



STATEMENTS AND SPEECHES

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THE FAR EASTERN SITUATION

Statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L.B. Pearson, introducing the debate on external affairs, made in the House of Commons, March 24, 1955.

Mr. Speaker, this motion gives us an opportunity each year to review some of the important international developments which have taken place, and more particularly Canada's relationship to those developments.

Although I may be required to speak at some length, I doubt whether I shall be able to cover all the points which will be in the minds of hon. members; but if matters arise during the course of the discussion on which I have not touched in my review I shall of course be glad to do my best to deal with them when I wind up the debate. Even a partial summary of these developments will indicate - this will be no surprise to the House - that Canada's international responsibilities have increased, are increasing, and with international conditions as they are, are not likely to diminish in the foreseeable future.

There are a number of reasons for this trend. One of them, of course, is the growing interdependence of all people and this, among other things, is the direct result of modern technical and scientific developments, especially in communications, which show no sign of slowing down. These developments certainly increase man's mastery over nature, and could make possible greater material welfare than he has ever dreamed of; but they also increase and make even more complicated relationships between nations.

Another factor, of course, bearing on our increased responsibility has been the striking growth of our country in strength and in authority. This has made possible an increase in the influence which Canada can expect on the course of international affairs. That influence in this day of super powers is not, or is very rarely, decisive. It may not always be very important; but a country like Canada with a special and close relationship to London and to Washington has unique opportunities through normal diplomatic and governmental contacts and in other ways to exert on occasion a special influence on those capitals and thereby influence the course of events, and I hope in the right direction.

Our effectiveness in this regard, however, will depend not only on the way we accept and discharge our own international responsibilities but also on the reputation that we acquire and maintain for sound and

objective judgment and action. In this respect we are, I think, very fortunate in having a good deal of credit on which to draw for use with both the United States and the United Kingdom Governments and we should, of course, try not to dissipate it. A quick way to do that would be to issue bad cheques on that credit; and that applies to other countries, of course, in their relations with us.

These long term trends are continuing to emphasize the growing responsibility of Canada and other governments in the field of international relations, and in particular the responsibilities without our own governmental framework of the Department of External Affairs. In conditions of tension and cold war a country's foreign service is unquestionably a part of its first line of defence.

I wish to say something about the international situation within which the government's external policy has to operate. A few weeks ago, in connection with the debate on the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to NATO, the House had a full discussion of the situation in Europe, which I take it need not be repeated on this occasion. I might say, however, that since that time the process of ratification of the Paris Agreements has gone ahead and at the present time, Parliamentary action has been completed in respect of that ratification by the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, Norway, Iceland, Portugal, Greece, Turkey, Italy and Canada.

The final stage - I devoutly hope it will be the final stage - in Parliamentary consideration of this matter in Paris is taking place today and tomorrow. I think, that action will be taken within the next day or so by the French Government, with similar action to be taken by a few other governments, which would then make possible the restoration of freedom and sovereignty for the Federal Republic of Germany and the accession of that government to the Atlantic community.

I think that on this particular occasion hon. members would wish me to concentrate on the Far East, where after all the majority of mankind live and which at this moment provides more than one area of tension.

I believe it is advisable to examine these tensions against the proper background of political and economic movement. I suppose from the long term point of view the most significant of all political developments of the past decade, or indeed possibly the past quarter century, has been the national awakening of the hundreds of millions in those nations and their insistent demand for economic, social and political progress for a better life.

The emergence of Asian independent states in India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, the Philippines, Indonesia, Korea, Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia, may well have the greatest possible significance to the future of humanity. So, too, but in a different way, may be development of a strong, centralized, despotic, communistic regime on the mainland of China. Canada has welcomed the growth of national freedom and democracy among the peoples of Asia, but the spread of

communism in China and indeed in other parts of Asia and the actions of the communist rulers of the Peking regime that has now secured effective control of the Chinese mainland, have caused deep and understandable anxiety in our own country and indeed in the whole of the non-communist world. At three points on the periphery of China there has been armed conflict in recent years, and in each case this has threatened the peace of the world. These three points are, of course, Indochina, Korea and Formosa. I shall have something to say about each of these areas in a few minutes, but first I think it is important to put all of this in the framework of the growth of communism in Asia; which has ambitions to control and exploit the Asian peoples through a strong and autocratic communistic government in Peking. This problem of communism in Asia is certainly not a simple one, and there are no simple solutions for it. It will not be solved by merely denouncing it, and certainly not by ignoring it. It is more important to try and understand its origins and purposes and to discover the sources of its support.

The communist movement in Asia is not simply a conspiracy of evil and alien forces seeking power and domination; unfortunately it is more than that. It has secured too many followers who see in it, at least until they have acquired some experience of its workings in government, a means of improving the welfare and happiness of their own people and ensuring their freedom from western pressure and control. Therefore I feel we shall not make much appeal to the peoples of Asia unless we make clear to them that while we denounce communistic doctrines and methods we wholeheartedly support the ideals of these people for liberation from hunger, misery and outside domination.

To understand the people of Asia and to live in terms of friendship with them requires, of course, on our part and on the part of western peoples both patience and tolerance. It requires also an effort of imagination. We have to try to see ourselves as the Asians see us. It is difficult for us, for example, to understand the intense preoccupation of the people and the new leaders of free Asia with the question of colonialism and imperialism, because we know that the former imperial powers have already withdrawn or are not in a position to dominate, even if they would. The governments and peoples of those same erstwhile imperial powers are among our closest friends in the world and we see in them people who, far from being enemies of freedom, nourish it in Asia itself as elsewhere, and are now able and willing to assist new and unsteady regimes to master their political and economic problems.

From the facts of their own history Canadians should understand, however, the viewpoint of Asians that self-government is more important even than good government. We should understand also the mistrust and suspicions of those who for years have felt themselves - possibly not at all times justifiably - to be the victims of prejudice and at times of racial arrogance. If we remember these things now, we may be able better to understand why so many Asians fail to see as clearly as we do the gulf which divides communism from democracy, and why they are so reluctant to join our side without reservations.

Along with this feeling of nationalism and anti-colonialism which has contributed to the strength of communism in Asia, increasing attention is being paid now to the social and economic sources of communism. We have talked about this matter more than once in this House. It is of course, an important aspect of the problem. No one would deny that hunger entices men to communism. The false promises of plenty are always an appealing argument to the destitute. We in the west have shown our awareness of this argument by various programmes of economic and technical assistance. This assistance should help to reduce the impulse toward communism by raising the standard of living, and by proving that it is possible to do it without the loss of political freedom and within a democratic system.

But I suggest that we should not forget that these social and economic aspects are only one element of this complex problem. I think there is a danger of oversimplifying the issues in Asia in these terms. Confronted by the appalling defence and political problems involved in the emergence of a free Asia, it is easy to lapse into the comfortable belief that we can save Asia - and that is how it is often put - with economic aid alone; that we can buy off communism and purchase peace for ourselves merely by stepping up our economic assistance.

That, as I see it, is unhappily nothing but a comforting illusion; and in saying that I do not minimize the importance of such economic assistance. What we are seeking to do, of course, in the Western World is help the Asian people to help themselves. That continent, I make bold to say, will not be saved or even, in the long run, helped by aimless assistance or by making political support a condition for such assistance, or by westerners attempting to assume the direction of political and economic forces in these Asian states, however benevolent their intentions. The danger to Asia comes from weaknesses which will not be removed merely by dumping in millions and millions of dollar or sterling aid for projects not carefully enough planned.

The west can help in this way, of course; but the west can help even more by co-operating in a partnership of mutual understanding, respect and support with genuine leaders of the Asian peoples. Democracy - and it does not necessarily need to be our type of Parliamentary democracy - can be established in those areas only by the efforts of the people themselves. Therefore, as I see it, the main problem at this time for Asians is to organize, as some Asian states have done, governments and administrations which are strong enough, free enough and incorruptible enough to make use of western assistance and support in helping to establish the conditions of law and order, freedom and prosperity which alone can counter the appeal of communism.

I do not know of any place where a more significant effort is being made to work out these problems with all their ramifications along all the sectors of this front than in Indochina. I should therefore like to say a few words about the situation

there, more particularly because of our participation, with India and Poland, in the supervision of the cease-fire settlements in Indochina.

The settlement reached at Geneva last July comprised cease-fire agreements for Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia. These provided for the establishment of three separate international supervisory commissions, each made up of representatives of India, Poland and Canada, and each charged with the task of supervising the carrying out of the cease-fire agreement for the particular country to which it was assigned. In each case, however - and this point is sometimes forgotten - the execution of the terms of the cease-fire agreement is the responsibility of the two sides directly concerned. The international commissions have no enforcement powers and their functions are purely mediatory, judicial and supervisory.

In Viet Nam the main provisions of the cease-fire agreement for withdrawal and re-development of French forces from north Viet Nam and Viet Minh forces from the south have so far been carried out reasonably well. This regroupment process which is to be completed, I believe, by May 18 has taken place without serious incident and is now well advanced. That is no mean achievement. I think we can take some satisfaction from the knowledge that the international commission, with Canadian membership, in its supervisory role and through mediation has helped to bring about this situation.

In relation to those clauses of the cease-fire agreement designed to maintain the military status quo and forbidding the introduction into Viet Nam of fresh troops, arms or munitions except on a restricted replacement basis, the international commission through its inspection teams, fixed and mobile, has tried to maintain a check on men and materials entering the country. It has taken some time to establish the inspection machinery which is required for this purpose, and I certainly am not yet in a position to say how effective it will prove to be.

In other parts of the world we have already had some experience with the difficulties encountered by international commissions with communist representation in an effort to police activities of this kind. Hence in Viet Nam, if one of the parties to the agreement is determined to circumvent these provisions of the agreement the international commission is not likely to be able to prevent it, though the inspection activities which are possible and which are being undertaken will certainly make, and indeed are making, violations more difficult.

With respect to those provisions of the cease-fire agreements relating to the right of democratic freedom and the movement of refugees, the record is not satisfactory. This has been a matter of great concern to us in view of our responsibility on this commission, because it has involved the fate of many thousands of Christians who have suddenly found themselves under the hard and intolerant rule of a communist administration. Our own representative on the Viet Nam commission has spared no effort to see to it that the commission does all within its power to facilitate the movement of persons from one zone to the other as is provided in the armistice

agreement itself. In this the commission has had some success; but it has also encountered difficulties, particularly, it is fair to add, because of the obstructive tactics of the communist government in northern Viet Nam. But here again it must be remembered that the responsibility for carrying out the terms of the agreement rests solely with the parties, who must cooperate with at least a minimum of good faith if the provisions of the armistice are to be properly implemented. All the commission can do is mediate, supervise and conciliate; it cannot enforce.

Notwithstanding these limitations on its powers and certain delays and obstructions that it has encountered - and they all have not been in the north - it is true to say that thousands of refugees from the north are now free in southern Viet Nam because of the international commission. As a matter of fact I think there has been a movement southward of something near half a million refugees. Most of them of course went south before the commission was established.

Our responsibilities on the supervisory commission in Viet Nam do not at the present time extend beyond the supervision of the implementation of the cease-fire agreement. The governments represented on that commission have not received any invitation or directive from the Geneva conference powers with respect to the supervision of elections that are to take place in due course in Viet Nam, as envisaged in the final declaration of the Geneva conference. It is expected, however, that we will be asked to do this along with the other two governments represented on the commission. So far as we are concerned, the responsibilities and procedures regarding the holding of elections would have to be defined satisfactorily and clearly by agreement between the parties concerned before we would be willing to undertake specific tasks in that connection as members of an international commission.

Now just a word about Laos, the second of these three countries. The main problem facing the commission in Laos has to do with the two northern provinces of Phong Saly and Sam Neua where the fighting forces of the so-called Pathet Lao, which have communist support, were concentrated pending a political settlement and their subsequent reintegration into the national community of Laos. So far as these northern areas of Laos are concerned, all you have to do is look at a map of that part of the world to realize their strategic importance, standing as they do between northern Viet Nam and Thailand. These northern areas have been the scene of numerous incidents involving both the communist Pathet Lao forces on the one hand and the royal Laotian forces on the other, and for which the former must bear the main share of responsibility.

Unfortunately, the commission's teams have not always been able to investigate these incidents as promptly or as thoroughly as was desirable. There is always a lack of communication facilities in that part of the country, and I am bound to say there has been no lack of communist obstruction. It is to be hoped that this state of affairs, which has caused us real anxiety on the commission, will be remedied. On the whole, however, the military provisions of the Laotian agreement have been fairly

satisfactorily carried out, and I think the presence in that country at this time of an international commission has done a great deal to prevent a recurrence of open and possibly serious hostilities.

The third country in which we are involved is Cambodia. Perhaps the most important problem there is reintegrating into the national community the indigenous resistance forces, which again have received communist support. It is our hope that Canada, as a member of that commission, will be able to help pave the way to a prosperous and peaceful future in that country. It was reported a few days ago in the press that the king of Cambodia abdicated because of the unjustified interference of the commission in domestic concerns of that country, more particularly in his desire to have the people vote on a new constitution. There is no ground for that charge nor has there been any unwarranted interference of any kind by the commission in the domestic affairs of that country. Some intervention has been necessary under the terms of the armistice. The commission has not gone beyond those terms.

Before going on to other matters I should like to pay tribute and I know the House will agree with me in this, to the very fine and unselfish work which is being done by our people in Indochina, not only by the chief commissioner, a very distinguished Canadian who has served his country well both in peace and war, Mr. Sherwood Lett, and the other Canadian commissioners who are members of the External Affairs Department, but by all the members of our armed services and our foreign service, numbering now something over 160, who are in these three countries. Many of them have to work and live under conditions of discomfort, hardship and even danger. They are, however, carrying out their difficult assignments with resourcefulness, with devotion, with patience and skill. Theirs is an important contribution to the maintenance of peace in Indochina, and they are making a fine impression wherever they work as representatives of Canada.

I should like particularly to pay my deep respect to the memory of Mr. Jack Thurrott, one of our department's foreign service officers, who had his promising career cut short in Indochina when he met with a tragic accident while serving as political adviser to the Canadian commissioner in Laos.

To the question as to how long Canadians are committed to serve with these commissions in these far-off countries, the very names of which were unfamiliar to most of our people only a short time ago, there is no simple answer. The agreements themselves are not specific on the point. We intend to keep our representatives there as long, but only as long, as they can make a useful contribution to the implementation of the armistice agreement reached at Geneva, and therefore to peace in that part of the world.

The second sector of the three I have mentioned is Korea. The last time I reported to the House on Korea was on June 11 last. I said then, referring to the Geneva Conference which was then meeting, that if some satisfactory answers were not soon forthcoming from the communist side of that conference on the matter of free

elections and all that implied, and if the communist powers at Geneva were not prepared to agree to international supervision of an election by a workable commission acceptable to the United Nations and composed of genuine neutrals, the United Nations side might shortly have to consider whether it was worth while continuing the effort at Geneva to reach agreement for the peaceful unification of Korea.

Shortly after I made that statement the communist representatives at Geneva made it crystal clear that they would neither agree to a Korea united through genuinely free elections nor accept the mandate of the United Nations mission in the divided peninsula. So the conference ended on June 15, as there was no useful purpose to be served in continuing it.

Subsequently the participating member states on our side informed the United Nations in a joint report of the failure of the conference. When the last session of the General Assembly reached the Korean item on its agenda the communists had not at that time given any indication of a change in their position, so the assembly could make no move last autumn in New York toward the achievement of peace and unification on any satisfactory basis. All that could be done was to pass a resolution, and that was done by a vote of 50 to 5, approving the report reaffirming the United Nations objective in Korea, and expressing the hope that progress toward this might soon be made. Should the communist position on these matters change we would favour resumption of negotiations.

How could such negotiations best be conducted if the circumstances were propitious for them? The Korean question remains before the United Nations; yet it is clear now, of course, that it cannot be peacefully resolved without the concurrence of the North Korean and Chinese communist governments, governments which are not members of the United Nations and which have defied its charter.

At Geneva negotiations were conducted outside of the United Nations, but in conformity with its principles. If further efforts to unify Korea peacefully are to be made then the United Nations will have to face the problem of finding an acceptable procedure for sponsoring negotiations which, to have any chance of success, will have to include these two non-members, North Korea and communist China.

And now I should say something about Formosa, the third sector of what I might call this Far Eastern front. I should like to try to explain as briefly as possible why the situation which has arisen in the Formosan straits is so worrying, and indeed so potentially explosive; particularly our own concern with and relationship to that situation. On the substance of the matter I have not very much to add to what I said in the House in January and last month, because the policy I stated then has not been altered. But there have been certain new developments.

It is reassuring, for instance, that the evacuation of thousands of civilians and soldiers from the Tachen and Nankishen Islands has taken place without any serious incident. The decision to evacuate these islands was, if not an easy one, certainly a wise one for the Chinese nationalist government to make. The Chinese

communists wisely did not attempt to interfere with these operations. Their completion without warlike incident does show at least that hostilities can be avoided in operations of this kind if restraint is exercised on both sides.

There is naturally much concern in all our minds - and that concern has been voiced in the House - as to what the Chinese communists have in mind regarding Formosa and those few coastal islands which still remain in the hands of the Chinese nationalists. It is devoutly to be hoped that the Chinese communists do not, by the use of force, renew the war over those islands, the consequences of which might spread further. Yet their words do not give us much comfort in this regard, if we are to judge their future actions by their past words.

It has been argued, especially by some of our Asian friends, that the leaders of the Peking Government are inspired more by Chinese than by communist aspirations; more by the desire to work out a national revolution than to precipitate an international one by interference in the affairs of their neighbours. True, they have embarked - that is the Peking government - upon an enormous programme of industrial and agricultural development, and it would seem foolhardy for them to risk all this in military adventures. Unfortunately, however, it is not possible to count upon the wisdom or restraint of a regime of this kind. The combination of national revolutionary fervour with the messianic delusions of communist ideology have in the past and can in the future prove dangerous. The Chinese communists may not be intent upon a career of Asian aggression and expansion, but their determination to pursue what they claim to be their legitimate interests has already led them to ignore the legitimate interests and security of other peoples, and may do so again. And that possibility certainly contains a serious threat to peace.

And so we cannot ignore in this connection the communist intention, loudly and frequently proclaimed, to attack and occupy Formosa and the islands. We can, however, having regard to declared United States policy to help in the defence of Formosa, retain strong doubts about their capacity to achieve this objective in the near future by any direct assault. To maintain an amphibious or airborne attack 100 miles across the Formosa straits would be a hazardous operation for a land power like communist China and would certainly strain its as yet limited resources, much more than did the operations in Korea.

The Chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Radford, was asked in an interview a few weeks ago what he thought of the Chinese communists' ability to carry out their threat to, as they put it, liberate Formosa. Admiral Radford's reply was:

"They cannot do it at this time. They just do not have the military capability to carry out an amphibious operation of the scale required, particularly in view of the announced United States position and the immediate availability of United States naval and air forces to counter such an operation."

That was Admiral Radford's conclusion, and that same conclusion has led many to doubt that the communists have in mind an invasion of the coastal islands of Quemoy and Matsu as a prelude to or part of an attack on Formosa. In any event, it would be tragic if widespread hostilities, or indeed hostilities of any kind, were to develop over the possession of these two islands which are, in effect, part of the Chinese mainland, and the strategic role of which would seem to be more important in the defence of that mainland against attack than in offensive action against Formosa and the Pescadores.

This problem of Formosa and the coastal islands is one of the most difficult which the free world at this moment has to face. It is one on which it is possible for friends and allies to honestly hold different opinions. Although the basic issues between the free world and the communist world are clear enough, we have here a dispute in which that clarity is not, to say the least, obvious. On the one hand, I think we have to recognize that in dangerous times like these positions which are demonstrably of tactical or strategic advantage in the struggle with communist aggression or imperialism cannot lightly be abandoned in the face of communist threats by those who hold them. Formosa is considered by many to be one such important position. There is also - and this has been particularly emphasized in Washington - the political problem arising out of the bad effect on morale in Formosa and in neighbouring free Asian states, if further losses or retreats take place in the face of Chinese communist attack or pressure or both.

Then, finally, the people of Formosa, about whom we do not hear very much, unfortunately, in connection with these matters, and those Chinese from the mainland who have fled there from communism, have a claim to consideration, both in respect of proposals to hand them over to a communist regime against their will, and in respect of proposals to involve them in a Chinese civil war without any regard to their own wishes.

So, in a situation as complex as that, it is not surprising that there are doubts and divisions among the governments and the peoples of the non-communist world. But it would be a sorry development if these were allowed to split or seriously weaken our peace coalition. It is true that some members of that coalition, including Canada, cannot subscribe to all aspects of United States policy in this Asian area, especially in regard to the coastal islands. But we are certain, I am sure, that that policy is not intended to lead to conflict. Personally I am satisfied that those who are directing it in Washington feel that it will help to avoid rather than provoke conflict.

In any event it is United States policy determined by the United States and embodied in a bilateral security treaty which she has signed with the Chinese Nationalist Government. Canada, of course, is not a part to or not committed by that treaty or that policy. We certainly have the right to comment on that policy but we should be careful, I suggest, that our comments on it are constructive and responsible, and not merely negative and divisive. Carping and unbalanced criticism is, to say the least, unhelpful at this time, or indeed at any time.

What is the United States position? In regard to Formosa itself, as I have said, the United States is firmly committed to its defence by treaty, even though the legal and political status of that island may be uncertain. But - and this is often forgotten - that same treaty gives the United States the right to restrain aggressive Chinese nationalist action from Formosa.

What about the coastal islands of Quemoy and Matsu, the immediate point of armed conflict between the two Chinas, and therefore the point of most immediate danger? United States policy here is based on acceptance of the responsibility to make secure and protect "positions and territories" which in the judgment of the President, "are necessary to, or related to the defence of Formosa." That does not involve a commitment or a purpose, as Mr. Dulles put it in New York on February 17, to "defend the coastal islands, as such"; but, he added, the Chinese communists themselves have "linked the coastal positions to the defence of Formosa". Therefore, in his own words, the United States "will be alert to Chinese communist actions, rejecting for ourselves any initiative of warlike deeds".

As I understand it, this is a warning to the Peking government not to use force against these islands, preparatory to attack or as a build-up for an attack on Formosa. The President alone has the power to decide at the time whether such an attack is local against the islands or a stage in an assault on Formosa itself. Mr. Dulles restated that position on March 8, and he added something to his earlier statement when, in discussing the responsibility of the President in this matter, he said:

"How to implement this flexible defence of Formosa the President will decide in the light of his judgment as to the over-all value of certain coastal positions to the defence of Formosa and the cost of holding these positions."

Well, that is not going to be an easy decision for the President to make if unfortunately the time ever arises that he has to make it. If it has to be made, I am glad the decision is in the hands of a man like President Eisenhower, a man of character and integrity, with a passion for peace.

On their part, the Chinese communists insist that these islands are part of the mainland of their own country and that if Chiang Kai-shek's troops do not evacuate them they will be driven out.

The possibility of serious trouble arising out of these conflicting positions is obvious and creates understandable and real anxiety, because the consequences might involve more than the two Chinese governments.

The Canadian position on this matter has been stated in the House. We have accepted no commitment to share in the defence of either Formosa or the coastal islands, or to intervene in any struggle between the two Chinese governments for possession of these off-shore islands. Our obligations in this matter arise only out of our responsibilities as a member of the United Nations, and I have stated in this House what those are. We also

think that a distinction, politically and strategically, can be made between Formosa and the coastal islands; also indeed between Formosa and Korea. Nevertheless, the fact that we have no commitments certainly does not mean that we have no concern. We have a deep and abiding concern because of considerations which make isolation from these questions well nigh impossible.

There is first our general concern with peace and anything that might threaten it. Then there is our special concern with United States policy from the consequences of which Canada, a North American country, cannot escape. Finally there is our close concern with anything that weakens - as this question may - that coalition the strength and unity of which, under the leadership of the United States, is at present the strongest deterrent against communist aggression and war.

I have said only recently, as many others have said before me, that it would be impossible, in my view, for either the United States or Canada to be neutral if the people of the other country were engaged in a major war in which their very existence as a people was at stake, and that in working out our foreign and our defence policies we can never forget that fact. By "we" I mean the United States as well as Canada. I think that is self evident. It is one of the facts of international life which we, and indeed other countries, have accepted. We in Canada have already recognized that fact by our membership in NATO. We have recognized it also in our North American continental defence arrangements which are and must be, to be effective, on a joint basis and closely co-operative.

Canadians, and I believe Americans also, understand and accept the inescapable interdependence of Canada and the United States in the policies required for our joint security and for the preservation of peace. We cannot, therefore, isolate ourselves from the implications of that interdependence, if either country were ever attacked by an aggressor. If these implications at times cause anxiety on our part, as they do, we certainly would have far greater cause for anxiety if there were no recognition across the border of any such mutual security and defence relationship, or no recognition of our right to make our views known on matters which may be primarily the responsibility of Washington.

There are two main reasons, I think, why the people of Canada do understand and accept this situation. The first is that any war in which we were jointly engaged would be a defensive one. It is inconceivable to Canadians, it is inconceivable certainly to me, that the United States would ever initiate an aggressive war. It is also inconceivable that Canada would ever take part in such a war.

The second reason, as I see it, is that the only aggressive force that threatens us today, or that could commit a major aggression, is communist imperialism. Does anybody believe that we could or should keep out of an all-out struggle precipitated by communist aggressive power which, if victorious, would end everything that makes for free and decent existence?

That, then is the meaning of the proposition I have advanced, of the inevitability of close, co-operative arrangements with the United States in maintaining the peace and in joint defence against a major attack. This means, as the United Nations and NATO meant, that our right to be neutral has been limited by our desire to strengthen the security of our country and protect the peace. It does not mean, although I have heard it mis-stated in these terms that whenever the United States is engaged in any kind of war, we are at war.

Only the other day I was reading an editorial in a Canadian paper which analysed very correctly what I was trying to say in Toronto the other day. After reading that editorial I went on to read a news story about the same subject and over that news story in large red type were these words: "U.S. Wars are ours". Nothing I have said today, or nothing I have said before means that.

It certainly does not mean that we must participate in limited or peripheral wars, although because of the danger of such wars spreading it gives us the right and the duty to express our concern, not only in Washington but also in London or in the United Nations or in NATO, over situations or policies that might lead to conflict. It also makes it imperative on all of us to prevent local conflicts, not only because they are war - war is war whether local or general - but also because they can spread and cover the world. In that case there would be no future for any of us, because a war that covered the world would be a nuclear war.

This view that we could not be neutral in a major war when the very existence of the people of the United States was at stake, far from representing an abdication of responsibility for our foreign policy, extends and deepens that responsibility. It underlines our right and our obligation to concern ourselves with and make our views known on the policies of others, especially of the United States, when questions of peace and war are involved. Its possession of the greatest power in the world gives us, I think, the right to be especially pre-occupied with the policies of the United States. It makes consultation and a continuous exchange of views imperative. It emphasizes our obligation to do everything possible to avoid every kind of war, big or little.

That is one reason why we were so glad to welcome to Ottawa in recent days the Secretary of State of the United States, and to discuss with him very frankly and very fully United States policy and our own policy on these matters. It has been argued - I commend this to the hon. member for Winnipeg North Centre (Mr. Knowles) - that if the Americans know we accept the proposition that in the circumstances I have mentioned Canada and the United States must stand together, Washington will no longer pay much if any attention to anything we say; they will, if I may use a colloquialism, feel that they have us in the bag. Of course the exact contrary is the case, as is shown by the reply Mr. Dulles made to a question asked at his press conference in this city last Friday. I should like to put this question and answer on the record, and I quote:

Q. Mr. Pearson said that in the event of a major war it would be impossible for Canada to stand aloof if the United States was at war. Some people interpreted that to mean the United States can now count on Canada in an emergency and therefore you will not pay as much attention to any protest against American foreign policy you get from Ottawa.

A. It is decidedly not true. The extent to which our countries can count upon each other depends primarily upon whether or not we each conduct ourselves in a way which wins the moral approval and support of the other.

Then he went on:

"Now there are, to be sure, explicit engagements which are expressed in the North Atlantic Treaty. Aside from that, the question of whether we support each other depends on the judgment that each country has of the other. I would not expect that Canada would blindly support the United States and I suppose the Canadian people would not expect to count on the support of the United States if they should engage in a venture which alienated public opinion in the United States.

"It is highly unlikely that those contingencies will occur, because we do have the same ideals, and because we do keep in touch with each other. Common action depends, for its mainspring, upon what our declaration of independence calls 'a decent respect for the opinions of mankind'. That relationship makes it sure that each of our countries will seek and pay heed to the views of the other."

Mr. Dulles also had something interesting to say in reply to one other question at the same conference, and I quote:

Q. Mr. Secretary, in the present situation around Formosa and the offshore islands, if something should arise does the United States count on the support of Canada?

A. That is entirely a matter for the Canadians to decide for themselves. There are no treaty engagements of any kind other than perhaps the United Nations Charter which create any obligations on the part of Canada in relation to that part of Therefore, we do not count on them in the sense that there is any obligation or undertaking. Naturally, we always hope and believe that our conduct will be such as to win the moral support and approval of other free nations, and particularly of the Canadian people.

While believing strongly in the view that the destinies of our two countries are intertwined in the way I have already indicated and as Mr. Dulles has indicated, as well as many others, I want to reaffirm my view that we could not stand aloof from a major war which threatened the very existence of the people of the United States; but I must add in all frankness that I do

not consider a conflict between two Chinese governments for possession of these Chinese coastal islands, Quemoy or the Matsus, to be such a situation, or one requiring any Canadian intervention in support of the Chinese nationalist regime. That view has already been made known more than once to our friends in Washington.

What I fear most in this matter is that even limited intervention, defensive in purpose, by the United States might have a chain reaction with unforeseen consequences which would cause the conflict to spread far beyond the locality where it began, and even across the ocean. If a little war were to spread like this it could become literally the little war before the last. That is why, may I repeat, we in Canada are definitely and deeply concerned in this particular issue, as we would be in any other peripheral conflict involving the United States, even though we might have no commitments in regard to it which would put us under any obligation for participation, except that which would flow out of our United Nations membership.

That is also one of the reasons we have to keep in the closest possible touch with Washington, as well as with London and New Delhi and other friendly capitals, on all these matters, and more particularly on these Formosan matters. I have personally more than once made known our views, our serious doubts and anxieties to the Secretary of State on this matter and have received from him a full statement of the United States position and the reason it has been adopted. He has confirmed the view, which I have already expressed, that there is no aggressive purpose of any kind behind that United States position.

It seems to me that the first requirement at the moment for the avoidance of conflict is for both Chinese sides to refrain from using force, particularly - this is the immediate danger point - against or from the coastal islands, but also against or from Formosa. We can certainly agree, I think, with Mr. Dulles when he said in New York in that speech which I have already mentioned:

"We do not expect the Chinese communists to renounce their ambitions. However, might they not renounce their efforts to realize their goals by force?"

If the Chinese communists have a case in this matter, then there are ways and means by which civilized countries can attempt peacefully to settle these disputes, both inside and outside the United Nations. An effort has already been launched in the security council to bring about a cease-fire as a preliminary to a political settlement based on reason and justice. The response to this initiative by the Peking regime was a summary refusal, but the council has shown great restraint in order to keep the door open for a peaceful solution whenever this can be obtained.

For the moment, however, I think there is a greater chance of finding a solution by direct diplomatic negotiation, which is presently going on, than by the use of the security council or even by calling a conference outside the United Nations. The main difficulty in the

first case, a meeting of the Security Council, arises over the fact that the Chinese Communist Government is not a member of the United Nations and now refuses to participate in a United Nations meeting at which China is represented by the Chinese Nationalist Government. The main difficulty in the second case, a conference outside the United Nations, is, I think, that it would be premature at this juncture, even if it were possible to get the two Chinese governments into the same room.

Although efforts that have been made have not yet resulted in any solution, we do not need to despair or abandon these efforts, which as I have said are taking place through diplomatic channels. What has been accomplished has revealed indications on the communist side of at least a desire to avoid all-out war.

In the age of the hydrogen bomb a readiness to negotiate may be inspired not by love but by fear. Whatever may be the cause, there is some reason to hope that all the parties concerned may at least be looking for a solution which they could dare to accept. If this is the case, then it would be great folly to miss any opportunity for negotiation which might present itself; even worse folly to destroy all such peaceful possibility by falling back again on the use of force. If a settlement could be reached over this most acute of all recent disputes, the free world might conceivably find itself in a position from which it could proceed, even if slowly, laboriously and fitfully, to establish a framework of peace and political stability in the Far East. The search for that peace and stability may require strong defences, but no solution will be found merely by putting a sterile reliance exclusively on those defences. That is one reason why I should say a few words about the disarmament discussion which is taking place in London at the present time, and concerning which some questions have been asked in this house.

As hon. members know, there is a sub-commission of five powers, and Canada is one of them, now meeting in London to discuss the limitation of armaments that are now ironically called both conventional and atomic weapons. That sub-commission of five is meeting again after having met last spring as a result of a United Nations Assembly resolution last fall with which my hon. friend the Minister of National Health and Welfare (Mr. Martin) had a great deal to do. That meeting in London is taking place in the awful shadow of the hydrogen bomb, which should be incentive enough for achievement. Hon. members will recall that last spring four-power proposals were put forward for limitation of armaments, atomic and conventional, by stages, with effective and complete control and inspection at every stage.

I cannot say much about what is going on in London because those meetings are being held in confidence; and although Pravda in Moscow, the organ of the Soviet Government, has today given a contentious and distorted account of what is happening there and has broken the confidence to that extent, I do not propose to follow that example. I can say, however, as I said the other day, that while the lack of progress is discouraging that is no reason why we should call off the negotiations. It is far too early to say yet that these negotiations must

break down in failure and futility. There is every reason why they should not. If they can only succeed in taking one step forward that would do something to remove that fear in the world which is the father of armaments.

It may also be, and I do not want to go into the details of this, that the introduction of the H-bomb into these discussions has really brought in a new element, and it may be that all of us will have to take a new look at this problem. The approach we have been making in the past has depended for any success on an agreement over a complete and foolproof system of international control. That is going to be more difficult than ever in the light of these new weapons which lend themselves even less than previous weapons did to such inspection and control. But without some kind of control and inspection which would give us a basis for confidence in any agreements reached being observed, any disarmament proposals under the present circumstances of fear and contention would merely be a cruel and hypocritical delusion and could be put forward only for propaganda.

The stakes are too high in this matter to call any discussions off quickly. We are told by scientists there is no means of ensuring complete or even adequate defence against these nuclear weapons and the means of carrying and dropping them on great masses of people. Therefore we must concentrate more than ever not only, I suggest, on the limitation of armaments, important though that may be, but in the search for measures which will prevent war itself. What is certain is that the control of our power to destroy ourselves is a subject of such desperate importance that if either side should use it as a means of propaganda or counter propaganda it would be utter folly and might be supreme tragedy.

There are some who get comfort out of the conclusion that those new weapons are so annihilating that no side will dare use them if, it is certain that the other side will retaliate and has preserved the means to do so against surprise destruction. It was said by an authority whose words we always respect, I refer to Sir Winston Churchill, in the House of Commons in London the other day:

"It was an ironic fact that we had reached a stage where safety might well be the child of terror and life the twin brother of annihilation."

In other words, according to this view peace instead of resting on a balance of power now rests on a balance of terror. I think that in one sense it is true that the greatest deterrent against a general war, although not against a limited one, is the certainty of nuclear retaliation. In present circumstances that may be our best safeguard. If that is true it may give us some time which can and must be used for continuing the persistent and patient search for the solution to international problems and for the easing of international tensions. If we do not find such agreement and understanding then peace, such as it is, will be balanced on a hydrogen bomb or, to use

the words which Mr. Nehru used a few weeks ago in London:

"Mankind would be doomed to hover indefinitely on the brink of catastrophe."

To avoid such a fate demands, and I know it will receive, all the support, all the strength, the energy, wisdom and faith of every member of this House.

s/c