the islands are again bare.

The seal is a polygamous creature. One bull may have a harem of as many as 50 females. For the needs of the fur industry the practice has, therefore, been to take the surplus males. Usually three-year-old males are taken, the pelage being then at its prime.

Convention Provisions

The Interim Convention provides for a co-ordinated six-year research programme to establish the best methods not only of managing the seal herds but also of determining the extent of their predation on commercially important fish of the North Pacific Ocean. During this six-year period the four parties will restrict pelagic sealing—that is to say the hunting of seals at sea— to agreed limits required for research purposes. The only sealing operations



SIGNING FOR CANADA

Mr. A. D. P. Heeney, then Canadian Ambassador to the United States, signing the North Pacific Fur Seals Convention at Washington, D.C. From left to right standing, Mr. G. P. Clark, Deputy Minister of Fisheries, Mr. S. V. Ozere, Assistant Deputy Minister, and Mr. Adrian Gilbert, Commercial Counsellor to the Canadian Embassy in Washington.

will be the selective and controlled kills on the island rookeries to which the seals return each year for breeding. The United States and the U.S.S.R. are to kill annually on these rookeries. In return for the restriction of pelagic sealing, both Canada and Japan will receive as compensation a share—based on a 15 per cent formula—of the skins taken by the U.S.S.R. and the United States. The Interim Convention also establishes a joint commission to coordinate the activities of the four parties during the six-year period and to recommend the lines which a permanent Convention should take at the end of that period.

The present Convention replaces one of 1911 between the same four parties and bears a family resemblance. The 1911 Convention banned pelagic sealing because males of all ages, and female seals bearing or nursing pups, were being destroyed in the uncontrolled sea hunts. Fur seal herds were menaced with extinction. Moreover, pelts taken at sea were often damaged by bullets and harpoons. As in the present Interim Convention, compensation on a 15 per cent formula was paid to other members from the annual kills on the island rookeries. In 1924, however, the U.S.S.R. stopped the intermittent payments which it had been making to Canada, and in 1940, Japan, concerned about her vital coastal fisheries, abrogated the Convention and permitted the resumption of pelagic sealing. In 1942, therefore, the United States and Canada reverted provisionally to a bilateral agreement such as they

had had shortly before the 1911 quadripartite Convention. Under this agreement Canada's portion of the seals taken on the Pribiloff Islands (20 per cent) yielded during the past ten years an average annual net revenue of about \$600,000. It was at all times understood that the bilateral arrangement should end as soon as a four-power conservation programme could be restored.

In November, 1955 when the four powers began the negotiations for a new joint programme, it was impossible simply to revise the Convention of 1911. For one thing, there had been a change in the countries exercising effective control over the rookeries. For this reason, Japan, the United States and Canada, in declarations made at the signing ceremony, reserved their positions on the sovereignty of Robben Island. Then, too, since 1911 there had been a great growth in scientific knowledge about the distribution, biology and feeding habits of the seals; this in turn had raised different problems about the relationship of the sealing and fishing industries. Until these problems had been solved, the negotiation of a nicely balanced, definitive settlement appeared premature. The purpose of the present Interim Convention is to protect the various interests involved as equitably as possible while, in the meantime, the four parties push forward with a co-ordinated research programme designed to obtain the data upon which a permanent Convention can be based.

More NATO Trainees

The Department of External Affairs announced April 18 that arrangements have been concluded by Canada with Denmark, Norway and The Netherlands for the training in Canada of a number of aircrew students under a special extension of the NATO Air Training Plan, on the recommendation of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, in view of the special difficulties experienced by these countries in providing such training under a suitable national scheme.

Under these special arrangements, which will remain effective for a period of three years, the Royal Canadian Air Force will be making available annually training accommodation for 55 student pilots of the Royal Danish Air Force, for 65 student pilots and 5 student navigators of the Royal Norwegian Air Force and for 30 student pilots of the Royal Netherlands Air Force. The training of the students of these countries will be phased into the Canadian Air Training System, in proportionately equal contingents throughout each training year.

The countries concerned will bear a portion of the costs to the Canadian Government for providing these special facilities under the Canadian Air Training System. The trainees are expected to commence training in Canada in July of this year.

Parliament Prorogued

THE fifth session of the 22nd Parliament of Canada was prorogued on April 12 by a speech by the Hon. Patrick Kerwin, Deputy Governor General. Referring to Canada's international relations, Mr. Justice Kerwin said:

The unstable situation in the Middle East has continued to give concern to Canadians throughout the session which I now bring to a close.

My Government has sought both inside and outside the United Nations to play a constructive part with a view to reducing the risk of renewed hostilities between Israel and Egypt; to facilitating the early clearance and reopening of the Suez Canal, which is so important to the waterborne commerce of our friends in Europe and Asia; and, through Canada's participation in the United Nations Emergency Force, to establishing conditions conducive to a long-term solution of the political problems of that area.

In March, discussions were held between my Prime Minister and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom at Bermuda which dealt with a wide range of matters of international concern and in particular with questions of primary interest to Canada and the United Kingdom. The possibility of a meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers early this summer was also discussed.

The emergence of the former colony of the Gold Coast into full Commonwealth membership as the independent State of Ghana was welcomed by all Canadians as a further confirmation of the value and the adaptability of our free association of sovereign states linked by common interests and common loyalties. One of my Ministers represented Canada at the inaugural ceremonies.

"During the present session useful discussions were also held with the Prime Minister of France, who addressed a special joint meeting of both Houses of Parliament . . .

The brutal suppression of the Hungarian people by the armed forces of the Soviet Union served to emphasize the continued need for the greatest possible degree of unanimity of purpose among the nations of the free world and the importance of maintaining an adequate system of collective defence.

"My Ministers continue to believe that our position in the Commonwealth and firm support of the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization are essential contributions to the advancement of our aim of preserving peace and promoting prosperity throughout the world . . .

Provision has been made to assist the transportation to Canada of Hungarian refugees. Special arrangements have also been made for the movement of large numbers of British, French and other immigrants to this country.

External Affairs in 1956

THE work of the Department of External Affairs during 1956 was reviewed in the Department's 47th Annual Report* tabled in the House of Commons shortly before Parliament prorogued. In a foreword to the Report, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, reviewed international developments during 1956 and stressed the increasingly important role being played by Canada in world affairs. Noting that there are numerous and serious international problems still unresolved, Mr. Pearson's foreword said in part:

A year ago, in my preface to the Annual Report for 1955, I observed that we could look forward to a turbulent year and that, so far as one could see, this would probably be a recurring theme in annual summaries for some time to come. However great our misgivings may have been then, I doubt if we could have anticipated all the problems which we have now inherited from the past year. Dilemmas and difficulties which confronted us in January 1956 remain unsettled; indeed, some of them now face us in an aggravated form. But, in addition to these old problems, the year 1956 has left us a dubious legacy of new and complex questions which we are now trying to solve against a background of world events which challenge our skill, our strength and our determination.

It seems to me pointless to brood about the misunderstandings, the errors of judgment, the lack of confidence and co-operation between free nations which have had much to do with bringing us to the present situation, especially as the responsibility for these weaknesses must be shared among many governments. It would be unrealistic to pretend that the North Atlantic Alliance, the bastion of the free world, was not shaken by the events of last autumn. Even the strong and cherished, if flexible ties of the Commonwealth were severely tested. We know what has taken place. It is now our duty to ensure that the old relations of firm friendship and close co-operation, on which our security depends, are firmly re-established on a more secure and more permanent foundation than before.

In spite of the depressing events which brought 1956 to a close, this last year was not entirely one of setback and gloom. Through the tragic sufferings of the Hungarian people, the entire free world and, surely, those nations which are somewhat curiously described as "uncommitted", must have come to a final realization that the amiable facade of Soviet co-existence conceals the brutal Soviet conception of international relations as a jungle where the strong do what they will and the weak suffer what they must. But the agony of Hungary has been a bitter price to have this evident truth demonstrated once again.

There is another development and from this we can gain comfort. The forces of freedom are fermenting in those communist countries which have previously had to submit to the totalitarian tyranny of Moscow. The results of this may be important ultimately in terms of international security and the solution of international problems. Indeed, these forces are working in Russia itself. The instinct for freedom—personal and national—cannot be destroyed in any people. There is a ray of hope for the end of the cold war in this development.

To counter-balance in some measure and in another field the discouragements which we have experienced in 1956 is the fact that the United Nations has been given at least the opportunity to act in a way which would increase its authority and its value. It is true that the United Nations has been shown to be unable to take effective action in such circumstances as surrounded the brutalities in Hungary; nonetheless, the conscience of the world was effectively aroused against the invader through the world organization, and its condemnation was unequivocally expressed in this worldwide forum. The United Nations has also been able to establish an Emergency Police Force in the Middle East whose operations we are all watching with concern because of their effect, not only on the pacification of the area, but also on the future of the United Nations itself in the field of security.


It must be remembered that the United Nations has no authority apart from the strength which its members contribute to it. The present United Nations Force, for instance, consists of national elements under the ultimate control of their home governments. It can act only through resolutions of the General Assembly which are merely recommendations and not instructions. If belligerent states were well-disposed to resolve

*Copies of the Annual Report of the Department of External Affairs for 1956 are sold by the Queen's Printer at a cost of 25c each.

their differences, there would be little need for a United Nations Force and, if they are not so disposed, the United Nations would have need of forces which it would be unrealistic to expect would be forthcoming. We have, however, made a beginning through this Force in creating machinery for supervision of the peace through Assembly action. In this way we have been able to introduce a new element into the conduct of international relations which may become important if—and it is well to emphasize the “if”—it works effectively on this occasion.

I mentioned last year that the Canadian role in international affairs was not likely to diminish. Indeed it has increased, and its execution has taxed the resources of the Department. Throughout the year, we have taken an active part in international conferences of many kinds; and have in many far-off places taken on responsibilities for preserving the peace and helping to make effective international decisions. I do not think that it can be said that Canada is shirking its international obligations.

I should like to join the Under-Secretary in paying a very sincere tribute to the work of the members of the Department, both at home and abroad (some of the latter in trying circumstances). If Canada has been asked recently to play a difficult and important part in many aspects of international affairs, and has done it worthily, this is due in large part to the men and women of the Department of External Affairs who have, with devotion and skill, carried out the task allotted to them.



PRESENTED TO QUEEN

Air Vice Marshal H. B. Godwin of Montreal, Air Officer Commanding the RCAF's NATO Air Division overseas, is presented to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth at a reception during her recent Royal State Visit to France. L. Dana Wilgress, Canadian Ambassador to NATO, makes the presentation while HRH Prince Philip looks on. At right is Mrs. Godwin. The reception was attended by Commonwealth dignitaries in France.

THE PRESENT POSITION OF THE UNITED NATIONS

(Address by Mr. L. B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the Women's Canadian Club, Saint John, N.B., April 4, 1957.)

There have been doubts and criticisms leveled recently—in Canada and in other countries—at the United Nations. On the other hand, hopes, perhaps exaggerated, have been raised about what the UN Assembly can now do because it stopped the fighting in Suez.

Our present preoccupation with the future of the Organization is, in fact, due to a large extent to the dramatic events of last autumn in the Middle East when the United Nations moved in, via the Assembly, in a way which captured the world's attention and caused both praise and criticism.

For myself, I remain firm in the belief that our world Organization remains an indispensable agency for international co-operation. If it did not exist, something like it would have to be found or else we would lapse into a state of international anarchy in a divided world with the forces of freedom on one side, the forces of reactionary Communism on the other, facing each other in fear and hostility across an unbridged chasm, and with the uncommitted millions of Asia and Africa trying to remain aloof or perhaps form their own alignments.

It is not a cheerful picture; and it makes it all the more advisable to have a new and realistic look at the United Nations, especially in the light of our recent experiences at the General Assembly.

One aspect of the situation—which those experiences have emphasized—concerns the position of individual states, especially in voting power. The voting rules of the United Nations Assembly are certainly not ideal. It is easy enough to portray as absurd an arrangement by which Luxembourg, Cambodia and the United States have one vote each; when any rational approach would result in some form of weighted voting by which power and responsibility would be related to voting rights. It can be argued that no national government could be run on such a basis of unequal distribution of representation and responsibility, although one should not forget that in the United States Senate, one-third of the members representing only a very small percentage of the population of the country could, theoretically, prevent any treaty becoming effective.

The fact remains, however, that the United Nations is an association of sovereign states each, in theory, equal to every other one. In any event, what matters most is not theoretical possibilities, but the use to which votes are put in practice. The record here is not unsatisfactory.

The larger powers, because they are the most powerful, do influence the voting of the smaller powers; do exercise far more power than a single vote would suggest. As an

example, during the weeks before the Israeli withdrawal from Egypt, a mathematical majority could probably have been secured in the Assembly for sanctions to be imposed against Israel. However, the issue was never presented to them for decision. Why? The influence of the United States and other countries, including Canada, was sufficient to prevent the Assembly from taking this action which would have been premature and unwise. The members—at least the majority of them—recognized the facts of power and the impossibility of taking effective action on sanctions without United States support, even if they desired to do so. They knew that diplomacy was going on behind the scenes and that a solution might be forthcoming which might be at least of a character which they could not openly oppose. So sanctions were never put to the vote.

At the recent eleventh session of the Assembly which was dominated—and at times disrupted—by Middle Eastern issues, voting power was used to pass some resolutions which were futile, others that were silly, and one or two that were unfair. But it would be hard to prove that any of them were dangerous or extreme, and some of them were of positive peace-preserving value. There were extreme speeches made and some irresponsible moves attempted. But the resolutions which secured the requisite two-thirds majority were usually the product of reasonable compromise.

The picture which is being built up in certain quarters of a majority of the votes of the United Nations Assembly lined up irrevocably against the West, demanding that the Western democracies give up their territories or hand over their treasure, is not an accurate one. It is based more on impressions from the controversial political harangues which so often disturb Assembly proceedings, than on a study of actual results. Good results, however, often command less attention than violent polemics. Unfortunately, conflict and controversy are their own best publicity agents, while quiet achievement seldom gets a headline.

Discouragement and defeatism about the United Nations arise also from a faulty understanding of the Charter and the power of the United Nations. We must never forget that the United Nations is not a government, let alone a super-state. Its Assembly can't order anybody to do anything. Its votes are only recommendations and therefore in that sense are not as important as those of a national parliament. Peoples become disillusioned when recommendations, which they confuse with orders, are not carried out; or, even worse, carried out only in certain circumstances.

It is also irritating and can be harmful for responsible countries to be unfairly censured

by a majority vote or to have impracticable or unfair resolutions directed against them when other members seem either to escape censure or ignore it. But one can easily exaggerate the damage that is done. It is regrettable, of course, that certain Western countries get far more than their fair share of censure, while far worse offenders escape. It is not true, however, that the Western powers are the only ones who suffer from this practice. There is also vigorous and effective criticism of Communist and of Asian States.

Nevertheless, there is, I admit, at the present time an "anti-colonial" bias in the Assembly which often operates unfairly against certain of its members. For good reason, this rankles. It is irritating, for instance, to hear the word "colonial" used only in respect of those powers who have acquired overseas territories which they have led to or are leading to freedom and self-government. I am thinking particularly of Great Britain whose great glory is the transformation by her own deliberate policy of her colonial empire into a Commonwealth of Nations. To listen to attacks on Great Britain and France as "colonial empires" when the Soviet Union, which holds under an iron despotism so many millions of subject people, is relatively immune from such attack is, I confess, hard to take. It should not, however, be seen out of proportion. It should not be assumed, for instance, that these colonial issues would not exist if the United Nations did not. They certainly would and probably in more dangerous forms.

Certainly the record of the recent Assembly on the most important items in its agenda does not warrant a charge that it behaved irresponsibly or fanatically; or that it was invariably hostile to the West. Let me give one or two examples.

(1) Algeria

It is charged that the Assembly's "interference" in Algeria, part of metropolitan France, would justify the French for rejecting completely the role of the United Nations. The French this year, however, wisely altered their previous tactics and tried to come to terms with the Assembly by participating in the debate with moderate and reasonable statements, in which they were able to make their own case more widely and favourably known. The Assembly produced a very mild resolution on Algeria, which the French accepted and which was approved by all members. The final resolution, in fact, served the best purpose which a United Nations Assembly can serve. It allowed members to blow off a certain amount of steam and eventually to compromise and, as a result, to produce an atmosphere more conducive to fruitful negotiations between the conflicting parties.

(2) Cyprus

The British, like the French, had agreed this year to put their case to the Assembly rather than deny its right to consider the

question at all as *ultra vires* the Charter. The debate was far from one-sided and served, in fact, to expose the fallacy of some of the more extreme anti-British positions. Although the Greeks, the Turks and the British had insisted that they could not accept any compromise, they were quite happy in the end to accept a mild and, I hope, useful resolution.

(3) West New Guinea

On this other "colonial" issue, the results were somewhat different. A resolution supported by almost all the Asian and African countries as well as some South American countries and the Soviet bloc did not secure the requisite two-thirds majority vote in the Assembly and, therefore, lapsed. The Dutch spoke firmly but moderately and reasonably, and they undoubtedly profited in goodwill from this approach. As no decision was taken by the Assembly, no requirement was made of the Dutch to take any action at all. The intervention of the United Nations, therefore, did not, because of the provisions of the Charter, result in any interference with the rights of a Western country. It is doubtful, furthermore, whether the debate which took place fanned the flames of anti-colonialist nationalism any higher than they would have been driven through the usual channels.

(4) Disarmament

The debate on this subject ended in unanimous agreement on a purely procedural resolution after a somewhat routine discussion. While there is clearly not very much agreement among the Great Powers on the substance of this question, they do agree that although this subject must be considered within the framework of the United Nations, the full Assembly is no place for serious discussion. The Russians started off with the usual propaganda attack, but they subsided quickly and stuck to an understanding reached with the Americans before the debate that there would be no examination of the substance of the subject in the unwieldy full Assembly, and that it would be referred again to the Sub-Committee.

These annual exercises on disarmament cannot be said to advance the matter very far, but they do keep the subject before the public. This year the Assembly proved a useful forum in which to push the Great Powers towards more serious consideration of limiting nuclear tests, a move in which the Canadian Delegation assisted. There is much to be said for the practical arrangement by which the responsible powers work on such subjects as disarmament in a small private committee, but are subject in the Assembly to the pressure of public opinion from other delegations.

The issues which I have mentioned, were, of course, not nearly so important as those of Hungary and Egypt. It is primarily for the handling of these questions that the United Nations has been accused by some of unwarranted interference; by others of ineffectiveness; and by many of laying down double standards of behaviour.

The Middle East

It is not possible yet to pass a final judgment on the actions of the United Nations over the Egyptian crisis. If we assume that the military invasion of Israel, followed by the intervention of Great Britain and France, if it had been not interfered with, would have resulted in the over-throw of Colonel Nasser and his replacement by a well-disposed Egyptian regime, by the establishment of international control of the Suez Canal and by progress towards a solution of the Palestine question, then one may consider United Nations intervention wrong and ill-advised. If it is felt, however, as I myself feel, that military action of the kind taken could have accomplished none of the purposes that I have mentioned, that, on the contrary, it would have driven the Egyptians to invite Communist help, have split the whole Asian-Arab world from the West in bitter hostility, and imposed heavy, perhaps unbearable, strains on the Commonwealth Asian members, then, the sooner it was stopped by international action the better for all concerned, including, in particular, the British and the French themselves.

From this point of view, United Nations intervention was an essential service to peace. Certainly there could not have been international intervention by any other agency. Intervention by the other Great Powers on their own would have had, I believe, disastrous results. Any effective international action outside the United Nations would have required collaboration between the United States and the U.S.S.R., which was obviously impossible. Or, at the least, it would have required close collaboration between the Big Three of the West. Even if that had been possible—and, unhappily, it was not—it would have met fierce Arab-Asian resistance and the threat of Russian interference.

In my view, the role played by the United Nations last November was important, yes essential, for the preservation of international peace and security. Whatever may happen now, and there is much to make us uneasy about the present position of the United Nations in the Middle East in attempting to carry out Assembly directives which are, in places, too vague and uncertain, I believe that a grave crisis last November was prevented from developing into something far worse by action of the kind which could only have taken place within the United Nations. Our subsequent efforts to move from a cease-fire to pacification and to a permanent solution, may or may not succeed, but even if they do not, that will not prove that the action of the United Nations in November 1956 was wrong.

The role of the United Nations Assembly, it seems to me, became more questionable later on when the effort to secure an equitable basis for Israeli withdrawal from Egypt was the issue. It is undoubtedly a handicap to have an Assembly with a large number of members committed strongly and in advance to one

side or the other. This awkward fact has contributed to the difficulty of securing the necessary majority for any United Nations policy except for one not clear or definite enough to ensure a solution of substantive problems. To get the necessary votes, we have too often watered down resolutions or, even worse, replaced them by "hopes and assumptions". But it is foolish to assume that the situation in question could be handled more easily if the United Nations could only be ignored. Would we be better off today in the Middle East without UNEF or the mediatory efforts of the Secretary-General? In diplomatic activities outside the United Nations, would there be a constructive role, or, indeed, any role at all for middle powers who, without immediate interests involved, should, therefore, be able to take an objective and impartial view of issues? The only feasible alternative to negotiation through the United Nations would be the imposition of a solution by unilateral action by the United States or the U.S.S.R. or by the joint action of the United States and the U.S.S.R., with all the risks to peace that this would involve; which has always been a nightmare of the European countries and is, as we all know, inconceivable at the present time or in the foreseeable future.

Hungary

It has also frequently been alleged that the Assembly sanctioned a double standard of morality in its attitude towards the U.S.S.R. over Hungary in contrast with its action towards the United Kingdom, France and Israel over Egypt. Undoubtedly there is a question of a double standard of morality involved. It is a perplexing and worrying aspect of the matter. But it is not the United Nations as a body but certain of its members who are guilty of trying to establish this double standard. The Assembly, as a body, has followed the same procedure in regard to Hungary and to Egypt. It requested the U.S.S.R. to withdraw from Hungary and the United Kingdom, France and Israel to withdraw from Egypt. The Russians treated United Nations resolutions with contempt, and the other members (even though their actions were in no ways comparable with the aggression of the Soviet Union) complied. Is the guilt for this varied response to be placed on the United Nations Assembly? Or is it, on the contrary, to be placed squarely on Russia, where it belongs?

To attack the United Nations as an institution for failing to save Hungary from Russia is misleading and perhaps unfair. The attack is based to some extent on the erroneous impression that the African-Asian group refused to condemn Soviet action in Hungary after having denounced the British and French Governments over Egypt. It is true that some members of this group were slow to recognize the brutal nature of Soviet aggression and inclined to suspect a deliberate effort to divert their attention from Egypt. When it was clear to them, however, what was happening, the great majority of them

strongly denounced Soviet action, and only the "hard-core Arabs" abstained from the condemnation which was voted.

The reason the United Nations did not save Hungary was that it could not; not that it would not. The fault lies not in the Organization as such, but in the hard facts of Soviet policy and the cold war, with peace balanced precariously on the edge of the atomic deterrent.

It would be rash, and might be fatal, if we tried on all occasions to take UN enforcement action in order to see that justice is always done without any regard to the consequences; or without, to be perfectly frank, any regard to the big blunt fact of the Red Army. We certainly must not become the prisoners of our fears, for if we do our diplomacy is doomed, and the future would be grim indeed. But neither must we indulge in threats and gestures which may provide an easy escape for our emotions, but cannot be followed up by effective action. In the case of Hungary, for instance, if we had intervened through the United Nations by force, the first victims would have been the Hungarians themselves, and the rest of the world might have followed into the abyss.

The world as it exists in reality does not cease to be the same world when it is reflected in the mirror of the United Nations. If the picture it reflects is a sombre one, attacking the mirror does not help much. The United Nations did not create the picture we see today. It did not create the cold war, or anti-colonialism or Colonel Nasser. It is idle to blame it for these things.

If we want to solve our difficulties, we have to go to the roots of the problems themselves, and we do nothing to advance this process; indeed we hinder it by seeking to weaken or pull down the United Nations.

I admit—and I deplore the necessity for the admission—that the United Nations as an institution could not drive the Russians out of Hungary by force, and it could not have persuaded any of its members to do so on their own. However, it did what it could. It gave the U.S.S.R. an opportunity to reach a negotiated settlement and offered its good offices for that purpose. But the U.S.S.R. spurned the United Nations, which then could only mobilize public opinion—though this itself was important—in order to make the nature of Soviet aggression clear to the world, and to put the Russians morally on the spot.

This United Nations action, inadequate as it must have seemed to many, may, however, have had some effect on Soviet policy. The argument that the Russians don't care at all about international opinion does not hold water. They gave every indication last autumn of anxiety over the international reaction to their actions in Hungary and even seemed to have been reluctant for this reason to do what they eventually did. This reluctance was not, of course, based on moral considerations, which

have no effect of any kind on Russian policy, but on a feeling that their action might have an adverse effect on their prestige and, therefore, on their diplomacy, especially in Asia and Africa. Although United Nations pressure did not save Hungary it had some effect—and what it had was good.

African-Asian Governments

Another criticism of the United Nations is that it is increasingly dominated by a majority of African and Asian countries allied from time to time with the Soviet bloc and Latin America; a majority which is alleged to be irresponsible in its attitude to international problems, which is dominated by an irrational hatred of Western "colonial" countries, and unwilling or unable to contribute to the wide-ranging technical and economic aid measures which it so often proposes to others. It is alleged that this situation is growing more acute, accentuated by the admission of a large number of new members last year, and that it will soon be entirely out of hand.

That there is an element of truth in the charges can hardly be denied. But it is not the whole truth, or even a major part of it. The Africans and Asians, with or without the Soviet bloc, do not dominate the Assembly. If—and this is a big "if"—they all vote together they can prevent the necessary two-thirds majority being obtained for any resolution. Their own power at its strongest, therefore, is a power not to impose, but to frustrate; not positive, but negative.

What has happened is that the Western Powers themselves no longer have that dominating influence on the actions of the United Nations which they had in the past. It by no means follows, however, that the West is now automatically frustrated in its efforts to secure a necessary majority for its measures. It does follow that it must work harder to get support for them.

The fact is that there is no "Afro-Asian bloc" at the United Nations. As one Asian representative to the United Nations said recently to a member of our delegation, "The Afro-Asian bloc does not exist but many European countries are doing their best to create it." These countries themselves are careful to speak of their "group" not their "bloc", and there are few groups within the United Nations which are less united and disciplined. The lack of cohesion in the group is a fact which should dispel some of the exaggerated fears of the Europeans.

The patterns within the group continue to shift, and often in the right direction. Provided groups do not become hard and inflexible blocs they can be a good thing rather than a bad thing for an Assembly which faces, perhaps, a greater threat from anarchy than from bloc voting.

The aim of the West, therefore, should be not to oppose the development of an African-Asian group, with results that would certainly be negative, but to show a friendly interest in its workings and maintain the most co-

operative relations possible with its members, very very few of whom want to team up with the Communists against the West; at the United Nations or elsewhere.

These African-Asian Governments, let us not forget, represent one of the most important forces of today; the surge of awakening millions of a long submerged world to political freedom, with a passionate determination to secure a better life than they have known in the past. Their emergence on the world scene, it is true, presents us with new problems. But these are the product of inevitable historical processes, not of the United Nations. The United Nations provides, in fact, a framework within which this evolution of international society which is going on can take place with the most peace and the least pain. Mankind marches on and we of the West must march with it, while trying to play our part in directing the march to a good goal. If we do not, there will be far more trouble even than we have today.

Framework for Diplomacy

The detractors of the United Nations, ignoring realities, see it merely as some extra-planetary body with a life of its own, independent of national states, but with a tendency to interfere with relations between those states and as a body over which right-thinking nations who should continue to run the world have no influence at all. That, as I have tried to point out, is not an accurate picture.

Some supporters of the United Nations, on the other hand, tend to regard it as a body on which they can cast their burdens and thereby simplify—and even evade—problems of national policy and national responsibilities. This can do the United Nations as much harm, perhaps, as open opposition to it. The United Nations is no substitute for wise national policies, and it is wrong and even dangerous to give the impression that it is. But it can and should supplement those policies by providing an international framework within which we can pursue an active and realistic diplomacy for the solution of problems.

Certainly it would have been infinitely more difficult, in my opinion, to get out of the difficulties in which we found ourselves last November if the nations of the world had not been gathered together in New York. It is true that one works at times in the United Nations under the white light of intense and often ill-advised and distorted publicity; at other times, in the shadow and under the threat of majority pressures which do not lead to moderate and responsible conclusions. Nevertheless, there have been great achievements to the credit of our world organization, and they should not be forgotten in the frustrations and setbacks we have also suffered. These setbacks would have occurred perhaps in a worse form if there had been no United Nations. The achievements might not have been possible at all without it.

The United Nations has now existed for ten years, during which time it has struck deep roots in the hopes, in the emotions and in the aspirations of the free nations and peoples of the world. Its very existence is a fact, the importance of which cannot be overlooked. We should work with and through it to the greatest possible extent. We should make the very best we can of it. We can try to alter and improve it, and we can and should resist certain wrong trends. But we do not serve the cause of peace and progress when we seek to weaken and denigrate the world organization. We do serve that cause when we try to support, strengthen and develop it.

I know of no better way of doing this than to restore and reinforce the closest possible co-operation between the British, American and French Delegations at the meetings of the Organization. I do not mean to suggest, of course, that this co-operation should not be wider and include many other delegations. But I want to see the kind of "togetherness", if I may use that word, between these three delegations which once existed and which can be of such great, even essential, value not only to the United Nations but to peace itself. Indeed, in the tense and difficult days in which we live, nothing can take its place.

It must continue to be a major principle of Canada's foreign policy to take advantage of every possible opportunity to bring this about.

APPOINTMENTS AND TRANSFERS IN THE CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

- Mr. W. F. A. Turgeon, Q.C., Canadian Ambassador to Portugal, posted to Ottawa, effective March 15, 1957.
- Mr. T. C. Davis, Q.C., Canadian Ambassador to Japan, posted to Ottawa, effective March 25, 1957.
- Mr. R. B. Edmonds posted from the Canadian Embassy, Djakarta, to Ottawa, effective March 28, 1957.
- Mr. C. N. Senior, Consul General at Seattle, posted to Ottawa, effective March 31, 1957.
- Mr. G. P. Kidd posted from the Canadian Embassy, Tel Aviv, to Ottawa, effective April 17, 1957.
- Mr. G. L. Magann, Ambassador to Switzerland, posted to Ottawa, effective April 29, 1957.
- Miss E. M. Stock posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Mexico City, effective April 29, 1957.

DEATHS

Mr. A. E. L. Cannon, member of the Canadian Delegation, International Supervisory Commission, Vietnam, was killed in Saigon April 12, 1957.

A native of Quebec City and a graduate of Laval University, Mr. Cannon entered the Department of External Affairs in 1946 following his discharge from the RCAF, and served in St. John's, Newfoundland, New York, Buenos Aires, and Ottawa prior to his posting to the Far East. He is survived by his wife, the former Madeleine Pratt, and two children.

CURRENT UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS* A Selected List

a) Printed documents:

Commission on Narcotic Drugs; report of the 11th session (23 April - 18 May 1956). E/2891; E/CN.7/315. N.Y., 1957. 64 p. Ecosoc Official Records: 22nd session, Supplement No. 8.

Economic Commission for Latin America; annual report. (10 May 1955 - 15 May 1956). E/2883/Rev.1; E/CN.12/AC.34/9/Rev.2. N.Y., June 1956. 31 p. Ecosoc Official Records: 22nd session, Supplement No. 10.

United Nations Children's Fund; report of the executive board. (22 Oct. - 2 Nov. and 11 Dec. 1956). E/2937; E/ICEF/333; E/ICEF/330. N.Y., 1956. 46 p. Ecosoc Official Records: 23rd session, Supplement No. 2.

Trusteeship Council Official Records. Sixth special session, 10 Dec. 1956 - 31 January 1957). N.Y., 1957. 23 p.

Convention on the taxation of road vehicles engaged in international goods transport done at Geneva on 14 December 1956. E/ECE/262; E/ECE/TRANS/496. Geneva, Feb. 1957. 7 p. (Eng.-Fr.).

Convention on the taxation of road vehicles engaged in international passenger transport done at Geneva on 14 December 1956. E/ECE/261; E/ECE/TRANS/495. Geneva, Feb. 1957. 7 p. (Eng.-Fr.).

* Printed documents may be procured from the Canadian sales agents for United Nations Publications, The Ryerson Press, 299 Queen Street West, Toronto, and Periodica Inc., 5112 avenue Papineau, Montreal, or from their sub-agents: Book Room Limited, Chronicle Building, Halifax; McGill University Book Store, Montreal; University of Toronto Press and Book Store, Toronto; University of British Columbia Book Store, Vancouver; University of Montreal Book Store, Montreal; and Les Presses Universitaires, Laval, Quebec. Certain mimeographed document series are available by annual subscription. Further information can be obtained from Sales and Circulation Section, United Nations, New York. UNESCO publications can be obtained from their sales agents, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, and Periodica Inc., 5112 avenue Papineau, Montreal. All publications and documents may be consulted at certain designated libraries listed in "External Affairs", February 1954, p. 67.

World Cartography. Volume IV, 1954. ST/SOA/SER.L/4. N.Y., Feb. 1956. Sales No.: 1956.I.9. 59 p.

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Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East, 1956. Also issued as Vol. VIII, No. 4 of the Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far East. Bangkok, Feb. 1957. Sales No.: 1957.II.F.1. Price: \$2.50. 233 p.

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UNESCO

International Bibliography of Sociology, Vol. V. (Documentation in the Social Sciences). Paris, 1957. Price: \$6.00. 293 p.

The university teaching of social sciences: Criminology. (Teaching in the Social Sciences series). Paris, Unesco, 1957. Price: \$2.00. 164 p.

ICJ

Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the ILO upon complaints made against the Unesco. (Advisory Opinion of October 23rd, 1956). Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents. Sales No.: 158. 289 p.

WHO

Official Records of the World Health Organization, No. 76. Executive Board, 19th session, Geneva, 15-30 Jan. 1957. Part I: Resolutions, Annexes. Geneva, March, 1957. Price: \$1.25. 159 p.

b) Mimeographed document:

Roundup of the first part of the 11th regular session of the General Assembly including first and second emergency special sessions: 1 Nov. 1956 to 8 March 1957. N.Y., Dept. of Public Information, 1957. Press Release GA/1450.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



CANADA

June-July 1957

Vol. 9 No. 6-7

• **EXTERNAL AFFAIRS** is issued monthly in English and French by the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa. It provides reference material on Canada's external relations and reports on the current work and activities of the Department. Any material in this publication may be reproduced. Citation of **EXTERNAL AFFAIRS** as the source would be appreciated. Subscription rates: **ONE DOLLAR** per year (Students, **FIFTY CENTS**) post free. Remittances, payable to the Receiver General of Canada, should be sent to the Queen's Printer, Ottawa, Canada.

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Department of External Affairs
Ottawa, Canada

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THE QUEEN WITH COMMONWEALTH PRIME MINISTERS

Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II entertained at dinner at Windsor Castle in honour of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers, who met in conference in London from June 26 to July 5.

Left to right, above, are Mr. Diefenbaker, Canada; Mr. Macmillan, United Kingdom; Mr. Menzies, Australia; Mr. Louw, Minister for External Affairs, South Africa; The Queen; Mr. Nehru, India; Sir Roy Welensky, Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland; Dr. Nkrumah, Ghana; Mr. Macdonald, Minister of Defence, New Zealand, and Mr. de Silva, Minister of Justice, Ceylon.

An account of proceedings at the conference will appear in the August issue of "External Affairs".

The Problem of Hungary

(Conclusions from the Report issued June 20, 1957 by the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary established by the United Nations General Assembly January 10, 1957)

The terms of reference of the Special Committee covered a broad field, namely to report to the General Assembly of the United Nations, after full and objective investigation, its findings on all aspects of the question of Soviet intervention in Hungary by armed force and by other means and the effects of such intervention on the political development of Hungary. The Committee's investigation, as has been explained, involved the study of copious documentation from various sources and in several languages, as well as the questioning of more than a hundred witnesses, whose testimony fills two thousand pages in the verbatim record. The Committee regrets that the attitude of the Hungarian Government has prevented it from basing its investigation on direct observation in Hungary, as required by the General Assembly resolution.

Statement by Department of External Affairs

The report of the United Nations Special Committee on Hungary, which was released in New York this morning (June 20, 1957) is being studied with close interest by the Canadian authorities. It is a lengthy document of over 400 pages, and obviously will require some time for detailed examination.

It is known that the Committee carried out its responsibilities diligently and impartially, and the Committee members deserve the highest commendation. The report establishes, without leaving any grounds for denial, that the Hungarian uprising was spontaneous and unprovoked, that the Soviet intervention was imposed upon the legitimate government of Hungary, and that this intervention was resisted and resented by virtually the entire Hungarian nation.

The Canadian authorities are now studying the report and consulting with the nations which co-sponsored the resolution setting up the Special Committee. It is expected that a meeting of the co-sponsors will be held soon to decide how the Committee's report should be handled at the 12th session of the General Assembly which opens in New York in September.

The Committee's findings relate to many aspects of the events in Hungary and are concerned with numerous points of detail that have a bearing on the origin and nature of those events. The report itself embodies the conclusions of the Committee, and these conclusions cannot be readily dissociated from the evidence which is there assembled. A summary of the Committee's findings on individual aspects of the situation in Hungary has been appended to certain of the chapters. It would, however, seem appropriate at this stage to summarize a number of conclusions drawn by the Committee from its study of the evidence as a whole. To the best of the Committee's belief, these conclusions represent the essential facts about the Hungarian uprising which are necessary to an understanding of its nature and outcome. They are as follows:

- (i) What took place in Hungary in October and November 1956 was a spontaneous national uprising, due to long-standing grievances which had caused resentment among the people. One of these grievances was the inferior status of Hungary with regard to the USSR; the system of government was in part maintained by the

weapon of terror, wielded by the AVH or political police, whose influence was exercised, at least until the end of 1955, through a complex network of agents and informers permeating the whole of Hungarian society. In other respects also, Soviet pressure was resented. From the stifling of free speech to the adoption of a Soviet-style uniform for the Hungarian army, an alien influence existed in all walks of life. Hungarians felt no personal animosity towards the individual Soviet soldiers on Hungarian soil, but these armed forces were symbols of something which annoyed a proud people and fed the desire to be free;

- (ii) The thesis that the uprising was fomented by reactionary circles in Hungary and that it drew its strength from such circles and from Western "Imperialists" failed to survive the Committee's examination. From start to finish, the uprising was led by students, workers, soldiers and intellectuals, many of whom were Communists or former Communists. The majority of political demands put forward during the revolution included a stipulation that democratic socialism should be the basis of the Hungarian political structure and that such social achievements as the land reform should be safeguarded. At no time was any proposal made for the return to power, or to the Government, of any figure associated with pre-war days. "Fascists" and "saboteurs", heavily armed, could not have succeeded in landing on Hungarian airfields which were under Soviet supervision, or in crossing the Austrian frontier, where a closed zone was shown by the Austrian authorities to the military attachés of France, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the USSR;
- (iii) The uprising was not planned in advance. It was the universal testimony of witnesses examined by the Committee that events took participants by surprise. No single explanation can determine exactly why the outbreak occurred just when it did. Communist spokesmen, including Mr. Kadar and the members of his present Government, have recognized the bitter grievances of the Hungarian people before 23 October. They have spoken of a "broad, popular movement" caused by the "bitterness and indignation" of the masses. Two factors would seem to have brought this resentment to a head. The first of these was the news received on 19 October of a successful move by Poland for greater independence from the USSR. This news was largely instrumental in bringing the Hungarian students together in the meetings of 22 October. The second factor was the acute disappointment felt by the people when Ernő Gerő, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers' (Communist) Party, in his speech on the evening of 23 October failed to meet any of the popular demands and adopted what was considered a truculent tone towards his hearers;
- (iv) Although no evidence exists of advance planning, and although the whole course of the uprising bears the hallmark of continuous improvisation, it would appear that the Soviet authorities had taken steps as early as 20 October to make armed intervention in Hungary possible. Evidence exists of troop movements, or projected troop movements, from that date on. It would appear that plans for action had therefore been laid some time before the students met to discuss their demands. The Committee is not in a position to say whether the Soviet authorities anticipated that the grievances of the Hungarian people, stimulated by events in Poland, could no longer be contained. Signs of opposition were evident before the 23rd; the Hungarian Government had reason to foresee that trouble was brewing. While the evidence shows that Soviet troops from outside Hungary were used even in the first intervention, no clause of the Warsaw Treaty provides for intervention by armed forces of the Soviet Union to dictate political developments within any signatory's frontiers;
- (v) The demonstrations on 23 October were at first entirely peaceable. None of the demonstrators appear to have carried arms, and no evidence has been discovered that any of those who voiced the political demands or joined the demonstrators had any intention to resort to force. While disappointment at Mr. Gerő's speech may have angered the crowds, it would hardly of itself have sufficed to turn the demonstration into an armed uprising. That this happened was due to the action of the AVH in opening fire on the people outside the Radio Building. Within a few hours, Soviet tanks were in action against the Hungarians. This appearance of Russian soldiers in their midst not as friendly allies, but as enemies in combat, had the effect of still further uniting the people;
- (vi) Obscurity surrounds the invitation alleged to have been issued by the Hungarian Government to the Soviet authorities to assist in quelling the uprising by force. Mr. Nagy has denied, with every appearance of truth, that he issued this invitation or was even aware of it. Since Soviet tanks appeared on the streets of Budapest at about 2 a.m. on 24 October, it would have been impossible for him to have addressed any official message to the Soviet authorities, since he held no Government post at the time when the tanks must have received their orders. An invitation may have been made privately by Mr. Gerő, First Secretary of the Central Com-

mittee of the Communist Party, or Mr. Hegedüs, the Prime Minister. The Committee, however, has had no opportunity of seeing a text of such an invitation, or of considering the exact circumstances in which it may have been issued. Until further information comes to light, it would be wise to suspend judgment as to whether such an invitation was issued at all.

Similar considerations apply to the invitation which is alleged to have been addressed to the Soviet authorities before the second intervention on 4 November. Mr. Kadar had remained a member of Mr. Nagy's Government when the latter was reconstituted on 3 November and the Committee is unaware of his having given any recorded indication of his disapproval of Mr. Nagy's policies. Mr. Kadar's movements at this time are not fully known, and he cannot be considered to have substantiated his own claim to have called, in the name of the Government, for Soviet help. In any event, there is abundant evidence that Soviet preparations for a further intervention, including the movement of troops and armour from abroad, had been under way since the last days of October. Mr. Kadar and his Ministers were absent from Budapest during the first few days after he formed his Government, and administrative instructions to the people of Hungary were issued by the commanders of the Soviet troops;

- (vii) When Mr. Nagy became Prime Minister, he was not at first able to exercise the full powers of that office. Only when the grip of the AVH was loosened by the victory of the insurgents was he able to take an independent stand. By this time, the real power in Hungary lay with the Revolutionary and Workers' Councils, which had sprung up spontaneously in different parts of the country and had replaced the collapsing structure of the Communist Party. Mr. Nagy, though himself a Communist of long standing who had lived for many years in the USSR, invited non-Communists into his new Government, and listened to the demands of various Revolutionary and Workers' Councils. It would appear that Mr. Nagy himself, like the country at large, was somewhat taken aback by the pace of developments. However, seeing that his countrymen were united in their desire for other forms of government and the departure of Soviet troops, he threw in his lot with the insurgents. By this action, he obliterated the impression which he had created while still under the domination of the AVH, and he became a symbolic figure in the uprising, although he had not instigated it, and was never its actual leader;
- (viii) The few days of freedom enjoyed by the Hungarian people provided abundant evidence of the popular nature of the uprising. A free press and radio came to life all over Hungary, and the disbanding of the AVH was the signal for general rejoicing, which revealed the degree of unity achieved by the people, once the burden of fear had been lifted from them;
- (ix) There were a number of lynchings and beatings by the crowds. These were, in almost all cases, confined to members of the AVH or those who were believed to have co-operated with them;
- (x) Steps were taken by the Workers' Councils during this period to give the workers real control of nationalized industrial undertakings and to abolish unpopular institutions, such as the production norms. These were widely resented as being unfair to workers and also a reflection of popularly suspected secret trade agreements with the USSR, which were said to make heavy demands on the Hungarian economy for the benefit of the Soviet Union. During the days of freedom, while negotiations continued with the Soviet authorities for the withdrawal of Russian troops, attempts were made to clear up the streets of Budapest and life was beginning to return to normal. The insurgents had agreed to amalgamate, while maintaining their identity, in a National Guard, which would have been responsible, with the Army and Police, for maintaining order;
- (xi) In contrast to the demands for the re-establishment of political rights put forward during the uprising, is the fact that basic human rights of the Hungarian people were violated by the Hungarian Governments prior to 23 October, especially up to the autumn of 1955, and that such violations have been resumed since 4 November. The Committee is convinced that the numerous accounts of inhuman treatment and torture by the AVH are to be accepted as true. On the evidence, it is also convinced that numbers of Hungarians, including some women, were deported to the Soviet Union and that some may not have been returned to their homes. These deportations were designed to break the back of the revolution. Action taken by the Hungarian people in their spontaneous uprising succeeded in ridding them for a few days of the apparatus of police terror. This democratic achievement of a united people was indeed, threatened by a form of "counter-revolution" and it was to this that it succumbed. However, the "counter-revolution" consisted in the setting up by Soviet armed forces of Mr. Kadar and his colleagues in opposition to a Government which enjoyed the overwhelming support of the people of Hungary;

- (xii) Following the second Soviet intervention on 4 November, there has been no evidence of popular support for Mr. Kadar's Government. Mr. Kadar has successively abandoned most of the points from the revolutionary programme which he had at first promised to the Hungarian people. On the central question of the withdrawal of Soviet troops, he has moved from complete acceptance of the nation's wishes to a refusal to discuss the subject in present circumstances. Against the workers, he has proceeded step by step to destroy their power and that of the Workers' Councils. Capital punishment is applicable to strike activities. The processes of justice have been distorted by the institution of special police and special courts and by the ignoring of the rights of the accused. The Social Democratic Party has again been forcibly liquidated. General elections have been postponed for two years. Writers and intellectuals are subjected to repressive measures. The Hungarian workers have shown no sign of support for Mr. Kadar's Government or for the prospect of continuous Soviet occupation. Only a small fraction of the 190,000 Hungarians, mostly young people, who fled the country have accepted his invitation to return. The peasants have reason to be grateful to Mr. Nagy for his attitude towards collectivization of agriculture and forced deliveries of farm produce;
- (xiii) In the light of the extent of foreign intervention, consideration of the Hungarian question by the United Nations was legally proper and, moreover, it was requested by a legal Government of Hungary. In the matter of human rights, Hungary has accepted specific international obligations in the Treaty of Peace. Accordingly, the Committee does not regard objections based on Paragraph 7 of Article 2 of the Charter as having validity in the present case. A massive armed intervention by one Power on the territory of another, with the avowed intention of interfering with the internal affairs of the country must, by the Soviet's own definition of aggression, be a matter of international concern.

THE COMMONWEALTH

"The Commonwealth connection and all it stands for, both practically and traditionally, is one of the glories of our Canadian heritage. It is the outstanding example in all world history of amity among free and independent peoples. Our Commonwealth has no written constitution. It has neither laws nor by-laws to define the mutual responsibilities of its membership. The only obligations it imposes are those of good sense, good faith, and goodwill. The ties that bind the Commonwealth together are family ties—and what a remarkable family it is! The members of our family range in age from hundreds of years to a few months. They are of many races, religions and languages. Its members are scattered all over the world. They live in every climate. They differ vastly in their histories, their viewpoints and their ways of life. And—like any family they have their disagreements, their misunderstandings, their ups-and-downs. Yet behind it all, there is that intangible "something" which they have in common, that indefinable yet blessed tie that binds us together. As your representative at this family council it will be my privilege to carry your good wishes to the other members of the Commonwealth, to express your confidence in the future of the family, and particularly to say that Canada is privileged to be able to extend a helping hand to those members who, through no fault of their own, have fared less well in material things of life than we have. It will be my privilege to tell them that we want to continue to stand together as a family, for richer or for poorer, for better or for worse, in good times or in bad times, in success or in adversity—against all others if necessary but, by God's Grace, in friendship and harmony with all the world, and especially the United States of America."

Mr. John Diefenbaker,
Prime Minister and Secretary
of State for External Affairs.
June 22, 1957.

The Suez Canal Question

At the request of the United States, the Security Council of the United Nations met on April 26, 1957, to resume consideration of the Suez Canal question in the light of an Egyptian declaration concerning arrangements for the future operation of the Canal. This was the tenth meeting of the Security Council devoted to the Suez Canal question since Egypt nationalized the Universal Suez Maritime Canal Company on July 26, 1956.

At the ninth of these meetings, held on October 13, 1956, the Council unanimously adopted a joint resolution introduced by the representatives of France and the United Kingdom enumerating six basic principles on which the Foreign Ministers of Egypt, France and the United Kingdom had agreed as requirements for any settlement of the question. These six basic principles were as follows:

1. there should be free and open transit through the Canal without discrimination overt or covert—this covers both political and technical aspects;
2. the sovereignty of Egypt should be respected;
3. the operation of the Canal should be insulated from the politics of any country;
4. the manner of fixing tolls and charges should be decided by agreement between Egypt and the users;
5. a fair proportion of the dues should be allotted to development;
6. in case of disputes, unresolved affairs between the Suez Canal Company and the Egyptian Government should be settled by arbitration with suitable terms of reference and suitable provisions for the payment of sums found to be due.

Egyptian Declaration

The Egyptian declaration, dated April 24, 1957, was the outcome of discussions held in Cairo between the United States Ambassador and the Egyptian Government over a period of some weeks. In this declaration, Egypt reaffirmed the Constantinople Convention of 1888 on the free navigation of the Suez Canal, expressed confidence that others would also respect the terms and the spirit of the Convention and asserted that Egypt was determined "to afford and maintain free and uninterrupted navigation for all nations within the limits of and in accordance with the provisions of the Constantinople Convention".

The declaration also stated that:

1. tolls would continue to be levied in accordance with the last agreement on the subject (dated April 28, 1936), any increase in the current rate being limited to one per cent within any twelve months unless a higher rate should be established as a result of negotiations or arbitration;
2. the Canal would "be maintained and developed in accordance with the progressive requirements of modern navigation";
3. it would be operated and managed by the autonomous Suez Canal Authority established by the Government of Egypt on July 26, 1956;
4. the Government would "welcome and encourage co-operation between the Suez Canal Authority and representatives of shipping and trade";
5. tolls would be payable in advance to the account of the Suez Canal Authority at any bank authorized by it;
6. the Suez Canal Authority would pay a 5 per cent royalty on gross receipts and put 25 per cent into a Suez Canal Capital and Development Fund;

7. due notice would be given of any alteration in the regulations governing the Canal;
8. by the terms of its charter the Suez Canal Authority could in no case grant "any vessel, company or other party any advantages or favour not accorded to other vessels, companies or parties on the same conditions";
9. complaints of discrimination or violation of the Canal Code, if not resolved by the Suez Canal Authority, might be referred to a three-member arbitration tribunal whose decisions would be binding on the parties;
10. claims in connection with the nationalization of the Suez Canal Maritime Company would be referred to arbitration unless otherwise agreed;
11. disputes were to be settled in accordance with the United Nations Charter;
12. differences of interpretation of the Constantinople Convention not otherwise resolved should be referred to the International Court of Justice, and Egypt would accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.

The document concluded with the assertion that "This declaration, with the obligations therein, constitutes an international instrument and will be deposited and registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations".

Debate on April 26

Mr. Henry Cabot Lodge opened the debate in the Security Council on April 26 with a concise statement of the United States position. In the view of his Government the Egyptian declaration in its present form did not fully meet the six requirements which had been unanimously agreed to on October 13 with the concurrence of Egypt. The fundamental difficulty was the absence of provision for "organized co-operation" which had been referred to in an exchange of correspondence last autumn between the Secretary-General and the Egyptian Government. There was therefore no assurance that the six requirements would in fact be implemented. Mr. Lodge took the view that no final judgment could be made regarding the regime proposed by Egypt until it had been tried. For that reason, he said, "any *de facto* acquiescence by the United States must be provisional and we reserve the right to express ourselves further on the matter in the future". Pending settlement of the claims of the Universal Suez Maritime Canal Company and "in view of the possibility of double jeopardy" American vessels would be authorized to pay tolls to Egypt only under protest.

The Egyptian permanent representative to the United Nations, Mr. Omar Loutfi, who had been invited to take part in the Council meeting, followed with a statement of the Egyptian position. He maintained that the declaration of April 24 was in full conformity with the Constantinople Convention of 1888 respecting the free navigation of the Suez Canal and with the six basic requirements agreed to on October 13, 1956—even "the most delicate" of them, namely the third requirement (insulation from the politics of any country) in view of the arrangements for reference of disputes to the International Court of Justice. He discussed the declaration point by point and emphasized the view of Egypt that "the declaration, with the obligations which it contains, constitutes an international instrument".

The next statement was made by Mr. Georges-Picot of France. According to the French Government, the intention last October when the question was brought before the Council had been to provide by means of valid international agreement a new system for the Canal but one embodying for the users the same guarantees and safeguards which flowed from the contracts concluded in the past between Egypt and the Universal Suez Maritime Canal Company. Both on essential points regarding the rights of users and on other

points, he said, the Egyptian declaration failed to provide for practical implementation of the six principles. Egypt's confirmation of the principle of freedom of passage had been accompanied by a reservation the true meaning of which "we all know full well". (This was a reference to Egypt's apparent intention to continue its restrictions on the passage through the Canal of Israeli ships or certain types of cargo bound for Israel.) Most of the other provisions of the declaration were too vague and nebulous to constitute proper safeguards, Mr. Picot believed. His general conclusion was that the declaration was a unilateral act which was based only on the second of the six principles and excluded the others. It contained threats of possible discrimination. Experience has shown that the interpretation given by Egypt to the Constantinople Convention "ignored the terms of the resolution passed by the Security Council in September 1951" calling for non-discrimination against Israeli vessels and cargoes. "As the declaration was decreed unilaterally", Mr. Picot concluded, "it can be modified or nullified in the same way. Where, then, are the guarantees or safeguards? These can be obtained, in our opinion, only if the Council decides to pursue . . . negotiations, in a way and under conditions to be decided upon later, . . . which would be designed to specify the provisional regime of the Canal, to set it on a contractual basis and then to define its final system of operation and administration by means of an international instrument."

In the afternoon session on April 26, the Security Council heard further statements on the item under consideration, the first of which was made by Australia. The Australian representative said that "the procedure adopted by the Egyptian Government and the actual contents of the Egyptian declaration still fall short of providing the sort of international agreement which is needed to establish the world's confidence in the future of the Suez Canal or a settlement that would fully meet the six requirements laid down by the Security Council last October". Something better than the Egyptian declaration was required in the light of past breaches of the Constantinople Convention by Egypt and its denial of free passage to Israeli shipping, in contradiction to the 1951 resolution of the Security Council. The Australian representative also spoke about the burden imposed on many nations by Egypt's "sabotage" of the Canal, which he said had been "entirely unwarranted by any Egyptian defence considerations". Now that the task of clearance had been completed, however, his delegation understood that the absence of a satisfactory international agreement on future operation of the Canal should not be allowed to stand in the way of resumption of traffic on a *de facto* basis, "provided it is recognized that the peoples of the world are not thereby acquiescing in the indefinite prolongation of all features of the present situation".

The U.S.S.R. representative, bearing in mind among other things the Egyptian statement regarding the establishment of arbitration procedures in the case of possible disputes, expressed the opinion that a fair and constructive settlement was implicit in the declaration of the Egyptian Government. There was no doubt that the Government of Egypt regarded this declaration as having the quality of an international document with international strength and validity. Mr. Soboley also remarked that "the Security Council should put an end to this trend on the part of certain circles in the western countries to foist upon Egypt a solution to the problem which would infringe upon its sovereign rights over the Canal and would allow for intervention in the domestic affairs of Egypt".

The United Kingdom representative, Sir Peirson Dixon, compared the Egyptian declaration with the six requirements and found it wanting in some respects. He went on to discuss the point on which the declaration was "most open to criticism: its unilateral form". Even though registered with the United Nations it was still a unilateral declaration which could be revoked or altered. In the United Kingdom view this was at the heart of the whole question. There was a general feeling, he added, that the declaration could not be regarded as a final settlement in accordance with the six principles contained in the Security Council resolution of October 13, 1956. Considered as a *de facto* arrangement, on the other hand, much would depend on the manner in which the Egyptian declaration was applied, as many members had pointed out.

Although the French and Australian representatives had been highly critical of the terms of the Egyptian declaration, the general sentiment in the Security Council proved to be in favour of giving the Egyptian proposal a fair trial. After comments on the declaration had been heard, the Council adjourned without attempting to adopt a formal resolution and without setting a date for its next discussion of the Suez Canal question.

Proceedings of May 21-22

On May 15 the Security Council was asked by France to resume consideration of the Suez Canal question. When the Council met on May 20 and 21 in response to the French request, the representative of the Soviet Union spoke against the adoption of the proposed agenda on the ground that the Canal problem was settled when the Egyptian Government issued its declaration of April 24, which was in accordance with the Constantinople Convention and the Charter of the UN and reflected the six agreed principles. The declaration had been registered with the United Nations and had acquired the status of an international instrument. Subsequent events had confirmed that the conditions laid down in the declaration were acceptable to all countries and the Canal was now functioning without obstruction. For these reasons the U.S.S.R. abstained from voting on the agenda, which was, however, supported by all other members of the Council.

Statement by French Representative

The Foreign Minister of France, Mr. Pineau, was the first speaker on the substance of the question on May 20. He declared that before taking up "the real motives of higher order" which had prompted the French action, he wished to dismiss "many mistaken interpretations" of the French decision to bring the Suez Canal problem to the Security Council once more. After a passing reference to Egyptian interference in the internal affairs of France in North Africa, he dismissed as unwarranted the charge that France was re-introducing the Suez question for reasons of internal policy. He emphasized the dangers to the United Nations of applying two different standards, one for countries which respected international law and the other for those who made unilateral decisions and paid no heed to the common rules. He then recalled the six agreed principles and argued along much the same lines as had been followed by Mr. Georges-Picot on April 26, in developing the thesis that the Egyptian declaration fell short of these principles. His delegation objected not only to the contents of the Egyptian memorandum, but also to its character. "It is not possible", Mr. Pineau said, "to imagine a unilateral settlement of the Suez Canal problem, a settlement which Egypt would always be free to

repudiate regardless of whether or not it is registered with the United Nations Secretariat . . . The Canal users decided in spite of France's reservations to have their ships use the Suez Canal once more by paying the transit fees to the Egyptian authority with 'reservations', but for how long will they make these reservations? Will the latter not accumulate in files gradually covered with the dust of the ages?"

Concluding, Mr. Pineau asked that negotiations be opened as soon as possible for the purpose of settling the problem in accordance with the six principles.

Statement by Egyptian Representative

Mr. Loutfi, Egyptian Permanent Representative to the United Nations, was the next speaker. He expressed surprise that the Council had been called into session again to discuss the Suez question. Nothing had happened during the past two weeks to justify this. He considered that the most important event which had occurred since the last Council meeting was that the Canal had been fully opened to navigation and that numerous vessels belonging to the most important maritime nations were now using the Canal. To prove this point, Mr. Loutfi gave detailed statistics about traffic in the Canal since March 29.

Mr. Loutfi confirmed that even those delegations which had not been in full agreement with Egypt and had claimed that the Egyptian declaration did not fully conform with the Security Council's six principles had stated that the Canal regime proposed by Egypt must be given a trial before definitive judgement could be passed. He recalled that on April 26 he had stated in the Security Council that his government had drafted its declaration not only in implementation of its obligations under the 1888 Convention but also in conformity with its understanding of the Security Council resolution of October 13, 1956. This had been clearly shown by the Egyptian Foreign Minister's letter to the Secretary-General of April 24, requesting registration of the declaration with the United Nations. In Egypt's view, therefore, the declaration was in accordance with the Security Council's resolution of October 13, 1956 and reflected the six principles contained in that resolution. Even the "most delicate" of these, the third principle, which stipulated that the operation of the Canal should be insulated from the internal politics of any country, was respected in the Egyptian declaration, because:

- (a) the Egyptian Government had assigned the operation of the Canal, following its nationalization, to a Suez Canal Authority, an autonomous organ with its own budget;
- (b) Egypt had accepted the principle of arbitration regarding disputes concerning the Canal Code and in respect of complaints of discriminatory measures or infractions of the Canal Code;
- (c) Egypt had promised to take the necessary steps to accept compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice with regard to disputes about the interpretation of the 1888 Convention;
- (d) it had re-affirmed the 1888 Convention in precise terms.

Mr. Loutfi concluded his statement as follows: ". . . Egypt, notwithstanding the events that took place last October and the unprovoked aggression committed against her and the cruel tests to which she was subjected, has proclaimed her declaration of April 24. This declaration was proclaimed in pursuance of the obligations the Egyptian Government had undertaken under the terms of the Constantinople Convention of 1888. This declaration clarified

the meaning the Egyptian Government gives to the resolution adopted by the Security Council of October 13, 1956 and is in accordance with the statements made before this Council by the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs. Moreover, my government considers that the declaration, with the obligations contained therein, constitutes an international instrument and on this basis the declaration was registered with the United Nations".

United Kingdom Statement

The next speaker, Sir Pierson Dixon of the United Kingdom, after recalling his remarks at the Security Council meeting of April 26, renewed his criticism of the Egyptian declaration from the point of view of both substance and form. As to substance, the United Kingdom was in broad agreement with French views as voiced by Mr. Pineau. There were points on which, he trusted, the representative of Egypt could give "reassuring replies":

- (a) the Suez Canal capital and development fund;
- (b) provisions for payment of compensation and claims, in connection with the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company;
- (c) the actual acceptance by Egypt of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice;
- (d) the way Egypt planned to establish "co-operation with the nations of the world in advancing the usefulness of the Canal";
- (e) provisions on the increase of tolls and on arrangements "for fact-finding, consultation and arbitration of complaints relating to the Canal Code".

As for the form of the Egyptian declaration, the United Kingdom Government considered that this was a unilateral declaration which "cannot be accepted as a settlement of the Suez Canal problem". Sir Pierson made a plea for a return to the "balanced system" which existed before the Egyptian nationalization order of July 26, 1956 by a negotiated settlement giving effect to the six principles. He emphasized that this balance could not be regarded as being restored by a unilateral declaration which could be withdrawn or amended at any time. Meanwhile the use of the Canal by British shipping would not "prejudice our existing legal rights or diminish our determination to pursue the search for a final settlement that is fair both to Egypt and to the users".

First Statement by Australian Representative

At the meeting on May 20, the Australian representative made only a short statement before the Council in which he reiterated the position taken by the Australian Government on April 26. He welcomed the initiative of France and endorsed its position and that of the United Kingdom. He reserved comment, however, on the statements made in the Council that day, including the observations of the representative of Egypt.

Statement by Representative of the Soviet Union

After a statement by Mr. Romulo of the Philippines, who was inclined to regard the Egyptian declaration as an interim measure and one which should be followed by negotiations designed to produce a settlement more in accordance with the six principles, Mr. Sobolev expressed Soviet views. After elaborating the arguments against renewed discussion of the Suez Canal item in the Council, he repeated that the Egyptian declaration of April 24 fully conformed with the 1888 Convention and the United Nations Charter and constituted

an acceptable solution, inasmuch as it took into account the legitimate interests of all Canal users without prejudicing the sovereignty of Egypt. The French representative had attempted in vain to prove that this declaration did not conform with the Security Council's six principles. The Soviet Delegation and many other members of the Security Council had no doubts that the Egyptian declaration "fully reflected" these six principles. The Soviet representative also spoke about the "encouragement of the aggressive circles in Israel to commit further provocative acts against Egypt". He linked France and the United States with this move.

Second Australian Statement

Mr. Walker, the permanent representative of Australia, opened the meeting of May 21 with a strong statement re-affirming the Australian position on the Egyptian declaration of April 24. He said that the procedure adopted by the Egyptian Government would make Egypt "the sole authority entitled to interpret the declaration authentically". He then emphasized the extent to which, in the Australian view, the declaration failed to meet the six principles and particularly the third concerning the insulation of the operation of the Canal from the politics of any country.

Mr. Walker held that the Egyptian statements before the Council had not served to clarify the situation sufficiently to reassure the users of the Canal. The Australian Government did not see how the declaration could be accepted by the Council as "the best incorporation" of the legal rights and principles contained in previous agreements regarding the Suez Canal. The Egyptian position seemed to be that possession and sovereignty "amounted to nine points of the law"; and so far as the tenth point was concerned, the rest of the world "must accept what Egypt offers as adequate". For the Council to accept this position would be a complete failure to face up to its responsibilities. The Council should take note of the fact that the procedure adopted by Egypt was in effect a repudiation of the normal methods of diplomatic and international negotiation. The Council should seriously consider "the crisis of confidence in the organization" which had arisen. The Council could not just tell the representative of France that the question of the Canal was now settled as the result of the Egyptian declaration and that the operations of the Canal were running smoothly.

The Australian representative strongly supported the arguments advanced by the representative of France in favour of re-opening negotiations concerning the Canal.

Statement by United States Representative

Speaking in his capacity as United States representative, the President of the Council, Mr. Henry Cabot Lodge, in addition to reviewing some of the points he had covered on April 26, pointed out in a short statement what seemed, in his view, to be the shortcomings of the Egyptian declaration. He then invited the Egyptian Government to give further clarification on the following points:

- (a) the lack of provision for an organized system of co-operation with the users;
- (b) the intention of the Egyptian Government regarding the implementation of the third principle;

- (c) co-operation with the users with regard to the fixing of tolls and charges;
- (d) the time when the Egyptian Government would deposit its acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice;
- (e) the "manner in which Egypt is proposing to give effect to the arbitration provision of its declaration";
- (f) the method envisaged by Egypt for reaching agreement on the question of the compensation claims of the Suez Canal Company.

A Final Settlement?

Mr. Pineau, in a short but significant exchange of views with the Soviet representative, said he preferred Marshal Bulganin's statement in a letter to Mr. Mollet to the effect that the Egyptian declaration provided "a good basis for a settlement" of the Suez problem to the statement made by Mr. Sobolev to the Security Council that the Egyptian declaration represented "a final settlement" of the problem. The Soviet representative replied that he was happy to hear that Mr. Pineau accepted Marshal Bulganin's view. There was, however, no contradiction between Marshal Bulganin's words and what he himself had said, that as a result of the Egyptian declaration the Suez Canal problem had been "in substance" settled. This was by no means tantamount to saying that a "final settlement" had been achieved.

Summary by President

As President of the Council Mr. Lodge then summarized the debate in a statement the full text of which is reproduced in the appendix to this article. He declared that it was plain a "clear majority" of the Council members were "acutely aware" of the responsibilities of the United Nations with regard to this question. The Council majority felt that the six principles adopted by the Security Council had not as yet been met by the Egyptian declaration of April 24. There were still "uncertainties" requiring clarification and the Egyptian position remained to be completed. The President observed that the Egyptian Government would probably wish to examine very carefully all these points as soon as possible and to consider concrete steps it could take to remove the remaining uncertainties. Member governments would be guided in their diplomatic actions by the views expressed in the Security Council and by the response Egypt would give to the questions posed in the present debate. In the meantime, the Security Council would remain seized of the question. It could resume its deliberations either to hear further from Council members and from the representative of Egypt or when other developments made a meeting desirable.

Following this summary, the Soviet representative again intervened to make the point that the questions asked of Egypt by certain members of the Council reflected the views of individual delegations only and could not in any way be considered as reflecting the views of the Council as an organ of the United Nations. Mr. Loutfi, the representative of Egypt, also said he wished to enter his delegation's reservations regarding the summary made by the President.

APPENDIX I

President's Summary of Security Council Proceedings

on May 20 and 21, 1957

THE PRESIDENT: The Council has now completed their further discussion of the Suez Canal question. It is plain that a clear majority of the members of the Council are acutely aware of the responsibilities of the United Nations with regard to this matter. This is shown by the fact that the Council on 13 October adopted six requirements which should be met in any Suez Canal settlement and adopted them unanimously. There is the further fact that the Council has discussed this problem several times and that it has remained seized of the issue. It is further evidence of the Council's interest and concern.

It is of course clear that certain views have also been expressed to the effect that the Egyptian declaration and the present operation of the Suez Canal do adequately implement the six requirements of the Council. But the majority of the members are of the opinion that these requirements have not yet been met, that there are uncertainties that require clarification, and that, even as expressed by the Egyptian representative yesterday, the Egyptian position remains to be completed.

It has been observed several times that the Egyptian Government has not yet deposited its acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in accordance with its statement of intention to do so. It has been a month or more since the Egyptian Government made this intention known and again at yesterday's meeting the representative of Egypt reiterated his Government's intention to take the steps necessary to accept the International Court's jurisdiction. It is natural in these circumstances that members should wish to know when such steps will in fact be taken.

Questions have been raised about the nature of the obligations which the Egyptian Government recognizes under the declaration, the manner in which they were put forward and whether the Egyptian Government considers that it can amend or withdraw them arbitrarily at its own will.

In this connexion, reference has been made to the provisional nature of the Egyptian declaration. As the Philippine representative well said: ". . . most of the members qualified their acquiescence as provisional rather than final . . ." The Philippines representative also said: "The United Nations must continue to seek a final solution, while giving the interim arrangements a chance to work out without injury to the interests of any of the nations involved".

Doubts have been expressed about the lack of provision for organized user co-operation in the declaration, and it has been pointed out that further clarification is needed on the participation of the users implicit in various paragraphs of it, particularly those relating to arbitration and the fixing of tolls.

Members have pointed out that the obligations which Egypt appears to have assumed require further initiative from Egypt if those obligations are to be carried out.

Questions on compensation of claims in connexion with the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company and concerning the method of reaching agreement have also been raised. Here again it has been pointed out that further initiative by Egypt is required.

Concern continues to prevail about the insulation of the Canal from the politics of any nation, and this concern is inherent in all of the doubts expressed here about the adequacy of the Egyptian declaration.

These comments reflect continuing doubts on the part of a number of members regarding the Suez Canal system now put into effect by the Egyptian Government, and about which clarification by Egypt is desired.

The Egyptian Government will presumably wish as soon as possible to examine these points carefully and to consider the concrete steps it can take to remove the doubts which have arisen. Member Governments will undoubtedly be guided in their diplomatic actions and users will be guided in their practical actions by the views that have been expressed here today and by the Egyptian response to the questions which have been raised here. In the meantime the Council will remain seized of the question and will be in a position to resume its deliberations to hear further from the representative of Egypt or when other developments make it desirable.

SUEZ AND WORLD TRADE*

The importance of the Suez Canal in world trade is shown in the December 1956 issue of the United Nations *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics*. In 1955, about 13 per cent by weight of world international trade passed through the Canal.

Of the 820 million metric tons of such trade, 107.5 million passed through the Canal, 87.4 million tons of it northbound, and 20.1 million tons southbound. Of the total ocean shipping, 430 million tons was dry cargo, and 360 million tons was tanker cargo, of which 68.8 million tons or 13½ per cent passed through the Canal. Another 39 million tons was loaded at Mediterranean ports from pipelines originating in Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Sixty-two per cent of the 87 million tons of tanker cargo transported from the Middle East to Europe passed through the Canal, and 57 per cent of the 15 million tons from the Middle East to North America.

If those Suez tanker cargoes had been carried by way of the Cape of Good Hope, the average length of haul of a ton of cargo would have been 11,160 nautical miles to Europe instead of 5,850, and 11,700 miles to North America instead of 8,070.

"Because of the limitations imposed by the capacity of the existing tanker fleet, the temporary closing of the Suez Canal will necessitate a rearrangement of the pattern of trade in oil," the *Bulletin* article states. "Assuming that tankers which used to carry oil from the Middle East to Europe and to North America via Suez, plus one third of the tankers built since 1955, are concentrated on carrying oil to Europe via the Cape, the reduction in Western Europe's oil supplies from outside Western Europe (which in 1955 were about 115 million metric tons) would be of the order of 15 per cent, provided that the pipelines which deliver oil to the Eastern Mediterranean are in full service. If the

*Reprinted from the *United Nations Review*, February, 1957.

pipeline traffic were to be diverted to Europe via the Cape, the reduction of Europe's supplies would increase to about 35 per cent."

The dependence in 1955 of some countries on the Middle East for their imported supplies of crude petroleum was as follows: United States, 34%; Canada, 11%; Belgium-Luxembourg, 93%; France, 94%; West Germany, 88%; Italy, 94%; Netherlands, 61%; Portugal, 100%; Sweden, 82%; United Kingdom, 84%. The only country in Western Europe which depends to a marked degree directly on the Middle East for supplies of refined products of petroleum is Turkey, which obtains from that source 45 per cent by weight of its supplies.

In 1955, 76.5 per cent by volume of the northbound traffic through the Suez Canal consisted of shipments of petroleum and its products. Of this trade about 64 million metric tons or about 96 per cent was oil originating in the Persian Gulf.

The southbound traffic is composed mainly of a variety of finished and semi-finished goods moving from industrialized Europe to primary-producing Asia.



BOUNDARY WATERS MEETING

A Canadian Delegation headed by the former Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources, Mr. Jean Lesage, and a United States Delegation headed by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Mr. John Wesley Jones, met at the Department of State on May 20 and 21 to discuss methods of dealing with problems relating to waters which cross the International Boundary. This meeting was preceded by a meeting of officials from both countries held in Ottawa on March 19 of this year.

In extending his greeting to the Canadian Delegation on behalf of the United States, Deputy Assistant Secretary Jones welcomed the opportunity to review jointly the various elements involved in the problem as well as to exchange opinions and suggestions in the traditional spirit of cordial co-operation which so happily marks the conduct of affairs between Canada and the United States.

Mr. Lesage thanked Mr. Jones for his warm welcome and for the courtesy of the Government of the United States in expediting consideration of matters of such importance to both countries.

By agreement each side had prepared working papers for discussion and as a basis for continuing consideration the United States working paper contained an analysis of the effects, both beneficial and adverse, of actions relating to waters crossing the International Boundary which might be taken in either country affecting the other. The Canadian Delegation presented a list of some 150 streams which cross the Boundary, with analyses of their international aspects. Provision was made for the continuing exchange of engineering, economic and other information, particularly with respect to such rivers of major importance as the Columbia, Yukon, and St. John.

Canada and the Colombo Plan

The Plan

The Colombo Plan had its origin and took its name from the meeting of Commonwealth Ministers held at Colombo, Ceylon, in January 1950. This meeting was convened to discuss ways and means of assisting the economic development of the countries of South and South-East Asia. At this meeting the "Consultative Committee" was formed and the plan was named "The Colombo Plan for Co-operative Economic Development in South and South-East Asia".

The original membership consisted only of Commonwealth countries but at the first of the annual meetings of the Consultative Committee, held at Sydney, Australia, in May of 1950, other countries in the area were invited to participate.

Membership now consists of the following countries: Australia, Canada, Ceylon, India, New Zealand, Pakistan, United Kingdom, Malaya (Malaya and Singapore), British Borneo (North Borneo, Brunei and Sarawak), Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Nepal, Philippines, Thailand, United States, Vietnam.

The Nature of the Plan

The Colombo Plan is not only or even primarily an aid programme. It is the sum of the development programmes of the Asian countries which are members of the Plan, and of the aid programmes of the other member countries; in short, it is, as its full title states, a co-operative plan. Furthermore, the major burden of economic development is borne by the Asian countries themselves. They have themselves embarked on programmes of economic development and are working very hard to improve their own conditions; this is the essential basis on which the Plan rests.

At the same time they know that they cannot achieve their objective without help from their friends—help that is urgently needed now and which will be needed for the next few years at least. The pump needs to be primed. Certain economic goals such as higher national production, greater capital availability, an increased flow of foreign investment and freer trade, which it is hoped will be secondary results of the first years' efforts to raise the living standards of the people of South and South-East Asia, will have to be realized before the countries of the area can consider themselves economically self-reliant.

The Colombo Plan, considered in both its capital assistance and technical co-operation aspects, has no permanent machinery or secretariat and no central headquarters. Special machinery exists for the handling of technical co-operation but co-ordination and orderly development in the capital field are achieved through bilateral negotiations, supplemented by consultation with others where necessary, and through the annual meetings of the Consultative Committee. There has thus grown up a flexible, pragmatic procedure which involves a great many governments and agencies on a continuing basis. This

system, by placing the emphasis on direct contacts, keeps overhead costs to a minimum and makes for a high degree of efficiency in the day-to-day operations of Colombo Plan assistance programmes.

How Capital is Provided

How does a "donor" country, for example Canada, provide capital assistance under the Plan? First the Asian government concerned suggests certain projects with which it thinks Canada can help. The Canadian Government examines the projects and decides what it can most usefully do. In this process the authorities concerned with economic development both in the Asian country and in Canada, as well as the diplomatic missions in each country, all play a part. There have now been worked out in practice a variety of methods which are flexible enough to provide for differing needs and are at the same time based on mutually accepted administrative and financial principles. The Departments of External Affairs, Trade and Commerce, Finance, Agriculture, National Health and Welfare, and Labour, as well as such agencies as the Bank of Canada, all play a part in this work.

The Consultative Committee

Supervision of the Colombo Plan is in the hands of a Consultative Committee of Foreign Ministers of the member countries, who meet once a year to review projects, exchange views on policy matters and prepare an annual report. It is, as its name implies a "consultative" body; no collective policy decisions binding member countries are taken by its meetings.

Bureau for Technical Co-operation


Colombo Plan technical aid, like capital assistance, is given bilaterally on a country-to-country basis. But the Bureau for Technical Co-operation at Colombo examines requests for such aid and endeavours to find the required assistance in other Colombo Plan countries. The members of the Council for Technical Co-operation, to which the Bureau is responsible, are drawn from the permanent representatives of Colombo Plan countries in Ceylon. The Colombo Plan technical assistance programme is regarded as supplementary to the work being done by the United Nations Technical Assistance Administration and by Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, such as the WHO and FAO.

The Information Unit

The Colombo Plan has an Information Unit in Colombo. The Information Officer, as is the Director of the Bureau for Technical Co-operation, is an official specially seconded from one of the Colombo Plan countries. The Unit assists member governments to publicize what is being done under the Colombo Plan, and is beginning to supplement their work with information of its own.



COLOMBO PLAN AREA



Canada's Participation

As one of the original members, Canada plays a very important role in this co-operative plan to help increase the economic potential of the countries concerned and thereby raise their living standards.

From the beginning of the Plan in 1950 through April 1958 Canada will have made available a total of \$196.8 million for capital and technical assistance projects in South and South-East Asia. Total financial assistance extended to all countries by Canada under the Colombo Plan as of December 31, 1956 was as follows:

	Capital Assistance	Technical Assistance	Total
Burma	\$ 170,513	\$ 91,297	\$ 261,810
Cambodia	15,000	48,775	63,775
Ceylon	10,170,165	816,362	10,986,527
India	79,947,945	890,588	80,838,533
Indonesia	400	366,091	366,491
Laos	—	22,752	22,752
Malaya	201,000	219,020	420,020
North Borneo	—	13,387	13,387
Pakistan	57,155,136	849,743	58,004,879
Sarawak	—	4,396	4,396
Singapore	50,000	25,363	75,363
Thailand	—	6,921	6,921
Vietnam	—	132,942	132,942
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	\$147,710,159	\$ 3,487,637	\$151,197,796
To the Colombo Plan Bureau for Technical Co-operation			32,231
			<hr/>
			\$151,230,027

Capital Assistance


Canada has now contributed towards sixty-seven capital assistance projects of varying sizes. Although these cover an extensive field of endeavour, it is perhaps natural, considering the experience gained in the development of her own vast resources, that Canada's greatest efforts should be directed along four main avenues, namely: the generation and distribution of electric power, the development of transportation and communication facilities, aerial and other surveys, and the peaceful use of atomic energy.

While eight separate countries are now receiving capital assistance from Canada in varying degrees, as shown above, the largest contributions to date have been made in India, Pakistan and Ceylon.

A summary of the major projects undertaken in these countries appears at the end of this article.

Technical Assistance

Under the Colombo Plan Technical Assistance programme Canada sends out technical experts to Colombo Plan countries in Asia and trains Asians in Canadian universities and research and industrial centres.



—NFB Photo

CANADIAN FISHERIES PROJECT, CEYLON

The development of the fishing industry to increase food production is an important undertaking of Ceylon's economic programme. Canada has played an important role by contributing both capital and technical assistance in this Colombo Plan venture which has been named the Canadian Fisheries Project.

Above Mr. A. W. Lantz, of the Fisheries Research Board of Canada, who until recently had charge of the Project, supervises the erection of a cold storage plant for refrigerating fish catches.


As with capital assistance, the guiding principle underlying Canada's technical assistance is that accepted projects are those proposed by recipient countries in the light of their own needs, which are clearly related to their economic development. Canada views technical and capital assistance as interdependent and has supported this integration wherever possible. Canada's technical assistance scheme has now been extended to twelve countries and to date has made it possible to train 636 Fellows and Scholars in Canada and send 94 Canadian experts to Colombo Plan areas. Canada's total expenditure on technical assistance to December 31, 1956 was \$3.49 millions.

Trainees

As indicated below, a total of 636 Fellows and Scholars had received training in Canada up to December 31, 1956. Of this total, 253 arrived in Canada during the preceding twelve months and, on that date, 190 were still in Canada.

This training includes academic and practical courses in agriculture, engineering, medicine, commercial and public administration, co-operatives, marketing and a wide variety of other fields. Trainees have come from the following countries:

Burma	— 20	Malaya	— 7
Cambodia	— 5	Pakistan	— 179
Ceylon	— 51	Sarawak	— 1
India	— 211	Singapore	— 4
Indonesia	— 93	Thailand	— 1
Laos	— 10	Vietnam	— 54



—NFB Photo

CANADIAN MEDICAL MISSION

Member of a medical mission which visited countries in the Far East early this year under the joint sponsorship of the Canadian Colombo Plan Administration and the governments of the countries concerned, Dr. John F. McCreary, Head of the Department of Pediatrics, University of British Columbia, makes friends with an Indian girl at the Victoria Jubilee Hospital in Amritsar, India. With them is the girl's mother.

Experts

Of the 94 Canadian experts sent abroad under the Colombo Plan since 1950, 42 are at present in Colombo Plan areas. Their assignments have included service in the following countries:

Burma	Laos
Cambodia	Malaya
Ceylon	North Borneo
India	Pakistan
Indonesia	Singapore

Canadian Capital Assistance Under The Colombo Plan

(The figures given below are for allocations of funds already voted by Parliament. They do not necessarily reflect the total Canadian commitment to specific projects now being implemented).


	India	Amount
Mayurakshi Power and Irrigation Project		
(a) Engineering services and electrical equipment		\$ 2,500,000
(b) Assistance in local costs—Financed from rupee counterpart funds created by the local sale of wheat supplied to India.		15,000,000
Bombay State Road Transport Corporation		
Trucks, buses and automotive equipment		4,353,000
Chittaranjan Locomotive Works		
50 locomotive boilers		1,808,000
Indian railways		
120 steam locomotives		21,462,000
Umtru Hydro-electric Project		
(a) Engineering services and electrical equipment		1,200,000
(b) Assistance in local costs—Financed from rupee counterpart funds created by the local sale of copper and aluminum supplied to India.		2,100,000
Locust control equipment		136,000
Beaver aircraft and spraying equipment for pest control		146,000
Diesel generators for rural electrification		3,003,000
Canada-India Atomic Reactor		
(a) Engineering services and equipment		5,000,000
(b) Assistance in local costs—Financed from rupee counterpart funds created by the local sale of copper and aluminum supplied in India.		2,900,000
Aero-magnetic survey		257,000
Kundah Hydro-electric Project		
Engineering services and equipment		20,000,000
	Pakistan	
Ganges Kobadak Irrigation Project		1,806,000
Daud Khel Cement Plant		
Engineering services and equipment		6,583,000
Aerial resources survey		3,135,000
Thal-Commonwealth Livestock Farm		197,000
Pakistan railways		
Railway ties		2,770,000
Locust control project		
(a) Beaver Aircraft		176,800
(b) Trucks		100,000
Warsak Hydro-electric and Irrigation Project		
(a) Engineering services and equipment		24,462,000
(b) Assistance in local costs—Financed from rupee counterpart funds created by the local sale of wheat and copper supplied to Pakistan.		—Wheat 11,500,000 —Copper 279,000

	Amount
Copper and aluminum	
Supplied to create rupee counterpart funds for allocation to other Colombo Plan projects, as required, to meet local costs.	\$ 720,000
Shadiwal Hydro-electric Project	
Engineering services and equipment	2,507,000
Dacca-Chittagong Power Distribution Link	
Engineering services and equipment	4,006,000
Goalpara (Khulna) Thermal Electric Plant	
Engineering services and equipment	2,000,000
Ceylon	
Fisheries Development Project	
(a) Boats and equipment	622,000
(b) Refrigeration and by-products plants	895,000
Mutwal Fisheries Harbour	
Assistance in local costs —Financed from rupee counterpart funds created by the local sale of flour supplied to Ceylon.	1,000,000
Gal Oya Transmission Line	
Engineering services and equipment	774,000
Rural roads	
Assistance in local costs —Financed from rupee counterpart funds created by the local sale of flour supplied to Ceylon.	1,050,000
Ceylon railways	
(a) Diesel locomotives with maintenance equipment and spare parts	1,781,000
(b) Railway ties	184,000
Agricultural maintenance workshops	
Equipment	340,000
Institute of Practical Technology—Katubedde	
(a) Equipment for laboratories and workshops	200,000
(b) Assistance in local building costs —Financed from rupee counterpart funds created by the local sale of flour supplied to Ceylon	500,000
Portable irrigation systems	
Equipment and piping	185,000
Colombo Harbour equipment	
Level Luffing cranes	580,000
Ratmalana Airport equipment	
Engineering services and telecommunication equipment	292,000
Ceylon University	
Assistance in local building costs of:	
(a) Laboratory \$50,000 —Financed from rupee counterpart funds created by the local sale of flour supplied to Ceylon	
(b) Veterinary Bldg. 41,500	91,500
Fisheries Co-operative School—Polgolla	
Assistance in local costs of building and equipment —Financed from rupee counterpart funds created by the local sale of flour supplied to Ceylon	180,000
Aerial resources survey	539,000
Pest control units	
Trucks and dusting equipment	64,000
Gal Oya Agricultural Development	
Light trucks, pumps and piping	210,000
Trade school	
Assistance in local building costs —Financed from rupee counterpart funds created by the local sale of flour supplied to Ceylon	200,000

Nato Ministerial Meeting

THE regular spring ministerial meetings of the North Atlantic Council are traditionally reserved for an exchange of views on the current political developments affecting the Alliance aimed at fostering conditions for maintaining and developing a common NATO approach to the main political issues of the day.

This year the Ministerial Meeting was held in Bonn on May 2 and 3, 1957. The Canadian Delegate was the former Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, assisted by the Permanent Representative of Canada to the NATO Council in Paris, Mr. L. D. Wilgress; the Canadian Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. C. S. A. Ritchie; and officers of the Department of External Affairs.



AT NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING

Mr. L. B. Pearson, the former Secretary of State for External Affairs, is seen second from left with the foreign ministers of Denmark, Belgium, Luxembourg, United States, The Netherlands, Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany at the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization held at Bonn May 2 and 3. Also shown are President Heuss (fourth from left) and Chancellor Adenauer (second from right) of the Federal Republic of Germany.

The decision to hold this meeting in the German capital underlined the desire of the North Atlantic Council to widen further public support for the organization in all NATO countries by making their respective peoples more familiar with the nature and purposes of NATO's activities. The decision was also in line with one of the recommendations formulated by the Committee of

Three Foreign Ministers, who, in their report to the Council in December, 1956 had stressed the desirability of rotating ministerial meetings between the various NATO capitals, instead of restricting them to the NATO Headquarters in Paris.

For the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, the meeting in Bonn offered a welcome opportunity to stress its interest in NATO, and to reaffirm its whole-hearted support of the Organization's present policies. In his opening address to the Council, Chancellor Adenauer helped to set the keynote of solidarity by rejecting suggestions of a neutral Germany or a neutral zone in the heart of Europe which could lead to Germany's leaving NATO.

The Canadian Government had hoped that the meeting in Bonn would succeed in:

- a) giving a telling collective answer to the present phase of Soviet foreign policy towards Europe;
- b) promoting a deeper realization, in Germany as well as in the rest of free Europe, of Western Europe's dependence, for security and stability, on the Alliance; and
- c) developing further a greater sense of political unity for the NATO Alliance as a whole.

Display of Firmness

Although no new or spectacular proposals were advanced, and none had been expected, progress was made towards these objectives. The meeting proved particularly useful and constructive in providing an encouraging indication of Atlantic unity and courage in the face of recent Soviet threats.

On this aspect of Soviet policy, the Council's position was firm and clear, as evidenced by the unequivocal language of its final communiqué, (see below). The Council agreed that one of the objects of the present Soviet campaign of threats against certain NATO countries was to ensure for Soviet forces a monopoly of nuclear weapons on the European Continent. Such a situation could obviously not be accepted, and the Ministers noted with satisfaction the firm answers given to these Soviet manoeuvres. The Soviet attempts to frighten these countries had not only not succeeded, the Council felt, but had had the opposite effect.

The Ministers felt there had been little change in Soviet policy since their last meeting, although they took cognizance of a new emergence of Soviet attempts at promoting a policy of peaceful coexistence. While recognizing the dilemma in which Soviet leaders find themselves at present, the Ministers made it clear again, through their final communiqué, that if the leaders of the Soviet Union were really sincere in their professed desire to eliminate the danger of atomic war, they could readily dissipate not only their own fears but those of the entire world by matching their words with deeds, mainly by removing such threats to peace as their continued partition of Germany, their brutal suppression of the struggle for freedom of Hungary, and their attempts to subvert the Middle East. On this last point, the length and range of the discussions on the Middle East showed a greater disposition by NATO Foreign Ministers than had existed in the past to review the problems affecting that area.

The firmness displayed by the Ministers in the face of present Soviet policy was also reflected in their consideration of the military state of the Alliance. As Chancellor Adenauer pointed out, the Soviet Union still has five million men under arms despite loudly publicized but never confirmed reductions, and is rapidly increasing the strength of its atomic armaments. The military threat facing the Alliance has therefore in no way diminished and the Ministers had this situation in mind when they reiterated the Alliance's intention to use all available means to meet any attack which might be launched against it. They noted that the availability for NATO forces of the most modern weapons of defence was still the best means of discouraging attempts to launch any such attack on the Alliance.

Generally, the Ministerial Meeting was well received by German public opinion. Although the German press suggested that the impact of the meeting would have been greater if the NATO Council had been in a position to produce concrete proposals for German reunification, there was a general expression of satisfaction that the fifteen Foreign Ministers had been prepared to renew their pledge to use every means at their disposal to bring about German reunification through free elections.

NATO cannot of course be expected to provide solutions to all the complex issues facing the free world today, and the Bonn Ministerial Meeting naturally left behind a good number of unanswered questions. But in the present circumstances, an organization like NATO must have flexible goals which can be adjusted to meet situations beyond its control, and it remains that the Bonn Ministerial Meeting did show the NATO Alliance as still a formidable force, materially and psychologically. In spite of the stiff weather NATO has occasionally encountered, the Organization has served a valuable purpose and continues to do so, and the Bonn Ministerial Meeting has confirmed that the fifteen members of the Alliance still consider it an essential instrument of their policies.

FINAL COMMUNIQUÉ

The North Atlantic Council, presided over by Mr. Gaetano Martino, Foreign Minister of Italy, held its regular Ministerial Meeting in Bonn on May 2 and 3, 1957. The Secretary General, Lord Ismay, acted as chairman of the Council's discussions.

2. The Atlantic Alliance has always been and remains purely defensive. It was created to protect its member countries from any aggression. It has succeeded. But the danger of aggression clearly continues, and the countries of the Atlantic Alliance must therefore remain united to provide for their defence. The Council noted that since its last meeting the Soviet leaders have launched a campaign which, while throwing the cloak of oblivion over Soviet repression in Hungary, is designed to induce public opinion in various member countries to oppose the modernisation of defence forces, and to weaken the principle of collective security in NATO. The Council agreed that one of the objects of this campaign was to ensure for Soviet forces a monopoly of nuclear weapons on the European Continent. Such a situation clearly could not be accepted. It was with satisfaction that the Council noted the firm replies given to these Soviet manoeuvres.

3. The Atlantic Alliance must be in a position to use all available means to meet any attack which might be launched against it. It is the availability of the most modern weapons of defence which will discourage attempts to launch any such attack on the Alliance. Pending an acceptable agreement on disarmament, no power can claim the right to deny to the Alliance the possession of the modern arms needed for its defence. If, however, the fears professed by the Soviet Union are sincere, they could be readily dissipated. All that is needed is for the Soviet Union to accept a general disarmament agreement embodying effective measures of control and inspection within the framework of the proposals made on numerous occasions by the Western Powers, which remain an essential basis of their policy.

4. During their discussions on the problem of security, the question was raised of the balance as between the latest weapons and conventional arms. The Council is awaiting the results of the studies now in hand by the NATO military authorities to enable member countries to decide together on the steps necessary for the development and balance of the different types of forces needed. The Council remains convinced that these decisions taken in common should take into account the need for NATO to retain an effective deterrent against aggression, including a powerful shield of land, sea and air forces, to protect the territory of member states.

5. Recent events in Hungary have confirmed that freedom counts for nothing in Soviet eyes, and that the U.S.S.R. is prepared to use force to crush the legitimate aspirations of nations. The Council agreed that the continued brutal repression of the struggle for freedom of the heroic Hungarian people remains, and continues to make difficult an improvement in East-West relations.

6. The Council discussed the effect of political developments in recent months on the question of German reunification. They decided to continue their efforts with every means at their disposal to induce the Soviet Government to carry out its agreement that Germany should be reunified by means of free elections. The Ministers view the prolonged division of Germany and the anomalous situation of Berlin as a continuing threat to world peace. They accordingly reaffirmed their determination by peaceful means to continue and intensify the common policy for the restoration of Germany as a free and united state within the framework of a system of European security. They directed particular attention to the inhumanity of the continued division of the German people.

7. The Council reviewed recent developments in the Middle East. They concluded that while the dangers to peace in the region remain great, certain new elements give promise of limiting the opportunities for communist expansion and subversion. The Council emphasized the importance of current initiatives to improve the situation and to reinforce the efforts already made to ensure the security and integrity of countries in the Middle East.

8. The Ministers considered the state of the Alliance in the light of political developments, both within and without the NATO area, which have taken place since they last met five months ago. In this connection they reviewed the progress achieved in political consultation under the new procedures inaugurated as a result of the recommendations of the Committee of Three approved last December. They concluded that useful and concrete results had been achieved, and that the Alliance was acquiring both greater maturity and solidarity.

9. The Council noted the report submitted by Lord Ismay, and conveyed to him their thanks and gratitude for the supreme services which he has rendered to the cause of the Alliance in the past five years.

RELATIONS ESTABLISHED

The Department of External Affairs announced May 31 that an agreement had been reached between Canada and Tunisia to establish diplomatic relations between the two countries. As a first step towards the development of closer relations between Canada and Tunisia, the present Tunisian Ambassador in Washington, M. Mongi Slim, will become concurrently the first Ambassador of Tunisia to Canada. Ambassador Slim will continue to reside in Washington.

Tunisia, a former French Protectorate, achieved full independence on March 10, 1956. Canada extended *de jure* recognition to the new state on June 20, 1956. Canada was represented by a special envoy at the celebration of Tunisia's first anniversary of its independence.

Korea's Changing Pattern*

AN operation that has changed the whole pattern of a country is being carried through in Korea by the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA) which for more than four years has been engaged in restoring life to that nation's war-paralysed economy.

A stage of achievement has now been attained in which it is not too much to claim that there is not a major industry, nor a man, woman or child, who has not, in some way, benefited from the United Nations' programme. Factories have risen from the ruins, homes have been rebuilt, the fishing fleet has been renewed, the mines are working again and small industries are springing up with fresh vitality. But all this did not happen in a day.

UNKRA came into being in 1950 when thirty-six nations pledged themselves to help in the rehabilitation of the Republic of Korea and promised contributions amounting to about \$140 millions.

Canadian Aid to Korea

Canada's contributions to the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA) totalled \$7.75 million, making this country the third largest contributor following the United States and the United Kingdom. The original Canadian contribution of \$7.25 million, made in 1951-52, was followed by an additional payment of \$500,000, made in 1954-55 with a view to encouraging other governments to make additional payments.

Canada also contributed Canadian salt cod valued at \$750,000 to the United Nations Emergency Relief Programme inaugurated under Security Council resolutions shortly after the outbreak of hostilities in Korea to provide immediate relief in the form of food and clothing.

Canada is a member of the UNKRA Advisory Committee, the Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations is chairman, and a substantial number of Canadians have served UNKRA in responsible posts. Canadian delegations to sessions of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council have participated actively in debates on UNKRA and have sponsored or co-sponsored several resolutions on its policies.


Pressing Needs

It was not possible to plunge into a programme of capital reconstruction the moment peace was in sight. The most urgent needs then were food, shelter, clothing and medical treatment for the thousands of starving, homeless, and sick. Though the task of providing immediate care rested with the United Nations Command, UNKRA gave auxiliary assistance by providing a skilled staff for disease control relief and welfare. The Agency also launched an emergency programme to get the children under cover by rebuilding schools and orphanages, rushed in \$11 million worth of grain to feed the hungry and later \$9 million of fertilizer to help the farmers.

*Reprinted from "United Nations Review", February, 1957.

The signal for launching the full-scale programme that UNKRA had mapped out in co-operation with the Government of the Republic of Korea, the United Nations Command and other aid agencies did not come until the cease-fire in July, 1951. UNKRA's aid programme was planned to help every single section of Korea's industrial and social life. It was like starting a huge jigsaw puzzle; every part had to interlock. It was important that, at one and the same time, aid should be given in the fields of agriculture, irrigation, forestry, fisheries, industries, mining, education, housing, medical facilities and welfare services. There was an acute shortage of tools, building materials and even of trained technicians.

Before progress could be made, machinery, equipment and other commodities had to be purchased in countries all over the world. At one point there were no fewer than seventy ships at sea bringing UNKRA imports to Korea.



—United Nations Photo

EXPERT FROM CANADA

Under the watchful eye of Mr. Benjamin Rothwell, Production Manager, Department of Public Printing and Stationery, a Korean printer tries out a technique just learned. Mr. Rothwell was in Korea in 1953-55 under the auspices of the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency helping Korean printing shop technicians master modern methods.

Farm and Fisheries Drive

As Korea is primarily an agricultural country, one of UNKRA'S major efforts has been to get farm production back on its feet. To this end, UNKRA has helped build 257 dams and irrigation systems, has brought in livestock to improve the herds and flocks, has introduced nation-wide immunization schemes to stamp out animal disease, and imported steel and equipment to encourage the agricultural tool industry.

Concurrently, Korea's fishing industry, which produces four-fifths of the protein diet of the country, was helped by the importation of ten deep-sea trawlers to add to the fishing fleet, lumber to build and repair small boats, fishing tackle, engines, ropes, fishnets, sailcloth and diving apparatus.

A 2,000-horsepower dredge was built in Hawaii and brought to Korea to clear the silted-up harbors and channels of the west coast ports, while quays, warehouses, canneries and ice plants were also built or repaired.

The next step was to reduce Korea's essential imports by getting her own factories and industries into operation and introducing possibilities for industrial development. For the existing textile industry, UNKRA provided spindles, looms and other equipment for the cotton-spinning and the woolen-worsted mills. Korea's only silk plant was reopened. Paper and wire plants received equipment not only to help them restart but to expand their production.

Other essential commodities needed in Korea were not being made. Korea had one cement plant which UNKRA rehabilitated, but which even at top production did not even begin to meet the requirements. To supplement this, UNKRA is building an \$8,500,000 cement plant that will have a capacity of 200,000 metric tons a year and solve the whole problem.

Glass was also in short supply, so UNKRA is building a flat glass plant, the only one of its kind in the country, which will practically end the need to import glass. To help the development of Korea's natural resources, international experts were brought in to advise on the modernization of the mines. An assay laboratory was built to assist in the identification and analysis of newly-discovered mineral deposits.

One of the most successful features of the programme has been assistance to small private enterprises through a revolving loan fund set up to help the small manufacturer who lacked the capital to restart his factory. Over a thousand loans have already been made and many of them repaid—to such enterprises as the manufacture of lenses, zippers, the making of bamboo chests, match manufacturing and other small industries.

Health Programmes

In the field of health, apart from helping the voluntary agencies to carry through medical programmes and run clinics, UNKRA has set up a rehabilitation centre at Tongnae, near Pusan. Here the limbless are being fitted with prosthetics and taught a trade suited to their disabilities that will enable them to return to their homes and families and earn their own livelihood.

Hospitals also have been rehabilitated and re-equipped. In Seoul itself a National Medical Center is being built that will include a modern hospital and a teaching college.

With major projects now nearing completion it is possible to see the results of this widely diversified programme in every province, city and village in the country. But much of the credit for UNKRA's achievements lies with the Korean people themselves who have worked indomitably to rebuild their own country. They have used the aid the United Nations was able to give not as a crutch on which to lean but as a helping hand across a rugged road.

Election Day in Delhi

by Mr. Escott Reid

(former Canadian High Commissioner in India)

DURING the latter part of February and early March the 190 million electors of the world's largest democracy took part in India's second general elections. Sunday, March 3, was election day in the capital. The cities of New and Old Delhi, together with a small part of the surrounding countryside, form one of the six "Centrally-Administered Territories" of the Indian Union. Delhi has no legislature of its own and its citizens can vote only in the elections for the Lok Sabha (House of the People), India's House of Commons. Almost everywhere else in India voters were casting their ballots not only for their representatives in the Lok Sabha but also for their representatives in the state assemblies (Vidhan Sabhas). It is as though the federal and provincial elections were held simultaneously throughout Canada, with the citizens of a federal district around Ottawa having a vote only in the federal elections.

Delhi Territory is divided into four constituencies. Two—Chandni Chowk and Delhi Sadar—are in the teeming Old City. One, New Delhi, takes in the New City. The fourth, Outer Delhi, takes in the suburban and rural fringe surrounding the capital. For these four seats, there are five members. This is because Outer Delhi is a double-member constituency, with one of its seats reserved for a representative of the Scheduled Tribes and Castes ("untouchables"). There are 98 such reserved seats in the 500-member Lok Sabha, but the distinction between reserved seats and ordinary seats is due to disappear in 1960.

Early on the morning of March 3, armed with a letter from the Election Commission which permitted me to enter polling stations, Mr. J. H. Taylor and I drove out into the countryside to watch the polling in several villages in the Outer Delhi constituency. We arrived shortly after the polls opened at 9:00 a.m. Voting was proceeding slowly and quietly. It was a peaceful, sunny Sunday morning and Indians, like Canadians, believe in working their way into Sunday easily. Later in the day people began to appear in greater numbers at the polling booth. By mid-day, when we visited the Old City, the bazaars were crowded. Everywhere people were good-natured and glad to volunteer their own interpretation of what was going on. Only once did I see a police constable having to do his duty; he was warning a party worker about putting up an election banner too close to a polling station. By the time the polls closed, between one-half and two-thirds of the voters in the various Delhi constituencies had cast their ballots—a healthy vote, especially considering that the electors of Delhi did not have the additional attraction of an election to the state assembly to draw them to the polls.

Complicated Procedure

Casting a vote in India can be a complicated business. In the Outer Delhi constituency, for example, there were thirteen candidates, each identified by his own party or individual symbol and each with his own ballot box. The

voter usually arrives at the polling station with an identification slip, bearing the symbol of one or the other of the parties which have been canvassing for his vote. Although these identification slips carry campaigning right to the doors of the polling stations, election officials welcome them, because they considerably reduce the time it takes to locate the voter's name on the electoral rolls, which in most polling subdivisions carry 750 to 1000 names. The identity slips are also helpful because quite frequently, particularly in country districts, married women will not give their husband's name, although they will answer "yes" or "no" to the question "Are you Mrs. So-and-so?"

This process of identification goes on at a desk in the open air outside the polling station. On this desk a ballot box is usually placed to give the voter an idea what one looks like. The boxes actually used to receive ballots are closed with a complicated triple seal to prevent "stuffing" and opened after the poll at a central counting station in the presence of the party agents of the candidates. Election officials will demonstrate how to cast a ballot, and the outside of the polling station is decorated with posters designed to explain how to queue, how to obtain a ballot, and how to vote. The election symbols of all candidates standing in the constituency are also displayed. A litter of crumpled registration slips surrounds the desk; within the polling booth, no signs of party warfare are permitted.

When the voter has been identified on the electoral roll, he receives a slip which entitles him to a ballot. There are two pads of these slips on the desk outside the polling booth, one for men and one for women. They are numbered consecutively from one. Thus, at any stage of the day, it is possible to tell exactly how many men and women have voted at a particular polling station simply by glancing at the number of the slip on the top of each pad.


Men and women then queue separately through the doorway into the polling station. Inside, there is another desk. Here, they surrender the numbered slip in exchange for a ballot, a small green rectangle about 3" x 2". The ballot is printed with an anti-counterfeiting device in the same manner as a banknote and bears a serial number and the Ashoka pillar symbol, the three lion heads which are India's substitute for the Crown. From the serial number it is possible for the Election Commission to identify the state and the constituency to which a particular ballot was supplied. This prevents ballots being taken from one part of India to another—a necessary precaution since voting goes on on different days in different places over a period of weeks.

The voter enters the polling station carrying the numbered slip which certifies that his name has been entered on the voter's list and that he is entitled to a ballot. He approaches a second desk, where another set of registers are kept. (In the Delhi area these registers were in Hindi, Urdu and English). The voter shows his numbered slip and receives the ballot paper to which he is entitled. When the voter receives the ballot his left forefinger is marked with a small circle of a special indelible ink which indicates that he has been given a ballot. The officer who issues the ballot enters the serial number which appears on the ballot against the voter's name. This might appear to weaken the secrecy of the vote, since it connects a particular voter with a particular ballot, but it is a useful safeguard against impersonation. The serial numbers also act as a check in double-member constituencies against electors casting two votes for the same candidate. In any event, the registers are kept sealed

except in cases of disputed elections. The secrecy of the vote is thus maintained.

Having received his ballot, the elector then disappears behind a screen—usually burlap—where he sees against the wall in front of him a row of ballot boxes. There is one ballot box for each candidate and each ballot box bears the symbol which has been given to the candidate. Some of these symbols, like the yoked bullocks of the Congress Party and the lamp of the Jan Sangh Party, are nationally recognized. Others are assigned to parties which are recognized only within a state or territory, and still others have been assigned to a particular independent candidate. The voter simply drops the ballot paper into the box marked with the symbol of the candidate of his choice. There is no marking of the ballot involved.

Since 1951, the Election Commission of India has gained valuable experience in the special problems of conducting large-scale democratic elections. It has shared this experience with a number of Asian and African states whose problems in this respect are similar to India's. I arrived in India too late to have seen the first general elections in 1951-52; and since I shall be leaving India shortly, after over four years service here, I was particularly grateful to have had the opportunity which I have described to witness India's second general elections.



—Capitol Press

WELCOMED TO CANADA

His Excellency Ratnakirti Senarat Serasinghe Gunewardene, first Ceylonese High Commissioner to Canada, is greeted on arrival in this country by Mr. D'Arcy McGreer, at that time Chief of Protocol, Department of External Affairs.

APPOINTMENTS AND TRANSFERS IN THE CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

- Mr. P. Reading posted from the Canadian Legation, Helsinki, to Ottawa, effective April 12, 1957.
- Mr. R. W. Nadeau posted from Ottawa to the International Supervisory Commissions, Indochina, effective May 3, 1957.
- Mr. E. M. Reid, Canadian High Commissioner in India, posted to Ottawa, effective May 4, 1957.
- Mr. N. A. Robertson, Canadian High Commissioner in London, appointed Canadian Ambassador to Washington. Proceeded to Washington May 8, 1957.
- Mr. J. J. M. Cote posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Rio de Janeiro, effective May 8, 1957.
- Mr. K. P. Kirkwood, Canadian High Commissioner in New Zealand, posted to Ottawa, effective May 10, 1957.
- Mr. E. Turcotte appointed Canadian Ambassador to Switzerland. Proceeded to Berne May 11, 1957.
- Mr. A. D. P. Heeney, Q.C., Canadian Ambassador to Washington, posted to Ottawa May 8, 1957. Separated from the Department of External Affairs May 14, 1957.
- Mr. M. Shenstone posted from the Canadian Legation, Beirut, to Ottawa, effective May 15, 1957.
- Mr. C. A. Ronning, Canadian Ambassador to Norway, appointed Canadian High Commissioner in India. Proceeded to New Delhi, May 17, 1957.
- Mr. R. M. Macdonnell appointed Canadian Ambassador to Egypt and Canadian Minister to Lebanon, effective May 22, 1957.
- Mr. H. O. Moran, MBE, Canadian Ambassador to Turkey, posted to Ottawa, effective May 22, 1957.
- Mr. G. A. H. Pearson posted from the Canadian Embassy, Paris, to Ottawa, effective May 23, 1957.
- Mr. R. L. Elliott posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Legation, Beirut, effective May 27, 1957.
- Mr. W. E. Bauer posted from the International Supervisory Commissions, Indochina, to Ottawa, effective May 28, 1957.
- Mr. A. J. J. Young posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Rome, effective May 28, 1957.
- Mr. A. S. McGill posted from Ottawa to the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, New Delhi, effective May 28, 1957.
- Mr. P. D. Scott appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1 effective May 28, 1957.
- Mr. F. J. L. Hudon appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective May 30, 1957.
- Mr. J. D. Lane appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective June 3, 1957.
- Mr. D. S. McPhail posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Paris, effective June 5, 1957.
- Mr. W. A. Jenkins posted from the Canadian Consulate, Detroit, to Ottawa, effective June 10, 1957.
- Mr. H. T. W. C. B. Blockley posted from the International Supervisory Commissions, Indochina, to Ottawa, effective June 10, 1957.
- Mr. A. C. Lapointe appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective June 12, 1957.
- Mr. G. A. Rau posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Consulate General, Boston, effective June 12, 1957.
- Mr. N. Haffey appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective June 17, 1957.
- Mr. G. G. J. Grondin posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Mexico City, effective June 17, 1957.
- Mr. O. W. Dier posted from the Canadian Embassy, Copenhagen, to the Canadian Legation, Helsinki, effective June 22, 1957.

- Mr. J. W. Courchesne posted from the Canadian Embassy, Rome, to Ottawa, effective June 25, 1957.
- Miss L. MacKay posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Bonn, effective June 28, 1957.
- Mr. K. C. Brown posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Berne, effective June 29, 1957.
- Mr. J. George posted from Ottawa to the Delegation of Canada to the North Atlantic Council, Paris, effective June 30, 1957.
- Mr. L. H. Amyot appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective June 3, 1957.

Treaty Information

Current Action

Multilateral

Convention on the Political Rights of married women adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations at its Seventh Session.

Entered into force for Canada April 30, 1957.

Bilateral

Denmark

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of Denmark providing for a continuation for a period of three years of Canada's NATO air training programme with respect to aircrew trainees.

Signed at Copenhagen April 17, 1957.

Entered into force April 17, 1957.

Japan

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of Japan respecting agricultural training in Canada for young Japanese farmers.

Signed at Ottawa March 27 and 28, 1957.

Entered into force March 28, 1957.

Netherlands

Convention and Protocol between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion in respect of taxes on income.

Signed at Ottawa April 2, 1957.

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands providing for a continuation for a period of three years of Canada's NATO air training programme with respect to aircrew trainees.

Signed at the Hague April 12 and 13, 1957.

Entered into force April 13, 1957.

Norway

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of Norway providing for a continuation for a period of three years of Canada's NATO air training programme with respect to aircrew trainees.

Signed at Oslo April 17, 1957.

Entered into force April 17, 1957.

Poland

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of Poland concerning the sale of Canadian wheat to Poland during the 1956-57 and 1957-58 crop years.

Signed at Ottawa March 15, 1957.

Entered into force March 15, 1957.

Portugal

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of Portugal amending paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Annex to the Agreement for Air Services between the two countries signed at Lisbon, April 25, 1947.

Signed at Lisbon April 24 and 30, 1957.

Entered into force April 30, 1957.

United Kingdom

Financial Agreement to amend the financial agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United Kingdom signed at Ottawa, March 6, 1946.

Signed at Ottawa March 6, 1957.

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United Kingdom to bring into force the financial agreement between the two countries signed at Ottawa, March 6, 1957.

Signed at Ottawa April 29, 1957.

Entered into force April 29, 1957.

United States of America

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America concerning dredging operations in the St. Mary's River and the St. Clair River Sections of the Great Lakes Connecting Channels.

Signed at Ottawa November 30, 1956; April 8 and 9, 1957.

Entered into force April 9, 1957.

PUBLICATION

Canada Treaty Series 1955 No. 19. Convention on Great Lakes Fisheries between Canada and the United States of America.

Canada Treaty Series 1955 No. 20. Exchange of Notes between Canada and the United States of America regarding Financial Arrangements for furnishing supplies and port services to visiting Naval Vessels of either country.

CURRENT UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS*

A Selected List

a) Printed documents:

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United Nations conference of plenipotentiaries on a supplementary convention on the abolition of slavery, the slave trade, and institutions and practices similar to slavery; held at Geneva, Switzerland, from 13 August to 4 Sept. 1956. Final Act and Supplementary Convention. E/CONF.24/23. N.Y., 1957. 36 p. (Eng.-Fr.-Spanish). Sales No.: 1957.XIV.2. Price: \$0.30.

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* Printed documents may be procured from the Canadian sales agents for United Nations Publications. The Ryerson Press, 299 Queen Street West, Toronto, and Periodica Inc., 5112 avenue Papineau, Montreal, or from their sub-agents: Book Room Limited, Chronicle Building, Halifax; McGill University Book Store, Montreal; University of Toronto Press and Book Store, Toronto; University of British Columbia Book Store, Vancouver; University of Montreal Book Store, Montreal; and Les Presses Universitaires, Laval, Quebec. Certain mimeographed document series are available by annual subscription. Further information can be obtained from Sales and Circulation Section, United Nations, New York. UNESCO publications can be obtained from their sales agents, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, and Periodica Inc., 5112 avenue Papineau, Montreal. All publications and documents may be consulted at certain designated libraries listed in "External Affairs", February 1954, p. 67

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EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



CANADA

August 1957

Vol. 9 No. 8

• **EXTERNAL AFFAIRS** is issued monthly in English and French by the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa. It provides reference material on Canada's external relations and reports on the current work and activities of the Department. Any material in this publication may be reproduced. Citation of **EXTERNAL AFFAIRS** as the source would be appreciated. Subscription rates: **ONE DOLLAR** per year (Students, **FIFTY CENTS**) post free. Remittances, payable to the Receiver General of Canada, should be sent to the Queen's Printer, Ottawa, Canada.

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Department of External Affairs
Ottawa, Canada

Authorized as Second Class Mail, Post Office Department, Ottawa.

Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers

A Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers was held in London at 10 Downing Street from Wednesday, June 26 to Friday, July 5, exactly a year after the meeting held in 1956. It was the first meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers presided over by Mr. Harold Macmillan, who succeeded Sir Anthony Eden as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom in January 1957. The Canadian Delegation was led by Mr. John Diefenbaker, Q.C., who flew to London only two days after he had accepted office as Prime Minister of Canada. He was accompanied by Mr. G. R. Pearkes, V.C., Minister of National Defence, with Mr. R. B. Bryce, Secretary to the Cabinet, and Mr. Jules Léger, Secretary of State for External Affairs, as advisers.

Other Prime Ministers present were Mr. R. G. Menzies, Q.C., of Australia, Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru of India, Mr. H. S. Suhrawardy of Pakistan, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, and Sir Roy Welensky of Rhodesia and Nyasa-



—Canada Pictures Photo

PRIME MINISTERS MEET

Prime Ministers Kwame Nkrumah, of Ghana, and John G. Diefenbaker, of Canada, at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, London, June-July, 1957.

land. Three Prime Ministers were unable to attend, New Zealand being represented by Mr. T. L. Macdonald, Minister of External Affairs and Defence, South Africa by Mr. E. H. Louw, Minister of External Affairs, and Ceylon by Mr. M. M. H. de Silva, Q.C., Leader of Senate and Minister of Justice.

Underlying Unity of Approach

The course of international events in the intervening year since the last meeting of Prime Ministers made the 1957 meeting of unusual significance. The crisis in the Middle East had profoundly affected all members of the Commonwealth and the meeting was a demonstration of the underlying unity of their approach to international affairs. While the communiqué made it clear that it was not the function of Prime Ministers' Meetings to record agreed decisions or formal resolutions, there was a wide area of agreement in the discussion of all important subjects. This was particularly true of the discussions on disarmament; on the United Nations, in which stress was given to the need for action to strengthen and improve the organization; and on problems of the Middle East for which all members were anxious to find solutions.

The changing nature of the Commonwealth was illustrated by the presence at the meeting of the Prime Minister of the new Commonwealth state of Ghana, which was specifically referred to in the opening paragraph of the communiqué, and by the formal notice taken by the meeting of the forthcoming independence of the Federation of Malaya.

In addition to the plenary sessions, the Prime Ministers had a strenuous programme which included a dinner party given by Her Majesty the Queen at Windsor Castle, a cruise on the Thames as guests of the Port of London Authority, a dinner party given by the United Kingdom Prime Minister, and a Commonwealth reception at the Guildhall.

For Stronger Economic Ties

Mr. Diefenbaker met Canadian residents in London at the July 1 reception held at Canada House, and spoke to a large audience at the Canada Club dinner in the evening. In his address Mr. Diefenbaker spoke of the importance of the Commonwealth for Canada and of the great sympathy between Canada and the newly emerging independent members of the Commonwealth. He also spoke of his belief that enlightened and mutual self-interest required the strengthening of economic ties within the Commonwealth and more diversity in trade. For this reason he had already announced his view that there ought to be an early Commonwealth trade and economic conference to explore the field of trade and capital investment within the Commonwealth.

Commonwealth and economic questions were discussed at plenary sessions during the latter part of the Prime Ministers' Meeting, including the encouragement of capital investment within the Commonwealth and the effect on the Commonwealth of the proposal for establishing an industrial free trade area as a complement to the European Common Market. It was also announced in the communiqué that the Canadian Government had invited the Commonwealth finance ministers to meet in Ottawa in September.

Final Communiqué

The Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers was concluded to-day. This was the first Commonwealth Meeting at which Ghana was represented, following her attainment of Independence in March, 1957. Other Commonwealth Ministers welcomed Ghana's participation in the Meeting as a full member of the Commonwealth, and took note of this occasion as further practical evidence of the progress made by the United Kingdom Government in the pursuit of their policy of fostering constitutional development in their dependent territories.

In the course of their discussions the Commonwealth Ministers have reviewed all the major international questions of the day which are of common concern to their countries. In this association of free and independent nations it is inevitable that there should be some differences of viewpoint and opinion. But these Meetings reveal a broad similarity of approach and purpose. It is not their function, nor is it the object of this communiqué, to record agreed decisions or formal resolutions. Their value lies in the opportunity which they afford for a full and candid exchange of views in the light of which each Commonwealth Government can formulate and pursue its separate policies with deeper knowledge and understanding of the views and interests of its fellow members.

The primary objective of all Commonwealth Governments is world peace and security. They believe that this objective can only be assured by increased co-operation between nations. They themselves accept the principle and practice of co-operation: it is the foundation of their own association: they will continue to work for its wider adoption.

The United Nations was designed to provide one of the main opportunities for the practical exercise of the principle of co-operation between nations. Experience has, however, revealed certain deficiencies and weaknesses in the functioning of the Organisation. The Commonwealth Ministers agreed that constructive action is needed to strengthen and improve the United Nations as an instrument for preserving peace, justice and co-operation throughout the world in accordance with the principles of the Charter.

In discussion of developments since their last Meeting Commonwealth Ministers expressed their grave concern at the tragic events in Hungary. They took note that the forthcoming consideration by the General Assembly of the report presented by its Special Committee will provide the occasion for the United Nations to record its views.

Commonwealth Ministers reviewed the course of the developments in the current discussions on disarmament. They noted that proposals relating to a first stage of disarmament were put forward on 2nd July in the Disarmament Sub-Committee on behalf of the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and France. They recognised that even a limited agreement, by reducing the suspicions and tensions throughout the world, would help to create conditions in which a more comprehensive scheme of disarmament could be developed.

The Commonwealth Ministers discussed the international problems of the Middle East. They agreed that, in the long term, economic and social progress must be the foundation for stability in the Middle East. They agreed, however, that in the short term the need is to work towards a relaxation of the tension arising from the dispute between the Arab States and Israel, the plight of the Arab refugees and the unresolved problems in connection with the Suez Canal. They considered that solutions of all these urgent questions should continue to be pursued by all practicable means.

Consideration was also given to the contribution which might be made by the Commonwealth Governments concerned towards the easing of tension and the maintenance of peace, stability and political freedom in the Far East and South East Asia. Commonwealth Ministers welcomed the important contribution already made by mutual assistance under the Colombo Plan towards raising standards of living and promoting economic development in the under-developed countries of this area.

In their general review of economic questions the Commonwealth Ministers gave special attention to the impact of the major programmes of development on which many of their countries are now engaged. These programmes call for high levels of domestic saving which can only be secured by sound internal policies. But they also call for conditions favourable to investment from other countries. The United Kingdom will continue to play its leading role in furthering economic development in the countries of the Commonwealth, and important contributions are also being made by other Commonwealth members. But, in view of the continued need for capital investment, it is also important to encourage investment from other sources on suitable conditions.

The Commonwealth Ministers noted the progress made since their last Meeting towards the freeing of trade and payments. In this context they discussed the proposals for the creation of an industrial free trade area in Europe as a complement to the European

Economic Community to be set up under the Treaty of Rome. They agreed that, as part of the continuous exchange of views between Commonwealth Governments on these matters, particular aspects of the proposals which might specially affect certain countries of the Commonwealth should be examined in London next week by officials of all Commonwealth countries in the light of the Ministers' discussions.

The Commonwealth Ministers noted that the Annual Meeting of the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development will be held in Washington in September. The normal practice is for this Meeting to be followed by a meeting of Commonwealth Finance Ministers. The Prime Minister of Canada extended an invitation that this meeting of Finance Ministers should be held this year in Ottawa.

The Commonwealth Ministers recognised the value of the work carried out over the past thirty years by the Commonwealth Economic Committee. They agreed that the Committee should be invited to examine and suggest to Governments what expansion of its scope and functions might usefully be undertaken for the particular purpose of drawing attention to the economic resources of Commonwealth countries.

The Commonwealth Ministers reviewed the progress of co-operation within the Commonwealth in the use of nuclear energy for civil purposes. They recognised the growing importance of the contribution which nuclear energy can make to the peaceful development of their countries and of the rest of the world and the value of close collaboration between members of the Commonwealth in this field. For this purpose nuclear scientists from Commonwealth countries will be invited to an informal meeting in the United Kingdom in 1958.

The Commonwealth Ministers noted that the Federation of Malaya was on the eve of attaining independence. They extended to the Federation their warm good wishes for its future, and they looked forward to being able to welcome an independent Malaya as a member of the Commonwealth on the completion of the necessary constitutional processes.



MR. MENZIES WELCOMED

—*Capital Press Photo*

Prime Minister Robert Menzies of Australia, centre, was greeted on his arrival in Ottawa August 1 for a two-day visit by Mr. W. R. Crocker, Australian High Commissioner to Canada, left, and Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker of Canada.

July 1 Celebration



—Canada Pictures

On July 1, 1957, the world's statesmen, diplomats and cultural leaders, as well as Canadian citizens visiting or resident overseas, gathered at Canadian missions abroad to celebrate Canada's national day. Above is a photograph taken at Canada House, London, during the reception there on July 1, which coincided with the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference. Left to right are Mrs. John G. Diefenbaker, Prime Minister Diefenbaker, Mrs. Sydney D. Pierce, and Mr. Pierce, the Acting High Commissioner for Canada in the United Kingdom.

In many countries, newspapers carried illustrated feature articles on Canadian Development since Confederation, or special editorials. The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation prepared a special July 1 programme which was transcribed in a number of languages and was broadcast by local radio stations in most of the world's great cities. Television stations across the United States and in many other countries carried a special programme prepared by the National Film Board, and a number of them also presented Canadian films in honour of the occasion.

The Dissolving Frontier*

by Arnold Toynbee

What a characteristic scene of modern life in this age of technology—the mouth of a gorge to be blocked with a dam. A diversionary tunnel has already been driven through the mountain-side to carry the river's waters while the dam's foundations are being laid. The workshops sprawl over the plain: the workers' housing estates climb the mountains' flanks and perch on their spurs on either side of the narrow valley.

Who are these labourers who swarm like ants, shovelling, blasting, carting, driving? I have put the question to the Canadian controller of labour, and he tells me that they are the local tribesmen: Mohamands from the hills north of the river, Afridis from the hills south of it.

The Warsak Project

The Warsak project, for irrigation and electrical generation, is being built by Canada under the Colombo Plan in northwest Pakistan, 19 miles from Peshawar. The project will consist of a 700-foot dam across the Kabul river and three tunnels; a power tunnel 39 feet in diameter through rock to a power-house 700 feet downstream: a 1,700-foot 35-bore diversion tunnel to permit the river water to bypass the site during construction: and an irrigation tunnel three and one-half miles long.

The project has been designed by one of Canada's most prominent consulting engineers and a Canadian contractor is building the dam, tunnels and power-house. Construction began in late 1955 and the project is scheduled for completion in 1960.

It is expected that the ultimate cost will be in the neighborhood of \$67,000,000; present commitments are \$36,600,000 from Canada and \$13,300,000 from Pakistan. Canada is also supplying, on a gift basis, the electrical generating equipment, the control gates and the construction plant. Approximately 300 Canadians, some Pakistani engineers, and a main labour force of 10,000 Pathan tribesmen make up the construction crew.

It is expected that the dam will irrigate some 120,000 acres of land, thus increasing food production by some 60,000 tons a year. Present electrical generating capacity is 160,000 kilowatts; if additional generators are installed at a future date the potential is 240,000 kilowatts of power. The power will increase industry in the area and will also be used to operate tube wells to lower the water table and to flush out saline farmland.

Some 4,000,000 frontier tribesmen live in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area which will be served by the project. It has presented a grave problem for centuries, chiefly because the tribesmen were unable to eke a living from its barren hills and were consequently forced to become fighters and raiders. What Canada is doing at Warsak is to help the Government of Pakistan to make a better life for these people and thus to bring greater stability to the area.

The project is in Canadian hands, but this wilderness is not the Laurentian Shield or the Rockies. We are at the mouth of the Warsak Gorge, through which the Kabul River forces its way en route from the plain of Jelalabad to the plain of Peshawar; and my Canadian mentor is at home in two worlds. When he turns to say something to one of his men, his speech changes from English

*Reprinted from "The Observer", London.



—NFB Photo

CANADIAN AT WARSAK

Assisted by a Pakistani tribesman, Engineer Giles Tenner, of Vancouver, B.C., works with a transit at the Warsak Power and Irrigation Project in northwest Pakistan. Canada is co-operating with Pakistan in the development of the project, contributing equipment and engineering services and helping to pay local labour costs.

into Urdu. He is the son of a Canadian missionary in India, and Hindustani, the lingua franca that is the parent of both Urdu and Hindi, is his second mother-tongue.

The Warsak Dam is Canada's gift to Pakistan under the Colombo Plan, and the project is admirably designed for solving the problem of the frontier that the Pakistanis inherited from the British, and the British, a hundred

years back, from the Sikhs. The mountains are bare and barren; the patches of cultivable ground in the torrent-beds are small and rare; the highlanders are numerous and hungry. They must either starve or make their living off the eastern plains into which their valleys open. They will not starve without fighting; so, for the rulers of the plains, the alternative to being at war with the highlanders is to provide them with some alternative occupation.

During the British century of the frontier's history a state of war had been the rule. There had been a vicious circle of raids, punitive expeditions, reprisals, and then more punitive expeditions on a larger scale. History kept on repeating itself, but with an increasing tendency for the burden of frantic defence to grow heavier out of proportion to the effort exerted by the tribesmen. A few thousand highlanders, armed with modern rifles—weapons bought or stolen from across the line, or manufactured at home by cleverly copying Western models—were able to keep in play large forces of Regular troops, equipped with elaborate and expensive apparatus and served by a host of non-combatants on the lines of communication.

The balance was shifting in the barbarians' favour, and this at an accelerating pace; and the history of the frontiers of the Roman and the Chinese empires bore witness to one of the ways in which the story might end. The growing financial burden might eventually break the back of the defence, and then the barbarians might burst through into the plains.

This had not, however, been the way that the story had ended always and everywhere. The Scottish highlanders, for example, who had pushed their way as far as Derby in 1745, had not, after all, overrun Britain. Instead, they had been converted from pugnacious barbarians into respectable and industrious citizens by being enticed into the new mills of Glasgow and the new homesteads of Upper Canada. That ending to the story of frontier warfare was a happy one; and to-day, 200 years later, the Government of Pakistan is trying to make the story of the Pathan frontier come to an end in this happy Scottish way.

Perhaps it would have ended like that if the British dispensation had continued; for that British century had already brought the modern world to the threshold of the Pathan highlander's hovel. Anyway, the transformation scene is in progress now; and the Pakistani heirs of the British Raj deserve credit for the imaginativeness and the boldness of their approach to the problem.

I met the political officer who had taken the decision to withdraw the troops from the cantonment at Razmak in the heart of Waziristan. "We leave the place to you," he had said to the Wazirs; "You can do what you like with it." The tribesmen were so taken aback that, instead of razing the evacuated cantonment to the ground, they took care of it as a valuable piece of public property.

Those well-housed Afridi and Mohamad workers on the Warsak dam will not go back to their hovels in the hills. When the Warsak project is complete, they will take up holdings on the hitherto barren tracts of plain that the Warsak reservoir is to irrigate. And the power the reservoir will generate will give them electricity in the home.

I visited the famous arms factory in the strip of unadministered territory between Peshawar and the Kohat Pass. The gunsmiths there are still turning their lathes by foot-driven wheels; but their workshop is now lighted by electricity laid on from the Peshawar power station, so the futile retort to a shooting incident will be not a punitive expedition, but one of those forms, threatening to cut off the current, that are served on a user when he is late in paying his quarterly bill to the electricity board.

In falling for electric light and hospitals and schools, the tribesman is indeed placing himself at civilisation's mercy. Soon those lathes will operate by electric power and the craftsmen will be turning out bicycles and buses instead of rifles and battle-axes. Their children will go to the University of Peshawar (a hostel, with free board, lodging, and tuition, has already been built for them there). Their grandsons will become garagehands; their granddaughters shorthand typists.

A prosaic ending to a romantic story? Well, if the story does end like this, it is not to be regretted; for the superficially romantic story of the Frontier turns out to have been nasty and brutish when one scrutinises it.



CANADA-JAPAN LINK

A direct radio telegraph circuit between Japan and Canada was inaugurated on June 27. To mark the occasion, the following message was sent to Mr. Keiso Shibusawa, Chairman of the Board of Directors of Kokusai Denshin Denwa Company, Ltd., the Japanese agency which handles overseas communications, by Mr. W. J. Bull, at that time Ambassador-designate to Japan:

On behalf of Canada, I join with you today in the inauguration of a direct radio telegraph circuit between our two countries. This operation marks another forward step in the development of Canada's external communications, and provides the means whereby the social and economic ties between our two peoples can be strengthened. More rapid and direct communication throughout the world contributes to the mutual understanding that is so essential to the preservation of peace and prosperity. Please accept my warmest personal regards and convey my best wishes to those of your associates who have made possible the forging of this important link between our two countries. I anticipate with the greatest pleasure my meeting with you and them and my forthcoming residence among you.


NATO Journalists Visit Canada

EIGHTEEN journalists representing twelve European nations belonging to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization were in Canada from May 29 to June 30 on the fourth tour of its kind arranged by the Canadian Government with a view to strengthening NATO ties.

The journalists inspected various industrial developments and military installations, had interviews with recent immigrants from their own countries, and were received at two of Canada's leading educational institutions, the University of Toronto and Laval University.

After arriving in Ottawa, the journalists met with officials of the Departments of External Affairs, Agriculture, National Defence, Northern Affairs and National Resources, and Citizenship and Immigration, with whom they discussed various aspects of national development in the fields of government, social and cultural progress, and economic expansion.

The group then went to Chalk River, where they learned of Canada's advances in the peaceful uses of atomic energy, and following this visited Toronto, where they were welcomed by the University and by one of the leading newspapers. As the federal election campaign was in its final stages,



WATCHING NAVAL MANOEUVRES


—*National Defence Photo*

Members of the party of journalists from NATO countries who toured Canada in June watched manoeuvres of the 1st Canadian Escort Squadron and the 3rd Canadian Escort Squadron, RCN, during a visit to Halifax. Shown above on the deck of HMCS Ottawa are, in the foreground, Mr. H. E. Janszen, The Hague, and Mr. Georg Andresen, Aarhus, Denmark.

the journalists took advantage of the opportunity to attend a large political rally in that city.

The tour also included visits to Niagara Falls, the air station at Gimli, Manitoba, where the journalists saw airmen from NATO countries in training, and Knob Lake, the site of spectacular iron ore developments. In Quebec, the journalists visited the Anglo-Canadian Pulp and Paper Company plant as well as Laval University, and in Montreal they saw aircraft being manufactured at the Canadair factory. A trip to the St. Lawrence Seaway project was one of the highlights of the tour. After stops in the Annapolis Valley and at Halifax, the visitors ended their journey in St. John's, Newfoundland, returning to their countries by aircraft.

These NATO tours form part of a programme to encourage cultural exchanges between European and North American members of the Atlantic Community, to increase the flow of information among them, and, by making wider-known the activities and achievements of NATO, to forge new links in the chain of co-operation and friendship by which the countries are joined.



FRIENDLY NEIGHBOURS

—*Canada Pictures Photo*

The friendly relations between the United States and Canada were underlined in the recent visit to Ottawa of Mr. John Foster Dulles, the U.S. Secretary of State, who is seen above, centre, with Mr. Livingston T. Merchant, U.S. Ambassador to Canada, left, and Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker, of Canada.

Canada and the Colombo Plan: The Umtru Project

HAILED as a landmark in the economic development of the State of Assam in north-eastern India and as a symbol of the continuing co-operation between Canada and India under the Colombo Plan, the Umtru Project—the first major hydro-electric plant in Assam—was formally inaugurated July 9 at a special ceremony at the dam site. Canada was represented at the inaugural ceremonies by Mr. Chester A. Ronning, High Commissioner for Canada in India, who made the formal transfer to India of the Canadian contribution towards the project. Others who took an active part in the ceremony were Shri S. Fazl Ali, Governor of the State of Assam; Shri Bisnuram Medhi, Chief Minister of the State; and Mr. G. C. Goswami, chief electrical engineer and electrical adviser to the Government of Assam. Awards were presented to project personnel and the guests visited the dam site and the power house.

The Umtru project has a total generating capacity of 8,400 kilowatts obtained from three generators of 2,800 kilowatts each. Though the plant is small by present-day standards, power from Umtru should go far to remedy a serious deficiency which has impeded the economic development of the area which it will serve. Besides providing for immediate electric power in and around the city of Gauhati (an area of about 1,000 square miles), the project is also intended to assist various present and potential industries. These include irrigation of agricultural crops, crushing of sugar cane, production of milk products in dairies, fruit preservation in squash factories near fruit-growing areas, weaving and reeling of silk yarn, brass industries and smithies, pottery, road metal working and the crushing of stone in quarries, carpentry, and rice and oil mills. A sugar mill is already nearing completion and cement, cotton and jute factories are intended to be established shortly. Other industrial potential includes coal, limestone, oil and lumber.

The structure of the project begins with a masonry diversion dam built at the head of the Umtru River rapids. From the dam, water for power generation is carried through a 4,600-foot conduit system to the power-house. The conduit system has two tunnels, one 2,730 feet long and another 828 feet long, connected by a steel pipeline 701 feet long. A 347-foot high pressure steel penstock runs from the second tunnel to the powerhouse, which, to avail itself of the maximum possible head, was designed as an almost submerged structure affording entry through the roof. The walls of the power-house are built of reinforced concrete made fully waterproof by sheets of copper at every construction joint. There are three turbines in the power-house.

Plans for the Umtru development had been discussed for many years and a preliminary survey was made by the Government of India as early as 1922. Agreement between the Governments of Canada and India to finance the project under the Colombo Plan was reached in October, 1953 and the preliminary construction of approach roads and staff quarters was begun in the same year. Work on the weir and tunnels began in November 1954, after designs had been prepared by the Central Water and Power Commission of

India in consultation with the Montreal Engineering Company. Construction of the power house, also designed by the Montreal Engineering Company, commenced in February 1955. Details of the hydro-electric machinery were worked out by the engineers of the Assam Electricity Department, the Central Water and Power Commission and the Montreal Engineering Company.

Canadian Contribution

The cost of the Umtru Project is estimated to be about \$4,600,000 (Rs. 2.05 crores) of which Canada contributed \$3,300,000. The Canadian contribution was in the form of electrical equipment and engineering services (\$1,200,000) and supplies of aluminum and copper (\$2,100,000) which were sold by India to cover part of the local cost of the development. In addition, Canada supplied engineers for the erection of the electrical equipment and training facilities in Canada for an engineer and other technical personnel connected with the project.


The project brought into being a nucleus of engineering personnel suited to the tasks of electrification programmes in general and hydro projects in particular and these people are expected to put their skills to good use in further development of the area.

"Value of Commonwealth Link"

In his address at the July 9 ceremony, the Governor of Assam predicted that the project would be the first of many in his State. He said, "We are potentially among the richest of States in India insofar as our hydro-power resources are concerned and with the installation of the Umtru hydro-electric plant we can take heart that the first tangible step has already been taken towards making good the leeway in electrical power production." Of Canada's contribution, he added, "The project stands before us as a tangible and enduring monument to the benefits of international economic co-operation and as a convincing testimony of the value of the Commonwealth link."

Transferring the project, Mr. Ronning said, "We in Canada are very happy to have achieved, together with the Government of Assam, the completion of the Umtru hydro-electric project. Through the Commonwealth we have demonstrated to the world how nations of different races, cultures and histories can work in harmony and peace for mutual benefit to our peoples."

Umtru is another in a number of projects that Canadian aid under the Colombo Plan has helped to achieve in India. During the past few years, such aid has totalled \$80,000,000 and has included contributions to a hydro-electric project in West Bengal, a hydro-electric project in Madras, an atomic reactor in Bombay, locomotives for Indian railways, buses for Bombay's state road transport, and a magnetometer oil survey of Central India.



PRESENTS CREDENTIALS

Mr. C. A. Ronning, who represented Canada at the Umtru Project inauguration ceremony, is shown above presenting his credentials as High Commissioner for Canada in India to Dr. Rajendra Prasad, President of India, at the Presidential Palace. On Mr. Ronning's right is Mr. S. Dutt, Foreign Secretary in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs.

Tenth World Health Assembly

THE World Health Assembly is the legislative body of the World Health Organization (WHO), one of the ten Specialized Agencies of the United Nations. The chief objective of WHO is "the attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health". The Tenth World Health Assembly, held in Geneva from May 7 - 24, was attended by delegates from seventy-five member states including four Communist countries (U.S.S.R., Poland, Bulgaria, Albania) which had not participated in WHO for several years. (At the end of the session, Romania announced it was resuming active participation in the Organization). The Assembly also welcomed Ghana, formerly an associate member, as a full member. The Canadian Delegation was led by Dr. P. E. Moore, Director of Indian and Northern Health Services, Department of National Health and Welfare.

Among the highlights at the Tenth Assembly were decisions to increase WHO's responsibilities in the fields of atomic energy research, malaria eradication, cancer research and health statistics. In the "atoms for peace field", the Assembly gave priority to the training of health physicists and medical personnel, and established a broad programme of activities including meetings, study groups and courses on such subjects as graduate public health training and mental health aspects of the peaceful use of atomic energy.

The Assembly determined to intensify its campaign to wipe out malaria before the resistance of the mosquito to insecticides becomes more prevalent, a factor which influenced the recent shift in WHO's malaria policy from mere control to eradication. The President of the Assembly reported that eradication has now been achieved in ten countries or territories, and that eradication programmes are under way in fifteen additional countries and are being initiated or planned in thirty-eight others.

The Assembly also decided that WHO should undertake an extensive comparative study of variations between cancer types in different countries. The Assembly expressed the belief that such a study might yield a clue to the origins of this disease.

The Director-General of WHO, Dr. M. G. Candau, of Brazil, in his report for 1956, declared that by the end of the last year, over fifty-five million people had been examined and sixteen million people treated with vaccine in a mass campaign against non-venereal syphilis and yaws. He reported that WHO and the United Nations Children's Emergency Fund were continuing to work in common on a wide vaccination campaign against tuberculosis and that the two organizations had assisted in the setting up of pilot projects for the mass treatment of trachoma with antibiotics.

As proposed by the Executive Board, the Assembly adopted an effective working budget of \$13,566,130 for the 1958 WHO programme, an increase over the 1957 budget of about \$1½ million. A large part of this increase will be met by the contributions of those states who this year resumed active participation in the Organization. Canada's share of the 1958 budget will be approximately \$425,060.

Afghanistan, Australia, Egypt, the Federal Republic of Germany, Liberia and the United States were elected by the Assembly to designate members of the 18-member Executive Board for a period of three years. At the Ninth World Health Assembly, Canada had been elected for a three-year (1956-59) term on the Board.

By an almost unanimous vote, the Assembly agreed to renew, for a period not exceeding five years, the contract of Dr. Candau, the Director-General.

An invitation by the United States to hold the Eleventh World Health Assembly, as well as a special tenth anniversary commemoration, in that country in 1958 was accepted by the Assembly. It has recently been announced that these two WHO meetings will take place in Minneapolis.

SALMON FISHERIES AGREEMENT

His Excellency Livingston T. Merchant, the United States Ambassador to Canada, Mr. E. Davie Fulton, Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs, and Mr. Angus MacLean, Minister of Fisheries, attended a ceremony of ratification on Wednesday, July 3, 1957, bringing into force an agreement between the United States and Canada for the conservation and regulation of the pink salmon fisheries of the Juan-De-Fuca—Fraser River area of the Pacific Coast.

The main purpose of this agreement, which takes the form of Protocol to the Convention of May 26, 1930, for the Protection, Preservation and Extension of the Sockeye Salmon Fisheries in the Fraser River System, is to extend to the pink salmon fisheries the same sort of protection and regulation which the International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission already affords to the sockeye salmon fisheries. The Commission has done outstanding work in the development of the valuable sockeye salmon resources since its establishment in 1937. It will now take on the additional task of maintaining the pink salmon stocks at the maximum level of productivity and of ensuring an equal division of the annual catch between Canadian and United States fishermen.

The Pink Salmon Agreement also provides for a co-ordinated investigation by research agencies of the two governments and the conservation of pink salmon stocks which enter the waters described in the Convention. It calls for a meeting in the seventh year after entry into force to review the results of the investigation and to determine what future arrangements concerning pink salmon conservation may be desirable.

Movement of Hungarian Refugees

MR. E. D. Fulton, Acting Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, made the following announcement June 26, 1957:

A review of the movement of Hungarian refugees shows that, as at July 19, Canada had received a total of 33,070 refugees. It is anticipated that this total will have risen by mid-August to more than 34,000 admitted since the fall of 1956. Of this total, 5,000 will have been taken by arrangement from the United Kingdom, 3,000 from France, 2,000 from The Netherlands, 1,500 from Italy and 1,000 from Yugoslavia. The remainder, more than 20,000, will have been taken direct from Austria.

The Inter-governmental Committee for European Migration reports for the period to July 15, 1957, show that a total of 142,054 Hungarian refugees had been moved from Austria to 36 countries. Canada's total given above compares with 33,205 admitted to the United States. According to these statistics there were about 28,000 Hungarian refugees remaining in Austria at the end of June, 1957. Other information indicates that the rate of border-crossings into that country from Hungary had dropped to an average of 19 per week at the beginning of July.

The Canadian Government has recently reviewed the whole situation with regard to the movement of Hungarian refugees in the course of a general survey of immigration statistics. Recognizing the tremendous assistance given by Austria to the refugees, and the continuing difficulties which are faced by those remaining in Austria, it has been decided to continue the refugee program on a somewhat modified basis for the balance of 1957. This modification takes into account both the winter accommodation situation in Canada and the effective rate of absorption of new population, in the light of the very heavy intake of immigrants through the normal channels, which reached a high of 175,000 in the first six months of this year.

It has been decided accordingly that for the balance of 1957 Canada will continue to accept only those Hungarian refugees who are sponsored by close relatives residing in Canada in a position to receive and care for them, or by responsible persons, firms or organizations in Canada prepared to provide employment to such refugees immediately upon their arrival. With regard to the latter category, Immigration officials, before approving applications, will have to be satisfied that such employers can and will fulfill their undertaking, that the sponsored refugees will not fill employment vacancies for which Canadians, immigrants or refugees already in Canada are qualified, and that they will be paid at prevailing wage rates.

This decision applies for the balance of 1957. The policy will be reviewed again prior to the commencement of the new immigration season next year.

It is significant to note that, of the approximately 32,000 Hungarian refugees who had been admitted to Canada to the end of June, 6,208 were receiving emergency assistance from the Department of Citizenship and Immigration. This figure includes those who arrived during the last week of June.

In connection with immigration generally, Mr. Fulton also pointed out that, judging by the large number of immigrants admitted to Canada during the first six months of this year (approximately 175,000), it is estimated that the total number admitted in 1957 will be the greatest since 1913, when 400,870 immigrants were received in Canada. The Minister's statement was concluded as follows:

In order to keep the total flow of immigrants within the absorptive capacity of our economy and the availability of housing accommodation, immigrants coming for open placement, i.e., those with no pre-arranged contract, in most occupations have been issued visas valid only for arrival in Canada before July 31, 1957. However, a large number of close relatives of immigrants who arrived earlier are expected to come to Canada between August 1 and December 31.

Economic and Social Council: 23rd Session

The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) held its twenty-third session at the United Nations Headquarters in New York from April 16 to May 3, 1957. Canada, which is serving its third term on the Council, was represented by a delegation headed by Dr. R. A. MacKay, Canadian Permanent Representative to the United Nations, with Mr. Jean Boucher, Director of Technical Services, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, as alternate delegate.

For the current calendar year the Council unanimously elected Mohammed Mir Khan, of Pakistan, as President, and Miss Minerva Bernardino, of the Dominican Republic, and Mr. Jersy Michalowski, of Poland, as First and Second Vice-Presidents, respectively. Miss Bernardino, the first woman to have been elected to one of the principal offices in the Council, assumed the Chairmanship of the Social Committee of the Council, and Mr. Michalowski became Chairman of the Economic Committee.

The agenda, as approved by the Council at its first plenary meeting, contained twenty items. Consideration of the question of the Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED), which had been the subject of much discussion at previous ECOSOC and General Assembly meetings, was deferred to the Council's twenty-fourth session.

Economic Matters

Major economic issues are generally considered at the regular summer session of ECOSOC, and since discussion of SUNFED had been postponed, only a few economic items appeared on the agenda of the twenty-third session, namely the reports of the International Monetary Fund and of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (which were approved unanimously), certain problems related to the economic development of underdeveloped countries, and the report of the Transport and Communications Commission.

Under the item entitled "Economic Development of Under-developed Countries", the Council adopted three resolutions relating to the Secretariat's study on industrialization and the problems of land reform and co-operatives. The main purpose of these resolutions was to record the progress achieved and to encourage the Secretariat and United Nations member countries to pursue their efforts to ensure further progress and a greater measure of international co-operation in these various fields of endeavour. There was general agreement on all these topics. Canada co-sponsored the resolutions on industrialization and co-operatives.

The Report of the Transport and Communications Commission, which is a functional commission of the Council, was also received with unanimous approval, as were most of its recommendations, particularly those which related to the establishment of a group of experts to study existing regulations on the tonnage measurement of ships, the creation of a similar *ad hoc* committee to consider problems related to the transport of dangerous goods,

the ratification of the U.N. Conventions on customs, and the easing of passports and frontier formalities. The Council also invited Governments to ratify the 1949 Convention on Road Traffic and to recognize in international traffic valid domestic driving permits.

In conformity with a resolution adopted at the last General Assembly, the Council had no difficulty in reaching agreement to invite its Commission on International Commodity Trade to give special consideration, within its programme of work, to current international commodity problems in relation to world economic stability.

Social Matters

The Council's agenda of social items included in particular the following topics: the development of international travel; the report of the Population Commission; a recommendation by the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, to initiate a study on the questions of minimum age and free consent for marriage; allegations regarding infringements of trade union rights in Saudi Arabia; the development of media of information in under-developed countries; the report of the United Nations Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF); and the review of the membership of the United Nations Refugee Fund (UNREF) Executive Committee.

There was general recognition of the benefits of international travel and tourism, and also unanimous approval of the Report of the Population Commission. With respect to the latter, the Council requested the Secretary-General to explore, in consultation with the Governments concerned, the desirability of early establishment of demographic training and research centres in Africa. The task of initiating the study on the questions of minimum age and free consent for marriage was entrusted to the Commission on the Status of Women, which had expressed a desire to undertake such a study. The Commission will be guided by the preference expressed by the Conference of Plenipotentiaries for a minimum marriage age of fourteen years.

The question of alleged infringements of trade union rights in Saudi Arabia proved to be more controversial. It concerned primarily a complaint by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions against an anti-strike decree issued by the Saudi-Arabian Government in June, 1956, and to measures taken by that Government to suppress a strike of petroleum workers, but it also referred to an earlier complaint by the World Federation of Trade Unions about general labour conditions in Saudi Arabia. In its reply, the Saudi-Arabian Government had squarely rejected these complaints and had declined to allow the ILO Fact-Finding and Conciliation Commission on Freedom of Association to investigate them. Following a lively exchange of arguments between the Saudi-Arabian observer, and the United Kingdom and French delegates, who took particular exception to unfavourable references in the Saudi-Arabian reply to labour conditions in countries "under alien rule", the Council finally adopted (by 15 votes, the United Kingdom, France and The Netherlands abstaining) a United States resolution which simply took note of the Saudi-Arabian reply. Some delegations, including that of Canada, explained that their vote in favour of receiving the Saudi Arabia reply was not to be construed as endorsement of the context of the reply. A United Kingdom-sponsored amendment noting "with regret" was defeated by 6 votes against, 3 votes in favour, and 9 abstentions (including Canada). In

plenary the Social Committee's action was approved after a further statement by the U.K. delegate by 14 votes. Mexico, the United Kingdom, France and The Netherlands abstained.

The Council also adopted (Canada and the United Kingdom abstaining) a resolution, the principal effect of which was to renew an earlier invitation of the Council to Governments to submit information and suggestions on the problem of development of media of information in under-developed countries, so that the Secretary-General might be in a position to submit a more complete report on the matter to the Council not later than at its twenty-seventh session.

The report and activities of UNICEF were again favourably commented upon by all delegations. The Council also unanimously supported proposals for increasing the membership of the UNREF Executive Committee, so that Canada could become a member, and to open the membership of the Technical Assistance Committee to non-member countries such as Western Germany and Switzerland. In the course of the elections for the functional commission of ECOSOC, Canada was elected for the first time to the Commission on the Status of Women.



FISHERIES AGREEMENT SIGNED

—*Capital Press Photo*

Shown above are the officials attending the signing in Ottawa July 3 of the Protocol bringing into force an Agreement between the United States and Canada for the Conservation and Regulation of the Pink Salmon Fisheries of the Juan-de-Fuca, Fraser River area of the Pacific Coast.

His Excellency Mr. Livingston T. Merchant, United States Ambassador to Canada, is shown signing the Protocol, and seated with him is Mr. E. Davie Fulton, at that time Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs. In rear from left to right: Mr. G. R. Clark, Deputy Minister of Fisheries; Mr. Angus Maclean, Minister of Fisheries, and Mr. J. W. Holmes, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.

Lord Ismay on NATO

FIVE rules for the conduct of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization were given by Lord Ismay, former NATO Secretary-General, in a speech in London at a dinner given by the English-Speaking Union. HRH Prince Philip was chairman.

Lord Ismay's first rule was that NATO had to be strong, not only militarily but also politically. It was therefore imperative that the 15 partners should keep in the closest touch with each other on all matters, great and small, which affect the Alliance.

The second rule was that it was a cardinal sin for one of the members to do anything which might disturb or even seriously weaken the Alliance. "If you find yourself at loggerheads with one of your partners, pause for a moment to reflect that you and he are fundamentally like-minded people, dedicated to the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rules of law", advised Lord Ismay. "This being so, you can even question his judgment, but you ought not to question his motives. The main thing is to settle it as quickly as possible . . . above all, if there is any dirty NATO linen to be washed, do not wash it in public."

Thirdly, vigilance should never be relaxed. Russia had always hated NATO. When they found that blustering and threatening were no use they substituted the grin for the growl. Quite a number of people began to indulge in wishful thinking such as "cannot we now start spending our money on those things which bring happiness and contentment to people instead of on engines of destruction?" That was a dangerous mood and might have led to dangerous consequences if it had not been for the revolt in Hungary, which showed the Kremlin in its true colours.

Lord Ismay's fourth rule was "do not forget that the North Atlantic Treaty is not only a solemn obligation but also an insurance against measureless catastrophe . . . nations who economise in the premiums which they pay for their security and thereafter become the victims of overwhelming aggression recover nothing".

His fifth rule was that it should not be forgotten there might be developments outside the NATO area which might exercise a permanent influence on the security of that area. "NATO must, therefore, always have an agreed policy for dealing with such developments as they occur, and must pursue that policy resolutely."

APPOINTMENTS AND TRANSFERS IN THE CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

- Mr. C. Roquet posted from the Canadian Embassy, Cairo, to Ottawa, effective June 20, 1957.
- Miss M. E. Kesslering posted from the Canadian Consulate General, New York, to Ottawa, effective June 28, 1957.
- Mr. A. J. Andrew posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Legation, Prague, effective July 1, 1957.
- Mr. F. Charpentier, MBE, posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Port-au-Prince, effective July 2, 1957.
- Mr. E. D. McGreer appointed Canadian Ambassador to Greece and Israel. Proceeded to Athens July 3, 1957.
- Mr. R. P. Gilbert appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective July 3, 1957.
- Miss J. E. Munro posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Consulate General, Seattle, effective July 4, 1957.
- Mr. G. B. Summers, Q.C., posted from the Canadian Legation, Prague, to Ottawa, effective July 5, 1957.
- Mr. J. M. G. Dery posted from the Canadian Embassy, Mexico, to Ottawa, effective July 6, 1957.
- Mr. E. W. T. Gill, Canadian High Commissioner in Pretoria, posted to Ottawa, effective July 10, 1957.
- Mr. E. R. Bellemare posted from the Canadian Embassy, Port-au-Prince, to Ottawa, effective July 15, 1957.
- Mr. O. A. Chistoff posted from the International Supervisory Commissions, Indochina, to Ottawa, effective July 16, 1957.
- Mr. G. K. Grande posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Military Mission, Berlin, effective July 17, 1957.
- Miss P. A. McDougall posted from the Canadian Embassy, Bonn, to Ottawa, effective July 17, 1957.
- Mr. J. W. Graham appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective July 19, 1957.
- Mr. J. A. Beesley posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Tel Aviv, effective July 20, 1957.
- Mr. J. R. McKinney posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Djakarta, effective July 29, 1957.
- Mr. J. D. Foote posted from the Canadian Consulate General, Seattle, to the Canadian Consulate General, Los Angeles, effective July 30, 1957.

Treaty Information Current Action

Bilateral

India

Exchange of Notes between Canada and India amending the agreement of January 26, 1951 concerning the entry to Canada, for permanent residence, of citizens of India.

Signed at New Delhi May 3, 1957.

Entered into force May 3, 1957.

Peru

Exchange of Notes between Canada and Peru amending the agreement of February 18, 1954 for air services between the two countries.

Signed at Lima April 25 and June 5, 1957.

Entered into force June 5, 1957.

South Africa

Exchange of Notes between Canada and the Union of South Africa amending the Trade Agreement of August 20, 1932 between the two countries by releasing the bound margin of preference of 10% ad valorem on iron and nickel electrodes imported for the manufacture of batteries for miners' safety lamps.

Signed at Ottawa June 20, 1957.

Entered into force June 20, 1957.

CURRENT UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS*

A Selected List

a) Printed Documents:

Official Records of the General Assembly. First emergency special session, 1-10 November 1956. Plenary meetings and annexes. 172 p.

Official Records of the General Assembly. Second emergency special session, 4-10 November 1956. Plenary meetings and annexes. 96 p.

Financial reports and accounts for the year ended 31 December 1956 and report of the board of auditors. A/3590. N.Y., 1957. 52 p. GAOR: 12th session, Supplement No. 6.

Report of the special committee on the problem of Hungary. A/3592. N.Y., 1957. 148 p. GAOR: 11th session, Supplement No. 18.

Resolutions of the twenty-third session of the Economic and Social Council (16 April - 2 May 1957). E/3009. N.Y., May 1957. 13 p. Ecosoc Official Records: 23rd session, Supplement No. 1.

Population Commission; report of the 9th session (25 Feb. - 8 March 1957). E/2957/Rev.1 E/CN.9/144/Rev.1. 17 p. Ecosoc Official Records: 23rd session, Supplement No. 4.

Report on the world social situation. E/CN.5/324/Rev.1; ST/SOA/33. N.Y., 1957. Prepared by the Bureau of Social Affairs, U.N. Secretariat, in co-operation with the ILO, the FAO, the UNESCO, and the WHO. Sales No: 1957.IV.3. Price: \$1.75. 198 p.

Non-Self-Governing Territories; summaries of information transmitted to the Secretary-General during 1956. ST/TRI/B.1956/8. N.Y., June 1957. 105 p.

Proceedings of the regional technical conference on water resources development in Asia and the Far East. Flood Control Series No. 9. SR/ECAFE/SER.F/9. Bangkok, 1956. Sales No: 1956.II.F.3. Price: \$4.50. 451 p.

UNESCO

Conference Manual. (Revised edition issued after the 9th session of the General Conference, New Delhi, 1956). Paris, 1957. 66 p.

Spain. Romanesque paintings. (Unesco World Art Series). Published by the New York Graphic Society by arrangement with Unesco. N.Y., 1957.

Scientific and technical translating and other aspects of the language problem. (Documentation and terminology of science). Paris, 1957. Price: \$4.00. 282 p.

World list of social science periodicals. Second edition, revised and enlarged. (Documentation in the social sciences). Paris, 1957. Price: \$3.00. 209 p. (bil.)

International bibliography of economics, Vol.IV. (Documentation in the social sciences). Paris, 1957. Price: \$10.00. 588 p. (bil.)

ICJ

Right of passage over Indian Territory. (Portugal v. India). Order of May 18, 1957. Sales

No: 162. 7 p. (bil.)

"Electricité de Beyrouth" Company Case (France v. Lebanon). Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents. Sales No: 160. 555 p. (bil.)

b) Mimeographed Document:

Social Commission. Report to the Economic and Social Council on the eleventh session of the Commission held in New York from 6 May 1957 to 24 May 1957. E/3008, E/CN.5/328. 29 May 1957. 47 p. Annexes I to V. (Final Report will be issued later in printed form as Supplement No. 9 to the Official Records of the Ecosoc.)

* Printed documents may be procured from the Canadian sales agents for United Nations Publications. The Ryerson Press, 299 Queen Street West, Toronto, and Periodica Inc., 5112 avenue Papineau, Montreal, or from their sub-agents: Book Room Limited, Chronicle Building, Halifax; McGill University Book Store, Montreal; University of Toronto Press and Book Store, Toronto; University of British Columbia Book Store, Vancouver; University of Montreal Book Store, Montreal; and Les Presses Universitaires, Laval, Quebec. Certain mimeographed document series are available by annual subscription. Further information can be obtained from Sales and Circulation Section, United Nations, New York. UNESCO publications can be obtained from their sales agents, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, and Periodica Inc., 5112 avenue Papineau, Montreal. All publications and documents may be consulted at certain designated libraries listed in "External Affairs", February 1954, p. 67.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



CANADA

September 1957

Vol. 9 No. 9

• EXTERNAL AFFAIRS is issued monthly in English and French by the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa. It provides reference material on Canada's external relations and reports on the current work and activities of the Department. Any material in this publication may be reproduced. Citation of EXTERNAL AFFAIRS as the source would be appreciated. Subscription rates: ONE DOLLAR per year (Students, FIFTY CENTS) post free. Remittances, payable to the Receiver General of Canada, should be sent to the Queen's Printer, Ottawa, Canada.

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Department of External Affairs
Ottawa, Canada

Malaya: New Nation in the Commonwealth

ANOTHER new nation has joined the Commonwealth. On August 31, the Federation of Malaya, whose British connection began with the establishment of a trading post at Penang in 1786, was granted its independence by the United Kingdom. The new Federation of States, whose official name is the Persekutuan Tanah Melayu, has an area of 50,690 square miles and a population of about 7,000,000.

The Head of State of the Federation, the Yang Di-Pertuan Agong, or Paramount Ruler, was elected by the Conference of Rulers on August 3. He is His Highness Tuanku Abdul Rahman Ibni Al-Marhum Tuanku Muhammad, GCMG, the Yang Di-Pertuan Besar (Head of State) of the state of Negeri Sembilan. A new Malayan cabinet was sworn in on September 1 headed by Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra. Queen Elizabeth II is recognized by the new state as Head of the Commonwealth.

Canada was represented at the independence day ceremonies in Kuala Lumpur, capital of the Federation, by Mr. J. M. Macdonnell, M.C., M.P., Minister without portfolio, who, during the ceremonies, presented several gifts to Malaya and announced others. The Canadian Government's gift to the Malayan Government is two writing desks and chairs for the members' writing room of the new Parliament building; a library of Canadiana was presented to the Malayan Department of External Affairs; and Mr. Macdonnell announced that the Canada Council had agreed to grant a \$2,000 scholarship to a Malayan scholar for graduate study at a Canadian university. Items of technical assistance under the Colombo Plan were also announced by the Canadian envoy.

Prime Minister's Statement

On August 26 Prime Minister Diefenbaker made the following statement:

In a few days the Federation of Malaya will have achieved independence and will take its place among the free nations of the world.

In Kuala Lumpur, the Honourable J. M. Macdonnell will personally convey the very warm wishes of the Government of Canada and of the Canadian people to the Government and people of Malaya as they embark upon a new future as a sovereign nation.

I am happy to say that from the date of its independence on August 31, Malaya will become a member of the Commonwealth. In company with the other Commonwealth Prime Ministers, I welcome this step and look forward with confidence to this new venture in statehood. We are justly proud of the record of the Commonwealth in making possible the orderly constitutional development of dependent territories. The addition of Malaya as a member will further increase the diversity of the Commonwealth, which draws together so many areas and peoples.

I would also like to pay tribute to the United Kingdom, whose enlightened and guiding hand has contributed in great measure to the attainment of Malayan independence and to her membership within the Commonwealth. Canada looks forward to cementing the most cordial relations with her new colleague.

Talk by Canada's Envoy

While in Malaya, Mr. Macdonnell recorded the following talk:

On August 31 Canada joins with the other Commonwealth countries in welcoming the independent Federation of Malaya to membership in this great association of free nations. The new country has a population of slightly less than half that of Canada and an area less than 1½ per cent of our size. It is a tropical area, whose southern tip lies only a few miles from the equator.

This relatively small nation, which lies on the other side of the world opposite Moosomin, Saskatchewan, will play an increasingly important part. It is still only partly developed. It is rich in rubber and tin. It is also rich in the diversity of its peoples, customs and religions. Its population descends from aborigines and from Malays, Indonesians, Indians, Chinese, and a few Europeans.

The country has a long history. The early inhabitants were Buddhists and Hindus, and Islam became established in the 13th century. European influence is relatively recent.

The constitutional development has been a complicated consolidation of unprotected, rival tribes and sultanates, through the establishment of Portuguese, Dutch and later British influence to a parliamentary and federal system, which today has many features similar to our own. The new Commonwealth member has attained complete autonomy by amicable agreement among the descendants of the early rulers, the elected Government of the Federation of Malaya, and Great Britain.

The attainment of independence has more than practical political significance. The cry "Merdeka", which means "freedom", led by the Federation's Chief Minister, is heard frequently in these days of celebrations. Listening to it, we can visualize some of the emotional excitement which is being generated.

Independence has been marked by celebrations, which start in Kuala Lumpur, the federal capital, and spread to every state, village and plantation. The central figure of British authority, the High Commissioner, Sir Donald MacGillivray, who played a large part in the creation of the new nation, has departed, closing an era. The new constitution has been proclaimed and the Head of State, the Yang Di Pertuan Agong, chosen from among the Malay rulers, has been installed. Special games and concerts followed. Fireworks and a lake pageant have been watched with joy and enthusiasm.

The creation of the new nation has not been easy, and responsible Malaysians know that the path ahead will be no easier. Recent hard won victories against vicious internal communist terrorism must be followed up and consolidated. This serious battle, which has been fought without fanfare for over nine years, is still continuing even though the country is gaining independence. It is being fomented by an unscrupulous minority, and the majority of the population are horrified at their excesses, which have extended to the worst type of intimidation and even murder.

Strenuous efforts to unite the different peoples here, in loyalty to the new nation, will continue, and outside the country the growing complexity of world affairs which affect all of us will face the new nation.

There is confidence in the ability of the new leaders to meet the challenges which face them.

Under the Colombo Plan, to which Canada is a party, and other schemes, a co-operative effort of development is taking shape. Australia helps the medical services, Japan is bringing modern fishing methods, Great Britain and New Zealand provide advanced education. Canada also is playing a modest part in this effort. We are providing training facilities for a few Malaysians and we send technical experts to Malaya. A Canadian Colombo Plan scientist, for instance, is now working in Kuala Lumpur studying ways of minimizing and preventing the effects of a serious rice disease. This project is an excellent example of the mutual benefits accruing from co-operation under the Colombo Plan. The reduction in rice disease has an effect on Malaya's rice production and our expert will return to Canada with scientific knowledge and a wealth of experience to be shared in both countries.

These and other forms of assistance which we may initiate in the future are undertaken only where a definite need which we can meet is demonstrated to us. We then thoroughly investigate the proposed project before a commitment to assist is made.

The patterns of co-operation will continue but the main task of creating a strong and free nation will be for the Malaysians themselves. Their entry into the Commonwealth and we hope soon to the United Nations as an independent partner with us is an act of faith in their own abilities and in our brotherhood. Canada wishes them well.

The Universal Postal Union

ON Wednesday, August 28, three armed men looted the mail car of a Canadian National Railways train near Woodstock, Ontario. This daring robbery, reminiscent of the "Wild West" of many years ago, probably caused only a small ripple of interest on Ottawa's Parliament Hill among some 300 delegates from 96 countries who are attending the fourteenth Congress of the Universal Postal Union. Yet, mail robberies were among the many thorny problems which eventually led to the formation of the Universal Postal Union in 1874.

It is with somewhat different problems involving the international transmission of mail that the representatives of the postal departments of their countries are concerning themselves during the Congress that opened August 14 and will continue until October 4.


That postcards and letters, periodicals and parcels can freely cross and re-cross international boundaries, even in times of war and political upheaval, is usually taken for granted. It was not always so.

Postal services began in the days of the Persian empire, when relays of horsemen each a day's march apart carried the emperor's messages at top speed from one post to another. The Macedonians developed a similar system. The Egyptians actually had airmail service-carrier pigeons. The Romans used fast horses for mail, and mules to transport goods and taxes collected in the provinces; it took a courier on horseback or in a light chariot 26 days to carry a message from Britain to Rome. The first "special delivery" mail was inaugurated by the Chinese emperors; they attached feathers to urgent letters. Medieval European kings had their own courier services for personal and government use.

Complex Mail Services

In the early days of the postal service, messages from private individuals had to be carried by couriers employed by the religious orders, the universities and the merchant guilds.

As the volume of private and personal mail grew, with the increase of international trade and communications, the invention of the printing press, and the spread of education, governments began to make their courier services available to individuals upon the payment of a fee. These fees soon became an important source of revenue. But as couriers were not always reliable (being often more interested in selling the goods they brought from abroad than in serving the governments or merchants who employed them) and as postal regulations varied so much from country to country, complicated bilateral treaties had to be enacted to facilitate the transmission of international mail. The fixing of postal rates was also a problem; fees were charged by the country in which the piece of mail originated, by each country through which it passed, and by the country in which it was received. Costs, weight rates and currencies varied from country to country. Mail that eventually reached its destination was often never read because, at that time, the recipient, not the sender, was required to pay postal charges and might refuse the letter if he could not afford the high fees.



AT POSTAL CONFERENCE

Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker, left, Sir Dudley Lumley, K.B.E., former Deputy Director General of the United Kingdom General Post Office, centre, and Mr. William Hamilton, Postmaster General of Canada, chat following the official opening of the Convention of the Universal Postal Union, being held in Ottawa.

The first step in the simplification of the postal service was taken by Great Britain in 1840 when the Victoria penny stamp was issued. Sir Rowland Hill had discovered that many people in England were defrauding the government by sending letters with code messages on the envelopes; the messages would be read and the letter refused without payment of the requisite fee. Sir Rowland worked out a plan for prepayment of mail by the sender at low, uniform rates, with a sticker on the envelope to serve as proof of payment. Other countries followed this example and the use of postage stamps spread to international mail.

The volume of international mail continued to increase; more treaties became necessary and by the second half of the 19th century only an expert could compute the correct postage and be sure that all postal regulations had been observed.

This complicated state of affairs led to the calling, at the behest of Montgomery Blair, Postmaster General of the United States, of a 15-nation conference in Paris in 1863 at which a code to simplify international postal formalities was drawn up. At about the same time, Heinrich von Stephan, head of the German postal service, outlined a plan for an international postal union.

Establishment of the Postal Union

In 1874 the Swiss Government invited representatives of 22 countries to a conference at Berne. The first international postal convention was adopted and the Postal Union was established. All the states of Europe, the United States, Asiatic Russia and Asiatic Turkey were charter members. Canada joined in 1878.

The men who met at Berne enunciated two main principles for the new Postal Union: First, that its activities must be strictly non-political and solely in the postal field; second, that its aim must be to make the world a "single postal territory for the reciprocal exchange of correspondence." The conventions of the Union bound the territories of all the contracting countries into a single postal area. This made possible the establishment of moderate uniform postage rates covering all classes of mail.

Accounting procedures were also simplified. The conference adopted the view that the furtherance of the international exchange of ideas and information was more important than the collection of tariffs; as a result, the settlement of postage accounts took on secondary importance. Henceforth, the despatching country kept the postage it charged and the country of destination kept the revenue from the reply, on the assumption that most letters call for answers and, in time, a balance is struck. The problem of payment for transit through intermediary countries was solved by an agreement that an annual lump sum would be paid by the despatching country to every transit country through which its mails passed. Each member also pledged itself to send all other members' mail by the best means of transportation, and members were thus given full and unrestricted use of the world's transportation facilities.

The Congress of the Universal Postal Union, meeting now in Ottawa for the first time and in North America for the second (a congress was held in Washington in 1897), is the supreme authority of the international body and has the power to amend the Convention of 1874. It meets every five years and is usually concerned with the arrangement of executive regulations between postal administrations. A 20-member executive and liaison committee, essentially an advisory and research group, meets annually to ensure the continuity of the Union's work between Congresses. The Union also has a permanent secretariat, the International Bureau, whose headquarters are at Berne.

Canadian Participation

Canada has been an active participant in the affairs of the Universal Postal Union since it became a member in 1878. In addition, Canada has special postal relations with other members of the Commonwealth of Nations, with members of the Postal Union of the Americas and Spain, and with France and the United States. These fall outside the strict provisions of the Universal Postal Union convention but are influenced by them. For example, letters (except those sent by airmail) pass from Canada to any place in the Commonwealth, to any country in the Postal Union of the Americas and Spain and to France at the same rate as if addressed to a point within Canada. Special bilateral conventions which recognize the unusual intimacy of business and social relations have been made between Canada and the United States.

Since 1948, the Universal Postal Union has been one of the ten specialized agencies of the United Nations.

Ottawa greeted delegates to the UPU's fourteenth congress by flying the flags of the 96 member states on Parliament Hill; and appropriately, by issuing two commemorative postage stamps, one of them depicting the symbol of the Union, the postal horn, and the other the Peace Tower of the Canadian Parliament Buildings.

Prime Minister's Welcome

Welcoming the delegates at the formal opening of the Congress on August 14, Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker said, "Your organization is one of the oldest of its kind in the world. It antedates both the United Nations and the League of Nations. There are 96 nations in the Universal Postal Union and I understand that your membership is the largest of any specialized agency. Your deliberations have not caught the newspaper headlines in the past and are not likely to do so now and in a way that is a good thing for it means quiet constructive work. The winds of the cold war have penetrated everywhere but have not disturbed the atmosphere of this Congress.



Walter J. Turnbull
Congress President

"I believe that one of the major steps to be taken to achieve international co-operation and understanding is in the creation and operation of committees engaged at the technical level. For in a specialized agency such as the Universal Postal Union the membership, having constructive work to do, forgets national considerations in the larger perspective of achieving the objects it has in mind.

"For postal purposes, all the member countries really form one country and thereby have created one world freed of artificial frontiers. As a result of this convention and of the work of the Universal Postal Union a thousand million pieces of mail cross national borders and political frontiers freely every year."

Canada's Deputy Postmaster General, Walter J. Turnbull, was elected President of the Congress in observance of the Union's custom that a postal representative of the host country be so honoured. Mr. Turnbull is also head of Canada's delegation to the Congress, which includes J. A. Boyle, J. N. Craig, Sarto Chartrand, W. C. McEachern and H. N. Pearl, all of the Post Office Department, and J. L. Delisle, of the Department of External Affairs.

How NATO Works

PREPARATIONS are now being made for the meeting next December of the North Atlantic Council at which ministers of the governments of the countries belonging to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will make their annual intensive examination of the collective defence effort of NATO and approve future plans.



Paul-Henri Spaak

Ministerial meetings of the NATO Council are held about twice a year and usually attract wide-spread attention. Little publicity has ever been given, however, to the way in which NATO carries on between these full-dress meetings. In fact, there is perhaps no international organization of such importance as NATO about whose day-to-day functions so little is known in Canada and the other member countries. As can be seen from the charts on pages 262 and 263, NATO is, in fact, a great co-operative enterprise of 15 nations, requiring continuing activity in many fields and dealing with many different aspects of international co-operation.

The Council

The North Atlantic Council is the supreme governing body of NATO and is composed of foreign ministers and, according to the agenda of the meeting, defence and finance ministers, assisted by senior civilian officials and ranking military officers. A foreign minister is President of the Council, the office rotating annually among member countries. As indicated above, ministerial sessions are held only about twice a year; between these meetings, however, the Council is in permanent session in Paris, where member governments are represented by permanent representatives, usually holding the rank of ambassador, (Mr. L. D. Wilgress is Permanent Representative of Canada to NATO).

The permanent representatives meet at least once a week at the Palais de Chaillot under the chairmanship of Paul-Henri Spaak, who early this year succeeded Lord Ismay as Vice-Chairman of the Council and Secretary-General of the Organization. On hand also, to provide both secretarial assistance and expert advice, are members of the international staff. The permanent representatives, armed with background information and recommendations prepared by the Council's subordinate bodies with the help of the staff, consider a widely assorted group of items. The business of a typical meeting may

include a variety of matters, such as reports on international developments of concern to NATO, the plans of the Organization's military bodies for future joint exercises, a suggested procedure for the preparation of correlated production programmes, or, perhaps, the budget of the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE).

As Secretary-General, Mr. Spaak directs the international staff in the NATO Secretariat. This staff is made up of a number of divisions dealing with the various aspects—production questions, economic and financial questions, political questions—of the Organization's work on the civilian side. It assists in the work of the various committees of the Council and provides a body of experts which can undertake special studies as required.

NATO and Peace*

Men being what they are, there are not innumerable ways of ensuring their peaceful coexistence. Fundamentally there are only two. The first involves the renunciation of violence and, as its necessary corollary, submission to arbitration. The second, far less desirable, seeks through a balance of forces to discourage violence, and where necessary, to ensure that violence does not go unpunished.

Between these two methods there is all the distance separating a civilized community from a barbarian society. In the former, right prevails over might; in the latter, might maintains what is claimed to be the right. Now these two methods, although contradictory, are, in our modern world, applied simultaneously by the same men, the first to govern relations between citizens of individual states, the second to govern relations between states. Such is the paradox of our time that we can, at one and the same time, be civilized at home and barbarous abroad. I must say however, in defence of our statesmen, that their barbarism is forced on them since it is limited to opposing the deliberate barbarism of others.

It is useless to deplore it. There was a time when such barbarism governed relations between individuals. That time is now long past. The world has improved in that respect. There is no reason why progress should not continue. And it is continuing. Before the war we had the League of Nations. Since the war we have had the United Nations. However disappointing these efforts towards establishing a universal rule of law may be, they do constitute steps along a road that is still long, no doubt, but that leads inevitably to the renunciation of violence and submission to arbitration.

We have not yet reached that point and one is always wrong to be "right" too soon. We must live with our time. We must be realistic, and reality demands to-day that we forget for the moment our dream of a world ordered like a state, in which reliance is placed on the wisdom of the courts for the settlement of disputes and on the existence of a police force for the enforcement of laws.

We must continue to be strong to live at peace, and to be strong we must unite. That is what the NATO countries have understood and done. They have taken up arms again in order to be strong. Now they are striving to unite, more and more each day, in order to add spiritual strength to the strength of arms. Peace reigns because of that. Without it, it would reign no longer. This will still be true, I fear, for some time to come.


—Paul-Henri Spaak.

*Reprinted with the permission of "The Fifteen Nations".


The Civilian Side

Subordinate to the Council are both civilian and military bodies. On the civilian side, (see chart on page 263), there are committees and working groups.

NATO CIVIL AND MILITARY ORGANIZATION MARCH 1957



PRINCIPAL COMMITTEES OF THE COUNCIL
MARCH 1957



to deal with such aspects of the Organization's work as the Annual Review of member countries' defence plans, the construction of fixed military installations for the common use of the NATO forces (called "infrastructure"), budgetary control, information and cultural activities, emergency planning, civil cooperation, and security. Some of these topics may be considered by a single committee, others by three or more, each with or without its specialized working group. Each committee is responsible to the Council and each has a group of experts in the international staff working with it. All meet in Paris. Generally speaking, the chairmen of these committees are drawn from the permanent delegations of the member countries in Paris, with secretaries and technical assistance provided by the international staff.

A number of committees composed of national experts in specific fields also meet frequently to discuss problems of a technical nature.

The Military Side

On the military side, the senior organ reporting to the Council is the Military Committee, composed of the chiefs of staff of the member countries. It normally meets when the Council meets in ministerial session in order to provide the Council with military advice and receive from the Council political guidance. It is also responsible for providing general policy guidance of a military nature to the Standing Group. The Standing Group is the permanent executive body of the Military Committee. It is located in Washington and is composed of the Chiefs of Staff (or their representatives) of the United States, the United Kingdom and France. The other members of NATO are in continuous association with the work of the Standing Group by means of the Military Representatives Committee, which is also located in Washington, and which consists of representatives of the national military authorities. Thus, between meetings of the Military Committee, top level military direction and co-ordination is provided by the Standing Group, and the interests of all the member countries are safeguarded by the Military Representatives Committee.

In order to provide close and continuous contact between the work of these military bodies, located in Washington, and the Council, meeting in Paris, there is a Standing Group Liaison Officer, located at the NATO Headquarters. He or his assistants attend all Council meetings and important committee meetings and are responsible for bringing the viewpoint of the Standing Group to the attention of the Council and of seeing that the Standing Group is, in turn, fully informed of the Council's deliberations.

Direct military command of the NATO forces is delegated to the supreme commanders, who are perhaps as well known to the public as the Council itself. The new Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) is General Lauris Norstad, United States Air Force, with headquarters at SHAPE, near Paris. He is responsible for the defence of northern, central, western and southern Europe (including Turkey) which, for this purpose, is divided into a number of subordinate naval, army and air commands. Admiral Jerauld Wright, United States Navy, is the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT), with headquarters at Norfolk, Virginia. He is responsible for the defence of the lines of communication across the Atlantic Ocean. The Channel Committee in London co-ordinates defence preparations in the narrow waters bordering France, Belgium, The Netherlands and the United

Kingdom. Under it is a Commander-in-Chief with headquarters at Portsmouth. For North America, which has no peacetime NATO commander, there is the Canada-U.S. Regional Planning Group, which has headquarters in Washington.

The Annual Review

Let us see how these various bodies on both the civilian and military sides work together on important problems with which the Organization has to deal in building up the defensive strength of the West. A good example is to be found in the process of the Annual Review of member countries defence plans, which provides the means whereby the organization as a whole can take stock of the progress made in the collective defence effort and, accordingly, make plans for the build-up of forces in future years.

Responsible under the Council for co-ordinating this work is the Annual Review Committee, one of the most active and important of the Council's subordinate bodies. In order to obtain the necessary information on the national defence plans, the international staff, under the guidance of the Annual Review Committee and in collaboration with the NATO military agencies, draws up a questionnaire for completion by member governments. At the same time, the supreme commanders take stock of the position of the forces under their command and prepare recommendations for changes in those forces designed to improve their effectiveness. When the replies of member governments to the questionnaire and the military recommendations have been received, the Annual Review Committee, the international staff and the NATO military agencies are in a position to examine the collective defence effort of NATO and to reconcile the military requirements with the national, political and economic capabilities.

In this process, various points of view are considered: national interests are represented in the Annual Review Committee; general political, economic and production considerations are contributed by the international staff; and military considerations are contributed by the Supreme Commands and the Standing Group. The results of this process of stock-taking and reconciliation in terms of recommended levels of forces for the NATO countries are embodied in a report which the Annual Review Committee prepares and the permanent representatives submit to the Council in ministerial session. The ministers in adopting decisions on this report also have before them the comments of the Military Committee. (At the ministerial session in December 1956 the Council considered the Report on the 1956 Annual Review and approved force goals for 1957, 1958 and 1959).

Infrastructure Programme

Another phase of the Organization's work which illustrates the way in which the various bodies work together is the "infrastructure" programme. The initial judge of NATO forces requirements for their common use in the way of fixed installations such as airfields, communications and radar facilities is the NATO commander concerned. These "infrastructure" requirements are therefore submitted in the first place by the supreme commanders to the Standing Group, which in turn reviews them in the context of overall NATO military planning. Consideration must also be given, however, to the technical

and financial aspects of these requirements in order to ensure that the airfields and other "infrastructure" projects are constructed as economically as possible and are within the financial means of the countries which are to pay for them.

The Infrastructure Committee of the Council, assisted by technical experts of the international staff, is responsible for screening the military recommendations from this point of view. Their conclusions are submitted to the Council where member governments, either through their permanent representatives or through their ministers, negotiate the proportions in which the cost of the agreed programme should be shared. An outstanding accomplishment of the Council at the ministerial session in 1953 was agreement on a three-year financial arrangement for "infrastructure" which enabled the Supreme Commanders to make their construction plans up to 1957. The actual expenditure of funds on these projects is subject to a system of close financial supervision for which the Infrastructure Payments and Progress Committee is responsible. This Committee arranges that member countries contribute to the cost of construction in proportion to the agreed formula and sees that these contributions are spent as they should be.

Non-Military Activity of NATO

The activity of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is not limited to purely military fields; NATO also forms a community of nations with a growing interest in non-military co-operation—that is political, economic and cultural co-operation.

In accordance with the recommendations of the Committee of Three approved at the ministerial session in December 1956, steps have been taken to ensure that greater attention be given to political consultations for the avoidance of serious differences among members and their rapid settlement should they arise. The principle of political consultation is not a new one for NATO, but the countries of the Atlantic Community had not previously asserted its necessity with as much force. According to the recommendations of the Committee of Three, governments of member states shall inform the Council of any event that might have serious consequences for NATO in order that a political consultation may take place before a decision is reached. This procedure represents considerable progress in the political field.

In 1957 a committee was set up to study problems that might affect the economic health of the Alliance. The activity of NATO in this field must take into account the work of the numerous international organizations in which the member states play a prominent part, and increased co-operation within these organizations and consultations within NATO itself will further the economic interests of the Atlantic Community.

In the fields of culture and information, NATO continues to make a great effort to promote exchanges and a deeper mutual knowledge among the people of the member states. Among other things, a programme of scholarships and fellowships has been set up and subsidies were granted for international seminars on NATO at Oxford University in 1956 and at Princeton University last June. Moreover, two conferences for leaders of youth movements were organized at the Palais de Chaillot and an expert in this field was added to the staff of NATO's Information Service. In addition, groups of parliamentarians from the countries of the Alliance meet periodically to discuss the problems of the Community and to propose solutions.

In the field of information, efforts are being continued by NATO and the member states to increase public knowledge about the Alliance by publicising its purposes, its activities, and accomplishments. Groups of visitors representing all levels of opinion are received at the Palais de Chaillot and annual tours for journalists enable representatives of the press to visit the NATO countries. Atlantic Treaty Associations have been founded in most of the member states. The Canadian Atlantic Co-ordinating Committee assists, through lectures and discussion groups, in making known the purposes of NATO and in spreading the concept of an Atlantic Community.

Canada's Contributions to NATO

The Canadian contribution to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization consists especially of an infantry brigade and an air division of twelve jet fighter squadrons stationed in Europe under the orders of SACEUR. In addition, more than forty units of the Royal Canadian Navy are placed under the control of SACLANT and participate in the protection of the North Atlantic area. As an indirect contribution, Canada trained, from the signing of the Treaty up to December 1956, 2,241 pilots and 2,237 navigators for certain member states of NATO. Canada has also provided members of the Alliance with military equipment. Among other things, Sabre V's were delivered to the Federal Republic of Germany and aircraft engines to Italy and Turkey, and the Government announced in August that it would provide Turkey in the coming months with ten escort vessels of the Bangor class. In all, Canada has contributed more than \$1,400,000,000 to the Mutual Aid Programme.

As a very important contribution to NATO, Canada guarantees, in close co-operation with the United States, the security of the North American area. Three radar networks, covering Canada from east to west, have been set up to warn headquarters in the event of an air attack and the Royal Canadian Air Force, jointly with the United States Air Force, protects Canada's Arctic frontier.

The many-sided work of NATO never ceases. The permanent representatives consult regularly in Paris, and, through civilian committees, carry on continuous deliberations. Military bodies function daily in varied places. At the Palais de Chaillot, the international staff representing all fifteen member nations carries out assiduously its daily work under the leadership of the Secretary-General. The total co-operative effort whereby like-minded nations adjust their viewpoints and requirements in order to achieve common objectives presents an excellent example of how complex international machinery can be made to function in a democratic alliance.

Proposals for Disarmament Agreement

AFTER nearly six months of intensive negotiation in London, the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission adjourned on September 6 and the question of disarmament is now before the General Assembly of the United Nations. Shortly before adjournment of the Sub-Committee, Canada joined with France, the United Kingdom and the United States in presenting to the Soviet Union proposals for a first stage disarmament agreement.*

In that connection Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker issued on August 29 the following statement of the Canadian position:

Today in London the Western Powers on the Sub-Committee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission—France, the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada—have presented to the Soviet Union proposals which we believe can provide the basis for an agreement on a first stage of disarmament. These proposals are the product of extensive consultations directed towards the design of a plan which could be given effect immediately, without political conditions, and so make a tangible contribution to world peace now by rendering more remote the danger of war.

Progress towards settlement of major political issues is a condition for moving toward the second and third stages since some steps toward solving the problems which can cause international conflicts are necessary before we and our allies can safely make extensive reductions in our defences. Nevertheless, reductions to the levels of 2.5 million for the United States and the Soviet Union and 750,000 for France and the United Kingdom, which are proposed for the first stage, would constitute a significant step towards disarmament.

During the first stage it is also proposed that these four powers place certain designated armaments under international supervision in depots within their own territories. We believe that this will be a valuable introduction to more extensive reductions in armaments envisaged in the second and third stages, when the arms retained would be related to the reduced manpower ceilings.

The proposals for nuclear disarmament provide for the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons except in defence against an armed attack. They further provide that the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes should cease, that transfers from weapon stockpiles to peaceful uses should be made and that there should be an effective inspection system to verify compliance with those commitments. The implementation of such proposals would first put a stop to the atomic armaments race and then reverse the trend by reducing the reserves of nuclear weapons.

Provision is also made for a time-table under which nuclear test explosions would, in the first instance, be suspended for a year. If satisfactory progress is being made towards arrangements to cut off production of fissionable materials for weapons, the suspension period would be extended for a further year. Thus the proposals treat suspension of tests as a matter for immediate action while keeping the problem in proper perspective, for the ending of tests cannot end the nuclear armaments race.

In order to ensure that all parties to the agreement are carrying out their obligations, and in order to diminish the dangers of surprise attack, the Western Powers have put forward a number of proposals regarding control and inspection. They would provide for systems to verify compliance with the suspension of nuclear tests and with the cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. They would also include provisions for aerial and ground inspection designed to assist in guarding against surprise attack. It is our belief that it is of the greatest importance to have in operation such systems of inspection if we are to ensure that under a disarmament treaty the nations will enjoy no less security than their present defences provide. Because of this belief the Canadian Government has agreed, if the Soviet Union will reciprocate, to the inclusion of either the whole or a part of Canada in an equitable system of aerial inspection and will do its utmost to ensure that the system works effectively. We consider that a useful start in providing safeguards against surprise attack could be made in the Arctic areas.

*The text of the Four Power proposals is given in External Affairs Supplementary Paper No. 57/11.

The Canadian Government is guided by the desire to find means for preventing war, since any war could provide the spark which would lead to nuclear conflagration. We consider that the proposals offer a realistic and practical basis for a first stage from which we could work with confidence toward more far-reaching measures. In preparing these proposals we have with our allies sought constantly to meet the legitimate interests and policies of the Soviet Union. We have made serious efforts to find terms on which immediate action can be taken because of our conviction that the passage of time makes the disarmament problem ever more intractable but that, if the Soviet Union displays a corresponding willingness to co-operate in the negotiations, significant and rewarding results are within our grasp.

INTERNATIONAL BALLISTIC MISSILE

Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker made the following statement
August 27, 1957:

The Soviet announcement of the successful testing of an intercontinental ballistic missile is another reminder to us all, whether we be private citizens or in positions of government responsibility, of the rapid development that science is making in engines of destruction. Whatever may be the degree of monopoly conferred on the Soviet Union by its success in this field, we may be sure that it will not long endure. Research into long-range rockets has been pressed forward elsewhere, and especially in the United States, during the past several years, and we can expect that the day is not far distant when the design of missiles which can reach virtually anywhere in the world will be widely understood.

Just as the development of nuclear weapons ushered in a new era in warfare twelve years ago, we must grasp the fact that when nations can produce intercontinental ballistic missiles in quantity yet another era will begin. That we are indeed on the point of entering that era is the sobering conclusion to be drawn from the Soviet announcement.

I devoutly hope that the first effect of this event will be redoubled sincerity and effort, on the part of all governments engaged in the negotiations for disarmament, in order to ensure that the passage of time does not bring to the problem of missiles the complications which delays in reaching agreement have introduced in the field of nuclear weapons. Every new mechanical instrument of destruction such as this underlines and re-emphasizes the urgent need for success in the negotiations of the Disarmament Subcommittee in London.

Arctic Explorer Honoured

THE city of Steinkjer in Norway has established a link with Canada that spans time as well as distance. It is a monument to Captain Otto Sverdrup, famous Arctic explorer, who gave his name to islands which he discovered in the Arctic seas and which are now part of the Queen Elizabeth Islands.

Another Arctic explorer, Superintendent Henry A. Larsen of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, himself Norwegian-born, represented the Canadian Government at a ceremony on July 21 during which His Royal Highness Crown Prince Olav of Norway, unveiled the monument. Some 10,000 spec-



EXPLORER HONOURED

Superintendent Henry A. Larsen, Canada's representative at the ceremony honouring Captain Otto Sverdrup, Arctic explorer, addresses guests following the unveiling of the memorial statue.

tators witnessed the ceremony, and addresses by the Crown Prince and by Supt. Larsen were broadcast throughout the country. Special guests included the Governor of the County of North Trøndelag, Mr. Asbjörn Lindboe; the Mayor of Steinkjer, Mr. Amunn Solberg; representatives of numerous Norwegian and foreign societies interested in Arctic exploration, and prominent figures of the local community.

"The names of Sverdrup and of Norway will ever be linked with that of Canada through the islands of the Canadian Arctic which bear his name and those of his Norwegian associates who were with him and assisted him in carrying out his expedition. This fact is one more link in the many which join both our countries in lasting bonds of esteem, friendship and affection", Supt. Larsen said.

Otto Sverdrup, one of several great polar navigators who brought fame to Norway at the turn of the century, was born in 1855 at Horstad Farm, Helgeland, near Steinkjer. He first went to sea in 1872; he accompanied Fridtjof Nansen on his overland journey across Greenland in 1888; and from 1893 to 1896 he was captain of the polar ship *Fram* on Nansen's famous attempt to reach the North Pole. In 1898, Sverdrup took the *Fram* on a second expedition, this time as leader, with the object of exploring in the north of Greenland. His vessel was ice-bound until 1902 but in the interval he discovered vast areas and explored new land west of Ellesmere Island to which he gave his name. This new land is now part of Canada's Queen Elizabeth Islands.

Canadian Contribution

When the city of Steinkjer began making preparations for its 1957 centenary celebrations, officials decided to erect a monument to the memory of Captain Sverdrup. As an expression of the gratitude and admiration of the Canadian people for Sverdrup's accomplishments and for the accuracy of his work in charting the Arctic islands, the Canadian Government contributed 10,000 kroner toward the construction of the monument. It is a bronze statue, slightly larger than life size, done by the well-known Norwegian sculptor Carl E. Paulsen, and depicts the explorer in a stance familiar to those who saw him as Captain of the *Fram* in the course of his many Arctic explorations. The statue stands in a small park in the centre of Steinkjer; a park surrounded by birches and pines and gay with many ornamental flower beds. Although Steinkjer was almost entirely destroyed by German incendiary bombs during the ill-fated campaign in Norway in April 1940, it has now been completely rebuilt in contemporary fashion.

The choice of Supt. Larsen as Canada's representative at the unveiling ceremony was appropriate because he had commanded the RCMP schooner *St. Roch* on a wartime voyage through the Northwest Passage and had taken part in Arctic explorations, thus following the footsteps of Sverdrup, Amundsen, Nansen and other Norwegian explorers.

ECOSOC: 24th Session

THE United Nations Economic and Social Council held its 24th session in Geneva from July 2 to August 2, 1957. (The Council's Co-Ordination Committee and the Technical Assistance Committee had both been convened one week earlier than the session). The Canadian Delegation was headed by Dr. R. A. MacKay, Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations in New York, and included as delegates Mr. M. H. Wershof, Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations in Geneva, Dr. G. F. Davidson, Deputy Minister of Welfare, Dr. O. J. Firestone, of the Department of Trade and Commerce, and Mr. S. Pollock, of the Department of Finance.

The Council considered an annual report on the UN Technical Assistance Programmes, and made a general review of the development and co-ordination of the economic, social, and human rights programmes of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies. While much attention was devoted to these questions, more controversy arose in connection with the annual survey of the world economic situation, the consideration of international commodity problems and the financing of economic development.

The main feature of the session was the adoption by the Council of a resolution urging the General Assembly to take the necessary steps for the establishment of the Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED), which has been under consideration by the Council since 1951. The United States, the United Kingdom and Canada voted against this resolution. While Canada has previously expressed its agreement in principle with the SUNFED proposal, it does not believe that its immediate establishment is likely to prove practicable as long as the main potential contributors, the United States and the United Kingdom, are unable to participate in it.

The U.S.S.R. Delegation introduced resolutions calling, among other things, (a) for a ten to fifteen per cent reduction in armaments so that the savings could serve the cause of economic development; (b) for a suspension of nuclear weapons tests; (c) for a study by the Secretary-General of the possibility of establishing new machinery for trade co-operation; and (d) for wider exchange of specialists in social development. The propaganda character of the first two of these resolutions was obvious, in view of the fact that the Disarmament Sub-Committee was then actively engaged in a discussion of these problems. The Council consequently rejected the resolution on nuclear tests and amended substantially the disarmament proposal by expressing the hope that efforts displayed by the UN Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee would be successful, thus freeing additional resources for economic development. Only the resolution on the exchange of specialists in social development, which actually introduced no radically new element in UN activities in this field, was endorsed by the Council. The resolution on trade co-operation was modified to suggest that the most urgent need was for a more effective use of the machinery already existing.

Other resolutions passed by the Council were concerned with the adoption of a proposal to celebrate in 1958 the tenth anniversary of the UN Declaration

of Human Rights, and a recommendation to extend the existence of the United Nations Refugee Fund for a period of five years as of January 1, 1959.

As at past sessions, the Canadian Delegation participated actively in discussion of all the important items. Dr. Davidson was chairman of the Co-ordination Committee.



OPENS SCIENTIFIC ASSEMBLY

Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker, who spoke in Toronto September 3, 1957 at the opening of the 11th general assembly of the International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics, is shown discussing the assembly programme with the President of the Union, Prof. K. R. Ramanathan, of India.

In his address, the Prime Minister devoted major attention to Canada's northern regions, now being opened to great development because of the advances in scientific methods of exploration and study. Mr. Diefenbaker said that Canada is one of the major Arctic powers, and that this country's Arctic territories may well play a paramount part in the developments of the future in this hemisphere.

GREAT ISSUES IN THE ANGLO-CANADIAN-AMERICAN COMMUNITY

An address by the Prime Minister of Canada, Mr. John G. Diefenbaker, M.P., at Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire, U.S.A., September 7, 1957.

This being the first occasion as Prime Minister that I have had to address an audience in the United States, I avail myself of the opportunity to discuss some phases of the relationship of Canada and the United States. I do so here, for the glory of Dartmouth College for almost two hundred years has been its tolerance and its pursuit of truth. Great issues have been debated in the history of this historic college which made the name of Daniel Webster a name to conjure with in the English-speaking world, and wherever else in the world freedom still lives.

A few weeks ago I was in London at the meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers and discussed with other members of the Commonwealth mutual problems which might be called "family problems". Here I shall discuss "neighbourly problems".

There will be full agreement among those present that the Anglo-Canadian-American Community constitutes a grand alliance for freedom, in partnership with others of the NATO family, in the defence of democracy against the Red Menace. This alliance has as its "built-in" stabilizers for unity a common tradition, a respect for the rights of man, an unswerving dedication to freedom. I believe with you that the maintenance of that unity is the only certain hope for the survival of freedom everywhere in the world.

Canada and the United States have grown up in separate ways. My country achieved its freedom and independence by evolution, not revolution—by its adherence to a limited monarchy within the Commonwealth of Nations, rather than through the establishment of a republic. The Commonwealth knows no written constitution or agreement—it is bound together by the aspirations of peoples in all parts of the globe who, while independent, are united in their dedication to freedom under the Queen as the symbol of their unity. Canada's status as an independent member of the Commonwealth and a constitutional monarchy will be emphasized when Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II opens Canada's Parliament on October 14 as the Queen of Canada.

Canada and the United States, as long ago as 1794 in a "Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation", undertook "to promote a disposition favourable to friendship and goodwill". While this undertaking has not at all times since been maintained, it is, and has been, of the essence of our relationship.

Partners in Defence

We are partners in defence—and we realize that the security of this continent cannot be assured without the closest co-operation between our two countries. To that end one of

the first acts of the new Canadian Government when it came into power this summer was to agree to the joint operational control of the air defence forces of Canada and the United States. This system embraces not only our two air forces, but the several radar warning lines which have been built by us jointly across this continent, and mainly through Canada. In so doing Canada does not in any way sacrifice her sovereignty over, or ownership of, these Arctic regions.

We have learned to trust one another. Neither has received aid from the other without payment. No hereditary animosities or ancestral fears remain to divide us. In Canada we know that if the United States since the last war had not assumed world leadership, the free world might not have survived. But we cannot take our relationship for granted. The former Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. L. B. Pearson) expressed the same sentiment a few years ago when he said "the era of easy and automatic good relations between Canada and the United States is over." That does not mean that an era of difficult or bad relations is beginning. It emphasizes the need for care being taken in attending to our relations and viewing each other's problems with common sense, frankness, absolute confidence and mutual trust.

The whole measure of warm friendship which has long existed between the United States and Canada, and the parallel interest of the two countries, enables us to speak to each other with a measure of forthrightness which is permitted to very few countries in the world. The candour with which we can communicate with each other strengthens our understanding of each other, and helps us to avoid the pitfalls of misunderstanding which have bedevilled relations of so many other countries in the world.

Economic Problems

May I now with the utmost frankness and goodwill, and in the interests of fullest understanding, deal with one or two economic matters that are causing unrest within my country. By doing so I emphasize that the Government of Canada has as its duty and responsibility to consider Canadian interests first. It is not now and will not be, anti-American. The Secretary of State of the United States, the Honourable John Foster Dulles, in evidence recently given before a Congressional Committee, said: "the purpose of the State Department . . . is to look out for the interests of the United States." The responsibility of the Canadian Government in like measure is to consider Canadian interests first. This should not be misinterpreted as being Anti-American.

Canada is numbered among the great trading countries of the world. While we are desirous of doing business with all nations, our trading world has become increasingly confined to the United States which takes sixty per cent of our exports and provides seventy-three per cent of our imports. A recent survey in the United States showed in graphic form that almost every American community of any size is selling something to Canada. It shows that Brooklyn sells more to Canada than Argentina does, that Louisville sells more to Canada than New Zealand does, that Chicago sells almost as much to Canada as does West Germany, and that Seattle sells almost as much to Canada as does Norway. Even in agricultural products, Canada buys a larger volume of American agricultural products, by some \$100,000,000, than Canada sells to the United States.

The value of United States exports to Canada is almost as much as that of its total sales to all Latin American countries. Canada is the United States' greatest customer and the United States is Canada's greatest customer. What you are buying from us is largely raw materials or semi or partially-manufactured materials, for the United States tariff system prohibits any major import of manufactured goods.

This concentration of trade in one channel contains inherent dangers for Canada. It makes the Canadian economy altogether too vulnerable to sudden changes in trading policy at Washington. Canadians do not wish to have their economic, any more than their political, affairs determined outside Canada.

Canada has always purchased more from the United States than the United States has purchased from Canada. This imbalance is now running to record proportions. In our commodity trade last year, Canada purchased from the United States goods to a value of \$1,298 millions more than the United States purchased from Canada. Thus far in 1957, the imbalance has increased, and if the present trend continues, 1957 will establish a new all-time record in imbalance in trade between the two countries.

Our trade with the United States is equivalent to 25 per cent of Canada's gross national product. On the other hand, it is the equivalent of less than 2 per cent of the gross national product of the United States. It is perhaps only natural, therefore, that Canadian-American trade should not make the same claim on the attention and consideration of the United States as it does on Canada.

A pressing concern in Canada is the question of the United States agricultural disposal programme, and in particular that of wheat and wheat flour, which has been more vigorous and more aggressive in the last two years, and which denies fair competition for markets. Canada's carry-over of wheat amounted to more than 700 million bushels this year. It is vital to Canada's economy that some 300 million bushels of wheat be exported every year.

Canada can compete for her share of the markets of the world, providing other nations follow recognized competitive practices. The share of the world market for wheat by the United States has been increasing in recent years by its policies of surplus disposal, and that increase has come about mainly at the expense of Canada's export trade, which has been decreasing. The surplus disposal legislation of the United States has made it difficult, if not impossible, for Canada to maintain its fair share of the world's market. Canada cannot compete for agricultural markets against the dominant economic power of the United States, with its export subsidies, barter deals and sales for foreign currency.

The free world faces not only the military, but the economic aggression of the U.S.S.R. Military alliances and joint co-ordination for defence are not enough. There must be economic co-operation, which in turn demands recognition by larger nations of the effect of their economic policies on smaller nations. Freedom cannot afford to allow any of the free nations to be weakened economically.

We are co-operating in defence measures—why not to a greater degree in economic matters? The joint United States-Canadian Cabinet Committee on Trade and Economic Questions will meet in Washington in early October, and Canadians hope that this matter can be resolved by mutual agreement which will provide for a fair and reasonable solution of the problem of the disposal of wheat and other agricultural surpluses.

One other matter deserves comment in the interests of clarification. Capital from the United States has played an important role in the development of Canadian resources. We welcome this investment and intend to continue to provide the best foreign investment climate in the world. The heavy influx of American investment has resulted in some 60 per cent of our main manufacturing industries, and a larger proportion of our mine and oil production, being owned and controlled by United States interests. In that investment what Canadians ask is that full account be taken of the interest of Canadians in the policies that are followed in the direction and use of that capital.

There would be no potential harm in external ownership as long as companies engaged in these industries are developed in Canada's interests, and their policies take account in their direction of the interests of Canadians.

There is an intangible sense of disquiet in Canada over the political implications of large-scale and continuing external ownership and control of Canadian industries. The question is being asked: "can a country have a meaningful independent existence in a situation where non-residents own an important part of that country's basic resources and industry, and are, therefore, in a position to make important decisions affecting the operation and development of the country's economy?" Canadians ask that American

companies investing in Canada should not regard Canada as an extension of the American market; that they should be incorporated as Canadian companies making available equity stock to Canadians. That there is cause for questioning seems clear when I tell you that it is estimated that of American-controlled firms operating in Canada not more than one in four offers stock to Canadians.

There are other problems but time denies reference to them. What I have said is not spoken in a spirit of truculence or of petition. My purpose is to have removed causes for disagreement which, unsolved, may diminish the spirit of understanding which is characteristic of our relationship. We in Canada and the United States are such close neighbours and have so much in common that it is hard to realize that we are bound to have some differences. We are united in the great cause of freedom and democracy. In our military alliance there is the closest co-operation between us. In the fundamental things of life we have no differences. Our comradeship knows no closer alliance in the world. Let it not be said that we cannot achieve a similar spirit of co-operation in economic affairs.

Joint Heritage of Freedom

The message I am trying to convey is epitomized by the words used by President Eisenhower in the Canadian House of Commons on November 14, 1953:

"More than friendship and partnership is signified in the relations between our countries. These relations that today enrich our people justify the faith of our fathers that

men, given self-government, can dwell at peace among themselves, progressive in the development of their material wealth, quick to join in the defence of their spiritual community, ready to arbitrate differences that may arise to divide them.

"Beyond the shadow of the atomic cloud, the horizon is bright with promise. No shadow can halt our advance together. For we, of Canada and the United States shall use carefully and wisely the God-given graces of faith and reason as we march toward it—toward the horizon of a world—where each man, each family, each nation lives at peace in a climate of freedom."

Our two countries, with Great Britain, have a joint heritage of freedom. We are united in our determination to preserve our heritage of spiritual values that are dearer than life itself. To preserve that steadfast and undiminished unity that saved us in war, our governments, our peoples, must give due regard at all times to the problems of each other with infinite respect, tolerance and consideration.

In the days ahead many grave decisions will face our peoples. In the last analysis, how Canadians and Americans and Britishers get along is a world test of "neighbourhood" in international relations.

In concord with the other free nations, the solidarity of Anglo-Canadian-American friendship is vital to the peace and well-being of the world and will provide the key to whether we succeed or fail in our great quest to maintain freedom for this and future generations.

THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY AWARDS

The Atlantic Treaty Association has announced a series of international awards for writings published in any of the 15 member countries of the Atlantic Alliance. These awards are intended to encourage the writing and publication of constructive literature of a high standard on all aspects of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Atlantic Community of Nations.

Prizes will be awarded in the field of journalism to the authors of the two best series or groups of articles published in daily or weekly newspapers or magazines between January 1 and December 31, 1957 "on the operation, problems or prospects of the Atlantic Alliance". The first prize will be £700 and the second £350. Prizes will also go to the authors and publishers of the two best books published between January 1, 1957 and November 15, 1958, "dealing with the defence of the Atlantic Community, its underlying principles and values and the development of political, military, economic, social or cultural co-operation within it". Both theoretical and practical studies are eligible. The first prize is £1400 and the second prize is £700, to be divided equally in each case between author and publisher.

The third category of award is for authors and publishers of the two best novels or books of short stories, published between January 1, 1957 and Nov-

ember 15, 1958, "dealing with problems of human understanding between two or more nations of the Atlantic Community, or between persons whose way of life is typical of that Community and persons of a different culture". The prizes (£1400 and £700) are to be divided between author and publisher.

The Canadian Atlantic Co-ordinating Committee, 230 Bloor St. West, Toronto 5, Ontario, is the Canadian member organization of the Atlantic Treaty Association and will offer substantial prizes for the best subject work in each class in Canada. The Committee will also constitute a national jury to judge the entries, designate the prize-winners and make the necessary regulations and announcements.

The published writings of the Canadian prize-winners will then be regarded as entries for the Atlantic Community Awards. The Council for the Atlantic Treaty Association will make these awards in accordance with the recommendations of international juries of distinguished persons of various Allied nationalities specially constituted for that purpose. The names will be announced before the end of the period set for each competition. All entries will be judged on their own merit without regard to the previous work of the author. However, the Council has indicated that it reserves the right to withhold any of the prizes if no work of outstanding merit is presented to the judges.

It is not necessary for authors to hold or express any particular point of view regarding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The judges will, however, bear in mind the ideas and recommendations expressed in the report of the Committee of Three Ministers approved by the North Atlantic Council at its meeting on December 13, 1956. Although published work submitted to a national jury can be in the language of any member country, the published works of the national prize-winners are to be presented to the international jury in either English or French, the two official languages of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The Canadian Atlantic Co-ordinating Committee will provide further detail and entry forms for these awards. Application may also be made to:—

The Secretary General,
The Atlantic Treaty Organization,
Benjamin Franklin House,
36 Craven Street,
London, W. C. 2.

APPOINTMENTS AND TRANSFERS IN THE CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

- Mr. P. Tremblay posted from the Delegation of Canada to the North Atlantic Council, Paris, to Ottawa, effective June 7, 1957.
- Mr. J. A. Irwin posted from duty with the International Civil Aviation Organization, Montreal, to Ottawa, effective June 30, 1957.
- Mr. W. K. Wardroper posted from the Canadian Consulate General, Los Angeles, to Ottawa, effective July 17, 1957.
- Mr. C. E. Chatillon posted from duty with the National Defence College, Kingston, to Ottawa, effective July 19, 1957.
- Mr. G. Mathieu posted from Ottawa to the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations, New York, effective July 29, 1957.
- Mr. H. B. Stewart, MBE, posted from the Canadian Embassy, Bonn, to Ottawa, effective July 29, 1957.
- Mr. C. J. Small posted from the University of Toronto (Language Studies), to Ottawa, effective July 29, 1957.
- Mr. J. D. M. Weld posted from the Canadian Consulate General, New York, to Ottawa, effective July 31, 1957.
- Mr. K. W. H. MacLellan posted from the Canadian Embassy, Berne, to Ottawa, effective August 2, 1957.
- Mr. L. H. LaVigne posted from the International Supervisory Commissions, Indochina, to the Canadian Embassy, Dublin. Departed Indochina August 5, 1957.
- Mr. E. H. Gilmour posted from Ottawa to the International Supervisory Commissions, Indochina, effective August 9, 1957.
- Mr. B. A. Keith posted from the Canadian Military Mission, Berlin, to Ottawa, effective August 12, 1957.
- Miss C. S. Weir posted from the Canadian Legation, Warsaw, to Ottawa, effective August 14, 1957.
- Mr. K. Goldschlag posted from the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, London, to Ottawa, effective August 14, 1957.
- Mr. F. M. Meech posted from Ottawa to the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Accra, effective August 14, 1957.
- Mr. W. St. L. Durdin posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Consulate General, New York, effective August 27, 1957.
- Mr. R. K. Henry posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Consulate General, New York, effective August 17, 1957.
- Mr. P. R. Duder posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Tokyo, effective August 18, 1957.
- Mr. J. Montpetit appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective August 19, 1957.
- The Hon. G. A. Drew appointed Canadian High Commissioner in the United Kingdom. Proceeded to London August 20, 1957.
- Mr. R. W. Murray posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, The Hague, effective August 20, 1957.
- Mr. P. A. Howard posted from the Canadian Embassy, Washington, to the Canadian Consulate General, New Orleans, effective August 26, 1957.
- Mr. G. F. Bruce posted from the Canadian Embassy, Tel Aviv, to Ottawa, effective August 27, 1957.
- Mr. J. E. M. Bryson posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Consulate General, Chicago, effective August 30, 1957.
- Mr. A. R. Potvin posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Montevideo, effective August 30, 1957.

CURRENT UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS*

A Selected List

Printed Documents:

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). Financial report and accounts for the year ended 31 December 1956 and report of the Board of Auditors. A/3591. N.Y., 1957. 51 p. GAOR: Twelfth Session, Supplement No. 6A.

Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization, 16 June 1956 - 15 June 1957. A/3594. N.Y., 1957. 139 p. GAOR: Twelfth Session, Supplement No. 1.

Budget estimates for the financial year 1958 and Information Annex. A/3600. N.Y., 1957. 82 p. GAOR: Twelfth Session, Supplement No. 5.

Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions. Fifth Report to the Twelfth Session of the General Assembly. A/3624. N.Y., 1957. 31 p. GAOR: Twelfth Session, Supplement No. 7.

Technical Assistance Committee. Annual Report of the Technical Assistance Board for 1956. E/2956, E/TAC/REP/97. N.Y., May 1957. 125 p. \$1.25. ECOSOC Official Records: Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 5.

World Economic Survey 1956. E/2982, ST/ECA/44. 271 p. \$3.00. Sales No.: 1957.II.C.1 (Dept. of Economic and Social Affairs).

New Sources of Energy and Economic Development. Solar energy. Tidal energy. Wind energy. Geothermic energy. Thermal energy of the seas. E/2997, ST/ECA/47. N.Y., May 1957. 150 p. \$1.25. Sales No.: 1957.II.B.1 (Dept. of Economic and Social Affairs).

Study of Inter-Latin-American trade. (Prepared by the Secretariat of the Economic Commission for Latin America). E/CN.12/369/Rev.1. N.Y., 1957. 313 p. \$3.00. Sales No.: 1956.II.G.3 (Dept. of Economic Affairs, 1957).

International Sugar Agreement of 1953 as amended by the Protocol opened for signature at London on 1 December 1956. E/CONF.22/8. 7 February 1957. 24 p.

Economic Commission for Europe, the first ten years 1947-1957. E/ECE/291. Geneva, 1957. Chapters I - XIV. Appendices A - H.

Non-Self-Governing Territories. Summaries of information transmitted to the Secretary-General during 1956.

a) *East African Territories*. ST/TRI/B.1956/2. N.Y., 15 July 1957. 61 p.

b) *Caribbean and Western Atlantic Territories*. ST/TRI/B.1956/6. N.Y., 1 July 1957. 131 p.

GATT

International Trade 1956. Geneva, June 1957. 278 p. \$2.00. Sales No.: GATT/1957-2.

ICJ

Case of certain Norwegian loans (France v. Norway). Judgment of July 6th, 1957. Reports of judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders. 1000 p. (bil.) Sales Number 163.

ILO

The prevention and suppression of dust in mining, tunnelling and quarrying. First International Report 1952-1954. Geneva, 1957. 374 p. (D.5. 1957).


Introduction to Work Study. Geneva, 1957. 349 p. \$3.50.

UNESCO

Handbook of the International Conference on Radio-Isotopes in Scientific Research, Paris, 9 - 20 September 1957. 68 p. (booklet).

International Yearbook of Education. Vol. XVIII, 1956. 463 p. \$3.50. Unesco, Paris/IBE, Geneva. Publication No. 180.

* Printed documents may be procured from the Canadian sales agents for United Nations Publications, The Ryerson Press, 299 Queen Street West, Toronto, and Periodica Inc., 5112 avenue Papineau, Montreal or from their sub-agents: Book Room Limited, Chronicle Building, Halifax; McGill University Book Store, Montreal; University of Toronto Press and Book Store, Toronto; University of British Columbia Book Store, Vancouver; University of Montreal Book Store, Montreal; and Les Presses Universitaires, Laval, Quebec. Certain mimeographed document series are available by annual subscription. Further information can be obtained from Sales and Circulation Section, United Nations, New York. UNESCO publications can be obtained from their sales agents, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, and Periodica Inc., 5112 avenue Papineau, Montreal. All publications and documents may be consulted at certain designated libraries listed in "External Affairs", February 1954, p. 67.



NEW CHANCERY OPENED

HRH Prince Bernhard of The Netherlands, centre, Mr. T. A. Stone, Canadian Ambassador to The Netherlands, left, and Mr. G. R. Pearkes, V.C., Canadian Minister of National Defence, leave the new Chancery of the Canadian Embassy, The Hague, after the official opening July 1, 1957.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



CANADA

October 1957
Vol. 9 No. 10

• EXTERNAL AFFAIRS is issued monthly in English and French by the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa. It provides reference material on Canada's external relations and reports on the current work and activities of the Department. Any material in this publication may be reproduced. Citation of EXTERNAL AFFAIRS as the source would be appreciated. Subscription rates: ONE DOLLAR per year (Students, FIFTY CENTS) post free. Remittances, payable to the Receiver General of Canada, should be sent to the Queen's Printer, Ottawa, Canada.

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Department of External Affairs
Ottawa, Canada

Prime Minister's Address to UN

Statement by Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker in the General Assembly of the United Nations, New York, on September 23, 1957.

MR. President, may I, not in a perfunctory manner, congratulate you on behalf of the Canadian Delegation on your election, and offer you our best wishes. Having known you throughout the years, I realize that the General Assembly's action was an expression of its faith in you as a man uniquely qualified for this high office by reason of your long and devoted service to the United Nations. At the same time, may I also pay the tribute of Canada to your predecessor, Prince Wan Waithayakon, who presided over a session of great length and stress with wisdom and skill.

In the last few months there has been a change of government in our country, but I hasten to assure the Assembly at once that, as in all democratic countries dedicated to peace, this does not mean that there has been any change whatsoever in fundamental international principles or attitudes. I say that because I have been asked on a number of occasions where Canada now stands with regard to the United Nations. My appearance here gives public evidence of Canada's stand. Indeed, it is the first time in twelve years that a Prime Minister has been present with our Foreign Minister, which is evidence of the fact that we stand on this question now where Canada has always stood since April 1945, and, I emphasize this, with the support of the party which is now in power. So far as Canada is concerned, support of the United Nations is the cornerstone of its foreign policy. We believe that the United Nations will grow stronger because it represents the inevitable struggle of countries to find order in their relationships and the deep longing of mankind to strive for and attain peace and justice.

We believe, too, that countries like Canada, acting in consultation with other friendly nations, can exert an influence far stronger than would be possible outside the United Nations. Indeed, our views of the value of this organization are epitomized by the Secretary-General in the introduction to his annual report for 1956-57, in which he stated: "If properly used, the United Nations can serve the diplomacy of reconciliation better than other instruments available to the member states. All the varied interests and aspirations of the world meet in its precincts upon the common ground of the Charter."

The Commonwealth

Canadians have a special pleasure, too, in welcoming Malaya, the newest member of the Commonwealth, as a member of the United Nations. Last year another member of the Commonwealth, Ghana, was elected to membership. We believe that the emergence of these new nations is an indication of growth and expansion of the concept of self-government and of the manner in which nations, one after another, attain independence but still remain members of that association of free nations which is known as the Commonwealth, which represents many different areas, colours and cultures, which has no rules or regulations and no constitution, which is a unity forged by the sharing of a heritage of common ideals and a love of freedom under law.

Over the last years, hundreds of millions of people in Asia and Africa have achieved independence and sovereignty, for which the credit must go to the statesmen of the United Kingdom. It is incredible that the British should be described here on occasion as "imperial and colonial masters", in view of this far-seeing policy which grants self-government so widely, and I am confident that our friends from Ghana and Malaya would be glad to invite comparison with what has happened to Hungary and to many other freedom-loving nations which have been subjugated by the U.S.S.R. in the past four decades.

Relations with United States

But our membership in the Commonwealth, while fundamental to our destiny, does not detract in any way from the closeness and neighbourliness of our relationships with the United States. We are joined with our neighbours in the United States by what I have called before our "built-in stabilizers" for unity, our traditional respect for the rights of man and our unswerving dedication to freedom. I think it is clearly established and is irrefutable that, if the United States was aggressive and sought territorial advantage and fomented war, as its enemies contend, Canada would not have maintained its existence as an independent nation.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Then there is another phase of our policy—Canada's membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which in our opinion constitutes a major bulwark against the forces of aggression and to which Canada will adhere regardless of threats from whatever source they may emanate.

If the notes delivered by the U.S.S.R. since July 4 to our friends in the Federal Republic of Germany, Turkey, the United Kingdom, France and Norway are indicative of any new trend in Soviet policy, then in our opinion there is more need today than ever before for the maintenance of the unity of NATO. The repetition of spurious propaganda by the U.S.S.R. that the existence of NATO is a threat to world peace and that the existence of NATO is the reason why permanent peace has not been established is a travesty of reason. Canada wants peace, and if NATO had aggressive designs anywhere in the world Canada would not remain a member of that organization. Believing as we do, we intend to continue to support it with all the power at our command.

Disarmament

Now I intend to say a few words with regard to the question of disarmament, because it is a matter of first importance to this Assembly. After nine years of stalemate after San Francisco, in 1954 Canada joined in co-sponsoring resolutions to get resolutions on disarmament before the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations. If that was necessary then, it is more necessary today, when the total amount being expended for war materials for defence, mobilization and manpower totals some \$85 billion per year.

What mankind fears today more than anything else is that war will come about suddenly and precipitately, without warning and without there being any opportunity for defence. The whole question of surprise attack is of pre-eminent importance to people everywhere in the world. Until the Second

World War took place, a surprise attack was almost impossible. No nation could conceal the mobilization of its forces, but today, when a nuclear attack could be mounted in a few hours and secrecy maintained until the atomic bombers appeared on the radar screens, the danger of a secret and surprise attack is one of the things that all mankind fears. And the danger of a secret and surprise attack has been multiplied with the potential development of the intercontinental ballistic missile.

The fear of surprise attack is the cause of the major tension of these days. For that reason there is a sombre urgency about the work of this General Assembly. Experience has taught us that no country ever possesses a monopoly of any device. What one country has today, the other nations will have tomorrow, and the day is not far distant, if this continues, when there will be armouries of these rockets. While a few years ago a new era was introduced by the development of nuclear weapons, today an even more frightening and awful time faces mankind. That is why I say that it is a matter of sombre urgency that this Assembly should act, and act effectively, if we are to bring about the control of the use of this dread menace, the ultimate engine of destruction.

While it is only the great powers that can afford the vast expense to build these earth-spanning missiles, small nations are concerned. Canada is vitally concerned, for we are the closest neighbour of the United States and the U.S.S.R. Our strategic position in the world, embracing as it does the Arctic area in which Canada owns and exercises sovereignty over great areas, makes Canada one of the most vulnerable nations in any future war.

I do not intend today to deal in any detail with the terms of the disarmament proposals that were put before the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission by the four Western powers, but I feel it well to refer for but a moment to the question of suspension of tests of nuclear and atomic weapons.

The suspension as provided for in the Western proposals would be for a year, conditional on a convention on disarmament being entered into, and this would be renewable for a second year if satisfactory progress had been made towards a cessation of the production of nuclear weapons. But there are well-intentioned people—many people—who believe that a ban on atomic tests is a panacea for all the ills of mankind. In all the clamour there has been over this, some have lost sight of the fact that the suspension of tests is not going to stop the stockpiling of nuclear weapons or the atomic armaments race. The only way to do this is to divert fissionable material from the manufacture of weapons to peaceful uses, and the Western proposals very sensibly linked an agreement to do this with a continuation of the suspension of the tests.

While treating the suspension of nuclear tests as a matter for immediate action, the 11-point Western proposals made such suspension dependent on the establishment of nuclear watching posts in the territories agreed on of the United States, the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R. and other countries. It must be admitted too that the need for inspection is not fully understood by many well-meaning people, largely because of a popular view that atomic or hydrogen explosions can be detected anywhere in the world. According to the scientific opinions that I have had, that is not so.

As far as we are concerned in North America, the danger of surprise attack on or from North America would be through the Arctic regions. Canada and the United States have no aggressive designs against the U.S.S.R. or any other nation. We have nothing to fear from inspection of the Arctic regions and I speak now for Canada when I say that. We unequivocally render and will continue to render available for inspection all our northern and Arctic areas.

In addition to inspection, the other Western proposals also included in the first stage a limitation on the size of armed forces; a ban on the use of nuclear weapons except in the case of defence; and "international supervision" to ensure that the production of fissionable materials should be for peaceful uses only.

We believe that these proposals are eminently fair and workable, but for some reason the U.S.S.R. has cavalierly and contemptuously refused to consider them seriously. Surely they must realize that in the climate of distrust and fear which exists paper declarations, however pious their purpose, are not acceptable and that a prerequisite to disarmament must be an adequate system of inspection and control. The promise to disarm and to control the use and production of nuclear weapons without effective inspection to ensure that the promise is kept makes a caricature of reality.

We believe that disarmament unsupervised by inspection will be dangerous to those nations which have the habit of keeping their pledged word.

Believing that inspection is of the essence, I issued at the time of submission of the Western proposals a statement including the following:

"... The Canadian Government has agreed, if the U.S.S.R. will reciprocate, to the inclusion of either the whole or a part of Canada in an equitable system of aerial inspection and will do its utmost to ensure that the system works effectively. We consider that a useful start in providing safeguards against surprise attack could be made in the Arctic areas."

On the other hand, the U.S.S.R. has produced a multitude of propaganda plans for disarmament but always on its terms and always on the basis that effective inspection is out of the question. It generates hope in mankind; it refuses on its part, though, to co-operate in any way except on its terms.

The Western nations have gone more than half-way on the subject of disarmament from the beginning of the meetings of the Sub-Committee. For some reason the Soviets have refused to give any ground and insist on its programme. And I say with all the sincerity that I can bring to my words that we in Canada, in the strategic position in which we are, are willing to go to the utmost limit of safety and survival to bring about disarmament. What value is there in the undertaking of the Soviets not to use atomic or hydrogen weapons for a period of five years unless full inspection is possible and provided for?

Disarmament proposals without inspection are, in our opinion, meaningless. Inspection is the key, and I ask this simple question because I think the proposition is as simple as this. I ask the representative of the U.S.S.R.: Why do you oppose effective inspection? If you have nothing to hide, why hide it? I think in general that that represents the thinking of free men everywhere.

There were hopes expressed in the month of June last and earlier that the disarmament talks would be effective. They ended without agreement, but they did not entirely fail. The positions of both sides were brought closer. I think that that Sub-Committee must continue to operate. There have been suggestions that the Sub-Committee membership should be broadened. We would be in accord with any suggestions that its membership be broadened providing that that step would lead or even give hopes of leading to a quicker and better solution of this grave problem. And we go further than that. Canada is prepared to withdraw from the Sub-Committee. It has worked on it from the beginning. It will do anything at all, take any stand whatever short of its safety and its survival in order to bring about what must come if mankind is to continue to live—and that is a measure, and a considerable measure, of disarmament.

We consider that a salutary effect might be achieved by adding other powers; they may be capable of rendering assistance with the processes of seeking agreement that we have not been able to achieve. But let me say this: That geography alone should not be the basis for choosing additional members, for all members are not equally equipped to contribute towards the agreement for which we all devoutly hope. We recognize the anomalies of our own status as a permanent member of this Sub-Committee. We know that, because of the fact that we are unable to produce, we have not stood on equal terms with the other members, for we lack that responsibility and direct interest which should be of the essence of membership. I will say no more of that.

United Nations Emergency Force

I do want to say something, however, in connection with one other matter that is of vital importance today—the United Nations Emergency Force. UNEF has had a stabilizing and tranquillizing influence in the Middle East. I am not a newly convinced convert to such a force, for I brought the suggestion for it before the House of Commons of Canada in January of 1956. I argued at that time that such a force could prevent the outbreak of war in the area in question, which today is served by that Force.

The Canadian Government is naturally deeply gratified that UNEF has had so large a measure of success in its endeavours, and Canada is willing to continue its contribution as long as it is considered necessary by the United Nations.

Canadians have a special pride in the fact that a Canadian, General Burns, has done his duty in so superb a manner as to have earned the approval and praise of the most objective of observers. He has done his work at personal sacrifice. My hope is that he will be able to continue to serve as commander even though his own personal interests, which he has always placed in the background, might otherwise dictate.

Canada is not unaware of the fact that Canadian troops make up some 1,200 of the total personnel of 6,000. I repeat what I said a moment ago: Canada will continue to be a strong supporter of the continuance of UNEF until its work is done.

We then come to the question of expenditures. The question of providing the necessary monies for the continuance of the Force suggests that an assess-

ment among all nations of the United Nations would be in keeping with the service to peace to which this Force has contributed so much and with the declarations of the Charter of San Francisco.

I go further and say that out of the experience of UNEF it should be possible to evolve a system by which the United Nations will have at its disposal appropriate forces for similar services where ever they may be required. The creation of UNEF has provided a pilot project, if I may use that expression, for a permanent international force. Malignant diseases, however, are not cured by tranquillizers, and for that reason I still hold the view that only by the establishment of a permanent United Nations force—and I realize the uncertain and faltering steps that must be taken to achieve this—can many of the hopes of San Francisco be achieved.

United Nations Must Succeed

I now wish to comment on the United Nations itself. I was present in a humble capacity at San Francisco in 1945. I believe in the United Nations, not because it has always succeeded but because it must succeed; it must go on from strength to strength or we perish. But that does not mean that bringing before the Assembly weaknesses now shows any desire to undermine or corrode it. I believe that we do not serve its high purposes by pretending that all is well when it is clear to everyone that all is not well. I do not take the cynical view that the United Nations is a failure. There have been many successes in its endeavours to keep the peace. But the major question today is whether we have had enough success for the terrifying needs of this age. We have had successes and we have had failures, but it is questionable whether, under the shadow of the dread menace of the latest nuclear weapons, we can afford any more major failures.

I spoke of the work of the last session. Much solid work was done at that session, and many new members deployed their forces in the cause of peace. But the United Nations found itself incapable of finding a solution to the Hungarian question. That was not because of the Charter; that was in spite of the Charter. The ineffectiveness of the action taken last year by the Assembly to assure justice to the Hungarians arose because of the existence of double standards in the United Nations membership rather than from any weakness in the Charter. But there are no double standards provided for in the Charter. Double standards are found not in the Charter but in the performance of some of its members. Some abide by the decisions; others do not. And there is no use in pretending that in all cases we, through the United Nations, can force recalcitrant members to behave as the Charter dictates. It is equally foolish to believe that we would have such power if the Charter were amended.

I believe that if the United Nations is to maintain its capacity to exercise an ameliorating influence on the problems of mankind it must be a flexible instrument. The United Nations must not become frozen by the creation of hostile blocs, which will have the result of stultifying efforts to find real and sensible solutions. There has been at the present session, I think, quite a movement against the bloc system, particularly in the votes that are being cast. It is healthy that member states should group together on a basis of common interest, consult with one another and, at times, adopt common policies. That is common sense. With an expanding membership, there is much to be said for

like-minded nations adopting like-minded positions and putting them forward, provided that the groups do not become blocs which would strangle the independent thinking of their members and prevent the solution of problems on considerations of merit. For blocs tend to create counter-blocs and, in the end, defeat their purposes.

I am not accusing any bloc. But it is a fact that new groups have been formed in the United Nations which are perhaps the inevitable result of older blocs that were created earlier.

As far as Canada is concerned, it is the firm determination of my delegation to resist the trend towards bloc development. Canada is a party to many associations, all of which we value highly—with our colleagues in the Commonwealth, with our allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, with our neighbours in the Americas and across the Pacific. We shall work together with these nations when we share common views or policies. But we will not be a party in any way to any bloc which prevents us from judging issues on their merits as we see them.

In conclusion, I profess the profound hope that we in the United Nations will dedicate ourselves anew to the high purposes and hopes of twelve years ago.

The United Nations will be true to the principles of the Charter when every nation, however powerful, does not permit itself the luxury of violating its principles or flouting its decisions. I remember as yesterday the inscription over the doorway to the hall at San Francisco where the United Nations had its beginning: "This monument eloquent of hopes realized and dreams come true", which mankind hoped would be the achievement of its supreme task—the establishment of a just and lasting peace. That is still the responsibility of the United Nations. Past failures or frustrations or cynicism must not be permitted to impede us in bringing about disarmament and an end to the suicidal armaments race. Past Assemblies have earned names descriptive of their major activities. There was the "Palestine Assembly", the "Korean Assembly". Mankind would breathe easier if this Assembly might be known in future years as the "Disarmament Assembly".

Commonwealth Finance Ministers' Conference

GENERAL agreement that a Commonwealth Trade and Economic Conference should be held in 1958 was reached at a meeting of Commonwealth finance ministers held at Mont Tremblant, Que., from September 28 to October 1.

Fourteen delegates of ministerial rank, representing 11 Commonwealth countries, took part in the discussions, and will recommend to their governments that a full-scale Commonwealth conference be held at a convenient place and time next year.

The ministers attending were as follows: Australia, Sir Arthur Fadden, KCMG, Deputy Prime Minister and Treasurer; Ceylon, Mr. Stanley de Zoysa, Minister of Finance; Ghana, Mr. K. A. Gbedemah, Minister of Finance; India, Shri T. T. Krishnamachari, Minister of Finance; Federation of Malaya, Sir Henry Hau Shik Lee, CBE, Minister of Finance; New Zealand, Mr. T. L. Macdonald, Minister of External Affairs; Pakistan, Mr. Syed Amjad Ali, Minister of Finance; Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Mr. D. Macintyre, CBE, Minister of Finance; Union of South Africa, Mr. J. F. Naude, Minister of Finance; United Kingdom, Mr. Peter Thorneycroft, Chancellor of the Exchequer; Sir David Eccles, KCVO, President of the Board of Trade; Mr. Reginald Maudling, Paymaster-General; Canada, Mr. Donald Fleming, Minister of Finance; Mr. Gordon Churchill, Minister of Trade and Commerce.

Address of Welcome

Delegates to the conference were welcomed by Mr. Fleming, who said, in part:


In the name of the Canadian people and the Canadian Government I greet all the visiting ministers and delegations and bid them a very warm welcome to Canada and to this Commonwealth Finance Ministers' Conference.

In the eyes of Canadians this is a very significant occasion. Although it has been the custom for some years to hold a conference of the finance ministers of the Commonwealth countries in Washington at the conclusion of the annual meetings of the International Bank and the International Monetary Fund, this is the first time that such a meeting has been held in Canada.

We feel highly honoured by the acceptance by all Commonwealth countries of our invitation to attend this Conference. Of the eleven countries ten are represented by their Ministers of Finance, and New Zealand by its Minister of External Affairs. In addition to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the United Kingdom has sent the President of the Board of Trade and the Paymaster General. I am happy to share the representation of Canada with my esteemed colleague, the Minister of Trade and Commerce. The number of Commonwealth countries is growing, and we are particularly happy to welcome the representatives of the newest self-governing nations of the Commonwealth, Ghana and Malaya.

I feel I am in distinguished company. With the exception of my colleagues from Ghana and Malaya, I am, as I said in Washington last Tuesday, "the newest recruit to that group of virtuous men commonly called ministers of finance who, in due course, become round-shouldered from bearing many burdens and taking responsibility for everything that goes wrong at home and abroad." The senior Minister of Finance among us is the Rt. Hon. Sir Arthur Fadden, Minister of Finance for Australia, who has a remarkable record of survival. He has introduced ten budgets in a post in which the political mortality rate is proverbially high.

The Conference today, in keeping with the practice of other years at such meetings, will devote its attention to consideration of the review by the Chancellor of the Exchequer



COMMONWEALTH FINANCE MINISTERS' CONFERENCE

Delegates of ministerial rank at the Conference of Commonwealth finance ministers held September 28 - October 1 at Mont Tremblant, Que., were, left to right above:

Front row: Syed Amjad Ali, Minister of Finance (Pakistan); Mr. J. F. Naude, Minister of Finance (Union of South Africa); Mr. Peter Thorneycroft, Chancellor of the Exchequer (United Kingdom); Mr. Donald M. Fleming, Minister of Finance (Canada); Conference Chairman; Sir Arthur Fadden, KCMG, Deputy Prime Minister and Treasurer (Australia); Shri T. T. Krishnamachari, Minister of Finance (India); Sir David Eccles, KCVO, President of the Board of Trade (United Kingdom).

Back row: Mr. D. Macintyre, CBE, Minister of Finance (Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland); Mr. T. L. Macdonald, Minister of External Affairs (New Zealand); Mr. Stanley de Zoysa, Minister of Finance (Ceylon); Mr. Gordon Churchill, Minister of Trade and Commerce (Canada); Mr. Reginald Maudling, Paymaster - General (United Kingdom); Mr. K. A. Gbedemah, Minister of Finance (Ghana); Sir Henry Hau Shik Lee, CBE, Minister of Finance (Federation of Malaya).

of economic questions and the proposed free trade area. On Monday the Conference will commence its consideration of the Canadian proposals for expanding trade and economic relations within the Commonwealth.

Why has Canada asked the Commonwealth finance ministers to meet on Canadian soil? Why have we very earnestly submitted to this Conference proposals for expanding trade and economic relations among the Commonwealth countries? Fundamentally, it is because we believe in the Commonwealth and its destiny.

We survey the Commonwealth's growth and development, its history of constructive achievement, its contribution to peace, freedom, goodwill, friendliness, decency, stability and good faith in the world. I say to you that Canada is proud to be a member of this Commonwealth.

We recognize also that the Commonwealth has brought great advantages to Canada and to the world. Undoubtedly it has similarly brought advantages to every other country within its family circle. We all derive important benefits from our membership in it—mutual assistance, trade and economic advantages and other benefits which can be measured only in terms of the spirit of man. The stature of each in the world and in the councils of the nations has been enhanced by its membership in the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth link subtracts nothing from the complete independence which each of our countries cherishes; it asks us to sacrifice nothing of the individuality of each country. The remarkable fact is that somehow the Commonwealth seems to thrive on diversity. Our membership means not freedom *minus* something, but freedom *plus* something. Without subtracting anything from the importance of the other great international organizations of our time the Commonwealth attachment is in the view of those for whom I speak infinitely precious.

Why do we ask the Conference to discuss trade and economic relations? The Commonwealth countries are widely scattered across the face of the globe. Their material interests are often widely different, sometimes even divergent. Formidable difficulties beset our path. Canada is the only country represented here which is not on the sterling system. Facing some or all of the countries represented here are problems of exchange, trade imbalances, balance of payment difficulties, trade restrictions, and shortage of capital for essential development needs. Yet we Canadians believe that this family can do more than is yet being done to expand its common and mutual trade and economic interests and by joint action increase the mutual benefits it offers to its members; and that is what we propose very seriously to endeavour to do.

One of the advantages of being a member of a family is that we can talk frankly to each other. Let us talk to each other in just that way, as we devote our efforts to serving the goal and purpose of making our Commonwealth attachment more significant and beneficial to all.

If this Conference contributes to strengthening and fructifying the Commonwealth I believe it will have contributed worthily to the noble causes of freedom, peace, prosperity and goodwill in the world.

The Communiqué

The following communiqué was issued at the close of the discussions:

The meeting of Commonwealth finance ministers at Mont Tremblant ended today. The ministers welcomed the presence for the first time of two new members, the Finance Ministers of Ghana and the Federation of Malaya. The meetings were held in an atmosphere of cordiality and understanding.

The following are the agreed conclusions on the three questions that were discussed:

1. *The Pound Sterling*

A strong pound sterling is vital to the stability and economic progress not only of the Sterling Area and its individual members, but also of the world trading community as a whole. At this meeting the ministers warmly supported the recent statements on sterling made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in London and Washington, and recognized that its strength depends upon the joint and individual policies of the members of the Sterling Area. Essentially this involves each member country living within its available resources. This does not—and should not—imply a static policy, for the resources of each country can be augmented by suitable policies directed towards strengthening its competitive position, increasing its savings, and promoting freer and expanding trade and payments and a larger flow of international capital.

2. *European Economic Integration*

The ministers reviewed the progress made towards the ratification of the Treaty of Rome, establishing the European Economic Community, and the effect of this Treaty on the interests of the Commonwealth. They noted that the Treaty would receive consideration in international organizations.

United Kingdom Ministers reported on the progress made following the United Kingdom initiative for the establishment of a Free Trade Area in Europe. The Commonwealth Ministers recognized that the establishment of an outward-looking Free Trade Area in Europe would broaden the advantages to be derived from economic integration in Europe, not only by the United Kingdom but by all the other participants. This was regarded as important as it could contribute to agreed Commonwealth policies of expanding world trade.

It was also agreed that there is need for effective machinery for continuous consultation among Commonwealth countries on matters related to the European economic Community and the proposed Free Trade Area.

United Kingdom Ministers reaffirmed the undertakings previously given by their Government about the safeguarding of Commonwealth interests in the United Kingdom market for foodstuffs, drink and tobacco.

3. *Commonwealth Trade and Economic Conference*

The ministers approved the proposal of the Canadian Government that a Commonwealth Trade and Economic Conference should be held at a convenient place and time in 1958 and agreed to recommend this proposal to their governments. The changing pattern in trade, production and development throughout the world presents all Commonwealth countries with new problems and new opportunities. They considered that the time is most opportune to assess these problems and opportunities jointly with particular reference to:

- (a) the significance for Commonwealth countries of changes taking place in world trade;
- (b) measures to expand trade between Commonwealth countries;
- (c) progress towards the common objective of freer trade and payments;
- (d) the progress and direction of economic expansion in the less-developed countries of the Commonwealth and the sources of capital and technical assistance that may aid in their further development;
- (e) economic and trade problems in regard to agriculture and other primary production;
- (f) the prospects and implications, especially for Commonwealth countries, of the European Economic Community and the proposed Free Trade Area;
- (g) arrangements for continuing Commonwealth consultations on economic matters.

It was agreed that the detailed preparatory work for the Conference, including the formulation of the agenda and other procedural matters, should be entrusted to a committee of officials and that this committee should be convened in London early in 1958.

Statement by Prime Minister

Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker issued the following statement October 1:

I am sure all Canadians will generally welcome warmly the announcement at the conclusion of the conference of Commonwealth ministers at Mont Tremblant, Quebec, today, that a conference which I have long advocated, to study Commonwealth trade and economic problems, will be held next year.

This conference will be the culmination of the proposals I placed before the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference last June in London.

We are indebted to the Mont Tremblant Conference for the considered comments made in the final communiqué on the subject of the pound sterling and European economic integration.

My colleagues and I are grateful to the Ministers of Finance and of Trade and Commerce, and to the officials of their and other government departments concerned, who attended the Mont Tremblant meetings on behalf of Canada.

I extend especially warm greetings to all the delegates of the other Commonwealth countries, and I am looking forward to meeting them here on Wednesday. I trust their stay in Canada has been a pleasant one, and I wish them, their advisors, and their staffs, Godspeed on their journey home.

Canada-United Kingdom Trade Talks

THE following statement was issued October 4 at the conclusion of trade talks held in Ottawa by United Kingdom and Canadian cabinet ministers following the meeting of Commonwealth finance ministers:

The talks which have been proceeding in Ottawa between the Canadian and United Kingdom ministers on the subject of trade between the two countries ended today.

It was the agreed conclusion that an expansion in Anglo-Canadian trade is a primary object of policy of both Governments, and consideration was given to methods whereby this object can best be achieved. Among proposals discussed with this aim in view was the proposal of the United Kingdom Ministers for a free trade area with Canada. It was emphasized by the United Kingdom Ministers that this proposal involved not only the progressive removal of tariffs, but also a speedier reduction in the quantitative restrictions now applied by the United Kingdom against imports from Canada. It was also emphasized by the United Kingdom Ministers that their proposal was a long-term one and not designed to come into full effect save over a period of twelve to fifteen years. The United Kingdom Ministers recognized that this proposal raised serious and complex problems and difficulties. In view of the long-term nature of the proposal the United Kingdom Ministers did not ask the Canadian Ministers for an expression of their views on the proposal. The ministers for both countries therefore addressed themselves to the immediate problem of expanding the beneficial two-way flow of trade between Canada and the United Kingdom.

It was agreed that in a number of ways the Canadian Government can assist United Kingdom sales and earnings in Canada with full regard for the interests of Canadian producers, and can thereby assist, within the framework of existing United Kingdom policy and undertakings, towards the reduction of remaining United Kingdom restrictions against importations from Canada. These ways include:—

- (a) a review of Government purchasing in Canada, with a view to encouraging and facilitating sales by United Kingdom manufacturers of goods now imported from non-Commonwealth sources;
- (b) a revision of the Canadian tariff relating to exemption of tourist purchases by Canadians making visits overseas; and
- (c) a visit by a high-level trade delegation from Canada to the United Kingdom.

1. Canadian Government purchasing falls into three categories: defence purchases, ordinary civilian purchases by the Canadian Government, and other types of purchases including those of Crown Companies. Canadian Ministers undertook to institute a detailed review, to be made in collaboration with the United Kingdom Trade Commissioner Service in Canada, of those areas of Government purchasing where it seems reasonable to hope and expect that United Kingdom firms would be able to meet Canadian import requirements satisfactorily. The United Kingdom Ministers emphasized that they do not expect orders to be placed with United Kingdom suppliers unless their products are fully competitive.

2. As regards defence purchases, the position is likely to continue to be influenced by the long lead-time involved in existing defence orders and in developing new types of equipment, combined with limitations on defence expenditures. The Canadian Government will welcome any possibility of increasing purchases from the United Kingdom of equipment now imported from non-Commonwealth sources.

3. In regard to sales by United Kingdom firms of civilian items to Canadian Government departments and agencies, Canadian Ministers have undertaken that purchasing arrangements will be reviewed immediately. Close contact will be maintained with the United Kingdom Trade Commissioners across Canada who, in turn, will acquaint United Kingdom exporters with new opportunities that can be opened up, with respect to goods now imported from non-Commonwealth sources.

4. The Canadian Ministers undertook to call for a review of the purchasing arrangements of Crown Corporations and other Government agencies with a view to encouraging purchases from the United Kingdom, wherever this is practical and economical, of goods now imported from non-Commonwealth sources.

5. United Kingdom Ministers expressed the hope that some measure could be taken to encourage more Canadian tourists to visit the United Kingdom and make more purchases there. In this connection it was noted with satisfaction that, a few months ago, the

United Kingdom authorities had found it possible to make available a currency allowance of £100 to travellers from the United Kingdom wishing to visit Canada.

6. Canada now allows Canadians who are out of the country for at least forty-eight hours to import \$100 worth of purchases abroad duty-free every four months. This tourist exemption is of considerably less benefit to tourists making longer but less frequent visits overseas. The Canadian Ministers undertook to give sympathetic consideration to enlarging the benefit of this exemption to tourists visiting the United Kingdom and other overseas countries.

7. It was agreed by the ministers for both countries that a high-level trade delegation from Canada should visit the United Kingdom at an early date with a view to stimulating purchases from United Kingdom sources of goods now imported from non-Commonwealth countries. This trade mission will include leading representatives of business, industry, labour, agriculture and other primary production from all areas of Canada.

The ministers for both countries expressed their gratification at the decision taken at Mont Tremblant earlier this week to hold a Commonwealth Trade and Economic Conference next year and look forward to fruitful results of benefit to all countries of the Commonwealth.



AUSTRALIA-CANADA AGREEMENT

An agreement between the Commonwealth of Australia and Canada for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to income taxes was concluded at Mont Tremblant, Que., on October 1, 1957.

The agreement was signed by Sir Arthur Fadden, KCMG, Deputy Prime Minister and Treasurer of Australia, and Mr. Donald Fleming, Minister of Finance of Canada. Mr. W. R. Crocker, Australian High Commissioner, and Mr. Gordon Churchill, Minister of Trade and Commerce of Canada, also participated in the signing ceremony.

The agreement provides generally that each country retains the right to tax income leaving that country, while at the same time undertaking to grant relief from taxation on income in respect of which a tax has already been imposed in the other country.

This agreement will come into force on the date on which the instruments of ratification are exchanged.

Canada and the United Nations

Twelfth Session of the General Assembly

THE Twelfth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations convened in New York on September 17. In its first two weeks the Assembly elected a new president and other officers, unanimously approved the admission of the Federation of Malaya as the 82nd member of the United Nations, decided once again not to seat representatives of the People's Republic of China, and elected Canada, Japan and Panama to two-year terms in the Security Council.

During the general debate, which began on September 19, representatives of the member states expounded their countries' views on the international situation and on items on the Assembly's agenda of particular interest to them. Prime Minister John Diefenbaker spoke for Canada on September 23. (*)

On September 26 the Assembly unanimously endorsed a recommendation by the Security Council that the term of office of Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld be renewed for another five years beginning April 10, 1958.

The composition of the Canadian Delegation is as follows: *Representatives*—Mr. Sidney E. Smith, Secretary of State for External Affairs (Chairman of the Delegation); Mr. Wallace B. Nesbitt, Member of Parliament for Oxford, Parliamentary Assistant to the Prime Minister (Vice-Chairman of the Delegation); Dr. R. A. MacKay, Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations; Mrs. Harry S. Quart, MBE; Mr. Frank Lennard, Member of Parliament for Wentworth; *Alternate Representatives*—Mr. H. O. White, Member of Parliament for Middlesex East; Mr. T. Ricard, Member of Parliament for St. Hyacinthe-Bagot; Mr. Douglas Jung, Member of Parliament for Vancouver Centre; Mr. Escott Reid, former Canadian High Commissioner to India; Mr. W. D. Matthews, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs; Mr. Benjamin Rogers, Canadian Ambassador to Peru.

Advisors for the Delegation are drawn from the Department of External Affairs, the Department of Finance and the Canadian Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York.

Elections

Sir Leslie Knox Munro, of New Zealand, was unanimously elected President of the Assembly, succeeding Prince Wan Waithayakon. Up until the day the Assembly began it was expected that Sir Leslie would be opposed by Dr. Charles Malik, of Lebanon; however, Dr. Malik withdrew his candidacy at the last moment. Representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the U.S.S.R., China, Ceylon, Paraguay and Tunisia were elected Vice-Presidents.

The following were named Chairmen of Committees: First Committee (Political and Security) Djalal Abdoh, (Iran); Special Political Committee, Emilio Arenales Catalan, (Guatemala); Second Committee (Economic and Financial) Jiri Nosek (Czechoslovakia); Third Committee (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural) Mrs. Aase Lionaes, (Norway); Fourth Committee

(*) See page 282 for text of Prime Minister Diefenbaker's address.

(Trusteeship) Thanat Khoman, (Thailand); Fifth Committee (Administrative and Budgetary) W. H. J. Van Asch Van Wikej, (Netherlands); Sixth Committee (Legal) Dr. Santiago Perez Perez (Venezuela).

Burma, Canada, Iceland, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union were named to the Credentials Committee.

On October 1 Canada was elected by 72 votes out of 78 to a seat in the Security Council of the United Nations for a two-year term beginning January 1, 1958. Panama, with 74 votes, and Japan, with 55 votes, were also elected to the Council for two-year terms. Canada had also served on the Security Council in 1948 and 1949.

Admission of Malaya

The Federation of Malaya, which had come into existence as an independent entity on August 31, 1957, (*) was the only nation seeking admission to the United Nations at the beginning of the twelfth session. Its admission had been unanimously recommended by the Security Council and the resolution endorsing this recommendation, co-sponsored by all the members of the Commonwealth, was unanimously passed by the Assembly. The admission of Malaya brought the total membership of the United Nations to 82.

In a speech supporting Malaya's admission to the United Nations, the Chairman of the Canadian Delegation, Mr. Smith, said in part:

A few weeks ago, a member of the Canadian Government, the Honourable J. M. Macdonnell, was present as a representative of my country at the impressive ceremonies at Kuala Lumpur on the occasion when Malaya became one of the independent members of the Commonwealth of Nations. At that time, the Canadian Government expressed its pleasure in welcoming Malaya as another independent member of that Commonwealth. I reiterate that welcome today to the distinguished representative of Malaya who has taken a seat in the General Assembly of the United Nations. It is most gratifying to me personally that my first utterance in the General Assembly should be, on this happy occasion, to welcome a new member of the Commonwealth to membership in the United Nations. The Canadian Government considered it an honour to take part in the historic ceremony at Kuala Lumpur, and it is for me a great privilege and pleasure to express today Canada's gratification over the election of Malaya to membership of the United Nations.

Progress toward the goal of self-government and full independence in Malaya has been an orderly and constitutional development, purposefully supported and assisted by the United Kingdom at every stage. This evolution is one which Canadians are especially able to appreciate and understand. We qualify very readily as expert witnesses in this context. Our own growth to nationhood has followed the peaceful pattern of gradual adjustment of responsibilities and relationships in a friendly and co-operative way. And it is, I think, fair to observe that the relationship between Canada and the United Kingdom which developed over the years of our evolution to nationhood has set, to some extent, the pattern for what is now the worldwide association of free nations to which we are proud to belong, and that is another example of the Britannic policy that produces growth from colony to nation rather than the retrogressive or backward step of going from nation to colony. In warmly welcoming Malaya to full sovereignty, national freedom, and membership in the United Nations, the Canadian Delegation is also applauding the United Kingdom for the enlightened attitude which has helped the Malayan people in their own efforts to achieve this happy result. Speaking for Canada, I can say that we are sure that this new state will make a most useful contribution to the work of the United Nations and therefore to the long-sought goal, the peace of the world.

Adoption of the Agenda

On the second day of the session the Assembly began considering its agenda. The General Committee of the Assembly had not approved a recommendation by India that the Assembly consider "the representation of China

(*) E. A. Bulletin, September 1957. See also page 301.

in the United Nations". Instead, the Committee had adopted a proposal, put forward by the United States, which declared a moratorium on any discussion regarding the seating of Communist China. On September 24, the Assembly by a vote of 47 to 27 with 6 absentions approved the Committee's decision not to discuss the question of Chinese representation. Canada and all other Commonwealth countries, except India and Ghana, voted with the majority.

The General Assembly also approved without opposition the inclusion of an item on Cyprus under the heading "the Cyprus Question".

Items relating to Algeria, West Irian, the treatment of Indians in South Africa and race conflict in South Africa were also included in the agenda. The representatives of the Union of South Africa opposed the inscription of the two South African items.

Disarmament

During the general debate several representatives, including the United States Secretary of State, the Soviet Foreign Minister, the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary and the Belgian Foreign Minister, as well as Prime Minister Diefenbaker, devoted a substantial proportion of their statements to disarmament. The agenda item on disarmament now consists of four parts: (a) the report of the Disarmament Commission; (b) expansion of the membership of the Commission and its Sub-Committee; (c) collective action to inform the peoples of the world as to the dangers of the armaments race; and (d) discontinuance under international control of tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons. In anticipation of the disarmament debate in the First Committee a number of draft resolutions pertaining to these matters were circulated by the Delegations of Belgium, India and the Soviet Union.

Special Session on Hungary

On September 13, the General Assembly of the United Nations, by a vote of 60 in favour to 10 opposed, with ten abstentions, condemned the U.S.S.R. for its ruthless armed intervention in Hungary in October and November 1956, and denounced both the U.S.S.R. and the present regime in Hungary for their continued defiance of United Nations resolutions on Hungary (1).

The condemnation of Soviet actions in Hungary was embodied in a resolution introduced on September 10 during the resumed eleventh session of the United Nations General Assembly. The Assembly had been convened to consider again the events which took place in Hungary last year and to discuss the report issued on June 20, 1957 by the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (2). The resolution was co-sponsored by 36 member nations, including Canada, and in its final form read as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 1132 (xi) of 10 January, 1957, establishing a Special Committee, consisting of representatives of Australia, Ceylon, Denmark, Tunisia and Uruguay, to investigate, and to establish and maintain direct observation in Hungary and elsewhere, taking testimony, collecting evidence and receiving information, as appropriate,

Having now received the unanimous report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary, (2)

Regretting that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the present authorities in Hungary have failed to co-operate in any way with the special committee,

(1) External Affairs Bulletin—November 1956 and January 1957.

(2) External Affairs Bulletin—June-July 1957.

1. *Expresses* its appreciation to the Special Committee for its work;
2. *Endorses* the report of the Special Committee;
3. *Notes* the conclusion of the Special Committee that the events which took place in Hungary in October and November of 1956 constituted a spontaneous national uprising;
4. *Finds* that the conclusions reached by the Special Committee on the basis of its examination of all available evidence confirm that:
 - (a) The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in violation of the United Nations Charter, has deprived Hungary of its liberty and political independence and the Hungarian people of the exercise of their fundamental human rights;
 - (b) The present Hungarian regime has been imposed on the Hungarian people by the armed intervention of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;
 - (c) The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has carried out mass deportations of Hungarian citizens to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;
 - (d) The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has violated its obligations under the Geneva Conventions of 1949;
 - (e) The present authorities in Hungary have violated the human rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty of Peace with Hungary;
5. *Condemns* these acts and the continued defiance of the resolutions of the General Assembly.
6. *Reiterates* its concern with the continuing plight of the Hungarian people.
7. *Considers* that further efforts must be made to achieve the objectives of the United Nations in regard to Hungary in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and the pertinent resolutions of the General Assembly.
8. *Calls upon* the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the present authorities in Hungary in view of evidence contained in the report to desist from repressive measures against the Hungarian people; to respect the liberty and political independence of Hungary and the Hungarian people's enjoyment of fundamental human rights and freedoms, and to ensure the return to Hungary of those Hungarian citizens who have been deported to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
9. *Requests* the President of the Eleventh Session of the General Assembly, H.R.H. Prince Wan Waithayakon, as the special representative of the General Assembly on the Hungarian problem, to take such steps as he deems appropriate, in view of the findings of the Special Committee, to achieve the objectives of the United Nations in accordance with resolutions of the General Assembly, to consult as appropriate with the Special Committee during the course of his endeavours, and to report and make recommendations as he may deem advisable to the General Assembly;
10. *Decides* to place the Hungarian item on the provisional agenda of the Twelfth Session of the General Assembly.

The representative of Hungary endeavoured to have the discussion terminated on the grounds that the report violated article 3, para 7 of the United Nations Charter, i.e. that the matter under discussion came entirely within the domestic jurisdiction of Hungary. The President of the Assembly, however, ruled that consideration of the item should continue. The representatives of the U.S.S.R., India, Indonesia, Yugoslavia and Poland also spoke against the resolution.

On September 12, Canada's Permanent Delegate to the United Nations, Dr. R. A. MacKay, made the following statement:

The Canadian Delegation is one of the co-sponsors of the draft resolution now before this resumed session of the 11th General Assembly. I wish to set out briefly why we are supporting this resolution, and what we hope can be achieved.

The United Nations has already considered repeatedly and at length the events which took place in Hungary last year. Time and again the United Nations has called upon the Government of the U.S.S.R. to cease its intervention in the internal affairs of Hungary and to permit the Hungarian people to select their own government in their own way, and to determine their own institutions. At an early stage action taken by the United Nations was in response to an urgent appeal from the legitimate government of Hungary. As we all know that government was stifled by armed intervention of the Soviet Union and a regime answerable only to the U.S.S.R. was installed. The General Assembly

also took action at its second emergency session and its 11th regular session to organize relief for the victims of the violent events in Hungary and to provide homes for Hungarian refugees. More than 35,000 have found a new home in Canada.

To our great regret, the Soviet authorities, as well as the new Hungarian government which they installed by their intervention in Hungary, have flouted the opinion of the world community expressed in various resolutions adopted by large majorities in the General Assembly of the United Nations. The U.S.S.R., and its puppet Hungarian government, have chosen instead to shield themselves behind the myth that the violence in Hungary resulted from some kind of intervention from the Western side. This explanation made last autumn, and repeated again ad nauseam in this present session, is, I submit, an insult to the intelligence of this Assembly.

Our hope last autumn was that the U.S.S.R. would heed an indignant world and would reconcile itself at least to important adjustments in the direction of national autonomy and recognition of genuine sovereignty for the Hungarian state. Unfortunately, the U.S.S.R. lost the opportunity last autumn to put this problem on the way to a moderate and constructive solution. We have no evidence that since then it has taken any real steps in this direction.

Since no response was forthcoming to the United Nations efforts to meet the emergency situation of last year, this Assembly established the Special Committee whose report is now before us. The main facts of a spontaneous national movement towards independence in Hungary and the suppression of this movement by Soviet armed force were already painfully clear to everyone. The Special Committee has now documented these basic facts in its highly detailed account of the day by day, and even hour by hour, events in Budapest last October and November (Canada made a modest contribution to the information in the reports by facilitating the receipt of evidence by the Committee from some of the large number of Hungarian refugees now in Canada). I wish to take this opportunity to express my delegation's thanks to all the members of the Committee—to the Hon. Mr. Anderson of Denmark, who was its Chairman; to Ambassador Shann of Australia, its rapporteur; to Ambassador Gunewardene of Ceylon; to Ambassador Slim of Tunisia; and to Ambassador Febregat of Uruguay. The significant fact is that this Committee, so widely representative of various groupings within the United Nations, has submitted a completely unanimous report.

The Committee's report is a sober and factual account of what happened in Hungary during those tragic days last year. Its conclusions flow simply and directly from the mass of facts obtained from a great number of witnesses. No one can honestly and seriously challenge the truth of the terrible story which the Special Committee has put before the world. The common people of Hungary—students, workers, ordinary soldiers—took action, at first by completely peaceful demonstrations, to demand internal reforms and freedom from foreign domination. The Soviet-dominated security police began the violence by firing on a peaceful assembly of the common people of Hungary. In response to this a whole people rose up, in what has been called a miracle of unity, to sweep away a corrupt and foreign-dominated regime. For a few brief days Hungary had a government responsive to the will of the people of Hungary. In those days the new Hungarian government began successfully to restore order and to revive freedom in Hungary.

But from the very beginning of these events the ominous shadow of the Red Army was cast over Hungary. Soviet troops and tanks moved across the frontier in even greater numbers. In spite of a Soviet pretense of willingness to negotiate with Premier Nagy for the withdrawal of all Soviet forces, at about midnight on November 3, we read in the report, General Serov, Head of Soviet security forces, arrested the Hungarian negotiators, and Soviet tanks moved forward into the streets of Budapest. What followed was a ruthless and brutal attack on the people of Hungary. A great power, the U.S.S.R., sent its armed forces to crush and destroy a popular movement for freedom in a small neighbouring country. On the basis of this terrible intervention a new regime was installed in Budapest. The Hungarian nation has been reduced to the status of a colony of the U.S.S.R.

The draft resolution, of which Canada is a co-sponsor, and which I am certain will be approved by a very large majority, is not a negative, destructive or propagandist document. It is a realistic document. It indicates clearly the essential responsibility of the U.S.S.R. for what has happened and is happening in this part of Eastern Europe. It does not envisage any action which is not in accord with the legitimate national interests of the U.S.S.R.

The sponsors have not sought in this resolution to do anything to intensify discord between rival power groups. But the Assembly cannot fail to condemn continued refusal to comply with its resolutions, nor can it fail to condemn the flagrant and cruel disregard of human rights which members of the United Nations pledge themselves to uphold. We endorse the conclusions in the Committee's report. In proposing that a special representative of the General Assembly should be nominated to take such steps as he deems

appropriate to achieve the objectives of the United Nations we are seeking to emphasize a constructive and forward looking approach to this difficult question. We can think of no one more suitable to carry this responsibility than the distinguished President of this Assembly.

The Soviet Union is one of the great powers of the world. It has a special position in the United Nations as one of the permanent members of the Security Council which I suggest entails special responsibilities. In advancing and supporting this resolution, it is our hope that it will help to induce the U.S.S.R., one of the most important members of our organization, to take steps to permit a moderate and reasonable adjustment of the situation in Hungary, so that the legitimate aspirations of the Hungarian people for independence and sovereignty may be met. Justice for Hungary must be a continuing concern of the United Nations.

Other UN Activities

Trusteeship Council—On September 13 the Trusteeship Council met to consider the future of French Administered Togoland. The Council based its discussions on the Report submitted by the United Nations Commission to French Togoland on which Canada was a member. On September 19 the Council decided to transmit this report to the Assembly, and on the following day it adopted its report to the Assembly.

Security Council—On September 24, the Security Council resumed consideration of the Kashmir question.



MEET IN OTTAWA

Mr. Sidney E. Smith, Secretary of State for External Affairs, chats with Chief Kola Balogun, Minister of Research and Information of the Federal Nigerian Government, during the Chief's visit to Ottawa early this month.

Malayan Independence Ceremonies

By R.W. Clark


As the clock on the Secretariat Building in Kuala Lumpur began to toll the hour of midnight on August 30, a military band on the Padang (Town Square) broke into the strains of "God Save the Queen", and the Union Jack on the Secretariat Building was slowly lowered for the last time. A moment later, the same band played Malaya's new "Negra Ku" (My Country) and the new eleven-striped Malayan flag was proudly unfurled to the cheers of the thousands of citizens gathered around the Padang. The official Proclamation of Independence was not read until the following morning but, to the majority of the Malaysians assembled in front of their Moorish-styled, white and cream Secretariat Building, this simple ceremony marked the end of British "domination" which had begun in 1786 when the Sultan of Kedah ceded the island of Penang to the East India Company.

As the Malayan flag billowed out under the spotlights, Tunku Abdul Rahman, the Prime Minister of this tenth member of the Commonwealth of Nations, gave a brief impassioned speech, to which the cheering audience responded with the cry "Merdeka!" (Independence). Although there had been rumours that the flag-lowering ceremony might be the occasion for an anti-British demonstration by radicals of the Malayan independence movement, the remainder of the midnight rally passed in an orderly manner and in a mood of subdued excitement.

This mood of subdued excitement appeared to prevail throughout the majority of the events in the week-long celebration of Malayan independence. It was obvious that many among the thousands of Malaysians who had congregated in Kuala Lumpur, while welcoming the new status of their Federation, were aware of the problems facing the fledgling nation: The excitement was therefore tempered by the knowledge that nearly 2,000 hard-core Communist terrorists remained in the jungle and that Malaya's future as a multi-racial state would present further difficulties. The Malayan leaders, however, in their speeches, referred with pride to the advances made by the Federation since July, 1955 when the first federal elections were held, and prophesied that "from henceforth every loyal Malayan may hold his head high."

Reason for Pride

The Malayan leaders had just reason for pride, because their leadership had allowed Malaya to advance towards self government far more rapidly and more smoothly than even the most optimistic observer would have been willing to forecast ten years earlier. At that time Malaya had been suffering crippling raids from roaming bands of Communist terrorists, numbering almost 8,000 members at the peak of the campaign. Utilizing various techniques, including a vigorous military campaign, and a number of progressive social and economic policies, the Federation Government had broken the back of the "emergency." The new government, which took office after the 1955 elections and which was based on an alliance between the major political parties of the three largest racial groups (Malay, Chinese and Indian), sent a delegation to a Constitutional Conference in London in January, 1956. As a result of this



AT MALAYAN CEREMONIES

Mr. James Macdonnell, Minister without Portfolio, right, who represented Canada at the celebration to mark the attainment of independence by the Federation of Malaya and its accession to the Commonwealth of Nations, as he is about to be presented to HRH the Duke of Gloucester, representative of the Queen at the ceremony.

Conference, in June of the same year the Federation of Malaya Constitutional Commission (Reid Commission) commenced work. The report of this Commission, published in February 1957, recommended a form of constitution for a fully self-governing and independent Federation of Malaya. A further conference in London in May reached final agreement on independence for the Federation. August 31, therefore, was the culmination of a relatively rapid rise to self-government.

The Malayan Government had invited many other governments to share in its historic moment by sending delegations to Kuala Lumpur to witness the ceremonies. As a result, a group of Canadians, headed by Mr. J. M. Macdonnell, Minister without Portfolio, Special Envoy to the Malayan Independence Ceremonies, were present at the birth of the first South-East Asian member of the Commonwealth. Other members of Canada's delegation included Mr. G. R. C. Heasman, Canadian Ambassador to Indonesia, Mr. F. G. Ballachey, of the Department of External Affairs, and Mr. M. P. Carson, Canadian Government Trade Commissioner in Singapore. Also

present were Mr. R. W. Clark and Miss K. Richardson, of the Department of External Affairs, and four newspapermen: Mr. Robert Taylor, *Toronto Daily Star*; Mr. Langevin Cote, *Toronto Globe and Mail*; Miss Dorothy Howarth, *Toronto Telegram*; and Mr. Robert Lansdale, Federal News Photo Service. The group travelled to and from Malaya in the RCAF C5 aircraft which had been used for similar trips in the past.

Visits by Mr. Macdonnell

Mr. Macdonnell, as the first cabinet minister of the new Government to visit this area since the recent elections, took this opportunity to pay brief official or non-official calls in various countries en route. Visits of one day or more were made in Honolulu, Manila, Singapore, New Delhi, Karachi and London. The C5 also made overnight or refueling stops in Minneapolis, San Francisco, Wake, Guam, Beirut, Shannon and Gander.

The most memorable part of the brief visit to Hawaii was probably the tour of Pearl Harbour in a United States Navy launch. Sharp memories of December 1941 were recalled by the sight of the rusting hulk of the "Arizona". The harbour has, of course, been restored, and the very extensive installations gave the visitors some idea of the target which must have been available to the Japanese bombers.

At each stop en route the Minister and his party were impressed with the genuine hospitality of the local inhabitants and with the willingness of any Canadian representatives resident in the area to do everything possible for the Canadian Delegation. Both these characteristics were visible in Manila, where the group enjoyed a brief rest stop.

In Singapore the touring Canadian Minister visited the local Boys' Town, a high school and vocational training school run by the Brothers of St. Gabriel, many of whom come from the Province of Quebec; stopped at the Ford Assembly Plant which is a subsidiary of the Ford Motor Company of Canada; and inspected the new Polytechnic Institute which, when completed, will receive \$50,000 worth of technical equipment from Canada. The short visit to Singapore was concluded with a reception given by local Commonwealth and consular representatives in honour of visiting delegations en route to Kuala Lumpur. Among the well-known residents of Singapore who attended this function were the Governor, Sir Robert Browne Black, the Chief Minister, Mr. Lim Yew Hock, and the former Chief Minister, Mr. David Marshall.

Smoothness and Efficiency

Kuala Lumpur, of course, was the highlight of the trip. The most outstanding feature of the celebrations became apparent as soon as the C5 landed at the Malayan capital—this was the smoothness and efficiency with which every function was carried out. The ceremonies were masterpieces of forethought and planning and augured well for the future of the new government. From the time that the Canadian aircraft taxied up to the modern air terminal, which had been draped with red, white and blue bunting and flew the Canadian Ensign for the occasion, until the Delegation boarded the aircraft once more, everything possible was done to ensure the comfort and enjoyment of the visitors. Malaya had a good representation of distinguished visitors for its birthday. The Queen, recognized as Head of the Commonwealth by the new Federation, was represented by their Royal Highnesses the Duke and Duchess

of Gloucester, accompanied by His Royal Highness Prince William. Among the other distinguished visitors were the Prime Minister of Ceylon, Mr. Solomon Bandaranaike; the Lord Chancellor of the United Kingdom, the Right Honourable, the Viscount Kilmuir; the French Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Maurice Faure; the Minister for External Affairs for Australia, Mr. R. G. Casey; the Minister for External Affairs for New Zealand, Mr. T. L. Macdonald, and the Under-Secretary of State for the United States, Mr. Christian A. Herter.

Kuala Lumpur was decked in festive fashion for the occasion. The city of 300,000, which celebrated its 100th birthday this year, had been scrubbed, polished and painted until it gleamed, and then bunting, flags, and decorative lighting had been distributed to complete the party atmosphere. The city bulged at the seams with visiting delegations from approximately sixty states and with thousands of Malaysians who had flocked into the capital. And yet, in spite of the fact that the huge crowds might be expected to bring chaos, the planning done beforehand resulted in a minimum of delay or confusion. The happy, jostling crowds moved easily and expectantly from one event to another during the celebrations.

Ceremonies and celebrations had been scheduled to fill most of the waking hours from August 30 until September 4 when the Canadian Delegation departed. It is impossible to paint in words the colour, pageantry and spectacle that filled the days and nights. In addition to the flag-lowering ceremony mentioned earlier, four other outstanding ceremonies took place. The Malays are a sports-loving people and as a preliminary to their independence they opened their dream-stadium. From a beflagged dais under the huge winged canopy of the brick and stone oval, Tunku Abdul Rahman declared the Merdeka Stadium open and the structure resounded to the cheers of 25,000 school children and visitors. Then 1,500 children in white shorts and singlets ran onto the field to present a massed drill display. The new stadium was the site, on the following morning, where the moving ceremony of the Proclamation of Independence took place. Here, after the playing of "God Save the Queen" as a final tribute to Her Majesty the Queen at the close of an era in Malaysian history, the Duke of Gloucester presented the Chief Minister with the Constitutional Instrument of the Transfer of Power and then the Tunku read the Proclamation of Independence to the assembled thousands. Another of the most colourful ceremonies took place on September 2 when the Supreme Ruler of Malaya, His Majesty The Yang di-Pertuan Agong, was installed. With much of the pomp and splendour which one would imagine took place in ancient Malay courts, the new ruler was presented with the Chogan Alam (the mace symbolic of temporal power), the Chogan Agama (the mace symbolic of spiritual power) and a variety of weapons each with significance buried in Malay lore. His Majesty accepted the power and authority of Kingship by unsheathing the Kris, or long sword of state, kissing the naked blade and returning it to its sheath. The final ceremony, which marked full independence, occurred on the following day when, before the assembled representatives of the various nations, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong formally opened the Federal Legislature of the Persekutuan Tanah Melayu, the official name of the new country.

Meanwhile, receptions, dinners, garden parties and similar functions occupied the time between ceremonies and a full programme of games and

sports drew crowds of followers. Visiting delegates were taken on tours of the gaily decorated capital; the departing High Commissioner, Sir Donald MacGillivray, entertained at King's House; a State Banquet, at which native entertainers presented samples of Malayan singing, dancing and of "bersilat", the traditional Malay art of self-defence, was held at the Supreme Ruler's palace or Istana; thousands of Malaysians crowded the Padang to watch 2,000 men and women of the armed forces in their smart ceremonial uniforms march proudly past the reviewing stand; a fireworks display costing \$200,000 (Malayan) lit up the sky over Kuala Lumpur; the Chief Minister entertained at a gay garden party and at a formal dinner; a magnificent lake pageant gave the visitors an idea of the exciting early history of the Malay States, and a stirring massed band concert by more than ten military bands provided a musical touch for the celebrations. All these and more provided the visitors with glimpses of the pride with which the Malaysians greeted their independence and with unforgettable memories of Malayan hospitality.

Distinctive Canadian Note

The Canadian Envoy and his party, in addition to attending as many of these functions as possible, attempted to add a few distinctive Canadian notes to the celebrations. On September 1, Mr. Macdonnell gave a luncheon at the Selangor Club for members of the Malayan cabinet and prominent Government officials. The guests included the Deputy Prime Minister, the Honourable Dato Abdul Razak bin Hussein, the Minister without Portfolio, Ambassador to United States, and Delegate to the UN General Assembly, the Honourable Dr. Ismail bin Dato Abdul Rahman, and the Minister for Agriculture, the Honourable Abdul Aziz bin Ishak. The following afternoon, Mr. Macdonnell entertained at a small reception to meet Canadians in Malaya and Malaysians who had trained in Canada under the Colombo Plan. The Minister also visited the Kuala Lumpur Technical College, where he presented a collection of technical text books to officials of the Technical High School and announced a Colombo Plan gift of a larger collection of similar books to the College. He then paid a visit to the laboratory of a Canadian scientist, Dr. R. G. Lockard, who is conducting an investigation into a rice disease known as "red rice".

Mr. Macdonnell also announced the nature of the Canadian Government gifts to the new nation. These gifts included two writing tables and chairs which are being prepared from Canadian materials for presentation to the reading room of the Parliamentary Library, a Canada Council Scholarship, valued at \$2,000 annually, for study in the arts, humanities and social sciences, and a small library of Canadiana for the Malayan External Affairs Library. Mr. Macdonnell personally carried the greetings of the Canadian Government and people to the new Chief Minister and to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong when he called on each during his stay in Kuala Lumpur.

In both New Delhi and Karachi the Canadian Minister had an extremely busy schedule, calling on various government officials and attempting to gain some impressions of the first two Asian members of the Commonwealth. While in India Mr. Macdonnell had brief discussions with the President, Dr. R. Prasad; the Vice-President, Dr. S. Radhakrishnan; the Prime Minister, Mr. J. Nehru; the Minister of Defence, Mr. V. K. Krishna Menon, and the Minister of Finance, Mr. T. T. Krishnamachari. Between meetings Mr. Macdonnell was able to pay a short visit to the Lok Sabha (equivalent to the House of

Commons) and inspect a typical Indian village. In Pakistan, Mr. Macdonnell called on the President, General Iskander Mirza; the Prime Minister, Mr. H. S. Suhrawardy; the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations, Malik Firoz Kahn Noon, and the Minister of Finance, Syed Amjad Ali.

The Canadian Delegation departed from Malaya tremendously impressed by the smoothness and efficiency with which the ceremonies and celebrations took place. The new nation had obviously experienced an auspicious beginning and, although it would probably be faced with difficulties in its early years,

(Continued on Page 309)



—NFB Photo

PRESENTS CREDENTIALS

His Excellency Mongi Slim, Ambassador of Tunisia to Canada, left, is seen with the Deputy Governor General, the Hon. Patrick Kerwin, P.C., Chief Justice of Canada, centre, and Mr. Jules Léger, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, after presenting his letter of credence in a ceremony held September 9 at the Supreme Court of Canada.

40th Conference of the ILO

THE International Labour Organization (ILO), which was established in 1919 and was originally associated with the League of Nations at Geneva, in 1946 became a Specialized Agency of the United Nations. Its purpose is to promote the improvement of working and living conditions throughout the world and to this end it formulates and adopts international labour standards known as ILO conventions and ILO recommendations. The former, when ratified by governments, have the status of international treaties.

The 40th Conference of the International Labour Organization met in Geneva from June 5-27, 1957 under the presidency of Mr. H. E. Holt, Australian Minister of Labour and National Service. The Conference was attended by a record number of more than 900 delegates, advisers and observers from 73 of ILO's 78 member countries. Since the holding of the 39th Conference in 1956, three countries—Ghana, Nicaragua and Paraguay—had joined ILO, and Venezuela had withdrawn from membership.

The constitution of the ILO is unique in providing for tripartite representation at all its meetings. National delegations to its annual conference are composed of four delegates, two representing government, one representing employers, and one representing workers. The Canadian Government was represented at the 40th Conference by Mr. G. V. Haythorne, Assistant Deputy Minister of Labour, and Mr. P. Goulet, also of the Department of Labour. Mr. C. Jodoin, President of the Canadian Labour Congress, represented Canadian workers, and Mr. W. A. Campbell, Vice-President and Secretary of Canadian Westinghouse Co., Ltd., represented Canadian employers. These delegates were accompanied by technical advisers.

Director-General's Report

The ILO's Director-General, Mr. David Morse, submitted to the Conference his annual report in two parts: Part I was devoted to the impact of automation and other modern technological advances on labour and social policy; Part II described, in greater detail than the reports of previous years, the work carried out by the ILO in the preceding year. The Conference devoted a major part of its meetings to discussion of the Director-General's report. Commenting on this discussion, the Director-General said that his foremost concern in raising the question of automation was to show that technological progress did not in itself cause unemployment. He thought that the discussion had re-emphasized the importance of labour-management co-operation.

The Director-General's ten-year term of office, which was due to expire in 1958, was extended by unanimous vote for a further period of five years.

Credentials

The credentials of some of the delegates to the Conference were objected to by a number of delegations, but the objections were rejected by the Credentials Committee, except for one pertaining to the Hungarian Delegation. The Committee advised against action with regard to the credentials of the Hungarian Delegation pending a United Nations decision on the legality of the Kadar Government. However, in the plenary session, the Conference rejected

the credentials of the Hungarian worker delegate and the Hungarian employer delegate, but, in effect, accepted those of the Hungarian Government delegates, the vote of protest on these credentials being lost when the proposal (94-88, with 52 abstentions) failed to receive a two-thirds majority. All members of the Canadian Delegation voted to reject the credentials of the Hungarian employer and worker delegates. However, the Canadian Government representatives abstained in the vote to exclude the Hungarian Government delegates, since they held the view that the question of principle involved should first be decided by the United Nations General Assembly and not by one of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations.

Three of the Canadian delegates, Mr. Haythorne, Mr. Jodoin and Mr. Campbell, led a panel discussion on the role of governments in labour-management relations. This type of meeting, the first of its kind held by the ILO, was deemed a great success by those attending the Conference.

ILO Governing Body

One of the most important items before the 40th ILO Conference was the selection of the 30 non-permanent members of the Governing Body who will serve for the next three years. The Governing Body—the executive council of the ILO—consists of 20 government representatives, 10 employer representatives and 10 worker representatives. The 10 states of chief industrial importance having permanent seats on the Governing Body are Canada, China, France, Federal Republic of Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and United States. Government representatives of the following 10 member states were elected for a three-year term: Belgium, Brazil, Chile, Czechoslovakia, Iraq, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines and Sweden. The workers' group elected their 10 representatives from Australia, Brazil, Denmark, France, Federal Republic of Germany, India, Pakistan, Mexico, United Kingdom, and United States, and the employers' group elected their 10 representatives from Australia, Chile, France, India, Italy, Iran, Mexico, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States. In addition, deputy and substitute members of the three groups were elected for the period 1957-1960, including a deputy employer member and a deputy worker member from Canada.

Conventions and Recommendations

The 40th Conference adopted three conventions and two recommendations—a forced labour convention, an indigenous and tribal populations convention supplemented by a recommendation, and a weekly rest (commerce and offices) convention supplemented by a recommendation.

The ILO convention on forced labour, approved by a vote of 240-0 with one abstention, could be regarded as supplementing the forced labour convention of 1930 although it does not constitute a formal revision of the earlier international instrument. The 1957 forced labour convention will require governments which ratify it to suppress and refrain from using forced or compulsory labour as a means of political coercion or education, or as a method of using labour for economic development, or as a means of labour discipline, as a punishment for having taken part in strikes, or for any form of discrimination.

The ILO convention on the protection and integration of indigenous and tribal populations in independent countries was approved by a vote of 179-8, with 45 abstentions. The two Canadian Government delegates abstained on the vote while the Canadian employer and worker delegates voted for the convention. Its lengthy provisions set out a general policy to be followed towards these indigenous peoples and also give special attention to land ownership, education, social security and health matters. While voting for the ILO recommendation on this subject, the Canadian Government delegates explained that they had abstained on the vote on the convention because they considered it much too detailed for general application.

The third convention adopted dealt with weekly rest in commerce and offices. It was adopted by a vote of 176-127, with 31 abstentions. The Canadian Government and worker delegates voted in favour while the Canadian employer delegate voted against the adoption of this convention.

Technical Assistance

The Conference also examined the technical assistance activities of the ILO in 1956. Some of this work is done with funds from the regular budget of ILO, but the greater part of it is carried on with money placed at the disposal of the ILO by the United Nations Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance (ETAP). During 1956 the ILO had 289 experts working in 13 countries of the less-technically-developed areas of the world, and awarded 297 fellowships and study grants. The Organization also spent a total of about \$3,250,000 in 1956 on various kinds of technical assistance in order to provide vocational training, rehabilitation for handicapped workers, employment service organization and other improvements in the training and use of manpower. For 1957, the ILO has been allotted \$3,500,000 by ETAP to carry on its effective and valuable programme of improving work skills and increasing the productivity of labour and, with \$500,000 from ILO's regular budget, the total technical assistance funds to be expended in 1957 by the ILO will run close to \$4 million.

The 40th Conference approved a budget of nearly \$7.9 million for ILO in 1958. Canada's assessment, which is computed at the rate of 3.56 percent of the total budget, will amount to a contribution of \$268,203.

(Continued from Page 306)

most visitors shared with the Malayan leaders a faith in the future of democracy in Malaya. The Federation has set for itself no easy task, as expressed by the Deputy Prime Minister: "In less than a generation we shall be able to weld all the people into a united Malayan nation, and the barriers and barricades which now exist will disappear." In this task Malaya will have the support of Canada and the other members of the Commonwealth. Probably the main impression gained throughout the tour was that this Commonwealth had much to offer its members and the world and that it possesses continued and growing possibilities of usefulness.

Truce Supervision in Cambodia

THE work of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Cambodia is drawing to a close. In its fifth interim report,* covering the period from October 1, 1955 to December 31, 1956, the Commission notes that its only remaining responsibility is to check the entry of war material into the country and that the strength of the Commission has, therefore, been reduced to one fixed team located in the capital, Phnom Penh. When the Commission was established in 1954, there were five fixed and four mobile teams in Cambodia.


The Commission in Cambodia, with its counterparts in Laos and Vietnam, was established by the Geneva Conference in July, 1954. The Conference resulted in three agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, respectively, each agreement providing for the establishment of a separate international commission with responsibility for the control and supervision of the application of the provisions of the agreement. Representatives of Canada, India and Poland serve on each of the commissions, with the Indian representative acting as chairman.

The agreement for Cambodia set forth the procedure for the withdrawal of foreign armed forces and "foreign military personnel" from the territory of Cambodia. It also contained provisions for the demobilization of the Khmer resistance forces and for their reintegration into the national community, as well as for a ban on the introduction of fresh troops, military personnel, armaments, and munitions. The main responsibilities given to the Commission were to control the withdrawal of foreign forces, to see that the frontiers were respected, to control the release of prisoners of war and civilian internees, and to supervise the application of a declaration by the Cambodian Government which stated that foreign aid in war material, personnel, or instructors would not be solicited "except for the purpose of the effective defence of the territory".

By 1955 the Commission had completed the military phase of its task under the Cease-Fire Agreement and had turned its attention to the political phase—the integration into the national community of the former Khmer resistants, and the holding of general elections. The ex-resistants had already been demobilized, granted amnesty, and offered identity cards as citizens in good standing in the realm, but there was still some misunderstanding, suspicion, and fear of reprisals in the air which the Commission helped to dissipate by its investigations of complaints. As a result, all citizens were able to resume constitutional political activity and to participate in the electoral campaign.

Elections were held on September 11, 1955, and the party of the former King Norodom Sihanouk won all 91 seats, with about 83 per cent of the popular vote. The Commission reported to the co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference that "the elections passed off peacefully" and that the electoral "settlement foreseen under Article 6 of the Geneva Agreement had been completed".

*External Affairs Supplementary Paper No. 57/8.



CONFER IN CAMBODIA

Mr. Lorne LaVigne, left, former Commissioner of the Canadian Delegation to the International Commission in Cambodia, seen at the Palace with HRH Prince Norodom Sihanouk, Prime Minister of Cambodia, during a meeting on aspects of the Commission's truce supervisory activities.

The Commission's tasks then diminished and by October 1955 personnel had been reduced by 40 per cent.

During the period reviewed by the fifth interim report, Cambodia became a member of the United Nations and its Government declared a policy of neutrality in its external relations. In a discussion of the political situation in Cambodia, the report notes that the Royal Government of Cambodia has fulfilled its obligation to take all necessary measures to reintegrate all citizens into the national community without discrimination and to guarantee to them the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms provided in the constitution of the Kingdom. The Government also promulgated a third amnesty pardoning various ex-Khmer resistance force members.

Border problems between Cambodia and Vietnam are discussed in the fourth chapter of the report and the Commission expresses its satisfaction that, during the period reviewed, members of the Royal Government of Cambodia and the Government of South Vietnam had held direct talks in an effort to settle some of their problems.

In the chapter on foreign aid in war materials, military bases, and alliances, the Commission reports that during 1956 the Royal Government furnished statements of existing ammunition, armaments, vehicles and signals equipment held by the Royal Khmer Armed Forces. "The Commission, having carefully considered the information made available by the Royal Government, unan-

imously agreed that the information furnished by the Royal Government appeared to be a genuine and an earnest effort on their part to comply with the terms of the Geneva Agreement," the report says.

The report also mentions a declaration received by the Commission in December, 1956 to the effect that no military agreement had been concluded or even envisaged between the Government of Cambodia and the Peoples Republic of China, a declaration arising out of rumours circulating outside Cambodia that Prime Minister Chou En-Lai of China, when visiting Cambodia in November of that year, had furnished military aid to Cambodia.

Another aspect of the Commission's work described in the report concerns the stopping of hostile propaganda between Cambodia and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the establishing of friendly relations between the governments of the two countries.

At a meeting in Phnom Penh, on April 20, 1956 the Canadian Commissioner, Mr. Arnold Smith, tabled a resolution calling for the dissolution of the Commission on May 15, 1956. Presenting the Canadian Government's view that the Commission's work was completed and that it could therefore cease to exist, Mr. Smith said:

A consideration which should be prominent in our minds is that Cambodia, as a sovereign and independent state, must not be saddled unnecessarily with a body whose functions are to supervise and control its actions. It is inevitable that the presence of the Commission involves a check on Cambodia's exercise of her sovereignty. That was for a period necessary, as part of the Cease-Fire Settlement; and it was accepted voluntarily and with good grace. But it should not go on when it is no longer needed. The International Commission was, for a time, necessary to give confidence and to dissipate the distrust which the years of fighting had made so sharp. But today the confidence exists; no one, I think, today distrusts Cambodia's policies or intentions.

The departure from Cambodia of the International Commission for Supervision and Control will be one more step in this country's march toward untrammelled independence and sovereignty.

The withdrawal of the International Commission for Cambodia would provide international recognition that Cambodia is the outstanding success story of the Indochina settlement. We think it would be desirable to mark, and to give official international recognition to, the fact that *both* the Royal Government of Cambodia *and* the Democratic Republic of Vietnam have satisfactorily performed the obligations which they assumed toward each other under the Geneva settlement.

Furthermore, the early departure of our Commission from Cambodia with its tasks well done and fully accomplished, can, I suggest, have a salutary and encouraging effect on the parties to the Agreements in Vietnam and Laos; since they would thus realize that the Commissions in those countries plan on remaining there only so long as is required for the performance of important and substantial tasks of keeping the peace and consolidating the Cease-Fire.

The Canadian proposal was discussed at subsequent meetings. Both the Indian and Polish Commissioners expressed the view that the Commission could not be dissolved without regard to the progress of the Commissions in Laos and Vietnam. The Canadian resolution was therefore not put to a vote; its text and the relevant discussions are included as annexes to the interim report.

When the Commission was established in 1954, 32 Canadians were members. In October 1955 Canadian representation was reduced to 23 and in December 1956 to 13. Members of the Canadian Delegation are drawn from the Department of External Affairs and from the armed services.

APPOINTMENTS AND TRANSFERS IN THE CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

- Mr. P. E. Uren appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 4, effective September 1, 1957.
- Mr. G. W. J. Charpentier posted from Ottawa to the National Defence College, effective September 2, 1957.
- Mr. A. J. Boudreau appointed Canadian Consul General at Boston. Proceeded to Boston September 3, 1957.
- Miss F. Gagnon posted from Ottawa to the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations, New York, effective September 3, 1957.
- Mr. L. A. H. Smith and Mr. J. I. Gow appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officers 1, effective September 3, 1957.
- Mr. W. F. Bull appointed Canadian Ambassador to Japan. Arrived in Tokyo September 5, 1957.
- Mr. P. M. Roberts posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Moscow, effective September 5, 1957.
- Mr. O. A. Chistoff posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Legation, Warsaw, effective September 5, 1957.
- Miss J. A. Horwood posted from the Canadian Consulate General, Chicago, to Ottawa, effective September 5, 1957.
- Mr. G. L. Magann, Canadian Ambassador to Switzerland, retired from the Canadian Diplomatic Service, effective September 6, 1957.
- Mr. P. L. Trottier posted from the Canadian Embassy, Djakarta, to the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, London, effective September 7, 1957.
- Mr. M. J. O. E. Heroux posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Madrid, effective September 7, 1957.
- Mr. D. W. Stevenson posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Belgrade, effective September 10, 1957.
- Mr. K. A. McVey posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Cairo, effective September 11, 1957.
- Mr. H. O. Moran, MBE, appointed Canadian High Commissioner in Pakistan. Proceeded to Karachi September 13, 1957.
- Miss A. T. Hardy posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Washington, effective September 13, 1957.
- Mr. P. A. E. Johnston appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 3, effective September 16, 1957.
- Mr. T. B. B. Wainman-Wood posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Legation, Warsaw, effective September 19, 1957.
- Mr. P. R. Jennings posted from the Canadian Embassy, Dublin, to the Canadian Embassy, Copenhagen, effective September 19, 1957.
- Mr. T. F. M. Newton posted from the Canadian Embassy, Tokyo, to Ottawa, effective September 19, 1957.
- Mr. F. G. Ballachey posted from Ottawa to the National Defence College, Kingston, effective September 19, 1957.
- Mr. R. E. Collins posted from the Canadian Embassy, Moscow, to Ottawa, effective September 20, 1957.
- Miss D. J. Armstrong, Mr. J. Brossard and Mr. R. W. MacLaren appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officers 1, effective September 23, 1957.
- Mr. C. E. Glover posted from Ottawa to the International Supervisory Commissions, Indochina, effective September 24, 1957.
- Mr. P. E. J. Charpentier posted from the Canadian Embassy, Madrid, to Ottawa, effective September 24, 1957.
- Mr. C. J. Marshall appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective September 25, 1957.

Mr. L. Houzer posted from the Canadian Embassy, Moscow, to Ottawa, effective September 29, 1957.

Miss B. M. Fitzpatrick has retired from the staff of the Canadian Consulate General, New York, after spending 43 years in the public service.

CURRENT UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS*

A Selected List

a) Printed Documents:

Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization (16 June 1956 - 15 June 1957). A/3594/Add.1. N.Y., 1957. 7 p. GAOR: Twelfth Session, Supplement No. 1A.

Information Annex III to Budget Estimates for the financial year 1958. A/3600/Add.1. N.Y., 1957. 33 p. GAOR: Twelfth Session, Supplement No. 5A.

Annual Report of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Board. A/3611. N.Y., 1957. 33 p. GAOR: Twelfth Session, Supplement No. 8.

United Nations Refugee Fund. Accounts for the year ended 31 December 1956 and Report of the Board of Auditors. A/3622. N.Y., 1957. 10 p. GAOR: Twelfth Session, Supplement No. 6C.

Special Report of the Committee on South West Africa. A/3625. N.Y., 1957. 8 p. GAOR: Twelfth Session, Supplement No. 12A.

Report of the Committee on South West Africa. A/3626. N.Y., 1957. 43 p. GAOR: Twelfth Session, Supplement No. 12.

Economic Applications of Atomic Energy. Power General and Industrial and Agricultural Uses. (Report of the Secretary-General). E/3005, ST/ECA/48. N.Y., May 1957. 108 p. Sales No.: 1957.II.B.2.

Resolutions adopted at the twenty-fourth Session (Geneva, 2 July - 2 August 1957) of the Economic and Social Council. E/3048. N.Y., August 1957. 32 p. ECOSOC Official Records: Twenty-fourth session, Supplement No. 1.

Report of the Preparatory Commission of the International Atomic Energy Agency. GC.1/1, GOV/1. N.Y., 1957. 55 p. (booklet).

Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council. Supplement 1952-1955. ST/PSCA/1/Add.1. N.Y., 1957. (12 December 1956). 180 p. \$1.75. Sales No.: 1957.VII.1.

The aging of populations and its economic and social implications. ST/SOA/Series A/26.-(Population Studies No. 26). N.Y., December 1956. 168 p. \$1.75. Sales No.: 1956.XIII.6.

Housing through non-profit organizations. Seminar sponsored by the United Nations and the Government of Denmark in collaboration with the Organization of American States for participants from Latin American countries. Copenhagen, September-October 1954. ST/SOA/SER.C/10. N.Y., September 1956. 121 p. \$1.25. Sales No.: 1956.IV.7.

ILO

Proposed *International Convention* concerning the protection of performers, manufacturers of phonographic records and broadcasting organizations. (Documentation prepared by the ILO for the information of governments). Geneva, 1957. 39 p.

* Printed documents may be procured from the Canadian sales agents for United Nations Publications, The Ryerson Press, 299 Queen Street West, Toronto, and Periodica Inc., 5112 avenue Papineau, Montreal, or from their sub-agents: Book Room Limited, Chronicle Building, Halifax; McGill University Book Store, Montreal; University of Toronto Press and Book Store, Toronto; University of British Columbia Book Store, Vancouver; University of Montreal Book Store, Montreal; and Les Presses Universitaires, Laval, Quebec. Certain mimeographed document series are available by annual subscription. Further information can be obtained from Sales and Circulation Section, United Nations, New York. UNESCO publications can be obtained from their sales agents, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, and Periodica Inc., 5112 avenue Papineau, Montreal. All publications and documents may be consulted at certain designated libraries listed in "External Affairs", February 1954, p. 67.

UNESCO

John Amos Comenius, 1592-1670. Selections. Introduction by Jean Piaget. Paris 1957. 193-p. \$3.25.

Committee of Experts on Neighbouring Rights. Monaco, 1957. (UNESCO Copyright Bulletin, Vol. X, No. 1, 1957). Paris 1957. 199 p. (Eng.-Fr.-Sp.).

Training of primary teacher training staffs. (XXth International Conference on Public Education, Geneva, 1957). 202 p. \$2.50. UNESCO, Paris/IBE, Geneva. Publication No. 182.

Expansion of school building. (XXth International Conference on Public Education, Geneva, 1957). 244 p. \$2.50. UNESCO, Paris/IBE, Geneva. Publication No. 184.

WHO

Executive Board, Twentieth Session, Geneva, 27 and 28 May 1957: Minutes. Geneva, 1957. 98 p. *Resolutions. Annexes.* Geneva, August 1957. 35 p. Official Records of WHO, No. 80.

b) Mimeographed Documents:

Fifth Report of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission. DC/113. 11 September 1957. 3 p. Annexes 1 - 13.


Report of the International Law Commission covering the work of its ninth session. A/CN.4/110. 4 July 1957. 37 p.

Fourth Report of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission. DC/112. 1 August 1957. 2 p. Annexes 1 to 12.

Economic Commission for Latin America. Annual Report to the Economic and Social Council, covering the period 15 May 1956 - 29 May 1957. E/2998, E/CN.12/451. 29 May 1957. 230 p.

Annual Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. E/3015 (A/3585). 6 June 1957. 92 p. Annexes I to III.

Financing of economic development. The international flow of private capital, 1956. (Report by the Secretary-General). E/3021. 21 June 1957.



SUPPLEMENTARY INCOME-TAX CONVENTION

On September 26, 1957 Mr. John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, on behalf of the United States, and Mr. N. A. Robertson, Ambassador of Canada in Washington, and Mr. Donald Fleming, Minister of Finance of Canada, on behalf of Canada, exchanged the instruments of ratification with respect to the supplementary income-tax convention of August 8, 1956 between the United States and Canada. The convention was brought into force by this exchange.

The convention, which was signed at Ottawa on August 8, 1953, further modifies and supplements the convention and accompanying protocol of March 4, 1942, for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion in the case of income taxes, as modified by the supplementary convention of June 12, 1950. The convention became effective with respect to taxable years beginning on and after January 1, 1957.

This new convention reflects further experience in connection with tax problems arising from the application of the existing treaty provisions for the avoidance of double taxation and from the economic relations between the two countries.

From left to right, above: Mr. Fleming, Mr. Dulles, and Mr. Robertson.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



CANADA


November 1957

Vol. 9 No. 11

• EXTERNAL AFFAIRS is issued monthly in English and French by the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa. It provides reference material on Canada's external relations and reports on the current work and activities of the Department. Any material in this publication may be reproduced. Citation of EXTERNAL AFFAIRS as the source would be appreciated. Subscription rates: ONE DOLLAR per year (Students, FIFTY CENTS) post free. Remittances, payable to the Receiver General of Canada, should be sent to the Queen's Printer, Ottawa, Canada.

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Department of External Affairs
Ottawa, Canada



SPEECH FROM THE THRONE

Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II as she reads the Speech from the Throne opening the First Session of the 23rd Parliament. With her is HRH The Prince Philip.

External Affairs In Parliament

Speech From The Throne

THE First Session of Canada's 23rd Parliament was opened October 14 by Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II. It was an historic occasion in that it was the first time that the Parliament of Canada has been opened by a reigning Sovereign.

The delivery by the Queen of the Speech from the Throne was the climax of a triumphant visit paid to Ottawa by Her Majesty and HRH The Prince Philip.

That part of the Speech from the Throne devoted to Canada's international relations was as follows:

You have come here to form this new Parliament from across a great land, a land far wider than either of those older countries that first gave it birth. I am proud to contemplate the great heritage of this nation—the minerals, the forests, the lands, the waters, the sources of power and energy which fire your ever-growing industries. But I am more proud to contemplate the spirit and ideas which brought this country to nationhood, and now, drawing reinforcement and enrichment from many lands and peoples, have given Canada a national character peculiarly her own.

Yet in this age no nation can live unto itself. Through the overcast of international affairs the bright constellation of the Commonwealth illumines our times. The continuing admission of nations newly guided to self-government both broadens and strengthens our diverse Commonwealth as more of us come to share the great inheritance of those institutions and ideals which make our association a quiet but pervasive force for good in an unquiet world. This was manifest when the Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth met in London last June to talk of great affairs; and again, only a few days ago when on Canada's invitation, the Finance Ministers met at Mont Tremblant and in a comradely spirit laid plans for a Commonwealth Trade and Economic Conference to take place next year.

A similar spirit has been evident in the Colombo Plan, which is a part of the high venture of the peoples of South and South-East Asia as they move along the path of national development, and which my government will continue to support.

My Ministers believe that Canada's active participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is essential for the preservation of peace. You will accordingly be asked to maintain modern defence forces in being which, together with those of our allies, will continue to act as a deterrent to attack upon any part of that alliance.

While Canada plays a full part in these particular associations, my Ministers remain convinced that in the wider forum of the United

Nations we must also continue to seek such agreements as will preserve security and bring about a wide measure of disarmament. Indeed we must continue to hope that through the United Nations the aspirations of men and women for peace and security will be fulfilled.

Colombo Plan Contribution

Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker announced in the House of Commons October 22 that, subject to the approval of Parliament, Canada's contribution to the Colombo Plan in 1958 would be \$35 million.

Text of the Prime Minister's statement was as follows:

Mr. Speaker, in connection with a question asked by the hon. member for Essex East (Mr. Martin) relative to the prospective Canadian contribution to the Colombo Plan and also questions that were asked by some other hon. members, I wish to advise that, subject to the approval of Parliament, Canada will contribute \$35 million to the Colombo Plan in 1958.

For some years now the basic Canadian contribution to the Colombo Plan has stood at \$26.4 million. In order to meet certain additional expenditures in connection with the Warsak Project in Pakistan and the Canada-India Reactor, this amount was supplemented by a further \$8 million both this year and last. We have now decided to do away with this idea of a basic contribution to which additional amounts are added. We shall therefore seek the authority of Parliament to provide that the total vote for Canada's regular Colombo Plan programme be, as I stated a moment ago, \$35 million for this year.

In connection with the expenditures being made thereunder we have agreed first, to provide \$1 million worth of flour to the Government of Ceylon. The proceeds of the sale of this flour will be used by the Government of Ceylon for various development projects.

Second, the Government of Pakistan has drawn our attention to the very serious floods that occurred recently in West Pakistan and to the resulting need for food grains. We have therefore offered \$2 million worth of wheat to the Government of Pakistan out of Colombo Plan funds and the Government of Pakistan has indicated that this would be very welcome. This wheat will be shipped very shortly.

In India, we have proposed to the government of that country that the balance of counterpart funds held by the Indian Government which have been created by the sale of Canadian commodities supplied under the Colombo Plan will be used to meet the further rupee costs of the Canada-India Reactor. These counterpart funds amount to the equivalent of \$2,900,000.

In connection with other proposals concerning the Colombo Plan programme, they will be announced in due course after they have been discussed with the governments concerned. Might I add that later today the leader of the Canadian Delegation to the Colombo Plan Conference at Saigon, Hon. W. J. Browne, will be announcing in that country what I have stated here.

Discussions with United Kingdom Prime Minister

Prime Minister Harold Macmillan of the United Kingdom visited Ottawa on Friday evening October 25 and part of Saturday October 26, accompanied by Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, Foreign Secretary, following their discussions with President Eisenhower and other officials of the United States.

During their stay they discussed with Prime Minister Diefenbaker and members of the Cabinet the questions that had arisen in Washington.

Prime Minister Diefenbaker made the following statement on the visit in the House of Commons October 28:

The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, accompanied by their officials, visited Ottawa on Friday evening and part of Saturday after their conversations in Washington and we—certain of my colleagues and myself—had the opportunity to discuss the questions that had arisen in Washington.

Since the meeting of the Prime Ministers in London in June I have been in close touch with Mr. Macmillan and naturally I welcomed the opportunity to discuss matters of common interest.

The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the Foreign Secretary described the conversations which they had had with President Eisenhower and Mr. Dulles. With the leave of the House I should like to table the communiqué issued in Washington on October 26 by the Prime Minister and the President of the United States.

Hon. members, I am sure, have been impressed by the obvious importance of this meeting and its significance in the world today. As we chatted with the Prime Minister we were greatly impressed by his appreciation of the interdependence of the free nations. That attitude is fully shared by this government. The discussions that took place in Washington were not intended to reach conclusions on matters of detail, and far less was it intended to arrive at formal and signed agreements. Just as I said a moment ago in answer to my friend the hon. member for Algoma East (Mr. Pearson), the destination was indicated, the direction was determined, but the means to achieve either were not in any way finalized.

I believe this conference between the Prime Minister and the President in Washington has made possible great forward steps not only by the partnership of the United Kingdom and the United States, but also in the fact that it provides an assured opportunity for many countries to broaden and strengthen their peace and security within NATO. I think the communiqué makes it clear—and our conversations certainly supported that impression—not only that the Government of the United States and the Government of the United Kingdom were in close agreement in their approach to the basic problem of the free world but, in addition, that they determined to open a clear road on which Western countries could go forward in interdependence and co-operation.

The hon. gentleman would not expect me to comment in detail, but I would draw the attention of the House to many passages in which practical measures of co-operation are indicated. Stress is once more laid on the importance of disarmament and also, in the absence of effective disarmament, on the furtherance of collective defence arrangements. Thus to the agreed ideology of the free nations there can be added a greater sharing of scientific knowledge accompanied and reinforced by co-operation in the economic field.

As Canadians we welcome this further increase of common understanding and, I believe, imaginative thinking on the part of two great powers with whom we are so closely associated. The results achieved in Washington will have particular significance in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which will be one of the principal means through which practical results can be achieved.

The hon. member mentioned the December meeting. No final determination has been made as yet regarding the attendance of heads of government, although I think we can look forward with certainty to such a meeting taking place. As he said, I propose to attend the meeting. I understand also that proposals may be sent out to the heads of NATO countries to be present at the important discussions which will inevitably take place at that time.

As far as the discussions are concerned which took place here on Friday and Saturday, they are of a confidential character and I am sure the hon. gentleman will understand that they could not properly be repeated in full detail in this House. However, I feel that a great step forward has been made, and that any of those separations that kept us apart at any time since 1945 have been closed as a result of the meetings that have taken place. The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the United States met as friends who were in the war together. They met with the objective of bringing about that unity which assured peace in the days of war, and peace with victory.

Today, as a result of the meeting there, I am extremely hopeful that the essential character of what may prove to be a milestone on the pathway to security of the free world has been attained. The objective unites us. The dangers of the present give us a cohesion similar to that which existed in the days of war. With unity and firm determination I believe that the Washington meeting will in the years ahead represent a step worthy of the best in both the nations represented, and that it will in general, in its objective, be acceptable to all those nations which are joined together in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.



PRIME MINISTERS MEET

Prime Minister Harold Macmillan of the United Kingdom was received warmly on his arrival in Ottawa October 25 after conversations with President Eisenhower in Washington.

From left to right, above: Mr. Graham McInnes, Chief of Protocol, Department of External Affairs; Mr. Sidney E. Smith, Secretary of State for External Affairs; Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker, and Mr. Macmillan.

United States-Canadian Joint Committee On Trade and Economic Affairs

THE THIRD meeting of the United States - Canadian Joint Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs was held in Washington on October 7 and 8. Previous meetings of the Committee were held on March 16, 1954 in Washington and on September 26, 1955 in Ottawa.

The Committee was established as a result of an Exchange of Notes on November 12, 1953. It was intended to serve as a forum for periodic consultation between those Canadian and United States Cabinet members who had a major responsibility for questions of economic policy. Specifically the Committee was entrusted with the following functions:

- (1) To consider matters affecting the harmonious economic relations between the two countries;
- (2) In particular, to exchange information and views on matters which might adversely affect the high level of mutually profitable trade which has been built up;
- (3) To report to the respective Governments on such discussions in order that consideration may be given to measures deemed appropriate and necessary to improve economic relations and to encourage the flow of trade.

In addition to Mr. Donald Fleming, Minister of Finance, who acted as Chairman, the Canadian Delegation to the most recent meeting of the Committee included Mr. Sidney E. Smith, Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Douglas S. Harkness, Minister of Agriculture, and Mr. Gordon Churchill, Minister of Trade and Commerce. The United States Delegation was chaired by Mr. John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State, and included Mr. Robert B. Anderson, the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Ezra Taft Benson, the Secretary of Agriculture, and Mr. Sinclair Weeks, the Secretary of Commerce.

In accordance with normal practice the Canadian Ambassador in Washington and the United States Ambassador in Ottawa, as well as senior officials from both sides, were present at the meeting of the Committee.

This was the first opportunity for the United States members of the Committee to exchange views on trade and economic subjects with members of the new Canadian Government. The discussions covered a wide range of problems in which the two countries have a current interest. In particular, the meeting enabled Canadian Ministers to raise matters which have been causing special concern in Canada and to which the Prime Minister of Canada had already had occasion to refer in his speech at Dartmouth on September 7.

Surplus Wheat Disposal

Foremost among these matters is the United States programme for the disposal of surplus wheat by the payment of subsidies and by such means as barter and sales for local currency. The extent to which this programme may

be held to have affected Canada's normal commercial exports of wheat is indicated by the fact that, while United States exports rose from 347 million bushels of wheat to 547 million bushels between the crop years 1955-56 and 1956-57, Canadian exports over the same period fell from 309 million to 261 million bushels.

The Canadian Government's view of these wheat surplus disposal programmes on the part of the United States was put in the following terms by the Prime Minister when speaking at Dartmouth:

A pressing concern in Canada is the question of the United States agricultural disposal programme, and in particular that of wheat and wheat flour, which has been more vigorous and more aggressive in the last two years, and which denies fair competition for markets. Canada has a carryover of wheat which amounted to over 700 million bushels this year. It is vital to Canada's economy that some 300 million bushels of wheat be exported every year.

Canada can compete for her share of the market of the world, providing other nations follow recognized competitive practices. The share of the world market for wheat by the United States has been increasing in recent years by its policies of surplus disposal, and that increase has come about mainly at the expense of Canada's export trade, which has been decreasing. The surplus disposal legislation of the United States has made it difficult, if not impossible, for Canada to maintain its fair share of the world's market. Canada cannot compete for agricultural markets against the dominant economic power of the United States, with its export subsidies, barter deals and sales for foreign currency.

At the meeting of the Joint Committee in Washington, the Canadian Delegation reiterated this position with special emphasis on the harmful effects which barter transactions had on normal commercial marketings of wheat by exporting countries. For their part, the United States Delegation reiterated their commitment "in all surplus disposal activities to avoid, insofar as possible, interfering with normal commercial marketings". They also agreed that continuing consultation between the United States and Canada in this matter would help "to keep to a minimum any harmful effects of surplus disposal activities". With respect to barter transactions, an assurance was given to the Canadian Delegation that under the barter programme as revised earlier this year "each barter contract must result in a net increase in exports of the agricultural commodity involved".

Another matter of specific concern to Canada which was taken up at the Washington meeting was the current review of United States duties on lead and zinc. Attention was drawn to the possibility that these duties might be raised and to the serious difficulties Canadian exporters of these metals would face as a result of such a step. For their part the United States Delegation pointed to the problem confronting their domestic producers of lead and zinc. They also explained that any tariff action taken "would have the primary objective of maintaining a normal relationship between imports and domestic production" and would conform with the procedures laid down in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

Trade and Payments

On more general lines, the Committee considered the trade and payments relationships between Canada and the United States. The Canadian Delegation stressed the great importance for Canada of developments in United States commercial policies in the light of the very high proportion of Canada's trade that was being conducted with the United States. They pointed out that "the volume and variety of goods entering into this trade made Canada by far the

most important commercial customer of the United States and vice versa". The position in 1956 had been that "well over \$4 billion worth of United States goods—or approximately one-quarter of the total cash exports of the United States—were sold in Canada". By contrast, Canada's own exports to the United States in that year had amounted to less than \$3 billion. Both countries agreed that in formulating their trade policies it was important for each of them to "show careful regard for the interests of the other".

A matter of equal importance to Canada which was raised at the Washington meeting relates to United States investment in Canada's natural resources and in important sectors of the manufacturing industry. The Canadian Ministers took the opportunity at Washington to put in its proper perspective the concern that is being expressed from time to time in Canada regarding the nature and extent of this investment. They explained that the inflow of United States capital into Canada was welcomed and its contribution to the growth of Canada's economy recognized. At the same time they expressed "the hope of the Canadian Government that all United States companies participating in the expansion of the Canadian economy would develop and maintain closer and mutually beneficial relationships with the people of Canada".



AT CANADIAN PAVILION

A group of visitors, including Dr. Ludger Westrick, State Secretary, Economic Ministry, Federal Republic of Germany, and Dr. Gerhard Friehe, Director of the Berlin Fairs, are shown a display of Canadian-made living room furniture in the Canadian Pavilion at the Berlin Industrial Fair. The visitors are escorted by Mr. R. C. O'Hagan, Vice-Consul, Canadian Military Mission, Berlin.

International Claims

Most governments today are faced with many problems of international claims whose scope and complexity have been greatly increased by two World Wars, the depression between these wars, and the adoption by certain governments of a policy of nationalizing or expropriating property. This article will endeavour to show what principles have guided states in the protection abroad of the interests of their nationals, how the types of claims currently being dealt with arose, and how they have been, and are being, dealt with by international organizations and by Canada.

In the past one hundred years governments have increasingly been concerned with requests by their own nationals for assistance in the protection of life, limb or property abroad. They have also been concerned with an ever-growing number of claims for restitution of property arbitrarily taken, or for compensation in respect of death, personal injury, maltreatment or loss of or damage to property. From time to time funds have been collected from foreign governments, and international and domestic tribunals or commissions have been established in order to make an equitable distribution of such funds amongst the eligible claimants. Historically, one of the better known of these tribunals was that which functioned for several years in the United States and dealt with claims for compensation from United States citizens who had suffered from the depredations of the Confederate raider "The Alabama"; as this ship had been constructed and fitted out in England, the British Government, after years of negotiation, eventually agreed to place a lump-sum at the disposal of the United States for distribution to the claimants. There are many other instances of tribunals having been established to adjudicate upon losses arising out of bombardments, civil wars, revolutionary uprisings and boundary incidents. In consequence, over the years certain fundamental principles regarding claims have found general recognition in the practice of these tribunals and of states. One of these principles is that one state will only intervene with another state—that is sponsor a claim—on behalf of a person who was a national of the sponsoring state at the time of the alleged wrong or injury; another principle is that intervention usually takes place only when municipal or local remedies have been exhausted and in cases in which there has been discrimination or a denial of justice; however, these and other principles have been modified in many treaties and other international agreements.

First World War Claims

The First World War saw a loss of life and destruction of property on a scale hitherto unknown, not only among the armed combatants but also among civilians. In addition, the complicated structure of international trade was seriously dislocated and many well-known currencies, such as the German mark and the Austrian crown, ceased to have any value for all practical purposes. The problem of reparation bulked large in the minds of the framers of the Treaty of Versailles. As funds were received from Germany, recipient countries established tribunals to distribute them. Thus, in Canada, there were four successive Reparations Commissions, the last one making its final report in March 1933. Among other things, these Commissions had to hear and adjudicate upon claims arising out of the sinking of the "Lusitania" in 1915.

Broadly speaking, claims which occupy attention at the present time can be divided into three main classes: claims arising out of contracts and other obligations entered into before the outbreak of the Second World War, sometimes referred to as pre-war debt claims; those arising out of the war itself, or war claims; and those arising out of post-war nationalization, expropriation or other taking of property. Specific claims may, of course, arise at any time; an example is the Canadian claim which was recently presented to the Bulgarian Government and which arose out of the deaths of four Canadians in the crash of an Israeli airliner shot down by Bulgarian air defence forces on July 27, 1955.*

Pre-war Debt Claims

As Germany had always been a prominent trading nation, was partitioned after the Second World War and had borrowed extensively between the two World Wars, the settlement of that country's pre-war indebtedness gave rise to most complicated problems. Beginning with the Dawes Loan of 1924 and ending with the Young Loan of 1930 scores of foreign loans were floated abroad, and especially in the United States by the German Government itself, by German states and municipalities, and by German industrial enterprises and churches. Inevitably, with the sudden onset of the depression, some of these debtors defaulted. Matters became more critical when the main German banks were obliged in September 1931 to enter into the so-called Standstill Agreement to defer payment of short-term credits. In June 1933, after the advent of the Nazi régime, normal business relationships with Germany were further impeded by the institution of the Conversion Office for German Foreign Debts, which represented a serious form of foreign exchange control. The position of Germany's foreign creditors became more and more difficult, and the outbreak of the war put an end to the intermittent attempts which had been made to ease their plight.

By the time the war ended Germany had no government and no resources in foreign exchange, many accounts credited in the territory of the Axis powers to Allied nationals or governments had been taken over by the Axis custodians of enemy properties, and many debtors had disappeared or were in territory under Soviet control. However, after the monetary reform of 1948 and because of large-scale Allied—especially American—aid, a German debt settlement became a practical proposition. It became a reality in 1953 when the Federal Republic of Germany and twenty other countries, including Canada, signed the Agreement on German External Debts following a five months' conference in London and some two years of preparatory work. This Agreement represented a considerable achievement, for not only had German capacity to pay to be fully taken into account, but many divergent opinions among the creditors themselves concerning the settlement had to be resolved. As a result of this Agreement most German external bonds were reserviced, and arrangements made for dealing with Standstill Agreement claims, blocked Deutsche mark accounts, payments into the Conversion Office, currency options, Reichsmark and goldmark debts and gold clauses in foreign currency loans as well as old commercial claims and innumerable similar claims. An Arbitral Tribunal and Mixed Commission, to which the Signatory Governments can refer matters in dispute, was also established.

*See Department of External Affairs Press Release No. 17 of March 21, 1956.

Second World War Claims

The settlement of claims arising out of the Second World War presented problems even more intractable than those that followed the First World War. An effort was made to deal with this question on a territorial basis, i.e. with each country accepting responsibility for the settlement of claims arising out of incidents occurring on its own territory (this is the basis recognized in the various peace treaties). Although in theory this approach appeared practicable, in practice it left much to be desired: for example, some countries provided little or no compensation for their own nationals, let alone for foreigners; some solution had to be found for meritorious claims for losses on the high seas, of which the sinking of the S.S. "Athenia" was an outstanding example, especially for Canada; and several countries, while providing compensation for damage to tangible property, provided no compensation for damage to intangible property.

A source of funds is obviously a condition precedent to the settlement of any type of claim. For Canadian war claims arising out of the Second World War, the principal source arose out of the Final Act of the Paris Conference on Reparation from Germany. This Act, which is often referred to as the Paris Agreement on German Reparation or, simply, the Paris Agreement, was signed in Paris in December 1945 by the governments of certain countries, including Canada, which had participated in the war against Germany. It provided for the establishment in Brussels of the Inter-Allied Reparation Agency (IARA) which has an Assembly and an international Secretariat. Nineteen governments are members of the IARA, whose function is to allocate German reparations among the member governments in accordance with the provisions of the Paris Agreement. The chief forms of reparation made available are industrial capital equipment, German external assets, merchant shipping, captured enemy supplies and Russian reciprocal deliveries which consisted of foodstuffs and raw materials which the U.S.S.R. had undertaken to deliver in return for industrial equipment and other materials received from the Western Zones of Germany.

Under the Paris Agreement German reparation was divided into A and B Categories. German external assets within the jurisdiction of the members of the Agency, as well as those of certain neutral and ex-enemy countries, comprised the major portion of Category A, which also included all other forms of German reparation except those included in Category B. Category B included the industrial and other capital equipment removed from Germany, merchant ships, and inland water transport. Each member government was given a percentage entitlement, this being determined on the basis of the material damage its economy had suffered, loss of human life, and contribution to the general war effort. In allocating current reparation, efforts have been made to allow for partial renunciations and to correct, so far as possible, imbalances caused by overdrafts or underdrafts. Canada's chief course of German reparation is, and always has been, German external assets.

Ultimately, in Canada, the whole question of war claims was reviewed by the Advisory Commission on War Claims,* the majority of its recommendations being accepted by the Canadian Government. A War Claims Fund was established into which funds received under the Paris Agreement and the

*War Claims, Report of the Advisory Commission, February 25, 1952.

Treaty of Peace with Japan have been, and are being, paid. As it was impossible to foretell how much would eventually find its way into this Fund, let alone the total of the claims which would eventually be found to be valid, a strict system of priorities was established, in particular with regard to property claims. In practice, this system has worked well: under it, all death, personal injury and maltreatment claims have been paid in full, while all valid property claims up to an amount of \$30,000 have been paid. In considering claims the Commission followed, where applicable, the accepted principles of international law, due attention being paid to the decisions of the tribunals which dealt with such claims after the First World War. Thus, a claimant, in order to be eligible, had to be a Canadian, as defined, at the time of the act complained of, as well as at the time of presentation of the claim. This stipulation eliminated the property claims of many persons who emigrated to Canada immediately before and after the war.

Corporations presented a special problem owing to the size of their claims and the fact that so many were resident or non-resident-owned investment or foreign business corporations. The solution was to stipulate that, in order to be eligible, the corporation had to have had a Canadian charter and to have been carrying on active trading operations in Canada either itself or through one or more subsidiaries at the time of the loss or damage as well as at the time of presentation of the claim. However, where the corporation itself was not eligible, shareholder claims were admissible on the same basis as individual claims.

Death and personal injury claims followed the principles in use in Canadian courts, except that in cases involving injuries awards were restricted to items of pecuniary loss, actual or estimated. Awards have also been made to members of the Armed Forces of Canada and civilians who suffered exceptional hardship in enemy concentration, prisoner-of-war or internment camps. The classes of property claims were varied, but here again the decisions of former tribunals were of the greatest value. Exchange rates presented peculiar difficulties. As regards valuations, except for money claims, pre-war valuations were used, the basis being market, and not replacement, value. It was also necessary to take into consideration payments made, or likely to be made, from other sources, e.g. payments received from foreign governments under peace treaties or under equal treatment agreements on war damage compensation.

In the case of war claims against Italy, the stipulated treaty procedure of submission of individual claims by the Canadian Government to the Italian Government, and the reference of disputes to a conciliation commission, was not followed; instead, a lump-sum payment of 290 million lire from the Italian Government was negotiated, the distribution of this sum amongst interested claimants being left to the Canadian War Claims Commission and the Minister of Finance. As regards Japan, the stipulated treaty procedure has been followed, the claims having been submitted by the Canadian Government to the Japanese Government. Such Japanese claims are of two classes, firstly, claims in respect of property losses in Japan arising out of the war and, secondly, claims arising out of the Sino-Japanese "incident" of 1937-1941. In the former class of claim the treaty provides for the submission of any dispute to a Property Commission in Tokyo, which has a neutral chairman.

(Continued on page 352)

Role of the United Nations

Excerpt from the Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization from June 16, 1956 to June 15, 1957. Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld's term of office as Secretary-General has been renewed for five years beginning April 10, 1958.



—Karsh Photo

Dag Hammarskjöld

The events of the past year have, I believe, cast a clearer light upon the role of the United Nations in these times. The Charter, read as a whole, does not endow the United Nations with any of the attributes of a super state or of a body active outside the framework of decisions of member governments. The United Nations is, rather, an instrument for negotiation among, and to some extent for, governments. It is also an instrument added to the time-honored means of diplomacy for concerting action by governments in support of the goals of the Charter. This is the role the Organization has played, sometimes successfully, sometimes with disappointing setbacks, throughout its life.

From time to time complaints are heard about the limitations upon the Organization's power. It has even been suggested that, unless these limitations are corrected, the usefulness of the United Nations is so questionable that the main effort of the governments in the search for peace should be concentrated in other directions.

This view does less than justice to the contributions of the United Nations in its short life. Especially, it fails to take into account that the real limitations upon action by the Organization do not derive from the provisions of the Charter. They result from facts of international life in our age which are not likely to be by-passed by a different approach or surmounted by attempts at merely constitutional reform.

To turn aside from the United Nations now because it cannot be transformed into a world authority enforcing the law upon the nations would be to erase all the steady, though slow and painful, advances that have been made and to close the door to hopes for the future of world society, toward which present efforts and experiences should be at least a modest stepping stone.

We should, rather, recognize the United Nations for what it is—an admittedly imperfect but indispensable instrument of nations in working for a peaceful evolution toward a more just and secure world order. The dynamic forces at work in this stage of human history have made world organization necessary. The balance of these forces has also set the limits within which the

power of world organization can develop at each step and beyond which progress, when the balance of forces so permits, will be possible only by processes of organic growth in the system of custom and law prevailing in the society of nations.

Processes of Adjustment

These processes of adjustment take time. Systems of alliance, maintained side by side with the United Nations in recognition of the prevailing balance of forces, may serve a useful purpose during the period through which we are passing. However, most of us agree that such systems of alliance, like other traditional means of diplomacy and defense of the national interest, are limited in their value as safeguards of the present and future security and welfare of our countries. Nations and groups of nations will never again be able to live and to arrogate judgment unto themselves in international affairs in ways which once were a matter of course.

The greatest need today is to blunt the edges of conflict among the nations, not to sharpen them. If properly used, the United Nations can serve a diplomacy of reconciliation better than other instruments available to the member states. All the varied interests and aspirations of the world meet in its precincts upon the common ground of the Charter. Conflicts may persist for long periods without an agreed solution and groups of states may actively defend special and regional interests. Nevertheless, and in spite of temporary developments in the opposite direction under the influence of acute tension, the tendency in the United Nations is to wear away, or break down, differences, thus helping toward solutions which approach the common interest and application of the principles of the Charter.

I believe that the criticism of the system of one vote for one nation, irrespective of size or strength, as constituting an obstacle to arriving at just and representative solutions tends to exaggerate the problem. The General Assembly is not a parliament of elected individual members; it is a diplomatic meeting in which the delegates of members states represent governmental policies, and these policies are subject to all the influences that would prevail in international life in any case. Smaller nations are not in the habit of banding together against the larger nations whose power to affect international security and well-being is so much greater than their own. Nor do I see justification for talk about the responsible and the irresponsible among the nations. Finally, the two-thirds rule applied to all major decisions in the General Assembly should serve as a reasonable assurance to those who may not fully share the views that have been here expressed.

In this connection, it is worth recalling that the "uniting for peace" resolution, in establishing a procedure intended to safeguard the application of the relevant provisions of the Charter—Articles 10, 11, 12 and 51—in support of the maintenance of peace, did not constitutionally transfer to the General Assembly any of the enforcement powers reserved to the Security Council by the Charter. Enforcement action by the United Nations under Chapter VII continues to be reserved to the Security Council. The relative role and significance of the Assembly and the Council, in practice, reflect general political conditions playing within the constitutional framework which, thus, was maintained in line with the basic concepts of the Charter.

With its increase in membership, the United Nations more fully mirrors the realities of the present world situation than ever before, although necessarily the picture given in the debates and votes in the United Nations can be truly evaluated only after a careful analysis. The United Nations reflects, but is in no sense a cause of, the renaissance of Asia. The awakening of Africa, and the other great changes that are under way in the balance of power and relationships of the peoples are likewise part of the dynamics of history itself. As always, they bring with them many grave problems of adjustment. These all too easily may become the occasion for arousing passion, fear and hatred, and lead in turn to violent upheavals and to the ultimate disaster of war in this atomic age.

The functions of debate and vote are an essential part of the processes by which the United Nations can assist the governments in avoiding these dangers and in guiding the development in constructive and peaceful directions. But if it is accepted that the primary value of the United Nations is to serve as an instrument for negotiation among governments and for concerting action by governments in support of the goals of the Charter, it is also necessary, I believe, to use the legislative procedures of the United Nations consistently in ways which will promote these ends. In an organization of sovereign states, voting victories are likely to be illusory unless they are steps in the direction of winning lasting consent to a peaceful and just settlement of the questions at issue.

Full weight should also be given to the fact that the processes of adjustment and negotiation which the institutions of the United Nations make available to the member governments embrace much more than the public proceedings of its councils and Assembly. In the diplomacy of world organization the quiet work of preparing the ground, of accommodation of interest and viewpoint, of conciliation and mediation, all that goes into the winning of consent to agreed solutions and common programs, this forms a basis upon which the United Nations can become an increasingly influential and effective force to aid the governments in pursuit of the goals of the Charter.

There are, I believe, promising and practical opportunities for improving the practices and strengthening the institutions of the United Nations in this area of multilateral diplomacy. Especially in the past two years we have begun to explore these opportunities in a number of ways with generally positive results. I hope this evolution of emphasis and practice will be pursued and broadened in the future. This seems to be a more urgent task than to attempt formal constitutional changes, the consideration of which the Committee of the whole Assembly, charged with studying the problem of time and place for a Charter review conference, at all events unanimously wished to postpone until a later stage.

United Nations Day Observed

APPROPRIATE observances were held in Canada on the occasion of United Nations Day, October 24.

A statement was issued by Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker emphasizing the importance of the United Nations in the world today, and a radio address was given by Mr. Sidney E. Smith, Secretary of State for External Affairs.

The United Nations flag was flown from the eastern flag pole of the Centre Block of the Parliament Buildings, and the flags of all United Nations member countries were displayed in front of the Parliament Buildings.

During the course of United Nations Day, the Dominion Carillonneur gave a recital which featured the national anthems of the countries whose nationals are officials of the Twelfth Session of the General Assembly; President of the Security Council; President of ECOSOC; President of the Trusteeship Council, and President of the International Court of Justice.

The national service of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation carried special programmes in connection with United Nations Day. The International Service of the CBC broadcast a documentary programme on Canada and the United Nations over some of its transmissions, and special commentaries marked the occasion on other transmissions.

As in previous years, the United Nations Association in Canada and other Canadian non-governmental organizations encouraged the holding of non-official celebrations throughout Canada. Special speakers addressed groups across the country and in many communities there were ceremonies at which United Nations flags were raised.

Statement by Prime Minister

Mr. Diefenbaker's statement was as follows:

October 24 is United Nations Day—the twelfth anniversary of the ratification of the United Nations Charter and of the coming into being of the organization whose aims and ideals portray the kind of world for which we are striving.

This anniversary gives me a welcome opportunity to emphasize the important place that we assign to the United Nations in the realm of international relations. The United Nations was established to maintain international peace and security, to develop friendly relations among nations and to achieve international co-operation in solving problems of an economic, social or humanitarian nature. The Charter laid down these objectives and created the machinery designed to carry them to completion. In the twelve years of its existence, the United Nations has developed this machinery and adjusted its methods to meet the demands of a troubled world. The organization has had its difficulties and its setbacks. But in many important and dangerous issues its influence for peace has been so strong, and its facilities for conciliation so effective, that we must recognize its preservation and development as essential to our hopes for a more peaceful and prosperous world. It is encouraging to note that accumulating experience is constantly adding to the organization's ability to act as an effective instrument of mediation and of international co-operation in a great variety of fields.

The very important but often unheralded economic and humanitarian aspects of United Nations work are an excellent example of the forward strides which can and have been made. Outstanding in this field is the aid to under-developed countries which has been given through United Nations programmes of technical assistance and the advances in social and physical well-being which have been achieved throughout the world by the Specialized Agencies.

Because the United Nations is but the sum of its parts, we cannot expect fruitful and satisfactory results from its deliberations unless we ourselves are prepared to give full support to its aims and to its decisions. Therefore, we should today renew our determination to strengthen and develop the United Nations as the main safeguard for peace in this troubled world.

Mr. Smith's Address

The following is the text of Mr. Smith's radio address:

Today the 82 member countries of the United Nations are celebrating the 12th anniversary of the founding of this world-wide organization.

The men who met twelve years ago in San Francisco to draft the United Nations Charter were determined, after the experience of two world wars, to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war. They believed, as we do today, that this end could only be achieved by uniting their strength to maintain international peace and security, by ensuring that armed force should not be used to resolve disputes, save in the common interest, and by bringing about co-operation among nations to root out those evils—political, economic and social—which are the fundamental causes of war. These objectives were embodied in the United Nations Charter which first set out the aims and ideals to be achieved and then established the machinery designed to attain these objectives.

What is the role of the United Nations in the world today? The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Dag Hammarskjold, has aptly described it as an instrument of multilateral diplomacy. The United Nations is not a court of law or a parliament or a super-state. It is a place where one takes problems and seeks to negotiate equitable solutions. It is a flexible instrument of negotiations which can help to stop and prevent war and which can also help in all sorts of ways to hammer out solutions to other problems. But these things cannot be achieved without wise diplomacy by the members directly concerned and the assistance and goodwill of others. We should beware of asking too much of the United Nations. We should not avoid our responsibilities by placing them in the lap of the General Assembly with the idea that it is some kind of voting-machine equipped to solve all problems by some automatic process. The United Nations is an aid to diplomacy, not a substitute, and its existence does not do away with the necessity for developing national policies or pursuing the aims of the Charter by multilateral means.

Responsibility for the settlement of disputes which have led or may lead to armed conflict was vested by the United Nations Charter in the Security Council. This body was able in its first years to bring influence to bear to end hostilities in Indonesia and Kashmir, and later, because of the absence of the Soviet representative, to take effective action against aggression in Korea. The veto has, however, tended to hamper the Security Council in carrying out its responsibilities for the maintenance of world peace. Faced with this situation, the General Assembly has devised procedures which allow it to step in when the Security Council fails to act. The Suez crisis is a case in point. The General Assembly is, however, an effective instrument for peace only when the members concerned have that essential ingredient—goodwill. Failure to understand this factor led last year to charges that the United Nations applied a "double standard" to the Middle East and Hungarian questions. It is true that member states have sometimes displayed "double standards" by completely ignoring some Assembly resolutions while demanding that others be obeyed. But we are not thereby justified in levelling this charge at the United Nations itself.

The United Nations has a useful role to play in what the Secretary-General has aptly referred to as the "renaissance of Asia" and the "awakening of Africa", two of the post-war phenomena which are having a profound influence on the world today. Assembly discussions of the problems facing the powers responsible for colonial administrations have sometimes led to acrimonious debate and criticism which has not always been well-founded. On the whole, however, those discussions have brought to more and more of the members of the United Nations a sense of participating in the process by which the administering nations are leading their dependent territories to independence or self-government. The United Kingdom has given a lesson to the world in this regard. Beginning with Canada, she has launched nine new nations. In this very year, Ghana and Malaya have become new stars in the Commonwealth constellation.

In assessing the usefulness of the United Nations and the role which it can play in the world today, we often tend to forget the unpublicized but valuable work that it is doing in the economic and humanitarian fields. Solid achievements are being chalked up every day by the agencies which are dedicated to the stamping out of disease, to the improvement of the world's food supply and to the care and re-settlement of refugees, to mention only a few examples. Through our membership on the Economic and Social Council, Canada has been closely connected for the past two years with the more de-

tailed workings of these various programmes. We have seen how difficult it is sometimes to equate the justifiable demands of the under-developed countries with the resources which the more advanced countries can make available to assist them. But we have also seen how it is possible, by careful planning, to achieve a programme designed to yield the greatest results. A good example of such co-operation amongst nations is the United Nations Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance which has been devised to meet one of the most important needs of less-developed countries—that is, the need to acquire practical knowledge of the mechanical skills and advanced technology required for the development of a modern economy. In the social and humanitarian field, as opposed to the economic, the United Nations is slowly building a framework of agreements which can do much to protect the human rights and fundamental freedoms which we in Canada take for granted, but which, unfortunately, are still not enjoyed by millions of our fellow-men.

The United Nations has the failings of all representative bodies in this imperfect world. It reflects the picture of what we are today and reproduces in its council chambers the struggles and cross-currents which characterize the twentieth century. But it provides, at the same time, an opportunity to ease these struggles and to lessen the tensions which otherwise may stretch to the breaking point. We should work even harder to build up and to strengthen the moral authority of the United Nations so that the forces within it which work in opposition to its aims will cease to have influence. This attitude is fundamental to Canadian foreign policy. We intend to continue to work vigorously at the United Nations to create the kind of atmosphere which will enable all the nations and all the peoples of the world to achieve peace. The Canadian public deserve and Canadians everywhere want no less than that.

Syrian Complaint at United Nations

IN a letter of October 15, 1957 to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Syrian Delegation to the United Nations requested an urgent meeting of the General Assembly to consider the inscription of an item on the agenda entitled: "Complaint about threats to the security of Syria and to international peace." The letter enclosed a Syrian memorandum which referred to "the heavy, unprecedented and unwarranted concentration of Turkish troops . . . in close proximity to the Syrian-Turkish border" and to "other foreign pressures on the Syrian people and Government". Stating that the situation required United Nations measures because Syrian diplomatic initiatives had failed to realize "fruitful results", the memorandum recommended the establishment by the General Assembly of an impartial and international commission to investigate the situation on the Syrian-Turkish border.

In a letter of October 16, 1957 to the President of the General Assembly, the Delegation of the U.S.S.R. supported the Syrian proposal in terms which implied that the "other foreign pressures" mentioned in the Syrian memorandum (which had mentioned only Turkey by name) were intended to refer to the United States. The Soviet letter alleged that the United States was "prodding Turkey to commit aggression against Syria". A United States press release stated that it welcomed Assembly consideration of the situation in the Middle East and that a prompt investigation of developments should help to ease tensions, "as well as clarify who it is threatens peace in the area".

On October 18, 1957, the General Committee, having heard statements by both the Syrian and Turkish representatives, decided to recommend to the General Assembly the inclusion in the agenda of the Syrian item. The Syrian spokesman repeated the gist of the Syrian complaint and stated that no reply to Syrian protests to Turkey had been received until October 17, 1957. The Turkish representative pointed out that Turkey had stated its peaceful intentions in the Middle East, during the opening debate of the twelfth session of the Assembly and at other times, but that Turkey welcomed the inclusion of an item concerning the Middle East. Later the same day, the General Assembly, by a vote of 66 in favour, none against, with one abstention (Liberia), adopted the General Committee's recommendation.

Debate in Assembly

The debate on the item began on October 22, 1957 in plenary session, at which time the Turkish representative, leading off on a point of order, suggested informally that, in view of Turkish acceptance of an offer by King Saud of Saudi Arabia to mediate between Turkey and Syria, an appropriate delay in the consideration of the item would be in order. The deputy head of the Syrian Delegation stated his delegation's opposition and called for the continuation of the debate in order that "a full investigation" might take place (although subsequently he stated that mediatory efforts would not be excluded by a continuation of the debate). In the absence of a formal motion for delay at this stage, the discussion of the Syrian complaint commenced with statements of the views of various delegations, including those of Syria, Egypt, the U.S.S.R., Turkey and the United States. However, the representative of Paraguay then formally proposed a postponement of the discussion, "thus permitting the results of the Saudi Arabian initiative to become known". At

the request of the Syrian Delegation, the Assembly adopted instead, by 39 votes (including Canada) to ten, with 32 abstentions, a compromise motion to adjourn the debate for a period not exceeding three days.

The debate recommenced on October 25 and continued (the following week) on October 28, 29 and 30, coming to a conclusion on November 1, 1957. On the substance of the Syrian complaint, which, as the Syrian Foreign Minister's address to the Assembly on October 22 showed, was now clearly aimed at implicating the United States Government in the complaint against Turkey, there was a wide range of opinion expressed in various statements. On the question of Turkish troop concentrations, a majority of delegations participating in the debate left no doubt as to their firm belief in Turkey's peaceful intentions, although a number acknowledged that Syria was nevertheless entitled to have recourse to the United Nations if it was not satisfied as to Turkish intentions. On the broader issue of United States involvement, the debate was characterized by lengthy and vigorous attacks on the United States and the West by delegations from the Soviet bloc, to which the United States representative, amongst others, said, regretfully, he was forced to reply. The Western response, in general, dwelt on the theme that the "crisis" alleged to exist was an artificial one: and that the threat to peace arose not from any real threat of hostilities occurring on the Turkish-Syrian border but from tensions deliberately created by Soviet activities in relation to Syria and other countries in the Middle East. A number of delegations expressed their disapproval of the way in which the debate had been allowed to spread to include "cold war" implications.

In these circumstances, the objective of the debate, which logically ought to have been consideration of the appropriate means for meeting the Syrian request for General Assembly action, tended to be lost from sight. The Soviet delegate charged that procedural manoeuvring and other delaying tactics had been used by the Western delegations in an attempt to sidetrack the Syrian complaint. However, in fact it was not until October 30 that the Syrian Delegation formally submitted a specific resolution calling for the establishment of a fact-finding commission. In addition, the Syrian attitude had not been definitively expressed on the Saudi Arabian mediatory proposal; on suggestions that the Secretary-General's good offices might be sought; or on the contention, advanced by several delegations, that, if the Syrian request merited the urgent attention that had been alleged, it should have been directed to the Security Council.

In the light of these considerations and as a result of informal discussions among interested delegations, the Delegation of Japan, shortly after the tabling of the Syrian draft resolution on October 30, formally proposed, jointly with the Delegations of Canada, Denmark, Norway, Paraguay, Peru and Spain, a second draft resolution. In this it was proposed that the General Assembly should express its confidence that the Secretary-General, without prejudice to efforts being made under Article 33* of the United Nations Charter, would be available to undertake discussions with representatives of Syria and Turkey and could proceed, if necessary, to the countries concerned in connexion with the performance of his task.

*Article 33 enjoins parties to a dispute that is likely to endanger international peace and security, to seek, first of all, a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

Canadian Statement

In support of this joint resolution, the Canadian representative, Mr. W. B. Nesbitt, M.P., made the following statement:

The Government and people of Canada have been watching with increasing concern the developments during the past few months in the Middle East and particularly the situation in and around Syria. Earlier this year we were encouraged to believe that we could look for an improvement in conditions in the area. We have been deeply gratified, as the Canadian Prime Minister indicated in the general debate, that the United Nations has had some measure of success as a calming influence in some parts of the Middle East. In these circumstances our concern about recent developments is given greater emphasis.

Like others in this Assembly Hall, the Canadian Delegation has followed with careful interest the course of the debate on the item submitted by the Government of Syria. In listening to the statements made by representatives of those states more directly concerned with the matter, we have been able to shape our opinions about what action, if any, the Assembly should take.

In the first place, we were not opposed to having the item raised in the Assembly. We shared the opinions of those delegations which have argued that the Assembly may discuss any questions related to the maintenance of international peace and security and we would not quarrel with the view that any member state, but particularly the smaller states, should be entitled to bring to the attention of the United Nations any cause of anxiety about its security and independence. Our assumption would be that the state concerned would be the best judge of where its best interest lay in a matter of this kind, but that in seeking assistance from the United Nations the interested government would act with responsibility and moderation. We have frequently expressed in this Assembly our belief that the United Nations will grow in strength and stature if we, as member governments, are prepared to heed the appeal of nations—and this applies with perhaps greater force among the smaller nations—who seek here to establish order in their relationships and on a basis of peace and justice.

Having said this, however, I would not wish my remarks to be interpreted as meaning that the Canadian Delegation believes that the complaint of Syria on this occasion is well-founded. It is evident that the Government of Syria views the situation along its borders with anxiety and concern, but for our part we are satisfied that the Government of Turkey has not behaved, and has no intention of behaving in any sense, in the irresponsible manner suggested in the explanatory memorandum submitted with the Syrian item, and in the statement of the distinguished Foreign Minister of Syria during this debate. In this connection I should like to endorse what the distinguished representative of the United States had to say on Friday about Turkey as a loyal member of the United Nations.

On several occasions during the course of this debate, the Assembly has heard the solemn assurances of the Government of Turkey about its intentions. We believe that these assurances are entitled to receive our respectful attention. The distinguished representative of Turkey has given some account of the anxiety which his government and his people have been experiencing because of recent developments in neighbouring countries. These comments from the representative of Turkey are surely relevant to our discussion here and particularly in view of the violent remarks which we have heard from the distinguished Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union.

Our intention at this time is not to engage in polemics or propaganda, but we cannot fail to note the lack of restraint which has characterized the statements of the Soviet Delegation during this debate. These have led us to question the motives and intentions of the Soviet Government in supporting the complaint of Syria. The Canadian approach to this item would be to deal with it calmly and constructively and we therefore deplore utterances here and statements elsewhere which, through their very lack of restraint, tend to aggravate not only the debate in this Assembly, but the situation in the area. However, in saying this, we are fully aware that unwarranted charges and accusations cannot be left unanswered, as the distinguished representative of the United States made clear in his intervention on October 25.

It was emphasized in the General Committee that the Syrian item involved a situation which all members of the United Nations should try to discuss in an atmosphere of calm and confidence. We regard this as good advice. We believe too that the Assembly would be wise to consider this matter carefully with a view to bringing about a reconciliation, rather than an intensification, of conflicting views. In other words, we should seek to allay any apprehension and anxiety which might prevail in the states immediately concerned. By doing this, we would help to allay those wider anxieties which naturally stem from deterioration of the situation in the Middle East. We have been happy to see that others share our preference for a constructive approach to the Syrian item.

In these circumstances we warmly welcome the generous initiative of His Majesty King Saud because clearly His Majesty's main interest has been to ease undesirable tensions between two neighbouring states. It would be our view that the distinguished ruler of a third Middle Eastern state could effectively lend good offices to a situation of this kind. It would be entirely consistent with the Charter of the United Nations if the Syrian complaint, which has brought into sharp focus serious charges and counter-charges, as between Syria and Turkey, were to be dealt with through regional processes. If we interpreted his remarks correctly, we understood the distinguished representative of Afghanistan to express the same view in his thoughtful and welcome statement of October 22. We have no doubt that this opinion is shared by many other delegations in this Assembly.

The Assembly should note with approval, we suggest, the repeated assurances and practical demonstration that the Government of Turkey has been fully prepared to accept the worthy offer of King Saud. It is surely incumbent on all member states to explore fully all channels of negotiation, mediation, conciliation or other peaceful means for resolving their differences. As we see it, the Government of Turkey has acted in accordance with its Charter obligations in the response to the initiative of His Majesty King Saud. We have been informed that this offer still stands. We hope we are right in assuming that the Government of Syria has not rejected it. The Canadian Delegation joins with others who have urged the Syrian authorities to weigh carefully the advantages of accepting the offer. Because of the uncertainties of the moment, we believe that the Assembly should be prepared to consider as well other means of dealing with the situation. In consultation with other delegations, and in the light of views expressed during this debate, we have reached some conclusions about a possible course of action.

If, for whatever reason, the parties are unable to agree to avail themselves of this regional process for settling the present matter, there are other means, as implied in the Charter. Several speakers in this debate have suggested that the Secretary-General, acting within the scope of the responsibilities given to him in the Charter, might be able to assist the parties to reconcile their differences and in this way to bring about an easing of tension, a situation of quiet. We have no hesitation in supporting that suggestion and in commending it to the Assembly and to the parties concerned.

In doing so, we have no wish to circumscribe the kind of action which the Secretary-General might take to achieve the aims I have mentioned. With the goodwill and co-operation of those most concerned and in the relaxed atmosphere which should prevail now that the situation has been fully aired in the Assembly, the Secretary-General should be able to make a helpful contribution.

I wish only to emphasize that the Canadian Government has complete confidence in the Secretary-General's diplomatic skill and patience. As we all know, he is no stranger to the political conditions which exist in the Middle East. We are sure that governments in the area share our appreciation of the Secretary-General's helpfulness during difficult negotiations. Accordingly, we believe that it would be wise not to tie the Secretary-General's hands in this matter but to allow him the opportunity, consistent with his responsibilities under the Charter, to explore the situation fully with the parties and with such others as may appear useful, all in order to bring about an easing of tension in the area.

It was for these reasons that the Canadian Delegation joined with others in co-sponsoring the draft resolution which has been introduced in the Assembly this morning. I need not describe the proposal because the document is self-explanatory and because it has been ably explained by the distinguished representative of Japan. I wish only to underline that our joint proposal is not in any sense a preferred alternative to, nor a move competitive with, the other efforts which have been made to deal with the present matter. On the contrary, and as I have indicated in this statement, we regard those efforts as highly commendable.

In these circumstances we urge that if those other efforts should prove unavailing, the "United Nations diplomacy of reconciliation", mentioned in the introduction of the Secretary-General's annual report, be permitted to take effect. What the Canadian Delegation has been looking for in this debate is an improvement in the actual situation, a means of making progress. We are confident that the approach which we and others have supported will serve those ends. We earnestly hope that this is the view of the great majority of delegations here.

(Continued on page 352)

United Nations Commission for Togoland

By J. L. Delisle

Delegate of Canada on the Commission

ON January 23, 1957, by Resolution 1046 (XI), the General Assembly of the United Nations decided to send a six-man commission to Togoland under French administration to study the situation resulting from the application of the Statute of Togoland granted by France, in August 1956, to that Trust Territory. The Commission was also to examine the manner in which the Statute was being applied. It was asked to submit to the Trusteeship Council, in due course, a report on its investigations, along with comments and suggestions. The establishment of this body was a result of debates which had taken place at the United Nations during the eleventh session of the General Assembly, when France, the administering power, had signified its intention of terminating the trusteeship agreement concluded in 1946 with the United Nations with respect to Togoland.

A short time after the adoption of the above-mentioned resolution, Prince Wan Waithayakon, President of the General Assembly, designated the six following countries, on the basis of equitable geographical distribution, to make up the membership of the Commission: Canada, Denmark, Guatemala, Liberia, the Philippines and Yugoslavia. It was the first time that Canada had participated in the work of a United Nations commission making investigations in a trust territory. The designated countries later appointed the following persons as their delegates on the Commission: Charles T. O. King, Liberia; Jean-Louis Delisle, Canada; Hermod Lannung, Denmark; Jose Rolz-Bennett, Guatemala; Victorio D. Carpio, the Philippines; Alessandar Bozovic, Yugoslavia. When Mr. Lannung had to resign, shortly after his arrival in Togoland, he was replaced by Mr. Lars Tillitse. At the Commission's first meeting, the distinguished Liberian representative, Mr. King, accepted the chairmanship of the Commission at his colleagues' request. Most members of the Commission already knew one another, having taken part in the work of the Fourth Committee of the eleventh session of the General Assembly. Their task was greatly facilitated by the courtesy and cordiality which at all times marked their relations.

The Commission was to perform its work over a period of some three months. After preliminary meetings in New York early in May, during which the work was planned and the places to be visited were determined, the Commission proceeded to Paris, where one week was spent in conversations with the French authorities. Late in May, the Commission left for Lomé, Togoland, where it arrived on May 30 after a flight over the Sahara and brief stops at Niamey, capital of the French Niger, and Cotonou, capital of Dahomey.

The Commission spent a full month in Togoland, dividing its time about equally between the capital city and the various regions of the country, and was warmly welcomed everywhere both by the authorities and the population as a whole. Although, in its desire to gain the fullest possible knowledge of the country, the Commission had set itself a rather elaborate programme, it succeeded in carrying it out entirely. It visited the territory from end to end, stopping at numerous centres, meeting a large number of political personalities, and giving hearings to a great many groups and associations.

The mission was in Togoland toward the end of the rainy season in the south and the beginning of the rainy season in the north. Though the rainfall was not heavy, it brought welcome relief from the tropical heat.

Description of Togoland

Togoland is a strip of territory about 75 miles wide and 375 miles long which extends from the coast of the Gulf of Guinea, in the south, to the French territory of Haute Volta in the north. In area, it is about as large as Nova Scotia. Its western neighbour is Ghana and its eastern neighbour Dahomey, a French territory. It will be recalled that Togoland, as a German colony until the early stages of the First World War, included also the territory which became British Togoland, now an integral part of Ghana. The centre of the country is crossed by the Togo Range, which extends from the south-west to the north-east and has an average height of 2,300 feet. These mountains long raised a barrier against the migrations of neighbouring populations as well as, to a certain extent, against European influence. However, highways and air transport have now conquered this obstacle. The northern slopes of the range overlook a plain along which the Oti River flows toward the Volta River. The southern slopes reach a plateau which gradually falls away toward the coastal plain. The seaboard is one long sandy beach partly isolated from the mainland by a series of lagoons, one of which forms quaint Lake Togo, a popular resort.

Togoland is almost exclusively an agricultural country. The main food crops are manioc, maize, yam, rice, and sorghum, and leading exports are cocoa, coffee, copra, palm-oil, peanuts, and cotton. No plantation in Togoland is operated by Europeans. Production is entirely in the hands of the natives, who cultivate the land on a collective basis, as individual ownership generally is non-existent. The population consists of slightly more than one million Africans and only about one thousand Europeans. The Negro population is made up of about thirty tribes. Those of the northern region are mainly of Sudanese Voltaic-type origin, and those of the south, such as the Ewes and the Minas, are of the Benin negroid type, of Eastern Nigerian origin.

The Commission at work

After paying visits to the Prime Minister of the autonomous Republic of Togoland, Mr. Nicolas Grunitzky, and to the High Commissioner of the French Republic, Mr. Spénale, the Commission set to work. It held study meetings with the Prime Minister and his cabinet as well as with officials of the various Government departments. It also had meetings with the High Commissioner. It gave hearings to a large number of delegations representing different associations and the various political parties. It was invited to a session of the Legislative Assembly and established contacts with the members of the Assembly both at a study meeting in Lomé and in the course of visits in the various parts of the country. In this way, the Commission was able to obtain all necessary information on the significance and scope of the new Statute, on the manner in which it is being applied, and on the spirit according to which it is interpreted. The Commission did not limit itself to receiving statements and petitions from the opposition parties; it was also present at political meetings held by those parties on the occasion of its visit to Togoland. Furthermore, in order to acquire an even more complete knowledge of the country, the mission visited various agricultural, educational and medical establishments. It was able to see for itself that very useful work is being achieved in those various fields.

In the course of its investigations, the Commission visited most of the regions and ethnological groups of the country. For instance, it paid two different visits to the administrative circle of Anécho, whose name as well as that of several other localities—Porto-Séguero is another outstanding example—recalls the coming of the Portuguese in the 18th century, during the period of the slave trade.

The City of Anécho, located on the coastline a short distance from the border of Dahomey, boasts a very old tradition and is considered the cradle of Togoland. The members of the Commission were received there by the Regent and the traditional ministers of the king of Anécho. A reception was also offered in their honour by the rival dynasty of Adjigo, which has joined the strongest opposition party. During a subsequent visit, the Commission travelled through the Ouatchi back-country, a very fertile agricultural plain where maize and manioc fields unfold to the horizon.

Another important region in the southern part of the country is that lying north-west of Lomé, where Tsévié and Palimé, the two main cities of the Ewes, are located. The Ewes, 175,000 strong, are the second racial group in Togoland, after that of the Cabrais-Lossos in the north. The Ewes are mostly farmers and planters. Their largest group is in Ghana, where they number more than half a million.

During their visit to Central and Northern Togoland, the United Nations representatives operated from the chief towns of the various circles, travelling in teams through the neighbouring regions. Thus a team from Atakpamé, capital of the Central Circle, travelled west to the country of the Akposso, where the growing of cocoa is particularly flourishing. It was on the territory of Atakpamé that French and British troops forced the capitulation of the German troops in September 1914.

Proceeding north, the mission then visited the settlement zone of East Mono, where numerous families of Cabrais peasants from the over-populated northern regions have been regrouped by the French and Togolese authorities. A few hours were also spent at the Cotton and Exotic Textiles Research Institute, at Kolécopé, which is maintained entirely by the administering power.

In the Sokodé Circle, the mission visited scientifically-cultivated plantations of commercial trees such as teak, kapok, and oil-palm, set out in many places on what was formerly a treeless plain. Sokodé is a pleasant city in a mountainous and forested area. The Commission was greeted there by a delegation of traditional chiefs in Muslim robes riding frisky small Arab horses. Many traces are to be found here of Arab invasions from the north in past centuries. Muslims are numerous among the local inhabitants, the Coto-colis, and mosques are to be seen in a few cities.

The Commission then spent a day in the country of the Bassaris, along the border of Ghana, where big game is plentiful. Then it moved north to Lama-Kara, the centre of an agricultural region which is well-known for the intensive cultivation conducted there, often on the mountainside, by the hard-working Cabrais peasants. To complete its northern trip, the Commission formed two groups, one of which visited the Circle of Mango while the other pushed ahead to Dapango, the centre of the administrative division bearing the same name which touches on the French territory of Haute Volta. The



COMMISSION HEARS PETITION

Mr. J. L. Delisle, third from left, seated, and other members of the United Nations Commission on French Togoland, hear a petition presented by the Committee for Togoland Unity Party at a meeting held near the Great Mosque at Sokodé.

main racial groups here are the Mobas and the Gourmas. After meeting the authorities and interested groups, the Commission returned to Lomé. For the second half of its return trip the Commission travelled by auto-rail over the railroad built at the time of the Germans.

In many communities, the Commission attended sessions of various organs of regional or municipal government. Numerous receptions and picturesque popular festivities were held in its honour. It was greeted everywhere with much consideration by a favourable and co-operative populace. The geographical and racial diversity reflected by the composition of the Commission seemed to arouse vivid interest and enhanced respect. The fact that the Commission's chairman was himself an African made the Togolese understandably proud.

The Commission's Report

On June 30, the Commission left Togoland for the European Office of the United Nations, in Geneva, where it prepared its report. This document was completed late in July and made public about one month later. It was submitted to the Trusteeship Council by the Commission chairman on September 12.

The main body of the Report (T 1336 and Corr. 1), which was adopted unanimously by the members of the Commission, describes in detail the interpretation given to the Statute by the administering authority and the Togolese Government, respectively, as well as by the interested political

parties. Togolese governmental institutions, their operation and their relations with the administering authority are also reviewed, as well as the position of the political parties and, generally, the conditions under which they operate.

Chapter V contains the comments and suggestions of the Commission. In this chapter the Commission expresses the view that Togoland "possesses a large measure of internal autonomy or self-government" and that, while there are still important restrictions in view of the keeping of certain powers and jurisdictions by France, the new Statute "represents a very significant step in the achievement of the objectives of Article 76 of the Charter". The fields reserved to France relate mostly to foreign relations, defence, currency and external trade, the judiciary, the codified systems of criminal and commercial law and the labour code. These fields, according to both the French and the Togolese Governments, on the whole are either financially or technically burdensome.

Amendments made to the Statute since its entry into force in August 1956 have added considerably to Togoland's autonomy. In the opinion of the Commission the Statute has been broadly interpreted and liberally applied to such a point that jurisdictions expressly reserved to the French authorities have been curtailed in large measure by this interpretation. The Togolese Government, for its part, exercises control over most internal matters and its jurisdiction extends generally to all fields not specifically reserved to the administering authority. While noting that the Togolese have no power to amend the Statute unilaterally, even in those internal fields handed over to them, and that it may be desirable that the Togolese Government assume that power, the Commission recognized that the territory will evolve constitutionally towards an increasing transfer of powers to the Togolese authorities. The Commission noted that the Togolese Government has the fields under its jurisdiction well in hand and that, in the carrying out of its plans for economic and social development, it relies on economic, financial and technical assistance from France. The Commission pays tribute to the many constructive aspects of the work performed by the administering authority in the economic, social and educational spheres.

The Commission reports that it found among the people "a highly developed political consciousness and a lively interest in the political future of the territory", although with these factors is to be noted a certain tension between the opposed political parties. The main problem in this field is that of ensuring the right of assembly at the local level in tribal communities, a problem related to the more general one of introducing modern democratic methods in social systems of this type. The Commission hopes that elections by direct universal suffrage will be held as provided for in the Statute; this might contribute to the establishment of a more stable political atmosphere and give wider popular support to the institutions set up under the Statute. The Commission considers that the political development of the territory and its relations with France should be decided upon freely in full agreement with the wishes of the Togolese people. It expressed the opinion that the presence of armed forces and of a French gendarmerie constitutes "a substantial potential limitation" of the autonomy enjoyed by Togoland, and it recommends that the agreement between France and Togoland governing the maintenance of these forces be defined in the Statute.

The Commission's report was very favourably received by most members of the Trusteeship Council. The Council examined the Report and decided, by a resolution adopted on September 19, to transmit it to the General Assembly to serve as a basis for the consideration of the Togolese question during the current session of the Assembly. The Commission did not express a view on the maintenance or termination of the trusteeship, leaving that question to the discretion of the Assembly. However, it expressed the opinion that, "at an appropriate time the people of the territory would need to be consulted by appropriate means" concerning their desires for the future status of the Territory.

One thing in Togoland which impressed the members of the Commission was the immense prestige of the United Nations in that part of West Africa. Everywhere, the Commission was greeted with the cry of "Long live the United Nations!". The great organization apparently constitutes in the eyes of the Togolese people an international reality worthy of the greatest respect.

The Commission took pleasure in mentioning in its report the excellent co-operation and the close social relations between the French and the Togolese, as well as the ease and courteous character of social contacts. The Commission commended both groups for this.

Another fact noticed by the Commission, one that speaks highly for the Togolese, is the keen desire of their young people to take advantage of the modern educational facilities placed at their disposal, and their serious application to their studies. As the Commission did not fail to observe in its Report, such a fact augurs well for the future of Togoland.

DISARMAMENT

Statement by Mr. Sidney E. Smith, Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada, in the First Committee of the United Nations, on October 23, 1957.

Mr. Chairman, in my first intervention in the Political Committee I have pleasure in extending to you my warm congratulations on your election as our presiding officer.

My Prime Minister, Mr. Diefenbaker, in his statement in the general debate on September 23, has made known the anxiety with which the Canadian Government views the dark prospect of growing arsenals of increasingly apocalyptic weapons. As we reflect on the awesome prospect of man's ability to destroy himself, we renew in Canada our determination to prove, before it is too late, that statecraft has not lagged too far behind science. All of us in this room and all our governments must continue to search for sure means to secure the peace of the world. Yet as we survey the antagonisms which rend the world we find an array of well-nigh overwhelming problems. It would be idle to suppose that at this session of the General Assembly we can bring about a settlement of all these controversies. We may hope, nevertheless, that our endeavours will serve to start a reversal in the trend of world events so that we may, as we are pledged to do under the Charter—"save succeeding generations from the scourge of war". When those words were written, despite the appalling devastation which a global war had wrought, those at San Francisco in 1945 could not realize that soon means of destruction would be created which would make us uncertain that the world would ever see those succeeding generations. We have indeed a more fundamental task than that envisaged in the Charter—not merely to save the world from the scourge of war but to save the world from destruction.

Debate on Survival

As some representatives have rightly said, our debate in this Assembly is not merely about disarmament, but about human survival. We have yet to prove that we are capable of the radical adjustment in our thinking which the modern age demands. We are still using, Mr. Chairman, the outworn vocabulary of international rivalry in the age of intercontinental missiles and the beginning of ventures into outer space. Modern science requires us to achieve a solidarity of purpose as human beings in the great venture of exploring these new developments in science for the benefit of mankind.

The Soviet Union makes a simple appeal—ban the use of nuclear weapons altogether, or for five years, and then eliminate them entirely, and I must confess, in common with many others throughout the world, that this proposition has an immediate attraction and appeal. An end to any possibility of the use of nuclear weapons is certainly our objective. Why then, it is fair to ask, can we not now accept this simple appeal? The answer is that a promise not to use nuclear weapons is good only until one nation decides to break it.

There is at present no reliable means of ensuring the elimination of all nuclear weapons.

A disarmament agreement must be based on something more substantial than mere promises. All nations must know (and be able to rely on that knowledge) that other nations will not continue to keep and develop such weapons in spite of their pledged word to get rid of them. We must be convinced that no nation is planning or preparing the destruction or crippling of another, and each of the nations must, by its deeds and not by mere declarations, persuade the other nations of the world that its weapons will never be used except for defence. We must have mutual trust and confidence, but it must be based on the cold, hard terms of a binding agreement under which real safeguards have been established. If the nations of the world had the faith in one another on which moral obligations without such safeguards would have to depend, they would not now be caught in the dire armaments race.

Throughout the United Nations disarmament talks the U.S.S.R. has been notably reluctant to come to grips with the question of inspection. Instead, they have frequently accused other countries of using arguments of inspection as an excuse for avoiding disarmament. We were considerably encouraged by the fact that at least in principle the Soviet attitude on controls in the last year or so had improved considerably, and I believe this was a major factor in the hopes during the past year that at least a partial disarmament agreement might be soon achieved. It was, therefore, with deep dismay that we heard in the latest Soviet pronouncement the same old contemptuous reference to the guarantees of inspection and control which mark the difference between empty declarations and serious disarmament undertakings.

I know that the deep suspicions which divide the great nations today make any agreement on inspection and controls slow and difficult, but countries which are genuinely peaceful in their intentions and whose armed forces and armaments are honestly defensive and not aggressive, should be able to accept this essential condition of disarmament. As my Prime Minister put it, "If you have nothing to hide, why hide it"? Canada, for example, has agreed to open its territory to whatever inspection may be mutually accepted by the parties to a disarmament agreement. We have explicitly agreed to aerial inspection of all or part of our country under a fair and equitable system for warning against surprise attack. Soviet spokesmen have rather sarcastically written off inspection of Canada's Arctic regions (included in one of the zones suggested), but this area is of course significant in this context, both as a possible route of surprise attack and as an area for a beginning of such inspection which would be

free of some of the complications of more heavily populated regions.

Even if we are agreed in principle on the necessity for controls, there are innumerable questions of technical detail which would need clarification and agreement. The immense amount of work still to be done in this field was strikingly illustrated by the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom in his statement in the general debate when he listed many of the vital inspection questions to which we would need to find exact answers.

Must Express Views

By the will of the United Nations, Canada has accepted the obligation to serve on the Sub-Committee in the hope of making some contribution to the disarmament problem. While the Great Powers represented on the Sub-Committee, which have the responsibility and power associated with the production of nuclear weapons, must play a decisive part in reaching an agreement, other countries, which like ourselves, do not produce such weapons, have the right and the duty to express their views on an issue which, as I said earlier, affects all mankind. To some extent, Canada, the only smaller country on the Sub-Committee, shares the point of view of the majority of member states which might be classed as middle or smaller powers. During the course of this debate we have already heard, from many delegations not represented on the Sub-Committee, thoughtful and important statements on disarmament. To name only a few, Mr. Chairman, the Delegations of Japan, Belgium, India and of Mexico in their interventions have called attention to significant aspects of this problem: We have also heard the significant statements of the Great Powers and in particular the lucid and cogent exposition of Mr. Moch yesterday morning.

Following the lead of some of these earlier statements, we must come to grips with the real difficulties which now beset disarmament negotiations. Recriminations and rehashing of old controversies, from whichever side put forward, are in our opinion inappropriate. The issue is too grave to furnish material for propaganda points.

In this connection, I must say that our delegation deplors certain statements contained in the speech by the Soviet representative in this Committee. They are, I suggest, unworthy of this debate. I refer in particular to Mr. Gromyko's implication in his speech in this Committee that the Western democracies were responsible for the Second World War. While I do not wish to dwell on the ill-fated German-Soviet pact which did so much to launch that war, I must say again that we consider these communist attempts to falsify history as out of place in discussion of the disarmament issue.

When we begin to examine the essential problems before us, we must face the fact that the world failed in its efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons at a time when the inspection necessary to guarantee such an under-

taking presented considerably less difficulty than it does today. The distinguished representative of India has commented on the absence from the twenty-four-power draft resolution of reference to the elimination of nuclear weapons. The explanation, of course, is that this particular draft resolution deals with those limited objectives in disarmament which could be achieved at once or soon. Unfortunately the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, for which there are at present no adequate safeguards, cannot be regarded as immediately attainable. Nevertheless we have not abandoned as a goal the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. If the means of inspection adequate to guarantee such an undertaking can be devised it would certainly be part of my Government's recommendation for a comprehensive disarmament agreement. But, I reiterate, it is not helpful to approach this goal by way of unsubstantiated declarations and unenforceable agreements such as a promise never to use nuclear weapons.

Immediate Responsibility

Our immediate responsibility now is to do whatever may be possible to decrease stockpiles of such weapons and to ensure the use of fissionable materials for peaceful purposes. We believe that a beginning could be made in this direction. At the same time, and I emphasize this point, constructive efforts must continue through the United Nations to reduce world tension and to solve dangerous problems as they arise and so to make certain that these weapons of terrible destruction are never used. At this point, although I do not for a moment suggest any political conditions for the first stage disarmament plan which we espouse, we are again up against the inevitable link between progress on disarmament and progress on the other difficult international issues which divide the world. Disarmament in any comprehensive sense must go in step with settlement of these other grave international problems. Without any slackening of our efforts to make a beginning in disarmament we must also seize every opportunity for settlement of these other problems. One of the ways in which the United Nations has already made a great contribution to world peace has been the provision of neutral and impartial United Nations observation or inspection forces in tense and troubled areas. The United Nations must be ready whenever appropriate situations arise—and of course whenever the circumstances are favourable—to consider further action of this kind which at the very least inhibits dangerous movements of forces and may even save the peace of the world and thus give us the time and the atmosphere in which to continue disarmament negotiations. I need hardly add that Canada has always made a full contribution to United Nations undertakings of this sort.

It has been our wish in the Canadian Delegation to participate in a constructive approach to this central question of international security, and in our participating, I repeat, we have the role of a middle power. We be-

lieve that there are many measures of disarmament which are capable of inspection and control and which could genuinely add to our security because all participating countries could be reasonably sure that other states are living up to their obligations. Among these measures are reductions in forces and conventional armaments and also agreement to provide that henceforth all production of fissionable materials will be solely for peaceful purposes. These are two of the main themes in the draft resolution before the Assembly co-sponsored by four members of the Sub-Committee and a large number of other nations.

Two other measures, included in that resolution, could do a great deal to allay our present anxieties. These are, first, a suspension of testing of nuclear weapons, particularly the largest-scale hydrogen weapons, and second, some variant of the several proposals which have been made for a system of advance warning against surprise attack by means of reciprocal air and ground inspection. The Delegation of India has tabled proposals for scientific commissions to go into some of the detailed problems of inspection and control. These suggestions merit careful examination, particularly with reference to these last two measures.

Canada is one of the sponsors of the twenty-four-power resolution I have mentioned. We urge its adoption. Nevertheless we must remain sensitive to every possibility of improving it. Let us not be inflexible. We of Canada certainly do not say that the particular proposals with which we are now associated are the only means by which at least some progress can be made towards disarmament.

The Soviet Delegation has been particularly indifferent—even hostile—to the proposal to use all production of fissionable material for peaceful purposes. We are at a loss to understand this Soviet objection to any cut-off date on the production of weapons from fissionable material. It seems to us strange that despite their many declarations in favour of "banning the bomb" and prohibiting its use, they are not more interested in finding a workable proposal for stopping the manufacture of such weapons, particularly when such a proposal is preceded as it would be under our resolution by the suspension of test explosions.

Suspension of Tests

Speakers in this debate have properly devoted considerable attention to suggestions for suspension of tests of nuclear weapons with suitable control posts and technical equipment in the areas where such tests have been made. The latest proposals in the Sub-Committee, which I have mentioned and which Canada co-sponsored, do provide for suspension of tests as the very first thing to be done in our plan for initial steps of disarmament. Under this plan tests could be sus-

pending for two years. The Assembly should note that the sponsors of this proposal have made a real effort to match the proper international concern about the testing of nuclear weapons. As you are all aware, Canada does not produce nuclear weapons. Therefore, we have not ourselves conducted any of these tests. Thus, we are in this respect in the same position as the great majority of the other nations represented here. Whatever the correct view may be as to the possible harmful effects of radiation and fallout, I think none of us would want to discount the anxiety on this score felt by the peoples of all nations. However, in the present international circumstances of tension and fear, it is inevitable, unless we do something now, that the major powers will seek to augment and improve their weapons, and this involves tests. While we are certainly not opposed to any fair and reciprocal measures to be taken as soon as possible with respect to tests of nuclear weapons, we are also convinced that some more fundamental action must also be agreed upon and must be taken.

We all have this much in common, that we share an interest in survival. Let us then so order our endeavours that we may ensure that the engines which are capable of putting our survival in hazard are made the servants and not the masters of man. But if the wonderful devices for harnessing the forces of nature which science has contrived are to be used to alleviate and not to increase human misery and destitution, we must organize political machinery which will direct these discoveries into the ways of peace. I cannot believe that this is a simple matter which can be done by the stroke of a pen or the passage of a resolution. But I am convinced that such an achievement is within our capacity and within our grasp.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I ask sincerely this question. What is the alternative? Are we once again to end our discussions in deadlock? We should ask ourselves, each of us, have we all really faced up to the meaning of this for the peoples of the world—for all mankind? Prime Minister Diefenbaker, in participating in the general debate, concluded his statement with the heartfelt wish that this Assembly might become known in future years as the Disarmament Assembly. My final word is a plea directed primarily to the Great Powers, which must bear the main responsibilities, for at least a beginning in actual measures of disarmament. Canada has co-sponsored plans for partial disarmament but, I repeat, we do not regard them as necessarily the last word. Further negotiation in the interests of world peace is the bounden duty of all of us. At the beginning, the experience gained and the confidence created by our first steps in disarmament—however limited—could lead us on towards our goal, which is the elimination of nuclear weapons. The stake is the very survival of the human race.

APPOINTMENTS, TRANSFERS AND RETIREMENTS IN THE CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

- Mr. M. D. G. Baudouin posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Brussels, effective September 26, 1957.
- Mr. A. J. G. Couvrette appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective October 1, 1957.
- Mr. H. W. Walker posted from the Canadian Embassy, Belgrade, to Ottawa, effective October 2, 1957.
- Mr. E. W. T. Gill appointed Canadian High Commissioner in Ghana. Proceeded to Accra October 4, 1957.
- Mr. J. E. G. Blais posted from the Canadian Embassy, Paris, to the International Supervisory Commissions, Indochina, effective October 9, 1957.
- Mr. R. S. MacLean posted from Ottawa to the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, New Delhi, effective October 10, 1957.
- Mr. W. F. A. Turgeon, QC, Canadian Ambassador to Portugal, retired from the Canadian Diplomatic Service, effective October 15, 1957.
- Miss C. S. Weir posted from Ottawa to the International Supervisory Commissions, Indochina, effective October 15, 1957.
- Mr. W. M. Wood posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Brussels, effective October 18, 1957.
- Mr. D. W. Munro posted from the Canadian Embassy, Brussels, to Ottawa, effective October 21, 1957.
- Mr. J. R. Francis posted from the International Supervisory Commissions, Indochina, to Ottawa, effective October 22, 1957.
- Mr. D. R. Taylor, DFC, posted from the Canadian Embassy, Washington, to Ottawa, effective October 24, 1957.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Action

Bilateral

United States of America

Convention between Canada and the United States of America further modifying and supplementing the Convention and accompanying protocol of March 4, 1942, for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion in the case of Income Taxes, as modified by the supplementary Convention of June 12, 1950.

Instruments of Ratification exchanged at Washington September 26, 1957.
Entered into force September 26, 1957.

Australia

Agreement between Canada and Australia for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income.

Signed at Mont Tremblant October 1, 1957.

Union of South Africa

Agreement between Canada and the Union of South Africa for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to income tax.

Signed at Ottawa September 28, 1956.

Instruments of Ratification exchanged at Pretoria October 11, 1957.

Entered into force October 11, 1957.

Agreement between Canada and the Union of South Africa for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to succession duties.

Signed at Ottawa September 28, 1956.

Instruments of Ratification exchanged at Pretoria October 11, 1957.

Entered into force October 11, 1957.

(Continued from page 329)

Nationalization Claims

Although many classes of pre-war debt and war claims have been settled, or are in the course of settlement, the same cannot be said for nationalization claims. Most of these claims, which were relatively unknown prior to the First World War, concern property in Eastern Europe. After the Second World War, a number of Eastern European States embarked upon extensive nationalization measures affecting, among other things, industrial and agrarian property. A considerable amount of the property expropriated or taken over by the governments of these countries had been owned by aliens, among whom were a number of Canadians.

Mention should also be made of one class of claim not included in the above review. These are the claims of persons who were persecuted on racial religious or political grounds before or during the war, and who lost life, limb or property as a result. Both the Federal Republic of Germany and Austria have passed legislation to provide relief in some cases and the Federal Republic has concluded bilateral agreements to this effect with Israel and with various Jewish organizations.

Finally, it should be noted that some classes of claims can probably never be settled, if only because they represent losses in respect of which compensation has rarely, if ever, been granted. Prominent among such claims are those in respect of the disappearance of, or the depreciation in, the purchasing power of currencies, or in respect of funds blocked abroad in accordance with the normal foreign exchange control practice of the country concerned.

(Continued from Page 339)

Vote not Pressed

On November 1, the discussion of the draft resolutions was foreshortened by an appeal by the Indonesian Delegation to the sponsors not to press their drafts to a vote, since the Assembly, because of the intricacy and delicacy of the issues involved, was "not in a position to propose any definite line of action or to pronounce a judgment in this matter". The Syrian and Turkish representatives having indicated that this proposal was acceptable to them, the President of the Assembly closed the discussion with a statement that he was confident that the Assembly would regard the final position as a satisfactory outcome of the debate.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



CANADA

December 1957

Vol. 9 No. 12

• **EXTERNAL AFFAIRS** is issued monthly in English and French by the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa. It provides reference material on Canada's external relations and reports on the current work and activities of the Department. Any material in this publication may be reproduced. Citation of **EXTERNAL AFFAIRS** as the source would be appreciated. Subscription rates: **ONE DOLLAR** per year (Students, **FIFTY CENTS**) post free. Remittances, payable to the Receiver General of Canada, should be sent to the Queen's Printer, Ottawa, Canada.

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Department of External Affairs
Ottawa, Canada

External Affairs in Parliament

Aspects of Canadian Foreign Policy

Excerpts from a statement by Mr. Sidney E. Smith, Secretary of State for External Affairs, in the House of Commons on November 26, 1957.



—Milne Studios Ltd.

Mr. Sidney E. Smith

I know the people of this country are indeed interested in the foreign policy of Canada . . . and I also know that other governments are equally interested in the actions and policies of this Government. We have been considering in this House, and we shall be considering in this House, matters of great moment which might be described as domestic or national. I am not discounting in any measure the importance and significance of these matters when I observe that the solution of the grave problems which confront the nations of the world in 1957 has a practical bearing on the health and happiness of Canadians and on the welfare and progress of Canada.

We cannot expect in this field of external affairs to find ready made solutions. Only the eradication of fear and the establishment of mutual confidence among the nations will provide the basic solution, and the government will endeavour in every way to bring this about. Second, to bring about this state of affairs we shall need steadiness, strength and patience.

In view of the fact that today I am making my first statement on foreign policy, and having regard to the fact that there are many new members of the House, freshmen like myself, I propose to outline in somewhat general terms some of the relations and relationships of Canada with other nations. In common with Canadians of all political persuasions I take pride in the advancement of our country to a position of respect and influence in the international field. We are regarded as a leading country of middle-status in the world. Our role is an important one in the Commonwealth, in the affairs of the United Nations, in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and in all the other various organizations to which Canada adheres. That is a position which Canada has attained by reason of its growing strength, its sense of responsibility and its willingness to accept responsibility; and I believe it is also due to the exercise by Canadians of a certain wisdom and maturity of judgment.

Natural resources and the development of those resources which Canada has achieved have helped to give us a prestige out of all proportion to the size of our population. Our sacrifices in two world wars, and then in recent years in

securing the peace in Korea, the Middle East and Indochina, have added to that prestige; our contributions, of which I will speak later, toward raising the standard of living in various parts of the world, and our contributions toward the alleviation of want and suffering have, too, enabled Canada to speak with confidence and authority.

Moreover, I think we bring to the consideration of the solution of international problems peculiar qualities which Canadians possess. We are the heirs of a European civilization, and I would think, having regard to the development of our national scene, that we have a national, or perhaps I should say a natural, tendency and gift for compromise. We are possessed of an idealism which has been somewhat modified by the skepticism which Canadians must have when they realize that the solution of any problem cannot come about by miracles but only as the result of persistent and hard endeavour.

... It is with these encouraging yet challenging thoughts in mind that I take up my new office as Secretary of State for External Affairs. As I enter this field I assure this House that, having regard to the firm foundations which have been laid in respect of our foreign affairs by successive governments, I will endeavour to build on these foundations and, as a member of this Government under the leadership of the Prime Minister, I will do my best to help in building something distinctive and valuable upon these foundations.

In this context it is clear that Canada must seek to understand the aspirations of other countries; Canada must endeavour to apprehend the motives of other nations, whether they be ill or good, and work closely with friendly nations. But all the while Canadians must think for themselves, and Canada's foreign policy should not be merely a pale reflection of the views of other countries.

United Nations

My first assignment after I became a member of the Government was to go to the United Nations. I think that was an excellent introduction for me because it enabled me to study at first hand, at the beginning of my political and diplomatic career, the machinery, the aspirations and the objectives of that great Organization.

There was in the United Nations, I found, a curiosity with respect to the attitude of the new government in Canada toward the Organization, and I can best describe the views of this Government by repeating to this House the words of the Prime Minister when he spoke to the General Assembly on September 3, 1957. He stated: "We stand on this question now where Canada has always stood since April 1945. And I emphasize this, with the support of the party which is now in power. So far as Canada is concerned, support of the United Nations is a cornerstone of its foreign policy. We believe that the United Nations will grow stronger because it represents the inevitable struggle of countries to find order in their relationships, and the deep longing of mankind to strive for and attain peace and justice." That is the stand of this country towards the United Nations.

Our confidence in the United Nations, Mr. Speaker, is not blind. It is, we know, an imperfect instrument. . . . The United Nations is not, as the Secretary-General stated in his last annual report, a supra-state, and how can we

expect the United Nations to be better than those who constitute it? The United Nations is, indeed, a microcosm of an imperfect world, a world now in the shadow of nuclear weapons. However, the United Nations has had its successes, and I think it warrants the designation or description that it is the workshop of world diplomacy.

. . . Amidst all the portents and dark threats of 1957, I suggest to you, Sir, that the United Nations is the greatest hope for peace. If the United Nations were not in existence I do think mankind would have to invent something like it in order to afford a forum in which 82 nations could sit down together and discuss face to face their differences and their agreements.

It is a gratifying yet a sobering thought for us that Canada will take its seat for the second time on the Security Council. That will happen on January 1, 1958.

I was particularly pleased that my first task at the United Nations was to endorse the admission of Malaya and to welcome that country as the newest member state of that Organization. The United Nations has now become a more universal body, and many of its new members have risen from the status of colony to that of nationhood. It afforded me even greater pleasure to say on that occasion that I saluted Great Britain, because here was another case that we in Canada know so well of Great Britain encouraging a colony to become a nation. I could not refrain from observing that this had been the historic, the outstanding record of Great Britain, while the U.S.S.R. reversed that process of developing colonies into nations by reducing nations to colonies.

Canada has worked and will continue to work with these new members of the United Nations, and as far as my experience is concerned it has been a joy to co-operate with them.

Disarmament

Among the topics which were discussed at the United Nations this year was the question of disarmament, which was perhaps the major topic. I and members of the Canadian Delegation at the United Nations had some reason to be not entirely satisfied about the consideration in the twelfth session of the United Nations of that topic which means so much to mankind. The 24 powers did put forward a resolution that was drafted by the Subcommittee on Disarmament on August 29, 1957, and that resolution did receive endorsement by the General Assembly. In fact the U.S.S.R. was not able to line up any votes in opposition to that resolution except those of its own satellites. It is true that there were some who abstained from voting on that 24-power resolution, but I judged that in many cases the abstention was due not to any opposition to the resolution but because they really thought any resolution put forward and adopted by the United Nations would be ineffective, as the U.S.S.R. said it would not co-operate in further negotiations under that resolution. . . .

After we had obtained for that resolution approval from the General Assembly which was unanimous but with abstentions, the U.S.S.R. said it would not participate in the discussions of the Disarmament Commission or of the Subcommittee. We were greatly disappointed to hear that, because in getting that resolution so admirably supported in the United Nations we felt we had a vote . . . that would carry some weight with the U.S.S.R. because it reflected a world-wide opinion that they should reconsider their rejection of the Western proposals.

We tried to make it clear to the United Nations that the resolution that was so widely supported by the General Assembly was not necessarily in our opinion the only means whereby disarmament could be promoted. On October 23, 1957, I spoke in the Political Committee and asked our Russian friends to look at the resolution; not to regard it as coming from us in a take it or leave it manner, but to accept it on our assurance that it would be a basis for further negotiations. . . . After the U.S.S.R. stated definitely that it would not negotiate any further, the Soviet Delegation did put forward the suggestion that the Disarmament Commission should be made up of the 82 member nations of the United Nations, and indeed that the complexion of the General Assembly itself should be reflected in the new Disarmament Commission.

We all felt that this was a manifestly impractical proposition; and we were bound to conclude that it was merely a propaganda move. It would be entirely unwieldy for 82 nations to sit down and discuss the problem in one meeting or series of meetings on disarmament. That was, however, put to the General Assembly by the U.S.S.R. and it was rejected by the General Assembly.

Even after that Canada, taking the lead in some cases and in other cases co-operating with other friendly powers, tried again to find a well-balanced and reasonable group by way of a suggestion for the composition of the Disarmament Commission that would satisfy the U.S.S.R. Finally there was put before the General Assembly a proposal for the extension and enlargement of the Disarmament Commission to include the members of the Security Council, 11, and Canada, and in addition 13 other countries. That was adopted by the General Assembly to the extent that three-quarters of the governments of every group in the United Nations endorsed it. That proved unacceptable to the U.S.S.R., although at one point in our negotiations we did hope that it might be acceptable to them.

Now that the enlarged Disarmament Commission has been established the U.S.S.R. says it will not participate in its discussions, and our only hope is that it will reconsider its views so we can sit down together to the end that the armament race will not be continued, because as I endeavoured to tell the Political Committee of the United Nations — and I have no desire to indulge in scare headlines here today — the issue is in effect and in essence human survival.

In all these arguments in the Committee and in the General Assembly the U.S.S.R. came back time and time again to its proposal. The first part of its counter-proposal is that the nations of the world who are members of the UN should resolve to ban the use of nuclear weapons. Since I have come to Ottawa I have had letters from many persons throughout Canada which said, "What a laudable proposal that is from the U.S.S.R."

Now, Sir, one must confess it has an immediate attraction and appeal. "Ban the use of nuclear weapons". I ask you, Sir, and I ask this House why, then, can we not accept this laudable proposal? The answer, the grim answer, is that a promise not to use nuclear weapons is good only until one nation decides to break it. There must be, for our security, a measure of inspection that will ensure that the undertakings in that regard are being carried out. Disarmament cannot be achieved by the stroke of a pen or the mere passing of a resolution. . . .

It is evident that the advances or discoveries in the field of science and technology pose a new and urgent problem in international politics. We cannot solve that problem merely by talking about our endeavours of yesteryear. New scientific weapons and scientific discoveries have provided an urgency about the solution of those problems. Canada, I can assure this House, will endeavour in every way possible to advance further discussion and negotiations with respect to disarmament. For 11 years representatives of Canada have carried on those endeavours, and we hope we can keep the Canadian flag waving in respect of a matter of such vital concern to the human race, at least to make suggestions in negotiating a first-stage agreement with the U.S.S.R.

Syrian Situation

Apart from disarmament there was consideration of political crises. One had to do particularly with Syria. The Syrians lodged a resolution with the Secretary-General that would provide for a discussion of the threat to their security on the Syrian-Turkish border. Several efforts were made toward negotiation in that regard. . . . Our approach to that problem was that any nation such as Syria should have the opportunity to bring before the General Assembly what it thought was a threat to its security. That did not in any way indicate that we had in mind that Turkey, as a responsible member of NATO, would act in an irresponsible way. But we endeavoured to provide every possible way of thinking out the facts.

Hon. members may recall that King Saud of Saudi Arabia offered to intervene and mediate, and there were suggestions that the Security Council might come into the picture. In association with Japan, Denmark, Norway, Paraguay, Peru and Spain we put forward a resolution that would call attention to the availability of the Secretary-General for consultation between Syria and Turkey, or even the availability of the Secretary-General to carry on an investigation; and then rather dramatically Syria and Turkey decided that the debate should be terminated.

I said it was dramatic, but it was not very spectacular. I do not think the press gave it enough publicity. It really was a product of what the Secretary-General of the United Nations has said of the United Nations "diplomacy of reconciliation". There in the General Assembly these charges and counter-charges were exchanged, and it was undoubtedly felt by the U.S.S.R. that it was . . . losing the battle of polemics and that its propaganda concepts and objectives were being turned against it. That was indeed a victory for the United Nations and for the participation of the nations of the world in that debate in the General Assembly.

It would be an illusion, Mr. Speaker, to think that the underlying causes of tension in that area, and the fever and the rise in tempers are gone. We would all hope that the diplomacy, the reconciliation which was provided by the United Nations could be again brought to bear. . . .

UNEF

I now desire to say something about the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East. . . . I can say that the record of UNEF, the United Nations Emergency Force, has been one of great satisfaction not only to the UN but to the world. There have been on the border few incidents in recent months. Indeed, I was talking to Major General Burns and he told me that in

the last few weeks there have not been any incidents on that border. Undoubtedly UNEF contributed at least to arrest the movement that might have resulted in war, and we in Canada must be proud of our participation in that Force. One-fifth of the Force come from Canada, 1,200 out of 6,000. We must take a particular pride in the Commander in Chief of the Force, Major General E. L. M. Burns. On all sides he was praised by members of the General Assembly in the debate that took place last Friday morning. I would say, in the words of our Prime Minister, who spoke to the General Assembly in September, that as long as the United Nations considers the presence of the UNEF in that particular area as necessary, Canada will continue to support by participating in its composition.

The Secretary-General in his recent annual report having mentioned the temporary nature of the Force, with the limited mandate in a particular area, went on to say that the value of such a force in such situations has been fully demonstrated. I would certainly subscribe to that view, as all the delegations from the West would. In that report the Secretary-General suggested that an agreed stand-by plan for a United Nations peace force which could be activated on short notice might be given consideration. Small wars, small conflicts, expand into great wars, and if agreement could be reached on the establishment of such a force I would think it would be a most significant step in making the United Nations a more effective organization for the maintenance of peace.

The establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force as an experiment gave rise to certain consequences, and one had to do with money. The estimated cost of the Force during the period from November 1956 to December 31, 1957 is in the region of \$30 million. Against this sum the total amount received or firmly pledged so far is some \$24 million. That includes the recent offer from the United States of \$12 million and the recent offer from the United Kingdom of \$1 million. It now appears that there will be a shortfall for the period ending December 31, 1957, of approximately \$3 million to \$4 million. It is estimated that in the year 1958 the Force will cost \$25 million.

I have used these figures, and I do not regard them as large or high when you put into the balance the great benefit that has followed the establishment and development of that Force on that border, the release of tension thereby preventing further expansion of the conflict in the area. On Friday last I introduced in the General Assembly a resolution for which 20 other countries offered their co-sponsorship. That resolution reaffirmed the principle that the responsibility for additional funds required in 1958 for the maintenance of this Force should be shared by all members of the United Nations in accordance with the scale of assessment that is invoked for the normal United Nations budget. That resolution was adopted despite the opposition of the U.S.S.R. bloc, and was adopted by a larger majority than we expected, with the result that I can say to members of the House that the financing of UNEF is now assured.

Palestinian Refugees

Other Middle East issues continue to be the centre of attention at the United Nations. One of them has to do with the grave plight of the Palestinian refugees, and in this context one cannot say that any real progress has been made during the past year. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, to give it its full title, has continued to

provide essential rations and other relief services, but shortage of funds has increasingly hampered the Agency in its effort to maintain these services or to proceed in an orderly way with the limited rehabilitation projects possible under present conditions.

I am happy to report that Canada during the past nine years has been the fourth largest non-Arab contributor to Palestine refugee relief, and in 1957 Canada was the third largest contributor. We have continued to urge other countries that they should accord greater support to UNRWA in order that there will not be a further decline in the standard of living of these unfortunate refugees. The estimates for 1957-58, at present before the House, seek approval of a Canadian contribution to UNRWA of \$750,000 to cover the 18-month period ending December 31, 1957. When the estimates for 1958-59 are brought before the next session, Parliament will be asked to approve a Canadian contribution to UNRWA of \$500,000 . . . (for the calendar year 1958).

Before I turn from the United Nations I desire to inform the House of certain other contributions to the United Nations extra-budgetary programmes. The following amounts are included in the 1957-58 estimates at present before the House to cover Canadian contributions to these programmes of the United Nations during the calendar year 1957. In the 1958-59 estimates Parliament will be asked by the Government to approve Canadian contributions of the same amounts to cover the programmes of these organizations during the year 1958.

These are the amounts. In addition to UNRWA there is \$2 million to the United Nations Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance, \$200,000 to the United Nations Refugee Fund and \$650,000 to the United Nations Children's Emergency Fund. All these proposed contributions are on the same scale as those to which the previous Parliament gave its approval. . . .

There are negotiations going on now at the United Nations — the Minister of Finance referred to this in the House last week — with respect to the providing of financial assistance outside of the Colombo Plan to nations not only in South-East and South Asia but throughout the world. I do not regard the negative vote (cast by the Canadian Delegation to the Economic and Social Council) against the proposal of SUNFED as indicating that the Canadian Government will not support a proposal that I hope will come out of the negotiations. . . .

Colombo Plan

If I may leave the United Nations and go to the Colombo Plan, I doubt, Mr. Speaker, whether there is any single task in the international field which Canada has undertaken that should receive greater approval and endorsement from Canadians of all walks of life and all political persuasions. No reasonable man could doubt the benefits which this type of enterprise is bringing. . . .

Two of my colleagues in the Government have recently been in South and South-East Asia, the hon. member for Greenwood (Mr. Macdonnell) and the hon. member for St. John's West (Mr. Browne). They have returned to Ottawa, and from each of them I have heard of the unceasing struggle of the undeveloped countries in that part of the world to raise their standards of living. The hon. member for St. John's West, who attended in my place the Saigon meeting of the Consultative Committee of the Colombo Plan, can testify to the benefits that have accrued from Canada's investment in these particular projects.

These grants, hon. members of the House — and I say this from the bottom of my being — are not hand-outs. We should really think of them as helping hands. There is another feature, members of the House, about our investment in the Colombo Plan: Famine, distress and low standards of living create the seed-beds of unrest and indeed could create — and in some instances have done so — the seed-bed of war. It worries me to talk in this vein, but if anyone wants to talk about these matters in mere monetary terms, I would offer a good argument and, I think, a conclusive one that in time these countries in which we are making investments will become good customers and provide much opportunity for Canada. But I put that suggestion forward in second or third place.

As some hon. members of this House know, particularly the hon. member for Algoma East (Mr. Pearson), the Colombo Plan was a concept initiated and brought about in the Commonwealth. Here is another instance of the Commonwealth creating a nucleus which in due course produced a strengthened, forward-looking and beneficial international enterprise. In the routine aspect of carrying forward the programme under the Colombo Plan there always has had to be and there will have to be discussions with engineers, administrators and economists. Then there will have to be discussions with the countries to whom help might be offered, as to their needs. When decisions in that regard are made, Mr. Speaker, we will of course report to the House.

On November 22 in this session of Parliament the Prime Minister informed the House that the Government will seek Parliamentary approval of an appropriation for 1958-59 of \$35 million. The estimates that will be considered in a few days provide for a contribution of \$34,400,000. We are proposing an increase of \$600,000 for 1958-59.

International Commissions in Indochina

Time does not permit me to go into detail with respect to other parts of South and South-East Asia but in passing I would refer to the work of the International Commissions in Indochina. The task of the Commission in Cambodia is, in our opinion, about completed. There have been difficulties in the way of dissolving or disbanding the Commission. In Laos, where we are members of an international commission, after nearly three years of negotiations between the Royal Government and the Pathet Lao, an agreement has finally been reached whereby the Pathet Lao, which has been controlling one part of Laos, will be integrated into the national community. I seize this opportunity to say that we sympathize with the desire of the Laotian people to achieve a political settlement within the terms of the Geneva Agreements of 1954. We hope that this latest development will result in a strong Laos and a continuation of the democratic approach that has been followed by the Royal Government.

Vietnam remains divided. It is in this area where the sort of international supervision that is provided by the International Commissions has been most important for the maintenance of peace.

In relation to South and South-East Asia I would reiterate what I have endeavoured to say, namely that the recent visits of Ministers of the Government to that part of the world should be taken as indicative of our interest in the area, our close interest in Commonwealth ties, our desire to help the countries of the area to improve their standard of living and of our willingness to do our part in preserving peace.

The Commonwealth


A few moments ago I mentioned the Commonwealth. May I interpolate here — and this is a personal note — that after I reached the United Nations in the middle of September I was asked to attend a meeting of the Commonwealth group. It was not a bloc but a group. I am sure that no one else in the room could appreciate how thrilled I was, indeed how excited I was, at that first meeting. Here sitting around a horseshoe table were representatives of ten independent nations of the British Commonwealth, men and women coming from various climes, of various religions and cultures. There they sat. It seemed to me — and this is the basis of my thrill and my excitement — that there was before me a brilliant page of British history, the bringing of colonies to nationhood. There was no treaty binding them together. Indeed I would say, for the want of a better word, that there was something mystical in their adherence to common ideals of the dignity of the individual, of justice, fairness and fair play.

Latin America

I now come closer to home, Mr. Speaker, and I desire for a moment or two to mention our neighbours in this hemisphere. I would point out first our relationship to the republics of Latin America. Some of my first conversations at the United Nations in September were with representatives of the republics of Latin America. Since I have been in Ottawa I am gradually beginning to get to know better the Ambassadors from Latin America. I know that in the Assembly and the Councils of the United Nations our Canadian representatives over the years have acquired a deep appreciation of the strength, the wisdom and the vision which representatives of the Latin republics have brought to the discussions, deliberations and decisions of that body.

I refer, just by way of example, to only two. Colombia and Brazil made contributions in men and equipment to UNEF. Colombia and Brazil have each served three times on the Security Council. I think of Brazil today, which is the largest Latin nation in the world, with a population larger than that of Spain or Italy or France, with enormous natural resources scarcely tapped, a country of great promise. We have traded with those countries over many years, indeed for a century, I am informed. I hope that the substantial volume of our two-way trade with the Latin American nations today is only a stage on the way to greater expansion.

But it is only in the post-war years since 1945 that there has been an increased exchange of personnel, visitors and businessmen between Canada and the Latin American republics. Attending our colleges and universities are a considerable number of students who have come to us from Latin America. Visitors and tourists are increasing. Commercial aviation has been a significant factor in helping us to become better acquainted with the Latin American countries. The Mexican air line operates a regular service between Mexico City and Windsor, Ontario. Our own Canadian Pacific Air Lines now ranks as a major air service in the Americas. Those 20 independent nations are playing an increasing part in deliberations that are designed for the solution of international problems — and I express the hope that the cordial relations which now exist with those 20 nations will be enhanced and increased.



ASSUMES GHANA POST

The Canadian High Commissioner to Ghana, Mr. Evan Gill, presenting his letter of introduction to Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah at Government House, Accra, on October 30, 1957.

United States

I come now, Mr. Speaker, to our closest neighbour, the United States. A kindly providence has willed the geographical location of that country with respect to Canada. With the United States we share a continent and a common heritage from many lands beyond the seas, moulded around political philosophies which have become, in some measure perhaps, the central core of the institutions of both our countries. These philosophies, coming from our twin motherlands, Great Britain and France, have been shared by us as comrades in arms during two world wars. Again, when we fought with the Americans under the flag of the United Nations in Korea, we Canadians knew the value of our American friends.

We have been in close association with our neighbour in the United Nations and we also work closely with them in NATO. Particularly, those of us who remember the years before the First World War welcome their assumption of world leadership during the last two decades. I must however observe that sometimes in pursuit of common objectives the means chosen by the United States to effect these ends may have side effects which are injurious to Canada and which in many instances are not made clear to the American people and of which therefore they are not properly aware.

When we in Canada consider that such effects may stem from any action or inaction on the part of the United States and may affect what we deem to be the best and just interests of our country and our people we must, without petulance or sophomoric sensitivity, seek from our United States neighbours the consideration of those effects. There is nothing wrong or improper with conscientiously facing the problems or difficulties separating true friends. This is also true in the field of international relations. What to my mind would be wrong and improper would be for us to dig and dig for slights and to magnify oversights. It would be equally improper for the two governments to allow old and burning problems to fester. . . and to continue unresolved. It is in that way that misunderstandings grow and fair-mindedness of the people and their governments may be warped. There have been problems between our countries throughout our history. The territorial part which we know as Canada did not exist in the early days but those who have read the biography of Sir John A. Macdonald by Professor Creighton will appreciate what I have been saying.

From those early years there have been problems between us and they have continued, indeed, down to our present difficulties with respect to the United States wheat surplus disposal programmes. I declare, Mr. Speaker, that considerate frankness will not endanger true friendship between our countries. Above all, it is of paramount importance to international peace that Canada and the United States, unequal as they are with respect to military and economic force but equal in their common respect for the dignity of the individual, should set a continued example to the whole world of how friendly nations can live together.

May I state as simply as I can how I see the development of our relations with the United States. We must be friends; friendship however means something more than the absence of enmity. Friendship really means the existence of positive and effective interest on the part of each nation in the welfare of the other.

In recent weeks . . . we have been forced to give closer examination to our collective security arrangements by reason of the success of the U.S.S.R. in the launching of the inter-continental ballistic missile and in the launching of two earth satellites. It has been a shock but it has had a salutary effect in terms of the re-appraisal of our common defence.

NATO

We in the democracies are apt to relax until pressure is brought upon us by the course of events; then we jump into action. . . . In this age of infinite risk we should have some concern about this characteristic tendency to relax in the absence of pressure. That attitude of relaxation when there is no pressure on us may, and in this case probably has, tempted fate. However, we have now been dramatically reminded of the terrible menace of nuclear warfare and as a result all members of NATO recognize they are faced with the necessity of making far-reaching decisions in the military field while, at the same time, having to cope with political problems of exceptional complexity. . . . I wish to say a word about the military and political problems because I think the success of NATO in rising to the occasion will depend largely on how it can merge its military and its political objectives.

Despite Soviet accusations that NATO is an aggressor and was designed for aggression, the sole military purpose of NATO — this has been declaimed over and over again and we have no reason to doubt it — is to deter aggression by providing firm evidence that aggressors would be quickly and successfully met if they should attack any member of the Alliance. In NATO there is a formidable capability — as General Norstad stated in Ottawa 10 days ago — to deter aggression. In this connection he also said that this capability is not altered or modified by the possession by any other power of a nuclear inter-continental ballistic missile.

This is a field, I am aware, where theories abound and often conflict. I do not intend to do more at this point than to state the Government's position, indeed its conviction, that the value of NATO as a deterrent remains intact and that it is incumbent upon us — we who have banded together in NATO — to exploit the opportunities which exist for closer co-operation in the fields of military, economic and scientific affairs.

We must seek for co-operation by increased exchange of scientific and technical information and from the stimulation of scientific education and research in the NATO countries. We should be able to find that further co-operation is possible in the economic production of modern weapons.

Military problems will loom large on the agenda of the NATO meeting which is to be held next month in Paris but, in the minds of many governments and of many peoples, that meeting will be judged just as much by its achievement in the non-military field as in the military field. With the challenge of communism all the time advancing, NATO must move with the times in the field of politics.

It is essential that we of the NATO alliance should intensify and develop our military contribution. But that is not enough. It is essential that we should work together to improve our machinery for consultation and promote the intimacy of our intramural understanding. These obligations are with us and they must be observed, but they are limited. To confine ourselves in NATO

to attaining them alone would be to cultivate our own interdependence as members of NATO without realizing that the health and strength of the Alliance depends on its relations with the world outside. There is, in other words, a global interdependence in this age of scientific discovery and nationalist ferment, and it is important for us and important for NATO not to underestimate that need.

No one should think of letting down his guard at the present time; no prudent man can deny the need for defence insurance. What I am suggesting is that the security organization will be successful or unsuccessful according to the degree of intelligence with which its political policies are formulated and pursued.

To give an example, I turn for a moment to the problem of (Soviet activity in) uncommitted neutral states. This is a serious and growing danger. How are they going? Are they going toward the Russians or towards the West? This cannot be ignored by NATO members, and yet NATO as such is perhaps not well equipped to deal with such a problem. . . . The Asian and African nations which are uncommitted have no more desire than we have to see greater domination of other countries by the U.S.S.R. But, having regard to the historic relations they have had with the West and having regard to their desire to flex their muscles as new and independent nations, they might think that the steps which are being taken at NATO are designed for our security, and of course they are, and they would not necessarily adopt them wholeheartedly as their measures.

We must recognize, too, that nationalism is not necessarily synonymous with communism in young countries, but we have to realize also that nationalism has been exploited by communism. There are real risks in dealing with these uncommitted nations. Their peoples may succumb to the blandishments and to the plausible and insidious appeal of Soviet tactics, but we must respect them as independent nations. We must work with them and assure them that we regard them as independent nations, and try to establish a mature and wise relationship with them. Or, to put it another way, unless we assure them by word and deed that our participation in NATO is complementary to and not in conflict with our membership in the Commonwealth and in the United Nations we may not be able to make much appeal to them.

Canada is a middle power with roots in the three associations, in NATO, in the Commonwealth and in the United Nations. I think Canada has a special reason for avoiding an absolutely rigid dependence on any one of these organizations as the sole instrument or channel of its foreign policy.

I come now to my final point in relation to the NATO meeting projected for Paris in December. The House will not expect me — and even if it did I could not do this — to predict the specific terms of the agenda or the likely outcome of the deliberations. I am more concerned to suggest to this House the general philosophy which I think should govern our approach to that meeting. We must . . . start from the premise that new and intensified efforts at military and scientific co-operation are essential, and we must be prepared to do our part in developing that co-operation. We must, in the second place, in view of the unhappy events of the last two or three weeks, renew our determination to consult frankly on issues which have caused, or are likely to cause divisions in NATO. And, thirdly, to return to the point I was trying to make

a few moments ago, we must assure the world outside NATO that no one need fear aggression from us; that far from regarding the forthcoming meeting as an end in itself, the whole world, including ourselves, regards it as a symbol of our determination to protect ourselves and, no less important, of our genuine and sustained interest in finding ultimate peaceful solutions to the issues that divide us from the communist world.

I have endeavoured to put before this House a diagram of Canada's relations with other nations. Nothing that I have said should obscure our intense resolution to reduce tensions between the West and the U.S.S.R. No sane person could run the risk of shutting any promising door on the possibility of co-existence. Yet — and this is not double talk — we should not fall into a propaganda plot; we should not be lulled into complacency by empty or hollow professions such as happened after the Geneva meeting. We must keep up our defences pending the arrival of the day for which we have hoped, the arrival of the day of substantial mutual trust between the West and the East. And I should add this: we must have convincing proof that the U.S.S.R. has abandoned its policies of domination. Co-existence cannot be used as a cover for subversion on the part of the U.S.S.R. in free countries. What I have been trying to say, Sir, is that we must keep our powder dry and put the hand out.

Statement on Disarmament

Among the speeches made in the external affairs debate in the House of Commons on November 26, 1957 was a statement on the disarmament question by Mr. W. A. Nesbitt, M.P., Parliamentary Assistant to the Prime Minister, and Vice-Chairman of the Canadian Delegation to the Twelfth Session of the United Nations General Assembly. Mr. Nesbitt spoke, in part, as follows:

This evening, Mr. Speaker, in entering this debate on the subject of external affairs, I propose to deal exclusively with the subject of disarmament, which is a matter of the greatest interest and importance not only to the people of Canada but to people all over the world. I would like to take this opportunity of dealing with this subject because I have, in the last eight weeks, had the honour and the opportunity of serving as Vice-Chairman of our delegation to the United Nations and of following the whole subject at first hand.

The disarmament negotiations of the Sub-Committee, which was held last summer in London, came to an abrupt end at the beginning of September after the Soviet representative, Mr. Zorin, had rejected the proposals for partial measures of disarmament submitted by the four western powers in a working paper on August 29. This abrupt termination of the Sub-Committee's work was clearly a matter of great concern to many countries when the General Assembly of the United Nations opened last September 17. The opening statements of all the great powers in the Assembly reflected this concern. Speaking for Canada on September 23, the Right Hon. Prime Minister (Mr. Diefenbaker) expressed the hope that the current session of the United Nations Assembly might be known in future years as the disarmament assembly. These words were quoted with warmth by a number of successive speakers and I think the general tenor of the debate opened with fairly high hopes.

In general the debate concentrated upon the resolution of October 11, introduced by 24 of the major powers. Much of this resolution was based on the Western proposals in the Sub-Committee on August 29 . . .

This afternoon the hon. member of Fort William (Mr. McIvor) made a request of the Secretary of State for External Affairs asking that he deal with those proposals in detail and this evening I think I might outline the proposals of the 24-power resolution . . . This resolution was based upon six points which are as follows:

1—The immediate suspension of nuclear testing in conjunction with an adequate control system to ensure that this was carried out.

2—The so-called "cut-off" or the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes.

3—The reduction of stocks of nuclear weapons.

4—The controlled and graduated reduction of armed forces and armaments; that is, conventional armaments, a field in which agreement had almost been reached.

5—The progressive establishment of a ground and aerial system to guard against surprise attack.

6—The study of an inspection system to ensure that objects would be sent into outer space only for peaceful and scientific purposes.

These six points presented a more complex resolution than any of those put forward by the U.S.S.R., for they represented a series of concrete proposals on which the Western powers and their allies in NATO had negotiated for months to ensure agreement. As a member of the Sub-Committee, Canada participated in the drafting of this resolution and co-sponsored it.

In contrast, the Soviet resolutions were simple, propagandistic in their appeal and in their essence completely uncontrollable. Briefly, the Soviet Union presented two proposals. The first was for a five-year ban on the use of nuclear weapons. This clearly meant nothing more than an uncontrollable promise which would be valid until the day it was broken. This resolution, I might say, received only 11 votes in favour.

The second Soviet proposal called for the immediate cessation of testing, without regard to any other measures on disarmament. It became quite evident that many nations were attracted by a proposal of this kind. India had submitted a very similar resolution and Japan presented a compromise resolution which linked the objective of a temporary suspension of nuclear testing to negotiations for an adequate supervision and inspection system to verify this. The Indian proposal received a vote of 22 for, 38 against and 20 abstentions. The Japanese proposal was opposed by the Soviet bloc as well as by the West and was defeated by a vote of 18 for, 32 against and 31 abstentions. Canada voted against all these proposals because it felt, as did many other countries, that the question of nuclear test suspension can only be settled as a part of a more comprehensive disarmament agreement which also does something to solve the more fundamental matter of the arms race in nuclear weapons.

Perhaps because of the reservations which many countries had on matters such as nuclear test suspension, the disarmament debate showed little enthusiasm at the beginning. For some time there was a shortage of countries willing to speak; and while it was apparent that the 24-power resolution would receive an adequate majority many of the uncommitted nations questioned the value of requesting support by the Assembly for what was essentially the position of one side to the cold war alone.

Many of our allies were slow to make public their support, as if they were waiting for some further clarification of the Western position. For these reasons the Secretary of State for External Affairs, when he delivered the Canadian statement in the Committee on October 23 last, emphasized repeatedly that Canada, while it had sponsored the 24-power draft resolution and urged its adoption, remained open-minded. I should like to make a brief quotation from the remarks of the Secretary of State for External Affairs in the Political Committee of the United Nations which was at that time discussing disarmament:

Canada is sensitive to every possibility of improving it. Let us not be inflexible in this regard. We of Canada certainly do not say that the particular proposals with which we are now associated are the only means by which at least some progress can be made toward disarmament. Canada has co-sponsored plans for partial disarmament, but I repeat that we do not necessarily regard them as the last word.

Canada's position of flexibility was enthusiastically welcomed by the representatives of many countries, including Norway, Mexico, Pakistan, Israel and Nepal. It was particularly noteworthy that in the closing remarks of the representative of the United States, Mr. Henry Cabot Lodge, he said that the United States associated itself at some length with the remarks made by the Secretary of State for External Affairs.

Ambassador Lodge added that the United States also desired openmindedness and flexibility and they too were not suggesting that our proposals, the 24-power resolution, were the last word. It is perhaps not too much to say that this position of flexibility contributed to the large vote by which the 24-power resolution was passed. The resolution, incidentally, received 57 votes in favour, 9 votes against, being merely the Soviet bloc, 15 abstentions. This vote was later sustained when the resolution came from the political committee to the General Assembly.

It would have been a very satisfactory result for the West and for Canada except for the dramatic Soviet announcement just before the vote was taken that they would not return to participate in the work of either the Disarmament Committee or its Sub-Committee. Shortly before, Russia had introduced a resolution calling for the establishment of a permanent disarmament commission consisting of all 82 members of the United Nations which would discuss disarmament continuously and without any secrecy whatsoever. It is hard to believe that the U.S.S.R. really wants such a commission or that this move was anything but a propaganda move . . .

Composition of Commission

Commenting on the Soviet announcement from the Canadian point of view, Mr. Nesbitt emphasized that Canada

had always considered the composition of the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee to be in question. One month earlier our Prime Minister, speaking of the Disarmament Sub-Committee, had said in the assembly:

We consider that a salutary effect might be achieved by securing the participation of other powers; they may be capable of rendering assistance in the processes of seeking an agreement that we have not been able to achieve. But let me say this: Geography alone should not be the basis for choosing additional members, for all members are not equally equipped to contribute towards the agreement for which we all devoutly hope.

Some of our allies had said in the course of the debate that there should be no expansion either of the Commission or its Sub-Committee, but we had been careful in our concluding remarks on November 4 last to keep our position open on this matter . . .

Describing further initiatives taken by the Canadian Delegation with a view to meeting this situation, Mr. Nesbitt continued as follows:

Therefore, on November 6 we made only a guarded statement in the Political Committee just before the votes were taken. At that time I made certain remarks and I should like to quote what I said. I do so only because I think the remarks are pertinent to the remarks I am making at the moment. I said:

We do not believe that the size or composition of the Disarmament Commission and the Sub-Committee has been a major obstacle in the way of agreement. But, by the same token, we do not believe that a matter of some alteration in the United Nations disarmament bodies need inevitably be allowed to stand in the way of at least the opportunity for further negotiation . . . Our fundamental approach to a possible change in disarmament bodies was defined by Prime Minister Diefenbaker in his statement in the general debate on September 23. He made it clear at that time that we were certainly not opposed in principle to associating other countries with these disarmament talks if there was any chance that this would improve the prospects of success. If, however, the very possibility of continuing the negotiations at all is now jeopardized, then the willingness to accept some reasonable adjustment is all the more essential.

As we expected, this statement was warmly welcomed by many countries, including some of our NATO allies. Very shortly thereafter our allies on the Sub-Committee indicated to us that they would not now be opposed to reasonable expansion of the Disarmament Commission . . .

At first it was agreed that an addition of five new members might be reasonable. Then immediately rumours of our negotiations began to spread, as they do down there, and many countries indicated that if there were to be any Commission expansion then their own region, or more particularly their own country in some cases, should not be excluded. Thus, our Sub-Committee allies themselves asked that not five but ten countries should be added. These ten were Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Czechoslovakia, India, Italy, Tunisia and Yugoslavia.

It was agreed that if such a resolution for Commission expansion were to be effective it should unite rather than divide the Assembly, or at least that part of it outside the Soviet bloc. Therefore, along with our allies we had been in constant consultation with India and with other leaders of the uncommitted nations. We had also had some contact, I may add, with the Soviet Delegation who had made it clear that they would not commit themselves to any resolution in advance. At times we seemed on the point of finding a list of countries which would be acceptable to all the powers concerned. However, after some days of negotiation it became more and more clear to the Canadian Delegation that, regardless of our own views, it would be very hard to get prior agreement between all of our Sub-Committee allies on the one hand and the major uncommitted countries on the other. Therefore, in order to get the ship launched, so to speak, together with Japan we introduced a resolution calling upon the Assembly "to enlarge the Disarmament Commission by the addition of ten member states which, for the first year, from 1 January, 1958, to 1 January, 1959, shall be"—and then followed the ten countries I have previously mentioned. Our tactic on this occasion was, in the words of an eminent statesman of the past, to wait and see the reaction of the Assembly to this resolution.

We were not surprised to learn that there was widespread feeling, even among some of our NATO allies, that while our resolution was a good thing it was perhaps not quite good enough, and that a more equitable and satisfactory list of countries could still be found. In short, Mr. Speaker, we continued to negotiate with the same intensity after our resolution was introduced as we had before. Twice the discussion of our resolution was postponed and once the Assembly was adjourned for this purpose.

At length it became clear that India, Sweden and Yugoslavia would be satisfied with an amendment to our resolution which we ourselves had been considering, namely the addition of four more countries, Egypt, Mexico, Norway and Poland. When it was clear that this amendment could be accepted by all of our Sub-Committee allies we tabled a revised version of our resolution, one which was in our view very much more satisfactory and which would add all of these 14 countries and thus give the Disarmament Commission a membership of 25 countries. We were particularly pleased to obtain for our resolution the co-sponsorship of all the middle powers most concerned, namely, Canada, India, Japan, Sweden and Yugoslavia. Later Paraguay joined the sponsors as a representative of Latin American countries . . .

In discussing the reaction to this proposal, Mr. Nesbitt stated that there had been some degree of optimism that the Soviet Union would not be opposed, and would indicate its willingness to return to the Disarmament Commission. "However," he commented, "such was not to be the case". At the last minute an amendment to the resolution was put forward by the Albanian Delegation, according to which a further seven countries (Austria, Bulgaria, Ceylon, Finland, Indonesia, Romania, and the Sudan) would have been added to the fourteen already proposed. Speaking in support of the Albanian amendment, the representative of the Soviet Union stated that, unless it were accepted, his country would not be willing to participate in the work of the expanded Disarmament Commission.

Mr. Nesbitt continued with a description of the voting on these proposals:

The voting on our resolution and on the Soviet proposal showed that the Soviet Union had allowed itself to become completely isolated on this matter. Many neutral countries were offended by this abrupt Soviet rejection of a serious negotiated compromise on which much labour had been expended. Yugoslavia in particular expressed its regret that our resolution had not been generally accepted. Because of this disappointment Yugoslavia declined to vote on the resolution in any way. After the Albanian amendment had been defeated by a vote of 19 for and 38 against with 19 abstentions, our resolution was then passed by the impressive majority of 60 for to 9 against, with 11 abstentions. Only the hard core of the Soviet bloc voted against our resolution. I might say, Mr. Speaker, that our resolution was supported by most of the Asian countries and almost the entire Arab group, including Egypt, Jordan and Syria. The Soviet proposal for a permanent 82 member commission received only the 9 votes of its own block.

Where Responsibility Rests

Mr. Nesbitt then commented on the overall results of the long discussion of the question of expansion, and the progress which had been achieved by Canadian efforts to devise a satisfactory solution. He spoke, in part, as follows:

If the U.S.S.R. persists in its refusal to negotiate, one may well ask what Canada's efforts in this matter have achieved. I think that question was probably in the mind of the hon. member for Algoma East (Mr. Pearson) when he made his remarks this afternoon. We have at the very least shown a constructive willingness to make reasonable concessions in order to continue serious talks on this vitally urgent question. No one can say that Western stubbornness on the mere machinery of United Nations disarmament talks has been an obstacle to progress . . .

It would, of course, serve no constructive end to allow the Commission to become a mere sounding board for Soviet propaganda. In our negotiations we were constantly mindful of this danger. But since the passage of our resolution all of our Sub-Committee allies have indicated to us that they have no misgivings at all about the composition of the new Commission . . .

The new larger Disarmament Commission of 25 members does not rule out further meetings of a small Sub-Committee. If the major powers concerned will agree, there can be further meetings of the old, indeed of a new, Sub-Committee . . .

In conclusion, Mr. Nesbitt emphasized that continued refusal on the part of the Soviet Union to participate in disarmament discussions would make it apparent to all nations where the responsibility lay for lack of further progress. "One can still ask", he said

whether the Soviet Union can afford to boycott a Commission where countries like India, Egypt, and Yugoslavia have come to hear the U.S.S.R. defend its position on disarmament. Thanks to our resolution, if the U.S.S.R. does boycott the Commission it will no longer have any respectable reason for doing so. It will certainly not endear itself to these uncommitted countries; while the West, on the other hand, will be in a position to make its point of view much more clearly understood.

In the voting on our resolution, the U.S.S.R. was already isolated from these uncommitted countries. Many other countries have approached us to express their gratitude and relief that a sound and constructive resolution to expand the Commission was introduced and passed. For this means that the Assembly has done what it could to further disarmament negotiations; and the onus is now squarely on the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to justify its position . . .



AT PARIS CONFERENCE

Some of the members of the Canadian Delegation to the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference held last month in Paris. Left to right, seated: Senator Léon Methot; C. A. Cannon, M.P.; J. C. Pallett, M.P., chairman; G. W. Montgomery, M.P.; H. F. Jones, M.P.; standing: E. Régier, M.P.; R. Thomas, M.P.; R. English, M.P.; N. C. Schneider, M.P.; G. E. Nixon, M.P.; J. C. Van Horne, M.P.

Canada and the United Nations

The United Nations Emergency Force

On November 22, the United Nations General Assembly debated and passed a draft resolution introduced by the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, and co-sponsored by 20 other nations, regarding the financing of the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East. The resolution "noted with appreciation" the Secretary General's report on the Force dated October 9, 1957, approved his proposals for the allocation of costs between participating countries and the United Nations, and provided for the raising of the necessary additional funds required for 1957 and 1958 through common assessment of all members. (The funds to be raised by this method include at least \$3 - 4 million for 1957, and \$25 million for 1958, after deduction of "special assistance" recently offered by the U.S. (\$12 million), the U.K. (\$1 million) and several other countries.) Fifty-one countries, including Israel and Jordan, voted in favour of the resolution, 11 countries opposed (the Soviet bloc, Chile and Ecuador) and 19 countries abstained (the remainder of the Arab States including Morocco and Tunisia, Cambodia, China, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Malaya, Nepal and Panama).

During the debate on the resolution most of the speakers expressed approval of the useful role the Force is playing in the Middle East. The only objections to the principle of the Force voiced during the discussion were made by the representatives of the Soviet bloc, who reaffirmed their view that the establishment of armed forces of the United Nations under Chapter VII of the Charter falls exclusively within the competence of the Security Council.* The majority of the abstentions on the UNEF resolutions appear to have been made on the ground that the Assembly resolution of February 2, 1957, which called for "the placing of the . . . Force on the Egyptian-Israel Armistice Demarcation Line" has so far been only partially fulfilled; a few countries abstained or opposed the resolution because of the financial burden which it would place on them.

Canadian Participation in UNEF

The prominent role which the Canadian Delegation played, both before and during the debate, in helping to ensure the passage of the UNEF resolution is a logical outgrowth of the close concern which Canada has had with UNEF since the establishment of the Force. It will be recalled that the initial resolution of November 4, 1956 requesting the Secretary-General to submit a plan for the setting up of the Force was introduced into the Assembly by the Canadian representative; and that Canada was one of the three co-sponsors of the resolution of November 5, 1956 which actually established the Force and appointed Major-General E. L. M. Burns as its Commander. Subsequently Canada became a member of the Advisory Committee established by the Assembly on November 7 to assist the Secretary-General in carrying out his

*The special session of the UN General Assembly which established UNEF in November, 1956 was convened under the terms of the "Uniting for Peace" resolution which provides for emergency meetings of the General Assembly, on the request of any seven members of the Security Council if the Council, because of lack of unanimity among its permanent members, fails to act where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.



REVIEWS CANADIANS

Major General E. L. M. Burns, Commander of the United Nations Emergency Force, takes the salute from Canadians under his command at a review held in observance of United Nations Day.

responsibilities with regard to the Force. (This Committee, which still meets frequently, has proved to be extremely useful in ensuring adequate liaison between the Secretariat and the general body of UN members on UNEF problems.) In a matter of a few days after the Force was officially established, it was on its way to Egypt, and the first troops arrived in the Canal Zone on November 15. Until March, 1957 the Force was concerned mainly with taking over from the troops withdrawing from Egypt and Gaza. Since that time UNEF has been located in the Gaza Strip, along the eastern border of Sinai, and in the Sharm al-Shaikh sector, and has concentrated on its basic function of maintaining quiet in the area and preventing frontier incidents.

Canada has provided the largest contingent in UNEF (1,060 men as of October 25, 1957). The other contingents are from Brazil (545 men), Colombia (522), Denmark (424), India (957), Norway (498), Sweden (349) and Yugoslavia (673). An Indonesian contingent of 582 men was withdrawn in September, and Finland, which provided 255 men, is withdrawing its contingent this month. It should be noted, however, that both of these countries reaffirmed their support for UNEF during the recent debate, and were among the 21 co-sponsors of the resolution of November 22, 1957.

Within UNEF, the Canadian contingent has had the responsibility for most of the logistical and administrative problems of the Force, such as signals, engineering, supply and transport, workshop, ordnance, medical and dental services, postal and pay offices, and provost and movement control. In addition, Canada has provided two RCAF units, one at Naples which acts as

a support element to the Force and is responsible for the heavy lift of mails, priority cargo and transport of passengers between Egypt and Italy; and the other at El Arish (Egypt), which provides air communications within the area of operation of the Force. It is responsible for reconnaissance, medical evacuation and internal transport support. The Canadian contingent comprises also a reconnaissance squadron of some 20 Ferret scout cars which patrol the demarcation line. The Commander of the Force is a Canadian, Major-General E. L. M. Burns, who formerly acted as Chief of Staff of the UN Truce Supervision Organization. The Canadian contingent is now in the process of completing the rotation of its personnel, most of whom have served a full year term. Some of the other contingents rotate their troops every six months.

Secretary-General's Report

In his recent report to the General Assembly, the Secretary-General remarked that the Force "had earned acceptance as a significant pioneering effort in the evolution of methods of peace-making". A study of the report indicates that the Force has unquestionably been effective in its role, which has been defined by the Secretary-General, with the approval of the Assembly, as "to help maintain quiet during and after the withdrawal of non-Egyptian troops". In this connection it is noteworthy that frontier incidents have been at a minimum in recent months along the Egyptian-Israeli armistice demarcation line. During the performance of its task, UNEF has enjoyed good relations, in general, with the population of the Gaza Strip; and, as the Secretary of State for External Affairs said in his statement to the UN, the Egyptian Government has adopted a helpful attitude towards the Force's presence and functioning in Egyptian-controlled territory.

The Secretary-General has, however, reminded members of the United Nations that the Force is limited in its authority; it was not established to enforce the withdrawal of forces or the maintenance of peaceful conditions along the armistice line, and it does not use all normal military methods in achieving the objectives defined for it by the General Assembly. Furthermore there is still a need to find, at the appropriate time, satisfactory solutions for certain unresolved issues, among which are: the completion of UNEF's deployment (it operates only on Egyptian-controlled territory, despite the Assembly resolution calling for it to be placed on the Armistice line); authority to fire during darkness at infiltrators approaching the line from either direction; and the proposal for a protective fence along the armistice line. "The line under present conditions is vulnerable", said the Secretary-General in his report, "and the quiet, at any moment, could be abruptly broken". Nevertheless it is clear that the Force is, in his words, "one of the pre-conditions for the preservation of quiet along the line between Egypt and Israel. Such quiet, in turn, is indispensable to fruitful effort towards the removal of the major obstacles to peace in the Near East".

Statement by Mr. Smith

Reproduced below is the text of the statement made in the UN General Assembly on November 22 by Mr. Sidney Smith, Secretary of State for External Affairs, in introducing the 21-power draft resolution on UNEF:

The representatives present at this meeting of the General Assembly need hardly be reminded that, slightly more than a year ago, the Assembly met in emergency session

in the face of a dangerous situation which had arisen in the Middle East. For reasons with which we are all familiar, it was—and I emphasize this—it was the Assembly, in which all member governments are represented, which bore the brunt of that crisis, that situation which had the gravest implications for the peace of the area and, indeed, of the whole world. Our meeting at this time, however, is not to dwell upon the events of the past but to consider the consequences of one of the important steps which the Assembly took last year, namely, the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force. That was a decision in which all of us participated.

Since the dark days of November 1956, a great deal has been said and written about the role of UNEF in the Middle East. Members of this Assembly may not then have been wholly in agreement on the principles which should govern the presence and functioning of that Force. But what we are now agreed on, I believe, is that UNEF has made a valuable contribution to the maintenance of quiet and order in the area of its deployment. This, in turn, has done much to allay the anxiety, the fear and the frustration which had produced international tension there. In the introduction to his last annual report to the General Assembly, the Secretary-General has made thoughtful and persuasive comment on the ways in which the Force has continued to serve the cause of peace in the Middle East, and he points out that it has played a pioneering role which has been accompanied by many difficulties.

In the admirable report (A/369), dated 9 October 1957, which the Secretary-General has made, he discusses in detail the development of UNEF. I could not possibly improve on what the report states about organizational and operational matters and about the role and functioning of the Force. I wish only to add my voice to the other expressions of warm appreciation which we have heard from time to time about the Secretary-General and his staff—those men and women who have worked so tirelessly and effectively for the success of the UNEF experiment. It is, of course, a source of satisfaction to Canada that the Commanding Officer of the Force has been Major General Burns—a Canadian.

At the same time, I pay equally warm tribute to those governments which, in one way or another, have made a contribution to this work of practical peace-making. I have in mind the participating governments which, with Canada, have provided contingents to UNEF; the governments which, without charge, have furnished services, facilities and supplies; the governments which have made voluntary contributions and special assistance available in order to meet the problems of financing the Force; and also those governments which offered contingents in the early days of UNEF when the broad response did much to encourage those whose responsibility it was to organize the Force. All those governments warrant congratulations for their support of the United Nations at that time of great trial—a time which perhaps provided a decisive test of the vitality of this Organization. And this rallying round of member states, representing various shades of opinion in this Assembly, is inspiring evidence that the United Nations ideal can be given practical expression.

For, in a sense, the creation of the UNEF has been a practical application of the foremost among the purposes and principles enunciated in Article I of our Charter. In establishing UNEF, the United Nations took an effective and collective step towards the prevention and removal of a threat to peace. The collectivity of this action is symbolized in the composition of the Force itself and in the offers and contributions made by other governments to assist in bringing UNEF into being.

In this context, it is appropriate to mention the helpful attitude which the Government of Egypt has adopted toward the presence and functioning of UNEF in territory under Egyptian control.

Costs of UNEF

The Prime Minister of Canada has already expressed in this Assembly hall Canada's willingness to continue its contribution to UNEF as long as this is considered necessary by the United Nations. We are fully aware of those reasons why the duration or extent of UNEF's operation cannot be defined at this time. I can see no particular advantage in attempting that definition now. Nevertheless, we of Canada deeply hope that the members of this Assembly share our view that UNEF should continue to have the widest support of the United Nations as long as it appears to be making a useful contribution to peace in the area.

We have the impression that these views are widely shared in this Assembly. If this is so, it follows that the Assembly should give careful consideration to the consequences of continuing the Force in being. There is no doubt that the financial consequences are of concern to all of us here. The Secretary-General has described them in detail in Part III of his report. This shows that to maintain a force of 6,000 United Nations soldiers, performing necessary duties in the service of peace in the Middle East, involves a considerable expenditure. I have no desire to underestimate the actual cost,

but I ask members; and I ask this very, very seriously, to relate those financial costs to the political benefits which UNEF has helped to achieve, and to the possible dangers which UNEF has helped to avert. How do we measure the value of decreased tension between nations, the diminishing of fear and anxiety among peoples, and the strengthening of hope for further progress towards peace? It is surely these intangible factors which must be placed in the balance sheet—and which should be given due weight—when we look at the figures for the costs of UNEF.

To meet those costs, it seems to me inevitable that the Assembly should accept and firmly support the principle of common assessment, based on the regular scale of assessments for United Nations members. The Secretary-General has placed the issue squarely before us in paragraph 106 of his report. He has stressed the grave risks inherent in an inadequate and insecure basis for financing UNEF. Clearly, to base the operations of the Force on a series of appeals for voluntary contributions would be quite inadequate and wholly unworthy of this Organization and the cause which it is serving. The validity of this conclusion has been demonstrated beyond doubt, and I say this without detracting from my previous expression of gratitude for the voluntary contributions and special assistance which some members have so generously provided. I have no hesitation in supporting the assertion in the Secretary-General's report that:

"It is essential that this vital United Nations undertaking be assured of the same degree of certainty of financial support as afforded to other United Nations activities which have as their purpose the maintenance of security and peace."
(A/3694, para. 106).

The Canadian view, which has been consistently expressed during the Assembly debates on this subject, is that the financing of UNEF and similar United Nations endeavours can be assured only if the principle of assessment, of collective sharing in the collective effort of peace, is followed.

Draft Resolution

It is with these views in mind that the Canadian Delegation has been consulting with a number of other delegations about the course of action which the Assembly should adopt at this time. We and others have reached certain conclusions which are embodied in the draft resolution (A/L.235/Add.1) now before us. It has been suggested that I should introduce this draft resolution formally to the Assembly. I consider it an honour and a privilege to do so, but I approach the task with a sense of humility, because I am conscious of the fact that I am acting on behalf of a large number of delegations whose names appear on the draft resolution and who represent most of the opinions held in this Assembly. Indeed, I earnestly hope that, in introducing this resolution, I am reflecting the views of the great majority of members here. I say this because of my abiding conviction that UNEF is serving all of us in the Middle East and serving us well.

The draft resolution is a straightforward document. The preamble begins by recalling the earlier resolutions on UNEF. These resolutions, of course, remain operative and are in no way abrogated by the draft which we are considering today and which we should regard as complementary to the earlier resolutions.

The second paragraph of the preamble notes with appreciation the report which the Secretary-General has placed before us. It also recognizes the Assembly's wisdom in appointing an Advisory Committee on UNEF composed of representatives of certain member governments.

The third preambular paragraph acknowledges that UNEF has contributed and is contributing to the maintenance of quiet in the area.

In the operative paragraphs, following an expression of appreciation to those who have rendered assistance to the Force, three main decisions are involved. The first is the approval of the principles and proposals concerning the allocation of costs as between the United Nations and the governments which have provided contingents for UNEF. These are set forth mainly in paragraphs 86, 88 and 91 of the Secretary-General's report. The Secretary-General would be authorized to enter into the agreements for the reimbursements of appropriate extra and extraordinary costs to the members contributing troops. This provision is consistent with earlier resolutions concerning the allocation of costs and it is most important by reason of its implications for participating governments, which have made a considerable effort to give the Assembly's decisions on UNEF effective application. Such voluntary participation in this and similar activities of the United Nations should be encouraged.

Secondly, the Secretary-General would be authorized by the Assembly to expend the additional amounts necessary to meet the costs during the period ending 31 December, 1957. These costs are set forth in Part III of the Secretary-General's report and will be given detailed examination by the Administrative and Budgetary Committee following the normal practice of the United Nations. The same procedure would be adopted re-

garding the cost estimates for the future operations of the Force beyond 31 December, 1957. For that period the Secretary-General would be authorized to expend, as necessary—and I emphasize “as necessary”—an amount not exceeding \$25 million. This figure could reasonably be expected to cover the costs of maintaining the Force on its present basis until the next session of the Assembly. In this regard, the words “as necessary” have special significance and I call the attention of the Assembly to them.

The third main decision contemplated in the draft resolution deals with the method of financing the Force. As I have emphasized in the earlier part of my statement, the basic principle should be that the expenses would be borne by the member states in accordance with the annual scale of assessments. This principle is embodied in paragraph 4 of the draft resolution. The phrase “such other resources as may have become available” is not without importance, however, and should be read in conjunction with the note which the Secretary-General circulated on 20 November (A/3745). It will be seen that the liabilities—for the period ending 31 December, 1957—have been substantially reduced owing to the contributions of special assistance, and in this connection our warm appreciation is extended especially to the Government of the United States. We know that further assistance has been offered and, of course, other voluntary contributions in the future are not excluded.

Finally, the draft resolution requests the Administrative and Budgetary Committee, with the assistance of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, to examine, in the light of the present resolution, the cost estimates for maintaining the Force—that is, those contained in Part III of the Secretary-General's report. These budgetary bodies are requested to make such recommendations as they consider appropriate concerning the expenditures authorized by the resolution. This request would enable the General Assembly—and here I fall in line with your observation, Mr. President—to avoid discussion of details and to concentrate on the discussion of general principles.

The draft resolution embodies, we think, the various measures required to meet the needs of UNEF. In particular, it deals with the administrative decisions listed in paragraph III of the Secretary-General's report. But the draft resolution does more than that; it establishes a sound basis for the continuing operation of UNEF and, together with the various reports by the Secretary-General, lays the groundwork for the analysis and study of the experience of UNEF which, the Secretary-General has suggested, should be preserved for the future.

The draft resolution is, moreover, a comprehensive document and one which must be viewed in its entirety. Any one paragraph would be virtually meaningless without the others. We believe that this integral character of the proposal should be retained.

I look forward to hearing the views of other delegations on this matter which has important implications for all of us as states members of the United Nations and for the Organization itself. In introducing this draft resolution, I urge the Assembly to weigh carefully the measures which have been proposed. Our deliberations at this time have a bearing on whether we can demonstrate to the peoples of the world that the United Nations has the determination and strength to put into practice the high principles and purposes to which we all subscribed in acceding to the Charter.

I conclude by expressing my confidence that the Assembly's response now, as its response last year in circumstances of greater stress, anxiety and danger, will serve to give real meaning to those lofty ideals and will, in practical terms, enable UNEF to fulfill the responsibilities placed upon it by the General Assembly.

Items Relating to South Africa

During the twelfth session of the United Nations Assembly three items relating to South Africa have been considered. These are:

- (1) The Question of South West Africa
- (2) The Question of Race Conflict in South Africa
- (3) The Treatment of People of Indian Origin in the Union of South Africa

The Canadian Delegation abstained on the vote on inscription of the last two items because of its view that there had been ample opportunity for the United Nations to discuss racial problems in South Africa in the past and there would be no practical value in so doing once again. Both items were, however, inscribed by a large majority.

On South West Africa Canada voted in favour of the resolution setting up a Good Offices Committee consisting of the United States, the United Kingdom and a third member to be nominated by the President of the Twelfth Assembly, to discuss with the Government of South Africa a basis for agreement which would continue to accord an international status to South West Africa. This resolution was approved in the Special Political Committee on October 11 by 52 votes to 10 with 17 abstentions. Because of a desire to allow the Good Offices Committee to work unhampered, the Canadian Delegation abstained on 5 other resolutions concerning South West Africa which arose out of reports of the Committee on South West Africa.

The resolution on Race Conflict in South Africa, sponsored by 29 countries recalled previous resolutions on *apartheid*; deplored that the Government of South Africa had not responded to them; and appealed to the Government to revise its policy in the light of the principles and purposes of the Charter and of world opinion, and to inform the Secretary-General of its response. The Canadian Representative, taking part in the debate on the resolution, affirmed Canada's respect for human rights and its opposition to racial discrimination wherever it might appear. He pointed out that there was no quick and easy solution to the problem which existed in South Africa and expressed the hope that the Assembly would not approve any resolution which did not recognize the extent as well as the urgency of the problem. He said that the Canadian Delegation would be prepared to support a resolution of a general nature reminding all states of the obligations in the Charter applicable to this question.

Believing that it would not have a beneficial effect on the racial situation in South Africa, the Canadian Delegation abstained in the vote on the resolution which, however, was approved in Committee on November 1 by 59 in favour, 5 against (Australia, Belgium, France, Portugal and the United Kingdom) with 10 abstentions (including Canada and New Zealand).


On the Treatment of People of Indian Origin in South Africa a resolution was introduced which recalled last year's resolution which had urged South Africa and India and Pakistan to enter into negotiations on this problem and (1) noted that India and Pakistan were ready to pursue negotiations; (2) regretted South Africa's lack of response; (3) again appealed to South Africa to participate in negotiations and (4) invited the parties concerned to report to the General Assembly the progress of the negotiations.

It was the Canadian view that the object of the resolution—to bring about negotiations between South Africa and India and Pakistan on this problem—could only be achieved by a resolution which was more acceptable to South Africa than the resolution proposed. In order to make its position clear the Canadian Delegation asked for a clause-by-clause vote in which it supported clauses 1 and 3, abstained on clauses 2 and 4 and abstained on the resolution as a whole. The resolution was passed in Committee on November 12 by 63 in favour, none against with 14 abstentions (Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, Dominican Republic, Finland, France, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom.) The Delegations of Honduras, Luxembourg, Nicaragua, Paraguay and South Africa were absent.

Colombo Plan Conference

THE Ninth Meeting of the Colombo Plan Consultative Committee was held in Saigon, Vietnam, from October 21 to 24, 1957. The Committee, which exercises general supervision over the Plan, is composed of representatives from the member countries who meet each year to consider the progress of economic development in South and South-East Asia and to exchange views on the operation of the Plan.

The newest member of the Commonwealth, the Federation of Malaya, was welcomed as a full member of the Colombo Plan. All member countries sent representatives to the Meeting. (The 18 member countries are Australia, Burma, Cambodia, Canada, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaya, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, The Philippines, Thailand, United Kingdom, United States and Vietnam). The Colombo Plan Bureau for Technical Co-operation and the Information Office, (both of which are located in Colombo), the United Nations Technical Assistance Board, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East were represented by observers.



VISIT IN SAIGON

Mr. William J. Browne, Minister without Portfolio, seen with President Diem of Vietnam. Mr. Browne represented Canada at the annual meeting of the Colombo Plan Consultative Committee held in Saigon.

The Canadian Delegation to the Conference was led by Mr. W. J. Browne, Minister without Portfolio, and included Mr. H. O. Moran, the Canadian High Commissioner to Pakistan, Mr. A. R. Menzies, Mr. D. M. Cornett and Mr. S. C. H. Nutting, of the Department of External Affairs, Mr. W. D. Mills, of the Department of Trade and Commerce, and Mr. D. Hudon, of the Department of Finance. During the Meeting Mr. Browne announced that the annual Canadian contribution to the Colombo Plan would be increased in 1958-59, subject to the approval of Parliament, to \$35,000,000, thus bringing to more than 231 million the total of Canada's contribution to the Plan since its establishment in 1950.

The Conference arrangements made by the host country (Vietnam) were excellent. A preliminary meeting of officials was held from September 30 to October 5 to prepare the ground for the chief task of the officials, the preparation of the draft annual report. The main body of officials arrived for the Officials Meeting, which was held from October 5 to October 21, during which time they prepared for the consideration of delegation leaders (most of whom were Cabinet Ministers) a draft annual report reviewing the progress of economic development in South and South-East Asia and considering the tasks which lie ahead. The officials also set-up sub-committees to consider the specialized fields of technical assistance and information.

The Meeting of the Consultative Committee was officially opened by the inaugural address of President Diem of Vietnam. He spoke of the political, social and economic aspirations of the peoples of the newly independent nations of South and South-East Asia and the part which the Colombo Plan was playing in helping to raise the standard of living in the area. In the course of his speech he said:

We all share in the uniqueness of the Colombo Plan. Like the great Commonwealth of Nations which gave it birth, the Plan is a voluntary and flexible arrangement, imbued with the practical idealism of raising man's lot to a higher station.


During the next four days the Ministers considered the draft report and discussed the common problems arising out of it. Each of the Ministers made a speech in which he outlined the views of his government on Colombo Plan matters. Mr. Browne concluded his speech in these words:

We have come a long way in the six years since the beginning of the Colombo Plan. In those years a great many Canadians have become newly aware of the problems of the peoples of South and South-East Asia. We have had the pleasure to welcome in Canada many Asian trainees and officials. This has increased our knowledge of them and of the tasks with which they are confronted. Our experts return from Asia having formed a close attachment to the countries in which they worked and, inspired by the manner in which the people are meeting the challenge of economic development.

... I think that the assistance, both capital and technical, that has been given by Canada has been put to good use and that my country's continued support is fully justified.

Throughout these meetings, which were conducted in a friendly and informal atmosphere, many useful discussions were held between the representatives of the member governments. Following the tradition established at successive Colombo Plan Conferences, the discussions were frank and cordial.

On the last day of the Meeting the delegates accepted the invitation of the United States to hold next year's Meeting in the United States. The Meeting adopted the draft annual report and issued a communiqué which noted the economic progress which had been made in the area in the year under review and set forth some of the tasks which lie ahead in the field of economic development.



INDIAN ATOMIC EXPERTS

A group of scientists, engineers and technicians from India, concluding a 15-month stay at Chalk River, Ontario, paid a farewell visit November 28 to Mr. Nik Cavell, right, Administrator for Canada of the Colombo Plan.

The Indians were in Canada under the auspices of the Colombo Plan to study the NRX reactor at Chalk River on which the reactor being built near Bombay with Canadian assistance is modelled.

Review of Economic Progress

Reviewing the progress made, the communiqué stated 'inter alia':

During the year the growth of per capita real income in the region appears to have been maintained, and there was further progress in economic development. However, the period has also seen the emergence of certain problems including balance of payments difficulties, an expansion of the money supply in most countries, and an increase in internal inflationary pressures.

Although agricultural production, and industrial and mining output as well, showed in general an upward trend, exports failed to keep pace with the expansion of imports. Important contributing factors were the need for increased expenditure on imports for developmental purposes and domestic monetary expansion. As a result of fluctuations in export prices, and of higher prices of imports, the terms of trade deteriorated for many countries in the region. One of the consequences of the foregoing trends was the emergence of sizeable trade deficits in most of the countries.

In agricultural production there was a considerable increase in the output of food-grains over the preceding year, but this was offset to some extent by a lower output of rubber and of tea. In mining there was a substantial increase in production, particularly of petroleum and iron ores. Industrial output increased considerably, more particularly in industries producing capital goods.

Most countries of the region are giving a high priority to expenditure on agriculture and irrigation, and to the production of basic services such as power, transport and communications. At the same time there is a general recognition of the need for the

provision of social services, particularly in the fields of health and education. It appears that practically all the countries in the region have increased expenditure on development in the public sector.

Private investment continues to be of major importance in the economic growth of the region. It is being encouraged by member governments through the provision of credit and marketing arrangements, by making available facilities such as buildings, power and technical advice, and also through tax concessions, direct financial assistance, protective tariffs and other measures.

Foreign private investment has been encouraged, particularly in fields where such investment is likely to be of benefit to economic development. Special treatment has been accorded to foreign investment in certain fields such as the provision of facilities for repatriation of capital and for remittance of current earnings. There have been many instances of fruitful collaboration between foreign and domestic private capital and also between foreign capital and the government of a country.

External economic assistance continues to play an important role in supplementing the resources available within the area itself. While it is not possible to estimate precisely the total amount of external resources directed to the region in 1956-57, it appears that in total the equivalent of about US \$1,000 million has been made available by donor countries in the form of economic and technical assistance. From the beginning of the Colombo Plan to the middle of 1957 the total external aid has amounted to about US \$3,500 million. In addition, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development has made loans to countries in the area amounting to about US \$39 million in 1956-57; and further loans to the value of US \$191 million have been made since June 1957. The total of International Bank loans to countries in the area since 1949 thus amounts to US \$586 million.

It is, of course, impossible to assess in monetary terms the economic value of technical assistance provided in the form of training or experts; but since 1950 training has been extended to approximately 13,000 trainees from countries of the area, while about 6,000 experts have been provided by Colombo Plan members and United Nations agencies.

The Tasks Ahead

The following passages are taken from that section of the communiqué dealing with the tasks which lie ahead:

Six years of the Colombo Plan have now elapsed: years in which member countries have been engaged in an intensive effort to accelerate economic development. It would be surprising if in this period some unforeseen problems, as well as achievements, had not emerged. The maintenance of satisfactory future progress will in no small measure depend on readiness to face these problems, to recognize their causes, and take them fully into account in reaching new decisions.

The amount and utilization of capital available in the year 1956-57 provide very satisfactory evidence of the increasing tempo of economic development in South and South-East Asia. In previous years one of the difficulties has been to use capital in development up to the full amounts potentially available. Shortages of some goods and facilities, of managerial skills, of technicians and of administrative personnel, combined with shortcomings in planning, have in many cases been the main limiting factors in development, with the result that projected developments have sometimes not been fully realized. This is still true of most countries. But the enormous amount of development activity currently in progress in some countries is an indication of the vitality of their economies in both the public and the private sectors.

The experience of the past year has, however, underlined the risk that the pace of development may outrun the availability of resources, and the consequent need for the implementation of development plans to be flexible so that they can be rephased as necessary to match the resources available. Plans or policies serve the purpose of settling priorities and securing balanced development. At this meeting member countries re-emphasized the need for a realistic approach to planning. They acknowledged that the implementation of formal plans may have led to rising confidence and increased demands in various parts of a country's economy, which raised consequential problems for all governments . . .

Private capital already goes to South and South-East Asia in significant amounts which cannot be exactly measured, through many diverse channels. The importance of foreign private capital lies both in its contribution to production facilities and in promoting local enterprise and talent. Governments of the area have generally shown awareness of the need to take positive steps, within the framework, of their own particular economic circumstances, to encourage such investment. All countries have to compete

for available private capital, and the advantage of the region in this competition is that it offers potentially large and growing markets. Capital may flow in from long-established business connections which are well acquainted with the conditions of the area. It may also flow in through industrial corporations new to the area, some with world-wide connections which are consequently selective in their decisions. They have a wide area of choice and they will naturally try to establish or expand industrial enterprises, frequently in co-operation with local private interests or governments, in those countries where they believe that their investment will be most secure and profitable, and where the friendly receptivity of governments is assured. The attractions of the region, however, can be counter-balanced by such factors as apprehensions as to the security of investment, difficulties with administrative and financial procedures and restrictions, and uncertainties about the incidence and weight of taxation. To such matters governments will no doubt continue to give detailed consideration.

During the year a number of countries in South and South-East Asia have run into balance of payments difficulties. They have been due to a variety of causes, for example different relative movements of prices, the impact of inflationary developments, or the increasing demand for imports flowing from the momentum of economic development. Such a situation tends to be aggravated by speculative factors. Some of the countries facing these difficulties have been fortunate in possessing substantial external reserves and have thus been able to cover the deficit in their balance of payments while measures to rectify their difficulties have had time to take effect. Some other countries whose exports are currently inadequate to pay for essential imports and whose exchange reserves are small in comparison with their needs have been helped by other external resources. While deficits may arise from unforeseen circumstances there are dangers in planning for even a temporary deficit in the balance of payments unless there are adequate exchange reserves or the certainty of other external resources to cover it . . .

As previous reports have emphasized, the great bulk of the finance needed for development must come from domestic resources, and the encouragement and mobilization of domestic savings, together with its utilization on wise economic lines, is therefore of crucial importance. In the case of most countries in the area, external aid can only be supplementary, although it may be particularly valuable in helping to cover some portion of the external costs of development or achieving other specific purposes.

Their own export earnings are, however, of predominant importance for the fortunes of most countries of the area. The almost inevitable fluctuations in the prices of stable exports pose a difficult problem, particularly for those countries dependent on one or two export items. There is no simple solution. Countries in this position may have to seek a solution in such ways as further diversification of their economies and the maintenance of financial reserves adequate to tide them over short term fluctuations.

The settlement of main priorities is a matter to which governments in the area are giving increasing attention. In the case of food-importing countries, the expansion of food production is a high priority. An adequately fed population is a first essential. Quite apart from the social disasters which a shortage of food can occasion, it can also have serious effects on prices and may necessitate a large diversion of resources to pay for urgent food imports. At the same time there are important food-exporting countries in the area and it is in the interests of their customers to profit from the natural advantages of these sources of supply and that the amounts of food available for export from these countries should continue to increase. Here again comparative advantage may determine the allocation of resources between alternative fields of production.

The provision of better transport facilities is another high priority in many countries, to enable the best use to be made of resources by increasing their mobility, to move agricultural produce from farms to markets, to bring raw materials to industries, and to provide access to external markets . . .

There is continued reference throughout this report to the search by countries of the area for additional resources, more capital, more equipment, and more managerial and technical skills. But it would be wrong to regard the situation as wholly discouraging. These are the signs that the countries concerned are pressing on with urgent tasks of development and the raising of living standards with speed and energy. Reference to difficulties must not of course be taken to imply that the difficulties are insuperable, or indeed peculiar to countries at a relatively early stage of development. Signs of strain are by no means limited to the less industrialized countries: they have been repeatedly evident in recent years in some of the most highly developed countries in the world; these too tend to find themselves continuously faced with the need to balance resources against aspirations, and, while making the quickest possible advance, to be constantly on their guard against the onset of inflation and external dis-equilibrium. Efforts must not flag because the road ahead runs uphill.

The existence among the peoples of the region of abounding confidence in their own destiny is a factor highly favourable to social and economic improvement. The problems remaining do not arise from static or stagnating economic conditions. Rather they are

problems arising out of dynamic growth and expansion. They thus offer a challenge which will be met with a determination to achieve further progress in the years ahead.

After the Conference, Mr. Browne paid brief visits to Ceylon, India and Pakistan. He was able to see a number of Colombo Plan projects in which Canada is participating, among them the fisheries storage and refrigeration plant at Mutwal, Ceylon, and the Warsak Dam in northwestern Pakistan. At Warsak, Mr. Browne had the opportunity to address part of the large Canadian colony of technicians and their wives (nearly 400 in all) who live at Warsak. This project is the largest in which Canada is engaged and besides providing power for the surrounding region it is expected to irrigate about 100,000 acres.



CANADIAN EXHIBIT

Part of the Canadian display which attracted many visitors during the Colombo Plan meeting.

International Atomic Energy Agency: First General Conference

THE first session of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency was held in Vienna October 1-23, 1957. The Statute of the Agency was opened for signature on October 26, 1956, and was signed by representatives of seventy countries. The Statute came into force on July 29, 1957, and by October 24, 1957, it had been ratified by fifty-nine States.* Of this number 55 countries were represented at the Conference by voting delegations. In addition, 11 states which had signed the Statute but had not yet ratified it were represented by observers. On October 8, the General Conference approved Finland's application for membership. Finland is not an original signatory but will become a member of the Agency when its instrument of acceptance of the Statute has been deposited. The United Nations, the Specialized Agencies and a number of other inter-governmental and non-governmental agencies were also represented by observers. The plenary sessions and the meetings of the main committees were open to the public.

Canada was represented by Mr. M. H. Wershof, Q.C., Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the European Office of the United Nations in Geneva, with Mr. W. H. Barton, Department of External Affairs, and Mr. S. Pollock, Department of Finance, as alternates.



CANADA'S DELEGATION

Members of the Canadian Delegation to the first session of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, held October 1-23 in Vienna, were, seated, left to right: Mr. M. H. Wershof, Chairman; Mr. W. H. Barton; Mr. S. Pollock; standing, Mr. Murray Cook and Mr. D. Watson.

*For background information see Volume 8, Numbers 7 and 11 of "External Affairs" (July and November 1956)

The Statute of the Agency provides for a permanent staff headed by a Director General, a 23-member Board of Governors, and a General Conference consisting of representatives of all members which will meet in regular annual session and, under certain circumstances, in special session.

This first session of the General Conference was essentially an administrative conference. It had before it for discussion recommendations on most of the main items of business prepared by an 18-member Preparatory Commission which had been established on October 26, 1956. The General Conference adopted certain measures to permit the establishment of the Agency in Vienna, including approval of a Headquarters Agreement with the Austrian Government, and the recruiting of staff. It approved an initial programme of action, a budget and a provisional scale of contributions. A Board of Governors was elected and a Director General appointed. Permanent rules of procedure were approved and agreement was reached regarding the attendance of representatives of states not members of the Agency and of representatives of other international organizations and of non-governmental organizations. A relationship agreement between the Agency and the United Nations was approved and authorization given to the Board of Governors to enter into negotiations for appropriate relationship agreements with the Specialized Agencies. The General Conference decided to hold its second regular session in Vienna beginning September 22, 1958.

Opening of the Conference

The Conference was formally opened with Mr. Bernardes, of Brazil, Chairman of the Preparatory Commission, in the chair as temporary president. A minute of silence in honour of the late King Haakon of Norway was observed. The Conference was then addressed by Dr. Adolph Schaerf, President of Austria, Dr. Ralph Bunche, representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and Mr. Bernardes. Messages from Heads of Government were then delivered by the representatives of the United States, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, France, Canada, India and Japan. Mr. Diefenbaker's message was as follows:

On behalf of the Government and people of Canada, I extend to the First General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency the warmest good wishes for a full measure of success in its important endeavours. The Agency has a leading part to play in bringing the benefits of atomic energy quickly and abundantly to all. Even as it takes up its task, the Agency has the satisfaction of knowing that it cannot fail to contribute to prosperity, security and a wholesome peace throughout the world. The question which you must face is how great that contribution will be. We in Canada shall do all that we can, together with other countries large and small, advanced and not yet fully advanced, to make that contribution as great as it can be and should be.

Elections

Dr. Karl Gruber, Austrian Ambassador to the United States and Head of the Austrian Delegation, was unanimously elected President of the Conference. The Canadian representative, Mr. M. H. Wershof, was elected a member of the General (Steering) Committee.

In accordance with the powers bestowed on it by an annex to the Statute, the Preparatory Commission had designated thirteen members for the first Board of Governors. (This will be done in subsequent years by the outgoing Board of Governors). The members designated provide for adequate repre-

sentation of the countries most advanced in the technology of atomic energy in the various areas of the world, of producers of source material and of suppliers of technical assistance. The following countries were designated: Canada, France, U.S.S.R., United Kingdom, United States, Brazil, South Africa, India, Australia, Japan, Czechoslovakia, Portugal and Sweden. The Conference was called upon to elect ten additional members, one each from seven geographical areas (not including North America) and three floaters. The following were elected: Argentina; Italy, Rumania, Egypt, Pakistan, Indonesia and Korea; Guatemala, Peru and Turkey*.

The Board of Governors at its first meeting elected Mr. Winkler, of Czechoslovakia, as its Chairman for the next year and, as its two Vice-Chairmen, Mr. Wershof, of Canada, and Mr. Furuuchi, of Japan. The Board then appointed Mr. Sterling Cole as Director General of the Agency, subject to the approval of the General Conference. This approval was obtained on October 7 and Mr. Cole immediately took an oath of office. (Mr. Cole has been a member of the United States Congress for about 25 years. He has resigned in order to accept this appointment). Although there was no formal opposition to Mr. Cole's appointment, the U.S.S.R. delegate stated that his delegation would have preferred someone from a "neutral" country. Selection of a candidate from one of the great powers, he suggested, might lead smaller countries in need of assistance to fear that their interests might be sacrificed to those of the great power of which the Director General was a national. Moreover, in the future, other great powers might be tempted to press for the appointment of one of their nationals. However, he concluded, since the views of the Soviet Delegation had not commanded the support of certain delegations the Soviet Delegation, conscious of the importance of preserving the spirit of co-operation which had marked the proceedings of the Statute Conference and those of the Preparatory Commission, would not oppose Mr. Cole's appointment.

Programme and Budget

The Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency defines the objectives of the Agency in the following terms:

The Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. It shall ensure, so far as it is able, that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose.

The Conference had before it carefully considered recommendations by the 18-member Preparatory Commission for the initial programme, budget and staff establishment of the Agency. The recommendations were necessarily couched in general terms and were designed to take account of the capacity of the new agency to complete substantive work in its first year of life. They distinguished between activities which could be undertaken from the start, with relatively modest resources, and those which will require more extensive preparation and planning. The first group included assistance to member states in acquiring knowledge and skills needed to make full use of radioisotopes and radiation sources; measures to promote the interchange of technical and scientific information, including the convening of scientific conferences; projects for the exchange and training of scientists and experts; and the formulation of standards for health and safety for the Agency's oper-

*See Vol. 8 No. 7, External Affairs July 1956.

ations as well as international co-ordination of activities in this field. In the initial phase, the Preparatory Commission also proposed that the Agency should assist its member states in laying the ground-work for reactor programmes. At the same time, the Agency should undertake planning and preparations for its longer-term programmes, such as the encouragement of nuclear research; more extensive activities in the reactor field; arrangements for the provision of nuclear materials and the development of safeguard procedures.

In the course of the discussions at the first session of the General Conference a number of member states, including Canada, offered to make available to the Agency fissionable or source materials, facilities for training and other forms of assistance which would help it to implement its programme. Mr. Wershof announced in the course of the general debate that Canada is in a position to make substantial quantities of uranium available to the Agency or its members in various forms, including fabricated fuel elements. He also informed the Conference that Canada will gladly co-operate with the Agency in the provision of training and technical assistance and in the exchange of technical information. The actual terms and conditions under which materials and assistance will be made available remain to be worked out with the Board of Governors. The majority of delegations emphasized the shortage of trained personnel and recommended that the Agency in its initial period should concentrate on training and on the exchange of information. Again many delegates suggested that maximum use of existing national facilities should be made and that the Agency should act as a clearing house rather than embarking on ambitious training and information programmes of its own. In line with this concept of the Agency's functions in its early years was the view expressed by many delegates regarding the need for economy and restraint in building up the staff of the Agency. All were agreed that the Agency should secure first-class scientists, technicians and administrators, but a good many delegates were obviously concerned lest the Agency should start off with too large an establishment — one that might be difficult to fill with competent personnel or one that might waste the talents of experts who are in short supply.

On the recommendation of the Board of Governors, the General Conference unanimously approved the proposals of the Preparatory Commission. In so doing, however, it noted that the recommendations contained in the programme were largely of a general character and recommended that "in planning the work of the Agency, the Board should give high priority to those activities which will give the maximum possible benefit from the peaceful applications of atomic energy in improving the conditions and raising the standard of living of the peoples of the under-developed areas". The General Conference also recommended that the Board of Governors should examine the desirability of making application on behalf of the Agency for participating membership in the United Nations Technical Assistance Board.

The Statute provides that the expense of the Agency should be divided as between administrative expenses and operational expenses. The former are to be met by all member governments by assessment. The operational expenses are to be met by voluntary contributions and any excess of revenue over expenditures from Agency projects. The administrative budget proposed by the Preparatory Commission for the first year amounts to \$4,089,000, of which \$624,000 will be to meet the expenses of the Commission itself and of

the first session of the General Conference. The only operational item included in the 1958 Budget is \$250,000 for an initial fellowship programme. In approving this item the Conference invited all member states to make voluntary contributions to the general fund of the Agency to finance the programme. The Conference also agreed to establish a working capital fund of \$2,000,000. Members will pay into this fund according to the scale fixed for the administrative budget.

The provision of safeguards to prevent the use of materials made available through the Agency for military purposes was an essential element in the minds of the original sponsors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The incorporation of this principle in the Statute in terms acceptable to all was the most important and difficult task facing the Statute Conference*. Although there was no substantive discussion during this First General Conference on the question of safeguards, the problem was mentioned during the general debate by the Indian and Soviet Delegations. The Indian representative suggested that the question of safeguards should not be taken up until more important problems had been dealt with, such as health and safety, problems of radioactive isotopes, transport of radioactive material, and disposal of waste. The Soviet delegate agreed that there must be some measure of control but warned the Conference that such control should not infringe the sovereignty of the recipient states. Although these were only passing references it is clear that, because of the complex nature of the problems involved, the establishment and application of effective control measures will be a difficult task for the Agency in the future.

Relationship Agreements

The General Conference had before it for consideration a draft agreement between the United Nations and the Atomic Energy Agency which was the result of negotiations between the Preparatory Commission and the United Nations Advisory Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. This Agreement was the result of many months of negotiation and while it did not entirely satisfy all representatives at the Conference it was accepted unanimously by the Board of Governors and the General Conference.

The Statute authorizes the Board of Governors, with the approval of the General Conference, to enter into agreements establishing an appropriate relationship between the Agency and any other organization whose work is related to that of the Agency. The Conference authorized the Board to negotiate relationship agreements with the Specialized Agencies, taking into account certain guiding principles suggested by the Preparatory Commission, and to submit these agreements for the approval of the Conference during the regular session following the negotiations of each such agreement. With regard to other international organizations the Preparatory Commission noted that any relationship agreement will depend on the nature of the organization and upon other factors which cannot be foreseen. No specific resolution was adopted but the rules of procedure provide for the possibility of such relationship agreements negotiated on an individual basis with interested organizations. The Conference did have before it certain recommendations regarding the principles which might govern the granting of consultative status to non-governmental organizations. A resolution adopted by the Conference requests

*See "External Affairs" November 1956.

the Board to draw up rules, based on these principles, for the consideration of the second session of the General Conference.

The question of relations with the UN and Specialized Agencies involves the problem of co-ordination and co-operation in order to avoid duplication of effort in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy. A number of delegations, including that of Canada, recognized that the attainment of effective co-ordination in this field cannot be left entirely to secretariats or to the UN Administrative Committee on Co-ordination, although they have an important role to play. Ultimate responsibility lies with governments, which should adopt a consistent attitude on the problem of co-ordination and on the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency and other agencies in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy through their delegates to the various agencies.

Representation of Non-Members

At the Statute Conference the Soviet bloc argued at length that the Agency would suffer from the exclusion of Communist China. During the first session of the General Conference the same group of countries argued that all states and international or non-governmental organizations interested in the work of the Agency should be given the automatic right to be represented by observers at sessions of the Conference. They based their arguments on what they described as the principles of universality implicit in the Statute. However, the majority of the members decided to restrict the automatic right to send observers to (a) states, members of the UN or of the Specialized Agencies but not members of the Agency, and (b) the United Nations and Specialized Agencies. With regard to other inter-governmental organizations the majority decision was to restrict the right to send representatives to organizations with which an appropriate relationship with the Agency might be established. Pending the approval of rules for the granting of consultative status to non-governmental organizations and of relationship agreements with inter-governmental organizations, the Board of Governors was authorized to invite appropriate inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations to be represented at the second session of the General Conference.

Conclusions

As noted at the beginning of this article the first session of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency was essentially an administrative conference. There were no startling developments or pronouncements which could steal the headlines from Sputnik. Nevertheless, solid foundations were laid for the construction of the Agency. During the general debate, Canadian views on the future of the Agency were expressed by Mr. Wershof, in part, in the following terms:

It will be our task in the days ahead to see that the Agency discharges to the greatest possible extent the heavy responsibilities which history has laid upon it. Our efforts will be successful only to the extent that we continue to co-operate constructively in our work, and to the extent that we are prepared to contribute what we can not only in knowledge and resources, but from time to time in sacrifice of particular national interests or preferences, to the collective judgment of what the Agency's best interests will require. The success so far achieved, and the efforts which so many governments have made towards that achievement, give us every reason not only to hope, but to expect, that our further efforts will be harmonious and fruitful. . . . As Canada's representative on the Board of Governors, may I say that my country will do its part to ensure that the programme of the Agency, as determined during these sessions, is pressed forward with vigor and determination.

Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration

IN recent years, the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration has played an important role in assisting migratory movements from Europe to overseas countries. It has also been active in facilitating the resettlement of European refugees and the work which it performed during the Hungarian exodus has been particularly impressive. This article may help its readers to understand better what ICEM stands for.

Historical Background

In the years immediately following the Second World War, the Western countries were much concerned about economic and political dangers arising in Europe from surplus population and the influx of refugees. The population problems of countries of relatively high birth rate, such as Italy, Greece and The Netherlands, had been made acute by the effects of war and by the fact that overseas migration had ceased during the war years. Political changes had reduced the ability of some countries to absorb their growing population and increased the problem by causing groups of the nationals of these countries, established elsewhere, to return home. The loss of Indonesia weakened the power of The Netherlands to absorb its increasing labour force and added to its population some 300,000 returned Dutch citizens. Italy lost the colonial outlets for its population as well as part of its European territory and received over 400,000 refugees from these former possessions. In Greece, the disasters of the war were followed by civil war which rendered nearly 700,000 persons homeless and, in addition, some 50,000 refugees entered the country from the communist states to the north.

The war created similar problems in countries in which population had hitherto been relatively stable. Western Germany received some 10 million refugees, chiefly of German ethnic origin, and Austria had to bear a similar influx, but on a much smaller scale.

International effort concentrated on one segment of this problem—those persons defined as refugees according to United Nations criteria. The International Refugee Organization assisted, in some form or other, more than 1,600,000 such refugees and succeeded in resettling more than 1,000,000 of them, but its operations were due to come to an end on completion of its programme for 1951.

In December 1951, on the initiative of the United States and Belgium, a conference of interested governments took place in Brussels to consider whether some way could not be found of continuing to use the operational machinery of IRO to deal with the serious problems of refugees and surplus population after that organization's mandate came to an end. At this conference the organization now known as the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) was established. Although the conference was largely preoccupied with European problems and recognized the necessity of "an increase in European emigration to countries overseas", it considered at

length the requirements of the immigration countries, emphasized "the close relationship which existed between economic development and immigration", and pointed out that "international effort to increase European emigration should stimulate the creation of new economic opportunities in countries lacking manpower".

Sixteen countries voted for the Enabling Resolution of the Brussels conference. Since then 27 governments have accepted the formal constitution which came into force on November 30, 1954*. ICEM draws funds for its work chiefly from contributions from its member governments. Its administrative funds are subscribed on a percentage basis from all member governments, and its operational funds are contributed voluntarily, usually as per capita payments related to the number of migrants or refugees moved to or from the contributing country.

Although the main task of ICEM is to arrange transport and give financial help to persons wishing to migrate from over-populated areas in Europe, it has the additional responsibility of helping its member governments to develop machinery to handle migration within their national administrations and of preparing the migrant to make the best use of opportunities open to him. ICEM has helped to develop services for recruitment, medical selection and trade selection in the emigration countries, and has distributed factual information to prospective emigrants on opportunities open to them and the standards of living and way of life they may expect in the immigration country of their choice. It has helped to establish services to receive the immigrants on arrival and to place them in employment. It has organized language training and vocational training for intending migrants.

ICEM is also authorized to assist in the movement overseas of refugees. Between February 1, 1952 and September 30, 1957, ICEM has given direct transport and financial assistance to 729,218 migrants, of whom 334,482 may be defined broadly as refugees, 239,945 of the latter being within United Nations definitions. During this period ICEM directly assisted 82,008 Hungarian refugees from Austria as well as 54,130 Hungarian refugees who received processing assistance only. In addition, 6,444 Hungarian refugees were moved from Yugoslavia, and 4,151 refugees from the Middle East following the Suez crisis.

The headquarters of ICEM are located in Geneva, Branch offices are maintained in Austria, Germany, Spain, Greece, Italy, Australia, South Africa, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, United States of America, and many Latin American countries. ICEM has a payroll including 650 officials and employees.

Seventh Session of the Council

The Seventh Session of ICEM's Council was convened in Geneva's Palais des Nations on October 7, and concluded its deliberations on October

*Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Spain, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, Paraguay, Netherlands, Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Switzerland, Sweden, Union of South Africa, United States and Venezuela.

12, 1957*. A number of very important issues were up for discussion at the Council Session. Some of the resolutions adopted by the Council are of a far-reaching character and may produce discussions which could influence future ICEM policies and possibly modify the basic aims and purposes of the Committee as now set out in its constitution.

A brief word might be said here of two main problems discussed at the Session. First, an important discussion took place with regard to the methods of financing ICEM's operations. Secondly, the Council reconsidered ICEM's position in connection with assistance to be given to refugees of European origin who are now leaving mainland China in considerable numbers.

The present system of financing ICEM's operations is extremely complex. Until now, it has been the practice for those governments interested in the particular movement of a migrant to make a contribution towards transportation costs. For example, if a migrant wishes to move from The Netherlands to Brazil, contributions will be forthcoming both from The Netherlands and the Brazilian Governments. Subject to the financial arrangements made with regard to each particular stream of migration, it happens that some movements receive more than adequate financial assistance while others face a deficit; many movements from Europe to Australia are in the latter category. Therefore there has developed a pattern of minus and plus movements, the latter being insufficient to meet the deficit created by the former. In order to meet this deficit, the Council has for the past years resorted to the device of the Special Fund to which member governments contribute on a voluntary basis. During the previous session of the Council earlier this year, there was general agreement that the special fund had proved itself unsatisfactory as a means of covering ICEM's operational deficit and in order to find a more adequate solution, a Working Group composed of representatives of The Netherlands, United States, Australia, Brazil and Italy, examined the problem during the summer months. At its Seventh Session, the Council considered the Working Group's report, the main recommendation of which being that a special budget should be established to cover those ICEM activities classifiable as "international services" e.g. distribution of literature to migrants, information and language interpretation, etc. The Council decided to refer to member governments the recommendations of the Working Group, which will meet again in Washington next February to study the replies.

*ICEM has two main organs: the Executive Committee composed of nine member countries, including Canada, and the Council composed of all 27 member governments. Both the Executive Committee and the Council meet twice a year.

APPOINTMENTS, TRANSFERS AND SEPARATIONS IN THE CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

- Mr. J. L. Fournier, Canadian Consul General at Boston, posted to Ottawa effective September 3, 1957. Separated from the Department of External Affairs, effective October 11, 1957.
- Miss A. M. Matheson separated from the Department of External Affairs, effective October 29, 1957.
- Mr. A. R. Crépault separated from the Department of External Affairs, effective November 1, 1957.
- Mr. J. J. A. Asselin appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective November 1, 1957.
- Mr. J. A. Millard appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective November 20, 1957.
- Mr. J. E. Redmond appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officer 1, effective November 1, 1957.
- Mr. W. H. Holmes posted from the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations, New York, to Ottawa, effective November 4, 1957.
- Mr. D. B. Wilson posted from the Canadian Embassy, Lisbon, to Ottawa, effective November 5, 1957.
- Mr. A. F. Broadbridge posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Washington, effective November 6, 1957.
- Mr. J. R. Francis posted from Ottawa to the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Pretoria, effective November 10, 1957.
- Mr. H. G. Hampson posted from the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, New Delhi, to Ottawa, effective November 11, 1957.
- Miss M. A. Macpherson posted from the International Supervisory Commissions, Indochina, to Ottawa, effective November 15, 1957.
- Mr. A. B. Bonnezen appointed to the Department of External Affairs as External Affairs Officer 3, effective November 15, 1957.
- Mr. W. G. M. Olivier posted from Ottawa to the International Supervisory Commissions, Indochina, effective November 21, 1957.
- Mr. J. F. X. Houde posted from Ottawa to the Delegation of Canada to the North Atlantic Council, Paris, effective November 22, 1957.
- Mr. P. A. Bissonnette posted from the Canadian Embassy, Brussels, to Ottawa, effective November 28, 1957.

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Ottawa, Edmond Cloutier, C.M.G., O.A., D.S.P., Printer to the Queen's Most Excellent Majesty, Controller of Stationery, 1957.

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