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CANADA AND THE KOREAN CRISIS

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EDMOND CLOUTIER, C.M.G., B.A., L.Ph.,
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1950

THE HISTORY OF THE

REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES




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
*To His Excellency
The Governor General in Council*

YOUR EXCELLENCY:

I have the honour to lay before Your Excellency the attached Report entitled "Canada and the Korean Crisis".

I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your Excellency's Obedient Servant,
L. B. PEARSON,
Secretary of State for External Affairs.

OTTAWA, September 1, 1950.



Canada and the Korean Crisis

The first purpose of the United Nations is to maintain international peace and security. For this purpose the members have bound themselves to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace when these occur. When, therefore, the United States Government informed the Secretary-General of the United Nations on June 25 that it considered the attack of the North Korean forces on the Republic of Korea constituted "a breach of the peace and an act of aggression" and urgently requested the calling of an immediate meeting of the Security Council, the whole machinery and the first purpose of the United Nations was put to the test.

When the Security Council met at 2.00 p.m. that same day there was placed before it a telegram* from the United Nations Commission on Korea in Seoul reporting that attacks had been launched in strength all along the 38th parallel in the early morning hours of June 25. The Commission drew attention to the serious situation developing which was assuming the character of full-scale war.

While this act of open aggression came as a surprise, the existence along the 38th parallel of a situation which constituted a threat to peace was known to the United Nations. For nearly three years the United Nations had tried to assist the Koreans to achieve their aspirations of national independence and unity under a freely elected government.† These efforts were frustrated by the Soviet Union in its unwillingness to accept the procedures to achieve the ends laid down by the General Assembly of the United Nations in its resolutions of November 14, 1947, December 12, 1948 and October 21, 1949. The Commission sent to Korea by the General Assembly was never permitted to cross the 38th parallel and was rebuffed in its repeated attempts to establish contact with the North Korean authorities. It was compelled, therefore, to confine its activities to South Korea where it supervised elections on May 10, 1948 and witnessed the establishment of the Republic of Korea. In its report for 1949 the Korean Commission noted that the new Republic of Korea

*See Appendix 2

†For further background information on United Nations efforts to deal with the problem of Korean independence, see the following publications of the Department of External Affairs: "Canada at the United Nations, 1947", pp. 31-35; "Canada and the United Nations, 1948", pp. 67-71; "Canada and the United Nations, 1949", pp. 73-75; "External Affairs", August, 1950, pp. 288-295.

was being threatened by the increased incidence of insurgent uprisings and border clashes along the 38th parallel. To assist the Commission to report on "developments which might lead to or otherwise involve military conflict in Korea" the General Assembly in its resolution of October 21, 1949, authorized the appointment of military observers.* As the hope of making progress toward the unification of North and South Korea faded, the Commission remained to try to serve as a stabilizing influence in Korea, which might, by its presence, prevent open conflict, and in the event of an armed outbreak, keep the United Nations fully informed. The record clearly indicates that the United Nations took every peaceful step open to it to assist the Koreans to achieve national independence and unity and to try to head off possible conflict.

The members of the Security Council already had, then, a good deal of background information about Korea when this complaint of aggression against the Republic of Korea was brought before the Council on June 25. Furthermore, inasmuch as the United Nations had assisted in the creation of the new Republic and had kept its Commission in Korea at the request of the Republic, this act of aggression could be regarded as a challenge to the organization itself.

After considering the reports which it had before it, the Security Council concluded that it already had sufficient information to label the North Korean aggression as a clear breach of the peace. By a vote of 9 to 0, with one abstention (Yugoslavia) and one absence (U.S.S.R.) the Security Council adopted a resolution on June 25† calling for the immediate cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of the North Korean armed forces to the 38th parallel. The United Nations Commission on Korea was asked to observe the North Korean withdrawal, keep the Security Council informed and make recommendations on the situation as quickly as possible. Meanwhile, all members of the United Nations were requested to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities.

On June 26 the Korean Commission sent four further reports to the Secretary-General. One described the North Korean peace offensive in June as "intended solely for its screening effect".‡ It concluded that "all evidence continues to point to a calculated co-ordinated attack prepared and launched in secrecy." Another message said that from past experience the Commission was "convinced North Korea will not heed Council resolution nor accept Commission's good offices." A further message gave it as the Commission's view, in the light of all reports available, including those of its military observers, that the North Korean attack was

*See Appendix 1 for text of General Assembly resolution of October 21, 1949.

†See Appendix 3.

‡See Appendix 4.

a well planned full-scale invasion, that the Southern forces were deployed on a wholly defensive basis and were taken completely by surprise.*

On June 26, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, made his first report to the House of Commons on what had happened in Korea and the action taken by the Security Council on June 25. Mr. Pearson also reported that steps were being taken to ensure that the safety of Canadians in Korea was being cared for.

At noon on June 27, President Truman issued a statement which said that "the attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that Communism has gone beyond the point of subversion to conquer independent nations and will make use of armed invasion and war."† Because the resolution passed by the Security Council in an effort to restore peace had been defied the President stated that he had "ordered United States air and sea forces to give the Korean Government troops cover and support".

At 3.00 p.m. on June 27 the Security Council met again to consider the reports received from the Korean Commission. In view of the failure of the North Koreans to heed the Council's resolution of June 25, a further resolution was passed by a vote of seven to one (Yugoslavia), with two abstentions (India and Egypt) and one absence (U.S.S.R.), recommending that "the members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area."‡ India later gave its support to this resolution.

On June 28, Mr. Pearson reported again to the House of Commons on Korean developments.** He said that, although Canada did not have a vote in the Security Council, "the House will support, as indeed does the Government, the action taken by the Security Council because it represents collective action through the United Nations for peace". The United States had acted "not only in accordance with the spirit and letter of the Charter of the United Nations, but also in pursuance of the resolution which was adopted by the Security Council on Sunday (June 25)". Mr. Pearson explained that the Charter of the United Nations had intended that such an act of aggression be met "by the despatch of forces put at the disposal of the Security Council by member governments as the result of prior agreements". Since agreement on the forces to be put at the disposal of the Security Council had proved impossible, the responsibility for checking aggression had to be shouldered "by individual members of the Security Council acting within the terms of the Charter, but on their own initia-

*See Appendix 8.

†See Appendix 5.

‡See Appendix 6.

**See Appendix 7.

tive". "If any further international authorization were needed", Mr. Pearson added, "for the prompt and vigorous action which has been taken by the United States, it has been provided by the further resolution of the Security Council". This statement of the Government's position was approved by members of the Opposition.*

On June 29 Mr. Pearson made a further statement in the House of Commons† indicating that discussions had been opened at Lake Success, London and Washington to consider "what action Canada, as a member of the United Nations, might appropriately take to help the Government of Korea maintain itself in the face of this aggression". Mr. Pearson announced that on request two military observers were being made available immediately for service with the United Nations Commission on Korea. Leaders of the Opposition spoke in favour of the action being taken by the United Nations to deal with the North Korean aggression.‡

On the last day of the session, June 30, the Prime Minister, Mr. St. Laurent, told the House of Commons that "if a Canadian contribution to aid United Nations operations, under a United Nations commander, would be important to achieve the ends of peace, which is of course our only purpose, then the Government wishes Parliament to know that it would immediately consider making such a contribution". Mr. St. Laurent said that Canadian destroyers were being despatched immediately to Western Pacific waters "where the ships would be closer to the area where they might be of assistance to the United Nations and Korea if such assistance were required". If, after prorogation, further action beyond that indicated were required, the Prime Minister said that Parliament would be summoned to consider the new situation.** This further statement of the Government's position was also given support by the Opposition parties.

On July 7 the Security Council passed a third resolution‡‡ recommending that all members providing military forces and other assistance should make them available to a unified command under the United States, which was authorized to use the United Nations flag in operations against the North Korean forces. Pursuant to this resolution, President Truman designated General Douglas MacArthur to be commander of the United Nations forces operating in Korea. These measures were further rounded out on July 31 when the President of the Security Council stated that the various land, naval and air forces being made available for operation under the unified command would constitute "a United Nations force". He added that this was "a development of great practical and even

*See *Hansard*, June 28, 1950.

†See Appendix 9.

‡See *Hansard*, June 29, 1950.

**See Appendix 10.

††See Appendix 11.

greater historical significance".* For the first time a United Nations force was operating under a unified command to carry out resolutions of the Security Council directed toward the suppression of an act of aggression and the restoration of peace and security.

The United States was in the best position to assist the Republic of Korea because it had forces nearby in Japan. The Government and people of the United States assumed this new responsibility willingly and promptly. The Secretary-General of the United Nations was informed on July 6 that, in addition to United States air and naval support, the President had authorized the use of certain supporting ground units. The President also authorized the United States Air Force to conduct missions on specific targets in Northern Korea wherever militarily necessary, and had ordered a naval blockade of the entire Korean coast. United States troops fought a courageous rearguard action down through Korea alongside the remaining South Korean forces. This action made possible the build-up in the Pusan bridgehead for the ultimate counter-offensive. In the first two months of bitter defensive action the United States assumed almost the whole burden of supporting the Republic of Korea in fulfilment of the Security Council resolutions.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations sent communications to all members on June 29 asking for a report on what assistance they would be in a position to supply in compliance with the Security Council's resolution of June 27. Prompt replies endorsing the action of the Security Council, and offering material or moral support, were received from an overwhelming majority of the members. Only three—the Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia—opposed the Council's resolution. The United Kingdom was the first to offer military assistance. On June 28 Prime Minister Attlee announced that United Kingdom naval forces in Japanese waters were being placed immediately at the disposal of the United States authorities to operate on behalf of the Security Council in support of South Korea. Australia made available its R.A.A.F. fighter squadron stationed in Japan and two naval vessels. New Zealand despatched two frigates. The Chinese National Government offered three divisions but, on the advice of the Unified Command, these were not accepted. France and the Netherlands sent a naval vessel each. Bolivia offered 30 army officers. Other countries offered medical assistance, transportation and various commodities. Many replies were of a preliminary and general character and were made more precise later.

The Soviet Union, which had been boycotting meetings of all United Nations organizations because the majority of members had not been willing to seat Chinese Communist representatives in place of the Chinese

*See Appendix 17
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Nationalists, was not represented in the Security Council when it passed its resolutions dealing with the North Korean aggression. In a communication addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on June 29, the Soviet Government challenged the legality of the Security Council's resolutions because they were passed without the concurrence of the Soviet Union and the "legal" Communist representative of China. The non-Communist members of the United Nations were not prepared to accept this Soviet contention. They took the view that any change in Chinese representation would have to be effected by the proper procedures and not as a result of Soviet pressure. They also took the view that the voluntary absence of a permanent member (U.S.S.R.) from the Security Council is clearly analogous to an abstention and does not affect the validity of Security Council resolutions.

On July 12 the Acting Permanent Delegate of Canada to the United Nations, Mr. Holmes, informed the Secretary-General that the three Canadian destroyers—*Athabasca*, *Cayuga* and *Sioux*—which had sailed the previous week from Esquimalt were now made available to the United Nations for the defence of the Republic of Korea.*

In acknowledging the Canadian communication making the three destroyers available, the Secretary-General on July 14 drew attention to the urgent need for additional effective assistance. He asked the Canadian Government, and other member governments, to consider the possibility of providing "an increased volume of combat forces particularly ground forces.† This request to member governments for further assistance was made in view of the gravity of the military situation in Korea where United States and South Korean forces were desperately trying to hold the Kum River line above Taejon.

The Prime Minister, Mr. St. Laurent, issued a statement on July 19‡ concerning the consideration given by the Cabinet to this request for further assistance. He noted that Canada had obligations as a member of the United Nations, as a signatory of the North Atlantic Treaty, and for the joint defence with the United States of the North American continent. He referred to the three destroyers that had been made available and said these vessels would require continuing support. In view of the need for air transport, Mr. St. Laurent said that the Government had decided to provide at once a long range R.C.A.F. transport squadron for service in the Pacific air lift.** Having in mind the other obligations for the employment of Canadian ground forces, Mr. St. Laurent said that the Cabinet had reached the conclusion that the despatch, at that stage, of existing first line elements of the Canadian Army to the Korean

*See Appendix 12.

†See Appendix 13.

‡See Appendix 14.

**See Appendix 15.

theatre would not be warranted. To meet possible future requirements, Mr. St. Laurent said that steps were being taken to strengthen all three of the Canadian armed services. The Prime Minister concluded by saying:

The Korean situation cannot be viewed in isolation. The attack on the Republic of Korea has increased the cohesion of resistance to aggressive Communism in other parts of the world. The measures which the United States Government have taken and are taking are far-reaching and significant. Here in Canada we also shall press on with measures which will increase the preparedness of this country. We are increasing immediately our defence effort and expenditure. We are also giving consideration to further measures of aid by this country to our North Atlantic partners.

Grave decisions may lie ahead but it is deeply sustaining to know that the well-nigh unanimous weight of Canadian public opinion is behind the Government in its decision that Canada do its share in resisting aggression and restoring peace.

When the need for further air transport was notified to the Canadian Government by the Unified Command, it decided on August 11 to make available to the United Nations, with the co-operation of Canadian Pacific Air Lines, the complete passenger facilities of that line between Vancouver and Tokyo on two flights a week westbound and the equivalent of one flight a week eastbound.*

Toward the end of July the Soviet representative announced that he would return to the Security Council to take his turn as President of that body. Anticipating Soviet interference, the members had to consider whether any further measures relating to the Korean undertaking should be passed before the return of the Soviet representative. Hence, on July 31 the Security Council passed a resolution† requesting the Unified Command to exercise responsibility for determining the requirements for the relief and support of the civilian population of Korea, and requesting the Economic and Social Council, the Secretary-General, the specialized agencies and appropriate non-governmental organizations to provide such assistance as the Unified Command might request for relief purposes. This was the last constructive measure that the Security Council was able to take before the Soviet representative returned in August to block any further action.

During the last week of July and the first week of August offers of ground forces for service in Korea were made by a number of countries. On July 24 Thailand offered to send a contingent of 4,000 men, and on July 26 Turkey promised a combat force of 4,500 men. On the same date the United Kingdom announced its intention to provide "a self-contained force", while the Australian Government stated that it had decided to send ground troops, the nature and extent of such forces to

*See Appendix 19.

†See Appendix 16.

be determined following discussions between Prime Minister Menzies and United States authorities. On August 3 the Australian Government announced that the Australian Infantry Force in Japan would be raised to full war establishment for use at the earliest possible time in Korea. Meanwhile the New Zealand Government had undertaken to raise a regiment of field artillery, with supporting elements, for service with United Nations forces. On August 4 South Africa offered a fighter squadron with air crew and ground personnel. On August 7 the Panamanian Government offered a corps of volunteers, and on the following day it was announced that the Netherlands had decided to raise two companies of combat troops.*

The Prime Minister, Mr. St. Laurent, made a broadcast on August 7 announcing further defence measures required in Canada by the international situation.† He reviewed the measures that had been taken by other free nations in the face of the aggression against the Republic of Korea. He explained that the Canadian postwar military establishment had not provided for a fully trained expeditionary force available for immediate action outside Canada. Attention had been concentrated on maintaining a basic training establishment capable of expanding the Canadian Army quickly in the event of a general war, and the development of an air-borne brigade group highly trained for operations in the North and designed to share in the immediate protection of this continent. The Government considered it unwise to send this brigade group to Korea. Mr. St. Laurent announced that an additional brigade, to be called the Canadian Army Special Force, would be recruited, trained and equipped immediately to be available for use in carrying out Canada's obligations under the United Nations Charter or the North Atlantic Treaty. Subject to the approval of Parliament, this force would be available for service in Korea as part of the United Nations force, if it could be most effectively used in that way when ready for service.‡ Mr. St. Laurent also announced that Parliament would be summoned to deal with the deterioration of the situation in Korea and the expansion and acceleration of the defence programme as soon as fuller information could be gathered and specific plans formulated.

*These offers were succeeded by further contributions later in the month of August, the available details of which are as follows: the Philippines, Regimental Combat Team of approximately 5,000 men; El Salvador, volunteer troops, to be trained in the United States; The United Kingdom, two battalions of infantry from Hong Kong for immediate use in Korea, additional to self-contained force already promised; France, special infantry force of 800 men; Belgium, infantry force of unspecified size (press report).

†See Appendix 18.

‡See Appendices 20 and 21.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1

General Assembly resolution, October 21, 1949

The General Assembly,

Having regard to its resolutions 112 (II) of 14 November 1947 and 195 (III) of 12 December 1948 concerning the problem of the independence of Korea,

Having considered the report of the United Nations Commission on Korea, and having taken note of the conclusions reached therein,

Mindful of the fact that, due to difficulties referred to in the report of the Commission, the objectives set forth in the resolutions referred to have not been fully accomplished, and in particular that the unification of Korea, and the removal of barriers to economic, social and other friendly intercourse caused by the division of Korea have not yet been achieved,

Having noted that the Commission has observed and verified the withdrawal of United States occupation forces, but that it has not been accorded the opportunity to observe or verify the reported withdrawal of Soviet occupation forces,

Recalling its declaration of 12 December 1948 that there has been established a lawful government (the Government of the Republic of Korea) having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea was able to observe and consult and in which the great majority of the people of Korea reside; that this Government is based on elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate of that part of Korea and which were observed by the Temporary Commission; and that this is the only such Government in Korea,

Concerned lest the situation described by the Commission in its report menace the safety and well-being of the Republic of Korea and of the people of Korea and lead to open military conflict in Korea,

1. *Resolves* that the United Nations Commission on Korea shall continue in being with the following membership: Australia, China, El Salvador, France, India, Philippines and Turkey and, having in mind the objectives set forth in the General Assembly resolutions of 14 November 1947 and 12 December 1948 and also the status of the Government of the Republic of Korea as defined in the latter resolution, shall:

- (a) Observe and report any developments which might lead to or otherwise involve military conflict in Korea;
- (b) Seek to facilitate the removal of barriers to economic, social and other friendly intercourse caused by the division of Korea; and make available its good offices and be prepared to assist, whenever in its judgment a favourable opportunity arises, in bringing about the unification of Korea in accordance with the principles laid down by the General Assembly in the resolution of 14 November 1947;

- (c) Have authority, in order to accomplish the aims defined under subparagraphs (a) and (b) of the present paragraph, in its discretion to appoint observers, and to utilize the services and good offices of one or more persons whether or not representatives on the Commission;
- (d) Be available for observation and consultation throughout Korea in the continuing development of representative government based on the freely-expressed will of the people, including elections of national scope;
- (e) Verify the withdrawal of Soviet occupation forces in so far as it is in a position to do so;

2. *Decides* that the Commission:

- (a) Shall meet in Korea within thirty days from the date of the present resolution;
- (b) Shall continue to maintain its seat in Korea;
- (c) Is authorized to travel, consult and observe throughout Korea;
- (d) Shall continue to determine its own procedures;
- (e) May consult with the Interim Committee of the General Assembly (if it be continued) with respect to the discharge of its duties in the light of developments and within the terms of the present resolution;
- (f) Shall render a report to the next regular session of the General Assembly and to any prior special session which might be called to consider the subject matter of the present resolution, and shall render such interim reports as it may deem appropriate to the Secretary-General for transmission to Members;
- (g) Shall remain in existence pending a new decision by the General Assembly;

3. *Calls upon* Member States, the Government of the Republic of Korea, and all Koreans to afford every assistance and facility to the Commission in the fulfilment of its responsibilities, and to refrain from any acts derogatory to the purposes of the present resolution;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide the Commission with adequate staff and facilities, including technical advisers and observers as required; and authorizes the Secretary-General to pay the expenses and *Per Diem* of a representative and an alternate from each of the States members of the Commission and of such persons as may be appointed in accordance with paragraph 1 (c) of the present resolution.

APPENDIX 2

Cablegram from the United Nations Commission on Korea to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, June 25, 1950

Seoul, June 25, 1950.

Government of Republic of Korea states that about 04:00 hrs. 25 June attacks were launched in strength by North Korean forces all along the 38th parallel. Major points of attack have included Ongjin Peninsula, Kaesong area

and Chunchon and east coast where seaborne landings have been reported north and south of Kanknung. Another seaborne landing reported imminent under air cover in Pohang area on southeast coast. The latest attacks have occurred along the parallel directly north of Seoul along shortest avenue of approach. Pyongyang radio allegation at 13:35 hrs. of South Korean invasion across parallel during night declared entirely false by President and Foreign Minister in course of conference with Commission members and principal secretary. Allegations also stated Peoples' Army instructed repulse invading forces by decisive counter-attack and placed responsibility for consequences on South Korea. Briefing on situation by President included statement thirty-six tanks and armoured cars used in northern attacks at four points. Following emergency Cabinet meeting Foreign Minister issuing broadcast to people of South Korea encouraging resistance against dastardly attack. President expressed complete willingness for Commission broadcast urging cease-fire and for communication to United Nations to inform of gravity of situation. Although North Korean declaration of war rumoured at 11:00 hrs. over Pyongyang radio, no confirmation available from any source. President not treating broadcast as official notice. United States Ambassador, appearing before Commission, stated his expectation Republican Army would give good account of itself.

At 17:15 hrs. four yak-type aircraft strafed civilian and military air fields outside Seoul destroying planes, firing gas tanks and attacking jeeps. Yongdungpo railroad station on outskirts also strafed.

Commission wishes to draw attention of Secretary-General to serious situation developing which is assuming character of full-scale war and may endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. It suggests that he consider possibility of bringing matter to notice of Security Council. Commission will communicate more fully considered recommendation later.

APPENDIX 3

Security Council resolution, June 25, 1950

The Security Council,

Recalling the finding of the General Assembly in its resolution of 21 October 1949 that the Government of the Republic of Korea is a lawfully established government "having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea was able to observe and consult and in which the great majority of the people of Korea reside; and that this Government is based on elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate of that part of Korea and which were observed by the Temporary Commission; and that this is the only such Government in Korea";

Mindful of the concern expressed by the General Assembly in its resolutions of 12 December 1948 and 21 October 1949 of the consequences which might follow unless Member States refrained from acts derogatory to the results sought to be achieved by the United Nations in bringing about the complete independence and unity of Korea; and the concern expressed that the situation described by the United Nations Commission on Korea in its report menaces the safety and well being of the Republic of Korea and of the people of Korea and might lead to open military conflict there;

Noting with grave concern the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea,

Determines that this action constitutes a breach of the peace,

- I. *Calls for* the immediate cessation of hostilities; and
Calls upon the authorities of North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the thirty-eighth parallel;
- II. *Requests* the United Nations Commission on Korea
 - (a) To communicate its fully considered recommendations on the situation with the least possible delay;
 - (b) To observe the withdrawal of the North Korean forces to the thirty-eighth parallel; and
 - (c) To keep the Security Council informed on the execution of this resolution;
- III. *Calls upon* all Members to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities.

APPENDIX 4

Cablegram from the United Nations Commission on Korea to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, June 26, 1950

The Commission submits following Summary Report on background events preceding twenty-fifth June outbreak of hostilities:

1. For the past two years the North Korean regime has by violently abusive propaganda, by threatening gestures along the 38th parallel and by encouraging and supporting subversive activities in the territory of the Republic of Korea, pursued tactics designed to weaken and destroy the Government of the Republic of Korea established under the auspices of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea and recognized by the General Assembly. During the same period, the United Nations Commission on Korea has been the target for repeated propaganda broadcasts which denied its legality, dubbed it futile, and subjected its individual members to abuse. This campaign has been relentlessly pursued during the past eight months. While the economy of the young Republic remains shaky and the deliberations of the First National Assembly have been frequently stormy and critical of the Administration, there have been distinct signs of improvement in recent months, both in economic and political stability of the country. In early April the Korean army and police climaxed a winter offensive against Northern-supported guerillas operating in South Korea by smashing two guerilla battalions totalling some 600 men soon after their crossing of the parallel. At the same time internal security and domestic morale have been strengthened by suppression of subversive elements.

2. Although the North Korean regime by its radio propaganda and its support of subversive elements endeavoured to prevent the holding of effective general elections on 30 May 1950, these elections, which were observed by the Commission, were on the whole successfully conducted and in an atmosphere of law and order.

3. This new Assembly succeeded the Republic's first National Assembly, which had been elected in May 1948 under the supervision of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea. Unlike the 1948 elections, which "middle-of-the-road" parties boycotted for fear that elections in only half of Korea would make permanent the artificial barrier at the 38th parallel, all parties except the underground Communist participated in the 1950 elections. Although the two largest parties in the previous Assembly, one pro-Government and the other opposition, both suffered heavy losses and the most significant gains were made by those moderate elements which had boycotted the 1948 elections, the new Assembly with some 130 Independents out of a total of 210 members, convened on 19 June 1950 in a hopeful atmosphere conducive to continued progress in the building of an effective representative Government in an economically healthy State. The initial sessions have indicated determination to tackle the Administration in a critical spirit for its numerous shortcomings.

4. At the beginning of June the North Korean regime's Pyongyang radio gave the widest publicity to an article calling for intensification of measures aimed at unifying Korea, and on 3 June a *communiqué* stated that the signing by 5,300,000 Northerners of an appeal for peace and unification meant that a renewed struggle for national unification was beginning.

5. On 7 June Radio Pyongyang began to broadcast at repeated intervals a Letter of Appeal from the Democratic Front for Attainment of Unification of the Fatherland to all democratic political parties and social organizations in Korea proposing elections throughout Korea following the meeting of a proposed consultative council.

6. The tone of the appeal indicated an ostensible change in the North's previous attitude in spite of such conditions as the exclusion from the Council, as traitors, of nine top leaders in the South Korean Government, and a statement that the United Nations Commission on Korea would not be permitted to interfere in the task of unification. Included among the addresses, the Commission sent a representative across the parallel to receive the text of the appeal on 10 June and to convey personally to three Northern representatives the Commission's desire for peaceful unification.

7. The three Northern representatives came south the next day carrying copies for all but a few of the leading parties and political personalities of the Republic. They were immediately placed under detention by the South Korean authorities, who have since tried to induce them to switch sides by showing the facts in the South. The Southern action of detaining "envoys of peace" has been denounced violently by the Northern radio. At a hearing the Commission was assured by all three Northern representatives of their good treatment by the Southern authorities and of their sincere belief in the good intentions of the Northern regime, though admitting that their eyes had been opened through direct observation to numerous Northern misconceptions of fact on political personalities of the Republic.

8. The President of the Republic of Korea took the occasion of denouncing the appeal to reiterate the South Korean position on peaceful unification. He urged once again the holding of free elections in North Korea under the observation of the United Nations Commission after which 100 Assemblymen from the

North would take their seats in the National Assembly. He added that he was prepared to receive all traitors, including Premier Kim Il Sung, if elected, with open arms and give them due positions if they repented and resolved to devote themselves to establishing a sound basis for the Republic of Korea.

9. Subsequently, the Letter of Appeal was replaced by another plan for peaceful unification prepared by the Praesidium of the Peoples' Supreme Assembly of the Northern regime. This contemplated a procedure which involved the convening of the Assemblies of the North and the South into a single representative Assembly, but it was accompanied by objectionable conditions similar to those of the earlier appeal.

10. Both appeals have been denounced by the South Korean Press, political parties and leaders as sheer propaganda. An apparent intention of these appeals was to split the unity prevailing in the South Korean National Assembly by encouraging those who had opposed the 1948 elections to think that there was a real possibility of peaceful unification by negotiation.

11. Meanwhile the Commission had agreed to mediate, if its good offices were acceptable to both parties, in an exchange of important political prisoners originally suggested by the North. On 10 June the Commission made clear its unwillingness to jeopardize the exchange in any way. Although North Korea rejected on 20 June the proposed role of the Commission, arrangements for the exchange were still pending at the time of the invasion.

12. In the light of the ever-increasing strength of the Republic of Korea in recent months and the utterly unexpected invasion on 25 June, the radio propaganda offensive calling for early unification by peaceful means seems to have been intended solely for its screening effect.

13. General Kim Il Sung in a radio broadcast this morning at 09:30 hours (26 June) reiterated the North Korean claim first made at 13:35 hours yesterday that South Korea, having rejected every Northern Proposal for peaceful unification, had crowned its iniquity by launching an invasion force across the parallel in the sector of Haeju, thus precipitating North Korean counter-attacks for which South Korea would have to assume the consequences.

14. In the same broadcast the Premier called for a struggle to the end in order to secure unification and punish the "traitors", calling for mass risings and for sabotage in South Korea. The Commission has no evidence to justify in any respect the Northern allegations. All the evidence continues to point to a calculated co-ordinated attack prepared and launched with secrecy.

APPENDIX 5

Statement by the President of the United States, June 27, 1950

In Korea the Government forces, which were armed to prevent border raids and to preserve internal security, were attacked by invading forces from North Korea. The Security Council of the United Nations called upon the invading troops to cease hostilities and to withdraw to the 38th parallel. This they have not done but on the contrary have pressed the attack. The Security Council called upon all members of the United Nations to render every assistance to the

United Nations in the execution of this resolution. In these circumstances I have ordered United States air and sea forces to give the Korean Government troops cover and support.

The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that Communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war. It has defied the orders of the Security Council of the United Nations issued to preserve international peace and security. In these circumstances the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in that area.

Accordingly I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa. As a corollary of this action I am calling upon the Chinese Government on Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against the mainland. The Seventh Fleet will see that this is done. The determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations.

I have also directed that United States Forces in the Philippines be strengthened and that military assistance to the Philippine Government be accelerated.

I have similarly directed acceleration in the furnishing of military assistance to the forces of France and the Associated States in Indo-China and the dispatch of a military mission to provide close working relations with those forces.

I know that all members of the United Nations will consider carefully the consequences of this latest aggression in Korea in defiance of the Charter of the United Nations. A return to the rule of force in international affairs would have far-reaching effects. The United States will continue to uphold the rule of law.

I have instructed Ambassador Austin, as the Representative of the United States to the Security Council, to report these steps to the Council.

APPENDIX 6

Security Council resolution, June 27, 1950

The Security Council,

Having determined that the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea constitutes a breach of the peace,

Having called for an immediate cessation of hostilities, and

Having called upon the authorities of North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the 38th parallel, and

Having noted from the report of the United Nations Commission on Korea that the authorities in North Korea have neither ceased hostilities nor withdrawn their armed forces to the 38th parallel and that urgent military measures are required to restore international peace and security, and

Having noted the appeal from the Republic of Korea to the United Nations for immediate and effective steps to secure peace and security,

Recommends that the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area.

APPENDIX 7

**Excerpts from statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs
in the House of Commons, June 28, 1950**

Mr. Speaker, perhaps I might be permitted to report to the House on certain developments that have taken place in the last forty-eight hours with respect to the situation in Korea, and to outline the attitude of the Canadian Government.

The House will recall that at its meeting on Sunday the Security Council of the United Nations termed the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea as a breach of the peace, and called upon the Communist forces to withdraw to the 38th parallel. It soon became apparent that this appeal would be without effect on the Communist government of North Korea. Their forces continued to advance on Seoul, the capital of Korea. The United Nations Commission on Korea reported that they were convinced that North Korea would pay no heed to the resolution of the Security Council.

When the Charter of the United Nations was drawn up, it was intended that such an act of aggression would be met by the dispatch of forces put at the disposal of the Security Council by member governments as the result of prior agreements. However, the Security Council has never been able to negotiate such agreements, for reasons which I need not go into now. In these circumstances, with one link missing in the chain which has been designed to hold aggression in check, it was impossible for the Security Council itself to take effective action to provide military assistance to the Republic of Korea. If help were to be given, the responsibility would have to be shouldered by individual members of the Security Council acting within the terms of the Charter, but on their own initiative. In this case the United States recognized a special responsibility which it discharged with admirable dispatch and decisiveness.

As hon. members will know, President Truman yesterday announced that the United States would send air and sea forces to give the Korean Government's troops cover and support. I feel sure that all members of the House will applaud and support this act of high courage and firm statesmanship on the part of the Government of the United States.

I think it would be appropriate, Mr. Speaker, if I read into the records of the House the statement of the President* . . .

I should like to point out, if I may, that although the United States Government has taken this step on its own authority, it is acting not only in accordance with the spirit and letter of the Charter of the United Nations, but also in pursuance of the resolution which was adopted by the Security Council on Sunday. This resolution, it will be remembered, called on all members of the United Nations to render every assistance in regard to its execution. It should also be borne in mind that the United States has accepted responsibility generally for the maintenance of international peace and security in the Pacific area, and specifically for the maintenance of the security of Japan as the power responsible under international agreements for the occupation of that country. Those specific responsibilities, as well as the responsibilities which are shared

*See Appendix 5.

by all of the members of the Security Council—and indeed by all members of the United Nations—for maintenance of international peace and security have no doubt contributed to the decision by the United States to come at once to the aid of Korea. If any further international authorization were needed for the prompt and vigorous action which has been taken by the United States, it has been provided by the further resolution of the Security Council which was passed last night recommending that the members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area concerned. That resolution was passed by a vote of seven in favour, one against, and two delegations non-participating because they had not at that time received instructions in regard to this matter . . .

The Government of Yugoslavia, which had produced a resolution of its own in this matter, voted against the United States resolution. The representatives of India and Egypt had not at that time last night received instructions. I understand they expect those instructions during the course of the day. The U.S.S.R., of course, took no part in the meeting, and the other delegations voted in favour of the resolution.

Possibly I should put on *Hansard* this extremely important resolution of the Security Council* . . .

That, Mr. Speaker, is the resolution of the Security Council on this matter. As hon. members know, Canada is not now a member of the Security Council and therefore no decision on our part was required yesterday in regard to this resolution; but I am sure that the House will support, as indeed does the Government, the action taken by the Security Council, because it represents collective action through the United Nations for peace.

It is the firm hope of the Canadian Government, as I am sure it is the firm hope of all members of this House and of the Canadian people, that this action which has now been taken by the Security Council and by the United States Government in conformity with the resolutions of the Security Council will soon end the war in Korea and thereby make possible a fresh attempt to compose the differences which have long kept that country in a state of tension and unrest, and which have led to the present outbreak of hostilities.

APPENDIX 8

Cablegram, dated June 29, 1950, from the United Nations Commission on Korea to the President of the Security Council, transmitting a report from the United Nations Field Observers.

Following report dated 24 June from United Nations field observers submitted to Commission on their return from field trip along 38th parallel commencing 9 June to report developments likely to involve military conflict is forwarded for information:

“General situation along Parallel. Principal impression left with observers after their field tour is that South Korea army is organized entirely for defence

*See Appendix 6.

and is in no condition to carry out attack on large scale against forces of North. Impression is based upon following main observations:

1. South Korea army in all sectors is disposed in depth. Parallel is guarded on southern side by small bodies troops located in scattered out-posts together with roving patrol. There is no concentration of troops and no massing for attack visible at any point.

2. At several points, North Korean forces are in effective possession of salients on south side parallel, occupation in at least one case being of fairly recent date. There is no evidence that South Korean forces have taken any steps for or are making any preparation to eject North Korean forces from any of these salients.

3. Proportion of South Korean forces are actively engaged in rounding up guerrilla bands that have infiltrated into the mountainous area in the eastern sectors. It was ascertained that these bands are in possession of demolition equipment and are more heavily armed than on previous occasions.

4. So far as equipment of South Korean forces concerned, in absence of armour, air support, and heavy artillery, any action with object of invasion would, by any military standards, be impossible.

5. South Korea army does not appear to be in possession of military or other supplies that would indicate preparation for large scale attack. In particular, there is no sign of any dumping of supplies or ammunition, petrol, oil, lubricant, in forward areas. Roads generally are little used and apart from convoy four trucks taking company from Kangnung westward to join rounding up guerrilla band, no concentration transport anywhere encountered.

6. In general, attitude South Korean commanders is one of vigilant defence. Their instructions do not go beyond retirement in case of attack upon previously prepared positions.

7. There is no indication of any extensive reconnaissance being carried out northward by South Korea army nor of any undue excitement or activity at divisional headquarters or regimental levels to suggest preparation for offensive activity. Observers were freely admitted to all sections various headquarters including operations room.

8. Observers made special point inquiring what information was coming in regarding situation North of parallel. In some sectors it has been reported that civilians had recently been removed from areas adjoining parallel to North to depths varying from 4 to 8 kilometers. Another report received during night Thursday 22 June at regimental headquarters Ongjin was to effect that there was increased military activity in vicinity Chuyia about 4 kilometers north parallel. No reports however have been received of any unusual activity on part of North Korean forces that would indicate any impending change in general situation along parallel."

Appendix 9

**Excerpts from statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs
in the House of Commons, June 29, 1950**

. . . In regard to the Security Council resolution which I mentioned yesterday, and which I stated we supported, as there was no indication in the House on any side of lack of support for that resolution, we immediately after yesterday's statement got in touch through our representatives in the United Nations with other members of the United Nations to exchange views as to how best we could implement this resolution. We know of course that the most important member of the United Nations in this particular matter is the United States. It is the country best able to intervene in this matter as an agent of the United Nations and it has already, as I said yesterday, acted effectively. Therefore we have been discussing not only at Lake Success but in Washington with United States authorities what action Canada, as another member of the United Nations, might appropriately take to help the Government of South Korea maintain itself in the face of this aggression. Also our High Commissioner in London is meeting with the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and with representatives of other Commonwealth governments to see what can be done, to exchange views with these governments on what they are preparing to do. Of course, as we know, some of these governments have already made statements. I think the committee will also be interested to learn of an announcement that the Government of India, the representative of which was not in a position yesterday to state his government's position on the Security Council resolution, has now indicated its full support of that resolution. Our High Commissioner in Pakistan has also cabled us that the Government of that eastern dominion of the Commonwealth, through its foreign secretary, has told him that they support strongly the Security Council's resolution.

The Secretariat of the United Nations, through one of its senior officials, was in touch with me yesterday to inquire whether we could do something which they consider of some immediate importance, and that is, to supply one or two military observers to join the United Nations Commission in Korea which, as members of the committee know, has been functioning there, although it recently had to leave South Korea temporarily, but I understand it is going back. The work of that Commission is of great importance, especially that aspect of it which deals with observation and report to Lake Success on what is going on. They have a lack of trained observers for that purpose, and they asked us if we could help fill the gap. I at once got in touch with my colleague, the Minister of National Defence, and we have agreed that we would make two military observers available at once for that particular duty.

APPENDIX 10

Statement by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons, June 30, 1950

Mr. Speaker, I should like to make a further brief report to the House with regard to our relationship to the present situation in Korea.

As the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) said yesterday, our responsibility in this matter arises entirely from our membership in the United Nations and from our support of the resolution of the Security Council passed on Tuesday last, part of which reads as follows:

"The Security Council. . . Recommends that the members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area."

Any participation by Canada in carrying out the foregoing resolution—and I wish to emphasize this strongly—would not be participation in war against any state. It would be our part in collective police action under the control and authority of the United Nations for the purpose of restoring peace to an area where an aggression has occurred as determined under the Charter of the United Nations by the Security Council, which decision has been accepted by us. It is only in such circumstances that this country would be involved in action of this kind. The House, I think, has already approved this position.

I would add, however, that if we are informed that a Canadian contribution to aid United Nations operations, under a United Nations commander, would be important to achieve the ends of peace, which is of course our only purpose, then the Government wishes Parliament to know that it would immediately consider making such a contribution. It might, for instance, take the form of destroyers to operate with other naval units of the United Nations, though our destroyers could not in any event reach Korean waters in less than about three weeks' time, because after all it is more than six thousand miles from Esquimalt.

Hon. members will recall that our naval units there were to proceed to European waters for summer exercises. These arrangements will be suspended, and the move will now be made into western Pacific waters, where the ships would be closer to the area where they might be of assistance to the United Nations and Korea if such assistance were required. If the situation in Korea or elsewhere, after prorogation, should deteriorate and action by Canada beyond that which I have indicated should be considered, Parliament will immediately be summoned to give the new situation consideration.

Meanwhile the Government, within the mandate which the attitude of the House in the last two days has given it, will do its full duty, within the measure of its power and ability, as a member of the United Nations, in common with other members, to make the collective action of the United Nations effective, and to restore peace in Korea.*

*The text of this statement by the Prime Minister was transmitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, under covering note from the Acting Permanent Delegate of Canada to the United Nations, on June 30, 1950.

APPENDIX 11

Security Council resolution, July 7, 1950*The Security Council,*

Having determined that the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea constitutes a breach of the peace,

Having recommended that Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area,

1. *Welcomes* the prompt and vigorous support which governments and peoples of the United Nations have given to its Resolutions of 25 and 27 June 1950 to assist the Republic of Korea in defending itself against armed attack and thus to restore international peace and security in the area;

2. *Notes* that Members of the United Nations have transmitted to the United Nations offers of assistance for the Republic of Korea;

3. *Recommends* that all Members providing military forces and other assistance pursuant to the aforesaid Security Council resolutions make such forces and other assistance available to a Unified Command under the United States;

4. *Requests* the United States to designate the commander of such forces;

5. *Authorizes* the Unified Command at its discretion to use the United Nations flag in the course of operations against North Korean forces concurrently with the flags of the various nations participating;

6. *Requests* the United States to provide the Security Council with reports as appropriate on the course of action taken under the Unified Command.

APPENDIX 12

Note from the Acting Permanent Delegate of Canada to the United Nations, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, July 12, 1950

With my letter to you dated June 30 I enclosed the text of a statement which was made by the Right Honourable Louis S. St. Laurent, Prime Minister of Canada, in the House of Commons in Ottawa on June 30. In the course of that statement Mr. St. Laurent declared that "if we are informed that a Canadian contribution to aid United Nations operations under a United Nations Commander would be important to achieve the ends of peace which is, of course, our only purpose, then the Government wishes Parliament to know that it would immediately consider making such a contribution."

2. General MacArthur has now been designated by the United States as the Commander of the forces of the United Nations for the defence of the Republic of Korea, in accordance with the Security Council's resolution of the 7th of July. The Canadian Government has, furthermore, been informed that destroyers can be of assistance in United Nations operations for the defence of Korea.

3. Three Canadian destroyers sailed last week from the Pacific coast of Canada for western Pacific waters. These vessels are hereby made available to the United Nations and appropriate action is being taken by the Canadian Government to place them at once under the operational control of the Commander-in-Chief of the forces made available by members of the United Nations for the defence of the Republic of Korea against the aggression committed by North Korean forces.

4. The Commanding Officer of these vessels is being instructed to report to the headquarters of General MacArthur and is being authorized to use the United Nations flag, in accordance with the Security Council's resolution of the 7th of July.

5. It would be appreciated if you would bring this decision of the Canadian Government to the attention of General MacArthur as quickly as possible.

APPENDIX 13

Telegram from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Acting Canadian Permanent Delegate to the United Nations, July 14, 1950

I have the honour to acknowledge your reply of 12 July 1950 regarding the Security Council resolution of 27 June 1950 and wish to express my appreciation for the decision of the Canadian Government, under the terms of the resolution, to make available to the United Nations three Canadian destroyers which have sailed for Western Pacific waters. Your reply has been transmitted to the Security Council, to the Government of the Republic of Korea, and to the Unified Command (USG).

I have been informed that the Government of the United States which, under the resolution of 7 July 1950 has been given the responsibility for the Unified Command, is now prepared to engage in direct consultation with your Government with regard to the co-ordination of all assistance in a general plan for the attainment of the objectives set forth in the Security Council resolution. In this connection I have been advised that there is an urgent need for additional effective assistance. I should be grateful, therefore, if your Government would examine its capacity to provide an increased volume of combat forces, particularly ground forces. Offers of military assistance should be communicated to the Secretary-General in terms leaving detailed arrangements for subsequent agreements between your Government and the Unified Command (USG).

APPENDIX 14

Statement by the Prime Minister, July 19, 1950

The attack of the North Korean aggressors on South Korea is a breach in the outer defences of the free world. Each of the free nations has its responsibilities. So far as Canada is concerned, we have our obligations as a Member of the United Nations. We have our obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty. We have our joint responsibility with the United States for the defence of the North American continent.

The resistance to aggression in Korea is to restore peace and to check those aggressive forces which threaten a world war. As an essential step to this end the nations of the free world must examine urgently and carefully where each can make its weight most effectively felt in the overall defence pattern.

The Cabinet has had under consideration the communication addressed last Friday by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the 52 nations which had supported resistance to aggression in Korea. The Secretary-General has asked these governments to consider what assistance they could offer to the United Nations Commander.

The Cabinet has given full and earnest study to the Secretary-General's request for assistance in the light both of the needs of the Korean situation and of the other interests and responsibilities of Canada. In this connection, the Cabinet has had before it detailed reports from the three Armed Services and the advice of the Chiefs of Staff. We have also been in touch with the civil and military authorities of the United States.

Already three Canadian destroyers are proceeding to Korean waters. To be prepared for other eventualities, including the requirements for supporting the ships now in the Far East, authority has been given for the Navy to place additional ships in commission, to bring others up to full complement, and to recruit whatever additional men are needed. In making this decision the Government has kept in mind the well understood role of the Canadian Navy in protecting sea lanes against submarines, mines and coastal raids.

Having in mind the other obligations for the employment of Canadian ground forces, the Cabinet has reached the conclusion that the despatch, at this stage, of existing first line elements of the Canadian Army to the Korean theatre would not be warranted. However, with a view to strengthening the Canadian Army to meet future requirements the Cabinet has authorized recruiting above present ceilings and the acceleration of other aspects of the Army programme. Should a decision be taken by the Security Council of the United Nations to recruit an international force for service, under the U.N. Commander, in Korea, the Canadian Government will give immediate consideration to Canadian participation in such an undertaking. Any participation of this nature would require approval by Parliament in accordance with my statement made in the House of Commons on 30th of June.

It has been indicated to the Government that transport by air is an immediate need. The Government has, therefore, decided to provide at once a long range RCAF transport squadron for service in the Pacific air lift. The programme for increasing the operational strength of the RCAF is being accelerated. Canadian aircraft production is being speeded up, and additional personnel will be recruited and trained.

The Korean situation cannot be viewed in isolation. The attack on the Republic of Korea has increased the cohesion of resistance to aggressive Communism in other parts of the world. The measures which the United States Government have taken and are taking are far-reaching and significant. Here in Canada we also shall press on with measures which will increase the preparedness of this country. We are increasing immediately our defence effort and expenditure. We are also giving consideration to further measures of aid by this country to our North Atlantic partners.

Grave decisions may lie ahead but it is deeply sustaining to know that the well-nigh unanimous weight of Canadian public opinion is behind the Government in its decision that Canada do its share in resisting aggression and restoring peace.

APPENDIX 15

**Note from the Acting Permanent Delegate of Canada to the United Nations,
to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, July 21, 1950**

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your message dated 14 July 1950 concerning additional assistance to the forces operating in Korea under authority of the Security Council's resolution of 27 June.

I am instructed to inform you that the Canadian Government has given full and earnest study to the request contained in your message in the light both of the needs of the Korean situation and of the other interests and responsibilities of Canada.

The Canadian Government understands that there is an immediate need for additional air transport. It has therefore decided to make available, at once, to the United Nations a long range air transport squadron including ground crews of the Royal Canadian Air Force, for assistance in the Pacific air lift. In accordance with your suggestion, the detailed arrangements for the participation of this squadron will be made with the Unified Command established under authority of the Security Council.

With respect to ground forces, for the reasons indicated in a statement issued by the Prime Minister on 19 July (of which I am enclosing a copy) the Canadian Government is unable, at this stage, to despatch existing first line elements of the Canadian army to the Korean theatre.*

You will observe that in Mr. St. Laurent's statement reference is made to the Canadian Government's willingness to give consideration to participation in a United Nations force for service in Korea should a decision to that effect be taken by the Security Council.

With respect to naval assistance, you are aware three Canadian destroyers are already proceeding to Korean waters for service under the Unified Command.

As you will observe from the Prime Minister's statement, the Canadian Government, having in mind its defence responsibilities, including those as a member of the United Nations, is taking immediate steps for strengthening and increasing its armed forces.

APPENDIX 16

Security Council resolution, July 31, 1950

The Security Council,

Recognizing the hardships and privations to which the people of Korea are being subjected as a result of the continued prosecution by the North Korean forces of their unlawful attack; and

Appreciating the spontaneous offers of assistance to the Korean people which have been made by governments, specialized agencies, and non-governmental organizations;

Requests the Unified Command to exercise responsibility for determining the requirements for the relief and support of the civilian population of Korea, and for establishing in the field the procedures for providing such relief and support;

*See Appendix 14

Requests the Secretary-General to transmit all offers of assistance for relief and support to the Unified Command;

Requests the Unified Command to provide the Security Council with reports, as appropriate, on its relief activities;

Requests the Secretary-General, the Economic and Social Council in accordance with Article 65 of the Charter, other appropriate United Nations principal and subsidiary organs, the specialized agencies in accordance with the terms of their respective agreements with the United Nations, and appropriate non-governmental organizations to provide such assistance as the Unified Command may request for the relief and support of the civilian population of Korea, and as appropriate in connection with the responsibilities being carried out by the Unified Command on behalf of the Security Council.

APPENDIX 17

Statement by the President of the Security Council, July 31, 1950

Before adjourning, I should like, as President of the Security Council, to note with satisfaction the response to the request for participation by members of the United Nations in police operations against the aggressor in Korea. Land, naval and air contingents have been or are being made available to assist South Korean and United States forces which are at present bearing so courageously the burden of combat. These contingents will constitute, with those already in action, a United Nations force which will operate together under a Unified Command.

This is a development of great practical and even greater historical significance. The Council, in taking note of it will, I feel sure, wish to add an expression of its hope that other contributions, particularly of land troops, can be added as soon as possible to the United Nations forces which are now being assembled.

APPENDIX 18

Statement by the Prime Minister, August 7, 1950

I would like to talk to you tonight about recent serious international developments, and of the relationship of our country to them. I am thinking—as you are—more particularly of the Communist aggression in Korea. But we have to be even more concerned with the menacing implications of this aggression.

There was, of course, nothing really new about the Communist aggression in Korea: the same kind of thing had happened—though not in the same way—over and over again since the end of the war in 1945. What was new was the prompt action of the United Nations, led by the United States, in resisting the Communist attack on Korea.

The action of the United Nations in Korea is not war; it is police action intended to prevent war by discouraging aggression. That is why Korea is so important to all of us who want to avoid another world war; and that is why the government at once pledged Canada's support to the United Nations action in Korea.

Everyone knows, and every honest person will admit, that all the free countries in the world want to avoid war, and most of us realize that the only way to avoid war is by positive action to prevent it. That is why we set up the United Nations. That is why twelve nations joined in the North Atlantic alliance. The last five years have shown us, however, that peaceful intentions and peaceful policies are not enough to avoid war; and that we must also have the strength to meet and to repel aggression.

You remember what happened before 1939. One successful act of Fascist aggression followed another, until the Fascist tide of conquest could be stopped only by a world war.

That must not be allowed to happen again, and it seems clear the only way to prevent it is to call a halt to aggression. That is what is being done now. There is a real chance that the final defeat of the Communist aggressors in Korea will discourage aggression in other places because the risks will appear too great.

It is going to be hard for nations hungering for peace and not yet recovered from six years of total war, once again to give first place to re-armament. But events force us to be realistic. If we are to avert the danger which threatens the free world, we must marshal and increase the resources available to resist aggression; we must build up military strength backed by industrial strength; we must accept the economic and financial policies which will enable us to maintain our strength.

All Canadians have been impressed by the expansion by the United States and Great Britain of their defence programmes; and we in the government feel the security of Canada requires further expansion of our own efforts.

Obviously it is essential to overcome the aggressors in Korea; it is just as urgent to make the free world as strong as collective efforts can make it to resist aggression anywhere.

Thus far in Korea itself, the main burden has fallen on the armed forces of the United States. This was because the United States alone had forces immediately available to throw into the struggle. These American forces have resisted a well-armed and well-trained Communist force with outstanding heroism; and the strength to turn the military tide is being built up with the greatest urgency.

We in Canada took our stand with the United Nations against this Communist aggression. Three Canadian destroyers were at once despatched to Far Eastern waters, and placed under the United Nations command. And we know they are giving a good account of themselves.

The government at once considered what other effective immediate help Canada could give in response to the appeal to all the United Nations to contribute to the necessary collective strength.

On the 19th of July I was able to announce that Canada was providing a long range RCAF transport squadron for immediate service in the Pacific air-lift at a time when transport planes were urgently needed. As you know, the squadron is already engaged in that difficult and essential task.

We decided at that time to announce only what we could do at once. As to future effective action, we have been giving urgent and constant consideration to every possibility.

Everyone knows that ground troops trained and ready for immediate action with the existing United States forces would be of assistance. The

government considered whether any part of the Canadian army should be despatched to Korea for immediate action. Having in mind other obligations for the employment of Canadian ground forces and the uncertainties of the whole world situation, we reached the conclusion that the despatch, at this stage, of existing first line elements of the Canadian army to the Korean theatre would not be warranted. I announced that decision on July 19 and that remains the view of the government.

Let me tell you why. Since our wartime forces were demobilized we have not attempted to maintain, in the Canadian army, a fully trained expeditionary force available for immediate action outside Canada.

We wanted to get the best value we could for the Canadian taxpayers' defence dollars; and for the army, the first requirements were for our immediate territorial defence and for a basic training establishment. We have developed an air-borne brigade group highly trained for operations in the North and designed to share in the immediate protection of this continent. We have also maintained an establishment for the rapid expansion of the Canadian army in the event of a general war.

But, at this time, we have no expeditionary force in being. Moreover, before the aggression in Korea, no definite plans existed for the creation of a United Nations force. And that was certainly not the fault of Canada. As early as 1946 I myself stated to the Assembly of the United Nations that the people of Canada were anxious to know what military contribution they would be expected to make to the international forces to be established under the United Nations Charter. But, in spite of its obligations under the Charter, the Soviet Union, by its wilful obstruction, prevented an international force from being set up.

The action taken by the United Nations in respect of Korea is in fact its first effective attempt to organize an international force to stop aggression. In consequence, the government and the people of Canada were faced with two questions. First, how much and in what way should we contribute to the United Nations police action in Korea and, secondly, how much and in what way could we increase our ability to participate in other common efforts, either under the United Nations Charter or the North Atlantic Treaty.

We have considered several possible courses. It was not too difficult to decide that some courses would certainly be unwise, but it has been much less easy to determine what positive course is likely to be most effective.

I have already said we could not send the trained brigade group, or any worthwhile part of it, to Korea without dangerously weakening our own immediate defences.

There has been talk of a United Nations Police Division of Volunteers and this may in time work out, and be of value for areas other than Korea. If and when such a division is formed along lines considered practicable, the government will recommend appropriate Canadian participation.

But we feel the present situation calls for something more immediate. The government has therefore authorized the recruitment of an additional army brigade which is beginning on Wednesday. This brigade will be known as the Canadian Army Special Force and it will be specially trained and equipped to be available for use in carrying out Canada's obligations under the United Nations Charter or the North Atlantic Pact. Naturally, this brigade will, subject to the approval of Parliament, be available for service in

Korea as part of United Nations forces, if it can be most effectively used in that way when it is ready for service. The way in which it could be used in the United Nations force is being discussed with the Unified Command.

For this new brigade the army wants young men, physically fit, mentally alert, single or married, particularly, just as many veterans of the Second World War as possible. The brigade will, of course, include infantry, artillery and other elements. The infantry units will be organized as second battalions of the Royal Canadian Regiment, of the Princess Patricia's and the Royal 22nd. The association of the new brigade with these historic regiments will have numerous advantages.

In accordance with the policy announced on July 19, we are also pressing on with recruiting for the other active forces of the Army, for the Navy, and the Air Force which are all being expanded, and for the reserve forces which form such an important part of the defence system of Canada.

We are accelerating the production of our new all-weather two-seater jet fighter, the CF-100, now known as the "Canuck". Its tests have exceeded expectations. This week will see the test flight of the first of the F-86 Sabres manufactured in Canada.

We are greatly expanding our capacity to produce the Orenda jet engine.

At the same time, we are stepping up our production programme for naval vessels, armament, ammunition, radar and other types of equipment.

We are working in the closest co-operation with the United States to the end that our joint resources and facilities are put to the most effective use in the common defence effort.

We have in Canada a capacity for defence production far greater than we need to meet our own defence requirements, heavily increased though these will be. We are looking forward confidently to an acceleration and an intensification of our joint production efforts. To this end, the Joint United States-Canada Industrial Mobilization Planning Committee is meeting in Ottawa tomorrow.

On the closing day of the last session of Parliament, I said that if the situation in Korea or elsewhere should deteriorate and further action by Canada be considered, Parliament would be summoned. The situation in Korea has deteriorated, and the expansion and accelerating of our defence programme will require Parliamentary action. The government has, therefore, decided that Parliament should be summoned as soon as it is possible to gather the fuller information and to formulate the specific plans we will wish to lay before Parliament. It is now felt that the date is apt to be six or seven weeks hence, though naturally Parliament will be called earlier if it appears that an earlier meeting is required by international developments or would expedite effective action.

It should be remembered that in addition to the developments in Korea, important meetings of the North Atlantic Treaty organization are now going on all the time. We want to place before Parliament just as complete a picture as possible of the entire world situation, as well as details of the expansion of our defence programme to meet that situation. No time is being lost. We are pressing on, in the meantime, with everything useful that can be done to increase our effective strength.

In taking these actions and in formulating the programme to be laid before Parliament, our objective is not to make war. We are, as all our people wish us to, doing our best to prevent war.

No one can guarantee that, through the action we are all now taking, the free nations will succeed in preventing a general war. We do know that no one of them can do this alone and that our best chance of doing it is by following wise and progressive international policies and by building up our joint strength with speed and determination. We owe it to ourselves, to each other, to our children, and to each other's children, to do everything human foresight can suggest to prevent the disasters of a third world war. Under Providence I hope and I trust we shall succeed.

APPENDIX 19

Note from the Acting Permanent Delegate of Canada to the United Nations, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, August 11, 1950

I have the honour to refer to my message No. 29 of July 21, 1950 concerning additional Canadian assistance to the forces operating in Korea under the authority of the Security Council's Resolution of June 27. In that message I informed you that the Canadian Government had decided to make available to the United Nations a long-range air transport squadron, including ground crews, of the Royal Canadian Air Force, for assistance in the Pacific air-lift.

I am instructed to inform you that the Canadian Government has now decided, with the co-operation of Canadian Pacific Airlines, to make available, at once, to the United Nations, the complete passenger facilities of the regular Canadian commercial air service between Vancouver and Tokyo, operated by Canadian Pacific Airlines, on two flights a week west-bound and the equivalent of one flight a week east-bound.

The detailed arrangements for the participation of these aircraft will be made with the Unified Command established under the authority of the Security Council.

APPENDIX 20

Note from the Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, August 14, 1950

The Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada requested me, on my departure from Ottawa last week, to deliver to you immediately upon my arrival in New York the text of a statement of August 7, 1950, by the Prime Minister. You will observe that in the course of this statement Mr. St. Laurent announced that the Government had authorized the recruitment of an additional army brigade, to be known as the Canadian Army Special Force, which will be specially trained and equipped to be available, amongst other things, for use in carrying out Canada's obligations under the United Nations Charter. The Prime Minister stated that this brigade would, subject to the approval of the Parliament of Canada, be available for service in Korea as part of the United Nations forces, if it can be most effectively used in that way when it is ready for service. I am enclosing for your information a full copy of the text of Mr. St. Laurent's address on August 7.*

*See Appendix 18

APPENDIX 21

Note from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations, August 21, 1950

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of the communication of the Acting Permanent Representative of Canada dated 11th August 1950 and your own dated 14th August 1950 concerning additional effective assistance to the Unified Command (USG) in Korea. I wish to convey to you and through you to your Government my sincere appreciation of the further assistance provided by the Government of Canada by making available to the United Nations the complete passenger facilities of the regular Canadian Air Service between Vancouver and Tokyo and of the Canadian Government's decision to authorize recruitment of an additional army brigade which will, subject to the approval of Parliament, be available for service in Korea as part of the United Nations Forces. Understand that detailed arrangements for the participation of the aircraft and for the use of the Canadian Army Special Force will be made with the Unified Command (USG). The text of your Government's communications have been transmitted to the Unified Command and the Security Council.

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