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 INTO THE

NATURE AND CAUSES

Ofithe

## WEALTH of NATIONS.

By
AD AM SMITH, LLD.
AND F. R. S. OF LONDON AND EDINBURGH: ONE OF THE COMMISSIONERSOFHISMAJESTY'S CUSTOMS IN SCOTLAND;
AND FORMERLY PROFESSOR OF, MORAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE'UNIVERSITX OF GLASGOW.

IN THREE VOLUMES.
VOL. 1.
THESEVENTHEDRTH.
M.W.AMBERG

LONDON:
Printed for A. Strahan; and T. Cadelle, in the Strand. M DCCXCIII.

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## ADVERTISEMENT

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TO THE
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THIRDE DITION.

THE firf Edition of the following Work was printed in the end of the year 1775, and in the beginning of the year 1776. Through the greater part of the Book, therefore, whenever the prefent ftate of things is mentioned, it is to be underfood of the ftate they were in, either about that time, or at fome earlier period, during the time I was employed in writing the Book. To the third Edition, however, I have made feveral additions, particularly to the chapter upon Drawbacks, and to that upon Bounties; likewife a new chapter entitled, The ConcluA 3
fion

## ADVERTISEMENT.

fion of the Mercantile Syfem; and a new article to the chapter upon the expences of the Sovereign. In all thefe additions, the prefent fate of things means always the flate in which they were during the year 1783 and the beginning of the year 1784 .

I

FOURTHEDITION.

I$\mathbf{N}$ this fourth Edition I have made no alterations of any kind. I now, however, find myfelf at liberty to acknowledge my very great obligations to Mr. Henry Hope of Amfterdam. To that Gentleman I owe the moft diftinct, as well as liberal information, concerning a very interefting and important fubject, the Bank of Amfterdam ; of which no printed account had ever appeared to me fatisfactory, or even intelligible. The name of that Gentleman is fo well known in Europe, the information which comes from him mult do fo much honour to whoever has been fa-

## ADVERTISEMENT:

 voured with it, and my vanity is fo much interefted in making this acknowledgment, that I can no longer refufe myfelf the pleafure of prefixing this Advertifement to this new Edition of miy Book.Tordoduction and Plan of the Worí
B OOKI.

Of the Caufes of Improvement in the productive Powers of Labour, and of the Order according to which its Produce is naturally diftributed among the different Ranks of the People

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\mathbf{C H A P .} \text { I. }
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Of the Divifion of Labour $-\quad-\quad$ ibid. CHAP. H .
Of the Principle wbich gives occafion to the
Division of Labour.
C H A P. III.
Tbat tbe Divifion of Labour is limited by tbe
Extent of tbe Market

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Introduct. its labour is generally applied; and, fecondly, by the proportion between the number of thofe who are employed in ufeful labour, and that of thofe who are not fo employed. Whatever be the foil, climate, or extent of territory of any particular nation, the abundance or fcantinefs of its annual fupply muft, in that particular fituation, depend upon thofe two circumftances.

The abundance or fcantinefs of this fupply too feems to depend more upon the former of thofe two circumftances than upon the latter. Among the favage nations of hunters and fifhers, every individual who is able to work, is more or lefs employed in ufeful labour, and endeavours to provide, as well as he can, the neceffaries and conveniencies of life, for himfelf, or fuch of his family or tribe as are either too old, or too young, or too infirm to go a hunting and fifhing. Such nations, however, are fo miferably poor, that from mere want, they are frequently reduced; or at lealt think themfelves reduced, to the neceffity fometimes of direcliy deftroying, and fometimes of abandoning their infants, their old people, and thofe afflicted with lingering difeafes, to perifh with hunger, or to be devoured by wild beafts. Among civilized and thriving nations, on the contrary, though a great number of people do not labour at all, many of whom confume the produce of ten times, frequently of a hundred times more labour than the greater part of thofe who work; yet the produce of the whole labour of the fociety is fo great, that all are often abundantly fupplied, and a workman, even of the
loweft and pooreft order, if he is frugal and in. Introdust. duftrious, may er a greater fhare of the neceffaries and conver, "cies of life than it is poffble for any favage to acquire.

The caufes of this improvement in the productive powers of labour, and the order, according to which its produce is naturally diftributed among the different ranks and conditions of men in the fociety, make the fubject of the Firf Book of this Inquiry.

Whatever be the actual fate of the fkill, dexterity, and judgment with which labour is applied in any nation, the abundance or fcantinefs of its annual fupply muft depend, during the continuance of that ftate, upon the proportion between the number of thofe who are annually employed in ufful labour, and that of thofe who are not fo employed. The number of ufeful and productive labourers, it will hereafter appear, is every where in proportion to the quantity of capital fock which is employed in fetting them to work, and to the particular way in which it is fo employed. The Second Book, therefore, treats of the nature of capital ftock, of the manner in which it is gradually accumulated, and of the different quantities of labour which it puts into motion, according to the different ways in which it is employed.

Nations tolerably well advanced as to fkill, dexterity, and judgment, in the application of latour, have followed very different plans in the general conduct or direction of it; 'and thofe plans have not all been equally favourable to the

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Introduct. greatnefs of its produce. The policy of fome $\sim^{\text {nations has given extraordinary encouragement }}$ to the induftry of the country; that of others to the induftry of towns. Scarce any nation has dealt equally and impartially with every fort of induftry. Since the downfall of the Romian empire, the policy of Europe has been more favourable to arts, manufactures, and commerce, the induftry of towns; than to agriculture, the induftry of the country. The circumftances which feem to have introduced and eftablifhed this policy are explained in the Third Book.

Though thofe different plans were, perhaps, firf introduced by the private interefts and prejudices of particular orders of men, without any regard to, or forefight of, their confequences upon the general welfare of the fociety; yet they have given occafion to very different theories of political œconomy; of which fome maghify the importance of that induftry which is carried on in towns, others of that which is carried on in the country. Thofe theories have had a confiderable influence, not only upon the opinions of men of learning, but upon the public conduct of princes and fovereign ftates. I have endeavoured in the Fourth Book, to explain, as fully and diftinetly as I can, thofe different theories, and the principal effects which they have produced in different ages and nations.

To explain in what has confifted the revenue of the great body of the people, or what has been the nature of thofe funds, which, in different ages and nations, have fupplied their annual confumption,

## B $\quad \mathbf{O} \quad \mathbf{O} \quad \mathrm{K} \quad \mathrm{I}$.

Of the Caufes of Improvement in the Productive Powers of Labour, and of the Order according to which its Produce is naturally diffributed among the different Ranks of the People.

CHAP. I.

## Of the Divifion of Labour.

$\underbrace{\text { BOOK }}$HE greateft improvement in the productive powers of labour, and the greater part of the ikill, dexterity, and judgment with which it is any where directed, or applied, feem to have been the effects of the divifion of labour.

The effects of the divifion of labour, in the general bufinefs of fociety, will be more eafily underftood by confidering in what manner it operates in fome particular manufactures. It is commonly fuppofed to be carried furtheft in fome very trifling ones; not perhaps that it really is carried further in them than in others of more importance: but in thofe trifing manufactures which are deftined to fupply the fmall wants of but a fmall number of people, the whole number of workmen muft neceffarily be fmall; and thofe employed in every different branch of the work can often be collected into the fame workhoufe,
workhoufe, and placed at once under the view of с н a the fpectator. In thofe great manufattures, on
 the contrary, which are deftined to fupply the great wants of the great body of the people, every different branch of the work employs fo great a number of workmen, that it is impoffible to collect them all into the fame workhoufe. We can feldom fee more, at one time, than thofe employed in one fingle branch. Though in fuch manufactures, therefore, the work may really be divided into a much greater number of parts, than in thofe of a more trifling nature, the divifion is not near fo obvious, and has accordingly been much lefs obferved.

To take an example, therefore, from a very trifing manufacture; but one in which the divifion of labour has been very often taken notice of, the trade of the pin-maker; a workman not educated to this bufinefs (which the divifion of labour has rendered a diftinct trade), nor acquainted with the ufe of the machinery employed in it (to the invention of which the fame divifion of labour has probably given occafion), could fcarce, perhaps, with his utmoft induftry, make one pin in a day, and certainly could not make twenty. But in the way in which this bufinefs is now carried on, not only the whole work is a peculiar trade, but it is divided into a number of branches, of which the greater part are likewife peculiar trades. One man draws out the wire, another ftraights it, a third cuts $i r_{2}$ a fourth points it, a fifth grinds it at the top for receiving the head; to make the head requires
${ }^{B}$ oo K two or three diftinct operations; to put it on, is I. a peculiar bufinefs, to whiten the pins is another; it is even a trade by itfelf to put them into the paper; and the important bufinefs of making a pin is, in this manner, divided into about eighteen diftinct operations, which, in fome manufactories, are all performed by diftinct hands, though in others the fame man will fometimes perform two or three of them. I have feen a fmall manufactory of this kind where ten men only were employed, and where fome of them confequently performed two or three diftinct operations. But though they were very poor, and therefore but indifferently accommodated with the neceffary machinery, they could, when they exerted themfelves, make among them about twelve pounds of pins in a day. . There are in a pound upwards of four thoufand pins of a middling fize. Thofe ten perfons; therefore; could make among them upwards of forty-eight thoufand pins in a day. Each perfon, therefore, making a tenth part of forty-eight thoufand pins, might be confidered as making four thoufand eight hundred pins in a day. But if they had all wrought feparately and independently, and without any of them having been educated to this peculiar bufinefs, they certainly could not each of them have made twenty, perhaps not one pin in a day; that is, certainly, not the two hundred and fortieth, perhaps not the four thoufand eight hundredth part of what they are at prefent capable of performing, in confequence of
$t$ on, is another ; into the aking a eigh-manuhands, metimes feen a en men of them diftinet y poor, nodated 1, when them There pins of lerefore; ty-eight erefore, houfand thouif they dently, Hucated bld not ot one he two thou. are at ence of proper
a proper divifion and combination of their different $\mathbf{C H} \mathbf{A P}$. operations.

In every other art and manufacture, the effects of the divifion of labour are fimilar to what they are in this very trifling one; though in many of them, the labour can neither be fo much fubdivided, nor reduced to fo great a fimplicity of operation. The divifion of labour, however, fo far as it can be introduced, occalions, in every: art, a proportionable increafe of the productive powers of labour. The feparation of different trades and employments from one another, feems to have taken place, in confequence of this advantage. This feparation too is generally carried furtheft in thofe countries which enjoy the higheft degree of induftry and improvement; what is the work of one man in a rude ftate of fociety, being generally that of feveral in an improved one. In every improved fociety, the farmer is generally nothing but a farmer; the manufacturer, nothing but a manufacturer. The labour too which is neceffary to produce any one complete manufacture, is almoft always divided among a great number of hands. How many different trades are employed in each branch of the linen and woollen manufactures, from the growers of the flax and the wool, to the bleachers and fmoothers of the linen, or to the dyers and dreffers of the cloth! The nature of agriculture, indeed, does not admit of fo many fubdivifions of labour, nor of fo complete a feparation of one bulinefs from another, as manufactures. It is impoffible to feparate fo entirely, the bufinefs of

воок the grazier from that of the corn-farmer, as the 1. trade of the carpenter is commonly feparated from that of the fmith. The fpinner is almott always a diftinct perfon from the weaver; but the ploughman, the harrower, the fower of the feed, and the reaper of the corn, are often the fame. The occafions for thofe different forts of labour returning with the different feafons of the year, it is impofible that one man fhould be conftantly employed in any one of them. This impoffibility of making fo complete and entire a feparation of all the different branches of labour employed in agriculture, is perhaps the reafon why the improvement of the productive powers of labour in this art, does not always keep pace with their improvement in manufactures. The moft opulent nations, indeed, generally excel all their neighbours in agriculture as well as in manufactures; but they are commonly more diftinguifhed by their fuperiority in the latter than in the former. Their lands are in general better cultivated, and having more labour and expence beftowed upon them; produce more in proportion to the extent and natural fertility of the ground. But this fuperiority of produce is feldom much more than in proportion to the fuperiority of labour and expence. In agriculture, the labour of the rich country is not always much more productive than that of the poor; or, at leaft, it is never fo much more productive, as it commonly is in manufactures. The corn of the rich country, therefore, will not always, in the fame degree of goodnefs, come cheaper to market almoft er ; but of the ften the forts of $s$ of the be conhis imire a feour em. fon why s of lace with mott
Ill their anufac-diftinthan in better xpence proporof the feldom fupeulture, always r; or, ve, as prn of ys, in per to harket
market than that of the poor. The corn of Po- © HAP. land, in the fame degree of goodnefs, is as cheap as that of France, notwith tanding the fuperior opulence and improvement of the latter country. The corn of France is, in the corn provinces, fully as good, and in moft years nearly about the fame price with the corn of England, though, in opulence and improvement, France is perhaps inferior to England. The corn-lands of England, however, are better cultivated than thofe of France, and the corn-lands of France are faid to be much better cultivated than thofe of Poland. But though the poor country, notwithftanding the inferiority of its cultivation, can, in fome meafure, rival the rich in the cheapnefs and goodnefs of its corn, it can pretend to no fuch competition in its manufactures; at leaft if thofe manufactures fuit the foil, climate, and fituation of the rich country. The filks of France are better and cheaper than thofe of England, becaufe the filk manufacture, at leaft under the prefent high duties upon the importation of raw filk, does not fo well fuit the climate of England as that of France. But the hard-ware and the coarfe woollens of England are beyond all comparifon fuperior to thofe of France, and much cheaper too in the fame degree of goodnefs. In Poland there are faid to be fcarce any manufactures of any kind, a few of thofe coarfer houfehold manufactures excepted, without which no country can well fubfirt.

This great increafe in the quantity of work, which, in confequence of the divifion of labour, the
$0_{1} 0_{1} \mathrm{~K}$ the fame number of people are capable of per(rming, ir owing to three different circumftances; Q the increafe of dexterity in every particulat workman; fecondly, to the faving of the time which is commonly loft in paffing from one fpecies of work to another; and laftly, to the invention of a great number of machines which fisilitate and abridge labeur, and enable one man to do the wark of many,

First, the improvement of the dexterity of the workman neceffarily increafes the quantity of the work he can perform; and the divifion of labour, by reducing every man's bufinefs to fome one fimple operation ${ }_{2}$ and by making this operation the fole employment of his life, necerfarily increales very much the dexterity of the workman. A common fmith, who, though accuftomed to handle the hammer, has never been ufed to make nails, if upon fome particular occafion he is obliged to attempt it, will fcarce ${ }_{2}$ I am affured, be able to make above two or three hundred nails in a day, and thore too very bad ones. A finith who has been accuftomed to make nails, but whofe fole or principal bufinefs has not been that of a nailer, can feldom with his utmoft diligence make more than eight hundred or a thoufand nails in a day. I have feen feveral boys under twenty years of age who harl never exercifed any other trade but that of mok. ing nails, and who, when they exerted hincirfelves, could make, each of them, upwards of two thoufand three hundred nails in a day. The mak rof a nail, however, is by no means one
of the fimplet operations. The fame perfon $\mathrm{CH}_{1} \mathrm{~A}_{\mathrm{A}} \mathrm{P}$. blows the bellows, ftirs or mends the fire as there is occafion, heats the iron, and forges every part of the nail: In forging the head too he is obliged to change his tools. The different operations into which the making of a pin, or of a metal button, is fubdivided, are all of them much more fimple, and the dexterity of the perfon, of whofe life it has been the fole bufinefs to perforio thern, is ufually much greater. The rapidity with which fome of the operations of thofe manufactures are performed, exceeds what the hum man hand could; by thofe who had never feen them, be fuppofed capable of acquiring.

Secondey, the advantage which is gained by faving the time commonly loft in paffing from one fort of work to another, is much greater than we fhould at firf view be apt to imagine it. It is impoffible to pafs very quickly from one kind of work to another, that is carried on in a different place, and with quite different tools. A country weaver, who cultivates a fmall farm, muft lofe a good deal of time in paffing from his loom to the field, and from the field to his loom. When the two trades can be carried on in the fame workhoufe, the lofs of time is no doubt much lefs. It is even in this cafe, however, very confiderable. A man commonly faunters a little in turning his hand from one fort of employment to another. When he firft begins the new work he is feldom very keen and hearty; his mind, as they fay, does not go to it, and for fome time he rather trifles than applies to good purpofe. The habit rily acquired by every country workman who is obliged to change his work and his tools every half hour, and to apply his hand in twenty different ways almolt every day of his life; renders him almoft always flothful and lazy, and incapable of any vigorous application even on the moft preffing occafions. Independent, therefore, of his deficiency in potht of dexterity, this caufe alone muft always reduce confiderably the quantity of work which he is capable of performing.

Thirdly, and laftly, every body muft be fenfible how much labour is facilitated and abridged by the application of proper machinery. It is unneceffary to give any example. I fhall only obferve, therefore, that the invention of all thofe machines by which labour is fo much facilitated and abridged, feems to have been originally owing to the divifion of labour. Men are much more likely to difcover eafier and readier methods of attaining any object, when the whole attention of their minds is directed towards that fingle object, than when it is difipated among a great variety of things. But in confequence of the divifion of labour, the whole of every man's attention comes naturally to be directed towards fome one very fimple object. It is naturally to be expected, therefore, that fome one or other of thofe who are employed in each particular branch of labour thould foon find out eafier and readier methods of perforr.ing their own particular work, wherever the nature of it admits of fuch improvement.
improvement. A great part of the machines $\mathbf{C H}_{\mathrm{I}}^{\mathrm{A}} \mathbf{A} \mathbf{P}$. made ufe of in thofe manufactures in which la- $\underbrace{\text { I. }}$ bour is moft fubdivided, were originally the inventions of common workmen, who, being each of them employed in fome very fimple operation, naturally turned their thoughts towards finding out eafier and readier methods of performing it. Whoever has been much accuftomed to vifit fuch manufactures, muft frequently have been fhewn very pretty machines, which were the inventions of fuch workmen, in order to facilitate and quicken their own particular part of the work. In the firfl fire-engines, a boy was conftantly employed to open and fhut alternately the communication between the boiler and the cylinder, according as the pifton either afcended or defcended. One of thofe boys, who loved to play with his companions, obferved that, by tying a ftring from the handle of the vaive which opened this communication to another part of the machine, the valve would open and fhut without his affiftance, and leave him at liberty to divert himfelf with his play-fellows. One of the greateft improvements that has been made upon this machine, fince it was firf invented, was in this manner the difcovery of a boy who wanted to fave his own labour.

All the improvements in machinery, however, have by no means been the inventions of thofe who had occafion to ufe the machines. Many improvements have been made by the ingenuity of the makers of the machines, when

BOOK to make them became the bufinefs of a peculiar $\underbrace{\text { 1. }}$ trade; and fome by that of thoie who are called philofophers or men of fpeculation, whofe trade it is not to do any thing, but to obferve every thing; and who, upon that account, are often capable of combining together the powers of the moft diftant and difimilar objects. In the progrefs of fociety, philofophy or fpeculation becomes, like every other employment, the principal or fole trade and occupation of a particular clafs of citizens. Like every other employment too, it is fubdivided into a great number of different branches, each of which affords occupation to a peculiar tribe or clafs of philofophers; and this fubdivifion of employment in philofophy, as well as in every other bufinefs, improves dexterity, and faves time. Each individual becomes more expert in his own peculiar branch, more work is done upon the whole, and the quantity of fcience is confiderably increafed by it.

It is the great multiplication of the productions of all the different arts, in confequence of the divifion of labour, which occafions, in a well-governed fociety, that univerfal opulence which extends itfelf to the loweft ranks of the people. Every workman has a great quantity of his own work to difpofe of beyond what he himfelf has occafion for; and every other workman being exactly in the fame firuation, he is, enabled to exchange a great quantity of his own goods for a great quantity, or, what comes to the fame thing, for the price of a great quan-
tity of theirs. He fupplies them abundantly with C Ha $_{1 .} \mathrm{P}$. what they have occafion for, and they accommodate him as amply with what he has occafion for, and a general plenty diflufes itfelf through all the different ranks of the fociety.

Orserve the accommodation of the moft com: mon artificer or day-labourer in a civilized and thriving country, and you will perceive that the number of people of whofe indultry a part, though but a finall part, has been employed in procuring him this accommodation, exceeds all computation. The woollen coat, for example, which covers the day-labourer, as coarfe and rough as it may appear, is the produce of the joint labour of a great multitude of workmen. The fhepherd, the forter of the wool, the woolcomber or carder, the dyer, the fcribbier, the fpinner, the weaver, the fuller, the dreffer, with many others, muft all join their difierent arts in order to complete even this homely production. How many merchants and carriers, befides, mutt have been employed in tranfporting the materials from fome of thofe workmen to others who often live in a very diftant part of the country! how much commerce and navigation in particular, how many fhip-builders, failors, failmakers, rope-makers, mutt have been employed in order to bring together the different drugs made ufe of by the dyer, which often came from the remoteft corners of the world! What a variety of labour too is neceffary in order to produce the tools of the meanett of thofe workmen! To fay nothing of fuch complicated ma-

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chines
${ }^{\text {в о о }}$ о . chines as , the fhip of the failor, the mill of the
I. fuller, or even the loom of the weaver, let us confider only what a variety of labour is requifite in order to form that very fimple machine, the fhears with which the flepherd clips the wool. The miner, the builder of the furnace for fmelting the ore, the feller of the timber, the burner of the charcoal to be made ufe of in the fmelting-houfe, the brick-maker, the bricklayer, the workmen who attend the furnace, the mill-wright, the forger, the fmith, muft all of them join their different arts in order to produce them. Were we to examine, in the fame man-. ner, all the different parts of his drefs and houfehold furniture, the coarfe linen fhirt which he wears next his fkin , the fhoes which cover his feet, the bed which he lies on, and all the different parts which compofe it, the kitchen-grate at which he prepares his victuals, the coals which he makes ule of for that purpofe, dug from the bowels of the earth, and brought to him perhaps by a long fea and a long land carriage, all the other utenfils of his kitchen, all the furniture of his table, the knives and forks, the earthen or pewter plates upon which he ferves up and divides his victuals, the different hands employed in preparing his bread and his beer, the glafs window which lets in the heat and the light, and keeps out the wind and the rain, with all the knowledge and art requifite for preparing that beautiful, and happy invention, without which thefe northern parts of the world could fcarce have afforded a very
nill of the ver, let us
is requie machine, 1 clips the he furnace ae timber, ufe of in the brickrnace, the nuft all of to produce fame man. drefs and hirt which cover his all the dif-chen-grate the coals rpofe, dug rought to long land s kitchen, nives and oon which the difhis bread lets in the wind and art requihappy inparts of
a very mfortable
comfortable habitation, together with the tools $C H_{A} \mathrm{P}$. of all the different workmen employed in producing thofe different conveniencies; if we examine, I fay, all thefe things, and confider what a variety of labour is employed about each of them, we fhall be fenfible that without the affiftance and co-operation of many thoufands, the very meaneft perfon in a civilized country could not be provided, even according to, what we very falfely imagine, the eafy and fimple manner in which he is commonly aecommodated. Compared, indeed, with the more extravagant luxury of the grear, his accommodation muft no doubt appear extremely fimple and ealy; and yet it may be true, perhaps, that the accuminodation of an European Prince dues not always fo much exceed that of an induftrious and frugal peatant, as the accommodation of the latter exceeds that of many an African king, the abfolute mafter of the lives and liberties of ten thoufand naked favages.

C H A P. II.
Of the Principle wobich gives occafion to the Divifion of Labour.
T HIS divifion of labour, from which fo many advantages are derived, is not originally the effect of any human wifdom, which forefees and intends that general opulence to C 2 which

Book which it gives occafion. It is the neceffary,
I. though very now and gradual, confequence of a certain propenfity in human nature which has in view no fuch extenfive utility; the propenfity to truck, barter; and exchange one thing for another.

Whether this propenfity be one of thofe original principles in human nature, of which no further account can be given; or whether, as feems more probable, it be the neceffary confequence of the faculties of reafon and fpeech, it belongs not to our prefent fubject to enquire. It is common to all men, and to be found in no other race of animals, which feem to know neither this nor any other fpecies of contracts. Two greyhounds; in running down the fame hare, have fometimes the appearance of acting in fome fort of concert. Each turns her towards his companion, or endeavours to intercept her when his companion turns her towards himfelf. This, however, is not the effect of any contract, but of the accidental concurrence of their paffions in the fame object at that particular time. Nobody ever faw a dog make a fair and deliberate exchange of one bone for another with anocher dog. Nobody ever faw one amimal by its geftures and natural cries fignify to another, this is mine, that yours; I am willing to give chis for that. When an animal wants to obtain fomething either of a man, or of another animal, it has no other means of perfuafion but to gain the favour of thofe whofe fervice it requires. A puppy fawns upon its dam, and a fuaniel endea-
vours by a thoufand attractions to engage the $\mathrm{CH}_{\mathrm{H}}$ A. ${ }^{2}$. attention of its mafter who is at dinner, when it $\underbrace{\text {, }}$ wants to be fed by him. Man fometimes ufes the fame arts with,his brethren, and when he has no other means of engaging them to act according to his inclinations, endeavours by every fervile and fawning attention to obtain their good will. He has not time, however, to do this upon every occafion. In civilized fociety he ftands at all times in need of the co-operation and affiftance of great multitudes, while his whole life is fcarce fufficient to gain the friendhip of a few perfons. In almoft every other race of animals, each individual, when it is grown up to maturity, is entirely independent, and in its natural ftate has occafion for the affiftance of no other living creature. But man has almoft conftant occafion for the help of his brethren, and it is in vain for him to expect it from their benevolence only. He will be more likely to prevail if he can intereft their felf-love in his favour, and shew them that it is for their own advantage to do for him what he requires of them. Whoever offers to another a bargain of any kind, propofes to do this: Give me that which I want, and you hall have this which you want, is the meaning of every fuch offer; and it is in this manner that we obtain from one another the far greater part of thofe good offices which we ftand in need of. It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expest our dinner, but from their

B $Q_{1} 0 \times$ regard to their own intereft. We addrefs our$\underbrace{\text { I. }}$ felves, not to their humanity but to their felflove, and never talk. to them of our own neceffities but of their advantages. Nobody but a beggar chufes to depend chiefly upon the benevolence of his fellow-citizens. Even a beggar does not depend upon it entirely. The charity of well-difpofed people, indeed, fupplies him with the whole fund of his fubfiltence. But though this principle ultimately provides him with all the neceffaries of life which he has occafion for, it neither does nor can provide him with them as he has occafion for them. The greater part of his occafional wants are fupplied in the fame manner as thofe of other people, by treaty, by barter, and by purchafe. With the money which one man gives him he purchafes food. The old cloaths which another beftows upon him he exchanges for other old cloaths which fuit him better, or for lodging, or for food, or for money, with which he can buy either food, cloaths, or lodging, as he has occafion.

As it is by treaty, by barter, and by purchafe, that we obtain from one another the greater part of thofe mutual good offices which we ftand in need of, fo it is this fame trucking difpofition which originally gives occafion to the divifion of labour. In a tribe of hunters or fhepherds a particular perfon makes bows and arrows, for example, with more readinefs and dexterity than any other. He frequently exchanges rhem for cattle or for venifon with his companions; and
he finds at laft that he can in this manner get ${ }^{\mathbf{C H}}{ }_{\mathrm{H}}^{\mathrm{A}}$. ${ }^{\mathrm{P}}$. more cattle and venifon, than if he himfelf went $\underbrace{\text { n. }}$ to the field to catch them. From a regard to his own intereft, therefore, the making of bows and arrows grows to be his chief bufinefs, and he becomes a fort of armourer. A nother excels in making the frames and covers of their little huts or moveable houfes. He is accultomed to be of ufe in this way to his neighbours, who reward him in the fame manner with cattle and with venifon, till at laft he finds it his intereft to dedicate himfelf entirely to this employment, and to become a fort of houfe-carpenter. In the fame manner a third becomes a fmith or a brazier; a fourth a tanner or dreffer of hides or fkins, the principal part of the cloathing of favages. And thus the certainty of being able to exchange all that furplus part of the produce of his own labour, which is over and above his own confumption, for fuch parts of the produce of other men's labour as he may have occalion for, encourages every man to apply himfelf to a particular occupation, and to cultivate and bring to perfection whatever talent or genius he may poffefs for that particular fpecies of bufinefs.

The difference of natural talents in different men is, in reality, much lefs than we are aware of; and the very different genius which appears to diftinguifh men of different profeffions, when grown up to maturity, is not upon many occafions fo much the caufe, as the effect of the divifion of labour. The difference between the

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${ }^{B} 0_{1}$. $K_{\text {mof }}$ diffimilar characters, between a philofopher and a common ftreet porter, for example, feems to arife not fo much from nature, as from habir, cuftom, and education. When thay came into the world, and for the firft fix or eight years of their exiftence, they were, perhaps, very much alike, and neither their parents nor playfellows could perceive any remarkable difference. About that age, or foon after, they come to be employed in very different occupations. The difference of talents comes then to be taken notice of, and widens by degrees, till at laft the vanity of the philofopher is willing to acknowledge fcarce any refemblance. But without the difpofition to truck, barter, and exchange, every man muft have procured to himfelf every neceffary and conveniency of life which he wanted. All muft have had the fame duties to perform, and the fame work to do, and there could have been no fuch difference of employment as cculd alone give occafion to any great difference of talents.

As it is this difooficion which forms that difference of talents, fo remarkable among men of different profeflions, fo it is this fame difpofition which renders that difference ufeful. Many tribes of animals acknowledged to be all of thefame fpecies, derive from nature a much more remarkable diftinction of genius, than what, antecedent to cultom and education, appears to take place among men. By nature a philofopher is not in genius and difpofition half fo different from a ftreet porter, as a maftiff is from a greyhound, or a greythound from a fpaniel, or this

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laft from a fhepherd's dog. Thofe different $\mathbf{C H}_{\text {He }}{ }^{\text {P }}$. tribes of animals, however, though all of the $\underbrace{\text { nil }}$ fame fpecies, are of farce any ufe to one another. The ftrength of the maftiff is not in the leaft fupported either by the fwiftnefs of the greyhound, or by the fagacity of the fpaniel, or by the docility of the fhepherd's dog. The effeets of thofe different geniufes and talents, for want of the power or difpofition to barter and exchange, cannot be brought into a common ftock, and do not in the leaft contribute to the better accommodation and conveniency of the fpecies. Each animal is ftill obliged to fupport and defend itfelf, feparately and independently, and derives no fort of advantage from that variety of talents with which nature has diftinguifhed its fellows. Among men, on the contrary, the moft diffimilar geniufes are of ufe to one another; the different produces of their refpective talents, by the general difpofition to truck, barter, and exchange, being brought, as it were, into a common ftock, where every man may purchafe whatever part of the produce of other men's talents he has occafion for.

CHAP.

## C H A P. III.

## Tbat the Divifion of Labour is limited by the Extent of the Market.

Book $\mathrm{A}^{\mathrm{S}}$ it is the power of exchanging that gives occafion to the divifion of labour, fo the extent of the divifion mult always be limited by the extent of that power, or, in other words, by the extent of the market. When the market is very fmall, no perfon can have any encouragement to dedicate himfelf entirely to one employment, for want of the power to exchange all that furplus part of the produce of his own labour, which is over and above his own confumption, for fuch parts of the produce of other men's labour as he has occafion for.

There are fome forts of induftry, even of the laweft kind, which can be carried on no where but in a great town. A porter, for example, can find employment and fubfiftence in no other place. A village is by much too narrow a fphere for him; even an ordinary market town is fcarce large enough to afford him contant occupation. In the lone houfes and very fmall villages which are fcattered about in fo defert a country as the Highlands of Scotland, every farmer muft be butcher, baker, and brewer for his own family. In fuch fituations we can fca:ce expect to find even a fmith, a carpenter, or a mafon, within lefs than twenty miles of another of the fame trade. The fattered families that live
live at eight or ten miles diftance from the ${ }^{\mathbf{C H}} \mathbf{H} \mathbf{A}$. . neareft of them, mult learn to perform them-~~ـ~ felves a great number of little pieces of work, for which, in more populous countries, they would call in the affitance of thofe workmen. Country workmen are almolt every where obliged to apply themfelves to all the different branches of induftry that have fo much affinity to one another as to be employed about the fame fort of materials. A country carpenter deals in every fort of work that is made of wood; a country fmith in every fort of work that is made of iron. The former is not only á carpenter, but a joiner, a cabinet-maker, and even a carver in wood, as well as a wheelwright, a plough-wright, a cart and waggon maker. The employments of the latter are ftill more various. It is impoffible there fhould be fuch a trade as even that of a nailer in the remote and inland parts of the Highlands of Scotland. Such a workman at the rate of a thoufand nails a day, and three hundred working days in the year, will make three hundred thoufand nails in the year. But in fuch a fituation it would be impoffible to difpofe of one thoufand, that is, of one day's work in the year.

As by means of water-carriage a more extenfive market is opened to every fort of induftry than what land-carriage alone can afford it, fo it is upon the fea-coaft, and along the banks of navigable rivers, that induftry of every kind naturally begins to fubdivide and improve itfelf, and it is frequently not till a long time after that thofe

в O O $K$ thofe improvements extend themfelves to the in-

1. land parts of the country. A broad-wheeled waggon, attended by two men, and drawn by eight horfes, in about fix weeks time carries and brings back between London and Edinburgh near four ton weight of goods. In about the fame time a hip navigated by fix or eight men, and failing between the ports of London and Leith, frequently carries and brings back two hundred ton weight of goods. Six or eight men, therefore, by the help of water-carriage, can carry and bring back in the fame time the fame quantity of goods berween London and Edinburgh, as fifty broad-wheeled waggons, attended by a hundred men, and drawn by four hundred horfes. Upon two hundred tons of goods, therefore, carried by the cheapett landcarriage from London to Edinburgh, there muft be charged the maintenance of a hundred men for three weeks, and both the maintenance, and what is nearly equal to the maintenance, the wear and tear of four hundred horfes as well as of fifty great waggons. Whereas, upon the fame quantity of goods carried by water, there is to be charged only the maintenance of fix or eight men, and the wear and tear of a Thip of two hundred tons burthen, together with the value of the fuperior rilk, or the difference of the infurance between land and water-carriage. Were there no other communication between thofe two places, therefore, but by land-carriage, as no goods could be tranfported from the one to the other, except fuch whofe price was very confi-
derable
derable in proportion to their weight, they could CHAP. carry on but a fmail part of that commerce which at prefent fubfifts between them, and confequently could give but a fmall part of that encouragement which they at prefent mutually afford to each other's induftry. There could be little or no commerce of any kind between the diftant parts of the world. What goods could bear the expence of land-carriage between London and Calcutta? Or if there were any fo precious as to be able to fupport this expence, with what fafety could they be tranfported through the territories of fo many barbarous nations? Thofe two cities, however, at prefent carry on a very confiderable commerce with each other, and by mutually affording a market, give a good deal of encouragement to each other's induftry.

Since fuch, therefore, are the advantages of water-carriage, it is natural that the firf improvements of art and induftry fhould be made where this conveniency opens the whole world for a market to the produce of every fort of labour, and that they fhould always be much later in extending themfelves into the inland parts of the country. The inland parts of the country can for a long time have no other market for the greater part of their goods, but the country which lies round about them, and feparates them from the fea-coaft, and the great navigable rivers. The extent of their market, therefore, muft for a long time be in proportion to the riches and populoufnefs of that country, and confequently their improvement mutt aiways be pofterior

E 0 o k terior to the improvement of that country. In Nour North American colonies the plantations have conftantly followed either the fea-coaft or the banks of the navigable rivers, and have fcarce any where extended themfelves to any confiderable diftance from both.

The nations that, according to the beft authenticated hiftory, appear to have been firft civilized, were thofe that dwelt round the coaft of the Mediterranean fea. That fea, by far the greatef inlet that is known in the world, having no tides, nor confequently any waves except fuch as are caufed by the wind only, was, by the fmoothnefs of its furface, as well as by the multitude of its inlands, and the proximity of its neighbouring fhores, extremely favourable to the infant navigation of the world; when, from their ignorance of the compals, men were afraid to quit the view of the coaft, and from the imperfection of the art of fhip-building, to abandon themfelves to the boifterous waves of the ocean. To pafs beyond the pillars of Hercules, that is, to fail out of the Streights of Gibraltar, was, in the antient world, long confidered as a molt wonderful and dangerous exploit of navigation. It was late before even the Phenicians and Carthaginians, the molt fkilful navigators and fhipbuilders of thofe old times, attempted it, and they were for a long time the only nations that did attempt it.

Of all the countries on the coaft of the Mediterranean fea, Egypt feems to have been the firft in which either agriculture or manufactures were cultivated
cultivated and improved to any confiderable $\mathbf{C}$ HA. ${ }_{\text {A. }}$. degree. Upper Egypt extends itfelf nowhere above a few miles from the Nile, and in Lower Egypt that great river breaks itfelf into many different canals, which, with the affiftance of a little art, feem to have afforded a communication by water-carriage, not only between all the great towns, but between all the confiderable villages, and even to many farm-houfes in the country; nearly in the fame manner as the Rhine and the Maefe do in Holland at prefent. The extent and eafinefs of this inland navigation was probably one of the principal caufes of the early improvement of Egypt.

The improvements in agriculture and manufactures feem likewife to have been of very great antiquity in the provinces of Bengal in the Eaft Indies, and in fome of the eaftern provinces of China; though the great extent of this antiquity is not authencicated by any hiftories of whofe authority we, in this part of the world, are well affured. In Bengal the Ganges and feveral other great rivers form a great number of navigable canals, in the fame manner as the Nile does in Egypt. In the Eaftern provinces of China too, feveral great rivers form, by their different branches, a multitude of canals, and by communicating with one another afford an inland navigation much more extenfive than that either of the Nile or the Ganges, or perhaps than both of them put together. It is remarkable that neither the antient Egyptians, nor the Indians, nor the Chinefe, encouraged foreign commerce, but feem
${ }^{\text {B }} \mathbf{O}_{1}$. K feem all to have derived their great opulence from this inland navigation.

All the inland parts of Africa, and all that part of Afia which lies any confiderable way north of the Euxine and Cafpian feas, the antient Scythia, the modern Tartary and Siberia, feem in all ages of the world to have been in the fame barbarous and uncivilized ftate in which we find them at prefent. The fea of Tartary is the frozen ocean which admits of no navigation, and though fome of the greateft rivers in the world run through that country, they are at too great a diftance from one another to carry commerce and communication through the greater part of it. There are in Africa none of thofe great inlets, fuch as the Baltic and Adriatic feas in Europe, the Mediterranean and Euxine feas in both Europe and Alia, and the gulphs of Arabia; Perfia, India, Bengal, and Siam, in Afia, to carry maritime commerce into the interior parts of that great continent; and the great rivers of Africa are at too great a diftance from one ano* ther to give occation to any confiderable inland navigation. The commerce befides which any nation can carry on by means of a river which does not break itfelf into any great number of branches or canals, and which runs into another territory before it reaches the fea, can never be very confiderable; becaule it is always in the power of the nations who polefs that other territory to obfrut the communication between the upper country and the fea. The navigation of the Danube is of very little ufe to the different all that ble way e antient -ia, feem the fame we find the froion, and he world o great a ommerce part of great in. feas in feas in Arabia, Afia, to or parts rivers of pne ano$e$ inland bich any r which nber of another ever be in the er terricen the ation of difierent ftates
ftates of Bavaria, Auftria, and Hungary, in com- C Ha P. parifon of what it would be if any. of them poffeffed the whole of its courfe cill it falls into the Black Sea.

## C H A P. IV.

## Of the Origin and UJe of Money.

WHEN the divifion of labour has been once thoroughly eftablifhed, it is but a very fmall part of a man's wants which the produce of his own labour can fupply. He fupplies the far greater part of them by exchanging that furplus part of the produce of his own labour, which is over and above his own confumption, for fuch parts of the produce of other men's labour as he has occafion for. Every man thus lives by exchanging, or becomes in fome meafure a merchant, and the fociety itfelf grows to be what is properly a commercial fociety.

But when the divifion of labour firft began to take place, this power of exchanging mult frequently have been very much clogged and em. barraffed in its operations. One man, we fhall fuppofe, has more of a certain commodity than he himpelf has occafion for, while another has lefs. The former confequently would be glad to difpofe of, and the latter to purchafe, a part of this fuperfluity. But if this latter fhould chance to have nothing that the former ftands in need of, no exchange can be made batween them. Vol, I.

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в о о $k$ The butcher has more meat in his fhop than he himfelf can confume, and the brewer and the baker would each of them be willing to purchafe a part of it. But they have nothing to offer in exchange, except the different productions of their refpective trades, and the butcher is already provided with all the bread and beer which he has immediate occafion for. No exchange can, in this cafe, be made between them. He cannot be their merchant, nor they his cuftomers; and they are all of them thus mutually lefs ferviceable to one another. In order to avoid the inconveniency of fuch fituations, every prudent man in every period of fociety, after the firft eftablifhment of the divifion of labour, mult naturally have endeavoured to manage his affairs in fuch a manner, as to have at all times by him, befides the peculiar produce of his own induftry, a certain quantity of fome one commodity or other, fuch as he imagined few people would be likely to refufe in exchange for the produce of their induftry.

Many different commodities, it is probable. were fucceffively both thought of and employed for this purpofe. In the rude ages of fociery, catle are faid to have been the common inftrument of commerce; and, though they muft have been a moft inconvenient one, yet in old times we find things were frequently valued according to the number of cattle which had been given in exchange for them. The armour of Diomede, lays Homer, coit only nine oxen; but that of Glaucus coft an hundred oxen. Salt is faid to
be the common inftrument of cornmerce and ex-c C A P. changes in Abyfinia; a fpecies of fhells in fome iv, pirts of the coalt of India; dried cod at Newfoundland; tobacco in Virginia; fugar in fome of our Weft India colonies; hides or dreffed. leather in fome other countries; and there is at this day a village in Scotland where it is not uncommon, I am told; for a workman to carry nails inftead of money to the baker's thop or the alehoufe.

In all countries, howeve; men feem at laft to have been determined by irrefiftible reafons to give the preference, for this employment, to metals above every other commodity. Metals can not only be kept with as little lofs as any other commodity, fcarce any thing being lefs perifhable than they are, but they c.n likewife, without any lofs, be divided into any number of parts, as by fufion thofe parts can eafily be reunited again; a quality which no other equally durable commodities poffers, and which more than any other quality renders them fit to be the inftruments of commerce and circulation. The man who wanted to buy falt, for example, and had nothing but cattle to give in exchange for it, mult have been obliged to buy falt to the value of a whole ox, or a whole fleep, at a time. He could feldom buy lefs than this, becaufe what he was to give for it could feldom be divided without lofs; and if he had a mind to buy more, he mult, for the fame reafons, have been obliged to buy, double or triple the quantity, the value, to wit, of two or three oxen, or be D 2
b. о о K of two or three fheep. If, on the contrary, in-

1. ftead of theep or oxel1, he had metals to give in exchange for it , he could eafily proportion the quantity of the metal to the precife quantity of the commodity which he had immediate occafion for.

Different metals have been made ufe of by different nations for this purpofe. Iron was the common inftrument of commerce among the antient Spartans; copper among the antient Romans; and gold and filver among all rich and commercial nations.

Those metals feem originally to have been made ufe of for this purpofe in rude bars, without any ftamp or coinage. Thus we are told by Pliny*, upon the authority of Timæus, an antient hiftorian, that, till the time of Servius Tullius, the Romans had no coined money, but made ufe of unftamped bars of copper, to purchafe whatever they had occafion for. Thefe rude bars, therefore, performed at this time the function of money.

The ufe of metals in this rude flate was attended with two very confiderable inconveniencies; firft, with the trouble of weighing; and, fecondly, with that of affaying them. In the precious metals, where a fmall difference in the quantity makes a great difference in the value, even the bufinefs of weighing, with proper exactnefs, requires at leaft very accurate weights and fcales. The weighing of gold in particular is an

[^0]operation of fome nicety. In the coarfer metals, c н a p. indeed, where a frnall error would be of little confequence, lefs accuracy would, no doubr, be neceffary. Yet we fhould fin! it exceffively troublefome, if every time a poor man had occafion either to buy or fell a farthing's worth of goods, he was obliged to weigh the farthing. The operation of affaying is fill more difficult, ftill more tedious, and, unlefs a part of the metal is fairly melted in the crucible, with proper diffolvents, any conclufion that can be drawn from it, is extremely uncertain. Before the inftitution of coined money, however, unlefs they went through this tedious and difficult operation, people muft always have been liable to the groffeft frauds and impofitions, and inftead of a pound weight of pure filver, or pure copper, might receive in exchange for their goods, an adulterated compofition of the coarfeft and cheapeft materials, which had, however, in their outward appearance, been made to refemble thofe metals. To prevent fuch abufes, to facilitate exchanges, and thereby to encourage all forts of induftry and commerce, it has been found neceffary, in all countries that have made any confiderable advances towards improvement, to affix a public ftamp upon certain quantities of fuch particular metals, as were in thofe countries commonly made ufe of to purchafe goods. Hence the origin of coined money, and of thofe public offices called mints; inftitutions exactly of the fame nature with thofe of the aulnagers and ftampmafters of woollen
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BOOK and linen cloth. All of them are equally meant
I. to afcertain, by meáns, of a public ftamp, the quantity and uniform goodnefs of thole different commodities when brought to market.

The firf public ftamps of this kind that were affixed to the current metals, feem in many cafes to have been intended to afcertain, what it was both moit difficult and moft important to afcertain, the goodnefs or finenefs of the metal, and to have refembled the fterling mark which is at prefent affixed to plate and bars of filver, or the Spanifh mark which is fometimes affixed to ingots of gold, and which being ftruck only upon one fide of the piece, and not covering the whole furface, afcertains the finenefs, but not the weight of the metal. Abraham weighs to Ephron the four hundred fhekels of filver which he had agreed to pay for the field of Machpelah. They are faid however to be the current money of the merchant, and yet are received by weight and not by tale, in the fame manner as ingots of gold and bars of filver are at prefent. The revenues of the antient Saxon kings of England are faid to have been paid, not in money but in kind, that is, in victuals and provifions of all forts. William the Conqueror incroduced the cuftom of paying them in money. This money, however, was, for a long time, received at the exchequer, by weight and not by tale.

The inconveniency and difficulty of weighing thofe metals with exactnefs gave occafion to the infticution of coins, of which the ftamp, covering entirely both fides of the piece and fometimes
the edges too, was fuppofed to afcertain not only C H A P. the finenefs, but the weight of the metal. Such coins, therefore, were received by tale as at prefent, without the trouble of weighing.

The denominations of thofe coins feem originally to have expreffed the weight or quantity of metal contained in them. In the tirse of Servius Tullius, who firft coined money at Rome, the Roman As or Pondo contained a Roman pound of good copper. It was divided in the fame manner as our Troyes pound, into twelve ounces, each of which contained a real ounce of good copper. The Englih pound fterling in the time of Edward I, contained a pound, Tower weight, of filver of a known finenefs. The Tower pound feems to have been fomething more than the Roman pound, and fomething lefs than the Troyes pound. This laft was not introduced into the mint of England till the 18th of Henry VIII. The French livre contained in the time of Charlemagne a pound, Troyes weight, of filver of a known finenefs. The fair of Troyes in Champaign was at that time frequented by all the nations of Europe, and the weights and mealures of fo famous a market were generally known and efteemed. The Scots money pound contained, from the time of Alexander :he Firft to that of Robert Bruce, a pound of filver of the fame weight and finenefs with the Englifh pound fterling. Englifh, French, and Scots pennies too, contained all of them originally a real pennyweight of filver, the twentieth part of an ounce, and the two

[^1]B o o K hundred-and-fortieth part of a pound. The fhil-
$\underbrace{\text { 1. }}$ ling too feems originally to have been the denomination of a weight. When wheat is at twelve fillings the quarter, fays an antient ftatute of Henry III. then waftel bread of a fartbing fisall weigh eleven fillings and four pence. The proportion, however, between the Shilling and either the penny on the one hand, or the pound on the other, feems not to have been fo conftant and uniform as that between the penny and the pound. During the firt race of the kings of France, the French fou or fhilling appears upon different occafions to have contained five, twelve, twenty, and forty pennies. Among the antient Saxons a fhilling appears at one time to have contained only five pennies, and it is not improbable that it may have been as variable among them as among their neighbours, the antient Franks. From the time of Charlemagne among the French, and from that of William the Conqueror among the Englifh, the proportion between the pound, the fhilling, and the penny, feems to have been uniformiy the fame as at prefent, though the value of cach has been very different. For in every country of the world, I believe, the avarice and injuttice of princes and fovereign ftates, abufing the confidence of their fubjects, have by degrees diminifhed the real quantity of metal, which had been originally contained in their coins. The Roman As, in the latter ages of the Republic, was reduced to the twenty-fourth part of its original value, and, inftead of weighing a found, came to weigh only
half an ounce. The Englifh pound and penny chap. contain at prefent about a third only; the Scots pound and penny about a thirty-fixth; and the French pound and penny about a fixty-fixth part of their original value. By means of thofe operations the princes and fovereign fates which performed them were enabled; in appearance, to pay their debts and fulfil their engagements with a finaller quantity of filver than would otherwife have been requifite. It was indeed in appearance only; for their creditors were really defrauded of a part of what was due to them. All other debtors in the fate were allowed the fame privilege, and might pay with the fame nominal fum of the new and detafed coin whatever they had borrowed in the old. Such operations, therefore, have always proved favourable to the debtor, and ruinous to the creditor; and have fometimes produced a greater and more univerfal revolution in the fortunes of private perfons, than could have been occalioned by a very great public calamity.

IT is in this manner that money has become in all civilized nations the univerfal inftrument of commerce, by the intervention of which goods of all kinds are bought and fold, or exchanged for one another.

What are the rules which men naturally obferve in exchanging them either for money or for one another, I shall now proceed to examine. Thefe rules determine what may be called the relative or exchangeable value of goods. two different meanings, and fometimes expreffes the utility of fome particular object, and fometimes the power of purchafing other goods which the poffeffion of that object conveys. The one may be called "value in ufe;" the other, " value " in exchange." The things which have the greatef value in ufe have fiequeatly little or no value in exchange; and on the contrary, thofe which have the greatelt value in exchange have frequently little or no value in we. Nothing is more ufeful than water: but it will purchafe farce any thing; fcarce any thing can be had in exchange for it. A diamond, on the contrary, has fcarce any value in ufe; but a very great quantity of other goods may frequently be had in exchange for it.

In order to inveftigate the principles which regulate the exchangeable value of commodities, I hall endeavour to hew,

First, what is the real meafure of this exchangeable value; or, wherein confifts the real price of all commodities.

Secondly, what are the different parts of which this real price is compofed or made up.

And, laftly, what are the different circumftances which fometimes raife fome or all of thefe different parts of price above, and fometimes fink them below their natural or ordinary rate; or, what are the caufes which fometimes hinder the market price, that is, the actual price of commodities, from coinciding exactly with what may be called their natural price.

I shall endeavour to explain, as fully and ${ }^{C H A P}$. diftinctly as I can, thofe three fubjects in the three following chapters, for which i mult very earneftly entreat both the patience and attention of the reader: his patience in order to examine a detail which may perhaps in forme places appear unneceffarily tedious; and his attention in order to underftand what may, perhaps, after the fulleft explication which I am capable of giving it, appear ftill in fome degree obfcure. I am always willing to run fome hazard of being tedious in order to be fure that I am perficicuous; and after taking the utmoft pains that I can to be perfpicuous, fome obfcurity may ftill appear to remain upon a fubject in its own nature extremely abftracted.

## C H A P. V.

Of the real end nominal Price of Commodities, or of their Price in Labour, and their Price in Money.

EV ER Y: man is rich or poor according to the degree in which he can afford to enjoy the neceffaries, conveniencies, and anufements of human life. Bus after the divifion of labour has once thoroughly taken place, it is but a very finall part of thefe with which a man's own labour can fupply him. The far greater part of them he muft derive fiom the labour of other
s o or people, and he mult be rich or poor according
I. to the quantity of that labour which he cam command, or which he can afford to purchafe. The value of any commodity, therefore, to the perfon who poffeffes it, and who means not to ufe or confume it himfelf, but to exchange it for other commodities, is equal to the quantity of labour which it enables him to purchafe or command. Labour, therefore, is the real meafure of the exchangeable value of all commodities.

The real price of every thing, what every thing really cofts to the man who wants to acquire it, is the toil and trouble of acquiring it. What every thing is really worth to the man who has acquired it, and who wants to difpole o. $0^{-}$it or exchange it for fomething elfe, is the toil and trouble which ic can fave to himfelf, and which it can impofe upon other people. What is bought with money or with goods is purchafed by labour, as much as what we acquire by the toil of our own body. That money or thofe goods indeed fave us this toil. They contain the value of a certain quantity of labour which we exchange for what is fuppofed at the time to contain the value of an equal quantity. Labour was the firft price, the original purchafe-money that was paid for all things. It was not by gold or by filver, but by labour, that all the wealth of the world was originally purchafed; and its value, to thofe who pofiefs it, and who want to exchange it for fome new productions, is precifely equal to the quantity of labour which it can enable them to purchafe or command.

Wealth, as Mr. Hobbes fays, is power. But C hap. the perfon who either acquires, or fucceeds to a great fortune, does not neceffarily acquire or fucceed to any political power, either civil or military. His fortune may, perhaps, afford him the means of acquiring both, but the mere poffeffion of that fortune does not neceffarily convey to him either. The power which that poffeffion immediately and directly conveys to him, is the power of purchafing; a certain command over all the labour, or over all the produce of labour which is then in the market. His fortune is greater or lefs, precifely in proportion to the extent of this power; or to the quantity either of òther men's labour, or, what is the fame thing, . :'ie produce of other men's labour, whicl. .. enables him to purchafe or command. The exchangeable vaiue of every thing muft always be precifely equal to the extent of this power which it conveys to its owner.

Bur though labour be the real meafure of the exchangeable value of all commodities, it is not that by which their value is commonly eftimated. It is often difficult to afcertain the proportion between two different quantities of labour. The time fpent in two different forts of work will not always alone determine this proportion. The different degrees of hardhip endured, and of ingenuity exercifed, mult likewife be taken into account. There may be more labour in an hour's hard work, than in two hour's eafy bufinefs; or in an hour's application to a trade which it colt ten years labowr to learn, than in a month's

Boor month's inciultry, at an ordinary and obvious employment. But it is not eafy to find any accurate meafure either of hardfhip or ingenuity. In exchanging indeed the different productions of different forts of labour for one another, fome allowance is ommonly ma'e for both. It is adjufted, however, not by any accurare meafure, but by the higgling and bargaining of the market, according to that fort of rough equality which, though not exact, is fufficient for carrying on the buinefs of common life.

Every commodity befides, is more frequently exchanged for, and thereby compared with; other commodicies than with labour. It is more natural therefore, to eftimate its exchangeable value by the quantity of fome other commodity than by that of the labour which it can purchafe. The greater part of people too underftand better what is meant by a quantity of a particular commo.."•v, than by a quantity of labour. The one is a plain palpable object; the other an abftract notion, which, though it can be made fufficiently intelligibt, is not altogether fo natural and cbvious.

But whin barter ceales, and money has become the common inftrument of commerce, every particular commodity is more frequently exchanged for money than for any other commodity. The butcher feldom carries his beef or his muton to the baker, or the brewer, in order to exchange them for bread or for beer; but he carries them to the market, where he exchanges them for money, and afterwards exchanges that
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money for bread and for beer. The quantity $\mathbf{C H}_{\mathbf{H}}^{\mathrm{H}} \mathrm{A}^{\mathbf{P}}$. of money which he gets for them regulates too $\longrightarrow$ the gantity oi oread and beer which he can afterwards purchate. It is more natural and obvious to him, therefore, to eftimate their value by the quantity of money, the commodity for which he immediately exchanges them, than by that of bread and beer, the commodities for which he can exchange them only by the intervention of another commodity; and rather to fay that his butcher's meat is worth threepence or fourpence a pound, than that it is worth three or four pounds of bread, or three or four quarts of fmall beer. Hence it comes to pafs, that the exchangeable value of every commodity, is more frequently eftimated by the quantity of money, than by the quantity either of labour or of any other commodity which can be had in exchange for it.

Gold and filver, however, like every other commodity, vary in their value, are fometines cheaper and fometimes dearer, fometimes of eafier and fometimes of more difficult purchafe. The quantity of labour which any particular quantity of them can purchafe or command, or the quantity of other goods which it will exchange for, depends always upon the fertility o: barrennels of the mines which happen to be known about the time when fuch exchanges aie made. The difcovery of the aburdant mines of America reduced, in the fixteenth century, the value of gold and filver in Europe to about a third of what is had been before. As it cult lefs labour

## THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF

BOOK to bring thofe metals from the mine to the market, fo when they were brought thither they could purchafe or cornmand leis labour; and this revolution, in their value, though perhaps the greateft, is by no means the only one of which hiftory gives fome account. But as a meafure of quantity, fuch as the natural foot, fathom, or handful, which is continually varying in its own quantity, can never be an accurate meafure of the quantity of other things; fo a commodity which is itfelf continually varying in its own value, can never be an accurate meafure of the value of other commodities: Equal quantities of labour, at all times and places, may be faid to be of equal value to the labourer. In his ordinary tate of health, ftrength, and fpirits; in the ordinary degree of his kill and dexterity, he muft always lay down the fame portion of his eafe, his liberty, and his happinefs. The price which he pays muft always be the fame, whatever may be the quantity of goods which he receives in return for it. Of thefe, indeed, it may fometimes purchafe a greater and fometimes a finaller quantity; but it is their value which varies, not that of the labour which purchafes them. At all times and places that is dear which it is difficult to come at, or which it cofts much labour to acquire; and that cheap which is to be had eafily, or with very little labour. Labour alone, therefore, never varying in its own value, is alone the ultimate and real ftandard by which the value of all comniodities car at all times and places be sftimated and compared.
compared. It is their real price; money is their nominal price only.

But though equal quantities of labour are always of equal value to the labourer, yet to the perfon who employs him they appear fometimes to be of greater and fometimes of finaller value. He purchafes them fometimes with a greater and fometimes with a fmaller quantity of goods, and to him the price of labour feems to vary like that of all other things. It appears to him dear in the one cafe, and cheap in the other. In reality; however, it is the goods which are cheap in the one cafe, and dear in the other.

In this popular fenfe, therefore, iabour, like commodities, may be faid to have a real and a nominal price. Its real price may be faid to confift in the quantity of the neceffaries and conveniences of life which are given for it; its nominal price, in the quanticy of money. The labourer is rich or poor, is weil or ill rewarded, in proportion to the real, not to the nominal price of his labour.'

The diftinction between the real and the nominal price of commodities and labour, is not a matter of mere fpeculation, but may fometimes be or confiderable ufe in practice. The fame real price is always of the fame value; but on account of the variations in the value of crold and filver, the fame nominal price is fometimes of very different values. When a landed eftate, therefore, is fold with a refervation of a perpetual rent, if it is intended that this rent fhould always be of the fame value, it is of importance Vol. I. E to

в о OK to the family in whofe favour it is referved, that
$\underbrace{\text { I. }}$ it fhould not confift in a particular fum of money. Its value would in this cafe be liable to variations of two different kinds: firft, to thofe which arife from the different quantities of gold and filver which are contained at different times in coin of the fame denomination; and, fecondly, to thofe which arife from the different values of equal quantities of gold and filver at differe ${ }^{\text {at }}$ times.

Princes and fovereign ftates have frequently fancied that they had a temporary intereft to diminifh the quantity of pure metal contaired in their coins; but they feldom have fancied that they had any to augment it. The quantity of metal contained in the coins, I believe of all nations, has, accordingly, been almoft continu. ally diminifhing, and hardly ever augmenting. Such variations therefore tend almoft always to diminih the value of a money rent.
$\mathrm{T}_{\mathrm{HE}}$ difcovery of the mines of America diminifhed the value of gold and filver in Europe. This diminution, it is commonly fuppofed, though I apprehend without any certain proof, is ftill going on gradually, and is likely to continue to do fo for a long time. Upon this fuppofition, therefore, fuch variations are more likely to diminifh, than to augment the value of a money ent, even though it fhould be ftipulated to be did, not in fuch a quantity of coined money of a denomination (in fo many pounds ferling, for example), but in fo many ounces either of pure filver, or of filver of a certain ftandard.

The rents which have been referved in corn $\mathbf{C H}$ H. $_{\text {A }}$ P. have preferved their value much better than thofe $\underbrace{\mathbf{v} \text {. }}$ which have been referved in money, even where the denomination of the coin has not been altered. By the 18 th of Elizabeth it was enacted, That a third of the rent of all college leafes Mould be referved in corn, to be paid either in kind, or according to the current prices at the neareft public market. The money arifing from this corn rent, though originally but a third of the whole, is in the prefent tinnes, according to Doctor Blackftone, commonly near double of wha: arifes from the other two-thirds. The old money rents of colleges muft, according to this account, have funk almoft to a fourch part of their ancient value; or are worth little more than a fourth part of the corn which they were formerly worth. But fince the reign of Philip and Mary the denomination of the Englifh coin has uniergone little or no alteration, and the fame number of pounds, fhillings and pence have contained very nearly the fame quantity of pure filver. This degradation, therefore, in the value of the money rents of colleges, has arifen altogether from the degradation in the value of filver.

When the degradation in the value of filver is combined with the diminution of the quanticy of it contained $i$ is the coin of the fame denomination, the lofs is frequently ftill greater. In Scotland, where the denomination of the coin has undergone much greater alterations than it ever did in England, and in France, where it has E 2 under-
noo $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}} \mathrm{K}$ undergone ftill greater than it ever did in Scot-
$\underbrace{1 .}$ land, fome ancient rents, originally of confiderable value, have in this manner been reduced almot to nothing.

Equal quantities of labour will at diftant times be purchafed more nearly with equal quantities of corn, the fubfiftence of the labourer, than with equal quantities of gold and filver, or perhaps of any other commodity. Equal quantities of corn, therefore, will, at diftant times. be more nearly of the fame real value, or enable the poffeffor to purchafe or command more nearly the fame quantity of the labour of other people. They will do this, I fay, more nearly than equal quantities of almoft any other comimodity; for even equal quantities of corn will not do it exactly. The fubfiftence of the labourer, or the real price of labour, as I fhall endeavour to fhow hereafter, is very different upon different occafions; more liberal in a fociety advancing to opulence, than in one that is ftanding ftill; and in one that is ftanding ftill, than in one that is going backwards. Every other commodity, however, will at any particular time purchafe a greater or fmaller quantity of labour in proportion to the quantity of fubfiftence which it can purchafe at that time. A rent therefore referved in corn is liable only to the variations in the quantity of labour which a certain quantity of corn can purchafe. But 2 rent referved in any other commodity is liable, not only to the variations in the quantity of labour which any particular quantity of corn can
 corn which can be purchafed by any particular quantity of that commodity.

Though the real value of a corn rent, it is to be obferved however, varies much lefs from century to century than that of a money rent, it varies much more from year to year. The money price of labour, as I fhall endeavour to show hereafter, does not fluctuate from year to year with the money price of corn, but feems to be every where accommodated, not to the temporary or occafional, but to the average or ordinary price of that neceffary of life. The average or ordinary price of corn again is regulated, as I hall likewife endeavour to thow hereafter, by the value of filver, by the richnefs or barrennefs of the mines which fupply the market with that metal, or by the quantity of labour which mult be employed, and confequently of corn which mult be confumed, in order to bring any particular quantity of filver from the mine to the market. But the value of filver, though it fometimes varies greatly from century to century, feldom varies much from year to year, but frequently continues the fame, or very nearly the fame, for half a century or a century together. The ordinary or average money price of corn, therefore, may, during fo long a period, continue the fame or very nearly the fame too, and along with it the money price of labour, provided, at leaft, the fociety continues, in other refpects, in the fame or nearly in the fame condition. In the mean time the temporary and

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во о I occafional price of corn may frequently be dou-
${ }^{\text {n }}$ ble, one year, of what it had been the year before, or fluctuate, for example, from five and twenty to fifty $\mathrm{f}^{\mathrm{A}}$ illings the quarter. But when corn is at the latter price, not only the nominal, but the real value of a corn rent will be double of what it is when at the former, or ill command double the quantity either of labour, or of the greater part of other commodities; the money price of labour, and along with it that of moft other things, continuing the fame during all thefe fluctuations.

Labour, therefore, it appears evidently, is the only univerfal, as well as the only accurate meafure of value, or the only ftandard by which we can compare the values of different commodities at all times and at all places. We cannot eftimate, it is allowed, the real value of different commodities from century to century by the quantities of filver which were given for them. We cannot eftimate it from year to year by the quantities of corn. By the quantities of labour we car, with the greateft accuracy, eftimate it both from centary to century and from year to year. From century to century, corn is better meafure than filver, becaufe, from century to century, equal quantities of corn will command the fame quantity of labour more nearly than equal quantities of filver. From year to year, on the contrary, filver is a better meafure than corn, becaufe equal quantities of it will more nearly command the fame quantity of labour,
${ }^{\text {B O O }}$ O K don. If a London merchant, however, can buy at Canton for half an ounce of filver, a commoand dity which he can afterwards fell at London for an ounce, he gains a hundred per cent. by the bargain, juft as much as if an ounce of filver was at London exactly of the fame value as at Canton. It is of no importance to him that half an ounce of filver at Canton would have given him the comm:nd of more labour and of a greater quantity of the neceffarics and conveniences of life than an ounce can do at London. An ounce at London will a!ways give him the command of double the quanticy of all thefe, which half an ounce could have done there, and this is precifely what he wants.

As it is the nominal or money price of goods, therefore, which finally ditermines the prudence or. imprudence of all purchafes and fales, and thereby regulates almoft the whol bufinefs of common life in which price is concerned, we cannot wonder that it fhould have been fo much more attended to than the real price.

In fuch a work as this, however, it may fometimes be of ufe to compare the different real values of a particular commodity at different times and places, or the different degrers of power over the labour of other people which it may, upon different occafions, have given to thole who poffeffed it. We mufe in this cafe compare, not fo much the different quantities of filver for which it was commonly fold, as the different quantities of labour which thofe different quantities of filver could have purchafed,

But the current prices of labour at diftant times ${ }^{\mathbf{C H}} \mathrm{V}$. $P$. and places can fcarce ever be known with any degree of exactnefs. Thofe of corn, though they have in few places been regularly recorded, are in general better known and have been more frequently taken notice of by hiftorians and other writers. We muft generally, therefore, content ourfelves with them, not as being always exactly in the fame proportion as the current prices of labour, but as being the neareft approximation which can commonly be had to that proportion. I fhall hereafter have occafion to make feveral comparifons of this kind.

In the progrefs of induftry, commercial nations have found it convenient to coin feveral different metals into money; gold for larger payments, filver for purchafes of moderate value, and copper, or fome other coarfe metal, for thofe of ftill fmaller confideration. They have always, however, confidered one of thofe metals as more peculiarly the meafure of value than any of the other two; and this preference feems generally to have been given to the metal which they happened firft to make ufe of as the inftrument of commerce. Having once begun to ufe it as their ftandard, which they muft have done when they had no other money, they have generally continued to do fo even when the neceffity was not the fame.

The Romans are faid to have had nothing but copper money till within five years before the firt

в O O K firlt Punic war*, when they firlt began to coin filver. Copper, therefore, appears to have continued always the meafure of value in that republic. At Rome all accounts appear to have been kept, and the value of all eftates to have been computed either in Affes or in Seflertii. The $A s$ was always the denomination of a copper coin. The word Seftertius fignifies two Afles and a half. Though the Sefertius, therefore, was originally a filver coin, its value was eftimated in copper. At Rome, one who owed a great deal of money was faid to have a great deal of cther people's copper.

The northern nations who eftablifhed themfelves upon the ruins of the Roman empire, feem to have had filver money from the firt beginning of their fettlements, and not to have known either gold or copper coins for feveral ages thereafter. There were filver coins in England in the time of the Saxons; but there was little gold coined till the time of Edward III. nor any cop. per till that of James I. of Great Britain. In England, therefore, and for the fame reafon, I believe, in all other modern nations of Europe, all accounts are kept, and the value of all goods and of all eftates is generally computed in filver: and when we mean to exprefs the amount of a perfon's fortune, we feldom mention the number of guineas, but the number of pounds fterling which we fuppofe would be given for it.

[^2]Originally, in all countries, I believe a le- c hap. gal tender of payment could be made only in the $\underbrace{\mathrm{V} \text {. }}$ coin of that metal, which was peculiarly confidered as the ftandard or meafure of value. In England, gold was not confidered as a legal ten: der for a long time after it was coined into money. The proportion between the values of gold and filver money was not fixed by any public law or proclamation; but was left to be fettled by the market. If a debtor offered payment in gold, the creditor might either reject fuch payment alcogether, or accept of it at fuch a valuation of the gold as he and his debtor could agree upon. Copper is not at prefent a legal tender, except in the change of the fmaller Gilver coins. In this ftate of things the diftinction betwen the metal which was the ftandard, and that which was not the ftandard, was fomething more than a nominal diftinction.

In procefs of time, and as people became gradually more familiar with the ufe of the difterent metals in coin, and confequently better acquainted with the proportion between their refpective values, it has in moft countries, I believe, been found convenient to afcertain this proportion, and to declare by a public law that a guinea, for example, of fuch a weight and finenefs, fhould exchange for one-and-twenty Shillings, or be a legal tender for a debt of that amount. In this ftate of things, and during the continuance of any one regulated proportion of this kind, the diftinction between the metal which is the ftandard, and that which is not the ftandard,

BOOKftandard, becomes little more than a nominal $\underbrace{\text { 1. }}$ diftinction.

In confequence of any change, however, in this regulated proportion, this diftinction becomes, or at leaft feems to become, fomething more than nominal again. If the regulated value of a guinea, for example, was either reduced to twenty, or raifed to two-and-twenty fhillings, all accounts being kept and almoft all obligations for debt being expreffed in filver money, the greater part of payments could in either cafe be made with the fame quantity of filver money as before; but would require very different quantities of gold money; a greater in the one cafe, and a fmaller in the other. Silver would appear to be more invariable in its value than gold. Silver would appear to meafure the value of gold, and gold wouid not appear to meafure the value of filver. The value of gold would feem to depend upon the quantity of filver which it would exchange for; and the value of filver would not feem to depend upon the quanrity of gold which it would exchange for. This difference, however, would be altogether owing to the cuftom of keeping accounts, and of exprefling the amount of all great and fmall fums, rather in filver than in gold money. One of Mr . Drummond's notes for five-and-twenty or fifty guineas would, after an alteration of this kind, be ftill payable with five-and-twenty or fifty guineas in the fame manner as before. It would, after fuch an alteration, be payable with the fame quantity of gold as before, but with
very different quantities of filver. In the pay- C H $\mathrm{H}_{\mathrm{A}} \mathrm{F}$. ment of fuch a note, gold would appear to be $\underbrace{\mathrm{V}_{\text {. }}}$ more invariable in its value than filver. Gold would appear to imeafure the value of filver, and filver would not appear to meafure the value of gold. If the cuftom of keeping accounts, and of expreffing promifiory notes and cther obligations for money in this manner, fhould ever become general, gold, and not filver, would be confidered as the metal which was peculiarly the ftandard or meature of value.

In reality, during the continuance of any one regulated proportion between the refpective values of the different metals in coin, the value of the moft precious metal regulates the value of the whole coin. Twelve copper pence contain half a pound, avoirdupois, of copper; of not the beft quality, which, before it is coined, is feldom worth feven-pence in filver. But as by the regulation twelve fuch pence are ordered to exchange for a fhilling, they are in the market confidered as worth a fhilling, and a fhilling can at any time be had for them. Even before the late reformation of the gold ccin of Great Britain, the gold, that part of it at leaft which circulated in London and its neighbourhood, was in general lefs degraded below its ftandard weight than the greater part of the filver. One-andtwenty worn and defaced fhillings, however, were confidered as equivalent to a guinea, which perhaps, indeed, was worn and defaced too, but feldom fo much fo. The late regulations have brought the gold coin as near perhaps to. its twenty worn and defaced hhilhgs, however ftandard weight as it is poffible to bring the cur-

BOOK rent coin of any nation; and the order to receive
I. no gold at the public offices but by weight, is likely worderve it fo, as long as that order is enforced. The filver coin ftill cortinues in the fame worn and degraded ftate as before the reformation of the gold coin. In the market, how. ever, one-and-twenty fhillings of this degraded filver coin are ftill confidered as vorth a guinea of this excellent gold coin.

The reformation of the gold coin has evidently raifed the value of the filver coin which can be exchanged for it.

In the Englion mint a pound weight of gold is coined into foty-four guineas and a half, which, at one and-tweney binthegs the guinea, is equal to forty fix pousdi, fourteen fhillings and fixpence. An ounce of fuch gold coin, therefore, is worth $3 l .175 .10 \frac{2}{2}$ d. in filve:. In England no daty or feignorage is paid upon the coinage, and he who carries a pound weight or an ounce weight of Atandard gold bullion to the mint, gets back a pound weight or an ounce weight of gold in cois, without any deduction. Three pounds feventeen fhilings and tea-jence halfpenny an sunce, therefore, is faid to be the mint-price of gold in England, or the quantity of gold coin which the mint gives in return for ftandard gold buliion.

Bepore the reformation of the gold coin, the price of ftandard gold bullion in the market had for many years been upwards of $3 l$. 18 s . fometimes $3 l$. 19 s . and very frequently $4 l$. an ounce : that fum, it is proble, in the worn and in
graded gold coin, feldom containing more than $\mathbf{C} \mathbf{H V A}_{\mathbf{H}}$. an ounce of ftandard gold. Since the reformation of the gold coin, the market irice of ftandard gold bullion feldom exceeds $\therefore l . \quad 17$ s. 7 d. an onnce. Before the reformation of the gold coin, the market price was always more or lefs above the inint price. Since that reformation the markee price has been conftantly below the mint price. But that market price is the fame whether it is paid in gold or in filver coin. The late reformation of the gold coin, therefore, has raifed not only the value of the gold coin, but hikewife that of the filver coin in proportion to gold bullion, and probably too in proportion to all other commodities; though the price of the greater part of other commodities being influenced by fo many other caufes, the rife in the value either of gold or filver coin in proportion to them, may not be fo diftinct and fenfible.

In the Englifh mint a pound weight of ftandard filver bullion is coined into fixty-two millings, containing, in the fame manner, a pound weight of ftandard filver. Five thillings and two-pence an ounce, therefore, is faid to be the mint price of filver in England, or the quantity of filver coin which the mint gives in return for ftandard filver bullion. Before the reformation of the gold coin, the market price of ftandard filver bullion was, upon different occafions, five fhillings and four-pence, five killings and fivepence, five fhillings and fixpence, five fhillings and feven-penc, and very often five hillings and eight-pence an ounce, Five Millings and fevenpence,

воок pence, however, feems to have been the moft

1. common price. Since the reformation of the gold coin, the market price of ftandard filver bullinn has fallen occafionally to five fhillings and three-pence, five fhillings and four-pence, ard five fhillings and five-pence an ounce, which laft price it has fcarce ever exceeded. Though the market price of filver bullion has fallen con. fiderably fince the reformation of the gold coin, it has not fallen fo low as the mint price.

In the proportion between the different metals in the Englifh coin, as copper is rated very much above its real value, fo filver is rated fomewhat below it. In the market of Europe, in the French coin and in the Dutch coin, an ounce of fine gold exchanges for about fourteen ounces of fine filver. In the Englifh coin, it exchanges for about fifteen ounces, that is, for more filver than it is worth according to the common eftimation of Europe. But as the price of copper in bars is not, even in England, raifed by the high price of copper in Englifh coin, fo the price of filver in bullion is not funk by the low rate of filver in Englifh coin. Silver in bullion ftill preferves its proper proportion to gold; for the fame reaton that copper in bars preferves its proper proportion to filver.

Upon the reformation of the filver coin in the reign of William III. the price of filver bullion ftill continued to be fomewhat above the mint price. Mr. Lock imputed this high price to the permifion of exporting filver bullion, and to the prohibition of exporting filver coin. This permiffion
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 demand for filver bullion greater than the de'mand for filver coin. But the number of people who want filver coin for the common ufes of buying and felling at home, is furely much greater than that of thofe who want filver bullion either for the ufe of exportation or for any other ufe. There fubfifts at prefent a like permiffion of exporting gold bullion; and a like prohibition of exporting gold coin; and yet the price of gold bullion has fallen below the mint price... But in the Englifh coin filver was then, in the fame manner as now, under-rated in proportion to gold; and the gold coin (which at that time too was not fuppofed to require any reformation) regulated then, as well-as now, the real value of the whole coin. As the reformation of the filver coin did not then reduce the price of filver bullion to the mint price, it is not very probable that a like reformation will do fo now.

Were the filver coin brought back as near to its ftandard weight as the gold, a guinea, it is probable, would, according to the prefent proportion, exchange for more filver in coin than is would purchafe in bullion. The filver containing its full ftandard weight, there would in this cafe be a profit in melting it down, in order, firf, to fell the bullion for gold coin, and afterwards to exchange this gold coin for filver coin to be melted down in the fame manner. Some alteration in the prefent proportion feems to be the only method or? reventing this inconveniency.

Bo OK THE inconveniency perhaps would be lefs if filver was rated in the coin as much above its proper proportion to gold as' it is' at prefent rated below it; provided it was at the fame time enacted that filver fhous as la a legal tender for more than the change ut a guinea; in the fame manner as copper is not a legal tender for more than the change of a hilling. No creditor could in this cafe be cheated in confequence of the high valuation of filver in coin, as no crect:tor can at prefent be cheated in confequence of the high valuation of copper. The bankers only would fuffer by this regulation. When a run comes upon them they fometimes endeavour to: gain time by paying in fixpences, and they would be precluded by this regulation from this difcre. ditable method of evading imınediate payment. They would be obliged in confequence to keep at all times in their coffers a greater quantity of calh than at prefent; and though this might no doubt be a confiderable inconveniency to them, it would at the fame time be a confiderable fecurity to their creditors.

Three pounds feventeen fhillings and tenpence halfpenny (the mint price of gold) certainly does not contain, even in our prefent excellent gold coin, more than an ounce of fandard gold, and it may be thought, therefore, fhouid not purchafe more ftand 'd bullion. But gold in coin is more conveni- than gold in bullion, and though, in England, the coinage is free, yet the gold which is carried in bullion to the mint, can feldom be returned in coin to the
own pref turn dela gold equa Eng prop bulli even the filve the chan A of $b$ ftill abov lion. the the fon in p fuper the $n$ rage genc coin, again only buy profis Frand
owner till after a delay of feveral week. In the C HAP. prefent hurry of the mint, it could not be" returned till after a delay of feveral months. This delay is equivalenc to a fmall duty, and renders gold in coin fomewhat more valuable than an equal quantity of gold in bullion. If in the Englifh coin filver was rated according to its proper proportion to gold, the price of filver bullion would probably fall below the mint price even without any reformation of the filver coin; the value even of the prefent worn and defaced filver coin being regulated by the value of the excellent gold coin for which it can be changed.

A smal. feignorage or duty upon the coinage of both gold and filver would probably increale ftill more the fuperiority of thofe metals in coin above an equal quantity of either of them in bullion. Tus coinage would in this cafe increafe the value of the metal coined in proportion to the extent of this fimall duty; for the fame reafon that the fafion increafes the value of plate in proportion to the price of that fafhion. The fuperiority of coin above bullion would prevent the melting down of the coin, and would difcourage its exportation. If upon any public exigency it hould become neceffary to export the coin, the greater part of it would foon return again of its own accord. Abroad it could fell only for its weight in bullion. At home it would buy more than that weight. There would be a profit, therefore, in bringing it home again. In France a feignorage of about eight per cent. is

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\mathrm{F}_{2} \text { impofed }
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Bu n $K$ impofed upon the coinage, and the French coin, when exported, is faid to return home again of its own accord.

Tar occafional fluctuations in the market price of gold and filver bullion arife from the fame caufes as the like fluctuations in that of all other commodities. The frequent lofs of thofe metals from various accidents by fea and by land, the continual wafte of them in gilding and plating, in lace and embroidery, in the wear and tear of coin, and in that of plate; require, in all countries which poffefs no mines of their own, a continual importation, in order to repair this lofs and this wafte. The merchant importers, like all other merchants, we may believe, endeavour, as well as they can, to fuit their occafional importations to what, they judge, is likely to be the immediate demand. With all their attention, however, they fometimes over-do the bufinefs, and fometimes under-do it. When they import more bullion than is wanted, rather than incur the rifk and trouble of exporting it again, they are fometimes willing to fell a part of it for fomething lefs than the ordinary or average price. When, on the other hand, they import lefis than is wanted, they get fomething more than this price. But when, under all thofe occafional fluctuations, the market price either of gold or filver bullion continues for feveral years together fteadily and conftantly, either more or lefs above, or more or lefs below the mint price; we may be affured that this fteady and conftant, either fuperiority or inferiority of price, is the effect
effect of fomething in the fate of the coin, $\mathbf{C H}_{\mathbf{H}} \mathrm{A}^{\mathrm{P}}$. which, at that time, renders a certain quantity of $\underbrace{\mathrm{v} \text {. }}$ coin either of more value or of lefs value than the precife quantity of bullion which it ought to contain. The conftancy and fteadinefs of the effect, fuppofes a proportionable. conftancy and fteadinefs in the caufe.
The money of any particular country is, at any particular time and place, more of lefs an accurate meafure of value according as the current coin is more or lefs exactly agreeable to its ftandard, or contains more or lefs exactly the precife quantity of pure gold or pure filver which it ought to contain. If in England, for example, forty-four guineas and a half contained exactly a pound weight of ftandard gold, or eleven ounces of fine gold and one ounce of alloy, the gold coin of England would be as accurate a meafure of the actual value of goods at any particular time and place as the nature of the thing would admit. But if, by rubbing and wearing, forty-four guineas and a half generally contain lefs than a pound weight of ftandard gold; the diminution, however, being greater in fome pieces than in others; the meafure of value comes to be liable to the fame fort of uncertainty to which all other weights and meafures are commonly expofed. As it rarely happens that thefe are exactly agreeable to their flandard, the merchant adjufts the price of his goods, as well as he can, not to what thofe weights and meafures ought to be, but to what, upon an average, he finds by experience they actually are. In confe. F 3 quence

Bo ok quence of a like diforder in the coin, the price of goods comes, in the fame manner, to be ad. jufted, not to the quantity of pure gold or filver which the coin ought to contain, but to that which, upon an average, it is found by experience it actually does contain.

By the money-price of goods, it is to be obferved, I underftand always the quantity of pure gold or filyer for which they are fold, without any regard to the denomination of the coin. Six fhillings and eight-pence, for example, in the time of Edward I., I confider as the fame mo-ney-price with a pound fterling in the prefent times; becaufe it contained, as nearly as we can judge, the fame quantity of pure filver.

> C H A P. VI.

## Of ibe component Parts of the Price of Commodities.

IN that early and rude ftate of fociety which precedes both the accumulation of ftock and the appropriation of land, the proportion between the quantities of labour neceffary for acquiring different objects feems to be the only circumftance which can afford any rule for exchanging them for one another. If among a nation of hunters, for example, it ufually colts twice the labour to kill a beaver which it'does to kill a deer, one beaver. fhould naturally exchange
 that what is ufually the produce of two days or two hours labour, fhould be worth double of what is ufually the produce of one day's or one hour's labour.

If the one fpecies of labour fhould be more. fevere than the other, fome allowance will naturally be made for this fuperior hardfip; and the produce of one hour's labour in the one way. may frequently exchange for that of two hours labour in the other.
$O_{R}$ if the one fpecies of labour requires an uncommon degree of, dexterity and ingenuity, the efteem which men have for fuch talents, will naturally give a value to their produce, fuperior to what would be due to the time employed about it. Such talents can feldom be acquired but in confequence of long application, and the fuperior value of their produce may frequently. be no more than a reafonable compenfation for the time and labour which muft be fpent in acquiring them. In the advanced ftate of fociety, allowances of this kind, for fuperior hardfhip and fuperior fkill, are commonly made in the wages of labour; and fomething of the fame kind inult probably have taken place in its earlieft and rudeft period.

In this ftate of things, the whole produce of labour belongs to the labourer; and the quantity of labour commonly employed in acquiring or producing any commodity, is the only circumflance which can regulate the quantity of la$F$ or bour

Boor bour which it ought commonly to purchafe, com: mand, or exchange for.

As foon as ftock has accumulated in the hafids of particular perfons, fome of them will naturally employ it in fetting to work indultrious people, whom they will fupply with materials and fubfiftence, in order to make a profit by the fale of their work, or by what their labour adds to the value of the materials. In exchanging the complete manufacture either for money, for labour', or for other goods, over and above what may be fuficient to pay the price of the materials, and the wages of the workmen, fomething muft be given for the profits of the undertaker of the work who hazards his ftock in this adventure. The value which the workmen add to the materials, therefore, refolves itfelf in this cafe into two parts, of which the one pays their wages, the other the profits of their employer upon the whole ftock of matertais and wages which he advanced. He could have no intereft to employ them, unlefs he expected from the fale of their work fomething more than what was fufficient to replace his fock to him; and he could have no intereft to employ a great flock rather than a firall one, unlefs his profits were to bear fome proportion to the extent of his flock.

The profits of flock, it may perhaps be thought, are only a different name for the wages of a particular fort of labour, the labour of infpection and direction. They are, however, altogether different, are regulated by quite differ-
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ent principles, and bear no proportion to the ${ }^{\mathrm{C}} \mathrm{H}$ A P . quantity, the hardfhip, or the ingenuity of this $\underbrace{\text { vi. }}$ fuppofed labour of infpection and direction. They are regulated altogether by the value of the ftock employed, and are greater or fmaller in proportion to the extent of this ftock. Let us fuppofe, for example; that in fome particular place; where the common annual profits of manufaeturing fock are ten per cent. there are two different manufactures, in each of which twenty workmen are employed at the rate of fifteen pounds a year each, or at the expence of three hundred a year in each manufactory. Let us fuppofe too, that the coarfe materials annually wrought up in the one coft only leven hundred pounds, while the finer materials in the other coft feven thoufand. The capital annually employed in the one will in this cafe amount only to one thoufand pounds; whereas that employed in the other will amount to feven thoufand three hundred pounds. At the rate of ten per cent. therefore, the undertaker of the one will expect an yearly profit of about one hundred pounds only; while that of the other will expect about feven hundred and thirty pounds. But though their profits are fo ve:y different, their labour of infpection and direction may be either altogether or very nearly the fame. In many great works, almoft the whole labour of ti:is kind is conmitted to fome principal clerk. His wages properly exprefs the value of this labour of inipec. sion and direction. Though in fettling them fome regard is had commonly, not only to his
s o o K labour and fkill, but to the truft which is re-

1. ${ }^{\text {- }}$ pofed in him, yet they never bear ans regular. proportion to the capital of which lit overfees the management ; and the owher of this capital, though he is thus difcharged of almont all la-bour, ftill expects that his profits fhould bear ai regular proportion to his capital. In the price of commodities; therefore, the profits of ftock conftitute a component part altogether different from the wages of labour, and regulated by quite different principles.

In this ftate of things, the whole produce of labour does not always belong to the labourer. He muft in moft cafes; fhare it with the owner of the ftock which employs him. Neither is the quantity of labour commonly employed in acquiring or producing any commodity, the only circumftance which can regulate the quantity which it ought commonly to purchafe, command, or exchange for. An additional quantity, it is evident, mult be due for the profits of the ftock which advanced the wages and furnifhed the materials of that labour.

As foon as the land of any country has all be. come private property, the Jandlords; like all other men, love to reap where they never fowed; and demand a rent even for its natural produce. The wood of the forelt, the grafs of the field; and all the natural fruits of the earth, which, when land was in common; coft the labourer only the trouble of gathering them, come even to him, to have an additional price fixed upon them. He mult then pay for the licence to gather them;
them; and muft give up to the landlord a portion ${ }^{\mathrm{C}} \mathrm{F}$ A A . of what his labour either collects or produces. This portion, or, what comes to the fame thing, the price of this portion, conftitutes the rent of land, and in the price of the greater part of commodities makes a third component part.

The real value of all the different component parts of price, it muft be obferved, is meafured by the quantity of labour which they can, each of them, purchife or command. Labour meafures the value not only of that part of price which refolves itfelf into labour, but of that which refolves itfelf into rent, and of that which refolves itfelf into profit.

In every fociety the price of every commodity finally refolves itfelf into fome one or other, or all of thofe three parts; and in every improved fociety, all the three enter more or lefs, as component parts, into the price of the far greater part of commodities.

In the price of corn, for example, one part pays the rent of the landlord, another pays the wages or maintenance of the labourers and labouring cattle employed in producing it, and the third pays the profit of the farmer. Thefe three parts feem either immediately or ultimately to make up the whole price of corn. A fourth part, it may perhaps be thought, is neceffary for replacing the ftock of the farmer, or for compenfating the wear and tear of his labouring cattle, and other inftruments of hufbandry. But it mult be confidered that the price of any inftrument

EOOK Atrument of hufbandry, fuch as a labouring horfe, is itfelf made up of the fame thrse parts; the rent of the land upon which he is reared, the labour of tending and rearing him, and the profits of the farmer who advances both the rent of this land, and the wages of this labour. Though the price of the corn, therefore, may pay the price as well as the maintenance of the horfe, the whole price fill refolves itfelf either immediately or ultimately into the fame three parts of rent, labour; and profic.

In the price of flour or meal we mult add to the price of the corn, the profits of the miller, and the wages of his fervants; in the price of bread, the profits of the baker, and the wages of fervants; and in the price of both, the labour of aranfporting the corn from the houfe of the farmer to that of the miller, and from that of the miller to that of the baker, together with the profits of thole who advance the wages of that labour.

The price of flax refolves itfelf into the fame three parts as that of corn. In the price of linen we muft add to this price the wages of the flaxdreffer; of the fpinner, of the weaver, of the bleacher, \&c. together with the profits of their refpective employers.

As any particular commodity comes to be more manufactured, that part of the price which refolves itfelf into wages and profit, comes to be greater in proportion to that which refolves itfelf into rent. In the progrefs of the manufacture, not only the number of profits increafe,
but every fubfequent profit is greater than the C HAPP. foregoing; becaufe the capital from which it is V1. derived muft always be greater. The capital which employs the weavers, for example, mutt be greater than that which employs the fpinners; becaufe it not only replaces that capital with its profits, but pays, sefides, the wages of the weavers; and the profits mult always bear fome proportion to the capital.

In the moft improved focieties, however, there are always a few commodities of which the price refolves itfelf into two parts only, the wages of labour, and the profits of flock; and a ftill finaller number, in which it confifts altogether in the wages of labour. In the price of fea-filh, for example, one part pays the labour of the fifhermen, and the other the profits of the capital employed in the fifhery. Rent very feldom makes any part of it, though it does fometimes, as I fhall . Thew hereafter. It is otherwife, at leaft through the greater part of Europe, in river fifheries. A falmon fifhery pays a rent, and rent, though it cannot well be called the rent of land, makes a part of the price of a falmon as well as wages and profit. In fome parts of Scotland a few poor people make a trade of gathering, along the fea-fhore, thofe little variegated ftones commonly known by the name of Scotch Pebbles. The price which is paid to them by the ftone-cutter is altogether the wages of their labour ; neither rent nor profit make any part of it.

Book But the whole price of any commodity muft Atill finally refolve itfelf into fome one or other, or all of thofe three parts; as whatever part of it remains after paying the rent of the land, and the price of the whole habour employed in raifing, manufacturing, and bringing it to market, mut neceffarily be profic to fomebody.

As the price ci exchangeable value of every particular commodity, taken feparately, refolves itfelf into fors one or other, or all of thofe three parts; fo that of all the commodities which compofe the whole annual produce of the labour of every country, taken complexly, muft refolve itfelf into the fame three parts, and be parcelled out amorg different inhabitants of the country, either as the wages of their labour, the profits of their ftock, or the rent of their land. The whole of what is annualiy either collected or produced by the labour of every fociety, or what comes to the fame thing, the whole price of it, is in this manner originally diffributed among fome of its different members. Wages, profit, and rent, are the three original fources of all revenue as well as of all exchangeable value. All other revenue is ultimately derived from fome one or other of thefe.

Whoever derives his revenue from a fund which is his own, muft draw it either from his labour, from his ftock, or from his land. The revenue derived from labour is called wages. That derived from ttock, by the perfon who manages or employs it, is called profit. That derived from it by the perfon who does not em-
ploy it himfelf, but lends it to another, is called C t AP. the intereft or the ufe of money. It is the com- $\underbrace{\text { vi. }}$ penfation which the borrower pays to the lender, for the profit which he has an opportunity of making by the ufe of the mevs. Part of that profit naturally belongs to the borrower, who runs the rink and takes the trouble of employing it; and part to the lender, who affords him the opportunity of making this profit. The intereft of money is always a derivative revenue, which, if it is not paid from the profit which is made by the ufe of the money, mult be paid from fome other fource of revenue, unlefs perhaps the borrower is a fpendthrift, who contracts a fecond debt in order to pay the intereft of the firft. The revenue which proceeds altogether from land, is called rent, and belongs to the landlord. The revenue of the farmer is derived partly from his labour, and partly from his ftock. To him, land is only the inftrument which enables him to ears the wages of this labour, and to make the profits of this ftock. All taxes, and all the eevenue which is founded upon them, all falariss. penfions, and annuities of every kind, are n!timately derived from fome one or other of thofe three original fources of revenue, and are paid either immediately or mediately from the wages of labour, the profits of ftock, or the rent of land.

When thofe three different forts of revenue belong to different perfons, they are readily d.r. tinguifhed; but when they belong to the fame they

B O O $K$ they are fometimes confounded with one another, $\underbrace{\text { 1. . }}$ at leaft in common language.

A gentleman whe farms a part of his own eftatc, after paying the expence of cultivation, fhould gain both the rent of the lancllord and the profit of the farmer. He is apt to denominate, however, his whole gain, profit, and thus confounds rent with profit, at lealt in common language. The greater part of our North American and Weft Indian planters are in this fituation. They farm, the greater part of them, their own eftates, and accordingly we feldom hear of the rent of a plantation, but frequently of its profit.

Common farmers feldom employ any overfeer to direct the general operations of the farm. They generally too work a good deal with their own hands, as ploughmen, harrowers, $\mathcal{E}^{\circ} c$. What remains of the crop, after paying the rent, there-fore, fhould no: only replace to them their ftock employed in cutrivation, together with its ordinary profits, but pay them the wages which are due to them, both as labourers and overfeers. Whatever remains, however, after paying the rent and keeping up the ftock, is called profir. But wages evidently make a part of it. The farmer, by faving thefe wages, mult neceffarily gain them. Wages, therefore, are in this cafe confounded with profit.

An independent manufacturer, who has ftock enough both to purchafe materials, and to maintain himfelf till he can carry his work to market,
fhoud gain both the wages of a journeyman who ${ }^{\text {C }}{ }^{\text {HAA }}$ A. works under a mafter, and the profit which that mafter makes by the fale of that journeyman's work. His whole gains, however, are com. monly called profit, and wages are, in this cafe too, confounded with profit.

A gardener who cultivates his own parden with his own hands, unites in his own el three different characters, of landlord, fa and labourer. His produce, therefore pay him the rent of the firft, the profit o fecond, and the wages of the third. The whole, however, is commonly confidered as the earnings of his labour. Both rent and profit are, in this cafe, confounded with wages.

As in a civilized country there are but few commodities of which the exchangeable value arifes from labour only, rent and profit contributing largely to that of the far greater part of them, fo the annual produce of its labour will always be fufficient to purchafe or command a much greater quantity of labour than what was employed in raifing, preparing, and bringing that produce to market. If the fociety were annually to employ all the labour which it can annually purchafe, as the quantity of labour would encreafe greatly cuery year, fo the produce of every fucceeding year would be of vaftly greater: value than that of the foregoing. But there is no country in which the whole annual produce is employed in maintaining the induftrious. The idle every where confume a great part of it; and according to the different proportions in which Yol. I.



BOOK it is annually divided between thofe two different orders of people, its ordinary or average value muft either annually increafe, or diminifh; or continue the fame from one year to another.

## C H A P. VII.

## Of the natural and Market Price of Commodities.

THERE is in every fociety or neighbourhood an ordinary or average rate both of wages and profit in every different employment of labour and ftock. This rate is naturally regulated, as I fhall thow hereafter, partly by the general circumftances of the fociety, their riches or poverty, their advancing, ftaticiary, or declining condition; and partly by the particular nature of each employment.

There is likewife in every fociety or neighbourhood an ordinary or average rate of rent, which is regulated too, as I thall thow hereafter, partly by the general circumftances of the fociety or neighbourhood in which the land is fituated, and partly by the natural or improved fertility of the land.

These ordinary or average rates may be called the natural rates of wages, profit, and rent, at the time and place in which they commonly prevail.

When the price of any commodity is neither more nor lefs than what is fuffigient to pay the
rent of the land, the wages of the labour, and CHAP. the profits of the ftock employed in raifing, pre- $\underbrace{\text { - }}$ paring, and bringing it to market, according to their natural rates, the commodity is then fold for what may be called its natural price.

The commodity is then fold precifely for what it is worth, or for what it really cofts the perfon who brings it to market; for though in common language what is called the prime coft of any. commodity does not comprehend the profit of the perfon who is to fell it again, yet if he fells it at a price which does not allow him the ordinary rate of profit in his neighbourhood, he is evidently a lofer by the trade; fince by employing his ftock in fome other way he might have made that profit. His profit, befides, is his revenue, the proper fund of his fubfiftence. As, while he is preparing and bringing the goods to market, he advances to his workmen their wages, or their fubfiftence; fo he advances to himfelf, in the farne manner, his own fubfiftence, which is generally fuitable to the profit which he may reafonably expect from the fale of his goods. Unlefs they yield him this profit, therefore, they do not repay him what they may very properly be faid to have really coft him.

Though the price, therefore, which leaves him this profit, is not always the loweft at which a dealer may fometimes fell his goods, it is the loweft at which he is likely to fell them for any confiderable time; at leaft where there is perfect liberty, or where he may change his trade as often as he pleafes.

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$$ either be above, or below, or exactly the fame with its natural price.

The market price of every particular commodity is regulated by the proportion between the quantity which is actually brought to market, and the demand of thofe who are willing to pay the natural price of the commodity, or the whole value of the rent, labour, and profit, which muft be paid in order to bring it thither. Such people may be called the effectual demanders, and their demand the effectual demand; fince it may be fufficient to effectuate the bringing of the commodity to market. It is different from the abfolute demand. A very poor man may be faid in fome fenfe to have a demand for a coacly and fix ; he might like to have it; but his demand is not an effectual demand, as the commodity can never be brought to market in order to fatisfy it.

When the quantity of any commodity which is brought to market falls fhort `the effectual demand, all thofe who are willing 1. pay the whole value of the rent, wages, and profit, which muft be paid in order to bring it thither, cannot be fupplied with the quantity which they want. Rather than want it altogether, fome of them will be willing to give more. A competition will immediately begin among them, and the market price will rife more or lefs above the natural price, according as either the greatnefs of the deficiency, or the wealth and wanton luxury of the competitors, happen to animate more or lefs the eagernefs
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of the competition. Among competitors of equal C H A P. wealth and luxury the fame deficiency will geneVII. rally occafion a more or lefs eager competition, according as the acquifition of the commodity happens to be of more or lefs importance to them. Hence the exorbitant price of the neceffaries of life during the blockade of a town or in a famine.

When the quantity brought to market exceeds the effectual demand, it cannot be all fold to thofe who are willing to pay the whole value of the rent, wages, and profit, which muft be paid in order to bring it thither. Some part mult be fold to thofe who are willing to pay lefs, and the low price which they give for it mult reduce the price of the whole. The market price will fink more or lefs below the natural price, according as the greatnefs of the excefs increafes more or lefs the competition of the fellers, or according as it happens to be more or lefs important to chem to get immediately rid of the commodity. The fame excefs in the importation of perifhable, will occafion a much greater competition than in that of durable commodities; in the importation of oranges, for example, than in that of old iron.

When the quantity brought to market is juft fufficient to fupply the effectual demand and no more, the market price naturally comes to be either exactly, or as nearly as can be judged of, the fame with the natural price. The whole quantity upon hand can be difpofed of for this price, and cannot be difpofed of for more. The G 3 compe- all to accept of this price, but does not oblige them to accept of lefs.

The quantity of every commodity brought ta market naturally fuits itfelf to the effectual demand. It is the intereft of all thofe who employ their land, labour, or ftock, in bringing any commodity to market, that the quantity never fhould exceed the effectual demand; and it is the interelt of all other people that it never fhould fall hort of that demand.

If at any time it exceeds the effectual denand, fome of the component parts of its price mult be paid below their natural rate. If it is rent, the intereft of the landlords will immediately prompt them to withdraw a part of their land; and if it is wages or profit, the intereft of the labourers in the one cafe, and of their employers in the other, will prompt them to withdraw a part of their labour or ftock from this employment. The quantity brought to market will foon be no more than fufficient to fupply the effectual demand. All the different parts of its price will rife to their natural rate, and the whole price to its natural price.
$\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{F}}$, on the contrary, the quantity brought to market fhould at any time fall fhort of the effectual demand, fome of the component parts of its price mult rife above their natural rate, If it is rent, the interelt of all other landlords will nafurally prompt them to prepare more land for the raifing of this commodity; if it is wages or profit, the intereft of all other labouress and dealers
 labour and ftock in preparing and bringing it to $\underbrace{\text { (1). }}$ market. The quantity brought thither will foon be fufficient to fupply the effectual demand. All the different parts of its price will foon fink to their natural rate, and the whole price to its natural price.

The natural price, therefore, is, as it were, the central price, to which the prices of all commodities are continually gravitating. Different accidents may fometimes keep them fufpended a good deal above it, and fametimes force them down even fomewhat below it. But whatever may be the obftacles which hinder them from fettling in this center of repofe and continuance, they are conftantly tending towards it.

The whole quantity of induftry annually employed in order to bring any commodity to market, naturally fuits itfelf in this manner to the effectual demand. It naturally aims at bringing always that precife quantity thither which may be fufficient to fupply, and no more than fupply, that demand.

But in fome employments the fame quantity of induftry will in different years produce very different quantities of commodities; while in others it will produce always the fame, or very nearly the fame. The fame number of labourers in hufbandry will, in different years, produce very different quantities of corn, wine, oil, hops, \&cc. But the fame number of fpinners and weavers will every year produce the fame or very nearly the fame quantity of linen and woollen G 4 cloth.

B O. O K cloth. It is only the average produce of the one fpecies of induftry which can be fuited in any refpect to the effectual demand; and as its actual produce is frequently much greater and frequently much lefs than its average produce, the quantity of the commodities brought to market will fometimes exceed a good deal, and fometimes fall fiort a good deal of the effectual demand. Even though that demand therefore hould continue always the fame, their market price will be liable to great fluctuations, will fometimes fall a good deal below, and fometimes rife a good deal above, their natural price. In the other fpecies of indultry, the produce of equal quantities of labour being adways the fame, or very nearly the fame, it can be more exactly fuited to the effectual demand. While that demand continues the fame, therefore, the market price of the commodities is likely to do fo too, and to be either altogether, or as nearly as can be judged of, the fame with the natural price. That the price of linen and woollen cloth is liable neither to fuch frequent nor to fuch great variations as the price of corn, every man's experience will inform him. The price of the one fpecies of commodities varies only with the variations in the demand: That of the other varies not only with the variations in the demand, but with the much greater and more frequent variations in the quantity of what is brought to market in order to fupply that demand.

The occafional and temporary flugtuations in the market price of any commodity fall chiefly upon thofe parts of its price which refolve themfelves
 refolves itfelf into rent is lefs affected by them. A rent certain in money is not in the leaft affected by them either in its rate or in its value. A rent which confifts either in a certain proportion or in a certain quantity of the rude produce, is no doubt affected in its jearly value by all the occafional and temporary fluctuations in the market price of that rude produce ; but it is feldom affected by them in its yearly rate. In fettling the terms of the leafe, the landlord and farmer endeavour, according to their beft judgment, to adjuft that rate, not to the temporary and occafional, but to the average and ordinary price of the produce.

Such fluctuations affect both the value and the rate either of wages or of profit, according as the market happens to be either over-ftocked or under-ftocked with commodities or with labour ; with work done, or with work to be done. A public mourning raifes the price of black cloth (with which the market is almoft always under-ftocked upon fuch occafions), and augments the profits of the merchants whe offers any confiderable quantity of it. It has no effeet upon the wages of the weavers. The market is under-ftocked with commodities, not with labour; with work done, not with work to be done.' It railes the wages of journeymen taylors. The market is here under-ftocked with labour. There is an effectual demand for more labour, for more work to be done than can be had. It finks the price of coloured filks and cloths, and there-
-0. O. $K$ by reduces the profits of the merchants who

1. have any confiderable quantity of them upon hand. It finks too the wages of the workmen employed in preparing fuch commodities, for which all demand is ftopped for fix months, perhaps for a twelvemonth. The market is here over-ftocked both with commodities and with labour.

But though the market price of every particular commodity is in this manner continually gravitating, if one may fay fo, towards the narural price, yet fometimes particular accidents, fometimes natural caufes, and fometimes particular regulations of police, may, in many commodities, keep up the market price, for a long time together, a good deal above the natural price.

When by an increafe in the effectual demand, the market price of fome particular commodity happens to rife a good deal above the natural price, thofe who employ their flocks in fupply.ing that market are generally careful to conceal this change. If it was commonly known, their great profit would tempt fo many new rivals to employ their ftocks' in the fame way, that, the effectual demand being fully fupplied, the market price would foon be reduced to the natural price, and perhaps for fome time even below it. If the market is at a great diftance from the refidence of thofe who fupply ir, they may fometimes be able to keep the fecret for feveral years together, and may fo long enjoy their extraordinary profits without any new rivals. Secrets of this kind, however,
howe be 10 laft $v$ SE longe has $f$ colou price good difco as a gains his p high peate whole lar p dered Su evide which laft fo

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however, it muft be acknowledged, can feldom ${ }^{\mathbf{C}} \mathrm{H}_{\mathrm{VA}} \mathrm{Al}^{\mathrm{P}}$. be long kept; and the extraordinary profit can laft very little longer than they are kept.

Secrets in manufactures are capable of being longer kept than fecrets in trade. A dyer who has found the means of producing a particular colour with materials which coft only half the price of thofe commonly made ufe of, may, with good management, enjoy the advantage of his difcovery as long as he lives, and even leave it as a legacy to his pofterity. His extraordinary gains arife from the high price which is paid for his private labour. They properly confift in the high wages of that labour. But as they are repeated upon every part of his ftock, and as their whole amount bears, upon that account, a regular proportion to it, they are commonly coalis dered as extraordinary profits of ftock.

Such enhancements of the market price are evidently the effects of particular accidents, of which, however, the operation may fometimes laft for many years together.

Some natural productions require fuch a fingularity of foil and fituation, that all the land in a great country, which is fit for producing them, may not be fufficient to fupply the effectual demand. The whole quantity brought to market, therefore, may be difpofed of to thofe who are willing to give more than what is fufficient to pay the rent of the land which produced them, together with the wages of the labour, and the profits of the ftock which were employed in preparing and bringing them to market, according

IOOK to their natural rates. - Such commodities may 1. continue for whole centuries together to be fold at this high price; and that part of it which refolves itfelf into the rent of land is in this cale the part which is generally paid above its natural rate. The rent of the land which affords fuch fingular and efteemed productions, like the rent of fome vineyards in France of a peculiarly happy foil and fituation, bears no regular proportion to the rent of other equally fertile and equally well-cultivated land in its neighbourhood. The wages of the labour and the profits of the ftock employed in bringing fuch commodities to market, on the contrary, are feldom out of their natural proportion to thofe of the other employments of labour and ftock in their neighbourhood.

Such enhancements of the market price are evidently the effect of natural caufes which may hinder the effectual demand from ever being fully fupplied, and which may continue, therefore, to operate for ever.
A. manopoly granted either to an individual or to a trading company has the fame effect as a fecret in trade or manufactures. The monopolifts, by keeping the market conftantly underftocked, by never fully fupplying the effectual demand, fell their commodities much above the natural price, and raife their emoluments, whether they confift in wages or profit, greatly above their natural rate.

The price of monopoly is upon every occafion the higheft which can be got. The natural price,
or the is the occafi roget highe or w give can time
or the price of free competition, on the contrary, CHAP. is the loweft which can be taken, not upon every vil. occafion indeed, but for any confiderable time rogether. The one is upon every occafion the higheft which can be fqueezed out of the buyers, or which, it is fuppofed, they will confent to give: The other is the loweft which the fellers can commonly afford to take, and at the fame time continue their bufinefs.

The exclufive privileges of corporations, flatutes of apprenticefhip, and all thofe laws which reftrain, in particular employments, the competition to a fmaller number than might otherwife go into them, have the fame tendency, though in a lefs degree. They are a fort of enlarged monopolies, and may frequently; for ages together, and in whole claffes of employments, keep up the market price of particular commodities above the natural price, and maintain both the wages of the labour and the profits of the ftock employed about them fomewhat above their natural rate.

Such enhancements of the market price may laft as long as the regulations of police which give occafion to them.

The market price of any particular commodity, though it may continue long above, can feldom continue long below, its natural price. Whatever part of it was paid below the natural rate, the perfons whofe intereft it affected would iminediately feel the lofs, and would immediately withdraw either. fo much land, or fo much labour, or fo much ftock, from being employed

BOOK about it, that the quartity brought to market

1. would foon be no more than fufficient to fupply the effectual demand. Its market price, therefore, would foon rife to the natural price. This at leaft would be the cafe where there was perfect liberty.

The fame ftatutes of apprenticefhip and other corporation laws indeed, which, when a manufacture is in profperity, enable the workman to raife his wages a good deal above their natural rate, fometimes oblige him, when it decays, to let them down a good deal below it. As in the one cafe they exclude many people from his employment, fo in the other they exclude him from many employments. The effect of fuch regulations, however, is not near fo durable in finking the workman's wages below, as in raifing them above, their natural rate. Their operation in the one way may endure for many centuries, but in the other it can laft no longer than the lives of fome of the workmen who were bred to the bufinefs in the time of its profperity. When they are gone, the number of thofe who are afterwards educated to the trade will naturally fuit itfelf to the effectual demand. The police mult be as violent as that of Indoftan or antient Egypt (where every man was bound by a principle of religion to follow the occupation of his father, and was fuppofed to commit the moft horrid facrilege if he changed it for another), which can in any particular employment, and for feveral generations together, fink either the wages of labour
labour rate.

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This is all that I think neceffary to be obferved at prefent concerning the deviations, whether occafional or permanent, of the market price of commodities from the natural price.

The natural price itfelf varies with the natural rate of each of its component parts, of wages, profit, and rent; and in every fociety this rate varies according to their circumftances, according to their riches or poverty, their advancing, ftationary, or declining condition. I fhall, in the four following chapters, endeavour to explain, as fully and diftinctly as I can, the caufes of thofe different variations.

First, I fhall endeavour to explain what are the circumftances which naturally determine the rate of wages, and in what manner thofe circumftances are affected by the riches or poverty; by the advancing, ftationary, or declining ftate of the fociety.

Secondiy, I hall endeavour to fhow what are the circumftances which naturally determine the rate of profit, and in what manner too thofe circumftances are affected by the like variations in the ftate of the fociety.

Though pecuniary wages and profit are very different in the different employments of labour and ftock; yet a certain proportion feems commonly to take place between both the pecuniary wages in all the different employments of labour, and the pecuniary profits in all the different employments of flock. This proportion, it will appear

BOOK appear hereafter, depends partly upon the nature
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Bu cheap might been goods greate power or th the $q$ nally had day's tity ol chang greate labou ginal only,
partic weigh times it wo guires
ments in its productive powers, to which the $\mathbf{C} \underset{\mathbf{V} \text { н }}{\boldsymbol{A}} \mathbf{P}$. divifion: labour gives occafion. All things $\underbrace{\text { ( }}$ would geminally have become cheaper. They would have been produced by a fmaller quantity of labour; and as the commodities produced by equal quantities of labour would naturally in this fate of things be exchanged for one another, they would have been purchafed likewife, with the produce of a fmaller quantity.

But though all things would have become cheaper in reality, in appearance many things might have become dearer than before, or have been exchanged for a greater quantity of other goods. Let us fuppofe, for example, that in the greater part of employments the productive powers of labour had been improved to tenfold, or that a day's labour could produce ten times the quantity of work which it had done originally; but that in a particular employment they had been improved only to double, or that a day's labour could produce only twice the quantity of work which it had done before. In exchanging the produce of a day's labour in the greater part of employments, for that of a day's labour in this particular one, ten times the original quantity of work in them would purchafe only twice the original quantity in it. Any particular quantity in it, therefore, a pound weight, for example, would appear to be five times dearet than before. In reality, however, it would be iwice as cheap. Though it required five times the quantity of other goods to VOL. I. H purchafe

1. tity of labour either to purchafe or to produce it. The acquifition, therefore, would be twice as eafy as before.

Bur this original ftate of things, in which the labourer enjoyed the whole produce of his own labour, could not laft beyond the firft introduction of the appropriation of land and the accumulation of ftock. It was at an end, therefore, long before the moft confiderable improvements were made in the productive powers of labour, and it would be to no purpofe to trace further what might have been its effects upon the recompence or wages of labour.

As foon as land becomes private property, the landlord demands a fhare of almoft all the produce which the labourer can either raife, or collect from it. His rent makes the firft deduction from the produce of the labour which is employed upon land.

It feldom happens that the perfon who tills the ground has wherewithal to maintain himfelf till he reaps the harveft. His maintenance is generally advanced to him from the ftock of a mafter, the farmer who employs him, and who would have no intereft to employ him, unlefs he was to thare in the produce of his labour, or unlefs his ftock was to be replaced to him with a profit. This profit makes a fecond deduction from the produce of the labour which is employed upon land.

THE produce of almoft all other labour is liable to the like deduction of profit. In all arts
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pends made are by to get poffibl order wages
and manufactures the greater part of the work- C HAA. ${ }^{\text {P. }}$ men ftand in need of a mafter to advance them $\underbrace{\text { (1). }}$ the materials of their work, and their wages and maintenance till it be completed. He fhares in the produce of their labour, or in the value which it adds to the materials upon which it is beftowed; and in this fhare confifts his profit.

It fometimes happens, indeed, that a fingle independent workman has ftock fufficient both to purchafe the materials of his work, and to maintain himfelf till it be completed: He is both mafter and workman, and enjoys the whole produce of his own labour, or the whole value which it adds to the materials upon which it is beftowed. It includes what are ufually two diftinet revenues, belonging to two diftinct perfons, the profits of ftock, and the wages of labour.

Such cafes, however, are not very frequent, and in every part of Europe, twenty workmen ferve under a mafter for one that is independent; and the wages of labour are every where underftood to be, what they ufually are, when the labourer is one perfon, and the owner of the ftock which employs him another.

What are the common wages of labour, depends every where upon the contract ufually made between thofe two parties, whofe interefts are by no means the fame. The workmen defire to get as much, the mafters to give as little as poffible. The former are difpofed to combine in order to raife, the latter in order to lower the wages of iabour.

Ir is not; however, difficult to forefee whiefs
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l. $\xrightarrow{\text { Com }}$ of the swo parties mult, upon all ordinary occafions, have the advantage in the difpute, and force the other into a compliance with their terms. : The matters, being fewer in number, can combine much more eafily; and the law, befides, authorifes, or at leaft does not prohibit their combinations, while it prohibits thofe of the workmen. We have no acts of parliament againft combining to lower the price of work; but many againft combining to raife it. In all fuch difputes the mafters can hold out much longer. A landlord, a farmer, a matter manufacturer, or merchant, though they did not employ a fingle workman, could generally live a year of two upon the focks which they have already acquired. Many workmen could not fubfift a week, few could fublift a month, and farce any a year without employment. In the long-run the workman may be as neceffary to his mafter as his mafter is to him; but the neceffity is not fo immediate.

We rarely hear, it has been faid, of she combinations of mafters, though frequently of thofe of workmen. But whoever imagines, upon this account, that mafters rarely combine, is as ignorant of the world as of the fubject. Mafters are always and every where in a fort of tacit, but conftant and uniform, combination, not to raife the wages of labour above their actual rate. To violate this combination is every where a moft unpopular action, and a fort of reproach to a matter anong his neighbours and equals. We feldoms.
feldom, indeed, hear of this combination, be- c Wat ${ }_{\text {Vhl }}{ }^{+}$ caufe it is the ufual, and one may fay, the natural fate of things which nobody ever hears of. Mafters too fometimes enter into particular combinations to fink the wages of labour even below this rate. Thefe are always conducted with the utmoft filence and fecrefy, till the moment of execution, and when the workmen yield, as they fometimes do, withour refiftance, though feverely felt by them, they are never heard of by other people. Such combinations, however, are frequently refifted by a contrary defenfive combination of the workmen; who fometimes too, without any provocation of this kind, combine of their own accord to raife the price of their labour. Their ufual pretences are, fometimes the high price of provifions; fometimes the great profit which their mafters make by their work. But whether their combinations be offenfive or defenfive, they are always abundantly heard of. In order to bring the point to a fpeedy decifion, they have always recourfe to the loudeft clamour, and fometimes to the moft mocking violence and outrage. They are defperate, and ast with the folly and extravagance of defperate men, who muft either starve, or frighten their mafters into an immediate compliance with their demands. The mafters upon thefe occafions are juft as clamorous upon the other fide, and never ceafe to call aloud for the affiftance of the civil magiStrate, and the rigorous execution of thofe laws which have been enacted with fo much feverity againg the combinations of feryants, labourers,

BOOK and journeymen. The workmen, accordingly, very feldom derive any advantage from the violence of thofe tumultuous combinations, which, partly from the interpofition of the civil magiItrate, partly from the fuperior fteadinefs of the mafters, partly from the neceffity which the greater part of the workmen are under of fubmitting for the fake of prefent fubfiftence, generally end in nothing, but the punifhment or ruin of the ringleaders.

But though in difputes with their workmen, mafters muft generally have the advantage, there is however a certain rate, below which it feems impofible to reduce, for any confiderable time, the ordinary wages even of the loweft fpecies of labour.

A man muft always live by his work, and his wages muft at leaft be fufficient to maintain him. They mult even upon moft occafions be fomewhat more; otherwife it would be impofible for him to bring up a family, and the race of fuch workmen could not laft beyond the firt generation. Mr. Cantillon feems, upon this account, to fuppofe that the loweft fpecies of common labourers mult every where earn at lealt double their own maintenance, in order that one with another they may be enabled to bring up two children; the labour of the wife, on account of her neceffary attendance on the children, being fuppofed no more than fufficient to provide for herfelf. But one half the children born, it is computed, die before the age of manhood. 'The pooreft labourers, therefore, according
sinding to this account, muft, one with another, $\mathbf{C} \mathbf{~ H} \mathbf{V I f I}$. $\mathbf{P}$. attempt to rear at leaft four children, in order that two may have an equal chance of living to that age. But the neceffary maintenance of four children, it is fuppofed, may be nearly equal to that of one man. The labour of an ablebodied lave, the fame author adds, is computed to be worth double his maintenance; and that of the meaneft labourer, he thinks, cannot be worth lefs than that of an able-bodied nave. Thus far at leaft feems certain, that, in order to bring up a family, the labour of the hurband and wife together muft, even in the loweft fpecies of common labour, be able to earn fomething more than what is precifely neceffary for their own maintenance; but in what proportion, whether in that above mentioned, or in any other, I fhall not take upon me to determine.

There are certain circumftances, however, which fometimes give the labourers an advantage, and enable them to raife their wages confiderably above this rate; evidently the loweft which is confiftent with common humanity.

When in any country the demand for thofe who live by wages, labourers, journeymen, fervants of every kind, is continually increafing; when every year furnihes employment for a greater number than had been employed the year before, the workmen have no occalion to combine in order to raife their wages. The fcarcity of hands occafions a competition among mafters, who bid againit one another, in order to get workmen, and thus voluntarily break H. 4 through

## B OOK through the natural combination of mafters not to

 1. raife wages.The demand for thofe who live by wages, it is evident, cannot increafe but in proportion to the increale of the funds which are deftined to the payment of wages. Thefe funds are of two kinds: firt, the revenue which is over and above what is neceffary for the maintenance; and, fecondly, the ftock which is over and above what is neceffary for the employment of their mafters.

When the landlord, annuitant, or monied man, has a greater revenue than what he judges fufficient to maintain his own family, he employs either the whole or a part of the furplus in maintaining one or more menial fervants. Increafe this furplus, and he will naturally increafe the number of thofe fervants.

When an independent workman, fuch as a weaver or fhoemaker, has got more fock than what is fufficient to purchafe the materials of his own work, and to maintain himfelf till he can difpofe of it, he naturally employs one or more journeymen with the furplus, in order to make a profic by their work. Increafe this furplus, and he will naturally increafe the number of his journeymen.

The demand for thofe who live by wages, therefore, neceffarily increales with the increafe of the revenue and ftock of every country, and cannot pofibly increafe without it. The increafe of revenue and ftock is the increafe of national wealth. The demand for thafe who live by
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wages, therefore, naturally increafes with the C ${ }_{\text {Gifl. }}$ A. increafe of national wealth, and cannot poffibly increafe without it.

Ir is not the actual greatnefs of national wealth, but its continual increafe, which occafions a rife in the wages of labour. It is not; accordingly, in the richeft countries, but in the moft thriving, or in thofe which are growing rich the fafteft, that the wages of labour are higheft. England is certainly, in the prefent times, a much richer country than any part of North America. The wages of labour, however, are much higher in North America than in any part of England. In the province of New York, common labourers earn* three fhillings. and fixpence currency, equal to two hillings fterling, a day; thip carpenters, ten Thillings and fixpence currency, with a pint of rum worth fixpence fterling, equal in all to fix fhillings and fixpence trerling; houfe carpenters and bricklayers, eight thillings currency, equal to four fhillings and fixpence fterling; journeymen taylors, five fhillings currency, equal to about two fhillings and ten pence fterling. Thefe prices are all above the London price; and wages are faid to be as high in the other colonies as in New York. The price of provifions is every where in North America much lower than in England. A dearth has never been known there. In the worft feafons, they have always had a fufficiency

[^3] the money price of labour, therefore, be higher than it is any where in the mother country, its real price, the real command of the neceffaries and conveniencies of life which it conveys to the labourer, mult be higher in a ftill greater proportion.

Bur though North America is not yet fo rich as England, it is much more thriving, and advancing with much greater rapidity to the further acquifition of riches. The moft decifive mark of the profperity of any country is the increafe of the number of its inhabitants. In Great Britain, and moft other European countries, they are not fuppofed to double in lefs than five hundred years. In the Britifh colonies in North America, it has been found, that they double in twenty or five-and-twenty years. Nor in the prefent times is this increafe principally owing to the continual importation of new inhabitants, but to the great multiplication of the fpecies. Thofe who live to old age, it is faid, frequently fee there from fifty to a hundred, and fometimes many more, defcendants from their own body. Labour is there fo well rewarded, that a numerous family of children, inttead of being a burthen, is a fource of opulence and profperity to the parents. The labour of eash rhild, before it can leave their houfe, is comrue ${ }^{\text {a }}$, wort: a hundred pounds clear gain to them. A young widow with four or five young children, who, among the middling or inferior ranks of people $\therefore$ Errope, would have fo little chance for a
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fecond hußband, is there frequently courted as a c ${ }^{\text {Hinf. }}$ P. fort of fortune. The value of children is the $\underbrace{\text { vill. }}$ greateft of all encouragements to marriage. We cannot, therefore, wonder that the people in North: America fhould generally marry very young. Notwithltanding the great increafe occafioned by fuch early marriages, there is a continual complaint of the fcarcity of hands in North America. The demand for labourers, the funds deftined for maintaining them, increafe, it feems, ftill fafter than they can find labourers to employ.

Thovor the wealth of a country fhould be very great, yet if it has been long ftationary, we mult not expect to find the wages of labour very high in it. The funds deftined for the payment of wages, the revenue and ftock of its inhabitants, may be of the greatelt extent; but if they have continued for feveral centuries of the fame, or very nearly of the fame extent, the number of labourers employed every year could eafily fupply, and even more than fupply, the number wanted the following year. There could feldom be any fcarcity of hands, nor could the mafters be obliged to bid againtt one another in order to get them. The hands, on the contrary, would, in this cafe, naturally multiply beyond their employment. There would be a conftant fcarcity of emplogment, and the labourers would be obliged to bid againft one another in order to get it. If in fuch a country the wages of labour had ever been more than fufficient to maintain the labourer, and to enable him to bring up a family, intereft of the mafters wculd foon reduce them to this loweft rate which is conffitent with common humanity. China has been long one of the richeft, that is, one of the moft fertile; beft cultivated, moft induftrious, and moft populous countries in the world. It feems, however, to have been long ftationary. Marco Polo, who vifited it more than five hundred years ago, defcribes its cultivation, induftry, and populoufnefs, almoft in the fame terms in which they are defcribed by travellers in the prefent times. It had, perhaps, even long before his time, acquired that full complement of riches which the nature of its laws and inftitutions permits it to acquire. The accounts of all travellers, inconfiftent in many other refpects, agree in the low wages of labour, and in the difficulty which 2 labourer finds in bringing up a family in China. If by digging the ground a whole day he can get what will purchafe a finall quantity of rice in the evening, he is contented. The condition of artificers is, if polfible, ftill worle. Inftead of waiting indolently in their work-houfes, for the calls of their cuftomers, as in Europe, they are continually running about the ftreets with the tools of their refpective trades, offering their fervice, and as it were begging employment. The poverty of the lower ranks of people in China far furpaffes that of the moft beggarly nations in Europe. In the neighbourhood of Canton many hundred, it is commonly faid, many thoufand families have no habitation on
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the land, but live conftantly in little fifing boats C H A P. upon the rivers and canals. The fubfiftence $\underbrace{\text { (1). }}$ which they find there is fo fcanty that they are eager to filh up the naftieft garbage thrown overboard from any European hip. Any carrion, the carcafe of a dead dog or cat, for example, though half putrid and ftinking, is as welcome to them as the moft wholefome food to the people of other countries. Marriage is encouraged in China, not by the profitablenefs of children, but by the liberty of deftroying them. In all great towns feveral are every night expofed in the Atreet, or drowned like puppies in the water. The performance of this horrid office is even faid to be the avowed bufinefs by which fome people earn their fubfiftence.

China, however, though it may perhaps ftand fill, does not feem to go backwards. Its towns are no where deferted by their inhabitants. The lands which had once been cultivated, are nowhere neglected. The fame, or very nearly the fame, annual labour muft therefore continue to be performed, and the funds deftined for maintaining it muft not, confequently, be fenfibly diminihed. The loweft clafs of labourers, therefore, notwithftanding their fcanty fubfiftence, mult fome way or another make fhift to continue their race fo far as to keep up their ufual numbers.

But it would be otherwife in a country where the funds deftined for the maintenance of labour were fenfibly decaying. Every year the demand for fervants and labourers would, in all the dif-

B O O K ferent claffes of employments, be lefs than it ${ }^{1 .}$ had been the year before. Many who had been bred in the fuperior claffes, not being able to find employment in their own bufinefs, would be glad to feek it in the loweft. The loweft clafs being not only overfocked with its own workmen, but with the overflowings of all the other claffes, the competition for employment would be fo great in it, as to reduce the wages of labour to the moft miferable and fcanty fubfiftence of the labourer. Many would not be able to find employment even upon thefe hard terms, but would either ftarve, or be driven to feek a fubfiftence either by begging, or by the perpetration perhaps of the greateft enormitic? Want, famine, and mortality, would immediately prevail in that clafs, and from thence extend themfelves to all the fuperior claffes, till the number of inhabitants in the country was reduced to what could eafily be maintained by the revenue and ftock which remained in it, and which had efcaped either the tyranny or calamity which had deftroyed the reft. This perhaps is nearly the prefent ftate of Bengal, and of fome other of the Englifh fettlements in the Eaft Indies. In a fertile country which had before been much depopulated, where fubfiftence, confequently, fhould not be very difficult, and where, notwithftanding, three or four hundred thoufand people die of hunger in one year, we may be affured that the funds deftined for the maintenance of the labouring poor are faft drcaying. The difference between the genius of
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the Britifh conititution which protects and go- C HiAP. verns North America, and that of the mercantile company which oppreffes and domineers in the Eaft Indies, cannot perhaps be better illuftrated than by the different ftate of thofe countries.

The liberal reward of labour, therefore, as it is the neceffary effect, fo it is the natural fymptom of increafing national wealth. The fcanty maintenance of the labouring poor, on the other hand, is the natural fymptom that things are at a ftand, and their ftarving condition that they are going faft backwards.

In Great Britain the wages of labour feem, in the prefent times, to be evidently more than what is precifely neceffary to enable the labourer to bring up a family. In order to fatisfy ourfelves upon this point it will not be neceffary to enter into any tedious or doubtful calculation of what may be the loweft fum upon which it is poffible to do this. There are many plain fymptoms that the wages or labour are no-where in this country regulated by this loweft rate which is confiftent with common humanity.

First, in almoft every part of Great Britain there is a diftinction, even in the loweft fpecies of labour, between fummer and winter wages. Summer wages are always higheft. But on account of the extraordinary expence of fewel, the maintenance of a family is moft expenfive in winter. Wages, therefore, being highert when this expence is loweft, it feems evident that they are not regulated by what is neceffary for this expence; but by the quantity and fuppofed value

## E O K value of the work. A labourer, it may be faid

 indeed, ought to fave part of his fummer wages in order to defray his winter expence; and that through the whole year they do not exceed what is neceffary to maintain his family through the whole year. A llave, however, or one ablolutely dependent on us for immediate fubfiftence, would not be treated in this manner. His daily fubfiftence would be proportioned to his daily neceffities.Secondly, the wages of labour do not in Great Britain lluctuate with the price of provifions. Thefe vary every-where from year to year, frequently from month to month. But in many places the money price of labour remains uniformly the fame fometimes for half a century fogether. If in thefe places, therefore, the labouring poor can maintain their families in dear years, they mult be at their eale in times of moderate plenty, and in affluence in thole of extraordinary cheapnefs. The high price of provifions during thefe ten years paft has not in many parts of the kingdom been accompanied with any fenfible rife in the money price of labour. It has, indeed, in fome; owing probably more to the increafe of the demand for labour, than to that of the price of provifions.

Thirdi.y, as the price of provifions varies more from year to year than the wages of labour, fo, on the other hand, the wages of labour vary more from place to place than the price of provifions. The prices of bread and butcher's meat are generally the fame, or very nearly the fame, through
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through the greater part of the united kingdom. ${ }^{\text {C }}{ }^{H}$ A A ${ }^{\text {P }}$. Thefe and moft other things which are fold by retail, the way in which the labouring poor buy all things, are generally fully as cheap or cheaper in great towns than in the remoter parts of the country, for reafons which I fhall have occafion to explain hereafter. But the wages of labour in a great town and its neighbourhood are frequently a fourth or a fifth part, twenty or five-and-twenty per cent. higher than at a few miles diftance. Eighteen pence a day may be reckoned the common price of labour in London and its neighbourhood. At a few miles diftance it falls to fourteen and fifteen pence. Ten pence may be reckoned. its price in Edinburgh and its neighbourhood. At a few miles diftance it falls to eight pence, the ufual price of common labour through the greater part of the low country of Scotland, where it varies a good deal lefs than in England. Such a difference of prices, which it- feems is not always fufficient to tranfport a man from one parifh to another, would neceffarily occalion fo great a tranfportation of the moft bulky commodities, not only from one parifh to another, but from one end of the kingdom, almoft from one end of the world to the other, as would foon reduce them more nearly to a level. After all that has been faid of the levity and inconftancy of human nature, it appears evidently from experience that a man is of all forts of luggage the moft difficult to be tranfported. If the labouring poor, therefore, can maintain their families in thofe parts of the kingdom where the Vol. I. I price

BOOK price of labour is loweft; they muft be in affluence where it is higheft.

Fourthly, the variations in the price of labour not only do not correfpond either in place or time with thofe in the price of provifions, but they are frequently quite oppofite.

Grain, the food of the common people, is dearer in Scotland than in England, whence Scotland receives almolt every year very large fupplies. But Englifh corn muft be fold dearer in Scotland, the country to which it is brought, than in England, the country from which it comes; and in proportion to its quality it cannot be fold dearer in Scotland than the Scotch corn that comes to the fame marker in competition with it. The quality of grain depends chiefly upon the quantity of flour or meal which it yields at the mill, and in this refpect Englifh grain is fo much fuperior to the Scotch, that though often dearer in appearance, or in proportion to the meafure of its bulk, it is generally cheaper in reality, or in proportion to its quality, or even to the meafure of its weight. The price of labour, on the contrary, is dearer in England than in Scotland. If the labouriig poor, therefure, can maintain their families in the one part of the united kingdom, they muft be in affluence in the other. Oatmeal indeed fupplies the common people in Scotland with the greateft and the beft part of their food, which is in general much inferior to that of their neighbours of the fame rank in England. This difference, however, in the mode of their fubfiftence, is not the caufe,
but the effect, of the difference in their wages; $\mathbf{c} \underset{\text { vi:1. }}{A}{ }^{\text {P }}$. though, by a ftrange mifapprehenfion, I have $\underbrace{\text { vir. }}$ frequently heard it reprefented as the caufe. Ic is not becaufe one man keeps a coach while his neighbour walks a foot, that the one is rich and the other poor; but becaufe the one is rich he keeps a coach, and becaufe the ocher is poor he walks a foor.

During the courfe of the laft century, taking one year with another, grain was dearer in both parts of the united kingdom than during that of the prefent. This is a matter of fact which cannot now admit of any reafonable doubt; and the proof of it is, if poffible, ftill more decifive with regard to Scotland than with regard to England. It is in Scotland fupported by the evidence of the public fiars, annual valuations made upon path, according to the actual ftate of the markets, of all the different forts of grain in every different county of Scotland. If fuch direct proof could require any collateral evidence to confirm it, I would obferve that this has likewife been the cafe in France, and probably in moft other parts of Europe. With regard to France there is the cleareft proof. But though it is certain that in both parts of the united kingdom grain was fomewhat dearer' in the lalt century than in the prefent, it is equally certain that labour was much cheaper. If the labouring poor, therefore, could bring up their families then, they mult be much more at their eafe now. In the laft century, the moft ufual day-wages of common dabour through the greater part of Scotland

B о о $K$ were fix-pence in fummer and five-pence in winter. Three fhillings a week, the fame price very nearly, fill continues to be paid in fome parts of the Highlands and Weftern Inands. Through the greater part of the low country the moft ufual wages of common labour are now eightpence a day; ten-pence, fometimes a fhilling about Edinburgh, in the counties which border upon England, probably on account of that neighbourhood, and in a few other places where there has lately been a confiderable rife in the demand for labour, about Glafgow, Carron, Ayrfhire, \&c. In England the improvements of agriculture, manufactures and commerce began much earlier than in Scotland. The demand for labour, and confequently its price, muft neceflarily have increafed with thofe improvements. In the laft century, accordingly, as well as in the prefent, the wages of labour were higher in England than in Scotland. They have rifen too confiderably fince that time, though on account of the greater variety of wages paid there in different places, it is more difficult to alcertain how much. In 1614, the pay of a foot foldier was the fame as in the prefent times, eight-pence a.day. When it was firft etablithed it wauld naturally be regulated by the ufual wages of common labourers, the rank of people fro:n which foot foldiers are commonly drawn. Lord Chief Juftice Hales, who wrote in the time of Charles II. computes the neceffary expence of a labourer's family, confiting of fix perfuns, the father and mocher, two children able
to do fomething, and two not able, at ten hil- C Vill. lings a week, or twenty.fix pounds a year. If $\underbrace{\text { vilit. }}$ they cannot earn this by their labour, they muft make it up, he fuppofes, either by beggin, ir ftealing. He appears to have enquired very carefully into this fubject *. In $1688, \mathrm{Mr}$. Gregory King, whofe fkill in political arithmetic is fo much extolled by Doctor Davenant, computed the ordinary income of labourers and out-fervants to be fifteen pounds a year to a family, which he fuppofed to confift, one with another, of three and a half perfons. His calculation, therefore, though different in appearance, correfponds very nearly at bottom with that of judge Hales. Both fuppofe the weekly expence of fuch families to be about twenty pence a head. Both the pecuniary income and expence of fuch families have increafed confiderably fince that time through the greater part of the kingdom; in fome places more; and in fome lefs; though perhaps fcarce any where fo much as fome exaggerated accounts of the prefent wages of labour have lately reprefented them to the public. The price of labour, it muft be obferved, cannot be afcertained very accurately any where, different prices being often paid at the fame place and for the fame fort of labour, not only according to the different abilities of the workmen, but according to the eafinefs or hardnefs of the mafters. Where wages are not regulated by law, all that we can

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been laid upon thern. The quantity of thefe, $C$ ir 1 P . however, which the labouring poor are unc $r$ any $-\sim$ neceflity of confuming, is fo very fmall, that the increafe in their price does not compenfate the diminution in that of fo many other things. The common complaint that luxury extends itfelf even to the loweft ranks of the people, and that the labouring poor will not now be contented with the fame food, cloathing and lodging which fatisfied them in former times, may convince us that it is not the money price of labour only, but its real recompence, which has augmented.

Is this improvement in the circumftances of the lower ranks of the people to be regarded as an advantage or as an inconveniency to the fociety? The anfwer feems at firft fight abundantly plain. Servants, labourers and workmen of different kinds, make up the far greater part of every great political fociety. But what improves the circumftances of the greater part can never be regarded as an inconveniency to the whole. No fociety can furely be flourifhing and happy, of which the far greater part of the members are poor and miferable. It is but equity, befides, that they who feed, cloath and lodge the whole body of the people, fhould have fuch a mare of the produce of their own labour as to be themfelves tolerably well fed, cloathed and lodged.

Poverty, though it no doubt difcourages, does not always prevent marriage. It feems even to be favourable to generation. A half-ftarved
noor Highland woman frequently bears more than twenty children, while a pampered fine lady is often incapable of bearing any, and is generally exhauted by two or three. Barrennefs, fo frequent anong women of fafion, is very rare among thofe of inferior flation. Luxury, in the fuir lex, white it inflames perhaps the pafion for enjoyment, feems always to weaken, and frequently to deftroy altogether, the powers of generation.

But poverty, though it does not prevent the geaeration, is extremely unfavourable to the rearing of children. The tender plant is prodnced, but ia fo cold a foil, and fo fevere a climate, foon withers and dies. It is not uncommon, I have been frequently told, in the Highlands of Scotland for a mother who has borne twenty children not to have two alive. Several officers of great experience have affured me, that fo far from recruiting their regiment, they have never been able to fupply it with drums and fifes from all the foldiers children that, were born in it. A greater number of fine children, however, is feldom feen any where than about a barrack of foldiers. Very few of them, it feems, arrive at the age of thirteen or fourteen. In fome places one half the children born die before they are four years of age; in many places before they are feven; and in almoft all places before they are nine or ten. This great mortality, however, will every where be found chiefly among the chiluren of the common people, who cannot afford to tend them with the fame care as thole
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It defer does th which deman labour manner bourers tinually creafing time $b$ pofe, it; and excefliv
of better ftation. Though their marriages are ${ }^{\mathrm{C}} \mathrm{HAPP}^{\mathrm{A}} \mathrm{P}$. generally more fruitful than thofe of people of $\underbrace{\text { (Hi- }}$ falhion, a fmaller proportion of their children arrive at maturity. In foundling hofpitals, and among the children brought up by parifh cha. rities, the mortality is ftill greater than among thofe of the common people.

Every fuccies of animals naturally multiplies in proportion to the means of their fubfiftence, an! no fpecies can ever multiply beyond it. But in civilized fociety it is only among the inferior ranks of people that the fcantinefs of fubfiftence can fet limits to the further multiplication of the human fpecies; and it can do fo in no other way than by deltroying a great part of the children which ther frumful marriages produce.

Tese liberal reward of labour, by enabling them to provide better for their children, and contequently to bring up a greater number, naturaliy tends to widen and extend thofe limits. It deferves to be remarked too, that it neceffarily does this as nearly as poffible in the proportion which the demand for labour requires. If this demand is continually increafing, the reward of latour muft neceffarily encourage in fuch a manner the marriage and multiplication of labourers, as may enable them to fupply that continually increafing demand by a continually increafing population. If the reward fhould at any time be lefs than what was requifite for this purpofe, the deficiency of hands would foon raife it; and if it fhould at any time be more, their exceflive multiplication would foon lower it to

во о $\quad$ this neceffary rate. The market would be fo much underftocked with labour in the one cale, and fo much overftocked in the other, as would foon force back its price to that proper rate which the circumftances of the fociety required. It is in this manner that the demand for men, like that for any other commodity, neceffarily regulates the production of men; quickens it when it goes on too flowly, and ftops it when it advances too faft. It is this demand which regulates and determines the ftate of propagation in all the different countries of the world, in North America, in Europe, and in China; which renders it rapidiy progreffive in the firft, llow and gradual in the fecond, and altogether ftationary in the laft.

The wear and tear of a have, it has been faid, is at the expence of his mafter ; but that of a free fervant is at his own expence. The wear and tear of the latter, however, is, in reality, as much at the expence of his mafter as that of the former. The wages paid to journeymen and fervants of every kind mult be fuch as may enable them, one with another, to continue the race of journeymen and fervants, according as the increafing, diminifhing, or ftationary demand of the fociety may happen to require. But though the wear and tear of a free fervant be equally at the expence of his mafter, it generally cofts him much lefs than that of a nave. The fund deftined for replacing or repairing, if I may fay fo, the wear and tear of the llave, is commonly managed by a negligent mafter or carelefs overfeer. That deftined for performing the
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fame office with regard to the free man, is ma- C VIII. $_{\text {a }}{ }^{\mathbf{P}}$. naged by the free man himfelf. The diforders $\underbrace{\text { vill. }}$ which generally prevail in the ceconomy of the rich, naturally introduce themfelves into the management of the former: The ftrict frugality and partimonious attention of the poor as naturally eftablifh themfelves in that of the latter. Under fuch different management, the fame purpofe mu't require very different degrees of expence to execute it. It appears, accordingly, from the experience of all ages and nations, I believe, that the work done by freemen comes cheaper in the end than that performed by llaves. It is found to do fo even at Bofton, New York, and Philadelphia, where the wages of common labour are fo very high.

The liberal reward of labour, therefore, as it is the effect of increafing wealth, fo it is the caufe of increafing population. To complain of it, is to lament over the neceffary effect and caufe of the greateft public profperity.

IT deferves to be remarked, perhaps, that it is in the progreffive ftate, while the fociety is advancing to the further acquifition, rather than when it has acquired its full complement of riches, that the condition of the labouring poor, of the great body of the people, feems to be the happielt and the molt comfortable. It is hard in the ftationary, and miferable in the declining ftate. The progreflive ftate is in reality the cheerful and the hearty ftate to all the different orders of the fociety. The ftationary is dull; the decliming melancholy.

B o or The liberal reward of labour, as it encourages the propagation, fo it increafes the induftry of the common people. The wages of labour are the encouragement of induftry, which, like every other human quality, improves in proportion to the encouragement it receives. A plentiful fubfiftence increafes the bodily ftrength of the labourer, and the comfortable hope of bettering his condition, and of ending his days perhaps in eare and plenty, animates him to exert that ftrength to the utmoft. Where wages are high, accordingly, we fhall always find the workmen more active, diligent, and expeditious, than where they are low; in England, for example, than in Scotland; in the neighbourhood of great towns, than in remote country places. Some workmen indeed, when they can earn in four days what will maintain them through the week, will be idle the other three. This, however, is by no means the cafe with the greater part. Workmen, on the contrary, when they are libeberally paid by the piece, are very apt to overwork themfelves, and to ruin their health and conftitution in a few years. A carpenter in London, and in fome other places, is not fuppofed to laft in his utmoft vigour above eight years. Something of the fame kind happens in many other trades, in which the workmen are paid by the piece; as they generally are in manufactures, and even in country labour, whereever wages are higher than ordinary. Almoft every clafs of artificers is fubject to fome peculiar infirmity occafioned by exceffive application
to their an emi ticular not rec of peop been er and lit have fi the unc to earn to the r pulatior defire to over by exc ing fou caufe much bour e feveral followe if not ceflity, ture, dulgen too of compli gerous, always, infirmi liften they rate,
to their peculiar fpecies of work. Ramuzzini, c ${ }_{\text {viII. }}{ }^{\text {P. }}$ an eminent Italian phyfician, has written a particular book concerning fuch difeafes. We do not reckon our foldiers the moft induftrious fet of people among us. Yet when foldiers have been employed in fome particular forts of work, and liberally paid by the piece, their officers have frequently been obliged to ftipulate with the undertaker, that they fhould not be allowed to earn above a certain fum every day, according to the rate at which they were paid. Till this ftipulation was made, mutual emulation and the defire of greater gain, frequently prompted them to overwork themfelves, and to hurt their health by exceffive labour. Exceffive application during four days of the week, is frequently the real caufe of the idlenefs of the other three, fo much and fo loudly complained of. Great labour either of mind or body, continued for feveral days together, is in moft men naturally followed by a great defire of relaxation, which, if not reftrained by force or by fome ftrong neceflity, is almoft irrefiftible. It is the call of nature, which requires to be relieved by fome indulgence, fometimes of eafe only, but fometimes too of diflipation and diverfion. If it is not complied with, the confequences are often dangerous, and fometimes fatal, and fuch as almoft always, fooner or later, bring on the peculiar infirmity of the trade. If mafters would always liften to the dictates of reafon and humanity, they have frequently occafion rather to moderate, than to animate the application of many of their

Book their workmen. It will be found, I believe, in every fort of trade, that the man who works fo moderately, as to be able to work conftantly, not only preferves his health the longeft, but, in the courfe of the year, executes the greateft quantity of work.

In cheap years, it is pretended, workmen are generally more idle, and in dear ones more induftrious than ordinary. A plentiful fubfiftence therefore, it has been concluded, relaxes, and a fcanty one quickens their induftry. That a little more plenty than ordinary may render fome workmen idle, cannot well be doubted; but that it hould have this effect upon the greater part, or that men in general flould work better when they are ill fed than when they are well fed, when they are difheartened tha. when they are in good fpirits, when they are frequently fick than when they are generally in good health, feems not very probable. Years of dearth, it is to be obferved, are generally among the common prople years of ficknefs and mortality, which cannot fail to diminifh the produce of their induftry.

In years of plenty, fervants frequently leave their matters, and truft their fubfiftence to what they can make by their own induftry. But the fame cheapnefs of provifions, by increafing the fund which is deftined for the maintenance of fervants, encourages mafters, farmers efpecially, to employ a greater number. Farmers upon fuch occafions expect more profit from their corn by maintaining a few more labouring feivants, than
by fell deman of tho minifh quentl In tainty to rett vifions maint to din they ent w with with liged More get it terms vants years. M make than and They as m farme mafte with profio price furd,
by felling it at a low price in the market. The c $\mathbf{C H A P}_{\text {vil. }}$. demand for fervants increafes, while the number $\underbrace{\underbrace{\text { mim }} \text {, }}$ of thofe who offer to fupply that demand diminifhes. The price of labour, therefore, frequently rifes in cheap years.

In years of fcarcity, the difficulty and uncertainty of fubfiltence make all fuch people eage: to return to fervice. But the high price of provifions, by diminifhing the funds deftined for the maintenance of fervants, difpofes mafters rather to diminifh than to increafe the number of thofe they have. In dear years too, poor independent workmen frequently confume the little ftocks with which they had ufed to fupply themfelves with the materials of their work, and are obliged to become journeymen for fubfiltence. More people want employment than can eafily get it; many are willing to take it upon lower terms than ordinary, and the wages of both fervants and journeymen frequently frok in dear years.

Masters of all forts, therefore, frequently make better bargains with their fervants in dear than in cheap years, and find them more humble and dependent in the former than in the latter. They naturally, therefore, commend the former as more favourable to induftry. Landlords and farmers, belides, two of the largeft claffes of mafters; have another reafon for being pleafed with dear years. The rents of the one and the profits of the other depend very much upon the price of provifions. Nothing can be more abfurd, however, than to imagine that men in ge-

в о о $K$ neral fhould work lefs when they work for them-1.- felves, than when they work for other people. A poor independent workman will generally be more induftrious than even a journeyman who works by the piece. The one enjoys the whole produce of his own induftry; the other fhares it with his mafter. The one, in his feparate independent ftate, is lefs liable to the temptations of bad company, which in large manufactories fo frequently ruin the morals of the other. The fuperiority of the independent workman over thofe fervants who are hired by the month or by the year, and whofe wages and maintenance are the fame whether they do much or do little, is likely to be ftill greater. Cheap years tend to increafe the proportion of independent workmen to journeymen and fervants of ail kinds, and dear years to diminifh it.

A French author of great knowledge and ingenuity, Mr. Meffance, receiver of the taillies in the election of St . Etienne, endeavours to Show that the poor do more work in cheap than in dear years, by comparing the quantity and value of the goods made upon thofe different occafions in three different manufactures; one of coarle woollens carried on at Elbeuf; one of linen, and another of filk, both which extend through the whole generality of Rouen. It appears from his account, which is copied from the regifters of the public offices, that the quantity and value of the goods made in all thofe three manufactures has generally been greater in cheap than in dear years; and that it has always
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been greateft in the cheapeft, and leaft in the CHAP. deareft years. All the three feem to be ftationary manufactures, or which, though their produce may vary fomewhat from year to year, are upon the whole neither going backwards nor forwards.
'The manufacture of linen in Scotland, and that of coarfe woollens in the weft riding of Yorkfhire, are growing manufactures, of which the produce is generally, though with fome variations, increafing both in quantity and value. Upon exariining, however, the accounts which have been publifhed of their annual produce, I have not been able to obferve that its variations have had any fenfible connection with the dearnefs or cheapnefs of the feafons. In i740, a year of great fcarcity. both manufactures, indeed, appear to have declined very confiderably. But in 1756, another year of great fcarcity, the Scotch manufacture made more than ordinary advances. The Yorkhire manufacture, indeed, declined, and its produce did not rife to what it had been in 1755 till 1766, after the repeal of the American ftamp act. In that and the following year it greatly exceeded what it had ever been before, and it has continued to advance ever fince.

The produce of all great manufactures for diftant fale mult neceffarily depend, not fo much upon the dearnefs or cheapnefs of the feafons in the countries where they are carried on, as upon the circumitances which affect the demand in the countries where they are confumed; upon peace or war, upon the profperity or declenfion of Vol. I.
other
${ }^{\boldsymbol{B}} \boldsymbol{o}_{\mathrm{i}}$ о K other rival manufactures, and upon the good or bad humour of their principal cuftomers. A great part of the extraordinary work, befides, which is probably done in cheap years, never enters the public regifters of manufactures. The men fervants who leave their mafters become independent labourers. The women return to their parents, and commonly fin in order to make cloaths for themfelves and their families. Even the independent workmen do not always work for public fale, but are employed by fome of their neighbours in manufactures for family ufe. The produce of their labour, therefore, frequently makes no figure in thofe public regifters, of which the records are fometimes publifhed with fo much parade, and from which our merchants and manufacturers would often vainly pretend to announce the profperity or declenfion of the greateft empires.

Though the variations in the price of labour, not only do not always correfpond with thofe in the price of provifions, but are frequently quite oppofite, we mult not, upon this account, imagine that the price of provifions has no influence upon that of labour. The money price of labour is neceffarily regulated by two circumftances; the demand for labour, and the price of the neceffaries and conveniencies of life. The demand for labour, according as it happens to we increafing, ftationary; or declining, or to require an increafing, ftationary, or declining population, determines the quantity of the neceffaries and conveniencies of life which mult be
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given to the labourer; and the money price of $\mathbf{C H A P}$. labour is determined by what is requifite for purchafing this quantity. Though the money price of labour, therefore, is fometimes high where the prici of provifions is low, it would be ftill higher, the demand continuing the fame, if the price of provifions was high.

It is becaufe the demand for labour increafes in years of fudden and extraordinary plenty, and diminifhes in thofe of fudden and extraordinary fcarcity, that the money price of labour fometimes rifes in the one, and finks in the other.

In a year of fudden and extraordinary plenty, there are funds in the hands of many of the employers of induftry, fufficient to maintain and employ a greater number of induftrious people than had been employed the year before; and this extraordinary number cannot always be had. Thofe mafters, therefore, who want more workmen, bid againft one another, in order to get them, which fometimes raifes both the real and the money price of their labour.

The contrary of this happens in a year of fudden and extraordinary fcarcity. The funds deftined for employing indultry are lefs than they had been the year before. A confiderable number of people are thrown out of employment, who bid one againt another, in order to get it, which fometimes lowers both the real and the money price of labour. In 1740, a year of extraordinary fcarcity, many people were willing to work for bare fubfiftence. In the fucceeding

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B O O K vears of plenty, it was more difficult to get la$\mathrm{I}^{\sim}$ bourers and fervants.

The fearcity of a dear year, by diminifhing the demand for labour, tends to lower its price, as the high price of provifion tends to raife it. The plenty of a cheap year, on the contrary, by increafing the demand, tends to raife the price of labour, as the cheapnefs of provifions tends to lower it. In the ordinary variations of the price of provifions, thofe two oppofite caufes feem to counterbalance one another; which is probably in part the reafon why the wages of labour are every-where fo much more fteady and permanent than the price of provifions.
$\mathrm{T}_{\mathrm{HE}}$ increafe in the wages of labour neceffarily increafes the price of many commodities, by increaling that part of it which refolves itfelf into wages, and fo far tends to diminifh their confumption both at home and abroad. The fame caufe, however, which raifes the wages of labour, the increale of ftock, tends to increafe its productive powers, and to make a fimaller quantity of labour produce a greater quantity of work. The owner of the ftock which employs a great number of labourers, necefiarily endeavours, for his own advantage, to make fuch a proper divifion and diftribution of employment, that they may be enabled to produce the greateft quantity of work poffible. For the fame reafon, he endeavours to fupply them with the beft machinery which either he or they can think of. What takes place among the labourers in a particular 9 workhoufe,
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workhoufe, takes place, for the fame reafon, C HAP. among thofe of a great focicty. The greater $\xrightarrow{\text { VII }}$ their number, the more they naturally divide themfelves into different claffes and fubdivifions of employment. More heads are occupied in inventing the molt proper machinery for executing the work of each, and it is, therefore, more likely to be invented. 'There are many commodities, therefore, which, in confequence of thefe improvements, come to be produced by fo much lefs labour than before, that the increafe of its price is more than compenfated by the diminution of its quantity.

## C H A P. IX.

## Of the Profits of Stock.

THE rife and fall in the profits of ftock depend upon the fame caufes with the rife and fall in the wages of labour, the increafing or declining ftate of the wealth of the fociety; but thofe caufes affect the one and the other very differently.

The increafe of ftock, which raifes wages, tends to lower profit. When the flocks of many ,ich merchants are turned into the fame trade, their mutual competition naturally tends to lower its profit; and when there is a like increafe of ftock in all the different trades carried

BOOK on in the fame fociety, the fame competition $\underbrace{1 .}$ mutt produce the fame effect in them all.

It is not ealy, it has already been obferved, to afcertain what are the average wages of labour, even in a particular place, and at a particular time. We can, even in this cafe, felfo:n determine more than what are the moft ufual wages. But even this can feldom be done with regard to the profits of fock. Profit is to very fluctuating, that the perfon who carries on a particular trade, cannot always tell you himfelf what is the average of his annual profit. It is affected, not only by every variation of price in the commodities which he deals in, but by the good or bad fortune both of his rivals and of his cultomers, and by a thoufand other accidents to which goods when carried either by fea or by land, or even when ftored in a warehoufe, are liable. It varies, therefore, not only from year to year, but from day to day, and almoft from hour to hour. To afcertain what is the average profit of all the different trades carried on in a great kingdom, muft be much more difficult; and to judge of what it may have been formerly, or in remote periors of time, with any degree of precifion, mult be a'together imponible.

But though it may be impoliible to determine with any degree of precifion, what are or were the average profits of ftock, either in the prefent, or in ancient times, fome notion may be formed of them frum the interett of money. It may be laid down as a maxim, that wherever a great deal can be made by the ufe of money,
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or $t$ borr per belo
 of it; and that wherever little can be made by it, lef's will commonly be given for it. According, therefore, as the ufual market rate of interelt varies in any country, we may be affured that the ordinary profits of fock muft vary with it, muft fink as it finks, and rife as it rifes. The progrefs of intereft, therefore, may lead us to form fome notion of the progrefs of profit.

By the 37th of Henry VIII, all intereft above ten per cent. was declared unlawful. More, it feems, had fometimes been taken before that. In the reign of Edward VI. religious zeal prohibited all intereft. This prohibition, however, like all others of the fame kind, is faid to have produced no effect, and probably rather increafed than dimin fhed the evil of ufury. The ftatute of Henry VIII, was revived by the 13th of Elizabeth, cap. 8. and ten per cent. continued to be the legal rate of intereft till the 21 it of James I. when it was reftrified to eight per cent. It was reduced to fix per cent. foon after the reftoration, and by the 12 th of Queen Anne, to five per cent. All thefe different ftatutory regulations feem to have been made with great propriety. They feem to have followed and not to have gone before the market ate of intereft, or the rate at which people of good credit ufually borrowed. Since the time of Queen Anne, five per cent. feems to have been rather above than below the market rate. Before the late war, the government borrowed at three per cent.; and people of good credit in the capital, and in K + many
${ }^{\mathrm{B}} \mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{I}}$ o $\mathrm{K}_{\text {many }}$ other parts of the kingdom, at three and a half, four, and four and a half per cent.

Since the time of Henry VIII. the wealth and revenue of the country have been continually advancing, and, in the courle of their progrefs, their pace feems rather to have been gradually accelerated than retarded. They feem, not only to have been going on, but to have been going on fatter and fafter. The wages of labour have been continually increafing during the fame period, and in the greater part of the different branches of trade and manufactures the profits of ftock have been diminifhing.

It generally requires a greater fock to carry on any fort of trade in a great town than in a country village. The great ftocks employed in every branch of trade, and the number of rich competitors, generally reduce the rate of profit in the former below what it is in the latter. But the wages of labour are generally higher in a great town than in a country village. In a thriving town the people who have great ftocks to employ, frequently cannot get the number of workmen they want, and therefore bid againt one another, in order to get as many as they can, which raifes the wages of labour, and lowers the profits of ftock. In the remote parts of the country there is frequently not ftock fufficient to employ ali the people, who therefore-bid againft one another in order to get employment, which lowers the wages of habour, and raifes the profits of nock.

In Scotland, though the legal rate of intereft ${ }^{C}{ }^{H}{ }^{\text {A }}{ }^{\text {P }}$. is the fame as in England, the market rate is rather higher. People of the beft credit there feldom borrow under five per cent. Even private bankers in Edinburgh give four per cent. upon their promifiory notes, of which payment either in whole or in part may be demanded at pleafure. Private bankers in London give no intereft for the money which is depofited with them. There are few trades which cannot be carried on with a fmaller ftock in Scotland than in England. The common rate of profit, therefore, mult be fomewhat greater. The wages of labour, it has already been obferved, are lower in Scotland than in England. The country too is not only much poorer, but the fleps by which it advances to a better condition, for it is evidently advancing, feem to be much nower and more tardy.

The legal rate of intereft in France has not, during the courfe of the prefent century, been always regulated by the market rate*. In 1720 intereft was reduced from the twentieth to the fiftieth penny, or from five to two per cent. In 1724 it was raifed to the thirtieth penny, or to $3 \cdot \mathrm{~s}$ per cent. In 1725 it was again raifed to the twentieth penny, or to five per cent. In 1766, during the adminiftration of Mr. Laverdy, it was reduced to the twenty-fifth penny, or to four per cent. The Abbe Terray raifed it afterwards to the old rate of five per cent. The fup-

[^5]${ }^{B} 0_{1}$. ${ }^{\circ}$ pofed purpofe of many of thofe violent reduction
$\underbrace{1 .}$ of intereft was to prépare the way for reducing that of the public debts; a purpofe which has fometimes been executed. France is perhaps in the prefent times not fo rich a country as England; and though the legal rate of intereft has in France frequently been lower than in England, the market rate has generally been higher; for there, as in other countries, they have feveral very fafe and eafy methods of evading the law. The profirs of trade, I have been affured by Britifh merchants who had traded in both countries, are higher in France than in England; and it is no doubt upon this account that many Britifh fubjects chufe rather to employ their capitals in a country where trade is in difgrace, than in one where it is highly refpected. The wages of labour are lower in France than in England. When you go from Scotland to England, the difference which you may remark between the drefs and countenance of the common people in the one country and in the other, fufficiently indicates the difference in their condition. The contralt is ftill greater when you return from France. France, though no doubt a richer country than Scotland, feems not to be going forward fo faft. It is a common and even a popular opinion in the country, that it is going backwards; an opinion which, I apprehend, is illfounded even with regard to France, but which nobody can poffibly entertain with regard to Scotland, who lees the countiy now, and who faw it twenty or thirty years ago.

The province of Holland, on the other hand, $\mathbf{c} \boldsymbol{H}_{1 \times}{ }^{\text {a }}$. in proportion to the extent of its territory and the number of its people; is a richer country than England. The government there borrow at two per cent. and private people of good credit at three. The wages of labour are faid to be higher in Holland than in England, and the Dutch, it is well known, trade upon lower profits than any people in Europe. The trade of Holland, it has been pretended by fome people, is decaying, and it may perhaps be tixe that fome particular branches of it are fo. But thefe fymptoms feem to indicate fufficiently that there is no general decay. When profit diminifhes, merchants are very apt to complain that trade decays; though the diminution of profit is the natural effect of its profperity, or of a greater flock being employed in it than before. During the late war the Dutch gained the whole carrying trade of France, of which they ftill retain a very large fhare. The great property which they poffels both in the French and Englifh funds, about forty millions, it is faid, in the latter (in which I fufpect, however, there is a confiderable exaggeration); the great fums which they lend to private people in countries where the rate of intereft is higher than in their own, are circumftances which no doubt demonftrate the redundancy of their ftock, or that it has increafed beyond what they can employ with tolerable profit in the proper bufine?s of their own country: but they do not demonftrate that that bulinefs has decreafed. As the capital of a private

B o o $K$ private man, though acquired by a particular ${ }^{\text {1. }}$ trade, may increafe beyond what he can employ in it, and yet that trade continue to increare too; fo may likewife the capital of a great nation.

In our North American and Weft Indian colonies, not only the wages of labour, but the interef of money, and confequently the profits of ftocs; are highe: than in England. In the different colonies both the legal and the market rate of intereft run from fix to eight per cent. High wages of labour and high profits of ftock, however, are things, perhaps, which fcarce ever go together, except in the peculiar circumftances of new colonies. A new colony mult always for fome time be more under-ftocked in proportion to the extent of its territory, and more under-peopled in proportion to the extent of its fock, than the greater part of other countries. They have more land than they have ftock to cultivate. What they have, therefore, is applied to the cultivation only of what is moft fertile and moft favourably fituated, the land near the fea fhore, and along the banks of navigable rivers. Such land too is frequently purchafed at a price below the value even of its natural produce. Stock employed in the purchafe and improvement of fuch lands muft yield a very Jarge profit, and confequently afford to pay a very large intereft. Its rapid accumulation in fo profitable an employment enables the planter to in.. creafe the number of his hands fatter than he can find them in a new fettlement. Thofe whom he can find, therefore, are very liberally rewarded.

As the dually fituated calı be rior bd can be ployed. cording intereft courfe provem tereft fink w Jaboui ever b nifhed, but to with is the ac individ profits, fock verb, litcle, difficul betwee dufty, partly plaines cumul
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As the colony increafes, the profits of ftock gra- $\mathrm{CH}_{\text {H }} \mathrm{A} P$ dually diminifh. When the moft fertile and beft $\underbrace{1 x \text {. }}$ fituated lands have been all occupied, lefs profit can be made by the cultivation of what is inferior both in foil and fituation, and lefs intereft can be afforded for the flock which is fo employed. In the greater patt of our colonies, accordingly, both the legal and the market rate of intereft have been confiderably reduced during the courfe of the prefent century. As riches, improvement, and pupulation have increafed, intereft has declined. The wages of labour do not fink with the profirs of ftock. The demand for laboui increafes with the increafe of ftock whatever be its profits; and after thefe are diminifhed, ftock may not only continue to increafe, but to increafe much fafter than before. It is with induftrious nations, who are advancing in the acquifition of riches, as with induftrious individuals. A great ftock, though with fmall profits, generally increafes fafter than a. fmall flock with great profics. Money, fays the pirverb, makes money. When you have got a little, it is often eafy to get more. The great difficulty is to get that little. The connection between the increafe of ftock and that of induftry, or of the demand for ufeful labour, has partly been explained already, but will be explained more fuliy hereafter in treating of the accumulation of ftock.

The acquifition of new territory, or of new branches of trade, may fometimes raife the profits of Atock, and with them the intereft of moner,

Bo $0^{\circ} \mathrm{K}$ even in a country which is faft advancing in the acquifition of riches. The ftock of the country not being fufficient for the whole acceffion of bufinefs, whica fuch acquifitions prefent to the different people among whom it is divided, is applied to thofe particular branches only which afford the greateit profit. Part of what had before been employed in other trades, is neceffarily withdrawn from them, and turned into fome of the new and more profitable ones. In all thofe old tradec, therefore, the competition comes to be lefs than before. The market comes to be lefs fully fupplied with many different forts of goods. Their price neceffarily rifes more or lefs, and yields a greater profit to thofe who deal in them, who can, therefore, afford to borrow at a higher iniereft. For fome time after the conclufion of the late war, not only private people of the beft credit, but fome of the greateft companies in London, commonly borrowed at five per cent. who before that had not been ufed to pay more than four, and four and a half per cent. The great acceffion both of territory and trade, by our acquifitions it: North America and the Weft Indies, will fufficiently account for this, without fuppofing any diminution in the capital ftock of the fociety. So great an acceffion of new bufinefs to be carried on by the old flock, muft neceffarily have diminifhed the quantity employed in a great number of particular branches, in which the competition being lefs, the profits mult have been greater. I fhall hereafter have occafion to mention the reafons which
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difpofe me to believe that the capital ftock of CHAP. Great Britain was not diminifhed even by the IX. enormous expence of the late war.

The diminution of the capital fock of the fociety, or of the funds deftined for the maintenance of induftry, however, as it lowers the wages of labour, fo it raifes the profits of ftock, and confequ: tly the intereft of money. By the wages of labour being lowered, the owners of what fock remains in the fociety can bring their goods at lef's expence to market than before, and lefs ftock being employed in fupplying the market than before, they can fell them dearer. Their goods coft them lefs, and they get more for them. Their profits, therefore, being augmented at both ends, can well afford a large intereft. The great fortunes fo fuddeniy and fo eafily acquired in Bengal and the other Britilh fettlements in the Eaft Indies, may fatisfy us that, as the wages of labour are very low, fo the profits of ftock are very high in thofe ruined countries. The intereft of money is proportionably fo. In Bengal, money is frequently lent to the farmers at forty, fifty, and fixty per cent. and the fucceeding crop is mortgaged for the payment. As the profits which can afford fuch an intereft mult eat up almoft the whole rent of the landlord, fo fuch enormous ufury muft in its turn eat up the greater part of thofe profits. Before the fall of the Roman republic, a ufury of the famc kind feems to have been common in. the provinces, under the ruinous adminiftration of their proconfuls. The virtwous Brutus lent

BO O K money in Cyprus at eight-and-forty per cent. as we Jearn from the letters of Cicero.

Is a country which had acquired that full. complement of riches which the nature of its foil and climate, and its fituation with refpect. to other countries, allowed it to acquire; which could, therefore, advance no further, and which was not going backwards; both the wages of labour and the profits: of ftock would probably be very low. In a country fully peopled in proportion to what either its territory could maintain or its ftock employ, the competition for employment would neceffarily be fo great as to reduce the wages of labour to what was barely fuficient to keep up the number of labourers, and; the country being already fully peopled, that number could never be augmented. In a country fully ftocked in proportion to all the bulinefs it had to tranfact, as great a quantity of ftock would be employed in every particular branch as the nature and extent of the trade would admit. 'The competition, therefore, would every-where be as great, and confequently the ordinary profit as low as pollible.

But perhaps no country has ever yet arrived at this degree of opulence. - China feems to have been long fationary, and had probably long ago acquired that fuil complement of riches which is confltent with the nature of its laws and inftitutions. But this complement may be much inferior to what, with other laws and inftitutions, the nature of its foil, climate, and fituation might admit of. A country which negieds
 the veffels of foreign nations into one or two of its ports only, cannot tranfact the fame crantity of bufinefs which it might do with different laws and inftitutions. In a country too, where, thought the ric.: or the owners of large capitals enjoy $\alpha$ good deal of fecurity, the poor or the owners of fmall capitals enjoy fcarce any, but are liable, under the pretence of juftice, to be pillaged and plundered at any time by the inferior mandarines, the quantity of fock emplayed in all the differeni branches of bufinefs cranfacted within it, can never be equal to what the nature and extent of that bufinefs might admit. In every different branch, the opprefion of the pout muft eftablifh the monopoly of the rich, who, by engroffing the whole trade to themfelves, will be able to make very large profits. Twelve per cent. accordingly is faid to be the cominon intereft of money in China; and the ordinary profits of ftock muft be fufficient to afford this large interef.

A Derect in the law may fometimes raife the rate of intereft confiderably above what the condition of the country, as to wealth or poverty, would require. When the law does not enforce the performance of contracts, it puts all borrowers nearly upon the fame footing with bankrupts or people of doubttul credit in better regulated countries. The uncertainty of recovering his money makes the lender exatt the fame ufurious interef which is ufually required from bankrupts. Among the barbarous nations who
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BOOK over-ran the weltern provinces of the Roman i. empire, the performance of contracts for many ages to the faith of the contracting parties. The courcs of jultice of their kings feldom intermeddled in it. The high rate of interert which took place in thofe ancient times may : perhaps be partly accounted for from this caufe.

When the law prohibits intereft altogether, it does not prevent it. Many peofle muft borrow, and nobody will lend without fuch a confideration for the ufe of their money as is fuitable, not only to what can be made by the ufe: of $i_{2}$ but to the difficulty and dapger of evading the law. The high rate of intereft among all Mahometan nations is accounted for by Mr. Montefquieu, not from texir poverty, but partly from this, and partly from the difficulty of recovering the money.

The loweft ordinary rate of profit muft always be fomething more than what is fufficient to compenfate the occafional loffes to which every: employment of ftock is expofed. It is this furplus only which is neat or clear profit. What is called grofs profit comprehends frequently, not, only this furplus, but what is retained for compenfating fuch extraordinary loffes. The intereft which the borrower can afford to pay is in pro-s portion to the clear profit only.

The loweft ordinary rate of intereft muft $\mathrm{t}_{2}$ in the fame manner, be fomething more than fufficient to compenfate the occafional loffes to which lending, even with tolerable prudence, is exp. 9 pored.
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## THE WEALTH OF NATIONS:

pofed. Were it not more, charity or friendihip could be the only motives for lending.

In a country which had acquired its full complement of riches, where in every particular branch of bufinefs there was the greateft quantity of itock that could be employed in it, as the ordinary rate of clear profit would be very fmall, fo the ufual market rate of intereft which could be afforded out of it, would be fo low as to render it impoffible for any but the very wealthieft people to live upon the intereft of their money. All people of fmall or middling fortunes would be obliged to fuperintend themfelves the employment of their uwn focks. It would be neceffary that almoft every man houid be a man of bufinefs, or engage: in fome fort of trade. The province of Holland feems to be approaching near to this ftate. It is there unfafionable not to be a man of bufirefs. Neceffity makes it ufual for almoft every man to be fo, and cuftom every where regulates fafhion. As it is ridiculous not to drefs, fo is it, in fome meafure, not to be employed like other people. As a man of a civil profeffion feems awkward in a camp or a garrifon, and is even in fome danger of being defpifed there, fo does an idle man among men of bufinefs.

The higheat ordinary rate of profit may be fuch as, in the price of the greater part of commodities, eats up the whole of what fhould go to the rent of the land, and leaves only what is fufficient to pay the labour of preparing and biting-

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sook ing them to market, according to the lowett rate

1. at which labour can any-where be paid, the bare fubliftence of the labourer. The workman mult always have been fed in fome way or other while he was about the work; but the landlord may not always have been 'paid. The profits of the trade which the fervants of the Eaft India company carry on in Bengal may not perhaps be very far from this rate.

The proportion which the ufual market rate of intereft ought to bear to the ordinary rate of clear profit, neceffarily varies as profit rifes or falls. Double intereft is in Great Britain reckoned, what the merchants call, a good, moderate, reafonable profit; terms which 1 ap. prehend mean no more than a common and ufual profit. In a country where the ordinary rate of clear profit is eight or ten per cent. it may be reafonable that one half of it chould go to intereft, wherever bufinefs is carried on with borrowed money. The ftock is at the rifk of the borrower, who, as it were, infures it to the lender; and four or five per cent. may, in the greater part of trades; be both a fufficient profit upon the rifk. of this infurance, and a fufficient recompence for the trouble of employing the ftock. But the proportion between intereft and clear profit might not be the fame in countries where the ordinary rate of profit was either a good deal lower, or a good deal higher. If it were a good deal lower, one half of it perhaps could not be afforded for intereft; and
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more might be afforded if it were a good deal ${ }^{C H}{ }^{H}$ A ${ }^{\text {P }}$. higher.

In countries which are faft advancing to riches, the low rate of profit may, in the price of many commodities, compenfate the high wages of labour, and enable thofe countries to fell as cheap as their lefs thriving neighbours, among whom the wages of labour may be lower.

In reality high profits tend much more to raife the price of work than high wages. If in the linen manufacture, for example, the wages of the different working people, the flax dreffers, the fpinners, the weavers, \&cc. fhould, all of them, be advanced two-pence a day; it would be neceffary to heighten the price of a piece of linen only by a number of two pences equal the number of people that had been employed about it, multiplied by the number of days during which they had been fo employed. That part of the price of the commodity which refolved itfelf into wages would, through all the different ftages of the manufacture, rife only in arithmetical proportion to this rife of wages. But if the profits of all the different employers of thofe working people hould be raifed five per cent. that part of the price of the commodity which refolved itfelf into profts, would, through all the different ftages of the manufacture, rife in geometrical proportion to this rife of profit. The employer of the flax-dreffers would, in felling his flax, require an additional five per cent. upon the whole value of the materials and wages which he advanced to his workmen. The employer of $\mathrm{L}_{3}$ the
${ }^{\mathrm{B}} \mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{I}} \mathbf{O} \mathrm{K}$ the fpinners would require an additional five per $\sim^{\text {u }}$ cent. both upon the advanced price of the: $\boldsymbol{\text { fax }}$ and upon the wages of the fpinners. And the employer of the weavers would require a like five per cent. both upon the advanced price of the linen yarn and upon the wages oi the weavers. In raifing the price of commodities, the rife of wages operates in the fame manner as fimple intereit does in the accumulation of debt. The rife of profit operates like compound intereft. Our merchants and mafter-manufacturers complain much of the bad effects of high wages in raifing the price, and thereby leffening the fale of their goods both at home and abroad. They fay nothing concerning the bad effects of high profits. They are filent with regard to the pernicious effects of their own gains. They complain only of thofe of other people.

CHAP, X .

## Of Wages and Profit in the different Employments of Labour and Stock.

THE whole of the advantages and difad- $\mathbf{C H}_{\mathrm{X}}^{\mathrm{H}} \mathrm{A}^{\mathrm{P}}$. vantages of the different employments of labour and fock, muft, in the fanre neighbourhood, be either perfectly equal, or continually tending, to equality. If in the fame neighbourhood, there was any employment evidently either more or lefs advantageous than the reft, fo many people would crowd into it in the one cafe, and fo many would defert it in the other, that its advantages would foon recurn to the level of other employments. This at leaft would be the cafe in a feciety where things were left to follow their natural courfe, where there was perfect liberty, and where every man was perfectly free both to chufe what occupation he thought proper, and to change it as often as he thought proper. Every man's intereft would prompt him to feek the advantageous; and to fhun the difadvantageous employment.

Pecuniary wages and profit, indeed, are every where in Europe extremely different, according to the differeft employments of labour and ftock. But this difference arifes partly from certain circumftances in the employments themfelves, which, either really, or at leaft in the imaginations of men, make up for a fmall pecuL. 4 niary
${ }^{B} O_{1}$ OK niary gain in fome, and counter-balance a great
thoug one in others; and partly from the policy of Europe, which no-where leaves things at perfect liberty.

The particular confideration of thofe circumftances and of that policy will divide this chapter into two parts.

PARTI.
Inequalities ariong from the Nature of the Employments themselves.

THE five following are the principal circumftances which, fo far as I have been able to obferve, make up for a fmall pecuniary gain in fome employments, and counter-balance a great one in others: firft, the agreeablenefs or difagreeablenefs of the employments themfelves; fecondly, the eafinefs and cheapnefs, or the difficulty and expence of learning them; thirdly, the conftancy or inconftancy of employment in them; fourthly, the fmall or great truft which muft be repofed in thofe who exercife them; and fifthly, the probability or improbability of fuccefs in them.

First, The wages of labour vary with the eafe or hardfip, the cleanlinefs or dirtinefs, the honourablenefs or difhonourablenefs of the employment. Thus in moft places, take the year round, a journeyman taylor earns lefs than a journeyman weaver. His work is much eafier. A journeyman weaver earns lefs than a journeyman finith. His work is not always eafier, but it is much cleanlier. A journeyman blackfmith, though
.though an artificer, feldom earns fo much inc $\mathrm{C} \boldsymbol{\mathrm { A }}$. P . twelve hours, as a collier, who is only a labourer, $\underbrace{\text { 人. }}$ does in eight. His wark is not quite fo dirty, is lefs dangerous, and is carried on in day-light, and above ground. Honour makes a great part of the reward of all honourable profeffions. In point of pecuniary gain, all things confidered, they are generally under-recompenfed, as I thall endeavour to thew by and by. Difgrace has the contrary effect. The trade of a butcher is a brutal and an odious bulinefs; but it is in moft places more profitable than the greater part of common trades. The moft deteftable of all employments, that of public executioner, is, in proportion to the quantity of work done, better paid than any common trade whatever.

Hunting and filhing, the moft important employments of mankind in the rude fate of fociety, become in its advanced ftate their moft agreeable amufements, and they purfue for pleafure what they once followed from neceffity. In the advanced ftate of fociety, therefore, they are all very poor people who follow as a trade, what other people purfue as a paftime. Fihermen have been fo fince the time of * Theocritus. A poacher is every-where a very poor man in Greas Britain. In countries where the rigour of the law fuffers no poachers, the licenfed hunter is not in a much better condition. The natural tafte for thofe employments makes more people follow them than can live comfortably by them, and the produce of their labour, in propartion

[^6]${ }^{B} 00 \mathrm{~K}$ to its quantity, comes always too cheap to market 1. to afford any thing but the moft fcanty fubfiftence to the labourers.

Disagreeableness and difgrace affect the profits of fock in the fame manner as the wages of labour. The keeper of an inn or tavern, who is never mafter of his own houfe, and who is expofed to the brutality of every drunkard, exercifes neither a very agreeable nor a very creditable bufinefs. But there is fearce any common trade in which a fma!l fock yields fo great 2 profit.

Secondly, The wages of labour vaiy with the eafinefs and cheapnefs, or the difficulty and expence of learning the bufinefs.

When any expenfive machine is erected, the extraordinary work to be performed by it before it is worn out, it muft be expected, will replace the capital laid out upon it, with at leaft the ordinary profits." A man educated at the expence of much labour and time to any of thofe einployments, which require extraordinary dexterity and Ikill, may be compared to one of thofe expenfive machines. The work which he learns to pertorm, it mult be expected, over and above the ufual wages of common labour, will replace to him the whole expence of his education, with at leaft the ordinary profits of an equally valuable capital: It mult do this too in a reafonable time, regard being had to the very uncertain duration of human life, in the fame manner as to the more certain duration of the machine.
 labour and thofe of common labour, is founded مـر upon this prin iple.

The policy of Europe conliders the labour of all mechanics, artificers, and manufacturers, as Ikilled labour; and that of all country labot rers as common labour. It feems to fuppofe that of the former to be of a more nice and delicate nature than that of the latter, It is fo perhaps in fome cafe, ; but in the greater part it is quite otherwife, as I Thall endeavour to thew by and by. The laws and cuftoms of Europe, therefore, in order to qualify any perfon for exercifing the one fpecies of labour, impore the necelfity of an apprenticelhip, though with different degrees of rigour in different places. They leave the other free and open to every body. During the continuance of the apprenticefhip, the whole labour of the apprentice belongs to his mafter. In the mean time he muft, in many cafes, be maintained by his parents or relations; and in almont all cafes mult be cloathed by them. Some money too is commonly given to the mafter for teaching him his trade. They who cannot give money, give time, or become bound for more than the ufual number of years; a confideration which, though it is sot always advantageous to the mafter, on account of the ufual idlenefs of apprentices, is always difadvantageous to the apprentice. In country labour, on the contrary, the iabourer, while he is employed about the eafier, learns the more difficult farts of his bufinefs, and his own labour maintains him throug

O O K through all the different ftages of his employ1. incont. It is reafonable, therefore, that in Europe the wages of mechanics, artificers, and manufactirers, fhould be fomewhat higher than thofe of common labourers. They are fo accorclingly, and their fuperior cains make them in moft places be confidered as a fuperior rank of people. This fuperiority, however, it generally very fmall; the daily or weekly earaings of journeymen in the more conmon forts of manufactures, fuch as thofe of plain linen and woollen cloth, computed at an average, are, in moft places, very litte more than the day wages of common labourers. Their cmployment, indeed, is more fteady and uniform, and the fuperiority of their earnings; taking the whole year together, may be fomewhat greater. It feems evisently, however, to be no greater than what is fufficient to compenfate the fuperior expence of their education.

Education in the ingenious arts and in the liberal profeffions, is ftill more tedious and experifive. The pecuniary recompence, therefore, oi painters and fculptors, of lawyers and phyficians, ought to be much more liberal : and it is fo accordingly.

The profits of fock feem to be very little affected by the eafinefs or dis.culty of learning the trade in which it is employed. All the different ways in which ftock is commonly employed in great towns feem, in reality, to be almoft equally eafy and equally difficult to learn. One branch either
either of forejrit or domeftic trade, cannot well C HAAP. be a much roore intricate bufinefs than another.
Thirdes, the wages of labour in different occupations vary with the conftancy or inconftancy: of emplo/ment.

Employment is much more conftant in fome trades than in others. In the greater part of manufactures, a journeyman may be pretty fure of employment almoft every day in the year that he is able to work. A mafon or bricklayer, qni the contrary, can work neither in hard froft nor in foul weather, and his employment at all other times depends upon the occafional calls of his cuftomers. He is liable, in confequence, to be: frequently without any. What he earns, therefore, while he is employed, mult not only main-1 tain him while he is idle, but make him fome: compenfation for thofe anxious and defponding moments which the thought of fo precarious a ficuation mult fometimes occafion. Where the computed earnings of the greater part of manufacturers, accordingly, are nearly upon a level with the day wages of common labourers, thofe of mafons and bricklayers are generally from one half more to double thofe wages. Where common labourers earn four and five fhillings a week, mafons and bricklayers frequently earn feven and eight; where the former earn fix, the latter often earn nine and ten, and where the forme., tarn nine and ten, as in London; the latter commonly earn fifteen and eighteen. No fpecies of ikilled labour, howevir, feems more eafy to learn than that of mafons and bricklayers. Chairmen
sook Chairmen in London, during the fummer feafon,
${ }^{\text {1. }}$ are faid fometianes to be employed as brick. layers. :The high wages of thofe workmen, therefore, are not fo much the recompence of their fkill, as the compenfation for the inconftancy of their employment.

A house carpenter feems to exercife rather a nicer and a more ingenious trade than a mafon. In moft places, however, for it is not univerfally fo, his day-wages are fomewhat lower. His employment, though it depends much, does not depend to entirely upon the occafional calls of his cuftomers; and it is not liable to be interrupted by the weather.

When the trades which generally afford confant employment, happen in a particular place not to do fo, the wages of the workmen always rife a good deal above their ordinary proportion to thofe of common labour. In London almoft all journeymen artificers are liable to be called upon and difmified by their mafters from day to day, and from week to week, in the fame manner as day-labourers in other places. The loweft order of artificers, journeymen taylors, accordingly, earn there half a crown a day, though eighteen pence may be reckoned the wages of common labour. In fmall towns and country villages, the wages of journeymen taylors frequently fcarce equal thofe of common labour: but in London they are often many weeks without employment, particularly during the fummer.

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When the inconftancy of employment is com- $\mathbf{C} \boldsymbol{H}_{\mathbf{x}} \mathbf{A}^{\mathbf{A}}$. bined with the hardfhip, difagreeableners, and dirtinefs of the work, it fometimes raifes the wages of the moof common labcur above thofe of the molt fkilful artificers. A collier working by the piece is fuppofed, at Newcaftle, to earn commonly about double, and in many parts of Scotland abour three times the wages of common labour. His high wages arife altogether from the hardfhip, difagreeablenefs, and dirtinefs of his work. His employment may, upon moft occafions: be as conftant as he pleafes. The coal-heavers in London exercife a trade which in hardinip, dirtinefs, and difagreeableners, almoft equals that of colliers; and from the unavoidable irregularity in the arrivals of coal mips, the employment of the greater part of them is neceffarily very inconftant. If colliers, therefore, commonly earn double and triple the wages of common labour, it ought not to feem unreafonable that coal heavers fhould fometimes earn four and five times thofe wages. Io he enquiry made into their condition a few years ago, it was found that at the rate at which they were then paid, they could earn from fix to ten millings a day. Six millings are about four times the wages of common Jabour in London, and in every particular trade, the loweft common earnings may always be confide thofe of the far greater number. How extravagane foever thofe earnings may appear, if they were more than fufficient to compenfate all the difagreeable circumftances of the bufinefs, there would
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ferent rates of profit, therefore, in the different ${ }^{\mathbf{C}}{ }_{\mathrm{H}}^{\mathrm{H}} \mathrm{A}$. ${ }^{\mathrm{P}}$. branches of $t r \quad$, cannot arife from the different $\underbrace{\text { X. }}$ degrees of truft repofed in the traders.

Fifthly, The wages of labour in different employments vary according to the probability or improbability of fuccefs in them.

The probability that any particular perfon fhall ever be qualified for the employment to which he is educated, is very different in different occupations. In the greater part of mechanic trades, fuccefs is almoft certain; but very uncertain in the liberal profeffions. Put your fon apprentice to a hoemaker, there is little doubt of his learning to make a pair of fhoes: but fend him to ftudy the Jaw, it is at len?t twenty to one if ever he makes fuch proficiency as will enable him to live by the bufinefs. In a perfectly fair lottery, thofe who draw the prizes ought to gain all that is loft by thofe who draw the blanks. In a profeffion where twenty fail for one that fucceeds, that one ought to gain all that fhould have been gained by the unfucceffful twenty. The counfellor at law who, perhaps, at near forty years of age, begins to make fomething by his profeflion, ought to receive the retribution, not only of his own fo tedious and expenfive education, but of that of more than twenty others who are never likely to make any thing by it. How extravagant foever the fees of counfellors at law may fometimes appear, their real retribution is never equal to this. Compute in any particular place what is likely to be annually gained, and what is likely to be anVol. 1. M nually

B O O K nually fpent, by all the different workmen in any
common trade, fuch as that: of noomakers or weavers, and you will find that the former fum will generally exceed the latter. But make the fame computation with regard to all the counfellors and ftudents of law, in all the different inns of court, and you: will find that their annual gains bear but a very fmall proportion to their annual expence, even though you rate the former as high, and the latter as low, as can well be done. The lottery of the law, therefore, is very far from being a perfectly fair lottery; and that, as well as many other liberal and honourable profeffions, is, in point of pecuniary gain, evidently under-recompenfed.

Those profeffions keep their level, however, with other occupations, and, notwithftanding thefe difcouragements, all the moft generous and liberal fpirits are eager to crowd into them. Two different caufes contribute to recommend them. Firft, the defire of the reputation which attends upon fuperior excellence in any of them; and, fecondly, the natural confidence which every man has more or lefs, not only in his own abilities, but in his own good fortune.

To excel in any profeffion, in which but few arrive at mediocrity, is the moft decifive mark of what is called genius or fuperior talents. The public admiration which attends upon fuch diftinguifhed abilities, makes always a part of their reward; a greater or fmaller in proportion as it is higher or lower in degree. It makes a confiderable part of that reward in the profeffion of phyfic;
phyfic; a ftill greater, perhaps, in that of law. $\mathbf{C H}_{\mathbf{x}} \mathbf{A P}^{\mathbf{P}}$. in poetry and philofophy it makes almoft the $\underbrace{\text {. }}_{\text {. }}$ whole.

There are fome very agreeable and beautiful talents, of which the poffeffion commands a certain fort of admiration; but of which the exercife for the fake of gain is confidered, whether from reafon or prejudice, as a fort of public proftitution. The pecuniary recompence, therefore, of thofe who exercife them in this manner, muft be fufficient, not only to pay for the time, labour, and expence of acquiring the talents; but for the difcredit which attends the employment of them as the means of fubfiftence. The exorbitant rewards of players, opera-fingers, opera-dancers, \&c. are founded upon thofe two principles; the rarity and beauty of the talents, and the difcredit of employing them in this manner. It feems abfurd at firlt fight that we fhould defpife their perfons, and yet reward their talents with the moft profufe liberality. While we do the one, however, we muft of neceffity do the other. Should the public opinion or prejudice ever alter with regard to fuch occupations, their pecuniary recompence would quickly diminifh. More people would apply to them, and the competition would quickly reduce the price of their labour. Such talents, though far from being common, are by no means fo rare as is imagined. Many people poffefs them in great perfection, who difdain to make this ufe of them; and many more are capable of acquiring

## B o o I . them, if any thing could be made honourably by them.

The over-weaning conceit which the greater part of men have of their own abilities, is an ancient evil remarked by the phiiofophers and moralifts of all ages. Their abfurd prefumption in their own good fortune, has been lefs taken notice of. It is, however, if poffible, fill more univerfal. There is no man living, who, when in tolerable health and fpirits, has not fome fhare of it. The chance of gain is by every man more or lefs over-valued, and the chance of lofs is by moft men under-valued, and by farce any man, who is in tolerable health and fpirits, valued more than it is worth.

That the chance of gain is naturally overvalued, we may learn from the iniverfal fuccefs of lotteries. The world neither ever faw, nor ever will fee, a perfectly fir lottery; or one in which the whole gain compenfated the whole lofs; becaule the undertaker could mike nothing by it. In the thate lotteries the tickets are really not worth the price which is paid by the original fubfcribers, and yet commonly fell in the market for twenty, thirty, and fometimes forty per cent. advance. The vain hope of gaining fome of the great prizes is the fole caufe of this demand. The fobereft people fcarce look upon it as a folly to pay a fimall fum for the chance of gaining ten or twenty thoufand pounds; though they know that even that fmall fum is perhaps twenty or thirty per cent. more than the chance is worth. In a lottery in which no prize exceeded
twe proz than be have fom fria not, then vent lofer lote the proa T valu wort prof eithe com fate man mig emp who mor pric infu a lit a g alon bala geo
twenty pounds, though in other refpects it ap- $\mathbf{C H}_{\mathbf{x}}^{\mathrm{H}_{\mathrm{A}}}{ }^{\mathrm{P}}$.
 than the common ftate lotteries, there would not be the fame demand for tickets. In order to have a better chance for fome of the great prizes, fome people purchafe feveral tickets, and others, fmall fhares in a ftill greater number. There is not, however, a more certain propofition in mathematics, than that the more tickets you adventure upon, the more likely you are to be a lofer. Adventure upon all the tickets in the lottery, and you lofe for certain ; and the greater the number of your tickets, the nearer you approach to this certainty.

That the chance of lofs is frequently undervalued, and fcarce ever valued more than it is worth, we may learn from the very moderate profic of infurers. In order to make infurance, either from fire or fea-rifk, a trade at all, the common premium muft be fufficient to compenfate the common loffes, to pay the expence of management, and to afford fuch a profit as might have been drawn from an equal capital employed in any common trade. The perfon who pays no more than this, evidently pays no more than the real value of the rifk, or the loweft price at which he can reafonably expect to infure it. But though many people have made a little money by infurance, very few have made a great fortune; and from this confideration alone, it feems evident enough, that the ordinary balance of profic and lofs is not more advantageous in this, than in other common trades by M 3 which

B O O K which fo many people make fortunes. Moderate, however, as the premium of infurance commonly is, many people defpife the rifk too much to care to pay it. Taking the whole kingdom at an average, nineteen houfes in twenty, or rather, perhaps, ninety-nine in a hundred, are not infured from fire. Sea-rikk is more alarming to the greater part of people, and the proportion of fhips infured to thofe not infured is much greater. Many fail, however, at all feafons, and even in time of war, without any infurance. This may fometimes perhaps be done without any imprudence. When a great company, or even a great merchant, has twenty or thirty fhips at fea, they may, as it were, infure one another. The premium faved upon them all, may more than compenfate fuch loffes as they are likely to meet with in the common courfe of chances. The neglect of infurance upon fhipping, however, in the fame manner as upon houfes, is, in moft cafes, the effect of no fuch nice calculation, but of mere thoughtlefs rafhnefs and prefumptuous contempt of the rifk.

The contempt of rifk and the prefumptuous hope of fuccefs, are in no period of life more active than at the age at which young people chufe their profeffions. How little the fear of misfortune is then capable of balaricing the hope of good luck, appears ftill more evidently in the readinefs of the common people to enlift as foldiers, or to go to fea, than in the eagernefs of thofe of better falhion to enter into what are called the liberal profeffions.

What a common foldier may lofe is obvious C Hap. enough. Without regarding the danger, however, young volunteers never enlift fo readily as at the beginning of a new war; and though they have fcarce any chance of preferment, they figure to themfelves, in their youthful fancies, a thoufand occalions of acquiring honour and diftinction which never occur. Thefe romantic hopes make the whole price of their blood. Their pay is lefs than that of common labourers, and in actual fervice their fatigues are much greater.

The lottery of the fea is not altogether fo difadvantageous as that of the army. The fon of a creditable labourer or artificer may frequently go to fea with his father's confent; but if he enlifts as a ooldier, it is always without it. Other people fee fome chance of his making fomething by the one trade: nobody but himfelf fees any of his making any thing by the other. The great admiral is .efs the object of public admiration than the great general; and the higheft fuccefs in the fea fervice promifes a lefs brilliant fortune and reputation than equal fuccefs in the land. The fame difference runs through all the inferior degrees of preferment in both. By the rules of precedency a captain in the navy ranks with a colonel in the army: but he does not rank with him in the common eftimation. As the great prizes in the lottery are lefs, the finaller ones theuft be more numerous. Common failors, therefore, more frequently get fome fortune and preferment than common foldiers; and the hope of thofe prizes is what principally recommends M 4
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B O O K the trade. Though their kill and dexterity are much fuperior to that of almoft any artificers, and though their whole life is one continual fcene of hardhip and danger, yet for all this dexterity and Ikill, for all thofe hardhips and dangers, while they remain in the condition of common failors, they receive fcarce any other recompence but the pleafure of exercifing the one and of furmounting the other. Their wages are not greater than thofe of common labourers at the port which regulates the rate of feamen's wages. As they are continually going from port to port, the monthly pay of thofe who fail from all the different ports of Great Britain, is more nearly upon a level than that of any other workmen in thofe different places; and the rate of the port to and from which the greateft number fail, that is, the port of London, regulates that of all the reft. At London the wages of the greater part of the different claffes of workmen are about double thofe of the fame claffes at Edinburgh. But the failors who fail from the port of London feldom earn above chree or four fhillings a month more than thofe who fail from the port of Leith, and the difference is frequently not fo great. In time of peace, and in the merchant fervice, the London price is from a guinea to about feven-and-twenty millings the calendar month. A common labourer in London, at the rate of nine or ten fhillings a week, may earn in the calendar month from forty to five-and-forty fhillings. The failor, indeed, over and above his pay, is fupplied with provi-
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fions. Their value, however, may not perhaps $\mathbf{C}{ }_{\mathbf{X}}^{\mathbf{H}} \mathbf{A} \mathbf{P}$. always exceed the difference between his pay and that of the common labourer; and though it fometimes fhould, the excefs will not be clear gain to the failor, becaufe he cannot fhare it with his wife and family, whom he muft maintain out of his wages at home.

The dangers and hair-breadth efcapes of a life of adventures, inftead of difheartening young people, feem frequently to recommend a trade to them. A tender morher, among the inferior ranks of people, is often afraid to fend her fon to fchool at a fea-port town, left the fight of the thips and the converfation and adventures of the failors fhould entice him to go to fea. The diftant profpect of hazards, from which we can hope to extricate ourfelves by courage and addrefs, is not difagreeable to us, and does not raife the wages of labour in any employment. It is otherwife with thofe in which courage and addrefs can be of no avail. In trades which are known to be very unwholefome, the wages of labour are always remarkably high. Unwholefomenefs is a fpecies of difagreeablenefs, and its effects upon the wages of labour are to be ranked under that general head.

1s all the different employments of ftock, the ordinary rate of profit varies more or lefs with the certainty or uncertainty of the returns. Thefe are in general lefs uncertain in the inland than in the foreign trade, and in fome branches of foreign trade than in others; in the trade to North America, for example, than in that to Jamaica.

B o o K The ordinary rate of profit always rifes more or ${ }^{\text {1. }}$ lefs with the rifk. It does not, however, feem to rife in prciortion to $i t$, or fo as to compenfate it completely. Bankrupicies are moft frequent in the moft hazardous trades. The mof hazardous of all trades, that of a fmuggler, though when the adventure fucceeds it is likewife the mont profitat'e, is the infallible road to bankruptcy. The prefumptuous hope of fuccefs feems to act here as upon all other occafions, and to entice fo many adventurers into thofe hazardous trades, that their competition reduces their profit below what is fufficient to compenfate the rifk. To compenfate it completely, the common returns ought, over and above the ordinary profits of ftock, not only to make up for all occafional loffes, but to afford a furplus profit to the adventurers of the fame nature with the profit of infurers. But if the common returns were fufficient for all this, bankruptcies would not be more frequent in thefe than in other trades.
$\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{f}}$ the five circumitances, therefore, which vary the wages of labour, two only affect the profits of ftock; the agreeablenefs or difagreeablenefs of the bufinefs, and the rifk or fecurity with which it is attended. In point of agreeablenefs or difagreeablenefs, there is little or no difference in the far greater part of the different employments of ftock; but a great deal in thofe of labour; and the ordinary profit of tock, though it rifes with the rilk, does not always feem to rife in proportion to it. It hould follow from all this, that, in the fame fociety or
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neighbourhood, the average and ordinary rates $\mathbf{C H} \mathbf{A}$. $\mathbf{P}$. of profit in the different employments of ftock fhould be more nearly upon a level than the pecuniary wages of the different forts of labour. They are fo accordingly. The difference between the earnings of a common labourer and thofe of a well employed lawyer or phyfician, is evidently much greater than that between the ordinary profits in any two different branches of trade. The apparent difference, befides, in the profits of different trades, is generally a deception arifing from our not always diftingiifhing what ought to be confidered as wages, from what ought to be confidered as profit.

Apothecaries profit is become a bye-word, denoting fomething uncommonly extravagant. This great apparent profit, however, is frequently no more than the reafonable wages of labour. The fkill of an aporhecary is a much nicer and more delicate matter than that of any artificer whatever; and the truft which is repofed in him is of much greater importance. He is the phyfician of the poor in all, cates, and of the rich when the diftrefs or danger is not very great. His reward, therefore, ought to be fuitable to his fkinl and his rruft, and it arifes generally from the price at which he fells his drugs. But the whole drugs which the beft employed apothecary, in a large market town, will fell in a year, may not perhaps coft him above thirty or forty pounds. Though he fhould fell them, therefore, for three or four hundred, or at a thoufand per cent. profit, this may frequently be

B O O K no more than the reafonable wages of his labour charged, in the only way in which he can charge them, upon the price of his drugs. The greater part of the apparent profit is real wages difguifed in the garb of $f$ :ofit.

In a fmall fea-port town, a little grocer will make forty or fifty per cent. upon a ftock of 2 fingle hundred pounds, while a confiderable wholefale merchant in the fame place will fearce make eight or ten per cent. upon a ftock of ten thoufand. The trade of the grocer may be neceffary for the conveniency of the inhabitants, and the narrownels of the market may not admit the employment of a larger capital in the bufinefs. The man, however, mult not only live by his trade, but live by it fuitably to the qualifications which it requires. Befides poffeffing a little capital, he muft be able to read, write, and account, and mutt be a tolerable judge too of, perhaps, fifty or fixty different forts of goods, their prices, qualities, and the markets where they are to be had cheapeft. He muli have all the knowledge, in Mort, that is neceffary for a great merchant, which nothing hinders him from becoming but the want of a fufficieat capital. Thirty or forty pounds a year cannot be confidered as too great a recompence for the labour of a perfon fo accomplifhed. Deduct this from the feemingly great profits of his capital, and little more will remain, perhaps, than the ordinary profits of ftock. The geteater part of the apparent profit is, in this cafe too, real wages.
$\mathrm{T}_{\mathrm{H}}$ the re lefs in try v be en the tion appar fore, thofe accou as ch capita Groce cheap as ch goods villag corn muft
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The difference between the apparent profit of $\mathbf{C H}$ A ${ }^{\text {P. }}$. the retail and that of the wholefale trade, is much lefs in the capital than in finall towns and country villages. Where ten thoufand pounds can be employed iti the grocery trade, the wages of the $a$ acer's labour muft be a very trifling addition to the real profits of fo great a ftock. The apparent profits of the wealthy retailer, therefore, are there more nearly upon a level with thofe of the wholefale merchant. It is upon this account that goods fold by retail are generally as cheap and frequently much cheaper in the capital than in fmall towns and country villages. Grocery goods, for example, are generally much cheaper; bread and butcher's meat frequently as cheap. It cofts no more to bring grocery goods to the great town than to the country village; but it cofts a great deal more to bring corn and cattle, as the greater part of them muft be brought from a much greater diftance. The prime coft of grocery goods, therefore, being the fame in both places, they are cheapeft where the leaft profit is charged upon them. The prime coft of bread and butcher's meat is greater in the g:eat town than in the country village ; and though the profit is lefs, therefore they are not always cheaper there, but often equally cheap. In fuch articles as bread and butcher's meat, :he fame caufe, which diminifies apparent profit, increafes prime coft. The extent of the market, by giving employment to greater ftocks, diminiihes apparent profit; but by requiring fupplies from a greater diftance, it increafes

B o o $\mathbf{1}^{\text {o }}$ increales prime coft.: This diminution of the

1. one and increafe of the other feem, in mol cafes, nearly to counter-balance one another; which is probably the reafon that, though the prices of corn and cattle are commonly very different in different parts of the kingdom, thofe of bread and butcher's meat are generally very nearly the fame through the greater part of it.

Though the profits of ftock both in the wholefale and retail trade are generally lefs in the capital than in fmall towns and country villages, yet great fortunes are frequently acquired from fmall beginnings in the former, and fcarce ever in the latter. In fmall towns and country villages, on account of the narrownefs of the market, trade cannot always be extended as ftock extends. In fuch places, therefore, though the rate of a particular perfon's profits may be very high, the fum or amount of them can never be very great, nor confequently that of his annual accumulation. In great towns, on the contrary, trade can be extended as ftock increafes, and the credit of a frugal and thriving man increafes much fafter than his ftock. His trade is extended in proportion to the amount of both, and the fum or amount of his profits is in proportion to the extent of his trade, and his annual accumulation in proportion to the amount of his profits. It feldom happens, however, that great fortunes are made even in great towns by any one regular, eftablifhed, and well-known branch of bufinefs, but in confequence of a long life of induftry, frugality, and attention. Sudden fortunes, indeed, are fome-
times trade 0 exercife known this ye fugar, He en it is li and he are lik His pr gular and we ventur fortune but is unfucc no wh places refpon can be

T thoug the w none vanta ploym cumit pecun great In take difad.
times made in fuch places by what is called the $\mathbf{C H}_{\mathrm{x}}^{\mathrm{H}} \mathrm{A}^{\mathbf{P}}$. trade of fpeculation. The jpeculative merchant $\underbrace{\text { x. }}$ exercifes no one regular, eftablifhed, or wellknown branch of bulinefs. He is a corn merchant this year, and a wine merchant the next, and a fugar, tobacco, or tea merchane the year after. He enters into every trade, when he forefees that it is likely to be more than commonly profitable, and he quits it $u^{\prime}$, he 'refees that its profits are likely to tet $n$ he level of other trades. His profits and $r$ of re, can bear no regular proportion of any one eftablifhed and well-known bras of bufinefs. A bold adventurer may fometimes acquire a confiderable fortune by two or three fuccefsful fpeculations; but is juft as likely to lofe one by two or three unfucceffful ones. This trade can be carried on no where but in great towns. It is only in places of the moft extenfive commerce and correfpondence that the intelligence requifite for it can be had.

The five circumftances above mentioned, though they occafion confiderable inequalities in the wages of labour and profits of ftock, occafion none in the whole of the advantages and difadvantages, real or imaginary, of the different employments of either. The nature of thofe circumftances is fuch, that they make up for a fmall pecuniary gain in fome, and counter-balance a great one in others.

In order, however, that this quality may take place in the whole of their advantages or difadvantages, three things are requifite even where

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## IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3)





Photographic Sciences
Corporation


BOOK where there is the moft perfect freedom. Firft, the employments muft be well known and long eftablifhed in the neighbourhood; fecondly, they muft be in their ordinary, or what may be called their natural ftate; and, thirdly, they muft be the fole or principal employments of thofe who occupy them.

First, this quality can take place only in thofe employments which are well known, and have been long eftablifhed in the neighbourhood.

Where all other circumftances are equal, wages are generally higher in new than in old trades. When a projector attempts to eftablifh a new manufacture, he muft at firf entice his workmen from other employments by higher wages than they can either earn in their own trades, or than the nature of his work would otherwife require, and a confiderable time muft pafs away bifore he can venture to reduce them to the common level. Manufactures for which the demand arifes altogether from fafhion and fancy, are continually changing, and feldom laft long enough to be confidered as old eftablifhed manufactures. Thofe, on the contrary, for which the demand arifes chiefly from ufe or neceffity, are lefs liable to change, and the fame form or fabric may continue in demand for whole centuries together. The wages of labour, therefore, are likely to be higher in manufactures of the former, than in thofe of the latter kind. Birmingham deals chiefly in manufactures of the former kind; Sheffield in thofe of the latter;
and place: the n $\mathrm{T}_{\mathrm{r}}$ of an practi from ordin very perha they old tr fucce Whe eftabl duces
and the wages of labour in thofe two different $\mathrm{CH}_{\mathrm{X}}^{\mathrm{A}} \mathrm{P}$. places, are faid to be fuitable to this difference in the nature of their manufactures.

The eftablifhment of any' new manufacture, of any new branch of commerce, or of any new practice in agriculture, is always a fpeculation, from which the projector promifes himfelf extraordinary profits: Thefe profits fometimes are very great, and fometimes, more frequently, perhaps, they are quite otherwife; but in general they bear no regular proportion to thofe of other old trades in the neighbourhood. If the project fucceeds, they are commonly at firft very high. When the trade or practice becomes thoroughly eftablifhed and well known, the competition reduces them to the level of other trades.

- Secondly, This equality in the whole of the advantages and difadvantages of the different employments of labour and fock, can take place only in the ordinary, or what may be called the natural fate of thofe employments.

The demand for almoft every different fpecies of labour is fometimes greater and fometimes lefs than ufual. In the one cafe the advannages of the employment rife above, in the other they fall below the common level. The demand for country labour is greater at hay-time and harvelt, than during the greater part of the year; and wages rife with the demand. In time of war, when forty or fifty thoufand failors are forced from the merchant fervice into that of the,king, the demand for failors to merchant fhips neceffarily rifes with their fcarcity, and their wages

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B o o K upon fúch occafions commonly rife from a guinea
I. and feven-and-twenty fhillings, to forty fhillings and three pounds a month. In a decaying manufacture, on the contrary, many workmen, rather than quit their old trade, are contented with finaller wages than would otherwife be fuitable to the nature of their employment.

The profits of ftock vary with the price of the commodities in which it is employed. As the price of any commodity rifes above the ordinary or average rate, the profits of at leaft fome part of the ftock that is employed in bringing it to market, rife above their proper level, and as it falls they fink below it. All commodities are more or lefs liable to variations of price, but fome are much more fo than others. In all commodities which are produced by human induftry, the quantity of induftry annually employed is neceffarily regulated by the annual demand, in fuch a manner that the average annual produce may, as nearly as poffible, be equal to the average annual confumption. In ie employments, it has already been cblerved, the fame quantity of induftry will always produce the fame, or very nearly the fame quantity of commodities. In the linen or woollen manufactures, for example, the fame number of hands will annually work up very nearly the fame quantity of linen and woollen cloth. The variations in the market price of fuch commodities therefore, can arife only from fome accidental variation in the demand. A public mourning raifes the price of black cloth. But as the demand
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for moft forts of plain linen and woollen cloth is $\mathbf{C H}_{\mathbf{X}} \mathbf{x}^{\mathbf{A}} \mathbf{P}$. pretty uniform, fo is likewife the price. But $\underbrace{\text { X, }}$ there are other employments in which the fame quanticy of induftry will not always produce the fame quantity of commodities. The fame quantity of induftry, for example, will, in different years, produce very different quantities of corn, wine, hops, fugar, tobacco, \&rc. The price of fuch commodities, therefore, varies not only with the variations of demand, but with the much greater and more frequent variations of quantity, and is confequently extremely fluctuating. But the profit of fome of the dealers muft neceffarily fluctuate with the price of the commodities. The operations of the fpeculative merchant are principally employed about fuch commodities. He endeavours to buy them up when he forefees that their price is likely to rife, and to fell them when it is likely to fall.

Thirdly, This equality in the whole of the advantages and difadvantages of the different employments of labour and ftock, can take place only in fuch as are the fole or principal employments of thofe who occupy them.

When a perfon derives his fubfiftence from one employment, which does not occupy the greater part of his time; in the intervals of his leifure he is often willing to work at another for lefs wages than would otherwife fuit the nature of the employment.

There ftill fubfifts in many parts of Scotland a fet of people called Cotters or Cottagers, though they were more frequent fome years ago

BOOK than they are now. They are a fort of out${ }^{\text {1. }}$ fervants of the landlords and farmers. The ufual reward which they receive from their mafters is a houfe, a fmall garden for pot-herbs' as much grafs as will feed a cow, and, perhaps, an acre or two of bad arable land. When their mafter has occafion for their labour, he gives them, befides, two pecks of oatmeal a week, worth about fixteen pence fterling. During a great part of the year he has little or no occafion for their labour, and the cultivation of their own little poffeffion is not fufficient to occupy the time which is left at their own difpofal. When fuch occupiers were more numerous than they are at prefent, they are faid to have been willing to give their fpare time for a very fmall recompence to any body, and to have wrought for lefs wages than other labourers. In ancient times they feem to have been common all over Europe. In countries ill cultivated and worfe inhabited, the greater part of landlords and farmers could not otherwife provide themfelves with the extraordinary number of hands, which country labour requires at certain feafons. The daily or weekly recompence which fuch labourers occafionally received from their mafters, was evidently not the whole price of their labour. Their fmall tenement made a confiderable part of it. This daily or weekly recompence, however, feems to have been confidered as the whole of it, by many writers who have collected the prices of labour and provifions in ancient times, and who have taken pleafure in reprefenting both as wonderfully low.

The produce of fuch labour comes frequently $C_{X_{X}} \mathbf{P}^{P}$. cheaper to market than would otherwife be fuitable to its nature. Stockings in many parts of Scotland are knit much cheaper than they can any-where be wrought upon the loom. They are the work of fervants and labourers, who derive the principal part of their fubfiftence from fome other employment. More than a thoufand pair of Shetland ftockings are annually imported into Leith, of which the price is from five pence to feven pence a pair. At Learwick, the finall capital of the Shetland inlands, ten pence a day, I have been affured, is a common price of common labour. In the fame iflands they knit worfted ftockings to the value of a guinea a pair and upwards.

The fpinning of linen yarn is carried on in Scotland nearly in the fame way as the knitting of ftockings, by fervants who are chiefly hired for other purpofes. They earn but a very fcanty fubfiftence, who endeavour to get their whole livelihood by either of thofe trades. In moft parts of Scotland the is a good fpinner who can earn twenty pence a week.

In opulent countries the market is generally fo extenfive, that any one trade is fufficient to employ the whole labour and ftock of thofe who occupy it: Inftances of people's living by one employment, and at the fame time deriving fome little advantage from another, occur chiefly in poor countries. The following inftance, however, of fomething of the fame kind is to be found in the capital of a very rich one. There

воок is no city in Europe, I believe, in which houre${ }^{\text {I. }}$ rent is dearer than in London, and yet I know no capital in which a furnifhed apartment can be hired fo cheap. Lodging is not only much cheaper in London than in Paris; it is much cheaper than in Edinburgh of the fame degree of goodnefs; and what may feem extraordinary, the dearnefs of houfe-rent is the caufe of the cheapnefs of lodging. The dearnefs of houferent in London arifes, not only from thofe caufes which render it dear in all great capitals, the dearnefs of labour, the dearnels of all the materials of building, which mult generally be brought from a great diftance, and above all the dearnefs of ground-rent, every landlord acting the part of a monopolift, and frequently exacting a higher rent for a fingle acre of bad land in a town, than can be had for a hundred of the beft in the country; but it arifes in part from the peculiar manners and cuftoms of the people, which oblige every matter of a family to hire a whole houfe from top to bottom. A dwellinghoufe in England means every thing that is contained under the fame roof. In France, Scotland, and many other parts of Europe, it frequently means no more than a fingle fory. A tradefman in London is obliged to hire a whole houfe in that part of the town where his cuftomers live. His fhop is upon the ground-floor, and he and his family neep in the garret; and he endeavours to pay a part of his houfe-rent by letting the two middle ftories to lodgers. He expects to maintain his family by his trade, and
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ways. fome would feconc it nat ing th from to pla Fir impor tages ments
not by his lodgers. Whereas, at Paris and $C_{H_{x}}{ }^{\text {P }}$. Edinburgh, the people who let lodgings have commonly no other means of fubfiftence; and the price of the lodging mult pay, not only the rent of the houfe, but the whole expence of the family.

## PARTI.

## Inequalities occafioned by the Policy of Europe.

SUCH are the inequalities in the whole of the advantages and difadvantages of the different employments of labour and ftock, which the defect of any of the three requifites abovementioned muft occafion, even where there is the moft perfect liberty. But the policy of Europe, by not leaving things at perfect liberty, occafions other inequalities of much greater importance.

Ir does this chiefly in the three following ways. Firft, by reftraining the competition in fome employments to a fmaller number than would otherwife be difpofed to enter into them: fecondly, by increafing it in others beyond whai it naturally would be; and thirdly, by obftructing the free circulation of labour and ftock, both from employment to employment, and from place to place.

First, The policy of Europe occafions a very important inequality if the whole of the advantages and difadvantages of the different employments of labour and ftock, by reftraining the

$$
\mathrm{N}_{4} \quad \text { competition }
$$

B o o $K$ competition in fome employments to a fmaller into them.

The exclufive privileges of corporations are the principal means it makes ure of for this purpofe.

- The exclufive privilege of an incorporated trade neceffarily reftrains the competition, in the town where it is eftablifhed, to thole who are free of the trade. To have ferved an apprenticefhip in the town, under a mafter properly qualified, is commonly the neceffary requifite for obtaining this freedom. The bye-laws of the corporation regulate fometimes the number of apprentices which any mafter is allowed to have, and almoft always the number of years which each apprentice is obliged to ferve. The intention of both regulations is to reftrain the competition to a much fmaller number than might otherwife be difpofed to enter into the trade. The limitation of the number of apprentices reftrains it direetly. A long term of apprenticefhip reftrains it more indirectly, but as effectually, by increafing the expence of education.

In Sheffield no mafter cutler can have more than one apprentice at a time, by a bye-law of the corporation. In Norfolk and Norwich no mafter weaver can have more than two apprentices, under pain of forfeiting five pounds a month to the king. No mafter hatter can have more than two apprentices any-where in England, or in the Englifh plantations, under pain of forfeiting five pounds a month, half to the
king, and half to him who thall fue in any court ${ }^{\text {C. }}$ X.A. $\mathbf{P}_{\text {. }}$ of record. Both theie regulations, though they have been confirned by a public law of the kingdom, are evidently dictated by the fame corporation fpirit which enacted the bye-law of Sheffield. The filk weavers in London had fcarce been incorporated a year when they enacted a bye-law, reftraining any matter from having more than two apprentices at a time. It required a particular act of parliament to refcind this bye-law.

Seven years feem anciently to have been, all over Europe, the ufual term eftablifhed for the duration of apprenticelhips in the greater part of incorporated trades. All fuch incorporations were anciently called univerfities; which indeed is the proper Latin name for any incorporation whatever. The univerfity of fmiths, the univerfity of taylors, \&tc. are expreffions which we commonly meet with in the old charters of ancient towns. When thofe particular incorporations which are now peculiarly called univerlities were firft eftablifhed, the term of years which it was neceffary to Itudy, in order to obtain the degree of mafter of arts, appears evidently to have been copied from the term of apprenticefhip in common trades, of which the incorporations were much more ancient. As to have' wrought feven years under a mafter properly qualified, was neceffary in order to entitle any perfon to become a matter, and to have himfelf apprentices in a common trade; fo to have ftudied feven years under a mafter.properly qualified,

- $0_{1} 0 \mathrm{~K}$ lified, was neceffary to entitle him to become a $\underbrace{1 .}$ mafter, teacher, or doctor (words anciently fynonimous) in the liberal arts, and to have fcholars or apprentices (words likewife originally fynonimous) to ftudy under him.

By the 5th of Elizabeth, commonly called the Statute of Apprenticefhip, it was enacted, that no perfon Should for the future exercife any trade, craft, or myttery at that time exercifed in England, unlefs he had previoufly ferved to it an apprenticefhip of feven years at leaft; and what before had been the bye-law of many particular corporations, became in England the general and public law of all trades carried on in market towns. For though the words of the ftatute are very general, and feem plainly to include the whole kingdom, by interpretation its operation has been limited to market towns, it having been held that in country villages a perfon may exercife feveral different trades, though he has not ferved a feven years apprenticefhip to each, they being neceffary for the conveniency of the inhabitants, and the number of people frequently not being fufficient to fupply each with a particular fet of hands.

By a ftrict interpretation of the words too the operation of this ftatute has been limited to thofe trades which were eftablifhed in England before the 5th of Elizabeth, and has never been extended to fuch as have been introduced fince that time. This limitation has given occafion to feveral diftinctions which, confidered as rules of police, appear as foolith as can well be imagined.
gined. It has been adjudged, for example, that ${ }^{\mathbf{C H}}{ }_{\mathrm{H}^{A}}{ }^{P_{0}}$ a coach-maker can neither himfelf make nor $\underbrace{\text {. }}$ employ journeymen to make his coach-wheels 3 but muft buy them of a malter wheelwright; this latter trade having been exercifed in England before the 5 th of Elizabeth. But a wheelwright, though he has never ferved an apprenticelhip to a coach-maker, may either himfelf make or employ journeymen to make coaches 3 the trade of a coach-maker not being within the ftatute, becaufe not exercifed in England at the time when it was made. The manufactures of Manchefter, Birmingham, and Wolverhampton, are many of them, upon this account, not within the ftature; not having been exercifed in England before the 5th of Elizabeth.

In France, the duration of apprenticefhips is different in different towns and in different trades. In Paris, five years is the term required in a great number; but before any perfon can be qualified to exercife the trade as a mafter, he muft, in many of them, ferve five years more as a journeyman. During this latter term he is called the companion of his mafter, and the term itfelf is called his companionfhip.

In Scotland there is no general law which regulates univerfally the duration of apprenticeShips. The term is different in different corporations. Where it is long, a part of it may generally be redeemed by paying a fmall fine. In moft towns too a very fmall fine is fufficient to purchafe the freedom of any corporation. The weavers of linen and hempen cloth, the principal

F o o K manufactures of the country, as well as all other $\underbrace{\text { I. }}$ artificers fubfervient to them, wheel-makers, reelmakers, \&cc. may exercife their trades in any town corporate without paying any fine. In all towns corporate all perfons are free to fell butcher's meat upon any lawful day of the week. Three years is in Scotland a common term of apprenticehip, even in fome very nice trades; and in general I know of no country in Europe in which corporation laws are fo little oppreffive.
'The property which every man has in his own labour, as it is the original foundation of all other property, fo it is the moft facred and inviolable. The patrimony of a poor man lies in the ftrength and dexterity of his hands; and to hinder him from employing this ftrength and dexterity in what manner he thinks proper without injury to his neighbour, is a plain violation of this moft facred property. It is a manifeft encroachment upon the juft liberty both of the workman, and of thofe who might be difpofed to employ him. As it hinders the one from working at what he thinks proper, fo it hinders the others from employing whom they think proper. To judge whether he is fit to be employed, may furely be trufted to the difcretion of the employers whofe intereft ic fo much concerns. The affected anxiety of the law-giver, left they fhould employ an improper perfon, is evidently as impertinent as it is oppreffive.

The inflitution of long apprenticefhips can give no fecurity that infufficient workmanhip fhall not frequently be expofed to public fale. When this
is done it is generally the effect of fraud, and $C^{H_{x}}{ }_{x}$. not of inability; and the longelt apprenticefhip $\underbrace{\mathbf{x .} \text {. }}$ can give no fecurity againft fraud. "Quite different regulations are neceffary to prevent this abufe. The fterling mark upon plate, and the ftamps upon linen and woollen cloth, give the purchafer much greater fecurity than any ftatute of apprenticehhip. He generally looks at thefe, but never thinks it worth while to enquire whether the workmen had ferved a feven years apprenticelhip.

The inftitution of long apprenticefhips has no tendency to form young people to induftry. A journeyman who wo:'s by the piece is likely to be induftrious, becaule he derives a benefit from every exertion of his induftry. An apprentice is likely to be idle, and alnoft always is fo, becaufe he has no immediate intereft to be otherwife. In the inferior employments, the fweets of labour confift altogether in the recompence of labour. They who are fooneft in a condition to enjoy the fweets of it, are likely fooneft to conceive a relifh for it, and to acquire the early habit of induftry. A young man naturally conceives an averfion to labour, when for a long time he receives no benefit fromoit. The boys who are put out apprentices from public charities are generally bound for more than the ufual number of years, and they generally turn out very idle and worthlefs.

Apprenticeships were altogether unknown is the ancients. The reciprocal duties of mafter and apprentice make a confiderable article in
${ }_{B} \mathbf{O}_{\mathbf{I}}$. $\mathrm{K}_{\mathrm{K}}$ every modern code. The Roman law is per-

1. fectly filent with regard to them. 1 know no Greek or Latin word (I might venture, I believe, to affert that there is none) which expreffes the idea we now annex to the word Apprentice, a fervant bound to work at a particular trade for the benefit of a mafter, during a term of years, upon condition that the mafter fhall teach him that trade.

Long apprenticefhips are altogether unneceffary. The arts, which are much fuperior to common trades, fuch as thofe of making clocks and watches, contain no fuch myftery as to require a long courfe of inftruction. The firf invention of fuch beautiful machines, indeed, and even that of fome of the inftruments employed in making them, muft, no doubt, have been the work of deep thought and long time, and may juftly be confidered as among the happieft efforts of human ingenuity. But when both have been fairly invented.and are well underftood, to explain to any young man, in the completeft manner, how to apply the inftruments and how to conftruct the machines, cannot well require more than the leffons of a few weeks; perhaps thofe of a few days might be fufficient. In the common mechanic trades, thofe of a few days might certainly be fufficient. The dexterity of hand, indeed, even in common trades, cannot be acquired without much practice and experience. But a young man would practife with much more diligence and attention, if from the beginning he wrought as a journey-
man, being paid in proportion to the little work $\mathbf{C H}_{\mathbf{X}}^{\mathbf{H}} \mathbf{A}$. which he $\mathrm{cer}^{\circ}$ execute, and paying in his turn for the materin is which he might fometimes fpoil through awkwardnefs and inexperience. His education would generally in this way be more effectual, and always lefs tedious and expenfive. The mafter, indeed, would be a lofer. He would lofe all the wages of the apprentice, which he now faves, for feven years together. In the end, perhaps, the apprentice himfelf would be a lofer. In a trade io eafily learnt he would have more competitors, and his wages, when he came to be a complete workman, would be much lefs than at prefent. The fame increafe of competition would reduce the profits of the mafters as well as the wages of workmen. The trades, the crafts, the myfteries, would all be lofers. But the public would be a gainer, the work of all artificers coming in this way much cheaper to market.
$I_{T}$ is to prevent this reduction of price, and confequently of wages and profit, by reftraining that free competition which would moft certainly occafion it, that all corporations, and the greater part of corporation laws, have been eftablifhed. In order to erect a corporation, no other authority in ancient times was requifite in many parts of Europe, but that of the town corporate in which it was eftablifhed. In England, indeed, a charter from the king was likewife neceffary. But this prerogative of the crown feems to have been referved rather for extorting money from the fubject, than for the defence of the common
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From every other within the town, fomewhat ${ }^{\sim} \mathrm{H}_{\mathrm{X}}^{\mathrm{A}} \mathrm{P}$. dearer than they otherwife might have done. $\underbrace{X^{A}}$ But in recompence, they were enabled to fell their own jult as much dearer; fo that fo far it was as broad as long, as they fay; and in the dealings of the different claffes within the town with one another, none of them were lofers by thefe regulations. But in their dealings with the country they were all great gainers; and in thefe latter dealings confifts the whole trade which fupports and enriches every town.

Every town draws its whole fubfiftence, and all the materials of its induftry, from the country. It pays for thefe chiefly in two ways: firft, by fending back to the country a part of thofe materials wrought up and manufactured; in which cafe their price is augmented by the wages of the workmen, and the profits of their mafters or immediate employers; fecondly, by fending to it a part both of the rude and manufactured produce, either of other countries, or of diftant parts of the fame country, imported into the towns in which cafe too the original price of thofe goods is augmented by the wazes of the carriers or failors, and by the profits of the merchants who employ them. In what is gained upon the firtt of thofe two branches of commerce, confilts the advantage which the town makes by its manufactures; in what is gained upon the fecond, the advantage of its inland and foreign trade. The wages of the workmen, and the profits of their different employers, make up the whole of what is gained upon both. WhatVol. I.
${ }^{B} O_{\mathrm{I}} \mathbf{O}$. K ever regulations, therefore, tend to increafe thafe
 induftry which properly belongs to towns, for one who has done fo by that which properly belongs to the country, the railing of rude produce by the improvement and cultivation of land. Indultry, therefore, mult be better rewarded, the wages of labour and the profits of stock mult evidently be greater in the one fituation than in the other. Buc ftock and labour naturally feek the moft advantageous employment. They naturally, therefore, refort as much as they can to the town, and defert the country.

The inhabitants of a town being collected into one place, can eafily combine together. The moft infignificant trades carried on in towns have accordingly, in fome place or other, been incorporated; and even where they have never been incorporated, yet the corporation fpirit, the jealoufy of ftrangers, the averfion to talke apprentices, or to sommunicate the fecret of their trade, generally prevail in them, and often teach them, by voluntary affociations and agreements, to prevent that free competition which they cannot prohibit, by bye-laws. The trades which emplogy but a fmall number of hands, run moft eafily into fuch combinations. Half a dozen woolcombers, perhaps, are neceffary to keep a thoufand pinners and weavers at work. By combining not to take apprentices, they can not only engrofs the employment, but reduce the whole manufacture into a fort of havery to themfelves, and raife the price of their labour much above what is due to the nature of their work,

B O O K The inhabitants of the country, difperfed in diftant places, cannot eafily combine together. They bave not only never been incorporated, but the corporation fpirit never has prevailed among them. No apprentice?hip has ever been thought neceffary to qualify for hufbandry, the great trade of the country. After what are called the fine arts; and the liberal profeffions; however, there is perhaps no trade which requires fo great a variety of knowledge and experience. The innumerable volumes which have been written upon it in all languages, may fatisfy us, that amongft the wifelt and moft learned nations, it has hever been regarded as a matter very eafily underftood. And from all thofe volumes we fhall in vain attempt to collect that knowledge of its various and complicated operations, which is cominonly poffeffed even by the common farmer; how contemptuoully foever the very con.temptible authors of fome of them may fometimes affect to fpeak of him. There is fearce any common mechanic trade, on the contrary, of which all the operations may not be as completely and diftinetly explained in a pamphlet of a very few pages, as it is poffible for words illuftrated by figures to explain them. In the hiftory of the arts, now publifing by the French acadeny of fciences, feveral of them are actually explained in this manner. The direction of operations, befides, which muft be varied with every change of the weather, as well as with many other accidents, requires much more judgment and difcretion, than that of thoie
the, which are always the fame, or very nearly $\mathbf{C H}_{\mathbf{x}} \mathrm{A}^{\mathrm{A}} \mathbf{P}$. the fame.

Not only the art of the farmer, the general direction of the operations of hufbandry, but many inferior branches of country labour, require much more 1 kill and experience than the greater part of mechanic trades. The man who works upon brafs and iron, works with inftruments and upon materials of which the temper is always the fame, or very nearly the fame. But the man who ploughs the ground with a team of horfes or oxen, works, with inftruments of which the health, ftrength, and temper, are very different upon different occafions. The condition of the materials which he works upon too is as variable as that of the inftruments which he works with, and both require to be managed with much judgment and difcretion. The common ploughman, though generally regarded as the pattern of ftupidity and ignorance, is feldom defective in this judgment and difcretion. He is lefs accuftomed, indeed, to focial intercourfe than the mechanic who lives in a town. His voice and language are more uncouth, and more difficult to be underftood by thofe who are not ufed to them. His underftanding, however, being accuftomed to confider a greater variety of objects, is generally much fuperior to that of the other, whole whole attention from morning till night is commonly occupied in performing one or two very fimple operations. How much the lower ranks of people in the country are really fuperior to thofe of the town, is well known to every man whom either
${ }^{\text {b }} \mathbf{0}$ o $\mathbf{1}$. bufinefs or curiofity has led to converfe much ${ }^{\text {1, }}$ with both. In China and Indoftan accordingly both the rank and the wages of country labourers are faid to be fuperior to thofe of the greater part of artificers and manufacturers. They would probably be fo every-where, if corporation laws and the corporation fpirit did not prevent it.

Tye fuperiority which the induftry of the towns has every-where in Europe over that of the country, is not altogether owing to corporations and corporation laws. It is fupported by many other regulations. The high duties upon foreign manufactures and upon all goods imported by alien merchants, all tend to the fame purpofe. Corporation laws eable the inhabitants of towns to raife their prices, without fearing to be underfold by the competition of their own countrymen. Thofe other regulations fecure them equally againtt that of foreigners. The enhancement of price occafioned by both is everywhere finally paid by the landlords, farmers, and Jabourers of the country, who have feldom oppofed the eftablifhment of fuch monopolies. They have commonly neither inclination nor fitnefs to enter into combinations; and the clamour and Pophiftry of merchants and manufacturers eafily perfuade them that the private intereft of a part, and of a fubordinate part of the fuciety, is the general intereft of the whole.

In Great Britain the fuperiority of the induftry of the towns over that of the country, feems to have been greater formerly than in the prefent times. The wages of country labour approach
mearer to thofe of manufacturing labour, and the ${ }^{C} H_{x} A^{\mathbf{P}}$. profits of ftock employed in agriculture to thofe $\underbrace{x .}$ of trading and manufacturing ftock, than they are faid to have done in the laft century, or in the beginning of the prefent. This change may be regarded as the neceffary, though very late confequence of the extraordinary encouragement given to the induftry of the towns. The ftock accumulated in them comes in time to be fo great, that it can no longer be employed with the ancient profit in that fpecies of induftry which is peculiar to them. That induftry has its limits like every other; and the increafe of stock, by increafing the competition, neceffarily reduces the profit. The lowering of profit in the town forces out fock to the country, where, by creating a new demand for country labour, it neceffarily raifes its wages. It then fpreads itfelf, if I may fay fo, over the face of the land, and by being employed in agriculture is in part reftored to the country, at the expence of which, in a great meafure, it had originally been accumulated in the town. That everywhere in Europe the greateft improvements of the country have been owing to fuch overlowings of the ftock originally accumulated in the towns, I fhall endeavour to fhew hereafter; and at the fame time to demonftrate, that though fome countries have by this courfe attained to a confiderable degree of opulence, it is in itfelf neceffarily flow, uncertain, liable to be difturbed and interrupted by innumerable accidents, and in every refpect contrary to the order of nature
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carnot laft longer than every fingle trader conti- $\mathbf{O}^{\mathbf{C}} \mathbf{X}^{\mathbf{A}}{ }^{\mathbf{P}}$. nues of the fame mind. The majority of a corporation can enact a bye-law with proper penalties, which will linnit the competition more effectually and more durably than any voluntary combination whatever.

The pretence that corporations are neceffary for the better government of the trade, is without any foundation. The real and effectual difcipline which is exercifed over a workman, is zot that of his corporation, but that of his cuftomers. It is the fear of lofing their employment which reftrains his frauds and corrects his negligence. An exclufive corporation neceffarily weakens the force of this difcipline. A particular fet of workmen muft then be einployed, let them behave well or ill. It is upon this account, that in many large incorporated towns no tolerable workmen are to be found, even in fome of the moft neceffary trades. If you would have your work tolerably executed, it mult be done in the fuburbs, where the workmen, having no exclufive privilege, have nothing but their character to depend upon, and you muft then finuggle it into the town as well as you can.

Ir is in this manner that the policy of Europe, by reftraining the competition in fome employments to a finaller number than would otherwife be difpofed to enter into them, occafions a very important inequality in the whole of the advantages and difadvantages of the different employments of labour and ftock.
© Ook Secondly, The policy of Europe, by increafing

1. the competition in fome employments beyond what it naturally would be, occafions another inequality of an oppofite kind in the whole of the advantages and difadvantages of the dififerent employments of labour and ftock.

- Ir has been confidered as of to much importance that a proper number of young people fhould be educated for certain profeffions, that, fometimes the public, and fometimes the piety of private founders have eftablifiel many penfions, fcholarhips, exhibitions, bu:faries, acc. for this purpole, which draw many more people into thofe trades than could otherwife pretend to follow them. In all chriftian countries, I believe, the education of the greater part of churchmen is paid for in this manner. Very few of them are educated altogether at their own expence. The long, tedious, and expenfive education, therefore, of thofe who are, will not always procure them a fuitable reward, the church being crowded with people who, in order to get employment, are willing to accept of a much fmaller recompence than what fuch an education would otherwife have entitled them to; and in this manner the competition of the poor takes away the reward of the rich. It would be indecent, no doubt, to compare either a curate or a chaplain with a journeyman in any common trade. The pay of a curate or chaplain, however, may very properly be confidered as of the fame nature with the wages ui a journeyman. They are, all three, paid for their work according to the con-
tract which they may happen to make with their $\mathbf{C H}_{\mathbf{H}}{ }^{\text {A P }}$. refpective fuperiors. Till after the middle of $\underbrace{(1)}$ the fourteenth century, five merks, containing about as much filver as ten pounds of our prefent money, was in England the ufual pay of a curate or a ftipendiary parilh prieft, as we find it regulated by the decrees of feveral different national councils. At the fame period four pence a day, containing the fame quantity of filver as a fhilling of our prefent money, was declared to be the pay of a mafter mafon, and three pence a day, equal to nine pence of our prefent money, that of a journeyman mafon *. The wages of both thefe labourers, therefore, fuppofing them to have been conftantly employed, were much fuperior to thofe of the curate. The wages of the mafter mafon, fuppofing him to have been without employment one third of the year, would have fully equalled them. By the inth of Queen Anne, c. 12, it is declared, "That whereas for " want of fufficient maintenance and encourage" ment to curates, the cures have in feveral " places been meanly fupplied, the bihop is, " therefore, empowered to appoint by writing " under his hand and feal a fufficient certain "ftipend or allowance, not exceeding fifty and " not lefs than twenty pounds a year." Forty pounds a year is reckoned at prefent very good pay for a curate, and notwithftanding this act of parliament, there are many curacies under twenty pounds a year. There are

[^7]journeymen

- 0 O K journeymen fhoe-makers in London who earn forty pounds a year, and there is farce an induftrious workman of any kind in that metropolis who does not earn more than twenty. This laft fum indeed does not exceed what is frequently earned by common labourers in many, country parifhes." Whenever the law has attempted to regulate the wages of workmen, it has always been rather to lower them than to raife them. But the law has upon many occafions attempted to raife the wages of curates, and for the dignity of the church, to oblige the rectors of parifhes to give them more than the wretched maintenance which they themfelves might be willing to accept of. And in both cafes the law feems to have been equally ineffectual, and has never either been able to raife the wages of curates, or to fink thofe of labourers to the degree that was intended; becaufe it has never been able to hinder either the one from being willing to accept of lefs than the legal allowance, on account of the indigence of their fituation and the multitude of their competitors; or the other from receiving more, on account of the contrary competition of thofe who cxpected to derive either profit or plealure from employing them.

The great benefices and other ecclefiaftical dignities fupport the honour of the church, notwithftanding the mean circumftances of fome of its. inferior members. The refpect paid to the profefion too makes fome compenfation even to them for the meannefs of their pecuniary recom-
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count much exam and fatisf) which of m fuffici able In fuch of pe the c fink migh educa his o donec publis would felves entire feffior
'TH called ficuati would every have been into fore,
pence. In England, and in all Roman Catholic CHAP. countries, the lottery of the church is in reality much more advantageous than is neceffary. The example of the churches of Scotland, of Geneva, and: of feveral other Proteftant churches, maj fatisfy us; that in fo creditable a profeffion, in which education is fo eafily procured, the hopes of much more moderate benefices will draw a fufficient number of learned, decent, and refpectable men into holy orders.

In profeffions in which there are no benefices; fuch as law and phyfic, if an equal proportion of people were educated at the public expence, the competition would foon be fo great, as to fink very much their pecuniary reward. It might then not be worth any man's while to educate his fon to either of thofe profefions at his own expence. They would be entirely abandoned to fuch as had been educated by thofe public charities, whofe numbers and neceflities would oblige them in general to content themfelves with a very miferable recompence, to the entire degradation of the now refpectable profeffions of law and phyfic.

That unprofperous race of men, commonly called men of letters; are pretty much in the ficuation which lawyers and phyficians probably would be in upon the foregoing fuppofition. In every part of Europe the greater part of them have been educated for the church, but have been hindered by different reatons from entering into holy orders. They lave generally, therefore, been educated at the public expence, and their

B o o I . their numbers are every-where fo great as com-
${ }^{\text {I. }}$ monly to reduce the price of their labour to a very paltry recompence.

Before the invention of the art of printing; the only employment by which a man of letters could make any thing by his talents, was that of a public or private teacher, or by communicating to orher people the curious and ufeful know. ledge which he had acquired himfelf: and this is ftill furely a more honourable, a more ufeful; and in general even a more profitable employment than that other of writing for a bookfeller, to which the art of printing has given occafion. The time and ftudy, the genius, knowledge, and application requifite to qualify an eminent teacher of the fciences, are at leaft equal to what is neceffary for the greateft practitioners in law and phyfic. But the ufual reward of the eminent teachers bears no proportion to that of the lawyer or phyfician; becaufe the trade of the one is crowded with indiyent people who have been brought up to it at the public expence; whereas thofe of the other two are incumbered with very few who have not been educated at their own. The ufual recompence, however, of public and private teachers, fmall as it may appear, would undoubtedly be lefs than it is, if the competition of thofe yet more indigent men of letters who write for bread was not taken out of the market. Before the invention of the art of printing, a fcholar and a beggar feem to have been terms very nearly fynonymous. The different governors of the univerfities before that
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time appear to have often granted licences to their ${ }^{C} H_{X} A P$. fcholars to beg.

In ancient times, before any charities of this kind had been eltablifhed for the education of indigent people to the learned profeffions, the rewards of eminent teachers appear to have been much more confiderable. Ifocrates, in what is called his difcourfe againft the fophifts, reproaches the teachers of his own times with inconfiftency. "They make the moft magnificent promifes to their fcholars," fays he, "and undertake to teach them to be wife, to be happy, and to be juit, and in return for fo important a fervice, they flipulate the paltry reward of four or five mine. They who teach wifdom," continues he, " ought certainly to be wife themfelves; but if any man were to fell fuch a bargain for fuch a price, he would be convicted of the mott evident folly." He certainly does not mean here to exaggerate the reward, and we may be affured that it was not tels than he reprefents it., Four minæ were equal to chirteen pounds fix fhillings and eight-pence: five mine to fixteen pounds thirteen fhillings and four-pence. Something not lefs than the largeft of thofe two fums, therefore, muft at that time have been ufually paid to the moft eminent teachers at Athens. lfocrates himfelf demanded ten minæ, or thirtythree pounds fix thillings and eight-pence, from each fcholar. When he taught at Athens, he is flard to have had an hundred fcholars. I underfand this to be the number whom he taught at one time, or who attended what we would call

B O O K one courfe of lectures, a number which will not
i. appear extraordinary from fo great a city to fo famous a teacher, who taught too what was at that time the moft fathionable of all fciences, rhetoric. He muft have made therefore, by each courfe of lectures, a thoufand minæ, or 3,333 l. 6 s. 8 d. A thoufand minæ, accordingly, is faid by Plutarch in another place, to have been his Didactron, or ufual price of teaching. Many other eminent teachers in thofe times appear to have acquired great fortunes, Gorgias made a prefent to the temple of Delphi of his own ftatue in folid gold. We muft not, I prefume, fuppofe that it was as large as the life. His way of living, as well as that of Hippias and Protagoras, two other eminent teachers of thofe times, is reprefented by Plato as fplendid even to oftentation. Plato himfelf is faid to have lived with a good deal of magnificence. Ariftotle, after having been tutor to Alexander, and molt munificently rewarded, as it is univerfally agreed, both by him and his father Philip, thought it worth while, notwithftanding, to return to Athens, in order to refume the teaching of his fchool. Teachers of the fciences were probably in thofe times lefs common than they came to be in an age or two afterwards, when the competition had probably fomewhat reduced both the price of their labour and the admiration for their perfons. The moft eminent of them, however, appear always to have enjoyed a degree of confideration much fuperior to any of the like profeffion in the prefent times. The Athenians
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fent Carneades the academic, and Diogenes the С н A P. ftoic, upon a folemn embaffy to Rome; and though their city had then declined from its former grandeur, it was till an independent and confiderable republic. Carneades too was a Babylonian by birth, and as there never was a people more jealous of admitting foreigners to public offices than the Athenians, their confideration for him mult have been very great.

This inequality is upon the whole, perhaps, rather: advantageous than hurtful to the public. It may fomewhat degrade the profeffion of a public teacher; but the cheapnefs of literary education is furely an advantage which greatly over-balances this trifing inconveniency. The public too might derive ftill greater benefit from it, if the conftitution of thofe fchools and colleges, in which education is carried on, was more reafonable than it is at prefent through the greater part of Europe.

Thirdly, The policy of Europe, by obftructing the free circulation of labour and ftock both from employment to employment, and from place to place, occafions in fome cafes a very inconvenient inequality in the whole of the advantages and difadvantages of their different employments.

The fatute of apprenticeehip obftructs the free circulation of labour from one employment to another, even in the fame place, The exclufive privileges of corporations obftruet it from one place to another, even in the fame employment.
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${ }^{B}$ OOK Ir frequently happens that while high wages are given to the workmen in one manufacture, thofe in another are obliged to content themfelves with bare fubfiftence. The one is in an advancing ftate, and has, therefore, a continual demand for new hands: the other is in a declining ttate, and the fuper-abundance of hands is continually increafing. Thofe two manufactures may fometimes be in the fame town, and fometimes in the fame neighbourhood, without being able to lend the leaft affiftance to one another. The ftatute of apprenticelhip may oppofe it in the one cafe, and both that and an exclufive corporation in the other. In many different manufactures, however, the operations are fo much alike, that the workmen could eafily change trades with -one another, if thofe abfurd laws did not hinder them. The arts of weaving plain linen and plain filk, for example, are almoft entirely the fame. That of weaving plain woollen is fomewhat different; but the difference is fo infignificant, that either a linen or a filk weaver might beccome a tolerable workman in a few days, If any of thofe three capital manufactures, therefore, were decaying, the workmen might find a refource in one of the other two which was in a more profperous condition; and their wages would neither rife too high in the thriving, nor fink too law in the decaying manufacture. The linen manufacture indeed is, in England, by a particular ftatute, open to every body; but as it is not much cultivated through the greater part of the country,
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it can afford no general refource to the workmen $\mathbf{C H}_{\mathbf{x}}^{\mathbf{H}} \mathbf{A P}^{\mathbf{P}}$. of other decaying manufactures, who, wherever $\underbrace{\text { x. }}$ the ftatute of apprenticefhip takes place, have a other choice but either to come upen the parifh, or to work as common labourers, for which, by their habits, they are much worfe qualified than for any fort of manufacture that bears any refemblance to their own. They generally, therefore, chufe to come upon the parifh.

Whatever obftructs the free circulation of labour from one employment to another, obftructs that of ftock likewife; the quantity of ftock which can be eniployed in any branch of bufinefs depending very much upon that of the labour which can be employed in it. Corporation laws; however, give lefs obftruction to the free circulation of fock from one place to another, than to that of labour. It is every-where much eafier for a wealthy merchant to obtain the privilege of trading in a town corporate, than for a poor artificer to obtain that of working in it.
$\mathrm{T}_{\mathrm{HE}}$ obftruction which corporation laws give to the free circulation of labour is common, I believe, to every part of Europe. That which is given to it by the poor laws is, fo far as I know, peculiar to England. It confifts in the difficulty which a poor man finds in obtaining a fettlement, or even in being allowed to exercife his induftry in any parifh but that to which he belongs. It is the labour of artificers and manufacturers only of which the free circulation is obftructed by corporation laws. The difficulty

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BOOK of obtaining fettlements obftructs even that of ${ }^{1 .}$ common labour. It may be worth while to give fome account of the rife, progrefs, and prefent state of this diforder, the greateft perhaps of any in the police of England.

When by the deftruction of monatteries the poor had been deprived of the charity of thofe religious houfes, after fome other ineffectual attempts for their relief, it was enacted by the 43 d of Elizabeth, c. 2. that every parifh Chould be bound to provide for its own poor; and that overfeers of the poor fhould be annually appointed, who, with the churchwardens, fhould raife, by a parifh rate, competent fums for this purpofe.

By this fatute the neceffity of providing for their own poor was indifpenfably impofed upen every parifh. Who were to be confidered as the poor of each parifh, became, therefore, a queftion of fome importance. This queftion, after fome variation, was at laft determined by the $13^{\text {th }}$ and 14th of Charles II. when it was enacted, that forty days undifturbed refidence fhould gain any perfon a fettlement in any parifh; but that within that time it fhould be lawful for two juftices of the peace, upon complaint made by the churchwardens or overfeers of the poor, to remove any new inhabitant to the parifh where he was laft legally lettled; unlefs he either rented a tenement of ten pounds a year, or could give fuch fecurity for the difcharge of the parifh where he was then living, as thofe juftices fhould judge fufficient.

Some frauds, it is faid, were committed in $\mathrm{C}^{\mathrm{H}} \mathrm{x}^{\mathrm{A}}$ : confequence of this ftatute ; parih officers fometimes bribing their own poor to go clandeftinely to another parih, and by keeping themfelves concealed for forty days to gain a fettlement there, to the difcharge of that to which they properly belonged. It was enacted, therefore, by the ift of James II. that the forty days undifturbed refidence of any perfon neceffary to gain a fettlement, fhould be accounted only from the time of his delivering notice in writing, of the place of his abode and the number of his family, to one of the churchwardens or overfeers of the parifh where he came to dwell.

But parifh officers, it feems, were not always more honeft with regard to their own, than they had been with regard to other parifhes, and fometimes connived at fuch intrufions, receiving the notice, and taking no proper fteps in confequence of it. . As every perfon in a parifh, therefore, was fuppofed to have an intereft to prevent as much as poffible their being burdened by fuch intruders, it was further enacted by the $3^{d}$ of William III. that the forty days refidence fhould be accounted only from the publication of fuch notice in writing on Sunday in the church, immediately after divine fervice.
"After all," fays Doctor Burn, " this kind " of fetclement, by conitinuing forty days after "publication of notice in writing, is very fel" dom obtained; and the defign of the acts is " not fo much for gaining of fettlements, as for "s the avoiding of them by perfons coming into

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B O O K " a parifh clandeftinely: for the giving of no-
$\underbrace{1}$ "tice is only putting a force upon the parifh to "remove. But if a perfon's fituation is fuch, " that it is doubtful whether he is actually re" moveable or not, he Thall by giving of notice " compel the parifh either to allow him a fettle"' ment uncontefted, by fuffering him to con" tinue forty days; or, by removing him, to try " the right."

This ftatute, therefore, rendered it almoft impracticable for a poor man to gain a new fettlement in the old way, by forty days inhabitancy. But that it might not appear to preclude altogether the common people of one parifh from ever eftablifhing themfelves with fecurity in another, it appointed four other ways by which a fettlement might be gained without any notice delivered or publifhed. The firft was, by being taxed to parifh rates and paying them; the fecond, by being elected into an annual parifh office, and ferving in it a year ; the third, by ferving an apprenticefhip in the parifh; the fourth, by being hired into fervice there for a year, and continuing in the fame fervice during the whole of it.

Nobody can gain a fettlement by either of the two firft ways, but by the public deed of the whole parih, who are too well aware of the confequences to adopt any new-comer who has nothing but his labour to fupport him, either by taxing him to parifh rates, or by electing him into a parifh office.

No married man can well gain any fettlement ${ }^{\mathbf{C}}{ }_{\mathbf{X}}^{\mathrm{X}} \mathrm{A}^{\mathrm{A}}{ }^{\mathrm{P}}$. in either of the two laft ways. An apprentice is fcarce ever married; and it is exprefsly enacted, that no married fervant thall gain any fettlement by being hired for a year. The principal effect of introducing fettlement by fervice, has been to put out in a great meafure the old fafhion of hiring for a year, which before had been fo cuftomary in England, that even at this day, if no particular term is agreed upon, the law intends that every fervant is hired for a year. But mafters are not always willing to give their fervants a fettlement by hiring them in this manner: and fervants are not always willing to be fo hired, becaufe, as every laft fettlement difcharges all the foregoing, they might thereby lofe their original fettlement in the places of their nativity, the habitation of their parents and relations.

No independent workman, it is evident, whether labourer or artificer, is likely to gain any new fettlement either by apprenticefhip or by fervice. When fuch a perfon, therefore, carried his induftry to a new parih, he was liable to be removed, how healthy and induftrious foever, at the caprice of any churchwarden or overfeer, unlefs he either rented a tenement of ten pounds a year, a thing impoffible for one who has nothing but his labour to live by; or could give fuch fecurity for the difcharge of the parifh as two juftices of the peace fhould judge fufficient. What fecurity they Shall require, indeed, is left altogether to their difcretion; but they cannot well require lefs than thirty pounds, it having $\mathrm{P}_{4}$ been

B o o $k$ been enacted, that the purchafe even of a free. ${ }^{1 .}$ hold eftate of lefs than thirty pounds value, fhall not gain any perfon a fettlement, as not being fufficient for the difcharge of the parifh. But this is a fecurity which fcarce any man who lives by labour can give ; and much greater fecurity is frequently demanded.

In order to reftore in fome meafure that free circulation of labour which thofe different ftatutes had almoft entirely taken away, the invention of certificates was fallen upon. By the 8th and $9^{\text {th }}$ of William 1II. it was enacted, that if any perfon hould bring a certificate from the parifh where he was laft legally fettled, fubfcribed by the churchwardens and overfeers of the poor, and allowed by two juftices of the peace, that every other parifh fhould be obliged to receive him; that he fhould not be removeable merely upon account of his being likely to become chargeable, but only upon his becoming actually chargeable, and that then the parifh which granted the certificate fhould be obliged to pay the expence both of his maintenance and of his removal. And in order to give the moft perfect fecurity to the parifh where fuch certificated man fhould come to refide, it was further enacted by the fane ftatute, that he fhould gain no fettlement there by any means whatever, except either by renting a tenement of ten pounds a year, or by ferving upon his own account in an annual parith office for one whole year; and confequently neither by notice, nor by fervice, nor by apmenticeflip, nor by paying parih rates. By
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the 12 th of Queen Anne too, ftat. i. c. 18. it CHAP. was further enacted, that neither the fervants nor apprentices of fuch certificated man fhould gain any fettlement in the parifh where he refided under fuch certificate.

How far this invention has reftored that free circulation of labour which the preceding ftatutes had almoft entirely taken away, we may learn from the following very judicious obfervation of Doctor Burn. "It is obvious," fays he, " that "there are divers good reafons for requiring " certificates with perfons coming to fettle in' "s any place; namely, that perfons refiding un" der them can gain no fettlement, neither by " apprentice $h i p$, nor by fervice, nor by giving " notice, nor by paying parih rates; that they " can fettle neither apprentices nor fervants; " that if they become chargeable, it is cer" tainly known whither to remove them, and " the parifh fhall be paid for the removal, " and for their maintenance in the mean time; " and that if they fall fick, and cannot be re" moved, the parifh which gave the certificate " muft maintain them: none of all which can " be without a certificate. Which reafons will " hold proportionably for parihies not granting "certificates in ordinary cales; for ic is far "s more than an equal chance, but that they will " have the certificated perfons again, and in a " worfe condition." 'The moral of this obfervation feems to be, that certificates ought always to be required by the parith where any poor man comes to refide, and that they ought very feldom
sook to be granted by that which he purpofes to leave.
rem pari their ftant
removed likewife. The farcity of hands in one ${ }^{C}{ }_{\mathbf{x}} \mathbf{x}^{\mathbf{A}}$. parifh, therefore, cannot always be relieved by $\underbrace{\text {, }}$ their fuper-abundance in another, as it is conftantly in Scotland, and, I believe, in all other countries where there is no difficulty of fettlement. In fuch countries, though wages may fometimes rife a little in the neighbourhood of a great town, or wherever elfe there is an extraordinary demand for labour, and fink gradually as the diftance from fuch places increales, till they fall back to the common rate of the country; yet we never meet wich thofe fudden and unaccountable differences in the wages of neighbouring places which we fometimes find in England, where it is often more difficult for a poor man to pafs the artificial boundary of a parih, than an arm of the fea or a ridge of high mountains, natural boundaries which fometimes feparate very diftinctly different rates of wages in other countries.

To remove a man who has committed no mifdemeanour from the parifh where he chufes to refide, is an evident violation of natural liberty and juftice. The common people of England, however, fo jealous of their liberty, but like the common people of moft other countries never rightly underfanding wherein it confifts, have now for more than a century together fuffered themfelves to be expofed to this oppreffion without a remedy. Though men of reflection too have fometimes complained of the law of fettlements as a public grievance; yet it has never been the object of any general popular clamour, fuch

Bo o $K$ fuch as that againft general warrants, an abufive
$\underbrace{\text { 1. }}$ practice undoubtedly, but fuch a one as was not likely to occafion any general oppreffion. There is fcarce a poor man in England of forty years of age, I will venture to fay, who has not in fome part of his life feit himfelf moft cruelly oppreffed by this ill-contrived law of fettlements.

I shall conclude this long chapter with obferving, that though anciently it was ufual to rate wages, firft by general laws extending over the whole kingdom, and afterwards by particular orders of the juftices of peace in every particular county, both thefe practices have now gone entirely into difufe. "By the experience of above "four hundred years," fays Doctor Burn, "it "feems time to lay afide all endeavours to bring " under ftrict regulations, what in its own na" ture feems incapable of minute limit"rion: " for if all perfons in the fame kind of work " were to receive equal wages, there would be no " emulation, and no room left for induftry or in" genuity."

Particular acts of parliament, however, fill attempt fometimes to regulate wages in particular trades and in particular places. Thus the 3 th of George III. prohibits, under heavy penalties, all mafter taylors in London, and five miles round it, from giving, and their workmen from accepting, more than two fhillings and ferenpence halfpenny a day, except in the cafe of a general mourning. Whenever the leginture attempts to regulate the differences between mafters and their worknien, its counfellors are
 fore, is in favour of the workmen, it is always $\underbrace{\text {, }}$ juft and equitable; but it is fometimes otherwife when in favour of the mafters. Thus the law which obliges the mafters in feveral differtnt trades to pay their workmen in money and not in goods, is quite juft and equitable. It impofes no real hardfhip upon the mafters. It only obliges them to pay that value in money, which they pretended to pay, but did not always really pay, in goods. This law is in favour of the workmen; but the 8th of George III. is in favour of the mafters. When mafters combine together in order to reduce the wages of their workmen, they commonly enter into a private bond or agreement, not to give more than a certain wage under a certain penalty. Were the workmen to enter into a contrary combination of the fame kind, not to accept of a certain wage under a certain penalty, the law would punifh them very feverely; and if it dealt impartially, it would treat the mafters in the fame manner. Put the 8th of George Iil. enforces by law that very regulation which mafters fometimes attempt to eftablifh by fuch combinations. The complaint of the work. men, that ic puts the ableft and moft induftrious upon the fame footing with an ordinary workman, feems perfectly well founded.

In ancient times too it was ufual to attempt to regulate the profits of merchants and other dealers, by rating the price both of provifions and other goods. The affize of bread is, fo far as I know, the only remnant of this ancient ufage.
${ }^{B}$ o o I . K ufage. Where there is an exclufive corporation, I. it may perhaps be proper to regulate the price of the firft neceffary of life. But where there is none, the competition will regulate it much better than any afize. The method of fixing the affize of bread eftablifhed by the 31 ft of George II. could not be put in practice in Scotland, on account of a defect in the law ; its execution depending upon the office of clerk of the market, which does not exift there. This defect was not remedied till the $3^{d}$ of George III. The want of an affize occafioned no fenfible inconveniency, and the eftablihment of one in the few places where it has yet taken place, has produced no fenfible advantage. In the greater part of the towns of Scotland, however, there is an incorporation of bakers who claim exclufive privileges, though they are not very Atrictly guarded.

The proportion between the different rates both of wages and profit in the different employments of labour and ftock, feems not to be much affected, as has already been obferved, by the riches or poverty, the advancing, ftationary, or declining ftate of the fociety. Such revolutions in the public welfare, though they affect the general rates both of wages and profit, mult in the end affect them equally in all different employments. The proportion between them, therefore, muft remain the fame, and cannot well be altered, at lealt for any confiderable time, by any fuch revolutions.

## C H A P. XI.

## Of the Rent of Land.

R
 ufe of land, is naturally the higheft which $\underbrace{\text { xi. }}$ the tenant can afford to pay in the actual circumftances of the land. In adjufting the terms oif the leafe, the landlord endeavours to leave him no greater thare of the produce than what is fufficient to kesp up the fock from which he furnifhes the feed, pays the labour, and purchafes and maintains the cattle, and other inftruments of hufbandry, together with the ordinary profits of farming ftock in the neighbourhood. This is evidently the fmalleft fhare with which the tenant can content himfelt without being a lofer, and the landlord feldom means to leave him any more. Whatever part of the produce, or, what is the fame thing, whatever part of its price, is over and above this fhare, he naturally endeavours to referve to himfelf as the rent of his land, which is evidently the higheft the tenant can afford to pay in the actual circumftances of the land. Sometimes, indeed, the liberality, more frequently the ignorance, of the landlord, makes him accept of fomewhat lefs than this portion; and fometimes too, though more rarely, the ignorance of the tenant makes him undertake to pay fomewhat more, or to content himfelf with fomewhat lefs, than the ordinary profits of farming ftock in the neighbourhood, This portion,

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## THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF

B o o K however, may fill be confidered as the natural rent of land, or the rent for which it is naturally meant that land fhould for the moft part be let.

The rent of land, it may be thought, is frequently no more than a reafonable profit or intereft for the ftock laid out by the landlord upon its improvement. This, no doubt, may be partly the cale upon fome occafions; for it can fcarce ever be more than partly the cafe. The landlord demands a rent even for unimproved land, and the fuppofed intereft or profit upon the expence of improvement is generally an addition to this original rent. Thofe improvements, befides, are not always made by the ftock of the landlord, but fometimes by that of the tenant. When the leafe comes to be renewed, however, the landlord commonly demands the fame augmentation of rent, as if they had been all made by his own.

He fometimes demands rent for what is altogether incapable of human improvement. Kelp. is a fpecies of lea-weed, which, when burnt, yields an alkaline falt, ufeful for making glafs, foap, and for feveral other purnofes, It grows in feveral parts of Great Britain, particularly in Scotland, upon fuch rocks only as lie within the high water mark, which are twice every day covered with the fea, and of which the produce, therefore, was never augmented by human indultry. The landlord, however, whofe eftate is bounded by a kelp thore of this kind, demands a rent for it as much as for his corn fields.

The fea in the neighbourhood of the inlands of Shetland is more than commonly abundant in
fifh, which make a great part of the fubfiftence ${ }^{C H}$ AP. of their inhabitants. But in order to profit by $\underbrace{\text {, }}_{\text {XI. }}$ the produce of the water, they mutt have a habitation upon the neighbouring land. The rent of the landlord is in nroportion, not to what the farmer can make by rhe land, but to what he can make both by the land and by the water. It is partly paid in fea-fifh; and one of the very few inftances in which rent makes a part of the price of that commodity, is to be found in that country.

The rent of land, therefore, confidered as the price paid for the ufe of the land, is naturally a monopoly price. It is not at all proportioned to what the landlord may have laid out upon the improvement of the land, or to what he can afford to take; but to what the farmer can afford. to give.

Such parts only of the produce of land can commonly be brought to market of which the ordinary price is fufficient to replace the ftock which muft be employed in bringing them thither, together with its ordinary profits. If the ordinary price is more than this, the furplus part of it will naturally go to the rent of the land. If it is not more, though the commodity may be brought to market, it can afford no rent to the landlord. Whether the price is, or is not more, depends upon the demand.

There are fome parts of the produce of land for which the demand muft always be fuch as to afford a greater price than what is fufficient to bring them to market; and there are others for Vol. I. $\qquad$

Bo o K which it either may or may not be fuch as to afford inis greater price. The former muft always affor a rent to the landlord. The latter fometimes may, and fometimes may not, according to different circumitances.

Rent, it is to be obferved, therefore, enters into the compofition of the price of commodities in a different way from wages and profit. High or low wages and profit are the caufes of high or low price; high or low rent is the effect of it. It is becaufe high or low wages and profit mult be paid, in order to bring a particular commodity to market, that its price is high or low. But it is becaufe its price is high or low; a great deal more, or very little more, or no more, than what is fufficient to pay thofe wages and profit, that it affords a high rent, or a low rent, or no rent at all.

The particular confideration, firt, of thofe parts of the produce of land which always afford fome rent; fecondly, of thofe which fometimes may and fometimes may not afford rent; and, thirdly, of the variations which, in the different periods of improvement, naturally take place in the relative value of thofe two different forts of rude produce, when compared both with one another and with manufactured commodities, will divide this chapter into three parts.
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## PARTI.

## Of the Produce of Land wbich always afords Rent.

$\mathrm{A}^{\mathrm{S} \text { men, like all other animals, naturally mul- chap. }}$ tiply in proportion to the means of their fub- $\qquad$ fiftence, food is always, more or leff, in demand. It can always purchafe or command a greater or fmaller quantity of labour, and fomebody can always be found who is willing to do formething in order to obtain it. The quantity of labour, indeed, which it can purchafe, is not always equal to what it could maintain, if managed in the moft œeconomical manner, on account of the high wages which are fometimes given to labour. But it can always purchafe fuch a quantity of labour as it can maintain, according to the rate at which that fort of labour is commonly main. tained in the neighbourhood.

But land, in almoft any fituation, produces a greater quantity of food than what is fufficient to maintain all the labour neceffary for bringing it to market, in the mof liberal way in which that labour is ever mainctined. The furplus too is always more than fufficient to replace the ftock which employed that labour, together with its profits. Something, therefore, always remains for a rest to the landlord.

The moft defart moors in Norway and Scotland produce fome fort of pafture for cattle, of which the milk and the increale are always more

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B o o $K$ than fufficient, not only to maintain all the labour

1. neceffary for tending them, and to pay the ordinary profit to the farmer or owner of the herd or flock; but to afford fome fimall rent to the landlord. The rent increales in proportion to the goodnefs of the pafture. The fame extent of ground not only maintains a greater number of cattle, but as they are brought within a fmaller compafs, lefs labour becomes requifite to tend them, and to collect their produce. The landlord gains both ways; by the increafe of the produce, and by the diminution of the labour which mult be maintained out of it.

The rent of land not only varies with its fertility, whatever be its produce, but with its fituation, whatever be its fertility. Land in the neighbourhood of a town gives a greater rent than land equally fertile in a diftant part of the country. Though it may coft no more labour to cultivate the one than the other, it muft always coft more to bring the produce of the diftant land to market. A greater quantity of labour, therefore, mult be maintained out of it; and the furplus, from which are drawn both the profit of the farmer and the rene of the landlord, mult be diminifhed. But in remote parts of the country the rate of profits, as has already been fhown, is generally higher than in the neighbourhood of a large town. A finaller proportion of this diminimed furplus, therefore, mult belong to the landlord.

Good roads, canals, and navigable rivers, by diminifning the expence of carriage, put the re-
mote parts of the country more nearly upon a $\mathbf{C H}_{\mathrm{xi}}{ }^{\mathbf{A}} \mathbf{P}$. level with thofe in the neighbourhood of the town. They are upon that account the greateft of all improvements. They encourage the cultivation of the remote, which mult always be the moit extenfive circle of the country. They are advantageous to the town, by breaking down the monopoly of the country in its neighbourhood. They are advantageous even to that part of the country. Though they introduce fome rival commodities into the old market, they open many new markets to its produce. Monopoly, befides, is a great enemy to good management, which can never be univerfally eftablifhed but in confequence of that free and univerfal competition which forses every body to have recourfe to it for the fake of felf-defence. It is not more than fifty years ago, that fome of the counties in the neighbourhood of London petitioned the parliament againft the extenfion of the turnpike roads into the remoter counties. Thofe remoter counties, they pretended, from the cheapnefs of Jabour, would be able to fell their grafs and corn cheaper in the London market than themfelves, and would thereby reduce their rents, and ruin their culcivation. Their rents, however, have rifen, and their cultivation has been improved fince that time.

A corn field of moderate fertility produces a much greater quantity of food for man, than the beft pafture of equal extent. Though its cultivation requires much more labour, yet the furplus which remains after replacing the feed and

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B O OX maintaining all that labour, is likewife much
${ }^{\text {1. }}$ greater. If a pound of butcher's meat therefore was never fuppofed to be worth more than a pound a bread, this greater furplus would every-where be of greater value, and conftitute a greater fund both for the profit of the farmer and the rent of the landlord. It feems to have done fo univerfally in the rude beginnings of agriculture.

But the relative values of thofe two different species of food, bread, and butcher's meat, are we:y different in the different periods of agriculture. In its rude beginnings, the unimproved wilds, which then occupy the far greater part of the country, are all abandoned to cattle. There is more butcher's meat than bread, and bread, therefore, is the food for which there is the greateft competition, and which confequently brings the greateft price. At Buenos Ayres, we are told by Ulloa, four reals, one-and-twenty pence halfpenny fterling, was, forty or fifty years ago, the ordinary price of an ox, chofen from a herd of two or three hundred. He fays nothing of the price of bread, probably becaufe he fqund nothing remarkable about it. An ox there, he fays, cofts little more than the labour of catching him. But corn can no-where be raifed without 2 great deal of labour, and in a country which lies upon the river Plate, at that time the direct road from Europe to the filver mines of Potofi, the money price of labour could not be very cheap. It is otherwife when cultivation is extended over the greater part of the country.

There is then more bread than butcher's meat. $\mathbf{C H}_{\times 1 .}^{\mathrm{H}} \mathrm{A}^{\mathrm{A}} \mathrm{P}$. The competition changes its direction, and the $\underbrace{\text { xi. }}$ price of butcher's meat becomes greater than the price of bread.

By the extenfion befides of cultivation, the unimproved wilds becomes infufficient to fupply the demand for butcher's meat. A great part of the cultivated lands mult be employed in rearing and fattening cattle, of which the price, therefore, muft be fufficient to pay, not only the labour neceffary for tending them, but the rent which the landlord and the profit which the farmer could have drawn from fuch land employed in tillage. The cattle bred upon the moft uncultivated moors, when brought to the fame market, are, in proportion to their weight or goodnefs, fold at the fame price as thofe which are reared upon the moft improved land. The proprietors of thofe moors profit by it, and raife the rent of their land in proportion to the price of their cattle. It is not more than a century ago that in many parts of the highlands of Scotland, butcher's meat was as cheap or cheaper than even bread made of oatmeal. The union opened the market of England to the highland cattle. Their ordinary price is at prefent about three times greater than at the beginning of the century, and the rents of many highland eftates have been tripled and quadrupled in the fame time. In almoft every part of Great Britain a pound of the beft butcher's meat is, in the prefent timus, generally worth more than two pounds of the beft white bread; and in

- BOOK $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{I}}$ plentiful years it is fometimes worth three or four pounds.

It is thus that in the progrefs of improvement the rent and profit of unimproved pafture come to be regulated in fome meafure by the rent and profit of what is improved, and thefe again by the rent and profit of corn. Corn is an annual crop. Butcher's-meat, a crop which requires four or five years to grow. As an acre of land, therefore, will produce a much fmaller quantity of the one fpecies of food than of the other, the inferiority of the quantity muft be compenfated by the fuperiority of the price. If it was more than compenfated, more corn land would be turned into pafture; and if it was not compenfated, part of what was in pafture would be brought back into corn.

This equality, however, between the rent and profit of grafs and thofe of corn; of the land of which the immediate produce is food for cattle, and of that of which the immediate produce is food for men; mult be underltood to take place only through the greater part of the improved lands of a great country. In fome particular local fituations it is quite otherwife, and the rent and profit of grafs are much fuperior to what can be made by corn.

Thus in the neighbourhood of a great town, the demand for milk and for forage to horfes, frequently contribute, together with the high price of butcher's meat, to raife the value of grafs above what may be called its natural proportion to that of corn. This local advantage,
it is evident, cannot be communicated to the lands $\mathbf{C}$ н A P. at a diftance.

Particular circumftances have fometimes rendered fome countries fo populous, that the whole territory, like the lands in the neighbourhood of a great town, has not been fufficient to produce both the grafs and the corn neceffary for the fubfiftence of their inhabitants. Their lands, therefore, have been principally employed in the production of grafs, the more bulky commodity, and which cannot be fo eafily brought from a great diftance; and corn, the food of the great body of the people, has been chiefly imported from foreign countries. Holland is at prefent in this fituation, and a confiderable part of ancient Italy feems to have been fo during ihe profperity of the Romans. To feed well, uid Cato faid, as we are told by Cicero, was the firft and molt profitable thing in the management of a private eftate: to feed tolerably well; the fecond; and to feed ill, the third. To plough, he ranked only in the fourth place of profit and advantage. Tillage, indeed, in that part of ancient Italy which lay in the neighbourhood of Rome, mult have been very much difcouraged by the diftributions of corn which were frequently made to the people, either gratuituounly, or at a very low price. This corn was brought from the conquered provinces, of which feveral, inftead of taxes, were obliged to furnifh a tenth part of their produce at a ftated price, about fixpence a peck, to the republic. The Jow price at which this corn was diftributed to

DOOX the people, muft neceffarily have funk the price of what could be brought to the Roman market from Latium, or the ancient territory of Rome, and mut have difcouraged its cultivation in that country.

In an oper country too, of which the principal produce is $c \cdot r n$, a well-enclofed piece of grafs will frequently rent higher than any corn field in its neighbourhood. It is convenient for the raintenance of the cattle employed in the cultivation of the corn, and irs high rent is, in this cale, not fo properly paid from the value of its own produce, as from that of the corn lands which are cultivated by means of it. It is likely to fall, if ever the neighbouring lands are completely enclofed. The prefent high rent of enclofed land in Scotlard feems owing to the fcarcity of enclofure, and will probably laft no longer than that fcarcicy. The advantage of enclofure is greater for pafture than for corn. It faves the labour of guarding the cattle, which feed better too when they are not liable to be difturbed by their keeper or his dog.

But where there is no locai advantage of this kind, the rent and profit of corn, or whatever elfe is the common vegetable food of the people, mult naturally regulate, upon the land which is fit for producing it, the rent and profit of pafture.

The ufe of the artificial graffes, of turnips, carrots, cabbages, and the other expedients which have been fallen upon to make an equal quantity of land feed a greater number of cattle
than when in natural grafs, fhould fomewhat $\mathbf{C}$ н. A. P. reduce, it might be expected, the fuperiority $\underbrace{\text { xI. }}$ which, in an improved country, the price of Dutcher's-meat naturally has over that of bread. It feems accordingly to have done fo; and there is fome reafon for believing that, at leait in the London market, the price of butcher's-meat, in proportion to the price of bread, is a good deal lower in the prefent times than it was in the beginning of the laf: cencury.

In the appendix to the life of Prince Henry, Doctor Birch has given us an account of the prices of butcher's-meat as commonly paid by that prince. It is there faid, that the four quarters of an ox weighing fix hundred pounds ufually coft him nine pounds ten fhiliings, or thereabouts; that is, thirty-one fhillings and eight pence per hundred pounds weight. Prince Henry died on the 6th of November 1612, in the nineteenth year of his age.

In March 1764, there was a parliamentary inquiry into the caufes of the high price of provifions at that time. It was then, among other proof to the fame purpofe, given in evidence by a Virginia merchart, that in March 1763 , he had victualled his fhips for twenty-four or twentyfive fhillings the hundred weight of beef, which he confidered as the ordinary price; whereas, in that dear year, he had paid twenty-feven fhillings for the fame weight and fort. This high price in 1764 is, however, four fhillings and eightpence cheaper than the ordinary price paid by prince
so o K prince Henry; and it is the beft beef only; it muft

1. be obferved, which is fit to be falted for thofe diftant voyages.

The price paid by prince Henry amounts to $3 \frac{4}{5} d$. per pound weight of the whole carcafe, coarfe and choice pieces taken together; and at that rate the choice pieces could not have been fold by retail for lefs than $4 \frac{1}{2} d$. or 5 d . the pound.
In the parliamentary inquiry in $: 764$, the witneffes ftated the price of the choice pieces of the beft beef to bo to the confumer $4 d$. and $4 \frac{1}{4} d$. the pound; and the coarfe pieces in general to be from feven farthings to $2 \frac{1}{2} d$. and $2 \frac{3}{4} d$; and this they faid was in general one halfpenny dearer than the fame fort of pieces had ufually been fold in the month of March. But even this high price is ftill a good deal cheaper than what we can well fuppofe the ordinary retail price to have been in the time of prince Henry.

During the twelve firt years of the laft century, the average price of the beft wheat at the Windfor market was I $l .8 \mathrm{~s} .3^{\frac{1}{6}} \mathrm{~d}$. the quarter of nine Winchefter bufhels.

Eut in the twelve years preceding 1764, including that year, the average price of the fame meafure of the beft wheat at the fame market was 2l. 1 s. $9 \frac{1}{2} d$.

In the twelve firf years of the latt century, therefore, wheat appears to have been a good deal cheaper, and butcher's-meat a good deal dearer, than in the twelve years preceding 1764, including that ycar.

In all great countries the greater part of the ${ }^{\mathbf{C}}{ }_{\mathbf{X I}}{ }^{\text {A }}$. ${ }^{\mathbf{P}}$. cultivated lands are employed in producing either $\underbrace{\text { RA. }}$ food for men or food for cattle. The rent and profit of thefe regulate the rent and profit of all other cultivated land. If any particular produce. afforded lefs, the land would foon be turned into corn or palture; and if any afforded more, fome part of the lands in corn os pafture would foon be turned to that produce.

Those producions, incleed, which require either a greater original expence of improvement, or a greater annual expence of cultivation, in order to fit the land for them, appear commonly to afford, the one a greater rent, the other a greater profit, than corn or pafture. This fuperiority, however; will feldom be found to amount to more than a reafonable intereft or compenfation for this fuperior expence.

In a hop garden, a fruit garden, a kitchen garden, both the rent of the landlord, and the profit of the farmer, are generally greater than in a corn or grafs field. But to bring the ground inco this condition requires more expence. Hence a greater rent becomes due to the landlord. It requires too a more attentive and fkilful management. Hence a greater profit becomes due to the farmer. The crop too, at leaft in : the hop and fruit garden, is more precarious. Its price, therefore, befides compenfating all occafional lofies, muft affori fomething like the profit of infurance. The circumftances of gardeners, generally mean, and always moderate, may fatisfy us that their great ingenmity is not

B O O K commonly over-recompenfed. Their delightful

1. art is practifed by fo many rich people for amufement, thai little advantage is to be made by thofe who practife it for profit; becaufe the perfons who thould naturally be their beft cuftomers, fupply themfelves with all their mot precious productions.

The advantage which the landlord derives from fuch improvements feems at no time to have been greater than what was, fufficient to compenfate thr: original expence of making them. In the ancient hufbandry, after the vineyard, a well-watered kitchen garden feems to have been the part of the farm which was fuppofed to yield the moft valrable produce. But Democritus, who wrote upon hufbandry about two thoufand years ago, and who was regarded by the ancients as one of the fathers of the art, thought they did not act wifely who enclofed a kitchen garden. The profit, he faid, would not compenfate the expence of a ftone wall; and bricks (he meant, I fuppofe, bricks baked in the fun) mouldered with the rain, and the winter ftorm, and required continual repairs. Colurnella, who reports this judgment of Democritus, does not controvert it, but propofes a very frugal method of enclofing with a hedge of brambles and briars, which, he fays, he had found by experience to be both a lafting and an impenetrable fence; but which, it feems, was not commonly known in the time of Democritus. Palladius adopts the opinion of Columella, which had before been recommended by
 provers, the produce of a kitchen garden had, it $\underbrace{\mathbf{x q .}}$ feems, been little more than fufficient to $p^{2}$ : the extraordinary culture and the expence of watering; for in countries fo near the fun, it was thought proper, in thofe times as in the prefent, to have the command of a ftream of water, which could be conducted to every bed in the garden. Through the greater part of Europe, a kitchen garden is not at prefent fuppofed to deferve a better enclofure than that recommended by Columella. In Great Britain, and fome other northern countries, the finer fruits cannot be brought to perfection but by the affiftance of a wall. Their price, therefore, in fuch countries mult be fufficient to pay the expence of building and maintaining what they cannot be had without. The fruit-wall frequently furrounds the kitchen garden, which thus enjoys the benefit of an enclofure which its own produce could feldom pay for.

That the vineyard, when properly planted and brought to perfection, was the moft valuable part of the farm, feems to have been an undoubted maxim in the ancient agriculture, as it is in the modern through all the wine countries. But whether it was advantageous to plant a new vineyard, was a matter of difpute among the ancient Italian.hufbandmen, as, we learn from Columella. He decides, like a true lover of all curious cultivation, in favour of the vineyard, and endeavours to how, by a comparifon of the profit and expence, that it was a moft advan-

BOOK tageous improvement. Such comparifons, how1. ever, between the profit and expence of new: projects, are commonly very fallacious; and in nothing more fo than in agriculture. Had the gain actually made by fuch plantations been commonly as great as he imagined it might have been, there could have been no difpute about it. The fame point is frequently at this day a matter of controverfy in the wine countries. Their writers on agriculture, iadeed, the lovers and promoters of high cultivation, feem generally difpofed to decide with Columella in favour of the vineyard. In France the anxiety of the pro-' prietors of the old vineyards to prevent the planting of any new ones, feems to favour their opinion, and to indicate a confcioufnefs in thofe who muft have the experience, that this fpecies of cultivation is at prefent in that country more profitable than any other. It feems at the fame time, however, to indicate another opinion, that this fuperior profit can laft no longer than the Jaws which at prefent reftrain the free cultivation of the vine. In 1731, they obtained an order of council, prohibiting both the planting of new vineyards, and the renewal of thofe old ones, of which the cultivation had been interrupted for two years, without a particular permiffion from the king, to be granted only in confequence of an information from the intendant of the province, certifying that he had examined the land, and that it was incapable of any other culture. The pretence of this order was the fcarcity of corn and pafture, and the
fuper-abundance of wine. But had this fuper- $\mathbf{C H}_{\mathrm{xi}} \mathrm{A}^{\mathbf{A}} \mathbf{P}$. abundance been real, it would, without any order of council, have effectually prevented the plantation of new vineyards, by reducing the profits of this fpecies of cultivation below their natural proportion to thofe of corn and pafture. With regard to the fuppofed fearcity of corn occafioned by the mulciplication of vineyards, corn is nowhere in France more carefully cultivated than in the wine provinces, where the land is fit for producing it: as in Burgundy, Guienne, and the Upper Langredoc. The numerous hands employed in the one fpecies of cultivation necesfarily encourage the ceher, by affording a ready market for its produce. To diminifh the number of thofe who are ce pable of paying for it, is furely a moft unpromifing expedient for encouraging the culcivation of corn. It is like the policy which would promote agriculture by difcouraging manufactures.

The rent and profit of thofe productions, therefore, which require either a greater original expence of improvement in order to fit the land for them, or a greater annual expence of cultivation, though often' much fuperior to thofe of corn and pafture, yet when they do no more than comptnfate fuch extraordinary expence, are in reality regulated by the rent and profit of thofe common crops.

Ir fometimes happens, indeed, that the quantity of land which can be fitted for fome particular produce, is too fmall to fupply the effectual demand. The whole produce can be difpored Vol, I.

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BOOR of to thofe who are willing to give fomewhat
$\underbrace{\text { more than what is fufficient to pay the whole }}$ rent, wages and profit neceffary for raifing and bringing it to market, according to their natural rates, or according to the rates at which they are paid in the greater part of other cultivated land. The furplus part of the price which remains after defraying the whole expence of improvement and cultivation, may commonly, in this cafe, and in this cafe only, bear no regular proportion to the like furplus in corn or pafture, but may exceed it in almoft any degree; and the greater part of this excefs naturally goes to the rent of the landlord.

The ufual and natural proportion, for example, between the rent and profit of wine, and thofe of corn and pafture, mult be underftood to take place only with regard to thofe vineyards which produce nothing but good common wine, fuch as can be raifed almoft any-where, upon any light, gravelly, or fandy foil, and which has nothing to recommend it but its ftrength and wholefomenefs. It is with fuch vineyards only that the common land of the country can be brought into competition; for with thofe of a peculiar quality it is evident that it cannot.

The vine is more affected by the difference of foils than any other fruit-tree. From fome is derives a flavour which no culture or management can equal, it is fuppofed, upon any other. This flavour, real or imaginary, is fometimes peculiar to the produce of a few vineyards;
. fometimes it extends through the greater part of
a finall diftrift, and fometimes through a con- ${ }^{\text {chen }}{ }^{\text {Afi. }}$. fiderable part of a large province. The whole quantity of fuch wines that is brought to market falls fhort of the effectual demand, or the demand of thofe who would be willing to pay the whole rent, profit and wages neceflary for preparing and bringing them thither, according to the ordinary rate, or according to the rate at which they are paid in common vineyards. The whole quantity, therefore, can be difpofed of to thofe who are willing to pay more, which neceffarily raifes the price above that of common wine. The difference is greater or lefs, according as the falhionablenefs and fcarcity of the wine render the competition of the buyers more or lefs. eager. Whatever it be, the greater part of is goes to the rent of the landlord. For though fuch vineyards are in general more cartwly cultivated than moft others, the high price of the wine feems to be, not fo much the effect, as the caufe of this careful cultivation. In to valuable a produce the lofs occafioned by negligence is fo great as to force even the moft carelefs to attention. A fimali part of this high price, therefore, is fufficient to pay the wages of the extraordinary labour beftowed upon their cultivation, and the profits of the extraordinary ftore which purs that labour into motion.

The fugar colonies poffeffed by the European nations in the Welt Indies, may be compared to thofe precious vineyards. Their whole produce Gills hort of the effectual demand of Europe, and can be difpofed of to thofe who are willing to R 2
give

BOOK give more than what is fufficient to pay the
 and the molaffes thould defray the whole ex- $\underbrace{\text { X1. }}$ pence of his cultivation, and that his fugar thould be all clear profit. If this be true, for I pretend not to affirm it, it is as if a corn farmer expected to defray the expence of his cultivation with the chaff and the ftraw, and that the grain fhould be all clear profit. We fee frequently focieties of merchants in London and other trading towns, purchafe wafte lands in our fugar colonies, which they expect to improve and cultivate with profit by means of factors and agents; notwithftanding the great diftance and the uncertain returns, from the defective adminiftration of jultice in thore countries. Nobody will attempt to improve and cultivate in the fame manner the moft fertile lands of Scotland, Ireland, or the corn provinces of North America, though from the more exact adminiftration of juftice in thefe countries, more regular returns might be expected.

Is Virginia and Maryland the cultivation of tobacco is preferred, as moft profitable, to that of corn. Tobacco might be cultivated with advantage through the greater part of Europe; but in almoft every part of Europe it has become a principal fubject of taxation, and to collect a tax from every different farm in the country where this plant might happen to be cultivated, would be more difficult, it has been fuppofed, than to levy one upon its importation at the cuftom-houfe. The cultivation of tobacco has upon this account been moft abfurdly prohibited

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 THE Nature and causes of${ }^{\mathrm{B}} \mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{l}} \mathrm{O}^{\mathrm{K}}$ through the greater part of Europe, which necef-
tot
tobacco, can manage, they reckon, four acres of $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{X}}^{\mathrm{H}} \mathrm{A}$. P . Indian corn. To prevent the market from being overftocked too, they have fometimes, in plentiful years, we are told by Dr. Douglas*, (I fufpect he has been ill informed,) burnt a certain quantity of tobacco for every negro, in the fame manner as the Dutch are faid to do of fpices. If fuch violent methods are neceffary to keep up the prefent price of tobacco, the fuperior advantage. of its culture over that of corn, if it ftill has any, will not probably be of long continuance.

IT is in this manner that the rent of the cultivated land, of which the produce is human food, regulates the rent of the greater part of other cultivated land. No particular produce can long afford lefs, becaufe the land would immediately be turned to another ufe; and if any particular produce commonly affords more, it is becaufe the quantity of land which can be fitted for it is too fmall to fupply the effectual demand.

In Europe corn is the principal produce of land which ferves immediately for human food. Except in particular fituations, therefore, the rent of corn land regulates in Europe that of all othe: cultivated land. Britain need envy neither the vineyards of France nor the olive plantations of Italy. Except in particular fituations, the value of thefe is regulated by that of corn, in which the fertility of Britain is not much inferior to that of either of thofe two countries.

[^8] vegetable food of the people fhould be drawn from a plant of which the moft common land, with the fame or nearly the fame culture, produced a much greater quantity than the moft fertile does of corn, the rent of the landlord, or the furplus quantity of food which would remain to him, after paying the labour and replacing the ftock of the farmer, together with its ordinary profits, would neceffarily be much greater. Whatever was the rate at which labour was commonly maintained in that country, this greater furplus could always meintain a greater quantity of it, and confequently enable the landlord to purchafe or command a greater quantity of it. The real value of his rent, his real power and authority, his command of the neceffaries and conveniencies of life with which the labour of other people could fupply him, would neceffarily be much greater.

A rice field produces a much greater quantity of food than the moft fercile corn field. Two crops in the year from thirty to fixty buthels each, are faid to be the ordinary produce of an acre. Though its cultivation, therefore, requires more labour, a much greater furplus remains after maintaining all that labour. In thofe rice countries, therefore, where rice is the common and favourite vegetable food of the people, and where the cultivators are chiefly maintained with it, a greater hare of this greater furplus fhould belong to the landlord than in corn countries. In Carolina, where the planters,
planters, as in other Britifh colonies, are gene- © HAP. rally both farmers and landlords, and where rent $\underbrace{\text { X. }}$, confequently is confounded with profit, the cultivation of rice is found to be more profitable than that of corn, though their fields produce only one crop in the year, and though from :he prevalence of the cuftoms of Europe, rice is not there the common and favourite vegetable food of the people.

A good rice field is a bog at all feafons, and at one feafon a bog covered with water. It, is unfit either for corn, or pafture, or vineyard, or, indeed, for any other vegetable produce that is very ufeful to men: and the lands which are fit for theie purnofes, are not fit for rice. Even in the rice countries, therefore, the rent of rice lands cannot regulate the rent of the other cultivated land which can never be turned to that produce.

The food produced by a field of potatoes is not inferior in quantity to that produced by a field of rice, and much fuperior to what is produced by a field of wheat. Twelve thoufand weight of potatoes from an acre of land is not a greater produce than twe thoufand weight of wheat. The food or folid nourifmment, indeed, which can be drawn from each of thofe two plants, is not altogether in proportion to their weight, on azcount of the watery nature of potatoes. Alloriag, however, half the weight of this root to go to water, a very large allowarce, fuch an acte of potatoes will ftill produce fix thoufand weight of folid nourifhment, tisree times

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BOOK times the quantity produced by the acre of 1. wheat. An acre of potatoes is cultivated with lefs expence than an acre of wheat; the fallow, which generally precedes the fowing of wheat, more than compenfating the hoeing and other estraordinary culture which is always given to potatoes. Should this root ever becone in any part of Europe, like rice in fome rire cotur:ies, the common and favourite vegetable food of the people, fo at to oicupy the lame proportion of the lands in thllage which wheat and other forts of grain for human food du ar peefent, the fome quantity of culivated land would mainain a much greater number of people, and the labours bei:, generally fed with potatoes, a Ereater farpius would remain after replacing all the thock, and maintaining all the labour employed in cultivation. A greater fhare of this furplus too would belong to the landlord. Population would increafe, and rents would rife much beyond what they are at prefent.

The land which is fic for potatoes, is fit for almolt every other ufeful vegetable. If they occupied the fame proportion of cultivated land which corn cioes at prefent, they would regulate, in the fame manner, the rent of the greater part of other cultivated land.

In fome parts of Lancahire, it is pretended, I have been told, that bread of oatmeal is a heartier food for labouring people than wheaten bread, and I have frequently hard the fame doctrine held in Scotland. : however, fomewhat doubtful of the truth . The com-
 are in generai neither fo ftrong nor fo handfome as the fam: rank of people in England, who are fed with wheaten bread. They neither work fo well, nor look '? well; and as there is not the fame difference between the people of fafhion in the two countries, experience would feem to fhew, that the food of the common people in Scotland is not fo fuitable to the human conftitution as that of their neighbours of the fame rank in England. But it feems to be otherwife with potatoes. The chairmen, porters, and coalheavers in London, and thofe unfortunate women who live by proftitution, the ftrongett men and the moft beautiful women perhaps in the Britifh dominions, are faid to be, the greater part of them, from the loweft rank of people in Ireland, who are generally fed with this root. No food can afford a more decifive proof of its nourifing quality, or of its being peculiarly fuitable to the health of the human conftitution.

IT is difficult to preferve potatoes through the year, and impoffible to ftore them like corn, for two or three years together. The fear of not being able to fell them before they rot, difcourages their cultivation, and is, perhaps, the chief obftacle to their ever becoming in any great country, like bread, the principal vegetable food of all the different ranks of the people.

> PARTII.

Of the Produce of Land which fometimes does, and fometimes does not, afford Rent.
${ }^{B} O_{1}$ OK . TUMAN food feems to be the only produce of land which always and neceffarily affords fome rent to the landlord. Other forts of produce fometimes may and fometimes may not, according to different circumftances.

After food, cloathing and lodging are the two great wants of mankind.

Land in its original rude fate can afford the materials of cloathing and lodging to a much greater number of people than it can feed. In its improved ftate it can fometimes feed a greater number of people than it can fupply with thofe materials; at leaft in the way in which they require them, and are willing to pay for them. In the one ftate, therefore, there is always is fuper-abundance of thofe materials, which are frequently, upon that account, of little or no value. In the other there is offen a farcity, which neceffarily augments their value. In the one ftate, a great part of them is thrown away as ufelefs, and the price of what is ufed is confidered as equal only to the labour and expence of fitting it for ufe, and can, therefore, afford no rent to the landlord. In the other they are all made ufe of, and there is frequencly a demand for more than can be had. Somebody is always willing to give more for every part of them than
what is fufficient to pay the expence of bringing ${ }^{C}{ }^{H_{X i}}{ }^{A}$. ${ }^{P}$. them to market. Their price, therefore, can always afford fome rent to the landlord.

The fkins of the larger animals were the original materials of cloathing. Among nations of hunters and mepherds, therefore, whofe food confifts chiefly in the fleth of thofe animals, every man, by providing himfelf with food, provides himfelf with the materials of more cloathing than he can wear. If there was no foreign commerce, the greater part of them would be thrown away as things of no value. This was probably the cafe among the hunting nations of North America, before their country was difoovered by the Europeans, with whom they now exchange their furplus peltry, for blankets, fire arms, and brandy, which gives it fome value. In the prefent commercial fate of the known world, the moft barbarous nations, I believe, among whom land property is eftablifned, have fome foreign commerce of this kind, ata ind among their wealthier neighbours fuch a demand for all the materials of cloathing, which their land produces, and which can neither be wrought up nor confurned at home, as raifes their price above what it cofts to fend them to thofe wealthier neighbours. It affords, therefore, fome rent to the landlord. When ', greater part of the highland cattle were confumed on their own hills, the exportation of their hides made the moft confiderable article of the commerce of that country, and what they were exchanged for afforded fome addition to the rent

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 the nature and cajses ofB.OOK of the highland eftates. The wool of England, which in old times could neither be confumed nor wrought up at home, found a market in the then wealthier and more induftrious country of Flanders, and its price afforded fomething to the rent of it $1 w^{\prime}$ which produced it. In countries not butter sucivated than England was then, or than the highlands of Scotland are now, and which had no foreign commerce, the materials of cloathing would evidently be fo fuper-abundant, that a great part 6 chcou would be thrown away as ufelefs, and no part could afford any rent to the landlord.

The materials of lodging cannot always be tranfported' to fo great a diftance as thofe of cloathing, and do not fo readily become an object of foreign commerce. When they are fuperabundant in the country which produces them, it frequently happens, even in the pre ${ }^{\text {ent }}$ commercial ftate of the world, that they are of no value to the landlord. A good fone quarry in the neighbourhood of London would afford a confiderable rent. In many parts of Scotland and Wales is affords none. Barren timber for building is of great value in a populous and well-ciltivated councry, and the land which produces it affords a confiderable rent. Bur in many paits of North America the landlord would be much obliged to any bcely who would carry away the grewer part of his large trees. In fome parts the highlands of Scotland the bark is the orly part of the wood which, for want of roads and water-carriage, can be fent to markes,
market. The timber is left to rot upon the ${ }^{\mathbf{C}} \underset{\mathbf{X} \mathbf{H}_{1}}{ }{ }^{\mathbf{A}} \mathbf{P}$ ground. When the materials of lodging are fo fuper-abundant, he part made ufe of is worth only the labour and expence of fitting it for that ufe. It affords no rent to the landlord, who generally grants the ufe of it to whoever takes the trouble of afking it. The demand of wealthier nations, however, fometimes enables him to get a rent for it. The paving of the ftreets of London has enabled the owners of fome barren rocks on the coaft of Scotland to draw a rent from what never afforded any before. The woods of Norway and of the coats of the Baltic, find a market in many parts of Great Britain which they could not find at home, and thereby afiord fome rent to their proprietors.

Countries are populous, not in proportion to the number of people whom their produce can cloath and lodge, but in proportion to that of thofe whom it can feed. When food is provided, it is eafy in find the neceffary cloathing and lodging. But thoush thefe are at hand, it may often be difficult to find food. In fome parts of the Britifh dominions what is called A Houfe, may be built by one day's labour of one man. The fimpleft fecies of cloathing, the fkins of animals, require fomewhat more labour to drefs and prepare them for ufe. They do nor, however, require a great deal. Among favage or barbarous nations a hundredth or little more than the hundrecth part of the labour of the whole year, will be fuffient to provide them with fuch cloathing and lodering as facisity the
greater provide them with food.

But when by the improvement and cultivation of land the labour of one family can provide food for two, the labour of half the fociety becomes fufficient to provide food for the whole. The other half, therefore, or at leaft the greater part of them, can be employed in providing 'other things, or in fatisfying the other wants and fancies of mankind. Cloathing and lodg. ing, houfhoid furniture, and what is called liquipage, are the principal objects of the greater part of thofe wants and fancies. The rich man confumes no more food than his poor neighbour. In quality it may be very different, and to felect and prepare it may require more labour and art; but in quantity it is very nearly the fame. But compare the facious palace and great wardrobe of the one, with the hovel and the few rags of the other, and you will be fenfible that the difference between their cloathing, lodging, and houhhold furniture, is almoft as great in quantity as it is in quality. The defire of food is limited in every man by the narrow capacity of the human flomach; but the defire of the conveniencies and ornaments of building, drefs, equipage, and houhold furniture, feems to have no limit or certain boundary. Thofe, therefore, who have the command of more food than they themfelves can confume, are always willing to exchange the furplus, or, what is the fame thing, the price of it, for gratifications of
this other kind. What is over and above fatif $\mathbf{C H} \mathrm{HA}_{\mathrm{A}} \mathrm{P}^{\mathrm{P}}$. fying the limited defire, is given for the amufe- . ment of thofe defires which cannot be fatisfied, but feem to be altogether endlefs. The poor, in order to obtain food, exert themfelves to gratify thofe fancies of the rich, and to obtain it more certainly, they vie with one another in the cheapnefs and perfection of their work. The number of workmen increafes with the increafing quantity of food, or with the growing improvement and cultivation of the lands; and as the nature of their bufinefs admits of the utmoft fubdivifions of labour, the quantity of materials which they can work up, increafes in a much greater proportion than their numbers. Hence arifes a demand for every fort of material which human invention can employ, either ufffully or ornamentally, in building, drefs, equipage, or houfehoid furniture; for the foffils and minerals contained in the bowels of the earth, the precious metals, and the precious ftones.

Food is in this manner, not only the original faurce of rent, but every other part of the produce of land which afterwards affords rent, derives that part of its value from the improvement of the powers of labour in producing food by means of the improvement and cultivation of land.

Those other parts of the produce of land, however, which afterwards afford rent, do not afford it always. Even in improved and cultivated courtries the demand for them is not, always fuch as to afford a greater price than what VoL. I.
${ }^{B} O_{\mathrm{I}} \mathrm{O}^{\mathrm{K}}$ is fufficient to pay the labour, and replace, to1. gether with its ordinary profits, the ftock which mult be employed in bringing them to market. Whether it is or is not fuch, depends upon different circumftances.

Whether a coal-mine, for example, can afford any rent, depends partly upon its fertility, and partly upon its fituation.

A mine of any kind may be faid to be either fertile or barren, according as the quantity of mineral which can be brought from it by a certain quantity of labour, is greater or lefs than what can be brought by an equal quantity from the greater part of other mines of the fame kind.

Some coal-mines, advantageoufly fituated, cannot be wrought on account of their barrennefs. The produce does not pay the expence. They can afford neither profit nor rent.

There are fome of which the produce is barely fufficient to pay the labour, and replace, together with its ordinary profits, the fock employed in working them. They afford fome profit to the undertaker of the work, but no rent to the landlord. They can be wrought advantageouny by nobody but the landlord, who being himfelf the undertaker of the work, gets the ordinary profit of the capital which he employs in it. Many coal-mines in Scotland are wrought in this manner, and can be wrought in no other. The landlord will allow nobody elfe to work them without paying fome rent, and nobody can afford to pay any.

Other

Other coal-mines in the fame country, fuf- $\mathbf{C H} \boldsymbol{H}$. ficiently fertile, cannot be wrought on account $\underbrace{\text { xi. }}$ of their fituation. A quantity of mineral, fufficient to defray the expence of working, couid be brought from the mine by the ordinary, or even lefs than the ordinary quantity of labour: but in an inland country, thin'ly inhabited, and without either good roads or water-carriage, this quantity could not be fold.

Coals are a lefs agreeable fewel than wood: they are faid too to be lefs wholefome. The expence of coals, therefore, at the place where they are confumed, muft generally be fomewhat lefs than that of wood.

The price of wood again varies with the fate of agriculture, nearly in the fame manner, and exactly for the fame reafon, as the price of cattle. In its rude beginnings the greater parc of every country is covered with wood, which is then a mere incumbrance of no value to the landlord, who would gladly give it to any body for the cutting. As agriculture advances, the woods are partly cleared by the progrefs of tillage, and partly go to decay in confequence of the increafed number of cattle. Thefe, though they do not increafe in the fame proportion as corn, which is altogether the acquifition of human induftry, yet multiply under the care and protection of men; who fore up in the feafon of plenty what may maintain them in that of fcarcity, who through the whole year furnifh them with a greater quantity of food than uncultivated nature provides for them, and who by deS 2 Itroying
\& 0 O 0 flroying and extirpating their enemies, fecure them in the free enjoyment of all that the provides. Numerous herds of cattle, when allowed to wander through the woods, though they do not deftroy the old trees, hinder any young ones from coming up, fo that in the courfe of a century or two the whole foreft goes to ruin. The fcarcity of wood then raifes its price. It affords a good rent, and the landlord fometimes finds that he can fcarce employ ins beft lands more advantageoully than in growing barren timber, of which the greatnefs of the profit often compenfates the latenefs' of the returns. This feems in the prefent times to be nearly the fate of things in feveral parts of Great Britain, where the profit of planting is found to be equal to that of either corn or pafture. The advantage which the landlord derives from planting, can no-where exceed, at leaft for any confiderable time, the rent which thefe could afford hint; and in an inland country which is highly cuitivated, it will frequently not fall much fhort of this rent. Upon the fea-coaft of a well-improved country, indeed, if coals can conveniently be had for fewel, it may fometimes be cheaper to bring barren timber for building from lefs cultivated foreign countries, than to raife it at home. In the new town of Edinburgh, built within thefe few years, there is not, perhaps, a fingle ftick of Scotch timber.

Whatever may be the price of wood, if that of coals is fuch that the expence of a coal-fire is nearly equal to that of a wood one, we may be affured.
 tances, the price of coals is as high as it can be. It feems to be fo in fome of the inland parts of England, particularly in Oxfordhire, where it is ufual, even in the fires of the common people, to mix coals and wood together, and where the difference in the expence of thofe two forts of fewel cannot, therefore, be very grat.

Coals, in the coal-countries, are every-where much below this higheft price. If they were not, they could not bear the expence of a diftant carriage, either by land or by water. A fimall quantity only could be fold, and the coal mafters and coal proprietors find it more for their intereft to fell a great quantity at a price fomewhat above the loweft, than a fmall quantity at the highett. The moft fertile coal-mine too, regulates the price of coals at all the other mines in its neiphbourhood. Both the proprietor and the undertaker of the work find, the one that he can get a greater rent, the other that he can get a greater profit, by fomewhat underfelling all their neighbours. Their neighbours are foon obliged to fell at the fame price, though they cannot fo well afford it, and though it always diminifhes, and fometimes takes away altogether, both their rent and their profit. Some works are abandoned altogether ; others can afford no rent, and can be wrought only by the proprietor.

The loweft price at which coals can be fold for any confiderable time, is, like that of all other commodities, the price which is barely fufficient
$B O_{\mathrm{I}} 0 \mathrm{~K}$ to replace, together with its ordinary profits, the Atock which mult be employed in bringing them to market. At a clal-mine for which the landlord can get no rent, but which he muft either work himfelf or let it alone altogether, the price of coals mult generally be nearly about this price.

Rent, even where coals afford one; has generally a fmaller fhare in their price than in that of moft other parts of the rude produce of land. The rent of an eftate above ground, commonly amounts to what is fuppofed to be a third of the grofs produce; and it is generally a rent certain and independent of the occafional variations in the crop. In coal-mines a fifth of the grofs produce is a very great rent; a tenth the common rent, and it is feldom a rent certain, but depends upon the occafional variations in the produce. Thefe are fo great, that in a country where thirty years purchafe is confidered as a moderate price for the property of a landed eftate, ten years purchafe is regarded as a good price for that of a coal-mine.

The value of a coal-mine to the proprietor frequently depends as much upon its fituation as upon its fertility. That of a metallic mine depends more upon its fertility, and leís upon its fituation. The coarfe, and ftill more the precious metals, when feparated from the ore, are fo valuable that they can generally bear the expence of a very long land, and of the moft diftant fea carriage. Their market is not confined to the countries in the neighbourhood of
she mine, but extends to the whole world. The $\mathbf{C} \mathrm{H}_{\mathrm{x}}$ A $\mathrm{P}_{\text {. }}$ copper of Japan makes an article of commerce
 in Europe; the iron of Spain in that of Chili and Peru. The filver of Peru finds its way, no: only to Europe, but from Europe to China.

The price of coals in Weftmorland or Shopmire can have little effect on their price at Newcaftle; and their price in the Lionnois can have none at all. The productions of fuch diftant coal-mines can never be brought into competiton with one another. But the productions of the molt diftant metallic mines frequently may, and in fact commonly are. The price, therefore, of the coarfe, and fill more that of the precious metals, at the molt fertile mines in the world, mut neceffarily more or left affect their price at every other in it. The price of copper in Japan mut have forme influence upon its price at the copper mines in Europe. The price of filler in Peru, or the quantity either of labour or of other goods which it will purchafe there, mut have forme influence on its price, not only at the filver mines of Europe, but at thole of China. After the difcovery of the mines of Peru, the filver mines of Europe were, the greater part of them, abandoned. The value of filer was fo much reduced, that their produce could no longer pay the expence of working them, or replace, with a profit, the food, cloaths, lodging, and other neceffaries which were confumed in that operation. This was the cafe too with the mines of Cuba and St. Domingo, and S 4 even
${ }^{B} 0_{1}$ or even with the ancient mines of Peru, after the $\sim_{\text {difcovery of thofe of Potofi. }}$

The price of every metal at every mine, therefore, being regulated in fome meafure by its price at the moft fertile mine in the world that is actually wrought, it can at the greater part of mines do very little more than pay the expence of working, and can feldom afford a very high yent to the landlord. Rent, accordingly, feems at the greater part of mines to have but a fmall thare in the price of the coarfe, and a ftill fmaller in that of the precious metals. Labour and profic make up the greater part of both.

A sixth part of the grofs produce may be reckoned the average rent of the tin mines of Cornwall, the moft fertile that are known in the world, as we are told by the Rev. Mr. Borlace; vice-warden of the ftannaries. Some, he fays, afford more, and fome do not afford fo much. A fixth part of the grofs produce is the rent too of feveral very fertile lead mines in Scotland.

In the filver mines of Peru; we are told by Frezier and Ulloa, the proprietcr frequently exaits no other acknowledgment from the undertaker of the mine, but that he will grind the ore at his mill, paying him the ordinary multure or price of grinding. Till 1736, indeed, the tax of the king of Spain amounted to one-fifth of the ftandard filver, which till then might be confidered as the real rent of the greater part of the filver mines of Peru, the richeft which have been known in the world. If there had been
no tax, this fifth would naturally have belonged $\mathbf{C H}_{\mathbf{X}} \mathbf{A}^{\text {A }}{ }^{\mathbf{P}}$. to the landlord, and many mines might have $\underbrace{\text { X. }}$ been i wrought which could not then be wrought, becaufe they could not afford this tax. The tax of the duke of Cornwall upon tin is fuppofed to amount to more than five per cent. or onetwentieth part of the value; and whatever may be his proportion, it would naturally too belong to the proprietor of the mine, if tin was duty free. But if you add one-twentieth to one-fixth, you will find that the whole average rent of the tin mines of Cornwall, was to the whole average rent of the filver mines of Peru, as thirteen to twelve. But the filver mines of Peru are not now able to pay even this low rent, and the tax upon filver was, in 1736 , reduced from one-fifth to one-tenth. Even this tax upon filver too gives more temptation to fmuggling than the tax of one-twentieth upon tin; and fmuggling mult be much eafier in the precious than in the bulky commodity. The tax of the King of Spain accordingly is faid to be very ill paid, and that of the duke of Cornwall very well. Rent, therefore, it is probable, makes a greater part of the price of tin at the moft fertile tin mines, than it does of filver at the moft fertile filver mines in the world. After replacing the ftock employed in working thofe different mines, together with its ordinary profits, the refidue which remains to the proprietor, is greater it feems in the coarfe, than in the precious metal.

Neither are the profits of the undertakers of filver mines commonly very great in Peru. The
${ }^{B} 0001$ fame moft refpectable and well informed authors acçuaint us, than when any perfon undertakes to work a new mine in Peru, he is univerfally looked upon as a man deftined to bankruptcy and ruin, and is upon that account fhunned and avoided by every body. Mining, it feems, is confidered there in the fame light as here, as a lottery, in which the prizes do not compenfate the blanks, though the greatnefs of fome tempts many adventurers to throw away their fortunes in fuch unprofperous projects.

As the fovereign, however, derives a confiderable part of his revenue from the produce of filver mines, the law in Peru gives every poffible enccuragement to the difcovery and working of new ones. Whoever difcovers a new mine, is entitled to meafure off two hundred and fortyfix feet in length, according to what ine fuppofes to be the direction of the vein, and half as much in breadth. He becomes proprietor of this portion of the mine, and can work it without paying any acknowledgment to the landload. The intereft of the duke of Cornwall has given occafion to a regulation nearly of the fame kind in that ancient dutchy. In wafte and uninclofed lands any perfon who difcovers a tin mine, may mark out its limits to a certain extent, which is called bounding a mine. The bounder becomes the real proprietor of the mine, and may either work it himfelf, or give it in leafe to another, without the confent of the owner of the land, to whom, however, a very fmall acknowledgment mult be paid upon working it. In both regula-
 facrificed to the fuppofed interefts of public revenue.

The fame encouragement is given in Peru to the difcovery and working of new gold mines; an. $n$ gold the king's tax amounts only to a twentieth part of the ftandard metal. It was once a fifth, and afterwardse a tenth, as in filver; but it was found that the work could not bear even the loweft of thefe two taxes. If it is rare, however, fay the fame authors, Frezier and Ulloa, to find a perfon who has made his fortune by a filver, it is fill much rarer to find one who has done fo by a gold mine. This twentieth part feems to be the whole rent which is paid by the greater part of the gold mines of Chili and Peru. Gold too is much more liable to be fmuggled than even filver; not only on account of the fuperior value of the mecal in proportion to its bulk, but on account of the peculiar way in which nature produces it. Silver is very feldom found virgin, but, like moft other metals, is generally mineraiized with fome other body, from which it is inspoffible to feparate it in fuch quantities as will pay for the expence, but by a very laborious and tedious operation, which cannot well be carried on but in workhoufes erected for the purpofe, and therefore expofed to the infpection of the king's officers. Gold, on the contrary, is almoft alwajs found virgin. It is fometimer found in pieces of fome bulk; and even when mixed in fmall and almoft infenSible particles with fand, earth, and other extra-

B O O 0 neous bodies, it can be feparated from them by

1. 2 very fhort and fimple operation, which can be carried on in any private houfe by any bady who is poitfied of a fmall quantity of mercury. If the king's tax, therefore, is but ill paid upon filver, it is likely to be much worfe paid upon gold ; and rent mult make a much finaller part of the price of gold, than even of that of filver.

The lowett price at which the precious metals can be fold, or the fmalleft quantity of other goods for which they can be exchanged during any confiderable time, is regulated by the fame principles which fix the loweft ordinary price of all other goods. The ftock which mult commonly be employed, the food, cloaths and lodging which muft commonly be confumed in bringing them from the mine to the market, determine it. It muft at leaft be fufficient to replace that ftock, with the ordinary profits.

Their higheft price, however, feems not to be neceffarily determined by any thing but the a itual fcarcity or plenty of thofe metals themfelves. It is not determined by that of any other commodity, in the fame manner as the price of coals is by that of wood, beyond which no fcarcity carr ever raife it. Increafe the fcarcity of gold to a cercain degree, and the fmalleft bit of it may becomẹ more precious than a diamond, and exchange for a greater quantity of other goods.

The demand for thofe metals arifes partly. from their utility, and partly from their beauty. If you except iron, they are more uffful than, perhaps, any other metal. As they are lefs liable
liable to ruft and impurity, they can more eafily $\mathbf{C}$ н $\mathbf{H}_{\mathbf{x} .}{ }^{\text {A. }}$. be kept clean; and the utenfils either of the table or the kitchen are often upon that account more agreeable when made of them. A filver boiler is more cleanly than a lead, copper, or tin one; and the fame quality would render a gold boiler ftill better than a filver one. Their principal merit, however, arifes from their beauty, whis aters them peculiarly fit for the ornaments and furniture. No paint or dye can $\xi \quad$ in a colour as gilding. The merit of eauty is greatly enhanced by their fcarcity. .th the greater part of rich people, the chief enjoyment of riches confifts in the parade of riches, which in their eye is never fo complete as when they appear to polfefs thofe decifive marks of opulence which nobody can poffefs but themfelves. In their eyes the merit of an object which is in any degree either ufeful or beautiful, is greatly enhanced by its fcarcity, or by the great labour which it requires to collect any confiderable quantity of it, a labour which nobody can afford to pay but themfelves. Such objects they are willing to purchafe at a higher price than things much more beautiful and ufeful, but more common. Thefe qualities of utility, beauty, and fearcity, are the original foundation of the high price of thofe metals, or of the great quantity of other goods for which they can every-where be exchanged. This value was antecedent to and independent of their being employed as coin, and was the quality which fitted them for that employment. That employment,


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oo $\mathrm{I}_{\text {emplisyment, however, by occafioning a new de- }}^{\text {mand, and by diminifhing che quantity which }}$ could be employed in any other way, may have after wards contributed to keep up or increafe their valute.

The demand for the precious fones arifes altogether from their beauty. They are of no ufe, but as ornaments; and the merit of their beauty is greatly enhanced by their fcarcity, or by the difficulty and expence of getting them from the mine. Wages and profit accordingly make up, tupon moft occafions, almoft the whole of their high price. Rent comes in but for a very fmall Share; frequently for no fhare; and the moft fertile mines only afford any confiderable rent. When Tavernier, a jeweller, vifited the diamond mines of Golconda and Vifiapour, he was informed that the fovereign of the country, for whofe benefit they were wrought, had ordered all of them to be hut up, except thofe which yield the largelt and fineft ftones. The others, it feems, were to the proprietor not worth the working.

As the price both of the precious metals and of the precious ftones is regulated all over the world by their price at the moft fertile mine in it, the rent which a mine of either can afford to its proprieiur is in proportion, not to its abfolute, but to what may be called its relative fertility, or to its fuperiority over other mines of the fame kind. If new mines were difcovered as much fuperior to thofe of Potofi as they were fuperior to thofe of Europe, the value of filver might be
fo much degraded as to render even the mines of $\mathbf{C} \mathrm{H}_{\times 1} \mathrm{~A}$ P. Potofi not worth the working. Before the dif- $\underbrace{\text { xi. }}$ covery of the Spanifh Weft Indies, the moft fertile mines in Europe may have afforded as great a rent to their proprietor as the richeft mines in Peru do at prefent. Though the quantity of filver was much lefs, it might have exchanged for an equal quantity of other goods, and the proprietor's fhare might have enabled him to purchafe or command an equal quantity either of labour or of commodities. The value both of the produce and of the rent, the real revenue which they afforded both to the public and to the proprietor, might have been the fame.

The moft abundant mines either of the precious metals or of the precious ftones could add little to the wealth of the world. A produce of which the value is principally derived from its fcarcity, is neceffarily degraded by its abundance. A fervice of plate, and the other frivolous ornaments of drefs and furniture, could be purchafed for a fmaller quantity of labour, or for a fmaller quantity of commodities; and in this would confift the fole advantage which the world could derive from that abundance.

It is otherwife in eftates above ground. The value both of their produce and of their rent is in proportion to their abfolute, and not to their relative fertility. The land which produces a certain quantity of food, cloaths, and lodging, can always feed, cloath, and lodge a certain number of people; and whatever may be the proportion of the landlord, it will always give

B O OK him a proportionable command of the labour of thofe people, and of the commodities with which that labour can fupply him. The value of the moft barren lands is not diminifhed by the neighbourhood of the moft fertile. On the contrary, it is generally increafed by it. The great number of people maintained by the fertile lands afford a market to many parts of the produce of the barren, which they could never have found among thofe whom their own produce could maintain.

Whateyer increafes the fertility of land in producing food, increafes not only the value of the lands upon which the improvement is beflowed, but contributes likewife to increafe that of many other lands, by creating a new demand for their produce. That abundance of food, of which, in confequence of the improvement of land, many people have the difpofal beyond what they themfelves can confume, is the great caufe of th demand both for the precious metals and . . precious ftones, as well as for every other conveniency and ornament of drefs, lodging, houfehold furniture, and equipage. Foud not only conftitutes the principal part of the riches of the world, but it is the abundance of food which gives the principal part of their value to many other forts of riches. The poor inhabitants of Cuba and St . Domingo, when they were firft difcovered by the Spaniards, ufed to wear little bits of gold as ornaments in their hair and other parts of their drefs. They feemed to value them as we would do any little pebbles of fomewhat
fomewhat more than oidinary beauty, and to con- $\mathbf{C H}_{\text {XI. }}$ A. fider them as juft worth the picking up, but not worth the refufing to any body who afked them. They gave thein to their new guefts at the firft requeft, without feeming to think that they had made them any very valuable prefent. They were aftonifhed to obferve the rage of the Spaniards to obtain them; and had no notion that there could any-where be a country in which many people had the difpofal of fo great a fuperfluity of food, fo fcanty always among themfelves, that for, a very finall quantity of thofe glittering baubles they would willingly give as much as might maintain a whole family for many years. Could they have been made to underftand this, the paffion of the Spaniards would not have furprifed them.

## PARTIII.

Of the Variations in the Proportion between the refpective Values of that Sort of Produce which always affords Rent, and of that which fometimes does and fometimes does not afford Rent.

THE increafing abundance of food, in confequence of increafing improvement and cultivation, mult neceffarily increafe the demand for every part of the produce of land which is not food, and which can be applied either to ufe or to ornament. ' In the whole progrefs of improvement, it might therefore be expected, there Chould be only one variation in the comparative

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B O O K values of thofe two different forts of produce.
The value of that fort which fometimes does and fometimes does not afford rent, fhould conftantly rife in proportion to that which always affords fome rent. As art and induftry advance, the materials of cloathing and lodging, the ufeful foffils and minerals of the earth, the precious metals and the precious ftones fhould gradually come to be more and more in demand, thould gradually exchange for a greater and a greater quantity of food, or in other words, fhould gradually become dearer and dearer. This accordingly has been the cafe with moft of thefe things upon moft occafions, and would have been the cafe with all of them upon all occafions, if particular accidents had not upon fome occafions increared the fupply of fome of them in a ftill greater proportion than the demand.

The value of a free-ftone quarry, for example, will neceffarily increafe with the increafing improvement and population of the country round about it; efpecially if it chould be the only one in the neighbourhood. But the value of a filver mine, even though there fhould not be another within a thoufand miles of it, will not neceffarily increafe with the improvement of the country in which it is fituated. The market for the produce of a free-ftone quarry can feldom extend more than a few miles round about it, and the demand mult generally be in proportion to the improvement and population of that fmall diftrict. But tie market for the produce of a
filver mine may extend over the whole known ${ }^{\mathbf{C}} \underset{\text { xi. }}{\text { A. }}$. world. Unefs the world in general, therefore, be advancing in improvement and population, the demand for filver might not be at all increafed by the improvement even of a large country in the neighbourhood of the mine. Even though the world in general were improving, yet, if in the courle of its improvement, new mihes fhould be difcovered, much more fertile than any which had been known before, though the demand for filver would neceffarily increafe, yet the fupply might increafe in fo much a greater proportion, that the real price of that metal might gradually fall; that is, any given quantity; a pound weight of it, for example, might gradually purchafe or command a fmaller and a fmaller quantity of labour, of exchange for a frialler and a frnaller quantity of corn, the principal part of the fubfintence of the labourer.

The great market for filver is the commercial and civilized part of the world.

Ir by the general progrefs of improvement the demand of this market fhould increafe, while at the fame time the fupply did not increafe in the fame proportion, the value of filver would gradually rife in proportion to that of corn. Any given quantity of filver would exchange for a greater and a greater quantity of corn; or, in other words, the average money price of corn would gradually become cheaper and cheaper.

Ir, on the contrary, the fupply by fome accident, Aould increafe for many years together in a in other words, the average money price of corn woukd, in fpite of all improvements; gradually become dearer and dearer.

Bur if, on the other hand, the fupply of the metal chould increafe nearly in the fame proportion as the demand, it would continue to purchafe or exchange for nearly the fame quantity of corn, and the average money price of corn would, in fpite of all improvements, continue very nearly the fame.

These three feem to exhauft all the pofible combinations of events which can happen in the progrefs of improvement; and during the courfe of the four centuries preceding the prefent, if we may judge by what has happened both in France and Great Britain, each of thofe three different combinations feem to have taken place in the European market, and nearly in the fame order too in which I have here fet them down.

Digrefion concerning the Variations in the Value of Silver during the Courfe of the Four laft Centuries.

## First Period.

IN 1350, and for fome time before, the average price of the quarter of wheat in England feems not to have been eftimated lower than four ounces of filver, Tower-weight, equal to about twenty fhillings of our prefent money. From

## this

this price it feems to have fallen gradually to $\mathbf{C H}_{\mathrm{H}}^{\mathrm{H}} \mathrm{P}$. ewo ounces of filver, equal to about ten fhillings $\underbrace{\text { x. }}$ of oun prefent money, the price at which we find it eftimated in the beginning of the fixteenth century, and at which it feems to have continued to bo eftimated tillabout 1570
In 1350 , being the 25 th of Edward III. was enacted what is called, The Statute of Labourers. In the preamble it complains much of the infolence of fervants, who endeavoured to raife their wages upon their mafters. It therefore ordains, that all fervants and labourers fhould for the future be contented with the fame wages and liveries (liveries in thofe times fignified, not only cloaths, but provifions) which they had been accuftomed to receive in the 20 th year of the king, and the four preceding years; that upon this account their livery-wheat fhould no-where be eftimated higher than ten-pence a bufhel, and that it fhould always be in the option of the mafter to deliver them either the wheat or the money. Ten-pence a bufhel, therefore, had, in the $25^{\text {th }}$ of Edward III. been reckoned a very moderate price of wheat, fince it required a particular ftatute to oblige fervants to accept of it in exchange for their ufual livery of provifions; and it had been reckoned a reafonable price ten years before that, or in the 16 th year of the king, the term to which the flatute refers. But in the 16th year of Edward III. ten-pence contained about half an ounce of filver, Tower-weight, and was nearly equal to half a crown of our prefent money. Four ounces of filver, Tower-weight,

B O O, $K$ therefore, equal to fix Chillings and eight-pence of te money of thofe times, and to near twenty Ghillings of that of the prefent, muft have been reckoned a moderate price for the quarter of eight buthels.

This ftatute is furely a better evidence of what was reckoned in thofe times a moderate price of grain, than the prices of fome particular years which have generally been recorded by hife torians and other writers on account of their extraordinary dearnefs or cheapnefs, and from which, therefore, it is difficult to form any judgment concerning what may have been the ordinary price. There are, befides, other reafons for believing that in the beginning of the fourteenth century, and for fome time before, the common price of wheat was not lefs than four ounces of filver the quarter, and that of other grain in proportion.

In 1399 , Ralph de Born, prior of St. Auguf-, tine's, Canterbury, gave a feaft upon his inftalla-tion-day, of which William Thorn has preferved, not only the bill of fare, but the prices of many particulars. In that feaft were confumed, ift, Fifty three quarters of wheat, which coft nineteen pounds, or feven fhillings and twon pence a quarter, equal to about one-and-twenty fhillings and fixpence of our prefent money; 2dly, Fifty-eight quarters of malt, which coft feventeen pounds ten Chillings, or fix billings a quarter, equal to about eighteen hillings of our prefent money: 3dly, Twenty quarters of oats, which colt four pounds, or four, fhillings a quarn
 money. The prices of malt and oats feem here $\underbrace{\text { X. }}$ to be higher than their ordinary proportion to the price of wheat.
These prices are not recorded on account of their extraordinary dearnefs or cheapnefs, but are mentioned accidentally, as the prices actually paid for large quantities of grain confumed at a feaft which was famous for its magnificence.

In 1262, being the 5 Ift of Henry III. was revived an ancient ftatute called, The 10ize of Bread and Ale, which, the king fays in the preatinble, had been made in the times of his pro. genitors, fometime kings of England. It is proBably, therefore, as old at leatt as the time of his grandfather Henry II, and may have been as old as the conqueft It regulates the price of bread according as the prices of wheat may happen to be, from one fhilling to twenty hillings the quarter of the money of thofe times. But ftatutes of this kind are generally prefumed to provide with equal care for all deviations from the middle price, for thofe below it as well as for thofe above it. Ten fhillings, therefore, containing fix ounces of Gilver, Tower-weight, and equal to about thirty fhillings of our prefent money, muft, upon this fuppofition, have been reckoned the middle price of the quarter of wheat when this ftatute was firft enacted, and muft have continued to be fo in the 5 Ift of Henry III. We cannot therefore be very wrong in fuppofing that the middle price was not lefs than one-third of the higheft price at which this

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${ }^{B} O_{1}$ O $K$ ftatute regulates the price of bread, or than lix
I. fhillings and eight-pence of the money of thofe times, containing four qunces of filver, Towerweight.

From thefe different facts, therefore, we feem to have fome reafon to conchude, that about the. middle of the fourteenth century, and for a confiderable time before, the average or ordinary price of the quarter of wheat was not fuppored to be lefs than four ounces of filver, Tower-weight.

From about the middle of the fourteenth to the beginning of the fixteenth century, what was reckoned the reafonable and moderate, that is the ordinary or average price of wheat, feems to have funk gradually to about one-half of this price; fo as at laft to have fallen to about two ounces of filver, Tower-weight, equal to about ten shillings of our prefent money. It continued to be eftimated at this price till about 1570 .

In the houfhold book of Henry, the fifth ear! of Northumberland, drawn up in 1512 , there are two different eftimations of wheat. In one of them it is computed at fix fhillings and eightpence the quarter, in the other at five fhillings and eight-pence only. In 1512 , fix fhillings and eight pence contained only two ounces of filver, Tower-weight, and were equal to about ten thillings of our prefent money.

From the 25 th of Edward III, to the beginning of the reign of Elizabeth, during the fpace of more than two hundred years, fix Shillings and eight-pence, it appears from feveral different ftatutes, had continued to be confidered as what
is called the moderate and reafonable, that is the $\mathrm{C}^{\mathrm{H}} \mathrm{A} \mathrm{A}^{\mathrm{P}}$. : ordinary or average price of wheat. The quantity of filver, however, contained in that nominal fum was, during the courfe of this period, continually diminifhing, in confequence of fome alterations which were made in the coin. But the increafe of the value of filver had, it feems, fo far compenfated the diminution of the quantity of it contained in the fame nominal fum, that the legiתature did not think it worth while to attend to this circumftance.

Thus in 1436 it was enacted, that wheat might be exported without a licence when the price was fo low as fix fhillings and eight-pence : and in $\$ 463$ it was enacted, that no wheat hould be imported if the price, was not above fix fhillings and eight-pence the quarter. The legifature had imagined, that when the price was fo low, there could be no inconveniency in exportation, but that when it rofe higher, it became prudent to allow of importation. Six fhillings and eightpence, therefore, containing about the fame quantity of filver as thirteen fhillings and fourpence of our prefent money (one third part lefs than the fame nominal fum contained in the time of Edward III.) had in thofe times been confidered as what is called the moderate and reafonable price of wheat.

In 1554 , by the 1 it and $2 d$ of Philip and Mary; and in 1558, by the ift of Elizabeth, the exportation of wheat was in the fame manner prohibited, whenever the price of the quarter thould exceed fix fhillings and eight-pence, which

BOOK which did not then contain two penny worth more filver than the fame nominal fum does at prefent. But it had foon been found that to reftrain the exportation of wheat till the price was fo very low, was, in reality, to prohibit it altogether. In 1562, therefore; by the sth of Elizabeth, the exportation of wheat was allowed from certain ports whenever the price of the quarter fhould not exceed ten Shillings, containing nearly the fame quantity of filver as the like nominal fum does at prefent. This price had at this time, therefore, been confidered as what is called the moderate and reafonable price of wheat. It agrees nearly with the eftimation of the Northumberland book in 1512.

That in France the average price of grain was, in the fame manner, much lower in the end of the fifteenth and beginning of the fixteenth century, than in the two centuries preceding, has been obferved both by Mr. Duprè de St. Maur, and by the elegant author of the Effay on the police of grain. Its price, during the fame period, had probably funk in the fame manner through the greater part of Europe.

This rife in the value of filver, in proportion to that of corn, may either have been owing altogether to the increafe of the demand for that metal, in confequence of increafing improvement and cultivation, the fupply in the mean time continuing the fame as before: Or , the demand cortinuing the fame as before, it may have been owing altogether to the gradual diminution of the fupply; the greater part of the mines which
which were then known in the world, being $\mathbf{C H}_{\mathrm{XI}} \mathrm{P}^{\mathbf{P}}$. much exhaufted, and confequently the expence $\underbrace{\text { xi. }}$ of working them much increafed: or it may have been owing partly to the one and partly. to the other of thofe two circumitances. In the ead of the fifteenth and beginning of the fixteenth centuries, the greater part of Europe was approaching towards a more fettled form of government than it had enjoyed for feveral ages before. The increafe of fecurity would naturally increale induftry and improvement; and the demand for the precious metals, as well as for every other luxury and ornament, would naturally increafe with the increafe of riches. A greater annual produce would require a greater quantity of coin to circulate it; and a greater number of rich people would require a greater quantity of plate and other ornaments of filver. It is natural to fuppofe too, that the greater part of the mines which then fupplied the European market with filver, might be a gcod deal exhaufted, and have become more expenfive in the working. They had been wrought many of them from the time of the Romans.

Ir has been the opinion, however, of the greater part of thofe who have written upon the prices of commodities in ancient times, that, from the Conqueft, perhaps from the invation of Julius Cæfar,' till the difcovery of the mines of America, the value of filver was continually diminifhing. This opinion they feem to have been led into, partly by the obfervations which they had occafion to make upon the prices both
${ }^{3} 0_{1} 0^{\circ} \mathrm{K}$ of corn and of fome other parts of the rude prow duce of land; and partly by the popular notion, that as the quantity of filver naturally increafes in cevery country with the increafe of wealth, fo its value diminifhes as iss quantity increafes.

In their obfervations upon the prices of corn, three different circumftances feem frequently to have milled them.

First, In ancient tiones, almoft all rents were paid in kind; in a certain quantity of corn, cattle, poultry, \&xc, It fometimes happened, however, that the landlord would ftipulate, that he thould be at liberty to demand of the tenant, either the annual payment in kind, or a certain fum of money inftead of is. The price at which the payment in kind was in this manner exchanged for a certain fum of money, is in Scotland called the converfion price. As the option is always in the landlord to take either the fubflance or the price, it is neceffary for the fafety. of the tenant, that the converfion price fhould rather be below than above the average market. price. In many places, accordingly, it is not much above one half of this price. Through the greater part of Scotland this cuftom ftill continues with regard to poultry, and in fome places with regard to cattle. It might probably. have continued to take place too with regard to corn, had not the inffitution of the public fiars put an end to it. Thefe are annual valuations ${ }_{x}$ according to the judgment of an affize, of the average price of all the different forts of grain, and of all the different qualities of each, ac-
cording to the actual marker price in every dif- $\mathrm{C} \mathrm{H}_{\mathrm{XI}} \mathrm{P}$. ferent county. This inftitution rendered it fuf$\underbrace{\mathrm{XI}}$ ficiently fafe for the tenant, and much more conwenient for the landiord, to convert, as they call it, the corn rent, rather at what fhould happen to be the price of the fiars of each year, than at any certain fixed price. But the writers who have collected the prices of corn in ancient times feem frequently to have miftaken what is called in Scotland the converfion price for the actual market price. Fleetwood acknowledges, upon one occalion, that he had made this miftake. As he wrote his book, however, for a particular purpofe, he does not think proper to make this acknowledgment till after tranfcribing this converfion price fifteen times. The price is eight shillings the quarter of whear. This fum in 1423, the year at which he begins with it, contained the fame quantity of filver as fixteen Shillings of our prefent money. But in 1562, the year at which he ends with it, it contained no more than the fame nominal fum does at prefent.

Secondiv, They have been milled by the flovenly manner in which fome ancient fatutes of affize had been fometimes tranfcribed by lazy copiers; and fometimes, perhaps, actually compofed by the legifature.

The ancient flatutes of affize feem to have begun always with determining what ought to be she price of bread and ale when the price of wheat and barley were at the loweft, and to have proceeded gradually to determine what it ought
${ }^{B} O_{1} O^{\circ}$ to be, according as the prices of thofe two forts $\xrightarrow[\sim]{\sim}$ of grain fhould gradually rife above this loweft price. But the tranferibers of thofe flatutes feem frequently to have thought it fufficient to copy the regulation as far as the three or four firft and loweft prices; faving in this manner their own labour, and judging, I fuppofe, that this was enough to fhow what proportion ought to be obferved in all higher prices.

Thus in the affize of bread and ale, of the 5 Ift of Henry III, the price of bread was regulated according to the different prices of wheat, from one fhilling to twenty fhillings the quarter, of the money of thofe times. But in the manufcripts from which all the different editions of the ftatutes, preceding that of Mr. Ruffhead, were printed, the copiers had never tranfcribed this regulation beyond the price of twelve fhillings. Several writers, therefore, being mined by this faulty tranfcription, very naturally concluded that the middle price, or fix hillings the quarter, equal to about eighteen fhillings of our prefent money, was the ordinary or average price of wheat at that time.

In the ftatute of Tumbrel and Pillory, enacted nearly about the fame time, the price of ale is regulated according to every fixpence rife in the price of barley, from two fhillings to four fhillings the quarter. That four fhillings, however, was not confidered as the highett price to which barley might frequently rife in thofe times, and that thefe prices were only given as an example of the proportion which ought to be obferved in "cabis fecundum prefcripta habendo refpectum

[^9]B o o K of ad pretium bladi." "You fhall judge of the re"c maining cafes according to what is above written "having a refpect to the price of corn."

Thirdly, They feem to have been milied too by the very low price at which wheat was fomerimes fold in very ancient times; and to have imagined, that as its loweft price was then much lower than in later times, its ordinary price mutt likewife have been much lower. They might have found, however, that in thofe ancient times, its higheft price was fully as much above, as its loweft price was below any thing that had ever been known in later times. Thus in 1270, Fleetwood gives us two prices of the quarter of wheat. The one is four pounds fixteen fhillings of the money of thofe times, equal to fourteen pounds eight fhillings of that of the prefent ; the other is fix pounds eight fhillings, equal to ninereen pounds four thillings of our prefent money. No price can be found in the end of the fifteenth, or beginning of the fixteenth century, which approaches to the extravagance of thefe. The price of corn, though at all times liable to variation, varies moft in thofe turbulent and diforderly focieties, in which the interruption of all commerce and communication hinders the plenty of one part of the country from relieving the fociety of another. In the diforderly fate of England under the Plantagenets, who governed. it from about the middle of the twelfth, till towards the end of the fifteenth century, one diftrict might be in plenty, while another at no great diftance, by having its crop deftroyed. either
either by fome accident of the feafons, or by the ${ }^{\text {C HAA }}$ P. incurfion of fome neighbouring baron, might be fuffering all the horrors of a famine; and yet if the lands of fome hoftile lord were interpofed between them, the one might not be able to give the leaft affiftance to the other. Under the vigorous adminiftration of the Tudors, who governed England during the latter part of the fifteenth, and through the whole of the fixteenth century, no baron was powerful enough to dare to difturb the public fecurity.

The reader will find at the end of this chapter all the prices of wheat which have been collected by Fleetwood from 1202 to 1597, both inclufive, reduced to the money of the prefent times, and digefted according to the order of time, into feven divifions of twelve years each. At the end of each divifion too, he will find the average price of the twelve years of which it confilts. In that long period of time, Fleetwood has been able to collect the prices of no more than eighty years, fo that four years are wanting to make out the laft twelve years. I have added, therefore, from the accounts of Eton College, the prices of $1598,1599,1600$, and 1601 . It is the only addition which I have made. The reader will fee, that from the beginning of the thirteenth, till after the middle of the fixteenth century, the average price of each twelve years grows gradually lower and lower ; and that towards the end of the fixteenth century it begins to rife again. The prices, indeed, which Fleetwood has been able to collect, feems to have been thofe chiefly which were Vol. I. U remark -

B o o K remarkable for extraordinary dearnel or cheapnefs; and I do not pretend that any very certain conclufion can be drawn from them. So far, however, as they prove any thing at all, they confirm the account which I have been endeavouring to give. Fleetwood himfelf, however, feems, with moft other writers, to have believed, that during all this period the value of filver, in confequence of its increafing abundance, was continually diminifhing. The prices of corn, which he himfelf has collected, certainly do not agree with this opinion. They agree perfectly with that of Mr. Duprè de St. Maur, 'and with that which I have been endeavouring to explain. Bifhop Fleetwood and Mr. Duprè de St. Maur are the two authors who feem to have collected, with the greateft diligence and fidelity, the prices of things in ancient times. It is fomewhat curious that, though their opinions are fo very different, their facts, fo far as they relate to the price of corn at leaft, fhould coincide fo very exactly.

It is not, however, fo much from the low price of corn, as from that of fome other parts of the rude produce of land, that the moft judicious writers have inferred the great value of filver in thofe very ancient times. Corn, it has been faid, being a fort of manufacture, was, in thofe rude ages, much dearer in proportion than the greater part of other commodities; it is meant, I fuppofe, than the greater part of unmanufactured commodities; fuch as cattle, poultry, game of all kinds, \&xc. That in thofe times of poverty and barbarifm thefe were proportion-
ably much cheaper than corn, is undoubtedly $\mathbf{C H}_{\mathrm{XI}}^{\mathrm{H}} \mathrm{A}_{\mathrm{f}} \mathrm{P}_{6}$ true. But this cheapnefs was not the effect of the high value of filver, but of the low value of thofe commodities. It was not becaufe filver would in fuch times purchafe or reprefent a greater quantity of labour, but becaufe fuch commodities would purchafe or reprefent a much fmaller quantity than in times of more opulence and improvement. Silver mult certainly be cheaper in Spanifh America than in Europe; in the country where it is produced, than in the country to which it is brought, at the expence of a long carriage both by land and by fea, of a freight and an infurance. One-and-twenty pence halfpenny fterling, however, we are told by Ulloa, was, not many years ago, at Buenos Ayres, the price of an ox chofen from a herd of three or four hundred. Sixteen fhillings fterling, we are told by Mr. Byron, was the price of a good horfe in the capital of Chili. In a country naturally fertile, but of which the far greater part is altogether uncultivated, cattle, poultry, game of all kinds, \&cc. as they can be acquired with a very fmall quantity of labour, fo they will purchafe or command but a very fmall quantity. The low money price for which they may be fold, is no proof that the real value of filver is there very high, but that the real value of thofe commodities is very low.

Labour, it mult always be remembered, and not any particular commodity, or fet of commodities, is the real meafure of the value both of filver and of all other commodities.

BOOK BUT in countries almolt wafte, or but thinly inhabited, cattle, poultry, game of all kinds, $\& \mathrm{c}$. as they are the fpontaneous productions of nature, fo the frequently produces them in much greater quantities than the confumption of the inhabitants requires. $\quad$ In fuch a ftate of things the fupply commonly exceeds the demand. In different ftates of fociety, in different ftages of improvement, therefore, fuch commodities will reprefent, or be equivalent to, very different quantities of labour.

In every ftate of fociety, in every ftage of improvement, corn is the production of human induftry. But the average produce of every fort of induftry is always fuited, more or lefs exactly, to the average confumption; the average fupply to the average demand. In every different ftage of improvement, befides, the raifing of equal quantities of corn in the fame foil and climate, will, at an average, require nearly equal quantities of labour; or, what comes to the fame thing, the price of nearly equal quantities; the continual increafe of the productive powers of labour in an improved fate of cultivation, being more or lefs counterbalanced by the continual increaling price of cattle, the principal inftruments of agriculture. Upon all thefe accounts, therefore, we may reft affured, that equal quantities of corn will, in every ftate of fociety, in every ftage of improvement, more nearly reprefent, or be equivalent to, equal quantities of labour, than equal quantities of any other part of the rude produce of land. Corn, accordingly,
thinly kinds, ions of much of the things d. In ages of ies will ifferent
of imman inery fort exactly, : fupply nt ftage $f$ equal climate, 1 quanre fame ies : the wers of ivation, he conprincipal hefe acat equal fociety, arly recities of part of rdingly, it it has already been obrerved, is, in all the dif- $\mathbf{C H}_{\text {xi. }} \mathbf{P}^{\text {P. }}$ ferent ftages of wealth and improvement, a more accurate meafure of value than any other commodity or fet of commodities. In all thofe different ftages, therefore, we can judge better of the real value of filver, by comparing it with corn, than by comparing it with any other commodity, or fet of commoditjes.

Corn, befides, or whatever elfe is the common and favourite vegetable food of the people, conftitutes, in every civilized country, the principal part of the fubfiftence of the labourer. In confequence of the extenfion of agriculture, the land of every country produces a much greater quantity of vegetable than of animal food, and the labourer every-where lives chiefly upon the wholefome food that is cheapeft and moft abundant. Butcher's-meat, except in the moft thriving countries, or where labour is moft highly rewarded, makes but an infignificant part of his fubfifterice; poultry makes a ftill finaller part of it, and game no part of it. In France, and even in Scotland, where labour is fomewhat better rewarded than in France, the labouring poor feldom eat butcher's-meat, except upon holidays, and other excraordinary occafions. The money price of labour, therefore, depends much more upon the average money price of corn, the fubfiftence of the labourer; than upon that of but-cher's-meat, or of any other part of the rude produce of land. The real value of gold and filver, therefore, the real quantity of labour which they can purchafe or command, depends much more

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upon the quantity of corn which they can purchafe or command, than upon that of butcher's-meat, or any other part of the rude produce of land.

Such night obfervations, however, upon the prices either of corn or of other commodities, would not probably have minled to many intelligent authors, had they not been influenced, at the fame time, by the popular notion, that as the quantity of filver naturally increafes in every country with the increafe of wealth, fo its value diminifhes as its quantity increafes. This norior, however, feems to be altogether groundlefs.

The quantity of the precious metals may increafe in any country from two different caules: either, firft, from the increafed abundance of the mines which fupply it; or, fecondly, from the increafed wealth of the people, from the increafed produce of their annual labour. 'The firft of thefe caufes is no doubt neceffarily connected with the diminution of the value of the precious metals; but the fecond is not.

When more abundant mines are difcovered, a greater quantity of the precious metals is brought to market, and the quantity of the neceffaries and conveniences of life for which they muft be exchanged being the fame as before, equal quantities of the metals mult be exchanged for fmaller quantities of commodities. So far, therefore ${ }_{2}$ as the increafe of the quantity of the precions ine it in any co intry arifes from the increafe a ancance of the mines, it is neceffarily connected with fome diminution of their value.

When, on the contrary, the wealth of any country increafes, when the annual produce of
its labour becomes gradually greater and greater, $\mathbf{C H}_{\mathbf{x} \text { A. }}{ }^{\text {P. }}$ a greater quantity of coin becomes neceffary in $\underbrace{\text { XI. }}$ order to circulate a greater quantity of commodities: and the people, as they can afford it, as they have more commodities to give for it, will naturally purchafe a greater and a greater quantity of plate. The quantity of their coin will increafe from neceffity; the quantity of their plate from vanity and oftentation, or from the fame reafon that the quantity of fine ftatues, pictures, and of every other luxury and curiofity, is likely to increafe among them. But a ftatuaries and painters are not likely to be worfe rewarded in times of wealth and prol erity, than in times of poverty and depreffion, fo gold and filver are not likely to be worfe paid for.

The price of gold and filver, when the accidental difcovery of more abundant $m$ s does not keep it down, as it naturally rifes with the wealth of every country, fo, whatever be the ftate of the mines, it is at all times nacurally higher in a rich than in a poor country. Gold and filver, like all other commodities, naturally feek the market where the beft price is given for them, and the beft price is commonly given for every thing in the country which can beft afford ic. Labour, it muft be remembered, is the ultimate price which is paid for every thing, and in countries where labour is equally well rewarded, the money price of labour will be in proportion to that of the fubfiftence of the labourer. But gold and filver will naturally exchange for a greater quantity of fubfiftence in a rich than in a $\mathrm{U}_{4}$ - poor its

300 K poor country, in a country which abounds with fubfiftence, than in one which is but indifferently fupplied with it. If the two countries are at a great diftance, the difference may be very great; becaufe though the metals naturally fly from the worfe to the better market, yet it may be difficult to tranfport them in fuch quantities as to bring their price nearly to a level in both. If the countries are near, the difference will be fmaller, and may fometimes be fcarce perceptible; becaufe in this cafe the tranfportation will be eafy. China is a much richer country than any part of Europe, and the difference between the price of fubfiftence in China and in Europe is very great. Rice in China is much cheaper than wheat is any-where in Europe. England is a much richer country than Scotland; but the difference between the money price of corn in thofe two countries is much fmaller, and is but juft perceptible. In proportion to the quantity or meafure, Scotch corn generally appears to be a good deal cheaper than Englifh; but in proportion to its quality, it is certainly fomewhat dearer. Scotland receives almoft every year very large fupplies from England, and every commodity muft commonly be fomewhat dearer in the country to which it is brought than in that from which it comes. Englifh corn, therefore, muft be dearer in Scotland than in England, and yet in proportion to its quality, or to the quantity and goodnefs of the flour or meal which can be made from it, it cannot commonly be fold higher there than the

Scotch
ds with ndifferries are oe very ally fly it may Iantities n both. will be perceportation country nce beand in s much Europe. 1 Scotmoney s much proporh corn per than $y$, it is receives n Engonly be th it is Eng-Scottion to nefs of n it, it tan the Scotch

Scotcli corn which comes to market in competition C \& A P. with it.

The difference between the money price of labour in China and in Europe; is ftill greater than that between the money price of fubfiltence; ; becaufe the real recompence of labour is higher in Europe than in China, the greater part of Europe being in an improving ftate, while China feems to be ftanding ftill. T money price of labour is lower in Scotland than in England, becaufe the real recompence of labour is much lower; Scotland, though advancing to greater wealth, advances much more flowly than England. The frequency of emigration from Scotland, and the rarity of it from England, fufficiently prove that the demand for labour is very different in the two countries. The proportion between the real recompence of laboưr in different countries, it mult be remembered, is naturally regulated, not by their actual wealth or poverty, but by their advancing, ftationary, or declining condition.

Gold and filver, as they are naturally of the greateft value among the richeft, fo they are naturally of the leaft value among the pooreft nations. Among favages, the pooreft of all nations, they are of fcarce any value.

In great towns corn is always dearer than ia remote parts of the country. This, however, is the effect, not of the real cheapnefs of filver, but of the real dearnefs of corn. It does not coft lefs labour to bring filver to the great town than to the remote parts of the country; but it cofts a great deal more to bring corn.

Boor In fome very rich and commercial countries, fuch as Holland and the territory of Genoa, corn is dear for the fame reafon that it is dear in great towns. They do not produce enough to maintain their inhabitants. They are rich in the induftry and fkill of their artificers and manufacturers, in every fort of machinery which can facilitate and abridge labour; in hipping, and in all the other inftruments and means of carriage and commerce: but they are poor in corn, which, as it mult be brought to them from diftant countries, mult, by an addition to its price, pay for the carriage from thofe countries. It does not coft lef́s labour to bring filver to Amfterdam than to Dantzick; but it cofts a great deal more to bring cos. The real coft of filver mult be nearly the fame in both places; but that of corn mult be very different. Diminifh the real opulence either of Holland or of the territory of Genoa, while the number of their inhabitants remains the fame : diminifh their power of fupplying themfelves from diftant countries; and the price of corn, inftead of finking with that diminution in the quantity of their filver, which muft neceffarily accompany this declenfion either as its caufe or as its effect, will rife to the price of a famine. When we are in want of neceffaries, we muft part with all fuperfluities, of which the value, as it rifes in times of epulence and profperity, fo it finks in times of poverty and diftrefs. It is otherwife with neceffaries. Their real price, the quantity of labour which they can purchafe or command, rifes in times of poverty.

## Second Pesiod.

B
UT how various foever may have been the opinions of the learned concerning the progrefs of the value of filver during the firf period, they are unanimous concerning it during the fecond.

From about 1570 to about 1640 , during a period of about feventy years, the variation in the proportion between the value of filver and that of corn, held a quite oppofite courfe. Silver funk

Book funk in its real value, or would exchange for 1. a fmaller quantity of labour than before; and corn rofe in its nominal price, and inftead of being commonly fold for about two ounces of filver the quarter, or about ten fhillings of our prefent money, came to be fold for fix and eight ounces of filver the quarter, or about thirty and forty fhillings of our prefent money.

The difcovery of the abundant mines of America, feems to have been the fole caufe of this diminution in the value of filver in proportion to that of corn. It is accounted for accordingly in the fame manner by every body; and there never has been any difpute either about the fact, or about the caufe of it. The greater part of Europe was, during this period, advancing in induftry and improvement, and the demand for filver muft confequently have been increafing. But the increafe of the fupply had, it feems, fo far exceeded that of the demand, that the value of that metal funk confiderably. The difcovery of the mines of America, it is to be obferved, does not feem to have had any very fenfible effect upon the prices of things in England till after 1570; though even the mines of Potofi had been difcovered more than twenty years before.

From 1595 to 1620 , both inclufive, the average price of the quarter of nine buthels of the beft wheat at Windfor market, appears from the accounts of Eton College to have been 2 l. Is. $6 d . \frac{9}{\mathrm{~T} 3}$. From which fum, neglecting the fraction, and deducting a ninth, or $4 \mathrm{~s} .7 \mathrm{~d} . \frac{1}{3}$, the
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Ameof this ion to gly in re neact, or jart of ing in nd for eafing. ms , $\mathfrak{f o}$ $e$ value covery ferved, Cenfible nd till Potofi years
e aveof the from e been lecting 7 d. $\frac{1}{3}$, the
 out to have been 1 l. $16 \mathrm{~s} .10 \mathrm{~d} . \frac{2}{3}$. And from this fum, neglecting likewife the fraction, and deducting a ninth, or 4 s. I $d . \frac{7}{5}$, for the difference between the price of the beft wheat and that of the middle wheat, the price of the middle wheat comes out to have been about il. 12 s . $8 \mathrm{~d} . \frac{8}{9}$, or about fix ounces and one third of an ounce of filver.

From 1621 to 1636 , both inclufive, the average price of the fame meafure of the bet wheat at the fame marker, appears, from the fame accounts, to have been $2 l$. Io s.; from which, making the like deductions as in the foregoing cafe, the average price of the quarter of eight bufhels of middle wheat comes out to have been 1l. igs. 6 d . or about feven ounces and twothirds of an ounce of filver. -

## Thirdereriod.

BETWEEN 1630 and 1640 , or about 1636 , the effect of the difcovery of the mines of America in reducing the value of filver, appears to have been completed, and the value of that metal feems never to have funk lower in proportion to that of corn than it was about that time. It feems to have rifen fomewhat in the courfe of the prefent century, and it had probably begun to do fo even fome time before the end of the laft.

From 1637 to 1700 , both inclufive, being the fixty-four laft years of the laft century, the ave-

BOOK rage price of the quarter of nine bufhels of the beft wheat at Windfor market, appears, from the fame accounts, to have been $2 l$. IIs. od. $\frac{1}{3}$; which is only is. $0 \mathrm{~d} . \frac{2}{3}$ dearer than it had been during the Gixteen years before. But in the courfe of thefe fixty-four years there happened two events which muft have produced a much greater fcarcity of corn than what the courfe of the feafons would otherwife have occafioned, and which, therefore, without fuppoling any further reduction in the value of filver, will much more than account for this very fimall enhancement of price.

The firf of thefe events was the civil war, which, by difcouraging tillage and interrupting commerce, mult have raifed the price of corn much above what the courfe of the feafons would otherwife have occafioned. It mutt have had this effect more or lefs at all the different markets in the kingdom, but particularly at thofe in the neighbourhood of London, which require to be fupplied from the greateft diftance. In 1648, accordingly, the price of the beft wheat at Windfor market, appears, from the fame accounts, to have been 4 l .5 s . and in 1649 to have been $4 l$. the quarter of nine bufhels. The excefs of thofe two years above $2 l$. ios. (the average price of the fixteen years preceding 1637) is 3 l. 5 s . ; which, divided among the fixty-four laft years of the laft.century, will alone very nearly account for that fmall enhancement of price which feems to have taken place in them. Thefe, however, though the higheft, are by no
of the m the od. $\frac{1}{3}$; d been in the ppened much urfe of d , and further 1 more cement
il war, rupting of corn feafons of have different larly at which diftance. It wheat me acto have 'he exthe ave1637) sty-four ne very hent of them. by no means
means the only high prices which feem to have $\mathbf{C}{ }_{\text {XI }} \mathbf{A l}^{\mathbf{P}}$. been occafioned by the civil wars.

The fecond event was the bounty upon the exportation of corn, granted in 1688. The bounty, it has been thought by many people, by encouraging tillage, may, in a long courfe of years, have occafioned a greater abundance, and confequently a greater cheapnefs of corn in the home-market, than what would otherwife have taken place there. How far the bounty could produce this effect at any time, I fhall examine hereafter; I fhall only obferve at prefent, that between 1688 and 1700, it had not time to produce any fuch effect. During this fhort period its only effect muft have been, by encouraging the exportation of the furplus produce of every year, and thereby hindering the abundance of one year from compenfating the fcarcity of another to raife the price in the home-market. The fearcity which prevailed in England from 1693 to 1699, both inclufive, though no doubt principally owing to the badnefs of the feafons, and, therefore, extending through a confiderable part of Europe, mult have been fomewhat enhanced by the bounty. In 1699, accordingly, the further exportation of corn was prohibited for nine months.

There was a third event which occurred in the courfe of the fame period, and which, though it could not occafion any fcarcity of corn, nor, perhaps, any augmentation in the real quantity of filver which was ufually paid for it, muft neceffarily have occafioned fome augmentation in

Boo. or the nominal fum. This event was the great debafement of the filver coin, by clipping and wearing. This evil had begun in the reign of Charles II. and had gone on continually increaling till 1695 ; at which time, as we may learn from Mr. Lowndes, the current filver coin was, at an average, near five-and-twenty per cent, below its ftandard value. But the nominal fum which conftitutes the market price of every commodity is neceffarily regulated, not fo much by the quantity of filver, which, according to the ftandard, ought to be contained in it, as by that which, it is found by experience, actually is contained in it. This nominal fum, therefore, is neceflarily higher when the coin is much debafed by clipping and wearing, than when near to its ftandard value.

In the courfe of the prefent century, the filver coin has not at any time been more below its ftandard weight than it is at prefent. But though very much defaced, its value has been kept up by that of the gold coin for which it-is exchanged. For though before the late re-coinage, the gold coin was a good deal defaced too, it was lefs fo than the filver. In 1695, on the contrary, the value of the filver coin was not kept up by the gold coin; a guinea then commonly exchanging for thirty fhillings of the worn and clipt filver. Before the late re-coinage of the gold, the price of filver bullion was feldom higher than five fhillings and feven-pence an ounce, which is but five-pence above the mint price. But in 1695 , the common price of filver bullion was fix fhit-
 ing and reign of ally in, ay learn jin was, er cent. nal fum ry comnuch by to the s by that $y$ is con. efore, is debafed ar to its
the filver selow its t though pt up by changed. the gold as lefs fo rary, the p by the changing pe filver. the price han five ch is but in 1695 , fix Thillings
$\mathrm{so}_{1}$. K In the fixty-four years of the prefent century, accordingly, the average price of the quarter of nine buthels of the beft wheat at Windfor market, appears, by the accounts of Eton College, to have been 2\%. os. 6d. ' $\frac{1}{3}$, , which is about ten fhillings and fixpence, or more than five-and-twenty per cent. cheaper than it had been during the fixty-four laft years of the laft century; and about nine fhillings and fixpence cheaper than it had been during the fixteen years preceding 1636, when the difcovery of the abundant mines of America may be fuppofed to have produced its full effect; and about one fhilling cherper than it had been in the twentylix years pieceding 1620, before that difcovery can well be fuppofed to have produced its full effect. According to this account, the average price of middle whear, during thefe fixty-four firft years of the prefent century, comes out to lave been about thirty-two fhillings the quarter of eight bufhels.

The value of filver, therefore, feems to have rifen fomewhat in proportion to that of corn during the courfe of the prefent century, and it had probably begun to do fo even fome time before the end of the laft.

In 1687, the price of the quarter of nine bufheis of the beft wheat at Windfor market was 1l. 5 s .2 d . the loweft price at which it had ever been from 1595 .

In 1688 , Mr. Gregory King, a man famous for his knowledge in matters of this kind; eftimated the average price of wheat in years of moderate
century, quarter Windfor ton Colwhich is ore than it had f the laft fixpence e fixteen ary of the ppofed to bout one e twentydifcovery ed its full e average fixty-four es out to pe quarter
s to have of corn ys and it ome time
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n famous sind, eftiyears of moderate
 buifhel, or eight-and-twenty fhilings the quarter. The grower's price I unde ftand to be the fame with what is fometimes calied the contract price, or the price at which a farmer contracts for a certain number of years to deliver a certain quantity of corn to a dealer. As a contract of this kind faves the farmer the expence and trouble of marketing, the contract price is generally lower than what is fuppofed to be the average market price. Mr. King had judged eightand twenty Chillings the quarter to be at that time the ordinary contract price in years of moderate plenty. Before the fcarcity occafioned by the late extraordinary courfe of bad feafons, it was, I have been affured, the ordinary contract price in all common years.
In 1688 was granted the parliamentary bounty upon the exportation of corn. The country gentlemen, who then compofed a ftill greater proportion of the leginature than they do at prefent, had felt that the money price of corn was falling. The bounty was an expedient to raife it artificially to the high price at which it had frequently been fold in the times of Charles I. and II. It was to take place, therefore, till wheat was fo high as forty-eight fhillings the quarter; that is, twenty hillings, or $\frac{5}{7}$ ths dearer than Mr. King had in that very year eftimated the grower's price to be in times of moderate plenty. If his calculations deferve any part of the reputation which they have obtained very univerfally, eight-and-forty fhillings the quarter

B O OK was a price which, without fome fuch expedient ${ }^{1}$ as the bounty, could not at that time be expected, except in years of extraordinary fcarcity. But the government of King William was not then fully fettled. It was in no condition to refufe any thing to the country gentlemen, from whom it was at that very time foliciting the firft eftablifiment of the annual land-tax.

The value of filver, therefore, in proportion to that of corn, had probably rifen fomewhat before the end of the laft century; and it feems to have continued to do fo during the courfe of the greater part of the prefent; though the neceffary operation of the bounty muft have hindered that rife from being fo fenfible as it otherwife would have been in the actual ftate of tillage.

In plentiful years the bounty, by occafioning an extraordinary exportation, neceffarily raifes the price of corn above what' it otherwife would be in thofe years. To encourage tillage, by keeping up the price of corn even in the moft plentiful years, was the avowed end of the inftitution.

In years of great fcarcity, indeed, the bounty has generally been fufpended. It muft, however, have had fome effect upon the prices of many of thofe years. By the extraordinary exportation which it occafions in years of plenty, it muft frequently hinder the plenty of one year from compenfating the fcarcity of another.

Both in years of plenty and in years of fcarcity, therefore, the bounty raifes the price of corn above what it naturally would be in the
actual ftate of tillage. If, during the fixty four $\mathbf{C}{ }^{H}{ }_{x i}{ }^{\mathbf{A}}$. firft years of the prefent century, therefore, the $\underbrace{\text { XI. }}$ average price has been lower than during the fixty-four laft years of the laft century, it muft, in the fame fate of tillage, have been much more fo, had it not been for this operation of the bounty.

But without the bounty, it may be faid, the ftate of tillage would not have been the fame. What may have been the effects of this inftitution upon the agriculture of the country, I fhall endeavour to explain hereafter, when I come to treat particularly of bounties. I fhall o: 'y obferve at prefent, that this rife in the value of filver, in proportion to that of corn, has not been peculiar to England. It has been obferved to have taken place in France during the fame period, and nearly in the fame proportion too, by three very faithful, diligent, and laborious collectors of the prices of corn, Mr. Duprè de St. Maur, Mr. Meffance, and the author of the Effay on the police of grain. But in France, till 1764, the exportation of grain was by law prohibited; and it is fomewhat difficult to fuppofe, that nearly the fame diminution of price which took place in one country, notwithftanding this prohibition, fhould in another be owing to the extraordinary encouragement given to exportation.

Ir would be more proper, perhaps, to confider this variation in the average money price of corn as the effect rather of fome gradual rife in the real value of filver in the European market, X 3
than
${ }^{B} 00 \mathrm{~K}$ than of any fall in the real average value of corn. 1. Corn, it has already been obferved, is at diftant periods of time a more accurate meafure of value than either filver, or perhaps any other commodity. When, after the difcovery of the abundant mines of America, corn rofe to three and four times its former money price, this change was univerfally afcribed, not to any rife in the real value of corn, but to a fall in the real value of filver. If during the fixty-four firft years of the prefent century, therefore, the average money price of corn has fallen fomewhat below what it had been during the greater part of the laft century, we Chould in the fame manner impute this change, not to any fall in the real value of corn, but to fome rife in the real value of filver in the European market.

The high price of corn during thefe ten or twelve years paft, indeed, has oecafioned a fufpicion that the real value of filver ftill continues to fall in the European market. This high price of corn, however, feems evidently to have been the effect of the extraordinary unfavourablenefs of the feafons, and ought therefore to be regarded, not as a permanent, but as a tranfitory and occafional event. The feafons for thefe ten or twelve years paft have been unfavourable through the greater part of Europe; and the diforders of Poland have very much increafed the fcarcity in all thofe countries, which, in dear years, ufed to be fupplied from that market. So long a courfe of bad feafons, though not a very common event, is by no means a fingular one; and whoever
e of corn. at diftant re of valte r commoe abundant - and four hange was n the real al value of sars of the ige money ow what it e laft cenmpute this te of corn, lver in the
efe ten or a fufpicion nues to fall price of e been the blenefs of régarded, $y$ and ocefe ten or le through diforders he fearcity years, ufed So long a y common id whoever mas
has enquired much into the hiftory of the prices ${ }^{C}{ }^{\mathrm{H}} \mathrm{AA}^{\mathrm{A}}$. P . of corn in former times, will be at no lofs to re- $\underbrace{\text { م- }}$ collect feveral other examples of the fame kind. Ten years of extraordinary fcarcity, befides, are not more wonderful than ten years of extraordinary plenty. The low price of corn from 174 x to 1750 , both inclufive, may very well be fet in oppofition to its high price during thefe laft eight or ten years. From 1741 to 1750, the average price of the quarter of nine bufhels of the beft wheat at Windfor market, it appears from the accounts of Eton College, was only 1.l. 13s. 9d. $\frac{4}{3}$, which is nearly 6 s. 3 d. below the average price of the fixty-four firlt years of the prefent century. The average price of the quarter of eight bufhels of middle wheat, comes out, according to this account, to have been during thefe ten years, only rl .6 s .8 d .

Between 1741 and 1750, however, the bounty mutt have hindered the price of-corn from falling fo low in the home market as it naturally would have done. During thefe ten years the quantity of all forts of grain exported, it appears from the cuftom-houfe books, amounted to no lefs than eight millions twenty-nine thoufand one hundred and fify-fix quarters one buthel. The bounty paid for this amounted to $1,514,962 l$. 175. 4 d. $\frac{1}{2}$. In 1749 accordingly, Mr. Pelham, at that time prime minifter, obferved to the Houfe of Commons, that for the three years preceding, a very extraordinary fum had been paid as bounty for the exportation of corn. $X_{4}$ He

Boo K He had good reafon to make this obfervation, I. and in the following year he might have had ftill better. In that fingle year the bounty paid amounted to no lefs than 324,176 l. ios. $6 d$ :* It is unneceffary to obferve how much this forced exportation mult have raifed the price of corn above what it otherwife would have been in the home market.

At the end of the accounts annexed to this chapter the reader will find the particular account of thofe ten years feparated from the reft: He will find there too the particular account of the preceding ten years, of which the average is likewife below, though not fo much below, the general average of the fixty-four firt years of the century. The year 1740, however, was a year of extraordinary fcarcity. Thefe twenty years preceding 1750, may very well be fet in oppofition to the twenty preceding 1770 . As the former were a good deal below the general average of the century, notwithftanding the intervention of one or two dear years; fo the latter have been a good deal above it, notwithftanding the intervention of one or two cheap ones, of 1759, for example. If the former have not been as much below the general average, as the latter have been above it, we ought probably to impute it to the bounty. The change has evidently been too firdden to be afcribed to any change in the value of filver, which is always now and gradual. The fuddennefs of the effect can be

[^10]accounted

 fuddenly, the accidental variation of the feafons.

The money price of labour in Great Britain has, indeed, rifen during the courfe of the prefent century. This, however, feems to be the effect, not fo much of any diminution in the value of filver in the European market, as of an increafe in the demand for labour in Great Britain, arifing from the great, and almoft univerfal profperity of the country. In France, a country not altogether fo profperous, the money price of labour has, fince the middle of the laft century, been obferved to fink gradually with the average money price of corn. Both in the laft century and in the prefent, the day-wages of, common labour are there faid to have been pretty uniformly about the twentieth part of the average price of the feptier of wheat, a meafure which contains a little more than four Winchefter bufhels. In Great Britain the real recompence of labour, it has already been fhown, the real quantities of the neceffaries and conveniencies of life which are given to the labourer, has increafed confiderably during the courfe of the prefent century. The rife in its money price feems to have been the effect, not of any diminution of the value of filver in the general market of Europe, but of a rife in the real price of labour in the particular market of Great Britain, owing to the peculiarly happy circumftances of the country.

For fome time after the firf difcovery of America, filver would continue to fell at its
${ }^{\boldsymbol{B} O} \mathbf{O}$. K former, or not much below its former price. The profits of mining would for fome time be very great, and much above their natural rate. Thofe who imported that metal into Europe, however, would foon find that the whole annual importation could not be difpofed of at this high price. Silver would gradually exchange for a fmaller and a fmaller quantity of goods. Its price would fink gradually lower and lower till it fell to its natural price; or to what was juft fufficient to pay, according to their natural rates, the wages of the labour, the profits of the ftock, and the rent of the land, which muft be paid in order to bring it from the mine to the market. In the greater part of the filver mines of Peru, the tax of the king of Spain, amounting to a tenth of the grofs produce, eats up, it has aleeady been obferved, the whole rent of the land. This tax was originally a half; it foon afterwards fell to a third, then to a fifth, and at laft to a tenth, at which rate it fill continues. In the greater part of the filver mines of Peru, this, it feems, is all that remains, after replacing the ftock of the undertaker of the work, together with its ordinary profits; and it feems to be univerfally acknowledged that thefe profits, which were once very high, are now as low as they can well be, confiftently with carsying on their works.

The tax of the king of Spain was reduced to 2 fifth of the regiftered filver in 1504*, one.

[^11]and-forty years before $\mathbf{1 5 4 5}$, the date of the dif. $\mathrm{OH}_{\mathrm{XI}} \mathrm{A}^{\mathrm{P}}$. covery of the mines of Potofi. In the courfe of ninety years, or before 1636 , thefe mines, the moft fertile in all America, had time fufficient to produce their full effect, or to reduce the value of filver in the European market as low as it could well fall, while it continued to pay this tax to the king of Spain. Ninety years is time fufficient to reduce any commodity, of which there is no monopoly, to its natural price, or to the loweft price at which, while it pays a particular tax, it can continue to be fold for any confiderable time together.

The price of filver in the European market might perhaps have fallen ftill lower, and it might have become neceffary either to reduce the tax upon it, not only to one tenth, as in 1736, but to one twentieth, in the fame manner as that upon gold, or to give up working the greater part of the American mines which are now wrought. The gradual increafe of the demand for filver, or the gradual enlargement of the market for the produce of the filver mines of America, is probably the caufe which has prevented this from happening, and which has not only kept up the value of filver in the European market, but has perhaps even raifed it fomewhat higher than it was about the middle of the laft century.

Since the firt difcovery of America, the market for the produce of its filver mines has been growing gradually more and more extenfive.
ooor First, The market of Europe has become gradually more and more extenfive. Since the difcovery of America, the greater part of Europe has been much improved. England, Holland, France and Germany ; even Sweden, Denmark, and Rufia, have all advanced confiderably both in agriculture and in manufactures. Italy feems not to have gone backwards. The fall of Italy preceded the conqueft of Peru. Since that time it feems rather to have recovered a little. Spain and Portugal, indeed, are fuppofed to have gone backwards. Portugal, however, is but a very finall part of Europe, and the declenfion of Spain is not, perhaps, fo great as is commonly imagined. In the beginning of the fixteenth century, Spain was a very poor country, even in comparifon with France, which has been fo much improved fince that rime. It was the well-known remark of the Emperor Charles V. who had travelled fo frequently through both countries, that every thing abounded in France, but 'that every thing was wanting in Spain. The increafing produce of the agriculture and manufictures of Europe muft neceffarily have required a gradual increafe in the quantity of filver coin to circulate it; and the increafing number of wealthy individuals muft have required the like increafe in the quantity of their plate and other ornaments of filver.

Secondly, America is itfelf a new market for the produce of its own filver mines; and as its advances in agriculture, induftry, and population, are much more rapid than thofe of the mort
thriving
become Since the f Europe Holland, penmark, ably both ly feems of Italy that time - Spain to have is but a lenfion of ommonly fixteenth even in been fo was the arles V. gh both France, in. The d manurequired lyer coin mber of the like nd other arket for nd as its populathe moft thriving
thriving countries in Europe, its demand mutt ${ }^{\mathbf{C}}{ }^{\mathrm{H}} \mathrm{A}^{\mathrm{A}}{ }^{\mathrm{P}}$. increafe much more rapidly. The Englifh co-lonies are altogether a new market; which pardy for coin, and partly for plate, requires a continually augmenting fupply of filver through a great continent where there never was any demand before. The greater part too of the Spanih and Portuguefe colonies are altogether new markets. New Granada, the Yucatan, Paraguay, and the Brazils, were, before difcovered by the Europeans, inhabited by favage nations, who had neither arts nor agriculture. A confiderable degree of both has now been introduced into all of them. Even Mexico and Peru, though they cannot be confidered as altogether new markets, are certainly much more extenfive ones than they ever were before. After all the wonderful tales which have been publifhed concerning the fplendid ftate of thofe countries in ancient times, whoever reads, with any degree of fober judgment, the hiftory of their firft difcovery and conqueft, will evidently difcern that, in arts, agriculture, and commerce, their inhabitants were much more ignorant than the Tartars of the Ukraine are at prefent. Even the Peruvians, the more civilized nation of the two, though they made ufe of gold and filver as ornaments, had no coined money of any kind. Their whole commerce was carried on by barter, and there was accordingly fcarce any divifion of labour among them. Thofe who cultivated the ground were obliged to build their own houfes, to make their own houfhold furniture, their own clothes,
${ }^{8} \mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{s}} \mathrm{O} \mathrm{K}$ elothes, moes, and inftruments of agriculture. The few artificers among them are faid to have been all maintained by the fovereign; the nobles, and the priefts, and were probably their fervants or naves. All the ancient arts of Mexico and Peru have never furnifhed one fingle manufacture to Europe. The Spanifh armies, though they fcarce ever exceeded five hundred men, and frequently did not amount to half that number, found almoft every-where great difficulty in procuring fubfiftence. The famines which they are faid to have occafioned almoft wherever they went, in countries too which at the fame time are reprefented as very populous and well-cultivated, fufficiently demonftrate that the fory of this populoufnefs and high cultivation is in $\lambda$ great meature fabulous. The Spanifh colonies are under a government in many refpects lefs favourable to agriculture, improvement, and population, than that of the Englifh colonies. They feem, however, to be advancing in all thefe much more rapidly than any country in Europe. In a fertile foil and happy climate, the great abundance and cheapnefs of land, 2 circumftance common to all new colonies, is, it feems, fo great an advantage as to compenfate many defects in civil government. Frezier, who vifited Peru in 1713, reprefents Lima as containing between twenty-five and twenty-eight thoufand inhabitants. Ulloa, who refided in the fame country between 1740 and 1746 , reprefents it as containing more than fifty thoufand. The difference in their accounts of the populouf-
nefs of feveral other principal towns in Chili and CHAP. Peru is nearly the fame; and as there feems to be $\underbrace{\text { xi. }}$ no reafon to doubt of the good information of either, it marks an increafe which is fcarce inferior to that of the Englifh colonies. America, therefore, is a new market for the produce of its own filver mines, of which the demand muft increafe much more rapidly than that of the moft thriving country in Europe.

Thirdly, The Eaft Indies is another market for the produce of the filver mines of America, and a market which, from the time of the firtt difcovery of thofe mines, has been continually taking off a greater and a greater quantity of filver. Since that time, the direct trade between America and the Eaft Indies, which is carried on by means of the Acapulco fhips, has been continually augmenting, and the indirect intercourfe by the way of Europe has been augmenting in a fill greater proportion. During the fixteenth century, the Portuguefe were the only European nation who carried on any regular trade to the Eaft Indies. In the laft years of that century the Dutch began to encroach upon this monopoly, and in a few years expelled them from their principal fettlements in India. During the greater part of the laft century, thofe two nations divided the moft confiderable part of the Eatt India trade between them; the trade of the Dutch continually augmenting in a ftill greater proportion than that of the Portuguefe declined. The Englifh and French carried on fome trade

BOOK with India in the laft century, but it has been greatly, augmented in the courfe of the prefent. The Eaft India trade of the Swedes and Danes began in the courfe of the prefent century. Even the Mufcovites now trade regularly with China by a fort of caravans which go over land through Siberia and Tartary to Pekin. The Eaf India trade of all thefe nations, if we except that of the French, which the laft war had well nigh annihilated, has been almoft continually augmenting. The increafing confumption of Eaft India goods in Europe, is, it feems, fo great, as to afford a gradual increafe of employment to them all. Tea, for example, was a drug very little uled in Europe before the middle of the latt century. At prefent the value of the tea annually imported by the Englifh Eaft India Company, for the ufe of their owr countrymen, amounts to more than a million and a half a year; and even this is not enough; a great deal more being conftantly finuggled into the country from the ports of Holland, from Gottenburg in Sweden, and from the coalt of France too, as long as the French Eaft-India Company was in profperity. The confumption of the porcelain of China, of the fpiceries of the Moluccas, of the piece goods of Bengal, and of innumerable other articles, has increafed very nearly in a like proportion. The tonnage a cordingly of all the European fhipping employed in the Eaft India trade, at any one time during the laft century, was not, perhaps, much greater than
that of the Englih Eaft India Company before ${ }^{C}{ }^{H} \times{ }^{\text {a }}$ P. the late reduction of their fhipping.

But in the Eaft Indies, particularly in China and Indoftan, the value of the precious metals, when the Europeans firt began to trade to thofe countries, was much higher than in Europe; and it fill continues to be fo. In rice countries, which generally yield two, fometimes three crops in the year, each of them more plentiful than any common crop of corn, the abundance of food mult be much greater than in any corn country of equal extent. Such countries are accordingly much more populous. In them too the rich, having a greater fuper-abundance of food to difpofe of beyond what they themfelves can confume, have the means of purchafing a much greater quantity of the labour of other people. The retinue of a grandee in China or Indoftan accordingly is, by all accounts, much more numerous and fplendid than that of the richeft fubjects in Europe. The fame fuperabundance of food, of which they have the difpofal, enables them to give a greater quantity of it for all thofe fingular and rare produtions which nature furnifhes but in very fmall quantities; fuch as the precious metals and the precious ftones, the gieat objects of the competition of the rich. Though che mines, cherefore, which fupplied the Indian market had been as abundant as thofe which fupplied the European, fuch commodities would naturally exchange for a greater quantity of food in India than in Europe. Bur the mines which fupplied the Indian Vol. I.

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sook market with the precious metals feem to have been a good deal lefs abundant, and thofe which fupplied it with the precious ftones a good deal more fo, than the mines which fupplied the European. The precious metals, therefore, would naturally exchange in India for fomewhat a greater quantity of the precious fones, and for a much greater quantity of food than in Europe. The money price of diamonds, the greateft of all fuperfluities, would be fomewhat lower, and that of food, the firf of all neceffaries, a great deal lower in the one country than in the other. But the real price of labour, the real quantity of the neceffaries of life which is given to the labourer, it has already been obferved, is lower both in China and Indoftan, the two great markets of India, than it is through the greater part of Europe. The wages of the labourer will there purchafe a fmaller quantity of food; and as the money price of food is much lower in India than in Europe, the money price of labour is there lower upon a double account; upon acrount both of the fmall quantity of food which it will purchafe, and of the low price of that food. But in countries of equal art and induftry, the money price of the greater part of manufactures will be in proportion to the money price of labour; and in manufacturing art and induftry, China and Indoftan, though inferior, ieem not to be much inferior to any part of Europe. The money price of the greater part of manufactures, therefore, will naturally be much lower in thofe great empires than it is any-where in Europe. Through
the greater part of Europe too the expence of $\mathbf{C} \mathbf{H}_{\mathbf{x}} \mathbf{A}^{\mathbf{A}} \mathbf{P}$. land-carriage increafes very much both the real $\underbrace{\text { xi. }}$ and nominal price of moft manufactures. It cofts more labour, and therefore more money, to bring firlt the materials, and afterwards the complete manufature to market. In China and Indoftan the extent and variety of inland navigations fave the greater part of this labour, and confequently of this money, and thereby reduce ftill lower both the real and the nominal price of the greater part of their manufactures. Upon all thefe accounts, the precious metals are a commodity which it always has been, and ftill continues to be, extremely advantageous to carry from Europe to India. There is fcarce any commodity which brings a better price there; or which, in proportion to the quantity of labour and commodities which it cofts in Europe, will purchafe or command a greater quantity of labour and commodities in India. It is more advantageous too to carry filver thither than gold ; becaufe in China, and the greater part of the other markets of India, the proportion be:tween fine filver and fine gold is but as ten, or at moft as twelve to one; whereas in Europe it is as fourteen or fifteen to one. In China, aind the greater part of the other markets of India, ten, or at moft twelve, ounces of filver, will purchafe an ounce of gold: in Europe it requires from fourteen to fifteen ounces. In the cargoes, therefore, of the greater part of European Mips which fail to India, filver has generally been one of the moft valuable articles. It is the mof valuable article in

B oo 1 . the Acapulco fhips which fail to Manilla. The

1. filver of the new continent feems in this manner to be one of the principal commodities by which the commerce between the two extremities of the old one is carried on, and it is by means of it, in a great meafure, that thofe diftant parts of the world are connected with one another.

In order to fupply fo very widely extended a market, the quantity of filver annually brought from the mines mult not only be fufficient to fupport that continual increafe both of coin and of plate which is required in all thriving countries; but to repair that continual wafte and confumption of filver which takes place in all countries where that metal is ufed.

The continual confumption of the precious metals in coin by wearing, and in plate both by wearing and cleaning, is very fenfible; and in commodities of which the ufe is fo very widely cxtended, would alone require a very great annual fupply. The confumption of thofe metals in fome particular manufactures, though it may not perhaps be greater upon the whole than this gradual confumption, is, however, much more fenfible, as it is much more rapid. In the manufactures of Birmingham alone, the quantity of gold and filver annually employed in gilding and plating, and thereby difqualified from ever afterwards appearing in the fhape of thofe metals, is faid to amount to more than fifty thoufand pounds fterling. We may from thence form fome notion how great muft be the annual confumption in all the different parts of the world,

OF nilla. The is manner to oy which the s of the old is of it , in a Jarts of the extended a ally brought fufficient to of coin and riving counafte and conin all counthe precious late both by ble ; and in very widely ery great anthofe metals ough it may hole than this much more
In the mae quantity of gilding and m ever afterlofe metals, is ifty thoufand thence form e annual conof the world, either
either in manufactures of the fame kind with $\mathbf{C H}$ H. $\mathbf{P}$. thofe of Birmingham, or in laces, embroideries, $\underbrace{\text { X. }}$ gold and filver ftuffs, the gilding of books, furniture, \&c. A confiderable quantity too muft be annually loft in tranfporting thofe metals from one place to another both by fea and by land. In the greater part of the governments of Afia, befides, the almoft univerfal cuftom of concealing treafures in the bowels of the earth, of which the knowledge frequently dies with the perfon who makes the concealment, muft occafion the lofs of a ftill greater quantity.

The quantity of gold and filver imported at both Cadiz and Lifbon (including not only what comes under regifter, but what may be fuppofed to be fmuggled) amounts, according to the beft accounts, to about fix millions fterling a year.

According to Mr. Meggens* the annual importation of the precious metals into Spain, at an average of fix years; viz. from 1748 to 1753 , both inclufive; and into Portugal, at an average of feven years; viz. from 1747 to 1753 , both inclufive; amounted in filver to $1,101,107$ pounds weight; and in gold to 49,940 pounds weight. The filver, at fixty-two fhillings the pound Troy, amounts to $3,413,431 \mathrm{l}$. 10 s . fterling. The gold, at forty-four guineas and a

[^12]$$
Y_{3} \quad \text { half }
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sook half the pound Troy, amounts to $2,333,446 \mathrm{l}$. 14 s .

1. fterling. Both together amount to $5,746,878$ l. 4 s. fterling. The account of what was imported under regifter, he affures us, is exact. He gives us the detail of the partictilar places from which the gold and filver were brought, and of the particular quantity of each metal, which, according to the regifter, each of them afforded. He makes an allowance too for the quantity of each metal which he fuppoies may have been fmug. gled. The great experience of this judicious merchant renders his opinion of confiderable weight.

According to the eloquent and, fometimes, well informed Author of the Philofophical and Political Hiftory of the Eftablifhment of the Europeans in the two Indies, $\theta$ annual importation of regiftered gold anc :uer into Spain, at an average of eleven years; viz. from 1754 to 1764, both inclufive; amounted to $13,984,185^{\frac{3}{5}}$ piaftres of ten reals. On account of what may have been fmuggled, however, the whole annual importation, he fuppofes, may have amounted to feventeen millions of piaftres; which, at 4 s .6 d . the piaftre, is equal to 3,$825 ; 000 \%$. fterling. He gives the detail too of the particular places from which the gold and filver were broughr, and of the particular quantities of each metal which, according to the regifter, each of them afforded. He informs us too, that if we were to judge of the quantity of gold annually imported from the Brazils into Lifbon by the amount of the rax paid to the
king of Portugal, which it feems is one-fifth of ${ }^{\mathrm{C}} \mathrm{H}_{\mathrm{XI}}^{\mathrm{H}} \mathrm{A}^{\mathrm{P}}$. the ftandard metal, we might value it at eighteen $\underbrace{\text { X1. }}$ millions of cruzadoes, or forty-five millions of French livres, equal to about two millions fterling. On account of what may have been fmuggled, however, we may fafely, he fays, add to this fum an eighth more, or 250,000 l. fterling, fo that the whole will amount to $2,250,000 l$. fterling. According to this account, therefore, the whole annual importation of the precious metals into both $\mathrm{Spsin}^{\text {in }}$ and Portugal, amounts to about $6,075,000 \mathrm{l}$. Aterling.

Several other very well authenticated, though manufcript, accounts, I have been affured, agree, in making this whole annual importation amount at an average to about fix millions fterling; fometimes a little more, fometimes a little lefs.

The annual importation of the precious metals into Cadiz and Lifbon, indeed, is not equal to the whole annual produce of the mines of America. Some part is fent annually by the Acapulco Ships to Manilla; fome part is employed in the contraband trade which the Spanifh colonies carry on with thofe of other European nations; and fome part, no doubr, remains in the country. The mines of America, befides, are by no means the only gold and filver muss in the world. They are, however, by far the moft abundant. The produce of all the other mines which are known, is infignificant, it is acknowledged, in comparifon with theirs; and the far greater part of their produce, it is likewife acknowledged, is annually imported into Cadiz $\mathrm{Y}_{4}$ and
 ${ }^{\text {i. }}$ ham alone, at the rate of fifty thoufand pounds a year, is equal to the hundres-and-twentieth part of this annual imporation at det taie of fix millions a ycar. The whule annual confumption of gold and filver, therefore, in all the different countries of the world where thofe metals are ufed, may perhaps be nearly equal to the whole annual produce. The remainder may be no more than fufficient to fupply the increafing demand of all thriving countries. It may even have fallen fo far fhort of this demand as fomewhat to raife the price of thofe metals in the European market.

The quantity of brafs and iron annually brought from the mine to the market is out of all proportion greater than that of goid and filver. We do not, however, upon this account, imagine that thofe coarfe metals are likely to multiply beyond the demand, or to become gradually cheaper and cheaper. Why hould we imagine that the precious metals are likely to do fo? The coarfe metals, indeed, though harder, are put to much harder ufes, and, as they are of lefs value, lefs care is employed in their prefervation. The precious metals, however, are not neceffarily immortal any more than they, but are liable too to be loft, wafted, and confumed in a great variety of ways.

The price of all metals, though liable to now and gradual variations, varies lefs from year to year then that of almoft any other part of the rude produce of land; and the price of the precious

Birmingpounds a cieth part $f$ fix milmption of different netals are the whole ay be no eafing deeven have mewhat to European
annually $t$ is out of d and filis account, likely to to become fhould we ikely to do gh harder, they are of eir preferr, are not ey, but are fumed in a
ole to now om year to jart of the of the precious
cious metals is even lefs liable to fudden vari- CHAP. ations than that of the coarfe ones. The durable- $\underbrace{\text { xI. }}$ nefs of metals is the foundation of this extraordinary fleadinefs of price. The corn which was brought to market laft year, will be all or almoft all confumed long before the end of this year. But fome part of the iron which was brought from the mine two or three hundred years ago, may be ftill in ufe, and perhaps fome part of the gold which was brought from it two or three thoufand years ago. The different maffes of corn which in different years muft fupply the confumption of the world, will always be nearly in proportion to the refpective produce of thofe different years. But the proportion between the different maffes of iron which may be in ufe in tiwo different years, will be very little affected by any accidental difference in the produce of the iron mines of thefe two years; and the proportion between the maffes of gold will be ftill lef's affected by any fuch difference in the produce of the gold mines. Though the produce of the greater part of metallic mines, therefore, varies, perhaps, ftill more from year to year than that of the greater part of corn-fields, thofe variations have not the fame effect upon the price of the one fpecies of commodities, as upon that of the other, EFORE the difcovery of the mines of America; the value of fine gold to fine filver was regulated in the different mints of Europe, between the proportion of one to ten and one to twelve; that is, an ounce of fine gold was fuppoled to be worth from ten to twelve ounces of fine filver. About the middle of the laft century it came to be regulated, between the proportions of one to fourteen and one to fifteen; that is, an ounce of fine gold came to be fuppofed worth between fourteen and fifteen ounces of fine filver. Gold rofe in its nominal value, or in the quanticy of filver which was given for it. Both me.tals funk in their real value, or in the quantity of labour which they could purchafe; but filver funk more than gold. Though both the gold and filver mines of America exceeded in fertility all thofe which had ever been known before, the fertility of the filver mines had, it feems, been proportionably ftill greater than that of the gold ones.

The great quantities of filver carried annually from Europe to India, have, in fome of the Englifh fettements, gradually reduced the value of that metal in proportion to gold. In the mint of Calcutta, an ounce of fine gold is fuppofed to be worth fifteen ounces of fine filver, in the fame: manner as in Europe. It is in the mint, perhaps, rated too high for the value which it bears in the market
 gold to filver ftill continues as one to ten, or one $\underbrace{\text { xi- }}$ to twelve. In Japan, it is faid to be as one to eight.

The proportion between the quantities of gold and filver annually imported into Europe, according to Mr. Meggens's account, is as one to twenty-two nearly ; that is, for one ounce of gold there are imported a little more than twenty-two ounces of filver. The great quantity of filver fent annually to the Eaft Indies, reduces, he fuppofes, the quantities of thofe metals which remain in Europe, to the proportion of one to fourteen or fifteen, the proportion of their values. The proportion between their values, he feems to think, muft neceffarily be the fame as that between their quantities, and would therefore be as one to twenty-two, were it not for this greater exportation of filver.

But the ordinary proportion between the refpective values of two commodities is not neceffarily the fame as that between the quantities of them which are commonly in the market. The price of an ox, reckoned at ten guineas, is about threefcore times the price of a lamb, reckoned at 3 s .6 d . It would be abfurd, however, to infer from thence, that there are commonly in the market threefcore lambs for one ox: and it would be juft as ablurd to infer, becaufe an ounce of gold will commonly purchafe from fourteen to fifteen ounces of filver, that there are commonly in the market only fourteen cr fifteen ounces of filver for one ounce of gold.
${ }^{\mathrm{B}} \mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{i}} \mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{K}} \mathrm{T}$ Tequantity of filver commonly in the market, it is probable, is much greater in proportion to that of gold, than the value of a certain quantity of gold is to that of an equal quantity of filver. The whole quantity of a cheap commodity brought to market, is commonly not only greater, but of greater value, than the whole quantity of a dear one. The whole quanticy of bread annually brought to market is not only greater, but of greater value than the whole quantity of butcher's-meat; the whole quantity of butcher's-meat, than the wiole quantity of poultry; and the whole quantity of poultry, than the whole quantity of wild fowl. There are fo many more puichafers for the cheap than for the dear commodity, that, not only a greater quantity of it, but a greater value, can commonly be difpofed of. The whole quantity, therefore, of the cheap commodicy mult commonly be greater in proportion to the whole quantity of the dear ote, than the value of a certain quantity of the dear one, is to the value of an equal quantity of the cheap one. When we compare the precious metals with one another, filver is a cheap, and gold a dear commodity. We ought naturally to expect, therefore, that there fhould always be in the market, not oniy a greater quantity, but a greater value of filver than of gold. Let any man, who has a little of both, compare his own filver with his gold plate, and he will probably find, that, not only the quantity, but the value of the former greatly exceeds that of the latter. Miany people, befides, have
have a good deal of filver who have no gold ${ }^{\text {C }}{ }_{\text {X1. }}{ }^{\text {A }}{ }^{\text {P. }}$ plate, which, even with thofe who have it, is generally confined to watch-cafes, fnuff-boxes, and fuch like trinkets, of which the whole amount is feldom of great value. In the Britifh coin, indeed, the value of the gold preponderates greatly, but it is not fo in that of all countries. In the coin of fome countries the value of the two metals is nearly equal. In the Scotch coin, before the union with England, the gold preponderated very littie, though it did fomewhat *, as it appears by the accounts of the mint. In the coin of many countries the filver preponderates. In France, the largeft fums are commonly paid in that metal, and it is there difficult to get more gold than what is neceffary to carry about in your pocket. The fuperior value, however, of the filver plate above that of he gold, which takes place in all countries, will much more than compenfate the preponderancy of the gold coin above the filver, which takes place only in fome countries.

Though, in one fenfe of the word, filver always has been, and probably always will be, much cheaper then gold; yet, in another fenfe, gold may, perhaps, in the prefent ftate of the Spanifh market, be faid to be fomewhat cheaper than filver. A commodity may be faid to be dear or cheap, not only according to the abfolute greatnefs and finallinefs of its ufual price, but

[^13]B o OK according as that price is more or lefs above the loweft for which it is poffible to bring it to market for any confideratle time together. This loweft price is that which barely replaces, with a moderate profir, the ftock which mutt bie employed in bringing the commodity thither. It is the price which affords nothing to the landlord, of which rent makes not any component part, but which refolves itfelf altogether into wages and profit. But, in the prefent ftate of the Spanilh market, gold is certainly fomewhat nearer to this loweft price than filver. The tax of the king of Spain upon gold is only onetwentieth part of the ftandard metal, or five per cent.; whereas his tax upon filver amounts to one-tenth part of it, or to ten per cent. In thefe taxes too, it has already been obferved, confifts the whole rent of the greater part of the gold and filver mines of Spanih America; and that upon gold is $f t:!$ worfe paid than that upon filver. The profits of the undertakers of gold mines too, as they more rarely make a fortune, mult, in general, be ftill more moderate than thofe of the undertakers of filver mines. The price of Spanih gold, therefore, as it affords both lefs rent and lefs profit, muft, in the Spanifh narket, be fomewhat nearer to the loweft price for which it is poffible to bring it thither, than the price of Spanifh filver. When all expences are computed, the whole quantity of the one metal, it would feem, cannot, in the Spanifh market, be difpofed of fo advantageoufly as the whole quantity of the other. The tax, indeed,
indeed, of the king of Portugal upon the gold $\mathbf{C H}_{X 1}{ }^{\wedge}{ }^{\mathbf{A}}$. of the Brazils, is the fame with the ancient tax $\xrightarrow[\sim]{\sim}$ of the king of Spain upon the filver of Mexico and Peru; or one fifth part of the ftandard metal. It may, therefore, be uncertain whether to the general market of Europe the whole mals of American gold comes at a price nearer to the loweft for which it is poffible to bring it thither, than the whole mafs of American filver.

The price of diamonds and other precious ftones may, perhaps, be ftill nearer to the loweft price at which it is poffible to bring them to market, than even the price of gold.

Thouger it is not very probable, that any part of a tax which is not only impofed upon one of the moft proper fubjects of taxation, a mere luxury and fuperfluity, but which affords fo very important a revenue, as the tax upon filver, will ever be given up as long as it is poffible to pay it ; yet the fame impolfibility of paying it, which in 1736 made it neceffary to reduce it from onefifth to one-tenth, may in time make it neceffary to reduce it fill further ; in the fame manner as it made it neceffary to reduce the tax upon gold ta one-twentieth. That the filvar mines of Spanih America, like all other mines, become gradually more expenfive in the working, on account of the greater depths at which it is neceffary to carry on the works, and of the greater expence of drawing out the water, and of fupplying them with frefh air at thofe depths, is acknowledged by every body who has enquired into the fate of thofe mines.
book These caufes, which are equivalent to a growing fcarcity of filver (fur a commodity may be faid to grow fcarcer when it becomes more difficult and expenfive to collect a certain quantity of it), muft, in time, produce one or other of the three following events. The increafe of the expence muft either, firft, be compenfated altogether by a proportionable increafe in the price of the metal; or fecondly, it muft be compenfated altogether by a proportionable diminution of the tax upon filver; or thirdly, it muft be compenfated partly by the one, and partly by the other of thofe two expedients. This third event is very poffible. As gold rofe in its price in proportion to filver, notwithftanding a great diminution of the tax upon gold; fo filver might rife in its price in proportion to labour and commodities, notwithftanding an equal diminution of the tax upon filver.

Such fucceffive reductions of the tax, however, though they may not prevent altogether, muft certainly retard, more or lefs, the rife of the value of filver in the European market. In confequence of fuch reductions, many mines may be wrought which could not be wrought before, becaufe they could not afford to pay the old tax; and the quantity of filver annually brought to market muft always be fomewhat greater, and, therefore, the value of any given quantity fomewhat lefs, than it otherwife would have been. In confequence of the reduction in 1736, the value of filver in the European market, though it may not at this day be lower than before that reduction, than it would have been, had the Court of Spain continued to exact the old tax.

That, notwithftanding this reduction, the value of filver has, during the courfe of the prefent century, begun to rife fomewhat in the European market, the facts and arguments which have been alleged above, difpofe me to believe, or more properly to fufpect and conjecture; for the bett opinion which I can form upon this fubject fcarce, perhaps, deferves the name of belief. The rife, indeed, fuppofing there has been any, has hitherto been fo very fmall, that after all that has been faid. it may, perhaps, appear to many people uncertain, not only whether this event has actually taken place; but whether the contrary may not have taken place, or whether the value of filver mas not fill continue to fall in the European market.

It muft be obferved, however, that whatever may be the fuppofed annual importation of gold and filver, there muft be a certain period, at which the annual confumption of thofe metals will be equal to that annual importation. Their confumption muft increafe as their mafs inCrates, or rather in a much greater proportion. As their mals increafes, their value diminihes. They are more ufed, and lefs cared for, and their confumption confequently increafes in a greater proportion than their mafs. After a certain period, therefore, the annual confumption of thofe metals muft, in this manner, become equal to their annual importation, provided that importation Vol. I.

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is
${ }^{3} 00 \mathrm{~K}$ is not continually increafing; which, in the prefent times, is not fuppofed to be the cafe.
$I_{f}$, when the annual confumption has become equal to the annual importation, the annual importation fhould gradually diminifh, the annual confumption may, for fome time, exceed the annual importation. The mafs of thofe metals may gradually and infenfibly diminifh, and their value gradually and infenfibly rife, till the annual importation becoming again ftationary, the annual confumption will gradually and infenfibly accommodate itfelf to what that annual importation can maintain.

Grounds of the Sufpicion that the Value of Silver fill continues to decreafe.

THE increafe of the wealth of Europe, and the popular notion that, as the quantity of the precious metals naturally increafes with the increafe of wealth, fo their value diminighes as their quantity increales, may, perhaps, difpofe many people to believe that their value ftill cortinues to fall in the European marker; and the ftill gradually increafing price of many parts of the rude produce of land may confirm them ftill further in this opinion.

That that increafe in the quantity of the precious metals, which arifes in any country from the increare of wealth, has no tendency to diminifh their value, I have endeavoured to fhow already. Gold and filver naturally refort to a rich
rich country; for the fame reafon that all forts of ${ }^{\mathbf{C}} \mathbf{~ H A} \mathbf{A}$. : luxuries and curiofities refort to it; not becaufe $\underbrace{\text { xi. }}$ they are cheaper there than in poorer countries, but becaufe they are dearer, or becaufe a better price is given for them. It is the fuperiority of price which attracts them, and as foon as that fuperiority ceafes, they neceffarily ceafe to go thither.

If you except corn and fuch other vegetables as are raifed altogether by human induftry, that all other forts of rude produce, cattle, poultry, game of all kinds, the ufeful foffils and minerals of the earth, \&cc. naturally grow dearer as the fociety advances in wealth and improvement, I have endeavoured to fhow already. Though fuch commodities, therefore, come to exchange for a greater quantity of filver than before, it will not from thence follow that filver has become really cheaper, or will purchafe lefs labour than before, but that fuch commodities have become realiy dearer, or will purchafe more labou: than before. It is not their nominal price only, but their real price which rifes in the progrefs of improvement. The rife of their nominal price is the effect, not of any degradation of the value of filver, but of the rife in their real price.

## Different Effects of the Progrefs of Improvement upon three different Sorts of rude Produce.

T
HESE different forts of rude produce may be divided into three claffes. The firf comprehends thofe which it is farce in the Z 2 power

в о о K power of human induftry to multiply at all. The
$\mathrm{I}^{\text {I. fecond, thofe which it can multiply in propor- }}$ tion to the demand. The third, thofe in which the efficacy of induftry is either limited or uncertain. In the progrefs of wealth and improvement, the real price of the firtt may rife to any degree of extravagance, and feems not to be limited by any certain boundary. That of the fecond, though it may rife greatly, has, however, a certain boundary beyond which it cannot well pafs for any confiderable time together. That of the third, though its natural tendency is to rife in the progrefs of improvement, yet in the fame degree of improvement it may fometimes happen even to fall, fometimes to continue the fame, and fometimes to rife more or lefs, according as different accidents render the efforts of human induftry, in multiplying this fort of rude produce, more or lefs fuccefsful.

## Firft Sort.

The firt fort of rude produce of which the price rifes in the progrefs of improvement, is that which it is farce in the power of human induftry to multiply at all. It confifts in thofe things which nature produces only in certain quantities, and which being of a very perifhable nature, it is impofible to accumulate tngether the produce of many different feafons. Such are the greater part of rare and fingular birds and fifhes, many different forts of game, almoft all wild-fowl, all birds of paftage in particular, as well as many other things. When wealth and

The oporwhich r un-rrove0 any be liof the howcannot yether. adency yet in fomeontinue fs, acorts of f rude
the luxury which accompanies it increafe, the ${ }^{C}{ }^{H} A$ demand for thefe is likely to increafe with them, and no effort of human induftry may be able to increafe the fupply much beyond what it was before this increafe of the demand. The quantity of fuch commodities, therefore, remainiag the fame, or nearly the fame, while the competition to purchafe them is continually increafing, their price may rife to any degree of extravagance, and feems not to be limited by any certain boundary. If woodcocks fhould become fo fafhionable as to fell for twenty guineas a-piece, no effort of human induftry could increafe the number of thofe brought to market, much beyond what it is at prefent. The high price paid by the Romans, in the time of their greateft grandeur, for rare birds and fifhes, may in this manner eafily be accounted for. Thefe prices were not the effects of the low value of filver in thofe times, but of the high value of fuch rarities and curiofities as human induftry could not mulciply ac pleafure. The real value of filver was higher at Rome, for fome time before and after the fall of the repuhblic, than it is through the greater part of Europe at, prefent. Three feftertii, equal to about fixpence fterling, was the price which the republic paid for the modius peck of the tithe wheat of Sicily. This price, however, was probably below the average market price, the obligation to deliver their wheat at this rate being confidered as a tax upon the Sicilian farmers. When the Romans, therefore, had occafion to order more corn than the tithe of

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\mathbb{Z}_{3} \quad \text { wheat }
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${ }^{3} 0_{1} 0^{\prime}$. ${ }^{\text {w }}$ wheat amounted to, they were bound by capitulation to pay for the furplus at the rate of four fefterrii, or eight-pence fterling the peck; and this had probably been reckoned the moderate and reafonable, that is, the ordinary or average contract price of thofe times; it is equal to about one-and-twenty fhillings the quarter. Eight-and-twenty fhillings the quarter was, before the late years of fcarcity, the ordinary contract price of Englifh wheat, which in quality is inferior to the Sicilian, and generally felis for a lower price in the European market. The value of filver, therefore, in thofe ancient times, mult have been to its value in the prefent, as three to four inverfely; that is, three ounces of filver would ther have purchafed the fame quantity of labour and commodities which four ounces will do at prefent. When we read in Pliny, therefore, that Seius* bought a white nightingale, as a prefent for the emprefs Agrippina, at the price of fix thoufand feftertii, equal to about fifty pounds of our prefent money; and that Afinius Celer $\dagger$ purchafed a furmullet at the price of eight thoufand feftertii, equal to about fixty-fix pounds thirteen fhillings and four-pence of our preíent money; the extravagance of thofe prices, how much foever it may furprife us, is apt, notwithftanding, to appear to us about one-third lefs than it really was. Their real price, the quantity of labour and fubfiftence which was given away for them, was about one third more than their nominal price is apt to exprefs to us

[^14] gale the command of a quantity of labour and fubfiftence equal to what 66 l .13 s .4 d . would purchafe in the prefent times ; and Afinius Celer gave for a furmullet the command of a quantity equal to what 88 !. 17 s . 9 d. $\frac{1}{3}$, would purchafe. What occafioned the extravagance of thofe high prices was, not fo much the abundance of filver, as the abundance of labour and fubfiftence, of which thofe Romans had the difpofal, beyond what was neceffary for their own ufe. The quantity of filver, of which they had the difpoial, was a good deal lefs than what the command of the fame quantity of labour and fubfiftence would have procured to them in the prefent times.

## Second Sort.

The fecond fort of rude produce of which the price rifes in the progrefs of improvement, is that which human induftry can multiply in proportion to the demand. It confifts in thofe ufeful plants and animals, which, in uncultivated countries, nature produces with fuch pro. fufe abundance, that they are of little or no value, and which, as cultivation advances, are therefore forced to give place to fome more profitable produce. During a long period in the progrefs of improvement, the quantity of thefe is continually diminifhing, while at the fame time the demand for them is continuarlv incaifing. Their ral value, therefore, tite real quantity of labou: which they will purchafe or command, gradually rifes, till at laft it gets fo

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24 \quad \text { high }
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${ }^{8} O_{1}$ or high as to render them as profitable a produce
${ }^{1 .}$ as any thing elfe which human induftry can raife upon the moft fertile and beft cultivated land. When it has got fo high it cannot well go highe: If it did, more land and more induftry would form be canployed to increafe their quantity.

When the price of cattle, for example, rifes fo high that it is as profitable to cultivate land in order to raife food tor them, as in order to raife food for man, it cannot well go higher. If it did, more corn land would foon be turned into paiture. Whe extenfion of tillage, by dimi. nifhing the quantity of wild pafture, diminifhes the quantity of butcher's-meat which the country naturally produces without labour or cultivation, and by increafing the number of thofe who have either corn, or, what comes to the fane thing, the price of corn, to give in exchange for it, increafes the demand. The price of butcher's-meat, therefore, and confequently of cattle, mult gradually rife till it gets fo high, that it becomes as profitable to employ the moft fertile and beft cultivated lands in raifing food for them as in raifing corn. But it muft always be late in the progrefs of improvement before tillage can be fo far extended as to raife the price of cattle to this height; and till it has got to this height, if the country is advancing at all, their price mult be continually rifing. There are, perhaps, fome parts of Europe in which the price of cattle has not yet $\mathcal{G}$ to this height. It '. Ad not got to this height its any part of Scot1., before the union. Fial the Scotch cattle been
been always confined to the market of Scotland, CXA. in a country in which the quantity of land; which can be applied to no other purpole but thefeeding of cattie, is fo great in proportion to what can be applied to other purpofes, it is fcarce poffible, perhaps, that their price could ever have rifen fo high as to render it profitable to cultivate land for the fake of feeding them. In England, the price of cattle, it has already been obferved, feems, in the neighbo thood of London, to have got to this height about the beginning of the lalt century; but it was much later probably before it got through the greater part of the remoter counties; in fome of which, perhaps, it may fearce yet have got to it. Of all the different fubftances, however, which compofe this fecond fort of rude produce, cattle is, perhaps, that of which the price, in the progrefs of improvement, firft rifes to this height.

Till the price of cattle, indeed, has got to this height, it feems fcarce poffible that the greater part, even of thofe lands which are capable of the higheft cultivation, can be completely cultivated. In all farms too diftant from any town to carry manure from it, that is, in the far greater part of thofe of every extenfive country, the quantity of well-cultivated land mult be in proportion to the quantity of manure which the farm itfelf produces; and this again mult be in proportion to the ftock of catcle which are maintained upon it. The land is manured either by pafturing the cattle upon it, or by feeding them in the ftable, and from chence

B o ox thence carrying out their dung to it. But unlers I. the price of the cattle be fufficient to pay both the rent and profit of cultivated land, the farmer cannot afford to pafture them upon it; and he can ftill lefs afford to feed them in the ftable. It is with the produce of improved and cultivated land only, that cattle can be fed in the fable; becaufe to collect the fcanty and fcattered produce of watte and unimproved lands would require too much labour and be too expenfive. If the price of the cattle, therefore, is not fufficient to pay for the produce of improved and cultivated land, when they are allowed to pafture it, that price will be ftill lefs fufficient to pay for that produce when it mult be collected with a good deal of additional labour, and brought into the fable to them. In thefe circumftances, therefore, no more cattle can, with profit, be fed in the ftable than what are neceffary for tillage. But thefe can never afford manure enough for keeping conftantly in good condition, all the lands which they are capable of cultivating. What they afford being infufficient for the whole farm, will naturally be referved for the lands towhici it can be mof advantageounly or conveniently applied; the moft fertile, or thofe, per. haps, in the neighbourhood of the farm-yard. Thefe, therefore, will be kept conftantly in good condition and fit for tillage. The reft will, the greater part of them, be allowed to lie wafte, producing fearce any thing but fome miferable pafture, juft fufficient to keep alive a few ftraggling, half-Itaried cattle; the farm, though much
under-
under-ftocked in proportion to what would be $\mathbf{C} \underset{\mathbf{x} \mathbf{H}_{\mathbf{1}} \text {. }}{\mathbf{P}}$. neceffary for its complete cultivation, being very frequently overfocked in proportion to its actual produce. A portion of this wafte land, however, after having been paftured in this wretched manner for fix or feven years together, may be ploughed up, when it will yield, perhaps, a poor crop or two of bad oats, or of fome. other coarfe grain, and then, being entirely exhaufted, it mult be refted and paftured again as before, and another portion ploughed up to be in the fame manner exhaufted and refted again in its turn. Such accordingly was the general fyftem of management all over the low country of Scotland before the union. The lands which were kept conftantly weil manured and in good condition, feldom, exceeded a third or a fourth part of the whole farm, and fometimes did not amount to a fifth or a fixth part of it. The reft were never manured, but a certain portion of them was in its turn, notwithftanding, regularly cultivated and exhaufted. Under this fyftem of management, it is evident, even that part of the lands of Scotland which is camble of good cultivation, could produce but litti: in comparifon of what it may be capable of producing. But how difadvantageous foever this fyftem may appear, yet before the union the low price of cattle derns to have rendered it almoft unavoidable. If, notwithftanding a great rife in their price, it ftill continues to prevail through a confiderable part of the country, it is owing, in many places, no doubt, to ignorance and attach- ment to old cuftoms, but in moft places to the unavoidable obftructions which the natural courfe of things oppofes to the immediate or fpeedy eftablifhment of a better fyftem: firf, to the poverty of the tenants, to their not having yet had time to acquire a ftock of cattle fufficient to cultivate their lands more completely, the fame rife of price which would render it advantageous for them to maintain a greater ftock, rendering it more difficult for them to acquire it; and, fecondly, to their not having get had time to put their lands in condition to maintain this greater flock properly, fuppofing they were capable of acquiring it. The increafe of ftock and the improvement of land are two events which muft $\mathrm{g} c$ hand in hand, and of which the one can no-where much out-run the other. Without fome increafe of atock, there can be fcarce any improvement of land, but there can be no confiderable increafe of flock but in cont zuence of a confiderable improvement of jand; becaufe otherwife the land could not maintain it. Thefe natural obftructions to the eftablifhment of a better fyitem, cannot be removed but by a lig courfe of frugality and induftry; and half a century or a century more, perhaps, mult pafs away before the old fyftem, which is wearing out gradually, can be completely abolifhed through all the different parts of the country. Of all the commercial advantages, however, which Scotland has derived from the union with England, this rife in the price of cattle is, perhaps, the greateft. It has not only raifed the value of all highland eftates, but it has, perhaps,
 ment of the low country.

In all new colonies the great quantity of wafte land, which can for many years be applied to no other , purpofe but the feeding of cattle, foon renders them extremely abundant, and in every thing great cheapnefs is the neceflary confequence of great abundance. Though all the cattle of the European colonies in America were originally carried from Europe, they foon multiplied fo much there, and became of fo little value, that even horfes were allowed to run wild in the woods without any owner thinking it worth while to claim them. It muft be a long time after the firft eftablifhment of fuch colonies, before it can become profitable to feed cattle upon the produce of cultivated land. The fame caufes, therefore, the want of manure, and the difproportion between the fock employed in cultivation, and the land which it is deftined to cultivate, are likely to introduce there a fyftem of hufbandry not unlike that which ftill continues to take place in fo many parts of Scotland. Mr. Kalm, the Swedin traveller, when he gives an account of the hufbandry of fome of the Englifh colonies in North America; as he found it in 1749, obferves, accordingly, that he can with difficuity difcover there the character of the Englifh nation, fo well fkilled in all the different branches of agriculture. They make fcarce any manure for their corn fields, he fays; but when one piece of ground has been exhaufted by continual cropping, they clear and cultivate another
30.0 K piece of frefh land; and when that is exhaufted, 1. procett to a third. Their cattle are allowed to wander through the woods and other uncultivated grounds, where they are half-ftarved; having long ago extirpated almoft all the annual graffes by cropping them too early in the fpring, before they had time to form their flowers, or to fhed their feeds *. The annual graffes were, it feems, the beft natural graffes in that part of North America; and when the Europeans firft fettled there, they ufed to grow very thick, and to rife three or four feet high. A piece of ground which, when he wrote, could not maintain one cow, would in former times, he was affured, have maintained four, each of which would have given four times the quantity of milk which that one was capable of giving. The poornefs of the pafture had, in his opinion, occafioned the degradation of their cattle, which degenerated fenfibly from one generation to angther. They were probably not unlike that ftunted breed which was common all over Scotland thirty or forty years ago, and which is now fo much mended chrough the greater part of the low country, not fo much by a change of the breed, though that expedient has been employed in fome places, as by a more plentiful method of feeding them.

Though it is late, therefore, in the progrefs of improvement before cattle can bring fuch a price as to render it profitable to cultivate land for the

[^15]fake of feeding them; yet of all the different parts $\mathbf{C l}_{\mathbf{x}}^{\mathbf{~}} \mathbf{A} \mathbf{A}^{\mathbf{1}}{ }^{\mathbf{P}}$. which compofe this fecond fort of ude produce, $\xrightarrow{\longrightarrow}$ they are perhaps the firft whict bring this price; becaufe till they bring it, it feens impoffible that improvement can be brought near even to that degree of perfection to which it has arrived in many parts of Europe.

As cattle are among the firt, fo perhaps venifon is among the laft parts of this fort of rude produce which bring this price. The price of venifon in Great Britain, how extravagant foever it may appear, is not near fufficient to compenfate the expence of a deer park, as is well known to all thofe who have had any experience in the feeding of deer. If it was otherwife, the feeding of deer would foon become an article of common farming, in the fame manner as the feeding of thofe finall birds called Turdi was among the ancient Romans. Varro and Columella affure us, that it was a moft profitable article. The fattening of ortolans, birds of paffage which arrive lean in the country, is faid to be fo in fome parts of France. If venifon continues in fafhion, and the wealth and luxury of Great Britain increafe as they have done for fome time paft, its price may very probably rife ftill higher than it is at prefent.

Between that period in the progrefs of improvement which brings to its height the price of fo neceffary an article as cattle, and that which brings to it the price of fuch a fuperfluity as venifon, there is a very long interval, in the courle of which many other forts of rude produce

Bo oK gradually arrive at their higheft price, fome fooner I. and fome later, according to different circumftances.

Thus in every farm the offals of the barn and ftables will maintain a certain number of poultry. Thefe, as they are fed with what would otherwife be loft, are a mere fave-all; and as they coft the farmer farce any thing, fo he can afford to fell them for very little. Almolt all that he gets is pure gain, and their price can fcarce be fo low as to difcourage him from feeding this number. But in countries ill cultivated, and, therefore, but thinly inhabited, the poultry, which are thus raifed without expence, are often fully fufficient to fupply the whole demand. In this ftate of things, therefore, they are often as cheap as butcher's-meat, or any other fort of animal food. But the whole quantity of poultry, which the farm in this manner produces' without expence, mult always be much fmaller than the whole quantity of butcher'smeat whicti reared upon it ; and in times of wealth and luxury what is rare, with only nearly equal merit, is always preferred to what is common. As wealth and luxury increafe, therefore, in confequence of improvement and cultivation, the price of poultry gradually rifes above that of butcher's-meat, till at laft it gets fo high that it becomes profitable to cultivate land for the fake of feeding them. When it has got to this height, it cannot well go higher. If it did, more land would foon be turned to this purpofe. In feverai provinces of France, the feeding of poultry is confidered
confidered as a very important article in rural C H A P. ceconomy, and fufficiently profitable to encou- $\underbrace{\text { x!. }}$ rage the farmer to raife a confiderable quansity of Indian corn and buck-wheat for this purpofe. A middling farmer will there formetines have four hundred fowls in his yard. The feeding of poultry feems fcarce yet to be generally confidered is a matter of fo much importance in England. They are certainly, however, dearer in Englayd than in France, as England receives confiderable fupplies from France. In the progrefs of improvement, the period at which every particular forc of animal food is deareft, muft naturally be that which immediately precedes the general practice of cultivating land for the fake of railing it. For fome time before this practice becomes general, the fcarcity mult neceffarily raife the price. After it has become general, new methods of feeding are commonly fallen upon, which enable the farmer to raife upon the fame quantity of ground a much greater quantity of that particular fort of animal food. The plenty not only obliges ham to fell cheaper, but in confequence of thele improvements he can afford to fell cheaper; for if he could not afford it, the plenty would not be of long continuance. It has been probably in this manner that the introduction of clover, turnips, carrots, cabbages, \&ec. has contributed to fink the common price of butcher's -meat in the London market famewhat below what it was apour the beginning of the laft century.

BOOK The hog, that finds his food among ordure, and greedily devours many things rejected by every other ufeful animal, is, like poultry, originally kept as a fave-all. As long as the number of fuch animals, which can thus be reared at little or no expence, is fully fufficient to fupply the demand, this fort of butcher's-meat comes to market at a much lower price than any other. But when the demand rifes beyond what this quantity can fupply, when it becomes neceffary to raife food on purpofe for feeding and fattening hogs, in the fame manner as for feeding and fattening other cattle, the price neceffarily rifes, and becomes proportionably either higher or lower than that of other butcher's-meat, according as the nature of the country, and the ftate of its agriculture, happen to render the feeding of hogs more or lefs expenive than that of other cattle. In France, according to Mr . Buffon, the price of pork is nearly equal to that of beef. - In moft parts of Grear Britain it is at preferit fomewhat higher.

The great rife in the price both of hogs and poultry has in Great Britain been frequently imputed to the diminution of the number of cotragers and other imall occupiers of land; an event which has in every part of Eirope been the immediate forerunner of improvenent and better cultivation, but which at the lame time may have contributed to raife the price of thofe articles, both fomewhat fooner and fomewhat fafter than it would otherwife have rifen." As the $\therefore \therefore$ - .. poorelt
pooreft family can often maintain a cat or a dug, C HA P. without any expence, fo the pooreft occupiers of $\underbrace{\text { Xt. }}$ land can commonly maintain a few poultry, or a fow and a few pigs, at very little. The little offals of their own'table, their whey, fkimmed milk and butter-milk, fupply thofe animals with a part of their food, and they find the reft in the neighbouring fields withour doing any "fenfible damage to any body. By diminifhing the number of thofe finall occupiers, therefore, the quantity of this fort of provifions which is thus produced at little or no expence, mult certainly have been a good deal diminilhed, and their price muft confequently have been raifed both fooner and fafter than it would otherwife have rifen. Sooner or later, however, in the progrefs of improvement, it muft at any rate have rifen to the utmoft height of which it is capable of rifing; or to the price which pays the labour and expence of cultivating the land which furnifhes them with food as well as thefe are paid upon the greater part of other cultivated land.
$\mathrm{T}_{\mathrm{HE}}$ bufinefs of the dairy, like the feeding of hogs and poultry, is originally carried on as a fave-ali. The cartle neceffarily kept upon the farm, produce more milk than either the rearing of their own young, or the confumption of the farmer's family requires; and they produce moft at one particular feafon. But of all the productions of land, milk is perhaps the moft perifhable. In the warm feafon, when it is moft abundant, it will fcarce keep four-and-twenty hours. The farmer, by making it into frefh A 22 butter,

B O OK butter, fores a fmall part of it for a week; by making it into falt butter, for a year; and by making it into cheefe, he ftores a much greater part of it for feveral years. Part of all thefe is referved for the ufe of his own family. The reft goes to market, in order to find the beft price which is to be had, and which can fcarce be fo low as to difcourage him from rending thither whatever is over and above the ufe of his own family. If it is very low, indeed, he will be likely to manage his dairy in a very flovenly and dirty manner, and will fcarce perhaps think it worth while to have a particular room or building on purpofe for it, but will fuffer the bufinefs to be carried on amidit the fmoke, filth, and naftinefs of his own kitchen; as was the cafe of almoft all the farmers dairies in Scotland thirty or forty years ago, and as is the cafe of many of them ftill. The fame caufes which gradually raife the price of butcher's-meat, the increafe of the demand, and, in confequence of the improvement of the country, the diminution of the quantity which can be fed at little or no expence, raife, in the fame manner, that of the produce of the dairy, of which the price naturally connects with that of butcher's-meat, or with the expence of feeding cattle. The increafe of price pays for more labour, care, and cleanlinefs. The dairy becomes more worthy of the farmer's attention, and the quality of its produce gradually improves. The price at laft gets fo high that it becomes worth while to employ fome of the moft fertile and beft cultivated
lands in feeding cattle merely for the purpofe of ${ }^{\mathbf{C}} \mathrm{H}_{\mathrm{x}}^{\mathrm{A}} \mathrm{A}^{\mathbf{P}}$. the dairy; and when it has got to this height, it cannot well go higher. If it did, more land would foon be turned to this purpofe. It feems to have got to this height through the greater part of England, where much good land is commonly employed in this manner. If you except the neighbourhood of a few confiderable towns, it feems not yet to have got to this height anywhere in Scotland, where common farmers feldom employ much good land in raifing food for cattle, merely for the purpofe of the dairy. The price of the produce, though it has rifen very confiderably within thefe few years, is probably ftill ton low to admit of it. The inferiority of the quality, indeed, compared with that of the produce of Englifh dairies, is fully equal to that of the price. But this inferiority of quality is, perhaps, rather the effect of this lownefs of price than the caufe of it. Though the quality was much better, the greater part of what is brought to market could not, I apprehend, in the prefent circumitances of the country, be difpofed of at a much better price; and the prefent price, it is probable, would not pay the expence of the land and labour neceffary for producing a much better quality. Through the greater part of England, notwithftanding the fuperiority of price, the dairy is not reckoned a more profitable employment of land than the raifing of corn, or the fattening of cattle, the two great objects of agriculture. Through the greater part of Scotland, therefore, it cannot yet be even fo profitable.

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BOOK The lands of no country, it is evident, can ever be completely cultivated and improved, till once the price of every produce, which human induftry is obliged to raife upon them, has got fo high as to pay for the expence of complete improvement and cultivation: In order to do this, the price of each particular produce mutt be fufficient, firft, to pay the rent of good corn-land, as it is that which regulates the rent of the greater part of other cultivated land; and fecondly, to pay the labour and expence of the farmer, as well as they are commonly paid upon good corn-land; or, in other words, to replace with the ordinary profits the ftock which he employs about it. This rife in the price of each particular produce, muft evidently be previous. to the improvement and cultivation of the land which is deftined for raifing it. Gain is the end of all improvement, and nothing could deferve that name of which lofs was to be the neceffary confequence. But lofs muft be the neceffary confequence of improving land for the fake of a produce of which the price could never bring back the expence. If the complete improvement and cultivation of the country be, as it moft certainly is, the greateft of all public advantages, this rife in the price of all thofe different forts. of rude produce, inftead of being confidered as a public calamity, ought to be regarded as the neceffary forerunner and attendant of the greateft of all public advantages.

This rife too in the nominal or money-price of all thofe different forts of rude produce has been the effect, not of any degradation in the C HAP. value of filver, but of a rife in their real price. $\underbrace{\text {, }}$ They have become worth; not only a greater quantity of filver, but a greater quantity of labour and fubfiftence than before. As it cofts a greater quantity of labour and fubfiftence to bring them to market, fo when they are brought thither, they reprefent or are equivalent to a greater quantity.

## Tbird Sort.

The third and laft fort of rude produce, of which the price naturally rifes in the progrefs of improvement, is that in which the efficacy of human induftry, in augmenting the quantity, is either limited or uncertain. Though the real price of this fort of rude produce, therefore, naturally tends to rife in the progrefs of improve: ment, yet, according as different accidents happen to render the efforts of human induftry more or lefs fuccefsful in augmenting the quantity, it may happen fometimes even to fall, fometimes to continue the fame in very different periods of improvement, and fometimes to rife more or lefs in the fame period.

There are fome forts of rude produce which nature has rendered a kind of appendages to other forts; fo that the quantity of the one which any country can afford, is neceffarily limited by that of the other. The quantity of wool or of raw hites, for example, which any

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${ }^{3} 00 \mathrm{~K}$ country can afford, is neceffarily limited by the

1. number of great and fmall cattle that are kept in it. The fate of its improvement, and the nature of its agriculture, again neceflarily determine this number.

The fame caufes, which, in the progrefs of improvement, gradually raife the price of bstcher's:meat, flould have the fame effect, it may be thought, upon the prices of wool and raw hides, and raife them too nearly in the fame proportion. It probably would be $\{0$, if in the rude beginnings of improvement the market for the latte. commodities was confined within as narrowo bounds as that for the former. But the extent of their refpective markets is commonly extremely different.

The market for butcher's-meat is almoft everywhere confined to the country which produces it. Ireland, and fome part of Britifh America indeed, carry on a confiderable trade in falt provifions; but they are, I believe, the only countries in the commereial world which do fo, or which export to other countries any confiderable part of their butcher's-meat.

The market for wool and raw. hides, on the contrary, is in the rude beginnings of improvemeht very feldom confined to the country which produces them. They can eafily be tranfported to diftant countries, wool without any preparation, and raw hides with very little; and as they are the materials of many manufactures, the induftry of other countries may occafion a demand
for them, though hat of the country which pro- $\mathbf{C H}_{\mathbf{X I}} \mathbf{A}$. . duces them might not occafion any.

In countries ill cultivated, and therefore but thinly inhabited, the price of the wool and the hide bears always a much greater proportion to that of the whole bealt, than in countries where, improvement and population being further advanced, there is more demand for butcher'smeat. Mr. Hume obferves, that in the Saxon times, the fleece was eftimated at two-fifths of the value of the whole fheep, and that this was much above the proportion of its preient eftimation. In fome provinces of Spain, I have been affured, the fheep is frequently killed merely for the fake of the fleece and the tallow. The carcafe is often left to rot upon the ground, or to be devoured by beafts and birds of prey. If this fometimes happens even in Spain, it happens almoft conftantly in Chili, at Buenos Ayres, and in many other parts of Jpanifh America, where the horned cattle are almoft conftantly killed merely for the fake of the hide and the tallow. This too afed to happen almoft conftantly in Hifpaniola, while it was infefted by the Buccaneers, and before the fettlernent, improvement, and populoufnefs of the French plantations (which now extend round the coaft of almoft the whole weftern half of the illand) had given fome value to the cattle of the Spaniards, who fill continue to poffefs, not only the eaftern part of the coait, but the whole inland and mountainous part of the country.

Though

BOOK Thovgh in the progrefs of improvement and
 population, the price of the whole beaft neceffarily rifes, yet the of the carcafe is likely to be much more affected hy this, rife than that of the wool and the hide. The market for the carcaic, being in the rude flate of fociety confined always to the country which produces it, mult neceffarily be extended in proportion to the inprovement and population of that country. But the market for the wool and the hides even of a barbarous country often extending to the whole commercial world, it can very feldom be enlarged in the fame proportion. The fate of the whole commercial worid can feldom be much affected by the improvement of any particular country; and the market for fuch commodities may remain the fame, or very nearly the fame, after fuch improvements, as before. It fhould, however, in the natural courfe of things rather upon the whole be fomewhat extended in confequence of them. If the manufactures, efpecially, of which thofe comnodities are the materials, fhould ever come to flourifh in the country, the market, though it might not be much enlarged, would at lealt be brought much nearer to the place of growth than before; and the price of thofe materials might at leaft be increafed by what had ufually been the expence of tranfporting them to diftant countries. Though it might not rife therefore in the fame proportion as that of but-cher's-meat, it ought naturally to rife fomewhat, and it ought certainly not to fall.

In England, however, notwithftanding the C. मf Ap. Aourifhing ftate of its woollen manufacture, the price of Englifh wool has fallen very conliderably fince the time of Edward III. There are many authentic records which demonftrate that during the reign of that prince (towards the middle of the fourteenth century, or about (339) what was reckoned the moderate and reafonable price of the tod or twenty-eight pounds of Englifh wool, $v$ is not lefs than ten thillings $r^{6}$ the money of thofe times*, containing, at th ". of twentyf wee the ounce, fix ounces of ifler Towerweight, equal to about thirty fhillings of our prefent money. In the prefent times, one-andtwenty fhillings the tod may be reckoned a good price for very good Englifh wool. The moneyprice of wool, therefore, in the time of Edward III. was to its money-price in the prefent times as ten to feven. The fuperiority of its real price was ftill greater. At the rate of fix fhillings and eight-pence the quarter, ten fhillings was in thofe ancient times the price of twelve buhels of whear. At the rate of twentyeight fhillings the quarter, one-and twenty fhillings is in the prefent times the price of fix bufhels only. The proportion between the real prices of ancient and modern times, therefore, is as twelve to fix, or as two to ne. In thofe ancient times a tod of wool would have purchafed twice the quantity of fubfiftence which it will purchafe at prefent; and confequently twice

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$B O_{1} O_{1} X$ the quantity of labour, if the real recompence of labour had been the fame in both periods.

This degradation both in the real and nominal value of wool, could never have happened in confequence of the natural courfe of things. It has accordingly been the effect of violence and artifice: Firf, of the abfolute prohibition of exporting wool from England: Secondly, of the permiffion of importing it from Spain duty free : Thirdly, of the prohibition of exporting it from Ireland to any other country but England. In confequence of thefe regulations, the market for Englifh wool, inftead of being fomewhat extended in confequence of the improvement of England, has been confined to the home market, where the wool of feveral other countries, is allowed to come into competition with it, and where that of Ireland is forced into competition with it. As the woollen marufactures too of Ireland are fully as much difcouraged as is confiftent with juftice and fair dealing, the Irih can work up but a fmall part of their own wool at home, and are, therefore, obliged to fend a greater proportion of it to Great Britain, the only market they are allowed.

I have not been able to find any fuch authentic records concerning the price of raw hides in ancient times. Wool was commonly paid as a fublidy to the king, and its valuation in that fubfidy afcertains, at leaft in fome degree, what was its ordinary price. But this feems not to have been the cafe with raw hides. Fleetwood, however, from an account in 1425 , between the prior
of Burcefter Oxford and one of his canons, gives $\subset$ C $\mathbf{H}$ A $P$. us their price, at leaft as it was ftated, upon $\underbrace{\mathbf{x} .}$ that particular occafion; viz. five ox hides at twelve fhillings; five cow hides at feven hillings and three pence; thirty-fix fheep fkins of two years old at nine fhillings; fixteen calf ikins at two fhillings. In 1425, twelve fhillings contained about the fame quantity of filver as four-and-twenty fhillings of our prefent money. An ox hide, therefore, was in this account valued at the fame quantity of filver as 4 s . $\frac{2}{5}$ ths of our prefent money. Its nominal price was a good deal lower than at prefent. But at the rate of fix fhillings and eight-pence the quarter, twelve shillings would in thofe times have purchafed fourteen bufhels and four-fifths of a buthel of wheat, which, at three and fix-pence the bufhel, would in the prefent times coft 51s.4d. An ox hide, therefore, would in thofe times have purchafed as much corn as ten thillings and threepence would purchafe at prefent. Its real value was equal to ten hillings and three-pence of our prefent money. In thofe ancient times when the cattie were half ftarved during the greater part of the winter, we cannot fuppofe that they were of a very large fize. An ox hide which weighs four ftone of fixteen pounds of averdupois, is not in the prefent times reckoned a bad one; and in thofe ancient times would probably have been reckoned a very good one. But at half a crown the ftone, which at this moment ( Fe bruary 1773) I undertand to be the common price, fuch a hide would at prefent coft only ten
fhillings.

E o $\%$ fhillings. Though its nominal price, therefore, is higher in the prefent than it was in thofe ancient times, its real price, the real quantity of fubfiftence which it will purchafe of command, is ratlier fomewhat lower. The price of cow hides, as tated in the above account, is nearly in the common proportion to that of ox hides. That of meep fkins is a good deal above it. They had probably been fold with the wool. That of calves thins, on the contrary, is greatly below it. In countries where the price of cattle is very low, the calves, which are not intended to be reared in order to keep up the ftock, are generally killed very young; as was the cafe in Scotland twenty or thirty years ago. It faves the milk, which their price would not pay for. Their kk . s , therefore, are cominonly good for little.

The price of raw hides is a good deal lower at prefent than it was a few years ago; owing probably to the taking off the duty upon feal fkins, and to the allowing, for a limited time, the importation of raw es from Ireland and from the plantations duty free, which was dore in 1769. Take the whple of the prefent century at an average ${ }^{2}$ their real price has probably. been fomewhat higher than it was in thofe ancient times. The nature of the commodity renders it not quite fo proper for being tranfported to diftant markets as wool. It fuffers more by keeping. A falted hide is reckoned inferior to a freh one, and fells for a lower price. This circumftance muft neceffarily have fome tendency to fink the price of raw hides produced
in a country which does not manufacture them, $\mathbf{C H A O}$ but is obliged te export them; and comparaXI. tively to raife that of thofe produced in a country ${ }^{\text {th }}$ which does manufacture thern. It mult have fome rendency to fink their price in a barbarous, and to raife it in an improved and manu. facturing country. It mult have had fome tendency therefore to fink it in ancient, and to raife is in modern times. Our tanners befides have not been quite fo fuccefsful as our clothiers, in convincing the wifdom of the nation, that the fafety of the commonwealth depends upon the profperity of their particular manufacture. They have accordingly been much lefs favoured. The exportation of raw hides has, indeed, been prohibited, and declared a nuifance; but their importation from foreign countries has been fubjected to a duty; and though this duty has been taken off from thofe of lreland and the plantations (for the limited time of five years only), yet Ireland has not been confined to the market of Great Britain for the fale of its furplus hides, or of thofe which are not manufactured at home. The hides of common cattle have but within thefe few years been put among the enumerated commodities which the plantations can fend no-where but to the mother country; neither has the commerce of Ireland been in this cale oppreffed hitherto, in order to fupport the manufactures of Grear Britain.

- Whatever regulations tend to link the price either of wool or of raw hides below what it naturally would be, muft, in an improved and cultivated
- $0_{1}$ o K cultivated country, have fome tendency to raife 1. the price of butcher's-meat. The price both of the great and fmall cattle, which are fed on improved and cultivated land, mult be fufficient to pay the rent which the landlord, and the profit which the farmer has reafon to expect from improved and cultivated land. If it is not, they will foon ceafe to feed them. Whatever part of this price, therefore, is not paid by the wool and the hide, muft be paid by the carcafe. The lefs there is paid for the one, the more mult be paid for the other. In what manner this price is to be divided upon the different parts of the beaft, is indifferent to the landlords and farmers, provided it is all paid to them. In an improved and cultivated country, therefore, their intereft as landlords and farmers cannot be much affected by fuch regulations, though their intereft as confumers may, by the rife in the price of provifions. It would be quite otherwife, however, in an unimproved and uncultivated country, where the greater part of the lands could be applied to no other purpofe but the feeding of cattle, and where the wool and the hide made the principal part of the value of thofe cattle. Their intereft as landlords and farmers would in this cafe be very deeply affected by fuch regulations, and their intereft as confumers very litele. The fall in the price of the wool and the hide, would not in this cafe raife the price of the carcafe; becaufe the grearer part of the lands of the country being applicable to no other purpofe but the feeding of cattle, the fame number would butchor's-meat would ftill come to market. The demand for it would be no greater than before. Its price, therefore, would be the fame as before. The whole price of cattle would fall, and along with it both the rent and the profit of all thofe lands of which cattle was the principal produce, that is; of the greater part of the lands of the country. The perpetual prohibition of the exportation of wool, which is commonly, but very falfely afcribed to Edward III, would, in the then circumftances of the country, have been the moft deftructive regulation which could well have been thought of. It would not only have reduced the actual value of the greater part of the lands of the kingdom, but by reducing the price of the noft inportant fpecies of fmall cattle, it would have retarded very much its fubfequent improvement.

The wool of. Scotland fell very confiderably in its price in confequence of the union with England, by which it was excluded from the great market of Europe, and confined to the narrow one of Great Britian. - The value of the greater part of the lands in the fouthern counties of Scotland; which are chiefly a meep country, would have been very deeply affected by this event, had not the rife in the price of butcher'smeat fully compenfated the fall in the price of wool:

As the efficacy of human induftry, in increafing the quantity either of wool or of raw hides, is limited, fo far as it depends upon the

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produce
${ }^{B} O_{1}$ O $K$ produce of the country where it is exerted; fo it is uncertain fo far as it depends upon the produce of other countries. It fo far depends, not fo much upon the quantity which they produce, as upon that which they do not manufacture; and upon the reftraints which they may or may not think proper to impofe upon the exportation of this fort of rude produce. Thefe circumftances, as they are altogether independent of domeftic induftry, fo they neceffarily render the efficacy of its efforts more or lefs uncertain. In multiplying this fort of rude produce, therefore, the efficacy of human induftry is not only limited, but uncertain.

Is multiplying another very important fort of rude produce, the quantity of fifh that is broughs to market, it' is likewife both limited and uncertain. It is limited by the local fituation of the country, by the proximity or diftance of its different provinces from the fea, by the number of its lakes and rivers, and by what may be called the fertility or barrennefs of thofe feas, lakes, and rivers, as to this fort of rude produce. As population increafes, as the annual produce of the land and labour of the country grows greater and greater, there come to be more buyers of filh, and thofe buyers toa have a greater quantity and variety of other goods, or, what is the fame thing, the price of a greater quantity and variety of other goods, to buy with. But it will generally be impoffible to fupply the great and extended market without employing a quantity of labour greater than in proportion to
what had been requifite for fupplying the narrow $\mathbf{C} \boldsymbol{H}_{\mathbf{X}} \mathbf{A}^{\mathbf{A}} \mathbf{P}_{\mathbf{o}}$ and confined one. A market which, from requiring only one thoufand, comes to require annually ten thoufand ton of fifh, can feldom be fupplied without employing more than ten times the quantity of labour which had before been fufficient to fupply it. The fin muft generally be fought for at a greater diftance, larger veffels mult be employed, and more extenfive machinery of every kind made ufe of. The real price of this commodity, therefore, naturally rifes in the progrefs of improvement. It has accordingly done fo, 1 believe, more or lefs in every country.

Though the fuccefs of a particular day's fifhing may be a very uncertain matter, yet, the local fituation of the country being fuppofed, the general efficacy of induftry in bringing a certain quantity of fifh to market; taking the courfe of a year, or of feveral years together, it may perhaps be thought, is certain enough; and it, no doubt, is fo. As it depends more, however, upon the local fituation of the country; than upon the fate of its weal and induftry; as upon this account it may in different countries be the fame in very different periods of improvement, and very different in the fame period; its connection with the ftate of improvement is uncertain, and it is of this fort of uncertainty that I am here fpeaking.

In increafing the quantity of the different minerals and metals which are drawn from the bowels of the earth, that of the more precious B b 2
${ }^{8} 0_{1} 0 \mathrm{~K}$ ones particularly, the efficacy of human induftry. feems not to be limited, but to be altogether uncertain.

The quantity of the precious metals which is to be found in any country is not limited by any thing in its local fituation, fuch as the fertility or barrennefs of its own mines. Thofe metals frequently abound in countries which poffefs no mines. Their quantity in every particular country feems to depend upon two different circumftances; firft, upon its power of purchafing, upon the ftate of its induftry, upon the annual produce of its land and labour, in confequence of which it can afford to employ a greater or a fmaller quantity of labour and fubfiftence in bringing or purchafing fuch fuperfluities as gold and filver, either from its own mines or from thofe of other countries; and, fecondly, upon the fertility or barrennefs of the mines which may happen at any, particular time to fupply the commercial world with thore metals. The quantity of thofe metals in the countries moft remote from the mines, mult be more or lefs affected by this fertility or barrennefs, on account of the eafy and cheap tranfportation of thofe metals, of their fmall bulk and great value. Their quantity in China and Indoftan muft have been more or lefs affected by the abundance of the mines of America.

So far as their quantity in any particular country depends upon the former of thofe two circumftances (the pawer of purchafing), their real price, like that of all other luxuries and fuperfluities, is likely to rife with the wealth and im-
 poverty /and depreffion. Countries which have a $\underbrace{\text { xi. }}$ great quantity of labour and fubfiftence to fpare, can afford to purchafe any particular quantity of thofe metals at the expence of a greater quantity of labour and fubfiftence; than, countries which have lefs to fpare.

So far as their quantity in any particular country depends upon the latter of thofe two circumftances (the fertility or barrennefs of the mines which happen to fupply the commercial world) their real price, the real quantity of labour and fubfiftence which they will purchafe or exchange for, will, no doubt, fink more or lefs in proportion to the fertility, and rife in proportion to the barrennefs of thofe mines. :

The fertility or barrennefs of the mines, however, which may happen at any particular time to fupply the commercial world, is a circumftance which, it is evident, may have no fort of connection with the ftate of induftry in a particular country. It feems even to have no very neceffary connection with that of the world in general. As arts and commerce, indeed, gradually fpread themfelves over a greater and a greater part of the earth, the fearch for new mines, being extended over a wider furface, may have fomewhat a better chance for being fuccefsful, than when confined within narrowerbounds. The difcovery of new mine's, however, as the old ones come to be gradually exhaufted, is a matter of the greateft uncertainty, and fuch as no human fkill or induftry can enfure. All.

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$80_{1} 0 \times$ indications, it is acknowledged, are doubtful; and the actual difcovery and fuccefsful working of a new mine can alone afcertain the reality of its value, or even of its exiftence. In this fearch there feem to be no certain limits either to the poffible fuccefs, or to the poffible dirappointment of human induftry. In the courfe of a century or two, it is poffiblo that new mines may be difcovered more fertile than any that have ever yet been known; and it is juft equally poffible that the moft fertile mine then known may be more barren than any that was wrought before the difcovery of the mines of America. Whether the one or the other of thofe two events may happen to take place, is of very little importance to the real wealth and profperity of the world, to the real value of the annual produce of the land and labour of mankind. Its nominal value, the quantity of gold and filver by which this annual produce could be expreffed or reprefented, would, no doubt, be very different; but its real value, the real quantity of labour which it could purchafe or command, would be precifely the fame. A fhilling might in the one cafe reprefent no more labour than a penny does at prefent; and a penny in the other might reprefent as much as a fhilling does now. But in the one cafe he who had a fhilling in his pocket, would be no richer than he who has a penny at prefent; and in the other he who had a penny would be juit as rich as he who has a fhilling now. The cheapnefs and abundance of gold and filver plate, would be the fole advantage which
ubtful; orking lity of fearch to the ppointof a s may thave ly pofvn may rought nerica. events le imof the roduce ts nover by effed or fferent ; labour suld be the one ny does ght reBut in pocket, enny 'at penny fhilling f. gold vantage which
 and the dearnefs and fearcity of thofe trifling fuperfuities the only inconveniency it could fuffer from the other.

## Conclufion of the Digreffion conserning the Variations in the Value of Silver.

The greater part of the writers who have collected the money prices of things in ancient times, feem to have confidered the low money price of coxts and of goods in general, or, in other words, the high value of gold and filver, as a proof, not only of the fcarcity of thofe metals, but of the poverty and barbarifin of the country at the time when it took place. This notion is conneeted with the fyftem of political ceconomy which reprefents national wealth as confifting in the abundance, and national poverty in the fcarcity, of gold and filver; a fyitem which I fhall endeayour to explain and examine at great length in the fourth book of this enquiry. I fhall only obferve at prefent, that the high value of the precious metals can be no proof of the poverty or barbarifm of any particular country at the time when it took place. It is a proof only of the barrennefs of the mines which happened at that time to fupply the commercial world. A poor country, as it cannot afford to buy more, fo it can as little afford to pay dearer for gold and filver than a rich one; and the value of thofe metals, therefore, is not likely to be higher in. the former than in the latter. In China, a counB b 4
${ }^{B}$ O O $_{1} \mathrm{~K}$ try much richer than any part of Europe, the 1. value of the precious metals is nuch higher than in any part of Europe. As the wealth of Europe, indeed, has increafed greatly fince the difcovery of the mines of America, fo the value of gold and filver has gradually diminifhed. This diminution of their value, however, has not been owing to the increafe of the real wealth of Europe, of the annual produce of its land and labour, but to the accidental difcovery of more abundant mines than any that were known be. fore. The increafe of the quantity of gold and filver in Europe, and the increafe of its manufactures and agriculture, are two events which, though they have happened nearly about the fame time, yet. have arifen from very different caufes, and have fcarce any natural connection with one another. The one has arifen from a mere accident, in which neither prudence nor policy either had or could have any thare: the other from the fall of the feudal fyltem, and from the eftablifhment of a government which afforded to induftry the only encouragement which it requires, forne tolerable fecurity that it fhall enjoy the fruits of its own labour. . Poland, where the feudal fyftem ftill continues to take place, is at this day as beggarly a country as it was before the difcovery of America. The money price of corn, however, has rifen; the real value of the precious metals has fallen in Poland, in the fame mauner as in other parts of Europe. Their quantity, therefore, muft have increafed there as in other places, and nearly in
the fame proportion to the annual produce of its $\mathbf{C}_{\mathbf{X}}^{\mathrm{H}_{\mathbf{X}}} \mathrm{A}^{\mathbf{P}} \mathbf{P}$. land and labour. This increafe of the quantity of thofe metals, however, has not, it feems, increafed that annual produce, has neither improved the manufactures and agriculture of the country, nor mended the circumftances of its inhabitants. Spain and Portugal, the countries which poffefs the mines, are, after Poland, perhaps, the two moft beggarly countries in Europe. The value of the precious metals, however, mult be lower in. Spain and Portugal than in any other part of Europe; as they come from thofe countries to all other parts of Europe, loaded, not only with a freight and an infurance, but with the expere of fmuggling, their exportation being either prohibited, or fubjected to a duty. In proportion to the annual produce of the land and labour, therefore, their quantity muft be E sater in thofe countries than in any other part of Europe; thofe countries, however, are poorer than the greater part of Europe. Though the feudal fyitem has been abolifhed in Spain and Portugal, it has not been fucceeder by a much better.

As the low value of gold and filver, therefore, is, no proof of the wealth and flourifhing ftate of the country where it takes place; fo neither is their high value, or the low money price either of goods in general, or of corn in particular, any proof of its poverty and barbarifm.

But though the low money price either of goods in general, or of corn in particular, be no proof of the poverty or barbarifin of the times,
${ }^{8} 0_{\mathrm{I}} \mathrm{O} \mathrm{K}$ the low money price of fome particular forts of goods, fuch as cattle, poultry, game of all kinds, \&c. in proportion to that of corn, is a moft de. cifive one. It clearly demonftrates, firf, their great abundance in proportion to that of corn, and confequently the great extent of the land which they occupied in proportion to what was occupied by corn; and; fecondly, the low value of this land in proportion to that of corn land, and confequently the uncultivated and unimproved fate of the far greater part of the lands of the country. It clearly demonftrates that the Stock and population of the country did not bear the fame proportion to the extent of its territory, which they commonly do in civilized countries, and that fociety was at that time, and in that country, but in its infancy. From the high or low money price either of goods in general, or of corn in particular, we can infer only that the mines which at that time happened to fupply the commercial world with gold and filver, were fertile or barren, not that the country was rich or poor. But from the high or low money price of fome forts of goods in proportion to that of others, we can infer, with a degree of probability that approaches almoft to certainty, that it was rich or poor, that the greater part of its lands were improved or unimproved, and that it was either in a more or lefs barbarous ftate, or in a more or lefs. civilized one.

Any rife in the money price of goods which proceeded altogether from the degradation of the value of filver, would affect all forts of goods equally,
 or a fourth, or a fifth part higher, according as $\qquad$ tilver happened to lofe a third; or a fourth, or a fifth part of its former value. But the rife in the price of provifions, which has been the fubject of fo much reafoning and converfation, does not affect all forts of provifions equally. Taking the courfe of the prefent century at an average, the price of corn, it is acknowledged, even by thofe who account for this rife by the degradation of the value of filver, has rifen much lefs than that of fome other forts of provifions. : The rife in the price of thofe other forts of provifions, therefore, cannot be owing altogether to the degradation of the value of filver. Some other caufes muft be taken into the account, and thofe which have been above affigned, will, perhaps, without having recourfe to the fuppofed degradation of the value of filver, fufficiently explain this rife in thofe particular forts of provifions of which the price has actually rifen in proportion to that of corn.

As to the price of corn itfelf, it has, during the fixty-four firft years of the prefent century, and before the late extraordinary courfe of bad feafons, been fomewhat lower than it was during the fixty-four laft years of the preceding century. This fact is attefted, not only by the accounts of Windfor market, but by the public fiars of all the different counties of Scotland, and by the accounts of feveral different markets in France, which have been collected with great diligence and fidelity by Mr. Meflance and by Mr. Duprè

Book de St. Maur. The evidence is more complete than could well have been expected in a matter which is naturally fo very difficult to be afcertained.

As to the high price of corn during thefe laft ten. or twelve years, it can be fufficiently accounted for from the badnefs of the feafons, without fuppofing any degradation in the value: of filver.
The opinion, therefore, that filver is continually finking in its value, feems not to be founded upon any good obfervations, either upon the prices of corn, or upon thole of other provifions.

The fame quantity of filver, it may, perhaps, be faid, will in the prefent times, even according to the account which has been here given, purchafe a much fmaller quantity of feveral forts of provifions than it would have done during fome part of the laft century; and to afcertain whether this change be owing to a rife in the value of thofe goods, or to a fall in the value of filver, is only to eftablifh a vain and ufelefs diftinction, which can be of no fort of fervice to the man who has only a certain quantity of filver to go to market with, or a certain fixed revenue in money. I certainly do not pretend that the knowledge of this diftinetion will enable him to buy cheaper. It may not, however, upon that account be altogether ufelefs.

It may be of fome ufe to the public by affording an ealy proof of the profperous condition of the country. If the rife in the price of fome forts
forts of provifions be owing altogether to a fall © $\mathrm{H}_{\times 1} \mathrm{~A}^{\boldsymbol{A}}$. P . in the value of filver, it is owing to a circumftance from which nothing can be inferred but the fertility of the American mines. The reat wealth of the country, the annual produce of its tand and labour, may, notwithftanding this circumftance, be either gradually declining, as in Portugal and Poland; or gradually advancing, as in moft other parts of Europe. But if this rife in the price of fome furts of provifions be owing to a rife in the real value of the land which produces them, to its increafed fertility; or, in confequence of more extended improvement and good cultivation, to its having been rendered fit for producing corn; it is owing to a circumftance which indicates in the cleareft manner the profperous and advancing ftate of the country. The land conftitutes by far the greateft, the moft important, and the moft durable part of the wealth of every extenfive country. It may furely be of fome ufe, or, at leaft, it may give fome fatisfaction to the public, to have fo decifive a proof of the increafing value of by far the greateft, the moft important, and the moft durable part of its wealth.

Ir may too be of fome ufe to the public in regulating the pecuniary reward of fome of its inferior fervants. If this rife in the price of fome forts of provifions be owing to a fall in the value of filver, their pecuniary reward, provided it was not too large before, ought certainly to be augmented in proportion to the extent of this 'fall. If it is not augmented, their real recompence
${ }^{5} 0$ o K compence will evidently be fo much diminifhed. But if this rife of price is owing to the increafed value, in confequence of the improved fertility. of the land which produces fuch provifions, it becomes a much nicer matter to judge either in what proportion any pecuniary reward ought to be augumented, or whether it ought to be augmented at all. The extenfion of improvement and cultivation, as it neceffarily raifes more or lefs, in proportion to the price of corn, that of every fort of animal food, fo it as neceffarily: lowers that of, I believe, every fort of vegetable food. It raifes the price of animal food; becaufe a great part of the land which produces it, being rendered fit for producing corn, muft afford to the landiord and farmer the rent and profit of corn land. It lowers the price of vegetable food; becaufe, by increafing the fertility of the land, it increafes its abundance. The improvements of agriculture too introduce many forts of vegetable food, which, requiring lefs, land and not more labour than corn, come much cheaper to market. Such are potatoes and maize; or what is called Indian corn, the two moft important improvements which the agriculture of Europe, perhaps, which Europe itfelf, has received from the great extenfion of its commerce and navigation. Many forts of vegetable food, befides, which in the rude ftate of agriculture are confined to the kitchen-garden, and raifed only by the fpade, come in its improved ftate to be introduced into common fields, and to be raifed by the plough: fuch as turnips, carrots, cab-
 ment, therefore, the real price of one fpecies of $\underbrace{\text { x1. }}$ food neceffarily rifes, that of another as neceffarily falls, and it becomes a matter of more nicety to judge how far the rife in the one may be compenfated by a fall in the other. When the real price of butcher's-meat has once got to its height (which, with regard to every fort, except, perhaps, that of hogs fleh, it feems to have done through a great part of England more than a century ago), any rife which can afterwards happen in that of any other fort of animal food, cannot much affect the circumftances of the inferior ranks of people. The circumftances of the poor through a great part of England cannot furely be fo much diftreffed by any rife, in the price of poultry, fifh, wild-fowl, cr venifon, as they muft be relieved by the fall in that of potatoes.

In the prefent feafon of fcarcity the high price of corn no doubt diftreffes the poor. Bur in times of moderate plenty, when corn is at its ordinary or average price, the natural rife in the price of any other fort of rude produce cannot much affect them. They fuffer more, perhaps, by the artificial rife which has been occafioned by taxes in the price of fome manufactured commodities; as of falt, foap, leather, candles, malt, beer, and ale, \&xc.

Efferis of the Progress of Improvement upon the reat Price of Manufactures.

T is the natural effect of improvement, however, to diminif gradually the real price of alinoft all manufactures. That of the manufacturing workmanfhip diminifhes, perhaps, in all of them without exception. In confequence of better machinery, of greater dexterity, and of a more proper divifion and diftribution of work, all of which are the natural effects of improvement, a much fmaller quantity of labour becomes requifite for executing any particular piece of work; and though, in confequence of the flourifhing circumftances of the fociety; the real price of labour fhould rife very confiderably, yet the great diminution of the quantity will generally much more than compenfate the greateft rife which can happen in the price.

There are, indeed, a few manufactures, in which the neceffary rife in the real price of the rude materials will more than compenfate all the advantages which improvement can introduce into the execution of the work. In carpenters' and joiners work, and in the coarfer fort of cabinet work, the neceffary rife in the real price of barren timber, in confequence of the improvement of land, will more than compenfate all the advantages which can be derived from the beft machinery, the greateft dexterity, and the molt proper divifion and diftribution of work.

But in all cafes in which the real price of the $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{X}}^{\mathrm{H}} \mathrm{Al}^{\mathrm{A}} \mathrm{P}$. rude materials either does not rife at all, or does not rife very much, that of the manufactured commodity finks very confiderably.

This diminution of price has, in the courfe of the prefent and preceding century, been moft remarkable in thofe manufactures of which the materials are the coarfer metals. A better movement of a watch, than about the middle of the lait century could have been bought for twenty pounds, may now perhaps be had for twenty fhillings. In the work of cutlers and lockfmiths, in all the toys which are made of the coarfer metals, and in all thofe goods which are commonly known by the name of Birmingham and Sheffield ware, there has been, during the fame period, a very great reduction of price, though not altogether fo great as in watch-work. It has, however, been fufficient to aftonifh the workmen of every other part of Europe, who in many cafes acknowledge that they can produce no work of equal goodnefs for double, or even for triple the price. There are perhaps no manufactures in which the divifion of labour can be carried further, or in which the machinery emsployed admits of a greater variety of improvements, than thofe of which the materials are the coarfer metals.

In the clothing manufacture there has, during the fame period, been no fuch fenfible reduction of price. The price of fuperfine cloth, I have been affured, on the contrary, has, within thefe five-and-twenty or thirty years, rifen fomewhat

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so 0 . K in proportion to its quality; owing, it was faid, to a confiderable rife in the price of the material, which confifts altogether of Spanifh wool. That of the Yorkfhire cloth, which is made altogether of Englifh wool, is faid indeed, during the courfe of the prefent century, to have fallen a good deat in proportion to its quality. Quality, however, is fo very difputable a matter, that I look upon all information of this kind as fomewhat uncertain. In the clothing manufacture, the divifion of labour is nearly the fame now as it was a century ago, and the machinery employed is not very different. There may, however, have been fome fmall improvements in both, which may have occafioned fome reduction of price.

But the reduction will appear much more fenfible and undeniable, if we compare the price of this manufacture in the prefent times with what it was in a much remoter period, towards the end of the fifteenth century, when the labour was probably much lefs fubdivided, and the machinery employed much more imperfect, than it is at prefent.

In 1487, being the 4th of Henry VII. it was enacted, that "s whofoever thall fell by retail a " broad yard of the fineft fcarlet grained, or of " other grained cloth of the fineft making, " above fixteen fhillings, fhall forfeit forty fhil" lings for every yard fo fold." Sixteen fhillings, therefore, containing about the fame quantity of filver as four-and-twenty fhillings of our prefent money, was, at that time, reckoned
 cloth; and as this is a fumptuary law, fuch cloth, it is probable, had ufually been fold fomewhat dearer. A guinea may be reckoned the higheft price in the prefent times. Even though the quality of the cloths, therefore, thould be fuppofed equal, and that of the prefent times is moft probably much fuperior, yee, even upon this fuppofition, the money price of the fineft cloth appears to have been conliderably reduced fince the end of the fifteenth century. But its real price has been much more reduced. Six thillings and eight-pence was then, and long afterwards, reckoned the average price of a quarter of wheat. Sixteen Millings, therefore, was the price of two quarters and more than threa buinels of wheat. Valuing a quarter of wheat in the prefent times at eight-and-twenty fhillings, the real price of a yard of fine cloth mutt, in thofe times, have been equal to at leaft three pounds fix hillings and fixpence of our prefent money. The man who bought it muft have parted with the command of a quantity of labour and fubfiftence equal to what that fum would purchafe in the prefent times.

The reduction in the real price of the coarfe manufacture, though confiderable, has not been fo great as in that of the fine.

In 1463, being the 3d of Edward IV. it was enacted, that " no fervant in hufbandry, nor "common labourer, nor fervant to any artificer " inhabiting out of a city or burgh, fhall ufe or " wear in their clothing any cloth above two

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800 K " Millings the broad yard." In the 3d of Edward IV. two fhillings contained very nearly the fame quantity of filver as four of our prefent money. But the Yorkhire cloth, which is now fold at four fhillings the yard, is probably much fuperior to any that was then made for the wearing of the very pooreft order of common fervants. Even the money price of their clothing, therefore, may, in proportion to the quality, be fomewhat cheaper in the prefent than it was i.. thofe ancient times. The real price is certainly a good deal cheaper. Ten-pence was rinera reckoned what is called the moderate anc reafonable price of a bufhel of wheat. Two Mill. lings, therefore, was the price of two bufhels and near two pecks of wheat, which in the prefent times; at three fhillings and fixpence the bufhel, would be worth eight thillings and ninepence. For a yard of this cloth the poor fervant mult have parted with the power of purchafing a quantity of fubfiftence equal to what eight Shillings and nine-pence would purchafe in the prefent times. This is a fumptuary law too, reftraining the luxury and extravagance of the poor. Their clothing, therefore, had commonly been much more expenfive.

The fame order of people are, by the fame law, prohibited from verain lonfe, of which the price thould exceed wincen. pence the pair, equal to about eight-and-twenty pence of our prefent money. But fourteen-pence was in thofe times the price of a buhhel and near two pecks of wheat; which, in the prefent times, at three and
fixpence the buhhel, would coft five millings ${ }^{\mathbf{C}}{ }^{\mathrm{H}} \mathrm{XI}^{\mathrm{A}}$. ${ }^{\mathbf{P}}$. and three-pence. We thould in the prefent $\underbrace{\text { a. }}$ times confider this as a very high price for a pair of ftockings to a fervant of the pooreft and loweft order. He mult, however, in thofe times have paid what was really equivalent to this price for them.

In the time of Edward IV, the art of knitting ftockings was probably not known in any part of Europe. Their hofe were made of common cloth, which may have been one of the caufes of their dearnefs. The firft perfon that wore ftockings in England is faid to have been Queen Elizabeth. She received them as a prefent from the Spanifh ambaffador.

Вотн in the coarfe and in the fine woollen manufacture, the machinery employed was much more imperfect in thofe ancient, than it is in the prefent times. It has fince received three very capital improvements, befides, probably, many fmaller ones of which it may be difficult to afcertain either the number or the importance. The three capital improvements are: firf, The exchange of the rock and fpindle for the fpin-ning-wheel, which, with the fame quantity of labour, will perform more than double the quantity of work. Secondly, the ufe of feveral very ingenious machines which facilitate and abridge in a ftill greater proportion the winding of the wortted and woollen yarn, or the proper arrangement of the warp and woof before they are put into the loom; an operation which, pre-

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воок vious to the invention of thofe machines, muft I. have been extremely tedious and troublefome. Thirdly, the employment of the fulling mill for thickening the cloth, inftead of treading it in water. Neither wind nor water mills of any kind were known in England fo early as the beginning of the fixteenth century, nor, fo far as I know, in any other part of Europe north of the Alps. They had been introduced into Italy fome time before.

The confideration of thefe circumftances may, perhaps, in fome meafure explain to us why the real price both of the coarfe and of the fine manufacture, was fo much higher in thofe ancient, than it is in the prefent times. It coft a greater quantity of labour to bring the goods to market, When they were brought thither, therefore, they mult have purchafed or exchanged for the price of a greater quantity.

The coarle manufacture probably was, in thofe ancient times, carried on in England, in the fame manner as it always has been in countries where arts and manufactures are in their infancy. It was probably a houfehold manufacture, in which every different part of the work was occafionally performed by all the different members of almoft every private family; but fo as to be their work only when they had nothing elfe to do, and not to be the principal bulinefs from which any of them derived the greater part of their fubfiftence. The work which is performed in this manner, it has already been obferved, comes
comes always much cheaper to market than that $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{Xi}}^{\mathrm{A}} \mathrm{A}^{\mathrm{P}}$. which is the principal or fole fund of the workman's fubfiftence. The fine manufacture, on the other hand, was not in thofe times carried on in England, but in the rich and commercial country of Flanders; and it was probably conducted then, in the fame manner as now, by people who derived the whole, or the principal part of their fubfiftence from it. It was befides 2 foreign manufacture, and muft have paid fome duty, the ancient cuftom of tonnage and poundage at leaft, to the king. This duty, indeed, would not probably be very great. It was not then the policy of Europe to reftrain, by high duties, the importation of foreign manufactures, but rather to encourage it, in order that merchants might be enabled to fupply, at as eafy a rate as poffible, the great men with the conveniencies and luxuries which they wanted, and which the induftry of their own country could not afford them.

The confideration of thefe circumftances may perhaps in fome meafure explain to us why, in thofe ancient times, the real price of the coarfe manufacture was, in proportion to that of the fine, fo much lower than in the prefent times.

## Conclusion of the Chapter.

1 SHALL conclude this very long chapter with obferving that every improvement in the circumftances of the fociety tends either directly or indirectly to raife the real rent of land, to increafe the real wealth of the landlord, his power of purchafing the labour; or the produce of the labour of other people.

The extenfion of improvement and cultivation tends to raife it directly. The landlord's fhare of the produce neceflarily increafes with the increafe of the produce.

That rife in the real price of thofe parts of the rude produce of land, which is firt the effect of extended improvement and cuitivation, and afterwards the caufe of their being ftill further extended, the rife in the price of cattle, for example, tends too to raife the rent of land directly, and in a ftill greater proportion. The real value of the landlord's fhare, his real command of the labour of other people, not only rifes with the real value of the produce, but the proportion of his fhare to the whole produce rifes with it. That produce, after the rife in its real price, requires no more labour to collect it than before. A fmaller proportion of it will, therefore, be fufficient to replace, with the ordinary profit, the ftock which employs that labour. A. greater proportion of it muft, confequently, belong to the landlord.
 powers of labour,- which tend directly to reduce the real price of manufactures, tend indirectly to raife the real rent of land. The landlord exchanges that part of his rude produce, which is over and above his own confumption, or what comes to the fame thing, the price of that part of it, for manufactured produce. Whatever reduces the real price of the latter, raifes that of the former. An equal quantity of the former becomes thereby equivalent to a greater quantity of the latter; and the landlord is enabled to purchafe a greater quantity of the conveniencies, ornaments, or luxuries, which he has occafion fọr.

Every increafe in the real wealth of the fociety, every increafe in the quantity of ufeful labour employed within it, tends indirectly to raife the real rent of land. A certain proportion of this labour naturally goes to the land. A greater number of men and cattle are employed in its cultivation, the produce increafes with the increafe of the fock which is thus employed in raifing it, and the rent increafes with the produce.

The contrary circumftances, the neglect of cultivation and improvement, the fall in the real price of any part of the rude produce of land, the rife in the real price of manufactures from the decay of manufacturing art and induftry, the declention of the real wealth of the fociety, all tend, on the ocher hand, to lower the real rent

BOOK of land, to reduce the real wealth of the land$\underbrace{\text { I. }}$ lord, to diminifh his power of purchafing either the labour, or the produce of the labour of other people.

The whole annual produce of the land and labour of every country, or what comes to the fame thing, the whole price of that annual produce, naturally divides itfelf, it has already been obferved, into three parts; the rent of land, the wages of labour, and the profits of ftock; and conftitutes a revenue to three different orders of people; to thofe who live by rent, to thofe who live by wages, and to thofe who live by profit. Thefe are the three great, original and conftituent orders of every civilized fociety, from whofe revenue that of every other order is ultimately derived.

The intereft of the firf of thofe three great orders, it appears from what has been juft now faid, is ftrictly and infeparably connected with the general intereft of the fociety. Whatever either promotes or obftructs the one, neceffarily promotes or obftructs the other. When the public deliberates concerning any regulation of commerce or police, the proprietors of land never can millead it, with a view to promote the intereft of their own particular order; at leaft, if they have any tolerable knowledge of that in, tereft. They are, indeed, too often defective in this tolerable knowledge. They are the only one of the three orders whofe revenue cofts them neither labour nor care, but comes to them, as
land. either other d and to the proy been d, the x ; and ders of fe who profit. conftn whore imately uft now ed with hatever ceffarily hen the ation of ad never the inleaft, if that in; ective in the only fts them them, as it
it were, of its own accord, and independent of ${ }^{\mathrm{C}} \mathrm{H}_{\mathrm{xI}} \mathrm{A}^{\mathrm{P}}$. any plan or project of their own. That indolence, which is the natural effect of the eafe and fecurity of their fituation, renders them too often, not only ignorant, but incapable of that application of mind which is neceffary in order to forefee and underftand the confequences of any public regulation.

The intereft of the fecond order, that of thofe who live by wages, is as Atrictly connected with the intereft of the fociety as that of the firft. The wages of the labourer, it has already been thewn, are never fo high as when the demand for labour is continually rifing, or when the quantity employed is every year increafing confiderably. When this real wealth of the fociety becomes ftationary, his wages are foon reduced to what is barely enough to enable him to bring up a family, or to continue the race of labourers. When the fociety declines, they fall even below this. The order of proprietors may, perhaps, gain more by the profperity of the fociety, than that of labourers : but there is no order that fuffers fo cruelly from its decline. But though the intereft of the labourer is ftrietly connected with that of the fociety, he is incapable either of comprehending that intereft, or of underftanding its connexion with his own. His condition leaves him no time to receive the neceffary information, and his education and habits are commonly fuch as to render him unfit to judge even though he was fully informed. In the public deliberations, therefore, his voice is little heard and lefs regarded, except upon fome particular occafions, when his clamour is animated, fet on, and fupported by his employers, not for his, but their own particular purpofes.

His employers conftitute the third order, that of thofe who live by profit. It is the ftock that is employed for the fake of profit, which puts into motion the greater part of the ufeful labour of every fociety. The plans and projects of the employers of ftock regulate and direct all the moft important operations of labour, and profic is the end propofed by all thofe plans and projects. But the rate of profit does not, like rent and wages, rife with the profperity, and fall with the declenfion of the fociety. On the contrary, it is naturally low in rich, and high in poor countries, and it is always higheft in the countries which. are going fafteft to ruin. The intereft of this third order, therefore, has not the fame connexion with the general intereft of the fociety as that of the other two. Merchants and mafter manufacturers are, in this order, the two claffes of people who commonly employ the largeft capitals, and who by their wealth draw to themfelves the greateit fhare of the public confideration. As during their whole lives they are engaged in plans and projects, they have frequently more acutenefs of underftanding than the greater part of country gentlemen. As their thoughts, however, are commonly exercifed rather about the intereft of their own particular branch
s little e parmated, hot for
er, that ck that ch puts 1 labour ; of the all the d profit ind proike rent and fall he conhigh in $t$ in the n. The not the of the ants and the two ploy the draw to olic conthey are have freing than As their fed rather ar branch of
of bufinefs, than about that of the fociety, their ${ }^{\text {c }}{ }^{\mathrm{H}}{ }_{\mathrm{x} 1.0}{ }^{\mathrm{P}}$. judgment, even when given with the greatelt candour (which it has not been upon every occafion), is much more to be depended upon with regard to the former of thofe two objects, than with regard to the latter. Their fuperiority over the country gentleman is, not fo much in their knowledge of the public incereft, as in their having a better knowledge of their own intereft than he has of his. It is by this fuperior knowledge of their own intereft that they have frequently impofed upon his generofity, and perfuaded him to give up both his own intereft and that of the public, from a very fimple but honeft conviction, that their intereff, and not his, was the intereft of the public. The intereft of the dealers, however, in any particular branch of trade or manufactures, is always in fome refpects different from, and even oppofite to, that of the public. To widen the market and to narrow the competition, is always the interelt of the dealers. To widen the market may frequently be agreeable enough to the intereft of the public; but to narrow the competition mult always be againft it, and can ferve only to enable the dealers, by raifing their profits above what they naturally would be, to levy, for their own benefit, an abfurd tax upon the reft of their fellow-citizens. The propofal of any new law or regulation of commerce which comes from this order, ought always to be liftened to with great precaution, and ought never to be adopted

B O O $K$ till after having been long and carefully examined, $\underbrace{}_{\text {not only with the moft ferupulous, but with the }}$ moft fufpicious attention. It comes from an order of men, whofe intereft is never exactly the fame with that of the public, who have generally an intereft to deceive and even to opprefs the public, and who accordingly have, upon many occafions, both deceived and oppreffed it.

| Years XII. | Price of the Quarter of Wheat each Year. | Average of the dif-\| ferent Prices of the fame Year. | The average Price of each Year in Money of the prefent Times |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1202 | f. s. d. | E. s. d. | f. s. |
| 1205 | $\left\{\begin{array}{lll}-13 & 4 \\ -15\end{array}\right\}$ | 135 | $2-3$ |
| 1237 | - 34 | - | - 10 |
| 1243 | - 2 | - - | - 6 |
| 1244 | - 2 | - - - | - 6 |
| 1246 | -16- | - | 28 |
| 1247 | - 134 | $\pm-$ | 2 - |
| 1257 | 14 |  | 3. 12 |
| 1258 | $\left\{\begin{array}{l}1.15 \\ -16\end{array}\right.$ | 17 | 2 II |
| 1270 | $\left\{\begin{array}{ccc}4 & 16- \\ 6 & 8-\end{array}\right\}$ | 512. | 1616 |
| 1286 | $\left\{\begin{array}{rrr}-2 & 8 \\ - & 16 & -\end{array}\right\}$ | $-94$ | 18 |
|  |  | - Total, | 35. 9 9 |
|  |  | Average Price, | 21915 |

mined, th the n order le fame rally an public, cafions,
erage Price of ?ear in Money prefent Times.
s. d.

16 -
$-3$
16 -
$10=$
$6=$
$6=$
$8=$

1 I
$516 \div$
8 -
$5 \quad 3$
$219 \quad 1 \frac{1}{4}$





C HAP.<br>XI.

Prices of the Quarter of nine Bußhels of the beft or bigbeft priced Wheat at Windfor Market, on Lady-Day and Micloaelmas, from 1595 to 1764, both inclufive; the Price of each rear being the Medium between the bigbeft Prices of thofe two Market-days.


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BOOK
$\underbrace{\text { I. }}$ Years.

## THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF

|  |  |  |  | Brough | ov |  | 14 | 10 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1637, | - | 213 | $\bigcirc$ | 167 r , | - | 2 | 2 | 0 |
| 1638 , | - | 217 | 4 | 1672, | - | 2 | 1 | $\bigcirc$ |
| . 1639 , |  | 24 | 10 | 1673 | - | 2 | 6 | 8 |
| 1640, |  | 24 | 8 | 1674, | - | 3 | 8 | 8 |
| 1641, |  | 28 | 0 | 1675, | - | 3 | 4 | 8 |
| 1642, 7 |  | $\bigcirc$ | 0 | 1676, | - |  | 18 | 0 |
| 1643, | Ef | 0 | 0. | 1677, | - | 2 | 2 | $\bigcirc$ |
| 1644, |  | 0 | 0 | 1678, | - | 2 | 19 | 0 |
| 1645, |  | $\bigcirc$ | - | 1679, | - | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| 1646, | - | 28 | 0 | 1680, |  |  | 5 | 0 |
| 1647, | - | 313 | 8 | 1681, | - | 2 | 6 | 8 |
| 1648, | - | 45 | 0 | 1582, | - | 2 | 4 | 0 |
| 1649, | - | 40 | - | 1683, | - | 2 | $\bigcirc$ | $\bigcirc$ |
| 1650, | - | 316 | 8 | 1684 , | - | 2 | 4 | $\bigcirc$ |
| 1651, | - | 313 | 4 | 1685, | - | 2 | 6 | 8 |
| 1652, | - | 29 | 6 | 1686, | - | 1 | 14 | $\bigcirc$ |
| 1653, | - | 115 | 6 | 1687, |  | I | 5 | 2 |
| 1654, | - | 16 | - | 1688, | - | 2 | 6 | 0 |
| 1655, | - | 113 | 4 | 1689, |  | I | 10 | - |
| 1656, | - | 23 | $\bigcirc$ | 1690, | - | 1 | 14 | 8 |
| 1657. | - | 26 | 8 | 1691, |  | I | 14 | $\bigcirc$ |
| 1658, | - | 35 | - | 1692, | - | 2 | 6 | 8 |
| 1659, | - | 36 | $\bigcirc$ | 1693, |  | 3 | 7 | 8 |
| 1660, | - | 216 | 6 | 1694, | - | 3 | 4 | 0 |
| 1661, | - | 310 | $\bigcirc$ | 1695, | - | 2 | I 3 | 0 |
| 1662, | - | 314 | 0 | 1696 | - | 3 | II | 0 |
| 1663, | - | 217 | $\bigcirc$ | 1697 , | - | 3 | - | $\bigcirc$ |
| 1664, | - | 20 | 6 | 1698, | - | 3 | 8 | 4 |
| I 665, | - | 29 | 4 | 1699, | - | 3 | 4 | $\bigcirc$ |
| 1666, | - | 116 | 0 | I700, | - | 2 | 0 | $\bigcirc$ |
| 1667 , | - | 116 | 0 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1668, | - | 20 | 0 |  | 60) |  | 1 | 8 |
| 1669, | - |  | 4 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1670, | - | 2 I | 8 |  |  | 2 | 11 | $0 . \frac{1}{5}$ |

THE WEALTH OF NATIONS.


| 406 |  | THE NATURE | AND | CAUSE | S OF |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\mathrm{BO}_{\mathrm{I}} \mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{S}} \mathrm{~K}$ |  | Whent per Quarter. |  |  | Wheat per Quarter. |
|  | Years. | f. s. d. |  | Years. | f. s. d. |
|  | 1731, | - 11210 |  | 1741, | -268 |
|  | 1732, | - 168 |  | 1742, | - 1140 |
|  | 1733 , | - $1 \begin{array}{lll}1 & 8\end{array}$ |  | 1743, | - 1410 |
|  | 1734, | - 11810 |  | 1744 , | - 1410 |
|  | 1735, | - 230 |  | 1745, | - 176 |
|  | 1736, | - 204 |  | 1746, | - 1190 |
|  | 1737, | - 1180 |  | 1747, | -11410. |
|  | 1738, | - 1156 |  | 1748, | - 1170 |
|  | 1739, | -1186 |  | 1749, | - 1170 |
|  | 1740, | 2108 |  | 1750, | 1126 |
|  |  | 10)18 $12 \quad 8$ |  |  | 10) $1618 \quad 2$ |
|  |  | $1173{ }^{\frac{1}{3}}$ |  |  | $\begin{array}{llll}1 & 13 & 9 \\ 5\end{array}$ |

## Quarter.

 s. d. 68
## INTRODUCTION.

IN that rude fate of fociety in which there is introduct. no divifion of labour, in which exchanges are feldom made, and in which every man provides every thing for himfelf, it is not neceffary that any ftock fhould be accumulated or ftored up beforehand in order to carry on the bufinefs of the fociety. Every man endeavours to fupply by his own induftry his own occafional wants as they occur. When he is hungry, he goes to the forelt to hunt; when his coat is worn out ${ }_{2}$ he clothes himfelf with the fkin of the firft large animal he kills; and when his hut begins to go to ruin, he repairs it, as well as he can, with the trees and the turf that are neareft it.

But when the divifion of labour has once been thoroughly introduced, the produce of a man's own labour can fupply but a very fmall part of his occafional wants. The far greater part of them are fupplied by the produce of other men's labour, which he purchafes with the produce, or, what is the fame thing, with the price of the produce of his own. But this purchafe Dd 4
cannot
${ }^{B}$ O O O . cannot be made till fuch time as the produce of $\underbrace{\text { n. his own labour has not only been completed, }}$ but fold. A ftock of goods of different, kinds, therefore, muft be ftored up fomewhere fufficient to maintain him, and to fupply him with the materials and tools of his work, till fuch time, at leaft, as both thefe events can be brought about. A weaver cannot apply himfelf entirely to his peculiar bufinefs, unlefs there is before-hand ftored up fomewhere, either in his own poffeffion or in that of fome other perfon, a ftock fufficient to maintain him, and to fupply him with the materials and tools of his work, till he has not only completed, but fold his web. This accumulation muft, evidently, be previous to his' applying his induftry for fo long a time to fuch a peculiar bufinefs.

As the accumulation of lock muft, in the nature of things, be previous to the divifion of labour, fo labour can be more and more fubdivided in proportion only as ftock is previoufly more and more accumulated. The quantity of materials which the fame number of people can work up, increafes in a great proportion as labour comes to be more and more fubdivided; and as the operations of each workman are gradually reduced to a greater degree of fimplicity, a variety of new machines come to be invented for facilitating and abridging thofe operations. As the divifion of labour advances, therefore, in order to give conftant employment to an equal number of workmen, an equal ftock of provifions, and a greater flock of materials and tools, than what kinds, ficient th the ne, at about. is peftored or in ent to mate$t$ only umulaplying eculiar
he naof la-fubdi:vioully utity of ple can labour and as ally revariety r faciliAs the rder to mber of and a n what would
would have been neceffary in a ruder ftate of things, $\underbrace{\text { Introdut. }}$ muft be accumulated before-hand. But the number of workmen in every branch of bufinefs generally increafes with the divifion of labour in that branch, or rather it is the increafe of their number which enables them to clafs and fubdivide themfelves in this manner.

As the accumulation of ftock is previounly neceffary for carrying on this great improvement in the productive powers of labour, fo that accumulation naturally leads to this improvement: The perfon who employs his ftock in maintaining labour, neceffarily wifhes to employ it in fuch a manner as to produce as great a quantity of work as poffible. He endeavours, therefore, both to make among his workmen the moft proper diftribution of employment, and to furnih them with the beft machires which he can either invent or afford to purchafe. His abilities in both thefe refpects are generally in proportion to the extent of his ftock, or to the number of people whom it can employ. The quantity of induftry, therefore, not only increafes in every country with the increare of the fock which employs it, but, in confequence of that increafe, the fame quantity of induftry produces a much greater quantity of work.

Such are in general the elfects of the increafe of ftock upon induftry and its productive powers.

In the following book I have endeavoured to explain the nature of ftock, the effects of its accumulation into capitals of different kinds, and the effects of the different employments of thofe
${ }^{\text {B O O }}$, thofe capitals. This book is divided into five
$\underbrace{\text { ni. }}$ chapters. In the firft chapter, I have endeavoured to thew what are the different parts or branches into which the ftock, either of an individual, or of a great fociety, naturally divides itfelf. In the fecond, I have endeavoured to explain the nature and operation of money confidered as a particular branch of the general ftock of the fociety. The ftock which is accumulated into a capital, may either be employed by the perfon to whom it belongs, or it may be lent to fome other perfon. In the third and fourth chapters, I have endeavoured to examine the manner in which it operates in both thefe fituations. The fifth and laft chapter treats of the different effects which the different employments of capital immediately prociuce upon the quantity both of national induftry, and of the annual produce of land and labour.

> C H A P. I.

## Of the Divifion of Stock.

WHEN the flock which a man poffeffes is no more than fufficient to maintain him for a few days or a few weeks, he feldom thinks of deriving any revenue from it. He confumes it as fpa:ingly as he can, and endeavours by his labour to acquire fomething which may fupply its place before it be confumed altogether. His
revenue is, in this cafe, derived from his labour CHAP. only. This is the ftate of the greater part of the $\underbrace{1 .}$ labouring poor in all countries.

But when he poffefles fock fufficient to maintain him for months or years, he naturally endeavours to derive a revenue from the greater part of it; referving only fo much for his immediate confumption as may maintain him till this revenue begins to come in. His whole ftock, therefore, is diftinguifhed into two parts. That part which, he expects, is to afford him this revenue, is called his capital. The other is that which fupplies his immediate confumption; and which confilts either, firft, in that portion of his whole ftock which was originally referved for this purpofe; or, fecondly, in his revenue, from whatever fource derived, as it gradually comes in; or, thirdly, in fuch things as had been purchafed by either of thefe in former years, and which are not yet entirely confumed; fuch as a ftock of clothes, houfehold furniture, and the like. In one, or other, or all of thefe three articles, confifts the ftock which men commonly referve for their own immediate confumption.

There are two different ways in which a capital may be employed fo as to yield a revenue or profit to its employer.

First, it may be employed in raifing, manufacturing, or purchafing goods, and felling them again with a profit. The capital employed in this manner yields no revenue or profit to its employer, while it either remains in his poffeffion, or continues in the fame fhape. The goods of the
merchant
${ }^{B} \mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{n}} \mathrm{O}^{\mathrm{K}}$ merchant yield him no revenue or profit till he fells them for money, and the money yields him as little till it is again exchanged for goods. His capital is continually going from him in one fhape, and returning to him in another, and it is cnly by means of fuch circulation, or fucceffive exchanges, that it can yield him any profit. Such capitals, therefore, may very properly be called circulating capitals.

Secondly, it may be employed in the improvement of land, in the purchafe of ufeful machines and inftruments of trade, or in fuchlike things as yield a revenue or profit without changing malters, or circulating any further. Such capitals, therefore, may very properly be called fixed capitals.

Different occupations require very different proportions between the fixed and circulating capitals employed in them.

The capital of a merchant, for example, is altogether a circulating capital. He has occafion for no machines or inftruments of trade, unlefs his mop or warehoufe be confidered as fuch.

Some part of the capital of every mafter artificer or manufacturer muft be fixed in the inftruments of his trade. This part, however, is very fmall in fome, and very great in others. A mafter taylor requires no other inftruments of trade but a parcel of needles. Thofe of the matter fhoemaker are a little, though but a very little, more expenfive. Thofe of the weaver rife a good deal above thofe of the fhoemaker. The far greater part of the capital of all fuch mafter artificers,
till he ds him His Shape, is cnly ve exSuch called
he imufeful a fuchwithout further. erly be

## lifferent

 ing cafion for alefs hiser artie inftruis very ers. A nents of of the it a very aver rife r. The h mafter utificers,
artificers, however, is circulated, either in the C н A P. wages of their workmen, or in the price of their $\underbrace{1 .}$ materials, and repaid with a profit by the price of the work:

I s : ther works a much greater fixed capital is required. In a great iron-work, for example, the furnace for melting the ore, the forge, the fit-mill, are inftruments of trade which cannot be erected without a very great expence. In coal-works, and mines of every kind, the machinery neceffary both for drawing out the water and for other purpofes, is frequently ftill more expenfive.

That part of the capital of the farmer which is employed in the inftruments of agriculture is a fixed, that which is employed in the wages and maintenance of his labouring fervants, is a circulating capital. He makes a profit of the one by keeping it in his own poffeffion, and of the other by parting with it. The price or value of his labouring cattle is a fixed capital in the fame manner as that of the inftruments of hufbandry: their maintenance is a circulating capital in the fame manner as that of the labouring fervants. The farmer makes his profit by keeping the labouring cattle, and by parting with their maintenance. Both the price and the maintenance of the cattle which are bought in and fattened, not for labour, but for fale, are a circulating capital. The farmer makes his profit by parting with them. A flock of fheep or a herd of cattle that, in a breeding country, is bought in, neither for labour, nor for fale, but

B O O K in order to make a profit by their wool, by their II. milk, and by their increafe, is a fixed capital. The profit is made by keeping them. Their maintenance is a circulating capital. The profit is made by parting with it ; and it comes back with both its own profit, and the profit upon the whole price of the cattle, in the price of the wool, the milk, and the increafe. The whole value of the feed too is properly a fixed capital. Though it goes backwards and forwards between the ground and the granary, it never changes mafters, and therefore does not properly circulate. The farmer makes his profit, not by irs lale, but by its increafe.
' HE general ftock of any country or fociety is the fame with that of all its inhabitants or members, and therefore naturally divides itfelf into the fame three portions, each of which has a diftinct function or office.

The firft is that portion which is referved for immediate confumption, and of which the characteriftic is, that it affords no revenue or profit. It confilts in the ftock of food, clothes, houlehold furniture, ixc. which have been purchafed by their proper confumers, but which are not yet entirely confumed. The whole ltock of mere dwelling-houfes too fubfifting at any one time in the country, make a part of this firft portion. The fock that is laid out in a houfe, if it is to be the dweiling-houfe of the proprietor, ceafes from that moncat to ferve in the function of a capital, or to afford any revenue to its owner. A dwelling-houfe, as fuch, contributes nothing to the revenue of its inhabitant; and though it

THE WEALTH OF NATIONS.
their apital. Their ofit is $\varepsilon$ with whole , the of the $t$ goes d and theremakes
ciety is mbers, e fame anction eferved ch the nue or lothes, n purich are ock of ny one rft poroufe, if prietor, unction owner. nothing ough it is, is, no doubt, extremely ufeful to him, it is as his $\mathbf{C H}_{\mathrm{H}_{1}} \mathrm{~A}$. clothes and houfehold furniture are ufeful to him, $\qquad$ which, however, make a part of his expence, and not of his revenue. If it is to be let to a tenant for rent, as the houfe itfelf can produce nothing, the tenant mult always pay the rent out of fome other revenue which he derives either from la. bour, or fock, or land. Though a houfe, therefore, may yield a revenue to its proprietor, and thereby ferve in the function of a capital to him, it cannot yield any to the public, nor ferve in the function of a capital to it, and the revenue of the whole body of the people can never be in the finalleft degree increafed by it. Clothes, and houfehold furniture, in the fame manner, fometimes yield a revenue, and thereby ferve in the function of a capital to particular perfons. In countries where mafquerades are common, it is a trade to let out mafquerade dreffes for a night. Upholiterers frequently let furniture by the month or by the year. Undertakers let the furniture of funerals by the day and by the week. Many pecple let furnifited houfes, and get a rent, not only for the ufe of the houfe, but for that of the furniture. The revenus, however, which is derived from fuch things, mut always be ultimately drawn fiom fome other fource of revenue. Of all parts of the ftock, either of an individual, or of a fociety, referved for immediate confumption, what is laid out in houfes is moft flowly confumed. A flock of clothes may laft feverai years: a ftock of furniture half a century or a century : but a ftock

B O O K ftock of houfes, well built and properly taken care of, may laft many centuries. .Though the period of their total confumption, however, is more diftant, they are ftill as really a ftock referved for immediate confumption as either clothes or houfehold furniture.

The fecond of the three portions into which the general ftock of the fociety divides itfelf, is the fixed capital, of which the characteriftic is, that it affords a revenue or profit without circulating or changing mafters. It confifts chiefly of the four following articles :

First, of all ufeful machines and inftruments of trade which facilitate and abridge labour:

Secondly, of all thofe profitable buildings which are the means of procuring a revenue, not only to their proprietor who lets them for a rent, but to the perfon who poffeffes them and pays that rent for them ; fuch as fhops, warehoufes, workhoufes, farmhoufes, with all their neceffary buildings; ftables, granaries, \&c. Thefe are very different from mere dwelling-houfes. They are a fort of inftruments of trade, and may be confidered in the fame light:

Thirdly, of the improvements of land, of what has been profitainy laid out in clearing, draining, enclofing, manuring, and reducing it into the condition moft proper for tillage and culture. An improved farm may very juftly be regarded in the fame light as thofe ufeful machines which facilitate and abridge labour, and by means of which, an equal circulating capital can afford a much greater revenue to its em-
n care period difor imfehold
which is the that it ing or he four ents of iildings ue, not a rent, ays that work-buildery dif$y$ are a nfidered
and, of learing, ucing it age and juftly be ful majur, and y capital its employer.
ployer. An improved farm is equally advan. tageous and more durable than any of thofe machines, frequently requiring no other repairs than the moft profitable application of the farmer's capital employed in cultivating it :

Fourthly, of the acquired and ufeful abilities of all the inhabitants or members of the fociety. The acquifition of fuch talents, by the maintenance of the acquirer during his education, ftudy, or apprenticefhip, always cofts a real expence, which is a capital fixed and realized, as it were, in his perfon. Thofe talents, as they make a part of his fortune, fo do they likewife of that of the fociety to which he belongs. The improved dexterity of a workman may be confidered in the fame light as a machine or inftrument of trade which facilitates and abridges labour, and which, though it cofts a certain expence, repays that expence with a profit.

The third and laft of the three portions into which the general ftock of the fociety naturally divides itfelf, is the circulating capital; of which the characteriftic is, that it affords a revenue only by circulating or changing mafters. It is compofed likewife of four parts :

First, of the money by means of which all the other three are circulated and diftributed to their proper confumers :

Secondly, of the fock of provifions which are in the poffeffion of the butcher, the grazier, the farmer, the corn-merchant, the brewer, \&x. and from the fale of which they expect to derive a profit:

> Vol. I. Ee Thirdly,

Thirdly, of the materials, whether altogether $\underbrace{\text { rude, or more or lefs manufactured, of clothes, }}$ furniture, and building, which are not yet made up into any of thofe three fhapes, but which remain in the hands of the growers, the manufacturers, the mercers, and drapers, the timbermerchants, the carpenters and joiners, the brickmakers, \&cc.

Fourthly, and laftly, of the work which is made up and completed, but which is Atill in the hands of the merchant and manufacturer, and not yet difpofed of or diftributed to the proper confumers; fuch as the finifhed work which we frequently find ready-made in the fhops of the fmith, the cabinet-maker, the goldfimith, the jeweller, the china-merchant, \&c. The circulating capital confifts in this manner, of the provifions, materials, and finifhed work of all kinds that are in the hands of their refpective dealers, and of the money that is neceffary for circulating and diftributing them to thofe who are finally to ufe or to confume them.

Of thefe four parts, three, provifions, materials, and finifhed work, are, either annually, or in a longer or fhorter period, regularly withdrawn from it, and placed either in the fixed capital, or in the ftock referved for immediate confumption.

Every fixed capital is both originally derived from, and requires to be continually fupported by a circulating capital. All ufeful machines and inttruments of trade are originally derived from a circulating capital, which furnilhes the materials
igether lothes, made which mănu-imber-brick-
hich is ftill in er, and proper lich we of the th, the e circuof the of all efpective flary for ofe who s, mateannually, rly withthe fixed nmediate upported hines and ved from material's of

Of which they are made, and the maintenance $C$ A A P . of the workmen who make them. They require too a capital of the fame kind to keep them in conftant repair.

No fixed capital can yield any revenue but by means of a circulating capital. The moft uféful machines and inftruments of trade will produce nothing without the circulating capital which affords the materials they are employed upon, and the maintenance of the workmen who employ them, Land, however improved, will yield no revenue without a circulating capital, which maintains the labourers who cultivate and collect its produce.

To maintain and augment the fock which may be referved for immediate confumption, is the fole end and purpole both of the fixed and circulating capitals. It is this ftock which feeds, clothes, and lodges the people." Their riches or poverty depends upon the abundant or fparing fupplies which thofe two capitals can afford to the ftock referved for immediate confumption.

So great a part of the circulating capital being continually withdrawn from it, in order to be placed in the other two branches of the general ftock of the fociety; it muft in its turn require continual fupplies, without which it would foo: ceafe to exift. Thefe fupplies are principally drawn from three fources, the produce of land, of mines, and of fifheries. Theíe afford continual fupplies of provifions and materials, of which part is afterwards wrought up
Ee3. into

BOOK into finifhed work, and by which are replaced the provifions, materials, and finihed work continually withdrawn from the circulating capital. From mines too is drawn what is neceffary for maintaining and augmenting that part of it which confifts in money. For though, in the ordinary courfe of bufinefs, this part is not, like the other three, neceffarily withdrawn from it, in order to be placed in the other two branches of the general ftock of the fociety, it muft, however, like all other things, be wafted and worn out at laft, and fometimes too be either loft or fent abroad, and muft, therefore, require continua., though, no doubt, much fmaller fupplies.

Land, mines, and fifheries, require all ${ }^{3}$ fixed and a circulating capital to cultivate them; and their produce replaces with a profit, not only thofe capitals, but all the others in the fociety. Thus the farmer annually replaces to the manufacturer the provifions, which he had confumed and the materials which he had wrought up the year before; and the manufacturer replaces to the farmer the finifhed work which he had wafted and worn out in the fame time. This is the real exchange that is annually made between thofe two orders of people, though it feldom happens that the rude produce of the one and the manufactured produce of the other are directly bartered for one another ; becaule it feldom happens that the farmer fells his corn and his cattle, his flax and his wool, to the very fame perfon of whom he chufes to purchafe the ift, howand worn ither loft ; require fmaller he wants. He fells, therefore, his rude produce $\xrightarrow{\text { ( }}$ for money, with which he can purchafe, whereever it is to be had, the manufactured produce he has occafion for. Land even replaces, in part at leaft, the capitals with which fifheries and mines are cultivated. It is the produce of land which draws the filh from the waters; and it is the produce of the furface of the earth which extracts the minerals from its bowels.

The produce of land, mines, and fifheries, when their natural fertility is equal, is in proportion to the extent and proper application of the capitals employed about them. When the capitals are equal, and equally well applied, it is in proportion to their natural fertility.

In all countries where there is tolerable fecurity, every man of common underftanding will endeavour to employ whatever ftock he can command, in procuring either prefent enjoyment or future profit. If it is employed in procuring prefent enjoyment, it is a ftock referved for immediate confumption. If it is employed in procuring future profit, it muft procure this profit, either by ftaying with him, or by going from him. In the one cafe it is a fixed, in the other it is a circulating capital. A man muft be perfectly crazy who, where there is tolerable fecurity, does not employ all the ftock which he commands, whether it be his own, or borrowed of other people, in fome one or other of thofe three ways.

Ee 3
a O OK In thofe unfortunate countries, indeed, where men are continually afraid of the violenc of their fuperiors, they frequently bury and conveal a great part of their ftock, in order to have it always at hand to carry with them to fome place of fafety, in cafe of their being threatened with any of thofe difafters to which they confider themfelves as at all times expofed. This is faid to be a common practice in Turkey, in Indoftan, and, I believe, in moft other governments of Alia. It feeins to have been a common practice among our anceftors during the violence of the feudal government. Treafure-trove was in thofe times confidered as no contemptible part of the revenue of the greateft fovereigns in Europe. It confifted in fuch treafure as was found concealed in the earth, and to which no particular perfon could prove any right, This was regarded in thofe times as. fo important an object, that it was always confidered as belonging to the fuvereign, and neither to the finder nor to the proprietor of the land, unlefs the right to it had been conveyed to the latter by an exprefs claufe in his charter. ' It was put upon the fame footing with gold and filver mines, which, without a fpecial claufe in the charter, were never fuppofed to be comprehended in the general grant of the lands, though mines of lead, copper, tin, and coal were, as things of fmaller confequence.

CHAP.

## C HAP. II.

Of Money confidered as a particular Branch of the general Stock of tb: Society, or of the Expence of maintaining the National Capital.

IT has been thewn in the firft Book, that the $\mathbf{c} \mathrm{H}_{\text {If }}$ A. $\mathrm{P}_{\text {. }}$ price of the greater part of commodities refolves itfelf into three parts, of which one pays the wages of the labour, another the profits of the ftock, and a third the rent of the land which had been employed in producing and bringing them to market: that there are, indeed, fome commodities of which the price is made up of two of thofe parts only, the wages of labour, and the profits of ftock; and a very few in which it confifts altogether ir one, the wages of labour; but that the price of every commodity neceffarily refolves itfelf into fome one, or other, or all of th_fe three parts; every part of it which goes neither to rent nor to wages, being neceffarily profit to fomebody.

Since this is the cafe, it has been obferved; with regard to every particular commodity, taken feparately; it muft be fo with regard to all the commodities which compore the whole annual produce of the land and labour of every country, taken complexly. The whole price or exchangeable value of that annral produce, muft refolve itfelf into the fame three parts, and be parcelled out among the different inhabitants of

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в o o $k$ the country, either as the wages of their labour, the profits of their ftock, or the rent of their land.

But though the whole value of the annual produce of the land and labour of every country is thus divided among and conftitutes a revenue to its different inhabitants; yet as in the rent of a private eftate we diftinguifh between the grofs rent and the neat rent, fo may we likewife in the revenue of all the inhabitants of a great country.

THE grofs rent of a private eftate comprehends whatcver is paid by the farmer; the neat nent, what remains free to the landlord, after deducting the expence of management, of repairs, and all other neceffary charges; or what, without hurting his eftate, he can afford to place in his fock referved for immediate confumption, or to fpend upon his table, equipage, the ornaments of his houfe and furniture, his private enjoyments and amufements. His real wealth is in proportion, not to his grofs, but to his neat rent.

The grofs revenue of all the inhabitants of a great country comprehends the whole annual produce of their land and labour ; the neat revenue, what remains free to them after decucting the expence of maintaining; firft, their fixed; and fecondly, their circulating capital; or what, without encroaching upon their capital, they can place in their ftock referved for immediate confumption, or fpend upon their fubliftence, conveniencies, and amufements. Their real wealth too
is in proportion, not to their grofs, but to their $\boldsymbol{C H}^{\boldsymbol{H} A P}$. neat revenue.

The whole expence of maintaining the fixed capital, muft evidently be excluded from the neat revenue of the fociety. Neither the materials neceffary for fupporting their ufeful machines and mittruments of trade, their profitable buildings, \&c. nor the produce of the labour neceffarv for fafhioning thofe materials into the proper tu.m, can ever make any part of it. The price of that labour may indeed make a part of it; as the workmen fo employed may place the whole value of their wages in their ftock referved for immediate confumption. But in other forts of labour, both the price and the produce go to this ftock, the price to that of the workmen, the produce to that of e:her people, whofe fubfiftence, conveniencies, and amufements, are augmented by the labour of thofe workmen.

The intention of the fixed capital is to increafe the productive powers of labour, or to enable the fame number of labourers to perform a much greater quantity of work. In a farm where all the neceffary buildings, fences, drains, communications, \&c. are in the moft perfect good order, the fame number of labourers and labouring cattle will raife a much greater produce, than in one of equal extent and equally good ground, jut not furnifhed with equal conveniencies. In manufactures the fane number of hands, affifted with the beft machinery, will work up a much greater quantity of goods than with more imperfect inftruments of trade. The

Bn OK expence which is properly laid out upon a fixed capital of any kind, is always repaid with great profit, and increafes the annual produce by a much greater value than that of the fupport which fuch improvements require. This fupport, however, fill requires a certain portion of that produce. A certain quantity of materials, and the labour of a certain number of workmen, both of which might have $\mathrm{b}: \mathrm{n}$ immediately employed to augment the food, clothing, and lodging, the fubfiftence and conveniencies of the fociety, are thus diverted to another employment, highly advantageous indeed, but ftill different from this one. It is upon this account that all fuch improvements in mechanics, as enable the fame number of workmen to perform an equal quantity of work with cheaper and fimpler machinery than had been ufual before, are always regarded as advantageous to every fociety. A certain quantity of materials, and the labour of a certain number of workmen, which had before been employed in fupporting a more complex and expenfive machinery, can afterwards be applied to augment the quantity of work which that or any other machinery is ufeful only for performing. The undertaker of fome great manufactory who employs a thoufand a-year in the maintenance of his macninery, if he can reduce this expence to five hundred, will naturally employ the other five hundred in purchafing an additional quantity of materials to be wrought up by an additional number of workmen. The quantity of that work, therefore, which his machinery
chinery was ufeful only for performing, will C.H A P. naturally be augmented, and $\cdots$ th it all the advantage and conveniency which the fociety can derive from that work.

The expence of maintaining the fixed capital in a great country, may very properly be compared to that of repairs in a private eftate. The expence of repairs may frequently be neceffary for fupporting the produce of the eftate, and confequently both the grofs and the neat rent of the landlord. When by a more proper direction, however, it can be diminifhed without occafioning any diminution of produce, the grofs rent remains at leaft the fame as before, and the neat rent is neceffarily augmented.

But though the whole expence of maintaining the fixed capital is thus neceffarily excluded from the neat revenue of the fociety, it is not the fame cafe with that of maintaining the circulating capital. Of the four parts of which this latter capital is compofed, money, provifions, materials, and finifhed work, the three laft, it has already been obferved, are regularly withdrawn from it, and placed either in the fixed capital of the fociety, or in their ftock referved for immediate confumption. Whatever portion of thofe confumable goods is not employed in maintaining the former, goes all to the latter, and makes a part of the neat revenue of the fociety. The maintenance of thofe three parts of the circulating capital, therefore, withdraws no portion of the annual produce from the neat revenue of the fociety, befides what is neceffary for maintaining the fixed capital.

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The circulating capital of a fociety is in this respect different from that of an individual. That of an individual is totally excluded from making any part of his neat revenue, which mut confift altogether in his profits. But though the circulating capital of every individual makes a part of that of the fociety to which he belongs, it is not upon that account totally excluded from making a part likewise of their neat revenue. Though the whole goods in a merchant's Chop mut by no means be placed in his own flock referved for immediate confumption, they may in that of other people, who, from a revenue derived from other funds, may regularly replace their value to him, together with its profits, without occafioning any diminution either of his capital or of theirs.

Money, therefore, is the only part of the circulating capital of a fociety, of which the maintenance can occafion any diminution in their neat revenue.

The fixed capital, and that part of the circuslasting capital which confifts in money, fo far as they affect the revenue of the fociety, bear a very. great refemblance to one another.

First, as thole machines and inftruments of trade, \&c. require a certain expence, first to erect them, and afterwards to fupport them, both which expences, though they make a part of the grots, are deductions from the neat revenue of the faciety; fo the flock of money which circulates in any country mut require a certain expence, first to collect it, and afterwards to Support it, both which
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circufar as a very.
rents of to erect h which e grofs, the $f a-$ dates in ce, firlt it, both which
which expences, though they make a part of $=\mathrm{H}_{\mathrm{H}} \mathrm{A} \mathrm{P}_{0}$ the grofs, are, in the fame manner, deductions from the neat revenue of the fociety. A certain quantity of very valuable materials, gold and filver; and of very curious labuvis, inftead of augmenting the ftock referved for immediate confumption, the fubfiftence, conveniencies, and amufements of individuals, is employed in fupporting that great but expenfive inftrument of commerce, by means of which every individual in the fociety has his fubfiftence, conveniencies, and amufements, regularly diftributed to him in their proper proportion.

Secondly, as the machines and inftruments of trade, \&c. which compore the fixed capital either of an individual or of a fociety, make no part either of the grofs or of the neat revenue of either; fo money, by means of which the whole revenue of the fociety is regularly diftributed among all its different members, makes itfelf no part of that revenue. The great wheel of circulation is altogether different from the goods which are circulated by means of it. The revenue of the fociety confilts altogether in thofe goods, and not in the wheel which circulates them. In computing either the grofs or the neat revenue of any fociety, we muft always, from their whole annual circulation of money and goods, deduct the whole value of the money, of which not a fingle farthing can ever make any part of either.

Ir is the ambiguity of language only which can make this propofition appear either doubtful

Bo 0 or paradoxical. When properly explained and underftood, it is almoft felf-evident.

When we talk of any particular fum of money, we fometimes mean nothing but the metal pieces of which it is compofed; and fometimes we include in our $m$. ining fome obfcure reference to the goods which can be had in exchange for it, or to the power of pufrchafing which the poffeffion of it conveys. Thus when we fay, that the circulating money of England has been computed at eighteen millions, we mean only to exprefs the amount of the metal pieces, which fome writers have computed, or sather have fuppofed to circulate in that country. But when we fay, that a man is worth fifty or a hundred pounds a-year, we mean commonly to exprefs not only the amount of the metal pieces which are annually paid to him, but the value of the goods which he can annually purchate or confume. We mean commonly to afcertain what is or ought to be his way of living, or the quantity and quality of the neceffaries and conveniencies of life in which the can with propriety indulge himfelf.

When, by any particular fum of money, we mean not only to exprefs the amount of the metal pieces of which it is compofed, but to include in its fignification fome obfcure reference to the goods which can be had in exchange for them, the wealth or revenue which it in this cafe denotes, is equal only to one of the two values which are thus intiinated fomewhat ambiguoully by the fame word, and to the latter more properly than to the former, to the money's worth more properly than to the money.

Thus if a guinea be the weekly penfion of ac ни. particular perfon, he can in the courfe of the week purchafe with it a certain quantity of fubfiftence, conveniencies, and ainufements. In proportion as this quantity is great or fmall, fo are his real riches, his real weekly revenue. His weekly revenue is certainly not equal both to the guinea, and to what can be purchafed with it, but only to one or other of thofe two equal values; and to the latter more properly than to the former; to the guinea's worth rather than to the guinea.

If the penfion of fuch a perfon was paid to him, not in gold, but in a we kly bill for is guinea, his revenue furely would not fo properly confit in the piece of pape: as in what he could get for it. A guinea may be confidered as a bill for a certain quantity of neceffaries and conveniencies upon all the tradefmen in the neighbourhood. The revenue of the perfon to whom it is paid, does not fo properly confift in the piece of gold, as in what he can get for it; or in what he can exchange it for. If it could be exchanged for nothing, it would, like a bill upon a bankrupt, be of no more value than the molt ufelefs piece of paper.

Though the weekly or yearly revenue of all the different inhabitants of any country, in the fame manner, may be, and in reality frequently is paid to them in money, their real riches, however, the real weekly or yearly revenue of all of them taken together, muft always be great or fmall in proportion to the quantity of confumable
${ }^{\text {B O O K }}$ goods which they can all of them purchafe with this money. The whole revenue of all of them taken together is evidently not equal to both the money and the confumable goods; but only to one or other of thofe two values, and to the latter more properly than to the former.

Though we frequently, therefore, exprefs a perfon's revenue by the metal pieces which are annually paid to him, it is becaufe the amount of thofe pieces regulates the extent of his power of purchafing, or the value of the goods which he can annually afford to confume. We ftill confider his revenue as confifting in this power of purchafing or confuming, and not in the pieces which convey it.

But if this is fufficiently evident even with regard to an individual, it is ftill more fo with regard to a fociety. The amount of the metal fieces which are annually paid to an individual, is often precifely equal to his revenue, and is upon that account the fhorteft and beft expreffion of its value. But the amount of the metal pieces which circulate in a fociety, can never be equal to the revenue of all its members. As the fame guinea which pays the weekly penfion of one man today, may pay that of another tomorrow, and that of a third the day thereafter, the amount of the metal pieces which annually circulate in any country, muft always be of much lefs value than the whole money penfions annually paid with them. But the power of purchafing, or the goods which can fucceffively be bought with the whole of thofe money penfions as they are fucceflively paid, mult always
ee with them th the mly to : latter f thofe of purhe can ider his afing or ey it. n with fo with e metal dividual, and is exprefe metal hever be As the nfion of ther toereafter, annually $s$ be of penfions power of ceeffively ney pent always be
be precifely of the fame value with thofe pen- $\mathbf{C H}_{\text {II }}{ }^{\text {A P }}$. fions; as mult likewife be the revenue of the different perfons to whom they are paid. That revenue, therefore, cannot confift in thofe metal pieces, of which the amount is fo much inferior to its value, but in the power of purchafing, in the goods which can fucceffively be bought with them as they circulate from hand to hand.

Money, therefore, the great wheel of circulation, the great inftrument of commerce, like all other inftruments of trade, though it makes a part and a very valuable part of the capital, makes no part of the revenue of the fociety to which it belongs; and though the metal pieces of which it is compofed, in the courfe of their annual circulation, diftribute to every man the revenue which properly belongs to him, they make themfelves no part of that revenue.

Thirdly, and laftly, the machines and inftruments of trade, \&xc. which compofe the fixed capital, bear this further refemblance to that part of the circulating capital which confifts in money; that as every faving in the expence of erecting and fupporting thofe machines, which does not diminifh the productive powers of labour, is an improvement of the neat revenue of the fociety; fo every faving in the expence of collecting and fupporting that part of the circulating capital which confifts in money, is an improvement of exactly the fame kind.

Ir is fufficiently obvious, and it has partly too been explained already, in what manner every faving in the expence of fupporting the fixed Vol. I.

Fi
capital

B O O K capital is an improvement of the neat revenue
II. of the fociety. The whole capital of the undertaker of every work is neceffarily divided between his fixed and his circulating capital. While his whole capital remains the fame, the fmaller the one part, the greater muft neceffarily be the other. It is the circulating capital which furnifhes the materials and wages of labour, and puts indultry into motion. Every faving, therefore, in the expence of maintaining the fixed capital, which does not diminifh the productive powers of labour, muft increafe the fund which puts indultry into motion, and confequently the annual produce of land and labour, the real revenue of every fociety.

The fubititution of paper in the room of gold and filver money, replaces a very expenfive inftrument of commerce with one much lefs coftly, and fometimes equally convenient. Circulation comes to be carried on by a new wheel, which it cofts lefs both to erect and to maintain than the old one. But in what manner this operation is performed, and in what manner it tends to increale either the grofs or the neat revenue of the fociety, is not altogether fo obvious, and mar: therefore require fome further explication.

There are feveral different forts of paper money ; but the circulating notes of banks and bankers are the fpecies which is beft known, and which feems beft adapted for this purpofe.

Winen the people of any particular country have fuch confidence in the fortune, probity, and prudence of a particular banker, as to believe that
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that he is always ready to pay upon demand fuch C H A P. of his promiffory notes as are likely to be at any $\underbrace{\ldots-\text {, }}$ time prefented to him ; thofe notes come to have the fame currency as gold and filver money, from the confidence that fuch money can at any time be had for them.

A particular banker lends among his cuftomers his own promiffory notes, to the extent, we fhall fuppofe, of a hundred thoufand pounds. As thofe notes ferve all the purpofes of money, his debtors pay him the fame intereft as if he had lent them fo much money. This intereft is the fource of his gain. Though fome of thofe notes are continually coming back upon him for payment, part of them continue to circulate for months and years together. Though he has generally in circulation, therefore, notes to the extent of a hundred thoufand pounds, twenty thoufand pounds in gold and filver may, frequently, be a fufficient provifion for anfwering occafional demands. By this operation, therefore, twenty thoufand pounds in gold and filver perform all the functions which a hundred thoufand could otherwife have performed. The fame exchanges may be made, the fame quantity of confumable goods may be circulated and diftributed to their proper confumers, by means of his promiffory notes, to the value of a hundred thoufand pounds, as by an equal value of gold and filver money. Eighty thoufand pounds of gold and filver, therefore, can, in this manner, be fpared from the circulation of the country; and if different operations of the fame kind Ef2 fhould,

B o o k fhould, at the fame time, be carried on by many
${ }^{11 .}$ different banks and bankers, the whole circulation may thus be conducted with a fifth part only of the gold and filver which would otherwife have been requifite.

Let us fuppofe, for example, that the whole circulating money of fome particular country' amounted, at a particular time, to one million fterling, that fum being then fufficient for circulating the whole annual produce of their land and labour. Let us fuppofe too, that fome time thereafter, different banks and bankers iffued promiffory notes, payable to the beare; to the extent of one million, referving in their different coffers two hundred thoufand pounds for anfwering occafional demands. There would remain, therefore, in circulation, eight hundred thoufand pounds in gold and filver; and a million of bank notes, or eighteen hundred thoufand pounds of paper and money together. But the annual produce of the land and labour of the country had before required only one million to circulate and diftribute it to its proper confumers, and that annual produce cannot be immediately augmented by thofe operations of banking. One million, therefore, will be fufficient to circulate it after them. The goods to be bought and fold being precifely the fame as before, the fame quantity of money will be fufficient for buying and felling them. The channel of circulation, if I may be allowed fuch an exprefion, will remain precifely the fame as uefore. One million we have fuppofed fufficient
to fill that channel. Whatever, therefore, is ${ }^{\mathbf{C H}}{ }_{\text {His }}{ }^{\text {A. }}$. poured into it beyond this fum, cannot run in it, $\underbrace{\text { H. }}$ but muft overflow. One million eight hundred thoufand pounds are poured into it. Eight hundred thoufand pounds, therefort, mult overflow, that fum being over and above what can be employed in the circulation of the country. But though this fum cannot be employed at home, it is too valuable to be allowed to lie idle. It will, therefore, be fent abroad, in order to feek that profitable employment which it cannot find at home. But the paper cannot go abroad; becaufe at a diftance from the banks which iffue it, and from the country in which payment of it can be exacted by law, it will not be received in common payments. Gold and filver, therefore, to the amount of eight hundred thoufand pounds, will be fent abroad, and the channel of home circulation will remain filled with a million of paper, inftead of a million of thofe metals which filled it before.

But though fo great a quantity of gold and filver is thus fent abroad, we muft not imagine that it is fent zbroad for nothing, or that its proprietors make a prefont of it to foreign nations. They will exchange it for foreign goods of fome kind or another, in order to fupply the confumption either of fome other foreign country, or of their own.

If they empioy it in purchafing goods in one foreign country in order to fup the confumption of another, or in what is calied the carrying trade, whatever profit they make will id an ad-

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3 oo K dition to the neat revenue of their own country. It is like a new fund, created for carrying on a $\mathrm{n} \approx \mathrm{w}$ trade; domeftic bufinefs being now tranfacted by paper, and the gold and filver being converted into a fund for this new trade.

If they employ it in purchaing foreign goods for home confumption, they row, either, firft, purchafe fuch gouds as are likely so be confumed by idle people who produce nothing, fuch as foreign wines, foreign filks, \&c.; or, fecondly, they may purchafe an additional itock of matesials, tools, and provifions, in order to maintain and employ an additional number of induftrious people, who re-produce, with a profit, the value of their annual confumption.

So far as it is employed in the firft way, it promotes prodigality, increafes expence and confumption withcue increafing production, or eftablifhing any permanent fund for fupporting that expence, and is in every refpect hurtful to the fociety.

So far as it is employed in the fecond way, it promotes induftry; and though it increafes the confumption of the faciety, it provides a permanent fund for fupporting that confumption, the people who confum re-producing, with a profit, the whole value of their annual confumption. The grofs revenue of the fociety, the annual produce of their land and labour, is increafed by the whole value which the labour of thofe work. men adds to the naterials upon which the we employed; and $\therefore \therefore$ neat revenue by what remains of tha $e$, after deducting what is neceffary
ceffary for fupporting the tools and inftruments of $C \mathrm{H}_{\mathrm{HA}} \mathrm{A}$. their trade.

That the greater part of the gold and filver which, being forced abroad by thofe operations of banking, is employed in purchafing foreign goods for home confumption, is and mult be employed in purchafing thofe of this fecond kind, feems not only probable but almoft unavoidable. Though fome particular men may fometimes increafe their expence very confiderably, though their revenue does not increafe at all, we may be affured that no clafs or order of men ever does fo; becaufe, though the principles of common prudence do not always govern the conduct of every individual, they always influence that of the majority of every clafs or order. But the revenue of idle people, confidered as a clafs or order, cannot, in the fmalleft degree, be increaled by thofe operations of banking. Their expence in general, therefore, cannot be much increafed by them, though that of a few individuals among them may, and in reality fometimes is. The demand of idle people, therefore, for foreign goods, being the fame, or very'nearly the fame, as before, a very fmall part of the money, which being forced abroad by thofe operations of banking, is employed in purchafing foreign goods for home confumption, is likely to be employed in purchafing thofe for their ufe. The greater part of it will naturally be deftined for the employment of indultry, and not for the mairtenä̆ce of idlenef.

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${ }^{B}$ OO O $_{\text {II }}$ When we compute the quantity of indultry
$\underbrace{\text { II. }}$ which the circulating capital of any fociety can employ, we mult always have regard to thofe parts of it only, which confift in provifions, materials, and finifhed work: the other, which confifts in money, and which ferves only to circulate thofe three, mult always be deducted. In order to put induftry into motion, three things are requifite; materials to work upon, tools to work with, and the wages or recompence for the fake of which the work is done. Money is neither a material to work upon, nor a tool to work with; and though the wages of the workman are commonly paid to him in money, his real revenue, like that of all other men, confifts, not in the money, but in the money's worth; not in the metal pieces, but in what can be got for them.

The quantity of induftry which any capital can employ, muft, evidently, be equal to the number of workmen whom it can fupply with materials, tools, and a maintenance fuitable to the nature of the work. Money may be requifite for purchafing the materials and tools of the work, as well as the maintenance of the workmen. But the quantity of induftry which the whole capital can employ, is certainly not equal both to the money which purchafes, and to the materials, tools, and maintenance, which are purchafed with it; but only to one or other of thofe two values, and to the latter more properly than to the former.

When paper is fubftituted in the room of gold c н a p. and filver money, the quantity of the materials, tools, and maintenance, which the whole circulating capital can fupply, may be increafed by the whole value of gold and filver which ufed to be employed in purchafing them. The whole value of the great wheel of circulation and diftribution, is added to the goods which are circulated and diftributed by means of it. The operation, in fome meafure, refembles that of the undertaker of fome great work, who, in confequence of fome improvement in mechanics, takes down his old machinery, and adds the difference between its price and that of the new to his circulating capital, to the fund from which he furnifhes materials and wages to his workmen.

What is the proportion which the circulating money of any country bears to the whole value of the annual produce circulated by means of it, it is, perhaps, impoffible to deterine. It has been computed by different authcis at a fifth, at a tenth, at a twenticth, and at a thirtieth part of that value. But how fmall foever the proportion which the circulating money may bear to the whole value of the annual produce, as but a part, and frequently but a fmall part, of that produce, is ever deftined for the maintenance of induftry, it mult always bear a very ccaduerable proportion to that part. When, therefore, by the fubititution of paper, the gold and filver neceffary for circulation is reduced to, perhaps, a fifth part of the former quantity, if the value of only the greater part of the other four-fifths be added to
the

Book the funds which are deftined for the maintenance of induftry, it mult make a very confiderable ad. dition to the quantity of that induftry, and, confequently, to the value of the annual produce of land and labour.

An operation of this kind has, within thefe five-and-twenty or thirty years, been performed in Scotland, by the erection of new banking companies in almoft every confiderable town, and even: :..ne country villages. The effects of it have been precifely thofe above defcribed. The bufinefs of the country is almoft encirely carried on by means of the paper of thofe different banking companies, with which purchafes and payments of all kinds are cominonly made. Silver very feldom appears except in the change of a twenty fhillings bank note, and gold ftill feldomer. But though the conduct of all thofe different companies has not been unexceptionable, and has accordingly required an act of pari. ment to regulate it; the country, notwithftanding, has evidently deri ed great benefit from their crade. I have heard it afferted, that the trade of the city of Glafgow doubled in about fifteen years after the firft erection of the banks there; and that the trade of Scotland has more than quadrupled fince the firft erection of the two public banks at Edinburgi, of which the one, called The ank of Scotland, was eftablifhed by act parliament in 1695 ; the other, called The soyal Bank, by royal charter in $\mathbf{1 7 2 7}$. Whether the trade, either of Scotland in general, or of the city of Glafgow in particular, has really in-

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creafe in fo great a proportion, during fo hort $\mathbf{C H}_{\text {Hit. }} \mathrm{A}^{\mathrm{P}}$. a period, I do not pretend to know. If either $\underbrace{\text { II. }}$ of them has increafed in this proportion, it feems to be an effect too great to be accounted for by the fole operation of this caufe. That the trade and indultry of Scotland, however, have increafed very confiderably during this period, and that the banks have contributed a good deal to this increafe, cannot be doubted.

The value of the filver money which circulated in Scotland before the Union, in 1707, and which, immediately after it, was broughr into the bank of Scotland, in order to be re-coined, amounted to 4 ii,: 17 l l. 10 s. 9 d. fterling. No account has been got of the gold coin; but it appears from the ancient accounts of the mint of Scotland, that the value of the gold annually coined fomewhat exceeded that of the filver*. There were a good many people too upon this occafion, who, from a diffidence of repayment, did not bring their filver into the bank of Scotland: and there was, befides, fome Englifh coin, which was not called in. The whole value of the gold and filver, therefore, which circulated in Scotland before the Union, cannot be eftimated at lefs than a million fterling. It feems to have conftituted almoft the whole circulation of that country; for though the circulation of the bank of Scotland, which had then no rival, was confiderable, it feems to have made but a very fmall part of the whole. In the prefent times the

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sook whole circulation of Scotland cannot be eftimated
II. at lefs than two raillions, of which that part which confifts in gold and filver, moft probably, does not amount to half a million. But though the circulating gold and filver of Scotland have fuffered fo great a diminution during this period, its real riches and profperity do not appear to have fuffered any. Its agriculture, manufactures, and trade, on the contrary, the annual produce of of its land and labour, have evidently been augmented.

It is chiefly by difcounting bills of exchange, that is, by advancing money upon them before they are due, that the greater part of banks and bankers iffue their promiffory notes. They deduct always, upon whatever fum they advance, the legal intereft till the bill fhall become due. The payment of the bill, when it becomes due, replaces to the bank the value of what had been advanced, together with a clear profit of the intereft. The banker who advances to the merchant whofe bill he difcounts, not gold and filier, but his own promiffory notes, has the advantage of being able to difcount to a greater amount by the whole value of his promiffory notes, which he finds, by experience, are commonly in circulation. He is thereby enabled to make his clear gain of intereft on fo much a larger fum.

The commerce of Scotland, which at prefent is not very great, was ftill more inconfiderable when the two firft banking companies were eftablifhed; and thofe companies would have had but little trade, had they confined their bufinefs

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to the difcounting of bills of exchange. They $C^{11} A P$. invented, therefore, another method of iffuingis their promiffory notes; by granting, what they called cafh accounts, that is, by giving credit to the extent of a certain fum (two or three thoufand pounds for example), to an individual who could procure two perfons of undoubted credit and good landed eftate to become furety for him, that whatever money fhould be advanced to him, within the fum for which the credit had been given, fhould be repaid upon demand, together with the legal intereft. Credits of this kind are, I believe, commonly granted by banks and bankers in all different parts of the world. But the eafy terms upon which the Scotch banking companies accept of repayment are, fo far as I know, peculiar to them, and have, perhaps, been the principal caufe, both of the great trade of thofe companies, and of the benefit which the country has received from it.

Whoever has a credit of this kind with one of thofe companies, and borrows a thoufand pounds upon it, for example, may repay this fum piece-meal, by twenty and thirty pounds at a time, the company difcounting a proportionable part of the intereft of the great fum from the day on which each of thofe fmall fums is paid in, till the whole be in this manner repaid. All merchants, therefore, and almoft all men of bufinefs, find it convenient to keep fuch cafh accounts with them, and are thereby interelted to promote the trade of thofe companies, by readily receiving their notes in all payments,
${ }^{\text {B O O }}$ or K and by encouraging all thofe with whom they have any influence to do the fame. The banks, when their cuftomers apply to them for money, generally advance it to them in their own promiffory notes. Thefe the merchants pay away to the manufacturers for goods, the manufacturers to the farmers for materials and provifions, the farmers to their landlords for rent, the landlords repay them to the merchants for the conveniencies and luxuries with which they fupply them, and the merchants again return them to the banks in order to balance their cafh accounts, or to replace what they may have borrowed of them; and thus almoft the whole money bufinefs of the country is tranfacted by means of them. Hence the great trade of thofe companies.

By means of thofe cafh accounts every merchant can, without imprudence, carry on a greater trade than he otherwife could do. If there are two merchants, one in London, and the other in Edinburgh, who employ equal ftocks in the fame branch of trade, the Edinburgh merchant can, without imprudence, carry on a greater trade, and give employment to a greater number of people than the London merchant. The London merchant muft always keep by him a confiderable fum of money, either in his own coffers, or in thofe of his banker, who gives him no intereft for it, in order to anfwer the demands continually coming upon him for payment of the goods which he purchafes upon credit. Let the ordinary amount of this fum be fuppofed five
hundred pounds. The value of the goods in $\mathrm{CH}_{\mathrm{A}} \mathrm{P}$. his warehoufe mult always be lefs by five hun- $\underbrace{\text { n. }}$ dred pounds than it would have been, had he not been obliged to keep fuch a fum unemployed. Let us fuppofe that he generally difpofes of his whole ftock upon hind, or of goods to the value of his whole ftock upon hand, once in the year. By being obliged to keep fo great a fum unemployed, he muft feil in a year five hundred pounds worth lefs goods than he might otherwife have done. His annual profits muft be lefs by all that he could have made by the fale of five hundred pounds worth more goods; and the number of people employed in preparing his goods for market, mult be lefs by ali thofe that five hundred pounds more ftock could have employed. The merchant in Edinbrugh, on the other hand, keeps no money unemployed for anfwering fuch occafional demands. When they actually come upon him, he fatisfies them from his cafh account with the bank, and gradually replaces the fum borrowed with the money or paper which comes in from the occafional fales of his goods. With the fame ftock, therefore, he can, without imprudence, have at all times in his warehoufe a larger quantity of goods than the London merchant; and can thereby both make a greater profit himfelf, and give conftant employment to a greater number of induftrious people who prepare thofe goods for the market. Hence the great benefit which the country has derived from this trade.

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B ook The facility of difcounting bills of exchange, $\underbrace{\sim}$ it may be thought, indeed, gives the Englifh merchants a conveniency equivalent to the calh accounts of the Scotch merchants. But the Scotch merchants, it mult be remembered, can difcount their bills of exchange as eafily as the Englifh merchants; and have, befides, the additional conveniency of their cafh accounts.

The whole paper money of every kind which can eafily circulate in any country never can exceed the value of the gold anci fiver, of which it fupplies the place, or which (the commerce being fuppofed the fame) wouid circulate there, if there was no paper money. If twenty hilling notes, for example, are the loweft paper money current in Scotland, the whole of that currency which can eafily circulate there cannot exceed the fum of gold and filver which would be neceffary for tranfacting the unnual exchanges of twenty fhillings value and upwards ufually tranfacted within that country. Should the circulating paper at any time exceed that fum, as the excefs could neither be fent abroad nor be employed in the circulation of the country, it mult immediately return upon the banks to be exchanged for gold and filver. Many people would immediately perceive that they had more of this paper than was neceffary for tranfacting their bufinefs at home, and as they could not fend it abroad, they would immediately demand payment of it from the banks. When this fuperfluous paper was converted into gold and filver, they, could eafily find a ufe for it by fending it abroad;
abroad; but they could find none while it re- CHAP. mained in the fhape of paper. There would immediately, therefore, be a run upon the banks to the whole extent of this fuperfluous paper, and, if they fhewed any difficulty or backwardnefs in payment, to a much greater extent; the alarm, which this would ocenfion, neceffarily increafing the run.

Over and above the expences which are common to every branch of trade; fuch as the expence of houfe-rent, the wages of fervants, clerks, accountants, \&c.; the expences peculiar to a bank confift chiefly in two articles: Firft, in the expence of keeping at all times in its coffers, for anfwering the occafional demands of the holders of its notes, a large fum of money, of which it lofes the intereft; and, fecondly, in the expence of replenißhing thofe coffers as faft as they are emptied by anfwering fuch occafional demands.

A banking company, which iffues more paper than can be employed in the circulation of the country, and of which the excefs is continually returning upon them for payment, ought to increafe the quantity of gold and filver, which they keep at all times in their coffers, not only in prcportion to this exceffive increafe of their circulation, but in a much greater proportion; their notes returning upon them much fafter than in proportion to the excefs of thèir quantity. Such a company, therefore, ought to increafe the firit article of their expence, not only Vol. I.

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BOOK in proportion to this forced increafe of their bufinefs, but in a much greater proportion.

The coffers of fuch a company too, though they ought to be filled much fuller, yet muft empty themfelves much fafter than if their bufinefs was confined within more reafonable bounds, and mult require, not only a more violent, but a more conftant and uninterrupted exertion of expence in order to replenifh them. The coin too, which is thus continually drawn in fuch large quantities from their coffers, cannot be employed in the circulation of the country. It comes in place of a paper which is over and above what can be employed in that circulation, and is, therefore, over and above what can be employed in it too. But as that coin will not be allowed to lie idle, it muft, in one fhape or another, be fent abroad, in order to find that profitable employment which it cannot find at home; and this continual exportation of gold and filver, by enhancing the difficulty, muft neceffarily enhance ftill further the expence of the bank, in finding new gold and filver in order to replenifh thofe coffers, which empty themfelves to very rapidly. Such a company, therefore, mult, in proportion to this forced increafe of their bufinefs, increafe the fecond article of their expence ftill more than the firt.

Let us fuppofe that all the paper of a particular bank, which the circulation of the country can eafily abforb and employ, amounts exactly to forty thoufand pounds; and that for anfwering occafional
occafional demands, this bank is obliged to keep chen $_{\text {Hit }}$ at all times in its coffers ten thoufand pounds in gold and filver. Should this bank attempt to circulate forty-four thoufand pounds, the four thoufand pounds which are over and above what the circulation can eafily abforb and employ, will return upon it almoft as faft as they are iffued. For anfwering occafional demands, therefore, this bank ought to keep at all times in its coffers, not eleven thoufand pounds only, but fourteen thoufand pounds. It will thus gain nothing by the intereft of the four thoufand pounds exceffive circulation; and it will lofe the whole expence of continually collecting four thoufand pounds in gold and filver, which will be continually going out of its coffers as faft as they are brought into them.

Had every particular banking company always underftood and attended to its own particular intereft, the circulation never could have been overfocked with paper money. But every particular banking company has not always underftood or attended to its own particular intereft, and the circulation has frequently been overtocked with paper money.

By iffuing too great a quantity of paper, of which the excefs was continually returning, in order to be exchanged for gold and filver, the bank of Engiand was for many years together obliged to coin gold to the extent of between eight hundred thoufand pounds and a million a year; or, at an average, about eight hundred and fifty thoufand pounds. For this great G g 2

B O O II coinage the bank (in confequence of the worn and degraded ftate into which the gold coin had fallen a few years ago) was frequently obliged to purchafe gold bullion at the high price of four pounds an ounce, which it foon after iffued in coin at $3 l$. 175 . $10 \frac{1}{3} d$. an ounce, lofing in this manner between two and a half and three per cent. upon the coinage of fo very large a fum. Though the bank therefore paid no feignorage, though the government was properly at the expence of the ccinage, this liberality of government did not prevent altogether the expence of the bank.

The Scotch banks, in confequence of an excefs of the fame kind, were all obliged to emplay conitantly agents at London to collect money for them, at an expence which was feldom below one and a half or two per cent. This money was fent down by the waggon, and infured by the carriers at an additional expence of three quarters per cent. or fifteen fhillings on the hundred pounds: Thofe agents were not always able to replenifh the coffers of their employers fo faft as they were emptied. In this cafe the refource of the banks was, to draw upon their correfpondents in London bills of exchange to the exten of the fum which they wanted. When thofe correfpondents afterwards drew upon them for the payment of this fum, together with the intereft and a commiflion, fome of thofe banks, from the diftrefs into which their exceffive circulation had thrown them, had fometimes no other means of fatisfying this draught but by drawing flued $g$ in three fum. rage, exvern. e of
drawing a fecond fet of bills either upon the $\mathbf{C H}_{\text {H. }} \mathbf{A P}^{\mathrm{P}}$. fame, or upon fome other correfpondents in $\underbrace{\text {, }}$ London; and the fame fum, or rather bills for the fame fum, would in this manner make fometimes more than two or three journies: the debtor bank paying always the intereft and commiffion upon the whole accumulated fum. Even thofe Scotch banks which never diftinguifhed themfelves by their extreme imprudence, were fometimes obliged to employ this ruinous refource.

The gold coin which was paid out either by the bank of England, or by the Scotci banks, in exchange for that part of their paper which was over and above what could be employed in the circulation of the country, being likewife over and above what could be employed in that circulation, was fometimes fent abroad in the fhape of coin, fometimes melted down and fent abroad in the fhape of bullion, and fometimes melted down and fold to the bank of England at the high price of four pounds an ounce. It was the neweft, the heavieft, and the beft pieces only which were carefully picked out of the whole coin, and either fent abroad or melted down. At home, and while they remain in the fhape of coin, thofe heavy pieces were of no more value than the light: but they were of more value abroad, or when melted down into bullion, at home. The bank of England, notwithftanding their great annual coinage, found, to their aftonifhment, that there was every year the fame fcarcity of coin as there had been the year be-

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Book fore; and that notwithftanding the great quantity of good and new coin which was every year iffued from the bank, the fate of the coin, inftead of growing better and better, became every year worfe and worfe. Every year they found themfelves under the neceffity of coining nearly the fame quantity of gold as they had coined the year before, and from the continual rife in the price of gold bullion, in confequence of the continual wearing and clipping of the coin, the expence of this great annual coinage became every year greater and greater. The bank of England, it is to be obferved, by fupplying its own coffers with coin, is indirectly obliged to fupply the whole kingdom, into which coin is continually flowing from thofe coffers in a great variety of ways. Whatever coin, therefore, was wanted to fupport this exceffive circulation both of Scotch and Englin paper money, whatever vacuitres this exceffive circolation occafioned in the neceffary coin of the kingdom, the bank of England was obliged to fupply them. The Scotch banks, no doubr, paid all of them very dearly for their own imprudence and inattention. But the bank of England paid very dearly, not only for -its own imprudence, but for the much greater imprudence of almoft all the Scotch banks.

The over-trading of fome bold projectors in both parts of the united kingdom, was the original caufe of this exceffive circulation of paper money.

What a bank can with propriety advance to 2 merchant or undertaker of any kind, is not
either the whole capital with which he trades, or $\mathbf{C H}_{\text {iI }} A^{\prime}$ P. even any confiderable part of that capital; but $\underbrace{\text { in. }}$ that part of it only, which he would otherwife be obliger so keep by him unemployed and in ready money for anfwering occafional demands. If the paper money which the bank advances never exceeds this value, it can never exceed the value of the gold and filver, which would neceffarily circulate in the country if there was no paper money; it can never exceed the quantity which the circulation of the country can eafily abforb and employ.

When a bank difcounts to a merchant a real bill of exchange drawn by a real creditor upon a real debtor, and which, as foon as it becomes due, is really paid by that debtor; it only advances to him a part of the value which he would otherwife be obliged to keep by him unemployed and in ready money for anlwering occafional demands. The payment of the bill, when it becomes due, replaces to the bank the value of what it had advanced, together with the intereft. 'rise coffers of the bank, fo far as its dealirgs are confined to fuch cuftomers, retemble a water pond, from which, though a itream is continually running out, yet another is continually running in, fully equal to that which runs out; fo that, without any further care or attention, the pond keeps always equally, or very near equally full. Litde or no expence can ever be nereffary for replenilhing the coffers of fuch a bank.

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## THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF

Book A merchant, without over-trating, may fre-
${ }^{11 .}$ quently have occafion for a fum ready money; even when he has no bills to difcount. When a bank, befides difcounting his bills, advances him likewife upon fuch occafions, fuch fums upon his caih account, and accepts of a piece-meal repayment as the money comes in from the occafional fale of his goods, upon the eafy terms of the banking companies of Scotland; it difpenfes him entirely from the neceffity of keeping any part of his ftock by him unemployed and in ready money for anfwering occafional demands. When fuch demands actually come upon him, he can anfwer them fufficiently from his cafh account. The bank, however, in dealing with fuch cuftomers, ought to obferve with great attention, whether in the courfe of fome fhort period (of four,. five, fix, or eight months, for example) the fum of the repayments which it commonly receives from them, is, or is not, fully equal to ehat of the advances which it commonly makes to them. If, within the courfe of fuch fhort periods, the fum of the repayments from certain cuftomers is, upon moft occafions, fully equal to that of the advances, it may fafely continue to deal with fuch cuftomers. Though the ftream which is in this cafe continually running out from its coffers may be very large, that which is continually running into them mult be at leaft equally large; fo that without any further care or attention thofe coffers are likely to be always equally or very near equally full; and
fcarce ever to require any extraordinary expence $\mathbf{C H}{ }^{\text {A }}$ P. to replenifh them. If, on the contrary, the fum $\underbrace{\text { If. }}$ of the repayments from certain other cuftomers falls commonly very much fhort of the advances which it makes to them, it cannot with any fafety continue to deal with fuch cuftomers, at leaft if they continue to deal with it in this manner. The Atream which is in this cafe contin al mo out from its coffers is neceffarily $m$ arger than that which is cor: tinually $\quad$, fo that, unlefs they are replenifhed $L$ ie great and continual effort of expence, thoue coffers mult foon be exhaufted altogether.

The banking companies of Scotland, accordingly, were for a long time very careful to require frequent and regular repayments from all their cuftomers, and did not care to deal with any perfon, whatever might be his fortune or credit, who did not make, what they called, frequent and regular operations with them. By this attention, befides faving almoft entirely the extraordinary expence of replenifhing their coffers, they gained two other very confiderable advantages.

First, by this attention they were enabled to make fome tolerable judgment concerning the thriving or declining circumftances of their debtors, without being obliged to look out for any other evidence befides what their own books afforded them; men being for the moft part cither regular or irregular in their repayments, according as their circumftances are either thriving

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BOOK or declining. A private man who lends out his
il. money to perhaps half a dozen or a dozen of debtors, may, either by himfelf or his agents, obferve and enquire both conftantly and carefully into the conduct and fituation of each of them. But a banking company, which lends money to perhaps five hundred different people, and of which the attention is continually occupied by objects of a very different kind, can have no regular information concerning the conduct and circumftances of the greater part of its debtors beyond what its own books afford it. In requiring frequent and regular repayments from all their cuftomers, the banking companies of Scotland had probably this advantage in view.

Secondly, by this attention they fecured themfelves from the poffibility of iffuing more paper money than what the circulation of the country could eafily abforb and employ. When they obferved, that within moderate periods of time the repayments of a particular cuftomer were upon moft occafions fully equal to the advances which they had made to him, they might be affured that the paper money which they had advanced to him, had not at any time exceeded the quancity of gold and filver which he would otherwife have been obliged to keep by him for anfwering occafional demands; and that, confequently, the paper money, which they had circulated by his means, had not at any time exceeded the quantity of gold and filver which would have circulated in the country, had there been no paper money. The frequency, regu-〕arity,
larity, and amount of his repayments would fuffi- $\mathbf{C}$ H A $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{A}}$ ciently demonftrate that the amount of their advances had at no time exceeded that part of his capital which he would otherwife have been obliged to keep by him unemployed and in ready money for anfwering occafional demands; that is, for the purpofe of keeping the reft of his capital in conftant employment. It is this part of his capital only which, within moderate periods of time, is continually returning to every dealer in the thape of money, whether paper or coin, and continually going from him in the fame thape. If the advances of the bank had commonly exceeded this part of his capital, the ordinary amount of his repayments could not, within moderate periods of time, have equalled the ordinary amount of its advances. The ftream which, by means of his dealings, was continually running into the coffers of the bank, could not have been equal to the ftream which, by means of the fame dealings, was continually running out. The advances of the bank paper, by exceeding the quantity of gold and filver which, had there been no fuch advances, he would have been obliged to keep by him for anfwering occafional demands, might foon come to exceed the whole quantity of gold and filver which (the commerce being fuppofed the fame) would have circulated in the country, had there been no paper money; and confequently to ex. ceed the quantity which the circulation of the country could eafily abforb and employ; and the excefs of this paper money would immediately
${ }^{\mathrm{B}} \mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{H}}{ }^{\circ} \mathrm{K}$ have returned upon the bank in order to be ex${ }^{11}$ changed for gold and filver. This fecond advantage, though equally real, was not perhaps fo well underfood by all the different banking companies of Scotland as the firft.
When, partly by the conveniency of difouinting bills, and partly by that of cah accounts, the creditable traders of any country can be difpenfed from the neceffity of keeping any pars of their flock by them unemployed and in ready money for anfwering occafional demands, they can reafonably expect no farther affiftance from banks and bankers, who, when they have gone thus far, cannot, confiftently with their own inzereft and fafety, go farther. A bank cannot, confiftently with iss own intereft, advance to a trader the whole or even the greater part of the circulating capital with which he trades; becaufe, though that capital is continually returning to him in the thape of money, and going from him in the fame fhape, yet the whole of the returns is too diftant from the whole of the outgoings, and the fum of his repayments could not equal the fum of its advances within fuch moderate periods of time as fuit the conveniency of a bank. Still lefs could a bank afford to advance him any confiderable part of his fixed capital; of the capital which the undertaker of an iron forge, for example, employs in erecting his forge and finelting-houfe, his work-houfes and warehoufes, the dwelling houfes of his workmen, $\& c \mathrm{c}$. ; of the capital which the undertaker of a mine employs in finking his hafts, in erecting
engines for drawing out the water, in making $\mathbf{C H} \mathbf{H}_{\text {A }} \mathbf{P}$. roads and waggon-ways, \&c.; of the capital which the perfon who undertakes to improve land employs in clearing, draining, enclofing, manuring and ploughing wafte and uncultivated fields, in building farm-houfes, with all their neceffary appendages of ftables, granaries, \&c. The returns of the fixed capital are in almoft all cafes much nower than thofe of the circulating capital; and fuch expences, even when laid out with the greateft prudence and judgment, very feldom return to the undertaker till after a period of many years, a period by far too diftant to. fuit the conveniency of a bank. Traders and other undertakers may, no doubt, with great propriety, carry on a very confiderable part of their projects with borrowed money. In juftice to their creditors, however, their own capital ought, in this cafe, to be fufficient to enfure, if I may fay fo, the capital of thofe creditors; or to render it extremely improbable that thofe creditors Should incur any lofs, even though the fuccefs of the project fhould fall very much fhort of the expectation of the projectors. Even with this precaution too, the money which is borrowed, and which it is meant fhould not be repaid till after a period of feveral years, ought not to be borrowed of a bank, but ought to be bor-rowed upon bond or mortgage, of fuch private people as propofe to live upon the intereit of their money, without taking the trouble themSelves to employ the capital; and who are upon that account willing to lend that capital to fuch
people
${ }^{8} \mathrm{O}_{\text {II }} \mathrm{K}$ people of good credit as are likely to keep it for
${ }^{\text {in. feveral years. A bank, indeed, which lends its }}$ money without the expence of ftampt paper, or of attornies fees for drawing bonds and mortgages, and which accepts of repayment upon the eafy terms of the banking companies of Scotland; would, no doubt, be a very convenient creditor to fuch traders and undertakers. But fuch traders and undertakers would, furely, be moft inconvenient debtors to fuch a bank.

It is now more than five-and-twenty years fince the paper money iffued by the different banking companies of Scotland was fully equal, or rather was fomewhat more than fully equal, to what the circulation of the country could eafily abforb and employ. Thofe companies, therefore, had fo long ago given all the affiftance to the traders and other undertakers of Scotland which it is poffible for banks and bankers, confiftently with their own intereft, to give. They had even done fomewhat more. They had overtraded a little, and had brought upon themfelves that lofs, or at leaft that diminution of profit, which in this particular bufinefs never fails to attend the fmalleft degree of over-trading. Thofe traders and other undertakers, having got fo much affiftance from banks and bankers, wifhed to get ftill more. The banks; they feem to have thought, could extend their credits to whatever fum might be wanted, without incurring any other expence befides that of a few reams of paper. They complained of the contracted views and daftardly fpirit of the directors of thofe banks,
banks, which did not, they faid, extend their C HAP. credits in proportion to the extenfion of the trade $\underbrace{11 .}$ of the country; meaning, no doubt, by the extenfion of that trade the extenfion of their own projects beyond what they could carry on, either with their own capital, or with what they had credit to borrow of private people in the ufual way of bond or mortgage. The banks, they feem to have thought, were in honour bound to fupply the deficiency, and to provide them with all the capital which they wanted to trade with. The banks, however, were of a different opinion, and upon their refufing to extend their credits, fome of thofe traders had recourfe to an expedient which, for a time, ferved their purpofe, though at a much greater expence, yet as effectually as the utmoft extenfion of bank credits could have done. This expedient was no other than the well-known thift of drawing and re-drawing; the fhift to which unfortunate traders have fometimes recourfe when they are upon the brink of bankruptcy. The practice of raifing money in this manner had been long known in England, and during the courfe of the late war, when the high profits of trade afforded a great temptation to over.trading, is faid to have been carried on to a very great extent. From England it was brought into Scotland, where, in proportion to the very limited commerce, and to the very moderate capital of the country, it was foon carried on to a much greater extent than it had ever been in England.

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received thofe contents, had all of them in their $\mathbf{C H}_{\text {HII }} \mathbf{A}^{\mathbf{P}}$. order endorfed, that is, written their names upon $\underbrace{\text { HI. }}$ the back of the bill; each endorfer becomes in his turn liable to the owner of the bill for thofe contents, and, if he fails to pay, he becomes too from that moment a bankrupt. Though the drawer, acceptor, and endorfers of the bill fhould, all of them, be perfons of doubtful credit; yet ftill the thortnefs of the date gives fome fecurity to the owner of the bill. Though all of them may be very likely to become bankrupts; it is a chance if they all become fo in fo fhort a time. The houfe is crazy, fays a weary traveller to himfelf, and will not ftand very long; but it is a chance if it falls to-night, and I will venture, therefore, to fleep in it to-night.

The trader A in Edinburgh, we fhall fuppofe, draws a bill upon $B$ in London, payable two months after date. In reality $B$ in London owes nothing to A in Edinburgh; but he agrees to accept of A's bill, upon condition that before the term of payment he Shall redraw upon A in Edinburgh for the fame fum, together with the intereft and a commiffion, another bill, payable likewife two months after date. B accordingly, before the expiration of the firlt two months, redraws this bill upon A in Edinburgh; who again, before the expiration of the fecond two months, draws a fecond bill upon $B$ in London, payable likewife two months after date; and before the expiration of the third two months, $B$ in London re-draws upon A in Edinburgh another bill, payable alfo two months after date. This pracVol. I. $\mathrm{H} \mathrm{h}^{\text {hice }}$

Book tice has fometimes gone on, not only for feveral months, but for feveral years together, the bill always returning upon $A$ in Edinburgh, with the accumulated intereft and commifion of all the former bills. The intereft was five per cent. in the year, and the commiffion was never lefs than one half per cent. on each draught. This commiffion being repeated more than fix times in the year, whatever money A might raife by this expedient mult neceffarily have coft him fomething more than eight per cent. in the year, and fometimes a great deal more; when either the price of the commiffion happened to rife, or when he was obliged to pay compound interelt upon the intereft and commiffion of former bills. This practice was called raifing money by circulation.

In a country where the ordinary profits of ftock in the greater part of mercantile projects are fuppofed to run between fix and ten per cent. it mult have been a very fortunate fpeculation of which the returns could not only repay the enormous expence at which the money was thus borrowet for carrying it on; but afford, befides, a good furplus profit to the projector. Many vaft and extenfive projects, however, were undertaken, and for. feveral years carried on without any other fund to fupport them befides what was raifed at this enormous expence. The projectors, no doubt, had in their golden dreams the moft diftinct vifion of this great profit. Upon their awaking, however, either at the end of their projects,' or when they were no longer
able to carry them on, they very feldom, I believe, had the good fortune to find it ".

The bills which Ain Edinburgh drew upon B in London, he regularly difcounted two months before they were due with fume bank or banker in Edinturgh; and the bills which B in London re-drew upon A in Edinburgh, he as regularly difcounted either with the bank of Engiand, or with fome other bankers in London. Whatever was advanced upon fuch circulating bills, was, in Edinburgh, advanced in the paper of the Scotch banks, and in London, when they were difcounted at the bank of England, in the paper of that bank. Though the bills upon which this paper had been advanced, wese all of them re-

* The method defcribed in the text was by no means either the molt common or the mof expenfive one in which thofe adventurers fometimes raifed moncy by circulation. It frequently happened that $A$ in Edinburgh would enable $B$ in London to pay the firft bill of exchange by drawing, a few days before it became due, a fecond bill at three months date upon the fame B in London. This bill, bcing payable to his own order, A fold in Edinburgh at par; and with its contents purchafed bills upon London payable at fight to the order of B, to whom he fent them by the poft. Towards the end of the late war, the exchange between Edinburgh and London was frequently three per cent. againft Edinhurgh, and thofe bills at fight muft frequently have colt A that premium. This tranfaction therefore being repeated at leaft four times in the year, and being loaded with a commiffion of at leaft one half per cent. upon each repetition, mult at that period have coft $A$ as leaf fourteen per cent. in the year. At other times $A$ would enable $B$ to difcharge the firft bill of exchange by drawing, 2 , few days before it became due, a fecond bill at two months date; not upon $B$, but upon fome third perfon, $C_{2}$ for Hh 2
examples

во о $K$ paid in their turn as foon as they became due; U. yet the value which had been really advanced upon the firft bill, was never really returned to the banks which advanced it; becaufe, before each bill became due, another bill was always drawn to fomewhat a greater amount than the bill which was foon to be paid; and the difcounting of this other bill was effentially neceffary towards the payment of that which was foon to be due. This payment, therefore, was altogether fictitious. The ftream, which, by means of thofe circulating bills of exchange, had once been made to run out from the coffers of the banks, was never replaced by any ftream which really run into them.
example, in London. This other bill was made payable to the order of $B$, who, upon its being accepted by $C$, difcounted it with fome banker in London; and $A$ enabled $C$ to difcharge it by drawing, a few days before it became due, a third bill, likewife at two months date, fometimes upon his firft correfpondent B, and fometimes upon fome fourth or fifth perfon, D or E , for example. This third bill was made pay. able to the order of $C$; who, as foon as it was accepted, dif. counted it in the fame manner with fome banker in London. Such operations being repeated at leaft fix times in the ycar, and being loaded with a commiffion of at lealt one-half per cent. upon each repetition, together with the legal intereft of five per cent. this method of raifing money, in the fame manner as that defcribed in the text, muft have coft -A fomething more than eight per cent. By faving, however, the exchange between Edinburgh and London, it was lefs expenfive than that mentioned in the foregoing part of this note; but then it required an eftablifhed credit with more houfes than one in London, an advantage which many of thefe adventurers could not always find it eafy to procure.
 culating bills of exchange, amounted, upon many $\underbrace{\text { n. }}$ occafions, to the whole fund deftined for carrying on fome vaft and extenfive project of agriculture, commerce, or manufactures; and not merely to that part of it which, had there been no paper money, the projector would have been obliged to keep by him, unemployed and in ready money for anfwering occafional demands. The greater part of this paper was, confequently, over and above the value of the gold and filver which would have circulated in the country, had there been no paper money. It was over and above, therefore, what the circulation of the courtity could eafily abforb and employ, and upon that account immediately returned upon the banks in order to be exchanged for gold and filver, which they were to find as they could. It was a capital which thofe projectors had very artfully contrived to draw from thofe banks, not only without their knowledge or deliberate confent, but for fome time, perhaps, without their having the moft diftant fufpicion that they had really advanced it.

When two people, who are continually drawing and re-drawing upon one another, difcount their bills always with the fame banker, he muft immediately difcover what they are about, and fee clearly that they are trading, not with any capital of their own, but with the capital which he advances to them. But this difcovery is not altogether fo eafy when they difcount their bills fometimes with one banker, and fometimes with Hh3
another,

BOOK another, and when the fame two perfons do not
I. conftantly draw and re-draw upon one another, but occafionally run the round of a great circle of projectors, who find it for their intereft to affift one another in this method of raifing money, and to render it, upon that account, as difficult as polfible to diftinguih between a real and a fictitious bill of exchange; between a bill drawn by a real creditor upon a real debtor, and a bill for which there was properly no real creditor but the bank which difcounted it; nor any real debtor but the projector who made ufe of the money. When a banker had evein made this difcovery, he might fomerimes make it too late, and might find that he had already difcounted the bills of thofe projectors to fo great an extent, that, by refuling to difcount any more, he would neceffarily make them all bankrupts, and thus, by ruining them, might perhaps ruin himfelf. For his own intereft and fafety, therefore, he might find it neceffary, in this very perilous fituation, to go on for fome time, endeavouring, however, to withdraw gradually, and upon that account making every day greater and greater difficulties about difcounting, in order to force thore projectors by degrees to have recourfe, either to other bankers, or to other methods of raifing money; fo as that he himfelf might, as foon as poffible, get out of the circle. The difficulties, accordingly, which the bank of Eng. land, which the principal bankers in London, and which even the more prudent Scotch banks began, after a certain time, and wher all of them had
had already gone too far, to make about dif- $\boldsymbol{\sim}$ н A . counting, not only alarmed, but enraged in the higheft degree thoie projectors. Their own diftrefs, of which this prudent and neceffary referve of the banks was, no doubt, the immediate occafion, they called the diftrefs of the country; and this diftrefs of the country, they faid, was altogether owing to the ignorance, pufillanimity, and bad conduct of the banks, which did not give a fufficiently liberal aid to the firited undertakings of thofe who exerted themfelves in order to beautify, improve, and enrich the country. It was the duty of the banks, they feemed to think, to lend for as long a time, and to as great an extent as they might wifh to borrow. The banks, however, by refufing in this manner to give more credit to thofe, to whom they had already given a great deal too much, took the only method by which it was now poffible to fave either their own credit, or the public credit of the country.

In the midft of this clamour and diftrefs, a new bank was eftablifhed in Scotland for the exprefs purpofe of relieving the diftrefs of the country. The defign was generous; but the execution was imprudent, and the nature and caules of the diftrefs which it meant to relieve, were not, perhaps, well underftood. This bank was more liberal than any other had ever been, both in granting cafh accounts, and in difcounting bills of exchange. With regard to the latter, it feems to have made fcarce any diftinction between real and circulating bills, but to have dif-

B o o K . counted all equally. It wn the avowed principle
$\underbrace{\text { iI. }}$ of this bank to advance, upon any reafonable fecurity, the whole capitai which was to be employed in thofe improvements of which the returns are the molt flow and diftant, fuch as the improvements of land. To promote fuch improvements was even faid to be the chief of the public fpirited purpofes for which it was inftituted. By its liberality in granting cafh accounts, and in difcounting bills of exchange, it, no doubt, iffued great quantities of its bank notes. But thofe bank notes being, the greater part of them, over and above what the circulation of the country could eafily abforb and employ, returned upon it, in order to be exchanged for gold and filver, as faft as they were iffued. Its coffers were never well filled. The capital which had been fubfcribed to this bank at two different fubferiptions, amounted to one hundred and fixty thoufand pounds, of which eighty per cent. only was paid up. This fum ought to have been paid in at feveral different inftalments. A great part of the proprietors, when they paid in their firft inftalment, opened a cafh account with the bank; and the directors, thinking themfelves obliged to treat their own proprietors with the fame liberality with which they treated all other men, allowed many of them to borrow upon this cafh account what they paid in upon all their fubfequent inftalments. Such payments, therefore, only put into one coffer, what had the moment before been taken out of another. But had the coffers of this bank been filled ever fo well,
 fafter than they could have been replenified by any other expedient but the ruinous one of drawing upon London, and when the bill became due, paying it, together with intereft and commiffion, by another draught upon the fame place. Its coffers having been filled fo very ill, it is faid to have been driven to this refource within a very few months after it began to do bufinefs. The eftates of the proprietors of this bank were worth feveral millions, and by their fubfcription to the original bond or contract of the bank, were really pledged for anfwering all its engagements. By means of the great credit which fo great a pledge neceffarily gave it, it was, notwithftanding its too liberal conduct, enabled to carry on bufinefs for more than two years. When it was obliged to fop, it had in the circulation about two hundred thoufand pounds in bank notes. In order to fupport the circulation of thofe notes, which were continually returning upon it as faft as they were iffued, it had been conftantly in the practice of drawing bills of exchange upon London, of which the number and value were continually increafing, and, when it ftopt, amounted to upwards of fix hundred thoufand pounds. This bank, therefore, had, in little more than the courfe of two years, advanced to different people upwards of eight hundred thoufand pounds at five per cent. Upon the two hundred thoufand pounds which it circulated in bank notes, this five per cent. might, perhaps; be confidered as clear gain, without
${ }^{3} \mathrm{IIO}_{\text {I }}$ without any other deduction befides the expence
II. of management. But upon upwards of fix hur:dred thoufand pounds, for which it was continually drawing bills of exchange upon London; it was paying, in the way of intereft and commiffion, upwards of eight per cent. and was confequently lofing more than three per cent. upon more than three-fourths of all its dealings.

The operations of this bank feem to have produced effects quite oppofite to thofe which were intended by the particular perfons who planned and directed it. They feem to have intended to fupport the fpirited undertakings, for as fuch they confidered them, which were at that time carrying on in different parts of the countiy; and at the fame time, by drawing the whole banking bufinefs to themfelves, to fupplant all the other Scotch banks; particularly thofe eftablifhed at Edinburgh, whofe backwardnefs in difcounting bills of exchange had given fome offence. This bank, no doubt, gave fome temporary relief to thofe projectors, and enabled them to carry on their projects for about two years longer than they could otherwife have done. But it thereby only enabled them to get fo much deeper into debt, fo that when ruin came, it fell fo much the heavier both upon them and upon their creditors. The operations of this bank, therefore, inftead of relieving, in reality aggravated in the long-run the diftrefs which thofe projectors had brought both upon themfelves and upon their country. It would have been
much better for themfelves, their creditors and CHAP. their country, had the greater part of them been $\underbrace{\text { II. }}$ obliged to ftop two years fooner than they actually did. The temporary relief, however, which this bank afforded to thofe projectors, proved a real and permanent relief to the other Scotch banks. All the dealers in circulating bills of exchange, which thofe other banks had become fo backward in difcounting, had recourfe to this new bank, where they were received with open arms. Thofe other banks, therefore, were enabled to get very eafily out of that fatal circle, from which they could not otherwife have difengaged themeelves without incurring a confiderable lofs, and perhaps too even fome degree of difcredit.

In the long-run, therefore, the operations of this bank increafed the real diftrefs of the country which it meant to relieve; and effectually relieved from a very great diftrefs thofe rivals whom it meant to fupplant.

At the firft fetting out of this bank, it was the opinion of fome people, that how faft foever its coffers might be emptied, it might eafily replenifh them by raifing money upon the fecurities of thofe to whom it had advanced its paper. Experience, I believe, foon convinced them that this method of raifing money was by much too flow to anfwer their purpofe; and that coffers which originally were fo ill filled, and which emptied themfelves fo very faft, could be replenifhed by no other expedient but the ruinous one of drawing bills uron London, and when they
©OK 11. . upon the fame place with accumulated intereft and commifion. But though they had been able by this method to raife money as faft as they wanted it; yet, inftead of making a profit, they mult have fuffered a lofs by every fuch operation; fo that in the long-run they muft have ruined themfelves as a mercantile company, though, perhaps, not fo foon as by the more expenfive practice of drawing and re-drawing. They could ftill have made nothing by the intereft of the paper, which being over and above what the circulation of the country could abforb and employ, returned upon them, in order to be exchanged for gold and filver, as faft as they iffued it; and for the payment of which they were themfelves continually obliged to borrow money. On the contrary, the whole expence of this borrowing, of employing agents to look out for people who had money to lend, of negociating with thole people, and of drawing the proper bond or affigniment, muft have fallen upon them, and have been fo much clear lofs upon the balance of their accounts. The project of replenifh. ing their coffers in this manner may be compared to that of a man who had a water-pond from which a ftream was continually running out, and into which no ftream was continually running, but who propofed to keep it always equally full by employing a number of people to go continually with buckets to a well at fome miles diftance in order to bring water to replening it.

But though this operation had proved, not $\mathbf{C H A P}$. only practicable, but profitable to the bank as a $\underbrace{1 \text {. }}$ mercantile company; yet the country could have derived no benefit from it; but, on the contrary, muft have fuffered a very confiderable lofs by it. This operation could not augment in the fmalleft degree the quantity of money to be lent. It could only have erected this bank into a fort of general loan office for the whole country. Thofe who wanted to borrow, mult have applied to this bank, inftead of applying to the private perfons who had lent it their money. But a bank which lends money, perhaps, to five hundred different people, the greater part of whom its directors can know very little about, is not likely to be more judicious in the choice of its debtors, than a private perfon who lends out his money among a few people whom he knows, and in whofe fober and frugal conduct he chinks; he has good reafon to confide. The debtors of fuch a bank, as that whofe conduct I have been giving fome account of, were likely, the greatet part of them, to be chimerical projectors, the drawers and re-drawers of circulating bills of exchange, who would employ the money in extravagant undertakings, which, with all the affiftance that could be given them, they would probably never be able to complete, and which, if they fhould be completed, would never repay the expence which they had really coft, would never afford a fund capable of maintaining a quantity of labour equal to that which had been employed about them. The fober and frugal debtors of pri-
${ }^{B} \mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{JI}} \mathrm{O}$. K vate perfons, on the contrary, would be more likely to employ the money borrowed in fober undertakings which were proportioned to their capitals, and which, though they might have lefs of the grand and the marvellous, would have more of the folid and the profitable, which would repay with a large profit whatever had been laid out upon them, and which would thus afford a fund capabie of maintaining a much greater quantity of labour than that which had been employed about them. The fuccefs of this operation, therefore, without increafing in the fmalleft degree the capital of the country, would only have transferred a great part of it from prudent and profitable, to imprudent and unprofitable undertakings.

That the induftry of Scotland languifhed for want of money to employ it, was the opinion of the famous Mr. Law. By eftablifhing a bank of a particular kind, which he feems to have imagined might iffue paper to the amount of the whole value of all the lands in the country, he propofed to remedy this want of money. The parliament of Scotland, when he firft propofed his project, did not think proper to adopt ir. It was afterwards adopted, with fome variations, by the duke of Orleans, at that time regent of France. The idea of the poffibility of multiplying paper money to almoft any extent; was the real foundation of what is called the Miffiffippi fcheme, the moft extravagant project both of banking and ftock jobbing that, perhaps, the world ever faw. The different operations
of this fcheme are explained fo fully, fo clearly, $\mathbf{C}{ }_{\text {HiA }}^{\text {A }}$ P. and with fo much order and diftinctnefs, by Mr. Du Verney, in his Examination of the Political Reflections upon Commerce and Fi nances of Mr. Du Tor, that I fhall not give any account of them. The principles upon which it was founded are explained by Mr. Law himfelf, in a difcourfe concerning money and trade, which he publined in Scotland when he firft propofed his project. The fplendid, but vifionary ideas which are fet forth in that and fome other works upon the fame principles, ftill continue to make an impreffion upon many people, and have, perhaps, in part, contributed to that excefs of banking, which has of late been complained of both in Scotland and in other places.

The bank of England is the greatef bank of circulation in Europe. It was incorporated, in purfuance of an act of parliament, by a charter under the great feal, dated the 27 th of July, 1694. It at that time advanced to government the fum of one million two hundred thoufand pounds, for an annuity of one hundred thoufand pounds: or for $96,000 l$. a year intereft, at the rate of eight per cent, and $4,000 \mathrm{l}$. a year for the expence of management. The credit of the new government, eftablifhed by the Revolution, we may, believe, muft have been very low, when it was obliged to borrow at fo high an intereft.

In 1697 , the bank was allowed to enlarge its capital fock by an ingraftment of $1,001,171 \%$. ros. Its whole capital ftock, therefore, amounted at this time to $2,201,17 \mathrm{Il}$. Ios. This. ingrafment

E OOK graftment is faid to have been for the fupport of public credit. In 1696 , tallies had been at forty, and fifty, and fixty per cent. difcount, and bank notes at twenty per cent.* . During the great recoinage of the filver, which was going on at this time, the bank had thought proper to difcontinue the payment of its notes, which neceffarily occafioned their difcredit.

In purfuance of the 7th Anne, c. vii. the bank advanced and paid into the excheque:, the fum of $400,000 \mathrm{l}$. ; making in all the fum of $1,600,000 \mathrm{l}$. which it had advanced upon its original annuity of $96,000 \mathrm{l}$. intereft and 4000 l . for expence of management. In 1708, therefore, the credit of government was as good as that of private perfons, fince it could borrow at fix per cent. intereft, the common legal and market rate of thofe times. In purfuance of the fame act, the bank cancelled exchequer bills to the amount of $1,775,027 \mathrm{l}$. 17 s . ro $\frac{1}{2} \mathrm{~d}$. at fix per cent. intereft, and was at the fame time allowed to take in fubfcriptions for doubling its capital. In 1708, therefore, the capital of the bank amounted to $4,402,343 \mathrm{l}$. and it had advanced to government the fum of $3,375,027$ l. 17 f . $10 \frac{1}{2} \mathrm{~d}$.

By a call of fifteen per cent. in 1709, there was paid in and made flock 656,204 \%. is. 9d.; and by another of ten per cent. in 1710 , 501,448 l. 12s. IId. In confequence of thofe two calls, therefore, the bank capital amounted to 5,559,995 l. 1,4s. 8d.

[^18]In purfuance of the 3 d George I. c. 8. the $\mathrm{C}^{\mathrm{H} A} \mathrm{~A}$. bank delivered up two millions of excliequer bills $\underbrace{\text { n. }}$ to be cancelled. It had at this time, therefore, advanced to government $5,375,027$ l. 17s. 10 d . In purfuance of the 8 th George I. c. 21. the bank purchafed of the South Sea Company, ftock to the amount of $4,000,000$ l. : and in 1722, in confequence of the fubfcriptions which it had taken in for enabling it to make this purchafet its capital ftock was increaled by $3,400,000 \%$. At this time, therefore, the bank had advanced to the public $9,375,027 \mathrm{l} .17 \mathrm{~s} .10 \frac{1}{2} \mathrm{~d}$; and its capital ftock amounted only to $8,959,995$ l. 14s. $8 d$. It was upon this occafion that the fum which the bank had advanced to the public, and for which it received intereft, began firft to exceed its capital ftock, or the fum for which it paid a dividend to the proprietors of bank fock; or, in other words, that the bank began to have an undivided capital, over and above its divided one. It has continued to have an undivided capital of the faine kind ever fince. In 1746, the bank had, upon different occafions, advanced to the public $11,686,800 \%$. and its divided capital had been raifed by different calls and fubferiptions to $10,780,000 \mathrm{l}$. The ftate of thofe two fuins has continued to be the fame ever fince. In purfuance of the $4^{\text {th }}$ of George III. c. 25. the bank agreed to pay to government for the renewal of its charter $110,000 l$. without intereft or repayment. This fum, therefore, did not increafe either of thofe two other fums.
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${ }^{B} \mathbf{O}_{\mathrm{n}} \mathbf{o f}^{\mathrm{K}}$. The dividend of the bank has varied according to the variations in the rate of the intereft which it has, at different times, received for the money it had advanced to the public, as well as according to other circumitances. This rate of intereft has- graduilly been reduced from eight to three per cent. For fome years paft the bank dividend has been at five and a half per cent.

The ftabihy of the bank of England is equal to that of the Pritifh government. All that it has advanced to the public mult be loft before its creditors can fuftain any lofs. No other banking company in England can be eftablifhed by act of parliament, or can confift of more than fix members. It acts, not only as an ordinary bank, but as a great engine of ftate. It receives and pays the greater part of the annuities which are due to the creditors of the public, it circulates exchequer bills, and it advances to government the annual amount of the land and malt taxes, which are frequently not paid up till fome years thereafter. In thofe different operations, its duty to the public may fometimes have obliged it, without any fault of its directors, to overftock the circulation with paper money. It likewife difcounts merchants bills, and has, upon feveral differ 1. occalions, fupported the credit of the principal houfes, not only of England, but of Hamburgh and Holland. Upon one occafion, in 1763, it is faid to have advanced for this purpofe, in cne weck, about $1,600,000$ l.; a great part of it
in bullion. I do not, however, pretend to war- $\mathbf{C H}_{\text {If. }} \mathrm{P}^{\mathbf{P}}$. rant either the greatnels of the fum, or the fhortnefs of the time. Upon other occafions, this great company has been reduced to the neceffity of paying ip fixpences.

IT is not by augmenting the capital of the country, but by rendering a greater part of that capital active and productive than would otherwife be fo, that the moft judicious operations of banking can increafe the induftry of the country. That part of his capital which a dealer is obliged to keep yy him unemployed, and in ready money for afwering occafional demands, is fo much dead ftock, which, fo long as it remains in this fituation, produces nothing either to him or to his cot ry. The judicious operations of banking enab e him to convert this dead ftock into active and productive ftock; into materials to work upon, nto tools to work with, and into provifions and fubfiftence to work for ; into ftock which produces fomething both to. himfelf and to his counesy. The gold and filver money which circulates in any country, and by means of which the pro uce of its land and labour is annually circulated and diftributed to the proper confumers, is, in the fame manner as the ready money of the dealer, all dead ftock. It is a very valuable part of the capital of the country, which produces nothing to the country. The judicious operations of banking, by fubftituting paper in the room of a great part of this gold and filver, enable the country to convert a

B O OK great part of this dead ftock into active and pro:
$\underbrace{\text { II. ductive ftock; into ftock which produces fome. }}$ thing to the country. The gold and filver money which circulates in any country may very properly be compared to a highway, which, while it circulates and carries to market all the grals and corn of the country, produces itfelf not a fingle pile of either. The judicious operations of banking, by providing, if I may be allowed fo violent a metaphor, a fort of waggon-way through the air; enable the country to convert, as it were, a great part of its highways into good paftures and cornfields, and thereby to increafe very confiderably the annual produce of its land and labour. The commerce and induftry of the country, however, it mutt be acknowledged, though they may be fomewhat augmented, cannot be altogether fo fecure; when they are thus, as it were, fufpended upon the Dædalian wings of paper money, as when they travel about upon the folid ground of gold and filver. Over and above the accidents to which they are expofed from the unkilfulnefs of the conductors of this paper money, they are liable to feveral others from which no prudence or fkill of thofe conductors can guard them.

An unfuccefsful war, for example, in which the enemy got pofferion of the capital, and confequently of that treafure which fupported the credit of the paper money, would occafion a much greater confufion in a country where the whole circulation was carried on by paper, than
in one where the greater part of it was carried on ${ }^{\mathrm{C}} \mathrm{H}_{\mathrm{A}} \mathrm{A}$ pi oy gold and filver. The ufual inftrument of $\underbrace{11}$ commerce having loft its value, no exchanges could be made but either by barter or upon credic. All taxes having been ufually paid in paper money, the prince would not have wherewithal either to pay his troops, or to furnifh his magazines; and the ftate $c^{f}$ the country would be much more irretrievable than if the greater part of its circulation had confifted in gold and filver. A prince, anxious to maintain his dominions at all times in the ftate in which he can moft eafily defend them, ought, upon this account, to guard, not only againft that exceffive multiplication of paper money which ruins the very banks which iffue it; but even againf that multiplication of it, which enables them to fill the greater part of the circulation of the country with it.

The circulation of every country may be confidered as divided into two different branches; the circulation of the dealers with one another, and the circulation between the dealers and the confumers. Though the fame pieces of money, whether paper or metal, may be employed fometimes in the one circulation and fometimes in the other ; yet as both are conitantly going on at the fame time, each requires a certain flock of money of one kind or another, to carry it on. The value of the goods circulated between the different dealers, never can exceed the value of thofe circulated between the dealers and the confum-

B O O K K ers; whatever is bought by the dealers; being ultimately deftined to be fold to the confumers. The circulation between the dealers, as it is carried on by wholefale, requires generally a pretty large fum for every particular tranfaction. That between the dealers and the confumers, on the contrary, as it is generally carried on by retail, frequently requires but very fimall ones, a fhilling, or even a halfpenny, being often fufficient, But fmall fums circulate much fafter than large ones. A fhilling changes mafters more frequently than a guinea, and a halfpenny more frequently than a fhilling. Though the annual purchafes of all the confumers, therefore, are at leat? equal in value to thofe of all the dealers, they can generally be tranfacted with a much fmaller quantity of money; the fame pieces, by a more rapid circulation, ferving as the inftrument of many more purchafes of the one kind than of the other,

Paper money may be fo regulated, as either to confine itfelf very much to the circulation between the different dealers, or to extend itfelf likewife to a great part of that between the dealers and the confumers. Where no bank notes are circulated under ten pounds value, as in London, paper money confines itfelf very much to the circulation between the dealers. When a ten pound bank note comes into the hands of a confumer, he is generally obliged to change it at the firft thop where he has occafion to purchafe five Rillings worth of goods; fo that it often re-
turns inte the hands of a dealer, before the con- C HAP. fumer hath fpent the fortieth part of the money. Where bank notes are iffued for fo fmall fums as twenty fhillings, as in Scotland, paper money extends itfelf to a confiderable part of the circulation between dealers and confumers. Before the act of parliament which put a ftop to the circulation of ten and five fhilling notes, it filled a ftill greater part of that circulation. In the ourrencies of North America, paper was commonly iffued for fo fmall a furn as a milling, and filled almoft the whole of that circulation. In fome paper currencies of Yorkfhire, it was iffued even for fo fmall a fum as a fixpence.

Where the iffuing of bank notes for fuch very fmall fums is allowed and commonly practifed, many mean people are both enabled and encouraged to become bankers. A perfon whofe promiffory note for five pounds, or even for twenty fhillings, would be rejected by every body, will get it to be received without fcruple when it is iffued for fo fmall a fum as a fixpence. But the frequent bankruptcies to which fuch beggarly bankers muit be liable, may occafion a very confiderable inconveniency, and fometimes even a very great calamity, to many poor people who had received their notes in payment.

It were better, perhaps, that no bank notes were iffued in any part of the kingdom for a fmaller fum than five pounds. Paper money would then, probably, confine itfelf, in every part of the kingdom, to the circulation between
${ }^{B} 0_{\text {II: }}^{0}$ K the different dealers, as much as it does at prefent in London, where no bank notes are iffued under ten pounds value; five pounds being; in moft parts of the kingdom, a fum which, though it will purchafe, perhaps, little more than half the quantity of goods, is as much confidered, and is as feldom fpent all lat once, as ten pounds are amidtt the profufe expence of London.

Where paper money, it is to be obferved, is pretty much confined to the circulation between dealers and dealers, as at London, there is always plenty of gold and filver. Where it extends itfelf to a confiderable part of the circulation between dealers and confumers, as in Scotland, and ftill more in North America, it banifhes gold and filver almoft entirely from the country; almoft all the ordinary tranfactions of its interior commerce being thus carried on by paper. The fuppreffion of ten and five fhilling bank notes, fomewhat relieved the fcarcity of gold and filver in Scotland; and the fuppreffion of twenty fhilling, notes, will probably relieve it ftill more. Thofe metals are faid to have become more abundant in America, fince the fuppreffion of fome of their paper currencies. They are faid, likewife, to have been more abundant before the inflitution of thofe currencies.

Though paper money should be pretty much confined to the circulation between dealers and dealers, yet banks and bankers might ftill be able to give nearly the fame affiftance to the in-
duftry and commerce of the country, as they had C H.A P. done when paper money filled almoft the whole circulation. The ready money which a dealer is obliged to keep by him, for anfwering occafional demands, is deftined altogether for the circulation between himfelf and other dealers, of whom he buys goods. He has no occafion to keep any by him for the circulation between himfelf and the confumers, who are his cuftomers, and who bring ready money to him, inftead of taking any from him. Though no paper money, therefore, was allowed to be iffued, but for fuch fums as would confine it pretty much to the circulation between dealers and dealers; yet, partly by difcounting real bills of exchange, and partly by lending upon calh accounts, banks and bankers might. Itill be able to relieve the greater part of thofe dealers from the neceffity of keeping any confiderabie part of their ftock by them, unemployed and in ready money, for anfwering occafional demands. They might ftill be able to give the utmoft affiftance which banks and bankers can, with propriety, give to traders of every kind.

To reftrain private people, it may be faid; from receiving in payment the promiffory notes of a banker, for any fum whether great or fmall, when they themfelves are willing to receive them; or, to reftrain a banker from iffuing fuch notes, when all his neighbours are willing to accept of them, is a manifeft violation of that natural liberty which it is the proper bufinefs of
io ook law, not to infringe, but to fupport. Such re-
gi gulations may, no doubt, be confidered as in fome refpect a violation of natural liberty. But thofe exertions of the natural liberty of a few individuals, which might endanger the fecurity of the whole fociety, are, and ought to be, reftrained by the laws of all governments; of the molt ; free; as well as of the moft defpotical. The obligation of building. party walls, in order to prevent the communication of fire, is a violation of natural liberty, exactly of the fame kind with the regulations of the banking trade which are here propofed.

A paper money confifting in bank notes, iffued by people of undoubted credit, payable upon demand without any condition, and in fact always readily paid as foon as prefented, is, in every refpect, equal in value to gold and filver money; fince gold and filver money can at any time be had for it. Whatever is either bought or fold for fuch paper, muft neceffarily be bought or fold as cheap as it could have been for gold and filver.

The increafe of paper money, it has been faid, by augmenting the quantity, and confequently diminifhing the value of the whole currency, neceffarily augments the money price of commodities. But as the quantity of gold and filver, which is taken from the currency, is always equal to the quantity of paper which is added to it, paper money does not neceffarily increafe the quantity of the whole currency. From the beginning
ginning of the laft century to the prefent time, $\mathbf{C}$ н A $\mathbf{P}$. provifions never were cheaper in Scotland than in 1759, though, from the circulation of ten and five fhilling bank notes, there was then more paper money in the country than at prefent. The proportion between the price of provifions in Scotland and that in England, is the fame now as before the great multiplication of banking companies in Scotland. Corn is, upon molt occafions, fully as cheap in England as in France; though there is a great deal of paper money in England, and fcarce any in France. In 1751 and in 1752, when Mr. Hume publifhed his Political Difcourfes, and foon after the great multiplication of paper money in Scotland, there was a very fenfible rife in the price of provifions, owing, probably, to the badnefs of the feafons, and not to the multiplication of paper money.

It would be otherwife, indeed, with a paper money confifting in promiffory notes, of which the immediate payment depended, in any refpect, either upon the good will of thofe who iffued them; or upon a condition which the holder of the notes might not always have it in his power to fulfil; or of which the payment was not exigible till after a certain number of years, and which in the mean time bore no intereft. Such a paper money would, no doubt, fall n:ore or lefs below the value of gold and filver, according as the difficulty or uncertainty of obtaining immediate payment was fuppofed to be

BOOK greater or lefs; or according to the greater or lefs diftance of time at which payment was exigible.

Some years ago the different banking companies of Scotland were in the practice of inferting into their bank notes, what they called an Optional Claufe, by which they promifed payment to the bearer, either as foon as the note fhould be prefented, or, in the option of the directors, fix months after fuch prefentment, together with the legal intereft for the faid fix months. The dircetors of fome of thofe banks fometimes took advantage of this optional claufe, and fometimes threatened thofe who demanded gold and filver in exchange for a confiderable number of their notes, that they would take advantage of it, unlefs fuch demanders would content themfelves with a part of what they demanded. The promiffory notes of thofe banking companies conftituted at that time the far greater part of the currency of Scotland, which this uncertainty of payment neceffarily, degraded below the value of gold and filver money. During the continuance of this abufe (which prevailed chiefly in 1762,1763 , and 1764 ), while the exchange between London and Carlinle was at par, that between London and Dumfries would fometimes be four per cent. againft Dumfries, though this town is not thirty miles diftant from Carline. But at Carline, bills were paid in gold and filver; whereas at Dumfries they were paid in Scotch bank notes, and the uncertainty of get-
ting thofe bank notes exchanged for gold and CHAP. filver coin had thus degraded them four per cent. $\omega w$ the value of that coin. The fame act of parliament which fuppreffed ten and five fhilling bank notes, fuppreffed likewife this optional claufe, and thereby reftored the exchange between England and Scotland to its natural rate, or to what the courfe of trade and remittances might happen to make it.

In the paper currencies of Yorkfhire, the payment of fo fmall a fum as a fixpence fometimes depended upon the condition that the holder of the note fhould bring the change of a guinea to the perfon who iffued it; a condition, which the holders of fuch notes might frequently find it very difficult to fulfil, and which mult have degraded this currency below the value of gold and filver money. An act of parliament, accordingly, declared all fuch claufes unlawful, and fuppreffed, in the fame manner as in Scotland, all promiffory notes, payable to the bearer; under twenty hillings value.

The paper currencies of North America confifted, not in bank notes payable to the bearer on demand, but in a government paper, of which the payment was not exigible till feveral years after it was iffued: And though the colony governments paid no intereft to the holders of this paper, they declared it to be, and in fact rendered it, a legal tender of payment for the full value for which it was iffued. But allowing the colony fecurity to be perfectly good; a hundred

Book pounds payable fifteen years hence, for example, in a country where intereft is at fix per cent. is worth little more than forty pounds ready money. To oblige a creditor, therefore, to accept of this as full payment for a debt of a hundred pounds actually paid down in ready money, was an act of fuch violent injutice, as has fcarce, perhaps, been attempted by the government. of any other country which pretended to be free. It bears the evident marks of having originally been, what the honeft and downright Doetor Douglas affures us it was, a fcheme of fraudulent debtors to cheat their creditors. The government of Penfylvania, indeed, pretended, upon their firft emifion of paper money, in 1722, to render their paper of equal value with gold and filver, by enacting penalties againft all thofe who made any difference in the price of their goods when they fold them for a colony paper, and when they fold them for gold and filver; a regulation equally tyrannical, but much lefs effectual than that which it was meant to fupport. A pofitive law may render a filling a legal tender for a guinea ; becaufe it may dieet the courts of juftice to difcharge the debtor who has made that tender. But no pofitive law can oblige a perfon who fells goods, and who is at liberty to fell or not to fell, as he pleafes, to accept of a Chilling as equivalent to a guinea in the price of them. Notwithftanding any regulation of this kind, it appeared by the courfe of exchange with Great Britain, that a hundred pounds fterling was occafionally
cafionally conl'red as quivalent, in fome of $\mathbf{C} \mathbf{H}_{\text {II. }} \mathbf{P}^{\mathbf{P}}$. the colonies, a hur lied and thirty pounds, and in others to fo great a fum as eleven hundred pounds currency; this difference in the value arifing from the difference in the quantity of paper emitted in the different colonies, and in the diftance and probability of the term of its final difcharge and redemption.

No law, therefore, could be more equitable than the act of parliament, fo unjuftly camplained of in the colonies, whic declared that no paper currency to be emitted there in time coming, fhould be a legal tender of payment.

Pensylvania was always more moderate in its emiffions of paper money than any other of our colonies. Its paper currency accordingly is faid never to have funk below the value of the gold and filver which was current in the colony before the firf emiffion of its paper money. Before that emiffion, the colony had raifed the denomination of its coin, and had, by act of affembly, ordered five fhillings fterling to pafs in the colony for f.x and three-pence, and afterwards for fix and eight-pence. A pound colony currency, therefore, even when that currency was gold and filver, was more than thirty per cent. below the value of a pound fterling, and when that currency was turned into paper, it was feldom much more than thirty per cent. below that value. The pretence for raifing the denomination of the coin, was to prevent the exportation

OOK of gold and filver, by making equal quantities II. of thofe metals pafs for greater fums in the colony than they did in the mother country. It was found, however, that the price of all goods from the mother country rofe exactly in proportion as they raifed the denomination of their coin, fo that their gold and Gilver were exported as faft as ever.

- The paper of each colony being received in the payment of the provincial taxes, for the full value for which it had been iffued, it neceffarily derived from this ufe fome additional value, over and above what it would have had, from the real or fuppofed diftance of the term of its final difcharge and redemption. This additional value was greater or lefs according as the quantity of paper iffued was more or lefs above what could be employed in the payment of the taxes of the particular colony which iffued it. It was in all the colonies very much above what could be employed in this manner.

A prince, who fhould enact that a certain proportion of his taxes fhould be paid in a paper money of a certain kind, might thereby give a certain value to this paper money; even though the term of its final difcharge and redemption should depend altogether upon the will of the prince. If the bank which iffued this paper was careful to keep the quantity of it always fomewhat below what could eafily be employed in this manner, the demand for it might be fuch as to make it even bear a premium, or fell for fomewhat
fomewhat more in the market than the quan- CHAP. tity of gold or filver currency for which it was iffued. Some people account in this manner for what is called the Agio of the bank of Amfterdam, or for the fuperiority of bank money over current money; though this bank money, as they pretend; cannot be taken out of the bank at the will of the owner. The greate: part of foreign bills of exchange mult be paid in bark money, that is, by a transfer in the books of the bank; and the directors of the bank, they allege, are careful to !eep the whole quantity of bank money always below what this ufe occafions a demand for. it is upon this account; they fay, that bank money fells for a premium, or bears an agio of four or five per cent. above the fame nominal fum of the gold and filver currency of the country. This account of the bank of Amfterdam, however, it will appear hereafter, is in a great meafure chimerical.

A paper currency which falls below the value of gold and filver coin, does not thereby fink the value of thoie metals, or occafion equal quantities of them to exchange for a finaller quantity of goods of any other kind. The proportion between the value of gold and filver and that of goods of any other kind, depends in all cafes, not upon the nature or quantity of any particular paper money, which may be current in any particular country, but upon the richnefs or poverty of the mines, which happen at any Vol. I. K k particular
${ }^{8} 0_{10} 0^{K}$ particular time to fupply the great market of the $\underbrace{\text { commercial world with thofe metals. It de: }}$ pends upon the proportion between the quantity of labour which is neceffary in order to bring a certain quantity of gold and filver to market, and that which is neceffary in order to bring thither a certain quantity of any other fort of goods.

If bankers are reftrained from iffuing any circulating bank notes, or notes payable to the bearer, for lefs than a certain fum; and if they are fubjected to the obligation of an immediate and unconditional payment of fuch bank notes as foon as prefented, their trade may, with fafety to the public, be rendered in all other refpects perfectly free. The late multiplication of banking companies in both parts of the united kingdom, an event by which many people have been much alarmed; inftead of diminifhing, increafes the fecurity of the public. It obliges all of them to be more circurnfpect in their conduct, and, by not extending their currency bejond its due proportion to their calh, to guard themfelves againtt thofe malicious runs, which the rivalnip of fo many competitors is always ready to bring upon them. It reftrains the circulation of each particular company within a narrower circle, and reduces their circulating notes to a fmaller number. By dividing the whole circulation into a greater number of parts, the failure of any one company, an accident which, in the courfe of things, mult fometimes happen,
becomes of lefs confequence to the public. This $\mathbf{C H}_{\mathrm{H}}^{\mathrm{H}} \mathbf{A}^{\mathbf{P}}$. free competition too obliges all bankers to be $\underbrace{\text { It. }}$ more liberal in their dealings with their cuftomers, left their rivals fhould carry them away. In general, if any branch of trade, or any divifion of labour, be advantageous to the public, the freer and more general the competition, it will always be the more fo.

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.




[^0]:    - Plin. Hilt. Nat. lib. 33. cap. 3.

[^1]:    D 4
    hundred-

[^2]:    - Pliny, lib. $x x x$ iii. c. 3 .

[^3]:    *This was written in 1773, before the commencement of the late difturbances,

[^4]:    * See his fcheme for the maintenance of the Poor, in Burn's Hittory of the Poor-laws.

[^5]:    - See Denifart, Article Taux des Interets, tom. iii. p. 18.

[^6]:    * See Idyllium xxi.

[^7]:    - Sec the Statute of Labourers, 25 Ed. III.

[^8]:    - Donglas's Summary, vol. ii. p. 372, 373.

[^9]:    * See his preface to Anderfon's Diplomata Scotiz.

[^10]:    * See Tracts on the Corn Trade; Tract 3d.

[^11]:    - Solorzano, vol. ii,

[^12]:    * Pofffript to the Univerfal Merchant, p. 15 and 16. This Pollfcript was not printed till 1756 , three years after the publication of the book, which has never had a fecond edition. The Poftcript is, therefore, to be found in few copies: it corrects feveral errors in the bnok.

[^13]:    * See Ruddiman's Preface to Anderion's Diplomata, \&cc. Scotix.
    according

[^14]:    *Lib. x.c.29. $\dagger$ Lib. ix. c. 17.

[^15]:    - Kalm's Travels, vol. i. p. 343, 344 •

[^16]:    * See Smith's Memoirs of Wool, vol. i. c. 5, 6, and 7; alfo, vol. ii, c. 176 .

[^17]:    - See Ruddiman's Preface to Anderfon's Diplomata, \&c. Scotix.

[^18]:    * James Poftlethwaite's Hiftory of the public Revenue, page 301.

