
A Guide to

Canadian Policies on

Arms Control, Disarmament,

Defence and

Conflict Resolution

1987-1988

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PREFACE

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Min. des Affaires extérieures
OTTAWA

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A GUIDE TO
CANADIAN POLICIES ON
ARMS CONTROL, DISARMAMENT,
DEFENCE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION
1987-88

Peter Gizewski

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Roger Hill, editors

ISBN 0-662-15623-4

PREFACE

This third volume of the Guide outlines major developments in international peace and security during 1987-88 and describes the main Canadian policy statements and parliamentary debates in the field. Covering the areas specified in the mandate of the Institute, the survey deals first with various aspects of arms control and disarmament, and afterwards goes on to look at defence and then at conflict resolution.

The Guide is divided into 31 distinct sections, focussing on such issues as the efforts to establish a new treaty on strategic nuclear weapons, the acquisition of new equipment for the Canadian armed forces, and the evolution of regional conflict situations in Central America and elsewhere. All are important items on the international or Canadian peace and security agendas.

Global developments pushed themselves increasingly to the centre of Canadian attention during 1987-88. The signing of the Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Weapons (INF) at the Washington Summit in December 1987, as well as increased hopes for a new treaty on strategic nuclear weapons, Soviet moves towards withdrawal from Afghanistan, and some extraordinary political developments within the Soviet Union itself, sparked off a good deal of speculation about the future prospects for East-West relations. Meanwhile, the persistence of conflicts between Israelis and Palestinians, within Lebanon, in Kampuchea, in Central America, and elsewhere, underlined the limits of superpower influence. Concern about the global economic, social, health and ecological situation also continued to grow, as the greenhouse effect and other threats to human survival loomed like dark

clouds on the horizon.


There were other important developments at the national level. In pursuit of policies adopted since it came to power in 1984, the Progressive Conservative Government reached a free trade agreement with the United States and undertook the process of seeking parliamentary approval for this accord. It proceeded with the task of up-grading North America's air defences. It participated in international consultations on arms control measures and continued to emphasize a number of areas such as a comprehensive test ban and verification. In efforts to give effect to the Defence White Paper of June 1987, it began the process of consolidating and strengthening the commitments to NATO. A major public debate continued over the government's plans to acquire 10-12 nuclear-propelled submarines for the Canadian Navy, with some critics claiming that they would cost far more than the \$8 billion estimated by the government or that they would undermine the moral bases of Canada's efforts to stem international nuclear proliferation. Sovereignty and arms control in the Arctic also attracted significant interest in Canada in 1987-88.

These are the kinds of things we have to think about as we consider Canadian policies on peace and security in the past year. We need to recall that Canada is involved in international affairs in many ways: this country is located geostrategically between the United States and the Soviet Union; it maintains a vast array of economic, defence and other relations with other members of the international community; and it works to promote worldwide peace, security, and prosperity through the United Nations and regional international organizations. It does this while seeking to preserve its own security and territorial integrity by maintaining national defence forces as well as collective defence arrangements with the United States and other allies. An

entire complex of peace and security objectives have to be pursued at one and the same time, and the government has to do its utmost to forge its various activities into coherent policies. A vital task is to set out key objectives and to establish priorities that can be reached within a realistic time frame.

In effect Canadians are caught up in world affairs and know that they share the destiny of the human race. While they recognize that the government has particular, national objectives to pursue, such as the maintenance of national unity and protection of the country's sovereignty, they hope as well that Canadian policies will contribute to a safer and more harmonious world as well as to the promotion of immediate national goals. Canadians are fortunate that for the most part Canada's national interests co-incide with those of the wider world.

We hope that this Guide will provide a useful tool for tracing the development of Canadian policies on international peace and security during 1987-88 and for judging this country's performance in that period.



Geoffrey Pearson
Executive Director

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INTRODUCTION

This Guide is designed to provide Canadians with a readily accessible check list of issues in the field of peace and security. It seeks to identify the major policy issues to which Canada responded in the period between August 1987 and July 1988, to place them in context, and, where appropriate, to identify a range of Parliamentary comment on these issues.

In identifying official Canadian policies, we have relied entirely on public statements by Government leaders and responsible officials. The statements are either summarized or excerpted verbatim.

The Guide is not itself designed as a commentary, and contains no interpretative opinion, although the choice of excerpts and statements inevitably requires editorial discretion. Our purpose, therefore, is to assemble in one collection materials which will give to the interested reader a basic reference source on Canadian policies in the field of peace and security, and, at the same time, to indicate the scope for further enquiry.

In organizing the contents, we have chosen to follow the subject order identified in the mandate of the Institute, viz: arms control and disarmament, defence, and conflict resolution. The reader may wish to note that the last category - conflict resolution - has been defined for the present purposes as Canadian responses to major regional conflict issues.

Each entry is organized under five headings, as follows:

Background provides an account of the basic issue. It seeks to avoid excessive detail, but to draw on recent material as appropriate in order to set the context of current policy issues. Where Canadian policy prior to 1987 was integral to the development of the issue itself, or where it is necessary for an understanding of the current Canadian position, it is included under this heading.

Current Canadian Position is based on statements by Ministers and responsible officials, and identifies recent developments in Canadian policy.

Parliamentary Comment is intended primarily to capture the formal response of the opposition parties. For the most part it relies on statements and questions in the House of Commons by designated spokespersons on foreign and defence policy. Committee hearings have been used primarily in the Background section, and when appropriate, in describing the current Canadian position.

Current References is designed for the most part to indicate only some of the most recent materials relevant to the issue; the section is not intended to be an extensive reference list.

Further Reading contains a limited number of earlier references which the reader may wish to consult for more detailed background.

This year's Guide differs in certain respects from last year's, in part reflecting changing developments on the national and international scene. The number of individual entries has been reduced from 36 to 31, by means of the following changes:

- the sections on "SALT II Compliance," "A Comprehensive Nuclear Freeze," "Nuclear Winter," and "Canada-US: SDI Research" have all been eliminated, for lack of current developments;
- the section on "Biological Weapons" has been consolidated with that on "Chemical Weapons," to form "Chemical and Biological Weapons";
- the section on "Nuclear and Space Arms Negotiations" has been split into three separate entries: "START," "INF", and "Defence and Space Arms," the latter incorporating last year's section on "The ABM Treaty"; and
- an entirely new section has been added on the Third Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament (UNSSOD III), held during 1988.

In addition, the section on "Comprehensive Test Ban" has been renamed "Nuclear Testing," to reflect more accurately the range of topics encompassed (from ratification of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty to new proposals for a lower threshold or quota of tests). Similarly, the sections on "Canada as a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone," "The Non-Proliferation Treaty," and "Arctic Sovereignty and Surveillance" have been renamed "Canada and Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones," "Nuclear Non-Proliferation," and "Arctic Sovereignty and Security," respectively, again to reflect their broader scope.

Finally, Section III on "Conflict Resolution" has been reorganized along regional lines, rather than by individual country or conflict, so as to encompass conflicts that would not otherwise merit inclusion as separate

entries. Thus, the previous section on "Afghanistan" now falls within "South Asia"; "Central America" remains as before; "The Iran-Iraq War," "The Israeli-Arab Conflict," and "Lebanon" all fall within "The Middle East"; "Libya" within "North Africa"; and "South Africa" within "Sub-Saharan Africa," while a new section on "East Asia and the Pacific" has been added. The section on "Cyprus" has been subsumed under "Peacekeeping and Observation."

The appendices remain as before (with updating).

The individual entries were researched and written by Peter Gizewski, Michael Holmes, and Francine Lecours of the Institute's Research Division. Mr. Gizewski was responsible for entry numbers 4, 6, 10, 12, 15, 17, 19, and 22; Mr. Holmes for numbers 1-3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 18, 20-21, and 31; and Ms. Lecours for numbers 8, 13, 16, 23, and 24-30. In addition, Brad Feasey of the CIIPS Public Programmes Division contributed entry number 14, on UNSSOD III.

Ron Purver, Research Associate, and Roger Hill, Research Director, have edited the volume, Mr. Purver being responsible primarily for those entries submitted in English (i.e., those by Messrs. Gizewski, Holmes and Feasey); and Mr. Hill for those submitted in French (i.e., those by Ms. Lecours).

Once again, the authors and editors owe a special debt of gratitude to Doina Cioiu, now Administrative Assistant of the Research Division, for her tireless and invaluable work in guiding the manuscript through its various stages from beginning to end. Thanks are also due to H el ene Samson and Eva Bild of the Public Programmes Division for copy-editing of French- and English-language entries, respectively.

SECTION I - ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

The Institute welcomes comments on the Guide's utility and format, as well as suggestions for improvement. All such communications should be addressed to:

Background

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In January 1985 the Soviet Union agreed to begin negotiations "concerning the reduction of strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons, taking into account their interrelationships." Known as the Nuclear and Space Arms Talks (NSAT), the discussions have been divided into three distinct negotiations, involving strategic nuclear arms, intermediate-range nuclear arms, and defence and space weapons.

An official name has been selected for the group dealing with strategic nuclear arms, though it is often referred to by the name of the earlier Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). START, which ended without agreement in December 1984, was preceded by the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I (1969-72) and II (1972-79). Each of these negotiations dealt with intercontinental strategic nuclear weapons. Strategic weapons are generally defined as those weapons capable of reaching the territory of one superpower from that of another (specified in SALT II as those with a range in excess of 5500 km).

When the new START negotiations began on 27 March 1985, the opening positions of both sides demonstrated little change from those taken in the previous talks. By the end of the first round of the new negotiations (23 April 1985), the Soviet Union had suggested a track on

SECTION I - ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

1. NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS (NST): STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS

Background

On 8 January 1985 the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to begin negotiations "concerning space and nuclear arms, both strategic and intermediate-range, with all the questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship." Known as the Nuclear and Space Arms Talks (NST), the discussions have been divided into three distinct negotiations, involving: strategic nuclear arms, intermediate-range nuclear arms, and defence and space weapons.

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negotiations (23 April 1985), the Soviet Union had suggested a freeze on the nuclear arsenals of both sides. A reduction of strategic offensive arms by one-quarter as an opening move leading to deeper mutual cuts, and a ban on all cruise missiles with a range of over 600 km. The United States had suggested limits of 5000 ballistic missile warheads, 400 heavy bombers, and 850 ballistic missile launchers.

On 30 September 1985 the Soviet Union presented a new proposal calling for a 50 per cent reduction in strategic launchers and a 6000-warhead ceiling, with no more than 60 per cent of the warheads allowed on any one leg of the strategic triad (air-, land- and sea-based weapon systems).

The United States presented a counter-proposal on 1 November calling for ceilings of 4500 on ballistic missile warheads, 1500 on air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs), 3000 on ICBM warheads, and 350 on heavy bombers, together with a 50 per cent cut in the Soviet Union's aggregate throw-weight (the total weight that can be thrust over a given range by a ballistic missile). Both sides agreed that reductions would take place over a period of five to eight years.

At their 19-21 November 1985 Summit in Geneva, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev agreed in principle to 50 per cent reductions in their strategic nuclear arsenals, together with effective measures of verification.

On 15 January 1986, General Secretary Gorbachev made a public statement outlining a Soviet proposal to eliminate all nuclear weapons by the year 2000. Reductions would occur in three stages over a fifteen-year period, culminating in a universal accord to prevent such weapons from coming into existence again.

At the second summit meeting between the two leaders, in Reykjavik, Iceland, on 11-12 October 1986, the Soviet Union proposed to eliminate all nuclear weapons over a ten-year period. The United States proposed the elimination of all ballistic missiles within ten years. There was agreement that in the first five years each side would reduce to 6000 their strategic warheads and to 1600 their strategic launchers. The summit talks broke down, however, over the issue of strategic defence, which the Soviets linked to any possible accord on offensive arms.

Some limited progress on the strategic forces issue was made at the 7-10 December 1987 Washington Summit. At its close, the superpowers agreed on the following points: a 50 per cent reduction in strategic offensive arms; a 6000-warhead ceiling with no more than 1600 intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (ICBMs and SLBMs) and bombers; a sub-ceiling of 4900 ICBM and SLBM warheads (permitting up to 1100 air-launched cruise missiles); a 50 per cent cut in the number of Soviet "heavy" ICBMs to 154, with ten warheads each; a ceiling on the aggregate throw-weight of ICBMs and SLBMs at 50 per cent of the current Soviet level; a separate ceiling (outside the 6000 warhead limit) on long-range, nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs); and certain methods of verification of an accord. In addition, the two sides agreed on the "counting rules" for determining how many warheads would be assumed to be carried by each type of ballistic missile.

Nevertheless, a number of critical issues remained in dispute, leaving many officials pessimistic over the possibility of the superpowers reaching an accord in 1988. These problems included:

- methods of verification for SLCMs, given the difficulty in differentiating between nuclear and conventionally armed missiles;

- the question of warhead sublimits, with the Soviets not willing to agree to the US proposal for an ICBM warhead sublimit of 3300 and desiring a "freedom-to-mix" between SLBMs and ICBMs;
- counting rules for ALCMs, with the US proposing a count of six per bomber, regardless of the number an aircraft is capable of carrying, and the Soviets demanding separate counts for each type of bomber;
- the US desire for a ban on mobile ICBMs;
- the US proposal to exclude ALCMs with ranges of under 1500 km from restrictions (while the Soviets insist on using the SALT II definition for long-range ALCMs of 600 km); and
- the reduction period itself, with the Soviets suggesting five years and the US seven.

President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev met in Moscow in late May for their fourth summit, but it was clear some time in advance that a START agreement would not be reached at the meeting. Verification, counting rules and sub-limits continued to be major stumbling blocks on the way to an accord. Following the Moscow Summit, the sides issued a Joint Document outlining the meeting's achievements. In regard to START, the Document stated:

During the course of this meeting in Moscow, the exchanges on START resulted in the achievement of substantial additional common ground, particularly in the areas of ALCMs and the attempts to develop and agree, if possible, on a solution to

the problem of verification of mobile ICBMs.¹

In response to a question following the Summit's conclusion, General-Secretary Gorbachev stated that a START agreement in 1988 could not be ruled out:

I am sure that there still is a possibility to achieve a treaty this year and I'm reinforced in this optimism by the headway we have made...and also the exchange of views here....It gives me grounds to voice such an optimistic assessment.²

Current Canadian Position

Following the signing of the INF agreement on 8 December 1987, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney expressed the Government's views on the developments in arms control that took place at the Washington Summit:

Security is indivisible. The elimination of intermediate-range weapons benefits all Western countries. But the weapons that directly threaten Canada - destabilizing intercontinental missiles, as well as nuclear-armed submarines and bombers - are not affected by this agreement. We therefore especially welcome the progress that has been made on strategic weapons at this Summit. Canada hopes that the INF Treaty will now provide the momentum for reducing the huge number of nuclear weapons that remain, and lead to an agreement in Moscow next spring. This would meet the fundamental Canadian priority - stable security at much lower levels of armaments.³

¹ New York Times, 2 June 1988, p. 17.

² New York Times, 2 June 1988, p. 18.

³ Office of the Prime Minister, Press Release, 10 December 1987, p. 2.

In his cross-country tour, Ambassador for Disarmament Douglas Roche was optimistic over the direction in which arms control negotiations were heading:

An historical process of disarmament is actually underway. These achievements represent a success for those countries, like Canada, that have been pressing both superpowers hard for radical reductions in nuclear weapons.

He continued:

At their Reykjavik Summit of 1986, both President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev suddenly projected a vision of a nuclear-free planet, which startled the world with its implication that East-West confrontation might possibly give way to a new approach to international cooperation. This vision requires many steps to bring it about, but the continuing discussion of the full meaning of Reykjavik itself represents a new sense of direction for the international community.⁴

Caution has been expressed, however, due to the complexities of the arms control issue. The Prime Minister stated this clearly while speaking in reference to the agreement-in-principle on the INF negotiations in October 1987:

The next step, reduction of long-range intercontinental missiles, will undoubtedly be even more arduous and protracted than the negotiations which will culminate with

⁴ "Beyond the Summit: the Future of Disarmament (Address by Mr. Douglas Roche, Ambassador for Disarmament, 8 December 1987)," Department of External Affairs Statement 87/71, p. 1.

the Reagan-Gorbachev Summit next month. But if both sides continue to manage the issue with care, there is every prospect for further mutual reductions.⁵

Parliamentary Comment

On 9 December 1987, NDP member Pauline Jewett asked the Prime Minister whether and to what extent Canada had expressed its concern on arms control, and on ALCMs and SLCMs in particular, to the superpowers. The Prime Minister replied:

On the communications we have had on this very important subject, we have conveyed the views of the Government of Canada in regard to the steps which we believe ought to be taken to secure further reductions in the possible deployment of nuclear arms.⁶

The question of cruise missiles and the START agenda was raised again in January by Liberal Member Douglas Frith:

...in a post-INF world both superpowers will be putting more emphasis on air-launched and sea-launched cruise missile weaponry systems. Therefore, today it is more important than ever for the two superpowers to put cruise missile systems on the START agenda as a priority.

Why does Canada not cease the testing of the cruise and demand that Canada's long-term policy objectives and defence interests be given top priority in that START agenda?

⁵ Office of the Prime Minister, "Notes for an Address Before the Bilderberg Dinner," 1 October 1987, p. 4.

⁶ Commons Debates, 9 December 1987, pp. 11626-27.

Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark responded:

...the question of cruise missiles is included in the START negotiations. It is a matter of negotiation between the United States and the Soviet Union. If an ally of the United States took an action that broke the solidarity of the West on questions in negotiation with the Soviet Union, that would weaken the prospects of progress being made in these negotiations.⁷

Mr. Clark later declared: "What worked on the INF can work on strategic systems."⁸

The issue of cruise missiles and START was raised by Ms Jewett again in March 1988. She stated:

As far as I can determine, the Government has not pressed upon the superpowers the absolute necessity of including cuts on both sides in cruise missile arsenals at the START talks in Geneva.⁹

Later in the debate, Progressive Conservative member Barbara Sparrow replied:

Canada has consistently supported the agreed USA and Soviet objective of a 50 per cent cut in their strategic arsenals. We have also advocated the negotiation of effective limits on long range air and sea launched cruise missiles. In addition, we have regularly conveyed our views to both negotiating parties on how this joint aim of radical

⁷ Commons Debates, 19 January 1988, p. 12059.

⁸ Ibid., p. 12059.

⁹ Commons Debates, 25 March 1988, p. 14157.

reductions in strategic weaponry can best be realized.¹⁰

Optimistic viewpoints were expressed in the House of Commons in the aftermath of the Moscow Summit. On 3 June, NDP Member Mike Cassidy paid tribute to the superpower leaders by stating:

...all Canadians, men and women, will want to congratulate President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev for this week's Summit in Moscow, not so much for specific successes as for the feeling that the two countries are learning to live together and beginning to reduce the arms race that threatens the whole world with nuclear destruction.¹¹

External Affairs Minister Joe Clark responded to a question from Progressive Conservative Member Dave Nickerson by outlining the accomplishments of the Moscow Summit:

...a great deal was accomplished at the Summit between President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev. There has not been the conclusion of a START treaty yet. As the Hon. Member knows, that is the number one priority in the view of the Government of Canada.

However, significant progress was made on that question and on the signing of verification protocols that will allow the ratification of other important arms control agreements. We are continuing to make steady progress toward effective regimes of arms control. That has been highlighted and given real impetus by the meeting in Moscow between the President and Mr. Gorbachev.¹²

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 14158.

¹¹ Commons Debates, 3 June 1988, p. 16104.

¹² Ibid., p. 16112.

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Canada-US: Cruise Missile Testing

Nuclear and Space Arms Talks: Defence and Space Arms

Nuclear and Space Arms Talks: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces

2. NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS: INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

Background

Intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) consist of non-strategic, theatre-based nuclear weapons. Both long-range (LRINF:1000-5500km) and short-range (SRINF:500-1000 km) weapons are included in the INF category. INF have long been deployed in Western Europe, as well as in other military theatres (for example, Soviet Asia). These weapon systems gained prominence in the late 1970s with the Soviet deployment of SS-20 ballistic missiles and the resulting NATO decision in December 1979 to modernize its LRINF forces in Western Europe.

In what is known as the "two-track" decision, NATO began a parallel process of pursuing arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union for LRINF while proceeding toward deployment of new weapons systems in 1983. The weapons involved included 108 Pershing II ballistic missiles and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs), stationed in five NATO nations: the United Kingdom (160 GLCMs), Italy (112 GLCMs), Belgium (48 GLCMs), the Netherlands (48 GLCMs), and West Germany (96 GLCMs and 108 Pershing IIs).

Preliminary meetings between the US and the USSR on INF began in October 1980. On 18 November 1981, President Reagan announced the "zero option" as the United States' opening position, calling on the USSR to dismantle all of its INF globally in return for the US cancelling its planned LRINF deployment. The Soviets did not accept the "zero option" and negotiations continued without result until the arrival of the first GLCMs in the United Kingdom on 15 November 1983, after which the Soviets

broke off the talks.

On 8 January 1985, US Secretary of State George Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko signed a joint communiqué outlining the nature and objectives of new negotiations "concerning space and nuclear arms, both strategic and intermediate-range, with all the questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship." These negotiations, known as the Nuclear and Space Arms Talks (NST), began on 27 March 1985.

Various proposals on INF were put forth by both sides in the opening months of the negotiations. On 15 January 1986, General Secretary Gorbachev proposed to eliminate all nuclear weapons in three stages by the year 2000. In the first stage, the US and the USSR would eliminate all US and Soviet INF in the European zone. In early February the Soviets stated that an INF agreement was possible without prior limitations on the US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The United States, on 24 February 1986, proposed a time-table of reductions to eliminate all US and Soviet INF deployments worldwide.

On 11-12 October 1986, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev met for their second summit meeting at Reykjavik, Iceland. The leaders agreed, as a package separate from strategic forces, to eliminate all LRINF missiles in Europe and retain 100 LRINF warheads elsewhere. SRINF missile levels in Europe were to be frozen and dealt with in future negotiations. By the close of the summit, however, General Secretary Gorbachev had re-linked INF to an agreement on a larger package including strategic and space arms.

On 28 February 1987, General Secretary Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union would again separate the INF issue from the larger package. The Soviets also proposed a separate negotiation for SRINF and the

withdrawal of these weapons from East Germany and Czechoslovakia.

In the summer of 1987 the pace toward an INF agreement increased dramatically. On 21 July General Secretary Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union would agree to eliminate all INF missiles rather than maintaining the 100 in Asia. Throughout August, pressure built up on NATO to agree to dismantle 72 West German-owned Pershing 1A SRINF missiles, armed with US-owned nuclear warheads. At the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva on 6 August, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze stated that "72 nuclear warheads stand between us and an agreement on intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles." On 26 August West German Chancellor Kohl announced the Federal Republic's willingness to get rid of the Pershing 1As, given certain preconditions. These included prior ratification of a treaty between the US and USSR to ban INF worldwide, with verification questions resolved satisfactorily and a time-table for dismantling agreed upon. Further, Kohl stated that the threat West Germany faced from SRINF in Czechoslovakia and Poland must be eliminated. The Soviet reaction to Kohl's statement was hesitant but positive.

In a joint statement 18 September, the US and the USSR announced an "agreement in principle to conclude a treaty" on INF. Later, a procedure for dismantling the Pershing 1A missiles was agreed upon. This involved the Federal Republic destroying its missiles by the time all American and Soviet missiles were destroyed.

In Washington on 8 December 1987 President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev signed the INF Treaty, banning all US and Soviet land-based INF. The Treaty is historic for a number of reasons. First, it eliminates an entire class of nuclear weapons, calling for the destruction of 857 missiles with 1,667 warheads, currently deployed by

the Soviets; and 429 single-warhead missiles deployed by the US. Soviet and American INF missiles in storage are also included in the Treaty, bringing the total number of Soviet missiles to be destroyed to 1,836 and American to 867. SRINF, including SS-12/22 and -23 missiles on the Soviet side and Pershing 1A missiles on the American, must be destroyed within 18 months of ratification of the Treaty. LRINF, including SS-4, SS-5, and SS-20 ballistic missiles and SSC-X-4 cruise missiles (stored, but not yet deployed) on the Soviet side and Pershing IIs and GLCMs on the American, must be destroyed within three years.

The Treaty is historic, second, because of its extensive verification measures. For the first time ever, for a period of thirteen years, each side will station inspectors outside one missile production site on the other's territory--in the Soviet Union, the Votkinsk SS-20 and SS-25 assembly plant, and in the United States the former Pershing II production plant in Magna, Utah. Also for thirteen years, each side is allowed to conduct on-site, short-notice inspection of all INF installations that have been used for storage, repair, basing, and deployment of missiles, including over 100 sites in the U.S., Western Europe, the USSR, and Eastern Europe. Twenty such inspections per calendar year can be conducted during the first three years of the Treaty, fifteen per year during the next five years, and ten per year during the remaining five years. In addition, one factory producing GLCM launchers on each side will be open to short-notice inspection. The Treaty itself is of unlimited duration. Between 30 to 90 days after its entry into force, each party will be allowed to inspect all operating missile and support bases to verify the number of missile launchers, support structures and support equipment.

Although the vast majority of commentators have supported the Treaty, it has been criticized for including only a small percentage of the

superpowers' missile arsenals; allowing the INF's intended targets to be covered by other weapon systems; leaving NATO vulnerable to the Warsaw Pact's conventional forces; and containing verification provisions insufficient to ensure full compliance.

Following the defeat of a number of proposed "killer amendments", the US Senate approved the INF Treaty on 28 May 1988, by a vote of 93 to 5. The instruments of ratification were exchanged by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev at the Moscow Summit on 1 June.

Current Canadian Position

In a statement issued on 10 December 1987, the Prime Minister declared the Canadian Government's approval of the signing of the INF Treaty:

I am sure that all Canadians applaud this treaty as a pragmatic step towards a better and safer world. It is a celebration of common sense over adversity.¹

On the day the agreement was signed, Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark spoke of its importance, as well as of the importance of NATO unity and steadfastness:

This agreement is an unprecedented breakthrough in efforts to reverse the nuclear arms spiral and engage in actual reductions in nuclear arms rather than just their limitation. The INF accord will result in the complete elimination of an entire category of nuclear missiles and is therefore the first nuclear disarmament agreement in modern history.

¹ Office of the Prime Minister, Statement, 10 December 1987.

The outcome of the INF negotiations has reaffirmed the validity of NATO's December, 1979, "double-track" decision. It underlines the important role Alliance unity and solidarity have played throughout. The difficult decisions taken over the past 8 years on the issue of INF have had a direct bearing on the successful outcome of these negotiations. Canada is satisfied with the results and looks forward with anticipation to similarly successful conclusions to other arms control negotiations currently underway.²

In his cross-Canada speaking tour in December 1987, Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament Douglas Roche drew out some of the broader implications of the signing of the Treaty:

Clearly, the agreement to eliminate all medium and shorter-range nuclear missiles (INF) is a breakthrough in re-building East-West relations. For the first time an entire class of weapons will be destroyed. Although the agreement will eliminate only 3 percent of the world's nuclear arsenal, its political significance is enormous. The bilateral negotiating process has, in fact, achieved a concrete result.³

Parliamentary Comment

In the House of Commons on 8 December 1987, comments were heard from representatives of each Party in regard to the signing of the INF Treaty. Progressive Conservative Member Alex Kindy spoke of the need to remain wary of the Soviet Union's record in complying with international agreements:

² DEA, News Release No. 245, 8 December 1987.

³ SSEA, Statement 87/71, 8 December 1987, page 1.

The event is the signing of a treaty to ban INF range nuclear missiles. Some people see it as a move in the direction of nuclear disarmament. Who would quarrel with that proposition?

The only problem is that the U.S., a democracy, is signing a treaty with the biggest colonial power of the twentieth century. The record of the Soviet Union in respecting treaties is dismal....Yalta is an agreement to hold free elections in Poland and other satellite countries. We are still waiting forty years later for these free elections....

Let us put the signing of the treaty in its proper perspective.⁴

Liberal Member Marcel Prud'homme saw the agreement in a more optimistic light, referring to the trend toward openness or glasnost in Soviet society:

... I rejoice at the fact that the two most powerful men on this earth can come to an agreement.

I publicly applaud the open-mindedness which now exists in the USSR thanks to the new Soviet leader Mr. Gorbachev. I hope that this openness to new ideas will meet a corresponding attitude in the Western world.

I hope that this would only be the first step toward the real summit of total disarmament, the real summit toward better comprehension and a better world.⁵

Mr. Bill Blaikie of the New Democratic Party (NDP) spoke of the agreement as raising a new hope for the future. He cautioned, however, that the INF Treaty must be used as a first step in a continuing process:

The agreement to be signed is a first, in that it eliminates

⁴ Commons Debates, 8 December 1987, p. 11583.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 11583-4.

a whole class of nuclear weapons, but it must become the building block upon which future agreements to rid the world eventually of nuclear weapons are built. Otherwise, it will have been an occasion for false hope.⁶

The following day, 9 December 1987, Mr. Blaikie referred to the contribution of the peace movement in Canada and elsewhere in helping to bring about the INF agreement.⁷

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⁶ Ibid., p. 11584.

⁷ Commons Debates, 9 December 1987, p. 11620.

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¹ Ibid., p. 21-22. Last sentence is corrected.

² Common Debates, 2 December 1987, p. 11-12.

3. NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS: DEFENCE AND SPACE ARMS

Background

The Defence and Space Talks began in Geneva on 27 March 1985, as part of the Nuclear and Space Arms Talks (NST) between the Soviet Union and the United States. The NST also deals with long-range strategic and intermediate-range theatre nuclear weapons control. The aim of the Defence and Space Talks is to prevent an arms race in outer space and in strategic defences. This issue has drawn considerable attention since the announcement by President Reagan on 23 March 1983 of the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI or, as it is often referred to, Star Wars).

SDI, in its most basic form, is a plan to provide defence against incoming ballistic missiles. As conceptualized at present, SDI calls for research, development and testing of new weapon technologies, many of which would be based in outer space. These weapons may include "exotic" technologies such as lasers and particle beams, as well as more conventional anti-satellite (ASAT) and anti-ballistic missile (ABM) weapons. Naturally, there is a close link between this project and the status and future of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty signed between the Soviet Union and the United States in May 1972.

The ABM Treaty itself was the result of increased interest in anti-ballistic missile defence, on the part of both the US and USSR, throughout the 1960s. In the United States, the ABM issue sparked a prolonged public debate, centered on two main concerns: the ease with which the defences could be overcome by large numbers of cheaper offensive missiles, and the possibility that ABM deployments might

destabilize deterrence based on the concept of mutual assured destruction. This concept, which had become the basis of nuclear deterrence, assumes the impossibility of an adequate defence against nuclear weapons.

The ABM Treaty prohibits both sides from deploying a nation-wide ABM defence and limits each to two ABM deployment areas, later amended on 3 July 1974 to one area. The intent of the Treaty is outlined in Article I (2):

Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defence of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defence, and not to deploy ABM systems for defence of an individual region except as provided for in Article III [establishing two specific deployment areas] of this Treaty.

Extensive verification measures are provided for in the Treaty, which also established the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) to deal with questions of interpretation and compliance. The United States Senate ratified the Treaty by a vote of 88 to 2.

During the 1970s both the United States and the Soviet Union continued research into ballistic missile defence. In 1976, the US dismantled the ABM system it had deployed at a missile base in Grand Forks, North Dakota. The Soviet Union has kept its ABM deployment around Moscow.

In his March 1983 announcement, President Reagan stated that the United States would pursue a new programme, SDI, aimed at providing a defence which would make nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete". Although he initially stated that SDI was only a research programme and would be conducted within the limits of the ABM Treaty, the Administration has put forward, and moved towards acceptance of, a "new" interpretation of the

Treaty which would allow the US to carry out tests and development of systems previously considered prohibited by it.

This new interpretation, also known as the "broad" interpretation, would allow the testing and development of ABM systems based on new physical principles and would prohibit only their actual deployment. The Reagan Administration has stated that it believes this broad interpretation to be legally valid.

The interpretation of the ABM Treaty has, therefore, become an issue of considerable debate, centering on how ABM systems based on new technologies are dealt with by the Treaty. The key to the debate lies in Article V of the Treaty which states that:

Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.

Proponents of the broad interpretation maintain that the systems and components referred to in Article V are defined by Article II. The use of the phrase "currently consisting of" as part of the definition of a system in Article II, according to this interpretation, means that only systems based on 1972 technology (current at the time the Treaty was signed) are banned. This would mean that systems based on new technology in the basing modes listed were not affected.

The narrow interpretation holds that Article V clearly bans all sea-based, space-based or mobile land-based systems and components, whether they are based on 1972 technology or not. The phrase "currently consisting of" was used in Article II only to demonstrate the functional nature of the definition, not to exclude future technologies.

The Soviet Union has stated that it believes the narrow interpretation to be the only valid interpretation of the Treaty. Indeed, until 1985 this was the only interpretation held by the United States. The Soviets have stood by this position at the Defence and Space Talks, insisting that the testing of ABM systems and components must be restricted by the traditional interpretation. The general approach of the United States at the Defence and Space Talks consists of discussing the effects of the relationship between offence- and defence-based systems on the strategic balance, negotiating a smooth transition from an offense-dominated to a defence-dominated military structure, and resolving concerns over possible Soviet violations of the ABM Treaty.

At the Washington Summit in December 1987, both sides agreed to establish a non-withdrawal period of some (as yet undetermined) length for the ABM Treaty. Currently the United States is suggesting six years, while the Soviet Union has put forward a ten-year proposal.

On 15 January 1988, at the ninth round of the NST talks, the Soviets tabled a draft protocol to the proposed Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) Treaty. During the 10 year non-withdrawal period suggested in the proposal, testing of ABM systems and components would be restricted by the narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty. The Soviets have consistently held that agreement on SDI and the ABM Treaty must be reached before a START agreement is possible.

The United States rejected the Soviet-proposed Protocol, arguing that a START Treaty should not be tied to restrictions on SDI. On January 22, the United States presented a draft treaty on ballistic missile defence (BMD). The draft was intended to provide a basis for a transition to a defence-oriented military structure by allowing for development, testing, and deployment of advanced missile defences.

In the United States, recently, pressure has increased on the Reagan Administration for greater flexibility in its position on SDI. Congress has consistently cut back proposed budget appropriations for SDI research. Congress has also continued to insist that spending that does occur on SDI-related projects must be kept within the confines of the narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty.

Current Canadian Position

The Government of Canada has declared that it is in favour of the narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty. Following a meeting with Mr. Paul Nitze, Special Advisor to President Reagan on arms control issues, on 5 March 1987, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark stated the Canadian position:

The Canadian Government has consistently supported the USA in its adherence to the strict interpretation of the ABM Treaty. Any move to a broader interpretation could have significant political and strategic ramifications for international stability and security....Any unilateral action by either party to the Treaty that could have a negative impact on the current strategic balance would be regarded by Canada with profound concern.¹

On 26 March 1985, Canada and the other NATO allies, as well as Australia, Japan and Israel, received a letter from US Secretary of Defence Caspar Weinberger. Weinberger reassured US allies that they were to be included in the benefits of the SDI programme and the decision-making process, and invited them to become participants in the research stage of the

¹ DEA Statement 87/14, 5 March 1987.

programme, insofar as they were allowed under the limits of the ABM Treaty.

On 7 September 1985, Canada refused the offer of government-to-government participation in the research programme but left open the possibility that private companies could compete for SDI contracts. The Canadian Government has expressed its belief that while it does not want to get involved directly in SDI research, it is only prudent to have some such research pursued in the West. The Canadian view was elaborated in March 1987 following the Nitze visit:

Canada has expressed its support for the Strategic Defence Initiative research program as a prudent measure in light of significant similar Soviet activity in the field of ballistic missile defence. We believe, however, that any transition to a greater dependence on strategic defences should be undertaken on a mutually agreed basis by both superpowers and should be combined with significant reductions in strategic offensive forces....[T]he SDI program should continue to be pursued within the current restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty. We welcome the assurance by Secretary of State Shultz that the USA Administration considers premature any decision on deployment of a ballistic missile defence at this point.²

In his speech before a meeting of the North Atlantic Assembly in Quebec City in May 1987, Prime Minister Mulroney stated that strategic defences must meet the criteria that were outlined previously by Mr. Nitze--cost effectiveness, survivability, and affordability--along with two other criteria: "extreme care must be taken to ensure that defences are not integrated with existing forces in such a way as to create fears of a first strike" and "we cannot allow strategic defences to undermine the

² DEA Statement 87/14, 5 March 1987.

arms control process...."³

Parliamentary Comment

Upon learning of the involvement of the Canadian Commercial Corporation, a Crown Corporation, as a prime contractor for a SDI contract, Liberal member Douglas Frith, in November 1987, asked External Affairs Minister Joe Clark to explain the Government's guidelines concerning such involvement. Mr. Clark stated:

The Canadian Commercial Corporation is required by law... to act as an agent for Canadian companies that are involved in contracts with the United States Department of Defence. That is the exclusive and total nature of the role of the Canadian Commercial Corporation in this transaction. It is mandated by law, a law that predated the Strategic Defence Initiative.⁴

Mr. Frith pursued the questioning, asking for an amendment to the law in order to disallow such involvement:

Either a Crown corporation which is an agent of the federal Government will become involved in a peripheral or direct way, or it will not. It seems clear to me that it is in violation of the Prime Minister's commitment to the House that the Government of Canada, which I believe includes Crown corporations, should not be involved in star wars projects.⁵

³ Office of the Prime Minister, "Notes for an Address before the North Atlantic Assembly", 23 May 1987, p. 3.

⁴ Commons Debates, 16 November 1987, p. 10829.

⁵ Ibid., p. 10829.

In response Mr. Clark reaffirmed the Government's position on SDI research:

The policy with respect to the Strategic Defence Initiative is very clear. There will be no government-to-government involvement. There is no government-to-government involvement.

It was also made very clear in the decision by the Government of Canada at the time of the announcement of the U.S. program that we did not intend to use the fact that research or other activities that had previously been allowed between Canadian companies and American companies would be eliminated or prohibited simply because the Strategic Defence Initiative process was in place. We are dealing with an arrangement that predates the Strategic Defence Initiative, that uses the Canadian Commercial Corporation in its agency role exclusively, which is among the roles for which it was established.⁶

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4. CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Background

The use of chemical weapons during the first world war led the international community to increase its efforts to eliminate them. Such efforts were also extended to the related problem posed by the prospect of biological agents being used as weapons of warfare. By 1925 these initiatives resulted in the signing of the Geneva Protocol, which prohibits the use of "asphyxiating poisonous or other gases, analogous liquids, materials or devices as well as bacteriological (biological) methods of warfare".

The Protocol's failure to ban the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons, however, led to a growing recognition of the need for more comprehensive restrictions. This goal has been actively pursued in various United Nations disarmament bodies, particularly during the last twenty years.

By 1971, the difficulties of concluding a single agreement banning both chemical and biological weapons led to a decision in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) to consider them separately. Progress in the area of biological weapons control soon followed, producing a convention signed in 1972 which came into force three years later. Considered the first international agreement requiring actual disarmament measures, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) prohibits the development, production, stockpiling and transfer of bacteriological or poisonous weapons, and calls for the destruction of existing stocks. As of 1 July 1987, the Convention had 108 signatories and 26 parties.

The BWC has been subject to two review conferences aimed at ensuring its effectiveness, in 1980 and 1986. Among the concerns addressed at both review conferences were the ability of the Convention to cover potential weapons developments made possible by new technologies, such as recombinant deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA); the absence of provisions restricting research on biological and toxic agents, together with the possible weapons applications of such research; and problems of verifying compliance with the Convention.

Such issues were highlighted by a stream of allegations beginning in the mid-1970s concerning the development and use of biological and toxic weapons by the superpowers and their allies. Particularly noteworthy were charges that the Soviet Union and its allies had used toxin weapons in Southeast Asia (i.e. yellow rain), and the inability to establish the facts conclusively.

In an attempt to strengthen the BWC further, the final declaration of the Second Review Conference included a new arrangement allowing any state to call a meeting of an advisory group of experts if a problem arises concerning application of the Convention. It also requires signatories to begin work on measures to prevent or reduce any "ambiguities, doubts and suspicions concerning bacteriological activities and to improve international cooperation on the peaceful uses of microbiology."

Specific measures included an exchange of information concerning research facilities, biological products and the occurrence of rare diseases. In order to elaborate precise procedures for such exchanges, an ad hoc group of scientific and technical experts from the states parties met in Geneva from 31 March to 15 April 1987. The 1986 Review Conference had also requested that states send information to the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs. On 30 October 1987, both the United States and the Soviet Union filed reports including information on their research

centres and laboratories. A second report was filed by the United States in April 1988.

A ban on chemical weapons has been on the UN agenda since 1968. Yet progress has materialized only recently. In 1980, the forty-nation Conference on Disarmament (CD) established an Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons. By 1983, this Group had developed a consensus document identifying elements of a comprehensive treaty, and had outlined areas of agreement and disagreement.

An important step in the CD negotiations on chemical weapons was taken by the United States in 1984 when it tabled a draft treaty providing for verification by challenge inspections (i.e. short-notice, mandatory inspections of plants suspected of cheating). That year also saw general agreement that the destruction of existing chemical weapon stockpiles should be subject to systematic international inspection--although disagreement persisted over the particular inspection procedures to be used.

Concern over chemical weapons has been fed by recent allegations of their use. Since 1980, the UN Secretary General has conducted several inquiries to ascertain the truth of such charges. A series of UN reports, beginning in 1984, has confirmed that chemical weapons have been used in the Gulf War by Iraq against Iran. On 1 March 1988 Iraq was again reported to have used chemical weapons--this time against its Kurdish population. A UN investigation of the alleged attacks was undertaken 17 March-4 April 1988. On 26 April, a report on the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war was presented by the UN Secretary-General to the Security Council. Although the report indicated the use of both mustard and nerve gas in the conflict, it did not identify the countries responsible for such action.

In Geneva, progress towards a chemical weapons ban has been made in recent years, as the negotiators have moved closer to agreement on the definition of chemical weapons and on procedures for their destruction. Detailed provisions have been elaborated on the verification of declarations of existing stocks, and the closure and elimination of production facilities, while useful work has also been done on the guidelines for an international inspectorate. On 11 August 1987 the USSR tabled a proposal on compulsory on-site inspection which came close to that put forth by the United States in 1984. The Soviet proposal accepted the concept of challenge inspection of all chemical weapon facilities with no right of refusal. It also provided for the entry of inspection teams within 48 hours of a challenge (previously the Soviets had insisted on the right to veto requests for challenge inspection, and did not require that inspections be so expedient).

On 3 October 1987, the representatives of forty-five nations visited a Soviet chemical weapons facility at Shikhany, on the Volga River south of Moscow. The foreign delegations were shown 19 different types of chemical munitions, as well as a mobile complex used for the destruction of chemical weapons. Bilateral talks between the superpowers also resulted in arrangements whereby the United States would visit a Soviet facility devoted to the destruction of chemical weapons at Chapayesk, while the Soviets would visit an American chemical weapon facility at Tooele, Utah. During the Tooele visit, which took place 19-20 November 1987, Soviet military experts viewed various elements of the United States stockpile. The American visit to the Soviet facility is scheduled to take place this year.

On 26 December 1987, the Soviet Union declared the size of its chemical weapons stockpile as being no more than 50,000 tons of poisonous agent,

all located on Soviet territory. Superpower bilateral talks on chemical weapons are now moving toward negotiation of arrangements on data exchange.

In the meantime, however, after a hiatus of 18 years, the United States has renewed its production of chemical weapons to counter the Soviet Union's chemical arsenal. On 16 December 1987 it began final assembly of its first binary artillery shell. Plans for the production of a chemical weapon deterrent also continue in France.

Notwithstanding the progress made on a chemical weapons convention in the CD, several issues require further attention. These include: a definition of chemical weapons; verification difficulties, given the ease with which such weapons can be manufactured; the cost, size and scope of an international monitoring agency; the procedural details for instituting challenge inspection; and the problem of ensuring the broadest possible participation in a chemical weapons convention.

Canada has signed and ratified both the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. Since the conclusion of the BWC, Canada has shown great interest in the elaboration of verification measures to strengthen its enforcement. Moreover, successive Canadian governments have sought to help define and promote a chemical weapons convention, as well as to ensure its effective verification. The conclusion of such a ban constitutes one of the six major goals in arms control and disarmament of the present Canadian government.

Current Canadian Position

Among Canada's recent contributions to biological and chemical arms

control have been its production of a Handbook for the Investigation of Allegations of the Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons in 1985; its sponsorship of three investigations of alleged Soviet use of toxin weapons in Southeast Asia;¹ and the submission to the CD of various working papers relating to a chemical weapons ban. In 1986 Canada tabled a document dealing with an international system for classifying chemical substances, and on 9 July 1987, Canada and Norway submitted a working paper on the verification of alleged use of chemical weapons. This paper contained proposals to be included in the annex to article IX of a future convention.²

Canada was an active participant at the Ad Hoc meeting of scientific and technical experts held in Geneva in March and April 1987 in accordance with the provisions of the Final Declaration of the second review conference on the BWC. There Canada contributed to a better understanding of the utility of adopting criteria relating to disease outbreaks, as well as containment standards for research facilities.³

¹ Handbook for the Investigation of Allegations of the Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, Ottawa, Department of External Affairs, November 1985; Butler, G. C., Report on the Use of Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia (Memo to External Affairs), 2 December 1981; Shiefer, H. B., Study of the Possible Use of Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia (A Report to the Department of External Affairs), Ottawa, 1982; Norman, J. J., and Purdon, J. J., Final Summary Report on the Investigation of Yellow Rain Samples from Southeast Asia, Ottawa, Defence Research Establishment, February 1986; Department of External Affairs, Arms Control and Disarmament Division, Conference on Disarmament: Chemical Weapons Working Papers, 1986 Session, Ottawa, June 1987; and Department of External Affairs, Arms Control and Disarmament Division, Conference on Disarmament: Chemical Weapons - Final Records (PV), 1986 Session, Ottawa, June 1987.

² CD/766, 9 July 1987.

³ "Biological Weapons: Successful Conference Outcome," The Disarmament Bulletin, Summer-Fall 1987, p. 10.

Canada has been similarly active recently on the issue of a chemical weapons convention. On 9 July 1987, Canadian Ambassador to the CD, Alan Beesley, presented a series of compendia on chemical weapons comprising documents from the 1986 CD session, as well as a report entitled "Verification: Development of a Portable Trichothecene Sensor Kit for the Detection of T-2 Mycotoxin in Human Blood Samples".⁴ Ambassador Beesley also expressed concern over the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war, as well as evidence of their development by an increasing number of countries. Nevertheless, he cautioned that negotiations should proceed with care and deliberation.⁵

Such sentiments were echoed on 13 October 1987 at the 42nd Session of the UN General Assembly by Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament Douglas Roche, who noted that "A treaty banning chemical weapons will require the most complex set of verification measures ever included in a multilateral arms control agreement."⁶

In November 1987, three resolutions were put forth in the General Assembly on chemical and biological weapons. Resolution 42/37A of which Canada was the lead sponsor, urged that efforts be intensified and that increased time be devoted to negotiations on a chemical weapons convention.⁷ Resolution 42/37B called for strict adherence to the Geneva Protocol; efforts by the Secretary General to improve the capability for

⁴ CD/PV 420, 7 July 1987.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Speech by the Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament to the 42nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly, First Committee, New York, 13 October 1987.

⁷ UNGA Resolution 42/37 (A), 30 November 1987.

timely investigations into accusations of use; and the appointment of experts for this purpose.⁸ Finally, Resolution 42/37C requested the Secretary General to provide assistance and services required for implementing the final declaration of the second review conference on the BWC, and called upon states to ratify or sign the Convention without delay if they had not yet done so.⁹ All three resolutions were adopted without a vote.

On 8 December 1987, during a cross-Canada speaking tour, Ambassador for Disarmament Douglas Roche referred to the conclusion of a chemical weapons ban as a matter of "paramount importance." Mr. Roche also called upon states to take every step to prevent the transfer of chemical weapons to other states in the interim. In this regard, he recommended following the example of countries which had established export controls on highly toxic chemicals and a warning-list procedure for other chemicals (a practice followed by Canada in co-ordination with other countries since 1984).¹⁰

Early 1988 saw additional expressions of Canadian concern over the use of chemical weapons. On 25 March 1988, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, condemned the use of such weapons against civilians in Northern Iraq. In addition, Canada asked the UN Secretary General to consider sending experts to investigate the tragedy. The government conveyed its message to Iran and instructed the Iraqi Ambassador to inform his government as well.¹¹

⁸ UNGA Resolution 42/37 (B), 30 November 1987.

⁹ UNGA Resolution 42/37 (C), 30 November 1987.

¹⁰ DEA, Statement 87/71, 8 December 1987, p. 6.

¹¹ DEA Communiqué No. 068, 25 March 1988.

On 10 March 1988, Canadian Ambassador to the CD, de Montigny Marchand, reviewed some of the outstanding verification issues relating to a chemical weapons convention. Ambassador Marchand also expressed Canada's satisfaction with recent moves by the United States and the Soviet Union on the question of data exchange. Finally, he announced that Canada intended to submit working papers to the CD on the international inspectorate for a chemical weapons convention.¹² On 31 March 1988, Canada tabled one such document entitled "Factors Involved in Determining Verification Inspectorate Personnel and Resource Requirements". The paper addressed the factors which should have an impact on the size of the inspectorate and technical support staff, associated costs, and related issues.¹³

Parliamentary Comment

On 22 March 1988 Conservative Member John Oostrom made a statement in the House condemning the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war. He said:

...there has been a dangerous escalation in the Iran-Iraq war. Strong evidence has emerged that confirms the use of chemical weapons. Such an escalation will lead to heavier casualties as well as increased terror among the innocent civilian population.¹⁴

¹² Speech by the Canadian Ambassador de Montigny Marchand to the Conference on Disarmament, 10 March 1988.

¹³ CD/823, 31 March 1988.

¹⁴ Commons Debates, 22 March 1988, p. 14002.

Recognizing existing prohibitions on the use of chemical weapons, Mr. Oostrom went on to note:

The use of these chemical agents leaves the possibility of a future biological catastrophe for the region and perhaps for other nations which are not involved in this conflict. We in this House must use all means at our disposal to prevent any more chemical weapons from being used and to see to a speedy end to this tragic conflict.¹⁵

Later that day, Mr. Oostrom asked Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark whether he would investigate recent charges of the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war and--if such allegations proved correct--whether he would communicate Canada's objections and concerns to the warring parties.¹⁶ Mr. Clark replied:

It is hard to secure detailed information but I agree...that we have to do our best to try. It is our view that there should be an expert investigation. We believe that it would best be conducted under the United Nations and we would recommend to the Secretary General that he put in place such an expert investigation.¹⁷

Conservative MP Alex Kindy also referred to the alleged use of chemical weapons in the Gulf war, and noting that it was his understanding that the Iranian Chargé d'Affaires had asked Canada for medical assistance for injuries incurred as a result of the chemical weapon attacks. Mr. Kindy went on to ask Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark whether such help would be forthcoming, and also if the Minister could assure the House that there was "no Canadian content" in the chemical warfare taking

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.

place.¹⁸ Responding to the latter question, Mr. Clark stated:

...to the best of my knowledge there is no Canadian content in the chemical warfare. I use that phrase simply out of normal prudence. I think there is no reason to believe that there is any Canadian content in that chemical warfare.¹⁹

As to the question of Canadian medical aid to Iran, Mr. Clark stated:

That is a complex problem that requires co-ordination between federal and provincial Governments. We are looking to see if there is a way in which Canada can respond effectively.²⁰

On 25 March 1988, NDP Member Bill Blaikie inquired about the Government response to the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war, asking:

What has the Government clearly said to the Iraqi Government in respect to the use of chemical weapons? What is the Government planning to do to give leadership in the UN and in the international community in general to censure Iraq, to censure the use of chemical weapons, and finally to bring about the cease-fire which the United Nations requested many months ago in respect to this ugly conflict?²¹

Responding to Mr. Blaikie's questions, Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark explained:

...we have made the strongest possible representations to the Ambassador of Iraq and will be following these up through

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.

21 Commons Debates, 25 March 1988, p. 14134.

other channels.²²

Referring to the fact that the Government also planned to raise the issue with the United Nations, Mr. Clark went on to state that:

...there is established in the United Nations secretary generalship a requirement and a capacity to seek expert confirmation of the facts that should be done, and then the problem arises...to find ways in which international opinion, apart from simply being expressed in the strongest possible terms, can be made effective against Iraq and against Iran. That is the challenge. If there is some way in which Canada can move that process forward, I am certainly eager to find and follow that way.²³

Mr. Blaikie referred to the possibility of an arms embargo on the two countries, observing:

I think Canada has a special role to play in calling the world community to account, the superpowers and everyone motivated....One of the opportunities the Minister has, it seems to me, is to take a leading role in getting the world community to put that kind of arms embargo on both those nations.²⁴

Mr. Clark agreed with Mr. Blaikie's suggestion, but questioned how such an idea would be put into practice.²⁵ Nevertheless, the Minister stated:

We are seeking more unanimity by more countries, and we want to make it clear that not only are we prepared to be a part of an embargo...but that we will be actively urging others to

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid., p. 14135.

25 Ibid.

seek that, or to follow that or other procedures that can bring an end to a conflict which is more and more gruesome every day.²⁶

On 4 May 1988, NDP Member Pauline Jewett also condemned the use of chemical weapons in the Gulf conflict. Further, Ms Jewett pointed to the US decision to produce binary weapons and stated:

...I urge the Government to reconsider its misguided and unqualified support of the United States' production of a new regime of chemical weapons, namely, binary agents. Real progress toward an international convention banning chemical weapons will be encouraged if the Government of Canada now takes a strong stand against these new agents of death.²⁷

On 25 March 1988, questions were raised in the House concerning the production of chemical weapons and antidotes to them at the Defence Research Establishment at Suffield, Alberta. NDP Member Jim Fulton referred to the fact that production contracts for the antidote drug HI-6 were being considered for a firm in Edmonton, and asked:

Will the deputy Prime Minister give his assurance that before any further production...of chemical or biological weapons or potential antidotes to those is contracted in Canada, the Government will produce in public a position paper on how such production by Canada will affect the potential for progress toward a world-wide production ban on chemical and biological weapons?²⁸

Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark replied:

I cannot accept the premises of [the] question without

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Commons Debates, 4 May 1988, p. 15109.

²⁸ Commons Debates, 25 March 1988, p. 14136.

looking into all the circumstances and I cannot answer him without doing that.²⁹

In a follow-up question, Mr. Fulton asked the Minister if he could give his assurance that HI-6 studies would be reviewed publicly prior to its use on Canadian soldiers.³⁰ Once again, Mr. Clark stated that more time would be needed to examine the issue before an answer could be given.³¹

On 14 June 1988, responding to information that the Department of National Defence had been conducting open-air tests of nerve gas at the Defence Research Establishment in Suffield since 1983³², NDP Member Nelson Riis asked:

Does the Government of Canada manufacture this nerve gas at Suffield? Does it import the nerve gas? If so for whom? Why did the Government allow this nerve gas to be released into the atmosphere without prior notification to the people living in adjacent areas?³³

In response to Mr. Riis' inquiries, Associate Minister of National Defence Paul Dick stated:

...the Department of National Defence has never made any bones about the fact that at Suffield, in an isolated area, we have tested nerve gas in small quantities, in laboratories and elsewhere, in order to protect our own troops in case they were ever faced with this situation. I should point out

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid.

32 See, for instance, Geoff White, "Nerve Gas Tested in Alberta," Ottawa Citizen, 14 June 1988, p. AI-2.

33 Commons Debates, 14 June 1988, p. 16426.

that in the case of testing done outside it was between 1.4 and 1.5 kilograms of nerve gas that was used in an area of 2 square miles from which everybody else was excluded at the time the tests were conducted. At the present time we are negotiating in Geneva on the quantities countries can have for their own testing and the suggested level is 1,000 kilograms. This is 1.4 to 1.5 kilograms.³⁴

On 23 June 1988, NDP Member Jim Fulton questioned the safety of the open air tests being conducted at the Suffield experimental site. Mr. Fulton addressed the Minister of National Defence, Perrin Beatty:

The Minister has stated these tests pose no danger, but...the Deputy Director of Mountain Region of Labour Canada...has confirmed that on May 26, 1986, there was a near fatal accident at Suffield involving two researchers who were exposed to lethal nerve gas. In fact the experimental station was evacuated and the researchers were hospitalized, one for a lengthy period.³⁵

Mr. Fulton then asked how Mr. Beatty squared this information with assurances he had given that the tests at Suffield posed no health risks.³⁶ Mr. Beatty replied:

I understand that in 1986 a World War II shell which contained nerve gas was found on the range. In the process of decontaminating it one of the technicians had an accident and two technicians were exposed to gas. Both of them were taken in for medical treatment and both of them were released immediately afterward. In follow-up studies, neither one suffered long-term damage at all.³⁷

34 Ibid.

35 Commons Debates, 23 June 1988, p. 16765.

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid.

In a follow-up question, Mr. Fulton pointed to an independent analysis of the field tests which concluded that they constituted a "real and immediate" threat to the public health communities near the base. He then asked if, in light of the near fatalities, and the severe health threat posed by tests, the Minister would order an immediate halt to them.³⁸

Mr. Beatty replied:

...in one case one technician spent one day in hospital. The technician was given an additional three days off. The junior technician returned to work the following day. That is hardly an indication of "lengthy time in hospital" as a result of this.³⁹

Mr. Beatty also noted:

With respect to the scare tactics being used by the Hon. Member to prevent defensive research designed to protect member of the Canadian Forces, the public is well protected.⁴⁰

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid.

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5. CANADA AND NUCLEAR WEAPON-FREE ZONES

Background

Nuclear Weapon-free Zones (NWFZs) consist of defined geographic areas in which the manufacture, testing, and deployment of nuclear weapons is prohibited. Various types of NWFZs exist and have been proposed since the 1950s. They have been supported as a means to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons and provide a confidence-building measure (CBM) in the pursuit of regional security, as well as constituting steps in a progressive "denuclearization" of the planet.

The first NWFZ was proposed at the United Nations by Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki in 1957. The Rapacki Plan would have prohibited the manufacturing, stockpiling, and use of nuclear weapons in Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and West Germany. While the Plan had Soviet support, it was opposed by NATO and subsequently dropped. The Plan did, however, succeed in generating widespread interest in the establishment of regional denuclearized zones.

Five NWFZs have been established by international agreement: the Antarctic Treaty of 1959; the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, following a unanimously adopted UN resolution calling upon nations to refrain from introducing weapons of mass destruction into outer space; the Treaty of Tlatelolco of 1967, establishing Latin America as the first populated NWFZ in the world; the Seabed Treaty of 1971; and the Treaty of Rarotonga of 1985, establishing a South Pacific Nuclear-free Zone. The latter, negotiated by the thirteen members of the South Pacific Forum, bans the deployment, production, and testing of nuclear weapons in their area. The question of transit and visiting rights for ships and aircraft

carrying nuclear weapons in the zone has been left open for signatory nations to decide independently. The Treaty has encountered problems, in that only two of the five nuclear weapons states, China and the Soviet Union, have signed the relevant Protocols. France, which maintains an active nuclear testing programme in the region, is opposed to the zone. So are the United States and the United Kingdom, which have both expressed reservations over the Treaty's symbolic importance as a precedent allegedly incongruent with their national interests.

Proposals have also been made to establish NWFZs in the Middle East, South Asia, Africa, the Indian Ocean, the Balkan states, the South Atlantic, the Nordic states, the Mediterranean, and Southeast Asia. Most of these efforts have been made in the United Nations General Assembly and the Conference on Disarmament, with interest in them varying over time. Two areas which have received considerable international attention recently, include the Arctic--stimulated by the Soviet Union's October 1987 initiative (please see the Arctic Sovereignty section of the Guide), and Southeast Asia--through the efforts of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). At their December 1987 summit meeting, ASEAN members agreed to intensify efforts for a Southeast Asia NWFZ given the example of New Zealand and improved US-USSR relations as an impetus. The US has stated its strong opposition to the concept, however.

Current Canadian Position

Canada supports the principle of nuclear weapon-free zones whenever they are considered feasible and likely to promote stability in an area. Although the creation of such a zone is not judged a satisfactory alternative to having the countries involved ratify the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), it can make a significant contribution to preventing the

spread of nuclear arms and increasing regional security in the absence of NPT ratification.

The Canadian Government's stance remains unchanged. It is prepared to study such proposals on a case-by-case basis but it believes that to be effective, any proposals must meet certain requirements: the zone must apply to a defined geographic area; it must be based on proposals which emanate from and are agreed to by most countries in the area concerned, including the principal military powers; it must not give advantage to any state or group of states; it must contain adequate treaty assurances and means to verify that countries abide by their commitments; and it must not permit the development of an independent nuclear explosive capability in the area.¹

At the 42nd Session of the UNGA in 1987, Canada voted in support of related resolutions on the Treaty of Tlatelolco, Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon-free Zone in the Middle East (adopted without a vote), Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon-free Zone in South Asia, Denuclearization of Africa, Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace (adopted without a vote), and Zone of Peace and Cooperation in the South Atlantic.

As a result of Canada's NATO membership, it has always been opposed to the establishment of such zones in Central or Northern Europe or the Balkans. The Government believes that the establishment of zones in these areas would cast doubts on the effectiveness of the NATO deterrent and expose certain areas to the risk of Soviet attack, without making a genuine contribution to nuclear disarmament.

¹ DEA, Arms Control and Disarmament Division, "Canada's Position on Nuclear Weapon-free Zones," Disarmament Bulletin, Summer-Fall 1986, p. 12.

The Government does not support a declaration of nuclear weapon-free status for Canada. Although Canada does not possess nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons are not stationed on Canadian territory, Canada is a member of NATO which, as already indicated, relies on a nuclear deterrent. The declaration of a nuclear weapon-free zone, if it is maintained, would be inconsistent with membership in that alliance.²

Despite this position the local authorities in 169 municipalities across Canada have declared their areas nuclear-free. Manitoba, Ontario, and the Northwest Territories have each declared themselves to be NWFZs. As a result of these declarations, approximately 60 percent of the Canadian public resides in locally declared NWFZs.

Parliamentary Comment

Proposals to make Canada a nuclear weapon-free zone have been put forward in the House of Commons on several occasions. On August 31, 1987 Mr. Neil Young of the New Democratic Party (NDP) put forth a Private Member's Motion (C-214) to declare Canada a NWFZ. The motion called for a prohibition of "the deployment, testing, construction and transportation of nuclear weapons and associated equipment through and within Canada, [and] the export of goods and materials for use in the construction and deployment of nuclear arms," while calling on the government to "encourage cities, provinces and states throughout the world to undertake similar action."³ In Mr. Young's view, Canada would thereby strengthen its position on international disarmament and proliferation matters, building upon its traditional support for the establishment of NWFZs.

² Ibid.

³ Commons Debates, 31 August 1987, p. 8627.

At the two special sessions of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament, in 1978 and 1982, Canada supported the final declarations encouraging the establishment of nuclear weapon-free zones. In Mr. Young's words: "It would appear from all that activity that Canada should have taken the lead and shown by example what it is indeed encouraging other nations to do. Instead, we have managed to confuse our position by acts of both the present and past Governments."⁴

The Honourable Allan MacKinnon responded to Mr. Young from the Government side of the House. Mr. MacKinnon emphasized the threats facing Canada and the Canadian approach as a Western alliance member to responding to those threats:

Although the alliance has pledged never to resort to force except in response to attack, it remains united in its determination to deter any aggression against its members. The Honourable member who has just spoken wishes to do away with deterrence. Our Government continues to believe that it is through participation in these collective defence arrangements, rather than retreating into the uncertain security of a nuclear weapon-free zone, that we can make our most effective contribution to preserving the peace and security for ourselves and others.⁵

The Liberal Party, as determined at its 1986 Convention, favours the establishment of a NWFZ for Canada, but not at the expense of abrogating Canada's alliance obligations as they perceive them. The Honourable Donald Johnston raised some of the Liberal Party's concerns in the debate on C-214:

⁴ Ibid., p. 8628.

⁵ Ibid., p. 8629.

The question is: Would a unilateral decision contribute? Or would it not, on the contrary, tend to remove Canada from nuclear policy decisions at the NATO table? Might it not compromise our ability to influence our allies on arms control? In addition, could we enforce it? Obviously we could not.⁶

On 14 December 1987 the motion was defeated by a vote of 34 in favour to 93 against.

A second Bill, C-304, was introduced on 30 June 1988 by NDP Member Svend Robinson. The purpose of this Bill was to "...establish in the North of Canada a nuclear weapons free zone hopefully together with other Nordic countries as an important step toward peace and disarmament and a nuclear weapons free world."⁷ Mr. Robinson suggested that it was important for the West to respond positively to changes occurring in the Soviet Union through the policies of glasnost and perestroika.

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⁶ Commons Debates, 20 October 1987, p. 10207.

⁷ Commons Debates, 30 June 1988, p. 16965.

6. NUCLEAR TESTING

Background

In the 1950s, the United States and Great Britain began negotiations with the Soviet Union to ban all forms of nuclear testing. While efforts to conclude a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) proved unsuccessful, the negotiations bore some fruit with the signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) in 1963. The PTBT prohibits the testing of nuclear devices in the atmosphere, underwater and in outer space. As of January 1986, the treaty had 115 states parties, although two nuclear weapons states--France and China--have yet to sign.

Further progress on the limitation of nuclear testing came when the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) in 1974, and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) in 1976. The former limits underground nuclear testing to 150 kilotons, while the latter does the same for so-called "peaceful nuclear explosions." Neither the TTBT or the PNET has, however, been ratified by the US Senate.

Efforts to achieve more ambitious limitations on nuclear testing continued when the Carter Administration reopened trilateral negotiations on a CTB in 1977. Although some headway was made in developing a draft treaty, strong domestic political opposition in the United States ensured that progress was limited. These negotiations ceased with the advent of the Reagan Administration.

On 6 August 1985, the Soviet Union announced a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, later extended three times. Yet the Soviet initiative

failed to prompt the United States to take similar action, or to resume negotiations on a CTB. Soviet testing resumed on 28 February 1987. The US Congress has put forth proposals seeking a moratorium on nuclear tests above one kiloton, but these have never been accepted by the Administration.

The Reagan Administration has maintained that, although it regards a total ban on nuclear testing as a long-term objective, the need to ensure weapon reliability and national security requires continued testing. In addition, the Administration has contended that progress on a CTB can be achieved only in stages--first by securing more stringent monitoring provisions for the TTBT and PNET; then by negotiating intermediate limitations on testing; and finally by pursuing a total ban as part of a broad, effective disarmament process.

While the Soviets initially opposed the US government's approach to limits on nuclear testing--favouring instead immediate negotiations on a total ban--the prospects for accommodation began to brighten by the summer of 1986. In July of that year, the two sides resumed talks on testing at the expert level in Geneva. By summer 1987, the Soviets had largely acceded to the US position on how negotiations toward a CTB should proceed.

On 17 September 1987, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and US Secretary of State George Shultz announced that the two sides had agreed to begin "full-scale stage by stage negotiations on nuclear testing" before 1 December 1987. The negotiations would begin by searching for mutually agreeable procedures for verifying the TTBT and the PNET. On 9 December 1987, during the first round of talks, Robert Barker, head of the US negotiating team, announced that the two sides had further agreed to visit each other's testing sites in January 1988 in order to better

familiarize themselves with the test site layouts and equipment. Barker added that the parties also planned to hold joint nuclear test explosions in order to calibrate equipment to help in verifying any future limits on testing. In particular, the joint tests would aid in settling differences between the superpowers regarding their preferred methods of monitoring the size of atomic tests. The Soviets prefer to rely on seismic devices, while the United States prefers the Cortex system of hydrodynamic measurements. The Soviets have, however, agreed to negotiate on-site hydrodynamic methods as a step toward a CTB.

In accordance with the agreements reached in December 1987, a twenty-man team from the US visited the principal Soviet test site at Semipalatinsk in Central Asia from 11 to 14 January 1988. A twenty-member Soviet delegation visited the US testing site in Nevada two weeks later. This followed a series of scientific exchanges aimed at testing methods of monitoring limits on underground explosions, sponsored jointly by the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), a non-profit environmental and disarmament organization in the United States, and the Soviet Academy of Sciences. In September 1987, US scientists tested seismic monitoring equipment near Soviet test ranges by measuring the detonation of three non-nuclear explosions. Similar monitoring by the Soviet Union took place in an area not far from the Nevada test site in late April 1988. The tests in the Soviet Union have indicated that seismic devices are capable of measuring most meaningful nuclear explosions. Soviet seismic tests on American soil have been less successful, owing to the geological peculiarities of Nevada.

During their 21-22 April 1988 meetings in Moscow, US Secretary of State Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze approved a schedule for the joint verification experiment on nuclear testing announced in December 1987, and reached an agreement on its conduct. The experiment

is scheduled to take place this summer. In addition, the Ministers instructed their negotiators to complete ongoing work on a verification protocol for the PNET. At the Moscow Summit on 28 May - 1 June 1988, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev noted that substantial progress had been made on a new protocol to the PNET. They instructed their negotiators to complete expeditiously work on this protocol, as well as to complete a protocol to the TTBT as soon as possible after the joint verification experiment had been conducted and analyzed.

Additional efforts at limiting nuclear testing have been made in multilateral forums. In 1983, the UN Conference on Disarmament (CD) established a CTB working group. Now called the Ad Hoc committee, the group has been unable to agree on a programme of work and has not met since 1983.

Despite the inability of the CD to agree on a mandate for the CTB working group, the Group of Scientific Experts--a CD body charged with developing a global system of seismic monitoring--met from 22 of July to 7 August 1987. The Group discussed options for the establishment of international data centers (IDCs), communication links, and procedures for IDCs. It also set up new study groups to elaborate an international seismic data exchange system, as well as to plan new data exchange experiments. The Group's report and its recommendations were adopted by the CD in late August 1987. The Group met again in Geneva from 7 to 18 March 1988, and discussed the exchange of seismic data and its processing at IDCs. The Group also continued work on the design of an international data exchange system that might be ready for large-scale experimental testing by 1990.

In November 1987, Mexico and five other non-aligned countries initiated a draft resolution in the UN's First Committee recommending that non-nuclear states parties to the PTBT call on depository governments to

convene a conference to consider amending the treaty by converting it into a CTB. As UNGA resolution 42/26 (B), it was adopted by a vote of 128-3-22 on 30 November 1987. While Britain, France and the United States voted against the resolution, the Soviet Union voted in favour.¹ The sponsoring states have begun work in preparation for the Conference, although it is not expected to take place before 1989.

While some progress on limiting nuclear testing has been made recently, significant issues remain to be resolved. Among these are: the nature of the verification measures required to improve the monitoring of existing treaties; the character of intermediate limitations on the size and number of nuclear tests, as well as their acceptability; and the circumstances under which a CTB can be achieved.

Further limitations on nuclear testing have been a priority item on the Canadian Government's agenda, a CTB remaining one of the six major goals in arms control and disarmament during 1987 and 1988. Canada has contributed to this goal in various ways in the recent past. In 1986, the government approved the sum of \$3.2 million in order to upgrade the seismic array station in Yellowknife as a contribution toward seismic verification. Modernization of the array is to be completed by 1989, at which point it will constitute a world-class facility and possibly a prototype for other international stations.² In 1985, the government awarded a grant to the University of Toronto for further research on the use of regional seismic data for verification of a CTB. Canada also hosted a technical workshop on seismic verification of a CTB in October 1986. Attended by 43 representatives from 17 countries, the workshop

¹ UNGA Resolution 42/26 (B), 30 November 1987.

² "Canada's Role in Verification," The Disarmament Bulletin, Supplement, Summer-Fall 1987, p. 3.

produced specific technical recommendations on the methods, protocols and formats for seismic waveform exchange. The workshop's proceedings were tabled by Canada in the CD on 28 April 1987.³

Current Canadian Position

On 4 November 1987, Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament Douglas Roche addressed the issue of a CTB before the First Committee. Expressing Canada's satisfaction with the Fall 1987 decision of the United States and the Soviet Union to begin full-scale, stage-by-stage negotiations on nuclear testing, Ambassador Roche went on:

Canada supports a step by step approach to the realization of an eventual comprehensive test ban treaty....We should not lose sight of the fact that a comprehensive nuclear test ban is not an end in itself, but is rather a means to the ultimate goal which is the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. I would submit that the primary purpose of the reduction and cessation of nuclear testing should be to enhance confidence in the global arms control and disarmament process.⁴

The Ambassador added that the CD had an important role to play in supporting and encouraging the process of achieving a CTB--particularly through consideration of questions of scope, compliance and verification. In this regard, he noted Canada's support for the work of the Ad Hoc group of scientific experts, and welcomed the selection of Dr. Peter Basham, a Canadian, as co-ordinator of a major text for the development of an international Seismic Data Exchange. Ambassador Roche also urged members of the CD to define a mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee, allowing

³ CD/753, 28 April 1987.

⁴ DEA, Press Release No. 42, 4 November 1987, p. 2.

it to begin substantive discussions.⁵

At the 42nd Session of the UN General Assembly, three resolutions were passed regarding a CTB. Resolution 42/26 (A) called upon the CD to establish an Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate a CTB, comprising two working groups--one on compliance and verification, and another on content and scope. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 137-3-14, with the United States, Britain and France voting against it, and Canada abstaining.⁶ Resolution 42/26 (B) (discussed above) called for the convening of a conference to amend the PTBT by converting it into a CTB. This resolution was adopted by a vote of 128-3-22, with the United States, Britain and France once more voting against the resolution and Canada again abstaining.⁷ Finally, Canada co-sponsored resolution 42/27, which called on the CD to initiate substantive work and for the nuclear weapon states to agree to "appropriate verifiable interim measures on nuclear testing". It also called on the CD to set up an international seismic monitoring network. This resolution was adopted by a vote of 143-2-8, with France and the United States voting against.⁸

On 10 March 1988, Canada's Ambassador to the CD de Montigny Marchand reiterated the importance accorded a CTB in Canadian policy. Welcoming the US-Soviet negotiations and their planned exchange of on-site observations of nuclear tests on their respective territories, Ambassador Marchand also expressed Canada's hope that the negotiations would proceed to a consideration of further limitations on nuclear tests as soon as

⁵ Ibid., p. 1.

⁶ UNGA Resolution 42/26 (A), 30 November 1987.

⁷ UNGA Resolution 42/26 (A), 30 November 1987.

⁸ UNGA Resolution 42/27, 30 November 1987.

possible. He added that developments between the superpowers should be seen as presenting an opportunity for the work of the CD, and should not detract from it. In this regard, the Ambassador stressed the need for the two major nuclear powers to become constructively engaged in the multilateral process in order to facilitate progress therein. That process, Ambassador Marchand noted, also required that a mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee be defined so that substantive work on a test ban could commence, and that careful consideration be given to how best to structure such work so as to support and complement the bilateral talks.⁹

Parliamentary Comment

On 9 December 1987, following the conclusion of the INF Treaty between the superpowers, NDP Member Pauline Jewett referred to the issue of nuclear testing when questioning Prime Minister Brian Mulroney about official Canadian communications with US and Soviet leaders on arms reductions. Ms Jewett asked:

Did [the Prime Minister] ask both or did he tell both of them of Canada's particular concern about air-launched cruise missiles and submarine-launched cruise and ballistic missiles?....Finally, did he also press upon both the need now for a comprehensive test ban before there is further enlargement or enhancement of the nuclear arms race?¹⁰

Prime Minister Mulroney replied:

⁹ Speech by the Canadian Ambassador de Montigny Marchand to the Conference on Disarmament, 10 March 1988.

¹⁰ Commons Debates, 9 December 1987, p. 11627.

In the communications we have had on this very important subject, we have conveyed the views of the Government of Canada in regard to the steps which we believe ought to be taken to secure further reductions in the possible deployment of nuclear arms.¹¹

On 26 April 1988, Conservative Member John Ostrom criticized France for its conducting of underground nuclear tests in the South Pacific, stating:

I believe that conducting underground nuclear testing on South Pacific Islands which are mostly extinct volcanoes, is like playing Russian roulette with the environment. This region of the world has been fortunate that the atoll of Mururoa did not break up and release its deadly radiation into the ocean, creating an environmental disaster of epic proportions. Canada must make its concerns known to France that testing in this area of the world could have severe repercussions on life.¹²

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¹¹ Ibid., p. 11628.

¹² Commons Debates, 26 April 1988, p. 14826.

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Nuclear Non-Proliferation

7. CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE (CCSBMDE)

Background

The Helsinki Final Act of 1975 was the culmination of two years of negotiation in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The Final Act contained three "Baskets" of issues: Basket I - Questions relating to Security in Europe; Basket II - Co-operation in the Field of Economics, of Science and Technology and of the Environment; and Basket III - Co-operation in Humanitarian and Other Fields. There was also a section concerning the follow-up to the Conference.

In Basket I, the 35 nations participating in the CSCE agreed, among other things, to voluntary observance of limited confidence-building measures, designed to further such objectives as reducing the risks of armed conflict resulting from misunderstanding or miscalculation of military activities. The measures agreed to were in the following areas: prior notification of major or other military manoeuvres; exchange of observers; and prior notification of major military movements.

CSCE Follow-up meetings have been held in Belgrade (1977-78), Madrid (1980-83), and Vienna (1986 - present). The Madrid follow-up meeting established a Conference on Confidence- and Security- Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CCSBMDE), also commonly referred to as the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE), to take place in Stockholm. The aim of this conference was "to undertake, in stages, new, effective and concrete actions designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security and in achieving disarmament, so as to give

effect and expression to the duty of states to refrain from the threat or use of force in their mutual relations."

The Stockholm talks opened on 17 January 1984. The 35 participating nations, roughly divided into three main groupings, included the sixteen NATO members, the seven Warsaw Pact nations, and the neutral and non-aligned (NNA) countries. The mandate for the talks committed the participants to the negotiation and adoption of a set of mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation. These measures were to be applicable to "the whole of Europe as well as the adjoining sea area and air space", to be militarily significant, politically binding, and adequately verifiable.

NATO proposals put to the Conference in its first year contained six concrete measures: the exchange of general military information; the exchange of information on planned military activities one year in advance; the announcement of manoeuvres involving at least one division, or 6,000 men, 45 days in advance; compulsory invitations to observers for announced military activities; methods of monitoring compliance and verification including challenge on-site inspections; and the establishment of communication links in order to implement or facilitate rapid contact in situations of tension.

These Western proposals were followed by others from Romania, the Soviet Union, the Neutral and Non-Aligned States, and Malta.

The Soviet Union, representing the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), tabled its proposals in May, 1984. These suggestions were of a more political nature than NATO's, including a proposed treaty on the non-use of force; a no first-use of nuclear weapons pledge; a ban on chemical

weapons in Europe; support for nuclear weapon-free zones in the Balkans, Central Europe, and the Nordic area; a freeze and reduction of military spending; and improvements on the CSBMs agreed to in the Helsinki Final Act. The last of these elements focussed on practical military measures relating to limits on exercises, prior notification of troop movements, and development of the practice of exchanging observers.

The Neutral and Non-Aligned Group indicated a particular interest in the adoption of "constraint measures" which would limit or constrain military activities through geographical restrictions or ceilings on manpower and/or equipment.

In December 1984, the Conference agreed to a Finnish/Swedish proposal for a set of working groups. Group A considered measures of observation and notification (items already included in the Helsinki Final Act); Group B examined all other measures (those not in the Final Act); and a combined group considered linked issues. This helped the work to proceed.

In January and February 1985, the NATO countries submitted six working documents which recommended such measures as 45 days' prior notification for any military manoeuvres involving 6,000 troops (compared with 21 days' notice for manoeuvres of 25,000 troops in the Final Act).

The Warsaw Pact tabled their proposals for CSBMs at the same time, calling for 30 days' notification of movement of more than 20,000 men and an overall limit for any manoeuvres to 40,000 men. In November 1985, the NNA submitted a revised proposal that many hoped would be a bridge between the NATO and Warsaw Pact positions. It combined the Western emphasis on specific information exchange and on demanding verification measures with the Warsaw Pact's desire for a declaration on non-use or threat of force.

The pace of the negotiations gradually quickened during the first half of 1986, in pursuit of efforts to reach an agreement by September (before preparatory phases of the CSCE Follow-up Meeting started in Vienna). For example, new Western proposals were tabled on 30 June 1986, agreeing to raise the limit on the troop numbers requiring notification above 6,000. The Soviet Union accepted the principle of on-site inspections on 19 August and compromises were pursued on other issues such as arrangements for aerial inspections.

On 22 September 1986, after almost three years of negotiations, an agreement was finally reached in Stockholm. The terms of the accord, effective 1 January 1987, included the following: notice of military activities involving more than 13,000 troops or 300 tanks must be given 42 days in advance; host states must extend invitations to foreign observers to attend manoeuvres exceeding 17,000 men; each state has the right to request a ground and/or aerial inspection of any military activity raising doubts about compliance with agreed CSBMs, although no state is required to submit to more than three such inspections per year; aircraft for aerial inspections will be chosen by the mutual consent of the parties involved, and inspectors will furnish the monitoring equipment and specify the flight path of the aircraft in the suspected area; and calendars outlining the schedule for military activities subject to prior notification in the following year are to be exchanged by 15 November. Notice for military activities involving over 40,000 or 75,000 troops must be given by 15 November, one and two years in advance, respectively. Finally, the signatories agreed to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territory or political independence of other

states in accordance with the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of the United Nations.¹

The question of how to follow up the Stockholm Conference was on the agenda of the third CSCE Follow-up meeting in Vienna, which began on 19 November 1986. The working group on security is discussing a proposal for two distinct negotiations on conventional arms control. One set of talks, part of the CSCE process, would build up and expand the CSBM regime agreed to in Stockholm. The second set, also within the CSCE framework but autonomous and involving only the 23 nations of the Warsaw Pact and NATO, would deal with enhancing security and stability in Europe at lower levels of conventional forces. These latter talks, generally referred to as the Conventional Stability Talks (CST), would follow the informal Mandate Talks now under way and would likely replace the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks (see MBFR section). The concept of having two distinct conventional security negotiations was first outlined in the NATO Brussels Declaration of December 1986.

In future negotiations on CSBMs, the West appears to be especially interested in discussing proposals intended to enhance "openness" about military formations and troop levels. For its part, the Soviet Union appears to be interested in extending the application of CSBMs to include sea and air exercises, increase transparency, and include issues concerning military doctrine.

¹ Canada, Department of External Affairs, Document of the Stockholm Conference: On confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe convened in accordance with the relevant provisions of the concluding document of the Madrid meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1986, pp. 1-20.

All states appear to have been generally satisfied with the fulfillment of the provisions of the Stockholm Agreement since its establishment. In 1987 a total of 19 observable exercises involving the Warsaw Pact and NATO took place. Canada sent observers to every exercise attended by the West. Nine challenge inspections were conducted, five by the East and four by the West. Sixteen observable exercises were notified for 1988.

Current Canadian Position

The agreement on a confidence-building regime in September 1986, to which Canada is a signatory, drew unqualified Canadian support. Canada's official position was outlined in the Government's response to a recommendation contained in the 1986 report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons:

Canada has been an active participant in the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and security-building measures and hailed its successful conclusion. In the government's view, Stockholm represents a significant accomplishment in the field of arms control which will impart an unprecedented openness to the conduct of military affairs in Europe.²

Canada's strong commitment to the work of the Stockholm Conference and satisfaction at its successful outcome were also indicated in articles in the Disarmament Bulletin, Winter 1986 - Spring 1987, by Ambassador Tom Delworth and the Military Advisor to the Canadian Delegation, Colonel C. A. Namiesniowski. In a speech before an International Conference on Implementing a Global Chemical Weapons Convention held in Ottawa in

² DEA, Canada's International Relations: Response of the Government of Canada to the Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons, 1986, p. 48.

October, 1987, Canadian Undersecretary of State for External Affairs James Taylor spoke of the importance of the Stockholm Conference, given its political nature:

Arms control has traditionally largely confined itself to the issue of military capability, leaving the question of intent to largely declaratory political gestures. Herein lies the great significance of the agreement in Stockholm in 1986 on specific measures, subject to agreed verification procedures, designed to increase mutual assurance about the benign military intent of parties to the agreement. The notably efficient and effective way in which challenge inspections of conventional military exercises were recently conducted on the territories of the USSR and the German Democratic Republic respectively is a most welcome development. So, too, are recent formulations by official spokesmen of the USSR which speak in terms of a "sufficiency" of military force. More than at any time in recent years, parties on all sides of the East-West divide seem to accept that security is a matter of mutuality. Neither side can feel secure unless both do.³

Parliamentary Comment

On 23 February 1988, Mr. Bud Bradley, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Defence, outlined the conventional arms control process in which Canada is currently involved in Vienna. Referring to the Conventional Stability Talks and the negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, Mr. Bradley stated

³ "Under Secretary of State for External Affairs (International Conference on Implementing a Global Chemical Weapons Convention, Ottawa, October 7, 1987," in: DEA Arms Control and Disarmament Division, "Canadian Policy on Arms Control and Disarmament: Excerpts from Official Statements and Communications," 21 March 1988, p. 14.

that these talks would address the conventional military problem from "two complementary directions."⁴

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⁴ Commons Debates, 23 February 1988, p. 13069.

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Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks

8. DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT

Background

Disarmament and development have been matters of increasing concern to the United Nations throughout the entire history of the Organization. The General Assembly has often considered the growth of military expenditures around the world, the possibility of redeployment of resources released from military purposes through disarmament measures to economic and social development, and the relationship between disarmament and development. This latter issue led to a number of UN recommendations ranging from the establishment of an international disarmament fund for development to working out specific measures for disarmament and the control of armaments. Other causes for concern have been the worsening of world socio-economic conditions as well as the arms race.

At the first United Nations Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD) held in 1978, the General Assembly assigned a Group of Governmental Experts to conduct a study on the relationship between disarmament and development which was completed in 1981. Undertaken by representatives of twenty-seven states (including Canada) under the chairmanship of Mrs. Inga Thorsson of Sweden, this study concluded that the arms race and development are in a competitive relationship and that the world can either indulge in an arms race or make deliberate attempts to establish a more stable and equitable socio-economic development coupled with a more sustainable international economic and political order. It cannot do both.¹

¹ The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, Vol. 11, 1986.

These issues have continued to interest the UN since the release of the Thorsson report. The General Assembly subsequently accepted the 1984 Disarmament Commission's recommendation to hold an international conference on the relationship between disarmament and development. Held from 24 August to 11 September 1987, and attended by 150 states, this conference dealt primarily with the existing contrast between global military expenditures and the frequent failure to meet basic human needs. The Conference's final report reveals that "a reduction in global military spending would considerably enhance development". It also mentioned that security involved not only a military dimension but also political, economic, social, humanitarian and ecological aspects, and that its strengthening could create favourable conditions for disarmament and development and vice-versa. According to this report, "security is equally undermined by underdevelopment, the ever gloomier prospects for development and the mismanagement and waste of resources". Moreover, it shows that "the world's military expenditures actually devoted to the defence of security interests are, in real terms, at a level four to five times higher than what they were at the end of the second world war" and that they represent about 6 per cent of the world's total output. Finally, the report underlines the importance of "releasing, at the national level, resources formerly devoted to the military which could be reallocated to the civilian sector".²

The United States did not participate at this conference because the American government does not consider that disarmament and development are linked and because it is opposed to the idea that western countries should transfer to the poor nations the money provided for military expenditures.

² Report of the international Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, United Nations, New York, 1987.

In November 1987, the United Nations General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution (42/45) requesting the Secretary-General to take measures to implement the plan of action adopted by the Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development. The resolution (42/45) also recommends that this issue be included in the agenda of the third United Nations Special Session on Disarmament.

Current Canadian Position

From the very beginning, Canada supported the decision to hold a conference on this matter. Speaking at its plenary session on 24 August 1987, Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark noted that "progress toward development and progress toward disarmament can both contribute to increase world security", and he recognized "that the level of a nation's security is the main criterion against which efforts for disarmament must be measured, not the level of economic gain". The same view had been expressed in March of that same year by the Ambassador for disarmament Douglas Roche at the United Nations Regional Conference on the World Campaign for Disarmament. Mr. Clark added: "I mean security in its broadest sense - not just military strength. The sense of economic and social well-being is an important factor in a nation's overall security." He underlined the importance of examining further what possibilities disarmament measures could bring in favour of development, having recalled that as far as disarmament is concerned "the record of the United Nations - and its member states - has been less impressive". Finally, Mr. Clark mentioned some aspects of Canada's assistance for

development, adding that disarmament was one of the major objectives of Canadian foreign policy.³

The Government believes that disarmament and development are two distinct processes linked to each other only to the extent that each contributes to security and in turn benefits from its strengthening. Ottawa is not prepared to accept the notion of a direct transfer of resources provided for military expenditures to socio-economic development. So far, Canada has not taken any steps to implement the plan of action adopted by the international Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development.

Parliamentary Comment

In the House of Commons on 28 August 1987, Conservative Member Barry Turner asked the Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark what consequences the absence of the United States would have on the outcome of the Conference and if a consensus on the issues of disarmament and development could be reached.

Mr. Clark expressed his confidence that a constructive consensus would be reached and deplored the absence of the United States from the Conference, noting that it could incite the Soviet Union to score propaganda points in an area in which it had nothing to claim. The contribution of the Eastern countries to United Nations development

³ Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations, Press release, No. 17, New York, 24 August 1987.

efforts, including the Soviet Union's, is less than that of the Western countries and even that of the developing countries.⁴

Furthermore, on 25 September 1987, NDP Member Jim Manly introduced a motion on this question according to which the Canadian Government should consider the advisability of transferring, on an annual basis, one per cent of its defence budget to official development assistance, over and above the present expenditure; the amount recovered in this way would be made available only to those countries which decreased their military budgets by at least one per cent on an annual basis. Mrs. Monique Tardif, parliamentary secretary to the Minister of National Health and Welfare, called the proposition interesting, but in fact unrealistic. She did not believe that there is a causal link between defence and development expenditures (reduction of the former would be followed by an increase of the latter), as the motion suggested. She was also opposed to any arbitrary reduction of Canada's defence budget, adding that the proposition does nothing to attack the reasons why developing countries spend too much for military purposes.

As for Liberal Member Roland de Corneille, he called this proposition inconsistent because, according to him, the assistance given to these countries cannot be related to the amount of their military expenditures. He cited the case of Mozambique, a beneficiary of Canadian aid, which would suffer from a reduction of its defence budget.

Mr. Bud Bradley, parliamentary secretary to the Minister of National Defence, mentioned for his part, that "the motion and most of the foreign and defence policies of the Honourable Member's Party seem to come from

⁴ Commons Debates, 28 August 1987, p. 8570.

the same naive idealistic base". He added that the idea of any prescribed transfers of funds saved through disarmament is unrealistic and that "Canadian development assistance is provided in accordance with well-established socio-economic criteria which, in the Government's view, must remain the principal guide".

Finally, NDP Member Cyril Keeper supported Jim Manly's motion arguing that it is important to link defence spending to development aid. According to him, new ways must be found to resolve problems and conflicts. This motion suggests one and asks that action be taken now.⁵

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9. MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTION TALKS (MBFR)

Background

The Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks between members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact have been going on in Vienna since 1973. The aim of the talks is to reduce the level of conventional forces in a Central European zone covering the territories of West Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. Direct participants include the eleven NATO and Warsaw Pact nations with troops stationed in these countries--the above seven, plus the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. Eight nations, known as "flank states", are indirect participants in the talks. These consist of Denmark, Greece, Norway, Italy, and Turkey from NATO; and Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania from the Warsaw Pact.

The MBFR talks showed some progress through the 1970s, including an agreement in principle in 1977 to reduce each side's forces in the region to 900,000 air and ground personnel with a 700,000 sub-ceiling for ground forces alone. In the past several years, however, the talks have come to a stalemate largely over the issues of the number of troops each side has stationed in the area and the methods that would be used for verifying any troop reductions.

Throughout the negotiations, NATO's positions have centered on achieving parity with the Warsaw Pact in military manpower; agreeing on effective verification measures to ensure Treaty compliance; allowing for geographical asymmetries, given the greater distance to the central front

from North America and the UK; and requiring collectivity in force reductions--enabling deployments of troops from one nation to substitute for those of another while remaining under the overall manpower ceiling. The Warsaw Pact, on the other hand, has opposed collectivity and pushed to have national sub-ceilings on force levels in any agreement; desires the inclusion of equipment reductions in addition to manpower; and wishes verification measures less intrusive than those proposed by the West.

A longstanding dispute in the negotiations has raged over the size of current force-levels, with the West counting 230,000 more Warsaw Pact troops than officially declared by the East bloc.

The most recent proposal tabled by the West, in December 1985, called for an immediate withdrawal of 5000 American and 11,500 Soviet troops from Central Europe without prior agreement on force levels. The proposal also included provisions for exchanging force data following the reduction; freezing force levels in Central Europe for three years; and a verification regime involving up to 30 on-site challenge inspections annually, as well as permanent entry/exit points for troops moving in and out of the zone.

The Warsaw Pact responded by suggesting force reductions of 6500 American and 11,500 Soviet personnel. According to Eastern figures, this would leave overall post-reduction force ratios unchanged and, as a result, set a precedent for future reductions. The Eastern Bloc would allow on-site inspection to take place if the basis for the request to inspect was well-founded.

Little progress has been made in the negotiations over the past couple of years. The political atmosphere surrounding the talks has changed,

however, for a number of reasons. First, in April 1986, General Secretary Gorbachev proposed to expand the "zone of reductions" to the "entire territory of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals". Subsequently, in June 1986, the Warsaw Pact suggested troop cuts of 100,000 to 150,000 over the next two years, with ultimate reductions of 500,000 on each side by the early 1990s. The Soviets suggested that negotiations on these proposals could take place in an expanded MBFR forum (including countries not already involved), a forum related to the Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CCSBMDE) (please refer to CCSBMDE section in the Guide), or a new forum altogether. In May 1986, NATO formed a High Level Task Force (HLTF) as a steering body for the review and development of Western positions on conventional arms control.

Second, in September 1986, the first stage of the CCSBMDE concluded with an agreement signed in Stockholm. There was hope that the success of these talks in creating a more open and predictable security regime in Europe would carry over to the MBFR negotiations.

In December 1986, the North Atlantic Council issued the Brussels Declaration on Conventional Arms Control. It recommended that two distinct negotiations take place: one, to expand upon the results of the Stockholm Conference on confidence and security-building measures; and the second, to establish conventional stability at lower levels from the Atlantic to the Urals. The former would be for all CSCE participants while the latter would be restricted to the nations of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

In February 1987 the Conventional Mandate Talks (CMT) between the Warsaw Pact and NATO began with the aim of drafting a mandate for the anticipated new negotiations on conventional stability in Europe,

generally referred to as the Conventional Stability Talks (CST). While the latter will be conducted within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the precise link to the CSCE is undecided.

Currently the mandate talks are running parallel to the MBFR negotiations. Most analysts expect that upon agreement on a mandate, MBFR will be suspended. At the 43rd session of MBFR, however, the West rejected East Bloc efforts to end the talks with a symbolic agreement. In the meantime, greater political impetus has been injected into the subject of conventional arms control as a result of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) agreement signed in December 1987 by the United States and the Soviet Union.

Current Canadian Position

The Government of Canada, with its NATO Allies, supports the goal of conventional force reduction to the lowest levels commensurate with security and stability. In a symposium at the McGill Centre for Research in Air and Space Law on 21 October 1987, Canada's Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament, Mr. de Montigny Marchand, spoke of the importance of conventional arms control, particularly in light of progress in the nuclear arms control field:

Already, the pending INF agreement has triggered vigorous discussion about the most desirable combination of conventional and nuclear military forces which ought to be retained in order to preserve and strengthen stability in the European theatre, a debate which will predictably continue for some time. This increased awareness of the interrelationship between conventional and nuclear forces, particularly at the theatre level, has doubtless been one of the factors which has given impetus to the efforts to

formulate a mandate for negotiations among members of the two major alliances, within the CSCE framework, on conventional forces in Europe.¹

Canada has expressed its full support for establishment of the CST, including agreement to making it autonomous from the CSCE process yet related to it in some form.

Parliamentary Comment

In a discussion in the House of Commons on 23 February 1988, Progressive Conservative Member Reginald Stackhouse raised the issue of the conventional arms balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. He voiced his concern that, despite the current priorities of the Soviet Union to pursue negotiations, Canada must continue and perhaps increase its efforts toward improving Canada's contribution to its forces in Europe.² Mr. Bud Bradley, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Defence, responded that "...the importance of redressing the current imbalance in conventional weapons in Europe is a top priority for this Government, as well as for NATO as a whole."³ To accomplish this, he stated, Canada would continue its efforts to improve its contribution, while, at the same time, encouraging conventional arms control negotiations:

¹ Speech to McGill University, Centre for Research in Air and Space Law's Symposium on Space Surveillance for Arms Control and Verification, 21 October 1987.

² Commons Debates, 23 February 1988, p. 13068.

³ Ibid., p. 13069.

We are currently engaged in exploratory mandate negotiations with representatives of the Warsaw Pact in Vienna. It is our hope that these preliminary talks will bear fruit, and that two new conventional arms control negotiations will commence some time late this year, or possibly early in the new year.⁴

Mr. Bradley explained that one set of talks would deal with confidence-building measures while a second set would attempt to eliminate disparities. Of the latter, he said: "We will try to establish a level of force which would remove the ability of one side to threaten the other, but would retain an ability to meet legitimate defences."⁵

The question of Canada's participation in MBFR discussions was raised by Liberal Party Member Douglas Frith in the Standing Committee on National Defence on 23 March 1988. Mr. Frith asked whether Canada had put forward any proposals within the NATO Alliance as to the course conventional arms control should follow. Defence Minister Perrin Beatty responded:

On a continuing basis we have been consulting very closely with our NATO Allies...ensuring that Canada's views are brought forward....We have made the argument very strenuously in favour of the need for cuts at the conventional level. Unfortunately, in the case of MBFR we have not made great progress in recent years. It is an area where we would like to see progress made.⁶

Mr. Robert Fowler, Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy), added:

⁴ Ibid., p. 13069.

⁵ Ibid., p. 13069.

⁶ SCND, 23 March 1988, p. 13.

The key issue facing MBFR and the follow-on from MBFR is of course the challenge of asymmetrical reductions, to deal in a stabilizing way with the enormous preponderance of Warsaw Pact conventional forces.⁷

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10. NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

Background

International efforts to control nuclear proliferation date back to the early 1940s, during the initial stages of the development of the first atomic bomb. In 1943, allied governments, including the United States and Britain, met in Quebec and concluded agreements aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear technologies to states other than the US and the UK. In 1945, the United States, Britain, and Canada signed the Agreed Declaration on Atomic Energy which foresaw the dangers of nuclear proliferation.

While more ambitious international efforts aimed at preventing the future spread of nuclear weapons were initially frustrated, some success was eventually achieved with the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1956. Under the aegis of the UN, the IAEA's function--as defined in the agency's statute of 1957--is "to seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity" as well as "ensure that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its operation and control is not used to further any military purpose". Although not exclusively devoted to the task of curbing proliferation, the IAEA has contributed significantly to this goal through the application of safeguards and inspections to insure that states not divert nuclear energy, material and facilities used for peaceful purposes to the development of nuclear weapons. At the end of 1986, the Agency had concluded 164 safeguards agreements with 94 states.

Chief among existing international non-proliferation measures is the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Evolving out of a 1961 UN General Assembly

Resolution, the Treaty was signed on 1 July 1968, and entered into force on 5 March 1970. It contains provisions for quinquennial reviews of its operation, and is due for renewal in 1995.

The NPT contains provisions to be followed both by existing nuclear weapon states (NWS) and non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). Thus, Article I of the Treaty declares that each NWS "undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosives directly or indirectly; and not in any way assist, encourage or induce non-nuclear weapon states to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."

In turn, under Article II, non-nuclear weapon states agree not to receive and not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear explosives or other nuclear explosive devices; and agree to accept full IAEA safeguards on their nuclear activities. For their part, nuclear weapon states parties agree to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of information and assistance to their non-nuclear counterparts for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Moreover, all states parties undertake not to provide fissile material, or equipment used for processing or producing it, unless under IAEA safeguards.

Finally, under Article VI, nuclear-weapon states parties to the NPT agree to undertake to pursue negotiations "on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict, effective international control."

Although viewed by some as an agreement between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states, only three of the states possessing these weapons--the

United States, Britain and the Soviet Union--have actually signed the NPT. France and China--as well as suspected or "near" nuclear weapon states such as Israel, India, Pakistan, Brazil, Argentina and South Africa--have all yet to accede to the Treaty. So far, however, India is the only non-signatory, NNWS known to have exploded a nuclear device. The explosion took place in 1974, and was described by the Indian government as intended "for peaceful purposes only." On the 5 November 1987, Spain, a nation with a fairly substantial nuclear program, acceded to the Treaty.

One obstacle to further accession to the NPT has been the long-held view among some states that it is discriminatory. Not only does it allow nuclear weapon states to maintain their arsenals while refusing the right of acquisition to others, but it requires the latter to open their facilities to the IAEA while the former are not required to do so. Nevertheless, as of November 1987, 135 states were party to the Treaty.

Three review conferences have thus far been held on the operation of the NPT. At the first review, in 1975, expressions of concern were voiced by the neutral and non-aligned nations regarding the failure of the NWS to halt the arms race. These states called for an end to underground nuclear testing, large reductions in nuclear arsenals, and a pledge by nuclear weapon states not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against their non-nuclear counterparts. Agreement by the NWS to make a greater effort to address these concerns was reflected in the Final Document.

The second review conference in 1980 was less successful than its predecessor. This was in large part due to the fact that since 1975, none of the demands of the neutral and non-aligned states had been met. Although some agreement was reached on safeguards for peaceful nuclear

programs, no consensus could be reached on bringing a halt to the expansion of existing nuclear arsenals ("vertical proliferation"). In fact, no final declaration, nor any reaffirmation of support for the Treaty, was issued from the review's proceedings.

The failure of the NWS to make substantive progress in the area of vertical proliferation resurfaced as the key issue at the most recent review in 1985. Indeed, in the five years separating the third review from the second, no major arms control measure of any kind had been achieved. A Final Declaration was, however, adopted by consensus. In it, the participants expressed the conviction that the NPT was essential for international peace and security, and reaffirmed their support for the Treaty and its objectives.

The declaration also expressed the deep regret of all but some participants (ie. the United States and Britain), over the failure to conclude a comprehensive test ban, and called on nuclear weapon states parties to resume trilateral negotiations, as well as to participate actively in the CD, to achieve it.

Canada has always played a leading role in the quest for strict non-proliferation measures. While Canada assisted the US in the development of the world's first nuclear weapons during World War II, it was also the first nation to forgo the option of developing them despite possession of the capacity to do so. One of the three states participating in the Agreed Declaration on Atomic Energy in 1945, Canada also took part in the negotiation of the IAEA, its statute, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty itself. The maintenance and strengthening of the non-proliferation regime has been articulated as one of the six specific arms control goals

of the Canadian Government.

Current Canadian Position

Present Canadian policy on nuclear non-proliferation is based on changes introduced by Ottawa in 1974 and 1976, imposing tighter controls over nuclear exports.

Under this policy, nuclear co-operation will be allowed only with those non-nuclear weapon states that have made a general commitment to non-proliferation by either ratifying the NPT, or accepting full-scope IAEA safeguards on their nuclear activities. Moreover, Canada will export nuclear materials only to those states (both nuclear and non-nuclear) which have undertaken to accept, in a formal agreement, a number of additional requirements designed to minimize proliferation risks. Such states must assure that Canadian-supplied nuclear items (eg. nuclear material, heavy water, nuclear equipment, and technology) will not be used in connection with the production of nuclear explosive devices. In addition, they must be willing to accept fallback safeguards in the event that a situation arises where the IAEA is unable to continue to perform its safeguard functions. These fallback safeguards include controls over both the re-transfer of Canadian-supplied nuclear items, and the reprocessing of Canadian-origin spent fuel.¹ Since 1976, these requirements have been negotiated with the United States, Euratom, Australia, Japan and the Republic of Korea.

¹ DEA, "Canada's Nuclear Non-proliferation Policy," 1985, p. 13.

In 1978 Canada also began work on an extensive programme aimed at developing and improving the verification mechanisms of the NPT. This initiative, known as the Canadian Safeguards Research and Development Programme, was designed to assist the IAEA in the development of safeguards systems for CANDU reactors. Work under this programme, which received a five-year budget of approximately \$11 million, is reported to be well advanced.²

On 13 June 1988, in his speech at UNSSOD III, Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark referred to the importance of the NPT, and described future Canadian policy initiatives in support of it. Mr. Clark noted:

No measure demonstrates the commitment of a nation to nuclear disarmament more effectively than adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Beginning last week and throughout this session, officials of the Canadian Government, on my instructions, will be calling on the Governments of all non-signatories of this treaty, strongly urging any nation that has not done so to accede to this essential arms control treaty. I hope that the Special Session will issue a similar call.³

² "Canada's Role in Verification," The Disarmament Bulletin, Supplement, Summer-Fall 1987, p. 3.

³ Secretary of State for External Affairs, Statement 88/31, 13 June 1988, p. 5.

Parliamentary Comment

The Defence White Paper of June 1987 called for the purchase of 10-12 nuclear-powered submarines. For reasons of military security, and because neither the NPT nor the IAEA deals with the use of nuclear material for non-explosive military purposes, fuel for these vessels would not be subject to the safeguards that would apply if it were allotted to peaceful, non-military activity. Although bilateral safeguards between the supplier of the fissionable material and the recipient are possible, the submarine programme has nevertheless raised concern as to whether Canada's use of the uranium fuel would be fully consistent with its obligations under the NPT, and past Canadian non-proliferation policy. Speaking before the Standing Committee on National Defence on 23 February 1988, NDP Member Derek Blackburn speculated upon the possible implications of Canada's removal of fissionable material from international safeguards for the purpose of fuelling nuclear submarines:

I am not suggesting that a country like Canada would deliberately and knowingly in any way try to use the spent fuel for other purposes, for explosive purposes for example-- or not even spent fuel, but divert some of the high grade fuel for other illegal purposes. What I am saying is that by getting this exemption for us we are setting an example that other countries, sort of the bad guys might use in their submissions--countries that are not as reputable as ours--and they might use the same example whereby we have the fuel encased in not only a physical wall but a security wall away from any kind of third party objective scrutiny or observation, and we have it for up to five or seven years. We know what we are going to do with it, we are the good guys. What about other countries that might want to use our precedents and hide their high grade fuel, their enriched uranium for five to seven years? We do not know what is

going on--we will never know...--but they have used our exemption, our example, our precedent.⁴

Responding to the Member's statement, Mr. Armand Blum, Canadian Submarine Project Co-ordinator for the Department of External Affairs, observed that after the fissionable material had been used in the submarines and had been taken out, it would either fall back under IAEA safeguards or would remain under bilateral inspection.⁵ He added:

...at least in the case of Canada a system will have been developed that will ensure that there is no possibility of diverting the material. That material, as I said, will be safeguarded either by the IAEA or by a reputable guarantor, so to speak, which would be either the United Kingdom or France. Now, we hope any other supplier, anybody who in the future would wish to sell a submarine to a third country, would perhaps copy the Canadian example....⁶

In turn, Mr. Blackburn commented:

But...obviously there is no guarantee. You are talking about Canada, a reputable country....We are arguing...about the dangerous precedent that I suggest we are setting in this exemption that other countries could possibly use, and where you will not get that kind of bilateral agreement and where we will not be able to put our trust in that agreement. We will not have a guarantee that this highly enriched uranium will be used for this specific propulsion purpose, but it could be diverted and

⁴ SCND Proceedings, 23 February 1988, p. 13.

⁵ Ibid., p. 14.

⁶ Ibid.

again add to the world's explosive nuclear capability.⁷

Similarly, on 7 March 1988, again before the Standing Committee on National Defence, Liberal Member Douglas Frith commented that:

We have always been in favour of strengthening IAEA safeguards. I think a lot of other countries in the world that are not nuclear have always looked at Canada as a leader in this respect, and they view the decision to go to a nuclear powered submarine as a departure from past practice.⁸

In reply, Defence Minister Perrin Beatty stated that he believed that current Canadian policy with respect to the acquisition of nuclear submarines:

...is entirely consistent with past practice. The position Canada has taken from the outset is that we strongly oppose the proliferation of nuclear weapons. What we are talking here in the case of nuclear-propelled submarines is not a nuclear weapon, but simply a propulsion system. If the NPT had been designed to outlaw in some way the use of nuclear propulsion for military purposes it would have said so.⁹

The Minister went on:

What we will demonstrate is that a country that is nuclear-- that is, that uses nuclear energy for both civil and military purposes--is capable of using them consistently with the spirit of the NPT and of specifically renouncing the

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ SCND Proceedings, 7 March 1988, p. 15.

⁹ Ibid.

acquisition of nuclear weapons despite our capacity to develop them here.¹⁰

Mr. Frith also expressed the opinion that, despite the fact that the non-proliferation regime does not deal with the use of nuclear material for non-explosive military purposes, it was his understanding that the governors and senior officials of the IAEA had always expressed the hope that no signatory state would ever put this exclusion to the test.¹¹

Comment on the possible negative consequences of the Government's plan to purchase nuclear-powered submarines for the NPT and Canadian non-proliferation policy continued to be voiced in the House in early summer 1988.¹²

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¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² See, for instance, Commons Debates, 7 June 1988, pp. 16205-6; 9 June 1988, p. 16283; and 15 June 1988, pp. 16485-86.

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11. PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE

Background

In 1961, a resolution passed by consensus in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) identified the principles by which states should be guided in their exploration and use of outer space. It was established that international law, including the UN Charter, applied to outer space, and that outer space and all celestial bodies were free for all states to explore. Two years later, one hundred and twenty-five countries, including the US and the Soviet Union, signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) prohibiting nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space and underwater.

In December 1966, the UN General Assembly unanimously approved a Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. Canada ratified this Treaty in 1967. The Outer Space Treaty, as it is known, states that the exploration and use of outer space shall be for the benefit of all. It bans the stationing of any weapons of mass destruction in space, and also prohibits military bases, installations, or fortifications; weapons testing of any kind; and military manoeuvres on the moon and other celestial bodies.

The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union limits the number of anti-ballistic missile sites, interceptor missiles and associated radars. Under Article V of the Treaty, the parties also undertake "not to develop, test or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or

mobile land-based" (emphasis added). The ABM Treaty, therefore, acts as a barrier to the extension of the arms race into outer space.

The Final Document of the First UN Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD I) in 1978 urged that further agreements be developed to reserve outer space for solely peaceful purposes.

In June 1979, bilateral superpower talks on anti-satellite (ASAT) activities were suspended after a year of inconclusive discussions. There was disagreement concerning the capabilities of each side in this area, as well as the possible defensive or offensive nature of ASAT weapons.

In 1982, at the Second UN Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD II), Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau outlined Canada's official stand on the increasing militarization of outer space. He pointed out the "highly destabilizing" loopholes in the Outer Space Treaty, particularly those regarding "anti-satellite weapons or anti-missile laser systems":

I believe that we cannot wait much longer if we are to be successful in foreclosing the prospect of space wars. I propose, therefore, that an early start be made on a treaty to prohibit the development, testing and deployment of all weapons for use in space.¹

In 1982, as a contribution to the necessary preparation for substantive negotiations, Canada tabled a working paper in the CD outlining the factors of stable and unstable deterrence, desirable objectives for arms

¹ Rt. Hon. P. E. Trudeau, "Technological Momentum the Fuel That Feeds the Nuclear Arms Race: An Address...to the Second United Nations Special Session on Disarmament, New York, June 18, 1982," DEA Statements and Speeches No. 82/10, p. 5.

control, the increasing importance of space for military purposes and the present state of arms control in space. The paper also illustrated the relationship of anti-satellite systems to ballistic missile defence.² The following year, Canada initiated a national research programme on the problems for verification which were likely to arise from the possible dual nature of many space systems.

For a long time the forty nations represented at the Conference on Disarmament were unable to reach a consensus on a mandate for the Ad Hoc working group on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. It was only in 1985 that the matter was resolved. It was agreed that in addition to studying the issues involved in such a ban, the committee should also study existing treaties and international law relating to outer space along with any proposals concerning the issue. During 1986 the CD re-established the Ad Hoc Committee to continue its examination of issues related to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The 1986 mandate was, in turn, re-established in 1987 and 1988.

In April 1988 the Ad Hoc Committee presented a special report to the CD, concluding that "the legal régime applicable to outer space by itself does not guarantee the prevention of an arms race in outer space." The report also recognized the need to consolidate and reinforce the legal régime in order to enhance its effectiveness. Finally, it called for strict compliance with existing multilateral and bilateral agreements.³

In 1985 the Canadian delegation at the CD tabled a working paper entitled "Survey of International Law Relevant to Arms Control and Outer Space at

² CD/320, 26 August 1982.

³ Special Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, CD/833, 25 April 1988.

the CD."⁴ This review of existing relevant agreements was considered essential to ensure that the CD worked in conformity with existing treaties and international law. Over twenty international agreements, including the UN Charter, were examined, and a variety of issues were identified as being fundamental to the successful development of a treaty preventing an arms race in outer space.

The multilateral negotiations at the CD on the prevention of an arms race in outer space take into consideration the bilateral talks between the United States and Soviet Union on this topic. The most important difference between these two parties is that Moscow thinks priority should be given to obtaining a general agreement banning an arms race in outer space, while Washington insists that the coverage of earlier agreements (1962-1967) should be examined first.

The 42nd session of the UN General Assembly in the Fall of 1987 passed Resolution 42/33, calling on the CD to give priority to the question of preventing an arms race in outer space, and to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on this question. It also called upon the United States and the Soviet Union to intensify their negotiations on this issue. The US changed its vote, as compared to the previous year's similar resolution (41/53), from an abstention to a "no". This was possibly due to the inclusion of a new clause recognizing the current legal regime applicable to outer space as being insufficient to guarantee the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The resolution passed by a vote of 154-1-0.

⁴ CD/618, CD/OS/WP.6, 23 July 1985.

Current Canadian Position

Since the beginning of the 1980s, Canada has been conducting a research project on verification called "PAXSAT A," studying the feasibility of developing a system of satellites capable of verifying arms control agreements in outer space. "PAXSAT A" involves space-to-space remote sensing, with satellites used to identify the purpose and function of other space objects. A second project, "PAXSAT B," is a feasibility study of the use of satellites for space-to-ground remote sensing to verify agreements on conventional forces. Canada presented its analysis of PAXSAT to the CD in April 1987.

Ambassador for Disarmament Douglas Roche has summarized Canada's substantive contributions to outer space arms control as follows:

Canada has contributed to the Conference on Disarmament's deliberations on this subject in several ways: the first substantive working paper dealing with possible stabilizing and destabilizing space-based military systems; an extensive survey of international law to provide a data base concerning its applicability to outer space; an Outer Space Workshop in Montreal to examine ways to strengthen the legal regime for outer space.⁵

The workshop to which Mr. Roche referred was a cooperative effort between the Department of External Affairs and the McGill Centre for Research of Air and Space Law, held in May 1987. Thirty-nine officials, including eleven ambassadors representing 35 nations, were present. The purpose of the workshop was to "provide an opportunity for an exchange of views on broad legal questions relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space."

⁵ "Beyond the Summit: The Future of Disarmament," Secretary of State for External Affairs, Statement 87/71, 8 December 1987, pp. 10-11.

As Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, James Taylor, has stated, Canada recognizes the limits to its influence:

It is important to recognize that the current bilateral efforts by the USA and the USSR to prevent an arms race in outer space and the multilateral efforts in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) are not and must not be at cross-purposes. We urge the USA and the USSR to continue their efforts in this area, while at the same time, we recognize that arms control in relation to outer space has an important multilateral dimension.⁶

These sentiments were expanded upon by Canada's Ambassador de Montigny Marchand in his speech before the Conference on Disarmament on 10 March 1988:

Here too we can try to enrich our work through interaction with the bilateral discussion between the two major space powers. A first order of priority of the Canadian delegation is to ensure that we do nothing to set back or interfere with the work that is being done in the bilateral space talks. We hope that the two major space powers might see advantage in promoting discussion in this forum of some of the practical, and legal problems brought to light in the bilateral talks.⁷

⁶ International Conference on Implementing a Global Chemical Weapons Convention, Ottawa, 7 October 1987.

⁷ Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations at Geneva, "Speech of Ambassador de Montigny Marchand to the Conference on Disarmament, Thursday, 10 March 1988, Geneva."

Parliamentary Comment

The issue of peaceful uses of outer space was raised in the House of Commons, in a general sense, in regard to Canadian participation in the space station (see Canada-US-Space Station section of the Guide) and in relation to the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI). On 14 December 1987, Liberal Member William Rompkey stated:

We in the Liberal Party have taken the position all along that Canada should participate in the space station only if it is used for peaceful purposes and only if there is no military use of that space station. There is still no confirmation that that has been agreed to. There is still no confirmation, far from it, that the Government has reached agreement with the Americans that there will be no military use.⁸

In the same debate NDP Member Mike Cassidy made clear his position on the space station:

The Government wishes to ensure that any military use of the space station is consistent with international law, and with the treaty obligations of all participants in the space station. The Minister of State for Science and Technology is nodding, Mr. Speaker. I would like to know what are the treaty obligations.

Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan met in a summit last week, which was welcomed by people from around the world, but on the question of the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty which effectively governs experimentation in space that might be used for the SDI, for star wars, they went away agreeing to

⁸ Commons Debates, 14 December 1987, pp. 11734-35.

disagree. They simply stated that both countries would respect the treaty obligations.⁹

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12. URANIUM AND TRITIUM EXPORTS

Background

Canada is one of the world's largest suppliers of uranium. During World War II it was involved in the research and development of the atomic bomb, and supplied uranium for atomic weapons from Port Radium in the Northwest Territories. Canada continued to provide uranium and plutonium for the weapons programmes of the United States and Britain for twenty years, although it renounced any intention of developing its own atomic weapons. In 1965, Canada's uranium export policy was altered when Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson announced that, henceforth, Canadian uranium exports would be used for peaceful purposes only.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) ushered in greater restrictions on the uses of nuclear material internationally. In addition to agreeing not to develop nuclear weapons, non-nuclear weapon states parties to the Treaty are required to submit to full IAEA safeguard measures over their nuclear programmes. In turn, nuclear-weapon states parties agree to work toward halting the proliferation of their own arsenals ("vertical" proliferation), and are required to cooperate with their non-nuclear counterparts in the development of the uses of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

India's explosion of its "peaceful nuclear device" in 1974 served as the harbinger of change in Canadian policy on the export of nuclear material and equipment. After the Indian government admitted that the plutonium used in its "device" had been produced in the Canadian-supplied CIRUS reactor, Canada suspended all nuclear cooperation with India, and later

that year announced more stringent safeguards on its nuclear exports.

Natural uranium is not classified as a strategic material. A blend of uranium 235 (U235) and uranium 238 (U238), natural uranium contains less than one per cent U235--a quantity too low to generate a nuclear explosion.

Approximately 85 percent of the uranium exported from Canada goes to the United States, Great Britain and France. There it is enriched for use in light water nuclear reactors. Because these reactors require uranium with a 3 per cent concentration of U235, the natural uranium must be enriched to this level by increasing the percentage of U235 isotope. Elaborate and expensive, the enrichment process was, until recently, confined to those countries possessing nuclear weapons programmes, as only they could afford the cost of such large operations.

The Canada-United States Nuclear Co-operation Agreement, signed in 1955 and most recently renewed in 1980, stipulates that uranium of Canadian origin cannot be used for any kind of military purposes. Similar conditions govern uranium exports to Britain and France under the Canada-Euratom agreement (1978).

Since enrichment plants have both civilian and military uses, the separation of materials for either application occurs only as a bookkeeping procedure. Imported uranium effectively goes into a large "pot" and is not kept separate according to the country of origin or its intended use. In a letter to NDP leader Ed Broadbent in October 1985, Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark stated:

It is impossible to trace precisely each and every molecule of Canadian uranium through these complex enrichment plants ... However, for each ounce of Canadian uranium fed into the

enrichment plant, the same amount, in both enriched and depleted forms as appropriate, is subject to the Canada-USA nuclear co-operation agreement and to the non-explosive use and non-military use commitments contained therein. This is an example of the application of the internationally-accepted notion of fungibility.¹

After the uranium is enriched to the required 3 per cent concentration, the commensurate amount is taken off, and the depleted uranium (which still contains small amounts of U235) is stored.

Depleted U238 can be used in military reactors to breed plutonium--a substance which itself can be used to make nuclear weapons. U238 also constitutes an important element of hydrogen bombs--providing 50 per cent of their explosive power.

Following the Indian nuclear explosion in 1974, the Canadian government announced that no uranium of Canadian origin could be enriched or reprocessed without Canada's prior consent. In January 1977, Canada halted uranium shipments to both the European Economic Community (EEC) and Japan after two years of negotiation failed to produce their agreement to the Canadian stipulations. Although Japan consented to abide by the clause soon afterwards, the EEC remained intransigent. It was not until 1980 that an agreement was signed by Canada and the EEC which allowed sales to occur, with consultation on a case-by-case basis. Canadian uranium is also enriched by the Soviet Union for use by Spain, East Germany, Sweden and Finland. In this case, Canada requires that both the depleted as well as the enriched uranium be supplied to the countries concerned.

¹ Secretary of State for External Affairs, Letter to the Hon. Edward Broadbent, 3 October 1985.

Tritium, a radioactive isotope of hydrogen, constitutes another key component of nuclear weapons. It is generally found as tritiated water. Canadian CANDU reactors use heavy water to control the nuclear reaction. The heavy water--containing deuterium--captures neutrons from the main reaction chamber, converting deuterium to tritium. This process is peculiar to CANDU reactors, and therefore more tritium is produced as a by-product by the CANDU reactors than by any other type of reactor.

Each year, approximately 0.5 kg of tritium is used for civilian purposes such as phosphorescent lights and fusion experiments, while approximately 11 kg is used for military purposes. A component of all but very primitive nuclear weapons, tritium decays at a rate of about 5.5 per cent per year. Consequently, older nuclear weapons must have their tritium supply replaced from time to time.

For health and safety reasons, the tritium by-products of CANDU reactors require removal. Ontario Hydro is constructing a tritium recovery facility at Darlington, Ontario, and plans to market the recovered tritium--which sells for approximately \$15 million per kilogram on the international market. Tritium is not classified as a nuclear material by the IAEA, and is therefore not subject to international safeguards. It possesses a relatively short half-life and thus would create problems for IAEA monitoring. In June 1986, in response to a letter from author Margaret Laurence that expressed concern over Ontario Hydro's plans for the export of tritium, Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark stated:

The Canadian Government believes that, given the physical nature of tritium and its limited proliferation significance, the application of safeguards to tritium is not appropriate. It should be clear, however, that export licences and permits

for tritium will not be issued unless the government is satisfied that tritium will not be used for nuclear weapons or any other nuclear explosive purposes.²

The recovery facility at Darlington is scheduled to begin operations in the fall of 1988.

Current Canadian Position

Canada continues to require that its uranium exports be used for non-explosive purposes, pursuant to bilateral nuclear co-operation agreements, and in keeping with its nuclear non-proliferation commitments. The export of tritium is also to take place within the general framework of Canada's non-proliferation policy.

In November 1987, at the UN General Assembly, Canada was the lead sponsor of Resolution 42/38L entitled "Prohibition of the Production of Fissionable Material for Weapons Purposes". The resolution noted that such a prohibition would be an important step in facilitating the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other explosive devices, as well as halting and reversing the nuclear arms race. It therefore requested that the CD pursue its consideration of the question of an adequately verifiable cessation and prohibition, and that it keep the General Assembly informed of that consideration. The resolution passed by a vote of 149-1-6, with France being the only state opposing it.

² Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, Letter to Margaret Laurence, 19 June 1986, as quoted in The Disarmament Bulletin, Summer-Autumn 1986, pp. 18-19.

Parliamentary Comment

Before the Standing Committee on National Defence on 23 February 1988, NDP Member Derek Blackburn noted that Canada's acquisition of nuclear submarines could require the transfer of technology from the United States. In this connection, Mr. Blackburn asked whether the Department of External Affairs had considered the possibility that:

...the US Congress may ask something in return to wit, a revision to the already existing agreement between Canada and the United States on inspection control over the use of spent fuel in the United States that they acquire from Canada.³

In particular, the Member noted the possibility that the US Congress would be "very interested" in breaking out of the tight nuclear export controls which Canada has traditionally imposed through its bilateral agreement with the United States⁴ (i.e., that Canadian nuclear exports not be used for any military purpose whatsoever).

In response to Mr. Blackburn's query, Mr Armand Blum, Canadian Submarine Project Co-ordinator for the Department of External Affairs, stated that there had been "no indication whatsoever" of any such desire.⁵

The issue of tritium exports has not been raised in the Commons this year.

³ SCND Proceedings, 23 February 1988, p. 27.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

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Cross References

Nuclear Non-Proliferation

13. VERIFICATION

Background

Verification is now recognized as a key factor in all areas of disarmament and arms control. It is at the heart of the negotiations on nuclear missiles, arms in outer space, chemical weapons and nuclear testing. The issue of compliance often generates controversy and makes it difficult to reach agreements in any of these sectors. However, two important developments have occurred since the end of summer 1987: talks have resumed on verification of nuclear testing after an eight-year hiatus, and the Soviet Union and the United States have signed an agreement to eliminate ground-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles (INF). The INF treaty contains certain innovative provisions on verification that could set a precedent for future disarmament and arms control agreements.

Over the years, Canada has acquired solid expertise in verification, in the recognition that an arms control and disarmament agreement must be accompanied by provisions designed to ensure compliance and build confidence. Following the United Nations' First and Second Special Sessions on Disarmament, which stressed the inclusion of adequate verification provisions in disarmament agreements, the Canadian Government announced in 1983 the launching of an Arms Control Research Program, which now has an annual budget of \$1 million. This Department of External Affairs program involves the Government, the academic community and the commercial sector and includes such projects as studies of problems that arise in international negotiations, creation of specialized technical training programs and organization of international symposia of experts.

The Arms Control Research Program focusses on certain Canadian arms control priorities: the achievement of a comprehensive convention to ban chemical weapons; negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty; the development of a treaty to ban weapons for use in outer space; and the pursuit of arms control and military confidence-building in Europe.

The Government's activities include a \$3.2 million upgrading of the seismic array station at Yellowknife, two studies given to the UN Secretary-General on operational procedures for investigating alleged chemical weapons abuses, and working papers on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Canada has also set up a project known as PAXSAT; this is a feasibility study of two potential applications of space-based remote sensing to the verification of multilateral arms control agreements. PAXSAT 'A' studies the use of space-based remote sensing for arms control agreements governing arms in outer space, while PAXSAT 'B' is concerned with verifying conventional arms control agreements.

In 1985, at the 40th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, Canada's UN delegation initiated and sponsored Resolution 40/152 on all aspects of verification, which was passed by consensus. The resolution called on member states "to increase their efforts towards achieving agreements on balanced, mutually acceptable, verifiable and effective arms limitation and disarmament measures," and urged them "to communicate to the Secretary-General [...] their views and suggestions on verification principles, procedures and techniques [...] and on the role of the United Nations in the field of verification." The resolution was

called "a historic breakthrough", since previous resolutions on this issue had failed to proceed beyond the negotiating stage.⁶

Carrying out the requirements of this resolution, in April 1986, the Canadian Government submitted to the Secretary-General and subsequently published A Comprehensive Study on Arms Control and Disarmament Verification Pursuant to UNGA Resolution 40/152 (0). This publication, in addition to describing the relevant principles, procedures and techniques used in verification, also foresees an important role for the United Nations in the application and interpretation of arms control agreements, despite the fact bilateral negotiations between the superpowers will likely continue to be of paramount importance in this context. That same year, during the 41st Session of the UN General Assembly, Canada tabled Resolution 41/86 Q on the role of verification in arms control agreements, which was passed by consensus.

In October 1986, Canada hosted an international workshop on the exchange of seismic data. Experts representing 17 countries met in Ottawa to study the problems posed by rapid exchange of numerical seismic data in wave form. The purpose of this workshop was to support the work of the Group of Scientific Experts of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD). Canada has made another notable contribution to this issue: in 1987, a Canadian, Peter Basham, was appointed coordinator of the project to develop an international exchange of seismic data, which forms part of the work of the Group of Scientific Experts.

In May 1987, Canada invited CD delegation heads and observers to attend a workshop in Montreal on arms in outer space. The purpose of this

⁶ Permanent Canadian Delegation to the United Nations, News Release, No. 62, 22 November 1985.

workshop was to promote dialogue on the major legal issues linked to preventing an arms race in outer space and focussed in particular on the current legal system governing outer space. Results were also presented of research conducted in Canada on the use of space-based remote sensing for verification of arms control and disarmament (PAXSAT study).

In 1987 and 1988, Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament, Douglas Roche, chaired the UN Disarmament Commission's Verification Working Group. The Group completed its work in May 1988, approving a consensus document containing 16 principles on verification. The Group also held discussions on procedures and techniques and on the role the United Nations might play in verification of arms control and disarmament agreements. This last point was the subject of a speech by Mr. Roche on 12 May 1988, in which he listed certain roles the UN could play with regard to verification:

- development of internationally recognized standards on arms control and disarmament verification;
- creation of a verification data base, especially to assist negotiators;
- provision of assistance, advice and technical expertise to regional arms control negotiators, on request;
- research into structures, procedures and techniques for verification;
- on a responsive basis and with the consent of the parties to an arms control or disarmament negotiation or agreement, potential

involvement in the formulation and execution of verification provisions of specific agreements.⁷

Current Canadian Position

On 25 August 1987, Canada's Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament, Allan Beesley, reviewed recent progress in negotiations on chemical warfare, nuclear testing and weapons in outer space. After noting that the verification measures accompanying certain bilateral and multilateral agreements were imperfect, he stated:

These few examples--in multilateral and bilateral agreements--demonstrate not only the importance of verification and compliance, but the political sensitivity of the whole process of detecting and handling events suggesting possible non-compliance. Indeed, recent concerns about verification and compliance seem in some cases to have eroded the confidence among the parties to arms control agreements rather than reinforced it. None the less, it is the Canadian position, which I wish to emphasize, that the careful negotiation and drafting of adequate and effective verification provisions and the establishment of the necessary implementing mechanisms is essential to preventing such a deterioration of confidence. This applies a fortiori to agreements involving nuclear weapons and nuclear tests.⁸

In a speech to the UN First Commission on 13 October 1987, Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament Douglas Roche noted:

⁷ Intervention on the Role of the United Nations in Verification by Canadian Representative at UNDC, Verification Working Group, United Nations, 12 May 1988.

⁸ CD/PV 433, 25 August 1987.

Verification [...] is a basic and normal process that reflects a legitimate concern about on-going compliance with a commitment. The conduct of verification activities must come to be accepted as a necessary and normal part of the relations between parties to arms control agreements.⁹

On 31 March 1988, Canada submitted a working paper to the Conference on Disarmament regarding verification of a future Convention on Chemical Weapons, under the title: Factors involved in determining verification inspectorate personnel and resource requirements (CD/823).

At the United Nations' Third Special Session on Disarmament in June 1988, Canada and the Netherlands submitted a paper on the role the United Nations might play in verification. The two countries proposed in particular that a UN Group of Experts conduct a thorough study of this subject, to serve as a key international document on future UN activities in this field. The Group of Experts would hold its first meeting after January 1990 and submit its report to the 46th Session of the General Assembly, in 1991.

⁹ Canadian Policy on arms control and disarmament, Excerpts from official statements and communications, DEA, March 1988.

Parliamentary Comment

On 18 September 1987, Conservative MP Barry Turner questioned Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark on the Soviet-US agreement on nuclear testing concluded the previous day:

Considering that Canada is upgrading its seismic verification capacity in Yellowknife to world-class standards, coupled with our potential satellite capabilities, does the Minister see Canada playing a verification role in this vital arms reduction progress?

Mr. Clark replied:

[...] one of the surprising and important developments is that there has been an agreement, after an eight-year hiatus, to resume discussions on nuclear testing. That brings directly to the fore the importance of verification in which Canada has some very real expertise. That expertise will be available fully if it can be put into service.¹⁰

On 13 June 1988, Liberal MP André Ouellet referred to the United Nations debate on disarmament, and asked Minister of National Defence Perrin Beatty:

Why is Canada not ready to accept the proposal that has been put forward which is now under discussion to have an international verification agency come under the auspices of the United Nations? Why is Canada not ready to accept this? Certainly such an agency would be absolutely essential to monitor disarmament, and certainly to monitor a treaty such as the INF.

¹⁰ Commons Debates, 18 September 1987, pp. 9090 and 9091.

Mr. Beatty noted that after returning from the United Nations' Third Special Session on Disarmament, Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark agreed to discuss proposals made by Canada. He added:

Suffice it to say that across the board our position has been, first, to press for cuts in terms of nuclear and conventional weapons and, second, to press for regimes of verification and control which would ensure that those treaties are met."¹¹

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¹¹ Commons Debates, 13 June 1988, pp. 16373 and 16374.

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Background

Cross References

Chemical and Biological Weapons

Nuclear Testing

Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space

14. THIRD UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT (UNSSOD III)

Background

The Third Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament (UNSSOD III) was held from 31 May to 25 June 1988. The substantive issues on its agenda included an assessment of the implementation of the decisions taken at the previous two UNSSODs, a forward-looking assessment of developments and trends in the disarmament process, and consideration of the role of the UN in disarmament and the effectiveness of UN disarmament machinery, including information and educational activities. Despite the stopping of the clock in the last hour of June 25 in order to provide more time, the Special Session was unable to reach consensus on a broad range of issues. As a result, no final document, or even concluding statement, was agreed upon.

The First Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD I) was held in New York 23 May to 1 July 1978. UNSSOD I was largely due to the lobbying of the non-aligned states, and produced an ambitious 129-paragraph Final Document adopted by consensus. Divided into four sections - Introduction, Declaration, Programme of Action, and Machinery - the Final Document established what it described as "the foundations of an international disarmament strategy...in which the United Nations should play a more effective role."

Some of the substantive achievements of the First Special Session included: i) agreement that the Committee (later renamed Conference) on Disarmament in Geneva would be the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum in the international community; ii) the decision that

henceforth, the First Committee of the General Assembly would deal exclusively with matters of "disarmament and related international security questions"; and, iii) the call for a Second Special Session devoted to disarmament to be convened in the future.

At UNSSOD I, Prime Minister Trudeau delivered the Canadian address, calling for the adoption of a "strategy of suffocation." This strategy included: i) a Comprehensive Test Ban; ii) a cessation of flight testing of all new strategic delivery vehicles; iii) a prohibition of all production of fissionable material for weapons purposes; and iv) agreement to limit, then reduce, spending on new strategic nuclear weapons systems.

The Final Document of UNSSOD I marked the UN's assertion of the importance of multilateral disarmament efforts. The success of UNSSOD I did not carry over to UNSSOD II, however, held from 7 June to 10 July 1982. At a time of growing tension between East and West, UNSSOD II was characterized by disagreement and paralysis. Consensus was not reached on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament which was to be its centrepiece. Neither could a consensus be achieved on an evaluation of the results of the First Special Session in 1978. UNSSOD II did, however, inaugurate the World Disarmament Campaign, an attempt to influence world public opinion in favour of disarmament. Public opinion was well expressed at the time of the Second Special Session, independent of the efforts of the UN. On June 12, an estimated 750,000 to 1,000,000 people marched past the UN headquarters in New York in support of nuclear disarmament.

At UNSSOD II, Canada reaffirmed the strategy of suffocation and the validity of the Final Document of UNSSOD I, while urging the US and USSR to resume strategic arms talks.

Current Canadian Position

Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, delivered the Canadian statement to the plenary meeting of UNSSOD III on 13 June 1988. In his statement, he noted the achievements in arms control which had occurred since the convening of UNSSOD II. The Stockholm Agreement of 1986, the INF Treaty of 1987, and the Moscow Summit of 1988 between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev were presented as evidence of forward movement in arms control. Mr. Clark called upon the Special Session to build upon recent arms control successes by setting "clear, realistic goals" and adhering to priorities.

Mr. Clark spoke strongly of the importance of adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). He argued that it was no longer possible to demand that the superpowers reduce their own nuclear arsenals before others sign the Treaty, since superpower disarmament had begun.¹ To emphasize the importance Canada attaches to the NPT, Canadian officials had been instructed to make representations to nations which had not signed the NPT, calling upon them to do so.

Another Canadian initiative at the Special Session was contained in a working paper presented jointly with the Netherlands. This urged that the Special Session request the Secretary General "to undertake an in-depth study on the subject of the existing and possible activities of the United Nations in the verification of multilateral arms control and

¹ Permanent Canadian Delegation to the United Nations, Press Release No. 28, 13 June 1988.

disarmament agreements."² France later joined the Netherlands/Canada initiative. A major verification proposal was also put forth by the Group of Six Nations/Five Continent Initiative (Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania). It called on the Special Session to endorse "the principle of an integrated multilateral verification system within the United Nations" and requested the Secretary-General to prepare "an outline of such a system."³ For much of the Special Session, consultations were carried out on how to bridge these two proposals in order to present one consensus proposal. Two agreed-upon paragraphs were presented to the Committee of the Whole on June 25 as part of the draft final document of the Special Session but were for naught as the latter itself did not garner consensus.

Canada played an active role at the Special Session, delivering formal interventions in all three working groups, and later presenting these interventions as working papers. In addition to the Netherlands/Canada working paper on verification, Canada also presented working papers on the role of the UN in the field of disarmament and the effectiveness of UN disarmament machinery⁴, UN information and educational activities⁵, and a proposed orientation programme for representatives of non-governmental organizations.⁶ Lastly, Canada co-sponsored a working paper

² UN Document A/S-15/25, 3 June 1988.

³ UN Document A/S-15/AC.1/1, 3 June 1988.

⁴ UN Document A/S-15/AC.1/WG.III/1, 9 June 1988.

⁵ UN Document A/S-15/AC.1/WG.III/5, 10 June 1988.

⁶ UN Document A/S-15/AC.1/WG.III/4, 10 June 1988.

with Australia and New Zealand calling for an enhanced role for women in the field of disarmament, and particularly within the UN Secretariat.⁷

Parliamentary Comment

On 31 May 1988, NDP Member Bill Blaikie told the House of Commons that, while the superpower Summit in Moscow was a welcome event, Canada must keep in mind the "equally important discussions" taking place at the Third Special Session. He criticized the Government for not having "adequately outlined the positions it plans to take at the special session."⁸ Mr. Blaikie returned to this theme on 13 June when he referred to letters written by numerous non-governmental organizations to Mr. Clark, seeking a statement of the Government's position. The NDP Member asked why these inquiries had not been answered. Minister of National Defence Perrin Beatty replied that Government policies on arms control and defence were already in the public domain.⁹

Prior to Mr. Clark's speech at the Special Session, on 3 June 1988, Liberal MP André Ouellet asked whether Mr. Clark would "propose an arms suffocation strategy like the one suggested ten years ago by former Prime Minister Trudeau?" Mr. Clark replied that Canada's position would have to take into account "the constructive differences in the present situation - there have been many changes in attitude among the superpowers and changes in the international situation with respect to arms control." He declared that he was "prepared to consider any

⁷ UN Document A/S-15/AC.1/24, 22 June 1988.

⁸ Commons Debates, 31 May 1988, p. 15938.

⁹ Commons Debates, 13 June 1988, p. 16370.

suggestions the Hon. Member and any other Members of this House may wish to make," and stated: "...our main concern is to continue to play a constructive role in the present situation."¹⁰

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¹⁰ Commons Debates, 3 June 1988, p. 16112.

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SECTION II - DEFENCE

15. ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY AND SECURITY

Background

Successive Canadian Governments have attributed great economic and political value to the Arctic and its resources. Active involvement in the High Arctic began in the 1890s in the form of exploration and patrol expeditions. During World War II, the Canadian Arctic took on a new strategic significance when Canada gave permission to the United States to build a chain of weather stations and airfields in the Arctic in order to deliver military aircraft to the Soviet Union.

In 1955, Canada and the United States signed an agreement to build the Distant Early Warning (DEW) system, a line of early warning radar stations stretched across the Canadian North. The main purpose of the system was to provide warning of a Soviet bomber attack across the North Pole against the continental United States.

While this increased activity in the Arctic was initiated primarily by the United States, co-operative agreements satisfied Canadian Government concern about the protection of sovereignty. This situation changed in 1969 when a privately owned oil tanker, the Manhattan, attempted to cross the Northwest Passage without seeking the permission of the Canadian Government. Concerned with the threat to sovereignty and a possible increase in commercial shipping, the Canadian Government passed the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, 1970, which established Canadian environmental jurisdiction for up to 100 miles off the Arctic coasts. As

late as 1969 considerable confusion seemed to characterize the Canadian Government's position on the precise nature of Canadian claims to the Arctic waters. After 1973 however, Canadian Governments were consistently claiming the waters of the Arctic Archipelago as internal, and that no right of innocent passage through them existed.

At the Quebec Summit in March 1985, Canada and the United States signed a Memorandum of Understanding on developing the North Warning System (NWS), a line of modern long- and short-range radars to replace the DEW line. Unlike the earlier system, which was largely manned and operated by US personnel, the NWS will be manned and controlled entirely by Canadians. (for more information, see the "NORAD" section of this Guide).

Although the first nuclear submarine operated under the Arctic icecap for an extended period of time as early as 1958, it is only recently that both superpowers have developed the technology needed to operate ballistic missile submarines under the ice. This development has raised the prospect of the Arctic becoming an area of growing strategic importance to the superpowers, and has created dilemmas for the Canadian Government. As nuclear submarines are particularly difficult to detect and monitor effectively under the ice, their operation in the Arctic poses a new challenge to the assertion of Canadian sovereignty in the region.

In August 1985, a more visible threat to Canadian sovereignty presented itself with the voyage of the US Coast Guard vessel, the Polar Sea, through the Northwest Passage. The declared purpose of the voyage was to shorten the sailing time to Alaska. The US Government failed, however, to request the Canadian Government's permission to make the voyage. Although the US Government made it clear that it did not agree with Canada's position on the status of the Arctic waters, it nevertheless

proposed that the voyage be made on a co-operative basis. To this end, the US Coast Guard provided information to its Canadian counterpart and took Canadian observers on board the vessel. Moreover, the US Government stated that the voyage did not prejudice the legal position of either government with regard to the waters.¹

The Canadian Government responded to the Polar Sea incident with a firm assertion of Canada's sovereignty over the waters of the Arctic Archipelago. On 10 September 1985, in a statement before the House of Commons, Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, said:

Only with full sovereignty can we protect the entire range of Canadian interests. Full sovereignty is vital to Canada's security. It is vital to the Inuit people. And it is vital to Canada's national identity. The policy of this Government is to exercise full sovereignty in and on the waters of the Arctic archipelago and this applies to the airspace above as well. We will accept no substitutes.²

Mr. Clark announced several measures that the Government would undertake to better ensure the protection of Canadian Arctic sovereignty. These included: an Order in Council establishing straight baselines (enclosing Canada's internal waters) around the outer perimeter of the archipelago; the introduction of measures designed to extend the application of Canadian civil and criminal law to all offshore zones, including the Arctic (Bill C-104); an increase in the number of surveillance flights and in the level of naval activity in eastern Arctic waters; and the construction of a Polar Class 8 icebreaker. The Government also

¹ This was made clear in a State Department Press Guidance released on 14 June 1985, the day after the Canadian public was made aware of the impending transit.

² Commons Debates, 10 September 1985, p.6463.

indicated its willingness to have the sovereignty question referred to the World Court, by withdrawing its earlier reservations in this regard. Finally, it called for immediate discussions with the United States on all means of co-operation in Arctic waters on the basis of full respect for Canadian sovereignty. Negotiations between Canada and the United States began soon afterwards.

On 5 April 1987, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney commented on the ongoing negotiations on Canada-US Arctic co-operation. The Prime Minister stated:

We are...aware of certain international geopolitical realities where Canada as a friend and ally will seek to reach a mutually beneficial accommodation. But on the fundamental issue of sovereignty we expect the United States in the course of ongoing negotiations to recognize that and to reach an agreement with Canada.³

On 1 October 1987 in a speech in the Soviet city of Murmansk, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev proposed that the Arctic become a zone of peace. Specifically, the Soviet leader called for negotiations aimed at scaling down militarization and naval activity in the Baltic, Greenland and Norwegian Seas. Limitations on anti-submarine weapons, advance notification of major military exercises, and the banning of naval activity in international straits and shipping lanes that are heavily travelled were proposed as possible confidence-building measures for the region. General Secretary Gorbachev also called for multilateral co-operation in the development of Arctic resources, in scientific exploration, and in Arctic environmental protection. Finally, he raised the possibility of the Soviet Union opening to other nations the Northern Sea Route from Europe to the Far East.

³ Prime Minister Mulroney, Interview with Meet the Press, 5 April 1987.

On 6 October 1987, the Soviet draft text of a Soviet-Canadian agreement on Arctic cooperation was released by the Canadian Arctic Resources Committee. First proposed by the Soviets in early 1987, the provisions of the draft included: recognition of the rights of both countries to control pollution and govern navigation in the Arctic waters adjacent to their territories, provision for information exchanges on environmental, natural resource and navigation safety issues, and the extension of existing scientific and technical co-operation between the two countries.

Current Canadian Position

On 1 October 1986, in her speech from the throne, the Governor General of Canada stated that:

The Government asserts complete sovereignty over the Arctic and recognizes that sovereignty requires a vigorous national presence.⁴

In June 1987 Canada's Defence White Paper stated:

After the defence of the country itself there is no issue more important to any nation than the protection of its sovereignty. The ability to exercise effective national sovereignty is the very essence of nationhood.⁵

The passage went on to point out that the Canadian forces have an important role to play in sovereignty protection. The White Paper also lists a number of sovereignty-related defence initiatives that the

⁴ Commons Debates, 1 October 1986, p. 13.

⁵ DND, Challenge and Commitment, 5 June 1987, p. 6.

Government plans to undertake. These include: the on-going modernization of the DEW line radars; the upgrading of 5 northern airfields to accommodate fighter interceptors, an increase in the number of Aurora Long-Range Patrol Aircraft, the modernization of the Tracker medium-range aircraft; an expansion of the Canadian Ranger force, the establishment of a Northern training centre for Canadian Forces⁶, and the planned deployment of fixed sonar systems in the Arctic passages. In addition, recognizing the Arctic's potential as a viable passageway for submarines between the Arctic and Atlantic oceans, the White Paper announced the Government's decision to acquire 10-12 nuclear-powered submarines of its own, partly because of their under-ice capability.

Canada's Minister of National Defence Perrin Beatty commented on the utility of nuclear submarines for protection of Arctic sovereignty on 7 February 1988, in testimony before the Standing Committee on National Defence:

With any breach of Canadian or international law including unwanted incursions into Canadian territory or waters, the possibility of seeking recourse to diplomatic means in international courts will be an important option for us. However the preferred government approach is to deter the intrusion in the first place. Deterrence in this regard can only be provided by adequate surveillance and monitoring of our territory and waters, backed up by the means to enforce our laws. At the moment, nuclear propelled submarines are the best, if not the only, vehicles that can meet these difficult requirements in the Arctic.⁷

⁶ In February 1988, the Government announced its choice of Baffin Island for the training centre, DND, News Release, 59/88, 2 June 1988, p. 2.

⁷ SCND Proceedings, 7 March 1988, pp. 8-9.

The Government has also indicated a desire to develop a comprehensive Northern foreign policy. Speaking at the Norway-Canada Conference on Circumpolar Issues on 9 December 1987, Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark stated the elements of this policy as follows: 1) affirming Canadian sovereignty; 2) modernizing Canada's northern defences; 3) preparing for commercial use of the Northwest Passage; and 4) promoting enhanced circumpolar co-operation.⁸

On 11 January 1988, after two years of discussion, Canada and the United States signed the Canada-United States Arctic Co-operation Agreement (also known as the "Icebreaker" Agreement). This agreement seeks to facilitate navigation by the icebreakers of the two nations, and to develop co-operative procedures for this purpose. Under its terms, the United States pledges that all navigation by US icebreakers in waters claimed to be internal by Canada will be undertaken with the consent of the Canadian Government.⁹ It goes on to state that nothing in the Agreement nor any practice thereunder affects the respective positions of the two Governments on the law of the sea in this or other maritime areas, or their positions regarding third parties.¹⁰

Describing the agreement as "an important step for Canada in the North," Prime Minister Brian Mulroney went on to say:

While we and the United States have not changed our legal positions we have come to a practical agreement that is fully

⁸ Statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Norway-Canada Conference on Circumpolar Issues, Tromso, Norway, 9 December 1987.

⁹ "Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America on Arctic Cooperation," DEA, News Release, No. 010, 11 January 1988.

¹⁰ Ibid.

consistent with the requirements of Canadian Sovereignty in the Arctic. It is an improvement over the situation which prevailed previously. What we have now significantly advances Canadian interests.¹¹

On 9 December 1987, at the Norway-Canada Conference on Circumpolar Issues, Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, commented on Soviet leader Gorbachev's proposal for an Arctic "zone of peace." Noting that Canada was interested in the development of realistic policies aimed at enhancing security and stability in the North, Mr. Clark stated that the Canadian Government had "very serious reservations" about the Soviet proposals. He explained:

Mr. Gorbachev appears to focus exclusively on the Western Arctic without discussing the Barents Sea or other waters adjacent to the USSR. He does not offer any detail as to how a ban on naval activity would be verified or enforced. Obviously, it would be inappropriate to discuss the Western Arctic and not the Soviet Archipelago. Finally, Mr. Gorbachev's words do not reflect the actions of his Government. Unlike Canada or the Nordic countries, the Soviet Union has an enormous concentration of military forces and weapons in the Arctic region.¹²

Parliamentary Comment

In a speech in Vancouver on 6 February 1988, Liberal Party leader John Turner voiced his opposition to the Government's submarine programme. In its place, Mr. Turner called for the acquisition of conventionally

¹¹ Ibid..

¹² Speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Norway-Canada Conference on Circumpolar Issues, Tromso, Norway, 9 December 1987.

powered submarines, together with negotiation of an international treaty to remove the military presence in the Arctic. Comparing Mr. Turner's proposals with Government policy, Liberal MP Andre Ouellet stated in the House:

It is obvious that the Leader of the Opposition has suggested a much more serious and praiseworthy method... namely, the development of a new international regime for the Arctic under a treaty which would have the support of all powers in the region. With such a treaty, we could stop the militarization of the Arctic, pave the way for technological, economic and environmental co-operation, and most importantly, guarantee the future of northern residents.¹³

That same day, NDP member Derek Blackburn registered his party's opposition to the Government's policy. Referring to the July 1987 NDP paper on defence, Mr. Blackburn stated:

We brought forward our version of a Maritime policy; to pursue the frigate program, to purchase conventionally powered submarines, to increase the number of long-range patrol aircraft, and to put in place a passive peacetime surveillance network in the Canadian Arctic, although not to militarize it as the Conservative Government wants to do.¹⁴

On 29 January 1988, Minister of National Defence Perrin Beatty commented on NDP policy regarding the Arctic:

The difference between us and the NDP is that we want, to have an enforcement capability. It is clear that someone's Navy is going to be in Canada's North. The real question that remains is whether Canada's Navy is going to be there

¹³ Commons Debates, 4 March 1988, p.13430.

¹⁴ Ibid., p.13426. See also: 6 June 1988, pp. 16160-61; and 9 June 1988, pp. 16282-83.

and we want Canada to have the capacity to go there.¹⁵

On 7 March 1988, during testimony before the Standing Committee on National Defence, Mr. Beatty responded to calls by the Liberal Party for the demilitarization of the Arctic by stating:

When Canadians propose we accept seductive Soviet proposals for demilitarization of the Canadian Arctic, the onus is on them to say whether they would insist that the Soviets demilitarize theirs or whether they would simply strip down the defences of Canada without any response from the Soviet Union.¹⁶

In the House on 7 December 1987, Liberal leader John Turner raised the issue of the Canada-US Arctic co-operation negotiations. Noting that details of an agreement were becoming available, Mr. Turner stated:

The Secretary of State admitted yesterday that a secret deal has been signed between Canada and the United States which allows the Americans access to our northern waters, waters which we claim as national waters, but does not recognize full sovereignty of Canada over those waters.¹⁷

NDP leader Ed Broadbent also referred to the impending agreement. Recalling Mr. Clark's speech to the Commons on 10 September 1985 in which he stated that the Government's intention was to exercise "full sovereignty" in, on, and above the waters of the Arctic Archipelago, Mr. Broadbent stated:

15 Commons Debates, 29 January 1988, p. 12429.

16 SCND Proceedings, 7 March 1988, p.30.

17 Commons Debates, 7 December 1987, p. 11536.

...there is a clause [in the agreement] which leaves open to the US again to challenge the sovereignty question. Will [Ms. Carney] comment on that? Second, will the Minister acknowledge that this commitment made by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, has specific reference to the notion of US submarines in the territory and that the secret agreement...excludes that? Will the Minister tell us what procedures if any, US submarines will now have to follow if they want to go through this water?¹⁸

Responding to Mr. Broadbent's questions, Ms. Carney said:

... with the discussions which are taking place, which involve the exercise of our sovereignty over the Arctic, we are seeking a major concession from the US, namely, that the Americans have to seek our permission before the passage of ice-breakers through the Northwest Passage. There are other arrangements in place through our environmental laws for merchant shipping.¹⁹

As a follow-up question, Mr. Broadbent requested further information regarding arrangements governing submarines. He asked:

Is the Minister telling us now... that there is a secret agreement between Canada and the United States that is pertinent to submarines? Or, will she admit that the Government got nothing at all in terms of controlling access to the waters by submarines?²⁰

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 11539.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

Addressing Mr. Broadbent's question, Canada's Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, Harvie Andre, stated:

It is not in the interests of Canada's security or sovereignty to go into details about that kind of information on submarines in our Arctic.²¹

On 18 January 1988, after the text of the Icebreaker Agreement had been released, Liberal leader, John Turner, again raised the issue in the Commons. Addressing Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark, Mr. Turner asked:

In view of the fact that last week the Secretary of State for External Affairs... signed an agreement with the United States which fails to recognize Canadian sovereignty over the Arctic, which makes no mention of American submarines patrolling our waters, and which in effect clearly weakens Canada's legal claim to the Arctic, why would the Prime Minister tolerate a senior Minister... negotiating and signing an agreement... which clearly violates a declaration and undertaking he gave to the House of Commons?²²

Responding to the Liberal leader's statement, Mr. Clark stated:

...before that agreement was signed the United States did not acknowledge its need to seek Canada's consent before the transit through our Northwest Passage of US Government owned or operated ice-breakers. As a result of that agreement the United States now acknowledges and has a legal obligation to seek Canada's consent before the transit through our Northwest Passage of Government owned or operated ice-breakers. That is a small but significant step forward in

²¹ Ibid.

²² Commons Debates, 18 January 1988, p. 11999.

Canada's control over the North.²³

On 14 March 1988, Mr. Turner called attention to a study on Canada's North by the Canadian Institute of International Affairs (CIIA), and asked, with regard to the Canada-US Arctic Cooperation Agreement:

How does the Prime Minister respond to a...conclusion of this working group which says: "the Working Group is unable to agree with the opinion of the Prime Minister...that "What we have now significantly advances Canadian interests"...?.²⁴

Citing the Working Group's study in his response, Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, stated:

The Right Hon. Leader will know that their view continues that; - "if a prior consent is required on a case by case basis -", and that is the case, "- there will be no damage to the Canadian position. Indeed, it should be normally affirmed by practice."²⁵

On 21 October 1987, Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark was asked if the Government had yet made any formal response to Soviet proposals for an Arctic zone of peace. In his reply, Mr. Clark commented that the Government had not yet received the proposals, but was interested in continuing to pursue the question of Arctic co-operation with the Soviet Union as well as other Northern states. In addition, he stated:

²³ Ibid..

²⁴ Commons Debates, 22 March 1988, p.14005.

²⁵ Ibid..

We will look very carefully at the proposals put forward by Mr. Gorbachev in his speech. Naturally, we will not conclude any agreements with them on the basis of a speech that he makes. If there are some specific proposals that might flow from it, we would be interested in pursuing them in detail and formally.²⁶

On 7 March 1988, in testimony before the Standing Committee on National Defence, Liberal MP Douglas Frith asked Canada's Minister of National Defence Perrin Beatty about the extent to which the Government had pursued ideas that the Soviets had proposed. In reply to the Member's inquiry, Mr. Beatty stated:

What we said is that if the Soviets want to make proposals to us that are meaningful, we are anxious to discuss them. We should discuss them in the context of all of the western democracies and not simply a unilateral deal, obviously between Canada and the Soviet Union. Now the position that was taken...was that they will talk about the rest of the world, but when it comes to these forces in the Soviet Union, they are essentially strategic forces and not fit to be discussed here.²⁷

On 22 March 1988, Liberal leader, John Turner, raised the issue of Arctic co-operation with Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark. Mr. Turner stated:

... the Prime Minister, through his own Secretary of State for External Affairs, did not respond to my suggestion that a new international regime be created for the Arctic, and the Minister of National Defence did not react constructively to

²⁶ Commons Debates, 21 October 1987, p. 10226.

²⁷ SCND Proceedings, 7 March 1988, p. 19.

the proposition made by Soviet Leader Gorbachev.²⁸

The Liberal leader then asked whether the Prime Minister or Mr. Clark would respond to a proposal made by the CIIA Working Group for Canada to take the initiative in convening all countries interested in the Arctic with a view to creating a Nordic Council in order to settle issues relating to the Nordic regions. In response, Mr. Clark noted:

Mr. Speaker I think this is an interesting, serious and important recommendation concerning co-operation in the North. Indeed our government took a number of initiatives and, for the first time we took the position that we ought to establish Canadian sovereignty in the North. We as a Government are prepared for the first time--I cannot make the same comment about the administration of the...Leader of the Opposition--to recognize the jurisdiction of a world tribunal with respect to our sovereignty in the North.²⁹

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²⁸ Commons Debates, 20 March 1988, pp. 14005-06.

²⁹ Ibid., p.14006.

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Cross References

Defence--Major Equipment Acquisitions

Canada-US: NORAD

NATO

16. ARMS TRANSFERS

Background

After growing steadily for more than a decade, the global arms trade has declined in recent years; the value of conventional arms imports peaked around US\$49 or US\$50 billion (constant 1984 dollars) between 1981 and 1984, then dropped to US\$42 billion in 1985 and US\$34.6 billion in 1986.¹ The decline was quite sharp in the developing countries, especially the Middle East. Arms imports by these countries, which accounted for 80 per cent of world arms sales in 1977 and 84 per cent in 1982, dropped to 75 per cent in 1985. This year, the Middle East was still the largest buyer of arms (34.8 per cent), followed by Europe (21.5 per cent), Africa (12.1 per cent), East Asia (11.5 per cent), South Asia and Oceania (10.1 per cent), and Latin America (8 per cent).²

The Soviet Union, the United States and the other NATO countries (especially France, Britain, Germany and Italy) are the world's primary arms suppliers. From 1982 to 1986, Soviet arms transfers, destined primarily for the Middle East, Africa, South Asia and Latin America, were valued at US\$87 billion (current dollars); US arms transfers, destined primarily for Europe and East Asia, represented US\$51.4 billion, while transfers by

¹ US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, Washington: ACDA, 1987, p. 6. In its annual report for 1987, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) also published figures showing a decline in the value of the global arms trade after 1984 (SIPRI World Armaments and Disarmament Yearbook, 1987, pp. 218 to 221).

² Ibid., p. 7.

other NATO countries amounted to US\$42.6 billion.³

In 1985, the Soviet Union and the United States shared 63 per cent of the global market for arms exports, with 35 and 28 per cent respectively. Only the USSR has not followed the recent (1985-1986) downward trend in global arms exports.⁴

Arms transfer controls by exporters, whether through regulation, creation of a world arms register, or any other means, have often been considered but never effectively enacted by members of the United Nations. The most recent experiment in specifically limiting conventional arms transfers was President Carter's 1977 unilateral restrictive policy limiting US arms exports, followed by CAT (Conventional Arms Transfers) talks with the Soviet Union. The process ultimately failed, however.

Canada is a very minor player in the global conventional arms market; in 1986, military goods represented only 0.1 per cent of total Canadian exports.⁵ However, according to figures published by the federal government, the volume of Canadian military exports has risen over the years, from C\$336.2 million in 1970 to C\$721.7 million in 1980 and C\$1,388 million in 1986 (current dollars). In 1986, 68.2 per cent of these exports were destined to customers in the US,⁶ a pattern reflecting both the overall continental orientation of Canadian trade and the impact of the Defence Production Sharing Agreement (DPSA) between Canada and the United States.

³ Ibid., p. 9.

⁴ Ibid., p. 10.

⁵ Ibid., p. 95.

⁶ DEA, Defence Programs Bureau, March 1988, unpublished.

Questions have been raised in the past about Canada's arms exports practices. Alleged violations of the Canadian policy, particularly the granting of export permits for sales of strategic goods to governments involved in conflicts or known to systematically violate human rights, have been the subject of public debate. Many have also questioned the ultimate use of defence goods produced in Canada. Middlemen in countries such as the United States can purchase Canadian military equipment to manufacture arms systems which may then be exported to developing countries.

Current Canadian Position

Canadian military exports are primarily in the electronics and aerospace sectors. Since Canadian firms manufacture few complete arms systems, most exports consist of support goods, despite Ottawa's continued efforts to develop a domestic industry specializing in this field. Canada's policy on military exports has not changed since Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark announced revised guidelines on 10 September 1986 aimed at regulating Canadian exports.⁷ This policy restricts military exports to countries that seriously or persistently violate human rights, "unless it can be demonstrated that there is no reasonable risk that the goods might be used against the civilian population," countries under UN Security Council sanctions, and countries involved in or under imminent threat of hostilities. Restrictions also apply to exports of civilian strategic equipment to the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact and countries where there is a risk the goods will be rerouted to these destinations

⁷ For a full overview of the new policy, see: "Export Controls Policy", DEA Communiqué, No. 155, 10 September 1986.

(COCOM proscribed destinations).

Despite the proposed free trade agreement between Canada and the United States, protectionists in the US Congress are pressing for a review of US military equipment procurement and purchase policies. This wave of protectionism has led in particular to the tabling of trade bills in the Senate and House that would place restrictions on purchases of foreign defence goods, in order to promote US products. These measures may well affect existing Canada-US agreements on military trade, such as the Defence Production Sharing Agreement (DPSA) and the Defence Development Sharing Agreement (DDSA). Consequently, Canadian overseas military exports, which have risen since the early 1980s, will most likely continue to grow.

Acting on a recommendation of the Special Joint Committee on Canada's Foreign Relations (Simard-Hockin Report, June 1986) that Ottawa should strive to convince other nations to support the proposals "for an international system to register exports and imports of weapons and munitions," (p. 145) the government asked the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security to study the feasibility of and opportunity for such a register. CIIPS completed this study in July 1987, and then held a conference on the global arms trade in October, at which Canada's Under-Secretary of State, James Taylor, delivered an address on the subject of an arms trade register. After pointing out that Canada supports the idea of such a register, Mr. Taylor listed the current obstacles to such a measure, especially the type of information to be provided and the range of goods to be declared. He also realized that some countries might refuse to be included on such a register for security reasons, since this register would contain virtually all information on a country's military strength, and might be used by a potential enemy. Finally, Mr. Taylor explained that the problem of the

arms trade could not be solved until the insecurity of some countries, which is often the result of flawed international security mechanisms, has been addressed.⁸

Parliamentary Comment

On 20 November 1987, in the House of Commons, New Democrat MP John Parry asked the Deputy Prime Minister why the government had authorized a Canadian company, Expro, to supply a Portuguese firm with 1,250 tons of gunpowder, even though the CBC claimed to have discovered links between this firm and the government of Iran.

Jean-Guy Hudon, Parliamentary Secretary to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, answered:

Exporting gun powder or munitions from Canada takes two permits: a permit for the exporting country, which has been issued, and a permit for the importing country, which has also been issued. We have no control over any re-exporting that may occur subsequently, and that is exactly what is happening. The RCMP is investigating to determine whether [...] there may have been illegal diversion of goods from the legal destination apparent from the contracts signed by the parties concerned.

Mr. Parry added, "I would like to have the Government's commitment that not only will our ambassador in Lisbon be instructed to attempt to identify whether that explosive is being re-exported, but also what will the Government do to introduce controls to ensure that Canadian munitions

⁸ Krause, K., The International Trade in Arms: Problems and Prospects, (Conference Report), Ottawa: CIIPS, October 1987.

do not end up on the battlefields of Iran and Iraq?"

Mr. Hudon ended the discussion with the observation, "[...] We have met our commitments and we have complied with the regulations that exist today and have always been enforced here in Canada. If there are people who subsequently re-export those goods, the receiving country has a responsibility, and that is what should be investigated."⁹

On 22 April 1988, Liberal MP John Nunziata in turn raised this issue with a question to Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark on why these permits had been issued when DEA "knew or ought to have known that the ultimate destination for this gun powder was Iran."

After denying that the government knew the ultimate destination of these shipments of gunpowder, Mr. Clark reminded Mr. Nunziata that an RCMP investigation had absolved Expro Chemical Products of any wrongdoing, and further, that no export permits had since been issued to this firm. The Secretary of State for External Affairs did admit, however, that he was very concerned over the fact Expro had apparently acted on export permits issued prior to his order prohibiting any future permits. Mr. Clark promised to look into the situation.¹⁰

On 27 April 1988, New Democrat MP Pauline Jewett voiced her approval of Mr. Clark's decision to set up a technical working group to study the feasibility of an arms register. However, she pointed out the "Department's failure to invite representatives of disarmament groups, particularly Ernie Regehr, of Project Ploughshares, who has skilfully and eloquently promoted the need for an arms register for many years, to

⁹ Commons Debates, 20 November 1987, p. 11015.

¹⁰ Commons Debates, 22 April 1988, p. 14741.

attend the inaugural meeting of the working group." Mrs. Jewett added, "Unless the Minister broadens the representation of this group to include disarmament organizations, the group's credibility is put seriously in question."¹¹

On 21 June 1988, Liberal MP Lloyd Axworthy reminded the government and the Secretary of State of their commitment to close loopholes in the export control policy, and amend that policy. Noting that Pratt & Whitney continued to ship helicopter engines to various countries engaged in human rights violations or major wars, he asked why the government had reneged on its commitment to close these loopholes.

Minister for External Relations Monique Landry explained, "Exports of military engines and engines with strategic technology are governed by the Export Act. As far as we are concerned, the claim that Pratt & Whitney circumvented Canadian law is absolutely false."¹²

On 30 June 1988, Conservative MP Dave Nickerson made a statement on the subject of the top achievers in the international arms trade. He noted that, "Perestroika notwithstanding, the USSR comes in first by a wide margin, with annual arms exports of \$120 billion. Yankee traders manage only a little less than half of this. France, with its Mirage jets and Exocet missiles, comes in third at \$30 billion. The prize for most improved performance goes to China, at \$11 billion, which has now cornered some 80 per cent of the lucrative Iran-Iraq market. These

¹¹ Commons Debates, 27 April 1988, p. 14861.

¹² Commons Debates, 21 June 1988, p. 16643.

countries must certainly be very proud of their contribution to world peace."¹³

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¹³ Commons Debates, 30 June 1988, p. 16981.

17. CANADA-US: CRUISE MISSILE TESTING

Background

On 10 February 1983, Canada and the United States signed an agreement establishing a procedure for the testing of US defence systems in Canada. Known as the "Canada/US (CANUS) Test and Evaluation Program", the agreement, initially valid for five years, was renewed automatically for an additional five-year period on 28 February 1987.

Covering only the testing of US systems in Canada, the agreement is not reciprocal. Under its terms, the United States can request testing of various systems, including: artillery equipment; helicopters; surveillance and identification systems; and the guidance system for unarmed cruise missiles. Canada may, however, refuse any project, and no biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons may be brought into the country. Furthermore, the agreement can be terminated on twelve months' notice.¹

Two groups were formed within the Department of National Defence (DND) to oversee the programme. A steering group, charged with exercising authority over the programme itself, makes recommendations concerning which projects are acceptable to Canada. In addition, a co-ordinating group reviews the feasibility of the projects and administers the programme. At the beginning of each year, the United States submits a 30-month forecast to DND, outlining the projects it wishes to see implemented in Canada. After review and ministerial approval, the government informs the US of its approval in principle. US sponsors then submit a project proposal to DND. This is again reviewed, and when the proper authority is granted, a project

¹ DEA, "Testing of Defence Systems in Canada: Background Notes," 1983.

arrangement is jointly developed, which, when it is signed, allows testing to begin. Cabinet approval may, however, be required for specific tests.

On 15 July 1983, the Canadian Government announced that it had agreed to allow tests of the AGM-86B Air-launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) to be conducted in Canada. The cruise missile is an unmanned vehicle propelled by a jet engine that can carry conventional or nuclear warheads. It can be sea-, ground-, or air-launched.

The Government's rationale for agreeing to the US request was that testing of the cruise missile guidance system was "linked intimately to Canada's security as a member of NATO and NORAD, and to Canada's policy on arms control and disarmament". Canadian territory was particularly suitable for such testing because it offered extensive stretches of uninhabited cold weather terrain similar to the attack routes into the Soviet Union. The tests generally take place during the first three months of the year in order to ensure that proper weather conditions exist. The government made clear, however, that its agreement to allow such testing "...in no way changed Canada's own renunciation of nuclear weapons for our national forces".

Agreement to test the cruise missile has generated considerable public debate. Some Canadians have felt that it has compromised Canada's position on nuclear weapons and has contributed to the arms race. Concern has also been voiced regarding the potential harm which such tests could have on Canadian citizens and on the environment, if anything went wrong. In announcing individual tests, however, the Canadian government has assured Canadians that the flight of the cruise missile will never be closer than eight kilometres "to any built-up area".

To date, eleven tests of the cruise missile have been carried out. These

include one in 1984, three in 1985, and two in 1986. Five tests have occurred during the last two years. In 1987, three tests were carried out. The first--a "free flight" test--took place on 24 February 1987. Following the release of the missile over the Beaufort Sea by a US B-52 bomber, US F-4 and F-16 fighter aircraft joined Canadian CF-18 fighters in an attempt to intercept the missile. This was followed by a similar test on 1 March.

The third test of 1987 occurred on 27 October. In a "captive carry" test, the missile remained attached to the US B-52 bomber carrying it during its entire journey from the Beaufort Sea to the Primrose Lake testing range in Northwestern Alberta. The flight followed a slightly different path from that of previous tests in response to public concerns about safety.

Two tests of the cruise missile have thus far occurred in 1988. A "free flight" test took place on 19 January. The missile was released by a B-52 bomber over the Beaufort Sea, and later intercepted by US F-15 and F-16, as well as Canadian CF-18, fighter aircraft. Similarly, after poor weather conditions and technical problems with bomber and cruise missile guidance systems caused successive delays, a second "free flight" test occurred on 27 January. Both tests were considered successful by military authorities.

The announcement of a tentative agreement on Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) by US and Soviet negotiators in September 1987, followed by the signing of a Treaty on 9 December 1987, prompted more vigorous questioning of cruise missile testing in Canadian air space. In October 1987, protests were staged by the Alberta Citizens Coalition Committee--a coalition of church, labour and peace groups--and the Toronto Disarmament Network. Similar protests were held in January 1988, during which a poll was taken in 32 cities across Canada by the Canadian Peace Alliance to determine public opinion regarding continued testing of the cruise. A spokesperson for the group reported that, of the 8,655 people polled, 84 per cent believed that

such testing should cease, while only 16 per cent favoured its continuation.

More recently, a Gallup poll conducted from 2-5 March 1988 and based on in-home interviews with over 1000 Canadians, reported that of those polled, 54% opposed cruise missile testing, 38 per cent favored it, and 9 per cent were undecided. The results reportedly represented a nine-point increase in opposition to the testing of the cruise missile since 1985.

Current Canadian Position

In January 1985, a Department of National Defence publication stated that the ALCM is an important retaliatory element of the US strategic triad which provides the ultimate deterrent for NATO. This continues to be the Government's position. On 6 March 1987, during debate on an NDP motion to halt cruise testing, Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark stated:

The cruise missiles being tested in Canada ... are air-launched and are part of the strategic deterrent forces of the United States. The role played by U.S.-based strategic deterrent forces in maintaining the global balance of nuclear deterrence would expand if an INF agreement were to lead to the elimination of U.S. missiles in Europe. In this perspective, tests to verify the reliability and effectiveness of air-launched cruise missiles would be needed even more if an agreement on intermediate nuclear forces were concluded, both from the point of view of arms control and of defence.²

The same day the Associate Minister of National Defence told the House that:

² Commons Debates, 6 March 1987, p. 3909.

The agreement has always been and still is, liable to termination at any time by either party giving 12 months' notice... Either party can terminate a specific arrangement under the agreement - for example, cruise missile testing - at any time on one days notice should imperative circumstances so warrant... We have repeatedly stated our intention to carry on, and will do so, but this in no way precludes second thoughts should circumstances change.³

The first term of the umbrella testing agreement officially ended on 28 February 1988. Its renewal now extends the agreement to 1993.

Parliamentary Comment

On 1 October 1987, Liberal party leader John Turner called for an end to cruise missile testing. Referring to past Liberal policy linking testing to the outcome of superpower negotiations on INF, Mr Turner stated:

As I said in my speech to the House... when the issue was debated on March 6, we should test the cruise missile until such time as there are concrete results in the negotiations between the two super powers on intermediate range nuclear weapons.... There have been concrete results, much to the relief of the world and I say the time has arrived to move forward in the world search for peace and for Canada to suspend cruise missile testing in Canada.⁴

The Liberal leader then asked Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark whether he agreed with the statement, and later, whether the Government would seek to persuade the US to stop cruise testing. Mr Clark replied:

³ Ibid., p. 3918.

⁴ Commons Debates, 1 October 1987, p. 9545.

... the suggestion that Canada should now renege on commitments observed in the past that had made a major contribution toward the ratification of an agreement on reducing levels of nuclear arms, as far as that question is concerned, we do not agree with a policy that could destroy the unity of NATO, and we do not agree with a policy that could be a threat to what we have accomplished so far in reducing levels of nuclear arms.⁵

Mr. Clark's statement prompted accusations from both opposition parties that the government had changed its stance with regard to cruise missile testing. Referring to a statement made by Mr. Clark on 2 March 1987, in which he explained that Canadian Government policy on cruise missile testing would be determined "on the basis of what is actually decided in Geneva", NDP leader Ed Broadbent stated:

Mr. Speaker, I, and many Canadians at the time thought that the Secretary of State for External Affairs was linking the testing of the cruise missile with progress being made in the disarmament field.⁶

He went on to ask:

Why does the Canadian Government not clearly live up to the implication left with the people of Canada? Why does it not make a contribution toward disarmament instead of moving in the opposite direction?⁷

In response, Mr. Clark stated:

Mr. Speaker, my words are clear. They are on the record, and they

⁵ Ibid., p. 9546.

⁶ Ibid., p. 9547.

⁷ Ibid.

have just been read by the leader of the New Democratic Party. He drew an interpretation from them that he claims is a legitimate interpretation. I would quarrel with that. I think my words speak for themselves.⁸

On 19 January 1988, Liberal MP Douglas Frith asked the Secretary of State for External Affairs:

Why does Canada not cease the testing of the Cruise and demand that Canada's long term foreign policy objectives and defence interests be given top priority in the START agenda?⁹

Mr. Clark replied that:

If an ally of the United States took an action that broke the solidarity of the West on questions in negotiation with the Soviet Union that would weaken the prospects of progress being made in those negotiations. That may be in the interest of the Liberal party of Canada... but it is certainly not the position of this Government.¹⁰

On 25 March 1988, NDP member Pauline Jewett put forward a motion to end cruise missile testing. Previously introduced in the House in March 1987, the motion read:

That in the opinion of the House, the Government should consider the advisability of giving notice, under the terms of the weapons testing umbrella agreement with the United States, for the termination of cruise missile testing in Canada.¹¹

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Commons Debates, 19 January 1988, p. 12059.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Commons Debates, 25 March 1988, p. 14156.

Ms. Jewett noted an "enormous and tragic" increase in cruise missile development over the last two years. Expressing concern regarding Canadian involvement in the US Air Defence Initiative (ADI), and possible involvement in the testing of the Advanced Cruise Missile (ACM) in the future, she stated:

When we read about these developments ... we think of the constant buildup and the modernization that has taken place... and we wonder what has happened to arms control. We wonder what the government is thinking about. So far at least, it has given only a military response to the modernization of the cruise. It has signed on to the US Air Defence Initiative which is supporting the development of a supersonic cruise of a first strike capability. We have apparently, gladly signed on... We will, therefore undoubtedly be testing the advanced cruise missiles.¹²

Ms. Jewett also pointed to a lack of Canadian initiative with regard to negotiated cuts in superpower cruise missile arsenals. She stated that the Government:

...has said nothing at all about the importance of pursuing negotiated cuts in cruise missile arsenals rather than the superpowers engaging in activities that encourage enhancement and modernization of cruise missile arsenals. As far as I can determine the Government has not pressed upon the superpowers the absolute necessity of including cuts on both sides in cruise missile arsenals at the START talks in Geneva.¹³

Referring to the results of the Gallup poll on cruise missile testing conducted earlier that month, she concluded by urging an end to cruise missile tests:

...we should, as this motion suggests give notice now. Canadian

¹² Ibid., p. 14157.

¹³ Ibid.

public opinion wants to see all the response to the modernization of the cruise missile, not the testing of it, not the testing of the new radar avoiding cruise missiles but rather the pressing on the superpowers, in all fora for cuts in cruise missile arsenals and the elimination of cruise missile modernization. The Canadian public wants to see an end to cruise missile testing.¹⁴

Liberal MP Andre Ouellet supported the motion, stating:

Clearly, as the situation has evolved there is no reason for the Canadian Government to pursue the same position in regard to cruise missile testing. It is clear that the recent agreement between President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev has changed the situation and does not force the Canadian Government to continue to allow this testing to take place on our soil.¹⁵

Conservative MP Michel Champagne, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for External Relations, voiced opposition to the NDP resolution, noting:

Without the Alliance's solidarity and determination to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent force, it is doubtful that the Soviet Union would have accepted to resume the Geneva negotiations... which have finally resulted in the elimination of a class of weapons. The same solidarity and determination will be necessary to achieve any progress on the reduction of strategic systems. A unilateral decision by Canada to terminate airborne cruise missile testing in Canada would have detrimental effects on the Alliance's strategic deterrent force and would jeopardize the solidarity which has proven so efficient in the INF area.¹⁶

Expiration of the time provided for consideration of private members'

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid., p. 14160.

16 Ibid.

business precluded a vote on the NDP motion.

On 13 June 1988, Liberal Member André Ouellet inquired about the Government's policy on cruise missile testing after referring to complaints from the Canadian Peace Alliance that it had failed to receive pertinent answers from the Government on questions that it had raised earlier that day. Mr. Ouellet asked:

In view of the USA-USSR agreement banning intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe, is the Deputy Prime Minister now in a position to declare that cruise missile testing in Canada will no longer be accepted?¹⁷

Minister of National Defence Perrin Beatty replied:

...the INF agreement...which was a result of the two-track decision taken by NATO, deals only with the issue of ground-launched cruise missiles. Submarine-launched and air-launched cruise missiles are not covered by the agreement. Our hope would be to have them covered under the START talks....At the present time we continue to find Soviet long-range bombers approaching the Canadian air defence identification zone. The purpose of those...bombers is to carry the air-launched cruise missile. The air-launched cruise missile continues to be a threat to Canada's security. It is appropriate that Canada should continue to test an unarmed guidance system of an air-launched cruise missile in Canada.¹⁸

Current References

For the full debate on the NDP motion in the House of Commons, see: Commons

¹⁷ Commons Debates, 13 June 1988, p. 16373.

¹⁸ Ibid.

Debates, 25 March 1988, pp. 14156-14162.

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17 Commons Debates, 13 June 1988, p. 14373.
 18 Ibid.

18. CANADA-US: NORAD

Background

On 7 August 1957 the North American Air Defence Command (NORAD) was formed on an interim basis between Canada and the United States. It began operations on 12 September 1957, and was established formally by the two governments on 12 May 1958.

NORAD was the result of many years of continental defence co-operation between Canada and the United States following the Second World War. Its purpose was to defend against air attack on North America, particularly from the Soviet bomber force. For Canada, a major concern from NORAD's conception was the effect it would have on Canadian sovereignty. NORAD's commander is an American, while a Canadian officer holds the Deputy Commander position.

The NORAD agreement, initially of ten years' duration, established an integrated headquarters exercising operational control over both nations' forces dedicated to continental defence. At the outset, the Command included both active and passive defence systems with a joint fighter-interceptor force and a series of radar nets across the continent. These nets included the Pinetree Line, built in 1951, at 50° North latitude; the Mid-Canada Line, completed in 1954, at 55° North latitude; and the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line, completed in 1957, at 70° North latitude.

As the threat assessment evolved, NORAD's resources also changed. The development of the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in particular, lessened the need for bomber defence. By 1965, the 98 detection stations of the Mid-Canada Line--the only system built, designed and financed solely by

Canada--were deactivated. The number of DEW Line and Pinetree Line installations was reduced from 78 to 31 and from 39 to 15, respectively. From its height between 1958 to 1962 of nearly 250,000 (including 17,000 Canadians), the manpower available to NORAD had decreased to approximately 64,000 (including 6,700 Canadians) in 1985. Canadian financial contributions have traditionally been about 10 percent of the annual total of \$6.8 billion (in 1985 dollars).

In May 1968 the NORAD agreement was renewed for the first time for a period of five years. The renewed agreement included two changes: one, clarifying that either party could nullify the agreement after review and a period of notice of one year; and second, the insertion of a clause stating that the NORAD agreement would "not involve in any way a Canadian commitment to participate in an active ballistic missile defence." The 1973 renewal of the agreement was for two years only to allow for re-evaluation of the strategic situation. Both the existence of a substantial Soviet ICBM force and developments within the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) prompted this reassessment.

The 1975 renewal recognized the changed strategic circumstances, namely a higher degree of mutual and stable deterrence and a less significant long-range bomber threat. The NORAD function to warn of bomber attack and provide some limited defence remained. In addition, reflecting the increased emphasis on ICBMs, NORAD was charged with providing space surveillance and warning and assessment of ballistic missile attack to ensure an effective response should deterrence fail. These new tasks involved the development and maintenance of new surveillance systems, including the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) and the Satellite Early Warning System (SEWS), although Canada's involvement was quite minimal.

As a result of a continuing debate in Canada on NORAD and an upcoming election, the 1980 Agreement was for a single year. In March 1981 the agreement was renewed for five years with two important changes for Canada. First, in recognition of the changing nature of the arrangement and the threat it was meant to answer, the title was changed to North American Aerospace Defence Command (emphasis added). Second, the 1981 Agreement also removed the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) clause which had been inserted in 1968. Officials attributed this change to the fact that the United States did not have an ABM system at the time, as well as the desire to avoid any suggestion that either Canada or the United States would breach the ABM Treaty. Some analysts have argued that the change was made so as not to preclude any future ABM possibilities.

In August 1984, with the coming into operation of two, co-located Canadian Region Operations Control Centres (ROCCs) at North Bay, Ontario, Canada took over full command and control of NORAD operations within its own airspace. Previously, a significant amount of Canadian airspace had been under the command and control of US facilities.

At the Quebec City Summit on 18 March 1985, Canada and the United States signed a Memorandum of Understanding to collaborate on an extensive modernization of NORAD's assets. Most important, the Memorandum set out the terms for the construction of the North Warning System (NWS) to replace the DEW Line.

The modernization programme included the following:

- a system of four very-long-range Over-the-Horizon Backscatter (OTH-B) radars to be deployed in the United States (one in Alaska and three in the continental United States) to monitor the eastern, western and southern approaches to North America;

- the North Warning System consisting of 13 long-range (11 in Canada) and 39 short-range (36 in Canada) radars located along the northern periphery of the continent;
- use of USAF Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) to supplement NWS at times of alert;
- upgrading of forward operating locations and dispersed operating bases to accommodate fighter and AWACS aircraft; and
- improvements to the command, control and communications (C3) elements of the system.

The modernization programme will cost over \$7 billion, of which Canada will contribute 12 per cent (about \$840 million). The programme is scheduled to be fully completed by 1992.

The Canadian commitment to the programme includes: meeting all the communication needs of the North Warning System; integration of the radars with the ROCCs in North Bay, Ontario; design and building of any new facilities required by the NWS in Canada; 40 percent financing of the \$1.3 billion NWS system (a 60/40 cost-sharing ratio also applies to operational and maintenance costs of the NWS); managing the final stages of the programme after 1989; and complete operational control of the NWS in Canada upon its completion. Canada will also be involved, to a limited extent, in the manning of the OTH-B radars and the AWACS.

On 19 March, 1986 Canada and the United States renewed the NORAD Agreement for a further five years without any changes.

In March 1987 Canada announced the locations of the five forward operating locations for NORAD fighter-interceptors as being Rankin Inlet, Inuvik, Yellowknife, and Iqaluit in the Northwest Territories, and Kuujjuaq in Quebec. Canada and the US will share equally the cost of their development.

The first five long-range radars of the NWS, the westernmost of the Canadian-based ones, became operational in November 1987. Construction of the remaining six Canadian NWS long-range radars in the Eastern Arctic, Labrador and Baffin Island began in Spring 1988, with completion scheduled for Fall 1988. The first OTH-B radar, on the east coast of the United States, is due to come into service by mid-1988. In Spring 1989 construction is to begin on the first of the 39 short-range NWS radars. This system will be completed by Fall 1992.

Current Canadian Position

The Government remains fully committed to its membership in and support of NORAD. In September, 1987 Defence Minister Beatty was able to celebrate NORAD's thirtieth anniversary with a testing of the newly installed equipment for the NWS. On that occasion he stated:

... this system ... when completed will extend from Alaska, across the Canadian Arctic and down the east coast of Labrador and will provide clear warning of an attack on North America. It will improve our ability to deter aggression and maintain peace. With this modernization, Canadians can be confident that we are able to deny any potential aggressor the free and undetectable use of Canadian airspace.¹

While visiting the ROCCs at North Bay, the Defence Minister related the protection of North America to the security of Western Europe, declaring: "We are conscious that a strong vigilant North America, with its important industrial capability, makes the NATO job of preserving the peace in Europe

¹ DND, News Release, 16 September 1987, p. 1.

easier. And that is good for the prospects of global peace."²

As revealed in the 1987 Defence White Paper, Canada has also agreed to participate in the United States' Air Defense Initiative (ADI). This is a small (US\$300 million) programme concentrating on research into radar technologies that offer the promise of reliable detection of cruise missiles with Stealth characteristics. Canada is also pursuing a \$50-million research and development programme for Canadian industry, in particular, on space-based surveillance systems for the future. This project began in 1987 and will run for approximately seven years. Current studies aim at determining the feasibility of space-based radar with "look-down" capability for detecting low-flying objects.

Parliamentary Comment

In September 1986, Brigadier-General (Retired) C. Beattie and Brigadier-General (Retired) K. Greenaway published an article arguing that the NWS had been located too far south for purposes of protecting Canadian sovereignty. They called for radars to be placed along the outer edge of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago, not limited to the vicinity of 70° North, as at present.³ Before the House Standing Committee on National Defence (SCND), New Democrat member Derek Blackburn asked Defence Minister Beatty whether the NWS had been "misplaced geographically", in favour of the United States, leaving gaps in coverage of Canadian territory. Mr Beatty replied that he knew such concerns had been raised and that the Government had pursued the

² DND News Release, 18 September 1987, p. 1.

³ Beattie, C. E. and Greenaway, K. R., "Offering Up Canada's North," Northern Perspectives, Vol. 14, No. 4, September 1986, pp. 5-8.

practicality of basing the NWS further north. However, "If we were to do that, we would cost ourselves in the range I believe, of hundreds of millions of dollars more. Yet the difficulty would still exist".⁴ Stating that a gap over the Beaufort Sea presents a problem that cannot be solved by land-based radars, the Defence Minister suggested that the only cost-effective solution was radar coverage by AWACS aircraft. He added that the temporary nature of the NWS made further expenditure on it even less warranted:

We see the North Warning System as being a major improvement over the old DEW Line, but as being a stop-gap. The next generation of technology will be space-based radars, which will give us much more comprehensive coverage....The North Warning System provides only a tripwire today....Space-based radar will enable you to track anything that flies throughout the whole of its activities.⁵

He continued to say that it was necessary for Canada to obtain space-based radar technology to defend North America against air-breathing, including cruise missile, attack.⁶

Regarding the cost of such a space-based system, Mr. Beatty argued that it would be put in place regardless of Canadian participation or financing. Mr. Healey, DND's Assistant Deputy Minister for Materiel, referred to the \$50 million programme the DND is financing for space-system research and development as the beginning of a process to prepare Canada for participation in space-based surveillance:

In the final analysis, we would see the space-based radar being a

⁴ SCND Proceedings, Issue #30, 23 March 1988, p. 22.

⁵ Ibid..

⁶ Ibid., p. 23.

joint project, where we would have an invisible share in Canadian industry and a share of the output of the radar.⁷

NORAD has also received attention over the past year as a result of the New Democratic Party's declared intention to cancel the agreement if elected. In its international security policy paper, Canada's Stake in Common Security, released in April 1988, the NDP argues that the nature of the Agreement has changed. It believes that NORAD is drawing Canada closer to the United States' Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), and that it has a detrimental effect on Canadian sovereignty. In the words of the Report, "we believe that NORAD is being drawn into a central place in the strategies of the current US Administration for fighting a protracted nuclear war."⁸

The NDP proposes, if elected, to replace the current agreement:

We will negotiate before 1991 a new agreement, shorn of any links to ballistic missile defence, with the United States, to devise -- under Canada's leadership and management -- improved peacetime surveillance and an improved warning system in the event of crisis or war. We will extend Canada's own monitoring and surveillance of our Arctic coastal areas with the best available technology -- to the limit of our political, technical and financial capacity.⁹

In response to a question in the House of Commons on the implications of Canadian withdrawal from NORAD, Defence Minister Beatty stated:

The effect of such a policy would be to cost Canada any influence

⁷ Ibid..

⁸ NDP International Affairs Committee, Canada's Stake in Common Security, April 1988, p. 23.

⁹ Ibid., pp. 24-25.

in setting alliance policy for arms control or defence. It would drive up the cost to Canada of air defence of North America by some \$5 billion.¹⁰

In his speech before The Canada Conference III on 7 February 1988 in Vancouver, Liberal Party leader John Turner stated his position on the NORAD alliance:

...I strongly believe that Canada must maintain its membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and North American Aerospace Defence (NORAD), and commit itself to becoming a more active participant in their discussions.¹¹

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¹⁰ Commons Debates, 21 August 1987, p. 8296.

¹¹ The Right Honourable John Turner, "Building the Canadian Nation: Sovereignty and Foreign Policy in the 1990's," 7 February 1988, p. 5.

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Arctic Sovereignty and Security

19. CANADA-US: SPACE STATION

Background

In his State of the Union address in January 1984, President Reagan announced the beginning of a United States project to build a space station, and invited the allies to participate. In response, the Canadian Government commissioned studies on the potential costs and benefits of participation in the project, and on 30 March 1985 it announced its commitment in principle. Similar commitments by the 13-member European Space Agency (ESA) and Japan have promised to make the project the largest international space venture ever undertaken.

The space station would be built, in space, over a period of two years, and would be expected to be operational by 1994.

The Canadian contribution to the project would consist of construction of a Mobile Servicing Centre (MSC), to service the instruments and payloads of the station, aid in the deployment and retrieval of satellites and aid in the construction of the station itself. In return for this contribution, Canada would receive preferred access to all of the station's facilities.

The ESA is developing an orbiting laboratory for the station, as well as two free-flying spacecraft. A laboratory for space biology research, and an unpressurized facility for space experiments, would be developed by Japan.

In 1986, the cost of the space station was estimated at \$12 billion, of which the United States would contribute \$8 billion, the ESA about \$2 billion, Japan \$1 billion and Canada approximately \$800 million.

On 7 April 1987, in a letter to Secretary of State George Shultz, US Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger stated that the United States should be prepared to undertake the space station project alone rather than accept any limitations that would preclude unilateral US decisions to use it for military activities. This brought international negotiations on the project to a temporary halt while the US Departments of Defense and of State moved to settle the dispute.

More recently, the estimated costs of the space station have increased well beyond the earlier projections. Current estimates now range from \$14-\$30 billion (US) for the total programme. Canadian Minister of State (Science and Technology) Frank Oberle confirmed in March 1988 that Canada's costs had risen to \$1.2 billion--a 50% increase over earlier estimates.

Current Canadian Position

On 9 December 1987, after more than a year of negotiations, Canada and the United States concluded a Memorandum of Understanding detailing Canada's role in the space station, and the conditions under which it would participate. Included in the text of the memorandum is a provision allowing for Canadian withdrawal from the project, and for reimbursement of any money it has spent, if the United States uses the station for military purposes unacceptable to Canada. The agreement would govern the operations of the space station for 30 years. Minister of State (Science and Technology), Frank Oberle, commented:

... the space station will perhaps be the single largest repository of new technologies and ideas that will be generated in the early part of the next century. It is

critically important. ... it is important to us that the concept on which the invitation to Canada was based is maintained. It is important that it remain a civilian and peaceful exercise. We shall not have it any other way.¹

Referring to the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), the Minister continued:

We have this assurance and I can further assure ... that the MOU that has now been negotiated will provide additional safeguards to ensure that our strong position in this area is respected.²

The agreement was then submitted to Cabinet for consideration.

The rising costs of Canada's contribution to the space station prompted the Cabinet to consider money-saving measures. The options reportedly considered included: scaling down the commitment so as to bring it in line with the cost originally anticipated (ie. \$800 million); paying the extra money and proceeding as planned; or pulling Canada out of the project entirely.

On 21 April 1988 Robert de Cotret, Minister of Regional Industrial Expansion and Minister of State for Science and Technology, and Frank Oberle, Minister of State (Science and Technology), announced increased funding of \$388 million, for a total of \$1.185 billion, for Canada's role in the design, development, operation and use of the Space Station to the year 2000. In an overview of the project, Mr de Cotret noted:

...I will be informing our international partners that Canada has confirmed its investment in the Space Station project, a venture which will extend human reach beyond our planet. As our

¹ Commons Debates, 14 December 1987, p. 11739.

² Ibid..

contribution... Canada will design and build the mobile servicing system, an intelligent roving robot which will play a critical role in the construction and operation of the orbiting space center. Our investment, in dollar terms, will be \$1.2 billion to the turn of the century. This will pay the cost of developing hardware and state-of-the-art technologies to build the system and include programs to help apply these technologies on earth and to prepare Canadians to exploit the R&D facilities aboard the Space Station. It will also cover Canada's share of the ... operating costs.³

In return for its investment, Mr. Oberle observed, Canada would receive 3 per cent use of all Space Station facilities, including those of other partners; and be entitled to provide Space Station crew members (the equivalent of one astronaut for a six-month period every two years)⁴. Mr. de Cotret went on to state that almost all of the money would be spent in Canada, largely in industries and universities. This would create a technology base for the future, while producing an estimated \$5 billion in spinoffs and 80,000 person-years of employment. The Minister also noted that all regions of the country would share in the benefits of the program.⁵

Parliamentary Comment

On 14 December 1987, Liberal member William Rompkey commented on the Memorandum of Understanding reached between the United States and Canada on the Space Station:

³ Speaking Guide for Mr. de Cotret, 21 April 1988.

⁴ Speaking Notes for Mr. Oberle, 21 April 1988.

⁵ Speaking Guide for Mr. de Cotret, 21 April 1988.

We in the Liberal Party have taken the position all along that Canada should participate in the space station only if it is used for peaceful purposes and only if there is no military use of that space station. There is still no confirmation that that has been agreed to. There is still no confirmation that the Government has reached agreement with the Americans that there will be no military use.⁶

Later, Mr. Rompkey asked the Minister of State (Science and Technology) Frank Oberle:

How can the Minister have a commitment not to participate in military use of the space station and at the same time have a money back guarantee if they do? Does that not reflect equivocation, doubt and uncertainty? When is a decision going to be made one way or the other; yes it is going to be military or, no, it is not?⁷

Responding to the question, Mr. Oberle noted:

I did not say that we will walk away and get our money back, "if" ... The fact is I was in Washington last week to look at the text which had been negotiated and to remove a couple of minor irritants that had to be discussed at a higher level. The military aspect has not changed from the time the President and our Prime Minister (Mr. Mulroney) agreed to cooperate with this enterprise.⁸

Elaborating further, the Minister stated:

What I think the Cabinet will be considering will be a participation in line with the invitation. It will be a civilian peaceful exercise. We have built into this concept of a dispute

⁶ Commons Debates, 14 December 1987, p. 11734-35.

⁷ Ibid., p. 11742.

⁸ Ibid.

mechanism, ... and we have built certain safeguards into the MOU, which I will be recommending to Cabinet, that would permit us in the event - never mind militarization, which would be one aspect - that we do not like the management regime agreed to by the Europeans and Japanese, if we do not like any aspects of this thing later on, to perhaps sell our assets to other partners. It may well be a situation where we get this thing up there and the cost becomes so horrendous we can no longer participate.⁹

Concerning costs, NDP member Michael Cassidy commented on the likelihood of the Canadian contribution escalating to about \$1.3 billion:

What is instructive about that is that that is equal to the total space program that has been enunciated for the course of the next 13-15 years. On top of all that, the carrying and operating costs for Canada's participation in the space station are estimated to be a possible \$30 million a year. That is more than is currently being spent on all of the space science in Canada. That, too, raises some very serious problems. This one prestige project ... is quite profoundly distorting Canada's space program.¹⁰

Cassidy also speculated upon the prospect of military use of the space station. Criticizing the Canada-US Memorandum of Understanding, he stated:

What has the Minister got? He has an agreement in the Memorandum of Understanding ... that, if the Americans try to do something that is too overtly military in the space station, then we can ask them to buy us out. Is that not ridiculous? In other words we have not got the specific commitment Canada should have sought and insisted upon, that before we participated ... the Americans clearly and unequivocally promise they will not use the space station as a part of the Star Wars program.¹¹

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 11743.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 11744.

On 21 April 1988, NDP member Howard McCurdy asked Prime Minister Brian Mulroney for assurances that additional funds for the project would not be taken out of the \$1.3 billion that the Government had committed to fundamental research, largely to be conducted in universities, in January 1988. In addition, Mr. McCurdy asked for some indication of where the extra money would in fact come from. In response, Prime Minister Mulroney stated:

The large increase of investment in science and technology will go the education route, in substantial measure. It will, with the blessing of the universities, go for the Canada Science Scholarships.¹²

On 19 May 1988 Liberal Member David Berger raised the issue of the distribution of economic benefits arising from Canada's participation in the Space Station. Referring to Quebec's share of the benefits, Mr. Berger stated:

On several occasions [the] Government has formally promised that Quebec would get 35 per cent of the economic spin-offs derived from our participation in the American Space Station. According to the figures obtained from the Department of Regional Industrial Expansion and Science and Technology, Quebec will get only 25 per cent of the spin-offs.¹³

He then asked the Prime Minister if he could explain:

...why the Government does not live up to its commitment to provide Quebec with 35 per cent of the economic spinoffs?¹⁴

¹² Commons Debates, 21 April 1988, p. 14695.

¹³ Commons Debates, 19 May 1988, p. 15628.

¹⁴ Ibid.

On behalf of the Prime Minister, Mr. Bernard Valcourt, Minister of State for Small Businesses and Tourism, and for Indian Affairs and Northern Development, replied:

The avowed purpose of the Canadian government which has been expressed on many occasions, is to make sure that Quebec will get 35 per cent of all economic spin-offs resulting from Canadian participation in the space program, including RADARSAT, MSAT and the Space Station. That is the position of the Canadian Government.¹⁵

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20. THE DEFENCE BUDGET AND THE WHITE PAPER ON DEFENCE

Background

Total planned budgetary expenditures for the Canadian Government in 1988-89 equal \$132.25 billion. Of this, \$11.1 billion will be spent by the Department of National Defence (DND). In addition, as agreed through a ministerial review, the DND will receive a further \$60 million in 1988-89 towards construction of a second batch of Canadian Patrol Frigates. The total defence budget estimates of \$11.2 billion represent a real growth of 2.7 per cent over the 1987-88 forecast expenditures of \$10.55 billion. With a 3.3 per cent inflation rate factored into the calculation, Canada's 1988-89 defence budget equals 8.4 per cent of the total Canadian budget, remaining equal to that of 1987-88. The \$200 million deferral from the defence budget in 1987-88 was restored to the 1987-88 defence budget estimates in February 1988.

Personnel costs represent the largest component of the current defence budget, at over 40 per cent. The next largest component--about 26 per cent of the main estimates--is capital expenditures. Five major equipment acquisition programmes--the Canadian Patrol Frigate, Low Level Air Defence, the Tribal Class Destroyer Update and Modernization, CF-18 fighter aircraft modernization, and the North American Air Defence system update--account for approximately 50 per cent of the capital expenditures (see Defence--Major Equipment Acquisitions section).

A new system for establishing defence budgets has been agreed to within the Government, involving a base two per cent yearly increase along with additional funding to be determined in annual Cabinet review. This method was announced in the June 1987 Defence White Paper. Its purpose is to allow

for long-term planning in the Department's budgetary process over the next fifteen years, particularly with major equipment procurement in mind. The first five-year plan provides \$1.4 billion for the patrol frigates above the guaranteed 2 per cent growth rate. This is broken down as follows: 1988-89, \$60 million; 1989-90, \$175 million; 1990-91, \$411 million; 1991-92, \$367 million; and 1992-93, \$387 million.

Current Canadian Position

Questions have been raised among defence critics and analysts as to the adequacy of the agreed-upon financing formula for covering the costs of the programmes outlined in the White Paper. The Canadian Business Council on National Issues, for example, has stated the need for an increase in the defence budget of three per cent after inflation in order for Canada to meet its commitments.¹ It also notes that informal estimates suggest a minimum requirement of four per cent real annual growth.

In an interview by Canada's Defence News Bulletin, Defence Minister Perrin Beatty explained the Government's predicament:

Every single aspect of government spending is finding itself under very tight constraints today, and will for the foreseeable future, at least until the debt-to-GNP ratio is reduced -- which could be into the early '90's. As a consequence, there are tremendous pressures on every dollar that is available for the government to spend. It's as simple as that. There must be a continuation of the political will to re-equip the armed forces.²

¹ Globe & Mail, 14 October 1987.

² The Wednesday Report (Canada's Defence News Bulletin), Vol. 1, No. 16, 23 September 1987, p. 3.

In fact, the White Paper's architects are reported to have assumed at least a five per cent annual budget increase after inflation.³

The Defence Minister, however, is optimistic about the funding formula agreed upon:

We've reached an agreement on a formula for financing which I think is good and fair. It gives me sufficient certainty to be able to go ahead and launch the White Paper and retains for Cabinet the ability to regulate the pace at which various large, capital projects come on-line.⁴

Mr. Beatty does not discount the possibility of changes in the procurement programme in the future:

We'll have a rolling five-year plan adjusted annually. It will allow us each year to push the horizon out another year to talk about what new capital programs we should be getting into during that period. It will also mean that as we report to Parliament on our estimates there will be a fine-tuning of the White Paper. I expect that over the next fifteen years we will see developments taking place -- for example, in arms control -- that could substantially affect our procurement.⁵

Another policy area which received attention in the White Paper and over the past year was the Reserves. Decisions were made to increase the size of the Reserves by 2000 members in 1988-89, raising the level to approximately

³ James Bagnall, "Beatty's Doctrine," Financial Post, 16 November 1987, p. 45.

⁴ David Cox, "Sovereignty and Security: Canada's New Defence Policy," Canadian Business Review, Autumn 1987, p. 9.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 9-10.

23,000. The Reserves were also granted pay increases averaging 4.5 per cent for the Primary Reserve Force. Budget estimates for the Reserves equal approximately \$419 million for 1988-89, up from \$398 million in 1987-88. DND plans to have an established Primary Reserve Force of about 65,000 members by the year 2003. In addition, a Supplementary Reserve Force of 25,000 is planned by 1992. While no firm amount has been budgeted for equipment in the Reserve revitalization programme, the cost has been estimated at \$1.9 billion over the next fifteen years.⁶ Lt.-General James Fox has stated that the cost of tripling the number of Canada's Reserves over the next 15 years will be approximately \$9.2 billion.⁷

Finally, DND is also looking to acquire a replacement for Canada's main battle tank, the Leopard I. It has been estimated that this will cost approximately \$2.4 billion. Procurement would begin in about four years.⁸

Parliamentary Comment

Before the Standing Committee on National Defence, Defence Minister Beatty was asked whether in addition to the two per cent floor rate, DND would require \$50 billion from now to the year 2002. Mr. Beatty responded that it was impossible to put firm figures on the cost. He continued:

But as we indicated in the White Paper, we cannot finance the White Paper on two percent real growth. We indicated that as

⁶ John Best, "Excitement over belief that new era dawning for reserve forces," Ottawa Citizen, 24 June 1988, p. E3.

⁷ Globe and Mail, 2 May 1988, p. A4.

⁸ John Best, "New, Stronger Commitment to NATO's Central Region in Germany," Ottawa Citizen, 24 June 1988, p. F1.

major capital projects come on stream I would be going back to my colleagues on an annual basis with our forecast expenditures, and we would be seeking bumps above the line.... This is what they did in the case of SRP-2 [frigates]. We got roughly 60 percent of the cashflow for SRP-2 put above the line....⁹

In a question from NDP member Derek Blackburn, Mr. Beatty was asked what the total cost of the White Paper would be. He responded:

I can tell you what the financing formula we are talking about would generate in terms of funds. We are talking there about between \$180 billion and \$200 billion over the course of the next 15 years. That is purely mechanical extrapolation of the financing formula over where we stood.¹⁰

Mr. Blackburn further queried whether the Defence budget would be over the line every year. He also referred to documents estimating the potential spread of the White Paper's procurement costs between \$182.3 billion and \$238.86 billion. Mr. Beatty stated:

All this depends on what we have above the line and the rate of procurement we are looking at. In the case of the submarines, for example, the \$8 billion we are talking about there is spread over 27 years. It goes well beyond the planning period.¹¹

When pressed on whether some programmes may have to be sacrificed for others, Mr. Beatty reaffirmed the Government's commitment to the White Paper: "The government has signed on for it. They have said they approve of it and they believe it is appropriate in terms of acquisitions during that period."¹² With the frigate funding as a precedent, the Minister

⁹ SCND Proceedings, Issue No. 30, 23 March 1988, p. 14.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 20.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 20.

¹² Ibid., p. 21.

voiced his approval of the funding system: "It has been very helpful...in setting a useful example to be followed, I think in terms of procedure."¹³

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13 1988, p. 21

21. DEFENCE--MAJOR EQUIPMENT ACQUISITIONS

Background

The Department of National Defence (DND) has been involved in a number of major equipment acquisition projects for the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) over the past year. These include both projects which have come about as a consequence of the Defence White Paper, issued in June 1987, and projects which preceded the White Paper.

On 16 April 1986, the DND announced the awarding of the contract for a Low-Level Air Defence (LLAD) system for the CAF. The Oerlikon-Buhrle Litton consortium received the contract of \$1.138 billion (1987 dollars) to provide the CAF with its air defence anti-tank system (ADATS), with expected delivery beginning in October 1988. Through the contract the CAF will acquire 36 ADATS and 20 35mm twin guns with 10 accompanying fire-control systems. The system will be deployed at CAF bases at Baden-Soellingen and Lahr, West Germany as well as with the Canadian Air Sea Transportable (CAST) Brigade, whose current role is to be ready for deployment in Norway in the event of crisis (this obligation is scheduled to cease in November 1989, at which time the CAST will be assigned to the defence of the European Central Front). The LLAD system is being manufactured in St. Jean sur Richelieu, Quebec, and is scheduled for completion in 1991.

Though a programme for the CAF to acquire a replacement for its heavy truck fleet had begun in 1983, the recent White Paper's reference to the current shortfall in logistic support added greater impetus to awarding a contract. On 5 February 1987, Associate Defence Minister Paul Dick announced that the team of Urban Transportation Development Corp. (UTDC) Inc. of Kingston, Ontario--85 percent owned by Lavalin Industries Ltd.--and Styr-Daimler-Puch of Austria would fill an order for 1,122 heavy trucks. Over \$310 million

(1987) has been budgeted for the purchase. The trucks will replace the current fleet of 800 five-ton trucks, 40 percent of which were acquired between 1953-63. The remaining 60 percent were built in 1975-76.

The truck programme was not without controversy, as some of the short-listed contenders for the contract sought to better their standing by offering regional industrial benefits. UTDC itself suggested that some assembly may take place in Nova Scotia. The three short-listed consortia not chosen included: Montreal-based Bombardier Inc. with Oshkosh Truck Corp. of Wisconsin; Canadian Kenworth Co. of Mississauga, Ontario with Saab-Scania AB of Sweden; and General Motors of Canada Ltd. with MAN of West Germany. Bombardier Ltd. pledged to establish a manufacturing plant west of Calgary, Alberta, and GM offered to assemble some trucks in Nova Scotia. The DND used load capacity, durability, logistics support and the ability of the truck to manoeuvre on steep gradients as measures to evaluate the contestants. The new trucks will commence service in the CAF in Spring 1989.

On August 30, during a visit by French Prime Minister Chirac, Prime Minister Mulroney announced that Canada would purchase the French ERYX short-range, anti-armour weapon. The purchase will take place over 10 years and cost approximately \$200 million. The weapons will enter service in 1990.

Also contained in the White Paper was a commitment to purchase six new Aurora Long-range Patrol Aircraft (to supplement Canada's current fleet of Aurora and Tracker aircraft), and a commitment to replace Canada's main battle tank, the Leopard I. The main contenders for the tank replacement programme, estimated to cost \$2.4 billion, include the American M1A1, the German Leopard II, the British Challenger II, and the French LeClerc. Procurement of the new tanks would begin in about four years.

Recently, the greatest emphasis in major equipment acquisition has been on modernizing Canada's naval forces. The first element of the modernization is the Tribal [class destroyers] Update and Modernization Project (TRUMP), announced prior to the White Paper in May 1986.

TRUMP consists of a mid-life update for Canada's four DDH 280 destroyers, which entered service in 1972-73. The destroyers will receive new command, control, communication, and combat systems. The new combat systems will provide defence against air and anti-ship missile attack as well as the ability to defend other ships. The total estimated cost of the TRUMP is \$1.7 billion (1987). Work on the first destroyer, the HMCS Algonquin, began in November 1987 and is scheduled for completion by mid-1989. The modernization of the HMCS Iroquois begins in November 1988. This work is being done by Marine Industries Limited (MIL) of Montreal at their Davie Shipyard in Lauzon, Quebec. Litton Systems Canada Ltd., the prime contractor, has yet to award the sub-contract for modernizing the second batch of two ships, HMCS Athabaskan and HMCS Huron. The last ship's modernization is to be completed by August 1992.

The Canadian Patrol Frigate programme was initiated in 1983 for the procurement of six ships. Total estimated cost for the programme is \$4.9 billion (1987), with the St. John Shipbuilding Limited and Marine Industries Ltd. of Montreal building three frigates each. The first of the new ships, HMCS Halifax, was launched in May 1988. Work began on the second and third ships, the HMCS Ville de Québec and HMCS Vancouver in May, and December 1987, respectively. The final ship is to be delivered by 1992.

The Government announced approval of the second phase of the Ship Replacement Programme, to build six more frigates, in December 1987. Whereas the first frigate contract was split between two companies, St. John Shipbuilding was awarded the contract to build the entire second batch of

frigates. These ships should enter service by 1996.

In August 1986, the Government granted approval for the Department of National Defence to enter into the project definition stage for a new shipborne aircraft (NSA). The NSA would replace Canada's current fleet of 35 Sea King helicopters, which entered service in 1963. Two helicopters were in contention for the project: the Anglo-Italian EH-101, and the French Aerospatiale As-332 Super Puma. On 5 August 1987, DND announced its choice of the EH-101 helicopter. The project definition phase is now proceeding. This involves settling contractual arrangements and determining whether or not the helicopter can meet Canadian requirements. Between 28 and 51 aircraft are to be purchased, at an estimated cost of between \$1.8-\$2.8 billion (1987). E.H. Industries (Canada) Inc. is owned jointly by Westland Helicopter of Britain and the Agusta Group of Italy. A team formed by EHI consisting of Bell Helicopter Textron of Mirabel, Quebec, Paramax Electronics and Canadian Marconi of Montreal, IMP Group of Halifax, and Sikorsky Aircraft of Stratford, Connecticut is handling the project. The NSA's primary functions are anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and anti-ship surveillance and targetting. Its secondary roles consist of search and rescue, medical evacuation, troop transport and communications. The project definition is to conclude by the end of 1989.

On 3 March 1988, DND announced the acquisition of two mine counter-measure (MCM) auxiliary vessels. These will serve mainly as training vessels for the naval reserve and are expected to come into service in late 1988. The ships to be acquired are as yet unspecified. A large programme to acquire 10 - 20 MCM vessels is also under consideration.

The greatest attention in relation to defence acquisitions has been focussed on the Government's plan to acquire 10-12 nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs), as outlined in the Defence White Paper. The Government's cost estimate for

this project is \$8 billion, to be spread over a 27-year programme life-span. The vessels will replace Canada's three diesel-propelled Oberon class submarines currently in naval service.

Two classes of submarines are being considered for the purchase: the British Trafalgar class SSN, designed by Vickers Shipbuilding and Engineering Ltd.; and the French Rubis/Amethyste-class SSN, designed by Société de Navigation Atomique (SNA). The characteristics of the two submarines vary considerably. The Trafalgar-class vessel is nearly twice the size of the Rubis/Amethyste SSN. Its maximum speed (submerged) is 32 knots, compared to 26 knots for the French vessel. The British submarine carries a crew of 97, while the French has a crew of 66. The British vessel requires weapons-grade fuel (defined as uranium enriched above 20%), whereas fuel for the French design is less than 10% enriched. Another important difference is in the price of the two contenders. The Trafalgar design is estimated to cost \$450-500 million each, compared to \$320-350 million for the Amethyste/Rubis. As a result of its size, however, the British vessel is able to carry more detection and stealth-enhancing equipment, required for the performance of anti-submarine, coastal patrol and surveillance duties. The British submarine also has experience operating in the Arctic, of prime importance to the role Canada expects of its SSNs.

A complicating factor in the decision-making process concerns two international agreements. One, a 1959 agreement between Canada and the United States, restricts the transfer of nuclear-related technology. This agreement would have to be amended, requiring US Congressional approval, if Canada chose to purchase the British submarine design. Second is the 1958 agreement between Britain and the United States governing the transfer of American nuclear technology. Under this agreement, Britain must obtain the consent of the United States before British nuclear submarines can be purchased by Canada. The French vessel is under no such restrictions.

In May 1988 it was announced that five Canadian companies interested in receiving the prime contract for the submarine project had joined forces to form the Canadian Submarine Consortium. The five include: Marine Industries Ltd., Litton Systems Canada Ltd., Lavalin Inc., the SNC Group, and Halifax-Dartmouth Industries Ltd.. Three other firms are competing for the contract: Saint John Shipbuilding Ltd., Paramax Electronics Inc., and Canadian Shipbuilding and Engineering Ltd. with Rockwell International of Canada Ltd..

The Government expects to choose its preferred design by mid-1988, and is planning to begin replacing the Oberon submarines in 1996.

Current Canadian Position

In announcing Cabinet approval for procuring six more patrol frigates on December 8, 1987, Defence Minister Perrin Beatty stated:

This is the first concrete example of the implementation of the White Paper... Canadian sailors are recognized as being among the best in the world. Giving them these state-of-the-art ships to match their abilities will dramatically increase Maritime Command's operational effectiveness and serve Canada well into the next century.¹

Supply and Services Minister Michel Côté explained the rationale behind the awarding of the contract to Saint John Shipbuilding Ltd. (SJSJL):

As a result of the original contract for the first batch of six

¹ DND, News Release, 18 December 1987, p. 2.

frigates, SJSL and Paramax have established the necessary resources and infrastructure to construct the frigates and supply the high technology combat systems at an economical price and within the required timeframe. We intend to take advantage of this opportunity to provide our navy with the additional ships it needs so badly.²

In a letter published in the Ottawa Citizen on 9 December 1987, Mr. Beatty addressed a number of issues concerning the acquisition of SSNs. These included the function of the submarines, their operational guidelines, and cost. Critics have suggested that the submarines' role is not well-thought-out and that the costs are under-estimated.

The Minister wrote that the vessels' purpose was to patrol Canada's three oceans and, in the event of hostilities, to "keep enemy warships and submarines as far as possible from our shores and from allied shipping routes, military convoys, and other Canadian and allied interests."³ Hybrid nuclear/diesel-electric submarines represented too great a risk, due to their unproven technology, to be a viable alternative for Canada's submarine fleet.

In answer to the charge that Canada's submarines would inevitably become involved in the United States' maritime strategy, Mr. Beatty stated:

Canada's submarines enjoy the benefits of close cooperation with the navies of our allies... That coordination will continue... It is preposterous to suggest that, because we will be equipping the Canadian Navy with a high performance vessel, we will inexorably be committing those vessels to the dictates of some other nation's

² Ibid.

³ Ottawa Citizen, 9 December 1987.

operating philosophy.⁴

The \$8 billion estimate for the programme, Beatty explained, included the price of the vessels' shore-based support infrastructure and training facilities. Over the 27-year life of the project this would amount to approximately \$300 million per year, representing about 3 percent of the total annual defence budget and 10 percent of the annual capital equipment budget.

The SSNs would provide Canada with "leading-edge" military technology to contribute to the protection of Canadian sovereignty. The Minister declared: "The essential issue is that Canada must have the ability to detect and track foreign submarines in Canadian waters--a capability we do not now have." The submarines would perform under "precise rules of engagement", as determined by the Government under the prevailing circumstances.

The Government summed up its position on recent procurement projects for the navy as follows:

These new submarines, together with the frigates, helicopters and long-range patrol aircraft, will provide Canada with a credible, balanced mix of forces essential to permit our navy to perform its maritime tasks.⁵

⁴ Ibid..

⁵ Defence Update, 1988-1989, p. 10.

Parliamentary Comment

Considerable Parliamentary comment occurred over the past year on the issues of the patrol frigate programme and the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines.

In regard to the frigate programme, controversy arose over the distribution of shipbuilding contracts. Mr. Gabriel Fontaine, Progressive Conservative member from Lévis, suggested that the Department of National Defence obtain hard evidence to prove the prime contractor's claim that it would cost \$80 million more per frigate to share the contract.⁶ He also questioned relying on a single contractor as a supplier of defence equipment:

"...strategically, technically, and economically, there is not a single country where the armed forces rely on a single supplier. We should certainly not be the first!"⁷

After the contract had been awarded to Saint John Shipbuilding Limited, Mrs. Shirley Martin, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Public Works, defended the Government's rationale:

We have two primary objectives which guide our [shipbuilding] policy, the rationalization of our shipbuilding industry and regional development. The awarding of the frigate contract to Saint John Shipbuilding proves the Government's commitment to these objectives.⁸

⁶ Commons Debates, 5 November 1987, p. 10775.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Commons Debates, 28 January 1988, p. 12411.

She indicated that portions of the contract would be carried out in other regions, including approximately \$800 million in Montreal by Paramax Electronics for design, construction and integration of weapons-control systems. She went on to describe the regional benefits of the frigate project:

Calculated over the entire life of the 12-ship project, the breakdown is slightly different: 37 percent to Atlantic Canada; 33 percent to Quebec; and 30 percent to Ontario and Western Canada. Over the course of the next nine years, the construction of the six patrol frigates will represent the equivalent of 14000 person-years of employment, with more than half the jobs going to workers in the Atlantic region alone where employment opportunities are most welcome.⁹

On 1 June 1988, Liberal Member Brian Tobin asked the Acting Prime Minister whether he was aware of correspondence between Saint John Shipbuilding and Paramax "indicating numerous defaults by Paramax [sic] in meeting its contractual obligations"? Mr. Tobin also asked whether regular audits of the frigate programme had been conducted. The Honourable Stewart McInnes, Minister of Public Works, replied that he was indeed aware of the allegations, and added:

The audit for 1986 has been completed. We are half way through the audit for 1987, and to date no irregularities or dissatisfaction have been uncovered. We are monitoring the situation closely. We are happy with the progress of the contract.¹⁰

In further questioning the next day in the House, Mr. Tobin made reference

⁹ Commons Debates, 28 January 1988, p. 12411.

¹⁰ Commons Debates, 1 June 1988, p. 15978.

to internal company documents he possessed which revealed the company's contract awarding process:

The documents...make clear that Paramax awarded contracts worth in excess of \$100 million, without tender or a competitive bidding process, to affiliates of its U.S.-based parent company, Unisys. Why has the Government approved of such an uncompetitive process that would eliminate competition and therefore eliminate potential savings to the taxpayer?

Minister of Supply and Services Otto Jelinek responded:

...because of the subcontract being a fixed contract, nothing went outside the rules and regulations of the contract with the primary contractor, Saint John Shipbuilding, in any way, shape or form.¹¹

Many issues have been raised in regard to the Canadian nuclear-powered submarine acquisition programme. On 19 November 1987, Liberal member Doug Frith asked to what extent Canada had entered into negotiations with the United States in order to transfer SSN technology. Associate Minister of National Defence, Paul Dick, responded:

...It is not our responsibility to talk to the United States about transferring that technology. It is the responsibility of the British Government to see if it can get agreement from the United States in order to transfer that technology.

The fact is that we have another option, which does not depend on the United States at all, which is a very active option, that is, looking at the nuclear-powered submarines made by France.¹²

¹¹ Commons Debates, 2 June 1988, p. 16061.

¹² Commons Debates, 19 November 1987, pp. 10965-66.

Mr. Derek Blackburn of the NDP raised the question of sovereignty, its relation to the role of the submarines and their procurement.

I wish to know if the Minister could explain where the logic lies in a defence program where we have virtually to beg for a transfer of technology from the United States through the United Kingdom to Canada, in order to protect the very sovereignty in our Arctic that the United States objects to and refuses to accept?¹³

Mr. Dick replied:

...I thought the defence critic for the New Democratic Party was aware that part of our commitment to NATO is to have surveillance on the submarines of other countries which are in our quadrant. We can hardly do that if we have a submarine that moves a lot slower than theirs.

The reason we must have a submarine of equal capability is to maintain our commitment to NATO and to assure our own security and sovereignty.¹⁴

On 23 November 1987, Liberal member George Baker questioned the French submarine, given its lack of ice-strengthening and the fact that it is not currently designed to accommodate the Mark 48 torpedo Canada has chosen to use in the submarines.

In response, the Honourable Harvie André, Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, assured the House that Canada's choice would have to meet CAF specifications:

¹³ Commons Debates, 19 November 1987, p. 10966.

¹⁴ Ibid..

They would have to be modified to enable them to come through Arctic ice and to operate in the Arctic environment. Both are within the technical capabilities of current design.¹⁵

The question of the cost of the submarine programme was also raised repeatedly throughout the year. A number of statements criticized the Government's estimates of \$7-8 billion as being inconsistent and too low. On 18 November 1987, Liberal Party Member Douglas Frith addressed the Defence Minister:

The Minister's own Department has changed the original \$5 billion numbers upward to what is now estimated to be between \$7.5 billion and \$8 billion. Consultants to the British Navy estimate the cost of the programme at \$11.25 billion. Would the Minister explain the discrepancies between all of the numbers, and which numbers is the Department now using?¹⁶

Paul Dick, Associate Minister of National Defence, responded:

The difference, translated into Canadian dollars, has been the exchange rate differences as the dollar has been going down and the pound has been going up. That is the only difference that has been going on.

There is an additional expenditure [to the SSNs themselves] of which we estimated about \$2 billion for the infrastructure. We have been consistent on that all the way through.¹⁷

¹⁵ Commons Debates, 23 November 1987, p. 11062.

¹⁶ Commons Debates, 18 November 1987, p. 10926.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 10926.

The Associate Minister then stated that the public figures were the accurate figures for the "construction and implementation" of the submarine programme. He indicated that costs such as future fuel recycling could not be applied to these amounts.¹⁸

The Government's estimates of the costs of the SSN programme were attacked from many quarters, both within Canada and internationally. On 11 March 1988, Mr. Dan Heap of the NDP referred, in a general sense, to these criticisms:

The Government has discovered that the subs in fact need shore bases. It appears that it left that out. Shore bases cost money. So the total project cost now, according to independent critics which the Government does not answer in any detail, is somewhere between \$10 billion and \$15 billion. Those are the costs.¹⁹

On a separate occasion, in response to a question in the House, Associate Defence Minister Paul Dick defended the Government's estimates against criticisms by an American analyst by stating:

We have done our calculations based on our economic models, based on prices in Canada, not on prices in the United States....We do not take our advice necessarily from Americans on our sovereignty and security; we take it from Canadians.²⁰

In a letter to the editor in the Globe and Mail on 2 May 1988, Rear Admiral John Anderson, Chief of the Submarine Acquisition Programme, wrote:

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 10926.

¹⁹ Commons Debates, 11 March 1988, p. 13663.

²⁰ Commons Debates, 2 May 1988, p. 15020.

Our cost estimates have included maintenance, refit, operating, training and support facilities. We have also addressed the costs associated with Canadian construction and industrial support. The basis of our assessments has been data provided by the two contending nations, France and Britain. We recently validated our earlier estimates. Our conclusion: for the \$8 billion forecast, we can acquire 10 to 12 submarines plus the necessary infrastructure.²¹

As the debate progressed, however, the issue of cost resurfaced on several occasions. On 6 June, Minister of Finance Michael Wilson was asked by Liberal Party Member Lloyd Axworthy to explain his earlier statement that he did not know the precise cost of the submarine programme. Mr. Wilson replied:

What we are facing right now is a decision on the country of origin for the submarine purchase. We have a fairly good idea of the cost of this program at this point. It is not until you can get into the detailed discussions, which come only after you make the decision on country of origin, that you are able to define the cost of the program with the degree of precision that would be necessary before a final decision is taken. That is the position we are in right now.²²

On 20 June, NDP Member Nelson Riis referred to a statement made by Rear Admiral John Anderson, head of the submarine acquisition programme, indicating that the \$8 billion amount for the project excluded a number of key components. These included, for example, anti-ship missiles, communication equipment and nuclear fuel. Defence Minister Beatty responded by stating:

²¹ Globe and Mail, 2 May 1988.

²² Commons Debates, 6 June 1988, p. 16159.

...it is not our intention to acquire anti-ship missiles. Were we to do so, however, they would replace the Mark 48 torpedo we are buying for the submarines and an anti-ship torpedo would cost less money than a Mark 48 torpedo.

He continued:

Second, with respect to fuel fabrication, we do not intend to fabricate it in Canada although we will have the ability to load the fuel in Canada....

...and that is included in the \$8 billion figure. Third, with respect to the VLF communications with the submarines, these submarines will be capable, as are our three Oberon Class submarines today, of receiving these messages. At the present time we use allied communications systems. We have taken no decision on whether to build our own or to continue to use allied communications systems. If we do, we would take that into consideration and it would come off the \$8 billion figure.²³

The same day, Liberal Party Member Len Hopkins asked the Defence Minister how the programme cost was divided between infrastructure and submarines. Mr. Beatty replied:

Whether it is \$3 billion and \$5 billion or \$4 billion and \$4 billion, it adds up to \$8 billion, which is equal. The exact ratio will depend on the exact model of submarine which is chosen.²⁴

The nature of the role Canada's nuclear-powered submarines would play in allied strategy was also a contentious issue during the past year. Critics have argued that Canada's submarine force could become involved in the US

²³ Commons Debates, 20 June 1988, p. 16592.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 16593.

forward maritime strategy, perceived by some as being provocative and destabilizing. Liberal defence critic Douglas Frith raised the issue in the Standing Committee on National Defence on 3 February 1988. Rear Admiral Anderson replied that Canada did have some barrier patrol responsibilities in the North Atlantic through NATO:

...at a certain stage of alert we have committed certain forces to the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT). He would then exercise operational control over our units. But the command of the submarine is still handled by a Canadian--in fact, working to very specific Canadian guidelines.²⁵

M.P. Derek Blackburn pursued the question of the Canadian maritime strategy:

...if we are talking about Arctic or the Arctic region or the Arctic responsibility for Canada, are we talking about an independent Canadian maritime command commitment, or are we talking about a shared commitment with SACLANT?

General Manson (Chief of Defence Staff, DND) responded:

Because these vessels are not in service and will not be for another nine years, we have not...come to any arrangements with NATO or with the United States regarding the command, control, and employment of nuclear submarines when they finally arrive on the scene.²⁶

On 14 June 1988 NDP Member Bill Blaikie commented on the submarines and their strategic role:

Nuclear technology or, for that matter, any technology, is not the

²⁵ SCND Proceedings, 3 February 1988, p. 12.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 14.

way to responsible or independent action for global survival. Only policy can do that and, unfortunately, instead of adopting a non-provocative defence posture designed to ensure Canadian security without threatening the security of our superpower neighbours, the Government's proposal will tie Canada even closer to the war-fighting strategies of the United States and to the insecurity for the human race that such thinking involves.²⁷

Another concern raised in the House of Commons was the possible environmental risk posed by the submarines. NDP Member Lynn McDonald requested that an environmental assessment of the submarine project be conducted, with particular reference to the Arctic. Mr. Dick responded that no known leaks of radioactive material had occurred on either French- or British-designed submarines, and Canada intended to maintain a high level of expertise in handling the nuclear power systems. Further, the nature of the submarines' operating areas--the oceans--would make an environmental assessment difficult.²⁸

For criticisms of the proliferation implications of the SSN programme, see the "Nuclear Non-Proliferation" section of this Guide.

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²⁷ Commons Debates, 14 June 1988, p. 16419.

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22. NATO

Background

Canada is a founding member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO's declared aim is the prevention of war:

It works to achieve this by striving to improve understanding between East and West and by possessing sufficient strength to deter an attack on any member of the alliance. The Treaty provides that Alliance members will come to each other's assistance in the event of an armed attack upon any one of them.¹

In the years immediately following the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, the Allies set up machinery for collective defence, and extended membership to include Greece, Turkey and the Federal Republic of Germany. By the mid-1950s they were facing a more varied Soviet challenge and recognized that progress on European and other issues required efforts to strengthen Western unity, solidarity and co-operation. A committee of "Three Wise Men" established in 1956 recommended ways of improving political consultation and led to improvements which helped NATO to face up to the difficulties and opportunities of the following decade: Berlin crises, the Cuban missile crisis, French withdrawal from the integrated military structure, the question of the control of nuclear weapons, and negotiations on arms control focussing on such questions as nuclear non-proliferation.

¹ NATO Information Service, NATO and Warsaw Pact Comparisons, Brussels, 1984, p.1.

In 1967, faced with a changing strategic situation, NATO carried out a review of its policies and issued a report entitled: "The Future Tasks of the Alliance" (the Harmel Report). This report indicated that the basic policy of NATO is to pursue the two objectives of defence and detente, and stated that the aim of all members countries is to achieve a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe accompanied by appropriate security guarantees.

The record of East-West relations over the last twenty years has been a mixed one, but nonetheless NATO has continued to pursue better relations with the East whenever that was possible. In the early 1970s it supported establishment of the SALT I Treaty, the conclusion of the Berlin agreements, and the launching of negotiations on European security and conventional force reductions. A period of stagnation following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the end of 1979 and the imposition of martial law in Poland in the early 1980s, has recently given way to renewed hopes for improvements focussing on the INF Treaty and the prospect of new negotiations on conventional military stability and progress on other arms control issues.

At the same time, NATO has continued to give attention to the requirements of Western cohesion and defence. The Atlantic Declaration of 1974 reaffirmed the commitment of all members to the Treaty and clarified further their responsibilities in such fields as political consultation. Defence improvements and force modernization programmes have also continued, together with work on defence planning, infrastructures, communications, crisis management procedures and similar tasks.

The North Atlantic Council is the highest authority in the Alliance. Composed of the representatives of the sixteen member countries, it meets at the level of Ministers or of Permanent Representatives (Ambassadors).

Ministerial meetings, attended by Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Finance, and so on, are held twice a year or more, while the Council in permanent session meets once a week or as often as required. Special meetings of Heads of Government are also held at particularly important junctures in Alliance affairs.

Under the Council, there is a range of committees and commands, such as the Political Committee, the Defence Planning Committee, the Military Committee, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Atlantic. The Secretary General of NATO is the civilian head of the organization, and he chairs the Council and other such key bodies as the Nuclear Planning Group.

At present, Canada's military commitments to NATO consist of:

- a mechanized brigade group of about 4,100 men, stationed in Lahr, Germany;
- 3 squadrons of tactical fighter aircraft plus related maintenance and headquarters elements with 1 Canadian Air Group at Lahr and Baden-Soellingen;
- other headquarters and support elements in Lahr;
- the Canadian Air/Sea Transportable (CAST) Brigade Group, based in Canada and committed to reinforcing northern Norway when required in time of crisis;
- 2 Rapid Reinforcement fighter squadrons, also committed to North Norway;
- a battalion group committed to the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (Land) (AMF(L)), and a fighter squadron committed to the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (Air) (AMF(A)), for deployment to NATO's Northern Region. (Both the battalion group and the fighter squadron are stationed in Canada. The latter is one of the two squadrons already

committed to Norway);

- other land, air and maritime forces stationed in Canada are designated to contribute to the Allied defence of north America, to assist in the allied naval defence of the North Atlantic and other waters, to provide reinforcements for Europe in time of crisis or war.

Canada also provides training facilities for NATO troops on Canadian territory. Shilo, Manitoba is used by West German forces for tank training, while the British Army employs facilities at Suffield and Wainwright, Alberta. German, British and US Air Forces use facilities at Goose Bay, Labrador, for training in low-level flying. In December 1986, the Government announced that the Royal Netherlands Air Force would be making similar use of the Canadian base at Goose Bay. The effects of these low-level flying exercises on the environment and the lives of native peoples in the area have prompted some concern. At present, the Federal Environmental Review Committee is conducting a study on this issue, and expects to table it in the Spring 1989.

In 1986, the last of the new assignment of CF-18 fighters were deployed to the Canadian Air Group in West Germany, replacing ageing CF-104 aircraft. Following through on a commitment made in 1985, Canada has increased its forces in Europe by about 1,500. Currently, a total of about 7,000 Canadian Armed Forces personnel is stationed there.

Canada's air base at Goose Bay has been under consideration as a possible site for NATO's new Tactical Fighting and Weapons Training Centre (NTFWTC). While a site at Konya, Turkey, was recommended by NATO officials in September 1986, Canadian officials were successful in convincing NATO to postpone a final decision on an NTFWTC site until a more in-depth analysis can be carried out. The Canadian Government is currently spending \$93

million to expand the Goose Bay facility.² As yet, no final decision has been made on the location of the NATO site.

Current Canadian Position

On 15 January 1987, in an address to the Empire Club in Toronto, Minister for National Defence, Perrin Beatty, outlined the rationale for Canadian membership in NATO. Mr. Beatty stated:

We are not in NATO and in Europe today simply out of a spirit of altruism. We are there because our interests as a nation require us to be there and because the loss of a free Europe would be a grave blow to our ability to maintain our democratic freedoms here in Canada. There can be no doubt that the defence of Western Europe continues to be critical to the defence of the Canada we wish to preserve.³

As was stated in the Defence White Paper of June 1987, the Canadian Government intends to relinquish its CAST commitment to north Norway, assigning the brigade to a role in West Germany instead. Noting that Canada's commitment to the defence of two different areas of Europe exceeded its capabilities, the White Paper went on to point out that the CAST commitment faced particularly severe problems:

The force requires some weeks to reach Norway, making timely deployment questionable, and it cannot make an opposed landing. Moreover, once deployed, it would be extremely difficult to reinforce and resupply, particularly after the start of

² Commons Debates, 1 March, 1988, p.13265.

³ Perrin Beatty, "Address to the Empire Club," Disarmament Bulletin, Winter-Spring 1987, p. 28.

hostilities....If these commitments in northern Norway were to be met fully and effectively, the deficiencies cited above would have to be rectified. This could only be done at great cost....The Government has concluded that consolidation in southern Germany is the best way to achieve a more credible, effective and sustainable contribution to the common defence of Europe.⁴

On 24 June 1988, the creation of a composite NATO force designed to replace Canada's CAST commitment to northern Norway was announced at NATO Headquarters in Brussels. Contributing to the force will be the United States, West Germany, Norway and Canada. According to Defence Minister Perrin Beatty, Canada's contribution will consist of the 1st Battalion, Royal Canadian Regiment, based in London, Ontario - an infantry unit of about 1200 personnel.⁵ Previously slotted for the defence of either Norway or Denmark, in future it will be committed exclusively to northern Norway. In turn, Belgium has offered to replace Canada in the role it previously filled in defence of Denmark.

The two squadrons of Rapid Reinforcement fighters which Canada had assigned to the defence of northern Norway will also be shifted to southern Germany. These squadrons are presently being converted from CF-5 to CF-18 aircraft, and the first was scheduled to be earmarked for deployment on the central front in June 1988. The second squadron will be operational in 1989. Both are based in Canada, but intended to reinforce Canadian forces in Germany in time of crisis.⁶

As a result of these changes in Canada's land and air forces, this country

⁴ DND, Challenge and Commitment, 5 June 1987, p. 61.

⁵ DND, News Release 65/88, 24 June 1988.

⁶ DND, Defence Update: 1988-89, March 1988, p. 14.

will have a "division-sized force" in Central Europe during a crisis. Equipment for the CAST brigade will be pre-positioned, and new tanks purchased. Negotiations are currently underway to provide Canadian forces with a small logistics base in Europe. Canada is also consulting with the Federal Republic of Germany to expand facilities used by Canadian forces, and to better ensure for their adequate support in wartime.⁷

Parliamentary Comment

Comment on the Government's decision to shift Canadian Forces commitments from northern Norway to the central front in West Germany intensified in late March and early April 1988. This was followed by indications that two former high-level defence officials had advocated that the opposite course be taken. In March, former Canadian Chief of the Defence Staff, General Gerard Thériault was reported to have stated before a conference of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs that Canada's CAST commitment to Norway was a "valued asset," while its forces in Central Europe meant "next to nothing."⁸ The General reportedly advocated that Canada should have pre-positioned equipment in Norway rather than increased its commitment to Central Europe. This was followed in April by stories in the press indicating that former Defence Minister Erik Nielsen had supported a similar policy in work on an earlier version of the Government's Defence White Paper.⁹

⁷ Ibid., p.15.

⁸ Ottawa Citizen, 28 March 1988, p. A4.

⁹ Gwynne Dyer, "Europeans torpedoed Tory plan to withdraw NATO troops," Ottawa Citizen, 14 April 1988, p. A1.

Noting these revelations, NDP Member Derek Blackburn made several remarks in the Commons. On 30 March 1988, Mr Blackburn referred to Gen. Thériault's comments, stating:

Last year I took a lot of flak for suggesting that keeping a small band of Canadian troops in West Germany was a waste of money. In fact, I was called a neutralist, isolationist, soft on communism, radical....Now someone has had the courage to challenge so-called conventional thinking. This time that someone is a man who spent his entire life defending this country.¹⁰

On 19 April 1988, Mr. Blackburn referred to the Nielsen story. Defending NDP policy on NATO, he commented:

...I will debate any conservative cold warrior on his or her bleak policy to fuel the...arms race, but I cannot stomach duplicity. When the Minister of Defence (Mr. Beatty) has the nerve to call our proposals costly, dishonest, and cowardly, I must draw the line. Didn't he read last week's newspapers? We found that it was Conservative Defence Minister Erik Nielsen who first proposed to pull Canada's troops out of Europe.¹¹

On 29 March 1988, in testimony before the Standing Committee on National Defence, Canada's present Chief of the Defence Staff, General Paul Manson, was asked by Conservative Member Stan Darling for his opinion of Gen. Thériault's remarks. General Manson replied:

I agree with General Thériault on a great many things but I must say I do not agree with him in his contention that Canada should have retained its commitment to the north flank. My reasons... are reflected very closely in the way the White Paper is worded on

¹⁰ Commons Debates, 30 March 1988, p.14272.

¹¹ Commons Debates, 19 April 1988, p. 14610.

this subject. It is well known why the Government chose to transfer that commitment from the north flank of Europe to the central region. There are many arguments that have been made for and against this move....The fact remains that there was a commitment...that Canada could not sustain adequately....Sustaining it once it was there meant that commitment really could not be upheld in a way that I, as Chief of Defence Staff, would consider militarily viable.¹²

During the same hearing, Mr. Robert Fowler, Assistant Deputy Minister for Policy in the Department of National Defence, also commented on Gen. Thériault's remarks. Responding to a query by Liberal MP Douglas Frith about the existence of a "Thériault Plan", Mr. Fowler stated:

I have not ... heard of anything called the "Thériault Plan." I have heard from General Thériault the kinds of views he expressed in [the press] article. He has expressed publicly a preference for having retained the CAST commitment to the north flank, perhaps, but not necessarily at the expense of the other European commitments. It is not quite clear whether he would have sacrificed all the other European commitments to doing that one right or not.¹³

In reply to Mr. Fowler's statement, Mr. Frith remarked that a Canadian General at SHAPE headquarters had indicated to him that Thériault's ideas had "gone beyond just talk."¹⁴

On 4 March 1988, Liberal Party Member Len Hopkins introduced a motion in the House concerning Canada's participation in, and support for, NATO. The motion read:

¹² SCND Proceedings, 28 March 1988, p. 6.

¹³ Ibid., p. 40.

¹⁴ Ibid..

That this House recognizes the pivotal role that NATO continues to play in mutual security and defence and in further progress in arms control and disarmament and, therefore, reaffirms its commitment to continued Canadian participation in and active support for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a primary instrument of Canadian defence policy.¹⁵

Mr. Hopkins then proceeded to criticize the Government's defence policy in broad terms.

Responding to the motion, Associate Minister for National Defence Mr. Paul Dick remarked that, while he would like to support the motion, failure of the Liberal Member to speak to its substance prevented him from doing so.¹⁶

NDP Member Derek Blackburn opposed the motion on different grounds. He stated:

Unfortunately, NATO has failed to date to come to grips with the issue of arms control and disarmament. It has pursued consistently aggressive, deep strike policies. That is not what the world wants. The world does not want the superpowers to be backed up by their two treaty organizations egging them on, pushing them on to greater sophistication in the means of destruction they have at their command. What we need, and what we can do for ourselves, is to pursue the defence of North America in conventional terms....¹⁷

The debate on the motion also gave rise to criticism of the Government's

¹⁵ Commons Debates, 4 March 1988, pp. 13400-01.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 13405.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 13427.

policy on NATO by Liberal Member Andre Ouellet. Mr. Ouellet stated:

It should... be emphasized that two different concepts of NATO are involved here: the militaristic approach of the Tory Government, and the peaceful and responsible approach of the Liberal Party. The Government has insisted on the need for a strong Canada that is capable of defending itself. We agree but the Liberal Party recognizes that in the world today, a defence policy based on defence, not on offence, is a legitimate part of a comprehensive approach. We feel that as a member of NATO, Canada should continue to do its fair share but also continue to express its views on peace in a multilateral context.¹⁸

In April 1988, after conducting a review of its defence policy, the NDP released a report entitled "Canada's Stake in Common Security." The report qualified the proposal for Canadian withdrawal from NATO presented in the Party's July 1987 policy paper on defence by stipulating that an NDP Government would not undertake such action during its first term in office.¹⁹

The NATO-Warsaw Pact conventional military balance was also the object of comment in the House. On 21 September 1987, in the wake of the news regarding the possibility of a superpower agreement on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF), Conservative Member Reginald Stackhouse asked Minister of National Defence Perrin Beatty:

Will the Minister advise the House what consideration NATO members are giving to closing the conventional arms gap between the Warsaw

¹⁸ Ibid., p.13431.

¹⁹ Canada's Stake in Common Security, Report by the International Affairs Committee of the New Democratic Party of Canada, 16 April 1988.

Pact and NATO?²⁰

Mr. Beatty replied that the INF agreement--although very significant--did not deal with other areas of concern in the NATO-Warsaw Pact balance. In his words:

...left untouched were a number of important areas, such as conventional imbalances between East and West where the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact maintain an advantage of two or three to one at the present time in chemical weapons and a range of other areas. We are hopeful that progress can be made in these areas.²¹

Mr. Stackhouse referred to the NATO-Warsaw Pact military balance again on 23 February 1988, observing that the task of redressing the current imbalance of conventional weapons in Europe was a top priority for the Canadian Government and for NATO as a whole.²²

On 4 March 1988, Liberal MP Len Hopkins referred to the state of the European military balance in introducing a motion reaffirming Canadian support for, and participation in, NATO:

The Soviet nuclear and conventional power is strong, and European free countries cannot deal with it alone. As the nuclear threat is reduced, so must the conventional arms threat be reduced. Certain elements of the Armed Forces in the Warsaw Pact outnumber NATO forces by three to one. Therefore we cannot remove the nuclear protection while leaving the European continent at the mercy of an overdose of conventional power.²³

²⁰ Commons Debates, 21 September 1987, p. 9140.

²¹ Ibid..

²² Commons Debates, 23 February 1988, p. 13069.

²³ Commons Debates, 4 March 1988, p. 13401.

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23. PEACEKEEPING AND OBSERVATION

Background

Peacekeeping may be defined as the employment, under the auspices of a recognized international authority, of military, para-military or non-military personnel or forces in an area of conflict, for the purpose of restoring or maintaining the peace. The purpose of peacekeeping is to enable the parties to disengage and to give them confidence that their differences can be settled by negotiation. While peacekeeping operations are concerned mainly with supervision and control, observer missions are smaller in scope and limited to the monitoring and reporting of any cease-fire violations.

In light of the inability of the Security Council to use the enforcement measures granted to it by the UN Charter, the UN continues to sponsor peacekeeping operations to maintain international peace and security. A number of observer missions were created in the late 1940s along the India-Pakistan border and in the Middle East following the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. In 1950 the General Assembly adopted the "Uniting for Peace" resolution granting it the authority to recommend specific measures deemed necessary to maintain international peace. That same year, following the outbreak of hostilities between North and South Korea, a Security Council resolution sponsored by the United States in the absence of the Soviet Union led to the creation of a unified military command to counter the North Korean offensive. However, this action was unprecedented and has never been repeated. The first large-scale UN peacekeeping operation was the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), established to supervise the cease-fire following the 1956 Suez crisis. Since that time the UN has fielded ten other peacekeeping and observation missions in the Congo, Cyprus, the Middle

East and Indonesia.

In addition to participating in all UN peacekeeping missions, Canada has also contributed to five non-UN operations: the International Commission for Supervision and Control, created in 1954 to oversee the cease-fire in Indochina; its successor, the International Commission for Control and Supervision, established in 1973; the Observer Team to Nigeria, created to supervise the 1968 elections; the Commonwealth Monitoring Force, established in 1979 to observe the elections in Zimbabwe; and the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai, responsible for overseeing the application of the 1979 peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. One hundred and forty Canadians, committed to this task since March 1986, provide the MFO with air transportation by helicopter for both troops and civilian observers.

Canada currently participates in three UN peacekeeping operations. One of these is the UN Disengagement Force (UNDOF) which monitors and supervises the cease-fire between Israel and Syria along the Golan Heights. Two hundred and twenty Canadians provide logistics, communications and other technical services. In addition, since 1954 Canada has contributed 22 officers to the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), a permanent mission created in 1948 to monitor and maintain the cease-fire ordered by the Security Council and to supervise the General Armistice Agreements between Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and Israel. Canada also participates in the UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), established in 1964 following the outbreak of hostilities between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The 575-member Canadian contingent is responsible for policing the cease-fire and resolving disputes between the opposing factions in a sector containing the capital, Nicosia. The mission is financed through voluntary contributions by UN members, although in reality the troop-contributing countries bear the major portion of the cost before being reimbursed for their expenses. Canada is also active in the UN Military Observer Group for India and Pakistan

(UNMOGIP), supplying the air transportation required for rotating the Group's headquarters on a periodic basis between Srinagar and Rawalpindi. In addition, a Canadian attaché is posted to the UN Command Military Armistice Commission in Korea. Finally, Canada is also participating in the UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP), created in May 1988 to oversee the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

Nine hundred and sixty-two members of the Canadian Armed Forces were posted at various points around the world in 1988. The Government of Canada does not consider peacekeeping to be an end in itself, but rather that it is important to create an environment in which solutions to conflict may be found. The Government sees peacekeeping as an interim measure in the resolution of regional conflict and is continuing to call for effective multilateral financing of operations to ease the burden on troop-contributing countries, especially with regard to the UNFICYP. The Defence White Paper tabled in the summer of 1987 outlined the criteria the Government uses to determine whether it should participate in peacekeeping operations:

The Government's decision will be based upon the following criteria: whether there is a clear and enforceable mandate; whether the principal antagonists agree to a ceasefire and to Canada's participation in the operation; whether the arrangements are, in fact, likely to serve the cause of peace and lead to a political settlement in the long term; whether the size and international composition of the force are appropriate to the mandate and will not damage Canada's relations with other states; whether Canadian participation will jeopardize other commitments; whether there is a single identifiable authority competent to support the operation and influence the disputants; and whether participation is adequately and equitably

funded and logistically supported.¹

Within the UN itself there is disagreement on a number of issues concerning peacekeeping operations, such as the effectiveness of peacekeeping, support for non-UN operations, the use of force by UN peacekeepers and the financing of UN missions. The question of financing is particularly contentious; some countries refuse to pay for any operation not established by the Security Council, while others fail to make payments on time. Consequently, some UN peacekeeping operations are incurring large deficits, and troop-contributing countries have generally borne most of the financial burden.

Current Canadian Position

New events since the tabling of the Defence White Paper have reinforced Canada's commitment as a peacekeeper. First, Canada's relations with the Central American countries took on a new dimension following their signature of the Arias Peace Plan in August 1987. Canada again made offers of assistance, this following up on previous indications that it would be willing to participate in control and verification operations should a pact be reached.² In a newspaper article in the 17 November 1987 edition of the Ottawa Citizen, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark repeated Canada's willingness to provide practical help with the implementation of the Plan, indicating that this assistance could take the form of help with peacekeeping procedures and with the security mechanisms that would be needed as a cease-fire, an amnesty and the suspension of outside military

¹ DND, Challenge and Commitment, 5 June 1987, p. 24.

² See especially: DEA, Communiqué No. 154, 10 August 1987.

aid were implemented.³ In recent years Canada has provided Central American governments with information on peacekeeping operations and the problems surrounding verification of peace plans in a regional context. In April 1988, the five signing countries (Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and Costa Rica) requested that Canada, Spain and West Germany be responsible for determining the mechanisms required to establish a peacekeeping force, but as yet no formal invitation has been extended. The entire process continues to be shrouded in uncertainty: the Central American countries are slow in respecting the terms of the agreement and may not be willing to grant the required authority to the three proposed peacekeeping countries.

With the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan beginning in May 1988, Canada has undertaken new commitments in the area of international observer missions. Five Canadian officers are members of the UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP), consisting of 50 observers from 10 countries and responsible for overseeing the implementation of the Geneva accord signed on 14 April 1988. Canada has not, however, committed itself to participating in any peacekeeping operation in Afghanistan. Should the need arise, UN forces would occupy a position between the Communist regime in Kabul and the numerous Muslim groups that have yet to cease their fighting. Certain criteria must be satisfied before Canada will participate in such an operation: the antagonists must agree to a ceasefire, accept the terms of the Geneva accord and request the UN to oversee an end to the hostilities. Finally, the UNGOMAP operation will set a precedent in that for the first time the Soviet Union is accepting UN intervention in a conflict in which the Soviet Union is itself involved.

³ Clark, Joe, "Canada hopes it can help Central America find peace", Ottawa Citizen, 17 November 1987.

Parliamentary Comment

Some members of the House of Commons expressed their points of view on the signing of the Arias Peace Plan and Canada's offer of technical assistance to put the Plan into effect. NDP member Pauline Jewett supported Canadian participation in the Central American peace process and asked External Affairs Minister Joe Clark if he was "now prepared to consider increasing Canada's permanent diplomatic presence in the region, up to and including establishing an embassy in Managua?". Mr. Clark responded that he was not prepared to do so at that time.⁴

Two other NDP members, Jim Manly and Bill Blaikie, stated that it was important that the Government of Canada condemn the funding of the Contras by the United States, claiming that the funding constituted a major obstacle to the peace process in Central America.⁵

On 2 December 1987, Joe Clark reported to the House of Commons on his recent trip to Central America. He spoke of the "complexities of the region", including the deep suspicion among the Governments of the signing countries, "which are complicated further by the extension to Central America of the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union". Stressing the "practical challenges of designing and operating verification and peacekeeping mechanisms", Mr. Clark indicated that "Canadian expertise would be available for all or part of that work, if the five Presidents agreed unanimously that they wanted Canadian help."⁶

4 Commons Debates, 12 and 17 August 1987, pp. 7971 and 8118.

5 Commons Debates, 1 and 15 October 1987, pp. 9580 and 9991.

6 Commons Debates, 2 December 1987, pp. 11410 and 11411.

Finally, Canada's participation in the UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan gave rise to opposing reactions on the part of two Conservative MPs. While Dave Nickerson saw the UN request as "a tribute to the professionalism and experience of our Armed Forces",⁷ fellow MP William C. Winegard stated: "I cannot think of a more dangerous role for our armed forces to play than to be on site in Afghanistan before a complete cease-fire has been negotiated."⁸

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⁷ Commons Debates, 2 May 1988, p. 15010.

⁸ Commons Debates, 19 April 1988, p. 14611.

SECTION III - CONFLICT RESOLUTION

24. CENTRAL AMERICA

Background

No military solution to the conflicts raging in Central America appeared likely in 1987 and 1988; in each of the civil wars, neither the government forces nor the rebel groups were able to win a decisive victory. Only the contras, waging an armed struggle against Nicaragua's Sandinista government with military and logistical support from the United States, conducted major military operations in 1987, primarily in the central regions and on the Atlantic coast, which intensified the Nicaraguan conflict.

The Central American Peace Plan proposed by Costa Rican President Oscar Arias Sanchez, which earned him the Nobel Peace Prize, was the highlight of 1987. This was the first time leaders of the five Central American countries--Costa Rica, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras--agreed in principle to comply with a process aimed at bringing peace to the region. After several months of negotiations, the "Arias Plan" was signed on 7 August 1987 by the five presidents, at Esquipulas, Guatemala. The plan essentially requires a national reconciliation with opponents, a cease-fire within the existing constitutional framework, democratization in each country, efforts to halt foreign aid to insurgents, a commitment to provide no assistance to groups aimed at destabilizing other governments, free and democratic elections, measures to help refugees return home and joint efforts to guarantee obtention of international

economic aid.

Implementation and verification of the planned measures are obviously the main obstacles facing the signatories, as was evident at the summit held in San José, Costa Rica on 15 and 16 January 1988. The progress achieved in democratization has been quite small, despite certain steps in this direction by Managua. In brief, the Peace Plan is far from achieving all of its objectives. Talks between the governments of Guatemala and El Salvador and their respective opponents to negotiate a cease-fire have yet to produce serious results. However, after intermittent negotiations between the Sandinista government and guerilla representatives, and after the United States Congress decided in February 1988 to suspend military aid to the contras, the parties agreed on 24 March 1988 to observe a 60-day truce. Peace talks between the Sandinistas and contras have continued since; the guerilla representatives have demanded political changes such as greater freedom as a condition for stopping the war.

Canada has always openly supported peace efforts in Central America, particularly those of the Contadora group. Although it has never publicly condemned US activities in Central America, the Canadian government has voiced opposition to third-party intervention in the region.¹ At the 41st and 42nd sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, Canada voted in favour of a resolution urging the United States to comply with the June 1986 ruling of the World Court that US military aid to the contras violated international law, and that Washington should definitely cease these actions. Ottawa has often given Central American governments information on peace-keeping operations and the problems that may arise from verification of regional agreements aimed at ending hostilities. Canadian economic aid in the region is another important

¹ DEA, Statements and Speeches, 15 September 1986.

aspect of Ottawa's policy toward Central American countries (Honduras is the main recipient).

Current Canadian Position

Canada has repeatedly shown its support for the Central American Peace Plan. Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark has indicated that if asked, Canada might agree to take part in control and verification of an accord. Since the Peace Plan was signed by the Central American leaders, Ottawa has increased its offers of assistance, as reflected in a passage from a speech delivered by Mr. Clark on 22 September 1987 to the 42nd session of the United Nations General Assembly. He mentioned that:

Canada supports the initiatives of the Central American presidents. We are prepared to provide our expertise mechanisms which, once peace is possible, can help it endure. The disputes must be resolved by those actually involved in the conflict, but Canada is prepared to contribute to that process in any direct and practical way open to us.²

When the Secretary of State for External Affairs visited Central America in November, representatives of private development aid organizations openly denounced the Canadian Government's attitude in the region as too closely linked to the US position. They also criticized Canadian aid to Nicaragua as inadequate. Mr. Clark's visit followed an announcement a few days earlier that Canada would resume bilateral economic aid to

² DEA, Statements 87/49, 22 September 1987. See also the News Release(s) of 10 and 16 August 1987, published by DEA.

Guatemala, after a six-year interruption.

Upon returning to Canada, Mr. Clark addressed the House of Commons on 2 December on the Central American peace process. In reporting on his tour of the region, Mr. Clark noted that general conditions of unanimity and authority are required if Canada is to participate in any peace-keeping operation. He also voiced his opposition to the idea that because of the special circumstances in Central America, Canada must abandon the principle of not using its aid for political purposes, since Canadian aid "has been designed to help the poorest, to help the most needy." Turning to the program of bilateral aid to Guatemala, Mr. Clark stated his belief that sufficient progress had been made in the area of human rights under the democratically elected government of President Cerezo to justify a resumption of aid. On the issue of whether Canada's Central American policy should be more oriented toward public criticism of US aid to the contras, Mr. Clark said that:

I believe that such a policy would reduce, and not increase, whatever real influence we might have in Washington on this question. It could, in addition, impede our ability to play other, more active roles in support of the peace plan. The five Governments of Central America are in no doubt about the difference between Canadian and US policy, and our conduct should be guided by what makes us most effective in Central America itself.

In closing, Mr. Clark noted that,

The real issue in Central America is not Marxism, nor is it death squads, nor even is it the abuse of human rights. Those are symptoms. The root problems are economic and social, and Central America needs peace to resolve them.³

In March 1988, after Nicaraguan troops crossed into Honduran territory and after additional US troops were despatched to Honduras, Mr. Clark expressed his concern over these developments. After noting that the presence of US forces only served to increase tensions, he called on "all parties to the dispute to settle their differences at the bargaining table rather than on the battlefield."⁴

The Special Committee on the Central American Peace Process published its first report in July 1988, after completing a tour of the region. This Committee, composed of five Members of Parliament, was formed to study how Canada could play a constructive role in the Central American peace process. The report contains recommendations on verification of a cease-fire agreement, human rights, economic aid and consolidation of Canada's diplomatic presence in the region. The Committee believes Canada should help mobilize the international community to support peace, democracy and development in the region.

Parliamentary Comment

The Canadian Government's failure to formally condemn US aid to the contras has drawn frequent criticism in the House of Commons since the

³ Commons Debates, 2 December 1987, pp. 11409 to 11413.

⁴ DEA, News Release No. 063, 18 March 1988.

summer of 1987. Some MPs have also called for a more active Canadian diplomatic presence in Central America, to encourage the peace process in this region, and increased Canadian aid to Nicaragua has been suggested as well.

Following Mr. Clark's statement on Central America in the House on 2 December 1987, Lloyd Axworthy (Lib.) and Bill Blaikie (NDP) voiced their reactions. Mr. Axworthy disagreed with the analysis of the Secretary of State for External Affairs that Central America's problems were primarily economic and social. According to Mr. Axworthy, "the problem has been the sense of imperialism, colonialism, or domination under which they have lived." The Liberal Member also deplored the fact that we still have no "policy as to how Canada will organize its various economic, diplomatic and political initiatives to meet the historic significance and the historic challenge that greets us in that region of the world." He added that Canada should denounce US aid to the contras and tell the United States to lift its economic embargo on Nicaragua. Finally, Mr. Axworthy agreed that Canada should take the initiative and proceed with reconstruction plans for Central America.⁵

NDP Member Bill Blaikie termed Mr. Clark's analysis of superpower relations and Canadian interests in Central America timid. He argued that the Minister should have "had some sharp words of protest to register against the attacks on Canadians and Canadian-sponsored projects," which, he added, were perpetrated by people with US support. Mr. Blaikie also rejected the claim that both superpowers have identical commitments in the region, and noted that in Mr. Clark's statement, "with respect to burden of proof, [...] a much harder case is made against Nicaragua than some of the other countries." In his view, this reveals

⁵ Commons Debates, 2 December 1987, pp. 11413 to 11415.

"an over-all willingness to be critical of those elements in Central America which might irritate the Americans." Finally, Mr. Blaikie noted that resumption of aid to Guatemala constituted "a political act" that would have political repercussions regardless of what Mr. Clark said.⁶

On 3 February 1988, just as the United States Congress was voting on the issue of contra funding, Bill Blaikie asked Prime Minister Brian Mulroney if he would inform the Congress of his objection to continuing aid. Mr. Mulroney replied:

...is the Member of the NDP actually suggesting that we as a Parliament insinuate ourselves into the deliberative rights of another sovereign parliamentary body? The Parliament of Canada would react very strongly if anybody tried to tell us what to do. I am offended by the suggestion of the NDP that we impose our will, or seek to, on the Congress of the United States.⁷

On 21 March, in reply to a question from MP Bill Blaikie on whether the Canadian Government would criticize the deployment of US troops in Honduras, Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark explained:

If you are interested in peace in Central America, we can work towards peace. If you are interested in simply attacking the United States on every opportunity, you can do that too, but that will not move peace forward.⁸

On 25 March, following the announcement of a truce in Nicaragua, NDP Member Jim Manly questioned Mr. Clark on the possibility of setting up a

⁶ Ibid., pp. 11415 to 11417.

⁷ Commons Debates, 3 February 1988, p. 12580.

⁸ Commons Debates, 21 March 1988, p. 13957.

special development aid program for this country. Mr. Clark first pointed out that the Arias Plan covered all five countries in the region, not just Nicaragua, and that it was also important to settle the other conflicts in the region. He then noted that Canada would be willing to take steps to promote development, but that he preferred "to do that in the region as a whole as a result of the Arias Plan."⁹

On 5 May, MP Jim Manly again asked Mr. Clark whether Canada was willing, as part of its participation in the peace process, to contribute to a reconciliation fund designed to promote the repatriation of thousands of Nicaraguans now living inside Honduras, as recommended by a peace mission that had just returned to Canada. Mr. Clark explained that he had not yet had an opportunity to study this mission's report, but that he did intend to do so.¹⁰

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⁹ Commons Debates, 25 March 1988, p. 14140.

¹⁰ Commons Debates, 5 May 1988, p. 15168.

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25. THE MIDDLE EAST

Background

Since 1987 important changes in the Middle East have put increasing pressure on the moderate Arab states, Sunni Moslem for the most part, to reconsider certain aspects of their foreign policy. For instance, at a time when the Iran-Iraq conflict is in danger of spreading, the Arab monarchies of the Gulf are experiencing a growing need to re-evaluate the Iranian threat. Moreover, Israel's repeated incursions into south Lebanon and the measures it has taken to crush the Palestinian uprising in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, which began at the end of 1987, have left a number of observers skeptical as to the holding of an International Conference on the Arab-Israeli conflict, currently under study.

The Arab League Summit held in Amman, Jordan, from 8 to 11 November 1987, was an important event. In contrast to preceding years when the Arab-Israeli conflict was the major point of discussion, the Amman summit concentrated on the Iran-Iraq war, with special emphasis on the Iranian threat to security in the Persian Gulf. A number of Arab countries decided to re-establish diplomatic ties with Egypt, which had been isolated from the Arab world following the Camp David Accord in 1979. In fact, the summit reflected a different attitude on the part of Arab moderates who, faced with new conditions resulting from strategic changes, decided to adopt a new order of priority.

Iran-Iraq

Since 1987 the fighting between Iran and Iraq has largely been

concentrated in the southern area near the border. Bombing raids against civilian targets and attacks against oil tankers in the Gulf increased, while Iraq made repeated use of chemical weapons against the Iranian population. As a result of the escalation in the naval war, the United States and five other Western countries deployed air-sea forces in the Persian Gulf to insure, according to Washington, the free passage of merchant shipping. These operations led to a number of clashes between American and Iranian forces. The most tragic event occurred on 3 July 1988 when a U.S. warship shot down a civilian Iranian airliner over the Gulf, killing all 290 people on board. Lastly, Iran finally accepted UN Security Council Resolution 598, adopted in July 1987 and calling for a ceasefire, the withdrawal of the opposing forces to international boundaries, an exchange of prisoners and the commencement of peace talks. Iran's decision to accept the resolution and observe an eventual ceasefire came after it had suffered major military setbacks.

Lebanon

The year 1987 in Lebanon was marked by violent fighting between the Palestinians and the Amal Shiite Moslem militia group, which during the year broke off its attacks against certain Palestinian camps in West Beirut, and by the war in the south opposing the Hezbollah Shiite group and the south Lebanese Army, supported by Israel. In February 1987, Syrian troops entered Lebanon and now occupy more than a third of the country. The Syrian intervention generated a temporary easing of tension between the various factions. In 1988, there has been intense fighting south of Beirut between the Amal militia, supported by Syria, and the Hezbollah group, backed by Iran. Syrian and Iranian representatives met in May in an effort to negotiate a ceasefire.

Israel and the Occupied Territories

The Palestinian uprising in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the resulting military intervention by Israel hold an important regional dimension, as attention is once again being focused on the Palestinian question and the future of the territories occupied by Israel since 1967. In January 1988, UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar published a report strongly urging the international community to persuade Israel to respect the Fourth Geneva Convention in the occupied territories. Among the Arab nations, Egypt and Jordan were careful not to impose political or economic sanctions against Israel. The use of violent counteroffensive measures by the Israeli army was the subject of heated debate within Israel itself. At the beginning of 1988, American Secretary of State George Shultz travelled to Syria, Jordan and Israel on a negotiation mission to present a plan for a political solution to the issue of Palestinian autonomy in the occupied territories. In April, PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat and Syrian President Hafez al Assad met in Damascus to discuss a number of issues, including the problems in the occupied territories. Both leaders rejected the Shultz peace plan.

Current Canadian Position

Canada has always insisted on the importance of reaching a negotiated settlement to the Iran-Iraq conflict and supported Security Council Resolution 598, adopted on 20 July 1987. In recent years Canada has condemned the attacks on cities, the use of chemical weapons and the harsh treatment of prisoners of war. In a speech given at the 42nd session of the UN General Assembly, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark referred briefly to the war between Iran and Iraq. Among his statements was that " (...) Security Council Resolution 598 reflects welcome

political will and unanimity in the Security Council, and the Secretary-General is to be commended for his patient, persistent mediation. The Secretary-General's mission was not as successful as we all had hoped (...). (...) Canada would fully support the implementation of the axiomatic second half of Resolution 598, the application of sanctions."¹

Following the U.S. attack against two Iranian oil drilling platforms in the Persian Gulf in April 1988, a Department of External Affairs news release stated that "(...) Canada fully supports the efforts of our allies to protect international shipping and freedom of navigation in the Gulf. The information available to us indicates that the U.S. action (...) was fully warranted in support of this objective."²

On 18 July, Canada and Iran agreed to resume normal diplomatic relations, undertaking to exchange ambassadors. The Government of Canada wished to emphasize "that this development, which it welcomes, reflects the significance it attaches to relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran, a nation of major importance in the Middle East, in view of the consequences of the Islamic Revolution and Iran's strategic position and role on the international scene."³ Ottawa had closed its embassy in Tehran in 1980.

With respect to Lebanon, Canada has repeatedly supported calls for its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Ottawa did, however, transfer its embassy to Damascus, Syria, in July 1985 to insure the safety of its diplomatic personnel. Despite pressure exerted by

¹ SSEA, Statement 87/49, New York, 22 September 1987.

² DEA News Release, No. 089, 18 April 1988.

³ DEA News Release, No. 152, 18 July 1988.

Lebanese authorities and Canadians of Lebanese descent, the Secretary of State for External Affairs remains steadfast in his refusal to reopen the Canadian mission in Lebanon until an acceptable level of security can be guaranteed. In February 1988, External Relations Minister Monique Landry announced a five million dollar payment to the UN Disaster Relief Office (UNDRO). The money will be used for aid to Lebanon.

As to the Arab-Israeli conflict, on 4 October 1987, Joe Clark gave a speech at a dinner in honour of Saudi Arabian Foreign Affairs Minister Prince Saud Al Faisal Al Saud. During his remarks Mr. Clark stated:

Although our two countries might not agree on the details of an approach to a solution, it must be emphasized that both Canada and Saudi Arabia are committed to policies which would guarantee the right of all nations in the region to live at peace within secure and recognized boundaries. We also support a homeland for the Palestinians within a clearly defined territory, the West Bank and Gaza Strip. (...) Canada will continue to support wholeheartedly the leaders of those countries who are committed to the search for peace with honour, and who are prepared to take the risks required to achieve a just and lasting settlement.⁴

On 2 December 1987, Charles V. Svoboda, member of the Canadian delegation to the 42nd session of the UN General Assembly, explained Canada's voting rationale on the resolutions regarding the Palestinian question. The delegation abstained "on the resolution contained in document L.34 concerning the Division for Palestinian Rights. (The Canadian delegation had adhered to) a negative vote on similar resolutions in past years (...)." According to Mr. Svoboda, this change in position reflects a "concern for the tragic plight of the Palestinian people" and demonstrates the Canadian delegation's understanding and sympathy for the

⁴ DEA Statement, 87/53, Ottawa, 4 October 1987.

individual and collective rights of the Palestinian people. Mr. Svoboda went on to state that:

As regards the PLO itself, we once again wish to recall that, while we do not recognize the organization as the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people we do see it as an important element in Palestinian opinion. As such, we value effective communications with the PLO.

With respect to the draft resolution calling for the holding of an international peace conference on the Middle East (L.40), the Canadian delegation again abstained, most notably because of its reservations "about certain of the provisions of resolution 38/58C which is again referred to, and which in our view prejudices the outcome of negotiations." Among other concerns, the delegation had some concrete reservations as to the impartiality and effectiveness of a Preparatory Committee that was the fruit of Security Council negotiations, given that two of the permanent members had either broken off or never established diplomatic relations with one of the states directly involved. Mr. Svoboda also indicated that Canada does not believe that an international conference is a substitute for direct talks between the parties to the dispute.⁵

On 27 January 1988, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark

welcomed the UN Secretary General's analysis of the situation in the occupied territories, expressed appreciation for the realistic and practicable measures for the safety of their population and for the report's emphasis on the need to find a political solution to the current situation.

⁵ News Release, No. 56, Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations, 2 December 1987.

He added that

Canada would be prepared to join with other contracting parties to (the Geneva) Convention in an appeal to the Government of Israel to apply its provisions to the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Violations of the Geneva Convention, including human rights abuses and settlements, are unacceptable and damaging to the peace process.⁶

The legislation passed by the U.S. Congress in 1987 to force the closure of the Palestine Liberation Organization's (PLO) observer mission in New York was opposed by Canada, Ottawa considering the law to be contrary to the United States' obligations under the Headquarters Agreement. In a statement made to the UN on 29 February 1988, Stephen Lewis, Canada's ambassador and permanent representative to the United Nations, noted that "the host government is under a legal obligation to allow the PLO to maintain its United Nations office." Speaking on behalf of the Governments of Australia, New Zealand and Canada, Mr. Lewis indicated that "if it proves necessary, the procedure for dispute settlement, set out in the Headquarters Agreement between the UN and the host government could be utilized."⁷

Finally, a speech on 10 March 1988 by External Affairs Minister Joe Clark to the Annual Conference of the Canada-Israel Committee gave rise to a good deal of controversy. Mr. Clark focused on the violence in the occupied territories and condemned the actions of Israeli forces against the Palestinians. He stated that the recent human rights violations in the West Bank and Gaza were totally unacceptable and, in many cases, illegal under international law. Mr. Clark went on to say that

⁶ DEA News Release, No. 029, 27 January 1988.

⁷ DEA News Release, No. 051, 29 February 1988.

(...) we call on Israel's political leaders to show vision, compassion and the strength to make the decisions required to ensure that Palestinians are treated more humanely (...). Finally, he observed: "Part of our concern about the situation in the occupied territories comes from the realization that it gives rise to intense positions that could pit Canadians against one another."⁸

Parliamentary Comment

The Iran-Iraq conflict has been the subject of a number of comments in the House of Commons since the end of summer 1987. On 20 October 1987, Conservative MP Bob Corbett asked Joe Clark what role Canada would be assuming to help bring a swift end to the Iran-Iraq war. Mr. Clark responded:

The most effective role that Canada can continue to play is to continue to urge the members of the Security Council of the United Nations and, most important, the Secretary General, to work toward the implementation of Security Council Resolution 598.⁹

On 21 January 1988, Liberal MP Aideen Nicholson spoke out on the effects of the Iran-Iraq war on the civilian populations. She observed:

Every effort must be made internationally to stop the sale of arms to Iran and to use all peaceful means to bring an end to

⁸ DEA Statement, 88/18, Ottawa, 10 March 1988.

⁹ Commons Debates, 20 October 1987, p. 10187.

this tragic situation.¹⁰

On 22 March, following fresh allegations concerning the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq struggle, Joe Clark called for a UN-conducted investigation.¹¹ On 25 March, Liberal MP Andre Ouellet asked Mr. Clark what he had done to convey Canada's disapproval of the use of chemical weapons in the Gulf. The Secretary of State for External Affairs replied that

...yesterday we called the Iraqi ambassador to express serious concern and disapproval with respect to action related to the use of chemical weapons by Iraq. We also told the Iranian Government about our contact with Iraq. We did raise the issue at the United Nations. The Iraqi signed the United Nations protocol and can be expected to honour their commitment.¹²

On 25 March, NDP Member Bill Blaikie questioned Mr. Clark on what measures he was planning to take to condemn Iraq's use of chemical weapons in the Kurdistan region and to bring the two sides to agree to a ceasefire. Mr. Clark stated: "We have made the strongest possible representations to the Ambassador of Iraq and will be following these up through other channels." Mr. Blaikie continued, emphasizing:

One of the opportunities the Minister has (...) is to take a leading role in getting the world community to put (an) arms embargo on both (Iran and Iraq).

Mr. Clark agreed, but pointed out that the problem consisted not in

¹⁰ Commons Debates, 21 January 1988, p. 12142.

¹¹ Commons Debates, 22 March 1988, p. 14013.

¹² Commons Debates, 25 March 1988, p. 14133.

calling for an embargo but rather in implementing one.¹³

On 4 and 5 July, a number of MPs expressed their deep concern over the incident involving the shooting down of an Iranian civilian airliner by a U.S. warship. Liberal MP Chas. L. Caccia was critical of the "unwarranted presence in the Persian Gulf of the U.S. fleet engaged in a role that endangers more the seeking of peace in that region than it prevents war". NDP member Jim Manly was of a similar opinion and stated: "A common security framework for the Persian Gulf must be pursued, rather than mutually antagonistic military postures." For his part, Liberal MP Lloyd Axworthy asked Acting Prime Minister John Crosbie (International Trade Minister) if the Government intended to request an emergency session of the UN Security Council and a special meeting of ICAO to investigate the tragic incident. Mr. Crosbie replied:

We will take a position and exercise our responsibilities as members of ICAO or as members of the United Nations if and when the matter comes before either of those bodies. We will then support what seems to be the correct and best course of action to take in the interests of humanity and the interests of Canadians. (...) We are not a party immediately involved in this incident. We will do what is best for the international community of nations when this matter comes forward and is brought to the attention of these bodies by the countries immediately involved.¹⁴

The Arab-Israeli conflict, especially the uprising in the occupied territories, gave rise to a number of comments in the House. On 2 February 1988, NDP member Howard McCurdy asked the Prime Minister if he was willing "to use his good offices to expedite the holding of a (...) peace conference on the Middle East." Acting Secretary of State for

¹³ Commons Debates, 25 March 1988, pp. 14134 and 14135.

¹⁴ Commons Debates, 4 July 1988, pp. 17011, 17014, 17015 and 17016.

External Affairs Pat Carney reminded the House that Mr. Clark had stated that the Government was ready to examine how Canada could contribute to finding a solution acceptable to all parties involved. She added that "we already participate in the region through our peace-keeping forces and through development assistance."¹⁵

On 9 February, Liberal MP Sheila Finestone emphasized the need "for direct negotiations towards a peaceful resolution of the conflict" that is ravaging the West Bank and Gaza Strip. She completed her remarks by adding: "I urge all parties to refrain from further aggression and to work towards an environment in which a negotiated settlement can be found. The U.S. peace plan may be such a starting point."¹⁶

On 26 February, NDP member Bill Blaikie stated his hope that Israeli soldiers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip would soon put an end to their violent actions. He also underlined the fact that there "has not been a Canadian position elucidated with respect to many of the difficult questions which must be asked about (a peace) conference." International Trade Minister Pat Carney replied that the Secretary of State for External Affairs had stated Canada's position in the House of Commons on a number of occasions.¹⁷

On 14 March, Liberal MP Lloyd Axworthy wanted to know if the Prime Minister had approved of the final version of the External Affairs Minister's speech on the Middle East and if the speech expressed "explicitly (...) the position of the Prime Minister and his Government

¹⁵ Commons Debates, 2 February 1988, p. 12529.

¹⁶ Commons Debates, 9 February 1988, p. 12776.

¹⁷ Commons Debates, 26 February 1988, p. 13175.

on the (...) matters taking place in the Middle East?" Mr. Clark replied, asserting that the statements made to the Canada-Israel Committee did reflect the policy of the Government of Canada.¹⁸

The same day Conservative MP Reginald Stackhouse asked Mr. Clark if the Government had informed U.S. officials of its position on the Shultz peace plan. The Secretary of State for External Affairs stated:

Canada has expressed clearly and unequivocally our support for the initiatives being taken by the United States Secretary of State. As the House will know, they are based upon the principle of territorial compromise in accordance with Security Council Resolution 242. That requires movement by both sides.

To that end, among other initiatives in which we might have some influence, I have instructed Ambassadors for Canada in countries in the Middle East, and in countries that might have some influence upon Palestinians, to encourage Palestinian leaders vigorously to recognize formally and declare formally their acceptance of the independence and territorial integrity of the State of Israel.¹⁹

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¹⁸ Commons Debates, 14 March 1988, p. 13697.

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26. NORTH AFRICA

Background

Western Sahara

The conflict in Western Sahara persists despite feverish diplomatic activity by North African countries since 1987. The Saharan conflict, which has accounted for about 100,000 deaths since 1975, pits Morocco against the Polisario Front, supported by Algeria. Polisario members are demanding independence for Western Sahara, which has been occupied by Morocco since the end of Spanish colonial rule. The United Nations is still attempting to organize a referendum on the future of this territory, but although the parties to the conflict favour this initiative, they have placed various conditions on their participation. In 1987, a joint mission of the UN and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) visited Western Sahara and the bordering states in an attempt to find a political solution to the conflict, but failed to achieve any satisfactory results.

In the interim, Polisario guerillas have intensified assaults on Moroccan troops, and occasionally inflicted heavy damage. In April 1987, Morocco completed its sixth "wall of defence", a line of barbed wire fences linking a series of fortified positions, to prevent guerilla infiltrations. This wall, which is close to the border with Mauritania, led to protests by that country, which fears the conflict will spill over its border. Despite the withdrawal of its troops from Western Sahara in 1978 and its subsequent neutral stand, Mauritania is increasingly affected by rebel attacks.

On 4 May 1987, a tripartite summit of Morocco's King Hassan II, Algerian President Chadli Bendjedid and King Fahd of Saudi Arabia marked the start of ongoing talks between Algiers and Rabat, with a series of high level meetings. In March 1988, Algeria and Morocco resumed diplomatic relations, after a 12-year break caused by Algeria's decision in 1976 to recognize the Democratic Saharwi Arab Republic (DSAR) proclaimed by the Polisario Front. The thaw in relations, achieved with Tunisian assistance, nurtured hope for a settlement in the Saharan conflict, although no clear solution is yet in view.

Libya-Chad

Another serious conflict in North Africa has involved Libya and Chad since 1980, primarily due to Libyan military intervention in domestic strife in Chad. This war took a new turn in 1987 as Chad's government forces, with the support of most rebel factions in the country, won several victories over Colonel Qaddafi's forces. A series of offensives by Hissène Habré's troops north of the 16th parallel (a line drawn in 1983 by France, dividing the country into the Libyan controlled North and the Chad government controlled South) enabled N'Djamena to retake several major cities (such as Fada, Ouadi-Doum and Faya Largeau) while inflicting heavy losses on the enemy, which had to retreat toward the northern border. In August, government forces briefly captured the Aozou strip, a border region in northern Chad controlled by Libya but claimed by both countries, and even entered Libyan territory a short time later, reaching the Maatenes-Sara air-land base. In September, Kenneth Kaunda, President of Zambia and of the Organization of African Unity, mediated a cease-fire between the two sides. The dispute over the Aozou strip was then submitted to international arbitration.

Chad receives logistic and military assistance from France and the United

States. In 1987, it was learned that supplies from both countries to the Republic of Chad included Stinger anti-aircraft missiles. Approximately 1,200 French soldiers are stationed in Chad and are involved in such operations as air defence.

Despite Chad's victories, peace is still not in sight and sporadic battles continue, especially along the Sudanese border. N'Djamena suspects a Libyan offensive in eastern Chad due to the presence of Libyan troops in the Sudan. Tripoli will probably renew efforts to unite the various guerilla groups and resume fighting.

Current Canadian Position

Canada maintains an attitude of strict neutrality toward the situation in Western Sahara, opting for a policy of non-interference and non-indifference. Ottawa encourages the ongoing mediation efforts of United Nations Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar aimed at settling the conflict, and places great hope in the fact that all parties involved have proposed, either in the United Nations or elsewhere, that a referendum be held in Western Sahara. Two Canadians participated in the UN technical mission conducted in the fall of 1987 to gather the information needed to hold such a referendum.

Canada abstained from voting on the resolution concerning Western Sahara passed by the 41st and 42nd sessions of the United Nations General Assembly in 1986 and 1987. This resolution (93 for, 0 against and 50 abstentions at the 42nd session) called on the two parties, Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberacion de Saguia el-Hamra y de Rio de Oro (Polisario Front) to begin negotiations as soon as possible on a cease-fire that would create the necessary conditions for a referendum. In

explaining its abstention on both resolutions, Canada pointed out that "its neutrality should not be seen as a sign of indifference toward this deplorable situation." [translation] It also urged the parties involved "to continue to use every available means at their disposal to move as quickly as possible toward a solution that is mutually acceptable and enjoys the credibility of the international community." [translation]

Canada has no established policy on the Chad-Libya conflict.

Parliamentary Comment

The conflicts in North Africa have not been raised in the House of Commons since summer 1987.

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27. SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Background

While 1987 saw an intensification of the wars ravaging southern Africa, 1988 has been marked by the continuing search for a settlement to the armed conflicts by all parties involved, who seem to be in favour of negotiation. There are serious obstacles, however, which must be overcome.

It is possible that the diplomatic activity seen in the area since the beginning of 1988 has been the result of the absence of a clear military victory by any of the combatants and the extreme cost of the intervention by South Africa in a region stretching from the northern provinces of Mozambique, along the borders of Botswana and Zimbabwe, to the central Angolan plateau.

Angola and Namibia

At the centre of the talks was the war in Angola. The various parties in the area are faced with a new state of affairs, including the repeated negotiations between U.S. and Angolan officials on the withdrawal of Cuban troops stationed in Angola. In January 1988, Luanda accepted for the first time the principle of a complete withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola within the framework of a comprehensive settlement of the southern African conflict. A major component of this framework is the independence of currently South African-controlled Namibia. Other recent developments include the 3 and 4 May 1988 conference in London of U.S., South African, Cuban and Angolan representatives, direct talks between Angola and South Africa nine days later in Brazzaville and another

upcoming meeting of officials from the four countries. The London conference saw the South African delegation formally accept the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 435 on Namibia in exchange for the withdrawal of Cuban forces. Talk of any kind of peace formula leading to "national reconciliation" in Angola is, however, premature. In early June there was even speculation that the negotiations had reached an impasse, but the talks continued thanks to the efforts of American Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker. The major issues are the timetable for the withdrawal of Cuban troops, U.S. and South African military aid to the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) rebel group and the pullout of South African forces from Angola.

Although there is widespread speculation about a political settlement to the Angolan conflict, fighting continues. Despite intense clashes and the increased involvement of Cuban and South African troops in the battle for the key city of Cuito Cuanavale, which began following the large-scale, September 1987 offensive by Angolan forces against UNITA rebels in the southeast, there has been no clearcut victory by any side. It must be pointed out that Angola is now much better equipped with sophisticated radar systems, surface-to-air missile batteries and advanced Soviet fighters.

Mozambique

With Mozambique being involved in a struggle with the South African-backed Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) rebel group since 1975, the political and economic situation continues to be a cause for great concern given the immense number of victims of the war and successive famines. Despite the assistance of troops from both Zimbabwe (10,000 soldiers) and Tanzania, the Mozambique Government controls only the

cities, while roughly 20,000 rebels command the rural areas. Moreover, Zimbabwe is becoming increasingly alarmed at the spreading of the conflict into its territory. As well, since 1987 a number of Western countries have sided with the nations in the region and increased their economic and military assistance to the Chissano Government. With regard to military operations, RENAMO suffered a major defeat in March 1987 when it was forced to withdraw from the Zambezi River valley, thereby losing its control over the area.

South Africa

The chances of political change in South Africa are slight. The May 1987 parliamentary elections saw President Botha's National Party returned to power with fifty-four per cent of votes cast, which means a comfortable seventy-four per cent majority. Opposed to any kind of racial reform, the Conservative Party now forms the official opposition, having increased the number of seats held from seventeen to twenty-two. Despite strikes by black workers in some industrial sectors, the spontaneous uprisings in the townships of 1985 and 1986 have tapered off since 1987 owing to the Botha Government's declaration of a state of emergency and adoption of even more restrictive measures. Clashes between the Pretoria Government and the African National Congress (ANC) continued.

Ethiopia - Somalia

In April 1987, Ethiopia and Somalia resumed negotiations toward a settlement of their dispute over Ogaden, the territory at the root of the 1977-1978 Somali-Ethiopian war. Talks were held despite a border attack by Ethiopian troops in February. In April 1988, both countries agreed to resume diplomatic relations, withdraw their troops from the border area and curb subversive activities against each other.

Current Canadian Position

Canada has attempted to assist those countries affected by the conflicts in southern Africa. One example of this is Ottawa's acceptance in 1977 to be a member of the Contact Group, a body comprising five Western countries and established by the UN to find a solution to the problem of the South African occupation of Namibia. In addition, Canada annually provides roughly 140 million dollars in economic aid, chiefly through the South African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC), to front-line states such as Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Angola. The SADCC is composed of "a regional organization of nine southern African states committed to accelerated economic development and reduced dependence on South Africa through increased regional integration and self-reliance."¹ While Canada gives assistance to the front-line states and helps them ensure their security, Ottawa refuses to provide any direct military support. Finally, since 1961, when the Diefenbaker Government declared its opposition to apartheid, Canada has repeatedly condemned South Africa for its racist policies and has gradually, especially since 1985, imposed limited economic sanctions against Pretoria (see the 1986-1987 Guide).

Since the summer of 1987, Canada has received visits from Oliver Tambo, President of the ANC, and Reverend Allan Boesak, President of the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the World Alliance of Reformed Churches. Canada also hosted the October 1987 Commonwealth Conference in Vancouver, where once again much of the discussion was focussed on South Africa.

¹ Intervention of Pierre Blais, Minister of State (Agriculture), Commons Debates, 19 October 1987, p. 10160.

In a 22 September 1987 speech at the 42nd session of the UN General Assembly, Joe Clark asserted that the sanctions imposed against Pretoria had been effective from both an economic and psychological point of view. By introducing additional restrictions on individual rights, Pretoria has fostered a greater mobilization of South Africans intent on obtaining reforms. Mr. Clark also stated:

We are at a critical stage in the campaign to end apartheid. (...) The pressure against apartheid must continue and increase, and the challenge, in the United Nations and elsewhere, is to find peaceful and effective means to build that pressure. It is not enough to ask others to act.²

The same ideas are found in the final communiqué from the Vancouver Commonwealth Conference. The document also refers to reinforcing the efforts of the front-line states to counter the South African policies of destabilization and destruction³, as well as increasing in various ways the assistance provided to victims of apartheid in South Africa. To achieve these objectives, the Commonwealth heads of state established a special committee of eight foreign affairs ministers to be chaired by Mr. Clark.

In a 10 November 1987 news release, Mr. Clark "called on the Government of the Republic of South Africa to act quickly to release political prisoners who remain in detention for opposing apartheid". He also called for an end to the state of emergency.⁴

² Statements and Speeches, DEA, 22 September 1987.

³ Communiqué, The Okanagan Statement on Southern Africa and Programme of Action, Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, Vancouver, 1987.

⁴ News Release, No. 209, DEA, 10 November 1987.

In a 19 November statement to the regular meeting of the 42nd session of the UN General Assembly, Canadian representative Walter McLean made several observations, including that "(t)he Government of South Africa must recognize the inevitability of change (...) before time runs out", this alluding to pressure being exerted both inside and outside the country. Mr. McLean also underlined the difficult conditions in Namibia and Mozambique, two countries that are victims of South African policy.⁵

A number of resolutions dealing with the apartheid policy of the South African Government were introduced during the same session. Canada voted in favour of the resolution calling for concerted international action to eliminate apartheid (Resolution A/42/L.32) and co-sponsored the resolution for the creation of a UN special allotment fund for South Africa (Resolution A/42/L.36). A consensus emerged on the latter resolution. On other issues Canada either voted against or abstained. Chief among Canada's reservations were: the reference to armed resistance in the resolution on assistance to liberation movements (L.26) and the resolution concerning the work program of the Special Committee Against Apartheid (L.30); accusations levelled against specific countries (L.28 and L.29); and the imposition of mandatory sanctions against South Africa (Resolution L.31, calling for an oil embargo, and Resolution L.28).⁶

Canada also abstained on the Namibian resolutions for procedural reasons related to its participation in the Contact Group, which practices neutrality in such matters. The Canadian delegation stressed that the intransigence of South Africa on the question of Namibia, the creation of a so-called interim government and the setting of conditions for the

⁵ News Release No. 54, New York, 19 November 1987.

⁶ "Explanation Of Votes, Item 33: Apartheid", 20 November 1987.

implementation of Resolution 435, reflected a defiance of the principles on which the UN was founded.⁷

In February 1988, Joe Clark repeatedly condemned "...the South African Government's imposition of draconian new restrictions on the political activities of 17 anti-apartheid organizations in South Africa". He indicated that "these measures will limit severely if not totally prohibit political activity by a number of the most important groups engaged in non-violent opposition to apartheid and in providing support to its victims."⁸

In a House of Commons speech on South Africa on 2 March 1988, Joe Clark stated that it was the wrong time for Canada to sever diplomatic ties with that country. Closure of the embassy in Pretoria would deprive Ottawa of a valuable source of information and would adversely affect Canada's aid program of roughly five million dollars per year. Mr. Clark continued:

(...) if we were absent from Pretoria we would have more difficulty mounting an aid program in Namibia, more difficulty advancing Canadian and Commonwealth (...) interest in South Africa, and no ability to demonstrate within South Africa itself our solidarity with anti-apartheid leaders." With respect to economic relations, he indicated that Ottawa is reviewing two aspects of its policy: "First, to see if there are new economic measures which Canada might take effectively alone. Second, to encourage broader action, particularly by countries who prize democracy, in specific response to South Africa's multiple assaults upon freedom

⁷ "Question of Namibia, Explanation of Vote", presented by C.V. Svoboda, member of the Canadian delegation, 6 November 1987.

⁸ See especially News Release(s) No. 048 and No. 050, DEA, 24 and 26 February 1988. One of these was drafted in the name of the Committee of Commonwealth Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa.

during the last week.⁹

Parliamentary Comment

In the House of Commons on 9 September 1987, Liberal MP Roland de Corneille asked Mr. Clark if he was going to attempt to obtain a comprehensive agreement on sanctions from all Commonwealth states. Mr. Clark replied:

The position of the Government is very clear on the question of sanctions. We believe they are effective economically and, more importantly, psychologically. We naturally believe that they would be more effective if they were more universal. (Mr. Clark responded to a second question by Mr. de Corneille.) We are prepared, if necessary, if other measures do not succeed, to disrupt, to end, economic and diplomatic relations with the Republic of South Africa. It should be understood that to do that would take us out of influence on the pressures to try to bring an end to apartheid. We do not think it is yet the time for Canada to take itself out of influence on ending apartheid.¹⁰

The following day Opposition Leader John Turner also asked, the question this time being put to Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, if Canada was going to sever all relations with South Africa and impose full economic sanctions before the end of the year "unless the Government of that country takes concrete and visible measures to put an end to the apartheid regime?" Key to Mr. Mulroney's response was that: "We are trying to do two things: maintain ever more sustained pressure on South Africa and, second, make consequential radical changes in the apartheid

⁹ Speeches, 88/17, DEA, 2 March 1988.

¹⁰ Commons Debates, 9 September 1987, pp. 8776 and 8777.

system (...)."11

On 17 September, Mr. de Corneille again addressed himself to Mr. Clark, asking if he shared the views of Commonwealth Secretary General Shridath Ramphal, who stated that Canada and the other Commonwealth countries "will have to provide more than army boots if they are serious about the security needs" of the front-line states. The central element of Mr. Clark's response was that "(...) there has been in Canada for some time a reluctance to become involved in what is traditionally called military aid. We do have the MTAP program that has very limited application. I do not think there would be much support in Canada for going beyond that kind of program (...)."12

On 22 September, Mr. de Corneille brought a motion to force the Canadian Government to take steps to strengthen Mozambique's economy and internal stability, asserting that the humanitarian aid currently being provided by Canada is insufficient. He added: "The amount of money given to Mozambique is pitiful compared to some of the other front-line states." Benno Friesen, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Employment and Immigration, stated that "the Government of Canada is well aware of the grave situation in Mozambique" and stressed that this year the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) will again spend approximately thirty-three million dollars in Mozambique.¹³

On 3 November, NDP member Howard McCurdy asked Mr. Clark what Canada's reaction was to the attack that very day by South African forces against

11 Commons Debates, 10 September 1987, p. 8823.

12 Commons Debates, 17 September 1987, p. 9047.

13 Commons Debates, 22 September 1987, pp. 9222 and 9223.

targets in Angola. The Secretary of State for External Affairs responded:

We have condemned and continue to condemn the aggression of South Africa with respect to Angola. We believe that the occupation of Namibia, as the Hon. Member knows, is illegal. We believe that that question should be resolved in accordance with the Security Council resolution with which the Hon. Member is well acquainted. It is part of a pattern of violence in South Africa that will continue so long as the apartheid system remains in place.¹⁴

In 1988 a number of Liberal and NDP members stood in the Commons to call for a break in economic and diplomatic ties between Canada and South Africa. The Conservative Government maintained its position as stated in the 2 March 1988 address to the House.

On 25 March 1988, Liberal MP Andre Ouellet questioned Mr. Clark on Canadian aid to Mozambique given the current famine and fact that the bilateral assistance program unveiled in January will not begin before late 1989. Mr. Clark replied that he was prepared "to consider any means likely to help us provide assistance as soon as possible." Mr. Ouellet went on to remind Mr. Clark of the constant efforts of South Africa to destabilize the Mozambican Government, a policy which according to Mr. Ouellet only adds to Mozambique's problems.¹⁵

On 29 March, Mr. Ouellet again spoke out, this time concerning South African border raids into neighbouring countries, especially a recent attack against Botswana. He stated:

¹⁴ Commons Debates, 3 November 1987, p. 10682.

¹⁵ Commons Debates, 25 March 1988, p. 14132.

I urge the Canadian Government to condemn this incursion into Botswana and to increase its pressure on the South African Government to end its menacing raids on neighbouring south African countries which, unlike South Africa, are trying to develop along non-racist lines.¹⁶

In a 2 May 1988 statement on the political dimension of the food shortage in Ethiopia, Conservative MP Reginald Stackhouse observed:

(...) Canada's ambassador to Ethiopia has finally recognized that country's food crisis has a political component. Drought is not its only cause. (...) It has always been partly due to the Marxist militaristic oppressive regime of that country. The dictatorial Dergue has been determined to turn Ethiopia into a massive collective farm even if that has reduced food production. It has spent 46 per cent of its resources on weapons while its people have gone hungry. It is now preventing food supplies from reaching two million people in the rebel held North. Canada has condemned the use of food supplies as an instrument of political policy. It is time and more than time that we condemned this action in Ethiopia.¹⁷

Finally, on 27 June, Conservative MP Alan Redway referred to a demonstration organized by the Eritrean Canadian community in Ottawa "(...) in support of emergency relief and Eritrean self-determination and in opposition to Ethiopian aggression and the massacre of civilians by Soviet supplied napalm and cluster-bombs." Mr. Redway stated:

I call upon the Minister for External Relations (Mrs. Landry) to send emergency relief directly to Eritrea on an urgent basis and call upon the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Clark) to demand that the Ethiopian Government stop using Soviet napalm and cluster-bombs on women and

16 Commons Debates, 29 March 1988, p. 14237.

17 Commons Debates, 2 May 1988, p. 15011.

children.¹⁸

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¹⁸ Commons Debates, 27 June 1988, p. 16806.

28. SOUTHERN ASIA

Background

Southern Asia underwent major change in 1987 and 1988, highlighted by the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

Afghanistan

The Soviets had been saying for more than a year that they would be willing to pull out of Afghanistan under certain conditions. On 8 February 1988, Secretary General Mikhail Gorbachev announced that Soviet troops would leave Afghanistan in less than 10 months, starting on 15 May 1988, provided the United States and Pakistan refrained from any interference or intervention in Afghan affairs. He added that this withdrawal was not linked in any way to the type of government in power in Kabul. This announcement was followed by negotiations in Geneva between Afghanistan, Pakistan, the United States and the Soviet Union which led to the signing of an agreement on 14 April providing for repatriation of the Soviet expeditionary corps between 15 May 1988 and 15 February 1989 (at the latest). The Afghan resistance rejected this agreement and announced that it would continue its struggle until the communist regime in Kabul had been overthrown. The accord covers only the "foreign" aspects of the conflict and does not address the internal struggles. It does not require an end to Soviet military aid to the Kabul government or to US military assistance to Pakistan and the resistance.

The Soviet Union announced its intention to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan during 1987, at a time when the Afghan Mujahideen had considerably strengthened their military capability, mainly through an

increase in arms shipments (primarily from the United States), as well as through progress in coordinating local military activities and evidence of greater professionalism in some regions.¹ Most of Moscow's military operations during the year were defensive and achieved little success.

The departure of Soviet troops, however, does not solve the problems of achieving peace within Afghanistan and choosing a government capable of running the country. The failure of the "policy of national reconciliation" introduced at the end of 1986 by President Najibullah and Moscow, which called for creation of a coalition government, but with the Afghan Communist Party (PDPA) still firmly in control, and the split between the various resistance movements, suggest the possibility of a prolonged civil war.

India-Pakistan

Antagonism between India and Pakistan grew with Pakistan's continuing efforts to manufacture nuclear arms, India's acquisition of new types of military equipment and clashes between armies of the two countries in the mountains of Kashmir. However, military manoeuvres by both countries in border areas in early 1987, resulting in troop build-ups on both sides, almost reached the flashpoint. The climate of tension was successfully contained and the incident was settled after a visit to India by Pakistan's President Zia-ul Haq. In April 1988, the New York Times reported that Pakistan had conducted a test of a medium-range surface-to-surface missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. In February, India had also tested a surface-to-surface missile with a range of 240 km,

¹ Strategic Survey 1987-1988, London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 1988, p. 135.

capable of delivering a nuclear warhead to several major cities in Pakistan.

India-China

The eighth session of Sino-Indian talks on the border problem was held in November 1987, against a background of charges by both sides of border violations and unjustified troop build-ups in border zones. These negotiations closely followed the uprising of nationalist partisans in Tibet. The Soviet union exerted pressure on New Delhi to settle its differences with Pakistan and China, and Mr. Gorbachev raised this issue during his visit to India in November 1987.

Sri Lanka

Finally, civil unrest and the many other internal problems besetting India did not prevent Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi from intervening in the armed conflict in Sri Lanka between the Colombo government and the Tamil minority. Indian forces entered Sri Lankan territory twice, on 3 and 4 June 1987, to provide material assistance to Jaffna, a northern city with a Tamil majority. A cease-fire agreement was signed on 29 July 1987 by India's prime minister and Sri Lankan President Jayewardene. New Delhi immediately sent 15,000 troops to Sri Lanka to monitor observance of the agreement. The number of Indian troops grew to 40,000 by the end of the year and 80,000 in April 1988.² This agreement gives the Tamils certain powers that enable them to exercise control in areas where they form the majority (primarily in northern Sri Lanka), but stops short of declaring these territories independent, which would jeopardize Sri Lankan unity. This "political solution" has little chance of success, because of

² Canadian-Asian Working Group on Human Rights, April 1988.

opposition by both the Sri Lankan majority and the main Tamil separatist group, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Indian peace-keeping forces have also engaged in bloody confrontations with the same group they are supposed to protect, the Tamil separatists.

Current Canadian Position

In recent years, the Canadian government has repeatedly condemned Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and human rights violations committed there by Soviet and Afghan forces. Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark and Canada's Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Stephen Lewis, have made statements to this effect on various occasions. Canada supplies more than \$20 million a year in aid to Afghan refugees in Pakistan.

In an address to the 42nd session of the UN General Assembly in October 1987, Mr. Lewis again denounced the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, calling this a testing ground for glasnost.³ In November and December, Canada supported two resolutions on Afghanistan passed by the General Assembly (A/42/L.16 and A/42/803/Add.1). The first called for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan and urged the parties involved to find a political solution to the Afghan conflict; the second expressed the General Assembly's concern over human rights abuses committed by Afghan authorities with the support of foreign troops, and urged the parties in the conflict to apply the principles and rules of international humanitarian law.

³ News Release No. 51, Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations, New York, 9 November 1987.

After an agreement was signed for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, Mr. Clark made a statement on 8 April 1988 praising this initiative, but expressing concern over the lack of negotiations in Geneva to achieve a cease-fire and halt arms shipments to the warring factions. Mr. Clark also voiced dismay that no agreement had been reached to form a government in Afghanistan acceptable to the Mujahideen. He added "...that the outcome of the Geneva process is only the first stage in creating conditions that will bring eventual peace to Afghanistan."⁴

Following the Geneva accord, Canada, which had stated its willingness to assist the United Nations in peace efforts in Afghanistan, agreed to provide five officers for the UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP) that would oversee application of the provisions contained in the accord.

In Canada's relations with India, the situation in the Punjab was of special concern to Ottawa because of activities by a militant minority of the country's Sikh community. In the first week of March 1988, Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark sent a letter to several provincial premiers regarding the activities of three Sikh organizations in Canada. This letter asked the premiers to avoid attending meetings or participating in activities that might inadvertently sanction the separatist objectives of these groups. In response to criticisms raised by some Members of Parliament and to the tabling of a motion by Liberal MPs, Mr. Clark addressed the House on 10 March, explaining again the reasons for his actions and noting in particular that "...the activities of a small group of Sikhs in Canada constitutes one of the most serious

⁴ DEA News Release, No. 076, 8 April 1988.

threats which Canada faces today."⁵ On 15 May 1988, speaking at a dinner to honour the visit of K. Natwar Singh, India's Minister of State for External Affairs, Mr. Clark stated:

The trouble in India creates tension in Canada--tension that can explode into violence even here. [...]the peace of the Sikh community in Canada is threatened by the violence in Punjab. The security of relatives is threatened. And, tragically, a tiny group of Canadians of Sikh origin abuses their rights, in Canada, by counselling or pursuing terrorism in India, or supporting separatism there. The majority of Canadians of Sikh origin work tirelessly and fearlessly to ensure that moderate views prevail in the Canadian community. This Government, encourages those moderates, and opposes extremists who abuse Canadian law and traditions. But the connections between the Punjab and Canada are personal and profound. It is much more difficult to encourage moderation in Canada while violence continues in Amritsar and elsewhere. Among the urgent issues we share in common is the need to bring peace and justice to the Punjab, and we pray that occurs.⁶

Parliamentary Comment

On 29 October 1987, Conservative MP Lloyd R. Crouse tabled the report of an official Canadian Parliamentary delegation that visited Pakistan in September. On this occasion, he spoke of the annual food aid program for refugees living in Pakistan, introduced by Canada three years earlier. Mr. Crouse pointed out certain changes that could be made to this aid

⁵ SSEA, Statement 88/19, 10 March 1988.

⁶ DEA, Statements 88/28, 15 May 1988.

program.⁷

On 3 March 1988, Leader of the Opposition John Turner questioned Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark on his letter to the provincial premiers regarding certain Sikh organizations in Canada. He asked, "Will the Minister explain to the House why he has chosen to condemn and boycott all members of these organizations for the alleged actions of a few?" Mr. Clark replied:

Some members of those organizations seek legitimacy in Canada by identifying themselves with prominent Canadians and some of them have engaged in or promote violence in Canada and elsewhere. Those are activities which should not appear to be condoned by Canadian authorities. As the Right Hon. Leader of the Opposition well knows, some members of the Canadian Sikh community do not feel free to speak on these matters. The Government has a duty to help Canadians live their lives in peace and in freedom. We are going to do that.⁸

On 27 May 1988, Liberal MP André Ouellet hailed the Soviet departure from Afghanistan:

Secretary General Gorbachev is to be commended for his decision to withdraw from Afghanistan, and we hope the Soviet authorities have learned a lesson from this unfortunate experience. Yesterday, Vietnam, today Afghanistan. Let us hope the superpowers will understand they should influence the peoples of this world through their outstanding

⁷ Commons Debates, 29 October 1987, p. 10535.

⁸ Commons Debates, 3 March 1988, pp. 13367 and 13368.

achievements in science, medicine and the arts, not with bayonets.⁹

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⁹ Commons Debates, 27 May 1988, p. 15843.

29. EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

Background

China - Soviet Union and the Indochina Conflict

The recent improvement in Sino-Soviet relations has influenced the foreign policy of some countries in East and Southeast Asia since 1987. With the much-talked about July 1986 speech in Vladivostok by Mikhail Gorbachev on the new shape of Soviet foreign policy in Asia as a background, talks between China and the Soviet Union on the border dispute resumed in February after nine years of silence. Discussions on the normalization of political relations between the two countries continued.

With regard to the border area, the withdrawal of a Soviet mechanized infantry division, completed in June 1987, is one of the most concrete steps to have been taken in the wake of the Vladivostok speech. Other developments include the agreement between China and Mongolia on measures designed to enhance mutual confidence, the reduction in the number of Chinese troops along the China-USSR border and the Kremlin's decision to eliminate 100 SS-20 medium range missiles stationed in Asia. Moscow and Beijing (Peking) continued their discussions on the border conflict involving the Amur and Ussuri Rivers. In 1987 the two countries agreed that the Amur River would be used for transportation and trade and hydro-electric projects. Despite the progress made, some portions of the border continue to be in dispute, most notably the sector near Khabarovsk.

In the area of Sino-Soviet talks to normalize relations, the major point of focus was the presence of Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea. China, one of the members of the anti-Vietnamese coalition, wants the Soviet Union, an ally of Vietnam, to put increased pressure on Vietnam to withdraw from Kampuchea, a country it has occupied since 1978 and from which it has promised to withdraw by 1990. Since 1987 both Vietnam and the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) have shown signs of a willingness to reach a political settlement to the conflict. An example of this has been Vietnam's efforts over the past year to stimulate a resumption of talks between the PRK and the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK). At a December meeting in Paris, Prince Sihanouk, one of the leaders of the CGDK, the main opposition group, and Hun Sen, Prime Minister of the pro-Vietnamese regime in Phnom Penh, attempted to set out a process for national reconciliation. A second meeting between the two was held a short time thereafter. While no concrete results were achieved during these talks, they did give rise to hopes for the future. Other proposals for resolving the conflict which continue to be under discussion include those put forward by Indonesia in its mediation efforts, as well as the "framework of negotiation for a political settlement of the Cambodian problem" adopted by the International Conference on Kampuchea in July 1981. In October 1987, during its 42nd session, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for the withdrawal of all foreign occupation forces from Kampuchea. The resolution, voted on in the UN since 1979, had never before been adopted with such a strong majority (117 voting in favour, twenty-one against, including Vietnam and the Soviet Union, with sixteen countries abstaining).

There were repeated clashes between Chinese and Vietnamese forces along the border, and it is estimated that this fighting has resulted in at least 30,000 deaths since 1979. Thailand and Laos have also been

involved in border clashes, each accusing the other of interfering in its internal affairs. A far more positive development was the normalization of relations between China and Laos at the end of 1987, with both countries pledging to improve relations and exchange ambassadors.

Japan - Soviet Union

Despite the fact that Soviet diplomatic initiatives in the Pacific cannot ignore the interests of Tokyo, relations between Japan and the Soviet Union continue to be strained, as they have been since the end of 1986. Widely cited as the greatest obstacle to an improvement in relations is the territorial dispute over the islands north of Hokkaido seized by the Soviets at the end of the Second World War and over which Japan claims sovereignty. In addition, Moscow is less than pleased about Japan's participation in the Star Wars defence program. In light of the weakening of the United States and the increasing influence of the Soviet Union in the South Pacific, Japan's declared intention, made public in 1987, of assisting in insuring the stability of the South Pacific constituted a major diplomatic initiative. This followed Japan's formal decision in January to increase the ceiling on defence spending by 1 per cent.

East Timor

Finally, the dispute between Indonesia and Portugal over East Timor continues to be a diplomatic burden for Jakarta. A former Portuguese possession, East Timor declared independence in 1975 but was subsequently invaded and occupied by Indonesian forces. Indonesia now considers East Timor part and parcel of its own territory. While this issue is the subject of intense debate in Portugal, there is little chance of direct negotiation between the two parties. In the fall of 1987, during the

42nd session of the UN General Assembly, it was decided for the fifth consecutive year that the East Timor question would not be part of the agenda.

North Korea and South Korea

Since 1987 North and South Korea have been unable to agree to terms necessary for a resumption of the bilateral talks broken off in January 1986. None of the proposals put forward by either of the parties has been acceptable to the other. On the eve of the Olympic Games to be held in Seoul in September 1988, the only development giving rise to any hope of improvement in relations between the two countries was the July 1988 declaration of Roh Tae Woo, the President of South Korea. However, the North rejected all elements of the declaration. Most notable among President Roh's proposals was a formula for economic free trade and cultural exchanges between the two countries.

Current Canadian Position

Canada is one of the members of the anti-Vietnamese coalition along with China, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), certain west European countries and the United States. In 1979, following the Vietnamese invasion, Ottawa suspended its aid to Vietnam and in 1982 recognized the CGDK. Canada supports peace efforts such as those made by the ASEAN countries and once again co-sponsored in October 1987 the UN resolution on the situation in Kampuchea. Ottawa also provides financial support to the non-Communist elements of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea. Finally, the Government of Canada gave tens of millions of dollars in aid to Indochinese refugees in first asylum countries and has

welcomed more than 100,000 of these refugees as immigrants to Canada. Some observers condemn Canada's position on Vietnam as being too closely linked to that of the United States, the ASEAN countries and China. These observers call for a Canadian policy in the region which is more specific and less passive.

On 14 October 1987, the day during the 42nd session of the UN General Assembly on which the Kampuchea resolution was tabled, Canadian MP John Bosley made a declaration on the situation in that country. After strongly condemning the permanent occupation by a foreign power and reminding the Assembly of the suffering of the Khmer people, Mr. Bosley stated that:

(...) there can be no realistic basis for a solution until Vietnam is committed to an early withdrawal of its troops. Vietnam must soon make such a commitment or stand convicted of the same imperialism of which it used to accuse others. For our part, Canada continues to support ASEAN in its attempts to find the appropriate lasting political solution - one that will bring the Khmer people what they deserve - peace and justice, prosperity and freedom - one that will avoid both occupation and atrocities.¹

With respect to the Korean question, Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark welcomed the July 1988 declaration made by the President of the Republic of Korea, Roh Tae Woo, proposing to improve exchanges between North and South Korea. Mr. Clark indicated that "We strongly support the restoration of the dialogue between North and South Korea which is critical to easing the tension on the Korean peninsula."²

¹ News Release, No. 33, Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations, 14 October 1987.

² DEA News Release, No. 146, 11 July 1988.

Parliamentary Comment

The countries of East Asia and the Pacific discussed above were not the subject of any interventions in the House of Commons.

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30. HUMAN RIGHTS

Background

The International Charter on Human Rights is the foremost international legal instrument on human rights. It comprises : the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its Optional Protocol. Other instruments aimed at protecting human rights are the Helsinki Final Act adopted by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), for the countries of Europe and North America, and numerous conventions related, for example, to the rights of women, the rights of refugees, and those regarding labour, racial discrimination and torture.

Government adherence to international human rights standards is monitored by UN agencies, particularly the General Assembly (Third Committee), the UN Human Rights Commission, the Human Rights Committee and the International Labour Organization. Adherence to the Helsinki Final Act is monitored through the periodic meetings of the CSCE. There are also procedures established to respond to alleged human rights violations.

Canada has adopted legislation to protect human rights within its boundaries, namely the Canadian Bill of Rights, enacted in 1960, the Constitution Act on Human Rights (1977), and the Constitution Act comprising the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982). Since human rights come under provincial jurisdiction, the Federal Government has worked with the provinces (which have also passed their own legislation) to formulate Canadian policies in this field. The twenty-four international instruments which Canada has ratified include

the United Nations Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which Ottawa ratified in 1987.

In its 1986 annual report, Amnesty International has once again referred to human rights violations by many governments around the world. The report gives details of the organization's research in 129 countries responsible for these violations. It addresses the issue of refugees who are often forced to leave their countries to avoid persecution. This fact is quite evident in many regions of the world; there are refugees in exile in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, America and Europe. Amnesty International's report underscores that governments have become more restrictive toward those who seek political asylum due to their increasing numbers and to pressing economic conditions. Amnesty International is concerned that host states, particularly in Europe and North America, tend to consider asylum requests as unfounded. It contends that governments have the obligation to ensure that legitimate political refugees seeking asylum are not turned back. Nevertheless, Amnesty International points out that even though humanitarian actions towards refugees are vital, they can have only limited success as long as the human rights violations, underlying this massive wave of refugees, are not stopped.¹

Current Canadian Position

In a speech given at the Technical University of Nova Scotia on 23 August 1987, the Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark referred to the Human Rights issue. He pointed out : "(...) Canada, of course,

¹ Amnesty International Report 1987, London : Amnesty International publication, 1987.

cannot impose our standards on the world, but we can act to seek respect for the standards the United Nations has established, and the obligations freely entered into in the Helsinki Accord." Clark added:

We are increasingly factoring human rights consideration into our aid and development policies, while taking care not to penalize the very people whose human rights are being abused.²

A news release issued by the Canadian Government on 13 November announced Ottawa's intention to establish a centre for international cooperation for the promotion of human rights and the development and strengthening of democratic institutions. Its primary focus will be co-operation between Canada and developing countries, and it will be known as the "International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development".³

On 9 December, Mr. Joe Clark announced the election of a Canadian, professor Peter Burns, to the United Nations Committee Against Torture, under the provisions of the International Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.

Since last summer, certain aspects of Canada's policy regarding human rights have been controversial. First, Bills C-55 and C-84, debated in Parliament and still pending Senate approval, have raised questions in the country. They aim to bring major changes to the immigration laws by making requests for political asylum subject to tighter control. Second, following a six-year ban, Ottawa renewed its economic assistance to Guatemala in the fall of 1987. This reversal was due to Guatemala's

² DEA, Statement 87/44, 26 August 1987.

³ Government of Canada, News Release, 13 November 1987.

return to civilian government. Ottawa's decision was strongly criticized by human rights advocates in Canada and Central America who allege that the human rights situation in Guatemala has not at all improved.

Moreover, Canada has been elected to a three-year term at the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. The election took place on 26 May at the meeting of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, in which one third of the seats of the Commission were filled. The Commission is the key coordinating and policy-making body in the human rights field in the United Nations system. Canada last served on the Commission between 1976 and 1984.⁴

Finally, on 21 June 1988, the House of Commons Committee on Human Rights published a report entitled "Human Rights behind the Iron Curtain", in which it noted that "The countries behind the Iron Curtain have not lived up to the international obligations to which they have subscribed."⁵ Following public hearings held throughout the country during fourteen months, the report underscores that freedom of religion and national minorities rights remain very restricted in these countries; it condemns the USSR, Romania and Czechoslovakia for limiting freedom of movement and making emigration and family reunification very difficult, if not impossible.

Parliamentary Comment

Several members of parliament maintained that despite glasnost there are

⁴ DEA, News Release, No. 111, 27 May 1988.

⁵ "Human Rights Behind the Iron Curtain", First Report of the Standing Committee on Human Rights, June 1988, p. 4.

still many instances of human rights violations in the Soviet Union and that the Canadian Government should remain vigilant. Alluding to the absence of political freedom in that country, many participants called on the Soviet Government to "set the captives free" and to discharge its commitments under the Helsinki Accord.⁶

On 13 October 1987, Conservative Member Reginald Stackhouse, Chairman of the House of Commons Committee on Human Rights, indicated that, according to an Amnesty International report, thirty-three of the forty-nine countries in the Commonwealth were guilty of serious human rights violations. Having cited these countries, Stackhouse added :

Clearly human rights ought to be on the agenda of the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Vancouver, and clearly we need an ongoing program here. Some of the offending countries receive Canadian development assistance. The Canadian Government will do right to use the leverage of its assistance programs to gain justice for people unable to secure it for themselves.⁷

Other members also condemned El Salvador, South Korea, Haiti, Israel and Ethiopia and Singapore for abusing human rights.⁸ On 2 November 1987, Mr. Reginald Stackhouse brought to the attention of the House that Ethiopia, to which CIDA has given \$20 million in bilateral aid so far, is responsible for human rights violations "which are patently systematic,

⁶ Common Debates, 15 September 1987, p. 8948, 20 October 1987, p. 10178.

⁷ Common Debates, 13 October 1987, p. 9909.

⁸ Commons Debates, 28 August 1987, p. 8575; 30 October 1987, p. 10569; 10 December 1987, p. 11672; 19 January 1988, p. 12050; 25 February 1988, p. 12123, and 26 February 1988, p. 13169, 22 June 1988, p. 16704.

gross and continuous". According to him, the Canadian Government, prior to its new and renewed aid programs to Ethiopia, should insist that the Ethiopian Government come up to at least minimum standards with regard to human rights. He pointed out that the Government's response to the report of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, which argued that human rights and overseas development assistance should always go together, was "that human rights concerns must be fully integrated into Canada's development policies."⁹

Lise Bourgault, parliamentary secretary to the Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, replied :

We have raised these issues on a number of occasions with the Ethiopian authorities and, if need be, we will keep on doing so. We see the adoption of a new Constitution as a major event, since it amounts to a formal commitment to respect human rights in Ethiopia.

She also expressed her disappointment that a general amnesty for all political prisoners in Ethiopia was not announced on the day the new Constitution for the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia was proclaimed.¹⁰

On 4 March 1988, NDP member Jim Fulton raised the issue of the rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada. Noting that Canada has many treaties with its aboriginal first nations, he asked Mr. Joe Clark to support the proposed evaluation by a subcommittee to the United Nations Human Rights Commission of the legal status of treaties between aboriginal groups in Canada and aboriginal groups and other governments around the world.

⁹ Commons Debates, 2 November 1987, p. 10655.

¹⁰ Ibid..

Mr. Clark replied:

(...) Canada is trying to ensure that the legitimate questions relating to agreements affecting indigenous people apply to all the indigenous people of the world, not only those indigenous people who happen to have a treaty relation with the government of their country.

Speaking again, Mr. Fulton stated that Mr. Clark officials were arguing, in Geneva, that there were not any treaties between Canada and the first nations of this country. He asked:

(...) why will the Minister and his Government not stand up at the international level and defend what is in Canada's Constitution under section 35 which states that the treaty rights of aboriginal people of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed?

Mr. Clark replied:

In the United Nations and elsewhere we are seeking to ensure that the activities which are undertaken by that commission apply to the range of relations between aboriginal people and their Governments - not limited in Canada, not limited to Canada.¹¹

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¹¹ Commons Debates, 4 March 1988, pp. 13412-13413.

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31. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

Background

International terrorism has remained a major policy issue for Western governments in recent years. This attention was largely the result of a general increase through the early to mid-1980s in the number of terrorist incidents, both internationally and in the Western nations. While the number of dramatic terrorist incidents has declined since then, terrorism is still widespread and attention to the issue has been maintained, in part, through the development and use of counterterrorist measures.

Common forms of terrorism include airplane hijackings, kidnappings, hostage-takings and bombings. Several groups are well-known internationally as being responsible for perpetrating terrorist activities.

In response to the wave of terrorist incidents in 1985, which included the Achille Lauro cruise ship hijacking and the Air India flight mid-air bombing, the United Nations General Assembly unanimously adopted a landmark resolution on terrorism on 9 December 1985. The resolution "unequivocally condemns, as criminal, all acts, methods and practices of terrorism wherever and by whomever committed."¹ After repeated US entreaties for concerted action on terrorism, the European Economic Community agreed, on 28 January 1986, to ban all arms sales to states clearly implicated in supporting terrorism.

¹ UNGA Fortieth Session Resolutions, Resolution 40/61, pp. 607-609.

In early 1986 Libya became the focus of Western and particularly of US concern over terrorism. US-Libyan hostilities peaked with the bombing of a discotheque in West Berlin on 5 April 1986 and US retaliatory attacks on two Libyan cities on 14 April.

At the conclusion of the Tokyo Economic Summit on 5 May 1986, the heads of government of the seven leading Western industrialized countries (Britain, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, West Germany and the United States) released a joint statement strongly condemning international terrorism, urging determined national and international action to combat it, and pledging to take strong measures against states supporting it. These commitments supplemented those entered into by Western governments in the Bonn Summit Declaration of 1978.

At meetings of the North Atlantic Council, the foreign ministers have repeatedly condemned terrorism and expressed their resolve to combat it jointly. At the May 1986 meeting of the Defence Planning Committee, the ministers "resolved to work together to eradicate this scourge and urge[d] closer international co-operation in this effort."²

In September 1987, the United States government, under pressure from members of Congress, ordered the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to close its Washington office. The move was designed to show disapproval of the elements in the PLO that favour using terrorist methods. In December, Congress approved the closing of all offices of the PLO in the US, including the observer office at the United Nations. This move, according to the UN, would violate the US commitment under a 1947 agreement not to impose restrictions on people invited to the UN

² NATO Press Service, Final Communique, No. M-DPC-1(86)15, 22 May 1986.

headquarters in New York, thus running counter to international law.

The UN General Assembly approved its legal committee's recommendation against closing the mission, by a vote of 145 to one. Israel was the lone dissenting vote, with the United States not participating. Subsequently, the UN held a special session to challenge the anticipated order to close the PLO office. The session voted 143 to one in favour of the need for binding arbitration, and 143 to zero on asking for a world court advisory opinion on whether the US was obliged to enter into arbitration. Despite this, as well as US State Department efforts to prevent implementation of the Congressional action, on 11 March 1988 the US Justice Department gave the PLO until 21 March to close its mission. On 29 June a US Federal judge ruled that the Government could not force the PLO to close its office. The Justice Department was studying the ruling and stated that it would make a decision about further proceedings as soon as possible.

Terrorist incidents of note in 1987-88 included the continuation of hostage-takings in Lebanon, the victims being mainly American, French and British nationals.

In other major incidents related to the Middle East, on 5 April 1988 a Kuwait Airways jumbo jet was hijacked on a flight from Bangkok to Kuwait. The hijackers demanded the release of 17 Shiite Moslems imprisoned in Kuwait, but this was not accepted. Two passengers were killed in the ordeal. The siege ended 15 days later, while the airplane was located in Algeria.

On 16 April 1988 Abu Jihad, the PLO's military commander and Yasser Arafat's top aide, was assassinated in Tunis. The assassination was widely reported to have been undertaken by Israeli agents.

Terrorist incidents also occurred involving the Irish Republican Army. On 30 October 1987, Western security forces captured a Panamanian-registered ship sailing from Libya to Ireland, carrying 150 tons of arms and munitions. Three of the ship's crew were identified as IRA members. Although Libya denied it, British, Irish and French officials were convinced that the cargo was Libyan-supplied. The capture of the ships involved American, French, British and Irish security forces.

On 3 March 1988, three IRA members were shot in Gibraltar by British agents. Their funerals in Northern Ireland sparked a series of incidents including a grenade-throwing attack at the burial of the three IRA members on 16 March and the killing of two British soldiers at a later funeral.

A mysterious incident involving a North Korean saboteur occurred on 29 November 1987, when a Korean Air Lines jet exploded near Burma. The North Korean agent confessed to the planting of a bomb aboard the jet. The confession, however, raised many questions as to who else was involved and their motives.

Many Western officials have been pleased with the gains made in counterterrorist measures over the past two years. Improved coordination among Western security forces, harsher penalties and more strict travel regulations - including airport security and visa requirements for example - are believed to have reduced the effectiveness of terrorist efforts.

Current Canadian Position

Canada has not been immune to terrorist attacks. In March 1985 a guard was killed at the Turkish Embassy in Ottawa by members of the Armenian Revolutionary Army. A bomb which exploded at Narita airport, Japan, and the bomb which may have destroyed the Air India jetliner on 22 June 1985, are believed to have been planted in Canada. On 25 May 1986 an attempt was made to assassinate Punjabi Minister Malkiad Singh Sidhu on Vancouver Island, allegedly by four members of the Sikh community.

The Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations recommended, in its final report, that airport security and border control be improved to deal with terrorism in Canada. It also recommended that the Government "work through the United Nations" by, for example, striving "to get support for a UN Security Council resolution to deny countries harbouring terrorists the right to invoke their sovereignty to prevent international action."³ Canada has strongly condemned international terrorism on several occasions, including External Affairs Minister Joe Clark's address to the UN General Assembly on 25 September 1985 and through the Tokyo (May 1986), Venice (June 1987) and Toronto (June 1988) Economic Summits.

In January 1988 Canada and the United States issued a Joint Declaration on Counterterrorism, establishing a Bilateral Consultative Group on Counterterrorism to meet annually, or more often if required.⁴ On 9 February 1988 an 81-nation Diplomatic Conference was held at the Headquarters of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in Montreal. The result of a Canadian initiative aimed at deterring and

³ SJCCIR, Independence and Internationalism, 1986, pp. 63-64.

⁴ DEA News Release No. 008, 11 January 1988.

punishing the perpetrators of unlawful acts of violence at airports, it adopted a protocol to this effect, filling a gap in the international legal regime. Previously, only acts conducted on aircraft, not in airports, had been covered by international law.⁵

Parliamentary Comment

The status of the Canadian investigation into the 23 June 1985 Air India disaster sparked comment in the House of Commons. The Government was questioned by Liberal Party Member Mr. John Nunziata on whether it could explain the various aspects of the investigation, including the erasing of wiretap tapes. The Solicitor General, James Kelleher, stated that he could not disclose any information that might jeopardize the outcome of the matter. Mr. Kelleher denied charges that the Government had bungled the investigation and attempted a cover-up:

I can tell the Honourable Member and the House that this is the most extensive investigation the Royal Canadian Mounted Police have undertaken. Shortly after the incident, there were more than 200 officers working full-time on the case, at all times since then there have never been less than 50 officers working on the case. That is the situation today.⁶

On another issue, on 17 January 1988, it became public that Mahmoud Mohammed Issa Mohammed, a convicted Palestinian terrorist, was living in Canada. The issue was raised extensively in the House of Commons, although mainly in regard to its implications for Canadian immigration

⁵ DEA, News Release No. 046, 24 February 1988.

⁶ Commons Debates, 15 December 1987, pp. 11806-7.

policy. The Honourable Benoit Bouchard, Minister for Employment and Immigration, stated that despite Mohammed's presence, Canadian security was never jeopardized as the RCMP were aware of his whereabouts "the same day or day after this individual entered Canada."⁷

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⁷ Commons Debates, 18 January 1988, p. 12002.

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Oakley, R., "International Terrorism," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 65, No. 3, Spring 1987, pp. 611-629.

"The Politics of Violence," Canada and the World, Vol. 52, No. 5, January 1987, pp. 5-8.

"Terrorism: a growth industry," in: Strategic Survey 1985-1986, London, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1986.

For Canada the following reservation applies:

The Protocol is binding only as regards states which have both signed and ratified or acceded to it. The Protocol will cease to be binding in regard to any enemy state whose armed forces or whose allies fail to respect the prohibitions laid down in the Protocol.

United Nations Charter

Entered into force for Canada, 9 November 1945.

North Atlantic Treaty

Entered into force: 24 August 1949.

Ratified: 3 May 1949.

Stated: 4 April 1949, Washington, D.C.

Entered into force: 24 August 1949.

* in the arms control, disarmament and defence fields.

Appendix 1

Canadian Treaty Obligations*

The Geneva Protocol of 1925

(Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare)

Signed by Canada: 17 June 1925 (Geneva).

Ratified: 6 May 1930.

For Canada the following reservation applies:

The Protocol is binding only as regards states which have both signed and ratified or acceded to it. The Protocol will cease to be binding in regard to any enemy state whose armed forces or whose allies fail to respect the prohibitions laid down in the Protocol.

United Nations Charter

Signed: 26 June 1945.

Ratified: 9 November 1945.

Entered into force for Canada: 9 November 1945.

North Atlantic Treaty

Signed: 4 April 1949, Washington, D.C.

Ratified: 3 May 1949.

Entered into force: 24 August 1949.

* in the arms control, disarmament and defence fields.

Partial Test Ban Treaty

(Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water. Also known as the Partial Test Ban Treaty or the Limited Test Ban Treaty.) Signed by the United States, Soviet Union and United Kingdom on 5 August 1963 in Moscow.

Signed: 8 August 1963.

Ratified: 28 January 1964.

Entered into force: 10 October 1963.

Outer Space Treaty

(Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies).

Signed: 27 January 1967.

Ratified: 10 October 1967.

Entered into force: 10 October 1967.

Non-Proliferation Treaty

Prohibits non-nuclear weapon signatories from acquiring nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon signatories from giving nuclear weapons or their technology to non-nuclear weapon states. Approved by the United Nations General Assembly 12 June 1968. Signed in London, Moscow and Washington on 1 July 1968. Canada also has a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency as required by the NPT.

Signed: 23 July 1968.

Ratified: 8 January 1969.

Entered into force for Canada: 5 March 1970.

Seabed Arms Control Treaty

(Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof). Approved by the United Nations General Assembly 7 December 1970.

Signed: 11 February 1971.
 Ratified: 17 May 1972.
 Entered into force: 18 May 1972.

Biological Weapons Convention

(Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction).

Signed: 10 April 1972, London, Moscow, Washington.
 Ratified: 18 September 1972.
 Entered into force for Canada: 26 March 1975.

ENMOD Convention

(Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques).

Signed: 18 May 1977, Geneva.
 Ratified: 11 June 1981.
 Entered into force: 5 October 1978.

Inhumane Weapons Convention

(Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects).

Signed: 10 April 1981.
 Ratified: not yet ratified by Canada.

Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident

Signed: 26 September 1986, Vienna.
 Ratified: not yet ratified by Canada.

Assistance for Nuclear Accidents

(Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency).

Signed: 26 September 1986, Vienna.
Ratified: not yet ratified by Canada.

Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

(Intended to ensure the physical protection of nuclear material in domestic storage and transport).

Signed: 22 September 1980.
Ratified: 21 March 1986.
Entered into force for Canada: 8 February 1987.

The Antarctic Treaty

(Guarantees the use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only and prohibits any activities of a military nature, nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive waste material).

Acceded: 4 May 1988.
Entered into force: 4 May 1988.

Appendix 2

The Canadian Armed Forces

1. Personnel (summer 1988)

Regular Forces	87,299
Primary Reserve	25,404
Supplementary Reserve and Cadet Instructors List	35,891
Civilian Strength	37,929
	<u>186,523</u>

<u>Command</u> ¹	<u>Regulars</u>	<u>Reserves</u>	<u>Civilians</u>	<u>Total</u>
Maritime	12,240	3,244	7,257	22,741
Mobile	20,185	19,458	5,815	45,458
Air	23,957	966	7,887	32,810

¹ Major commands only; totals do not correspond to personnel strength listed above.

2. Functional and Regional Commands

Command

Maritime

Headquarters

Halifax, Nova Scotia

Mobile	St.-Hubert, Quebec
Air	Winnipeg, Manitoba
Canadian Forces Europe	Lahr, F. R. Germany
Canadian Forces Communication Command	Ottawa, Ontario
Canadian Forces Training System	Trenton, Ontario
Northern Region	Yellowknife, NW Territories

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3. Naval Forces - Maritime Command, Fleet Strength

<u>Type</u>	<u>Number</u>
Patrol Submarines	3
Destroyers	4
Frigates	16 (3 reserve)
Replenishment Ships	3
Tanker, Small	1
Research Vessels	3
Patrol Vessels/Training Ships	7
Gate Vessels	5
Reserve Tenders	14
Tugs	14
Auxiliaries	25
	<hr/> 95

4. Land Forces - Mobile Command and Canadian Forces Europe, Major Equipment

<u>Type</u>	<u>Number</u>
Tanks	114 Leopard C-1
Armoured Fighting Vehicles - Reconnaissance	175 Lynx
Armoured Fighting Vehicles	195 Cougar
Armoured Personnel Carriers	1090 M-113 269 Grizzly
Artillery (Howitzer)	44 Model 44 [L-5] pack 105 mm) 189 towed 105 mm 50 M-109 Self-Propelled 155 mm
Anti-tank Weapons (TOW)	
Recoilless Rifles	787 Carl Gustav 84 mm
Anti-tank Guided Weapons	151 Tow
Air Defence	
Guns	57 L-40/60 40 mm
Surface-to-air Missiles	111 Blowpipe

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Command

Maritime

Headquarters

Halifax, Nova Scotia

5. Air Forces - Air Command and Canadian Forces Europe, Major Equipment

<u>Type</u>	<u>Number</u>
Fighter	58 CF-116 (Freedom Fighter) 118 CF-18D (F/A-18A/B Hornet)
Electronic Countermeasures	3 CC-117 (Mystere-Falcon 20) 3 CC-144 Challenger
Maritime Reconnaissance	18 CP-140 Aurora 19 CP-121 Tracker
Transport	28 CC-130E/H Hercules 5 CC-137 (Boeing 707) 7 CC-109 Cosmopolitan 7 CC-138 Twin Otter 12 CC-115 Buffalo 56 CT-133 Silver Star 124 CT-114 Tutor 22 CT-134 Musketeer

Type (Helicopters)

Anti-Submarine Warfare	35 CH-124 Sea King
Observation	58 CH-136 Kiowa
Transport	40 CH-135 Twin Huey 6 CH-147 Chinook
Search and Rescue	14 CH-113/A Labrador/ Voyageur 9 CH-118 Iroquois
Training	14 CH-139 (Bell 206)

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6. Canadian Forces Europe

a. Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (CMBG) - Headquarters: CFB Lahr, F. R. Germany

Unit Formation	Unit Name	Base
Armoured Regiment	The 8th Canadian Hussars (Princess Louise's)	CFB Lahr
Mechanized Infantry Battalions	3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry 1st Battalion, Royal 22 nd Regiment	CFB Baden- Soellingen CFB Lahr
Artillery Regiment	1st Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery	CFB Lahr
Engineer Regiment	4 Combat Engineer Regiment	CFB Lahr
Helicopter Squadron	444 Tactical Helicopter Squadron	CFB Lahr
4 Air Defence Regiment	128 Airfield Air Defence Battery	CFB Baden- Soellingen
	129 Airfield Air Defence Battery	CFB Lahr
Headquarters & Signal Units	4 Mechanized Brigade Group Headquarters and Signal Squadron	CFB Lahr
Support Units	4 Service Battalion	CFB Lahr
	4 Field Ambulance	CFB Lahr
	4 Military Police Platoon	CFB Lahr
Communications Units	CFE Communication Group Headquarters	CFB Lahr
	Communication Squadron	CFB Lahr
	Communication Squadron	CFB Baden- Soellingen

b. Canadian Air Division (1 CAD) - Headquarters: Lahr, F. R. Germany

Fighter	409 Tactical Fighter Squadron	CF-18	CFB Baden- Soellingen
	439 Tactical Fighter Squadron	CF-18	CFB Baden- Soellingen
	433 Tactical Fighter Squadron	CF-18	CFB Baden- Soellingen

Headquarters Unit
Support

Headquarters 1 CAD
1 Air Maintenance Squadron

CFB Lahr
CFB Baden-
Soellingen

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Sources

In addition to interviews with staff of the Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies (CISS), the following sources were consulted for this Appendix:

Canada, Senate, Special Committee on National Defence, Proceedings, Issue No. 23, 31 May 1988, p. 23A:6.

DND, Defence 87

DND, Fact Sheets

IISS, The Military Balance 1987-1988

Appendix 3

Canadian Contribution to Peacekeeping Operations, 1948 to the Present

Operation	Location	Dates	Maximum Troop Contribution	Current Troop Contribution	Total UN Troop Contribution	Missions UN ¹	Other
United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization Palestine (UNTSO)	Egypt Israel Jordan Lebanon Syria	1948	22	22	298	S&O	
United Nations Military Observer Group India-Pakistan (UNMOGIP)	Kashmir	1949-79	27	Yes ²	102-39	S	
United Nations Command Korea (UNCK)	Korea	1950-54	8,000	-			PK
United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC)	Korea	1953-	2	-		0	
International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICSC)	Cambodia Laos Vietnam	1954-74	133	-		ICSC S	
United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF 1)	Egypt	1956-67	1,007	-	6,373-3,378		PK
United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL)	Lebanon	1958-59	77	-	591-375		0

Operation	Location	Dates	Maximum Troop Contribution	Current Troop Contribution	Total UN Troop Contribution	Missions UN ¹	Other
Organisation des Nations-Unies au Congo (ONUC)	Congo (Zaire)	1960-64	421	-	19,828	PK	
United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA)	West New Guinea (West Irian)	1962-63	13	-	15,761	S	
United Nations Yemen Observer Mission (UNYOM)	Yemen	1963-64	36	-	189-25	0	
United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)	Cyprus	1964-	1,126	575	6,411-2,345	PK	
Dominican Republic (DOMREP)	Dominican Republic	1965-66	1	-	3	0	
United Nations India-Pakistan Observer Mission (UNIPOM)	India-Pakistan Border	1965-66	112	-	96-78	0	
Observer Team to Nigeria (OTN)	Nigeria	1968-69	2	-		0	
United Nations Emergency Force (UUNEF 2)	Egypt (Sinai)	1973-79	1,145	-	6,973-4,031	PK	

Operation	Location	Dates	Maximum Troop Contribution	Current Troop Contribution	Total UN Troop Contribution	Missions UN ¹	Other
International Commission for Control and Supervision (ICCS)	South Vietnam	1973-	278	-			ICCS O&S
United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)	Israel-Syria (Golan)	1974-	220	220	1,450		O-PK
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)	Lebanon	1978-	117	-	7,000-5,773		S-PK
Multinational Force and Observers (MFO)	Egypt-Israel	1982-(1986)	140	140	2,700		O&PK
United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan	Afghanistan Pakistan	1988	5	5	50		0

(1) O-Observation, S-Supervision, PK-Peacekeeping

(2) Airlift of Group, twice annually (Rawalpindi-Srinagar)

Source: Canada, Senate, Special Committee on National Defence, Proceedings, 18 March 1988 (updated from conversations with DEA officials).

Appendix 4**Public Opinion**

Canadian public opinion in relation to arms control, defence policy, and regional conflict issues was measured through many polls conducted between July 1987 and July 1988. The results of these polls have been summarized below and categorized under the subject headings of Canadian Defence Policy; Canadian Foreign Policy; and International Affairs.

Canadian Defence Policy

A survey conducted between June and September 1987, commissioned by the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security (CIIPS), touched upon a number of issues related to Canadian defence policy. The poll, conducted by Longwoods Research Group, comprised a total of 1,015 respondents. On the question of the size of Canadian defence forces, it asked: "From what you know or have read, do you think Canadian defence forces should be larger, about the present size, or smaller?" The poll found that 63 per cent felt that the forces should be larger, 33 per cent about the present size, and 5 per cent, smaller.

On a related issue, 23 per cent of respondents believed that Canada should increase the size of its armed forces in Europe; 49 per cent felt that the present size was about right; 10 per cent felt that their size should be reduced; and 19 per cent believed that all Canadian military forces in Europe should be withdrawn.

A Gallup poll in August 1987 found that 57 per cent of 1,040 Canadians thought that Canada should maintain troops in Europe with NATO, while 26 per cent thought that the troops should be brought back to Canada, and 16 per cent were undecided. About half, or 49 per cent, of those surveyed approved of government proposals to increase defence spending, with 34 per cent disapproving, and 17 per cent unsure.

In May 1988, Angus Reid Associates Inc. polled 1,501 Canadians on behalf of the Canadian Peace Alliance (CPA). The poll asked the following defence-related question:

The federal government has recently announced a policy calling for an increase in defence spending of approximately \$185 billion over the next twenty years. Some people think this money is necessary for Canada to expand our military capabilities and improve our security. Other people think it would be better to spend this money on improving our social services in areas like health care and education. What do you think?

The survey found that 31 per cent of respondents believed that the money was needed for the military, 60 per cent would rather spend it on social services, and 9 per cent were unsure.

The most controversial aspect of the 1987 Defence White Paper, the decision to purchase 10-12 nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs), also received attention from pollsters during the year. A poll of 1,520 Canadians conducted from 3 to 17 May 1988 by Environics Research Group Ltd. for the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament (CCACD), stated:

The federal government plans to buy a fleet of ten to twelve nuclear-propelled submarines at a total cost of at least \$8 billion.

Asked if they approved, Canadians responded as follows:

strongly approve	:	9 per cent
somewhat approve	:	23 per cent
somewhat disapprove	:	24 per cent
strongly disapprove	:	35 per cent
don't know	:	8 per cent

Canadian Foreign Policy

A wide range of questions related to Canadian foreign policy were posed over the course of the past twelve months.

Canadians were surveyed a number of times on the issue of unarmed cruise missile tests being conducted in Canada. The Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security poll asked the following:

The Reagan Administration recently decided to exceed the limits for nuclear weapons as set out in the SALT II agreement. Given that Ottawa has allowed testing of cruise missiles in Canada on the understanding that the United States would continue to pursue arms reductions with the Soviet Union, should the Canadian government now refuse permission for further tests or not?

Over two-thirds of respondents, 68 per cent, believed that Canada should refuse further testing, while 32 per cent believed that further testing should be allowed.

On 20 January 1988 the Canadian Peace Alliance set up ballot boxes in 32 Canadian cities and towns to ask Canadians: "Do you agree that we should stop testing the cruise and start testing what we can do for world peace?" According to a Canadian Press article in the Ottawa Citizen, of the 8,655

respondents, 7,288 or 84 per cent felt that testing should be stopped. The remaining 16 per cent believed that it should continue.

A Gallup poll of 100 Canadians conducted from 2 to 5 March 1988 found that 54 per cent of those surveyed believed that Canada should halt testing, while 38 per cent believed that testing should be allowed. The remaining 9 per cent did not know.

On the issue of whether Canada should become a nuclear weapon-free zone, the CIIPS poll found that 57 per cent of respondents felt that it should, and 43 per cent that it should not. In a related question, the Canadian Peace Alliance poll posed the following:

Another military issue that people talk about is whether or not Canada should allow foreign warships that are nuclear armed to enter Canadian waters and dock at our ports. In your opinion, should Canada allow nuclear armed foreign warships to enter Canadian waters or should Canada refuse them?

Approximately two-thirds, 67 per cent, felt that Canada should not allow foreign warships, while 27 per cent felt that it should. Six per cent were unsure.

An Angus Reid Associates poll conducted in Spring 1988 surveyed both American and Canadian views on the issue of Arctic sovereignty. Having been read a brief paragraph describing the Canadian and American positions concerning the Northwest Passage, 53 per cent of 1,000 Americans polled thought that the US should respect the Canadian position. Less than half that number, 25 per cent, thought that the US should ignore Canada's position, while 22 per cent were unsure.

Having outlined the issue to 1,510 Canadians, Angus Reid asked what approach Canada should take in settling the Arctic sovereignty question. In

response, 16 per cent thought that Canada should establish a greater military presence in the Arctic to deter and confront the US, if necessary; 69 per cent favoured the continuation of diplomatic and political pressure; 12 per cent felt that Canada should drop the matter and allow American access; and 3 per cent were unsure.

Questions of a more general nature concerning Canadian foreign policy were also asked. In the CIIPS poll, Canadians were asked how much influence they thought Canada has on the course of world events. Four per cent of respondents felt that Canada had a great deal of influence, 32 per cent some influence, 52 per cent very little influence, and 12 per cent no influence at all.

A poll commissioned by the North-South Institute surveyed 1,210 Canadians in October 1987. Asked the most effective method for increasing Canada's influence internationally, 31.5 per cent believed that Canada should speak out more often on international issues, 6.2 per cent thought that Canada should increase the size of its armed forces, 10.4 per cent felt that Canada should spend more on aid for developing countries, and 48.7 per cent thought that Canada should put more emphasis on its economic and trade power. Less than 1 per cent chose other options, while 2.4 per cent did not know.

The North-South Institute's poll also asked: "In countries where there are serious abuses of human rights, do you think Canada should mind its own business or protest in some way?". Those feeling that Canada should protest amounted to 68.2 per cent of respondents, while 29.3 per cent stated that it should "mind its own business," and 2.5 per cent did not know.

On the issue of South Africa, 9.7 per cent of those polled believed that Canada was doing too much to help end racial policies; 37 per cent believed

too little; 39.9 per cent believed the right amount, and 13.4 per cent did not know.

International Affairs

The North-South Institute's survey asked respondents to rank some general issues as very important, somewhat important, not very important or not at all important. The highest portion of respondents, 98 per cent, identified pollution and environment as either very important or somewhat important. Apartheid and human rights ranked fifth, with 87 per cent support; accidental nuclear war eighth, with 83 per cent; erratic US foreign policy eleventh, with 80 per cent; regional wars twelfth, with 76 per cent; and Soviet aggression thirteenth, with 61 per cent describing it as an important issue.

The CIIPS poll asked how much confidence Canadians had in the ability of the US to deal wisely with present world problems. Three per cent of respondents had very great confidence, 34 per cent considerable, 46 per cent little, 13 per cent very little, and 4 per cent had none. Asked which situation posed the greatest threat to world peace, 5 per cent of Canadians identified Soviet actions on the international scene, 8 per cent US actions, 27 per cent the superpower arms race, 29 per cent the spread of nuclear arms to smaller countries, 27 per cent the Middle East conflict, and 4 per cent conflicts elsewhere in the world.

A March 1988 Gallup poll found that 34 per cent of 1,035 polled had very great or considerable confidence in the US ability to deal wisely with world problems, while 57 per cent replied that they had little or very little confidence. Another 4 per cent stated they had no confidence at all, and 5 per cent answered that they did not know. This compared to previous Gallup

the results from January 1986 in which 47 per cent of respondents had either
but very great or considerable confidence in US abilities.

Turning to regional conflict issues, 38 per cent of 1,020 respondents in a November Gallup poll supported US military action to protect shipping in the Persian Gulf. Nearly a quarter, 24 per cent, urged tougher American action against Iranian attacks, while 27 per cent believed that the US should withdraw completely.

In regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict, a February Gallup poll found that Canadian opinion in favour of Israel had decreased, as compared to a similar 1982 poll. Of 1,028 questioned, 12 per cent were sympathetic to Israel, and 14 per cent to the Palestinians. Ten per cent had sympathy for both sides, while the majority--64 per cent--chose neither, or had no opinion. In 1982, 17 per cent had been sympathetic to Israel, and 13 per cent to the Palestinians.

In April 1988 The Reid Report, published by Angus Reid Associates, asked the question: "Based on whatever you might have seen about the current situation in the Israeli-occupied territories, who do you feel deserves more of the blame for the current increased tensions--the Israeli government or Palestinian groups such as the PLO?" Of 1,517 polled, 20 per cent felt that the Israeli government deserved more blame, 21 per cent identified Palestinian groups, 24 per cent chose both, and 35 per cent were unsure. Asked whether Canada should play a role or take a firm position on the issue, 44 per cent believed that it should, 46 per cent saw no real point in taking a stand, and 10 per cent were unsure.

Concerning arms control, a Gallup poll taken in January 1988 found that Canadians welcomed the signing of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union. Of 1,033

polled, 18 per cent felt that the Treaty went "a long way towards the maintenance of world peace," while 56 per cent saw it as "a small but significant step."

N.B. For a more detailed analysis of the CIIPS/Longwoods opinion survey, see Don Munton, "Where Does Canada's Security Lie?", Peace & Security, Winter 1987/88, Vol. 2, No. 4, pp. 2-3; and Don Munton, Peace and Security in the 1980's: The View of Canadians, CIIPS Working Paper, January 1988.

Appendix 5**Strategic Nuclear Balance****United States**

	launchers	warheads	yield (Mt)	total warheads
ICBMs				
Minuteman II	465	1	1.20	465
Minuteman III	210	3	0.17	630
Minuteman III 12A	300	3	0.33	925
				(25 spares)
MX	45	10	0.30	450
SLBMs				
Poseidon C3	265	10	0.04	2650
Trident C4	400	8	0.10	3200
Bombers				
B-52 G	167			
B-52 H	96			
B-1B	99			

Source: Natural Resources Defense Council, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Vol. 1: US Forces and Capabilities (Revised edition) (forthcoming, Spring 1989).

Strategic Nuclear Balance

Soviet Union

	launchers	warheads	yield (Mt)	total warheads
ICBMs				
SS-11	420	1	1.00	420
SS-13	60	1	0.60	60
SS-17	130	4	0.75	520
SS-18	308	10	0.50	3080
SS-19	350	6	0.55	2100
SS-24	20	10	0.50	200
SS-25	126	1	0.55	126
SLBMs				
SS-N-6	256	1	1.00	256
SS-N-8	286	1	0.80	286
SS-N-17	12	1	1.00	12
SS-N-18	224	7	0.20	1568
SS-N-20	100	10	0.50	1000
SS-N-23	64	4	0.25	256
Bombers				
Bear A	24			
Bear B/C	30			
Bear G	45			
Bear H	60			

Source:

Natural Resources Defense Council, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Vol. IV: Soviet Nuclear Forces (forthcoming, Winter 1989).

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