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# **THE RWANDAN CRISIS OF APRIL 1994 THE LESSONS LEARNED**

*November 30, 1994*

**for**

**Regional Security and Peacekeeping Division (IDC)  
International Security, Arms Control, and CSCE Affairs Bureau  
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade  
Ottawa, Canada**


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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

**Chapter 2** - Substantial Rwandan early warning intelligence existed for years, and peaked during 1993 and early 1994. UN mechanisms particularly, failed to effectively channel sufficient intelligence to prod relevant national and UN decision makers. What was needed was overwhelming intelligence, presented in clear and certain terms, so as to override the general perception of yet "another civil war in Africa". Nevertheless, the warnings were undeniably there, and the largest failure was on the part of national and UN leaders who hoped the issue would just resolve itself. A rapid, limited, peacekeeping deployment within a week of April 6th was not only eminently possible, but would have substantially reduced both massacres and refugee flows. The undeniable, albeit narrow, success of Operation Turquoise supports this conclusion.

**Chapter 3** - The conflict resolution and peacekeeping response in the months immediately after April 6th was a failure. The fundamental and continuing lack of political will by almost every UN member was most evident in the Security Council. This general lack of will, exacerbated by widely different national agendas, even resulted in an initial denial of genocide despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Many countries used the crisis to establish positions on issues (eg. peacekeeping, the role of the Security Council) that had little to do with the Rwandan crisis. The rapid withdrawal of most of UNAMIR once foreign nationals were withdrawn was followed by a glacial and half hearted reinforcement of UNAMIR. Consensus is that at best UNAMIR did little for Rwandans during this period, and at worse, increased the hardline Hutu perception of world indifference to them orchestrating massacres and refugee flows. The problem this time was not the UN structure or staff, but its member states.

**Chapter 4** - The humanitarian response on the other hand was fast and relatively well orchestrated amongst both UN agencies and with nongovernmental humanitarian organizations. There were some real successes and just as promisingly, many in the humanitarian community are actively identifying and setting about to correct the failures. The present confusion on how to address the humanitarian dilemmas of the refugee camps in Zaire, and Rwandan reconstruction, does not detract from those initial successes.

**Chapter 5** - Apart from occasional glimmers, the UN human rights structures failed in the lead up to, and immediately after, April 6th. Subsequently their interventions have been unfocussed and largely ineffectual to date. Perhaps more unsettling is the feeling that some key UN human rights decision makers have not realised what they should have done, and thus are not actively looking for lessons to be learned. This has extremely negative implications for the next human rights 'Rwanda'.

**Chapter 6** - Overarching coordination did not occur. This is not to deny a leap forward in coordination within the humanitarian community (Ch. 4) and to a lesser degree within the UN's peacekeeping and conflict resolution apparatus where DPKO, DHA, and DPA increased and are busy enhancing their consultative mechanisms (Ch. 3). Within other sectors such as human rights, there was little or no coordination either within the UN or with NGOs . With such uneven sectoral development, this time one could not reasonably anticipate any overarching coordination.

**Conclusion** - Both Rwandans and the international community abjectly failed to prevent widespread genocidal massacres and massive refugee flows. The international community partly mitigated its failure through rapid and effective humanitarian assistance. There are cautious grounds for optimism that some have learned from the Rwandan catastrophe, and will be more prepared to prevent similar cataclysms that threaten both Africa and the world.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

### **Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping**

#### **RECOMMENDATION p. 16**

*Canada should encourage debate within the UN as to the usefulness of Charter Art. 40 in achieving a graduated transition from Chapter VI operations to Chapter VII Arts. 41 & 42 operations.*

#### **RECOMMENDATION p. 17**

*Canada and other concerned TCN's should collaborate on and publish a policy statement and set of guidelines addressing the need to provide fully trained peacekeeping troops and operational equipment. In this way, potential troop and equipment contributing nations would be made more aware that they alone are the solution in mounting peacekeeping operations, and that by reneging on offers, or providing inappropriate equipment and troops, or by attempting to capitalize on reimbursement or getting equipped, they become part of the problem.*

#### **RECOMMENDATION p. 19**

*Canada along with DPKO and other interested TCNs should fully examine the concept and modalities of creating UN Permanent Rapid Deployment Headquarters.*

#### **RECOMMENDATION p. 19**

*Canada should precipitate the creation of a UN Permanent Rapid Deployment Headquarters by offering free accommodation at a location in Canada along with the paid secondment of a Canadian Major General as commander and up to 1/2 of the remaining staff establishment, eg. 30 out of 60.*

#### **RECOMMENDATION p. 19**

*Canada should encourage the UN to develop a peacekeeping command and control doctrine.*

#### **RECOMMENDATION p. 20**

*Canada must ensure that the results of its imminent study on enhancing the UN's responsiveness and rapid reaction capability are broadly disseminated, and that follow up action takes place within the UN and amongst TCN's to engender substantive changes or improvements.*

**RECOMMENDATION p. 20**

*Canada should encourage the UN to develop more opportunities for open multilateral consultations with senior UN policy and operational staff, in order to balance off the preferential access provided to the Permanent Five and other major UN powers.*

**RECOMMENDATION p. 21**

*Canada should suggest that Troop Contributing Nations meetings become fixed weekly sessions chaired by the USG for peacekeeping or a representative, with additional sessions convened by the USG when necessary. These meetings should take place in a physical environment that lends itself to open and frank discussions aimed at achieving consensus on the most appropriate ways to move forward.*

**RECOMMENDATION p. 23**

*Canada should encourage debate both within Canada and within the UN so as to educate the public and policy makers as to the very real likelihood of peacekeepers and humanitarian workers being killed in the line of duty. Only then can informed decisions be taken to engage and stay engaged when the inevitable happens.*

**RECOMMENDATION p. 23**

*Canada should encourage the holding of working meeting of UN troop contributing nations, humanitarian agencies, and human rights agencies (UN and NGO), to create standard operating procedures and model Rules of Engagement for UN peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. This should feed into similar processes for 'RoEs' for UN humanitarian assistance or human rights mission members.*

**RECOMMENDATION p. 24**

*The Canadian Armed Forces should lead by example in carrying out more extensive training for all its members on peacekeeping in general, and the cultural and political contexts of peacekeeping specifically. In addition, its standby troops and individuals designated to take on individual roles such as Force Commander, should receive additional intensive training that is more specific to the country and society that they will be operating in. The issues of conflict resolution, humanitarianism and human rights must be integral to this training.*

**RECOMMENDATION p. 28**

*Canada should encourage other developed countries to also contribute to the OAU special fund for conflict resolution, with levels premised upon the willingness and capacity of the OAU to undertake regional conflict prevention and resolution.*

**RECOMMENDATION p. 29**

*Canada should encourage the UN to provide space on every UN African crisis intervention or peacekeeping mission for an OAU Secretariat observer/trainee. The expectation would be that this person will take what they learn back to the OAU and train and educate others. In this same vein, the OAU should second operational staff to such functional divisions or agencies as DPKO*

*and UNHCR. The UN should provide them with office space and on job training by assigning them to a variety of tasks through which they will learn the operational requirements of mounting the conflict resolution components of humanitarian or peacekeeping missions.*

**RECOMMENDATION p. 29**

*Canada should encourage the OAU Central Organ of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution to mandate sub-regional groupings of the Organ to design and proceed with initiatives that do not impose duties or obligations on other OAU members.*

### **Humanitarian**

**RECOMMENDATION p. 31**

*Canada should expand the number of military officers seconded to international organizations, for example the strategic planning units of UNHCR.*

**RECOMMENDATION p. 32**

*Canada should encourage countries to view refugees and internally displaced persons as being integrally linked, and push for the mandate of UNHCR to be changed so that they are the lead UN agency for all internally and externally displaced.*

### **Human Rights**

**RECOMMENDATION p. 39**

*Canada should recommend to the Commission on Human Rights that situations referred to the Commission by the Sub-Commission under the 1503 procedure should become open to public scrutiny.*

**RECOMMENDATION p. 39**

*Canada should recommend to the Commission on Human Rights that it automatically appoint a country rapporteur when that country appears concurrently in the reports of three or more of the Commission's thematic mechanisms.*

**RECOMMENDATION p. 41**

*Canada should encourage the UN Centre for Human Rights to provide greater support for rapporteurs including the provision of mission staff and logistical support, and the UN should fully reimburse rapporteurs for reasonable expenditures directly resulting from them carrying out their tasks, such as photocopying, postage, and telephone/fax costs.*

**RECOMMENDATION p. 42**

*Canada should encourage the holding of annual meetings of special rapporteurs and individuals from other relevant UN human rights mechanisms to hear from them on how their skills can be better used in an enhanced human rights information gathering regime.*

**RECOMMENDATION p. 45**

*Canada should encourage the UN Centre to bring together the various sectors or agencies of the UN that regularly mount field missions to discuss how the Centre can utilize their field presence. The objective would be to involve them in first line human rights monitoring upon which specialised human rights experts could take appropriate follow-up action. Together they should also design a common reporting procedure and form, and the Centre should offer to help in training where appropriate.*

**RECOMMENDATION p. 45**

*Canada should encourage the UN Centre for Human Rights to bring together its staff and relevant outside human rights NGOs, individuals, and appropriate UN agencies, to initiate an evaluation of how the Centre could have better monitored and informed other parts of the UN about the human rights implications leading up to and immediately after April 6th.*

**RECOMMENDATION p. 46**

*Canada should encourage the UN Centre to scale back its human rights monitoring mission to Rwanda to a manageable level so that they can carry out a limited but credible task. Subsequently the Centre should have a clearly stated policy of fielding only small missions until it has built up its conceptual and operational capacity.*

**RECOMMENDATION p. 47**

*Canada should encourage the UN Centre to consult with other UN agencies such as UNHCR, UNICEF, and DPKO, as well as NGOs such as AI, and ICRC on how to best be prepared and capable of rapidly mounting emergency field missions within the space of days. This consultation should explore the possibilities of piggy-backing on possible existing UN field operations, be they peacekeeping, humanitarian, or developmental.*

**RECOMMENDATION p. 48**

*Canada should encourage development of, where not existing already or where imperfectly functioning, automatic UN judicial mechanisms to make clear and fast determinations of well founded allegations of human rights violations, both individual and systemic such as genocide.*

**RECOMMENDATION p. 50**

*Canada should encourage the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Centre for Human Rights to clearly enunciate their obligation to advocate for human rights*

**RECOMMENDATION p. 51**

*Canada should strongly recommend that the senior position at the Centre for Human Rights New York office be a D2 or higher so as to provide whomever fills it with sufficient political clout to advocate for human rights*

**RECOMMENDATION p. 51**


*Canada should encourage the Departments of DPKO, DHA, and DPA to each create a separate desk officer for human rights.*

**RECOMMENDATION p. 52**

*Canada should encourage the Centre for Human Rights to draw upon the example of UNICEF and others on how to develop a marketing capacity to enable it to effectively communicate its knowledge and concerns about human rights*

**RECOMMENDATION p. 52**

*Canada should encourage the High Commissioner for Human Rights to produce both an annual human rights report which would cover every country, and special country reports as necessary.*



# THE RWANDAN CRISIS OF APRIL 1994

## THE LESSONS LEARNED

### 1 INTRODUCTION

This is an assessment of the international community's response to the humanitarian and genocidal tragedy of Rwanda. It evaluates how international institutions and organizations gathered and assessed information on Rwanda prior to April 6th 1994 and how they then responded as the cataclysm unfolded.

This study through the Rwandan looking glass is looking at the capacity and potential for international action in situations such as Rwanda. Rwanda has provided not only an unfortunate but incontrovertible catastrophe of incredible dimensions, but it's most recent chapter<sup>1</sup> has played out within a relatively small political context (Rwandan and international) and over a short time period. These factors make it a relatively transparent and quantifiable case scenario.

This study is not an attempt to point the way forward for Rwanda despite the fact that such studies are essential and fortunately many are underway. The apparent failure to achieve even a rudimentary broad based social commitment to human rights, power sharing, and resource equity after 30 years of international bilateral and UN development programs and major efforts by international NGO developmental and church groups, poses perhaps the largest question mark for the future of Rwanda.

Also, it will not be looking at what went wrong with Rwandan society per se. It is true that outsiders actively and callously armed Rwandans, and outsiders over the years allied with and encouraged particular élites in the hope that those élites would further their political or business objectives. Such realpolitik is not new and certainly not excusable, often moving into the morally reprehensible and at times internationally illegal. However it only mitigates the fundamental responsibility of Rwandans for themselves. If we can draw any conclusions from Northern Ireland, Lebanon, ex-Yugoslavia, the Arab-Israeli conflict, Cyprus and so on, it is that the

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<sup>1</sup> This is not to ignore the historical roots, for the Rwandan civil war has been an on and off event for generations, and the underlying political battle between competing élites, both local and colonial, has been going on for centuries. See the Annex for a short history of Rwanda followed by a detailed chronology of events leading up to and following the April 6th plane destruction.

international community cannot save people from themselves. Rwandan civil society has the primary responsibility for its future and therein lies the hope for its future even in what now appears to be an almost unsolvable situation.

However, just as the international community can certainly worsen things, so too we can also actively intervene to mitigate societal disasters even if we cannot totally save. The international community can and must learn from its failure to more effectively mitigate the Rwandan crisis of April 1994. Fortunately we often learn best from our mistakes and it looks as if Rwanda is proving to be extremely instructive for many of us.

Although this is not an exercise in finger pointing and does not set out to accuse any country, organization, or individual from amongst the international community for failures, there is a need to identify who and what went wrong. Only then can we start to draw the conclusions and lessons to guide us all in the next such humanitarian catastrophe.

In this exercise, it is useful to heed the advice that many Rwandan victims themselves are voicing to the new regime and the millions of other victims in Rwanda. Although a degree of retributive justice is needed particularly for those guilty of genocide and other crimes against humanity, reconciliation and reconstruction will be impossible if the government or the victims remain the eternal accusers. All must move on from catastrophe to solutions.

While the genocidal aspect of Rwanda sets it apart from other crises in recent memory, the effective breakdown of government and society does not. In Africa and elsewhere there are increasing numbers of situations where national structures have ceased to exist and warlords and anarchy prevail, or where regimes are so corrupt and repressive that they are totally unacceptable to both their people and the international community. In such instances the duty of the international community becomes overwhelming. Cold war realpolitik often blinded us to that duty as various alliances were prepared to 'legitimize' and defend their client regime regardless of democratic or human rights shortcomings. In the brave new world of the 1990's we are a bit slower to rationalize the undefensible.

Hopefully this assessment of the actual role, successes, and failures of the international community over Rwanda will contribute in some small measure to the international community further recognising its duty and increasing its capacity to responsibly and rapidly intervene.

This study has been done for the Regional Security and Peacekeeping Division of the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. Resources did not allow, nor was it felt that it was that critical, that I visit Rwanda. In fact, there was a feeling that yet another visitor to Rwanda was the last thing that on-the-ground workers needed and much of the same information could be gleaned from individuals who had been in Rwanda. Also, it was felt that most of the lessons to be learned by the international community would come from the successes and failures that occurred in New York, Geneva, and national capitals. That is where most of the UN, governmental, and non-governmental, decisions were being taken.

As such I made quick visits to New York (UN Agencies and the Secretariat including DPKO, DHA, and DPA, various permanent missions, and a number of NGOs) and Geneva (UN including UNHCR, UN Centre for Human Rights, and a number of NGOs) stopping briefly in London (AI and several other NGOs). I of course consulted extensively in Ottawa with both governmental and non-governmental individuals along with a quick foray to Montreal for the Canadian Council for Refugees' day session on Rwanda which brought together many from the Montreal Rwandan community. In addition, I talked to innumerable individuals elsewhere by phone. All along the way I reassured those being consulted that they were commenting off the record so as to elicit candid commentary, so I am reticent to detail the myriad UN, governmental, and non-governmental people who gave generously of their scarce time and invaluable insights. I also wish to thank them all for their knowledge and help, and hope that this report properly reflects their concerns and hopes.

## **Report Layout**

*Chapter 2* examines whether there was sufficient and effective early warnings, and then quickly assesses whether there were some viable options for greater success in the response of the international community.

*Chapters 3, 4, and 5* all deal with the international response to the Rwandan crisis. This is the core analysis section of the report, and merited being divided into three. Normally these three areas would have overlapped more, but particularly in the early months of the Rwandan crisis, they appear to have been relatively distinct which is instructive in itself.

*Ch. 3* looks at the UN and OAU conflict resolution and peacekeeping response.

*Ch. 4* looks at the humanitarian assistance response

*Ch. 5* looks at the UN's human rights establishment's response

*Chapter 6* deals with the mix of linkages, coordination, and transfers of tasks and responsibilities of all the organizations and parties attempting to respond to the Rwandan crisis.

The *Annex* includes a short historical Background prior to 1993, and then a extensive crisis Chronology from early 1993. The Chronology along with the Background will help set the backdrop for this study and its recommendations.

## 2 EARLY WARNING, AND PAST POTENTIAL

The first section will look at early warning in the Rwandan context, to determine if the international community knew enough to have acted differently. The second section will discuss whether international community could have made a difference if it had acted differently on that intelligence.

### 2.1 Intelligence Gathering & Decision Makers

Certainly the specifics of the Rwandan crisis were unique and more horrific than might have been anticipated. However there is clear proof that many parts of the international community, both NGO<sup>2</sup> and UN<sup>3</sup> were fully aware of the incipient crisis in Rwanda. What is not clear and may never be known is the extent to which individual countries had their own intelligence on what was happening. It would be particularly surprising if France did not have a rather complete awareness of what was occurring within military and governing circles of the RG and RGF inasmuch as they were closely involved and supportive of both parts of the ruling élite. Other countries in view of the small size and strategic unimportance of Rwanda, would invariably have relied more on NGO and UN intelligence. Fortunately this was not lacking, unfortunately they do not seem to have used it.

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<sup>2</sup> ie. Amnesty International: report "Rwanda, persecution of Tutsi minority and repression of government critics 1990-1992" (Afr 47/02/92) which talked of more than 1,000 extrajudicial executions, and the over 8,000 political prisoners following the October 1990 invasion by the RPF.

or

Human Rights Watch: "Rwanda, Talking Peace and Waging War: human rights since the October 1990 invasion", pp. 33 Feb. 27 1992, or "Beyond The Rhetoric: continuing human rights abuses in Rwanda", pp. 29 June 1993, or "Arming Rwanda: the arms trade and human rights abuses in the Rwandan War", pp. 66 January 1994.

or

ICHRDD , UIDH, FIDH, and HRW, combined to produce the March 1993 "Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights Violations in Rwanda Since 1 October 1990". The commission inter alia concluded that the government had participated in or sanctioned the killing of over 2,000 individuals.

<sup>3</sup> Of particular note was the report of the Special Rapporteur Waly Bacré Ndiaye on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions. In view of the seriousness of events in Rwanda, he submitted a lengthy 36 page addendum to his main report to the UNCHR, in which he reported on his mission to Rwanda from 8 to 17 April 1993 (almost exactly one year before the April 6th plane crash). Not only were his observations and recommendations detailed, he published this report on the 11th of August 1993. In addition, his report was formally tabled during the 50th session of the Commission on Human Rights in February 1994.

In addition, there was quite clearly different perceptions that coloured intelligence gathering and its interpretation. By and large the UN and most countries had built up over the years a perception that everything happening was merely evidence of an ongoing and at time messy civil war. The human rights violations by the government were only seen as quantifiably different from those of the RPF so as to not substantially differentiate the two warring parties. More insidious and undeniably racist was the perception that such human rights violations were certainly horrendous but acceptable in the African context.

The Rwandan government played on that perception and was ably abetted by the French government who quite apart from failing to criticising their ally for documented massacres since 1990, acted more as apologist and saw this as more of a quid pro quo for RPF attacks and atrocities. This same attitude was evidenced by the Special Representative of the Secretary General, M. Booh Booh, He was admittedly close to the RG and reported events following April 6th as simply a resurgent civil war and recommended the UN halt the advance of the RPF. That attitude and his general incompetence resulted in his being quietly exiled to Nairobi until his term ended.

This widespread perception by most countries would explain the amazing lethargy of the world community during the first week and for many during the second week of the crisis. Accusations of genocide were initially dismissed, and only repeated accusations by reputable individuals and organizations started to overcome that initial bias.

Many commentators felt that this was clearly the attitude of the US State Department, and that it was only after strong pressure by US NGOs such as Human Rights Watch and the Lawyers Committee in tandem with the CNN factor that they began to admit the humanitarian and genocidal aspects of the incoming intelligence. Paradoxically the very seriousness of the crime of genocide worked against countries officially recognizing their mistake. Accepting that genocide was occurring would have certainly imposed moral obligations to intervene, and many argued that it would impose legal obligations on the 101 states that have ratified the Genocide Convention.

There is a critical **second half** to any successful early warning mechanism, for the collection of intelligence is but the first and often the more frequently attained half. This was true over Rwanda where groups and individuals both within and outside of the UN had collected the substantial intelligence and themselves were clearly cognizant of the seriousness of the warnings. The second half, where key decision makers were 'undeniably' aware of this intelligence, was not as clearly attained. The term 'undeniably' refers to those decision makers both being made aware of relevant intelligence, and others knowing they had been made aware, so that deniability real or otherwise was no longer an option.

One example is the black hole into which the Special Rapporteur Ndaiye's report (footnoted below) had been dropped after being tabled with the Commission on Human Rights. There is no

indication for example that the UN Centre for Human Rights<sup>4</sup> or any other part of the UN made it its' task to ensure that the report was impressed upon senior UN decision makers. Furthermore, there is absolutely no proof that senior decision makers were aware of the report, and thus it is hard to refute their more general claims that they had not been sufficiently aware of intelligence out of Rwanda that would have possibly alerted them to an impending disaster but certainly would have prepared them to respond rapidly once the crisis occurred.

Another example came to light when the Czech representative during the SC session of June 8th stated that the UN Secretariat had received field intelligence from UNAMIR of inflammatory broadcasts, the influx of arms, and government troop movements just prior to April 6, and had not informed the Security Council. It was implied by several observers that the Secretary General had had too much on his plate at the time and simply missed seeing this warning intelligence so as to authorize its being passed on. However, he has a large and politically sensitive office, so it is more likely that whomever received the information consciously choose not to pass it on. Was this due to the secretive nature of his office staff and the UN at large, ie. information is power and to be hoarded, or was it that such intelligence went counter to the plans of the SG's office, and so was filed away.

What is more surprising is that the Force Commander General Dallaire said that upon taking up his post, that he had not been warned to expect anything out of the ordinary. He was led to believe that this, his first peacekeeping mission, was to have been a relatively tranquil affair. He was caught very much by surprise when tensions built up in the early months of 1993. Prior to April 6th when he started receiving a number of written notes from moderate Hutu army officers warning of disquieting planning and training within the RGF he felt that it would not be easy to verify their fears. More critical in his decision to not follow up their warnings, was his repeatedly stated position then and since, that it was not part of the philosophy of peacekeeping nor his mandate to carry out any intelligence gathering much less pass on that information<sup>5</sup>. That policy seems particularly bizarre in light of the obvious disquiet of a number of NGOs as well as individuals inside and outside the UN particularly about gross and systemic human rights violations.<sup>6</sup> Why was he not briefed on what he might well face, and what his response should have been?

Integral to the success of this second stage of a functioning international early warning process consists of ensuring that relevant decision makers formally acknowledge or at least are in the position that they cannot even begin to deny knowledge. This is not to be confused with them

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<sup>4</sup> This lack of advocacy by the Centre is dealt with at greater length in Chapter 5.2.

<sup>5</sup> Paradoxically the French forces during Operation Turquoise were obviously given the mandate to monitor human rights violations and they then reported their information to the Commission of Experts, see UN Doc S/1994/933 p.5, the report on Op. Turquoise from the French Mission to the UN SG

<sup>6</sup> This is dealt with at greater length in section 5.1 on human rights monitoring.

then refusing to act on the information. Rather, it addresses the facile political ploy of claiming not to have been informed and implying that effective steps would have been taken if only they had known. The optimum solution of course is to have some form of 'signing off' process, so decision makers know that at a later date they will not be able to easily deny accountability.

A partial solution is that certain early warning mechanisms be standard operational procedure. International officials, triggered by certain types of events, would officially alert political decision makers as to possible developments along with concrete proposals to preempt crises and catastrophes. Political decision makers would be expected to respond to or at least acknowledge receipt.

In this regard, the Secretary General has inordinate ability to press intelligence upon the UN member states and to expect some response. Whether he wants to is a completely different question. However, he has implied many times during the Rwandan crisis that the SC and various countries were just not listening to him. It has been suggested that if that is truly so, that he should have had recourse to Art 99 which allows him to "bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security". Article 99 has only been used once or twice in the past 50 years, so prefacing his communications with reference to Article 99 would serve to alert all as to its' dramatic seriousness. Overuse would depreciate its value, but responsible and limited recourse to Article 99 would create a new breed of early warning, ie. 'an Article 99 communication'.

Another solution to political gridlock would be for certain early warning reactions to be standard operational procedure. UN officials would have a legislated right and duty, triggered by certain types of events, to initiate lower level crisis responses or crisis preparedness unless specifically instructed to the contrary by political superiors. eg. preparing peacekeeping contingency plans, seeking troop or equipment commitments, stockpiling equipment close to the crisis, sending in technical missions.

A key question is just where and how clearly can the line can be drawn between political responses and administrative responses? However failure to draw some line only makes for confusion about the division of mandates and responsibilities, which in turn serves to obscure who is accountable for taking action on early warnings. It is also inevitable that many cautious UN officials without a clear mandate will simply refer everything up the line, the perfect recipe for inaction.

**In conclusion**, there was more than enough intelligence about what was happening in Rwanda to have alerted everyone as to the need to be prepared for a possible crisis. It is not as clear that there was sufficient warning to merit substantively more preemptive action prior to April 6. But after April 6th, should we have been better prepared to respond? The answer is absolutely yes. If we had, could we have made a difference? Again, as the next section will discuss, the answer seems to be absolutely yes.

## 2.2 Could The UN Have Made a Difference?

In assessment studies such as this, it is useful to seriously consider 'what if' scenarios. If realistically the international community could not have done better, then the lessons to be learned consist mainly of repeating the successes. On the other hand, prima facie evidence that the international community could have done better provides grounds for attempting to identify how. Going through a quick 'what if' exercise can give us that prima facie evidence.

Such a 'what if' exercise need not be too divorced from reality if we set down clearly some concrete operational proposals for a 'what if', and place this in the actual crisis context. In Rwanda, the key contextual factors were cultural, political and military. In that context, we can make some initial assessment as to whether perceived failures and shortcomings did in fact adversely affect the situation, and could it have been done better. However, before leaping into the academic exercise of 'what if', it will be useful to quickly review the successes and failures of Operation Turquoise. It provides an interesting backdrop for the 'what if' exercise.

### Operation Turquoise

On the 15th of June, French Minister Juppé announced a willingness to intervene in Rwanda in concert with European and African partners if the massacres did not stop. Their European partners elected not to get involved, but did end up along with the US and the Secretary General in supporting the French in getting UN authorization. There was a great deal of debate in and around the SC, with various countries strongly opposed to a unilateral French initiative but at the end of the day SC Res 929 22 June 1994 passed 10-0-5 (abst: China, Brazil, Nigeria, Pakistan, New Zealand). It was to be strictly humanitarian and not constitute an inter-position force, and in addition it was only given a mandate until UNAMIR was brought up to the necessary strength or at most two months<sup>7</sup>.

Within days the French started to deploy their troops with a peak force strength of 2,555 French<sup>8</sup> and 350 Francophone African troops<sup>9</sup>. With headquarters in the Zairian towns of Bukavu and Goma, they quickly took up a presence in the western and south-western portions of Rwanda reaching almost to Butare.

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<sup>7</sup> For a detailed account of the politics in and around the SC concerning Operation Turquoise, see the Crisis Chronology in the Annex to this report, particularly the entries for June 15, 17, 20, 21, and 22.

<sup>8</sup> French forces included , a company of commandos, 4 mechanized infantry companies, a light armoured squadron, support units, 11 helicopters, and fighter aircraft.

<sup>9</sup> African components included 2 Senegalese companies, a section from both Chad and Guinea-Bissau, and assorted troops from Mauritania, Egypt, Nigeria, and the Congo.

Estimates of displaced Rwandans in those sectors range from 500,000 to a million. Approximately 300,000 moved into Zaire as refugees during the existence of the French 'safe humanitarian zone'. This would imply that for whatever reason, between 200,000 and 700,000 felt secure enough not to move on to Zaire. French forces also disarmed Rwandan Government Forces (RGF) in the zone, and collected information on human rights violations and passed that information on to the Commission of Experts set up by the Security Council.

There were no reports of conflict between the advancing RPF and the French, and in fact near the end of their mandate the RPF were quietly asking them to delay their departure until UNAMIR was better able to take over. The RPF had initially opposed the French initiative partly from fear that they would delay an RPF victory. Paradoxically the French presence allowed the RPF to ignore that region and more quickly roll over the RGF units in the north and south.

Various humanitarian agencies reported being unable to operate in the region until the French moved in, and subsequently found them open and cooperative<sup>10</sup>.

As early as the New York Troop Contributors Meeting of July 7th, the French emphasised their intention to begin their withdrawal at the end of July with total withdrawal no later than the end of August, the 2 month deadline set by SC Res 929. Ironically they appealed for member states to quickly expand UNAMIR and take over from the French.

They completed their withdrawal as of August 21st, and their haste to depart had as much to do with their desire to get out before anything went wrong as much as the deadline set out by the Security Council. The French and most others agreed that they had been fortunate to get out without any serious incident.

Few people want to believe that Operation Turquoise was a success, for the French history in this crisis screams out for condemnation. The French had facilitated Egyptian arms sales to Rwanda<sup>11</sup>, the French had equipped and trained the RGF, the French had advised and reportedly fought along side the RGF against the RPF, and the French had acted as apologists for RG sanctioned or RGF led massacres of Tutsis. Even during Operation Turquoise, France made no effort to encourage Francophone African nations to join UNAMIR II until after Operation Turquoise as they needed them to camouflage their total control and conduct of Operation Turquoise.

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<sup>10</sup> Anecdotally, their replacement UNAMIR units were commanded by an Ethiopian with a military security background. He proved to be much less cooperative and at one point refused to give humanitarian agencies any idea of UNAMIR troop strengths and deployment.

<sup>11</sup> see the Human Rights Watch report "Arming Rwanda: the arms trade and human rights abuses in the Rwandan War", pp. 66 January 1994. This report was particularly enlightening about those prepared to sell arms to an unelected regime of an impoverished African country in the midst of a civil war. This included France's role in facilitating the sale of \$6 million in arms by Egypt to Rwanda as well as its own arms transfers to Rwanda combined with the provision of military advisors and up to 680 troops who by many accounts actively participated in the conflict with the RPF.

But Operation Turquoise was indeed a success, and it was a success because they intervened quickly with a small number of highly mobile professional troops. The fact that widespread massacres had already occurred does not detract from their success in preventing further massacres and in limiting violence to isolated sporadic killings. By whatever measure, their presence reduced the flow of refugees to Zaire. One must assume that there were substantial numbers of government troops and militia working their way through to Zaire, and they clearly were not about to take on disciplined professional troops and many of them were even disarmed by the French. What conclusions can be drawn about UNAMIR doing likewise albeit much earlier and throughout the country?

### **Rwanda 'what if' scenario**

One feasible Rwandan 'what if' scenario starts on April 6th 1994, the date when the presidential aircraft was shot down killing both Presidents. Within days it became clear that the de facto Rwandan authorities had no intention of fulfilling the Arusha Accords, and that they had initiated a planned extermination of moderate Hutus and Tutsis at large. At that point, ie. April 8th or 9th, it is highly feasible that in response to field intelligence, UNAMIR could have without any change in its mandate or numerical size<sup>12</sup>, have undergone the below:

- \* UNMOs could have regrouped into 5 main centres outside of Kigali and been provided with supplies, arms, armoured vehicles, and small defensive troop detachments. This would have allowed them to provide intelligence for international decisions and play a role in limiting massacres and reassuring potential refugees.

- \*UNAMIR could have been provided with more armoured reconnaissance and transport vehicles. This would have allowed faster and safer movement of sub-units to facilitate roving patrols and temporary outposts. As with the UNMOs, they would have been able to play a critical role in limiting the massacres and reassuring potential refugees to stay put. It should be recalled that UNAMIR lacked even the capacity to pull GhanBatt back to Kigali.

- \*The UN Belgian battalion could have been replaced by an equally trained and equipped battalion. This would not have increased the UNAMIR establishment, it would merely have replaced authorised like with like. A conservative estimate was that the departure of the Belgian UN contingent cut the armed response

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<sup>12</sup> This scenario does not have to debate whether early warnings were sufficient to warrant earlier international action. Arguably on April 6th, UNAMIR strength and mandate was about as good as could be reasonably expected. Less reasonable was the lack of preparedness of UNAMIR, and the UN at large, to respond quickly to a crisis for which there was a reasonable likelihood.

capacity of UNAMIR by half.

\*UNAMIR could have been supplied with radio jamming and counter propaganda capability to reach the Rwandan people who live in what has been described as a 'radio information culture'. The disinformation campaign by the RG radio station "mille collines" directly called for the killing of Tutsis, encouraged the Hutus to flee RPF territory, and threatened UNAMIR security through several hate campaigns. Why was UNAMIR simply told to go and close down the station?

\*Instructions could have been given to all UN staff but in particular UNAMIR, that apparent human rights violations were to be documented and halted if possible. In addition, the public and authorities should have been made fully aware that grave violations of humanitarian or human rights norms would be recorded and acted upon either immediately if possible or in the fullness of time eg. international tribunals

In assessing these different options, it must be remembered that Rwanda is a small country, half the size of Nova Scotia and one-third the size of southern Ireland (average 80 miles north to south, and 100 miles east to west), with a population of 7.2 million. Also, the military forces involved were relatively small (RGF: 15,000 regulars and 20,000 Interahamwe versus RPF: 15,000 max)

Even within this limited 'what-if' scenario and in light of Operation Turquoise, almost universal reaction was that tens of thousands of lives would have most certainly been saved during the massacres. Such an ongoing UNAMIR presence would also have made it operationally easier and thus possibly more acceptable politically, to increase the size and mandate of UNAMIR at an earlier juncture. There is also almost certainty that the steps set out above in the scenario would have reduced the refugee flow so as to indirectly save lives and avoid massive economic dislocation. In addition, with reduced refugee flows, the overall cost savings for UNHCR and others appears obvious.

Many people feel that the obvious confusion in and around UNAMIR during that first month, combined with an obvious concentration on getting foreign nationals to safety, only reinforced the perception of the RG and RGF that they could operate with impunity. Observers felt that the Hutu extremists concluded that the world community was not particularly watching what they did, and did not really care about what happened to Rwandan peasants. The Rwandan ruling élite both Hutu and Tutsi had demonstrably proven over the centuries and in the previous three years of the on again off again civil war that the lot of the peasant majority was of minimal concern to them. They naturally assumed that the rest of the world felt the same, and the actions of the UNAMIR and the UN at large during that first month did little to dispel that view.

Butare was a case scenario. For the first two weeks, the civil authorities ensured that the situation remained calm. This was well known by UNAMIR as they still had a military presence in Butare, and it is reported that the Préfet asked for a greater UNAMIR presence to avoid destabilization

by retreating RGF troops. On the 20th of April the 16 UN military observers were withdrawn from Butare at which point there was no further UNAMIR presence in Butare nor elsewhere in Rwanda apart from Kigali. The previous day, April 19th, lightly armed units of the Presidential Guard flew in from Kigali, arrested and killed the Préfet, and initiated broad based massacres<sup>13</sup> immediately subsequent to the departure of the 16 UNMOs.

**In conclusion,** Operation Turquoise and this brief 'what if' scenario provide a prima facie case for concluding that rapid international action could have substantially mitigated the genocide and massive population displacement that occurred. The previous section determined that the international community also had sufficient early warning. The grounds are there to proceed with a more in-depth examination of what lessons the international community can draw from Rwanda.

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<sup>13</sup> see p.4, "Genocide in Rwanda April-May 1994", Human Rights Watch, and p.10 "Rwanda: Mass murder by government supporters and troops in April and May 1994", Amnesty International 23 May 1994 AFR 47/11/94

### **3 CRISIS RESPONSE - Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping**

Crisis response, what do we do when catastrophe is imminent or situations have totally deteriorated, is the crux of this study. The Rwandan crisis response divides easily into three separate chapters:

- this Chapter 3 -conflict resolution and peacekeeping**
- Chapter 4 -humanitarian assistance**
- Chapter 5 -human rights violations and protection.**

This Chapter on conflict resolution and peacekeeping can be usefully broken down into two further divisions, the UN and the OAU. While the OAU played a minor role in the UN context, it merits its own subsection to deal generally with debate over regionalism and specifically with the OAU action and inaction in the Rwandan crisis.

#### **3.1 Conflict resolution and peacekeeping - through the United Nations**

Throughout this discussion, we must not lose sight of the international legal regime particularly as it applies to the UN. This international regime is populated by a widely disparate group of players with gross differences in power. International customary law and practice provides the overwhelming normative influence for their behaviour.

The United Nations with its member sovereign states with all that the term sovereign implies, ostensibly operates by the rules of its Charter. However it is part and parcel of that larger international legal regime in which power, perception and customary practice reign almost supreme. Also, the UN Charter does not explicitly address internal conflict situations. In previous decades that gap would have been a fundamental flaw in how the UN would have handled a similar Rwandan crisis.

The reaction or inaction of the Security Council and the UN in the face of events in Rwanda post April 6th make it obvious that this flaw remains in part. Fortunately as will be seen, there were

sufficient glimmers of international revolt both at the height of the crisis and more so now as nations and the world understand more clearly our failure. There are signs that the international community can evolve and is evolving through changing state and UN practice. It appears that the UN is sufficiently robust to bend and effectively re-write or at least re-interpret the Charter and other international norms concerning internal conflicts.

However on April 6th, the perceived wisdom on conflict resolution and peacekeeping was that the most powerful countries such as the United States continued to have effective control over the success or failure of such initiatives, and in fact had the deciding say on whether they even proceeded. This perception had taken hold during the cold war when a bi-polar world moved largely to the tune of those with massive military clout. The rapid dissolution of such an international regime has not seen a commensurate change in that perception of the hidden hand of the biggest. This continued belief has been encouraged by the UN permanent 5 in what appears to be a giant confidence trick reinforced by a dated set of UN rules that govern a world community dramatically different from 50 years ago.

It appears curious that the handful of 14 middle power western nations<sup>14</sup> who at a conservative estimate have a total annual military budget of \$70 billion and a total of 1,100,000 troops, are not capable of making common cause with like-minded developing countries. Those countries may lack peacekeeping skills and equipment but give every indication of being prepared to take their place on the world stage if only given a hand. It seems a little simplistic for middle powers as well as the UN membership at large to ascribe UN gridlock to the P5 and others. All should look to themselves for solutions as the UN moves into its 50th year amid cries for reform from the governed.

In the weeks following the April 6th plane crash, debate in and around the SC made it clear that the ghost of Somalia figured prominently in the thoughts of various big powers<sup>15</sup>, most especially the US which had 18 of its soldiers killed (total of 113 UN fatalities to date), with the bodies of several abused in public.

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<sup>14</sup> Austria, Australia, Canada, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden

<sup>15</sup> Just prior to the 21 April decision of the SC to reduce UNAMIR from 2,000 to 270, the SC had considered the report of the Commission of Inquiry into the attacks on the UN in Somalia and inter alia that report recommended that: " 270. The United Nations should refrain from undertaking further peace enforcement actions within the internal conflicts of states." What was less prominent and likely attracted less notice was a small clause at the end of the next paragraph, "271. The United Nations should, where necessary, continue peace-keeping operations of the traditional type under its Charter, but with increased emphasis on preventive diplomacy, assistance in peaceful nation-building efforts and preparedness to respond quickly to emergencies." (emphasis added), see A/1994/653 1 June 1994. At this point it appears that the UN may yet be forced to undertake peace enforcement action within the internal conflict of Rwanda because in those weeks following April 6 the UN was unwilling to respond quickly to the emergency.

Involved in the crisis were a relatively small number of key actors in addition to the RG, the RGF, and the RPF. Key countries were France and Belgium because of their neo-colonial connections and troop presence, and the US because of its preponderance internationally and within the SC. The key UN players were the SC and the SG. The OAU and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) caucus played a junior role. A key individual as time progressed was the Force Commander (FC) General Dallaire. Others such as the UK, Canada, NZ as SC chair, and Nigeria as the NAM spokesperson, played important but not pivotal roles. Harder to define but certainly key was the collective UN membership, in particular those with the capacity to provide troops or equipment.

Not surprisingly, the SC played the deciding role as it had the sole authority for creating and mandating first UNOMUR and then UNAMIR. With such pride of place comes the promise of glory if all goes well, and blame if it fails. It looks as if the Security Council, or more specifically its various members, did not meet reasonable expectations. For a day by day account of the debate and jockeying in and around the SC, see the Annex and the crisis chronology.

The SC's apparent failure stemmed initially from a general unwillingness of the US to allow substantive peacekeeping efforts to occur. In this they were abetted in decreasing degrees by the UK, China, and Russia. Further failure resulted because of the glacial speed at which countries apart from Canada, Zimbabwe, Ghana, Ethiopia and Senegal agreed to commit troops or equipment once the SC finally decided to strengthen the size and mandate of UNAMIR.

Consensus is that the US was rebounding from its most recent experience in Somalia. It simply did not think that the UN was capable of mounting an effective peacekeeping operation, and the US felt it had a duty to save the UN from itself. It also did not want to incur further financial costs to the US to support an abortive mission, and absolutely did not want to have to contribute troops to rescue any such mission. Without debating the merits of their assessment, it is obvious that steps must be taken to assure the US and other countries that there is UN capacity. As will be elaborated below, one such confidence building measure would be the creation of permanent rapid deployment headquarters.

At any rate, the US chose Rwanda as a chance to 'draw a line in the sand' and forcefully enunciated and implemented Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25). New Zealand in particular argued in vain that UNAMIR post April 6th was no longer a peacekeeping mission but rather a humanitarian mission and thus did not fall squarely under PDD 25.

PDD 25 itself is a group of good peacekeeping principles and ideas. In many ways it only repeats what many other troop contributing nations have been saying, and this resonates in their own official and off the record concerns about UNAMIR and other ongoing peacekeeping missions. However, in the Rwandan crisis post April 6th, PDD 25 was pushed too far and applied inflexibly so as to become an impediment to rapid and effective conflict resolution and intervention into what was a humanitarian disaster.

The US position stemmed from an initial predetermination that Rwanda was solely a civil war with few, and certainly no over-riding, human rights or humanitarian aspects. This was combined with senior administration instructions to use Rwanda as the example on how peacekeeping missions were to be mandated and created in the future. Middle ranking officials once they had become more informed as to the genocidal nature of Rwanda, had difficulty in educating their superiors and reportedly were dismayed at US support for downsizing UNAMIR.

By May 17th it was obvious that the UN had to step back into the conflict, and the SC passed Res 918/94 which increased the size and mandate of UNAMIR. In advance of its passing, there was protracted debate as to whether it should be a Chapter VI or VII operation. Canada and others wanted a Chapter VII operation, and in lieu of achieving this, demanded to see what the RoEs would be prior<sup>16</sup> to accepting to commit troops.

The US insistence on Chapter VI stemmed from their black and white interpretation of Chapter VII. They felt that Chapter VII was only to sanction moving the UN into a confrontational war situation with parties to a conflict. They did not understand the import of Chapter VII Art. 40 which is very much a transitional stage. Art. 40 would have allowed an interpositional mandate for UNAMIR II, which would have given several countries the opportunity to gain a clearer understanding of events before opting for Art 41 or 42 action. A better understanding of graduated response capable under Chapter VII would have served to shorted debate on Resolution 918, lessened the acrimony of the debate, and hastened substantive action.

#### **Recommendation**

*Canada should encourage debate within the UN as to the usefulness of Charter Art. 40 in achieving a graduated transition from Chapter VI operations to Chapter VII Arts. 41 & 42 operations.*

The US government's strict adherence to PDD 25 and strongly held conviction that the UN was not capable of rapid deployment of UNAMIR II, also affected the rate of implementation of SC Res 918/94. At US insistence<sup>17</sup>, UNAMIR II proceeded in two stages, the first being the redeployment of "UNAMIR military observers currently in Nairobi and to bring up to full strength the elements of the mechanized infantry battalion currently in Rwanda". The US then wanted to review the operation in its entirety with an eye on PDD 25 criteria before proceeding to stage two. This created a substantive degree of uncertainty about both time constraints and the second phase itself. Troop contributing nations (TCNs) not already so inclined now started to ponder the dangers of involvement and questioned the field headquarter's command, control, and communications capacity.

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<sup>16</sup> It should be noted that this was the first time that a TCN had demanded and had received clarification of and input into the RoEs.

<sup>17</sup> Comments from other nations made it clear that apart from possibly Russia, they all had wanted to proceed to a rapid and full deployment of UNAMIR II.

All arguments aside about the rights or wrongs of countries opposing or not fully supporting or contributing to UNAMIR prior to April 6th, the international perception of the situation by May 17th was fundamentally different. The deeds were done, the facts were known, and the Security Council had passed Res. 918 agreeing to expand UNAMIR to 5500 with an expanded mandate. It is revealing to view the slowness with which TCN's then provided troops or equipment on the ground in Rwanda.

On May 17th with the passing of Res. 918, there were 471 UNAMIR troops remaining on the ground in Rwanda. Two months later, there were only 550 troops on the ground, an increase of 89. On August 10th, almost three months after Res. 918, there were only 1,257 troops on the ground, leaving them 4,293 short.

In a hard hitting press conference, Under-Secretary General Kofi Annan set out what he saw as the reasons for these delays;<sup>18</sup>

- many countries offered troops without equipment;
- equipment offered not enough or not what is needed;
- some insisted on exorbitant reimbursement for equipment and their demands had to be negotiated down;
- some equipment offered requiring reconditioning and repairs;
- complications of matching equipment with troops (eg. logistics and training);
- apart from Canada absolutely no airlift capacity into Kigali offered;
- commercial airlift insurance prohibitive;
- UN secretariat administrative delays<sup>19</sup>.

He prefaced his comments by stating that "prompt and effective action to strengthen UNAMIR could have mitigated the terrible human toll of recent months." He then closed off by referring to the ongoing affront to the conscience of the world and that "There is nothing UNAMIR needs that the Member States of the United Nations do not already possess, and could provide if the necessary political will existed to do so." (emphasis added)

## RECOMMENDATION

*Canada and other concerned TCN's should collaborate on and publish a policy statement and set of guidelines addressing the need to provide fully trained peacekeeping troops and*

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<sup>18</sup> See his background notes for the press conference of July 28 1994, and the subsequent and more diplomatic letter of the SG to the SC dated 1 August 1994 but carrying the same message, "What is required is the political will".

<sup>19</sup> It should be noted that they did attempt to move quickly and in fact DPKO put out the request for troops 5 days before Res 918 in anticipation of its passing. Invariably however, the DPKO branch tasked with putting together peacekeeping missions just did not have sufficient staff to conduct the rather convoluted negotiations forced upon it by various contributors in order to nail down troop and equipment offers.

*operational equipment. In this way, potential troop and equipment contributing nations would be made more aware that they alone are the solution in mounting peacekeeping operations, and that by reneging on offers, or providing inappropriate equipment and troops, or by attempting to capitalize on reimbursement or getting equipped, they become part of the problem.*

It should be mentioned in passing that the Secretariat elected not to ask various traditional 'white' TCNs such as Canada for infantry troops. The Secretariat hoped strongly that African countries would put in the majority of troops and that 'white' TCNs would supply communication, transport, medical, and other support units. While this requirement for African line troops may have been theoretically and politically correct, one wonders whether Rwandans would have worried about being protected by all or mostly white troops. Having said that, it is far from clear that any 'white' TCNs would have offered infantry units even if asked. They certainly did not offer them unsolicited.

One of the reasons for the US demanding a review before the second phase of UNAMIR II stemmed from PDD 25's laudable expectation that there be sufficient command and control capacity by peacekeeping field headquarters. In a normal situation, this should be the stance of all TCN's and as mentioned earlier, a standing rapid deployment headquarters would go a long way to reassuring the US and others.

However, Rwanda on May 17th was no longer a normal peacekeeping operation. New Zealand and others argued strenuously that the humanitarian and moral imperatives of events in Rwanda should override what was otherwise a valid criteria for the rapid and full deployment of UNAMIR II. Unfortunately they did not win the day, but then moral suasion, however well premised on righteousness and justice, hardly ever does win by itself.

Rather than attempting to rely solely on moral and humanitarian arguments in future situations, DPKO and interested TCN's such as Canada should investigate in detail the concept being advanced by some<sup>20</sup> of a permanent UN rapid reaction force headquarters. Each such headquarters commanded by a Major General would comprise 50-80 military and civilian staff on 2 year placements with the UN. Based in appropriate locations around the world, they would have the capacity to deploy within 3 to 14 days to the field. For peacekeeping missions, subordinate units with combined personnel strengths of up to 10,000 would be drawn from national forces under stand-by force agreements. These agreements would specify that those units could be assigned to such a headquarters depending on the situation, mission mandate, and national political authorization to deploy. However their tentative designation would allow more sophisticated generic planning and a close association of prospective units within a credible command and control mechanism.

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<sup>20</sup> In September 1993, Canadian Foreign Affairs put forward a concept paper on a permanent rapid reaction force headquarters for the UN, and it is starting to garner support in some UN circles and by various TCNs.

When not in the field the headquarters would be tasked with liaising with designated national stand-by forces and carrying out such activities as tactical exercises without troops, regular commanders conferences, and other inter-force confidence and capacity building activities.

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

*Canada along with DPKO and other interested TCNs should fully examine the concept and modalities of creating UN Permanent Rapid Deployment Headquarters.*

Bearing in mind the slowness with which even the most dedicated UN department or agency can move through changes, Canada can help precipitate rapid movement by fully supporting the concept and offering both a Canadian location<sup>21</sup> and Canadian staff for the first of such headquarters. If other countries were prepared to make similar resource commitments for this and other such headquarters, the time frame for realization would be shortened dramatically.

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

*Canada should precipitate the creation of a UN Permanent Rapid Deployment Headquarters by offering free accommodation at a location in Canada along with the paid secondment of a Canadian Major General as commander and up to 1/2 of the remaining staff establishment, eg. 30 out of 60.*

The idea of a rapid deployment headquarters is only part of the UN's peacekeeping rapid reaction matrix. The UN needs to develop its thinking on this along with an expansion of DPKO capacity. Command structures within the UN must be improved, and the UN must develop a peacekeeping command and control doctrine.

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

*Canada should encourage the UN to develop a peacekeeping command and control doctrine.*

Along these lines, and as announced by the Foreign Minister in speaking to the General Assembly in September 1994, Canada will be carrying out a study on enhancing the UN's responsiveness and rapid reaction capability. The Canadian government must ensure that

the results of this study are broadly disseminated, and that follow up action takes place within the UN and amongst TCN's to engender substantive changes or improvements.

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<sup>21</sup> For example, the under utilized capacity at what was National Defense College at Fort Frontenac in Kingston with its proximity to resources at Base Kingston and RMC, relatively easy access to New York, and nearness to NDHQ in Ottawa without appearing to be 'under its wing'. In addition, the Headquarters 1 Canadian Division at the nearby McNaughton Barracks is tasked as a Canadian Joint Task Force Headquarters, and as such it could provide developmental support as a model HQ with established operational procedures.

## **RECOMMENDATION**

*Canada must ensure that the results of its imminent study on enhancing the UN's responsiveness and rapid reaction capability are broadly disseminated, and that follow up action takes place within the UN and amongst TCN's to engender substantive changes or improvements.*

During the ongoing debates about the Rwandan peacekeeping option, there were the traditional efforts by the better informed and more powerful countries to manipulate the system behind the scenes. At one point, a US government team of about 50 quietly descended upon the Secretariat to impart the official US stance and pressure the Secretariat to back off on efforts to enhance UNAMIR. This is but one example of the behind the scenes bilateral debate and pressures that other countries are often not fully, if at all, aware of. The P5 are especially happy with this state of affairs as they can get to the SG and his people any time they want. This however tends to limit the contribution of even middle powers, and certainly reduces the capacity of the vast majority of UN countries to have any impact on policy and decision making. It appears that the present SG is also comfortable with this method of operating. Inter alia it probably facilitates his manoeuvring since the dynamics are far fewer and thus more manageable. Undoubtedly such jockeying and manipulation is antithetical to the principles of the UN. More to the point however, this lack of transparency and consultation has not proven to be especially effective either in the long term as it engenders cynicism and distrust, nor in the short term as evidenced by Rwanda.

During the Rwandan crisis, there was one minor and one major development in this regard. On the minor side, during the debate on whether Chapter VI operations automatically implied the right to self defense by peacekeepers, MGen Baril sat down with the SC to discuss the issue. Such multilateral meetings with senior UN policy and operational staff allows open debate and limits the ability of a few with easy access to manipulate decision making. In the first instance, this serves to better inform all those countries that are faced with taking decisions in UN political forum. It also facilitates the contribution of all concerned countries on a particular issue, for UN secretariat staff are effectively setting Secretariat policy by the way in which they interpret or create administrative or operational procedures.

## **RECOMMENDATION**

*Canada should encourage the UN to develop more opportunities for open multilateral consultations with senior UN policy and operational staff, in order to balance off the preferential access provided to the Permanent Five and other major UN powers.*

A more major initiative occurred when the NZ president of the SC insisted on calling briefing sessions for the TCNs. This was strongly opposed by both France and the UK, with France actually walking out when a meeting moved beyond the TCNs being briefed, to a discussion about what the Security Council should be doing. Both countries relented on their opposition when it

became clear that the US was prepared to go along with the briefings, and the rest of the Western European and Others Group (WEOG) was extremely positive about the initiative. While President of the SC, NZ called a large number of meetings so that now it is accepted practice albeit at the discretion of the President. Another weakness is that the meetings occur in a large room with all of the delegations facing a podium from which the SG or his representative gives a briefing. This group dynamic does not foster a round table discussion and easily shifts into countries delivering prepared position statements. In addition, countries are often represented by military representatives who are not comfortable opening up and having a free-ranging discussion in such surroundings.

### **RECOMMENDATION**

*Canada should suggest that Troop Contributing Nations meetings become fixed weekly sessions chaired by the USG for peacekeeping or a representative, with additional sessions convened by the USG when necessary. These meetings should take place in a physical environment that lends itself to open and frank discussions aimed at achieving consensus on the most appropriate ways to move forward.*

Far from saving the US and the UN money, the US success in reducing UNAMIR I and in delaying the deployment of UNAMIR II inadvertently but undeniably exacerbated the humanitarian crisis and made it necessary for the US itself to spend an estimated 50 times<sup>22</sup> what an effective and preventive UN peace enforcement mission would have cost.

Over one month into the crisis, with death counts mounting into the 100,000's, Washington instructed its mission to continue to take a hard stance. During the Security Council debate of 16/17 May, the US felt that Resolution 918 did not sufficiently satisfy their PDD 25 and was flawed without clear commitments from troop/equipment contributors, without the complete consent of parties, and without a refined operations mandate and plan. The US had by this time gained the reputation of obstructing UNAMIR, so that their concerns were too easily dismissed. In fact the objectives set out in SC Res. 918/94 were disjointed and unclear.

Clearly the mandate for an expanded UNAMIR required the use of force to enforce the peace. However Res. 918 did not explicitly state this, and there were several reservations. Paradoxically the US itself added the term "in self-defence", which along with other reservations made the rules of engagement dangerously unclear. The Force Commander (FC) needed but did not get explicit Rules of Engagements (RoEs) which would legitimize the proportional level of force necessary

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<sup>22</sup> "US Might Have Avoided Rwanda Tragedy", Holly Burkhalter, Washington Director of Human Rights Watch, writing in The Christian Science Monitor, August 9 1994. Burkhalter uses the figure of 50 times and predicates her assessment on the US "conducting extensive humanitarian efforts, including the eventual deployment of thousands of US troops to Rwanda itself and the expenditure of \$250 million in relief assistance." In fact the US deployed almost 5,000 troops in Goma and elsewhere (the US stressed the point that they were not part of UNAMIR).

to achieve the assigned tasks.

In addition, the location and the method of creating secure humanitarian areas was quite unclear. And, what was only belatedly realised was the strong possibility that such secure areas could act to pull more refugees from their homes and act as a focal point for Interahamwe and similar 'thugs' to establish power bases.

While it is misleading to compare the international community's intervention into the former Yugoslavia with upwards of 38,000 troops over time with the Rwandan intervention of 2,500 downsized to 450 (270 mandated) as soon as the situation worsened, the comparison is inevitable and thought provoking. For the international community to claim massive ignorance of causal factors and a degree of international incompetence is not much more satisfactory and certainly less believable than the accusations of simple real politik underscored by perhaps not so subtle racism.

It is understandable that the Belgians were shocked by the April 6th execution by Rwandan government troops of the 13 Belgian peacekeepers and President Agathe Uwilingiyimana. This act of terrorism against moderate Hutus and UNAMIR had the desired effect when Belgium very quickly flew in over 700 troops to get its civilian nationals out of Rwanda and soon after announced that they were withdrawing their battalion from UNAMIR. By April 15th all Belgian nationals, national troops, and peacekeeping troops, had left. At the last moment they reneged on their promise to leave behind equipment, particularly armoured vehicles for the Ghanaian Battalion. The withdrawal of the Belgians also took up UNAMIR resources such as the single air link, the Canadian military C-130, which helped to airlift them out.

Then in an even more controversial move, Belgium at the UN in New York conducted a major lobbying effort to convince countries that the situation for UNAMIR was totally untenable and that it would be 'chopped up' by government forces. Sceptics claim that this was an effort by Belgium to cloak their hasty departure, and a desire by not to be seen as the only country abandoning the effort. Their campaign clearly had the desired effect on those TCNs who had no independent source of information on events in Rwanda. Several of them such as Bangladesh quietly voiced a desire to also slip out of Rwanda. US officials are also claiming now that Belgium's warnings convinced them that it was time to close down UNAMIR<sup>23</sup>.

Perhaps the Rwandan military had taken note of the ability of a handful of thugs on the dock at Port au Prince to turn back the UN teams attempting to land from a US naval ship. At any rate, their ability to scare off the strongest component of UNAMIR and throw other TCNs and UN decision makers in New York into disarray and a state of inertia is rather worrisome. Peacekeeping doctrine needs to be further clarified and the public, the politicians, and

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<sup>23</sup> This claim seems a bit of an overstatement as the US had its own intelligence on what was happening in Rwanda, and they had long opposed the initial creation of UNAMIR. US officials also claim that they had only agreed to the creation of UNOMUR and then UNAMIR as a favour to the French. This claimed willingness to tailor US policy to the wishes of first France and then Belgium, is not given much credibility.

peacekeepers themselves need to discuss and understand that peacekeeping and certainly peace enforcement will invariably involve deaths. Most certainly the humanitarian agencies have for some time been aware of the inherent dangers of what they do. Although even they are having to revise their procedures and educate themselves to the growing dangers of various humanitarian initiatives, notably the Rwandan refugee camps in Zaire.

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

*Canada should encourage debate both within Canada and within the UN so as to educate the public and policy makers as to the very real likelihood of peacekeepers and humanitarian workers being killed in the line of duty. Only then can informed decisions be taken to engage and stay engaged when the inevitable happens.*

In a similar vein, the Rules of Engagement (RoEs) for peacekeepers need to be clarified with regard to attacks on peacekeepers. The perception amongst groups such as the RGF in Rwanda that they can get away with terrorizing or killing peacekeepers or humanitarian workers will only serve to put peacekeepers and others at even greater risk. This is not to call for a knee-jerk reaction as in Somalia where the peacekeeping force attempted to hunt down General Aidid. What is needed is a broad range of deliberate options going from immediate armed retaliation to eventual arrest and international trials of those responsible.

In a broader sense, present RoEs are extremely ad hoc and open textured in that they are open to many interpretations. There was lengthy debate during the Rwandan crisis as to whether self defense was part of RoEs under Chapter VI operations. There is an obvious need to work out clear RoEs.

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

*Canada should encourage the holding of working meeting of UN troop contributing nations, humanitarian agencies , and human rights agencies (UN and NGO), to create standard operating procedures and model Rules of Engagement for UN peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. This should feed into similar processes for 'RoEs' for UN humanitarian assistance or human rights mission members .*

UN peacekeeping procedures and mechanisms must include a human rights component. Traditional peacekeepers, like traditional diplomats, tend to see human rights as an irritant and hindrance in achieving their task of keeping the peace. By now it should be increasingly evident that in the 1990's peace which is built upon or accepting of human rights abuses is rather ephemeral. In truth, human rights observance must be seen for what it is, the firm underpinnings of a durable peace. The peacekeepers and peacemakers must be convinced of the need to incorporate human rights into the process from the very start.

By his own admission, the Force Commander General Dallaire was given absolutely no indication when he took command that he was facing anything other than a traditional peacekeeping function. He was not briefed that events could take a turn for the worse, nor was he brought up to speed on the lengthy and ongoing political history of gross violations of human rights as determined by various UN mechanisms and a number of very credible NGOs. He could be excused for a sense of betrayal in that he was not sufficiently trained and briefed for his mission, and that he was effectively abandoned by almost everyone when the going got tough. These gaps in training and briefings for peacekeepers have become more obvious in past years, but they had not been heeded in time to rectify the induction procedures for General Dallaire. This needs to be worked on by the UN and interested countries with some haste.

### **RECOMMENDATION**

*The Canadian Armed Forces should lead by example in carrying out more extensive training for all its members on peacekeeping in general, and the cultural and political contexts of peacekeeping specifically. In addition, its standby troops and individuals designated to take on individual roles such as Force Commander, should receive additional intensive training that is more specific to the country and society that they will be operating in. The issues of conflict resolution, humanitarianism and human rights must be integral to this training.*

### **UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations**

DPKO USG Kofi Annan in his press release of July 28th stated that "the Secretariat is not blameless since our administrative procedures are not entirely suited to the exigencies of an emergency situation; we are taking measures<sup>24</sup> to introduce such changes as are possible within the authority of the Secretariat". This self criticism was the only criticism heard about the efforts and professionalism of DPKO over Rwanda or any other peacekeeping operation of recent vintage.

One must clarify here that DPKO has to work with the mandates provided for it by the SC, and it is within these parameters that one must judge DPKO. In other words, the failure of the SC to provide UNAMIR with sufficient resources and mandate to do a credible job has little to do with DPKO. Similarly, the unwillingness of countries to contribute troops and appropriate equipment even once the SC mandated UNAMIR II has little to do with DPKO. In fact, the lethargic and piecemeal way in which countries responded to the request for troops and equipment, impose further and almost impossible burdens on DPKO. Not only did it require a multiplicity of 'begging' calls from DPKO to potential contributors, they then had to attempt to match up a variety of offers of troops without even basic equipment, with equipment offers that were often

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<sup>24</sup> See the discussion in the Chapter on Coordination and Transition for the broader internal reforms within the UN Secretariat to coordinate DPKO with DHA and DPA.

inappropriate or in need of refurbishment or tied with a request for financial reimbursement that was far beyond the value of the equipment being offered. In this regard, the UN needs to establish some basic standards of troop training and equipment below which the UN will not envisage entertaining a nation offering those troops. Similarly, the UN needs to establish basic standards for the provision of equipment which will ensure that they are sufficiently serviceable, and set out the ranges of payment to nations for various types of equipment.

The changes within DPKO over the past several years have been substantive, for example the high profile 24 hour a day and 7 days a week Operations Centre. In November 1993 a high level in-house review of DPKO took place which came up with a number of further recommendations that DPKO is attempting to address within the constraints of staffing and financial resources. It must be emphasised that this evolution of the past couple of years has occurred even while DPKO was being called upon to mount ever more and substantially larger peacekeeping operations. That they have managed to do both with a fair degree of success is a credit to the staff of DPKO and the willingness of many of them to work long hours of overtime.

DPKO is clearly one of those few parts of the UN that not only requires urgent increases in staff and resources if they are to improve their effectiveness, but who deserve to be rewarded for both fulfilling the peacekeeping tasks at hand and for their attitude and track record on internal reform.

## **Conclusion**

The conflict resolution and peacekeeping response in the months immediately after April 6th was a failure. The fundamental lack of political will by almost every UN member was most evident in the Security Council. Many countries used the crisis to establish positions on issues (eg. peacekeeping, the role of the Security Council) that had little to do with Rwanda. The rapid withdrawal of most of UNAMIR once foreign nationals were evacuated was followed by a glacial half hearted reinforcement of UNAMIR. At best UNAMIR did little for Rwandans during this period, and at worse, increased the hardline Hutu perception of world indifference to them orchestrating massacres and refugee flows. **The problem this time was not the UN structure or staff, but its member states.**

### 3.2 Regional conflict resolution and peacekeeping: the OAU

The very size and 'distance' of the UN has caused many to argue in favour of an increased role for regional organizations in conflict resolution and peacekeeping. However, there are many problems in principle, and practice leaves even more to be desired.

In the Rwandan crisis, the OAU and African countries took very ambivalent stances. On one hand, they were extremely concerned about developments in Rwanda, and both the OAU and countries like Nigeria pushed hard for an expanded UNAMIR with a stronger mandate. At the same time African countries refrained from using, and at times within the UN and SC debate actively blocked, the use of strong explicit language criticising human rights violations. This was particularly true with regards the term genocide.

That type of ambivalence stems not from a lack of concern, but from a lack of political will to take the steps necessary to have any substantive impact on the internal abuse of human rights. It is indicative to look at paragraph 14 of the OAU's statement on the creation of its new mechanism for conflict resolution<sup>25</sup>:

**14. The *Mechanism* will be guided by the objectives and principles of the *OAU Charter*; in particular, the sovereign equality of Members States, non-interference in the internal affairs of States, the respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Member States, their inalienable right to independent existence, the peaceful settlement of disputes as well as the inviolability of borders inherited from colonialism. It will also function on the basis of the consent and the cooperation of the parties to a conflict. (emphasis added)**

This unwillingness to intervene in the internal affairs of fellow African states will continue to hobble efforts of Africans to play constructive roles in African crises. Fortunately episodes such as the recent Lesotho intervention by South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Botswana shows the possibilities when the fundamentals of democracy and human rights are not overridden by those governments who are unsure of their own legitimacy or own ability to sustain regional or international scrutiny.

Another aspect of regional conflict resolution and peacekeeping involves the double sided factor of 'local knowledge'. On one side, Africans culturally and geographically are initially better placed to understand the issues and identify the solutions for Rwanda, and other African crises. The flip side is that such proximity often results in real or perceived partiality either because they favour a particular party to the dispute or because they have a national vested interest in the

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<sup>25</sup> see the "Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government on the Establishment Within the OAU of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution", Cairo Declaration AHG/Dec.13(XXIX) of 30 June 1993.

outcome. Nevertheless, the hope is that cultural affinity, awareness, and unbiased concern, can with time outweigh such conflicts of interest. The most recent diplomatic resolution of the coup in Lesotho by South Africa, Botswana, and Zimbabwe again is a regional success story. It was an example of the usefulness of local knowledge combined with that real concern for a neighbour's well being. Liberia and other examples are not so promising.

Then there is the question of operational capacity. Conflict resolution with or without peacekeeping forces, is a complex and difficult process to conduct. It requires trained staff or troops who can not only operate on the ground, but staff who can direct operations or interventions from distant headquarters where bureaucratic and administrative constraints can prove to be insurmountable. It is not clear that the OAU has this operational capacity yet.

Even assuming the political will and the capacity to conduct an intervention, the costs of doing so can be prohibitive. At this point in time, the OAU and African countries just do not have the resources to unilaterally put together such operations. For example, their troops invariably do not have sufficient appropriate equipment. Sometimes this results from an unwillingness to redirect existing resources both nationally and regionally, more often it is because the money is just not there. However, if the financial resources were available, we return to the question of whether the OAU has the capacity to conduct peacekeeping.

While we have mentioned the success of Lesotho, the Liberian example of regional African peacekeeping has not proven to be particularly satisfying for any of those involved. It has failed and continues to fail for many of the reasons set out above. Initially there was no political will within the OAU, and they very quickly agreed that ECOWAS could take the initiative.

Then, despite some initial success, ECOMOG started to bog down and become part of the Liberian problem. It fell prey to the danger of becoming too closely allied with various factions.

For example, part of the Nigerian contingent began supplying arms and ammunition to the Liberian Peace Council (LPC) in what is alternately seen as strategic support or profiteering by Nigerians. At any rate there is now extreme distrust and antagonism between ECOMOG and the largest internal faction, the NPFL, which controls over half of the country. To resolve a rapidly deteriorating peacekeeping operation, both the UN and the OAU started to take a role. UNOMIL was created to help supervise and monitor the July 1993 Cotonou accord, which was a diplomatic way of saying that the UN through UNOMIL would quietly supervise ECOMOG. Then the OAU started to play a larger role behind the scenes, and attempted to involve troops from outside of the sub-region.

Also, ECOMOG and now the OAU involvement occurred in large part because the US was prepared to put up millions of dollars. In 1993 alone they first put \$19.83 million into the UN Trust Fund for peacekeeping in Liberia, and in November allocated another \$11 for

peacekeeping<sup>26</sup>. This largesse appears to be rapidly tailing off and ECOMOG's future is questionable. The OAU as part of its new Mechanism for conflict resolution has allowed for the creation of a special fund<sup>27</sup> for operational activities related to conflict management and resolution. It is incumbent upon African states to provide a modicum of money needed, but the developed world should make contributions commensurate with the start taking up its role in this area.

## **RECOMMENDATION**

*Canada should encourage other developed countries to also contribute to the OAU special fund for conflict resolution, with levels premised upon the willingness and capacity of the OAU to undertake regional conflict prevention and resolution.*

A quick extrapolation from Liberia seems to indicate that there was little hope that the OAU could have or should have played a larger role in Rwanda. For a start, there were innumerable conflicts of interest. The Rwandan crisis perhaps never was a country specific conflict and is increasingly being referred to as a Central African regional crisis. The Rwanda-Burundi and Rwanda-Uganda linkages are substantive. The massive spill over of refugees and RGF/Interahamwe into Zaire and Tanzania have also dramatically increased their national vested interests in the resolution of the conflict. The regional links and the broader context of the Rwanda crisis probably would have argued against a greater OAU role even if they had had the political will to intervene.

They certainly did not have the financial capacity to assume the Rwandan peacekeeping operations in what for them would have been quite an onerous financial burden. The OAU and African countries declined the UNSG's specific invitation to take the lead in May and June of 1994 despite the UNSG's stated hope that they would replace a stalled UNAMIR. There is no doubt but that the financial aspects were a deciding factor in their reasoning as the non-UN portions of such a regionally directed operation would have depended on voluntary contributions.

Despite the relative absence of the OAU in the Rwandan crisis, the development of a functioning conflict resolution capacity by the OAU should be a long term objective. A first step is for the OAU Secretariat to have a better understanding of the operational content of conflict prevention and conflict resolution. The UN particularly as it wishes to hand off certain responsibilities in the

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<sup>26</sup> p. 14 "Human Rights in Africa and U.S. Policy", Human Rights Watch, July 1994.

<sup>27</sup> para 23, "Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government on the Establishment Within the OAU of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution", Cairo Declaration AHG/Dec.13(XXIX) of 30 June 1993. As of January 1994 that voluntary fund had received (approximate figures): OAU budgeted \$1,000,000; Italy \$200,000; Algeria \$10,000; OAU spouses assoc. \$10,000; UK \$200,000; Canada \$200,000. Separately the US has already advanced \$1.35 and has pledged a total of \$4.5 for OAU conflict resolution and peacekeeping capacity. This amount of money will provide the OAU with more than sufficient monies to undertake conflict prevention and other non-peacekeeping initiatives. Peacekeeping however would involve a quantum jump in costs.

future, can help in this capacity building.

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

*Canada should encourage the UN to provide space on every UN African crisis intervention or peacekeeping mission for an OAU Secretariat observer/trainee. The expectation would be that this person will take what they learn back to the OAU and train and educate others. In this same vein, the OAU should second operational staff to such functional divisions or agencies as DPKO and UNHCR. The UN should provide them with office space and on job training by assigning them to a variety of tasks through which they will learn the operational requirements of mounting the conflict resolution components of humanitarian or peacekeeping missions.*

The OAU should be encouraged to sub-regionalise aspects of its conflict resolution operations. For example, sub-groupings of the Central Organ<sup>28</sup> of their new Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution could meet to undertake initiatives in their particular region. This will allow particularly the Southern African region<sup>29</sup> to undertake successful initiatives such as occurred in Lesotho, and thus create both success and precedence for other sub-regions.

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

*Canada should encourage the OAU Central Organ of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution to mandate sub-regional groupings of the Organ to design and proceed with initiatives that do not impose duties or obligations on other OAU members.*

In conclusion, the OAU had a limited role in the Rwandan crisis. This was partly due to a lack of finances and most definitely a lack of operational capacity. Both of these factors are showing signs of improving, and the larger world community can play a significant role in strengthening this OAU capacity. Much more problematic is the question of OAU political will inasmuch as state sovereignty remains an overwhelming issue for African governments.

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<sup>28</sup> this is composed of the State members of the Bureau of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government elected annually

<sup>29</sup> Strengthening Southern Africa sub region by building upon the economic and political links of SADCC (now with South Africa as partner not pariah) is clearly Canadian CIDA's key African strategy. Quite apart from the merits of putting resources where they will have the most impact, there is also the ancillary objective of fostering the southern region's economic growth and political stability as a example and sheet-anchor for the rest of Africa.

#### **4 CRISIS RESPONSE - Humanitarian Assistance**

The humanitarian response to Rwanda is of much more recent vintage than that of conflict resolution and peacekeeping. It was triggered by the massacres and refugee flows that started only in early to mid April 1994, and so the track record is still being recorded. Nevertheless, early indicators are that the humanitarian response once it was provided with sufficient security by UNAMIR II, has been proceeding very well.

In fact, most of the success stories from the international response to the Rwanda crisis are coming from the humanitarian side. Despite the size of the disaster including the numbers of displaced people both within and without, the response of the international community has been very rapid and generous. In part this has been to assuage a certain amount of guilt about having done little to avoid the cataclysm. But whatever the reasons, the various UN agencies and NGOs have been quickly provided with most of the wherewithal to do their jobs and to date they have performed very well.

One of the success stories comes from the development of 'services packages' by UNHCR. Broadly speaking UNHCR put out a request for various services such as providing water at the Goma refugee camp or running the Entebbe or Kigali airports including air traffic control, airport security, and airport maintenance. Countries or organizations could then select which service package they would wish to carry out. The advantage for UNHCR was that that country or organization would run and pay for that particular service package. The advantage for the donors was that rather than just give money or have their nationals spread throughout a UNHCR activity, they would be able to have a highly concentrated profile from which to wave their flag. This need to get public recognition particularly back home, plays directly to the politicians and others who see tangible benefits. Without overstating it, there is a benefit in the public seeing some of their aid money going to their own national teams which can reassure them as to their larger contributions.

UNHCR has been pleased with their innovation, and plan to refine it in several ways. First of all, the service packages were too large, which made it difficult for several potential donors to 'buy in'. Secondly, they found that they needed to be much more explicit on what the service package was as the donors often had quite different interpretations so that several times foreign teams arrived on related assignments and found that they both assumed that they were undertaking a particular task. There was even confusion between the US government and the US military.

UNHCR will be carrying out a number of appraisals of their Rwandan operation including one on the service packages.

In Rwanda, the humanitarian agencies found themselves working more closely with the military than anticipated. The very size and urgency of the humanitarian efforts made it necessary to harness the massive lift capacity of the military. This was doubly so as commercial carriers were not prepared to operate in the region without extremely costly insurance coverage. UNHCR for one found that it benefitted immeasurably from the presence of 4 seconded military staff with their air operations staff in Geneva. There is now some discussion about the potential of having military in the communications and in the strategic planning parts of UNHCR. As discussed elsewhere in the report, there are tangible benefits from bridging the military-civilian gap, and having seconded military officers in organizations such as UNHCR has real benefits for both.

Canada already seconds military officers but would benefit from a much larger presence in international organizations. A willingness to pay all or part of their salaries and related costs for such secondments will facilitate such placements. Canadian military will not only benefit from such experiences, but their level of professionalism will be welcomed and will hasten the acceptance by both military and civilians of the benefits and possibilities of cooperation. It goes without saying that increased presence of Canadians internationally increases our ability to affect policy making and program delivery.

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

*Canada should expand the number of military officers seconded to international organizations, for example the strategic planning units of UNHCR.*

There are minor questions about a concentration on short term humanitarian actions, but these are more than understandable in light of the immediacy and size of the catastrophe. The larger issues of returning refugees and economic reconstruction appear not to have been forgotten and now with time to pause and develop strategies, humanitarian agencies such as CIDA are focussing on the longer term.

There is a growing and quite substantive imbalance between the massive amount of funding for relief efforts and the extremely small amount of technical and financial support for the new government. This gap and obvious lack of coordination between relief and development highlights a similar problem elsewhere. If UN agencies or others deal solely with relief, then they have an undeniable bias in raising and expending resources on their task. The hard decisions about when to start scaling back relief programs and put scarce international resources into medium and long term development are not taken.

The identical debate is occurring over the efforts of UNHCR as their mandate covers refugees but not the internally displaced. Therefore they are focussing their relatively massive resources on refugees in Tanzania, Burundi, and Zaire. However it is scandalous that particularly in the

Zairian camps that these resources are being co-opted and misused by the hard line Hutu élite to retain their human power base in situ and to more closely control their people. At what point does UNHCR assistance move from essential relief to aiding and abetting the attempts of a few to capitalize on the misery of so many. Even if it is not as has been suggested by some a callous and calculated effort of UNHCR to keep up its involvement and power, most certainly there will be a time when UNHCR must withdraw relief support even knowing that hundreds of thousand will suffer with the calculated hope that this will precipitate a massive repatriation of refugees to Rwanda where they can be freed from the tyranny of their old leaders and encouraged to enter into dialogue and reconciliation with the new government and the returning Tutsi refugees.

The often arbitrary distinction between refugees and internally displaced persons has become particularly dysfunctional in the Rwandan context. For individuals to even suggest that UNHCR is purposely keeping the Zairian camps going rather than see the refugees return to Rwanda and become IDPs and thus outside of their mandate is disquieting. At best it is a completely false perception which while wrong, does affect how others in the UN system deal with UNHCR and for that reason alone requires resolution. At second best, the resources and initiative of UNHCR with its largely refugee focus results in inordinate resources going to refugee camps with far fewer resources as a result being available from the international community to create attractive camps and other services in Rwanda to help draw the refugees back. At worse, there may be an element of truth to claims by that some consciously or more likely subconsciously act to artificially retain the refugee load to enhance their role.

If you wish, take your pick of the optional answers above in what I would hope is largely an academic exercise of witch hunting. It is more useful to address the core issue which is the artificial distinction and the overwhelming need to expand UNHCR's mandate to include internally displaced people. Every one of UNHCR's functions can and should service the needs of IDPs. In addition, apart from the standard concerns about any UN bureaucracy there is little debate about the relative dynamism and effectiveness of UNHCR. Any discussion at this point about the resource capacity of UNHCR to handle the extra load is rather wasted since they will not attract any resources or even any firm commitments until they assume the load. No, the issue remains whether the benefits of joining of refugee programs and IDP programs under UNHCR leadership brings substantial benefits in cost benefits, consistency, and downright efficacy which outweigh the costs of merging the two. Yes they do.

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

*Canada should encourage countries to view refugees and internally displaced persons as being integrally linked, and push for the mandate of UNHCR to be changed so that they are the lead UN agency for all internally and externally displaced.*

IGO-NGO cooperation appears to be going very well, and there are some real success stories. For example, the Norwegian children's rights organization Redde Barne was sub-contracted to experts on child welfare to the refugee camps to log in children as they arrive and attempt family reunification and generally handle child welfare.

In 1991 the UN Secretariat Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) was given the mandate<sup>1</sup> of humanitarian coordination certainly within the UN and to a lesser but no less important extent with the NGO and bilateral humanitarian assistance. What they were not given was the ability to coordinate by command. The reasons for this are obvious inasmuch as existing players both UN (eg. UNHCR), nongovernmental (eg. ICRC), and bilateral donors (eg. USAID), were not about to allow themselves to be subordinate to an arm of the UN which had both limited resources and capacity, and of which they had little indication of its intentions whether it had any empire building proclivities.

There is no indication, nor is it immediately apparent, that such power could or should be delegated to DHA. Its operation for Rwanda, specifically UNREO, has by all accounts been successful in the initial stages of the crisis. However such success has tended to be the result of the fortunate mix of personnel, and as the large agencies such as UNHCR, Oxfam, Care, MSF, and ICRC have become larger and larger players in and around Rwanda, UNREO's role has been increasingly minimized. Such an evolution is not necessarily incorrect, assuming that logical and informed decisions were taken as to who would become lead organizations in particular situations, or how other ad-hoc cooperation arrangements could be produced.

Theoretically the role of DHA as a coordinator of humanitarian efforts is as a neutral broker facilitating and coordinating the efforts of UN and other agencies. This model breaks down however when large agencies such as UNHCR evolve programs in the field and become an overwhelming presence either geographically or on one aspect of humanitarian assistance, then the role of DHA units such as UNREO in the Rwandan context become extremely problematic.

If DHA through field units similar to UNREO or from New York or Geneva attempts to create any substantive program capacity, then it will inevitably enter into competition with the program delivery components of the UN such as UNDP, UNICEF, or UNHCR. Rather what is needed is the ability of a handful of extremely knowledgeable individuals to deploy to the field within days of a crisis with the aim of pulling out almost completely as soon as they can hand over activities to appropriate program delivery organizations from either the UN, governmental, or non-governmental sectors. Only in this way will those latter organizations see DHA as non-threatening and with a limited hidden agenda to fear. If however DHA is developing its own long-term program delivery capacity, then they will be perceived as attempting to further their own programs as opposed to allowing the others to stay the lead organizations.

The type of knowledge they need to bring to the situation is largely three-fold. First the team must have in-depth knowledge of the country or regions, both historical and political. Secondly they must be thoroughly versed in the components, capacity, and politics of the UN, including peacekeepers. Thirdly they must have a similar knowledge of the NGO community that will be

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<sup>1</sup> GA Res 46/182 Dec. 17 1991 (Strengthening of the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Emergency Assistance of the United Nations) which mandates the "coordinating and facilitating" of UN emergency response but does not give DHA any directing mandate.

playing a role in that particular situation. Finally they must have the capacity to bring together the relevant players and facilitate their cooperation through advocacy and diplomacy. As such, a team apart from its logistical or administrative support, may only have 2 or 3 people. At most, there should not be more than 5 substantive team members in any single setting albeit I recognize that satellite teams may be necessary. So using Rwanda as an example, UNREO when limited to the Nairobi situation, needed only a single team. However, upon deployment into Rwanda there could have been the possible need at the outset for various satellite teams or individuals in various refugee camp regions or in 3 or 4 locations within Rwanda.

Such a concentrated team approach will have several important benefits. **First** of all it will be easier to quickly find the very experienced and talented individuals needed for such a difficult task<sup>2</sup>. Such senior capable personnel are always in short supply and overstretched. As such having to raise a staff of 5 will be far simpler than raising 15 or 20. Furthermore, such people will be more willing to go and to stay long term if they are aware that they will be part of a critical core as opposed to simply one of a multitude. In other words, if they do not think that they will be allowed to make a tangible contribution, then they will be less willing to sign up.

**Second**, small teams will maximize the potential of teams working together. As any management expert knows, the number of interpersonal links increases exponentially with an increase in team numbers, thus multiplying greatly the potential for interpersonal conflict and competing cliques. A corollary is that compact cooperative teams tend to retain their members which will enhance the objective of operational continuity.

**Third**, it will be much easier to deploy them within days of the need arising. There is limited benefit in arriving after those they ostensibly are there to coordinate. By that time the coordination vacuum will have already been filled by ad hoc arrangements between players on the ground, or by various organizations taking the lead in various locations or with regard to a particular humanitarian function, or by a free-for-all competitiveness that is hard to bring under control post facto.

**Fourth**, it will be cheaper to deploy and keep them in the field and easier to retain all or most of the team members as one is invariably faced with turn-over if one has large numbers or if individuals feel they are being under-utilized.

**Fifth**, their obvious seniority and knowledge will reassure the UN and NGO components that they are attempting to coordinate.

**Sixth**, and perhaps most importantly, their small numbers will be tangible proof to those UN and

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<sup>2</sup> These very problems weakened UNREO as they ended up having to rotate DHA staff through on short assignments, and fill out their numbers with locally recruited staff in Nairobi who were not particularly suitable and from NGOs, individuals without much if any UN or humanitarian field experience.

NGO components that DHA has no intention of taking over the roles that those components feel are rightfully theirs, and thus will be more open to allowing DHA to fulfil its purely coordination role.

Returning to an earlier observation that DHA had not been given the power to command coordination. There is no indication that the GA is prepared to legislate such power to DHA in the short or medium term. Rather, it is incumbent upon DHA to demonstrate to the agencies that it is coordinating, that they do not have designs on the program roles of those agencies. In this way, those agencies will be prepared to delegate at least a portion of their sovereignty so as to allow neutral central leadership. Over time this will become established practice so that DHA will be in the position to 'assign' particular tasks or regions to various agencies who will acquiesce for the greater good. Such an evolution need not be dreaming in technicolour if DHA handles its mandate with diplomacy, neutrality, and studied professionalism with no hint of expansionism.

With time it may well become apparent and acceptable to the larger humanitarian players that DHA be given powers to coordinate by command.

Humanitarian intervention must of course not be limited to the here and now. There must be constant forward planning, particularly in situations like Rwanda where it appears that prior traditional development programs were not sufficient to avoid a cataclysm. This is not to ignore the political and military components of the Rwandan tragedy and this coming together or coordination is discussed elsewhere.

However, within the humanitarian and development community, it appears logical that DHA in an extension of its coordination role in humanitarian assistance, play a similar role in bringing together the larger humanitarian-development community to assess the past and reassess plans for the future. The mandated larger focus of DHA should extend to an assessment of the scope of the problem so that in the Rwanda situations for example, that the Great Lakes grouping of Burundi, Zaire, Uganda, and Tanzania are seen as integral to the discussion and the solutions.

Subsequently, DHA is admirably placed to initiate the liaison with the other international sectors such as the political and the military. Again this will be dealt with in Chapter 7. Throughout this, DHA and the rest of the humanitarian community will have the task of advocating for the victims of disasters and underdevelopment.

**In conclusion**, the humanitarian response to the Rwandan crisis was fast and relatively well orchestrated amongst both UN agencies and with nongovernmental humanitarian organizations. There were some real successes and just as promisingly, many in the humanitarian community are actively identifying and setting about to correct the failures. The present confusion on how to address the humanitarian dilemmas of the refugee camps in Zaire, and Rwandan reconstruction, does not detract from those initial successes.

## **5 CRISIS RESPONSE - Human Rights Violations and Protection**

Broadly speaking, the response of the international community to human rights violations in Rwanda prior to April 6th was good by the NGOs, and poor by the nations of the world, both bilaterally and through the UN.

For years the NGOs had been investigating and raising the issue of Rwanda, and this had increased in the last couple of years. As such I do not think that there is any need for this report to thoroughly canvass their response and many of their interventions will be mentioned in the larger context of what the UN and nations did or did not do. Similarly, human rights NGOs like humanitarian agencies, moved extremely quickly post April 6th and continued to lobby hard for Rwandan human rights.

The failure of individual states prior to April 6th to take umbrage with human rights violations can largely be put down to the fact that Rwanda was either a great unknown to them or of minimal interest. For the majority of states with finite foreign affairs resources and capacity, this may be unfortunate but reflects a reality that will not change substantially. Many countries argue with some justification, that the UN as their 'agent' is expected to concern itself with such issues and alert them when action needs to be taken by individual nations. A major exception to such possible exoneration is France whose record of arming, training, and fighting alongside the RGF raises some serious questions about its failure to pressure the RG to halt its violations.

On a multilateral level, there was a failure by the OAU and the UN to take appropriate action on human rights violations both before and after April 6th. Before, both were involved in attempting to move peace negotiations forward, but paid minimal attention to human rights violations which appear to have inadvertently but not surprisingly sent a message to the RG and the RGF and its militia that such behaviour would not be heavily censured if at all. Post April 6th the UN human rights effort moved forward in fits and starts, raising serious issues of what it sees as its role and its capacity to do what is needed. The OAU itself has been extremely quiet and inactive concerning Rwandan human rights violations, an African 'protective' response that (as in many earlier African crises) does not reflect well on the moral and ethical underpinnings of the OAU.

This chapter will focus almost entirely on the tentative and at times non-action of the UN as this is where some substantive shortcomings were evident and where exists the most pressing need for growth in international human rights action. Human rights NGOs and others understand the

potential of regional IGOs and the UN in taking concrete action on human rights, and for this reason are doubly upset about its failures over Rwanda.

The High Commissioner for Human Rights' (HCHR) role and capacity within the UN is both new and evolving, and he personally had just joined the Centre for Human Rights (UNCHR). Nevertheless the Centre itself is well established and the expectation is that the Commissioner and the Centre certainly will act as the core and driving force of the UN Secretariat human rights machinery per se if not the larger UN human rights community. It is useful in the Rwandan context to examine the effectiveness of the UN's human rights response under the following headings:

*Monitoring and Intelligence Gathering* - the effective assessment of human rights violations throughout the world informs and drives all other possible functions of the international human rights community.

*Advocacy* - being an advocate for those who cannot sufficiently advocate for their own rights is the most pressing role for the international human rights community.

*Policy or Program Advice* - institutionalised advocacy such as when peacekeeping or humanitarian or development agencies and others draw upon UN human rights experts both within their structure, from elsewhere in the UN (eg. the Centre for Human Rights), and from outside the UN, as they automatically factor in human rights to their mandate and operations.

*Coordination* - particularly relevant to the UN Centre for Human Rights which is strategically placed to coordinate those aspects of UN activities which have a substantive human rights impact.

*Program Delivery* - human rights are integral to most international situations and advocacy, advice, and coordination will facilitate all agencies and organizations in fulfilling their particular contribution to human rights. However there are times when international human rights bodies per se need to run their own substantive field programs.

## 5.1 Human Rights Monitoring and Determination

Even a cursory examination of NGOs such as Amnesty International<sup>3</sup>, Human Rights Watch<sup>4</sup>, le Federation International des Droits de l'Homme, l'Union Inter africaine des Droits des Peuples, and the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development<sup>5</sup>, confirms that for years they have been actively reporting on Rwanda and advocating action by the UN.

While NGOs are increasingly effective and comprehensive in reporting human rights violations, there is an undeniable importance to the UN providing its own comprehensive and reliable human rights intelligence. Inter alia this would make it harder for countries and the UN to deny the veracity of human rights violations if their own in-house agency had gathered its own information or had validated NGO reports of human rights violations. Such UN human rights monitoring and assessing would facilitate the SG, the SC, and subsidiary UN agencies in more effectively carrying out their tasks by factoring in necessary and factual human rights intelligence.

There were several glimmers of hope inasmuch as there were a number of UN ongoing reviews of Rwanda that should have triggered greater international debate on the degree of such violations and the possible need to take or be prepared to take active protective initiatives. For example, Rwanda had been considered under the 1503 confidential procedure for both the 1993 and 1994 sessions of the Commission on Human Rights. This actually served to shield Rwanda from more public scrutiny and does highlight several

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<sup>3</sup> ie. the AI report entitled "Rwanda, persecution of Tutsi minority and repression of government critics 1990-1992" (Afr 47/02/92) which talked of more than 1,000 extrajudicial executions, and the over 8,000 political prisoners following the October 1990 invasion by the RPF. They also reported RPF abuses such as the killing of prisoners and 'traitors'.

<sup>4</sup> see "Rwanda, Talking Peace and Waging War: human rights since the October 1990 invasion", pp. 33 Feb. 27 1992, or "Beyond The Rhetoric: continuing human rights abuses in Rwanda", pp. 29 June 1993, or "Arming Rwanda: the arms trade and human rights abuses in the Rwandan War", pp. 66 January 1994. The latter report was particularly enlightening about those prepared to sell arms to an unelected regime of an impoverished African country in the midst of a civil war. This included France's role in facilitating the sale of \$6 million in arms by Egypt to Rwanda as well as its own arms transfers to Rwanda combined with the provision of military advisors and up to 680 troops who by many accounts actively participated in the conflict with the RPF.

<sup>5</sup> ICHRDD along with the previous three, UIDH, FIDH, and HRW, combined to produce the March 1993 "Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights Violations in Rwanda Since 1 October 1990". The commission created at the request of a consortium of Rwandan human rights organizations, visited Rwanda 7-21 January 1993. After hearing extensive testimonies and carrying out on-site visits to mass graves, they concluded that the government had participated in or sanctioned the killing of over 2,000 individuals (predominantly Tutsi but also Hutu moderates), and that in turn the RPF had killed and kidnapped civilians and had looted and destroyed property.

problems facing the UN system in an effort to more openly and thus more effectively monitor human rights.

First of all, demand is increasing that the latter stages of the 1503 procedure be made public. Not only is it felt that the confidential list of communications should be public information, but once situations are referred to the Commission by the Sub-Commission, the debate should become public. Such a change would have allowed a more public airing of ongoing events in Rwanda which would very likely have put pressure upon the Rwandan government to alter its behaviour, and have alerted other parts of the UN and the world community as to the need to prevent further escalation.

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

*Canada should recommend to the Commission on Human Rights that situations referred to the Commission by the Sub-Commission under the 1503 procedure should become open to public scrutiny.*

Second, the Quaker office in Geneva and others are also calling for an automatic process by which a country which appears concurrently in the reports of three or more thematic mechanisms of the Commission, has a country rapporteur appointed. In 1992 Rwanda was mentioned by the rapporteur on Torture and the rapporteur on Summary or Arbitrary Executions. In 1993 Rwanda continued to feature in the reports of both those rapporteurs as well as the Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances and started to be dealt with under the 1503 procedure. In 1994, all four mechanism continued to deal with Rwanda<sup>6</sup>. Arguably, if in 1993 the Commission had automatically appointed a Rwandan country rapporteur, the increased level of UN information and the international signal of censure to the government of Rwanda would have either modulated Rwandan government repression or prepared the international community to move faster than it did.

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

*Canada should recommend to the Commission on Human Rights that it automatically appoint a country rapporteur when that country appears concurrently in the reports of three or more of the Commission's thematic mechanisms.*

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<sup>6</sup> Of particular note in all of these UN mechanisms is the report of the Special Rapporteur Waly Bacré Ndiaye on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions. In view of the seriousness of events in Rwanda, he submitted a lengthy 36 page addendum to the main report, in which he reported on his mission to Rwanda from 8 to 17 April 1993 (almost exactly one year before the April 6th plane crash). Not only were his observations and recommendations detailed, he published this report on the 11th of August 1993. In addition, his report was formally tabled during the 50th session of the Commission on Human Rights in February 1994. It appears to have disappeared into a black hole.

In light of the warnings coming from its rapporteurs, the Commission clearly failed to take appropriate early action on Rwanda. The two recommendations above are only two of the many which were directed to the Commission by the international human rights community. Space and time precludes a larger reflection by this report on what is needed and what is possible in reforming and improving the Commission.

A month after April 6th, the Commission tried to catch up with events and play some constructive role.

### **UNCHR special session**

The members of the Commission on Human Rights under its relatively new procedure<sup>7</sup>, responded favourably to the formal request of Canada on May 9th [initially suggested by the HCHR on May 4th] for a special meeting on Rwanda. They met the 24-25th of May, and apart from condemning the violations, appointed a Special Rapporteur mandated to report back within 4 weeks.

The session sent an important albeit belated message from the world's nations. That message was somewhat blunted through the low profile of African nations during the Commission's debate, and the qualified references to genocide. The 7 week delay from April 6 to May 24th raises questions about the need for a shorter response time<sup>8</sup>. Realistically, considering the mechanics of calling the Commission together, it will never provide rapid reaction as 'rapid' should be measured in days not weeks or months. Rather it is the task of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Centre to respond without delay. They did not.

### **UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and Human Rights Centre**

Prior to the creation of the office of High Commissioner for Human Rights, the UN Centre for Human Rights for did not have the mandate to carry out its own investigations per se. This has now changed although the HCHR was slow to take action in the Rwandan context. It is felt that the HCHR was relatively new to the job and this very partly explains the slowness. It is felt by some that he has learned that lesson and will react much faster next time, but only time will tell. The personality of the High Commissioner and senior staff at the Centre will determine whether they push forward the limits of promoting and protecting human rights within the UN.

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<sup>7</sup> ECOSOC Res. 1990/48 25 May 1990 authorized the Commission for Human Rights with the consent of the majority of its members, to convene special meetings of the Commission. The first two special meetings, 13/14 August 1992 and 30 Nov-1 Dec 1992, focussed on massacres in the ex-Yugoslavia.

<sup>8</sup> This raises the issue of having a permanent commission or some other permanent human rights committee that could carry out such functions as the supervision of the treaty bodies, etc.

But the Centre was well aware of what was happening in Rwanda, so why was the Centre itself so quiet? It appears that prior to May 4th 1994 and certainly prior to April 6th, the Centre like the HCHR, did not play an active role in informing decision makers involved with the establishment and evolution of UN Rwandan peacekeeping or humanitarian operations .

The Centre did of course have access to the human rights intelligence that had been gathered by various rapporteurs and other UN human rights bodies/mechanisms. For many of them, the Centre is actually integral to their functioning and progress. UN treaty bodies and rapporteurs such as Ndaiye on disappearances, who attempted human rights early warning on Rwanda, were largely ignored by the Centre and others in the UN human rights system.

In this regard it is worth digressing inasmuch as rapporteurs receive little support from the Commission or the Centre. Greater capacity on their part might well have enabled them to more effectively transmit their warnings. In this regard, a recent promising development is that Centre staff are now allowed to travel with rapporteurs on missions to aid them in their investigations.

This can only serve to facilitate the job of rapporteurs and create a greater awareness on the part of the Centre and the HCHR as to their findings and what practical implications they hold for the Centre.

Similarly, rapporteurs who are volunteers, only receive expenses if they are in Geneva or on mission. The rest of the time in addition for not being paid for their time, even work-related expenses such as telephone/fax costs or photocopying are not reimbursed. This forces them to rely on personal or organizational support (oft times their own personal resources). Such an imposition is particularly onerous for Southern candidates for such positions as they invariably cannot accept such burdens and often have to refuse to serve.

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

*Canada should encourage the UN Centre for Human Rights to provide greater support for rapporteurs including the provision of mission staff and logistical support, and the UN should fully reimburse rapporteurs for reasonable expenditures directly resulting from them carrying out their tasks, such as photocopying, postage, and telephone/fax costs.*

Apart from facilitating the functioning of rapporteurs and similar individuals, there is a need to look at how they can and should react amongst themselves and with the UN human rights centre. This type of debate has been proceeding for several years in an ad hoc way between treaty bodies<sup>9</sup>, and their recommendations could largely be applied to rapporteurs and others.

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

*Canada should encourage the holding of annual meetings of special rapporteurs and individuals from other relevant UN human rights mechanisms to hear from them on how their skills can be better used in an enhanced human rights information gathering regime.*

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<sup>9</sup> See the report of the fifth meeting of persons chairing the human rights treaty bodies that took place 19-23 September 1994

On the 4th of May, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights José Ayala Lasso finally announced his intention to undertake a mission to Rwanda and Burundi. He went on to suggest the calling of a special session of UNCHR and sending human rights monitors to Rwanda. Even assuming that staff and resource constraints at the Centre for Human Rights precluded any particular emphasis on Rwanda prior to the massacres starting on April 6, it is surprising that it was 4 weeks before any substantive action was taken by either the HCHR or the Centre. It is reported that his relatively tardy entry into the issue was at the bequest of the SG and pressures from NGOs as opposed to any internal organizational motivation. Questions were raised that apart from token symbolism, whether there would be substantive benefits from a special session and HCHR Lasso going on mission to Rwanda. Most felt that they should have been playing a role much earlier, and that quite apart from missing the moment to affect reality, that their very inaction had sent the wrong signals to the Rwandan military and government.

The initial failure of the Centre and the HCHR to play a role in early warning and rapid deployment stems from several weaknesses:

- narrow perception of their role
- administrative and organizational weaknesses
- new 'territory' for them, and thus little idea on how to proceed.

It is useful to look at these weakness in the context of the issue of Rwandan human rights monitors.

## **Monitors**

There is no doubt but that human rights monitors are a necessity in Rwanda. There are two main components to any such monitoring mission. The first is as their title indicates that of monitoring human rights violations. In the Rwandan context this will be retroactive, partly to fulfil their commitment to help the Commission of Experts and now the newly created Tribunal. It is felt that identifying more precisely what happened and who the worst perpetrators were is necessary not only to prosecute the worst offenders, but to provide a prerequisite for reconciliation. Failure to do so would leave uncertainties along with guilt and anger to fester.

Ongoing monitoring is equally, if not more, important in helping to create confidence amongst the internally and externally displaced so that they will begin to return to their homes. In this ongoing crisis, the presence of human rights monitors will remind leaders and civil society of fundamental human rights norms and encourage them to continue to observe these rights in the face of ongoing adversity. The threat of international observance and possible penalties will also not go amiss.

The other role of monitors is that of helping to identify and initiate ways of developing a climate of human rights and democracy in partnership with civil society and their legitimate leaders. In the parlance of the UN Human Rights Centre, this constitutes advisory services and technical cooperation.

All the above however is the theory of UN human rights monitors. The practice both past and present is extremely ad hoc, disjointed, and an administrative nightmare.

The present mission had and has some good people in the field, but even their getting there has been fraught with difficulties and delayed to the extreme. For example, the initial plan was to have a team of 6 in the field. The first two arrived only in early June, two months after the massacres began. It was another four weeks before the next 2 arrived with the 5th arriving three weeks later. In September the head monitor quit in reported disgust with the UN system, as did the other 4 soon after<sup>10</sup>.

Subsequently under the enhanced plan of action, the Chief of the Field Operation who by all accounts will prove to be a good choice, only arrived in Kigali on September 10th, over 5 months after the present crisis began. This is despite regular warnings prior to April 6th by various UN rapporteurs and a plethora of NGOs that human rights were being seriously violated in Rwanda and that the situation could well get worse. Even allowing for extreme underfunding of the Centre, there are real organizational lacunae if even after such substantive human rights early warnings followed by demonstrable genocide, that the heart of the UN human rights community could not respond more quickly.

The general unpreparedness and organizational weakness of the Centre was then further exacerbated by 'too much, too late'. Encouraged by well meaning NGOs as well as the new government of Rwanda, the High Commissioner who had agreed that his initial 6 monitors would be increased to 20, then agreed to provide a total of 147. He took the last quantum leap despite the increasing number of complaints of administrative, policy, and directional shortcomings.

Asking for \$10,500,000 for a six month field operation, the plan was for it to develop in three phases: Phase I 15 Sep. - 14 Oct. mobile teams out of Kigali; Phase II 15 Oct. - 11 Nov. bases in each Prefecture; and Phase III 14 Nov - 12 Dec bases in Sub-Prefectures. As of the 18 of November, there were only about 40 monitors in the country and they were largely confined to Kigali. The Centre also conceded by early November that they were not going to be able to find and deploy any more than 97 monitors. That the Centre would fail in achieving its goals was not only predictable, but fulfilled the negative perception of most donors who have become increasingly weary of the ways in which the Centre spends their money.

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<sup>10</sup> Karen Kinney the team leader as well as the other 4, quit in various degrees of extreme unhappiness at the almost total lack of administrative support and confused operational direction from Geneva. Hopefully the new Chief William Clarence will receive better support so as to concentrate on the task at hand.

Yes monitors are crucial, but the Centre certainly with regards to a human rights monitoring mission must learn to walk before they attempt to run. They at a minimum should:

1. involve other UN field staff
2. have smaller teams
3. plan now for the 'next' mission
4. say no

The very severity of the human rights violation of genocide resulted in peacekeeping forces monitoring and reporting on such abuses after April 6<sup>11</sup>. However, this was done to satisfy operational imperatives and to quantify the threats to international peace and security which would justify either a Chapter VI or VII action. There was no feeling that they had a human rights monitoring role and certainly no understanding that they should be feeding such information into UN human rights channels like the Centre or rapporteurs. Obviously there needs to be a conscious attitude by peacekeepers that they are not to be 'silent witnesses'<sup>12</sup> to human rights violations.

At a minimum, where there is no UN human rights monitoring presence, peacekeepers must assume a duty to report incidents and allegations to the relevant UN human rights bodies and agencies. In talking to a variety of peacekeepers from past missions, they obviously did not feel that they did or should have had such a role, an attitude that screams out for rectification. In addition, this duty accrues to any and all UN personnel inasmuch as human rights are central to the very existence of the UN. Arguably even the presence of human rights monitors in a theatre of operations does not absolve peacekeepers or others from this duty.

There is also the added argument that the creation of even large human rights monitoring missions cannot achieve even a fraction of the coverage achieved by the peacekeeping, developmental, humanitarian, and other members of missions in complex emergencies where there are substantive threats to human rights. It is absolutely essential that every UN field staff be versed in the fundamentals of human rights observation and the procedures for reporting them. Their front line monitoring would serve to alert and trigger more indepth investigation or human rights promotion by UN human rights specialists.

This front line reporting into a central UN human rights clearing house requires some

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<sup>11</sup> Curiously, the force commander in responding to why apparent indicators of planned massacres and other human rights violations were not received in sufficient number or strength to alert them to some impending human rights catastrophe, stated that "the UN does not have an intelligence gathering network" and "it was not within our philosophy and not within our mandate", CBC TV Newsmagazine, 10:25 PM Nov.28 and 29th. It is also interesting to note that the French in Operation Turquoise saw human rights monitoring and the reporting of incidents to the UN as part of their mandate.

<sup>12</sup> The UN Secretary General in January 1993 instructed UN peacekeepers in the Western Sahara to interpret their mandate of monitoring the ceasefire to include the duty to report on human rights abuses, see UN doc S/25170 26 January 1993.

standardized procedures so that human rights intelligence is easily collected, rapidly passed on and smoothly combined with other UN streams of information.

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

*Canada should encourage the UN Centre to bring together the various sectors or agencies of the UN that regularly mount field missions to discuss how the Centre can utilize their field presence. The objective would be to involve them in first line human rights monitoring upon which specialised human rights experts could take appropriate follow-up action. Together they should also design a common reporting procedure and form, and the Centre should offer to help in training where appropriate.*

This stream of information must go both ways, and this will be argued further on the section on advocacy. It appears quite obvious however advocacy apart, that there are many times when other operational arms of the UN could usefully factor in human rights intelligence into their operations both to protect their own staff and to increase the effectiveness of their particular mission. So far the Centre has not played this role, and Rwanda will provide a useful vehicle to examine what and how they could have proceeded.

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

*Canada should encourage the UN Centre for Human Rights to bring together its staff and relevant outside human rights NGOs, individuals, and appropriate UN agencies, to initiate an evaluation of how the Centre could have better monitored and informed other parts of the UN about the human rights implications leading up to and immediately after April 6th.*

The UN Centre for the foreseeable future must send much smaller human rights monitoring teams than they would wish in principle. This will allow them to insure that the team is composed of experienced human rights people who inherently understand the concept and objectives of missions and who can help to formulate and operationalize those conceptual and policy objectives as they go along. Each mission will help to incrementally create and add to the philosophical and policy basis for UN human rights missions.

Small teams are also more able to work as an operationally coherent team in a situation where operational guidelines are almost non-existent or far from adequate. As with policy, they will be incrementally developing operational procedures and knowledge which will provide the corporate memory and capacity to mount ever larger missions if and as needed in the future.

Finally, the smaller the teams the faster they can be deployed. Many situations will inherently be so transitory as to never lend themselves to large monitoring missions. However as the rapid deployment procedures of the Centre evolve, they will be able to move larger numbers of experienced monitors in rapidly and still be capable of providing them with sufficient resources and administrative backup.

The above strategy will help the Centre to have demonstrable successes which is critical in changing the present perception of the Centre, a perception that unfortunately will not be changed and in fact may be reinforced by the present mission being mounted.

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

*Canada should encourage the UN Centre to scale back its human rights monitoring mission to Rwanda to a manageable level so that they can carry out a limited but credible task. Subsequently the Centre should have a clearly stated policy of fielding only small missions until it has built up its conceptual and operational capacity.*

The High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Centre must learn to say no even to governments if asked to take on tasks that are beyond their capacity and which if undertaken and not done properly are at best a waste of resources and at worst may aggravate the situation. Saying no is anathema to those who value appearance over substance, and who concentrate on their department or unit being perceived as a player in order to get resources and acclaim. Unfortunately such attitudes are often rewarded within the UN, and it has been suggested that it is expecting too much of UN civil servants to operate otherwise. Fortunately there are increasing numbers of UN staff, particularly at the junior-middle management level who prize substance over travelling road shows.

The HCHR and the Centre must prioritize their goals with an eye to their resources and capacity, and say no when they are asked to do the impossible or the wasteful. Agreeing to do what they patently cannot undertake successfully and which will truly advance human rights will only contribute to cynicism about what they do, and in the medium and long term delay any increase in resources from donor nations who rightly fear what they see as another UN black hole.

The Centre needs to start to learn from the present mission and start planning for the next<sup>13</sup>. Without having to identify where and when they will be mounting the next mission, they can and should be addressing such issues as:

- written policy on monitoring and operation principles
- an up to date roster of potential monitors
- written operating procedures for deployment and field administration
- create or strengthen ties with other parts of the UN who might be present
- prepare those UN staff to recognize and play their role

### **RECOMMENDATION**

*Canada should encourage the UN Centre to consult with other UN agencies such as UNHCR, UNICEF, and DPKO, as well as NGOs such as AI, and ICRC on how to best be prepared and capable of rapidly mounting emergency field missions within the space of days. This consultation should explore the possibilities of piggy-backing on possible existing UN field operations, be they peacekeeping, humanitarian, or developmental.*

### **Commission of experts**

The Rwandan Commission of Experts moved ahead much more smoothly albeit not more quickly<sup>14</sup>. This was partly because it was created first and was able to get the first choice of available experts both from outside and within the Centre. Also, it was kept small and manageable with a total of 3 commissioners and 8 others. Nevertheless despite a clear and focussed mandate to investigate serious violations of international humanitarian law during the conflict<sup>15</sup> they arrived in Rwanda 4 months after the start of the crisis but had no files prepared for them upon which they could elect to proceed. For example, it was common knowledge that Butare had been relatively calm for the first two weeks of the crisis, and that massacres only

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<sup>13</sup> It was worrisome to hear comments at the Centre in Geneva that the Rwanda mission was proceeding well, and that the departure of the first five monitors had little if anything to do with Centre shortcomings. Such a fundamental mis-interpretation of how badly it has proceeded to date bodes ill for them drawing the appropriate lessons. Hopefully the experienced and competent mission members will be able to get various Centre members to re-examine their apparent complacency.

<sup>14</sup> 26 July the 3 commissioners were chosen, it began its work on August 15th with its first session 18-19 August, and its first mission took place 29 August to 17 September with a preliminary report 29 September.

<sup>15</sup> See: 1 July SC Res 935/1994 requesting the SG to establish a Commission of Experts; the 26 July Report of the SG on the establishment of the commission of experts S/1994/879; the 27 Aug Plan of Action proposed by Commission of Experts; and the 29 Sep. Preliminary Report of the Independent Commission of Experts.

began upon the arrival of RGF troops from Kigali. The commissioners should have been presented with a file on situations like that with preliminary investigatory reports so that they could decide if there were prima facie evidence of war crimes which would merit their full attention.

## **Genocide**

The term genocide complicated the Rwandan debates in and around the Security Council as well as the Commission and other UN bodies. Obviously this was because any determination of genocide immediately imposed substantial moral and legal obligations on countries. The seriousness of the accusation naturally inhibited its rapid use by those that understood the legal and political implications.

Nevertheless, fairly soon after April 6 it became patently obvious that genocide was occurring. A number of countries still denied the obvious in an effort to limit their obligations. The shameful semantic games played within the SC and elsewhere in the UN over ongoing Rwandan genocide of incredible dimensions, made it clearer than ever that political bodies cannot be expected to make determinations of human rights allegations. No functioning national judicial system operates this way, and increasingly national jurisdictions are creating specialized human rights institutions such as human rights commissions and ombuds in recognition of the need to have independent human rights experts adjudicate on human rights allegations.

The UN has been evolving a number of procedures and treaty bodies that more closely approximate such use of independent unbiased experts to judge alleged violations. Invariably however these procedures tend to deal with individual complaints and are not clearly mandated to comment on systemic violations. The UN needs to speed up its human rights judicial evolution particularly in the determination of systemic human rights abuses so as to relieve political bodies of the job of making such determinations.

## **RECOMMENDATION**

*Canada should encourage development of, where not existing already or where imperfectly functioning, automatic UN judicial mechanisms to make clear and fast determinations of well founded allegations of human rights violations, both individual and systemic such as genocide.*

## 5.2 Advocacy

The HCHR has the authority to place a particular situation or issue onto the international agenda<sup>16</sup>, including the agenda of the SC and the SG. The HCHR and the Centre should be acting as the institutionalized human rights conscience of the UN and have as a mandate the duty to ensure that human rights issues are taken into account at all levels and forums, including if not particularly in political forums.

In the Rwandan context, it looks as if the advocacy worked the other way. In other words, the UN Secretary General and events themselves forced the HCHR to address the human rights dimension of what was happening. It is true that the new High Commissioner only moved into what was a brand new position as the Rwandan Crisis escalated in April. However, it appears as if his staff at the Centre did not brief him as to his capacity and arguably his duty to actively advocate in New York on behalf of Rwandan human rights.

Such a failure by the Human Rights Centre in Geneva, ostensibly the focal point of human rights activity within the UN, is not new. In recent years there have been a number of comprehensive peace settlements<sup>17</sup> that have often been brokered by the UN and in which the UN has had a key role in their implementation. All of these peace building exercises have not only monitored human rights, but most had substantive human rights development programs. Largely because the settlements were seen as both political and an extension of the more traditional peacekeeping mandate of the UN, the settlements were directed from the UN in New York. There was a relative dearth of involvement by the Geneva based UN human rights community, either the Centre or other UN human rights bodies or experts.

Prior to early May, the Centre's failure to project itself and to play the role in Rwanda it should have, as the preeminent UN human rights operational body, appears to have occurred for 3 reasons. It appears as if senior staff were not fully cognizant that they should be getting involved, and even more so that they should have been pushing from the beginning for the incorporation of human rights into Rwandan peacebuilding and peacekeeping.

Second, the Centre lacked the internal capacity to advocate in New York. Plagued consistently by inside turf battles, hobbled by arcane bureaucratic procedures, and desperately underfunded largely because funders have little confidence in their ability to

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<sup>16</sup> see GA document 11 Dec. 1993, A/C.3/48/L.85, which created the post of UNHCHR, operative para 4(b) calling on the HCHR to carry out "the tasks assigned to him/her by the competent bodies of the United Nations system in the field of human rights and make recommendations to them...", and 4(g) instructs the HCHR to engage in dialogue with governments in the implementation of the mandate.

<sup>17</sup> Namibia (UNTAG), Angola (UNAVEM II), Western Sahara (MINURSO), El Salvador (ONUSAL), Mozambique (ONUMOZ), and Cambodia (UNTAC).

spend money wisely, the Centre would have had difficulty even if they had fully understood the implications and demands of their duty to take the lead.

It does not appear that the Centre is learning much from the Rwandan crisis. There is little talk of having not taken the lead in actively advocating both within and without the UN about violations in Rwanda. Several rapporteurs with scarce resources and minimal Centre support, attempted to put the spotlight on Rwanda. The report<sup>18</sup> of Special Rapporteur Ndiaye on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions was tabled at the 50th session of the Commission on Human Rights, but effectively died there. There appears to have been no effort by the Centre in Geneva or through its New York office to lobby with regard to Rwanda even after the April massacres began. In fact, in mid November many New York based national missions and NGOs did not think that the new High Commissioner for Human Rights had even been to the UN in New York since he had taken up his Geneva post in April<sup>19</sup>.

Inter alia the UN Centre and the HCHR need to take two steps if they are to start to more adequately carry out human rights advocacy. First of all they must make a conscious policy shift to in fact advocate on behalf of human rights victims. They must fully understand that they are the full time human rights conscience of the UN and that they have a duty to push the limits of advocacy within the UN. They then need to alert the rest of the UN including the Secretary General and the Security Council that their duty flows from the UN Charter and the International Bill of Rights<sup>20</sup> and in instances of grave human rights violations that this duty to advocate for the abused overrides all other duties.

## **RECOMMENDATION**

*Canada should encourage the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Centre for Human Rights to clearly enunciate their obligation to advocate for human rights*

Secondly, they must increase the lobbying capacity of their NY office. The initial point of departure is an increase in the seniority of the senior position at the Centre for Human Rights NY office<sup>21</sup> to at least a D2 level and more hopefully at the D3 level. The post must be sufficiently senior to open doors within the Secretariat and amongst missions, and to make it difficult to

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<sup>18</sup> E/CN.4/1994/7/Add.1 11 August 1993

<sup>19</sup> It appears that he has, but if his passing left so little impact, then one has to be even more concerned about what human rights lobbying he might have done.

<sup>20</sup> The International Bill of Human Rights consists of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its Optional Protocol.

<sup>21</sup> This is already being requested although it is not clear whether this is to more forcefully advocate for the Centre and the HCHR, or for the rights of the abused, or for both.

ignore. An increased lobbying capacity does not require many more staff, although 3 or 4 human rights political officers would be needed.

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

*Canada should strongly recommend that the senior position at the Centre for Human Rights New York office be a D2 or higher so as to provide whomever fills it with sufficient political clout to advocate for human rights*

In further recognition that most of the peacekeeping and peacemaking initiatives occur in NY, there should be a human rights desk officer in each of the critical departments of DPKO, DHA, and DPA. Their job would be to actively liaise with the UN Centre and the larger human rights community. As integral parts of their particular department, they would have the task of interjecting human rights factors and objectives into the design and delivery of departmental missions and programs. Quite apart from the obvious goal of protecting against human rights violations by governments and other national entities, they would work to ensure that UN missions themselves did not violate human rights<sup>22</sup>.

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

*Canada should encourage the Departments of DPKO, DHA, and DPA to each create a separate desk officer for human rights.*

The Human Rights Centre has not proven effective in marketing the human rights information that is available from within the UN or even the Centre itself. The term marketing has been judiciously chosen over the word public information or dissemination. Dissemination often has been interpreted or at least implemented by putting out poorly printed crowded texts that are daunting to avid human rights activists and mind numbing for the rest who invariably file them unread. Without getting into the details of marketing, the objective must always be to have your message heard which might not necessarily but hopefully will include being read.

One need only look at human rights documents from NGOs such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, or even the tiny office of the International Service for Human Rights to understand what can be done with very little. Attractive cover pages, concise summaries for those who do not have the time to read the whole document, variable and

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<sup>22</sup> International humanitarian and human rights standards must be consciously applied to UN operations particularly where missions involve more than merely monitoring or observing. The mandate of UNOSOM II in Somalia included making arrests, holding people in detention, and ensuring judicial prosecutions. A failure to sufficiently train and provide field direction to UN forces on how to function in such circumstances, predictably resulted in troops continuing to operate as trained for military combat with rather dire results including torture and murder.

very readable typeface, judicious use of white space, etc. all serve to facilitate communication.

Then there are all of the other techniques for marketing your message which include using the media, holding interesting press conferences, being online with internet, and so on. In short, the Human Rights Centre needs an active and effective information marketing department. UN agencies such as UNICEF have effectively mastered many of these techniques and the Centre should emulate them.

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

*Canada should encourage the Centre for Human Rights to draw upon the example of UNICEF and others on how to develop a marketing capacity to enable it to effectively communicate its knowledge and concerns about human rights*

The High Commissioner and the Centre should also take action to pull together the various human rights reports and other UN sources of human rights intelligence. There are 6 major treaty bodies and 26 charter based mechanisms including rapporteurs that presently report annually. In addition, there many other authoritative UN human rights intelligence sources. The HCHR and the Centre can provide a very useful service in synthesising this information both in an annual global report and in special country reports.

The annual report would synthesis information on a country basis rather than on a thematic basis. This country by country compilation would provide information in a digestible form for both UN and public consumption. It would be tabled in the General Assembly by the Secretary General so as to emphasis its importance.

Special country reports would be compiled when the HCHR felt the seriousness of a country situation merited it. For example, the report of Ndiaye provided to the Centre on 11 August 1993, along with other Rwandan human rights warnings, should have triggered the creation of a country specific report. In other words, serious human rights violations in a particular country would mandate the production of an up-to-date synthesis of authoritative and relevant human rights intelligence on that country. This document would provide an informed basis upon which UN staff and member states could predicate their actions.

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

*Canada should encourage the High Commissioner for Human Rights to produce both an annual human rights report which would cover every country, and special country reports as necessary.*

### **5.3 Human Rights Policy Advice, Coordination, and Program Delivery**

The roles of policy advice, coordination, and program delivery are critical to the task of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Centre for Human Rights. In the Rwandan context, all of these roles appear to have been missed. It waits to be seen if, in the Rwandan context, they start to undertake their duties in these areas. So while there is no Rwandan 'record' in this regard to comment on, it is worthwhile just to quickly review the three concepts.

#### **Policy Advice**

The HCHR and the Centre should play an active role in anticipating and/or responding to the needs of other parts of the UN for recommendations on action to be taken vis-à-vis human rights. Those decision makers will then have to weigh off human rights against other factors such as resources and politics. Nevertheless, they will at least have been provided with the human rights options.

This policy and operational role can be very time and energy consuming, but will act to inject the advocacy/intelligence role of the UN human rights community into other UN sectors in a very substantive way.

#### **Coordination**

The HCHR should play a role in coordinating the activities of the human rights communities. The HCHR's primary coordinating role should occur within the UN and its agencies. The Commissioner's secondary coordinating role would involve liaising with regional bodies such as the OAU and the OAS. Tertiary coordination or involvement would be within the context of broad based human rights activity that includes NGOs and others, both at the regional and global level.

#### **Program Delivery**

Human rights promotion and protection can be furthered by a number of specific programs as opposed to being components of programs delivered by other parts of the UN. While the Centre should endeavour to encourage other parts of the UN in the latter, there are many instances when its' particular expertise and position makes it best suited to run a particular programs. This can be part of Advisory Services, or be undertaken by other parts of the Centre. In light of the almost total breakdown of Rwandan human rights, there is substantial scope for this type of activity within Rwanda although the collapse of most of society will dramatically complicate the design and delivery of those programs.

## Resources

In all of the activities of the Centre, finances remain a major factor. Some claim that the Centre itself does not have sufficient resources, many others claim they mis-spend what they get. All agree that not enough money is reaching human rights promotion and protection.

In this regard it is useful to quickly look at a Rwandan humanitarian 'success' story, UNHCR's service packages concept (see Ch.4 for details). The idea was UNHCR would identify a list of distinct tasks which countries could choose to carry out, such as supplying water to a particular refugee camp. While UNHCR wants to improve on how this process played out in the field, by and large the service packages worked well. They allowed countries and organizations to 'wave the flag' by carrying out well define 'national' tasks, while at the same time providing necessary humanitarian services. Countries provided cohesive 'service' teams who invariably arrived with pre-existing operational structures and functional working relations. The added bonus of course was that the packages were paid for by the donor nation.

This was very much akin to national peacekeeping units who remain as self contained companies or battalions etc., but who plug into and are controlled by multinational headquarters with force commanders and others who report directly to the UN. It is recognized that peacekeeping operational imperatives make this route relatively critical, and the desires of troop contributing nations make it a necessity.

Most of the roles of the UN Human Rights Centre can with innovative thinking lend themselves to a similar service packages approach. This is especially attractive since the Centre will continue to be starved of funds until it proves its can operate wisely and cost effectively. For example, early on in the Rwandan crisis, the US offered as human rights monitors approximately 300 ex Peace Corp individuals. All of them had worked in Rwanda and many of them spoke Kinyarwanda. Human Rights Watch and others had already started to train them, and 40 had received the necessary medical inoculations. It is not clear why the UN decided not to use them. One can surmise that such a massive US presence, when there were only 5 UN human rights monitors on the ground at the time, would have sent the wrong message. However, one wonders whether Rwandans would have differentiated much between Americans, Canadians, Europeans, Latin Americans, etc. Was there not some way in which some of the US monitors could have been used by the UN eg. in a small sector of Rwanda, and an appeal put out to other potential funders to provide similar teams?

Without getting too caught up on that particular example, it appears obvious that the Centre should seriously look at that and other potential areas where human rights service packages can be designed to allow individual countries or organizations to 'buy into' a program. For example, assuming that the Human Rights Centre developed sufficiently comprehensive operational procedures, reporting procedures, and field headquarters capacity, it seems quite feasible that countries could sent distinct teams of human rights monitors who would be assigned to particular

regions or tasks. Criteria would have to be developed as to who they could have on their teams, how they would have been trained in advance (ostensibly in part by the Centre), how fast they would be expected to deploy, how they would report to a UN human rights headquarters, and as a cautionary measure their prior agreement to leave the operation and the country immediately upon being requested to do so.

## **5.4 Conclusion**

Apart from occasional glimmers, the UN human rights structures failed in the lead up to, and immediately after, April 6th. Subsequently their interventions have been unfocussed and largely ineffectual to date. Perhaps more unsettling is the feeling that some key UN human rights decision makers have not realised what they should have done, and thus are not actively looking for lessons to be learned. This has extremely negative implications for the next human rights 'Rwanda'.

In particular, the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Centre for Human Rights have substantial potential to influence the UN's crisis response. Going even further, by definition they are the core of the UN human rights system. They have a duty to play a larger and much more independent role as the UN's human rights conscience.

## 6 COORDINATION AND HANDING OVER

At the outset of this study, it was envisaged that there would be much to review in the area of coordination between international actors, and the handing over of responsibilities as the crisis entered different phases.

At the sectoral level, eg. peacekeeping or humanitarian or human rights, there was indeed much to observe. Chapters 3,4, and 5, each cover that sector's coordination, or its lack of, in quite some detail. In those chapters we reviewed the success of UNREO and others on the humanitarian assistance side. We also covered the tentative, but quickly evolving, coordination in New York between DPKO, DHA, and DPA. The latter contains some real potential for overarching coordination especially if it expands to include other parts of the UN.

However, actual overarching coordination in Rwanda was less in evidence. In many ways this should not be surprising. First, the period reviewed was so short as to preclude handovers caused by the crisis moving into a different phase. For example, the peacekeepers have not been able to leave and hand over some of their tasks to others.

Second, various components of the international community, both governmental and non-governmental, have traditionally dealt with distinct sectors or aspects of the developmental, humanitarian, peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding continuum<sup>23</sup>. It has only been in recent years that many have started to understand and address their linkages to the other international sectors in the continuum. Many have consciously been enlarging their mandates in the recognition of the linkages, which of course increases sectoral overlap and the need for coordination.

Within particular sectors such as humanitarian assistance, attempts to avoid duplication, cut down costs, and more efficiently reach those in most need of international intervention, are becoming more automatic. But there has been hesitation in this evolution, particularly between sectors. And, there are some valid reasons why many attempt to give coordination the slip. Quite apart from a natural tendency to want to run one's own show, coordination has some tangible costs.

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<sup>23</sup> A continuum that expands ever outwards and upwards so as to include human rights, democracy, trade, etc.

Coordination takes effort which otherwise could be directed at the problems at hand. Coordination hampers rapid action. And coordination centralises some functions that are best delegated and decentralised.

A large stumbling block is in deciding who takes the lead. Who decides who can best do the job, or direct or coordinate the actions of others? At times comparative advantage is evident, and leads to voluntary delegation and coordination. For example, the increasing need for security for humanitarian organizations has weakened reservations about working with peacekeepers.

Equally difficult is the division of resources. In particular, how do the financial implications of increased peacemaking impinge on relations with the humanitarian and developmental sectors? Certainly within the UN system, there appears to be a redirection of development funds to peacekeeping, and it would be surprising if this did not antagonize the developmental and humanitarian sectors.

Sometimes coordination fails for no other reason than perceived differences between cultures; military, NGO, humanitarian assistance, development, police, human rights, and so on. It is promising that many individuals are actively working at lowering those often subtle but none the less critical perception barriers. Certainly rubbing shoulders while on concurrent missions had led to an upwards spiral of informal contacts leading to informal cooperation leading to more contact.

**In conclusion** and for many of reasons above, overarching coordination in Rwanda did not occur. This is not to deny a leap forward in coordination within the humanitarian community (Ch. 4) and to a lesser degree within the UN's peacekeeping and conflict resolution apparatus where DPKO, DHA, and DPA increased and are busy enhancing their consultative mechanisms (Ch. 3). Within other sectors such as human rights, there was little or no coordination either within the UN or with NGOs . With such uneven sectoral development, this time one could not reasonably anticipate any overarching coordination. Hopefully next time we can.

## **7 REPORT CONCLUSION**

Most of the underlying issues being addressed in this study are not new, and many remain quite intransigent. However, the Rwandan crisis is an excellent vehicle to revisit these issues. Rwanda was catastrophic and should have merited rapid substantive intervention by the international community. Paradoxically, despite the massive numbers of dead and suffering, it is also a rather compact issue with a limited number of domestic and international actors. And finally, while Rwanda has gone through cycles of violence and crises, this most recent crisis occurred over a very short time frame. For these reasons, the April 1994 Rwandan crisis allows us to more clearly analyze the failures and successes of international crisis response.

Substantial and sufficient Rwandan early warning intelligence existed for years, and peaked during 1993 and early 1994. Nevertheless, many states and UN leaders did not see the need for themselves or the UN to get too involved. They hoped the issue would simply resolve itself. This hope died on April 6th, and soon after the UN and the world community should have been prepared to react with speed and forceful action. A small rapid peacekeeping deployment within the two weeks following April 6th was eminently possible, and would have substantially reduced both massacres and refugee flows.

Instead, there was a rapid withdrawal of most of UNAMIR once foreign nationals were evacuated. This was followed months later by the glacial and half hearted reinforcement of UNAMIR. At best UNAMIR did little for Rwandans during this period, and at worse, increased the hardline Hutu élites' perception of world indifference to them orchestrating massacres and refugee flows.

A fundamental lack of political will to intervene was evidenced by almost every UN member. There was a distinct lack of trust by states in the UN system, and the Security Council in particular did not allow the UN to function as it could have. The problem this time was not the UN structure or staff, but its member states

This rather abject **political** failure around Rwanda is certainly open to general censure but is less amenable to the identification of country specific culprits. The very nature of international politics is the uneven injection of a myriad of agendas and objectives into imperfect forums where manipulation and obfuscation is the order of the day. The primacy of realpolitik is not about to change quickly.

The key lesson from the Rwandan crisis is that as much as possible of the international crisis

response mechanism must be removed from the strictly political dimension. The key sign of optimistic coming out of Rwanda is that there are many parts of the UN, as well as other international organizations, that show increasing capacity to assume such delegated authority.

The humanitarian community's response to Rwanda was fast and relatively well orchestrated amongst both UN agencies and nongovernmental humanitarian organizations. They achieved some real successes and just as promisingly are actively identifying and setting about to correct failures. Similarly, parts of the UN's peacekeeping and conflict resolution apparatus in New York, specifically DPKO, DHA, and DPA, increased their cooperation during the Rwanda crisis and are busy enhancing these consultative mechanisms.

The concept of a UN permanent rapid deployment headquarters most certainly holds promise for future Rwandas. Not least of all it will serve to reassure UN decision makers and potential troop contributing nations. Then perhaps DPKO and others will be allowed to get on with their job.

Other international non-political mechanisms, such as the UN's human rights structures and the OAU's mechanism for conflict resolution, did not play the kind of role over Rwanda that they could and should have. Nevertheless, and although they have further to develop, they too have the potential to play a substantial and independent role in conflict prevention, conflict management, and conflict resolution.

This is not to deny that there are core international decisions that must remain political. But, as countries increase their trust in the capacity of the UN Secretariat, UN agencies, and nongovernmental organizations such as the ICRC or Oxfam, the more they will be prepared to delegate responsibility. This evolution occurs in any maturing democratic system, and is merely the acceptance of the inherent limitations of political decision making. The UN member states need to recognize their functional limitations and delegate greater authority and tasks to those parts of the UN and international society best able to handle them.

Both Rwandans and the international community abjectly failed to prevent widespread genocidal massacres and massive refugee flows. The international community partly mitigated its failure through rapid and effective humanitarian assistance. There are cautious grounds for optimism that some have learned from the Rwandan catastrophe, and will be better prepared to prevent similar cataclysms that threaten both Africa and the world. There is real potential for improvements in international crisis response and conflict resolution if states are prepared to allow the UN and other international structures to play their part.

## RWANDA HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND CRISIS CHRONOLOGY

### BRIEF HISTORICAL BACKGROUND prior to March 1993

The Tutsi (14% of the population, Hutu 85%, Twa 1%) historically dominated Rwanda from the 17th century until 1961 when the Tutsi monarchy was overthrown by the Hutu élite. During the period 1960-2, thousands of Tutsi were either internally displaced or fled to neighbouring countries. The latter known as Banyarwanda refugees, carried out sporadic attacks from Tanzania, Burundi, Zaire, and Uganda. By 1964 an estimated 20,000 Tutsi had been killed and there were 150,000 Banyarwanda refugees.

By 1990 those 150,000 and their descendants were estimated to number 400,000 with the largest concentration in Uganda where they were raised speaking English not French. Their repatriation to Rwanda which has a population density of approximately 300/square km, was problematic in itself. In addition, by the end of 1993 a further 200,000 new Tutsi refugees had joined them, and within Rwanda there were over 1 million internally displaced Hutus.

From 1961 on, the political élite in Rwanda were predominantly Hutu. In 1973 Minister of Defense Habyarimana seized power and ruled Rwanda as a single party state. His party, the Movement for Democracy and Development (MRND) initially claimed to incorporate all sections of the populace but with time became largely restricted to his family and friends from his birthplace in northwestern Rwanda.

In Uganda, the Tutsi diaspora supported Musevini's guerilla movement in the 80's (he is from a related tribe the Ankole, and may have Tutsi ancestry), and over 2,000 Tutsi enlisted in his army. The present cycle of the Rwandan civil war started in October 1990 when the Tutsi dominated Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) invaded from Uganda. Almost half of the 7,000 guerillas were ex-Ugandan army (NRA) who had 'deserted' overnight to the RPF with their arms and heavy equipment. The invasion seems to have taken Musevini by surprise, and it certainly complicated his term as OAU Chairman. He probably feels that he no longer owes the Rwandan Tutsi community his active support. At any rate, the October 1990 RPF invasion was repulsed. It created another 350,000 refugees, and the RPF returned to Uganda to regroup and carry out a series of small attacks during 1991-2.

Coincidentally with the 1990 invasion, internal and international pressures had forced President Habyarimana to initiate internal political reform through power sharing and allowing other political parties. Ongoing jockeying amongst the Hutu élite led in April 1992 to a government of cohabitation which drew members from the 4 main political parties. The Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister both from the Republican Democratic Movement (MDR) were hostile to President Habyarimana, while President's Habyarimana support came increasingly from hard line Hutu chauvinists, in particular the Defence Minister.

The President was also forced to respond to international pressure for some accommodation with the RPF. There were a number of attempts to negotiate ceasefires and resolve the conflict, with meetings in Dar-es-Salaam, Gbadolite, Paris, and Arusha. A ceasefire was signed at Arusha in July 1992 which led to protocols on power sharing signed on October 30 1992 and January 1993. President Habyarimana repudiated the agreements, and the RPF in turn violated the ceasefire on February 8 1993 resulting in heavy fighting, hundreds of deaths, and 650,000 Rwandans displaced. During this whole period, hardline Hutus regularly harassed and occasionally massacred Tutsi in order to forestall peace and block any power sharing agreements. It is estimated that over 2,000 Tutsi were massacred during the period 1990-92.

A new ceasefire was agreed on March 9 1993 which inter allowed alia for a neutral OAU to monitor a demilitarized zone.

## **CRISIS CHRONOLOGY from March 1993 to September 1994**

Crisis refers to the events leading up to and following the April 6th crash of the presidential aircraft.

### **2-17 March 1993**

On behalf of the UN Secretary General (SG) and in response to a request from the Ugandan and Rwandan governments to monitor their common border, Macaire Pedanou led a UN goodwill mission to the region and then subsequently observed talks in Arusha between the Rwandan Government (RG) and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).

### **4 March**

France and Rwanda lobbied the SC to authorize a new peacekeeping mission to act as a buffer between the Rwandan Government Forces (RGF) and RPF. The initial reaction was cool and at the Permanent Five (P5) meeting the UK suggested that the OAU should deal with situation and the US agreed. This proposal was distinct from the UN goodwill mission

The French were quite fixated by the perception that the RPF were rapidly advancing and threatening the relative tranquility of the situation. However, the Belgians felt that the RPF advance to within 27 km of Kigali had halted.

### **7 March**

In Dar es Salaam, the RPF and RG agreed to a **9 March** ceasefire and an agreement on "the withdrawal of foreign troops and their replacement by an international force organised under the aegis of the OAU and UN." The French again pushed for an interpositional UN force, but the US and others wanting the OAU to take the lead successfully stalled any UN decision.

### **12 March**

French persistency and their repairing of relations with OAU and African SC members, allowed them to advance a very toned down **SC Res 812/93** asking the SG to do what he had already informally initiated, which was consult with the OAU regarding a joint Peace Keeping Operation (PKO). The SG wanted regional groups such as the OAU to take more regional leadership, but even the OAU argued that it lacked PKO experience and resources.

### **16 March**

Peace talks started in Arusha between the RG and the RPF. There was some serious internal wrangling within the RG, inter alia the draft accord apportioned the MDR party the right to appoint the PM and they had appointed Nbenziyaremye. President Habyarimana whose party was the MRND opposed Nbenziyaremye, so invited another MDR member Agathe Uwilingiyimana to form the government. The MDR responded by revoking her membership in the party. This was ultimately settled by the compromise selection of Twagiramungu Faustin as PM.

### **2 April 1993**

The French formally wrote to the SG asking for an immediate deployment of UNMOs on the Rwanda/Uganda border as the Arusha talks were deadlocked and they feared that hostilities were about to restart.

### **2-6 April**

MGen. Baril led a Tech Mission to Rwanda and Uganda, and Col. Ross drafted the SG's report/recommendations for 100 UNMOs on Ugandan side.

Concurrently DPKO examined options if the Arusha talks were completed. If the UN were to supervise a ceasefire, identify cantonment points for integration and demobilization of both armies, organize and train the merged military and police, and observe an election, it was felt that they would need a Brigade Group of about 4500 and additional UN Civilian Police (CivPol).

### **20 May 1993**

The SG's Interim Report on Rwanda (S/25810) asked the SC to authorize UNOMUR.

### **June 1993**

The OAU had sent in a Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) into Rwanda.

### **22 June**

SC Res 846/93 15-0-0 created UNOMUR for 6 months initially, with a review every six months. It was pushed through by France with reluctant support by the US. Many SC members felt that UNOMUR would only be useful if it were part of a larger UN role within Rwanda. This larger role was perceived as hinging on the success of the Arusha peace talks.

### **28 June**

RG refuses to sign the peace accord agreed to in Arusha. This was further indication of substantial divisions within the RG on issues such as the integration of the RPF into the military and the police.

**27 July 1993**

Arusha agreement revised again and ready for signing.

**4 August 1993**

Peace Accord signed in Arusha. It included power sharing by means of a Broad-Based Transitional Government, a single National Army and National Gendarmerie composed of both armies and RG police, and guaranteed the right of all Rwandan refugees to return home.

**11 Aug**

Report by Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial executions, Bacré W. Ndiaye on his mission to Rwanda 8-17 April 1993 (E/CN.4/1994/7/Add.1 11 Aug 1993, tabled at 50th session of the Commission on Human Rights in March 1994.

**17-29 August**

UNOMUR technical mission by MGen Baril and BGen Dallaire to investigate inter alia if it should deploy in Rwanda in addition to its mandated location only in Uganda. The feeling was that support for the implementation of the Peace Accord should be a separately mandated mission with the idea that UNOMUR would fall under it.

**23 August**

Discussions in Kampala on how to facilitate the Accords. Observers felt the UN was relying on the UNDP resident representative in Kampala to lead the negotiations but he was too inexperienced. Uganda was anxious for troop deployment in Rwanda to implement Peace Accord. The US and UK HOMs also anxious and the UK was suggesting that there was some French meddling going on.

**5 October 1993**

SC Res 872/93 creates UNAMIR with OAU's NMOGs and UNOMUR continuing but both falling under the control of UNAMIR commanded by FC BGen Dallaire.

**30 December 1993**

The SG's 3 month progress report on UNAMIR recommended expanding it by a second battalion.

**17 February 1994**

The SC issued a statement reflecting its concern at failure of the two parties to form a broad-based transitional government, as this was a critical aspect if the peace process were to succeed.

**5 April 1994**

The SC extended UNAMIR's mandate for another 6 months.

**6 April**

President Habyarimana, his Chief of Staff, and President Ntaryamira of Burundi, were killed as their plane crashed on the approach to Kigali airport. The Presidential Guard sealed the airport which effectively blocked any investigation of the crash site. All indications are that it was shot down by government forces.

The acting President Agathe Uwilingiyimana was taken from the UNDP offices by the Presidential Guard (PG) and shot. The 13 Belgian peacekeepers guarding her were also executed. In what was clearly a well thought out process, the PG abducted and killed a number of opposition party members including the President of the National Assembly and the President of the Constitutional Court. Leading Hutus who had shown a willingness to work for national reconciliation with the Tutsi were targeted and killed. The PG and the local militia then turn on Tutsi and begin systematic massacres which will claim 20,000 lives in and around Kigali during the first week.

UNAMIR still not aware of the organized killings, believe government claims of scattered arbitrary killings, and

attempted to set up joint police patrols with the Gendarmerie. Strength of UNAMIR at this time is 2,486.

#### **7 April**

The SC met, but it had little information on events on the ground in Kigali and elsewhere in Rwanda. They decided to take no decisions until they had better intelligence. However reports of massacres are starting to pour in. At this stage, UNAMIR had a complement of approximately 2300 armed with light weapons. Some of the troops like the Bangladeshi were not at all prepared for a shooting war. Furthermore, the formal UNAMIR mandate and terms of engagement remained limited to self defense, albeit aggressive self defense if they opted to get out.

#### **8 April**

The RPF representative met with the NZ president of the SC to warn against the UN taking a more forceful role that would impede the advance of the RPF. He also asked for warnings of UN flights so that RPF forces would not shoot them down.

The SC met and had a broad discussion but took no decisions. The SG asked the SC to consider changing UNAMIR's mandate and increase the size of the force by 2-3 battalions in order to effectively evacuate UNAMIR/UN staff/foreign nationals. He stated that the situation had calmed and there were no further UN dead since the 7th. Discussion about a mandate change to have UNAMIR evacuated was also postponed particularly as the FC and others in Rwanda wanted to wait 24 hours to assess developments.

Nigeria argued in the other direction, asking for a multinational intervention force. This being Friday, the SC felt that if the ceasefire held, that they would not meet until Monday otherwise they would reconvene on Saturday.

Outside the SC, the RPF repeated in a milder form the warning given earlier to NZ as President of the SC. They denied moving forces through the DMZ, and they had moved their battalion out of Kigali (previously stationed there as part of the Arusha Peace Accord process)

#### **8 April**

Without any warning to UNHQ, the UNSC or UNAMIR, 190 French national troops landed and secured the airport without significant resistance. Another 400 arrived April 9th and assumed responsibility for the airport tower and operated it in cooperation with the RG forces. Similarly, 240 Belgian national troops arrived early the 10th followed by a Belgian battalion that night, for total of approximately 700.

#### **9 April**

The situation in Kigali had stabilized somewhat as there was no new UN casualties in the previous 24 hrs. Quite clearly the main problem was rampaging PG and the militia. UNAMIR was unable to enter many parts of the city.

In the SC there was a suggestion that the SC should issue a statement endorsing the unilateral French and Belgian humanitarian efforts to evacuate expatriates. France, Belgium (from outside of the chamber), the UK and the US blocked such a statement on the grounds that this was "self-defence" and of no concern to the SC. Such a reaction raised suspicions amongst African countries and the RPF particularly as France and Belgium maintained that they had cleared their arrival with the Rwandan authorities, one must assume they meant the Presidential Guard commanded by MGen Augustine Bizimungu (also RGF Chief of Staff).

With differences of opinion and a lack of coherent information, the SC elected not to discuss UNAMIR's mandate. USG Riza felt satisfied that the FC had been given greater latitude to include the protection of Rwandan civilians where possible. The US position at this point was that UNAMIR should remain in its location in case it needed to evacuate civilians overland.

The Belgians said their UN troop contingent would stay, but wanted UNAMIR to be more proactive in protecting

expatriates. Furthermore, they complained to USG Kofi Annan on Dallaire's alleged cautiousness in his interpretation of UNAMIR's mandate

The RPF meanwhile were angry that UN Special Representative Booh Booh had made a failed attempt to set up a "transitional national authority" in Kigali. He had deemed it "national" despite the fact it had no RPF or Tutsi representation. Subsequently UNSR Booh Booh took refuge in the Meridien Hotel and was for all purposes useless for the duration.

#### **10 April**

The RG offered to agree to a ceasefire, but the RPF were advancing and saw no need to negotiate. In Kigali French\* troops had assumed full responsibility for the airport control tower and routes into the city from airport, while the Belgians had assumed airport perimeter and assembly point security. North of Kigali, the Ghanaian Battalion at Byumba was ordered out of town by the advancing RPF but did not have sufficient transport to move.

\*(3 Fr Companies [190] in Kigali with a 4th due to arrive 11 April, 240 Belgian troops in Kigali with another 300 expected)

#### **11 April**

An alleged RPF mortar round landed in the hospital grounds leaving 27 dead and 150 casualties out of 6,000 refugees. RPF forces at edge of city but had not moved in yet.

The SC met in closed session to discuss future of UNAMIR. The French continued to refuse to allow the SC to comment on the French and Belgian operations. General feeling was that their presence would not have any adverse impact on UNAMIR per se unless RGF-RPF combat resumed at which point both sides might not differentiate between the Fr/Belg troops and UNAMIR. African representatives complained that the SC discussion was too focused on expatriates and not on Rwandans. No decision was taken to change the UNAMIR mandate.

From the field, both Dallaire and Booh were asking for the truce that had been negotiated to be given a chance. Clearly the following days were seen as pivotal for it was felt that if there was no peace progress, then UNAMIR might have to pull out before the French and Belgians completed their imminent withdrawal from the airport and Rwanda. Government forces shelled positions in the city, and UNDP evacuated their personnel from Kigali. UNAMIR at this point was protecting over 10,000 civilians (8,000 in the stadium and 2,000 in one hospital compound)

#### **12 April**

The SC met to discuss 3 options:

1. expanded UNAMIR size and mandate
2. reduction to a small 'political' presence to foster dialogue
3. withdraw altogether

The Nigerian representative, on behalf of the NAM SC caucus members and the OAU, asked for as much concern for Rwandese as for expatriates, and asked for an expanded size and mandate for UNAMIR.

The UK felt UNAMIR's mandate was untenable but felt full withdrawal would leave a negative impression in Africa, so called for a reduced political facilitation role. The US also argued that the status quo was not viable, and pushed for evacuation (leaving behind the SG's Special Representative) while the French and Belgians still secured the airport.

Argentina thought that full evacuation was premature and suggested a temporary relocation to a neighbouring country. Russia felt UNAMIR was preventing deaths, but needed more troops if it were to stay.

The French said their evacuation was almost complete and their troops would withdraw within 24 to 48 hrs. They felt that while the RPF would probably take over Rwanda, that this would be temporary as the demographics of a 14% Tutsi minority would prevent the RPF from holding on.

In the end, no decision was taken, as the SC elected to wait for the SG's recommendations based on the FC's assessment.

On the ground, half of the Ghanaian Battalion, along with the Bangladeshi engineers and some UNAMIR UNOMs from the DMZ had regrouped in Kigali. The other half of GhanBatt was still in Byumba.

#### **12 April**

The RPF warned the French and Belgian national forces to leave. The interim government apart from the Defence Minister had fled Kigali and probably Rwanda, and the RPF refused to negotiate with the Defence Minister.

#### **13 April**

An ICRC vehicle, clearly marked, was stopped by armed Hutu civilians in Kigali and 6 wounded civilians taken out and shot. The ICRC then stopped transporting wounded, but continued to treat people in a make-shift hospital attached to their compound using 31 Swiss expatriates. In preparation for opening a humanitarian effort, the IFRC were asking about the possibility of transporting goods through southern Uganda for positioning in NW Tanzania.

In the UN operations, the previous week witnessed some important institutional precedents:

1. there were formal consultations with TCNs by the SC President. (ASG Riza, Fr and UK resisted, but Can, Arg, Czech and the US pushed for them)
2. the UN/DPKO situation centre began holding daily operations briefing

#### **14 April**

The French having evacuated 1361 people (450 Fr. nationals), withdrew their last 50 troops. The Belgians asked for a 1 day extension to exit a further 1,000 people. They had promised to leave their APCs with UNAMIR, but reneged at the last moment. They also announced the withdrawal of their contingent in UNAMIR.

UNAMIR had 11 days of rations and 4 days of fuel. It was also limited to Kigali as the UNMOs in border regions had relocated to neighbouring countries. Those in Kigali were underemployed so FC Dallaire tasked a group to identify humanitarian needs and to be prepared to assist international agencies once they arrive in Kigali to undertake relief and reconstruction.

UNAMIR was recommending 3 options to the SG:

1. maintain present strength minus Belgian contingent leaving next day.
2. reduce to 1,000: maintain airport and key sections of the city, support reconstruction efforts, and work on political reconciliation.
3. reduce to 200: a presence at the airport and a hotel to support and protect SGSR focussing solely on political reconciliation.

Within the SC there was consensus on the two ends of the spectrum:

- 1- not a total withdrawal of UNAMIR unless security for peacekeepers absolutely lacking
- 2- no enlargement of troop strength (approx 2,000) nor change to enforcement action and mandate

Therefore, SC debate continued on the options in between.

MSF doctors arrived in Kigali to visit hospital, but had to leave the same day because of danger. Reports were coming in of 200,000 plus refugees on the Burundi/Rwandan border.

#### **15 April**

The RPF is largely in control of Kigali with the Presidential Guard surrounded in its barracks. Both parties want UNAMIR to stay but RPF insists Belgian battalion leave as planned, to be replaced by Ghanaians.

A closed SC session is quite acrimonious. The Belgians argue strongly that they know Rwanda best, and that there are far too many factions to allow UNAMIR to achieve anything so they should leave while they can. This view was strongly opposed by the NAM representatives and the SG's advisor.

The US announced the new instructions from Washington replacing the previous day's support for option 2 (ie. SGSR and 200 troops). The US now wanted to terminate UNAMIR and move the SGSR to a neighbouring country until the parties were prepared to negotiate. Their rationale was that UNAMIR could achieve nothing in the current situation, and their primary concern was for the safety of UN personnel.

This infuriated the NAM reps, and France caustically noted that their assessment was the opposite of the US's and based on more information. The SG's representative de Soto stated the SG's support of option 1, ie. UNAMIR at present strength of 2000 with updated mandate, the SG also felt that the threat to UNAMIR personnel was decreasing.

The NAM reps said they had met with Bangladesh, the largest troop contributor, who remained supportive. The NAM reps wanted to move beyond Option 1, and asked that the departed Belgian contingent be replaced. At this point US representative Albright made a show of calling Secretary Christopher on a cell phone who then authorized the concession of moving back to option 2 to join the UK and Russians in this regard. The NAM reps were not impressed.

By the end of the session, no SC decision was taken, so UNAMIR continued with a mandated ceiling of 2500 and real strength of 2000. It was felt that any change in mandate could only be precipitated by changes on the ground in Rwanda or following a recommendation from the FC as opposed to any compromise in NY.

#### **16 April**

The focus of the FC and the SGSR was on obtaining a ceasefire, but talks between the parties in Kigali were at best exploratory. The last Belgian national troops were gone, and the UNAMIR BelgBatt would hand over to Ghanaian troops the next day (200 Ghanaians at airport, and remaining 600 on the way). The feeling from UNAMIR and DPKO was that the status quo of the 2000 was not viable, and a decision was needed to either reduce or strengthen. The Ghanaians and Tunisians were game to stay, but Bangladesh was reconsidering its participation.

In the SC closed session, Fr clashed with US. France, the NAM, and the SG wanted a larger UNAMIR so there was no consensus to change the status quo.

#### **17 April**

Bangladesh became more concerned about the safety of its troops, and gave the SC three options: 1- relocate BangBatt outside of Rwanda until the situation stabilizes; 2-reinforce UNAMIR; 3- obtain firm guarantee of safety from the RG and the RPF.

#### **18 April**

The hardline RG defense minister set up an interim govt in Gitarama with a rump of the Presidential Guard, and RG garrisons loyal to him in Gisenyi, Cyangugu and Ruhengeri were massacring civilians. However RG troops in Butare and Kibuye were not backing him, were remaining neutral, and reportedly were not involved in civilian massacres.

#### **19 April**

USG Gharekhan briefed the SC on reports of massacres and the shelling of Kigali's Amahoro stadium protected

by UNAMIR. There was also a RG radio propaganda campaign against UNAMIR when UNAMIR turned down their proposal to co-administer the airport. There appeared to be little chance of a ceasefire.

The SGSR and FC Dallaire recommended (opt 2) downsizing within 2 days to 200-300 with a revised mandate of only political reconciliation. The SG decided not to place that recommendation in his report due but not delivered today as this would undermine his option for strengthening. The onus would remain on the SC to alter the status quo. The permanent representative of Rwanda called the SG and recommended that UNAMIR be reinforced.

At the TCN afternoon meeting, the African TCNs (especially Ghana & Togo & Senegal) wanted to increase the UNAMIR and argued the precedent of Cambodia and Bosnia. Uruguay and Tunisia and others were for option 2, as was Canada who elected to be guided by the FC's assessment/recommendations.

The prefect of Butare who had been keeping calm in the city was replaced by a military man from the north and calls went out over mille collines radio calling for the killing of "accomplices" in Butare. The prefect had asked for UNAMIR protection in the past week, but the 16 UNMOs were withdrawn from Butare early on the 20th which completed the total retreat of UNAMIR throughout Rwanda to Kigali. The evening of the 19th units of the Presidential Guard flew in from Kigali and extensive massacres began concurrently with UNAMIR's departure.

#### **20 April**

In a briefing to SC, USG Gharekhan apologised without explanation that the requested SG's report on Rwanda on had not been delivered on schedule yesterday and promised it for the 21st. The SC President NZ indicated frustration about the delayed report as it was necessary before any decision could be taken by the SC.

Reportedly DPKO was supporting the FC's and SGSR's recommendation to downsize immediately to about 300.

The Nigerian ambassador said there had been progress at talks in Kampala between the Rwandan Ambassador, the RPF rep, and the US ambassador. Talks had also been arranged for the 23rd in Arusha.

On the ground, there had been no progress on a ceasefire, no further shelling of the stadium, and UNAMIR was assisting ICRC medical teams. The airport was surrounded by government troops and the zones neutrality was in jeopardy. 264 non-essential UNAMIR had been evacuated, and apart from 87 UNMOs still in the DMZ, all 1707 UNAMIR forces were in Kigali (down from 6 April strength of 2,486 following departure of Belgian contingent and 'non-essential personnel')

Humanitarian agencies and NGOs were positioning themselves for move back into Rwanda eg . WFP had stocked 4000 mt of food in Tanzania. At the UNDP sponsored Rwandan humanitarian cell meeting in Nairobi, it was decided that the IFRC would be located in Bujumbura to handle refugee camps in Rwanda and the UNHCR would look after refugees in Burundi.

#### **21 April**

The SC presented his Special Report on UNAMIR S/1994/470 setting out 3 options: 1-immediate massive reinforcement, 2-reduced presence, 3-withdrawal. He did not support option 3 but did not indicate his preference for 1 or 2 in what was seen by some as a defensive move if whatever choice made subsequently 'failed'. SG said he would have another formal report for the SC within 2 weeks.

The US after having long argued to abandon UNAMIR, now wanted to maintain its strength above that of option 2 but still lower than at present. The Africans appeared prepared to go along with option 2 since the terms would permit the reinforcing of UNAMIR if circumstances permitted.

Only Nigeria, Oman, Djibouti, Rwanda and France spoke. The Rwandan perm rep criticised double standards where increased threats to a mission in one instance was followed by reinforcements, while in Rwanda it reduced

the mission and helped foreigners to exit, effectively abandoning Rwanda. Nigeria felt option 2 was reasonable.

Thus in overview, the US, the UK and Russia opted for a reduced presence, while France and the NAM pushed for a robust presence.

Thirteen days after April 6th, SC Res 912/94 reduces UNAMIR mandate strength to 270 and Dallaire starts to evacuate troops.

#### **22 April**

500 troops withdrawn to Nairobi today and another 500 to go on the 23rd, leaving about 600 Ghanaian and Tunisians and assorted UNMOs. UNAMIR was confident that the 20,000 refugees in their control would not be subjected to additional risks.

#### **26 April**

Canadian promise of \$4m food aid plus \$1m humanitarian (CIDA budget of 4 mill for 93/4 with another 1 mill supplementary in light of the crisis.)

#### **27 April**

UNAMIR strength at 387 troops and 72 UNMOs for a total of 459. UNAMIR in Nairobi included 15 CivPol, 175 UNMOs, and some Bangladeshis who were about to be flown home. Another 40 UNMOs in other countries and they are being relocated to Nairobi.

#### **28 April**

During 24 hour period, 200,000 refugees arrived in the Ngara region of Tanzania.

200 Canadian expatriates were evacuated without deaths, but 7 Canadians killed earlier -wife and 2 children of a Rwandan minister, and 4 Rwandan Canadians.

#### **29 April**

There was increasing criticism from the OAU and NGOs about the decision to downsize UNAMIR, but privately African countries like Nigeria and Egypt voiced concerns about committing troops in the present situation. The RPF control the north and west, and were advancing southwest. RGF were withdrawing around the Kigali airport.

There was a marathon SC meeting considering inter alia a letter from the SG to the SC endorsing more forceful action both with an expanded UNAMIR and with a upgraded peace enforcement mandate. The SC elected to postpone dealing with the SG's letter for a week, and seek further recommendations from SG before taking action.

The SC however did prepare a statement. There was contention over NZ, US, and Czech insistence on a paragraph on the responsibility of RGF for massacres and an explicit reference to genocide. Nigeria and the NAM at the behest of Rwanda tried to block it. The result was compromise language proposed by the UK and Spain which assigned blame to both albeit RGF primarily, and dropped the word genocide but with language that implied the same.

Outside the SC, RPF representative Claude Desaidi denounced the SC for dropping the reference to genocide, called for the resignation of SGSR Booh Booh, praised FC Dallaire, and said that UNAMIR should have been strengthened two weeks earlier.

#### **2 May 1994**

The US Administration in reaction to congressional and public horror with the violence in Rwanda, sent out Assistant Sec. for Humanitarian Affairs Shattuck and Ambassador Rawson, initiated humanitarian assistance of about \$15 million, and pushed for an arms embargo. They hinted about possible financial and logistical support

for UNAMIR, but made no definite commitment.

### **3 May**

Heavy fighting in Kigali as RPF steadily advances. Large refugee exodus to Tanzania under way. SG wrote to the OAU and several African troop contributors seeking suggestions for resolving the situation, and to seek troop commitments for an expanded regional presence possibly under OAU control with UN help.

The SC met and elected to take no action until the SG reports on responses to his letter and makes some specific proposals that the SC could consider. The US supported by NZ suggested a sensitization mission, but the UK and others blocked what they saw as an excuse for inaction. The SC president committed himself to consult with the Tanzanians, OAU representatives, and the RPF.

### **4 May**

UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Ayala Lasso announced his intention to undertake a mission along with Louis Joinet of the Sub-Commission, to Rwanda and Burundi. He also suggested the calling of a special session of the UNCHR and sending human rights monitors to gather information. Questions were raised as to the usefulness of a belated special session, and about the usefulness of Lasso now going on mission to Rwanda.

### **5 May**

Letter from OAU SG Salim Salim to UNSG categorically stating that the Rwanda operation should remain a UN operation, and the focus should not be on creating a new force, but on building on what was there in order to provide security to displaced persons and those delivering humanitarian assistance.

Informal SC session considered the letter of Salim Salim, and the Nigerian president of the SC Gambari, was asked to draft a letter to the UNSG asking for options directed at the security of the displaced and the delivery of foreign assistance, the draft to be discussed by the SC the next day.

### **6 May**

The SC discussed a draft resolution changing the mandate of UNAMIR and increasing the contingent to 5,500 military along with an arms embargo. Russia and the US had reservations as to the ability of the UN to pay for such an operation, and no decision was taken by the SC. They did however put forward the letter to the SG asking for options.

**9 May** SG non-paper to SC outlining possible mandate and force structure for an expanded UNAMIR

### **10 May**

RPF consolidating control of Kigali, and attempting to take control around airport and large military camp close to the airport. Mortar rounds landed in Amhoro Stadium and killed one Ghanaian soldier. No clearance for flights so Canadian aircraft turned back

Around Ngara in Tanzania there are 4 main refugee camps with a total of 262,000. Coordination being done by UNHCR, who are complaining of some NGOs arriving on the ground unannounced. Problems of water, sanitation, and food storage. US announce contribution of \$38 million to UNHCR, IFRC, and the ICRC. NGOs in Ngara include ICRC, MSF, CARE, World Vision, ZOA, GOAL, Oxfam, African Education Fund, 7th Day Adventists.

### **11 May**

The SC begins discussion of SG's response dated 9 May to the SC letter of 6 May. This non-paper set out the details of a revamped UNAMIR-A of 5,500 military with a mandate to support displaced persons and provide assistance in the provision of aid by humanitarian agencies. It would be a strong, highly mobile force, capable of self-defence, but would remain a Chapter 6 operation thus requiring the consent of the parties.

HCHR Ayala Lasso arrived in Kigali for a 24 hour visit.

#### **12 May**

The SC resumed debate on the SG's non-paper and what a SC resolution would deal with and recommend. NZ and France wondered if a Ch.6 operation could function amid the fighting, and some NAM members and the Rwandan Ambassador were lobbying for a Ch.7 mission albeit with a view to interposing the UN between the combatants, an option strenuously opposed by the RPF. The US continued to call for a small force restricted to the borders and offered airlift capacity if this option chosen.

There was SC consensus on the need for an arms embargo. The draft resolution also included a request to the SG to recommend options for prosecuting war criminals, but did not include any reference to human rights or the role of the HCHR. Anticipated Chinese veto on any such reference was working against its inclusion.

There was no final SC consensus apart from a desire to ease civilian suffering, so it was decided to have a drafting group work on the Nigerian draft resolution

In anticipation of an enlarged force, DPKO had been soliciting troop and equipment commitments. Responses had been poor although Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal and Tanzania indicated they might have some lightly equipped infantry.

#### **13 May**

The SG produced a report that replaced the non-paper of 11 May. It was not substantially different, but included further operation details.

The SC drafting group worked on its draft resolution, but any final decision by the SC was postponed until at least Monday 16 May as the US State Dept. informed its mission that it would not have instructions before then.

#### **17 May**

SC Res 918/94 15-0-0 passed authorizing the expansion of UNAMIR to 5500 troops with an expanded mandate to facilitate humanitarian assistance and protect Rwandan civilians where possible (22 days after the 21 April SC res 912 downsizing UNAMIR to 270).

NZ had failed in an attempt to make it a Chapter VII operation, but there was support for stronger rules of engagement (RoEs) to provide greater specificity than the UK, US or China had wanted (ie. "action against person or groups who threaten... populations"). The US and China insisted on prefacing that with "self-defence" so that the final RoEs implied but did not clearly authorize enforcement.

There was concern about the ability to translate into reality the hedging agreement from the RG and the RPF as to a neutral zone around the airport. Also, NZ failed to inject the term genocide, and opposing legalistic arguments appeared to mask some nations' attempts to avoid incurring obligations under the genocide convention.

The US felt that the resolution did not sufficiently satisfy their PDD 25 and it took a lot of time to overcome their demand for clear commitments from troop/equipment contributors, complete consent of parties, and more refined operations plans before the resolution could be passed. They also failed in their demand that another SC Res would be required before Phase 2 deployment went forward, but did get agreement that the SG would have to report on the progress of Phase 1 before Phase 2 would be allowed to proceed.

#### **18 May**

A meeting of troop contributors to try and get the additional troops/equipment needed. Canada indicated its willingness to provide a communications squadron plus support staff for a total of 350. Of the rest, only Australia said more than that their government were considering the requests.

### **19 May**

Report of High Commissioner for Human Rights Ayala Lasso on his mission to Rwanda 11-12 May. Noticeably he does not refer to the massacres as genocide.

**24/25 May** Special Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights passed a resolution (see E/CN.4/S-3/L.2 25 May 1994) appointing a Special Rapporteur for Rwanda, asked the HR Commissioner to assign a team of human rights field officers to the SR, and to work with UNAMIR.

### **25 May**

The SG at a press conference said that events in Rwanda amounted to genocide. This was the first official use of the term and caused broad consternation.

UNAMIR (including UNMOs) troop strength in Rwanda 471: Ghana 334, Tunisia 40, Canada 11, Togo 18, Senegal 12, Bangladesh 11, Zimbabwe 8, Mali 7, Austria 7, Congo 7, Nigeria 7, Russia 4, Poland 3, Egypt 2, Malawi 2, Mali 2, Uruguay 2, Fiji 1.

UN DPKO MILAD had written offers for four of five infantry battalions from Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Senegal, and Ghana. All will need APCs etc. No offers received for 5th infantry battalion or for support units apart from the Canadian offer of a signals company.

### **31 May**

Report of the SG on the situation in Rwanda following 22-27 May visit of ASG Riza and MILAD Baril. A blunt report, it talks of genocide, the shamefully slow international response for troop contributions, and SG's plan to review the entire UN system to strengthen its reactive capacity. The report did not clarify the relationship between the new UNAMIR mandate and the authority of the FC to carry them out, including and particularly the RoEs.

Nagara refugee camp in Tanzania now holding over 300,000 with several thousand daily still arriving.

### **3 June 1994**

A much calmer situation in Kigali, eg. easy clearance for flights. The RPF confident that their victory over the RGF almost complete. They control about 60% of Rwanda. UNAMIR continues where possible to protect civilians in situ.

The US finally agreed to lease the UN 50 APCs as opposed to using the possibility as leverage over secretariat. In a dramatic about turn for the US, they are drafting a SC Res not to delay the deployment of Phase 2, but to endorse the SG's report, strengthen the language of the previous resolution, and call for troop/equipment contributions. The resolution would not alter the RoEs but DPKO felt that present RoEs were sufficient to avoid standing by during massacres.

ICRC hospital is jammed, but it has supplies and an effective expatriate team of doctors. They gave high praise for Canadian aircraft operation. ICRC plans to stockpile food in Goma Zaire for distribution into western Rwanda still controlled by RGF. IFRC and USAID had recovered and buried 40,000 bodies from Lake Victoria. ICRC report Kigali authorities as having buried 67,000

Ongoing accounts of major ethnic massacres in RGF held territory. Violations on a much lesser extent in RPF held territory where policy appears to be that if 5 witnesses substantiate an individual's involvement in a massacre, then they are summarily executed. This is particularly true for Interahamwe who have been caught.

### **7 June**

TCN meeting told by ASG Riza that killing of civilians continuing in RGF areas. Troop commitments received from: Ghana/Senegal/Ethiopia/Tanzania a full battalion each, Nigeria/Congo/Mali a company each, Canada communications company and one aircraft, US leasing 50 APCs. UNAMIR II shortfall is equipment not

personnel. Several European countries tentatively offering aircraft at dates to be confirmed. The UN might have to turn to civilian contractors to provide logistics support albeit at a greater cost to UN.

ASG Riza said UNAMIR II was not a traditional PKO and it dealt with 3 separate issues: 1. humanitarian and physical security of civilians 2. ceasefire and end of civil war 3. political/democratic reconstruction

Marathon SC session on draft resolution. It was hung up on NZ-led insistence on a reference to genocide

#### **8 June**

SC passed Res 925/94 15-0-0 which extends UNAMIR II for 6 months, refers to genocide and human rights (softened for China), and solicited contributions to special fund for Rwanda. France stated its willingness to come up with equipment

US largely in agreement with resolution, but it insisted on preambular language reference UNAMIR's end date to satisfy PDD 25, but NZ argued strongly that humanitarian operation could not be held to arbitrary deadlines and they compromised with 'as long as needed' language. NZ representative also directed comments to the US, regretting that SC had not produced Res 925 21 days earlier rather than Res 918 which was tentative and confused (reflecting US ambivalence about UNAMIR) and discouraged potential contributors.

In a partial defense of SC tardiness in early April, the Czech representative criticised the UN Secretariat for failing to inform the SC of field intelligence of inflammatory broadcast, influx of arms, and RG troop movements received just prior to April 6

#### **9 June**

Kigali airport closed for security. Pres. Museveni and others encouraging RPF to have a ceasefire.

In Kable Uganda, UNREO having limited success in coordinating 12 NGOs already in field and 25 NGOs attending briefings. Catholic Relief Services and ICRC feel food demands greater in south than north but unclear on numbers and difficult to ship in food to date

#### **13 June**

RPF appears to be over extended and unable to completely oust the RGF and Interahamwe, so war looks as if it will drag out. There has been a new wave of anti-white and anti-Dallaire propaganda over the government controlled radio.

#### **15 June**

French Minister Juppé indicated willingness to intervene in Rwanda in concert with European and African partners if massacres did not stop. This took their NY mission by nasty surprise as well as those ostensible partners, who had not been consulted. Post statement, the UK said no to troops but possibly some truck, Belgians also said no to troops but possibly logistics, and Italy was considering request.

#### **17 June**

France floats a draft SC Res to create a French lead multinational UN force with a Ch VII mandate, modelled on US intervention (UNTAF) in Somalia. A transitional force, it would go into government held territory and stay until UNAMIR deployed. RPF and most other countries were ambivalent as they saw the merit of halting the massacre of Tutsi but remained fearful of French grandstanding and duplicity. The SG appeared to encourage the French to the dismay of many of his officials.

They made it clear that they would proceed unilaterally within the week if they did not receive support. Others however queried why the French did not facilitate the enlargement and deployment of UNAMIR, eg. air transport, equipment for African countries that had offered troop contingents.

### **19 June**

SG report to SC in which he set out the response to efforts to raise troops/equipment for an expanded UNAMIR. Ethiopia, Ghana, Senegal, Zambia and Zimbabwe offered a battalion, while the Congo, Malawi, Mali, and Nigeria offered a company. All troops offers were on the condition that they be fully equipped. Italy and Netherlands offered one aircraft on condition they did not fly into Rwandan air space, the UK offered 50 trucks (reimbursable), and the US 50 APCs(reimbursable). France unilaterally offered to pay for Senegalese troop equipment. Other unofficial offers waiting firm commitments: Australia (medical coy), Canada (comms coy), Italy (20 tanker trucks), Romania (surgical team), Russia (8 helicopters and transport planes).

SG thus envisaged deployment of Phase I UNAMIR by first week of July, but Phase II seriously under-committed and it could take 3 months despite continued killings of civilians. He suggested the SC consider the French initiative which would operate until UNAMIR was strong enough to take over.

### **20 June**

Signals that the US was prepared to back the French initiative, and might even supply transport. Also, Senegal and Zaire have agreed to participate.

### **21 June**

Canada agrees to provide up to 350 comms personnel.

France and SG actively lobbying for support for the French initiative. The OAU SG Salim Salim opposed as he viewed long term solution based upon Arusha Accords which involved France leaving Rwanda. RPF representatives openly opposed and implying that UNAMIR would be in jeopardy as a result. New Zealand left SC meeting to disassociate itself from initiative. China and Nigeria wanted clarification of RPF position before agreeing. Ghana as the largest troop contributor was incensed they had not been consulted by SG. Pakistan ambivalent as SG representative to Rwanda had personal doubts but carried the SG's line. Russia supportive but in the context that they were about to send 3000 troops into Georgia and wished to get the same type of resolution passed to legitimize their actions. The French went away to redraft resolution with a view to resubmitting it to SC next day.

### **22 June**

SC Res 929/94 10-0-5 (abst: China, Brazil, Nigeria, Pakistan, New Zealand) authorizing the French led operation Turquoise to create humanitarian safe zones in west and south west Rwanda. The resolution is hedged with a variety of claw back phrases: "strictly humanitarian...not constitute an inter-position force...unique case...a threat to peace and security in the region...until UNAMIR is brought up to the necessary strength...two months".

In the SC debate, it received extremely qualified support and only passed because of extensive and effective lobbying by France as a permanent member abetted by the SG despite advice from his staff. The US gave support along with cautions about need for transparency and need to get UNAMIR up to strength. The US announced it had agreed to equip the Ghanaian battalion, and that they would pressure the RPF to avoid contact with French Operation Turquoise

### **28 June**

Troops Contributors meeting faced with no new offers, and USG Annan felt many of the equipment requests were unreasonable. Present UNAMIR strength primarily 1/2 Ghanaian Bn of 314 and Tunisian Coy of 40. It was hoped by the end of July the rest of the Ghanaian Bn along with Zimbabwean and Ethiopian Bn and Canadian Squadron for a total of 2810. USG Annan pointedly asked all countries present who had not made commitments to comment, and clearly indicated his frustration with their smoke and mirrors.

UNCHR Special Rapporteur René Degni Ségui submitted his Report on the human rights situation in Rwanda E/CN.4/1995/7 28 June 1994

### **1 July 1994**

SC Res 935 / 94 15-0-0 asking SG to set up a Commission of Experts to investigate and compile evidence of grave violations of international humanitarian law including acts of genocide. Muted support from Nigeria and objections from China and Rwanda but neither prepared to abstain.

### **7 July**

Troop Contributors Meeting, and French emphasised their intention to begin withdrawal at end of July with total withdrawal no later than the end of August, the 2 month deadline set by SC Res 929. They appealed for member states to quickly expand UNAMIR and take over from French. They had deployed 2,555 personnel (by 26 July there were 350 Francophone African personnel). DPKO reviewed contribution status which had not changed appreciably as equipment shortfalls continued to plague conditional troop commitments. Japan offered \$3 million for equipment, Italy offered trucks if they were reimbursed, and the Netherlands tentatively offered some trucks, jeeps, generators, and spare parts. It became clear that the Ethiopian offer of a motorized Bn was conditional on substantial requirements like trucks and armoured vehicles. Ghanaian Bn almost at full strength, and Canadian deployment to start 18 July.

Internally the RPF controlled 2/3 of Rwanda, the RGF part of the NW, and the French the SW. The RPF indicated a desire to return to Arusha Accords and a willingness to negotiate with moderates.

### **18 July**

RPF closing in on Gisenyi, and confusion in Goma where mortar rounds fell on airport. Unclear if an RPF error or RGF effort to embarrass RPF, but the French force officially identified the RGF as the probable culprits and condemned the shelling. There were a reported 800,000 refugees in Goma.

Reported that the new President Bizimungu was being sworn in in Kigali, ostensibly he is a moderate Hutu member of RPF who was to be Interior Minister under Arusha Accords. The VP and Min of Defense is MGen Paul Kagame, and the Prime Minister is Faustin Twagiramungu

Confusion at UNAMIR Nairobi office so that Canadian aircraft was being under-utilized through the inability to identify cargoes from within UNAMIR or NGOs.

### **20 July**

UNHCR reports 1,200,000 refugees in Goma but flow stopped. There are over 200,000 in Bukavu and 200,000 in Uvira with flows continuing in both. Internally, there are 600,000 in Gikongoro and 500,000 in Cyangugu, and 100,000 new arrivals through to Burundi. They launched an appeal for \$300 million.

### **22 July**

Pres. Clinton announces massive US response of more than \$100 million including lift capacity into Bukavu and Goma.

### **25 July**

Call goes out from DPKO for transmission facility to counter Radio Milles Collines

### **26 July**

USG DPKO Kofi Annan calls a Troop Contributors Meeting. French reiterate their intention to pull out starting 1 Aug to be completed no later than 25 Aug. This may have cause potential contributors to hesitate. UNAMIR plans to deploy 3 Bns to replace French and 4 to 5 self-contained Coys throughout rest of country. Australia firmly commits to 300 personnel; a medical company with 120 riflemen for defense. UNMilad asked countries to adopt others such as the US had done with Ghana so as to equip them, as overstretched DPKO staff could not cope.

UNAMIR still plans to have 2,000 deployed by end of July but not close to that goal. ASG DPKO Iqbal Riza

concluded meeting saying that of 5,500 troops authorized for UNAMIR, after 2 months only 10% had been deployed. Only Australia and Canada have made firm commitments.

US is planning to put 5,000 troops into Zaire to assist with refugees.

Report of the SG on establishment of the commission of experts pursuant to para 1 of SC res 935 S/1994/879, mandated to investigate reports of serious violations of international human rights law during the conflict.

### **28 July**

UK announces commitment of 450 to 600 troops consisting of field ambulance, field engineers, and electrical/mechanical personnel.

USG for Peacekeeping Kofi Annan gives press conference repeats SG's opinion that prompt and effective action to strengthen UNAMIR could have mitigated the catastrophe, and that SC resolutions 918, 925, and 929 have failed to elicit more than 550 troops on the ground to date from recalcitrant member states.

### **29 July and 1 Aug 1994**

US briefings emphasised that their intervention is purely humanitarian and not peacekeeping, and that it is not part of UNAMIR. They now anticipate using 3,000-4,000 troops.

The SG writes to the SC restating the message of Kofi Annan on the 28 of July albeit slightly more diplomatically so as to formally spell out the difficulties and frustrations of the UN in getting commitments of troops and/or equipment and calling for political will.

### **2 August**

Before leaving for Rwanda, the High Commissioner for HR appeals for \$2.1 million to finance an extra 20 human rights monitors in Rwanda. While down there he agrees to the Rwandan government request for 147 monitors, one for each préfecture.

### **3 August**

Report of the SG on the situation in Rwanda S/1994/924

### **10 August**

SC debate and statement calling inter alia for greater relief efforts. Debate on an international tribunal to look at human rights violations particularly genocide gets support from USA, UK, Cz, NZ, Arg, Belgium and Spain. China wanted to block but as request was coming from the new Rwandan government, they felt constrained to officially recognize the request. It is envisaged that China will limit itself to stalling over mandate, cost, etc.

Spain, US and Belgium want to expand mandate of Ex-Yugoslavia tribunal to handle Rwanda, but opposition either fears this would weaken effort over ex-Yugoslavia while others fear that such an expanded tribunal would lead to a permanent international criminal court.

UNAMIR deployment status: BritCon deploying, Canadian Sigs Coy operational, US Forces coordinating flights at Kigali, UNCivPol preparing to train new gendarmes, UNICEF taking over Kigeme hospital. UNAMIR personnel status: AusMed 75, CanSigs 289, BritCon 225, GhanBatt 520, EthioBatt 3, Staff Officers / MilObs 145 for a total of 1257.

### **11 August**

The UN DHA had called for contributions in mid-April, made a stronger call 22 July, held a donors conference 2 August, but was still working on an action strategy for within Rwanda.

UNHCHR Ayala Lasso planning to go to Rwanda next week and is bringing together the 3 experts on the 15th of

August albeit he still does not have funds for their travel. He still plans to send 20 observers at a cost of \$2.1 million but only has commitments to date totalling \$1 million.

**12 Aug**

Report on the human rights situation in Rwanda submitted by the Special Rapporteur for the Commission René Degni Ségui (E/CN.4/1995/12 12 August 1994).

**21 Aug**

French complete pull out from their zone of security in SW. RPG agrees that Senegalese and Chadian troops from operation Turquoise can join UNAMIR.

**27 Aug**

Plan of Action proposed by Commission of Experts on how to examine and analyze the grave violations of humanitarian law in Rwanda, including possible genocide

**1 Sept**

40 Nigerians troops arrive, 300 more to follow next week

**13 Sept**

Japanese government agrees to provide 480 military to help refugees outside of Rwanda, not part of UNAMIR.

**14 Sept**

Preliminary Operation Plan for Human Rights Centre field operation in Rwanda following from 25 May request of Commission on HR for a team of human rights field officers to assist the Special Rapporteur (4-6 officers) as varied by 2 Aug meeting with donors (up to 20) and then again in late Aug (up to 1470). As of 15 September they had received pledges amounting to \$2.5 million for an anticipated 6 month cost of \$10.5 million.

**29 Sept**


Prelim report of the independent commission of experts

**6 Oct**

Progress report of the SG on UN assistance mission for Rwanda

**18 Nov**

Report of SG on security in the Rwandan refugee camps S/1994/1308



DOCS  
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