













HOUSE OF COMMONS  
Second Session—Twenty-seventh Parliament  
1967

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STANDING COMMITTEE  
ON  
**EXTERNAL AFFAIRS**

*Chairman:* Mr. JEAN-EUDES DUBÉ

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PROCEEDINGS

No. 1

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TUESDAY, MAY 30, 1967

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INCLUDING

*Appendix A*

Main Estimates 1967-68 of the Department  
of External Affairs

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.  
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY  
OTTAWA, 1967

STANDING COMMITTEE  
ON  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Chairman: Mr. Jean-Eudes Dubé

Vice-Chairman: Mr. W. B. Nesbitt

and

Mr. Allmand,  
Mr. Andras,  
Mr. Asselin  
(Charlevoix),  
Mr. Brewin,  
Mr. Churchill,  
Mr. Faulkner,  
Mr. Forest,

Mr. Forrestall,  
Mr. Harkness,  
Mr. Klein,  
Mr. Lambert,  
Mr. Laprise,  
Mr. Lind,  
Mr. Macdonald  
(Rosedale),

Mr. Macquarrie,  
Mr. McIntosh,  
Mr. Pelletier,  
Mr. Pilon,  
Mr. Prud'homme,  
Mr. Stanbury,  
Mr. Thompson,  
Mr. Walker—(24).

Fernand Despatie,  
Clerk of the Committee.

TUESDAY, MAY 30, 1987

INCLUDING

Appendix A

Main Estimates 1987-88 of the Department  
of External Affairs

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS  
ORDERS OF REFERENCE

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

FRIDAY, May 19, 1967.

*Resolved*,—That the following Members do compose the Standing Committee on External Affairs:

Messrs.

Allmand,	Forrestall,	McIntosh,
Andras,	Harkness,	Nesbitt,
Asselin ( <i>Charlevoix</i> ),	Klein,	Pelletier,
Brewin,	Lambert,	Pilon,
Churchill,	Laprise,	Prud'homme,
Dubé,	Lind,	Stanbury,
Faulkner,	Macdonald ( <i>Rosedale</i> ),	Thompson,
Forest,	Macquarrie,	Walker—(24).

On motion of Mr. Macquarrie, seconded by Mr. Laprise,  
*Resolved*,—That a motion be moved.  
Thereupon, the Clerk of the Committee read:  
THURSDAY, May 25, 1967.

*Ordered*,—That, saving always the powers of the Committee of Supply in relation to the voting of public monies, the items listed in the Main Estimates for 1967-68, relating to the Department of External Affairs be withdrawn from the Committee of Supply and referred to the Standing Committee on External Affairs.

*Attest*

LÉON-J. RAYMOND,

*The Clerk of the House of Commons.*



## MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

TUESDAY, May 30, 1967.

(1)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs met at 10.35 a.m. this day, for organization purposes.

*Members present:* Messrs. Allmand, Andras, Dubé, Faulkner, Lambert, Laprise, Lind, Macdonald (*Rosedale*), Macquarrie, McIntosh, Pilon, Stanbury, Walker (13).

*Also present:* Mr. Lewis, M.P.

The Clerk of the Committee opened the meeting and presided over the election of the Chairman of the Committee.

Mr. Macdonald (*Rosedale*) moved, seconded by Mr. Allmand,  
—That Mr. Dubé be elected Chairman of the Committee.

On motion of Mr. Macquarrie, seconded by Mr. Laprise,  
*Resolved*,—That nominations be closed.

Thereupon, the Clerk of the Committee declared Mr. Dubé duly elected Chairman of the Committee.

The Clerk of the Committee then invited the Chairman to come to the head table and the conduct of the meeting was turned over to Mr. Dubé.

The Chairman thanked the Committee for the honour conferred upon him.

Mr. Macquarrie moved, seconded by Mr. Lambert,  
—That Mr. Nesbitt be elected Vice-Chairman of the Committee.

On motion of Mr. Andras, seconded by Mr. Pilon,  
*Resolved*,—That nominations be closed.

Thereupon, the Chairman declared Mr. Nesbitt duly elected Vice-Chairman of the Committee.

On motion of Mr. Macdonald (*Rosedale*), seconded by Mr. Walker,  
*Resolved*,—That the Chairman and five members appointed by him do compose the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure.

On motion of Mr. Stanbury, seconded by Mr. Lambert,  
*Resolved*,—That the Committee print from day to day 850 copies in English and 350 copies in French of its Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, with the understanding that additional copies will be printed when required, on special occasions.

On motion of Mr. Macquarrie, seconded by Mr. Macdonald (*Rosedale*),  
*Resolved*,—That the items listed in the Main Estimates for 1967-68, relating to the Department of External Affairs, be printed as an appendix to this day's Minutes of Proceedings (*see Appendix A*).

The Chairman indicated that the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure would meet in the near future in order to discuss matters pertaining to the work of the Committee.

At 10.50 a.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

Fernand Despatie,  
Clerk of the Committee.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

Tuesday, May 30, 1967

(1)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs met at 10:30 a.m. this day for organizational purposes.

Members present: Messrs. Allmand, Andrus, Dube, Foulkes, Lambert, Laprise, Lind, Macdonald (Rosdale), Macquarrie, McIntosh, Pilon, Stansbury, Walker (13).

Also present: Mr. Lewis, M.P.

The Clerk of the Committee opened the meeting and presided over the election of the Chairman of the Committee.

Mr. Macdonald (Rosdale) moved, seconded by Mr. Allmand, —That Mr. Dube be elected Chairman of the Committee.

On motion of Mr. Macquarrie, seconded by Mr. Laprise, Resolved—That nominations be closed.

Thereupon, the Clerk of the Committee declared Mr. Dube duly elected Chairman of the Committee.

The Clerk of the Committee then invited the Chairman to come to the head table and the conduct of the meeting was turned over to Mr. Dube.

The Chairman thanked the Committee for the honor conferred upon him.

Mr. Macquarrie moved, seconded by Mr. Lambert, —That Mr. Nesbitt be elected Vice-Chairman of the Committee.

On motion of Mr. Andrus, seconded by Mr. Pilon, Resolved—That nominations be closed.

Thereupon, the Chairman declared Mr. Nesbitt duly elected Vice-Chairman of the Committee.

On motion of Mr. Macdonald (Rosdale), seconded by Mr. Walker, Resolved—That the Chairman and five members appointed by him to compose the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure.

On motion of Mr. Stansbury, seconded by Mr. Lambert, Resolved—That the Committee print from day to day 250 copies in English and 250 copies in French of its Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence with the understanding that additional copies will be printed when required, on special occasions.

On motion of Mr. Macquarrie, seconded by Mr. Macdonald (Rosdale), Resolved—That the items listed in the Main Estimates for 1967-68 relating to the Department of External Affairs be printed as an appendix to this day's Minutes of Proceedings (see Appendix A).



## EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

No. of Vote	Service	1967-68	1966-67	Change	
				Increase	Decrease
		\$	\$	\$	\$
A—DEPARTMENT					
(S)	Secretary of State for External Affairs— Salary and Motor Car Allowance (Details, page 118)	17,000	17,000		
1	Administration, Operation and Maintenance, including payment of remuneration, subject to the approval of the Governor in Council and notwithstanding the Civil Service Act, in connection with the assignment by the Canadian Government of Canadians to the staffs of the International Organizations detailed in the Estimates and authority to make recoverable advances in amounts not exceeding in the aggregate the amounts of the shares of those Organizations of such expenses, and authority, notwithstanding the Civil Service Act, for the appointment and fixing of salaries of Commissioners (International Commissions for Supervision and Control in Indo-China), Secretaries and staff by the Governor in Council; and authority, notwithstanding the Civil Service Act, for the appointment and fixing of salaries of High Commissioners, Ambassadors, Ministers Plenipotentiary, Consuls, Secretaries and staff by the Governor in Council; assistance and repatriation of distressed Canadian citizens and persons of Canadian domicile abroad, including their dependents; cultural relations and academic exchange programs with other countries (Details, page 118)	42,260,000	35,733,000	6,527,000	
10	Construction, acquisition or improvement of Buildings, Works, Land, Equipment and Furnishings (Details, page 123)	5,085,000	3,095,000	1,990,000	
15	Assessments, grants, contributions and other payments to International (including Commonwealth) Organizations and International Multilateral Economic and Special Aid Programs as detailed in the Estimates, including authority to pay assessments in the amounts and in the currencies in which they are levied, and authority to pay other amounts specified in the currencies of the countries indicated, notwithstanding that the total of such payments may exceed the equivalent in Canadian dollars, estimated as of January, 1967, which is (Details, page 131)	34,437,700	33,623,800	813,900	
(S)	Payments under the Diplomatic Service (Special) Superannuation Act, and Pensions (Details, page 134)	49,000	48,000	1,000	
(S)	Credits to the Government of India under a financial agreement entered into between the Government of Canada and the Government of India to finance the purchase in Canada of aircraft and associated spare parts and equipment (Details, page 134)	92,000	160,000		68,000
		81,923,700	72,659,800	9,263,900	

No. of Vote	Service	1967-68	1966-67	Change	
				Increase	Decrease
		\$	\$	\$	\$
<b>A—DEPARTMENT (Continued)</b>					
<b>EXTERNAL AID OFFICE</b>					
30	Salaries and Expenses (Details, page 134).....	2,521,700	1,735,200	786,500	
35	Economic, technical, educational and other assistance as detailed in the Estimates (Details, page 135).....	130,100,000	151,600,000		21,500,000
—	Appropriation not required for 1967-68 (Details, page 136).....		9,428,572		9,428,572
		132,621,700	162,763,772		30,142,072
<b>SUMMARY</b>					
	To be voted.....	214,404,400	235,215,572		20,811,172
	Authorized by Statute.....	158,000	225,000		67,000
		214,562,400	235,440,572		20,878,172
<b>B—INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION</b>					
40	Salaries and Expenses of the Commission and Canada's share of the expenses of studies, surveys and investigations of the Commission (Details, page 137).....	489,200	395,700	93,500	

Positions (man-years)		Details of Services	Amount	
1967-68	1966-67		1967-68	1966-67
			\$	\$
		<b>A—DEPARTMENT</b>		
		<b>Approximate Value of Major Services not included in these Estimates</b>		
		Accommodation (provided by the Department of Public Works).....	837,500	654,500
		Accommodation (in this Department's own buildings). Accounting and cheque issue services (Comptroller of the Treasury).....	211,200	170,400
		Contributions to Superannuation Account (Treasury Board).....	617,700	466,600
		Contributions to Canada Pension Plan Account and Quebec Pension Plan Account (Treasury Board)....	1,216,000	678,600
		Employee surgical-medical insurance premiums (Treasury Board).....	171,300	176,800
		Employee compensation payments (Department of Labour).....	107,700	62,800
		Carrying of franked mail (Post Office Department).....	2,100	2,700
			96,800	93,900
			<b>3,260,300</b>	<b>2,306,300</b>
		<b>Statutory—Secretary of State for External Affairs— Salary and Motor Car Allowance</b>		
		Salary.....(1)	15,000	15,000
		Motor Car Allowance.....(2)	2,000	2,000
			<b>17,000</b>	<b>17,000</b>
		<b>Vote 1—Administration, Operation and Maintenance, including payment of remuneration, subject to the approval of the Governor in Council and notwithstanding the Civil Service Act, in connection with the assignment by the Canadian Government of Canadians to the staffs of the International Organizations detailed in the Estimates and authority to make recoverable advances in amounts not exceeding in the aggregate the amounts of the shares of those Organizations of such expenses, and authority, notwithstanding the Civil Service Act, for the appointment and fixing of salaries of Commissioners (International Commissions for Supervision and Control in Indo-China), Secretaries and staff by the Governor in Council; and authority, notwithstanding the Civil Service Act, for the appointment and fixing of salaries of High Commissioners, Ambassadors, Ministers Plenipotentiary, Consuls, Secretaries and staff by the Governor in Council; assistance and repatriation of distressed Canadian citizens and persons of Canadian domicile abroad, including their dependents; cultural relations and academic exchange programs with other countries</b>		

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

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Positions (man-years)		Details of Services	Amount	
1967-68	1966-67		1967-68	1966-67
			\$	\$
A—DEPARTMENT (Continued)				
<b>Vote 1 (Continued)</b>				
DEPARTMENTAL ADMINISTRATION				
Salaried Positions:				
Executive, Scientific and Professional:				
1	1	Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (\$29,160)		
1	1	Deputy Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (\$20,500-\$24,750)		
3	3	Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (\$20,500-\$24,750)		
1	1	Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (\$18,500-\$22,750)		
1	1	Chairman, Canadian Section of Canada-United States Permanent Joint Board on Defence (\$7,000)		
1		Senior Officer 1 (\$16,500-\$20,500)		
2	2	(\$14,000-\$16,000)		
3	3	(\$12,000-\$14,000)		
2	2	(\$10,000-\$12,000)		
3	3	(\$8,000-\$10,000)		
4	4	(\$6,000-\$8,000)		
Administrative and Foreign Service:				
11	14	Head of Post (1 at \$22,680, 2 at \$22,000, 2 at \$20,750, 5 at \$19,500, 1 at \$19,000)		
11	5	Foreign Service Officer 10, External Affairs (\$24,250)		
7	9	Foreign Service Officer 9, External Affairs (\$22,000)		
40	37	Foreign Service Officer 8, External Affairs (\$20,750)		
45	42	Foreign Service Officer 7, External Affairs (\$18,500-\$19,500)		
71		(\$16,000-\$18,000)		
110	62	(\$14,000-\$16,000)		
219	90	(\$12,000-\$14,000)		
35	232	(\$10,000-\$12,000)		
64	49	(\$8,000-\$10,000)		
100	101	(\$6,000-\$8,000)		
	1	(\$4,000-\$6,000)		
Technical, Operational and Service				
3	1	(\$12,000-\$14,000)		
10	3	(\$10,000-\$12,000)		
26	13	(\$8,000-\$10,000)		
103	78	(\$6,000-\$8,000)		
172	199	(\$4,000-\$6,000)		
8	7	(Under \$4,000)		
Administrative Support:				
2		(\$8,000-\$10,000)		
111	14	(\$6,000-\$8,000)		
966	956	(\$4,000-\$6,000)		
202	228	(Under \$4,000)		
12	20	(Seasonal)		
Local Assistance Abroad:				
807	734	(Full Time)		
3,157	2,916			
(3,154)	(2,911)	Continuing Establishment.....	18,974,000	15,302,000
(202)	(183)	Casuals and Maintenance Staff.....	367,000	328,000
(3,356)	(3,094)	Salaries and Wages (including \$1,100,000 allotted during 1966-67 from the Finance Contingencies Vote for increases in rates of pay).....(1)	19,341,000	15,630,000

Positions (man-years)		Details of Services	Amount	
1967-68	1966-67		1967-68	1966-67
			\$	\$
A—DEPARTMENT (Continued)				
<b>Vote 1 (Continued)</b>				
DEPARTMENTAL ADMINISTRATION (Continued)				
		Overtime.....(1)	418,000	311,000
		Allowances.....(2)	7,441,000	6,258,000
		Professional and Special Services.....(4)	563,000	312,000
		Courier Service.....(5)	560,000	373,000
		Removal and Home Leave Expenses.....(5)	2,170,000	1,990,000
		Other Travelling Expenses.....(5)	1,119,000	700,000
		Freight, Express and Cartage.....(6)	181,000	170,000
		Postage.....(7)	277,000	259,000
		Carriage of Diplomatic Mail.....(8)	52,000	57,000
		Telephones, Telegrams, and Other Communication Services.....(8)	2,819,000	2,741,000
		Publication of Departmental Reports and Other Material.....(9)	268,000	289,000
		Displays, Films, and Other Informational Publicity.....(10)	127,000	142,000
		Office Stationery, Supplies and Repairs to Office Equipment.....(11)	876,000	780,000
		Purchase of Publications for Distribution.....(12)	102,000	78,000
		Fuel for Heating and Other Materials and Supplies.....(12)	269,000	269,000
		Repairs and Upkeep of Buildings and Works.....(14)	750,000	551,000
		Rentals of Land, Buildings and Works.....(15)	1,180,000	1,095,000
		Acquisition of Equipment.....(16)		72,000
		Repairs and Upkeep of Equipment.....(17)	310,000	304,000
		Rental of Equipment.....(18)	3,000	5,000
		Taxes on Diplomatic Properties in the Ottawa Area.....(19)	282,000	285,000
		Municipal or Public Utilities Services.....(19)	260,000	260,000
		Benefits in Consideration of Personal Services.....(21)	140,000	120,000
		Official Hospitality.....(22)	200,000	50,000
		Assistance to Distressed Canadians (Part Recoverable).....(22)	25,000	25,000
		Compensation to Employees for Loss or Damage to Furniture and Effects.....(22)	2,000	2,000
		Sundries.....(22)	215,000	167,000
		Expenses Related to the Canada-West Indies Prime Ministerial Conference.....(22)		150,000
			39,950,000	33,445,000
		Expenditure Revenue		
		1964-65.....	\$ 26,443,842	\$1,136,315
		1965-66.....	30,009,856	1,200,467
		1966-67 (estimated).....	34,233,000	1,330,000
CANADA'S CIVILIAN PARTICIPATION AS A MEMBER OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSIONS FOR SUPERVISION AND CONTROL IN INDO-CHINA INCLUDING AUTHORITY, NOTWITHSTANDING THE CIVIL SERVICE ACT, FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND FIXING OF SALARIES OF COMMISSIONERS, SECRETARIES AND STAFF BY THE GOVERNOR IN COUNCIL				
Salaried Positions:				
		Administrative and Foreign Service:		
1	1	Foreign Service Officer 9, External Affairs (\$22,000)		
2		(\$16,000-\$18,000)		
	2	(\$14,000-\$16,000)		

Positions (man-years)		Details of Services	Amount	
1967-68	1966-67		1967-68	1966-67
			\$	\$
A—DEPARTMENT (Continued)				
Vote 1 (Continued)				
CANADA'S CIVILIAN PARTICIPATION AS A MEMBER OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSIONS (Continued)				
Salaried Positions: (Continued)				
Administrative and Foreign Service: (Continued)				
7	1	(\$12,000-\$14,000)		
	7	(\$10,000-\$12,000)		
	1	(\$8,000-\$10,000)		
Technical, Operational and Service:				
1	1	(\$6,000-\$8,000)		
		(\$4,000-\$6,000)		
Administrative Support:				
2		(\$6,000-\$8,000)		
17	24	(\$4,000-\$6,000)		
30 (30)	37 (37)	Salaries (including \$21,000 allotted during 1966-67 from the Finance Contingencies Vote for in- creases in rates of pay).....(1)	209,000	202,000
		Overtime.....(1)	4,000	4,000
		Allowances.....(2)	108,000	112,000
		Professional and Special Services.....(4)	4,000	1,000
		Travelling Expenses.....(5)	80,000	47,000
		Freight, Express and Cartage.....(6)	1,000	1,000
		Postage.....(7)	300	100
		Telephones, Telegrams and Other Communication Services.....(8)	107,000	225,000
		Office Stationery and Supplies.....(11)	14,500	15,100
		Materials and Supplies.....(12)	1,600	1,500
		Repairs and Upkeep of Buildings.....(14)	2,000	
		Acquisition of Equipment.....(16)		10,500
		Repairs and Upkeep of Equipment.....(17)	4,800	1,800
		Rental of Equipment.....(18)	800	
		Sundries.....(22)	2,000	2,000
			539,000	623,000
			Expenditure	
1964-65 .....			\$ 588,080	
1965-66.....			585,363	
1966-67 (estimated).....			565,550	

Positions (man-years)		Details of Services	Amount	
1967-68	1966-67		1967-68	1966-67
			\$	\$
A—DEPARTMENT (Continued)				
Vote 1 (Continued)				
SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES INCLUDING PAYMENT OF REMUNERATION, SUBJECT TO THE APPROVAL OF THE GOVERNOR IN COUNCIL AND NOTWITHSTANDING THE CIVIL SERVICE ACT, IN CONNECTION WITH THE ASSIGNMENT BY THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT OF CANADIANS TO THE STAFFS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DETAILED IN THE ESTIMATES (PART RECOVERABLE FROM THOSE ORGANIZATIONS), AND AUTHORITY TO MAKE RECOVERABLE ADVANCES IN AMOUNTS NOT EXCEEDING IN THE AGGREGATE THE AMOUNTS OF THE SHARES OF THOSE ORGANIZATIONS OF SUCH EXPENSES				
Special administrative expenses, including salaries, allowances and removal expenses:				
		Asian Development Bank..... (22)	36,000	
		Less—Amount recoverable..... (34)	25,000	
			11,000	
		Commonwealth Secretariat..... (22)	64,000	57,300
		Less—Amount recoverable..... (34)	25,000	20,300
			39,000	37,000
		North Atlantic Treaty Organization..... (22)	121,000	126,200
		Less—Amount recoverable..... (34)	50,000	48,700
			71,000	77,500
		Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development..... (22)	27,000	51,600
		Less—Amount recoverable..... (34)	17,000	26,700
			10,000	24,900
		Commonwealth Education Liaison Unit..... (22)		600
			131,000	140,000
		Expenditure		
		1964-65..... \$	30,323	
		1965-66.....	51,206	
		1966-67 (estimated).....	110,000	
CANADIAN REPRESENTATION AT INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES				
		Professional and Special Services..... (4)	2,000	2,000
		Travelling Expenses..... (5)	300,000	335,000
		Telephones and Telegrams..... (8)	3,000	3,000
		Rentals..... (15)	10,000	15,000
		Entertainment..... (22)	15,000	10,000
		Sundries..... (22)	10,000	10,000
			340,000	375,000
		Expenditure		
		1964-65..... \$	222,904	
		1965-66.....	275,187	
		1966-67 (estimated).....	288,000	

Positions (man-years)		Details of Services	Amount	
1967-68	1966-67		1967-68	1966-67
			\$	\$
		A—DEPARTMENT (Continued)		
		<b>Vote 1 (Continued)</b>		
		CULTURAL RELATIONS AND ACADEMIC EXCHANGE PROGRAMS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES..... (22)	1,300,000	1,150,000
		Expenditure		
		1964-65.....	\$ 229,429	
		1965-66.....	843,055	
		1966-67 (estimated).....	1,000,000	
		<b>Total, Vote 1.....</b>	<b>42,260,000</b>	<b>35,733,000</b>
		Expenditure		
		1964-65.....	\$ 27,514,378	\$1,136,315
		1965-66.....	31,764,667	1,200,467
		1966-67 (estimated).....	36,196,550	1,330,000
		Revenue		
		1964-65.....	\$ 27,514,378	\$1,136,315
		1965-66.....	31,764,667	1,200,467
		1966-67 (estimated).....	36,196,550	1,330,000
		<b>Vote 10—Construction, Acquisition or Improvement of Buildings, Works, Land, Equipment and Furnishings</b>		
		Office Furnishings and Equipment..... (11)	525,000	359,000
		Acquisition, Construction and Improvement of Properties for Offices and Residences Abroad, including Land..... (13)	3,000,000	1,540,000
		Furniture and Furnishings for Residences Abroad... (16)	458,000	422,000
		Acquisition of Motor Vehicles and Other Equipment..... (16)	265,000	239,000
		Basic Household Equipment and Furnishings for Staff Abroad..... (16)	364,000	361,000
		Acquisition of Communications Equipment..... (16)	473,000	174,000
			<b>5,085,000</b>	<b>3,095,000</b>
		Expenditure		
		1964-65.....	\$ 1,616,509	
		1965-66.....	1,983,311	
		1966-67 (estimated).....	2,981,000	
		Further Details for Votes 1 and 10		
1,232	1,131	HEAD OFFICE—Operational Expenses.....	17,713,000	14,868,000
		Capital Items.....	436,000	
			18,149,000	14,868,000
30	37	INDO-CHINA—Operational Expenses.....	539,000	602,000
		Capital Items.....	46,000	
			585,000	602,000
16	16	Diplomatic Missions—		
		ARGENTINA—Operational Expenses.....	215,000	172,000
		Capital Items.....	5,000	15,000
			220,000	187,000

Positions (man-years)		Details of Services	Amount	
1967-68	1966-67		1967-68	1966-67
			\$	\$
A—DEPARTMENT (Continued)				
Further Details for Votes 1 and 10 (Continued)				
		Diplomatic Missions (Continued)		
25	23	AUSTRALIA—Operational Expenses.....	268,000	200,000
		Capital Items.....	94,000	8,000
			362,000	208,000
20	19	AUSTRIA—Operational Expenses.....	269,000	231,000
		Capital Items.....	9,000	10,000
			278,000	241,000
35	33	BELGIUM—Operational Expenses.....	513,000	347,000
		Capital Items.....	12,000	11,000
			525,000	358,000
24	26	BRAZIL—Operational Expenses.....	367,000	260,000
		Capital Items.....	190,000	38,000
			557,000	298,000
125	113	BRITAIN—Operational Expenses.....	1,441,000	1,059,000
		Capital Items.....	105,000	48,000
			1,546,000	1,107,000
16	16	CAMEROUN—Operational Expenses.....	203,000	182,000
		Capital Items.....	9,000	18,000
			212,000	200,000
22	22	CEYLON—Operational Expenses.....	186,000	182,000
		Capital Items.....	20,000	9,000
			206,000	191,000
16	15	CHILE—Operational Expenses.....	189,000	199,000
		Capital Items.....	6,000	7,000
			195,000	206,000
14	13	COLOMBIA—Operational Expenses.....	143,000	107,000
		Capital Items.....	5,000	4,000
			148,000	111,000
16	14	CONGO—(LEOPOLDVILLE)—Operational Expenses.....	199,000	130,000
		Capital Items.....	53,000	5,000
			252,000	135,000
13	15	COSTA RICA—Operational Expenses.....	125,000	127,000
		Capital Items.....	23,000	3,000
			148,000	130,000
24	24	CUBA—Operational Expenses.....	298,000	260,000
		Capital Items.....	33,000	16,000
			331,000	276,000

Positions (man-years)		Details of Services	Amount	
1967-68	1966-67		1967-68	1966-67
			\$	\$
A—DEPARTMENT (Continued)				
Further Details for Votes 1 and 10 (Continued)				
Diplomatic Missions (Continued)				
18	20	CYPRUS—Operational Expenses.....	152,000	147,000
		Capital Items.....	16,000	13,000
			168,000	160,000
25	22	CZECHOSLOVAKIA—Operational Expenses.....	297,000	226,000
		Capital Items.....	17,000	17,000
			314,000	243,000
17	17	DENMARK—Operational Expenses.....	207,000	177,000
		Capital Items.....	4,000	5,000
			211,000	182,000
7	7	DOMINICAN REPUBLIC—Operational Expenses.....	93,000	77,000
		Capital Items.....	11,000	6,000
			104,000	83,000
9	9	ECUADOR—Operational Expenses.....	98,000	83,000
		Capital Items.....	2,000	2,000
			100,000	85,000
16	16	ETHIOPIA—Operational Expenses.....	135,000	182,000
		Capital Items.....	13,000	105,000
			148,000	287,000
17	17	FINLAND—Operational Expenses.....	254,000	208,000
		Capital Items.....	26,000	6,000
			280,000	214,000
89	81	FRANCE—Operational Expenses.....	1,321,000	1,069,000
		Capital Items.....	75,000	191,000
			1,396,000	1,260,000
42	39	FRANCE—North Atlantic Council (including O.E.C.D.)		
		Operational Expenses.....	623,000	517,000
		Capital Items.....	10,000	17,000
			633,000	534,000
4	4	GERMANY—BERLIN—Operational Expenses.....	58,000	55,000
		Capital Items.....		4,000
			58,000	59,000
39	40	GERMANY—BONN—Operational Expenses.....	477,000	438,000
		Capital Items.....	498,000	459,000
			975,000	897,000
21	19	GHANA—Operational Expenses.....	271,000	234,000
		Capital Items.....	19,000	10,000
			290,000	244,000

Positions (man-years)		Details of Services	Amount	
1967-68	1966-67		1967-68	1966-67
			\$	\$
A—DEPARTMENT (Continued)				
Further Details for Votes 1 and 10 (Continued)				
Diplomatic Missions (Continued)				
23	24	GREECE—Operational Expenses.....	288,000	222,000
		Capital Items.....	7,000	8,000
			295,000	230,000
19	18	GUYANA—Operational Expenses.....	158,000	157,000
		Capital Items.....	15,000	10,000
			173,000	167,000
10	8	HAITI—Operational Expenses.....	122,000	83,000
		Capital Items.....	8,000	24,000
			130,000	107,000
59	56	INDIA—Operational Expenses.....	556,000	506,000
		Capital Items.....	9,000	226,000
			565,000	732,000
27	38	INDONESIA—Operational Expenses.....	366,000	270,000
		Capital Items.....	27,000	27,000
			393,000	297,000
19	19	IRAN—Operational Expenses.....	229,000	224,000
		Capital Items.....	9,000	11,000
			238,000	235,000
13	12	IRELAND—Operational Expenses.....	142,000	127,000
		Capital Items.....	3,000	4,000
			145,000	131,000
22	22	ISRAEL—Operational Expenses.....	250,000	214,000
		Capital Items.....	8,000	16,000
			258,000	230,000
33	32	ITALY—Operational Expenses.....	537,000	372,000
		Capital Items.....	42,000	19,000
			579,000	391,000
16	13	JAMAICA—Operational Expenses.....	209,000	129,000
		Capital Items.....	2,000	10,000
			211,000	139,000
45	43	JAPAN—Operational Expenses.....	601,000	477,000
		Capital Items.....	22,000	43,000
			623,000	520,000
18		KENYA—Operational Expenses.....	176,000	
		Capital Items.....	19,000	
			195,000	

Positions (man-years)		Details of Services	Amount	
1967-68	1966-67		1967-68	1966-67
			\$	\$
A—DEPARTMENT (Continued)				
Further Details for Votes 1 and 10 (Continued)				
Diplomatic Missions (Continued)				
25	23	LEBANON—Operational Expenses.....	257,000	206,000
		Capital Items.....	13,000	15,000
			270,000	221,000
26	26	MALAYSIA—Operational Expenses.....	278,000	236,000
		Capital Items.....	19,000	10,000
			297,000	246,000
24	24	MEXICO—Operational Expenses.....	213,000	205,000
		Capital Items.....	5,000	11,000
			218,000	216,000
27	25	THE NETHERLANDS—Operational Expenses.....	374,000	292,000
		Capital Items.....	18,000	13,000
			392,000	305,000
15	15	NEW ZEALAND—Operational Expenses.....	189,000	142,000
		Capital Items.....	11,000	3,000
			200,000	145,000
22	19	NIGERIA—Operational Expenses.....	247,000	211,000
		Capital Items.....	191,000	131,000
			438,000	342,000
19	19	NORWAY—Operational Expenses.....	235,000	196,000
		Capital Items.....	9,000	9,000
			244,000	205,000
42	44	PAKISTAN—Operational Expenses.....	399,000	372,000
		Capital Items.....	207,000	22,000
			606,000	394,000
14	13	PERU—Operational Expenses.....	178,000	136,000
		Capital Items.....	2,000	4,000
			180,000	140,000
31	30	POLAND—Operational Expenses.....	301,000	280,000
		Capital Items.....	192,000	161,000
			493,000	441,000
18	18	PORTUGAL—Operational Expenses.....	197,000	171,000
		Capital Items.....	8,000	12,000
			205,000	183,000
18	18	SENEGAL—Operational Expenses.....	183,000	183,000
		Capital Items.....	20,000	102,000
			203,000	285,000

Positions (man-years)		Details of Services	Amount	
1967-68	1966-67		1967-68	1966-67
			\$	\$
A—DEPARTMENT (Continued)				
Further Details for Votes 1 and 10 (Continued)				
Diplomatic Missions (Continued)				
13	15	SOUTH AFRICA—Operational Expenses.....	165,000	162,000
		Capital Items.....	23,000	19,000
			188,000	181,000
23	20	SPAIN—Operational Expenses.....	343,000	188,000
		Capital Items.....	14,000	4,000
			357,000	192,000
17	17	SWEDEN—Operational Expenses.....	234,000	195,000
		Capital Items.....	10,000	7,000
			244,000	202,000
16	16	SWITZERLAND—Operational Expenses.....	172,000	140,000
		Capital Items.....	2,000	8,000
			174,000	148,000
16	13	TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO—Operational Expenses.....	168,000	119,000
		Capital Items.....	5,000	5,000
			173,000	124,000
16		TUNISIA—Operational Expenses.....	182,000	
		Capital Items.....	18,000	
			200,000	
23	21	TURKEY—Operational Expenses.....	249,000	201,000
		Capital Items.....	81,000	91,000
			330,000	292,000
41	37	U.S.S.R.—Operational Expenses.....	609,000	539,000
		Capital Items.....	66,000	19,000
			675,000	558,000
35	33	UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC—Operational Expenses.....	378,000	292,000
		Capital Items.....	36,000	22,000
			414,000	314,000
48	41	PERMANENT MISSION OF CANADA TO THE EUROPEAN OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS, GENEVA— Operational Expenses.....	734,000	564,000
		Capital Items.....	42,000	15,000
			776,000	579,000
37	36	PERMANENT MISSION OF CANADA TO THE UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK— Operational Expenses.....	737,000	565,000
		Capital Items.....	18,000	15,000
			755,000	580,000

Positions (man-years)		Details of Services	Amount	
1967-68	1966-67		1967-68	1966-67
			\$	\$
A—DEPARTMENT (Continued)				
Further Details for Votes 1 and 10 (Continued)				
Diplomatic Missions (Continued)				
28	22	UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA—		
		Operational Expenses.....	388,000	226,000
		Capital Items.....	31,000	10,000
			419,000	236,000
77	73	U.S.A.—Operational Expenses.....	1,190,000	985,000
		Capital Items.....	62,000	37,000
			1,252,000	1,022,000
9	8	URUGUAY—Operational Expenses.....	92,000	69,000
		Capital Items.....	38,000	9,000
			130,000	78,000
14	14	VENEZUELA—Operational Expenses.....	246,000	186,000
		Capital Items.....	10,000	5,000
			256,000	191,000
31	26	YUGOSLAVIA—Operational Expenses.....	315,000	222,000
		Capital Items.....	23,000	21,000
			338,000	243,000
41	34	NEW MISSIONS—Operational Expenses.....	214,000	161,000
		Capital Items.....	124,000	258,000
			338,000	419,000
		Total, Diplomatic Missions.....	24,227,000	19,557,000
Consulates—				
17	16	BORDEAUX, FRANCE—Operational Expenses.....	176,000	157,000
		Capital Items.....	6,000	6,000
			182,000	163,000
14	12	BOSTON, U.S.A.—Operational Expenses.....	206,000	192,000
		Capital Items.....	6,000	14,000
			212,000	206,000
18	16	CHICAGO, U.S.A.—Operational Expenses.....	219,000	208,000
		Capital Items.....	19,000	15,000
			238,000	223,000
1	1	CLEVELAND, U.S.A.—Operational Expenses.....	1,000	1,000
1	1	DETROIT, U.S.A.—Operational Expenses.....	19,000	16,000
4		DUESSELDORF, GERMANY—Operational Expenses....	25,000	
		Capital Items.....	25,000	
			50,000	

Positions (man-years)		Details of Services	Amount	
1967-68	1966-67		1967-68	1966-67
			\$	\$
A—DEPARTMENT (Continued)				
Further Details for Votes 1 and 10 (Continued)				
Consulates (Continued)				
4	4	HAMBURG, GERMANY—Operational Expenses.....	47,000	28,000
		Capital Items.....	3,000	4,000
			50,000	32,000
10	7	HONG KONG—Operational Expenses.....	87,000	75,000
		Capital Items.....		5,000
			87,000	80,000
18	15	LOS ANGELES, U.S.A.—Operational Expenses.....	237,000	174,000
		Capital Items.....	4,000	8,000
			241,000	182,000
5	3	MANILA, PHILIPPINES—Operational Expenses.....	69,000	25,000
		Capital Items.....	2,000	6,000
			71,000	31,000
16	16	MARSEILLES, FRANCE—Operational Expenses.....	153,000	151,000
		Capital Items.....	4,000	23,000
			157,000	174,000
4	4	MILAN, ITALY—Operational Expenses.....	56,000	40,000
		Capital Items.....	20,000	1,000
			76,000	41,000
12	10	NEW ORLEANS, U.S.A.—Operational Expenses.....	164,000	148,000
		Capital Items.....	3,000	25,000
			167,000	173,000
32	29	NEW YORK, U.S.A.—Operational Expenses.....	522,000	398,000
		Capital Items.....	40,000	20,000
			562,000	418,000
1	1	PHILADELPHIA, U.S.A.—Operational Expenses.....	1,000	17,000
		REYKJAVIK, ICELAND—Operational Expenses.....	1,000	2,000
14	13	SAN FRANCISCO, U.S.A.—Operational Expenses.....	224,000	168,000
		Capital Items.....	11,000	9,000
			235,000	177,000
1	1	SAO PAULO, BRAZIL—Operational Expenses.....	28,000	17,000

Positions (man-years)		Details of Services	Amount	
1967-68	1966-67		1967-68	1966-67
			\$	\$
		A—DEPARTMENT (Continued)		
		Further Details for Votes 1 and 10 (Continued)		
		Consulates (Continued)		
13	11	SEATTLE, U.S.A.—Operational Expenses.....	173,000	145,000
		Capital Items.....	10,000	10,000
			183,000	155,000
		Total, Consulates.....	2,561,000	2,108,000
		Unallotted Operational Expenses.....	97,000	75,000
		Unallotted Capital Items.....	1,726,000	486,000
		Amount allotted during 1966-67 from the Finance Contingencies Vote for increases in rates of pay.....		1,132,000
3,187	2,953		47,345,000	38,828,000
		RECAPITULATION		
		Operational Expenses.....	42,260,000	35,733,000
		Capital Items.....	5,085,000	3,095,000
			47,345,000	38,828,000
		<b>Vote 15—Assessments, Grants, Contributions and other payments to International (including Commonwealth) Organizations and International Multilateral Economic and Special Aid Programs as detailed in the Estimates, including authority to pay assessments in the amounts and in the currencies in which they are levied, and authority to pay other amounts specified in the currencies of the countries indicated, notwithstanding that the total of such payments may exceed the equivalent in Canadian dollars, estimated as of January 1967</b>		
		(Contributions, Grants and Payments to International Commissions and Organizations including Commonwealth, and Miscellaneous Grants and Payments)		
		UNITED NATIONS AND ITS AGENCIES		
		INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (OPERATIONAL BUDGET) (\$57,000 U.S.)..... (20)	62,000	62,000
		INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION (PART REIMBURSEMENT FOR COMPENSATION PAID ITS CANADIAN EMPLOYEES FOR QUEBEC INCOME TAX FOR THE 1966 TAXATION YEAR)..... (20)	120,000	100,000
		INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION—GRANT TO ASSIST IN DEFRAYING COSTS OF ACCOMMODATION (20)	500,000	
		UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND..... (20)	1,000,000	1,100,000

Positions (man-years)		Details of Services	Amount	
1967-68	1966-67		1967-68	1966-67
			\$	\$
<b>A—DEPARTMENT (Continued)</b>				
<b>Vote 15 (Continued)</b>				
<b>UNITED NATIONS AND ITS AGENCIES (Continued)</b>				
		UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM..... (20)	10,750,000	9,500,000
		UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES.. (20)	350,000	350,000
		UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY FOR PALESTINE REFUGEES IN THE NEAR EAST..... (20)	500,000	500,000
		UNITED NATIONS TRAINING AND RESEARCH INSTITUTE. (20)	60,000	60,000
		WORLD FOOD PROGRAM (\$2,291,666 U.S.)..... (20)	2,475,000	2,478,000
<b>COMMONWEALTH ORGANIZATIONS</b>				
		COMMONWEALTH INSTITUTE (£500)..... (20)	1,500	1,500
<b>OTHER INTERNATIONAL COMMISSIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS</b>				
		INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS..... (20)	20,000	15,000
		PAYMENT TO THE LAKE ONTARIO CLAIMS TRIBUNAL, UNITED STATES AND CANADA..... (20)	90,000	180,000
		PAYMENT TO THE ROOSEVELT CAMPOBELLO INTERNATIONAL PARK COMMISSION FOR THE PURPOSES AND SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE ACT RESPECTING THE COMMISSION ESTABLISHED TO ADMINISTER THE ROOSEVELT CAMPOBELLO INTERNATIONAL PARK (\$100,000 U.S.)..... (22)	108,000	27,000
<b>MISCELLANEOUS GRANTS AND PAYMENTS</b>				
		GRANT TO THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL OF CANADA..... (20)	2,500	2,500
		DEFENCE SUPPORT ASSISTANCE TO COVER DIRECT EXPENDITURES ON BEHALF OF COUNTRIES NOT MEMBERS OF NATO..... (20)	3,500,000	6,620,000
		DEFENCE SUPPORT ASSISTANCE TO GREECE AND TURKEY. (20)	1,000,000	
		GRANT TO THE CANADIAN-GERMAN SOCIETY OF HANOVER (50,000 DEUTSCH MARKS)..... (20)	14,000	13,400
		GRANT TO LA MAISON CANADIENNE, PARIS..... (20)	159,000	
		UNITED NATIONS ASSOCIATION IN CANADA..... (20)	17,000	17,000
		GIFTS TO COUNTRIES ATTAINING INDEPENDENCE AND TO MARK SPECIAL OCCASIONS..... (20)	25,000	40,200

Positions (man-years)		Details of Services	Amount	
1967-68	1966-67		1967-68	1966-67
			\$	\$
<b>A—DEPARTMENT (Continued)</b>				
<b>Vote 15 (Continued)</b>				
(Assessments for Membership in International Commissions and Organizations, including Com- monwealth)				
UNITED NATIONS AND ITS AGENCIES				
		UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION (\$3,930,000 U.S.).... (20)	4,244,000	3,866,000
		UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION (\$894,350 U.S.)..... (20)	966,000	757,000
		UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE (\$675,000 U.S.)... (20)	729,000	734,000
		FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION (\$1,240,000 U.S.)..... (20)	1,339,000	950,000
		INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (\$261,459 U.S.)..... (20)	282,000	281,000
		INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION (\$251,000 U.S.)..... (20)	271,000	271,000
		INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION (\$845,000 U.S.) (20)	913,000	817,000
		INTER-GOVERNMENTAL MARITIME CONSULTATIVE OR- GANIZATION (\$14,000 U.S.)..... (20)	15,000	15,000
		WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (\$1,770,000 U.S.)..... (20)	1,912,000	1,512,000
COMMONWEALTH ORGANIZATIONS				
		COMMONWEALTH FOUNDATION (£37,250)..... (20)	112,500	112,500
		COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT (£90,000)..... (20)	270,000	270,500
OTHER INTERNATIONAL COMMISSIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS				
		GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE (\$168,000 U.S.)..... (20)	181,000	108,000
		LAOS INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION..... (20)	35,000	41,000
		NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (COST OF CIVIL ADMINISTRATION) (3,944,000 FRENCH FRANCS)..... (20)	871,000	633,000
		NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION'S SCIENCE PROGRAMS (276,500 U.S.)..... (20)	299,000	265,000
		ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DE- VELOPMENT (5,688,785 FRENCH FRANCS)..... (20)	1,243,000	1,650,000
		PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION (4,000 DUTCH FLORINS)..... (20)	1,200	1,200

Positions (man-years)		Details of Services	Amount	
1967-68	1966-67		1967-68	1966-67
<b>A—DEPARTMENT (Continued)</b>				
<b>Vote 15 (Continued)</b>				
ITEMS NOT REQUIRED FOR 1967-68				
		Grant to the World Veterans Federation.....		5,000
		Canadian Participation in the Zambian Airlift.....		233,000
		United Nations International School Development Fund.....		35,000
		(20).....		273,000
		<b>Total, Vote 15.....</b>	<b>34,437,700</b>	<b>33,623,800</b>
		Expenditure		
		1964-65.....	\$ 20,063,148	
		1965-66.....	32,315,953	
		1966-67 (estimated).....	31,647,903	
		<b>Statutory—Payments under the Diplomatic Service (Special) Superannuation Act (Chap. 82, R.S.) and Pensions..... (21)</b>	<b>49,000</b>	<b>48,000</b>
		Expenditure		
		1964-65.....	\$ 36,317	
		1965-66.....	43,023	
		1966-67 (estimated).....	45,000	
		<b>Statutory—Credits to the Government of India under a financial agreement entered into between the Government of Canada and the Government of India to finance the purchase in Canada of aircraft and associated spare parts and equipment (External Affairs Vote 97, Appropriation Act No. 5, 1963)..... (20)</b>	<b>92,000</b>	<b>160,000</b>
		Expenditure		
		1964-65.....	\$ 402,858	
		1965-66.....	222,774	
		1966-67 (estimated).....	160,000	
<b>EXTERNAL AID OFFICE</b>				
<b>Vote 30—Salaries and Expenses</b>				
Salaried Positions:				
Executive, Scientific and Professional:				
	1	Director-General, External Aid Office (\$27,000)		
	1	Senior Officer 3 (\$20,500-\$24,750)		
	1	Senior Officer 2 (\$18,500-\$22,750)		
	6	Senior Officer 1 (\$16,500-\$20,500)		
	1	(\$14,000-\$16,000)		
	9	(\$10,000-\$12,000)		
Administrative and Foreign Service				
	4	(\$16,000-\$18,000)		
	17	(\$14,000-\$16,000)		
	38	(\$12,000-\$14,000)		
	2	(\$10,000-\$12,000)		
	51	(\$8,000-\$10,000)		
	7	(\$6,000-\$8,000)		

Positions (man-years)		Details of Services	Amount	
1967-68	1966-67		1967-68	1966-67
			\$	\$
<b>A—DEPARTMENT (Continued)</b>				
<b>EXTERNAL AID OFFICE (Continued)</b>				
<b>Vote 30 (Continued)</b>				
		Salaried Positions: (Continued)		
		Technical, Operational and Service:		
		(\$8,000-\$10,000)		
		Administrative Support:		
		(\$6,000-\$8,000)		
		(\$4,000-\$6,000)		
		(Under \$4,000)		
3	3			
22				
167	114			
20	56			
350	275	Continuing Establishment.....	2,135,000	1,553,000
(350)	(275)	Casuals and Others.....	29,000	18,000
(10)	(6)			
(360)	(281)	Salaries and Wages (including \$75,000 allotted during 1966-67 from the Finance Contingencies Vote for increases in rates of pay)..... (1)	2,164,000	1,571,000
		Overtime..... (1)	7,000	5,000
		Allowances..... (2)	30,000	
		Professional and Special Services..... (4)	40,000	7,800
		Travelling and Removal Expenses..... (5)	100,000	50,400
		Freight, Express and Cartage..... (6)	200	200
		Telephones and Telegrams..... (8)	35,000	14,800
		Publication of Reports and Other Material..... (9)	20,000	15,000
		Photographs and Advertising..... (10)	20,000	4,000
		Office Stationery, Supplies, Equipment and Furnishings..... (11)	90,000	53,000
		Sundries..... (22)	15,500	14,000
			<b>2,521,700</b>	<b>1,735,200</b>
		Expenditure		
		1964-65..... \$ 852,291		
		1965-66..... 1,131,433		
		1966-67 (estimated)..... 1,670,000		
<b>Vote 35—Economic, technical, educational and other assistance as detailed in the Estimates</b>				
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE—PAYMENT TO THE SPECIAL ACCOUNT IN THE CONSOLIDATED REVENUE FUND ESTABLISHED BY EXTERNAL AFFAIRS VOTE 33D OF APPROPRIATION ACT NO. 2, 1965, FOR THE PROVISION OF ECONOMIC, TECHNICAL AND EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND TO EXTEND THE PURPOSES OF THE SAID VOTE TO AUTHORIZE IN THE CURRENT AND SUBSEQUENT FISCAL YEARS PAYMENTS OUT OF THE SAID SPECIAL ACCOUNT FOR THE COMMONWEALTH SCHOLARSHIPS AND FELLOWSHIPS PLAN IN ACCORDANCE WITH TERMS AND CONDITIONS PRESCRIBED BY THE GOVERNOR IN COUNCIL..... (20)				
			50,000,000	48,500,000
		Expenditure		
		1964-65..... \$ 48,500,000		
		1965-66..... 48,500,000		
		1966-67 (estimated)..... 48,500,000		

Positions (man-years)		Details of Services	Amount	
1967-68	1966-67		1967-68	1966-67
			\$	\$
		<b>A—DEPARTMENT (Continued)</b>		
		<b>Vote 35 (Continued)</b>		
		INTERNATIONAL EMERGENCY RELIEF.....(20)	100,000	100,000
		Expenditure		
		1964-65.....	\$ 77,000	
		1965-66.....	100,000	
		1966-67 (estimated).....	100,000	
		INTERNATIONAL FOOD AID PROGRAM, INCLUDING COM- MODITY CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY FOR PALESTINE RE- FUGEES IN THE NEAR EAST, AND TO THE WORLD FOOD PROGRAM IN THE CURRENT AND SUBSEQUENT FISCAL YEARS NOTWITHSTANDING SECTION 35 OF THE FINANCIAL ADMINISTRATION ACT.....(20)	75,000,000	97,500,000
		Expenditure		
		1964-65.....	\$ 20,594,000	
		1965-66.....	34,538,000	
		1966-67 (estimated).....	100,500,000	
		CONTRIBUTION TO THE INDUS BASIN DEVELOPMENT FUND.....(20)	5,000,000	5,500,000
		Expenditure		
		1964-65.....	\$ 6,385,000	
		1965-66.....	1,748,000	
		1966-67 (estimated).....	3,000,000	
		<b>Total, Vote 35.....</b>	<b>130,100,000</b>	<b>151,600,000</b>
		Expenditure		
		1964-65.....	\$ 75,556,000	
		1965-66.....	84,886,000	
		1966-67 (estimated).....	152,100,000	
		<b>Appropriation not required for 1967-68</b>		
		To forgive payment by India to Canada of the total principal and interest accruing thereon under agreements related to purchase of Canadian wheat and flour between Canada and India dated February 20, 1958, October 22, 1958 and March 29, 1966, the principal amount being.....(20)		9,428,572

Positions (man-years)		Details of Services	Amount	
1967-68	1966-67		1967-68	1966-67
			\$	\$
<b>B—INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION</b>				
<b>Approximate Value of Major Services not included in these Estimates</b>				
		Accommodation (provided by the Department of Public Works).....	18,900	17,400
		Accounting and cheque issue services (Comptroller of the Treasury).....	5,500	4,800
		Contributions to Superannuation Account (Treasury Board).....	11,000	5,100
		Employee surgical-medical insurance premiums (Treasury Board).....	600	500
		Contributions to Canada Pension Plan Account and Quebec Pension Plan Account (Treasury Board)...	800	1,200
		Employee compensation payments (Department of Labour).....	100	
			36,900	29,000
<b>Vote 40—Salaries and Expenses of the Commission and Canada's share of the expense of studies, surveys and investigations of the Commission</b>				
<b>SALARIES AND EXPENSES OF THE COMMISSION</b>				
1	1	Chairman, Canadian Section (\$20,000)		
2	2	Commissioner, Canadian Section at \$12,000		
		Salaried Positions:		
		Executive, Scientific and Professional:		
		(\$16,000-\$18,000)		
	1	(\$14,000-\$16,000)		
	1	(\$12,000-\$14,000)		
		Administrative and Foreign Service:		
		(\$12,000-\$14,000)		
	1	(\$10,000-\$12,000)		
		Technical, Operational and Service:		
		(\$6,000-\$8,000)		
	1	Administrative Support:		
		(\$6,000-\$8,000)		
	2	(\$4,000-\$6,000)		
	2			
	1	(Under \$4,000)		
12	12	Salaries (including \$3,700 allotted during 1966-67 from the Finance Contingencies Vote for increases in rates of pay)..... (1)	124,700	114,200
(12)	(12)	Reporters' and Professional Fees..... (4)	2,500	3,500
		Travelling Expenses..... (5)	15,000	15,000
		Postage..... (7)	100	100
		Telephones and Telegrams..... (8)	3,000	2,000
		Advertising of Public Hearings..... (10)	3,000	3,000
		Office Stationery, Supplies, Equipment and Furnishings..... (11)	6,000	3,000
		Sundries..... (22)	900	900
			155,200	141,700
			Expenditure	
			\$	
1964-65.....			116,128	
1965-66.....			126,001	
1966-67 (estimated).....			141,500	

Positions (man-years)		Details of Services	Amount	
1967-68	1966-67		1967-68	1966-67
			\$	\$
<b>B—INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION</b>				
(Continued)				
<b>Vote 40 (Continued)</b>				
CANADA'S SHARE OF THE EXPENSES OF STUDIES, SURVEYS AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE INTER- NATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION				
		Studies and surveys of the Mid-Western Watershed.....	2,000	2,000
		Canada's share of the expenses of the International St. Lawrence River Board of Control.....		5,000
		Canada's share of the expenses of the Champlain Water- way Reference.....	2,000	2,000
		Canada's share of the expenses of the studies of Boundary Waters Pollution.....	310,000	230,000
		Canada's share of the expenses of the Great Lakes Levels Reference—St. Lawrence River Board of Control.....	10,000	15,000
		Canada's share of the expenses of the Air Pollution Study Detroit-Windsor, Sarnia-Port Huron.....	10,000	
		(4)	334,000	254,000
		Expenditure		
		1964-65.....	\$ 10,120	
		1965-66.....	52,709	
		1966-67 (estimated).....	200,000	
		<b>Total, Vote 40.....</b>	<b>489,200</b>	<b>395,700</b>
		Expenditure		
		1964-65.....	\$ 126,248	
		1965-66.....	178,710	
		1966-67 (estimated).....	341,500	

No. of Vote	Service	1967-68	1966-67	Change	
				Increase	Decrease
		\$	\$	\$	\$
	EXTERNAL AFFAIRS				
	External Aid Office				
L30	Special loan assistance for developing countries in the current and subsequent fiscal years, subject to such terms and conditions as the Governor in Council may approve, for the purpose of undertaking such economic, educational and technical projects as may be agreed upon by Canada and the developing countries or recognized international development institutions.....	90,000,000	50,000,000	40,000,000	
—	Appropriations not required for 1967-68.....	.....	27,773,400	.....	27,773,400
		90,000,000	77,773,400	12,226,600	

PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

This edition contains the English deliberations and the translation into English of the French deliberations.

Copies and complements are available to the public by subscription to the Queen's Printer. Cost varies according to Commission.

Translated by the General Bureau for Translation, Secretariat of State.

LÉON J. RAYMOND,  
The Clerk of the House.

Main Estimates 1967-68 of the Department of External Affairs

WITNESSES:

From the External Aid Office: Mr. Maurice F. Strong, Director General; Mr. Earl G. Drake, Acting Director, Planning and Policy Division; Mr. D. Ross McLellan, Director, Finance Division.

QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF MANUSCRIPTS  
OTTAWA, 1967



HOUSE OF COMMONS

Second Session—Twenty-seventh Parliament

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

1967

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STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

# EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

*Chairman:* Mr. JEAN-EUDES DUBÉ

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MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 2

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THURSDAY, JUNE 8, 1967

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Respecting

Main Estimates 1967-68 of the Department  
of External Affairs

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WITNESSES:

*From the External Aid Office:* Mr. Maurice F. Strong, Director General;  
Mr. Earl G. Drake, Acting Director, Planning and Policy Division;  
Mr. D. Ross McLellan, Director, Finance Division.

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.  
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY  
OTTAWA, 1967

STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Chairman: Mr. Jean-Eudes Dubé

Vice-Chairman: Mr. W. B. Nesbitt

and

Mr. Allmand,  
Mr. Andras,  
Mr. Asselin  
(Charlevoix),  
Mr. Brewin,  
Mr. Churchill,  
Mr. Faulkner,  
Mr. Forest,

Mr. Forrestall,  
Mr. Harkness,  
Mr. Klein,  
Mr. Lambert,  
Mr. Laprise,  
Mr. Lind,  
Mr. Macdonald  
(Rosedale),

Mr. Macquarrie,  
Mr. McIntosh,  
Mr. Pelletier,  
Mr. Pilon,  
Mr. Prud'homme,  
Mr. Stanbury,  
Mr. Thompson,  
Mr. Walker—(24).

Fernand Despatie,  
Clerk of the Committee.

WITNESSES:

From the External Aid Office: Mr. Maurice F. Strong, Director General;  
Mr. Earl G. Drake, Acting Director, Planning and Policy Division;  
Mr. D. Ross McEllan, Director, Finance Division.

## MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

THURSDAY, June 8, 1967.

The Standing Committee on External Affairs met at 9.45 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Dubé, presided.

*Members present:* Messrs. Allmand, Brewin, Churchill, Dubé, Faulkner, Forest, Forrestall, Harkness, Laprise, Lind, Macdonald (*Rosedale*), Macquarrie, McIntosh, Nesbitt, Pelletier, Pilon, Stanbury, Walker (19).

*Also present:* Mr. Pugh, M.P.

*In attendance: From the External Aid Office:* Mr. Maurice F. Strong, Director General; Mr. Earl G. Drake, Acting Director, Planning and Policy Division; Mr. D. Ross McLellan, Director, Finance Division; Dr. Henri Gaudefroy, Director, French Language Programs; Miss Mary MacKay, Officer, Planning and Policy Division.

At the opening of the meeting, the Chairman read the Order of Reference dated May 25, 1967.

The Chairman then announced the names of the Members who have been designated to act with him on the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure, namely Messrs. Brewin, Laprise, Macdonald (*Rosedale*), Nesbitt and Thompson.

The following report was read by the Chairman:

### *"First Report of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure"*

Your Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure met on Tuesday, June 6, 1967, with the following members in attendance: Messrs. Brewin, Dubé (Chairman), Laprise, Macdonald (*Rosedale*) and Nesbitt.

Your Subcommittee has agreed to recommend that, in dealing with the Main Estimates 1967-68 of the Department of External Affairs, witnesses be heard in the following order:

1. Mr. Maurice F. Strong, Director General, External Aid Office (Items 30, 35, L30).
2. Mr. M. Cadieux, Q.C., Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (Items concerning administrative matters).
3. Mr. A. D. P. Heeney, Chairman, International Joint Commission (Item 40).

and

The Honourable Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs.

Your Subcommittee has also agreed to recommend that a report to the House respecting the Estimates be made before the summer recess with a recommendation that the Report of the Department of External Affairs, 1966 be referred to the Committee after the recess."

On motion of Mr. Macdonald (*Rosedale*), seconded by Mr. Allmand,

*Resolved*,—That the Report be adopted.

The Committee proceeded to the consideration of the items listed in the Main Estimates for 1967-68, relating to the Department of External Affairs.

Item 1 was allowed to stand.

The Chairman called the following items pertaining to the External Aid Office:

- 30. Salaries and Expenses—\$2,521,700.
- 35. Economic, technical, educational and other assistance—\$130,100,000.
- L30. Special loan assistance for developing countries in the current and subsequent fiscal years—\$90,000,000.

The Chairman introduced Mr. Strong, who made a statement and was questioned. The witness was assisted by Messrs. Drake and McLellan.

Documents entitled *Canadian External Assistance Program* and *Canadian Aid Program 1967-68 Fiscal Year* were submitted by Mr. Strong and distributed to members of the Committee.

Certain members made suggestions regarding the form of the External Aid Office estimates. It was agreed that this matter could be discussed at the time of preparation of a report to the House respecting the Estimates.

Mr. Strong undertook to supply the Committee at its next meeting with the last available figures concerning direct bilateral aid to all countries concerned.

At 11.45 a.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

Fernand Despatie,  
Clerk of the Committee.

## EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

Thursday, 8 June 1967

**The Chairman:** Gentlemen, I see a quorum. First, I will read the order of reference, dated Thursday, May 25, 1967.

Ordered,—That, saving always the powers of the Committee of Supply in relation to the voting of public moneys, the items listed in the main estimates for 1967-68, relating to the Department of External Affairs be withdrawn from the Committee of Supply and referred to the Standing Committee on External Affairs.

Gentlemen, the members of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure are the same as for the last session, namely Messrs. Brewin, Dubé, Laprise, Macdonald (Rosedale), Nesbitt, and Thompson.

I will now read the first report of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure, which reads: (See Minutes of Proceedings)

The Chair will entertain a motion to adopt the report of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure, as read.

**Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale):** I so move.

**Mr. Allmand:** I second the motion.

Motion agreed to.

1 Administration, Operation and Maintenance, including payment of remuneration, subject to the approval of the Governor in Council and notwithstanding the Civil Service Act, in connection with the assignment by the Canadian Government of Canadians to the staffs of the International Organizations detailed in the Estimates and authority to make recoverable advances in amounts not exceeding in the aggregate the amounts of the shares of those Organizations of such expenses, and authority, notwithstanding the Civil Service Act, for the appointment and fixing of salaries of Commissioners (International Commissions for Supervision and Control in Indo-China), Secretaries and staff by the Governor in Council; and authority, notwithstanding the Civil Service Act,

for the appointment and fixing of salaries of High Commissioners, Ambassadors, Ministers Plenipotentiary, Consuls, Secretaries and staff by the Governor in Council; assistance and repatriation of distressed Canadian citizens and persons of Canadian domicile abroad, including their dependents; cultural relations and academic exchange programs with other countries, \$42,260,000.

**The Chairman:** To enable Mr. Martin to testify when he returns from his NATO trip, is it agreed that we stand item 1?

**Some hon. Members:** Agreed.

Item 1 stood.

External Aid office

30. Salaries and Expenses, \$2,521,700.

**The Chairman:** Our witness this morning is Mr. Maurice F. Strong, Director General of the External Aid Office. Most of you know Mr. Strong, but because this is his first appearance here, with your permission, I would like to give you a brief outline of his curriculum vitae.

Mr. Strong was born at Oak Lake, Manitoba. In 1944 and 1945 he was in the employ of the Hudson's Bay Company at the fur trading post at Chesterfield Inlet on the west coast of Hudson Bay. In 1947 and 1948 he served as a member of the Secretariat of the United Nations in New York. From 1954 to 1959 he was with Dome Petroleum Limited and associated companies as vice president and treasurer. From 1959 to 1964 he was President as well as a director of Canadian Industrial Gas Ltd. From 1962 to 1966 he was with Power Corporation of Canada, Limited, first as an Executive Vice President and then as President and Director. During this period he was also an officer or director of a number of other Canadian, United States and international corporations. On October 1, 1966 he resigned all business positions to accept the appointment as Director General of the External Aid Office. Mr. Strong is also the National President of the National Council of the YMCA of Canada, a member of the

Advisory Board of the York University School of Business Administration, and a director of the Ottawa Roughriders Football Club.

**Mr. Walker:** What year did you say Mr. Strong was born?

**The Chairman:** I did not say. He was born on April 29, 1929, which makes him one of the youngest persons in this room.

With your permission I will ask Mr. Strong to give us a brief outline of his philosophy and what he intends to do about external aid, and of course he will then submit to questioning.

**Mr. Maurice F. Strong (Director, External Aid Office):** Mr. Chairman, I very much appreciate your kind kind introduction. I am very glad that you emphasized, not so much my youth but my rather short term of office, because I am appearing here for the first time. It is with a great deal of pleasure that I agreed to this opportunity of subjecting myself this morning to the questions that members may have in relation to our External Aid estimates.

I have not prepared this morning a formal statement because I felt it would be better if I gave you a very brief outline of our program, making reference to this year's budget, and then allowed the rest of the story to come out in response to your questions. I think it would be much more useful for me to talk about the things that interest you rather than the things that may seem to me the most urgent at this point.

The level of our aid program, of course, is the most important item that will be on your minds this morning. There is in the minds of a number of people—there certainly was in my mind when I first came into this office—some confusion concerning this whole problem of levels of aid, because there are various international forms in which levels of aid are reported in different ways. These reports do create some misunderstanding of what the actual levels of our program are.

This year the estimates before you call for total allocations of \$254.3 million for bilateral and multilateral aid. This compares with a total allocation for the 1966-67 fiscal year, for the same purposes of \$245.5 million. It will be evident that on this basis the increase is only in the order of \$10 million. However it should be borne in mind, in considering this, that last year—and this happens frequently—there were non-recurring items, or items which were

not included in the principal estimates, totaling \$34 million. The largest single item of this was represented by the special vote of food aid to India and Pakistan of \$22½ million.

When you consider that these, what you may call non-recurring items, are not part of the regular program but come up due to special circumstances that arise during the year and are dealt with on the basis of a special request from Parliament for appropriation, then you get a more indicative view of the actual increases in our normal program. Extracting these non-recurring items, the last year's program would have been \$210.5 million and this year's figure on that basis would represent an increase of some \$44 million over last year's normal program.

Also in the international forum of the DAC (Developments Assistance Committee) which publishes its figures and other United Nations figures that are frequently quoted, credit is given to export credits. In the 1966-67 fiscal year these amounted to a total of \$61.8 million. These, as you know, are administered by ECIC, not by the External Aid Office, but they are included in reports of total aid flows because, to make them comparable with those of other countries, these figures must be included. It is not possible to project these figures with any degree of accuracy. For the current year it is probably fair to assume, however, that levels of loan disbursements or loans made by ECIC would likely be somewhere in the same area that they were last year. Perhaps they are greater; this depends really on their negotiation of individual loans with developing countries. But on the assumption that they would be in the order of \$62 million, as they were last year, the program for this year would amount in total to about \$316 million. It could amount to substantially more than that if ECIC loans do in fact exceed the \$60 million figure.

**Mr. Lamberg:** The totals that you were talking about in external aid, of about \$230 million, do not appear from your estimates in any way, certainly not in the blue book and I am wondering where you are getting these figures. Your two items 30 and 35 for the External Aid Office in the blue book come to a total of \$132 million this year. There must be some other items.

**Mr. Strong:** This is correct. They appear in various different places. I can give you the total from my sheet here, and then I will ask Mr. McLellan to relate it to the figures in your blue book. I will give you the various

components of this. Under the bilateral aid program there is a total of \$50 million for international development grants, various outright grants.

As a matter of fact, I have a few copies here for members and, if you like, I could give you the breakdown of these figures on a sheet of paper.

**Mr. Faulkner:** I think that would be better.

**Mr. Strong:** It is a bit confusing because these are included in various places. The bilateral aid does amount to \$216.4, and this is the program directly administered by the External Aid Office. The multilateral grants and advances, which are made to various UN and other multilateral institutions, total \$37.9 million and those appear in two different places in the blue book.

The problem here is that some of these appear as items under the Department of External Affairs as distinct from the External Aid expenditures as such. Some actually appear in the Department of Finance Estimates which are not before you. It is really not possible to talk about the total aid program without including some of these items. What we could do, and this might be helpful to members, is table and prepare for each of you, if you wish, copies of a statement which indicates precisely where these items appear in the estimates.

**Mr. Lambert:** I would think that it would be very helpful, Mr. Chairman, because with all due reference to Mr. Strong, he makes reference to some items appearing in the Department of Finance and this department's estimates do not show anything with regard to aid or grants outside. Most have to do with subsidies and other payments to provinces.

**Mr. Strong:** The Department of Finance aspect of it is carried forward from the 1964-1965 fiscal year, covering a three-year period.

**Mr. Brewin:** Does the External Aid Office have the responsibility of administering those moneys?

**Mr. Strong:** The External Aid Office does two things: it administers the direct bilateral programs; it also acts as the administrative support agency for the External Aid Board, which is charged with the general task of reviewing all aid matters wherever the administrative responsibility resides within the government. One of the things that does give

rise to confusion is the fact that we are talking about Canada's external aid program as distinct from talking about the specific estimates. To get a proper picture of the aid program you do have to include these items which are found really in other people's votes. However we do have the breakdowns to indicate where each of these items can be found in present votes and carried forward from previous votes. I would be very happy to make that detailed information available. We have it with us.

**Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale):** For example, Mr. Strong, many of the multilateral programs come under Vote 15 of the External Affairs Department.

**Mr. Strong:** Yes.

**Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale):** UNDP, for example.

**Mr. Strong:** That is right. I realize this is confusing. On the other hand, we would have to decide on what sort of tact to take. To me, it is really more indicative of our program to talk about the total amount of money that the government is voting for external aid and then to relate that back to the specific estimates that you have before you.

**Mr. McIntosh:** Why the division between the external aid, the bilateral that you deal with and the multilateral that the Department as a whole deals with?

**Mr. Strong:** I think perhaps I should clarify the relationship between the Department of External Affairs and the External Aid Office. I, as Director General of the External Aid Office, report directly to the Secretary of State for External Affairs. Because the External Aid Office does not result from any particular legislation, it has its estimates included in those of the Department of External Affairs. Part of those are included as a special item attributable to external aid. Part of them are included under the heading of Contributions to Multilateral Agencies. This pattern was established long before the establishment of the External Aid Office as such. In practice it does not give rise to difficulty in reporting, but I concede that it does give rise to some confusion.

**Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale):** Mr. Chairman, I do not know if I fully understood Mr. McIntosh's question but a further difference between the bilateral and the multilateral

program is that the bilateral program involves actual administration by Canada whereas in respect of the multilateral program we just give a cheque and the recipients actually administer its application.

**Mr. McIntosh:** Then the heading of this branch, External Aid, is not correct; it is just partial.

**Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale):** I suppose it involves external and bilateral programs plus supportive, to say the least.

**Mr. Brewin:** Mr. Chairman, I have a supplementary on that point. As an illustration of what Mr. Macdonald says may be the explanation, you find on page 132 under Vote 15 a contribution of half a million dollars to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and then on page 136, under Vote 35, you have a general figure of \$75 million, including a lot of other things such as the International Food Aid Program, including commodity contributions to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, and to the World Food Program and so on.

Now here you have a case of both contributions apparently going to Palestine refugees a subject we are rather interested in at the moment, and yet you have to look at two entirely different items to see what we are doing in that field. It is confusing.

**Mr. Strong:** This is the reason that I have tried to present the total picture here. I agree that to make it understandable it has to be related back to this rather confusing breakdown in the estimates. Incidentally, the answer to your specific question, Mr. Brewin, is that the grant to the U.N. Agency Administrative Program comes under External Affairs, Vote 15, and the commodity portion of it—the portion of it under which we provide actual commodities to this program—comes under our External Aid grant.

**Mr. Brewin:** I am sure none of us are blaming Mr. Strong but I am wondering if we could at some time or other perhaps consider a more comprehensive and comprehensible way of presenting the total picture.

**Some hon. Members:** Agreed.

**Mr. Lambert:** Perhaps your original suggestion, Mr. Strong, that you could pool together in the table that you have presented to us the sources of these amounts, is very

good, and then we would be in a much better position to assess the over-all program. Even your figure for multilateral grants and advances of \$37.93 million under 1967-68 does not accord with the blue book.

**Mr. Strong:** Again, this does relate to Vote 35 and Vote 15. If you add up the total of the various items that appear, such items as Contributions to the United Nations Development Program in Vote 15 of \$10 3/4 million, Contribution to the Operational Budget of the International Atomic Energy Agency of \$60,000—a whole series of items like this, and you add the Item from Vote 35 of Contribution to the Indus Basin Fund of \$5 million you will find that the total does in fact, come up to \$37.93 million. I agree that it is difficult to get the answer.

**The Chairman:** Is it the wish of the Committee to have this document printed as an appendix to the report?

**Some hon. Members:** Agreed.

**Mr. Lambert:** Only with the revisions because, if I may say so, this on its own is terribly confusing.

**Mr. Strong:** We can present the figures in any way you wish, but I thought the Committee might like to know what the total program was and then relate it to that portion of it which they are considering as part of these estimates. However, we can present it in any way you wish.

**Mr. Lambert:** It must be realized that we are working within the confines of this blue book.

**Mr. Strong:** Would you prefer me to address my comments only to those items in the book or would you like to have a view of the whole program? I am prepared to do it any way you want.

**Mr. Harkness:** I think we should have a view of the whole program but I certainly think, Mr. Chairman, that this Committee should recommend that these estimates covering external aid in future be presented in a clearer, more logical and more easily understood form than is the case at the present time.

**The Chairman:** As I understand it, this is the procedure which has been followed throughout the years. If it is the wish of the Committee to make a recommendation to

change the procedure then, of course, we should make one. I feel that we should let our witness continue at the present time.

**Mr. Harkness:** I agree with that. I think we should get the whole picture presented to us and have it related to the estimates in the blue book to the greatest extent that this is possible.

**Mr. Strong:** Mr. Chairman, just to be clear, this gives you a perspective of our whole program, including the portions of it which are not directly administered by the External Aid Office but with which we are concerned in our role as administrative support for the External Aid Board and with which, I think, anyone who is looking at the whole program would also want to be concerned.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** Mr. Chairman, I think perhaps we should make it clear so that there is no misunderstanding in the record. I think all of us are very grateful to Mr. Strong for having brought to our attention something that perhaps many of us were not aware of in the past. There is no reflection at all on Mr. Strong. I just want to make that very clear so there is no misunderstanding.

**Mr. Strong:** Thank you very much. I will present the two things to you: the one that speaks of our total program and the one which is directed specifically to the items that appear in your estimates and then you can have them both in front of you.

**Mr. Brewin:** Mr. Chairman, may I ask one further question on this narrow point. Does the external assistance program include what you refer to, I think, as export credits or is that totally different?

**Mr. Strong:** Yes. We have included that at the bottom.

**Mr. Brewin:** Oh, I see.

**Mr. McIntosh:** In adding up that last column, how do you get \$311.03 million?

**Mr. Strong:** You get \$311.03 million by adding \$249.26 million, which is the total of the bilateral and the multilateral appearing at the top half of the sheet here, to the \$61.77 million Export Credits and you come up with \$311.03 million.

The other calculation in the middle of the page simply extracts from the total the special non-recurring items that did not appear in the original estimates to enable a comparison to be made between what you might

regard as the normal program and the total allocations last year. It is always possible that this year too there may be special allocations which would increase the total amount. This has happened quite a bit in the past. The reason we have done this is because the figures quoted publicly usually are the total figures of aid. We did it this way because we realized it was confusing and because the questions that have come to me, mostly from Members and others, have related to an explanation of how we arrive at our \$300 million figure that we are talking about. This sheet is designed to explain that. The other one is designed to explain specifically how each of these items ties back into your estimates, which I agree results in a considerable amount of exercise.

**Mr. Brewin:** Would it be appropriate perhaps to go into the note on the bottom of the sheet?

**Mr. Strong:** I am at your disposal.

**Mr. Brewin:** It says at the bottom: "1.0% of National Income Target" I think some of us have a general idea what this is, but what is the National Income Target referred to in that note?

**Mr. Strong:** The figure that has been quoted by the Minister, the Minister of Finance and other Ministers, when referring publicly to the objective of the Canadian Government, is 1.0% of gross national product at factor cost by approximately 1971. Factor cost simply means gross national product adjusted downward to take account of the actual costs of production. This results in a slightly lower figure than would result if you took the GNP figure unadjusted for factor cost.

At the present time our total of \$311 million of allocations made for all purposes during 1966-67 was something slightly below .6 of one per cent of GNP at factor cost. I think the figure is .58 or .57 per cent.

**Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale):** Mr. Chairman, it might be helpful to the Committee if Mr. Strong briefly referred to the Development Assistance Committee and how the one per cent criterion has been established on an international basis?

**Mr. Strong:** Yes. The one per cent figure is subject again to a good deal of confusion. In fact this whole area, internationally, actually requires a fair amount of clarification. There never has been an agreed international definition of what the one per cent figure is

to be based upon but we hope fairly soon to come up with an agreed definition. In the meantime we are using the definition that we think most appropriate, one per cent of GNP at factor costs.

The DAC figures, which again are frequently quoted in newspapers, create further confusion for Canadians and for those of other countries too, because the DAC figures are based on actual disbursements during a year whereas what we are talking about is authorized allocations and there is quite a lag sometimes between allocations and disbursements and, therefore, the catching up process as far as Canada is concerned in DAC reflects this kind of a lag. It is often said that Canada has been 14th out of 15 in the DAC figures, this was true but it is a reflection of the position as it really was several years ago. We do not have the figures for last year because they have not been released by DAC. I would think that they will reflect a considerable improvement in the Canadian position and that we will be up quite a bit from 14th. I do not know precisely where we will stand but I do know that the DAC figures will not again reflect, even at that point, the total allocations and the increases in allocations that you have approved.

• (10.15 a.m.)

**Mr. McIntosh:** I have another question arising out of this sheet. I refer to item (d) Cancellation of India Wheat Loan. Last year it was \$8.72 million and this year \$1.31 million. Was that a cancellation of shipment or a cancellation of a loan that India owed Canada?

**Mr. Strong:** No. That was the cancellation of certain aspects of a loan that was owed to Canada by India.

**Mr. McIntosh:** Then why is this taken in on this sheet?

**Mr. Strong:** It is like an outlay of money. It is money we would have been receiving from India during this year and because we agreed with other members of the international community to provide India with a certain measure of debt relief, our share of that debt relief representing funds that we would otherwise have been receiving from India in that year was \$8.72 million.

**Mr. McIntosh:** No, but the point is if that loan was repaid it would not go back into your treasury.

**Mr. Strong:** No, it would not.

**Mr. McIntosh:** Why is it included as an item here? It is not a grant, as far as external aid is concerned.

**Mr. Strong:** I would not attempt to defend the accounting procedures used. I think you would need someone else to do that. I did not devise them and I find them rather mysterious myself.

**Mr. McIntosh:** The gentleman over there has something to say, I think.

**Mr. D. R. McLellan (Director, Finance Division, External Aid Office):** I can only say that Parliament appropriated the money in the estimates last year to pay off the loans. The funds were actually appropriated in the usual manner and the proceeds used to liquidate the debt. The item of \$9.42 million appears in the 1966-67 estimates.

**Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale):** And the appropriation was made under the estimates of this department.

**Mr. McLellan:** That is right, in the final supplementary estimates.

**Mr. Churchill:** Why is this item at the bottom of the page concerning long-term export credits included here? It is not really a gift; it is a form of aid which is repayable.

**Mr. Strong:** Mr. Chairman, the reason for this is, again, to show the total makeup of the external aid figures that are quoted by the government and by international sources who refer to the total Canadian aid program. Internationally, export credits are in fact accepted, provided they exceed a five year term and their interest rates are no higher than 6 per cent. These are counted for international accounting purposes and this is simply designed to show the makeup of the total Canadian figure of \$311 million.

**Mr. Churchill:** That may be all right for international propaganda purposes but as far as the Canadian people are concerned, it is not really a clear picture. It is a pretense that we are making grants in aid of \$311 million and yet part of that, \$61 million, are simply credits. I do not object to the presentation of the picture this way for the purposes of this Committee and I can see that there is an attempt to indicate that insofar as other countries are concerned, Canada is doing its part and paying its share. It may be all right in international circles to say to some other

country if you are going to put in your export credits, we are going to put in ours. I do not think, as far as the Canadian people are concerned, that this would be clear.

I can see the Minister of Finance or the Minister of External Affairs proclaiming at some length about what Canada is doing in the international field, but this figure might be published in reports as being Canada's contribution and, actually, it is not correct.

**Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale):** May I put it to you in another way. Is it not a fact that these funds are appropriated from the Canadian taxpayer and, of course, in due course they will be paid back, but the taxpayer has to pay for them and the foreign borrower, for a period of up to 20 years, has the benefit of them? By international criteria it has been decided that these are equivalent to loan funds.

**Mr. Strong:** Mr. Chairman, there is no attempt here to describe these as being something they are not. It is simply that in order to get a total picture comparing Canada's aid program to the aid programs of other countries, you have to make reference to this. I agree that it would be wrong to refer to it as anything other than what it is and that is an export credit scheme. I think it does, in fact, result in part from motivation that relates to assisting developing countries. I think probably most countries extending this kind of assistance would have to have a certain amount of developmental motivation in doing this as distinct from only the normal commercial motivations because the loans that are being made to the developing countries, even under export credit schemes of Canada and other countries, very often have to ignore some of the commercial standards.

**Mr. Churchill:** These are seldom outright grants of money; it is the equipment purchased in Canada?

**Mr. Strong:** You are quite right, sir. This is entirely what they are.

**Mr. McIntosh:** It is entirely different and it gives a false picture with regard to the note you have at the bottom of this sheet.

**Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale):** Why is that?

**Mr. McIntosh:** It says here:

Long-Term Export Credits are included as part of Canada's total assistance in

international measurements of aid that count towards the 1 per cent of National Income Target.

I do not think they should be included in the goal you are trying to reach of one per cent for external aid because it is actually aid in a different way. It is a loan which is repayable. It is not a gift but a business transaction on which you make money.

**Mr. Strong:** Again, might I just point out that there is no attempt here to describe these as being anything different than what they are, but Canadians, I think, certainly in their communications with the External Aid Office, most frequently raise this question with us and this is one of the reasons we mentioned it here. Most people who are interested in the subject look at the international totals and compare Canadian performance to the performance of other countries and in doing so, to get a proper picture for comparison purposes, you really have to include the same elements in our total that they include in their totals. I agree that we certainly should not and I hope we are not misrepresenting the figure.

**Mr. McIntosh:** It is a false picture as far as the Canadian people are concerned, when this note shows that we are giving close to one per cent.

**Mr. Walker:** Mr. Chairman, I think it is a much truer picture to give the Canadian people, particularly in relation to what other countries are doing, and this is the only purpose for it. How can you give the Canadian people the true picture if you use a different standard of measurement than the other countries are using when they are using this formula?

Does DAC make any differentiation between military and non-military assistance in terms of dollars?

**Mr. Strong:** Military is not counted at all in the DAC figures. I might point out, too, that the accepted United Nations formula for arriving at these figures includes export credits. As a matter of fact, it also includes private investment which is made purely for commercial purposes. In fact, the figure of some countries compares more favourably to Canada's than it really should because of the inclusion of substantial amounts of private investment and export credits. I think members should appreciate that a strict comparison of the figures, even including export

credits relating to Canada's total external aid program as set against those of many other countries, does not reflect as favourably on Canada as it should because the terms under which Canada provides this aid, on an overall basis, are really amongst the best in the world.

**Mr. McIntosh:** Then would you agree, that if you carry this to the extreme our whole total of \$311 million could be export credits and actually Canada would be contributing nothing to external aid?

**Mr. Strong:** From the point of view strictly of reporting, this might well be the case. On the other hand, each country has to appear before DAC every year and subject itself to the kind of scrutiny to which you gentlemen are subjecting us this morning. We have to defend our aid program, including its various elements. If we were to mount a program which was entirely export credits, while for reporting purposes it would be permitted, it would obviously make it pretty difficult for purposes of defending Canada's program in this international forum.

**Mr. McIntosh:** Could you give us in percentages how Canada's export credits compare with the export credits of other countries for which they get a credit of, say, one per cent?

**Mr. Strong:** I cannot, out of my head, but we could get the figures on this for you. Generally speaking both are in terms of the total amount, the relationship of grants to loans; for example, in 1966-67, 72 per cent of our bilateral funds were given in the form of grants and 28 per cent in the form of loans. The majority of those loans were on interest free terms of 50 years with ten years' grace before repayment commences. This year we are proposing an increase in the ratio of development loans to grants, but again our loans are on the softest terms available really from any source. These are the interest free, 50 year loans with ten years' grace on repayment. Now, because last year the 3/4 of one per cent service charge was eliminated, there is no longer a service charge. While the proportion of loans to grants has grown, if Parliament adopts this year's estimates, the terms under which Canadian aid provide them are still amongst the best in the world.

**Mr. McIntosh:** Is there any place on these sheets that shows where loans made in the past and repaid now are deducted from this?

**Mr. Strong:** No; this is not brought into this accounting. There is no credit against these figures for funds that come back to us. Mind you, they are very small in number at this point and they primarily relate to export credits. However, the DAC figure which is based, as I mentioned, on disbursements, is a net figure.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** Could you tell us what DAC is? I do not have my glossary of these four and five letter terms here.

**Mr. Strong:** Yes; I am sorry. It is the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD and it is the principal forum in which donor countries are called upon to justify their aid programs in terms of quantity and quality of aid. In essence, it attempts to induce donors to give more aid on better terms.

*(Translation)*

**The Chairman:** Mr. Pelletier, have you a question?

**Mr. Pelletier:** I wonder if we really should spend much time on this, considering that if the words mean anything, clearly no one is misled when we speak of long-term export credit. Moreover, I wonder if we are not wasting time in wondering whether there are any false claims, the words being quite clear. And speaking of words, I would very much like these documents to be given to us in French, not only for the use of members of the Committee, but especially because of the repercussions. If those responsible for external aid want the repercussions of these figures to be as well known in the French language press, it is very unwise to issue them solely in English at the time they appear and let the French press have them several days later in French, at a time when the French press might have lost interest whereas there is a great need on the contrary, that it be interested.

*(English)*

**The Chairman:** Do you have French copies of these sheets?

**Mr. Strong:** We do not because we were only told yesterday that we were to appear. We can provide French copies, Mr. Chairman, but we had not expected to appear before this Committee quite so quickly. This information is what we use for our own working purposes and we simply reproduced it to have it available this morning in case it was wanted. We did not actually make any—

**Mr. Pelletier:** Yes; I suppose you understood my remarks about the consequences.

**Mr. Strong:** Yes.

**Mr. Pelletier:** When these documents are published two or three days later the French press does not have access to them. It is not only a matter of having respect for the French press, but for your own purposes also. If they are not published and do not get any diffusion, they suffer because of that fact.

**Mr. Strong:** As a matter of fact, Mr. Chairman, we do publish everything in English and French. This might be an appropriate time to say that although I am not as bilingual as I might like to be, of all other government departments of which I have knowledge I think we in the External Aid Office have almost the highest percentage of bilingual staff. About 50 per cent of our staff is bilingual and we have very good facilities.

**Mr. Pelletier:** Then it might be a good idea to work on documents in both languages.

**Mr. Strong:** We do, in fact, but we do not publish them for our own use in both languages. We publish them in either French or English depending on the person who is doing the work.

**The Chairman:** Is the Committee agreed that these documents should be printed as appendices to today's proceedings so, at least, they will be printed in both languages?

**Mr. Churchill:** Mr. Chairman, I thought they were to be revised, first, with references to the blue book and so on. Why do we have to rush into print with this now? We have raised certain objections to it. I still have my objection to showing export credits. This worry about what other countries are doing and the comparison between the aid given by Canada and other countries should be cleared up. If other countries are including export credits, and as the witness said, in some instances, private investments, then it is just ridiculous to attempt to make a comparison between what Canada and other countries are doing. I do not think we should attempt to do this. In view of certain debates we have had in the House in the past and the criticism of the government for failing to reach the alleged one per cent of national income for this purpose, is that an attempt to meet that criticism or to forestall it in the future? I think that should be left to the Minister of External Affairs to answer. He is pretty good

at semantics. Why should we, as a Committee, have to do this? Frankly, I do not approve of it. I think it gives an incorrect picture of Canada's aid insofar as the ordinary Canadian taxpayer is concerned.

**Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale):** Surely not, Mr. Chairman, because the fact is that these export credits are being made available to the developing countries on better than commercial terms. If the developing countries had to acquire this same equipment on commercial terms, they would unquestionably have to pay a much stiffer rate. To that extent this is an appropriation by the Canadian taxpayer and it is really only a matter of degree between the export credit, the development loan on the terms you have set out and a grant. These are three different types of financial assistance that are made available. Surely if we are going to be talking sensibly about Canada's external assistance program, we should be talking about all the assistance provided, whatever its terms short of commercial terms.

Is it not a fact that some of the other countries, France for example, add the cost of colonial administration as well as commercial loans for the criteria?

**Mr. McIntosh:** The only difference that should be included in this is the difference between what they actually would pay and the interest rate.

**Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale):** On that basis, then, you gentlemen are saying we should only be talking about grants, but in fact we are talking about the whole area of assistance whether it be loans, export credits or outright grants. The most sensible way to talk about an external aid program is to talk about all the figures and not just about the grant figures.

**Mr. Allmand:** How long has it been set up this way?

**An hon. Member:** That is what I would like to know.

**Mr. Strong:** It has been set up this way for a number of years.

**Mr. Allmand:** From what year, sir?

**Mr. Strong:** Until what year or since what year?

**Mr. Allmand:** From what year.

**Mr. Strong:** It is sort of an evolving thing. DAC was set up about seven years ago.

**Mr. Drake:** Before 1963—somewhere around that time.

**An hon. Member:** It only registers now, some seven years later.

**The Chairman:** Order, please.

**Mr. Strong:** If you want that we will put it in.

**The Chairman:** Order, please. We have a witness here this morning and I believe that all questions should be directed to him. If the Committee wants to make a recommendation to change the procedure of the past, we can do so, but at this time I think we should address our questions to the witness. We should let him proceed with his explanations before we get too deeply involved in political discussions as to accounting procedures.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** I think I should say again that we are very grateful to Mr. Strong for bringing to our attention for the first time just what strange accounting procedures have been going on.

**Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale):** Mr. Chairman, Mr. Nesbitt was the Parliamentary Secretary for some five years and this was in effect when he was there. Surely, this is not the first time.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** Mr. Macdonald can get as political as he likes, but this was not my particular field of operation.

**The Chairman:** Order, please. I will ask Mr. Strong to continue.

**Mr. Strong:** Mr. Chairman, my role obviously is simply to present the figures to you. Whether you want to use the ECIT things or not, of course, is up to you, but because of the fact that we have found that most people find it confusing not to mention them we have put them here so that they are available to you if you wish to use them. We have also felt that it would be useful to present the figures in the way in which they are generally accepted internationally, but we can present them in any other way that the Members may wish. They can be broken down in many different ways.

**Mr. Churchill:** Mr. Chairman, just on that phrase "generally accepted internationally", Mr. Macdonald has told us that France puts in her colonial administration as foreign aid. How many other things like this are added by other countries in this international field

which simply confuses the picture? This is what I object to and I do not think we should just simply tag along because some other country is doing something like this. We might dream up some other things that could be listed under foreign aid. Maybe if we launch a few satellites that would be advantageous to other countries we could put that down as external aid.

**Mr. Walker:** Mr. Chairman, I wonder if Mr. Churchill would agree that we might be in a better position to make whatever recommendations we want to make about the accounting and about a true picture after Mr. Strong has spoken in general terms about the programs?

**Mr. Churchill:** I am quite prepared to listen. I was objecting to the printing of this in the report.

**The Chairman:** Go ahead, Mr. Strong.

**Mr. Strong:** Mr. Chairman, I do not wish to monopolize the time of the Committee by speaking to things that seem important to me. I would much rather speak to things that seem important to the Members. I might make a couple of rather quick comments though on a number of areas that seem important.

First of all, we have talked about the levels and the confusion that does exist because of the various ways of reporting it. These ways have been with us for some years. I think the areas of growth in our program is also something that might be of interest to you. The principal areas of growth are in Francophone Africa and in the Caribbean area. I should also mention that the whole question of food aid which has been on everybody's mind very recently with the reports of famine in India and so on, should probably deserve special attention because food aid is a very significant part of the total Canadian program. Last year, in fact, it accounted for \$100 million of our bilateral expenditures which is some 40 per cent of the total.

It seems to me that there is a fair amount of misunderstanding in the minds of the public about the way in which our food aid is given and the kind of effect it has on the economies of the developing countries. What is not generally appreciated is that when we give our food aid we require the recipient country to establish in its accounts a counterpart fund equivalent in terms of local currency to the value of the gift of grain, flour or whatever it happens to be. These counterpart

funds are then directed by agreement between us and the recipient country to projects of long-term development in the country and in this way Canadian gifts of wheat, flour and other commodities are translated into, not only the meeting of immediate needs but such things as bridges, schools, dams and this kind of thing. It really does a twofold impact. It is not just a case of putting a finger-in-the-dyke sort of operation as it does direct itself to both the immediate and the long-range development problem. This is a fairly important point to bear in mind when considering food aid.

I think perhaps it might also be useful to mention the degree of co-operation which does exist in the international community in which Canada takes an active part and which conditions very much the development of our own program. This co-ordination takes place on an over-all level through the Development Assistance Committee to which we have already referred. It is, really, the prime function of this group to focus on problems of levels of aid and terms of aid in an effort to bring a little more order into what is, admittedly, not a completely orderly system of international reporting and to try and induce governments to improve both their levels of aid and their terms of aid.

The other principle forums in which aid is co-ordinated are the consortia and consultative groups set up by the World Bank. The difference between the two is solely that in the consortial groups you make actual pledges and in the consultative groups you consult together but do not actually make firm pledges. These groups now cover the principle recipient countries and what happens in them is that under the auspices of the World Bank the country concerned, let us say India, for example, is brought together with the World Bank and with the other principle donor countries. In this case they review the development plans of India, the World Bank makes its own review of the Indian development plan, they determine what resources are available to the Indian government for the execution of this plan, and they determine also what resources might be made available from external sources. In doing this they try to take account of the special capacities of each country, and it is through this mechanism that we are able to determine the best and most effective role that Canadian aid can play in respect of that particular country. We participate in most of these consortia and consultative groups. We take an active role in

them and they play an active part in assisting us in co-ordinating our programs with those of other donors.

Also, we are co-operating to an increasing degree with the various multilateral organizations—the United Nations Development program and others—which administer programs to which we make contributions. In addition to those contributions we very often team up with them in specific projects where we devote some of our bilateral aid to supporting a project which may be managed or run by them. This is something that is happening to an increasing degree.

One other point I might just mention is that the Secretary of State for External Affairs has mentioned, I think, on several occasions the fact that Canada is seeking to concentrate its aid to a greater extent in those areas where major Canadian interest is involved and where Canadian aid can be most effective. The result of this is that today some 80 per cent of our total aid is provided to about 12 countries or areas while, on the other hand, a total of 65 countries receive some form of Canadian aid. There is a very substantial concentration in about a dozen key countries or areas.

I might also just make one other reference as, again, I think this is something that might be of interest to you. As the Minister has mentioned, the government wants to involve the private sector to a greater extent in external aid. This means drawing upon the resources which exist in private companies, private institutions, universities and other voluntary agencies. It means drawing on them for people as well as encouraging them themselves to engage in various forms of international activity which can be complementary to our own external aid program. Perhaps the best example of this is the support of the CUSO program, which, as you know, is a privately organized and sponsored institution which now receives some 90 per cent of its funds under external aid programs. But, as a result of the fact that it is a private agency and is used principally as the instrument of sending young Canadian volunteers abroad, the cost per volunteer to the Canadian Government is considerably less by this method than the cost per volunteer experienced by the United States, Great Britain, and others who are involved in similar voluntary programs.

During my recent visit to India I visited the Mysore Institute of Food Technology which is another interesting example of a

threefold co-operative endeavour. It is set up under the auspices of the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations. It is supported by contributions from thousands of individual Canadians, both individuals and companies in the food business in Canada through the Canadian Hunger Foundation and, in addition, it was supported by Canadian Government funds under External Aid. So here is an example of an international institute headquartered in India, serving the entire south east Asia in the vital area of food technology and representing a partnership or operation between these three groups. I think, Mr. Chairman, that is probably all I should say by way of general remarks.

**The Chairman:** Mr. Faulkner, Mr. Nesbitt and Mr. Brewin have indicated they have questions.

**Mr. Faulkner:** Mr. Strong, I was very interested in your remarks on the role of the private sector in the External Aid Program. It seems to me a very useful development from several points of view. Probably not the least important aspect of it is that if we can, or if you can, in a larger way involve the private sector then the normal problems associated with selling and expanding the External Aid Program will be mitigated by a greater or wider involvement of the Canadian people. You cited two instances of the private sector at work in the External Aid Program. I was wondering if you would like to elaborate specifically how you intend to utilize the private sector? How wide-ranging will be the involvement? Do you envisage, for instance, the labour movement in Canada participating in, say, setting up labour colleges in some of these countries? What about the co-operative movement and things of this character? Could you, in a general way elaborate on the two specific examples and say how you intend to utilize the private sector?

**Mr. Strong:** Mr. Chairman, I should make clear that the private sector is now very much involved in our External Aid Program. I understand it is the government's intention to increase their involvement and we have had some very encouraging evidence in the few months that I have been on this job that the private sector is in fact very interested in this. I have been pleasantly surprised to know this.

The two instances that you mention, the co-operative movement and the labour move-

ment, certainly are included in what is referred to as the private sector. In fact we now have very extensive programs with both the co-op and the labour movement. We bring people from various countries to the labour college here. Perhaps a very good example is the Coady Institute of Antigonish where a majority of the students are actually supported by External Aid. The Coady Institute has had a very significant influence in a number of areas, particularly in Africa and South America. We must call on our advisers, for example. A large number of our technical advisers and teachers come from the private sector but they do come from provincial and federal governments too. The majority of them do come from private companies, from schools and universities and we have almost 1200 of these individual advisers and teachers overseas now. So there is already a substantial involvement. What we are hoping is to see a greater institutional involvement on the part of some of these organizations. The Society of Industrial and Cost Accountants for example has approached us, as well as members of the chartered accountancy profession. These are not voluntary organizations in the normal sense, but being professional organizations it has been very encouraging to me to see that these associations are very interested in using the talents of their organizations on a national level as well as through them into their membership to make available assistance to the developing countries.

**Mr. Faulkner:** I have a supplementary question. Does your office attempt to compile all types of aid in Canada and the level in dollars just so that you will know what people in Canada are doing?

**Mr. Strong:** We are trying to do that. The best estimate we have at the moment is that some \$25 million probably flows from private sources in Canada—voluntary agencies, church programs, mission programs, and so on which relate to development as distinct from the proselytizing programs of missionary organizations. The best figure we have is about \$25 million. However, this often is supplemented, obviously, by a tremendous amount of voluntary effort. As you know, in missionary programs people that go out usually do so at very much lower salaries and the administrative organization at the Canadian end receives a tremendous amount of voluntary help and support. Very often the significance of this is somewhat greater than might be

indicated by quoting the pure dollar figures involved.

**Mr. Faulkner:** Could you clarify for my benefit the relationship between yourself, your group, and the specialized agencies of the U.N.? Are you the channel through which we work and contribute to the specialized agencies or is that outside your purview?

**Mr. Strong:** We are concerned with this and we participate in the interdepartmental process of considering these matters as they effect our total aid program but the actual expenditures are made through the Department of External Affairs. We have a very close relationship with each of these agencies. In fact we are the recruiting agency in Canada for most of the U.N. Agencies, recruiting Canadians to act as experts and advisers in various areas. We are also usually represented and participate in meetings of these organizations that have anything significant to do with aid or development.

**Mr. Faulkner:** Are there Canadians in senior positions heading up these specialized agencies?

**Mr. Strong:** There is no Canadian at the head of them at the moment. Of course you may recall that in the past Dr. Chisholm was head of the World Health Organization and Dr. Keenleyside headed up the United Nations Technical Assistance Program. There are quite a number of Canadians scattered through the agencies in various jobs. At the moment there is not one at the head of any of the agencies.

**Mr. Faulkner:** As a matter of policy, if I understood you correctly, you said that the decision of the government is to channel our aid to specific countries. Although I did not fully understand the basis of the decision, would it be true to say that we are tending to concentrate on countries where we feel we can be particularly effective and where our interest lies rather than channelling our aid generally through specialized agencies and the U.N.?

**Mr. Strong:** No. In respect of the policy issues involved, as you know we do not make the policy; we just try to interpret it and to operate under it. I do not think there is anything mutually exclusive about these two things. As the Minister has said, we are concentrating our assistance in those areas in which it can make the most impact and where Canadian interest is considered to be

most significantly involved and this really applies to about 12 basic countries or areas. But, by the same token, an increasing amount of our aid in these countries and others is related to the work being done in those countries by the United Nations and related agencies.

**Mr. Faulkner:** What do you mean by "related"?

**Mr. Strong:** Let me give you a specific example, the one I used before, Mysore. We provided counterpart funds to help build the student hostel at the Mysore Institute of Food Technology. We would not have been able to do this in other countries where we did not have a sufficient allocation available in our bilateral budget. In India, where we have a substantial budget and where we have substantial bilateral funds allocated to that budget, we have obviously more opportunities to seek partnership arrangements with some of the multilateral agencies. Correspondingly, in countries where we have a relatively small allocation the opportunities for working directly with multilateral agencies are more limited. But we do seek out these opportunities and we are having an increasing amount of communications on the working official level with the people running these agencies and they see benefits to them as to us. It is simply a matter of trying to seek more effective ways of applying our bilateral assistance within the limits of the policies laid down for us. It is not necessarily a new policy in itself.

**Mr. Faulkner:** Just one last quick question. Would you consider that the U.N. Development Program, a new agency for industrial development through the U.N., has been effective?

**Mr. Strong:** I am really no judge of that in a general way. I could perhaps answer specific questions on it but I do not think I am the appropriate person to sit in judgment on these programs. I can say that they have some very good ones.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** I have one or two brief questions. First of all, I understand from your remarks, Mr. Strong, that there is some allocation in the estimates for CUSO?

**Mr. Strong:** This is right. It is chargeable against the \$50 million which appears for this year under International Development Grants. It is chargeable against that particular item.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** Oh yes. Is there any allocation under that same grant for The Company of Young Canadians?

**Mr. Strong:** No, this does not come within the venue of our External Aid operations.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** And anything that The Company of Young Canadians may do then does not come in anyway into your estimates, sir?

**Mr. Strong:** No, except, naturally, to the extent that they were to become involved in overseas programs, there would undoubtedly be with them, as there are with other similar agencies, a process of consultation and coordination.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** But there would be no figure in your estimates?

**Mr. Strong:** No.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** I was very interested in the final part of your remarks. You said that there was a tendency to make a greater concentration of our bilateral aid to perhaps 12 countries but that 65 countries were actual recipients. Could you give us some figures as to the amount as well as some of the countries in the 65 minus 12, so to speak, that receive this aid?

**Mr. Strong:** Are you talking about the ones that receive the smaller amounts?

**Mr. Nesbitt:** Yes.

**Mr. Strong:** Well, it ranges everywhere, from a few thousand dollars in places like Western Samoa. It includes the Maldive Islands, for example, where I think we have an allocation of \$5,000 or something like that. It is very, very small but it ranges down to that level. I can give you quite a few of them. This gives you a series of examples: Malta, \$23,000; Botswana, \$81,000; Central African Republic, \$13,000; Chad, \$144,000—

**Mr. Walker:** Is this cash or projects?

**Mr. Strong:** No. I think it might be useful to point out in respect to this question that we do not give cash. We give cash grants to the multilateral agencies but cash does not flow directly from us to any of the developing countries under our normal bilateral programs. The funds are used to buy goods and services in Canada and what really is involved here is a transfer of resources and our funds are used to purchase Canadian goods

and services for particular projects and programs in the developing countries. We do not just send them cash.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** If you have the figure with you, could you tell us the total amount given to the 12 countries where our aid is concentrated, and what those 12 countries are?

• (11.02 a.m.)

**Mr. Strong:** May I give them to you country by country? I will use the 1967-68 figures and I will quote the bilateral figures, exclusive of export credits. Also, they do not include the country's pro rata share of our multilateral contributions.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** Direct bilateral aid?

**Mr. Strong:** Yes. India, \$90 million; Pakistan, \$28.5 million; Malaysia \$3 million; Ceylon, \$4.5 million. In Francophone Africa: Tunisia, \$2.3 million; Cameroun, \$2.2 million; Senegal, \$1.7 million. In Commonwealth Africa: Nigeria, \$7 million; Ghana, \$4 million. For the Caribbean, which is counted as a single unit for these purposes although it involves, of course, a number of countries and territories, there is a total of \$17.2 million. For these purposes I considered Latin America as one area because our Latin American program is somewhat different than the rest of our program. In Latin America we do not have allocations to individual countries. We made arrangements with the Inter-American Development Bank whereby we made available up to \$10 million in each of the past three years, and there is another \$10 million in the estimates for this year.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** Is that an additional \$10 million?

**Mr. Strong:** Yes. This is administered by the Inter-American Development Bank on our behalf and it can go to any Latin American country where the conditions are such that Canadian goods and services can be used in what we regard as a project that has priority from a development standpoint. You therefore cannot really tie that money down to a particular country.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** This question may be slightly out of your field and I will understand if you feel you cannot answer it. On what basis are decisions made regarding what countries will receive aid and in what amount?

**Mr. Strong:** I could tell you the process. I think the basis on which they are made is

outside my area of competence to discuss. These matters are considered by the various departments of government involved on an official level through the departmental committees and they eventually go to the Cabinet for approval. Of course there are a variety of considerations involved.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** The countries that receive these really trivial amounts of aid which you mentioned, these \$5,000 and \$20,000 items, could you give us some idea what this aid is actually for?

**Mr. Strong:** It is principally technical assistance. In most cases it is a matter of financing tours for a small number of people, students and trainees, who are coming to Canada to develop a particular skill. This is a form of assistance which it is possible to give to areas where even a few trained people can make a real contribution to the country and where it does not really require a substantial administrative load on our part. In many of these countries we have no on-the-spot representation and it would be difficult to administer any substantial program, but it is feasible to make it possible for a certain number of people from those countries to come to Canada to receive training. Occasionally it is also feasible for us to send a teacher or an adviser for a particular use in one of those countries.

**Mr. Walker:** May I ask a supplementary? In those cases do you require a reciprocal type of work in the particular country that you mentioned, India? You said that if we relieve them of their food problem then there is an agreement that they will carry on and do some other type of work.

**Mr. Strong:** No. We require that they cooperate. It is basic to any part of our program that the recipient country has to provide part of the cost. There are some special conditions where this does not apply, but for the most part this is basic to our whole program. For example, when we send a teacher or adviser abroad, typically the recipient country will provide the housing and perhaps a car, or whatever other local facilities are required. This means that they are partners in bearing the cost of the project.

In respect to food aid, I would like to explain this a little further because there is a quite important point involved. The reason that we are able to insist on the setting up of these counterpart funds when we give a gift of food or commodities is that these are nor-

mally marketed within the country through their normal marketing channels and they give rise in most cases to local currency. The problem here is not so much the availability of money as it is the availability of foreign exchange to purchase grain, and we relieve them of the necessity of finding that foreign exchange and this enables them to continue to pursue their own long-range development projects while they are meeting their immediate food needs.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** I only have two very brief questions at this time. I was wondering if Mr. Strong could provide the members of the committee—although perhaps it would be better if something could be appended to the report later—with the exact figures for direct bilateral aid to all countries concerned so that we would have a record of it. I know he probably does not have the figures with him right now but I wonder if he could give a list to the clerk of the Committee so that it could be included in the report of this committee's proceedings.

**Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale):** Do you mean for the year just completed?

**Mr. Nesbitt:** No, for the coming year, 1967-68. It has been suggested that perhaps we could have it for both years.

**Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale):** Would the figures for the current year be available yet?

**Mr. Strong:** No. This would be a problem for the current year because decisions have not been made with respect to all the elements involved.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** Perhaps you could give them for the last year they are available.

**Mr. Strong:** Yes, we could certainly do that.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** With respect to the training of students, it is my understanding that students are selected by the country in question. Do we have any control at all over the students who are sent to Canada for training?

**Mr. Strong:** Yes, we have an approved selection procedure worked out with each country. It varies a bit from country to country, depending on their situation, but basically it requires their nomination and our approval.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** It has been alleged by a number of persons who should be in a position to know that very often some of these students come from relatively well-off families in these

countries and that perhaps they are not of the highest academic standing. Would you care to comment on this?

**Mr. Strong:** From the academic point of view I certainly imagine that all procedures are subject to some trial and error. I think the errors that may have been made in this area are probably very much in the past because the machinery that has been established for doing this is working quite well now. It will never guarantee against the possibility of the kind of difficulties arising that you mention. On the other hand, with regard to the problem of people being relatively wealthy, I think this happens fairly infrequently. We do not make any—

**Mr. Nesbitt:** No, I just meant that sometimes those who could have come anyway are being sent here on—

● (11.10 a.m.)

**Mr. Strong:** We try to avoid situations of this kind. We have no way of making a means test requirement, of course, but one of the problems is that many of these countries have a very serious foreign exchange problem. It is not just a matter of how wealthy or how poor they may be locally; it is the availability of foreign exchange to send them. It is their academic qualifications that really governs as far as we are concerned.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** Could you give an approximate figure as to how much it costs the government per year to educate and maintain one of these students in Canada?

**Mr. Strong:** Approximately \$4,500, on the average. This of course takes into account the transportation and this kind of thing.

I wonder, Mr. Chairman, if I may correct a very serious omission that I made at the commencement of my remarks. I had intended to introduce my associates, and in the excitement of my first appearance before you I neglected to do this. You have already heard from some of them but may I now introduce to you on my immediate right Mr. E. G. Drake, who is in charge of our policy and planning section. Next to him is Mr. Ross McLellan, who is director of finance and next to him is Dr. Henry Gaudefroy, who is my special adviser on French programs and, incidentally, one of the outstanding recent additions to the External Aid office. We joined on the same day. Miss Mary MacKay sitting over there is an officer in the policy planning divi-

sion and is primarily responsible for the preparation of these figures that have been put before you.

**Mr. Brewin:** I just want to ask one small question of detail. Mr. Strong mentioned twelve areas to which we gave assistance, and then I think he listed only eleven. I believe there is one other area and it might be Rwanda.

**Mr. Strong:** I did not intend to miss Rwanda but it is pretty small on the map, I guess. Rwanda is one of the countries involved and the total for Rwanda is \$800,000 and this is applied almost entirely in support of the University of Rwanda.

**Mr. Brewin:** Then, Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask Mr. Strong a general question and one which is not based on any criticism of the what has been done, but I am very much concerned about the adequacy of the total contribution, and I am basing my question on an article written by Escott Reid recently in the International Journal and with which you are no doubt familiar. He was, of course, ambassador to India and also an official in the World Bank. He speaks of the lack of economic aid as a most serious gap in the defences of civilization and suggests an increase of \$700 million in the Canadian contribution in this field. I do not want to ask you to comment on this because I am sure it is matter of general policy and one that I doubt you would be able to control. It is a matter for the government. However, I do want to ask if there is anywhere we can get a picture from the various places where we do in fact make contributions or whether there are other projects or other needs that are not being met because of lack of funds. For example, Mr. Reid suggests that there is a great need for the rich countries of the world to contribute more to the World Bank, the International Development Association, regional banks, of which the Latin American bank I suppose is one, the UN development program, and I noticed figures about Palestine refugees and the Colombo plan is another matter. Is there any place where we could get a list of what these various agencies think are the practical needs—I do not mean the absolute needs, that would probably be a bottomless pit—by way of things they could do if the international community or the rich nations of the world were able to find, as Mr. Reid suggests, a larger fund out of which these things could be done. We are given

comparisons with other countries and quite rightly we are given justification for what we are doing. Is there anywhere this committee can get a picture from these organizations of what they think would be an optimal suitable contribution?

**Mr. Strong:** Mr. Chairman, I think the best estimate that has probably been put forward in this area was made by Mr. George Woods, president of the World Bank, and he based it not only on the need but on the administrative capacity of developing countries to effectively utilize aid, and his estimate given last September at the World Bank meeting was from \$3 to \$4 billion. He said that the developing countries could probably use effectively some \$3 to \$4 billion more aid than they are now receiving.

As a matter of fact, I had the pleasure last night of spending the evening with one of the senior people in the World Bank and we were discussing this very point, and this does result from a specific country by country analysis of projects that are at a stage that they could be implemented if these additional funds were made available.

**Mr. Brewin:** Are the details of that available?

**Mr. Strong:** I do not have the details of this. I doubt that he would make it available for public reference because it would give rise to some difficulties I would think for the World Bank, but it is reliable and I think probably the best estimate of its kind that exists.

**Mr. Brewin:** This \$3 or \$4 billion relates to specific practically administrative projects which, if the finances were available, could be undertaken right away?

**Mr. Strong:** This is what I understand it to mean. This is over and above what is now being given.

**Mr. Brewin:** I realize that. It is additional to what is now being done by the world community as a whole.

**Mr. Pugh:** May I ask a supplementary, Mr. Chairman? Mr. Strong, pro rated to Canada, as one of the participating nations, what increased amount would that be?

**Mr. Strong:** I must say I have not done the calculation on that basis. If you are really using round figures here, our total program of \$300 million related to world flows, excluding

private investment, of \$6 billion, would be about 5 per cent. I suppose if you want to relate that to the \$4 billion figure you would come up with a figure of \$200 million more.

**Mr. Pugh:** I was only trying to justify the \$800 million suggested by Reid.

**Mr. Brewin:** The actual figure was \$700 million. It was a fairly vague suggestion.

**Mr. Strong:** I think even Mr. Woods would probably admit that the \$3 to \$4 billion is probably a very conservative figure, and if there were any expectation of significantly increased amounts of aid you would find that the administrative capacity of the countries to digest these amounts would grow rather rapidly too. As I understood it when I talked to him directly about it, this is really based on an immediate situation. In other words, if \$3 or \$4 billion were made available right now, it could be effectively used. This does not represent an index of what is actually needed.

**Mr. Brewin:** It is what can be used now. Presumably, the more education, training and so on, you use, the more the needs develop to some extent, I suppose. Does the administrative limitation that you refer to mean lack of training, expertise and that sort of thing?

**Mr. Strong:** For quite a while the limitation in the field of development was, in fact, an administrative limitation; this is still a big limitation. It is not easy to spend money effectively in developing countries. If I might add a personal comment here, business is simple by comparison with administering aid programs effectively. But in the early stages of development aid programs the limitations were mainly administrative. A lot of funds were made available rather quickly, particularly by some of the larger donor countries, and neither the donor countries nor the recipient countries at that stage had adequate machinery for implementing the projects to which this aid related. In the intervening years the capacity of both recipient and donor countries to deal effectively with the administration of large sums of aid money has grown considerably, and many projects are coming out of the pipeline now, that have been in the works for several years in the process of development. This is happening at a time when the net amount of aid available for these projects has been levelling out on a worldwide basis. So that now you have the opposite situation prevailing.

**Mr. Brewin:** Before you had more money but less administrative ability to use it; now you have the administrative ability, but not the money.

**Mr. Strong:** I am talking on a world-wide basis.

**Mr. Brewin:** That is what I understood. I take it when Mr. Woods uses an over-all figure like \$3 or \$4 billion, again he is referring to projects of the type that would be approved by the World Bank as a real contribution to the self-sustaining powers of the nations referred to. This is not any sort of charity that \$3 to \$4 billions would be put into improving the productive capacities of the countries concerned.

**Mr. Strong:** In giving that estimate he is certainly reflecting the normally very businesslike and conservative attitude of the World Bank. I would think that other estimates would probably be considerably higher than his.

**Mr. Brewin:** There is just one other question that I want to ask you, again from Mr. Principal Reid's article here. He said:

Canada would thus be making a most significant contribution to the war against world poverty if it strengthened its corps of experts on this problem in the public service and if this corps of experts were instructed to examine in turn each of the international agencies to which Canada belongs which is concerned directly or indirectly with the economic development of poor countries and to draw up recommendations on what steps should be taken to make each of them more effective, by changes in their practices or management, by increasing their resources, if necessary by changes in their constitutions. The recommendations of the Canadian experts would constitute a basis for discussions with other countries. Gradually, a consensus might emerge.

My question is whether that aspect of the problem, training of Canadian experts, the examination of the efficiency of the various projects that are undertaken, is provided for within your operation or within the estimates, or could it be provided for?

**Mr. Strong:** We do have a growing administrative capacity to make a contribution of the kind that Mr. Reid points out, through the multilateral agencies. Obviously it takes time

to develop expertise in these areas. I think Canada has developed a fairly significant amount of expertise. I will be the first, however, to admit—

**Mr. Brewin:** If Parliament provided more money you could do a better job on that.

**Mr. Strong:** Well, this is not for me to say. I think we will try to do the job of administering whatever funds you make available to us.

**Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale):** Mr. Chairman, I have a supplementary. Would it not be fair to say that the evaluation of international agencies does not come under the External Aid Office, but that it comes under the department itself, the UN division in particular?

**Mr. Strong:** Yes. The primary responsibility for the relationship rests with the Department of External Affairs; we participate in the process.

**Mr. Brewin:** Yes, it may come under the Department of External Affairs, but are you not the organization that would be best suited to find the people to do this job?

**Mr. Strong:** I think we have expertise in the aid area, and anything that involves aid or development; obviously we have appropriate opportunities for presenting our case.

**Mr. Harkness:** In connection with the food aid that we have provided, are you able to tell us what proportion of that food aid actually has been used to counterpart funds for the development of productive facilities in the countries which have received it?

**Mr. Strong:** Certainly well over half have already been allocated. I cannot be precise about it, but I can obtain the precise figures for you. But at the time of my visit to India, we discussed with the Indians the allocation to development projects of counterpart funds which by the end of this year would amount to about \$200 million in respect of India. This means that this would be almost the amount of last year's and this year's total program. So there is a lag because it takes time again for the project to develop. I would think, however, that we have real good priority uses in sight at this point for virtually all of these funds.

**Mr. Harkness:** Have you any means of determining really to what extent these counterpart funds are used for productive purposes?

**Mr. Strong:** Yes; for example, one of the significant projects we are undertaking now is the construction of a hydro-electric dam complex in South India in the state of Kerala at a place called Idikki. The foreign exchange cost of this project will be met from our normal bilateral aid funds; a substantial portion of the local cost, the cost of local labour and local material and this sort of thing, will be met from our counterpart funds. These are accounted for in the normal way. The funds are actually the property of the Indian government, but they are held by the Indian government subject to this agreement, which requires that they use them for agreed development projects; and they do have to, and do in fact render very detailed accounting to us of how these funds are disbursed. We do really know how they are spent.

**Mr. Harkness:** I have always been concerned over the extent to which the food aid which we give may be, as you expressed it, just a finger in the dike, and not really in the long run contributing to the ability of these countries to feed themselves and otherwise improve the living conditions of their people. In my view, one of the essential things, as far as we are able to do so, is to ensure that the aid given in the form of food has a long-range effect.

**Mr. Strong:** Well, this is indeed what we are trying to do. I think it should be pointed out with respect to India, for example, that Indian food production actually suffered substantially last year. It fell a good deal below the normal expectations because of the very severe drought, and I had the interesting but rather shocking experience of visiting Bihar a few weeks ago and seeing this area where normally you have a flourishing crop of wheat at this time of the year. In fact, this area supports a rural population of some 1300 people per square mile. It could not do that unless it was normally very productive. This is why the problem is as drastic as it is. There were two drought years, one following the other, and last year they exhausted the reserves completely. When you fly over the area, you can see it is arid, just like a desert with little spots of green here and there, little oases which result from the drilling of wells, and you can see immediately what the application of water does; the area around the well just flourishes. One of the things that are happening there—and we are providing some assistance in this respect—is the drilling of more wells to relieve this situation. Our food in the case of Bihar, for example, will be used

actually to feed these people to save the Indian government foreign exchange so that they can continue with their long-range development program, and in addition, to provide the local cost of such things as well drilling programs. It really does have a long-range benefit as well.

**Mr. Harkness:** There will be a certain proportion of our food aid—I was thinking particularly of that for the Palestinian refugees—which, of course, is just a straight matter of relieving a famine and which is written off as such.

**Mr. Strong:** Yes; we also administer the emergency relief programs of the government in the External Aid Office, and these do have to be distinguished, as you rightly say, from the development programs. Their primary object is to effect immediate relief in an emergency situation.

**Mr. Harkness:** You mentioned that the Caribbean area received—I suppose that it was in the last fiscal year—something in the neighbourhood of \$17 million in the form of aid.

**Mr. Strong:** This is the allocation for the coming year.

**Mr. Harkness:** This is the point I want to make. What is the relationship between what has been supplied in the past and what is going to be supplied this year?

**Mr. Strong:** Last year it was \$13.1 million, this year it will be \$17.2 million. This is about a 30 per cent increase.

**Mr. Harkness:** I am very glad to see that. I think this is one of the areas where our aid perhaps can be most usefully employed. I presume, then, that this very considerable increase reflects a general policy of continuing to increase aid to that particular area?

**Mr. Strong:** Yes. The Government has said on several occasions that this is the policy. As you know, there was a conference last year here in Ottawa at which the Prime Minister announced that aid was going to be stepped up substantially and these figures reflect that stepup.

**Mr. Harkness:** What proportion of this foreign aid which we provide—this would be straight grants, of course, and would have nothing to do with loans, I should think—is taken up for the provision of Canadian tech-

nical and other personnel in foreign countries on the one hand and the training of students from these countries in Canada on the other?

**Mr. Strong:** About 15 per cent of our grant aid is taken up by what generally we call technical assistance which includes the items that you have mentioned. This is our grant aid. The development loans are used, to some extent, in relation to technical assistance programs and always in relation to the provision of certain items of capital equipment. For example, under our development loan program to Latin America a loan was recently concluded for several million dollars for development of the University of Chile. The Development Loan Program does have some relationship to the development of education and technical assistance, too, but the figure in relation to the provision of experts, professors and teachers and the training of these people here is about 15 per cent.

**Mr. Harkness:** Has that figure as a proportion of our aid been going up or down?

**Mr. Strong:** As a proportion of our aid, it has been going up. As an example of this, in 1960 the number of students in Canada from foreign countries was something like 114. I am sorry, I am talking about the number of Canadians overseas which has gone up from 114 six years ago to a little over 1,150 now. The number of students and trainees in Canada will, this year, be something in the order of 3,000. Since 1960 this has risen from a total of about 723 representing an increase of about 400 per cent in seven years.

**Mr. Harkness:** This is a very good development and personally I think we can give more beneficial assistance in the long run by providing technical personnel and by training people from these countries in Canada than by the actual expenditure of funds, for example, to build dams in many cases, although both are useful.

Are there any provisions to ensure that students who come from these countries and are trained in Canada do not just remain here? I have heard a considerable number of complaints. In fact, some complaints have come from representatives of the countries concerned that students we bring here and who are desperately needed—medical personnel, and so on—apply for landed immigrant status and remain here to settle permanently, instead of returning to contribute to the welfare of their countries.

**Mr. Strong:** There is no question that this is a problem. It is a rather difficult problem, too, but we owe it, we believe, to the Canadian taxpayer and to the recipient governments to follow through with the original intent of our program. The intent is to provide training in Canada for students whose skills will be useful to their country and assist in its development.

It is true that people who come here occasionally do decide to stay and this does put us in a difficult position because they have a personal commitment to return. This is one of the conditions of their being recruited. We bring them here at considerable cost and on the nomination of their governments for this purpose. It defeats the entire purpose of the program if the net result is that we are simply bringing in another person who is, in effect, a high-cost, subsidized immigrant to Canada.

**Mr. Harkness:** Have we any means of preventing this from taking place?

**Mr. Strong:** We do, in fact, try to adhere pretty rigidly to this. There are mitigating circumstances from time to time from the human point of view that we do take into account, but by and large we have had to take a very tough line on this because, if we did not, the whole purpose of the program would be very quickly frustrated.

**Mr. Harkness:** It was represented to me by some people from the countries concerned that really it represents a bleeding off of their best brains and people who have become the best trained. Therefore, to the extent that this sort of thing takes place instead of being of assistance to them, it is really doing them damage.

**Mr. Brewin:** May I ask a supplementary question on that? I think, Mr. Strong, you would agree—in fact, you have already implied—that there are some cases where the person either marries a Canadian, or political conditions change in the country from which they come which makes it impossible to lay down an absolute rule that you will not allow people to stay in Canada. But has it reached significant proportions? I know that one method of trying to stop this happening is trying to recover the money that was advanced. I know this has been done. The other thing is that some of the countries of origin have bonds put up which they forfeit. This is another method of trying to put on pressure,

but has this problem, which Mr. Harkness has raised, reached such a proportion that it seriously endangers this program of bringing students to Canada? If it has gone too far then one would have to consider whether the whole program was justifiable or not. Has it reached that sort of proportion?

**Mr. Strong:** No. I could not say that it has reached those proportions but I think if we were to allow the students to disregard the commitments they make—which are made in writing, incidentally, when they come here—it might well become a larger problem. This is one of the reasons we make very few exceptions and there are only in those cases where the reasons, on a human or other basis, are very compelling because if we did not enforce this policy, I think it could very quickly become a serious problem and could frustrate the entire purpose for which, as I understand it, Parliament votes these funds.

**Mr. Harkness:** Mr. Brewin has raised the point of how serious the problem is. Can you give us any indication of the proportion of these students who have elected to remain here or who have not gone back?

● (11.40 a.m.)

**Mr. Strong:** There are only half a dozen or so. I will not say that we have not had the problem with other students. This is why I say I think it could become a problem quite quickly if it were not for the fact that we do try to adhere to this policy as strictly as possible within the limits of common humanity. But there are only about half a dozen who have actually been allowed to stay.

**Mr. Brewin:** Most of them are fully justified.

**Mr. Strong:** I think Mr. Brewin is aware of some of these cases.

**Mr. Harkness:** How many of them, apart from the ones who have actually stayed in Canada, have not returned to their countries of origin but have gone elsewhere?

**Mr. Strong:** From our point of view they all go back to their countries of origin. We have no way—

**Mr. Harkness:** Two things are involved. There are the ones who actually stay and the others who do not go back or, if they do go back, promptly go somewhere else and therefore the country loses their services.

**Mr. Strong:** This is something over which we have really no control. I think the amount of moral suasion that can be brought to bear by their own government has got to be the principal factor here. We cannot properly insist that they stay in their own country. We can and do take an interest in whether or not they come back to Canada within a certain period of time. They cannot return to Canada for two years. We do everything we can to try to assure that the intent of the program is made very clear to these people and that this is why they are nominated in the first place. Otherwise they might come here under non-subsidized arrangements which they are perfectly free to do if they wish, but we do try within our power to have them adhere to the purpose of this plan. If we did not, the recipient governments would not regard this as playing ball with them properly either.

**Mr. Churchill:** It is time to adjourn, Mr. Chairman. We cannot settle everything today.

**The Chairman:** Is it the wish of the Committee to adjourn? Quite a few have expressed a desire to ask questions. There is Mr. Macdonald, Mr. McIntosh, Mr. Pelletier, Mr. Allmand, Mr. Forrestall, Mr. Stanbury and Mr. Walker. It is quite true that we cannot possibly finish today.

**Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale):** Also, some of us have conflicts with other committees. It would be helpful if we could adjourn now and meet at another time.

**The Chairman:** Would it be possible to meet again on Tuesday?

**Some hon. Members:** Agreed.

**The Chairman:** The meeting is adjourned until Thursday at 9:30 a.m. The witness cannot be here on Tuesday as he has other commitments.

The meeting is adjourned.













OFFICIAL REPORT OF MINUTES  
OF  
PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

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Translated by the General Bureau for Translation, Secretary of State.

LÉON-J. RAYMOND,  
*The Clerk of the House.*

HOUSE OF COMMONS

Second Session—Twenty-seventh Parliament

1967

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STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

**EXTERNAL AFFAIRS**

*Chairman:* Mr. JEAN-EUDES DUBÉ

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MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 3

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THURSDAY, JUNE 15, 1967

TUESDAY, JUNE 20, 1967

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RESPECTING

Main Estimates 1967-68 of the Department  
of External Affairs

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WITNESSES:

*From the Department of External Affairs:* Mr. A. E. Gotlieb, Head of Legal Division. *From the External Aid Office:* Mr. Maurice F. Strong, Director General; Dr. Henri Gaudefroy, Director, French Language Programs.

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.  
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY  
OTTAWA, 1967

1967

## STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

*Chairman:* Mr. Jean-Eudes Dubé*Vice-Chairman:* Mr. W. B. Nesbitt

and

Mr. Allmand,	Mr. Forrestall,	Mr. McIntosh,
Mr. Asselin (Charlevoix),	<sup>2</sup> Mr. Goyer,	Mr. Pelletier,
Mr. Brewin,	<sup>3</sup> Mr. Haidasz,	Mr. Pilon,
<sup>1</sup> Mr. Caron,	Mr. Harkness,	Mr. Prud'homme,
Mr. Churchill,	Mr. Klein,	Mr. Stanbury,
Mr. Faulkner,	Mr. Lambert,	Mr. Thompson,
Mr. Forest,	Mr. Laprise,	<sup>4</sup> Mr. Tremblay
	Mr. Macquarrie,	(Matapedia-Matane)
		—(24).

Fernand Despatie,  
*Clerk of the Committee.*

<sup>1</sup> Replaced Mr. Andras on June 14, 1967.<sup>2</sup> Replaced Mr. Walker on June 14, 1967.<sup>3</sup> Replaced Mr. Macdonald (*Rosedale*) on June 19, 1967.<sup>4</sup> Replaced Mr. Lind on June 19, 1967.

RESPECTING

Main Estimates 1967-68 of the Department  
of External Affairs

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From the Department of External Affairs: Mr. A. E. Gotlieb, Head of Legal  
Division. From the External Aid Office: Mr. Maurice F. Strong, Direc-  
tor General; Dr. Henri Gaudet, Director, French Language Pro-  
grams.

## MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

Tuesday, June 13, 1967

### ORDERS OF REFERENCE

WEDNESDAY, June 14, 1967.

*Ordered*,—That the names of Messrs. Goyer and Caron be substituted for those of Messrs. Walker and Andras on the Standing Committee on External Affairs.

MONDAY, June 19, 1967.

*Ordered*,—That the names of Messrs. Haidasz and Tremblay (*Matapédia-Matane*) be substituted for those of Messrs. Macdonald (*Rosedale*) and Lind on the Standing Committee on External Affairs.

*Attest*

LÉON-J. RAYMOND,  
*The Clerk of the House of Commons.*

At 11.10 a.m. the Members present dispersed.

Tuesday, June 20, 1967

The Standing Committee on External Affairs met at 9.45 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Dubé, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Allmand, Caron, Churchill, Dubé, Fournier, Goyer, Haidasz, Harkness, Lambert, Laplante, Nicholson, Pilon, Prud'homme, Stanbury, Thompson, Tremblay (*Matapédia-Matane*).

Also present: Mr. Lewis, M.P.

In attendance: From the External Affairs Office: Messrs. Maurice F. Evans, Director General; L. D. Hudson, Assistant Director General; Earl G. Drake, Acting Director, Planning and Policy Division; D. Ross McLaughlin, Director, Foreign Division; Dr. Henri Gaudet, Director, French Language Programme; Mr. G. K. Westall, Director, Information Division; Mr. R. W. Johnson, Head of Canada Plan Section, Planning and Policy Division; Miss Mary Mackay, Office, Planning and Policy Division.

The Chairman referred to the second meeting of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure, held on June 14, 1967, and its recommendation that



## MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

THURSDAY, June 15, 1967.

(3)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs, having been duly called to meet at 9.30 a.m. this day, the following members were present: Messrs. Caron, Churchill, Dubé, Forest, Goyer, Harkness, Macdonald (*Rosedale*), Nesbitt, Pelletier, Pilon, Stanbury (11).

*Also present:* Mr. Lewis, M.P.

*In attendance:* The Honourable Charles M. Drury, Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs. *From the Department of External Affairs:* Mr. A. E. Gotlieb, Head of Legal Division; Mr. D. M. Miller, Legal Division.

At 10.15 a.m., there being no quorum, the members present agreed to proceed informally and to hear the Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs.

The Minister made a statement concerning the *Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies*, and was questioned. He was assisted in answering questions by Mr. Gotlieb.

It was noted that each member of the Committee had been supplied with a copy of the *Treaty*.

At 11.10 a.m., the Members present dispersed.

TUESDAY, June 20, 1967.

(4)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs met at 9.40 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Dubé, presided.

*Members present:* Messrs. Allmand, Caron, Churchill, Dubé, Faulkner, Goyer, Haidasz, Harkness, Lambert, Laprise, Pelletier, Pilon, Prud'homme, Stanbury, Thompson, Tremblay (*Matapédia-Matane*) (16).

*Also present:* Mr. Lewis, M.P.

*In attendance:* *From the External Aid Office:* Messrs. Maurice F. Strong, Director General; L. D. Hudon, Assistant Director General; Earl G. Drake, Acting Director, Planning and Policy Division; D. Ross McLellan, Director, Finance Division; Dr. Henri Gaudefroy, Director, French Language Programs; Mr. S. K. Westall, Director, Information Division; Mr. R. W. McLaren, Head of Colombo Plan Section, Planning and Policy Division; Miss Mary MacKay, Officer, Planning and Policy Division.

The Chairman referred to the Second meeting of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure, held on June 14, 1967, and its recommendation that

the Committee suspend the order of business already approved, in order to discuss the *Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies*. The Chairman also referred to the Committee's meeting of June 15, 1967.

On motion of Mr. Thompson, seconded by Mr. Faulkner,

*Resolved*,—That the Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the meeting of June 15, 1967 be incorporated as part of the Committee's official records.

As requested at the meeting of June 8, 1967, a document entitled *Country Allocation of Bilateral Aid Funds for Fiscal Year 1966-67* was submitted by Mr. Strong and distributed to members of the Committee.

The Committee resumed consideration of Items 30, 35 and L30—External Aid Office, of the Main Estimates for 1967-68, relating to the Department of External Affairs.

Mr. Strong was questioned. He was assisted in answering question by Dr. Gaudefroy.

Mr. Strong undertook to supply the Committee with a summary of major capital aid projects under way (fiscal year 1966-67).

At 11.35 a.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

Fernand Despatie,  
Clerk of the Committee.

## EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

Thursday, June 15, 1967.

**The Chairman:** Order, please. Gentlemen, we will proceed informally, subject to approval and ratification at our next meeting which will take place on Tuesday.

This morning we have with us Mr. Drury, Minister of Defence Production, who is here in his capacity as Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs. Mr. Drury wishes to take us into outer space this morning and tell us about the proposed Treaty on principles governing the activities of states in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies.

This Treaty has already been signed by some sixty or more countries. It is about to be ratified by these countries, including Canada, but before the government ratifies the Treaty, which can be done by order in council, it felt that some explanation should be given to this Committee. I will now ask Mr. Drury to present his statement and if there are any questions I am sure he will be pleased to answer them.

**The Honourable C. M. Drury (Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs):** Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As the Chairman mentioned, the purpose of this morning's hoped for formal—but now informal—meeting was to secure the advice of the Committee in respect of the proposed ratification of the Treaty before you.

Perhaps I should first of all say a word or two about the reason why ratification by Canada of the Treaty is a matter of some urgency. This is because the three depository countries, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Soviet Union are themselves in the process of ratifying the treaty in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures. It is expected that, following the precedents which were established for the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Agreement in 1963, the three governments will soon announce an agreed date upon which each will deposit its Instrument of Ratification with the other two, as prescribed in the Treaty, thereby bringing it into force. Indeed, it is possible that this will take place

any day now. Once that has happened, other countries will be able to deposit their own Instruments of Ratification with any or all of the three depository nations, and thus bring the Treaty into effect for themselves.

• (10.20 a.m.)

Canada, as a member of the 28 State United Nations Outer Space Committee, played an active part in the negotiations which culminated in the adoption of the text of the Treaty. Since Canada was one of the first countries to sign the Treaty, on January 27, 1967, it would serve to emphasize the importance which we attach to it if Canada were also to be among the first countries to ratify it.

This treaty, copies of which have been distributed to you in advance, is intended to ensure that the moon and other celestial bodies will be explored and used only for peaceful purposes and that there can be no national appropriation of such bodies. Of particular significance in this respect are those provisions which state that parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the earth any body carrying nuclear weapons or any other weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons in celestial bodies or station such weapons in outer space. The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type or weapons and the conduct of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies are also forbidden. These terms incorporate the main ideas expressed in the 1963 United Nations resolution on outer space and represent a significant step forward in the achievement of multilateral area control arrangements.

The Treaty emphasizes freedom of scientific investigation on celestial bodies and in outer space. It also stresses co-operation among states, both in avoiding the contamination of outer space and in the dissemination of information on conditions which might cause harm to the health or effect the safety of astronauts. In order further to promote such international co-operation States party to the Treaty are to consider, on the basis of equality, requests from other parties to build

tracking facilities on their territory for observing the flight of space objects which the requesting nation has launched. The Treaty stipulates that if the request is considered favourably all the necessary terms and conditions are to be arranged by negotiations. Should these terms and conditions prove unacceptable to the host nation, however, there is no obligation to grant the facilities requested.

In view of the significance of the Treaty, it would indeed seem appropriate if Canada were to ratify it as soon as possible after it is opened for ratification. As I have explained, the timing in this respect will depend upon the date on which the three depository nations, Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States of America, decide to exchange their own Instruments of Ratification. This has been under discussion among them, I understand, for some time now. We do not yet know definitely when they will act, but indications are that it will be in the very near future, and possibly even next week. It is for this reason that it is our hope that this Committee will see no objection to the course of action which we plan to follow. If agreed, I will arrange to table the Treaty in Parliament within a day or so. Statements will be made to both Houses at that time.

In conclusion, I would like to point out that the Treaty does not, by its terms, require any legislative action on the part of these countries which become parties to it. It is, rather, a significant forward step in the codification and formalization of principles of international law, many of which were earlier set out in the 1963 United Nations resolution on outer space. It is because of this country's active role in the space field and in the international legal sphere and because of the importance of the Treaty for the development of the rule of law in outer space, that it would be particularly appropriate for Canada, by ratification, to be among the first countries that formally accept the principles which the Treaty enshrines.

Mr. Chairman, if there are any questions I will be glad to try to answer them.

I have with me the two chief officials from the legal division of the Department of External Affairs, one of whom was very active in the negotiation of this Treaty that we are being asked to consider today.

**The Chairman:** Thank you. Mr. Macdonald.

**Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale):** Mr. Drury, would I be correct in assuming that Article II represents a departure from international law

in the sense that, unlike the situation with regard to the discovery of America, the race is not to the swift or to the powerful; no nation by its explorations will be in a position to acquire sovereign rights in any part of space.

**Mr. Drury:** In the sense in which I think you have described it, this is so. It is a departure. The policy of "first come, first served" could give some temporary possession, not absolute control and ownership. How the possession and effect of possession is to be controlled or administered I think has still to be worked out. One of the clear characteristics of this particular Treaty is that it is the beginning—and perhaps only the beginning—of a whole new framework of international law. There still remains to be elaborated within, we hope, the framework of the United Nations—as was the case with this Treaty—extension or clarification of points of detail in respect of this international law concept.

**Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale):** Mr. Minister, in working out these details is there any one international organization which will be responsible for concerting action in the field of outer space?

**Mr. Drury:** The Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space would be the committee of the United Nations primarily responsible, and it has a legal subcommittee which will be charged with elaborating on these particular details.

**Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale):** This committee will be the meeting ground for questions in this field and it will be the legislative body in which further action will have to be discussed?

**Mr. Drury:** That is correct.

**Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale):** I take it from what you said about Article IV that in effect this means the orbiting of weapons of any kind, particularly nuclear weapons, will now be unlawful by any signatory to the Treaty?

**Mr. Drury:** Any weapons of mass destruction whether they be nuclear or otherwise will be unlawful. Indeed these are explicitly prohibited.

**Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale):** With respect to other military equipment such as satellites for the purpose of photography or for studying the earth's surface, whether for military or other purposes, they are not prohibited by the Treaty?

**Mr. Drury:** They are not prohibited.

**Mr. Macdonald (Rosdale):** Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

**Mr. Harkness:** I presume there is no indication that Communist China would accede to this Treaty, but what is the situation with regard to France? I am thinking of the countries which presently have nuclear weapon capability or actually possess nuclear weapons.

**Mr. Drury:** In the case of France, Mr. Chairman, the Committee will recall that France is not as yet a signatory to the test ban treaty. Although they have not up until the present time signed this treaty, I am not sure that one would be warranted in assuming they will not sign it.

**Mr. Harkness:** However, you have no information on whether they are likely to sign it or not?

**Mr. Drury:** No.

**Mr. Lewis:** I am not interrupting Mr. Harkness, this is merely supplementary to the question he asked. What countries are engaged in outer space?

**Mr. Drury:** I am sorry, I did not hear you.

**Mr. Lewis:** Could you indicate what countries, other than France and China, are engaged in outer space investigation?

• (10.30 a.m.)

**Mr. Drury:** That is a very broad question. There are relatively few countries that have the ability to launch or have launched vehicles into outer space. There are a larger number of countries which possess facilities for tracking vehicles in outer space. There is another group of countries that while they do not have their own launching facilities they have vehicles of their own manufacture and design launched by others orbiting in outer space. Canada is a case in point. There are also a vast number of other countries which have a scientific, technological and a certain academic interest in outer space. When one wishes to look at the interest taken in outer space, the fact that some 80 countries have already signed this agreement indicates there are this many countries which have an interest in outer space. When one considers how effective this interest is in terms of extending current effort on exploiting outer space, the list is rather more limited. The countries which have launched vehicles include, of course, the United States, the Soviet Union and France. The countries which have satellites of one sort or another launched by others

include Canada, Japan and Italy, to the best of my recollection. Then, of course, there are a number of countries which have—and I cannot recollect the entire list of these—tracking facilities for monitoring vehicles in outer space.

**Mr. Harkness:** What do you mean when you say that some 80 countries have signed this agreement?

**Mr. Drury:** Mr. Chairman, in producing an effective treaty the process is one of negotiating amongst all the parties who are interested and in one way or another, of course, this includes virtually the whole membership of the United Nations. This Treaty was elaborated by the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. When a treaty is agreed upon between the negotiators they are authorized to sign it, subject to ratification by the government of the country concerned. Following signature the treaty is then subject to national treatment in order to make it binding on the countries concerned and these procedures differ in each country.

The procedure for ratification in Canada is authorization by the Governor in Council for the deposit of a formal instrument of ratification. Upon deposit of this instrument the treaty then becomes formally binding on Canada, as distinct from signature, which is merely interim approbation.

**Mr. Harkness:** Did the representatives of France and Italy sign this agreement?

**Mr. Drury:** I am advised that France did not but Italy did. However, in the case of France there has been some indication in the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Use of Outer Space of approval of the principles, although the French representative did not sign the treaty.

**Mr. Harkness:** This, I presume, would have no relation whatever to the orbiting and use of communications satellites?

**Mr. Drury:** It would not directly pretend to control this aspect although there are provisions in Article VI of the treaty which makes the countries responsible in international terms for what are called "national activities", whether they be carried out by or on behalf of national governments or by private, non-governmental nationals of the country concerned. This means, in respect of a communications satellite, that the country which owns the satellite would be responsible for it internationally, including any damage or other problems which it might cause.

Article I of the Treaty provides that there shall be freedom of scientific investigation in outer space, which means—within the limits of practicality, of course—that any nation is free to launch and conduct scientific investigation of outer space. However, basically this treaty would not really prevent any country from putting up a communications satellite or a probing satellite, such as the Alouettes that Canada has put up, and matters along this line. It would not prevent this. On the contrary, it would encourage a co-operative use of outer space for these purposes.

**Mr. Harkness:** There seems to be somewhat of a contradiction in what you say. You say it would not prevent but it would encourage. I do not quite see how it would encourage it. I think the main point here is that the agreement would not make this more difficult. As long as that point is clear, I think this would really have very little significance as far as any activities which we are likely to carry on in Canada in outer space are concerned. I am not talking about the significance from the point of view of preventing the orbiting of warlike satellites of various kinds, in which we are all extremely interested, but as far as anything we are likely to put up ourselves is concerned I would like to be sure that this is not going to prevent our either putting up communications satellites or scientific probing satellites.

**Mr. Drury:** No. The treaty as such will not do that. It will do rather the reverse; it will encourage it. It establishes a reasonable framework in which this can be done and it invites the co-operation of all the states signatory, including ourselves, in facilitating this kind of operation.

**Mr. Harkness:** If we wished to put up another Alouette after this treaty was put into effect, would it be necessary for us to go to some international body or to the states that had signed this treaty to get their concurrence before doing so?

**Mr. Drury:** No. We will be free to do this. Of course, one of the things that still has to be worked out is that at some time in the future I think one can anticipate some congestion, particularly in respect to communications satellites, and there will have to be some agreed international allocation of the use of outer space for practical—if I can call it this—purposes. This treaty does not make specific provisions for this.

**Mr. Harkness:** Have there been any practical steps taken with respect to arriving at

an agreement, treaty or anything else as far as the allocation of outer space is concerned, for communications satellites in particular? I am concerned about this because it would seem to me that this is the particular sphere in which there is going to be difficulty. As I understand it there is only room for so many of these communications satellites to operate.

**Mr. Drury:** On December 19, 1966, Mr. Chairman, the General Assembly adopted unanimously Resolution No. 2222, which provided, amongst other things:

...requests the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: (a) To continue its work on the elaboration of an agreement on liability for damages caused by the launching of objects into outer space and an agreement on assistance to and return of astronauts and space vehicles, which are on the agenda of the Committee;

(b) To begin at the same time the study of questions relative to the definition of outer space and the utilization of outer space and celestial bodies including the various implications of space communications;

(c) To report to the twenty-second session of the General Assembly on the progress of its work.

● (10.41 a.m.)

The Committee has been invited by the General Assembly to work out solutions to the problems you have just raised, namely a procedure for the allocation of space for communications purposes.

**Mr. Harkness:** This has not get been done. No treaty has been signed or no agreement arrived at in this regard?

**Mr. Drury:** Unfortunately, not yet.

**Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale):** A supplementary, Mr. Chairman. Is it correct that the legal subcommittee is either meeting now or is soon to meet on this particular question?

**Mr. Drury:** Yes, Mr. Chairman, they are meeting next Monday on this.

**Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale):** Thank you.

**The Chairman:** Mr. Nesbitt?

**Mr. Nesbitt:** Perhaps I should direct my question through the Minister to Mr. Gotlieb in particular. What is the purpose of emphasizing the moon? All through the treaty one sees reference to "the moon and other celestial bodies". As a matter of academic interest,

why is the moon signaled out particularly rather than, say, Mars or Venus or some of the other planets?

**Mr. A. E. Gottlieb** (Head, Legal Division, Department of External Affairs): Mr. Chairman, I will try to reply to that question. I think the reason that emphasis was given to the moon is simply because the moon was in everybody's mind. It is the one place where there was, until this treaty came about, the greatest danger of an armaments race taking place. I think it was simply done for reasons of practical interest, and that is about it.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** There was no other reason than that?

**Mr. Gottlieb:** I think another general point is that by and large the treaty deals mainly with celestial bodies, including the moon. It deals sometimes and only marginally with outer space as a whole. The terminology could have been simply "celestial bodies" on the one hand and "outer space" on the other. I think the moon aspect is for emphasis.

**Mr. Harkness:** I suppose that is also partly due to the fact that the moon is the one body that it is now known can be reached.

**Mr. Gottlieb:** Quite.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** Or in the immediate future.

**Mr. Harkness:** In the immediate future at least.

**Mr. Lewis:** Mr. Chairman, I would like the Minister or Mr. Gottlieb to explain Article XV with respect to the amending power, and particularly where it says:

Amendments shall enter into force for each State Party to the Treaty accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the States Parties to the Treaty...

I presume that means a majority of the states which have deposited ratification of the Treaty, not merely the signatories.

**Mr. Drury:** That is correct. It is formally binding, as I understand it, only on those states which have ratified and not merely signed.

**Mr. Lewis:** So that all through the Treaty where you talk about "States Parties" to it you are only referring to those states which have in fact ratified and deposited instruments of ratification?

**Mr. Drury:** That is correct.

**Mr. Lewis:** So that if a majority of those states who have done so accept an amend-

ment, then the amendment comes into force for those who so accept it?

**Mr. Gottlieb:** Exactly.

**Mr. Harkness:** I have one other question. Has any approach been made to Communist China in regard to this Treaty?

**Mr. Drury:** I do not think we are aware of any approach. Indeed, there would be considerable difficulty in doing this because the Treaty has been elaborated in a forum of the United Nations, of which the Chinese mainland government is not a member.

**Mr. Harkness:** No. This is why I said I presumed that probably there was no information about Communist China, but I wondered if any approach had been made as to whether it had even been put before them?

**Mr. Drury:** Not as far as it is known to us.

**Mr. Lewis:** A supplementary to that question. Do you have any knowledge whether mainland China has done anything in this field at all?

**Mr. Drury:** In this field—

**Mr. Lewis:** In any of the aspects you described earlier,—the launching or tracking or anything like that.

• (10:45 a.m.)

**Mr. Drury:** There has been no evidence of a launching of orbital vehicles by the Chinese and this, of course, would be quickly and readily known had it taken place. I know of no ready capability to launch an orbital vehicle on the part of the Chinese. Whether they intend to at some future time or in the near future, I do not know.

**Mr. Lewis:** All of this underlines the importance of admitting China to the United Nations.

**Mr. Drury:** I think it does.

**Mr. Harkness:** Mr. Chairman, of course I think the point there is that the Chinese, having used the rocket to carry a nuclear device for some several thousand miles, quite evidently have the capability of using the same type of rocket to put something into orbit.

**Mr. Drury:** There are some technological problems in moving from launching an orbital vehicle to the use of propulsion units which are satisfactory for intercontinental ranges. I do not think we know—or I do not in any event—whether these differences or these difficulties have in fact been overcome by the

Chinese. I think it is reasonable to assume that if they—

**Mr. Harkness:** They certainly have orbital capability.

**Mr. Drury:** Yes, if they wanted to they could.

(Translation)

• (10:47)

**Mr. Goyer:** Mr. Chairman, could we know officially the reasons for France's refusal to sign so far?

**Mr. Drury:** Up to now we cannot say that France has refused to sign. All that can be said is that it has not yet signed. It can therefore be presumed that they are studying the matter at the present time.

**Mr. Goyer:** There is then no known reason for France's delay in accepting the treaty?

**Mr. Drury:** We know of no such reason.

**Mr. Lewis:** Other than the President? Nevertheless a major obstacle.

**The Chairman:** Are there any other questions? Mr. Forest.

**Mr. Forest:** I have some difficulty in interpreting Article VII. Is there any arbitration providing for, for instance, any damages that could result from the launching of these objects into space? Should we leave this matter to the International Court of Justice in The Hague or to other organizations which could assess any damages or difficulties arising between parties to the Treaty?

**Mr. Drury:** As I pointed out a while ago, this is a matter to be studied by the legal subcommittee at next Monday's meeting. An article had been prepared in the present Treaty with regard to interpretation but as no agreement was reached the article has been withdrawn. This is something which will be resolved.

**The Chairman:** Mr. Pelletier.

**Mr. Pelletier:** Article D reads:

In order to promote international co-operation in the exploration and use of outer space. . . the States Parties to the Treaty shall consider on a basis of equality any requests by other States Parties to the Treaty to be afforded an opportunity to observe the flight of space objects launched by those States.

I rather think that this article is really not binding on anybody, but I would nevertheless

like to I know how we should interpret these words: "on a basis of equality."

**Mr. Drury:** If I may, Mr. Chairman, I will ask an expert to answer that question of interpretation.

**Mr. Pelletier:** To make my question more precise, Mr. Gotlieb, this article does not obligate anyone, except to consider.

**Mr. Gotlieb:** No, that is it. There is an obligation to consider.

**Mr. Pelletier:** Then, why the words "on a basis of equality"?

**Mr. Gotlieb:** It means that there is an obligation to consider the proposals on a basis of equality, that is, that country A should be given the same advantages as countries B or C. It means simply to consider such proposals; there is no obligation to reach an agreement.

**Mr. Pelletier:** Which means that there is no private surveillance?

**Mr. Drury:** I should like to elaborate a little on this point. In the economic field we speak of M.F.N. I hope you know what that means. In the economic field, in respect of commercial treaties, it is a well known rule that we should grant each state "most favoured nation" treatment. This means then that we should not give more favourable consideration to one nation than to another. The same consideration should be given to the requests of all nations. If a state gives favourable consideration to one nation's request, it should give the same consideration to requests of all other states.

**The Chairman:** It means no favouritism.

**Mr. Pelletier:** It is probably in this article that there should be an undertaking to accept surveillance for enforcing the Treaty's yet there is no mention made of this. It means that the countries undertake not to have military installations and weapons of mass destruction but they do not accept any surveillance by other state parties to the Treaty.

• (10:53 a.m.)

**Mr. Gotlieb:** That's it on the latter point. I might add a few words here about the tracking article. It is the most difficult article in the Treaty. The U.S.S.R. has requested most favoured nation treatment for the observation of satellites, but almost every other country has also made objections to this proposal. That is why we agreed that there is an obligation to consider such a request but not that there is an obligation to carry out observation or to agree on its application.

(English)

**Mr. Lewis:** Why did the other nations oppose the idea of giving these countries...

**Mr. Gottlieb:** The desire to have co-operation in this field, of course, is a reasonable one but I believe that all countries felt—most countries felt—that they have a right to agree or not to agree on the use of their facilities. It might put a very great strain on their facilities to track satellites for all countries which launch satellites. They may not have those facilities. There may be a number of reasons why this would put a considerable strain on their resources. Consequently, it was felt that in accordance with the normal sovereignty that countries have they should be entitled to consider these requests and to discuss them, but not *ipso facto* in advance to agree automatically to observe flights for another country regardless of the consequences of that burden on them. For a large country such as Canada I think it could result in a very substantial burden. It is not because we are opposed, or any of the other members are opposed, to the idea of assisting countries that wanted to have their satellites tracked. It is simply that for administrative and financial reasons primarily countries wanted to reserve their sovereign right to agree or not to agree.

**Mr. Lewis:** So you have retained the right to do it for some countries but not for others?

**Mr. Drury:** That is correct. We do undertake in this treaty to consider—to put on the basis of equality, which means MFN, all the requests that are made for assistance, for instance in tracking, but not because we agree to track under certain conditions for one country, we must necessarily offer and carry out the same degree of tracking under the same conditions for all countries.

**Mr. Lewis:** I would like to follow up Mr. Pelletier's question one step further. Does this mean that if you had requests from five countries for the facilities and the opportunities that Article X talks about Canada would be free to grant the request of one of the five and to refuse it to the other four?

**Mr. Drury:** This would be the result. We would be free to do this. We do undertake to give equal consideration to all the five.

**Mr. Gottlieb:** Could I perhaps add one point. If this were not here—this right to consider—but only to consider—then it might well be that an article which went beyond and guaranteed MFN, treatment would be inimical to

international co-operation because a country would know that if with limited resources the country agreed to track a satellite of country "A" it was automatically agreeing to track the satellites of all other countries, then it may not be willing to track the satellites of any country because of the open-ended obligation it would undertake. Moreover, there was a very substantial attempt during the negotiation of this article to demand reciprocity.

If a country had to track the satellites of another country, why could not that country ask for benefits back? For example, the right to know the results of that particular scientific experiment.

I think there was a great deal of difficulty finding any equation which would have provided for a reciprocal exchange of obligations, and it was very difficult to convince almost all members of the Committee that it would further scientific co-operation if they were required to enter into an open-ended obligation to track satellites of other countries regardless of whether or not their resources were substantial enough to do that. What is required here is good faith on the part of the various countries and a willingness in the spirit of this treaty to co-operate and to find a way, if possible, subject to their right to refuse to help other countries in their respective tracking of satellites.

**Mr. Lewis:** Has there been any discussion as to whether, if a country is faced with something that may be too great a burden, it can seek the co-operation of other countries that can assist so that all the demands could be met?

**Mr. Gottlieb:** I do not think that proposition was put forward in the Committee.

**Mr. Drury:** There is nothing in the agreement—in the treaty—which would inhibit this but there is no specific provision for it.

**Mr. Stanbury:** Mr. Chairman, it seems appropriate that Canada, as the third country to put a satellite into space, should act promptly in ratifying this treaty.

I think though that Canada has much or more at stake, particularly in the development of communications satellites, as any other country and I would like to be re-assured that the technological implications of the agreement have been fully explored as well as the legal ones.

Have there been consultations with such experts as those who served on the Chapman

Committee; those that we find in the Institute of Aerospace Studies at the University of Toronto or similar institutes at McGill, the University of Saskatchewan and the University of Western Ontario and the University of Calgary, I believe. Has there been full consultation on the technological implications for our future plans in space?

**Mr. Drury:** I cannot say specifically that there has been consultation with all the bodies and people of which mention has been made but there has been the usual routine consultation between all the government departments concerned in this matter on the technological aspects and it is reasonable to assume that these government departments, in turn, in the particular fields in which they are interested, have consulted those bodies outside the government service which have expert knowledge and expert advice to give.

**Mr. Stanbury:** Would that consultation with government departments include the Privy Council? I ask that question because the Science Council of Canada, as I understand, comes under the Privy Council rather than a department.

**Mr. Drury:** It includes the Privy Council office.

**Mr. Stanbury:** Thank you.

**Mr. Harkness:** I have a supplementary question. What is the advice of the officials of the Defence Research Board who are the only people in Canada who have had actual practice in putting satellites into orbit?

**Mr. Drury:** The Defence Research Board has not seen any impediment in this Treaty—in fact, rather the reverse—to the kind of interest they have in outer space.

**Mr. Gotlieb:** Perhaps I could add one comment. A very large part of this Treaty codifies what has largely become international law through practice, as recognized by Resolutions of the General Assembly. Although there are new aspects in this Treaty, as, for example, the right of access to the installations of other states on the moon, Nevertheless the basic body of it is a codification of what already has become accepted by all states, such as the freedom of scientific investigation, freedom to send satellites into outer space, freedom to explore and the denial of a right to appropriate. All this has become accepted by the international community. Consequently, this Treaty embodies what has been the consensus of all states, such as Canada, that have been

in the field of space exploration since the beginning of this new scientific venture.

**Mr. Drury:** This is the first step, not into space law, but in its codification.

**Mr. Stanbury:** Into space statute law.

**Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale):** International space law.

[Translation]

**Mr. Goyer:** How can we decide whether an instrument, an object or an exercise is more military than scientific? It is rather vague at the present time. It is not possible to determine exactly whether an exercise is being carried out for a military or for a purely scientific purpose. Is there any kind of process which could be used to determine the demarcation line?

**Mr. Drury:** Not in the Treaty, Sir. Such problems may arise but we should use ordinary diplomatic means to solve them. However, with regard to this Treaty no provision exists for settling the matter, although one article treats of the banning of satellites and weapons of mass destruction. Article IV prohibits weapons of mass destruction being installed in satellites, but the final paragraph reads:

The use of military personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited.

It is difficult to determine whether military personnel are engaged in peaceful or non-peaceful operations. There is no provision in the Treaty for solving such disputes. They must be solved by existing means or means which should be added to the Treaty in the future.

**The Chairman:** Are there any other questions?

(English)

• (11.05 a.m.)

If not, that concludes the Minister's evidence on the Treaty.

On behalf of the Committee I wish to thank him and his associates for attending this morning.

The Committee will meet again on Tuesday at 9.30 to resume Mr. Strong's evidence on the External Aid Office.

**Mr. Drury:** Mr. Chairman if I may make a short statement, the purpose of this morning's meeting was to bring this Treaty to the Committee's knowledge and to provide information on it before tabling it in the House. Because of the rather crowded timetable facing the House I do not believe there would be adequate opportunity to discuss it there. This seemed to be the best way of bringing it to the attention of the House of Commons. We will follow a similar procedure with the Senate. We will give the background of this Treaty, prior to its being tabled in the House, followed by the deposit of the instrument of ratification.

**Mr. Lewis:** Mr. Chairman, forgive me for taking another moment. Through the Minister, may I ask Mr. Gotlieb, or one of the others, whether there was any discussion about having provisions in the Treaty dealing with control of the use of outer space for military purposes? Was it discussed and no solution found that was acceptable to all or did the question not arise? This is the same question that Mr. Goyer asked.

**Mr. Gotlieb:** One extremely important Article does provide for control. Article XII provides for a right of access on the part of each party to the installations of the other party on the moon and celestial bodies. This right of access provides, in a sense, for a right of control. It is based on a similar provision in the Antarctica Treaty. It is subject only to very very limited qualifications about the requirement to give notice, but there are some aspects of these obligations which are not subject to control, in particular there is no control provision in respect of the obligation not to orbit weapons of mass destruction in outer space. There was no discussion whatsoever in the Committee on how that obligation could be controlled. However, from statements made by representatives of other countries we have reason to believe that they have the capacity from the ground, through the use of national facilities, to monitor, or to detect, any violation of the obligation not to orbit weapons of mass destruction without recourse to international controls.

• (11:09 a.m.)

**The Chairman:** Thank you, Mr. Minister. The meeting is adjourned until Tuesday at 9.30 a.m.

Tuesday, June 20, 1967.

• (9:42 a.m.)

**The Chairman:** Gentlemen, on June 14 we had a meeting of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure and your Subcommittee recommended that we take one meeting to study the Treaty on Outer Space. As you will recall, on June 15 the Committee met and heard the Honourable Mr. Drury, Minister of Defence Production, explain the Treaty and questions were asked and answers given at that time. Because we did not have a quorum on June 15, the Chair will entertain a motion that the Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the meeting of June 15, 1967 be incorporated as part of the Committee's official record.

**Mr. Thompson:** I so move.

**Mr. Faulkner:** I second the motion.  
Motion agreed to.

**The Chairman:** We will now resume consideration of Items 30, 35 and L30 of the External Aid Office. Mr. Maurice F. Strong, Director General, External Aid Office, is with us this morning to answer any remaining questions. At the last meeting, when Mr. Strong was present, Mr. Nesbitt asked for a document entitled the Country Allocation of Bilateral Aid Funds for the Fiscal Year 1966-67. This document is available this morning and with your consent I will ask the Clerk to pass out copies of same.

**Mr. Lambert:** Mr. Strong was going to have a table prepared pulling together from the various sources, and identifying same, the total amount going into external aid. You will recall the chief question at the last meeting directed to Mr. Strong was how he reconciled the figures he was giving to us with those that appeared in the Blue Book. It was indicated that these came from various other departments. If that is being done I think it may clear up the picture a good deal.

**Mr. Maurice F. Strong (Director General, External Aid Office, Department of External Affairs):** Mr. Chairman, an English copy of this information was made available; we have additional copies of it, and a French copy is now available.

**The Chairman:** Is available now?

**The Chairman:** Is it available now?

**The Chairman:** Do you have a sufficient number to pass around?

**Mr. Strong:** Yes, I believe so.

**The Chairman:** These copies are available and will be passed around.

**Mr. Strong:** The English copies were distributed at the last meeting.

**The Chairman:** And you have French copies here now?

**Mr. Strong:** Yes. Mr. Chairman, I think the last two pages of that document are the ones the honourable member was referring to; this is the one that actually refers to the specific sections of the vote.

**The Chairman:** Are there any questions?

**Mr. Lambert:** Mr. Chairman, my questions do not deal with this particular document. I am interested in the actual vetting of programs that may be proposed by underdeveloped countries, the actual facilities available to the Canadian Government to see that the program is actually carried out, and the auditing with regard to these programs. There have been suggestions from time to time that the accounting has been a little loose and that actually the donee countries may not be getting their money's worth, particularly under the Export Credit Program.

What facilities do you have available to you, Mr. Strong, to check out that the auditing of these programs has been undertaken in a reasonably competent manner?

**Mr. Strong:** Mr. Chairman, the honourable member will understand that I must address my remarks only to our Bilateral Aid Programs and not to Export Credits Insurance Corporation for which our office is not responsible.

I think you really have asked two questions. Our own accounts are of course subject to the normal Government auditing procedures, and I am not aware of any significant problems that exist in that area.

As to the auditing procedures of countries receiving our aid, we are not involved with them except to the extent that they are required to account to us for their contribution to any projects. Probably the main principal area in which we are directly involved in the accounting practices of recipient countries would be in the use of the counterpart funds. For example, when we provide food and commodity aid to a country we require, as a condition of providing that aid, that the country itself establish in its own accounts a fund equivalent in local currency to the value of our gift. That fund, by agreement between that country and Canada, is then used for development projects within the country, and

in that respect we do require, and do receive, a very strict auditing of those particular accounts.

**Mr. Lambert:** I do not think that answers the question, Mr. Chairman. I realize the question was two-pronged. The first one related to the vetting of a program that is submitted for external aid; the second related to the auditing of a program once it had been approved.

**Mr. Strong:** If I understand the honourable member correctly, I think you are really asking now about a program audit—about the effectiveness and what we do as distinct from the actual accounting.

**Mr. Lambert:** That is right.

**Mr. Strong:** In this instance, of course, this is one of our principal tasks and one of our principal pre-occupations. We do this in various ways. We do of course require detailed reports on performance in respect of each project. These are routed through our missions in the country concerned, and are supplemented by visits to these projects by officials of the External Aid Office. I have recently returned from quite an intensive trip to India, Pakistan, and Ceylon, which have been the main recipients of Canadian aid over the years. A good part of the reason for this trip was the personal inspection of projects that had been carried out and those that were under way, as well as those that are being proposed.

In addition to that we employ consultants from time to time: first, to assist us in evaluating the proposals put forward by recipient countries for Canadian aid and, second, in respect of technical projects—and a good many of them are classed as such; we employ consultants to supervise the actual construction in the case of capital projects; in the case of other large field technical assistance projects, universities are often employed to assist us in our supervision and implementation of these projects. There are a number of devices of this kind that are used to supplement the staff resources of the External Aid Office and of the missions in the field.

**Mr. Lambert:** Is external aid initiated by a prospective donee country, or is it often initiated by Canadian businessmen or other agencies that possibly see a need for something that could be done in a particular country? Where are your sources of inspiration for external aid?

**Mr. Strong:** Basically, our program is a responsive one, which means that we do not

do anything that is not requested by a developing country; but the original initiative—and this often does happen—can come from various sources including, as you suggest, a Canadian business or a Canadian university, or some other institution of Canadian society may well take the initial initiative in arousing the interest in the recipient country. We cannot, however, undertake any programs that are not in fact requested at some point by the recipient country.

**Mr. Lambert:** To revert to the auditing and checking out as to whether you feel satisfied that the project itself is being carried out as economically and reasonably efficiently and so forth, do you rely on your consultants, say, in the case of a highway building program, the erection of a bridge, or the provision of an industrial plant such as a saw mill, a paper mill, or something like that? How do you satisfy yourself that this is not going down a big sort of bottomless well?

**Mr. Strong:** First of all, our funds are not just advanced per se but are used to purchase the goods and services and the items of equipment that would go into a project like that. They are dispersed, for the most part, in Canada because, as you know, our program is based upon purchase of goods and services in Canada. So we have this form of control.

In addition to that, normally in a capital project of the kind you suggest, we would have a Canadian firm of consulting engineers supervising the whole process, and it would only be against favourable reports of a firm like this that our disbursements would actually be made.

Evaluating the effectiveness of the project itself is a complicated process and we are always trying to strengthen our capacities to do this effectively.

**Mr. Lambert:** With regard to projects that may be put up under loan programs as against outright gift programs, how do you satisfy yourself that the borrowing country is getting money's worth under the program, that there is not some siphoning off of money. There is a variety of ways of siphoning off money; one does not have to go into the details of it but these things have existed at times in this country and at times in others. How do you satisfy yourself that this is not done? And if there are complaints of it, how do you track them down?

**Mr. Strong:** On the first question, I think our procedures would make it very difficult for this to happen because, as I say, our funds

are for the most part dispersed in Canada against purchase orders for equipment or invoices for services, and these payments are actually made to the Canadian firm providing this equipment or these services. I think this really allows very little room for the kind of siphoning off that is often suggested in public comments on aid programs. I think our procedures are probably as good as any and better than most in this area. I have not seen any evidence since assuming this office that there is any significant problem in this particular area. I would think the greatest problem area is, as always, this one of just how effective the project is in terms of the country's development. In this area one can always have doubts, and this is an area in which we are always trying, as indeed we are now trying to improve our ability to handle these situations. But in terms of siphoning off funds it is my experience that this really does not happen to any significant degree at all with the Canadian programs.

**Mr. Lambert:** There have been suggestions at political levels at various conferences by underdeveloped nations that they would like to have the freehand; in other words, in the spending of the money they would just simply say, "Well, Canada, you are providing \$15 million; give us the \$15 million and we will look after the spending of it". Do you get this, shall we say, at the working level?

**Mr. Strong:** I think this has been widely debated, in general, in international aid development circles. We do not participate in any significant way in this debate because, as the honourable member knows, as officials we simply are charged with implementing the programs as they are set up. However, I think it is true that while this question is raised from time to time, in fact, and as Mr. Martin has said on various occasions, the one string that can be properly tied to Canadian aid is that it be used effectively. I think all countries, in my experience in Canada, are quite prepared to accept that this is a very reasonable way to look at it and that it is necessary for us to assure that our funds are spent effectively.

**Mr. Lambert:** I have heard arguments at the political level that it is a matter of more pride, dignity and so on on the part of the recipient country. If it is argued at the official level, say at the level of the External Aid Office, they must use some other arguments; if so, what are they?

**Mr. Strong:** On the working level I would think the principal argument used is the tying

of aid to procurement in the donor country. This is often argued to result in increased costs to recipient countries, but I think it should be borne in mind that aid is never forced on any country. Our program is a responsive one and we do only what we are asked to do, so I think it can be implied in that relationship that while this question may be raised on both political and official levels, in general there is, in fact, a wide degree of acceptance of the necessity for this practice.

**Mr. Stanbury:** Mr. Chairman, there has been wide interest in Canada's aid program in Viet Nam. When the Minister was here some weeks ago he gave us an outline of what Canada was doing at that time. Since then I believe Dr. Vennema has come home for consultations and has gone back, and some new plans were, perhaps, formulated while he was here. I wonder if you could bring us up to date on the state of Canadian aid in Viet Nam and let us know what the plans for the immediate future are.

**Mr. Strong:** As the hon. member has said, Dr. Vennema, who has now been made Director of Canadian Medical Aid Services in Viet Nam, was recently in this country for consultation with our officials and we discussed in some detail our present programs in Viet Nam and the various ways in which we could most effectively improve these programs.

Dr. Vennema has just returned to Viet Nam following these discussions and we are expecting to receive specific recommendations from him very shortly concerning the way by which we can increase our program. I think hon. members are probably familiar with the things that we are doing, and I am quite prepared to mention them, but it is natural that we would be considering extending the scope of existing programs as well as trying to identify the new areas in which Canadian assistance can be particularly useful and effective.

In particular, we have been considering other ways of implementing a program for assisting the rehabilitation of civilian victims of the war.

**Mr. Stanbury:** When you say "other ways" do you mean other than the ones that were being discussed and have apparently fallen through?

**Mr. Strong:** I mean, principally, other than the plan that we had been working on for some time, as you know, to put a Canadian rehabilitation facility in Saigon.

**Mr. Stanbury:** That seems to have been rejected now by the South Viet Nam authorities.

**Mr. Strong:** The South Vietnamese authorities, of course, have not rejected Canadian assistance in any form but have pointed out to us that in their view they have satisfied the requirements for the Saigon area through their national rehabilitation centre. They are very happy, of course, to work with us in schemes that might involve areas of South Viet Nam outside of Saigon and it is these schemes that are now under investigation by Dr. Vennema, with some assistance, I might point out, from Dr. Gingras, who is continuing to co-operate with us in this area.

**Mr. Stanbury:** Has any further consideration been given to the suggestion of bringing children from Viet Nam to Canada?

**Mr. Strong:** The advice we have had from Dr. Vennema and others with whom we have checked this out is that while this might have some value in certain very special cases, by and large the same amount of money could produce much more in the way of effective medical assistance on the spot in South Viet Nam.

**Mr. Stanbury:** Is any increase planned in the allotment in your budget for civilian medical aid in Viet Nam?

**Mr. Strong:** We have some additional funds in our budget. The limitation at the moment is not so much one of funds but of identifying specific projects in which it is possible to make an effective Canadian contribution with the kind of administrative base that we have in Viet Nam.

**Mr. Stanbury:** You will be familiar with an article that appeared in a periodical in Canada a few months ago which suggested that Canada had turned its back on the suffering children of Viet Nam. What is your reaction to that article?

**Mr. Strong:** I think the hon. member will appreciate that my reaction is not a very happy or favourable one because I think this is just not the case. There is no question that in one instance we encountered very serious problems in implementing a project which we had, in fact, wanted and had vigorously pursued for some time. However, while we were unsuccessful in implementing this particular project, during the same period we did put ten hospitals into service, shipped ten 200-bed hospitals, each one with recovery rooms, operating rooms, x-ray facilities, and so on.

Seven of these are now in active service. The Quang Ngai TB clinic was opened. Some people question the need for a TB clinic. TB is the biggest single health hazard in Viet Nam and the existence of this TB clinic in Quang Ngai, which is some 350 miles north of Saigon in the heart of the territory where active fighting has been in progress for some time, has provided us with a base from which Dr. Vennema and his assistants have been able to provide a wide variety of medical services in this area.

It is difficult, I think, for people to understand the absolute necessity for working with the full co-operation of the Vietnamese. It is not possible for Canada unilaterally to conduct a program without the full co-operation of the local authorities, and this we have received in every case.

**Mr. Allmand:** May I ask a supplementary question? Did the *Star Weekly* consult, or try to get any information from, you or your office before writing that article?

**Mr. Strong:** I think the *Star Weekly*, in common with other newspapers, have taken quite an interest in this matter. We have always made available any factual information within our power from the External Aid Office to the *Star Weekly* and other publications that have been interested in this subject.

**Mr. Allmand:** When the article had been written, did the External Aid Office take any steps to correct the impression given by that article? Do you have your own press conferences to make certain that the Canadian people know what you are doing, other than this type of meeting?

**Mr. Strong:** Mr. Chairman, I think the hon. members will understand that our role is one of providing information. We have not, of course, directed any of our information services to the policy issues involved but we have attempted and did, in fact, in respect of the *Toronto Star* story, attempt to put the *Toronto Star* and other interested publications in possession of all the facts as we had them.

Both before and after the story, particularly after, we met with members of the *Toronto Star* staff and provided them with all the information available on our programs. This had previously been done, too, but obviously it was not all taken into account in the story to which you refer.

**Mr. Stanbury:** It may not have fitted in with their editorial policy.

**Mr. Strong:** I could not comment on that.

**Mr. Stanbury:** What opportunity has there been through the Red Cross to provide aid to areas where you are not able to get co-operation with local governments; for instance, in North Viet Nam?

**Mr. Strong:** It is the policy of the government to act only in response to requests for aid that are received. To my knowledge no requests have been received by the Canadian government from North Viet Nam.

Concerning our relations generally with the Red Cross we have, of course, very close working relations with them, particularly in respect of emergency situations. It has been our fairly well established custom when an international emergency arises with which the Red Cross is in a position administratively to cope immediately, normally to match the Red Cross's own funds by a donation designed to relieve the immediate distress and then we are able to have a look at what the longer range needs might be. Because of this practice we have very close co-operation with the Red Cross and constant communication with them.

**Mr. Stanbury:** Is any Canadian aid going to North Viet Nam through the Red Cross or its affiliated international bodies?

**Mr. Strong:** No Canadian government aid is going to North Viet Nam. I should point out, though, as Dr. Vennema mentioned himself, that in the conduct of his medical activities he makes no distinction, and we require him to make no distinction, among the patients that he treats. For example, he is the doctor to a Viet Cong prison camp where there are some 2200 Viet Cong prisoners. He provides medical assistance to the villages in the area, which are commonly assumed to be at least very strongly oriented to the Viet Cong. I mention that only to point out that in respect of our program with South Viet Nam we do treat everyone, but we have never had a request from North Viet Nam.

**Mr. Harkness:** May I ask a supplementary question in connection with that? Were these ten mobile hospitals which you sent to Viet Nam paid for out of this vote of \$2 million for aid advanced to Viet Nam, or were they donated by the Department of Health and Welfare and so do not appear in the \$2 million?

**Mr. Strong:** They do appear in our allocations but they did, in fact, come from the Department of Health and Welfare; but they were paid for out of External Aid funds.

**Mr. Harkness:** In other words, you paid Health and Welfare for the hospitals.

**Mr. Strong:** Yes.

**Mr. Harkness:** I thought this might have been a donation in addition to the \$2 million, but it is included in it.

**Mr. Strong:** We get a lot of help and co-operation from other government departments but, for the most part, when it takes the form of using a particular facility or item of equipment that they have, they usually require us to pay for it.

**Mr. Churchill:** With reference to this document showing the Country Allocation of Bilateral Aid Funds, the countries are listed and grants and loans are shown. Do we have some examples of projects that are actually under way in these countries? What is being done specifically in India under Grants and Loans?

**Mr. Strong:** The biggest, single project now under way in India is the Idikki Dam in South India—Kerala. I mentioned this at the first meeting. This is a very impressive undertaking involving many miles of tunnelling, diversion of streams and several dam. It has just been started and it will take several years to complete, but when it has been completed probably it will become the principal source of electric power for the State of Kerala.

Not too far from this project is another that has just been completed. It is not complete in every detail, but for all practical purposes it is complete. I may have mentioned this last time, but I think it is one of the finest projects that could have been undertaken anywhere. It involves twelve dams, five power houses, the clearing of large areas of jungle country on which people are now able to live. It is the Kundah Project.

Also, I might mention that the Myrose project in India is a particularly interesting one because it does involve co-operation among private donors in Canada through the Canadian Hunger Foundation, the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, and the Canadian Aid Program. This is designed to provide training in food technology to people from the entire South-East Asia area.

It might be interesting for the hon. members to know that a high level agricultural task force is in the course of grouping together here in Canada and will shortly be going out to India to examine with the Indian gov-

ernment, following my visit there, specific ways in which our program might be more closely attuned to the food and agricultural needs of that area.

In Pakistan the hon. Mr. Drury presided on behalf of Canada at the opening of a thermopower generating station in a place called Sukkur in West Pakistan. This is a particularly interesting project. It is based on the use of natural gas, which has been discovered in that area for generation of electric power, and this electric power in turn is used to enable a large scale program of land reclamation to take place. In this area the land is going back to desert because of the process of salination, if that is the correct term. A large scale operation involving the drilling of wells and the electrification of these wells is required there so that the water table can be lowered, which will permit tens of thousands of acres of land to be reclaimed. Did you want me to go through them all?

**Mr. Churchill:** I would be pleased if you would just run down the list and give us some examples.

**Mr. Strong:** I have been mentioning here specific capital programs as distinct from commodity programs; of course in both India and Pakistan our principal contribution is in the area of food aid.

**Mr. Churchill:** I am more interested at this moment in the capital projects.

**Mr. Strong:** Perhaps I should mention that the Indus Basin Development Fund which you have on your list of course represents Canada's contribution to a large scale multi-lateral project for development of the Indus Basin. Again, during our visit there, we had an opportunity to see the latest developments in respect to the Tarbella dam project, which is one part of the Indus Basin Development project. As is well known to members, this is one of the most significant projects of its kind carried on anywhere in the world.

In Malaysia we have a number of things going on. On the upper Perak and Pergau rivers we are conducting a survey looking toward the possibility of developing a major hydro-electric scheme in that area. We are also financing a water and sewage feasibility study, and a natural resources and land use survey is under way. In this area probably our principal single project has been the provision of equipment for 54 technical training schools. This arose out of a previous project in which Canadians went out to assist in the establishment of these schools and the

training of people and amounted to about \$3 million. We also have provided equipment for a sawmill training school in Sarawak, which is a part of the country of Malaysia, and 50 two-way radios for the medical services in that country. These are just some of the projects in Malaysia.

• (10.20 a.m.)

I think perhaps our most notable single project in Ceylon is the assistance we have provided the Katunayake airport. Anyone who arrives in Ceylon is immediately exposed to this particular project; its runway construction is now fully completed and the construction of terminal buildings is well advanced. We also have provided on the outskirts of Colombo a fish processing plant which services the fishing fleet in that area. Ceylon faces an anomalous situation in that she imports fish but has off her shores a good deal of fish which, if they could be caught in sufficient numbers, would relieve them of the necessity of importing as much fish as they do.

Also in Ceylon one of our Canadian advisers is assisting in developing a mental health program for the whole country. This of course is not a capital project.

**Mr. Thompson:** May I ask a supplementary question? Thailand may be on our minds today because the king of Thailand is here. Are you including your aids to Thailand in "others", because it is not shown separately.

**Mr. Strong:** Yes, that is right, although aid to Thailand is a significant element in that category.

**Mr. Thompson:** Might you just mention that so that we are aware of it.

**Mr. Strong:** Yes. The most significant and recent project in Thailand is the assistance we are giving to the development of what we call comprehensive schools in Thailand, and this is being done with the assistance of the Department of Education in Alberta. A comprehensive school is one that involves both technical training and normal academic training. Under our development loans we are making available \$1 million to assist with the equipping of these schools. At the same time we have in Alberta, Canada—there will be 110 in total—34 now receiving training so that they will be able to go back and teach in these schools. At the same time a number of Canadians from Alberta are in Thailand assisting in the development of the program from that point of view. This is a very good example of what we call comprehensive pro-

gramming in that our capital assistance and our technical assistance are combined in a program which is designed to accomplish one particular significant result for a country like this.

The University of Manitoba is also providing significant assistance in Thailand through 8 professors who are there in the engineering and agricultural faculties of the University of the North-East. There is also a survey of a very large roads project that is being carried out by Canadian consultants in that area. Of course Thailand does get its share of the benefit of our contributions to the Mekong Development Fund as well.

**Mr. Churchill:** Since you are coming now to Francophone Africa, may I ask this question regarding Algeria. In the House yesterday a question was put to the Prime Minister with regard to the training of certain Algerian pilots in Canada and the answer was that they were civilian pilots and not members of the Algerian armed forces. Is this being done under External Aid, and by whom?

**Mr. Strong:** It is being done under External Aid; I must consult my associate here in terms of where the actual training is being carried out.

Gentlemen, this is Dr. Henri Gaudefroy, my adviser on French programs and the Director of our Francophone programs.

**Dr. Henri Gaudefroy (Director, French Language Programs, External Aid Office):** There are 19 civilian pilots from Algeria who are now being trained in Canada. The training for one group is likely to last another six months, and for the second group probably a year or a year and a half. They are civilian pilots who are supposed to handle civilian traffic, and there is no indication at all that these are connected to military operations.

• (10.26)

(Translation)

**The Chairman:** Mr. Prud'homme.

**Mr. Marcel Prud'homme:** I would like to ask a supplementary question. Do you feel that it would be possible to be sure that these people are not serving in the Algerian army? Could we not ask a question like that?

**Dr. Gaudefroy:** We are being asked for assurance that these pilots would not be eventually used on military operations.

(English)

**Mr. Strong:** Mr. Chairman, of course our program is entirely a civilian program and bears no relationship to military programs of

any kind. This is a normal requirement of any assistance that we give. It is entirely for civilian purposes.

**Mr. Churchill:** This must have been arranged on a government to government basis though. You say that nineteen pilots are being trained now. Are other pilots or other trainees going to come to Canada for subsequent training?

**Dr. Gaudefroy:** I have not heard that this project is going to be continued after the 19 trainees have terminated their period of training in Canada.

**Mr. Strong:** I think we should point out that we have the assurance, which we normally require in these instances of the Algerian Government that these pilots are in fact being trained solely for civilian purposes. In our study of the project the theory was that there were needs in the civilian area in Algeria and this program was designed to fill these needs.

**Mr. Churchill:** Is this just an assumption or is this actually written into the government to government agreement.

**Mr. Strong:** It is written right into the agreement, sir.

**Dr. Gaudefroy:** I might add perhaps, Mr. Chairman, that the RCAF does not share at all in the training of these pilots. They are not trained in the military aspect of pilot operations.

**Mr. Lewis:** Who does this training?

**Dr. Gaudefroy:** The training is done through schools in Quebec, and I believe Air Canada Services as well.

**Mr. Harkness:** It would seem to me that the half million dollars allocated for Algeria would not be sufficient to train these pilots, let alone do anything else. It is on the basis of the cost of training pilots that we give money; that is my experience in the defence department.

**Mr. Strong:** I might point out that some of these programs are funded over more than one year; if in fact they take place over a period of one year, it is only required that we approve the cost for the current year. I am not sure if that is the case on this particular program. Perhaps one of my associates would know. Dr. Gaudefroy, do you know whether or not the entire costs of the Algerian pilot training program are included?

**Dr. Gaudefroy:** I could not tell you; this is a part of the training aspect in the Training

Division. There is \$500,000; a rough estimate would be about \$300,000 for the 19 trainees. We figure that it costs approximately \$15,000 to train each pilot, so a part of this allocation is not committed.

**Mr. Stanbury:** It is cheaper than training military pilots.

**Mr. Churchill:** Under the present circumstances why should we continue to assist Algeria when they are showing such a belligerent attitude at the present time.

**Mr. Strong:** Mr. Chairman, I am sure the hon. member would not expect me to answer that question.

**Mr. Churchill:** No. I wish the Minister were here to answer that question. I realize you cannot answer it.

**The Chairman:** The Minister will be here before we adopt the estimates and that same question might be asked of Mr. Martin at that time.

**Mr. Churchill:** Mr. Chairman, a lot of time has been taken on this matter. When did the training program start?

**Dr. Gaudefroy:** It started before I arrived. It probably started during the winter of 1965-66, maybe about a year and two months ago.

**Mr. Churchill:** What is the length of the training period?

**Dr. Gaudefroy:** I believe it is a year and a half.

**Mr. Churchill:** Mr. Chairman, I would like to have a rundown of the projects in these other countries but I realize a lot of time has been taken up until now. We might come back to it, unless you wanted to go ahead and complete the survey of the projects.

**The Chairman:** Is it the feeling of the Committee that we cover it country by country or move on to something else.

**Mr. Allmand:** May I have the details of aid to these different countries. It is not printed in the report of the External Aid Office.

**Mr. Strong:** Mr. Chairman, this is so. Our annual report, which is now at the printers, will be available very shortly and will give details of these projects. However, I would be happy either to give them here or to supplement what we give here by a brief summary of the principal projects in each of these countries, if this is what the members desire.

**Mr. Churchill:** Mr. Chairman, I think it is much more interesting to hear details of the

projects than just simply questioning on the total amount of money available. I feel that we should not wait for the report to come out. Whether we continue this now or subsequently is immaterial to me but I would like to have a rundown of the whole thing.

**Mr. Lewis:** Mr. Chairman, is it possible to have Mr. Strong provide a memorandum which could be made part of the minutes rather than have an off-the-cuff verbal story.

**The Chairman:** Mr. Strong, would it be possible?

**Mr. Strong:** I would be happy to do that.

**The Chairman:** Perhaps at a later meeting we could have this memorandum attached to our report.

**Mr. Allmand:** Mr. Strong, is the nuclear reactor program which we have in India a part of the External Aid Office program?

**Mr. Strong:** Yes, but this project has been completed for some time.

**Mr. Allmand:** Who has control now over the agreements that we have with respect to those nuclear reactors?

**Mr. Strong:** The administration of the agreement really does not come under the responsibilities of the External Aid Office. These agreements are in force but the administration of the agreement to which I believe you refer is not the responsibility of the External Aid Office.

**Mr. Allmand:** Has there been any pressure by India to use these reactors for military purposes, to change the agreement and so forth.

**Mr. Strong:** I am not the proper person to answer this question.

**Mr. Allmand:** Do you have any figures to indicate which country receives the greatest per capita aid from Canada.

**Mr. Strong:** As a whole, the West Indies would receive the greatest per capita aid.

**Mr. Allmand:** Under Latin America you have \$10 million in loans. To which countries are these loans allocated?

**Mr. Strong:** The latest loan, and the largest single loan I believe, has gone to Chile to assist in the expansion and development of the national university in Chile. This was \$4½ million. Loans have also gone to El Salvador for a port project at Acajutla; to Ecuador for a study of the Guayas River basin; to Paraguay for a study of their highway system; to

Argentina for a hydroelectric power study; to Bolivia to provide mining and industrial equipment; to Mexico to finance pre-investment studies. Loans have also been approved to Peru to finance feasibility studies, and to the one I just mentioned, the latest one which actually has been approved—the Chilean State Technical University, which is the largest single one. Other projects are of course always under scrutiny and there are three or four that are now under active consideration in addition to those I have mentioned.

**Mr. Allmand:** Does your office contemplate any increased aid to Latin America, or do you feel that the present type of aid is sufficient under the circumstances.

**Mr. Strong:** Again, I believe you are touching on a policy question that goes beyond my competence to answer.

**Mr. Allmand:** I have another question. When your office attempts to decide which countries should receive aid, do you look at the per capita aid that that country is already receiving from other nations or states? In other words, do you take into consideration the fact that our aid to South America is rather low, comparatively speaking, due to the fact that the United States or maybe other countries have large programs there?

**Mr. Strong:** I think again, on the last part of the question, I would have to say that these are policy considerations and I do not think it would be appropriate for me to speak directly to them. On the first part of your question though, we do in fact consult with various other donor countries and with the multilateral agencies, principally the World Bank, that are involved in providing assistance to countries in which we are also actively interested. The principal instruments for consultation and co-ordination in this area are the consultative and consortia groups set up by the World Bank, and Canada participates in a number of these.

The India and Pakistan consortia are probably very good examples where the donor countries, under the auspices of the World Bank, meet with India or Pakistan or whatever the recipient country is and discuss the over-all development plans of the country and the external resources that are going to be required to assure that these plans and objectives can be met and then they match these up with the availability of resources. This, in turn, enables the various countries that are making aid available to determine the contribution that they can make and how

it can best be made within the context of the total. So there is in fact a very highly developed procedure with respect to these major recipients of aid to assure that our plans and programs are co-ordinated.

**Mr. Allmand:** I have one final question. With respect to CUSO, have you made any studies of the effectiveness of young Canadians working in the countries to which they have gone? Has this program been in effect long enough to determine whether it is a good thing for the recipient countries to have younger people working in those countries as opposed to older people who are better trained and experts in the field.

**Mr. Strong:** I think, from the evidence that we have suggested, there is value to having both younger and older and more experienced people. In the case of CUSO people and similar less experienced volunteers, I think it has to be acknowledged, and is acknowledged, that a great part of the benefit arising from sending these people to the developing countries accrues to Canada in that we are developing through this means a cadre of young people who have had experience in the developing countries. By the same token, particularly in the teaching profession, they are able to render, and are rendering, very significant, specific contributions in the jobs that they are doing. Probably their largest contribution though is the fact that at these ages they are able to establish good communication, good rapport, good relationships with their counterparts. I think in that respect, in particular, there is real value to the CUSO program.

**Mr. Allmand:** Thank you.

**Mr. Pelletier:** I would like to come back to some of the answers that have already been given and ask for additional details. What is the total aid to Latin America if you do not include the Caribbean?

**Mr. Strong:** Our program up to this point has involved solely development loans of \$10 million in each of the last three years and \$10 million again being requested this year for development loans to Latin America.

**Mr. Pelletier:** Through the bank?

**Mr. Strong:** Yes, sir. This program is administered by the Inter-American Development Bank on our behalf.

**Mr. Pelletier:** Is Canada present in any form when the loans are actually given to one country for a particular project?

**Mr. Strong:** Yes, these loans are all made by specific arrangement with us. We participate in this process with the bank. No loan is made except with our agreement. In fact, the loan agreement is signed in each case by Canada.

**Mr. Lewis:** What about the rate of interest?

**Mr. Strong:** The rates can vary. Basically the main body of our development loans involves interest free loans for periods of 50 years with a grace period for commencement of repayment of 10 years. In fact, I can give you the specific ones that have been made. Most of the loans that have been made up to this point also involve a  $\frac{3}{4}$  of one per cent service charge because they were made before it was agreed that this service charge be dropped. On new loans this  $\frac{3}{4}$  of one per cent service charge will not apply.

For example, the Argentina loan was for 50 years with no interest, just a service charge, with a grace period of 10 years. On the other hand, the loan to Bolivia was for 30 years with seven years grace with a  $\frac{3}{4}$  of one per cent rate. The Guayas River basin study was also for 50 years with 10 years grace at  $\frac{3}{4}$  of one per cent.

**Mr. Churchill:** A better credit risk than Canadians.

**Mr. Pelletier:** In view of the fact it is frequently said that intellectual or educational underdevelopment is the most dangerous form of all, do you have an idea of the proportion of the over-all foreign aid budget devoted to education under one form or another?

**Mr. Strong:** I do not have it broken down precisely under this category because of the fact that some of this comes into capital and some into technical assistance, but I think about 10 per cent is on educational and technical assistance. This excludes the capital items. If you include capital items such as the building of schools and universities and provide equipment for these, the figure, I think, would be up to about 16 or 17 per cent in total.

**Mr. Pelletier:** This would be capital and service for educational purposes?

**Mr. Strong:** Directly.

**Mr. Pelletier:** The total of it?

**Mr. Strong:** Yes.

**Mr. Pelletier:** Adult education or—

**Mr. Strong:** There is an educational component in so many of our other projects that are merged into it. For instance, in putting up a hydro-electric power project, you will have a program of training people for this project. We do not actually break out of the total figures for that project the component that would really relate to the training of people. Also a good deal of the funds are spent on feasibility studies—not so much feasibility studies, perhaps, as engineering supervision—and a good deal of this actually has a strong educational component. While engineers are supervising the construction of a project they do, in fact, train a good number of local people. In terms of what you would call direct educational assistance, in addition to the \$20 million spent on what we call education and technical assistance—it is called technical assistance in the vote—there would be, I think, another 6 per cent or 7 per cent directly attributable to capital assistance to educational programs. That is, excluding those kinds of things that are not specifically identified as educational programs.

**Mr. Pelletier:** Do you find the developing countries eager to get assistance in education, or do they have reservations about that? Is this the kind of project that they would ask for?

**Mr. Strong:** Yes, I think it is certainly generally true that a good many of their requests are in the field of education. Mind you, there is a certain discipline inherent in the way in which we handle our program that requires them to sort out their priorities, because normally we tell them how much we have allocated to their country for a particular year and, because it is obvious we cannot finance everything that is done for them, this requires them to make a selection of their priorities. I would say, by and large, that in selecting these priorities it would seem to me that they are giving significant priority to education. This does vary from country to country because the needs are somewhat different.

**Mr. Pelletier:** To come back to the requests you get from the countries, in answer to an earlier question you replied that they came in many various forms; it might be on the initiative of a Canadian group operating in that country that would have the idea. In such a case how would the government be moved to make the requests to put it into operation? You just mentioned that you would tell one country "This is the amount of money we have; what do you want us to spend this on

and what are your priorities?" I am rather confused about how the request comes from the country. Would you tell the country that they can make a request because you have something to give?

**Mr. Strong:** For countries with which we have long-standing aid arrangements—for example, India, Pakistan, and Ceylon—these procedures operate quite well because they are well understood by everyone. In this instance we sit down with them at the beginning of the year and tell them how much we have allocated for the year. Then, knowing this, they make requests. Each of these requests, if accepted by us, is charged against this allocation.

In the case of countries with which we do not have a long-standing arrangement, we do very much the same thing but the process probably takes a little more servicing because they have to be made aware of the fields in which Canada can provide assistance. Always remembering that the assistance we provide is in the form of Canadian goods and services, it is important for us to make these countries aware of the kinds of assistance that we can make available.

Until they understand this, often it is difficult for them to shape up a specific request of a kind that would be acceptable to us and this does require a good deal of two-way consultation. Out of this consultation will come an official request to us. All of these requests have to be made officially to us by them.

**Mr. Pelletier:** Perhaps my question is directed to the wrong person; tell me if this is the case. How is a country that has never received any foreign aid from Canada moved to ask for it? I suppose, generally speaking, that countries will not ask if they do not have some kind of assurance that they will get something.

**Mr. Strong:** I would not say this is always the case; we do get requests that are not necessarily formal requests. The needs of the developing countries are such that they are always seeking funds at every donor institution to meet their development needs, and Canada does get many indications that certain Canadian assistance would be welcome. But normally it is true that we would not receive a specific request unless an understanding had been reached with the country that Canadian aid funds were likely to be available.

**Mr. Pelletier:** You said a moment ago that there have not been any requests for medical

aid from North Viet Nam. The Minister has told us that any request would be considered, but from what you have just said would it not be reasonable to think that no requests will be made anyway?

**Mr. Strong:** I have no idea on this; I only know the fact that no request has come.

**Mr. Pelletier:** Do you have any information program, any system of informing the people of your activities? How do you proceed?

**Mr. Strong:** We do have an Information Officer, and he is present. He is Mr. Stan Westall. Would you like to stand up Stan? We can at least identify you. Stan is our Director of Information, and until very recently he was the sole Information Officer. In recent times we have had very strong demands from all sections of the Canadian press and public for more information, and we are endeavouring to increase the scope of our informational activities, both in the French and English languages.

(Translation)

• (10.52)

**The Chairman:** Is that all, Mr. Pelletier?

(English)

**Mr. Pelletier:** Do you feel that you have any active role to play in that field, or do you just organize to be in a position to supply the information when it is asked for?

**Mr. Strong:** No, we believe that we have an active role in the provision of information, and we operate on that assumption. We put out a monthly news letter; we put out the annual report this year; we put out various other materials; we co-operate with the press, television, and radio, in providing both information and access to people such as occasional foreign visitors but, more particularly, to returning Canadians that the press, television, and radio are interested in identifying in their own particular areas.

**Mr. Pelletier:** This is my last question, Mr. Chairman, which I realize might be a difficult one to answer. If Canada were to increase its program gradually to this 1 per cent, which is the target that has been established and generally recognized as reasonable, technically how many years would it take for your Department to cope with it? In other terms, if we consider only the technical requirements, how much time would you envisage we would require to go from our present participation to this 1 per cent target?

**Mr. Strong:** In as much as the Minister has said on a number of occasions that we are aiming to reach the 1 per cent target by 1970-71, we have been in the process of making the administrative arrangements that will enable us to effectively handle a budget of that size. I do not think—it is my hope, in any event—that we will fail to reach the objective because of a lack of administrative capacity.

**Mr. Pelletier:** Then it is possible within that period of time?

**Mr. Strong:** I think it is possible, but by no means can it be taken for granted. Obviously it requires substantial increases in our administrative capacity, which means additional people.

**Mr. Pelletier:** Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

**Mr. Thompson:** Mr. Chairman, there are two areas that I would like to question Mr. Strong about. The first relates to the Caribbean. We know that the expenditure there this year is expected to reach a little over \$13 million. This is part of the increased program that I believe was worked out during the recent Canadian-Caribbean Conference when the Government spoke of a program of \$65 million over a period of five years. We have also discussed in the Committee at previous times—and there has been public discussion about it as well—the general proliferation of Canadian aid over a large number of countries, and we have evidence of this in the report that we have here and the advantage of a policy which would give a saturation program to a certain area being of greater benefit both to that area and to the general aid program.

Recently it has been suggested by those who are more or less authorities in the area, apart from government, that if we were to double our aid program to the Caribbean or even treble it compared, shall we say, to the \$77 million worth of food aid that was given to India as a one-time mercy project, for starving peoples, an investment of, say, \$25 million, \$35 million or \$40 million in the Caribbean would be of far greater importance and of far greater value in the over-all picture. I wonder if Mr. Strong will give us his thoughts on this and what Canada's projected policy is towards a saturation aid program in the Caribbean which is so close to us and which is very definitely part of our responsibility.

**Mr. Strong:** Mr. Chairman, I am sure the hon. member would not expect me to com-

ment on the policy aspects of this question. There are however, some aid or development aspects that might—

**Mr. Thompson:** Perhaps it is not within your area to discuss policy, but I think probably we need leadership and direction.

**Mr. Strong:** From the pure point of view of development and aid, I think there are two comments I might make. One, of course, is that the program in the Caribbean is, in fact, increasing at a significant rate. The figure that the hon. member used was \$13.1 million which is the 1966-67 figure; this year the figure is \$17.2 million which represents a fairly significant increase. I think I have already mentioned that on a per capita basis, the Caribbean does indeed receive more Canadian aid than any other area of the world. I might also point out that whereas in absolute terms the amount India receives is very large, on a per capita basis they receive relatively less than many other areas.

I might also point out that the food aid does not only meet an emergency need; in a very real sense it contributes to the long term development of India too. First of all the food is required, of course, to meet the needs of starving people. For this reason if aid were not forthcoming the Indian Government would have to use its scarce foreign exchange resources to buy this food, and this in turn would seriously slow down the whole long term development program, if not bring it to a halt. Canadian food aid permits them to continue their long range development program while meeting emergency needs. In addition to this as I mentioned before, these counterpart funds are set up on receipt of Canadian gifts of food and commodities and, in turn, are applied to long range development projects. I think it is important to keep this in mind.

Now, I cannot speak directly to the policy issues, but I think it might be useful to keep in mind that the Minister has mentioned on several occasions, and other ministers have made reference to this too, that Canada has a special obligation as part of the Western World and as part of the Commonwealth to play its fair share in the attempt to make the economies in places like India and Pakistan viable and self-sustaining in the long run.

**Mr. Thompson:** In your opinion, would an increase of 50 per cent or even 100 per cent in a couple of years be profitably used in the Caribbean in light of their requests and the situation that you see.

**Mr. Strong:** I think the increase as now contemplated can be used effectively. I think the program is growing about as fast at this point as could be actually administered effectively in the area. I am not saying that the country could not use more aid over the long term but I would think at this stage that the assistance we are providing is increasing at a rate that is fully in line with the administrative capacity both here and in the island governments to use it effectively.

**Mr. Thompson:** Changing the topic, Mr. Chairman, recently the Centennial International Development Program was transferred from the Centennial Commission to External Aid. I understand that this does not involve the expenditure of money during the current year because the budget is there but I would ask if there are plans in Mr. Strong's department to continue or to extend the specific area of responsibility that has rested with the CIDP as it relates to a greater participation in the private sector.

**Mr. Strong:** Mr. Chairman, I think it should be pointed out that responsibility for the Centennial International Development Program has not been shifted to the External Aid Office. They continue to receive their funds from the Centennial Commission but we, at their request, have agreed to create a liaison with the CIDP and to generally overlook their activity. Of course, one of the reasons for this is to assure that the very useful programs which they are undertaking are preserved beyond the Centennial Year. Specific ways of doing this, of course, have not yet been decided but it is for the purpose of examining these ways that this liaison relationship between the External Aid Office and the CIDP has been created.

**Mr. Thompson:** With our own participation on the private sector very minimum compared with some countries which have a very large proportion of their aid programs carried out by the private sector, do you believe, Mr. Strong, that private sector participation is possible in Canada? Are there ways that this might be encouraged where it is not now being realized?

**Mr. Strong:** The private sector activities in Canada are significant at this point. Our latest estimate of the total amount of money coming from the private sector is something like \$34 million. It is up considerably from the last estimate that we made of about \$25 million. These are not precise figures nor do they take into account the very substantial amounts of

volunteer efforts that go into private programs. We are of course very interested in these programs because we are interested in assuring that there is an over-all co-ordination between what private organizations do and what we do. They are likewise concerned and we have been in consultation with these organizations. We have been seeking views from them on the best ways of providing information concerning our own program and other possible ways whereby our programs might become more and more complementary. The only other thing I could say in this respect is to remind you that the Minister has mentioned on a couple of occasions that it is the desire of the government to seek ways of involving the private sector in international development to an increasing extent.

**Mr. Thompson:** I suppose my last question also infringes on the policy area but I am sure there is a great deal of public interest in what use might be made of the Expo site following the end of Expo itself. One of the interesting aspects of Germany that I noticed recently was the Program of the International Institute which relates to a series of seminar programs carried on month by month involving various levels of public administration. Is there any planning, or would Mr. Strong have any comments for us on the development of such programs as they might relate to Expo or other aid use, if I might put it that way, of some of the Expo facilities.

**Mr. Strong:** I think the only thing I could say on this is, like most members here, I read the Prime Minister's speech to the Canadian Political Science Association where he did mention a possibility of this, but this is in the policy area and I do not think I should make any further comment on it.

*(Translation)*

**Mr. Goyer:** Mr. Strong, in the loans column, there appears the figure of 60 million dollars. Are these all good debts or do you expect there to be some bad debts and keep a reserve for bad debts under this item?

*(English)*

**Mr. Strong:** To date we have not had any bad debts as such, and we have no reserve as such for bad debts. Of course I am not talking on behalf of the Export Credit Insurance Corporation who do their accounting on a different basis and I believe provide some reserve. In any event we do not administer the Export Credit Program, and in respect to our program there is no reserve for bad debts as such. I might point out that there is also no

provision whereby funds received by way of interest and by way of principal repayment on development loans are credited against the allocation; they go back into the general fund too.

• (11.10 a.m.)

*(Translation)*

**Mr. Goyer:** Now, when you study a budget under the heading of loans, do you study the project as such without taking into consideration the country requesting a loan, its solvency, etc... or simply the implementation of the project. In short, do you disregard the people asking for the loan and think instead of carrying out a project?

*(English)*

**Mr. Strong:** No. These go directly to specific projects. If we require that the specific projects be looked into in considerable detail we look at the project, firstly, from the point of view of the kind of effect it can have on the development of the recipient country and, secondly, from the point of view of whether or not it is a suitable one for Canadian assistance. There are many areas in which Canadians are not really in a position to render assistance so we have to have these two requirements. Number 1 is that it meet a priority development need in the receiving country and, Number 2, that it be the kind of project that Canada has the capacity to assist with.

*(Translation)*

**Mr. Goyer:** Now, there is one question which is rather disagreeable in some respects, but it is the only dark spot on the picture in the public mind, if I may speak for public opinion. The question concerns, particularly with regard to food shipments to India, the question of loss and poor distribution, and some kind of red tape, or worse, with the result that the 70 million dollars could end up, the 77 million dollars could end up being frittered away and in fact seriously reduced, by the time it reaches the people we are trying to help. Is there any truth in this or...

*(English)*

**Mr. Strong:** I think it is obvious that in any program involving relationships from government to government there be some necessary red tape, as you call it. First of all, it takes time to get the information that we need on these projects. It then takes time to satisfy ourselves about the validity of the projects themselves. There is no question that this is one of our continuing problems. I think probably the difficulties are not fully understood by the public. Certainly they were not fully

understood by me until I came into this job. However, I think things can be done and are being done to improve the situation. I think it should be remembered too that these programs have not been going on for many years and neither we nor the recipient countries had a lot of experience in the complicated techniques of negotiating and administering aid programs, and that this experience that we have had over the last fifteen or seventeen years since we started the Colombo Plan is now, I believe, giving rise to improved administrative practices and capacities and I hope that we are going to be able to increasingly in the future minimize the problem. It has just been pointed out to me by Mr. Drake that, as an example, we are able very often to act fast. In the case of last year's emergency food aid to India, the orders were placed and the grain was on the move within days.

The case of the well publicized problems we had with Dr. Gingras, where we were not able to get buildings and this kind of thing and everybody wondered why this was so, obscured the fact that Dr. Vennema in his project at Quang Ngai obtained approval and secured a piece of land in thirty-six hours. There are examples where you do get bogged down in very real problems that are difficult to overcome and there are other heartening examples when it is possible to move ahead rapidly.

• (11.15 a.m.)

(Translation)

**Mr. Pelletier:** Supplementary question, Mr. Chairman; is there any way in which you can be sure that these food shipments, for example, are actually reaching the victims of the famine? Is there any way in which you can be sure?

(English)

**Mr. Strong:** Yes, I am satisfied that it does, but not always the precise shipments. When our food arrives, say in India, it does not always go to the precise place which you read in the newspaper is having a famine because very often the logistics of movement of food in a place like that require that food that is in one area closer be shipped. Canadians sometimes going up to these areas might see wheat or flour that they thought should be from Canada from some other country. But, despite the problems that there always are in areas like this, I am personally satisfied that our food by and large does reach the people for whom it is destined.

**Mr. Haidasz:** May I ask just one question relating to the Francophone African coun-

tries? Mentioned in "Others" is the grant of \$1.3 million. Does that include anything for the country of Upper Volta and if so for what project?

**Mr. Strong:** Upper Volta is eligible for our aid but it is one of those countries for which there is not a specific country allocation. We have a small technical assistance program, really consisting of the provision of educational films. This is the only actual program that has been put into operation.

**Mr. Haidasz:** Is this for the last fiscal year or for the present fiscal year?

**Mr. Strong:** No, this one would be for the last fiscal year.

**Mr. Haidasz:** What have you in mind, or has been anything been asked, for the present fiscal year?

**Mr. Strong:** No requests have been received for the present fiscal year to my knowledge.

Advisers and teachers will be provided and people will be coming to Canada for training at a total cost of \$17,500. No other project is being requested at this point.

**Mr. Lewis:** Is there any explanation of why the Middle East is not in this program at all?

**Mr. Strong:** We have not had development assistance programs in the Middle East as such. We have made our contributions to UNRWA, the World Food Program and various multilateral programs but we have no direct bilateral aid relationships with the Middle East countries at this time.

**Mr. Lewis:** I see that in your report. I am wondering whether there is any explanation of why that has been and is so? I just want to know the reason if there is one.

**Mr. Strong:** I think this is a policy question that I should not answer. I might point out, however, that it is also a policy of the government to concentrate its assistance in those countries where it can be most effective and in which major Canadian interest is involved. This means that we do not, as a matter of practice, give aid everywhere in the world because it would be difficult to do. I know that is not an answer to your particular question but it should be borne in mind when considering this question.

**Mr. Haidasz:** May I ask a supplementary question, Mr. Chairman? I notice that our contribution to the program of the United Nations High Commissioner for the Refugees has been cut in the present fiscal year by half. Some of these refugees, of course, are from

the area of the Middle East. This is in Vote 35—Multilateral Contributions.

**Mr. Strong:** I should point out that these multilateral appropriations come under the Department of External Affairs votes and not specifically in the External Aid budget. I think perhaps it would be more appropriate for this question to be asked at the time the Departmental officials are being questioned here.

**Mr. Stanbury:** Are you aware, Mr. Strong, of any requests for aid from any countries of the Middle East which have been refused by Canada?

**Mr. Strong:** I do not think I am in a position to answer that question.

**Mr. Stanbury:** Do you mean by that you are not aware of any or you do not feel you can answer?

**Mr. Strong:** I am not aware of any, but I would not want to say that none have been received.

**Mr. Stanbury:** No, but as far as your job is concerned, you are not aware of any?

**Mr. Strong:** No.

**Mr. Churchill:** I want to ask a question regarding the loan program. I am always fascinated by the non-interest-bearing loans which I have never been able to get myself.

Of the \$60 million under the loan arrangement, how much is non-interest bearing and how much is on very small interest rates?

**Mr. Strong:** Under the development loans basically there are two forms. There is no actual division between the two in monetary amounts. I have mentioned before that the best terms Canada can extend are for fifty years with no interest and a ten year grace for repayment. We have another type that we call medium term development loans which bear interest at a rate of 3 per cent for a thirty-year term and a seven year grace period for repayment. There is no actual monetary division between the two. We are free, as we appraise the particular project and the country's financial position, to use either of these loans or a combination of them.

**Mr. Lewis:** If I may interject, Mr. Churchill, when you use the term "grace period" do you mean after the period within which repayment is expected? If there is a fifty-year loan, and they do not start repaying until the fifty-first year, do you expect it to be paid by the sixtieth year?

**Mr. Strong:** Well, no. Normally under these loans repayments would start immediately in the first year. But the grace period simply means that we do not require repayments to commence until the end of the grace period. In the case of the long-term loans, the fifty-year loans, the grace period is ten years, which means that no repayments of principal have to be made during that ten-year period, but repayments have to be made after that. In the case of a seven year grace period, obviously we mean that repayment of principal does not have to be made until after the seventh year.

**Mr. Churchill:** Are only the Latin-American loans non-interest bearing?

**Mr. Strong:** No, sir. We extend the same terms to other countries. For example, the Idikki dam loan, as well as all the recent loans to India, Ceylon and Pakistan, have been fifty-year loans with no interest. Some of them bore a service charge of three-quarters of one per cent or one per cent and some of them did not, depending on when they were made.

**Mr. Churchill:** Does the government pay interest on the money that is provided at non-interest rates to these countries?

**Mr. Strong:** This is caught up in the overall budgetary situation. I could not begin to attempt to trace our funds back into the budget, but they are provided out of general government funds.

**Mr. Churchill:** What is the purpose behind the non-interest loan? I am not objecting to it; I would rather like it myself. Why is interest charged to some of these countries and not to others?

**Mr. Strong:** We take into account the kind of project for which the loan funds are being used. For example, it is more appropriate to charge interest on a loan for a project that is generating funds to be used to repay the loan; but more particularly it takes into account the overall capacity of the country, to provide the foreign exchange required to the repay the loan.

If you notice, the ratio between loans and grants has increased in the last year. In other words, we have reduced the percentage of grants and increased the percentage of loans, so in a sense, funds that were formerly granted are now being loaned on these soft terms. Of course, in the case of a grant there is no repayment possibility at all, but for development loans there is an expectation of ultimate repayment.

• (11.25 a.m.)

(Translation)

**Mr. Tremblay:** Mr. Chairman, I see that a sum of 11.1 million dollars has been allotted to the countries of French Africa and a sum of 18.5 million dollars to the African Commonwealth countries. I would like to know whether the total sum to be spent in all of these countries, grouped in this way as French Africa and Commonwealth Africa, was determined first of all, or whether these sums are merely the result of adding the sums allotted to the countries individually and these groups, French Africa and Commonwealth Africa, are formed simply by adding individual countries together.

(English)

**Mr. Strong:** To get a full account of the Francophone you would have to add what we call here the Indo-China states in Southeast Asia to Francophone Africa.

Really they are put out this way for overall interpretive purposes and they are not actually allocated in this fashion. We do not just allocate so much to Francophone countries and so much to Commonwealth countries, but for purposes of presenting them we do show them in those categories.

(Translation)

**Mr. Tremblay:** In other words, at that point, there is no attempt, say, to balance the total amount allotted to the French-speaking countries with the total sum allotted to the Commonwealth countries. This result simply arises after the fact?

(English)

**Mr. Strong:** No, there is no attempt to do this. I am sorry; I sought advice on your question as I was not sure I caught it.

(Translation)

**Mr. Tremblay:** Now, a second question. Here we have the sums allotted, but does this mean the sums spent during the year, and if it does mean the sums spent in these countries, can we have the figure which was given in the estimates? Is this the sum spent or the sum given in the estimates?

(English)

**Mr. Strong:** No, the figures on the sheet that you have represent actual figures for 1966 and 1967. The others simply are allocations.

**Mr. Lewis:** Have these amounts actually been spent or do the figures represent allocations to be spent?

**Mr. Strong:** No, they are specific allocations, not disbursements. There is always a lag between allocations and disbursements.

**Mr. Lewis:** Could we have the disbursement figures so that we can see the difference?

**Mr. Strong:** The final figures for last year are not available because the year ended on March 31, and at this point we do not have the final figures of disbursements. By about the end of this month we should have final figures on disbursements for the year.

(Translation)

**Mr. Tremblay:** The reason I ask this question, Mr. Chairman, is that there has been some criticism expressed among the public to the effect that, while almost as much money was allotted to the French-speaking countries of Africa as to the Commonwealth countries, in fact, a much smaller proportion was actually spent in the French-speaking countries than in the Commonwealth countries in Africa.

**Mr. Goyer:** I have a supplementary question, Mr. Chairman. What is the amount spent per capita in French-speaking Africa and in Commonwealth Africa?

(English)

**Mr. Strong:** It is true that because our programs in the Francophone countries are newer programs in a sense we do not have the same administrative ties; there are different kinds of administrative arrangements.

The developing of specific capital projects in particular has been a somewhat slower process. Our technical assistance and educational projects are proceeding very well. The finding of suitable capital projects has been a slower process. We have been pushing very hard on this. There are a number of matters that are being actively considered and some of them are being done, but there is no question that we have less experience in these countries and they have a good deal less experience in understanding Canadian capacities and resources. However, I think we have been moving rather rapidly to breach this gap.

(Translation)

**Mr. Goyer:** Do you anticipate much improvement in 1967-68?

(English)

**Mr. Strong:** I think the situation will be considerably improved this year. We are placing major emphasis in this area. We are send-

ing teams out and we are receiving people in return. One of our biggest projects, in fact, is in Tunisia. Some of our projects in Franco-phone Africa are very good. One of the largest comprehensive projects—or certainly one of the largest in the area of technical assistance—at the moment is the establishment of a pediatric hospital in Tunis. There are some 50 French-Canadian medical personnel who are assisting in the development of an entire pediatric facility at Tunis. So, there is some very significant evidence that we are making progress in this area. However, we are not yet satisfied that we have reached the point where they know everything they should know about our capacity to provide help and that we in turn have been able to match this up with their needs.

(Translation)

**Mr. Pelletier:** Do you feel that you now have the staff and facilities required to spend the full amount of the allotments which are made?

(English)

**Mr. Strong:** Yes, we have. We have been making significant additions to our staff. As I think I mentioned at the last meeting, about 50 per cent of our staff is now bilingual. As you can appreciate, the Director General still has a long way to go, but I can assure you he is working on this one hour every morning and in between times when he can. At present our total establishment, which authorizes the number of people we are permitted to employ, is 350. We actually have on staff 261, so you can see we are still in the process of recruiting. It has been quite encouraging, actually, that since I came in a great number of people have been coming forward and they have shown a real interest in external aid. In fact, the number of applications has risen very substantially and this has given rise to some recruiting problems because, as you know, it takes quite a lot of time to ensure that every applicant is given full and proper consideration.

(Translation)

**Mr. Goyer:** I see that you have improved your informational services outside Canada; but are your informational services in Canada as well organized today?

(English)

**Mr. Strong:** Our prime priority, of course, is external aid but everything we do has an implication in Canada as well. This cannot be helped. What we are doing in effect is extend-

ing assistance which is Canadian assistance. We are extending Canadian institutions. We are giving them an experience abroad. I think what in fact happens to Canadian business firms, Canadian educational institutions and individual teachers and advisers who are involved in external aid produces very significant results for Canada's internal development as well. However, the primary purpose, of course, is to give assistance to the developing countries.

**The Chairman:** Gentlemen, this completes the evidence on external aid. Shall item 30 carry?

**Mr. Churchill:** Mr. Chairman, I do not think we should pass items without having a quorum. I think it might be done at the next meeting. So we now have a quorum? Where did these people come from? So we have 13 members?

**The Chairman:** We have a quorum.

**Mr. Churchill:** Where is the thirteenth? I cannot count thirteen.

**Mr. Lewis:** I do not want to throw any monkey wrenches into the works, but I am not a member of the Committee.

**The Chairman:** In that case I will ask the Clerk to record the names of those who are present.

**Mr. Lewis:** If you are counting me—

**The Chairman:** We will adjourn until Thursday at 9.30. Does the Committee wish to recall Mr. Strong or have we completed the questioning? In that case, I wish to thank you very kindly, Mr. Strong, for your co-operation.

**Mr. Prud'homme:** Mr. Chairman, at the beginning of each session if someone attending is sitting at the table and is not a member of the Committee he should so identify himself. Other members of this Committee were present and when they saw there were sufficient people here they went to other committees. If a person attending is not a member of the Committee he should say so at the beginning to that we can work *avec plus de facilité*.

**The Chairman:** There is a list of Committee members available to all concerned. In any event, if it is not the wish of the Committee to have Mr. Strong recalled we can have these items adopted on Thursday. The meeting is adjourned until Thursday morning at 9.30 and the next witness will be on administration.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

Second Session—Twenty-seventh Parliament

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

1967

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STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

# EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Chairman: Mr. JEAN-EUDES DUBÉ

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MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 4

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THURSDAY, JUNE 22, 1967

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RESPECTING

Main Estimates 1967-68 of the Department  
of External Affairs

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WITNESSES:

*From the Department of External Affairs:* Messrs. B. M. Williams, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs; E. H. Gilmour, Head of the Consular Division; G. Warren, United Nations Division.

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.  
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY  
OTTAWA, 1967

HOUSE OF COMMONS

Second Session—Twenty-seventh Parliament

STANDING COMMITTEE

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Chairman: Mr. Jean-Eudes Dubé

Vice-Chairman: Mr. W. B. Nesbitt

and

Mr. Allmand,  
Mr. Asselin  
(Charlevoix),  
Mr. Brewin,  
Mr. Caron,  
Mr. Churchill,  
Mr. Faulkner,  
Mr. Forest,

Mr. Forrestall,  
Mr. Goyer,  
Mr. Haidasz,  
Mr. Harkness,  
Mr. Klein,  
Mr. Lambert,  
Mr. Laprise,  
Mr. Macquarrie,

Mr. McIntosh,  
Mr. Pelletier,  
Mr. Pilon,  
Mr. Prud'homme,  
Mr. Stanbury,  
Mr. Thompson,  
Mr. Tremblay (Mata-  
pédia-Matane)—(24)

Fernand Despatie,  
Clerk of the Committee.

WITNESSES:

From the Department of External Affairs: Messrs. B. M. Williams, Assistant  
Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs; E. H. Gilmore, Head of  
the Consular Division; G. Warren, United Nations Division.

HOOVER DUNHAM, P.R.C.  
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY  
OTTAWA, 1967

## MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

THURSDAY, June 22, 1967.

(5)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs met at 10.15 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Dubé, presided.

*Members present:* Messrs. Brewin, Caron, Churchill, Dubé, Forest, Forrestall, Goyer, Haidasz, Lambert, Macquarrie, Nesbitt, Pelletier, Pilon, Prud'homme, Stanbury, Tremblay (*Matapédia-Matane*) (16).

*In attendance:* From the Department of External Affairs: Messrs. B. M. Williams, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs; A. J. Matheson, Head of the Finance Division; E. H. Gilmour, Head of the Consular Division; G. Warren, United Nations Division.

The Committee resumed consideration of the Main Estimates for 1967-68, relating to the Department of External Affairs.

Items 30, 35 and L30—External Aid Office, considered at previous meetings, were severally carried.

The Chairman called Item 1:

Administration, Operation and Maintenance, \$42,260,000.

The Chairman then introduced officials from the Department of External Affairs. He noted that the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs could not be present since he was participating in the Canada-U.S. economic talks in Montreal.

Mr. Williams made a statement on the administration of the Department of External Affairs, and was questioned. He was assisted in answering questions by Messrs. Gilmour and Warren.

The following documents were submitted by Mr. Williams and distributed to members of the Committee:

*Assessments, Contributions, and Other Payments to International Organizations, and Economic and Special Aid Programs;*

*Employment Opportunities—Department of External Affairs;*

*Exercise of Franchise by Overseas Personnel;*

*Canadian News for External Affairs Posts Abroad.*

At 11.55 a.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

Fernand Despatie,  
Clerk of the Committee.



## EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

Thursday, 22 June, 1967.

**The Chairman:** Gentlemen, we have a quorum.

At our most recent meeting last Tuesday we completed the evidence on External Aid, and I would like to have the following items carried: items 30, 35 and L30 dealing with External Aid—

30 Salaries and Expenses, \$2,521,700.

35 Economic, technical, educational and other assistance as detailed in the Estimates, \$130,100,000.

L30 Special loan assistance for developing countries in the current and subsequent fiscal years, subject to such terms and conditions as the Governor in Council may approve, for the purpose of undertaking such economic, educational and technical projects as may be agreed upon by Canada and the developing countries or recognized international development institutions, \$90,000,000.

Item 30 agreed to.

Item 35 agreed to.

Item L30 agreed to.

This morning we are reverting to item 1 of the main estimates for 1967-68, dealing with Administration, Operation and Maintenance.

We have here with us this morning Mr. B. M. Williams, Assistant Under Secretary of State for External Affairs; Mr. E. H. Gilmour, Head of the Consular Division, Department of External Affairs; and Mr. A. J. Matheson, Head of the Finance Division, Department of External Affairs.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** I have a few questions.

**The Chairman:** Mr. Williams has a statement. If the Committee agrees he will start with his statement and then we will have questions.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** As a matter of curiosity, Mr. Chairman, where is Mr. Cadieux. Is he in New York?

**The Chairman:** I am told he is in Montreal at the Canada-U.S. economic talks.

**Mr. B. M. Williams (Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs):** Mr. Chairman, hon. members, may I first express the regret of the Under-Secretary that he cannot be here this morning. He went to Montreal on Monday to participate in the Canada-U.S. economic talks which are taking place there.

With your permission I should like to read the statement which he hoped to make had he been here today. In this statement I should like to devote attention to some of the management problems we face in the Department of External Affairs and also to the requirements of additional resources and improved administration that inevitably accompany new departmental efforts and undertakings.

The expansion of our overseas network of posts and the growth of our responsibilities at headquarters require us to adopt more sophisticated and often more elaborate methods of management than those that seemed adequate some years ago. In common with other government departments we find ourselves swept along in a process of management reform that was initiated in the wake of the Glassco Commission studies and now derives strength from the recognition on all sides that government departments must cope with new developments and deal with changed dimensions.

Our philosophy of management in the Department of External Affairs cannot be that of a business enterprise, but we believe that we can convert to our own use and employ to our own benefit a selection of the procedures that business has found useful. We do not wish to become as highly organized or mechanized or computerized as some departments whose responsibilities are more closely parallel to those of industry, but we are endeavouring to ensure that our affairs are conducted in an effective manner and that our practices and procedures keep pace with the march of progress. This involves the ordering of our work in a manner that is consistent with the principles of management that are being advanced by the central agencies. While we are profoundly affected by the "managerial revolution" that is said to be

under way in government departments, we are careful to ensure that any transformations it brings about are implemented in a way that will meet our special needs and will constitute a change for the better. We are making a careful study of the implications of recommendations for improvement developed within and outside the Department and are trying to obtain the best combination of efficiency and effectiveness.

As the world becomes more complex, and Canada's involvement in international relationships and happenings grows more extensive, we find it increasingly necessary to devote ourselves to planning of both kinds, that is, planning of the resources in men, money and materials that we will need in the months and years ahead and planning of the alternative policies that might appropriately be recommended for consideration by the Government. Both kinds of planning—and indeed all our operations—increasingly relate to the question of priorities. The Department cannot be all things to all people at all times. It must choose between worthwhile actions and endeavours at any one stage since the resources will never be adequate for everything. While our resources in officer strength and supporting staff have expanded considerably over the years, so have the demands made upon the Department and so have the opportunities for Canadian action and participation in world affairs. More and more must we be able to present alternative lines of action and operate on the basis of priorities. In doing so I think we will benefit considerably from some of the management developments that are taking place.

One hears a great deal these days about programme budgeting in government departments and about the programme review process that is associated with the preparation of estimates. We regard the programme review procedures as an opportunity to bring together all the factors that have a bearing on the choice of things we should be doing. While the pressures on the Department to assume new burdens are acute and growing, we must match our activities to the priorities of government policy and to the availability of resources.

In developing the management and administrative procedures that meet our present-day situation we have been guided by the principles enunciated in the general reports of the Glassco Commission and also by the report on External Affairs issued by that

Commission early in 1963. We have adapted the Glassco Commission ideas to our requirements and in some fields we have proceeded on the basis of conclusions reached through our own experience.

On the recommendation of the Treasury Board we established a position of Financial Management Adviser, and have been able to obtain a well qualified officer for this work. He is now in the process of determining the ways in which the new concepts of financial management can best be applied to the Department's requirements. As time goes on additional financial officers will be needed to enable us to move forward toward implementation. We have recently had meetings at which all heads of division have had the opportunity of becoming familiar with these concepts and of studying their relationship to the responsibilities of the individual divisions. Although it is a complex matter, we are making good progress in this field.

A number of other steps have been taken toward the introduction of modern methods. We have, for example, established an Organization and Methods Unit, responsible for determining ways in which we can improve our systems and procedures. It has made a number of studies and surveys and has more in prospect.

The number of External Affairs Officers has been increased. These officers are specialists in work in the consular, information and administrative fields. We have recruited university graduates for this work and have also attracted a number of experienced officers from other departments, including some from the armed services.

An accelerated programme has been developed for the acquisition of properties at overseas centres where we have posts. These properties are to be used for offices, residences and staff quarters. We have obtained the help of property specialists to expedite this programme.

Substantial progress has been made in defining the Department's requirements of space and facilities for the new headquarters building that is now being planned. It will meet a vital need since we are now spread about in five buildings, and within a month we will be into a sixth.

Some improvements have been made in the records management system and others are in process. We are determining the extent to

which changed methods and new equipment might help us to handle the increasing amounts of documentation that are essential to our work.

The application of modern methods of management is straightforward in the realms of pure administration, but becomes rather more complex when one approaches the spheres of diplomatic work. To help us develop an improved organization structure for the Department—one that would take into account our increased work-loads and also make allowance for the new techniques and commitments—we sought the assistance of the Public Service Commission. It has recently prepared a number of recommendations which involve in some instances changes in the assignment of responsibility and in others the adoption of different procedures for both diplomatic and administrative work. We are currently carrying on detailed consultations with the Commission officers on their proposals.

To organize the Department to carry out its expanding responsibilities requires a recognition of the growing complexity of our work which results from the expansion of traditional bilateral relationships and the increase in number and size of multilateral organizations. This complexity presents us with major problems of internal co-ordination. We also need to devote adequate attention to planning procedures and, as I said earlier, to the establishment of priorities.

Closely related to the broad requirements of management in the Department are the needs of adequate administrative support services. For example, a management audit section has been established and we are in the process of recruiting experienced candidates for it. The auditors will make periodic examinations of the financial transactions and related procedures, including the use of resources to achieve objectives, at posts abroad and to some extent in divisions in Ottawa.

Another instrument for the maintenance of effective management and good administration is the Inspection Service. The role of this Service was diminished while we concentrated on certain administrative improvements in the past but it has now been reinstated. It will carry continuing responsibilities both for inspection of overseas posts and for checking on progress at headquarters.

Good administration and indeed good operations generally require that there be an adequate framework of allowances and amenities

to permit our personnel abroad to maintain themselves properly and to do their jobs. We are now engaged in a review of the foreign service regulations which have long been in force and which include arrangements for travel and removal, for procurement of accommodation, for education of foreign service children, for representation obligations and for certain other forms of essential support. We have been pleased at the initiative taken by the Treasury Board in the past year to review these regulations in the light of present-day requirements and we are happy to be associated with this process of re-examination. Departmental officers are co-operating for this purpose with members of the Treasury Board staff and with representatives of other government departments. Satisfactory progress is being made.

In our own administration and in the operations of our missions abroad it is important that we maintain close liaison with the External Aid Office. It is a responsibility of the Under-Secretary to be a member of the Board charged with the development of Canadian policies in this field. Close liaison is also achieved through the secondment of officers from the Department of External Affairs to the External Aid Office. Of course, daily communication is maintained not only through the Economic Division, which is the formal channel, but through direct conversations and consultations with the Aid Office by a number of other divisions. With the Canadian Government's programme of external aid expanding rapidly and extending to an increasing number of the developing countries, we are interested in seeing still closer forms of liaison and co-operation developed and we are working to this end. Most of the detailed administrative work connected with external aid, particularly on the technical assistance side, is handled by members of our overseas missions. At some of our embassies in developing countries, aid work takes up more than half the available working time.

In the operation and administration of the Department it is essential to keep in mind continuously the availability of staff. We must not only apportion our strength amongst divisions at home and posts abroad in accordance with changing commitments and requirements, but we must plan for the future so that through adequate recruiting today we can meet the needs for experienced officers in future years. To fulfil the personnel management function, we have regrouped the various

kinds of work into readily identifiable areas of responsibility and have increased the number of personnel officers, including officers from outside the Department with specialist competence in this field.

• (10:30 a.m.)

The Canadian foreign service is still not large in comparison with other government departments and indeed in comparison with many other foreign services. The number of Canadian employees at home and abroad now totals approximately 2,100. Of this number, 446 are Foreign Service Officers. As a result of recruiting, this number will soon be 500. The Foreign Service Officers are assigned in the 26 divisions at home and in some 80 posts abroad. There are also some 140 External Affairs Officers concerned with consular services and information work and also with administration. To keep up with the growth of responsibilities we recruited 57 Foreign Service Officers last year and we hope to bring in about the same number this year. We have recruited some 25 External Affairs Officers in the last two years. Recruitment of employees for support categories, including stenographers, clerks, communicators and others has been carried out in similar proportions.

There are special problems in personnel administration and development. One such problem is the need to encourage bilingualism. We have long recognized the importance of working toward a service that was truly representative of Canada in culture and language. In the rotational officer categories—Foreign Service Officers and External Affairs Officers—28% are bilingual and another 20% are able to utilize both French and English adequately. Of some 400 stenographers and typists, 132, or a third, have qualified to receive the 7% pay bonus for a proven ability to work in both languages. These proportions are amongst the highest in the Federal Government, but they are not as high as we would wish them to be. However, we have been encouraged by the number of new officers who have come to us from French-language universities. Officers whose mother tongue is French make up 21% of the total. We are also seeking to increase the opportunities open to our English-speaking officers to be able to express themselves in French. Despite our shortage of staff, a large number of officers are engaged in French-language courses, full-time or part-time, and we are indebted to the Language Schools of

the Public Service Commission for making this possible. The results have been encouraging. A knowledge of the two official languages enables our officers to understand all aspects of their own country and to represent Canada abroad in a more effective fashion. Continued efforts are also being made to obtain French-speaking staff members as clerks, stenographers, communicators, and other kinds of support staff.

In devoting our efforts to personnel administration, we must adjust ourselves to a totally new dimension, that of collective bargaining and the grievance procedure. The decision of the Government to allow collective bargaining will inevitably alter the internal relationships in the Department, and have some effect on the traditional lines of authority and management. The Department has set up a Staff Relations Section in the Personnel Services Division and will ultimately have several officers devoting attention to the ways in which collective bargaining processes are to be handled, particularly the grievance procedure. In so doing we are maintaining close liaison with the Treasury Board staff. Our Foreign Service Officers have already formed an organization which they expect will be officially recognized as their bargaining agent. The interests of other groups of employees are likely to be represented by the major staff associations. Although there are aspects of these new relationships that have yet to be worked out, we are confident that we can operate within this new framework and continue to count on the dedicated efforts and full co-operation that our staff members have displayed in the past.

Another element in personnel administration that we consider of great importance is training. In the past we have given our main attention to ways of achieving effective on-the-job training. It is a fact that many of our best officers have not had training courses over the years but have steadily improved through the experience they gained as they did their work. However, we have reached the stage where something more is needed—particularly so when we must take in new members of the Department in large numbers and cannot give them as much individual attention as was possible in earlier days. We have formed a Training Section within our Personnel Operations Division, with a staff of three and it is making good progress. For example, it has arranged sessions at which senior officers have had the opportunity of

becoming familiar with new policy developments and of exchanging views on their implications. It has improved the training given to new officers and has made special arrangements for them to get to know Canada better; it has run administration courses for middle grade staff members; and it is developing courses in the skills and knowledge needed by junior employees going abroad. Much remains to be done in the training field but the results achieved so far are gratifying.

Mr. Chairman, with your permission and that of the Committee, we gave to the Clerk of the Committee four possible reference papers, one on "Exercise of Franchise by Overseas Personnel"; one on "Canadian News for External Affairs Post Abroad"; a summary of assessments to the United Nations specialized agencies, and a brief resume on employment opportunities in the Department of External Affairs. We have provided them in French and in English. Do you wish them to be distributed?

**The Chairman:** Are they available now?

**Mr. Williams:** Yes.

**The Chairman:** Is it agreed that these be passed around?

Agreed.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** I have some general observations on the report given by Mr. Williams. I do not want my observations to be taken personally by Mr. Williams in any way; they are not intended as such. With the exception of the latter part of the report, which dealt with some very interesting, very helpful and very specific matters on the number of people coming in the Department and the breakdown in the ability to use two languages which I think is certainly very helpful, a great deal of the rest of the report, I think, is of a most general and non-specific nature; in fact a masterpiece thereof, and I do not think it is perhaps as generally helpful as it might have been. I just make this observation for future guidance. I think a greater deal of specific information would be more helpful to the Committee than some of these very, very broad generalities. I have a number of brief questions which I would like to have answered. They deal with very specific matters.

The first one deals with a matter which has been brought up repeatedly at these meetings and from what I have been able to observe nothing has been done about it yet although perhaps in one of these papers that we have

just received, something might be suggested. That is the question of newspapers at embassies abroad. I can understand that in the more distant posts obviously there is some difficulty, because of the cost, in getting them there by airmail but certainly in posts like New York and Washington there should be no reason for finding leading Canadian newspapers there several days old and being unable to find out the local news. I know the CBC Bulletins news condensations that are received are helpful, but they are very much condensed indeed. Are any steps being taken to see that posts such as New York, Washington, London, Tokyo, do receive newspapers as quickly as possible by airmail? The cost could not be that great. It is a great lack at the present time that the information provided is days old.

**Mr. Williams:** Mr. Chairman, in reply to the hon. Member, I think he is aware that we send to 83 of the posts by airmail the first six pages of *Le Devoir*, and pages 1, 2, 5 and 8 of the *Globe and Mail* daily. I know this does not specifically reply to the question he raised in terms of full editions of Canadian newspapers to posts abroad. We have considered proposals that we send to each of our posts by airmail a representative selection of daily newspapers from across Canada, but we have concluded that we could not recommend expenditure of the very large sums of money required to do this, which we estimate to be about \$360,000 a year.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** Would that be all posts, or would that be some? Could you be selective in the posts, to do this?

**Mr. Williams:** It may be that we should look at it in terms of a selective group of posts.

• (10:40 a.m.)

**Mr. Nesbitt:** Since ordinary mails in the United States, I regret to say, are not as good as our mail services, particularly in New York and Washington unless you send things airmail, it may be weeks before they get there sometimes. The Department, if I may suggest it, should give very careful consideration to sending representative newspapers to some of the more important posts.

I realize that you cannot do it in the case of some of the more outlying posts, but certainly where a great deal is going on, a background of information of what is going on in Canada is most important to members of the mission itself for a number of reasons. Would you look into that?

The next thing I would like to ask concerns the question of passports and the passport office. Most Members of the House, from what I have been able to hear—it is certainly my own personal experience—have handed a great many compliments to the passport office for the courteous and prompt assistance that Members receive for emergency calls, and I should like to go on record as commending the personnel of the Passport Division very much indeed for their help. However, there is one little matter which seems very strange to me; that is the question of who could be guarantor for a passport photograph. There are a number of categories that are acceptable, among them schoolteachers. I am sure that the Department must be aware that nowadays a number of schoolteachers are 18, 19 and 20 years old; they move around a great deal, unlike in the past, and their signatures are acceptable for a passport photo, but that of a Justice of the Peace is apparently not acceptable, although a Justice of the Peace, in Ontario at least, can swear in an applicant for Canadian citizenship; a Justice of the Peace has quasi-magisterial powers; and he is usually a citizen of some note in the community. I find it quite incomprehensible that Justices of the Peace should not be permitted, though they have been in the past to act as guarantors, whereas schoolteachers are. Have you any explanation for this?

**Mr. Williams:** Mr. Chairman, I do not think that I could offer any useful comment at all to Mr. Nesbitt's observation. I know that this whole question of guarantors for passports is one that is under constant review in the passport office. I know that on many occasions during the year representations are made to the Minister that groups of professional or semi-professional people in Canada should be eligible to be considered as guarantors. If it would be satisfactory to Mr. Nesbitt, I will certainly relay this to—

**Mr. Nesbitt:** It is probably not an important matter in large metropolitan areas, but in smaller communities it would be very helpful. A Justice of the Peace is usually someone who has been in the community for a long time and who knows people, whereas school teachers are coming and going right and left. If you want any kind of responsibility behind the guaranteeing of the photograph, I think it would be far better to use someone like that; at the present time that is not possible. I hope this will be rectified.

I am interested in the general report that the Department was considering more sophis-

ticated methods of dealing with personnel, and I would take it from that, that perhaps there will be more flexibility. Is there a hard and fast rule in the Department that departmental officers, regardless of their status or ability, must retire at 65?

**Mr. Williams:** Mr. Chairman, I think the principle is yes. Normally they do retire at 65. I think, however, that as most people who are knowledgeable in the Department know, from time to time individuals who are in specialist positions, or who may have a special type of knowledge or background or experience, have had extensions, but basically the retirement age is 65.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** But exceptions would be made for cases of special information or unusual experience.

**Mr. Williams:** I think—

**Mr. Nesbitt:** I have a few specific persons in mind. I will not name them—I can see no point in that—but it can be done.

The question was raised in the general report about collective bargaining changing the relationships within the Department. I can see how that would take place.

Perhaps this question is a little out of your field and deal more with government policy than with administration, but within the department has any serious consideration been given to the question of treating the Department of External Affairs, because of its very specialized nature, in much the same way as the government of the United Kingdom treats its Foreign Office, the officers of which do not come under the government service to the same degree? This creates greater flexibility in dealing with personnel and in hiring people for special reasons, and so on. Has any consideration been given to that?

**Mr. Williams:** Mr. Chairman, I do not think that in recent years there has been any, what I would call, active or serious consideration given to it. Some years ago I believe senior officials looked at the desirability of there being a separate act but for a variety of reasons it was not proceeded with. Certainly in recent times there has been no active consideration given to it, Mr. Nesbitt.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** Are instructions sent out by the Department to embassies at public posts abroad concerning assistance and entertainment, and matters related thereto, with respect to visiting delegations or quasi-official groups from Canada? I have one speci-

fic item in mind which I would be glad to discuss with you privately. In other words, is it not the case that embarrassed Canadians are sometimes embarrassed by the hospitality extended by host countries and that Canadian posts do not seem to have any specific information on or instructors about, visiting groups such as sports teams and the like?

Are any regulations or instructions on this sent to posts abroad, telling them what to do and how to deal with these situations, or is it left entirely to the discretion of the staff or head of mission?

**Mr. Williams:** As is the case with so many of my answers, I am afraid I have to say Yes and No.

Where the department has advance notice of groups of Canadians travelling we try to inform the post. We also assume that the post, within its limits, will offer whatever hospitality it can. On the other hand, I know from my own experience that from time to time groups of Canadians have arrived in a particular country without any advance notification.

We try on all occasions to ensure that our posts do whatever they can to make the visits of groups of Canadians interesting; however, I know of one particular post where recently three or four fairly large groups of Canadians were visiting at the same time. I do not believe every one of them felt that they had been received in the way to which possibly they should be entitled. I think it is quite true that sometimes these posts are inundated with groups; and this is so in the smaller ones where the number of officers is limited.

We try to look after visiting groups of Canadians, Mr. Nesbitt, but I do not think that we always provide the complete hospitality that they might wish.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** How many foreign service officers and grades are there at our embassy in Mexico City?

**Mr. Williams:** Normally the establishment in Mexico City is the head of mission, one foreign service officer of grade 4 or 5, the first secretary and an administrative officer. I believe we are adding one administrative officer at the present time. I am talking about External Affairs personnel, Mr. Nesbitt.

The ambassador has been Mr. Feaver, and there are a commercial counsellor, a first secretary, a second commercial officer and an

External Affairs officer, on an officer from the External Affairs side, if I may put it that way. Other than the ambassador there are two officers.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** To how many other countries does our ambassador to Mexico also have to present his credentials?

**Mr. Williams:** One country only.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** Which one is that?

**Mr. Williams:** Guatemala.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** How are the other smaller Central American republics represented?

**Mr. Williams:** We have an embassy in Costa Rica which has multiple accreditation to the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Panama and El Salvador. There are five in addition to Costa Rica.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** And Honduras, I believe.

**Mr. Williams:** Yes, Honduras. We have a resident mission in Haiti—

**Mr. Nesbitt:** Does the same ambassador serve the Dominican Republic and Haiti?

**Mr. Williams:** No.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** My next question may perhaps touch on the Department, but the Department must be having some communication in this regard: Do you have the latest information on the projected parliamentary exchange with the Republic of Mexico?

**Mr. Williams:** I am afraid I am not in a position to say that. I do not have information on it.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** I realize that it comes more directly under the Speaker, but I had hoped that perhaps the Department might be acting as postman in this regard.

**Mr. Williams:** I am sure we must be concerned in some way, Mr. Nesbitt. I just do not happen to have information about it.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** If you would be good enough to look into the matter perhaps we can be told about it at a later stage.

My last question deals with the expense allowances of foreign service officers abroad. This is a matter that has been raised many times.

I recall that in days gone by the Treasury required a very detailed accounting of some

of these expenses. From time to time it has, I think, acted as a restraint, to some degree, on officers carrying out their duties. Could you give Members of the Committee some idea of the degree of detail required in accounting for these expenses of officers abroad? As everyone knows, in the performance of their duties, they have to be fairly elastic sometimes and a great deal of individual judgment has to be exercised, although we realize, of course, that it cannot be *carte blanche*. This has been a problem in the past. Have you any comment on this?

**Mr. Williams:** Under the allowance system, as I am sure you are aware, the allowances are comprised of three parts: a foreign service allowance, an indirect representation allowance and a direct representation allowance. The direct allowance is the part that is devoted to representational expenditures. Basically, it is calculated on the total number of guests per grade that the officer is expected to entertain, or to look after, on a quarterly basis. For each post there has been established a unit cost for each meal, or each type of representation, whether it be lunch in or lunch out, dinners in homes or dinners out and for reception costs.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** Let me get to my exact point. Is it permissible for a foreign service officer abroad to entertain his colleagues from other delegations only for lunch or dinner or are other types of entertainment permitted such as perhaps a trip to the country, or attendance at the theatre, or something like that? Are those included, or do they have to cover up for those things by describing them as meals?

**Mr. Williams:** I think the short answer to that is that about 25 per cent of the direct representation allowance is available for, or can be devoted to, the type of representation you have in mind, such as attending charity balls and taking a guest—the variety of types of entertainment that do not formally fall within the categories of luncheons and dinners. They are permitted a 25 per cent leeway on the direct representation allowance for that type of entertainment.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** That is an improvement, I must say.

**Mr. Lambert:** I have two points which I hope to discuss very briefly. Mr. Nesbitt raised a question about the dissemination of Canadian news to our personnel in posts

abroad—not only to those in External Affairs but to trade commissioners as well. I have read the paper that you have submitted and I have noted some improvement, but I find some things rather questionable. One of them is the assertion that it would cost \$614 a year to send the *Globe and Mail* to one post in Europe. I do not know where they get that figure. Perhaps they want their own jet plane for it. I know that some Canadian newspapers noted for their bulk are shipped here in Canada by air mail at a cost of about \$80. Taking account of the difference in distance and so forth I just cannot understand this \$614. Perhaps we are working on different rates.

I was wondering whether efforts had been made to make an arrangement with the RCAF, which has scheduled runs twice and three times a week to the United Kingdom and to Europe, for the carriage of representative newspapers. They have them in their messes. If, in Europe, you want to get news and you go to one of our messes you will see the newspapers and periodicals. They buy them with their own mess funds, but they are able to do so.

Two years ago I was in the Tokyo embassy. I had been absent from Canada for six weeks. I was astounded to find that the latest newspapers they had I had read in Canada. This is nonsense, both for the staff and for the public.

I notice in your estimates that there is an increase for the purchase of publications. As a matter of fact, it is an increase from \$78,000 to \$102,000. This is on page 120 of the blue book. I hope this will cover the cost of the dissemination of Canadian newspapers to some of our more popular posts in Europe. It is one of the functions of our representation abroad to keep Canadians there posted on what is happening at home.

**The Chairman:** Are you referring to Item 12?

**Mr. Lambert:** It is on page 120, the fourteenth or fifteenth item. It is entitled "Purchase of Publications for Distribution".

**The Chairman:** Yes; it is under item 12.

**Mr. Williams:** Mr. Lambert, I believe there is an increase of \$24,000 for distribution of departmental publications.

**Mr. Lambert:** Consisting of what—ministerial speeches?

**Mr. Williams:** Tax sheets, annual reports, reports of the United Nations and other informational...

**Mr. Lambert:** In other words, it is really house literature?

**Mr. Williams:** We have copies of the types of...

**Mr. Lambert:** But you might call it house literature. I am thinking of the other. This is a point I have been raising for about four or five years.

Frankly I think a better effort could be made in this, particularly if one were to talk to the Department of National Defence. They have been able to carry other things overseas. Why can they not carry these?

The other subject I would like to raise, Mr. Chairman, is in connection with the recruitment of personnel. I was glad to get from Mr. Williams the figures on the bilingual capability of foreign service officers. I rather suspect that the same situation prevails in the recruitment of foreign service officers as in the case of trade commissioners: that no effort at all is made to recruit Canadians with a capability in a language other than French or English or both.

In other words, do you go out specifically to get people who can speak Chinese, or Russian, or Spanish as their mother tongues and who possibly are highly qualified university graduates, if that is the other requirement? Just what effort is made to do this, apart from taking people out of the steam of the department, sending them to the foreign language school here in Ottawa for a year or 18 months, posting them abroad for two years and then sending them off to another post where there is absolutely no requirement for that language?

I gather that the Trade Commissioner Service was rather taken aback by this and that they have indicated that they are certainly going to look into it. We intend to keep after them about it, because I think we are missing a good opportunity here.

May I have your comments?

**Mr. Williams:** Mr. Chairman, in reply to the hon. member may I say, first, that in the case of our foreign service officers we do not specifically recruit language specialists. I think this applies also to our external affairs officers. We are recruiting Canadians against a broader qualification, if I may put it that

way. If, by chance they have knowledge of a language other than English or French it is a dividend to us in that particular context.

The short answer to Mr. Lambert's question is that we do not specifically seek out candidates because of their language skill. We have in the service at the present time a limited number of officers with language facility. We have four Chinese-speaking officers; three who are competent in modern Arabic; four Russian-speaking officers; four Japanese-speaking officers and one Serbo-Croatian.

At the present time we have 70 officers studying languages other than those of Canada. However Mr. Lambert, we do not specifically recruit language officers. It is my opinion that as long as we recruit foreign service officers at the FSO 1 level against a common standard, and unless we can develop a broad need for language officers, we will continue to rely on the foreign service officers in the hope that of the proportion we take in there will be some who have a language facility, other than English and French, or who have an aptitude for the more difficult languages. Of the group of 60 young officers recruited this year there are a reasonable number with facility in languages other than English and French, but I think it is by chance and not by design.

**Mr. Lambert:** Personally I tend to feel that that policy is debateable, and I would certainly suggest to you that, having particular regard to the universities in Western Canada where there are, for instance, courses in Ukrainian, we could do better than we are now doing, and that an additional credit should be given to a man who offers a third language. You say that it may happen quite by chance. I do not think this is good enough. We could go out and find people who really have that additional talent.

I hope that someone will examine this proposal. The Department of Trade and Commerce is certainly going to have a good look at it, and I hope that you will too. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

**Mr. Haidasz:** As a supplementary question I would like to ask who provides the interpretation services in our overseas missions where our officers are not fluent in the particular foreign languages? How do they communicate?

**Mr. Williams:** On the staff of almost all missions overseas where there is a foreign

language element there is a translator-interpreter who, of course, is locally engaged. On the other hand, at a great many of our foreign language posts we have officers who can speak the language concerned.

**Mr. Haidasz:** How many of our foreign service officers in Prague, Warsaw, Budapest and Belgrade speak the language of the countries?

**Mr. Williams:** In Belgrade at the moment we have one Serbo-Croatian officer who speaks the language.

**Mr. Haidasz:** And in Warsaw?

**Mr. Williams:** I am not too sure whether we have one at the present time or not, Dr. Haidasz. We did have one, but I think he has just been transferred. In Moscow we have two.

**Mr. Haidasz:** Would you not be inclined to agree with Mr. Lambert that there is a need, then, also to recruit foreign service officers who are language specialists, or to have special courses and encourage foreign service officers to acquire a knowledge of foreign languages?

**Mr. Williams:** We are encouraging a large number of them to study.

**Mr. Haidasz:** How? What is the encouragement?

**Mr. Williams:** At the present time the incentive is that if they qualify through a civil service language course—

**Mr. Haidasz:** This is a third language?

**Mr. Williams:** There is a civil service competition for language study and if they qualify and are using that language every day they are entitled to an increment of, I believe, \$15.00 a month. For instance, I assume that our Croatian-speaking officer in Belgrade is in receipt of the foreign language allowance.

**Mr. Haidasz:** In the central and eastern European countries our consular officers who have to do the work which immigration officers do in other countries would, I presume, have a great need for knowledge of the particular language?

**Mr. Williams:** As an example, Dr. Haidasz, at the present time in our mission in Warsaw we have 11 members studying Polish, in Belgrade 6 of the staff members are actively studying the language, five members of the staff in Prague are studying Czech; and, as I

mentioned, there are 11 at the embassy in Warsaw and 11 at the embassy in Moscow.

**Mr. Haidasz:** In the case of these embassies has there been any effort to distribute literature in the language of the country?

**Mr. Williams:** Although I cannot speak with certainty, it is my recollection that in some of the eastern European countries we have circulated information in the local language.

**Mr. Haidasz:** From what I saw during a visit to our embassy in Warsaw both the ambassador's residence and the chancellery are very inadequate for the work that the personnel have to do. What has been done to try to improve their office facilities and the external and internal appearance of the building?

**Mr. Williams:** The chancellery in Warsaw has long outgrown its usefulness in terms of size. For some months we have been trying to obtain additional space. As you are probably more aware than I, the amount of available office space in Warsaw is limited, and to date we have not been able to get additional accommodation. However, we have been proceeding with our construction program in Warsaw and the final drawings for the new chancellery have been sent to the Polish housing authority for their final approval. We hope to start construction in the fall.

We have done quite a bit of refurbishing and repainting of the residence, and Mr. Berlis, our ambassador there, told us when he was here some weeks ago that in terms of its suitability for representation purposes the residence is now in quite reasonable condition.

**Mr. Haidasz:** I have one other question. It refers to our consular division. What is the present policy of the Department on certificates of identity?

**Mr. Williams:** Mr. Chairman, I will ask Mr. Gilmour, head of our consular division to reply to that question.

**Mr. E. H. Gilmour (Head, Consular Division, Department of External Affairs):** I have some difficulty in giving a comprehensive answer, Dr. Haidasz, because this is dealt with primarily by the passport office. As I have no doubt you are aware, the basic considerations are that certificates of identity will be granted to people permanently resident in Canada, who, for good reasons, either cannot, or feel

that they are unwilling to, obtain passports of nationality. The majority of those who cannot obtain such documents would obviously be stateless persons. Those who prefer not to might include, for example, Jews who had been persecuted in Germany and who, some years ago at any rate, were German nationals.

Within those broad categories there are all sorts of refinements, and to give a more detailed answer I am afraid I would have to consult my colleague, the head of the passport office.

**Mr. Haidasz:** I ask this question, Mr. Chairman, because I have received many representations from travel agents and from Canadian citizens who have married recent immigrants who possess landed immigrant status. They want to travel to the United States to visit relatives and they are told to go to the embassy of their country of origin to renew their passport. Many of these people have no desire to prolong their relationship with these foreign embassies; there is also a time limit involved; and there are consular fees. I have recently received appeals which I would like to bring to your attention and I hope that the department and the Minister will be able to review this entire matter.

**Mr. Stanbury:** Mr. Chairman, I wonder if the witness could tell us whether there are any established criteria for the establishment or maintenance of posts abroad? I assume that from time to time new posts are opened and I hope that if it is necessary, posts are closed from time to time. I am wondering whether any yardstick has been established for making these decisions?

**Mr. Williams:** Mr. Chairman, I can reply only in very general terms. If I may I will attempt to reply in an illustrative fashion and take the most recently announced mission in Bangkok. For some years the government of Thailand has been anxious that we should be represented in their country. Indeed, a few years ago they appointed an ambassador to Canada. We were not able to reciprocate, primarily because of staff shortages, and relations in the formal diplomatic sense between Canada and Thailand were handled through our High Commissioner's Office in Kuala Lumpur.

However, within the last year and a half the External Aid Office has strongly emphasized that interest in their aid program was growing in the area and that the number of

Canadians going into Thailand, either under aid program or because of general Canadian interest, required a resident mission.

The Department of Trade and Commerce—because we have inter-departmental consultation on an issue of this kind—indicated that in terms of Canadian trade it would be of value to have a mission, and from the point of view of broad political interest it was recognized that it would be desirable to establish a new mission in Bangkok.

It is this sort of consideration, Mr. Stanbury, that is part and parcel of a recommendation that is put to the Minister for his consideration.

One could almost argue that each post is different in the sense that in some areas the greater emphasis may be on what might be called political interest and in other cases it may be on trade or other government concern. I do not think the day will ever come when we will be represented in every country.

In Africa we are trying to do a large amount of multiple accreditation, and as Mr. Nesbitt brought out earlier, we still have multiple accreditation in Latin America. However, there are some countries where, for a variety of reasons, we will still have to have individual or separate missions.

**Mr. Stanbury:** You mentioned an embassy as an example. Is there not some yardstick that you use for the opening of consulates, for instance?

**Mr. Williams:** By and large our consulates are in the United States, Germany and France. As far as I think I would be correct in saying that trade considerations were the primary impetus for setting up our consulates in the United States. This was true of the consulates in Frankfurt and Hamburg in Germany. The consulates in Bordeaux and Marseilles in France arose from an extension of mutual interest in the development of relations with France. However, by and large, because a preponderance of our consulates are trade-oriented; the emphasis or the desire comes from the Department of Trade and Commerce.

**Mr. Stanbury:** Is there any process of examination of all posts to determine whether or not some of them might be abandoned?

**Mr. Williams:** Each year during our estimate preparations or program review period

we try to make a judgment of the usefulness of posts. I do not know whether the day would come when we would close a post.

**Mr. Stanbury:** You have not done it yet?

**Mr. Williams:** Not to my knowledge. It is a very difficult thing to do, other than possibly in the case of consulates, and it is a government decision in the case of a diplomatic mission. Whether the government of the day would want to take the action to close a mission, I do not know. According to our record—and it is very limited in terms of a large number of missions—we have not closed a post.

**Mr. Stanbury:** Are there any instances where we maintain missions in countries which do not maintain one in Canada? I am taking into consideration that a country may be represented here on a multiple basis. Is there complete reciprocation?

**Mr. Williams:** Generally it is complete reciprocation, I would want to check the list very carefully, but I think that there are probably resident missions here from countries where we are not represented.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** What about Taiwan?

**Mr. Williams:** We have no mission there, but they are here. I believe the same is true of Ecuador. I would think the answer is that there probably are some countries represented in Canada in which we are represented on a multiple accreditation basis.

**Mr. Stanbury:** To put it the other way, are there countries in which we maintain missions who do not maintain one here?

**Mr. Williams:** Yes; for example, Cyprus. We have a mission in Cyprus and it is represented in Canada through Washington.

**Mr. Stanbury:** Are there a number of such countries?

**Mr. Williams:** Tunisia comes to mind. We have a mission in Tunisia and to date Tunisia has been represented from Washington.

**Mr. Stanbury:** Are those the only ones.

**Mr. Williams:** I would suspect that there may be one or two others. I am just very quickly trying to go over the map.

**Mr. Stanbury:** There might be four or five altogether?

**Mr. Williams:** There might be.

**Mr. Brewin:** Chairman, I would like to pursue with Mr. Williams the subject that Mr. Stanbury raised. I have looked over the list. It seems to me peculiar that we are not more strongly represented in what I call Francophone Africa: I am glad to notice that we have a mission in Tunisia, but I see no mention of one in Morocco, Algeria; and there is one in Senegal. But there is a whole series of other Francophone countries.

It has often been represented to me that because we are officially a bilingual country there is a natural contact and affinity with these countries, most of which used to be part of the French empire, which now are probably looking for contacts in other parts of the world. Has consideration been given to this aspect of the matter?

**Mr. Williams:** Mr. Chairman, in the last three years we have had a program of expansion in Africa in terms of six missions. This program was started two years ago, and in a sense we are on the last lap. In that period we opened in Dakar; and we did also in Addis Ababa primarily on account of the representation in that area of a large number of African organizations which have offices there. In addition, we opened in Tunis last year. Therefore, there are six posts in what I call the African development program. We have one more North African country to do under the present program.

This does not necessarily mean that additional countries cannot be added to the program if the government wishes. However, speaking officially, we have concluded that we can only cope with the opening of two posts a year; that the demands made on the administration if we embark on more become, on the whole, pretty intolerable. Therefore, we have been trying to keep to two posts a year. By the time you staff them, make money available, provide all the infra-structure, and try to find staff accommodation, an office, a residence, etc., we think we can only do two a year adequately.

As I say, we are coming to the end of our expansion program in Africa, and we are going to re-examine the situation and make recommendations to the government on further missions.

**Mr. Brewin:** Then, the fact that many of these nations in Africa are French-speaking is taken into account?

**Mr. Williams:** Indeed it is, Mr. Brewin.

**Mr. Brewin:** I would now like to deal with another subject which may, or may not come within the purview of your particular knowledge, Mr. Williams. You have furnished us with various written documents including one entitled "Assessments, contributions," etc. I want to ask you about one or two items in this document. Looking at page 2, under "Miscellaneous Grants and Payments" there is a substantial item of \$3,500,000 for "Defence Support Assistance to Non-NATO Countries". I am interested in that. Could you tell me a little more about to whom it goes and what is the basis of those arrangements for defence support to non-NATO countries?

**Mr. Williams:** Mr. Chairman, I hope Mr. Brewin does not expect me to give a too detailed reply, because my knowledge does not extend that far. This vote is primarily designed to cover the military training programs that Canada has entered into with certain Commonwealth countries. For instance, in Ghana there are 21 Canadian Air Force personnel instructing in the Ghanaian services. At one time the Canadian officers were on the staff of the military training college and were also acting as advisers to various types of military formations.

We have a military training team in Tanzania and it is helping not only with the development of the army but also of the navy. We have brought Tanzanian cadets to Canada and put them into Canadian training colleges.

We had a modest program, restricted, I believe, exclusively to the navy, in Nigeria. A larger program in terms of dollars and personnel is the one in Malaysia. We have undertaken, I believe, to provide some Beaver aircraft. We have brought Malaysian pilots to Canada, and have also given them some assistance in terms of experts on the ground.

We have had a limited program of defence co-operation, if I might call it that, with two of the Caribbean countries in bringing cadets for training.

These are the dimensions of the program in non-NATO countries.

For instance, we gave to Tanzania, free of charge, four Caribou and eight Otter aircraft together with spares and some training and support equipment. I could go into a great deal of detail here.

**Mr. Brewin:** Is this done in co-ordination with the Department of National Defence?

**Mr. Williams:** Mr. Brewin, I believe that at one time the funds provided for this military co-operation were carried by the Department of National Defence, but two years ago there was a government decision to transfer this to the Department of External Affairs.

All of this program is worked out in collaboration and consultation with the Department of National Defence. There is a military assistance committee which is chaired by an official of the Department of External Affairs. It is a joint program and the funds happen to be carried in the estimates of the Department of External Affairs.

**Mr. Brewin:** I am quite interested in the next item: "Defence Support Assistance to Greece and Turkey". Perhaps this item previously appeared somewhere else. It appears under Vote No. 15, at page 132 of the estimates, in the amount of \$1 million, and as though it were a new item because there is no corresponding item for the year 1966-67. I take it that may be because it is being made separate and not because it is a new item. Is this correct?

**Mr. Williams:** Yes, it is a new item.

**Mr. Brewin:** I know this may be a matter of policy and perhaps it is unfair to ask you about it, but has any thought been given to whether Canada's support to Greece, under the present circumstances of the military takeover there, is a sound external policy for Canada? Has that been considered at all?

**Mr. Williams:** All I can say, Mr. Brewin, is that to my knowledge a program for neither of these countries has been worked out as yet.

**Mr. Brewin:** It has not been worked out?

**Mr. Williams:** It has not been worked out.

**Mr. Brewin:** You cannot tell us then whether political consideration has been given to whether circumstances now existing in Greece render it appropriate to extend defence support, which, I suppose, could mean military training and military supplies? You do not whether that—

**Mr. Williams:** I am afraid, Mr. Brewin, that I cannot offer any useful comment.

**Mr. Stanbury:** If I may ask a supplementary; is it not true Mr. Williams, that the only offer of help of this kind that has been made within the last year has been in connection

with a communications link between Turkey and Greece, which is part of the whole communications link from Pakistan to Europe? Although it is under the NATO arrangements, and might be described in some ways as a defence arrangement, that the only help under consideration at all is in the form of communications?

**Mr. Williams:** Yes, Mr. Stanbury, I think you are quite right. There has been a development of a microwave project, and I think this is the only active program in existence with respect to Greece and Turkey under the NATO vote.

**Mr. Stanbury:** I do not think even that has been settled.

**Mr. Brewin:** I do not know whether or not it is just by chance, but on the same page, in the last item under A World Food Program, it looks as though there is a blank. Would the figure there be the \$2,475,000 that appears at page 132?

**Mr. Williams:** Mr. Brewin, we are inclined to think that is a typographical error.

**Mr. Brewin:** I had guessed it was.

**Mr. Williams:** It is \$2,475,000.

**Mr. Brewin:** I have just one other question and perhaps your answer will enlighten me on the subject. On the next page, under "Commonwealth Organizations", there appears "Commonwealth Foundation" at a fixed amount of \$112,500. Could you inform me what a Commonwealth Foundation is and how that amount is fixed?

**Mr. Williams:** I hope to have more accurate information in a moment, Mr. Brewin, but I think this is the bringing together of the earlier Commonwealth education office and one or two other Commonwealth offices.

With the establishment of the Commonwealth Secretariat a year and a half ago it was decided to bring these semi-related offices together under a Commonwealth Foundation.

At the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' meeting in July of 1964, it was considered that further steps should be taken to promote contacts in other fields and that it would be desirable to establish a Commonwealth Foundation to administer a fund for increasing interchange between Commonwealth organizations in professional fields.

The Canadian approach to the foundation was that if the majority of Commonwealth members favoured its establishment Canada would be prepared to contribute financially, and Prime Minister Wilson advised that a majority of them had signified their willingness to contribute to the foundation. Our forecast of our 1966-67 contribution is the \$112,500.

**Mr. Haidasz:** Mr. Chairman, I would like to get some information about the grant to the Canadian-German Society of Hanover and whether there is a reciprocal arrangement.

**Mr. Williams:** Mr. Chairman, \$14,000 is the estimated expenditure for the fiscal year for the grant to the Canadian-German Society of Hanover. Last year it was \$13,500 and in 1965-66 it was \$5,400. It is proposed to continue this program of visits by German students during the summer of 1967 and for that a further grant of 50,000 Deutsch marks is required for the German-Canadian Society of Hanover, Germany. It is a joint venture and in 1966 it covered 50 German students who visited Canada under this program.

**Mr. Haidasz:** They only paid part of the expenses.

**Mr. Forrestall:** Mr. Williams, I am not at all pleased or happy that items of national defence are appearing in the estimates of the Department of External Affairs. On page 3 of the documents that you so kindly distributed to us there is an item (a) under the classification of "Assessments for Membership in International Organizations". Could you enlighten us a little on the third item—U.N. Emergency Force, 3.17 per cent (plus surcharge of 25 per cent), which amounts to \$729,000. This, coupled with the other two, sends the amount apparently pertaining directly to defence up to a figure in excess of \$5 million. Could you enlighten us about that? You touched on the previous two. Could you discuss this item and tell us what is its purpose and where it came from?

**Mr. Williams:** Mr. Chairman, with your permission I will ask Mr. Warren of our United Nations Division to reply to that question.

**Mr. G. I. Warren (United Nations Division):** Thank you. The assessment for the United Nations Emergency Force is worked out each year by the 5th Committee of the United Nations and then approved by the General Assembly.

The costs of the Canadian contingent in the Middle East were reimbursed by the United Nations. In the case of the United Nations force in Cyprus the costs of maintaining the Canadian contingent there appear in the estimates of the Department of National Defence.

In the case of United Nations Emergency Force our out-of-pocket expenses are reimbursed by the United Nations. Therefore this is just an assessment approved by the United Nations, and because we are a member of that body we just have to meet our assessment. This is a United Nations matter.

**Mr. Forrestall:** Apparently, then, this is not a new item.

**Mr. Warren:** No. I might add, of course, that this situation is changing. As we all know, the force has now been withdrawn.

When the General Assembly discusses this matter at the 22nd session in the fall there will be a supplementary estimate and eventually there will be a credit to the Canadian government once the force has been wound up and the final cost estimates approved.

**Mr. Forrestall:** This \$729,000, then, could conceivably go to support other forces contributing to that UN force?

**Mr. Warren:** Of course, it is impossible at the moment to say exactly what new arrangements there will be for a United Nations presence in the area. It is possible that in making the financial arrangements for the United Nations Emergency Force it will be recommended that this amount be used. Of course, before this could happen it would have to be approved by member states in the General Assembly.

**Mr. Forrestall:** But you have no idea how the specific funds might have been used?

**Mr. Warren:** Yes. Each country was assessed a certain amount and those amounts were used to reimburse the countries providing contingents. That would include the cost of the Canadian contingent.

**Mr. Forrestall:** You are doing very well sir, but I am not sure that I follow that. In effect, this \$729,000 is an item of expenditure to support Canadian armed forces.

**Mr. Warren:** Not only Canadian; plus others. The system is that the United Nations is reimbursing each country that supplies a contingent, whereas in the case of the force in

Cyprus our Department of National Defence absorbs the costs. It is reimbursed by the United Nations for a certain amount of the cost, but other costs are absorbed by the Department of National Defence without the United Nations coming into the picture.

**Mr. Brewin:** This figure, then, is just a charge to Canada. It is not the cost rate of the Canadian contribution?

**Mr. Warren:** No.

**Mr. Brewin:** Do we have other costs in connection with UNEF that are not repaid, or is this the total cost of the Canadian contribution reimbursed by the United Nations?

**Mr. Warren:** We are reimbursed by the United Nations for our out-of-pocket expenses; in other words, the expenses that are inherent in supporting our force outside of Canada. Canada does, of course, absorb the costs that would be necessary to maintain our contingent here in Canada.

**Mr. Forrestall:** We pay our own salaries and supply our own equipment?

**Mr. Warren:** That is correct. It is just out-of-pocket expenses that are reimbursed by the United Nations.

**Mr. Churchill:** What about the International Control Commission?

**Mr. Forrestall:** That is an interesting question. What procedure do we use, or what provisions are there, for the ICC?

**Mr. Warren:** I am afraid that my knowledge does not extend to the ICC.

**Mr. Forrestall:** I suppose that, not being a UN body, perhaps...

**Mr. Williams:** To reply to Mr. Churchill's question about the ICC, we pay the salary allowances of Canadian personnel in the three Indochina commissions.

**Mr. Churchill:** Where are the items in the estimates for all the other observation keeping centres scattered around the world?

**Mr. Warren:** The costs of the other observer missions are included in the regular budget of the United Nations. On page 3 under section 2(a) there is shown our United Nations Organization regular assessment. In section 16 of the United Nations regular budget these costs are included under different chapters.

**Mr. Forrestall:** This, of course, covers the area mentioned by Mr. Churchill.

My point is that there seem to be many dollars and cents spent on military matters appearing under another budget. If nobody else has a question I would move on to another area.

**Mr. Churchill:** It is 10 minutes to 12, Mr. Chairman.

**The Chairman:** Are there any further questions?

**Mr. Forrestall:** I have one or two, but there is one final one that perhaps Mr. Williams could deal with quickly and then perhaps we could break for lunch.

I am curious about the attrition rates in two categories of foreign service officers. I notice that there has been a tremendous number of promotions. Is my assumption correct that the Department has found this necessary in order to retain trained and skilled men? You have said several times this morning that the Department was having extreme difficulty in recruitment and that you are short-staffed. Can you give us a fairly blunt, frank explanation of why this is so? Are our officials abroad in the foreign service underpaid?

**Mr. Williams:** Mr. Chairman, to reply to the question one would almost in a sense, have to take various categories of employees, but if I may initially restrict myself to foreign service officers our rate of recruiting is adequate in terms of requirements. We had a fairly rapid expansion rate last year, and this year, for instance, in the recruiting of about 60 foreign service officers we had some 800 candidates apply. We feel that the number and the quality we are getting are satisfactory.

The attrition rate of our foreign service officers is very low. At one time we were rather concerned about it and we went to the then Civil Service Commission and expressed alarm. Of course, they naturally asked us what we estimated our attrition rate to be. We said it was about 3 per cent. They pointed out to us that for professional groups this is very low.

The rate of attrition in our stenographic grades is probably average for government departments.

The attrition rate in clerical grades is about average, although it may be slightly lower.

Communications, as I mentioned last year, are always a problem because one is looking

for a specialist type of person and there is a heavy demand in Canada for communicators in industry and in other government departments.

Basically, our demand for personnel results from expansion and increased responsibilities. I suspect that for some years to come we will be looking for a large number of foreign service officers.

**Mr. Forrestall:** The question was prompted, Mr. Chairman, by an item in the estimates at page 119, under "Administrative and Foreign Service", which shows that in the year 1966-67, for example, in the \$12,000—\$14,000 range there was provision for 90 officers. This year it is for 219 officers. Last year in the \$10,000—\$12,000 bracket there were 232 positions and this year there are only 35. This indicates, very obviously a program of promotion. Is this in order to stave off some...

**Mr. Williams:** I think this is entirely as a result of salary increases in the public service, Mr. Forrestall. We keep moving up with the wholesale salary increases. The bulge keeps moving up.

**Mr. Forrestall:** I see. Thank you very much.

**The Chairman:** It is close to 12 o'clock. Has the Committee finished with the evidence of these three gentlemen, or does it wish to call them back on Tuesday?

**Mr. Nesbitt:** I have a couple of questions which might be answered very briefly.

**Mr. Churchill:** Let us have another meeting. I also have some questions. It is 12 o'clock, and we have a meeting on defence this afternoon, and that is an interesting subject.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** Mr. Chairman, if I may there is one question I would like to ask this morning. I overlooked it in my list earlier. How are we progressing in the matter of the claims of Canadian citizens, formerly Polish citizens, with regard to property in Poland?

**Mr. Williams:** We are still discussing the question, Mr. Nesbitt. I believe we have completed our claims negotiations with Bulgaria. The rate of progress with the other eastern European countries has yet to be rapid.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** How long have they now been going on within Poland?

**Mr. Williams:** I am informed, Mr. Nesbitt that:

*Poland*

9. In the summer of 1965, an understanding was reached with the Polish Government whereby the latter agreed to enter into negotiations with us towards a lumpsum settlement of Canadian claims on the basis of principles similar to those applied in settlements which Poland has concluded with other countries. A public announcement was issued on September 1, 1965, inviting Canadians to submit their claims against Poland to the Department before January 1, 1966, subsequently extended to May 1, 1966. These

claims have been examined and it is anticipated that details of them will shortly be forwarded to the Polish authorities with a request for the opening of negotiations. It is our hope that talks will commence in the near future.

**Mr. Haidasz:** Mr. Chairman, what is the lump-sum that the Canadian government, on behalf of the Canadian claimants, asks for, and how many claims are there?

**Mr. Williams:** Dr. Haidasz, I am afraid I do not have that information.

**The Chairman:** Gentlemen, the meeting stands adjourned until Tuesday at 9.30 a.m.





OFFICIAL REPORT OF MINUTES  
OF  
PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

This edition contains the English deliberations and/or a translation into English of the French.

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Translated by the General Bureau for Translation, Secretary of State.

LÉON-J. RAYMOND,  
*The Clerk of the House.*

HOUSE OF COMMONS

Second Session—Twenty-seventh Parliament

1967

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STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

**EXTERNAL AFFAIRS**

*Chairman:* Mr. JEAN-EUDES DUBÉ

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MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 5

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TUESDAY, JUNE 27, 1967

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RESPECTING

Main Estimates 1967-68 of the Department  
of External Affairs

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WITNESSES:

Mr. M. Cadieux, Q.C., Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs; Mr.  
W. E. Bauer, Far Eastern Division, Department of External Affairs.

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.  
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY  
OTTAWA, 1967

1967

STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Chairman: Mr. Jean-Eudes Dubé

Vice-Chairman: Mr. W. B. Nesbitt

and

Mr. Allmand,	Mr. Forrestall,	Mr. Macquarrie,
Mr. Asselin	Mr. Goyer,	Mr. McIntosh,
(Charlevoix),	Mr. Harkness,	Mr. Pelletier,
<sup>1</sup> Mr. Basford,	Mr. Lambert,	Mr. Pilon,
Mr. Brewin,	Mr. Laprise,	Mr. Prud'homme,
Mr. Caron,	<sup>2</sup> Mr. Lind,	Mr. Stanbury,
Mr. Churchill,	<sup>3</sup> Mr. Macdonald	Mr. Thompson—(24).
Mr. Faulkner,	(Rosedale),	
Mr. Forest,		

(Quorum 13)

Fernand Despatie,  
Clerk of the Committee.

<sup>1</sup> Replaced Mr. Klein on June 26, 1967.

<sup>2</sup> Replaced Mr. Tremblay (*Matapédia-Matane*) on June 26, 1967.

<sup>3</sup> Replaced Mr. Haidasz on June 26, 1967.

WITNESSES:

Mr. M. Cadieux, Q.C., Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs; Mr. W. E. Bauer, Par Eastern Division, Department of External Affairs.

MINUTE BOOKS  
ORDER OF REFERENCE

MONDAY, June 26, 1967.

*Ordered*,—That the names of Messrs. Lind, Macdonald (*Rosedale*) and Basford be substituted for those of Messrs. Tremblay (*Matapédia-Matane*), Haidasz and Klein on the Standing Committee on External Affairs.

Attest.

Members present: Messrs. Allmand, Barlow, Bédard, Bouchard, Goyer, Lambert, Lind, Macdonald (*Rosedale*), Pilon, Staubury, Thompson (15).

LÉON-J. RAYMOND,  
*The Clerk of the House of Commons.*

Also present: Mr. Lewis, M.P.

In attendance: From the Department of External Affairs: Messrs. M. Cédieux, Q.C., Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs; M. M. Williams, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs; A. J. Matheson, Head of the Finance Division; E. H. Gilmour, Head of the Consular Division; W. K. Bauer, Far Eastern Division.

The Committee resumed consideration of Item 1 of the Main Estimates for 1967-68, relating to the Department of External Affairs.

The Chairman introduced Mr. Cédieux, who was questioned. The witness was assisted in answering questions by Mr. Bauer.

Item 1 was allowed to stand.

The Chairman called Item 10:

Construction, acquisition or improvement of Buildings, Works, Land, Equipment and Furnishings ..... \$ 2,351,900.

Item 10 was carried.

The Chairman then called Item 15:

Assessments, grants, contributions and other payments to International (including Commonwealth) Organizations and International Multilateral Economic and Special Aid Programs ..... \$29,437,700.

It was moved by Mr. Churchill, seconded by Mr. McIntosh,

—That Item 15 be reduced by the sum of three million dollars under the heading of "Defence support assistance to cover direct expenditures on behalf of countries not members of NATO".

The motion was allowed to stand until the Committee has heard the Secretary of State for External Affairs, at its next meeting.

At 10:50 a.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

Fernand Despatie,  
*Clerk of the Committee.*



## MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

TUESDAY, June 27, 1967.

(6)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs met at 9.40 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Dubé, presided.

*Members present:* Messrs. Allmand, Basford, Brewin, Churchill, Dubé, Goyer, Lambert, Lind, Macdonald (*Rosedale*), Macquarrie, McIntosh, Pelletier, Pilon, Stanbury, Thompson (15).

*Also present:* Mr. Lewis, M.P.

*In attendance: From the Department of External Affairs:* Messrs. M. Cadieux, Q.C., Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs; B. M. Williams, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs; A. J. Matheson, Head of the Finance Division; E. H. Gilmour, Head of the Consular Division; W. E. Bauer, Far Eastern Division.

The Committee resumed consideration of Item 1 of the Main Estimates for 1967-68, relating to the Department of External Affairs.

The Chairman introduced Mr. Cadieux, who was questioned. The witness was assisted in answering questions by Mr. Bauer.

Item 1 was allowed to stand.

The Chairman called Item 10:

Construction, acquisition or improvement of Buildings, Works,  
Land, Equipment and Furnishings ..... \$ 5,085,000.

Item 10 was carried.

The Chairman then called Item 15:

Assessments, grants, contributions and other payments to  
International (including Commonwealth) Organizations  
and International Multilateral Economic and Special Aid  
Programs ..... \$34,437,700.

It was moved by Mr. Churchill, seconded by Mr. McIntosh,

—That Item 15 be reduced by the sum of three million dollars under the heading of "Defence support assistance to cover direct expenditures on behalf of countries not members of NATO".

The motion was allowed to stand until the Committee has heard the Secretary of State for External Affairs, at its next meeting.

At 10.50 a.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

Fernand Despatie,  
Clerk of the Committee.



## EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic apparatus)

Tuesday, June 27, 1967.

**The Chairman:** Order, please. Gentlemen, I see a quorum.

Last Thursday we heard the evidence of Mr. B. M. Williams, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs as the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Cadieux, was in Montreal attending the Joint Canada-United States Ministerial Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs. Mr. Cadieux is with us today and if you have any questions to ask him please feel free to do so.

**Mr. Lambert:** Mr. Chairman, I wonder if Mr. Cadieux could explain the precise nature of the increase in Canadian food aid to the Middle East which was announced yesterday. Are the funds for this to come before the House in the form of a supplementary estimate or is this a speeded-up allocation of the general item included in the estimates to provide food assistance?

**Mr. M. Cadieux (Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs):** My understanding is that it will come before the House as a supplementary estimate.

**Mr. Lambert:** And is the total amount for this food assistance \$1.3 million?

**Mr. Cadieux:** Yes; \$1 million is allocated for food aid, the estimated transportation costs have been raised to \$225,000 and \$80,000 is earmarked for the Red Cross, which totals approximately \$1.3 million in additional funds.

**Mr. Lambert:** When is it anticipated that this food will be made available? Is it to follow the usual distribution process or is it a speeded up allocation of food with a priority on delivery?

**Mr. Cadieux:** I understand that there is a co-operative effort being made by the United Nations' organizations responsible for distributing this food to do this as quickly as possible.

**Mr. Lambert:** Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

**Mr. Lind:** I have a supplementary question, Mr. Chairman, with regard to this food aid. As we have an extreme surplus of eggs in this country, could some of our surplus eggs be used in Foreign aid?

**Mr. Cadieux:** I am not sure I understand your question.

**Mr. Lind:** What types of food do we usually send to them? I was wondering if there was any chance of including eggs in these shipments as we have a surplus in Canada at the present time?

**Mr. Cadieux:** I am not in a position at this time to indicate whether this would be a possibility. The first task is to find out what their requirements are and then we look into the availability of the item here in Canada. If, as you have indicated, eggs are surplus, then there might be a possibility of including them, but it will depend, essentially, on the requirements.

**Mr. Lind:** Thank you very much, Mr. Cadieux.

**Mr. Brewin:** I did ask Mr. Williams this question and he was able to give us some information, but perhaps, you could give us a more detailed explanation. Under Miscellaneous Grants and Payments there is an item of \$1 million for Defence Support Assistance to Greece and Turkey. I understood Mr. Williams to say that the money had not yet been advanced. I wonder whether, in view of present circumstances, it is being reconsidered?

**Mr. Cadieux:** My understanding is that the offer still stands and that negotiations are continuing with these two countries to find out how the money could be used.

**Mr. Brewin:** Is it not yet known what form this \$1 million will take?

**Mr. Cadieux:** Yes, the offer is related to a communications project between these two countries and this is what is being discussed with them. Until the negotiations have been finalized, the money cannot be advanced. The money is still unspent.

**Mr. Brewin:** I understood that due to conditions in Cyprus, communications between Greece and Turkey were not in the best of shape. Do you know if the grant is being held up for this reason?

**Mr. Cadieux:** No; I think that in this area the two countries are facing a similar problem in relation to a potential threat. I understand that in this area there is co-operation between the two countries and that the prospect of developing the project assisted by Canadian financing, is keen. The offer still remains open.

**Mr. Brewin:** Is this military communications?

**Mr. Cadieux:** This is my understanding. It is a microwave system that would help, I think, in this military field.

**Mr. Lewis:** A early warning system to each other.

**Mr. Cadieux:** Both countries have one thing in common, in this area, and we believe it may be possible to reach an agreement with both of them.

**Mr. Brewin:** As I understand it, the present government which took over in Greece is a military government—a military dictatorship. Has this caused the Canadian government to reconsider their offer at this particular time?

**Mr. Cadieux:** Not as far as I am aware.

**Mr. McIntosh:** Mr. Chairman, I do not know whether or not I can make myself heard. My question relates to Mr. Lambert's earlier question regarding food and aid grants. Last year under the International Food Aid Program \$100 million was allocated, but this year the amount has been reduced to \$75 million. What is the reason for the reduction?

**Mr. Cadieux:** I am afraid this is not within our field. Is this not related to External Aid operations?

**Mr. McIntosh:** It comes under International Food Aid Programs, though.

**Mr. Cadieux:** It is External Aid.

**Mr. McIntosh:** Yes, but you cannot answer my question?

**The Chairman:** Mr. McIntosh, the two items under External Aid have already been passed.

**Mr. McIntosh:** Yes, but I raised this point as a supplementary to Mr. Lambert's question.

**Mr. Cadieux:** I think Mr. Strong of the External Aid Office would be better qualified than I to deal with that question.

● (9:50 a.m.)

**Mr. Lambert:** I will move on to another field. I do not know whether this is a matter of policy, Mr. Cadieux, and if so, I will respect your position. Are there outstanding claims with the Government of Canada for persons who suffered war losses during World War II? I am thinking of nationals of European countries who were expelled from their homes by the German authorities. We know there have been settlements made in favour of persons in a similar position who are now residing in other countries. I realize this has always been a very difficult problem, and I recall it being raised from year to year. What is the position with regard to these outstanding claims for war damages by so many residents of Canada?

**Mr. Cadieux:** As you indicated, there are many aspects to this question. In the first place, there are the claims of those who suffered war damages and in some cases I think these have been compensated under very special arrangements made by Canada. There are also those who have claims for assets that were nationalized by certain other countries. Then there are the claims of those who were displaced as a result of changes in certain areas, particularly some people in Yugoslavia. I do not know which specific category you have in mind, as the answer is not the same in each case.

**Mr. Lambert:** I have no particular category in mind, just the general problem of claims arising out of war damages from whatever source they may have come. From time to time I have seen reports of these claims being made and we, as Members of Parliament, receive representations from various groups asking for the assistance of the Canadian government in pressing these claims for some sort of settlement with the West German government. What is the Canadian government's attitude towards helping these people establish these claims and negotiating some form of general settlement with the German authorities?

**Mr. Cadieux:** In answering your question, I will deal with each country individually.

In the case of Poland, there is an agreement in principle and there have been advertisements, I think in the *Montreal Gazette*

and other newspapers, inviting Canadian claimants to document their claims. When this is in hand, negotiations will be undertaken with Poland

In the case of Hungary, I think we are beyond this stage and negotiations are now in process to determine the amount that will be made available, but agreements have yet to be reached with the Government of Hungary. When the amount is known, then there will be a third stage which will involve the allocation of the proceeds between the various claimants.

In the case of Roumania—I am reading from notes—on May 9 the Secretary of State for External Affairs tabled an exchange of letters which indicated that negotiations are to be undertaken at an early date and we have invited claimants to submit their claims to the department before September 15th.

With regard to Czechoslovakia, the position is different in that we are only at the preliminary stage of discussing the possibility of an agreement on negotiations of claims.

**Mr. Lambert:** Is there no general fund at present of sequestered enemy assets that would be available for allocation?

**Mr. Cadieux:** There are some, but these funds are held by the Custodian in Canada as they belong to the state with which we are negotiating. Generally, this is one of the elements in the negotiation. The other government wants to obtain the release of these assets to its nationals to be applied against Canadian claims which are to be satisfied out of assets that are to be made available by the other country.

**Mr. Lambert:** Are you in a position to assess the speed with which the general negotiations for these claims may be completed?

**Mr. Cadieux:** No, I am not in a position to make a fair guess. All I can indicate is that if we are to judge by the experience of other countries as well as our own past experience, these negotiations will take considerable time.

**Mr. Lambert:** I am concerned that it will only be the children of the children of the claimants who may benefit by any settlement. Then it becomes a mere pecuniary bonus to the eventual recipients and those people who suffered the damage will not be able to get their proper compensation. I am sure there are a vast number of people who came to this country from displaced persons' camps and

what have you, and who have had to struggle very strenuously to establish themselves here in Canada. Anything they could recover at this time would go a long way towards making their position a lot easier.

**Mr. Cadieux:** I can assure you that the Department is very conscious of the need to proceed quickly with this and we are making our best efforts to advance the negotiations. However, this is a bilateral process and we have to go along with the other governments. This is something, so far as I am concerned, which is raised on each occasion when these people come here or when we have an opportunity to speak to them. It is pointed out to them that the settlement of these claims will be an important element in the improvement of relations between the two countries. Reference is made to the fact that there are a number of Canadians who have a direct interest in a settlement and until such time as these people obtain some kind of satisfaction there is no doubt that this is on the negative side of any effort that is made to improve relations with these countries. This is not something that can be determined unilaterally by departmental action. The solution depends on the prospect of settlement with each country.

A factor that is sometimes relevant, I think, in that the amount, in the case of Canada, may not always be very large. These countries that are negotiating with us sometimes have outstanding claims from other areas that are far more important to them and I suspect that the kind of settlement they may be prepared to make with us has to be related to the more important claims that may be outstanding with them from other countries, which explains why they proceed a little more cautiously than we would like to see them do.

(Translation)

**The Chairman:** Mr. Pelletier.

**Mr. Pelletier:** May I ask a supplementary question, Mr. Chairman? Does the Department obtain satisfactory cooperation from the other end as to the identification of these claims when complications arise? I ask that question because a number of members have had visits from certain people in this regard. We try to enlighten them as best we can, but I have often wondered whether you obtain sufficient cooperation from the other end to identify these claims or whether you are working in total confusion?

**Mr. Cadieux:** I believe that the degree of cooperation depends on the state of the negotiations and on the results obtained. If we agree on the general principles and on the manner of proceeding generally, things will be settled more quickly. Otherwise, the other party will feel that the information given constitutes an element in the negotiations. These negotiations are pretty difficult, because in certain cases the amounts involved are considerable. There are principles involved here. I believe that in certain cases, for these claims to be approved by the Canadian Government the claimant must have been a Canadian national when his property was sequestered or nationalized. In other words, the time of the claimant having obtained his citizenship constitutes an important element. Some claims cannot be supported because the claimant was then a national of the country concerned. In such a case, according to international law, he comes under the legislation of his own country. We must therefore determine precisely what claims can and what claims cannot be endorsed.

There are also problems of estimation when somebody claims for the value of a property. What date is to be used to determine the value of the goods seized? If we use a remote date, the estimate is lower. These factors must all be taken into consideration when negotiating. There is sometimes another factor. What will be the mode of payment? Will he be paid in local currency or will he be paid in international currency? You will realize that there are a great many difficulties, but there has been some progress. In fact, I think that in the last two years there has been considerable progress in our relations with each of these countries. Negotiations are under way in some cases, but for many years, no dialogue was possible on these questions.

*(English)*

**Mr. MacQuarrie:** Mr. Chairman, I have a brief comment and inquiry about a matter in the appended document dealing with the exercise of franchise by overseas personnel. I recall this question being discussed quite often in the Committee on Privileges and Elections. I assume that the department is more or less resting its case on the development, hopefully, of a system of absentee balloting whereby not only military and public servants but all Canadians abroad might exercise their franchise. If that is the case, I commend them for it, because I hope this is

the system we will be able to evolve. I was impressed that the Department had discovered that the Representation Commissioner was preparing a report for a certain date. I am delighted that they found that out because it was something I had not known, and I am surprised that this is now the work of the Representation Commissioner rather than the Chief Electoral Officer. My main comment is to elicit the information that you are no longer exercising yourself about draft regulations for your own people, but resting your case with the absentee franchise.

**Mr. Cadieux:** That seems to be the position.

**Mr. MacQuarrie:** Yes.

**Mr. McIntosh:** In relation to the compensation offered by Poland, in particular to residents of Poland prior to the war and now residing in Canada, claims were submitted as early as two or three years ago. Have any of those claims ever been settled?

● (10:00 a.m.)

**Mr. Cadieux:** In regard to Poland, not yet—at least not to my knowledge.

**Mr. Basford:** When last I had occasion to check into your contribution to the International Committee of the Red Cross, I found that those people wishing for humanitarian reasons to make contributions to civilian casualties of the situation in Viet Nam were unable to make such contributions through the International Committee of the Red Cross because this Committee was not receiving the co-operation of the North Viet Nam Red Cross in the administration of the funds. Do you know if that situation has changed?

**Mr. Cadieux:** No, not to my knowledge. However, Mr. Bauer, who is an expert on far eastern problems, is present and perhaps I could ask him if the impression I have is correct, that there has been no change.

**Mr. W. E. Bauer (Far Eastern Division, Department of External Affairs):** As far as exercising control over the use of the funds, I think that this is still the case, but I think we would have to check on this. I believe the International Committee of the Red Cross does provide funds in both Viet Nams for these purposes. The only difference is that it has teams in the South that can oversee the use that the funds are put to and in the North this has not been possible. I think that is the situation.

**Mr. Cadieux:** In fact, the President of the International Committee was here not so long

ago and I think that was the information he had then.

**The Chairman:** Mr. Allmand, you are next.

**Mr. Basford:** I have another question on a different subject, the contribution for the redevelopment of the Campobello International Park Commission. What, if any, discussions have been held over the last year with the United States with regard to exploring the possibility of turning Point Roberts in the State of Washington into an international park?

**Mr. Cadieux:** I am not aware that there have been discussions on this lately.

**Mr. Basford:** Could I ask how one could get any discussions going?

**Mr. Cadieux:** I do not think it would be proper for me, as a civil servant, to give advice to members of Parliament on pressing a point like this. I am sure you would know what to do.

**Mr. Basford:** Thank you.

**The Chairman:** Are there other questions?

**Mr. Churchill:** Where is the item for the International Control Commission in Viet Nam?

**Mr. Cadieux:** It is under Vote 1, pages 120 and 121.

**Mr. Churchill:** Why is this not shown separately? On page 133 you show other International Commissions and Organizations separately, with the exact amounts spent on them. What is the exact amount for the International Control Commission?

**Mr. Cadieux:** It is \$539,000, and the reason this is dealt with separately is that this is a separate international operation while the other ones on page 133 are grants and contributions.

**Mr. Churchill:** One on page 133 is listed Laos International Commission. This has no connection with the ICC then?

**Mr. Cadieux:** It is a contribution whereas, in the other case, these are actual operations in which Canadian personnel are involved. In Laos we are contributing 1 per cent of the total cost of the Commission.

**Mr. Churchill:** Coming back to the ICC, when you show the details of the positions, does that include the military personnel or just the people from External Affairs?

**Mr. Cadieux:** This is just External Affairs.

**Mr. Churchill:** Do you know offhand how many from the Department of National Defence are in there?

**Mr. Cadieux:** Yes, there are 64 in Indochina.

**Mr. Churchill:** Does National Defence pay the expenses of those 64, or is that included in the \$539,000?

**Mr. Cadieux:** No, they are paid separately; it is not included in this amount.

**Mr. Churchill:** How then can we find out the total cost of the International Control Commission?

**Mr. Cadieux:** I suppose by adding this to the amount that we could obtain from National Defence as to their expenditures. I have some figures here which indicate the total cost, including National Defence; for the year 1965-66 the amount is \$1,179,946, which is the total in respect of civilian and National Defence personnel. The year before it was less, \$1,077,000.

**Mr. Churchill:** It is going up and they are doing less work.

**Mr. Cadieux:** It is about \$100,000 more. I think this could be explained by the fact that salaries have gone up during the year, and a certain number of administration costs have also gone up.

**Mr. Churchill:** But at the same time their activities are even more circumscribed than they were a year ago. For example, you have 30 civilian personnel listed for 1967-68 and I would like to know where they are located. Are they living in Saigon?

**Mr. Cadieux:** Saigon and Hanoi.

**Mr. Churchill:** How many are there in Hanoi?

**Mr. Cadieux:** I think there are four, but these are not civilians exclusively; I think there are four military personnel and two civilian personnel in Hanoi. On the civilian side, the rest are mainly in Saigon, but the military have some people on a few teams in the South.

**Mr. Churchill:** What type of work would be done by the civilian personnel?

**Mr. Cadieux:** The civilian personnel is composed mainly of the supporting staff, those who look after the files and arrange for the transmission of communications, and you also have the accountants. There are also a few officers who are more involved with the

political work of dealing with the issues that come before the Commission. These officers also maintain contact with the South Vietnamese authorities and, when they go to Hanoi, their tasks with the North Vietnamese authorities, are essentially of a political nature.

**Mr. Churchill:** In addition to the Canadian personnel, there would be employees drawn from the local population.

**Mr. Cadieux:** I am not sure. The Commission itself would recruit local staff, but since the Indians administer the Commission I think they would recruit people on the local market. These would not be recruited directly by Canada.

**Mr. Churchill:** Who from this International Control Commission reports directly to External Affairs?

**Mr. Cadieux:** The three Commissioners we have in Indochina and, in particular, the Commissioner in Viet Nam reports to the Department.

**Mr. Churchill:** What is the name of the Commissioner?

**Mr. Cadieux:** The name of the Commissioner now is Mr. Ormond Dier.

**Mr. Churchill:** Is he the Foreign Service Officer 9 shown on page 120?

**Mr. Cadieux:** He is the senior officer there. The positions are pooled in our service and it may well be that this Foreign Service Officer 9 may not necessarily be occupied by Mr. Dier as the incumbent. The Civil Service Commission allows us a certain flexibility. It does not mean that Mr. Dier has to be a Foreign Service Officer 9. He is posted there because in the opinion of the Government he is a suitably qualified man for the job. In some cases he could be a Foreign Service Officer 8 or 10, but it would not be a higher grade of position than those positions held by people doing corresponding jobs.

**Mr. Churchill:** Does he report directly to External Affairs?

**Mr. Cadieux:** Yes, sir. He is responsible to the Minister.

**Mr. Churchill:** Are you dependent on the reports of the Commission? Where do those reports go?

**Mr. Cadieux:** The reports of the Commission are sent to the Co-Chairmen. There are not too many, but when they are made they are sometimes published. These are thick

documents that have been made at intervals since the Commission has been set up. The Commissioner himself reports on a confidential basis to the Secretary of State for External Affairs on a day-to-day basis and receives instructions from him on the same basis.

**Mr. Churchill:** Have any Commission reports recently been made public?

**Mr. Cadieux:** Perhaps Mr. Bauer could answer your question.

**Mr. Bauer:** I think the last Viet Nam Commission report was in the spring of 1965, which concerned the withdrawal of teams from North Viet Nam. Just prior to that there had been one on the bombing of North Viet Nam. Concerning the other two Commissions, the Cambodian Commission just approved its thirteenth interim report on its activities. Its twelfth interim report will be published by the Co-Chairmen within the next two weeks. In Laos, the last Commission report, which was transmitted to the Co-Chairmen, was released to the public in, I think, August, and prior to that there had been one in December of 1965. There are no regular reports; they are submitted by the Commissions to the Co-Chairmen as issues arise which these three delegations feel should be reported.

● (10:15 a.m.)

**Mr. Churchill:** Am I correct in saying that the last report from the Commission in Viet Nam was two years ago?

**Mr. Bauer:** That is correct, sir.

**Mr. Churchill:** What do they find to do then? Do they not even send in a report that there is nothing doing, that they have not made any visitations and so on?

**Mr. Cadieux:** They meet, as required, at the call of the Chairman to consider sometimes the complaints from the North on violations of the agreement. They discuss these things and sometimes the discussion is quite protracted—it may take weeks—but they keep in touch with governments; they keep them up to date on the process of the deliberation.

**Mr. Churchill:** But with a war going on, which has escalated during the last two years, it is not rather astonishing that there has been no report in over two years?

**Mr. Cadieux:** Well, sir, I think we are getting into problems of policy as to whether it is advisable—

**Mr. Churchill:** I agree, but the fact is that there have been no reports for two years.

**Mr. Cadieux:** No reports to the Co-Chairmen, but the three delegations report to the government every day.

**Mr. Churchill:** Yes, but no reports to the Chairman means that the Commission is not functioning.

**Mr. Cadieux:** Well, that is a matter of judgment. We think these people are exchanging views and negotiating about the issues that have been brought before the Commission by the parties to the agreement and whether this constitutes a satisfactory discharge of its mandate, or whether it should do more, is a matter of judgment.

**Mr. Churchill:** We are spending over a million dollars and not getting any reports.

**Mr. Cadieux:** Not public reports—to the Co-Chairmen.

*(Translation)*

**Mr. Goyer:** I have a supplementary question, Mr. Chairman. If there were any possibility of negotiation between the belligerents in Viet Nam, would the commission have the staff and all the facilities in situ to answer the needs?

**Mr. Cadieux:** Already there is a nucleus in situ. It would probably be easier to expand the facilities of the Commission from the nucleus already there. The Americans and the North and South Vietnamese have indicated many times that the existence of the Commission, such as it is, is useful to them. The governments involved also have indicated the possible roles they want the Commission to play.

The Indians, Poles and Canadians must decide this matter, then, on policy grounds. They must decide whether they can continue to carry out the Commission's work under present conditions or whether the Commission must be expanded. If negotiations appear possible, taking into account the influence of the Commission on possible negotiations, the parties conceivably could come to an agreement because there is there an organization which could verify the decisions which might conceivably be taken.

However, I hasten to add that whether you get enough for the money you spend now or in the future is a matter of political judgment. At this moment I can refer only to the

statements that have been made on behalf of the government by the Secretary of State for External Affairs.

*(English)*

**Mr. Lewis:** May I ask a supplementary question. I do not suppose we have any regular embassy or other mission either in South Viet Nam or in North Viet Nam?

**Mr. Cadieux:** No.

**Mr. Lewis:** I suppose it would not be unfair to suggest that the personnel connected with the ICC is used by the Minister as the source of reporting similar to what would be the case if you had a regular mission.

**Mr. Cadieux:** This is the case. The delegation on the Commission is in touch, because of the nature of its duties, with the authorities in South Viet Nam and North Viet Nam and in this respect it operates very largely as a normal diplomatic mission would operate—that is, reporting on contacts, passing on information, and discussing with authorities any problems that may arise in the course of our relations.

**Mr. Brewin:** Apropos of this reporting there were some statements made by people in the press elsewhere that some of the reporting was made by members of our Commission to the American officials and I believe this was denied by the Prime Minister. Can you assure us that this is not the situation?

**Mr. Cadieux:** I am not in a position to add anything to what the Minister and the Prime Minister have said on this subject.

**Mr. Churchill:** I think this is a fair example of a waste of money and a waste of valuable effort. We have 94 Canadians, drawn from the Department of External Affairs and the Department of National Defence, in Viet Nam at a cost of over a million dollars a year, and without official reports from the International Control Commission for nearly two years it seems to me that this is a real waste of effort. Would it not be better to cut that representation down to about one quarter of its present size and wait for developments? I will ask that question of the Secretary of State for External Affairs because I realize that the deputy cannot answer that question.

I have another question. When we mention the International Control Commission people always talk about its operation in North Viet Nam, South Viet Nam, Cambodia and Laos,

but you have a Laos International Commission, shown on page 133, at a cost of \$35,000. Is this separate and apart from the International Control Commission?

**Mr. Cadieux:** Yes, that is a straight contribution to the cost of its operation.

**Mr. Churchill:** Who comprises that international commission in Laos?

**Mr. Cadieux:** The same countries: Poland, India and Canada.

**Mr. Churchill:** But it is quite separate from the Viet Nam one?

**Mr. Cadieux:** Yes, sir; it is a separate Commission. And the same is true in Cambodia. We have three Commissions in the three countries but the largest one is the one in Viet Nam.

**Mr. Churchill:** Where is the cost of the Cambodia one shown?

**Mr. Cadieux:** The estimates show the total cost for all of them on page 133.

**Mr. Churchill:** There is no item for Cambodia there.

**Mr. Cadieux:** Under an agreement that was made, I think in 1962 as a result of the Geneva Conference, an appointment of expenses in respect of the Laotian Commission was made between the number of countries and as Canada was part of that agreement we subscribed to it in the amount indicated for Laos.

Viet Nam and Cambodia, for accounting purposes, are together and the costs are indicated together.

**Mr. Churchill:** Mr. Chairman, my next question is in respect to what is set out at the bottom of page 132.

Last meeting we were discussing "Defence support assistance to cover direct expenditures on behalf of countries not members of NATO—\$3,500,000." As I have forgotten exactly the answers that were given to questions posed on that occasion, could we again have the countries who are getting assistance from that \$3½ million.

**Mr. Cadieux:** Yes. First, there is Malaysia in the amount of \$440,000, which is to cover officer cadet training and air training in Canada. The next item of \$2,560,000 is for assistance to Tanzania.

**Mr. Churchill:** What is the nature of that assistance?

**Mr. Cadieux:** It is to assist in setting up a military academy by providing an advisory and training team. There is also provision for some training in Canada of military personnel from Tanzania. There is also an advisory and training team for air training. The previous advisory and training team was for army. So there are two advisory and training teams, one for army training and another for air training. As I said, there is air training in Canada, with provision to cover the transportation of aircraft spares and ground support equipment. I do not have the detailed breakdown but the total amount for this is roughly \$2½ million, as I indicated.

Then there is an amount of \$200,000 for assistance to Ghana. There is a small training team in Ghana and I understand there is also provisions for some ad hoc training here in Canada of military personnel from Ghana.

Finally, there is a \$300,000 item to provide for ad hoc training assistance in Canada on the year-to-year basis to personnel coming from a number of countries. For instance, during the year 1966 there were 13 members of the Jamaican defence force brought to Canada. An additional amount has been provided at a cost of \$13,000 and an additional amount of \$11,000 has been estimated for the years 1967-68.

Two officer cadets from Zambia were brought to Canada in 1966 and provision has been made in the 1967-68 estimates for \$17,000 to train eight additional officer cadets from Zambia. Ten naval apprentices from Nigeria were trained in Canada during the year 1966. To repeat, \$440,000, for Malaysia; \$2,560,000 for Tanzania; \$200,000 for Ghana, and \$300,000 for a number of countries such as Jamaica, Zambia and Nigeria last year.

**Mr. Churchill:** When did we start sending aid to Tanzania?

**Mr. Cadieux:** In 1964-65.

**Mr. Churchill:** And has it been at about the same figure or is it increasing?

**Mr. Cadieux:** I think it has increased.

At the beginning it was a rather modest figure, but when equipment becomes involved the expenses rose. For instance, this year it is in the \$2 million category.

In the case of Tanzania, in 1965-66 the total for the Army was \$400,000, and for the Air Force program, \$2½ million. In 1966-67 it will be somewhat higher: \$4½ million for the Air

Force program and \$3 million for the Army program.

**Mr. Churchill:** As these are rather large sums to be spending on Tanzania, could the Deputy Minister inform us of the purpose for making this arrangement? Is there some reciprocal arrangement between Tanzania and Canada?

**Mr. Cadieux:** An agreement was entered into some years ago, and I think it was for a five-year program. I think the idea was to provide the elements of training the Army sufficiently to help maintain internal order, and a very modest airlift largely for the same purpose. I think you will remember no doubt that some years ago there was a coup there and the stability of the regime was in question. The feeling, on the part of the Tanzanian authorities, was that it would help them to maintain internal stability if it were possible for them to have at their disposal a small army unit well trained and a certain airlift capacity. This is the proposal that was considered by our Government, eventually it was approved and the provision was made for this gradual program of training. I think the program called for the establishment of a cadet school there, for the training of some air personnel here, and eventually the forces were trained with the provision of some equipment.

**Mr. Churchill:** Is it Tanzania that has broken off diplomatic relations with Great Britain because of the dispute over Rhodesia.

**Mr. Cadieux:** That is right.

**Mr. Churchill:** Tanzania is not favourably disposed toward Rhodesia. Perhaps I will ask another question.

**Mr. Brewin:** May I ask a supplementary. Is the Chinese Peoples Republic maintaining any military missions in Tanzania or was this so at one time?

**Mr. Cadieux:** I think this is still the case. My impression is that they have diplomatic relations with Tanzania, that they have a team there that provides some training but I think it is more on the militia side.

**Mr. Brewin:** They do not co-operate with the Canadians?

**Mr. Cadieux:** Not to my knowledge.

**Mr. Thompson:** They train the guerillas.

**Mr. Churchill:** I am going to ask you a question about an article appearing in the

Toronto Star on June 22, 1967, that speaks about a 'forgotten war' in Portuguese-Mozambique, which adjoins Tanzania, and the Portuguese forces are fighting and have been for some time certain rebels within their country who are alleged to be getting support from Tanzania and from Zambia. What information does your Department have with regard to that; and is some of our Canadian military assistance to Tanzania being funnelled into this strife.

**The Chairman:** Mr. Churchill, I do not wish to interfere with your question nor to unduly restrict you but I think you are getting very close to a question of policy. Perhaps these questions would be better asked of the Minister himself rather than the Deputy Minister. Mr. Cadieux is here this morning to give evidence and to answer questions on administration.

**Mr. Churchill:** He has been very good. We are getting the evidence about an unusual expenditure of Canadian money in areas where it seems to me there is not sufficient supervision over how this money is being used or the purpose behind it. I think perhaps I am satisfied with the evidence we have had up to date and when the Minister arrives perhaps we will see if he knows anything about it. In the interval his staff might brief him on this.

**The Chairman:** Are there any other questions?

**Mr. McIntosh:** Are military personnel on these Commissions seconded to External Affairs or are they paid by the Department of National Defence?

**Mr. Cadieux:** No, they are paid by the Department of National Defence. They remain with their own Department.

**Mr. McIntosh:** Then what is in these estimates is all for civilians.

**Mr. Cadieux:** Yes, for civilians.

**Mr. Allmand:** I notice at the bottom of page 133, we have an item for the Permanent Court of Arbitration. I do not see any entry for the International Court of Justice.

**Mr. Cadieux:** My immediate reaction is that the International Court of Justice comes under the U.N. while the Permanent Court of Arbitration is a separate operation.

**Mr. Allmand:** So our contribution to the World Court is under the U.N.

**Mr. Cadieux:** It is under the U.N. However, there is some connection in that the nominating groups for the Court of Arbitration at The Hague are consulted by member governments of the U.N. when nominations are made for appointment to the International Court of Justice, so that there is a kind of linkage.

**Mr. Allmand:** Are there any Canadian personnel on the Permanent Court of Arbitration or the International Court of Justice?

**Mr. Cadieux:** On the International Court for a number of years, as you may recall, we had Mr. Justice Read, who was the legal adviser of the Department of External Affairs for a good many years. After completing nine years, I think it is, on the Court he retired. On the Court of Arbitration there are national groups and in this country the group consists of four persons. I think, at the moment, one of these four, and the Chairman of the four, is Mr. Justice Ritchie of the Supreme Court. I am a member of this four, representing the Department of External Affairs and as former legal adviser. There are two more at the moment: Mr. Jean Yves Morin, a professor in Montreal, and the name of the fourth one escapes me for the moment.

**Mr. Allmand:** During the past year were any cases in which Canada had an interest submitted to either of these international tribunals?

**Mr. Cadieux:** Yes, there was the case on Article 19 of the Charter about Contributions that was referred to the Court by the General Assembly. Canada intervened in that and appeared before the Court in support of its contention that the resolution by the General Assembly apportioning expenses for peace-keeping operations was binding on members. As you will remember, the Court sustained that opinion. Eventually there was a special session of the United Nations and I do not think it was possible to reach agreement on this, as a result of which the discussion on peacekeeping has taken a different course.

**Mr. Allmand:** You mentioned that Jean Yves Morin is a representative of Canada.

**Mr. Cadieux:** No, he is a member of this national group of the International Court of Arbitration.

**Mr. Allmand:** Is he still a member?

**Mr. Cadieux:** At the moment I have not the list with me. I will check and let you know. He certainly was until recently.

**Mr. Allmand:** It seems strange to me that he is a representative of Canada since he is...

**Mr. Cadieux:** Although I am not the one who made the appointment, I think the rationale is that he is a Professor of International Law at McGill University; also, I think he has published a number of works of a scientific nature in the field of international law. This may be the reason that it was felt he should be appointed.

**Mr. Allmand:** He has been very critical of confederation in recent years. He has actually given many public speeches against the Canadian state.

In the last five years how many cases, in which Canada has had an interest, have been referred either to the international tribunal of the world court or the international Court of Arbitration?

**Mr. Cadieux:** The one specific case that I can remember is where Canada appeared before the Court and made a submission. But the other cases that are before the Court deal with the problems of international law and general principles that are of general interest to the world community and to Canada as a member of the United Nations, but there is no direct specific Canadian interest in any of these cases that I am aware of.

**Mr. Allmand:** Just to return to the other point that I brought up, who makes the type of appointment that you mentioned? I am thinking of an appointment such as Jean Yves Morin. Does the Minister make them?

**Mr. Cadieux:** This is made by the government on the advice of the Secretary of State for External Affairs who is in touch with some of his colleagues, and then he makes his recommendations accordingly.

**Mr. Allmand:** Thank you.

**The Chairman:** Are there any more questions? If not, we will proceed to, Items 10 and 15.

#### *Department of External Affairs*

10. Construction, Acquisition or Improvement of Buildings, Works, Land, Equipment and Furnishings, \$5,085,000.

15. Assessments, Grants, Contributions and other payments to International (including Commonwealth) Organizations and International Multilateral Economic and Special Aid Programs as detailed in the Estimates, including authority to pay

assessments in the amounts and in the currencies in which they are levied, and authority to pay other amounts specified in the currencies of the countries indicated, notwithstanding that the total of such payments may exceed the equivalent in Canadian dollars, estimated as of January 1967, \$34,437,700.

Item 10 agreed to.

**The Chairman:** Shall Item 15 carry?

**Mr. Churchill:** No, Mr. Chairman. I would like to move that Item 15 be reduced by the sum of \$3 million under the heading of Miscellaneous Grants and Payments, namely Defence Support Assistance to Cover Direct Expenditures on Behalf of Countries Not Members of NATO.

In support of my motion I suggest that we continue to give assistance to Jamaica but that we reduce or cut out the assistance to Tanzania and make such other reductions as may seem advisable if that amount is taken out of the estimates.

**The Chairman:** Is there a seconder to the motion?

**Mr. McIntosh:** I second the motion.

**The Chairman:** It has been moved by Mr. Churchill and seconded by Mr. McIntosh that:

Item No. 15 be reduced by the sum of 3 million dollars under the heading of "Defence Support Assistance to Cover Direct Expenditures on Behalf of Countries Not Members of NATO".

Are you ready for the question?

**Mr. Thompson:** Is the Minister planning to be before the Committee this week? Several references have been made, in answers to questions to the Minister's coming before us.

**The Chairman:** Are you speaking to the question before the Committee?

**Mr. Thompson:** I am speaking in relation to this particular—

**The Chairman:** I do not know whether or not the Minister will be available this week to answer questions.

**Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale):** I understand that the Minister would not be in a position to appear this week. There has been some hope that very possibly the Committee could meet next week, and it is very likely the Minister would be available at that time.

**The Chairman:** Is it the wish of the Committee to deal with this at the same time as the question? As we know now, the House will adjourn on Friday of next week, so it is up to the Committee to decide how many meetings we shall have. The Steering Committee has proposed that we next hear Mr. Heeny on the International Joint Commission and then Mr. Martin. Of course we are now pressed for time.

**Mr. Thompson:** I asked this question, Mr. Chairman, because I think there are some questions on which we might like to hear the Minister make a statement, one of which is the present situation and the benefit which the Government feels accrues as a result of this military mission in Tanzania. If there was any chance of his being here, it seems to me that some of these questions might be delayed until he comes.

**The Chairman:** The problem of a quorum may arise. Personally, I had in mind adjourning until Thursday of next week and having one final meeting then. If the Committee meets this Thursday and next Tuesday we may have difficulty obtaining a quorum. The Committee must decide this question. Do you feel perhaps that we can complete our estimates in one more meeting, with Mr. Martin present, on Thursday of next week.

**Mr. Basford:** But surely, Mr. Chairman, we can provide this aid set out in the estimates to one of Her Majesty's Commonwealth countries without hearing first from the Minister?

**Mr. Lambert:** Mr. Basford, Mr. Cadieux definitely indicated that some of the questioning by Mr. Churchill was getting into the field of policy, and he reserved his position, quite rightly so. Under those circumstances, I would agree with Mr. Thompson, that there is policy information and policy decisions that have to be explained.

**Mr. Churchill:** The Minister might even agree to this reduction.

**The Chairman:** Perhaps I did not express myself correctly. I did not say the Minister should not appear; I said that the Minister should come as our last witness on Thursday of next week and conclude our estimates.

**Mr. Lambert:** That would defer any decision on this motion of Mr. Churchill's until that time.

**The Chairman:** In that case the motion could stand until Thursday of next week.

(Translation)

**Mr. Goyer:** Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that the mover and seconder had enough information to put forward this proposal. If they and we have enough information why should we not vote? If the proposer needs more information he should have got it before making his motion.

**Mr. Lambert:** But neither the Minister nor Mr. Cadieux was able to give him the information. We too are not entirely ready to approve the government's decision as it was proposed.

(English)

**The Chairman:** To revert my initial proposition, is it agreed that we adjourn after this meeting until Thursday of next week, at which time we will conclude the estimates, after hearing the evidence of the Minister?

**Mr. Churchill:** In answer to that question, Mr. Chairman, although there may be a desire to conclude the estimates, there is no immediate haste for it now because the arrangement with the Government House Leader is that we will pass at this portion of the session ten departments. As he has not named External Affairs as one that he wishes to pass at that time, there is no great haste.

**The Chairman:** Yes, but at the first meeting our Committee agreed to adopt the estimates before the adjournment of the House.

**Mr. Brewin:** Mr. Chairman, as I understood it, and I want to have it cleared, it was agreed that if the estimates were approved the report of the Department of External Affairs for last year would be referred to the Committee so that the Committee would be free when the session re-opens after recess to make a standard study of some of the more important issues of the policy that we have discussed.

**The Chairman:** That is true, Mr. Brewin. It is my understanding that the Minister made a commitment to Mr. MacDonald, one of his Parliamentary secretaries, that after adjournment the House will refer to our Committee the current annual report for study as soon as we come back so that we can continue our discussions.

**Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale):** That is my understanding, Mr. Dubé. I would suggest, in

relation to the motion of Mr. Churchill, that since he would like to address questions to the Minister on this point that we perhaps postpone further consideration of item 15 and go on to the next item so that it can be dealt with next week when the Minister will be with us.

**The Chairman:** Is that agreeable?

**Mr. Thompson:** Mr. Chairman, may I ask another question in regard to our meetings. Is the Tuesday meeting definitely out?

**The Chairman:** It might be difficult to have enough members around after the weekend. However, if it is the feeling of the Committee that we should have a meeting on Tuesday of next week, we will try to have one.

**Mr. Thompson:** I would be in favour of meeting on Tuesday and of having an effort made to have the Minister here on Tuesday; that we postpone further discussion on Item 15 until then so that we can question the Minister on certain items that have arisen this morning and possibly others as well. This gives us an extra day; if the Minister cannot be present on Tuesday he might be present on Thursday.

**The Chairman:** Is that agreeable?

**Some hon. Members:** Agreed.

**The Chairman:** In that case, item 15, as well as the motion will stand until Tuesday of next week. We will try to have the Minister present on Tuesday, and if we cannot conclude with the evidence of the Minister next Tuesday we will meet again on the following Thursday.

**Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale):** For clarification, Mr. Chairman, I understand items 30 and 35 and L30 have been passed, leaving to be dealt with Vote 40 in regard to the International Control Commission?

**The Chairman:** Yes, that is correct.

**Mr. Lambert:** That report comes up this Thursday.

**The Chairman:** No. We are adjourning to Tuesday of next week, when we will have Mr. Martin.

**Mr. Lambert:** When is Mr. Heeney coming?

**The Chairman:** The following Thursday.



(Continued)

Mr. Gaget: Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that the mover and seconder had enough information to put forward this proposal. If they did or have enough information, why should we not vote? If the proposer wants more information he should have got it before making his motion.

Mr. Lamborn: But neither the Minister nor Mr. Cadbury was able to give him the information. We too are not entirely ready to approve the government's proposal. It is not a good deal.

(Continued)

The Chairman: To revert to my initial proposal, is it agreed that we adjourn after the meeting until Thursday, when we will meet after hearing the views of the French?

Mr. Churchill: Mr. Chairman, I should like to see the immediate reply to the French proposal. I am sure that the Minister will be able to give us the necessary information.

The Chairman: I am sure that the Minister will be able to give us the necessary information.

Mr. Gaget: Mr. Chairman, I am sure that the Minister will be able to give us the necessary information.

The Chairman: That is what Mr. Gaget is saying. I am sure that the Minister will be able to give us the necessary information.

Mr. Macdonald: Mr. Chairman, I am sure that the Minister will be able to give us the necessary information.

relation to the motion of Mr. Churchill, that since he would like to address questions to the Minister on this point that we perhaps postpone further consideration of Item 15 and go on to the next item so that it can be dealt with next week when the Minister will be with us.

The Chairman: Is that agreeable?

Mr. Thompson: Mr. Chairman, may I ask another question in regard to our meetings: Is the Tuesday meeting definitely off?

The Chairman: It is not a definite thing. I have to consult the Committee. We should have a meeting on Tuesday if we can.

Mr. Lamborn: I am sure that the Minister will be able to give us the necessary information.

Mr. Gaget: Mr. Chairman, I am sure that the Minister will be able to give us the necessary information.

**OFFICIAL REPORT OF MINUTES  
OF  
PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE**

This edition contains the English deliberations and/or a translation into English of the French.

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Translated by the General Bureau for Translation, Secretary of State.

**LÉON-J. RAYMOND,**  
*The Clerk of the House.*

HOUSE OF COMMONS

Second Session—Twenty-seventh Parliament

1967

STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

**EXTERNAL AFFAIRS**

*Chairman:* Mr. JEAN-EUDES DUBÉ

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 6

TUESDAY, JULY 4, 1967

RESPECTING

Main Estimates 1967-68 of the Department  
of External Affairs

INCLUDING

FIRST REPORT TO THE HOUSE

The Honourable Paul Martin, Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

and

WITNESS:

Mr. Earl G. Drake, Acting Director, Planning and Policy Division,  
External Aid Office.

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.  
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY  
OTTAWA, 1967

STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Chairman: Mr. Jean-Eudes Dubé

Vice-Chairman: Mr. W. B. Nesbitt

and

Mr. Allmand,  
Mr. Asselin  
(Charlevoix),  
Mr. Basford,  
Mr. Brewin,  
Mr. Caron,  
Mr. Churchill,  
Mr. Faulkner,

Mr. Forest,  
Mr. Forrestall,  
Mr. Goyer,  
Mr. Harkness,  
Mr. Lambert,  
Mr. Laprise,  
Mr. Lind,  
Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale)

Mr. Macquarrie,  
Mr. McIntosh,  
Mr. Pelletier,  
Mr. Pilon,  
Mr. Prud'homme,  
Mr. Stanbury,  
Mr. Thompson—(24).

(Quorum 13)

Fernand Despatie,  
Clerk of the Committee

INCLUDING

FIRST REPORT TO THE HOUSE

The Honourable Paul Martin, Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

and

WITNESS:

Mr. Earl G. Drake, Acting Director, Planning and Policy Division,  
External Aid Office

## REPORT TO THE HOUSE

WEDNESDAY, July 5, 1967.

The Standing Committee on External Affairs has the honour to present its

### FIRST REPORT

In accordance with its Order of Reference of May 25, 1967, your Committee has considered the items listed in the Main Estimates for 1967-68, relating to the Department of External Affairs.

Your Committee has held seven meetings from May 30 to July 4, 1967 and has heard the Honourable Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Charles M. Drury, Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs, and the following witnesses:

#### *From the Department of External Affairs:*

Messrs. M. Cadieux, Q.C., Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs; has heard the Honourable Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs, E. H. Gilmour, Head of the Consular Division; A. E. Gotlieb, Head of the Legal Division; W. E. Bauer, Far Eastern Division; G. Warren, United Nations Division.

#### *From the External Aid Office:*

Messrs. Maurice F. Strong, Director General; Earl G. Drake, Acting Director, Planning and Policy Division; D. Ross McLellan, Director, Finance Division; Dr. Henri Gaudefroy, Director, French Language Programs.

Your Committee commends to the House for its approval the Main Estimates for 1967-68 of the Department of External Affairs.

Your Committee is of the opinion that a useful purpose would be served if the Committee were empowered to consider the Report of the Department of External Affairs, 1966, when the House reconvenes in the fall.

A copy of the relevant Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence (*Issue Nos. 1 to 6*) is tabled.

Respectfully submitted,

JEAN-EUDES DUBÉ,  
*Chairman.*



## MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

TUESDAY, July 4, 1967.

(7)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs met at 11.05 a.m. this day.

*Members present:* Messrs. Allmand, Basford, Caron, Churchill, Faulkner, Forest, Forrestall, Goyer, Harkness, Lambert, Lind, Macdonald (*Rosedale*), Pelletier, Pilon, Stanbury, Thompson (16).

*In attendance:* The Honourable Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs; Messrs. M. Cadieux, Q.C., Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs; B. M. Williams, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs; Earl G. Drake, Acting Director, Planning and Policy Division, External Aid Office.

In the unavoidable absence of the Chairman and of the Vice-Chairman, the Clerk of the Committee opened the meeting and presided over the election of an Acting Chairman.

On motion of Mr. Macdonald (*Rosedale*), seconded by Mr. Pilon,

*Resolved*,—That Mr. Allmand be Acting Chairman of the Committee for this day's meeting.

Mr. Allmand assumed the Chair and the Committee resumed consideration of Item 15 of the Main Estimates for 1967-68 relating to the Department of External Affairs.

The Acting Chairman read the following motion which had been allowed to stand at the meeting of June 27, 1967:

Moved by Mr. Churchill, seconded by Mr. McIntosh,

—That Item 15 be reduced by the sum of three million dollars under the heading of "Defence support assistance to cover direct expenditures on behalf of countries not members of NATO".

The Minister made a statement concerning the military assistance provided by Canada to Tanzania, and answered questions.

The question being put on the said motion, it was negatived, on division.

After further discussion, Item 15 was carried, on division.

The Committee resumed consideration of Item 1.

The Minister made a statement regarding the Middle East and Canada's stand on resolutions put forward in the United Nations.

The Minister was examined on his statement and on other topics. He was assisted in answering questions by Mr. Drake.

Item 1 was carried, on division.

The Acting Chairman then called the following Item pertaining to the International Joint Commission:

40—Salaries and Expenses of the Commission and Canada's share of the expenses of studies, surveys and investigations of the Commission . . . . . \$489,200.

Item 40 was carried.

All items listed in the Main Estimates for 1967-68 relating to the Department of External Affairs having been carried, the Committee agreed that they be reported and commended to the House.

As discussed at the meeting of June 20, 1967, a document entitled *Main Capital Projects Undertaken by the External Aid Office during the Fiscal Year 1966-67* was distributed to members of the Committee.

At 1.15 p.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

Fernand Despatie,  
Clerk of the Committee.

## EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

Tuesday, July 4, 1967.

**The Clerk of the Committee:** Order, please. We now have a quorum.

Due to the unavoidable absence of the Chairman and of the Vice-Chairman, the Committee requires a motion to elect an Acting Chairman for this day's meeting.

**Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale):** I move that Mr. Warren Allmand be Acting Chairman of the Committee for this day's meeting.

**Mr. Pilon:** I second that motion.

**The Clerk of the Committee:** It is moved by Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale), seconded by Mr. Pilon that Mr. Allmand be Acting Chairman of the Committee for this day's meeting.

Is it agreed?

• (11.11 a.m.)

**Some hon. Members:** Agreed.

Motion agreed to.

**The Acting Chairman Mr. Allmand:** Gentlemen, we will continue with consideration of Item No. 15 of the Main Estimates. The Minister is with us this morning. I am not sure whether he wants to say anything before we start.

**The hon. Paul Martin (Secretary of State for External Affairs):** No.

**The Acting Chairman Mr. Allmand:** Are there any questions on Item No. 15?

If not, there was a motion by Mr. Churchill on June 27, 1967, which I will read. It was moved by Mr. Churchill and seconded by Mr. McIntosh that:

Item 15 be reduced by the sum of three million dollars under the heading of "Defence support assistance to cover direct expenditures on behalf of countries not members of NATO".

Is there any discussion on this motion?

**Mr. Lambert:** I thought it would be incumbent on the Minister to give an explanation. After all, I am sure he has been advised of

the queries that were raised at the time of Mr. Churchill's motion, particularly with regard to Tanzania.

In view of the reaction from Tanzania—perhaps not to Mr. Churchill's statements, but certainly arising from one of their own elected representatives—I think we should get a detailed explanation of what is going on in this particular sector or are we providing considerable dislocation to some of our military personnel of various training missions? It would be interesting to know precisely what they are doing.

**Mr. Churchill:** Yes, what?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Mr. Lambert, I read the observations on the assistance we were giving to Tanzania and I quite agree with you that the Committee is entitled to a description of the military assistance which the Canadian government is giving to that Commonwealth country.

We first extended military assistance to Tanzania in 1964 in response to a request from President Nyerere. This request was based on Tanzania's need to rebuild its small army following the army mutinies in East Africa in early 1964, and it was for assistance in developing a force adequate to ensure internal security. This is not, of course, the first instance in which the Canadian government has given military assistance to a Commonwealth country. We give such assistance to Ghana as well as to Malaysia; we have an ad hoc training assistance program for Jamaica; we give some assistance to Zambia and to Nigeria.

With regard to Tanzania, this military assistance, of course, is in addition to our economic aid program. Tanzania did not possess the personnel or the financial resources to carry out the necessary development of its forces and we agreed to provide a military training team numbering 33 personnel whose role is to help build up, with Canadian advice and training assistance, a small but self contained Tanzanian army. We also agreed to train up to 25 Tanzanian army personnel per

year in Canada during the planned five-year duration of the program and to participate in the financing and construction of a military academy in Tanzania.

We subsequently agreed to help Tanzania to develop a military air transport wing equipped to perform a transport, liaison and reconnaissance function. Under this air wing program we agreed to provide Tanzania with up to four Caribou and eight Otter aircraft with spares support; to station in Tanzania a Canadian Air Force training team numbering 57 personnel and to provide training in Canada and Tanzania for a total of some 400 Tanzanian airmen to staff the air wing.

The total estimated cost of these two programs, including the gift of aircraft, and the Canadian contribution to the military academy project, (\$2.6 million of a total estimated cost of \$5.2 million), is \$15 million.

I noticed queries concerning the reasons for this assistance. We did this because we believe that countries like Canada should be prepared to assist independent countries of the Commonwealth, not only to develop their economies, but to assist them in providing conditions of security and stability in which economic and social development programs can be carried out.

When we decided to give this assistance we were persuaded to do so because we appeared to be the Commonwealth country from which this assistance would be most acceptable. Had we had not done so, it would have probably been given by certain Communist countries, including China. I am sure the course that we have taken in this regard is the right one.

It is true, as Mr. Churchill pointed out, that Tanzania does not enjoy diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom at the present time. Tanzania withdrew its High Commission from London in December of 1965 as a result of the situation in Rhodesia, and as the Prime Minister of Canada has pointed out, we greatly regretted this decision. President Nyerere was very explicit in emphasizing that the withdrawal of the Tanzanian High Commission from Britain did not in any way indicate its lessening of interest in Commonwealth affairs, and I hope that before too long diplomatic relations will be restored. The breaking off of diplomatic relations between Tanzania and Britain followed a resolution of the Organization for African Unity calling on member states to take this action. Tanzania was one of nine countries which adhered to the resolution but perhaps I had better read

what President Nyerere said on December 21, 1966, referring to Nibmar, that is the "No Independence Before Majority Rule" declaration of the Britain Government. He said

had this declaration been made a year ago, there would have been no rupture between our two countries. Now, however, we will wait and see evidence of Mr. Wilson's earnestness in bringing down a regime he now admits is racist and fascist dominated.

I do not think that the fact that Tanzania broke diplomatic relations with Britain would alter the decision we have made to give military assistance to Tanzania in the way that we have done.

**Mr. Lambert:** Without criticizing in any way the original motives of the assistance, which was to provide service facilities in Tanzania with regard to internal security and their own development, I do not think anybody would quarrel with this. In the light of events in the past three years, is the Minister satisfied that this acquired knowledge and these additional training facilities are not being used for the training and for the participation in activities centred on Tanzania but aimed at neighbouring countries? It seems from reports constantly coming out of East Central Africa that Tanzania is providing the training base for a lot of what you might call guerrilla and other activities in Mozambique and in Burundi and even, perhaps, in Kenya. I am leaving aside, of course, what I think is a rather odd attitude and practical ideas with regard to Rhodesia, but what about this other question? Are we indirectly helping attacks on Tanzania's neighbours?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I think I can say quite definitely that the Tanzanian support for liberation movements, which undoubtedly exists, is not given through the Defence Forces with which our training teams work. I think that to understand this aspect of the problem, it should be understood that all the African states, with the exception of South Africa, support those groups in Africa which aim at eliminating colonial rule and in particular support the Mozambique Liberation Front which has its headquarters at Dar-es-Salaam, the capital of Tanzania. Tanzania shares in this African attitude which has found its expression through the Organization of African Unity, (O.A.U.), and in the United Nations itself. Dar-es-Salaam was chosen by the Organization of African Unity as the

headquarters of its liberation committee. This Tanzanian attitude and the general African attitude were known to us before we agreed to give this military assistance. We decided for the reasons that I have generally explained that this should be no obstacle to its provision. Of course, part of the arrangement that we have, not only in Tanzania but in any other Commonwealth country where we give military assistance, is that our forces are employed in a training and advisory capacity only; and are not, in any way, to be involved in any outside operations.

**Mr. Lambert:** In so doing, is Canada implicitly or directly approving of any of these liberation activities?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** No. These are matters that have to do with the policies of these respective countries.

**Mr. Lambert:** You will admit that the dividing line is rather a narrow one as to whether we support or we are giving indirect assistance to, not only the philosophy, but to the actual activities that are going on.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Tanzania is a non-aligned country in the Commonwealth. It does not support many of the positions that Britain supports, we support or that Australia and New Zealand support. It exercises the right of independence in this area. We do not seek to interfere with its right to have this particular view. I am satisfied beyond any doubt that if we had not given this military assistance, we would have made a great mistake. Why? Because the assistance that we are giving would have been given by China, or might have been given by one or two other Communist countries.

While Tanzania pursues a non-aligned policy, the relations between Canada and Tanzania are very close. I think it is in the Commonwealth interest that we should seek to maintain this position with Tanzania.

**Mr. Lambert:** My last question is this, Mr. Chairman. Now we have seen a perhaps isolated report of opposition to Canada's participation in military aid to Tanzania—

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I saw that this morning.

**Mr. Lambert:** Yes. Is this what I characterized an isolated opposition from within Tanzania or has the Minister been aware that there has been any appreciable volume of—

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I am not aware that there is any appreciable volume but I am aware that there have been a few dissident opinions which are not shared at all by the Tanzanian government.

**Mr. Lambert:** From what sources are these? Are they from what you would call far left philosophy representatives or are they—just what groups are they from within Tanzania?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** They are from groups that feel that Tanzania should have no connections with countries whose basic foreign policy posture is like that of Canada or of certain other countries of the Commonwealth, or certain other countries in the western world.

**Mr. Lambert:** Do we get this reaction within any other countries where we provide military assistance?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** There are some reactions from non-official groups but not from governments and, I am sure, not from the overwhelming body of people in these countries. Canada has very close relations with Zambia, through President Kaunda, one of the great figures of Africa. We know that in that country there are forces that do not fully support the position which we put forward. We know that certainly in some of these countries there are forces strongly opposed to the positions taken by Britain and the United States. While the criticism against these two countries is greater than that directed against Canada, nevertheless I would be correct in saying that there are some bodies that may not fully support the governments of those countries because of the policies of collaboration that they pursue with us.

**Mr. Thompson:** How strong is the present military aid to Tanzania from the People's Republic of China in terms of both dollars and men?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** As I said a moment ago, we are aware, of course of some Communist Chinese personnel in various capacities in Tanzania, particularly in the training of militia and of police officers. We were aware of this when the request for assistance came from Tanzania. We know also that the Chinese have a considerable economic assistance program in Tanzania as well; just as they have in Pakistan, just as they have had in India and in many other countries in Asia and Africa where we likewise have our External Aid programs. However,

we do not consider that the presence of Communist Chinese personnel has impeded our team in the work to which it has been assigned—the training programs—and we do not feel that it warrants any changes in our present program of military assistance to Tanzania. I do not have, Mr. Thompson, the exact economic strength of the Chinese form of assistance or the numbers of personnel that they have.

It should be pointed out that the total number of Communist Chinese in various capacities in Tanzania is only a fraction of the total number of personnel from western countries.

**Mr. Thompson:** In your opinion, Mr. Martin, is there any validity to the report that Chinese assistance in the country has to do more with the training of guerrilla forces and the infiltration of arms on what loosely might be called the militia level rather than on the official military level such as Canada has been doing?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I do have the answer to that. I have noted your question. I simply say I do have the answer to that. I would be glad to speak to you—

**Mr. Thompson:** Are there Tanzanian pilots or other military personnel receiving training in Canada at the present time?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I think there are approximately 18.

**Mr. Thompson:** Does the \$15 million that you mentioned, Mr. Martin, cover the cost of the program to date or is that the projected cost of the five-year program that you referred to?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** That is the estimated total cost of the five-year program.

**Mr. Thompson:** How does Canada's military aid to Tanzania compare in general terms to our non-military aid to that country? Are we keeping up our non-military aid?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** It may well be larger than our non-military aid. We have several large-scale aerial mapping projects totalling about \$1½ million. We have provided equipment for the National Parks Service of the Forestry Department in Tanzania. We have provided assistance for the technical college at Dar-es-Salaam and the adult educational programs of that institution. We have provided equipment for a pulp and paper mill site study. A link road feasibility study was

recently approved. Loan negotiations have been completed for \$2 million of transmission lines and \$450,000 for the preparation of a master plan for transmission lines at Dar-es-Salaam. Seventy-one students have been brought to Canada from Tanzania. Thirty teachers are teaching in Tanzania and 33 advisers are serving in Tanzania. I do not have the exact total of this economic aid here. I said that it would not be as large as on military aid but I think now perhaps it is larger. However I do not have the precise totals. The military program is a five-year program. I think that this economic aid would represent a little higher figure.

**Mr. Thompson:** In so far as the Government of Canada is aware, I wonder, Mr. Chairman, if I might ask the Minister if any of the military personnel being trained at present or having been trained in the past by the Canadian military missions have anything to do with the training of the so-called liberation forces from Mozambique or perhaps from Rhodesia that are being administered within Tanzania itself?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Certainly not while they are in the process of training. When they become fully trained, of course, they are members of the defence forces of that country. Their dispositions is one that is determined by the Government of Tanzania.

**Mr. Thompson:** Might we just switch for a moment from Tanzania and refer to the military mission in Ghana? Is it the intention of the government to continue the military mission and aid program being extended to Ghana for an indefinite period of time or is there a—

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** There is no prescribed period. Our Armed Forces training team there is still operating.

**Mr. Thompson:** Is it the intention of the government to renew that program?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** We have had no recent request for the revision of it but we are to see the Ghanaians very shortly. This may be in their minds; I do not know.

**Mr. Thompson:** Do we have any military personnel in Nigeria at the present time or is there any request or intention of establishing a similar training program there?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Yes, we had a small military aid program for Nigeria, but

I think it was finished a very short time ago. There has been no request for a renewal.

**Mr. Thompson:** Are there requests from any other African countries for Canadian military training programs such as we have had in Ghana?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** We have some relatively modest arrangements in Zambia. Just a token contribution. We have two officer cadets from Zambia. Of course, we have a program in Malaysia.

**Mr. Thompson:** Yes I am speaking of Africa, though.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** That is all we have in Africa.

• (11:42 a.m.)

**Mr. Thompson:** Coming back to Tanzania, have the Caribou and Otter aircraft to which you referred been delivered? Are they presently in use?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Four Caribou and four Otter have been delivered.

**Mr. Thompson:** This is my last question, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Martin, you stated a little while ago that Canada and Tanzania enjoy the closest of relationships with one another. Is it correct to assume there have been no official protests or questions regarding the role of our forces in the training mission in Tanzania and that reports such as were seen in the press this morning can only be considered as coming from dissident groups within Tanzania and not from the Government?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** That is right. As an example of the relations that prevail between the two countries, we carry out diplomatic functions in the United Kingdom for Tanzania through our High Commission office in London.

**Mr. Thompson:** You mean in Dar-es-Salaam?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** No, no, in London. They have withdrawn from there. We do the same in Dar-es-Salaam for Britain.

**Mr. Thompson:** You do the same in Dar-es-Salaam for Britain?

**The Acting Chairman Mr. Allmand:** Is that all?

**Mr. Thompson:** Yes.

**Mr. Stanbury:** Mr. Chairman, I wonder if the Minister could tell us what the Canadian reaction has been to Secretary General Arnold Smith's proposal that there be a Commonwealth pool of experts who will channel Commonwealth aid to these countries through the secretariat rather than making arrangements directly with these countries?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** You are referring to the meeting at Lagos?

**Mr. Stanbury:** I think this arose out of the recent meeting at Nairobi.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Mr. Smith and I discussed this and we felt that if we can avoid it we do not want to duplicate Canada's administrative structure for External Aid. We give some assistance, of course, to the United Nations technical assistance program. We also give assistance to the Commonwealth educational program and the cultural programs of Francophone countries. We feel it is desirable at this stage in the development of our external aid program to have as tight administrative control as possible. However, we would be prepared to provide personnel under the Commonwealth external aid program which is envisaged by Mr. Smith, and we have so advised him. I do not think any country has yet agreed to go beyond that. I do not think the position of all governments has been declared. We are, of course, sympathetic to the idea but we are certainly reluctant at this time to agree to an operational role for the secretariat. We think the secretariat can perform a useful function and we will assist them by supplying External Aid personnel. However, then I do not think that would be acceptable to us at the present time that organization were permitted to expend External Aid funds.

**Mr. Stanbury:** I take it you are expressing support of the concept which came out of that conference of a technical assistance and planning service—

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** That is right.

**Mr. Stanbury:** —but not an office which actually administers aid?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** That is right.

**Mr. Stanbury:** Thank you.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** For instance, if they wish to have some personnel to assist the secretariat in making assessments of projects, that would be well and good but, speaking for

Canada it would certainly be up to each Commonwealth country to make the decision whether there should or should not be an allocation for a particular project that is assessed in this way.

**The Acting Chairman Mr. Allmand:** Are you ready for the question on Mr. Churchill's motion?

**Mr. Harkness:** I have one or two questions, Mr. Chairman. What proportion of the \$15 million which has been or will be allocated for military aid to Tanzania has been or will be paid over to the Department of National Defence to cover the pay and allowances of the Canadian personnel involved?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Mr. Harkness wants to know out of the \$15 million what portion goes for pay and allowances?

**Mr. Harkness:** The pay, allowances and material that may be supplied, and so forth. In other words, the costs to the Department of National Defence which are involved in this \$15 million and which I presume the Department of External Affairs pays for by reimbursing the Department of National Defence?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I do not have that information at present Mr. Harkness. I will have to get it for you.

**Mr. Harkness:** Well is it the situation that the Department of External Affairs pays part of this amount to the Department of National Defence?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Yes. This comes under our estimates and we have to reimburse them. I will get all these details for you as quickly as I can.

**The Acting Chairman Mr. Allmand:** Are there any further comments on the motion?

**Mr. Harkness:** Yes. It seems quite apparent to me at least that a number of the people who will be trained by our air and army training teams will subsequently be employed in training people who will be engaged in raids into neighbouring countries. It would therefore seem to me that this act of indirectly training people for warlike operations against their neighbours—which takes place at the present time—is not constant with our general policy of trying to maintain peace in the world.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Our military assistance teams which serve abroad are not to be employed in any operational capacity which could lead to their involvement in police or military action. They are there in an advisory and a training capacity. Our agreements with countries to which we give military assistance provide for their abrogation at any time by either party when it is considered in the national interest to do so.

**Mr. Harkness:** I am well aware of that, Mr. Martin, but the point is that our military training teams are actually training Tanzanians, who in turn are training other Tanzanians and also people from Rhodesia, Mozambique and various other places who will then participate in raids into their neighbouring countries and thus we are indirectly training people to carry out warlike operations of this kind. This seems to me to be a very inappropriate use of Canadian funds.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I think we should examine this matter in the light of the actual military strength of this particular country. I well appreciate that your question is a natural one, but the defence forces of Tanzania are relatively very small. The training that we have been giving them is largely training that will give them the capacity to help to preserve order at home. Their police and military forces are not large. They do not lend themselves to foreign invasion in the sense that one might well imagine. If the Tanzanians did not receive this assistance they would not have the basic elements essential for the preservation of order. I can assure you of that the so-called forces of liberation are not primarily dependent on this kind of training.

**Mr. Harkness:** I do not think you are really in a position to assure me of that. I know that the general military training—having had some experience in this matter, as you know—which we provide to these African countries is of a general military nature involving battle schools, and so forth.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** But I do assure you of that because when we entered into it we were naturally concerned about this aspect of the problem. This matter was discussed earlier and I am sure you will recall that the modest character of the forces that preserve order in a country like Tanzania stood out. If we had given this kind of assistance the forces that engaged in preserving

order might have to come from elsewhere. This does not mean that this kind of training could not be used in another way, but the nature of Tanzanian support for liberation fronts does not depend primarily on this kind of assistance.

**Mr. Harkness:** I do not think the argument which you made a while ago that the assistance would have come from elsewhere—by which you mean from one of the communist countries—is very germane at the moment because that assistance is growing anyway. As you mentioned earlier, the Chinese as well as our own people are providing military training there.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Following the start of our training program for the Army, and before we came into the picture in training of the Air Wing air training was being given to Tanzania by West Germany and then, for reasons that I do not quickly recall, this assistance was withdrawn. It then became a question whether this training would be provided by Canada or by a country outside the Commonwealth perhaps a communist country such as China. I think the reason West Germany withdrew its assistance was because of the question of possible recognition of East Germany. It arose out of the status of the East German Consul-General in Dar-es-Salaam.

**Mr. Harkness:** I think everyone agreed when we started to provide military assistance to these emerging African countries that it was a useful thing to do and the military assistance we provided to Ghana, for example, has not been used in warlike activities against their neighbours. The same thing is true of the military assistance we provided to Nigeria. But here we have a different case because in effect the military assistance which we are providing Tanzania is indirectly being used to attack her neighbours. It is therefore an altogether different situation than that which prevailed in these other countries where we gave—and I think quite properly—military assistance. As I said before, in view of our general policy in the United Nations and elsewhere I think it is inappropriate that we provide military assistance to a country which is harbouring and training people on its soil to attack its neighbours.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I would have to disagree with that statement of position. I think your statement oversimplifies the situa-

tion. It seeks to suggest that the training that is given has a consequence along the lines you envisage. There is no doubt that a man who is trained as a policeman will not only be able to serve his country in the preservation of order but also if that country wishes—

**Mr. Harkness:** But we are not training these people as policemen, we are training them as soldiers.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Yes, that is true, but they are providing the basis for maintaining order. The military provides the essential framework for the security of the country. We have to make the choice whether we wish to give this assistance or leave it to someone else. If you keep in mind the evolutionary processes in Africa, the great changes that are taking place there and the position taken by countries like our own, toward the situation in Africa, I think this kind of assistance is not only desirable but also ought to be continued, for the reasons that I have indicated in general terms, that is the policy of the government.

**The Acting Chairman Mr. Allmand:** Are there any further comments on this matter?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I think in fairness to Mr. Harkness, whose questions are very important, I should say that we have had talks about this matter and as far as any information at my disposal is concerned, these forces are not used in any way, for example for raids into Mozambique. The fact that we provide aid may result in more moderate policies being pursued, I think, in regard to certain countries, including our own, and that is the objective.

**Mr. Harkness:** Apart from aircraft, does this \$15 million provide for any arms?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** No, just the Otter and the Caribou aircraft.

**Mr. Harkness:** There are no rifles, machine guns or anything else included?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** No, just the eight Otter and the four Caribou.

**The Acting Chairman Mr. Allmand:** Are you ready for the question on the motion?

**Mr. Churchill:** I spoke to the motion, but the Minister was not here when I did so. Perhaps I could ask him about three short questions.

Do we have a diplomatic mission in Tanzania?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Yes; we have a High Commissioner there, Mr. McGill.

**Mr. Churchill:** Where is he stationed?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Dar-es-Salaam.

**Mr. Churchill:** Do we have a trade commissioner there?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I do not think that we have a trade officer, no.

**Mr. Churchill:** What is the nature of its present government? Is it a one-party state?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Yes; however there are contested elections and so on. President Nyerere, the head of the government of Tanzania, is one of the very outstanding men in Africa. He has been to Canada. If he were in this room, speaking to you, I think he would impress you as a man of great experience, great erudition, great wisdom and great prudence. We must judge Tanzania on the basis of the kind of society which exists there—society with a low standard of living, which is emerging as are other countries in Africa; which is seeking not only the right of self-determination but the right to enjoy the advantages of an affluent international society. I regard President Nyerere as one of the leading statesmen of the world.

**Mr. Churchill:** You praise his wisdom and prudence. Do you approve of his breaking off relations with Britain over the Rhodesian situation?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** You know the answer to that, of course: I approve of you, generally, but when you do certain things of which I disapprove it does not involve any condemnation of you personally.

No, I did not approve of the action taken by the Government of Tanzania in December of 1965. As a matter of fact, we did our best to dissuade if from taking that course. It was the first time, I think, in the history of the Commonwealth that a Commonwealth country had withdrawn its diplomatic mission from London, and we were greatly concerned about the consequences. We certainly did not approve of that course.

**Mr. Churchill:** Mr. Chairman, the Minister is, of course, very uncomfortable about this topic...

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Mr. Churchill, let one thing be clear. When you and I are discussing things I am never uncomfortable.

**Mr. Churchill:** Well, as Mr. Harkness pointed out, our peacekeeping activities around the world and the Government's policy with regard to peacekeeping do not coincide very well with this advocacy of training people for war.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I am sure that you would not want to do violence to noble concepts, although sometimes one has that impression. As a strong supporter of the Commonwealth, would you advocate that we should withdraw this training assistance to Tanzania? Would you advocate that we should let some country outside the Commonwealth and outside our particular range of interests and beliefs do this job? Would you leave it to China? Would you leave it to Czechoslovakia? Those questions are very pertinent.

**Mr. Churchill:** True, I do not think we can be in competition with China on matters of this sort; we have other interests in the world besides this. However, from the standpoint of internal security it appears to me that a police force trained on the Canadian model of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police would be adequate under the circumstances, and that military and air force personnel...

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** That may be. All I can say is that when we received the request we sent out a military team to determine what should be done. The military team returned and recommended this program.

**Mr. Churchill:** Does the representative of Tanzania support Canada's position at the United Nations?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** On all questions, no; anymore than we always support positions taken by the United States. If you are going to judge the support that you give to a Commonwealth country on the basis of its attitude to another member of the Commonwealth we cannot hope to make much advance.

No, Tanzania does not support the position of Canada on a number of questions, but we are satisfied that Tanzania is an important country in the Commonwealth. We are satisfied that it is worth working hard to keep the Commonwealth together. We are satisfied that the African portion of the Common-

wealth is a vital factor in the capacity of the Commonwealth to have a role of influence in the modern world. We, in Canada, take the view that countries such as Kenya, Zambia, Tanzania, Ghana and Nigeria are important countries...

**Mr. Churchill:** Rhodesia, too?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** And Rhodesia. We disagree with the policy of the Government of Rhodesia. We think that it is wrong that in a country of 250,000 whites 3 million blacks should be denied the opportunity of exercising the ordinary status of citizenship as understood in the modern world. I think it is because Canada takes this position that she does have a useful collaboration with the countries of the Commonwealth in Africa.

**Mr. Churchill:** Do you believe in military dictatorship?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** No, I do not; any more than I believe in—well, I was going to make a remark to which you would probably have taken exception.

No, I do not believe in military dictatorship; but I do not know what that has to do with Tanzania.

**Mr. Churchill:** Well, it has to do with a number of other countries in Africa, but I will not pursue that subject. However, as a taxpayer I object to our spending our money in this way. I think it would be better spent in economic aid and things of that nature.

**The Acting Chairman Mr. Allmand:** Are you ready for the question?

All those in favour of the motion made by Mr. Churchill, please raise their hands. All those against the motion?

The motion is defeated.

Will item 15 carry?

**Mr. Churchill:** Wait a moment and we will see whether or not it will.

**Mr. Harkness:** I see on page 132:

United Nations relief and works agency for Palestine refugees in the Near East...\$500,000

This is the same as for last year. How much is that now being increased in view of the developments of the past month?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** In addition to the normal allocation, there was \$700,000 in com-

modities already provided for in the estimates, and other...

**Mr. Harkness:** It is not \$750,000; there are \$500,000 provided for in the estimates.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** There was a special supplementary appropriation of \$300,000 for commodities that were supplied. In addition to that, as the Prime Minister announced the other day, there is \$1 million worth of food aid to be provided to UNRWA, up to \$225,000 to pay for the transportation costs of this additional food aid and an additional \$100,000 to the Red Cross.

**Mr. Harkness:** What I am trying to find out is what will be the total amount of aid provided for the Palestine refugees this year, rather than the \$500,000 which appears in the estimates?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** One calculation would be \$1.2 million in cash and in kind under the normal program for 1967-68 but the overall total would be much higher.

**The Acting Chairman Mr. Allmand:** Do you have any further questions on this item, Mr. Harkness?

**Mr. Harkness:** No.

**The Acting Chairman Mr. Allmand:** Shall item 15 carry?

**Some hon. Members:** Carried.

**Mr. Churchill:** On division.

Item 15 agreed to on division.

We have not completed consideration of item 1.

Shall item 1 carry?

**Some hon. Members:** Carried.

**Mr. Lambert:** Perhaps the Minister could now give us in more detail just what the situation is in the Middle East, and what the standing is at the present time. He has been away from the Committee for a considerable time. There have been significant developments involving Canada, and he himself has been in New York. Is there to be a return to war?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** The situation in the United Nations as of this moment is as follows: There is a resolution, put forward by Latin American countries, which Canada announced yesterday it will support. The resolution calls for the withdrawal of Israeli

forces. It also calls for the foregoing of the state of belligerency and the recognition of certain issues, which were stated by me in my General Assembly statement, in so far as Canada was concerned, to involve certain principles. I will deal with those later.

The resolution also calls for the appointment by the United Nations of a mediator who will try to bring the parties together.

In the final operative clause the resolution, recalling certain resolutions of 1957, which dealt with the proposal for the establishment of an international regime in Jerusalem, calls upon the government of Israel to recognize the desirability of an international regime and asks that the question be decided only at the next General Assembly.

Yesterday I instructed our ambassador to announce that we would support this resolution, but, in doing so, to point out, with regard to the last operative clause that I have just been discussing, that we had opposed these resolutions in 1957 and that we felt that now was not the time to make a definitive arrangement for the regime in Jerusalem. In my speech to the General Assembly I had said that whatever was done with respect to Jerusalem there ought to be guarantees given for full access to the Holy places by Christians, Muslims and Jews, and that to this end it might be worth considering the establishment of a supervisory organization preferably under the United Nations.

We will support the resolution put forward by the Latin American countries and the three Commonwealth countries in the Caribbean, Trinidad, Barbados and Jamaica.

There is also a resolution, put forward by Yugoslavia, calling merely for the unconditional withdrawal of the forces of Israel, saying nothing about the state of belligerency that exists and saying nothing directly about the claims that are put forward by the parties. We will oppose that resolution.

There is another resolution, put forward by Albania, which incorporates the basic provisions of the resolution of Yugoslavia but adds to it a criticism of the United States. We will oppose that.

Then there is a resolution, put forward by Pakistan, calling on Israel not to proceed with the legislative processes that are under way in the Knesset with regard to the taking over of the Jordanian part of Jerusalem and asking that the matter be left over for decision at a later date. We will support that resolution, as I think most countries will.

I am not so sure what the end result will be. I believe there was a meeting last night of the proponents of the Latin American resolution with the idea that they might try and find a *modus vivendi* with the proponents of the Yugoslav position. I doubt that there will be any agreement between those two proposals.

However, we are nearing the end of the present Assembly. When the Assembly does reach its conclusions—and those conclusions, by the way, under the Charter of the United Nations, have the effect of merely being recommendations, the Security Council will have to wrestle with the problems charged to it under the Charter—it may be that only one resolution will emerge from this Assembly. There might be an agreement simply to recommend that there be a mediator appointed by the UN to try to bring the parties together. However, this is something that remains to be seen in the course of the next few hours.

Israel takes the position that she would like to have direct peace negotiations with the Arab countries. If the Arab countries are unwilling to have this direct negotiation then it can be done only through an intermediary.

The Canadian position on this whole question, of course, is that we greatly regret the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force. We understood the difficulties that faced the Secretary General.

I have not felt that it was desirable to engage now in an examination of his problem, because in terms of what is before the Assembly at the moment it is irrelevant. However, the moment will come when we will want to examine the circumstances of the terms of reference of peacekeeping forces.

Our position is that Israel's withdrawal from the territories she has occupied must be related to the other basic questions involved. These basic questions are involved with the four principles which I stated in the United Nations.

First, respect for the territorial integrity of the nations of the area, including provision for the security and international supervision of frontiers.

Second, the right of all nations to innocent passage through international waterways.

Third, an early and just solution of the refugee problem.

Fourth, international concern for the preservation of a special spiritual and religious interest in Jerusalem for Christians, Jews and Muslims.

These must be recognized. I suggested, perhaps by giving the United Nations an international supervisory responsibility for the protection of those interests. We also take the view that there should be no precipitate action which might prejudice these efforts.

We have said that we regret that UNEF is no longer in existence. We think it played a very important role over a long period. We feel that there will be a role for the United Nations to play as a presence in this situation. There are now in existence two international creations, one to which we call the attention of the nations in our statement, the Palestine Conciliation Commission, on which two of the great powers, France and the United States, are represented, along with Turkey. Then there is the observation group known as the United Nations Truce and Supervision Organization, which is a provisional organization. This body, also known as UNTSO, was in existence before UNEF and it is a creation of the Security Council. During the cease fire ordered by the Security Council, it played a very important role in overseeing the cease fire. It is our view that an expanded organization like this could play a very useful role in trying to preserve order in that troubled area. It will not be necessary for the Security Council to establish UNTSO, because it is now in existence, but if its numbers are to be increased, as may well be required, I think that this would require action by the Security Council. If it is to be located in areas where it has not normally been located, I think that this too would require further extension of powers by the Security Council. But it is there and I suspect that we will find this a useful body in the future.

At the present time Israel occupies certain territory. She has not given public indications of her intention with regard to this territory, but she does say that, if she could engage in direct negotiations, these would lead to a wise and useful settlement. We would all hope that this was the case.

Generally, that is the situation at the moment.

**Mr. Lambert:** Well, if the United Nations General Assembly comes to no conclusion outside of some sort of a minor recommendation, is there not danger that the continuing status quo, with breaches of the truce, will

merely escalate into a more generalized conflict, and also that it might invite intervention from outside powers who seem to be possibly teetering for an invitation to do so?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I do not think so, Mr. Lambert. Under the Charter of the United Nations this matter is one that properly belongs to the Security Council. The Security Council, under the Charter, is the agency primarily charged with the responsibility of dealing with situations that threaten the peace or where the peace has been violated, as was the case in this instance. When the Soviet Union called for a special meeting of the General Assembly, we had some doubts about the wisdom of this course and we said so. We were concerned that a general debate would have the effect of exacerbating understandable human passions in a very delicate situation. However, when it became apparent that the required 62 members wanted the Assembly to take place, we and a number of other countries took the position there was no sense in opposing the initiative taken by the Soviet Union.

When the General Assembly began, there were two propositions that faced it. One was the proposal by the Soviet Union, and that has not yet been voted on. Likewise there was a resolution put forward by the United States and that resolution will probably be dropped. The resolutions to be voted on are the four that I have indicated. However, the nations have had an opportunity of expressing their views on this very difficult situation and when the General Assembly's work is over today, tomorrow or this week, then the matter will revert to the Security Council, and it will be up to that body to take the necessary action. Whether or not the General Assembly passes a recommendation for the appointment of a mediator, it will be up to the Security Council to make that kind of decision. It may be that the Security Council will recommend the appointment of an outstanding personality. A number of important suggestions along this line have been made. I think it is obvious that it is going to require someone, in the absence of direct negotiations, to bring the parties to the stage where they must negotiate in order to effect a peace settlement.

I should say that there is another resolution, one put forward by Canada, Sweden and a number of other countries urging stronger support for the immediate refugee problem and for action that might lead to a more permanent settlement of this very difficult problem.

**The Acting Chairman Mr. Allmand:** Mr. Goyer, you are next.

(Translation)

**Mr. Goyer:** Do you believe in order to obtain a lasting peace in the Middle East it is essential that the Arab countries recognize the existence of Israel?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I think that it is essential in order to obtain a lasting peace in the Middle East. The Soviet Union, through Mr. Kosygin at the General Assembly, mentioned that Israel was established by the United Nations with the consent of the U.S.S.R. and that the U.S.S.R. would continue to recognize the juridical and legal existence of Israel. One of the reasons for the request by the Israeli government that there be direct negotiations with Arab countries is because the Israeli government feels, and I think justifiably so, that such negotiations would constitute recognition of the legal existence of the state known as Israel.

**Mr. Goyer:** Do you not think because of the fact that Canada supports the appointment of a U.N. mediator to promote negotiation that it delays the establishment of a lasting peace in the Middle East? If Canada supports the appointment of a mediator this means that official recognition of the state of Israel is put off until later by the Arab countries.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Mr. Eban, the foreign affairs minister of Israel, agreed—at least at the outset—ten days ago to the appointment of such a mediator to encourage negotiations. I think if this were not done there would never be any negotiations.

**Mr. Goyer:** What is the role played by Tunisia in arriving at a solution to a lasting peace in the Middle East? Does Tunisia play an important role in these negotiations?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Tunisia is active, yes. I had an opportunity on two occasions when I was at the General Assembly to discuss the problem with Mr. Bourguiba the Minister of Foreign Affairs for Tunisia. As you are aware it is an Arab country which is very much concerned about this matter and I found the viewpoint of Mr. Bourguiba to be interesting and very constructive. The role played by Tunisia is thus very active.

(English)

• (12:33 p.m.)

**The Acting Chairman Mr. Allmand:** Mr. Churchill, you are next.

**Mr. Churchill:** I would like to ask whether the Minister can make available to us the White Paper issued by the Secretary General of the United Nations?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Certainly.

**Mr. Churchill:** Will it be tabled in the House and copies circulated to all members?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Do you mean on the UNEF?

**Mr. Churchill:** Yes. I should question the House about it and I would not want to embarrass you by repeating it there. Is there a military—

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Let us clearly understand another thing. You and I must never be in the position where you would think that you could embarrass me; you could not.

**Mr. Churchill:** Well, I think sometimes you embarrass your own party.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I just want you and I always to have a clear understanding because only in that way can we maintain our very happy Damon and Pythias relationship.

**Mr. Churchill:** Well, now and again I get some information from you. What about the report of the Military Commander who is in charge of this unit?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** General Rikhye?

**Mr. Churchill:** Yes.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** You asked me about that the other day. The report will be tabled this week. The Secretary General has not yet made a decision about public distribution of the report, but it will be available to him this week.

**Mr. Churchill:** Would you make representations to the Secretary General to—

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I have already done so. I have directed the Secretary General's attention to what you said.

**Mr. Churchill:** Well, that is very good.

The newspaper report on the White Paper issued by the Secretary General said that U Thant declared that the UN contingent was only a symbolic force incapable of preventing war. It is the stand that I have been taking over a number of years; I presume now, with

the events that have taken place, that you, yourself, will have reached that conclusion too.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I would however, want to give a different gloss than you do to the statement that you attribute to the Secretary General. Any peacekeeping force is strong only in relation to the acceptance of that force by the powers involved. A force of 4,000 or 5,000 men obviously could not, in terms of the exercise of force itself, resist the action of 350,000 men on one side and 250,000 men on another. But this does not mean to say that a peace force does not have a very great value, because it does.

Undoubtedly, if there had been no United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East from 1957 on, over a period of 10½ years, we would not have had the peace and stability that we did. Undoubtedly the same is true of Cyprus; but no one suggests that the force in Cyprus could operate in the absence of a consent to its existence, and the support for its existence, by the countries concerned.

I want to say very strongly, Mr. Churchill, I believe that in the building of the processes of law in the kind of world in which we live what we are witnessing now of the United Nations, what we have seen over the last 20 years, represents a very necessary and important contribution to the development of law in the international community. The role of the United Nations Emergency Force, for a long time after everyone of us in this room will have gone, may well be referred to in the textbooks by coming generations as a beginning in the process of the development of the rule of law in the international community.

**Mr. Churchill:** I would like to see a rule of law established too.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** And if you do not mind my saying—because I always have a feeling when you put questions to me that there is an ulterior motive—

**Mr. Churchill:** Oh.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):**—Well this happens—it will long be remembered that the present Prime Minister of Canada was the man who made this possible.

**An hon. Member:** Hear, hear.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I say that, not because I want to be partisan but because I detect on the part of a small minority in Parliament, for some unknown, unbelievable,

inexplicable reason, a desire to suggest that the contribution that was made by Canada in 1957 was not one of the first order. It was one of the great UN contributions of our history.

**Mr. Churchill:** Oh, yes; we quite agree. But the Prime Minister himself has never claimed that he originated the idea; he has been very frank about it—more so than some of his colleagues.

I would like to ask the Minister whether it would be possible—and of course the Committee would have to determine this—to extend an invitation to General von Horn, who was in charge of some of the United Nations forces in Palestine for a number of years, and also in Yemen and so on, who has written a book with regard to United Nations' peacekeeping efforts in which he has pointed out some of the deficiencies in organization. Would it be possible to get him to come here to Canada and appear before this Committee? I am sure it would benefit all of us. We would learn from a man who was actually on the ground the practical difficulties involved in maintaining the United Nations Forces.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Well, General von Horn, a very fine gentleman and soldier whom I know very well, was Commander of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization for a long time—

**Mr. Churchill:** Yes.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):**—and was head of the Observation Mission in Yemen, to which Canada and Yugoslavia contributed forces. This is a decision that would have to rest with your Committee. He has written a book. I am sure that you would also perhaps be interested in the book that General Burns has written. I may say that there is a lot of information on the problems of peacekeeping available right here in Ottawa. But as I said, the Committee would have to decide whether you wish to hear General von Horn; I do not have any authority on that matter.

**Mr. Churchill:** When was the Palestine Conciliation Commission that you mentioned set up and what has it done over the years?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** The record of the Palestine Commission is not one of great activity. It was set up, Mr. Churchill, in 1948, as a result of a resolution of the General Assembly. The Assembly took the decision when renewed fighting was taking place in the Middle East during the latter part of 1948, and it came into being, of course, be-

fore the armistice agreements were negotiated. As I said, the Commission consists of three members, Turkey and two of the Great Powers, France and the U.S.A., chosen, as was stipulated in the General Assembly resolution by the five members of the Assembly who are also the permanent members of the Security Council.

The resolution adopted by the Assembly asked the Commission to undertake on the request of the Security Council any of the functions which had earlier been assigned to the UN Mediator or the UN Truce Commission by the Security Council. The Commission was instructed to take steps to assist the governments and authorities involved in the Arab-Israel dispute to achieve a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them. The Commission was also instructed to prepare detailed proposals regarding Jerusalem and to take steps to facilitate the repatriation, the resettlement, and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees, together with the payment of compensation to them. It was thus authorized to appoint technical experts for the effective discharge of this function.

In 1949 the Commission drew up proposals for Jerusalem which provided for the division of the Jerusalem area into Arab and Israeli zones administered by the two authorities. It envisaged also the creation of a United Nations supervisory administration in Jerusalem which would exercise powers regarding the protection of and free access to the holy places, to the protection of human rights and the co-ordination of public services of common interest.

These proposals were framed following the negotiation of the armistice agreement between Israel and Jordan, which left the city partly in Israeli and partly in Jordanian hands. We supported the Commission's plan for a modified internationalization of Jerusalem on the grounds that it adequately reconciled the maximum degree of local autonomy with the safeguarding of religious interests under international control. However, the Commission's proposals did not win the support of a majority at the United Nations at that time and were never put into effect. At the same time the Commission made a series of official visits to the Arab and Israeli governments—you may remember they convened a conference in Lausanne—in an effort to secure a resolution of the other outstanding questions, such as a territorial settlement, a solution to the refugee problem, and the negotiation of a peace treaty.

In 1951 the Commission tried to convene a conference in Paris for the purpose of discussing these questions but because of the continuing disagreement among the parties the efforts of the Commission did not lead to any solution of these problems. Subsequently the Commission concentrated its attention on individual problems. For instance, between 1953 and 1956 it devoted considerable attention to the release of Arab refugees' bank accounts blocked in Israel and matters of that kind.

In 1961 the Conciliation Commission made a special effort—I think Mr. Harkness referred to this in his speech in the House—to explore practical means of seeking progress on the Arab refugee problem. It was at that point and in that year that it appointed Dr. Joseph Johnson to visit the Middle East to discuss this problem with the host governments and with Israel. He pursued this matter with the governments concerned from his appointment in 1961 until his resignation in January of 1963, when he reported to the Commission that his proposal for a step by step approach to the refugee question had not been accepted by the parties.

Apart from these measures, the Commission has remained at the disposal of the parties during the intervening years. It has not been called on to perform any substantial function. When we mentioned it in our statement as one of the possible agencies that might be available but had been practically forgotten because it has not been active since that time, I found the last thing it did was in 1965 when it presented to the General Assembly a report which had been drawn up on the identification and evaluation of the refugees' immovable properties.

In 1950 the Soviet Union proposed the termination of the Commission. The Arab States in 1930 called for its enlargement and reactivation. Some of them suggested the addition of six members to the original three, drawn equally from the Soviet bloc and from non-aligned countries so, as they argued, the Commission would represent all shades of opinion at the UN. Ireland and New Zealand also favoured an expansion of the Commission. This proposal might have had a chance if it were not for the fact that it was associated with the idea of "troika" which at that time was being put forward by certain countries.

However, the Commission is there. It has to great power members on it and in the light of certain discussions that I know have been

under way, I would not dismiss the possibility that this Commission may yet play a role in this situation.

**The Acting Chairman Mr. Allmand:** Have you other questions, Mr. Churchill?

**Mr. Churchill:** Those are all my questions on that subject.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Mr. Harkness, I was going to give you a reply to your question about pay and allowances. I will give that at the end.

**Mr. Harkness:** I have two or three other questions. Have you any information in regard to the resumption of fighting which has taken place on the east bank of the Suez Canal during the past three days, and are any of the Truce Commission supervisory personnel in that area? I note from newspaper reports that each side blames the other for the resumption of firing, which of course is common, and I wondered if you could give us any definite information as to what the situation is there.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization has no powers to operate on the Canal. They are not there.

**Mr. Harkness:** Is there any possibility of them being sent there?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** They could only be sent if they were given the power by the Security Council. The Security Council, which established this body, has given them authority to be located in certain specified places.

**Mr. Harkness:** This would seem at the moment to be the place in which it is most essential for them to be. This is one of the reasons I raised the matter.

**Mr. Martin:** That is correct.

**Mr. Harkness:** You have no definite information in regard to the whole situation there?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** We have contradictory reports as to the causes, and both countries have placed submissions before the General Assembly, which were referred to this morning in their deliberations, but I do not know what the result was.

**Mr. Harkness:** In regard to the delivery of food, particularly, and also medical supplies to the refugees, some two weeks ago you said in the House that there were sufficient supplies for immediate needs, but I know that

the amount of supplies which are actually carried in storage in the Gaza Strip would not last very long. Do you have any information on whether fresh supplies have gone in and by what means they are to go in? The line of supply, of course, was from Port Said by railway and truck up to the Gaza Strip, but that means delivery is, of course, not feasible at the moment. I wondered if supplies were actually being delivered and if so, how it was being achieved.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I do not have the latest information on that, but I know some supplies have gone in to the Gaza Strip.

**Mr. E. G. Drake (Director, Planning & Policy Co-ordination Division, External Aid Office):** UNRWA has asked us to deliver supplies to the Israeli Port of Ashdod which is close to the Gaza Strip.

**Mr. Harkness:** Yes, it is just south of Tel-Aviv.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** He wants to know if there are any more supplies going in.

**Mr. Drake:** We understand from UNRWA that there is a regular supply going in. Some are going from European countries and we have been asked that ours be sent in July in order to keep the pipeline full.

**Mr. Harkness:** In other words, as far as your information goes, sufficient supplies are going in to keep the refugees going?

**Mr. Drake:** Yes, sir.

**Mr. Harkness:** What about the people in Jordan and Syria? Are any supplies getting to them, too?

**Mr. Drake:** We understand, sir, there is a sufficient supply on hand at present. Right now there is no emergency need for supplies but they are worried about the longrun supply over the next few months.

**Mr. Thompson:** Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask Mr. Martin three quick questions relating to areas that are directly concerned in the Middle East.

My first question concerns Yemen. Since the collaboration between Saudi Arabia and Egypt in the Israeli war, is there any evidence that the fighting in the Yemen is tapering off or is it continuing?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** There continues to be, of course, large numbers of UAR forces in the Yemen. I do not know what the exact

number is, but there were, I think, around 40,000. I do not have any information about the exact state of the disturbance before me at the moment. Hostilities fluctuate, of course. When we were part of the United Nations Yemen Observation Mission we were able, of course, to receive day by day accounts. As you know, for a period of two years, Mr. Thompson, Canada and Yugoslavia formed part of the United Nations Yemen Observation Mission there—from late 1963 to 1965. We supplied the air observation element. However, I do not have any information on what the situation has been over the last few days.

**Mr. Thompson:** There have been reports that the royalist forces are even reaching towards the coastal port of Hodeida.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I am advised now that there are no reports of intensification in the fighting.

**Mr. Thompson:** I will now turn briefly to Aden. Is there any evidence that Great Britain has considered delaying its turn-over of authority in Aden in view of the increased tempo of hostilities, particularly from the Egyptian sponsored element?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** No, Mr. Brown. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the British government, recently indicated, I think, that there was no intention to pull out forthwith. I have even seen an indication of an augmentation of the force, but I do not know how official that is. Certainly there will be no immediate withdrawal of the force in Aden which, I think, numbers about 16,000.

**Mr. Thompson:** Is there any information available this morning on the reported Ethiopian—Sudan border clashes on the west side of Ethiopia?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** No, I do not have any information before me. I have not seen my telegrams this morning.

**The Acting Chairman Mr. Allmand:** Shall Item No. 1 carry?

**Mr. Churchill:** No, Mr. Chairman, I indicated at the last meeting that I intended to deal again with the Minister's pet project, the International Control Commission.

**The Acting Chairman Mr. Allmand:** That is under Item No. 40, Mr. Churchill.

**Mr. Churchill:** No, it is under Vote 1, on page 121.

**The Acting Chairman Mr. Allmand:** Excuse me, yes.

**Mr. Churchill:** We discovered at the last meeting that, as shown in the estimates, there are 30 people from the Department of External Affairs and 64 from the Department of National Defence, for a total of 94, engaged in the International Control Commission.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Do you mean in Viet Nam?

**Mr. Churchill:** Yes.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** There are 45 in Viet Nam.

**Mr. Churchill:** Forty five what? Military personnel?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Yes, integrated service personnel. In Viet Nam there are 19 civilian personnel and 45 integrated service personnel, making a total of 64.

**Mr. Churchill:** The 30 others, then, not so listed, are in—

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** In Laos there are 8 civilian personnel and 18 integrated service personnel, making a total of 26. In Cambodia there are 3 civilian personnel and 1 integrated service personnel, making a total of 4. Therefore, in the whole of old Indo-China there is a total of 94 Canadian personnel.

**Mr. Churchill:** Ninety-four, right.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** This proportion is similar to the proportions of the colleague states, India and Poland.

**Mr. Churchill:** Well, we are just "keeping up with the Joneses".

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Since I do not know whether we are going to have a chance to deal with this and because it is such a vital matter, I would simply like to say this. I think it would be a matter of the greatest regret, one affecting possible peace moves in Viet Nam, if any effort to weaken the presence and the existence of the International Control Commission, particularly in Viet Nam, were successful I find it difficult to understand how there could be such a proposal.

**Mr. Churchill:** The Minister is very firm on this, but other people have different ideas, sometimes, from the Minister. I, for one, am impressed by the fact that the International

Control Commission has not made a formal report for two years. Despite all the Minister's statements with regard to the effectiveness of this organization, it is inconceivable that during the space of two years, with a war going on in Viet Nam, we can discern no useful activity by that Commission. When no war is going on, an International Control Commission may move about freely and, perhaps, report on border incidents, but when there is a war going on, an International Control Commission can do virtually nothing as its movements are restricted. It appears to me to be a waste of money and effort. I do not suggest and did not suggest the other day that the International Control Commission be abolished, but I think it should be reduced in size unless the Minister can indicate to us that the 94 personnel, during the course of a major war, are doing anything really effective with regard to that situation. Thus, we might usefully save anywhere from \$250,000 to \$500,000 spread between the Department of External Affairs and the Department of National Defence. Up to the present time we have not had information that has been conclusive, in my opinion. It has not convinced me that this is an effective operation. I ask the Minister, what in the world are these people doing?

**The Acting Chairman Mr. Allmand:** Mr. Minister, you have indicated that your answer may take considerable time.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I think we could deal with it now if you agree.

**The Acting Chairman Mr. Allmand:** Fine.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I remind members of the Committee that on April 4, 1966, this question was raised in the same way it is now being raised and I dealt with it in a statement which is part of the Committee's record. As members of the Committee know, the International Commission was established in 1954 to supervise—not to enforce—the implementation of the cease-fire agreement between the military forces of the French Union and those of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam.

No one at any time suggests that, with the numbers available to the Commission, that body could control an armed conflict, such as the regrettable war in Viet Nam. But, it would be wrong to conclude, as I am sure the Polish Ambassador who is in this room today will agree, that the Commission should be allowed to disband in the way that it is suggested.

**Mr. Churchill:** Reduce in size, not disband.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** The size of the Commission depends upon the functions that could well be given to the Commission. The other countries of the Commission maintain basically the same proportion of civilian and military personnel. On April 11 I suggested to the parties involved in the dispute in Viet Nam that if they were seriously interested in a cease-fire there were four courses open to them under the Geneva Agreement. In the suggestions I made I proposed that as a first step there be a disengagement in the demilitarized zone, and that if this disengagement were agreed to, in all equity there would have to be a cessation of the bombing by the forces of the United States.

I can do no more at this time than to say that we have made that proposal. It has been the subject of discussion. It continues to be the subject of active discussion.

I would not be prepared to say now that the present forces may have to be increased. I cannot go beyond that at this moment.

Certainly having in mind what India, Poland and Canada, as members of that Commission, have had to face in the last three years; what all of us agree may yet be a possible role for the Commission; what Canada firmly believes, at this moment, to be a desirable role for the Commission, it would be regrettable if we were to take any step whatsoever that would put Canadian participation in a less effective position than that of any of the two other members of the Commission.

I know it is possible to contend, and it is contended, that the size of the Commission might be drastically reduced, that only a token presence should be left in Viet Nam to perform the functions assigned to the Commission under this Agreement, but I would be very concerned about any such effort, particularly at this moment, when efforts are being made to help to bring about an end to hostilities in Viet Nam.

The sizes of the Canadian delegations to the Commissions in Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia are under constant review. Reductions are made whenever it becomes apparent that this can be done without undermining the ability of our delegations to work effectively, or without putting them in a position less potentially effective than our two colleague states on the Commission.

In Cambodia, for instance, a civilian Commissioner and his military adviser are able to carry out the responsibilities of the delegation.

In Laos, the International Commission has had the scope of its operations reduced in the past year or two, and a reduction was made in the strength of our delegation proportionately. This will be seen from the record of personnel given when I appeared before the Committee in 1966 and the present.

In Viet Nam, all our personnel are fully employed. Since, in addition to the requirements of the Saigon Headquarters and particularly the office in Hanoi, we must provide military offices for six Commission teams in South Viet Nam and in the demilitarized zone.

The work of some of these teams is not, in our opinion, as important as it was. We would have no objection to the suspension of three or four of these teams in South Viet Nam, especially since all teams in North Viet Nam have been withdrawn at the request of the North Viet Nam Government. But this is not a decision that we can take unilaterally.

Mr. Churchill understandably has expressed some regret that the Viet Nam Commission has not made a report to the Co-Chairmen for more than two years. The last report was in 1965. I do not think we should judge the value or the effectiveness of the Commission solely on the basis of reports to the Co-Chairmen.

This commission was established in 1954 and it was thought that one country would represent the Communist world, another country would represent the unaligned portion of the world and whatever may have been the intention with regard to Canada, we have sought as best we could to maintain an objective position on the Commission.

There is seldom agreement within the Commission about the contents of its reports. Ever since 1954, the process of completing the reports has been very difficult. I hope I have made it clear, however, that the Commission has many other functions to perform. The making of a report does not depend on Canada alone, at one point—I think it was in 1966—I thought that we might well seek to withdraw from the Commission.

I discussed this with certain Asian powers at the time, so frustrating and difficult was our assignment to the Indochina Commissions. This was before the war reached its present stage of intensification. Bearing in

mind the access the members of the Commission have to Hanoi, and what the Commission has enabled the Canadian government to do in the dispatch of an emissary on two occasions, I think it would be a matter of the greatest regret if the Commission were not to continue to function in the admittedly difficult way that it does function. The Commission may play a very important role in helping to bring about preliminary talks at least.

However, I cannot say much about that. I do not think I can add any more. If there were one subject in our Department to which I would feel more dedicated than anything else it would be that nothing should be done to disturb this Commission at the present time.

**Mr. Churchill:** You are just immovable.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Yes, I am immovable when it comes to the cause of peace.

**Mr. Churchill:** Oh, you are not the only person who believes in peace. Why make that pretence? Everyone around this table is just as interested in the cause of peace as the Minister.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I am sure of that but the difference between the Minister and the hon. gentleman who intervenes is that I have before me information which I know he would interpret just as well, but he just does not have it and I do and I have to take the responsibility. That is why I am saying that to suggest the authority of this Commission should in any way be diminished would be most regrettable.

Mr. Churchill, you are a very distinguished soldier, and I am not trying to suggest you are not interested in peace. I may put a barb in here and there but it never touches the integrity of the man at whom I am now looking. I want to make that very clear.

**Mr. Churchill:** You do not have to be so diplomatic. I think you failed to make a case for the International Control Commission though because you had to admit there has been—

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** You are going to get me back on something you will object to.

**Mr. Churchill:** There has been no formal report from that Commission in two years. You have admitted that some of the teams are inoperative. I would think with your marvellous diplomatic approach, the way in

which you so frequently convince me of error, that you should be able to deal with the Ambassadors from India and Poland and suggest to them that jointly the three countries might temporarily reduce their expenditure on the International Control Commission but keep it in operation on a smaller scale. Why do you not use some of your blandishments on those Ambassadors?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I will certainly see that your pearls of wisdom are passed on where they should be.

May I just answer Mr. Harkness' question about the percentage of pay and allowances that goes to the Department of National Defence. It is approximately 20 per cent of the estimated \$15 million.

**The Acting Chairman Mr. Allmand:** Are we ready to pass Item No. 1?

**Mr. Churchill:** Yes, so far as I am concerned I think we might pass it now but I should have liked to raise the whole question of Canada's drift toward neutrality. Perhaps we can bring this up in the fall and the Minister can think about it during the summer. But I think the whole foreign policy of Canada should now be subjected to intense scrutiny because of the changing nature of our role in world affairs and the apparent drift toward neutrality. It would be a nice topic to discuss but perhaps this is not the time to do it. I am prepared to pass Item No. 1 on division at any moment you say, Mr. Chairman.

**The Acting Chairman Mr. Allmand:** Shall Item No. 1 pass?

**Mr. Churchill:** On division.

Item No. 1 agreed to on division.

**The Acting Chairman Mr. Allmand:** The only outstanding item is Item No. 40 which deals with the International Joint Commission. It was felt that Item No. 40 should be discussed on Thursday and that Mr. A. D. P. Heeney, the Chairman of the International Joint Commission, would be called as a witness.

**Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale):** Perhaps we should seek the advice of the Committee as to whether we should ask Mr. Heeney to appear or whether the Committee would like to deal with the item now. Mr. Heeney appeared last year and we dealt with his estimates at some length. If the consensus of the Committee now is that it would not be appropriate to meet perhaps we could pass it now.

**The Acting Chairman Mr. Allmand:** Is the Committee ready to discuss Item No. 40, the International Joint Commission, today, or do they want to call Mr. Heeney?

**Some hon. Members:** Agreed.

**Mr. Harkness:** I do not think it is necessary to call Mr. Heeney at this stage; we heard him last year.

**The Acting Chairman Mr. Allmand:** Shall Item No. 40 carry?

Item No. 40 agreed to.

**The Acting Chairman Mr. Allmand:** Shall the Committee report the Estimates to the House?

**Some hon. Members:** Agreed.

**The Acting Chairman Mr. Allmand:** This completes the Estimates. The Committee is adjourned to the call of the Chair.













OFFICIAL REPORT OF MINUTES  
OF  
PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

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Translated by the General Bureau for Translation, Secretary of State.

LÉON-J. RAYMOND,  
*The Clerk of the House.*

HOUSE OF COMMONS

Second Session—Twenty-seventh Parliament

1967

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STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

**EXTERNAL AFFAIRS**

*Chairman:* Mr. JEAN-EUDES DUBÉ

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MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 7

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THURSDAY, OCTOBER 26, 1967

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RESPECTING

Report of the Department of External Affairs (1966)

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APPEARING:

The Honourable Paul Martin, Secretary of State  
for External Affairs.

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.  
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY  
OTTAWA, 1967

HOUSE OF COMMONS  
Second Session—Twenty-seventh Parliament  
1967

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Chairman: Mr. Jean-Eudes Dubé

Vice-Chairman: Mr. W. B. Nesbitt

and

Mr. Allmand,	Mr. Goyer,	Mr. Macquarrie,
<sup>1</sup> Mr. Andras,	Mr. Harkness,	Mr. McIntosh,
Mr. Asselin (Charlevoix),	<sup>2</sup> Mr. Hymmen,	Mr. Pilon,
Mr. Basford,	Mr. Lambert,	Mr. Prud'homme,
Mr. Brewin,	<sup>3</sup> Mr. Langlois (Chicoutimi),	Mr. Stanbury,
Mr. Churchill,	Mr. Laprise,	<sup>4</sup> Mr. Tolmie—(24).
Mr. Forest,	Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale),	
Mr. Forrestall,		

(Quorum 13)

<sup>1</sup> Replaced Mr. Caron on October 16, 1967.

<sup>2</sup> Replaced Mr. Lind on October 16, 1967.

<sup>3</sup> Replaced Mr. Faulkner on October 25, 1967.

<sup>4</sup> Replaced Mr. Pelletier on October 25, 1967.

Fernand Despatie,  
Clerk of the Committee.

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 26, 1967

## MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

Wednesday, October 25, 1967

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### ORDERS OF REFERENCE

The Standing Committee on External Affairs met at 11:00 a.m. on Monday, October 16, 1967. The Chairman, Mr. Dube, presided.

MONDAY, October 16, 1967.

*Ordered*,—That the Report of the Department of External Affairs tabled on March 21st, 1967, be referred to the Standing Committee on External Affairs.

*Attest*

Also present: Messrs. Klein, Lewis, Macdonald, Macpherson, Martin, and Sturges of Parliament.

MONDAY, October 16, 1967.

*Ordered*,—That the names of Messrs. Hymmen and Andras be substituted for those of Messrs. Lind and Caron on the Standing Committee on External Affairs.

At the opening of the meeting, the Chairman presided. The meeting was held on Wednesday, October 25, 1967 (see Evidence).

WEDNESDAY, October 25, 1967.

*Ordered*,—That the names of Messrs. Langlois (*Chicoutimi*) and Tolmie be substituted for those of Messrs. Faulkner and Pelletier on the Standing Committee on External Affairs.

*Attest*

Your Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure met on Wednesday, October 25, 1967, with the following members present: Messrs. Brown, Dube (Chairman), Langlois, and Tolmie.

ALISTAIR FRASER,

*The Clerk of the House of Commons.*

The Subcommittee discussed the agenda for the Committee meeting of October 26 and it was agreed to begin the consideration of the Report of the Department of External Affairs (1966)—which was referred to the Committee on October 14, 1967—with a statement from the Secretary of State for External Affairs.

The Honourable Paul Martin is to be followed by Mr. Michael C. Hall, Director General, External Aid Office.

It was also agreed to recommend that:

—Dr. Michael C. Hall be asked to appear before the Committee on Thursday, November 2, 1967;

—the Committee meet at least once a week, on Thursdays by a rule."

On motion of Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale), seconded by Mr. Paul Brown: Resolved,—That the Report be adopted.

The Committee then proceeded to the consideration of the Report of the Department of External Affairs (1966).

The Minister began making a statement pertaining to the Fisheries and Fishing Zones of Canada. A point of order was raised concerning the



## MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

THURSDAY, October 26, 1967.

(8)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs met at 11.05 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Dubé, presided.

*Members present:* Messrs. Allmand, Andras, Asselin (*Charlevoix*), Basford, Brewin, Churchill, Dubé, Goyer, Harkness, Hymmen, Lambert, Langlois (*Chicoutimi*), Laprise, Macdonald (*Rosedale*), Macquarrie, Nesbitt, Pilon, Prud'homme, Stanbury, Tolmie (20).

*Also present:* Messrs. Klein, Lewis, MacDonald (*Prince*), Members of Parliament.

*In attendance:* The Honourable Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs; Mr. M. Cadieux, Q.C., Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs; Mr. Maurice F. Strong, Director General, External Aid Office.

At the opening of the meeting, the Chairman read the Order of Reference dated October 16, 1967 (*see Evidence*).

The Chairman presented the *Second Report of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure*, as follows:

"Your Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure met on Wednesday, October 25, 1967, with the following members in attendance: Messrs. Brewin, Dubé (Chairman), Laprise, Macdonald (*Rosedale*) (4).

The Subcommittee discussed the agenda for the Committee's meeting of October 26 and it was agreed to begin the consideration of the Report of the Department of External Affairs (1966)—which was referred to the Committee on October 16, 1967—with a statement from the Secretary of State for External Affairs.

The Honourable Paul Martin is to be followed by Mr. Maurice F. Strong, Director General, External Aid Office.

It was also agreed to recommend that:

—Dr. Michael C. Hall be asked to appear before the Committee on Thursday, November 2, 1967;

—the Committee meet at least once a week, on Thursdays as a rule."

On motion of Mr. Macdonald (*Rosedale*), seconded by Mr. Prud'homme, *Resolved*,—That the Report be adopted.

The Committee then proceeded to the consideration of the Report of the Department of External Affairs (1966).

The Minister began making a statement pertaining to the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones of Canada. A point of order was raised concerning the

subject-matter of the statement. A discussion ensued, and it was agreed to allow the Minister to complete his statement, with the understanding that questioning on this matter would be deferred.

The Minister was then questioned on the subject of Vietnam.

A member's suggestion that representatives from the Committee visit Vietnam, and meet with some individuals from the South Vietnamese Assembly as well as with some representatives from the comparable body in North Vietnam, was discussed. The Chairman indicated that the question would be placed on the agenda for the next meeting of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure.

The questioning continuing, at 1.10 p.m. the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

Fernand Despatie,  
Clerk of the Committee.

## EVIDENCE

*Recorded by Electronic Apparatus*

Thursday, October 26, 1967.

• (11:05 a.m.)

**The Chairman:** Order, please. I see a quorum. First of all I will proceed by reading the Order of Reference.

*Ordered*—That the Report of the Department of External Affairs tabled on March 21st, 1967, be referred to the Standing Committee on External Affairs.

Your Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure met yesterday and I would like to have their report adopted if it is the wish of the Committee. This is the second report of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure, which reads: (*See Minutes of Proceedings*). Will someone move that the report be adopted?

**Mr. Nesbitt:** Mr. Chairman, before it is moved to be adopted—I have no objection to anything that is in the report—I will just say that to the best of my knowledge and information, no one in this group, this party, received any notice of the Steering Committee meeting and it is one of those accidental things that may well happen. But I will just say that I think it should be noted; that is all.

**The Chairman:** Mr. Nesbitt, the Clerk informs me that notices were sent to all members of the Subcommittee on Friday.

**Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale):** I confirm, Mr. Chairman, that I received a notice.

**The Chairman:** Will someone move that the report be adopted as read?

**Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale):** I so move.

**Mr. Prud'homme:** I second the motion.

Motion agreed to.

**The Chairman:** In that case I will ask Mr. Martin to proceed with the statement.

• (11:10 a.m.)

**Hon. Paul Martin (Secretary of State for External Affairs):** Mr. Chairman, I am in the hands of the Committee but I thought I

would like this morning to say something about a matter in connection with which a decision has already been taken by Parliament. The Committee will recall that on July 15, 1964 a law was passed enacting the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones of Canada. The main effect of this legislation was to create, beyond the already existing three-mile territorial sea off the shores of Canada, a further nine-mile zone within the limits of which Canada would exercise exclusive fishing rights.

This legislation, of course, was immediately enforced, the twelve-mile zone having as its inner limits the sinuosities of the coastline of Canada, except for certain bays, such as those of Newfoundland, which were already part of Canadian territorial internal waters. The only exceptions that were made to this general Canadian jurisdiction were in favour of certain European countries and the United States of America, whose fishermen had for a substantial number of years, and in certain cases for centuries, been exercising their activities within the zones described in the 1964 legislation.

It was then decided, and I informed Parliament of this decision, that pending the termination of negotiations with the countries involved, the fishermen of these countries would be allowed to continue the activities they had previously been carrying out in those areas where they had traditionally fished.

At the same time, however . . .

**Mr. Brewin:** Mr. Chairman, I do not like to interrupt but I would like to speak on a point of order. At the Steering Committee meeting yesterday we were informed, I think by Mr. Macdonald, that the Minister was going to make a statement on the report generally and on two subjects specifically; the present situation in Viet Nam and probably that in the Middle East. The subject of the territorial fishing rights treaty was mentioned but, as I understand it, we were told that we were not going to have a report on this. Therefore I did not come prepared to consider this par-

ticular subject and I wonder why this switch has been made. The members of the Opposition came here prepared to discuss certain subjects and then we suddenly have a new subject thrown at us. I would like to know the explanation for this.

**Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale):** Mr. Chairman, I do not think Mr. Brewin is quite stating the situation as it was presented yesterday. I indicated that the Minister would appear to make a general statement. Mr. Brewin invited me to make some predictions as to the subject which would likely be discussed and I indicated that it was entirely possible that we would be dealing with Viet Nam and the Middle East.

We discussed the question of straight base-lines, and my understanding at that time was that arrangements had not been made. However, I understand that all international arrangements have now been made in this regard and it seems to me that in view of the fact that Parliament has been waiting impatiently—including the hon. member for Comox-Alberni—for some two and a half years for an announcement in this regard, I do not see why we should not go ahead with it.

**Mr. Basford:** I think it is a matter of very great importance to a number of people in this country and as it involves our external relations I think the Minister should be allowed to go ahead.

**Mr. Brewin:** On a point of privilege. No one has suggested that it is not important. I suggest it is sufficiently important that if we are going to discuss it we should be given reasonable notice of it. I do not want any of the members on this side to suggest that we consider this subject to be unimportant. I am interested, although not as interested as some people because of my constituency. I think we should receive notice of this sort of mandate.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I did not understand that there was any prescribed agenda and I am willing to answer questions on all matters. This is not an announcement of policy, this is an announcement of the application of policy with regard to straight base-lines. It will give members of the Committee and others in the country an opportunity to analyze what we are doing and then at some subsequent date, if you wish, you can question me further. It will not take very long.

**Mr. Lambert:** I would suggest to the Minister with the greatest respect that this should have been made a statement on motions, where it could be commented upon. Nobody can question the Minister on it because it arises out of the business of a committee and a request that discussions be carried into the House from this Committee this afternoon for further clarification will be ruled out.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I think this is the kind of place to do this. It is not an announcement of policy; it is a report based upon what the government is doing with regard to powers already given to it by Parliament. I am ready to proceed if the Committee is agreeable.

**Mr. Churchill:** Mr. Chairman, I think the Minister should not proceed in view of the objections which have been indicated by members of this Committee.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I am in the hands of the Committee in regard to this.

**Mr. Churchill:** The suggestion has been made that he make the statement in the House. Why would he not accept that?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** For the reasons that I have already given. I wish to make this statement now. I am in the hands of the Committee.

**Mr. Basford:** Mr. Chairman, contrary to what Mr. Churchill has said, I think the Minister should proceed here rather than make a statement on Motions in the House. The only thing that can happen in the House is that the Minister will make a statement and there will be other statements made. If he makes a statement in front of the Committee, we as members of the Committee can ask him questions about it. I certainly do not know what he is going to say this morning but I already have a number of questions I want to ask here and now as to the application of the policy which he presumably is going to announce this morning. It seems to me that if he makes a statement here in Committee that we as members of this Committee should be allowed to ask questions about it.

**The Chairman:** In all fairness I must say that at the meeting of the Subcommittee yesterday we were under the impression that Mr. Martin would discuss Viet Nam, but not to the exclusion of other topics. We thought perhaps we would proceed with Viet Nam

and then move on to other topics, but I see no objection if he wants to make a brief statement on baselines and we can then move on to Viet Nam. We are not limited to any topic. I think, if it is agreeable to everyone, that Mr. Martin can proceed and make his comments on baselines and then go on to Viet Nam, or to any other topic. We will be meeting again with Mr. Martin and if there are other questions on baselines, or if there are members of Parliament who later on will have more knowledge on baselines or would like to ask further questions on this matter, then we can come back again to this subject. In that case I would ask Mr. Martin to proceed.

**Mr. Churchill:** Mr. Chairman, on a point of order. You say, "if people are agreeable." I am not agreeable at all. I think this is just a cooked-up scheme, with members of the Liberal Party prepared with planted questions to ask the Minister, and nobody else.

**Some hon. Members:** No, no, no.

**The Chairman:** Order, please.

**Mr. Churchill:** I am entitled to make my statement, Mr. Chairman. No one else present is prepared for this topic. There are members of our party who have expert knowledge on this subject and they should have been informed that the meeting was going to deal with this subject and they might have been able to be present as observers. Therefore I object to this method of procedure.

**The Chairman:** What is the wish of the Committee?

(Translation)

**Mr. Goyer:** Mr. Chairman, in my opinion the procedure used in committee is much more conducive to work than the procedure employed in the House with regard to the matter we are now dealing with. In the House, the Minister, as mentioned by Mr. Basford, will make his statement and a representative of each party will make a general comment. And that will be the end. Here, however, the opportunity to work exists and also the certainty of progressing in the work undertaken.

**Mr. Asselin (Charlevoix):** As long as we are prepared to do it.

**Mr. Goyer:** The Minister may make his statement and a little later we will be able to take part in the discussion.

(English)

**The Chairman:** Is it the wish of the Committee that we start with baselines?

All those in favour? All those against? It is agreed.

In that case Mr. Martin, will you kindly proceed.

**Mr. Churchill:** May I ask on a point of order, Mr. Chairman, if you are putting a motion to this Committee.

**The Chairman:** I am asking the wish of the Committee.

• (11.20 a.m.)

**Mr. Churchill:** You have now found that there is a very substantial group in the Committee that is against the proposal. As Chairman you have to be objective and not partisan and I therefore think you should reject the Minister's suggestion of proceeding with this discussion.

**Mr. MacDonald (Prince):** Mr. Chairman, I think democracy should rule and democracy has just ruled in favour of going ahead. I hope that this quibbling by Mr. Churchill has come to an end.

**The Chairman:** It has been ruled that Mr. Martin should proceed. We will come back to this topic later on if it is the wish of the Committee that we do so.

**Mr. Harkness:** Mr. Chairman, before Mr. Martin proceeds and so that we may know what he is talking about, could he indicate what European nations are continuing to fish in our territorial waters?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** France, Norway, Denmark, Spain and Italy.

**Mr. Prud'Homme:** Portugal?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** And Portugal. This is included in the statement. The United Kingdom as well of course.

**Mr. Harkness:** But not the U.S.S.R.?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** The U.S.S.R. lays down certain contentions but they are not involved in these particular discussions.

The statement is not too long, and I will continue. At the same time, however, the 1964 Act provided that the Governor in Council, and I quote Section 5, paragraph 1, of the Act:

may, by Order-in-Council, issue one or more lists of geographical co-ordinates of points from which baselines may be determined and may, as he deems necessary, amend such lists.

The effect of that section was that the government was empowered to establish along the coasts of Canada a system of straight baselines which would in those areas where they were proclaimed, replace the sinuosities rule. This process would permit an extension of the internal waters of Canada and, by consequence, an extension of the territorial sea and fishing zones of Canada.

The Canadian Government entered into a series of bilateral negotiations with those countries that would eventually be affected by any such establishment of baselines to ascertain whether or not the proposed straight baselines would be acceptable to them from the point of view of International Law. Although the drawing of straight baselines is a matter that can only be undertaken by Canada, such a system cannot be implemented unless it is carried out in accordance with the applicable rules of International Law. Thus if Canada could obtain the agreement of countries most directly affected, there could be no doubt that the application of the system of straight baselines would be legitimate in the eyes of the world community. If, on the other hand, such agreement could not be obtained, implementation by Canada could give rise to protests and possibly to international litigation.

These questions of treaty rights and traditional fishing activities were discussed with seven European countries, namely, the United Kingdom, Norway, Denmark, France, Portugal, Spain, Italy and, of course, with the United States of America. It will be recalled that on a number of occasions the Minister of Fisheries and I have explained some of the difficulties relating to these negotiations. I am now in a position to report further on this matter and to indicate the action that the Canadian government now proposes to take with regard to these baselines.

Within the next few days, the government will issue a first list of geographical co-ordinates of points, which will permit the immediate enforcement of a straight baseline system along the coast of Labrador and along the eastern and southern shores of Newfoundland. This will be only the first such list that the government intends to issue within the next few weeks. Other lists will follow for other areas. The main reason for beginning to implement this policy in Labrador is that the coast of Labrador is the one that most readily lends itself to an application of the rules of International Law as they are

laid down in the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zones and in the decision of the International Court of Justice in 1951 in the well-known Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case. As a matter of fact, the configuration of the Labrador coast is similar to that part of the Norwegian coast line that was the subject of the International Court decision of 1951.

As to the eastern and southern coasts of Newfoundland, the members will recall that the Canadian government committed itself in 1949, under the terms of the Union of Newfoundland and Canada, to preserve the historical internal character of the bays of Newfoundland. Although this commitment has already been fulfilled in practice through the assertion of our exclusive rights over these bodies of water ever since 1949, there have been, thus far, no special provisions made in our legislation to cover this situation. From now on, all bays on the eastern and southern coasts of Newfoundland will clearly and definitely be defined as internal waters of Canada.

The intended line along the eastern and southern coasts of Newfoundland will be a continuous one with only one exception—in the vicinity of the French islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon, pending a definitive settlement of the demarcation line in that area between Canada and France. This question is now the subject of negotiations with the Government of France.

As I said a little while ago, further lists of co-ordinates will shortly be issued. Our negotiations concerning closure of various bodies of water off our coasts have continued. I also wish to inform the Committee that the Canadian Government is at present discussing with other countries possible additional means of protection for coastal fisheries, looking to the eventual establishment of a rational regime of conservation and exploitation of the living resources of the sea through which coastal states would receive greater protection; under such a regime, it should also prove possible to provide for the interests of long distance fishing fleets.

I hope to be in a position to make an announcement on this matter in a few weeks time. I will be tabling an Order in Council consistent with this decision to establish the co-ordinates and to begin the establishment of baselines in the non-controversial areas. The Order in Council will deal exclusively at this time with the coast of Labrador and the

southeastern, southwestern and eastern coasts of Newfoundland.

**The Chairman:** Does any member of the Committee have any questions he wishes to ask the Minister with regard to baselines?

(Translation)

**Mr. Asselin (Charlevoix):** I raise a point of order, Mr. Chairman. Could we not postpone to another sitting the question period about this matter so that we can study the Minister's statement and thus ask him intelligent questions? We have told you this morning that we had not been advised that we would deal with this matter and we ask that we be granted a delay to study the Minister's statement and then ask our questions.

**Mr. Chairman:** Is the Committee agreed that the question period on this matter be postponed until later?

• (11.30 a.m.)

(English)

**Mr. Basford:** Mr. Chairman, I think if the Minister is able to answer a few short questions now and then if we were to come back for another session that the subsequent hearing would be more helpful because the members would then have had a chance to study his statement and some of his answers.

(Translation)

**Mr. Chairman:** Is this answer satisfactory to you, Mr. Asselin?

**Mr. Asselin (Charlevoix):** No. In my opinion, if we start asking questions we shall go on. We have said that we were not prepared this morning to participate in the question period. Everyone, I believe, must be treated fairly. I ask you if it is possible for the Committee to decide to postpone the question period until later.

**Mr. Prud'homme:** The questions which will be asked this morning will not be asked at the next sitting and this will give other members more time. If some members wish to ask some questions this morning and are ready to do so, I do not see why we should wait until the next sitting. If Mr. Basford questions Mr. Martin this morning I am sure he will not do it the next time. This will give more time to prepare themselves to those who are not ready this morning to ask their questions. Messrs. Asselin, Brewin and a few others will use this period at the next sitting.

**Mr. Laprise:** Mr. Chairman, that is not the point. We were convened yesterday to make

a decision about the special sitting to be held this morning. I was under the impression we had agreed that the first statement would deal with Viet Nam. Therefore, Mr. Asselin's suggestion that discussion be postponed until later is very valid. Let us then hear the Minister, if he is now ready to make this statement on Viet Nam, and we will ask our questions about territorial waters at a later sitting.

**The Chairman:** In my opinion, this request is reasonable. We will therefore adjourn the question period on this matter until the next sitting and we will ask the Minister to proceed to another matter.

(English)

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Mr. Chairman, I am in the hands of the Committee. I am ready to answer questions on anything that the Committee wishes to ask me.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** Mr. Chairman, before we leave this particular subject I was wondering if, perhaps you might use your good offices to see that we get copies of the Minister's statement because the reports of this Committee, for some reason or other, always seem to be behind the printed reports of other committees. As I say, can we not just speed it up so we can have a look at it and, perhaps, procure copies of the Minister's statement? Otherwise, we will never accept the report.

**The Chairman:** The meeting is open for questions, probably on Viet Nam.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** I was wondering whether the Minister would produce a statement on Viet Nam.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I have no statement to make but I am willing to answer any questions that any member of the Committee wishes to ask me about Viet Nam or any other subject that might come within my jurisdiction.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** Mr. Chairman, I will have some questions I would like to ask the Minister. I was unaware as I brought to your attention of what was going on this morning. I have sent for some papers containing information I want to ask the Minister about. I want to get a copy of the Minister's statement at the United Nations, unless there might be one here. Perhaps you members of the Department—

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** You were there I think, when it was delivered.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** Yes, I have a copy in my office but it is some distance from here. I would like to get a copy of that, if I might.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I would be glad to send you one.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** Is there one here?

**Mr. Allmand:** I wonder if I might ask the Minister a question on Rhodesia?

**The Chairman:** Perhaps we had better stick to Viet Nam unless there are no questions to be asked; in that case we will go on to Rhodesia.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** Well, I have a question on Viet Nam. I have sent the messenger for certain information—a copy of *Hansard*—but unfortunately I will have to speak from memory. I am sure the Minister will be good enough to correct me if I should misquote him. Could the Minister tell us—and I am dealing with the subject of the suggested bombing pauses against North Viet Nam—how many bombing pauses there have been to date for religious observances and the like?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** For religious purposes I think that there have been three.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** Could the Minister tell us how long these various pauses have been, approximately?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I think they have been from four to six days. I do not have the exact data in my mind but they were for short periods. One of them I think was for only two days.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** Has there been any evidence during these periods of time that the North Vietnamese have been accelerating the shipment of supplies and, indeed, men to the south part of Viet Nam to their Viet Cong allies?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** You ask whether there has been any acceleration; I cannot answer, I do not know.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** Would the Minister say that as far as he knows there has been no shipment of supplies during these periods?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I would not say that. I have seen it suggested that during the last short pause at *tet* supplies continued to come in and certainly there were violations of the temporary truce on both sides.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** Yes; but the Minister would not say whether there was an increase in the shipment of supplies during the bombing pauses?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I cannot say.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** What, in the Minister's opinion, could be the principal purpose of the United States aerial bombardment of North Viet Nam?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** What would be the...

**Mr. Nesbitt:** Yes; what, in your opinion, would be the principal purpose of the United States aerial bombardment of North Viet Nam?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Do you mean what is the tactic employed by the United States in its bombardment...

**Mr. Nesbitt:** No; why are they doing it.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I do not think I can answer why they are doing it. We have statements made by Mr. McNamara, but I cannot and I do not propose to explain the military strategy of the war in Viet Nam. We are not a combatant in that war and your opinion about why particular courses are taken by one side or another is as pertinent as anything I might say. But if you ask me about Canadian policy in Viet Nam I will be very glad to deal with that.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** Well, I say this. The Minister certainly has a lot of information at his disposal which the rest of us do not have. Actually I do not expect him to provide us with classified information.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Canada is in no way privy to the military strategy of either side in the war in Viet Nam and I am sure that no country that is not a combatant country has access to the military strategy or the military policy of any country in that particular field.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** The Minister will surely agree that Canada, in view of her position on the International Control Commission has, at least, some interest in what is going on there.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I think that because Canada is a member of the International Control Commission my hon. friend would recognize the limitations which would attend Canada having a greater detailed

knowledge of the military strategy of a particular country in this situation.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** Well, would not Canada in the capacity of a member of the International Control Commission receive any information or official complaints from North Viet Nam concerning military damage?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Certainly, but that is not the kind of question you have been asking me. You have been asking me for my opinion about the strategy of the war on the part of one country and I have told you that I am not in a position to comment on that. Now you have asked me a different question altogether and the answer to that is, yes, we have, as a member of the Commission, received complaints from the North; we have received complaints from the South and, in the limited circumstances facing the operation of the Commission we, as one member of the Commission, have tried to deal with those complaints.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** Has the Minister received via our representative on the Commission any information that the United States bombing has seriously damaged North Vietnamese supply lines or North Vietnamese ability to wage the war, such as the destruction of military equipment and the like?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** It is not the purpose of the Commission to report on the success or failure of any side in the war in Viet Nam. The role of the Commission is set out in the Geneva Accords. It is to arrange for a cease fire; it is to report on the extent to which member states have complied with the terms of their international commitments under the Geneva Accords, and you are asking me now to give you a report on the progress of the war and what has been the damage, and so on...

**Mr. Nesbitt:** No, I am not asking that at all.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** ...and I just do not feel that I am in a position to give you that information or do I think that is the kind of question that should be asked.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** The Minister has no information to the effect that any damage has been done by any of the bombs?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Obviously, you and I both have information. We read the papers every day.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** Well, now, that is fine.

**Mr. Churchill:** What about the Gallup poll?

• (11.40 a.m.)

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I read a Gallup poll that showed in Winnipeg certain members were way down.

**Mr. Churchill:** There are not any Liberal members out West.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** I have just one or two other questions.

In the Minister's statement to the United Nations he incorporated very largely the four points that he made to this Committee last April. After the statement was made at that time questions were put in the House and, just as a matter of opinion—unfortunately, of course, I have not the speech in front of me—there seemed to be some slight difference of opinion whether perhaps the Minister had been as specific at the United Nations as he was in our House of Commons as to whether the bombing should be stopped without any other prerequisites whatsoever, or without an equal accommodation by the North Vietnamese.

Then, the day before yesterday—I have sent for the Hansard as I have not got it here—I believe I asked the Minister in the House if he felt that if the bombing in North Viet Nam were suspended, peace talks would be a likelihood. As I recall, the Minister's reply was that he did not imply that at all.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** That is not what I said.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** Well, perhaps you could tell us what you did say. Unfortunately, I do not have it here.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** You have asked me a number of questions on a very important series of matters. On April, I made a statement to this Committee, and as you correctly point out, in my statement to the General Assembly in September I referred in the terms that I had used in this Committee to the suggestions that I made for bringing about an end to the conflict in Viet Nam.

I would like to preface my reply by pointing out that at that time I did not say that this was a proposal. I refused to put it in the form of a proposal because I was aware at that time that there was not any likelihood of acceptance of the idea. I suggested in the statement on April 11 a four-stage approach by which the combatants in Viet Nam might

start on the road to a de-escalation of the fighting, and then towards a cease fire and a negotiated settlement. Since then there has been an intensification of the fighting in and around what has been called, in the cease fire agreement of 1954, the demilitarized zone. This fact alone has immensely complicated the problem of creating the sort of situation I envisaged in the first stage of my suggestion made on April 11.

That phase, it will be recalled, envisaged a cessation of the bombing of the North in conjunction with a full restoration, under effective international supervision, of the demilitarized status of the area which serves as a provisional division between the two Viet Nams.

The four points were incorporated in my statement to the General Assembly. I stated then, and I state now, that I believe the Geneva Accords themselves provide the basis for an arrangement as contained in the four points of my April 11 suggestion. But because of subsequent events, and because there was not a full acceptance by all sides, and a complete rejection by one side of these four ideas, we have to address ourselves—to other possible solutions.

When we asked in the General Assembly for a cessation of the bombing, this was not a declaration of new policy. This was a position that we had taken privately on other occasions in consultations we had had. But this was the first time that the Canadian government at the United Nations took this position. And we did it only because we saw then, and see now, no other way of beginning peace talks. In making that suggestion, I pointed out at the same time in my General Assembly statement that this did not mean that if there was a cessation of bombing, the war would come to an end, but that there was much more that had to be done by both sides to bring the conflict to a final conclusion; and that after a careful examination of all the information available to the government, in view of the desire of the United States and in view of our own wish to see this war brought to an end, we thought the only way available at that time was for the bombing to be stopped.

I was very careful to point out that no one could guarantee what would be the results. I could not guarantee that there would be action—meaningful action—on the part of the North that would lead to preliminary talks. I did express the view that if the

bombing stopped I thought that that would be a new situation. I thought it would put an onus on the North, an onus on the Soviet Union, on Poland and on other countries to bring pressure to see that Hanoi did begin talks. And I still believe that is the situation. I am aware, naturally, of all the difficulties. I am aware of the dangers, if the bombings were to stop and were not to be followed by discussions. All of these things were taken into consideration before I did what, for a long time, many members of this Committee including my hon. friend's own party, had urged me to do.

His former Leader, it will be recalled, in the House of Commons on more than one occasion urged that the Canadian government should ask the United States to stop the bombing. I had to respond to those requests of the official opposition in the light of the situation as I assessed it at that time. I feel that the request that we did make on the 27th of September, the request that was also made by the Prime Minister of Denmark, who was at that time also the Foreign Minister of that country, and the similar requests made by the foreign ministers of Sweden and Norway, were responsible requests made after careful consideration by these governments. Certainly there was careful consideration by the Government of Canada.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** Well then, in the hope that this might lead to discussions the Minister suggests that the bombing should stop despite the fact that if the bombing stopped, undoubtedly supplies would move to the South in accelerated measure during that period, and as a consequence greatly increase the killing of our American friends.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** That is what I pointed out to Mr. Diefenbaker when, as your Leader, he made that suggestion a year ago.

• (11.50 a.m.)

**Mr. Nesbitt:** But you decided to accept that suggestion.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Well, what we have done speaks for itself, Mr. Nesbitt.

**Mr. Klein:** May I ask a question? Is there any limit to the cessation of bombing?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** No time limit has been stated.

**Mr. Klein:** Are you suggesting that they should never bomb North Viet Nam again?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** The suggestion was that the bombing should stop.

**Mr. Klein:** I know that.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Then we would see what the reaction was.

**An hon. Member:** You got the reaction apparently.

(Translation)

**Mr. Asselin (Charlevoix):** In this connection, Mr. Minister, when you made proposals to the Government of North Viet Nam as well as to the Government of the United States about ending the bombings, if I remember well I believe that the authorities of North Viet Nam had ignored the suggestion you had made and that the only condition . . .

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Are you referring to the suggestions made on April 11?

**Mr. Asselin (Charlevoix):** Exactly.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** You are right.

**Mr. Asselin (Charlevoix):** They ignored your suggestions, and the only condition under which the authorities of North Viet Nam were willing to enter into negotiations, was the withdrawal of American troops from South Viet Nam.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** No.

**Mr. Asselin (Charlevoix):** What was the answer of North Viet Nam to this suggestion?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** They rejected it completely. We did not simply ask for the ending of the bombings. We also asked for the restoration of the demilitarized zone, and Hanoi rejected that proposal. The Americans did not entirely endorse our suggestions, but they certainly approved of most of them.

As to the suggestion we have made to the General Assembly of the United Nations, it differs completely from the ones that were made before this Committee last April 11.

**Mr. Asselin (Charlevoix):** Was it somewhat along the same lines?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** No. It was a completely different arrangement, based on the Geneva Agreements of 1954.

(English)

**Mr. Stanbury:** Some Polish parliamentarians have been visiting Ottawa during the last few days. I wonder whether there has been any opportunity for you to discuss with them

the reactivation of the role of the International Control Commission in attempting to bring about negotiations between the combatants in Viet Nam.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Yes, I saw the delegation of Polish parliamentarians yesterday morning with Dr. Haidasz. The delegation was headed by the Speaker of the Polish Parliament. I had seen him before, about a year ago, in Warsaw. I discussed with him to the extent that I could—because after all this delegation is not representative of the government of Poland—in the terms that were open to me the work of the Commission. I discussed with the delegation the aspirations that the Canadian government had for this Commission since January 1966. I pointed out to the delegation that the public act we had undertaken at the United Nations when we asked the United States to stop the bombing had been taken only after the greatest consideration; that we enjoyed close friendship with the United States, with whom we have much in common, a country which shares with us the obligations of membership in the NATO alliance, and that we had come to this conclusion after the most careful consideration. And was it too much to hope that other countries, like Poland, could take corresponding action in a situation, which admittedly from their point of view might be difficult, but which might also be directed towards achieving the same purpose, which is the attainment of peace in Viet Nam.

**Mr. Stanbury:** Did you find any glimmer of hope that there might be that kind of response from Poland?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I think you would have to ask the delegation what reply they made. All I can tell you is what I said to them.

**Mr. Stanbury:** You did take the opportunity to try to activate Poland to a similar initiative?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I certainly did and I reiterate now that I continue to be strongly of the view that the members of the Commission, the three countries representing a wide area of world opinion, could play a very useful role. I could not say that it was a role that would lead to results, but a role that could prove valuable in trying to narrow the gap, and bring about an accommodation in this very serious matter.

I also took occasion to mention to them that we had received from Mr. Bebler, the former Yugoslav Ambassador to the United Nations, now the President of the World Federation of United Nations Associations, a proposal that Canada, Poland and India as the Commission powers, together with Britain and the Soviet Union, the Co-Chairmen powers, should meet in Geneva to discuss the war in Viet Nam to see what could result from such a meeting by way of a positive contribution to the bringing about of peace.

I pointed out to this delegation that we had accepted favorably—positively—the invitation, and that as far as I knew, outside of Britain, we were the only country that had accepted the invitation.

**Mr. Stanbury:** Mr. Martin, the opportunity for parliamentarians to meet seems to me to be a very valuable form of international relations, much better in many ways than formal meetings between representatives of government, in achieving some sort of rapport, understanding and mutual respect. There was a suggestion in this Committee by Mr. Pelletier, who is now one of your parliamentary secretaries—I think it was made last spring—that some representatives from this Committee might visit Viet Nam. I think at that time you did not feel there was any advantage to be gained from that.

Now that there is perhaps a more democratically-based legislature in South Viet Nam, would you see any advantage or prospective benefit from some representative members of this Parliament meeting with some individuals from the South Viet Nam Assembly, and also taking an opportunity to meet some representatives of the comparable body in North Viet Nam on a personal basis either in Canada, in Viet Nam or in some other place to try to establish some personal contact, not among the official spokesmen of these various countries, but among the representatives of the people to the extent that there are such representatives in each country?

• (12.00 noon)

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Mr. Stanbury, I fully appreciate the motives that you have in putting this question to me. You share, like everyone else, the desire to contribute to the solution of the war in divided Viet Nam. Of course, the decisions are going to be made in this difficult and complicated situation, not by individual legislators, but by those who have the responsibility of government in the

North, in the South and in other countries involved. There is, of course, value in exchanges such as the one you have in mind. Individual members of Parliament—I understand two on this Committee—have gone to Viet Nam, but were not able to get to Hanoi. There is real difficulty in that regard, and I do not want to comment on it beyond what I have said. Of course our representative on the Commission has no difficulty in going to Hanoi; he goes there regularly. I do, however, strongly emphasize that it is those who have the responsibility, those who are in authority, that we have to convince.

**Mr. Stanbury:** Everyone wants to do everything possible to try to bring about negotiations between the two sides, and negotiations on a formal basis do not seem to be achieving very much. Much of the difficulty appears to arise from a lack of trust, on the part of North Viet Nam, in any western country, for instance. It may be that personal contact can help break down that mistrust. I make the suggestion realizing that it is not we who can solve this problem, but it may be a small step toward a better understanding, which may lead to some solution.

**Mr. Churchill:** May I ask a supplementary question?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** The big problem is the establishment of contact with North Viet Nam.

**Mr. Stanbury:** Mr. Martin, perhaps if we indicate a desire on the part of this Parliament—

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Your desire will be a matter of public record. I would be interested to see the reaction to it.

**Mr. Stanbury:** It is more important that it be the desire of a Committee, or of Parliament, rather than mine; perhaps it could be considered.

**Mr. Churchill:** Perhaps I could come to the Minister's assistance here and be of help to him. Mr. Stanbury seems to be suggesting that ministerial operations in foreign affairs are not quite as successful as would be the activities of private members of Parliament. Does this cast a reflection on the Minister for External Affairs?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Certainly, if it were open to that interpretation, and I am sure you would grab that quickly!

I have always suspected, Mr. Churchill, that although there is an underlying interest on your part in the solution of vital problems, accompanying this underlying interest there is always a mischievous political disposition.

**Mr. Churchill:** I was trying to be helpful. I do not like to see a minister attacked by members of his own party.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Mr. Churchill, Mr. Stanbury is quite seriously trying to address himself to the most serious problem of our time, and you have not yet given evidence of your appreciation that this is as serious as he thinks it is.

**Mr. Stanbury:** Mr. Chairman, on a point of privilege, I want to assure my hon. friend that I have complete confidence in the Minister. It is just that the best efforts of the best minds in diplomacy in the world have not yet brought about a solution to this problem.

As Mr. Strong has indicated, there is more to the conduct of foreign relations that just relations on an intergovernmental level. He has brought business, charitable organizations and the whole Canadian community into the conduct of our external aid program, with the encouragement of the Minister, and I think that indeed all Canadians, and most particularly individual parliamentarians, should be doing all they can to try to find ways of improving communication between the combatants in the Viet Nam war.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** This is a very complicated picture, Mr. Stanbury, and if I had thought your suggestion one that deserved additional comment I certainly would have given it; but I assure you that contact with the North and with other forces is very essential. I think you have to bear that in mind.

**Mr. Allmand:** I have a supplementary, Mr. Chairman.

Earlier this year I sent to you, as chairman, just such a proposal as Mr. Stanbury has now put forward. You announced to the Committee at a meeting in the spring that you had received my proposal to send members of Parliament to Viet Nam and said that it would be discussed by the Steering Committee. Has the Steering Committee made any decision on that?

**The Chairman:** It was discussed by the Steering Committee, but no favourable decision was reached at that time.

**Mr. Allmand:** Would you say that the proposal has been rejected?

**The Chairman:** Perhaps the Committee as a whole could consider it again, but the Steering Committee itself was not favourable to it at that time.

**Mr. Stanbury:** I do not want to press something which may be considered to be completely impractical, Mr. Martin, but I do suggest that if the main objection to this suggestion is that North Viet Nam would not be amenable to it, then it seems to me...

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I did not suggest that.

**Mr. Stanbury:** No.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I simply said that your suggestion would be a matter of record; and I am sure it will be noted. I could not go beyond that.

**Mr. Stanbury:** If I may address this suggestion to the Chairman, I think that if the Steering Committee were to give further consideration to this, particularly in the light of the recent elections in South Viet Nam, an approach might be made to find out whether or not North Viet Nam, as well as South Viet Nam, would be interested in this kind of informal contact.

**The Chairman:** I would be very pleased indeed to have it on the agenda of the next meeting of our Steering Committee, and I so instruct the Clerk to take note of it.

*(Translation)*

**Mr. Prud'homme:** I would like to ask a supplementary question as a follow-up to Mr. Stanbury's question. Mr. Minister, do you mean in reply to Mr. Stanbury that, in your opinion, Hanoi would refuse to receive a group of Canadian parliamentarians who are of good faith?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I did not say that. I simply said that Mr. Stanbury's comments would be considered. That is all I can say at the moment.

**Mr. Prud'homme:** Do you believe that Hanoi might possibly be willing to receive a delegation of Canadian parliamentarians?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** It is not up to me to answer in the name of the Government of North Viet Nam. I only speak from our experience. For example, we sent over there a special envoy in the person of Mr. Chester Ronning. I know the difficulties we have encountered. I know how much preliminary work going to Hanoi involves for us, and it is with that in mind that I answered Mr. Stanbury. And I do not want to give the impression by my answer, considering the political situation, which is very sensitive, that I approve of the suggestion.

**Mr. Prud'homme:** But you do not disapprove of it either.

**The Chairman:** Mr. Goyer, you have the floor.

**Mr. Goyer:** Mr. Minister, Canada certainly took a further step forward towards the solution of the conflict in Viet Nam by advocating the unilateral stoppage of bombings by the United States. I do not know if my colleague alludes to my remarks when he says "Hum", but I would like, later, to have his comments.

(Translation)

• (12.10 p.m.)

I have already heard them, but I saw nothing very positive in his remarks. On the other hand, I wonder if Canada goes far enough in the second part of its solution with regard to the return to the Geneva Agreements and particularly with regard to the establishment of a demilitarized zone which would really be respected. Is there anything new on this matter?

(English)

**Mr. Churchill:** There is a demilitarized zone there now, and they are fighting on it.

(Translation)

**Mr. Goyer:** Which would be respected. All I ask of you is that you understand what I say. It is clear.

Many observers have believed for a long time that the war in Viet Nam continues mainly because China and the United States are in a constant state of fear, because they do not want to find zones of contention; in other words, countries where the two will really find themselves face by face as is presently happening in Viet Nam. Many observers have been suggesting and for quite a long time—and this tends to remain in the minds of those looking for a solution in Viet

Nam—that there be a wider demilitarized zone between China and the United States, such as the neutralizing of Southeast Asia and more particularly of the hemicycle between Indonesia, Japan and the Philippines.

Would not such a solution of neutralizing Southeast Asia be a progressive policy on the part of Canada? And would not this policy also be realistic, in the sense that it could support strongly our whole policy of aid to developing countries? If the neutralization of Southeast Asia could some day be realized, the amounts that these countries presently spend on arms could be used for the development for those countries. For Canada which aids some of these countries of Southeast Asia, the funds presently invested could bring much better returns in the long run.

Would it not be advantageous for Canada to do more than return to the Geneva Agreements and to the respect of the demilitarized zone and to ask instead for the neutralization of Southeast Asia and to urge the countries involved to adopt a definite position regarding this problem?

**Mr. Asselin (Charlevoix):** I would like to ask the Minister if his policy consists of asking the Americans to retire from Viet Nam?

**Mr. Goyer:** I believe that my question is clear enough.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** No, that is not the question. Mr. Goyer, I proposed a demilitarized zone in my comments of April 11. I submitted this project in order to promote a start of negotiations. As to your second question, namely the situation after the war and the neutralizing of Southeast Asia, I agree with you. I made a statement in the House explaining our position concerning that matter. You might study it and ask me your questions at the next meeting. But in principle I am in complete agreement with what you have said.

**Mr. Goyer:** Mr. Minister, I have read your statement, and if memory serves me right, you said that the Government of Canada was sympathetic to the project. Those were not the exact words used but I believe that was their meaning.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Not only sympathetic; we believe that this area must be free to choose for itself, to decide if the North and the South should unite, if they should have

one government or some kind of association. It is up to them to decide. But it behooves the international community, the great powers, to guarantee the stability of this area in order that the principle of free choice can be adopted by the Vietnamese.

**Mr. Goyer:** In your neutralization solution do you include, besides North and South Viet Nam, Cambodia and Laos which are bordering countries? In brief, do you include all the hemicycle comprised between Indonesia, the Philippines and Japan?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** On April 11 I said—I have the English text before me:

(English)

When I last spoke to the House I said that we could see merit in the proposals which have been made for the neutralization, in due course, not only of Viet Nam but of a wider area in Southeast Asia.

(Translation)

At the time of my statement to the House I said that I saw merit in the proposals of neutralization, not only in Viet Nam, but also in Southeast Asia.

**Mr. Goyer:** Are you saying this morning that the Government supports this policy?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Certainly. I confirmed this position in three lectures I gave recently at Columbia University.

**Mr. Goyer:** In this perspective, as it is up to the governments of Cambodia and Laos to make a decision on this policy, would it not be profitable to take up again Mr. Stanbury's idea in another form? Would it not be profitable, I repeat, for Canadian parliamentarians to go not to North Viet Nam, as there are difficulties and we must understand this, but to South Viet Nam and the other countries of Southeast Asia to propose this idea of neutralizing Southeast Asia; that is, to try to exercise some influence where we can really do it instead of trying to establish peace in North Viet Nam?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I believe that an exchange of views is always desirable.

**Mr. Goyer:** Do you not think it would be more profitable than to visit NATO bases? Such trips have merit per se but, in my opinion, do not advance the idea of peace. I believe that a parliamentarian will certainly be more interested in finding out de visu

what is happening in Southeast Asia to-day than in visiting NATO bases where he sees the same kind of installations over and over again.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** We can always do it, if the moment is auspicious. I have told you that I see a lot of good in these exchanges, but the question right now is to know if the moment is auspicious.

**Mr. Goyer:** Thank you.

(English)

**Mr. Harkness:** First of all, may I ask whether any of the International Commission's military teams are in, or are in the vicinity of, the demilitarized zone at this time?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** No, no.

**Mr. Harkness:** Is it not supposed to be part of their job, say, to patrol that demilitarized zone to ensure that neither side is engaged in warlike activities in it?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Yes; they are as close to it as the intensification of the present battle allows; but there is an engagement going on in the demilitarized zone.

**Mr. Harkness:** Then Control Commission personnel are in no position to report whether the North Vietnamese have camps, battle teams and so forth in the demilitarized zone?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** There is no doubt that both sides are deeply engaged in combat in the demilitarized zone.

**Mr. Harkness:** In view of the fact that these military teams are not in the demilitarized zone, which I think you said should be one of their main areas of operation...

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** That is certainly impossible, with a war in that area.

**Mr. Harkness:** Where are they, or what are they doing?

• (12:20 p.m.)

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** They are in many areas; but as I pointed out to you when we last discussed this phase of the problem, Mr. Harkness, the nature of the conflict is such that the Commission is impeded from carrying out fully, or even substantially, its obligations under the terms of the 1954 Accord. There is no doubt about that. It must be evident that where there is heavy fighting in the demilitarized zone, the Commission,

which was called upon to supervise a cease fire, is considerably hampered—very seriously I would think—in the first part of its assignment.

• (12:20 p.m.)

**Mr. Harkness:** In effect, the demilitarized zone no longer exists, then.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Well, there is a demilitarized zone scheduled by the Geneva Accord but it is a zone the demilitarization of which is not respected by the parties.

**Mr. Harkness:** In other words, it exists only on paper at the present time.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** This was not the situation a year ago. A year ago in September we made a suggestion that the demilitarized zone should be disengaged and the United States indicated its willingness to disengage in the demilitarized zone. As I recall it now, there was no official reply to that. The action of the North continued in the demilitarized zone and so did the action of the other side because of the failure to respond.

**Mr. Harkness:** So, in effect, there is no demilitarized zone at the present time from a practical point of view.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** There is a demilitarized zone set out in the Geneva Agreements, but the demilitarized zone is not respected by the parties involved.

**Mr. Harkness:** So, I say it exists now only on paper.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** It continues as an international obligation in my judgment...

**Mr. Harkness:** Well, are there any of these...

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** ... such as the demilitarized zone in the Middle East. It was not fully respected but that does not mean to say that there was not a continuing international obligation.

**Mr. Harkness:** Are there any of these military control teams in North Viet Nam at all at the present time?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Oh, yes. We have representatives in the North. There were five teams a year and a half ago and the North requested for security reasons that they be withdrawn, and for security reasons they were withdrawn.

**Mr. Harkness:** So, there are none in the North at the present time.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Outside of Hanoi, no.

**Mr. Harkness:** That is not a military control team in Hanoi, is it? Is it not merely one of the civilian representatives of the Control Commission?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** That is right.

**Mr. Harkness:** So, in the North none of the control teams are present at the present time.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** That is right.

**Mr. Harkness:** How many of them are there in South Viet Nam and where are they at present?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I do not know whether I can give you that information right now. Mr. Delworth, will you give me that? I can cover that later.

**Mr. Harkness:** How many civilian personnel of the Control Commission are there in Hanoi?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** The figures that I gave you in June I do not think have been changed. I think those figures that I put on the record continue to be the level of the civilian as well as the military commitment.

**Mr. Harkness:** That was two people as I recall it. Is that correct?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Two civilians and four military. Four military I think.

**Mr. Harkness:** Are those military personnel still in North Viet Nam? I thought you just said we had no military.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I said we had no military teams—no team sites; they were withdrawn on the basis of security. All that we have is at Hanoi. We have now teams in the South at Hue, Da Nang, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang and at Vung Tau and Saigon.

**Mr. Harkness:** What activities do those military teams carry on outside Saigon?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** To the extent that agreement enables them—agreement between the three Commission powers—they seek to carry out the assignment imposed on them by the Geneva Accord which includes an observation of what is transpiring. I admitted to you last June I think it was, or July, when

we met last, that the frustrations of the Commission are very great. They have not been able to discharge their responsibility. This has provoked you to make what I know is a carefully considered observation about their usefulness and I said at the time that I appreciated your viewpoint because of your own experience in these matters as the former minister of national defence, but my view was in view of the fact that other Commission powers maintain the same level of personnel it was important for that reason that we should do so, and also that we should not lose sight of the actual and the potential value of the existence of the Commission powers. The access that the Commission has to Hanoi and to Saigon is something that must not be overlooked.

**Mr. Harkness:** Do these teams report regularly on the numbers of American military personnel, their armament and the numbers of South Viet Nam personnel and their armament at the five places where they are stationed?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** To the extent that it is possible, they do. But there are obvious limitations.

**Mr. MacDonald (Prince):** I have a supplementary question. Who receives these reports?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** They go to the Commission and naturally I, as Secretary of State for External Affairs, receive reports.

**Mr. MacDonald (Prince):** Does a copy also go to the other two countries?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I presume so.

**Mr. Harkness:** On another phase of this matter I asked you two days ago whether you could make any statement as to the purpose of the South Viet Nam naval missions which was in Ottawa at the time—In fact, I think they were in the gallery just before I asked the question—and at that time you said you were not aware that they were here.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** The United States; I was not aware.

**Mr. Harkness:** Are you able now to tell us what the purpose of this mission was?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** They were a group of 17 who are touring various countries under the auspices of the United States

government. There are 17 officers from 12 countries including a Canadian officer and, in addition, a U.S. conducting officer. There were officers also from Indonesia, Thailand, The Republic of Korea, Philippines, The Republic of China, Brazil, Peru, Chile, Germany and so on. And they were here, not seeing me; they were here seeing the Department of National Defence.

**Mr. Harkness:** What was the purpose of this visit?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** They were here in connection with a tour—I do not suppose you could compare it to our Defence College who make a tour—but this is not the first time that the United States has had them. Every year they do this. I do not know that they come here every year; they come to discuss common military problems, supply and the like I suppose.

**Mr. Harkness:** Then the presence of the South Vietnamese admirals who were part of this delegation had nothing to do with any discussions with regard to any wars in Viet Nam?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** No.

**The Chairman:** Mr. Basford?

**Mr. Basford:** Mr. Martin, I understand that because of the United States' commitments in Viet Nam and Southeast Asia and its need to move a great deal of men and material into that area and, particularly to have free access through the Straits of Borneo, the United States' traditional position has been against any alteration of the rules relating to the high seas and particularly there is American opposition to any changes in Canadian internal waters. Is this true?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I do not know that I got the purport of that question. When you mentioned Borneo, I got sidetracked. Would you mind repeating your question?

• (12:30 p.m.)

**Mr. Basford:** I understand that Canada has been endeavouring to make some enlargement of its internal waters and territorial waters, and that because of the commitments of the United States in Southeast Asia and its need to have access to the waters of Southeast Asia, it has resisted any change in the rules relating to the high seas that any country might want to make encroaching upon the high seas.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** We have now established as a matter of law the fact that we have fishing zones of 12 miles. The issue between ourselves and the United States is not now on that point. A number of countries have taken this step unilaterally in the face of a failure of the international community to agree on a larger territorial sea. The issue is as to where the territorial sea begins. Do you start to measure from a straight baseline system or do you begin to measure from what are called the sinuosities of the coast line? This is the bone of contention. The United States itself has a bill before the Congress but that is not the real issue. The real issue is—and this is part of the continuing negotiations we have—as to where we begin to mark the 12-mile fishing zone limit.

**Mr. Basford:** Because of the need of the Americans to move through the waters of Southeast Asia, and I say particularly through the Straits of Borneo, the United States authorities have resisted attempts to change the rules relating to sinuosity of the coast, to change it from drawing the territorial waters on a sinuosity basis to drawing the waters on the basis of a straight-line course. I am wondering whether the American position has changed so that Canada can prepare geographic co-ordinates on a straight-line basis including those territorial waters, the Dixon Entrance, Hecate Strait and Queen Charlotte Sound.

**Mr. Harkness:** On a point of order, I thought that you had ruled that questioning in regard to this matter would be postponed until the next meeting or to a subsequent meeting.

**Mr. Basford:** My question is directly related to the American commitment in Southeast Asia and Viet Nam.

**The Chairman:** Are there any more questions, Mr. Basford?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I think that in fairness to Mr. Basford I should say that he is correct in saying that in the negotiations we have had—I would not want to identify the country because these negotiations are private—consideration of the principle represented by your questions has been put forward to us.

**Mr. Basford:** Is it necessary to resolve the conflict in Viet Nam...

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** No.

**Mr. Basford:** ... before we can make any change?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** No; that is, we do not believe that at all.

**Mr. Basford:** Therefore it is possible for us to change the laws relating to our territorial waters without a settlement in Viet Nam?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** The course that we are taking we believe is one that is our right to take in international law and international usage. There may be disagreement about this; this is why we are having these negotiations.

**Mr. Harkness:** There appear to be more sinuosities here than exist on the coast line.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Well, if by sinuosity you mean complication, yes. But that is not what sinuosity means.

**Mr. Basford:** If we do not have to wait for a settlement of the conflict in Viet Nam to draw baselines on the west coast, when can we do it?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** We are proceeding as rapidly as we possibly can.

**Mr. MacDonald (Prince):** In due course.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** In due course is a respectable phrase.

**Mr. Basford:** Next week?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I would not want to say when. I would not want to be tied down. We have announced the co-ordinates, the straight baseline systems; we have begun this process. There are special areas where there is controversy and negotiations with a number of countries will continue and I think we are making progress. In a matter like this you cannot speak of rapid progress because you have to take into account the interests of other countries. You have to take into account the possibility of international litigation. All of these things we have to take into account in the negotiations that are underway.

**Mr. Basford:** Bearing in mind the commitments in Southeast Asia, has the position changed?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I do not think that you can relate the commitment in Viet Nam in any way to this situation.

**Mr. Basford:** Well, you did a little earlier.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** No, I did not. I said in principle you were correct in saying that the position of one of the parties had to do with a particular concern that a country has with regard to areas in Asia, but not with regard to the war in Viet Nam. What I mean is that there are bodies of water in Asia that are of interest to some of the countries with whom we are negotiating and acceptance by them of, let us say, the Canadian position could involve these countries with respect to these other waters—the Indonesian Sea.

**Mr. Basford:** And that position has not yet been resolved?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Well, that is not for us to resolve. That is for other countries who are parties to the negotiations to discuss.

**Mr. Basford:** But we have not resolved that position with those countries with which we are negotiating?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** No, our negotiations are continuing. There have been two international conferences on this whole problem. Mr. Harkness would recall these negotiations as a member of a former Canadian government when an endeavour was made to settle this whole problem by collective international arrangement and that failed on two occasions. It was because of the failure of these conferences that the Canadian government in 1963 announced its intention of declaring as some forty countries had done, that they proposed to extend their fishing zone limits to 12 miles and then the question came up as to where you measure the 12-mile fishing zone limit: whether you used the ordinary coast line or whether you began to measure the 12 miles from the straight baseline system in accordance with the Norwegian Treaty.

**Mr. Basford:** Because of the considerations in Southeast Asia which you mentioned, would it not be possible for Canada to change its position and declare these waters protected for fisheries purposes only?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** That is one of our objectives in the negotiations.

**Mr. Basford:** Which are not yet completed?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** They are not completed.

**Mr. Basford:** Can you indicate when they will be?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** No, I cannot.

**Mr. Basford:** Is this the position that Canada is now taking—that rather than declare these waters territorial waters, we will declare them fisheries waters?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** No, our position is clear. We have established that it is now the law of the land that the 12-mile fishing zone limit is 12 miles. That is the law of this country. We have an Act. In Chapter 22, we have an Act respecting the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones of Canada assented to on 16th July, 1964.

**Mr. Basford:** Yes, but in order to avoid the problems that result from the Southeast Asia situation, is it not possible . . .

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** It does not result from the war in Viet Nam. It results from a situation in a certain portion of Asia.

**Mr. Basford:** Yes.

• (12:40 p.m.)  
**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I referred to the Indonesian Sea.

**Mr. Basford:** Yes, and I referred to the Straits of Borneo, which cause countries with which we are negotiating to take certain positions.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I do not think the war in Viet Nam is a factor in this at all.

**Mr. Harkness:** In other words the discussion is out of order.

**Mr. Macquarrie:** I am certainly not going to do what the Committee decided it would not do, namely, discuss or question the matter of the 12-mile limit. I do know now why the Minister decided not to make an announcement in the House.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I hope that you strongly approve what we are doing.

**Mr. Macquarrie:** I am delighted that after 18 years you have discovered what was in the terms of union, and also something about what has been the practice in Newfoundland for many many years. So to that extent it probably would not be meaty enough to make an announcement in the House.

I am very interested in another matter. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, that we have done such strange procedural things. We had a statement on the matter and then we decided not to have questions; and we are having

questions on a matter on which the Minister did not make a statement. I think that is unfortunate. If, in fact, this country has made any significant change in its foreign policy in reference to the Viet Nam situation since we last met in committee, and I presume when I hear the Minister on television occasionally that we have in fact done something significant and different, it is unfortunate that we did not have a statement before us.

Now all of us are of course tremendously interested in your reasoning . . .

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** We have a statement before us, the statement that I made in the General Assembly and the terms of which we have been discussing, namely, that we did take, publicly, a position with regard to at least what I think at the moment offers the only available way of trying to get meaningful negotiations under way.

**Mr. Macquarrie:** Oh yes, Mr. Chairman, I have mountains of statements made by the Minister. I read them all carefully, fully, and with appreciation but still I regret that the did—

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I am delighted that he seems to be so well informed.

**Mr. Macquarrie:** —not apply himself to this meeting of the committee which is, I think, taking up in depth a very important matter.

I would like to ask the Minister what factor prompted the change in the attitude of the government and its public utterances on the Viet Nam situation. I hope he will not seek to satisfy me with the answer that it was because of suggestions from the Opposition. This of course is good fun, but it is not really a very serious answer to a very serious question. You mentioned that the public call to the United States to cease bombing was taken after the greatest consideration. I am sure the Committee, and certainly the public, would like to know that if this serious consideration has brought about a change of approach, what factors prompted this change.

I was interested that the Minister seemed not to know a great deal about the military objectives of the United States. I wonder if he has any reason to believe that another bombing pause—I think there were more than he mentioned, and I think some of them were of a longer duration than he mentioned—would have greater efficacy—

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I was referring to the pause around the religious holiday.

**Mr. Macquarrie:** I would like to know what reason he has to believe, and hopefully what reasons the country and, indeed, the world has to believe, that a pause at this time would be more efficacious in bringing about a peaceful solution. Has any information come in as to the receptivity in the North?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Mr. Macquarrie, the decision that I announced on September 27 at the General Assembly of the United Nations naturally took into account the suggestions that had been made in many areas in our own country, and in our own Parliament. They were not the only influences that the Canadian government took into account, but they were part of the consideration. We were satisfied that the position as stated by Mr. Goldberg on September 22 represented a continuing position of the United States, namely, that they did not propose to stop the bombings unless there was some reciprocal military action on the part of the North. That could mean, for instance, a halt in the flow of materiel and of personnel from the North.

We were also aware that the North continued to say that it was not prepared to engage in talks, it was not prepared to say whether it would engage in talks, until the bombing did stop. We came to the conclusion that these were inflexible positions taken by both sides. We have had a series of conversations with many countries involved in the war in Viet Nam. We have had direct talks ourselves with members of the Commission, with Hanoi, and other countries involved. On two occasions we sent a special emissary who brought back information to us. And because we were invited by the President of the United States a year and one half ago, as were other countries, to do whatever we could to try and bring about peace in Viet Nam, we decided to do that very thing.

It was only because we saw no other possible means of encouraging preliminary discussions that we joined with the Premier of Denmark and with others in the United Nations in asking for a halt to see whether or not this would produce a preliminary meaningful discussion. We have had no information whatsoever that would warrant a positive view that if the bombing stopped the North would then regard this as the occasion for the kind of meaningful talks that we

envisaged. But we do have reasons for believing, not for knowing, that there would be a new situation created.

This is the only solution that we have available to us. If the bombing should stop, and this is a decision that does not rest with us, then there will be a new situation and the onus will have been transferred; and those who have called for the bombing to cease many of those who are calling for the bombing to cease, with the special position that they occupy vis-à-vis Hanoi, will, it seems to us, be obliged to exert legitimate pressure on Hanoi to give effect to this interpretation of what I am calling a new situation. If I thought there had been any other way open I would certainly have applied myself to that other way. We have tried for two years now, along with other countries and alone, to find other ways.

**Mr. Klein:** I have a supplementary question. Do I take it, Mr. Minister, that this policy is the by-product of the foreign policy of this Parliament?

• (12:50 p.m.)

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** The government of the country had the responsibility of taking its course in foreign policy, of formulating its foreign policy. Parliament has the right to reject or accept that policy. All I can say is that the government has taken this decision.

**Mr. Klein:** I think you said, Mr. Martin, that you took the decision as a result of it.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** No, no, I did not. I said I took that decision bearing in mind these suggestions as well as basing it on information that we ourselves as a government have. It is a decision for which we accept full responsibility and it is a decision on which we are prepared to rest.

**Mr. Tolmie:** I have a supplementary question, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Martin, it appears that Canada has advocated a bombing halt and then there is a certain "wait and see" attitude. Now, the idea has been advanced that the President of the United States should go to a neutral country such as Switzerland; he should publicly declare that he is willing to negotiate; he should stay there for a certain length of time and then if there are no overtures from North Viet Nam he should depart. I believe this was advanced because it was felt it would put more pressure on Hanoi to appear. What is your opinion on this particular idea?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I did not make that suggestion.

**Mr. Tolmie:** No, I know you did not.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** President Johnson has said on one occasion, or perhaps on more than one occasion, what his policy is and I think he said that he would go anywhere. But that is his decision. I have never suggested he should go anywhere.

**Mr. Tolmie:** Mr. Martin, I do not say that. I am asking what your opinion is on this particular idea.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I do not know that I have any comment to make on that. I do not know how useful that would be. I am not saying that he should not. I am simply noting that that was his own comment and I would like to leave my reply at that.

**Mr. Tolmie:** Mr. Martin, I feel it is a valid suggestion and perhaps one for consideration by our government.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Well, we have given consideration to that.

**Mr. Tolmie:** And what was the result of this consideration?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I do not think I can add to what I have said. We have accepted the proposal forwarded to us by Mr. Bebler. We ourselves would be prepared along with the Commission powers and the two Co-Chairman countries to go to Geneva—that was the site proposed—and that continues to be our position. But unfortunately, to the best of my knowledge, Britain and Canada are the only countries that accept it.

**Mr. Tolmie:** Then I take from your statement...

**The Chairman:** I think we should allow Mr. Macquarrie to complete his line of questioning, unless he has finished.

**Mr. Macquarrie:** No, I have not finished and I doubt if I will finish before one o'clock as it is only six minutes till then.

When the Minister was last in the Committee with us he suggested the government was demurring from a public call for a unilateral cessation of the bombing. Now, what were the factors that have prompted that change from what he used to call "quiet diplomacy" to a public call for action on the part of one of the fighting powers?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I do not think there is a change in the techniques of diplomacy. Diplomacy itself, by its very nature, I think has to be quiet. The fact that we called publicly for a bombing pause is not inconsistent with that position. This was a policy which we decided in the circumstances was one that should be pursued.

**Mr. Macquarrie:** I am asking you why you decided to change it?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Because we felt this is the only way by which we might be able to bring about preliminary meaningful talks. That is why. I know of no other way now open. I do not say other ways will not become open. But at the moment I know of no other way and, in view of the requests that have been made for the cessation of the bombing by the North repeatedly, in the absence of other solutions this seemed to us at the time and it continues to seem to us to be the only way that offers a possible solution at present.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** Could not this information have been communicated to North Viet Nam, since you were professing this, in another way rather than by what appeared to some to be a public propaganda attack on the United States?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I do not think your suggestion of a propaganda attack on the United States deserves comment any more than it would be fair to say that your own leader was guilty of a propaganda attack on the United States when he made a similar proposal a year ago.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** That was a year ago.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I think that Canada—

**Mr. Nesbitt:** It was not made in the same way.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Canada has shown its friendship for the United States. We understand the position of the United States. We are very sensitive of our relations with the United States. We understand the nature of their obligations and because Canada took this position, because many Canadians take it, I do not think warrants, if I may say so, from a distinguished member of Parliament the suggestion that this reflects an attack on a very friendly power. It was no such thing. It is not open to that kind of construction.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** A great many people think it is.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** And I regret that a man who was Parliamentary Secretary to the Secretary of State for External Affairs should have made it.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** You need not get ruffled. I am merely telling you so you will know what a great many people are saying. You ought to improve your sources of information, I should say.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I am not ruffled.

**Mr. Lewis:** The Minister is right but perhaps he should re-read some of the statements he made in Parliament against some of us who advocated it a year or two ago.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** No, I do not think I would change anything I said, Mr. Lewis. Foreign policy is something that is vital, particularly in this very serious situation. One has to reach decisions in the light of circumstances as they are presently before him.

I think the course that we have taken up to now has been constructive and wise.

**Mr. Lewis:** Does your statement to this Committee, Mr. Martin, mean in effect that you came to the conclusion that the quiet diplomacy approach had failed and a public statement had to be made?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** No. I said to Mr. Macquarrie a moment ago that quiet diplomacy is a technique in no way altered by a decision we took and declared on the 27th. We are now engaged in diplomatic efforts in this very matter. These efforts would be meaningless if they were not conducted within the limits of privacy.

**Mr. Lewis:** I am trying to understand. I understood over the time I have been in Parliament from your answers to statements made by some of us—my colleagues and myself—and your vote on a certain amendment which I moved last spring on this very issue, that what you were saying to us was that it was unwise . . .

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I am sure . . .

**Mr. Lewis:** Wait a minute. —to declare the policy publicly.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I am sure . . .

**Mr. Lewis:** You were hinting that you were in favour of the decision of the bomb-

ing but in your view that opinion ought to be transmitted to world or to other nations and to the United States quietly behind closed doors.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** That has been done. I assure you, Mr. Lewis . . .

**Mr. Lewis:** Now you have changed that.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** No.

**Mr. Lewis:** I am very glad you have changed it. I congratulate you on it. I am not criticizing it; I am just wondering whether that does not mean you have to admit that the quiet diplomacy approach was unsuccessful.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I have already dealt with that in answer to a question by Mr. Macquarrie. I think the course we took at the time you made this motion was the right one. When we took the position we did on the 27th of September this year, this was the background: the war was escalating; other solutions had not worked; other countries had taken the position that we took on the 27th and these were factors that strongly influenced us.

**Mr. Lewis:** I am delighted; better late than never.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I find this is so serious a matter that I cannot be convinced that it is as simple as you are suggesting now. It is a very difficult, complicated matter.

**Mr. Lewis:** Of course it is.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** It is not one that can be solved by simplification or generalization.

• (1:00 p.m.)

**Mr. Macquarrie:** I do not want to delay the Committee and perhaps it would be a good technique to call it one o'clock, or whatever one does on committees. I do not really think our purpose here is to discover who was right or wrong first, or who agreed or disagreed with someone else. I wish the Minister had been able to give us a little more justification for his change. At times we wonder if in fact there was a change. I notice two of the Minister's . . .

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** No, there was no change.

**Mr. Macquarrie:** There was no change?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** No. I have said that we felt for some time . . .

**Mr. MacDonald (Prince):** Last week you said that there was.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** We have said privately for sometime that we thought that a halt in the bombing was desirable. We did not publicly say so until the 27th of September. We had good reasons, in my judgment, for the decision to make public a position that we had made known privately.

**Mr. Macquarrie:** Are you prepared to tell the Committee and the Canadian people why the advice, which, I presume, was rendered often privately to a friendly government and was not heeded, has a better chance of being heeded by being proclaimed from the rostrum of the United Nations?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I think that the place to make these declarations is the rostrum of the United Nations, and that is why we did so.

**Mr. Macquarrie:** Why did you not do it earlier, in that case? What were the factors? What has brought about the change?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Because at other times there were other solutions that were being explored and the door had not been shut on some of these other possible solutions.

**Mr. Lewis:** What were they?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I cannot discuss them publicly.

**Mr. Harkness:** The question seems to be, "when is a change not a change?"

**Mr. Macquarrie:** It is possible that we are all getting . . .

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Mr. Lewis does not seem to be satisfied with my last response, and I would want him to be satisfied. We have had private conversations with a number of governments on this matter. We have had private discussions with Hanoi on this matter. It would not have been possible for us to have had these discussions if we had taken any other course. If we had revealed the nature of these discussions there would not have been any discussions.

**Mr. Lewis:** I am not asking you to reveal the nature of the discussions. With great respect I, as others do, read carefully what appears, and I wonder what solutions were available that have disappeared. Surely the Minister is exaggerating.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I am not exaggerating.

**Mr. Lewis:** He may have been exploring avenues, but surely there were no solutions available to him?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Yes, there were solutions. There were proposals which, if accepted, would have provided a solution. I exposed here in public on April 11, a solution which is contained in the Geneva Accord. Had this been accepted it would have brought about a solution.

**Mr. Lewis:** Well, of course, war would not have occurred if that had been accepted, Mr. Martin.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** The war certainly would have occurred.

**Mr. Lewis:** If the Geneva Accord had been accepted and lived up to you would not have had the war.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I do not think that you have examined those solutions. The war would have continued. A disengagement in the demilitarized zone would not have meant an end of the war by any means.

**Mr. Lewis:** You referred to observance of the Geneva Accord. I suggest to you that if the Geneva Accord had been observed the war would not have started.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** This proposal of April 11 was embedded in the Geneva Accord. This proposal called, first, for a disengagement in the demilitarized zone and then we said that if this took place in equity there should be a cessation of the bombing.

Then there was a next step, and until that next step and two others in the proposal were accepted the war would have continued. But it would have been a first step, just as we believe a cessation of the bombing could prove to be a first step. I cannot guarantee that it will be a first step, but if it does take place, as I have said, I think a new situation would be created; and I think there would be an onus on others to bring pressure to see that meaningful talks began.

There are those who say that there would be meaningful talks. I have never said that. I would hope that there would be meaningful talks. I saw an article—and we have had other messages to the same effect—by Mr. Burchett, an Australian newspaper man, who, in January of this year, after a conver-

sation with the foreign minister of North Viet Nam, reported that if the bombing stopped there would be talks. I cannot lay claim to such certainty, but these assertions are made. Something like that . . .

**Mr. Nesbitt:** This was in the report the other day.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** No. I think you are referring to the Statement of General Giap. If you carefully analyze that statement you will find that it is inconsistent with what Burchett said.

**Mr. Lewis:** Would it be correct to assume that Mr. Ronning brought similar information to you?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I cannot say what information Mr. Ronning brought back. We were able to have these conversations with the North. We hope to have further conversations with the North, but I want to respect the nature of those conversations. I want to make sure that they can take place again. That is why I cannot comment any further.

**Mr. Lewis:** May I rephrase the question and ask you whether the reports Mr. Ronning brought to you played a part in the decision you finally made and the declaration which you made on September 27?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Certainly they played a part.

**Mr. Macquarrie:** I am afraid I am losing the thread of this because there have been so many supplementary questions.

Is it the suggestion that a public call for the cessation of bombings, as against a private one, creates a better climate for discussion with the North? Is this the function the Canadian government is performing; and that now to say publicly what we have been saying privately has improved the chances? In other words, is it a *sine qua non* of further discussions that the United States be publicly called upon to restrain itself in this regard?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** The factors I have given you, namely, that the war was escalating, that other solutions had not worked, that other countries had called publicly in the United Nations for a cessation of bombing, were very much in our minds when we decided that this was the right course to take.

**The Chairman:** Gentleman, it is now well after one o'clock. Unless we wish to sit

through the lunch hour I think this would be a good point at which to adjourn. I am sure Mr. Martin will be willing to come back again.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I am ready to stay.

**The Chairman:** Does the Committee wish to remain?

**Some hon. Members:** No.

**The Chairman:** Adjourned until next Thursday.





OFFICIAL REPORT OF MINUTES  
OF  
PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

This edition contains the English deliberations and/or a translation into English of the French.

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Translated by the General Bureau for Translation, Secretary of State.

ALISTAIR FRASER,  
*The Clerk of the House.*

HOUSE OF COMMONS

Second Session—Twenty-seventh Parliament

1967

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STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

**EXTERNAL AFFAIRS**

*Chairman:* Mr. JEAN-EUDES DUBÉ

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MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 8

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THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 2, 1967

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 3, 1967

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RESPECTING

Report of the Department of External Affairs (1966)

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APPEARING:

The Honourable Paul Martin, Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

and

WITNESSES:

Dr. Michael C. Hall, Willowdale, Ontario; Mr. Maurice F. Strong,  
Director General, External Aid Office.

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.  
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY  
OTTAWA, 1967

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Chairman: Mr. Jean-Eudes Dubé

Vice-Chairman: Mr. W. B. Nesbitt

and

- |                              |                            |                    |
|------------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------|
| Mr. Allmand,                 | <sup>2</sup> Mr. Deachman, | Mr. Langlois       |
| Mr. Andras,                  | Mr. Forest,                | (Chicoutimi),      |
| Mr. Asselin<br>(Charlevoix), | Mr. Forrestall,            | Mr. Laprise,       |
| Mr. Basford,                 | <sup>3</sup> Mr. Gross,    | Mr. Macquarrie,    |
| Mr. Brewin,                  | <sup>4</sup> Mr. Habel,    | Mr. McIntosh,      |
| <sup>1</sup> Mr. Caron,      | Mr. Harkness,              | Mr. Pilon,         |
| Mr. Churchill,               | Mr. Hymmen,                | Mr. Stanbury,      |
|                              | Mr. Lambert,               | Mr. Thompson—(24). |
- (Quorum 13)

Fernand Despatie,  
Clerk of the Committee.

- <sup>1</sup> Replaced Mr. Macdonald (*Rosedale*) on October 27, 1967.
- <sup>2</sup> Replaced Mr. Goyer on November 2, 1967.
- <sup>3</sup> Replaced Mr. Tolmie on November 2, 1967.
- <sup>4</sup> Replaced Mr. Prud'homme on November 2, 1967.

Report of the Department of External Affairs (1966)

APPPEARING:

The Honourable Paul Martin, Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

and

WITNESSES:

Dr. Michael C. Hall, Willowsdale, Ontario; Mr. Maurice F. Strong,  
Director General, External Aid Office.

ROGER DURAND, P.R.C.  
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY  
OTTAWA, 1967

MINUTE ORDERS OF REFERENCE

FRIDAY, October 27, 1967.

*Ordered,*—That the names of Messrs. Klein and Caron be substituted for those of Messrs. Tolmie and Macdonald (Rosedale) on the Standing Committee on External Affairs.

WEDNESDAY, November 1, 1967.

*Ordered,*—That the name of Mr. Tolmie be substituted for that of Mr. Klein on the Standing Committee on External Affairs.

THURSDAY, November 2, 1967.

*Ordered,*—That the names of Messrs. Groos, Habel and Deachman be substituted for those of Messrs. Tolmie, Prud'homme and Goyer on the Standing Committee on External Affairs.

Attest

ALISTAIR FRASER,

*The Clerk of the House of Commons.*

The Subcommittee discussed the report of the representatives from the Committee. The members were of the opinion that a trip to Vietnam would only be useful if representatives of Parliament or of Government at Saigon and Hanoi indicated their willingness to receive a Parliamentary delegation from Canada. The members felt that the Department of External Affairs should be requested to make inquiries to that effect.

There was a discussion regarding letters received from the Canadian Section of The Fellowship of Reconciliation, dated October 23 and 24, 1967 and proposing that the Vietnamese Buddhist monk and leader Thich Nhat Hanh be asked to address the Committee about the Vietnam situation. The members agreed to recommend that an invitation be extended to Thich Nhat Hanh for Thursday, November 16, 1967, with the understanding that inquiries would be made through the Department of External Affairs in order to obtain the name of a prospective witness whose opinions might be different from those of the Buddhist monk.

Following remarks made by Mr. Nesbitt, it was agreed to amend the last part of the third paragraph to read: "... as a prospective witness who would represent the views of the Saigon Government."

On Motion of Mr. Brawn, seconded by Mr. Macgibbon, the Report, as amended, was adopted on division.

On motion of Mr. Basford, seconded by Mr. Lortie,

*Resolved,*—That reasonable living and travelling expenses be paid to Mr. Michael C. Hall, who has been called to appear before the Committee on November 3, 1967.



## MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

THURSDAY, November 2, 1967.

(9)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs met at 9.55 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Dubé, presided.

*Members present:* Messrs. Allmand, Andras, Asselin (*Charlevoix*), Basford, Brewin, Caron, Churchill, Dubé, Hymmen, Lambert, Langlois (*Chicoutimi*), Macquarrie, McIntosh, Nesbitt, Pilon, Stanbury, Tolmie (17).

*In attendance:* Mr. Michael C. Hall; Mr. Maurice F. Strong, Director General, External Aid Office.

The Chairman presented the *Third Report of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure*, as follows:

"Your Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure met on Tuesday, October 31, 1967, with the following members in attendance: Messrs. Brewin, Dubé (Chairman), Johnston (replacing Mr. Thompson), Nesbitt (4).

The Subcommittee discussed the question of a visit to Vietnam by representatives from the Committee. The members were of the opinion that a trip to Vietnam would only be useful if representatives of Parliament or of Government at Saigon and Hanoi indicated their willingness to receive a Parliamentary delegation from Canada. The members felt that the Department of External Affairs should be requested to make inquiries to that effect.

There was a discussion regarding letters received from the Canadian Section of The Fellowship of Reconciliation, dated October 25 and 30, 1967 and proposing that the Vietnamese Buddhist monk and Scholar Thich Nhat Hanh be asked to address the Committee about the Vietnam situation. The members agreed to recommend that an invitation be extended to Thich Nhat Hanh, for Thursday, November 16, 1967, with the understanding that inquiries would be made through the Department of External Affairs in order to obtain the name of a prospective witness whose opinions might be different from those of the Buddhist monk."

Following remarks made by Mr. Nesbitt, it was agreed to amend the last part of the third paragraph to read: ". . . of a prospective witness who would represent the views of the Saigon Government."

On Motion of Mr. Brewin, seconded by Mr. Macquarrie, the Report, as amended, was adopted on division.

On motion of Mr. Basford, seconded by Mr. Lambert,

*Resolved*,—That reasonable living and travelling expenses be paid to Dr. Michael C. Hall, who has been called to appear before this Committee on November 2, 1967.

The Chairman then introduced Dr. Michael C. Hall. It was indicated that this witness would be followed by Mr. Maurice F. Strong, Director General, External Aid Office.

Dr. Hall made a presentation regarding his views on Canadian aid in Vietnam. He was questioned thereon.

It was mentioned by the Chairman that copies of Dr. Hall's statement would be forwarded to Members of the Committee as soon as possible, together with the following documents submitted by the witness:

- (a) *Orthopaedic Unit at Cho Ray Hospital, and Coordinated Activities;*
- (b) *Additional Medical Aid by the Canadian Government to Vietnam.*

At 12.30 p.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

FRIDAY, November 3, 1967.

(10)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs met at 9.35 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Dubé, presided.

*Members present:* Messrs. Allmand, Andras, Basford, Brewin, Caron, Churchill, Deachman, Dubé, Forest Groos, Habel, Hymmen, Langlois (*Chicoutimi*), Laprise, Macquarrie, McIntosh, Pilon, Stanbury (18).

*Also present:* Messrs. Cameron (*Nanaimo-Cowichan-The Islands*), Goyer, Sherman, Members of Parliament.

*In attendance:* The Honourable Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs; Mr. Maurice F. Strong, Director General, External Air Office.

The Chairman referred to a meeting of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure, held on November 2, 1967. He then introduced the Honourable Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs.

The Minister made a statement pertaining to Canadian aid to Vietnam. He was followed by Mr. Strong who began making a statement, but was interrupted on a point of order, regarding questioning of the Honourable Paul Martin. A discussion ensued and Mr. Strong was allowed to complete his presentation and answer questions.

It was agreed to have the following documents printed as appendices to this day's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence:

- Application for Expert—By the Government of Vietnam to the Government of Canada for an expert in Orthopaedy—for the services of Dr. Michael C. Hall—(See Appendix B);*
- Top Contributors from the Colombo Plan—schedule based on figures prepared by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)—(See Appendix C).*

At 11.00 a.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

Fernand Despatie,  
Clerk of the Committee.

## EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

Thursday, November 2, 1967

• (9:55 a.m.)

**The Chairman:** Order, please. I believe we have a quorum.

Your Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure met yesterday and I would like to read the report for your consideration. (See *Minutes of Proceedings*)

You have heard the report of the Subcommittee. What is your pleasure?

**Mr. Nesbitt:** Mr. Chairman, I would like to make one slight correction. As I recall the meeting, the witness in addition to the Buddhist monk that we were trying to obtain to give evidence was to be a representative of the Saigon government. That was our understanding.

**The Chairman:** Would you like to amend the report to that effect?

**Mr. Nesbitt:** I would so move to that effect.

**The Chairman:** Will someone move that the amended report be adopted?

**Mr. Basford:** Mr. Chairman, speaking on the amendment, I do not know what protocol is involved. This is a Canadian parliamentary committee and it seems to me it would be a most unusual procedure if we were to have in front of this Committee a representative of some other government. I know this occurred, for example, in the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons on the Canada Pension Plan when the director of the American social security system appeared before the Committee. However, his appearance had really been arranged quite informally. There was no formal invitation extended to him. I am not aware of the protocol but to me this seems to be a somewhat unusual situation and I would like to refer the amendment back to the Steering Committee for consideration before we issue an invitation to the representative of some foreign government.

**The Chairman:** If I am correct, Mr. Nesbitt was not referring to a cabinet minister; he

was referring to someone representing the views of that government.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** Yes, exactly.

**Mr. Lambert:** Let us get a little balance on some of these things.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** Perhaps the Committee only wants to hear the Communist side of the story, I do not know.

**The Chairman:** It was felt that the monk would give his opinion which, I presume is the opinion of the pacifists, and to balance that off the Committee would try to obtain the opinion of another person who might have a different approach from that of the monk.

**Mr. Basford:** Yes, that is fine, but it is a slightly different proposal from the one which I understood Mr. Nesbitt originally made.

• (10.00 a.m)

**The Chairman:** Is there a mover for the adoption of the report as amended?

**Mr. Brewin:** I so move.

**Mr. MacQuarrie:** I second the motion that the report of the Subcommittee be adopted.

**The Chairman:** All those in favour?

**Mr. Lambert:** Mr. Chairman, are we going to provide a platform or a sounding board for everyone who wants to sound off on his views with regard to Viet Nam? If we invite this Buddhist monk to appear, can we then turn down anyone from anywhere in Canada who wants to use this Committee as a platform to express views that may extend from one end of the spectrum to the other?

**The Chairman:** No. I believe it was the feeling of the Subcommittee that we should invite two witnesses; one who would express one opinion and a second who would express a different opinion and we would then move on to another topic. Of course, we are in the hands of the Committee. It is up to the Committee to decide.

**Mr. Lambert:** Are you also prepared to hear representations with regard to one side or the other from people from Nigeria or Rhodesia or Israel?

**The Chairman:** We will see about that when we come to it. At the present time we are discussing Viet Nam and I hope that in December we will move on to some other topic. However, this is just an expression of the feeling of the Subcommittee. If the Committee feels that we should not hear these witnesses, very well.

**Mr. Basford:** I am inclined to agree with Mr. Lambert's observation, that we are opening the way to having 100 people attend who want to come and speak about Viet Nam.

**The Chairman:** Oh, yes, they may want to come but they will not all appear as witnesses.

**Mr. Basford:** But if we hear from two people, surely the other people who want to testify have a right to testify as well. What consideration was given to that by the Steering Committee?

**Mr. Allmand:** Mr. Chairman, I would agree that we should not hear everybody who may want to be heard. I think we can leave it with the Steering Committee to use their good discretion to look at the qualifications of the people who may come before us to see if they really have something worthwhile to contribute. Because this is a very serious problem I think it would be worthwhile to hear the views of people who are in touch with what is going on in Viet Nam and to have them appear before us. There is too much conflicting information and if we can get more information I think we would benefit from it. I think the Steering Committee will use its good discretion in determining which witnesses should come before us and which should not. I would support this particular resolution. I would like to hear this fellow.

**Mr. Lambert:** Mr. Chairman, may I add another remark?

**Mr. Chairman:** Yes, Mr. Lambert.

**Mr. Lambert:** In the light of the many letters that have appeared in the press with regard to the situation in Nigeria that protest against the sort of "head in sand" attitude that Canadians generally and the government is taking with regard to what is happening in a fellow Commonwealth country, I think we

should concern ourselves with the situation that is applicable there rather than perhaps getting embroiled in the internal affairs of Viet Nam.

**An hon. Member:** I quite agree.

• (10.05 a.m.)

**Mr. McIntosh:** Mr. Chairman, I agree with Mr. Allmand. I think if we are going to form an opinion, even if it is a personal one and without regard to whether it is government policy or not, that we should hear both sides of the story. I think this has been our lament in the past, that we have only been hearing one side of the story, and I am quite prepared to say that this Committee is capable of deciding on this matter and we should not leave it to the Steering Committee to decide whether we should hear both sides of the story or just one, the side we want to hear. I agree with Mr. Allmand that this Committee is entitled to do this, even if it is against what I believe.

**Mr. Macquarrie:** I also agree with Mr. McIntosh. We do not need to hear every proponent of a point of view but surely we should expose ourselves to all points of view. There may be more than two points of view and I hope we will be able to go in some depth—as deeply as we are able—into this Viet Nam situation and then move on to some of the other matters. I hope we will end this perfunctory examination of a few documents and then close shop with our Committee. I believe there is a great deal of examination ahead of us and I welcome the suggestion that we begin in this way.

**Mr. Churchill:** I wonder if the Steering Committee has given any thought to the aims of this particular Committee? We can get involved with the Viet Nam problem, as we have been doing now for about three years. We read of nothing else. Has the Steering Committee considered directing our attention to such matters as those of which Mr. Lambert spoke, affairs that affect the Commonwealth and matters that are perhaps a little more closely allied to the Canadian position? As far as Viet Nam is concerned we have been adopting a "hands off" attitude for several years now and I do not see any intention on the part of Canada of getting involved in that struggle, and yet from the great heights various people in Canada are passing opinion from time to time with regard to it. Should we not direct our attention to matters with which we are more

clearly involved and areas into which we are putting out money, and things of that nature, rather than spending our time and energy on the Viet Nam situation? Surely we have other problems that concern us more directly.

I do not minimize the dangers of the Viet Nam situation or the dangers of a third world war at all but for a country that is not actively engaged in that operation I think it is a bit ridiculous for us to carry on a pretense that we are going to form an opinion with respect to whether the war which is going on in Viet Nam should continue or should stop or should be modified. What right do we have as Canadians to officially—individually we can do what we like—attempt to pass opinion on that conflict? Why do we not concern ourselves with matters that are closer to us? We have observers between Israel and Egypt. The Middle East is perhaps more likely to cause world trouble than Viet Nam. We are mixed up in the subject of Rhodesia, which is part of the Commonwealth problem, Nigeria has been mentioned, and there is the whole question of aid to developing countries within the Commonwealth. Surely we should be giving our attention to that. We can read about Viet Nam every day of the week. We hear about it on radio and television every night. Why do we have to have two individuals come here to present a personal point of view with regard to Viet Nam? That is all it is, an individual point of view. The gentlemen who may be invited will possibly be first class but, after all, they are merely two individuals. I think our direction is wrong.

**The Chairman:** Mr. Brewin has asked to speak and so has Mr. Basford. Before Mr. Brewin begins I would like to say that in one way I agree with Mr. Churchill, that we should not limit ourselves to Viet Nam, but it was felt that we should hear two more witnesses before we moved on to something else. However, if the Committee feels that we have heard enough on Viet Nam, then we are in the hands of the Committee and we will proceed to something else. Mr. Brewin.

**Mr. Brewin:** Mr. Chairman, I think I agree with Mr. Churchill. We do not want to spend all our time on Viet Nam. I think you will recall the suggestion I made that we hear witnesses on the question of the Rhodesian sanctions, which is a very key problem as far as the Commonwealth is concerned, and it is one in which Canada in the person of Mr. Pearson made a contribution at the last Com-

monwealth meeting. However, I do not think that is any reason why we should not spend at least one or two days on Viet Nam. It is certainly a central issue in external affairs. Every country in the world is concerned because the implications can grow and expand into something that affects all of us and I do not see how a Committee on external affairs, which is what we are, could possibly shut its eyes or close its ears to some information which in the judgment of the Steering Committee can be helpful on the subject of Viet Nam. I do not think these are alternatives; I hope we will go on after this meeting to deal with the African or Rhodesian situation, or even Nigeria. The Steering Committee will have to use its judgment in this regard. I do not see any reason why we should not accept this suggestion.

• (10:10 a.m.)

**Mr. Basford:** Mr. Chairman, I disagree with Mr. Churchill. Apart entirely from the fact that this is an External Affairs Committee, surely as citizens of the world we are directly concerned and involved in the awful bloody war that is going on in Viet Nam. My objection to the Committee's report is that it does not seem to indicate whether or not we are going to have a proper examination of the situation in Viet Nam. Surely a proper examination does not consist of a statement from the Secretary of State in July, an appearance by a Buddhist monk and someone representing the viewpoint of the Saigon government. Surely that does not constitute a proper and thorough examination. If the Steering Committee wants us to go into an examination of Viet Nam then let us have a proper examination. I do not think that that constitutes a proper examination either for us or through the medium of the Committee, a proper examination in terms of public reception or understanding of the issues that would be gained by an examination here in the Committee. I would like to see the Steering Committee come forward with what its real proposal is on an examination of Viet Nam, rather than week by week adding other names to a list of witnesses.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** I think perhaps there is not really that much disagreement within the full Committee. There has just been certain emphasis on certain points. It so happened that I was one of those on the Steering Committee who insisted on seeing the qualifications of the Buddhist monk who appeared, and those qualifications were pro-

duced. He would seem to be a person who probably would give a clearly one-sided point of view and a personal one. Of course, he would be subject to cross-examination by members of the Committee and we might be able to gain some information from him. I do not think I am divulging anything I should not be divulging—anybody who does not agree with my interpretation of the Steering Committee meeting, of course, is welcome to say what they like—but we felt that there should also be someone who is qualified representing the other point of view. One of the factors concerned was the fact that this Buddhist monk who, as I understand it, is a resident of Paris, France, is available within the next week or so. To get witnesses from such other places as Nigeria or Rhodesia would take some time; in fact, it might take several weeks to arrange to get them here. In the meantime we felt that since these people would be easily available—representatives of the Saigon government are observing at the United Nations or in Washington—we could probably hear one right after the other, thereby having the two points of view. Certainly my understanding, as I gathered from Mr. Brewin, was that after this we were certainly going on to these other matters which are of equal or perhaps greater importance to Canada.

**Mr. McIntosh:** Mr. Chairman, I agree with most of what Mr. Churchill has said except his conclusion. I think it is a step in the right direction, as far as his argument is concerned if we start on one subject. Whether you take Viet Nam, Rhodesia or Nigeria first, it does not matter. As Mr. Nesbitt pointed out, this is the most convenient one to deal with at the present time because this witness is available. In view of what Mr. Churchill said, I would ask him to reconsider whether we, as representatives of the Canadian people, must deal with the situation in Viet Nam because our Minister of External Affairs has made a statement on this which I do not agree with. I take the opposing side. I have had the opportunity of listening to this Buddhist monk for a short time and though I do not agree with his views I think that the Committee would be well advised to listen to what he has to say. He has a proposal. It may not work. I do not think it will. I do not think that he can form a government or that his party can form a government, as he suggests, if both sides withdraw. However, I think for our own knowledge it would be beneficial. We have been getting too much on

one side and not enough on the opposing side on these situations in Rhodesia, Viet Nam and Nigeria. I would ask Mr. Churchill to reconsider because this is a first step to get information from both sides, and I think this is the way we should proceed.

• (10:15 a.m.)

**Mr. Allmand:** Mr. Chairman, although it has been said that we are not directly involved in Viet Nam—we are in a way because we are on the International Control Commission. We are also the neighbour of a country that is deeply involved. I think we also have to admit that Viet Nam is not just an internal matter; it is the most volatile international problem today. I think it can explode at any time. Every country that went before the United Nations in their general presentation mentioned it as the most serious international problem today. I think it deserves top priority in that we as a member of the International Control Commission—a country which has sent emissaries, such as Mr. Ronning and others, on several occasions to Hanoi and Washington—should be as well informed as we can. I would support Mr. Basford's suggestion. Maybe we should even have a deeper study. I think we should inform ourselves as much as possible on this situation.

**Mr. Churchill:** I have just one final word, Mr. Chairman. Why could we not have Chester Ronning here or some Canadian representative on the International Control Commission which we have been criticizing in this Committee. All we have is the Minister's statement. He claims that this Commission is doing more than we think it is doing. There is Canadian involvement in the International Control Commission. Why do we not examine our own people? Chester Ronning would be an admirable witness to have here.

**The Chairman:** I would agree with that. However, I am a bit surprised. In the past we used to hear complaints from members of the Committee because the only witnesses were government witnesses, but now that we have opened the doors and invited witnesses from outside the same ones who were complaining before are complaining now.

**Mr. Lambert:** I beg your pardon.

**The Chairman:** I was not referring to you, sir. Are we ready for the question? All those in favour? All those against?

Motion agreed to.

**Mr. Basford:** Mr. Chairman, I hope the Steering Committee will take note of the remarks that were made this morning.

**The Chairman:** I now require a routine motion for the payment of expenses. Will someone kindly move that reasonable living and travelling expenses be paid to Dr. Michael C. Hall who has been called to appear before this Committee on November 2, 1967.

**Mr. Basford:** Mr. Chairman, I think we had better hear him before we decide to pay his expenses. I so move.

**Mr. Lambert:** I second the motion.

Motion agreed to.

**The Chairman:** Dr. Hall, who is with us here this morning, graduated in medicine in 1952. He has been recognized as a specialist in orthopaedic surgery since 1957. He has a fellowship in the Canadian and American Colleges of Surgeons and a Ph.D. He spent three months in 1963 and one month in 1964 as a volunteer surgeon in Saigon, and between October 1964 and April 1967 he held appointments in the Medical Schools of Saigon and Hue as an adviser from the External Aid Office of Canada.

Dr. Hall wishes to make a statement. Following his statement members can put questions to him. When we have completed his evidence and the questioning, possibly this morning—if not, next Thursday—we will call on the Director General of External Aid, Mr. Maurice Strong, who is here this morning, to offer his own comments.

**Dr. Michael C. Hall (formerly Adviser in Viet Nam under contract to the External Aid Office of the Canadian Government):** Thank you, sir.

Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen: I have been asked to make a presentation to you regarding my views on Canadian aid in Viet Nam.

I believe that Canadian aid to Viet Nam has not been generous in quantity, and might have been better chosen in quality; I believe that Canadian aid to Viet Nam compares unfavorably with that of several other countries, and that official descriptions are worded in such a way that the public may easily misunderstand the nature of our expense on Viet Nam. There are two basic reasons for giving help to Viet Nam. In order of urgency these are:

1. To alleviate the distress occasioned by the war.

2. To aid in the long term development of a country in the Colombo Plan Group.

As civilised members of the world community we need seek no reason to alleviate the misery of war. Distress in itself is adequate reason for action.

Because many of the seriously injured die without reaching hospital and because large parts of Viet Nam are not under government control, there are no reliable figures on the number of civilian casualties, but they are estimated at between 50,000 and 150,000 per year, in a country with a population of about 15 million.

AID is the Agency for International Development, and is the United States' equivalent of our External Aid Office. AID figures in May, 1967, showed an average which was estimated conservatively at 4,000 casualties a month admitted to the government hospitals, and it was stated by the Americans that another 4,000 to 8,000 casualties did not reach the hospitals. Like the inhabitants of all tropical countries the Vietnamese are also subjected to many other health hazards, but unlike other countries they are unable, because of political and military disturbances, to receive the maximum benefit from their own facilities.

Of 1,200 Vietnamese doctors in Viet Nam, 750 are in the services and only about 300 are in practice caring exclusively for civilians—a doctor-to-patient ratio of about one to 50,000 in a country at war, whereas in Canada our ratio is about one to 1,000.

The doctors concentrate their practices in the few large cities, and since the greater proportion of the population is still rural the effective doctor-to-patient ratio is far less than this figure indicates. Few of these doctors have significant post-graduate training, and the standards of surgical care of the war wounded is most unfortunate.

In January, 1962, I offered to an American organisation called Orthopaedics Overseas to go as a one month volunteer on one of their programs and was asked to go to Saigon for the month of May, 1963. I found in 1963 that there was a tremendous need for orthopaedic surgeons to treat the casualties and instead of leaving in June I stayed at my own expense until August.

I was anxious to continue working in Saigon and the Vietnamese were anxious to have help. The Minister of Health, however, did not have a house large enough for my family, although some very small houses were

proposed, and he told me then that he knew that Canada would not pay for one. On return to Canada in August, 1963 I continued a previous correspondence with EAO, enquiring particularly about Viet Nam, but was told that no formal request had been sent for me, and that I could not be sent out by them unless the Vietnamese would provide housing. This the Minister had told me was just not possible for the government to find in Saigon where the population had risen in 10 years from 250,000 to 2 million.

Although I told EAO in January, 1964 that the Dean of the University had made a formal request in Saigon for my services, they wrote "we conducted a thorough search of our files and are satisfied that no request for such assistance has as yet reached us". Instead of telegraphing Saigon in January to confirm that this request had been made they wrote six months later "We have just received a letter from our Mission in Saigon asking for 3 professors all of whom are urgently needed—in September—the letter goes on to say that you are interested."

I had by this time already arranged to go out again at my own expense in August, 1964, and was told then by the Canadian Delegation in Saigon that for various reasons they did not wish to support the appointment in Hue. In Saigon a house belonging to a hospital was offered, and although, like all government houses, it was in a bad state of repair it was however big enough.

• (10:20 a.m.)

So in October 1964 I came back to Viet Nam as the first Canadian Government contract medical expert. This was when the war had been on for five years, and the hospitals were crowded with two or three casualties in each bed. But while I had had to wait for a year before Viet Nam could find a house so that the conditions set for a contract by Canada would be met, the governments of other countries had acted with more sympathy. In Viet Nam in 1964 Australia had an 8 man surgical team, France had 32 medical personnel, Germany 3 university medical professors, Italy a 9 man surgical team, Japan a 6 man surgical team, Korea a 140 man surgical hospital, New Zealand a 6 man surgical team and the Philippines 3 teams with 28 personnel, all treating the civilians. I was the only Canadian.

Arriving in the evening in Saigon with my wife and children, I found that the Canadian Delegation had not revisited the house

assigned to me, that no work had been done on it to make it habitable, and that no arrangements had been made to find us other accommodation. We remained six months in a hotel while the Canadian delegation argued with the Vietnamese Ministry of health over who should pay to make the house habitable. Eventually the repairs were made possible only through money lent by a private American organization, CARE MEDICO, who also lent the furniture for it. Prolonged argument between Canada and Viet Nam was settled by paying these expenses partly out of counterpart funds which were supposed to be used for project development in Viet Nam. Running expenses for my house were paid out of the already hopelessly inadequate hospital budget; and out of my own pocket I paid well over \$1000 dollars. The External Aid Office have recently said their "normal method of supporting advisers is that the department supplies the man and the local government everything else, which means that their normal method is *not* to support their advisers. All other countries sending aid to Viet Nam, even at this time in 1964, knew that the Vietnamese government did not have adequate available housing, and housing for an expert was paid for and maintained by his own country. This running argument between the delegation and the Ministry of Health over who was to pay my local expenses seriously affected my standing.

If the problem of my housing was unusual, then the attitude maintained rigidly by EAO might perhaps be defensible. But in 1962 Spicer, discussing the problems encountered by Canadian contract advisers, had reported "On connaît trois ou quatre cas de démission ou de renvoi quasi-immédiats qui furent motivés par des accrochages facilement évitables dans ces domaines." Only three months before my housing problem began, the Director General of EAO had reported to this Standing Committee "an increasingly difficult problem is the lack of adequate accommodation overseas. The developing countries are obtaining the services of more and more teachers and advisers from many of the Western countries and the housing problem is perhaps the most restrictive factor at the moment in our effort to enlarge the program... We have had people go out under a promise of accommodation which has never materialised. On occasions they have had to return their families to Canada. Others have had to live in substandard hotel rooms month after month, and sometimes they have finished their assignment and accommodation

still has not been forthcoming". Despite the knowledge that arguments over local expenses jeopardised an adviser's work, despite being the only country represented by only a single adviser in Viet Nam, Canada persisted as the only country to demand that Viet Nam should shoulder the local burden of expense of personnel sent to aid them.

And since, Mr. Chairman, there is a gentleman here who helped greatly on this point, I would also say that not only were my family and myself enormously inconvenienced, not only did the relations between my work and the Ministry of Health deteriorate as a result of this rigid attitude towards housing, but it also burnt up an enormous amount of time of members of the Canadian delegation who would have certainly preferred to spend it on other things.

My contract called for me "To organize an Orthopaedic Service in the University of Saigon Medical School Section of Cho Ray Hospital". It was presumed by the Vietnamese hospital and university authorities who requested my services that my government would provide personnel to work with me, equipment and expendable supplies, and probably some buildings, as had all other foreign countries that sent medical experts to Viet Nam. After consultation with my Vietnamese colleagues and the Canadian Delegation, a brief describing the personnel, buildings and material necessary to carry out the requested work in Saigon was submitted to the delegation. A copy of this was given to EAO when I visited Ottawa in September, and it was understood by the Vietnamese and myself that it would be acted upon. I would draw your attention to my recommendation in September, 1964 for the need of technicians to make artificial legs and braces. That, more than 3 years later, is still under discussion by our government. No action whatsoever was taken on this brief which was, in effect, the basic description and requirements for my proposed work in Viet Nam.

• (10:30 a.m.)

In February, 1965, I was asked by the Commissioner of the Canadian Delegation to submit a suggestion for an expenditure by Canada on medical aid to Viet Nam. I understood this, the first suggestion by the government of medical aid to Viet Nam, was related to speeches in the House on September 23, 1964 when, after the Prime Minister had called attention to the presence of Mr. Cabot Lodge in the gallery, the Minister of External Affairs had stated "Canada is now providing

non-military assistance to the amount of some \$700,000 for 1964-65. This includes food, education and contains projects having to do with medical and hospital care." There had been no Canadian medical projects prior to my arrival, and there were none underway in early 1965. I therefore submitted a second brief, similar to my first, on March 3, 1965, calling for an orthopaedic and rehabilitation centre. In July this was summarily dismissed—"External Aid have now informed us that after careful consideration they are unable to accede to the suggestion that the Canadian government should build the Orthopaedic Centre in Cho Ray Hospital in Saigon. They have decided that the cost of the Canadian content of the medical equipment would be too low and the cost of the project too great to allow it to be undertaken by the Canadian Government." Again I would like to draw your attention to this direct refusal to undertake a programme 2½ years ago that our government now has a second or a third team sent out to examine.

Without support in personnel, equipment or supplies I had to compete with the Vietnamese doctors for their limited resources and assistants which some of them not unnaturally resented. Canadian nurses applied to EAO to go to Viet Nam but were not sent out; non-government Vietnamese nurses, specialised in orthopaedic care, asked to work with me, but Ottawa would not pay the minimum salary they demanded; training was arranged in Canada for technicians and nurses, Vietnamese candidates were nominated by the hospital directors, but inter-government arrangements by the Canadian delegation were never completed.

During the whole of my first year's contract, despite frequent representations to the Canadian Delegation, not a single item of equipment or expendable supply was sent to me, and I am quite unable to understand the Minister's statement "I am sure Dr. Hall was given every assistance that could possibly have been given in the circumstances."

Because I was unable to organize a proper orthopaedic service that would have any viability after my departure, I concentrated after a few months on providing treatment for the more complicated cases such as bone tuberculosis and hand injuries; special services were developed for these within the hospital's existing organisation. The necessary equipment for my work was derived from the American government, military and charitable organisations, from Japanese gifts to the Vietnamese hospitals, and from my

own pocket; but none came from Canada. I was unable to fulfil the primary purpose of my contract, and expected to return home. However, at the request of the newly appointed Secretary of State I added to my work his service in the other University Hospital of Saigon. Here I worked for another year, using up the small stock of orthopaedic supplies given to the Vietnamese by outside sources, while members of the Canadian Delegation continued protracted discussions over my local costs on which contracts were based. The number of patients I could treat was reduced because of shortage of assistants and lack of specialized equipment. I became a professional beggar going from one American military or civilian group to another; and without their generous assistance my work in Canada's name would have come to a complete standstill. Appeals to the Canadian Delegation and EAO finally, near the end of my second year, produced enough plaster bandages to last for two or three days and rubber gloves for two or three weeks. These were the only supplies ever sent to me in Viet Nam by EAO, and their published statement that they "flew out what Dr. Hall deemed was essential and urgent" is barely related to the actual fact.

• (10:35 a.m.)

The Minister has described Viet Nam as "a country where tuberculosis is the greatest hazard faced by the people, apart from the war." I continued in my second year with my service for bone tuberculosis, but found that many patients did not improve, because as a result of their illness they were too poor to buy the essential drugs. Among the supplies I requested from EAO were medicines for the treatment of the tuberculous patients, but none were ever sent. I was ashamed not to be able to offer my patients more, and I was constantly ashamed to have to go, hat in hand, to beg from representatives of other countries in order to be able to do any work at all.

At the end of my second year the Secretary of State resigned and returned to his hospital appointment. I was asked by the Ministers of Health and Education to go to Hue to establish a new service there in connection with the University. I told the Canadian Delegation that there was no equipment at all in Hue and that I would have to have financial help for a service there. EAO in August replied to the Delegation that they would agree to a third contract for me, but not if giving financial support to my work

was a condition. I went to England on leave in September, wrote several times without answer to EAO, and finally had to ask the High Commissioner in London to telegraph them to find out whether or not I was to return to Viet Nam. Last November in Ottawa I was told that although Viet Nam had demanded a surgeon, because they had not submitted a demand for equipment none would be sent. I was given the standard allowance to an adviser of \$5,000 for equipment to which I added about \$1,000 of my own money and two surgical instrument companies gave another \$2,000 to \$3,000 worth of equipment. The air freight to Viet Nam for this equipment I had to pay myself since it was meant to come out of the \$5,000.

On arrival in Viet Nam I found that no one had bothered to inform the University of Hue that I was going to come and having received no answer after six months to their request, they had presumed I would not be coming. My intended functions were blocked by a French general surgeon and a young untrained Vietnamese, both of whom had arrived since the request for me was filed. As a result of this mismanagement I had the same obstruction from the Frenchman that has been a problem to Canadian advisers elsewhere and resistance from some of the Vietnamese in the hospital. The students, whom I had taught part-time the previous year, threatened the government that they would take over the radio station and broadcast the problem if it was not adjusted; the Dean wrote to the Delegation requesting a small expense on building and equipment to convert an existing block offered to me to make a self-contained orthopaedic unit; my German colleagues appealed to the Canadian Delegation and the Vietnamese Ministry to intervene; I wrote a detailed report describing the situation to the Delegation and to EAO, and the requirements necessary to correct the problems. Both the Dean's letter of request and my report remained unanswered. During the three and a half months the Vietnamese staff of the University, the Germans, the students, and I were trying to correct this problem, there was not a single visit of a Canadian representative to Hue, although a member of External Affairs in Viet Nam was employed full time on aid matters. In fact, during the 2½ years I worked under EAO in Viet Nam no member of the Delegation ever visited the hospitals in which I was working, nor did I ever meet any of the occasional visitors from Ottawa.

When it was obvious that nothing was going to be done to help make my work possible, after 8 months of a 12 month contract had expired without my doing any surgery at all, I left Viet Nam.

The hospital at Hue is the second largest civilian hospital in the country. It is used for the clinical training of the students of the Medical School and is the major hospital for the northern provinces where the heaviest fighting is going on. The hospital remains without an orthopaedic surgeon, and the students without a teacher. Everyone has difficulties with some of the Vietnamese personnel because of a clash of interests, but other countries provide diplomatic, financial and material support for their advisers whose work, although remaining difficult, becomes possible. I did not receive support, and I was unable to work.

Because of large numbers of casualties occurring in areas where there were no hospitals, and who died without treatment because there was no way to evacuate them, I suggested to the Minister of Health in June 1965 that a mobile hospital should be set up to follow the battles.

• (10:40 a.m.)

This was discussed with the Delegation and an offer of transportable hospital units was later made by External Aid. I could not interest anyone in providing aircraft (the only possible way to use a mobile hospital), and although there were Vietnamese personnel willing to staff such a hospital, the scheme fell through because of lack of transportation. In October, 1965 when I was visiting Ottawa, External Aid were still talking about these hospitals, and on July 8, 1966 they announced "Canada is despatching 10 packaged emergency hospital units from the national medical stockpile for civilian medical care in Viet Nam. The gift representing a cost of \$70,000 to Canada's External Aid program...".

These packaged units were designed for use in Canada for a short emergency of a few days, they were already paid for by the Government and their expense to External Aid was an inter-departmental financial exchange; I understand that it has not been intended that they should be replaced in the government's stockpile which I think has 200 of these hospitals but I have not had this confirmed. The Minister's statement "We supplied 10 emergency hospitals (a total of 2000 beds) for civilian use in provincial regions of Viet

Nam" may easily be interpreted by the unwary as meaning that Canada provided Viet Nam with 10 hospitals—which is not the case. There are no buildings involved, and the boxes are in fact equipment designed to be set up in a pre-existing building such as a school. Equally the Director General's statement to this Committee "We put ten hospitals into service, shipped ten 200 bed hospitals, each one with recovery rooms, operating rooms, D-ray facilities, and so on" is misleading. A bed is not a house or even a bedroom, and 200 flimsy cots are not a hospital.

The equipment selected for one purpose in Canada was sent for a completely different purpose in Viet Nam. Much of it is excellent and useful as individual items to be sent to hospitals as they were required. Some of it is not of local hospital value, such as the 'beds' which are camp cots (2,000) that will not sustain long use, operating 'tables' of similar construction, polaroid D-ray machines without a supply of polaroid film (nor is it obtainable through other sources in Viet Nam) and some is of use only in a few places for instance, emergency generators.

To send this pre-packaged and pre-purchased equipment can perhaps be justified on the grounds of convenience, but since I had been suggesting for two years that Canada should send medical supplies to Viet Nam it can hardly be justified on the grounds of urgency.

Although all local handling had to be done by USAID, External Aid insisted that the "hospitals" so-called, be sent out as complete units—which meant flying by aircraft—in almost every case approximately 10 large conex containers. Only when they reached their ultimate destination in a provincial hospital nominated by USAID and the Ministry could the boxes be opened, what was required taken out, and what was not of use might then be flown back again to Saigon, again by USAID. The men handling this for USAID were friends of mine and I know their reactions to being asked by Canada to do Canada's logistical work, and then have External Aid insist that bulky equipment should be flown in American aircraft to a Vietnamese hospital where they knew it could not be used, in order that Canada should be able to say that a 'complete hospital unit' had been sent to such and such a region. Although it has been hinted that reluctance to have a rehabilitation centre in a military compound for the use of veterans and their families was one of the many

vague reasons for its non-appearance, there was no hesitation in giving one of the first units of hospital equipment to the Ministry of Defense for use in a hospital established on the advice of the psychological warfare department and run by the military for soldiers' wives and children.

Dr. Alje Vennema came to Viet Nam, I believe in 1963, with Medico to work in their Unit in Quang Ngai. Medico discontinued its work there in March, 1965 because of repeated reports from Dr. Vennema of local danger, and because of the withdrawal of Vietnamese staff with whom they were supposed to be co-operating in immunization programs. Dr. Vennema stayed in Quang Ngai with an External Aid contract and continued his interest in the program of tuberculosis and infectious disease control that had been started by his predecessors (I visited the hospital in Quang Ngai several times between 1963 and 1966 when I was acting as a medical adviser). The drugs and supplies available to him were derived from the Ministry of Health, that is American money, the Medico stocks given to the hospital, also American, and what he could get from local American army units; only recently did he get Canadian supplies.

It has been reported that there are now three doctors in Quang Ngai. But in April Dr. Vennema was alone, he had been wanting to leave for some months to take post-graduate training, but was asked to stay on until a replacement could be found. One physician, Dr. Denneo of Vernon, B.C., served with him for six months in 1966 and did not wish to stay longer, and Dr. Pothier did not stay at all.

• (10:45 a.m.)

Of many medical teams sent to Viet Nam I do not think any other country has sent one entirely composed of non-specialist personnel. Although certainly a personal opinion, I believe from my three years experience that such a team not only fails to provide any thing that the Vietnamese are not perfectly capable of doing for themselves—there is a well staffed military hospital across the road—but it permits the Vietnamese to abandon their own responsibilities; no one is trained since these are not professional teachers, and the Canadian government is able to say "Look at what we are doing already; how can you expect us to do more?" Medical aid to such countries should be of a calibre that they cannot provide themselves; it should not be used to replace the efforts of the local

personnel, and the foreigners sent should have specialist's qualifications for their work, recognised by WHO. I do not call stitching up a cut "surgery", nor does picking up a knife and cutting a patient turn a general practitioner into a surgeon. Surgery in the civilian hospital in Quang Ngai has been in the hands of Vietnamese military surgeons, some of whom were my students and interns, and the international Rescue Committee have a surgical team there. I would not want to have a G.P. treat my war wounds and neither do the Vietnamese. Nobody is quicker to look a gift horse in the mouth and assess its professional value.

I must at this point make it well understood to you that I have been privileged for several years to regard Dr. Vennema as a friend as well as an extremely able colleague devoted to his work which he performs in a very difficult and very trying place. My objections are directed not at what Dr. Vennema has done, but at what the External Aid Office has failed to do.

Priority is given by the World Health Organization to programs of disease control and eradication by immunization. All orthopaedic surgeons who have visited Viet Nam have expressed the need for polio vaccine which is technically difficult to produce and costly. I asked External Aid to give vaccine to Viet Nam in 1964 and again in 1965; my wife and I supervised Vietnamese personnel in immunization programs at orphanages in 1965 and 1966—I believe the first in Viet Nam—with vaccine donated to CARE/Medico by the U.S. Navy and by an American Company, Eli Lilly. I could not get any through External Aid. The Ministry of Health has had a capable immunization program operating for many years, and although donations of vaccine and materials for its production are most valuable to the country, it should not be necessary to send personnel to Viet Nam for the actual administration. I cannot therefore understand the report from External Aid spokesmen "several Canadian medical teams at work in South Viet Nam in such tasks as immunizing children against polio and making TB tests".

Although there are now more Canadian medical personnel in Viet Nam since I was the solitary representative in 1964, there are also more personnel from other foreign countries.

In March, 1967 medical personnel serving in Viet Nam for civilians were:

United States .....	672
Korea .....	150
Philippines .....	112
Germany .....	88
Australia .....	37
Iran .....	31
China .....	26
New Zealand .....	24
Spain .....	12
United Kingdom .....	11
Switzerland .....	11
Canada .....	6
Japan .....	3
Italy .....	2

The United States figures do not take into account the considerable amount of medical treatment given by military personnel to civilians in addition to their military duties, or of another 400 personnel, many of whom are Americans, in private organizations. It is to be noted that the figures of Japan and Italy are lower than previous records of their countries' activities, whereas the 6 Canadian personnel is the highest that Canada has sent. Canada, in fact, is the least generous of the contributors of medical personnel. This is compatible with the Director General's statement to this Committee last June that Canada stood 14th in the world list of 15 donor countries although Plumpre from the same figures says we are 19th out of a list of 20 donor nations, and that far from improving our external aid generosity it had fallen from 0.48% of the G.N.P. in 1964 to 0.43% in 1965; in other words a 10 per cent fall.

• (10:50 a.m.)

#### *Children's Rehabilitation Centre*

Dr. Gingras was sent out to Saigon in September 1965 with the express mission, so he told me, of reporting on how a children's rehabilitation centre, that is, a centre to provide artificial legs, braces, and physiotherapy could be set up in Saigon. He specifically told me when I asked him at the time, that it was not his mission to decide if it should be set up, or whether Saigon was the most suitable place for it. I had requested in my first brief for an orthopaedic centre in 1964 that we should have technicians for this rehabilitation work, but this brief as ignored. At the time of the decision to send Dr. Gingras out, I was acting as Head of the Orthopaedic Department of the University of Saigon, but

I was not at any time consulted. Dr. Rusk of New York was already starting his centre in Saigon, which was widely publicized in Viet Nam and the United States and should have been known to Ottawa.

I understand the plan Dr. Gingras submitted called for a Catholic order of Sisters to surrender control of their buildings to Canada, for USAID to handle the logistics and for Viet Nam to pay the local expenses. The Secretary running the office of the South-East Asia region of Catholic Relief Services told me that she knew perfectly well the Sisters would not agree to this, and they did not. The Viet Nam government had already had their fingers burnt when they found out how much a "gift" of an orthopaedic surgeon cost them, and they were not interested in underwriting further Canadian "gifts", particularly since they would only reduplicate the same service in the same place that the U.S. was giving completely without expense to Viet Nam. This, incidentally, turned out to be one of the best projects undertaken in the country.

My contention that it was more important to have a centre to prevent amputations than a centre to provide artificial legs was ignored. My contention that we should not reduplicate existing services in the same city went equally without interest, but I did persuade Dr. Gingras to go to Hue to see if a centre could be set up there in conjunction with the University. This was very welcome to the University, but Dr. Gingras said it was not within his terms of reference. The *Star Weekly* in April of this year drew attention to the need for help in Viet Nam and set off some questions about the Centre-that-never-happened. At the end of April the Minister said: "The idea had to be postponed because Viet Nam had not assigned it a sufficiently high priority. We are about to make fresh representations". In early May "a letter... from the Minister of Health in South Viet Nam... says that our proposal for a separate rehabilitation unit is an undersirable means of producing the result we have in mind". In mid-May "Mr. McLaren of External Aid was sent to Saigon to investigate the situation... We are now discussing the matter". In mid-June "A centre in Saigon... would tend to duplicate existing facilities". At the end of June "We have accepted a proposal by Dr. Gingras that a doctor named by him should proceed to South Viet Nam to examine the matter further". "The Government of the United States of course has nothing to do

with this particular problem". And in October "It now seems that it is more appropriate for such a centre to be built out of Saigon". Finally *three years* after my first suggestion of rehabilitation work in Saigon, I cannot but agree with the Minister when he says "The fact that a representative of the Red Cross and a doctor representing the rehabilitation centre of Notre Dame in Montreal are now on their way to Viet Nam is a pretty complete answer to many of the things Dr. Hall alleged". In the meanwhile the United States have followed through with their 1965 plans and have extended their service from Saigon to centres in Denang in the North and Can Tho in the South, while a charitable group is opening a fourth in Quang Ngai.

• (10:55 a.m.)

*The Building in Hue—The Enlargement of Medical School and Assembly Hall.*

These buildings are in the University of Hue. According to the 1965-6 External Aid report "counterpart funds generated these supplies (the flour and butter) have been used to establish medical facilities at the University of Hue".

When Canada "gives" a country foodstuffs, the recipient is required to pay for their shipping with her own foreign exchange, and to create a fund with the value in local currency set on the foodstuffs by Canada. If the food is given to the poor, or is unsalable or spoiled, the recipient country is still obliged by Canada to show local currency available for project development to the value of the food "given". Thus if the food is used to feed the poor and starving, the country in fact buys it from Canada in her own local currency but Canada demands not only the credit for having "given" it, but also twice over credit for a further project built out of the local currency put into the counterpart funds.

The Medical School in Hue was first started under Diem, and I believe Mr. Cox as Commissioner in 1962 was interested in helping its further development. The wing Canada gave permission to Viet Nam to build from counterpart funds was for laboratories in physiology and biochemistry. To describe these as "medical facilities" is perhaps strictly correct but will certainly mislead the uninformed reader. To say that they have been established is certainly not correct. They are still standing as incomplete buildings. Building stopped in the Spring of 1966 when Vietnamese currency was devalued. The situation

was reported by the C.B.C. in November. In May, 1967 there was still no progress. The building would have been useful but the teachers requested from Canada but never provided would have been of much more value. The University Assembly Hall is part of the same story.

The agreement for the Medical School building was not only with Viet Nam, but also with Germany who undertook to equip the building and provide staff training. Staff were to return from Germany, but there was no building for them; German equipment in storage in Hue could not be used because these laboratories had not been built. More than a quarter of the total expenditure on Canada's external aid projects and commodities has gone on foodstuffs between the years 1950 and 1965. Although foodstuffs are by definition not accepted by the World Bank as "development aid", Canada justifies this 25 per cent of total grant aid on the grounds that they generate counterpart funds "used for economic development purposes as agreed between Canada and the recipient country." The Director General told this Committee last June: "These counterpart funds are directed by agreement between us and the recipient country to projects of long term development...in this way Canadian gifts...are translated into such things as bridges, schools". If our purpose in giving this food is to generate the funds for development, and these funds cannot be used without Canada's specific approval of the project on which they are spent, the statement that "Canada is in no way involved in the building" is incomprehensible to me. Certainly the Vietnamese think Canada is involved, for my photograph of the sign erected in front of the building proclaims "In cooperation with the Government of Viet Nam, the Government of Canada is financing the construction of this building for the Medical School of the University of Hue." I have never heard that the Canadian Government protested that they were "in no way involved" when this sign went up, or in the other buildings around the world financed by counterpart funds.

*Refugees*

During the last three years in Viet Nam there have been 1.8 million refugees recognized for help by the local administration and many more are without recognition. It was recently estimated that there are more than 700,000 persons in camps, and twice as many without homes; over 2 million people in a country of 15 million. Official refugees

survive on an 8 cents per day allowance, if they get the 8 cents and if there is food to buy. The unofficial refugees receive no help. To alleviate this distress the United States for 1967 allocated \$64 million and \$119.3 million in food was sent under P.L. 480.

• (11:00 a.m.)

Last year 18 different American charitable organizations working for the refugees were represented in Viet Nam, and more than \$19 million in funds and materials has been given by them. The Catholic Relief Services alone have shipped to Viet Nam a quarter of a million dollars worth of medicines, 1500 tons of clothing and erected temporary shelters for 100,000 refugees. Germany has given \$6½ million for refugee and social work and has teams of personnel working under control of the Maltese Hilf Dienst.

Other countries have sent personnel, building materials, blankets and food, but to the best of my knowledge Canada has sent nothing for these refugees. The foodstuffs sent to Viet Nam, butter and wheat, are only justifiable one presumes like the rest of the foodstuffs making up 25 per cent of our total grant aid, on the intention of developing counterpart funds for projects in Viet Nam. This food was not intended to be given to the hungry, but was intended to be sold, and obviously to be sold to the urban middle class who alone have refrigerators for butter, and eat significant quantities of bread. ICA, the forerunner of AID, tried to prevent surplus butter being sent by the U.S. to Viet Nam, it is the only country I can find to which Canada has chosen to send butter, and I can find no mention in Colombo Plan reports of other countries sending butter to any country in South-East Asia. As food to feed the people who needed food, our gift was inappropriate; as a method of project development it was unsuccessful since no projects have been developed. Apart from \$5,000 spent on laboratory equipment in 1957, food was the only commodity for which funds were allocated by External Aid until the fiscal year 1965-66.

I do not doubt the External Aid statement that in a legal sense "Viet Nam asked for these items," but I find it impossible to believe that Viet Nam would have chosen butter and flour if any other choice of project or commodity aid had been open to them. My objection is not so much that we have given them food of no use to the ordinary people, but that we did not give them anything else

that was of use. I would, for my own interest, like to ask whether the whole of the \$940,000 allocation for wheat for the fiscal year 1965-66 was in fact spent on wheat, since other records show only \$790,000 spent, and I was told, possibly incorrectly, that Viet Nam had declined offers of more Canadian wheat under the terms existant.

Whether or not we like it, whether or not we like how or why this has happened, is completely unrelated to the fact of the existence of these homeless and hungry people. If an earthquake had caused 2 million dispossessed persons, we would be full of sympathy; we would not stop to argue about whether we liked earthquakes, we would send help. Because this situation has arisen slowly, and has existed for years, we sent nothing. The surplus butter and wheat we allowed the Vietnamese to have was not sent, it had to be fetched; it was not given, it had to be sold. We can very well afford to give building materials for the refugees, send superintendents to see that they are used for the refugees, send large quantities of useable food and, under Canadian supervisors, set up kitchens in refugee centres to see that the food is properly prepared and distributed.

The temporary need for feeding and housing these people in a country that previously exported food is equivalent to the situation in Europe in 1945, whose need was generously recognized by Canada and assisted with \$271 million. It is not comparable to the chronically undernourished countries that have never been able to feed their own people.

#### *War materials*

The published descriptions show that, like it or not, we are deeply involved in the economics of the war in Viet Nam. It is not my business to comment on what is said here this morning, but I think perhaps we are far more involved in Viet Nam than is realized.

Full employment from war materials is given to 14,000 people in this country and another 110,000 people in this country are partially employed on war materials. United States military purchases in Canada have risen from \$90 million per year, when the Viet Cong started in 1959, to \$320 million this year. External Aid's expenditure of \$8.5 million over 17 years on Viet Nam—and most of this money never leaves Canada—is obviously a very small proportion of the money that the federal treasury gains from our trade in war materials.

• (11:05 a.m.)

The Prime Minister and the Minister for External Affairs have both separately pointed out that we have agreements with the United States and we cannot stop this trade. That I do not question, but unquestionably we are making a profit out of the Vietnamese war, like it or not. We are making more money out of it than we otherwise would. We make \$230 million more this year because of these war materials and we spend \$2 million on Viet Nam. I think those figures are incompatible.

*Long term development.*

Long term development aid is very much more difficult, and there is no doubt that one of the greatest obstacles has been rapid changes in local administration and personnel and poor control of the country. This, though, is true of many developing countries, and it is argued with some logic that a country with a competent administration doesn't need help. Viet Nam loses as well as gains from too much attention, and its shortcomings are better publicised than those of other countries. Whether Viet Nam has more claims to development aid than any other country in South East Asia is very questionable, but if we are going to enter into some activity of humanitarian relief—and I believe we should—then we can at the same time set it up so that it has long term value. The British, French and Germans, who I suppose are the most experienced in this field, have all set up long term continuing projects related to health, education and social welfare. They have not set up projects to do the work of the Vietnamese for them. Quick and easy projects must be resisted, and the usually more difficult to accomplish but more worthwhile projects striven for.

I know of only three development projects with which Canada has been associated, and I exclude my own suggestions which were never acted upon. The University of Hue project, I think a well-chosen one, was never completed. The Quang Ngai TB project is a perpetuation of a service abandoned by Medico, a very experienced international organisation, because of lack of Vietnamese interest in an area where none of the indigenous personnel wish to work, although they are quite capable in a technical sense of performing all of these functions. It is relevant to observe here that because of dissatisfaction with their conditions of service the number of trained Vietnamese health person-

nel has actually decreased in the last 18 months by 25 per cent, from 16 to 12 thousand, but in 1966 several very competent French doctors in private practice in Saigon were forced to leave the country. The third project, a children's rehabilitation centre, is after more than two years still in the talking stage, while other countries are treating patients in centres conceived, planned and executed during this time.

In April of this year figures were given showing that 463 trainees had been accepted in Canada, some sponsored by other countries. Of these, 380 were under the Colombo Plan and 231 were still in Canada. The Director General told this Committee that the cost of each scholarship student is approximately \$4,500 per year. Scholarships are awarded by Canada only for study of a subject that is not taught in Viet Nam. The youth, to gain prestige, to escape the draft, or to escape the country, are very anxious to obtain an overseas scholarship. It has been my frequent experience in discussions with them that they deliberately choose a subject for study that cannot be learnt in Viet Nam in order that they will be eligible for such a scholarship. It is my belief, and that of others who know about this matter, that there is no planning involved in the allocation of fields of study, and that quantities of electrical, chemical engineers etc. for whom there is no possibility of employment, are being trained. The scholarship holders hope not to return to Viet Nam and many have not gone home after their studies are complete. The United States takes special measures to prevent this, but the Canadian Delegation have told me that they do not know how many have failed to return after completion of studies; the relevance of present employment to scholarship training for those who have returned, or the likelihood of employment in their field for those now in training in Canada. Despite this ignorance we are paying for the maintenance and education of over 200 students from Viet Nam in Canada.

Because of the draft the males who return will go into the army, where their training might perhaps be of use, but this is not supposed to be our intention. Of several returned students I have met, one only was working in the field of training. She was my physiotherapist who, although money had been spent on four years of training, was completely without equipment; and my requests for such equipment remained unanswered by External Aid.

We have presently about 3,000 trainees in Canada, which, at the given figure of \$4,500 per student per year—if my mathematics is correct—means an expense of \$13.5 million per year. In effect, this is a very expensive experiment we are conducting in the hope that educating these students will improve their country of origin. No businessman or scientist would be allowed to spend money like this if he could not show the results, or even the general trend of the results, of his experiment.

• (11:10 a.m.)

Young men with university training who are unemployed, or improperly employed, have long been known as a source of trouble in developing countries. In giving scholarships we have a responsibility to find out whether their holders are returning to their native countries and whether they can find work there. Yet the Director General has told this Committee that we do not have, and are not attempting to get, this information. A diplomatic umbrella of "We mustn't interfere in their domestic business" is convenient to hide behind, but will not only fail to help a country to develop, it will probably hinder its development.

#### *Total Canadian Expenditure in Viet Nam*

The Minister tells us that "Since we began Canada's aid to Viet Nam in 1953 we have allocated as much money to assistance in this area as any other country but two". It should be noted that "allocated" does not necessarily mean "spent", and that "to this area" does not necessarily mean that the aid reached Viet Nam.

The 1965-66 EAO report showed \$3.8 million allocated to Viet Nam since 1953. Of this \$3.8 million, \$1 million was surplus food, for which Viet Nam had to pay the shipping, and which was available in Viet Nam only to those who could pay for it; \$2.3 million was for "technical assistance", i.e. scholarships for Vietnamese in Canada, and a small fraction for advisers' salaries. The cost of the scholarships is a redistribution of federal funds to provincial universities and is not lost to Canada. The cost of the foodstuffs is a "farmer subsidy" since we were unable to sell this food to anyone else. Thus, of \$3.8 million allocated to Viet Nam, \$3.3 million represented no loss to Canada whatsoever, and, on the basis of present information, very little gain to Viet Nam. Capital assistance grants, that is, actual materials bought in Canada and sent to Viet Nam, appear for the first time in the year 1965-66 (\$505,000) except for a \$5,-

000 grant in laboratory equipment allocated to the University of Dalat in 1957. Prior to this time "aid" was surplus food, scholarships whose usefulness to Viet Nam has never been evaluated and a handful of advisers working without logistical support. The total allocation by fiscal year ending 1967 was increased to \$6 million to provide a transfer of funds of \$700,000 to the Department of Health and Welfare for construction of what the Americans call "a small TB clinic"—the Dutch have undertaken to build 5 tuberculosis centres in Viet Nam—and for polio vaccine. But the training of Vietnamese students in Canada, on the basis of the figures given—230 students at \$4,500 each—is an expenditure of about \$1 million a year. I am unable, on the basis of these figures, to understand the Minister's statement, made shortly after the end of that fiscal year, "A large proportion of our aid to Viet Nam has been concentrated in the medical field".

To the end of fiscal year 1967-68 Canada has allocated, but has yet to spend, \$8.3 million in assistance to Viet Nam. Thus, over fifteen years there has been an average annual expenditure of about half a million dollars a year on Viet Nam.

The figures for expenditure by other countries are incomplete, but one finds that this year the United States is giving \$64 million for refugee relief, \$50 million for medical relief, and many other sums are being spent by them.

• (11:15 a.m.)

France, since 1956, has allocated \$111 million. Japan has given \$55 million, of which \$39 million were reparations. Germany has given \$10.6 million in gifts, \$17.6 million in goods and credits, and is spending \$3 million a year on overheads for a hospital ship. Australia through 1967 has given \$12 million and Thailand has allocated \$20 million in rice credit.

Again I am unable to understand the Minister's statement that "We have allocated as much money in assistance in this area as any other country but two".

**The Chairman:** Thank you, Dr. Hall. Mr. Allmand?

**Mr. Allmand:** To begin with, Mr. Chairman, Dr. Hall has spoken for over an hour and he has made some very serious allegations. It is unfortunate that we did not have copies of his presentation beforehand. He has ranged not only into the medical area, but has discussed sales of military equipment to

Viet Nam, and so forth. To be able properly to question such witnesses we should have their statements beforehand to examine them. Dr. Hall has made many, many allegations of facts which would have to be checked before we could question him.

We should be allowed to question today, but in the absence of a copy of his presentation I am wondering whether or not some provision should be made for questioning Dr. Hall, because I think it is important that we try to get to the bottom of many of these things. I will just leave that with you for the time being. Dr. Hall, you mentioned some \$5,000 worth of medical equipment that was supplied to your assignment in Hue. Were you not able to use this equipment?

**Dr. Hall:** No.

**Mr. Allmand:** Why not?

**Dr. Hall:** I never had a ward in which I could work.

**Mr. Allmand:** You did not have a ward in which you could work?

**Dr. Hall:** Hue is a recently-developed medical school. I worked there between 1965 and 1966 as a teacher of histology, which is microscopic anatomy. They asked me to return again the following year to teach also orthopaedic surgery because their students had just got to the stage of their training where this would be taught to them.

The services in the hospital were crudely developed. We needed a proper ward in which to treat orthopaedic patients who had never had this kind of treatment before. A few casualties had been treated, but orthopaedics, in the sense of correcting deformities, had never been practised there; so that there was no equipment for it. One needs, even by Vietnamese standards, a fairly clean place in which to work. They were treating the casualties in what was a converted storeshed which was really very unsatisfactory—again, even by Vietnamese standards.

The director of the hospital had promised me a ward in which to put my patients, but in Viet Nam the hospitals are, as a rule, broken up into a number of pavilions, and each pavilion is run by a doctor. The doctor regards this pavilion as his personal area, so that if a foreigner comes in somebody has to be displaced. They have got about 1,200 beds and approximately 12 doctors; so, they aver-

aged about 100 beds per doctor in the hospital. This, you would think, would simplify it, but nobody likes to be pushed aside, particularly for a foreigner to come in.

This is why I say that it is extremely important in Viet Nam, which I know, and in other countries which I have heard of that an adviser have the strongest political and diplomatic support from his country, because when he goes in he almost certainly is going to offend some local person. The French and the Germans provided this, but, frankly, I could not get the interest of the Canadians there to push the subject far enough. Certainly letters were sent to the Deputy Prime Minister who sent off a letter himself, but this is usually not adequate; you have to push quite hard, and this is a terrible bore for everybody.

**Mr. Allmand:** Does this not indicate that there was some lack of co-operation on the part of the Vietnamese government?

**Dr. Hall:** Yes.

**Mr. Allmand:** What happened to this \$5,000 worth of equipment?

**Dr. Hall:** The equipment is still there.

**Mr. Allmand:** Where?

**Dr. Hall:** I left it in the hands of the Germans. It is still crated there in the hope that they were talking about bringing a surgeon in themselves, in the hope that someone would be able to use it. My own equipment which I bought out of my own pocket is there too.

• (11:20 a.m.)

**Mr. Allmand:** You spoke of other equipment you had used, and you described it as flimsy medical equipment which had been sent under the Canadian program. This flimsy medical equipment which you have described, what actually was it?

**Dr. Hall:** No, I did not say flimsy medical equipment; I said what are described as beds are not beds as we would understand them. They are like camp cots. These hospitals which were set up for the Emergency Measures Organization were, I think, very, very well set up and packaged indeed for their purpose. They chose the right kind of equipment; they deliberately chose equipment which was small in bulk and could be folded or stored well, so that it could be set up in a school or a church hall or something of this kind to treat casualties in an atomic attack,

flood or something of this nature just for a few days.

This is what Canada has stockpiled and it was thought that this would be useful for Viet Nam. Certainly it is useful to Viet Nam. I am not saying that it cannot be used. I think it would have been better to have spent an equivalent amount of money to send Viet Nam what they specifically wanted. I know from my personal contacts with the Americans who are handling the logistical and supply side of this program that they wanted to break up these boxes. They did not want to regard them as hospitals, which they are not. They want to regard them as crates of medical equipment. They wanted to open them in Saigon in their main stores, put them into the stores, then when they found a hospital that has need of a particular item to send it the item.

Again, in all forms of aid work and especially in Viet Nam where materials are flooding in, we make the people worse by pouring equipment into them which they either do not know how to use or which they do not regard as difficult to get and valuable. You can go into any hospital in Viet Nam and you will find equipment from all countries standing all over the place which they either do not know how to use, or where some minor defect has occurred or because it has not been maintained and is not working. In Hue we had seven sterilizers in the operating room and only one of them worked.

**Mr. Allmand:** Have you personally examined all of the Canadian equipment—and when I say “all” I mean the major part of the Canadian equipment—that has been sent to Viet Nam? Is your evidence based on hearsay evidence?

**Dr. Hall:** No, no. There are ten identical units and I saw the second one which was set up.

**Mr. Allmand:** You saw one of them?

**Dr. Hall:** They are identical.

**Mr. Allmand:** I see. When you saw this one was it installed?

**Dr. Hall:** Yes.

**Mr. Allmand:** Completely installed?

**Dr. Hall:** Yes. Mr. Strong, perhaps you could pass him that picture.

**Mr. Allmand:** You mentioned having difficulty with other medical personnel in Viet

Nam. From what country did these medical personnel come?

**Dr. Hall:** There are difficulties in going to a country as a teacher of a subject which they do not always feel they want to be taught. We had extraordinary difficulty in Viet Nam unfortunately, because aid is political and I think we should have no question about this in our minds. I think we should discuss it frankly and know what we are talking about. Most of the aid given to Viet Nam is not given because we want to give them this particular material or these particular people, but it is a whole reaction to a demand for involvement.

**Mr. Allmand:** But Doctor, that may be an answer to another question.

**Dr. Hall:** No, it is not; it is part of the same question.

**Mr. Allmand:** I see. I was talking about difficulties with other medical teams.

**Dr. Hall:** When I was talking to the Minister of Health I was discussing the necessity for setting up an orthopaedic service. He said: “Dr. Hall, you must clearly understand that you are not here as an orthopaedic surgeon; you are here as a representative of Canada.” This is the government’s attitude.

• (11:25 a.m.)

**Mr. Allmand:** The Vietnamese government?

**Dr. Hall:** Yes. To them this is primarily political and secondarily medical. We the technical people, are not terribly interested in politics; our interest is in medical work, so we have to interlock these somehow.

**Mr. Allmand:** I thought you were referring to difficulties with medical personnel from other countries, not Viet Nam.

**Dr. Hall:** The Vietnamese are sometimes resentful of our coming in as we would be if French doctors came into our hospitals. This is perfectly natural and I am not surprised at that. There was a particular difficulty in Hue concerning a French surgeon there who had a very rigid attitude—and I thought it fascinating, actually—that his service in his view was confié à la France. He believed that this was set aside for them. I do not know whether you know this book of Spicer’s, but I find this is a problem in Africa as well.

**Mr. Allmand:** Would you then say that the French medical team did cause difficulty, not only for the Canadian team, but for other medical teams, such as the United States?

**Dr. Hall:** No, I would not say that at all. This was a single person.

**Mr. Allmand:** You would not say that it was general that the French medical team caused difficulties?

**Dr. Hall:** No, the major French medical team works in a French private hospital, the Gralle hospital in Saigon which is very highly regarded by the community. He was an individual working in Hue, who as an individual was a difficult person, as many individuals are.

**Mr. Allmand:** Do you know what the total per capita aid to Viet Nam is from all countries? You mentioned at the very beginning that Canada's contribution to Viet Nam was not favourable compared to that of other countries. I would like to ask you if you know the total per capita aid being received by Viet Nam?

**Dr. Hall:** No, I cannot tell you that. I have written to the Vietnamese Embassy and I did not get that figure. The most recent figures I have—and perhaps Mr. Strong has more recent ones—are from the hearings before the committee for foreign affairs in April of this year and some of the figures of the different countries are given.

**Mr. Allmand:** Therefore, you do not know whether it is a fact that perhaps Viet Nam is receiving more per capita aid than many other countries in the underdeveloped world?

**Dr. Hall:** I have never seen that figure, no.

**Mr. Allmand:** Do you have any idea of the comparable figures?

**Dr. Hall:** No, I do not. It would be very difficult to say what aid is, because we all have different ideas on whether we are helping them or not.

**Mr. Allmand:** No, but would you agree that when a small or medium country is going to give aid to any other country it should examine how much aid that country is already receiving?

**Dr. Hall:** Yes, I do.

**Mr. Allmand:** And you have already mentioned that there was a lot of medical equipment from all countries standing around Viet Nam not being used.

**Dr. Hall:** That is right.

**Mr. Allmand:** You would agree that it would be a good idea for Canada to know

these things and perhaps it would be a good idea if you would investigate them too, do you not think?

**Dr. Hall:** I think this is a difficulty. A country—we must not impugn their motives—with the best motives I am sure wishes to help. They say: "Now would it not be a good idea if we gave something or other?" It certainly seems like a good idea, but often when you are out there you find that this good idea is unthinkable because someone else has already done it, or the people on the ground are not able to handle it.

**Mr. Allmand:** I will ask one final question. You mentioned the profits that we are making in sending military supplies to Viet Nam and you mentioned certain figures. Because I do not have the statement I had difficulty following them.

**Dr. Hall:** \$320 million a year is the *Financial Post* statement.

**Mr. Allmand:** I was going to ask you what the basis for your...

**Dr. Hall:** This was an article in the *Financial Post* about three weeks ago, which I think is very well documented. I talked to the man who drew this up.

**Mr. Allmand:** Do you know the type of equipment that is referred to in that article?

**Dr. Hall:** All war supplies, and this includes prefabricated hospitals, Caribou aircraft, explosives...

**Mr. Allmand:** And clothing?

**Dr. Hall:** Yes, I think the green berets are made here, are they not?

**Mr. Allmand:** I do not know.

**Dr. Hall:** The *Financial Post* of October 14.

**Mr. Allmand:** I see.

**Dr. Hall:** I can show you here. These are the orders related to military purchases. This is 1959 and this is 1967.

**Mr. Allmand:** I see. Therefore, your statement before this Committee is based on this article which you read in the *Financial Post*?

**Dr. Hall:** Yes. And another article in the *Star Weekly* which is earlier and not as well documented.

**Mr. Allmand:** By whom?

**Dr. Hall:** I have it here somewhere.

**Mr. Allmand:** If you find it later, you could provide that information.

• (11:30 a.m.)

**Dr. Hall:** I have it here.

I have given all the references for the remarks I have made. It is the *Star Weekly*, the issue of May 27.

**Mr. Allmand:** You have, of course, stressed the bad side of the Canadian aid to Viet Nam. Would you say there has been any good at all in any of our efforts in Viet Nam? Is it all negative? Is it all completely useless?

**Dr. Hall:** Of course I would not say that. I am trying to avoid two things. First of all I want to avoid the idea that this is just a personal gripe. It is not. I want to avoid the idea that the External Aid Office is indifferent. It is not. I have talked to many of them at different times and I think they are all concerned. They would all like to see a much better job done. It is very difficult to do external aid anywhere; it is even more difficult to do it in Viet Nam. I think we need to examine very closely the purpose of what we are doing, and I think from the refugee point of view we could do more.

I think long-term development aid is quite different and I think the point you are making, which is do we all have to help Viet Nam, is a perfectly valid one. I think probably Canada should help the British Commonwealth more than some other area into which America is pouring money, but from the refugee and the relief point of view I think we should be doing more.

**Mr. Allmand:** Mr. Chairman, there are many other questions but I will pass.

**Mr. Macquarrie:** Mr. Chairman, I am a bit shaken by some of the information we have received. It seems to me there are two aspects; one is Dr. Hall's discussion of our program in general and the other matter that concerns me is the relationship of Dr. Hall, a Canadian doing a very important job in a very important area, with the government. I agree with the idea he has just expressed that it is not of any value to put this matter on a personal basis or to seek blame, and so on. However, I was impressed when Dr. Hall referred to letters and communications that were not answered. Was this a casual thing or were there numerous occasions on which your communications received no response?

**Dr. Hall:** Sir, I only once received a letter from the External Aid Office. This was from the previous Director General, and it was an entirely unsolicited communication in response to a conversation I held with a newspaper reporter at the request of the delegation commissioner. He reported something which the Director General did not like. It was really not of any great significance but this was the only time I ever had a letter from External Aid.

**Mr. Macquarrie:** But you wrote to them how many times, perhaps?

**Dr. Hall:** Quite a number of times and reports were submitted suggesting that we should do various things. This was not always done directly through me but often through the Commissioner and answers were either very, very slow in coming in the form of telegrams to the Commissioner or there was just no answer.

**Mr. Macquarrie:** I suppose you then reported your position as being something like an international beggar. Did this strike any response?

**Dr. Hall:** I think the attitude has been that which has been described in the *Financial Post* recently. I was sent out under what they are pleased to call their normal conditions of support, which means that an adviser is sent out like a box of biscuits; here he is, he is yours, take him, do what you please with him and that is it. They do not send money to pay for his living allowances and they do not send equipment to go with him so he can do his work. I think in External Aid, in going through their channels, that this was regarded as perfectly normal and proper.

**Mr. Macquarrie:** I am envisaging you in a very sensitive and difficult area. What sort of line of communication did you have? Did you have nothing better than letters that were not answered?

**Dr. Hall:** No. I always had the Canadian Delegation to whom I could go and speak, as I did very frequently.

**Mr. Macquarrie:** Did that expedite communications?

**Dr. Hall:** I do not think it made much difference. This is not the Canadian Delegation's fault; all they can do is pass on the message to External Aid and then I do not get to see what goes on in their telegrams.

**Mr. Macquarrie:** You referred to supplies and I forget how many rubber gloves and bandages there were for a number of days. In your requests what was the extent and range of the equipment which you indicated you felt was needed?

• (11:35 a.m.)

**Dr. Hall:** I asked for medicines to treat tuberculous patients who could not buy these medicines themselves. A patient would come in who would be worse than when I saw him two months ago and then after long questioning I would find out that his prescription had never been filled because he could not afford to buy the drugs, which were not...

**Mr. Nesbitt:** Were these antibiotics?

**Dr. Hall:** Yes, streptomycin and aureomycin, which are not really expensive drugs but they did not have any money at all. They did not have enough money for food let alone drugs. I asked for plaster of Paris, bandages, splints and surgical instruments, which are the ordinary expendable supplies of my work. In Saigon the major expense of particular technical instruments was not necessary because these had already been given to us; it was the expendable things like screws and bandages which I was using up. The Vietnamese only had a small stock of these and I was draining their supply.

**Mr. Macquarrie:** When you asked for these things, Doctor, were you told that they would come later or that they would not come at all, or were you told nothing?

**Dr. Hall:** I was told absolutely nothing and one day some boxes came a long time after I asked for them. My letter was never answered or I never received an answer to it.

**Mr. Macquarrie:** Good heavens, to be mild. I was interested in the reference to tuberculosis, which I had been lead to believe was an area of special concern and in which perhaps Canada had special competence and training. Do you believe there is for Canada in that field perhaps a unique area of achievement and opportunity and service?

**Dr. Hall:** I was asked about this by the Commissioner once. General Khanh sent around a list of things that he thought it would be nice for the country to have, and one of these was tuberculosis centres. I said in early 1965 that tuberculosis was a major health problem in the country. A lot of people died from it and many people were incapacitated because of it. I think they went through the civil service in Saigon and

found that 10 per cent of the civil service had active tuberculosis, so you can imagine what the poor people have got.

There is a great difficulty in this, though, in that I think we must try to avoid doing the work of the Vietnamese for them. I think we can give them the facilities and the assistance to do the work but to set up a tuberculosis centre in a place where they are not going to work themselves, and where they have no intention of continuing this centre once we withdraw our personnel, does not help the country. I find this is a very, very difficult thing to either get people to understand or to put into practice. In one of the External Aid reports—I think they now have three doctors and four nurses there—they suggested that when the doctors all go home they will send out a male nurse to run it. This is not the way to run a specialist centre.

Holland is in the books as having offered five TB centres and I think their intention is to set up a centre and let the Vietnamese run it themselves. They are quite able to do that.

**Mr. Macquarrie:** Just one further question. There are many, many more questions I would like to ask but I do not want to be selfish with the time of the Committee. I am sure the selection of butter and wheat as two of the commodities has impressed all of us. Were there any sort of sociological repercussions from the fact that wheat did not find its way to those who were not amply economically endowed, to the poorer folk? Was there a feeling that aid—I read of this somewhere—of this form was of assistance to those in Viet Nam who needed it least?

**Dr. Hall:** I think Mr. Strong will clear this up later. This was food which we had available to give away and I think the intention of this commodity aid is that it will be sold in the country and with the money that will be generated in this way they can then build something else. I think we are sort of trying to turn the wheat which we do not want here into a bridge or a building. I think this was the idea. I do not think it was really intended from this that we would feed the people who were otherwise going unfed because the local government has to give the money for this and put it into a counterpart fund which has to be inspected annually by Canada. I think this is another problem which perhaps Mr. Strong will go into.

• (11:40 a.m.)

In the records one has, a very large

amount of the money put into these counter-part funds around the world has never been spent. So, there is some question whether this is not contributing to inflation in these countries and just how much under this rather rigid system we are helping them. Our whole food program has changed recently and this may be changing too; I am not sure.

**Mr. Macquarrie:** I was thinking perhaps more of the sumptuary habits of the indigenous population, and that those who do not have refrigerators could not use butter; and it seems to me I read that many in Viet Nam, unless they were the wealthy, did not have ovens and probably could not bake bread, or make . . .

**Dr. Hall:** No, they cannot do this. The Chinese are the bakers there and the ordinary Vietnamese do not bake at all. But, what we could do, if we do want to help them, is to send people with ovens, to send people who can set up field kitchens and give them bread. If you give them bread they will eat it. If you give them wheat they will not know what to do with it.

**Mr. Macquarrie:** Of course. We look something like anti-Robin Hoods unless we get that second stage smoothed out. I will pass for the time being, Mr. Chairman.

**Mr. Brewin:** Mr. Chairman, like Mr. Macquarrie, I was very much disturbed by what the Doctor said. I would like to go into one aspect of what he said. He used what struck me as a euphemism when he said that he failed to understand certain statements by the Minister. I would like to go into that.

**Mr. Churchill:** You just joined the club.

**Mr. Brewin:** I think he said the Minister stated that since we began Canadian aid to Viet Nam we have allocated as much money and assistance as any other country but two. Do you know when that statement was made?

**Dr. Hall:** Yes, sir. Very recently.

**Mr. Brewin:** Because I asked the question does not mean I do not know the answer.

**Dr. Hall:** It was made in the House on October 11.

**Mr. Brewin:** To what area was the Minister referring? Do you know, from the statement?

**Dr. Hall:** This is what I am not sure about. Maybe he means the Colombo Plan. They were speaking specifically about Viet Nam at the time. Certainly one was left with the impression that it was Viet Nam that he was discussing.

**Mr. Brewin:** I take it from what you have told us that the statement just is not so. This is true is it?

**Dr. Hall:** Sir, I am not qualified to tell you that. All I can show you are these figures which come from the submission to the hearing in the House of Representatives and of course these are the figures. "Aid" is a funny expression and "allocated" is an even more funny expression. It is hard to know just what people are talking about. If I can read you this statement by the Minister:

It is difficult on Orders of the Day to answer his indictment or even the implication in my hon. friend's question, but I may say that since we began Canadian aid to Viet Nam in 1953 we have allocated as much money to assistance in this area as any other country but two.

**Mr. Brewin:** Well, that is fairly clear—"allocated as much money . . . since 1953" and it refers to Viet Nam. Why do you say that is not a correct statement?

**Dr. Hall:** I do not think I said it was not correct. I said I do not understand it.

**Mr. Brewin:** You do not understand it.

**Dr. Hall:** It may be possible for some political economist to take these figures and show that really we are number three.

**Mr. Brewin:** As far as you are concerned you listed about six or seven countries at least that were giving substantially more. . .

**Dr. Hall:** On the basis of these figures, I think we stand Number 7.

**Mr. Brewin:** Number 7. Perhaps we could get the Minister to explain that. You said the Minister made some other statement about a great part of our aid being in the form of medical. . .

**Dr. Hall:** That is right, sir.

**Mr. Brewin:** When was that statement made?

**Dr. Hall:** That was a statement made to the nurses in Windsor in June of 1965.

I think if we talk clearly and neatly about what we have done, it is fine. If we said we have given polio vaccine to these children, this is good. Polio vaccine is necessary. If we said: "We have a large stockpile of medical equipment which we do not think we have need for—we hope we will not—and we are going to give you some of our medical equipment which has already been paid for by the Department of National Health and Welfare", this is fine. But to allocate funds to External Aid and then go through the public pretence that External Aid is buying this material and we are sending out hospitals I think misrepresents the actual situation.

• (11:45 a.m.)

**Mr. Brewin:** Dr. Hall, do I understand from what you said that your own work you felt was hampered by lack of co-operation from the External Aid Office, lack of supplies...

**Dr. Hall:** My own work failed.

**Mr. Brewin:** You own work failed?

**Dr. Hall:** I was the only foreigner who had ever been permitted, and for rather a devious reason, to work as head of a department in this University Hospital. I am the only foreigner who has ever worked in both the University of Saigon and the University of Hue, and although the Vietnamese are happy for foreigners to come in and do what is properly their work at the lower echelons in the countryside, they are very resistant to foreigners coming in and working in the Universities and holding position of influence. I think this, to me a tremendous opportunity, was completely thrown away.

**Mr. Brewin:** You said your work had failed. The basis and the reason for the failure as I understand it was that you submitted briefs and requests for supporting material, large supplies and so on and you got no response.

**Dr. Hall:** I submitted a brief—and with your permission I would like this put in as part of the record—when I first went out there; when it was first discussed between the Vietnamese and myself what we should do, because I knew them already, we were good friends, and I thought we should set up a university service as other countries were doing in different places and different kinds. This was submitted to the Canadian Delegation, and the legal officer in charge of aid at the time said this seemed like a very sensible idea to him and he talked to some local people. I

talked to the Director of Education at that time in Ottawa and he said this seemed a very good idea to him and that they would probably act on this. I went out there expecting to spend some years to set this up and to organize it. I did not know at that time that the previous Director General of Aid had said he did not think Canada should engage in hospital activities. I did not know at that time that Canada would not send out any materials at all unless they were 80 per cent Canadian in origin. Although there are Canadian expendables supplied like bandages and drugs, there are not Canadian instruments. So, if they had told me the conditions under which their aid had to be sent, then I would have known at the beginning that I could never have done this. But instead, I submitted this idea to them and it was all accepted as a very nice plan.

**Mr. Brewin:** Then, apparently it is a matter of policy that the Canadian External Aid Office or the Canadian Government will say that the local country in which you are working should supply the supporting gifts, materials and so on.

**Dr. Hall:** Yes. I think like so many things this is not a personal matter. This is a system one is trying to fight.

**Mr. Brewin:** But were the supplies available in Viet Nam?

**Dr. Hall:** They were not available.

**Mr. Brewin:** Would the transportation of these supplies be a very serious matter?

**Dr. Hall:** In Saigon it was no problem. In Hue it was a very considerable problem because virtually everything has to be flown in Viet Nam. The roads are blocked and the railway is out.

**Mr. Brewin:** I suppose you could take all the supplies you need for quite a while, could you?

**Dr. Hall:** That is no problem. If they have flown a jeep out, they can fly medical supplies out.

**Mr. Brewin:** As I understand it, and no doubt Mr. Strong will be able to enlighten us on it more later, you say that the failure was really due perhaps not to cussedness but to a policy which said that we would rely on the local country to give the supporting supplies and the local country could not do that. Is that the situation?

**Dr. Hall:** I think the mentality was that if they wanted it done they were the same as every other country and it was up to them to

do it rather than assess the problem as an individual problem and see that it was impossible for them to do it and then waive their rules. The Americans in Viet Nam, in order to do the job properly, have waived whatever rule was blocking the job. But we were not prepared to do that.

**Mr. Brewin:** That is just what I wanted to ask you. You said that other countries were supplying various forms of medical assistance to Viet Nam. Did they adopt the same rule?

**Dr. Hall:** No. New Zealand sent one of the first medical teams. It is in Quang Ngai. It is a very good team and it has been very busy. They work there under the Colombo Plan as do we. They have put up buildings for their people and they have sent supplies which were bought outside New Zealand. No medical supplies in any great amount are made in New Zealand so they buy them outside when they are needed.

I think, we started off, in the University of Hue with about 50 students and Germany contributed quite expensive lights and microscopes for these students. The intake of students increased and New Zealand offered to do what they could to help. In order to provide the same microscopes for all the students they bought microscopes with New Zealand foreign money—and they do not have much foreign money—from Germany. They did not even insist they should be British. As I understand it, only Canada has had this rigid view, which has now changed a bit.

• (11:50 a.m.)

**Mr. Brewin:** I want to know about this 80 per cent Canadian content. Can we pin that down? Were you specifically told by someone in the External Aid office that some of the supplies you wanted could not be sent because of the 80 per cent content rule?

**Dr. Hall:** Yes, I was.

**Mr. Brewin:** Who told you that?

**Dr. Hall:** I do not know. I think I gradually found it out. I am not sure I did not find it out to start with from the Canadian Commissioner.

**Mr. Brewin:** Was there anybody in the External Aid office who...

**Dr. Hall:** I have a telegram here which will confirm that. Away back when I wanted to set up a mobile hospital—which I think would have been useful, although it was

quite ambitious—a telegram was sent about the availability of these stocks of hospital units. I am afraid the copy I have is not dated but it was in about July of 1965. The third item reads:

It is unfortunately difficult to calculate the exact overall Canadian content of the hospital, but it is expected to be well below the 80 per cent which we usually require for aid financed equipment. However, we are prepared to seek authority exceptionally in this case to dispense with Canadian content rule, provided it can be established that this type of equipment would make a really worthwhile Canadian contribution in Viet Nam.

Now, this rule has been waived for Viet Nam exclusively and I suppose the reason it was waived was in order that we could send these pre-stocked hospitals to Viet Nam.

**Mr. Brewin:** Dr. Hall, I just have one further question. Perhaps you do not know about this, but you mentioned Dr. Gingras. What was the project that he was to...

**Dr. Hall:** He was sent out—and I only have his word for this, I have not seen his documents—to tell External Aid how a children's rehabilitation centre could be set up in Saigon. This would be a centre where children would go after their legs had been cut off or, if they had polio, to have braces and things like this made. However, at the time he went out there the Americans were already setting up a centre in Saigon. Perhaps they could have helped them with this centre but there was no reason for two centres in the same place. This was widely known.

**Mr. Brewin:** I think he has described his experiences in an article in the *Toronto Star Weekly*.

**Dr. Hall:** Yes, in the *Star Weekly*. It was written for him. He did not do it himself.

**Mr. Brewin:** Mr. Chairman, those are all the questions I have at the moment.

**The Chairman:** There are at least four more members who would like to ask questions. I have the names of Messrs. McIntosh, Nesbitt, Andras, Basford and Churchill. It is nearing 12 o'clock noon so I do not believe we will be able to complete the questioning of this witness this morning. I presume that Mr. Strong, Director General of the External Aid Office, also would like to say a few

words. I wonder if we should not hear Mr. Strong now for a while and then have both gentlemen back next Thursday to complete the evidence. Is this agreed?

**Mr. McIntosh:** Mr. Chairman, I have an appointment at 12.30.

**The Chairman:** In that case, Mr. McIntosh, you may next question Dr. Hall.

**Mr. McIntosh:** Mr. Chairman, my first question to Dr. Hall is in regard to the aid that he referred to, and he used the term "counterpart funds". In your opinion is this a normal procedure in all countries when giving aid to Viet Nam, for instance?

**Dr. Hall:** There is a certain group of aid which I think is classified as "commodity aid". This might be nickel or it might be wheat. It is raw materials. These materials are given to the country and I understand the country has to pay the shipping costs. When they arrive in the country these materials are sold locally to ordinary commercial people and Canada tells the country how much these materials are worth in dollars. A fund is then set up in local currency to the extent of the local value of these dollars and this fund has to be reported upon annually to the External Aid Office. They have to say how much money is in the fund and then, if they wish to build something, Canada and this country will agree that what they wish to build is within a valid objective and it is built out of these local costs. I believe that Canada will often give equipment such as dynamos and the local counterpart funds are spent on the cost of labour or the cost of cement.

**Mr. McIntosh:** Did I understand you to say that one of the qualifications for counterpart aid was that it had to be war materials?

**Dr. Hall:** No, sir.

**Mr. McIntosh:** And wheat was a war material?

**Dr. Hall:** No, sir.

**Mr. McIntosh:** I took that from your last statement.

I believe you also said in a former statement that the wheat that was given was a subsidy to the farmers of Canada. How do you determine it was a subsidy?

**Dr. Hall:** I do not wish to offend anybody by saying this but the government paid for

this wheat which I believe we could not sell at that time.

**Mr. McIntosh:** What time was that?

**Dr. Hall:** I think this extended from 1959 to 1964.

**Mr. McIntosh:** My second question is a follow-up to what Mr. Allmand was trying to get at. You quoted certain figures and the figures that I have copied down for this aid that Canada gave to Viet Nam is that it employed roughly 1,400 people and I want to ask you about the source of this information.

**Dr. Hall:** The *Financial Post*.

**Mr. McIntosh:** The *Financial Post*? This is the same article that you referred to?

**Dr. Hall:** Yes.

**Mr. McIntosh:** My next question is with regard to the reports and recommendations which you have submitted to the Canadian government. I presume that you were very curious on your return to Canada why no attention had been paid to these reports and recommendations and I imagine you made enquiries as to why this was the case. Did you get any satisfaction from these enquiries?

**Dr. Hall:** While I was away I returned twice to the External Aid Office—and this was not paid for by the government—to talk to them about what I was trying to do, and I found there was no great overwhelming interest in having this done. I went to Viet Nam on the understanding it would be done and then it just transpired that it was not going to be done. I was very much in the hands of the Vietnamese. They asked that a particular service be provided by an adviser. Had this service to build up an orthopedic department at the University been financed by Canada I would have stayed in this one hospital in Saigon and organized it for them, but as it was obvious to them that Canada was not going to set up a service around me they then began to think to themselves, "Well, where can we use this man next?" So I went each year from place to place just filling in for them, hoping that the situation would improve but it steadily deteriorated.

**Mr. McIntosh:** When you were in Viet Nam did you report direct to the Canadian government in Canada was this done or through some liaison officer?

**Dr. Hall:** My immediate contact was with the Canadian Delegation but I also submitted reports and letters directly to External Aid.

**Mr. McIntosh:** Did you receive full co-operation in your contact with the Canadian Delegation in Viet Nam or the Canadian mission, or commission, or whatever it is called? Did you have any problems with them at all?

**Mr. Hall:** Yes, I had problems with them and they had problems with me. It was a very difficult and very tedious situation. They devoted a great deal of time in trying to clear up this matter which, had the system not existed—had more sense been used in Ottawa—would never have existed in the first place.

• (12 noon)

**Mr. McIntosh:** What system would you suggest? Have you any recommendations in that respect?

**Dr. Hall:** I think it is quite wrong to send a teacher, or an engineer, or anybody, from Canada to a country which we recognize is underdeveloped, or whatever other euphemism we care to use, and expect it to provide him with adequate housing and supplies and transportation.

I have a book here—I do not know whether you know it or not—written by a man called Spicer, which is the only one I know of which has analysed Canada's external aid policy. He gives many accounts of the tremendous amount of difficulties that advisers have encountered. As a result of this, if we provide, or accept, substandard housing and have very poor local support we may have a 22-year-old teacher who will go out for a year or two, but we will never develop a good core of professional men who will be prepared to stay in External Aid work.

**Mr. McIntosh:** Is Canada the only country that is encountering this problem?

**Dr. Hall:** Everybody encounters it because the problem is not developed by the foreigner going; the problem is there in the country to which he goes. But I think other countries are more malleable in their activities.

**Mr. McIntosh:** In other words, they have realized that the problem exists and have taken measures to overcome it?

**Dr. Hall:** Certainly in Viet Nam where there are awful problems, Canada is the only country which has insisted that local housing and local costs be paid by Viet Nam.

**Mr. McIntosh:** Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

**Dr. Hall:** No other country was doing this. Viet Nam's attitude was, "Well, thank you, we can manage without."

**Mr. Nesbitt:** I have observed on other occasions that it sometimes takes a little time for members to get reports of these Committee meetings. I believe Dr. Hall has a written text. Could it be mimeographed and sent to the members of the Committee before our next meeting? As has been pointed out by a number of members, because of the detail in Dr. Hall's report, which is very concise, I know that many of us have a number of questions to ask. I would like to see exactly what was said. I think it would be very helpful to everybody. I am sure, for instance, that Mr. Strong, who is going to be making some comments, would probably like to have a copy, unless he already has one.

**The Chairman:** We have some copies now, but not enough to go around. We will have further copies made as soon as possible for all the members.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** I have many questions, as has everybody else, but there is just one area of questioning I would like to pursue with Dr. Hall.

As I recall, during Dr. Hall's remarks he made some reference to a hospital ship supplied by West Germany. Dr. Hall, is this hospital ship in operation?

**Dr. Hall:** Yes, sir, I think it has been in operation for over a year.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** Have you had the opportunity of being aboard it.

**Dr. Hall:** Yes, I have been on it; and I know the German surgeons and the staff there quite well.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** Could you give us a brief description of this ship?

**Dr. Hall:** It has over 100 beds. It is a very nice ship. It is docked in the river right beside the main street of Saigon.

To start with the people were slow in going there. Later they gradually came, but they had to be directed there by the government. The casualties coming in from the countryside were naturally funnelled to a government hospital, and from there they had to be sent to the ship. After a while it became more successful in its operation.

I might say that the Germans told me that \$3 million in overhead for a ship—this is not

the medical operating cost, but the ship's overhead cost—was just not very sensible, and that they were thinking of withdrawing the ship later and spending their money on something else.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** In view of the fact that it is probably difficult to get building materials and supplies in Saigon, do you think this would perhaps be a useful temporary effort...

**Dr. Hall:** Sir, if you can take a hospital ship you can take a shipload of building supplies.

• (12:05 p.m.)

**Mr. Nesbitt:** I am very glad to have this information. It is a matter that has been under discussion from time to time here. This is very helpful information indeed.

**Dr. Hall:** If you will excuse me, I would like to add another point. In the *Financial Post* they point out that there is a Canadian firm which is building prefabricated hospitals for the American army. Would it not be nice if they built prefabricated hospitals for Canada?

**Mr. Andras:** Dr. Hall, am I correct that you mentioned in your remarks that you had two tours in Viet Nam?

**Dr. Hall:** It is difficult to say what a tour is. I went out twice myself, then I had three successive one-year contracts.

**Mr. Andras:** Contracts with whom?

**Dr. Hall:** External Aid; three successive contracts of one year each.

**Mr. Andras:** And the contracts were between you and...?

**Dr. Hall:** The External Aid Office.

**Mr. Andras:** At the beginning did you go out with certain specific terms of reference from External Aid?

**Dr. Hall:** The first and second times I went with Medico myself. The third time I went out I went with a contract. The basic demand of the contract, which was written by the Vietnamese government, was that I would organize an orthopaedic service at the University section of Cho Ray Hospital. In their mind, organizing a service meant arranging personnel, bringing supplies and setting up a complete new service. This is what they had in mind.

**Mr. Andras:** Was this contract wholly initiated by the Vietnamese and did you then negotiate a contract with External Aid, or did External Aid approach you?

**Dr. Hall:** There were two contracts. First of all, there was a contract between the Government of Viet Nam and the Government of Canada to send an expert to perform a stipulated service; then there was a second contract between the External Aid Office and the man, myself, by which I would go out and perform this service for such-and-such a period of time.

**Mr. Andras:** Did you have detailed discussions with External Aid before you went out...

**Dr. Hall:** I submitted a brief on what I thought would be necessary in terms of buildings, personnel and equipment to set this service up. This brief was accepted.

**Mr. Andras:** It was accepted before you went?

**Dr. Hall:** Yes; I would not have gone otherwise.

**Mr. Andras:** Therefore, you went on the understanding that those...

**Dr. Hall:** I went on the understanding that this was going to be done; and the Vietnamese accepted me on the understanding that it would be done.

**Mr. Andras:** And this was not what I describe as the first tour?

**Dr. Hall:** This was my first tour under External Aid.

**Mr. Andras:** But not your first tour under Medico?

**Dr. Hall:** No.

**Mr. Andras:** Thank you.

**Dr. Hall:** On my first two tours under Medico they got to know me and accepted the idea that I would be prepared to do this.

**The Chairman:** Is that all, Mr. Andras?

**Mr. Andras:** Yes, thank you.

**Mr. Basford:** Doctor Hall, I do not have your statement in front of me, and it is therefore difficult to ask questions on it. Reverting to the questions you have been asked about the level of Canadian aid and its relationship

to the aid being given by other countries, it seemed to me that at the end of the statement, when dealing with the Canadian figures, you eliminated food aid and scholarships and credits; you sort of subtracted those from the Canadian amount to show a very small amount of direct aid to Viet Nam. You then compared this with other countries' figures and you seemed to include all the things you had thrown out in the Canadian figures. Could you clarify that for me?

**Dr. Hall:** No, sir. I did two separate things. I broke down the expenditure allocated to Viet Nam, to show what is spent in Canada and never leaves Canada and the small amount of this that could be conceived of as going to Viet Nam. I then compared the total Canadian allocations with the figures I have—which may not be total allocations—of other countries. The major countries are actually spending money on, or supplying credit or material to, Viet Nam, whereas the greater part of our aid has not been of that nature.

**Mr. Basford:** I would like to revert to your remarks about scholarships, which have not been raised in the questioning.

First of all, I am not clear on whether or not you are opposed to this scholarship program?

**Dr. Hall:** Someone asked me: "Do you think education is a good thing?" I am a professional teacher and since my salary is involved I think it is a good thing; but education is a bit like motherhood—it is good for some people at the right times! I do not think that the giving of scholarships indiscriminately is good help; and there is the very good point that it may actually hinder. We should know why we are giving these scholarships, and to whom, and what they are going to do after they have finished. There is no question at all that in Viet Nam all the young boys want to get out of the country and stay out of it.

• (12:10 p.m.)

**Mr. Basford:** I know nothing about the scholarship program with Viet Nam, but it has been my experience with some other developing countries that they have placed the requirement on the recipients of scholarships that they return to the country. I know specifically, for example, that Malaysia has done this.

**Dr. Hall:** Yes.

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**Mr. Basford:** Does Viet Nam do it?

**Dr. Hall:** I think in theory it might; but in fact it does not operate.

I went to Viet Nam in 1964. It was said then, and I think it was correct, that there were more Vietnamese doctors in France than there were in Viet Nam. They stopped accepting scholarships in France because their people never came back. The United States, in order to encourage the boys to return to Viet Nam, take them under escort to San Francisco and put them on a non-stop airplane.

**Mr. Basford:** This is a common problem with all developing countries.

**Dr. Hall:** I have every sympathy for the students; I do not blame them for not wanting to go back to Viet Nam; I do not blame them for wanting to stay in Canada and make more money under, perhaps, better climatic conditions; but our purpose is not to help the individual, it is to help the country. It may be that we are helping them and it may be that we are not; I think we ought to know.

**Mr. Basford:** You say that if Viet Nam does it it is not effective, and this has caused the requirement placed on their students to return?

**Dr. Hall:** In fact, many of them do not return; and many of those who do return are either not willing, or able, to work in the field in which they are trained.

**Mr. Basford:** As I say, I know nothing about the Vietnamese scholarship program, but in my part of the country we have, for example, West Indian scholarship students. From time to time some of them have come asking for assistance to stay in Canada. It has certainly been my experience—not with External Aid; they were not directly involved—that the Department of Immigration takes an extremely hard line with these students. They are here on student visas and I have not yet been able to assist one to stay in Canada as a landed immigrant.

**Dr. Hall:** Mr. Strong's data, I think, showed that only six have been allowed to stay, and this, apparently, for good reason. However, they are told that they have to get out of the country for two years, and then I believe they may come back in again, as they do in the United States.

We have a large number of people in this country who, having taken a period of training in the United States, come back, sit out two years in Canada, and then go back to the United States and never go home. The requirement is not that they should go back and work in their own country; the requirement is just that they should be outside Canada for two years.

**Mr. Basford:** Yes; but it has been my experience with the Immigration Department that they take a very hard line with students applying for landed immigrant status, and refuse to grant it.

• (12:15 p.m.)

**Dr. Hall:** But these are students who have never left the country; these are not students who have gone down to the United States for two years, for a fellowship, and then come back again. I do not think we know anything about these people; I do not know that we have any figures on them at all. I think we should have.

We are spending a great deal of money, which I guess we can afford, but I would like to know that the countries are being helped by what we are doing. If they are not then let us spend the money on something else, or let us find out which countries are helped by scholarships and which are not.

**Mr. Basford:** You deal with the subjects of their study. Are we or the Government of Viet Nam the better judges of desirable subjects?

**Dr. Hall:** The Government of Viet Nam; it has to be.

**Mr. Basford:** I agree with you; that is why I asked the question. Do you know whether the Vietnamese government is endeavouring to exercise any control over the subjects their scholarship students study?

**Dr. Hall:** It is generally understood that they are not. Now, I cannot document this, obviously, but there are an enormous number of Vietnamese boys receiving scholarships all over the world, not just in Canada but in Australia, New Zealand and Germany; they are all giving scholarships.

The basis on which a scholarship is given is that they study a subject that they cannot study in Viet Nam. Now, there are no scholarships given for medicine. You cannot get a scholarship for a nurse. You can get a scholarship for a nurse to become a Bachelor of Nursing, but you cannot get a scholarship to

take a registered nursing diploma because they can do that in Viet Nam. The students say, "I cannot learn chemical engineering in Viet Nam, so I will be a chemical engineer," and off they go with a scholarship to be a chemical engineer. But there is no chemical engineering done in Viet Nam, so when they come back they cannot work as a chemical engineer. I talked to a young girl who said she was going off to be a chemical engineer. I said, "What are you going to do when you come back?" She said, "Well, my sister is a pharmacist; perhaps I can help her".

**Mr. Basford:** If we are going to have a scholarship program, as we do, I take it that you would agree then that it is not Canada or the External Aid Office but the Government of Viet Nam that should say what fields of study they enter?

**Dr. Hall:** Yes; we cannot say to Viet Nam, "We do not think your students should study such-and-such a field". We can say to them, however, "We have scholarships available in such-and-such a field. Do you want them?" As we say, "We have butter or we have wheat." What we can, very reasonably, say to these countries is, "For your sake, not for ours, we would like to know what is the effect of these scholarships". This is not a demand to know anything about Viet Nam's secret affairs; this is not trying to run their country for them; but we should know what is the effect of giving these scholarships. If we find that we have trained fifty chemical engineers and they are working, not as chemical engineers but as penpushers in some office because they speak English, then we know we should not train another fifty.

**Mr. Basford:** Yes; but it seems to me that the Vietnamese are better judges of that than we are.

**Dr. Hall:** You are leading me to say things that I do not want to say in public. The Vietnamese should be better judges of it, yes; but in giving aid to a country our obligation is more than the giving of money. I think we have an obligation to help them in their development. We do know that they are training many boys who are not going back to work in the country, and that what they have been trained in is not going to help the country.

**Mr. Basford:** Yes. I will pass for the moment.

**The Chairman:** Mr. Churchill.

**Mr. Churchill:** Dr. Hall, when you speak of the Canadian Delegation to whom are you referring?

**Dr. Hall:** These are the members who are sent from External Affairs to direct the political aspects of the International Control Commission.

**Mr. Churchill:** Have you been asked to submit to the Department suggestions for improving our medical assistance to Viet Nam?

**Dr. Hall:** No, sir.

**Mr. Churchill:** Are you prepared to make suggestions on what should be done?

**Dr. Hall:** If Mr. Strong would like to have them.

**Mr. Churchill:** When did you return from Viet Nam?

**Dr. Hall:** I left Viet Nam in April.

**Mr. Churchill:** Of 1967?

**Dr. Hall:** Yes. I would say that it would be impossible for me to sit down and write out what I think should be done in Viet Nam. Had I left Viet Nam even yesterday it would be impossible for me to do so because there are so many other people working there that one would have to find out what everybody else was doing and what everybody else planned to do, so that we would not duplicate their intentions and could interlock our efforts.

**Mr. Churchill:** On the basis of your experience, though, and without necessarily finding out what is being done at the present moment in Viet Nam, could you submit to this Committee a brief setting out what you think might be done by Canada in the way of giving medical assistance?

**Dr. Hall:** In very general terms, yes.

**Mr. Churchill:** I hope that the Chairman asks you to do that. We might then see that it gets to the Department.

You mentioned at the beginning of your remarks the number of patients admitted, or not admitted, to hospitals in Viet Nam. I did not make my note quickly enough. You talked about 4,000 a month as the average figure for those who required medical treatment.

**Dr. Hall:** No, sir; of casualties.

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**Mr. Churchill:** Casualties?

**Dr. Hall:** Yes; not medical cases, but casualties.

• (12:20 p.m.)

**Mr. Churchill:** Casualties as a result of the war?

**Dr. Hall:** Yes, sir.

**Mr. Churchill:** Civilian casualties?

**Dr. Hall:** Yes, sir.

**Mr. Churchill:** Are these civilian casualties caused because people are caught between the two armies, or are they caused by attacks made by the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese?

**Dr. Hall:** The official American figures have decided that it is 50-50.

**Mr. Churchill:** Fifty-fifty; they get in between the two?

**Dr. Hall:** Yes. It depends on the area. In some places it is purely Viet Cong, and in others it is from the sky.

**Mr. Churchill:** Did any cases of attacks by the Viet Cong on undefended villages come to your attention, where, say, the head man was injured or killed?

**Dr. Hall:** I think they scalped four and disembowelled two in one evening. I was looking across the river at this. This goes on all the time. This was not a village; it was Hue, which is quite a big city. Although I have no intention of getting into politics at all, the point has been made—and I think it is a legitimate and a pertinent one—that when Americans kill people with bombs this is a hazard of war, but when a Vietnamese kills them with a knife this is a deliberate personal affront.

**Mr. Churchill:** I noticed that somewhere along the line you said that there has been no Canadian from the Canadian Delegation to visit any of the institutions with which you were connected.

**Dr. Hall:** No one from the Canadian Delegation took the opportunity to go around to the hospitals in which I was working.

**Mr. Churchill:** Would it have been convenient or easy for them to get to those hospitals?

**Dr. Hall:** It is in the same city.

**Mr. Churchill:** I have no further questions.

**The Chairman:** Does the Committee want the doctor to be back next week, or have we completed the questions?

**Mr. Brewin:** Before you adjourn there is a matter I would like to discuss with the Committee. The witness has been extremely diplomatic in saying that Mr. Martin made certain statements to the House which he said he had failed to understand. But he also gave a statement that indicated the statement made in the House by Mr. Martin on October 10 was positively misleading and incorrect according to the information the witness had. It would be unparliamentary for me to suggest and I would not suggest that it was intentionally misleading, but I think that if misleading statements are being made in the House, and as this matter has come up here, we should give the Minister the very first opportunity to come and explain to this Committee, or perhaps if he prefers, to tell the House on a matter of privilege whether or not he did mislead the House. Because I am concerned about it, I would suggest that you, as Chairman, of the Committee should invite the Minister at the very first opportunity to come and explain this statement that he made in the House on October 10.

**The Chairman:** The Minister may want to do just that next Thursday.

**Mr. Churchill:** I am sure he will.

**The Chairman:** I presume that Mr. Strong will also want to testify next week.

Does the Committee want Dr. Hall to come back next Thursday, or are we finished with the questioning?

**Mr. McIntosh:** Could we have a copy of his statement so that we can study it in the meantime?

**The Chairman:** Oh, yes, that will be done today or tomorrow.

**Mr. Allmand:** I have a question, Mr. Chairman. You said that although there were several copies of his statement there were not enough to go around and that those available were distributed. Who did receive copies of this statement?

**The Chairman:** There were some at the table today while he was talking.

**Mr. Stanbury:** I noticed that Mr. Brewin was referring to something there; perhaps he has an extra copy.

**Mr. Brewin:** I always come well prepared, Mr. Stanbury.

**Mr. Stanbury:** If you have some extra copies perhaps you could share them with us.

**Mr. Brewin:** Well, I have not any extra copies.

**Mr. Allmand:** Did anyone on this Committee receive a copy of this brief beforehand?

**The Chairman:** No; the secretary has a copy and I have one here.

**Mr. Allmand:** No members of the Committee?

**The Chairman:** No. Photocopies will be made and distributed within the next two days.

**Mr. Churchill:** This time the Opposition is being placed in the same position as the Liberal side.

• (12:25 p.m.)

**The Chairman:** I have here two briefs which were submitted by Dr. Hall to the External Aid Office, I presume, and copies of these will be made also and distributed before the next meeting.

Now are we agreed that Dr. Hall and Mr. Strong will come back next Thursday and, of course the Minister if he wants to come?

**Mr. Basford:** I am not sure what these documents are or what Dr. Hall's status was at that time. If these are confidential communications between one civil servant and another, I do not know whether it would be proper.

**The Chairman:** What are these?

**Dr. Hall:** The first one is a recommendation which I drew up personally without solicitation. The second one was as a result of a request from the Canadian Commissioner to give him recommendations on Canadian aid in Viet Nam. I do not think that either of them is confidential; they are related to my pure personal desires and have nothing to do with anybody else.

**Mr. McIntosh:** Mr. Chairman, with regard to that point I had a reference to the reports and recommendations of Dr. Hall and I thought at one time that he was going to start to read them. Then I thought the Committee agreed that they would be attached to his statement of today.

**The Chairman:** Is it so agreed?

**Mr. McIntosh:** Otherwise I would have asked him to read them.

**Mr. Basford:** I just wanted to know what they were. I have no objections if they are not confidential.

**Dr. Hall:** No, they are not confidential.

**Mr. Allmand:** Mr. Chairman, in view of the fact that the next meeting is Thursday could we not ask Mr. Strong a question right now on one very simple point, which I believe he can explain, concerning this statement made in the House on October 11, that we give more aid than all other countries but two?

**An hon. Member:** No, no.

**Mr. Allmand:** Why not?

**Mr. Nesbitt:** He did not make the statement.

**Mr. Allmand:** The Opposition does not want the facts. Do they want to perpetuate some false information?

**The Chairman:** I think, in all fairness, if Mr. Strong has a quick statement to make now that we should not object.

**Mr. Churchill:** Well not if it is just in defence of the Minister. If this statement is the Minister's statement then it is up to the Minister to come and explain it. We are not going to embarrass Mr. Strong that way.

**Mr. Allmand:** It depends what we ask Mr. Strong, but I understood that he has facts on this particular point and that he could clarify this very quickly.

**Mr. McIntosh:** It would just be an interpretation by one individual.

**Mr. Allmand:** Well, let us find out.

**Mr. Langlois (Chicoutimi):** Well, that is what we have had this morning.

**The Chairman:** Do you have facts? If so, I will authorize Mr. Strong to make a brief declaration.

**Mr. Churchill:** No, Mr. Chairman, I raise an objection here. If this statement is the Minister's statement, the only person who can explain it or attempt to explain it is the Minister himself. We are not accepting now a statement from a member of the Minister's

Department with regard to what the Minister intended to say, or what he implied by his statement. That is not what officials are here for.

**The Chairman:** Mr. Allmand, do you have a question to ask of Mr. Strong?

**Mr. Allmand:** Yes, I would like to ask...

**Mr. Churchill:** Well, I move that we adjourn, Mr. Chairman.

**Mr. Allmand:** Mr. Chairman, are we to understand that the members opposite wish to leave a false impression with the Committee and with the public?

**Mr. Churchill:** We did not say...

**Mr. Brewin:** You can go and get the Minister right now, if you like.

**Mr. Allmand:** Mr. Strong's department or division has been attacked; certain allegations have been made about the administration. Mr. Strong, as the Director of that External Aid Office, I think probably has full access to all the details on this point and he should be allowed to give them.

**The Chairman:** Are there still objections to Mr. Strong making a statement?

**Mr. Macquarrie:** I think it would be very, very improper to ask any public servant to tell a committee what the Minister meant; this would be a most inappropriate move.

**Mr. Stanbury:** He just wants to give the facts.

**Mr. McIntosh:** Did the Minister not give the facts?

**Mr. Allmand:** I would not ask him to interpret what the Minister said, Mr. Chairman, but I would ask him if he has information on what the Canadian External Aid commitment or allocation was to Viet Nam in the period that was referred to from 1953, I believe, up to the present, and how it compares with other countries. I would not ask him to interpret the Minister's statement in the House.

**Mr. Churchill:** No, no.

**The Chairman:** Do you have a quick answer to that?

**Mr. Nesbitt:** This, Mr. Chairman, is the new opposition.

**An hon. Member:** The new look.

**An hon. Member:** I move we adjourn.

• (12:30 p.m.)

**The Chairman:** There is a motion to adjourn. We will adjourn until Thursday.

Friday, November 3, 1967.

• (9:35 a.m.)

**The Chairman:** Order, please. We have a quorum. Your Steering Committee met yesterday and we agreed to call a meeting this morning to hear the views of the Minister and of Mr. Strong on points raised at the Committee meeting yesterday.

I will call on the Minister to proceed with a statement, if he so wishes, and to answer questions, if there are any questions. Mr. Martin.

**Hon. Paul Martin (Secretary of State for External Affairs):** Mr. Chairman, I think the intention had been originally that Mr. Strong would be prepared to answer all the administrative problems in connection with Canada's external aid program. Important policy questions, I would, of course, consider it to be my duty to deal with. Mr. Strong is here and is available and at some juncture I suppose in our proceedings this morning, it may be desirable for him to supplement anything that I may say.

I would like to say at the outset, of course, that I think Canada has every reason to be proud of the people in her public service whether it be in the external aid or in any other department.

**An hon. Member:** In the CBC department, too?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I would like to say at once that my contact with the people in external aid has taught me to feel very strongly how much we owe to them, and I would like to say particularly at this time how grateful I am to Mr. Strong—I think one of Canada's most outstanding young men—for the decision he made in accepting an offer to come and serve his country in the external aid field.

**Some hon. Members:** Hear, hear.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I had an opportunity late last night of reading the statement of Dr. Hall. Dr. Hall, I am sure, is motivated by the loftiest of motives and many of the

things he said in his statement, I think, are understandable as part of the background of the difficulties of administration of an external aid program in wartime and in a war country. These two facts must be noted. Administering external aid in any part of South Viet Nam is certainly much different than administering external aid in Trinidad or in Jamaica. I am sure even Dr. Hall would fully agree with this statement.

• (9:40 a.m.)

The reason why I thought it desirable that at the earliest opportunity I should deal with at least one matter in Dr. Hall's statement, was that he did raise some question—and I am not objecting to the way he did it; I think he did it very fairly, even though inaccurately—concerning my statement in the House of Commons on October 11 when, as he correctly quoted me, I said:

... since we began Canadian aid to Viet Nam in 1953 we have allocated as much money to assistance in this area as any other country but two.

His statement in that regard can be found on page 24. He noted that: "allocated" does not necessarily mean "spent" and, of course, this is true.

As soon as the officials can have it ready I am tabling some time this morning a schedule based on figures prepared by the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD showing disbursements by the leading contributors of aid to South Viet Nam under the Colombo Plan. In a moment I will comment on this table, but I would like to observe at the beginning that Canada stands, as I indicated, third on the list, both on a cumulative basis and in each of the individual years 1960 through 1966 inclusive. I would emphasize that this is based on actual expenditures rather than allocations, but similar figures on allocation will show Canada in an equally favourable light.

Now, before dealing with the table, I want to make one observation on an inference—perhaps Dr. Hall did not mean it that way—that some of our aid might not be reaching Viet Nam. I have checked this with my officials and this statement is simply not true, and if Dr. Hall or anyone else has any information to support this inference I would, of course, be pleased to have it. This statement was made when Mr. Churchill was a member of a former government—

**Mr. Churchill:** That was good government.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):**—and it was denied at that time and I am denying it now. I have no information that would warrant that, but if there is any information I would like to have it.

I think the figures in the table or any other objective yardstick that might be used would demonstrate beyond doubt that the level of Canada's contribution to civilian aid to Viet Nam ranks among the highest. Canada is contributing aid now to 65 countries in the world. As an example of how far extended we are, the United States is giving aid to about 45 countries. I am not comparing the totals because the volume of United States aid, of course, cannot be compared with any other country.

The administration of foreign aid is not easy. I am happy to say that so far as we are able we continually supervise the funds which we provide to ensure they are being used as intended and to the fullest extent possible. I am sure you can make a pretty strong case for giving external aid on a collective basis, through the United Nations for instance, but the bilateral approach that we maintain in this particular, I think, gives us a control over the use of funds and this is very important.

● (9:45 a.m.)

I have said that the level of our contribution ranks among the highest and I think the record will speak for this. I do not think there is anything Canadians should apologize for, either this government or the former government. Most of the practices of the former government are being carried out by this government as some of the practices of the former government were initiated by the previous administration, although we have made some modifications and we have increased very considerably the volume of aid. I do not say that the administration is not without its faults; no government could take that position any more than that there were no weaknesses in the former administration. These are obvious things, but some of the things that Dr. Hall has spoken about, and that others might well speak about, are not without justification, because of the difficulty of administering an external aid program in the very difficult terrain of a country torn by war. Not only have we nothing to apologize for, on the contrary, on a per capita basis and in relation to our total aid expenditures the level of the Canadian aid program has been substantial.

Now, in addition to questioning the level of our aid, the submission yesterday by the witness brought up a number of other points reflecting on quality and administration. Mr. Strong will deal with those, but I would like to say on the basis of the most recent report of the OECD Canada was singled out for the quality of its external aid. The OECD, as this Committee knows, is the agency of western contributing countries that seeks to co-ordinate the work of external aid throughout the world.

I would like to say that the special medical aid team which has been in Viet Nam sent us a message yesterday, not in any way connected with these Committee sittings, but I think it might be worth mentioning. They have reported that in their view, and I quote:

The current Canadian aid projects there have been timely and useful and deserve continuing support.

I am sure that when this team does make its final report to us they will point out many things they think should be improved on, many programs that should be embarked on, but I think the Committee will find satisfaction in the view that the current Canadian aid projects there had been timely, useful, and deserve continuing support.

● (9:50 a.m.)

Now, in fact, the team—and I might say this team includes General Wrinch of the Canadian Red Cross and Dr. Dupuis of the Montreal's Notre Dame Hospital—recommends an extension of all of our existing programs in South Viet Nam including, incidentally, one of the projects that was critically referred to yesterday by the witness, and that is the supply of emergency hospital units. They recommend an increase in these emergency hospital units, or hospital packages, which consist, by the way, of about 200 beds, X-ray equipment and the general impedimenta that is required in trying to provide a basic hospital centre. Doctor Hall was quite right yesterday in saying, of course, that this does not include the building. These hospital package units are not buildings; they are the material that is necessary to carry on the internal medical professional operation of a hospital. The total cost of our contribution to these now is some \$750,000. They cost, I think, around \$79,000 each.

Doctor Hall questions our normal requirement that the recipient government provide

local support, including housing for the advisers we send out. Well, perhaps Mr. Strong could deal with that. I understand that Dr. Hall, who was one of the first to go to Saigon from Canada, did experience some problem in housing; this is not unique to Dr. Hall; members of our Commission in war-torn Saigon have had that experience, others have had that experience, and I regret that Dr. Hall had it. But, Mr. Strong will be able to give you the figures of the assistance that we did give to Dr. Hall, in admittedly his difficult housing problem.

Dr. Hall questions our normal requirement, that the assistance provided by our bilateral program should be largely in the form of Canadian goods and services. Well, this is an understandable criticism; it is one that I am prepared to defend. It is one that I am sure Mr. Churchill would defend because he had something to do with it when he was a minister in another government. The moneys that we spend on external aid are substantial, and I think a very strong case can be made for the use of Canadian goods and services, and it is not criticism that should be levelled only at Canada. This is a practice that I think most countries in the external aid field follow. However, I do not think it is the kind of criticism that could be regarded as anything but a criticism of policy; a policy that has been a long-established policy of Canadian governments. There have been some flexibilities established in our present procedures within recent months, but generally the situation is as I have indicated.

● (9:55 a.m.)

He also questions our policies in respect of the setting up and use of counterpart funds as a condition of supplying food and commodity aid under our bilateral program. Well, I find it hard to understand that criticism. Food is given to the receiving country because it has a foreign exchange problem; that receiving country, sells those commodities to its people from which it receives the needed funds, which in turn enables the government of the receiving country to put the products of the sale to constructive uses at home. There is nothing, I think, that is wrong with the counterpart fund system. I think it is a very effective way; in fact, it is really the only way of meeting the problem. The counterpart principle is one that we use, for instance, in the giving of commodities to countries like India, and, I do not know how a country could effectively meet its foreign

exchange problem, a country like Viet Nam particularly, unless this kind of arrangement were possible.

Now, let me say, Mr. Chairman, that each of these policies has been a basic attribute of our aid program from its inception in the early 1950's and practised throughout and they remain so because, I think, the fundamental basis of these policies is sound. The application of these policies has been modified in the light of experience over the years. I think the basic approach of the administrators of external aid has been to apply these policies sympathetically and flexibly, and to take account of the great variety of circumstances which naturally arise in a program of this magnitude and complexity.

In particular in the past year we have been concentrating on the strengthening and improvement of the administrative apparatus to ensure that it serves the important purpose of helping the people of the developing nations to help themselves.

Now, Dr. Hall indicated that we should be paying more attention to the problem of refugees in South Viet Nam. This has always been a very important problem in South Viet Nam. There are over a million refugees; there were over a million refugees in South Viet Nam before 1955. I saw something of this problem myself. No one can question that there are refugees. These unfortunate and dispossessed people are an integral part of the over-all problem of Viet Nam, and of the total civilian population of that country to which our program is directed.

I wish that the Canadian suggestions had been accepted three years ago when the efforts of the United Nations Refugee Organization were directed towards trying to relieve this serious problem of refugees all over the world, when a task force was undertaken to try to blunt and confront this great social problem of millions of homeless people all over the world. Not because the Organization did not want it, but for other reasons, the scope of the effort of the United Nations Refugee Organization did not come into play in that particular region.

● (10:00 a.m.)

However, it must be recognized that the refugees are an integral part of the over-all problem of Viet Nam, and are now part of the civilian population of that regrettably divided country. I need not apologize for the support that Canada, under all governments, has given to the international agencies which

have been set up to deal with the refugee problem. Whether it be the IRO, whether it be to UNRWA, on whether it be to Viet Nam, this country can hold its head very high for what it has tried to do, monetarily and otherwise, to meet this problem.

Now, Dr. Hall spoke of the quality of our contribution. I am sure that he would not suggest for a moment that the members of the External Aid Office, or myself or any member of this Committee, was not anxious to improve the quality of the Canadian contribution to alleviating the tragedy now afflicting the Vietnamese people, and we welcome any suggestions that will result in improvement. I would not suggest that our program is immune to the very difficult and complex problems experienced by all countries in the administration of aid, but I think, as I said a moment ago, that the quality of our aid is second to that of no country. And that is not my judgment. That is the judgment of the OECD. Far from deprecating it, I think all of us in Canada should be proud of it, and I think when you have had a chance of examining Mr. Strong you will find that what I have said is right.

Mr. Chairman, I now wish to deal with a question to which some reference was made yesterday by Dr. Hall and by one or two members of the Committee. I have before me a schedule of the top contributors from the Colombo Plan, and I will give the total figures from 1960 to 1966. The contributions of Australia come to \$1.3 million. Now, Australia—I must put in by way of parenthesis—is not a member of the OECD and, consequently, the figures I am quoting for Australia do not come from the OECD but, I am advised, from the Australian High Commission. The Canadian contribution for 1960-66 — and I am now speaking of actual expenditures — was \$3.244 million; Japan \$47.292 million; the United Kingdom, \$891,000; and the United States, \$1,726.104 million; so that as I indicated the Canadian contribution is third. On the basis of OECD figures we would be fourth or fifth, which is remarkably high, but Canada's rank among the Colombo Plan contributors, as I say, for 1960-66 was third every year — 1960, 1961, 1962, 1963, 1964, 1965 and 1966.

I must say, by the way, that a doctor that is willing to do what so many doctors are willing to do and go to these under-developed countries, particularly to this war-ravaged

country, is to be commended and I, in my comments, do not take away from Dr. Hall, or from anyone, the high motives that prompted this contribution. I was pleased to note that Dr. Hall appreciates the difficulties of administering an aid program in a country like Viet Nam. He was very refreshingly candid on this point, and perhaps some of my friends in the news media will give equal prominence to what he said in that regard as to some of the more delightfully sensational things that appeared in my favourite newspaper this morning. He was refreshingly candid before the Committee when he said that he would be unable to make sound recommendations concerning the expansion of our program.

Dr. Hall spoke of communications with the External Aid Office. Now, the External Aid channel to our advisers in the field is through our resident missions and our representatives in the country concerned. Although I have not seen all of it, I have seen some of the correspondence between particular individuals in the field as well as correspondence that has come from the field to the External Aid Director and his colleagues here in Ottawa.

• (10:05 a.m.)

Dr. Hall, quite understandably, chose on a number of occasions to supplement this channel with direct contact with our office here in Ottawa. In replying to him our normal practice was to use the Canadian Delegation in Saigon, and he may not, in retrospect, have interpreted many long discussions of his various problems in the field, between the Delegation and our office, as proper action on his direct requests. I hope that none of Dr. Hall's requests have been ignored and, I am told by my officials that is the case. Either he was dealt with directly here in Ottawa at the centre or by our representatives in the field. I know that on a number of occasions he had conversations in Saigon with our representative on the Commission.

He spoke of the supply of equipment to him. I am advised that the government of South Viet Nam declined to endorse his requests for certain equipment. In their request to us, and I am quoting from it now they say: "Dr. Hall also refers to needs of equipment and personnel, while they do not form part of this request they may form part of a subsequent request." My officials tell me that these requests were never made.

In his brief, Dr. Hall mentions that some support had been promised to him by certain groups and was never given. I understand that on one occasion when he was here he discussed this problem, and quite rightly so. After all, he was doing a very important medical job and if he felt that he did not have the equipment he had every right to ask for it. That equipment was sent him and it was not used. When I read this yesterday I at once asked where the equipment was, and I understand that it is now in Saigon and still not used. However, Mr. Strong and others may be able to deal with that. I am advised that it is clear from the reports made by our Delegation in Saigon that during 1965, for instance, there was no inclination to support the continuation of Dr. Hall's services at Cho Ray Hospital. I find it difficult, however, to associate this with any question of the provision of Canadian equipment and supplies.

• (10:10 a.m.)

I could go on with other matters but I feel that I have dealt with the main ones. However, we are prepared, either myself, Mr. Strong or External Aid officials, to deal with any other observations that he makes.

**Mr. M. F. Strong (Director General, External Aid Office):** Mr. Chairman, the Minister has asked me to supplement his remarks. I think perhaps the best contribution I might make, Mr. Chairman, is to review some of the specific...

**Mr. Brewin:** Mr. Chairman, on a point of order, would it not be more convenient to question Mr. Martin now on the statement he has made and then get the further details from Mr. Strong and question him later? Otherwise we will not be able to question Mr. Martin while the matter is fresh in our minds.

**The Chairman:** Is it the wish of the Committee to hear a statement from Mr. Strong first or to proceed with the questioning of Mr. Martin?

**Mr. Andras:** Mr. Chairman, would it not be just as convenient to hear both statements and then put questions?

**Mr. Brewin:** I do not think it would be. I think it would be confusing to hear a series of statements and then deal with them later. Mr. Martin has made a statement and I personally would like to question him about it right now.

**Mr. Stanbury:** Mr. Chairman, I think it is a question of whether the Minister has finished his statement or whether he is asking his official to complete the statement of information that he wants to present. If the latter is the case then, if Mr. Brewin takes exception to this method of proceeding, perhaps the Minister can complete his statement himself. I understood that he was asking his official to complete the statement that he wanted to make.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** That is right.

**Mr. Deachman:** Mr. Chairman, yesterday we listened to one statement and today we are being presented with a government statement in relation to that. I think it would be better at this time to hear the government statement from Mr. Martin and Mr. Strong. I understand that our time is limited this morning, and I do not think that the government's statement, as it will appear in our proceedings, should be broken up by the intervention of questioning at this time. I respectfully suggest that we proceed to hear what the government has to say.

**The Chairman:** In that case I will ask Mr. Strong to complete the statement.

**Mr. Brewin:** Surely we are entitled to question at this time. The Minister has made a statement.

**The Chairman:** I will ask Mr. Strong to complete Mr. Martin's statement, then the Committee may ask questions of both witnesses.

**Mr. Brewin:** Mr. Chairman, on a point of order, I am seriously suggesting that the proper and normal method of procedure, after a witness has given his evidence—and Mr. Martin has; I am perfectly prepared to have him complete the statement if he has not already done so—is to examine him on that evidence. I see absolutely no reason for taking up all our time this morning. No doubt Mr. Strong has a very important statement to make, and we are looking forward to hearing it. However, I suggest if Mr. Martin has now finished his statement that, as is the usual procedure—I do not think that he is in any special position—he be examined on the statement he has made.

**Mr. Groos:** I would like to support Mr. Deachman's suggestion. It may speed up our questioning if we hear from Mr. Strong who may be able to answer some of the

questions that we otherwise would be putting later on to the Minister. I hope that we can get on with the proceedings because, as we all know, the House meets at eleven o'clock and I would like an opportunity to pose some questions to both Mr. Strong and the Minister.

**Mr. Churchill:** On the point of order, Mr. Chairman, I support Mr. Brewin. I think the witnesses should be examined in order.

The proceedings could be shortened immediately if the government spokesman would admit that some errors have been made and that the corrections suggested by Dr. Hall will be brought into effect immediately. I do not know why we have to go over the experience of three years in an attempt to put up a defence against certain statements. Obviously things have not gone as well as they should and yet Dr. Hall has been doing good work. Let us commend him for it and make the necessary corrections. Why is it necessary to enter into a defensive attitude here and, with respect to each little statement, say that this is not so, and something else is different.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I do not often agree with you, Mr. Churchill, but three-quarters of what you said I do agree with. I think I have acknowledged that Dr. Hall has rendered services. I do recognize that there is always need for improvement. So you and I are agreed on that. This is rather unusual ground for you and me.

**Mr. McIntosh:** There must be something the matter.

**Mr. Churchill:** No. You are finally coming around to a sensible point of view.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Well, not after some of your speeches last night in the House.

**Mr. Stanbury:** Mr. Chairman, on a point of order, although I am enjoying this banter between the Minister and his friend I do not think it is getting the Committee anywhere. I would like to hear from either the Minister or the Director General of the External Aid Office so we can get the facts.

**Mr. Churchill:** I object to Mr. Stanbury's remark. I presented a sensible point of view.

**Mr. Stanbury:** Mr. Chairman, if I have the floor, I do not mind saying "thank you" to Dr. Hall for pointing out our errors but I

want to find out the facts on what he has alleged. I do not want to simply pat him on the back and send him home; I would like to find out the facts. I think that is what we are here for this morning. Let us hear the witnesses before eleven o'clock.

**The Chairman:** Order, please. Again I will ask Mr. Strong to proceed with his statement, and both witnesses—

**Mr. Churchill:** Mr. Chairman, I raise a point of privilege. This gentleman over here talks about banter. Who is he to be lecturing this Committee? I presented a proposal to this Committee. Instead of wasting time trying to set up a defence on minor points and this is all it is, let us acknowledge the fact that the work we are doing in Viet Nam is important, that Dr. Hall's work was very important, that the man in the field knows more about what goes on than people sitting around a desk here, and then let us make the necessary corrections instead of just setting up a defence because somebody said something to which someone else does not agree.

**The Chairman:** In order to save time I will ask the witness to proceed with his statement. Then questions may be asked of both witnesses.

**Mr. Macquarrie:** Mr. Chairman, the suggestion was made yesterday that the statements be prepared beforehand and I would like to ask if either of these people have statements that we can read as they go along?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I have some notes but I do not think you could read them all.

**Mr. Strong:** Mr. Chairman, I do not have a prepared statement. I will also refer to notes. Mr. Chairman, because of many of the remarks and allegations made yesterday in Dr. Hall's statement and in his reply to questions from members of this Committee, I thought it might be useful to direct my attention this morning to some of the specific comments and criticisms that Dr. Hall has made.

As members of the Committee will appreciate, Dr. Hall presented a very long statement which included a great many remarks and allegations. I would like to say, of course, that my personal knowledge of this matter only extends over a relatively short period but, as you can well imagine, I have directed a good deal of attention to examining all of the records of our experience over

the past several years in our aid program in South Viet Nam. I have spoken to most of the officers directly concerned with that program and the comments I make reflect the totality of the information I have received during that process.

I would certainly feel most uncomfortable if I were cast in the role of stoutly defending a set of immutable laws administered by an inflexible bureaucracy. I wish to say, as the Minister has mentioned, that our administrative apparatus is not perfect. We have, done things on occasion, perhaps, in respect to South Viet Nam which, in the light of the experience we now have we might not do again and are not doing again. Most of the specific instances referred to by Dr. Hall apply to periods in the fairly distant past and they apply to procedures and perhaps to applications of those procedures which have been completely corrected and modified. Indeed, I believe the hon. members will recall that by his own testimony he acknowledged this at one point in his remarks yesterday.

However, I would like to take a number of the specific points in his statement and refer to them. On page 4, toward the bottom of the page, he makes the comment, "The External Aid Office have recently said their normal method of supporting advisers is that the department supplied the man and the local government everything else". Then he goes on to say, "which means that their normal method is not to support their advisers." This, I must say, is categorically not the case. The Vietnamese, as Dr. Hall has admitted, told him even before his assignment that they fully understood the conditions under which Canadian aid was extended and they did, in fact, supply him with the housing that he requested. However, there were delays. Dr. Hall was not satisfied with the housing and he made that clear to our people in Saigon. My examination of the records of the conversations and the activities of our Delegation in attempting to rectify that situation showed that they did everything that could conceivably be expected of them to rectify it, and so did we. Despite the fact there was no obligation to do this, we supplied Dr. Hall with an additional \$100 a month over and above his rentals to enable him to do those additional things to his house—the house that was provided by Viet Nam—that he thought were necessary to provide him with the desired standard of accommodation.

On page 5, toward the bottom of the page, Dr. Hall makes the following comment:

... "To organize an Orthopaedic Service in the University of Saigon Medical School Section of Cho Ray Hospital". It was presumed by the Vietnamese Hospital and University authorities who requested my services, that my government would provide personnel to work with me, equipment and expendable supplies, and probably some buildings...

Yesterday Dr. Hall tabled a copy of the list of equipment that he said he presented at that stage and which he now says the Vietnamese had undertaken to provide. I would now like, Mr. Chairman, to table with this Committee a copy of the official application which was received from South Viet Nam for the services of Dr. Hall and in which they specifically state that this request does not cover that equipment, although they comment on his list of equipment.

**The Chairman:** Are we agreed?

**Some hon. Members:** Agreed.

**Mr. Strong:** Dr. Hall also says at the top of page 6 that his recommendation made in September of 1964 for the need of technicians to make artificial legs and braces is still under discussion more than three years later by our government. At the very best that is a gross distortion of the facts of this situation, which I will be very pleased to deal with in more detail.

• (10:25 a.m.)

At the bottom of page 6...

**Mr. Churchill:** Let us deal with it right now. Is the statement wrong, or what is happening?

**Mr. Strong:** Very good. Dr. Hall in fact indicated that in his opinion there was a need for this. He was unable to obtain from the South Vietnamese any confirmation that they in fact felt his specific scheme would meet those needs. It was the recognition of the general need in this area that led to the sending out of the team headed by Dr. Gingras to determine whether or not we could participate in the setting up of a rehabilitation centre in Saigon.

**Mr. Churchill:** It is still under discussion, is it not?

**Mr. Strong:** Dr. Hall's proposal has not been under discussion. It was dealt with...

**An hon. Member:** What about Dr. Gingras?

**Mr. Strong:** No, I am speaking of the proposal Dr. Hall said he made and which is

still under discussion three years later. This is certainly very much of a misrepresentation of the reality of that situation.

At the bottom of page 6 Dr. Hall says:

Again I would like to draw your attention to this direct refusal to undertake a program 2½ years ago that our government now has a second or a third team sent out to examine.

This relates to something he mentioned previously and it is simply not an accurate portrayal of the situation.

At the top of page 7 Dr. Hall says:

Canadian nurses applied to E.A.O. to go to Viet Nam but were not sent out...

The fact is that we have four nurses now, and six Canadian nurses in Viet Nam by the end of the year. There have been a number of nurses sent to Viet Nam. It is evident of course, that all nurses who applied would not be acceptable for a variety of reasons, but the inference that no nurses were sent is not an accurate one.

Dr. Hall also makes reference at the top of page 7 to a number of other things that he felt should have been done, and in various ways he did make us aware from time to time of the different things that he thought should be done. We expressed interest in all of these things but when Dr. Hall was not able to obtain the support of the Vietnamese authorities—who, after all, must have the ultimate responsibility for administering programs of this kind in their own country—we were not able to proceed to act on these particular requests.

I think Dr. Hall is fully aware of the nature of our program and of the necessity for working out these matters in co-operation with the South Vietnamese.

Dr. Hall acknowledges the difficulties he had with the Vietnamese authorities and some of his other colleagues in his work. I might say, without in any way trying to make a judgment on the validity of his role or the role of those people with whom he was in conflict, that I think by his own testimony he has confirmed that one of the really serious problems Dr. Hall confronted in Viet Nam was the matter of his own relationship with his colleagues. This is a matter that is covered at very great length in correspondence and cables between our representatives on the International Control Commission in Viet Nam and our own office. I

have reviewed a very substantial catalogue of correspondence and records interminable, detailed and difficult discussions between Dr. Hall and those people and between Dr. Hall and his Vietnamese colleagues. As I say, I am not attempting to pass judgment on this but I think it has to be borne in mind that this is a very important factor surrounding the difficulties which Dr. Hall experienced in implementing the projects to which he was assigned in that country.

• (10:30 a.m.)

Dr. Hall says at the middle of page 9 of his statement:

...I wrote a detailed report describing the situation to the Delegation and to E.A.O., and the requirements necessary to correct the problems. Both the Dean's letter of request and my report remained unanswered.

I do not think there is any other word that really could be used to describe this except to say that it is inaccurate. We received Dr. Hall's report on January 20, 1967, and from our documents on file we realized the difficulties which he had experienced. This is reflected in a document from the Minister of Health dated January 31 which states that the ministry just cannot satisfy all of Dr. Hall's demands.

I might point out that our normal method of communication—and I think Dr. Hall acknowledged this yesterday—with Dr. Hall was not by post from Ottawa but by cable to our representatives in Saigon, who then communicated these matters personally to Dr. Hall.

I do not have any personal feelings one way or the other towards Dr. Hall and this is not in a personal sense, but I do think it is perhaps necessary—to make his testimony understandable and to understand the context of his situation in Viet Nam—to report to you the statement that the Minister of Health for South Viet Nam made to one of our officers when Dr. Hall left Viet Nam. He asked this officer, and I am quoting:

...to carry his personal gratefulness to the Government of Canada for having arranged for the return of Dr. Hall to Canada.

I think this is indicative of the kind of problem that Dr. Hall encountered. As I say, this is not a one-sided thing; I am not trying to make a judgment on the rights or the wrongs. I am however, trying to indicate that

his whole attitude has to be understandable against the background of the very serious difficulties he experienced in his own relationships with the Vietnamese.

**Mr. Macquarrie:** To whom was that said?

**Mr. Strong:** The man to whom this statement was made was Mr. McLaren, who was in Saigon. The man making the statement was the Minister of Health for South Viet Nam, Mr. Tran Lu-Y.

**Mr. Churchill:** Just gossip.

**Mr. Strong:** This is not gossip, Mr. Chairman. This was a statement made seriously. I mention it only because I think it is the best method of emphasizing the very difficult position that Dr. Hall was in, and that we were in in dealing with Dr. Hall.

**Mr. Macquarrie:** It was not from the Viet Nam authority; it was second hand.

**Mr. Strong:** No, it was not second hand; it was directly from the Minister of Health for South Viet Nam.

**Mr. Macquarrie:** As reported to you by a Canadian.

**Mr. Strong:** Made to one of my officers, who was talking to him on an official basis; and made with witnesses present and duly recorded.

**Mr. Macquarrie:** It was a reported oral observation.

**Mr. Strong:** It was a specific request that this be passed on to our government.

**Mr. Deachman:** Was this an official statement made in the presence of witnesses with a view to action being taken and reported to you? Is that correct?

**Mr. Strong:** At that point Dr. Hall was in the process of leaving, or had just left, Saigon. No action was necessary, but it was officially made and officially recorded in the presence of witnesses. Our people were present in South Viet Nam for the specific purpose of discussing with the Minister of Health the various aspects of our program in that country.

Mr. Chairman, if I may continue, in the middle of page 9 Dr. Hall states that there was not a single visit of a Canadian representative to Hue while he was there. Again it is only fair to point out that Dr. Hall himself spent very little time in Hue, because

he felt that the conditions under which he would have to operate there were not suitable for him. He spent most of his time in Saigon. Officers of the External Aid Office, sent out specifically at my direction to try to discuss the problems with Dr. Hall, were unable to locate him.

About two thirds down page 10 Dr. Hall makes this comment on the 10 packaged hospital units that had been provided:

These packaged units were designed for use in Canada for a short emergency of a few days, they were already paid for by the Government and their expense to the E.A.O. was an inter-departmental financial exchange;

He goes on to make a comment reflecting very seriously on the quality and usefulness of these units. This is a very large subject. If the Committee wishes to deal with it in very substantial detail I would be very happy to do so, but I do think that I should point out that the report to which the Minister referred and which we have received from the special medical team that is just now returning from Viet Nam—having been sent out there as a further step in the implementation of our program there—is that not only are these units highly desirable and highly useful, but that there is an urgent requirement for 10 more. The suggestion that these were sent out as a public relations gesture is to me incredible.

**Mr. Churchill:** Where does this reference to public relations occur.

**Mr. Strong:** That occurs at the bottom of page 11, where Dr. Hall says:

The men handling this for USAID were friends of mine and I know their reactions to being asked by Canada to do Canada's logistical work, and then have E.A.O. insist that bulky equipment should be flown in American aircraft to a Vietnamese hospital where they knew it could not be used, in order that Canada should be able to say that a "complete hospital unit" had been sent to such and such a region.

The most generous comment that I could make about that, Mr. Chairman, is that it seems to me to be a shocking statement to be presented by a serious and qualified man, who really should have known better, and was in a position to have known better.

There are many of these specific instances that I could comment on. I am quite pre-

pared to do so on any one that the Committee has a special interest in.

At the bottom of page 12 Dr. Hall refers to Dr. Vennema's team to the medical unit at Quang Ngai. In one statement he says:

... I believe from my three years' experience that such a team not only fails to provide anything that the Vietnamese are not perfectly capable of doing for themselves, but it permits the Vietnamese to abandon their own responsibilities;

Later in the same paragraph he says:

I do not call stitching up a cut "surgery", nor does picking up a knife and cutting a patient turn a general practitioner into a surgeon. Surgery in the civilian hospital in Quang Ngai has been in the hands of Vietnamese military surgeons some of whom were my students and interns...

and he goes on. The whole tenor of these remarks attempts to deprecate the value of the work done by Dr. Vennema and his colleagues in Viet Nam.

• (10:40 a.m.)

The arguments used are such that I find it difficult to reason how Dr. Hall has reached his conclusions about Quang Ngai. He says that the reason for the original medical team's pulling out was that this was a very hazardous and difficult security area in which even the Vietnamese themselves did not wish to work. Surely, far from calling into question the value of the contribution that Dr. Vennema and the other Canadians are making under these difficult and hazardous circumstances, Dr. Hall should be prepared to admit that the contribution is an extremely valuable one.

He talks of the omission of specialist treatment. I am sure he would also agree with the medical expert's advice that I have received, that when dealing with a front line situation it is not necessarily specialist treatment that is needed; that you have to be able to provide treatment for a wide variety of things, ranging from the TB illness that originally gave rise to the clinic to all the miscellaneous injuries and problems resulting from the casualties of war. This is in the midst of Viet Cong-infested country. This indeed is in an area of maximum security hazard.

Dr. Vennema at this point does not have the benefit of specialists, but he and his team do what any other good general practitioner would do: they deal with the casualties in

the best possible way, and those that need major surgery are flown out. Dr. Vennema has accompanied a number of such patients to the hospitals in Saigon where specialist treatment is available.

**Mr. Churchill:** His objection is not to Dr. Vennema; it is to what the External Aid Office has failed to do. This appears on page 13.

**Mr. Strong:** Dr. Vennema came back at my request several months ago and reported in detail on the program. I asked him, and so did the Minister directly, what he needed to maintain and support him in his program there. What he has asked for has been provided.

Mr. Chairman, towards the bottom of page 13 I think it is significant to draw your attention to the following remarks of Dr. Hall:

Priority is given by WHO...

that is the World Health Organization

...to programs of disease control and eradication by immunisation. All orthopaedic surgeons who have visited Viet Nam have expressed the need for polio vaccine which is technically difficult to produce and costly.

He makes this statement and yet somehow manages to imply that this program is not valuable. There is a basic contradiction between what he says here and his implication that our contributions of vaccine have not been useful. Perhaps this is because he has not really thoroughly looked into this aspect of our program, because at the top of page 14, again, he says that it should not be necessary to send personnel to Viet Nam for the actual administration. I would say it is apparent from this that he has really very little knowledge of our program there, because we have not sent personnel to Viet Nam for the administration of this program. This program was one which the Vietnamese were quite capable of administering themselves. Their need was for the actual vaccine and that is what we sent them. It is implicit in his statement towards the end where he mentions that we have done only three things in Viet Nam and he implies that each one of them has failed for one reason or another. This is what I mean when I say he has implied that there is no value in this program. He attaches no value to it; yet here his own statement indicates the value of programs of this kind.

**Mr. Churchill:** I do not draw the same conclusions.

**Mr. Langlois (Chicoutimi):** We do not expect you to.

**Mr. Churchill:** I thought he was commenting on the *Toronto Globe and Mail* and that is not unusual.

**The Chairman:** Order, please. I will ask the witness to continue.

**Mr. Strong:** Mr. Chairman, on page 17 in the middle of the page, referring to Canada's food aid, he makes another statement which indicates that he really cannot understand the basis for our food aid program. He says:

Thus if the food is used to feed the poor and starving, the country in fact buys it from Canada in her own local currency. . . This is just not correct. Mr. Chairman, the Minister has explained one of the things that was needed at a certain stage according to the Vietnamese themselves was food. They asked us for food and we provided it to them. They themselves are in the best position to know their own needs for food, as is normal, and I think a very worth-while practice in these cases. We provide them with the food and we require them to set up in their own accounts—we do not have custody of this money—a counterpart fund equivalent in local currency to the foreign exchange that they have saved by our having given them the food and saving them the necessity of having bought it themselves with their scarce foreign exchange. They take these local currency funds and they set them up in their own accounts—we do not own them—but under agreement with them we require that these funds be directed to projects of long-term development within the countries concerned and we do not require that the Vietnamese buy the food from Canada. This simply indicates that Dr. Hall must not understand the operation of our food aid program. This is perhaps natural because Dr. Hall is a medical expert.

On page 18, a third of the way down the page, he also indicates that:

—foodstuffs are by definition not accepted by the World Bank as 'development aid',—

This, of course, is just not an accurate statement. I mention it only because it further underscores the fact that Dr. Hall's testimony in this particular area, and I suppose under-

standably, lacks the credibility of expert knowledge.

**Mr. Cameron (Nanaimo-Cowichan-The Islands):** May I ask a question? Does the World Bank accept food aid as developmental aid?

**Mr. Strong:** Yes, it does in fact. Contrary to the statement Dr. Hall made the World Bank does, in fact, accept food aid.

Also on page 20, about two-thirds of the way down the page, when referring to the surplus butter, he again makes the point that it was not given but that it had to be sold. This, I think, again reflects his lack of understanding of this particular program.

He makes a comment at another point here. I am not sure where it is—there are so many points I may have skipped this over but one of my officers might be able to point to the place in his statement. He indicates that we simply give our surpluses. I think members of this Committee will know that is not the case. We provide food aid whether or not we have surpluses. I think this is exemplified by the last two years when we have given more food aid than at any other point during the whole history of our aid program and at a time when there was a full commercial demand for wheat which was the principal element in that food aid program.

On page 21, in the middle of the page, Dr. Hall made some comments on long-range development. His comments were general ones but ones with which I think anyone concerned with aid and development would obviously have to agree. I mention this simply to indicate that I am not in disagreement with everything Dr. Hall says. Some of his generalities and homilies are very appropriate and ones which certainly I would endorse.

• (10:50 a.m.)

At the top of page 22 on the Quang Ngai project — and I have really addressed myself to this question — he says:

—a perpetuation of a service abandoned by Medico, a very experienced international organisation, because of lack of Vietnamese interest in an area where none of the indigenous personnel wish to work although they are quite capable in a technical sense of performing all of these functions.

I have already commented on that. He has come back to it again in his remarks so that is why I refer to it again. But, again I think

the evidence of the need which the Vietnamese themselves felt for this project was that it only took Dr. Vennema something like 48 hours to get approval from the Vietnamese government for the transfer of a piece of land that was necessary to erect that clinic. This indicates — and this is a product, incidentally, of the whole experience of Dr. Vennema and his group — that they somehow seem to be able to get things done. In my experience with our advisers — frankly, gentlemen, we have two general categories of people in the field. There are the problem creators and the problem solvers. Let me say only that Dr. Vennema is a problem solver.

**Mr. Churchill:** Has there not been a change of government over there? It sometimes happens that you get problems solved when you change a government too.

**Mr. McIntosh:** Were the terms of reference for Dr. Hall the same as the terms of reference for this other doctor or did you change them in the meantime?

**Mr. Strong:** Essentially the same. There has been an implication in everything Dr. Hall says about our basic policies requiring participation by the recipient government in any program involving advisers, which I think are very, very sound, because after all if a government itself is not prepared to participate with you in a project, you can question its assessment of the value of that project and also you can question whether or not it will be possible to work it out. While this is the basic policy—and I believe it to be a sound one from an operating and an administrative point of view—we have not applied it inflexibly.

In the case of housing, Dr. Hall has already said he was our first medical adviser. We saw the experiences that he had gone through in housing and when it came to Quang Ngai we decided to provide this local support. At Quang Ngai we do, in fact, provide housing.

**Mr. McIntosh:** Was Dr. Hall given the task of officially negotiating with the Vietnamese or did you have other personnel there to do the official negotiating?

**Mr. Strong:** Negotiation of the over-all

arrangements is, of course, on a government-to-government level and is done by members of our Delegation in Saigon. The actual operation of those arrangements which requires a good deal of internal negotiation between the particular adviser, in this case Dr. Hall and his colleagues with whom he is working, depends, of course, very much on the rapport and the relationship that is created between them. No amount of government intervention can resolve a situation of individual conflict. It can mitigate it—and there were many attempts at mitigating it—but I am simply pointing out that in contrast to the experience with Dr. Hall, Dr. Vennema seems to have been able to get things done and to get the co-operation he required from the Vietnamese.

There may be differences—I am not trying to make a judgment—but those are the facts.

**Mr. McIntosh:** Has there been a change of administrators out there since that time either on the part of the Canadian government or the Vietnamese government?

**Mr. Strong:** There have been three different Canadian commissioners on the International Control Commission.

**Mr. Brewin:** I see that the Secretary of State for External Affairs is leaving. I see that the process of making sure that we cannot question him has succeeded. When is he coming back so that we can question him on his most unsatisfactory statement?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** The reason I am leaving now after my most satisfactory statement is that the Prime Minister is waiting and the House is meeting at 11 o'clock. I will be back to see you again.

**Mr. Brewin:** I want you to be examined by the Committee.

**The Chairman:** The Minister will be with us for a long time.

**Mr. Brewin:** Mr. Chairman, when is the Minister going to appear again?

**The Chairman:** Order, please.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I will be here again.

**The Chairman:** The Minister will be at our disposal for the next meeting. The next meeting will probably be on Thursday, November 9, 1967.

**Mr. Andras:** Mr. Chairman, on a point of order. Yesterday we attempted to get Mr. Strong heard immediately following Dr. Hall's statement and that, in my opinion, was a steam-roller effort to prevent it.

**The Chairman:** Order, please. The Minister referred to a document called "Top Contributors From The Colombo Plan". Are we agreed to having this document printed as an appendix?

**Some hon. Members:** Agreed.

**The Chairman:** It is now three minutes to 11 o'clock. We will adjourn until next Thursday. The Committee is adjourned.

...of those arrangements which...  
...can resolve a situation of individual conflict...  
...it can mediate it—and there were many...  
...attempts at mediation—but I am simply...  
...pointing out that in respect to the expert...  
...encounter with Dr. Hall, Dr. Venema seems to...  
...have been able to get things done and to get...  
...the co-operation which is required from the...  
...Vietnamese, as well as from the...  
...the... Mr. Strong...  
...There may be differences—I am not trying...  
...to make a judgment—but those are the facts...  
...and I am not...  
...Mr. McInnis: Has there been a change of...  
...administrators out there since that time...  
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...and... We...  
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...my experience with our...  
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...people in the field. There are the...  
...creators and the...  
...only that Dr. Venema is a...  
...Mr. Carstairs: Has there not been a...  
...of government over these...  
...been that...  
...change a government...  
...Mr. McInnis: Were the terms of...  
...for that...  
...case for this...  
...them in the...  
...this...  
...Mr. Strong: There has been...  
...Hall says about our...  
...the participation by the...  
...in...  
...think the...  
...if a government...  
...participate with you...  
...question its...  
...project and also...  
...got it will be...  
...this is the...  
...the...  
...administrative point of view—we have not...  
...applied it inflexibly...  
...In the case of...  
...already said he was our...  
...We saw the...  
...through in...  
...Quang Ngai we...  
...support. At...  
...this...  
...Mr. McInnis: Was Dr. Hall...  
...officially negotiating...  
...or did you have...  
...the...  
...Mr. Strong: Negotiation of the...  
...2111-1

## APPENDIX B

FORM A1.  
(1962 Revision)THE COLOMBO PLAN COUNCIL FOR  
TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION IN SOUTH AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA

## APPLICATION FOR EXPERT

By the Government of VIETNAM to the Government of CANADA for an expert in Orthopedy.

- Notes.—(a) This form has been devised for the general guidance of co-operating countries in order to facilitate the supply of relevant information and data necessary to afford an adequate appreciation of the nature of the technical assistance required. Full and accurate completion of this application form will avoid much reference back and lead to speedier action.
- (b) The requisite number of copies of the Form A1, including a copy for the Colombo Plan Bureau, duly endorsed by the appropriate Foreign Aid Department of the requesting government should be forwarded to the donor government concerned through the appropriate channels.

## 1. BACKGROUND INFORMATION

This section should show as precisely as possible the general nature of the project for which the expert is required, stating whether it comes within the Government's development programme. It is important to indicate whether the project is a new enterprise or whether it was started previously. In the latter case, any assistance received under other technical co-operation programmes (e.g. under United Nations auspices) should be stated. With regard to industrial enterprises, some impression of the size is important and the output and number of workers to be employed are useful indications. The type of process, make and age of industrial or scientific equipment with which the expert will be concerned should be specified. In the case of academic establishments, it is an advantage to know the number of annual intake of students, their level of attainment, numbers and status of existing staff and details of any research facilities and the level of research being undertaken. (Copies of brochures, annual reports, financial statements, calendars, syllabus of instruction etc. should be attached where applicable).

To found and supervise an orthopaedic service in the University of Saigon Section of Cho Ray Hospital under the auspices of the Medical School. See Appendix A; a statement by Dr. M. C. Hall. It should be noted that Dr. Hall's statement also makes reference to needs of equipment and personnel which while they do not form part of this request may form part of subsequent requests.

## 2. SPECIFICATION FOR THE POST.\*

- (a) post title  
(b) duties for which the expert will be responsible. These should preferably be listed, and it is important to give as much detail as possible  
(c) authority to whom expert will be responsible  
(d) qualification and experience required and approximate age limits  
(e) number of personnel required

Orthopaedic Surgeon with University Qualifications.

As in 1.

Medical Director of Cho Ray and University of Saigon.

See 1 and 2.

One.

3. In the case of continuous projects, give name and particulars of understudy or counterpart who is to work with the expert

\*It is essential that full particulars should be given. If the space provided is inadequate, they should be given on a separate sheet.

4. TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF APPOINTMENT:

- (a) duration
- (b) actual place of employment, nearest town and post office
- (c) if living accommodation to be provided, state whether furnished or unfurnished, and whether suitable for married man with family:
  - (i) daily allowance for food if accommodation only provided
  - (ii) daily rate for accommodation and food if neither are provided in kind
- (d) daily and nightly rates of subsistence payable when away from base on duty
- (e) are costs of internal travel paid or car provided?
- (f) what leave arrangements are suggested?
- (g) extent to which free hospital and medical treatment is to be provided for the expert and his accompanying dependents, if any
- (h) is expert free from income tax?
- (i) will personal effects imported on first arrival be cleared free of custom duty?
- (j) does host government undertake to indemnify expert in respect of damages awarded against him for actions performed in the course of his official duties?
- (k) approximate date on which the expert is required to arrive in receiving country
- (l) any other information

One year subject to renewal.

Saigon, Vietnam.

See Appendices B and C.

No.

The Ministry of Health will provide free medical and hospital treatment for the expert and his dependents.

The expert will be exempt from all Vietnamese income tax.

The expert will have the right to import or buy goods tax free for the personal use of himself and his family.

The Ministry of Health agrees to indemnify the expert in respect of any damages awarded against him in the course of his employment.

August 1, 1964.

5. PROPOSALS FOR APPORTIONMENT OF COSTS OF SALARY AND ALLOWANCE AND PASSAGES

6. PREVIOUS STEPS, IF ANY, TO FILL THE POST:

If any previous attempt has been made to fill the post under the Colombo Plan (including ICA) or from any external source (UN, Specialised Agency or other) please indicate:

- (a) to whom application was addressed, with date
- (b) result or present stage of negotiations
- (c) are other experts working in this area in associated projects or have there been experts working in this field previously? If so, are any reports by these experts available?

7. CORRESPONDENCE:

Name, postal and telegraphic address of official to whom correspondence regarding this application should be forwarded

M. Nguyen Anh Tuan  
Directeur Général du Plan  
46 Ben Chuong Duong  
Saigon, Vietnam

Signed Aug. 14, 1964,  
on behalf of the Government of Viet Nam

Date: .....

Dr. Nguyen-Sanh-Châu  
Director of Cabinet,  
Ministry of Health

For use only by Donor Government

Application accepted/rejected/withdrawn

on behalf of the Department of .....

Date: .....

If it is essential that full particulars should be given in the space provided in brackets they should be stated on a separate sheet.

## APPENDIX C

## TOP CONTRIBUTORS FROM THE COLOMBO PLAN (1)

TABLE II

	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1960-1966
Australia ..		(not available)			.172	.142	.986	(1.300)
Canada ...	.47	.24	.28	.29	.45	.582	.832	3.244
Japan .....	.90	15.46	17.32	7.07	5.86	.316	.366	47.292
U.K. ....	....	....	.05	.06	.18	.231	.37	.891
U.S. ....	185.00	151.00	158.00	211.00	221.00	300.104	500.000	1,726.104

## Canada's rank among Colombo Plan contributors

1960 = (3rd)

1961 = (3rd)

1962 = (3rd)

1963 = (3rd)

1964 = 3rd

1965 = 3rd

1966 = 3rd

(1) Australian figures: from Australian High Commission  
 Others: DAC

(Note: Disbursements U.S. Dollars)





OFFICIAL REPORT OF MINUTES  
OF  
PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

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Translated by the General Bureau for Translation, Secretary of State.

ALISTAIR FRASER,  
*The Clerk of the House.*

HOUSE OF COMMONS

Second Session—Twenty-seventh Parliament

1967

STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

**EXTERNAL AFFAIRS**

*Chairman:* Mr. JEAN-EUDES DUBÉ

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 9

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 9, 1967

RESPECTING

Report of the Department of External Affairs (1966)

WITNESS:

Mr. Maurice F. Strong, Director General, External Aid Office.

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.  
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY  
OTTAWA, 1967

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Chairman: Mr. Jean-Eudes Dubé

Vice-Chairman: Mr. W. B. Nesbitt

and

- |                |                 |                    |
|----------------|-----------------|--------------------|
| Mr. Allmand,   | Mr. Deachman,   | Mr. Langlois       |
| Mr. Andras,    | Mr. Forest,     | (Chicoutimi),      |
| Mr. Asselin    | Mr. Forrestall, | Mr. Laprise,       |
| (Charlevoix),  | *Mr. Goyer,     | Mr. Macquarrie,    |
| Mr. Basford,   | Mr. Groos,      | Mr. McIntosh,      |
| Mr. Brewin,    | Mr. Harkness,   | Mr. Pilon,         |
| Mr. Caron,     | Mr. Hymmen,     | Mr. Stanbury,      |
| Mr. Churchill, | Mr. Lambert,    | Mr. Thompson—(24). |

Fernand Despatie,  
Clerk of the Committee.

\* Replaced Mr. Habel on November 7, 1967.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 2

Copies of complete sets are available to the public at the Queen's Printer.

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 8, 1967

FRASER

The Clerk of the House

RESPECTING

Report of the Department of External Affairs (1966)

WITNESS:

Mr. Maurice R. Strong, Director General, External Aid Office.

MINUTE BOOKS  
ORDER OF REFERENCE

TUESDAY, November 7, 1967.

*Ordered*,—That the name of Mr. Goyer be substituted for that of Mr. Habel on the Standing Committee on External Affairs.

*Attest*

ALISTAIR FRASER,  
*The Clerk of the House of Commons.*

*Members present:* Messrs. Allmand, Brewin, Caron, Churchill, Dube, Goyer, Langlois (Chicoutimi), Laprise, Marquand, Haxell, Tilden, Stannary, Thompson (23).

*Also present:* Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale), M.P.

*In attendance:* Mr. Maurice F. Strong, Director General, External Affairs.

Mr. Strong completed his presentation concerning Canadian aid to Thailand commenced at the meeting of November 3, 1967; he answered questions.

At 1.05 p.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

*Fernand Desjardins,  
Clerk of the Committee.*



## MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

THURSDAY, November 9, 1967.

(11)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs met at 11.10 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Dubé, presided.

*Members present:* Messrs. Allmand, Andras, Asselin (*Charlevoix*), Basford, Brewin, Caron, Churchill, Dubé, Goyer, Groos, Harkness, Hymmen, Lambert, Langlois (*Chicoutimi*), Laprise, Macquarrie, Nesbitt, Pilon, Stanbury, Thompson (20).

*Also present:* Mr. Macdonald (*Rosedale*), M.P.

*In attendance:* Mr. Maurice F. Strong, Director General, External Aid Office.

Mr. Strong completed his presentation concerning Canadian aid to Vietnam, commenced at the meeting of November 3, 1967. He answered questions.

At 1.05 p.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

Fernand Despatie,  
Clerk of the Committee.



## EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

Thursday, November 9, 1967

**The Chairman:** Order please. We have a quorum. When we adjourned last Friday Mr. Strong was giving evidence. I understand he has not quite finished his statement but he will do so this morning and afterwards he will receive and answer questions. I understand that the Minister will be here later on. Mr. Strong?

**Mr. M. F. Strong (Director General, External Aid Office):** Mr. Chairman and hon. members I will not take up too much time with further extension of the comments I commenced to make at the last meeting concerning the specific matters raised by Dr. Hall in his presentation to the preceding meeting, but there were two items towards the end of his presentation that I did not get to which I think are important enough to deserve some additional comment.

The first is covered on pages 22 and 23 of Dr. Hall's statement. I will just quote from it. He is speaking of the Vietnamese youths who come over to Canada on their training programs.

The youth, to gain prestige, to escape the draft, or to escape the country, are very anxious to obtain an overseas scholarship... there is no planning involved in the allocation of fields of study, and that quantities of electrical, chemical engineers et cetera for whom there is no possibility of employment, are being trained... many have not gone home after their studies are completed... the relevance of present employment to scholarship training... in giving scholarships we have a responsibility to find out whether their holders are returning to their native countries and whether they can find work there. Yet the Director General has told this Committee that we do not have, and are not attempting to get, this information.

Now let me say in respect to the point he makes, that there is no planning involved in the allocation of fields of study, that we are of course very anxious that the training we

provide in Canada be related to the recipient country's manpower needs and to its long-range development needs. However, the actual evaluation of the country's manpower requirements and selection procedures must necessarily be the prerogative of the nominating government. While it is not possible nor would it, I think, be proper for me to comment specifically on the amount and the effectiveness of the Vietnamese government's planning in relation to the scholarship program, I think it would be helpful perhaps to make some comments about the other issues raised in this connection in Dr. Hall's presentation which will, I think, be indicative of the planning that is involved and the knowledge that we have of this planning and the interest that we take in it.

The Commission for Overseas Studies of the Vietnamese Ministry of Education reviews all requests from students who wish to undertake studies abroad, including unsponsored students or students who come out here on their own resources—of course our program covers only those students that we sponsor and finance—but no student can obtain a passport without a decree authorizing him to study overseas, which passport I understand is only issued by the Commission once they have approved a student's choice of studies and the proposed university at which he intends to pursue these studies.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** Does this just apply to Viet Nam?

**Mr. Strong:** Yes. I am coming now to the actual practices of the Vietnamese government in dealing with these matters. Of course each government has different practices and these are not necessarily applicable everywhere. In addition, in Viet Nam a committee consisting of members of the various faculties of Vietnamese educational institutions was set up within the framework of this Commission to interview all candidates who wish to study abroad, and the Commission, incidentally, is also responsible for assisting returning students to obtain employment.

On the comment concerning the relevance of present employment to scholarship training, we of course share very much the concern that Dr. Hall expressed in this regard. This is an important matter, but scholarships awarded to Viet Nam under our external aid program, as to all other countries under our program, are extended, again, only in response to specific requests by the governments concerned. It is not simply a matter of the individual student desiring to come here. The nominating government is responsible for evaluating the requirements for personnel to be trained in specific fields and at specific levels, and they are also responsible to assure that suitable positions will be available to these trainees once they return home. The choice of a field of study and the degree objective to be attained by a particular student are determined solely by his government, which is consulted, and it must approve any change requested by the student. This, again, is to assure that the kind of training he receives in Canada under our program is consistent with what his government feels are the needs of his country. Similarly, the Vietnamese authorities must indicate to us that requirements in a given field have changed before any extension for further studies to a higher level is authorized. So, again, we attempt to attune the facilities that we provide to the requirements of the Vietnamese as we hear about these requirements from them.

Now on the comment—and I am quoting here from Dr. Hall's statement:

...that quantities of electrical, chemical engineers et cetera for whom there is no possibility of employment, are being trained.

Let me say that of the 211 Vietnamese students presently in Canada under sponsorship from the External Aid Office, 88 per cent are undergraduates and the remaining students are working towards an M.Sc. or Ph.D. and engineering studies of one kind or another do in fact predominate. Some 27 per cent are taking chemical engineering; 22 per cent electrical engineering, and 18 per cent mechanical engineering. Now it is true, as I understand it, that some of these people do perhaps experience difficulty in obtaining employment precisely in the field for which they are trained but certainly we take every step that I think could possibly be taken to assure, again, that the training they receive is related to actual employment needs and opportunities in their country.

I might say also, incidentally, that the Vietnamese students in Canada have a very, very fine record. They are amongst the very, very best students that we have in our Canadian universities and some of them have records that are unequalled by Canadian students. I think they do represent by and large a very, very fine and able group of young people and will represent a very significant long-term development asset to their country.

Facilities for electrical engineering studies became available in Viet Nam itself in 1966 and we have not accepted any further nominations in that field as of 1967. I might point out that under our program we do not accept nominations for training from Viet Nam if the training can be provided in Viet Nam. So when facilities for providing electrical engineering studies became available in South Viet Nam in 1966, we ceased to accept any more in Canada. Some of the other countries do not follow this practice but we think it is a sound one.

A list provided by the Vietnamese authorities in July, 1967 mentioned 74 former Colombo Plan students trained in Canada and specified the positions that they are presently occupying in Viet Nam, indicating clearly that they are employed in fields directly related to the training they received here.

Now recently, I think it was in August, we ourselves sent out a questionnaire to the various students from whom replies now are beginning to come in. These replies, too, at least from the students from whom we have heard, indicate that they are in fact employed in fields related to the training that they received in Canada.

As to the comment that "many have not gone home after their studies are complete", there is no question that there is a problem in this area. It is perhaps more a potential problem at the moment, one that we are looking at very carefully, than a real one because of the 386 Vietnamese students trained so far in Canada only three have actually been given permission to remain in Canada with immigrant status. There are students here in Canada now who have expressed interest in staying here but we make every effort to persuade these students to abide by the commitment that they enter into when they come here. They commit themselves to return to Viet Nam. This is true of other countries, too, because the whole purpose of the program, after all, is to provide training which will make them an

asset to the development of their own countries, and this purpose would of course be frustrated if they were permitted to easily get out of this commitment.

Discussions with aid officials of the United States, New Zealand, Australia and Germany held in Saigon this summer indicate, too, that these countries have the same kind of difficulties in terms of repatriation of students, so I think our experience certainly is not unique in this area.

Now as to the comment that:

The youth, . . . to escape the draft, . . . are very anxious to obtain an overseas scholarship.

I can only say that all of the students who come to Canada, whether they are on scholarship or otherwise, are 18 and 19 years of age when they come and they must clarify their draft status before obtaining a decree allowing them to apply for a passport. Students who apply for extension of their stay in Canada after having completed their undergraduate studies must have the approval of the Commission for Overseas Studies. During a discussion with the Director of the Commission for Overseas Studies this summer we were informed that individuals born in 1943 to 1944 had not been allowed to go overseas for study this year, whether on scholarship or otherwise, unless they had already completed their military service.

• (11:20 a.m.)

I would like to refer to one other item before completing these comments on Dr. Hall's report and going on to deal with the specific and detailed points of interest to Committee members arising out of Dr. Hall's statement and my own comments. I refer to pages 17 and 18 of Dr. Hall's prepared statement on Canada's food aid program. To quote from that briefly, he says:

Thus if the food is used to feed the poor and starving, the country in fact buys it from Canada in her own local currency but Canada demands not only the credit for having "given" it, but also twice over credit for a further project built out of the local currency put into the counterpart funds.

On page 18, he says:

Although foodstuffs are by definition not accepted by the World Bank as "development aid", Canada justifies this 25% of total grant aid on the grounds that they generate counterpart funds.

The food aid program has been a recognized feature of international development assistance since the beginning of the Colombo Plan. In recognition of its importance, provision for food aid was incorporated into the wheat agreements reached in Geneva earlier this year under the Kennedy Round negotiations.

The recipient country under food aid program is not forced to accept food aid, as implied in several places in the statement by Dr. Hall, particularly on page 17. The World Bank certainly does recognize Canada's \$71 million contribution to the Bank's 10 million ton target for food aid to India this year. In fact, in World Bank and international development circles there can be no question that food aid is considered very, very important, and a recognized element in aid programs.

If, in practice, under our bilateral program, a country requests food, we make them aware of the food that we produce and have available and the country then selects from this list the items that it needs. This food is a gift. It is an outright gift. Canada provides all of its food aid on an outright gift basis. There are no loans, no repayment provisions, no interest—nothing of that kind. The recipient pays nothing for it, except, of course, that the recipient does have to pick it up at a Canadian port and pay the shipping charges on it. These are not paid to us. They are simply charges for transporting it.

As a result of this gift, the recipient country is saved from the necessity of making the substantial expenditures on foreign exchange that would otherwise be necessary to enable it to meet its own food requirements. The country itself, in this case, South Viet Nam, actually handles the detailed administration of the program. It receives the food and disposes of it as it sees fit. We do not require them to sell it or to give it away. However, in many cases the most effective method of distribution is to use the normal commercial channels, the shortage originally having been one of foreign exchange, rather than of money, on the part of those people requiring the food. The government concerned makes that decision. It either markets it locally or gives it away; and this is a decision that they make.

In either event, we require, as a condition of our giving this food aid, that the receiving government set up its own accounts. I think this is important. These are their funds and we have no access to the funds at all. They set up in their own accounts an amount in

local currency which is equivalent to the amount of foreign exchange that they have saved by our gift of this food. It is this fund of local currency that Canada requires the recipient to apply to long term-development projects. In this sense, food aid serves the twofold purpose of enabling the receiving country to meet its immediate needs for food without depleting its foreign exchange resources and, at the same time, of enabling long-term development projects to be undertaken.

The importance of this is best illustrated in the case of India. Had India not received from Canada and the United States the substantial gifts of food that it has received in the past several years it would have had to use its own foreign exchange reserves to buy this food and this would have required them either to slow up or to halt many long-range development projects that are designed to help make the Indians eventually self-sufficient in agriculture. Therefore, food aid does serve this twofold purpose.

Mr. Chairman, I could obviously make further comments on these points, but perhaps the best thing to do is to stop there and to provide, as I am prepared to do, detailed answers to any questions that Committee members may have.

**The Chairman:** Thank you, Mr. Strong. Mr. Stanbury, I believe, indicated that he wished to ask the first question.

**Mr. Stanbury:** Mr. Chairman, perhaps it is only fair that I wait until the opposition has been given an opportunity to put some questions.

**The Chairman:** Mr. Nesbitt was second on my list.

**Mr. Churchill:** There is nothing partisan about this. It is a co-operative Committee.

**The Chairman:** I had Mr. Groos first, but he has left.

**Mr. Stanbury:** I shall await my turn.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** I have two questions—one specific and one general.

We have had a great deal of evidence from both sides, and apart from the need for clarification of certain points we can form our own conclusions.

I have one complaint about students that could apply to Viet Nam, but could also apply to other countries. I have been told by a number of very senior officials of different universities that, because most of these coun-

tries have either authoritarian or semi-authoritarian forms of government a great many of the students coming over under these plans are not the most deserving ones in the country at all; that they are frequently the sons and daughters of the local president and his friends, and often people who would be well able financially to come themselves, but might occasion certain foreign exchange problems. These officials declared this to be true, to a very large extent, of a number of these students. We all realize of course, that it would be very difficult for us to say that we did not want so-and-so because he was the nephew of the president and did not have a very good record at school, but have any arrangements been made to at least minimize this as much as possible?

**Mr. Strong:** I have heard this, too, and I would not be at all surprised if there were instances where this happens. Selection procedures vary from country to country. However, in the case of the Vietnamese I really do not have the specific knowledge that would enable me to break these down.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** My remark was not directed at Viet Nam; it was designed for more general application.

**Mr. Strong:** However, in the case of the Vietnamese I think it is important to note that their academic record here is, on the average, as I understand it, considerably better than that of the average Canadian student taking the same courses. This would suggest that whatever other considerations may enter into their selection there is strong credit given to their actual academic performance.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** In general terms, Mr. Strong, are you and your staff trying to find ways of minimizing this problem?

**Mr. Strong:** Absolutely; the whole purpose of our aid is to help those . . .

**Mr. Nesbitt:** Who need it.

**Mr. Strong:** . . . who benefit by it and who need it. I could not agree with you more.

• (11:30 a.m.)

**Mr. Nesbitt:** I have another specific question in this connection. There has been dispute on what it costs to train a foreign student. About a year ago I remember seeing a newspaper report to the effect that the cost is about \$8,000 per student. This to me, seemed rather high. Could you give us the

figures of what it actually costs a year to educate one of these students in Canada? And what sort of allowances do they receive, say, for clothing and travel?

**Mr. Strong:** The average costs range from about \$3,000 to \$4,500 a year, depending on the length of time that they are here and the period over which you can allocate such expenditures as travel which are constant no matter how long the student is here. The average is of the order of \$3,000. My officers here tell me it is about \$3.3 thousand per student.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** How is that made up? Could you give us an idea?

**Mr. Strong:** One of my officers may have a detailed breakdown; we can certainly get that for you.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** What about university fees, clothing allowance, food allowance and that sort of thing?

**Mr. Strong:** The allowance is \$170 a month plus medical expenses. We look after their medical expenses. Then, of course, they have their transportation to Canada and from Canada and they have their tuition fees and their books.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** Are they given any, albeit small, spending allowance for themselves?

**Mr. Strong:** Yes, \$170 a month. This includes, I think, spending allowance too. The living allowance is \$165 to \$300, depending on certain circumstances. Some of these people are more mature students with wives and families. For clothing, it is \$250 which is a one shot allowance; for books, \$120; and medical expenses amount to about \$40 per year on the average.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** But they would be covered if an unusual circumstance...

**Mr. Strong:** Oh yes, indeed.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** The other question I had in mind is one of a more general nature and it may take a little time. I do not want to monopolize the time of the Committee but it is a question you cannot answer in a very short time and I expect you probably cannot. You could perhaps continue it at another time. The question is this, and I think it concerns a lot of people: what is the motivation or motivations behind our foreign aid? I mean by that, do we select a country to give it aid on the basis of pure need because the

resources of the country are minimal and the people are poor and actually need food and clothing? Or do we design our foreign aid on the basis of self-help, trying to help people develop their resources, and if so, are surveys made to see what resources can be best developed? Or do we base it on some form of—in the broad sense of the word—political view that we should give aid on either one of the former bases to our friends or people who might be of assistance or help to us? Could you give us some general idea? Or would you prefer to pursue the subject another time?

**Mr. Strong:** I can certainly comment generally on this. I think this is quite a widely discussed subject and that different people have different motivations for their support of aid programs but, by and large, I think it is agreed by most people in the development business that the underdeveloped...

**Mr. Nesbitt:** I am referring to the Canadian government's reasons.

**Mr. Strong:** I do not think I can do anything but comment on my understanding of those reasons as they have appeared in various statements. The principal reason for the Canadian development assistance program, as distinct from the ECIC special credits which are a commercial operation, is to help induce economic and social development in the developing countries. However, it is recognized, and I think it is recognized as the very composition of our aid administration, that there are other considerations that have to be taken into account.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** That would be the main motivation, would you say?

**Mr. Strong:** As I understand it from statements that have been made by ministers from time to time; but they are equally clear that there are other factors, including those you have referred to, that have to be taken into account: the political factors, trade and commercial factors and financial factors; and the External Aid Board, which exists at the official level, includes the Deputy Minister of Finance, it includes the Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce, it includes the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, it includes the Governor of the Bank of Canada and myself which, I think, suggests that each of these components has to be looked at in relation to any administrative decisions concerning aid.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** I will put it this way, Mr. Strong. It is a pretty broad question; I recognize that. I was wondering if you might give us a broad statement on this matter, on some other occasion, and after having had some time to give it serious thought and consideration, perhaps in conjunction with your colleagues. It is something I think many of us run into when people are asking about aid: "Why is this aid going?" "What are we giving \$40,000 to Afghanistan for?" and "Why are we doing this?". I think it would be helpful to everybody in Canada and an actual help to aid programs if this could be done.

**Mr. Strong:** I might say that on the overall policy motivations of the aid program, I think it would be more appropriate for the Minister to reply to that.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** On that aspect, yes.

**Mr. Strong:** I think I should comment on our motivation for individual projects and programs once given the allocation, which is an expression of the over-all policy. I could comment on it now if you want me to or I could leave it to a future time. Whatever your wish is.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** Would you care to comment on it for perhaps about five minutes? I do not want the other Committee members to feel that I am monopolizing the time.

**Mr. Strong:** I will not dwell on it but it is very important because this is one of the most important elements in the administration of an aid program. What we do is this. Our allocations are approved on a general geographical basis and in Canada's case, although aid flows to a total of 65 countries under our program, between 80 and 90 per cent of it goes to about 12 countries or areas—countries that we call countries of concentration. On each of these particular areas we receive from the World Bank and other multilateral agencies all of the information that they have—and they have a very considerable amount of it—on the programs of other countries such as the United States, Great Britain, and DAC countries, on the aid that they are providing to the areas that we are primarily interested in.

We also receive from the country itself copies of its own development plans and its own development priorities. In the case of the principal countries like India, Pakistan, Malaysia and most of these countries of concentration, there are consultative or consortium groups which have been set up under the

auspices of the World Bank for the specific purpose of examining, on an international basis, the development priorities of each of these countries and determining how much of those development priorities can be met from their own local resources and how much outside help is required, and then relating this to the amount of outside help that might actually be available.

Then again in these groups the various donors attempt to relate the amount of aid that they are able to devote to these countries and the kind of aid that they are able to come up with. This is why, for instance, Canada provides a disproportionate amount of food aid to India because it happens to be one of India's priority development needs while wheat happens to be something that we are able to provide. It is much better for India to get wheat from Canada than from some country that obviously does not have wheat. So through this co-ordinating apparatus we determine the role that Canada can best play and then we tell the country roughly the amount of aid that we have for them during the year and we suggest that they make requests to us, each of which will be charged against that level.

We have to be convinced ourselves, first that the request for a particular project will meet one of these priority development needs that we have identified through this consultative process, and second, that it constitutes something that will follow within our budget and something that Canada has got the capacity to do. So, it is essentially a matter of development needs coming first. This is number one: we will not do it if it does not meet a priority development needs. And then number two: we will only do those things that we feel Canada has the capacity to do.

• (11:40 a.m.)

**Mr. Nesbitt:** There is one last thing that is relative. Is the question of military aid to other countries included in the program over which you have jurisdiction?

**Mr. Strong:** No.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** Such as the training of guerrillas in Tanzania, and that kind of thing?

**Mr. Strong:** No, this is completely separate from our external aid program. We have nothing to do with it.

**The Chairman:** Is that all, Mr. Nesbitt?

**Mr. Nesbitt:** Yes, Mr. Chairman.

**Mr. Stanbury:** Mr. Chairman, I think the evidence we have heard has underlined something of which all of us have been very aware, the fact that external aid is a very complex and difficult field in which governments have to operate. I think the real concern should be how well we are coping with these difficulties and how well we are progressing in coping with them better. The key element that arises out of what we have heard, is the question of the administrative efficiency with which our funds are used. I believe most of us here are strong supporters of the principles of external aid but we must realize that if the public is going to support this kind of aid we have to be able to convince them that we are using these funds efficiently and effectively.

It seems to me that your presence, Mr. Strong, is one indication of the importance that has been placed on this aspect of our external aid program and I am very grateful that a person of your experience is directing our program. Can you tell us what has been done since you have taken over this position to ensure that your office is efficiently looking after the funds which Parliament has assigned to it and that the people you are sending to these far places are being effectively assisted in carrying out the purposes of our program?

**Mr. Strong:** When I was given this assignment I was told that this was one of the government's top priorities, preparing for higher levels of aid and an expanding program, and it was apparent that we needed to provide a somewhat larger and certainly stronger administrative apparatus to support it. I think the best indication I can give you of the increased demands which have been made on our administration in the last few years is the fact that in 1960, I think it was, we had 84 technical assistance advisers in the field. We now have almost 1200. Many of these people are out on individual assignments where, in the very nature of things, they have to rely on their own efforts and on their relationships with receiving governments to make a lot of the local administrative arrangements that are required.

However, we have moved in the direction of trying to concentrate our efforts in those areas which lend themselves to more effective support in administration. For example, in Thailand we have one of a number of projects which reflect this new trend toward what I call comprehensive programming, programming which involves not only the

provision of experts but the provision of equipment and materials to support the experts. There is also provision for training in Canada to ensure the continuance of the program when our experts leave by trained local people. In Thailand we are now developing a comprehensive and academic vocational school system. We are providing some \$2 million worth of equipment and we are providing five senior advisers from the University of Alberta to aid in getting these schools in operation and training people on the spot. This is being supplemented by a training program in Canada for 50 Thai teachers each year, for a total of 150 over three years, who will go back and operate the schools.

This kind of comprehensive program obviously lends itself, first, to the likelihood of making a good strategic impact on the development of Thailand and, second, it lends itself to more effective administrative support from this end. I could give you quite a few other examples. We have told receiving governments that from here on in our preference when receiving requests from them would be for programs of the kind which enable us to make a maximum impact in a strategic area of need in that country and under conditions which we can better support administratively than an individual adviser can be supported out in the field.

I might further state that the aid office has gone through a very extensive re-organization. In fact, my principal role in life in the last year has been to first of all attempt to acquaint myself with the needs and, secondly, I have made a number of field trips in an attempt to acquaint myself with the problems experienced both at the level of the missions abroad, which are really responsible for administering the programs, and also the many hundreds of individual advisers and participants in the Canadian program.

Dr. Hall made some very useful comments and suggestions. Many of the other advisers that I have seen, and a good many others with whom I have had correspondence, have made some very helpful comments on ways we can improve our support for them in the field in our administrative practices. In my view we have made substantial progress toward implementing the knowledge we have gained from our experience. We have not dealt with every thing; some of these matters involve relatively major changes.

I am also discovering in government decision-making there are many factors one has

to contend with; other departments have to be consulted such as the Public Service Commission, Treasury Board, and this kind of thing. I am learning how to deal with these matters but I think by and large there is understanding within the government that the administration of an aid program involves very special considerations and you cannot rigidly apply to an operation extending to 65 countries, each with its own different administration, language and culture barriers, the same administrative norms you apply when doing business in Canada. This is understood, I think, and within the limitations that are necessarily applicable to any substantive changes of this nature within an administration I think we have made substantial progress in the last year.

**Mr. Stanbury:** But it is big business, is it not? It seems to me it is very valuable to have top management skills such as your own in this kind of operation. Have you been able to attract, or are you attempting to attract, people of similar skills to your office in this expanding program that you have mentioned?

**Mr. Strong:** Yes. I have been very gratified at the number of people who have come forward and offered to come into the aid office and make their skills available either on a full-time or part-time basis.

• (11:50 a.m.)

We have, in fact, a number of such people who have come in for relatively short term periods of a year or two years who are not necessarily committed to becoming civil servants for their entire careers. I think a very good example of this was made known yesterday. John Bene who is President of Weldwood of Canada, Ltd., one of our largest forest products companies, has agreed to take leave of absence for two years from his responsibilities, and to assist us in the development and improvement of our administrative apparatus.

**Mr. Stanbury:** I might be tempted to say that is a tribute to the Minister, but I think it would be fair to say it is a tribute to you, that you are able to attract people of that calibre to your office. More particularly, Mr. Strong, the program in Viet Nam has obviously been a developing one over the past few years and the situation there, as far as the effectiveness of our program is concerned, I hope has improved during this period. Last time you were here you mentioned

an assessment team that had gone to Viet Nam. I am sorry, I do not think we have the Minutes of that meeting yet. I may be covering some of the same ground you have already covered, but would you mind telling us what this team is, and what it has reported to you about the effectiveness of our program or recommendations for its improvement there.

**Mr. Strong:** Mr. Chairman, I would be very happy to do that. May I just make a comment first. While I naturally appreciate your kind comment, let me say that the reason people like John Bene and others are coming forward to offer their services is not related to my being here at all. It is simply related to the fact that they see our program; it is an important one and an exciting one, and I think people like this would come forward no matter who occupies the particular post that I occupy.

**Mr. Stanbury:** It is gratifying anyway.

**Mr. Strong:** On the other point—and I did refer to this the other day—a team of senior people has been out in Viet Nam, and it is now en route from Viet Nam, comprising people from the External Aid Office, from the Department of Health and Welfare, and including General Wrinch of the Canadian Red Cross and Dr. Dupuis from Montreal, an expert on rehabilitation. This was not just another study committee; this was part of a continuing process of implementing and upgrading our program in South Viet Nam. In the cable I received the day before the last meeting they reported—and I will read this from that telegram:

It is pleased to record that current CDN aid projects have been timely and useful and deserve continuing support.

In the remainder of the telegram they simply refer to the specific aspects of the program, but on an over-all basis they are recommending—and we will get their detailed recommendation on their return—that every one of our current projects in Viet Nam be extended because they found that they are valuable programs.

**Mr. Stanbury:** Mr. Chairman, I have some other questions, but I think other members undoubtedly will have some too, so I will pass for now.

**Mr. Brewin:** Mr. Chairman, I would like to open my questions by making the comment, if I may, that I do not think I am, or any

members of the Committee are, hostile to the external aid program. We are only anxious that it be just as effective as possible. Having said that, it seems to me that the major criticism made by Dr. Hall related to what appears to be a matter of policy. He said on page 4 of his statement that

The External Aid Office have recently said their "normal method of supporting advisers (is that) the department supplies the man and the local government everything else" (*Financial Post*, Oct. 21, 1967, p. 36), which means that their normal method is not to support their advisers.

In other words, I understood Dr. Hall to say that it is a matter of policy not to rely upon the host country, as it were—the country where the aid is given—to furnish these supplies and it seems that this would be a very inappropriate policy to apply to the circumstances in South Viet Nam.

**The Chairman:** Before the witness answers, I think as Chairman it is my duty to say that the witness should not speak on policy. He should restrict his comments to the administration of policy. The Minister himself will be here later on and he will be very happy to answer all questions dealing directly with policy.

**Mr. Brewin:** I want to know from this witness, who is eminently qualified to tell me, whether that is the policy applied; if he does not want to justify it...

**Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale):** Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out that the word "policy" was not introduced by Dr. Hall. He said the "normal method of supporting advisers" so it really is a question of administration, not of policy.

**Mr. Strong:** I am at your service; I am quite prepared to comment on it. It is really an operating method—I guess it has policy overtones; those I cannot comment on—but I can explain the method and its significance if that is in order, Mr. Chairman.

**The Chairman:** Indeed, yes.

**Mr. Strong:** There are really two sides to the statement itself. The first part of it—I do not have it here, but I think I can recall it—is that we send only the man, and the local government provides everything else. Now, this does refer to an operating practice, which I think we have explained; and I

would be very happy to explain it further. It is this: inherent in our program is the assumption that programs will only operate if they are based upon a partnership between Canada, as the donor, and the country that is receiving our aid. Under these partnership arrangements we require that the local governments normally provide those things that they are in the best position to provide, and normally these are things that require local currency and local arrangements.

Housing is one of those things that is normally required of a local government to provide. Many of these countries, of course, have very severe housing shortages, and it is very difficult often to provide the standards of housing required; it would be difficult for us too to provide the standard of housing that some advisers insist on. Now, I think this practice is a sound one in general, but it is not applied inflexibly. For example in South Viet Nam, Dr. Hall, who as you know was our first medical adviser there, did experience these problems of housing. Out of his experience we made changes in the application of this particular method and now Dr. Vennema and the others at Quang Ngai are all provided with housing. Out of this initial experience, where we found that the rigid application of an operating policy of this kind in the peculiar conditions of South Viet Nam would not have been attractive and would have led to other people experiencing some of the problems that Dr. Hall admittedly experienced during the early period of his assignment there, we changed. There is nothing scriptural about these; these are just overriding principles that are good principles, but have to be applied flexibly.

**Mr. Brewin:** In this connection, I have read, and no doubt you have, about Dr. Gingras. According to this article he had organized, and was ready to go out with, a team of people to set up a hospital for wounded or maimed children in Viet Nam. According to this statement you were obliged to write him on the 11th of January to explain that the project had been delayed due to some doubt about who would supply electricity. If that is so, it does not seem to make any sense to me that a project to look after children should be delayed where they have such an eminent man as Dr. Gingras and, I think, 17 others—a whole team—ready to go to do this work, and that it should be held up because of an argument with the Vietnamese about who is going to supply electricity.

• 12 noon)

**Mr. Strong:** I recall, generally, the article to which you refer. This, of course, is not the case. It was not an argument over electricity. It was a basic argument about whether or not this facility was needed or wanted by the Vietnamese in Saigon, as proposed by Dr. Gingras. The basic problem was that Dr. Gingras wanted a separate, identified unit: the Vietnamese wanted a unit integrated with their national rehabilitation centre in Saigon. Dr. Hall himself refers in his statement to the fact that it would have been difficult to implement Dr. Gingras' proposal at that point.

The significant aspect is simply that there is only so much that a donor country can do to make assistance available. If you do not have an agreement with the local government to provide those things which can only be provided locally—not so much the cost of them, but just the agreement to provide them, to make them available—then it is obvious that you cannot proceed with the erection of an institution of this kind.

In those instances where our desire to do something has coincided with Vietnamese willingness to work with us we have succeeded. This is evidenced by Dr. Vennema's being able, within 48 hours, to get the land he required for this medical centre in Quang Ngai.

Electricity is, of course, one of those things that would normally be provided by the local people, but there is certainly no justification for suggesting that the project did not go ahead because of any argument over electricity.

**Mr. Brewin:** The article says that you wrote to Dr. Gingras on January 11, thanking him for his report, made 15 months earlier, and explaining that the project had been delayed because of some doubt about who would supply the electricity. Is that not correct?

**Mr. Strong:** I do not recall the details of the letter. I may have referred to electricity amongst the many other things. There was a long list of things that had to be done by the local government and which they were not prepared to do. The reason for that, as they eventually advised us, was simply that they did not feel that this particular centre was required in Saigon.

We have since been working with them, with Dr. Gingras' advice, on their plans for

developing similar facilities outside of Saigon. Saigon is reasonably well served in comparison with the rest of the country. Quang Ngai is 350 miles north of Saigon, right in the heart of the troubled area. Dr. Hall mentioned that even the Vietnamese do not like working in Quang Ngai. Everybody wants to work in Saigon, because Quang Ngai is far more hazardous and dangerous. Therefore, we concentrated on this, and in this area the Vietnamese recognized the need and gave us excellent co-operation.

**Mr. Brewin:** I have just one more question, Mr. Chairman, and then I will pass. One of the things that disturbed me was Dr. Hall's saying that he sent briefs and letters and received no answer. You gave as an explanation that it was usual to communicate through the Commissioner. Is it now the practice—and surely it would be a reasonable practice—for the External Aid Office to communicate directly with people like Dr. Hall serving in the field and to answer their communications directly and not through some indirect channel?

**Mr. Strong:** There are several references in Dr. Hall's statement to his not having communication. One of those deals with prior to his first assignment. I have checked the records on this. There are on our files 20 letters between ourselves and Dr. Hall, even preceding that assignment. In a place like Viet Nam mail service is a far less reliable method of communicating with a person than through our direct cable to our Mission in Viet Nam. It is the most expeditious way. I am sure Dr. Hall himself would acknowledge that it is probably the most useful method, when one can communicate directly with a senior officer of the Canadian government who is on a direct wire to us in Ottawa.

This is a matter of concern to me, too. I have examined in great detail the records of these conversations. There are on our records very, very lengthy reports of discussions with Dr. Hall on many of these subjects, and there is correspondence, as I have mentioned, between us and the office, too. I do not think even Dr. Hall would suggest that there is anything wrong or inefficient in using the most direct channel of communication.

**Mr. Macquarrie:** Mr. Chairman, I would like to be allowed to make a comment which could be of help to the Committee's procedure. When Dr. Hall made his statement last Thursday there was available the following morning a full transcript of his remarks, and

these remarks were obviously used by the Minister and Mr. Strong when they referred to page so-and-so. This, of course, is fine. It is now a week since we heard from Mr. Strong and Mr. Martin and we do not have before us the text of their remarks. This is a very esoteric and difficult field. Where people are making long detailed statements it would be wise to have these documents available. This Committee has had certain difficulties in these matters. I recall that on one occasion the press had a statement which the Committee did not have. I also remember that when we expected to discuss Viet Nam we had a written statement about the 12-mile limit. I mention this to be helpful.

I also regret that there is a certain twilight zone developing here between the testimony of an official—a most respected one, may I say—and the minister. I would be the last person to seek to ask questions which would involve Mr. Strong in controversy, and I therefore regret our following precisely the routine of last week, by which Mr. Strong finished Mr. Martin's statement. I think this is unfortunate. There should always be a distinct line between an official and a minister. I am, therefore, somewhat inhibited in my questions.

I defer to no one in my regard for Mr. Strong's work and in my appreciation of his joining the public service, but I would have been happier had the Minister made the statement and Mr. Strong been available for specific questioning. Nevertheless, Mr. Strong, with those inhibitions, I gather, from your testimony of last week, that Dr. Hall was *persona non grata* to the South Vietnamese government. I understand that a congratulatory message was sent when it was learned that he was to be withdrawn. Was that the first indication you had that Dr. Hall was looked upon with less than favour by the South Vietnamese authority?

**Mr. Strong:** Mr. Chairman, that particular comment was related, I think you will recall, to the comments of Dr. Hall himself about the difficulties he had experienced. It was certainly not designed in any way—and I think I explained this at the time; certainly this was my intention—to impute any ill motives to Dr. Hall or to attempt to render a judgment on the merits or demerits of the people involved in those difficult relationships. However, by his own admission, he did have difficult relationships, and the files I have examined and the officers I have interviewed confirm this. In this respect I think

there is no difference of opinion between us and Dr. Hall as to the fact that his relationships were difficult. And I think that is a fact. If Dr. Hall had difficult relationships with the South Vietnamese, it has to be considered as one of the factors in his total experience there, one of the factors contributing to the difficulties he had. Now, it may be that Dr. Hall is wholly right in his attitude to these relationships, and the Vietnamese wholly wrong. The opposite may also be the case. I suspect that when there are difficult relationships there are problems on both sides.

• (12:10 p.m.)

**Mr. Macquarrie:** I am not looking for an evaluation of the judgment of the South Vietnamese, but I am asking if the message to which you referred last week was the first indication you had from the South Vietnamese authorities that they looked with something less than enthusiasm and favour upon Dr. Hall and were, in fact, because of these attitudes, not likely to co-operate with him.

**Mr. Strong:** Well, no it was not. There had been many indications. As a matter of fact, in September, 1965, because of the difficulties that had been reported to us, a legal adviser from the Department of External Affairs was sent out for the specific purpose of meeting with Dr. Hall, and with Mr. Tuan, the Director General of the Vietnamese Development Plan, to review with the Vietnamese authorities the numerous complaints received from Dr. Hall and to help, if possible, resolve some of the problems of relationship that existed at that time between Dr. Hall and the Vietnamese.

**Mr. Macquarrie:** Then Dr. Hall himself was surprised at the attitude officially communicated to our government.

**Mr. Strong:** I think Dr. Hall himself was the source of most of the information that we received about his difficulties. Dr. Hall was the man who actually experienced these difficulties, and Dr. Hall reported many of them to the members of the Control Commission serving in Saigon, and these people attempted to resolve the difficulties. So there was lots of evidence, both to us and to Dr. Hall, that these difficulties existed.

**Mr. Macquarrie:** If the Minister were here I would ask him at this time why, in the circumstances, this very highly trained man

was retained for three years under such circumstances by the External Aid Office.

**Mr. Strong:** That is a very good question, and as a matter of fact I think it is important to note that his last assignment terminated about August.

My first encounter with Dr. Hall was about last November, about a month after I joined the Aid Office, when the matter of his renewed assignment to South Viet Nam was under discussion. At that point officials of the External Aid Office, and later myself, discussed with Dr. Hall the various problems that he had had, and wondered with him if, in light of these problems, he should in fact go back for an assignment.

In the final analysis it was decided both by him and by us that he had had two years of experience; that he was prepared to face the problems and it was a different situation he was going into, a different department of the Vietnamese government, and on balance it was decided to send him back. Now, the experiences subsequent to that suggest that might not have been the wise thing to do from either our point of view or Dr. Hall's because, as he said himself, he experienced a great deal of frustration from that point on.

I think it is important to note the date involved here. Dr. Hall's contract to teach at Hue was dated August 30, 1966, last fall.

He left for Viet Nam in December 1966, and actually returned to Canada on April 7 of this year, without ever signing a contract actually, or working under its agreed provisions.

During this period from August 30, 1966 to December 16, Dr. Hall was in Canada. Following this, Dr. Hall returned to Viet Nam and to Hue on January 28, and then went to Saigon, indicating that private arrangements between himself and the authorities at Hue to provide him with a 30 bed ward at the hospital had fallen through. Dr. Hall decided not to proceed with the histology assignment, which was one of the two assignments he had agreed to take on. He decided not to proceed with this one, although he admitted, or suggested that he was willing to admit, that the facilities were available for this portion of his assignment.

Now, in fact, Dr. Hall, because of these difficulties which he has described, performed no services under his third contract from August 30 to April 7 of this year when he actually left South Viet Nam. Now, amongst the things that Dr. Hall indicated he required

and were not provided—and his own statement suggests that there was a French doctor at Hue with whom he did not see eye to eye—he wanted a full professor's title, and this the Vietnamese authorities were not prepared to extend to him. There were various questions of this kind which were not resolved. Our people attempted to assist him in resolving these questions. It is extremely difficult to intervene in the processes of the professional relationship of a man to the Institution, to which he is related, but the records that I have examined of that experience indicate that our people in Saigon did everything that could possibly be expected of the group to try and improve this relationship.

**Mr. Macquarrie:** I know it was extremely difficult and I would not try to pass judgment, although I doubt if Dr. Hall is totally wrong in his point of view. But I am just a little anxious that three years elapsed before what Dr. Hall himself describes as a failure seems to have been recognized.

With reference to the medical team which I believe you said is now returning from South Viet Nam; when was this team sent out?

**Mr. Strong:** The team was sent out about three or four weeks ago; October 12 is the precise date.

If I may just comment in relation to the difficulties experienced I would like to make very clear to members of the Committee that I am not trying to pass judgment on Dr. Hall or on the merits of the case of the various parties involved in these difficulties Dr. Hall experienced, nor am I trying to suggest that I am in complete disagreement with him. As a matter of fact, out of his experiences, as we have already said, we made a number of changes I think are going to benefit other advisers in the field. It is unfortunate that Dr. Hall had to be involved in some of these early problems, but I would not want in any way to suggest that some of his comments on these things are not valid. They have in fact, been taken seriously and acted upon.

**Mr. Macquarrie:** Yes. I am not suggesting otherwise. The team was sent out after Dr. Hall addressed the nation on Viewpoint.

**Mr. Strong:** I do not recall the exact date relative to Viewpoint. I believe we had asked Dr. Dupuis to go some months earlier. We had to find the personnel. People like General Wrinch and Dr. Dupuis are not readily

available. I am not quite certain of the date, but I believe October 12 is the date they left. Naturally, there was much discussion and telegrams were exchanged with the South Vietnamese government as these people had to be put in contact with the South Vietnamese authorities. Earlier we recalled Dr. Vennema so that we might discuss with him the different ways possible of extending the scope of our program and to get specific recommendations from him as how best to improve our program. We sent other personnel out as well. One person was sent to supervise a training program. We also took other measures.

**Mr. Macquarrie:** Did the team, or any members of it, told discussions with Dr. Hall prior to the departure to seek his advice or information?

• (12:20 p.m.)

**Mr. Strong:** No, not to my knowledge.

**Mr. Macquarrie:** Has any member of the External Aid Office or the Department of External Affairs held discussions with Dr. Hall on the whole question that is now such an important one?

**Mr. Strong:** Well, not since he made the charges to which you refer on the television program. However, we have had, you know, many of the same comments made to us, and publicly, prior to this, and I do not think there is any specific thing in his statement here that he had not made us aware of previously. Although he had not previously told us some of the specifics he has quoted on what other people are doing and this kind of thing, I do not believe there is a single thing in this report that he had not made us aware of in one fashion or another before.

**Mr. Macquarrie:** As you know, Canadian experts in Southeast Asia are not all that numerous. There has been no attempt to make use of his knowledge and rather unique experience in a consultative capacity, as your Department seeks to give depth to its program.

**Mr. Strong:** No, I would not say that at all. We have not employed him as a consultant, no, but his experience and recommendations are very well documented and, as I have said, many of them, arising particularly out of his early experiences, have already given rise to significant changes in our practices and standards, and in the application of

those to the problems of administering our program in Viet Nam.

**Mr. Macquarrie:** Apart from his written submissions and reports while he was a part, in a sense, of the External Aid Office, there has been no consultation with him?

**Mr. Strong:** Not in the sense that I think you mean that. He has no continuing consultative relationship with the External Aid Office.

**Mr. Macquarrie:** He has never been called in?

**Mr. Strong:** Oh indeed; he has been in our office many times. The files are thick with material received from Dr. Hall and records of discussions of our officers with him, and we have reviewed with a great deal of seriousness all of the things he has said.

**Mr. Macquarrie:** I have just one more question. Did the South Vietnamese authorities request that butter and wheat be sent to their country?

**Mr. Strong:** Yes. I mentioned generally the procedures followed in our food aid program. I believe this actually took place in 1958, and the regular normal procedures were followed. The Vietnamese did request these items and they were supplied. There was no condition that they be sold—no strings attached in that fashion; the only string attached at all to the use by the Vietnamese of these food supplies was the one that I have explained, that they were required to set up a counterpart fund in local currency and to use these for agreed long-range development projects.

**Mr. Macquarrie:** And they did specify the two commodities, wheat and butter?

**Mr. Strong:** Yes. We told them the things that we could supply and out of this list they chose these two commodities.

**Mr. Macquarrie:** Do you have any knowledge whether in fact these commodities were helpful to the alleviation of hunger in South Viet Nam?

**Mr. Strong:** Well, the United States, for example, is still providing flour and wheat. We have no detailed knowledge of the extent to which the butter made a contribution. As Dr. Hall explained, butter is not used by the poorer population, but I think it has to be recognized that this does not mean to say there is no need for butter. The Vietnamese had a need for butter. They would have had

to spend their own foreign exchange acquiring it, and they were able to get it from us under our aid program.

**Mr. Macquarrie:** One of the most careful students of the external aid program, Professor Spicer, suggests that these commodities in certain Southeast Asian countries consist only of a small group of westernized middle class people. Do you think that in South Viet Nam our aid of this kind was more widely dispersed?

**Mr. Strong:** I cannot say. I think there are more important things that we could provide than butter and I think that has been recognized by the fact that since 1958 we have provided no butter.

**Mr. Macquarrie:** No more butter?

**Mr. Churchill:** Is that butter or butter oil?

**Mr. Strong:** My understanding, Mr. Churchill, is that it is tinned butter.

**Mr. Lamberti:** Well am I oversimplifying it by saying perhaps the difficulty with Dr. Hall's reports and his relationship with the South Vietnamese is that perhaps with the officials of the External Aid Office he had the habit of calling a spade a spade and other people insist on calling it a hand agricultural tool?

**Mr. Strong:** There is no question that Dr. Hall was very much prepared to put forward his views and we have been equally prepared, certainly so far as I am concerned, to take into account those views. It might be interesting to mention the meeting I had with Dr. Hall. When he was a newly arrived civil servant I tended, and still tend, to be very sympathetic with him and people like him. After all, these people are volunteering to go out under extremely difficult conditions and our job is to support them. Dr. Hall provided me with a list of equipment that he needed. I turned to one of my officers and asked him what my maximum authority was. He told me \$5,000. I immediately turned to Dr. Hall, as I am sure he will confirm, and said: "Dr. Hall, as of now you can order the things you think you need with that \$5,000, and you tell me what other things you need that go beyond my immediate authority and I will see that they are expedited". I never heard from him beyond that. It is true that Dr. Hall is frank; I think it is also true that it is very difficult sometimes to follow some of Dr. Hall's recommendations. I think the most careful reading of many of the things he says

and has said to us, including things in his statement, does give rise to difficulty in understanding some of the things he does request. Many of them we do understand; many of them we sympathize with, and many of them we have corrected.

**The Chairman:** Were you finished, Mr. Macquarrie?

**Mr. Macquarrie:** Yes.

**The Chairman:** In that case I have on my list Mr. Thompson, Mr. Allmand and Mr. Goyer.

**Mr. Thompson:** Mr. Chairman, may I just say, first of all, and I am speaking to the Committee as well, that as a result of my two visits to South Viet Nam this year I am more than ever convinced that our greatest product and our greatest asset in external aid is found in our people. The service that is being rendered by Canadians and the general goodwill that they generate and their ability to co-operate with local governments, officials and people is an outstanding Canadian characteristic that sometimes Canadians do not realize they possess. On the other hand, this does not necessarily mean that everyone in their particular circumstances or within their ability finds that this is possible because I do not think one's professional or technical ability or academic background necessarily adds a third ingredient, which is the ability to get along with the people he is attempting to serve. If we cannot sell ourselves then we are not going to be able to sell our product, whether it be advice, food aid, education or service that we are attempting to render.

• (12:30 p.m.)

I believe, and I commend Mr. Strong for his emphasis on this, that our greatest and most worthwhile investment in aid is directly concerned with the service that Canadians in our aid program are rendering. Secondly, I think our most effective aid program concerns foreign students, and that brings me to the first of three points I would like to advance.

May I be permitted to say that I have had about ten years' experience in handling students not under an aid program in a foreign country but in the country itself by actually chairing the commission that selects students to go out under local sponsorship and financing. It is difficult to handle students who go to a foreign country. The appeal of studying overseas involves prestige, adventure, status

and what some people think of as a short-cut to a higher standard of living.

There are certain factors that we, as an aid-rendering country, really cannot have too much to do with and basically that concerns the selection of students and the means by which the students are recommended. This has to be the responsibility of the country from which these students originate and I think the remarks which Mr. Strong made are very appropriate in this regard.

However, there is a second point I am concerned about and again I am speaking somewhat from experience. It does not seem advisable to bring students to Canada who can obtain at home the type of education that is being offered here, whether it be at the graduate or undergraduate level. This is an area where the country which originates the aid certainly can have a say in the matter. I would like to ask Mr. Strong, first of all, if he is satisfied in this respect with the students who are coming here? Are they receiving education that they could not otherwise receive at home, or are we still bringing people here who could actually get the equivalent of that training in their own country?

**Mr. Strong:** Of course, Mr. Chairman, this is a point of continuing concern to us. The purpose of our program is to provide training that cannot be provided in their home country.

As I mentioned with respect to Viet Nam, as soon as we found that South Viet Nam had established facilities for educating electrical engineers we advised them that we would no longer accept nominations for electrical engineering students in Canada. This is our present policy. Having said that, there are obvious difficulties in making absolute judgments in specific instances here. We have an increasing and I think a very important emphasis on the provision of training in the countries or regions concerned and a good deal of our emphasis is being shifted in this direction. We have had discussions very recently with people like the Vice Chancellor of the University of the West Indies about this problem of integrating training in Canada not only with the needs of the recipient countries but with the facilities that exist at their own universities. One talks about combined courses where a student will get part of his training in Canada at a particular university and another part at his home university.

I think there is a very important trend in this direction and we are certainly very anxious to support this in our programs. At the University of the West Indies we now provide, amongst other things, 60 scholarships under which students from other areas can go to the University of the West Indies and receive training under external aid.

We also provide external aid support at the University of Rwanda in central Africa, where students outside Rwanda can obtain training. There is an increasing emphasis on this trend and I certainly agree with your comments to the effect that we should be moving very much in this direction.

**Mr. Thompson:** The instance I have in mind is the project which brought at some great expense sub-university standard elementary female teachers to Canada from Uganda for a short period of training of one or two years at the University of Alberta. Would it not have been more advisable to select one person from Canada who was qualified in that particular field to provide that same training in Uganda at a fraction of the expense?

**Mr. Strong:** Without commenting on the specifics of that case...

**Mr. Thompson:** I am only speaking generally.

**Mr. Strong:** Generally speaking, I share your view. I think we should be—as we are—looking hard at every one of these programs because I think the university and educational authorities in Canada whose advice we seek in these areas as well as our own experience tells us that the best place for these people to obtain their training is on the spot. Where those facilities exist we encourage them to use such facilities. Where they do not exist or where they are not adequate, our program attempts to provide or strengthen such facilities.

**Mr. Thompson:** With respect to another specific area, one of the interesting aspects which I observed of the medical situation in Viet Nam was that there are literally two classes of Vietnamese medical doctors. I am speaking of those who were trained under the old French colonial system who consider themselves vastly superior to the younger people who have been trained under the Vietnamese medical training program. There is a great deal of conflict and jealousy between these two groups of professional people. Does the aid program that is develop-

ing intend to provide seminar and post-graduate courses for people who have finished their basic professional or technical training who would come over here at a more mature age for a shorter length of time—a period of months or weeks, or a year or two—rather than just bringing youngsters over who are going through the normal educational program?

**Mr. Strong:** In our relationship with other governments, and particularly the West Indies, we provide for exactly this sort of thing. We make it possible for very senior people to come to Canada under a fellowship program to obtain additional advanced education in their particular field. With respect to Viet Nam, I think the suggestion is a very good one. I am not aware that this particular suggestion has come from any other source. It certainly appears to be a useful suggestion to look into and, based on our experience in other areas, I would agree it is the kind of thing that...

**Mr. Thompson:** My second question, Mr. Chairman, is in the area of what is commonly known as red tape and it is directed to Mr. Strong. Knowing your business experience and attitude toward this and also knowing of the difficulties that not only Dr. Hall has spoken of, but Dr. Vennema as well, which all of the people who are out there face as far as supplies and direct communication is concerned, in your position as Director of Aid have you been able to hire personnel or bring on personnel who are technically required without putting them through all the Public Service Commission red tape and where you can get people to do a job and then communicate with them?

**Mr. Strong:** From the experience I have had in the last year I can tell you I sympathize with anybody who has to contend with red tape, so my natural sympathies are with people like Dr. Hall, Dr. Vennema and others. It is perhaps too early in my career to make any final judgment on this. There is no question about it there are a lot of bureaucratic procedures which one encounters in government, including the hiring of people, the reasons for which I quite understand but it is quite new to me not to be able to hire the people I want or not to be able to hire them without a lot of difficulty. I think generally in the government there is an understanding of the needs of our external aid program. It is an understanding that the requirements for the administration of an external aid

program are different than the requirements for the administration of a domestic program.

• (12:40 p.m.)

**Mr. Thompson:** In acquiring the type of people that you may need for the service of external aid do you still have to go through the lengthy process that involves hiring somebody for the Civil Service at home or is a more efficient way being made available to you?

I am not asking this critically; I am talking about this problem of red tape.

**Mr. Strong:** I asked for and was given an authority early in my career here to engage people on a short-term consulting basis for periods of up to two years to supplement our normal staff. It is under this authority that I engaged a man like John Bene. This, of course, has to apply to a relatively small group of people who probably cannot be made available through the normal processes and perhaps whose services would not necessarily be required forever. This is because of the important changes that are going on in our administration and the need to have some very experienced senior people assisting us in the making of these changes.

For all other personnel, obviously our office, like all government departments, has to have Treasury Board approval of the specific positions that are allocated to us. As you know, you cannot recruit somebody unless you have a post into which to recruit him and that aspect of it is a Treasury Board responsibility. Having established the post and the specific and detailed requirements applicable to that post, you have to go to the Public Service Commission, who are the recruiters. They recruit the people for you. Understandably, this procedure does take some time.

**Mr. Thompson:** The second area that concerns me about red tape is the selection of projects. This concerns all the ponderous and cumbersome procedures involved in diplomatic relations. Is there any way that the selection of projects and the decision regarding the choice of projects can be speeded up, or does this represent a problem with you?

**Mr. Strong:** It does represent a problem and we have dealt with it in the following manner. First of all, we have instituted a procedure whereby recipient countries know in advance the kind of information we require before they submit a request, which

makes it more likely that they will answer in their original request the questions which we would normally have to raise after receiving their request. This should, and I think will, cut down the time period between the making of the request and our response to it.

Secondly, we have instituted with our major recipients a procedure for reviewing our program with them annually. In other words, we are going out into the field and sitting down with them each year and reviewing what has happened in the previous year, what the problems are in respect of current projects, what our allocations are for that country during the year, and relating what we have to provide in the ensuing year with their priority needs. I think this will make it a great deal easier both to select good projects and to assure that they are properly carried out.

**Mr. Thompson:** In the third area in this regard I might mention that the shipping and the receiving of supplies is one of the most frustrating things for Canadian people out in the field in aid programs where they have supplies available to them through the aid programs which they represent. I am sure this is one of the problems in Viet Nam. Does this represent a problem or have you been able to implement procedures where heads of projects can deal directly with heads of project departments back in your own Department?

**Mr. Strong:** We have a good deal to streamline this. As I mentioned earlier, a basic requirement of our program is that we must receive a request from the recipient government for anything like this that they want. However, we have modified this. I have been given authority now to provide up to \$5,000 worth of equipment to an individual adviser without the necessity of a request from the recipient government.

In addition to that, as I mentioned earlier, we are seeking to develop projects which involve more than one person, a team of Canadians which can make a long-term strategic impact and which can be supported by the provision of Canadian equipment, like the Thailand comprehensive school project, and like the paediatric hospital in Tunis where there are some 50 Canadian doctors, nurses and technicians at work.

We are doing more and more of these things within a framework that permits us to provide a good deal more administrative support. In addition to that we have recruited,

and will soon be sending into the field, a number of senior engineering officers who have the detailed technical knowledge that will enable them to assist both the receiving governments and our local diplomatic missions in coping with some of the technical problems that arise in administering aid programs.

**Mr. Thompson:** This is my third question, Mr. Chairman. It has been my observation that one of the greatest handicaps we face in our aid program is the non-availability of information concerning what others might have done in the same area. I am thinking of this medical research team that is going out. Are they just duplicating what other countries may have done in Viet Nam?

And I come to this point, which seems to me to be a very urgent need; and that is the establishment of an information exchange centre that would serve not only national but perhaps international aspects as well. Is any consideration being given in the aid program to the setting up of an information centre where information from various parts of the world about various countries, about various areas, about various types of aid, can be available on quick order, both for the governmental aspects of aid and for the private sector?

**Mr. Strong:** Such proposals are under active consideration at the present time. I might say that this is one thing that is often very difficult to understand in respect of aid programs. In the Vietnamese situation, for example, the Canadian program is not comprehensive in the sense that it attempts to meet the entire medical needs of Viet Nam. Viet Nam receives, like almost all recipient countries, aid from a variety of sources. Some supply people. Dr. Hall reported that some of these countries provide a lot of doctors and nurses to Viet Nam. Some provide only doctors and nurses and no equipment. Others supply only equipment and no supporting staff.

**Mr. Thompson:** But with the number of countries that are providing medical aid in Viet Nam, certainly if it was available there is a great deal of information that would be of tremendous use and would make possible tremendous saving if there was just some means of getting one's hands on it.

**Mr. Strong:** That is right.

**Mr. Thompson:** Are there plans afoot for the setting up of such a centre? I was dis-

turbed to find that there is no such organization even in the UN.

**Mr. Strong:** No, there is no organization at the moment which supplies the kind of operating detail that you are talking about. The development assistance committee of OECD provides co-ordination of over-all aid policies. The World Bank, through its consultative and consortium groups, provides co-ordination on the more important aspects of aid so that there is co-ordination in the way that I described earlier; but in terms of the specific operating co-ordination, this has to be done by collaboration amongst the parties concerned. In Viet Nam this is why the recipient country has to play a big role. For instance, it has to be assumed that the Minister of Health in Viet Nam is the best source of information on the totality, both of Viet Nam's medical needs and of all the various resources at their disposal which might meet their needs. What we have to do, and are doing, is determining those gaps in their needs which we can best fill.

**Mr. Thompson:** I must not take any more time, Mr. Chairman, but if I might I should like to close with this question. Is consideration being given in our aid program to the setting up of such an information centre that might be part of an aid contribution in a much wider sense than just a project in a specific country? It might reach into many other countries' aid programs as well as assisting private aid programs at home and assisting the governmental aid picture.

• (12:50 p.m.)

**Mr. Strong:** This whole matter is one which is getting some priority attention at the present time.

**Mr. Thompson:** I was referring specifically to the recommendation of one consultant to the UN, Erskine Childers, by name, who is out setting up a regional information centre.

**Mr. Strong:** We are very well aware of the proposal. We have discussed this with the man to whom you have referred. Generally speaking, that kind of project makes a good deal of sense and we are in the process of trying to determine how it might fit into our own plans for expanding external aid.

**Mr. Allmand:** Mr. Strong, what is your view on Dr. Hall's comment that scholarships are not usually considered a part of external aid?

**Mr. Strong:** I do not think he put it that way. I think he referred rather to the value of offering scholarships. I attempted to explain that the country concerned, in this case South Viet Nam, regards the provision of trained people as an important aspect of its long-range development program. It is fairly obvious that in training people it would have to be one of the most important elements.

What Dr. Hall criticized, as I understand it, was the kind of training they received, and he suggested that it was not necessarily related to the specific needs and opportunities for employment that existed in South Viet Nam. I think I have explained how this process works.

**Mr. Allmand:** I thought he was also critical of our including scholarships in our external aid program. Does OECD usually include scholarship aid under their assessments of external aid?

**Mr. Strong:** There are other aid scholarship programs, but our External Aid Office program for bringing people here is a very important part of our total development-assistance effort, and it is certainly recognized in the OECD figures. I think it is generally acknowledged by authorities in the development field that the principal need in these countries is for trained people.

**Mr. Allmand:** I will go to another point. Does your office have figures on the total *per capita* aid to Viet Nam from all countries? Are you trying to assess that?

**Mr. Strong:** We have figures on the levels of aid as reported to the Development Assistance Committee of OECD from all countries reporting to it. We have not worked them out on a *per capita* basis but it would be quite easy to do so.

**Mr. Allmand:** In a general way how does the total aid to Viet Nam compare with that to neighbouring countries? I do not want specific figures, but is it much higher or...?

**Mr. Strong:** There are various ways in which you can put these figures together for the different periods. If you examine those for all the countries reporting to the OECD from 1951 to May 1966, in certain years Canada ranks fourth and in others fifth.

**Mr. Allmand:** I meant the total aid by all countries to Viet Nam. Is Viet Nam receiving

a higher proportion of external aid from all countries than are its neighbours? Is this the sort of thing that you take into consideration when you give external aid? Do you look at what a country is already receiving, on a *per capita* basis?

**Mr. Strong:** Yes, this is a factor; and Viet Nam, by that standard, of course, receives a very substantial amount of outside assistance. I thought you were referring to where Canada stands.

**Mr. Allmand:** No.

**Mr. Strong:** In these tables it is anywhere from second to fifth, depending on the period used. Recently our performance has been better than it was in the past.

**Mr. Allmand:** No, I was asking what criteria you use. Who usually decides whether aid will be given to a country? Is this done by the External Aid Office, or by the government as a policy decision?

**Mr. Strong:** Obviously the level of aid to any country is a policy decision taken by the government.

**Mr. Allmand:** And whether aid goes to that country at all?

**Mr. Strong:** Oh, yes, indeed.

**Mr. Andras:** May I ask a supplementary question?

**The Chairman:** If you wish.

**Mr. Andras:** You mentioned our ranking in aid to Viet Nam, if that is the way to describe it, and with other countries, that in some years we have been fourth and in others we have been fifth. Do you have the figures on a cumulative basis?

**Mr. Strong:** Yes. There are two ways of looking at it. There are the Colombo Plan donors. Our aid, of course, is part of the Colombo Plan and, therefore, the Colombo Plan figures in our normal reporting procedures. I am reading the chart here. This year, for example, 1966-67, we are second on a cumulative basis. If you went right back to 1951, we would be fourth. As I say, the more recent the periods used the better our ranking is. It appears that we will be second this year.

**Mr. Brewin:** If I may ask a supplementary question, we are second in what? Are you talking about the Colombo Plan figures?

**Mr. Strong:** Yes, those are the Colombo Plan figures.

**Mr. Brewin:** There are, of course, relatively, just a few nations which contribute through the Colombo Plan.

**Mr. Strong:** Yes; but the rest of the figures on Viet Nam, including all countries reporting to DAC, would show us, to be either fourth or fifth, depending on the year.

**Mr. Stanbury:** I have a question which may help to clarify that. In those figures are the Japanese war reparations included as part of their total of aid?

**Mr. Strong:** Yes, they are. They ceased to be a factor about two years ago, I believe. In other words, the Japanese reparations payments were complete at that point. After that, of course, the Japanese figures no longer take reparations into account.

**Mr. Allmand:** I have a final question, Mr. Chairman. Some newspaper editorials have alleged that our external aid program to Viet Nam is merely a token of political support for the United States position there and that it is not based on the criteria of need and so forth that usually prompt our external aid to other countries. Are you in a position to reply to that allegation, or are you of the opinion that this is a question for the Minister?

**Mr. Strong:** Any question like that, dealing with policy, obviously has to be directed to the Minister. I can, of course, describe to you the components of our aid.

**Mr. Allmand:** No; you have done that already.

**The Chairman:** I will call on Mr. Basford and then we will adjourn.

**Mr. Basford:** In that case, I will ask just one short question. It seemed to me that the principal basis of Dr. Hall's complaint was that he went out to Viet Nam and recommended that Canada establish a very high-class teaching and operating orthopaedic unit at Cho Ray Hospital—I am taking this from his memo of March, 1965—and that the unit would be completely self-supporting and controlled by the Canadian Government. Nowhere either in his evidence or in yours do I see any indication that the government of South Viet Nam had any support for this proposal.

**Mr. Strong:** No; in fact, on Dr. Hall's original assignment to Viet Nam, as he reported in his own testimony before this Committee, he put forward a list of equipment that he would require to enable him to perform his duties at that hospital. He made this known to us and to the Vietnamese. When we received the request—and I tabled before this Committee a list of the official requests—from the Vietnamese themselves they did not include this. As a matter of fact, they specifically stated in the request that they acknowledged, the existence of Dr. Hall's list of suggested equipment and said that the request did not include it. The request also pointed out that it might be included at a future time. Our understanding is—that the Vietnamese themselves, before making this

request for equipment, wanted to make sure that the equipment was not already available in Viet Nam or en route from other sources.

**Mr. Basford:** In his memo of 1965 he suggests the orthopaedic unit at Cho Ray. This was more than a request for some equipment; it was to build a building, and all sorts of things. What support was there from the government of Viet Nam for that proposal?

**Mr. Strong:** The government of Viet Nam never did support that proposal in its entirety. They did support a request for the services of Dr. Hall.

**Mr. Basford:** Thank you.

**The Chairman:** Gentlemen, the meeting is adjourned until next Thursday.



Mr. Strong: No; in fact, on Dr. Hall's original assignment to Viet Nam, as he reported in his own testimony before this Committee, he put forward a list of equipment that he would require to enable him to perform his duties at that hospital. He made this known to us and to the Vietnamese. When we received the request—and I tabled before this Committee a list of the official requests—from the Vietnamese themselves they did not include this. As a matter of fact, they specifically stated in the request that they acknowledged the existence of Dr. Hall's list of suggested equipment and said that the request did not include it. The request also pointed out that it might be included at a future time. Our understanding is—that the Vietnamese themselves, before making this

request for equipment, wanted to make sure that the equipment was not already available in Viet Nam or en route from other sources.

Mr. Eastford: In his memo of 1965 he suggested the orthopedic unit at Chu Bay. This was more than a request for some equipment; it was to build a building and all sorts of things. What support was there from the government of Viet Nam for that proposal?

Mr. Strong: The government of Viet Nam never did support that proposal in its entirety. They did support a request for the services of Dr. Hall.

Mr. Eastford: Thank you.

The Chairman: Gentlemen, the meeting is adjourned until next Thursday.







OFFICIAL REPORT OF MINUTES  
OF  
PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

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ALISTAIR FRASER,  
*The Clerk of the House.*

HOUSE OF COMMONS

Second Session—Twenty-seventh Parliament

1967

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STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

**EXTERNAL AFFAIRS**

*Chairman:* Mr. JEAN-EUDES DUBÉ

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MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 10

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THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 16, 1967

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RESPECTING

Report of the Department of External Affairs (1966)

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WITNESS:

The Venerable Thich Nhat Hanh, Buddhist monk.

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.  
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY  
OTTAWA, 1967

STANDING COMMITTEE

ON  
STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Chairman: Mr. Jean-Eudes Dubé

Vice-Chairman: Mr. W. B. Nesbitt

and

Mr. Allmand,	Mr. Goyer,	Mr. McIntosh,
Mr. Andras,	Mr. Groos,	Mr. Pilon,
Mr. Asselin (Charlevoix),	Mr. Harkness,	Mr. Prud'homme,
Mr. Basford,	Mr. Hymmen,	Mr. Stanbury,
Mr. Brewin,	Mr. Lambert,	Mr. Thompson,
Mr. Churchill,	Mr. Laprise,	<sup>3</sup> Mr. Walker—(24).
Mr. Forest,	<sup>1</sup> Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale),	
Mr. Forrestall,	Mr. Macquarrie,	

(Quorum 13)

Fernand Despatie,  
Clerk of the Committee.

<sup>1</sup> Replaced Mr. Caron on November 9, 1967.

<sup>2</sup> Replaced Mr. Deachman on November 15, 1967.

<sup>3</sup> Replaced Mr. Langlois (*Chicoutimi*) on November 15, 1967.

Report of the Department of External Affairs (1966)

WITNESS:

The Venerable Thich Nhat Hanh, Buddhist monk.

ROGER DUNAWAY, P.R.S.  
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY  
OTTAWA, 1967

MINUTE BOOKINGS  
ORDERS OF REFERENCE

THURSDAY, November 9, 1967.

Ordered,—That the name of Mr. Macdonald (*Rosedale*) be substituted for that of Mr. Caron on the Standing Committee on External Affairs.

The Vice-Chairman, Mr. Nesbitt, presided.

WEDNESDAY, November 15, 1967.

Members present: Messrs. Alford, ...  
Ordered,—That the names of Messrs. Walker and Prud'homme be substituted for those of Messrs. Langlois (*Chicoutimi*) and Deachman on the Standing Committee on External Affairs.

Attest

ALISTAIR FRASER,

The Clerk of the House of Commons.

At the opening of the meeting, ...  
Mr. Brewin, it was

Resolved,—That reasonable living and travelling expenses be paid to Thich Nhat Hanh, who has been called to appear before this Committee on November 15, 1967.

On a point of order, Mr. Macdonald (*Rosedale*) made comments regarding the appearance before the Committee of witnesses who come from outside the country. He suggested that the matter be discussed at a future date.

The Chairman introduced Thich Nhat Hanh.

The witness made a statement embodying his opinions on the war in Vietnam, the prospects for peace, the steps to peace and Canada's role in seeking to bring the war to a close.

Thich Nhat Hanh was then questioned for the remainder of the meeting.

The Chairman thanked the witness for his appearance before the Committee.

At 12:05 p.m., the Committee adjourned at the call of the Chair.

Respectfully,  
Clerk of the Committee.



## MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

THURSDAY, November 16, 1967.

(12)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs met at 9.40 a.m. this day. The Vice-Chairman, Mr. Nesbitt, presided.

*Members present:* Messrs. Allmand, Andras, Asselin (*Charlevoix*), Basford, Brewin, Churchill, Forest, Goyer, Groos, Harkness, Hymmen Lambert, Laprise, Macdonald (*Rosedale*), Macquarrie, Nesbitt, Pilon, Prud'homme, Thompson, Walker (20).

*Also present:* Messrs. Addison, Herridge and Klein, Members of Parliament.

*In attendance:* The Venerable Thich Nhat Hanh, Buddhist monk.

At the opening of the meeting, on motion of Mr. Macquarrie, seconded by Mr. Brewin, it was

*Resolved,*—That reasonable living and travelling expenses be paid to Thich Nhat Hanh, who has been called to appear before this Committee on November 16, 1967.

On a point of order, Mr. Macdonald (*Rosedale*) made comments regarding the appearance before the Committee of witnesses who come from outside the country. He suggested that the matter be discussed at a future date.

The Chairman introduced Thich Nhat Hanh.

The witness made a statement embodying his opinions on the war in Vietnam, the prospects for peace, the steps to peace and Canada's role in seeking to bring the war to a close.

Thich Nhat Hanh was then questioned for the remainder of the meeting.

The Chairman thanked the witness for his appearance before the Committee.

At 12.05 p.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

Fernand Despatie,  
Clerk of the Committee.



## EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

Thursday, 16th November, 1967.

• (9.40 a.m.)

**The Vice-Chairman:** We now have a quorum. We are here this morning to discuss the brief presented by our witness. While the brief is being distributed may I say that we also have some biographical notes on our witness.

Before we commence hearing our witness this morning I would like to have someone move a motion that the reasonable living and travelling expenses of Thich Nhat Hanh be paid. The witness was called to appear before this Committee today. I might say we fully intended having this motion moved at the last meeting but just at the moment it was going to be moved, unfortunately one of the members of the Committee had to leave and we did not have a quorum.

**Mr. Thompson:** Mr. Chairman, how much does this involve? Do you have in mind travelling expenses from Viet Nam?

**The Vice-Chairman:** No. The witness came here from New York and will be returning tomorrow.

**Mr. Macquarrie:** I so move.

**Mr. Brewin:** I second the motion.

Motion agreed to.

**Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale):** Mr. Chairman, may I interrupt on a point of order before we proceed with the witness? I was not a member of the Committee at the time the Committee decided to have a witness from outside appear. I make these remarks not about this witness in particular, and they are not intended in any personal sense, but because a question of policy arises whether or not this Committee should hear from witnesses who come from outside the country to give testimony. I am strongly of the opinion that the Committee should not do this and I hope at some future stage of our proceedings we will have a discussion on this principle. For my part I want to make it clear that the

fact that we have done this in one case does not prevent me from bringing it up again in the hope that the Committee will make a general policy decision on this question.

**Mr. Lamberti:** Mr. Chairman, I would suggest that Mr. Macdonald get in touch with his colleagues, Messrs. Basford, Allmand and Stanbury, who I think were among the chief movers—perhaps not quite so much Mr. Basford but certainly Mr. Allmand and Mr. Stanbury. I think this is a question that you have to resolve within your own group.

**Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale):** I would just point out that perhaps unlike Mr. Lambert's party I am not in the position to impose my will on my colleagues. I am stating my own personal viewpoint.

**Mr. Lamberti:** I share your view.

**Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale):** That is fine, so do not work against me.

**Mr. Thompson:** Mr. Chairman, is there any precedent for paying money to bring witnesses from outside of the country before any Committee?

**The Vice-Chairman:** I am not in a position to give you a view on that; perhaps Mr. Macquarrie might do so.

**Mr. Macquarrie:** I do not want to comment with authority but on another Committee we had some distinguished civil servants from the United Kingdom and I am quite sure that their reasonable expenses were cheerfully and properly paid.

**The Vice-Chairman:** Perhaps we may discuss the point Mr. Macdonald has raised at a future meeting.

This morning we have with us the Venerable Thich Nhat Hanh who has been a Buddhist monk for more than twenty years. I make these observations for those who are not members of the Committee and who do not have the advantage of biographical notes concerning our witness.

He was born in Viet Nam and educated in Viet Nam, and also studied at Princeton and

Columbia Universities in the United States. He has been editor of a newspaper, and is a Director of The School of Youth for Social Service in Saigon.

If anybody other than the members, who already have them, would like to have a copy of the biographical notes of our witness this morning I am sure the Clerk of the Committee would be glad to give them out.

**Mr. Thompson:** Mr. Chairman, I have not gone through all these biographical notes but I do not see the answer to the question I would like to ask. How long is it since our witness has lived in Viet Nam?

**The Venerable Thich Nhat Hanh (Buddhist Monk):** I left the country in May of 1966.

**The Vice-Chairman:** The witness informs me he left Viet Nam in May of 1966.

I have no doubt that after the brief has been read the witness will be pleased to answer any questions. Perhaps if there are any more questions of this nature they could be placed at that time.

The witness has informed me that he will be speaking in both English and French during his remarks this morning. Without further comment I would like to call upon Thich Nhat Hanh. I would ask you not to put questions until the witness completes his remarks.

[Translation]

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** Mr. Chairman, gentlemen, I thank you for having invited me to speak before this Committee about the terrible war which is ravaging my country. I will answer the questions you wish to ask me. I thank you for the cordial hospitality you have manifested toward me. Your country has bestowed it upon me once already. I shall read my declaration in English, for I have not had sufficient time to translate it in French, but I will gladly answer your questions in English or French.

[English]

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Committee, I am grateful for the invitation to appear before this Committee to say something about the terrible war that is devastating my country, and to answer such questions as you care to ask. I am grateful for this as a further display of the warm hospitality I have had on several occasions from your country.

What I have felt to be my most important work in Viet Nam has been as Director of the School of Youth for Social Service, which trains young Vietnamese volunteers to work in the villages in helping to repair the ravages of the war and restore the faith and hope of the villagers in their own ability to mold their lives and build a decent society. As you may know, the School of Youth for Social Service has suffered severely in recent months, and particularly since it has been identified widely with the search for peace in Viet Nam. In April the School itself was attacked by a group of uniformed men who threw grenades at it. One professor and one student were killed and eleven others very seriously injured. Shortly thereafter a team of eight volunteers working in a village were kidnapped, and their fate has not been learned. Soon after that, another team of five was taken from its residence late at night by an unidentified group of men. Four of the five were shot to death and the fifth, a young monk, left for dead.

In spite of these experiences, the young people trained in the School, continued to work in the villages and in the cities, and have announced their intention to do so, without hate or a feeling of revenge even toward those who have sought to destroy them.

Much of my own life has been spent in the villages of Viet Nam, and it was because I felt so deeply the fact that these peasants who make up 90 per cent of the population of Viet Nam, had no voice with which to speak their own longing for peace and their horror of the war that I came to the United States in May, 1966. I came at the invitation of Cornell University to lecture there on modern Buddhism in Viet Nam, but remained to speak in many parts of the United States and subsequently in countries of western Europe and Asia, pleading for peace and asking for the cooperation of people of all the world in securing peace.

I long to return to my own country to resume my work there with the School of Youth for Social Service and the peasants there, but my associates have urged me to stay in the west. They point out that they have no other voice to speak to this part of the world and to try to interpret what has happened and is happening, and they warned also that my own outspokenness in opposing the war would endanger my freedom and even life if I were to return.

You already know a great deal about the immense physical suffering being visited on the Vietnamese people and countryside by the war. It has been reported again and again that the United States is dropping heavier loads of bombs on Viet Nam than it did in the Second World War, and not long ago the Associated Press reported that the rate of bombing is 3000 pounds a minute around the clock 24 hours a day. The sheer weight of physical suffering is almost beyond human comprehension, and its tragedy is increased by the fact that probably well over half of the casualties are civilians and children.

But physical suffering is only a part of the toll of the war. Perhaps even more devastating is the destruction of human values that has grown out of the desperate search for survival resulting from 25 years of continuous war. The faith of my people has been destroyed, in large measure: faith in themselves, faith in their religion, faith in the whole concept of democracy. A great deal has been said about the corruption that exists in the South Vietnamese society, and there is terrible corruption, with men in high places profiting by the diversion even of money set aside for the feeding of refugees. But such corruption must be seen in the context of what has happened to the whole economy of Viet Nam with the tremendous influx of American dollars and the inflation that has followed upon it. The livelihood of millions has been destroyed as the rice paddies and farms have been defoliated and their proprietors herded into refugee camps. People will literally do anything to survive. Women sell their bodies to the foreign soldier and civilian. Children beg and steal; their fathers use every opportunity to enrich themselves through bribery and graft.

A few years ago when Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia informed the United States that his country wished to terminate the American aid that it was receiving, he declared that it was better for his country to make its own way than to have its values corrupted, as they were being corrupted, by the flood of American dollars. While the evil effects of this money have been greatly exaggerated in Viet Nam by the war, it is an aspect of so-called "foreign aid", to which people in the West must be sensitive. When aid is given in such a way as to enrich the existing holders of power and impoverish the

poor, as too often is the case, then it is more destructive than constructive.

The people of Viet Nam are desperately weary of the war. This is so of all Vietnamese, whether they are in the Saigon controlled areas of South Viet Nam, in those areas controlled by the National Liberation Front, or in North Viet Nam, itself. A whole generation has grown up in Viet Nam that has literally known nothing but war, and again we must be sensitive to the effects on a society of such a generation having been reared and trained in the violent skills of conflict.

But with their weariness of the war there is also great discouragement. They see no end in sight to the war; no hope of bringing it to a conclusion within the foreseeable future. The National Liberation Front and the North Vietnamese claim great victories over the United States and declare their readiness to fight for 10 or 20 years if necessary to achieve full victory. The United States, on the other hand, claims progress toward victory, but the American people are warned that they must be prepared to stay in Viet Nam for 10 or 20 years if necessary to win that victory.

Militarily it is impossible to see how the National Liberation Front and the North Vietnamese allied with them can defeat the immense power that the United States can bring into that country. But at the same time the United States cannot defeat the Front, because as the war goes on more and more people turn to the Front in despair at being unable to find any other way out. Left with no choices except alliance either with the Front or with the American-supported government of Generals Thieu and Ky, most Vietnamese will turn to the Front.

This does not mean that they are Communists or Communist sympathizers. However much control the Communists may in fact exercise over the Front, most of those supporting it are not Communists and most Vietnamese do not see it primarily as Communist. They see it rather as a nationalist force, and it gains its strength because it is seen as a nationalist movement fighting those who have been brought from 12,000 miles away, from an alien society, to subdue them.

There has been a great deal of talk about peace and negotiations for peace, but there has been very little reality behind it.

In the United States people ask me why there has been no response to President

Johnson's "offers" to negotiate, such as this recent suggestion that he would meet with the North Vietnamese on a ship to discuss peace. Why, the Americans ask, is the response from North Viet Nam always to describe these offers as "trickery"? If the war is so terrible, they ask, and everyone is tired of it, why do not the North Vietnamese seize such an opportunity to bring it to an end?

The answer to this depends upon your understanding of the nature of the war and what it is all about.

If you accept the insistence of Secretary of State Dean Rusk that this is a war of aggression carried on by North Viet Nam against the sovereign state of South Viet Nam, then it is logical to ask why the North Vietnamese should not accept any opportunity to end the war, since it is obviously impossible for them to win it against American determination.

But most Vietnamese do not see it thus. They see it as a civil war that has grown out of a revolution, and out of the betrayal of agreements made in 1954, at the time that that revolution seemed to have been accomplished.

The objectives of that revolution since the beginning have been independence from foreign rule and a united Viet Nam. To accept an end to the war on American terms—that is, withdrawal of the North Vietnamese from South Viet Nam, dismemberment of the National Liberation Front, and the sovereignty of South Viet Nam—is to make all of the fighting, not only since 1954 but since before this century began, in vain. Therefore, even if the terrible suffering of war should make the Front and the North Vietnamese at some point decide to accept "peace", that peace could not be expected to last. The motivation that lies behind the war is nationalism, and nationalism will neither die nor be satisfied through an imposed peace.

Before negotiations of any sort can start between the combatants, three actions on the part of the United States appear to be necessary, if we are to believe the reports of the United Nations Secretary General U-Thant and others. These are: First, an end to the bombing of North Viet Nam; second, recognition of the National Liberation Front as a principal participant in the negotiations and a continuing political force in South Viet Nam; and third, a clear commitment that the United States will withdraw militarily from South Viet Nam.

I wish that the United States would take these steps. Anything that will slow down or stop the fighting and the destruction of my people has a value that cannot be denied. But I am apprehensive about it, and for three reasons.

First is the point that I have already suggested: that the terms upon which the United States on the one hand and the North Vietnamese and National Liberation Front on the other are prepared to end the war appear to be poles apart. The United States has never shown any signs of swerving from its insistence that South Viet Nam be a sovereign nation, independent of North Viet Nam into the indeterminate future. The National Liberation Front, on the other hand, is quite as determined that the Vietnamese must be permitted to determine their own destinies and that the United States must withdraw completely from a part in those decisions. While it can be said that any negotiations would be preferable to none, and that while the talking goes on there is the chance of a permanent settlement, there is also the danger that a failure of such negotiations would seem to the American administration a clear signal for continuing and further escalating the war.

My second reason for apprehension is the insistence of the United States on dealing only with North Viet Nam, and of associating the cessation of the bombing of North Viet Nam with "reciprocal acts" by the North Vietnamese. By reciprocal acts, the American government refers to the withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops from South Viet Nam. I fear that to prove their desire for peace, the Americans will call another pause to the bombing of North Viet Nam, but when the North Vietnamese do not "reciprocate" the United States will resume the bombing and peace will be farther away than ever. Because it must be understood that this kind of "reciprocal act" is impossible for the North Vietnamese to agree to. As I have already said, the Vietnamese do not see this as a war of aggression by North Viet Nam, but as the carrying on of a Vietnamese revolution against foreign domination. In this sense, therefore, the forces of North Viet Nam and the forces of the National Liberation Front are one, and any withdrawal of North Vietnamese which was not accompanied by a similar withdrawal of the United States from South Viet Nam, would be a betrayal of their cause and their comrades.

My third reservation about negotiations under such circumstances is that for the millions of South Vietnamese who are not ideologically aligned with the Front, such meetings mean that their destiny and future form of government will be resolved by the Americans and the Communist leadership of the Front, and they themselves will have no voice in it. Most South Vietnamese do not want either the Communists who constitute a significant portion of the Front's leadership or the Americans to dominate their country. They want to have the determining voice themselves.

There is one clear way by which this could be done, and which would be consistent with the publicized claims of both the United States and the National Liberation Front. It is also a way in which both sides, and particularly the Americans, might save face. I am not particularly interested in saving face for anybody, but if the price of peace is saving someone's face, then I am prepared to help save it.

The method I would propose for this is a quite simple one of allowing the South Vietnamese, within the Saigon-controlled areas of that country, to choose their own government freely and permit that government to make the decisions about whether and how the war is to be continued or terminated.

I can say with full assurance that such a government, freely chosen, would be a government that had campaigned on the issue of an immediate cease fire, the ending of the bombing north and south, and negotiation for peace with the National Liberation Front and the North Vietnamese and for withdrawal of their troops with the United States.

Many people in the United States, and perhaps in the West generally, believe that such a government was in fact elected on September 3 and that, in the words of spokesmen for the Johnson administration, a long step has been made in the direction of democratic government in South Vietnam. As you know, 22 official observers appointed by President Johnson visited South Vietnam for the September 3 elections and reported back to the President that the elections had been "reasonably fair".

Such a description is a travesty of the word "fair." Apart from the extensive frauds reported by such observers as Professor Michael Novak in the *National Catholic Reporter* in the United States, and Professor

David Wurfel, of the University of Missouri, both of whom had had extensive experience in Viet Nam and were qualified observers, the preconditions of the election made it impossible that the results could be in any sense the realization of the aspirations of the South Vietnamese people. I do not want to take your time to elaborate this in detail, but I am attaching to my statement a reprint from the Congressional Record of a speech made by Senator Ernest F. Gruening, of Alaska, in which he included the full text of an analysis of the election results by Mr. Alfred Hassler, Executive Secretary of the Fellowship of Reconciliation in the United States. I concur completely with this analysis and the conclusions drawn from it by Senator Gruening.

But even setting aside the censorship, suppression of free speech, manipulation of the ballot through the exclusion of the most likely "peace candidates" from it, and similar acts of political chicanery, the actual voting speaks eloquently of the profound desire of the South Vietnamese people for peace and the existence of a constituency that would support the kind of government I have spoken of.

Of the eleven slates of candidates who stood for the offices of President and Vice President, only Generals Thieu and Ky and one other candidate stood for continuation of the war, and the desire for peace among the people was so great that even General Thieu in the closing days of the campaign had to introduce into his speeches a promise to seek peace if he was elected. The other pro-war candidate, a Mr. Co, received only 100,000 votes out of 4.7 million cast.

The decisive factor in the election was the decision made a year earlier by the Constituent Assembly, under pressure from the military junta, that it would not be necessary for the winning candidate to receive a majority of the votes cast, but that he could be elected by a plurality without a run-off even if there were a great many candidates in the field. This was followed by the encouragement of a proliferation of candidates and the consequent listing of 11 slates of candidates, and the exclusion from the ballot of the two most popular non-government candidates, General Duong Van Minh and Mr. Au Truong Thanh. With all of this having been done to create obstacles to any possibility of electing anyone else than Generals Thieu and Ky, two-thirds of the voters still voted for non-government

candidates, and a relatively obscure candidate, Mr. Dzu, alone polled half as many votes as Generals Thieu and Ky. He did so because he appealed in the two weeks preceding the election on a clear basis of ending the war and doing so immediately. General Thieu, even though he had belatedly promised to seek peace if he was elected, succeeded in polling only 34.8 per cent of the vote, a total that Mr. Dzu said would have been only 10 per cent if fraud had not occurred as extensively as it did.

The present government of South Viet Nam remains in power because, and only because, it has the direct military and economic support of the United States. If that support were withdrawn, the present government of South Viet Nam would not last a week. Its overthrow would not come through the operations of the National Liberation Front, but through the rejection of those who are its own constituents. I plead for the right of those people to choose a government which really reflects what they want, and will be free to say so and to enter into the kind of negotiations that will achieve the peace that is so desperately needed in Viet Nam.

I know that in many ways the representatives of this government, official and unofficial, have sought to bring this war to a close. I know also that the decisions do not rest finally with you, as they do not rest with the governments of many other nations that are deeply unhappy about the continuation of the war. Still it is very important that such governments as yours continue their efforts to moderate the passions of both sides, and to bring into the public discussion of the issue the realities of the situation as they exist. In the United States these realities are frequently obscured by what can only be described as an obsessive and unrealistic view of communism and its role in the nationalist uprisings that are a characteristic part of our times.

Specifically, in every way possible open to you, I would urge the following things:

Such moves by the United States as would permit the choice of a genuinely representative government by the South Vietnamese, as I have already suggested.

Even within the context of the war itself, pressure should be brought on the United States to end such barbaric practices as the razing of whole villages in order to provide "free fire" zones. Vietnamese peasants are attached to their villages and to the homes of

their ancestors in a way that is quite unfamiliar to westerners, so that such destruction of villages carried with it not only the terrible suffering of those caught in the consequent shelling and bombing but also the psychic wounds of being torn from their ancestral homes. And I would include in this plea, of course, such other barbarities as the use of napalm bombs, the terrible pattern that is called "harassment and interdiction," the bombing and strafing of villages and fields, the defoliation of farms, and other applications of the obscene sophistication of weapons to this primitive and pastoral countryside.

Finally, and very important, is the question of political prisoners in South Viet Nam, a fact to which world attention should be drawn. No one except the Thieu government knows exactly how many such prisoners there are, but their numbers may run into the tens of thousands. General Thieu released almost 7,000 at the time of his inauguration, and these were referred to by a high government official quoted by the *New York Times* as only a tiny portion of the total. The "crime" of most such prisoners has been that they have agitated against the present government and favor an end to the war. Among them are a great many of the Buddhists who have taken leadership in such protests.

In some countries in Europe some people said to me, "This is a United States problem, not ours. How can we do anything about it, and, indeed, why should we?"

In fact it is everyone's problem. The terror visited on Viet Nam tears apart the fabric of our whole world society, deepens hostilities between nations and power blocs and creates a profound distrust of democratic societies. Above all, it carries with it the obvious threat of expansion into the third world war, a nuclear war that would probably spell the end of our whole world civilization and perhaps of the race itself.

I thank you for your patience, and will be very pleased to answer any questions you wish to address to me.

**The Vice-Chairman:** I would like to take this opportunity of thanking the witness for his testimony this morning. As he has indicated he will be prepared to answer questions in English and French.

I would like to apologize to members of the Committee, members of the press and other guests who are here for the inconvenient quarters we have this morning. As many of you are aware, there was a conference of provincial finance ministers and federal authorities and one of the larger committee rooms was being used for this purpose. Also, the regular committee room that we have used was given at the last minute to another committee of the House, without consultation with us, which I think was unfortunate because it might have been anticipated that there would be a large attendance at this meeting today. I would ask the Secretary to make arrangements to provide chairs for any others who may come in.

The first name I have on my list of questioners is that of Mr. Andras.

**Mr. Andras:** Mr. Chairman may I direct this question to the witness. Page 4 of your appendix to the statement summarizes by saying: "that" meaning a settlement of the situation

... can only be done by making possible an independent, civilian representative government for South Vietnam, free to make the ultimate decisions for peace;

and secondly,

... by emphasizing United States willingness to end the war by stopping all bombing and offensive ground action, and announcing a timetable for total withdrawal.

In the rest of your statement, sir, you have made quite a point of the necessity for what you describe as truly representative government in South Viet Nam; and on pages 9, 10 and 11 of your statement you have indicated that the recent elections in South Viet Nam were not in fact fair and representative elections. If the assumption that the representative government in South Viet Nam aspires to seek peace is a key factor, which seems to be valid, how could free elections in South Viet Nam, by your standards of free elections take place? Also, who do you think should supervise such elections, an outside country, a group of countries or an agency such as the United Nations; and whose responsibility do you feel it would be to move toward the procedures by which such a free election should be held. This seems to be a very fundamental key to it in your mind.

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** I think that free elections require many conditions, two of which

are freedom of the press and a kind of internationally sponsored supervision and I think that without at least these two conditions free elections in Viet Nam are not possible. However, I do not think that free elections provide the only way to get the kind of government we wish to have. The fact is that the Vietnamese people, who are mostly peasants, will support a government that can respond to their needs and aspirations. I think that if the United States consent to abandon the idea of having military bases in South Viet Nam everything will happen the way they wish: support to the South Vietnamese government, as it is now, will be stopped, and the kind of government we wish to have in Viet Nam will automatically emerge. If that government has not been able to emerge it has been because of the continuing support by the United States of the present government which calls itself an instrument of the war. But in order to have peace you have to have an instrument for peace, the kind of government that I have described.

I would like to bring to your attention a psychological factor in Viet Nam as well as in Southeast Asia. The majority of these people in Southeast Asia, like the Vietnamese, are peasants. Although 90 per cent of them do not know much about ideology, communism and anti-communism, they know very well that the sufferings they are enduring result from the conflict between communism and anti-communism, as a result of which they aspire to get out of the country into a neutral zone—and that applies not only to Viet Nam but also to Cambodia, Laos, Burma and many other countries in Southeast Asia.

Now if you had the kind of government in South Viet Nam that could persuade them to work toward a solution we could get out of this communism-anti-communism conflict. The kind of support we have in South Viet Nam would be an important requirement, and that government does not necessarily need to come from free elections. Any government that can move to end the war in that direction will be overwhelmingly supported by the Vietnamese and also by the non-communist members of the National Liberation Front because all of us prefer the shorter way to peace and independence than the long way of the Front. The basic problem, and the whole problem, is whether or not the United States wish to abandon the idea of maintaining military bases in South Viet Nam.

I have said something in my statement concerning the intention of the United States to deal with North Viet Nam, and I would like to elaborate a bit on that because I think it is very important. We believe that the United States do want to deal with North Viet Nam but concerning North Viet Nam only. Washington's intention is to offer to North Viet Nam a cessation of the bombing in exchange for a cessation of concentration of Northern troops to the South. In the minds of those in Washington, if Hanoi leaves the NLF alone in the South the NLF will be liquidated by United States armed forces in South Viet Nam and the United States will be able to return to the commissions of 1954, repatriating everything lost in the past twelve years. However, we believe that Hanoi cannot do that because if it left the Front in the South to be liquidated that would result in the collapse of prestige and then the regime of Hanoi as well. I am not very optimistic about the cessation of the bombing. Such action is very good and very encouraging but I think the problem is to deal with South Viet Nam. I think it should concern itself with the National Liberation Front and allow political life in Viet Nam to be free for the kind of government they wish to come into existence—to handle the negotiations for cease-fire, to handle negotiations for the new non-communist, non-pro-West government of South Viet Nam, and to negotiate the withdrawal of all United States and Northern Vietnamese troops from South Viet Nam. I do believe that free elections are helpful but even if we cannot organize them I am sure everything will happen the way we wish if the United States abandon the idea of military bases. Thank you.

**Mr. Andras:** Just following along that line then, the way you see it—there has to be two coincidental moves: an announcement by the United States of their intention at some specific future date to withdraw from Viet Nam, and allowing free elections. Do you see the necessity for any foreign body supervision of those free elections—I am thinking of the United Nations or Geneva powers—or do you feel that once the United States says they are going to withdraw 12 months or 10 months from now or whenever it might be that the election machinery, the campaigning and all of that could then be put in motion. And what about the present regime in Saigon; would they not be able to still impose, if that is the correct term...

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** The Government of Saigon cannot remain long at all if it does not get the support of the United States and the *raison d'être* of that support is the intention of Washington to go on with the war because that government is an instrument of war. I believe very strongly that everything will become easier if Washington changes its policy and that the kind of international provision for free elections in Viet Nam would be realized very easily when the intention of Washington on that matter is made clear to the world. I think agreement between socialist countries and countries of the other side will be reached very easily based upon such a decision by the United States. I think if the United States changes policy, and then in a few days, lets the political life in Viet Nam be free, we have to control them. Then in one or two days we would be able to have the kind of government which...

**The Vice-Chairman:** The next member interested in asking a question is Mr. Macquarrie. Before that, I have one or two questions arising out of Mr. Andras' questions I would like to interject very briefly—that is my prerogative—and that is this: If the United States withdrew completely from Viet Nam, this is, as you say, at the wish of the Vietnamese people, would the same apply to any influence or troops presently there by the Soviet Union and China? Do you feel they should withdraw?

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** Viet Nam has been a neighbour of China for many thousand years and we have been able to maintain our independence, and Viet Nam has not become a province of China. We believe that we are able to settle our problem without foreign intervention and it is our belief that we are able to prevent the foreign intervention of troops. We believe that the problem of Viet Nam should be seen in the context of the problem of Southeast Asia as a whole. We believe that the two main forces in the world can destroy each other in order to build the world the way each of them would like to see it, and that is why this kind of dialogue is beginning to be heard. But the fear from both sides of a possible attack by the other is still growing very quickly and that is the kind of fear that has created the sufferings like the ones in Viet Nam. In fact in Viet Nam we believe that the United States are fighting China on the Vietnamese battle-field because of that fear. I think that the decision

by both sides to let Southeast Asia be neutralized, at least the Indo-Chinese peninsula be neutralized, will contribute to a very important extent to the foundation of peace in the world and will reduce very much the amount of fear of the other side and I think that in solving the problem of Viet Nam we should think about the problem of Southeast Asia and the problem of the tension between the two blocs at the same time.

**The Vice-Chairman:** Do you not think that China would wish to retain Southeast Asia within her sphere of influence?

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** I think that if things go on like this for five or ten years, then China will be able to do that, but it is impossible for her to do that right now and it is for this that a solution should be adopted as soon as possible because this kind of agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States is possible now, but not possible, say, five years later.

**Mr. Macquarrie:** I would like to thank the witness personally for his thoughtful testimony. I will refer to his statement on page 4 in reference to the corruption of values by the flood of American dollars. This is a very interesting sociological discussion. You have no information of any corruption in the sense that you use it here stemming from the substantial inflow of aid from the Soviet Union and Communist China in the North? There is no anxiety in your mind about that?

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** No.

**Mr. Macquarrie:** No corruption is resulting there from that?

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** No. Would you like me to say something about it? The kind of society that we have in Saigon permits us a kind of corruption. We believe that there is a big gap between the bourgeois class and the class of the poor in Viet Nam. I feel that when I try to tell you something I reflect more the sentiment and feeling of the majority of the Vietnamese, who are peasants; I am not reflecting only the feeling of the bourgeois class in Saigon. They have had spokesmen. I think that the kind of austere life that all Vietnamese have to adopt in order to build a country, especially in a war situation, is not observed by that minority of bourgeois in Saigon. Many people in Saigon have been getting lots of money because of the presence of the war and they would not like to see the

war stop because that means the end of their ability to earn money. Then the kind of life: the presence of foreign troops and foreigners in South Viet Nam increases that kind of corruption. This is a matter of experience, not of speculation, because I have been in that society for a long time. I know it. In the city of Da Nang, for instance, or the city of Tuy Hoa, a prostitute is able to earn a living for four people, but a woodworker, if he does not work for Americans, cannot earn a living for his family. There are plenty of prostitutes in Saigon. Corruption in the South is something that you cannot imagine. The anxiety and the fear that death is behind is also a cause for such indulgence in corruption. As for the North, I think the kind of help from Russia and from China would be primarily weapons and ammunition and not the kinds of things that can give people a chance to be corrupt.

**Mr. Macquarrie:** Their assistance does not lead to corruption? I was interested, too, in the observations you make about the elections in the South. You suggest they were not free; that they were rigged and so on. Is the executive authority in the North based upon free elections?

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** The fact is that we do not know about the way they handle elections in the North. I have to confess that; because from the South we are forbidden by the government to have any correspondence with the North, even to listen to the radio of Hanoi. I do not mean that elections in the North are free. I do not mean that at all.

**Mr. Macquarrie:** I was interested that you regarded the free election as an important factor in the Southern portion and seemed not to express any reference to the same democratic instrument so far as the North is concerned. I quite agree; I have never heard from any witness or any person that there were free elections in the North. I was interested, too, in page 7 where you refer to the steps to peace. I noted particularly that you seem to have no suggestion that a country like Canada might pass on to Hanoi as to some steps they might take or some gestures they might make. These three steps seem to be somewhat restraining actions that the United States might take. Is there not something in your mind that the North, who of course are active in this combat—if I may use a very mild word—should do to bring

about the peace which, heaven knows, we all desire?

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** Sir, I have expressed my view that Hanoi is now under bombing and support for the National Liberation Front cannot be stopped because of the reasons I gave. I believe that Hanoi is very much for peace, too. No one in Viet Nam would like to see the war go on to destroy the country. But what I see is that the first steps should be taken by Washington and not by Hanoi. If Hanoi were bombing Washington, for instance, I would like to urge that Hanoi should stop the bombing of Washington at the same time that I urged Washington to stop the bombing of Hanoi. But is there anything that Hanoi can do now in order to say that they are also for this? The only thing they can do is to let the National Liberation Front alone in the South to be crushed, and that I do not think they can do. I do not see anything that Hanoi can do now, but if the United States takes this step and if Hanoi does not consent to negotiate with the South Vietnamese coalition government for withdrawal at the same time as the withdrawal of Hanoi troops, then I think Hanoi should do something. But I do not think that there is anything Hanoi can do before the United States realize these things.

**Mr. Andras:** May I ask a supplementary question? Why could not the Hanoi government at least indicate their willingness to come to the negotiating table with any combination of others? I believe that the United States have offered to meet the official representatives of the Hanoi government on neutral ground, and also, of late days, have indicated their willingness to have at that negotiating the representatives of the National Liberation Front. I think that Hanoi could at least agree to meet and talk and discuss this matter, with or without pre-conditions established.

**Thich Nhat Hahn:** Thank you. I think that Hanoi has expressed its feeling that it cannot participate in any negotiations at all while the bombing is going on, because the bombing is considered by Hanoi a kind of blackmail, and while the negotiation—that is my feeling—is going on, the bombing would be considered as a kind of pressure, and negotiations should be by agreements, words and ideas—not by bombing—to give more pressure. The stress of negotiations should rely

on agreement and not on force. That is my feeling, without identifying myself with the side of Hanoi at all.

**Mr. Macquarrie:** I just have one more question, Mr. Chairman. We often hear from fairly authoritative people in reference to this that at various stages in the past when, through a pause, the United States has de-escalated the air aspects of the operation that the North Vietnamese at the same time have escalated the ground operation which, in your terms, seems somewhat unfair. However, my final question to the witness refers to his statement on page 12 about the suffering visited upon the people by the United States, the use of barbaric practices, the razing of whole villages, and so on. Certainly this is most unfortunate, but do you ever hear anything about the suffering, death and destruction visited upon the people by the northern forces? I notice you did not mention that.

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** In fact, I have seen American soldiers in Viet Nam but I have not seen northern groups from Hanoi. I believe they are there but I have not been able to see them. I realize that atrocities are committed on both sides. That must happen in any war. The National Liberation Front has assassinated many village chiefs because they think they have been co-operating with the government and the Americans in pointing out where the members of NLF are located. In the middle of 1966 I read somewhere that the number of village chiefs assassinated in that way was about 400 or 500. We deplore all kinds of atrocities and we are aware of the kinds of atrocities that have been done by the National Liberation Front. I realize the kinds of atrocities that have been taking place and they are a thousand times more atrocious, more awful. They have not been reported as atrocities but as an effort towards democracy and freedom, and the millions of people who have fled the countryside through the refugee camps have done so mostly because of the bombs and not because of other things. I visited these camps and I know perfectly well what goes on in these refugee camps. You understand why I stress the atrocities. The people of Viet Nam are aware that most of the assassinations result from the destruction caused by the anti-Communist force, although they realize that the Communist force also causes untold suffering.

[Translation]

**Mr. Asselin (Charlevoix):** May I ask a supplementary question? When the United States went to South Viet Nam, they went in under certain terms. The United Nations' charter provides that one country may ask another for help. The United States went there in accord with those terms. Do you think that your government would be quite ready to ask the United States to withdraw from South Viet Nam?

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** I believe that the request, the invitation made by the South Vietnamese government to that of the United States, is something that can be discussed. I believe that type of cooperation between Washington and the president of the government of South Viet Nam. Ngo Dinh Diem is one thing which antedated that invitation; the cooperation had come before the invitation. In other words this invitation is a sort of formalization of a state of fact created by the United States and by President Ngo Dinh Diem, then President of South Viet Nam.

However, the problem is to determine if that government represents the South Vietnamese people or not. I do not think that the population of South Viet Nam is at all in favour of the presence of foreign troops on Vietnamese soil. This is true both of North Vietnamese and South Vietnamese. The South Vietnamese have a great deal of admiration for Ho Chi Minh because Mr. Ho did not invite Chinese troops to enter North Viet Nam. This is true of those Vietnamese who are sympathetic to Mr. Ho as well as of those Vietnamese who are hostile to him. We have had a great deal of experience with the Chinese. The Vietnamese have no intention of having foreign troops on their soil.

**Mr. Asselin (Charlevoix):** You claim that North Viet Nam has no support from Chinese troops?

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** There is Chinese aid to North Viet Nam, but this does not mean that North Viet Nam is completely under Chinese domination at all because of the geographic and political factors involved. Hanoi must of course be subject to some Chinese influence. But, what I would like to say to you is this: if Mr. Ho had any chance at all, he would certainly detach North Viet Nam completely from Chinese influence. But this opportunity, ironically enough, could well be offered by Washington itself.

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[English]

**The Vice-Chairman:** Before we continue I would like to point out that I have a number of names on my list of those members who wish to ask the witness questions. As we do not wish to sit beyond twelve o'clock and it is now ten minutes to eleven, I am going to voluntarily abandon my opportunity of asking the witness any questions—although there are a great many I would like to ask—and see that the other members get a chance. I will suggest, to see how it goes, that every person on my list will have about five or six minutes each in which they may ask questions and I would respectfully request that the witness—without any suggestion that he shorten his answers at all—make his answers brief so that we may get in as many questions as possible. Mr. Goyer is the next member of the Committee who wishes to ask questions.

[Translation]

**Mr. Goyer:** Mr. Chairman, sir, I found that there is a great deal of value to your evidence here as you have lived in Viet Nam for a considerable period. Until quite recently, you were still there. But have you had an opportunity, over the last few years, to visit North Viet Nam?

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** It is my intention to visit North Viet Nam, but as you know it is a dangerous thing for a non-Communist from South Viet Nam to have such contacts. The South Vietnamese government would like to be able to say that the Buddhists of South Viet Nam are cooperating with the Communists. They are looking for every opportunity to suppress their movement in South Viet Nam.

**Mr. Goyer:** Have you had any contacts with members of the government or with people who have some position of authority in North Viet Nam?

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** I have had contacts with non-Communists Vietnamese who themselves have some contacts with the representatives of the National Liberation Front in Hanoi. Here again, if I had any direct contact with these people, it would provide Saigon with an opportunity of suppressing Buddhist movements in the South.

**Mr. Goyer:** Therefore, you have never had any direct contact with people in authority in North Viet Nam?

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** Not directly. In Melbourne however, I made a statement in the form of a kind of an open letter to the Vietnamese in the National Liberation Front with regard to that suggested solution. Though I received no direct answer the NLF representative in Hanoi did say on two or three occasions something which constitutes some kind of an indirect answer to my proposals.

**Mr. Goyer:** Is it not true that historically China has always represented a certain danger, a threat of hegemony over North Viet Nam?

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** Yes, China for more than 3,000 years has in fact represented a threat to us. We have enough confidence in ourselves however, we do feel that it will be possible for us to solve our own problems, ourselves.

**Mr. Goyer:** But is this fear of China in Southeast Asia such as to justify certain countries neighbouring Viet Nam supporting the United States?

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** I think the psychological and cultural factors involved in Southeast Asia are very important elements. It is not fair to claim that if there were no anti-Communism there would be a vacuum into which Communism would move. That is not a statement of fact. There is something else. There is some fear of a conflict between these two conceptions of life. I feel that countries like Cambodia, Laos, Burma, for instance, are at the present time, fighting very hard to maintain this kind of neutrality. They are conscious of the fact that they do not want to become a new Viet Nam. The politicians of the world realize that fact. That is why I am putting them before you at this time.

[Translation]

**Mr. Goyer:** Do you favor such a policy?

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** I believe it is necessary to world peace. To arrive at that state of affairs, it will be necessary for us to look at all these matters on a world wide scale. It would require that an agreement of that type come about between the two blocs. China and the United States must work along those lines.

**Mr. Goyer:** Such being the case, would it not be proper for you to suggest also that

North Viet Nam have a more open policy toward China? Of course we are not very close to the place where these events are going on but we do feel sometimes that China is forcing a very rigid attitude upon North Viet Nam with regard to the possibility of peace talks, for instance. Being a Vietnamese do you not feel would it not be proper for you to point out that North Viet Nam should publicly ask China to favor peace talks, not only in respect of the Vietnamese conflict but in respect of Southeast Asia as a whole? You have mentioned that China is an essential factor to any peaceful solution of Southeast Asian problems.

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** I think this would be a necessary stage. I believe that the first stage would be the neutralization of South Viet Nam. This would involve the neutrality of Laos and Cambodia.

**Mr. Goyer:** But my question is this. You are a real spokesman for peace. Such being the case, do you not feel it would be just as necessary to ask that North Viet Nam have an independent policy towards China? And more than that, that it should favor a policy of "détente" in respect of China, and indeed ask China to participate in a general policy of "détente" in Southeast Asia?

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** I must confess I do share that view but I do not think that it is possible for Hanoi to envisage such a solution at a time when its territory is being devastated by war. If Hanoi were to make a statement such as this, it could be interpreted as meaning that Hanoi is showing signs of weariness. This might come about later, however.

**Mr. Goyer:** But you say: "It is everyone's problem". Does not this "everyone" include China?

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** I believe that the attitude of the United States vis à vis China is very important to the eventual solution of the conflict I have spoken about that aspect of the problem in the United States more than once. I have dealt with the attitude which should be adopted by the United States towards China.

**Mr. Goyer:** Thank you very much.

[English]

**The Vice-Chairman:** Mr. Allmand?

**Mr. Allmand:** If I understand correctly, you suggest that the way to settle this war would be for the United States to announce

that they will stop the bombing and cease active hostilities against the National Liberation Front and the North Vietnamese; that they should announce a withdrawal at some date, that peace negotiations take place between the North Vietnamese government and the National Liberation Front, the truly representative government of the South—the Saigon area, so to speak—but that these negotiations should not include the United States.

Now, why would you expect that the National Liberation Front and the North Viet Nam government would accept this proposal of yours? We are told that if the Americans announced withdrawal and did, in fact, withdraw, the National Liberation Front and the North Vietnamese government would merely take over without regard for the rights of people such as you who say that they are not communists but support a free Viet Nam. It has been suggested that the communist elements in the NLF and the North Vietnamese government would merely take over the country in a very short time and run it as they saw fit.

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** You cannot talk in realistic terms about self-determination in our country. However, if I were a communist Vietnamese I would say that communism and noncommunism is a problem for the Vietnamese who have the responsibility for their country. But, please, I am not a communist; I am a non-Communist. I think that I should like to share the idea of not wanting to see Viet Nam become a communist country.

The solution that we have been looking for is for a representative South Vietnamese government representing all Vietnamese who do not belong to the National Liberation Front and who are also opposed to the war. The Vietnamese is very subtle and he is of a psychological nature. If that government, upon coming into existence, asked the United States to stop all bombing and military action and stay there in key positions, in self-defence, what would happen? The Vietnamese would see that this government had come into existence for only a short time and yet it had stopped most of the tragedy happening. All of us would turn to support it because we want to be alive. That government would have proved that it was able to stop the war and yet the fact that it had asked the United States to do so would prove that it was not an agent of Washington. This would satisfy the Vietnamese aspiration for

independence and also stop the monopolization of nationalism by the National Liberation Front. This is a very important point.

When we think of withdrawal, we tend to imagine a kind of overnight withdrawal, but this is not possible. The United States would have to take ten months or so to withdraw and there would be all kinds of political and military preparations for such a withdrawal.

We would acquire a kind of certainty concerning the politics of Viet Nam. The kind of government we wish to have in Viet Nam will have the chance to establish the kind of political balance that will guarantee a neutral, non-communist and non-pro-West government in Viet Nam. The fact is that there are many, many members of the National Liberation Front who are not Communists and who will turn to support it.

If the Front, at that time, does not co-operate and continues the fighting, what will happen? The Vietnamese will see that the Front is no longer fighting for independence and peace and that they are fighting for something else, such as Communism. We are very afraid of the conflict between Communism and anti-Communism. The Front will be but in the position of having to accept co-operation. If they do not, then their support will collapse. I think there is a deeply psychological problem in the United States having dealings with the Viet Nam problem in a military sense.

**Mr. Allmand:** If that takes place, as you say, and once the Americans announce their withdrawal the situation begins to settle down and you see that the Communist elements are not just interested in liberation but in the imposition of a Communist government for all of Viet Nam, would you then support the Americans' staying?

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** No. Once the Communists in the Front show themselves to be Communists, as such, they will have no support. They never claim to be Communists. They claim to be fighting for national independence. More and more people are joining the Front on that basis. The non-communist members of the Front would have no reason not to co-operate with the kind of government we would have; and then the communists could not go on using the nationalistic truth any more. That is the problem. So far they have been able to monopolize nationalism. That is very important. If we had a government that could more symbolize

nationalism and yet other things such as freedom of religion and independence, the problem would be settled.

**Mr. Allmand:** Do you believe that the North Vietnamese government and the National Liberation Front would accept such a proposal as you have put forward, by which negotiations would take place without the Americans being there? Do you think they would accept that?

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** Yes; but I would like to...

**Mr. Allmand:** Looking at the history of the Communist party in other countries where it has operated they have not accepted what you...

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** To answer yes or no might be misleading. I think that the solution does not rely on the goodwill of the Front or of Hanoi. It depends on the political balance that we can establish in Viet Nam. Because we are Vietnamese we know the heart of the Vietnamese. The solution is not speculation; it is based on the plurality of the thinking and aspirations of the people of Viet Nam.

**Mr. Churchill:** Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the witness one or two practical questions. My first concerns the 25 years of warfare in Viet Nam. Would you just outline what happened over those 25 years and how much of that warfare was civil war?

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** The nature of the war in Viet Nam is mostly a struggle for independence. You know that we struggled against the French in order to gain national independence, and after that we struggled against the Japanese for the same reason. In the course of this struggle, Communism became a new factor, and it has been trying to identify itself with the resistance movement; but we find there are other forces that have been associating with the resistance, too, such as the Buddhists and others. I think the widespread idea that the war in Viet Nam is a war to condemn Communism is a very recent factor with the Vietnamese. The nature of the war in Viet Nam does include that kind of struggle, but that is not the most important aspect of the struggle in Viet Nam. The struggle for national independence caused be much more important, but the kind of international struggle which is going on between the big powers, using Viet Nam as the battleground, is also very important.

Twenty-five years is only a period of time. We had a struggle before that to remove the French domination over Viet Nam.

**Mr. Churchill:** I did not quite get the answer I was expecting. The Japanese invaded and conquered your country, did they not?

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** They replaced the French in 1944. That did not last long because the revolution of 1945 ended the domination of the Japanese and after that the French troops moved in again.

**Mr. Churchill:** The French returned?

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** Yes.

**Mr. Churchill:** Did the Vietnamese fight against the French from then until 1954?

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** Yes.

**Mr. Churchill:** Continuously?

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** Yes.

**Mr. Churchill:** What happened after 1954?

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** The presence of the United States...

**Mr. Churchill:** When did United States troops enter South Viet Nam?

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** At the time of the coming into existence of the government of Mr. Diem there were political and military advisers there.

**Mr. Churchill:** But they were not fighting?

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** At that time the National Liberation Front had not been formed.

**Mr. Churchill:** When did the North Vietnamese troops enter South Viet Nam?

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** The North Vietnamese troops only infiltrated South Viet Nam when the increase of military forces of the United States was seen as a threat to the National Liberation Front. The National Liberation Front was formed in South Viet Nam and consisted of some of the Vietnamese people who opposed the dictatorial regime of Ngo-Dinh-Diem.

**Mr. Churchill:** Yes. I was hoping you could give me the actual date because you say on page 4 that while the North Vietnamese are in South Viet Nam, the principal reason for their presence is the prior and growing intervention of the Americans. Are you saying

that the Americans entered South Viet Nam and fought there before the North Vietnamese entered?

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** I believe that is true. The National Liberation Front was formed in South Viet Nam in 1960 in opposition to the Diem regime and, because of the policy of the South Vietnamese government and Washington, that position grew very quickly and strongly and that is why troops and more "advisers" came to South Viet Nam and fought. Then, because of this increase by the United States, it was felt that an increase by the others was needed and that is why there was integration of the North regime.

**Mr. Churchill:** I was hoping you could have given me the exact year when military intervention occurred. May I ask you this question. Is it right—and I have read of this—that more than 3 million people fled from North Viet Nam to South Viet Nam after 1954 and if so, why?

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** No, it is not right. I do not think any report said that 3 million North Vietnamese entered South Viet Nam. The figures used by the South Vietnamese government was 800,000 and at that time the Communist regime in North Viet Nam was not yet a reality because the Hanoi government was just moving in. Most of the people who migrated to the South were Catholics. There were some Buddhists but they were mostly Catholics. I have many friends who are Catholic priests and I have been in sympathy with them. We know that in Viet Nam the followers of religion respect and believe in religious leaders very much. The Catholic peasants were told by their leaders to leave and they left. It was not because of a reaction of any kind.

**Mr. Churchill:** I have two more questions to ask at this stage, Mr. Chairman. From what source do the North Vietnamese get their military supplies; their guns, shells, rockets, and so on?

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** What sort of...?

**Mr. Churchill:** What source? What country? Do they manufacture them themselves?

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** I must confess that this is something that I have no experience in, but I believe that several things come from Russia and from China. That is all I know about it. Many things are created in North

Viet Nam but not the modern kind of weapons.

**Mr. Churchill:** One final question. Have you or any of your friends made representations to the Chinese which are similar to those you have been making in the United States and are now making in Canada?

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** I do not have the opportunity to be with the people of Russia and the United States very much. The only time I talked to the Russians was when I was in Viet Nam. There was a seminar on the political situation in Southeast Asia and political scientists from different countries were there and I explained the problem of Viet Nam and had a long talk with two political scientists from Moscow. Upon my presentation of a solution to this problem they told me they did not see any reason why the Soviet Union would oppose my proposal, but in the case of China that a different view might be taken.

**Mr. Churchill:** Is there anyone who holds your views presently in Moscow talking to the Russians as you are talking to us?

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** I do not know. I think something of that kind may be done by people who are in a situation where they can communicate with both sides. It is my hope that Canada can play the role of mediator between the two blocs in order to help solve the problem.

**Mr. Brewin:** Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the witness whether it is a correct assessment that some of us have gained that the attitude of the North Vietnamese government has been totally negative as far as any question of peace is concerned? I think that Dean Rusk has stated on occasions that there has been no indication whatever that the North Vietnamese government would be willing to enter into negotiations, even on the terms you suggest, such as stopping the bombing, recognizing that one must negotiate with the National Liberation Front and a commitment by the United States to eventually withdraw. It has been said quite often and I do not know whether it is correct or not, I am merely asking because I would like to know, to your knowledge have the North Vietnamese ever indicated anything other than a completely negative view of any prospect of peace?

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** We believe that all Vietnamese, including the Communists, want to be

alive and want to have peace. I think that Hanoi is negative in some of the things that the United States is not. For instance, Washington is positive in its escalation of the bombing. I think the fact that Hanoi does not invite Chinese troops into North Viet Nam or does not bomb Washington is an example of the negative attitude of Hanoi. If a country is devastated in that manner and they try to survive, why should we expect something more from Hanoi? I do not think Hanoi is negative; Washington is negative. The kind of positiveness which is shown in Washington is only an appearance. Who is causing much suffering? It is not Hanoi; it is Washington.

**Mr. Brewin:** Would it not be helpful, sir, if there was some public indication from Hanoi that under the conditions you mention—supposing they were acceptable and possible—they would be willing to negotiate?

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** Hanoi has expressed the idea that negotiations are possible only by the unconditional stopping of the bombing. I think that is a positive attitude. I would also like to say that in South Viet Nam not only is the National Liberation Front opposed to Washington but unfortunately those of us who do not agree with the Front are opposed to Washington as well. That is something we wish you to see. The unpopularity of Washington in Viet Nam is something that we can touch. Perhaps there is a good will promise on the part of the Americans to save us, but they are not saving us. They are destroying us. That should also be known to you people.

**Mr. Brewin:** I just have one further question, Mr. Chairman. The election on September 3 which you have described, and which is also described in the speech of Senator Gruening, was for president and vice-president. Are there other elected bodies among the people that share your views? I believe there is a senate. Is there any other elected assembly? You speak of the hope of elections. Are they any future elections that might possibly be free which would produce the results you hope for?

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** I think everything in Viet Nam depends on whether Washington wants to continue the war or whether it would like to change the policy. Everything will be the same if the intention to go on with the war in Viet Nam continues to exist. I do not believe that elections can be free while that will exist and that is why I think

the basic thing is not what the U.S. is going to do, the most basic thing is that Washington should accept the solution that South Viet Nam be neutral, which would require the withdrawal of all foreign troops from South Viet Nam, including the troops of North Viet Nam. I think the intention is to remain.

**Mr. Brewin:** Are there any elections pending? Are there any elections to an assembly?

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** There has been an election of the Senate and of the lower house. This has been done. I think these elections are about the most important thing that has happened in Viet Nam.

**Mr. Thompson:** My questions are related to some aspects that are not included in the report, Mr. Chairman. Colonial control over Viet Nam by France, and later by Japan during the war, covered a period of 95 years, and during this time certain factions that are characteristic of Viet Nam did not express themselves as they have since the defeat of the French in the early fifties. The two aspects that I have in mind, which are basically historical, concern first of all the lack of any national identity in the country, and the real loyalties in the country have been village, and regional loyalties rather than a national identity. This has brought into play a struggle between the north, central and southern delta area of Viet Nam, or even between areas within those general divisions of the country, that are just as deep and vital to any settlement in Viet Nam as the present struggle itself.

The second aspect concerns the long and bitter struggle between the religious factions within the country. This includes religious factions in the different divisions of Buddhism itself and the fact that the Catholics are better qualified and better educated to carry on general administration in the country. This factor plays a very vital part in any settlement that might be brought about and it will certainly play a very definite part in the NLF and in the over-all picture. Do you reject the fact that the control, policies and direction of any future administration is seriously complicated and that any understanding of the present situation must go back to these aspects of Viet Nam?

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** Thank you for the question. I would like first to say that the root

of the problem is in the war. For instance, the split within the Catholic church in the other communities of Viet Nam is also due to the war.

First of all I would like to deal with the problem of Catholics and Buddhists, which I think is a very important problem. There have been certain Catholics who have been making use of the Catholic community for their personal political interests, and in order to do this and they have had to rely on foreign powers. However, in recent years younger and more intellectual Catholics have realized the fact that this is wrong. Catholicism must be rooted within the country. That is why the kind of co-operation between the young and intellectual Catholics has developed, because they know that activities of the South are directed toward a peaceful solution and that they are backing a government for peace. That is why I said the root of the trouble is the intention to go on with the war; Saigon and Washington have to be firm in order to control political life and to try to split teams to have better control. I do not agree at all that the Vietnamese do not possess, a kind of awareness of their national unity. I am sure there are no Vietnamese in Viet Nam who can bear the thought of Viet Nam being divided forever and they wish to have reunification as soon as possible. But in the South, because we suffer so much, we know it is not realistic to have reunification now. It is believed that South Viet Nam should be separated from the North for a certain period of time, but I think it is wrong to say that we are a different part of Viet Nam fighting with each other.

**Mr. Thompson:** My second question, Mr. Chairman, concerns the statements of our witness as to how he believes the democratic process could be evolved once American intentions had been declared and withdrawal of the American forces was imminent. Regarding the provisional Constituent Assembly that was responsible for the drafting of the constitution that has resulted this fall in the election of a president and a vice-president of a senate and an assembly and of village government, I found in speaking with the members of the provisional Constituent Assembly that all aspects of thought in Viet Nam were represented. Many of those members were very opposed to government policy. Some of them were members of the government party. Even in respect of the elections that were held this fall for a permanent assembly and

a permanent senate it seems to me that amongst those elected were representatives of all different political factions if not political parties in the country. Would you not agree that this has been a great step forward and that there has been a very definite step taken towards the election of political representatives of the country?

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** I am sorry to say that I think the government of South Viet Nam has become a thousand times more unpopular since the election than before because of the election itself. The kind of manoeuvring in order to get elected has taken away the rest of the prestige that that kind of a government can have.

**Mr. Thompson:** But would you not agree that the factions within the country are represented in the various elected bodies and that there are voices that speak even as you speak?

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** I think if the Vietnamese people were represented in the government and in the senate that things would not be like they are in Viet Nam; they would stop at once. As you know, before elections the list of candidates for president and vice-president, for instance and also for the senate had to be submitted to the government for approval. You know of a case where one government candidate had to approve the eligibility of our candidate. What kind of election did we have in Viet Nam?

**Mr. Thompson:** Yet the governmental party represents much less than 50 per cent of the total number of elected candidates—I think it is in the thirties. It is a minority government in so far as the expression of political parties and factions are concerned in the elected representatives.

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** I think that over here we have a tendency to believe in present-day reports. I think that these things put out by the government and even by foreign reporters who do not say much about the situation over there have been very misleading. For instance, if the press say that about 500 communists were killed yesterday by allied forces, I think it is very misleading. It may be 500 more or less and it may be that all of them were innocent peasants. And if a number of them are fighters for the National Liberation Front they are not Communists. The Communists are not on the battlefield to be killed; they are much too clever and they are

somewhere else. So I think that these present-day statistical releases are such that we cannot rely on them because they do not reflect reality at all.

**Mr. Thompson:** Mr. Chairman, I have one more question. If North Viet Nam were to declare its intentions to withdraw all of its forces from South Viet Nam and reset the demilitarized zone on the 17th parallel which was originally suggested by Chou En-lai in his capacity as Foreign Minister of China in 1954, does the witness not think that American troops and the American government would be happy to withdraw and leave Viet Nam to itself?

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** I think at the Manila Conference the United States declared that the United States armed forces would withdraw from South Viet Nam if the Northern troops also withdrew from South Viet Nam. I think the withdrawal of the North Vietnamese troops from the South before the withdrawal of the United States troops would mean nothing but a retreat. I think if there was a cessation of bombing of North Viet Nam and Hanoi and Washington then entered into talks and both sides made a declaration, it would be more logical. It would allow the Vietnamese in the South to talk with each other and to set up their coalition government, and that would mean something.

**Mr. Prud'homme:** I would like to make a comment and then I will ask a few questions. You said on page 4 of the appendix:

North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front, lacking the supply facilities of the United States, are dependent on the help of the South Vietnamese peasants. If that help was removed, neither North Vietnam nor the National Liberation Front could continue to function effectively.

I doubt very much if the shells, the bombs and all the military equipment come from the peasants.

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** No, but you know that...

**Mr. Prud'homme:** That is my comment. I could ask many questions but this one concerns me most. If everything you said this morning and every wish you expressed in your comments happened—that is, the Americans withdrew and left, there were free elections and so on—what assurance do

you have that the North Vietnamese government and the National Liberation Front, with the help, let us say, of the Chinese, would not just decide to step into South Viet Nam?

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** For the same reason that China has not gone into countries like Laos, Cambodia, Burma and so on. Concerning your remarks, I did not mean support of peasants in the South to the Front implied rockets and things like that, but even with rockets and more modern weapons they have nothing if they do not have the support of the peasants. Concerning the solution, even though we in the South are not in line with Hanoi, I think that Hanoi has enough political maturity and I do not yet have that kind of confidence concerning the Front. However I do have that confidence vis-à-vis Hanoi.

**Mr. Prud'homme:** How do you have that assurance when you say that you never have been to North Viet Nam.

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** No, but we see that ability in the way that Hanoi conducts its policies. On the psychological aspect of the problem, I have repeated several times the longing of the Vietnamese for a neutral position is very important. Also, the satisfaction of the Vietnamese regarding the removal of the suffering and the feeling of national independence realized is a very strong factor that can change the whole political life and atmosphere in South Viet Nam. The kind of political balance we can create in South Viet Nam will be the most important ground to guarantee a solution. People in Viet Nam will not try to realize Communism. They shall not support that minority of Communism in order to invite what anti-Communism wants. They will stand on their own. Also, that is a risk to the Vietnamese as well as to the framework of international politics. We believe if this solution is accepted by Washington then the international grounds for such a solution will be settled by an accord—I mean Russia and the United States. These things are not stipulations but realities upon which you can check.

**Mr. Prud'homme:** I was not referring to Washington and Russia; I was referring to the Chinese.

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** I have expressed my feeling that Russia and the United States will not be able to realize the solution, that we will have to wait another five years, but now that is just possible.

**Mr. Prud'homme:** Do you still live in Viet Nam?

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** I am not allowed to return to Viet Nam because of my speaking against the policy of war but my colleagues have been giving me reports on the latest events in Viet Nam. In fact, my work concerning social reconstruction in South Viet Nam is still going on and the school with which I am associated has suffered many losses because it is identified with me as supporting a peaceful solution rather than war.

**Mr. Prud'homme:** Do you not find it strange being able to still live in the United States when your views on Viet Nam are unacceptable there.

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** I am not living in the United States. I am visiting many countries. I have a room in the Overseas Vietnamese Buddhist Association in Paris where I return after a trip. I have visited about 20 countries pleading for peace and I entered the United States only about three weeks ago. I shall continue my speaking tour until I have to get back.

**Mr. Prud'homme:** But you had no difficulty entering the United States and they have let you say whatever you want?

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** Yes. I was able to get to the United States thanks to the National Council of Churches. At first I did not get a visa; the United States Embassy in Paris refused a visa and I had to rely on my clergymen friends in the United States to get in. They intervened with the State Department and that is why I got a visa. Although I have not finished my tour yet in the United States—I wanted to come here—I was afraid that I would be unable to return again. I worried about this for three days and I almost decided not to come to Canada. But last night I got an assurance from the United States Embassy here and I think I will be able to go back on the basis of the same visa I now have.

**The Vice-Chairman:** I might say, as Chairman of this Committee, that I was given that unofficial assurance by the United States Embassy.

**Mr. Herridge:** Mr. Chairman, I shall be brief as usual. First of all, through you I want to compliment the Committee on inviting this gentleman here today to give his

point of view before the Committee. I am sure, regardless of even the different points of view, your presence here, sir, represents the great sympathy of all Canadian people for the problems and difficulties of your nation.

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** Thank you, sir.

**Mr. Herridge:** I have one question. I had one or two others but the time is going by. If an armistice could be arranged and if all foreign troops were withdrawn, would the South Vietnamese accept a United Nations peacekeeping unit to supervise the elections that you consider necessary and to stay there until the social fabric of the country was stabilized?

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** I think that the Vietnamese have very high esteem for the United Nations and particularly Secretary General U Thant. I think that most of us in Viet Nam would welcome such a kind of a force by the UN.

**Mr. Herridge:** Thank you.

**Mr. Groos:** Approximately what size of a force do you envisage would be necessary to supervise this arrangement?

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** I think I am not competent to answer your question. Possibly your question could be answered by some other Vietnamese. I think it could be the result of an agreement with those Vietnamese who represent the Vietnamese as a political reality. I do not think that I can answer your question. I can guess at a number but that would be risky; I would rather not.

**Mr. Klein:** Mr. Chairman, even as we are speaking now, thousands of people are dying in Viet Nam; even as we are sitting here. And when we speak of a question of neutrality, if you really wanted to try to be neutral in this case, the question is, on whose side are you neutral?

In the United States there is the expression of the hawks and the doves. Are there similar hawks and doves in North Viet Nam?

**Mr. Walker:** North Viet Nam?

**Mr. Klein:** North Viet Nam, yes. Are there hawks and doves in North Viet Nam?

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** Yes, everywhere.

**Mr. Klein:** Everywhere. Is it a naive question to ask whether the doves of North Viet

Nam and the doves of the United States could get together to see that this fighting should stop?

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** I think the problem lies in the fact of how strong are the doves in Washington and in Hanoi.

**Mr. Klein:** But would it be useful to try and get them together?

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** Yes, I think it would be useful.

**Mr. Klein:** I do not know if this question has been asked before, but do you think that Red China represents a threat to any of her neighbours?

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** Excuse me?

**Mr. Klein:** Do you think that Red China represents a threat to any of her neighbours?

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** A threat to whom?

**The Vice-Chairman:** A threat to any of the surrounding countries like Thailand or Burma. Do you think Red China is a danger to them?

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** We in Viet Nam are not afraid of a Chinese invasion, and that is why we do not think the United States armed forces have to be in Viet Nam. I think that to say yes is misleading, and to say no is also misleading. But, the fact is, under what conditions is such an invasion possible? I think that would be more appropriate, because I think the very attitude of China, for instance, depends not only on the intentions of China, but on the conditions and attitudes of other countries that deal with China, as well. I think if Westerners continue to describe China as a monster and view China as a monster, China will become one and will be aggressive. If, on the other hand, over here we deal with China in the proper manner, China will not be aggressive. So, China is not China by herself; China also depends on the non-China realities.

**Mr. Klein:** Do you think India feels the same way?

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** I think so, because the problem of the border between India and China has to be examined.

**Mr. Klein:** Does that mean that Red China may some day evacuate Tibet?

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** No.

**Mr. Klein:** No.

**The Vice-Chairman:** Will China leave Tibet some day?

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** I think, regarding the problem of Tibet, we have to consider the previous relations between Tibet and China in order to look at the events of Tibet.

**Mr. Klein:** And you think that Red China is right in what she...

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** No, I do not say she is right. But I would not like to say that Red China is 100 per cent wrong because the problem is not very simple. And concerning the border between China and India, I think that a study of the historical things about that would be needed for any kind of condemnation or support, because I believe it is very complicated and the Chinese are not 100 per cent wrong in this. But we lack understanding, and that is the cause of this trouble.

**Mr. Klein:** But, I think you will agree that the Indian people of India have the reputation of being very peaceful people.

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** No.

**Mr. Klein:** They are not peaceful people?

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** I do not believe so.

**Mr. Klein:** You do not believe so. All right. Well then, the only peaceful people are the Red Chinese?

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** Excuse me?

**Mr. Klein:** Then the only peaceful people are the Red Chinese?

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** No.

**Mr. Klein:** You say that the Indians are not peaceful.

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** I do not say that. I do not say that the only peaceful people are the Chinese.

**Mr. Klein:** Are there any peace negotiations or any negotiations going on now, to your knowledge, between India and Red China about adjusting these border incidents that seem to be constantly recurring from time to time?

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** I think there is a lack of understanding about these frontier limits. I think that the problem is not to back India

opposing China or to back China opposing India, but to try to give more light on the problem, and that is where other nations can help to settle. Because you cannot help the problem by helping one to oppose the other. That way you will only aggravate the situation. That is the way I think we should deal with every problem.

**Mr. Klein:** Well, let me make this statement to you. I know, for example, that there are Soviet troops in Hungary, and I know that there are Red Chinese troops in Tibet. I do not know of any country that the United States has gone into that she has not eventually withdrawn from. But I do not think we can say the same thing for the Soviet Union or for Red China.

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** I think that China is said by Washington to be a very aggressive country. But the presence of Chinese troops in the war is not seen. The United States armed forces are everywhere, and people like the Japanese, for instance, are struggling, concerning these things, like Okinawa and other things. China herself is considered to be more aggressive, but yet the presence of Chinese troops in those countries is non-existent. So China is aggressive more on the propaganda side, but less aggressive than the United States in a realistic sense. That is what I see in the war.

**Mr. Klein:** Do you think that the United States is fighting an imperialist war in Viet Nam?

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** I shall try not to make any statement of that kind, but I would say that the United States, because of its fear of China, is using Viet Nam as a battlefield in order to contain China. But that fear has been based more on imagination than on reality itself, and I think that fear is the cause of the suffering in Viet Nam. That is my belief.

**Mr. Klein:** May I just make this last statement to you. Irrespective of who is right and who is wrong in Viet Nam, as Canadians we deplore the fact that North Viet Nam agrees only under certain circumstances to sit down and talk. This is very disappointing for neutral people in Canada, as the question was put by Mr. Brewin. We are very disappointed that North Viet Nam will not sit down and talk.

**Thich Nhat Hanh:** I am sorry.

**The Vice-Chairman:** Gentlemen, it is now 12.00 noon and I think it is time that we adjourned. I would like to express the thanks of the Committee to Thich Nhat Hanh for coming here and giving us the benefit of his views and answering questions. Your help and light on this very difficult problem are very much appreciated.

I hope this Committee will meet again next Thursday. At the moment the program for that date is a little indefinite, but the Steering Committee will meet in the meanwhile.

The meeting is adjourned.

Mr. Klein: Well, let me make this statement to you. I know, for example, that there are Soviet troops in Hungary, and I know that those are Red Chinese troops. In fact, he does know of an incident in the United States, that the United States, because of the fact that the United States is a party to the order to control China, that the fact has been based more on imagination than on reality itself, and I think that is the case of the subject in Vietnam. That is my belief.

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The Vice-Chairman: Gentlemen, it is now 12:00 noon and I think it is time to adjourn. I would like to express the thanks of the Committee to each of you for your coming here and giving us the best advice you can and answering questions. Your help and views are very important. I hope the Committee will meet again next January. At the moment, the program for that date is a little indefinite, but the Secretary of the Committee will keep us advised. The meeting is adjourned.

Mr. Klein: Do you think India is the same way?

Thick What Hash: I think so, because the problem of the border between India and China has to be examined.

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Thick What Hash: Excuse me?

Mr. Klein: Then the only peaceful people are the Red Chinese?

Thick What Hash: No.

Mr. Klein: You say that the Indians are not peaceful.

Thick What Hash: I do not say that. I do not say that the only peaceful people are the Chinese.

Mr. Klein: Are there any peace negotiations or any negotiations going on now, to your knowledge, between India and Red China about adjusting these border incidents that seem to be constantly recurring from time to time?

Thick What Hash: I think there is a lack of understanding about these frontier limits. I think that the problem is not to back India

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1967

STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

OFFICIAL REPORT OF MINUTES  
OF  
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THURSDAY, DECEMBER 7, 1967  
ALISTAIR FRASER  
The Clerk of the House

RESPECTING

Report of the Department of External Affairs (1966)

WITNESS:

Mr. Clyde Sanger, Member of the Editorial Board,  
The Globe and Mail, Toronto, Ontario.

ROGER DURAND, F.R.C.  
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**EXTERNAL AFFAIRS**

*Chairman:* Mr. JEAN-EUDES DUBÉ

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 11

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STANDING COMMITTEE

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Chairman: Mr. Jean-Eudes Dubé

Vice-Chairman: Mr. W. B. Nesbitt

and

Mr. Allmand,	Mr. Goyer,	<sup>3</sup> Mr. Macdonald
Mr. Andras,	Mr. Harkness,	( <i>Rosedale</i> ),
Mr. Asselin	Mr. Hymmen,	Mr. Macquarrie,
( <i>Charlevoix</i> ),	Mr. Lambert,	Mr. McIntosh,
Mr. Basford,	<sup>1</sup> Mr. Langlois	Mr. Pilon,
Mr. Brewin,	( <i>Chicoutimi</i> ),	Mr. Prud'homme,
Mr. Churchill,	Mr. Laprise,	Mr. Thompson,
Mr. Forest,	<sup>2</sup> Mr. Lind,	Mr. Walker—(24).
Mr. Forrestall,		

(Quorum 13)

Fernand Despatie,  
Clerk of the Committee.

<sup>1</sup> Replaced Mr. Stanbury on November 29, 1967.

<sup>2</sup> Replaced Mr. Macdonald (*Rosedale*) on November 29, 1967.

<sup>3</sup> Replaced Mr. Groos on December 6, 1967.

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OTTAWA, 1967

ORDERS OF REFERENCE

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS  
WEDNESDAY, November 29, 1967.

*Ordered*,—That the names of Messrs. Langlois (*Chicoutimi*) and Lind be substituted for those of Messrs. Stanbury and Macdonald (*Rosedale*) on the Standing Committee on External Affairs.

WEDNESDAY, December 6, 1967.

*Ordered*,—That the name of Mr. Macdonald (*Rosedale*), be substituted for that of Mr. Groos on the Standing Committee on External Affairs.

Attest.

ALISTAIR FRASER,  
*The Clerk of the House of Commons.*

The Standing Committee on External Affairs met at 2:00 p.m.  
The Chairman, Mr. Dube, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Armand, Andrus, Brown, Charbonneau, Goy, Forest, Harkness, Hyman, Lambert, Langlois (*Chicoutimi*), Laprise, Macdonald (*Rosedale*), Macquarrie, McIntosh, Neshit, Pilon, Ringuette, Thompson, Walker (20).

In attendance: Mr. Clyde Sanger, Member of the Editorial Board, The Globe and Mail, Toronto, Ontario.

The Committee resumed consideration of the Report of the Department of External Affairs (1956).

The Chairman referred to a meeting of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure, held on November 29, 1967; he mentioned that invitations had been extended to Mr. Clyde Sanger and Professor R. C. Pratt to appear before the Committee and express their views on the subject of Rhodesia.

On motion of Mr. Macdonald (*Rosedale*), seconded by Mr. Macquarrie,

*Resolved*,—That reasonable living and travelling expenses be paid to Mr. Clyde Sanger and Professor R. C. Pratt who have been called to appear before the Committee.

There followed a discussion regarding witnesses who should be asked to appear before the Committee. The Chairman indicated that this matter would be considered by the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure.

The Chairman introduced Mr. Sanger, who made a statement regarding the Rhodesian situation.

Mr. Sanger was then questioned for the remainder of the meeting.

The Chairman thanked the witness for his appearance before the Committee.

At 12:25 p.m., the Committee adjourned to the end of the day.

Alistair Fraser,  
Clerk of the Committee



## MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

THURSDAY, November 30, 1967.

The Standing Committee on External Affairs, having been duly called to meet at 11.00 a.m. this day, *the following members were present*: Messrs. Allmand, Andras, Asselin (*Charlevoix*), Brewin, Churchill, Dubé, Forrestall, Goyer, Langlois (*Chicoutimi*), Laprise, Nesbitt (11).

*In attendance*: Mr. Maurice F. Strong, Director General, External Aid Office.

At 11.35 a.m., there being no quorum, the members present dispersed.

THURSDAY, December 7, 1967.

(13)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs met at 9.40 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Dubé, presided.

*Members present*: Messrs. Allmand, Andras, Brewin, Churchill, Dubé, Forest, Harkness, Hymmen, Lambert, Langlois (*Chicoutimi*), Laprise, Lind, Macdonald (*Rosedale*), Macquarrie, McIntosh, Nesbitt, Pilon, Prud'homme, Thompson, Walker (20).

*In attendance*: Mr. Clyde Sanger, Member of the Editorial Board, The Globe and Mail, Toronto, Ontario.

The Committee resumed consideration of the Report of the Department of External Affairs (1966).

The Chairman referred to a meeting of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure, held on November 29, 1967; he mentioned that invitations had been extended to Mr. Clyde Sanger and Professor R. C. Pratt to appear before the Committee and express their views on the subject of Rhodesia.

On motion of Mr. Macdonald (*Rosedale*), seconded by Mr. Macquarrie,

*Resolved*,—That reasonable living and travelling expenses be paid to Mr. Clyde Sanger and Professor R. C. Pratt who have been called to appear before this Committee.

There followed a discussion regarding witnesses who should be asked to appear before the Committee. The Chairman indicated that this matter would be considered by the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure.

The Chairman introduced Mr. Sanger, who made a statement pertaining to the Rhodesian situation.

Mr. Sanger was then questioned for the remainder of the meeting.

The Chairman thanked the witness for his appearance before the Committee.

At 12.25 p.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

Fernand Despatie,  
Clerk of the Committee.



## EVIDENCE

Thursday, December 7, 1967.

• (9:40 a.m.)

**The Chairman:** Gentlemen, we have a quorum. Your Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure met on November 29, 1967, as a result of which we extended invitations to Mr. Clyde Sanger and Professor R. C. Pratt to appear before the Committee and express their views on the subject of Rhodesia. Mr. Sanger is here this morning and Mr. Pratt will be present next Thursday.

Before I introduce Mr. Sanger I would like a motion that reasonable living and travelling expenses be paid to Mr. Clyde Sanger and Professor R. C. Pratt who have been called to appear before this Committee.

**Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale):** I so move.

**Mr. Macquarrie:** I second the motion.  
Motion agreed to.

**Mr. McIntosh:** Not knowing either one of these two gentlemen I take it that one is giving one side of the Rhodesian story and the other the other side.

**The Chairman:** I am not too sure about that. We will have to hear them first. Of course we have the statement that Mr. Sanger proposes to give but as yet we do not have one from Mr. Pratt.

**Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale):** Mr. Chairman, I think you will find that the views of Mr. Pratt and Mr. Sanger will be somewhat similar on most questions.

**Mr. McIntosh:** May I ask then, Mr. Chairman, if any arrangements have been made by the Steering Committee to get the other side of the story also.

**The Chairman:** Not yet but perhaps we should, after we have heard the evidence of these two witnesses.

**Mr. Brewin:** To say that there are two sides of the story may be a bit of an oversimplification but let us assume for now that there are two sides and no more. You will recall that the Steering Committee did propose calling a witness who might present a

different point of view if the evidence of the two witnesses we had seemed to be somewhat critical of the present regime in Rhodesia—I do not call it “government” because I doubt its legality. I do not know whether any such witness has been found yet but the Steering Committee felt that we should do that.

**Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale):** There had been some discussion of this question but one of the problems concerned was to find a qualified witness who for example might find himself in favour of the views of the Ian Smith government.

**The Chairman:** In any event, I presume that next Thursday's meeting will probably be the last one before the Christmas adjournment. If there is a feeling among Committee members, and I think there is, that we should have witnesses representing the other side then efforts will be made during the Christmas adjournment to find those witnesses.

**Mr. McIntosh:** Mr. Chairman, I have the feeling now that we are being brainwashed in respect of one side of the story only and I would like to hear both sides of it.

**The Chairman:** Maybe we are about to be brainwashed but we have not been brainwashed yet, because the witnesses have not testified.

**Mr. McIntosh:** Did you read the statement?

**The Chairman:** I have not had a chance yet.

**Mr. McIntosh:** If you had done your homework you would agree.

**The Chairman:** Once we have heard both witnesses the Steering Committee will meet again to consider calling a witness from the other side.

**Mr. Brewin:** Mr. McIntosh feels that any statement leading to one point of view is brainwashing.

**Mr. McIntosh:** You can draw your own conclusions.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** Mr. Chairman, Mr. Macdonald made some observations during one of our recent meetings concerning witnesses from other countries and while I do not actually agree with them I appreciated his point of view and understand his reasons. I have an objection to make about future witnesses and I would like to make it publicly. I object to calling before this Committee witnesses who wish to give evidence in respect of parts of the world in which they have never been and who, one might say, are self-appointed experts on the subject. Most of us in the Committee can read, most of us have university degrees or some equivalent degree, and I would like to make it clear right now that I object to Professor Pratt appearing before this Committee because I think that many of us can acquire the information he will be giving.

**Mr. Macdonald:** Mr. Chairman, perhaps on behalf of the witness you could set out his particular qualifications to talk on the question of Southern Africa.

**The Chairman:** I do not believe Mr. Nesbitt takes exception to this witness but, rather, the next one. In any event I will proceed with the peripheral qualifications of the witness.

**Mr. Brewin:** I take exception to Mr. Nesbitt's implied censure of Mr. Pratt.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** As far as I am concerned, you can take all the exceptions you like.

**Mr. Brewin:** He is a well qualified witness and, the Steering Committee decided to call him.

**The Chairman:** Thank you, gentlemen. Mr. Clyde Sanger was born in London, England in 1928. From 1949 to 1952 he read modern history at Brasenose College, Oxford. From 1952 to the present time he has been a journalist. From 1952 to 1957 he was with the London Daily Mail group. From 1957 to 1959 he was in Rhodesia first, as an Assistant Editor, and then Editor of the *Central African Examiner* which is a fortnightly magazine of comment established with the financial support of the Rhodesian Selection Trust Copper Company and *The Economist* newspaper in England.

From 1959 to February of 1967, he was with the *Manchester Guardian*. He was their only staff correspondent in Africa from June

1960 to 1965; based in Nairobi but travelling frequently to Rhodesia, Zambia, Malawi, as well as many other countries. He was also correspondent for *The Economist* from these various countries, and on a retainer basis as correspondent of the BBC African Service. He contributed to several other magazines on Africa, and contributed chapters to several handbooks on Africa. He was transferred in 1965 to cover the United Nations for *The Guardian* and followed the Rhodesian debates closely.

From February 1967 to the present he has been with *The Globe and Mail* as a member of the Editorial Board.

Mr. Sanger also wrote a book called *Central African Emergency* which was published in 1960.

**Mr. Clyde Sanger (Member of the Editorial Board, Toronto Globe and Mail):** Gentlemen, I am grateful for the invitation to appear before your Committee on the subject of Rhodesia, which I believe to be a crisis of particular significance for Canada. Its significance, in my view, lies in the fact that the authority of the United Nations Security Council is directly engaged since the imposition of selective mandatory sanctions last December, and even more in Rhodesia having become a crucial test case for principles of nonracialism and democracy in the Commonwealth.

I would like to make two short preliminary remarks before embarking on my main evidence. The first is that I understand you are subsequently hearing Professor Cranford Pratt. He and I know each other's view well and, in order to avoid wasting your time, we are attempting to avoid duplication beyond what is necessary for basic emphasis. And secondly, as a journalist I am particularly concerned to offer you facts, in hopes of sketching in more fully for you the present background, rather than to express an individual's opinions; but I trust any expression of opinion I make will be taken as my own, and not necessarily shared by my employers, the *Toronto Globe and Mail*.

• (9:50 a.m.)

The present Rhodesian regime came to power in the elections of December 1962; so that, if I first briefly outline the more significant bits of legislation and trends of administration by the Rhodesian Front party during those five years, it may shed light on what I consider the prevailing attitudes among the country's rulers.

The previous prime minister (1958-62), Sir Edgar Whitehead, had in his last years set a strong trend towards racial integration. He had attempted to break down segregation in hotels and public places; he brought in a constitution that opened parliament for the first time to African MPs; he began demolishing the rigid segregation of landholdings enforced under the 1941 Land Apportionment Act, first by buying up two large estates from the LonRho Company and resettling them with Africans, and then introducing a system under which a white farmer could gazette his land as "unscheduled", which was a preliminary to selling it to an African. He further announced that, if he won the 1962 elections, he would completely repeal the Land Apportionment Act, so opening for the first time the cities and towns and half the countryside to ownership or occupation by Africans; he also said he would integrate the Sixth Forms, as only two African schools—Goromonzi and Fletcher High—took students to university level, while white schools had many vacant places.

Sir Edgar lost the election, mainly because of these proposals. Only about 3,000 Africans voted, against some 69,000 whites. The campaign in that election centred around resistance to these measures of integration: the chairman of the Rhodesian Front, Fred Alexander, and its so-called "paymaster", familiarly known in Rhodesia as 'Boss' Lilford, had left Whitehead's party specifically because of his announced plans to repeal the Land Apportionment Act while Ian Smith had resigned from the same party in protest against the 1961 constitution. The Front's one positive plank was a vaguely worded thesis on "community development". In later months its main exponent in the Cabinet, Jack Howman, explained it could not be applied in towns or white farming areas because the population there was not homogeneous enough, and the single Independent MP Dr. Ahrn Palley, thereupon condemned it as "disguised apartheid".

These trends towards integration which Sir Edgar Whitehead has set were not only stopped but reversed. Not only were the sixth forms in government schools not integrated, but private schools which had accepted non-white pupils were told to discontinue this practice. In one case, a primary school started by white suburban housewives for servants' children was bulldozed to the ground. A

Municipal Amendment Act has been passed, which allows local authorities to restrict public amenities such as parks to members of one race, provided equal facilities are provided for those others who are excluded. Next year, the regime has announced, it will enforce the African (Urban Areas) Accommodation and Registration Act, which will limit the numbers of Africans living in white suburbs to domestic servants and it will mean that their wives and children will be sent off to live in African townships and reserves miles away. In September the Residential Areas (Protection) Bill was introduced, which is specially if tacitly aimed at preventing Asian businessmen from buying houses in white suburbs. At the Rhodesian Front congress in September-October, the Health Minister promised regulations enforcing complete separation of facilities and personnel in medical services. The Congress also passed resolutions calling for separate industrial councils for railway workers, and endorsing a policy of no multiracialism in schools.

These are some aspects of what a London *Times* correspondent recently called "an uncontrolled slide to the right".

The Ian Smith regime has continued government policy of financial support for the multiracial University College in Salisbury, where the student enrolment is at present 75 per cent white. The college has been a centre of opposition to the Rhodesian Front, and a year ago seven lecturers were briefly jailed and then deported, including one Canadian. Some 70 staff members resigned last year, but their places were filled by recruiting in South Africa and Britain. The Front has taken measures to increase its control over the university, for instance, by replacing the academic board's role, and in this instance its role in awarding scholarships to Africans with a panel of civil servants. The president of the Students Representative Council was recently charged under security legislation; he was acquitted, but the regime immediately placed him in restriction. It has powers to do so under the Preventive Detention Act which it renewed in 1964, or under emergency regulations; it has been regularly renewing the declaration of a state of emergency since October 1965.

There have also been attempts to end multiracial school sports. In mid-1967 the Education Ministry in a circular recommended that such fixtures should only be continued if

parent-teachers associations voted in favor of them. To official surprise the PTAs voted strongly for the continuance of such fixtures. The Ministry has now suggested that white school teams should only play away matches against nonwhite teams, and has said separate facilities must be provided for the different races.

A final bit of legislation recently passed that has been interpreted in racial terms is a law which provides for the expulsion or suspension of any MP convicted of a criminal offence—a very broad term in Rhodesia and it includes traffic infringements—as long as a two-thirds majority of parliament votes for it. Since the Rhodesian Front holds 50 of parliament's 65 seats, this law has been seen as a weapon to weed out any of the 14 African MPs (or the independent MP, Dr. Palley) if they nettle the regime too much.

At this point, I should perhaps pose—and try to answer—the question of what motives drive an administration to such measures. The 220,000 whites in Rhodesia are in a position of great privilege, and enjoying high standards of living which most of them could not attain to outside southern Africa. Although the white farmers are usually seen as the driving force behind the Front, and it can be fairly argued that the capital and skill and toil which they have invested entitle them to a position of prominence and influence, the main weight in the white electorate is supplied by the artisans, shopkeepers and middlerank civil servants. All these groups to a great extent rely for a continuance of their privileged position on measures of job reservation, and of school and residential segregation. If there is open competition from the country's 4 million Africans, competition based on equal opportunities in schooling, their whole way of life would be challenged. They could not all survive the competition in the way that whites in East Africa are able.

This is surely the motive behind the regime not only enforcing school segregation but also providing vastly unequal facilities. It may sound equal to say that African education is this year receiving 9.5 per cent of the budget expenditure and non-African education 9 per cent—but the ratio of population is 1:19, so that the amount spent on each African child at school is a tiny fraction of what is spent on each white child.

The regime claims a good record in providing wide primary education for African chil-

dren; and it is a good record, based on the pioneering work of Mr. Garfield Todd, who was premier from 1953-58. The regime hopes to provide full primary education (8 years) by 1972, which contrasts very well with the UNESCO target of six years' schooling for all in Africa by 1980. But the more important part of Mr. Todd's plan has been ignored, or drastically curtailed: a great extension of African secondary schools. The plan to build eight new secondary schools a year was discontinued after three years—Sir Edgar Whitehead, in fact, diverted this money to provide increased expenditure on police. In 1964, the RF Education Minister, Mr. A. P. Smith, announced a target of four years' secondary schooling for 25 per cent of those completing primary school. Last year this target was halved, so that only 1 in 8 of the Africans who successfully complete primary school can hope to have a secondary school education. Another 3 of those 8 can now hope for a two-year course of "vocational preparation"; the other 4 drop out. And there has been no more African schools opening sixth forms, so that the route to university is as restricted as ever.

• (10:00 a.m.)

On top of this, the regime has said that it will peg the African education vote to two per cent of the GNP. Since the African population has increased by one million in the last decade, with a three percent annual growth, while the GNP in the last six years has risen by a total of only 15 percent, it can be estimated that the amount spent on each African school-child will actually go down let alone increase sufficiently to provide for the more expensive secondary extensions.

I apologize if I have labored the question of education opportunities. But it is a fundamental question in Rhodesia for two reasons. First, because by training Africans only up to primary level, the white regime is simply satisfying demands for semiskilled labor while denying the students a full avenue of advancement. It is very similar to the pattern the Belgians set in the Congo. Secondly, qualification for a vote, either on the 'A' or the 'B' roll, depends on a combination of education and income in nearly every circumstance.

If Africans are to reform the country constitutionally, and provide better school and job opportunities for the mass of the coming

generation, they have to become voters; yet they cannot become an effective voting force until they have these opportunities. It is a vicious circle that they cannot break by themselves, and the whites, for reasons I have stated, are less than eager to break it for them.

It is, of course, the classic recipe for revolution: you educate people up to the point that they realize what they are missing. It is not the rural negro in Mississippi, nor the rural African in Matabeleland, that is the potential revolutionary. It is the negro who has migrated to a prospering northern city, and the 40,000 Rhodesian Africans who each year have to drop out of the school system with half or quarter of an education, that will become a sniper or a guerilla.

Professor Pratt, I understand, will speak more about the constitution, the "Tiger proposals" and the Wilson-Smith negotiations than I will. So I would just like to touch on a couple of constitutional points. First, that Mr. Ian Smith in these negotiations tried several ways to reduce the African voters' influence. Secondly, he has at the same time tried to build up the political power of the chiefs.

To enlarge on these two points, the 1961 constitution has a "crossvoting" device, which is a last remnant of Cecil Rhodes' common roll. The electorate is divided into 'A' or high qualification, and 'B' or lower qualification, rolls. Each voter has two votes, one for a candidate in one of the 50 constituencies, the other for a candidate in one of the 15 electoral districts. I am sorry if it is rather complicated, it is probably easier to see on paper than to describe in words. The 'A' roll voter's vote counts in full in all circumstances in a constituency, as does the 'B' roll vote in an electoral district. But the 'A' roll votes that are cast in a particular electoral district, or the 'B' roll votes cast in a particular constituency, are liable to be devalued to count only 25 percent of the total there. In a constituency where 2000 'A' roll votes and 2500 'B' roll votes are cast, the 'B' roll votes would be devalued to 500, and therefore each 'B' roll vote would be only one-fifth its normal value. The idea behind a crossvoting system is that it encourages middle-of-the-road candidates who appeal to either race, for the 'B' roll is predominantly African. It could also have been an accelerator in the transfer of power to Africans, because when African and white liberal voters reached about 35 to 40 percent of the 'A' roll, this

extra potential 25 percent weight from the 'B' roll could push them over into a majority.

So, throughout negotiations with Mr. Wilson Mr. Ian Smith kept up demands for the abolition of the crossvoting system. He also wanted the 15 'B' roll or electoral district seats "phased out" as African candidates begin winning 'A' roll or constituency seats. Alternatively, he wanted to "phase in" 15 "European reserved" seats on top of the 50 constituency ones. All these moves can be seen as tactics to delay majority rule.

Mr. Wilson fought off all these proposals, and in the talks aboard HMS Tiger won Smith's tentative agreement to a constitution that increased the electoral district from 15 to 17, reserved 15 of the existing 50 constituency seats for Europeans instead of adding 15, threw the 'B' roll open to any Rhodesian citizen over the age of 30, and retained crossvoting. This was, however, a hollow victory for Mr. Wilson for the only real advance in it was the addition of two seats in the control of 'B' roll voters.

To make hundreds of thousands of Africans eligible for the 'B' roll did not, as the British White Paper claimed, satisfy the third of Mr. Wilson's Six Principles—which was "immediate improvement in the political status of the African population". It was bartering away independence for something phoney, for their votes were bound to be drastically devalued for constituency elections. It increased the dangers of Africans being enraged in frustration at being half-offered something which was then removed from reach, as I suggested earlier was being done over education.

I am sorry to have been longwinded on this point, but it aptly illustrates the way Mr. Wilson got into detailed arguments and, having won a point at this level, or sometimes only having held the line, believed he had won, or pretended to believe he had won, a substantial victory, whereas, in fact, he had lost sight of essentials.

The other constitutional point, I want to make, concerns the chiefs.

The Rhodesian Front has done a great deal to bolster the power of the chiefs; and Mr. Stan Morris, former chief native commissioner, is one of the most influential men around Ian Smith today. The core of activity is with the 26-man Council of Chiefs. The Front's motives seem to be to produce evidence, by

the word of mouth of the chiefs, that Rhodesian Africans want independence from Britain, and want it on the terms that Smith and his men propose. This they have done, to some extent, at the Domboshawa Indaba in 1964 and two later indabas which are meetings, with Commonwealth Relations Secretary Arthur Bottomley in 1965 which I attended. The question is how representative are the opinions of the chiefs as expressed at these two indabas, when not more than 10 spoke? I suggest anyone should have strong reservations on this matter, and here are some reasons for my statement.

Since 1959 African political parties have been banned from holding meetings or organizing in the tribal reserves. This was Sir Edgar Whitehead's way of recognizing how successful the African National Congress had been in mobilizing the protest feelings against destocking and a good deal of bureaucratic injustice in the implementing of the native Land Husbandry Act. So the government-paid chiefs have had a clear hand in wielding influence for eight years. Yet the enormous turnout for the African nationalist-run referendum on the constitution in 1962 showed to me, and I went round the reserves on that occasion, that there was a quite strong ferment of feeling in the reserves. It is unlikely to have lessened in the last five years. While the regime's finance minister, Mr. John Wrathall, showed concern in this year's budget to expand the subsistence economy and draw more Africans into the cash system, his statistics showed that the value of African-grown agricultural cash sales was lower in 1966 than in 1957, and amounted to a pathetic \$13 million dollars among nearly 4 million rural Africans.

The poverty in the reserves is increasing frighteningly, and although experiments in African teagrowing, cottonplanting and so on have begun, they are 30 years behind East Africa in turning these into cash crops producing a return of any impact for Africans. So the chiefs are presiding over an impoverished and demoralised people. It is such an obvious problem that Professor Sadie of Stellenbosch University, the intellectual home of South Africa's apartheid policies, concentrated on it in his recent Economic Development report for the Rhodesian regime, and recommended irrigation and other schemes. They have been recommended before; for instance in the great Sabi-Lundi scheme for south-eastern Rhodesia. The only parts of that

scheme that have so far been implemented are the white areas of sugar estates. The rationalisation is offered that white areas have to be developed first, to prime the development in the other parts.

Even though poor, it can be argued, the rural Africans could still be supporting their chiefs and the opinions that their chiefs express. All I can say is that I believe there is great if disorganized discontent in rural areas; I believe that the large majority of minor chiefs do not express their views anyway and may well have been intimidated by the regime's officials. At the Domboshawa Indaba a paratroop-drop display was staged for their Sunday entertainment while gathered there and before meeting Mr. Bottomley they were taken to the meeting-place two days early and held incommunicado; and I believe that the few chiefs who spoke out at those Indabas are obviously in a position of privilege and official importance which no government has offered them before. When Mr. Bottomley asked them to show how they were the true voice of the people, their only reply was to say they were insulted by the question.

• (10:00 a.m.)

Again, I have been lengthy on this point. But it was a central issue between Wilson and Smith, when they argued over the "test of acceptability" of an independence constitution. Wilson began by talking of a referendum of all the people, Smith of accepting the chiefs' word. As well, the "Tiger" idea of establishing a Senate, to review legislation and to take part in any fundamental amendments to the Constitution, involved the chiefs. To amend the Specially Entrenched clauses would (under the Tiger scheme) require an affirmative vote of three-quarters of the Assembly and the Senate voting together. In a first election under the Tiger plan, there would probably be 17 elected Africans in the Assembly of 67 members, and 8 elected Africans in the 26-man Senate. The others would be whites, plus 6 chiefs in the Senate. So the 25 elected Africans would be just sufficient to frustrate an amendment; and perhaps that made Mr. Wilson think he had won another victory, because Ian Smith had wanted a higher proportion of chiefs in the Senate—which would have allowed amendments if the chiefs alone had voted with the whites. Again it was a hollow victory, and Smith was the winner, the real winner. For if two elected Africans were bamboozled (as happened with Jasper Savanhu

and Mike Hove in the Federal Parliament in 1958 in similar circumstances) or even bribed, amendments could be pushed through. It was certainly a far frailer guarantee than the provisions in the 1961 constitution, which stipulated a separate referendum among each of the country's four racial groups, the Asians and the coloured, who number about 22,000 in all, being considered the other two racial groups.

I do not intend to linger over the armoury of "security" legislation enacted since 1959 (although I could elaborate during question time!) These laws have been continuously strengthened since the first Preventive Detention Act which Whitehead intended should lapse in 1964. The Law and Order (Maintenance) Act of 1960 was given an amendment in 1963 that stipulated a mandatory death sentence for a wide range of offences connected with carrying inflammable containers, not simply "petrol bombs". I have a copy of that law with me, if you would like the exact words. This year the mandatory death sentence was introduced for anyone found in unauthorized possession of arms or ammunition or explosives—and the onus is on the accused to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he did not plan to endanger law and order.

There is also the Unlawful Organizations Act, with very wide scope in banning meetings and gatherings. The leaders of the two African parties have been detained without trial since April 1964, and about 550 of their supporters are now in restriction or prison on similar grounds. The number of Africans condemned to death is now more than 90, and I believe a majority of those came under the 'hanging clause' of the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act. So far, none has been executed since UDI although it was announced some months ago that three of them, including two petrol-bombers, would be hanged. Britain has warned Clifford Dupont, the "Officer Administering the Government", that he will be held responsible for their deaths if he signs any execution warrants.

Nor do I need to linger over why the Rhodesian Government made its illegal declaration of independence. I think it should be clear what kind of society they wished to perpetuate, and that they wished to throw off the last British restraints. Under the 1961 Constitution Britain had handed over its "reserved powers" to disallow specific Rhodesian

legislation, and the mechanism it substituted—a Rhodesian Constitutional Council of 12 members—was soon seen to be ineffective in stopping laws. For the Smith Government either used a Certificate of Urgency to bypass the Council, or else (as in the case of the Terrorism Bill last month) overruled the Council's objection by using its two-thirds majority of parliament. But Britain has still retained a theoretical power (theoretical, because it has never used it in 42 years till UDI) to legislate for Rhodesia in a way that would overrule local laws. It was a "last resort" power which Duncan Sandys (now arguing Mr. Smith's case among his fellow Conservatives) insisted on Britain keeping when he was Colonial Secretary in 1961.

The one significant fact brought out by Mr. Kenneth Young's book "*Rhodesia and Independence*" (a book very sympathetic to, if not actually authorized by, Ian Smith) is that at no stage did Britain take the initiative in pressing the Rhodesian Government before UDI to make reforms. Whether Conservative or Labor, the British Government only reacted to demands from Salisbury for independence, by saying a grant of independence would have to be linked to changes that guaranteed advance for the country's majority. Britain was only too content to let sleeping dogs lie; but this dog was the barking, not sleeping, sort.

#### Sanctions and the United Nations:

This meeting is taking place just as the UN Secretariat analysis of trade with Rhodesia since December 1966 (the date when the Security Council imposed selective sanctions on a wide range of Rhodesian exports and a few imports) is due. I telephoned the United Nations yesterday and was told that it would be out within a week. So it is hard to make really useful comments. However it seems clear that, in the first year of voluntary sanctions to December 1966, Rhodesian exports fell by 36 per cent, or about \$180 million. The main sufferer was, of course, tobacco. This last year, it is believed there has been little extra bite from sanctions: while some markets have been closed by the UN directive having effect, the Rhodesians have become more expert at organizing sales through loopholes. A recent Chatham House study suggested that no less than two-thirds of Rhodesia's exports were finding their way to markets through South Africa and Mozambique, where they are transhipped with new labels and forms.

The deduction that there has been no appreciable drop in Rhodesia's export earnings this year is made from the fact that the regime felt able to increase its imports for the first half of 1967 by some 20 per cent over the 1966 period's level. Mr. Wrathall claimed in his budget speech in July, that 368 new manufacturing projects—mostly substituting for imports—had been started since UDI. He also claimed non-African employment in May was 2,400 higher than in May 1966, and African employment was up by 12,000. These figures do not include agriculture, in which there has obviously been a decrease in jobs as he himself said. But it is clear that sanctions at their present level are far from effective, and that Portugal has been as flagrant as South Africa in its violation of the Security Council directive: three-quarters of Rhodesia's petroleum supplies are entering by rail through Mozambique, while in Portugal itself there are sheds stocked with Rhodesian tobacco and other products.

I would like to say a final word on Canada's role.

● (10:20 a.m.)

First, that although Mr. Paul Martin lays heavy emphasis on UN action rather than on Commonwealth action, there are many Commonwealth states which would wish the Commonwealth to take initiative, which see Canada as the crucial link between the races in the Commonwealth, and which hope that Canada will therefore take the initiative in calling a Commonwealth conference on Rhodesia. This looking to Canada for a lead is to a considerable extent based on admiration for the role which Mr. Lester Pearson played at the two 1966 Commonwealth conferences where Rhodesia was the main topic (Lagos and London). Action by the Commonwealth is complementary to, and not at odds with, any action undertaken at the United Nations. A Commonwealth understanding on future moves would make agreement at the UN so much easier to achieve: for if Canada, Britain, India and Nigeria were this month agreed on a detailed approach for the Security Council, it would be simple to assure a majority among the 15 members. As well as this, an attempt by Canada to draw the diverging states of the Commonwealth back together on common objectives for Rhodesia would be a very worthwhile, and perhaps vital, move if considered only in the context

of the Commonwealth's own future. My second point flows from the first, and I do not think it is an unimportant detail. Canada has been setting up a number of embassies and high commissions recently around Africa at a rate, I think, of two new ones a year. They have been placed in Tunis, Addis Ababa, Kinshasa (Congo), and so on. There is still no high commission in Lusaka, the capital of Zambia. Zambia was added to the Congo "parish" of the Canadian Ambassador in Kinshasa, who for a year had the link of an oil-airlift operating between the two countries with RCAF planes. The new Canadian High Commissioner in Tanzania will be accredited to Zambia—a more logical arrangement, except that I doubt if he will have much time to devote to Zambia. Yet Zambia, as neighbour and to some extent Siamese-twin of Rhodesia, is in the thick of this crisis. It has been the principal hostage in the sanctions battle. It has a government under President Kenneth Kaunda disposed to be very friendly to Canada, and appreciative of Canada's past help. With its mineral wealth it has the potential to lead that whole part of Africa in development. And in the immediate crisis it is an important information centre; yet if Canada is relying on British sources for information from Zambia, these are likely to be inadequate since Dr. Kaunda's relations with British officials are strained by disillusionment and frustration.

Whatever else Canada chooses to do in the Rhodesian crisis—and I personally hope she does a great deal, to make her worthy of the trust which many Commonwealth leaders place in her—an elementary step would be to place a high commission in Lusaka.

I apologize for the length of this testimony, and I thank you for your attention.

**The Chairman:** Thank you, Mr. Sanger.

**Mr. McIntosh:** Mr. Sanger, I take it from what you have said that you feel that the Africans are quite responsible and capable of taking over the government of Rhodesia at the present time. Is that a correct assumption of what you have said?

**Mr. Sanger:** No, I did not say that, Mr. McIntosh.

**Mr. McIntosh:** You do not believe that?

**Mr. Sanger:** I believe that the country needs a quite lengthy period of transition to majority rule. I believe that Britain needs to

go in and take a direct role, as she carried all the other countries of East and Central Africa through a period of direct rule by colonial or Commonwealth Office officials, for perhaps a period of five to seven years, as people are trained. There are so few Africans in the administration now that there has to be a crash—not a crash program because that suggests things being done haphazardly—rather an intensive program of training of African administrators; this was recognized at the Lagos Commonwealth Conference when a committee was set up to provide training in Commonwealth countries for African administrators. I think about 170 of them are now being trained throughout the Commonwealth, including about 20 or 30 in Canada.

**Mr. McIntosh:** Why do you say that you think Britain should go in and conduct a transition period? Do you not believe that the whites in Africa or in Rhodesia at the present time are capable of conducting a similar transition period?

**Mr. Sanger:** No, I do not think so. The word "capable" has two meanings, I think, in this context, has it not? I certainly believe they are capable of administering a government, but I do not believe that they are capable in their hearts of administering a government that is moving in transition to majority rule. I believe that the whole deplorable period of these last few years has so set apart attitudes like that, that it would be extremely difficult for many of those people, and they cannot be expected—and I do sympathize with their attitudes in this respect—to make a complete turnover to leading the country to majority rule from this step. I think a lot of them will want to leave for jobs in other countries. It is a very different situation from what happened in Kenya, or East Africa or Zambia, where most of the administration officials were expatriates who knew that at the end of their time they were going to get a lump sum compensation and move off to some other job. These people are men who believe that they have a deep stake in their country, there, and they are the instruments for bringing in this particular government, the Rhodesian Front, and they have been linked closely to that particular régime. I think it can be very difficult for them to be the main force in turning the government over to majority rule, and that they will inevitably need a number of British

or other officials from outside to help over this transitional period. I believe that in fact, when the time comes, both the whites and the Africans will accept this, because of mutual fear of each other; and I see this, if you like, as a buffer force operating for that brief time.

**Mr. McIntosh:** I cannot agree with you in that Britain could go in and do the job better than the people that have had the experience and have worked with these people for the number of years that the whites in Rhodesia have worked with the Africans. I say that because I do not think that Britain could come to Canada and tell us how to run our affairs any better than we can ourselves.

**Mr. Sanger:** I do not think that is a comparable situation, is it?

**Mr. McIntosh:** Why not?

**Mr. Sanger:** Because you have a deep division in the country at the moment between the different races, and you need some sort of plaster or cement that is going to bind these two together in the years ahead. This is the job—if you study the history of Northern Rhodesia, now Zambia—that the expatriate officials were doing, as indeed they did in Kenya. Now there is a much more happy situation in Kenya with a great number of those former white settlers, as they were called in those days, staying on and a good number of them becoming Kenya citizens. But the job that was done was by this, if you like, dispassionate group of expatriates who received the directive that was made by a Conservative government, Mr. Macleod's, in London, that Kenya should have majority rule and carried the job out. And they carried it out over four years, from 1960 to the end of 1963. I am thinking of a similar period for Rhodesia, although the bitterness has gone deeper in Rhodesia, and with every month that goes on, will go that much deeper.

**Mr. McIntosh:** I cannot agree with you that Britain did a good job in Zambia because I understand they got their independence on the pretext that they wanted to have a democratic form of government; and now, after getting their independence, they say that this type of government is not for them. This is what I understand the leader of Zambia says at the present time.

What I want to ask you more about is regarding page 8 of your brief where you say:

For if two elected Africans were bamboozled...

as happened with these two chaps that you have mentioned,

... in the Federal Parliament in 1958 in similar circumstances, or even bribed,

do you not feel that that is still a fear of the whites in Rhodesia—that these people that are elected can be bamboozled and can be bribed?

**Mr. Sanger:** Do you mean if there was majority rule?

**Mr. McIntosh:** Yes.

**Mr. Sanger:** I am giving here an instance of these men being bamboozled under Sir Roy Welensky's government. They were federal M.P.'s in 1958 and the case that I am quoting was the Federal Constitution Amendments Bill which enlarged the House, but decreased in fact the ratio of African members in the enlarged House.

**Mr. McIntosh:** But you said they were African M.P.'s; they were not white M.P.s.

**Mr. Sanger:** They were African M.P.s in Sir Roy Welensky's party; they were the two vital votes that would have given them—and in fact did give them—the two-thirds majority at that time.

**Mr. Lambert:** Is that a subjective view, Mr. Sanger? That is a rather strong term—"and even bribery." One does not toss around these terms lightly. This is a judgment decision—perhaps in your view. I am questioning the use of the terms. You would be quite right in that their judgment was erroneous, but with the greatest respect I do not think the terms that you use are right, or justified.

**Mr. Brewin:** Would the witness answer Mr. Lambert's comments?

• (10:30 a.m.)

**Mr. Sanger:** Yes, I will; surely. I really do believe that those two, Jasper Savanhu and Mike Hove, were bamboozled. You can call it a subjective judgment if you like. The fact is that the African Affairs Board headed by a very notable man, Sir John Moffat, of that old missionary family in Rhodesia, protested against this particular Bill to the British Parliament and the British Conservative Government, at that time, which did have the power

to ask for it to be delayed under the Queen's pleasure, did not do so although there was an acrimonious debate in Britain.

The point I am making is that Sir John Moffat and the other whites who were on this African Affairs Board, who were sitting for African interests—they had whites sitting for African interests in the Federal Assembly—obviously took a different point of view from Savanhu and Hove. They were not members of the federal party and I know, I was there at that time, that immense pressures were brought on Savanhu and Hove. You may object to the use of the word "bribe" as being particularly strong and perhaps it is a rather dramatic word, but Savanhu was offered a parliamentary secretaryship very soon afterwards. Is this bribery or is it promotion of a man who obviously sees things in the way the Government wishes? I do not know.

**Mr. Lambert:** This is something you can rationalize on the decision of many elected persons who are subsequently promoted, unless there is a greater proof.

**Mr. Sanger:** My point about this, without going too deeply into these two words, on which we all have suggested views, is that the guarantees against removing the most sacred and entrenched parts of the constitution were made that much more frail than had been made in the 1961 constitution under which Mr. Duncan Sandys, a Conservative, negotiated.

**Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale):** Mr. Chairman, I have a supplementary question. Was the missionary viewpoint that there had been undue influence brought up on these two individuals and was that expressed to the British Government?

**Mr. Sanger:** I cannot tell you that. I think they concentrated on the constitutional details, and tried to impress upon Britain their extreme disappointment that Mr. Savanhu and Mr. Hove did not vote the same way and therefore frustrated the amendment. I assume they did not want to talk that way about colleagues.

**Mr. McIntosh:** On page three, Mr. Sanger, you say:

A final bit of legislation recently passed that has been interpreted in racial terms is a law which provides for the expulsion or suspension of any MP convicted of a criminal offence...

Do you see anything wrong with that? We have that in Canada, do we not?

**Mr. Sanger:** As I put in parentheses, a criminal offence is a far broader term there than it is here.

**Mr. McIntosh:** What difference does that make? If it is a criminal offence certainly there should be some conviction.

**Mr. Sanger:** Because under some minor infringement of the law, they are liable to be expelled or suspended from Parliament.

**Mr. McIntosh:** But who made the laws, who voted for the laws, who demanded laws?

**Mr. Sanger:** The majority in Parliament.

**Mr. McIntosh:** That is right.

**Mr. Sanger:** The majority being of this single Rhodesian Front Party.

**Mr. McIntosh:** All the laws in other countries are not the same as they are in Canada. They have laws for certain reasons there and if this is a law of the country, certainly they should be suspended.

**Mr. Sanger:** Yes, but the point I am making is that this is a law passed by a government that was voted in by an electorate of 73,000 people in a country of 4½ million.

**Mr. McIntosh:** In the next paragraph you say, "...220,000 whites in Rhodesia are in a position of great privilege, and enjoying high standards of living most of them could not attain to outside southern Africa."

On what basis do you make such a statement as that?

**Mr. Sanger:** This is quite easily explained but it would take some time to go into cost of living and so on.

**Mr. McIntosh:** I would like the explanation.

**Mr. Sanger:** For example, you could have two servants in your house. I could produce a budget for you for someone over a single month in which the wife and the husband would earn, say \$600 between them. This is small by Canadian standards but on this budget they could afford at least three or four servants whom they would pay \$18 a month each—a house servant and someone running their garden; they would all have cars.

**Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale):** Would they not have these privileges in Britain?

**Mr. Sanger:** They would certainly not have them.

**Mr. McIntosh:** But they would certainly have more than \$600 a month.

**Mr. Sanger:** The actual figure of what they have is not really the thing you would want to compare so much as what they can get with the money they have there.

**Mr. McIntosh:** While you were in Rhodesia, did you live at the same standard as you do in Canada, or better?

**Mr. Sanger:** I was not married when I was in Rhodesia. I have got four children.

**Mr. McIntosh:** On page four you also say:

"I apologize if I have labored the question of educational opportunities. But it is a fundamental question in Rhodesia for two reasons. First, because by training Africans only up to primary level, the white regime is simply satisfying demands for semi-skilled labor while denying the students a full avenue of advancement."

Is this just your own opinion, or is this a fact?

**Mr. Sanger:** I think this surely derives from all I have said before. I can give you many more on African education figures if you would like them but I thought I made it clear that the whole mass of African children could not now expect more than eight years primary schooling. They are being schooled in those last years in a language which is not their basic language. They may even drop back to bare literacy with only eight years schooling, but, as I have said, they learn enough of what they are missing. They have got a taste of the bigger world which they did not have before, which creates a large group of discontented, young unemployed people and these are the basis for the guerrilla bands that are growing up.

**Mr. McIntosh:** Talking about the guerrilla bands which you mention in the last paragraph of page four, are they not led by educated Africans or are they all the type of person you are speaking about here?

**Mr. Sanger:** It is very hard to give you details because they are secretive about it, but I can tell you that the leader of the

guerrillas who is leading the ZANU group based in Zambia at this moment is a man called Herbert Chitepo. Herbert Chitepo came to Canada in February of this year and made a tour. He was the first African to become a lawyer in Rhodesia. An amendment to the Land Apportionment Act had to be passed to allow him to practice in chambers in Salisbury because Africans are not allowed to occupy chambers in any city or town or occupy premises for work. He was present at the constitutional talks in 1961 as a constitutional adviser. He is a poet, an abstract painter and, if I may make a suggestive judgment, a man of peace in normal circumstances.

**Mr. McIntosh:** Are not we all?

**Mr. Sanger:** Yes. I hope we are. He went off to Tanzania and became the Director of Public Prosecutions, a very high job in a neighbouring government and at UDI, he had been there for three years, he has five children, he felt that the situation had reached such a stage that however far it was away from his normal attitude, he had to become an activist, his country, to him, mattered more than the job he was doing. In fact, he completely changed his way of life and, is organizing guerrilla warfare. I find this one of the most pathetic sides of the story, that a man of such capabilities and talent and peaceful attitudes should be thrown into such a horrible position.

**Mr. McIntosh:** I have other questions, Mr. Chairman, but will ask only one. You say you have figures there and I have also seen figures which led me to believe that the effort the Rhodesian Government is presently making with regard to education, financially and proportionately, is much greater than any other country in Africa, it almost supersedes that effort made in Great Britain for education per taxpayer and per dollar of gross national product. You have a figure at the bottom of page 3, where you say the ratio population is one to nineteen. I was wondering how many of those 19 would be able to attend educational facilities that were made available? Is that a fair proportion, one to nineteen? Can these people who are on reserves, or in tribal areas, attend these schools? You also said something about not being taught in their basic language. Do you advocate that the teaching be in their basic language?

**Mr. Sanger:** There are about three questions there.

**Mr. McIntosh:** Yes, I realize that.

• (10:40 a.m.)

**Mr. Sanger:** One to nineteen; I think you would certainly find that the proportion of school age Africans is higher than the proportion of school age Europeans. There is the population explosion. There is less birth control practised among Africans than among Europeans proportionately, and the health services that have been provided, not only in Rhodesia but elsewhere in Africa, have created a population explosion. Therefore, I think that those figures are perfectly fair. In fact, it is an understatement, really, of the African needs for schooling.

You ask whether they are far from educational facilities. The enormous number of schools in Rhodesia have been built by missions, and only very few are government schools. The government pays the mission school teachers and, therefore, the subsidy goes in that way. These schools have been built where there was a population by the missions going to those areas, so that I think there is a good spread of them, and I think that the present government is extending theirs. They are attempting to set up African District Councils under the chiefs and the population have to petition to have a Council if they want a further school in the area, so they are extending it at that base level.

But the point I was trying to bring home is that although Rhodesia has this excellent record at the primary level, it is not carrying it on to the area in which it is most needed. This is, to my mind, extremely dangerous. I spent a lot of time in the Congo in 1960 and 1961, and what was evident to me was that the Belgians had trained people to do the semi-skilled jobs of being, perhaps, a health assistant in a clinic—a top job of that sort—or a game ranger or something of this sort, or a primary school teacher perhaps.

Lumumba, if you remember was a Post Office clerk; Tshombe, more by the private enterprise of the family and coming from a chiefly family, had some stores, but none of these people had any training at any high level. President Mobutu was a journalist in the last years before independence. The level has been cut off at this point and consequently when the Belgians abruptly left—and therefore I am not saying that there should

be any abrupt change in Rhodesia—there was chaos. I believe very sincerely that the Rhodesian regime at this time is storing up for itself a chaotic situation by not opening up the channels of education to secondary schools and universities as far as they can. Having started on the process of education you surely have to carry it all they way in order to get the best potential out of people and in order to avoid a volcanic eruption half way up.

**Mr. McIntosh:** Thank you.

**Mr. Brewin:** Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the witness whether he thinks the Commonwealth, the multi-racial Commonwealth, can survive if the sanctions imposed by the United Nations fail to bring about any change in the present situation in Rhodesia. By change I mean, of course, a change which would at least show some promise of bringing about majority rule in Rhodesia.

**Mr. Sanger:** I would like to quote in reply to that question a number of other people's views.

Mr. Arnold Smith, when he was here delivering his centennial professorship lecture at the University of Toronto, said that he had believed the Commonwealth would break up with a bang over Rhodesia in the first days. It had not done so. He suggested the bigger danger was that the Commonwealth would just fall apart with a sort of whimper of people being disinterested and not feeling there was any core of understanding and meeting there. So his feeling seems to be that there could be danger in the Commonwealth just gradually drifting apart, and I think this has been seen with Tanzania breaking off diplomatic relations with Britain; relying on Canada as the bridge between Tanzania and Britain; with Dr. Kaunda saying, this is the end of a love affair with the labour government; saying very strong words about Mr. Wilson and, at the same time, writing to the Canadian government appreciative letters during this last month. That was Mr. Arnold Smith's view.

A rather stronger attitude was taken by Bishop Huddleston of Masasi who, for the last seven years, has been in Southern Tanzania and who said during the Toronto international teach-in that he believed the Commonwealth would break up over Rhodesia; there were no "ifs" and "buts", it would break up over Rhodesia.

Mr. Garfield Todd, the past premier, whom I mentioned in this and who was also in Toronto, said that there was very great danger of this, and when he was here called for Canada to call a Commonwealth conference on Rhodesia.

**Mr. Brewin:** Then may I summarize it: Do you agree with these people that the existence of the Commonwealth is at stake in this problem about Rhodesia.

**Mr. Sanger:** Yes, I sincerely do. I think you can see this in the United Nations where the Commonwealth caucus is supposed to meet every month.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** It has not met for seven years.

**Mr. Sanger:** It does meet, in fact, to listen to outsiders of some interest.

**Mr. Brewin:** Then I take it it is your suggestion...

**Mr. Sanger:** No, it did meet when Mr. Brown came to the Security Council last December, but they are suppose to meet each month and they rotate the Chairman each month.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** Mr. Chairman, on a question of privilege, I was the Chairman of the Canadian Delegation for seven years in the United Nations, and I have been there ever since. It did meet in 1958 and 1960. Then it discontinued its meetings in 1961 and they have not been held on an ad hoc basis from time to time. We used to have a weekly meeting every Wednesday, but it finally dissolved about 1961.

**Mr. Brewin:** I take it, Mr. Sanger, that it is your recommendation that Canada, by reason of Mr. Pearson's contributions in the past and the confidence that other nations in the Commonwealth have, should try and coordinate Commonwealth policy with a view to making sanctions effective.

**Mr. Sanger:** I think the timing for this is going to be difficult. I think it very likely that there will be a Security Council meeting on the subject first. The trade analysis is due out in a few days and the likely result of this is that someone on the Security Council will call a meeting on this. Whether this results in a tightening of sanctions or not is one matter, but I still believe, in agreement with you, that there is a second job to be done of a Commonwealth Conference being called—and

there has not been one since September, 1966—in order to try to arrest this drifting apart of Commonwealth countries on a subject which is absolutely vital to the non-racial principles of the Commonwealth.

**Mr. Brewin:** Just one further line of questions, Mr. Sanger. You mention here that one of the reasons the sanctions have not been effective is the flagrant violation of the sanctions by Portugal and you also mention South Africa. Is not the probable future existence of the Portuguese colonial regime tied up with maintaining a white minority rule in Rhodesia? Can you really solve the Rhodesian problem by any sanctions without dealing with the situation in the Portuguese colonial territory?

**Mr. Sanger:** I think this is an extremely difficult question to answer. The British policy throughout has been to try to isolate the Rhodesian problem, realizing the very great economic problems involved in confronting South Africa. I think Portugal presents a very different picture. I agree that the future of their overseas territories is tied up to some extent with the prolongation of a white regime in Rhodesia, but I think the set-up in Mozambique, and to a lesser extent in Angola, is more,—I hesitate to use the word “liberal” when I cannot make it a lower case “l”—is more generous in its policies and there have been, in the past, movements towards a broad-based government in Mozambique, but it is now in a stage of fierce guerilla warfare in the north and so attitudes there have certainly tightened. But my point in underlining the violations by Portugal was to suggest that this is the area on which the Security Council, backed by the Commonwealth, could move in bringing pressure more on Portugal at this time than on South Africa. Ideally, she ought to bring pressure on both, but one recognizes the realities of this and Portugal is in a far more vulnerable position to world opinion and world pressures than is South Africa.

• (10:50 a.m.)

**Mr. Brewin:** I put the situation to you, then, that the Portuguese colonies constitute the weak link as far as enforcing sanctions are concerned, but on the other side of the picture, they constitute the weak link in that effective international action could operate there, perhaps, to make sanctions effective.

**Mr. Sanger:** Yes, I agree, and, therefore, pressures are being exerted on both sides.

The South Africans are extremely keen to promote a big hydro-electric scheme in Mozambique at this time, I think in order to shore up the attitudes of Portugal in the future of Mozambique because military expenditures is a heavy drain on their budget; it comes, I think, to almost half of it.

**Mr. Brewin:** A little better than half.

**Mr. McIntosh:** Before you leave the subject of sanctions, could I ask a supplementary question?

At the top of page 7, Mr. Sanger, you say that poverty in reserves is increasing frighteningly. This is in Rhodesia.

**Mr. Sanger:** Yes.

**Mr. McIntosh:** Could that be a result of the sanctions imposed on Rhodesia?

**Mr. Sanger:** No, When I gave the figures at the bottom of the previous page I was quoting figures to show that, in fact, the value of cash sales out of the reserves—African reserves—was lower than 10 years ago. That figure related to the year of voluntary sanctions, but I could quote the figure of the previous year.

**Mr. McIntosh:** Is that not a result of the sanctions? The volume has gone down because of sanctions; they cannot sell their produce?

**Mr. Sanger:** No, the reason for this—if I could quote you the figure of the previous year—is that there has not been an extension of cash crops into the area. There are several reasons this.

There was a booklet written some years ago by an agricultural officer in which he lays out these reasons. The Land Husbandry Act was instituted from about 1955 onwards. It divided the reserves into, basically, eight-acre holdings and communal grazing land on poor sandy soil, for the most part, because the reserves are on more sandy soil than other parts of Rhodesia. Anyone who was not farming on that land at that time lost all title to land, so this meant that there were immediately a lot of people who were landless. If they went to town and lost their jobs there, they were without any security at all. That is one group.

The other group is the group that were set down on eight acres of land. The Land Husbandry Act was implemented, as everyone admits, in a great hurry without much

regard to rain and so on. Eight acres for a man and his family to live on, intensive cultivation, not well trained cultivation and no introduction of reasonable cash crops has resulted in great poverty there. Contrast that with what is supposed to be the basic minimum for a white farmer to live on which is 750 acres—in fact, the land is divided into 3,000 acre blocks, but they can be divided into four blocks of 750 acres each.

• (10:55 a.m.)

**Mr. McIntosh:** Can you contrast it with the same circumstances in other African countries?

**Mr. Sanger:** Yes, I certainly can. If you take Kenya, the land that they are living on there is far more fertile. In Kikuyuland the land is either coffee or tea growing, very fertile rich country with lots of rivers and streams running through it, or, again, the Luo cotton-growing country or the Kalejin tea country. The Kalejin tribes are growing some of the best tea in the world. The problem in Kenya at the moment is that they are exceeding their international quota and are producing something like \$45 million worth of coffee, the majority of which is African grown; this contrasts very strongly with what is happening in Rhodesia.

**Mr. McIntosh:** How about Zambia?

**Mr. Sanger:** In Zambia agriculture is at an early stage. Zambian history is slightly complicated in that for 10 years it was part of the Central African Federation. My judgment on this, and it's also backed up by the expatriot official who was the finance minister in Zambia at that time, Mr. Nicholson, was that Northern Rhodesia put into the federal pool of finances something like \$200 million—those are large figures in African terms if not in Canadian—more than they ever got out in federal services, and during those 10 years of federation the development inside—the real productive development that inspired more development—took place in Southern Rhodesia. There were federal services that went into Malawi and some into Zambia, but there was no real push on agricultural development in Zambia and this is only now really beginning.

**The Chairman:** Mr. Brewin, are you finished?

**Mr. Brewin:** Yes.

**Mr. Allmand:** Mr. Sanger, in reply to Mr. McIntosh, you said that in the advance

towards majority rule you felt this advance should be directed by Britain rather than by the whites in Rhodesia. How do you suggest this should come about? Are you suggesting that the British should go into Rhodesia without consent of the government?

**Mr. Sanger:** First of all, I would not call the present regime the "government". It has been declared illegal by the British Government.

**Mr. Allmand:** All right.

**Mr. McIntosh:** Call it an "administration".

**Mr. Sanger:** "Administration", that's right. It is not recognized as a "government" by Britain. I am not being pedantic; it is a basic point.

**Mr. Allmand:** I agree with you.

**Mr. Sanger:** Britain, under pressure from many Commonwealth countries at the September conference, agreed that, if selected sanctions were voted on in December of last year by the Security Council with the help of the Commonwealth countries, they would then make the Nibmar Declaration that no proposals for a constitution would be submitted to the British Parliament which did not involve majority rule. This, on the face of it, might rule out a transitional period. I do not think so because there is a double negative there; there will be "no" independence before majority rule. There is, therefore, room for a period of direct rule by Britain with the help of both Africans and whites to prepare the country.

If I could, perhaps, put my answer to Mr. McIntosh in different words: it is that I do believe that the attitudes and the bitterness have become so set in the last few years and attitudes on both sides, African and white, have become so narrow and hostile to each other that there is this need at the top of a buffer—if you like, a faceless group—that would come in to do a job and try to heal this area. There really are very few whites that the African would trust at this time and I am almost certain that there are very few Africans of any standing among their own people whom the majority of the whites would trust. Therefore, this is why I say this group should come in as a faceless group, rather like Sir Humphrey Trevelyan went into Aden and sorted out that problem in a short time.

You ask, could they go in without the permission of the present administration? That question is rather set in the context of today when the regime is certainly in control of the situation.

• (11.00 a.m.)

I was putting my suggestion in the context of a situation quite different from that. I do not want to say that it would be a situation of complete disorder. Conceivably and unhappily, it might be.

On the other hand, it might be one where a group of whites decided that this situation is just a downward spiral for the country and that they must cut out. In this case, they would set off on a completely new course and this group would turn to Britain.

There has been around the governor, Sir Humphrey Gibbs, and the Chief Justice, Sir Hugh Beadle, a group, sometimes called "loyalists", which has been quiet during all this period. They have, what is now called the Constitutional Association, which only meets, in fact, for information meetings of a rather lukewarm thought.

I think that their still is small group of these, which can form this basis. I think Mr. Wilson at an earlier period of thinking, made the mistake that this group would do a complete change-over on their own at an early stage. He was obviously mistaken by this but I think that there will come a time when the situation will be very different from today when sanctions are tightened and had this effect, then such a group would play a part and Britain would come in with general acceptance.

**Mr. Allmand:** Your proposal rests on the possibility that certain whites in Rhodesia will change their position and want Britain to come in, and therefore they would become accepted. I was going to ask you, because I did not think that would be your answer.

What do you think of Britain coming in and forcibly taking over the colonial government, such as they have done throughout history with many other of their colonial governments? For example, when the non-white group took over powers of constitution without consent—I think in Guyana to a certain extent—what would be the reaction? In your opinion, what would happen if Britains were to do this?

**Mr. Sanger:** Well, Britain has suspended constitutions before in Malta and Guyana.

**Mr. Allmand:** Yes. Suppose they were to come in and take control?

**Mr. Sanger:** To answer the first part of your question, it would involve a change in mind of some groups there, certainly. There is also a silent group of people who used to be behind Garfield Todd when he was premier. This group is getting smaller as time goes on. These are the people who feel much more the really depressing, deteriorating situation there. These are the ones to leave.

Someone like Lord Acton went off to Swaziland recently. There are a good number of them who come to Canada. These are the people that Rhodesia is losing at this time. Rhodesia can ill afford to lose these whites who would help in a large way during a transitional stage.

The answer to the second part of your question, can Britain come in with force, or should Britain come in with force, is this. The situations are not really comparable with Guyana and Malta—or Kenya, for that matter, during the "Mau Mau" emergency.

First of all, Britain controlled the government in those countries. They had their own Governor getting direct orders from Britain, an executive Governor, that is. And there has been no other case of a rebel group having control of the troops on the spot. Obviously, in terms of logistics, this whole problem was far more difficult.

I think it is generally agreed that in those early days, either just before UDI or just after UDI, Britain could have done this in some way or other.

The officer commanding the army, General Anderson, did resign, because he said that he would not play any part in a unilateral declaration of independence. I think there was considerable feeling in the Rhodesian forces at that time backing him. There is only a single white regular battalion, the Rhodesian light infantry. The rest are territorial battalions on call.

That is just a historical matter and I believe they could have done that at the time and there are many that also feel the same.

Whether or not Britain should have, at this time, is a very different question. I do not believe that Britain should use force until

everything else has possibly been tried. I think it is unrealistic to believe that Britain is going to use force.

In its straightened economic circumstances, I believe that, with the American pre-occupation with Southeast Asia, she is not giving the attention to Southern Africa that some people in that administration realize ought to be given in terms of racial confrontations over these next years.

Both the British and American circumstances may change during the next year. I believe that the course of action in the immediate future must be a re-affirmation of a determination by Commonwealth and the world in general that there is going to be a movement towards majority rule and that this is carried on. The determination is shared by a tightening of sanctions with particular emphasis on Portugal at this time.

But it may come and there are circumstances in which Britain is, I would say, 95 per cent committed to using force. This would be the case if the Rhodesian regime cut off the hydro-electric power from the Kariba dam which supplies those countries. The power station is on the South side. I do not believe that will come up because I do not think the Rhodesian regime would provoke such a situation knowing what would happen.

The other circumstances in which the Lagos communique said that force should not be precluded was in the breakdown of law and order. The way that phrase is seen by Africans is, I think, a poor reflection on the whole situation. They believe that this is, in fact, a statement by Britain that the only circumstances under which Britain would use force there is if the lives of whites in the country were endangered.

A breakdown in law and order usually assumes that and, therefore, the only circumstances would be something similar to a Stanleyville situation or disorder generally in the country. Those are the two circumstances in which the idea of Britain using force has been mooted.

**Mr. Allmand:** Do you not think then, that if the present situation remains, and there does not seem to be any movement towards majority rule for the Africans, that sooner or later, there is bound to be violence through guerilla warfare and so forth? From what I read, Africans and Zambia and Tanzania,

being neighbours, are going to be stronger and, sooner or later, there is going to be more and more violence against the Smith regime. All I can see is that Britain, Canada and other Commonwealth countries are going to... once this happens... at that time we will have been in the position of not doing anything and the violence is going to come anyway. Then, we will be placed on the other side. I think we are going to be in the reactionary position, probably coming in after the damage has been done.

**Mr. Sanger:** I am certain that you are right. I think that time, as you indicated, is not on the side of Canada and other countries if they are going to do the necessary job to keep the people in Africa and elsewhere trusting in our good faith.

Certainly, the amount of guerilla warfare has increased. They are extremely amateurish at it. There are certain factors against them. The terrain is not particularly good for guerilla warfare. They have to cross the Zambesi and come up through this escarpment and it is an easy country in which to pick people off. As well, the security legislation is extremely tough.

Additionally, there has been a psychological attitude among Africans in Rhodesia that they are a conquered people. This is the real brainwashing in the situation but it is also true. In the 1893 and 1896 rebellions or revolutions, they were crushed people. This has taken generations to get out but there has been a growth in this last year of guerilla warfare. You have read, no doubt, about the large bands that moved down towards Bulawayo in September. The South African troops were on exercises in Rhodesia at the time and crack South African police were flown in from Johannesburg to deal with it. You have a situation in which South Africa ventured outside its own borders and lined up with the Rhodesian forces to fight against these guerilla bands. Obviously the guerilla warfare is increasing. The seriousness of it is strongly felt by the regime in Rhodesia and the government in Pretoria. I think the censorship of the papers in Rhodesia is covering up a great deal of other guerilla activity. One hears only about the captures and the trials of those who have been taken prisoner.

• (11:10 a.m.)

**Mr. Allmand:** Before we continue, I would like to complete my thoughts on this. Is there not also a possibility that if we do not do

anything to help the Africans that the communist countries will? There may be a lot of support, as there is in many other countries with wars of liberation, so to speak. We in the West or the Commonwealth may well find ourselves on the outside looking in at Africa, which might become communist dominated, if they take over these guerilla movements.

**Mr. Sanger:** I think there is a very strong possibility of this. The guerillas do in fact go to China and to Bulgaria to get trained. These are the places that offer it. I am not for a moment suggesting that Canada or western countries should train guerillas. I think this is acting in a communist way, of using other people to pull chestnuts out of fires. I think we have a direct responsibility in the situation and it is cowardly to do the job of just training and arming guerillas.

To come back to your main point, when time is not on the side of Canada, the Commonwealth or the West in this, and if it comes to the point that Rhodesia is made free of this regime by African guerilla movements, creating complete disorder in the country, that Britain comes in or tentatively take it over which would take many years, I think the bitterness against the West for not having done something when it was very much in their capacity to act would be so great that a good part of the world would hold the feeling for a very long time that Canada and other countries had let them down in a time of need.

**Mr. Walker:** I would like to ask a supplementary question, if I may.

**The Chairman:** Mr. Lind had a supplementary question before you, Mr. Walker.

**Mr. Lind:** My supplementary question is this, Mr. Chairman. In your estimation, how many of these officers or police from South Africa were involved in this uprising in Northern Rhodesia?

**Mr. Sanger:** In Southern Rhodesia.

**Mr. Lind:** Yes, they went into Rhodesia to help them. You said there were several officers or special police who were brought in. How many do you estimate were brought in?

**Mr. Sanger:** It is very difficult to give the exact figures because of the censorship but it is known that plane loads flew up from Pretoria with them.

**Mr. Lind:** Would you estimate a thousand?

**Mr. Sanger:** Oh, no. The outside number of guerillas engaged was said to be 200. I think it was probably nearer 100.

**Mr. Walker:** Yes.

**Mr. Sanger:** The numbers of South Africans I do not know, but, however, large or small the group was, it is symbolically interesting that South Africa feels there is a vacuum there. Up to now South Africa has been extremely careful to stay on the right side of constitutional matters. It does break sanctions under the fiction that it is carrying on normal trade. The Rhodesian regime is not recognized diplomatically as a legal government. All these moves are very carefully thought out but it seemed that it had finally decided that Britain was, in the phrase of the Zambian Ambassador, a "toothless bulldog" in this, and it could afford to send its own troops in. I do not believe Britain is as toothless as that. I believe the present team in the Commonwealth office of George Thomson and now Sir Morrice James who is the Under-Secretary and George Thomas are extremely determined that the situation will not fall away into an ignominious settlement with Smith.

**Mr. Lind:** I have a further question. You leave me with the impression that Britain gave its blessing to these 100 police officers you speak of who came in from the Union of South Africa.

• (11:15 a.m.)

**Mr. Sanger:** No, Britain did not give her blessing. After there had been protests from Zambia and other African countries on the intrusion of South Africa, Britain did protest. A somewhat belated protest in a matter of a week or ten days.

**The Chairman:** Are you finished gentlemen?

**Mr. Walker:** No, I have a supplementary question. Is there any thought at all around this table or with you Mr. Sanger, that Britain is capable, militarily, of doing what Mr. Allmand has suggested—

**Mr. Nesbitt:** Stop the war in Viet Nam.

**Mr. Walker:** I feel that you have left by inference

**Mr. Allmand:** If justice requires that, we should do it.

**Mr. Walker:** Is there any thought at all around this table or with the witness that

Britain is in fact capable at the moment of moving in with what would have to be a full-scale invasion, because Britain does not have one policeman or one type of military person in Rhodesia at all. There is nothing to build from. Is there any thought at all...

**Mr. Brewin:** Mr. Chairman, on a point of order.

**Mr. Walker:** May I finish this, please?

**The Chairman:** Mr. Brewin, on a point of order.

**Mr. Brewin:** It relates to what you are saying. I suggest that you ask the witness, instead of asking an opinion around the table. You might get a great variety of opinions.

**The Chairman:** The point is well taken, Mr. Walker should address his questions to the witness.

**Mr. Walker:** Is there any thought that Britain is in a position to move in and in fact win a war in Rhodesia if she decided it was the right thing to do?

**Mr. Sanger:** I do not think she is in such a position at the moment. I note Mr. Nesbitt's point about ending the war in Viet Nam, because, as I said, with American preoccupations in Southeast Asia they are not going to give the attention to southern Africa which the situation, they will discover, undoubtedly will deserve.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** That was not quite the point I had in mind, Mr. Sanger.

**Mr. Sanger:** Well...

**Mr. Nesbitt:** ... the wars of intervention.

**Mr. Sanger:** May I finish?

**The Chairman:** Order, please. Please allow the witness to finish his sentence.

**Mr. Sanger:** Mr. Wilson answered that Dr. Margai who was then head of the Sierra Leone government, said that it would take two divisions at that time—I think it was September 1966—to do the operation. This is obviously very much more than was ever done in East African mutinies of 1964, but the figure recently given was that it would probably take about 16,000 men and obviously a very well organized operation. It is not a thing that anyone undertakes lightly at all,

even if you are not considering the bloodshed and the deep scars that an operation of force would entail, but on the other hand you have to consider the deep scars that are week by week being made in Rhodesia by the continuance of this situation.

To sum up, I am saying that I do not think it is a practical measure at this time. What needs to be done is to tighten sanctions and make the determination of the world to end this regime credible which it has not been up to now, and make it clear that force is not excluded at some later time. It seems to me incredible the way Mr. Wilson, before UDI, said that force would not be used. It was in fact the green light for UDI to make such a statement.

My final point is that it may come that as a last resort an international peace force will need to be mobilized with Britain maybe playing the major role, maybe the Commonwealth giving the largest part. One hopes the Americans will be playing a part because they will understand the racial implications of the whole situation. I do not like the prospect of this happening but I am not sure that it is not a lesser evil than the continuation of the present situation which is embittering people and will for generations.

**Mr. Walker:** You are talking about the international peace force under the UN.

**Mr. Sanger:** Yes, it could well be under UN directive. Mr. Martin has said that if the UN made a directive on this, Canada would comply.

**The Chairman:** Order, please. I do not wish to interfere with—one moment, please. I would like to have Mr. Allmand complete his questioning and then I will call upon Mr. Hymmen, Mr. Lind, Mr. Walker and Mr. Lambert. If there is sufficient time remaining we will accept supplementary questions.

**Mr. Allmand:** I have one more question, but first, on a point of order, I do not agree that for Britain to intervene in Rhodesia is a case of foreign intervention. I believe that Britain has a constitutional right in Rhodesia that is quite different from Viet Nam.

My final question concerns the population growth in Rhodesia, both by birth and immigration. Do you know the rate of growth of the African population *vis-à-vis* the white population, both by birth and immigration?

**Mr. Sanger:** Yes, I can give you some figures. These are the figures in the Economic Survey of 1966, a regime's booklet that they put out in July of this year. If you go back to 1957, there were only 3.1 million Africans as against 197,000 Europeans.

• (11:20 a.m.)

If you take last year's figures, the Europeans have gone up 225,000. That is a net increase of 28,000 in ten years, whereas the African population has gone up by 1.1 million. The belief is that, I think, by 1980 there is going to be about eight million Africans. The ratio which is now 19 to 1 is going to be out of all proportion to what it is now.

**Mr. Allmand:** Well, are the whites trying to counterbalance this by immigration, since their birth rate is lower?

**Mr. Sanger:** Yes, they are. At the height of the Central African Federation, you would have about 18,000 net immigration in a good year, for example, in 1956-57, the years of the copper boom, and so on. However, this dropped rapidly to a net exodus at the time when the Federation broke off. There was a net exodus in 1966 of about 1,000.

This year they claim that there has been an increase of just about 1,000. Well, this is obviously nothing like now. There is also a smaller proportional natural increase of Europeans in the country to Africa. They are hoping to increase immigration very considerably, obviously. Professor Sadie's report on economic development lays the emphasis on increased white immigration. However, you are, obviously not going to get increased white immigration in any great numbers while there is great uncertainty of this sort.

Mr. Smith's claim before UDI, when he campaigned in the 1965 election, was that we must end the uncertainty in which the country is in—this is the post-Federation, pre-UDI period. He used to say in these election meetings that every day is a delay in setting the future of this country. This government is doing a disservice to the people if it is losing only one white immigrant or one thousand pounds worth of investment.

Well, UDI has obviously caused even greater uncertainty than there was in that period when a great deal of talk about UDI had caused uncertainty in itself. The position about encouraging white immigrants into the country has deteriorated, firstly, by the

whole pressures, at that time by Mr. Smith in concentrating on the uncertainty, and then by the fact of UDI itself, and the world's reaction to it.

**Mr. Allmand:** Are they trying to encourage birth control among the Africans?

**Mr. Sanger:** I think they have, to some extent, but whether you are going to make a political motive out of that, or a humanistic one, is another matter. I do not think that there is a large campaign as there is in Kenya, obviously, with the consent of that government. I do not think there is a similar campaign going on in Rhodesia.

**Mr. Allmand:** Thank you.

**The Chairman:** Mr. Hymmen.

**Mr. Hymmen:** In the Economic Development Report by Professor Sadie, aside from his recommendations regarding agricultural and industrial development in the tribal areas, he makes one assumption. He claims that in order to develop a more modern economy, one European is required for every 7.4 Africans. Now, I do not know how he arrived at those statistics. Have you any comment as to whether this is a reasonable or unreasonable figure?

**Mr. Sanger:** I think it is a reasonable figure if you go along on the basic assumptions he has and which I abhor. His assumptions are that the Europeans must be the skilled class and the Africans are the semi-skilled or unskilled labour that depend for their employment on the presence of a white man.

Surely, this is being disproved in all parts of Africa further to the North. There clearly was a drop in employment for a short time in Kenya during the period of uncertainty between 1960 and full independence in 1963. A number of whites had left the country and therefore a number of Africans were thrown out of employment. However, if you are going to train Africans to do their top, or even middle-to-top level jobs, then his figures make nonsense. Those figures are entirely based on the premise that you have in fact, a "master folk" running the country and giving employment to people below. If you are going to train the majority of the people to the levels of skilled jobs, then his figures mean nothing.

**Mr. Hymmen:** There are presently, I believe, 220,000 Europeans and four million

Africans. I think we are all aware that some of the Europeans have been there for a long time, as long as, if not longer, than the Africans. There was quite an exodus of emigration, I believe, after the Second World War. What would have been the white population in 1945?

**Mr. Sanger:** I think it was about 100,000.

**Mr. Hymmen:** One hundred thousand.

**Mr. Sanger:** As you see, the vast figures of the immigration came in these last 20 years. Sir Edgar Whitehead was the man who did a great move of the immigration, at that time, and, of course, a lot of people who went there to train in the Air Force in Gwelo liked the country and went back. There was a move out of the dreariness of postwar England, and so on.

If I may make an extra point on this, it is quite often observed that the Rhodesian whites who have been in the country the longest period of time are the ones who have—it is not really surprising—the greatest understanding of the country. These are the ones who intend to live in the country, whatever government stays there. Their roots are deep in the country and the men who followed Mr. Garfield Todd, when he was premier, are drawn very strongly from this group.

I think that the postwar immigrants there tend to be the ones who, in a way, are more extreme in their attitudes than the ones who have been there a long time and see it as their only home.

**Mr. Hymmen:** Thank you. Respecting education, you mentioned the eight years of primary schooling. In an official publication of the Smith government, they mention full schooling, for seven years, by 1972, with opportunity for 12½ per cent of those finishing primary education for the secondary school program and 37½ per cent, excuse me, 12½ per cent to a four-year course with opportunity for university education, and 37½ per cent of those to receive extra training, but not the full training. This confirms your statement that only one out of every two African children or youths will have an opportunity to proceed.

**Mr. Sanger:** Beyond primary.

**Mr. Hymmen:** Yes, but the seven years is a little different from your eight years.

**Mr. Sanger:** I am sorry. There are two sub-standards, sub-standard A and B and then standards one to six. I think that they have, in some circumstances, and are in the process of combining two of these ones to make a seven-year course instead of an eight-year course. This is the booklet for 1963 and, in that year, they certainly had the eight years. I think there is a combination to cut eight years into seven. But the other figures are the ones that I gave. I gave them in fractions of one in eight or three in eight.

• (11:30 a.m.)

**Mr. Hymmen:** You mentioned the Makerere University College in Salisbury with about 75 percent white enrolment. What is the enrolment? What is the size of the college?

**Mr. Sanger:** I think this year the numbers are to be about 1,000. The University was started, of course, as a federal university for the students in Malawi and Zambia and this was a great help to the Federation or even before this. It changed its character entirely and there are very few from outside the country, although a number of overseas whites come to do a one-year course in education.

**Mr. Hymmen:** This is the only university in the country?

**Mr. Sanger:** Yes, it is. It started in 1957.

**Mr. Hymmen:** And what opportunities are there for students to enter higher education in neighboring states, perhaps aside from South Africa?

**Mr. Sanger:** Can I say just a little bit more about the college itself? Just one point on this: The African enrolment has been so restricted by the fact that there are only these two schools, Goromonzi and Fletcher High, that will teach to university entry. The Principal of the college, about four years ago, started what was in fact a year's cramming course, taking people on mature entry; people who did the very risky thing in Rhodesia of giving up their jobs in order to try to qualify for the university in a cramming course. By this process he was able to double the entry. Obviously it is good for them to have a second chance at a university but it also reflected the very restricted chances the people had.

If an African went outside Rhodesia how easily would he get a place in another African university? I think he would generally

try to get a position in an North-American or British university where there are a good number of openings for African students. I think there is a certain restriction on African universities taking people from outside because they have so much need to train their own people. I do know that the university in Addis Ababa gave 200 places for students from other parts of Africa, and when this was done about three years ago it was considered a rather remarkable gesture by the Emperor.

**Mr. Hymmen:** And there would be far more opportunities outside the country than in the country for Africans?

**Mr. Sanger:** There is now, yes. There are, I think, about 400 to 500 Africans training in the United States either at upper high school or at university.

**Mr. Hymmen:** One other short question. In spite of the effort in your statement to clarify this crossvoting—I do not know about other members of this Committee—I am rather confused. There are 65 seats, possibly 67 following the Tiger negotiations. You mentioned constituencies and electoral districts. Do they overlap?

**Mr. Sanger:** Yes, they do. You have to have two maps of Rhodesia and one divides it into 50.

**Mr. Hymmen:** No, but you said that every voter has two votes.

**Mr. Sanger:** You take one map of Rhodesia and divide it into 50 and another map and divide it into 15 and they overlap.

**Mr. Hymmen:** Are Africans eligible to stand as candidates in both categories?

**Mr. Sanger:** They are eligible. I would have to get the qualifications for a voter. An African would be eligible to stand for a constituency—that is, one where the A Roll predominates—if he had the qualifications of an A Roll voter. I mean I think that is the only qualification.

The question of whether it would be worth his while depends on who the electorate is. I did not give the income and educational qualifications but I have them here if you are interested.

In the August, 1962 election there were 101,000 voters. There were 86,000 Europeans on the A Roll and 9,000 Africans on the B

Roll, and there were 1,920 Africans on the A Roll. That is in the 1962 election under which the Rhodesian Front came into power. And by 1965 the figures did not increase very much; 108,000 was the total electorate, of which 92,000 were Europeans on the A Roll, there were 10,000 Africans on the B Roll and 2,300 on the A Roll.

**Mr. Hymmen:** How does an African get on the B Roll?

**Mr. Sanger:** He has to have an annual income of £264 for six months before enrolment or the ownership of immovable property of £495, which really is a great deal for an African.

The per capita income of Africans in the country, and those are the ones in employment, is about £89 a year, so that he has to be rather exceptionally above it to be someone who has £264. But there are five other qualifications; one of them brings it down to £132 income—just above the average of someone in employment—or ownership of £275 of property and two years secondary schooling, so he has to be a reasonably educated person, far above the average, even to get on the B Roll; or he has to be a person over 30 with an income of £132 and full primary schooling. That is an older person; they are trying to get more mature people; or if he were a KRAAL head, that is the head of a small village, with 20 families under him, or an ordained minister of religion with a university degree or five years full-time training, or two years training and three years service in the ministry.

So they are still pretty high qualifications. But as I said, the Rhodesian Front leaders have been prepared to throw the whole of the B Roll open to anyone over the age of 30, which seems a very generous gesture at first sight but, as I explained the devaluing process of crossvoting, really it does not have any effect on the 50 crucial seats in the upper Roll.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** Mr. Chairman, on a point of order. The witness probably will not be back with us and there is not very much time left. Several members of the Committee have been asking very interesting and, indeed, very helpful questions, but there are some of us who would like the opportunity of asking perhaps one question. I wonder whether you might consider limiting the time of the people who are asking questions from now on?

**Mr. Allmand:** I have concluded.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** Some of us would like an opportunity to ask some questions.

**The Chairman:** Are we agreed that we move a bit more quickly?

**Some hon. Members:** Agreed.

**Mr. Lind:** Mr. Sanger, through you Mr. Chairman, you are quite familiar with the Rhodesian government by living there for a number of years and also spending a number of years in the East African states.

On this question of education where Rhodesia educates children, or the blacks, to grade 6 or 7, how does it compare with Tanzania—which has probably received the most foreign aid—Uganda and Kenya in the number of years of primary education that the nationals receive in those countries?

**Mr. Sanger:** Shall I go down the list of those different countries and try to give you a picture of it?

**Mr. Lind:** Well, I wish you would keep it short because I have several questions to ask you.

**Mr. Sanger:** I will be as quick as I can.

**Mr. Lind:** I wish you would come out with just the figures.

**Mr. Sanger:** Yes. Tanzania really has not received the most amount of aid. Canada's aid there has been remarkably high and other countries have refrained from giving Tanzania aid. Tanzania started on a much lower base because it was a U.N. Trust Territory and no one was really concerned with its development at that time. The general base in Rhodesia, I think, is comparable with Tanzania now. Tanzania has a President who calls himself Mwalimu, or "The Teacher" and a great part of his concentration has been on education.

Since becoming independent Zambia has a tremendous amount of its budget in secondary school education and I think it has multiplied eight times in the last three years. I will give you the figures but I have not got them in front of me. The number now going through Zambian secondary schools I think is something like 60,000 African students and this is a remarkable jump from previously. Uganda has had a long period of good educational practices. It had the earliest university

in that whole part of Africa—Makerere College. It has been there for 30 years. There were, I think, something like 2,000 Ugandan graduates at the time of independence in 1961.

Kenya is trying to keep its same figure of about 12½ per cent carrying on from primary into secondary schools. It has a larger population of about 8,000,000 compared with Rhodesia so its problems are much larger in volume and it finds it difficult to do more than to give one person in eight a full academic high school. But it is tackling this job and I think it is keeping pace with it.

• (11:40 a.m.)

**Mr. Lind:** My question related to primary education and you are speaking of university education. We were told that they are only educated to grade 3 in Uganda primary schools and that this was for all people.

**Mr. Sanger:** For all people.

**Mr. Lind:** You stated they had a grade 7.

**Mr. Sanger:** No, I have never said that they have universal education to Grade 7 in Rhodesia. I think about 90 per cent of the school-age children actually enter school in Rhodesia but there was a dropout after. I am referring to 1963.

**Mr. Lind:** What page is that on?

**Mr. Sanger:** It is in the Annual Report on Federal Education. The enrolment in Rhodesia in substandard A in 1963 was 57,000 boys and 50,000 girls but the figures in Standard 1 are 48,000 boys and 41,000 girls, so you have a drop there of 9,000 in each. I agree that you are talking about two different age groups but you can see that there is a dropout at various stages during those first seven years. No one has said there is going to be universal primary education in Rhodesia. The target year is 1972 when it is hoped that seven years education will be provided for everyone.

**Mr. Lind:** I am comparing it with the East African countries of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Now you are making reference to the fact that the Rhodesian Government is not giving primary education and I am saying that they are doing as good a job as these other three states which, I believe, received a lot of aid.

**Mr. Sanger:** I do not think this point is in dispute between us. I said that the Rhodesian Government is doing a good job in primary education, as good and better than many other African countries. Where it is failing is that in taking this on into secondary or high school education it is training, at the most, a lot of semi-skilled but certainly discontented people.

**Mr. Lind:** You mentioned Makerere University in Kampala. I was talking to Dr. Lule, the Registrar, and he states that they are up to an enrolment now of 1,800 and that their secondary schools now are nearly providing enough students to fill the University. You left the inference that they had plenty in 1960.

**Mr. Sanger:** I said that they had had 30 years of university training and therefore at the time of independence there were 2,000 African graduates in the country.

**Mr. Lind:** But how many African students were there in the university?

**Mr. Sanger:** If you want to know how many students there are at Makerere University, you have just given me the figure.

**Mr. Lind:** No. I asked of the 1,800 how many are Africans at the present time.

**Mr. Sanger:** Nearly all. There are very few who are not. I think there are some Americans who come there as students for post-graduate studies. The University College of Makerere is one of three component colleges of the University of East Africa and if you are training in engineering you would go to Nairobi and if you are training in law you would go to Dar-es-Salaam. These are Ugandians who are training in these other countries and, of course, there are Tanzanians who are training in Uganda to that extent, so I think probably the Ugandan figure is higher than the actual number that are actually training at Makerere in this way.

**Mr. Lind:** I would like to change my line of questioning. You have spent a good deal of your time in Rhodesia and while you were there no doubt you saw many incidents pointing up the influence Great Britain had. When you were in that country did you see many civil servants, army officers or police officers from the United Kingdom?

**Mr. Sanger:** Yes, they are there. About one third of the white population in Rhodesia are

immigrants from Britain, another third are from South Africa, and perhaps another third are Rhodesian-born. Obviously these proportions change with the passing years with more babies being born in the country. However I think probably those same proportions hold in the case of army and police personnel.

**Mr. Lind:** Are these in the employ of the Colonial Office and, if so, were they when you were there?

**Mr. Sanger:** No.

**Mr. Lind:** Or are they free people that have just come and lived there?

**Mr. Sanger:** Well they were recruited for the British South Africa police in Britain as elsewhere or they joined the Rhodesian Light Infantry when it was formed in 1960. They went of their own free will. As Rhodesia was and is a self-governing colony, which is the constitutional phrase used, it is not an independent territory, so to that extent they were responsible to the Governor who was the Queen's representative in the country. Are you leading up to the question of their loyalty at the time of UDI?

**Mr. Lind:** Yes.

**Mr. Sanger:** The question of their loyalty was never gone into. Although discussed at great length before UDI was what would happen if they were all given that test it never in fact was presented to them by Britain. I think Britain said that they should carry on in order to avoid chaos in the country. The only time the whole question of loyalty and constitutionality came up was in the courts and the judges decided that it is a *de facto* and not a *de jure* Government.

**Mr. Lind:** Then, in your opinion, at no time could the Colonial Office direct these people under it to rise up and rebel against the Ian Smith regime when he took over.

**Mr. Sanger:** They were not under the Colonial Office but in a British territory. Although it is called a colony it was never under the Colonial Office, it was under the Commonwealth Relations Office. It gets somewhat complicated. Because the Governor is the Commander in Chief of the Army and the Queen's representative their loyalty was to him and not to the Minister of Defence, Lord Graham. However they are in rebellion against the British Crown.

**Mr. Lind:** But they were at no time under the Colonial Office and, therefore, the United Kingdom Government did not have direct control over them?

**Mr. Sanger:** That is correct. This is why it is very different from the situation in Kenya where the British troops were, as you say, under their direct control. It worked through a Governor in Salisbury.

**Mr. Lind:** I heard the Honourable George Thompson, the Colonial Secretary for Prime Minister Wilson's Government, state that the United Kingdom never has had any police or civil servants in Rhodesia under their direct command for 45 years.

**Mr. Sanger:** Well, I am agreeing with him. In 1923 the country changed from being a chartered company. It was a country under charter to the British South Africa Company of Cecil John Rhodes. In 1923 a referendum was taken whether it would join as the fifth province of South Africa or whether it would become a self-governing colony and by a vote of a small margin it decided to become a self-governing colony. It was a freak, if you like, in constitutional terms of this sort. But Mr. Thompson is entirely right in saying that these were never under the direct control of the British Crown.

**Mr. Lind:** Mr. Thompson also went on to further state that they then had no right to interfere with armed force in Rhodesia. Do you agree with that?

**Mr. Sanger:** I would like to see that statement in writing, sir, because the country is a territory of the British Crown and when it is in rebellion against it the Constitution has in fact been suspended by Order in Council in Britain. Great Britain has certainly a constitutional right if not a duty.

**Mr. Lind:** Is it your opinion that economic sanctions have failed?

**Mr. Sanger:** I did not say they had failed, Mr. Lind, I said that what had happened was that they were at this stage far from effective, and if the rest of the world is to do what I believe it needs to do in Rhodesia for the cause of non-racialism in the world then as a first step it needs to make them more effective.

**Mr. Lind:** Have you any suggestions how they could be made more effective? We are here to determine how to make it work.

**Mr. Sanger:** Certainly. Well at present they are exporting a great deal of maize—it has been a good year for maize—and this has not been added to the list of selected sanctions. Also, there must be many ways in which pressure can be brought upon Portugal. Portugal is a small and poor country and it is also a member of NATO.

**Mr. Lind:** This is not connected with United Nations sanctions, is it?

**Mr. Sanger:** It certainly is.

**Mr. Lind:** Portugal?

**Mr. Sanger:** Certainly it is. Portugal has overseas territories of Angola and Mozambique which border on Rhodesia—Angola does not exactly border on Rhodesia; it is close—but Mozambique has two railway lines leading up from Beira and Lourenco Marques. The petroleum supplies that have gone into Rhodesia are mostly going in through the port of Lourenco Marques.

• (11:50 a.m.)

You will recall that in April of 1966 the Security Council made a directive under Chapter 7 that Britain could stop ships on the high seas—oil tankers going to Beira. Since then oil has not gone in through Beira, but it has gone in through Lourenco Marques which has a railway link down to South Africa. Oil can go from South Africa, up to Lourenco Marques and then into Rhodesia or they can land the oil directly at Lourenco Marques. I think something like 150 ships, in the last year, have landed oil at Lourenco Marques.

**Mr. Lind:** Other than adding additional products to the sanctions, you have no other suggestion?

**Mr. Sanger:** Yes, I have.

**Mr. Lind:** Have you?

**Mr. Sanger:** Yes; one of the large areas to which the export of Rhodesian goods has continued is Zambia. This is not because Zambia wants to provide export earnings to Rhodesia, but because of historical links it has been taking manufactured goods as well as coal and other products Kariba par. Necessarily, it has to pay freight rates on the copper that goes down on the Beira line. Zambia has lost up to \$300 million worth of both development and estimated revenue as a result of UDI.

I believe that the Commonwealth, especially with Canada playing a leading part, could do a great deal to ease Zambia's general position and also make it easier for Zambia to complete its cut-off of goods to Rhodesia. It is doing as much as it can by itself. It is producing a rather lower grade coal out of the Zambezi valley and hopes to be able to start to build a railway through Tanzania, but that is going to take five years and so, to some extent, that is irrelevant. But there are many ways in which Zambia could be helped and if Zambia were blocked off, there would be a great tightening of sanctions.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** May I ask a brief supplementary question? You do not think, then, that the importation of Rhodesian tobacco into Canada is very helpful to the enforcement of the sanctions?

**Mr. Sanger:** I did not know that Rhodesian tobacco is being imported.

**Mr. Lind:** South African tobacco.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** The information was given to us by government members at a meeting the other day.

**Mr. Lind:** I want to correct that, Mr. Chairman. No Rhodesian tobacco comes into Canada. I resent that statement. It is South African tobacco.

**Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale):** I must say that if Mr. Nesbitt has any evidence that Rhodesian tobacco has been imported into Canada, then he has evidence of a criminal offence and he should be making it available to the appropriate authorities.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** Well, the question was asked in the House and the Secretary of State for External Affairs was present at the time and he made no comment on it.

**Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale):** I must say, again, that if you have evidence, Mr. Nesbitt, do not just smugly smile but bring it to the attention of the appropriate authorities.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** It was discussed before the senior officials of about six government departments. I have met with three government members' wrath.

**Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale):** But if you have the evidence, what have you done about it?

**The Chairman:** Order, please. I think we had better stick to the main questioning of...

**Mr. Prud'homme:** I know, but we cannot let this go. The policy for importing is surely...

**Mr. Sanger:** I agree that this is an extremely important point. Canada has said that it is going even further than the mandatory sanctions.

**The Chairman:** Does the witness know of any...

**Mr. Sanger:** I have not heard of this and every time I have talked to Mr. Martin about it he has always said that Canada has faithfully observed sanctions and would certainly not allow any of the listed goods into the country. I am very surprised to hear from Mr. Nesbitt that this is the case.

**Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale):** Why do we not put him under oath and see if he is prepared to make the statement that Rhodesian tobacco has come into Canada?

**Mr. Nesbitt:** The question was asked in the House.

**Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale):** You made the allegation.

**Mr. McIntosh:** What power do you have to put him under oath?

**Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale):** The Committee has the power to put anybody under oath.

**The Chairman:** Order, please.

**Mr. Lind,** have you completed your questioning?

**Mr. Lind:** I have one more question. It is my understanding that the tobacco that comes into Canada comes from the Union of South Africa.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** No.

**Mr. Lind:** They have had an agreement since 1933 to ship up to 5 million pounds into Canada.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** There have been 1.5 million pounds imported during the last three months.

**Mr. Lind:** Yes, that is right. I know how much has come in, but it was South African tobacco.

**The Chairman:** Order, please.

**Mr. Lind:** It was not Rhodesian tobacco at all.

**The Chairman:** Will you kindly direct your questions to the witness.

**Mr. Lind:** Now, I am going to ask the witness...

**Mr. McIntosh:** Before we finish this, Mr. Chairman, let us get this straight. The Committee does not have the power to put a Member of Parliament under oath.

**Mr. Lind:** Pardon me, I have the floor.

**Mr. McIntosh:** That is all right. I just wanted to correct this misconception.

**Mr. Lind:** Stop interrupting.

**The Chairman:** Order, please. Please direct your questions to the witness.

**Mr. Lind:** I will direct my question to the witness. Have you any evidence of Rhodesian tobacco coming into Canada?

**Mr. Sanger:** No, I have not, but if it is South African tobacco...

**Mr. Lind:** Now, wait a minute.

**Mr. Sanger:** I am illustrating a possible loophole, in a sense.

**Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale):** Let him answer the question.

**Mr. Lind:** All right.

**Mr. Sanger:** I am trying to illustrate a possible loophole in the whole sanctions business in which South Africa exports some of its goods and takes in return Rhodesian goods. There is no way to plug such a loophole unless there are sanctions against South Africa. However, if South Africa is passing on Rhodesian tobacco, I would think that the experts would be able to identify the leaves because Rhodesian tobacco is a particularly high grade Virginia tobacco.

**Mr. Lind:** Thank you very much.

**Mr. Walker:** I just have one question, Mr. Chairman. I do want to correct, if I may use that word, a statement my colleague Mr. Lind, made. I was at the meeting, Mr. Lind, and I certainly never heard Mr. Thompson even suggest that Britain did not have the right to go in and use force, if necessary, in the pursuit of their constitutional duty in

Rhodesia. I do know that he intimated they did not have the money to enforce that right. I wanted to set that straight.

**Mr. Lind:** Thank you very much. I had intended to say that they did not have the forces to enforce it.

**Mr. Walker:** Yes; and I just want to make one other point clear. Recently some of us returned from the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association Conference in Kampala and Mr. Thompson and Nigel Fisher both made very clear, blunt and honest statements—they were pragmatic statements—to the effect that even if Britain decided that force was desirable, at the present moment it was absolutely out of the question. The logistics are impossible to undertake and they confirmed, certainly in my view, the statements that had been made prematurely, in my judgment, by Mr. Wilson some time before.

We spent a whole day at the CPA dealing with the Rhodesian question. The African representatives there, I believe, by the time the day was over accepted two things. First the fact that practically it was impossible, in the face of a military defeat, for Britain to move in by itself with an invasion in order to assert their constitutional right in Rhodesia. Secondly, they also accepted, without question, Mr. Thompson's statement that there would be no sell-out in Rhodesia on the principle of one man, one vote and majority rule.

Now, these are two opposite statements and really, in my judgment, what the African delegates have accepted is the fact that Britain's stand on the principle of majority rule is as strong as ever, but that there is no military might to back up this principle. My own view is that there is more strength in the African federation movement that is taking place now, particularly if it is undertaken with moderation, for solving the Rhodesian problem than there is in depending on Britain to do this alone because it is just not going to happen.

**Mr. Sanger:** I think that is an excellent summing up, if I may say so. I would just like to make the point that while all of us recognize the reality that faces Britain and the United States and so on, the prospect of using force, at this time, is difficult if not completely unrealistic. But, in addition to the danger of the bitterness growing, I think we have a problem that is going to be very difficult for sensible and moderate—although

I dislike that word—leaders such as President Kenneth Kaunda, to maintain the rule in Zambia, in a deteriorating situation. If men like President Kaunda and President Nyerere fall victims to this crisis, I think we will have done an enormous disservice to Africa itself.

• (12 noon)

I would like corrected an earlier statement made by the Conservative member, I think, that Doctor Kaunda had rejected the idea of democracy. He is a man who has refused the life-presidency of his party and he maintains European elected members in Parliament. Surely all this is evidence of continuing support of democratic rule.

**Mr. McIntosh:** So you deny that he made that statement?

**Mr. Sanger:** I would like to see his exact words.

**Mr. McIntosh:** I will show it to you right after the meeting if you want to see it.

**Mr. Sanger:** He might have said a Westminster-style democracy.

**Mr. McIntosh:** He said democracy was not the type of government for Zambia.

**Mr. Prud'homme:** That could be possible.

**Mr. McIntosh:** It is not impossible. I can prove it.

**Mr. Prud'homme:** I say it could be possible.

**Mr. McIntosh:** Certainly it is possible.

**The Chairman:** Order, please. Have you finished your questioning, Mr. Walker?

**Mr. Walker:** Yes.

**The Chairman:** Mr. Lambert, you are next.

**Mr. Lambert:** Mr. Chairman, I do not want to go into some sort of a rationalization of events prior to what I think is a deplorable mess with regard to Rhodesia. My view is that it has been the result of some rather stiff-necked and bull-headed thinking in many places and I think the hypercritical log rolling that goes on at the United Nations. We know this situation exists there and you then offer some suggestions for a change to achieve the end that you want. I was quite

perplexed at the thought that you might suggest ultimate force because sanctions are always ultimately put into effect by force. Mr. Allmand's suggestion simply appalls me because I think it is so impractical. Mr. Walker said that they have no might. I would like to ask the witness if he thinks for one moment there is one iota of willingness on the part of the British to go into Rhodesia or that you could get one man to voluntarily go into Rhodesia?

**Mr. Walker:** That is argument. You did get one man.

**Mr. Lambert:** No, no, this is...

**The Chairman:** Order, please.

**Mr. Sanger:** If I may come back to your argument, are you then suggesting that in order for sanctions to be effective they must always be backed by force, and as you are going to rule out force you ought to rule out sanctions, and therefore you ought to accept the status quo and the de facto government?

**Mr. Lambert:** No. My point is that unless you feel you could enforce your sanctions you then run into an exercise in futility.

**Mr. Sanger:** And therefore there should not be sanctions and therefore the...

**Mr. Lambert:** Unless you are able to back them up.

**Mr. Sanger:** In order to clarify this matter, are you therefore suggesting that sanctions should never have been put into effect?

**Mr. Lambert:** I do not think so. I think they were an exercise in futility. I can illustrate this point for you. I was out in New Zealand—as Mr. Walker was—at a CPA Association Conference when UDI was declared and I noted the extreme reluctance of the New Zealand government to participate in the sanctions and the frank loopholes that existed with regard to tobacco. They allowed Rothmans to make forward commitments for three years and tobacco is now going from Rhodesia to New Zealand on the basis of the forward commitments that were made. The Australians were not anxious to join in that because the people there are the same, they consider them as brothers, and to say that Canadians would go into this sort of an adventure in folly by using military might to go into Rhodesia—one has to be practical about this.

**Mr. Sanger:** I think you have raised about three points there. One point is that I think in New Zealand and Australia they identify very readily and very easily with the pioneering whites who go out to a country like Rhodesia, and they remember the 220,000 Rhodesian whites and identify with them and forget the 4 million blacks in the country. After all, they do not have 4 million blacks in their country. That is one point.

Secondly, the New Zealand government had their ambassador on the Security Council last December in the seat which Canada now has I believe, and New Zealand voted for mandatory selective sanctions at that time. They not only committed themselves, they directed the rest of the United Nations to this. I agree there is a problem in the forward order of goods and this has been going on for two or three years. This has been something of a problem in the case of chrome being delivered to the United States. Therefore if one believes that sanctions are far from effective at this time, when these orders are finally fulfilled sanctions will become that much more effective because no more will be undertaken.

**Mr. Lambert:** Unless there are other loopholes, which I suggest there can be.

**Mr. Sanger:** I think I suggested that to the Committee, and therefore the Security Council's next work was to try to see how they could plug those loopholes.

**Mr. Lambert:** I wonder why there is this great concern about Rhodesians and blacks in Rhodesia where progress is being made, albeit very slowly, when you have equal oppression and even greater bloodshed in Nigeria and Ghana, for instance. Why do we not concern ourselves with that? I object to this tendency to international busybodyness. As Canadians, we could say, "We are now going to go out and help the Welch and the Scottish nationalists. They have declared themselves. They are in Parliament."

**Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale):** I think—

**Mr. Lambert:** This is a principle.

**Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale):** Mr. Lambert, I think you should correct the suggestion you made that there was oppression and bloodshed in Ghana. I do not think there is any evidence whatsoever of that. I agree that Nigeria is another matter but I do not think there is anything in the recent history of

Ghana to support the fact that there is presently oppression or bloodshed.

**Mr. Lambert:** Not now, not in the same sense, but there was.

**Mr. Sanger:** Nigeria is now going through a tribal or national war such as Europe went through twice in this century. I think it is a deplorable situation but it is deep in the history of that area that the Ibo people are the ambitious and the thrusting groups that have gone ahead, and they have been disliked by the less progressive Muslim tribes. I do not think you can compare a situation like that, where between tribes of that sort there has been a deep history of dislike, such as there has been in Europe and elsewhere, with the situation in Rhodesia where a small group of settlers have gone into a country and where they are—I think I made this clear this morning—doing a great number of things to delay the right of franchise and development to the majority of the people.

**Mr. Lambert:** Do you want another Congo?

**Mr. Sanger:** I say there is more likelihood of a Congo situation developing if this government continues because they are depriving people of education to the higher ranks, where you could have a smooth transition to majority rule.

**Mr. Lambert:** I will put it to you that the Congo, of course, is not comparable in that in the Congo there was not a government in situ, an actual de facto government in charge. Rhodesia is unique in its situation whereas in the Congo, because of a completely unrealistic attitude in Brussels, they decided to pull out.

**Mr. Sanger:** There were 100,000 Belgians living in the Congo at the time they gained their independence.

**Mr. Lambert:** I know, I had many relatives there.

**Mr. Sanger:** Yes.

**Mr. Lambert:** And therefore I have some idea of what was going on. That was a terrible tragedy and the suffering and bloodshed that has followed is even worse than that which previously existed.

**Mr. Sanger:** Yes. I brought up the matter of the Congo this morning. If I could bring it up again I would like to say that it is the

lack of preparation on the part of the majority of the people to take over government that causes a situation like the Congo to develop, and I am very fearful it could cause a situation like that to develop in Rhodesia where you have a population explosion and, if you like, a primary school explosion, which could produce a great deal of discontent among the upper teenagers who will find any further avenue to advance and plot. To begin with, it is such a waste of talent and resource that it ought to be deplored in any case, but in another way it is an entirely negative thing at this stage in the matter of danger to the country and to the whole area. If these resources could only be harnessed into a government that was a non-racial government, elected by a majority of the people, the country would have a tremendous future.

• (12:10 p.m.)

**Mr. Lambert:** In Rhodesia, if this were to follow, and if you were to have one man, one vote, how long do you think the whites would have anybody in government?

**Mr. Sanger:** As I have said this morning, I am not suggesting one man, one vote, or a majority rule in these circumstances, at an early stage. There will be a period of transition.

How long will they stay? The numbers of whites in Kenya and in East Africa generally have not gone down appreciably since independence. They have gone down because officials have left and a number of white farmers have been bought out. But there has also been immigration into Rhodesia. In Kenya there are restrictions on people owning land if they are not citizens of the country. Britain has made it easy for people to take out Kenya citizenship and, if they want to change at a later stage in life, to resume British citizenship. This is going to make it easier for the flow backwards and forwards.

I do not think, therefore, if the situation is resolved in a comparatively short time, that all the whites in the country will go; but the longer it goes on the greater likelihood there is that there will be a mass exodus of whites. This in every sense is bad for Rhodesia, and bad for those whites, as well.

**Mr. Lambert:** That is all.

**The Chairman:** Mr. Andras.

**Mr. Andras:** Mr. Sanger, on page 10 of your brief you summarize your recommenda-

tions and make two suggestions about Canada's role. The first is at the beginning of page 10, where you say, as a statement of fact rather than of opinion, or suspicion, or hope, that there are many Commonwealth states which wish to see the Commonwealth take the initiative, which see Canada as the crucial link between Rhodesia and the Commonwealth, and which hope Canada will therefore take the initiative in calling a Commonwealth conference on Rhodesia. Is that, in fact, an opinion, or can you tell us what Commonwealth States specifically have expressed this opinion and who, on behalf of those governments, has expressed it?

**Mr. Sanger:** I think I may have slipped from facts in the first two relative clauses to opinion in the last. But it certainly is a fact that President Kaunda has written to Mr. Martin, I think, expressing appreciation of Canada's role at this time. It was a private letter, I think, and perhaps Mr. Martin could say whether he went on to talk about a Commonwealth conference. As I say, Mr. Martin's own view is that the U.N. action and consideration should come first.

**Mr. Andras:** Then, in the last sentence of that same paragraph, you say:

As well as this, an attempt by Canada to draw the diverging states...

and so on; and there is an inference at the end there

and perhaps vital, move if considered only in the context of the Commonwealth's own future.

Are you implying here that there is an opinion amongst other Commonwealth countries that Canada has become not a leader in the Commonwealth but the leader?

**Mr. Sanger:** Yes, I really do. If you want this documented, it is obviously difficult to have an opinion poll immediately around Commonwealth leaders, but it is a fact, I think, that 30 African heads of state or their deputies came to Expo this year. They all came and saw Mr. Martin, and Mr. Martin has said that they all talked about Rhodesia. They are deeply concerned in this matter, and the fact that this subject came up between him and them on every occasion, as he has said, suggests that they are both concerned and that they also see Canada playing a central role.

**Mr. Andras:** But the inference here is that it is not just in connection with Rhodesia but with Commonwealth affairs generally.

**Mr. Sanger:** I am sorry; perhaps I have not phrased it very well. I was suggesting at that point—and that is a statement of opinion rather than of facts, as earlier—that the Commonwealth could well break up, either by inertia or through a rumpus over the Rhodesian issue. Therefore, if you do not think of Rhodesia so much as of the future of the Commonwealth, as such, the links between these countries will be endangered by the Rhodesian situation.

If you will remember, when the Queen went to Jamaica in February of last year the then Prime Minister, Mr. Sangster, wrote her a speech from the throne in which she made a strong statement about Rhodesia and which caused some concern back in Rhodesia. This surely is some index of the concern that exists. Jamaican-Canadian relations have stayed strong, but I think that Rhodesia is conceivably a dangerous issue even in this link between Canada and Jamaica.

**Mr. Andras:** Going back to page 6, you state that since 1959 African political parties have been banned from holding meetings, and so on. Africans do own land in Rhodesia. They hold title to land in Rhodesia, do they not?

**Mr. Sanger:** Yes, they do. Very briefly, the land division under the Land Apportionment Act is that there are 40 million acres of tribal trust land; the African purchase area, which is supposed to be for the slightly more advanced master farmers, amounts to 4 million acres, but most of those are very small scale farms; the European area is nearly 36 million acres, just slightly smaller than the African trust land; and national land, which is parks and forest, 10 million.

Therefore, Africans hold title to land, but only if they were actively using the land at the time the Land Husbandry Act came into effect. Younger sons cannot have a title unless you divide 8 acres between two or three or four sons; and the people who went off to make a living in the towns do not, as they used to, have what was called one foot in the reserve. "One foot in the reserve" was their form of old age security. Instead of having a pension system one went back as an old man or woman and lived in the reserve.

This has all been cut out in the attempt, which may have been a progressive idea at the time, to secure a permanent urban population which did not derive part of its living from the land.

**Mr. Andras:** What is the comparable situation in, say, Uganda, in ownership of land and the holding of political meetings in the reserves and so on?

**Mr. Sanger:** Uganda made early progress far beyond Tanzania and Kenya because there were widespread small holdings of cotton and of coffee—Robusta coffee. This is the basis of the whole historical development of Uganda.

If you ask whether every single person in Uganda has title to land, I cannot answer that; but there is much broader ownership, and obviously it is not a case where ownership of half the area of the country is denied to the majority of the people, as it is in Rhodesia.

In 1961 a Parliamentary sub-committee of all parties recommended the repeal of the Land Apportionment Act, and they elicited the fact that a hundred thousand African families were squatting on the European-owned areas of the country and had lost any title to land in the reserve. Therefore, they were landless, but dependent on the land; and, in fact, they were in a completely illegal position. Therefore, besides all the economic reasons for this complete underdevelopment of the European areas in Rhodesia—and you can imagine how underdeveloped they are when the average holding is three thousand acres—this was another reason for the sub-Committee's recommending the total repeal of the Land Apportionment Act.

**Mr. Lind:** A supplementary question: when you speak of land holdings by Europeans in Uganda do you include Asians as Europeans.

**Mr. Sanger:** In Uganda.

**Mr. Lind:** Yes.

**Mr. Sanger:** I did not mention them. The Indians in Uganda have had large sugar estates in eastern Uganda and the Europeans have had tea plantations in the west mainly.

**Mr. Lind:** Are they controlled by Europeans or Asians?

**Mr. Sanger:** These tea plantations in western Uganda have been controlled by early British settlers, yes.

**Mr. Lind:** Are they of Asian or of European extraction?

**Mr. Sanger:** The sugar estates in eastern Uganda are Asian.

**Mr. Lind:** What about the tea?

**Mr. Sanger:** The last time I was there these were mainly British, but you have been there since.

• (12:20 p.m.)

**Mr. Lind:** There are four large firms that own large acreage in Uganda, but to get back to the natives, are they allowed to own land?

**Mr. Sanger:** In Uganda?

**Mr. Lind:** Yes.

**Mr. Sanger:** Yes, certainly.

**Mr. Lind:** And the farms, do they own the farms?

**Mr. Sanger:** Yes, certainly. The whole basis of wealth in Uganda is based on the coffee and the cotton plantations of the Buganda, the Bunyoro tribes, and the other tribes in the old western Kingdom. The sugar plantations in the Jinja area are a more recent part of development.

**Mr. Lind:** I have one more question.

**The Chairman:** Mr. Andras, have you completed your questioning?

**Mr. Andras:** Yes.

**The Chairman:** In that case, Mr. McIntosh had asked to be able to question the witness before Mr. Lind.

**Mr. McIntosh:** I have one question I wanted to ask when Mr. Allmand was questioning the witness. Regarding Mr. Allmand's hypothetical question about Communist support to the African people in the event of the situation continuing, could I ask the witness what the possibility is of Communist support to the white Rhodesians if Britain does take action?

**Mr. Sanger:** Chinese support to the white Rhodesians if Britain takes action?

**Mr. McIntosh:** I said Communist support.

**Mr. Sanger:** Communist support to the white Rhodesians if Britain takes action—minimal.

**Mr. McIntosh:** On what basis do you make that statement? You have made a long explanation as to what...

**Mr. Sanger:** Because I think that the Communist countries, and all their statements up to now, have shown this. They see the white population there in far more stark terms than any of us here do who have obviously degrees of sympathy with their position. In Communist terms they are exploiters, imperialists, any word you like to use. If you suggest they do an entire somersault and come in on the side of a small minority in temporary control of the situation, I do not think these are Communist tactics at all.


**Mr. Brewin:** Mr. Chairman, I have a supplementary question. I would like to ask the witness if he does not believe that underlying this whole business really is the racial issue, a fundamental moral issue?

**Mr. Sanger:** Yes, I certainly do. This was in my first paragraph and I did not elaborate on it at that time. The hour is late and I will not really elaborate on it now beyond emphasizing that when I say that I think this is a crucial test case of nonracialism in the world, I most sincerely believe it. Up to now British decolonization has been comparatively easy. It had control of the situation; it merely had to make a decision at Lancaster House and carry it out over a transitional period. Here for the first time they are facing what U Thant called the wall across Africa resisting the winds of change. If you look at any of the votes in the United Nations, you will surely see how there is beginning to be a division on many issues between the North and the South of this whole world. Latin America is becoming more and more lined up with Afro-Asians in believing that the North and the prosperous countries of this world are only concerned for themselves and will not do the hard things that need to be done for the vast majority in the whole world. So that I think that although we have been talking about a country of only 4 million people, it is a test case for, in fact, billions of people in the world.

The Chairman: Well, gentlemen, we have been sitting since quarter to ten this morning. I believe that we should adjourn, but before we do so, on your behalf I wish to thank Mr. Sanger for having accepted our

invitation and being here this morning. Thank you, Mr. Sanger.

The meeting is adjourned until next Thursday.



Report of the Department of External Affairs

Professor R. C. Pratt, Professor of International Studies



HOUSE OF COMMONS

Second Session—Twenty-seventh Parliament

1967

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STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

**EXTERNAL AFFAIRS**

Chairman: Mr. JEAN-EUDES DUBÉ

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 12

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 14, 1967

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RESPECTING

Report of the Department of External Affairs (1966)

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WITNESS:

Professor R. C. Pratt, Professor of Political Science and Chairman,  
International Studies Programme, University of Toronto.

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.  
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY  
OTTAWA, 1967

HOUSE OF COMMONS  
Second Session—Twenty-seventh Parliament  
1967

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Chairman: Mr. Jean-Eudes Dubé

Vice-Chairman: Mr. W. B. Nesbitt

and

Mr. Allmand,  
Mr. Asselin  
(Charlevoix),  
Mr. Basford,  
Mr. Brewin,  
Mr. Churchill,  
Mr. Forrestall,  
Mr. Groos,

Mr. Harkness,  
Mr. Hymmen,  
Mr. Lambert,  
Mr. Laprise,  
Mr. Lind,  
Mr. Macdonald  
(Rosedale),  
Mr. Macquarrie,

Mr. McIntosh,  
Mr. Orange,  
Mr. Pilon,  
Mr. Prud'homme,  
Mr. Stanbury,  
Mr. Thompson,  
Mr. Tolmie,  
Mr. Walker—(24).

(Quorum 13)

Fernand Despatie,  
Clerk of the Committee.

<sup>1</sup>Replaced Mr. Forest on December 13, 1967.

<sup>2</sup>Replaced Mr. Goyer on December 13, 1967.

<sup>3</sup>Replaced Mr. Andras on December 13, 1967.

<sup>4</sup>Replaced Mr. Langlois (Chicoutimi) on December 13, 1967.

RESPECTING

Report of the Department of External Affairs (1966)

WITNESS:

Professor R. C. Pratt, Professor of Political Science and Chairman,  
International Studies Programme, University of Toronto.

ROGER DURAMEL, F.R.S.C.  
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OTTAWA, 1967

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

ORDER OF REFERENCE

WEDNESDAY, December 13, 1967.

*Ordered*,—That the names of Messrs. Stanbury, Groos, Tolmie and Orange be substituted for those of Messrs. Andras, Forest, Langlois (*Chicoutimi*) and Goyer on the Standing Committee on External Affairs.

Attest.

ALISTAIR FRASER,  
*The Clerk of the House of Commons.*

The Committee resumed consideration of the Report of the Department of External Affairs (1966).

The Chairman introduced Professor Pratt, who made a statement on the subject of Rhodesia.

The witness was then questioned for the remainder of the meeting.

The Chairman thanked Professor Pratt for his appearance before the Committee.

At 12.30 p.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

Fergal Desautels  
*Clerk of the Committee*



## MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

THURSDAY, December 14, 1967.  
(14)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs met at 9.40 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Dubé, presided.

*Members present:* Messrs. Allmand, Basford, Brewin, Churchill, Dubé, Groos, Harkness, Hymmen, Lambert, Lind, Macdonald (*Rosedale*), Macquarrie, McIntosh, Nesbitt, Orange, Pilon, Stanbury, Thompson, Tolmie, Walker (20).

*In attendance:* Professor R. C. Pratt, Professor of Political Science and Chairman, International Studies Programme, University of Toronto.

The Committee resumed consideration of the Report of the Department of External Affairs (1966).

The Chairman introduced Professor Pratt, who made a statement on the subject of Rhodesia.

The witness was then questioned for the remainder of the meeting.

The Chairman thanked Professor Pratt for his appearance before the Committee.

At 12.30 p.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

Fernand Despatie,  
*Clerk of the Committee.*



## EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

Thursday, December 14, 1967.

• 0939

**The Chairman:** Order, please. Gentlemen, we have a quorum. May I introduce the witness this morning, Professor R. C. Pratt. Professor Pratt was born in Montreal in 1926 and educated at McGill University and Oxford University. He was a Lecturer at Mount Allison University, Assistant Professor at McGill, Research Officer at Oxford University Institute of Commonwealth Studies, Assistant Professor at the University of Toronto, Professor of Political Science and Chairman of the International Studies Program, University of Toronto.

His African experience includes Lecturer at Makerere University College on leave of absence from McGill; two extended research trips to East and Central Africa while at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies; Principal, University College, Dar-es-Salaam, sponsored by External Aid from 1961 to 1965 and two further research visits to East Africa in 1966 and 1967. He is currently President of the Committee on African Studies in Canada. He is the co-author of two books on Africa: *Buganda and British Overrule* and *A New Deal in Central Africa*, both published in 1960.

• 0940

You already have before you both in English and in French, the statement Professor Pratt is going to read. After he has read his statement he will answer any questions you wish to put to him.

**Professor R. C. Pratt (Professor of Political Science and Chairman, International Studies Programme, University of Toronto):** May I, Mr. Chairman, express to Committee members my recognition of and appreciation for the honour which they pay me in inviting me to appear before them on the subject of Rhodesia. At the risk of sounding presumptuous, I would like also to express my gratitude that the Committee is seized of the importance of the Rhodesia issue. I have fairly

extensive contacts with Canadians who have worked in Africa and who are proud of and have a sustained interest in Canada's role on that continent. In my judgment amongst these Canadians there has been a very widespread support for the firm Canadian insistence that there can be no just settlement in Rhodesia save on the basis of an unimpeded progress towards majority rule in the colony and on the understanding that there can be no independence there before that majority rule is achieved. I think it is also true that many of these Canadians feel that our continuing policy on this issue and the initiatives we are willing to take in its regard will have and properly should have an important influence on African assessments of the sincerity and integrity of our posture on African affairs.

Inevitably, on an issue of such topical importance, most Canadian scholars of modern Africa are likely to have strong convictions about this crisis and about the details of Canadian policies in its regard. In this I am certainly no exception. However, as an academic witness before this Committee, I shall try in my opening statement at least, primarily to be expository and analytical. I have not yet read the verbatim report of your meeting last week. However, I have read Mr. Sanger's opening statement to you and I will try as best I can to supplement the material which he presented.

If justice is to be done to the complexity of the Rhodesia crisis and if the present position of the European minority is to be fully and sympathetically understood, then some more extensive background is needed. This minority came to Rhodesia much as similar men and women had gone to Australia, New Zealand and Canada to open up a country new to Europe and to establish there a white dominion. These ambitions, the enormous cultural gap between the first settlers and the African peoples and the comparative abundance of land meant that naturally and almost innocently the Rhodesian Europeans came to base their life on the assumption that the European minority would live as an

autonomous community in a position of political and economic dominance and that the Africans would live apart, following a traditional way of life and practising subsistence farming.

For several decades these arrangements appeared to pose no serious problems. However, as African numbers increased and African aspirations could no longer be contained by a tribal way of life and by subsistence farming, the points of conflict and of tension between the races became more numerous. By then however, European dominance had become entrenched in law and any gradual adaptation to a more egalitarian and inter-racial social system was thereby rendered much more difficult. Let me illustrate the dimensions of this aspect of the problem.

The Land Apportionment Act in Rhodesia divides most of Rhodesia into either European or African areas. A Rhodesian government document in 1960 reported that the European areas totalled just over 48 million acres and the African areas totalled 42 million acres. There are under 8,000 European farms and ranches in the country and there are over 350,000 African family holdings. Much of the land in both the European and the African areas is not suitable for intensive cultivation. A bulletin of the Ministry of Agriculture in 1951 however, estimated that 36,900 square miles of land was suitable for intensive cultivation and that seventy per cent of that land was within the European areas. Almost all the land which is within 25 miles of the railway line is European land.

• 0945

The assumption of Rhodesian economic policy over the years has been that the economic development of agriculture in Rhodesia will take place primarily on European farms. In contrast to such colonies as the Gold Coast, Uganda, Kenya and Tanganyika where the British promotion of economic agriculture by Africans has transformed life in many African areas and where that African agriculture has provided the backbone of their developing economies, in Rhodesia, African agriculture languishes. The Economic Survey published this year by the present regime reports that in 1957 the value of African cash crops was £4.9 million while in 1966 it was only £4.2 million. I might add that in 1965, the last year before the unilat-

eral Declaration of Independence, the value given in that report was £3.7 million. This gives an annual average cash income per African farm unit of about £12.

For the first few decades after the imposition of colonial rule this situation appeared tolerable for African horizons remained narrowly tribal. However, as their aspirations and expectations increased and as their horizons widened, these arrangements had obvious revolutionary potential. This potential further increased after the war when land hunger became a serious problem for the first time in the African areas. This land hunger has meant that at the same time as African farmers in the thousands were finding themselves without any land, there were across the boundaries which separate the African and European areas large stretches of land, still unfarmed, being held for the future white immigrants whom the government was vigorously seeking. The most authoritative estimate of which I know puts at 15 per cent the portion of the European land which is suitable for intensive cultivation and at from three to four per cent the area of it which is actually so cultivated.

A second set of discriminatory practices which is also essential to the present position of the white minority is that of job discrimination. Through a variety of legal and white trade union devices, Africans have been effectively excluded from many of the trades and jobs which, elsewhere in Africa, are being done with increasing competence by Africans in the thousands. This is as true in the Civil Service as outside of it. In 1961 the last year for which I have been able to find figures, there were 1,440 civil servants in the top three grades of the Service. Of these, 1,440, 40 were Africans. Many commentators cite job reservation as one of the important factors explaining present European attitudes. Nearly twenty-five per cent of the European population are in jobs which are categorized as partially skilled or semi-skilled jobs. These are jobs in other words for which on the evidence of other African countries, Africans would now be competing and at much lower wages, were these jobs not effectively reserved for whites.

Political, social and economic reform in a society in which there is a dominant community enjoying such legally-enforced privileges as these, faces far more than merely the problems of ignorance and prejudice. The

dominant community recognizes that these laws are essential to the present pattern of life in that community and sees clearly that a genuinely representative government would not long tolerate such discriminatory laws. The dilemma however, is that as Africans develop politically and economically, they have also come to recognize the same truth and to realize that unless they share in the exercise of power the laws of the state would continue to be biased against them in these fundamental ways.

By the middle of the 1950's several outstanding Rhodesian European politicians realized that a major change in the direction of Rhodesian policies was necessary if African resentments were not understandably to develop to very serious proportions. Under Garfield Todd, Prime Minister from 1956 to 1958 and Sir Edgar Whitehead, Prime Minister from 1958 to 1962, a variety of reforms were introduced or were proposed. African representation to a limited degree was provided for the first time in the legislature, more vigorous efforts were made to achieve African economic agricultural developments, and the Land Apportionment Act was to be repealed. These efforts were certainly modest and would probably not have been sufficient in the long run to win African cooperation. They bear no comparison with the Kenyan policies which have so successfully transformed that colony from a European-dominated society to an African state in which Europeans now live without privilege but in security with equality. But the opposition which defeated the Todd and Whitehead reforms was European, not African.

The pattern was too entrenched, the changes that would eventually be needed were too unsettling, the influence of the British too slight for local European reformers to succeed in a situation where they had to depend upon an electorate which was predominantly white. The Europeans therefore chose instead to reject Todd and Whitehead and to follow other leaders with white different commitments. Since then as Mr. Sanger outlined to you at your last meeting, policy has been marked by a firm determination by the white minority to hold on to its position of dominance.

One obstacle, however, stood between the new leaders of the European community and full and unquestioned control, namely the

fact that Rhodesia was still a colony and that Britain remained ultimately responsible for Rhodesia and was still the final constitutional authority for it. Therefore, from 1962 on, it became a major concern of the Rhodesian government to achieve full independence.

They could win that independence constitutionally only if they could convince Britain to abandon one of the most central of her colonial policies in Africa, namely the policy that Britain gave independence to colonies only on the basis of majority rule. This proposition is no new idea. It has been a corner-stone of British colonial policy at least since 1923. As Mr. Arnold Smith recently pointed out "Every Commonwealth country got independence on the basis of majority rule. In the case of Kenya, there were the same pressures from the large minority of white settlers, and in the case of Kenya, as elsewhere, despite close and understandable links of sentiment and sympathy with many of the settlers, Britain resisted these pressures and gave independence to the people as a whole." By the 1960's however, the British government did not want to sustain a long period of British tutelage and whatever its historical and legal responsibilities for Rhodesia, the main British preoccupation by 1965 appears to have been to discharge these obligations as quickly as possible without open conflict with their "kith and kin" but with as little damage as possible to the international good name of British policy in Africa. I think a key to the complex negotiations between Prime Minister Wilson and Mr. Smith is that Wilson sought to bargain independence now for Rhodesia in exchange for guarantees which would assure a removal of racially discriminatory legislation and the eventual introduction of majority rule, while it was precisely to avoid British pressures towards such objectives as these that Smith wanted full independence. The deadlock was therefore inevitable and from that deadlock issued the unilateral declaration of independence by the Smith regime.

During the negotiations which preceded that declaration, Prime Minister Wilson had based the British position on five principles which had first been enunciated by his Conservative predecessor. He held that independence could not be granted to Rhodesia unless:

1. the principle of unimpeded progress to majority rule is maintained and guaranteed.

2. there are guarantees against retrogressive amendments to the constitution.

3. there is immediate improvement in the political status of Africans.

4. progress is made towards ending racial discrimination.

5. the British Government is satisfied that any basis proposed for independence is acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole.

By the time the Smith-Wilson negotiations had broken down in 1965, Wilson's concern to achieve a settlement at almost any cost led him to make such concessions to Smith that the hard question which remains is why Smith did not then and there accept Wilson's final offer. No doubt the major part of the answer to this lies in the dynamics of European politics in Southern Rhodesia which propelled the Smith Cabinet and a reluctant Smith towards the Unilateral Declaration of Independence. But in so far as the negotiations themselves were an important factor, the fifth principle above remained a stumbling block. At the end, the negotiations bogged down in discussions of how the opinion of Rhodesians would be tested, and about the composition of a Royal Commission on that issue and about the representative character of a Chiefs' assembly.

The seemingly secondary nature of these issues is deceptive. They represented a matter of fundamental importance. If Wilson stuck to the clear meaning of the fifth principle, then African rights might well continue to be safeguarded whatever concessions Wilson might nominally accept, because Africans could be counted upon to reject the constitution which would subjugate them to the wealthy and exclusive minority living in their midst. Smith, who had earlier failed to secure Sir Douglas Home's acceptance that a Chiefs' indaba was an adequate answer to this fifth principle, could not get Wilson to accept it either. He broke off negotiations with Prime Minister Wilson and U.D.I. followed on November 11, 1965.

• 0955

How is it that the Rhodesia crisis has become an issue of international importance? Why is it not just another colonial issue? There are, I think, two main reasons for this. First, a seizure of power in a British colony

by a tiny white minority ruling over a large African majority, if allowed to succeed, would cut at the very root of the Commonwealth as a multi-racial association. I believe it is true that almost everyone, and certainly our own Prime Minister, who values the Commonwealth as an important bridge between wealthy and predominantly white nations on the one hand and poor and developing non-white nations on the other, has recognized from the start that the Rhodesia crisis, if unresolved, could very easily destroy the trust and confidence of Commonwealth members that the Commonwealth is an association of states who accept and are committed to the principle of racial equality.

The second reason for the importance of the Rhodesian issue is the consequences to the United Nations in the event of failure to achieve a just settlement of the crisis. This point was recently made by Mr. Arnold Smith.

After the failure of the economic sanctions policy organized through the League of Nations against Italy at the time of its attack on Ethiopia, if the United Nations mandatory sanctions this time are also allowed to fail, not for technical reasons but through a lack of political will, it will gravely weaken the credibility and value of the key enforcement articles in the United Nations charter. This will be a setback not only to the Rhodesian problem but to the prestige and authority of the World Association and of International Law.

That Canada should now feel itself to have an important responsibility in regard to the resolution of the Rhodesia crisis is partly a product, no doubt, of its commitment both to the Commonwealth and to the United Nations. It is, however, also due, I expect, to the fact that Canada has already played an important and positive role in the handling of this crisis, a role which now involves it in a continuing obligation. It is at least arguable as well that the trust which the Asian, African and Caribbean members of the Commonwealth place in the integrity of Canada's position on the Rhodesia issue, along with our membership on the Security Council, gives Canada a unique opportunity and hence responsibility in regard to this international issue.

The Commonwealth took note of and discussed the Rhodesia crisis at least as early as

1964. As the confidential negotiations between Wilson and Smith dragged on into 1965, Africans within Rhodesia and outside became increasingly suspicious that Britain might agree to full independence for Rhodesia under the Smith government. In consequence, their spokesmen within the Commonwealth and particularly President Nyerere of Tanzania and President Kaunda of Zambia sought from Wilson the assurance that there would be no independence for Rhodesia before majority rule. The essential moderation of this African demand must in fairness be noted. They wanted Britain to pursue in Rhodesia the policies of trusteeship and training for self-government that had marked Britain's postwar colonial policies elsewhere in Africa. Both Presidents Nyerere and Kaunda went out of their way to stress that they would accept a period of colonial tutelage in Rhodesia as long as it was clearly established that, when it ended, there would be majority rule. At the June 1965 Commonwealth Conference, President Nyerere in particular pressed Prime Minister Wilson for this NIBMAR commitment. Wilson refused this for the good reason, as we now know, that he had already conceded the possibility of independence before majority rule in his confidential negotiations with Smith.

African suspicions of British policy increased after the Rhodesian declaration of independence. Africans noted bitterly the contrast between Britain's swift military intervention in other colonial crises and her adamant refusal to contemplate force in this instance. Most Africans are bound to feel that in addition to whatever other factors can be cited to explain this, a crucial factor nevertheless which distinguishes the Rhodesian crisis from similar crises in Aden, Kenya and Guiana is that in Rhodesia alone the rebels were white. It is an embittering conclusion.

• 1000

Most commentators seem to agree that Canada's role at both the Lagos Commonwealth Conference in January 1966 and at the London Conference in September 1966 was crucial in holding the Commonwealth together despite the enormous strain placed upon it by the very great caution with which Britain approached any vigorous tackling of the Rhodesian issue. At Lagos, Canada's influence was crucial in convincing Asian, Afri-

can and Caribbean members to give Britain the chance which she requested to demonstrate that the Smith regime could be brought down by voluntary sanctions in a matter of weeks, not months. When that proved hopelessly optimistic, Canada again played an important role at the London Conference in September 1966.

At this conference Wilson reaffirmed Britain's commitment to what had by then grown to six principles of British policy, the sixth being that there must be safeguards assuring that no racial groups would be subjected to domination by another. Britain was not ready at that conference, despite pressure from a large majority of the Commonwealth, to support the position that there could be no independence for Rhodesia before majority rule. Wilson wanted one further chance to put proposals to Smith. He agreed, however, that if these final proposals to Smith were rejected, "the British government... will not thereafter be prepared to submit to the British Parliament any settlement which involves independence before majority rule". He also promised in that event that, given the full support of commonwealth members, the British government would join in sponsoring in the Security Council a resolution providing for effective and selective mandatory economic sanctions. The heads of government at the Commonwealth Conference also announced their agreement that "the problem of Rhodesia should be kept under constant review, and they would meet again soon if the illegal regime were not brought to an end speedily."

Canada played a crucial role at this September conference. Prime Minister Pearson and the Canadian delegation stood with the newer members of the Commonwealth on the important long-term principle that there could be no acceptable constitutional solution in Rhodesia other than that based on majority rule. They were, in turn, able to influence these members to give Wilson the one last chance to negotiate with Smith, to refrain at this stage from pressing for the use of force and to accept the terms of Prime Minister Wilson's proposed appeal to the United Nations for mandatory sanctions.

Thus Canada had won over to a more moderate position the newer members of the Commonwealth by demonstrating that Canada supported the same basic long-term objectives as they did. Similarly, Canada helped to

win British acquiescence in a reaffirmation of these long-term objectives as the price for support for the immediate short-term objectives of British policy. This seems to me to have been a positive, proper, and entirely honourable policy for Canada to follow as long as, these immediate objectives accepted, Canada then remained faithful in her support also of the long-run objectives and exerted in their support the same diplomatic skills and initiatives which she had devoted to winning acquiescence from the rest of the Commonwealth for the immediate British policies.

After the failure of the further negotiations between Prime Minister Wilson and Mr. Smith on HMS *Tiger* in December 1966, Prime Minister Wilson then honoured his pledge to the Commonwealth and committed the British Government to the position that it would not grant legal independence to Rhodesia until after the achievement of majority rule. This is sometimes presented as a reluctant concession to African pressures. Mr. Arnold Smith, who should know, reports, however, that "the views of Canada and India and other commonwealth countries on this point were no less firm than those of Africans." Not only is this assertion based on moral and political principle and has been British policy for a very long time, it is also a principle that has every precedent on its side. There are no grounds to expect that a minority regime, once granted independence, will be able to be held to earlier promises to advance the political rights of the majority or to preserve their existing limited rights.

The entrenched clauses of the Union of South Africa Act proved worthless. The elaborate powers of reservation given to the African Affairs Board within the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland proved useless. The entrenched clauses and the Bill of Rights in the Southern Rhodesian Constitution of 1961 have been extremely ineffective. The moral is clear. There can be no guarantees without the reality of power to enforce them. If Africans are not yet to be given electoral power, then either Britain or an international consortium or the United Nations must continue to act as their trustee until that electoral power has been extended to them.

As the immediate economic effects of sanctions are taking far longer to have their effect than was expected and as the political

consequences, in any case, of these sanctions are by no means clear, each of the countries, Canada included, which has concerned itself with this issue is therefore bound soon to restate its position. It would seem to me to be a statement of fact to say that there are three possible directions which Canadian policy might now take, on the assumption that the Canadian government does not wish to execute any fundamental reversal of its position.

• 1005

The first would be to note the fact that alternative policies to the use of force have failed and to recommend the use of force by Britain to bring down the Smith regime. Again, as a statement of fact, this position would win Canada easy approval from many states but would not further the resolution of the crisis. Second, Canada could combine a renewed declaration of its opposition to the regime and its support for the NIBMAR principle with a policy of non-involvement other than that implied by a general willingness to support United Nations decisions. Thirdly, Canada could take the initiative in seeking to define policies which it could publicly recommend to the Security Council, to Britain and to the Commonwealth and could use Commonwealth and other channels to win effective support for these policies.

My own strong preference is for this latter alternative. However, I am seeking to be loyal to my initial statement to you that I shall strive to be as analytical and factual as possible in this opening statement, and I will therefore content myself with concluding on this issue that I think it is a further statement of fact that many who have accepted and welcomed the lead in this issue which Canada has provided in the past, particularly within the framework of the Commonwealth, now hope for a continued exercise of Canadian diplomatic skills on this issue and look for a fresh and positive Canadian initiative.

My confidence in the Department of External Affairs leads me to feel that it is more important to stress the possible importance of a fresh Canadian initiative both at the United Nations and in the Commonwealth than it is to spell out in detail what that initiative might be. However, I do feel one final obligation which, with your forbearance, I would like to fulfil.

Anyone who actively concerns himself with the Rhodesia crisis, and who takes a

position that continued and vigorous efforts are needed to secure the fall of the present regime and to assure uninterrupted progress to majority rule, has an obligation to give some indication of the type of arrangements which he feels ought to follow the defeat of the rebel regime. For the defeat of that regime would only clear away an enormous obstacle to the initiation of a whole range of policies that would be necessary if there was to be any chance of a stable and orderly advance to majority rule in Rhodesia.

The existing bitterness, the predominance of Europeans in the economy and in the civil service and the deep divisions within the ranks of the nationalists all indicate that whatever happens there will be a long period of most difficult political and administrative problems in Rhodesia. It is therefore interesting and encouraging that there would appear to be a fair degree of agreement amongst the critics of the present regime concerning the type of structure that would be needed after the fall of that regime. In indicating what these features are, I shall be expressing a personal opinion, but it is an opinion which involves, as well, a significant degree of summary of the views of others.

The arrangements which would appear to offer the most hope for long-term peace in Rhodesia are these:

1. continued international or British final authority
2. a British or international military presence
3. a widely-based interim administration which would include nationalist leaders as well as European leaders who are willing to work on a basis of equality with African political leaders
4. the negotiation with that administration of a fresh constitution which should be consistent with the six principles of British policy and should therefore promise "unimpeded progress on majority rule"
5. acceptance all around of the necessity of a reasonably long transitional period to majority rule so that Rhodesia can have a British presence during the time that will be necessary to heal the bitterness of these last years and to develop the institutions and to train the African manpower that will be needed to assure stability after the introduction of majority rule

6. an imaginative internationally-supported program of training for Africans particularly with reference to the many posts in the civil service which would fall vacant after independence

• 1010

7. a bold and generous scheme similar to that introduced by Britain in Kenya to provide for the purchase of European farms and businesses from those Rhodesian Europeans who do not wish to remain in Rhodesia under an African government

8. a generous scheme of assistance to Rhodesian Europeans to emigrate to other countries should they so wish

9. a large scale international program of technical assistance to assist Rhodesia with the skilled manpower which it will need should there be a more rapid departure of trained and experienced Europeans than there is the production of Rhodesian Africans with similar skills.

Government policies embodying many of these features worked wonders in securing the peaceful transition of Kenya to African rule. Something along these lines must surely eventually be undertaken in Rhodesia if there is to be any chance of that country evolving towards a stable and developing society free of racial discrimination. In my judgment, it is a crucial final argument in favour of continuing vigorous efforts to secure a return of constitutional government in Rhodesia. The longer one waits before initiating the sorts of policies outlined above, the harder will be their implementation.

**The Chairman:** Thank you, Professor Pratt. Mr. Lambert.

**Mr. Lambert:** I would be interested in knowing why Professor Pratt considers that Rhodesia is populated by Rhodesian Europeans and Rhodesian Africans rather than by Rhodesians. This is some of the nonsense that goes on in this country when we talk about Canadian French and Canadian English. We are Canadians and in the same way the inhabitants of Rhodesia are Rhodesians first—Europeans perhaps by origin and Africans by origin. I think this also covers a lot of the nonsense that goes on in this discussion.

**Prof. Pratt:** Certainly I would agree that in any country it is highly desirable for the

nationals of that country to feel themselves without distinction of race as nationals of that country. I think it is an inevitable fact in Rhodesia that a great deal of political thinking and a lot of legislation has reference to the racial composition of the population and in consequence it does seem to be hard to discuss the Rhodesian situation without reference to the racial question.

**Mr. Lambert:** Yes, but I am talking about the position. If it is applicable in Rhodesia it is applicable here in Canada.

**Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale):** Would it not be correct to say, Mr. Chairman, that the reason for the difference in description of the two is because the white Rhodesian minority has sought to make this difference enshrined in law. In other words, they have sought to create two different status of society and you are referring to that difference they have created in their own law. There is no difference of that kind created in Canada. Come now, Mr. Lambert. Your views will be interesting in the future.

**Mr. Thompson:** Professor Pratt, most of the statistics you used regarding the population and the situation within the country concerning peoples go back to 1961. Are there no more recent statistics than that, certainly those after U.D.I.?

**Prof. Pratt:** It depends which statistics you have in mind. Not particularly for the purposes of this appearance before you as a witness, but in relation to my work at the university I try to keep the figures I have up to date, but on numbers of these items...

**Mr. Thompson:** I am speaking of statistics regarding the income; the ones you use actually in your report.

**Prof. Pratt:** The income figure for African farms I gave is from the most recent publication that has come out of Rhodesia and it is dated July, 1967. It is the economic survey for 1966 and the last figures it includes are the 1965 figures. Some of the figures that I gave you with reference to land distribution related to an earlier comprehensive report, 1961.

• 1015

**Mr. Thompson:** Surely there are statistics on agriculture, education, and so forth that

are much more current. I wondered why you were not using those when there are, I believe, more recent statistics available.

**Prof. Pratt:** If there are I would be delighted to have them. I have here statistics on education which are for 1964; they appear in a book published in 1967. I have not gone into the education question because you spent some time on it last week. I do not think the pattern has significantly changed; I do not think there would be a major difference. Indeed, if there were a major difference I think one would know of it because it would be to the advantage of the regime to make it known.

**Mr. Thompson:** Another question for information relates to the status of Prime Minister Smith. In your opinion, is the pressure from his own Cabinet and from public opinion, as far as the European population is concerned, greater in regard to those differences which have divided the British government and the Rhodesian government on negotiations than his own stand, for instance, after the *Tiger* negotiations? It seemed at the beginning that Smith had come to an agreement with Wilson and I wonder what your opinion is in this regard?

**Prof. Pratt:** I can express only an opinion, Mr. Thompson. The hypothesis that your question presents is a hypothesis which Prime Minister Wilson has recently expressed to explain the reversal of Mr. Smith's position after the negotiations on HMS *Tiger* and, indeed, generally as a hypothesis explaining the pattern of European politics in Southern Rhodesia. It may very well be an important point and it suggests, therefore, that Mr. Smith's flexibility, in so far as he might want to exercise flexibility, is limited by members of his Cabinet who are watching him very closely and would be critical of the exercise of that flexibility.

You asked specifically, if I have recalled your question correctly, whether I feel that the differences between them are more significant than the differences between Mr. Smith and Prime Minister Wilson. No; I would feel that the differences between Prime Minister Wilson and Mr. Smith are fundamental and that although, when one reads the various command papers, the issues

on which they divide seem secondary. They seem to be arguing about comparatively unimportant things, the composition of a Royal Commission, and so on.

In fact—at least in my reading of these command papers—both Prime Minister Wilson and Mr. Smith clearly identified that there was something fundamental in the points about which they were disagreeing and this is why each persisted in the disagreement.

**Mr. Thompson:** Let me just follow that up with a second related question: Do you believe that the Smith administration has the overwhelming support of the white European population, or does he represent a somewhat smaller collective opinion?

**Prof. Pratt:** Again I can express only an opinion, but it would seem to me that there is a great deal of evidence, not the least of which is the fact that his party won every one of the 50 seats on the A roll. He represents a substantial majority.

**Mr. Thompson:** In suggesting an alternative you made three points, the first one being the use of force which, I appreciate, you did not support. Is there any possible hope of imposing a change in policy, now held by the Rhodesian administration, upon the European population of Rhodesia without the use of force?

**Prof. Pratt:** That is our \$64 question, is it not. Let me try to present in a coherent way an analysis of what I think are the factors relevant to it.

First, I think it necessary for Canada and for Britain and for other concerned nations to publicly accept that if all else fails they would be willing to give serious consideration to an international force to restore constitutional government in Rhodesia.

• 1020

**Mr. Churchill:** Would you repeat that sentence again please?

**Prof. Pratt:** I may not get it the same way. I was trying to be as careful as I could. But if all else fails, if in other words a more vigorous pursuit of sanctions and the pursuit of other possible policies to secure the defeat of the Smith regime does not succeed then it would seem to me that we ought now to recognize that we should at that point be willing to consider with other interested

states in the context of the United Nations the use of force through the medium of the United Nations.

**An hon. Member:** Good Lord!

**Prof. Pratt:** This is a position however which is important I think to state because it might well be a contribution to the achievement of that change of attitudes and expectations in the present regime which at the moment, I would agree with you Mr. Thompson, looks unlikely. If, however, international opinion, particularly Commonwealth opinion I think, continues to demonstrate that it is serious in saying that it cannot accept the justice of the present Smith regime's position and that it will persist in its efforts to secure its replacement by a just constitutional system—if that can be made credible to the present regime there may then be the possibility of movement of opinion in that regime such as occurred, as I am sure you will know as well as myself, in the European community in Kenya where there was an extraordinarily attractive and remarkable degree of adaptable capacity exhibited after 1959-60 when it was clear that...

**Mr. Thompson:** After Mau Mau.

**Prof. Pratt:** Yes.

**Mr. Thompson:** I have another related question. What about the migrant population in Kenya itself? Very little has been said of the opinion of the native Rhodesians—those who are indigenous to the country—and their attitude toward and support for the present administration, and then again as it relates to large numbers, up to half a million people, who come into the country on two-year work visas, do not have to pay income tax and are allowed to take back all of their earnings. What is your opinion on whether or not a good deal of the problem that exists in Rhodesia today towards a gradual takeover of majority rule relates to those who are really not Rhodesians at all.

**Prof. Pratt:** I would have thought probably that the political importance of the transient immigrant community is very slight. They come in as unskilled workers. They do not have the language of the predominant population among whom they are living. They are what economists like to call target workers; they are after a sum of money and

they return once they have secured it. So by and large my understanding of the situation is politically. In the African trade union movement they play a negligible role. People that I have heard talk about this have suggested that they pose one of the difficulties that African leaders face in organizing their people because of their significant numbers but their non-involvement.

• 1025

**Mr. Thompson:** I was a little disappointed in that you did not make any mention in your statement of the attitude of some of the immediately adjacent African countries. I am thinking specifically of Zambia and what is taking place there from reports that we read. And what is the official attitude and policy, say, of a country like Malawi where you have two African self-governing nations with a wide divergence of opinion. What would your comments be in this regard?

**Prof. Pratt:** Certainly it is true that the government of Malawi has taken a quite different stand on the Rhodesia question than have the governments of Zambia, Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya, this being the area that I know best. I think that position can be explained partly in terms of realism and partly in terms of the internal politics of that part of Africa. Malawi is heavily dependent upon Rhodesia because large numbers of its young people are attracted there for wage employment of the sort that you have made reference to earlier and as it would cause a major upheaval in the Malawian economy if that right was withdrawn Dr. Banda's decision is understandable—that he must not jeopardize his relations with Rhodesia because of the damage it would do to his own economy.

The Zambian position is the most complex because it is similarly and indeed even more dependent than it was two years ago on Rhodesia since their economies were fairly widely integrated under the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. It is dependent on Rhodesia for coal. The power dam that Rhodesia and Zambia share is physically located on the Rhodesian side of the Zambesi river. It is heavily dependent on Rhodesian industry for many manufacturing products. Yet the Zambian government has taken a position quite different from the Malawian

government. It is, in African terms, a wealthy government whereas Malawi is not. Zambia has more flexibility in its policy because it has the wealth of the copper belt and it has developed its own coal resources. Since the opening of the new Lusaka international airport it is flying manufacturing goods in, I believe it is in the process of or has already cut the importation of manufacturing goods from Rhodesia, and it continues within African circles to take a lead in trying to mobilize concerned opinion on the Rhodesian crisis. As you know, the countries to the north are very concerned critics of the trend of policy in Rhodesia.

**Mr. Thompson:** Mr. Chairman, I do not want to monopolize the time of the Committee but I have just one more question, which relates to sanctions. The only apparent force other than military force is the force of economic sanctions. Historically we know that sanctions never have been really effective in respect of their intended objective, but how can they ever be effective on Rhodesia? When you have a country like Malawi, which is an African-administered country, when you have a country like South Africa, when you have a country like Mozambique which are directly involved with the other sanction leaks if we might put it that way, how can sanctions ever be effective in this regard? Then how can the four African countries which you mentioned, but particularly Zambia, ever justify or be able to gain support for their stand when actually their position, both from an economic and a political point of view, is far from being the desirable one?

• 1030

I am not speaking about Kenya now and I am not really speaking about Tanzania; I am speaking about Zambia. It seems to me that the argument you are putting up is almost hopeless unless we come to the point of using force which would, in my opinion, open an Africa-wide conflagration which would be a horrible thing. It seems that there is not a continuation of logic in the argument you present.

**Prof. Pratt:** Let me try to speak to two aspects of this. First, which is partially a further aspect in answer to your previous question, I would think in Eastern Africa

generally—I would argue with you very strongly except I do not think there would be an argument; I hope you will agree—that what these countries need above all is a period of uninterrupted calm within which they can pursue their development and, with the technical assistance they are receiving, achieve the continuing development that quite clearly they desperately need. All of these countries now have the political leadership that is determined and committed to that. In almost every country in Africa the potential for unrest is enormous because there is such a comparatively small degree of power centered in every central government.

**Mr. Thompson:** The base of the pyramid is narrow.

**Prof. Pratt:** Yes, and the degree of power that the central government can mobilize in a crisis is slight so they are all under the threat of difficulty; they desperately need a period of assistance and stability.

In many ways my own concern on the Rhodesian crisis stems from a recognition of what I think is very true, that the crisis has an enormously important impact on these countries that are making, in my view, such a determined and well-motivated effort. But the appearance on their borders of a regime which defies, in their view, the principles of racial equality has a terrifically disturbing effect across the borders and makes the position of the leaders that we are mentioning and that you have met, Mr. Thompson, that much more difficult.

On the second part of your question, I am not convinced that sanctions finally will not work. By "working" I presume we mean that sanctions will have a sufficient impact on the Rhodesian economy to convince the Rhodesian Europeans that this situation is not going to change and they must face a continuing pattern under this economic impact. I am not convinced in that situation that there would not develop a significant body of European opinion that would come to the view they must accept the necessity of a settlement with Britain that would recognize the five British principles. I think there is a chance.

Sanctions, of course, have a bad historical record of success but in their enforcement on Rhodesia there are some advantages to be gained from the fact that it is a land locked

country. If the government of South Africa, while in no way turning against the Rhodesian regime which it would be unrealistic to expect it to do, nevertheless takes the position, as by and large in the first eighteen months or so of the crisis it did, that it would wish to continue normal relations with Rhodesia but would not seek to throw its full weight behind its protection, then I would think there is still real hope that sanctions could have the sort of result, which is not an extensive one, that I have indicated.

• 1035

**Mr. Thompson:** Thank you, very much.

**Mr. Brewin:** Mr. Chairman, I wanted to come to the very point that Professor Pratt has just left but I want to lead up to it a bit. In his preliminary statement, Professor Pratt said that Canada should take an initiative in seeking to define policies to be recommended to the Security Council, Britain and the Commonwealth. Then a little later he said that he did not think it was necessary to spell out in detail what the initiative should be but then he did give, however, some details of what should follow, what he called the defeat of the regime. The first question I would like to ask him is does he regard—perhaps it is very obvious—either the defeat of the regime in some sense or, rather unlikely, the complete change of heart on the part of the present regime in Rhodesia as a necessary preliminary to any satisfactory settlement?

**Prof. Pratt:** I think the answer is, yes; but just to make sure I have the full import of the question I think the position that Prime Minister Wilson defined, which is quoted in the Commonwealth communique in September, 1966 and which, as I understand it, is also the position of the Canadian government, is the correct one; that when a constitutional government is restored in Rhodesia it must be a constitutional government which, in the words of the Commonwealth communique, is widely representative and with which the British government then will negotiate a new constitution based on the six principles.

**Mr. Brewin:** Assuming this to be a necessary objective—and I do not hesitate to say I agree with you about it—I would like to ask you a little more about how you achieve it. First of all, I understand you to say that you

rule out the use of force except possibly as an ultimate means of going it. You then say the Canadian position could, in effect, do very little but offer vague support to some policy that the United Nations develops. That leaves only one avenue of approach and that is for Canada to endeavour to take initiative both through the Commonwealth and in the United Nations to bring about more effective economic sanctions.

**Prof. Pratt:** Yes. I am now intruding into your field in talking about specific and immediate policies and this, even more than anything else I have said, is nothing but an expression of opinion. Let me present two arguments. One is, why a Canadian initiative? Second, what sort of initiative might it be? I think there is a need for Canadian initiative because it is very hard, in a sense, to think of what other country is as well placed as ourselves to take that initiative.

I think by chance of history, the fact that we are on the Security Council this year and the fact that we have played such an important role at Lagos and at London means that, unlike all the other international crises about which Canadians get aroused, here is a crisis where we are in an almost unique position to play a role that very few, if any other, states are in a position to play.

**Mr. McIntosh:** Unless it is De Gaulle in Canada.

• 1040

**Prof. Pratt:** I do not regard that as a proper analogy to make. I think it is a debating point. The definition, then, of what that recommended initiative might be, if the argument is accepted that it should take place—and recommendations are far more competently received by our senior officials in External Affairs—would, I think, include the following, many of which are already Canadian policy: First, a repetition by the Canadian government, which both Prime Minister Pearson and Mr. Martin have done recently, that they continue to affirm their belief that there can be no just settlement save on the basis of unimpeded progress to majority rule. I think that is important because there is a clear commitment to that within the Commonwealth and it would be extremely disheartening for the newer members of the Commonwealth if that commitment were gradually eroded away. Therefore, as, in a way, the link between the newer members

and Britain Canada's reaffirmation of the importance of that would be—is already—an important contribution.

Secondly—and this may be a misunderstanding of the situation—I think it is probably true that whatever is done on the Rhodesia crisis must be done with Britain's concurrence and co-operation. Therefore, recommendations about the next round of steps on this issue going before the Security Council must be carefully worked out with Britain if Britain's concurrence is to be received and if a British veto is to be avoided. Merely for these specific reasons, if for no others, British concurrence is necessary.

The Commonwealth provided the machinery for that at an earlier stage of the crisis. The September 1966 conference was marked by a very carefully negotiated agreement about the terms on which Britain would go to the Security Council with recommendations about selective mandatory sanctions. It was all part of the negotiated parcel which is embodied in the Commonwealth communique; and because of the achievement of that negotiation within the Commonwealth its passage within the Security Council was greatly facilitated. Therefore, although the effective decisions on further sanctions are, of course, Security Council decisions it is probable, I think, that the essential, effective, political discussions leading to proposals that will have the chance of being effective and of receiving British support can probably thus take place within the framework of the Commonwealth.

The next specific step is a technical matter on which mine is only one opinion amongst those of many amateurs expressing an opinion. There are products on which the selective mandatory sanctions are not being applied, and there is a possibility of tightening up sanctions in that respect. There is the possibility of focussing enforcement of the sanctions, in the first instance, on the major leaks that go through Mozambique, which would be a further major tightening of sanctions.

There are other moves which would underline to the Rhodesian community how out of touch they are in their thinking compared with the main body of international opinion, particularly in relation relate to communications between the outside world and Rhodesia.

• 1045

There is the possibility of greater assistance to Zambia in order to put Zambia into a more effective position to close off her trade with Rhodesia. I understand, on the basis of a telephone call, made not by myself but by Mr. Sanger to the Zambian Ambassador to the United Nations, that the Zambian's figures on its trade with Rhodesia will shortly be presented and that they demonstrate that in the last month there has a 75 per cent cut in the previous flow of trade. That percentage is higher than I had thought it would be, and shows that Zambia has done a great deal; but further assistance from outside might put Zambia into a stronger position to be able further to cut her dependence on Rhodesia.

**Mr. Brewin:** Just one further question, by way of summary of what you have said, Professor Pratt. I appreciate that you are not claiming to be an expert on the technical aspects of this, but is it your view that the recent report of the UN Committee on Sanctions indicates loopholes in the economic sanctions that it is practical to block, and that their blocking might well, in your judgment, have the effect of changing the situation in Rhodesia?

**Prof. Pratt:** When I am in an optimistic frame of mind, yes. Certainly they must be tried, in my view.

**The Chairman:** Mr. Groos?

**Mr. Groos:** Dr. Pratt, I am not too clear in my own mind about the historical background of Rhodesia. Perhaps you can help me. Is there any historical reason for Rhodesia's being as it now appears, so far behind other British colonies and dependencies in developing what I would call the basic elements required for self-government?

You have spoken of 1,440 people being in the Civil Service, of whom only 40 were native Rhodesians. Why was it that they were so ill-prepared as compared to other such British dependencies when the time came?

**Prof. Pratt:** I think there are two reasons for that, sir. Firstly, Britain herself has never had the same detailed responsibility for the government of Rhodesia that she exercised for her other colonies in Africa up

to the moment of independence. Rhodesia, for the first 35 or 45 years of its existence was governed by the British South Africa Company under charter. In 1923 it became—what is the phrase that is used in the documentation—an internally self-governing colony, a situation in which the effective detailed administrative power was transferred from the British South Africa Company to a government responsible to an elected and entirely European legislature. That continued; that legislature stayed entirely European until 15 out of the 65 became African in 1961. So that you have the first fact therefore that Britain was not in an administrative position to pursue in Rhodesia the policies of training which she pursued in other countries. She could, and did, attempt to encourage this. For example, Britain played a major role in establishing the University College of Salisbury in Salisbury in 1953, but it was not as a power carrying out the detailed administrative responsibilities. Therefore the question really is: why did not the regime itself do this? I think the answer must lie in the sorts of factors that I have tried to identify. By the time African aspirations had developed and Africans had begun to move out of subsistence farming and a purely tribal way of life, the pattern had set along lines in which the position of the European community rested upon a framework of discriminatory legislation. Therefore, to preserve this pattern they had to preserve European control of the legislature. There were not the motives operating on that government that there were operating on the British Government in the areas where they were directly exercising responsibility.

• 1050

**Mr. Groos:** It seems to me that any country that wishes to achieve self-government must have certain basic elements. In my own mind I think of such things as education for the population, training in administration, the integration of the native population into the system of justice, the police and the security forces, and the development of agrarian and economic policy. Is there any indication that policy towards the development of these prerequisites for self-government are being advanced today by the Smith administration?

**Prof. Pratt:** I think very, very few. There were important indications of such an effort being made in the 1950's under Todd and then Whitehead, but the whole direction of their policies has been reversed. On the very

points that you identified. Sir Edgar Whitehead made one of his central pledges that he would repeal the Land Apportionment Act. It is my understanding that this was one of the major reasons which led to his defeat in the 1962 elections. The Act, of course, remains on the books and has recently been somewhat tightened up.

**Mr. Hymmen:** I have a related question. There was a definite change in thinking from Todd's time to Whitehead's. What actually caused the change in thinking?

Was it a different representation of population?

**Prof. Pratt:** I can only speculate with you. I certainly agree with you that there was a change because it was a white electorate that elected Todd, and Todd was replaced by a party with a majority headed by Whitehead, and yet that party has now disappeared from the political scene. It was not able to win a single seat out of the 50 in the last election. I think that the issues on which they were defeated were that they were not able finally to bring their own people with them on the franchise reforms which they were recommending and which were certainly modest, and on the land reform, which as you know, is the heart of policy there.

• 1055

**Mr. Groos:** Mr. Chairman, I would like to continue with this other line of thought. You were mentioning, Doctor, the possibility of one of the alternatives now being some sort of UN intervention and force. It seems to me that this would require the introduction into Rhodesia of a sudden overwhelming UN power and authority. If you are going to prevent bloodshed, it would, to my mind, be unthinkable in that it would open deep and long-lasting wounds, particularly within the British Commonwealth. To my mind that would be disastrous. I note that the UN if I interpret the UN constitution correctly, has no means of doing this other than through the Security Council, where it would probably be vetoed; what is more, they have no military machinery set up for assembling such a force and introducing it quickly enough to prevent the sort of thing that I have mentioned. To my mind sanctions would seem to be the answer, long lasting though they may be. What indications are

there that the Africans would be willing to wait for these to work? Are there enough indications that they are working at all so far and that would give promise of their working in the future?

**Prof. Pratt:** I hope so, though what indications I have suggest increasing African scepticism about sanctions and some feeling, in consequence, of having been misled over their potential. But I would underline the importance of all that you have said. A military intervention, however organized, if one assumed it were to take place, would have to be, as you say, a massive intervention of such transparent structure that its impact would be overwhelming; but even that would be a terribly embittering experience. I think it is also true and part of the picture, which I am sure you would also wish to acknowledge, that if nothing is done, the embittering consequences will be equally serious and disastrous because what we will in effect be saying to Africans is that there is no hope. It would be the beginning of perpetuation of underground activities that for a long time would be desperate and unsuccessful; it would be the beginning of a struggle that in the net result would certainly involve, in my view, more loss of life, and be equally, if not more, embittering. So we are in a situation where, if we have any concern for the area and for the rest of Africa, we must find and must continue to pursue a way in between there. My comment on force really was partly a consequence of feeling that one ought not to give away that card at this stage, because if one says one cannot ever contemplate a military intervention under UN auspices in Rhodesia—as I understand it from statements in the House that I have read that would not be the present Canadian position—if one gives that card away and says, "never can we conceive of this", it seems to me much less likely that any of the intermediate measures are going to be successful.

**Mr. Walker:** Are you saying that nothing is being done now?

**Prof. Pratt:** No, a lot is being done now.

• 1100

**Mr. Groos:** My final thought on this matter, Mr. Chairman, is that certainly the Smith regime is not having an easy time. They

must recognize their own difficulties as we recognize ours. Is it possible that the UN might contribute some support in the form of external aid to the Smith regime to help to overcome the deficiencies in their progression towards self-government that I mentioned previously? Could this be yet another alternative, or would the Smith regime accept it if it were done under UN auspices? Could this be a Canadian initiative while still maintaining our support for the UN sanction?

**Prof. Pratt:** Partly as an opinion and partly as a deduction from one or two other initiatives that I will mention, I would consider that a nonstarter so long as there is the present regime; but it would be absolutely essential as part of the arrangement after the return of constitutional government in Rhodesia. Why I suspect that it is a nonstarter is because the British themselves—and aid from them would probably be more acceptable than from the United Nations—offered extensive aid in African education to the Smith Government before U.D.I. This is relevant to the training of Africans and it is also very relevant to how many Africans vote, because the electoral qualifications for the A roll have an educational feature to them. Therefore, by increasing secondary school education for Africans you are increasing the number of Africans who, in due course, will qualify for a vote. That assistance was refused by Mr. Smith.

Assistance aimed at training Africans for civil service jobs, crash training programs of one sort or another that seek to change the racial pattern of the civil service in its permanent ranks and assistance in the control and introduction of African farmers into the now European areas are all absolutely essential, but, I would have thought, almost inconceivable under the present regime.

**Mr. Groos:** Could they have second thoughts? After the period that was elapsed might this not be possible under UN auspices?

**Prof. Pratt:** If they had second thoughts on that I think they would also have second thoughts about a constitutional settlement. When that type of mind develops we will be well on the way to a return to constitutional government.

**Mr. Groos:** Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

**Mr. Walker:** May I ask a supplementary question? Mr. Groos mentioned the historical background to the way the Rhodesian regime handled their native population problem. Do you have any difficulty in equating it with, or is there any similarity to, the way in which we in Canada have handled the problem of our native Indians and Eskimos who at one time were in the majority? I feel very hypocritical in discussing this.

**Prof. Pratt:** That is a very, very, fair question. It reminds me of one of my first encounters at an African secondary school in the middle of the 1950's when I was teaching in Uganda. I was invited by the student's council to address a school assembly and I said that I would be pleased to, and asked what would they like me to talk on. They said they would like me to talk on education in Canada and I had to do a fair amount of homework in a hurry. The first question in the question period was from a young man who asked the same question. He put up his hand and said "Would the speaker mind telling us if there are any indigenous peoples in Canada?"

I would have thought that there is a basic difference. I may not correctly understand our policy in regard to Canadian Indians but I understand they can live off the reserve in complete equality with other Canadians. That is not the case in Rhodesia.

• 1105

**Mr. Walker:** I was really speaking in philosophical terms.

**The Chairman:** Mr. Churchill.

**Mr. Churchill:** Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Relative to your very last sentence, Doctor, it says on page 12 of the little pamphlet published by the Ministry of Information for Rhodesia that 625,000 Africans are in employment and that that does not include the self-employed or the tens of thousands engaged as pastoralists in the tribal areas.

The fact that 625,000 African are employed in industry and services and so on surely does not agree with your most recent statement that they are unable to find employment. They can live off the tribal areas, in other words, just as you said the Indians could.

**Prof. Pratt:** I may not have stated my position correctly. Let me try to clarify it. The

625,000 Africans in employment is certainly a very significant figure. It includes just under 300,000 who are employed as farm labourers in the European areas, which certainly is wage employment. Others are employed in commerce and industry in the towns. In addition to that, there are Africans who are self-employed or following subsistence agriculture in the African areas.

There are two things which help to give dimensions to the problem. What we have in Rhodesia, in some respects, on the economic side, is a problem which is occurring everywhere in Africa. I think it is possibly true to argue that because of some of the specific political features in Rhodesia the solution is more difficult to arrive at, but what is happening in Rhodesia—and this is not a criticism of the regime; it is a fact of economic development in these areas—is that the number of Africans in wage employment is not going up; nor has it in many countries. This can be explained by a gradual shift of emphasis in employers' practices. The older pattern were dependent on purely unskilled, transient labour. Gradually employers are coming to feel that it is in fact more economic to have a stable labour force; that they develop more skills; that you pay them more but it is, in fact, more economical. As that develops the number in employment begins to fall though the total wage bill will go up. That is happening in many parts of Africa. It is happening in Rhodesia, as well.

**Mr. Churchill:** And also in Canada.

**Prof. Pratt:** I suppose also in Canada. It is a major problem. If one wants to recognize where the potential for social unrest is, one has to ask oneself what other channels of livelihood are going to be open to a population which is increasing.

It is there that you run into the Land Apportionment Act. The African areas, now under the native Land Husbandry Act, are overcrowded and one has, in consequence, the development of a landless group which cannot be absorbed in wage employment.

**Mr. Churchill:** I did not intend to ask questions along this line but you have diverted me again.

**Prof. Pratt:** I am sorry.

**Mr. Churchill:** On land use, you mentioned 350,000 African farms. This little pamphlet I

have just referred to says that there are 44,000,000 acres available for the Africans, which means over 1,200 acres for family farms. How many acres do you need?

**Prof. Pratt:** The figures both in the European areas and the African areas have to be broken down.

**Mr. Churchill:** No; never mind the European area. I know they have more land...

**Prof. Pratt:** No; the figures have to be broken down in terms of the arable areas. There are 2.8 million acres of that land which is arable. It is a...

**Mr. Churchill:** Let me interrupt. Am I to accept your figures, or am I to accept the figures of the Ministry of Information in Rhodesia? This is just a point. You can put forward all sorts of figures, but I am taking them from documents.

• 1110

**Mr. Walker:** Is that arable land? I do not want to interrupt, but there is a difference, is there not, between rocky mountain, desert and farm land.

**An hon. Member:** Or the Ottawa Valley.

**Mr. Walker:** Yes; or the Ottawa Valley. Does it refer to arable land?

**Mr. Churchill:** I would presume it is arable land. Surely they would not be mentioning 44,000,000 acres of land which is not useful for agriculture. We could say the same of Canada. We could take in all the north country and talk about millions of acres.

**Mr. Walker:** I am just wondering whether that is what the pamphlet was doing.

**Mr. Churchill:** However, the questions I wanted to ask were relative to sanctions and other matters.

**Prof. Pratt:** But—this is a very important question. I share your puzzlement about these figures. What I have finally found to be most reliable on the land question in Rhodesia is a publication by a man called Yudelman, who is a World Bank economist, who is now at Harvard. He has broken down the land in Rhodesia into a series of different types of zones. In the top three of these zones, which is the land suitable for intensive

cultivation, he has 70 per cent of this 32,900 square miles. Of the 32,900 square miles that comprises areas suitable for intensive production, 70 per cent is in the European areas. This has to be seen in the historical context that this is the land to which European farmers would naturally gravitate when they first came in as settlers. The consequence has been that as African agricultural developments cease to advance the main bulk, or 70 per cent, of the land suitable for intensive cultivation is closed off as well.

**Mr. Churchill:** Are you suggesting that I should not rely on the government's statistics in Rhodesia? I rely on the Dominion Bureau of Statistics in Canada. I do not go to someone outside Canada to give me a picture of what is going on. I like to place reliance on official publications.

**Prof. Pratt:** My own experience is that publications of Ministries of Information everywhere have to be checked.

**Mr. Churchill:** Including Canada?

**Prof. Pratt:** I am not versed...

**Mr. Churchill:** All right, we will remember that. May I now ask about sanctions. If social problems are being caused in Rhodesia because of land hunger and other matters, are social problems now being caused by the imposition of sanctions and is unemployment the result of this?

**Prof. Pratt:** I should think to some extent, yes. The figures that are in this economic survey that I have just mentioned indicate that the employment of Africans has gone down, I think, by 6,000 or 7,000. I am not sure about the figures on employment of Europeans, but it may well have dropped.

**Mr. Churchill:** As a result of sanctions?

**Prof. Pratt:** As a result of sanctions.

**Mr. Churchill:** Sanctions are causing unemployment in Rhodesia?

**Prof. Pratt:** Yes.

**Mr. Churchill:** You will be interested to know, if that is the case, that Mr. Pearson is anxious to assist. I asked him this question yesterday in the House, and it appears on page 5376 of *Hansard*.

Has the Government a plan to assist the working people of Rhodesia who

have been or may be thrown out of employment by the continuation of sanctions?

Mr. Pearson then referred me to the report of the prime ministers' conference. I then said:

Would that assistance be economic assistance in order that their standard of living might be maintained?

Here is Mr. Pearson's interesting answer:

It would certainly include that...

It is an interesting development in Canadian policy, if unemployment is pronounced in Rhodesia, that the Canadian Government is prepared to provide economic assistance. That is initiative on the part of Canada of which I am sure you would approve.

**Prof. Pratt:** Certainly. It would take real skill, but if a way could be found to provide assistance to Europeans and Africans who have suffered from sanctions, without simultaneously, of course, supporting a rebel regime, then I would agree it would be a positive step.

**Mr. Churchill:** You would then be content to have people endure economic distress pending the settlement of the political situation? That is not Mr. Pearson's view. He is now prepared to give economic assistance. I was very pleased with the statement he made yesterday.

• 1115

On page 14 of your brief you express confidence in the Department of External Affairs. I do not always share your view on this. You also omitted to mention Mr. Martin's name in your brief.

On page 14 you say:

it is more important to stress the possible importance of a fresh Canadian initiative both at the United Nations and in the Commonwealth than it is to spell out in detail what that initiative might be.

Unless you spell it out in detail what is to be gained? How can you have Canadian initiative in the United Nations and the Commonwealth without spelling out in detail what that initiative might be?

**Prof. Pratt:** My remark there is misleading and I will be pleased to clarify it. However, before doing so let me hasten to say that I

always associate Mr. Martin with the Department of External Affairs, and indeed my confidence is led by my confidence in Mr. Martin.

On this specific point, what I intended to say was that I felt it was perhaps more important to this Committee if I spoke to the possible importance of the initiative, but that discussions about the details of the initiative might be better dealt with by the officers of External Affairs. However, in the final analysis it is useless to talk about the importance of an initiative unless one also has a clear view of what that initiative must be.

**Mr. Churchill:** I concluded that you spelled out the initiative as far as you were concerned, on page 15. You have made about six points.

**Prof. Pratt:** Page 15 is slightly different. In a way, page 15 is an exercise of conscience because I feel that anyone such as myself who takes the position that one must press forward with this has to be ready to answer in detail the question of if you succeed what will be the consequences in Rhodesia. How are you going to achieve the stability that you claim you are after. Therefore these measures that I have outlined in my preliminary statement do not refer to immediate policies but to policies subsequent to the achievement of the return of constitutional government.

**Mr. Churchill:** I just have two or three questions on this point, Mr. Chairman. Professor Pratt, you speak about long term peace in Rhodesia. Is there not peace there now?

**Prof. Pratt:** Of course, this is a question of the interpretation of words, is it not? If instead of speaking of peace in my preliminary statement we were to talk about the achievement of long experienced stability and equality, that is really what I hope these measures would seek to achieve.

**Mr. Churchill:** You mention as item 1: continued international or British final authority, Item 2 is the one that interests me very much: a British or international military presence,

In other words, a regime resting on bayonets until the reforms that you suggest are brought into effect. Why do you not say a

Canadian military presence? Are you prepared to commit 10,000 Canadian service men to Rhodesia for a period of 30 years pending the political settlement that you would like to see take place in that country?

**Prof. Pratt:** I would hope that when constitutional government has been restored in Rhodesia, should Britain request other United Nations or Commonwealth members to join with her in the exercise of this final trusteeship, that Canada would participate and co-operate. But in my view it would not be, a question of 30 years, it would be much sooner than that, possibly slightly longer than the five to seven years that I think Mr. Sanger mentioned last week.

**Mr. Churchill:** Would you be prepared to volunteer Canadian military presence there? If you are pressing Britain and the United Nations to take action then why would Canada not volunteer to provide the necessary force so that the sanction will be there?

**Prof. Pratt:** In my view I would certainly say that within the framework of the Commonwealth or the United Nations, should the decision be taken at some later stage and after all else has failed to have a military intervention, that Canada would play its part.

**Mr. Churchill:** I posed these questions, Mr. Chairman, but I do not approve of the use of force in Rhodesia. However, if it became policy that force should be used, I hope that Canada will not push other people in front and stand behind. I think that is the type of woolly thinking which affects this type of discussion, but I certainly oppose the use of force.

• 1120

**Mr. Basford:** Professor Pratt, I would like to ask you some further questions about your examination of sanctions and your sometimes optimism about them. It seems to me that in spite of their history, which has not been successful, it is important that we make every effort to try to give the international community a successful example of the use of sanctions. In answer to Mr. Brewin you spoke about possible actions with regard to Mozambique to close up some of the leaks. I would like to explore with you the prospect of possible actions against South Africa with

the same purpose in mind and ask you if you see any wisdom in that course.

**Prof. Pratt:** I think I agree, but I take the British Government's position, and possibly our own government's position, that every effort should be made to try to keep the handling of the Rhodesian question separate from any discussion of the South African situation.

If these matters get inextricably intertwined, then it is a vastly bigger and more difficult problem and its solution is much farther in the future. Therefore I would have thought the first thing to try, if one is thinking along these lines, is to see what effect can be gained by applying pressure particularly in regard to any breaks in the mandatory sanctions that are occurring through Lourenço Marques and Beira, the two Mozambique ports. It would be much more manageable, if we are talking about two ports, and no doubt the Western countries have a leverage with respect to Portugal that possibly they do not have with South Africa. It is a tactical decision rather than a question of decision on principle.

**Mr. Basford:** To what extent do you see South Africa acting as a leak against the sanction?

**Prof. Pratt:** South Africa can always shelter Rhodesia from the full impact of sanctions if she is determined to do so. What one can only hope for, therefore, if international opinion reaffirms itself and is clearly determined to follow through with these sanctions and with appropriate increases in them, is that South Africa will recognize it as being in her interest that this extended war of nerves and economic sanctions should not too fully involve her and should come to an end as quickly as possible. As I understand it, right after sanctions the South Africa position was along these lines. They would not cut their trade with Rhodesia nor would they particularly inflate it. It seems possible that more recently South Africa has moved beyond that stage of reinforcing the Rhodesian situation by increasing its imports from and exports to Rhodesia. I would hope that South Africa could be convinced to move back to its earlier position, which would be in its interest. I think it would be in anybody's interests to integrate the handling and discussion of these two questions.

**Mr. Basford:** I was not trying to integrate the two questions. I was trying to get your assessment of South Africa as an agency for breaching the sanctions. I take it you presently see South Africa as something of a problem in this regard.

**Prof. Pratt:** Oh, a major one, to the extent that they could render negatory most of what might be attempted.

**Mr. Basford:** I was trying to find out from you how you avoided that.

**Prof. Pratt:** I am now, so to speak, in your field, but it would only be...

**Mr. Basford:** You have an engaging sense of modesty which is not characteristic of your profession.

• 1125

**Prof. Pratt:** It is more necessary than ever to try to continue to exhibit it. It is hoped that if the determination of the major Western powers, who are the ones most involved, continues to be made clear, that this will be persisted with and intensified, and once it is made clear that South Africa's assessment of her own interests would lead her to hesitate to provide full protection to Rhodesia, it would lead her—as there is some suggestion she did initially—to apply some pressure in order to come to a settlement.

**Mr. Basford:** What do you consider the mechanics of the success of sanctions in Rhodesia to be a change of government, Smith changing his mind, or what?

**Prof. Pratt:** I suppose the most realistic answer would be that there would be sufficient concern by the present regime to put them in a frame of mind to re-negotiate with the British along the sort of lines they had negotiated earlier. In my view that would not mean an end to the problem because one has to recognize that in these previous negotiations in search of a settlement Prime Minister Wilson went a very long way. One would still need to be interested in the details of the negotiations, but I would have thought the most realistic expectation would have been that it would still be the present regime that would return to the negotiating table.

**Mr. Basford:** Is there any feeling in the European community in Rhodesia at the pres-

ent time of "Let us get rid of these sanctions by negotiating"?

**Prof. Pratt:** I honestly do not know. Merely from reading what I can I understand there is a group that have recently formed themselves and they are talking in that sort of way, but there is really no indication so far that they are a major political force. The indications from internal political feeling within the European community suggest that the main pressure, at least, that is organized on Smith is still on the other side.

**Mr. Basford:** I do not wish to take up more time, but I have one question with regard to page 15 of your statement. You speak of your arrangements for long term solutions, which involves a continued presence by the British in Rhodesia, both military and political. How willing would the British government be to undertake that sort of presence?

• 1130

**Prof. Pratt:** In one sense one would have to say they would be reluctant to do so if it meant a major involvement. In other words, if we asked them to take the primary responsibility for the training programmes for Africans and the purchase of European farms for the settlement of Africans; all of those measures. They would no doubt be hesitant merely because it would be a costly undertaking. It is still true, of course, that Britain has within her numbers the talent to do this far more than any other country because they have experienced administrators who have engaged in the same sort of process in other parts of Africa. Therefore, I would think it would be a help to Britain if it were clear to her that there would be interested and sympathetically disposed countries such as Canada willing to assist with these training schemes by providing technical assistance personnel during this intervening period when there might otherwise be a serious shortage of skilled people. This is already part of our Commonwealth policy because the Lagos Conference, set up under the Commonwealth Secretariat, appointed a subcommittee on African training, under which Rhodesian Africans in a number of Commonwealth countries, including our own, are receiving training toward this long-term objective.

**Mr. Basford:** I think you said in your statement that after the UDI there was great pressure within the African community to use force right away and that we for the moment have avoided that through sanctions. Would you give us your assessment of the pressure for the use of force within the African community now?

**Prof. Pratt:** This is just my personal assessment. I think the present mood and attitude is complicated and possibly easy to misunderstand. I think in part it is marked by a despondency that grows from a recognition of their own weakness and their own inability to cope with the problem. I think it is marked also by a despondency, by a feeling that they are in the last analysis likely to be let down by people outside their continent and yet they cannot in the short and middle run see themselves with the military competence to reverse the situation. That possibly can help to explain an occasional indulgence in pretty forceful rhetoric that sometimes is a substitute for an actual ability to do something oneself. I think it also possibly explains the tendency now for a number of African leaders to say, "Well all right, it is going to have to be done by Africans", and they are talking in terms of their countries assisting the Rhodesian underground. It is an entirely understandable reaction but it is disheartening and depressing when one looks ahead over the years to the unhappiness and bitterness, loss of life and so on that that will cause. And it does seem to me this becomes a further reason for interested parties outside and particularly in the Commonwealth to stay concerned and to continue pressing for a solution that will not involve that.

**Mr. Basford:** Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

**Mr. Harkness:** Looking at this matter entirely from a pragmatic point of view, leaving aside the hopes and so on that we might have, would you agree that there are probably only four ways by which any change in the situation in Rhodesia could be brought about? The first would be by military intervention of a considerable size either by Britain or by the United Nations or some other setup of that kind, the second by economic pressure through sanctions, the third by force of world opinion as expressed in the United Nations and otherwise and, the fourth, by an internal revolt on the part of

the Africans themselves. Are there any other possibilities, besides these four I have mentioned, of securing a change in this situation?

• 1135

**Prof. Pratt:** No, I do not suppose so. I am not sure that some of those four could do it. I doubt, that mere force by itself of world opinion would do it unless it is linked with economic pressure.

**Mr. Harkness:** I want to follow up each of these but I first wanted to see if there were any other possibilities you could think of or that you know of which would change the situation as it exists in Rhodesia.

**Prof. Pratt:** All right, fine. Let us see where your argument is leading me.

**Mr. Harkness:** Coming to the first of these, you state on page 13, with regard to the three positions which you say Canada can take in this matter, that:

The first would be to note the fact that alternative policies to the use of force have failed and to recommend the use of force by Britain to bring down the Smith regime.

Then you go on:

... this position would win Canada easy approval from many states but would not further the resolution of the crisis.

I agree with that but the point I really want to bring out is whether this really is an alternative at all. In other words, do you think there is any possibility whatever that public opinion in the United Kingdom would permit their present government or any other government to use force in sufficient quantities, actually to go in and fight in Rhodesia, to bring down the present regime?

**Prof. Pratt:** I think it is in recognition of the force of your observation and the consequent inevitability of a British veto were the Security Council to try and place the full responsibility on Britain that leads me to suggest, as I do there, that merely to call upon Britain to do the job tomorrow by force is entirely unrealistic. But without regard to what the details of the situation might be at the end of a longer period of sanctions, this is not to say that one cannot envisage Britain inviting and sharing a United Nations intervention.

**Mr. Harkness:** Leaving the United Nations part of it out at the moment, do you think

that there is a possibility at all of Britain changing this regime by force?

**Prof. Pratt:** Britain by herself, now, and on her own, no.

**Mr. Harkness:** I agree with that. Then I suggest that what you put as the first of the alternative policies for Canada to pursue is not a course at all, that it is not realistic, as you have just said, and we should immediately forget that possibility.

**Prof. Pratt:** I am happily going along with you if we are talking in terms, as we have been, of Canada trying to put Britain into a position on her own and immediately using force. In my view, the use of force should only be contemplated after every effort has been made to achieve the return of constitutional government in Rhodesia by other means and then it should be contemplated after discussions within the environment of either the Commonwealth or the United Nations and with the concurrence of Britain.

**Mr. Harkness:** We then come to the matter of the use of force by the United Nations. First of all, has the United Nations ever intervened with force in a country to which they have not been invited by the people in effective or in supposed effective control of that country?

**Prof. Pratt:** We are talking about an eventuality and I have tried to suggest that that eventuality, which I hope and pray will not come about, would involve the legal authority for Rhodesia inviting the intervention.

• 1140

**Mr. Harkness:** Well we come down to a matter of the legal authority and the *de facto* authority.

**Prof. Pratt:** Right, it is an important distinction. I am talking about Britain.

**Mr. Harkness:** Yes, which is quite a distinction. But, in any event, do you think that many of the countries of the United Nations would really be prepared to contribute to, say, considerable forces to go in and make a conquest, which is what it would be, of Rhodesia?

**Prof. Pratt:** Not until, I think, every effort had been made to achieve this result in other ways, and I hope that that effort would be

successful. At that later circumstance, should it come to that I would hope, that a number of countries would recognize that the alternative to that would be even less attractive.

**Mr. Harkness:** I submit that I think it is really very unrealistic to expect the situation to be changed in Rhodesia by means of force on the part of the United Nations. It is possible, but I am saying that it is very unrealistic to look upon it as being one of the possible solutions.

**Prof. Pratt:** I agree that if the discussion and decision had to be taken now, that would be true, but we are of course talking about a hypothetical situation after other processes had been attempted, and at that stage, in the assessment of the alternatives, it may very well be that there would be a greater recognition of the disastrous consequences of not doing this which might lead to a willingness to support it.

**Mr. Harkness:** Then we come to the matter of sanctions. Have sanctions materially affected the economy of Rhodesia up to date?

**Prof. Pratt:** Yes, I think so. I spent a good deal of yesterday trying—and finally succeeded—to get a copy of the latest UN report on the results of the sanctions which has only just come out and on which there was an article in the *Globe* yesterday. I am not able to digest this in summary to you, but I drew the impression from it that they had been more successful than I had expected; and that the leaks through Mozambique and through South Africa were not as significant as I had, merely from reading the press, thought would be the case.

That material has to be mulled over and read several times, and I have not done that; but my first reaction was that there is more play yet in the sanctions device than we possibly had realized.

**Mr. Harkness:** Have you looked at the figures put out by the Rhodesian Government as to the exports and imports during the last two years? Do you disagree with those figures?

**Prof. Pratt:** The document only came out yesterday, and I have not yet been able to decide to what extent the UN figures, which are the reports of member countries on their trade with Rhodesia, appear to be in

direct and open conflict with the figures published by the present regime. Certainly, if it is your impression, it is also mine, that the first impact of the figures gives a quite different impression from the first impact of reading the figures of the member of the regime who is responsible for finance in Salisbury.

**Mr. Harkness:** Do you have any evidence to show that the essential services in Rhodesia have been seriously affected? For example, their transportation, or their standard of living?

**Prof. Pratt:** There is the evidence of the reports by the countries which the UN has now published, which shows a significant cut in the export of a series of important Rhodesian crops, and that cut appears to be more significant than one had thought. So, there is that evidence.

• 1145

It is possible for a while, I suppose—and maybe for a long while, although I think probably only for a relatively short while—for the economy and for the wealth of the country to carry that and to shield the impact of that on the individuals, by paying support prices for tobacco, for example, which they are doing, and then stockpiling the tobacco. So that the direct impact within Rhodesia is not as strongly and immediately felt by their own men and women there.

**Mr. Harkness:** Oh, I do not think there is any doubt that the sanctions have had some effect; there is no question about that. But as nearly as I can determine from what one can read about this, they have not had a material effect. Would you agree with that?

**Prof. Pratt:** No, not since seeing the UN report. I think they have had a material effect that might be difficult for the economy to sustain over a long haul.

**Mr. Harkness:** Well, this is a matter, I presume...

**Prof. Pratt:** Well, one or the other of us can write the other a letter in due course.

**Mr. Harkness:** ...on which you really cannot make any determination. But it would seem to me that the matter of sanctions, while they undoubtedly have had some effect, perhaps may have more effect in the future. They are to a large extent a matter of hope, as far as a solution is concerned, rather than giving

any firm indication that they will accomplish any of the purposes for which they were put into effect.

**Prof. Pratt:** This is an argument which is in a way, a reinforcement of your observation. There is a distinction between the economic effect of the sanctions and their political effect. What I have so far suggested is that it would appear from the UN report—quite markedly appear—that they have had more economic effect. But the economic effect of sanctions does not necessarily generate, at least in the short run, the political effect that sanctions are to have; and there are fewer signs of a willingness of the régime yet to return to constitutional government, than there are signs of economic effects from the sanctions.

**Mr. Harkness:** Then I suppose you would agree that the other two matters I mentioned, the force of world opinion and an insurrection on the part of the native population, are not really possibilities of accomplishing anything.

**Prof. Pratt:** The force of world opinion by itself, no; I would agree with you. But linked with the sanctions, and linked with the recognition that there is an international determination to see this issue through to a just constitutional settlement, I am still hopeful.

The probability of insurrection is so disheartening to contemplate. I think one must realistically admit that it is unlikely that there will be a successful insurrection for a good long time, but it is likely that there will be increasing attempts; and this is a terribly disheartening prospect.

**Mr. Harkness:** I suppose I would agree with you on that. I think it is unlikely, and what attempts are made will be unsuccessful in the foreseeable future.

**The Chairman:** Is that all, Mr. Harkness? Mr. Nesbitt is next, and then Mr. Macdonald.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** On this matter of sanctions, in which we have all been very much interested, I believe you mentioned, Professor Pratt, that probably South Africa and Mozambique have been the principal sources of leaks on the sanctions. Do you know of any other leaks?

**Prof. Pratt:** We are now talking about reactions to public documents, and if I have

read the documents correctly, the leaks that involve other countries are leaks that are facilitated through Mozambique and South Africa.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** A statement was brought to my attention yesterday published in a United States newspaper and made by a Mr. Rush who, I believe, is president of Union Carbide Corporation, that since Rhodesia is normally the principal supplier of chromium to the western world, and since the United States had been participating in the sanctions, the United States had been obliged to purchase their chromium from the Soviet Union. But the astonishing thing to me—and perhaps it has come to your attention as well—was that in November some 60,000 tons of high grade chromium ore had been purchased by the People's Republic of China from Rhodesia.

• 1150

**Prof. Pratt:** It is terribly interesting. It is not entirely a surprise, but if they did this, I am sure they took enormous care to do it in as subterranean a fashion as possible so that public knowledge would not come of it. If this is true, I hope it gets widespread publicity.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** Well, the indications were that this came as a statement from the president of Union Carbide and I understand that particular corporation has interests in chrome. Apparently one reason put up—which is just, of course, incidental—was that the Soviet Union had cut off supplies of chromium to China and that whereas the United States is now getting its chromium from the Soviet Union, China is getting its chromium from Rhodesia.

**Prof. Pratt:** China, presumably, presenting the Malawi argument that its importance is such that they cannot but do it. It is an interesting fact; I hope it receives publicity and further demonstration.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** We have had, of course, some samples here and in other places either indirect or direct quotations suggesting that tobacco, of course, is getting out.

Now, there is only one other question about which I am rather curious, rather of a philosophic nature, and again relating to sanctions. Rhodesia is the subject we are discussing here this morning, and there has

been a great deal of discussion about the sanctions being used against Rhodesia by the UN. What would your view be concerning where one stops, or where one starts, perhaps, in the use of sanctions against regimes in the world that carry on internal policies which are distasteful to the majority of the rest of the world? You can take many examples; one does not need to go into details. Where does one stop, or where does one start in these things? Rhodesia is the target at the moment. There is, for instance, a country like Saudi Arabia, where slavery is still carried on. What would your view be concerning the point at which the UN ought to start interfering with activities of this variety, and where should they not? Have you any suggestions?

**Prof. Pratt:** It is an extremely important and valid question, and anyone like myself who supports sanctions rightly should be asked this question. I think an important distinction that applies here is that the sanctions are being imposed by the legally recognized authority for the country, and that, in my judgment, is a terribly important part of it.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** This is a unique situation, perhaps.

**Prof. Pratt:** Not entirely unique; on sanctions, possibly, yes, but other UN intervention such as in the Congo was similarly on invitation by the constitutional authority. That is important.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** Another point, though, is that it creates the question of the disintegration of any kind of *de facto* authority there and civil war broke out.

**Prof. Pratt:** Yes, but they did, in fact, grant the material right to the UN who were terribly careful to establish that their right to be there was because of an invitation.

**Mr. Harkness:** If I might just interject, do you think this legally constituted authority argument is really valid now? Take the case of China; the legally constituted authority still, in effect, recognized by the United Nations for China and the people that hold the seat in the Security Council for China, is the Government of Taiwan. Therefore, from the strictly legal point of view, the Chiang Kai-shek government is still the legal government

of China, but everybody knows this is completely unrealistic. That is why I interject; I doubt whether this continual insistence, which Mr. Martin and various other people also put a great deal of reliance on, about the legal government of Rhodesia is of too much significance; it is not realistic.

• 1155

**Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale):** Mr. Chairman, just one point here. Is it not a fact that the Salisbury regime has not been recognized as sovereign by any state?

**Prof. Pratt:** I think that is an important part of it. The force of your observation would become much stronger if there were an increasing number of states that were recognizing the Salisbury regime as the legal authority. But no state does and also, of course, Britain still insists that she is the constitutional authority in Rhodesia, and is continuing to find ways to restore her *de facto* authority there. In that situation, especially, we all have sympathy with Britain in this position. I think the distinction is still an important one to keep.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** There is a great conflict in the charter of the United Nations concerning what may cause a danger to peace and security in the world, and what is the internal affairs of a country. Having been at the United Nations on a good many occasions I frequently had thrown in my face, as Mr. Walker mentioned a little earlier, the fact of our own treatment of the Indians. The Swedes are also sometimes described as goody-goodies along with Canada in that place, about their treatment of the Laplanders.

**Mr. Walker:** I must point out here that the remarks I made were in no way favouring what the illegal regime in Rhodesia is doing now.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** No, I did not suggest that, Mr. Walker. It is the old story; I was getting at the original question I was putting to Professor Pratt concerning the UN or other international bodies. What is the point at which they commence interfering in objectionable practices—and I consider our practices regarding the Indians objectionable. At what point do these various quasi-world authorities step in? I would be very interested in Professor Pratt's view because he has spent a lot of time in certain parts of Africa studying the

situation. I would be very interested in his view.

**Mr. Brewin:** Did you refer to the United Nations as a "quasi-world" authority?

**Mr. Nesbitt:** Well, it is not a world government; it is a quasi-world authority, as far as I can see.

**Mr. Brewin:** I just did not catch it; I just wanted the phrase clarified.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** I do not think it is not a world government, Mr. Brewin.

**Mr. Brewin:** No, no.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** It is a negotiating forum, I think, plus some other things.

**Prof. Pratt:** I would like to make two points; it is not only a very important question, it is also a question over which world-famous international lawyers are in disagreement. On the invitation by the legally constituted authority, there seems to me to be the Rhodesian crisis which would not refer to many others and that is where there are injustices in all probability a great deal more serious than those concerning us today.

Another might very well be a complete breakdown of law and order such as the Congo although, as I said, the legal justification for the intervention was the formal invitation by the regime. I am just trying to think, and you can help me on this, Mr. Nesbitt, whether there has been any UN action other than of those two types. I am inclined to think not. The only other point is, and I agree that it is, at least superficially, a pretty contradictory seeming thing that this crisis should be identified as a threat to international peace and that the situation in Yemen or Nigeria, or I could think of five or six other areas, should be considered an extreme difficulty, where they are not.

• 1200

I suppose one has to recognize the wisdom of the Security Council in being very hesitant to get involved in the operation of Articles 39 to 42 in any area where they are doubtful of their ability, so to speak, to deliver the goods, and that they would do the United Nations harm if they took on problems they were unable to cope with. As I understand it, it is for the Security Council to decide legally what is to be recognized as a threat to international peace. The safe-

guard that they will not do this in any truculent way, of course, lies in the veto, and the fact that there were two extensions but no veto on the first introductions of sanctions shows that the Rhodesian issue passed through that particular safeguard on an ill-conceived use of these Articles. That done, it does seem to me to establish, for anyone interested in the United Nations, the importance that it must not now fail. It would do a great deal of harm to the United Nations, particularly amongst some of the newly independent states, if the United Nations, having taken this stand, seemed unable to secure its enforcement against what is a tiny minority, in the last analysis. Having gone so far, there are considerations which must be accepted as an implication of the decisions already taken.

**Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale):** Professor Pratt, before going on to my first question, to clarify your previous answer, there is no conflict of international legal opinion on the legitimacy of the sanction. You were referring to the conflict where you have the right to interfere in a sovereign state but that question does not arise here.

**Prof. Pratt:** What specifically I had in mind—and you may be right; it may not be relevant—was a long correspondence in a column of the *London Times* about the legal validity of Britain's reference to the Security Council of the decision to stop the *Johanna V*, the ship carrying oil to Beira, which they did stop. That was debated by British international constitutional lawyers.

**Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale):** Mr. Nesbitt's question about interfering in internal affairs is an interesting hypothetical question but it does not actually arise in the case of Rhodesia.

**Prof. Pratt:** Because of the invitation from Britain.

**Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale):** With regard to your experience generally in tropical Africa, and particularly with the attitude of the independent states, could you comment on the failure of the political will in the West and its consequences for the countries of the West—for Britain, Canada, and the United States—to bring to an end the Smith regime. Do you think it likely that the independent countries of tropical Africa will turn to more extreme solutions, such as those proposed by Peking?

**Prof. Pratt:** It is a hypothetical question. I think it is a risk. I am not sure that it is yet demonstrated that there is that lack of political will. I think there is growing fear amongst African leaders that that may prove to be the case. In that situation, amongst leaders who have close relations with some western countries such as ourselves and who take a definite, genuinely and honestly non-aligned position, in my view, there is a terrific hope that Canada in particular, as the white member of the Commonwealth in whom there is the greatest trust, will be able to disprove the increasing allegations that there is no genuine will behind the protestations about the Smith regime.

• 1205

I remember about 15 months ago by chance attending a press conference—eavesdropping at a press conference—that President Nyerere gave, where one of the African reporters pressed him on why he was not moving faster and making more dramatic gestures. His reply was—and I think I have it right because it struck me very markedly then—“my Canadian friends keep insisting that I must give them time.” I think that is almost word for word what the reply was. I think there is a feeling on the part of many Canadians who have gone under CUSO or some other arrangements to work for several years in tropical Africa, of great consciousness of the continuing prestige that Canada has in that part of the world and the terrific potential that it gives us and the responsibility, therefore, that that entails.

**Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale):** With respect to the moderate leaders—moderate in action although sometimes extreme in statement—like Nyerere, would it be a reasonable political assumption that if the West failed to achieve a satisfactory evolution towards majority rule in Rhodesia, those moderates would be replaced by more radical elements less likely to be friendly to the West?

**Prof. Pratt:** I think that is too severe and too sharp a conclusion. I think it would be more accurate to say that they will be bound to be under more significant pressure from xenophobic forces in their community but both President Kaunda and President Nyerere as well as President Obote and President Kenyatta, are solidly placed politically and might well be able to ride it, but the concern

in my mind is slightly different. It is a concern for the effect on the judgment and attitude of these men themselves, and not only for the sort of pressures they will be under or for the sort of conclusions they will draw about the genuineness of the Commonwealth as an association of states in which one of the few unifying and the crucial feature is an acceptance of racial equality.

**The Chairman:** Do you have a supplementary question, Mr. McIntosh?

**Mr. McIntosh:** No, I have no supplementary question. It is a question I can ask after Mr. Macdonald has finished.

**Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale):** I have finished, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

**Mr. Macquarrie:** I just want to say that I regret to leave the meeting and therefore will not presume to question. I want to say, as an old academician, that it is a pleasure to hear Professor Pratt and to read what he said. I wish that more of our scholars in this country were able to devote their minds and their time to this vital continent of Africa. I think I share his implicit and explicit value judgment of this most inglorious regime in Rhodesia.

**Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale):** Some of us would like to regard you as a young academician.

**Mr. Macquarrie:** But I share, too, a sense of sadness when we contemplate the methods for translating our attitude into meaningful international action. I was interested in some of the courses of action which he suggested and all of them are difficult. Some of them are unrealistic. The only one which I think, with all respect, is perhaps unworthy as well as unrealistic was the suggestion that Canada would advocate the use of force by Britain alone. This is a course of action which I would not want to tolerate or even contemplate for a moment. I do appreciate Professor Pratt's presentation.

**Prof. Pratt:** I have dissociated myself entirely from that as well.

**Mr. Macquarrie:** Yes.

**Mr. McIntosh:** I have only one question. It is in reference to a reply which Dr. Pratt made to a question. He made the statement that the Smith regime defies majority rule. On what basis do you make that statement?

• 1210

**Prof. Pratt:** I may not have the full force of your question. I would have thought the evidence was terribly overwhelming that the nature of the electorate to which the regime is responsible...

**Mr. McIntosh:** I wonder if Mr. Smith has ever made the statement that his regime or his administration ever defies majority rule. Does not the problem concern the different plans for the transitional period? In fact, from all the articles I have read on what Mr. Smith has said, he accepts the idea of majority rule eventually for Rhodesia; the difference of opinion lies in how that transitional period will be conducted and on what basis people will be given a vote.

**Prof. Pratt:** I think I would agree with the essence of your identification of the disagreement. I would have thought one would have to say that one cannot view the regime now as resting on majority support. At least, the evidence of an electoral victory is irrelevant to that question because of the nature of the electorate and the insistence by Smith that he would not accept the referendum as the means of testing the 5th principle to which Britain rightly, I think, attaches such importance.

**Mr. McIntosh:** I do not think that gives you a basis for saying the Smith regime defies majority rule, because I do not think they do, and I do not think you can substantiate that statement.

**Prof. Pratt:** I would attach importance to the reluctance of Smith to test his judgment by referendum. That suggests to me his recognition that he would not have the majority of support on his side.

On the further question of Smith's position in regard to the long-term objective, your statement is certainly correct. The form of the argument between Mr. Wilson and Mr. Smith centred time and again on questions of detail about the speed of the movement towards an eventual majority rule. I think, Mr. Wilson's position has two features to it. One was that the checks and so on that Mr. Smith would wish to introduce would so postpone any achievement of majority rule as to make it unacceptable. And the second and possibly more important, because I think this was the point at which they broke, was that there would have to be, in Mr. Wilson's

view, effective guarantees—Mr. Wilson's phrase in the House was "copper bottom guarantees"—in the interim that, there would not be retrogressive legislation after independence but before majority rule was achieved relating to these features of the constitution that involved this long-term objective. A great deal of disagreement centred on what sort of guarantees there might be.

**Mr. McIntosh:** All I want to point out is that there are certain qualifications in Canada before you are allowed to vote. The same thing applies in the United States, and the same thing applies in respect of Mr. Smith's idea of this transition period. They do not have it completely in the States yet.

**Prof. Pratt:** Yes, that is true.

**Mr. McIntosh:** Circumstances are different in each country.

**Prof. Pratt:** But in the Rhodesian situation those who made the regulations felt the dominant circumstance was the necessity for maintaining white control of the legislature for a very long time, and that the franchise arrangements assure.

• 1215

**Mr. McIntosh:** Yes.

**Mr. Churchill:** I would like to ask a supplementary question, Dr. Pratt. You said that Mr. Smith was reluctant to submit to a referendum with regard to his present government. Question number one: Was his government not elected in an election? Question number two: Do you favour a referendum when there is an issue at stake in a country?

**Prof. Pratt:** On the first question, he was elected in an election in which he won every one of the 50 seats in which a vast majority on the electoral role were white and he lost every one of the 15 seats that had predominantly African voters. So he won an election but it was an election from the white minority.

On the second point, what is at issue is the rather long-standing British policy that they must be satisfied before giving independence to a government that it has the support of the people as a whole in that country. In a number of countries they have insisted upon an election before the final transfer of power to be sure that that government has the support of the people as a whole. Now they have done that in countries where there is a very wide franchise and, therefore, an election

result would reflect the opinion of the people as a whole. The Rhodesian situation is of course complicated by the fact that an election under the present franchise does not reflect that. In that situation it would seem to me that a referendum would be the obvious way to meet the British commitment endorsed by the Commonwealth in its September 1966 communiqué, that opinion would be tested by suitable democratic means.

**Mr. Churchill:** Under circumstances in which a government occupies a minority position would you advocate holding a referendum from time to time on public issues.

**Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale):** There is a difference between a government having a minority position in respect of a majority electorate and a government having a minority position because the electorate is only a tiny minority of the whole population.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** I wonder what example Mr. Macdonald had in mind when he mentioned a majority of the electorate.

**Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale):** A majority of the population of the country, who are the electorate.

**Mr. Thompson:** Mr. Chairman, I would like to raise a point regarding education in Rhodesia, bearing in mind that we have a mutual interest in African education. The statistics I have made a note of here are taken from last Spring's statistics, 1967, published by the Minister of Education. I am referring now exclusively to African statistics. I note there are 3,302 primary schools with 650,000 students, 94 secondary schools with 14,050 students, 652 miscellaneous specialist schools, including farm schools, with 24,000 plus students, and 28 teacher-training colleges with 2,551 teachers-in-training. And I believe I am right when I say that Rhodesia has one of the highest literacy rates in Africa. Then in addition to that there is a multi-racial university where not only Bantus but also coloured, Asiatic and European students are allowed to attend on an equal basis and for which there is, I believe, government support to help students get through university. Do you not think that this educational program automatically has inherent within it a very positive move towards eventual majority rule even on the present political structure, not to mention something that might be an improvement on it?

• 1220

**Prof. Pratt:** That is absolutely true and it is of course a major part, I would think, of the reason why Britain offered to give further support to secondary education in Rhodesia; because it would have this longer-term political consequence as well. The figures that I have before me are basically the same as yours, though they are a year or two out of date. You must be on a mailing list that I am not on. They are basically the same. They demonstrate the importance that the Rhodesian Government has attached, in the first instance, to primary education. There has been a major and entirely laudable effort in the development of primary education.

**Mr. Thompson:** And are there trade schools and high schools beyond that?

**Prof. Pratt:** The trade schools and high schools are a more recent development and are still not of any great consequence. I do not know whether you have the figure for the number of Africans in Form Six, which is the last year of secondary school, and on the basis of which alone you can attend university. The pyramid becomes very narrow at that point.

**Mr. Thompson:** I do not have that figure.

**Prof. Pratt:** The figures that I have, for 1965, are not as up-to-date. They show 1,734 Europeans and 93 Africans in Form Six. There are only two African secondary schools that are training at Form Six level. Therefore, in terms of training Africans to play a full part eventually in the senior ranks of the civil service etc., there is still a great deal to be desired.

On the trade schools, a point which I mentioned briefly but did not develop is, I suppose, the terribly disheartening device which is employed by the white trade unions. Entry to many of the trades is through apprenticeship, and control of who is admitted to an apprenticeship scheme effectively achieves job reservation in that particular trade.

All the figures that I have seen show vastly fewer Africans in semi-skilled and skilled trades than in countries to the north where this device does not operate.

**The Chairman:** Thank you.

**Mr. Basford:** I have just a brief question. You mentioned in your statement that there is a need for communication with Rhodesia. Would you, sir, be allowed into Rhodesia?

**Prof. Pratt:** I do not know. The last time I was there was before UDL. It was in the summer of 1965. In 1960, I was involved with the Institute of Commonwealth Studies at Oxford in the publication of the book that the Chairman referred to. It received a critical reception in Salisbury. I wondered, when I went, if I might not, in consequence, find myself on a list of prohibited immigrants. But I have never asked; and, indeed, there is not much point in asking until I see the possibility for personal reasons, of a visit. I do not really know the answer to your question. All I can say is that in 1965 I was admitted.

**Mr. Walker:** One quick question: Is there a trend of increasing white immigration into Rhodesia?

**Prof. Pratt:** I believe that the trend of white immigration has been very heavy since the war. In 1966, for the first time since the war, there was a net immigration of between 4,000 to 5,000. I am told that the most recent figures that the present regime has released show that there has been a turn and that there is margin of about a thousand on, shall I say, the plus immigration side for this year.

**Mr. Walker:** White?

**Prof. Pratt:** White, yes.

• 1225

**Mr. Churchill:** May I ask a supplementary question?

Dr. Pratt, relative to your interest in the Department of External Affairs, if you had a desire to go to Rhodesia could we not work out an exchange whereby you might get permission to visit that country and some member of the Government of Rhodesia might come to Canada? Would you take that up with Mr. Martin?

**Mr. Walker:** We would be getting the worst of the bargain, I am afraid.

**Prof. Pratt:** Anyone who went to Rhodesia on any sort of official sponsorship—and, of course, I would be very interested in going—would have to look very carefully at the arrangement. I would not want to go under any arrangement that suggested support for the regime. If I could not visit friends who

are now in detention, for example, I would be reluctant to go.

**Mr. Churchill:** Would you favour a member of the Rhodesian Government visiting Canada and meeting this Committee? Do you think that is a good idea?

**Prof. Pratt:** I do not know how much time you can spend on the Rhodesian issue. I would favour your hearing Rhodesian opinion directly. There are in Canada vigorous and articulate spokesmen who are recent Rhodesian subjects. They would certainly give you a direct impression of their feelings. There are also able Africans here who would give you a direct impression of the African view.

I think an invitation to a member of the Smith regime would be a rather unfriendly act to the governor who is constitutionally responsible for Rhodesia.

**Mr. Thompson:** Do you know of any African or Rhodesian member of the government who has been denied a visa to visit Canada?

**Prof. Pratt:** I have heard it alleged, but I do not know whether it is a fact.

**Mr. Thompson:** I am asking you because I understood, from the rumour I heard, that one was to come to the University of Toronto to take part in a teach-in...

**Prof. Pratt:** It could well be. The John Birch Society—No; I am sorry; that was a serious slip—I mean the Edmond Burke Society. That was not deliberate. It would have been a cheap trick had it been deliberate. The Edmond Burke Society ran a weekend teach-in on Rhodesia. I have not been in particular communication with them. It may very well be that they sought to get permission for a minister to come. What I heard—and I forgot where I heard it—was that Mr. Lardner-Burke had been invited. I did not realize that it was to Toronto, though.

**The Chairman:** Gentlemen, we have been meeting since 9.30 and it is now 12.30. I do not think we should overtax the patience and the goodwill of the witness.

On your behalf I wish to thank him for having accepted our invitation and for being here this morning.

The meeting stands adjourned to the call of the Chair.

are now in detention for example. I would like to see a list of the names of the persons who are in detention and the reasons for their detention. I would like to see a list of the names of the persons who are in detention and the reasons for their detention. I would like to see a list of the names of the persons who are in detention and the reasons for their detention.

Mr. Barford: I have just a brief question. You mentioned in your statement that there is a need for communication with Rhodesia. Would you be allowed into Rhodesia? I would like to see a list of the names of the persons who are in detention and the reasons for their detention. I would like to see a list of the names of the persons who are in detention and the reasons for their detention.

**OFFICIAL REPORT OF MINUTES  
OF  
PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE**

This edition contains the English deliberations and/or a translation into English of the French.

Copies and complete sets are available to the public by subscription to the Queen's Printer. Cost varies according to Committees.

Translated by the General Bureau for Translation, Secretary of State.

**ALISTAIR FRASER,**  
*The Clerk of the House*

I think an invitation to a meeting of the kind which you have mentioned would be a very good idea. I think an invitation to a meeting of the kind which you have mentioned would be a very good idea. I think an invitation to a meeting of the kind which you have mentioned would be a very good idea.

But I have never asked and indeed there is not much point in possibly the answer to your question. All I can say is that in 1965 I was invited to a meeting of the kind which you have mentioned. I think an invitation to a meeting of the kind which you have mentioned would be a very good idea.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

Second Session—Twenty-seventh Parliament

1967-68

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STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

**EXTERNAL AFFAIRS**

*Chairman:* Mr. JEAN-EUDES DUBÉ

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MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 13

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THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 1968

RESPECTING

Annual Report of the Department of External Affairs  
(1966)

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WITNESS:

Mr. Cedric A. S. Greenhill of Toronto, Chairman of the Friends  
of Rhodesia Association.

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.  
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY  
OTTAWA, 1968

STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Chairman: Mr. Jean-Eudes Dubé

Vice-Chairman: Mr. W. B. Nesbitt

and

- |                 |                 |                  |
|-----------------|-----------------|------------------|
| Mr. Allmand,    | Mr. Harkness,   | *Mr. Pelletier,  |
| Mr. Asselin     | Mr. Hymmen,     | Mr. Pilon,       |
| (Charlevoix),   | Mr. Lambert,    | Mr. Prud'homme,  |
| Mr. Basford,    | Mr. Laprise,    | Mr. Stanbury,    |
| Mr. Brewin,     | Mr. Lind,       | Mr. Thompson,    |
| Mr. Churchill,  | Mr. Macquarrie, | Mr. Tolmie,      |
| Mr. Forrestall, | Mr. McIntosh,   | Mr. Walker—(24). |
| Mr. Groos,      | Mr. Orange,     |                  |

(Quorum 13)

Fernand Despatie,  
Clerk of the Committee.

\*Replaced Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale) on January 30, 1968.

RESPECTING

Annual Report of the Department of External Affairs

(1966)

WITNESS:

Mr. Cedric A. S. Greenhill of Toronto, Chairman of the Friends  
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QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY  
OTTAWA, 1968

# MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

THURSDAY, February 22, 1968.

The Standing Committee on External Affairs met at 11:30 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Dubé, presided.

Members present: Mr. Green, Mr. Gwynne, Mr. Lortie, Mr. Lind, Mr. Pelletier, Mr. Orange, Mr. Proulx, Mr. St. Laurent, Mr. Walker—(13)

## ORDER OF REFERENCE

In attendance: Mr. Cedric A. S. Green TUESDAY, January 30, 1968.

Ordered,—That the name of Mr. Pelletier be substituted for that of Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale) on the Standing Committee on External Affairs.

Attest.

The Chairman referred to meetings of the Subcommittee on Rhodesia and Procedure held on February 1 and 14, 1968. Mr. Cedric Greenhill to appear before the Committee on the subject of Rhodesia.

ALISTAIR FRASER,

The Clerk of the House of Commons.

On motion of Mr. Green, seconded by Mr. Orange, it was

Resolved,—That reasonable living and travelling expenses be paid to Mr. Cedric Greenhill who has been called to appear before the Committee.

On a point of order, Mr. Ezerin raised the question of a meeting of the External Affairs and National Defence Committees with the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Minister of National Defence, in order to discuss the subjects of NATO and NORAD. The Chairman indicated that the matter had been discussed with Messrs. Martin and Cadogan and that it was hoped that such a meeting could be arranged for February 28.

The Chairman introduced Mr. Greenhill, who made a statement on the subject of Rhodesia.

The witness was then questioned for the remainder of the meeting.

On motion of Mr. Lind, seconded by Mr. Green, it was

Agreed,—That the following documents mentioned in the last paragraph of the statement made by Mr. Greenhill be filed with the Clerk of the Committee for reference by members.

—Brief on the Rhodesian Issue, prepared by the Rhodesia Society of Canada, Toronto. (Exhibit 1)

—Token 1,000 names of Canadians who also feel that Canada ought to send an all-party engineering body to Rhodesia. (Exhibit 2)

The Chairman thanked Mr. Greenhill for his appearance before the Committee.

At 1:45 p.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

Feroud Despatie,  
Clerk of the Committee.

ORDER OF REFERENCE

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Ordered—That the name of Mr. [Name] be substituted for that of Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale) on the Standing Committee on External Affairs.

Attest

ALISTAIR ERASER

- |             |            |            |
|-------------|------------|------------|
| Mr. Allmond | Mr. [Name] | Mr. [Name] |
| Mr. [Name]  | Mr. [Name] | Mr. [Name] |
| (Chairman)  | Mr. [Name] | Mr. [Name] |
| Mr. [Name]  | Mr. [Name] | Mr. [Name] |
| Mr. [Name]  | Mr. [Name] | Mr. [Name] |
| Mr. [Name]  | Mr. [Name] | Mr. [Name] |
| Mr. [Name]  | Mr. [Name] | Mr. [Name] |
| Mr. [Name]  | Mr. [Name] | Mr. [Name] |

(Quorum 13)

Fernand Despatie,  
Clerk of the Committee.

\*Revised Mr. [Name] (Rosedale) January 30, 1968.

## MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

THURSDAY, February 22, 1968.

(15)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs met at 11.50 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Dubé, presided.

*Members present:* Messrs. Allmand, Brewin, Dubé, Groos, Hymmen, Laprise, Lind, Pelletier, Orange, Pilon, Prud'homme, Tolmie, Walker—(13).

*In attendance:* Mr. Cedric A. S. Greenhill of Toronto, Chairman of the Friends of Rhodesia Association.

The Committee resumed consideration of the Report of the Department of External Affairs (1966).

The Chairman referred to meetings of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure held on February 1 and 14, 1968 and to an invitation extended to Mr. Cedric Greenhill to appear before the Committee and express his views on the subject of Rhodesia.

On motion of Mr. Groos, seconded by Mr. Orange, it was

*Resolved,*—That reasonable living and travelling expenses be paid to Mr. Cedric Greenhill who has been called to appear before this Committee.

On a point of order, Mr. Brewin raised the question of a meeting of the External Affairs and National Defence Committees with the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Minister of National Defence, in order to consider the subjects of NATO and NORAD. The Chairman indicated that the matter had been discussed with Messrs. Martin and Cadieux and that it was hoped that such a meeting could be arranged for February 29.

The Chairman introduced Mr. Greenhill, who made a statement on the subject of Rhodesia.

The witness was then questioned for the remainder of the meeting.

On motion of Mr. Lind, seconded by Mr. Groos, it was

*Agreed,*—That the following documents mentioned in the last paragraph of the statement made by Mr. Greenhill be filed with the Clerk of the Committee, for reference by members.

—*Brief on the Rhodesian Issue, prepared by the Rhodesia Society of Canada, Toronto. (Exhibit 1)*

—*Token 1,000 names of Canadians who also feel that Canada ought to send an all-party enquiring body to Rhodesia. (Exhibit 2)*

The Chairman thanked Mr. Greenhill for his appearance before the Committee.

At 1.45 p.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

Fernand Despatie,  
Clerk of the Committee.



EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

Thursday, February 22, 1968.

**The Chairman:** Gentlemen, we have a quorum. I will now call the meeting to order.

Your Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure met on February 1 and February 14, 1968 and decided to have one further witness on Rhodesia. We agreed to ask Mr. Cedric Greenhill, the Chairman of the Friends of Rhodesia Association, to appear before the Committee today.

I am very sorry that we had to wait so long to obtain a quorum, but I believe Mr. Greenhill is familiar with the conditions prevailing in Parliament at the present time.

Mr. Greenhill forwarded in advance copies of his presentation in English and in French. If some of you do not have copies of this presentation before you this morning we still have some available.

[Translation]

We have copies of Mr. Greenhill's brief in both English and French. Those of you who do not have your copies of that brief might find some here at the table.

[English]

Before introducing Mr. Greenhill I think it would be in order to have a motion that reasonable living and travelling expenses be paid to Mr. Cedric Greenhill who has been called to appear before this Committee.

**Mr. Groos:** I so move.

**Mr. Orange:** I second the motion.

Motion agreed to.

• 1150

**Mr. Brewin:** Mr. Chairman, I do not want to delay Mr. Greenhill's presentation but, on a point of order, the Steering Committee proposed that we try and arrange a meeting to which we would invite the Standing Committee on Defence. This meeting was arranged for next Thursday. None of us these days can predict what Parliament will be

doing next Thursday, but, subject to Parliament going on, has it been arranged that Mr. Martin and Mr. Cadieux will be available to discuss developments in respect of NATO and NORAD?

**The Chairman:** Mr. Laniel, the Chairman of the Standing Committee on Defence, and I have approached both Mr. Martin and Mr. Cadieux. Although we have not been able to obtain a definite commitment we do hope that Mr. Martin will be able to testify next Thursday. We will get in touch with him again regarding this matter. We do not know what conditions will prevail next Thursday, as you said, but we do hope that we will be able to have such a joint meeting.

Our next witness is Mr. Greenhill. He was born in England in 1917, joined the Royal Air Force in 1937, was awarded the D.F.C. in 1939, and was a prisoner of war from 1941 to 1945. In 1945 he emigrated to Southern Rhodesia, where he farmed and was in business from 1945 to 1951. In 1951 he went to Northern Rhodesia, which is now Zambia, farmed and was in business there from 1951 to 1961. In 1961 he came to Canada, is now a Canadian citizen and engaged in real estate. While in Southern Rhodesia Mr. Greenhill was a member of the Rhodesian National Farmers Union and on the Committee for Soil Conservation. While in Zambia he was on the Committee of the Rhodesian National Farmers Union, the Committee of the Federal Party in Sir Roy Welensky's constituency in Broken Hill, and the Committee of Broken Hill Chamber of Commerce.

Here in Canada, Mr. Greenhill is the Chairman of the Friends of Rhodesia Association. He is also on the Committee of the Rhodesia Society.

It is my pleasure to introduce to you, gentlemen, Mr. Cedric A. S. Greenhill. I presume Mr. Greenhill will make his presentation first and then accept questions from the members.

**Mr. Cedric A. S. Greenhill (Chairman of the Friends of Rhodesia Association):** Mr.

Chairman, gentlemen, it is a great honour to be here today. May I thank you for inviting me to appear before you. This is quite a responsibility because I am speaking on behalf of 4 million Rhodesians and all those Canadians and others who wish to see the state of semi-warfare against Rhodesia brought to an end. Before I say any more, I would like to say that I have no present financial or other interest in Rhodesia.

I came to Canada in 1961; my family arrived here a year later. And Rhodesia seemed to recede further and further from my mind. However in 1965 after Rhodesia declared itself independant, I and many other Canadians who had visited the country were horrified when we read the newspapers, listened to the radio, and watched TV in Canada, to see and hear the distorted picture that was being given. We listened to the half truths and lies and, knowing the country, realized that Canadians were not being given both sides of the situation.

• 1155

There are various methods of propaganda, lies and half-truths. Of the two, the half-truth is the more treacherous because the lie can be nailed; and it is the half-truth which is being most used in the propaganda war against Rhodesia. To illustrate how deadly a half-truth can be, I would like to tell the story of the eminent barrister, Marshall Hall, in the UK who became for some reason the enemy of one of the press lords. To teach the barrister a lesson, all he did was to print details of all the cases which the barrister lost without printing the details of any of the cases which he won. Hall's practice soon dwindled—I tell the story to illustrate what is being done to Rhodesia. This is why I and other concerned people in Canada who believe that justice and truth go together feel we should do all in our power to bring the facts of the situation to the Canadian public. We do believe an injustice is being done in waging economic warfare against an innocent people.

Who are these Rhodesians whom we are trying to destroy? They were our allies in two world wars. In World War II they were part of the Empire Air Training Scheme, together with Canada, and trained many pilots for the Royal Rhodesian Air force and the Royal Air force. They fought beside Canadians in the air and on the land, in fact they have the proud record of having had a higher percentage of the European population in the armed

forces than any other member of the Commonwealth.

Since the war Rhodesian airmen and soldiers have assisted Britain in many parts of the world, including Malaya, when they fought against Communist terrorists; in Kuwait; in the Suez Canal Zone; in Somalia, at the request of the British Government they dropped food supplies; in Cyprus and in Aden in 1962 the "C" Squadron of the Special Air Service operated against terrorists. Today this same unit is operating in the Zambesi valley against infiltrating Communist terrorists.

Rhodesia has never been a colony; Rhodesians have in fact never been ruled by England nor have received financial aid from England. Rhodesia has always been self-supporting. Rhodesia was originally settled from the South.

In 1890 the Pioneer Column placed the Union Jack in Salisbury. The British South Africa Company was solely responsible for the administration of Southern Rhodesia. As a matter of interest, the common law of Rhodesia is not English law but Roman Dutch law as the main settlement was from S.A., although many people from different parts of the world, including Canadians, came to Rhodesia as immigrants.

By 1923 Rhodesia had become ready for self-government and Britain offered the Rhodesians two choices. Either they could become a fifth province of the Union of South Africa or assume responsible government. This was put to a referendum. The people decided in favour of responsible government.

Rhodesia's affairs were handled by the Dominions office in London and through the British High Commissioner in Salisbury. In 1953 the Southern Rhodesians who could at that time have achieved complete independence without much difficulty, at the request of the British Government (and after the matter was again put to a referendum) joined the Federation of Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia as it was then, and Nyasaland. One of the conditions for joining was that the Federation could not be dissolved without the consent of the Southern Rhodesian government. However, in 1960 the Monkton Commission, recommended that the Federation be allowed to break up. The "winds of change" were blowing then through Africa. It became obvious to the Rhodesians that the British government policy was to end the Federation

and it was doing all in its power through its native commissioners in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland to assist in the creation of an atmosphere which would lead to the break-up of the Federation.

• 1200

Under these circumstances the Rhodesians realized that if they allowed this they would lose the status achieved in 1923. Therefore, shortly after the Monkton Commission returned to England conferences were held in Salisbury under the chairmanship of Mr. Duncan Sandys attended by the British Government, Rhodesian Government and all political parties in Rhodesia including African Nationalist parties to hammer out a new constitution for Rhodesia to remove the reserved clauses that were in the old 1923 Constitution.

At this conference it was agreed that the reserved clauses except for three would be entirely done away with, the Rhodesian electorate was asked to vote in July 1961, to accept or reject the new Constitution as set out in two Command White Papers. These were British command papers. The introduction to Command Paper 1399 contained the following paragraph, "The proposed new Constitution which is based on the conclusions of the Conference will reproduce many of the provisions of the existing Constitution. It will eliminate *all* the reserved powers at present vested in the Government of the U.K. save for certain matters set out in Paragraph 50". Paragraph 50 reads as follows: "Under the new proposals Southern Rhodesia will be free to make amendments to any section of the Constitution without reference to the United Kingdom, with the exception of amendments which would affect:

(a) The position of the Sovereign and the Governor.

(b) The right of the United Kingdom to safeguard the position regarding—

(1) International obligations.

(2) Undertakings given by the Government of Southern Rhodesia in respect of loans under the Colonial Stock Acts.

It is understandable therefore, that the Rhodesian electorate assumed that they were voting for a Constitution which would virtually give them complete independence. The new Constitution was accepted by a 2-1 majority. But when the Bill introducing the new 1961 Constitution was before the House of Commons in London on November 8, 1961—some months after the referendum had

taken place—it was stated by Mr. Braine, the then Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations:

"My right honourable friend (Mr. Duncan Sandys) proposes to advise Her Majesty to grant by Order in Council under the Bill, once enacted, a constitution which will follow the White Papers in every detail. It will include a few minor points for which provision has to be made, which were not mentioned in the White Papers, since these of necessity were expressed in layman's language.

One of the few *minor* points not mentioned in the White Paper was the inclusion of Section 111 in the New Constitution:—

*Section 111* Full power and authority is hereby reserved to Her Majesty by Order in Council to amend, add to or revoke the provisions of Sections 1,2,3,6,29,32,42, and this section and any Order In Council made by virtue of this section may vary or revoke any previous Order so made".

An almost identical provision section 61, was to be found in Rhodesia's previous 1923 Constitution, so in other words although the British government had asked the Rhodesian electorate to vote on Command papers 1399 and 1400, which would have been an "Independence" Constitution, the British Government slipped in Section 111 after the vote had taken place and after Southern Rhodesia's Prime Minister, Sir Edgar Whitehead, had made a speech in parliament stating specifically this fact the fact that it would lead to independence. The British Government never contradicted this and allowed this misleading interpretation of the Command Papers to be accepted by the Rhodesian people until after they had voted. I can think of no more flagrant, immoral act of fraud perpetrated against an electorate in modern times. And it is inconceivable...

**Mr. Brewin:** May I ask a question for information?

**The Chairman:** Perhaps you would allow the witness to complete his statement.

**Mr. Greenhill:** It is inconceivable that the Rhodesian electorate would have voted as they did if they had known that Section 111 was to be included. This is one of the factors that make the Rhodesian people distrust the British Government.

Joshua Nkomo, leader of one of the Nationalist parties, after the Conference in Salisbury stated, "We are to have a new Constitution, which is an achievement resulting from the pressures of the National Democratic party. We feel that the new provision has given us a certain amount of assurance that the country will not pursue policies which mean that Africans would perpetually be unable to control their country." However, I am sorry to say that as soon as the Constitution came into force Joshua Nkomo refused to support it and started a terrorist campaign to prevent Africans from voting. The campaign was largely successful.

Recently in Toronto I asked Mr. Garfield Todd the ex-Prime Minister of Rhodesia, whether he believed that Joshua Nkomo was right in resorting to these means at that time. Mr. Garfield Todd replied that Joshua Nkomo was justified in going back on the statement because if he had co-operated and the Africans had gone to the polls in large numbers this would have shown the British Government that the Africans were co-operating with the Rhodesian Government and that then there would be no case to prevent the Rhodesians from getting their independence. In other words he was saying that the unelected Nationalist leader was justified in using terrorist methods to prevent the Africans from taking part in the next stage of democratic evolution in Rhodesia under which an ever-increasing number of Africans would be able to take part in the government of their country.

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In June 1963 a conference was held at Victoria Falls to decide on plans for the break up of the Federation. It will be remembered that the British Government had to obtain the permission of the Southern Rhodesian government for this break-up. Mr. Rab Butler at the meeting gave an assurance to Prime Minister Field and Ian Smith, that Southern Rhodesian independence would be dealt with immediately and would present no difficulties. Unfortunately, this promise was not put in writing and has since been denied by the British Government.

After the dissolution of the Federation, the Rhodesian and British Governments started to negotiate for independence. However there were difficulties.

One of the factors in the negotiations was whether the Rhodesian people as a whole

wanted independence or not. The Rhodesian Government took the view that the best way of finding out African opinion was through their chiefs, and many meetings were held by the chiefs; and in addition to that there was a great meeting of chiefs at Dombashawa in March 1965. Previously, the African National Party had been trying to get into a position of power because they believed, with some justification, that the party which won power in the first election would stay in power. The way to win power in the first election would be, they decided, to intimidate by burning, murder, threats against families, etc.

This Mau Mau technique was of course deplored and banned by the Whitehead Government.

At the Dombashawa meeting, the chiefs made this statement to Mr. Arthur Bottomly, who represented the United Kingdom government: "It is obvious to us, Sir, that however much truth we can speak today, it is not the intention of you, our honoured guest, to be satisfied with what we know to be the truth. If we take you to the graves of these people who have been killed, you will not be satisfied that they have been killed by these nationalists. If we show the graves of the children of our people who have been killed by these people, you will not be satisfied. Sir, if it is your wish to hand over to the nationalists, well we cannot stop you; but all I can say is that if you do the time will come when the person who is about to die will point his finger at you". It has been said by those who wish to destroy Rhodesia that the Chiefs are puppets of the Government and in view of the fact that the African people and their chiefs since Independence on numerous occasions have stated their wholehearted support for the stance the Government is taking on Independence I think that here I should give a brief resume of how Chiefs are appointed.

Anyone who knows the African mind and the tribal system would never accuse a chief of giving lip-service. Matabele Chieftainships are hereditary, while Mashona chiefs are appointed from one of the leading families on a rotation system. The chief is more than judge and jury; he is the embodiment of the tribe's spirit. He is not an individualist; African life is communal and Chiefs rely on varying numbers of headmen or councillors to reach decisions with him. There is a tradi-

tional structure regulating the tribe's affairs including the selection of a Chief. After much ceremony a chief is named and then through various channels the Government is informed. The Government merely ratifies the appointment, and is bound by the African Affairs Act to make the appointment in accordance with the tribal custom. Both tribe and leader recognize that it is not a Government choice. There have been cases where the chief has been asked by the Government to stand down, but these are exceptional cases; 4 or 5 such instances over as many decades show the strength of the system, when one considers that at any one given time there are over 200 chiefs in office.

Here is a statement made by the Council of chiefs (November 2nd, 1966) almost one year after independence:

"We the Council of Chiefs, the elected representatives of all the traditional leaders of the African tribes of Rhodesia, have today held one of our periodic meetings to consider problems which confront our people and our country.

"Amongst other matters which were discussed is the bitter *war* being waged against us by Britain.

"We are concerned over the damage which is being caused our country and the suffering to which our people are being subjected at this time by the economic sanctions imposed by Britain.

"We wish to state quite clearly that we support the Government of Rhodesia and we do not accept the claims of the British Prime Minister that he has continuing responsibility and authority for and over our people through the government and Parliament of the United Kingdom. Why has the Government of the United Kingdom, while claiming this responsibility, seen fit to impose sanctions upon us, and why has the same British Government supported the Government of Zambia against us in what we regard as treachery? We condemn outright the policy of the Zambian Government in attempting to destroy our thriving economy for their own political ends. Not only does the Zambian Government permit our outlawed extremists to remain on Zambian soil but it allows them to raise armed bands which raid and murder in our peaceful country.

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"We shall stand firmly behind our Prime Minister in any steps which he decides to take"

Since 1923, as additional evidence of the esteem in which the Rhodesian Government was held whenever a Prime Minister's conference was held in London, the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia was invited to attend along with the other Prime Ministers of the Dominions. However in 1964, for the first time, when the Prime Ministers' Conference was held in London the Rhodesian Prime Minister was not invited to attend. The Rhodesian people took this as an insult and as an indication of the pressures which were being exerted on the British Government to change the standing of Rhodesia. In addition to this, the United Nations of 1962 passed a resolution declaring that Rhodesia was a non-self-governing territory and called on Great Britain to bring about a new constitution based on "one man, one vote". However, Britain explained before the Security Council, in detail, that Southern Rhodesia's self-governing character challenged the propriety of the United Nations to interfere in matters essentially within the *State's* domestic jurisdiction. No resolution of this committee or of the Security Council, or of the General Assembly, Britain said, can make the Status of Southern Rhodesia what it is not.

By 1964 business people were losing confidence in the future of Rhodesia because they believed that Prime Minister Wilson's statements before being elected to power in Britain indicated that he would never grant Rhodesia independence until what he called "Majority Rule" had been instituted. In addition to this, there was a certain amount of unrest among the Africans who were being terrorised by members of the "Nationalist" Parties. A solution therefore was urgent. In November 1965 Mr. Wilson arrived in Salisbury and further talks took place with the Rhodesian Government as the result of which it was agreed that a Royal Commission be set up to decide on whether the Rhodesian people as a whole wanted independence.

But on November 3rd, shortly after Mr. Wilson's return, he stated in the House of Commons that the British Government reserved its position to accept or reject the findings of the proposed commission; *and this*

meant that if the findings of the commission were that the majority of Rhodesians wanted independence, even then the British Government would not be bound by the findings of that commission.

This made U.D.I. inevitable, and in fact it was declared on November 11th, 1965. I wish to make it plain that at the time independence was declared the only official representative of the British Government in Rhodesia was the British High Commissioner. Sir Humphrey Gibbs was the Queen's representative, not the British Government's; and by the 1961 Constitution which was then in operation and not in dispute with the British Government, he was bound to take the advice of the Rhodesian ministers on all matters concerning Rhodesia's internal affairs. When Rhodesia declared itself independent they were not in revolt against the crown, they were merely stating to the world that they no longer could allow the British Government under mounting pressure from the United Nations to interfere in their internal affairs.

Immediately the British Government began an incredible campaign of hate propaganda. It froze all the assets of the Rhodesian Central Bank in London and instituted a policy of sanctions. It also set up broadcasting stations in Francistown, Botswana, and assisted in the financing of broadcasts from Lusaka, Zambia. These stations beamed propaganda programmes to Rhodesia inciting the Africans to revolt and to commit atrocities.

Wilson predicted that Rhodesia would "be brought to heel" "in weeks rather than months" and also predicted that there would be an uprising and that the Rhodesian Government would be overthrown. When it appeared obvious that these predictions would not come about he made a commitment to the Commonwealth Conference in London in 1966 to hand the matter over to be dealt with by the United Nations provided the Rhodesian Government had not already been "brought to heel" by the end of that year.

However, in early December 1966 Prime Minister Wilson invited Prime Minister Smith to a conference on board HMS Tiger to agree upon a new constitution which would be acceptable both to the British Government and the Rhodesian Government. This they succeeded in doing, and it was approved both by the British Government and Rhodesian Government. However, Wilson had stipulat-

ed that before this new constitution could be brought into effect there should be an interim period of direct rule from London, while the British Government decided whether the Rhodesians as a whole would accept the new constitution. In addition, the Rhodesians had to agree to hand over control of the police and armed forces to British control and allow if necessary British forces to be stationed in Rhodesia. Without any assurance from the British Government that they would grant this new constitution, the Rhodesians did not trust the British Government. They thought that this was another Wilson trick to gain control of Rhodesia in order to hand it over to the kind of racist rule which had become the pattern in Kenya and several other States. The Rhodesian view was that they were prepared to accept the new constitution, that the British Government should send the commission to Rhodesia to inquire into the acceptability and then as soon as the British Government agreed to the acceptability of the new constitution they would put it into effect.

It seems a tragedy, having got so close to agreement, when the only disagreement was one of detail about *how* to put the new constitution into effect, that Prime Minister Wilson, instead of persevering, immediately handed the matter over to be dealt with by the United Nations. This "expediency" brought the entire Conservative Party in Britain and the Chief Labour Whip to vote against the government's decision. In the House of Lords the vote was 2-1 against.

Through his act Wilson admitted to the world that Rhodesia was in effect beyond the control of the British Government and was de facto an independent state. In effect, he withdrew the protection of the crown from Rhodesia. It says something for the Rhodesians that they still maintain that they are loyal to that crown. When this matter was handed over to the United Nations the British Government, in order to get sanctions invoked by the U.N., has to make a charge against Rhodesia under which the Charter of the United Nations could allow sanctions to be invoked. The charge was that Rhodesia was a threat to world peace and security.

When the Rhodesian Government heard that this charge had been made against them they asked for the right to answer the charge and to participate in the debate in the Security Council. It is specifically stated in the

Charter that before sanctions can be invoked both parties to the dispute must be heard, whether or not they are members of the United Nations. This right was refused to the Rhodesian people. Whether or not the Rhodesians were in fact a threat to world peace and security was never discussed, much less proved. It was merely stated that they were a threat to world peace and security.

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Also the Charter specifically states that the 5 permanent members on the Security Council shall concur before sanctions can be invoked. Two permanent members abstained: France and Russia. France stated that they did not consider Rhodesia to be a threat to world peace. With the present global conflicts and indeed open warfare going on, it is utterly ludicrous that Rhodesia, a small and peaceful state, half the size of Ontario or less, should be isolated as a threat to world peace. Rhodesia is the only country ever to be given this label by the U.N.

One of the arguments used was that Rhodesia has a minority government and therefore other countries to the north might feel they had to attack Rhodesia and therefore Rhodesia was a threat to world peace.

The last time that this "word-peace-threat" argument was used was when Hitler accused the Poles of being a threat to Germany; and used it as justification for attacking Poland.

It was also stated by U Thant that Rhodesia could not be represented because it was not a State, and Britain has stated that it is a State. If it is not a State then, presumably, it is an appendage of Britain, in which case the Charter of the United Nations expressly forbids the interference in the internal affairs of a member state; they would therefore not be empowered to act. If, however, they are empowered to act, and have indeed acted, then the Charter expressly states that both parties must be heard, whether or not they are members.

Canada is taking part in this condemnation and economic warfare against Rhodesia, and I believe that in addition to this being illegal under the Charter of the United Nations, it is against the legal traditions of Canada. Canadian law is based on British law, and under this law all accused have the right to face their accusers and answer the charges brought against them; also, all accused must be presumed innocent unless proved guilty.

In the case of Rhodesia they have never been allowed to answer the charges, neither have they been proven guilty, and therefore must be presumed innocent. And this is why I as a Canadian must do all in my power to right the wrong being done. Is it right for Canada to try and starve *all* the people of Rhodesia, black and white, when no elected member or acknowledged representative of the African people has asked for sanctions to be invoked? Is it ever right to attack young and old people who are obviously innocent?

Yet Canada has taken part in these sanctions without the matter ever having been debated on the floor of the House of Commons. Has Canada ever previously waged war, and this is a form of warfare, without a parliamentary debate?

Rhodesians believe in democracy. They believe, however, that "one-man-one-vote" *now*, will not lead to democracy. They believe that it will lead to tyranny, anarchy and misery. Under their system of democracy, every-one black or white, votes on a non-racial basis, and everybody has an equal opportunity to take part in that democracy . . . on a merit basis. They believe that the first duty of a government is to maintain law and order, so that democracy, education, and other forms of advancement can take place. They believe, as the result of experience in countries to the north, that democracy can only be achieved in Africa *gradually* and as the result of education and training in democratic traditions. What country in Africa, they ask, which has been given a constitution based on "one-man-one-vote" has ever changed its government by means of a free election where an opposition party has been allowed to compete? I would like to remind the Committee that the Rhodesian Government has the responsibility for a people, many of whom are primitive and have no concept of voting principles. Western democracy is totally foreign to their culture. Giving those people a vote is not giving them "freedom" but rather destroying their present representation and dismantling the entire system of tribal authority. In the field of education, Rhodesians proudly state that more Africans are being educated than in any other African country to the north, and that every year a larger sum of money is being spent by the government on African education.

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Even since the imposition of sanctions the amount spent has increased by about a million and a half dollars per year. Rhodesians have often been criticized for the Land Apportionment Act. This was originally introduced at the request of the British Government in order to protect African holdings of land. It is maintained in order to prevent the people with the most money from obtaining most of the land, and in order to protect the African. If Canada had instituted a similar Land Apportionment Act for the indigenous Indians it would be like giving them British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba. If the Land Apportionment Act were repealed the Rhodesian Government believes that this would not benefit the Africans. They do, however, believe in the gradual and constant modification of this Act. They have instituted schemes for improved African farmers obtaining land in areas which were previously exclusively European, also they have set aside areas in the towns where Africans may own their own homes, and many are taking advantage of these opportunities.

Rhodesia has been accused of being a "police state". Many visitors to the country have stated that this is nonsense. The Prime Minister's house is unguarded. There are less policemen in Salisbury than there are in evidence in most big cities on the North American continent; since independence there has been less crime. Policemen in Rhodesia do not carry arms.

If the Rhodesian Government did not have the support of the African people, Prime Minister Wilson's prediction of a revolt would have certainly come true and the Rhodesian Government could not have survived.

Rhodesians are however under attack by Communist-armed terrorists crossing the Zambesi river from Zambia, and they rely upon the support of the Africans in order to round them up before they do any damage. In addition, most European farmers live with their families on farms often miles from their nearest neighbours. It is difficult to imagine, outnumbered as the white people are, and with most of them being engaged in running the country and beating sanctions, how they could cope unless they had the almost complete co-operation of the African population. Rhodesia feels that sanctions are a form of warfare. A number of African countries have openly stated their intention of overthrowing the Rhodesian Government by and a war of

"national liberation". Egypt has in fact declared war on Rhodesia, and for this and other reasons they have imposed censorship as Britain did during the war against Germany. They have stated that once the attack on Rhodesia ceases censorship will cease as there will no longer be any need for it. Much of the press in Rhodesia is controlled by British companies, and no government in time of war can allow the spread of alarm or despondency. There is no censorship on mail.

In view of the tragedies that have taken place in many other countries to the north of Rhodesia, Rhodesians believe that to let pseudo-nationalism run wild may well mean the end of Western civilization in that country with nothing to take its place. What the Rhodesians have succeeded in doing so far may not be ideal, but have the British or the Canadians any right to thrust yet another social tragedy on the world? There are no simple answers.

Perhaps the Committee may find it difficult to understand why the Rhodesian Government, who have the responsibility for 4 million people, defy the United Nations, world opinion, and a host of people devoted to "liberating" the Africans. Why do they accept this responsibility? The answer is that they cannot do otherwise.

All the Rhodesians ask is to be given time. They know that no slogan of NIBMAR is going to help the Africans, they know what has to be done and intend to try and do it. In conclusion, I would respectfully make the following requests to this committee:

1. That the committee recommend that an all-party parliamentary group visit Rhodesia. The purpose of this visit would be to observe, collect facts, talk to people in all walks of life, of the various races and tribes, and the information collected would be tabled in the House. Leaders of African tribes and legal representatives of the people will welcome such an inquiry.

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2. That the committee recommend that negotiations should be started with Canada as the mediator between the British Government and the Rhodesian Government.

3. It is our ardent hope that Canada can be instrumental in introducing to the United Nations a recommendation to seek a ruling from the International Court in the Hague, on the

legality of the economic isolation of Rhodesia. The present condemnation of Rhodesia without a hearing discredits the United Nations Organization and Canada in that it is being recognized by many people to be illegal.

I must apologize for taking up so much of your time but, as you can see from all the documents and books that I have in front of me, the question of Rhodesia is a very complex one. If I have succeeded in helping to bring understanding between Canadians and Rhodesians, however, then our time will not have been wasted. As you can appreciate this statement cannot possibly do more than summarize some of the salient features of the Rhodesian issue. The Rhodesian Society has prepared a comprehensive and very carefully documented brief which I would like to place before the Committee as evidence. I would like to make it clear that this brief is a product of Canadian people and states the Rhodesian case in relationship to Canada. In support of our first recommendation the Rhodesia Society of Canada would also like to table a token 1,000 names—and this is a petition we got some people to sign—of Canadians who also feel that Canada ought to send an all-party enquiring body to Rhodesia. Thank you, gentlemen.

**The Chairman:** Thank you very kindly, Mr. Greenhill.

I believe Mr. Brewin has some questions to ask.

**Mr. Brewin:** Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask Mr. Greenhill about this statement on page 3 of his brief:

I can think of no more flagrant, immoral act of fraud, perpetrated against an electorate in modern times.

This is fairly strong language and I would like to know to whom it applies. Is it the former British government, the present British government, or both?

**Mr. Greenhill:** It was the former British government.

**Mr. Brewin:** That was a Conservative government which at that time I think was led by Sir Douglas Home. He was the Prime Minister at the time.

**Mr. Greenhill:** I think he was Prime Minister at that time. It could have been Mr. Macmillan, I am not sure.

**Mr. Brewin:** I will not comment on your statement. You said, Mr. Greenhill, that you

were presenting the views of four million people.

**Mr. Greenhill:** Yes.

**Mr. Brewin:** Is that the total population of Rhodesia?

**Mr. Greenhill:** No, not quite.

**Mr. Brewin:** Not quite. Are there any Rhodesians you do not speak for?

**Mr. Greenhill:** No. I think I speak for most of them. This is the general view of the Rhodesian people, both black and white.

**Mr. Brewin:** I see. I wanted to get the figures on that. There are roughly 250,000 people of European ancestry or origin?

**Mr. Greenhill:** There are 4,280,000 Africans, 228,000 Europeans, 14,000 people of mixed races and 8,380 Asians.

**Mr. Brewin:** Your views are very similar to and friendly with those of the present regime, the present *de facto* government, whether or not it is *de jure*.

**Mr. Greenhill:** The government of Rhodesia, yes.

**Mr. Brewin:** That is correct, is it not? And is it correct that this regime was elected for the first time in 1962?

**Mr. Greenhill:** No.

**Mr. Brewin:** Is that not true?

**Mr. Greenhill:** Oh, wait a minute. You might be right. The present government was elected...

**Mr. Brewin:** Sir Edgar Whitehead's government was defeated in 1962.

**Mr. Greenhill:** Yes.

**Mr. Brewin:** It may not have been Mr. Smith. I think there may have been some other Prime Minister in the interim, but it was his party that was elected then and it has held office ever since.

**Mr. Greenhill:** Yes.

**Mr. Brewin:** Is that right? I want to ask if you know whether these figures are correct, that the electorate then consisted of 69,000 white European voters and 3,000 coloured voters.

**Mr. Greenhill:** I would like to point out that...

**Mr. Brewin:** But do you know if this is correct?

**Mr. Greenhill:** Joshua Nkomo was preventing the Africans from going to the polls.

**Mr. Brewin:** I beg your pardon?

**Mr. Greenhill:** The terrorist campaign conducted at the time of the first election after the new constitution was brought in was aimed at preventing the Africans from going to the polls.

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**Mr. Brewin:** Just to understand the representative nature of the government, do you agree for whatever reason that the facts as I stated them are more or less accurate—3,000 Africans out of nearly 4 million and about 69,000 out of 200,000 of European background?

**Mr. Greenhill:** I do not disagree.

**Mr. Brewin:** You do not disagree?

**Mr. Walker:** Excuse me, I would like to speak on a point of order. You said you do not agree?

**Mr. Greenhill:** I do agree.

**Mr. Walker:** You do agree.

**Mr. Brewin:** And then you say you represent the coloured Africans. Is this the same line of reasoning Mr. Smith has put forward, that the chiefs, the indabas, speak for the coloured South Africans? Is that the basis of your assertion, that you speak for these Africans?

**Mr. Greenhill:** Yes, but that is not the only basis. The real basis for my assertion is what has happened since independence.

**Mr. Brewin:** I see. It is what you said in your brief, then.

**Mr. Greenhill:** Yes. I said that it was obvious to any normal person who goes to Rhodesia and from the facts that they must have the support of the Africans, and it really is not necessary as proof that what Smith said, that the chiefs did represent the Africans, was correct.

**Mr. Brewin:** I see. Is it not true that the negotiations with the British government broke down, at least in part, on the fifth of five points?

**Mr. Greenhill:** Yes.

**Mr. Brewin:** Namely, it was recognized that the British government was demanding that any solution must be approved by the people of Rhodesia?

**Mr. Greenhill:** The final negotiations broke down over the question of the British government saying they would send a commission to Rhodesia to decide on whether it was acceptable to the Rhodesians as a whole, and that immediately Wilson went back to London he changed his mind and reserved his rights. He said that even if the commission did report this was acceptable to the people as a whole that he was still not going to be bound by it. He broke his word again. This was what led to UDI.

**Mr. Brewin:** I understand that is what happened at that time, but I am now talking about the later situation.

**Mr. Greenhill:** When negotiations broke down at a later time it was not on the question of the acceptability, it was on the question of the Rhodesians having to hand over control to the British government while that acceptability was being proved or not proved, as the case may be. We Rhodesians have always said we know the people are behind us. We know that if you find out whether it is acceptable or not you will have to give us independence. This is not why it broke down.

**Mr. Brewin:** Is it not true that Mr. Smith has insisted from time to time that the chiefs spoke for the people?

**Mr. Greenhill:** I believe that this is true. I have met many of these chiefs.

**Mr. Brewin:** I just want to narrow the issues.

**Mr. Greenhill:** I believe this is the best method of gauging their position, yes.

**Mr. Brewin:** I want to ask you one or two more questions.

You said in the brief—I will just check the accuracy of it—that Prime Minister Wilson has indicated he would never grant Rhodesia independence until what he called majority rule had been instituted. I suggest to you that is not an accurate statement. In the negotiations at point the five points were to indicate that there be active steps towards majority rule, but no institution of majority rule.

**Mr. Greenhill:** I can read something that Mr. Wilson sent to Watasa, and this was the subject of long correspondence between Mr.

Wilson and Prime Minister Smith. This is what Mr. Wilson wrote on October 2, 1964, just before he was elected to parliament:

The Labour Party is totally opposed to granting independence to Southern Rhodesia so long as the government of that country remains under the control of a white minority. We have repeatedly urged the British government to negotiate a new constitution with all of the African and European parties represented in order to achieve a peaceful transition to African majority rule.

He has never denied that. He has been asked whether this did in actual fact represent the policy of the Labour Party. In actual fact that letter states that he will never give them independence until they have changed the constitution to give Africans equality.

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**Mr. Brewin:** I want to read to you the evidence given to us by Professor Pratt of the University of Toronto.

I want to read what Professor Pratt says are the five principles on which the Prime Minister based the British position:

The principle of unimpeded progress to majority rule is maintained and guaranteed.

Is that not a different statement from the one you have given us?

**Mr. Greenhill:** Yes. This is a previous statement which I have just heard. These five principles came out after the conference in London. I believe this conference was held in 1965. It was not enunciated until after this conference in London.

**Mr. Brewin:** We were told that what was asked for were guarantees for the removal of racial discriminatory legislation and the eventual introduction of majority rule. I just wanted to see how accurate your statement was that the British government—Mr. Wilson—was insisting that majority rule be instituted before independence was granted.

**Mr. Greenhill:** Yes, I have just read this letter by Mr. Wilson.

**Mr. Brewin:** I see.

**Mr. Greenhill:** I can read the correspondence that also went on between Mr. Wilson and Mr. Smith after this letter was received in Rhodesia.

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**Mr. Brewin:** Mr. Greenhill, I do not propose to question you about the problems of racial discrimination, the Land Apportionment Act, the educational system, and so on, because I think we have had ample and very excellent information about that from other witnesses.

**The Chairman:** Before we move on to Mr. Orange, who is the next questioner, I would like to bring to the attention of the Committee the twofold proposition made by Mr. Greenhill. He stated that he had a brief which he would like to place before the Committee. He also stated he had a petition containing 1,000 names of Canadians who share his feelings. The Chair will entertain a motion that these documents be filed with the Clerk.

**Mr. Groos:** Mr. Chairman, I am not suggesting that they print the names of all the people who have signed this petition, but how big is the document?

**Mr. Prud'homme:** Are they individual signatures?

**Mr. Greenhill:** It is a petition.

**Mr. Groos:** But I am interested in the other document.

**The Chairman:** You are interested in the brief?

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**Mr. Groos:** Yes, the brief.

**The Chairman:** It is quite a bulky document.

**Mr. Groos:** I see. Could we have it included in the record or filed with the clerk so it would be available to the members of the Committee for study?

**The Chairman:** May we have a motion that the brief referred to be filed with the Clerk of the Committee?

**Mr. Lind:** I so move.

**Mr. Groos:** I second the motion.  
Motion agreed to.

**The Chairman:** What about the list of names? Is it agreed to file that also with the Clerk?

**Mr. Walker:** Is this just a list of names or is it in the form of a petition? Is there a preamble?

**Mr. Greenhill:** It is actually a petition which I will read to you, if you like.

**The Chairman:** Would you please read it.

**Mr. Greenhill:** It reads:

The people of Canada, through trade sanctions, are punishing the people of Rhodesia—black and white—men, women and children.

We, the undersigned, believe that Canada should not have become a party to punitive acts against Rhodesia without examining a report on that country by Canadian Members of Parliament. We contend that an all-party, fact-finding committee should visit Rhodesia at once and present its findings to the Canadian House of Commons.

**Mr. Brewin:** May I ask a question about that? I recognize, of course, the right to petition Members of Parliament about any subject at all. I would like to ask whether it is usual for petitions to be presented to a Parliamentary Committee? If this is the usual practice I certainly have no objection to receiving this petition. I just did not know whether that was the practice or not.

**The Chairman:** I have just inquired of the Clerk who tells me that it would be correct to have these documents filed with him in his office. They would be available then to anyone who wishes to read them. It is not a petition to the Committee nor to Parliament. The motion was made, so the documents will be available to anyone who wishes to peruse them, that is all.

**The Chairman:** It is agreed?

**Some hon. Members:** Agreed.

**Mr. Orange:** Mr. Chairman, on page 2 Mr. Greenhill said that "the Rhodesian electorate was asked to vote in July 1961, to accept or reject the new Constitution—" I would like to ask Mr. Greenhill who was allowed to vote in that election?

**Mr. Greenhill:** The electorate.

**Mr. Orange:** Who are the electorate?

**Mr. Greenhill:** Do you want me to go right through the Constitution?

**Mr. Orange:** No. I am just going back to an earlier statement that in one election there were something like 69,000 white persons who voted and 3,000 Africans.

**Mr. Greenhill:** But that is not the entire number of Africans who are qualified to cast a vote.

**Mr. Orange:** If you have the information could you answer my first question with regard to 1961? I will then proceed from there.

**Mr. Greenhill:** Yes. I will tell you who is entitled to vote. As you probably know there are two rolls, an "A" and a "B" roll. The qualifications for the "A" roll are as follows. Do you want me to go right through this? It is very complicated...

**Mr. Orange:** No, I do not particularly...

**Mr. Greenhill:** The fact is there is no discrimination. Any African can qualify for an "A" or "B" roll in the same way as a European. There is no discrimination on the grounds of race.

**Mr. Orange:** It is on a social and economic basis, then?

**Mr. Greenhill:** Yes. It is a qualitative franchise. They believe that this is the only way to get democracy going in Africa. No other system as yet has proved successful.

**Mr. Orange:** In the 1962 election how many Africans were entitled to vote?

**Mr. Greenhill:** I do not know about 1962 but I can tell you about 1965. It is estimated that in 1961, 10,000 Africans qualified for the "A" roll and 40,000 for the "B" roll. Many more must be eligible by now. The actual numbers registered are very different. In 1965 92,746 Europeans registered on the "A" roll and in 1967 it had dropped to 78,608. There were 1,244 Asians on the "A" roll in 1965. The number of Asians had dropped to 985 by 1967. For the coloured or mixed race there were 1,308 on the "A" roll in 1965 and 1,016 in 1967. In 1965 there were 2,356 Africans on the "A" roll and this figure dropped to 1,645 in 1967. On the "B" roll in 1965 the Europeans totalled 589 and in 1967 they had dropped to 536. In 1965 the Asians on the "B" roll totalled 119 but it dropped to 90 in 1967. In 1965 the coloured or mixed race on the "B" roll totalled 181 and in 1967 they had dropped to 99. In 1965 10,780 Africans were registered and this dropped to 4,280 by 1967. Why these numbers dropped in 1967 I do not know. I imagine it is because they are not at present expecting another election.

**Mr. Orange:** So in effect there is a form of discrimination with respect to who is eligible to vote in Rhodesia?

**Mr. Greenhill:** No.

**Mr. Orange:** When something less than only a few thousand out of four million people are entitled to vote.

**Mr. Greenhill:** You have completely the wrong idea about Rhodesia. The idea in Rhodesia is to try and build up the Africans by education so that they can qualify. They want the Africans to qualify for the vote. They want to give them education. This business of saying the Rhodesians are a bunch of—well, I am sorry, but I do not agree with it.

**Mr. Orange:** You have suggested that the chiefs are representative of the African people...

**Mr. Greenhill:** They represent...

**Mr. Orange:** Excuse me, sir, I would like to finish what I have to say. They are representative of the African people, and yet you tell us that in one election—I think it was in 1962—the bulk of the African people who were eligible to vote stayed away from the polls for fear of the Nationalists. I think there is a contradiction in your statement. If the Nationalists have this kind of control over certain segments of the population, then the chiefs cannot be representative of the African people.

• 1250

**Mr. Greenhill:** Have you seen the chiefs who have had their houses burned, their children burned and petrol poured over them? Do you know how the African terrorists operate? Have you seen "Africa Addia", a film that has been shown in Ottawa? Have you read anything about Africa? Do you know how terrorized these people have been?

**Mr. Orange:** Sir, I am not questioning what is happening. I am suggesting that your statement that the...

**Mr. Greenhill:** I am trying to explain to you something about Africa. It is not as simple as it seems.

**Mr. Orange:** I could not agree with you more, and I am suggesting that your statement that the chiefs are representative of their people may be an over-simplification.

**Mr. Greenhill:** It is not. That is my opinion.

**Mr. Orange:** That is all I have to ask, Mr. Chairman.

**The Chairman:** Mr. Pelletier, you are next.

[Translation]

**Mr. Pelletier:** Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask certain questions on certain points which appear in this brief.

**The Chairman:** One moment, Mr. Pelletier.

**Mr. Pelletier:** The witness, Mr. Chairman, has described to us as ridiculous the suggestion that the unilateral declaration of independence by Rhodesia constituted a threat to world peace. I would like to ask him his opinion on another matter. He is perfectly free to answer or not. However, it might enlighten us with regard to the rest of his brief.

The United Nations has also stated that the apartheid policy of South Africa constitutes a threat to world peace. Does the witness consider this United Nations declaration as ridiculous as the first?

[English]

**Mr. Greenhill:** I am not going to talk about apartheid. The Rhodesians do not believe in apartheid and their system is not one of apartheid. What the United Nations has to say about South Africa has nothing to do with the situation as it presently exists.

[Translation]

**Mr. Pelletier:** No. I asked the witness for his opinion on this statement and he has stated that he does not wish to give it to us.

[English]

I asked for your opinion.

**Mr. Greenhill:** I am not going to give an opinion on what the United Nations said about South Africa. I am here to give evidence about Rhodesia. Rhodesians do not believe in apartheid. I have had many arguments with South Africans. If you put Rhodesians and South Africans together in a pub they will argue just as much about the Rhodesian system or apartheid as Americans and Canadians argue about the war in Viet Nam.

[Translation]

**Mr. Pelletier:** Is our witness prepared to suggest that in the present system in Rhodesia there are no clearly definable elements of apartheid?

•1255

[English]

**Mr. Greenhill:** I think what you are talking about is a certain amount of social separate development where the two races are developing separately, side by side.

I will give an example. The Rhodesian idea is that people should have freedom of choice as far as possible. In the land, on the farms and in the countryside there are three types of development. There are the African areas which are purely African; there are the European areas which are purely European; and there are the mixed areas, of which there are about 5 million acres, where either the European or the African can own the land and farm.

It is fair to say that they have the African areas, they have the European areas and they now have the mixed areas. They believe that the only way they can have racial harmony is to have freedom of choice. If you have a quarter of a million white people they are outnumbered by about 16 or 17 Africans to every white person.

Many white people who went to Rhodesia—and this is nothing new; it is not something that has happened since independence—built their houses and built townships; they are quiet people. You having zoning in Toronto. You have areas where people are allowed to run rooming houses and other areas where they are allowed only one-family dwellings. You have a group of white people. They build a subdivision and they have white people in there.

The African people are different. They have different cultures. Actually, they are a very noisy people. Mind you, I have nothing against them. I like the African people and have great respect for them; but they are different. Some of them are not; some of them are developing, and there are mixed areas. In Salisbury, for instance, there are areas for white or African people if you want to live there. There are white people who want to live with other white people and this they also have; but I do not see that this is any reason for Canada to go and make war against them.

[Translation]

**Mr. Pelletier:** Mr. Chairman, I would like to put this question to the witness. Is it not a fact that even African Rhodesians who have

studied in the great Western universities are prevented from practising their professions in certain parts of Salisbury, and prevented from opening offices there? I might say to the witness that I have very clear evidence on that point.

[English]

**Mr. Greenhill:** I know that African lawyers have practised in Salisbury. I have not been in Salisbury for a good many years, and I cannot answer your question as of now, but I do know that African lawyers have practised in Salisbury. There was one practising when I was there. I do not think this has been changed.

[Translation]

**Mr. Pelletier:** I can tell the witness that the situation has changed, that lawyers are an exception.

For example, does the witness know that university professors, trained in the greatest Western universities, are not entitled to live in the same districts as white people, even though they teach in universities?

[English]

**Mr. Greenhill:** I did not know, if it is true. I do not know.

•1300

[Translation]

**Mr. Pelletier:** I would now like to deal with an economic question.

The witness spoke of threats to what he called "the thriving economy of Southern Rhodesia." I would like him to tell us what he knows of this thriving economy in which Africans are participating. What gradual improvement has there been in the Africans' position in this regard? What increase has there been in the part played by Africans in that economy and in their personal income over the last 20 years?

[English]

**Mr. Greenhill:** I will have to go back further than 20 years. Over the last 70 years the Africans have advanced—well, there was nothing there 70 years ago. There were no roads, no schools—there was nothing. There are many Africans who now have motor cars and houses. They have advanced to what they are today. They are being educated now, which they never used to be. Wage rates go

up fairly steadily. As the economy of the country advances so the Africans are advancing—from nothing. This is the whole point.

You in Canada know how difficult it is to get primitive races to advance quickly. You have the same problems here with your indigenous people. It is a slow grind. But people who say that the Africans are not being advanced as quickly as possible do not understand that it is in the interest, and I am talking about enlightened self-interest now, for the Rhodesians to advance the Africans economically. They are trying to build up industries in Rhodesia. If you go to Salisbury you will see hundreds of new factories and in Bulawayo and Henry Ford, when he started mass producing cars he had to increase the wages of his people in order that they could buy those cars. The same thing applies to Rhodesia. How can they build up industries when the white population there is about 220,000? They could not absorb the product of that industry.

Obviously it is in the interest of the government in order to obtain tax revenues to get the African people into the income-tax-paying classes; not many of them are yet. It is in the interest of business people that the Africans should earn good wages, so that they can buy the products of their factories. It makes sense to a Rhodesian, anyway, to advance the Africans economically.

[Translation]

**Mr. Pelletier:** One last question of fact, Mr. Chairman. The witness said there are very few policemen in Salisbury.

Does he know that South Africa has admitted to the United Nations that it had police forces in the South of the country, under the terms of an agreement with the Salisbury government?

[English]

**Mr. Greenhill:** Yes, very rightly so. Various countries to the north of South Africa and north of Rhodesia have declared their intention of destroying South Africa and Rhodesia and the Portuguese, our allies; Portugal and Africa as well. There are bands of armed raiders equipped with Russian and Chinese weapons being sent across the Zambezi. Recently one of those bands, according to their own information being given out in Lusaka, was headed for South Africa.

The South Africans have stated quite openly: if they are going to send people to attack

us through Rhodesia, we will go to the assistance of Rhodesia. I might tell you, gentlemen, that if these sanctions fail and if they have failed, the next stage in the United Nations is Article VII, I believe it is, which states that force may have to be used.

There are various groups in Canada advocating the outright use of force by Canada. The United Church in particular is conducting a big campaign. They have sent out 50,000 kits, mostly written by Professor Pratt and Mr. Sanger, advocating that Canada use force to overthrow the Smith government.

• 1305

Now, the South Africans are making it clear to the world that anybody that tries to attack Rhodesia will automatically find themselves at war with South Africa as well. I think this would be a tragedy. If you look at a map, you will know that Suez is closed. If South Africa goes, we are at war; the Americans are at war right now.

What would have happened if Rhodesia had not stood firm and said: this is our country, the frontier is the Zambezi, and the efforts of the United Nations had been successful? If Rhodesia had gone, Portuguese East Africa and Angola both would have gone, and the possibility that could have happened by now is that the war against South Africa would be on. You have lost Suez. That can be closed up any minute. The South African ports are the only ports between Europe and Australia, New Zealand, India and Asia that are open to the West.

I would like the Committee just to think of the strategic implications of Rhodesia. Rhodesia is our frontier just as much as the North Korean frontier is one of our frontiers, and the frontier between Thailand and North Viet Nam, or Laos and North Viet Nam—I am not even mentioning south of the frontier there—or between Tibet and India.

Rhodesia is our front line—the Zambezi. Just think about the ports that Britain is using today, and which are being supplied with oil; the ships that are being supplied with oil from South African ports, when Canada quite seriously is talking in the United Nations of cutting off oil supplies to South Africa because they are supplying oil to Rhodesia. You have not heard South Africa turn around and criticize the Canadians in the same way that the Canadians criticize Rhodesia and South Africa.

[Translation]

**Mr. Pelletier:** I would like to point out to the witness, when he speaks of the Zambian border, that Canada is not at war with Zambia as far as I know. I would also like to end with one last question concerning the police again.

Does the witness know how many political prisoners there are in Rhodesian prisons at this time?

[English]

**Mr. Greenhill:** At present there are under 400 people in restriction in Rhodesia. There was a period when there were over 2,000 just before independence. The fact of the matter is that the Rhodesian government has the support of the African people now, and they are able to let out restrictees. There are many fewer in restriction today than there were two years ago.

And another point I would like to make is why is Rhodesia always hounded and sanctioned for this particular thing? What country in Africa, Aden or India, where they have over 3,000 political detainees in restriction, or Egypt or the Communist countries; what country of these newly independent countries in Africa have not political detainees? Why is it that Rhodesia is the only country in the world against which you people are waging war, economic warfare? Anyway, there are only 400 there right now.

[Translation]

**Mr. Pelletier:** What is the basis for the information the witness is giving us?

[English]

**Mr. Greenhill:** The British Commonwealth Secretary made this statement in New Zealand. He said that Rhodesia is a fascist state; it has 400 detainees still in detention. He said this in New Zealand about 5 or 6 months ago.

**The Chairman:** Mr. Allmand?

**Mr. Groos:** Mr. Chairman, just one moment. How many more questioners are there?

**The Chairman:** I have Mr. Allmand, Mr. Lewis, Mr. Lind, and Mr. Walker.

It is now ten minutes past one. It is unfortunate that we had such a late start, but it is not the fault of us who are here. At what time does the Committee wish to adjourn?

**Mr. Allmand:** I have only two short questions.

**The Chairman:** We will see how it develops. Mr. Allmand?

**Mr. Allmand:** Mr. Greenhill, in referring to the Land Apportionment Act you stated that if Canada had instituted a similar land act it would be equivalent to giving to the Indians of Canada, British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba. According to the evidence that we received from others who are in Rhodesia, the Land Apportionment Act gives the Black Rhodesians the very worst land in Rhodesia, and it is nothing like the provinces that you mentioned. Perhaps the percentage of the territory is equivalent, but so far as richness is concerned it is nowhere near British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba; it is more like Ellesmere Island, Baffin Island and the Northwest Territories.

**Mr. Orange:** Be careful.

**Mr. Greenhill:** You are going on the evidence of Mr. Pratt and Mr. Sanger; I did not use that evidence.

• 1310

**Mr. Allmand:** So you state that the land given to the Africans is not the poor land of Rhodesia?

**Mr. Greenhill:** I have been to many places where the boundary fence between a European farm and an African farm goes down like that, and on the European side you will see crops growing beautifully and on the other side they are getting a very low yield. This is why there are extension officers conducting a terrific program in education amongst the Africans to teach them how to farm. Tropical agriculture is not an easy form of agriculture. The soil can be made very fertile. At the same time if it is badly farmed it can be what we call "worked out" in a couple of years.

**Mr. Allmand:** There is a division of opinion in that.

**Mr. Greenhill:** The great problem of the African actually is not lack of land, it is training them to farm it.

**Mr. Allmand:** In any case, you dispute the evidence...

**Mr. Greenhill:** Yes, and I can produce figures from the government.

**Mr. Allmand:** On page 6 you state:

that this was another Wilson trick to gain control of Rhodesia in order to hand it over to the kind of Racist Rule which had become the pattern in Kenya and several other States.

When you call it a racist state, are you referring to the present situation in Kenya?

**Mr. Greenhill:** Yes.

**Mr. Allmand:** Sir, recently I spoke to white people who had come back from Kenya and they told me that whites and blacks have equal rights as long as the whites are citizens.

**Mr. Greenhill:** If you have read the newspapers lately you would know that right now the Indians are leaving Kenya at the rate of a thousand a week.

**Mr. Allmand:** Are they citizens, sir?

**Mr. Greenhill:** No, they do not want to become citizens because they would be discriminated against. Have you heard of the Africanization policy?

**Mr. Allmand:** I understood that in Rhodesia there are equal rights for all citizens whether they are white or black.

**Mr. Greenhill:** That is what they call the Africanization policy. The Africanization policy states that if a job is available and if an African wants it, he will get the job. That is why the Indians and many other people are leaving Kenya. It is a form of racial discrimination. There is no question about it.

**Mr. Allmand:** I recently spoke to Canadians who dispute that, but I just wanted to find out your opinion.

**Mr. Greenhill:** The Africanization policy is another word for black racism.

**Mr. Allmand:** I have no more questions.

**Mr. Groos:** Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the witness for some information. In London at the moment—I think I am right in saying this—an office is still maintained by Rhodesia. What is it called?

**Mr. Greenhill:** The Rhodesia House. I think they call it the "Residual Mission," but I am not sure.

**Mr. Groos:** Then in as much as the...

**Mr. Walker:** I am having difficulty in hearing.

**Mr. Greenhill:** I do not know the status of the "Residual Mission". The British also have a "Residual Mission" in Salisbury.

**Mr. Groos:** Is it a sort of tourist bureau or a...

**Mr. Greenhill:** Rhodesia has its office like Canada House. It is just the remnants of whoever lives there.

**Mr. Groos:** There is no equivalent to a High Commissioner?

**Mr. Greenhill:** No.

**Mr. Groos:** I noticed you suggested that this Committee should recommend an all-party Parliamentary group to visit Rhodesia. I think this would present a number of serious problems. To begin with, this country does not recognize the present government in Rhodesia. Do you think if such a visit were made we would be able to get the facts? For example, it would seem to me that some sort of an invitation would have to be issued and presumably the invitation would have to receive the sanction of the British Government. Is that not correct?

• 1315

**Mr. Greenhill:** I agree. This is the problem.

**Mr. Groos:** Could also you...

**Mr. Greenhill:** Legally, there is nothing to prevent you from going to Rhodesia, as far as I know. There are plenty of visitors from Canada and America. Some Congressmen have been to Rhodesia.

**Mr. Groos:** Yes, that was a committee representing the government. I would be interested to know what means of communication there would be between the native population of 4 million and any visiting group.

**Mr. Greenhill:** There is no restriction on movement about Rhodesia or into the reserves.

**Mr. Groos:** There might be a language difficulty.

**Mr. Greenhill:** A number of them speak English. My knowledge of the native language is pretty well confined to what we call Chilapalapa, which is sort of a lingua franca, but I was able to get around and talk to these people. You will always find plenty of Africans who speak perfect English as well as

various native languages. It is difficult, I agree. This presents a problem, but there is no shortage of interpreters.

**Mr. Groos:** Would such a visit as this be welcomed by the present government in Rhodesia?

**Mr. Greenhill:** I am quite sure it would be very welcome.

**Mr. Groos:** You mention in your brief the two majority groups, one being the Matabele whom you state have "hereditary chieftainships" and the other being the Mashona whose chiefs are appointed from one of the leading families on a rotation system". You then describe the chief's duties and responsibilities. Could you explain to me for my own information how a "hereditary chieftainship" could be changed if he does not, in fact, carry out the wishes of those for whom he is responsible?

**Mr. Greenhill:** As I mentioned in my brief, there have been a few cases where the chiefs have been asked by the government to stand down. Basically this was because they had not been performing their duties properly.

**Mr. Groos:** The government?

**Mr. Greenhill:** There have been about four or five cases during the last 50 years. Remember, the Matabele are an offshoot of the Zulu from South Africa. They broke off from the Zulu and went up to Matabeleland in the early 19th century and adopted this hereditary system. They were a warlike people, as you probably remember, and this was their system of government. They do not depose a chieftain very often, just as we would not depose the Queen, except in a case similar to Charles I.

**Mr. Groos:** First of all, could you give us any indication, of the increase or the change in the native population of Rhodesia? Would there be an increase or a decrease?

**Mr. Greenhill:** When the pioneer column went to Salisbury in 1890 we think there were about 300,000 Africans in Rhodesia. Today there are about 4½ million, of whom about ½ million, incidentally, are not entitled to a vote. They are not Rhodesians. They are people who came to Rhodesia from Nyasaland, Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia, even Angola and Mozambique.

• 1320

**Mr. Groos:** As refugees?

**Mr. Greenhill:** No, they came to earn money. The indigenous population has gone up from about 3 million to, I think, about 3½ million in 70 or 80 years.

**Mr. Groos:** Is there any restriction on the movement of the population from Rhodesia to a neighbouring country if they wish to go?

**Mr. Greenhill:** Well, I am not too sure of the military situation right now between Zambia and Rhodesia, but in normal times they come and go very freely all over Africa. The Africans are terrific travellers; they are always on the move.

**Mr. Groos:** But if at the moment, a Matabele wished to . . .

**Mr. Greenhill:** So far as the situation between Malawi and Rhodesia is concerned there is very little restriction, but between Rhodesia and Zambia it is a frontier area right now, and you have to realize what that means.

**Mr. Groos:** Thank you, Mr. Greenhill.

**The Chairman:** Mr. Lind?

**Mr. Lind:** Mr. Chairman and Mr. Greenhill, I was interested in your statement about forces coming from Zambia and attacking in the northern part of Southern Rhodesia. You mentioned that they were Communist forces. Since you lived in Zambia and Southern Rhodesia, where would these Communist forces originate and where do they get their arms and supplies?

**Mr. Greenhill:** If you go to Salisbury, Bulawago or Umtali right now, I have been told by people who have been there recently, you will see on display large numbers of Russian and Chinese weapons, so presumably the arms come from Russia and China. The Africans themselves are being trained particularly in Tanzania but, in addition, they are also being trained in China and in Russia. Now, if you really want information about that, I think a lot of it is police information which the Rhodesian government could supply to the Canadian government if it is interested.

**Mr. Lind:** But there are armed bands being trained outside Rhodesia at the present time?

**Mr. Greenhill:** Yes, and they have been captured. A number of them have been killed, but a number of them have been captured.

**Mr. Lind:** Thank you. Now, I would like to ask another question.

**Mr. Groos:** May I ask a supplementary question, Mr. Chairman? What sort of justice do these persons receive? Are they treated as ...

**Mr. Greenhill:** No, they are not. War is a very serious business. The Rhodesian government believes it has to deal very severely with attacks from outside the country. The onus of proof, I am afraid, has been put on the people as they have been captured. They were being dealt with very severely indeed. At the moment this is a matter of life and death, not only for the white people but for the black people in Rhodesia as well.

One thing I can assure you is that the black people are right behind the government in this. There is no place for these people to hide. That is why they are being rounded up very promptly. They are being rounded up by the African people and reported by the African people. As you have probably heard, there is no place in an African bush where you can walk without somebody knowing you are there. This is why these terrorists are not having any great success at all.

**Mr. Groos:** Are they being treated as prisoners of war?

**Mr. Greenhill:** No, they are not.

**The Chairman:** In all fairness to the other members who have not had a chance to pose questions, I think we should complete the list, and if there is sufficient time we could come back to such things. You will agree that the others should be given a chance too. They are Mr. Lind, Mr. Walker, and Mr. Prud'homme, and if there is any time left we will be very pleased to come back to such things.

•1325

**Mr. Lind:** One thing I would like to find out, Mr. Greenhill, is whether there are any chiefs or political prisoners under detention at the present time in Southern Rhodesia.

**Mr. Greenhill:** Are there any chiefs?

**Mr. Lind:** Yes.

**Mr. Greenhill:** Not so far as I know, but I am open to correction on that.

**Mr. Lind:** Are there any in other areas close by in, say, Zambia, Tanzania, or Uganda?

**Mr. Greenhill:** I do not know at all.

**Mr. Lind:** I would like to change to another area of questioning. What level of education does the Southern Rhodesian government provide for the black people, the native races?

**Mr. Greenhill:** As you probably know, half of the present population of Rhodesia is under the age of 17, and there is a population explosion going on in Rhodesia. Until after the last war, basically the only form of education for the Africans—and it was difficult to get them to go to school—was provided by missionaries.

In the last 20 years the Africans have become very keen on education. Basically, they were starting on the ground floor to build up an educational system for people who, until then, had not been particularly interested in getting any education. In fact, even the few that did get it were mostly males.

Again, under the African tribal system, there was quite a lot of opposition to be overcome before they could get the Africans to send the girl children to school.

Now, the first thing to be done when this educational need began being felt, was to get primary schools built. This they have done. There are about 675,000 African children in school at present, which is about one in six of the population. This compares more than favourably with any other African country to the north. They have reached the stage now where 90 per cent of African children can receive a primary education.

Now the emphasis is on secondary education. By 1972 they hope to have enough schools built to achieve what is known here as junior high; they call it junior secondary. When they have done that, then the emphasis will be on senior secondary education.

It is a terrific program. There was a program to build 300 secondary schools within the next 10 years, but that has had to be cut in half to 150 secondary schools. This is due to sanctions, I am sorry to say. But even so, right now the emphasis of the program is on secondary education. They reckon that by 1969 all children can get primary education, and right now nearly all of them can. But they do not believe in compulsory education, and this again is a question of temperament with the African student. If you make some-

thing compulsory then he will think it is no good. Actually perhaps this is human nature and not peculiar to Africa.

**Mr. Lind:** Would you like to hazard a guess about what education this 675,000 native population receive related to our grade system? Would it amount to what we consider as secondary school entrance?

•1330

**Mr. Greenhill:** I do not know about grades, but I can give you a bit of information about the numbers of schools, and so on. A 10-year plan to overhaul the entire African education system was announced during 1966. This was after Independence. In terms of this plan, the target date for the introduction of full primary education for all who can reach a school has been advanced from 1974 to 1969. The great significance of the new plan lies in its emphasis on the development in the sphere of secondary education. The intention is that secondary schooling be made available for 50 per cent of the pupils who complete a primary course. By selection the top 12½ per cent of pupils completing primary school will be trained up to a full four year academic course of secondary education leading to a secondary certificate, and the further opportunity of sixth-form work up to university entrance.

However, that has since been cut. I think they have had to split it and make it take twice as long as it was going to take, mainly due to lack of funds.

**Mr. Lind:** The only thing that we can do is to try to find out whether they are ahead or behind by comparison. How would this compare with Zambia at the present time?

**Mr. Greenhill:** It compares more than favourably with Zambia. They are ahead of Zambia. They are ahead of every country in Africa except South Africa in the field of education.

**Mr. Lind:** Is this in spite of all their assets being frozen in England?

**Mr. Greenhill:** Yes. Strangely enough, they have not lost too much from their assets being frozen in England. The British government froze about 9 million worth of Central Bank assets. Of course, the Rhodesian government had to retaliate and they borrowed an awful lot more money than that in London and from the World Bank, and they

got the better of the deal. So this is one of the reasons that they are able to finance their growth of secondary industry. They also have been able to get by by cutting imports. Because of this they have not had to find so much money each each year to finance repayments of debt to Britain and also to the World Bank because those debts were guaranteed by Britain. They said, "Look, you have stopped our bank account, how can you expect us to pay the debts which you guaranteed? We are afraid you will have to pay them or let the British taxpayer pay them." This is another of the ridiculous things that has happened.

**Mr. Lind:** Is there any trade between Zambia and Southern Rhodesia at the present time?

**Mr. Greenhill:** Zambia depends almost entirely on Southern Rhodesia for its coal and electricity supplies. The Zambians have been complaining that they cannot get gasoline through. Canadians, I gather, have been using aeroplanes and so on to get it through. Incidentally, the Rhodesian government all the way along has said that they would transport along their railway all the gasoline needed into Zambia. A lot of people are under the impression that Rhodesia is waging some kind of economic warfare against Zambia. This is a misapprehension. There is still a lot of trade between Rhodesia and Zambia and to me this whole thing is a tragedy.

**Mr. Lind:** What about trade between Rhodesia and Tanzania?

**Mr. Greenhill:** I do not know about Tanzania but I do know about Rhodesia and Malawi, which is another of the independent African countries. Malawi will not go along with sanctions. Dr. Hastings Banda has been very critical of the other African heads of state. Even when he was out of Malawi and in Kenya not long ago he was very critical of the Kenya policy towards Rhodesia.

**Mr. Lind:** Thank you very much, Mr. Greenhill.

**Mr. Walker:** Mr. Greenhill, I just want to put the record straight. You equated the segregated housing developments in Rhodesia with zoning by-laws in Toronto. I would like to point out that I am a Toronto member, and

maybe Andy Brewin feels the same way as I do. Do not forget, Toronto zoning by-laws have absolutely no relationship to race, colour or creed.

• 1335

**Mr. Greenhill:** I agree with you. I am just saying that it is a different situation but that the motives behind it are somewhat similar to the motives of people living in an R-1 area in Toronto, not wanting to mix with the hoi polloi in R-2 or R-3.

**Mr. Walker:** I think you are really reaching for that one. Surely the purpose of zoning in Toronto is orderly physical development and it has nothing to do with controlling the social development of the city.

You have been in Canada since 1961. Has anything developed in Rhodesia between 1961 and now that leads you to have any different views than those expressed in the brief?

**Mr. Greenhill:** Quite frankly, I would not have been able to write this brief a year or 18 months ago but certain things have happened that made me take an interest in Rhodesia again. I had forgotten all about Rhodesia. However, in the last year I have been very much in touch with Rhodesia and I think I am fairly well aware of things that have happened. I have also made it my business to meet Rhodesians visiting Canada as often as possible.

**Mr. Walker:** Have you been back there since 1961?

**Mr. Greenhill:** No, I would like to get back but I cannot afford it right now.

**Mr. Walker:** May I just ask this one other question? What is the government's basic fear about majority vote? You stated that there is no doubt in your mind that Rhodesians, Africans and all the rest of them, are united behind the present régime. Obviously there can be no fear of a majority voting out the government, so what is the basic fear?

**Mr. Greenhill:** The most important question of the lot is why the Rhodesian government fears majority vote and why the ordinary Africans fear majority vote as well? We can only go on experience as to what has happened in every African country that has been given majority vote. Now these facts that I gave you are facts. Majority vote does not lead to democracy. The normal thing that happens in Africa—and again you can check

whether or not I am speaking the truth—is that the tribe with the biggest number of people wins the first election. They then introduce a policy saying they will have African democracy, or whatever they like to call it, but the effect is that from then on—and this is a matter of record—they outlaw the rights of the opposition. They have not yet in any of these countries allowed a government to be changed by a free vote where the opposition has been allowed to stand. Now the Rhodesians say that in their definition of a democracy the opposition party will receive the consideration that is due to it. You know what that means because you have been in the opposition. They say that the only way to teach the Africans how to run parliamentary democracy, which they believe in, is to let the African qualify for a vote and then he will not misuse it. They now have 13 or 14 African members of parliament. These people are in opposition right now but they are being respected as the opposition party. We hope that at some future date—and this is Smith's ardent hope—the people of Rhodesia will consider themselves as Rhodesians, not as black Rhodesians or white Rhodesians. I can say that one very good thing has come out of these sanctions. For the first time in the world, as far as I know, a country on achieving independence has found itself at war, basically, with the whole world. This has made a country of Rhodesia. They are a united country today. Again, do not take my word for it, ask people who have been visiting Rhodesia recently.

**Mr. Walker:** Am I doing you a disservice then, in the context of the very thing we are discussing, to suggest that this brief is in support of an enforced democracy by a minority rule?

**Mr. Greenhill:** It is an enforced democracy, if you like, and if you believe in democracy you will believe in enforcing democracy. After all, we fought for it during the war, and so did the Rhodesians.

**Mr. Walker:** But in relation to a one-man-one-vote by a minority.

**Mr. Greenhill:** You either believe in democracy or you do not. I do.

**Mr. Walker:** So do I.









OFFICIAL REPORT OF MINUTES  
OF  
PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

This edition contains the English deliberations and/or a translation into English of the French.

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Translated by the General Bureau for Translation, Secretary of State.

ALISTAIR FRASER,  
*The Clerk of the House.*

HOUSE OF COMMONS

Second Session—Twenty-seventh Parliament

1967-68

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STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

**EXTERNAL AFFAIRS**

*Chairman:* Mr. JEAN-EUDES DUBÉ

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MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 14

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THURSDAY, MARCH 7, 1968

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RESPECTING

Annual Report of the Department of External Affairs  
(1966)

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APPEARING:

The Honourable Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs and  
the Honourable Léo Cadieux, Minister of National Defence.

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.  
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY  
OTTAWA, 1968

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Chairman: Mr. Jean-Eudes Dubé

Vice-Chairman: Mr. W. B. Nesbitt

and

- |                 |                 |                  |
|-----------------|-----------------|------------------|
| Mr. Allmand,    | Mr. Harkness,   | Mr. Pelletier,   |
| Mr. Asselin     | Mr. Hymmen,     | Mr. Pilon,       |
| (Charlevoix),   | Mr. Lambert,    | Mr. Prud'homme,  |
| Mr. Basford,    | Mr. Laprise,    | Mr. Stanbury,    |
| Mr. Brewin,     | Mr. Lind,       | Mr. Thompson,    |
| Mr. Forrestall, | Mr. Macquarrie, | Mr. Tolmie,      |
| *Mr. Fulton,    | Mr. McIntosh,   | Mr. Walker—(24). |
| Mr. Groos,      | Mr. Orange,     |                  |
- (Quorum 13)

Fernand Despatie,

Clerk of the Committee.

\*Replaced Mr. Churchill on March 4, 1968.

Copies of this report are available to the public by subscription to the Queen's Printer. Cost varies according to Committees.

Translated by the General Bureau for Translation, Thursday, March 7, 1968.

FRASER, The Clerk of the House. RESPECTING

Annual Report of the Department of External Affairs (1968)

APPEARING:

The Honourable Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Honourable Léo Cadieux, Minister of National Defence.

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C. QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY OTTAWA, 1968

# MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

Thursday, March 7, 1968.

## ORDER OF REFERENCE

The Standing Committee on External Affairs met at 11:15 a.m. this day.  
The Chairman, Mr. Dubé, presided.

MONDAY, March 4, 1968.

*Ordered*,—That the name of Mr. Fulton be substituted for that of Mr. Churchill on the Standing Committee on External Affairs.

Attest.

ALISTAIR FRASER,

*The Clerk of the House of Commons.*

Present: Messrs. of the Standing Committee on External Affairs: Messrs. D'Amica, Messrs. Crossman, Fane, Hopkins, J. G. MacFarlane, MacFarlane, Matheson, Smith.

And also: Messrs. Dechman, Forest, Hurdidge, Members of Parliament.

In attendance: The Honourable Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs; the Honourable Léo Cadieux, Minister of National Defence; Mr. Marcel Cadieux, Q.C., Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.

The Committee resumed consideration of the Annual Report of the Department of External Affairs (1966).

The Chairman welcomed the Minister of National Defence and the members of the Standing Committee on National Defence. He introduced the Secretary of State for External Affairs.

The Honourable Paul Martin made a statement on Canada and collective security. He spoke of NATO and Canada's participation in the Alliance. He then talked about the threat to North America, ways in which Canada could play a useful part in North American air defence arrangements, NORAD and Canada's role in this Agreement.

The Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Minister of National Defence were questioned for the remainder of the meeting.

The Chairman thanked the Ministers for their appearance before the Committee.

At 1:05 p.m., the Committee adjourned in the cell of the Chair.

Fernand Dupuis,  
*Clerk of the Committee.*



## MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

THURSDAY, March 7, 1968.

(16)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs met at 11.10 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Dubé, presided.

*Members present:* Messrs. Brewin, Dubé, Forrestall, Groos, Harkness, Lambert, Laprise, Lind, Macquarrie, Nesbitt, Orange, Pelletier, Pilon, Prud'homme, Stanbury, Thompson, Tolmie (17).

*Also present:* Members of the Standing Committee on National Defence: Messrs. Crossman, Fane, Hopkins, Laniel, Legault, Lessard, Loiselle, MacRae, Matheson, Smith.

*And also:* Messrs. Deachman, Forest, Herridge, Members of Parliament.

*In attendance:* The Honourable Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs; the Honourable Léo Cadieux, Minister of National Defence; Mr. Marcel Cadieux, Q.C., Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.

The Committee resumed consideration of the Annual Report of the Department of External Affairs (1966).

The Chairman welcomed the Minister of National Defence and the members of the Standing Committee on National Defence. He introduced the Secretary of State for External Affairs.

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The Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Minister of National Defence were questioned for the remainder of the meeting.

The Chairman thanked the Ministers for their appearance before the Committee.

At 1.05 p.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

Fernand Despatie,  
Clerk of the Committee.



## EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

Thursday, March 7, 1968

• 1109

**The Chairman:** Order, please. I extend a hearty welcome to the members of the Standing Committee on National Defence and its Chairman, Mr. Gérard Laniel, as well as to the Minister, the Honourable Mr. Cadieux.

[Translation]

I would ask Mr. Laniel to please come and sit beside us, to worthily represent the Defence Committee.

[English]

We are very pleased to have you gentlemen as our guests. The purpose of the meeting this morning is to discuss NATO and NORAD, and we will begin the consideration of these subjects by having the Secretary of State for External Affairs as the first witness. Mr. Martin has kindly agreed to be with us this morning and I would ask him if he has a statement and if he wishes to proceed.

**Hon. Paul Martin (Secretary of State for External Affairs):** Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a general statement first of all on Canada and collective security.

Our defence policy since the Second World War has been based on the conviction that it is in Canada's interest to make a responsible contribution to collective security. Our hope in the immediate post-war period was that our security and that of other nations in the world could be assured by the United Nations, and we regrettably know that this hope has been frustrated. Even though we have been obliged to develop regional arrangements to assure our national security, we continue to regard these arrangements as transitory, essential though they are, I think, for the foreseeable future.

By these arrangements I mean, of course, NATO and depending on negotiations that have not terminated, NORAD. But we share the hope that the day will come when we can,

with confidence, entrust our security to the United Nations.

Meanwhile, we are making efforts to develop to the maximum degree feasible at this time, the capacity of the United Nations to keep the peace, and Canada stands ready to contribute to United Nations peacekeeping operations where conditions are appropriate. I think that our force structure enables us to contribute effectively to future peacekeeping operations, should these be needed.

Now, there are some in Canada who, I know, very sincerely hold the view that Canada should concentrate exclusively on this peacekeeping role. As Minister of External Affairs I must be realistic and while I can well sympathize with this aspiration, I cannot agree with it. At the present moment the United Nations requirement for peacekeeping forces is limited. Our efforts and those of like-minded countries at the United Nations to increase the United Nations' role in the field are, I say, regrettably making slow progress and there are no immediate prospects that the United Nations' peacekeeping capacity or role will be substantially increased. This is not because Canada and some other countries have not tried valiantly over the past three years to seek a more general agreement in the United Nations in this area.

Now it is argued sometimes that our role in NATO and NORAD has in some way diminished our acceptability as a peacemaker. In my view there is no reason to doubt that a continuing role in peacekeeping is compatible with our participation in collective defence arrangements. As a country desiring to make a responsible contribution to the maintenance of peace, it is desirable that we continue to make a contribution to regional defence arrangements genuinely devoted to the maintenance of peace.

• 1115

The key to our collective defence arrangements is NATO. I recognize that at this time

when there has been significant improvement in East-West relations and, I believe, hope of still further improvement, there are some who argue that NATO is no longer needed or even that it is a hindrance to the development of improved East-West relations. In my judgment it is a sign of the success of the Alliance that we can indulge freely in such speculations.

These are questions that are being asked not only in this country, but in most countries of the NATO group. NATO Foreign Ministers decided, as a result, in December of 1966 to commission a study of the future tasks of the Alliance. This was an adaptation of a proposal put forward by Canada in 1964. The study was completed and the results were approved by Ministers at the last December Ministerial Meeting in Brussels. I would like to read several paragraphs from the conclusions of this study which were agreed to by all members of the Alliance.

The Atlantic Alliance has two main functions. Its first is to maintain an adequate military strength and political solidarity to deter aggression and other forms of pressure and to defend the territory of member countries if aggression should occur. Since its inception, the Alliance has successfully fulfilled this task. But the possibility of a crisis cannot be excluded as long as the central political issues in Europe, first and foremost the German Question, remain unsolved. Moreover, the situation of instability and uncertainty still precludes a balanced reduction of military forces. Under these conditions, the Allies will maintain as necessary, a suitable military capability to assure the balance of forces, thereby creating a climate of stability, security and confidence.

In this climate the Alliance can carry out its second function, to pursue the search for progress towards a more stable relationship in which the underlying political issues can be resolved. Military security and a policy of détente are not contradictory but complementary. Collective defence is a stabilizing factor in world politics. It is the necessary condition for effective policies directed towards a greater relaxation of tensions. The way to peace and stability in Europe

rests in particular on the use of the Alliance constructively in the interest of détente. The participation of the Soviet Union and the United States will be necessary to achieve a settlement of the political problems in Europe.

I wish to emphasize that this statement was approved by the Foreign Ministers of all of the 15 countries in NATO. I think this is a convincing demonstration that the 15 members of the organization are agreed that the Alliance is not only a force in maintaining stability in Europe, but that it is committed to active involvement in the continued search for peace.

I would report, moreover, that the allies took encouragement from developments in the Soviet world. Here is what they had to say in this study:

No peaceful order in Europe is possible without a major effort by all concerned. The evolution of Soviet and East European policies gives ground for hope that those governments may eventually come to recognize the advantages to them of collaborating in working towards a peaceful settlement. But no final and stable settlement is possible without a solution of a number of questions and particularly the German question which lies at the heart of present tensions in Europe. Any such settlement must end the unnatural barriers between Eastern and Western Europe, which are most clearly and cruelly manifested in the division of Germany.

• 1120

Accordingly the Allies are resolved to direct their energies to this purpose by realistic measures designed to further a détente in East-West relations. The relaxation of tensions is not the final goal but is part of a long-term process to promote better relations and to foster a settlement. The ultimate political purpose of the Alliance is to achieve a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe accompanied by appropriate security guarantees.

In these two statements it is clear that there has been a shift of emphasis on the political role of the Alliance as an instrument for bringing about détente and a continuing recognition of the importance of the military capacity, particularly if I may add

in the light of additional military strengths taken on by the Soviet Union in the level of its military appropriations.

Now the study which was initiated by the Foreign Minister of Belgium and from which I have quoted certain excerpts, concluded that the Alliance continues to be a vigorous organization which is constantly adapting itself to changing conditions. In our judgment it has shown its capacity to grow and adapt to the evolution in relations between the countries of Europe and North America, yet it has remained an essential link between Europe and North America. This is a very important consideration for Canada. The Alliance has also made it possible for its smaller members to participate effectively in the dialogue with the Soviet Union. And it has provided, until the present, the only effective defence association linking the larger and smaller countries of Western Europe and enabling them to cooperate in a massive defence effort without arousing fears of one another.

For Canada, in particular, the link between North America and Europe which NATO represents, and the consequent involvement in wider Atlantic affairs which it affords, has been beneficial. It has provided an important extra-continental partnership to balance our close bilateral relations with the United States. It has facilitated the development of vastly increased political and economic relations with the countries of Western Europe, the world's fastest growing region during the last decade.

Paradoxically it is Europe's prosperity which has encouraged people in Canada to argue that Canada can now safely withdraw forces from Europe and make our future contribution to NATO from Canada. We must not ignore the relationship between our contribution of forces to the security of Europe and the continuing importance in our national life of maintaining the strongest possible connections with individual European countries. Our military contribution is now relatively much less important than it was when the European nations were weak. But it is still part of the collective effort. It is important not only as a demonstration of our continuing commitment to the Alliance, but as a contribution to European stability which vitally concerns us, and the preserva-

tion of which is vital to the preservation of peace. In this situation the government sees no alternative at the present time to Canada's continuing to make an appropriate contribution to NATO's forces in Europe. The acceptance by the countries of Western Europe of our participation in their councils rests essentially on the modest but effective military contribution we make to the security of Europe which in turn represents an important contribution to our own self defence.

• 1125

The principal threat to North America, however, now and for the foreseeable future, as I am sure my colleague, the Minister of National Defence, has already explained, comes from the growing Soviet arsenal of inter-continental ballistic missiles. Defence against these ICBMs is both technically difficult and enormously expensive, but some progress in missile defence has been achieved in recent years. Members of the Committee will be aware that the United States has recently announced its intention to deploy what it calls a "thin" ABM system directed against China.

The position of the Canadian Government on the proposed missile defence system was stated by the Prime Minister on September 22 at a press conference in these terms, and I quote:

"We have no intention at this time of taking part in any such ABM system. That is, the "thin" ABM system which was announced by the United States at that time. He went on:

Naturally we are keeping the matter under careful review. We do not wish to commit the Government to any particular course of action in the future as to what might be the best solution to the security problem that Canada will face."

While the principal danger to North America comes from the ICBMs, there is also, as the Minister of National Defence has pointed out, a substantial threat from manned bombers. The existing Soviet long range bomber fleet is not large and it is assumed the number will diminish somewhat over the next decade. But nevertheless it continues to be there, and continues to be a substantial threat. In spite of this diminishing trend these

bombers will continue to pose a serious threat to North America throughout the next decade.

Given this situation, the government believes it would be irresponsible to ignore such a threat, particularly when it is technically and financially practical to defend against it. For these reasons, the Government will of course have to continue to co-operate with the United States in the defence of the continent against bombers.

There are those who would like to think that by keeping to ourselves we in Canada could avoid both becoming a target in our own right and being involved in an attack on the United States. Apart from any obligation we might feel to contribute to the defence of North America, this view ignores the fact that Canada is located geographically along the main path which any Soviet—and indeed Chinese—attack against the United States would be likely to follow. Even if there was no intention of attacking Canada, there would always be the possibility that an accident or miscalculation would result in nuclear weapons coming down on Canadian territory, as well as the danger from fall-out resulting from nuclear explosions over targets in the United States.

• 1130

Apart from this, it is difficult to imagine that in attacking the United States an enemy would allow Canada to remain as a willing—or even unwilling—asylum for the United States population as well as a reservoir of food, arms, electric power and industrial capacity.

We cannot prudently do otherwise than assume that a potential attacker would expect Canada to be sympathetic to the United States and thus likely, in the event, God forbid, of a nuclear attack, to lend assistance if we were capable of doing so. He would never believe he could ignore this possibility, and I think he would be right. Now I must say that my own view is that the dangers of aggressive war are remote, perhaps one could say unlikely, but no government is worthy of the trust given to it by the people of the country which it serves if it does not realistically examine the situation in the world in which it finds itself, and we have had within the last six months at least one situation that must have caused any government to realize

that there are some precautions that it must take in its own security interests.

There are, of course, several ways in which Canada could play a useful part in North American air defence arrangements. One possibility would be for us to provide from our own resources the portion of the continental air defence system which needs to be located in Canada. This would be a very large portion of the whole and would necessitate an outlay of financial and personal resources which we believe to be beyond our capacity.

Another possibility would be to leave the entire burden for North American bomber defence to the United States, but give them unlimited access to Canadian air space and Canadian bases for both training and operational purposes. This would keep the cost to Canada to a minimum but it would tend to erode our sovereignty as well as any influence we could otherwise have on the development of air defence policies—policies which would inevitably have a significant impact on us.

A third possibility is to share the task of North American bomber defence with the United States on an appropriate basis. This co-operative approach is the one which has been followed in all our defence relations with the United States since the beginning of World War II and, in the view of the Government, is the one which makes the most sense as far as continental air defence is concerned, given the disadvantages of the other alternatives.

I would just like to say by way of parenthesis at this point that the arrangements for continental defence made between the Government of Canada through the Department of National Defence and its opposite number in the Government of the United States are not part of the NORAD structure. The NORAD structure does not involve a commitment of Canadian resources. It involves simply participation in a common command structure and in the planning process.

To preserve basic Canadian interests while participating in joint defence activities with a partner as powerful as the United States, it has been necessary to develop certain principles to govern our approach to specific problems. Over the years there has been mutual understanding that co-operative defence projects in either country should:

(a) be agreed by both Governments;

- (b) confer no permanent rights or status upon either country and should be without prejudice to the sovereignty of either country;
- (c) be without impairment to the control of either country over all activities in its territory.

In addition to these three principles, it has been found that, for a variety of reasons, the actual provision of the necessary manpower and equipment can best be handled through individual national contributions made on an *ad hoc* basis as requirements are defined.

Of course, if forces from the two countries are to be employed, it is essential to have satisfactory arrangements to ensure that they can be effectively utilized in time of need. One way of doing this is to co-ordinate respective national command and control elements. This formula was employed in the North American aid defence field prior to 1958 but it was found to be inadequate in circumstances where an immediate reaction to minimum warning of attack is essential.

If co-operation between the air defence forces of both countries is to be effective, it is necessary to have a single air defence plan, previously approved by the national authorities of the two countries, and an integrated command and control system. For the past ten years these requirements have been satisfactorily met by NORAD. We ourselves are now in the process of negotiation and consideration of this matter.

One of the major advantages of the NORAD arrangement, which was entered into by the previous administration in the summer of 1958, apart from making the most effective use of the available air defence forces of both countries, has been the opportunity it has provided for Canada to play a role in the formulation of continental air defence policy. Canada has provided the Deputy Commander in Chief and senior operations officers in the NORAD Headquarters, as well as the Commander of the Northern NORAD Region and the Commanders of two NORAD Divisions, including one in the United States. Plans are jointly drawn up by officers of the two countries and must be approved by both Canadian and United States authorities. United States thinking naturally plays a major part, but it is not by any means exclusive. The authority of the Commander in Chief NORAD in all respects is jointly de-

termined by the two Governments. It is also perhaps worth noting again that the NORAD system is exclusively defensive in nature and cannot possibly be used for any purpose apart from the defence of North America.

The NORAD agreement will lapse on May 12 unless it is renewed. The Government is currently, as I said a moment ago, giving careful consideration to this Agreement.

To the United States, partnership for the defence of our respective homelands is an important manifestation of the basic friendship between the two countries which enables us to speak frankly and to differ with the United States in other areas where such vital interests are not at stake. If we are seen to be doing our part in the defence of this continent, we are in a stronger position to express our views on other issues where we may disagree. In summary, I would like to make the following points. Canada is involved in a threat to this continent from manned bombers which no responsible government can ignore. In this situation, there are three choices open to us:

- (a) We could accept responsibility for providing all of the facilities and undertake all of the activities required in Canada for effective continental bomber defence. In our judgment this is beyond the financial capacity of this country.

• 1140

- (b) We could permit the United States to assume controlling responsibility for the entire task both in the United States and Canada. This would involve a surrender of sovereignty which this Government is not prepared to contemplate.

- (c) We can share the task of continental defence on an appropriate basis.

This third choice provides for effective defence within our means while fully protecting Canadian sovereignty. The NORAD arrangement is based on the principle of shared responsibility for continental air defence, but by itself renewal of the Agreement would not be a commitment of specific forces and equipment.

As I said earlier:

This is achieved through *ad hoc* arrangements between the two Governments as the need arises.

Based upon what I would think anyone would agree was an elementary principle namely, that in our own defence interests we

have to have arrangements made with our neighbour for continental defence and the defence of our own country.

**The Chairman:** Thank you, Mr. Martin. It is understood that members from both committees may ask questions. I have Mr. Nesbitt's name and then Mr. Brewin.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** Mr. Chairman, first of all I will start out by saying that I have seldom heard such a straightforward and concise speech from the Minister and I congratulate him on it, and I must say in general terms I agree with it. But I have two points for clarification and perhaps the Minister will elaborate.

The first has reference to the ABM defence, or defence against inter-continental missiles. The Minister certainly indicated so far as I understood that it is not Canada's intention, certainly at the moment, to take any part in this program of defence of US population centres. But later in his remarks the Minister indicated that any attack by missiles on the United States could not help but involve Canada. The Minister pointed out, and I presume he also implied, that an attack on the Seaway would mean perhaps an attack on and damage to or destruction of the City of Montreal, Windsor or Sault Ste Marie and the like.

Is the Minister suggesting that Canada is going to offer no assistance at all to the United States in this program, this thin line of defence that is being set up, or is it meant that the United States may have, if necessary, certain access to or use of our air space for this defence, or even some of our territory, for setting up whatever devices may be required?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I said we are not committed to make a contribution but we are reviewing the matter.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** Oh, we are doing so at the moment. My second question perhaps comes a little more directly under the Minister of Defence but I think it comes under the Secretary of State for External Affairs as well and it concerns the naval defences of North America. While the Minister did not mention it in his remarks, I think members of both committees are well aware of the fact that perhaps one of the principal means of attack on North America would be by

missiles directly from submarines or other such devices. They might get into Hudson's Bay where they could readily reach the heart of the continent.

Do we have any arrangements with the United States of America for the defence of the waters surrounding the continent, and what form do these arrangements or agreements take, and do they come under NATO or some extension of NATO such as NORAD?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I think the basic question should be responded to by the Minister of National Defence. I simply would like to say that I do not know that it is useful to engage in a discussion as to whether NORAD is part of NATO. My own view is that it is not; however, that is not important to the purpose of your question. Perhaps my colleague would like to deal with that question.

**Hon. Léo Cadieux (Minister of National Defence):** I think the specific question asked here is whether the NORAD Agreement involves some arrangements for NATO defence with the Americans. The answer is no, because NORAD is for the defence against manned bombers only. Now, we had arrangements, of course, with the Americans superimposed on the arrangements that we have also with NATO for the naval defence of North America, especially Canada as far as we are concerned.

As you know we cover a very wide area of the North Atlantic and we are constantly on alert in this particular region and we also participate in exercises with the American naval forces. There is one exercise going on now, "Exercise Maple Spring" which takes place every year, in which we co-ordinate our efforts for the defence of North America from the threat from the sea.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** Do we share some of these devices and arrangements?

**Mr. Cadieux:** No, no. This is very important, I believe; we have a force of our own and the arrangements we have with the Americans are that whenever we do participate we pay our share.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** That is on a 50-50 basis?

**Mr. Cadieux:** No, no; we pay for the operation of our units that participate.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** These are naval units, Mr. Minister. But there are other devices to which

we do not intend to refer directly; other means of defence against attack from the sea as well as naval ships.

**Mr. Cadieux:** In the defence against the sea threat we are involved not only with ships, we are also involved with planes in all sorts of bases. Some of them are manned American bombers and interceptors and some by Canadians, of course. There is an inter-relationship between those bases and the operational command that really looks after the security on the sea.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** I have one last question. Are there any formal treaties in this regard or is it done by arrangement between the two defence departments?

**Mr. Cadieux:** I am not aware of any special treaty; we have a working arrangement with the Americans.

**Mr. Harkness:** May I ask a supplementary question to clarify this? Is it not a fact that our sea defences, so far as the Atlantic is concerned, are really part of our NATO arrangements?

**Mr. Cadieux:** Yes, they are; yes certainly. A very specific purpose is the defence of Canada and North America. This is a very important point, Mr. Harkness. Whenever we talk of NATO, the NATO effort should also include what we do for the direct defence of Canada within NATO.

**Mr. Harkness:** The point I want to get at particularly, and I have not made it clear, in that so far as the naval defence of our Atlantic shores is concerned it is part of a NATO naval operation which comes under the supreme command of the NATO commander based on Norfolk, Virginia.

**Mr. Cadieux:** Yes.

**The Chairman:** Mr. Brewin?

**Mr. Brewin:** Mr. Chairman, I think the Minister has made it perfectly clear that Canada is proposing to renew the NORAD Agreement probably, I presume, for a term of 10 years or something of the sort, and I want to get quite clear what we are going to be committed to by the renewal of NORAD.

First of all, I understand fairly clearly the Minister's statement that the renewal of NORAD commits us generally to co-operation

in the air defence of North America. However, I also understand the Minister to make it very clear that that does not involve any particular commitment of forces or the adoption of any particular scheme or system of North American air defence.

Now, the question I want to ask the Minister is this: Does not the renewal of this Agreement morally commit Canada to take its part in continuing the present system until it is phased out and adopting and co-operating in a new antibomber system for North America when that may be finally decided on.

• 1150

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I made clear in my statement that the NORAD arrangement does not involve any commitment of specific resources and equipment. What the NORAD arrangement does is provide for participation in continental command structure, and in the process of planning for continental defence against bombers. That is what NORAD is.

Whether we had NORAD or not, we would have to have arrangements for continental defence in our own interest. Assuming that we did not renew the NORAD arrangement on different terms or on the old terms, we would still have to have arrangements for continental defence. These arrangements would be made as they have been made during the lifetime of the NORAD agreement, and as they would be if the agreement were renewed on an ad hoc basis altogether outside. I do not believe there is any additional obligation on us because we are participating in the common command structure or in the planning process. We would, in our own self-interest, want to be making arrangements with the United States for the protection of this country on a continental basis.

**Mr. Brewin:** Then I want to put this directly to the Minister. If NORAD does not commit us to a continuation of the present scheme of North American defence and to future schemes of North American defence, are we committed, at any rate, or do we intend to proceed with, or to continue, the present scheme or not?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Of NORAD?

**Mr. Brewin:** Yes, of NORAD.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I said that is a matter that is now in the stage of negotiation.

**Mr. Brewin:** Perhaps I did not make myself clear. We are now engaged in an endeavour that has cost us, I think we were told, \$145 million a year to defend North America against an air attack and my question is this. Is this government committed, does it propose to continue that arrangement, either under NORAD or outside NORAD? NORAD makes no difference.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I would think it was inconceivable that we would not continue to have continental defence arrangements by our own country, but that has nothing to do with NORAD.

**Mr. Brewin:** Nothing to do with NORAD.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I have made it clear that NORAD is participation in command structure for continental defence and in the planning process. Whether we had NORAD or not, is it conceivable that this country would not want to have arrangements with its neighbour for our defence. That is the point, and long before NORAD came into being we did have these arrangements, and I think as long as there is this regrettable situation in the world we will have to continue.

**Mr. Brewin:** Let me put another question and get at it in the same way. I presume the Minister is aware of the fact that the Secretary of Defence of the United States put a proposal before a Senatorial Committee, I think it was the Armed Services Committee, to come into effect some time in the future, I do not think it was definite. This proposal was to substitute a new defence system based on AWACS or air detective system plus a new group of interceptors. Now, I am asking the Minister does our signing of the NORAD agreement commit us to participate in that or does it not, or if not that, in some other similar scheme?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** NORAD does not touch that at all. That is a matter for us to decide.

• 1155

**Mr. Brewin:** If NORAD does not involve us in these schemes, would the Minister just say again briefly what it does involve us in.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** It gives us the very great opportunity of sharing in the command structure and in knowing something

about the planning process. This is a very good advantage indeed.

**Mr. Brewin:** Let me put this to the Minister. Supposing the government received information from reliable sources that there was no bomber threat and that the present system was totally ineffective against it, are we committed to continue it?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Of course not. Oh, do you mean to NORAD?

**Mr. Brewin:** Yes, to NORAD.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Well it will depend on the nature of our agreement. We are negotiating certain terms and it would all depend on the outcome of this particular negotiation.

**Mr. Brewin:** Mr. Martin for the benefit of those who are concerned about this matter, I want to get as clear an idea as I can about what we are committed. We are now taking part in an air defence system of North America involving...

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Just one minute, Mr. Brewin. I am sorry, Mr. Brewin I just wanted to consult my advisers.

**Mr. Brewin:** Let me try and put it to you this way, Mr. Martin. At the present moment we are engaged in a BOMARC missile interceptor system which is designed to defend North America against a Soviet bomber threat. What I am asking is this. Does our renegotiation of NORAD commit us in any respect to the continuation of that system?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** No, I thought I had made that clear. It does not commit us to any specific resources whatsoever. But we have got to think of our own interest and to make whatever arrangements we do have through ad hoc arrangements that are not part of the NORAD structure. We have to take into account, of course, proposals, which the United States government announced as you said, on the 1st of February, for the modernization of North American defence. We participated in the development of this proposed new system, which by taking advantage of new technology is intended to make defence against bombers more effective and I think, in the long run, to achieve economies. The intention is to increase the warning time by the use of airborne radar and to provide more effective interceptor aircraft, as you

know. By operating these facilities off the coast of Canada and the United States, and in the Arctic regions of Canada and Alaska, it will be possible to achieve two important objectives: to provide improved protection for strategic deterrent forces and to ensure that any engagement of hostile aircraft would take place far to the north of the population centres of Canada.

Now from the consultations which have taken place thus far between Canadian and United States authorities on this subject, it is clear that a series of options was open to Canada regarding the nature and the form of our future participation in continental air defence. That is a matter for us to decide and it is important to recognize that the proposed new system will not alter the requirement for continuing close co-operation between our two countries. It is not a departure from the present system. It is a modernization in which a Canadian contribution will be judged as necessary, and will depend upon the agreement and the decision which the Canadian government takes.

**The Chairman:** Mr. Laniel?

• 1200

**Mr. Laniel:** Could I ask a supplementary at this stage? My question, Mr. Minister, is based on two assumptions. Let us assume that we renew the NORAD agreement and that in the next ten-year period the Americans do develop a system of anti-ballistic missiles. It is a fact that we contribute to the actual command structure in the defence of North America against bomber attack. Would such a new anti-ballistic missile defence system come under a separate command? If such were the case we would be participating in part only in the command in the defence of North America. How can we say today that even though we are committed or are participating in the actual system that this renewal would not involve us in another system, if we really wanted to have our say in the command structure in the defence of the whole of North America and against all threats?

**Mr. Cadieux:** Mr. Chairman, I think we should make a very basic distinction here. We are talking of two things: first, the bomber threat, and then the ICBM threat. The NORAD arrangement is concerned only

with the bomber threat and it is expected, I am sure, that the ABM system that is being planned for the United States will be under a different command. It will not be under NORAD. Therefore if you do renew NORAD you are not implicitly involved in the eventual ABM system. This is very clear.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I think we could add to that that the renewal of the agreement does not involve in any way a Canadian commitment to participate in an anti-ballistic missile defence.

**Mr. Brewin:** I deduce from the Minister's statement that the government proposes to continue either under NORAD or elsewhere the present contribution to and maintenance of the BOMARC missile system. I want to ask the government whether it has given serious thought to the reality of the threat, to begin with, and secondly, whether this system is any longer effective in the missile world or can in any way contribute to the real defence or security of this country. I would like to suggest that it contributes nothing.

**Mr. Cadieux:** Well this is what I would respectfully call a personal opinion.

**Mr. Brewin:** It is shared by Mr. McNamara, for example, who has gone on record as saying that it is obsolete, vulnerable and only exists as a potential target.

**Mr. Cadieux:** To be factual, I must tell you that the new system that is planned or suggested by the United States sees a phasing out of the DEW line, which would be replaced by a much better detection system that would give you a longer warning of the bomber threat, and also in two or three years time—they are talking of the early 70's, possibly 1970—the phasing out of the BOMARC system, which is not only in operation in Canada but also in the United States. There is a misconception here, that Canada is the only country that has BOMARC bases. This is wrong because there are also bases in the United States.

Regarding the efficiency of the system, I do not know on what grounds anybody can say that it is ineffective because it has not yet been tried. We have not had any attack from bombers and therefore to say that it is ineffective before you fire the missile itself, I think, would be presumptuous.

• 1205

**Mr. Brewin:** Do you not think it is completely vulnerable and could be taken out in a few days, a few hours, or even a few minutes by the ICBM's?

**Mr. Cadieux:** Is a base itself not vulnerable? Of course it is if you do not defend yourself. But the assumption is that with the detection system you have you would put it in operation and it would be effective.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Mr. Brewin, may I just make a brief comment on your question and the comment. The facilities set up separately or jointly by the two countries are not specified by the present or future NORAD agreement. The plan and the equipment to defend the area are discussed separately, within the NORAD command of course, and each country decides apart from the agreement what it will provide.

**Mr. Brewin:** I am fully aware of that, Mr. Minister, but I just wanted to make the point to you that by continuing in NORAD you are morally obliged to continue these particular schemes. I still think that is the case. Whether legally or not, you are morally obliged.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Well I do not agree with you. What you are saying is that you are denying the advantage of Canada having a knowledge of plans for the defence of this continent and a knowledge of the incidence of command for the defence of this continent. I think it is very much in our interest to have this knowledge. We talk about dependence and I can think of nothing that would add to our dependence more than a lack of this.

**Mr. Brewin:** Mr. Chairman, I will not argue with the Minister any more. I would like to have questioned him about NATO and particularly the present situation in the dictatorial régimes within NATO of Greece and Portugal, but I will pass because I am sure other members would like to present questions to the Minister.

**The Chairman:** Thank you. Mr. Matheson you are next.

**Mr. Matheson:** I was wondering if the Minister would feel free to give us a picture of the relationship between some of our European NATO allies. I was thinking par-

ticularly of Greece and Turkey, differences that have emerged in the Mediterranean, and more particularly the extent to which we can rely on the full co-operation of France with respect to joint defence.

**Mr. Martin:** With regard to France, it has taken the position that it continues to support the Alliance. It continues to accept an obligation under Article V of the Treaty, reserving to itself however the right to determine the extent to which it is committed in time of war to come to the assistance of its partners. France does not agree to an integrated command structure nor does it intend to participate in the integrated force structure of NATO. The other 14 countries have continued to express their confidence in the desirability of an integrated command structure and an integrated force structure. There are large numbers of French forces on German territory and they continue to serve both treaty obligations and the interests of NATO by arrangements made between the German government and the French government. But it was very significant at the last meeting that while there has been much discussion about the role of France in the Alliance, the ringing declaration made at the conclusion of the meeting in December for support of the Alliance was fully participated in by the foreign minister for France, who was the spokesman of the French government.

• 1210

Turkey and Greece have had differences over the situation in Cyprus. These differences have had their implications for NATO because these two partners in the Mediterranean area could, by their decisions, have very important consequences for NATO. The Secretary-General of NATO was able to play a part, as were individual countries including Canada, in the recent crisis by helping to bring about an agreement between Greece and Turkey that led to an easing of the very serious situation in Cyprus. We ourselves would like to see a solution brought to this problem so that the forces of pacification would no longer be required. The efforts at bringing about a settlement continue but there is no immediate prospect that there will be a settlement that would mean withdrawal of Canadian forces as a member of the United Nations Force. This situation does

have a continuing interest and, on occasion, concern for the members of NATO.

**Mr. Matheson:** Mr. Chairman, I remember that on the last occasion on which the Defence Committee was in Paris at NATO Headquarters, there was an enunciation of the French policy of *frappe de force*, which appeared to be a national approach as distinct from a collective approach to the collective defence of Europe. Are you in a position, sir, to give us any idea of where Canada now stands? I am thinking in particular with respect to the rather sizable investments in Marville and Metz.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Do you mean the claims?

**Mr. Matheson:** I beg your pardon? Yes.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** The claims against France? As I said yesterday in the House, this is a matter that we have been reviewing, and we are now engaged in consultations. Until they are finished I really cannot make a definite report.

**Mr. Matheson:** Do you see, sir, any area of positive co-operation between Canada and France in the NATO alliance?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Yes I do.

**The Chairman:** Mr. MacRae.

**Mr. MacRae:** Mr. Chairman, my first question concerned the position of France in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** May I say, so that I will not be misunderstood when I talk about Greece and Turkey, that while I did express some impatience at the lack of a Cyprus settlement, there has been a welcome improvement in the relations between these two countries. Sorry, Mr. MacRae.

**Mr. MacRae:** The first question, Mr. Minister, had to deal with the position of France in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, but you answered that to my complete satisfaction when you answered Mr. Matheson. The next question perhaps should be addressed to the Minister of National Defence but either one of you may answer. What is our present military commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the three components—land, sea and air? The second part of the question is: has there been any significant change in that commitment in the past year, let us say? Thirdly,

is the Government at this particular time giving any consideration to reducing the commitment to NATO, especially in its land environment?

**Mr. Cadieux:** As you know, we have a heavy brigade now in Europe which consists of about 6,000 men. We have an air transportable brigade in reserve in Canada which includes two battalions for the ACE Force. We have the Air Division in Europe, then we have...

• 1215

**Mr. MacRae:** Pardon me, Mr. Minister, is the air division up to full strength?

**Mr. Cadieux:** Oh yes. The air division is deployed on three bases and the brigade is on one base. Included in the maritime forces committed, there is one aircraft carrier, 20 destroyers, three submarines, 30 patrol aircraft. That is for 1968. As you know, we are working on a five-year revolving commitment and this is the commitment that we made for this year. As far as any change is concerned we had committed as a back-up two heavy brigades that were supposed to be transportable in X-plus time but we thought that this was not realistic because we did not foresee the time when we would have the facilities to transport them. This is why we wanted to make a more realistic commitment and we changed that for an air transportable brigade. As far as plans for changing these commitments are concerned, we have no plans at the present time. I suppose what you are really asking is whether we have significantly reduced the air division or the brigade in Europe. We have reduced it somewhat in deleting some administrative positions. This would involve, in the case of the brigade, about 600 men and about the same number of people in the air division; there were about 6,600 before and there are now about 6,000.

**Mr. MacRae:** In other words, there are no significant reductions planned in our NATO strength in Europe at this particular time.

**Mr. Cadieux:** Not for 1968. As you know, we made some reductions in the air transportable brigade. Of course, this is a reduction.

**Mr. MacRae:** Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

**Mr. Hopkins:** Mr. Chairman, when the Minister was speaking he gave three alter-

natives: that the defence from the North could be handled by Canada alone; that it could be handled by the United States alone, which would end up endangering a certain amount of our sovereignty; or that it could be done on joint agreement. He stated that it was out of the question financially for Canada to do it alone. I think for the sake of the record it would be interesting to know how much both Canada and the United States have spent annually over the past few years on North American defence; and also if you have any projections of the cost of this defence in the North for the next year or two, let us say until 1970, when you consider phasing out the DEW line.

**Mr. Cadieux:** I do not know that I can give you figures for the past years but I can indicate that the figure for the NORAD cost to Canada in 1967-1968 was \$130,479,000 and for 1968-1969, it is expected that it is going to be \$134,633,000. Our information is that the cost to the United States for that operation is \$1,700,000,000. As far as personnel are concerned...

**Mr. Hopkins:** Is that annually, Mr. Minister?

**Mr. Cadieux:** I do not know. I am giving you the 1967-1968 and 1968-1969 figures. There is an estimation factor there. As you see, it goes up from \$130 million to \$134 million. For the past years I do not know. It must have been slightly lower both for Canada and the United States. Personnel-wise Canada contributes 9,000 men. We have 9,000 men assigned to specific NORAD jobs and the United States has 160,000 people.

• 1220

**Mr. Hopkins:** So this could conceivably cost in the neighbourhood of \$2 billion annually?

**Mr. Cadieux:** You mean the overall operations.

**Mr. Hopkins:** Yes.

**Mr. Cadieux:** Yes, approximately.

**Mr. Hopkins:** Thank you.

**Mr. Groos:** I want to ask the Minister of External Affairs a question. I think I heard him correctly when he said that France had agreed to remain within NATO reserving for itself the right to decide whether or not, or the extent to which it would come to the assistance of its allies if attacked. Is that it?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Under article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, "in time of war."

**Mr. Groos:** It seems to me that this reservation that they have made is really hitting at the foundations of NATO, in that the fundamental feature was that all the allies in NATO would come to the assistance of any member of the alliance in the event of an attack.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** That must be qualified by the fact that the constitutional processes can be invoked by any country in the making of the decision. Article 5 reads:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, ...

This is where the constitutional process comes in.

...including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

However, I agree that in the position taken by France after their withdrawal from the integrated force structure we would have welcomed a wider acceptance of the obligations under the Treaty.

**Mr. Groos:** Is there any sign, Mr. Martin, that any other NATO allies are thinking of taking a position similar to that of the French?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** No.

**The Chairman:** Mr. Harkness?

**Mr. Harkness:** I would like to return to the reduction in our commitments that Mr. McLean was dealing with. Up to the present time we have found it more or less impossible to secure any definite information on what the reduction in our commitments to NATO has been. First of all, as the Minister has just mentioned, we were committed to supply a division; one brigade in Europe and two brigades which were to be sent over there

within 60 days, as I recall it. The Minister has said that the commitment has been changed and that we will now provide one air-transportable brigade rather than the two heavy brigades we had before. When was this commitment changed?

**Mr. Cadieux:** At the December meeting.

**Mr. Harkness:** In other words, just since the last meeting of the NATO Council.

**Mr. Cadieux:** Yes.

**Mr. Harkness:** So that this is really applicable starting in this current year?

**Mr. Cadieux:** Yes.

**Mr. Harkness:** I must say that I myself think that this is a more realistic way of meeting this commitment than was the other. Most of those who have examined the situation never thought that it was going to be possible to get the two brigades over to Europe in time to be effective. My second question is about the air division. It was 12 squadrons. It is now reduced to six. When was the reduction in the air division agreed to, or when did it become effective?

**Mr. Cadieux:** The ten per cent reduction that we have proposed will take place between 1969 and 1972. For 1968 it is still constituted as it was last year, at 6,600 people.

• 1225

**Mr. Harkness:** When was our commitment reduced from an air division of 12 squadrons to an air division of six squadrons?

**Mr. Cadieux:** I have not personally known the air division to be more than six squadrons. I could not tell you that. I think it took effect in 1967, but I...

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Last July.

**Mr. Harkness:** Now; as a matter of fact, it was reduced to eight squadrons something over a year ago, as I recall it. Subsequently, last year, it was reduced to six squadrons. As I say, we have never been able to get any information on when this commitment was reduced. In particular, I would like to know whether it was reduced unilaterally by Canada or was reduced as result of agreement with the other NATO countries.

**Mr. Cadieux:** In December, at the invitation of SACEUR, I said that this would be the commitment, and it was accepted.

**Mr. Harkness:** You are talking about this 10 per cent reduction?

**Mr. Cadieux:** No. This does not involve the operation capability. This is the administrative procedure that we are trying to...

**Mr. Harkness:** But I am talking of the reduction, first, from 12 to eight squadrons and then from eight to six.

**Mr. Cadieux:** I am sorry; I do not have that information. I do not know. That was before my time. I suppose there were good reasons for that. The commitment as offered now seems to be satisfactory.

**Mr. Harkness:** Up to the present time we have never been able to get any information on how any agreement about a reduction in the air division as I have outlined was arrived at. This is what I am trying to get now, if it is at all possible.

**Mr. Cadieux:** I am sure it must have been accepted, because I have never heard to the contrary. I have not heard any protests about it.

**Mr. Harkness:** Your predecessor used to claim that the commitments were the same and that our meeting of the commitments was as good as it ever had been.

**Mr. Cadieux:** I have put it in the terms that I proposed to them.

**Mr. Harkness:** However, you have no information on that.

**Mr. Cadieux:** No.

**Mr. Harkness:** Perhaps we could get that information at a later meeting.

**Mr. Cadieux:** I am informed that at the end of the decade, in 1960, we phased out interceptors at the request of SACEUR and procured eight squadrons of CF-104 strike and reconnaissance aircraft. If this information is correct this was at the request of SACEUR. They must have revised their own plan.

**Mr. Harkness:** No. The situation at that time was that the interceptors had become obsolescent and we were requested by our NATO allies to replace the air division, which consisted entirely of interceptors, with an air division of strike-reconnaissance aircraft.

**Mr. Cadieux:** I do not know. Some changes were made in the brigade itself. As you

know, it was supposed to be a reserve brigade. Now it is a front line brigade and a heavy brigade.

**Mr. Harkness:** No. You are referring to the brigade. I am talking about the air division.

**Mr. Cadieux:** I know. But the implication there is that probably SACEUR itself made changes in its own plans.

**Mr. Harkness:** No. This was a matter of general NATO agreement. I was present when it took place. It was a matter of changing the role of the air division and producing a different type of air division.

**Mr. Cadieux:** Well, if you have the informa you could give it to me.

**Mr. Harkness:** The only information I have is that we agreed to produce an air division. Up to the time I ceased to be Minister of Defence it was still to be an air division of 12 squadrons.

**Mr. Cadieux:** I am informed that in 1960 SACEUR suggested that we reduced it to eight squadrons. Were you the Minister in 1960?

**Mr. Harkness:** Yes.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** That is right.

**Mr. Harkness:** The situation at that time was that we were substituting strike-reconnaissance squadrons for interceptor squadrons.

• 1230

**Mr. Cadieux:** I know it was reduced from eight to six in 1967.

**Mr. Harkness:** Let us now deal with naval forces. In 1963 we were committed to supply 64 naval vessels to NATO. At the present time, I think, we are supplying 27. When and under what circumstances did this reduction take place?

**Mr. Cadieux:** I do not know. When you were committed to 60 vessels, did you actually supply them? Did you have them?

**Mr. Harkness:** We had them and we had them at sea.

**Mr. Cadieux:** I have indicated to you the present commitment, 1 aircraft carrier, 20 destroyers, 3 submarines and 30 patrol aircraft.

**Mr. Harkness:** Was this reduction made unilaterally by Canada or was it made as a matter of a series of agreements with our NATO allies?

**Mr. Cadieux:** I do not know by what procedure it could be done unilaterally. These arrangements are not made within NATO. At the request of SACEUR, every year a plan is produced and this plan is...

**Mr. Harkness:** I have asked before if this was done by agreement and I have never received a definite answer, so the only conclusion I could come to was that it was done unilaterally.

**Mr. Cadieux:** The present commitment was submitted to SACEUR in December. I submitted it in writing and it was accepted.

**Mr. Harkness:** Perhaps we could get further information with regard to this reduction which took place over a series of years, of course.

With regard to NATO, the Secretary of State for External Affairs has said that there are no explicit commitments in regard to provision of, we will say, equipment or contributions to NORAD except in so far as the command structure and so on is concerned. But is it not a fact that the very active entry into the NORAD Agreement and, in fact, what you might call the *ad hoc* arrangements which existed prior to the NORAD Agreement meant there were implicit commitments on our part as far as provision of interceptors, warning systems, and so on?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** The point I want to make, Mr. Harkness, is, it seems to me we would have wanted to make these contributions whether NORAD had been in being or not.

**Mr. Harkness:** I agree. I agree, and we were making them.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Yes, we were making them and whether we renew NORAD or not we have to have these kinds of arrangements in our own elementary defence interest.

**Mr. Harkness:** But the point I was getting at is this. I think you probably left the idea with the Committee that as part of the NORAD Agreement we had no commitments for providing Bomarc squadrons, interceptor squadrons, warning stations and so forth.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** That is right.

**Mr. Harkness:** Actually, implicit in the Agreement and implicit in the *ad hoc* arrangements which existed before was the provision of a considerable amount along these lines.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** That is right.

**Mr. Harkness:** You also stated as far as provision of an ABM system is concerned and so far as one exists at the present time, that it had nothing to do with NORAD. But is it not a fact, say, that the central warning apparatus and the command structure for dealing with a possible ABM attack is actually NORAD headquarters?

**Mr. Cadieux:** No. This is not the information that we have. First of all, this is a technological development that is planned to start in 1970 and to continue for something like ten years. The information we were given was that this would not come under NORAD, it would be a different command. NORAD would be concerned possibly only with the AWACS system which is a detecting system for the bombers.

**Mr. Harkness:** But as things stand at the present time, is it not a fact that the warning information received from the BMEWS stations at Thule, Alaska and at Yorkshire in England are fed into the NORAD headquarters and any countermeasures which are taken are taken on the command of NORAD headquarters? This is the situation at the present time.

**Mr. Cadieux:** Yes, except that in the concept of the ABM defence system, there is an implication that each defence installation will have its own radar system and a lot of this is done by automatic operation. We definitely were told by the research and development people in the States that it would involve a new command. It was not contemplated that NORAD would have anything to do with it.

**Mr. Harkness:** In other words, your information is that instead of there being a centralized warning and command system, it now will be decentralized?

**Mr. Cadieux:** That is the information I have received.

**Mr. Harkness:** One of the reasons I brought up this point was...

**Mr. Cadieux:** Oh, yes, I know.

**Mr. Harkness:** ...to try to make this clear because I know what the situation was or has been up to the present time.

**Mr. Cadieux:** But there are a lot of new elements in this concept of the over-all ABM defence systems. They talk, for instance, of over-the-horizon radar which is a new development, but we actually are not concerned with that when we discuss NORAD. NORAD is simply the joint control and management of the air defence system, it has nothing to do with bomber command.

**Mr. Harkness:** Except, as I say, that up to the present time...

**Mr. Cadieux:** Oh, yes.

**Mr. Harkness:** ...the co-ordination of warning signals and the command structure to deal with any attack is at NORAD...

**Mr. Cadieux:** Yes.

**Mr. Harkness:** ...and is part of NORAD command. Therefore, as far as a further agreement is concerned—it is to come up for renewal on May 12, 1968—in the present state of the Art NORAD headquarters would still be, we will say, the command centre and the chief warning centre for missile attack.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** But there is no commitment on our part in the event of renewal to participate in an anti-ballistic missile defence.

**Mr. Harkness:** No, but in view of the fact that the deputy commander of NORAD is a Canadian and might very well be in command at NORAD when a missile attack took place, there really is a participation on our part, whether we like it or not.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I mean there is no commitment by Canada of resources.

**Mr. Harkness:** Oh, yes.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** That is what I meant.

**Mr. Harkness:** This is a different thing. The two concepts have to be separated—any commitment on our part as far as providing hardware is concerned, on the one hand, and our participation, on the other hand, from the command and warning point of view.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Yes.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** May I ask just a brief supplementary? Did I hear the Minister just say that there is no commitment of "resources",

I think, was the word the Minister used, on our part to the antimissile defence? In reply to a question I put earlier...

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Membership in NORAD does not necessarily involve a commitment.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** I know that very well, but in an earlier question I put to the Minister I asked, "Is Canada intending to make air space and land bases available wherever necessary for whatever instruments may be required for missile defence?" The Minister said, "Yes".

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Yes.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** Then there are resources committed.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** But I was just trying to complete my sentence. The NORAD Agreement essentially establishes a joint defence command for operation control only, and provides for a single air defence plan approved in advance by the authorities of both countries. That is what NORAD is.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** Look, Mr. Minister, I understand that fully, but what I do not understand is when I asked the question if any Canadian resources, air space, real estate, whatever you have—would be made available for antimissile defences of North America, you replied, "Yes, although perhaps we would not contribute the actual hardware". Then, a few minutes ago in reply to Mr. Harkness you said that there would be no resources committed by Canada. It seems a little incompatible.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I do not think so. I think that is exactly it.

**Mr. Nesbitt:** It depends on what you mean by "resources", I guess.

**Mr. Lambert:** First of all, the Minister has indicated that Canada's participation in NORAD has given us access to the planning and participation in planning for the air defence of North America; that our participation in NATO has given us the availability of participation in planning on the sea defences in so far as SACLANT is concerned. Has any thought been given—and here I am putting forward ideas that I have read—because of some possible uncertainty or declining influence of NATO it would be in Canada's interest for participation in the

planning of the total defence of North America to consider entering into a continental defence agreement with the United States which would permit us also to participate in the planning in the question of anti-ballistic missiles?

● 1240

When I put it this way, this does not mean that Canada would participate in the installation but that it would participate in the planning and that we would not be faced with a unilateral decision of an ABM system or, as is now indicated, that the AWACS warning system would not be within NORAD and therefore would be beyond our participation in planning.

**Mr. Cadieux:** First of all, we are faced with technological developments that offer alternatives and what is going on now is that we were first briefed by the research and development people of the Pentagon on what the new developments were. There was no approach to ask Canada either to participate or not participate. We were informed of the possibilities and we have an agreement by which we have some people of the Defence Department, especially, the research people on the technical side who are in constant contact with their counterparts in the United States and who are informed of the developments.

That is the stage at which we are now, so there is no known negotiation, no propositions; it is just that we are facing possible technological developments. The Americans have indicated that they plan to introduce an ABM system on their territory. They have not requested us to do anything about it.

**Mr. Lambert:** But, Mr. Minister, it is precisely for that purpose that my question was put. Well, has any consideration been given by Canada to a continental defence agreement between Canada and the United States involving the three elements, the land, sea and air, including the missiles?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** There has been no consideration to a general agreement but, as my colleague points out, it is felt that the consultative arrangements meet our present situation.

**Mr. Lambert:** I see. Then I will switch slightly to a related subject concerning the commitments to NATO and SACLANT referred to by Mr. Harkness. It is my information that the total strength of naval personnel committed in about 1964 was roughly 10,000

and the other day, in answer to a question I put on the Order Paper, the Minister of National Defence replied that the total strength of the personnel now on the ships afloat and on active duty was somewhat less than 6,000.

• 1245

May I infer from that that the commitment of ships since 1964 has been reduced or, if it has not been reduced, that the effective strength of personnel on those ships has been materially reduced?

**Mr. Cadieux:** Well, if what the former Minister says is correct that we had 60 ships committed to NATO before and if I indicate that we now have about 25, obviously there has been a reduction in the number of ships.

**Mr. Lambert:** But, Mr. Minister, at repeated Defence Committee meetings your predecessor insisted that there was no reduction in the commitment to NATO in so far as sea forces are concerned and that we were meeting our commitments. I am concerned about this matter of meeting our commitments because the logicity of the strengths of the forces in 1964 and in 1967 lead me to the conclusion that they are not unless there has been a reduction in the ships.

**Mr. Cadieux:** Yes, but you know some of the ships that were World War II ships certainly have been phased out and they have been replaced by more efficient ships. There is no reduction in capability. Of course, the commitment changes because the instruments by which you meet the commitment change and they are more efficient. I am sure you know about that; it is not always in terms of numbers that you can assess the capability.

**Mr. Lambert:** In fulfilment of our commitment to turn over command to SACLANT in the event of an emergency is the Minister satisfied, with the present strength which he gave as of November or December, that the ships would be fully operational?

**Mr. Cadieux:** They are all fully operational now.

**Mr. Lambert:** Are they at full strength?

**Mr. Cadieux:** Oh, yes.

**An hon. Member:** Is everything working?

**Mr. Forrestall:** That is not so.

**Mr. Lambert:** That is not my information.

**Mr. Cadieux:** I asked that very pointed question not very long ago of the Maritime Commander and he said, yes.

**Mr. Forrestall:** Oh, no.

**Mr. Cadieux:** Now, I did not count heads.

**Mr. Forrestall:** He is telling you what you want to hear.

**Mr. Stanbury:** The hon. member is calling the Maritime Commander a liar.

**Mr. Forrestall:** If you want to phrase it that way yes, and I think it can be well substantiated.

**Mr. Lambert:** That is all, Mr. Chairman.

**The Chairman:** Mr. Forrestall?

**Mr. Forrestall:** I wonder if I could just pursue for a moment, Mr. Minister, this total contribution that we are making to continental defence. I am rather curious under what agreements or arrangements with the United States we now contribute to, or co-operate in, Maritime defence or defence in the North Atlantic against an underwater threat. Is there any tangible agreement or arrangement, or do we do this through NATO?

**Mr. Cadieux:** There is a NATO agreement. We co-operate.

**Mr. Forrestall:** Is this the only one?

**Mr. Cadieux:** We have mutual agreements, I suppose. I do not know; I have not seen it but I know that in operations we do operate jointly in sea defences. We have committed most of our resources to NATO so we operate through NATO for the defence of the North Atlantic area.

**Mr. Forrestall:** Well, this is getting to it, but is it through NATO that we co-operate with the Americans in defence of our own continent?

**Mr. Cadieux:** Yes.

**Mr. Forrestall:** No formalized arrangement exists?

**Mr. Cadieux:** Between Canada and the United States?

**Mr. Forrestall:** There are just ad hoc arrangements and notes and understanding?

**Mr. Cadieux:** That is the way I understand it; that is right.

**Mr. Forrestall:** That is fine; that was the only point I had.

**Mr. Cadieux:** Well, there is the Permanent Joint Board on Defence that is still in operation. These things are operative all the time.

**Mr. Forrestall:** I understood that had been phased out.

**Mr. Cadieux:** Oh, no.

**Mr. Forrestall:** The Joint Board?

**Mr. Cadieux:** Oh, no.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** No. It is a very active body.

**Mr. Forrestall:** Is this again, Mr. Minister, an ad hoc body?

• 1250

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** The Permanent Joint Board of Defence is a product of the war and it has been continuing ever since. All these matters are discussed very actively in that Joint Board, often before there is any formal negotiation between the governments concerned. For instance NORAD has been the subject of continuous discussion in the Joint Board.

**Mr. Harkness:** Could I just ask a supplementary? Is not the Joint Board, to a large extent, a means of exchanging information and ideas between the United States and ourselves. It is not what you might call an executive body in any way?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** No.

**Mr. Matheson:** Mr. Chairman, I wonder if either of the Ministers would be kind enough to give us a picture of what defence in total, and/or defence in NATO, costs Canada in terms of either gross national product or per capita, whatever figures there may be. I would like to know what percentage.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** While my colleague is getting that I would like to indicate that Canada spends less on defence in relation to gross national product than all countries except Denmark, Luxembourg and Iceland.

**Mr. Matheson:** Is it possible to have any more information? Basically you are saying

that our contribution to defence is the lowest spectrum of our alliance. Is that correct?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Next to those countries that I have mentioned.

**Mr. Matheson:** And that includes not only our defence within NATO, but our defence in total?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** No, I am talking about our contribution to NATO.

**An hon. Member:** They are more important?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** No, no. Total military commitment expenses.

**Mr. Matheson:** Can the Minister of National Defence add anything to that?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** He can give you the figures.

**Mr. Cadieux:** I can give you the figures for our contributions to NATO. The total military, I think, depends on what basis of comparison you use. If you compare on a basis of percentages of gross national product I think it is below 3 per cent now, and it is one of the lowest in the NATO group. That is, on the basis of gross national product.

**Mr. Matheson:** Yes.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Lower than any but those three.

**Mr. Cadieux:** And that is total expenditure. If you want expenditures to NATO, the brigade would come to a total of \$77 million; the air division about \$69 million and Maritime Command, if you want all our operations related to NATO, is \$283 million.

**Mr. Matheson:** So in effect if we remain part of this alliance we can scarcely with decency reduce our commitments.

**Mr. Cadieux:** Well, we certainly cannot do much about Maritime Command because they are defending our own coasts.

**Mr. Matheson:** I have one other question, sir. I am concerned about what I think is Canada's international interest in the long run in the Caribbean area. I think for a whole variety of reasons we should be deeply concerned about the welfare of the islands, and we should think of them in many ways as partners, perhaps involved in an eventual union, an alliance, or perhaps even a confederation. Is the Caribbean being studied as

an area in which perhaps we enjoy a special responsibility in respect of defence.

**Mr. Cadieux:** This is a very specific question and I do not think I can answer it. I think the general agreement is that all the Maritime forces Canada has assigned to NATO are also used for the defence of Canada and the United States. Now if you would consider this particular area as specifically for the defence of the United States, then I think we would be involved.

• 1255

**Mr. Matheson:** Then to be more specific sir, the Secretary of State for External Affairs began his remarks by mentioning our bias in the interest of peacekeeping. If we could play a role here we would like to do so. Now bearing in mind that peacekeeping may very well involve military operations within an area perhaps 10 degrees north, to 10 degrees south of the equator, and bearing in mind that the United States and other countries do have tropic areas in which they can generally operate, does Canada bear in mind the importance to us for training, for operations, and so on of especially close relationship with our Caribbean neighbours?

**Mr. Cadieux:** We just went through an exercise on the island of Vieques, which was jungle warfare training.

**Mr. Matheson:** Is this a Canadian operation alone?

**Mr. Cadieux:** Oh yes, and we have now a team that is going to Australia to initiate itself and we think it will come back with knowledge of a different kind of environment which would be desert training. We are going through these exercises all the time.

**The Chairman:** It is now approaching one o'clock and there are two members who want to ask questions. I hope they can make them as brief as possible. We have been here for two hours now. There is Mr. Herridge, who is not a member of the Committee, and then there is Mr. Macquarrie.

**Mr. Herridge:** Well Mr. Chairman, as a former member of this Committee I could not resist the temptation to ask the Secretary of State for External Affairs a couple of questions to clarify issues and I shall be quite brief.

The Secretary of State for External Affairs knows what our policy is in the NDP. We

were for withdrawal from NATO once it became a nuclear alliance. The Hon. Paul Hellyer, who at one time was the Minister of National Defence, agreed with us in principle on that policy. You may remember he was opposed to nuclear weapons at one time. We are also in favour of withdrawal from NORAD. I listened to the Minister's statement as much as I could. Is it correct to say that the Minister is in disagreement with this aspect of New Democratic Party international policy?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I think it would be fair to say that the Minister is in disagreement with a number of aspects of New Democratic policy.

**Some hon. Members:** Oh, oh.

**Mr. Herridge:** I have one other question. At one time the Prime Minister promised the House that they would consider a renegotiation of the Bomarc Agreement. Can the Minister inform the Committee what has happened since that promise was made?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Part of those questions have already been dealt with.

**Mr. Herridge:** You mean to say a renegotiation of the Bomarc Agreement.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Mr. Brewin made a very eloquent defence of the proposition which you are now dealing with. It reflects a division in your party.

**Mr. Herridge:** I am afraid not. But Mr. Martin, has the Prime Minister... Members of our party took it for granted they were going to renegotiate the Bomarc Agreement to get out of this field. What has happened in that respect?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** We are carrying on and by the 1970's we will have to see what the situation is.

**Mr. Herridge:** So the situation to date is unchanged?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** That is right.

**The Chairman:** Mr. Macquarrie?

**Mr. Macquarrie:** Mr. Chairman, it is nearly an hour since I raised my hand.

**The Chairman:** I am sorry I missed it.

**Mr. Macquarrie:** I hate feeling like a poor sport but because it is nearly one o'clock I will ask only one question rather than

the ten I had noted here. I was interested to hear of so many things that NORAD was not, and did not imply, and I am reading over the agreement dated May 12th. I wonder if the Minister would, in a sentence or two, tell the Committee and me in particular just what the relationship between NORAD and NATO is, noting that NATO is invoked in three of the eleven principles and at least once in the preamble.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** Yes. As my honourable friend knows, the agreement was signed by Canada in the summer of 1963 by the former administration. The former Minister of National Defence took the position that NORAD was part of the NATO arrangement. I took exception to that on juridical grounds and I still believe that NORAD, although it may serve the purposes of the alliance, is an arrangement between two NATO countries, but not an arrangement that can be regarded as part of the NATO structure. I think it is simply a question of interpreting what is the legal situation. It is an agreement between Canada and the United States for continental defence. Now, continental defence obviously is of interest to the European partners; but the relationship is only in that sense.

• 1300

**Mr. Harkness:** Is it not a fact that the NATO agreement...

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I said NORAD was signed in 1963; I should have said 1958.

**Mr. Harkness:** ...was drawn up as a regional agreement as provided for under the NATO Charter?

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** That is the position that General Pearkes took; and I have...

**Mr. Harkness:** And that is the form that you have drawn up.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I am not convinced that juridically that is the situation, but that was the position that the then Minister of National Defence took.

**Mr. Macquarrie:** I would just like to observe, Mr. Chairman...

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I am not saying that critically. I am just saying that there was that...

**Mr. Macquarrie:** If I may say so, and to put the record straight, it is a little more than the *obiter dictum* of a former Minister. It is, in fact, a good deal of what would be a normal...

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** It was never the subject of decision in the NATO Council.

**Mr. Macquarrie:** The agreement of 1958 invoked NATO on more than one occasion.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** It invokes NATO.


**Mr. Macquarrie:** It was General Pearkes who did it...

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** I was not being critical of General Pearkes. I was just giving his interpretation as the then Minister of National Defence.

**Mr. Harkness:** It was actually drawn up in those terms as a regional agreement under NATO, as is shown by reading it.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** That is right; but I do not think that makes it part of the NATO structure. It has not been the subject matter of discussion in the NATO Council, for instance.

**The Chairman:** It is now past one o'clock. I wish to thank both Ministers on your behalf. The meeting is adjourned.





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1954

RESEARCH REPORT

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RESEARCH REPORT  
ON THE HISTORY OF THE  
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1954

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OFFICIAL REPORT OF MINUTES  
OF  
PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

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Translated by the General Bureau for Translation, Secretary of State.

ALISTAIR FRASER,  
*The Clerk of the House.*

HOUSE OF COMMONS

Second Session—Twenty-seventh Parliament

1967-68

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STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

**EXTERNAL AFFAIRS**

*Chairman:* Mr. JEAN-EUDES DUBÉ

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MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 15

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THURSDAY, MARCH 14, 1968

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RESPECTING

Annual Report of the Department of External Affairs  
(1966)

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WITNESS:

Dr. E. H. Johnson, Secretary for Overseas Missions of  
the Presbyterian Church in Canada.

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.  
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY  
OTTAWA, 1968

HOUSE OF COMMONS

Second Session—Twenty-seventh Parliament

1987-88

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Chairman: Mr. Jean-Eudes Dubé

Vice-Chairman: Mr. W. B. Nesbitt

and

Mr. Allmand,	Mr. Harkness,	Mr. Pelletier,
Mr. Asselin	Mr. Hymmen,	Mr. Pilon,
(Charlevoix),	Mr. Lambert,	Mr. Prud'homme,
Mr. Basford,	Mr. Laprise,	Mr. Stanbury,
Mr. Brewin,	Mr. Lind,	Mr. Thompson,
Mr. Forrestall,	Mr. Macquarrie,	Mr. Tolmie,
Mr. Fulton,	Mr. McIntosh,	Mr. Walker—(24).
Mr. Groos,	Mr. Orange,	

(Quorum 13)

Fernand Despatie,  
Clerk of the Committee.

Translated by the General Bureau for Translations, Secretary of State.

ALISTAIR FRASER,  
THURSDAY, MARCH 14, 1988

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OTTAWA, 1988

## MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

THURSDAY, March 14, 1968.

(17)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs met at 9.45 a.m. this day. The Vice-Chairman, Mr. Nesbitt, presided.

*Members present:* Messrs. Allmand, Brewin, Forrestall, Groos, Hymmen, Lambert, Laprise, Lind, Macquarrie, Nesbitt, Pelletier, Pilon, Thompson, Walker—(14).

*Also present:* Messrs. Herridge and MacDonald (*Prince*), Members of Parliament.

*In attendance:* Dr. E. H. Johnson, Secretary for Overseas Missions of the Presbyterian Church in Canada, Don Mills, Ontario.

The Committee resumed consideration of the Annual Report of the Department of External Affairs (1966).

The Vice-Chairman referred to a meeting of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure, held on February 14, 1968 and to an invitation extended to Dr. E. H. Johnson to appear before the Committee and express his views on the subject of Nigeria.

On motion of Mr. Walker, seconded by Mr. Thompson, it was

*Resolved*,—That reasonable living and travelling expenses be paid to Dr. E. H. Johnson who has been called to appear before this Committee.

Following the distribution of biographical notes concerning the witness, the Vice-Chairman invited Dr. Johnson to address the meeting.

Dr. Johnson gave his impressions on the conflict in Nigeria. He spoke particularly of his visits to the Biafran side and to the Federal Government side in Lagos.

The witness was then questioned for the remainder of the meeting.

The Vice-Chairman thanked Dr. Johnson for his appearance before the Committee.

At 12.25 p.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

Fernand Despatie,  
*Clerk of the Committee.*



## EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

Thursday March 14, 1968.

● 0946

**The Vice-Chairman:** Gentlemen, we now have a quorum so we shall proceed. We apologize for being a little late, but as everyone perhaps realizes there is a very large number of committees sitting this morning. So, as was privately suggested to me by our guest this morning, I am going to send for seat belts with locks on them so that you can be kept here for the remainder of the meeting.

First of all I shall refer briefly to the last meeting of the Subcommittee on Agenda of this Committee held on February 14. An invitation was extended at that time to Dr. Johnson to appear before the Committee to give us the benefit of his experience and his views on the subject of Nigeria. I ask someone to move that reasonable living and travelling expenses be paid to Dr. Johnson who has been called to appear before this Committee. This, of course, is the usual motion that we have made where other witnesses have appeared before us. I ask that somebody make this motion.

**Mr. Walker:** I so move.

**Mr. Thompson:** I second the motion.

Motion agreed to.

**The Vice-Chairman:** I have some biographical notes concerning Dr. Johnson which will be here in a very few moments and I will pass them around. I have a copy of them before me but as they are rather extensive I do not wish to take up the time of the Committee by reading them. When one does this, one has to go through them rather quickly and probably they would not be properly appreciated. They will be here shortly and I will pass them around to you.

The only other observation I should like to make before I ask Dr. Johnson to address us is that Dr. Johnson has had a great deal of experience, as you will see from the biographical sketch when it arrives, in both the Far East and Africa.

We are having technical problems, not only with the translation system; the reporter also is having troubles. She cannot take the meeting down so there will be a technician here, I hope, very soon. Gentlemen, during the interruption we have sent Dr. Johnson's biographical notes around. As you can see, I do not think there is need for any further introduction, so before anything else happens I turn the meeting over to Dr. Johnson.

**Dr. E. H. Johnson (Secretary for Overseas Missions of the Presbyterian Church in Canada):** Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, first I should like to say that I feel honoured to be invited to address this Committee and to share with you some of the thoughts I have on the Nigeria-Biafra conflict in the light of the visit I made there in the month of January of this year.

● 1000

I am particularly interested to meet with a group of this kind because, since I have come back from Nigeria and Biafra, I have concentrated my time particularly in talking to people that have the opportunity to form public opinion and to initiate the policy decisions that will lead to constructive actions. It seems to me most important that a Committee of think kind should be as fully informed as possible about this very important conflict taking place at the present time in West Africa.

In coming and talking to you today I do not intend to try to make an exhaustive analysis of the background of the conflict, because one would need to give a good bit of the history first of all of the colonial control of Nigeria. Some of the factors in the present conflict come from that long history. Second, one would need to give a fairly detailed analysis of the events of the last five years particularly, during which the Government of the Federation of Nigeria gradually broke down.

What I want to do at this time is to bring to you particularly some of the impressions that have come to me because of the unique opportunity I had in January to visit both the

Biafran side and the federal government side in Lagos. I think I am one of the very few people to visit both sides within a short period of time and this is new information that I am able to bring to this Committee.

Since my visit to Biafra in January, I have been involved in intensive consultations in Geneva, London, New York and Washington with various people in journalism and government seeking to share some of the insights. May I say at the beginning of this statement that while I will say a good bit about Biafra because that is the part of the conflict about which least is known because of the blockade, my concern is not just Biafra but peace in West Africa.

Unless a solution is found that meets some of the basic needs and requirements of the Biafran people it cannot be a good solution for the federal government of Nigeria, so I bring this information as part of a basic understanding which seems to me quite essential if the present conflict is to be resolved in peaceable ways and that part of Africa go forward again in the constructive building of nationhood.

Before I tell a little about my visit and my impressions, I should like to make three observations about the Nigeria-Biafra situation. The first is that to some extent this is a forgotten war or a silent war going on in Africa and most of the world knows very little about it. I keep a folder of clippings concerning this conflict. I try to read the British papers, the New York papers, some of the papers from France and, of course, our Canadian papers, and I have very few clippings from the last two-week period.

Here a war is going forward but we do not hear about it. I think there are at least two reasons why this is a forgotten war. One is that this was replaced at the beginning by other world news which, for various reasons, took precedence over it. Shortly after the conflict in Nigeria began, the war began in the Middle East and the attention of the press was focused on the Middle East. More recently, of course, the whole increase of war in Viet Nam has given that front-page publicity and this has become a matter shoved to the back pages of our papers.

The second reason, I think, is internal. The federal government of Nigeria has said: This is an internal matter; we are not interested in having outside groups interfere in what is an

internal affair in Nigeria. The world generally has accepted that. The United Nations can send observers to Lagos, but they cannot send observers to Biafra. The Organization for African Unity can send observers to Lagos, but they cannot send observers to Biafra. The Commonwealth Secretary, Arnold Smith, can go to Lagos but he cannot go to Biafra. The Canadian government can go to Lagos, but it cannot go to Biafra because we accept the position of the federal military government that they are the constituted government for the whole of Nigeria and we have not gone beyond that.

#### • 1005

That federal military government, in taking that position, has also blockaded Biafra and there has been a news blockade as well as a blockade of trade. For a time Biafra had representatives of the *New York Times* and the British Broadcasting Corporation, but because of pressures from Lagos those representatives had to be withdrawn and it has been impossible to get into Biafra without going by a very hazardous route which the Biafrans have established as one lifeline to the outside.

As a matter of fact, when you spend time in Lagos as I did you discover that even the news sources located in Lagos know about the war only second hand. They are not allowed to get to the war fronts and to move freely about the country and so the news which comes to us in this country is largely the official information statements of the federal government of Nigeria. The news from inside Biafra comes only through the very occasional visit, such as was made about three weeks ago, by a group of press people. You may have noticed at that time that *Time Magazine*, the *Economist*, the *Financial Post* in Britain, and a great many of the world journals had some news because a plane load of journalists went in for a few days and came out again. But by and large this is a forgotten war because of the news blockade.

The second preliminary observation I make is that this is a major civil war. This has been described by some as a rebel action by a small group that is trying to lead Biafra off into secession. When you go there you discover that this is a major war. There are 10 to 12 million people in Biafra at the present time, some 41 million people in the other part of the federation, and this is not a small police

action against a small rebel group that has set itself up in a remote part of the country, but is a large war in any terms.

I secured only recently from responsible Nigerian sources a very conservative estimate that since the beginning of 1966 more than 50,000 people have been killed in that war. There is a very good article in this morning's *Globe and Mail* by Mr. Clyde Sanger, and he uses the figure 100,000. That is why I say that the 50,000 may be a conservative estimate and this is from a Nigerian source.

That same conservative estimate says that up to the present time more than £50 million have been spent by both sides on military goods and more than £50 million lost in trade, industry and development because of the war. For a new country in Africa this is a major loss in economic development which sets back the very small margin of economic surplus they had.

The third preliminary observation I make is that what is happening in that country, and which one might call the forgotten war, may be the most important single happening in Africa at the present time. World attention has been focussed on South Africa and rightly on Rhodesia, but in both cases the issue is the racial contest between the white people and the black people. In Nigeria there is an issue which does not have white-black racial overtones but is a power struggle between two groups of black people and it may be that the attempt to establish stable government which is involved in this conflict may be the real issue, because if the African nations cannot find ways of peaceful development the whole future of life on that continent can be very chaotic and, for good or for bad, the question of peace or chaos in Nigeria may well be the most important single question in the stable development of the African continent.

• 1010

I want now to share a few things with you specifically from my own visit. The background of my visit to Biafra and to Lagos, the federal military government, comes out of the connections which our Presbyterian Church in Canada has had in that part of Africa for the last 12 years. At the present time some of our Canadian people are working in the Biafra area and some in the Lagos area. We have been closely acquainted with a good many of the leading figures in that con-

test because it happens that they are leading figures in the Christian community. A great many people in Canada know Sir Francis Ibiham who renounced his title because he feels so strongly about the British support of the federal government. He now prefers to be known as Dr. Akanu Ibiham. He will be in Canada next week and there may be an opportunity to see him here in this city.

Dr. Ibiham is the senior adviser to the military governor of Biafra. Sir Louis Mbanefo, the Chief Justice and the President of the Supreme Court of Biafra is another outstanding Christian council leader. On the other side many in this room would have had the opportunity to meet Dr. Okoi Arikpo, the Commissioner for External Affairs of the federal government in Lagos. These are men whom I have known for many years and count as very close personal friends. It seemed that in our church connection we had both an opportunity and a responsibility to visit our friends on both sides of the conflict and listen to what they had to say; to try to understand and interpret some of the issues that are involved so that we in this country could take the most helpful position in trying to resolve the conflict in peaceable ways.

It was following a visit of Dr. Arikpo in December of last year that I made a plan to make a visit. I discovered it was not easy to get to Biafra because of the blockade. At that time friends told me there were two ways to get there. One was to walk 20 miles along a forest trail from the Camerouns. It is difficult not just because of the walk of 20 miles, but because of the risk of being intercepted by patrols of the federal government and probably being shot as a mercenary. The other was to take the plane route in from Lisbon, now well known, by which the Biafrans have maintained some contact with the outside world and by which they have maintained a very thin supply of arms and other essential goods.

I was able to make contact with the Biafran government and to go to Lisbon. After waiting two or three days, on a half hour's notice late one night I was taken out to a far corner of the airport and a big old charter freight plane, a Super Constellation that had been converted to freight use, was there, which flew off on an 18-hour flight from Lisbon to Port Harcourt in Biafra. The flight had to go outside the continent of Africa, adding a

thousand miles. We just followed the coastline of Africa the whole day. We stopped once at midday for refuelling.

During the second 1,500 miles of the flight there had to be radio silence. They do not want it known when they are flying, because the federal government to maintain a tight blockade is committed to shoot down any planes that are coming in. So we got in late at night and we had the lights of the cabin off as we approached Port Harcourt airport. We landed on a tiny airstrip in heavy ground fog and darkness. Then the plane was unloaded and it took off again. The only contact the Biafrans have been able to maintain with the outside world is by this freight lift that they have set up to charter flights of various nationalities.

Of course, this is one of the problems for press or contact. Anybody who goes into that country has to chance the hazard of taking an old plane that flies without the ordinary aids to civil navigation, and which lands at Port Harcourt in Biafra under the threat of being shot down by the federal government which would like to sever this last link those people have with the outside.

I had a week in Biafra. May I say that when I use the word "Biafra" here I use it as an entity which does exist. When I went to Lagos later on, of course, and spoke of that part of the world I could not use the word "Biafra" because that word does not exist in Lagos as a reality. I had to speak of the other side, or Eastern Nigeria or the people in the east or some other term because the federal position is not to recognize in any sense the reality of the Biafran side. But I use "Biafra" here simply for purposes of economy of words.

I had a week there during which I spoke at length with people in government including Colonel Ojukwu who is the Governor of Biafra. I visited two of the war fronts, the Onitsha on the Niger river where there has been intense fighting and Port Harcourt down on the sea coast which has been the second major objective of the federal government attack. I had the opportunity, through missionaries, of being in touch with many ordinary people in the country and getting many observations about the events in the country in addition to the information given to me by the government and the special arrangements set up by the Biafran government.

• 1015

In the course of that week I came away with four impressions. First of all, what is happening in Biafra is a fairly big activity of a large potential nation. These people are carrying on and, in spite of the war, they have managed to grow enough food. Apart from the tremendous problems they have of imports from outside they should be able to carry on in terms of normal food supplies.

My second major impression is the tremendous morale and resolution of these people under the siege which has held them in since the beginning of July last year. When the war was started the federal military government hoped to complete the war within 48 hours. Now they have been fighting for eight months and have not succeeded in penetrating the central parts of Biafra. They have set March 31 as their target date for completing the war, and during this month the fighting is being intensified. But one would have real questions of whether it will be possible for them to gain a military victory in this period.

This has been called a rebel activity, but when you travel through Biafra you find that this is a people's movement and a people's war in a very real sense. If one talks to some of the great leaders like Sir Louis Mbanefo, one finds that these people are committed to fight a war of resistance because they believe it is a war for survival and freedom.

It is interesting in talking with many of these people one finds that they came to the position of working for an independent Biafra with considerable reluctance and regret. The Biafrans, more than any other group in Nigeria, were the ones that helped to construct the great unified nation of Nigeria for which all of us had such great hopes. They were the ones who lived all through Nigeria; more than the Hausa did and more than the Yorubas did. They had established their businesses and they had helped to develop posts and communications. It was with great reluctance that they withdrew into their own territory and with great reluctance that they decided the large Nigeria was not viable for them.

I spoke to several of them in extended personal conversations who said: "We used to live in this big area of Nigeria. Now we have withdrawn to the very much smaller area of Biafra. We do it with regret, but we feel there is absolutely no alternative. When we lived outside there were the massacres in the

north in which from 10,000 to 30,000 Ibo people were literally hacked to death."

So they withdrew and the threat of that kind of massacre led almost 2 million of the Ibo people to withdraw from all over the Nigerian federation back into Biafra. They said: "Now we have come here to our own homes these people are attacking us in our own homes, but we believe we have no alternative now but to have our own security in our own hands. We depended previously on security from Lagos. When these massacres happened the federal military government was not able to help us and it did not help us and we also have the impression that it was not particularly concerned about the fact that it could not help us. So we want to be in the position where we can defend ourselves. Never again will we risk our basic security to these people from outside".

• 1020

As I travelled through the country and met many ordinary people, I found the same words being used, that this is a war for survival. We must fight because we are up against a ruthless enemy and it is the common belief in Nigeria and in Biafra, that to give in would mean widespread slaughter. Of course, some of the casual statements made by some of the generals from outside have not helped; they have said these people must be driven into the sea. Others just say that these people must be defeated. They must be held in their place and never again be allowed to have the dominance and economic and political activity which they have had in the past.

A third fact that impressed me in Biafra was that while there is an overwhelming weight of military superiority on the federal side, which has some support from Britain, which is able to purchase arms from Russia and from other outside groups, which is able to train a large army and it is estimated they now have some 50,000 trained soldiers, Biafra on the other hand only has the arms that they can import by this very slim lifeline of charttered planes. They have very little military equipment except hand arms and a few larger guns. While the overwhelming weight is on the outside, one has a feeling that these people have taken the resources which they have and disposed of them with great resourcefulness and to the best advantage, and they have this tremendous morale which comes from a people who are literally fighting for survival.

I asked one of the Biafran leaders how he thought the war would go, and he said, "I believe it will be a seesaw war. When the other side decides to advance, we will have no alternative but to fall back because you cannot fight tanks and armoured vehicles and big guns with hand arms and hand grenades. They will advance 20 or 25 miles and establish a position and then they will have to establish their supply lines. Then our advantage will come in because during the night—over a period of time hand arms, hand grenades and small arms can be a powerful weapon—we will perhaps force them to withdraw again. We may accumulate a small surplus of arms; we will find a place of maximum nuisance value and we will advance and hold it for two or three weeks until our arms have given out. Then we will have to withdraw. I think it will be a seesaw war".

As one observes the news from the war one finds a situation of this kind. While there have been advances of the federal troops, the Biafrans have also advanced at certain points such as Nsukka, which for many months was in federal hands and which was almost taken a short time ago.

It was only a few days after I had been in Biafra that I was able to make a visit to the federal military government in Lagos. I was also received there as a guest of the government and I had an opportunity to talk with the top government leaders, including General Gowon, the Commander in Chief. I must say that I was received with great courtesy. The fact that I had been visiting the Biafra side was not held as an obstacle in any way. I talked very frankly with the people in Lagos, sharing with them some of the observations I had made from my visit a few days previously in Biafra, because it seems to me if Lagos is to have good military policy it must be based on an accurate estimate of what is happening on the other side.

I found it was more difficult to visit the governing people in Lagos than in Biafra. This was partly because of the size of the country. Biafra has been compressed and in siege and it has become very integrated and self-contained. The federal government covers a very widespread geographic area. However, the greater difficulty was not the geographic spread, it was the political spread. A competent observer on the side when asked where the real authority was in the federal military government said, "This is one of the prob-

lems behind General Gowon, who is the Commander in Chief. There are at least three groups, each of which has a fair amount of power." One is a kind of brain trust made up of a number of younger permanent secretaries in some of the ministries. I met three of these men and was very impressed by them—men of great gifts and great brilliance. A man named Ayida, who is the permanent Secretary for Development; a man named Osiodu, who is permanent Secretary for Industry and a man named Joda, who is the permanent Secretary for Information. These three young men had been in the United States just prior to my visit in Lagos and from them I learned a good bit of the thinking of the federal government. This group has a lot to do with formulating policy and influencing the thinking of the Commander in Chief.

• 1025

The second group is made up of some of the senior politicians. Chief Awolowo, who is the leader of the Yoruba, and one of the men who, if unified Nigeria were established might well be the first civilian prime minister—I think he would like to be in any case. Chief Enahoro, is also a mid-western man, and people say that Chief Enahoro is the person who has had most to do in engineering the purchase of arms and the securing of technical help from Moscow. This constitutes a second group of the Western region.

The third group that influences the Commander in Chief is made up of the northern emirs, that is, the Muslim rulers of the northern states who exert their influence through the senior military officers. This particular observer felt that as these three groups had their influence on Major-General Gowon, the most influential of the three is the last group because they actually have the military power to enforce the ideas they wish to express.

As I talked with the Commander in Chief I certainly felt he had the very difficult task of trying to define policy with these several pressure groups working on him. When I was with him I raised the question which to me is the great question in Nigeria today. I said that I had been to the East and told him of my impression that this was not a small rebel group but that it was a people's movement and a people's war in the East. I said if that is true, then the present federal policy of invading Biafra and seeking to destroy that government can only end in one of two ways. First, it could fail. If it does not break

through the resistance of the Biafran people it will fail and this would be very serious both economically and politically for the federal government. Already the federal reserves are very low; already there is some serious strain showing within these different groups in the federal government and failure to achieve their military objectives in the East would be most serious.

I said to General Gowon, "The only thing, it seems to me which would be more serious would be military victory". If it is a people's war, a military victory could only be obtained by a destruction of life and property that would destroy the objective of the federal military government, which is to create a happy, unified Nigeria. It would bring unity within Nigeria, an area which I described as half cemetery and half concentration camp. In other words, people kill not because this is the policy of General Gowon but because it is that kind of war and the people of Biafra have that kind of belief and resistance.

General Gowon then said, "Dr. Johnson, if this is true and you were head of state, what other policy is there? There is a part of our state that has resisted. Do I not have to bring this into line again"? I, of course, could not presume to advise the Commander in Chief. I said, "Sir, it seems to me that if you are faced with this dilemma, that either defeat or victory would be disastrous for Lagos as well as for Biafra, surely the only alternative is to seek a fresh initiative in negotiation with a much more flexible approach to the objectives to be attained." I continued by saying, "It seems to me that one of the most important things is to let life on the outside become aware of the whole situation, and not only to permit but to encourage people from outside to be in touch with Biafra as well as Nigeria and perhaps to let certain outsiders such as Arnold Smith, the Commonwealth Secretary-General, visit that side and sit down and hear what they have to say, so that he can in effect be a real mediator or negotiator between the two sides."

• 1030

On the last day of my visit to the federal side they set up a plane and took me out to one of the war fronts. By the way, it turned out to be an amphibian plane, a Canadian Otter built in Toronto. This was a very interesting visit. As I sat at lunch with the group of military officers and talked about the war,

one of the basic realities of this war came out, that on both sides the people long for some kind of negotiated solution. These military officers had just won a battle in that island of Bonny off the coastal port of Port Harcourt, the major city of Biafra. One of these men, a lieutenant colonel and a very gentlemanly officer who had been in a peace-keeping mission in Pakistan said dryly he seemed to be much more successful in peace-keeping in Pakistan than he is in this country, and two or three times during the meal he said what a blessing it would be if they could wake up some morning and find that this war had ended. Only ten days previously I had sat with the military commander on the other side of the same battle zone and he had said almost precisely the same thing. The fact of this war is that these men had been colleagues, that people on both sides have been working together and the tragedy is that they are not destroying one another with a deep conviction that it is senseless and with a hope that somehow, somewhere, someone may come with a formula that will lead to a negotiated and peaceable solution.

It is over a month ago that I was in Biafra and Nigeria. At the present time the war is continuing. On the Lagos side there are developing economic and political problems. I spoke with an important Canadian businessman this last week who was in Lagos less than two weeks ago and he said it was very disturbing for him to be there because he felt that the economic problems were going to create increasing political problems and the Lagos government faces some very serious internal problems as it continues the war. One finds in talking with people from Lagos a great deal of self-justification; they say they are not the first country that has had a civil war and they quote the parallel of the War of the Roses in England, they speak of the Civil War in the United States, and they speak of civil wars in Indonesia. They ask why the world should be particularly upset if they have a civil war in their part of the world in order to establish a great unified nation. But one hears this note of self-justification which comes I think to a great extent out of a deep sense of frustration that they have not achieved their objectives and may not be able to achieve their objective of a happy, unified country through their present war method.

• 1035

In Lagos they make a great deal of the March 31 deadline which was announced by

Major General Gowon in a New Year's Day address in which he urged the people to complete the war by March 31. March 31 was fixed as a date because first, that is the time when the new 12-state formula for the government of the country is to come into effect and, second, because it is the end of a budget year and they want to start their new budget with a unified country. Already there are indications that they are seeking to slip past that March 31 date. When I was in Lagos, Chief Enahoro, who is the Minister for Information, made an address to a big garden party of diplomatic and press people in which he said, not to take March 31 too seriously because they have set it just as an objective, that it does not mean that after that time there will be a great escalation of war nor does it mean that if they have not won the war by that time they will think the heavens have fallen in. So that one finds on the one hand an emphasis on March 31, and right now there is an escalation of war. Our own Canadian missionaries in Biafra are having a difficult time trying to move here and there to escape the air raids which are taking place not simply on military targets but on hospitals, church institutions, market places, and in civilian areas.

On the Biafran side at the present time the resistance is continuing, the people are under siege and conditions of life are becoming harder. As I say, we have this word which comes to us on firm authority. One of our own leper colony hospitals at ITU and the Mary Slessor Hospital, one of the oldest in the area, both were destroyed about a month ago by federal bombing. I find it very hard to believe, having talked with Major General Gowon, that this is the kind of program he would initiate, but there is no question in my mind that it was an intentional destruction of those hospitals by the pilots who were involved. We have pressed inquiries very rigorously on this matter. The hospitals were clearly marked with red crosses, and they had not been used for military purposes. The planes came one day, circled around to survey the situation, came back the next day, came down and in two successive waves the hospitals were destroyed and the compounds in which they were located were machine-gunned. The ITIGIDI, another hospital near our area which was supported by the Netherlands missionary group, has been destroyed.

The Roman Catholic Girls' School at IKOT EKPENE had a bomb land in the compound, although nobody has used this school and it has not been used for any military purpose. The IBIAKU Girls School, where some of our Canadian staff have worked, was also the target for a bombing attack and it was only good fortune that the church building in that compound was not destroyed. There is at the present time intensive bombing. A letter just in from one of our missionary staff says that many of the women and children spend all the daylight hours out in the bush because they never know when bombers may come in to destroy their buildings or to attack the market places where the people gather.

When I went to Nigeria and to Biafra at the beginning of January I was very doubtful about these reports and wrote them off as being propaganda, but these are items about which I know specifically and I wish to have them reported because it is part of the fact of the present war.

People ask me now, in coming back, what the present situation is in regard to the possibility of negotiations. You have read of course of the problems which Arnold Smith had. Unfortunately some of the press said too much about his negotiation and this has forced the federal government in many ways to repudiate some of the conversations which they had had with him. I would say two things about the possibilities for negotiation. One is that the official positions of the two groups at the moment are diametrically opposed. The federal government says they will not negotiate on any basis which recognizes the sovereignty or independence of Biafra, but only in terms of the 12-state system of government which they announced on May 27th. The other side says they can only negotiate on a position which recognizes the sovereignty of Biafra which they declared on May 30th of last year, and then there are a good many matters in relation in connection with trade and cultural relationships which they can negotiate together.

• 1040

While these are the official positions I sensed behind them something to which I have already referred, that a great many people on both sides of the war feel that the war can achieve nothing and the sooner they can get to the conference table the better. Therefore, at this time I feel that any pressure or

any assistance that outside people are able to give towards negotiation should be applied. If I can make one more comment, sir, I will then leave the matter open for questions to raise other points about which I might speak.

I think the matter of negotiation now is a very urgent one. The war could go, from this time on, into a very bitter and destructive and suicidal war. Some of you no doubt saw the article in the London *Times* recently, on March 4, which was headed: Nigeria Plods on Inexorably to Self-Destruction. This was a very realistic statement about the war, but one which was very pessimistic. Certainly if there is not a solution soon, the war will get in to the kind of thing you have in Viet Nam where it will go on to destruction and seemingly have no way to pull back out of it. At this time there is a certain amount of openness and certain steps which might be taken. It seems to me of very great urgency and importance that as much light as possible be thrown on the situation, and positive, helpful steps be taken by friendly nations such as Canada.

If I may conclude with this note, both sides of this war have a very friendly feeling towards Canada. As a matter of fact, it seems to me they hope from us very much more than we may be able to give. There have not been too many outside nations who have had close connection with Nigeria and Biafra, but Canada through its missions through trade and through some of its high commissioners, has had a very close connection with Nigeria and Biafra and is very highly regarded on both sides. So Canada does have a somewhat unique position in this, and it seems to me that inasmuch as we have an opportunity to be an influence, we should also see this as a responsibility and play our part as clearly and as effectively as we can.

I think I will stop at this time and leave the meeting open to questioning.

**The Vice-Chairman:** Thank you very much, Dr. Johnson. The information you have given us has certainly been very helpful to elucidate and, as you put it yourself, bring light on what is to most of us a very dark situation indeed.

There are quite a number of members of the Committee who have indicated they would like to ask you some questions. Because there are such a large number, may I suggest to members of the Committee that it

would be very helpful if they made their questions as concise as possible—I am not suggesting that anybody curtail his questions—so that everyone will have an opportunity to ask questions of Dr. Johnson.

Would you like some tea before we start, Dr. Johnson?

**Dr. Johnson:** No, thank you—I think I will just have water.

**The Vice-Chairman:** I will take the Chairman's prerogative and ask one or two brief questions.

First of all, you mentioned that a certain amount of arms and other supplies were coming in via Portugal. Who is providing the money to pay for these arms? Have you any idea?

**Mr. Walker:** Arms for both sides?

**The Vice-Chairman:** No, for Biafra—arms coming in by this circuitous route.

**Dr. Johnson:** The only routes in are by this series of charter flights which the Biafran Government has managed to set up as its only lifeline. I think one can say fairly definitely that the Portuguese are not providing them. There has been a good bit of talk about French support of Biafra, but a very thoughtful article in *West Africa Magazine* which, if anything, is pro-federal and would like to nail this on France and Biafra, says that they have not been able to discover any support from France. So I think these are arms which the Biafrans have been able to purchase with the somewhat limited reserves they had outside when the war began, and that at some time that supply is going to dry up. As far as I know—and I have pressed this question in every official quarter in Washington and London where I have been able to—there is no outside government providing financial support for Biafra at the present time.

• 1045

**The Vice-Chairman:** Referring to the horrible massacres that have gone on in Nigeria, just as a matter of background information, who were the original group that initiated this practice after Nigeria became independent? I recall very well that a rather good friend of mine, Sir Abubakar Balewa, was horribly murdered by a group. Would the Ibo have anything to do with that?

**Dr. Johnson:** The background of the massacres, of course, is quite a long background.

It goes back into earlier history of the tensions, particularly between the north and the east—that is, between the Hausa group of which Balewa was a member and the Ibo group in the east. The country had become, of course, under the northern dominance of the federal parliament in 1965, completely disorganized and there was a military coup which was participated in by a number of officers with a predominance of Ibos. It was in that first military coup that set up General Ironsi that Balewa and the Sardauna of Sokoto, who was the political leader in northern Nigeria and in some ways really the ruler of the whole of the country through the prime minister, were assassinated.

**The Vice-Chairman:** He was a guest for lunch here one day.

**Dr. Johnson:** Sardauna?

**The Vice-Chairman:** Yes.

**Dr. Johnson:** It was through that coup that those two men and a number of others were assassinated. Then, of course, six months later there was a second coup which set up the present government. I think that when one goes to the question of blame in the past, one can nail blame in many places. Whether or not military coups which affected military officers justify a free massacre of—estimates say from 10,000 to 30,000—civilians is another question. But there is a background, and of course when one is in Biafra and when one is in Lagos, one hears two different histories of the past five years. It seemed to me that neither history at this point was tremendously important, but that what was important was to find a solution of the present situation. There has been mistake on both sides, and one would be very foolish to suggest that all the mistake has been on one side.

**The Vice-Chairman:** I have one last brief question. Did either side indicate to you during your visits that it would accept mediation or indicate any individual or perhaps institution that it would accept as a mediator?

**Dr. Johnson:** I did not attempt, of course, as a church visitor, to be a professional mediator or to take part in the technical work of mediation. I got the impression that the most hopeful person for mediation at the present time is the Secretary General of the

Commonwealth. Neither side is very keen on the United Nations, being mediator, because they both feel that if the UN comes in, it will look as though the situation in Nigeria is similar to the chaotic situation of the Congo, and it is very different from that; one can draw almost no parallel between the Congo and Nigeria.

The Organization of African Unity, which one might think of as a possible negotiator, is not thought of too highly on either side. The Biafrans, of course, were very dismayed when the OAU met in Lagos and did not send a representative to their side to listen to their case, but only sent a directive. If you have a contest on which there are two parties, you surely cannot solve that contest by talking only to one party. The Biafrans feel that the Organization for African Unity did not solve their problem, and I think some of the Nigerians feel that perhaps the countries which make up the OAU are all very much smaller countries than Nigeria and do not particularly want to be helped out by that organisation.

• 1050

The United Kingdom could have a very great influence on the situation if it could re-establish its neutrality, because it has been continuing military support for Lagos, and many people in the British press who understand this situation are pressing the British Government to establish a neutral position because it had very good contacts on both sides of the war.

**The Vice-Chairman:** Mr. Macquarrie.

**Mr. Macquarrie:** Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask a few questions about Biafra, which stem from Dr. Johnson's description of it as a fairly large potential nation.

What proportion of the population there at the moment are indigenous people and what proportion are what we might describe as refugees, the people who have fled into this area because of the massacres?

**Dr. Johnson:** I suppose in the present Biafran territory, which is somewhat refused because the federal government has pressed in on Calabar and Ogoja, there would be from 10 million to 12 million people, of which perhaps somewhere between 1 million and 2 million might be people who came back from the rest of Nigeria. Those people

would think of themselves as indigenous Biafrans, because in that part of Africa your home village is the place to which you belong. One of the reasons they have been able to absorb the refugees is that everybody has had a relative to whom he could go. So you are not aware of a great refugee population. However, about that number have come from outside. I suppose that every family in Biafra felt those massacres at first hand because they had either close relatives or more distant relatives were killed or maimed or who fled back and lost everything. They literally came back with just the shirts on their backs.

**Mr. Thompson:** May I ask a supplementary question, Mr. Macquarrie? Is it not true that most of this one million or two million you speak about originated in the areas to which they have returned? They had gone out of their own areas. They were not necessarily born in these other areas, they were merely working there.

**Dr. Johnson:** I would expect that a good many of them were people who went out. Some of them had been out for more than one generation, so their children would have been born in a different part of Nigeria. The Biafran people, the Ibo people, are somewhat like the Chinese people in southeast Asia. They are great traders and one of the most industrious and aggressive groups in Africa, and so they left their own areas and set up businesses. They were the people who lived all through Nigeria.

Considering the mixing of population, the other groups have gone out only in a very small way. There would be a few Hausa traders in the East, but very few in prominent positions. The Yorubas tended to stay in their own area but the Ibos had spread out through the whole of Nigeria and had reached a position where because of their ability, in some ways they dominated trade and government. Outsiders would say they had reached this domination because of their aggressiveness and their plan to take over the country.

**Mr. Macquarrie:** In the struggle that is now waging, are the non-Ibo residents of Biafra identified with Colonel Ojukwu's efforts?

**Dr. Johnson:** That is a very good question, Mr. Macquarrie. This is one of the most important considerations with respect to a final, peaceable and stable solution in that area. You would find quite extreme positions

in the answers you would receive in Biafra and Lagos. In Lagos they would say that these non-Ibo people in Biafra, because they feel they are an oppressed people, are ready to rebel. I think without question this would cover the thinking of some of the non-Ibo peoples who are in Biafra.

On the other hand, the non-Ibo peoples of the eastern region were fully part of government and it was a fairly peaceable and constructive area in the previous years of the federation. As I went through the Biafran area in January one of the things which impressed me was the large number of very, very competent people from these areas in key positions, in both the military and the civil governments of Biafra. Chief Secretary N. U. Akpan is an Ibibio. Chief Bassey who is a prominent member, is an Ibibio. Others come from the river areas and different populations.

• 1055

I found that the rather indiscriminate bombing by the federal government of the civilian minority areas tended, if anything, to cement the non-Ibo people to this whole concept of Biafra. The Biafrans would say they have set up a form of government which fully integrates these people and that they have introduced many of the leading people of the non-Ibo groups into places of considerable authority. They are integrated, but I think any permanent settlement needs to provide some opportunity of expression for these minority peoples.

**Mr. Macquarrie:** This is a terribly general question...

**Mr. MacDonald (Prince):** May I just ask a supplementary on that particular issue? Are there a significant number of these non-Ibo people actually involved in the fighting against the federal authority?

**Dr. Johnson:** Oh, yes. I pursued this question at some length, and several of the top officers of the Biafran army are non-Ibo and the proportion of those people in the ranks is also fairly high. Volunteering for the army in the non-Ibo areas is also high, with four or five people volunteering for every one who can be taken into the army. The same is true of the civil defence, which is based on the local villages. The same is true of the militia, where those who cannot get into the army

volunteer for service without pay. I questioned some of the missionaries in that area because I was not able to travel widely through the villages and I did not want to only depend on the places to which I was taken by the government. I questioned many people and I received evidence that there are people in the minority areas who still protest about Ibo domination. However, I received no evidence to suggest this is anything in the nature of a major rebellion or would lead to that. Non-Ibo people were participating at high level in government.

**Mr. Macquarrie:** I have another very general question. The other day the Archbishop of Canterbury observed that it would have been a miracle if the Nigerian federal constitution had worked. With your knowledge of the whole of Nigeria, do you believe that after this conflict the prospects for the federal state of Nigeria as it now exists continuing are really very bright, or has this been a terrible wrench to the whole original concept?

**Dr. Johnson:** I think, Mr. Chairman, this question is really a very important one in trying to decide what kind of policy to support. I think that a unified Nigeria, achieved by the present military victory, would be a very fragile country. In Lagos people said "If the Ibos get away with it"—this is the phrase they use—"and they are allowed to secede, then perhaps the rest of Nigeria would break up because the Yorubas would want to break away and perhaps one or two of the northern states would want to break away. Therefore the Ibos must be brought in line lest other people follow the pattern".

There seemed to be a premise that if the Ibos are brought in line then the country will have solid stability. Personally I could not accept that. I think if the Ibos are brought in line by military victory, which would be very destructive, then it would simply have brought a very serious divisive problem right into the heart of the country. It seems to me that the real options which Lagos faces are bringing these people in line by the kind of destructive victory which would destroy their unified Nigeria, or perhaps recognizing in some very realistic way the concerns and the aspirations of the Biafran people, and therefore having what one might call a friendly neighbour relation rather than a hurt and resentful member within the family. To answer the question which you raised about whether the

old federation can be restored peaceably, I would say this could only happen if the federal government were able to persuade the people of Biafra that they will be happier within a reconstituted federation than they would be if they attempted to set up as a separate nation.

• 1100

**Mr. Macquarrie:** My last question, Mr. Chairman.

Considering that you were so well received in Lagos after having been to Biafra, do you think that the concept of Canadians working toward a Commonwealth fact-finding mission which would open some windows, let in some light and get out some information, is realistic or far-fetched?

**Dr. Johnson:** Normally the Commonwealth group would not want to deal with what might be called internal matters of a member state. On the other hand, if 50,000 to 100,000 people have been killed in the course of a war and there is a suspicion that there are basic questions of human rights, where genocide may be a proper word, it seems to me that for the Commonwealth organizations to ignore a question of that kind and not to ask about it would be failing in a major responsibility. It would be my hope that one of our positions in Canada might be to encourage the discussion of this question in Commonwealth meetings in order at least to get the facts out into the open.

I would like at this time to make a comment because we in Canada tend to play this question very carefully for a particular national reason. Many people have said to me in Europe and in other places, "why are you talking about Biafra that wishes to secede from Nigeria when you dislike having questions raised about Quebec which is bringing up the question of its relationships with the federal Government of Canada?" My answer to that is that while there may be some similarities in form there is no similarity in the realistic assessment of the situation, that the problems that we have here in our own Canada must be dealt with in realistic terms of this situation and those problems must be dealt with in a realistic assessment of that situation. The situation in Quebec would be comparable to Biafra if 20,000 French people had been killed in cold blood in Ontario and no restitution had been made to them or their families. It would be comparable if the

feeling about French people across Canada were so serious that almost every French person in Canada fled back to Quebec leaving all his property, all his assets and everything of a lifetime behind him and could only feel that he lived in safety of life within the Province of Quebec. It would be a comparable situation if, after this had happened, we blockaded that province and tried to strangle its economy, even preventing minimum supplies of medical goods, antibiotics and plague serums into the province. It would be comparable if we then invaded Quebec and had destroyed a good many of the schools and most of the hospitals in the province and had machine-gunned villages right up and down that province. It seems to me that while there may be some similarity in form, yet here you have a very serious problem of human rights and we in Canada who do have a particular opportunity and therefore a particular responsibility should not, out of an incorrect kind of caution, refrain from playing the part which we ought to play in that situation.

May I say, sir, one point lest I do not get it to you. I would like you to underline that while I may seem in this Committee to be speaking for Biafra and to be pro-Biafran, I say these things because that side of the war has not come out into the public—and I am one of few people that has had the opportunity to see it—and because I believe most deeply that there is no solution for Lagos which is a good solution unless it takes account of the realities of the thinking and of the needs of the Biafran people, that what is good for Biafra is going to be good for Lagos, and the only federal government solution which will be stable is one which takes account of the aspirations of the people on that side.

• 1105

**The Vice-Chairman:** Gentlemen, I have the following members who wish to ask questions and, again, I would ask you to make your questions as precise as possible: Mr. Walker, Mr. Brewin, Mr. Pelletier, Mr. Forrestall, Mr. Thompson, Mr. Allmand, Mr. Groos and Mr. David MacDonald. I will call next on Mr. Walker.

**Mr. Thompson:** Mr. Chairman, I serve on another major committee that is now in session and, unfortunately, I will just have to excuse myself and forego putting my questions.

**The Vice-Chairman:** If you have a question, Mr. Thompson, I am sure the other members

would perhaps agree to let you put it at this time.

**Mr. Thompson:** I will just limit myself then to one question, which has been partially answered in Dr. Johnson's last statement. May I express my appreciation for your being here and expressing yourself as candidly as you have. It is most useful in helping us to understand the problem.

What is the prospect of stable government in the federal area of Nigeria outside of the territory of Biafra under the new federal system of 12 states as opposed to four regions? From your experience would you believe that progress is being made towards stabilising the political administration and the picture in the rest of Nigeria?

**Dr. Johnson:** I could answer this question, Mr. Thompson, only really from my reading because I am not too familiar from direct contact with the northern area.

**Mr. Thompson:** Could we be specific, shall we say, with the Yoruba people because they represent one of the larger ethnic groups down closer in?

**Dr. Johnson:** I understand from direct information which has come to me partly through the press and partly through direct correspondence from friends in Lagos that there is a good bit of political instability in the Yoruba area. I was not able to see Chief Awolowo when I was in Lagos because he was up through Yorubaland trying to hold together his following in those areas. I understand that since that time there has been a considerable growth in instability. So there are very serious problems of stability within the part of Nigeria apart from the area which is called Biafra. But I think my answer to your question is that this will not be solved by bringing Biafra forcibly back into the Federation. In other words, these are problems which exist; they may be worked out within the present structure but it is hard at this time to say because there are some serious tensions within.

**Mr. Thompson:** Is there sympathy with Biafra among some of these other tribal areas out amongst the people? Is there sympathy of the Yorubas towards the Ibos?

**Dr. Johnson:** This is a strange question to answer. Certainly there was a general sympathy

but I was surprised in Lagos how many times people complained about the aggressiveness of the Ibos and many times they said, "We are sorry about the massacres but they probably had it coming to them." One of the questions I put to some friends to whom I could talk very frankly was, "Now that these chaps have become disliked, feared, hated and have retired into Biafra and now are out of your hair, why do you not leave them out of your hair because all week I have been listening to you complaining about the problems of the Ibos and their domination of political and economic life?" There is a good bit of this kind of feeling. One answer which I had to my question was: "When we bring Biafra back into the Federation we will set it up in such a way that there is no possibility that these people can again establish domination."—in other words, set up certain controls or limitations on their freedom of activity.

**Mr. Thompson:** I might mention in closing, Mr. Chairman, an experience I had last November. I met a senior member of the Foreign Office of Nigeria who is a Yoruba. I speak Hausa somewhat and I spoke to him in Hausa, as I had done often on other occasions. He refused to talk to me in Hausa and insisted on speaking English. I could not help but sense that there was an hostility even within the administration to the policies that the administration was carrying on towards Biafra as it expressed itself in nationalism towards other tribal groups.

• 1110

**Dr. Johnson:** The Yorubas, of course, have been afraid as the Ibos have been, of Hausa domination because they were the majority group and they had more seats in the federal parliament from the north than the west and the east had together; and I expect that some of that Yoruba concern about domination by the northern group exists even more strongly at the present time.

**Mr. Thompson:** Thank you, Dr. Johnson.

**Mr. Walker:** Dr. Johnson, my question is really supplementary to one asked by Mr. Macquarrie about the Ibos in Biafra.

Are there any Ibos still in positions of power in the federal government in Lagos?

**Dr. Johnson:** Yes; there are a number. I have talked with several of these men. Mr. Asika, the Administrator of Enugu, one of the areas which have been retaken by the federal

authorities, is an Ibo from Onitsha on the Niger River. Mr. Osiodu, the very brilliant young man who is the Permanent Secretary for Industry, is an Ibo from the Mid-West region. There are a number of Ibos and a number of the minority group who are in the federal government administration.

One of the great complications of this whole warfare is that very close personal friends find themselves on opposite sides.

**Mr. Walker:** Are these Ibos working to restore the federation? Are they taking an active part diplomatically, or are they just hanging on to their jobs? In other words, are they federalists, if you will?

**Dr. Johnson:** These are convinced federalists. Of course, now that they are on that side they have to be even more convinced federalists than the others to establish the correctness of their position. They are people who believe that Nigeria ought to be one, as did all the Ibos up to about a year ago, actually. They believe that Nigeria should be one and they are working for that objective. There is no question that there are people in business and in government on that side.

**Mr. Walker:** Are they allowed by the Biafran government to travel in Biafra?

**Dr. Johnson:** No.

**Mr. Walker:** Would these federalist Ibos travel in safety?

**Dr. Johnson:** No, not at the present time. They are part of the enemy staff. There would be no way that they could get in.

Actually, those on both sides who were most abused were people such as the Ibos who were on that side, or some of the minority people who were formerly part of the Eastern region government and went over into the federal government. Both in Lagos and in Biafra one heard very abusive language used on both sides about people like these who ought to be on one side but seemed to have taken the other position.

**Mr. Walker:** Did I understand you to say that both governments are military governments?

**Dr. Johnson:** Yes.

**Mr. Walker:** They are not democratic? They do not use the parliamentary process as we understand it?

**Dr. Johnson:** This is right. They arose out of military coups. The federal military government was set up in this way in July of 1966, when General Gowon was established. There was an attempt at an *ad hoc* constitutional conference to give it some kind of status, and one of the questions that was raised in the House of Lords was just what is the authority of a government that is set up by a coup. In other words, this is not a military rebellion against a democratically-constituted government. It is a rebellion of one military group under Colonel Ojukwu, with the support of the people, against another part of the country. Therefore, in a sense, it is a civil war between two parts of the country and two military leaders.

**Mr. Walker:** Nigeria was a federation rather than a confederation, as in Canada? It was a loose arrangement?

• 1115

**Dr. Johnson:** Yes. Actually, I do not know exactly what is intended by those two terms. It was a somewhat loose federation, the constituent parts of which were the four regions. When one talks about the developments which led to the present conflict, one of the quarrels is the unilateral announcement by the federal government of the twelve states at a time when the constitutional structure was four regions. The eastern region says that they cannot accept that because they had no part in establishing it and therefore it is unconstitutional. Of course, on the other side, the federal government asks what right they have to secede; although there had been some talk of the eastern region having its sovereignty a good many months before Biafra was set up.

**Mr. Walker:** Was there any single reason for Biafra's pulling out of the new federation? I am not talking about the massacres. Was there anything prior to the massacres of the Ibos that led to their wanting to pull out of the federation?

**Dr. Johnson:** I do not think so. I think it comes from that.

In many ways the eastern people had been the strongest supporters of the building and development of the federation, and it was with very great reluctance that they decided they had to go it alone.

Actually, from the time general Ankrah called the conference in Aburi in Ghana and

had some very good solutions to the problem, the Ibos took a lead in trying to save the federation; but when no action was taken on the Aburi agreements, and it seemed as though their only protection was the protection they could set out for themselves...

**Mr. Walker:** Excuse me; protection from what?

**Dr. Johnson:** They believe that this is simply security of life and limb against the possibility of the continuation, within their own area, of some of the massacres which have taken place. Rightly or wrongly, this is deeply believed by both leaders and people throughout Biafra.

**Mr. Walker:** You mentioned three groups in positions of power in the Lagos government. Do they all have the same purpose or is one of the groups bent on the actual genocide of the Biafran people as opposed to a military victory over a government?

**Dr. Johnson:** I myself find it hard to accept the Biafran statement that this is a war of extermination of the Ibos. I can accept the fact that it has been a very brutal war. There have been some terrible massacres in the course of it. However, I find it very difficult to accept that anybody, even some of the northern military officers who are supposed to be very blood-thirsty, would want to go in for this kind of destruction simply to reduce the number of Ibos in the country, as some people claim. There are differences in point of view in the different groups from which they come.

Perhaps one of the dominant themes is the desire of the north to maintain their domination by power, which it might be difficult for them to maintain simply by ability and other forms of leadership.

**Mr. Walker:** Prior to the military coups in Lagos we had very close relationships with Members of Parliament of Nigeria through the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association. I presume some of those people are still around, although we have not heard of them; they no longer attend our conferences.

You were speaking of the use of instruments in which there might still be some goodwill between peoples. Although not at the state level, which would be through Arnold Smith, can you see the Common-

wealth Parliamentary Association playing any role that would be helpful?

**Dr. Johnson:** I feel that it is very important that this question be raised at many levels so that it is brought out into the open. I must say that I have a very great respect for, and many very close friends in, the Nigerian side. Somehow or other we must try to have discussion so that people of goodwill can find a peaceful solution. Therefore, I feel that having this subject as opened up for discussion anywhere will be helpful in finding a solution.

**Mr. Walker:** Thank you very much.

**Mr. Brewin:** Mr. Chairman, I would like to refer Dr. Johnson to one or two of his statements that I found very interesting. He said that despite the desire of both sides to end the war, there appeared, at least on the surface, the entirely irreconcilable situation of the federal authorities saying that they insisted on any settlement being under the sovereignty of the federal government and the Biafrans saying that any settlement must necessarily recognize the sovereignty of Biafra.

• 1120

I presume that the attitude of the Biafrans is based on the view that unless they have control over some armed forces they may be the victims of extermination. They have no means of protecting themselves against possible genocide. Am I right in that conclusion? Is that the basic reason for insisting upon their sovereignty?

**Dr. Johnson:** Yes, and perhaps one could now give two reasons. I think one is simply physical survival and safety. I think there is now a second very strong one, and that is a freedom to live their lives because they believe that if they were again to be within the Federation they would likely be subjected to discrimination in spite of all that is said by General Gowon. I believe he is a very sincere person. I was well impressed with General Gowon, but in spite of all he says about guaranteeing security and giving the Ibo's the full privileges of the Federation, the Ibo people feel they would like to have those guarantees of the security of life and of their opportunity to develop economically and in other ways, as they may be able to do because of their abilities, their industry and

their desire to move ahead, in their own hands. Actually, I went to Biafra and to Lagos persuaded of two things—that a solution must have two minimal points. First, there must be a guarantee of security for the Ibo's in their own hands which is satisfactory to them. Second, that it should happen within some kind of entity called Nigeria. I came away from Biafra with the feeling that that entity—any kind of unified federation—would be unacceptable to them.

**Mr. Brewin:** I wonder if I might put this question to you? I am glad you have already explained that the situation is entirely different to the one that exists in Canada, because the suggestion I am going to put might indicate that I favour a similar solution in Canada, which I do not. Do you think there is some possible solution on the basis of what has been described as associate states; some means by which the Biafrans might have their own state but be associated with the other parts of Nigeria in some over-all arrangement?

**Dr. Johnson:** Yes, this is a suggestion which has been put forward by the Biafran government. They have a memorandum on association with the other parts of the former Federation of Nigeria. They would want, in terms of trade and perhaps certain cultural relations, to have agreements from a voluntary position—voluntarily entered into by Nigeria and Biafra—with the possibility of withdrawal from them should it not be found profitable by both sides. This is the basis on which they are talking, but of course it is completely unacceptable to the Lagos government at the present time.

**Mr. Brewin:** I want to ask one other group of questions. You have emphasized the importance of some form of mediation or conciliation by outsiders and you have suggested some degree of Canadian responsibility because of the goodwill on both sides towards Canada. Is it possible that someone—you mentioned Mr. Arnold Smith, the Commonwealth Secretary-General who presumably cannot act in such a capacity without the instructions of the Commonwealth as a whole because he is the servant of all the Commonwealth nations—within a reasonable period of time, Mr. Smith or someone representing the Commonwealth as a whole or instructed by the Commonwealth, could assume this responsibility? I ask this ques-

tion because I want to make a further suggestion to you after you have answered it.

• 1125

**Dr. Johnson:** The problem of Mr. Smith, of course, in this matter is that the member unit of the Commonwealth is the federal Government of Nigeria, so he could not move any further than that federal government would allow. I suggested when I was speaking to General Gowon, "I think it would be a wonderful thing if you could not only permit but encourage someone like Arnold Smith to go to Biafra and sit with those people and hear their concerns and then sit with Lagos and really try to draw together the deep concerns of the two parties." I think, from the present reaction of the federal government to what Arnold Smith has been doing, there would be a very strong negative reaction to any suggestion of that kind. In an article which I received from the Nigerian Embassy in Washington last week there appears a very strong statement to the effect that unless Arnold Smith goes to Nigeria in terms of the 12 states solution declared by General Gowon, he could hardly be acceptable in Lagos. There are problems of this kind which really hang on the actions of the Nigerian government in Lagos, which does not wish in any way to recognize either the sovereignty or perhaps even the identity of a Biafran group.

**Mr. Brewin:** I was also thinking of the difficulty that might come from the Commonwealth side in giving instruction to Mr. Smith. However, may I put this question to you. In your view is there any possibility of some more informal mediations—not by Canada officially—perhaps by the Canadian government appointing someone who could look into this? I was thinking of someone like our Ambassador to Egypt, Mr. T. L. Carter, who has lived in Nigeria for many years and is well regarded in that area. Is there any possibility that someone who does not occupy an official position as does Mr. Smith, who would be inhibited I suppose by his position, some other less official person acting in this capacity who knows the country and who could perhaps act unofficially as an intermediary between the two warring elements?

**Dr. Johnson:** At the present time, Mr. Chairman, I think the position of our govern-

ment makes it very difficult to do that in that we recognize the Nigerian officers as official representatives. Back in October when some very high-level representative of Biafra—Sir Louis Mbanefo—travelled to North America seeking to interpret their problem, our Canadian government people were not able to see him even outside or unofficially. The same was true last week when Dr. Mbadiwe was here as a special envoy. It was not possible for our government even to hear him and I expect Sir Francis Ibiam, who will be in Ottawa next week, will find himself in the same position. I understand that the Department of External Affairs had a rather strong protest from the Nigerian High Commissioner when Dr. Mbadiwe gave an address at Carlton University. They felt that this address should not be heard lest in a way it be some kind of tacit recognition. So, there is a very real problem.

I feel that the first stage should be a fact-finding group who would try to ascertain very clearly what our Canadian position is and what the points might be where we could express ourselves.

Before this meeting closes I have three comments I would like to make on possible Canadian action.

**Mr. Brewin:** I do not want to prolong my questioning, but if you have three suggestions for Canadian action I think the Committee would be interested in having them.

**Dr. Johnson:** I might bring these in now. The first one, it seems to me, is this matter of fact-finding. I am not sure what the points of limit are. Some of us who are friends of both sides—if Dr. Mbadiwe or these other friends come to Canada we welcome them and listen to them, and yesterday I paid a call on Mr. Sanusi, who is the High Commissioner for Nigeria—seek to maintain contact and hear what they have to say. However, I think this first suggestion of fact finding and what can be done within the limitations of our Canadian Government's operation is most important.

• 1130

The second, it seems to me, is that we can support and encourage the British government as we may be able, as a fellow government within the Commonwealth, to establish a position of neutrality. This is a matter on which there is some debate, but a great many of us feel that the position of Britain in

continuing to supply some armed support to the federal government and lifting the embargo which they had on the sale of arms by private dealers in Nigeria has aggravated the situation and really leaves the British in some ways party to what could be a very great injustice and something very destructive of both economic and human interest in that part of the world. Any way in which the Canadian Government can influence the British government to assume a position of neutrality would be useful.

I think a third very specific thing is that we should press the Nigerian Government—and we could do this directly to facilitate the International Committee of the Red Cross—to send in medical supplies and medical staff to Biafra because there is no flow of supplies. When I was there in January, in terms of antibiotics, smallpox serum, vaccines and ordinary medical supplies, they had practically nothing. There was a flight sitting in Geneva in January; that flight was sitting again and I heard it was to fly the first week of February; then it was held up by problems which Lagos has put in its way. I feel that on this humanitarian ground, here is a very positive and specific action which could be taken by us in Canada.

[Translation]

**Mr. Pelletier:** Many of the questions that I wanted to ask, Mr. Chairman, have been asked already, but I would like to ask two questions, one of which is supplementary to that which Mr. Brewin has just put forward.

At the present time is the Commonwealth not completely discredited as a mediator because the United Kingdom, which is nevertheless the head of the Commonwealth, has taken sides, supplied arms and fostered this war?

• 1135

[English]

**Dr. Johnson:** I think the fact that Britain is part of the Commonwealth and has supplied arms has made some problem for the Commonwealth. There was a time when the Biafrans were very unhappy about meeting with the Commonwealth in the United Kingdom and wanted to have their consultations in France or some place other than London; but I think this is not a serious problem. I think that both Lagos and the other side do have some faith and confidence in Mr. Smith,

while the present state of negotiation has been set back because of a rather unfortunate press leak of certain things that should not have been let out at this time. I think Mr. Smith is still in a position, and perhaps the most favourable position at the present time, to do some work as mediator in this situation. I feel, as I believe our Department of External Affairs does very strongly, that we should support Mr. Smith in any way that we can in his work, for instance by providing facilities if that is necessary for meeting. I believe we have given some assurance of help in our External Aid program in rehabilitation, but at this time the Commonwealth Secretariat is probably the most hopeful place for conversations in spite of this problem which you have correctly raised.

[Translation]

**Mr. Pelletier:** I would like to get some facts. Could Mr. Johnson tell us the strength of the military operations and the recorded loss of human life in order to give us an idea of the intensity of the war? Have you been able to obtain some figures or statistics?

[English]

**Dr. Johnson:** The only general figure I have is this rather conservative figure which I received the other day of a total loss of about 50,000 lives since the beginning of January 1966. That would include, I think, an estimate of the number of people who were massacred in the north. I find in the *Globe and Mail* in Clyde Sanger's column this morning a figure of 100,000. Actually in terms of some of the wars that we read about, this is not a large one in that the total military establishment of the federal government is estimated now at about 50,000 troops. I do not have any figure of how many trained troops are involved on the Biafran side, but I would guess it is somewhere between 10,000 and 20,000. The battles have been fairly modest as compared with the massive warfare in Viet Nam but there are no clear statistics. One of the problems of this war is that there is no objective or outside reporting on the site, so that you get totally different reports from the two sides of the war.

**Mr. Walker:** Is that casualty figure for both sides?

**Dr. Johnson:** Yes. This is the total death figure.

**Mr. Walker:** For both sides?

**Dr. Johnson:** That is correct.

[Translation]

**Mr. Pelletier:** One last question, Mr. Chairman. According to the state of mind in which Mr. Johnson found the authorities of Lagos, does external pressure on the central government, particularly pressure from Canada, have a chance of obtaining results?

[English]

**Dr. Johnson:** I think, Mr. Chairman, this is a \$64 question, in a sense, as to what exactly are the effective means to influence decision. Might I give in reply to that some comment I had from General Gowon when I was asking about it. He said that on the one hand they did not need a third party to solve their problem; on the other hand, both Lagos and the other side have many times expressed the desire to have some help or concern from outside nations in solving their problem, because traditionally in Africa you make use of third parties. In the African culture, this is the way you deal with a problem. I think if Canada in any way were to try to put on pressures, there could be resentment on both sides. I think it is more a matter of bringing influence from a friendly position than bringing threats from a position of strength, although our connections are so limited that I do not know of any very sharp economic or other pressure that we could bring. But I think a voice in this matter coming out of a concern for the total situation could be of influence.

• 1140

**Mr. Pelletier:** I did not have in mind any pressure or sanctions, but exactly what you expressed.

**Dr. Johnson:** I think this could be helpful. Certainly it is a great concern of us when from some of our own Canadian people we hear of the destruction of life and property which is going on in the present air raids, for instance, throughout Biafra.

**The Chairman:** Mr. Forrestall.

**Mr. Forrestall:** Doctor, most of the questions I had in mind when I indicated to the Chairman that I would like to ask you some questions certainly have been well covered. I would like to return to one of the first points

you made about an hour and a half ago, when you described what is going on in Nigeria as the "silent war". I am just a little puzzled after listening to your comments. I know Dr. Mbatwe. Is he still in the country? He certainly was last week.

**Dr. Johnson:** Yes, but not in Canada. I think he is still in North America, although I do not know for sure.

**Mr. Forrestall:** While he was here, accompanied by a small party of officials, I had occasion to watch him on television, I believe on the CTV network. From that program and the story today by Mr. Sanger in the *Globe and Mail*, and also one or two other very brief press reports, it would seem to me that his trip failed, if indeed it was made in the hope of informing Canadians at least about another side of the story in Nigeria. For example, where I live we usually watch CBC television. Why was he not interviewed by that group, for example? Was there no opportunity provided for him to speak to the Canadian people on these questions other than the very limited ones that have come to my attention?

**Dr. Johnson:** I am glad you raised that, Mr. Forrestall, because I think this is one of the questions this Committee should consider. Dr. Mbatwe hoped that by coming to Ottawa he might quietly meet some government people. He was not able to do so because of our recognition of the federal government and our fear of offending them. I think he met some Members of Parliament but he did not meet any officials of our Department of External Affairs, which is technically correct in dealing only with the Nigerian government, which we recognize.

When he went to Toronto he had a fairly full press conference which was set up for him by the Biafran Students' Association. He was also interviewed by the CBC rather fully.

**Mr. Forrestall:** I did not know that.

**Dr. Johnson:** I was given to understand indirectly that that is not being broadcast because of the fear of offending the Nigerian government.

**Mr. Forrestall:** Whose decision was that?

**Dr. Johnson:** I do not know because I just heard this indirectly. I asked why this program did not appear, because I am also a

CBC watcher for the most part and I had hoped to see it. However, I think it was checked with some authorities and quietly set aside. I think it is most important that these things be brought out into the open as much as possible, because these people also have a right to be heard.

**Mr. Forrestall:** That disturbs me a little bit. I suppose it would be unfair to say that is atypical of what...

**Dr. Johnson:** May I say that the CBC recorded a tape with me about a week ago which I think is to appear on one of their programs and in which I said a number of the things I have said here. I have not yet heard when this is to appear, but they spoke of putting it on the program *The Way It Is*, which I believe is their Sunday evening program, although I have not heard definitely that it is to be used. I think there is some caution at that point because of connections which the CBC have or perhaps which the Nigerian officials here have with them.

• 1145

**Mr. Forrestall:** We might pursue that somewhere else later on today.

**Dr. Johnson:** I do not know enough about the specifics of that except to raise the question. I am sorry that up to this time Mbatwe has not appeared before the general public here.

**Mr. Forrestall:** I am singularly impressed. The reason I raised that, Doctor, is that indeed all we have heard, which has been very limited, has come from official sources in Nigeria. It is always a little difficult to make any progress unless you know what the other side has to say in justification of its position.

Just to pursue it a little further, is this generally true? For example, in the United Kingdom is there an apparent suppression of views? I noticed there was a very useful and full debate about it in the House of Lords earlier in February which I had occasion to read. But beyond that, has there been any useful enlightenment of the British people on the other side of the question?

**Dr. Johnson:** Yes, within the United Kingdom this matter has broken open a little bit in the last two months. Up to that time there tended to be a somewhat one-sided presenta-

tion of the federal position only, but *The Guardian*, *The Observer*, *The London Times*, and the BBC are getting a good bit of news on both sides. The BBC finds itself vigorously attacked from both sides as being partial to the other side.

I think this debate on February 13 in the House of Lords was very excellent. I would commend this to you as some rather detailed background information. It has brought out these issues into public discussion in a very fair way. I think some of this was referred to by Mr. Macquarrie in a question which he asked in the House. There was a discussion in that session of the House of Lords, and the matter is getting into public discussion in Britain. Some of the churches in Britain that are deeply involved in mission work in both parts of Nigeria have made strong representations to Mr. George Thomson, the Commonwealth Secretary of the British government.

**Mr. Forrestall:** I hope you will correct me if I am wrong, but as I understand it, at present no other sovereign country in the world has as yet recognized Biafra. Am I correct?

**Dr. Johnson:** This is right, yes.

**Mr. Forrestall:** Would it be your opinion that a broadening of this basis of dialogue or information about what is actually taking place in the region of Biafra would perhaps change public opinion in other sovereign countries by, let us say, creating an atmosphere in which some form of recognition might be given to Biafra? In other words, has it been the suppression of factual information from both sides that has made people hide behind the present somewhat unrealistic grounds?

**Dr. Johnson:** I think it is very important that the *de facto* situation be fully recognized. Whether or not at this stage one should recognize Biafra's sovereignty as a nation, one cannot avoid recognizing its fact as an entity and that there are two parties to a very serious and very major conflict, and one of those is the entity called Biafra. It seems to me in the hearing of the issues I would want to hear Lagos just as fully as Biafra before decisions are made on what the ultimate outcome should be. I want to reaffirm that I think one should not take a one-sided view but should seek to understand the whole situation, because the only answer

that will be permanent will come out of both sides. The recognition of Biafra as an entity and some opportunity for its voice to be heard is of great importance in clarification and in an ultimate solution.

• 1150

**Mr. Forrestall:** This is my final question. I agree with the impression that you left with me, that this war is not going to end militarily, that it is going to evolve into a Viet Nam or perhaps something even worse than that because so many more people are involved. Do you think at some point in the future Portugal might consider public recognition of Biafra?

**Dr. Johnson:** Yes, I read about that but I find it hard to say that because I had no opportunity to talk with Portuguese officials. Personally, I think it a little unlikely from my observations in Biafra and the kind of relations which are really giving Biafra the opportunity to have a gateway into Europe and to be heard by letting them come through the Lisbon airport. But any suggestion that the Biafran defence is stirred up by Portugal or France or any other outside power, as one suspected, that the Katanga situation perhaps was stirred up by those outside, I think has no basis in fact at all. But you have suggested what is one of the tragedies of this war. Up to ten years ago that part of Africa was almost free of world power politics. The longer this war continues the deeper Russia puts its roots into Western Nigeria and that part of Africa. To some extent the Islamic influences of the Middle East also gained some foothold to support that which has been given to the air force from Egypt, and there are groups that would like to secure perhaps some interest in the oil of Biafra. So that the longer the war continues the more danger there is of this becoming a battleground not simply of African interests but some of these power group interests. However at this point I do not think it is that deep.

**Mr. Forrestall:** It is significant to note that perhaps one of the turning points that might have created the atmosphere in which it could go beyond that point of no return was the prior offer to the Biafran region of Russian assistance and its rejection by the institutions that were there at the time and that subsequent offer and its acceptance on the part of the other party involved in the war.

That is just a comment and I would not ask you to enlarge on that.

**Dr. Johnson:** One of the things that I was deeply impressed by on my visit to Biafra was that this was an African affair. I saw almost no expatriots in the week I was in the country, although strange to say the propaganda on the other side has made a great deal about mercenaries. I would say they are notable by their absence, and if they are there it is only in the most remote and specialized cases. It is not in any way a mercenary war but a Biafran.

**Mr. Forrestall:** May I ask you to excuse me, Doctor. Thank you very, very much for your very enlightening and informative talk.

**Mr. Allmand:** Mr. Chairman, most of my questions have been asked. Just to follow up on Mr. Forrestall's line of questioning, what about communist cells working within Biafra or Nigeria? Usually in revolutions like this communist cells try to organize themselves and take over. Is there any evidence that the war is being fired on one side or both sides by marxist or communist groups of Biafrans or Nigerians?

**Dr. Johnson:** No, I would find it very hard to think that this is a factor at all in the conflict. I think that Chief Enahoro, who was able to secure the arms aid from Moscow, has had some connections with Russian ingress and influences but I think one would be reading something into the situation to take this as a serious factor. This is a possibility in future years if this thing went on but most parts of Biafra, and I think of Nigeria, because of a very strong Christian background, would be very resistant to an infiltration of communist power groups or cell operations.

• 1155

**Mr. Allmand:** Those are all the questions I have.

**The Vice-Chairman:** Mr. Groos, you are next.

**Mr. Groos:** Doctor, as I understand it, the Nigerian contribution during the Second World War as far as actual troops were concerned was quite considerable. They were highly trained and were used extensively I believe in the Far East. This would give them a pretty broad military base from

which to start as a new emerging nation. About how evenly would you say those were divided between the Biafran and the Lagos sides?

**Dr. Johnson:** As far as I have been able to ascertain, the troops and the military equipment went mostly to the Lagos side. A good many of the officer category were on the Ibo side. I noticed one of the news reporters in the London *Times* observed that in the fighting there was much better military administration on the Biafran side than on the other side, which comes out of this background. For instance, the man whom I visited at Port Harcourt and who was in charge of the whole military establishment on that southern coast of Biafra had been the head of the military academy in Kaduna in the north, and many of the Ibo top officers are men who had rank in what had been developed by the British into a fairly competent military force with good discipline. They were left almost without equipment and almost without men because a great majority in the ranks had been from the north.

**Mr. Groos:** I am also of the impression that there was in recent years some military arrangements for the training of Nigerians in Canada. I am almost positive that some of the Nigerian naval officers were trained by the Canadian Navy, that some of their Air Force officers were trained by the Canadian Air Force, and that we had Canadian officers on loan to Nigeria for training duties. Is that correct?

**Dr. Johnson:** I have heard talk of only one of those, Mr. Groos, but that does not mean the others did not happen. I believe there was a group of Nigerians who were trained by our Air Force out in Winnipeg a few years ago. So we have had some part in training of military people. I wanted to secure the records in that connection because I think it is a little indicative of the situation in Nigeria. Perhaps the larger group of those who carried through and completed that course were eastern men, partly because of their industry and their competence.

**Mr. Groos:** This in some way accounts for part of the goodwill that you found existed between the Nigerians of both sides?

**Dr. Johnson:** This is right. Many of the Nigerians on both sides had very happy rela-

tions. Tom Carter, our first High Commissioner, has been referred to here, and he did an outstanding piece of work as the beginner in establishing good relations.

**Mr. Groos:** What is the economic base of the Biafran community at the moment? Is it this dormant oil?

**Dr. Johnson:** Yes. At the moment of course most of their economic base is inactive. They have a major oil development, with wells, refinery and petrol chemical industry, but that is inoperated now. That would be the major economic factor in Biafra. There is also a great deal of palm oil, there is some coal, there are a number of small industries which have been established in the last years, but pretty largely now those things are all dormant because of the impossibility of getting raw materials.

**Mr. Groos:** Then the communication with Biafra is now entirely by air?

• 1200

**Dr. Johnson:** It is entirely by air and it is a very thin line, depending on the decreasing financial reserves of the Biafran government.

**Mr. Groos:** You leave me with the impression that there is no eagerness at present for meaningful negotiation by either side. There has been a somewhat wistful yearning on both sides to which you have made reference; they wish they could get together.

You mentioned this March 31 deadline—I think it was a budgetary matter—by the government of Lagos, and then there is the running out of credit for the Biafrans, but there does not seem as yet to be any real disposition to negotiate.

**Dr. Johnson:** I think a number of things have happened, Mr. Groos, that would give one reason for a little more hope than that. There was a very rigid position for a time by Lagos that they would negotiate only with a group of people in Biafra whom they would designate. Now, obviously the Biafrans are not going to negotiate on that basis. If they wanted to negotiate they would want to put forward their own spokesmen. There was a time when they said they would not talk in any way with Colonel Ojukwu who is the Governor of Biafra. Now, I do not have firm word, but enough has been said to indicate that they may be a little more realistic on that because you cannot deal with Biafra

without dealing with Ojukwu who is the accepted leader in that country.

I think on the other side some of the statements of Colonel Ojukwu within the last month have been a little hopeful, he has indicated in some places that he might be willing to start a negotiation without pre-conditions. So there are a number of straws in the wind on both sides that indicate there may be a little more flexibility in spite of fairly rigid statements when you ask them head-on what are the terms for negotiation.

**Mr. Groos:** On the practical side, is there any indication that some of the ferocity and inhumanity of the fighting has petered out?

**Dr. Johnson:** Well, I think the air raids on civilian establishments of which I know indicate that it is still a fairly brutal undertaking. How much of that is policy and how much of it depends on mercenary pilots, I do not know. I think there has been some modification, for instance, in the matter of prisoners. I know that Dr. Ibiam, the senior advisor to Colonel Ojukwu, made a major issue of the shooting of prisoners, and now they are cared for.

I must say that when I was in Bonny as the guest of the federal government on the military front I talked with a group of prisoners of war whom they had taken and were holding at that point. So I think perhaps it is not quite as raw as it was in the early and somewhat disorganized stages when the reports seemed to indicate, and I think truly that there was the shooting of prisoners on both sides.

**Mr. Groos:** But none of the mass shootings have taken place in recent months?

**Dr. Johnson:** There has not really been an occasion when that could happen. When the midwest, was re-taken from the Ibos in Asaba and Benin, and when Calabar was taken there was a great loss of life. But there has not been any military activity of that scope in the last period where a similar thing might have taken place. I would not say that it could not happen, because if it is a people's war then, of course, the whole population is potential enemy.

**Mr. MacDonald (Prince):** I have a supplementary at this point if Mr. Groos will permit.

**Mr. Gross:** Yes, by all means.

**Mr. MacDonald (Prince):** Would the very fact that they have set this deadline at the end of March not indicate that perhaps the whole scope of military activity has been stepped up right at this very period, and because we are not getting information there may, in fact, be an even more intensive war going on during the next three week period?

**Dr. Johnson:** Well, this has happened in two ways. Up to the present, I think this broad general bombing across the country to try to stir panic is part of it. Second, there is a major move on to try to take Onitsha, which has become almost a name. The federal government tried to take it across the Niger River; they made four attempts but failed. Now they are trying to take it by land. There has been silence about that campaign for the last 10 days or 2 weeks, and one has the impression that perhaps it was successful so far and then bogged down. I think one could expect a major press by the federal government in these last weeks of March.

**Mr. Gross:** My last point is that you leave me with the impression that perhaps our best choice really, apart from trying to acquaint ourselves better with the situation, is to pursue the humanitarian aspect which I think could be exploited on both sides—the provision of hospital equipment, and so forth—but at least by that means you are opening the door slightly to negotiations on both sides. You are getting one side to recognize the advantage of opening some sort of communication with the other by this means. Do you agree with that?

**Dr. Johnson:** Yes; I think essentially there are two things and this is a very specific one which is urgently needed and, I think, an unquestionable base on which to move. I think the second is for us to press questions with the British, who are much more directly involved at present than we are, and perhaps in Commonwealth circles about what is going on so that this whole story can be looked at and the Biafran leadership can have some opportunity to be heard as the world looks on from the side and tries to influence decision in the area.

**Mr. Gross:** Thank you.

**The Vice-Chairman:** Mr. MacDonald?

**Mr. MacDonald (Prince):** Mr. Chairman, I thank you and the Committee for allowing

me to participate as I am not a regular member of this Committee.

**The Vice-Chairman:** Oh, in that case Mr. Hymmen comes before you.

**Mr. MacDonald (Prince):** Fine, thank you.

**The Vice-Chairman:** I had forgotten.

**Mr. MacDonald (Prince):** I should not have said that.

**Mr. Hymmen:** I do not think we should detain Dr. Johnson, whose evidence has been most informative, but I have one question that was referred to only briefly—I think in the evidence given to Mr. Allmand. Dr. Johnson referred earlier to the divided political authority in the Lagotian government and the tremendous power held by the northern Emirs. Dr. Johnson also expressed some consternation, I think rightly, about the indiscriminate bombing of the hospitals in Biafra. Are we right or wrong in assuming that there is a religious connotation to this civil war? Also I am interested in knowing—he did mention the Christian church—whether the efforts of the Christian church—your own Presbyterian church, the Roman Catholic church and others—have been more effective with any particular group of the population?

**Dr. Johnson:** Yes. There are some that would try to suggest this is a holy war of Islam against Christianity; I would reject that view. I think it is a political war of political factors. But I think you cannot escape the fact that there are overtones of religious background in the war. A church or a red cross perhaps does not mean the same thing to a mercenary from Egypt as it would to someone who comes from our own society. In terms of individuals there may be such aspects, but I would resist and argue against any such interpretation. You will get some Biafrans who say this is a holy war of Islam. They will quote one of the generals who says: We must drive the Ibos into the sea; but this, it seems to me, is quite an extreme position.

• 1210

On the question of the church, part of the war, you could say, comes out of the service that the church has rendered in relation to what was former British colonial policy.

Through the eastern and western regions, Christian missions came in strongly more than 100 years ago and they brought with them very strong general education. So, first among the Yorubas and then about a generation later among the Ibos there were highly trained people. Many of them later were taken to Europe or to the United Kingdom and had Masters' degrees and Ph.D. degrees in all kinds of subjects. Because the northern were Islamic and the British chose the course of indirect rule in the north as opposed to direct rule in the southern part of the country, they did not allow Christian missions into the north lest they disturb the Islamic people; and so general education was very limited in the north. When a university was opened at Zaria in the North just a few years ago, most of the students came from the south and the east and the west because there were not enough high school graduates of sufficient training to go as students to the university. So that in that sense the history of Christian missions under British colonial policy, which was very reluctant to disturb Islam by allowing churches and schools to be established, has been part of the background factor of this whole struggle.

I think one of the reasons that the Biafrans, for instance, feel so very bitter about the nonsupport from Britain is that they feel they are more similar to the British than any people in Africa. They are very democratic people and widely concerned with it. Their leadership is Christian. Many of them are very active and convinced and articulate Christian people, both Protestant and Roman Catholic, and they feel they represent this kind of country; and it would be a tragedy if this thing were stamped out in that part of Africa. So there are these factors.

**Mr. Hymmen:** Thank you.

**The Vice-Chairman:** Mr. MacDonald.

**Mr. MacDonald (Prince):** Dr. Johnson, in the light of what you have said about the educational level, particularly of the Ibos in Biafra, is there any great effort being expended at the present time towards the establishment of some kind of democratic government? They are moving beyond the kind of military regime which they are under at present.

**Dr. Johnson:** They have a very strong executive council which has on it some of

these people of whom I have spoken—Sir Francis Ibiam, Dr. Michael Okpara, who was the former premier of the eastern region, Sir Louis Mbanefo, Dr. Eni Njoku, who is a man of great stature and quality; and they play a very active role in the decisions which are taken. They have set up the form of government which actually was planned by the eastern region very considerably before Biafra was ever set up, and it has brought into effect a good bit of their civilian administration. That is, a great deal of the government is carried on at the level of what they call provinces by provincial administrators, so that it is not a straight military regime.

One of the interesting things to me in being in Biafra was how little I saw of the fact that life seemed to be carried on to a great extent by civilian people. But there has been some attempt to move and it is the quality of that broadly based, at least at the advisory level. It could be one of the great tragedies of Africa if these people in Biafra were erased or were forced to flee or were not able to play their part in the leadership of that part of West Africa in these next years.

**Mr. MacDonald (Prince):** Would you say, in comparing the governments in Biafra and in Lagos, whether there is more democratic participation or civilian control in Biafra than in the federal government in Lagos?

• 1215

**Dr. Johnson:** I think I would find it hard to give an accurate answer to that. I would say there is much more homogeneity in the government in Biafra, and for the reason it may give the lay participation more strength than there is on the other side. There is also an executive council which meets with General Gowon. After I had talked with a number of members of that council, they discussed my visit and I got some reaction back from them. I had only been five days in Lagos and had spent seven days in Biafra, and it was very strongly expressed that I should spend some more time in Lagos to get an equal view of both sides. On one hour's notice I cancelled out my flights back to Britain and a series of meetings in Geneva and the United Kingdom and stayed two more days and was very glad that I did. But there was an expression in that executive council of many of these men of whom I

have spoken: chief Awolowo, chief Enahoro; these younger permanent secretaries are members. What the role of that is and how the tensions between these several groups I have referred to are worked out within it, I do not know. But General Gowon does have this group that meets regularly to advise with him and I think there is an attempt to draw civilian people in and there is a plan to at some time turn this thing over again to civilian government.

**Mr. MacDonald (Prince):** To go back to something you said very early in your statement—to my mind one of the most intriguing statements that you have made this morning. To paraphrase, you said that this could well be the major issue in Africa today. When you think of the other issues that have received a great deal of coverage in the press, Rhodesia, South Africa, Kenya, the Congo and others, I wonder, without your going back and saying things that we have already covered whether there is one basic thing that you would like to focus on to emphasize this fact that this is to your mind the major issue in Africa today.

**Dr. Johnson:** The race issue, the white-black one, of course, is obviously an issue of very deep and very great human importance. It seems to me for the most part that it is settled in principle but there are some very, very difficult problems in applying it in practice, such as in the Rhodesia situation. When I said that about Nigeria, I said it because I feel that part of the solution of that race problem hangs on thoroughly competent and stable African states with African leadership; and if Nigeria, one of the places which had been a point of hope in Africa were to break up into chaos, it would set back the whole dealing with these other problems many years. If, on the other hand, a constructive and peaceable solution can be found there, it could have a great influence on the stability and strength of other African states and therefore on the whole future development of the continent, including this racial problem, this white-black problem, which must have a solution. This is if one of the most hopeful African states can find a stable and constructive solution.

**Mr. MacDonald (Prince):** What you are saying in effect, then, is that this particular conflict underlies the basic African question, whether or not the African people will be able to carry on their own forms of govern-

ment in different countries throughout that continent.

**Dr. Johnson:** Yes, but let me not suggest that I doubt that. I have no doubt that the Africans can; I believe that they can and will. The only question I raise is that this particular one, if it is solved by force, will set back that process, I say this partly out of the very great respect I have for a man whom I met both on the Biafran side and on the Lagos side—a man of great competence and integrity—and it would be a great tragedy if that kind of leadership were lost in a senseless war which has no answers. On the other hand, it will be a great triumph if some peaceable solution can be found that can make use of this quality of African leadership which does exist.

• 1220

**The Vice-Chairman:** Mr. MacDonald, we have now been here nearly three hours. I think this is the longest meeting of the External Affairs Committee I have been at in nearly fifteen years and it is a great tribute to Dr. Johnson. Some members have just indicated to me that they have other things to attend to, and perhaps under the circumstances we might adjourn the meeting. I am sure Dr. Johnson would be delighted to answer any questions privately.

**Mr. MacDonald (Prince):** May I just raise one issue that was not clear in the questioning and which I might clarify with Dr. Johnson?

**The Vice-Chairman:** Very well.

**Mr. MacDonald (Prince):** You mentioned the difficulties of the Red Cross International Committee in coming to the aid of the people of Biafra. But you also indicated here this morning that you were able to travel and that supplies are travelling from Lisbon to Port Harcourt. Has the possibility been explored of moving these supplies through that, as you call it, very fragile supply route?

**Dr. Johnson:** Yes, this is a good question, Mr. Chairman. The Red Cross, as an international organization which is part of the establishment, is very careful about having thoroughly clean procedures; therefore, in order to fly in officially with their own plane, they would need to have from the blockading power assurance that they can go in, and

from the blockaded power, the same thing. They have tried to secure that and, not securing it, apparently their charter or the conventions of the Red Cross allow them to use whatever other means they may be able to find to get help to people who are in need. I believe it is proposed now to take some of their drugs in this other way. But, of course, this is an increasingly hazardous route. You are in danger of being shot down in going into Biafra. The federal government would like to have a tight blockade, so that any personnel who go in that way have to accept that hazard, and any goods that are shipped in that way could be lost along the way. They have explored the other route and I think are going to use this route. But it would be a much better operation if the Red Cross were able to have free access.

May I say that I have supported and helped get relief supplies to the federal side. The Red Cross is dealing with relief in both sides. Our Canadian Churches, through their support of the Red Cross or through their support of the Committee on Inter-Church Aid, Refugee and World Service of the World Council of Churches are sending help in both sides; and a number of the Roman Catholic relief organizations are doing the same thing.

**Mr. MacDonald (Prince):** Thank you very much.

**The Vice-Chairman:** Dr. Johnson, on behalf of the Committee I would like to take this opportunity to thank you formally for being with us this morning. As I indicated, the length of time the Committee has sat is a considerable tribute to you and the questions only showed the interest that the members have.

I would also like to add to that, if I may, my personal thanks for your coming here and to say how much I have enjoyed hearing you. I would like to add, in conclusion, that no reference is made in a derogatory way to any individual, group of individuals or political affiliates and that very often in Canada I was subject to various matters of foreign affairs purely by situations. Our means of communications are such that we all too often hear only one side of the story and do not have the opportunity of hearing both. That is why I think it has been very helpful to this Committee to hear witnesses such as yourself who can give us the other side of the story that for a number of reasons we are not able to get.

Thank you very much again.

The meeting is adjourned.

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OF  
PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

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and various accounts of the Commission.

Translated by the Government of the  
Nation's Secretary of State.

ALISTAIR BRADY,  
The Clerk of the House

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Mr. MacDonald (Princess): Thank you very much.

The Vice-Chairman, Dr. Johnson, on behalf of the Committee I would like to take this opportunity to thank you formally for being with us this morning. As I indicated, the hope of some of the Committee has not yet been a moderate treaty, by you and the questions you showed the interest that the members have.

I would also like to add to that, if I may, my personal thanks for your coming here and to say how much I have enjoyed hearing you. I would like to add, in conclusion, that no reference is made in a derogatory way to any individual, group of individuals or political party.

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ALISTAIR FRASER,  
*The Clerk of the House*





HOUSE OF COMMONS

Standing Committee on  
External Affairs 1967/68

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