





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

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SOCIALISM

AN ADDRESS DELIVERED BEFORE THE KNOX COLLEGE ALUMNI
ASSOCIATION AT THEIR POST-GRADUATE SESSION.

BY

JAMES GIBSON HUME, M.A., PH.D.,

PROFESSOR OF ETHICS AND THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY,
UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO.

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An Inaugural Lecture

BY

JAMES GIBSON HUME, M.A., Ph.D.,

*Professor of Ethics and History of Philosophy,
University of Toronto.*

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SOCIALISM.

I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE INDIVIDUAL.

IT was suggested to me that instead of dealing with the subject announced—"The contribution of ethics towards the settlement of the relation of science to religion"—I should take some topic not so abstract and abstruse; something less theoretical—more practical.

I regard this demand for the "practical," which is such a prominent characteristic of our own time, as, on the whole, commendable, and the expression of what is, in its deepest meaning, a proper tendency.

It is not denied that this tendency, like everything else of a worthy character, is liable to be misconceived, misrepresented, and perverted. When the conception of what should be termed "practical" is a limited and inadequate one, when everything is measured by its immediate effect in producing wealth and procuring enjoyment, the desire for what is thus falsely conceived as "practical" results in a negative attitude towards all that is noblest and best; moral impulses and religious convictions are stifled; every claim for strenuous effort and high endeavor is treated with indifference; for who will "fight the good fight of faith" when the ideals that constitute this faith are regarded as the visionary dreams of speculation, or the prejudices of blind fanaticism? Even educational methods are modified, and we find that haste for immediate results, that shallowness and superficiality which ignores, and fails to secure, the best results of true education.

Yet I still maintain that though in this way liable to perversion, and evil consequence in proportion to this perversion, the demand for the practical is based upon a deep foundation of true insight. It registers a conviction that, after all, knowledge is for the sake of conduct; that theories and ideals, whether scientific, moral, or religious, should be realized and manifested in life;

that by their *deeds* we should know them. It is the Epistle of James in modern form, bringing out the supplementary truth sometimes overlooked or forgotten in St. Paul's message. It is convinced that faith should not remain a mere possession, a passive state, but should be evidenced and expressed in works; that faith should be living, and, like all life, full of energy, not absorbing, like a sponge, but assimilating and transforming what is received, in order to issue in beneficent action.

The relation of the theoretical to the practical is the relation of faith to works. The cry for the practical is the protest against severing theory from practice.

I need scarcely point out that, from my point of view, it would be just as disastrous to separate practice from theory.

Granted that action is the purpose of theory, that works are the proper outcome and expression of faith, still, works that do not express any faith are lifeless; acts which express no theory, or principle capable of being formalized in a theory, are merely instinctive, and may often be irrational. The more clearly the man knows and consciously adopts the principles that should guide action, the more effective and beneficent will be his action.

"Be practical," properly interpreted, means: Neglect no aspect of truth; forget no element in reality; wed deepest research to widest conduct; let all theory be living in action; let all action be guided by wise and tested theory; not capricious acts, not arbitrary theories. Away with dreaming, and away with bungling! Let us see the light, and let us act as children of the light.

With a true conception of what the really practical is, we may protest against many one-sided perversions in the name of the "practical."

The truly practical protests against the false separation of elements that are vitally interconnected, interrelated, mutually interdependent; the sham practical over against one abstraction sets up another and opposite one. For example, the false or sham practical will say: "What we want is more religion, and less theology"; but if, when thus contrasted with theology, religion means life and conduct that embodies and manifests ideals and convictions, and theology means the apprehension, through investigation, reflection, and interpretation of the principles, convictions, and ideals that should constitute religion, then

what the truly practical must assert is not "more religion and less theology," but, on the contrary, more religion and more theology, in more vital union.

Theology and ethics, by their procedure in the past in setting up one part in independence from another essentially united with it, have given a bad example to the falsely practical, which, in turn, simply sets up in independent reality the part previously ignored.

Theology, for instance, at times abstracts itself from ethics. It identifies morality with mere legalism, and excludes it. But legalism is not truly morality, because it is itself an abstracting or separating of the external from the inner life. The confusion of morality with its caricature leads to the casting out of both indiscriminately. The result is that, instead of being the deep conviction, the full consecration of the whole nature to the righteous and reasonable demands of truth, goodness, and holiness with reverence towards the personal source and fountain of purity and righteousness, religion, when thus severed from and opposed to morality, tends to degrade into mere sentiment and emotion, awakened by the contagion of excitement and backsliding as soon as the stimulus is withdrawn.

Instead of disconnecting and opposing, we should unite and combine theology and ethics, religion and morality, both in theory and in conduct. If ethical theory is separated from theological theory, the latter, left insecure as to its foundations in personality and accountability, is liable to topple over either towards pantheism, on the one hand, or to materialistic naturalism, on the other.

It is just as futile to make morality independent of religion. In theory, it is soon discovered that all the various duties under the divisions of loyalty and respect for the sacred meaning of the person's own real being, esteem and regard for the true well-being of his neighbor, requires to be taken up into the higher region and be referred to the source of all being and all true well-being, and demanding as our reasonable service reverence and worship to the personal source of all reality, truth, goodness, and holiness. And, on the other hand, experience has shown that wherever ethical societies have been formed, apparently trying to become independent, they may succeed without the special organization of a church, but they are soon found to be most

earnestly struggling to find a genuine religious basis for their work. Ethics, as a theory of morals, should be more comprehensive and practical than has been the usual custom. It should include a scientific and historical part, with its attempt to make classifications and descriptions; a philosophical investigation of the significance and validity of its fundamental principles—the most important and most difficult part, where it comes most nearly in contact with theology—and, lastly, it should consider concrete problems of real life, that the student may have training in discovering the application of moral principles to the complex relations of human life, and learn to see these intricate problems illuminated by the guidance of moral ideals. This is the work of what might be termed “applied ethics,” and one problem worthy of such an investigation is the one we shall endeavor briefly to deal with to-day—socialism.

Since the time when Aristotle defined ethics as that which deals with the conduct of individuals, and politics as the consideration of the constitution and action of organized society, there has been an explicit attempt to limit ethics to the consideration of the individual, regarded in abstraction from society, and a consequent failure to see that one of the most important subjects for ethical enquiry is man's duty, not as an independent individual, but as an actual member of an organized society. Hence it is not unnatural that many who felt the need of some special training to enable them to deal intelligently with what are termed the social problems of our time turned aside from ethics to political science. It is not difficult to see why they were doomed to disappointment, because political science simply deals with what has been, and what is, with the purpose of discovering tendencies and results, as these affect the accumulation and distribution of wealth, never once saying a word about what ought to be, and yet it is in order to discover what ought to be that the earnest student, desiring the real improvement of society, has undertaken the study. Thus the limitation of the ethical enquiry to the convictions and conduct of the individual as a separate individual, and the exclusion of the moral element from what Aristotle termed politics, has left a large and most important field of enquiry almost entirely neglected, and scarcely ever receiving due recognition—that is, the ethical consideration of social relations.

Moral convictions, intentions, and purposes in the individual are, indeed, fundamental and essential; but we need also to enquire how can good intentions find such expression in social conduct that will tend most to the moral advancement and highest welfare of our fellow-beings.

Just at this point, popular thought is most confused and uncertain, and, when we turn to the leaders of thought, their guidance seems to stop and leave us groping in the dark. Examples can easily be given of debated problems that concern the organization and united action of society, and yet are so distinctly and fundamentally ethical questions that the moral element is almost universally recognized as being, in some way, present. The subject of temperance will serve for illustration. Owing to the frequent and thorough discussion of this question for so many years, we may expect a great deal of information and insight. It will be very instructive to note that circumstance or relation of this much-debated question which still remains most uncertain, and about which we find the greatest disagreement among those who are honestly and conscientiously considering it. If we take the physiological standpoint, and ask about the influence of intoxicating liquors upon the human system, we have a great deal of scientific information forthcoming, and the moral element is perfectly clear, and fully recognized, viz., that the individual has a duty to endeavor to preserve his health, and not to sacrifice it to mere pleasurable feeling.

If we next consider the financial aspect, we get a great deal of scientific information about the commercial effects of the habit of using intoxicants. Here, however, the moral element seems rather to be obscured by the economic consideration. The emphasis upon the financial aspect leads careless thinkers to vaguely imagine that, if the balance were on the other side of the page, the use of intoxicants and the traffic therein would be justifiable; whereas, on the contrary, the moral demand from the previous consideration still holds good, even though the result of the traffic was an increase, instead of a loss, of wealth.

The confusion arises because the ideal for economics, the greatest amount of wealth, is not consciously and explicitly subordinated to the higher moral ideal, the highest development of character. Some who have been long accustomed to view everything from the standpoint of economics seem at times to forget

that, after all, wealth is merely a means, and not the end of our existence. "The body is more than meat, and the life than raiment."

But the confusion in this instance is slight in comparison with what is making the darkness visible in the next consideration to which I shall direct your attention.

This we may term the social, or administrative, side of the question. What may the organized community legitimately and properly do in such a matter? Some answer that it cannot legitimately do anything at all in the matter. It is a matter of private opinion and individual right. Each should be free to hold any opinion he chooses, and also free to use arguments to convince others to agree with him; that is, he may use what is sometimes called "moral suasion." But here the action should terminate: any legislative action is an interference with the rights of the individual. The usual answer is to point out similar acts of so-called "interference" that are not called in question. The reply is ready, however: "We may tolerate these: still, two wrongs do not make a right, nor justify any interference." Thus the argument goes on around the question of interference, one party claiming that the public are, in such legislation, interfering with the individual; the other that the public is merely restraining the individual from interfering with some one else. I believe the basis on which the argument is carried on is too narrow. We shall return to this question later. All I am concerned just now to point out is that there is no clear conception of what determines the correctness or incorrectness of public action. The claim for non-interference is simply a convenient way to protest against any legislation that is disliked; to claim that, because disliked, some right not defined is interfered with, and to cast the presumption against any legislative action that does not completely suit everybody.

I wish also to call attention to another curious circumstance. Although in the case of individual action it is everywhere admitted that the moral demand is the highest, and should guide all private actions in the pursuit of material well-being, when it comes to the action of the community, as a community, scarcely any one would think of calling in question the legitimacy of any measures proposed to advance the material well-being of the community, but a large number are up in arms at once, with

the cry of "Interference! Interference!" the moment any measure is proposed to advance the higher interest of moral well-being. Must we conclude that the state exists only to contribute to selfishness, and can never properly follow any higher ideal? What, in short, is the duty of the state? What may it do? What ought it to attempt to do? Am I stating it too strongly when I say that in regard to our duties as members of an organized society our conceptions are altogether vague and uncertain?

Consider the question of charity, and you will find the fog of uncertainty at the very same point. There is another great problem troubling our modern civilization. It is imperfectly understood that few people are even aware that it involves a profound moral question, and yet whose whole debate circles around the enquiry into the aspect of duty, to which we have called attention. What is the duty of society? Has society any duty at all? What may society undertake, what should it undertake to do? This is what socialism, in its various forms, is debating; and it is because it is disputing about this great fundamental difficulty that I select it for a brief consideration to-day.

It may still seem strange to some of you to hear socialism referred to as concerned with an ethical problem. When you call to mind the mistakes and crimes that have accompanied socialistic agitations, you will probably agree that I am not extreme in saying that to-day we are reaping bitter fruit because the field of ethics has been so limited to the consideration of the individual that the duties of the members of society have not been clearly enough and frequently enough presented to become generally recognized.

Now, what is socialism? If each one here will attempt to think out a brief answer to this question on the spur of the moment, most of you would, perhaps, be ready to confess that it is a movement difficult to define, and that your ideas on the subject are a little vague. But, if I ask, How are you disposed toward socialistic movements? what is your opinion about them? most of you would have little hesitation in pronouncing an unfavorable verdict. When we hear the term socialism, we think of nihilism, anarchism, and communism, and we call to mind the many deeds of violence and crime committed in the name of these. There is some excuse for this intermingling and confusing of different tendencies, no one of which is properly socialism, in

the strict use of that word. In the newspapers, the words anarchism and socialism are used almost interchangeably, sometimes varied by the introduction of the terms nihilism and communism. Lately, however, even the ordinary newspaper has learnt that it must use some discrimination in the use of these terms, for we learn that the socialists have been passing resolutions condemning the anarchists. If we turn to the Encyclopædia Britannica and look up the article on socialism, we shall not find much assistance in classifying these different tendencies. We find, in simple chronological order, an account of the lives, opinions, and enterprises of various persons who have attempted to modify the existing industrial system in various ways. If we read Kirkup's, Ely's, or Lavaley's *History of Socialism*, we shall find the same method of treatment, with scarcely any attempt made to separate the essential from the unessential, the theories from the foibles, and not even the pretence of trying to enunciate the principles underlying the various theories in their mutual relation. We shall have to make our own classification.

Perhaps we shall find it profitable to point out and distinguish two opposite tendencies. Set over against socialism is individualism. We can best understand each of these as it stands in contrast to its opposite. Individualism emphasizes the independence of the individual, and the need of guarding against any encroachments upon his rights. Socialism emphasizes the claims of society upon the individual, the duties of the individual to society, the need of limiting the individual to his sphere as a member in the state. The one speaks of the rights of the individual: the other, of the right of society, or its claims upon the individual, and his duties to society. To understand the one side, we must see it set over against the other. Let us, then, first take a preliminary look at what is signified by individualism. What do we mean by speaking of an individual? The whole history of civilization might be written with this in view: and it might be seen that our civilization advanced just in proportion to the degree of recognition given to the meaning, significance, and importance of the individual.

It may seem to be a remarkable statement to make, that there was a time when there was practically no recognition whatever of the individual as an individual, and consequently no thought of his rights as an individual. The individual was

merged in the tribe or in the state. Even at the height of ancient Greek civilization, the time of its noblest literature and highest art, the individual was almost completely merged in the state. But conquest and misfortune soon brought a consciousness of the fact that the individual was not identified with the state. At first it was a most unhappy consciousness: Epicurean and Stoic alike turned their attention to the problem of the individual's destiny; the problem of life was the happiness or misery of the individual. With this recognition of the worth and independence of the human spirit, we have splendid examples of the heroism of conduct that it often inspired. Stoicism proclaimed that, though the body might be chained, the spirit could never be fettered. Men learnt to despise outer circumstances, and to defy tyrants. Perhaps it was this very defiance that so enraged some of the most brutal of the tyrants, as they felt themselves baffled and beaten by the unconquered victim. But Stoicism and Epicureanism had both grave defects. In both, the view of religion was utterly inadequate. For the Epicurean, the gods were regarded as living apart, not troubling themselves with human weal or woe. For the Stoic, all was at bottom a relentless fate. We may find in each age a measure of the conception of the dignity and worth of the human soul by its view of the divine, and any element of degradation admitted into the view of the divine deteriorates and undermines self-respect and regard for the sacredness of human existence. So, not to mention Epicureanism, which easily deteriorated into mere sensualism, even Stoicism, with its nobler elements, through its false view of the divine as merely a relentless fate, soon lost respect for the sacredness of life, and thus came to advocate the cowardice of suicide, that counsel of despair.

It was at this stage that a new and marvellous power arose to proclaim the infinite worth of the individual, the nobility of his origin, the glory of his destiny, the illimitable meaning of his possibilities.

Christianity arose, in its purity, to proclaim that God is not far from any one of us: that He was not, as the Epicurean affirmed, indifferent to the fate of any of His creatures, but that not even a sparrow fell without His notice; that the human soul was of such importance that the question was asked, What would it profit if a man should gain the whole world, get in summation

a possession of all the delights pictured by the Epicurean, be an epitome of the whole universe as conceived by the Stoic—what would it profit him if he gained all this, and lost his own soul? How different is this from those earlier views that entirely forgot the soul, lost in their contemplation of nature! The infinite worth of the human soul of such importance that the divine Himself was willing to suffer, to come down and assist the struggling finite spirit, redeem the sinner, make him a son of God, an heir and joint-heir!

This is, indeed, a marvellous message, its words familiar to us, but whose height and depth of meaning we but dimly grasp. We repeat the phrases, "fatherhood of God," "brotherhood of man," but often they are little more than phrases, and even the most Christian nations, in international matters, are almost entirely forgetful of the significance of these momentous words. How we have to congratulate ourselves because lately an international dispute could be settled by an arbitration, as a wonderful occurrence, while the nations of Europe—Christian nations—are armed to the teeth for war! What jubilation over the peaceful meeting of the nations at the World's Fair! what exclamations of wonder over a peaceful discussion at the Parliament of Religions! that topic which should be the bond of peace, but which has been, alas! so often the fruitful cause of war. If the light of this truth is only beginning to dawn upon us now, at the close of the nineteenth century, we need not wonder that the message was imperfectly understood in the early history of the church. Pagan views of nature came in to mingle with the interpretation of the divine revelation. Nature was something altogether opposed to God, not His handiwork, declaring His glory. No; the early church held to the neo-platonic pagan conception of nature as utterly and altogether bad; everything finite was utterly depraved, debased, and vile. God was still very far off. Salvation was possible, but it was too good to be found and enjoyed in this vile world. It could only be begun in heaven. This world was only a dungeon, this life a curse.

Thus arose the asceticism of the early church—its views of poverty as the highest condition. The saints must be sickly and emaciated, weakening themselves by penances and self-inflicted tortures. Thus we may account for the vows that came to be taken, supposed to constitute a state of higher sanctity—poverty,

celibacy, obedience. Each of these we can trace from neo-platonic fallacies; each indicates the utter repudiation of everything connected with this life. We have an interesting example of how certain portions of the scriptures may be fitted into this interpretation in our modern Tolstois.

There must be some element of truth in this asceticism. Were it not for some element of truth, it would not be so readily accepted, so often recurring in history. Error must always be sugar-coated with truth to make it palatable and dangerous. Perhaps the most successful way of dealing with error is simply to recognize and remove the sugar-coating of truth. The hidden vileness will then disclose itself.

What is the sugar-coating of asceticism?

It is the truth that to live the purely selfish life is bad. To live for purely selfish ends is, in fact, the essence of badness. We should not live for selfishness: our lives should be dedicated to God's service. We are not our own. But, to live for God, which is our reasonable service, our only rational procedure, is not to abandon our earthly existence and our human interests. God has sanctified humanity. Many eastern ascetics have fully succeeded in abandoning utterly the world and crushing out every human interest, yet have not come into God's service. It is a tremendous fallacy to suppose that the absence of human interests is the presence of divine interests. The eastern ascetic is consistent in making his god "Nirvana," emptiness, non-existence. But the God of Christianity is not a negative quantity or an infinite zero.

Christ prayed, not that His disciples should be taken out of the world, but that they should be kept from the evil. We are enjoined to love our brother whom we see: and inasmuch as we do this to the least of Christ's brethren, we do it unto Him. Even prosaic business is to be done in the right spirit. We do not need to wait for the New Jerusalem, but may glorify God in Toronto.

The mediæval view of the worthlessness of human interests fitted in well with the institutions of the time, such as feudalism. But, as the implications of the vows of poverty, celibacy, and obedience became more and more ident, as they became hardened into institutions and organizations to suppress and destroy human interests and human life: when the church

became a power, and enforced the vow of obedience, and used its power as an engine of tyranny, the human spirit at length revolted against this false separation of the human from the divine; this division of everything into irreconcilable sacred and secular; this travesty of the deepest message of Christianity. One form of this revolt of the human spirit we are most familiar with in church history under the name of the Protestant Reformation. The protest of Wycliffe, and Huss, and Zwingli, and brave Luther, with his manly claim for the right of private judgment. The repudiation of the claim that the individual should be so disparaged and enslaved by a church system that interposed its ceremonies and authority between the human soul and its reconciled Creator. Luther's claim voiced a mighty movement—a heartfelt and deep conviction that we must recognize the sacred worth of the human soul; its right, its duty, to come into direct communion with its heavenly Father. The usurpation of the church that grew out of its pagan view of nature, its false separation of the sacred and secular, its negative attitude, was withstood.

All progress in science, art, and literature rests, for its possibility, on the implicit or explicit recognition of the positive element emphasized in the protest for the sacred right of the individual soul, its glorious privilege of freedom. This is not the claim that all progress is due to Protestantism. Still, Protestantism is one attempt to express and realize the principle on which all progress must be based. Neither should all the ills that follow the perversion of this principle be attributed to Protestantism. Take, for instance, the French Revolution. Consider its excessive revolt against all religion. Here there is every evidence that it was the parody of religion as it was then represented—or misrepresented—in the Roman Catholic Church, in league with the oppressive legislation of the time, and upholding it, that led to the disgust of what they supposed to be religion. They identified religion with Roman Catholicism, as the Roman Catholic Church had taught them to do; and so, seeing the evils and corruptions of Roman Catholicism, they rejected it, and supposed that they should reject all religion.

Again, in the other side of the revolt against the civil government of the time, there was an element that was simply negative and destructive, opposed to all form of regulation; the degrada-

tion of liberty into license. "Liberté" and "Égalité" came to mean: "Let every one do as he likes: down with every one who likes to do anything else!" But, even in the worst days of the French Revolution, there was another element stated, however slightly recognized in practice: "Fraternité"—brotherhood. And, if their practice was very unsatisfactory, some of the fault must surely lie with those who trained them so badly. It was certainly a violent and extreme reaction against tyranny, oppression, avarice, misgovernment. If the tempest was a terrible one, who were the guilty causes of its virulence? Was it not those who, by long-continued injuries and tyrannies, had at last goaded their victims to overstep all bounds in the spirit of revenge?

We have a better illustration of the recognition of the worth of the individual in the English Revolution; not destructive and passionately revengeful, but constructive, progressive, ameliorating, and beneficent. It found expression in positive reconstructions of society; such as (1) the extension of the franchise; (2) the emancipation of slaves; (3) removing selfish and unnatural restrictions upon trade—thus making the individual not only politically, but also industrially, free. The striking difference between the English and the French Revolutions is that the latter was simply the violent casting off of restraints; the former attempting to be positive, and to give to the individual a proper place in the reorganization of society. The one was a revolution; the other was an evolution. In the evolution we find a recognition of society, as an organization in whose regulation the individual should assist; in whose benefits he should share as a co-operating member.

From our brief review we may conclude that an enquiry into the significance, importance, and proper place of the individual is dealing with a fundamental question. We may notice that the progress of civilization has been so bound up with this question that we may say that every advance has been conditioned by a clearer apprehension in theory of the true place of the individual, and the expression of this truer theory in institutions, and in private and national conduct.

II. THE INDIVIDUAL AS A FACTOR IN SOCIETY.

THE distinction drawn between revolution and evolution will help in contrasting two views of the individual. The first is negative, opposed to all forms of regulation or control; the second, positive, seeking to give the individual a share in the control, and to widen the field for the exercise of his powers in harmony with others.

The negative attitude is what is usually in mind when individualism is referred to. We may term this pure individualism, or abstract individualism, and we shall be assisted in our classification if at once we set over against it the opposite extreme.

Pure individualism will have the individual absolutely uncontrolled. The other extreme would be to have the individual absolutely controlled. This we may term pure despotism. Between these great extremes we may easily range the various theories and beliefs concerning the proper relation of the individual to society, of the governed or ungoverned to the government.

Of pure individualism we may notice two types—the passive, eastern, and the active, western. Of these the eastern is the most individualistic, the most consistent. It is entirely self-included; it will have nothing to do with others; it will not even complain about them; nay, it will not even notice their existence at all. It will seek "Nirvana"; it will counsel indifference and quietism.

Let me quote its rules of conduct:

"In him who has intercourse with others affections arise, and then the pain which follows affection; considering the misery that originates in affection, let one wander alone, like a rhinoceros."

"He who has compassion on his friends and confidential companions loses his own advantage, having a fettered mind; seeing this danger in friendship, let one wander alone, like a rhinoceros."

The active form of pure individualism is more familiar in western civilization. Here the individual is not satisfied to retire, to leave the world and "wander alone, like a rhinoceros," allowing others to do as they please about it. He wishes to be entirely unhampered; so he desires to destroy every power that

seems to limit him in any way. "Down with all forms of control, away with all government!" is his motto. This is the doctrine of the nihilist.

Directly opposed to the nihilist, we find, in the same country in which they are most numerous, the opposite extreme of autocratic despotism, and this juxtaposition is not a matter of accident, for nihilism is just a violent reaction against the other extreme.

Despotism says, "All power to the government; let every one be completely dependent upon it." Nihilism says, "No right of power belongs to any government; each individual should be absolutely independent, unhampered, and uncontrolled."

Despotism may have two forms: Tyranny, where the governing power seeks its own wishes, without any regard for the governed. And paternalism, which is just as autocratic, but wishes to treat the governed in a way that is conceived to be for their good; not, however, because the governed wish this action, but because the governing power wishes it.

We may find many examples of organizations framed on the despotic (tyrannical or paternal) model. The theory of the divine right of kings in English history was an attempt to give a religious support to this plan of organization. Every army is organized on this model. The general issues the commands, the officers pass it down, the private soldier must act accordingly.

"Theirs not to reason why,
Theirs but to do or die."

The Protestant reformation that asserted the right of the individual was met by the counter-reformation that reasserted the inviolable validity of the church authority. Consequently, Loyola organized his followers on the model of the army, and insisted on the need of absolute obedience.

The Salvation Army is organized on the same model. All selection of officers is from above, and each subordinate is responsible, not to those under him, but to those over him, and ultimately to the General.

In education, we may contrast the method that starts from the side of a consideration of the individual, and the one that is framed on the despotic or paternal model.

The paternal, or despotic, is carried on in accordance with precise instructions from above. It has its authorities, and to

those it appeals. The work of the teacher is to instruct; that is, to unfold the authorities, being most careful not to add anything thereto. As so much depends on the authorities used, there must be a careful selection, and an "index expurgatorius" of everything questionable, or not in accord with the ultimate authority. This is still upheld as the only true method by the Jesuits.

The other principle starts from another point of view. It is most anxious to awaken the powers of the pupil, develop his capabilities, and train his faculties, so that he may eventually become independent of his teacher, and think matters out for himself. This is the principle of Protestantism applied to education. One of the difficulties in the way of uniting the separate and public schools, not generally recognized, is this fundamental opposition of theory of education.

I have called the principle of education, as opposed to instruction, the Protestant principle. But, perhaps, in view of recent events in the United States and Canada, we ought to say this is the principle that guides Protestants in education, with the exception of the theological colleges.

In recent discussion a large section of the Protestant community and most of the theological journals openly advocated the Jesuit principle as the only one applicable to the teaching of theology. Comment is needless.

If we have clearly before our minds the principles that underlie the two extremes that I have termed pure individualism and pure despotism, we may notice that the next theory in order is that modification of pure individualism as exemplified in nihilism, that would bring it one stage nearer to the opposite principle of pure despotism, by admitting some place for control or government. This will be anarchism, very slightly distinguishable from nihilism. They are alike in the beginning, for both advocate the need of tearing down as the first requisite. Both say we must destroy all existing institutions; we must reduce society to an atomic condition. But this is all nihilism works for; this is the "consummation devoutly to be wished." Anarchism, on the other hand, regards this as merely the first act in the tragedy. It hopes that upon this fragmentary chaos there may intervene and follow a reorganization. This is to be voluntary, dissolvable at wish, strictly local and limited in extent—that is, with "home

rule" sufficiently decentralized to satisfy even the Patrons of Industry.

In the meantime, nihilists and anarchists join hands in a war of extermination against every form of government. They are justly dreaded as the greatest enemies to society because they wish to destroy all organization. But there is this curious inconsistency, that, though desiring to destroy every form of organization, they are the most despotically and absolutely organized society in existence. Their secret organization has its circles of ten, in which each lower circle is ruled by a higher, absolutely; and, when any member is selected to do any deed, however horrible and revolting to him, it is literally "do or die."

In logical order, we should now reach our next theory by considering despotism as slightly modified by admitting an element of consideration for the individual. The paternal form of despotism is thus transformed into communism. The controlling power is still absolute, yet it recognizes the individuals in an imperfect way. All the individuals exist to contribute to a central fund, to be redistributed again. Each individual is regarded as a unit without any consideration of degrees of worth, earnestness, application, or industry, or of the opposite degrees of worthlessness, laziness, or carelessness. Each is to count for one, and no one to count for more than one. "Share and share alike" is the motto. You will easily recognize this as communism. The early church, for a short time, had a kind of communism when they had all things in common. I shall make no criticism of the fault of overlooking the moral value of different degrees of remuneration in accordance with difficulty of work and moral qualities required to ensure successful performance.

We now come to the second modification of pure individualism, and the second modification of pure despotism, and these as drawing much closer together, though starting from opposite extremes, will be of much greater interest. Only a small, though, at times, unpleasantly active, minority belong to the classes we have already enumerated, as nihilism and anarchism, on the individualistic side, and despotism and communism, on the other. The second modification of pure individualism begins by insisting upon the central thought of individualism, that each person should mind his own business; but, unlike nihilism and anarchism, it says it is not the business of one individual to settle what

another's business should be, or to see that he keeps to this sphere. Here there is need for government to settle the limits, and to keep each one strictly within his limits. Whenever government steps beyond this to undertake anything for the proposed good of individuals, it is overstepping its own province, and is interfering on its part with the rights of individuals, whose rights it was its duty to guard from all invasion. This view commends itself very much to a large class of people. It is most frequently appealed to as if it were an almost self-evident statement of the true relation of the individual to the government. The government is needed, indeed; but it is a necessary evil, and the less of it the better for all.

We have a famous exponent of this view in Mr. Herbert Spencer, and perhaps the plausibility of his presentation has done a great deal towards the wide acceptance of this theory.

Spencer says that we may note three stages in the history of the race. Originally, there is the military period, where there is an excessive amount of government and a great deal of control. Then came the industrial period, peace reigning, and government greatly curtailed. With the advancing evolution and improvement of the race, government will be gradually eliminated, both in the sphere of politics and morality. Eventually, government will altogether vanish, and then both moral and political obligation will cease.

Over against Spencer's modified individualism we need to set that form of modified paternalism that is most properly called "socialism," if that term is used with any degree of accuracy, and still more suitably termed "collectivism," for this helps to describe its chief characteristic.

Spencer allowed a place for the government as a necessary evil, to be gradually eliminated. Collectivism starts with the emphasis upon the need of extending the work of government, and limiting what it regards as evils from too great power in the hands of irresponsible individuals.

As Spencer's position is a great advance upon anarchism, so collectivism is a great advance on communism. It gives a much greater place to the individual than communism did. It believes that everything should be under the complete control of the government. It wishes to replace the present mode of industrial action, based on individualistic competition, by a form of co-oper-

ation, owned and controlled by the government. They do not propose, however, to give to each one an equal share in the accumulated product, but desire to apportion to each according to his worth and earnestness. It desires to leave room for choice in the selection of a career, and, with this in view, it insists that the state should see that all its citizens are educated and trained until they are eighteen years of age in such a way as to fit each to enter upon any industrial, literary, or artistic career, for which he or she was most fitted. The more disagreeable forms of work now despised are to be regarded as the most honorable.

Like Spencer, they also speak of three stages.

The first was when government was most lax and inadequate, where private individuals owned slaves, and carried on industrial operations by this slave labor, subject to the caprice of the slave-owner, unchecked by government. Feudalism would be regarded as a slightly modified form of slavery.

Then came a second stage, where government control increased, and removed feudalism and slave ownership. This marked a great advance to wage labor and freedom of contract.

But the collectivists claim that this is only an appearance of freedom, not real freedom to the great majority. The system of competition, especially since the rise of combinations, trusts, and joint-stock companies, has enabled a number of the stronger to combine, like the old feudal barons, to injure and oppress the remainder. The freedom of contract is merely nominal, while the contracting parties do not stand on an equal footing. The stronger dictate terms to the weaker, which they must accept. It is a form of industrial warfare said to be fair play; but one is fighting in armor and in companies, the rest unarmed and singly.

The collectivists wish for a truce, and they look to the further extension of governmental control to remedy this evil, as it did with the earlier feudalism. It hopes for government to grow strong enough and extensive enough to substitute organized and legally controlled universal co-operation, or at least national co-operation, instead of the present competitive system. The three stages, then, would be slave labor, wage labor, and national co-operative labor. The collectivists point to the success of such national enterprises as the post-offices, the system of national public education. They also bring examples to show that,

where fairly tried, municipalities have succeeded in managing their own water and gas supply; sanitary matters now have to be regulated by the municipalities; and they argue that gas supply and street railways should be managed by the municipalities, and railroads by the state. They go further, and conclude that it would be wise for the state to own and manage all the materials of production, and that the citizens should each and all become civil servants in the employ of the state. It is difficult, in a very brief outline, to do justice to any theory, yet I trust that this is not only a concise, but also a perfectly fair account of the leading principles underlying Spencer's position, and that of the collectivists.

Perhaps I may be allowed now a few words of estimation of these two positions, in neither of which, I believe, is to be found the full and correct statement of the problem to be solved, nor a satisfactory solution of the real difficulty before our civilization.

First, with reference to Spencer's account, which is the one that is accepted by the majority of English-speaking people as the most reasonable: a kind of sensible compromise between two fanatical extremes. But Spencer's theory does not reconcile these extremes, nor solve the difficulty. Instead of the extreme of pure individualism, or the extreme of pure despotism, we have both of them on our hands, merely juxtaposed: not reconciled, but set up to fight it out about the limits. Each is absolute within its own sphere, and the spheres are mutually exclusive, and the problem, or the battle, is to keep them mutually exclusive.

They must fight it out. For Spencer, it is not wise to interfere in any fight. Evolution advances by the survival of the fittest, the fight is necessary to determine which is the fittest, and Spencer has a good deal to say against the meddling philanthropists who interfere with what he regards as the beneficent and healthy working of this law. Let all forces fight away; hence, let there be unrestricted competition. The collectivists call this industrial warfare: very well, says Spencer, that is just what is wanted. It is said that the Anglo-Saxon people like a fight, that our early barbarism still clings to us, and this is sometimes said to explain the interest that is taken in such brutal exhibitions as prize-fights. But, along with this, there is another element associated with the fight or competition—the element of

uncertainty that lends occasion to the gratification of the low gambling instinct. The latter is one of the menaces of our time. Both of these instincts are in favor of letting matters be fought out and take the chances. How often the booty from gambling is not discriminated from genuine earnings I may illustrate by an editorial in one of our foremost papers, where it tried to account for the wide interest in prize-fights, and said of the winner in a late set-to that there were not many people who could, as he did, make \$20,000 in nine minutes with his own hands. Make! Earn! What preposterous nonsense!

Spencer's plausible account of government as gradually disappearing only takes account of one aspect of government, namely, a part of its attitude towards criminals and those opposed to good government. The restrictive and external force and might is all that he has in view. But government has another side in dealing with good citizens, and even in dealing with criminals it should not be merely restrictive, but also remedial. Though starting with the assertion of individualism, Spencer measures all advance by the limitation of the government. Thus he neither sees the true place of government nor the true, positive meaning of the individual. He does not give the individual his proper place because he does not see how he may express himself in participating in government; and, again, he does not give him his true place because he regards improvement as coming about by a necessary law of evolution, which obscures the truth that improvement at each stage is dependent upon the freely chosen moral conduct of responsible individuals. We neither become better by some vague "natural law," nor as a result of state regulation alone. Moral advance depends upon the willing co-operation of responsible moral agents—their free adoption of those lines of conduct that tend to their highest interests and truest well-being.

Natural conditions and state regulations may, indeed, assist, but only on the supposition that they build upon and call into exercise the selective action of moral agents, favoring and encouraging the selection of the higher, retarding and discouraging the selection of the lower.

Both Spencer and the collectivists measure advance by the limitation or the extension of government, but this is not the real question at all—not is government much or little, great or

small, limited or unlimited, but what is its character? It is not a question of quantity, but of quality. And the measure of improvement or advance proposed by both is erroneous—Spencer measuring by tendency to produce pleasure, the collectivists by the tendency to increase material possessions, while the real measure is deeper, viz., the tendency to develop the highest type of moral character. Hence we must take a wider view of government than Spencer does, a deeper view of the individual than either Spencer or the collectivist.

First, government must be wider than Spencer allows. He does not notice, in his account, that a new side to government begins to come in, slight in the war period, much more prominent in the industrial period, and continually increasing; the side where government is not external, restrictive, and opposed to the subject, but is adopted, chosen, and approved, and is thus an expression of the wishes of the governed themselves. Such government might be termed organized self-government. In it the subjects are not being ruled by an external power, but are regulating themselves. Such government will not appear as a restriction to the good citizen, and, if we should ever arrive at a stage when there would be no need of restriction, there could be the most complete organic self-regulation, and government as the expression of the wishes of this community might be most extensive.

There is no restriction to a good man to be commanded to do what he intends to do and should do; it is only to those who wish to do what is wrong that a good law appears as a restriction of their liberty; and a man's liberty to do wrong and injury needs to be restricted even on Spencer's own account.

This is not collectivism, however, which is inclined to measure every advance by the extension of government in such a way as to control most completely the production of wealth. As Spencer has too little place for government owing to a narrow view of the government and the individual, so the collectivist has too much trust in mere amount of government. It trusts too much to external applications in reforming; it belittles individual spontaneity. It is a reaction against the extreme of pure or negative individualism. It sees that each, to mind his own business, leaves everything to the arbitrary guidance of irresponsible and capricious individuals. It wishes order and rule. But may

we not fall into the hands of an arbitrary, capricious, and irresponsible government, whose actions may be more uniform, but may also be more uniformly tyrannical, being able to enforce their whims upon the governed? We must see to the character of our government, and before we can have more government control we must have more control of government.

And even though government were fully under control, the faithful servant of the public, there is a fallacy involved in the reasoning by which the collectivists conclude that it would be well to have complete nationalization of all industries. They reason from a certain class of enterprises that are often termed "natural monopolies." These are of such a character that it is a tremendous loss to duplicate them. One can be carried on more economically than more than one. For instance, it would be manifestly bad management to have two or several street railways on our streets. Such enterprises naturally tend to fall into the hands of one company, and are then monopolies. Now, it might be conceded that, with a properly controlled government and efficient management, such enterprises might be collectively owned and managed; that is, nationalized, or municipalized, successfully.

This is the grain of truth. But it does not at all follow that what might succeed with this peculiar class of enterprises would be suitable to entirely different classes of industry. In other cases the cost of supervision would be so great as to lead, in all probability, to a heavy loss, besides other disadvantages.

But, while differing from Spencer and the collectivists, I desire to be perfectly fair to each.

Now, it is not only manifestly unfair, but the height of absurdity or ignorance, to class the collectivists with the nihilists and anarchists. The latter desire the utter extirpation of all government. They desire to raze the structure of society to its foundations. The collectivists, or socialists, on the contrary, are excessive in their devotion to government, and every form of constituted authority. They desire to make such constituted authority all-embracing.

The socialists, instead of being identical with the anarchists, have been more earnest and zealous than any other part of the community in opposing and counteracting the ignorant and misguided fanaticism that is leagued together in nihilism and

anarchism. The nihilist or the anarchist is not to be regarded as an ordinary assassin; he is much more dangerous, because he acts, not from passion, but from a false principle. He is a misguided fanatic, who needs instruction and enlightenment to change his ignorant and false views of society. Nihilism and anarchism is a moral pestilence, resulting upon the neglect of a portion of the community by the more enlightened and cultivated portion, thus allowing a barbarism to grow up in their very midst.

I cannot, however, worship government to the extent the socialists or collectivists do. On the other hand, pure individualism, negative individualism, is evidently the *bellum omnium contra omnes* of Hobbes. And when negative self-included individualism speaks of the rights of the individual, it is contradicting itself. Right, in its very nature, can never be something special and anti-social. It must be the same for all. Hence to speak of a right to do as I please is a contradiction in terms. A man has the right to do as he pleases only so long as he pleases to do the right which does not depend on his whim.

The value of the individualistic protest is to enforce that the individual does not exist for government, but government for the individual. But if government is for the individual, then the individual must be more than a law of repulsion. He has a *positive* meaning, and is capable of entering into positive inter-relations with his fellow-beings. Indeed, only in such positive concrete relations does his life find content and meaning. We start from the individual, if he is properly conceived, as the positive individual who finds his realization in society. Government—and by government we mean any organized social action—is for this positive, concrete individual, and it should be the faithful expression of the wishes and aspirations of the individuals governed. Such a government may properly undertake anything that is agreed upon as for the highest good of all, and the test of the propriety of the government will be, Does it establish and conserve relations that are fitted to favor and conduce to the highest development of noblest character in the governed?

The government is the means; its end is to aid in the progress and development of the highest type of individuals. Carefully distinguish these.

- (1) What do we wish to bring about?
- (2) What methods must be employed to bring it about?

We want the most perfect and responsible government in order to bring in the highest type of manhood and womanhood.

The improvement of government is a necessary thing, and we must strive for the continual reformation of government, not as the goal of all effort, but as a means to reach our goal.

Government, or our organized social action, is to be improved that organized society may do its duty to the members of society.

But it is evident that the improvement of society that would tend to the benefit of the individuals is itself dependent upon the advancement of those who create and constitute the government. It is a case of reciprocal action: the people act on the government, and the government reacts on the people.

If improvement is to take place, one or the other must advance, and we see that, from the nature of the case, the advance must start from the side of the individuals.

There must be a certain advance before a law or regulation can be made. Such law expresses the higher view of the majority of the most enlightened; it thus becomes a means of educating or bringing up the rear portion of the army to the standard of the advance part. If advance goes much beyond the law, it may have the opposite effect of deteriorating in its influence; it then requires to be advanced.

But individuals may advance in apprehension without doing anything to advance the social organization. They have higher conceptions of what ought to be, but do nothing to make this act upon the social organization. They become indolent and self-righteous; they abandon society to its fate, and enjoy their pharisaical self-complacency. But there must be a different line of action if the world is to grow better.

We need the best individuals to react upon the organization of society, to purify it, remodel it, make it a true expression of what they see it ought to be. Instead, then, of standing apart from the regulation of society, instead of aping the mediæval retreat from the world and its prosaic duties, to enjoy contemplations, there is need that every good man and true come out of his hermit cell and manfully perform the noble duties of citizenship.

Some very good people, though they might be much better, say, "Government is so bad, we wash our hands of such a dirty

business." But if the government, if the social arrangements, if the constitution of our society is bad and vile, it is to a certain extent the man's fault who has not done everything in his power to make it better. There will come a time when those who boast of how little they do for the government of the country in which they live will see that they should be ashamed of themselves. They have left undone what they ought to have done.

How does this apply to you, ministers of the gospel, leaders in good works, as well as guides in good thought?

Perhaps I should commend you for your excellent plan for post-graduate study; but it is perhaps better that I should rather praise you to others, and, while talking to you, endeavor to leave you dissatisfied with present attainments, desirous of greater achievement.

Are you doing your duty in this matter, if you are only with difficulty stirred up to act as citizens when something like the Sunday street car question arises? Has mediævalism still got its clutches upon any of you? Do not suppose that, because dealing with such high themes, you are made a different order of beings, exempted from and incapacitated for the grand duty and privilege of citizenship. Standing apart, you leave unsupported the hands of those who are striving to bring in and carry out nobler policies.


We need a deeper view of the duties of the individual. We need to see that he realizes his nature in relation to his fellow-men. That it is his duty not to regard himself as an independent atom, but to seek to become a real and helpful member of society—in the home life, in the family, in the church organizations, in the State.

We need those of the highest character to permeate and transform all forms of social organization:—the family, the church, and that wider organization which so powerfully reacts upon and moulds the family and church—the State.

We need sanctified common sense. We need a purified political atmosphere. We need a deeper conviction of duty to our fellow-man. We need a citizenship of active working Christians. In short, instead of withdrawing our Christianity from contact with the world, making it a Sunday matter, and a mere sentiment of contemplation and rest, it must be brought out and used every day, every hour, through all business, through all

society, in every institution, in all organization, so that, through the life and activity of Christians as citizens in this world, it may be completely transformed, and become a living, acting, organized Christianized society.

TABLE.



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