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**UNITED NATIONS
INTERNAL IMPEDIMENTS TO
PEACE-KEEPING RAPID REACTION**

April 2, 1995

for

**Regional Security and Peacekeeping Division (IDC)
International Security, Arms Control, and CSCE Affairs Bureau
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
Ottawa, Canada**

by

**Paul LaRose-Edwards
International Policy Advisor**

*International Human Rights, Democracy, & Conflict Resolution
26 Tiffany, Kanata, Ottawa, Ont. K2K 1W2, Canada Tel / Fax (613) 599-4321*

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1 INTRODUCTION

This paper examines UN peace-keeping rapid reaction strengths and weaknesses against a matrix of rapid reaction components. **By design, the paper will not make recommendations, but will set out the existing operational parameters and constraints within the UN.** It will also identify planned changes within the UN that will take effect in the short term. In this way, the paper will provide factual background for the Canadian Government's Study on Improving the UN's Rapid Reaction Capacity.

The paper's matrix ¹ of rapid reaction is:

- (Chapter 2) Early Warning, and Intelligence/Information Sharing
- (Chapter 3) Contingency Planning
- (Chapter 4) Preparatory Activity
- (Chapter 5) Political Decision Making
- (Chapter 6) Peacekeeping Doctrine and Mission Mandates
- (Chapter 7) Standby Arrangements
- (Chapter 8) Financing
- (Chapter 9) Multidimensional peacekeeping operations
- (Chapter 10) Training and Standards
- (Chapter 11) Mission Deployment
 - Planning
 - Financial
 - Staffing and Equipment
 - Administration and Logistics
- (Chapter 12) Command and Control

The paper has attempted to separate analysis at four levels: political, strategic, operational, and tactical. This is to facilitate those proposing changes to UN peace-keeping rapid reaction since their recommendations will tend to address the four functional levels separately. Several activity areas such as

¹ This study does not pretend to have set out a comprehensive list, but has set out some of the key components in a relatively logical flow to act as a framework for this analysis of the UN.

political decision making by definition are largely restricted to one or two functional levels and are dealt within a single part of the paper. Others such as finance spread across all four levels and will be split between chapters: e.g., Chapter 8 for political/strategic finances, and Chapter 11 for operational/tactical finances.

Some peace-keeping issues have been left out as largely peripheral to rapid reaction per se. This includes end of mission assessments ² or reviews designed to amass lessons learned. Those lessons are critical in the long range development and improvement of all parts of peace-keeping including rapid reaction, but will not be discussed in this paper.

It should also be noted that all Secretariat UN peace-keeping ³ sectors are the object of this study, but DPKO is the responsibility centre for most of what is being discussed. In this regard, the recent rapid growth of DPKO ⁴ has already resolved some previous UN peace-keeping shortcomings. This has been driven both internally, and externally by TCNs ⁵ who have provided substantial advice and guidance along with staff on loan. Furthermore, DPKO is still in a state of flux as duties and responsibilities are firmed up and the working relationships normalize.

Even relatively mundane issues such as office space and physical dispersion of DPKO and related parts of the Secretariat must be resolved to maximize the output and speed of reaction of the "new" DPKO. Staffs are often jammed into small and at times dysfunctional work spaces, with key officers sometimes sharing common cramped offices. In addition, DPKO is spread through a variety of floors within the UN Secretariat main tower, in various offices across the road in the old UNITAR building, and in another set of offices down the road at 866 UN Plaza (Alcoa building). This dispersal is equally dysfunctional and must be addressed.

Another process that is unfolding is the coordination of DHA, DPKO and DPA activities in planning and implementing complex operations in the field (see Chapter 2). This enhanced coordination, which has only

² This step is part of the DHA/DPKO/DPA Coordination Plan see annex 6, and has just been done for the Somalia mission.

³ This report was not designed to look at the emergency preparedness structures of non-peace-keeping UN activities, but it is clear that DPKO and others are at least tangentially aware of processes elsewhere in the system. UNHCR for example has an emergency response coordinator with three teams that are on permanent standby. UNHCR buttresses this with standby arrangements with organizations like UNICEF, WFP, the Danish and Norwegian Refugee Councils, the Swedish Rescue Services Board, Redde Barne, and UN Volunteers. UNHCR has limited vehicle and equipment stockpiles, and has started to build upon the successful concept of "services packages" developed during the Rwandan crisis. Examination of UNHCR's and other UN crisis reaction mechanisms might indicate valuable options for the development of peace-keeping rapid reaction.

⁴ During the years 1992 to 1994, DPKO staff multiplied almost 10 fold with over 320 on staff at present. Some of the changes include a new Office of Operations, a new Office of Planning and Support, Situation Centre April 1993, Policy & Analysis Unit late 1993, new Mission Planning Service, FALD moved from DAM to DPKO Sept. 1993, Electoral Assistance unit moved from DPA, Demining Unit 1992, CivPol Unit 1993, Training Unit 1992, logistics base in Brindisi, and a broad variety of logistics/financial reviews.

⁵ The Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations (Committee of 34) has come up with a number of recommendations, and Canada chairs its working group.

just begun, will affect both regular peace-keeping operations as well as rapid reaction capacity.

Despite gaps within the UN system, there are real grounds for optimism about parts of the organization. This is particularly true within DPKO and various components of the Secretariat that are working closely with DPKO. Despite, and perhaps because of the rapid growth of DPKO, there is a tangible atmosphere of self-motivation. Individuals appear to be readily identifying where they or the systems are not up to scratch and moving to address past gaps and failures. Just the very lack of denial that the problems exist is quite at a variance with many other parts of the UN, and in itself is refreshing. **Much of DPKO is perfectly justified in maintaining that they know what needs to be done, and can do it if only they were given sufficient resources.**

However, as with the larger issue of member states' political will, there remain some major impediments to rapid reaction that are internal to the UN. The abiding question will be whether they are endemic to the UN, and as such must be resolved in whole or part outside of the UN. Are there various functions such as rapid reaction that can be dealt with only partially by DPKO or other parts of the UN proper, and thus recommend themselves to being "contracted" out in one form or another?

2 EARLY WARNING, AND INTELLIGENCE/INFORMATION SHARING

DPKO does not have an early warning system per se, but various parts of DPKO carry out an early warning function as it pertains to their particular tasks. The Situation Centre, the Policy and Analysis Unit, and both the Generic Planning Unit and the Conceptual Planning Unit within Mission Planning Service are examples. In addition, DPKO can and should tap into other UN early warning structures. Therefore DPKO's level of early warning per se is less than comprehensive and logically should remain so. Their area of responsibility should be restricted to the area of military intelligence and military early warning.

Other UN early warning mechanisms include DHA's. DHA in 1993 started a two-year project on a Humanitarian Early Warning System (HEWS) with the mandate of compiling information to identify potential crises with humanitarian implications. They will gather information initially on five countries of concern and then move to 55 by April 1995. They will turn out weekly general reports, produce early warning signals, and produce country profiles. It is intended that this will be shared with DPA and DPKO.

DPA also has its own early warning system. Also, starting in 1993 they convened an interdepartmental working group to start the rationalization and coordination of early warning systems in DPA, DHA, and DPKO⁶. Some thought is being given to enlarging this circle of cooperation to include the Department for Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis, and having the focus for all of these separate activities in the Office of the Secretary-General.

Outside of the Secretariat, various UN agencies such as UNHCR have developed early warning structures. UNHCR's system includes capacity at their Documentation Centre in Geneva for turning out country profiles, probably the pattern that DHA's HEW is implementing⁷. Cooperation between the UN Secretariat and the specialized agencies is not really being discussed but is inevitable.

⁶ See annexed 5 page draft flow chart dated 6 January 1995. The flow chart only tells part of what is a very promising development, as political sensitivities required that it not be all that explicit about various political aspects of such coordination. As such it appears on paper to be a rather mechanistic narrow procedure, but should be viewed as signifying the cooperative state of mind of the three departments as much as a relatively and perhaps unnecessarily complex blueprint.

⁷ UNHCR's country profile expertise was developed by its Canadian Director of Documentation Sharon Rusu who had developed Canada's Refugee Board's country profiles starting in 1988.

However as Rwanda so graphically showed, **early warning intelligence⁸ is not the problem.** "Certainly the specifics of the Rwandan crisis were unique and more horrific than might have been anticipated. However, there is clear proof that many parts of the international community, both NGO and UN were fully aware of the incipient crisis in Rwanda."⁹ **The failure continues to be what is done with early warnings.**

There are two uses for early warning, one consists of energising political decision makers to take decisions, the second consists of planning for an emergency. The first endeavour is undoubtedly the most difficult. The political disincentive to act upon early warnings permeates all levels of the UN. Most certainly the Secretary-General and his staff must consciously decide what warnings they can safely or effectively respond to.

The second use of early warning, planning for an emergency through contingency planning, can be and to a degree should be separated from the political energising objective. In this way the planners can be provided with sufficient space to get on with the requisite planning to enable effective and efficient response if the worst happens. This contingency planning will be dealt within Chapter 3.

Quite apart from early warning procedures, operational information sharing within the UN Secretariat and the UN system at large has proven to be an impediment to rapid reaction. Similarly, information sharing between UN HQ and field operations has been less than efficient. This appears to reflect the different nature between early warning and information sharing particularly in fast moving field situations. Early warning allows for a relatively more methodical gathering and sharing of information. Field operations are fraught with crisis management and confused lines of communications. There is some traditional UN hoarding of information, but much of the failure to communicate is the lack of mechanisms and standard procedures on how to share information.

DPKO has been moving to address some of the gaps, quite specifically through the creation of the Situation Centre. The Situation Centre provides a 24 hour nerve centre service, and is fostering discussion on possible mechanisms for effectively disseminating incoming information. With regards to preparing for rapid reaction, the recently created Conceptual Planning Unit is starting to identify its information and source requirements so that it can carry out contingency planning (see Chapter 3 below). The preparation of comprehensive operational plans requires a degree of country information and intelligence that may not yet exist within the UN system. It is problematic as to whether other national sources, e.g., US, France, UK, etc., can be tapped to provide such information. Or, should DPKO or another part of the UN develop its own sources of information particularly as it applies to the planning of peace-keeping or peace-enforcement missions?

In earlier peace-keeping missions the Force Commander (FC) reported directly to the SG. The FC now formally reports to one of the Regional Divisions in the Office of Operations. It was ventured that this would lessen the ability of the FC to pass back important military and political intelligence to key decision makers. In fact, the reverse may be true for in the past the SG's office was accused of being a choke

⁸ There was sentiment expressed as to problems in military early warning, although it is not clear how easily one can disaggregate military early warning from other early warning and whether there are substantial gaps in such intelligence. As discussed above, what is lacking is often military intelligence for effective mission planning as opposed to early warning.

⁹ p.4, LaRose-Edwards, P, *The Rwandan Crisis of April 1994: The Lessons Learned*, Department of Foreign Affairs (IDC), Ottawa Nov. 1994, pp.77.

point and a hoarder of intelligence. The creating of mechanisms and clear lines of communication within DPKO and elsewhere for the insertion and dissemination of intelligence should increase not decrease the information gathering usefulness of the FC and other field staff.

3 CONTINGENCY PLANNING

Particular events such as violations of human rights, breaches of international peace and security, should trigger UN needs assessments and contingency planning. This in turn, or even concurrently, would precipitate parts of the UN into taking certain preparatory actions. This latter aspect involves UN staff making concrete preparations such as stockpiling or starting to identify and even taking on key staff such as a FC and field HQ staff. This will be dealt with separately in Chapter 4 on Preparatory Activity.

The most intransigent issue for UN contingency planning will be that of political sensitivity by states to "official" intervention scenarios being put together for a particular country or region. Such sensitivity is not just a UN problem, and there are certain parallels to be drawn with NATO where they felt it useful to refer to it as "contingency thinking." In UNHCR, traditional timidity in this area has in recent years given way to active albeit discrete contingency planning. However, they are quick to agree that a UN agency located away from the UN politics of New York has much greater discretion in carrying out humanitarian contingency planning.

Achieving that separation between political fora and operational planning will always remain problematic. Political decision makers, at times, will continue to disallow or actively block contingency planning either because of a weakness in leadership, or when such activity itself truly does have a negative impact on the politics of the situation. Both occurrences can be reduced by distancing contingency planning units both physically and organizationally.

At present, contingency planning responsibility in peace-keeping lies primarily with Mission Planning Service (MPS). Its Generic Planning Section is tasked with devising several models or "templates" of peace-keeping missions along with model SOPs. They will draw upon their partner Lessons Learned Unit to continually refine these mission templates. With only a staff of five, Generic Planning has limited resources but if their work is restricted to such generic planning, then they probably have sufficient strength. They as of yet have not linked up with other UN agencies such as UNHCR to see how they carry out generic planning. What has happened to a limited extent is a drawing upon national military experiences in generic planning.

As discussed above, the more problematic step lies in contingency planning for particular countries or regions. This task lies with the MPS's Conceptual Planning Section. The Africa Unit has three staff, the Europe and Latin America Unit has three, and the Asia and Middle East Unit has three. Even assuming that these staffs can be moved between regions, the total capacity of nine seems rather limited in light of the number of potential hot spots in the world and the need to continually update country specific contingency plans.

Similarly, the Standby Arrangements Unit with a total staff of four, appears to be especially understaffed. Their task lies in negotiating and maintaining standby arrangements with all TCNs in both a generic sense and in a mission specific sense. Mission specific standby planning is extremely time consuming for this

mission specific contingency planning requires an in-depth needs analysis of what troops and equipment might be necessary.

In a similar vein, the High Level Expert Procurement Group in its report commented strongly on the relationship of contingency planning to procurement. "Good planning reduces crises, reduced crises in procurement reduces the amount of waste and possibility of malpractice. It is therefore imperative that some priority be afforded to contingency planning to break the current cycle of crisis management. One of the elements in this planning is logistic support and the production of a material requirement plan."¹⁰ Such improvements will have an indirect but discernable impact on rapid reaction if only through the provision of the right logistics at the right place at the right time.

Within DPKO, there have been giant steps taken in logistics planning such as the Trilateral Working Group to Improve UN Logistics, and the use of civilian contracting arrangements with discussion about doing so on a contingency basis. These developments and the continuing gaps will be discussed at greater length in Chapter 7 Standby Arrangements and Chapter 11 Mission Deployment.

As with generic planning, contingency planning efforts by DPKO have not as yet drawn upon expertise that exists elsewhere in the UN system such as UNHCR. What is far more problematic is the source of much of the raw intelligence data that needs to be accumulated to put together contingencies plans. This is particularly so for those which will require in-depth "military" intelligence. A number of nations, both their military and civilian agencies, have relevant information. What is extremely problematic is the ability of the UN to draw upon such information in an informal way much less through formalised links. Only slightly less politically sensitive is the question of receiving information from non governmental organizations and institutes.

The political sensitivity of both intelligence gathering and country specific contingency planning appears certain to remain a serious impediment despite the best efforts of DPKO. DPKO's location in New York alongside the Security Council, the General Assembly and the assorted world press is part of the problem. An ability to house such functions in less immediate parts of the organization's structure, including some geographical distance, would help. It will lessen the political profile of contingency planning and further political deniability. The less politicians are forced to acknowledge an activity, the more likely they will be prepared to turn a blind eye.

¹⁰ para 25, High-Level Expert Procurement Group, **PROCUREMENT STUDY**, Report December 1994.

4 PREPARATORY ACTIVITY

The logical extension of contingency planning is logistical and other preparatory activity to prepare for or initiate various "first stages" of peace-keeping operation. Political and financial authority to actually mount an operation does and should remain at the political level, but are there steps to be taken at the strategic and possibly operational level?, eg. TCN identification, stockpiling of equipment, preparation of maps, etc. "It is important that as much preparatory work as possible commence before the formal mandate of a mission is adopted."¹¹ This is particularly appropriate and politically feasible for preparatory actions that occur outside of the target country.

No action has been taken on the internal recommendation of March 1994 that "DPKO should undertake a study of the political issues involved in preparatory activity prior to the adoption of a mandate for a peace-keeping mission."¹² Issues to be studied would include devising a method to consult with UN or outside bodies negotiating agreements such as cease-fires that could call for a UN field operation. Then, those bodies could examine methods of mandating a preparatory UN field presence to initiate planning, as well as an advance canvassing of potential TCNs.

That recommendation has not been implemented. Also, there is no indication that DPKO or other parts of the UN have had the time to investigate many of the other preparatory activities that might feasibly take place to facilitate rapid peace-keeping reaction. For example, the MPS's Conceptual Planning Unit should be alerted through early warnings by other parts of the UN such as elsewhere in DPKO, from DHA, DPA or UN agencies, or from those outside of the UN. It would then start to identify those parts of their mission specific contingency plans that could be implemented or initiated without compromising the Security Council's prerogative of deciding whether and when a particular mission would take place.

Such a task by the Conceptual Planning Unit is very delicate, and would involve them in encouraging other parts of DPKO or the UN system at large to initiate preparations in reasonable anticipation of a Security Council decision. They would have to avoid any perception of the Secretariat unilaterally mounting a mission without first having received SC authorization.

As another example, the Conceptual Planning Unit should alert the Standby Arrangements Unit alongside

¹¹ A/49/136, para 38 2 May 1994 COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE WHOLE QUESTION OF PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS IN ALL THEIR ASPECTS, **Report of the Special Committee on Peace-Keeping Operations**

¹² See p.28, E/AC.51/1994/3 14 March 1994 PROGRAMME QUESTIONS: EVALUATION, **Progress report on the in-depth evaluation of peace-keeping: start-up phase, Report of the Secretary-General**

them in Mission Planning as early as possible as to an impending mission. They would encourage the Standby Unit to use the CPU's contingency plan for some early preparatory identification of TCNs and equipment. This would allow the Standby Unit to gain valuable lead time by matching mission specific contingency plans with specific TCNs. Countries could agree in advance albeit in principle to second troops or equipment if a particular mission were to take place.

Preparatory standby arrangements are critical initial steps that obviously occur to a degree already. Presently when the Security Council is debating the possibility of initiating or strengthening a particular mission, the Standby Arrangements Unit initiates informal contact with potential troop contributors. A problem is that this is already quite late in the day, and does not always provide much lead time for lining up troops in advance. Probably the bigger difficulty is that the Standby Arrangements Unit has a total of four professional staff, which is barely enough to carry out their more general mandate of getting countries to identify standby units through memorandums of understanding if possible, and keeping an up to date roster of standby resources and making sure that both standby troops and equipment meet UN operational standards (see Chapter 7 Standby Arrangements).

As a result, advance identification of TCNs for specific missions is seriously limited by DPKO staff shortages. Once missions are actually authorised, the often more difficult and certainly more pressing task begins of getting countries to actually engage their UN standby units. The Standby Arrangements Unit requires at least one professional per mission to undertake negotiations with potential TCNs both in the preparatory stage and once the SC has authorised the mission.

At a minimum, there are a number of key field command positions that cannot be left to the last minute if there is to be any hope of a rapid and effective reaction once the political decision to proceed has occurred. Often the selection of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (or head of mission) and even more so the Force Commander, is taken at a very late stage. Even more predictable is the belated appointment of the deputy head of mission, the chief of staff, the chief administration officer, and other heads of different mission components.

It would appear that the Conceptual Planning Unit and the Standby Arrangements Unit simply do not have enough staff to undertake preparatory activity as outlined above. Some specialized agencies such as UNHCR have devised methods to respond to crises before the political and financial aspects of deploying peacekeepers are addressed in New York. What methods do they use and are they transferable to peace-keeping?

Equally applicable are the "political" arguments outlined in the previous Chapter on Contingency Planning. The central location of DPKO to the SC and the GA increases their political profile and militates against them being able to undertake substantial preparatory activity. This applies also to the difficulty of identifying the force commander early on. That in turns starts to create a circular argument in that the lack of a force commander makes it more difficult to reassure potential TCN's that they should even tentatively commit their troops. Are there ways to "contract out" preparatory activity to overcome the political sensitivities of the UN in New York?

Even assuming effective early warnings which trigger comprehensive contingency planning and preparation, situations can only be foreseen to a finite degree and one can only advance plan to a finite point. Even vastly improved contingency planning followed by contingency action will not change the need for the UN to react rapidly to new and changing situations. This requires responsive political decision making combined with highly mobile trained response teams to deal with the unforeseen. The next chapter will review quickly what is probably the biggest and the most unresolvable component of UN rapid reaction, political decision making.

5 POLITICAL DECISION MAKING

"The United Nations has no armed forces, no readily deployable large civilian corps, no significant stockpile of equipment and only a very limited Headquarters staff to manage the Organization's activities for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Organization can levy assessments but has no effective recourse should its Members, despite their clear legal obligation under the Charter, fail to pay on time. In short, its peace-keeping missions can only be realized when the Member States are full and committed partners, willing to provide the personnel, equipment and money to do the job." ¹³

This report only wants to touch lightly on the Security Council and other UN political decision making mechanisms. They of course play the critical role in UN peace-keeping rapid reaction. However, their activities are very much outside of the purview of DPKO, the rest of the Secretariat, and this study. As such, the effective limitations they place upon UN internal operations merits at least a quick review.

There is a large amount of contradictory political direction given to the Secretariat. This is reflected in the dichotomy and at times fundamental contradictions contained in member states' decisions and directions in fora such as the General Assembly, 4th Committee, and 5th Committee, (not to mention in specialised UN agencies). One result is that often there is a obvious mismatch between operational directives and resources provided to the Secretariat to do the job.

General Assembly resolution 48/42 paragraph 6 emphasised "the need for the United Nations to be given the resources commensurate with its growing responsibilities in the area of peace-keeping, particularly with regard to the resources needed for the start-up phase of such operations." This includes the issue of peace-keeping troops and equipment, which is the most intransigent of all impediments to rapid reaction.

During interviews with a number of UN staff, many raised the possibilities that further improvements in DPKO and other related parts of the UN structure might have an indirect bearing on the speed and quality of the political decision making process. Eg. if a rapid reaction force of some form did exist, would this facilitate the Security Council taking a decision because they are more comfortable with the capacity of that force?

Another issue is the interface between the operational people and the politicians. This takes place largely at the strategic level, and in the case of peace-keeping includes a large military component. Even a civilian-political interface is fraught with difficulties. The military-political interface is compounded by the cultural divide between military and the politicians who of course are largely civilian. The designers of the

¹³ para 12, A/48/403 (S/26450) 14 March 1994 **Improving the capacity of the United Nations for peace-keeping**, Report of the Secretary-General

UN Charter envisaged the creation of the Military Staff Committee. There is no desire to get into the debate about the need or appropriateness the MSC for UN peace-keeping. However, the debate about it does highlight the gap between certainly politicians and the military on the strategic level.

An entire report can be built around the need for some form of MSC or international peace and security committee that would provide an interface between international political decision makers, in this case largely the Security Council, and the military/civilian peace-keeping operators including the Secretary-General and DPKO.

This report will restrict itself to merely identifying this political-peace-keeping interface as presently more of a gap than a bridge. It remains an ongoing impediment to UN peace-keeping both rapid reaction and otherwise.

6 PEACEKEEPING DOCTRINE AND MISSION MANDATES

The UN Charter of course has no provisions for peace-keeping per se, and there is no written peace-keeping doctrine as opposed to mission mandates, SOPs etc. "There is no general doctrine governing conditions that must be met before a mission can be deployed."¹⁴ As an important precursor of a mission mandate, doctrine helps to create consistency of purpose and goals from mission to mission. A lack of clear doctrine is more pressing when peace-keeping becomes more complex both in its multifaceted nature and the growing varieties of types of peace-keeping.

Having said this, the President of the SC on 3 May 1994¹⁵ set out the factors that the Security Council takes into consideration when considering the establishment of a peace-keeping operation:

1. a situation likely to endanger or threaten international peace and security
2. whether regional/subregional organizations are ready and able to assist
3. existence of a cease-fire and the consent/commitment of the parties involved
4. need for a clear political goal and thus the ability to set out a precise mandate
5. a reasonable assurance of safety and security for UN personnel

On 22 February 1995, the SC President repeated those factors and the principles of consent of the parties, impartiality, and the non-use of force except in self-defence.¹⁶ The Secretary-General in his 3 January 1995 Supplement to An Agenda for Peace stated quite forcefully that "Three particularly important principles are the consent of the parties, impartiality and the non-use of force except in self-defence. Analysis of recent successes and failures shows that in all the successes those principles were respected and in most of the less successful operations one or other of them was not."¹⁷

Therefore, it looks as if doctrine in the form of principles and guidelines has been developed and

¹⁴ See p.26, E/AC.51/1994/3 14 March 1994 PROGRAMME QUESTIONS: EVALUATION, **Progress report on the in-depth evaluation of peace-keeping: start-up phase, Report of the Secretary-General**

¹⁵ S/PRST/1994/22 pp 1-2

¹⁶ Ibid

¹⁷ para 33 A/50/60, S/1995/1, 3 January 1995, Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations.

enunciated in an ad-hoc way. There is perhaps a usefulness in setting it out formally. However, there is no longer a doctrinal gap which would impact negatively on UN peace-keeping generally or rapid reaction capacity specifically. This is not a comment on the correctness or impact of that ad-hoc doctrine.

Moving partly from the political to the strategic, problems do appear to be proliferating in the formulation of peace-keeping mission mandates. At present, political and overarching management guidelines (e.g., troops strengths) or mandates are presently formulated by the Security Council on a case-by-case basis.

The first issue which is particularly relevant to rapid reaction, is the speed at which a mandate is cobbled together once there is the political will to deal with an issue. While politics are such that there will always be a degree of ad-hoc crisis management, there appears to be a need for various model mission mandate frameworks. This would allow the Security Council to "fill in the blanks" when passing a resolution as opposed to allowing time constraints and political pressures to overly influence what is forgotten or purposefully left out. These mission "templates" are being created by DPKO.

The second issue is the absence of specialised advisors, particularly military, in order to enable the SC to more effectively devise achievable and effective mandates. There needs to be earlier involvement in mission mandate formulation by key parts of the UN Secretariat. DPKO is the lead peace-keeping department. Other key departments are the Executive Office of the Secretary-General, DPA, DHA, DAM (Dept. of Administration and Management), the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA), and the Department of Public Affairs.

The SG's Task Force on UN Operations is chaired by the USG/DPA and attended by the heads of DPKO, DPA, DHA, OLA, and a Special Advisor from the SG's Office. The Task force is especially geared to deal with policy issues that pertain to complex emergencies. Logically this task force could bring together relevant parts of the UN to provide coherent advice to the Security Council in the formulation of a mission mandate.

This "military-civilian-political interface" was discussed from a slightly different perspective in the previous Chapter 5 Political Decision Making. The creation of some international peace and security committee outside of the Secretariat might be a useful counterpart to a Secretariat body advising the Security Council on mission mandates.

7 STANDBY ARRANGEMENTS

It is a *sine qua non* that standby forces are fundamental to peace-keeping and the capacity of those forces to deploy rapidly will be a deciding factor in rapid reaction.

In early 1993 a Standby Forces Planning Team of seven senior military officers from various TCNs was created within DPKO with a mandate "To develop a system of standby resources, able to be deployed as a whole or in parts . . . at the Secretary-General's request, within an agreed response time, for United Nations duties, as mandated by the Security Council." A critical component of such arrangements is the response time. In theory the response time for individuals is seven days, for designated units and subunits in the initial phase of deployment is 15 days, and for all others 30 days.

Quite apart from nations sending standby troops when a mission actually takes place, even the "theoretical" standby roster is lacking in depth and breadth. The Secretary-General in his report to the SC dated 30 June 1994, stated that "The commitments made so far do not yet cover adequately the spectrum of resources required to mount and execute future peace-keeping operations. Deficiencies still exist in the areas of communications, multi-role logistics, health services, supply, engineers and transport." ¹⁸

The inherent problem with standby arrangements, and a theme that underlies most serious problems with UN rapid reaction, stems from the reluctance of UN member states to deliver when the time comes. Failure on their part to rapidly provide well trained and well-equipped units for authorized missions, remains the biggest stumbling block to UN rapid reaction.

Inasmuch as member states always retain the right to decline participation in a particular operation, standby forces even when there is a clear Memorandum of Understanding, are not the UN's by right. There is a national political impediment or time delay that is determined by each country's particular requirement for a governmental administrative decision, or some form of "parliamentary" approval, or government fiat in various unelected regimes. All of these time delays vary, are very hard to control or predict, and invariably go far beyond the target timings set out above of 7, 15, and 30 days.

In addition, there are "national" military time delays determined by the source of standby personnel, e.g., standing professional armies, call up mechanisms, or conscript forces. The latter situation usually requires the longest lead time before a unit is ready to be picked up for deployment.

For rapid reaction there also is a greater need for standby redundancy than in normal standby arrangements. A coherent and complete mission headquarters and the component mission units are needed within weeks not months. There have to be sufficient "alternates" or redundant capacity to allow

¹⁸ para 7, S/1994/777

immediate call up. Even units and individuals who have truly been put on UN standby, will have a certain amount of unavoidable personal and organizational demands which can delay immediate full mobilization.

Commonly, standby problems refer mostly to personnel numbers. The primary problem is actually getting the troops. However, almost as critical is the wide variation in training, competence, capacity, and equipment of units.

The first step in resolving this lies in verifying that standby forces actually meet the levels and standards they have ostensibly agreed to. At this time, DPKO does not have the capacity to play the role of an inspector-general and verify the standby arrangements agreed upon with separate TCNs. The SG and his staff have repeatedly emphasised that "it is essential that troops made available to the Organization come supplied and fully familiar with the equipment they will require to function in the field."¹⁹ At present, the Standby Unit has about three individuals who travel from country to country carrying out a number of tasks including that of ensuring that units are prepared. There is no conceivable way that they can carry out any regular or in-depth assessment of peace-keeping capacity much less rapid reaction capacity.

The second step lies in identifying what common contingent equipment standards should be, and what level is needed for any particular mission. Rapid reaction missions will tend to have similar needs and thus these standards can easily be developed in advance and modified as necessary.

Rapidly mobilizable UN resources are already envisaged and various components exist in the form of mission start-up kits. For example, communications needs for past missions have been studied and tables created that set out component requirements depending on the size and function of a headquarters or particular sub unit. Various communications packages have already been palletized. It is just a question of identifying which combinations of pallets get loaded and dispatched to meet the start up needs of a particular mission. Recognizing the high cost of reserve stocks, these start-up kits are primarily items of urgent necessity for new missions that component units would not normally have, eg. force HQ requirements.

Some stockpiling of start-up kits and other resources has been taking place particularly in Brindisi Italy. Much of that stockpiling consists of surplus equipment from terminated missions or 'gifts' from countries. These gifts are particularly problematic inasmuch as particularly older heavier equipment tends to be operational obsolescent and very expensive to store and maintain. Free equipment is invariably far from free. There was also the creation of a trust fund to acquire equipment. It had a target of \$15 million but appears to have only received \$40,000 to date.

Both because of costs and the need for incoming troops to have a thorough knowledge of their equipment, units are encouraged to come with their own equipment. There is thus a role to be played by the UN in ensuring that their equipment is up to standard. Establishing and verifying common equipment and competence with that equipment, will be easier to achieve in the military context. Less amenable to advanced preparations will be the civilian components of any rapid reaction mission.

In all of the above, DPKO has a very good appreciation of what needs to be done; from memorandums of understanding to detailed volumetrics to enable rapid deployment. The Standby Unit is the first to admit that they are not close to having sufficient staff nor the full procedures necessary to carry out their job.

¹⁹ para 17, A/48/403 (S/26450) 14 March 1994 **Improving the capacity of the United Nations for peace-keeping**, Report of the Secretary-General

UN rapid reaction capacity is thus flawed in this regard, but the seeds for much of its solution are planted and flourishing in DPKO. The question to be answered, is whether even fully resourced, if the Standby Unit is best placed and able to meet all of the standby arrangements needs of a rapid reaction peace-keeping force.

Provided with sufficient personnel, DPKO's Standby Unit has the ability to develop and administer all of the central standby functions necessary for normal peace-keeping. This includes the critical role of an inspector-general to ensure that standby units meet all required standards. What the Unit will continue to have difficulty with, is the political dimension of galvanizing countries into actually providing the troops when the time comes. To a large degree this task lies at the political level and is inherently part of countries' political will.

Countries' comfort level in allowing their standby troops to join a mission, is a factor that plays a determining role in their decision. This factor is even more critical when there is a need for rapid reaction and there is limited time to convince nations through lobbying and logic. However, if national units have been in regular contact with the individuals under whom they will be serving, they will have created some ties that bind. If those national units in turn assure their political masters that they are comfortable with a particular peace-keeping deployment, this will substantially increase the comfort level of those same political masters and their inclination to authorize their national unit's deployment.

8 FINANCIAL

This chapter will deal with the macro economics, largely the political and strategic dimensions of peacekeeping financing. The micro financial aspects which are largely at the operational and tactical levels will be dealt within Chapter 11 on Mission Deployment. To help envisage the macro financial process, see Figure 1 entitled the Financial Decision Making Process Of Peace-keeping Mission Start-up Phase at the end of this chapter.

There are several key bodies in the UN budgetary process. The Security Council of course precipitates and legitimizes any mission, and its time line is the most indeterminate. Delays here are political and have been discussed above. The General Assembly provides financial approval and its 5th Committee's Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) is the second most critical body in the process. ACABQ consists of 16 government nominees that have been elected in their own right and are paid a per diem of \$300 a day plus expenses. ACABQ clearly has some personality quirks but largely works quickly in exercising its financial oversight mandate. There are discussions about ACABQ reform, but its present configuration and procedures do not present any substantial barrier to rapid reaction.

There is then ACABQ's parent 5th Committee itself and then the General Assembly itself. Neither appears to play any delaying role in the peace-keeping budget process and as such are probably not an issue in rapid reaction.

On the administrative side, there has been some interplay between DAM and FALD, the latter having been moved from DAM to DPKO in 1993. Their relationship is being resolved, and DAM will play the senior role in budget preparation. DAM's growing capacity and sensitivity to peace-keeping needs combined with the move to annual mission budgets²⁰ will serve to speed up and improve the quality of DAM's budget preparation. In the short term DAM will not prove to be a major barrier to rapid reaction.

A basic issue is the division between spending authority and spending capability. In UN peace-keeping or any UN activity, the UN cannot sign any agreements that incur financial costs if the money is not held by the UN. In other words, if the UN does not have the cash then peace-keeping, rapid or otherwise, just cannot occur.

²⁰ The UN is moving towards mission budgeting on an annual basis as opposed to being linked to mandate periods. Next year this will reduce DAM's budget submissions from 82 to 27. Requests for a single unified peace-keeping budget has not been accepted. Annual budgeting will dramatically lighten the load of DAM and the whole budgetary process, but will not impact directly on rapid reaction.

At any time the SG has standing authority to spend \$3 million annually for "peace and security", but this will not take him very far in peace-keeping. After the Security Council has voted to establish a new mission and pending General Assembly approval and actual funds, the SG has financial authority to spend up to \$10 million annually per mission as part of his general "unforeseen and extraordinary expenses" authority. Slightly later in the process, after ACABQ has approved the budget but pending 5th Committee and GA approval, the SG can seek ACABQ authority to commit up to \$50 million to start up a mission. Invariably both the \$10 million and the \$50 are far from sufficient, and anyway as set out above, this is spending authority and not the actual cash itself.

Armed with spending authority, the SG has several avenues to internally borrow monies. There is the Central Emergency Revolving Fund that only has \$50 million, and is largely restricted to being used for humanitarian activities. That leaves three main funds, the Special Account, the Working Capital, and the Peace-keeping Reserve Fund. The Special Account of \$140 million and the Working Capital of \$100 million are general cash flow mechanisms to handle all UN internal financing and as such do not lend themselves easily to being tapped for peace-keeping loans.

The Peace-keeping Reserve Fund's purpose on the other hand is to provide adequate cash to handle the start-up costs of missions as well as temporary cash shortages in ongoing missions. As per GA Res 47/217 23 December 1992 it was authorized at \$150 million, although to date only \$64 million of this is available. The other \$86 million was to have been filled over time with general budget surpluses but those surpluses have been needed just to meet regular UN budget arrears. Even if the \$86 million is forthcoming, this level is seen as too low, and the SG has proposed "an amount of \$800 million, a sum equivalent to approximately four months' expenditure of the peace-keeping budgets in 1993..."²¹

An underlying complication is that peace-keeping missions unlike most other UN core activities, are not funded from the regular UN budget, but are the subject of separate assessments to member states. Once the General Assembly approves a particular peace-keeping budget, assessment letters are sent out to members states, and "Member States are required to pay their contributions in full within 30 days of the assessment, but in recent years, 90 days after the assessment, the Organization has received on average only 45 per cent of contributions, and after 180 days, only 68 per cent."²² If anything, and according to a senior UN financial officer, responses have worsened to only 30% after 90 days, and 60% after 180 days.

Peace-keeping arrears are common and increasingly debilitating for regular missions much less those requiring rapid reaction. The SG regularly urges member states "to establish appropriate legal and administrative mechanisms so that they can act promptly once the decision to contribute to an operation has been taken."²³ Peace-keeping contribution delays and shortfalls have resulted in a degree of creative UN bookkeeping.

The SG has suggested that immediately after a SC vote that "Member States be assessed for one third of

²¹ para 53, A/48/403 (S/26450) 14 March 1994 **Improving the capacity of the United Nations for peace-keeping**, Report of the Secretary-General

²² para 47, A/48/403 (S/26450) 14 March 1994 **Improving the capacity of the United Nations for peace-keeping**, Report of the Secretary-General

²³ para 13, A/48/403 (S/26450) 14 March 1994 **Improving the capacity of the United Nations for peace-keeping**, Report of the Secretary-General

the total amount included in the estimate of financial implications provided to the Security Council.”²⁴ Other ideas such as peace-keeping redeemable certificates are being floated around the UN but merely serve to mask the need for countries to be more responsible in meeting their commitments. In the short term however, the Secretariat is still tasked with mounting a mission once it has been approved even if the monies are not there yet.

Looking to other UN agencies for methods in which to resolve peace-keeping financing may not be all that useful inasmuch as they are not faced with the problems surrounding the need to assess countries for each and every mission. Also, the size of peace-keeping dwarfs others' budgets and arrangements. However, UNHCR may provide some help. Their comptroller has an emergency fund, and the High Commissioner for Refugees has total discretion on an initial tranche of \$1 million for any mission.

However, no matter how the regular peace-keeping budget process is tightened up, it will never be able to handle rapid reaction. The reality is that the Secretary-General must have sufficient funds and authority to start funding a rapid reaction mission the day it receives Security Council authorization. Alternately, various countries will have to meet all or most start up costs with the hope and expectation that they will be reimbursed.

A final issue is the funding of any contingency planning or preparatory activity. Ostensibly the Secretary-General cannot expend any resources on a mission until it is mandated by the Security Council. Presently, fiscal juggling occurs to resolve this problem. Some way must be found to allow the SG to initiate preparatory activity in the reasonable anticipation of the Security Council mandating a peace-keeping mission.

²⁴ para 52, A/48/403 (S/26450) 14 March 1994 **Improving the capacity of the United Nations for peace-keeping**, Report of the Secretary-General

<p>SPENDING AUTHORITY AND/OR \$ AVAILABILITY</p>	<p>FINANCIAL DECISION MAKING PROCESS OF A PEACE-KEEPING MISSION START-UP PHASE</p> <p style="text-align: center;">⇓</p>	<p>TIME LINES (average period)</p>
<p>No mission specific spending authority or funds exist at this point, so early warning work or contingency planning must be part of general peace-keeping programs</p>	<p>Preliminary estimates are done prior to any decisions of the Security Council. This normally consists of a Technical Survey Mission which reports back to the SG and the SC.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">⇓</p>	<p>(6 to 8 weeks)</p>
<p>SG has the authority to spend up to \$10 million annually per mission as part of his general "unforeseen and extraordinary" spending authority. [he is not provided with these funds and must take them from other existing funds such as the Special Account Fund \$140 million, the Working Capital Fund \$100 million, or the Peace-keeping Reserve Fund \$150 ²⁵</p>	<p>Security Council approves the peacekeeping mission through a resolution, and then the SG must seek General Assembly financial authority for the mission.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">⇓</p>	<p>(indeterminant) SC debate and passing of resolution has no average time line, be totally determined by politics</p>
	<p>Secretariat prepares the Mission Budget for submission to Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ)</p> <p>[until recently DPKO/FALD drafted the budget which was vetted by the Comptroller's Department of Management (DAM), and DAM put it forward to ACABQ. Now DAM will draft the budget, which will be vetted by FALD before DAM puts it forward to ACABQ.]</p> <p style="text-align: center;">⇓</p>	<p>(2-4 weeks) This can take longer depending on the size of the mission, but the UN is creating standard formats and costings templates leaving a small number of mission specific aspects to be costed independently</p>

²⁵ The Peace-Keeping reserve fund is nominally \$150 million but has only \$64 million, with \$86 million to be filled by budget surpluses but these have been used to cover ongoing regular budget arrears.

<p>Upon ACABQ budget approval but prior to GA approval, the SG has the financial authority to spend to a limit of \$50 million per mission, for an overall annual cumulative total of \$150 for all missions. As with any mere financial authority the SG is not provided with cash for this specific mission, and must draw monies from existing Secretariat funds such as the peace-keeping reserve fund.</p>	<p>ACABQ approves the budget and then recommends it to the 5th Committee</p> <p style="text-align: center;">⇓</p>	<p>(2 weeks) usually less than 2 weeks, but can range from several days to over a month (eg. UNAMIR) depending on ACABQ personalities and if a new or ongoing mission</p>
	<p>5th Committee approves the budget and recommends it to the GA for approval</p> <p style="text-align: center;">⇓</p>	<p>(1 week) depends on how thorough ACABQ has been and the complexity of the budget</p>
<p>The SG is now authorized to spend the full budgeted amount when and if all assessments are in. If not, then funds are 'borrowed' from other peace-keeping mission accounts.</p>	<p>General Assembly approves the budget and authorizes the sending out of assessments</p> <p style="text-align: center;">⇓</p>	<p>(2 days) Often a formality, if the GA is not in session the 5th committee reconstitutes itself and affirms its approval</p>
	<p>Assessment letters to all member states requesting their assessed contribution</p>	<p>On average only 30% of peace-keeping assessments are paid in the first 3 months and 60% in the first 6 months.</p>

figure 1: Financial Decision Making Process Of Peace-keeping Mission Start-up Phase

9 MULTIDIMENSIONAL PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS

The strategic level of multidimensional peace-keeping operations was touched on in Chapter 6, where it was clear that the SG's Task Force on UN Operations deals with policy issues that pertain to complex operations. One level down as one moves into the operational level, Inter-Departmental Working Groups address particular components of multidimensional or complex operations. DPKO is responsible for and chairs working groups dealing with military, CivPol, and electoral components. DHA is responsible for and chairs working groups dealing with humanitarian, emergency and rehabilitation components, and handles coordination with UNHCR and the Centre for Human Rights.

At the field operational and tactical level, the lead UN components on the ground are also expected to provide the interface between force contributors, UN agencies, NGOs, and any others involved. Having said this, each mission develops its own character, and the Chief of Mission has overall responsibility for the coordination of all UN substantive and support components, and liaison with non-UN parties.

Identifying certain nonmilitary components of peace-keeping operations at any stage, much less in rapid deployment situations, remains problematic. In human rights, "No doctrine directly concerning the human rights component of peace-keeping missions has been drafted or discussed."²⁶ "No general guidelines or manuals dealing with the human rights component of peace-keeping operations have been developed"²⁷

Similarly, "there is no doctrine differentiating functions that should normally be performed by civilian police from those to be performed by military personnel."²⁸ Certainly if there are to be substantial CivPol components of rapid reaction peace-keeping forces, then the Civilian Police Unit in DPKO needs to be expanded to meet the resultant demands. Inter alia an expanded CivPol Unit would develop CivPol doctrine, training standards, and most importantly standby arrangements. A major problem will be that "it has proven difficult to obtain police in the numbers required, because, unlike military personnel, who in peacetime essentially form a reserve, civilian police generally meet the ongoing needs of their home

²⁶ See p.20, E/AC.51/1994/3 14 March 1994 PROGRAMME QUESTIONS: EVALUATION, Progress report on the in-depth evaluation of peace-keeping: start-up phase, Report of the Secretary-General

²⁷ p.20, Ibid

²⁸ p.22, Ibid.

countries and are therefore not available in sufficient numbers for assignment abroad." ²⁹

Military command and control mechanisms are traditionally restricted to military lines of communication and authority, in a relatively narrow vertical pattern. This inherently makes it difficult to coordinate and liaise with nonmilitary "players". At the strategic level, this is easier to resolve as there is already the practice of liaising with the political level. It becomes far more problematic but even more pressing at the operational and tactical level. This should be resolved by having some key civilians in senior positions in a peace-keeping HQ, but initially will prove difficult as "Multidimensional operations require additional sources of qualified and readily available civilian personnel. It has been difficult to meet this requirement."

³⁰ However missions take place in a largely civilian context and therein lies part of the solution.

Peacekeeping missions deploy in a non-military context that predates the mission's presence and will continue beyond the mission. Invariably there is already a substantial UN "civilian" presence, and there is most certainly an international NGO presence. And it goes without saying that the local inhabitants and their governments and institutions are integral to the process and critical to any hoped for peace-keeping success. Quite apart from their necessary cooption for sustainable peace, peace-keeping military forces can usefully utilize such individuals and organizations to dramatically speed up military deployment and reaction capacity. The corollary is that ignoring those same factors may work to delay effective deployment, much less the success of peace-keeping.

At the strategic level DPKO-DHA-DPA have gone through a lengthy exercise to identify how they will liaise and cooperate so as to improve both rapid reaction and ongoing Secretariat operational capacity (see comments Chapter 2). Recently they carried out a dry run of the proposed system for the Africa desk officers so as to get them used to each other and the process. Similar "training" exercises will take place for other regions. In addition, DHA has played a credible role in starting to implement their "coordinating" function ³¹ within humanitarian field operations, and have recently created a rapid response unit in New York that appears poised to work closely with DPKO to address many of the peace-keeping multidimensional issues.

How is, or will this be translated into practice at the peace-keeping operational level and possibly more importantly at the tactical level? For example, what are the mechanisms for peacekeeping forces to tap into the intelligence capacity of UN agencies and others already in the field so as to more effectively conduct their peace-keeping mission? In advance of peacekeeping missions, should pre mission recces, assessments, and planning missions more actively identify existing and potential international and national partners to learn from them and to share some of their resources. This latter aspect, the use of potential partners already on the ground, is particularly important at the critical early stages of any rapid deployment. Are there attempts to have common territorial areas of responsibilities with humanitarian components of UN and related NGO activities? Are there moves to share or use the same type of communications equipment, combined with some shared frequencies?

²⁹ para 19, A/48/403 (S/26450) 14 March 1994 **Improving the capacity of the United Nations for peace-keeping**, Report of the Secretary-General

³⁰ para 22, Ibid

³¹ GA Res 46/182 Dec. 1991, Stengthening of the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Emergency Assistance of the United Nations, which mandated the "coordinating and facilitating" of UN emergency response, but, does not give DHA and directing mandate.

In various UN peace-keeping missions, there have been Civil-Military Operations Centres (different names in different missions) which formalized liaison between UN military and UN civilian components in a mission area. There also have been a number of ad hoc relationships such as the cooperation between UNHCR and US Forces in Rwanda in maintaining the air bridge through Kigali and in supporting humanitarian activities (US Operation Support Hope). This was achieved through the secondment of US Air Force Officers to UNHCR's Air Operations Cell in Geneva and by the establishment of Joint Logistics Cells (see Chapter 11 section on administration and logistics) and CMOCs in the field. At least in the UNHCR context³² liaison and cooperation between UNHCR and UN peace-keepers has varied from instances of "rare" and "limited" coordination, to UNPROFOR where "humanitarian and military operations have become closely entwined." Another example was the NATO liaison office in the UNPROFOR HQ in Zagreb, and NATO also had one liaison staff in New York.

In several UN operations such as El Salvador where the planning lead time was substantial, the creation and the integration of a multidimensional operation was highly successful. It has been far less successful where there was little lead time. In such situations, both the inclusion of nonmilitary components to a peace-keeping mission, and the liaison with outside civilian multidimensional players was at best ad hoc. There are no standard operating procedures or approved models on how such a process should develop. The creation of such UN procedures appears to be the first stage in resolving this ongoing gap in peace-keeping.

Attempts have been made to create rosters of pre screened civilian candidates, but such an endeavour is time consuming both in the creation and upkeep of such a roster. It is far from clear as to where responsibility for this lies within the UN. The Secretariat has conducted a major revision of the 300 series of Staff Rules which deal with short-term recruitment. This will enable a more rapid and efficient recruitment of civilian staff for peace-keeping missions.

There must always be a multidisciplinary element to any rapid deployment force. However, it should be recognised that the need for rapid deployment invariably is driven by an armed conflict that needs to be brought under control. Only then can traditional peace-keeping and other long terms activities including human rights protection, humanitarian aid, and development, take place.

Thus there are a number of multidimensional issues that are key to regular peace-keeping missions but which are less critical in the discussion of rapid reaction and the rapid deployment of peace-keeping missions. This is not to argue that those fundamental multidimensional components are not to be included in any rapid deployment force. Their early albeit limited inclusion into a rapid reaction force is essential to the long term effectiveness of any peacekeeping mission. Such issues include: public information, electoral assistance, repatriation, human rights, and development assistance. Such lead elements would be expanded once the emergency rapid deployment phase, ostensibly two to three months, was completed

In other words, a rapid deployment force will consist largely of military components. This rapid deployment force will need to be cognizant of the multi discipline context, and the HQ will require a number of senior civilians to handle the nonmilitary tasks. However, the task of implementing a fully multidimensional peace-keeping operation belongs to the follow-up peace-keeping force which would replace the rapid reaction force .

³²See UNHCR Handbook for the Military on Humanitarian Operations, Appendix 1 pp.51-4, January 1995, an excellent publication.

10 TRAINING AND STANDARDS

By definition multinational and multidimensional UN peacekeeping operations contain a number of components with a multiplicity of national standards and operational procedures. It is absolutely essential to establish common training and common standards for both military and nonmilitary peace-keeping staff up to and including the SRSG. This is especially true for components of any rapid deployment force who do not have the luxury of muddling through the first weeks and months of a mission until they adapt to each other's styles.

Historically peace-keeping missions have evolved ad hoc resolutions of this dysfunctional variety of operating procedures for different military contingents. Over time one "national" procedure tends to take precedence, be it that of the largest group, the FC's, or the majority national grouping in the mission HQ. This slows not only administrative mechanisms but more importantly it has been found that "the chain of command and the attributions of the different key authorities are not clear to many of those serving in the missions. In addition, command relationships varied widely from one mission to another."³³

Even terminology, an issue which is normally seen as quite mundane, is proving to be dysfunction at all levels. The high profile debate about the term "command" has often revolved around semantic differences, yet continues regularly at the political/strategic level. At the operational/tactical levels, common terminology is equally pressing in order to avoid rather sterile semantic debates or just plain confusion. DPKO has no peace-keeping lexicon, nor are there plans to create one in the short or medium term.

Common standard operating procedures can contribute to establishing fast and functional cohesiveness. Draft Guideline Standard Operating Procedures for Peace-keeping Operations were issued in 1991 with the understanding that they would be reviewed annually and revised as necessary. This has not been done, and while understandable in light of the enormous load being carried by DPKO, has not lessened the need for dramatically improved SOPs.

³³ p.25, E/AC.51/1994/3 14 March 1994 PROGRAMME QUESTIONS: EVALUATION, **Progress report on the in-depth evaluation of peace-keeping: start-up phase, Report of the Secretary-General**

There needs to be common training standards for national contingents to successfully undertake peace-keeping operations. The Training Unit in DPKO's Planning Division is developing an impressive array of manuals and training curriculum in conjunction with other parts of DPKO. The Training Unit's publication plan has 27 titles that already exist and are being improved, or that are being drafted or about to be drafted.³⁴ In addition they had a major regional training course in September 1994 for senior level officers, and three more regional courses are being planned. They have identified command post exercises (CPEX) as a useful training vehicle and are moving to develop such exercises. In all of this, DPKO and its training unit appear to understand the importance of political and social training in addition to the traditional military subjects.

However, "in view of the large numbers involved, the training of personnel provided by Member States will remain primarily the responsibility of Governments....based on common standards and a common curriculum."³⁵ With time as UN training standards become more established, there will be a need for a UN cadre of trainers who while continuing to devising training material, will be training the trainers in each TCN to carry out all or most of their own in-country training. There is also a key role for the Standby Arrangements Unit in conjunction with the Training Unit to ensure that national standby units meet training standards.

It should be noted that the UN with even informal peace-keeping standards, has been able to start refusing to accept military and CivPol that have not been sufficiently trained and equipped. The numbers have been limited to date, but the principles are being established and the standards will be become higher with time. The principle of operational standards below which standby units cannot be accepted, must become more established and known by those units before they are sent.

UN "military" training tends to build upon what exists nationally and consists to a degree in standardizing what exists. However, similar evolution has been more difficult on the "civilian" side. Much more UN training conceptualization and work is needed with regards to the multidisciplinary components of peace-keeping particularly as national training in this regard is almost nonexistent. In other words, there is little that the UN can build upon, and it must be devised and developed from scratch. The conceptual determination of what multi disciplinary peace-keeping is and the training required for it, are still extremely rudimentary. The UN must perforce play a senior role in its development.

Peace-keeping missions also involve huge logistical efforts, and logistics training is critical for field staffs be they military or civilian. The High-Level Expert Procurement Group found that "some people in management/senior supervisory positions are, in the Group's opinion, tasked beyond their capability, at least without the backup of a **training programme**. There is a real need to **teach managers how to**

³⁴ United Nations: Guidelines for Peace-keeping, Code of Conduct, Peace-keeping Training Guidelines, Infantry Units Field Manual, Peace-keeping Curriculum for Staff College, Military Observers Handbook, Military Observers Course, Civilian Police Course, Civilian Police Handbook, Training of Local Police, Staff Officers Course, Staff Officers Handbook, Peace-keeping Course Calendar, Peace-keeping Bibliography, Stress Management, Medical Units Manual, Peace-keeping Terminology Handbook, Communications Manual, Movement Manual, Junior Ranks Handbook, Peace-keeping Negotiation Handbook, Operational Support Manual, Engineer Support Manual, Logistics Officers Course, Military Police Course, Training Centre List.

³⁵ paras 23-4, A/48/403 (S/26450) 14 March 1994 **Improving the capacity of the United Nations for peace-keeping**, Report of the Secretary-General

manage, and, to bring in some fresh ideas from outside the institutional confines of the United Nations. ...The procurement officers suffered from the same lack of **specialist training** as their managers and support staff. Few understood contracts and contracting techniques or had any concept of managing the whole process.”³⁶(emphasis added)

As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, common training and common procedures are particularly important for rapid reaction forces. They do not have the luxury of time to sort out their internal working relations. Proposals for enhancing UN rapid reaction will need to address ways in which to build up this force cohesion and operational capacity. This is usually the role played by the overall command of an armed forces or the HQ of particular sub-units particularly where they are relatively operationally self sufficient. In other words, a UN peace-keeping rapid reaction force will depend heavily on its Force Commander and HQ to build a cohesive effective team. The earlier such an HQ can begin that leadership role the better.

³⁶ para 27, High-Level Expert Procurement Group, **PROCUREMENT STUDY**, Report December 1994.

11 MISSION DEPLOYMENT

Rapid reaction capacity requires a clear division of tasks combined with standard operating procedures for each component of a mission. Despite a lack of clear doctrine at the political and strategic level, the operational levels of the UN have started to set out their particular areas of field responsibility. This has occurred most rapidly within DPKO where a rather rapid growth in seconded "northern" military officers brought with them a relatively common perception of procedures and lines of operational demarcation. Where there were gaps, they moved quickly to fill them in. Related parts of the Secretariat, such as DHA and DPA, have also worked to keep up with developments within DPKO. Also, DHA, DPA, and DPKO have started to work out in detail the operational relationships among the three of them.

Almost all Secretariat field mission activities are expected to operate under the same administrative and operational rules as the rest of the UN Secretariat. As opposed to most UN specialized agencies which regularly have large field components and have varied their procedures to address the fundamental difference between field and "headquarters", the Secretariat has traditionally operated in a "headquarters" mode. Thus, Secretariat rules and SOPs are not geared for fast-moving field operations. DPKO and peace-keeping have been expected to fit in with the rest of the Secretariat. This fundamental problem has only been acknowledged by some and acted upon by even fewer.

11.1 Planning

Previous chapters have talked about the various stages of planning that take place prior to actual force deployment. For example, DPKO is developing a survey mission handbook (see annex 7 for outline) which will provide a comprehensive guide for the start-up stage of a peace-keeping mission. It will certainly play a role in contingency planning, and will be the key planning document for actual mission deployment. However, subsequent planning in the field in anticipation of or reaction to changing situations will be the job of the Head of Mission, the Force Commander, and the mission HQ.

It goes without saying that the HQ must have a solid understanding of the field situation, and the strengths and weaknesses of the units reporting to it. This is particularly important in crises situations such as would be faced by a rapid reaction force. The earlier such an HQ exists, the better knowledge it can build up, upon which to premise its planning and operational decisions.

At present even Force Commanders are brought in at a relatively late stage. Most certainly their headquarters staff are identified either just before or even after mission deployment. This is an impossible situation in even normal peace-keeping operations, and can prove to be disastrous in a rapid reaction context. Any recommendation for enhancing rapid reaction capacity will have to deal firmly with present UN procedures in this regard.

11.2 Financial

The macro financial aspects of peacekeeping have been dealt within Chapter 8, where the political and strategic components of financing were the focus. This section will look at operational and tactical finances. This is particularly relevant for rapid reaction as mission start-up costs invariably make up the largest component of a mission's overall cost. There is invariably the need to charter aircraft, procure and transport equipment and supplies, enter into contracts for services, recruit personnel, construct or rent accommodation, and so on.

As mentioned above in the section on deployment planning, a survey mission handbook³⁷ is being put together by DPKO. It will address the financial aspects of planning the mission. One of the biggest hurdles at the outset of a mission is the estimation of the financial implications of a mission even before SC authorization of the mission. In fact, such financial implications can often play a key role in hastening or slowing SC authorization. A standardized framework for projected costs is being constructed by DPKO drawing upon past peace-keeping start-up costs. This will allow a rapid initial financial budget to be constructed which will provide the basis for SC authorization of initial spending authority. This will build upon the existing Standard Cost Manual which itself is being expanded.

Operational

There have been several years of organizational shuffling in financing. As of 1 January 1993, the Field Operations Division was hived off from the Offices of General Services albeit remaining within the Division of Administration and Management (DAM). Then as of 1 September 1993 FOD was transferred from DAM to DPKO's Office of Planning and Support, and renamed the Field Administration and Logistics Division (FALD). The resultant uncertainties which encouraged "turf battles" has had an impact on both budgeting at the strategic and operational levels.

For example, following Security Council mission authorization, FALD until recently had the task of creating the draft budget which would be vetted by DAM and then forwarded to ACABQ and then 5th Committee for approval. Residual unhappiness by DAM for having lost FALD resulted in them being rather stringent in their review and subsequent reformatting of FALD's draft.³⁸ This procedure is once again changing for DAM will now create the initial draft budget albeit premised upon the needs stated by technical survey missions or mission field officers. The DAM draft will then go to FALD for their comments, before DAM formally submits it to ACABQ. There is cautious optimism that this change will be for the best.

In all of this to and fro, there is an ongoing tension between the needs on one hand of DPKO and peace-keeping missions, and the financial accountability needs of the UN on the other. At the strategic level, such financial accountability and oversight lies first with DAM and then ACABQ and 5th Committee.

³⁷ see Annex 7

³⁸ It should be noted that FALD contributed to their own difficulties by putting forward budgets that did not conform with the structure required for submission to ACABQ and thus DAM had to procedurally reformat the budget which allowed them to get more into substantive changes.

Moving down to the operational and tactical levels, this tension between the "operators" and those with UN financial accountability becomes more immediate and at times much more heated.

Operational/Tactical

In the field the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO)³⁹ is often the most senior "permanent" UN staffer. In other words, the Force Commander has been seconded from a national military to which he or she will return and to which they owe their long term allegiance and accountability. The SRSG is a political appointee of the SG's, and similarly lacks that long term accountability to the UN. The Head of Mission may be a separate individual or the SRSG or FC, but once again there is no long term accountability.

This long accountability comes when a person will be remaining with the UN long after any particular mission, and as such they and their staff owe their primary allegiance to the UN and will be around to account for their actions. Therefore, the Chief Administrative Officer has the primary fiduciary role on any mission. Under the CAO, the Chief Procurement Officer (CPO), the Chief Finance Officer (CFO), and the Civilian Personnel Officer (CivPersOff) have delegated financial and administrative authority that is crucial to the functioning of the mission. There are other UN officers such as the General Services Officer but they normally⁴⁰ have no financial authority and their tasks are restricted to implementing already agreed upon and financially authorised action.

While DPKO secretariat and field operational staffs readily recognize the need for clear and formal financial controls, they are quick to come up with examples where the financial and administrative "tail" wags the operational "dog". Some of the problems have stemmed from incompetency. Faced with a dramatic growth in peace-keeping missions, a number of ex UN financial officers were brought back out of retirement and younger less experience staff were used. As a result, many financial officers going into the field were not adequately prepared for what they would be expected to undertake.

However, a fair degree of perceived failure comes from misunderstandings on both sides of what the other's needs are. To a degree the operations side of any mission must be more cognizant of the procedure and time requirements of the UN system. This system like any system is always open to improvement, but like any system, has to be learned if one is to use it. On the other hand, financial/administrative officers have to understand the complexity and speed at which missions shift and change. They must have a better awareness of when particular operational demands must be allowed to stretch the financial reporting needs of the system.

DAM has instituted a number of changes to address past failures. They will play a much more active role in identifying and approving the critical positions of CAO and CFO. They will also endeavour to make sure that every field financial administration post is in fact filled, as this has frequently not been the case in past missions. In addition, they are creating a list of pre screened candidates for field positions. They have also already set about to train an additional cadre of 20-30 new officers.

³⁹ The Chief Financial Officer is usually a P4 or P5, but in large missions the UN will send a more senior Director of Administration usually at the D1 level. This paper will talk about CAOs with the understanding that this might at times be a Director of Administration.

⁴⁰ UNPROFOR presented a unique situation where the very size of the operation resulted in the Chief Engineering Officer, the Chief Transport Officer, the Chief Communications Officers, the Chief General Services Officer, and the Chief Supply Procurement Management System Officer exercising delegated signing authority.

Until recently, the CAO was authorised to communicate independently on substantive policy issues with the Secretariat in New York. This not only subverted the chain of command, but occasionally engendered misinterpretations as to the quasi equality of the CAO to the head of mission. The new policy is that in principle CAO communications to the UN go through the SRSG or the head of mission.

Finally, and this is particularly important for rapid reaction, there has been a failure by the system to create looser financial procedures for CAOs and their staff particularly in the start-up phase of peace-keeping operations. The more the need for rapid reaction, the less the system has been able to create new procedures.

A study by FALD for the year 1993, showed that 75% of UN headquarters procurement for peace-keeping missions were between \$1,000 and \$70,000. Delegation to the field for such amounts would reduce the load of an already stretched HQ procurement capacity and reduce delays in procurement.

There is a need to delegate operational authority and the flexibility that goes with it, down to even platoon level. Equally, "Financial authority and accountability should be commensurate with responsibility at each level."⁴¹ One possible example to follow would be that taken by UNHCR which has a procedure for Emergency Letters of Instruction. Under this procedure, field officers can request spending authorizing for a particular item up to a limit of approximately \$50,000 and will get a response from HQ in Geneva within 24 hours.

Because the UN has limited ability to make financial commitments during the early part of missions, TCNs sometimes take a decision to expend their own resources and then work for reimbursement. The more rapid the deployment, the more TCNs are forced to act now and bill later. This invariably poses greater problems for less economically developed countries who are restricted to supplying troops with limited equipment resources. This imposes a greater barrier to rapid reaction inasmuch as any rapid reaction force invariably needs to be well equipped, eg. armoured mobility, robust communications capacity, and greater weapons capacity.

11.3 Staffing and Equipment

There have been recommendations by various countries that field headquarters could be largely staffed by DPKO staff. Such recommendations recognized the dangers of depleting the core capacity in New York, and the SG has suggested creating a start-up team roster composed of political, humanitarian and military personnel. "The team will be able to begin the implementation of the mission in the field, establishing the administration and relevant procedures, to be replaced in due course by the staff designated to administer the mission."⁴²

⁴¹ p.25, E/AC.51/1994/3 14 March 1994 PROGRAMME QUESTIONS: EVALUATION, Progress report on the in-depth evaluation of peace-keeping: start-up phase, Report of the Secretary-General

⁴² para 44, A/48/945 25 May 1994 ADMINISTRATIVE AND BUDGETARY ASPECTS OF THE FINANCING OF THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS, Effective planning, budgeting and administration of peace-keeping operations, Report of the Secretary-General

This start-up team concept is really not much more than a formalization of the ad-hoc headquarters team building that goes on now. There is no indication that the deployment ability of such teams could substantially address the needs of rapid deployment. This putting together of a UN team when the time comes can only work for peace-keeping missions with substantial lead times of six months or more.

By its very nature, a rapid reaction mission invariably needs to conduct offensive or deterrent military operations. This requires troops that are trained in such operations and ready for such an eventuality. Regardless of national standby arrangements, and the existence or not of memorandums of understanding, it is only upon SC mission authorization that potential TCNs truly have to measure up. They very quickly ask themselves a number of key questions and not necessarily in this order;

- 1- does it serve their foreign policy interests?
- 2- do they have forces available?
- 3- what will it cost them financially?
- 4- what are the risks to troops, equipment, policy, etc.?
- 5- is there an appropriate role for their country's troops?
- 6- will retain command but will hand over control if confident in FC and HQ.
- 7- are the rules of engagement acceptable?
- 8- what are their particular legislative/administrative hurdles?

If the UN and DPKO has not done so already, now is when they have to reassure countries as to these and other questions. Increasing countries' comfort level with actually sending troops will be a critical objective for any recommendations on enhancing UN rapid reaction. Countries invariably are looking for operational safeguards for their troops, such as an effective functional field command capacity.

There are various potential non-military components of any complex mission including CivPol, electoral, information, humanitarian, and human rights. While arguably any rapid reaction peace-keeping force will be tasked primarily with dealing with a military situation, all of the other non-military components of a complex peace-keeping mission should be present. In the HQ, this may not necessarily require a separate individual for each and every component.

CivPol standby capacity still remains limited. There are only two professional staff in the DPKO CivPol unit. They have just not had the time to create an extensive roster of standby CivPol. Also, they face a different dynamic from military standby inasmuch as national police forces have their immediate on ongoing policing tasks. They just do not have the redundancy capacity of military, nor invariably do they have the budgetary freedom to have dedicated standby units.

Request for additional resources for the CivPol unit are proceeding successfully, and they have developed CivPol guidelines for each mission and a draft training curriculum. The Unit has also drafted guidelines for CivPol Contributing Nations, and 12 countries have pledged standby CivPol. The Unit is developing well albeit slowly, and as yet would not qualify as having a rapid reaction capacity.

This lack of CivPol rapid reaction capacity does have an impact on aspects of peace-keeping rapid reaction. Less critical is a lack of rapid reaction capacity in electoral assistance. The Electoral Assistance Unit is much better staffed with 10 professionals and 3 support staff. However, because of the need for relative political and social tranquillity for elections, the role of UN electoral assistance during a rapid reaction peace-keeping mission is small.

Human rights often should figure quite large during the start-up phase of any peace-keeping mission. The more violent the situation and the greater the need for rapid reaction, the greater the likelihood that human rights will have to be addressed. The main responsibility centre for human rights lies with the Centre for Human Rights in Geneva. All indications are that they are moving slowly to develop field capacity, and most certainly do not have any rapid reaction capacity nor peace-keeping operations doctrine.

The UN Office of Internal Oversight Services in its progress report of 14 March 1994, found that "No doctrine directly concerning the human rights component of peace-keeping missions has been drafted or discussed." Furthermore, "No general guidelines or manuals dealing with the human rights component of peace-keeping operations have been developed." And finally, they noted that "There are no management systems in place to mobilize assistance for the human rights component of peace-keeping missions."⁴³ As of the writing of this report, there is no indication that these gaps are being filled.

Beginning in November 1992 in UNPROFOR, the UN started a pilot project in which it used commercial contracts to acquire the services of support civilian personnel primarily in technical fields and trades. As mentioned above in Chapter 7 Standby Arrangements, the revision of the 300 series of the Staff Rules will now provide flexible and cost-effective contractual arrangements for recruiting non-career staff in the professional, field services, and general services categories. Personnel can be rapidly hired and let go using limited duration appointments which avoid regular allowances and benefits through the use of lump-sum salaries and travel arrangements, .

Equipment is almost as important a peace-keeping bodies. Six months into UNAMIR and that mission was still under equipped. This is a fairly common occurrence, and is frustrating even in a gradually unfolding peace-keeping mission. In a rapid deployment scenario, under equipment can threaten both individual lives and the very integrity of the mission itself.

Just as troops must be ready to deploy to conduct offensive or deterrent military operations, so also they must be equipped to do so. In past peace-keeping missions, large numbers of troops have shown up with limited equipment, both personal and unit. To an increasing degree this is being overcome simply through the insistence by the Standby Arrangements Unit that troops come equipped. Problems remain with the lack of heavy armoured equipment and there is some discussion about the UN purchasing a number of APCs to permanently resolve at least that gap in contingency owned equipment.

Also on the topic of contingency owned equipment, there is the relatively new Contingency Owned Equipment Project that hopes to avoid the time consuming "in-surveys" and "out-surveys" required in order to compensate countries for the use of their equipment. In Haiti, Canada has entered into a Services Equipment Agreement which will assign fixed numbers and costs to a contingent's equipment. This equipment "establishment" and standard levels of recompense will with time apply to all peace-keeping missions. An incoming unit will be expected to have the established amount of equipment and will be reimbursed for it. Extra equipment or more sophisticated equipment is at the unit's discretion and the UN will not pay to transport nor reimburse countries for that surplus to requirement equipment.

⁴³ paras 52-54 E/AC.51/1994/3 14 March 1994 PROGRAMME QUESTIONS: EVALUATION, Progress report on the in-depth evaluation of peace-keeping: start-up phase, Report of the Secretary-General

11.4 Administration and Logistics

In field administration and logistics, the roles of the Chief Administration Officer, Chief Finance Officer, Chief Procurement Officer and the Chief Personnel Officer are such that they can and often do exercise tangible control over the operational freedom of the Force Commander and the SRSG. This operational/administrative tension is a common source of friction and debate, and was discussed at length reference financial accountability in section 11.2 above.

Logistics is a key component of the start up phase of any peace-keeping mission. It involves getting what the 'customer' needs, to the right place at the right time and for the right cost. It includes procurement, goods in/out inspection, warehouse management, and inventory control.

Procurement as a subset of logistics, plays a critical role in part because the recent exponential growth in peace-keeping and the impact this has had upon UN secretariat support capacity. In December 1994, the UN's High-Level Expert Procurement Group produced its very forceful and forthright report which highlighted many serious shortcomings.

Many of the observations and recommendations were directed at cost-effectiveness which has only an indirect bearing on rapid reaction. However, they also recognized that "the procurement process plays a vital part in [the UN's] ability to deploy..."⁴⁴ The report talks about the UN considering "procurement as an unimportant area where inexperienced, untrained⁴⁵ or unwanted staff are put" and that the system remains "firmly stuck in a time warp in organizational, procedural and process terms."⁴⁶

Quite apart from training levels and morale, they felt that the whole peace-keeping procurement process "had also suffered the classic compartmentalization of functions where over the passage of time each and every manager with a vested interest in keeping his job tried to build an empire around himself. Each empire was solely interested in itself and not in its duty to the whole. The practical result of this was that individuals did their job, then passed the work on, and promptly forgot it because it was not their responsibility. From the Requisitioner to the Buyer, through FALD and PTS every area works in compartments with little or no vertical or horizontal integration."⁴⁷

This compartmentalization was worsened by other procedures. For example, "there is a good deal of transposition of data between documentation all the way through the process from the User in the field to the HQ procurement action. The Group saw numerous instances where transposition led to errors which in turn led to delays."

The Group came up with a number of recommendations which are quite specific and in light of their unequivocal criticism, will probably be met in part. Very relevant to rapid reaction is their strong call for delegation down to the lowest practical level. Failure to do so "prevents the efficient...and timely actioning

⁴⁴ para 2, High-Level Expert Procurement Group, **Procurement Study**, Report December 1994.

⁴⁵ see Chapter 10 Training and Standards for their recommendations in training.

⁴⁶ paras 2-3, High-Level Expert Procurement Group, **Procurement Study**, Report December 1994.

⁴⁷ Ibid, para 6.

of User needs." For example, "consideration should be given to greater imprest purchase orders without order paperwork (just receipts) for the one off needs at Sector level. A figure of up to \$5,000 should be made available which may appear inconsistent with accountability but at present the United Nations is concerned about protecting cents but are actually wasting and losing millions of dollars."⁴⁸

Equally important to rapid reaction is the Group's comments on organization. "At present the procurement function is split between DPKO and DAM which leads to inconsistencies in rule application and decision-making. The first step is to unify the procurement function under one head (PTS⁴⁹), but the operations should be directed by DPKO⁵⁰. This will allow an amount of autonomy, consistency and quality of regulation application and also give the Chief Procurement Officer (CPO) an external body that he has recourse to should he feel pressured into making ill advised purchases/contracts."⁵¹

Also with a view to rapid reaction, the Group touched on contingency planning which includes both advance procurement (see chapters on contingency planning and standby arrangements), and contingency contracting arrangements. Recently, advances have been made in using contractors in the field to deliver services. This trend to contract out should provide greater speed and flexibility. Some thought is being given to the concept of contingency contracting arrangements, much along the lines of the US Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program⁵² (LogCAP). This concept was used by the US in Somalia, and is now being used by the UN in Haiti, Angola, and Rwanda, albeit not on a contingency basis.

The objective in using contingency contracting arrangements is that civilian contractors can quickly pull in the right combination of staff and resources from the much larger civilian logistics pool. There would be major savings in not having to have UN resources on standby, even assuming that they would be the most appropriate resources when the time came.

Reserve stocks of basic equipment, including "start-up kits"⁵³ maintained for immediate shipment, is another logistics rapid reaction potential. The Italian government has provided a large base in Brindisi, and the maximum shipping time to any port in the world is 12 days. However, it is not yet clear what types of equipment should be stockpiled there or elsewhere. For example, at the end of missions there is a lot

⁴⁸ Ibid, para 15.

⁴⁹ Purchasing and Transport Services, part of DAM

⁵⁰ Although DPKO plays an integral role in procurement, in fact this is primarily as a customer of the UN procurement system. The only procurement executive authority of DPKO is Letters of Assist which allows DPKO to undertake sole sourcing contracts to a particular government, eg. have them provide parts for their contingent's APCs.

⁵¹ para 21, High-Level Expert Procurement Group, **Procurement Study**, Report December 1994.

⁵² see US Army Regulation 700-137 US Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program

⁵³ What should be noted is that the "start-up kits" are for a mission's HQ etc. , but not for the formed units which are expected to arrive fully equipped. Therefore these kits will enhance only some components of a rapid reaction.

of equipment and supplies that can be taken out and stored for future missions. The major question however is the cost effectiveness of doing so. Inter alia, the cost of transport and storage may far outweigh the value of the equipment. Also, such equipment is not always appropriate for future missions.

The issue of equipment storage is especially problematic for heavy equipment. Canada has a large number of DND staff actively involved with vehicle life cycles and even then Canada has major problems with long term storage. The UN has over 26,000 peace-keeping vehicles, half of them owned and half on loan. There are only two UN staff tasked with managing the life cycle program on those vehicles.

Lift capacity will always be a major determinant of logistical rapid reaction. There is not only the financial component of obtaining sufficient lift, but also the simple availability of such capacity. For long term peace-keeping, the financial constraints will remain the biggest problem, as sufficient capacity can be obtained from private contractors. However in rapid reaction operations, there is the added combination of immediacy plus invariably the ability to operate in dangerous situations where insurance for private companies proves to be either unavailable or too expensive.

In the area of coordination, an Integrated Logistics Support Program has been initiated both within the Secretariat and in a number of missions. The idea is that through dialogue, that military and civilian components can identify some common logistics support services. First used in Namibia in 1988, it has been refined in Cambodia and elsewhere. In the field, the Program takes life in an Integrated Logistics Centre, which consists of a number of joint committees dealing with different aspects of logistics. Ostensibly every logistics activity occurring under the aegis of the SRSG will be integrated through this Support Program.

12 COMMAND AND CONTROL

This chapter will restrict its discussion to the impact of command and control on rapid deployment. This is opposed to a discussion on the operation as it extends beyond the first couple of months after which rapid reaction deployment is no longer the issue.

At least in theory UN peace-keeping command moves through three levels. Overall political direction comes from the Security Council; executive direction and control comes from the Secretary-General; and field command rests with the Chief of Mission, i.e. the SRSG (FC if no SRSG). The use of the words field command is recognition that UN command is qualitatively different from normal national military command and control. UN operational command is specifically limited by the mission mandate as set out by the SC, and control of troops in the military sense is never given to the UN.

To achieve as seamless as possible unity of UN command, there is a critical need "to engage the troop contributors in dialogue in order to establish clear understandings about the mandate and the goal of the mission from the outset, thus also enhancing prospects for unity of command once troops are in the field."⁵⁴ This is an important step in minimizing the likelihood that national authorities would independently instruct their contingent commanders.

Even more useful in the long term is the enhancement of "the Secretariat's capacity for executive direction and management of [peace-keeping] operations. In particular, the Secretariat must have a greater capacity to conduct feasibility studies of options for the consideration of the Security Council; to translate mandates into achievable concepts of operations; to provide timely guidance and support to the field as well as meaningful feedback to the Council; to develop and refine, on the basis of experience, doctrines, operational concepts, standard operating procedures and related common terminology for United Nations peace-keeping operations. ...greater capacity within the Secretariat for contingency planning and large-scale logistics planning..."⁵⁵

In other words, if TCNs are satisfied with the mandate and confident in the capacity of the UN to command their troops, then they will tend to fully delegate field command. In regular ongoing peace-keeping missions, such a situation is more likely to occur. This is especially so in light of the recent improvements within DPKO.

⁵⁴ para 8, A/49/681 21 November 1994 COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE WHOLE QUESTION OF PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS IN ALL THEIR ASPECTS, **Command and control of United Nations peace-keeping operations, Report of the Secretary General**

⁵⁵ paras 15-6, Ibid

However, the greater the crisis and the faster events are moving, the less likely that a nation will be so sanguine about truly delegating field command. This has important ramifications for rapid reaction for lack of total field command can be a fatal flaw in any rapid reaction force. Mechanisms need to be developed to overcome countries' often justifiable fears, and to increase their comfort level with UN command.

Alternately, as with the Unified Task Force in Somalia, US forces in Haiti, NATO/WEU coordination with UNPROFOR, and Operation Turquoise in Rwanda, the Security Council has chosen at times not to undertake enforcement action itself but to delegate a general mandate to non-UN forces. The value for the forces involved lies in being able to claim international legitimacy and to a degree gain approval for their undertaking. The value for the UN lies in not having to assume the responsibility itself, often where consensus would not have allowed it to take action anyway.

However, the UN must retain at least some vague oversight role for forces not under direct UN command. "Issues of accountability and transparency are crucial... For such cooperation to be effective, new modalities for linkage to and review by the Security Council need to be devised."⁵⁶

Operational

Delegated operational responsibility and flexibility underpins the rapid reaction successes of various UN agencies and NGOs. Military structures on the other hand, particularly those which have long operated in a garrison mode, tend to become increasingly centralised in their decision making. Equally, political decision makers often want to move beyond their political sphere so as to intervene in field command. Both tendencies and their resultant confusion, reign supreme in the UN.

The formal and legal position is that UN peace-keeping operations are "under the command of the Secretary-General, who is responsible to the Security Council... Military personnel...are under the command of the Secretary-General in operational matters, though they remain under national command in matters of pay and discipline... Failure to respect this chain of command can lead to serious operational and political difficulties;"⁵⁷ It should remember that this quote does legitimize the need for a national communication link with its units or personnel for administrative needs. The problem occurs of course where this communications link is abused.

National forces are loathe to lose contact with their national contingents seconded to peace-keeping missions. Much of this stems from a lack of trust in UN operational command, a trust that will improve with the level of success and competency of strategic command and operational headquarters. Most certainly the FC and all of his senior commanders especially if they are the senior national commanding a particular national contingent, are very much aware that the eyes of their politicians and their military superiors are upon them. This limits even the often restrictive UN mandates they have been given.

⁵⁶ para 23, Ibid

⁵⁷ p.3, E/AC.51/1994/3 14 March 1994 PROGRAMME QUESTIONS: EVALUATION, **Progress report on the in-depth evaluation of peace-keeping: start-up phase, Report of the Secretary-General**

Tactical

Similar to the lack of fully delegated command authority to the UN operational command level, FCs and senior commanders are not always in a position and certainly are not encouraged to delegate substantial tactical authority to even large subunits much less down to platoon or section level. While this will not have an overwhelming effect on rapid deployment per se, it will have a bearing on the effectiveness of those units once deployed. Solutions lie somewhere in the area of more effective training for sub units so that they can be trusted to effectively exercise delegated power, and a concerted effort all of the way up the line of command, to delegate responsibility.

Command communications continue to hamper rapid reaction. This pertains to communication within the Secretariat, from the field to the Secretariat, and within the field mission. The latter is the easiest to resolve, and at a minimum will require communication equipment down to the platoon/squad level. All indications are that this is being addressed.

Communication from the field to the Secretariat is harder to disaggregate from communications within the Secretariat. This is because more is needed than just a simple and unique communications link from the FC to a contact at the Secretariat. Many people at both ends of a field-Secretariat link need to have access to the same information. For example, envisage a scenario where an ambulance is totally destroyed by a land mine. One part of the Secretariat needs to seek replacement personnel, eg. a doctor, medic, and driver. Probably they will need to go back to the original TCN to seek such replacements. Another sector of the Secretariat needs to get another ambulance, and possibly another sector needs to get additional medical supplies. Other parts of the system in the field and in New York need to arrange to transport all of the above as well as making arrangements for the return of bodies and effects. The key to this is the effective dissemination of information to those who need to act on it.

DPKO has a situation centre which provides 24 hour communications with field missions, and is tasked with packaging relevant information for various Secretariat staff. It is not clear that they have sufficient capacity nor clearly assigned channels of communication to achieve the degree of information dissemination needed. In other words, they need to know who needs what information coming from the field, and then have the capacity to get it to them rapidly. This will be partly resolved as the enlarged DPKO firms up its internal task assignments and responsibilities so that discrete bits of information can be separated from incoming mission communications and channelled effectively to the appropriate responsibility centres.

13 CONCLUSION

A major theme of this report, is that peace-keeping capacity within the UN is alive and well. This is particularly true for the Department of Peace-Keeping Operations.

DPKO has undergone rapid growth in size and capacity, and all indications are that this capacity will continue to grow even if staff resources do not. There is a high degree of professionalism and self-motivation with individuals moving to address perceived gaps and past failures. Much of DPKO is perfectly justified in maintaining that they know what needs to be done in peace-keeping, and can do most of it if only they are given sufficient resources and assistance. Also as reflected in the report, there are a number of other parts of the UN involved with peace-keeping that have the same attitude as DPKO. They are working effectively alongside DPKO to enhance UN peace-keeping capacity. There are also some glaring shortcomings by parts of the UN.

The capacity to respond quickly in the face of the unforeseen remains a premium in peace-keeping generally and rapid reaction particularly. There are a group of impediments to this rapid reaction that require substantial improvements, but appear to be imminently resolvable from within the UN. Such issues include standby troop and unit preparedness through sufficient and common training, the use of standard operational procedures, and the application of general operational plans that can be pulled out and quickly adapted.

It is largely accepted that "The Organization should be ready to field small missions within 48 hours of legislative authorization; start-up times to achieve operational self-sufficiency in general should be no more than 10 days to a month for a small mission (e.g. up to 500 personnel), two to three months for a medium-sized mission (e.g. up to 5,000 personnel) and four to five months for a large mission (e.g. above 5,000 personnel)."⁵⁸ Quite clearly the UN is not yet capable of this degree of limited rapid reaction, but arguably will be with time. However, larger rapid reaction operations are far beyond the present capacity of the UN. There are some real doubts as to the ability of the UN to achieve this larger rapid reaction capacity in the short or medium term.

These doubts arise because there are some major impediments to rapid reaction that appear inherent to

⁵⁸ para 4, A/48/945 25 May 1994 ADMINISTRATIVE AND BUDGETARY ASPECTS OF THE FINANCING OF THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS, **Effective planning, budgeting and administration of peace-keeping operations, Report of the Secretary-General**

the UN, and highly resistant to even a hugely reinforced DPKO. For example, nations are extremely slow to provide both troops and equipment, and their overall record in paying for peace-keeping is abysmal. There is a continued political sensitivity to country specific contingency planning and substantial country specific preparatory activity.

Many countries are clearly worried about any increase in UN military intervention capability. These and similar impediments reflect a political fear and reluctance on the part of member states to allow the UN to take peace-keeping action readily. There is no indication that this lack of political will by member states will dissipate in the near future. It is also debatable as to whether these types of impediment are resolvable from within the UN structure, eg. by DPKO or the Secretary-General.

Recommendations for enhancing United Nations rapid reaction capacity, must deal directly with the need for confidence building measures directed at member states in general, troop contributing nations specifically, and Security Council members absolutely.

Annex 1

Key UN Documents

A/48/403 (S/26450) 14 March 1994 Improving the capacity of the United Nations for peace-keeping, Report of the Secretary-General

A/48/707 14 December 1993 ADMINISTRATIVE AND BUDGETARY ASPECTS OF THE FINANCING OF THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS, Use of civilian personnel in peace-keeping operations, Report of the Secretary-General

E/AC.51/1994/3 14 March 1994 PROGRAMME QUESTIONS: EVALUATION, Progress report on the in-depth evaluation of peace-keeping: start-up phase, Report of the Secretary-General

A/48/945 25 May 1994 ADMINISTRATIVE AND BUDGETARY ASPECTS OF THE FINANCING OF THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS, Effective planning, budgeting and administration of peace-keeping operations, Report of the Secretary-General

A/49/136 2 May 1994 COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE WHOLE QUESTION OF PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS IN ALL THEIR ASPECTS, Report of the Special Committee on Peace-Keeping Operations

A/49/336 24 August 1994 REVIEW OF THE EFFICIENCY OF THE ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCIAL FUNCTIONING OF THE UNITED NATIONS, Restructuring of the United Nations Secretariat, Report of the Secretary-General

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
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
Annex 2

THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM



Annex 3

THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT




Listing of key organizational units

OIOS	Office for Internal Oversight Services
DPI	Department of Public Information
OLA	Office of Legal Affairs
DPKO	Department of Peace-Keeping Operations
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
DHA	Department of Humanitarian Affairs
DAM	Department of Administration and Management
DPCSD	Department for Policy Coordination and Sustainable Development
DESIPA	Department for Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis
DDSMS	Department for Development Support and Management Services
OSASGPP	Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary General for Public Policy
UNOG	United Nations Office at Geneva
UNCHR	United Nations Centre for Human Rights
UNOV	United Nations Office at Vienna
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNCHS	United Nations Centre for Human Settlements
ECA	Economic Commission for Africa
ECLAC	Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
ECE	Economic Commission for Europe
ESCAP	Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
ESCWA	Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia

DEPARTMENT OF PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS

DEPARTMENT OF PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS

Organization
Communications Guide



MISSION PLANNING SERVICE

January 20 1995

Annex 5

UN Peace-Keeping Rapid Reaction Impediments

DPKO MISSION PLANNING SERVICE

LaRose-Edwards p. 47

Col Cees VAN EGMOND
Chief

Lt Col Willy VAN STRAELEN
Deputy Chief

GENERIC PLANNING

Col Cees VAN EGMOND

Lt Col Bill NAGY

Mr George D'ANGELO

Support Staff

NCO Felix GARMON

Ms Barbara MOSKOWITZ

CONCEPTUAL PLANNING

AFRICA

Lt Col Willy VAN STRAELEN

Lt Col Mohammad ASIF KHAN

Lt Col Lars ANDERSON

EUROPE and LATIN AMERICA

Cdr Manuel MARTIN-OAR

Maj Geoffrey DODDS

Maj Urban ESKELUND

ASIA and MIDDLE EAST

Lt Col Antony MILLER

Lt Col Sanjiv LANGER

Lt Col Yam THAPA

STANDBY ARRANGEMENTS

Lt Col Jean-Robert HINSE

Cdr Marek JAMKA

Lt Col Carlos Daniel RAVAZZOLA

Lt Col Reiner DOELKER

LESSONS LEARNED

Col (Retd) Anil VASISHT

DATABASE COLLECTION

Mr Ryszard SIWANOWICZ

Lt Col Bruno GUYOT de SAINT MICHEL

INCOMING OFFICERS

- Senegal
- Botswana
- Denmark
- Italy

INCOMING SECRETARIES

- NCO Italy
- NCO Kenya (scheduled for 01/25/95)
- 1 Secretary
- 1 Secretary

Annex 6


Coordination of DHA, DPKO, and DPA Activities in Planning and Implementing Complex Operations in the Field

6 January 1995

Page 1


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COORDINATION OF DHA, DPKO AND DPA ACTIVITIES
IN PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTING COMPLEX OPERATIONS IN THE FIELD




N.B. While arrows indicate that interaction occurs between activities, the flow is not intended to convey absolute symmetry. Any Department may be in a different position in time or sequence, depending on the situation.

**COORDINATION OF DHA, DPKO AND DPA ACTIVITIES
IN PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTING COMPLEX OPERATIONS IN THE FIELD**




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COORDINATION OF DHA, DPKO AND DPA ACTIVITIES IN PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTING COMPLEX OPERATIONS IN THE FIELD




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**COORDINATION OF DHA, DPKO AND DPA ACTIVITIES
IN PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTING COMPLEX OPERATIONS IN THE FIELD**



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COORDINATION OF DHA, DPKO AND DPA ACTIVITIES IN PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTING COMPLEX OPERATIONS IN THE FIELD



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Annex 7

UN SURVEY MISSION HANDBOOK: Summary of Topics

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English

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ANNEX II

United Nations survey mission handbook

Summary of topics

I. INTRODUCTION

Institutional context: legislative basis, organizational procedures.

II. MANDATE OF THE MISSION

Terms of reference, composition, activities.

III. LIAISON AND RECONNAISSANCE

Geopolitical review.

Operation-specific and security review.

Establishing contact with local authorities.

Establishing contact with other international entities.

Establishing the United Nations presence.

Evaluation and risk analysis.

IV. MISSION ANALYSIS

Concept of operations.

Security considerations.

Proposed organization.

V. ADMINISTRATION ANALYSIS (Assessment of support requirements)

Logistics: Accommodation.

Technical infrastructure and services.

Security.

Rations.

Signals and communication.

Procurement and supply.

Transportation/movement control.

Storage and warehousing.

Maintenance and repair facilities/services.

Health services and medical supply.

Finance: Fiscal situation/currency regulations.

Factors likely to influence the mission subsistence allowance.

Financial services.

Personnel: Number and type of support personnel needed.

Visa and customs regulations.

Welfare and recreation services.

Availability and quality of local personnel.

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General services: Postal services.
Office equipment and supplies.
Determination of availability of local resources.

VI. STRUCTURE OF THE MISSION

Composition.
Scope of authority.
Lines of command.

VII. SPECIAL PROGRAMMES (as applicable)


Civilian affairs.
Electoral processes.
Humanitarian affairs.
Information programme.
Other programmes.

VIII. DURATION OF THE MISSION

Preparation: Headquarters instructions and procedures.
Briefings.
Country study.
List of principal contacts.
Itinerary of the mission.
Equipment for the team.
Procedures for contact with Headquarters.
Travel arrangements.

On-site phase: Reconnaissance.
Report coordination.

Wrap-up phase: Reporting to Headquarters.
Mission analysis.
Administrative analysis.
Logistic planning factors.
Determination of logistic requirements.



DOCS
CA1 EA360 95U56 ENG
LaRose-Edwards, Paul
United Nations internal impediment
to peace-keeping rapid reaction
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