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

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
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SPEECH

BY

HON. R. DANDURAND

ON

THE NAVAL FORCES OF THE EMPIRE

OTTAWA, THURSDAY, MAY 29, 1913.

Hon. Mr. DANDURAND—Reading certain newspapers and listening to certain orations, one would believe that Canada is about to do something immediately which will assure the salvation of Great Britain. The words pronounced are so big, the flights of imagination so high, that it would really seem as if Great Britain at this moment needed some active and material support from Canada to maintain its prestige in the world. In reality the proposal before us bears on the building of three ships to be donated or loaned to the British admiralty. This gift, or this loan, may bulge out big in the eyes of Canadians, but I share the view expressed by my hon. friend from Ottawa when he declared that it looks small in the eyes of Great Britain and the British admiralty. It would be an addition, pure and simple, of three ships to the mighty fleet of Great Britain. Mr. Churchill said in the last days of March last:

It would be ridiculous to say that one or two ships more or less make any essential difference, having regard to the rest of the fleet.

That is the true situation from a British point of view. What does it represent in

money? A sum which may look considerable in the eyes of some Canadians, but which is small compared with the budget of Great Britain—\$35,000,000—about the surplus that Mr. Lloyd George, Chancellor of the Exchequer, announced last year. We should, I think, have a better sense of proportion. In the few remarks I made on the address at the opening of this session, I stated that my hon. friend the leader of the government would have to establish one or two things in order to satisfy me that we should enter into the policy set forth in this Bill. He would have to establish either that an emergency existed, or that the government had a mandate from the people. I will not deal with the first proposition, although my hon. friend summoned enough courage to repeat the expression and affirm that there was an emergency. I do not think this chamber needs any further argument to dismiss that contention. Should there be a pressing need, it would be in the future; it could not be a need for this day, inasmuch as it would take two to three years to build those ships. But I will be asked, 'Does not the memorandum which came from the admiralty and which was read to

the House of Commons by the right hon. the Prime Minister on the 5th December last, disclose a very serious situation? I draw the attention of the hon. gentlemen of this House to the fact that this memorandum speaks of conditions which were disclosed to the right hon. the Prime Minister in July last. What were the real conditions in July last?

The Right Hon. Lloyd George had announced a surplus of \$32,500,000. If there had been an apparent need, or one which should be met within three years, by laying down more keels in the shipyards, the government at that moment had the money to start on the building of more ships. They did not require to borrow in any other market or from their bankers. They had the money. But we heard the Prime Minister of England, just when these fearful conditions were being disclosed to our Prime Minister, state that there was no cause for alarm whatever. That speech of Mr. Asquith has been read. That was on the 22nd of July, just at the time when the admiralty was disclosing the conditions upon which this memorandum was based. It reads as follows:

I deprecate anything in the nature of a panic or scare. I do not think there is the least occasion for it.

There never has been a moment and there is not now when we have not been overwhelmingly superior in naval force against any combination which can reasonably be anticipated.

I have maintained the opinion in this House and elsewhere, that it is a very great mistake in such a shifting art as naval ship-building, to make your provisions too far in advance, or you may find you are left with ships that are obsolete, out of date, and which are not really fit for the growing requirements and exigencies of naval warfare, in which case you will have lost your money, and will have to spend it over again in having to provide substitutes. There are many illustrations of that in our past naval history and I should be sorry that we should repeat that experiment.

The Prime Minister of England was practically repeating the expressions of the first Lord of the Admiralty who had spoken before him, and not only did he declare that there was no emergency and no cause for alarm, but he said it would be improvident to start and build more ships. That was in July. And yet what do we find? After listening to the speech in which the Prime Minister says 'No, I have the money, I

could build the ships. I could increase the number of ships by laying down more keels in our shipyards. I will not do it. It would be improvident to do so, we are offering to Great Britain to start building ships at a time when the Prime Minister of Great Britain says he does not need them. He was not alone in this case. The two leaders of the opposition, the preceding leader and the present one who followed in the same debate, Bonar Law, said:

I am quite sure that if the country really believed there was danger they would refuse no possible security which the government would ask, but in spite of all that has been said, does the country, do the House of Commons, do any of us really believe there is danger and vital danger? I confess I have the greatest difficulty in believing it myself.

The Right Hon. Arthur Balfour said on the same day:

Looking at it from a naval point of view, it seems to me that the fleets of the triple entente are not inadequate now and are not going to be inadequate to any strain that is going to be placed upon them.

The first Lord of the Admiralty had emphasized the point that Great Britain had an ample margin of safety. The Prime Minister declared that it was improvident to build more ships. It is true that the officious organ—or is it the official organ—of the admiralty in the city of Montreal answered this argument that the Prime Minister of Great Britain has vouched for the perfect safety of the empire under the present conditions, that the affirmation was a diplomatic one, that the Prime Minister of Great Britain could not throw his cards on the table and speak to the world in language which would be alarming. That is the answer which was made. It was a specious one. Let us look at the facts. If the Prime Minister wanted to deceive he would have acted otherwise than he spoke, but he did not do so. He acted according to his declaration that there was no use, no necessity to increase the building of ships in July last. Now it seems to me that this disposes of the emergency.

Hon. Mr. DANIEL—The hon. gentleman has read statements of some of the cabinet ministers. Has he the statement that Mr. Churchill made in his last speech in regard to the necessity of increasing the navy, and if the ships were not supplied by Canada they would have to be supplied by somebody else?

Hon. Mr. DANDURAND—Yes, I will come to that. If the hon. gentleman will read that speech which I read this afternoon in toto—that is the speech of the 26th March—he will find the Right Hon. Winston Churchill stated that if those ships were not provided for, although they were not needed for Great Britain, they would be needed for the general welfare of the empire; but I will come to that point in a moment. He was reckoning on the offer of the prime ministers of Canada to give them three ships. He was disposing of them. He wanted them for a more important reason than that of strategy. I will establish that from 1887 to this date the admiralty has never faltered in its ardent desire of having money contributions from the dominions beyond the seas. I will demonstrate that fact to the satisfaction of my hon. friend and it may surprise him when I enter into that argument, because he may think that, once it is established that the admiralty has never deviated, from 1887 to the present time, from that one policy of contribution, our refusal to give the money must be scandalous. I will discuss that point later. Now there was no emergency in July last. The Prime Minister of England said so. The first Lord of the Admiralty said so. Was there a need? A need of what? Of money? They had announced a surplus of \$32,500,000 the preceding April—that is 6,500,000 pounds of a surplus. Yet I am confronted by the affirmation that the memorandum disclosed a very serious situation. I ask my hon. friends to read that memorandum. They will see nowhere the word 'emergency,' nowhere the word 'need,' nowhere the word 'contribution.' Mr. Borden admits that he approached the admiralty for information and the memorandum says so. I will readily confess that the information furnished was very skilfully and artfully written. It was skilfully prepared for a purpose. It was the last shot, in a long drawn struggle, coming from the admiralty. It was the last attempt to have Australia reverse its policy, of retaining the contribution of New Zealand and of getting the South African contribution to follow suit. If only they could persuade Canada to retrace its steps, to efface the resolution of the 29th March, 1909; if only they could catch that big fish, then they would

land the rest of the dominions, because it had been the constant desire of the admiralty that there should be money contributions and that there should be but one navy. We are face to face to-day, and we have been for a number of years with a conflict of principles. There have been two schools of thought. One that has held, as my hon. friend from Amherst has said, for one king, one flag and one navy. This is his policy. It is the policy of my hon. friend the leader of the government. This I think is also the new policy of the Prime Minister of Canada, and that is why, I am justified in asking if the electors of Canada have been made aware of this reversion of policy, and if they have approved of it. This conflict of principles is based upon the desire of the admiralty to have unity of command. They want unity of command in order to have the greater amount of strength under their control. That is indisputable. This desire is very clear and must be accepted as a true and orthodox one. A school of thinkers who have been trying to shape the destinies of the empire, have also thought that there should be concentration in England, unity of the empire in concentration, and they have therefore helped the admiralty in its desire of having but one navy. This is the situation in London with a certain group of men desiring to reorganize and confederate the empire and to have centralization at London. They see the glory and safety of the empire in unity and concentration. There is another school in Great Britain, but more particularly in the dominions beyond the seas, which sees greater strength in unity through local autonomy, and that school is comprised of the best thinkers in the dominions beyond the seas, as I shall have occasion to show.

At the Colonial conference of 1897, the First Lord of the Admiralty asked for a money contribution, and at that time Australia agreed to the demand. Again, in 1902, there was a call for a money contribution. Lord Selborne, the First Lord of the Admiralty, expressly asked for a contribution, and succeeded in getting the colonies to supply money to the admiralty with one exception—Canada. What did

the representatives of Canada answer? They said that their objection arose not so much from the expense involved, as from a belief that the acceptance of the proposal would entail an important departure from the principles of self-government, which had proved so great a factor in the promotion of imperial unity. That demand came from the First Lord of the Admiralty. But there was, as president of that conference, a gentleman who cherishes also the ideal of a united empire under the principle of concentration. Yet he saw the political aspect of the situation. Mr. Chamberlain said:

The link which unites us, almost invisible as it is, sentimental in its character, is one which we would gladly strengthen but it seems to me it has proved itself to be so strong that we would not wish to substitute for it a chain which might be galling in its incidence.

In 1902 all the colonies, except Canada, had consented to pay money to the British admiralty. At the conference of 1907 what do we find? The First Lord of the Admiralty, again representing the men who have but one point of view, the unit of command and strength of the British fleet, Lord Tweedmouth, said:

We thoroughly recognize that we are responsible for that defence. We want you to help us in that defence. We want you to give us all the assistance you can, but we do not come to you as beggars; we gladly take all that you can give us, but at the same time, if you are not inclined to give us the help that we hope to have from you, we acknowledge our absolute obligation to defend the King's dominions across the seas to the best of our ability.

There is one sea, there is one empire, and there is one navy, and I want to claim in the first place your help, and in the second place authority for the Admiralty to manage this great service without restraint.

That was Lord Tweedmouth's declaration. He spoke for the admiralty. Because of his political functions the Prime Minister has of course to take a wider vista of things, and this is what Mr. Campbell-Bannerman said in his address of welcome at the opening of the conference of 1907:

The First Lord of the Admiralty, in the same way, will be present when naval questions are discussed. On this I may say, that I think the views sometimes taken of the proper relations of the colonies to the mother country with respect to expenditure on arma-

ments have been, of late, somewhat modified. We do not meet you to-day as claimants for money, although we cordially recognize the spirit in which contributions have been made in the past, and will, no doubt, be made in the future. It is, of course, possible to over-estimate the importance of the requirements of the over-sea dominions as a factor in our expenditure; but however this may be, the cost of naval defence and the responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs hang together.

The admiralty was to receive its first setback at that conference. Things had run fairly smoothly in 1902; all the colonies except Canada had chipped in their money, but in 1907 the Prime Minister of Australia said:

The agreement to which we assented and which has still a few years to run will have to be put an end to, or when ended will not be renewed, because we are not satisfied that this is the best scheme in the interests of Australia or Great Britain for us to continue. We will henceforth develop our own navy on our own lines.

This is the history of the efforts of the admiralty up to 1907 to get the dominions and the colonies beyond the seas to subscribe money for the development and maintenance of the British navy. I cite these facts because I want to establish that in March, 1909, when the Dominion of Canada, through its representatives in the House of Commons, made an official declaration of policy, it knew exactly what the admiralty wanted. A leading newspaper in my province, the Montreal Star, discussing the declaration of the leader of the opposition and his affirmation that the admiralty had always been in favour of a money contribution, headed its article by three words which showed its stupor: 'Straight against the admiralty.' Yes, straight against the admiralty, but straight also against the admiralty was the whole House of Commons on the 29th of March, 1909. Straight against the admiralty was the Hon. Mr. Borden, now the Prime Minister of Canada, who said:

In so far as my right hon. friend, the Prime Minister to-day outlined the lines of naval defence of this country I am entirely at one with him. I am entirely of opinion, in the first place, that the proper line upon which we should proceed in that regard is the line of having a Canadian naval force of our own. I entirely believe in that. The other experiment has been tried as between Australia and the mother country and it has not worked satisfactorily in any respect.

I quote these words in order to show that the leader of the opposition at that time knew what was desired by the admiralty. He knew the conditions that bound Australia to the admiralty, and the fact that Australia had decided to retrace its steps and to build an Australian-Antonomist navy. Not only was the Hon Mr. Borden straight against the admiralty in 1909, but he was not repentant in 1910. On the 12th of January, 1910, he said:

It has been suggested that instead of an organization of a Canadian naval force there should be a system of annual contributions from this country to the mother country, and I am free to admit that from the strategical point of view, I would be inclined to agree with the view of the admiralty that this would be the best way for the great self-governing dominions of the empire to make their contributions, but Sir, from a constitutional and political standpoint, I am opposed to it for many reasons.

I beg my hon. colleague's pardon, for the leader of the opposition in this chamber cited these very words, but I repeat them for the purpose of the continuity of my argument.

In the first place, I do not believe that it would endure. In the second place it would be a source of friction. It would become a bone of partisan contention. It would be subject to criticism as to the character and the amount of the contributions in both parliaments. It would not be permanent or continuous. It would conduce, if anything could conduce, to severing the present connection between Canada and the empire.

This was the statement of the present Prime Minister in 1910. Straight against the admiralty he remained till he started for Europe in July last. The admiralty met its Waterloo on the 29th of March, 1909, and when at the special conference of July, 1909, the First Lord of the admiralty, Mr. McKenna, faced the representatives of Canada and of Australia this is what fell from his lips:

If the problem of imperial naval defence were considered merely as a problem of naval strategy, it would be found that the greatest output of strength for a given expenditure is obtained by the maintenance of a single navy with the constitutional unity of training and unity of command. In furtherance then of the simple strategical ideal, the maximum of power would be gained if all parts of the empire contributed according to their needs and resources, to the maintenance of the British navy.

It has, however, long been recognized that, in defining the conditions under which the naval forces of the empire should be developed other considerations than those of strategy alone must be taken into account.

Looking to the difficulties involved it is not to be expected that the discussion with the several defence ministers will result in a complete and final scheme of naval defence, but it is hoped that it will be found possible to formulate the broad principles upon which the growth of colonial naval forces should be fostered.

While laying the foundation of future dominion navies to be maintained in different parts of the empire, these forces would contribute immediately and materially to the requirements of imperial defence.

Now, it was the resigned expression of the First Lord of the Admiralty in July, 1909, and the 'Times' speaking for a considerable constituency, said on the 29th November, 1909, while discussing the merits of the whole navy problem and specially of the 'one navy' policy:

It has long been evident that the maximum of power was not going to be gained in this way, because as the several parts of the empire advanced in the progress towards nationhood, the idea of a mere money contribution towards the naval defence of the empire, became, naturally enough, more and more repugnant to them.

It was evident and perhaps it ought to have been foreseen by the admiralty long before it was, that the further the several dominions advanced towards nationhood, the more certain they were sooner or later to insist in having navies of their own, or in Mr. McKenna's words again, 'While ready to provide local forces and to place them at the disposal of the crown in time of war, they would wish to lay the foundations upon which a future navy of their own could be raised. In point of fact, that wish is already taking shape in Australia and Canada, and we will congratulate those great dominions on their achievements in having at last educated the admiralty up to their own point of view.

A voice arose about that time, either in London or on the Pacific, or in Halifax, that of an old statesman honoured by all and cherished by many, Sir Charles Tupper. He wrote a letter to Hon. Mr. Borden, congratulating him upon having stood for the principle of a Canadian navy. Can anyone think that that hon. gentleman spoke without knowing what were the desires of the admiralty? I draw the attention of the Montreal 'Star' to the fact that Sir Charles Tupper, Mr. Borden, and Mr. Laurier all stood straight against the admiralty. The same question arose in 1902 in connection with the army. The army in London wanted an imperial unit service. There was considerable of a campaign carried on for that purpose, but it failed and I will cite the words of Mr. Balfour stating why it failed:

Naturally the soldiers desired that. They wished to know exactly what forces they could count upon in any given emergency.

I believe that scheme to be impossible. I do not think that the self-governing colonies would look at it, or that they would consent to it. It must be manifest that under the constitutional theories which we all hold in common, the ministry of the parliaments which raise, which equip, which pay, and which are responsible for the troops, is the ministry which must control the troops.

That principle triumphed against the contentions of the army, and it will triumph against the contentions of the navy, because at the basis of the contention is the question of control. The party who pays shall control, says Mr. Balfour. Above this grant of thirty-five million dollars there stands the principle of the self-governing dominions who want to control their expended time, and in this conflict of principle we have the explanation of the memorandum which was laid on the table of the House on the 5th December last. The Hon. Mr. Borden decided to go and consult the admiralty and find out if there was an emergency. I will not discuss why he was looking for an emergency, instead of applying himself to the developing of a permanent policy and to its submission to parliament. But I will explain his change of front. When the right hon. gentleman left for Europe in July last in search of an emergency situation, did he intend to go back upon the principle of a Canadian navy? I do not know, but I am justified in saying that when he reached England he was captured by the admiralty and became a convert to the one navy principle. He had declared that if there was an emergency proven he would stand by his offer of a contribution. It has been said that Mr. Borden's necessity was the admiralty's opportunity, and when he comes back we find that the whole trend of his argument is against the building of a Canadian navy; he said:

Is there any need that we should undertake the hazardous and costly experiment of building up a naval organization specially restricted to this Dominion?

That was a clear indication of his having renounced his principle of Canadian autonomy and his having taken sides with the admiralty. What is more serious is that we hear the First Lord of the Admiralty interpreting this gift of three ships as if

they were the indication of a permanent policy, although in his speech he admits that there is a string to the ships. Mr. Churchill shows he understood that Canada was entering upon a policy of contribution. When announcing his flying squadron he said that he was going to speak:

Of the general development of the Dominion navies and to indicate, so far as it was proper to do so what is, in the opinion of the admiralty the best course for such development to follow. And he added that the squadron could be strengthened from time to time by further capital ships or by fast cruisers if any of the dominions thought fit.

The whole speech shows, permanency of policy, and not expediency in the mind of Mr. Churchill. The same note has been struck here by the hon. leader of the government when he said:

Is Canada prepared to say, notwithstanding the representation of the Imperial Admiralty made to us, that we in Canada are not prepared to give the modest contribution of ships such as that involved in the Bill, and on the contrary to enter upon a programme of building up a navy for ourselves?

Those are the words of my hon. friend. They are re-echoed by my hon. friend from Amherst who advocated this evening the principle of one navy. The admiralty now had the Prime Minister in the mood to abandon the principle of a Canadian navy, and to offer three ships to the British fleet. The fly had gone into the spider's web. The admiralty has friends in London besides that group of imperialists who think of a united empire through concentration. It has friends in Canada and in the other dominions. I want to emphasize the fact that long before the 5th December a campaign was inaugurated through Canada to stampede parliament and the people. We have had the German war scare kept in cold storage and brought out every second day in the large dailies to try and stir the public feeling of Canada. We have had Field Marshal Lord Roberts' sensational speeches on conscription, which were always served to the Canadian readers as if they bore on the needs of the admiralty. We have had the secret information which our Prime Minister had received and which must have been very serious, because with the sense of responsibility attaching to his position, he told us that Great Britain was in need of three ships or of a contribu-

tion, forgetting that we could always pose to his behalf of responsibility, the same sense of responsibility which must have equally lied the Prime Minister across the seas, Hon. Mr. Anquith. In this display of pyrotechnics we had the Malay gift. I will not read what some of the London papers have said of the surgical operation made upon these unrepresented poor Malays and Chinese coal mine labourers. I will not dwell on that. I want to believe that this extraction of a ship from those wards of Great Britain will not be repeated. I am of the opinion that the coup was organized to stampede Canada into action. It was served hot at the proper moment; it came in this time when the Dominion parliament was about to be seized, or was just seized with the demand of help to the mother country so as to save the empire through the gift of three ships to the British fleet. During the campaign which was carried on throughout Canada there have been indications of tampering with the Canadian press in various ways. There has been an organized bureau of information which sent out editorial comments to the various country newspapers at so much per line.

An hon. SENATOR—Fourteen cents per square inch.

Hon. Mr. DANDURAND—As a climax, we have had a surprising intervention from the First Lord of the Admiralty, who felt that something had to be done to bring back Canada from its unanimous resolution of the 20th March in favour of a Canadian navy. We had the extraordinary condition of the First Lord of the Admiralty disposing of those three ships when the parliament of Canada was in session discussing whether or not to adopt that policy. It was a most astounding departure in British constitutional practice, and I cite it as a last desperate effort of the admiralty to try and win back Canada to a money contribution. If Canada could only be brought back, it was hoped that all the other dominions would follow. Australia had declared for her own navy. New Zealand was about to serve notice on the admiralty. It did not believe that its national status would allow it to continue the contribution which it had made and it intended to build a New Zea-

land navy. I could cite the declaration of the Prime Minister of the South African confederation which is not more than two or three months old. In his mind contribution is not the best solution of the difficulty, and I could cite the words of the Minister of Defence for South Africa, who feared this movement throughout the empire in favour of contribution was not wholly spontaneous. It is true that the statement of Mr. Churchill was mitigated by the declaration that the difference in method which separated the proposal of Mr. Borden's government from the proposal of Sir Wilfrid Laurier's was not of vital importance. Was the First Lord of the Admiralty sugar-coating the pill which his heterodox intervention represented in our domestic affairs? Whatever his intentions, we have there again evidence that Mr. Churchill is comparing one policy with another and does not treat the Borden offer as an expediency. It seems to me if we needed one more reason for delaying this measure, that this campaign was carried on to stampede the people of Canada and the Dominion parliament would be sufficient to justify the Senate in adjourning this measure and asking the people in their sober thoughts to pass judgment upon it. Both leaders stated to the people in September, 1911, that they stood for a Canadian navy. Nobody will deny that. It is apparent that the Prime Minister has changed his mind. But have the people changed theirs? This is an important question for the Senate to decide. The Canadian people went to the polls with the conviction that a Canadian navy was the policy of both parties. Now if we vote this contribution of three ships to the admiralty, what assurance have we that the people are getting what they voted for? It is true that the Prime Minister put a rider to his declaration in favour of a Canadian policy. That rider was to the effect that if he found an emergency after consulting with the British admiralty, he would offer a contribution to Great Britain. But then something happened after that, a very important fact, too. It was the amendment of Mr. Monk and the sub-amendment of Mr. Borden which came after his declaration of policy; Mr. Monk, flushed with his victory in Drummond-Arthabaska,

refused to vote for the sub-amendment of Mr. Borden. After Mr. Borden's sub-amendment was defeated, Mr. Borden decided that if Mr. Monk would not follow him he would follow Mr. Monk and voted for a full reference to the people of the whole question, with nearly all his supporters behind him; I think they were seventy-nine.

The question is how did the people vote? I will not detain the House by going into any figures in detail, but it is clear that if you deduct from the total of the 669,000 votes which the Conservatives and Nationalists together received, 133,000 given to the Nationalist candidates, then you have a majority as was stated this afternoon of 224,000 votes against this contribution. This does not tell the whole tale. There are many opposition candidates, besides, who did not specially bind themselves to follow their leader on a policy of contribution or anything else, but who, through a very able campaign, succeeded in getting the votes of those who were against the Naval Act and against the Borden contribution. In the eastern townships of Quebec the English voters were appealed to by the English press in favour of the Conservative party, and of the orthodox Borden policy, while the French voters in the same constituency were appealed to through the Nationalist organs, which urged them to vote against Laurier, because that would mean a chance of repealing the Naval Act. The hon. the Prime Minister told us that, at the beginning of the campaign, he had made a speech in London declaring that if he found an emergency he would ask for a contribution from parliament. There are many ways of appealing to the electors. You may appeal to them by written manifesto, by the press or by speeches. Mr. Borden made a speech in London. I do not know that that speech was reproduced very fully in the press of the province of Quebec.

But I know of one fact which is of some importance on the result of the election. It is that Mr. Borden through his official organization in Montreal, presided over by Mr. Herbert B. Ames, the present member for St. Antoine, went through the English speaking counties of the eastern townships,

took a list of the French electors, returned with that list of French electors to Mr. Bourassa's organ, *Le Devoir*, and for over a month had that paper distributed to all the French electors in those counties, and that distribution was paid for with good Conservative money from the Conservative organization, which, as I have said, was presided over by Mr. Ames. I have stated that a majority of 224,000 electors are to be found as voting against the contribution when the vote of the 21st September is analyzed, but there is more. There is the fact that the official Conservative organization appealed to the French speaking electors of the English counties against any naval policy and against any naval contribution, and there is more again. Mr. Borden came to Montreal. He went through the eastern townships and spoke in four or five places. Never in those speeches did he utter a word concerning the navy. He was there on a ground which was not perhaps propitious, and that double work, that north by south organization, would not have worked so harmoniously, if some indiscreet speech had been made. Not a word fell from his lips on the question of the navy, but some words fell from the candidates who were on the hustings with him. I will cite two examples. Dr. Hayes, who ran in Richmond, and Mr. White, who ran in Sherbrooke. Mr. Hayes said:

Not a cent of money shall be voted for naval defence without the people being consulted, because of the importance of the question, and its effect on our national life.

At Sherbrooke Mr. White, the Sherbrooke candidate, spoke as follows on the Navy Act:

It should be submitted to the people and I bind myself to ask for its recall and to stand for the submission of the question to the people. He added that this was the position taken by the opposition candidates in the eastern townships.

I state on my own responsibility that I have investigated the question of the circulation of Mr. Bourassa's organ through the instrumentality of the official committee presided over by Mr. Ames, and with his knowledge, that paper was circulated by thousands throughout the eastern townships to the French electors. This is the despatch which appeared in the papers in Montreal informing us of that fact:

From the Montreal 'Herald.'

A despatch of 'Le Canada' from Sherbrooke states that Mr. Ames, the chief organizer of the Borden force in the eastern townships, is sending large numbers of the 'Montreal Star' to English speaking voters in those counties and of 'Le Devoir' to the French speaking ones.

The 'Herald' has the best reasons for believing that the assertion, so far at least as 'Le-Devoir' is concerned, is true.

In what position does this place the Conservative candidate in St. Antoine?

Mr. Borden and his party feign to ignore Monk and Bourassa. They are holding separate meetings. They have separate central committee rooms in Montreal. Messrs. Monk and Bourassa ride the anti-imperialist and anti-navy horse, while Messrs. Borden and Sifton claim to be desirous of saving the navy. The aim of both is transparent. It is to destroy Laurier. Their insincerity is easily detected without lifting the veil which hides their electoral operations. But when the veil is lifted what do we see? Mr. Ames the chief representative of Mr. Borden in Quebec English counties giving imperialistic and jingo literature to the English electors, and at the same time distributing to the French groups in those counties the Monk-Bourassa paper, Le Devoir, and paying with Borden campaign money for that circulation.

After commenting upon it the article reads:—

If Mr. Ames is prepared to deny that he has had part or partial knowledge or participation in helping to disseminate the paper which preaches such doctrines, we will willingly accept his denial.

But our information is to the effect that he cannot deny it.

The same affirmation was made on the floor of the House of Commons. I will not discuss at length the reasons which actuated the Conservative organization in using 'Le Devoir.' Thousands of copies of Mr. Bourassa's paper were daily circulated, and surely it was not to carry on the campaign against reciprocity, because 'Le Devoir' was in favour of reciprocity. It was disseminated throughout a number of counties in Quebec because it was against a navy and contribution and because it favoured an appeal to the people. This seemed to be popular and to sway a certain number of electors, and this means was resorted to to carry the election. It was successful. It carried the election, and it brought these gentlemen to power, but it did not give them a mandate. You cannot support two policies which are absolutely contradictory at the same time and then come before parliament and say that you have a man-

date. On the 5th of September, Mr. Bourassa said in his own paper:

You will be told 'but if Laurier is rejected, it is Borden who climbs to power, and Borden is worse than Laurier.'

I resisted Mr. Borden when he presented his cash contribution scheme, but, between Laurier and Borden, Monk stood up to ask the appeal to the people. At first 17 members only supported him, but after the victory of Drummond and Arthabaska the whole of the Conservative party voted with him.

I will not cite the opinion of Messrs. Pelletier, Nantel, Coderre or Monk. Their stands are similar. They are against a contribution and for a repeal of the Navy Act. This is the gospel preached with the knowledge of Mr. Borden himself. He stood on the platform when the English speaking Conservative candidates expressed themselves in favour of the same policy, and I say that when you deduct from the Conservative vote 133,000 votes, this policy is in a minority of 224,000, and when you have, besides, such a campaign carried on in the full light of day, it takes some courage, to say the least, on the part of the Prime Minister to come to parliament and state that he has a mandate on this question and also to hear my hon. friend affirm that it was one of the principal planks of the Conservative party to offer a contribution in the form of ships or money. Was it the plank of Messrs. Pelletier, Monk, Nantel or Coderre? We have them on record as protesting against contributions and stating that they would vote for an appeal to the people. In the other House, when twitted with bringing down this policy as a hybrid policy, the product of the marriage of the Conservatives and Nationalists, the Minister of Trade and Commerce said, 'but look at the child; whom does he resemble? Who won?' The victory was an easy one, when every minister who had shammed nationalism, to win the election entered the cabinet without asking Mr. Borden what was his policy, what were his intentions, and swore allegiance to him. Who won? The victory was easy against Pelletier and Company, but I would ask the Minister of Trade and Commerce: is that the whole question? What about the offspring? What about the children? What about the voters who carried you into power? It seems to me they count for something. They represent tens of thous-

ands of electors, people who had faith in solemn declarations made to them. Who won? That is a question which the Senate cannot answer—who won? We want to know who won, and it seems to me the best way of knowing it will be to ask the government, whenever it pleases, and in the form it pleases them, to squarely lay down their cards on the table and say 'This is our policy.' We cannot say who won but we have a fair idea as to who was duped. It amuses me very much to hear some gentlemen in this chamber and in the other House speak of the Nationalists imposing their views upon the opposition. It has even been said by the hon. gentleman from Lunenburg that the amendment moved by the hon. leader of the opposition was a Nationalist amendment. It seems to me that my hon. friends, in attempting to abruptly separate their fortune from that of the Nationalists, have made a most unprecedented move. Since the Roman times 'repudiation' has not existed in our code of law. They entered into wedlock with the Nationalist party. They want to repudiate that alliance. Well, they will have to go before the court which married them, the people of Canada, who will settle the conditions of the separation. It may be said by some that there is no very great necessity to give any solemnity to the divorce, as the goods and chattels of the community can be easily divided. The Nationalists could withdraw with what they brought in, their ideals, and the Conservatives with what they contributed, their thirst for power. I only know of two real Nationalists, Messrs. Bourassa and Lavergne, among the leaders. They are the gentlemen who furnished the ideas and ideals. The others were shams. Messrs. Bourassa and Lavergne could take back with them their illusions and the Conservatives will be satisfied with power.

I conclude by reaffirming what I said in the beginning—there is no urgency, there is no mandate. Let us go our way undisturbed by the clamours of the jingo press. We are a young people with an immense territory to organize and develop. Our expendi-

ture on public works and railways goes on constantly increasing. European nations have no such obligations. We are spending very large sums of money for our militia. We have voted a Naval Act under which this country may establish, on both oceans, a ship-building industry for commercial shipping and for the building of the necessary crafts for the defence of this country, on a moderate scale. This country is blessed with the ideal happiness which comes to a peaceful and law-abiding people who have but one friendly neighbour and who fear no assault from any one—a people thus able to give all its time and best efforts to the arts of peace. Canada's best protection against assault from outside rests in its determination to deal fairly by every one and to submit to arbitration any question which cannot be settled by diplomacy. Let the jingo element which wants to inoculate this happy land with the microbe of militarism remember that most of its inhabitants have fled from Europe to escape the crushing burdens of militarism. Why should this country hasten to load itself with the curse of exaggerated armaments? I recognize our duty to ourselves and to the empire. All Canadians are ready, at all times, to help Britain in time of stress, but I do not believe in plunging into heavy naval expenditures through pressure from the outside. I commend the suggestion of the right hon. the Prime Minister made in January, 1910. He then believed in an emergency and in making a contribution, but when speaking of the naval service he said:

I say to my right hon. friend the Prime Minister, so far as my words have any weight with him: 'Go on with your naval service. Proceed slowly, cautiously and surely. Lay your proposals before the people and give them if necessary opportunity to be heard.'

These will be my last words: Let us proceed slowly and cautiously. It is the duty of the Senate to stop or adjourn hasty or dangerous legislation. If threats of reprisals could affect our course our usefulness would be at an end. Fiat justitia ruat cœlum.

