ARMS CONTROL IN THE NORTH PACIFIC:

THE ROLE FOR CONFIDENCE BUILDING AND VERIFICATION

Cooperative Research Workshop
19-21 February, 1993

Edited by
James A. Boutilier

Workshop Proceedings Prepared for

Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament Division
External Affairs and International Trade Canada

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Arms Control in the North Pacific: The Role For Confidence-Building and Verification

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Final Report

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Verification Research Unit,
Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament Division,
External Affairs and International Trade Canada

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PREFACE

In the latter part of February 1993, a small group of arms control and Asia specialists convened at Hatley Castle, the baronial centrepiece of Royal Roads Military College in Victoria, British Columbia, to discuss the greatest threat to the security of the Asia-Pacific region -- political and military instability on the Korean peninsula. The members of the External Affairs-sponsored Co-operative Research Workshop consisted of academics, verification experts, diplomats, senior serving and retired military officers, and authorities on arms control. Their deliberations, masterfully distilled in Jim Macintosh's summary which follows, extended over two days of intense debate.

That debate highlighted a number of critical concerns. First and foremost were the dangers associated with the apparent acquisition of nuclear weapons capability by the Democratic Peoples Republic of [North] Korea (DPRK). To the outside world Pyongyang appears paranoid, secretive and unpredictable. One of the challenges facing the participants was how to gain a better appreciation of the decision making culture of that reclusive regime; how to encourage the political will needed to bring about constructive dialogue between the two peninsular nations. In this regard, there was a division of opinion as to whether the DPRK's dwindling inventory of security and economic options would render the North more or less open to dialogue. Generally speaking, the participants were far from sanguine about the prospects of resolving tensions on the peninsula and the prudence -- not to say prescience -- that suffused many of the interventions appears to have been borne out by the DPRK's withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and Pyongyang's bellicose pronouncements early in March; actions which may suggest some intense struggle unfolding at the uppermost levels of the power structure in the North.

The members of the Workshop paid a good deal of attention to the European confidence-building process on the grounds that there were some instructive similarities between the polarized state of Europe in the times past and the standoff between Pyongyang and Seoul. The latter situation, however, rooted as it is in the legacy of the Korean War and the incipient civil war thereafter, is even more intractable than the confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact appears to have been. Workshop commentaries underscored the depth of distrust which exists between the two Koreas. Equally disconcerting was the elusive and complex nature of Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) themselves. If European style CBMs are to be employed to combat that distrust, it is essential that the subtle psychology and epistemology of confidence-building be fully understood. Were CBMs, the delegates asked, a meaningless mantra or a mechanism for increased stability through the transformation of

threat perceptions? Despite twenty years of experience in Europe, a nagging uncertainty remains as to CBMs real contribution to detente. The deliberations made clear that without the requisite political will there was little CBMs could do to enhance stability on the Korean peninsula.

Should the will be forthcoming, then CBMs, including simple and relatively inexpensive verification processes designed to provide reassurance, could assist in diminishing tensions. It was widely agreed that Canada would be ideally positioned to provide the verification expertise vital to a step-by-step confidence-building regime. Thus the workshop ended on a mixed note: a realization, on the one hand, of the sober realities of the North-South confrontation, and a guarded optimism, on the other, about the role a country like Canada could play in facilitating the reduction of tensions in one of the world's major trouble spots.

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March 1993

ARMS CONTROL IN THE NORTH PACIFIC
WORKSHOP SUMMARY[1]

James Macintosh
Canadian Security Research

The Cooperative Research Workshop revolved around the theme of "understanding the context of Korean arms control possibilities and the role that European-specific arms control insights might play in developing a more effective approach to arms control on the Korean peninsula." To that end, papers were presented (1) exploring the nature of the Korean security environment and (2) discussing various dimensions of arms control experience, both practical and conceptual. Discussions tended to be exploratory, with participants focusing on the complex nature of the Korean security relationship.

The first paper, "Global Uncertainty, Arms Control, and Conflict Resolution on the Korean Peninsula" by Dr. James Boutilier, provided an excellent introduction to and overview of the workshop' subject matter. The paper first looked at the post-Cold War security environment and its implications for the Asia-Pacific region. It then examined the applicability of the European arms control experience in the region. Finally, the paper assessed the potential for conflict resolution on the Korean peninsula. Dr. Boutilier concluded that the prospects for European-style arms control solutions, while not great for the region at large because of its unique security management culture, might be better in the case of the Korean peninsula. Although hints of encouragement from the North were slight at present, this would be a good time to try to reassure the Pyongyang regime while pressing for full disclosure on the nuclear weapons issue. Dr. Boutilier argued that a selective application of modest CBMs might help to achieve both goals.

In the discussion that followed the Boutilier paper, there was considerable interest in exploring how unstable the situation on the Korean peninsula was and what reactions there might be to

1. This report concentrates on general summaries of the discussions following each paper presentation. Although the basic nature of each paper is noted, there is no detailed summary of its content because the papers are included in this volume.

the collapse of the Kim regime, both on the part of the South and its various neighbours. Specialists familiar with the situation suggested that the greater concern was with the aftermath of Kim's death. Although declining dramatically in economic terms, the Kim regime appeared capable of maintaining order, largely because of its extremely authoritarian character. With the elder Kim's passing, the regime would likely be extremely fragile and could collapse in chaos. This was a very real fear in the South and elsewhere. However, the emergence of more pragmatic leaders, perhaps as the result of a bloodless coup, was also possible. It seemed unlikely that there would be any unprovoked intervention on the part of the South, although the North might not be convinced of this. Indeed, the South seemed virtually incapable of influencing events in the North.

One major concern that emerged early in the discussion was the fear that the South would have to absorb the North in one gigantic gulp after an abrupt economic and political collapse. With the experience of Germany still fresh in mind, the South Korean government was extremely concerned about the huge costs inherent in such a project. Earlier enthusiasm for rapid unification had been tempered by the sombre realities of the German experience. It would be a devastating blow to the thriving South Korean economy to have to support a massive rescue and reconstruction in the North. A more measured, step-by-step process of unification with an intact North regime was probably preferable.

From the perspective of the South Korean government, there seemed to be three main scenarios characterizing likely developments in the North over the next five years. The first scenario envisions the existing regime continuing with its current approaches to all policy areas. The second scenario — the worst case — sees the death of the elder Kim. His son, Kim Jong-il, attempts to continue the regime, but it collapses into chaos with a political and military crisis following (including the possibility of an invasion into the South). The third and best scenario pictures the relatively rapid emergence of a new regime led by more pragmatic leaders who pursue an "open door" policy of some form (Korean perestroika). Improved relations including serious arms control are possible only if this third scenario captures the shape of emerging events.

It was clear, from the South Korean perspective, that they must prepare for the worst scenario with its abrupt change, collapse, and great danger of military crisis. This scenario was **not** seen to be a remote possibility and had to guide policy planning in the South. Experience with the North over the last several years had not been very encouraging although the vestiges of lower-level contact were in place and might form the basis for improved contacts in the future. Otherwise, trade was very limited, as was social contact, and senior officials had only slight contact. Distrust was high and seemed to be warranted. The Kim regime in the North appeared to be paranoid and this made the improvement of relations at present difficult to imagine. Instead, fear and distrust informed both sides' views of the other. The objectives of the two Koreas appeared to be incapable of reconciliation. It was observed that this was hardly the sort of environment that might support the development of confidence building and other arms control efforts.

Although the North and the South had agreed to discuss confidence building efforts amongst other agenda items, there had been no real progress on this front. The seemingly intractable problems associated with North Korea's nuclear ambitions had brought this and most other conciliating efforts to a stand-still. It was difficult to see how relations might improve until this most central of issues had been resolved.

The fear in the South (and elsewhere within the international community) that the North was attempting to develop nuclear weapons was extremely troubling, particularly given the unpredictable nature of the Kim regime. Little could address this concern other than a major shift in North Korean policy that would permit adequate inspections of all nuclear and nuclear-related facilities.

It seemed to be the case that the Kim regime regarded all arms control efforts as aggressive and unacceptable. In fact, it appeared that the Kim regime was using arms control initiatives only for rhetorical purposes. Indeed, the North did not appear to have any real interest in arms control and seemed interested, instead, in stalling and delaying international demands for access as much as possible. Nothing external to the Kim regime

was likely to change this situation, according to the judgements of various specialists. The removal of U.S. forces, for instance, would not only not induce a more cooperative attitude on the part of the North, it would likely induce a more aggressive attitude. In the view of those familiar with the region, the mere presence of American forces — whether at their present strength or significantly reduced — appeared to operate as a genuine deterrent to North Korean aggression, whether or not the U.S. forces were nuclear-armed. As a result, the South was in a difficult position where only constant pressure for progress on a variety of fronts combined with a measured effort to prevent the sudden collapse of the North likely would provide minimally acceptable results.

South Korea was moderately optimistic in principle about the potential value of CSCE-type CBMs but remained sceptical of their utility in the current security environment. For instance, force activity CBMs (manoeuvre and movement information and notification measures) which worked so well in the CSCE case offered some potential prospect of helping on the peninsula, as well. The North, however, appeared to be extremely suspicious of the value of these sorts of measures. The fact that the North rarely engaged in significant military manoeuvres also reduced their potential value. Neither the North nor the South were likely to rely upon outside parties to initiate arms control (including confidence building) efforts. Thus, third parties could best help by concentrating on the nuclear issue and by providing whatever advice and insight they had on the merits of various security management approaches. This was a role that Canada could play with great effect.

Along related lines, participants generally felt that the two parties should be left to develop their own approaches to security management problems with only the broad support of outsiders. Despite their potential value, there was some scepticism about the exportability of Western ideas developed in the CSCE context. There was a strong feeling that existing security management approaches needed to be tempered by the realities of the participants. For instance, the North had a deeply ingrained suspicion of the United Nations, a view that most Westerners would fail to understand. The fear of Japan as a former imperial power in the region was also a consideration that outsiders might

fail to appreciate. It was also important to realize that the Kim regime might harbour genuinely-held (if unreasonable) fears of invasion by the United States and South Korea. Any assessment of security management solutions must accommodate these unique perspectives and concerns.

Some participants observed that most of the basic conditions were in place for the pursuit of a confidence building regime generally corresponding to that developed in Europe two decades earlier. "All" that was lacking was the political will to move forward. Others suggested that this assessment overlooked the extremely deep suspicion and isolationist attitude of the North.

The workshop's second paper was Chris Anstis' "Lessons to be Learned from the Helsinki Process." Prepared by a long-term participant in the CSCE process, this paper provided a number of valuable insights. The Anstis paper recalled the origins of the CBM process prior to Helsinki and stressed the very modest — even unintended — beginnings of the confidence building process. This articulate assessment of the CSCE experience highlighted the uncertain nature of confidence building, including the absence of any clear theory to account for the generation of "confidence" as a result of increased information. The Anstis paper wondered whether confidence building might not be a result of detente rather than a cause — a key question in any attempt to understand the confidence building process. As to that process, Anstis suggested that the negotiation of CBMs can "help pave the way toward political accommodation. They can help to convert confrontation into cooperation. They can reinforce existing trends." Indeed, the negotiation of CBMs can help to create a whole culture of confidence building.

The discussion following the Anstis paper concentrated first on the importance of attitudes or perceptions changing as a result of confidence building negotiations. Somehow, it seemed to some participants, good will carried the process forward and that required a major change in thinking on every ones' part. This led to the possibility of "economic CBMs," a concept with potentially significant meaning in the Korean case because relations might be seen to hinge more on economic improvement than on conventional military improvement. There was considerable resistance to

employing the confidence building concept in so elastic a manner but the idea was seen to warrant further consideration.

Following up on this train of thought, several participants wondered if there was any potential for developing confidence building regimes that focused on environmental issues rather than conventional military ones. It was clear that environmental concerns would increase in importance in the future and confidence building, it was thought, might offer an effective approach to dealing with some of those problems. There was mixed feeling about extending the confidence building idea to encompass this issue area, just as there was with "economic CBMs." Nevertheless, several participants acknowledged that we ought not to limit our conceptions to narrow appreciations based on European experience. To be more broadly useful, confidence building might be able to accommodate a variety of "security" issues, writ large.

Several participants observed that the successful implementation of CBMs already negotiated was as important as the process of negotiating them. While the latter could contribute to expectations about non-hostile intent, the former confirmed them in important, tangible ways. It was observed that in both cases, there was a strong component of psychology involved in making confidence building work. Pursuing this and an earlier point about the "culture of confidence building," several participants discussed how important the MBFR negotiations had been in terms of contributing to that culture. Although no agreement had emerged from the tortuous MBFR process, the various defence and foreign ministry negotiators gradually came to understand each other better as the years passed, significantly reducing the degree of personal suspicion and distrust. This might be said to have been a successful confidence building process and almost certainly helped to set the psychological stage for the CFE and CSCE negotiations that produced such rapid progress.

Relating this observation to the Korean case, one participant wondered what analogue negotiation existed — or might be created in the near-term — that could play a similar role for the two Koreas? There did not appear to be any. This spoke to the absence of a culture of confidence building in Korea and implied that there would not be such a culture for some time. As if to

underline this point, specialists most familiar with Korea observed that there was a great concern in South Korea about the North cheating if a CBM agreement were ever negotiated. Relating the Korean experience to that of the CSCE, several participants wondered if it would not require the adoption of perestroika and the emergence of a figure like Gorbachev in the North before a culture of confidence building could flourish. Given the grave uncertainties and suspicions, South Korea for the present tended to concentrate on "political" CBMs although the exact nature of this sort of measure remained unspecified and their status as true CBMs remained unclear.

One observer, after noting the many differences distinguishing the CSCE and Korean circumstances, wondered if the two were just too dissimilar for CSCE-derived approaches to function reliably or effectively in Korea. Another participant, however, observed that it was difficult to identify another region in the world that had so much in common with the Cold War Europe of the CSCE. The Korean peninsula and the Cold War Europe of the CSCE shared many common or similar military, political, and geostrategic features. It was difficult to dismiss the similarities although the distinct differences, especially in political culture, were also very important and had to be accommodated in any transfer of Eurocentric insights.

It was clear in this discussion that the South remained very suspicious of the North, doubting its sincerity in being willing to negotiate meaningful arms control accords. Although policy makers in the South felt that some sort of CBM undertaking (amongst many other initiatives) was necessary to foster improved relations with the North, there was considerable ambivalence about what type to explore and perhaps some confusion about what confidence building as a process might require and entail.

Jim Macintosh presented a paper that focused on the conceptual dimension of confidence building. That paper ("Key Elements of a Conceptual Approach to Confidence Building") outlined some central elements in an emerging understanding of the confidence building phenomenon. Noting the great reliance placed on the CSCE case by all conceptual efforts, the paper attempted to isolate some abstract or general characteristics of confidence building.

The central point of the paper was to argue that confidence building was intimately tied into larger processes of fundamental threat perception transformation. Without the transformation in perceptions of threat, it was difficult to see how CBMs could accomplish anything positive. The key outstanding question was what role CBMs played in causing or facilitating these significant transformations in threat perception at the national level. Were they trivial, peripheral accoutrements or was the negotiation and implementation of a CBM agreement more central to the transformation process? That question, at present, could not be answered but it ought to caution those who wish to export the confidence building approach to new contexts without understanding how it actually functions.

Dr. Man-Kwon Nam's presentation ("Arms Control Verification on the Korean Peninsula") was a detailed and impressive survey of lessons and considerations. The first part of the presentation moved from a discussion of lessons learned from the European experience, through an exploration of South and North Korea's strategy on arms control, and concluded with an assessment of the prospects for arms control negotiation in Korea. The second portion of the presentation focused on the role to be played by verification in likely Korean arms control arrangements. The presentation was extremely thorough and provided non-area specialists with valuable insights. Two aspects of the presentation were especially noteworthy for the participants: The extent to which the approaches and objectives of the North and South were mutually incompatible and the extremely high levels of suspicion and distrust, especially in the North but also in the South.

The third paper in the afternoon session was Shannon Selin's "Non-Proliferation in the North Pacific Region: The Confidence-Building Dimension." This innovative paper concentrated on the nature of North Pacific proliferation problems (both regional and extra-regional) and the prospects of employing confidence building solutions to manage them. The paper outlined the various proliferation concerns, highlighting the centrality of North Korea as both a developer and potential exporter of nuclear weapons and related technology as well as a developer and potential exporter of chemical weapons and ballistic missile technol-

ogy. Although CSCE-oriented confidence building efforts were not aimed at proliferation concerns per se, Selin argued in her paper that a package of measures could be developed if the political will exists amongst all participating states. Given the extreme reluctance of the North to allow any sort of intrusive information collection or inspection, the development of a workable regime was seen to be challenging. The Selin paper concluded that measures focusing on dialogue and transparency will likely enjoy the greatest mid-term success but will not be very effective on their own in constraining proliferation. Effective constraint will depend upon broader, more comprehensive and even-handed global regimes.

The afternoon discussion period began with some observations about the origins of the CSCE. The point was made that the participants at the time did not see their efforts in the same light that current reconstructions of confidence building suggest. The origins of confidence building were haphazard and negotiations were pursued without the grand ambitions and expectations now attached to ideas about the process. There was some concern expressed by those familiar with the long CSCE negotiation process that it and CBMs not be credited with causing the entire range of dramatic political and military transformations seen in Europe over the past six years. However, these negotiations did play some form of positive role in fostering the larger changes. The analytic challenge was to determine just what the causal role was. With this role more clearly understood, efforts to apply the confidence building approach in new regions would likely be much more successful.

A lengthy discussion ensued looking at the lessons of the Open Skies negotiations and how these lessons might apply to Korea. The main point made in this discussion was the need to keep things as simple as possible. The Open Skies experience had demonstrated that excess and needless complication could wreck the negotiation of this type of confidence building arrangement. The temptation to demand extremely sophisticated sensor packages and to attempt to achieve a wide variety of intelligence missions could totally undermine the whole point of a confidence building-oriented Open Skies regime. Attempts to develop such a regime in Korea, it was hoped, would recognize the imperative of keeping

things simple. This advice, if followed, would also permit the pursuit of an arms control relationship between North and South starting on a very basic and relatively undemanding level. There nevertheless remained some real scepticism about the utility of an Open Skies regime of any sort. The North and the South would likely have to be persuaded by interested third parties that this was indeed a worthwhile direction to pursue.

A consistent stumbling block to the initiation of a successful arms control relationship between the North and the South identified by several participants was the extremely difficult political relationship between the two Koreas. The Kim regime in the North appeared to be so suspicious, fearful, manipulative, and untrustworthy that any type of arms control agreement seemed unlikely. Some participants suggested that pursuing nuclear proliferation concerns on a multilateral level while allowing the two Koreas to pursue other arms control efforts bilaterally might work best. It was difficult to avoid the suspicion, however, that there could be no arms control relationship whatsoever as long as the Kim regime remained in control. The negotiation of mandates for various arms control negotiations, a process that had proved so important in shaping the CSCE experience, seemed out of the question at present given the attitudes and fears of both sides.

The workshop's second day began with two detailed presentations by representatives of the Verification Research Unit. First, Ron Cleminson provided a comprehensive introduction to "Overhead Imagery and its Role in Verification." This realistic, optimistic look at what overhead imaging of various types can contribute to the verification process provided the participants with a sound appreciation of how various technologies can have a synergistic impact when properly employed. Commercially-acquired satellite imagery, aircraft-borne sensor imagery (from basic Open Skies-type to very sophisticated technologies), and NTM-type surveillance satellites can all play an important role in verifying various types of agreements. The UNSCOM experience provided valuable lessons to this effect. A final observation extolled the virtues of a "smart card" approach to tracking personnel. Detailed information could be encoded on small plastic credit card-sized cards and these could prove invaluable in monitoring as well as verifying personnel-oriented arms control agreements.

Jeff Tracey presented an overview of the Open Skies experience. His presentation began with the details of the Open Skies Treaty. He stressed that the Open Skies arrangement is primarily a confidence building exercise and, as such, its technical requirements do not have to be as stringent as the aerial inspection requirements for the verification of a more rigorous ground-based reduction treaty. Tracey emphasized that Open Skies did not require unduly expensive equipment although the participants were discovering that the present Treaty would be more expensive to implement than was strictly necessary. The remainder of the presentation focused on the issues of sensors, aircraft ownership, observation quotas, data sharing, and costs. Aircraft and sensor packages could be leased, pooled, or bought outright. Different states would take different approaches to this issue depending upon their resources and national requirements. In conclusion, Tracey noted that an Open Skies-type equipment package and agreement could be used for other purposes, as well, including regional monitoring, peacekeeping, environmental monitoring, conflict resolution, and extended support for other arms control agreements.

The discussion period addressed the issue of intelligence agencies and their interaction with arms control monitoring and Open Skies-type arrangements. It was observed that some intelligence people resisted the implementation of Open Skies because they saw it as a threat to their monopoly on security information. It was acknowledged that it would be very difficult to separate intelligence functions from arms control and confidence building monitoring. The key point here, however, was that intelligence people would generally not play much of a role in dictating the areas to be monitored if it was for their own purposes. They would, of course, receive most if not all information collected and they might provide hints to arms control monitors as to where suspicious activities were occurring. Over all, it was agreed that the issue of competition between arms control verification/confidence building and intelligence gathering would prove to be a difficult one.

Dr. Bon-Hak Koo's presentation, "Open Skies in the Korean Context," applied the insights derived from the CSCE Open Skies experience to the Korean context. This useful overview provided

background to the Open Skies Treaty (including earlier proposals) and then turned to an examination of arms control dialogue between North and South Korea. Dr. Koo noted that the earlier, halting steps toward dialogue begun in late 1991 as part of the South-North High Level Talks process had become stalled as a result of the North's refusal to deal forthrightly with the nuclear inspection issue. Dr. Koo stressed the fundamental difference between the approaches of the North and the South with the North demanding a comprehensive arms reduction agreement as a first step while the South insisted that a step-by-step process was the only appropriate way to initiate an arms control relationship. This led to an inevitable impasse with the South suspecting the North of engaging in arms control only for propaganda purposes. The presentation concluded with a speculative look at how an Open Skies regime would contribute to security management on the peninsula. A cooperative overflight arrangement was seen to offer many advantages, particularly if developed as a graduated plan with very modest first steps. The proposal outlined by Dr. Koo employed four phases moving from a very modest first phase entailing limited flights over the DMZ and progressing to a more elaborate fourth phase covering the entire peninsula and employing more frequent flights with more sophisticated sensors. However, little prospect of success was foreseen until the Kim regime's attitude changed significantly.

The discussion period that followed highlighted the unwillingness of either state (but particularly the North) to permit overflights at present. Although it was acknowledged that there were many problems to overcome, the Open Skies approach nevertheless was seen by many to have much to recommend it as a first step in building a constructive and less hostile relationship on the peninsula. Clearly, a major question to pose was whether a "Korean Open Skies" could function as an initiating step in fostering improved relations. The answer to this was unclear but the promise seemed real enough to warrant preliminary preparation such as the initial training of photo interpreters and monitoring teams.

It was observed that there was little technical (i.e., intelligence gathering) reason to rely on an Open Skies regime. Its importance lay primarily in its confidence building character

and symbolic value. To this end, the value of having third parties — most likely other Asian nations — conduct Open Skies flights seemed unclear. For the exercise to have real meaning, it would have to directly involve the two Koreas. This was a view that extended to most potential arms control discussions although nuclear and chemical negotiations likely would be best conducted on a multilateral basis.

The workshop concluded with an extensive panel discussion. Amongst the points made in this discussion was the need to understand to what extent the lessons of other areas — especially the CSCE — could be applied to the Korean peninsula. It was agreed that there were a number of cultural considerations that might impair the smooth adoption of examples from the CSCE. It was also noted that a great many stumbling blocks existed at present to the initiation of a meaningful arms control dialogue between the North and the South. It was unclear how similar the situation in Korea today was to the East-West conflict centred in Europe several decades earlier. The differences between the North and the South appeared to be much starker and unresolvable than was the case in Europe. Of special significance, the current impasse between the North and the South was the result of civil war (in contrast to the Second World War and the Cold War that ensured immediately after its termination). Also of special significance was the nature of the Kim regime which had no ready analogue in recent European history with the possible exception of Romania (and perhaps Albania). Until the Kim regime had been transformed through an internal evolution or revolution, it seemed unlikely that any progress would be likely. Most participants agreed that the interim period, prior to the stabilization of a new regime in the North, would be particularly dangerous. This was especially so because of the North's presumed nuclear ambitions and predilection to pursue confrontational policies. The scope for arms control seemed very limited in this interim period.

Most participants understood the primary role of outsiders to be the restraint or reversal of North Korean nuclear ambitions in the short term. The nuclear issue was seen to be the central and dominant security concern, dwarfing all others. The highly unstable potential nature of the North was underlined by its

precipitous economic decline, a process that only increased the chance that the North might resort to force. The proportions of economic failure in the North were staggering and its non-performance relative to the South was astounding. Complete collapse seemed unavoidable within the next five years, even allowing for the extremely tight control exercised by the Kim regime. This decline did, however, offer some prospect of leverage for the South. Economic cooperation and assistance seemed to be only way in which any improvement in relations might be induced.

A very important consideration in any discussion of South-North security relations was the need to understand the Kim regime. It did no good to simply dismiss it as irrational. Attempting to devise strategies to deal with the nuclear issue or other security issues, as well as humanitarian, economic, and political issues, would be fruitless if the fears, concerns, and objectives of the Kim regime were ignored. This requirement, combined with the need to understand the political culture of both Koreas, meant that the importation of arms control ideas from other regions would need to be undertaken with great care and thoughtfulness.

The workshop came to a close with the concluding remarks of Dr. James Boutilier. He stressed the intractable and complex nature of security problems facing the Korean peninsula. By way of overview he noted some central themes that had emerged in the discussions, cultural considerations that might distinguish the North Pacific from other regions. First, there was a significant legacy of profound distrust, the aftermath of the Second World War, the Korean War and the prolonged Cold War conflict. In addition, there were serious perceptual problems with regional participants seeing institutions and security management approaches in ways quite different from Westerners. The United Nations, for instance, was not a benign institution in North Korean eyes and the North Koreans might well see confidence building as a particularly threatening approach, contrary to Western conceptions. It was very important to penetrate the psychology of the two Korean states and to understand that North Korea probably was not a conventional rational actor.

Dr. Boutilier observed that confidence building was both simpler and more complex than many analysts and policy makers appreciated. In terms of historical development, the confidence building process had been haphazard and perhaps under-appreciated. Is causal character remained something of a mystery. He also noted that in the Korean case, the North was extremely secretive and this augured poorly for information-oriented confidence building. Further confounding any simple transfer of CSCE-based insights, Korea and Europe had relatively little in common structurally despite superficial resemblances.

It seemed to be the prevailing wisdom that unification would need to be pursued bilaterally as a fundamentally Korean process while different security management approaches might involve primarily bilateral or multilateral negotiations. Proliferation control would almost certainly be a multilateral exercise but other arms control efforts might best be pursued on a bilateral or perhaps regional level.

Dr. Boutilier concluded that the near-term prospects of arms control in Korea were not very promising, particularly when viewed through the eyes of the North and the South. It was nevertheless important to maintain a constant dialogue (an insight derived from the European experience) and to be extremely patient. It was wise to prepare for future advances by devoting considerable energy today to various security management approaches. However, the process could not be rushed and much would depend upon the evolution of the North Korean political system. Although the role for outsiders was not extensive in this waiting game, there were constructive insights and observations that Canada could bring to the process. Its considerable experience in a variety of arms control fora (including confidence building, verification, proliferation control, and Open Skies) and other security management approaches such as peacekeeping might be helpful in the development of new security approaches for Korea by Koreans.

GLOBAL UNCERTAINTY, ARMS CONTROL, AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

by

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INTRODUCTION

We live in an era of ambiguity. The lethal certainties of the past have been replaced by the perplexing uncertainties of the present. History, far from ending, has revivified with a vengeance and the ethnic, religious and communal tensions that lay suppressed for half a century have resurrected like dragons' teeth.[1] The search is on for new paradigms to govern the conduct of international affairs. Roles and relationships are being redefined. Alliances are giving way to alignments.[2] Traditional principles of sovereignty are under siege. The moral, ethical and practical dimensions of interventionism are being debated. And the lessons of the Cold War are being reviewed in an effort to assess their validity.[3] Nowhere is that truer than in the Asia-Pacific Region (APR) where the multi-lateral frameworks to which the West was accustomed in its pursuit of security in Europe are absent and a dangerous remnant of the Cold War -- the Korean confrontation -- remains. Accordingly, the objects of this paper are threefold: to analyze the Post Cold War security environment in the Asia-Pacific Region; to examine the applicability of the European arms control experience to that region; and to assess the potential for conflict resolution on the Korean peninsula.

THE NEW WORLD DISORDER

In the aftermath of the Gulf War (1991) the American president, George Bush, proclaimed the beginning of the New World Order. It is now clear, in fact, that what was initiated was the New World Disorder.[4] Foreign ministries and defence establishments are still struggling to articulate policies that will reflect the fact that while the great ideological confrontation between capitalism and communism (or more precisely socialism) is over and the two great nuclear arsenals remain, a strange blend of unipolar military power and multipolar political power has

taken its place. What exactly are the hallmarks of that Disorder as they pertain to the Asia-Pacific Region?

In the first instance the end of the Cold War in Asia was not as cataclysmic as it was in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.[5] Asian socialism, as practiced in the Peoples' Republic of China (PRC) or Vietnam, for example, was more organic and nationalistic in character than East European socialism which was the product of ideological and geo-strategic imperialism.[6] Furthermore, the collapse of the Soviet empire and the disintegration of the Soviet Union meant that China and Russia abandoned their proxy war in Indo-China and the Russians and the Chinese curtailed their patronage of the Democratic Peoples' Republic of [North] Korea (DPRK). Thus the nations of the Asia-Pacific Region, that were never marshalled into an alliance like NATO and were never unanimous about which power or bloc constituted the enemy, have become even more divorced from an East-West world. Curiously, this disassociation has been accompanied by an interesting inversion. No longer are the capitalist states of the APR concerned about the contagion of communism. It is the socialist states now, and the DPRK in particular, that look with alarm at the possibility of spiritual pollution from the West.

Central to the future security architecture of the APR are three interlocking questions: what is the future role of the United States in the region?; will the Chinese be able to sustain their economic growth and if so to what effect?; and can Japan articulate a role as a non-military superpower? The American issue is particularly vexing as domestic pressures seem likely to encourage greater degrees of continentalism.[7] At question is whether the America of the 1990s will have the capability and commitment to ensure the security of the APR? Despite widespread anti-Americanism, there is a profound consensus -- even among the Chinese -- that the Americans

must stay; that an American presence guarantees the stability which is the necessary precondition for continued Asian prosperity.[8] However, there is a relentless logic about the budget figures. Even if the current $300 billion US defense budget were to be cut by fifty percent it would still be pitched at twice the average peacetime level.[9] Will the lineal descendant of Nixon's Guam Doctrine (1969) be an America unable to project its power to the Asian shore?[10] The Gulf War experience suggests that despite a deep-seated resistance to multilateral initiatives, the United States may find itself intervening in the APR only on an ad hoc basis via the agency of a body like the United Nations. Such interventionism legitimizes the cause, spreads the burden, and cuts the cost.

One of the real concerns in Asia is what is China up to? For the first time in decades the PRC's internal borders are secure, its northern rival is humbled, and its economy is booming. The last mentioned development raises two other questions: How long can that economy boom in the face of a pitifully inadequate infrastructure and what are the likely political ramifications of dramatic economic growth? The evidence of the past suggests that China will continue its jerky integration into the free market economy of the Asia-Pacific region and that while infrastructural and domestic political constraints may slow the rate of growth, China's commitment to capitalism is irrevocable. A corollary of that growth is the fact that the PRC is likely to become a more and more dominant player in the APR, lobbying for membership in regional and global economic organizations and asserting itself in the maritime realm.[11]

While Southeast Asian nations are worried about China's expansiveness, the Chinese are concerned about Japan's future role. The Japanese have come under a good deal of internal and external pressure to play a part in global affairs commensurate with their enormous economic

power. And indeed Japan's willingness to re-establish links with Beijing in advance of the United States (following the Tiananmen Square massacre (1989)) and comparable assertiveness with regard to Vietnam, suggests that Tokyo has begun to abandon its traditional foreign policy passivity. There are, however, limits to Japan's capacity to develop a more independent foreign policy. The Japanese are currently unable to become Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council by virtue of their continued inscription as aggressors in the UN Charter and constitutional and practical constraints on their use of military power deny them a traditional superpower role. The question then is: can Japan articulate a non-traditional role? Can the Japanese translate their economic might into some sort of foreign policy vehicle, particularly at a time when there is a widespread belief that the global agenda is characterized by the primacy of economic over military solutions?[12] Japanese contributions to the cost of the Gulf War fell short of awarding Japan the necessary status and the Japanese, acutely aware of the fact that the non-Asian world has never accepted them fully, are eager to find ways to enhance their authority without exciting the anxieties of their neighbours. This pursuit of an appropriate international role takes on added meaning when it is seen in the context of declining US power in the region. Whereas, previously, the US enlisted Japan's aid in the containment of Asian communism, America's continued presence in Japan is now seen in many quarters as a useful way of containing a remilitarized Japan. The Japanese, of course, are sensitive to this situation and they wish to abandon their Cold War client role while maintaining their close working relationship with the United States; a relationship which is arguably the most important security relationship in the world.

One particularly worrisome feature of the post Cold War period is the global proliferation

of conventional and nuclear weaponry as well as delivery systems.[13] Compounding these concerns is the fact that existing international conventions like the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty appear less and less adequate in the face of unscrupulous regimes dedicated to acquiring weapons of mass destruction.[14] The spread of such weapons has refocused attention on the ways in which Cold War arms control negotiators sought to pattern the qualitative relationship of nuclear arsenals and the evolution and use of conventional armaments. The Iraqi case has come as a stern reminder that post Cold War euphoria was not altogether warranted. Furthermore, the difficulties involved in the inspection and compliance aspects of the Iraqi nuclear weapons programme suggest just how difficult it will be to prevent such programmes elsewhere. And experience indicates that if they are not checked they will spawn yet more programmes: that the nuclear chain reaction is a deadly metaphor for a larger phenomenon.[15]

These weapons programmes have contributed to the global sense of unease; one fuelled by an international crisis-driven media which treats viewers and listeners to over-exposure and under analysis, reaction rather than reflection. In fact, the media appear to be making it more difficult to achieve foreign policy consensus as the presentation of conflicting expert opinion leaves national constituencies in a state of indecision. What is more, foreign affairs agencies are increasingly perceived as ineffectual by virtue of their inability to respond instantly to international crisis that are communicated with equal speed to general publics. The Eurocentric or Mid-Atlantic nature of many news services means that coverage of developments in Asia is frequently minimal, and, in the case of the worst trouble spots, Cambodia and the Koreas, almost non-existent.

Another aspect of the new disorder is that security has come to be interpreted more and more broadly. Cooperative security can now be said to encompass environmental issues, human rights concerns, cultural conflicts, and so forth. Increasingly, inter-state relations are being effected or driven by questions of compliance in which states in receipt of aid or trade must be seen to contribute to a region's security by responding to demands for greater sensitivity to military or non-military issues. Thus China has come under repeated scrutiny by the US Congress in terms of its human rights record (as a precondition for the renewal of Most Favoured Nation status) while the North Korean regime has been denied assistance by an informal consortia of powers pending its willingness to allow intrusive inspection of its alleged nuclear weapons' programme.

The fluid state of global affairs, in which nations previously committed to one armed camp or another are developing independent agendas and traditional patron-client relationships are being rewritten, has highlighted, in the minds of many observers, the lack of any regional or sub-regional security forum in the Asia-Pacific Region. The natural tendency has been to turn to Cold War Europe for models, but the usefulness and applicability of those models is open to question. Thus, the next section of this paper is dedicated to an examination of the evolution of European arms control and security initiatives and their applicability, if any, to the APR in general and the Korean peninsula in particular.[16]

ARMS CONTROL IN EUROPE AND ASIA

The Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), which brought the world to the brink of nuclear disaster, galvanized the superpower's resolve and created the necessary political conditions for serious

arms control negotiations. The geographic focus was Europe where the interests of the nuclear powers were concentrated on the Central Front. The result of the prolonged period of post-crisis detente was the Conference on Security and Cooperation Europe (CSCE), a 34-nation multilateral forum (including Canada and the United States) dedicated to reducing tensions between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. The CSCE's first statement of intent, the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, was not a binding treaty but a set of principles and provisions directed at improving interstate behaviour. The arms control mechanism employed (though there is some debate as to whether they are a sub-set of arms control or a prelude to it) were Confidence Building Measures or CBMs. CBMs were a process and a procedure. Whereas formal arms control addressed military capability, CBMs addressed types of military activity. The primary object of the first generation of CBMs was to inculcate stability in interstate relations by transforming perceptions of threat. Put another way, CBMs were mutually agreeable measures designed to reduce the levels of secrecy surrounding military activities, thereby reducing fears of surprise attack and enhancing predictability.[17] While the Helsinki CBMs suggested that military activities be subject to prior notification and recommended the presence of observers, the measures, as Darilek suggests, lacked definitional rigour and were non-binding. Furthermore, as Anstis has demonstrated, these early CBMs raised a worrisome problem, namely, the fact that the very reduction in anxiety could generate a false sense of security.[18]

Subsequent generations of CBMs at Stockholm (where the more actively oriented nature of the measures was recognized in the new title, Confidence- and Security-Building Measures -- CSBMs) in 1986 and Vienna in 1990 sought to address the shortcomings of these early measures. They did so by making the CBMs militarily significant, politically binding and verifiable.[19]

Verification, in fact, was the key. Without it, the alleged transparency that resulted from longer periods of notification, reduced thresholds of activity, and greater access to military information, could not be trusted. Thus, over the space of seventeen years, CSCE initiatives moved slowly and steadily along a series of continua from transparency to verification, from moral suasion to prohibition, and from discretionary compliance to compulsion.

In the final analysis arms control is a political matter. It was Gorbachev who breathed new life into the super-power arms negotiations by creating favourable political conditions for the final stages of the CSCE process. The problem with the Gorbachevian revolution, however, was that it was so sweeping that it is almost impossible to evaluate the CBMs contribution to improving interstate relations in Europe. Outward evidence suggests that they contributed very little; being more the products than the producers of detente. In fact, CSCE may have done little more than create a fraternity of negotiators, a tribal arms control language, a conference culture, and a menu of activities centring around notification and the provision of information which would have been useful if the political will had been present. The ultimate irony is that once the will was present CBMs were irrelevant.

The breakup of the Soviet Empire in the late 1980s raised the spectre of nuclear catastrophe by inadvertence. With nuclear arsenals drifting out of control the world faced a threat comparable to that of the Cuban Crisis. Negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, paralyzed by attention to arcane detail, had proceeded with glacial slowness throughout the post war period, succeeding in doing little more than limiting the rate of growth of the nuclear arsenals.[20] Now, faced with the possibility of nuclear chaos, the superpowers abandoned formality with indecent haste and embarked on a process of mutually reinforcing

unilateralism that resulted in a spate of arms control and disarmament initiatives.[21] The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty or START was concluded in July 1991; the United States cut tactical nuclear forces in September 1991 (a move which resulted in the removal of sea-launched tactical nuclear weapons from US Navy vessels and implied the removal of ground and air launched tactical nuclear weapons from the Republic of Korea); the Soviet Union reduced its strategic and tactical stocks in October; the United States and the Commonwealth of Independent States (the nebulous successor to the Soviet Union) undertook sweeping arms cuts in January 1992; the newly independent republics of the former Soviet Union transferred their tactical nuclear weapons to Russia; three of them -- the Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus -- undertook to repatriate their strategic nuclear weapons; and Presidents Bush and Yeltsin agreed in principle to further deep cuts in June 1992 and signed the START II Treaty in January 1993.[22]

What does all this tell us about the arms control and disarmament experience in Europe? Darilek has summarized some of the lessons of that experience.[23] In the first instance -- and self evidently -- confidence building takes a long time and security takes even longer: and all that in a geographically confined area with a fairly high degree of cultural continuity, and a simplistic security geometry. Arms control, it appears, cannot produce fundamental political change though it can positively influence the political environment once change is underway. But until the political, military or economic threat to the state brings enough pain to bear on the decision- making cortex no amount of confidence building will help. It is also obvious that CBMs must be developed incrementally. They can lead to increased transparency, which is the sine qua non for further arms control, but as emphasized above, the triggering device is political rather than mechanical. The more ambitious arms control becomes the more intrusive the

verification regime will be. In this regard, Darilek notes, it is probably easier to negotiate force reductions than to impose constraints on an "enemy's" armed forces.[24] The European experience indicates as well that multilateral arms control initiatives are not necessarily inferior to bilateral approaches and that impartial third parties can play a useful role encouraging compromise, breaking deadlocks or offering services. CSBMs also appear fairly resilient to political change and the value of CSBMs is that, once in place, they provide the means and habit of dialogue even though political relations have deteriorated. The most important contribution that CBMs make is that they institutionalize the right to ask questions and expect answers.

So far so good, but what is the likelihood of these lessons being translated into the Asia-Pacific region where there is a glaring paucity of security fora? On the one hand, analysts point to the need for the creation of a security forum, particularly in view of the armed confrontation on the Korean peninsula, a confrontation which comes closest to replicating the NATO/WTO standoff in Western Europe. On the other hand experts adduce a wide range of reasons why a forum isn't needed or wouldn't work if it were.[25] One line of argument, in response to an Australian initiative in the late 1980s to create a Conference on Security and Cooperation Asia (CSCA), is that this is simply another example of the application of inappropriate European models to a region where informal, ad hoc, non-binding solutions to security problems are the order of the day.[26] Leaving aside this emotional vision of CSCA as an exercise in latter day imperialism, there are a number of specific reasons why it would be difficult to create a region-wide security forum of the CSCE sort.[27] The authors of CSCE were committed to the fiction that there were no outstanding territorial disputes in Europe. That was a necessary precondition to the forum's labours but no amount of Nelsonian myopia is likely to result in the territorial and maritime disputes of the Asia-Pacific Region being willed away quickly. Furthermore, there is

no consensus in the APR as to which nation or nations constitute the enemy. If anything, it is internal threats to stability that are the major sources of concern to most nations in the region and those nations are not particularly given to seeing interventionist policies exercised at their expense. There was some semblance of common negotiating culture in Europe, whereas the staggering diversity of cultures and values in the APR militates against ready negotiating. Having said that, a trans-national fraternity of Asia-Pacific diplomats and negotiators has begun to develop which is increasingly comfortable with and adept at the language and expectations of the CSCE culture. Working against them is the fact that there is no tradition of collective security in the Asia-Pacific Region. Nor is there any equivalent to the European neutral and non-aligned bloc which worked so hard to see a CBM security component included in the Helsinki Final Act. Conventional wisdom suggests that the APR is simply too huge, too disparate, to be considered a candidate for a CSCE-style forum and that it makes more sense to proceed on a case by case, sub-regional basis when security concerns are tackled. But even at that level there are no established sub-regional security outlooks and almost every case is likely to involve a different array of players. Compounding these problems are geostrategic and force asymmetries, the current arms buildup, particularly in Southeast Asia, the lack of fifst hand experience with arms control and the reluctance -- at least hitherto -- of the US Navy to consider naval CBMs.

What makes it even more difficult to sell the idea of a CSCA is the fact that Europe appears to be in the grips of profound organizational confusion. A host of European organizations, with overlapping memberships and agendas, are jockeying to be the premier security forum on the continent. NATO is effecting a transition from a collective defence to a collective security orientation.[28] Some argue that the European Commission or the Western European Union should replace it eventually.[29] Whatever the case, all of them, not least the

CSCE (with its much vaunted security monitoring and promoting mechanisms), have proven thunderingly ineffectual in the face of economic instability in Eastern Europe and virulent tribalism in Southeastern Europe. "Are these the models Asia should emulate"? critics ask. If after decades of discussion and lifetimes of institution building Europe can do no better than this, is there any point in trying to superimpose European legalism on Asian pragmatism?

Furthermore the news out of Asia, while severely mixed, is probably more optimistic than ever before.[30] Despite a certain peripheral pushiness, China is stable and appears to be coping with economic change on a gargantuan scale. Russia has muddled its way into temporary quietude and the northern territories dispute with Japan has lost most of its animus and immediacy. Taiwan has acquired new fighter aircraft and destroyers but, for the moment, politics and economics remain separated skilfully in the pursuit of greater mutual goals of economic development on the coasts of China. Cambodia is a lethal morass, incapable of internal or external resolution, but the Vietnamese and the Thais, having grown weary of the whole affair, have turned to matters closer to hand -- making money. ASEAN is an organization in search of a reason for being now that the threat of Indo-Chinese communism is at an end. It seems unlikely to become a defence association but will, no doubt, incorporate the states of Indo-China and strive to fill the gap by becoming the APR's security forum with enhanced participation in the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (PMC). The PMC, for reasons enumerated above, is unlikely to become a CSCA and will probably steer clear of advocating such contentious CSCE functions as attempting to ameliorate human rights. Japan's future role remains ill-defined, but despite contradictory statements by the Japanese prime minister and his foreign minister about the Japanese Self Defence Force playing a more active international role, it seems very unlikely that the Japanese will pursue the "military option" in the exercise of their foreign policy.

What is significant about the dramatic reduction in the size of American and Russian nuclear arsenals is that it places renewed pressure on China to become an active participant in, as opposed to self-righteous supporter of, arms control initiatives in the Asia-Pacific Region.[31] The Chinese have always feared that arms control was a way in which the superpowers could institutionalize China's military inferiority and argued that as those powers were responsible for global confrontation it was up to them to reduce their inventories to the point of parity with China before China would become actively engaged in the arms control and disarmament process. Parity is still a long way off. Russia and the United States both have 50 to 70 times the strategic nuclear inventory of China and the presence of nuclear arsenals in Britain and France, as well as in the Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan (where the commitment to repatriate strategic nuclear weapons has begun to ebb in the face of the unpredictable political environment in Russia) complicates the comparative calculus still further.[33]

Another development which bears on the discussion at hand is the slow but perceptible increase in the receptivity of a number of the major states in the APR, particularly the United States and Japan, to the potential of multilateral initiatives.[34] Andrew Mack, the Australian arms control expert, is fond of noting how the Americans, secure in their dominance of a host of bilateral Asia-Pacific security relationships, have traditionally feared the M-Word -- multilateralism. The US Navy, in particular, saw naval CBMs and multilateral conventions as a plot to dilute their authority and undermine their mobility in a quintessentially maritime theatre.[35] Recently, however, Tritten has suggested, that the USN might even be open to naval CBMs as a way of avoiding further budgetary cuts. What were negotiated as maximum ceilings might suddenly become convenient floors for such weapons systems as hunter killer submarines.[36] Coalition endeavours in Iraq and Somalia may also point the way and suggest how

the United States can maximize its shrinking resources in Asia to best effect. This process will be facilitated by the remarkable degree to which the US-Russian relationship has become one of cooperation, if only perforce, in the face of the failing Russian economy and the need to deal with such issues as the dismantling of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. Japan is also likely to exhibit a new interest in multilateralism. Hitherto, as a loyal and passive adjunct to the United States, Japan was unwilling to advance the cause of multilateralism. Now, however, multilateralism offers Japan a way to develop an enhanced non-military international role without arousing latent Asian concerns about Japanese aggressiveness.[37] Japan is already a CSCE observer and a member of a number of global organizations like the G7. Thus, it may be possible for Japan to take an active role in a sub-regional security initiative particularly in view of America's reduced capacity for involvement in the APR.[38]

The Canadians began to address this problem in July 1990 when the Honourable Joe Clark, the Minister of External Affairs, unveiled the North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue concept during an address in Victoria.[39] The NPCSD envisaged the participation of Canada, Russia, the United States, China, the Koreas, and Japan in a security dialogue reminiscent of CSEC dialogues. The Chinese analyst Sa has described the NPCSD as "not a bad idea", a concept derived from Canada's long experience with peacekeeping, arms control and disarmament and reflective, in Sa's estimation, of Canada's increasing concern with maintaining peace and stability in a region of paramount economic importance.[40] However, the NPCSD, which envisaged a twin track approach to the promotion of collective security via a formal, government to government dialogue and a non-governmental organization (NGO: primarily academic) dialogue, suffered from a number of shortcomings.[41] First, it was launched with insufficient forethought. Much of the analysis that should have underpinned the idea was undertaken after

the event. Only then were the difficulties inherent in promoting such a concept fully appreciated. By that time, however, the idea had been received coolly in many Asian capitals and in Washington where there was entrenched opposition to entangling multilateral commitments. Second, there was a good deal of definitional confusion, particularly in American minds, between collective defence, to which they were accustomed in Japan and Germany, and cooperative security.[42] And third, there was a good deal of skepticism in the Asia-Pacific Region about Canada's legitimacy as a genuine regional player with a say in northeast Asian security affairs.[43] Complicating the perceptual problem was the fact that no sooner had the idea been publicized than the diplomatic energies of Japan and the mid-Atlantic community came to be absorbed by events in the Persian Gulf and Mr. Clark's successor found herself more concerned about developments in Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia than in the APR. Thus, formal commitment to the NPCSD began to wane, and while the NGO track was pursued conscientiously, the idea appeared destined to run its course and die unmourned. It is ironical, therefore, that just as the NPCSD enters its final phase the international environment appears to have become increasingly disposed to such an initiative.

THE KOREAN SECURITY CHALLENGE

While the NPCSD sought to address a broad range of security concerns from refugee movements and environmental degradation to human rights, its principal focus was on the Korean peninsula, where 1.1 million troops faced one another over the inaptly named Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). The army of the north, enjoying the materiel and moral support of the DPRK's two great patrons, China and the Soviet Union, remained the largest and most powerful on the

peninsula until late in the 1980s. Heavily equipped with tanks and artillery, it appeared to be dedicated to mounting a blitzkrieg against the ROK, decapitating the southern military machine by overrunning Seoul twenty-five miles south of the DMZ.[44] While the population of the ROK was much greater than that of the north (43 to 20 million) the ROK armed forces were considerably smaller (655,000 to 995,000) and the defence of the south depended ultimately on the trip wire presence of American military personnel backed by tactical nuclear weapons, the existence of which the Americans would neither confirm nor deny.[45]

Politically, the two regimes are products of the Cold War division of the peninsula; a division annealed by a legacy of hatred derived from the Korean War (1950-1953).[46] The DPRK is a highly secretive, neo-Stalinist state dedicated to an autarkic policy known as juche which blends repressive socialism, militarism, and a bizarre cult of personality. That cult relates to the eighty-year old head of state, Kim Il Sung, and, inferentially, to his son Kim Jong-Il who has been positioned to succeed his father in the world's first socialist succession. Like their counterparts elsewhere in the socialist world, the two Kims are the victims of the systemic crisis that has begun to destroy that world, the failure to deliver. The legitimacy of the North Korean regime is now in doubt and Pyongyang has become increasingly beleaguered. The DPRK economy is in terminal decline.[47] Beijing and Moscow have abandoned Pyongyang effectively, curtailing assistance and demanding that trade be conducted at world market prices in what is for the North almost non-existent hard currency.[48] The regime's international credit worthiness is equally non-existent and the economy, crushed by the unsustainable burden of huge defence expenditures, has begun to run out of fuel. Such is the industrial sclerosis that factories are reportedly operating at only a fraction of their capacity and military exercises have had to be curtailed.[49]

Compounding Pyongyang's problems is the fact that the South's economy is not only five to seven times the size of the DPRK's but the gap is opening inexorably.[50] There is no crisis of confidence in the ROK, and the South and has begun to surpass the North in terms of the quality of its armed forces, particularly in the realm of expensive, high-technology conventional weaponry.[51] One reason for Seoul's strength and Pyongyang's weakness is Nordpolitik, a skillful diplomatic offensive in which Seoul outflanked the North and normalized relations with the Soviet Union (1990) and China (1992).[52] In doing so, the ROK exploited two opportunities: the diplomatic impasse between Japan and Russia, which had denied Moscow Japanese risk capital, and China's appetite for foreign trade.[53]

The upshot of these changes is that the DPRK has had to abandon its commitment to the forcible reunification of the peninsula under a juchean order: all this at a time when Kim Il Sung is exhorting his followers to greater and greater levels of dedication to an ideology which has left the state teetering on the brink of starvation.[54] Indeed, Kim is pursuing two contradictory policies in an effort to escape from isolation and insolvency. On the one hand, he is attempting his own outflanking manoeuvre, trying to establish relations with Japan and the United States. On the other hand, he hopes that those relations will result in a sufficient amelioration of the DPRK's economic conditions that the legitimacy of the Kim dynasty and the socialist order will be confirmed and the crisis of confidence will pass. Thus, paradoxically, increased openness should enable the Kims to sustained increased secretiveness.[55] Monk, however, has argued persuasively that the DPRK is not nearly as hermetically sealed as we have been led to believe and that senior bureaucrats and military personnel in Pyongyang are well aware of what has happened in the socialist world in general and in Romania (a European analogue for the DPRK) in particular.[56] If this is the case, the regime may very well be doomed, once Kim Jong Il, who

many view as a dangerous and unpredictable dilettante, succeeds his father.[57]

Some ironic inversions have taken place on the peninsula lately. After decades of promoting reunification, both regimes have begun to back away from the prospect. The elder Kim realizes that reunification by force is no longer possible and that reunification on any other terms would probably weaken his regime mortally. Seoul realizes that it is in the ROK's best interest to buttress the ailing regime in the North because the precipitous collapse of the Kim dynasty could bring serious peninsular instability or an irresistible demand for unification which, in view of the German experience, would bring untold economic hardship to the ROK.[58] Thus both states face the prospect of bankruptcy but for quite different reasons. At the macro-level the traditional relationship between north and south has been reversed as well. After setting the agenda for more than forty years, Pyongyang has adopted a passive role while Seoul has become the active player now.[59]

Central to Seoul's security calculations is the unsettling matter of whether Pyongyang is developing nuclear weapons or not.[60] The evidence suggests that Kim probably began exploring the nuclear option in the late 1940s when the Soviets were about to detonate their first atomic device, Joe I. The Korean war, and the threat of American nuclear retaliation, underscored the importance of nuclear weaponry and the North, assisted by the Russians, embarked on a modest nuclear research programme in the 1960s. The authorities in the South drew the same conclusions, and, alarmed by the prospect of a declining American commitment to Asia in the aftermath of the Vietnamese War, they began to develop a nuclear weapons programme in the mid-1970s. The Americans, however, intervened, discouraging further work on the project and promising continued nuclear protection. Seoul had seen nuclear weapons as a critical equalizer in the unequal military contest with the North. Pyongyang came to see nuclear weapons in the

same light ten years later when the huge cost of conventional weaponry, the DPRK's difficulties in ensuring a steady acquisition of sophisticated weapons, and the voraciously consumptive nature of contemporary war had become inescapably obvious.[61]

It was about this time that the nuclear superpowers began to intervene. American intelligence satellites revealed the existence of a nuclear complex at Yongbyon, ninety kilometres north of Pyongyang, which was too big and too unusual to meet existing descriptions of a small scale research programme.[62] The Russians and the Chinese, concerned about the implications of a possible nuclear arms race in northeast Asia, cajoled the North into becoming a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1985).[63] However, Pyongyang steadfastly refused to sign the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguard accords, which were part of the NPT package, and which would have ensured at least a minimal degree of verification of the DPRK programme. The North's failure to embrace the accords, of course, merely reinforced the South's perception of the DPRK as a duplicitous and untrustworthy regime; a mind-set derived from and reinforced by a number of terrorist acts sponsored by the North.

A desultory and largely unproductive series of negotiations, designed to introduce CBMs to the North-South dialogue, took place during the 1980s. Small scale family reunification and a military hotline were discussed, and Pyongyang was invited to send observers to the annual US-ROK Team Spirit exercises. But the DPRK's unwillingness to recognize the legitimacy of the Seoul regime, clashes on the DMZ, and growing uncertainty about the apparent nuclear weapons programme in the North, meant that Cold War conditions prevailed. Complicating the matter was the fact that the northern and southern negotiating strategies were fundamentally incongruent. The DPRK was dedicated to immediate disarmament while the ROK was committed to gradual arms control.[64] Then, in the early 1990s, a number of meetings were held at the prime

ministerial level.[65] It appeared as if Pyongyang, encouraged by Beijing, was ready to pursue a new policy of openness. But Pyongyang continued to insist on the withdrawal of all US nuclear weapons from the South and guarantees of immunity from nuclear attack by the United States in return for embracing the long-delayed IAEA safeguards.[66] The first of these demands was realized in the global context when President Bush dismantled most of the US tactical nuclear inventory in September 1991. The second was non-negotiable. The DPRK could not expect Washington to accept such a quid pro quo and US policy already afforded non-nuclear states protection save when they were allied to a nuclear state as the DPRK was with Russia.[67]

By this stage, in late 1991, an informal arms control coalition had been created in northeast Asia. Neither the Japanese, the Americans, the Russians, nor the Chinese were prepared to give ground on the nuclear inspection issue.[68] Verification, full and complete, was the key to the impasse, but the North refused to climb down. However, the international outlook was becoming increasingly sombre for Pyongyang. The Gulf War had illustrated the United States' determination, the efficacy of smart weapons, and the inadequacy of Russian military hardware. Saddam Hussein's clandestine nuclear weapons programme had been the subject of almost universal condemnation and the United Nations, backed by the United States and several other Gulf War partners, showed no hint of abandoning its mission to winkle out and destroy Iraqi nuclear facilities.[69] It may very well have been that a pragmatic assessment of these developments led the North to enter into two unprecedent agreements with the South in December 1991: one, an agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, Exchanges and Cooperation; the other a Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Further, both parties agreed in principle to reciprocal inspections and set up a Joint North-South Commission to work out the details.[70]

In January 1992, more than six years after the NPT, the North agreed to the IAEA safeguards.[71] Initial euphoria was muted when it was realized that there would be further delays while Pyongyang ratified the agreement (April 1992), that IAEA inspectors could only examine those facilities designated by the North, and that even if weapon's-grade plutonium was discovered there was nothing to prevent the DPRK from holding it in storage.[72]

The DPRK's conduct raised three perplexing and worrisome questions. Why would the North have embarked on a nuclear weapons programme when the regime had long advocated the denuclearization of the peninsula? Was Kim Il Sung playing his opponents, like an expert trout fisherman, with a programme that might not even exist, or might have been abandoned? And were there crucial facilities hidden away in caves or underground that no one in the West was aware of? The first question was perhaps the easiest of the three to answer. While the North may have been committed to a nuclear free zone in the past, the unwillingness of the Americans to confirm the widely held suspicion that there were US tactical nuclear weapons on the peninsula made the matter moot. As the southern military machine matched and then surpassed that of the North and as the crippled state of the northern economy made it more and more problematic that parity could ever be achieved, nuclear weapons were seen as inexpensive equalizers that would enhance the regime's global status, deter attack, and stay the Americans' hand in the event of North-South hostilities.

Far more difficult was the matter of Pyongyang's current policy. Was Kim Il Sung winning useful concessions with a Potemkin programme?[73] Or was he employing Khmer Rouge "Fight, fight, talk, talk" tactics in order to delay the inspection process sufficiently to complete work on a nuclear weapons system that would give his regime renewed credibility?[74] Were his apparent concessions in the December 1991 part of a carefully orchestrated smoke screen, a two-

steps forward, one-step back policy reminiscent of Saddam Hussein?[75] And what about clandestine subterranean activities? The Iraqi experience demonstrated just how difficult it was to locate nuclear facilities even when there was a full-scale inspection programme.[76] The ROK had demanded challenge inspections but the North had refused. What kept suspicions alive was not only such refusal but the fact that the DPRK had a well-established reputation for tunnelling and underground installations.[77] What concerned arms control experts in particular was the realization that if the North did develop nuclear weapons capable of being miniaturized to the point where they could be used as warheads on improved, 1000-mile SCUD missiles, the whole of the ROK and large parts of Japan would fall within operational range. The ROK and Japan might then be subject to irresistible pressure to embrace the nuclear option, a course of action which would have the most profound consequences for the Asia-Pacific Region.[78]

FUTURE PROSPECTS

Segal has argued cogently that it is probably a mistake to try to create a multilateral regional security forum for the APR. Rather than trying to replicate the attenuated European experience, it is best to tackle security challenges on an ad hoc, sub-regional basis, drawing, as he describes it, on the larger CBM and arms control and disarmament menu in an à la carte fashion. Certainly the Korean peninsula is a prime candidate for such an approach. The New World Disorder has resulted in the DPRK becoming increasingly marginalized and desperate. The apparent existence of a nuclear weapons programme in the North adds fresh urgency and lethality to the forty-year confrontation between the ROK and the DPRK. While the moment of inventory symmetry -- which often seems propitious for arms control initiatives -- appears to be

slipping past, both states have reached the point where their ardour for reunification has cooled. The North appears more open politically but the signals coming out of Pyongyang are mixed. This is perhaps only to be expected as hard and soft-line factions jockey for position, arguing strategies within the framework of current political orthodoxy while casting an eye to the post-Kim future.[79]

As nuclear weapons and delivery systems proliferate around the world it is more and more important that the North Korean case be dealt with. The European experience provides a catalogue of useful CBMs once Pyongyang makes the crucial political decision to embark on a course of genuine openness. Ironically, however, as Scalapino has suggested, CBMs may not build the North's confidence if, as he speculates, they reveal that the DPRK's war machine is not nearly as deadly as imagined.[80] The European experience also suggests that it may be easier to reduce the numbers of weapons, as the Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) Agreement did, than to impose constraints on the remaining forces. Whatever the case, the process will be a long one in which bilateral relations between North and South may be usefully complemented by a multilateral initiative that keeps the United States and Japan involved and in which a non-sub-regional third party like Canada provides assistance with the vital verification dimension.[81] A successionist power struggle that toppled Kim Jong-Il could render the arms control process largely irrelevant, but the habit of dialogue and the exchange of information could, if Darilek is correct, provide a stabilizing factor if the transition is an extended one.[82] Certainly, the December 1991 agreements provide the framework for the North and South to take the lead once the requisite political will is exhibited. Some might argue that there is nothing more to be done.[83] But a multilateral initiative may provide the supporting mechanisms and the face-saving opportunities needed to ensure at least the minimal success of a North-South dialogue. That

dialogue involves a complex and unpredictable dialectic between arms control and reunification; a sort of three dimensional chess in which the former is not only an end in itself but a means to an end.[84]

CONCLUSION

The end of the Cold War and the need to redefine national and international agendas has focused attention on the Korean peninsula and the perceived lack of a European-style security forum to deal with the pressing problem of weapons proliferation there. What makes the peninsula particularly important is that it marks the spot in Northeast Asia where the interests of three nuclear powers and an economic superpower converge. As all of these powers are in the process of rearticulating their foreign policies, the way seems clear for some new collective security initiatives in the sub-region. However, the European arms control experience is not particularly promising in terms of its achievements and the applicability of that experience to a region much given to informal, non-binding agreements is open to debate. Indeed, the very success of unilateral arms reductions in northeast Asia has tended to call into question the need for a structured security forum. The Korean peninsula is perhaps a special case. It comes closest to replicating the polarized relationship between NATO and the Warsaw Pact with the latter, like the DPRK, being the beleaguered military giant imploding under the weight of its own defence budget. It is these conditions, Tong has argued, that make it so important to enlist arms control processes to stabilize the military relationship between the Koreas.[85]

The Canadian North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue constituted a modest, multifaceted sortie into the world of multilateralism in the North Pacific. It was a good idea

before its time and paradoxically, just as it is about to draw to a close, the international climate has become more attuned to such an initiative.[86] It is Segal's recommendation that the most profitable way to proceed is on a case-by-case basis, drawing selectively on the European experience and blending multilateral and bilateral approaches in regional and sub-regional contexts where appropriate.[87] While the signals from the North are mixed, Pyongyang, despite the brute problem of nuclear verification, does seem to be moving slowly toward more openness. It is this stage which is often most promising for CBMs. The right course of action seems to be to provide the paranoid regime in Pyongyang with timely reassurance while continuing to press for full disclosure on the nuclear weapons issue.[88] At first glance, these may be mutually contradictory objectives but it may be that the European menu of CBMs will suggest ways of creating the necessary sense of reassurance which, coupled with a political sea change, will set the stage for a resolution of the nuclear and conventional arms control problems on the Korean peninsula.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I am particularly indebted to Ms. Pam Wiley for her assistance in the preparation of this paper.

ENDNOTES

1 Robert S. Wood, "Europe: Transfigured or Transfixed," Naval War College Review, vol. 45, no. 4 (Autumn 1992), pp. 22. See also, Johan Holst, "European and Atlantic Security in the Period of Ambiguity," The World Today, vol. 48 (December 1992), p. 218.

2 Gerald Segal, "North-East Asia: Common Security or à la Carte?" International Affairs, vol. 67, no. 4 (October 1991), p. 760. See also Patrick M. Cronin, "Beyond Bilateralism," The Pacific Review, vol. 5, no. 3 (1992), p. 209; Han Sung-Joo, "South Korean Perspective on International and Regional Security Issues," Paper presented at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 34th Annual Conference, Seoul, 9-12 September 1992, p. 2.

3 Christopher Greenwood, "Is There a Right of Humanitarian Intervention," The World Today, vol. 49, no. 2 (February 1993), p. 34.

4 Hideshi Takesada, "Korean Reunification in the Post-Cold War Era: A Japanese Perspective," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, vol. 4, no. 2 (Winter 1992), p. 245.

5 Han Sung-Joo, p. 18.

6 Gerald Segal, p. 755.

7 Patrick Cronin, p. 210.

8 Andrew Mack and Desmond Ball, "The Military Build-up in Asia-Pacific," The Pacific Review, vol. 5, no. 3 (1992), p. 203. See also James C. Wendt, "Conventional Arms Control for Korea: A Proposed Approach," Survival, vol. 34, no. 4 (Winter 1992-93), p. 122.

9 Jeffery Barnett, "Defense Spending in Free-Fall," Strategic Review, vol. 20, no. 4 (Fall 1992), p. 74.

10 Sarah S. Doyle and James E. Doyle, "Japan and Nuclear Weapons: Considerations for U.S. Japanese Security Cooperation," Strategic Review, vol. 20, no. 3 (Summer 1992), p. 76.
James Wendt argues that "Arms control should be designed to help maintain a continuing US presence in Korea and reduce or eliminate the military threat from the North (p. 123)."

11 Anon., "North Korea: Nuclear Proliferation and Negotiation," RUSI Newsbrief, vol. 12, no. 3 (March 1992), p. 22. The author highlights the value of constraining China through co-optation.

12 Han Sung-Joo, p. 8. See also Patrick Cronin, p. 215 and Gary Klintworth, "Asia-Pacific: More Security, Less Uncertainty, New Opportunities," The Pacific Review, vol. 5, no. 3 (1992), p. 227. Cronin and Klintworth emphasize the importance of growing regional economic interdependence and cooperation as precursors to multilateral security structures.

13 Steven Zaloga, "Russia Exporting Top-of-the-Line Weapons," Armed Forces Journal, (December 1992), p. 46.

14 Nazir Kamal, "China's Arms Export Policy and Responses to Multilateral Restraints," Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 14, no. 2 (September 1992), p. 134. See also, Anon., "Let's Do Launch," Newsweek [European edition], (25 January 1993), p. 37 and William Walker, "Nuclear Weapons and the Former Soviet Republics," International Affairs, vol. 68, no. 2 (April 1992), pp. 273-274. One estimate suggests that there are 5000 ex-Soviet scientists with expertise in plutonium separation and uranium enrichment.

15 Andrew Mack tracks the conventional build-up in the Asia-Pacific in The Pacific Review, vol. 5, no. 3 (1992), pp. 197-208.

16 John Simpson, "Nuclear Capabilities, Military Security and the Korean Peninsula: A Three-Tiered Perspective from Europe," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, vol. 4, no. 2 (Winter 1992), p. 14.

17 Chris Anstis, "Arms Control in the North Pacific: The Role of Confidence Building and Verification." Paper presented at the External Affairs Cooperative Research Workshop on Arms Control in the North Pacific, Victoria, 19-21 February 1993, p. 2.

18 Chris Anstis, p. 13.

19 Chris Anstis, p. 7.

20 Anon., "US - Russian Arms Cuts: Mutual Unilateralism," RUSI Newsletter, vol. 12, no. 3 (March 1992), p. 22.

21 Jan Wong, "Yeltsin Surprises Washington by Announcing New Weapons Cut," The Globe and Mail, (Saturday, 9 December 1992), p. A-1. Wong points out that it took the Soviet Union and the United States 15 years to reduce their strategic weapons inventories by one-third and that they reduced them by two-thirds in less than a year.

22 Michael Brown, "Has De-Nuking Become De Rigeur?" Pacific Research, vol. 5, no. 3 (August 1992), p. 10. See also, Anon., "End of Term Flourish," The Economist, vol. 326, no. 7793 (9 January 1993), p. 40. The January 1993 treaty provides for a first stage reduction of warheads to 3800 - 4200 within seven years of START I coming into force and a further reduction to 3000 - 3500 by 2003. The Ukraine still has 1656 strategic warheads.

23 Richard Darilek, "Confidence Building and Arms Control in the East-West Context: Lessons from the Cold War Experience in Europe," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, vol. 4, no. 2 (Winter 1992), pp. 224-237.

24 Richard Darilek, p. 232.

25 Andrew Mack, "Arms Control in the North Pacific: Problems and Prospects." Paper presented at the Second Asia-Pacific Roundtable, Kuala Lumpur, 2-4 July 1988, pp. 2-21. See also, James Boutilier, "Arms Control and Disarmament in the Pacific Region: Confidence Building and Verification (Pacific)" Report submitted to External Affairs, Ottawa, March 1991, pp. 26-37.

26 Patrick Cronin quotes Hellman who observes that such a forum would provide "an excessive amount of atmospherics but a dearth of substance (p. 214)." See also Gerald Segal who refers to the "virtuous cycle" of mutually reinforcing, unilateral disarmament undertaken by China and the Soviet Union.

27 Gary Klintworth, p. 221, and Patrick Cronin, p. 214. Klintworth maintains that the Asia-Pacific Region is "ready for a regional forum on cooperative security because the institutional building blocks (and the attitudinal ones) are in place." Cronin, however, argues that "The Asia-Pacific Region has not yet reached such a stage [where it perceives security problems as common concerns]."

28 Robert S. Wood, p. 28.

29 Geoffrey Till, "European Security and the Future of NATO," The Naval Review, vol. 80, no. 4 (October 1992), pp. 312-313. "It is hard to avoid the conclusion," Till writes, "that the future of NATO will be somewhere between permanent relevance and instant irrelevance (p. 314)."

30 Gary Klintworth, p. 222.

31 Michael Krepon, "Arms Control in the Post-Cold War World," Pacific Research, vol. 5, no. 3 (August 1992), p. 5.

32 Anon., "US - Russian Arms Cuts: Mutual Unilateralism," RUSI Newsbrief, vol. 12, no. 3 (March 1992), p. 22.

33 Michael Brown, p. 12. See also, Anon., "Heels Dug In," The Economist, vol. 326, no. 7793 (9 January 1993), p. 47. The Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty (1987) between the United States and the Soviet Union further enhanced China's security -- by eliminating Soviet SS-20 missiles from Asia -- as did President Bush's unilateral decision (1991) to remove tactical nuclear weapons from the ROK and the seas around the peninsula.

34 Gary Klintworth, p. 228.

35 Andrew Mack (1988), p. 40.

36 James Tritten, personal communication, 15 September 1992.

37 Patrick Cronin, p. 211.

38 Gerald Segal, p. 760. Segal, in contradistinction to Klintworth and Cronin, argues that "Despite some signs of increased economic interdependence, these are far from sufficient to shape a regional stake in miltilateralism and regional cooperation (p. 760)."

39 David Dewitt and Paul Evans, "The Changing Dynamics of Asia-Pacific Security: A Canadian Perspective," NPCSD Working Paper, no. 3, Toronto (January 1992), p.1.

40 Sa Benwang, "An Analysis of the Canadian Initiative for a North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue," International Strategic Studies (Beijing), no. 2 (June 1992), p. 16.

41 Gerald Segal, p. 764.

42 Sa Benwang, p. 19.

43 Patrick Cronin, p. 214.

44 Tong Whan Park, "Issues of Arms Control Between the Two Koreas," Asian Survey, vol. 32, no. 4 (April 1992), p. 363.

45 Anon., "N[orth] Korea May Possess N-Weapons by '95," Korea Newsreview, vol. 19, no. 47 (24 November 1990), p. 7. Andrew Mack in "North Korea and the Bomb," Foreign Policy, no. 83 (Summer 1991), p. 100 gives the figures 1,111,000 (DPRK) and 750,000 (ROK).

46 Nicholas Eberstadt, "Can the Two Koreas Be One?" Foreign Affairs, (Winter 1992/93), p. 165. Eberstadt notes that over one-tenth of Korea's population perished during the war.

47 Anon., "Summing Up" [An Analysis of North Korean Policy Directions in 1992], Vantage Point, vol. 15, no. 12 (December 1992), p. 13. In 1991 the economy of the DPRK experienced minus 3.7 per cent growth and in 1992 the figure was minus 5.2 per cent.

48 Anon., "Beijing's Demand For Cash Payment in Trade Puts Pyongyang in [a] Serious Dilemma," Vantage Point, vol. 16, no. 1 (January 1993), pp. 14-17. See also, Anon., "North Korea: Nuclear Proliferation and Negotiation," RUSI Newsbrief, vol. 12, no. 3 (March 1992), p. 23.

49 Robert Scalapino, Personal communication, 4 December 1992. See also, FBIS, Tass (24 February 1992) [Russian oil deliveries down]; Anon., "Russian Institute Reveals Serious State of North Korean Economy," North Korea News, no. 668 (1 February 1993), pp. 3-4. Industrial production is reported to be down 40-50 per cent while oil imports from the Soviet Union fell from 500,000 tons in 1990 to 25,000 tons (January to September) in 1992.

50 Nicholas Eberstadt, p. 160. According to Eberstadt, Seoul reckons that the ROK economy is more than ten times larger than that of the North. Defense outlays in the DPRK amount to approximately 22 per cent of GNP while those in the ROK amount to 4 per cent. See, Tong Whan Park, p. 363.

51 Doug Bandow, "A New Korea Policy For a Changed World," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, vol. 4, no. 2 (Winter 1992), p. 262.

52 Han Sung-Joo, p. 19.

53 Hong Nack Kim, "The Koreas: In Search of Reunification," Current History, (December 1992), p. 431.

54 Korea, Ministry of National Defense, Defense White Paper: 1991-1992, Seoul, The Ministry of National Defense (ROK), 1992, p. 125. See also, Rhee Sang-woo, "North Korea in 1991: Struggle to Save Chuch'e Amid Signs of Change," Asian Survey, vol. 32, no. 1 (January 1992), p. 56.

55 Anon., "Summing Up," Vantage Point, vol. 15, no. 12 (December 1992), p. 12.

56 Paul Monk, "Coping With the End of History: Pyongyang and the Realm of Freedom," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, vol. 4, no. 2 (Winter 1992), p. 106. See also James Cotton, "North Korea's Nuclear Ambitions: National Security or Regime Security?" Paper presented at the International Institute for Strategic Studies Conference, Seoul, 10-12 September 1992, p. 13.

57 Nicholas Eberstadt, p. 155 and Paul Monk, p. 114. Monk describes Kim Jong-il as an "insecure, impulsive, reclusive, corrupt, conniving and perhaps paranoid princeling."

58 Hung Nack Kim, p. 435. Kim puts the cost of reunification between 170 and 300 billion dollars over several years. Shim Jae Hoon in "The Price of Unity," Far Eastern Economic Review, vol. 155, no. 12 (26 March 1992), p. 54, estimates the cost of reunification as 200 - 500 billion dollars over 5 to 10 years. See also, Andrew Mack, "North Korea and the Bomb," Foreign Policy, no. 83 (Summer 1991), p. 95 and Nicholas Eberstadt, p. 161, who points out the dislocating effects of wholesale troop demobilization. While the populations of the DPRK and East Germany are fairly similar (20 million to 16 million) the army in the DPRK is believed to be seven times larger than the East German Volksarmee in 1989. Paul Bracken, "The Korean State and Northeast Asia," Strategic Review, vol. 20, no. 3 (Summer 1992), p. 41 looks at the long term cost of failing to reunite.

59 Tong Whan Park, p. 353 and Hideshi Takesada, p. 246.

60 See Kwan-Chi Oh, "Making Peace on the Korean Peninsula," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, vol. 4, no. 1 (Summer 1992), pp. 186-187 and Leonard Spector and Jacqueline Smith, "North Korea: The Next Nuclear Nightmare," Arms Control Today, vol. 21, no. 2 (March 1991), pp. 9-10 for a discussion of the reasons why the DPRK would wish to acquire nuclear weapons. See also, Tae Hwan Kwak, "Designing the Non-Nuclear Korean Peninsula: Problems and Prospects," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, vol. 4, no. 1 (Summer 1992), pp. 225-227 for a history of the DPRK's nuclear programme.

61 Andrew Mack (1991), p. 94. Mack notes that ".... the total cost of the DPRK nuclear program, excluding the cost of the reactors, is $203 million -- around 5 per cent of the annual defence budget."

62 The Yongbyon and related complexes consists of:

(i) A 2 to 4 megawatt research reactor.
(ii) A 30 megawatt reactor modelled after the British Calder Hall magnox reactor. This reactor takes 75 tons of uranium at a time and can produce plutonium after the spent fuels are cooled.
(iii) A 50 to 200 megawatt reactor, with a research centre, and a nuclear detonation site.

Tae Hwan Kwak, pp. 224-225; Andrew Mack (1991), p. 88; and Anon., "North Korea For First Time Reveals Details About Its Nuclear Power Research Complex at Yongbyon," North Korea News, no. 628 (22 April 1992), pp. 4-5.

63 Lincoln Kaye, "Peking Pilgrimage," Far Eastern Economic Review, vol. 155, no. 40, p. 10.

64 Tong Whan Park, p. 358, and Hideshi Takesada, p. 249.

65 These meetings were reinforced by trade overtures, which resulted in a sharp increase in inter-Korean trade, and by the admission (and mutual recognition) of both Koreas to the United Nations in 1991. See Han Sung Joo, p. 6, and Ed Paisley, "Call of the North," Far Eastern Economic Review, vol. 155, no. 30 (30 July 1992), p. 64.

66 Anon., "North Korea: Bombs Away," Pacific Researcher, vol. 5, no. 2 (May 1992), p. 12. See also, Kwan-Chi Oh, p. 168.

67 Andrew Mack (1991), p. 90.

68 Gary Klintworth, p. 224.

69 Susumu Awanohara, "Nuclear Warning," Far Eastern Economic Review, vol. 155, no. 5 (6 February 1992), p. 12. See also, Roger Highfield, "Allies Target Part of Nuclear Programme," The Daily Telegraph, (Monday, 18 January 1993), p. 2. The Highfield article relates to the 17 January Tomahawk strike by the US Navy against the Zaafaraniyah "nuclear complex" thirteen miles from Baghdad.

70 Nicholas Eberstadt, p. 155. See also, Paul Monk, p. 118. On 26 December 1991 the DPRK renounced the possession of plutonium processing or uranium enrichment facilities.

71 Tae-Hwan Kwak, p. 222.

72 John Simpson, "Nuclear Capabilities, Military Security and the Korean Peninsula: A Three-Tiered Perspective from Europe," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, vol. 4, no. 2 (Winter 1992), p. 28. See also, Tae-Hwan Kwak, pp. 228-230. The DPRK has become a test case for the effectiveness of global non-proliferation verification systems.

73 Tong Whan Park, p. 357.

74 John Simpson, p. 21.

75 Nicholas Eberstadt, p. 158. See also, Anon., "North Korea: Nuclear Proliferation and Negotiation," RUSI Newsbrief, vol. 12, no. 3 (March 1992), p. 24.

76 Tai Ming Cheung, "Check for Bombs," Far Eastern Economic Review, vol. 155, no. 20 (21 May 1992), p. 20. As Paul Monk suggests, the very act of inspection can distract world attention from clandestine operations (p. 119).

77 Andrew Mack, "Nuclear Dilemmas: Korean Security in the 1990s." Unpublished paper, November 1992.

78 Tai Ming Cheung, p. 22; Andrew Mack (1992), p. 202; and Sarah S. Doyle and James E. Doyle, "Japan and Nuclear Weapons: Considerations for U.S. - Japanese Security Cooperation," Strategic Review, vol. 20, no. 3 (Summer 1992), p. 75. Projections of Japan's enrichment capacity indicate that it would have enough enriched uranium to produce over 300 nuclear weapons by the year 2000.

79 Nayan Chanda, "Atomic Ambivalence," Far Eastern Economic Review, vol. 155, no. 39 (1 October 1992), p. 9. Chanda quotes a US State Department official as saying, "For the first time the US is not looking at North Korea as a two-dimensional country with a cardboard emperor."

80 Chris Anstis, p. 13 and Robert Scalapino, personal communication, 4 December 1992.

81 Gerald Segal, p. 766; Peter Hayes, "Moving Target: North Korea's Nuclear Potential," Pacific Research, vol. 5, no. 1 (February 1992), p. 11; and Han Sung-Joo, p. 23.

82 Richard Darilek, p. 243. See also Dewitt and Evans, p. 11.

83 Patrick Cronin, p. 220. Cronin argues that "while Northeast Asia seems to be ripe for such a [security] forum, any proposals to deal with this area must not interfere with current policies designed to deter North Korea from acquiring a nuclear capability. We must not give North Korea a reason to stall on its international obligations as a signatory to the NPT."

84 Paul Bracken, p. 43. See also, Ministry of National Defense, Korea, Defense White Paper: 1991-1992, Seoul, The Ministry of National Defense, 1992, p. 129.

85 Tong Whan Park, p. 354.

86 Patrick Cronin, p. 210.

87 Gerald Segal, pp. 765-766.

88 Doug Bandow, "A New Korea Policy for a Changed World," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, vol. 4, no. 2 (Winter 1992), p. 277.

LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FROM THE HELSINKI PROCESS

Christopher Anstis

Notes for presentation at the
Workshop on "Arms Control in the North Pacific: The Role for Confidence-Building and Verification"
Royal Roads Military College, Victoria, B.C.
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The Chinese strategist Sun Tzu noted 2500 years ago that "All warfare is based on the art of deception".

Deception - secrecy - surprise attack.

Sun Tzu said it all - or most of it - about Confidence-Building and Verification in the Helsinki Process. What lessons does this experience hold for arms control in the North Pacific?

Origins of CBMs Before Helsinki

To judge whether the results of the Helsinki Process, or CSCE, can be applied elsewhere, we should recall the origins of confidence-building measures, or CBMs, and verification in the CSCE; and the motives of the proponents. They were the members of NATO - and they were concerned about the threat of surprise attack by the Warsaw Pact.

The precursors of CBMs and verification measures may well date back to visits between military staffs even before World War I and on-site inspections following it in Germany.

But a good starting point is the "Open Skies" proposal which President Eisenhower presented in July 1955 to the United Nations Disarmament Commission. According to this initiative, which was revived almost four decades later as a CBM, the United States and the Soviet Union were to exchange information about the strength, command structure and disposition of military personnel, units and equipment as well as lists of military plants, facilities and installations with their locations. Verification of this information was to be achieved by ground observers as well as unrestricted, but monitored, aerial reconnaissance. These measures, intended as a prerequisite to disarmament, were repeated in a proposal adopted by the United Nations in 1955, under the title, "Measures Aimed at Creating a Climate of Confidence".

Ironically, as it would turn out, the Soviet Union proposed measures at the United Nations which foreshadowed CBMs even before NATO did. In the context of a plan for complete and general disarmament in early 1955, the Russians suggested the establishment of an international control organization to which States would be required to provide necessary information on the implementation of

reductions of weapons and armed forces in order to promote international confidence. In other words, such measures would apply after, not before, disarmament

In their proposal before the United Nations in September 1961 on general and complete disarmament, the United States envisaged CBMs comprising prior notification of military movements and manoeuvres. In the context of a similar draft in 1962, the Soviet Union proposed to prohibit large-scale military movements and manoeuvres. Later that year, the United States tabled a set of measures at the United Nations aimed at lowering the risk of accidental war by building on discussions at the Geneva Surprise Attack Conference in 1958.

The CBM concept thus enjoyed some stature by the 1960s. For instance, in the preparation of the Harmel Report reviewing NATO's role in 1967, allies stressed that agreements on force reductions should be accompanied by measures such as observation posts to counter possible resulting instability.

In preparing for MBFR, or Multilateral Balanced Force Reductions, in which NATO was to engage the Warsaw Pact in 1973, the United States proposed that the allies seek agreement on constraint measures to enhance stability and to reduce the danger of either side miscalculating the intentions of the other, while reducing the risk of surprise attack. Accordingly, NATO tabled a package of "associated measures" at MBFR, including pre-notification of military movements and exercises as well as provisions on non-circumvention and verification.

CBMs and Arms Control

In this as in other matters, NATO was much influenced by the United States - being primus inter pares and inventor of arms control theory as it was defined in the late 1950s. This summum bonum of Western thought on the subject at the time, which Hedley Bull called "the new thinking", was described as a promising enlargement of United States military strategy. While threatening to deter by resistance or retaliation, this theory held that a nation could also cooperate with adversaries by providing reassurance that restraint on one side would be matched by restraint on the other side. Arms control gave priority to the reduction of tensions and the achievement of basic military stability over political objectives such as "disengagement", that is, settlement of the German question.

Analysts stressed both the danger of accidents as long as both sides relied on nuclear weapons for forward defence in Europe; and the threat of surprise attack if they put their trust primarily on conventional arms. Arms control had then come to mean strengthening deterrence and guarding against surprise attack. Among ways to avert surprise attack, the literature of the day suggested:

1) the advance notification of major military movements or manoeuvres seen as a way

> "...to remove the element of surprise in a sudden assault if the normal observations of military intelligence were not confirmed by notification; at the same time, the need to notify one's intentions (in some detail if the data was to be regarded as trustworthy) would inhibit the practice of demonstrative manoeuvres like those which were held in East Germany in 1969"

2) inspections and control procedures which had been

> "...under consideration by NATO [involving] a zone of inspection comprising the two Germanies, Poland and Czechoslovakia, as well as parts of France and the Low Countries. Within the zone, inspection and control procedures would be tried out, both by air surveillance and through mobile ground teams", and

3) the exchange of information on force postures which was to

> "...provide a certain insurance both against surprise attack and miscalculation. As long as freely proffered information on the strength and deployment of troops tallied with intelligence estimates, it would have great value in promoting mutual confidence, and in providing real safeguards against error or surprise".

You will have recognized these ideas which resurfaced a decade later in the Helsinki Process, re-labelled as CBMs.

NATO Promotes CBMs in the CSCE

In 1972, the United States drafted a proposal as the basis of NATO's position on CBMs at the CSCE, arguing that in tactical terms CBMs could promote stability and induce more openness in Soviet military activities. The Americans also suggested that CBMs should meet several criteria such as undiminished security. Only two measures studied by NATO satisfied this condition: prior-notification of large-scale military movements and manoeuvres; and the exchange of observers.

Subscribing to the American view, the NATO allies put CBMs on the agenda of the CSCE. They believed that a conference on security which did not address issues relating to military confrontation in Europe would not make sense to the public; yet, they did not want to deal with questions of armaments and force levels which were the subject of MBFR being held in Vienna at the same time as the CSCE met in Helsinki and Geneva. Thus NATO chose CBMs as the "limited and achievable military dimension of the CSCE" which could add to concrete steps aimed at improving security and cooperation in Europe in accordance with its broad political objectives.

Insisting on the political causes of instability in Europe, the Russians at first rejected concrete negotiations on military security in the CSCE, other than as political generalities

confirming the status quo in the European geopolitical situation. However, Moscow eventually accepted that there was a place in the CSCE for addressing some military activities which could be assessed from the point of view of the principle of the non-use or threat of force.

The initial Soviet draft on military matters was limited to stating:

> "The participating States...deem it of great importance that the States concerned should notify each other in advance on the basis of agreed procedures [presumably to be worked out after the Conference] of major military manoeuvres in specified areas."

Later, the Russians stated that such notifications should only be given to neighbouring States; in the case of the Soviet Union, that would mean only other members of the Warsaw Pact as well as Finland and Turkey, depending on circumstances.

NATO proposed that notification of manoeuvres held in Europe involving a division or more troops (about 10,000 men) be given bilaterally to all CSCE participating States 60 days in advance.

Subsequently, the Russians proposed notification of manoeuvres limited to those taking place in border zones of 50 kilometres involving an army corps (between 30,000 and 50,000 men) with five days notice.

These were the parameters. The resulting compromise after more than two years of negotiation was pre-notification of manoeuvres of 25,000 or more men held in the case of the Soviet Union within 250 kilometres of its borders with European States 21 days in advance. It was also agreed that observers might be invited to attend notifiable manoeuvres.

You may well ask why the Russians agreed to these provisions which departed so far from their positions two years earlier.

The Soviet policy of "political" arms control had evolved by then both as a reaction to Western "military/technical" arms control proposals and as a means of promoting Soviet political objectives as they were affected by those proposals. Almost two decades before the CSCE, at the Geneva Surprise Attack Conference, the West had sought to prepare a technical, military analysis of the problem of surprise attack and to evaluate various systems of inspection. The Russians had submitted political proposals for a system of inspection and disarmament as a means of preventing surprise attack.

Even if the West would trumpet the provisions in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act for the peaceful change of borders and the movement of peoples and circulation of ideas across them, the Russians won their political aim of confirming the territorial

status quo in Europe. Besides, the CBMs in the Helsinki Final Act were unlikely to contribute much to averting a surprise attack in Western Europe - if Moscow ever contemplated one; and CBMs certainly would do little to prevent the use of force for political intimidation.

That became clear when the CSCE was in session five years later in Madrid trying to draw up a mandate for the Conference on Confidence-and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, or CDE, which was to devise a second generation of CBMs. The Warsaw Pact launched a large exercise called "Soyuz 81" in the Spring of 1981 aimed at intimidating the Opposition in Poland. No Helsinki-type notification was given and in effect this action was taken without prior warning, relying for effect on dramatic surprise, if not assault. Later that year, the Warsaw Pact undertook further manoeuvres, "Zapad 81", in and around Poland. They were notified but inadequately, omitting enough information to judge the significance of the exercise.

This experience highlighted the need for mechanisms to permit enquiry through "challenge". It also showed that agreements on CBMs had to be "binding"; otherwise, how could the adequacy of a notification be judged if the data required for that judgement were given on a voluntary basis only.

CSCE Adopts a Second Generation of CBMs at Stockholm

Despite this spotty record in the implementation of first generation CBMs, NATO decided to persevere with plans to hold the CDE starting in 1984 in Stockholm. The allies agreed with the thesis of the French who had proposed the Conference: if the Russians wanted a Pan-European security forum so badly, make them pay for it by agreeing to CBMs which would be military significant, politically binding and verifiable.

These CBMs would enhance Western security by making it more difficult to launch a surprise attack in Central Europe. Technical arms control, as the "enlargement" of military strategy had focused for years on trying to secure strategic advantage. What the allies were unable or unwilling to do in balancing the Warsaw Pact forces, they would try to achieve through arms control. Protesting that Western proposals for CBMs in the CDE were aimed at supplementing intelligence in identifying targets for NATO's new "Airland Battle", members of the Warsaw Pact were not just being rhetorical.

Another reason why the allies went ahead with the CDE, despite misgivings about it for tactical reasons and Washington's doubts about CBMs on substantive grounds, was related to broader security issues. Arms control had become identified with explicit agreements linked to international negotiations constituting a bellwether of East-West detente. The allies had to be seen by the public to be trying hard in arms control and to retain the initiative in the negotiations.

NATO's preparations for the CDE said something about how the allies regarded CBMs. Prior to the CSCE meeting in Madrid, which drew up the mandate for the CDE, NATO had begun to prepare a package of so-called "second generation" measures to propose at renewed negotiations on CBMs. The allies had identified about 25 possible initiatives to be adopted or discarded depending on how they might enhance or undermine alliance strategy. The work was suspended after the Madrid meeting started in order to focus on the mandate issue.

At the conclusion of the Madrid meeting, in the Autumn of 1983, there was not much time left to complete NATO's study of possible new measures before the CDE began the next January. Concerned about varying perceptions among the allies, Washington moved quickly in cobbling together a package of CBMs, mostly patterned off the associated measures which NATO had proposed some years before in MBFR. While several allies questioned aspects of the package, worried that the Russians would find it provocative and accuse the West of negotiating in bad faith, the alliance embraced it faut de mieux since there was not enough time to pick up the work which had been suspended on the 25 possible measures.

Compliance with CBMs

As we have seen, compliance with the CBM provisions in the Helsinki Final Act was mixed. Aside from the flagrant violations incited by the events in Poland, there were errors in notifications and the amount of information they contained varied greatly.

Among the measures adopted in 1986 at the CDE in Stockholm and refined in 1990 at negotiations in Vienna (by then the measures were hopefully called confidence-**and security**-building measures to mark a qualitative change over the first generations CBMs), calendars of military activities were faithfully published which corresponded closely with the exercises held. Advance notification of most activities was given and observers were invited in accordance with the agreements. Predictably, as States felt less threatened, the number of notifiable activities dropped: from 47 in 1987; to nine in 1990; 10 in 1991 and only five in 1992. Over the same period, as activities declined, observation fell from 17 to three. The continuing value of CSBMS thus seemed marginal.

The CSCE "Vienna Document 1990" also called for extensive exchanges of information. The treaty on the reduction of Conventional Forces in Europe, or CFE, committed the members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact to disclose even more data. Later, all members of the CSCE agreed to exchange this data. In general, the results of these exchanges have been satisfactory.

It was not until 1989 that United States and Soviet officers held an exchange of views and concerns, although the Helsinki Final Act had, 15 years before, provided for exchanges of military delegations. The CSCE also conducted seminars in 1990 and 1991 on

military doctrine at which the participants gave details of their military organizations.

Verification of CBMs by On-Site Inspections

As long ago as 1986, the CDE in Stockholm agreed on a regime of on-site inspections. During the first four ensuing years there were 44 inspections conducted almost equally between NATO and the Warsaw pact. While several technical difficulties and differences of interpretation of the agreement arose, there were no formal complaints of violation.

This was a remarkable achievement remembering that when the CDE began in 1984 East-West relations were at a very low ebb. The Russians had abandoned negotiations on strategic and intermediate nuclear weapons in protest against the deployment of American INF in Europe. Reagan was indulging in his rhetorical flights calling the Soviet Union an "Evil Empire".

The on-site inspection regime adopted in Stockholm was also remarkable in the way it was drawn up. Until a few weeks before the conclusion of the CDE, the Russians had refused to discuss inspections, calling them, "espionage". Suddenly, the Chief of Soviet General Staff, Akhromeyev, who was to commit suicide after the abortive coup in Moscow in 1991, arrived at the Conference to announce that Moscow would agree to inspections, although those undertaken by air would have to be conducted in aircraft provided by the overflown State.

The modalities of the inspection regime were drafted by the KGB resident and a member of the British delegation starting from scratch in absence of previous negotiations over a weekend in an apartment outside of Stockholm. By then it was Friday, September 19, 1986, the day that the Conference was supposed to end. The clocks were stopped in accordance with an inimitable CSCE subterfuge.

Almost 60 hours later the clocks were started up and the Conference concluded, incorporating the results of the hasty negotiation on this first ever aerial inspection regime which would hold important precedent for the INF and "Open Skies" agreements. Despite the rather slapdash way that it was put together, all sides expressed general satisfaction with the inspection procedures over subsequent years.

The Questionable Theory Underlying CBMs

In his magnum opus on confidence-building measures, Confidence (and Security) Building Measures in the Arms Control Process: A Canadian Perspective, which I commend to any of you who hasn't read it yet, Jim Macintosh here lamented what he called "definitional imprecision" and lack of a "convincing psychological explanation" in dealing with confidence-building. I think that the details on CBMs and verification in the Helsinki process which I have just

related bear Jim out. The evolution of CBMs was not based on a set of precepts or specific theory for promoting confidence; but rather it emerged from diplomatic interaction as a kind of garniture to disarmament plans.

One could go even further in questioning the value of CBMs qua measures. For instance, does transparency in military activities which is supposed to accrue from CBMs really add to security? It changes perceptions; but does it alter military realities? East-West tensions were not only due to misperceptions and misunderstanding but also to deep-seated political differences.

Transparency in military activities resulting from CBMs does not assure States that they won't be attacked. They could be attacked despite prior notification of activities and the presence of observers. In fact, these measures could help to conceal preparations for a surprise attack. They could create a false sense of security.

Even constraint measures could do more harm than good. While they can buy useful warning time, they create reassuring appearances which may differ from reality. The Helsinki experience showed that it is difficult to design constraints which apply equally to all participants, thus tempting potential aggressors and inciting rather than calming fears among others.

As Jim has written, perceptions of threat are reached only partly in rational ways. One side's assumptions about the other side's motives may lead to misinterpretations. Thus, some CBMs might actually diminish confidence in a State about its own security. In a RAND Corporation simulation of a late 1980 USA-Soviet crisis over Yugoslavia, CBMs did not promote confidence among the protagonists; nor did CBMs reduce Soviet ability to intimidate by the threat of use of force - as we saw in the real life exercises "Soyuz 81" and "Zapad 81".

Conclusion

I don't mean to conclude that CBMs have not helped at all in contributing to the reduction of tensions in Europe. But like other aspects of arms control, CBMs may be more a result of detente than a cause of it. They have become a sign, or again, a bellwether of detente. For instance, the CDE would never have adopted an on-site inspection regime if Gorbachev had not chosen it as the forum to show that he meant business in trying to allay Western fears about a Warsaw Pact attack.

If CBMs have made any difference in relaxing East-West tensions - in helping to end the Cold War - it is mostly due to Soviet attitudes. Throughout the Helsinki Process, the Soviet Union was willing to compromise on the substance of measures to win what they wanted in process.

Process is the key word, the one I want to leave with you in reviewing confidence-building and verification in the CSCE. The Soviet Union could compromise on substance because CBMs, as procedure - as measures - are not militarily important. No one is going to agree to measures which compromise his security.

But as a process within the Helsinki process CBMs are politically important. Mostly, because they deal with an area - military activities - where publicly visible progress is possible. And negotiations on CBMs provide a useful forum to bring adversaries together to talk, to exchange perceptions to express concerns and, of course, to make publicity.

CBMs certainly did not create the epochal events of 1989 in Europe. But they did help to induce the climate of confidence in which Gorbachev could conclude that the West did not pose a military threat to the Soviet Union. CBMs may have helped him to see and to persuade his generals that the Eastern European glacis was not worth the price of holding on to.

So this is the main lesson to be drawn from the European experience with CBMs. They can help to pave the way toward political accommodation. They can help to convert confrontation into cooperation. They can reinforce existing trends.

Negotiating CBMs has also contributed to overcoming the so-called "security dilemma". I intentionally said "negotiating CBMs", and I would emphasize negotiation over implementation of CBMs. While it may be in vogue these days to question how useful arms control negotiations are, it is the very process of negotiation which explains to a great extent the benefit of CBMs. In the European experience these negotiations have grouped together adversaries together for prolonged periods: not just officials around a table, occasionally joined by ministers. But through the constant traffic of messages generated by such negotiations, capitals are, in a sense, brought together as well.

The Canadian delegation put it this way at the end of the negotiation of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975:

> "For almost three years it has been possible at formal and informal meetings, over lunch and at working dinners, to remind the Russians that their view of the world of Europe is becoming outdated and that many aspects of their increasing interaction with countries having different systems are simply not tolerable any longer....it was this very process, this stream of telegrams going back to Moscow from Geneva...."

KEY ELEMENTS OF A CONCEPTUAL APPROACH TO CONFIDENCE BUILDING[1]

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Introduction

The success enjoyed in developing comprehensive confidence building agreements in Europe as part of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) process has highlighted the importance of confidence building as a valuable security management approach. In particular, ***it seems clear that the negotiation and implementation of confidence building agreements in the CSCE process must have played a relatively important role in contributing to the positive changes in the European security environment witnessed during the past six years.***[2] This contribution has made us even more aware of the potential value of confidence building as a security management approach. Thus, it is hardly surprising that the potential use of confidence building in other regions of the world has attracted increasing attention during the last few years.

Although the promise of confidence building as a formal security management approach is great, there are some considerations that must be appreciated before attempts are made to transfer the positive experience of Europe and the CSCE to other regions. Perhaps the most important point to make — and a key theme underlying this paper's research — is that ***we know less about the confidence building phenomenon than is commonly realized.*** The specific history of the CSCE negotiations that led to the Helsinki CBMs of 1975, the more comprehensive Stockholm Document of 1986, and the even more substantial Vienna Documents of 1990 and 1992 is quite well understood but the "larger" process of confidence building — what could be called ***profound or extended confidence building*** — appears to extend beyond this narrow negotiation history. There are good reasons to think that the larger confidence building process, while obviously and intimately connected with the negotiation and implementation of CBM agreements, also includes connections with more profound processes of change in evolving security relationships. In fact, "confidence building" as it is conventionally understood may not be able to accomplish very much unless it ***is*** associated with these more profound processes of transformation. If true, this will have an enormous impact on attempts to transplant the confidence building approach.

The ***reconstructed***[3] understanding of confidence building presented in this brief paper differs somewhat compared with the observations of policy makers and analysts who concentrate more narrowly on the operational nature of CBMs. Although not wrong, per se, this narrower view is

incomplete. If we are to employ the generalizable insights of the CSCE experience in other contexts, it is critical that we understand the confidence building phenomenon as fully as possible. This paper presents an outline of a developing conceptual approach intended to escape some of the limitations of the ***"minimalist"*** appreciation of confidence building that continues to structure much of our thinking.

This more comprehensive approach to understanding confidence building (1) attempts to incorporate a sense of the larger transformation process into which the negotiation and implementation of CBM agreements are "hooked" and (2) makes a conscious effort to construct a general and more abstract understanding of the confidence building phenomenon that is not too closely tied to an operationally-oriented version of the European experience. It is difficult, however, to escape from the roots of the confidence building phenomenon which are clearly European in nature and strongly informed by the CSCE experience.

Before looking at the essential elements in this comprehensive conceptual approach, it might prove helpful to explain in clear terms why the minimalist perspective is inadequate and why a more complex approach is necessary. It must be acknowledged at the start that the more complicated approach recommended in this paper is controversial and does not enjoy broad support in the analytic community. For many, this approach appears to make confidence building into something larger, more involved, and more powerful than seems warranted.

In the most straightforward of terms, the reason for preferring this more complicated approach lies in the incapacity of the conventional minimalist approach to explain ***how*** confidence building works and ***why*** it can have any but the most ephemeral impact on very practical political perceptions of threat in a difficult security environment. Second, and in a related vein, the minimalist approach does not attempt to explore the connection(s) between the negotiation and implementation of confidence building agreements and broader transformations in security relationships that we know have occurred contemporaneously in the defining European case. Before analysts and policy makers in other parts of the world decide to adopt the confidence building approach, they would be well-advised to understand it as fully as possible. It may be a more complex, powerful, and misunderstood process than many appreciate. That is the reason for asking the sorts of difficult question that underlie the conceptual approach sketched out in this paper.

Outline

The paper has a number of components. Each contributes to the gradual development of a comprehensive understanding of confidence building. The idea is first to look briefly at the minimalist understanding and then assemble the elements of a more comprehensive reconstruction of confidence

building. These elements emerge as the product of a discursive exploration of several important conceptual issues having to do with the way in which confidence building appears to function. This emphasis on questions of causality and psychology helps to distinguish the paper's conceptual approach from the more conventional or minimalist approach. By way of abstracting these observations, the paper presents a process- and an operationally-oriented general definition of confidence building. The concluding portion of the paper reiterates the main points distinguishing the comprehensive conceptual approach. It also includes several remarks dealing with the problems that face any effort to export the still-poorly-understood confidence building approach to other regions. For background purposes, the paper's appendices contain a comprehensive typology of CBM categories and a summary of the 1992 Vienna Document.

The Minimalist Approach

There is an overwhelming tendency in both policy and academic circles to rely on a ***minimalist*** construction of confidence building. This basic understanding tends to portray confidence building as

> a security management approach employing purposely designed, distinctly ***cooperative*** measures intended to help clarify participating states' military intentions, to reduce uncertainties about their potentially threatening military activities, and to constrain their opportunities for surprise attack or the coercive use of military forces.

Although there is nothing intrinsically wrong with this reconstruction — that is, it doesn't dramatically misrepresent what confidence building seems to be about — this construction is very constrained in its outlook. In particular, it recognizes little in the way of clear causal connections between the negotiation and implementation of confidence building agreements ***and any deeper, underlying, or associated process of change or transformation in security relations.***

In the minimalist construction, "confidence building" is treated for all intents and purposes as little more than an approximate synonym for ***implementing*** a collection of CBMs. And implementing these measures is associated with a general but unexplored expectation that the adoption of CBMs will reduce suspicion and misperception and thus improve a security relationship. This is presumed to occur because participating states will have more (and more reliable) information about each others' military capabilities and activities. ***Without something more fundamental changing in an enduringly antagonistic military relationship, however, more (and more reliable) information is not necessarily going to result in reduced tensions and a significantly better relationship.*** It is entirely reasonable to believe, for instance, that more — although not "complete" — information will ***increase*** rather than

diminish suspicion because it will feed fears and doubts and populate misperceptions with additional grounds for concern. This analytic weakness is an important point to consider when exporting the confidence building approach to new contexts, especially ones with political cultures that do not necessarily mirror those of northern Europe and North America. In any event, the minimalist construction is virtually always silent about how, in any formal sense, confidence building functions — that is, how it accomplishes what conventional treatments imply it can accomplish.

The assertion that "something more fundamental than the increased and more reliable flow of information must happen in an enduringly antagonistic military relationship in order for security relations to improve in a meaningful way" is the key claim that distinguishes this paper's comprehensive understanding of confidence building from the typical minimalist account. The minimalist construction, because of its unreflective nature, can function with an unexplored assumption about the virtues of transparency and why more information improves security relations. A comprehensive understanding of confidence building requires more and insists on asking ***why*** security relations improve?

Obviously, this more comprehensive view takes as a given that significant improvement ***is*** the central, explicit, deliberate goal of confidence building as a policy process and that positive change ***does*** occur as a result of the successful employment of the confidence building process writ large. This appears to be an irreducible, minimum assumption ***if*** confidence building is to be seen as anything more than a trivial endeavour. However, this view does not assume that positive change automatically will occur if CBM agreements are negotiated. From an analytic standpoint, it continues to be unclear just what antecedent or parallel conditions (including but not limited to the negotiation and implementation of CBM agreements) are necessary for a positive transformation to occur. The outstanding goal of this more comprehensive approach is to determine what these antecedent and/or parallel conditions are and how they interact with "confidence building."

The approach sketched out in this paper attempts to link the development and implementation of confidence building agreements to an underlying process of confidence building — or, potentially, an even broader process of fundamental political change. This alternative approach asks how it is that developing and implementing packages of CBMs can

(1) ***initiate*** a fundamental process of ***threat perception transformation*** or

(2) ***facilitate*** in critical ways the development of a nascent process of transformation, a process already underway as the result of another stimulus or stimuli?

If we don't know how we reached the current state of transformed relations in Europe, then we are unlikely to know how to maintain and improve the current state of transformed security relations. This is a very important point. As if to underline this concern, we are already seeing disturbing indications in 1993 of our inability to sustain and nurture transformation processes begun in Europe only a few years earlier.

At least as significant, ***without a sound causal understanding of this transformation process, we will have no idea how to reliably transfer the experience of Europe to other parts of the world and to other types of security relationships.*** This is also a very important point. The general "exportability" of Vienna-style CSBMs and the broader "regime" we think their use creates ***ought not to be assumed a priori.*** The misapplication of the confidence building approach in new contexts could either retard incipient improvements or inadvertently worsen a problematic security relationship.

A Closer Look at Confidence Building and What Enables it to Succeed

Primarily as a result of studying the experience of confidence building in the CSCE case,[4] we are beginning to appreciate that successful confidence building involves something more profound than improved access to security information. If the European case is any guide, it appears that confidence building, if it is to be successful, must also be associated with a process of transformation ***— a fundamental shift in the way leaders and publics think about potentially dangerous neighbours and the sorts of threats that they pose.*** Thus, confidence building is not simply the adoption of specific measures — CBMs — providing participating states with more (and more reliable) information about each others' military capabilities and activities.

This observation speaks to the causal nature of the confidence building process and does so in a way that highlights the central role of basic decision maker beliefs and the importance of fundamental shifts in perception. A provisional but promising hypothesis suggests that the ability to suspend intrinsically unverifiable suspicion about a potentially hostile neighbour in the face of ambiguous evidence — in effect, to engage in a positive ***leap of faith*** about the nature of neighbours and their military intentions — may be the key factor that allows a genuine confidence building regime to develop. Equally important, the process also may require a "spark" or "initiator" — for instance, the intervention at a critical period of a key figure able and willing to initiate or facilitate the process of transformation through significant unilateral action.

Without that leap of faith and the events or processes that trigger it, true confidence building and the escape from perpetual suspicion and hostility entailed by its successful operation may be very difficult to achieve. In its absence, the best that can be managed may be a very modest information-

oriented arrangement of real but very limited value — a superficial or pseudo-regime with the appearance but *not* the function of a confidence building regime. This is an important distinction because it focuses on ***underlying function rather than superficial form.***

This transformation process-oriented explanation of how confidence building works raises some difficult conceptual issues. Perhaps most central, what is it that encourages some actors to take this kind of deliberate chance, either on the basis of calculation or intuition? What happens to cause these particular actors to see another state or states as being significantly less threatening and dangerous than conventional wisdom or traditional analysis would recommend? What induces them to undertake critical initiatives? And how does this influence other key actors? Thus, the main theme in this reconstruction of the confidence building phenomenon is the centrality of dramatic shifts in conceptions both of international security and how to achieve it — what philosophers of science call "paradigm shifts."[5] A comprehensive explanation capable of accounting for the paradigm shifts, however, continues to be elusive, primarily because of the intensely psychological — and hence inaccessible — nature of the process.

There are two points relevant to the psychology of confidence building worth further reflection. First, however much we try to wriggle out of this conclusion and however much we attempt to develop an alternative model, it appears inescapably clear that ***profound shifts in the way key decision makers understand threatening neighbours lie at the heart of a successful confidence building process***. This is especially so when seen in the context of the European CSCE experience. That is a fundamental conclusion emerging from over eight years of reflection and analysis. Important and profound changes take place in the minds of key decision makers that permit — indeed, constitute — a transformation in conceptions of security relations. This seems to be the central feature of the confidence building process. ***Confidence building otherwise would be a trivial exercise in incomplete information exchange if it didn't facilitate this kind of profound change*** ... and it certainly seems to have been associated with just this type of profound change in the European case.

Second, usefully direct access to the relevant thought processes of the key decision makers involved in the confidence building transformation seems unlikely. Thus, direct and compelling proof for the claims made in this paper may be hard to come by. The key decision makers (and their habits of thought) are generally not available for dissection (either literal or figurative) and the processes thought to have occurred did so some years ago. Worse, the processes of change themselves may help to obliterate any evidence of the change. Although we understand increasingly well the ways in which the human mind works, that knowledge is still surprisingly incomplete and is not easy to deploy in the attempt to understand and explain complex international relations events and processes.

Despite the very serious methodological problems that may confound any truly refined analysis of the confidence building process, this idea of a major change in perceptions of threat is important. It alerts us to the likelihood that CBMs may work best when some variety of positive shift in security thinking is already taking place. According to this view, the negotiation and implementation of a package of confidence building measures will ***accelerate or facilitate that process of improvement.*** It seems less likely that a confidence building arrangement can actually start such a process by itself although this also may be possible, particularly in regions with different security relationships and political cultures.

Thus, the timing of negotiations to develop CBMs may be critical to their success. Pursue them too soon and they will produce a disappointingly marginal — or even dangerous — result. Wait too long and the pursuit of a CBM package will miss the window during which it can have a positive impact on the evolution of security relations. We do not yet completely understand the exact role played by the negotiation and implementation of confidence building agreements in this larger process of change. Thus, we remain uncertain about their precise status as ***agent*** (cause) or ***artifact*** (parallel phenomenon) of change. Nevertheless, it seems clear that the negotiation of confidence building agreements can play an important — perhaps crucial — part in the positive transformation of security relations. This makes their pursuit worthwhile and important.

In a related vein, confidence building may prove to be a process with ***finite*** and relatively limited rather than open-ended possibilities. Misunderstanding the phenomenon blinds us to this very consequential possibility. For example, there may be a limited window of opportunity for the development of programmes intended to initiate or facilitate fundamental changes in perception and belief. Initiated too soon or too late, the transformation process may not occur successfully. It may only be possible to undertake the confidence building process for a relatively short time in the evolution of a security relationship. There may also be a natural limit to what confidence building agreements and their negotiating processes can achieve before the exercise collapses under its own weight, breeds counterproductive suspicion, or successfully facilitates major underlying change.

In addition, it shouldn't be assumed that the negotiation of ever-more-complex confidence building agreements must continue forever. Thus, we may need to expand our conceptualization somewhat to recognize the existence of two forms of confidence building process: ***transformation*** confidence building and ***maintenance*** confidence building. The former is associated directly with the transformation process. The latter is more correctly understood as contributing to a ***confidence maintaining process***, a process that builds on (and maintains) the prior occurrence of a significant transformation.

Generalizing the CSCE Experience

Because the bulk of our understanding of confidence building is inescapably rooted in the CSCE experience of the last ten years (and especially the last six years), confidence building ideas will have to pass through a thoughtful process of abstraction and analysis in order for them to be genuinely valuable for use in new application areas, whether substantive or geographic. Despite our best efforts, however, it still is not clear whether or not the resulting ideas will be much more than ***artifacts of a completely idiosyncratic European experience.*** Obviously, their broader utility will be suspect if this proves to be the case.

The "concept building" outlined in this paper is a deliberate effort to buffer against the limitations of this essentially inductive and idiosyncratic origin. However, this fundamental Eurocentric influence may be inescapable and profound given its significant impact on our initial as well as current thinking about confidence building. This will be a serious problem if we have ambitions to use the confidence building concept in significantly new contexts. This is a concern that must be acknowledged forthrightly.

It is difficult to tell to what extent our understanding of comprehensive confidence building truly is in fact a creature of an idiosyncratic experience. If we had additional examples of successful confidence building — as opposed to sporadic and limited instances such as those of the US-SU strategic relationship — we could discern general patterns and tendencies much more easily. Unfortunately, we do not have such comprehensive examples at present. ***Indeed, their development may actually depend upon the successful prior inference of the very generalities for which we need many discrete cases to discover in the first place.*** This places a rather substantial conceptual burden on the CSCE example of Europe. For now, however, it is our main source of insight.

The ideas explored in this paper thus far represent a collection of informed speculations about confidence building. While clearly based on the experience of the CSCE, these observations and speculations attempt to establish a broader appreciation of what confidence building as a general process entails. It is premature to speak of confidence building ***theory*** at this point but the basis for its development is clearly perceptible. A final product, if it is to be useful to analysts and policy makers, will have to combine aspects of the operational and pragmatic with perspectives of a more conceptual nature. The concluding portion of this paper provides a preliminary illustration of that requirement. It includes two general definitions of confidence building — one stressing the process dimension and the other the operational dimension — as well as a number of summary observations that seek to present a very general view of confidence building.

A General Definition of Confidence Building

Earlier in the paper, we looked at a brief working definition of confidence building. Although useful, it is quite limited. For instance, it does not capture any sense of how confidence building actually works. Based on the experience of the European case, a more general or abstract definition can be developed. This is a definition of the confidence building ***process***, a definition that attempts to capture the underlying purpose and political dynamic associated with confidence building. It focuses on the process of change that we believe has been associated with the successful negotiation and implementation of confidence building agreements in Europe. This helps us to understand that confidence building is ***not*** simply a means unto itself. Instead, it is a component of a larger political process and purpose. ***Disassociated from this larger process and purpose, confidence building loses much of its meaning and becomes a narrow, information-enhancing activity incapable of fundamentally altering a security relationship.***

This process-oriented definition states that

- Confidence building is primarily a psychological process
- involving the transformation of senior decision maker beliefs about
- the nature of threat posed by other states,
- primarily entailing a fundamental shift from a basic assumption of hostile intentions to one of non-hostile (but not necessarily friendly) intentions.

The key element in this process approach is the identification of ***transformation*** — the transformation of ideas and beliefs about the threat posed by neighbouring states. The exact character of the transformation and why leaders come to feel comfortable with new, less stark conceptions of threat remain unclear. However, it seems that subtle processes of genuine change (perhaps the result of fatigue and concern about the costs of security) are combined with dramatic acts of statesmanship. Central decision makers must see that neighbours are no longer the threat they once were and act to formalize this new reality in concrete terms.

In addition, we can construct a generalized definition of what confidence building measures do. This provides a more operationally-oriented appreciation of confidence building although it does ***not*** replace the process-oriented understanding.

- Confidence building is a variety of security management typically entailing state actions, undertaken with a ***reasonable*** expectation that fellow participating states do not currently have hostile intentions,

- that can be (in principle) unilateral but which are typically either bilateral or multilateral

- that attempt to reduce or eliminate misperceptions of and concerns about potentially threatening military capabilities and activities

- by providing verifiable information about and advance notification of potentially threatening military activities

- and/or by providing the opportunity for the prompt explanation or exploration of worrisome military activities

- and/or by restricting the opportunities available for the use of military forces and their equipment by adopting verifiable restrictions on the activities, deployments, or qualitative improvements of those forces (or crucial components of them), frequently within sensitive areas near the borders of neighbours.

Together, these two definitions provide a general sense of the process of confidence building as well as its operational character. However, as we move to examine confidence building and the role that it can play in managing or moderating security relationships in other regions, we may find that we need to adjust our understanding of the concept to better reflect the nature of conditions in those regions. These current ideas about confidence building, therefore, should ***not*** be regarded as the final word on the approach and what it involves.

Summary Overview

The following points represent the key elements of the emerging conceptual approach discussed in this paper:

- The conventional or "minimalist" understanding of confidence building treats it for all intents and purposes as little more than an approximate synonym for ***implementing*** a collection of CBMs. And implementing these measures is associated with a general but unexplored expectation that the adoption of CBMs will reduce suspicion and

misperception and thus improve a security relationship. This is presumed to occur because participating states will have more (and more reliable) information about each others' military capabilities and activities. This unreflective view of confidence building is seen here to be incomplete, lacking any sense of causality;

- The comprehensive view of confidence building explored in this paper takes as a given that significant improvement in a group of states' security relations *is* the central, explicit, deliberate goal of confidence building as a policy process and that positive change *does* occur as a result of the successful employment of the confidence building process writ large. This appears to be an irreducible, minimum assumption *if* confidence building is to be seen as anything more than a trivial endeavour;

- If the European case is any guide, it appears that confidence building, if it is to be successful, must also be associated with a process of transformation — ***a fundamental shift in the way leaders and publics think about potentially dangerous neighbours and the sorts of threats that they pose.*** Thus, confidence building is not simply the adoption of specific measures — CBMs — providing participating states with more (and more reliable) information about each others' military capabilities and activities;

- The ability to suspend intrinsically unverifiable suspicion about a potentially hostile neighbour in the face of ambiguous evidence — in effect, to engage in a positive ***leap of faith*** about the nature of neighbours and their military intentions — may be the key factor that allows a genuine confidence building regime to develop. Equally important, the process also may require a "spark" or "initiator" — for instance, the intervention at a critical period of a key figure able and willing to initiate or facilitate the process of transformation through significant unilateral action;

- It appears clear that ***profound shifts in the way key decision makers understand threatening neighbours lie at the heart of a successful confidence building process.*** This is especially so when seen in the context of the European CSCE experience. Important and profound changes take place in the minds of key decision makers that permit — indeed, constitute — a transformation in conceptions of security relations. This seems to be the central feature of the confidence building process. ***Confidence building otherwise would be a trivial exercise in incomplete information exchange if it didn't facilitate this kind of profound change***;

- Usefully direct access to the relevant thought processes of the key decision makers involved in the confidence building transformation seems unlikely. Thus, direct and compelling proof for the claims made in this paper may be hard to come by. The key decision makers (and their habits of thought) are generally not available for dissection (either literal or figurative) and the processes thought to have occurred did so some years ago;

- If we don't know how we reached the current state of transformed relations in Europe, then we are unlikely to know how to maintain and improve the current state of transformed security relations there — and, we are unlikely to learn how to develop or facilitate transformations anywhere else;

- The timing of negotiations to develop CBMs may be critical to their success. Pursue them too soon and they will produce a disappointingly marginal — or even dangerous — result. Wait too long and the pursuit of a CBM package will miss the window during which it can have a positive impact on the evolution of security relations. We do not yet completely understand the exact role played by the negotiation and implementation of confidence building agreements in this larger process of change. Thus, we remain uncertain about their precise status as ***agent*** (cause) or ***artifact*** (parallel phenomenon) of change. Nevertheless, it seems clear that the negotiation of confidence building agreements can play an important — perhaps crucial — part in the positive transformation of security relations. This makes their pursuit worthwhile and important;

- There may be a limited window of opportunity for the development of programmes intended to initiate or facilitate fundamental changes in perception and belief. Initiated too soon or too late, the transformation process may not occur successfully. It may only be possible to undertake the confidence building process for a relatively short time in the evolution of a security relationship;

- There may be a natural limit to what confidence building agreements and their negotiating processes can achieve before the exercise collapses under its own weight, breeds counterproductive suspicion, or successfully facilitates major underlying change;

- Finally, it shouldn't be assumed that the negotiation of ever-more-complex confidence building agreements must continue forever. Thus, we may need to expand our

conceptualization somewhat to recognize the existence of two forms of confidence building process: ***transformation*** confidence building and ***maintenance*** confidence building. The former is associated directly with the transformation process. The latter is more correctly understood as contributing to a ***confidence maintaining process***, a process that builds on (and maintains) the prior occurrence of a significant transformation.

Conclusion

This brief paper provides an introduction to the key elements comprising a comprehensive conception of confidence building. The goal has been to provide "food for thought" rather than ready-made proposals for CBM packages applicable in distinct regions throughout the world. The advance construction of such packages by outsiders is inappropriate. For them to have meaning and value, CBM proposals must be informed by conceptual depth and breadth ***and*** a deep appreciation of the specific political, military, and social context of a particular regional application. The latter entails incorporating the insights of true area specialists and also requires the active engagement of thoughtful and committed policy makers from the region. The potential for genuine confidence building in different regions will be difficult to realize unless policy makers and area specialists have a good understanding of the confidence building approach ***and*** how its implementation could serve the security interests of states within the region.

A secondary aim of this paper has been to suggest that confidence building — and its use in new areas of application — is more complex than some might suspect. Merely copying existing applications — for instance, transferring a simple version of the Vienna CBM agreement to a new region — probably will prove inadequate. The provision of information about military forces (both structures and activities), the opportunity to observe military activities, the provision of direct communication lines, and some modest deployment constraints (the basics of a modest CBM package) do little on their own to change the security relationship of a group of states. Information is as likely to stir concerns as it is to resolve them. One simply acquires more data to support existing conceptions of adversaries and threatening neighbours. While some measures can be useful on their own terms — "Hot Line" communication links, for instance — they are of limited utility. The understanding of confidence building guiding this paper maintains that a true confidence building arrangement taps into broader processes of transformation, both in the perception of security relations and perhaps in even broader terms.

Although this security management approach has great promise, its adoption must be tempered by caution and pursued with imagination. Confidence building is not simply the negotiation

of a collection of CBMs. As we are increasingly coming to appreciate, it involves more fundamental processes of change. This paper has attempted to stress the importance of the relationship between the negotiation and implementation of CBM agreements on the one hand and, on the other, the fundamental transformation of perceptions of threat. *If* confidence building means facilitating transformation — if it means more than simply compiling a collection of discrete measures — then the use of the confidence building concept must be linked with a genuine transformation process. And, of course, the process of change must be attainable and imminent. Timing — when to begin exploring the negotiation of CBM agreements — will be important and the identification of the roots of change or transformation will be crucial. But most importantly, policy makers and analysts must understand the basic nature of the confidence building approach in order to use it effectively and productively. If they do, the promise of confidence building surely will be realized.

NOTES

1. This paper was prepared for an informal Canadian/Korean cooperative research workshop, "Arms Control in the North Pacific: The Role for Confidence Building and Verification," held at Royal Roads Military College in British Columbia, 19-21 February 1993. The workshop was sponsored by the Verification Research Unit of External Affairs and International Trade Canada. Many of the ideas presented in this paper are drawn from a larger study (***From Stockholm to Vienna and Beyond: The Confidence Building Process Revisited***) currently being prepared for the Verification Research Unit. The views expressed in the paper do not necessarily represent those of the Government of Canada.

2. This is perhaps the most fundamental assumption underlying this paper's analysis of confidence building. The long and difficult process of grappling with (and trying to explain) the relationship between the negotiation and implementation of CSCE confidence building agreements and the apparently fundamental transformations of security beliefs eventually resulted in the conceptual ideas outlined in this paper. The pursuit of a comprehensive explanation of the confidence building process, however, is far from complete.

3. The concept of a ***reconstructed*** understanding is important for it helps us to appreciate the difference between a deliberately conceptual reconstruction of a phenomenon and a time- and context-bound operational understanding of that phenomenon. Confidence building as a ***reconstructed*** concept has acquired a more comprehensive content than the early authors of the idea originally seem to have intended. Negotiators and scholars in 1955, 1968, or 1973 may not have appreciated — or even dreamed of — the broader and deeper impact that negotiating and implementing a collection CBMs could have on a security relationship. We have increasingly come to understand the transforming impact of CBM agreements and can now legitimately characterize the "confidence building process" in more comprehensive terms than were understood ten or twenty years ago. This view, however, is controversial because of the change in conceptual content.

It is an entirely legitimate question to ask whether analysts today are wrong for employing a "minimalist" reconstruction of confidence building that grows out of their own recollections of what may have been intended or expected when confidence building negotiations were undertaken in an earlier time. It would certainly be unfair and inaccurate to say that negotiators were trying to accomplish significantly more than they understood themselves to be doing or to impute to them more elaborate motivations about (for instance) regime transformation when they had no such understood motivation or objective.

However, this is ***not*** the intention of the conceptual approach presented in this paper. Instead, the idea is to grapple with what we ***now*** see to have happened in the course of negotiating and implementing confidence building accords in the CSCE context. The nature of this reconstruction of confidence building is different compared with the sparer, less comprehensive understanding of the past. The minimalist account is historically accurate but no longer accommodates what we now understand confidence building to entail. It is important that we keep the historical, policy-rooted understanding separate from the current reconstruction. Many analysts may still be prone to rely upon the minimalist account because they remember quite well what was originally intended, a recollection rooted in a different context and time.

4. It is clear that our principal experience with the confidence building approach has been in the European context of the CSCE. However, confidence building ideas also have been used effectively in the United States-Soviet Union strategic nuclear relationship (for instance, "Hot Line" agreements) as well as the maritime context ("Incidents at Sea" agreements). Some modest confidence building arrangements also have been developed in Latin America and Asia. Nevertheless, the bulk of our ideas about confidence building have a distinctly European flavour, one informed by concerns about large conventional armed forces with substantial tank armies, the terrain of Central Europe, and fears of surprise attack. While other security environments such as the Korean peninsula may share some of these characteristics, the broader political cultures, geostrategic realities, and military relationships are unlikely to mirror those of Europe in the late 1980s. Thus, we must be very deliberate in constructing a ***usefully general understanding*** of the confidence building phenomenon. It would be both inappropriate and unwise to ignore these potentially great differences as this might impair the effectiveness of new confidence building agreements.

5. The classic discussion of this idea remains Thomas S. Kuhn, ***The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*** Second Edition, Enlarged (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).

APPENDIX I

Categories of Confidence Building Measure

We can gain an excellent idea of what confidence building is about by examining a comprehensive collection of CBM categories. This operationally-oriented perspective serves as a menu from which policy makers can select appropriate measures which then can be tailored to their specific needs. Although confidence building involves more than simply putting together a collection of CBMs, this is the raw stuff of policy. Recall, however, that this is a fundamentally atheoretical perspective and says nothing directly about the process of confidence building.

Based on the careful examination of over one hundred specific confidence building proposals, we can identify the following general categories, defined by basic function:

Type A: Information and Communication CBMs

(1) ***Information Measures*** (provision of information about military forces, facilities, structures, and activities)

Examples include: publication of defence information, weapon system and force structure information exchange, consultative commissions, publication of defence budget figures, publication of weapon system development information, doctrine and strategy seminars;

(2) ***Communication Measures*** (provision of means of communication)

Examples include: hot lines for exchange of crisis information, joint crisis control centres, "cool lines" for the regular distribution of required and requested information

(3) ***Notification Measures*** (provision of advance notification of specified military activities)

Examples include: advance notification of exercises, force movements, mobilizations — including associated information about forces involved;

(4) ***Observation-of-Movement Conduct Measures*** (provision of opportunity to observe specified military activities)

Examples include: mandatory and optional invitations to observe specified activities (with information about the activity) and rules of conduct for observers and hosts)

Type B: Constraint CBMs

(1) ***Inspection Measures*** (provision of opportunity to inspect and/or monitor constrained or limited military forces, facilities, structures, and activities)

Examples include: special sensing devices, special observers for sensitive movements, on-site inspections. The "Open Skies"-type observer-inspection mission constitutes a special case, combining elements of the observation and inspection measure type. The inspection is not limited to a constrained facility or activity;

(2) ***Non-Interference (with verification) Measures;***[1]

(3) ***Activity Constraint Measures*** (provision of assurance to avoid or limit provocative military activities)

Examples include: no harassing activities such as "playing chicken" on the high seas or near territorial boundaries;

(4) ***Deployment Constraint Measures*** (provision of assurance to avoid or limit the provocative stationing or positioning of military forces)

Examples include: no threatening manoeuvres or equipment tests, no threatening deployments near sensitive areas (such as tanks on a border), equipment constraints such as no attack aircraft within range of a neighbour's rear area territory, manpower limits, nuclear free zones;

(5) ***Technology Constraint Measures*** (provision of assurance to avoid or limit the development and/or deployment of specified military technologies, including systems

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1. Note that "verification" has an ambiguous status in a confidence building agreement. Verification is a fundamentally unilateral activity that can be ***facilitated*** by provisions in a confidence building agreement. According to this view, verification provisions provide the opportunity and right to verify compliance but they do not constitute verification ***per se***. Facilitating verification has a positive confidence building impact.

and subsystems, believed by participating states to have a destabilizing character or impact)

Examples include: no ***replacement*** of deployed military equipment of certain types (typically, tanks, heavily armoured combat vehicles (HACVs), self-propelled artillery, combat aircraft, and combat helicopters) with new, more advanced types; no ***modernization*** of deployed military equipment of certain types in certain key, well-defined respects; no ***training*** with new systems; no ***field testing*** of new designs; and ***no production*** of specified new systems or subsystems.

Type C: Non-Traditional CBMs

At present, this is a special (but not residual) category. To date, "CBMs" that do not fall readily into one of the militarily-relevant categories noted above have been dismissed as non-examples. Given the variety of new political-cultural and security contexts around the world where comprehensive confidence building might be attempted, this exclusion may not be sound. While we do not want to surrender the precision inherent in the existing typology, a precision that depends upon clear functional boundaries and internal comprehensiveness, we must be sensitive to additional "measures" that ***demonstrably perform an equivalent function.*** If the point of confidence building is to facilitate the transformation of perceptions of threat — and it is argued in this paper that it is — then it may be possible to devise quasi-military and non-military security measures that perform this task. The great concern in expanding the boundaries of what can count as a confidence building measure is that we blur the character of the confidence building process, making it far too broad. On the one hand, we may wish to explicitly identify confidence building exercises that focus on non-military types of "security threat." On the other, we may wish to restrict confidence building per se to military security threats but permit a wider assortment of measures — including non-military ones — to count as legitimate CBMs. This is clearly a non-European approach but that is not necessarily a bad thing. This issue will have to be explored from the perspective of non-European cases with the assistance of area experts and policy makers. Until then, the non-conventional category remains — but remains empty.

APPENDIX II

The Vienna Document 1992

Confidence building agreements are constructed using these basic categories of CBMs in various combinations and to varying degrees of strictness. Measures can be assembled and designed in countless ways to address specific concerns. Agreements can include two or three very basic measures with modest limits or they can include a wide variety of diverse measures with very strict limits and thresholds. The Open Skies Treaty characterizes a very focused type of confidence building arrangement that concentrates on a hybrid task of inspection and observation. Its confidence building character flows from the willingness of participating states to permit neighbours access to troubling activities or facilities. The CSCE's Vienna Document, on the other hand, is a good example of a comprehensive agreement.

The Vienna Document 1992 is the most recent of three comprehensive confidence building agreements developed in the CSCE context. Each has expanded on the content and scope of the preceding example, starting with the Stockholm Document of 1986. The Stockholm agreement, in turn, grew out of the much more modest Helsinki Final Act CBMs of 1975.

An important lesson from the CSCE experience is the way in which the confidence building enterprise began with a modest package of measures and then expanded on it with each successive agreement to eventually produce a very comprehensive confidence building agreement. This is a pattern that we might expect to see repeated in other regions.

Looking at the sorts of measures that are contained in the Vienna Document can give us an excellent idea of what a comprehensive confidence building agreement entails. In particular, it illustrates how the various measures work ***together*** to create a whole that is more than the sum of its parts. Of course, an agreement developed in a different political, cultural, and military environment will likely begin with a more modest selection of measures and they would likely be crafted to address the unique concerns of that region. They might well concentrate on different types of potentially threatening behaviour and they might employ different types of notification thresholds. Nevertheless, the Vienna Document provides an excellent example of a real confidence building agreement and, less directly, a good idea of what confidence building is about.

The Vienna Document 1992, in outline, includes the following CBMs:

- Non-Use of Force Re-Affirmation;

- **Annual exchange of military information** — requires the submission of information detailing land force organization, unit location, manpower, and major weapon and equipment systems organic to formations. It includes non-active and low-strength formations and combat units. Additional requirements include information on military budgets ***and*** major new weapon system deployments;

- **Risk reduction** (employing the Conflict Prevention Centre) — entails timely consultation regarding unusual military activities; cooperation as regards hazardous military incidents; and voluntary hosting of visits to dispel concerns about troubling military activities;

- **Contacts** — to enhance openness and transparency through invitations to visit air bases; expanded military exchanges; ***and*** the demonstration of new types of major weapon and equipment systems;

- **Prior Notification** — requires minimum 42 days advance notification of all military activities involving at least: 9,000 troops or 250 tanks, if organized in a division-like structure (air force participation also is to be notified if fixed-wing sorties associated with the activity are expected to exceed 200); or 3,000 troops in an amphibious or parachute assault exercise; or transfers or concentrations of a division equivalent (including extensive information about the activity and participating forces);

- **Observation** — requires invitation of up to 2 observers per state to observe any exercise, transfer, or concentration involving at least 13,000 troops or 300 tanks or 3,500 amphibious or parachute assault troops and includes extensive regulations to ensure acceptable observation opportunities;

- **Calendar** — requires extensive information about notifiable military activities scheduled for the following year;

- **Constraining provisions** — limit notifiable major activities of more than 40,000 troops or 900 tanks to one per two years and smaller exercises (13,000 to 40,000 troops or 300 to 900 tanks) to six per year for each state. Of these six activities per year, only three may be over 25,000 troops or 400 tanks. Maximum of three simulta-

neous notifiable activities and none may exceed more than 13,000 troops or 300 tanks;

- **Compliance and verification** — provides for short-warning ***inspections*** (to be initiated within 36 hours of the request, employing a maximum of four inspectors, and to last no more than 48 hours) of troubling sites and activities (limit of three received inspections per year for each state) as well as ***evaluation*** visits to confirm the accuracy of the information measure's data (the number of visits based on force size but a maximum of fifteen received visits per year for each state);

- **Communications** — establishes an efficient and direct communications network for CSCE use in distributing notifications, clarifications, and requests; and

- **Annual Implementation Assessment** — which mandates an annual assessment of compliance.

ARMS CONTROL VERIFICATION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

1993. 2.

Man-Kwon Nam

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OUTLINE

- LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE
- SOUTH AND NORTH KOREA'S STRATEGY ON ARMS CONTROL
- PROSPECTS FOR ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS IN KOREA
- VERIFICATION POLICY FOR A S/N NON-AGGRESSION PACT
- VERIFICATION MEANS WITH RELATED TECHNOLOGIES
- VERIFICATION AGENCIES AND ASOCIATED STUDIES

QUESTIONS FROM EUROPEAN EXPERIENCES

- COULD THE DRAMATIC BREAKTHROUGH BE HOPED FOR IN KOREA?
- HOW THE SITUATION IN KOREA DIFFERS FROM THAT OF EUEOPE?
- WHAT LESSONS FROM EUROPE APPLICABLE TO THE KOREAN PENINSULA?
- WHAT THE NATURE OF "DRAMATIC" DEVELOPMENTS IN ARMS CONTROL?
- WHAT ISSUES TO THE PROSPECTS FOR POSSIBLE INITIATIVES?
- WHAT PREREQUISITES TO ARMS CONTROL/VERIFICATION IN KOREA?

POSSIBLE SCENARIOS IN N.KOREA

- CONTINUITY OF THE PRESENT REGIME
  - Junior KIM could not play the same role as his father
  - Struggle with a dilema in open or closed-door policy
  - Few modifications of its overall arms control strategy

- AN UNSTABLE FUTURE
  - Disruption following the death of KIM Il-Sung
  - Redoubled emphasis on the external threat
  - Arms control talks only with propaganda value
    ※ Collapse and unification by absorption?

- MOVEMENT TOWARD N.KOREAN 'PERESTROIKA'
  - Post-KIMs regime possibly to modify its old behavior
  - Arms control begins to follow the European model

HOW THE KOREAN SITUATION DIFFERS FROM?

- THE ROLE OF STATUS QUO
  - Europe : Assuring the continuation of a status quo
  - Korea : Seeking shifts in the strategic context(unification)
- STRATEGIC GEOGRAPHICAL ASPECTS
  - Geograpy prohibits trading between the two Koreas
  - Steadfast classic defense as far forward as possible
- HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE
  - Europe : No war
  - Korea : the Korean War, the Armistice Treaty
- POLITICAL PRECONDITIONS
  - Nuclear and human right issues
  - Issues related to US forces(e.g. T/S)

WHY HAS SOUTH KOREA MISTRUSTED THE NORTH?

- A refusal to recognize and respect South Korea's political social system
- The absence of an apology for starting the Korean War and atonement for crimes committed therein
- North Korea's revolutionary strategy toward the South as clealy stated in its contitutional law
- Massive military expansion since 1962 under the 4 Great Military Guidelines
- Offensive military posture of its forward-deployed forces with full readiness

- A two-faced policy, and outright deceit, such as digging tunnels under the DMZ while engaging in South-North dialog to "ease tensions"

- An inclination for ruthless terrorism as demonstrated by the Rangoon bombing and in-flight demolition of KAL 858

- Incessant subversive activities such as instigating the Southern people and students to violence

- Endless censuring political propagenda, even since signing the pact

- Ignoring human rights issues, such as exchange visits of long-seperated family members due to Korean War

- Use of massive spy-ring in the South Korean society
- Secretive development of nuclear weapons and refusal of inter-Korean nuclear inspection
- Producing/stockpiling of mass-destruction weapons and refusal of signing international CWC, BWC, MTCR
- Demand cancellation ROK/US combined exercise(Team Spirit)
  - The anual TS has been held since 1976
  - TS has nature of defensive training event
  - '92 TS was not held to encourage S-N talks
  - Resume '93 TS to dispel the Nuke suspision
  - N.Korea refused to dispatch its observer teams
  - N.Korea suspended all S-N dialogues after announcing '93 TS plan
  - N.Korea threatened to boycott the IAEA inepections

FORA FOR S-N DIALOGUES IN PROGRESS

- SOUTH-NORTH HIGH-LEVEL TALKS
  - Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, Exchange/Cooperation
  - Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula
- SOUTH-NORTH SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING
  - Political Subcommittee for discussing Reconciliation accords
  - Military Subcommittee for discussing Non-aggression accords
  - Exchange/Cooperation Subcommittee for discussing E/C accords
- SOUTH-NORTH JOINT COMMISSION MEETING
  - Joint Commission for social/cultural exchanges and cooperation
  - Joint Military Commssion
  - Joint Commission for economic exchanges and cooperation
  - Joint Nuclear Control Commission

BASIC AGREEMENT ON NON-AGGRESSION

- NOT UNDERTAKE ARMED AGGRESSION AGAINST EACH OTHER
- PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF DIFFERENCES OF VIEWS/DISPUTES
- EXACT IDENTIFICATION OF THE MILITARY DEMARCATION LINE
- DISCUSSION AND CARRYING OUT STEPS TO BUILD MILITARY CONFIDENCE AND REALIZE ARMS REDUCTION
- INSTALLATION OF A TELEPHONE HOTLINE BETWEEN MILITARY AUTHORITIES
- ESTABLISHMENT OF A S-N JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION

A. C. MEASURES IN NON-AGGRESSION PACT

- MUTUAL NOTIFICATION AND CONTROL OF MAJOR MILITARY ACTIVITIES
- PEACEFUL UTILIZATION OF THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE
- EXCHANGES OF MILITARY PERSONNEL AND INFORMATION
- PHASED REDUCTIONS IN ARMAMENTS INCLUDING THE ELIMINATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND ATTACK CAPABILITIES
- VERIFICATION

DISPUTING POINTS EXPECTED FROM NEGOTIATION

- PRIORITY OF CBMs AND ARMS REDUCTION
- ISSUES RELATING TO THE US FORCES IN KOREA
- TARGET OF ARMS REDUCTION: WEAPONS OR TROOPS
- METHODS OF ARMS REDUCTION REALIZATION
- INTRODUCTION OF LIMITED DEPLOYMENT ZONES
- EMPLOYMENT OF VERIFICATION MEANS
- PATICIPATION IN INSPECTION AGENCIES
- SANCTION PROBLEMS FOR VIOLATIONS

J. DECLARATION OF THE DENUCLEARIZATION

- NOT TEST, MANUFACTURE, PRODUCE, RECEIVE, POSSESS, STORE, DEPLOY OR USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS
- USE NUCLEAR ENERGY SOLY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES
- NOT POSSESS NUCLEAR REPROCESSING AND URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITIES
- CONDUCT INSPECTION OF THE OBJECTS SELECTED BY THE OTHER SIDE AND AGREED UPON BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES
- ESTABLISHMENT OF A S-N JOINT NUCLEAR CONTROL COMMISSION

DISPUTE OVER BILATERAL NUCLEAR INSPECTIONS

	SOUTH KOREA	NORTH KOREA
● IAEA Inspection	· Insufficient	· Sufficient
● Objects of Inspection	· Equal numbers of nuclear and military facilities of both side	· All US military bases vs. Yongbyon nuclear complex
● Inspection Method	· Annual inspection	· Simultanous inspection
● Challenge Inspection	· Necessary	· Unnecessary
● Inspection to military sites	· Necessary	· Unnecessary

NORTH KOREA'S ARMS CONTROL STRATEGY

- FINAL GOAL
  - Unification based on NK terms(A communized Korea)
- INTERMEDIATE GOALS
  - Maintenance of NK military superiority
  - Withdrawal of US Forces from Korea and severance of Alliance
  - Undermine & destabilize SK regime
- NEGOTIATION STRATEGY
  - Hold to the preconditions for S-N Talks
    - ·· Cessation of ROK-US combined military exercise(T/S)
    - ·· Repeal of National Security Law
  - Control S-N Talks in tune with its policy goals
    - ·· Diplomatic normalization with U.S. and Japan
    - ·· Maintain Control of NK's domestic politics

SOUTH KOREA'S ARMS CONTROL STRATEGY

- FINAL GOAL
  - Unification based on liberal democracy
- INTERMEDIATE GOALS
  - Establishment of peaceful coexistence
  - Promotion of military stability
    - Ban of N.Korea's nuclear/chemical/biological arms
    - Elimination of N.Korean surprise attack capability
    - Prevention of accidental military conflicts
- NEGOTIATION STRATEGY
  - Pursue with reconciliation/exchange/cooperation
  - Apply "carrots" and "sticks"

ARMS CONTROL APPROACH

	SOUTH KOREA	NORTH KOREA
BASIC APPROACH	● Arms control through 3 stages - Political/military CBMs - Arms limitation - Arms reduction	● Preconditions for arms control - Cessation of Team Spirit - Withdrawal of US forces
MILITARY CBMs	● Prior notification with invitation of observation team ● Demilitarization of the DMZ and its use for peaceful purposes ● Establishment of hot-line ● Mutual visits and exchanges of military personnel ● Mutual disclosure and exchanges of military information	● Prior notification of military exercises ● Making a peace zone of the DMZ ● Establishment of hot-line ● Prohibition of combined EX's with foreign forces

ARMS CONTROL APPROACH (Cont.)

	SOUTH KOREA	NORTH KOREA
ARMS REDUCTION	● Initial balancing of military forces ● Possess equal numbers of troops and weapons at a lower level ● Balanced force reduction thereafter successively lower levels ● Reduce the number of troops in accordance with arms reduction ● Reduce concurrently reserve and and paramilitary forces	● Phased reduction of forces in three stages within 3-4 years ● Troop cuts to 300,000-200,000 -100,000 ● Withdrawal of US forces in step with the phased troop cuts ● Equipment scaled down in propor. to troop cuts ● Disbandment of militia in the initial stage
VERIFICATION	● Strict verification - OSI with challenge schemes - Permanent monitoring group - Open skies	● Loose verification - OSI with routine bases - No permanent Monitoring

PROBLEMS IN THE NORTH'S APPROACH

- DISREGARD FOR A PHASED ARMS CONTROL FROM CONFIDENCE B. TO ARMS REDUCTION
- EXCLUSION OF ESSENCIAL CBMs i.e. DATA EXCHANGE, INVITATION OF OBSERVERS
- AN ABSENCE OF REALISTIC ARMS-RDUCTION PROCEDURES TOWARD MILITARY PARITY
- DEMAND FOR CEILINGS ON MILITARY MANPOWER RATHER THAN WEAPONS
- STICK TO VERY INCOMPLETE INSPECTION SCHEMES

PROSPECTS FOR ARMS CONTROL IN KOREA

- N.KOREA: REFUSE BILATERAL INSPECTIONS
  - Stick to develop nuclear weapons
  - IAEA inspection only, no challenge inspection
  - Low expectation under Kims' regime

- S.KOREA: LINK RESOLVING THE NUCLEAR ISSUE TO:
  - Overall inter-Korean dialogue
  - ROK/US annual combined exercise(Team Spirit)
  - S/N economic cooperation

- PRE-REQUISITES FOR THE PROGRESS OF ARMS CONTROL
  - should not pursue 'nuke' program
  - should show sincere attitude for humanitarian issues
  - should not pursue a strategy of 'unifying by force'
  - should not demand irrational preconditions

NECESSARY MEASURES FOR TENSION REDUCTION

- PROHIBITION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
  - Mutual inspection of nuclear facilities independent of IAEA
  - Acceptance of challenge inspection by IAEA
  - Destruction of chemicak weapons
  - Respect of international conventions on NPT, CWC and BWC
- VOLUNTARY MILITARY CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES
  - Removal of weapons/military facilities unauthorized in the DMZ
  - Exposure and deactivation of all tunnels beneath the DMZ
  - Unilateral reduction of numerically superior forces
  - Transform of deployed forces from offensive to defensive posture
  - Publication of a North Korean's defense white paper

NECESSARY MEASURES (Cont.)

- OBLIGATORY MILITARY CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES
  - Information exchange scheme
  - Notification with inviting an observation team
  - On-site inspection
  - Mechanisms for military conflicts prevention

- CONSTRAINTS ON OPERATIONS OF MILITARY FORCES
  - Limitations on force deployment
  - Limitations on military movements and maneuvers
  - Limitations on logistical support

COLLECTIVE ACTIONS FOR STABILIZATION

- Demand N.Korea to carry out the Basic Agreement and the J. Declaration of Denulearization of the Korean peninsula
- Demand N.Korea to stop developing nuclear weapons
- Demand N.Korea to accept inter-Korean nuclear inspections
- Call for tight control of nuclear materials, devices, technologies, and scientists from the ex-Soviet Union so that they not be transferred to N.Korea
- Demand N.Korea to stop encroaching upon human rights
- Demand N.Korea to sign to CWC and MTCR

VERIFICATION ORGANIZATION (PROPOSAL)



TRAINING OF VERIFICATION TEAMS

TRAINING COURSE	SUBJECTS	Period(week)			No.
		Lectu	field	tot	pers
INITIAL COURSE	. S-N agreements/background . Case study of verification . Verification policy/guidelines	4	-	4	70
O S I-C (O S I-N)	. Operation of inspecting teams . Objects/procedures of OSI . Portable monitoring equipments . Operation of escort teams	8 (6)	4 (6)	12 (12)	20 (20)
PERMANENTLY MANNED OBSERVATION	. Operation of PMO teams . Objects/procedures of PMO . Monitoring equipments	8	4	12	20
LOW-ALT AERIAL INSPECTION	. Operation of LOI teams . Objects/procedures of LOI . A/C and sensors	8	4	12	5
NTM OPERATION	. Operation of NTM teams . Objects/procedures of monitrong . Monitoring sensors	8	4	12	5

VERIFICATION RESEARCH REPORTS

- A Study on South-North Arms Conrol Strategy, 1989
- A Study of Negotiation Strategy for S-N Arms Conrol, 1990
- Verification Measures for Guaranteeing S-N Non-Aggression Agreement, 1991
- Inspection/Verification Measures for Genuine Demilitarization of the DMZ, 1991
- A Case Study of IAEA Nuclear Inspection, 1991
- Arms Control Verification Regime and Technology on the Korean Peninsula, 1992
- An Inter-Korean Nuclear Inspection scheme, 1992
- A Verification Regime for South-North Data Exchange, 1992

FUTURE WORKS ON VERIFICATION AREA

- S-N bilateral nuclear inspection talks: A Breakthrough
- Feasibility of Open Skies regime on the Korean Peninsula
- On-site inspection regime for weapon destruction processes
- Operational regime of permanently manned observation posts
- Bilateral inspection of C/B weapons control measures
- Acquisition of monitoring technologies and equipements
- MND verification oganization, function, and management
- Verification regime for negotiation of the S-N JMC

NON-PROLIFERATION IN THE NORTH PACIFIC REGION: THE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING DIMENSION

Shannon Selin

Notes for presentation at the Workshop on "Arms Control in the North Pacific: The Role for Confidence-Building and Verification" Royal Roads Military College, Victoria, B.C. February 19-21, 1993

This presentation focuses on three items:
1) the nature of the North Pacific proliferation problem;
2) the appropriateness of using confidence-building to deal with proliferation;
3) potential C(S)BMs for curbing North Pacific proliferation.

1. Nature of the Problem

There are two types of proliferation concerns with respect to the North Pacific:
1) states within the region acquiring weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles or excessive conventional arsenals;
2) states within the region contributing to the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles or excessive conventional arsenals by states in other regions.

Over the next five to ten years, the most pressing issues will be the following:
- North Korea's probable quest for a nuclear weapon capability;
- the build-up of conventional military forces in North and South Korea, including North Korea's ballistic missile capability;
- exports from regional states in the nuclear, missile and conventional areas. China, Russia and North Korea are all problem exporters. South Korea poses a potential problem in the conventional field;
- finally -- and this goes beyond the scope of my research but is an important and, I believe, under-investigated concern -- China's role in hindering a resolution of India's and Pakistan's nuclear competition.

Less pressing -- but not to be ignored -- concerns, include:
- Japan's plans to ship and store large quantities of plutonium for use in civilian "breeder" reactors. This is problematic primarily because of the precedent it sets for other states like the two Koreas and Taiwan to do the same;
- China's and North Korea's "probable" possession of CW;
- the possibility of CW and BW exports from the region;
- China's growing power projection capability, which is partly spurring conventional

build-ups by other Asia-Pacific states.

2. Appropriateness of Using Confidence-Building to Deal with Proliferation

As Jim Macintosh has ably noted, confidence-building refers both to the psychological process by which misperceptions and concerns about others' military capabilities and intentions are reduced, and to the specific measures that bring about such a reduction. While the best definition may be "a total tautology: anything that builds confidence is a confidence-building measure,"[1] CBMs or CSBMs are typically thought to involve the generation of reliable information about the nature and use of military force.

The psychological process by which CSBMs lead to an improved inter-state political and military climate is not clearly understood. However, it is generally agreed that the most-cited example of regional confidence-building -- namely the Helsinki-Stockholm-Vienna Document CSBMs applied amongst CSCE participating states -- contributed to the reduction of NATO-Warsaw Pact tensions and set the stage for negotiation of the CFE and Open Skies Treaties and of possible further measures.

The CSCE confidence-building process was not designed to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or, at least initially and directly, excessive conventional arms build-ups. This notwithstanding, there is no *a priori* reason for believing that CSBMs could not make a useful contribution to curbing proliferation. Non-proliferation CSBMs have been tried in bilateral and regional contexts -- for example, in South Asia, in the South Pacific and in Latin America -- with mixed results.

Non-proliferation CSBMs could have any of several general aims:

1) to increase parties' confidence in their ability to detect other parties' attempts to proliferate (or to help others proliferate) early enough to make an appropriate response;
2) to increase parties' confidence in other parties' intentions not to proliferate (or not to aid others to proliferate) and in the absence of any attempt to do so; and/or
3) to increase parties' confidence in the non-confrontational and non-aggressive intentions of other parties, and thus reduce the perceived need to proliferate. This assumes that attempts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles or excessive conventional arsenals are driven primarily by immediate military security concerns.

CSBMs could achieve these aims by providing credible evidence of the absence of proliferation-related efforts, by providing opportunity for the prompt explanation of worrisome activities, and/or by restricting the opportunities available for proliferation-

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[1]Lynn Marvin Hansen, "The Evolution from Transparency to Constraint," in *Confidence and Security-Building Measures: From Europe to Other Regions*, Disarmament Topical Papers 7, (United Nations: New York, 1991), p. 60.

related activities.

As evidenced by the Helsinki Accord and the Sinai Disengagement Agreement, regional CSBMs -- to be successful -- do not necessarily have to await the emergence of a cooperative political relationship. However, Barry Blechman argues that

> they must be preceded by shared perceptions of the need to redirect the foreign policies of each state towards the active pursuit of regional stability.... Within such broader political parameters, the technical solutions proposed in any arms control regime can ameliorate the general uncertainty and tension which otherwise would hinder cooperation.[2]

Applied to non-proliferation measures, this begs a question. If, in the realm of general military affairs, CSBMs are not intended to prevent the deliberate use of force, i.e., they "assume...that no participating State is seen to be planning to resort to force,"[3] how useful are such measures in cases where states are intent on seeking a mass destruction or excessive conventional capability, or do not care if they contribute to such a capability on the part of others? One might assume that the potential proliferator is unlikely to voluntarily agree to CSBMs, unless it believes it can successfully deceive or evade them. If this is the case, questions about compliance are likely to breed mutual suspicion rather than confidence and the measures will not be of much use in satisfying even the first of the aims suggested above. Even in Europe, CSBMs do not play the role of a major intelligence source, since most data available through CSBMs is also available from national technical means, and any timely information gained through CSBMs is verified through traditional intelligence systems. If a state were to enter into CSBMs in such circumstances, it might do so with the third aim uppermost in mind, recognizing that the process would be a long one, of uncertain course and outcome.

Even in circumstances where states are not seeking illicit weapons, a non-proliferation confidence-building process among traditional antagonists is likely to be protracted, beginning with militarily insignificant measures in the hopes that this will ease agreement on farther-reaching measures later on. Given the urgency governments attach to stopping proliferation, there will be a strong temptation to forego the mutual confidence-building route in favour of other options, of which there are many, ranging from supplier export controls, to economic coercion, to deterrence and defence, to an UNSCOM-type operation, in which it is fair to say that any confidence being built is wholly one-sided.

The choice is not "either/or"; most of these measures can, and should, operate in parallel

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[2]Barry M. Blechman, "Confidence-Building in the North Pacific: A Pragmatic Approach to Naval Arms Control," *Working Paper* No. 29, Peace Research Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, February 1988, p. 13.

[3]Macintosh, "Confidence- and Security-Building Measures: A Sceptical Look," *Confidence and Security-Building Measures in Asia* (New York: United Nations, 1990), p. 79.

with CSBMs. But because the choice exists and because the track record of non-proliferation confidence-building is as yet slender, arguments in favour of specific CSBMs (as opposed to the mantra of confidence-building in general) will be judged critically.

3. Potential Application of C(S)BMs to Curb Proliferation in the North Pacific

Of the proliferation problems identified earlier, only North Korea's quest for a nuclear capability, its "probable" CW capability, and the North and South Korean conventional arms build-up can properly be called exclusive-to-region concerns. The rest all have direct extra-regional implications. Thus the application of *regional* confidence-building measures might be expected to have little effect in alleviating North Pacific proliferation problems, except on the Korean Peninsula. This not does preclude, however, the involvement of regional states in broader Asia-Pacific CBMs, or the regional application of global non-proliferation CBMs (e.g., regional participation in the UN arms register).

What follows is a brief discussion of measures worthy of further exploration.

Nuclear

If the current stalemate in implementing the Denuclearization Declaration continues, the two Koreas may well wish to step back from the ambitious measures envisioned therein and begin with lower-level CBMs, such as exchanges of information about nuclear installations, reciprocal visits to nuclear facilities, and Open-Skies-type flyovers. The information exchanged might include the data the two sides already submit to the IAEA, as well as information about security, safety and waste disposal features.

There is a difference between "visits" and "inspections," however, and given the degree of concern about North Korea's nuclear program, only inspections -- ultimately of the "anytime, anywhere" variety -- will be able to provide the assurance necessary to reduce unease in Seoul and other regional capitals. There is the further danger that moving to lower-level CBMs could take the heat off Pyongyang to move on the bilateral inspection issue. Alternatively, the North-South debates surrounding bilateral inspection could simply be transferred to the issue of information exchange and visits, with no progress on either. And, if Pyongyang is indeed actively seeking a nuclear weapons capability, and is seeking it not because of fears about a South Korean nuclear capability (i.e., the analogy is not, strictly speaking, to Argentina-Brazil), but as a cheap way to offset the South Korean-US conventional superiority and as a deterrent against American use of nuclear weapons (which does not depend on the presence of American nuclear weapons on South Korean territory), it is questionable whether information exchange and visits will build confidence in Pyongyang -- which is ultimately where confidence must be built if the nuclear issue is to be resolved cooperatively.

Nonetheless, transparency measures are aimed as much at giving an indication of intentions as of capabilities, and insofar as they demonstrated both sides' willingness to move to a less

antagonistic relationship, exchanges of information and visits could lead the way for confidence to be built in both Seoul and Pyongyang. In addition, procedures instituted now could eventually bear fruit in the context of future leadership upheavals in the North. One measure of particular value in the Argentine-Brazil case has been the exchange of technical personnel to work at one another's nuclear facilities. This type of ongoing contact -- building the habit of working side-by-side in sensitive areas -- may be one of the most feasible and one of particular value over time.

Instituting region-wide transparency measures is complicated by the mix of nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon states in the North Pacific. While transparency between the US and Russia on nuclear weapon issues is already at an advanced level, neither side has shown a willingness to open this process to non-nuclear-weapon states. The feasibility and value of an information exchange are also affected by the answers to: what sort of information to share, and to what end?

Assuming the Koreas do make acceptable progress towards a nuclear-free peninsula, there are arguments for extending a nuclear-free zone beyond the North and the South. The integration of a bilateral accord into a broader multilateral security arrangement could allay regional suspicions about the eventual implications of a reunified Korea. It could also embrace Japan in a secure non-nuclear framework and provide Tokyo with a credible avenue for reassuring its neighbours about its non-nuclear intentions. If the zone prohibited the production and import of weapons-grade fissionable materials, it would address the proliferation concerns arising from Japan's plans for its civilian nuclear economy. The zone might also moderate the nuclear behaviour of China, Russia and the US in the region and contribute to a world-wide nuclear "allergy," which, Andrew Mack argues, "may prove to be the most effective weapon for reducing the growing risks of regional nuclear proliferation."[4]

The zone could be built in an incremental, pragmatic manner. For example, the steps might include the following, not necessarily in this order:

- verified denuclearization of the Korean peninsula;
- a region-wide moratorium on the production and import of weapons-grade fissionable material;
- region-wide agreement to require full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply;
- nuclear-related CBMs, such as information exchanges, reciprocal visits to sensitive facilities, scientific and technical cooperation in the nuclear field, and agreements not to damage each other's nuclear installations; these might begin between the two Koreas, then be extended to include Japan, Taiwan and Canada, then finally to include the region's nuclear-weapon states;

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[4]Andrew Mack, "The Case for Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones: The Rarotonga Treaty and a Northeast Asian Nuclear-Free Zone," Paper prepared for the 6th Asia-Pacific Roundtable on Confidence-Building and Conflict Reduction in the Pacific, Institute of Strategic and International Studies, Kuala Lumpur, June 21-25, 1992, p. 24.

- extension of the Korean-agreed verification procedures to other regional states; and
- restrictions on the deployment of nuclear weapons in the region, with a ban on those weapons that -- because of their technical characteristics or deployment mode -- could be used only against zonal territory.

Chemical

Confidence-building efforts should focus on encouraging all regional states to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention at an early date, and on building confidence in the period before the CWC comes into effect. Since China's main concern about the CWC is the intrusiveness of verification procedures, reciprocal trial inspections of both military and civilian chemical facilities might be of particular value. Given that Beijing's concerns come mainly from the military establishment, such inspections are perhaps better initiated by the US or Russia than by a non-CW possessor. However, Canada could explore the possibility of having the Chinese visit Defence Research Establishment Suffield, as well as the scope for exchanges of chemists and other relevant experts. South Korea might encourage similar cooperation with North Korea. Canada might also consider convening one or a series of workshops, designed to discuss the implications of adhering to the Convention, to explore possibilities for cooperation and assistance in implementation, and to consider the Convention's probable impact on participants' chemical industries and trade.

Biological

Since BW proliferation is not a major problem in the region, it is probably sufficient to rely on the global process now underway to strengthen the BTWC's verification provisions. Continuation of Russian, US and UK trilateral confidence-building should also be encouraged; the steps agreed among these three might set a precedent for broader multilateral CBMs and verification in the BW field.

Missile

Since missile programs in the North Pacific are not primarily in direct response to one another, transparency about these programs is not likely to have as great an effect in this region as it could in others, such as South Asia and the Middle East (although China's participation in South Asian missile CBMs would be key to their success). In addition, attempts to promote CBMs in the missile field are handicapped by the lack of agreement over the dangers posed by ballistic missile proliferation. China, for example, wonders why missiles should be treated any differently than other modern delivery vehicles such as advanced military strike aircraft.

An exchange of information on missile-related trade, beyond what is to be reported to the UN arms register, is not likely to be agreed to and would be near-impossible to verify.

Constraints on testing could limit the qualitative improvement of North Korea's short-range

missiles and forestall the development and deployment of reliable longer-range versions. Despite their technical feasibility and verifiability, constraints on ballistic missile tests are highly unlikely to be agreed to on their own. They could, however, form part of an agreement to restrict missile possession and deployment, particularly in the Korean or South Asian contexts.

Conventional

Although the Korean conflict may now be susceptible to modest CBMs of the information exchange and communication variety, many observers believe that further-reaching measures and broader resolution of the underlying conflict will have to await a regime change in the North. I am sure that the presentations of our Korean guests will amply cover the potential for conventional CBMs on the Peninsula.

Moving beyond the Koreas, there is a general need for discussion and transparency on force developments in the Asia-Pacific region, to improve confidence and to check any trend towards competitive arms acquisition. In the North Pacific, such confidence-building would be useful not only among the traditional powers of the US, Russia and China, but also among Japan and its Asian neighbours. A series of regional workshops or meetings could allow participants to discuss issues of concern and consider potential CBMs. To encourage participation, the agenda could be framed to address military build-ups indirectly rather than head-on, for example, through discussion of the security of trade routes in the region. Eventually, measures such as information exchange and notification and observation of military activities could be pursued.

The UN arms register provides another logical and relatively simple locus for initial North Pacific cooperation in transparency. The advantage of a region-wide commitment to report is that states may be more likely to submit data if they know that their neighbours will do likewise. Reciprocal reporting commitments by North and South Korea could be particularly valuable. At minimum, the failure of all states in the region to report to the register would seem to limit the possibilities for region-wide cooperation in transparency in other areas.

It is not likely that North Pacific states will go beyond the global register in terms of the scope and timeliness of information to be exchanged or in implementing preliminary verification measures, given that the major players in the region are the pace-setters -- some might say foot-draggers -- for the global register. This does not preclude sub-regional arrangements for data exchange on a variety of military indicators between, say, North and South Korea, China and Russia, Japan and Russia, or -- moving beyond the region -- China, India and Pakistan, and China and Taiwan.

Verification would increase confidence in the information exchanged, but -- depending on what is to be monitored -- could require technology beyond the reach of most regional states and involve unacceptable intrusiveness and costs.

4. Conclusion

Dealing with impending proliferation threats in the North Pacific will not be easy. Within the region, there will be tendency to want to retain military options because of deeply engrained mutual suspicions and uncertainty about the future. Outside the region, economic pressures and strategic considerations will tend towards arms supplying. A combination of responses is required: multilateral and bilateral, supply- and demand- side, direct and indirect. China, the US and Russia will be key to future non-proliferation developments, both regionally and globally, but it is far from evident that these three will put non-proliferation above considerations of prosperity and influence, especially when it comes to conventional arms.

The most feasible and promising CBMs for the region would seem to be those that increase dialogue and transparency. The main initial aim should be to break down the secrecy that pervades regional military establishments. It will have to be recognized, though, that such information and communication CBMs are alone unlikely to significantly limit the proliferation of weapons, especially in the short term. It goes without saying that all regional confidence-building efforts should be placed in the context of continued supply-side controls and efforts to shore up global regimes, as well as broader efforts aimed at encouraging greater regional security cooperation.

Arms Control in the North Pacific
The Role of Confidence-Building and Verification
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OVERHEAD IMAGERY AND ITS ROLE IN VERIFICATION

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Introduction

In the first Royal Roads Military College/University of Victoria (RRMC/UVIC) workshop relating to the possible role of confidence-building and verification in terms of arms control in the North Pacific, the approach taken was a broad but modest one. Focus related to the confidence-building process rather than to the possible use of verification methodologies. Indeed, at that time it was not clear just how significant arms control might be in the region. We were unclear as to the type of agreement that might be sought.

Two years later, and with the participation of our Korean colleagues, we now have a better grasp on a number of real and immediate problems. This is particularly so in terms of the Korean peninsula. Thus we have been able to focus more clearly, albeit from a conceptual perspective, upon a problem area whose dimensions are real and measurable.

In this very short paper this morning, I want to discuss the possible application of overhead (satellite and aircraft) imagery to the arms control verification process. This will lead to Jeff Tracey's more detailed and technical presentation. It is essential that we look ahead and recognize that with the rapidly changing security environment, we should stretch our minds and not rule out options which might appear untenable at this time. For our purposes, we can draw from experience in the bilateral and multilateral dimensions of arms control negotiations. Satellite imagery has been a central ingredient in verifying previous USA-USSR strategic arms agreements. In some form, it can play a useful role as part of a package of methodologies designed for specific multilateral purposes.

National Technical Means (NTM)

Overhead imagery has been used for verification purposes in a bilateral (USA-USSR) context for more than 30 years. Such imagery is acquired through the use of National

Technical Means (NTM). The U.S. State Department formally defines NTM as:

> "Assets under national control for monitoring compliance with the provisions of an agreement. NTM include photographic reconnaissance satellites, aircraft-based systems (such as radars and optical systems), as well as sea- and ground-based systems such as radars and antennas for collecting telemetry."

NTM's most important characteristics are its unilateral and non-intrusive nature. Although cooperative measures by the other side may be used to assist NTM, NTM are the responsibility of each side alone. NTM are non-intrusive in the sense that they are not located on the national territory of the side being monitored.

Although NTM has provided the foundation for verification of bilateral arms control treaties between the United States and Soviet Union, none of the agreements have included a formal definition for NTM. Instead, there are vague statements that the use of "national technical means of verification" is permitted "in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law." The reason for including such an ambiguous definition is reportedly the concern that a precise definition may not protect the U.S. need for flexibility.

Increasingly, the use of satellite imagery has been seen as a significant factor from both the unilateral and multilateral perspective. The non-interference clauses in the Stockholm and Vienna documents can be seen as tacit approval for NTM on a multilateral basis. The CFE Treaty text deals with NTM in Article XXI.

In the CFE Treaty, Article XXI draws extensively on the language concerning NTM developed in bilateral USA/USSR agreements. A very important innovation, however, has been the introduction of the concept of multinational technical means (MTM). The first paragraphs of Article XXI provides for the right to use "national or multinational technical means of verification ... in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law." The second paragraph prohibits interference with NTM/MTM, and the third paragraph prohibits the use of concealment measures that impede NTM/MTM except for concealment practices associated with normal training, maintenance or operations. The fourth and final paragraph requires the use of cooperative measures to enhance verification by NTM/MTM, but the details regarding what measures are to be included have not yet been worked out.

Multilateral Technical Means (MTM)

The evolution from NTM to Multilateral Technical Means (MTM) should not be overly difficult. The possibility of this type of evolution is dealt with at some length in a study entitled "Constraining Proliferation: The Contribution of Verification Synergies" which will be available in March 1993. The authors, two American and two Canadian specialists, focus on the synergistic effects to be derived from combining overhead imagery with other verification tools within a "layered" verification package.

There should be no technical barriers to the establishment of a multilateral technical regime using satellites. Many countries will have the technical resources to construct, launch and operate an overhead satellite system. The development of high resolution satellites imaging for verification appears feasible, however, it will require a substantial financial commitment by participating States. Costs, could be reduced if overhead and administrative costs could be shared.

An integrated multilateral satellite verification regime would have some difficulties to meet from the political perspective. Not all arms limitation and disarmament agreements are negotiated at the same time as the establishment of confidence-building measures. Not all parties would necessarily agree to all aspects of the same agreement. The multilateral satellite regime would have to be considered probably only as a central guidance agency to steer member parties in the appropriate direction.

Operationally, there are a number of factors to be considered. Processing of the satellite data could be undertaken either on a multilateral basis, using a mix of expertise collected from the participating States, or done as a national responsibility, in the event that some technology may wish to be protected. Data analysis of the images acquired by the satellites system could either be a multilateral or a national prerogative. The Western European Union (WEU) is rationalizing this aspect of a possible MTM for Europe. Of course, there may be instances where specific alliances between certain States may require discretion when conducting analysis of overhead imagery of one of their neighbours.

Airborne Imagery

The Open Skies Treaty of 1992 envisions the use of aerial surveillance as a significant confidence-building measure. Such use could have application in the Korean context as the KIDA presentation suggests. There is also a provision in the CFE Treaty of 1990 to include an aerial component in the future compliance component of that agreement.

Such a CFE verification system, incorporating a significant aerial component (i.e., fixed-wing aircraft equipped with appropriate remote sensors), would almost certainly be more effective than a similar system based on ground on-site inspection segment alone. This view is based on several considerations:

(a) aircraft are a cost-effective and important complement to ground inspections: they can check more territory, more quickly and can act as a trigger for ground inspections.

(b) Because aircraft involve monitoring TLE and their sites from farther away than is the case for ground inspectors, in many respects they may involve less intrusion into the military activities of the inspected countries and less overall risk of revealing sensitive information not germane to the verification requirements of the CFE agreement.

(c) Aircraft are highly flexible: they can be used for area surveillance (e.g., looking for TLE outside of declared sites, monitoring TLE transfers and entry into/exits out of the ATTU, etc.) or for close-looks at particular sites (e.g. reducing the number of ground inspections needed, supplementing a ground inspection at one site by simultaneously checking adjacent sites, etc.).

(d) Aircraft will form one layer of a multilayered approach to verification: data from aircraft will serve to provide invaluable checks on data from other verification methods (e.g. more satellite time devoted to CFE verification) and on ground inspections (e.g., higher quotas).

(e) Aircraft are more readily available than some other remote sensing techniques, notably satellites. This will permit greater participation in the verification regime and greater burden sharing of verification costs among the Allies.

(f) Intrusive overflights by an inspecting country's aircraft will have the <u>supplementary</u> value of helping to build confidence among the parties of the CFE agreement. This is in contrast to Open Skies where the emphasis is the inverse: confidence-building is the primary purpose while verification objectives should be secondary.

(g) CFE aerial inspections will have an important precedent setting value for future arms control and disarmament agreements and in other security related fields (e.g., peacekeeping).

Verification Package

Verification should be viewed as a collective process using a multi-layered approach to ensure effectiveness -- and more importantly cost-effectiveness -- particularly in terms of long-term compliance. The following sums up a number of methods which used in a mutually supportive manner can provide an increased level of effectiveness well beyond any single system. These methods could include:

- Satellite Imagery: Two types of satellite imagery -- National Technical Means (NTM) and commercial imagery -- might be used. NTM provides high resolution images and an innovative arrangement should be designed for its use. Commercially available imagery (e.g., SPOT, LANDSAT, Soyuzcarta) is openly available for use. Both can provide wide area coverage. For purposes of monitoring an arms control agreement in the Korean peninsula, an innovative combination of data from the two systems, combined with airborne and helicopter imagery might be useful.

- Airborne Imagery: Both high altitude and mid-altitude airborne imagery could provide high resolution imagery from which additional information of site specific areas could be derived. An assessment of effectiveness of U-2 and Helicopter borne imagery as used by UNSCOM in Iraq would be useful for purposes of application to future compliance requirements.

- On-Site Inspection (OSI): These have already been undertaken by UNSCOM and the IAEA.

- Other OSI Technologies: These include specialized seals, tags, and portal and perimeter monitoring techniques which could be utilized to keep track of the movement of personnel and equipment.

- Data handling: processing capability using inventory techniques.

Concluding Remarks

Underlying this paper are the following premises. Arms control, in a variety of forms, will remain a fundamental approach to international security. Verification or some form of explicit and agreed-upon "confirmation" will be required for regimes and approaches aimed at constraining the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their advanced delivery systems. Finally, the need to control and resolve regional conflicts will necessitate more adversarial verification regimes and coercive regimes, such as mandatory inspections and embargoes encompassed in resolutions of the United Nations Security Council.

Now I will turn to Jeff Tracey to illustrate in more detail the characteristics and capabilities of one such means of overhead surveillance which can contribute as a supporting -- and sometime as the central -- means of verifying compliance.

Arms Control in the North Pacific
The Role of Confidence-Building and Verification
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THE OPEN SKIES REGIME: OPERATIONS AND SENSORS

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Open Skies - General Objectives and Principles

The Open Skies treaty was signed in Helsinki by twenty-five countries on March 24, 1992. After two long years of negotiation within the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe this historic treaty was signed as a signal to all of Europe, North America and the once Soviet Union, that the military powers were conceding their mutual mistrust by allowing unarmed, cooperative aerial inspection overflights over one another's territory.

Open Skies is Confidence-Building - The principle objective of the Open Skies treaty is to establish an international mechanism in which to build the seed of confidence between NATO, the former Warsaw Pact and the former Soviet Union. By allowing systematic aerial overflights using remote sensors to image each other's militarily significant areas, a measure of transparency would be established between countries. The treaty was also negotiated with a view to facilitate the monitoring of compliance with existing or future arms control agreements.

Open Skies is Far Ranging - Open Skies participants included the territories of North America, Eastern and Western Europe and the Soviet Union. The territory of operation of Open Skies overflights was commonly known during the negotiation process as "from Vancouver to Vladivostock".

Open Skies is not Inexpensive - Due to the nature of the complex imaging sensors that were negotiated in the treaty, combined with the stringent data sharing requirements, including the necessity for space on-board the inspecting aircraft for observers from both the inspected and inspecting countries, the overall costs involved to conduct Open Skies overflights is substantial. The overall costs for a treaty compliant aircraft inclusive of sensors and aircrew is approximately 15-20 million USD. Considering the low number of quotas available to each country (Canada has 4.5 for the first year of the treaty), this cost is unjustifiably high for many smaller, less technologically developed countries. Countries have three options open for aircraft and sensors; using national

military capabilities, leasing the service from a third party, or pooling of resources and quotas with several different countries to help defray the costs.

Open Skies is Expandable - The Open Skies concept can be modified for any type of requirement, whether it is on a bilateral or multi-lateral basis. The existing Open Skies treaty allows for the membership of any country wishing to participate within the guidelines of the treaty. The objectives and general principles are readily transferable to other areas of the world. For example, Hungary and Romania have established a bilateral Open Skies treaty completely separate from the multi-lateral treaty, although the treaty was used as a framework in their bilateral negotiation process.

Canada's Leadership Role in Open Skies

Canada played an important role in the implementation and negotiation phases of the Open Skies treaty. The original multi-national Open Skies negotiations commenced in Ottawa in February 1990 with Canada hosting the first international conference. It was with Canada's persistence in believing that this concept was possible, that the Open Skies treaty "got off the ground".

In January 1990 Canada commenced it's innovative approach to the Open Skies concept by conducting an historical trial overflight in Soviet airspace using a Canadian aircraft, a C130 Hercules. The aircraft flew a figure eight pattern throughout Hungarian airspace to demonstrate that flight parameters in foreign airspace were not restrictive issues to the continuance to future negotiations.

One year later in January 1992, Canada reciprocated the Hungarian trial of 1990 by inviting a contingent of Hungarian diplomatic and military personnel to Canada to partake in an experiment more detailed than the original overflight. Representatives from Hungary came to Canada to conduct two trial overflights. One flight was conducted as an observer flight using a Canadian Department of National Defence Buffalo aircraft to assist in orienting themselves with a more complex data acquisition experiment. Following this flight, test procedures for the collection of synthetic aperture radar imagery, aerial photography and video imagery were conducted using the Canada Centre for Remote Sensing's Convair 580 sensor platform. The data were processed and shared among participants to test the procedures and problems that one may expect in an operational setting. Results of this trial overflight were tabled and presented to the Open Skies Consultative Commission in Vienna.

Canada and Hungary are the only depositories of the two original Open Skies treaties. Canada was the first country to ratify the treaty.

Open Skies - Principle Negotiation Issues

The negotiation of the Open Skies treaty extended from the original conference in Ottawa in 1990 to talks in Budapest later that same year, to it's conclusion in Vienna in late 1991. Several key issues had to be negotiated by twenty-five countries.

Sensors - Among the most contentious issue to be agreed upon during the negotiations was the one of the types of sensors to be used during the overflights. The procedure of negotiating such highly technical issues in a diplomatic setting did not lend itself for easy agreement by 25 individual countries. The original sensors that the United States proposed included aerial cameras, infrared linescanners, synthetic aperture radars, multi-spectral scanners, magnetometers, gravitometers and laser detection devices. This differed dramatically with the proposed sensor package that the Soviet's offered as their initial negotiating offer, aerial cameras. Initial sensor issues were not agreed upon until the final negotiating round in Vienna in 1992. Three categories of sensors were chosen. Aerial cameras with a spatial resolution of 30 centimetres was permitted, as well as infrared linescanning sensors with 50 centimetre resolution and 0.2 degrees Celsius thermal resolution, although this sensor will not be allowed until final implementation of the treaty with a gradual phasing in of the sensor. The most complex sensor to be negotiated within the Open Skies treaty was synthetic aperture radars (SAR) with a spatial resolution of not better than three metres. Because of the international restrictions on the exportability of SAR in the commercial world, and the introduction of a relatively new technology, SAR negotiations were very difficult. The rationale for the inclusion of SAR as a sensor worthy of negotiation within the Open Skies regime, was it's all weather, day/night capability to produce useable imagery. In areas of northern latitudes, especially during winter, the passive optical sensors such as photography and infrared would not suffice as the only means of imagery collection.

Aircraft Ownership - During the course of the negotiations it became increasingly clear that the Soviet Union did not want any foreign aircraft flying in Soviet airspace. The Soviets insisted on providing a "taxi" service to any country wishing to acquire data over Soviet territory. Treaty certified aircraft and remote sensors would be provided by themselves to accomplish this. This position was opposite to that of all other countries, that is, allowing the inspecting country to operate it's own Open Skies aircraft within the inspected country. The Soviet stance on aircraft ownership was probably insisted because of safety and flight routing parameters. In the Soviet Union, all airspace is restricted, with the exception of approved flight corridors. In most of the other countries negotiating the treaty, all airspace is open, with the exception of specific flight corridors. Perhaps the lack of navigational aids for pilots, and poor maps of large parts of the Soviet Union, the issue of retaining complete control of all Open Skies aircraft within their airspace was warranted. The

Soviet Union are presently considering the use of a Tupolov 154 jet aircraft complete with the required sensor capabilities as their principle option.

Quotas - During the initial phases of the Open Skies negotiations, all countries wanted a very liberal numbers of overflights over all countries party to the treaty. Many nations requested a disproportionate number of allowed overflights over their historical adversaries. It was no coincidence that most countries wanted large numbers of overflights over the Soviet Union, and conversely, the Soviet Union requested a similar number of overflights over the United States. Eventually, a complex formula was devised based on relative military strength and size of territory to establish a baseline number of both active (those flights that a particular country were obligated to conduct) and passive (those overflights that a country were obligated to accept) quotas. Ultimately, the number of both active and passive quotas were reduced significantly during the initial phases of the treaty. Table 1 lists the allowable quotas during the first phase of the treaty.

TABLE 1. **OPEN SKIES - INITIAL QUOTAS**

Germany	4	Greece	2
United States	8.5	Hungary	2
Belarus and Russia	26	Italy	3.5
Benelux	2	Norway	3
Bulgaria	3	Poland	3
Canada	4.5	Romania	4
Denmark	2	Czech and Slovak	2
Spain	1	Turkey	4.5
France	4	Ukraine	6
United Kingdom	4		
		Total	**89**

Data Sharing - One of the key technical decisions on the data acquisition component of the Open Skies negotiations was the issue of sharing the imagery that was collected during the course of an overflight. Options ranged from the collection of two individual data sets using two camera systems or dual tape recording, to the production of two identical prints from a master tape or film negative. The negotiations on data sharing were focused on the loss of spatial resolution during data reproduction and a standardized method of film processing. The use of digitally acquired images, such as digital SAR was a contentious issue, especially to the Soviets, who are weak in this technological area. Ultimately, it was decided that two copies of imagery would be produced in the field following the overflight if possible. The inspected country would have first choice of the data, with the

inspecting country getting the other. If it is not possible to produce a suitable copy immediately following the flight, the inspected country can accompany the inspecting country back to a suitable location for image and data production.

Trial Overflights to Date

In order to understand the general operating, political, technical and flight principles of what to expect during the implementation of the Open Skies treaty, several trial overflights were conducted by various countries.

Hungary - Canada - In February of 1990 a Canadian Forces C130 Hercules aircraft and crew were invited to Hungary to conduct the first ever trial flight planning and safety procedural flights within the Open Skies context. This flight set the tone for future negotiations. There were no sensors on-board the aircraft.

Hungary - Romania - In June of 1991, Hungary and Romania concluded their bilateral Open Skies treaty by testing the concept by conducting a trial overflight over Romania using a dual set of identical aerial cameras.

Canada - Hungary - Canada reciprocated the previous Hungarian invitation by hosting a trial data acquisition, data processing and sensor procedural overflight in Canada in January 1992. SAR, aerial photography and video data were collected by a Canada Centre For Remote Sensing Convair 580 (Cosmopolitan) aircraft. Data handling and data sharing was shown to be of minimal problems.

United Kingdom - Russia - The Russians were invited to overfly an area within the United Kingdom using aerial cameras. In January of 1992 data was collected by a Russian aircraft in the UK.

Benelux - Poland - A new concept was tested by the Benelux countries over Poland in April 1992. A modified external fuel tank carrying a panoramic and framing aerial camera and forward looking infrared system was flown on-board a Hercules aircraft to test the viability of a pod mounted system. The infrared data was not recorded since the FLIR system is not an approved Open Skies sensor.

Russia - United Kingdom - The most recent trial Open Skies overflight was a program conducted by the UK within Russian territory. Aerial cameras and video sensors were flown on board a British Andover accompanied by a Russian AN-30.

Sensor Calibration Trials

Following the signing of the Open Skies treaty in Helsinki in March 1992, the Open Skies Consultative Commission (OSCC) located in Vienna, were given the task of producing a consensus on the operating and technical parameters of the approved sensor, including; synthetic aperture radars, aerial cameras, and infrared

linescanners and video cameras. Three independent OSCC sensor working group sessions and experiments have been conducted to date to achieve common methodologies for the certification of these sensors. The results of each test were negotiated and agreed within the OSCC and included as individual "Decisions" within the Open Skies treaty.

Boscombe Down, United Kingdom - In June of 1992 the OSCC sensor experts met in Boscombe Down to test and evaluate aerial photographic procedures for the data acquisition, data production and sensor parameters required for the certification of aerial cameras. Film development and characteristics were agreed upon, as well as the type of ground targets for certification procedures.

Budapest, Hungary - A synthetic aperture radar experiment was conducted in Budapest in October 1992 using Canadian, Danish and Russian SAR's and aircraft. The purpose of the trial was to establish within the OSCC a common methodology for the certification of SAR sensors by agreeing on resolution measurement criteria.

Brindisi, Italy - The latest sensor trial conducted within the sensor working group of the OSCC was conducted in March 1993 in Brindisi, Italy using infrared linescanners and video sensors. Sensor parameters and methodologies for the determination of both spatial and thermal resolutions based on overflying active and passive ground targets were investigated.

Open Skies and Supplementary Applications

The Open Skies treaty will probably be one of the most important aerial inspection regimes ever negotiated. As a confidence-building and transparency measure, once ratified and implemented, will set the stage for future aerial inspection negotiations, whether for verification or confidence-building applications. The complex task of negotiating and agreeing on sophisticated imaging sensor technology has been successfully, albeit not efficiently, conducted within a multi-national setting. Acceptance by over twenty-five countries to allow intrusive invasion of their airspace will predominate as a precedent for future aerial inspection regimes. The capability of any other nation to enter the current Open Skies regime as a member, or use the framework of the regime as a guide to other bilateral or multilateral aerial agreements is important. Other supplementary applications using the Open Skies regime as a cornerstone are possible.

Regional Monitoring - Aerial inspection for surveillance, monitoring or confidence-building within the context of areas of regional adversarial conflict could be effective. For example, the utilization of repetitive and continuous aerial overflights in the Czech and Slovak Republics could help the United Nations in monitoring the region and keeping track of the situation. A bilateral Open Skies regime between North and South Korea could

alleviate some of the mistrust between the two countries and promote a significant amount of transparency.

Peacekeeping - The incorporation of the use of aerial imagery into the United Nations peacekeeping operations could help ground-based peacekeepers operate smarter, by knowing what they may face. Aerial inspections when used as a tool to help United Nations peacekeepers, can extend their "eyesight" to an area of deployment through the acquisition of aerial imagery. Aerial imagery has been used in the past in the Sinai quite effectively as an aid to ground-based personnel. In times of dwindling manpower resources, an appropriate aerial inspection regime, negotiated within a particular peacekeeping mandate, and politically accepted by all parties, could play a key role in the decision making process by United Nations peacekeeping Commanders.

Environment - The environment will be one of the most important global concerns within the next decade. Since environmental catastrophes know no boundaries, are often large scale events, and can be readily monitored using remote sensing techniques, extensions of the Open Skies concept for this application is logical. The utilization of the environment or deliberately changing the environment as an aggressive act will be on the agenda of arms control negotiators as an important issue. During the Persian Gulf war, all of Kuwait's oil wells were ignited as an intentional attempt to disrupt the flow of financial resources. The ultimate result was an environmental disaster which was monitored regularly by spaceborne and aerial imagery. The deliberate attempt to destroy a dam in Yugoslavia to disrupt the community downstream is an example of environmental manipulation which can be monitored by aerial means. The current status of an little known arms control treaty called the Environmental Modification Convention (ENMOD) should be either amended or renegotiated and include extensive verification provisions using remotely-sensed imagery as a means of collecting evidence and routine monitoring.

Extended Support for Arms Control Agreements - Aerial inspection regimes can provide additional support to other arms control agreements to help on-site inspectors with their increasing responsibilities. The United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) are currently using combinations of NTM satellite imagery, U-2 high altitude photography, and helicopter 35mm and video aerial images to assist the on-site inspector in conducting their task of monitoring Iraq's compliance of United Nations Resolution 687. Although not an aerial inspection agreement, the United Nations are now using NATO AWACS support in monitoring the "no-fly" zone in the former Yugoslavia. The Conventional Force Reductions in Europe (CFE) treaty has included in it a provision for an aerial inspection protocol, similar in many respects to the Open Skies regime. A logical extension of the current Open Skies regime would be to assist on-site inspectors within the CFE treaty monitor treaty limited items. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has recently addressed the need for "special inspections" to

help their on-site inspections of nuclear facilities around the world. Although the mandate of the IAEA is not one related to any particular arms control agreement, aerial inspections of nuclear related facilities could provide inspectors with updated maps and other ancillary information of a facility.

Conclusion

The Open Skies regime signed in March 1992 represents a milestone in the negotiation of a complex, technological oriented, multi-national, aerial monitoring arms control treaty. The lessons learned from the negotiating process and the sensor certification tests should be heeded by others who wish to incorporate the use of aerial inspections as a confidence-building or verification device.

Trial Open Skies overflights have proven themselves as important adjuncts to the treaty as the lessons learned from them can be considered to be, in some instances, more relevant than the negotiating process itself.

Other supplementary applications or variations of the Open Skies regime include; uses for regional monitoring, peacekeeping, environmental monitoring, and as a support tool for other arms control agreements.

OPEN SKIES IN THE KOREAN CONTEXT

by

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I. WHAT IS OPEN SKIES?

■ The Concept

- On March 24, 1992, 25 signatories agreed to open their skies for unarmed surveillance flights with a short-notice, hence Europe in the post-Cold War era entered a new phase of openness and transparency. The agreement encompasses an area stretching from Vancouver east to Vladivostok (now called Pavlovskoye). It is the first confidence-building regime which includes all of the territories of North America, Europe, and the Asian part of Russia, opening over 16 million square miles of land to aerial inspection.[1]

- The purposes of verification are to demonstrate compliance, to deter non-compliance, and to clarify certainty regarding military affairs of other countries. In order to perform these 3 functions, verification regimes employ both cooperative measures, such as on-site inspection, manned or unmanned monitoring posts, or aerial inspection, and non-cooperative measure, such as national technical means (NTM).[2]

- Open Skies is a cooperative inspection measure; it cannot be conducted without a permission from inspected states. The main purposes of Open Skies are to ensure transparency and confidence-building by encouraging reciprocal openness on the part of the participating states and allowing the observation of military activities and facilities on their territories. Open Skies can serve these ends as a complement both to NTM of data collection and to information exchange and verification arrangements established by current and future arms control agreements.

■ Developments of Open Skies

- The Open Skies Treaty of March 24, 1992 is the materialization of President Bush's proposal on May 12, 1989 at the Texas A & M University. President Bush proposed the creation of a so-called "Open Skies" regime, in which the participants

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[1] Peter Jones, "Open Skies: A New Era of Transparency," *Arms Control Today*, vol. 22, no. 4 (May 1992), p. 10.

[2] Sidney Graybeal, George Lindsey, James Macintosh, and Patricia McFate, *Verification to the Year 2000* (Ottawa: The Arms Control and Disarmament Division, External Affairs and International Trade Canada, Canada, 1991), p. 5.

would voluntarily open their airspace on a reciprocal basis in order to strengthen confidence and to increase transparency regarding their military activities.

- This proposal was an expansion of a concept that had already been proposed during the 1950s. President Eisenhower first proposed Open Skies in 1955 -- before surveillance satellites became available -- to monitor the US' and the Soviet Union's strategic arsenals and other military activities. Soviet leaders were suspicious of President Eisenhower's proposal, denouncing it as "a bald espionage plot" against the Soviet Union.[3]

- Nevertheless, the practical use of aerial inspection dates back to 1957 when the first UN Emergency Force was deployed in the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula to oversee the withdrawal of French, British, and Israeli forces. UN peace keepers used aircraft to patrol the Egyptian-Israeli frontier, the Armistice Demarcation Line, and the Sinai Coast in order to detect any offensive military movement.[4]

- The 1974 and 1975 Egyptian-Israeli Disengagement Agreement and 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty incorporated bilateral reconnaissance flights, third-party surveillance, and aerial inspections conducted by multinational monitoring organizations as means to verify compliance of provisions of the treaties.

- In Europe, the 1986 Stockholm Agreement includes aerial overflights by planes or helicopters within the specified area to observe military exercises up to 3 times annually. The inspectors may employ cameras, binoculars, dictaphones, and maps.

- After President Bush revived the idea of Open Skies, the first 2 rounds of the Open Skies conferences held in Ottawa and Budapest in early 1990. In preparation for the Ottawa conference, Canada and Hungary jointly conducted a trial "Open Skies" overflight during January 4-6, 1990 to test the flight planning and safety procedures which will be crucial when a "Open Skies" regime is established. The conferences resulted in an intensive and productive dialogue, but failed to produce agreement on some of the major outstanding questions.[5]

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[3] Peter Jones, "Open Skies," p. 10.

[4] Amy E. Smithson, "Open Skies Ready for Takeoff," *The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* (January/February 1992), pp. 17-18.

[5] The issues included who would pay the costs of overflights, what sensors would be permitted, whose planes would be used, and whether each party would be obliged to share the

- By late 1990, with German reunification and the completion of the CFE Treaty, Open Skies gained renewed importance as a possible verification measure.[6] The most important impetus to Open Skies in late 1990, however, stemmed from the Soviet Union's shipment of a considerable amount of military equipment east of the Urals shortly before the signing of the CFE Treaty. These permitted transfers removed this equipment from the CFE requirement that it be destroyed, and from CFE provisions as well.[7]

- The only way the Europeans could keep track of this equipment was through a regime that would permit them to examine Soviet military holdings beyond the Urals, and the only idea which would accomplish that purpose was Open Skies.[8]

- In May 1991, Hungary and Romania signed a bilateral agreement which was modeled on the draft Open Skies text. Each nation will accept four overflights annually. Only optical and video cameras will be carried during these 3-hour flights, but the treaty can be amended to induce other sensors.

- After the 2 rounds of negotiations in Vienna on September and November 1991, the Open Skies Treaty signed on March 24, 1992, heralding a new era of openness in the post-Cold War Europe.

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information collected on a flight with the other members of the regime. Peter Jones, "Open Skies," p. 10.

[6] Articel XIV, Paragraph 6 of the CFE elaborated an aerial inspection regime (Upon completion of the 120-day residual validation period, each state party shall have the right to conduct, and each state party with territory within the area of application shall have the obligation to accept, an agreed number of aerial inspections within the area of application. Such agreed numbers and other applicable provisions shall be developed during the negotiations referred to in Article XVIII.). Aerial inspection is therefore considered to become a part of the agreed means by which the Treaty is verified.

[7] Peter Jones, "Open Skies," p. 11.

[8] *ibid.*, p. 13.

II. ARMS CONTROL DIALOGUE BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA

■ The North-South Dialogue

- In the past, Northeast Asia has largely been under a bipolar international structure in which 2 blocs played out the politics of confrontation. The nature of bipolarity has undergone modifications since the early 1970s. The rise of cooperative ties linking Washington, Tokyo, and Beijing was instrumental in "loosening up" the bipolar makeup in the region. In the Korean peninsula, however, the two Koreas remained in a vicious confrontation until the late 1980s.

- Under these circumstances, President Roh Tae Woo announced on July 7, 1988, a special declaration that brought a significant change in the relations between the South and the North. Roh proclaimed in his statement that South Korea would not only cooperate with the North in its participation in the international community but would also support the Northern efforts to improve relations with the US and Japan.

- As follow-up to the July 7 declaration, on October 7, 1988 South Korea proposed an open-door economic policy toward North Korea to achieve common prosperity. Two months later the South again proposed a South-North high level meeting to discuss all pending issues related to unification.

- Two months after the proposal the first preliminary meeting was held at Panmunjom, and one-and-a half years after the first preliminary meeting began, the prime ministers of the South and the North met in September 1990 in Seoul for the first time since the end of the Korean War to discuss various pending South-North issues.

- On 13, December 1991, at the 5th round of High-Level Talks held in Seoul, delegates of both sides agreed to make an accord on "Reconciliation, Non-aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation." On January 20, 1992 they also agreed to make an accord on Denuclearization of the peninsula.

- In the 6th round of South-North High-Level Talks held in Pyongyang in February 1992, the prime ministers of both sides signed the Basic Accord on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Exchange and Cooperation" and the "Joint Declaration of Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula".

- It was the first comprehensive agreement between the authorities of the two Koreas since the division, it was designed to lay the foundation for building a mechanism of peaceful coexistence between Seoul and Pyongyang. Defining the current state of inter-Korean relations as a "special interim relationship," the Basic Accord stipulates that the South and the North shall recognize each other, not interfere with each other's domestic affairs, not slander or vilify each other, and not plot any acts of sabotage or subversion against each other.

- Furthermore, both sides agreed to work together to transform the present armistice into a solid state of peace, to observe the military demarcation line (MDL) with mutual non-aggression, to take proper steps to build military confidence, and undertake exchanges in various fields.

- In May 1992, at the 7th round of High-Level Talks held in Seoul, the delegates of both sides agreed to open liaison offices at Panmunjom and to form joint commissions on military, economic exchanges and cooperation, and socio-cultural exchanges and cooperation to implement the Basic Accord. At the same time, the 2 sides agreed to allow about 100 dispersed family members from each side to visit each other's capital cities, Seoul and Pyongyang on August 15, 1992.

- The two sides, however, failed to draw up regulations on their mutual inspection of nuclear weapon sites. The South wanted an "on-site inspection" of all suspected facilities in the North while the North claimed that the ongoing IAEA inspection was more than enough to verify the facts. Subsequently the Talks has been broken down, and no progress has been made so far.

■ The North-South Arms Control Negotiations

- Currently, North-South talks in the military sphere are conducted through two channels. One is the South-North High-Level Talks in which military representatives can have direct consultations on military affairs. The other is the

Military Armistice Commission (MAC), an organization set up for maintaining and managing the armistice agreement between the nations that took part in the Korean War.

- North Korea, however, abruptly called off the Military Armistice Commission in 1991 when the chief delegate of the United Nations Representative for MAC was replaced by a South Korean general. Therefore, the High-Level Talks is the only channel regarding the consultation of military affairs. But the Talks have brought about no visual results so far.

- South Korea recognizes that the reality of mistrust and confrontation exists between the South and the North caused by the national division and the Korean War, and proposes phased and gradual arms control measures. In contrast, the North's basic stance is that a comprehensive arms reduction should be implemented first to resolve the confrontation between South and North Korea. North Korea insists that this will naturally lead to confidence building.

- Considering the historic lessons of arms control in Europe and the situation of division of the peninsula, such a North Korean arms control proposal is unrealistic and unreasonable. Further, North Korea is currently strengthening its internal political system and heightening military tension between the South and the North by developing mass-destructive arsenals such as nuclear and chemical weapons and long-range guided missiles. Therefore, North Korea's proposals for arms control in the peninsula appears to be a mere political propaganda.

Arms Control Proposals of South and North Korea

lassification	North Korea	South Korea
Military Confidence Building	Limitation of Military Exercises and Drills Designation of the DMZ as a Peace Zone Establishment of a Military Hotline	Prior Notification and Cross-Observation of Maneuver Exercises Designation of the DMZ as a Buffer Zone and Its Utilization for Peaceful Purposes Establishment of a Military Hotline Exchanges of Visits by Military Leaders Disclosure and Exchange of Military Information
Arms Limitation	-	Possession of the Same Level of Major Offensive Weapons and Total Troops Establishment of Restricted Zones for Force Deployment
Arms Reduction	Three Staged Troop Reduction: 300,000 - 200,000 - 100,000 Prohibition of Renewal of Outdated Weapons Notification and Verification Through Designated Procedures	Mutually Balanced Reduction of Military Power to the Level Conversion of Offensive Troop Structure into Defensive One Operation of Joint Verification Team and Resident Inspection Team
Others	Making the Korean Peninsula a Nuclear Free Zone Suspension of the ROK-US Team Spirit Exercise Withdrawal of Foreign Forces Stationed in Korea	-

III. THE UTILITIES OF OPEN SKIES IN THE KOREAN PENINSULA

- At the first round of High-Level Talks, North Korea suggested that "the North and the South verify the implementation of agreed arms reduction measures through mutual on-site inspection of the other side." South Korea has consistently requested in each round of talks a permanent monitoring post as well as on-site inspections to verify the implementation of measures guaranteeing non-aggression. Thus, the two sides have agreed in principle to undertake verification, details have not been discussed yet.

- Nevertheless, Open Skies among other verification measures has some utilities to build confidence and to ensure military transparency between the two Koreas. First, since Open Skies is less intrusive means of verification than on-site inspection, it can be more or less easily introduced to the two Koreas at the initial stage. An Open Skies agreement between the two Koreas could break the negotiating impasse by eliminating some of the obstacles.

- Second, unlike on-site inspection, a cooperative overflight does not need to place inspectors on the ground. It does not interrupt normal patterns of military or civilian life, thus less threatening to North Korea, which is preoccupied with maintaining its societal controls.[9]

- Third, an Open Skies may function as an important CBM on the Korean peninsula. The successful implementation of Open Skies would not only promote military transparency, but also reduce tension and uncertainties between the two Koreas.

- Finally, an Open Skies may be the most effective and economical means of verification currently available to the two Koreas, which lack advanced monitoring equipment, such as NTM satellites and other remote sensors.

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[9] Amy Smithson and Seong W. Cheon, "Open Skies Over the Korean Peninsula: Breaking the Impasse" (a draft), pp. 12-13.

IV. PRINCIPLES FOR OPEN SKIES REGIME ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

■ Guidelines

The Open Skies regime on the Korean peninsula should be based on the following guidelines:

- Ensure North and South Korea for greater transparency by aerial overflights without other limitations except those imposed by flight safety or rules of international law.
- Conduct and receive observation flights based on annual quotas.
- All territories of North and South Korea will be gradually included under the regime.
- An observation aircraft should be unarmed, fixed-wing civilian or military aircraft or helicopter capable of carrying host country observers.
- A variety of sensors would be allowed except devices used for the collection and recording of signals intelligence.

■ Operation Principles

- Aircraft will begin observation flights from agreed pre-designated points of entry and terminate at pre-designated points of exit.
- The host country is responsible to provide the kind of support equipment, servicing and facilities normally given to commercial air carriers.
- An observing state should notify the arrival of observation team 16 hours before it arrives at the point of entry.
- An observation team should file a flight plan within 6 hours of its arrival at the point of entry
- After the filing of a flight plan, a 24-hour pre-flight period to check flight safety problems in the planned route, to provide necessary servicing for the aircraft, and to inspect aircraft for prohibited sensors and recorders.
- Prior to the flight, host country may place monitors on the observatory aircraft to ensure the proper operation of the aircraft and monitors.
- Loitering over a single location will not be permitted.
- North and South Korea will share the data collected from the overflights, but interpretation of the data is each other's own responsibility.

V. A GRADUATED APPROACH TO THE NORTH AND SOUTH KOREAN OPEN SKIES

Under the current circumstance of confrontation between the two Koreas, neither the North nor the South will accept Open Skies for their entire territories in the near future. Should North and South Korea decide to initiate cooperative overflights, a graduated approach would be appropriate.

■ The First Phase

- The first step that might be contemplated would be coordinated overflights within the Demilitarized Zone, 4 kilometer-wide and 250 kilometer-long from one side to the other of the peninsula.

- Because the area is comparatively narrow and small either fixed-wing aircraft or helicopter might be employed.

- Optical cameras and binoculars are enough in this initial stage.

- The nature of this initial step is to allow each side to become familiar with the concepts and mechanics of cooperative aerial inspections.

■ The Second Phase

- In the second stage, South and North Korea would conduct their first flights across their respective borders. The geographic scope might advance to 50 kilometers from the MDL. The North Korean city of Kaesung and the South Korean city of Tongducheon, 7.5 and 18.5 kilometers from the MDL, respectively, would be overflown. However, the South Korean capital, Seoul, 42.5 kilometers south of the MDL, should be excluded from the overflight route.

- Slow-flying fixed-wing aircraft could be used. The two Koreas might consider allowing the inspectors to use video cameras, laptop computers, and panoramic cameras.

■ **The Third Phase**

- At the third stage, South and North Korea could expand the amount of territory that these flights can cover up to 100 kilometers from the MDL. The two Koreas might use high-altitude overflights, about 5-10 kilometers high.

- The sensors such as infrared line scanners might be used in addition to the equipment employed at the second stage.

■ **The Fourth Phase**

- At the fourth stage, the entire peninsula would be open to aerial inspections. High-altitude (more than 10 kilometer high) overflights might be allowed.

- Synthetic Aperture Radar might be used in addition to sensors allowed at the third phase.

- At a certain point in this stage, the Open Skies regime might include "special" or "challenge" overflights, outside the normal Open Skies quota or schedule. Such flights would be requested under circumstances where the normal flight provisions were insufficient to satisfy the concerns of one of the participants. For instance, if a high-altitude flight revealed new construction or an anomalous activity at a military facilities, a special lower-altitude flight might be requested so that the nature of the activity might be more clearly understood by the other side.[10]

VI. Problems

■ **North Korea's Negative Attitude Toward Verification**

- North Korea has maintained a closed-door policy for more than 40 years. The North Korean leaders are very reluctant to open their society to foreigners, especially to capitalists.

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[10] *ibid.*, pp. 26-27.

- Though the two Koreas agreed on mutual notification and control of major military movements and exercises in the non-aggression section of the Basic Accord, North Korea has so far strongly opposed the exchange of observers for such exercises. This resistance to observer exchanges is indicative of the sensitivities of the North Korean leaders toward the openning of their society to outsiders..

■ **Lack of Confidence Between the Two Koreas**

- The second major obstacle is lack of confidence between the two Koreas. Even though the Basic Accord was reached and several committees and commissions were subsequently formed, no trust exists between the North and the South

- Any sincere proposal by other side regarding verification would be denounced as an espionage attempt.

■ **Limitations on Acquisition of Information**

North Koreans have concealed many of their facilities by locating them underground, while most of South Korean military facilities are open to aerial inspection. Therefore, the South's aerial overflights may not collect any meaningful North Korean military information, while the North could acquire very valuable South Korean military information. This disparity of opportunity for data collection may cause the South's anxiety about the Open Skies regime.

VII. Conclusions

- No matter how useful is an Open Skies regime in initiating confidence-building, generations of mistrust cannot be swept away with one action or simply a change in rhetoric. South and North Korea must find a way to begin working cooperatively.

- Open Skies regime between the two Koreas obviously has significant political and symbolic meaning to build confidence between them. Nevertheless, Open Skies

cannot be implemented on the Korean peninsula in the near future, as long as the supreme leader of North Korea, Kim Il Sung, maintains the current closed-system based on Juche ideology (meaning self-reliance or independence).

- Should Open Skies be implemented on the Korean peninsula, it must depend on the progress of the North-South dialogue. Keeping in pace with the progress of cooperation in other fields, i.e., political, economic, social, and cultural, North and South Korea may undertake a step-by-step approach to Open Skies.

THE SECURITY BALANCE AND NUCLEAR ISSUES ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

by

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SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

- Due to the end of the East-West Cold War during the recent past years, the global military trend is now moving toward a reduction of tensions. In the Asia-Pacific region, however, the structure of Cold-War military confrontation remains unresolved even through the region is rapidly becoming more important in the fields of international politics, economy and military affairs.

- With such a background, potential factors for instability in the region are increasing due to the political and military efforts of each nation in the region to secure a strategically superior position, as well as to the continued possibility of unpredictable military adventurism by the DPRK, which to this day has still not renounced its strategy of reunifying the Korean peninsula by force.

- Over the whole world, the Korean peninsula is pinpointed as the spot with the highest possibility of local war. ROK government is thus stressing an assertive implementation of our Northern Policy and enhancing the already established ties of security cooperation with nations friendly to the ROK in order to achieve stability on the peninsula and peaceful unification, which is linked directly with the security of the Asia-Pacific region as well as the world.

IMPACTS ON ROK SECURITY OF REGIONAL FACTORS

1. Positive Impacts

- Following the end of the Cold War, lots of changes in the world situation were happened: (1) the political rapprochement between the East and West, (2) the unification of Germany, (3) the entry of the ROK and the DPRK into the UN, and especially, (3) the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union. All these factors are expected to have a positive impact toward alleviating the persisting political and military conflicts between the ROK and the DPRK and nurturing an atmosphere favorable to the peaceful unification of the peninsula.

- Here are two basic factors serving to prevent the DPRK from committing military provocations: reform and openness policies of China and Russia, which are centered around economic improvement; and their urging the DPRK to pursue openness and their support of the South-North dialogue. Both are a result of Russia and Chinese recognition that maintaining stability on the peninsula will be hepful to their own security environment.

- Meanwhile, Japan's expanding role for regional peace and stability and its ensuing efforts to improve its defense capability are increasingly becoming cause for consern to its neighbors.

As long as it is pursued within the framework of US-Japan military cooperation headed by the US, however, the larger Japanese role will contribute directly and indirectly to the balance of military power, war deterrence and the protection of SLOCs in the region.

- The enhanced UN function of safeguarding regional security including the US forces are expected to promote the possibility that the DPRK will change its military strategy toward the ROK and its attitude South-North political dialogue.

2. Negative Impacts

- On the contrary, there are some factors that could induce the DPRK provocation toward the South. The ongoing neo-detente mood between East and West could, potentially, weaken the Western collective security system and the security cooperation between the ROK and the Weatern countires. Also, the rapid improvement of relations and expansion of exchanges between South Korea and the socialist countries including China and Russia might bring about negative psychological repercussions in the DPRK.

- Despite their improvement of diplomatic relations and economic cooperation with the ROK, Russia and China still confirm their policy of providing the DPRK with political and military support. The maintenance of their Treaties for Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the DPRK and Russia, and the DPRK and China continue to serve as a prop for the DPRK's military position.

- A trend toward recess in US military capability can be seen in the large-scale adjustments and cuts in the US military structure and the reduction of US troops stationed abroad, which are due to budget restraints and progress in arms control with Russia. Accordingly, the power balance around the Korean peninsula between the US, Japan, Russia and china is in a process of readjustment and involves some uncertainty. If this uncertainty were to evolve into a power vaccum - that is, absence of that power balance necessary to deter war - then the possibility of a new military threat cannot be excluded.

- If the US role were to shrink drastically, it is very possible that Japan woul have no choice but to try to complement that role in order to fill the void in the region. Such a Japanese move would have a new impact on the security relations among the ROK, the US and Japan and the military relations among the DPRK, Russia and China. The military policies of the nations in the region would also be affected.

MILITARY STRENGTHS OF THE ROK AND THE DPRK

- The DPRK is superior to the ROK in the active-duty forces. It has half as many troops and twice as many major weapons including tanks, artillery, warships and aircraft as the ROK. Regarding mobilized reserve forces, the DPRK has an edge over the ROK in the terms of the manpower immediately available for mobilization during a short war, but the overall manpower mobilization capability of the ROK and the DPRK is estimated to be equal. In terms of overall capability potential to conduct war, the ROK is estimated to have an edge over the DPRK.

- The ROK finds advantage in war sustainability with superior military science and technology, defense industry and mobilization ability. However, it falls behind the DPRK in the production capability of military hardware such as artillery, tanks and submarines that would be used immediately in the initial stages of war. South Korea must not overlook the massive war material stockpiles and efficient wartime prearation efforts.

- The DPRK is currently estimated to produce and export SCUD missiles. The DPRK's long-range weapons pose the ROK a serious threat over the ROK. It also must be noted that the DPRK's possession of chemical and biological warheads and potential to produce nuclear weapons are the major factors that could alter the characteristics of a future war on the peninsula.

- The DPRK's numerical superiority over the ROK in major combat units and equipment is expected to continue for the coming decades. However, the DPRK's defense burden will grow more and more unbearable as the economic gap with the ROK widens which will result in narrowing the gap of military power.

ARMS CONTROL ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

- The ROK government believes that an arms control process is necessary if reunification efforts are to proceed. Inter-Korean arms control talks are influnced by several key variables: political detente, military balance, economic burdens, and nuclear issue. Political detente and the resolution of the DPRK nuclear issue are absolute preconditions for arms control.

- Although the simultaneous admissions of the two Koreas into the United Nations, and the adoption of the Basic Agreement seemingly marked the beginning of a new era in inter-Korean relations, it is clear that recent detente is not strong enough to facilitate further progress. The

DPRK's nuclear issue is a major stumbling block in the implementation of the Basic Agreement.

- The military imbalance between the two Koreas is a factor impeding arms control negotiations. It appears that North Korea has a negative view of arms control due to its fear of losing military superiority over the South. The North believes that its superiority translates into political leverage over thw South, and might not be willing to surrender the leverage for the sake of arms control. An economic factor moght work in a positive way for inter-Korean arms control. That is, North Korea might come to favor arms control as a way to reduce the burden of military spending.

- Inter-Korean arms control is further impeded by the conflicting nature of the national goals of the South and North. The national goal of the ROK is peaceful coexistence; this goal dictates a gradual arms control process. The DPRK's goal is unification on its term; either by force or/ and unified front stragegy, i.e., subversion of South Korean system.

The key issues likely to be disputed by the two sides include: (1) linkage of CBMs to arms reduction talks, (2) inclusion of the US forces in Korea as a component of military parity, and (3) introduction of intrusive verification means.

- Perhaps, it is premature to expect tangible results in Inter-Korean arms control, since the recent spate of arrangements and declarations between the two sides might be a necessary condition, but not a sufficient condition for further progress in inter-Korean relations, including arms control.

THE DPRK'S NUCLEAR ISSUES AND RELATED PROBLEMS

- The DPRK is now allowing IAEA inspections on some of its nuclear facilities, while denying any intention to develop nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, these inspections are inadequate due to the limitations of the IAEA mandate, and because of the North's refusal to accept inter-Korean mutual inspections.

- Why is Pyongyang playing the nuclear card so persistently? The nuclear option may be seen as the last resort for a North Korean leadership faced with internal economic crisis and international isolation. However, it is believed that the DPRK's nuke program can not be used as a bagaining chip anymore.

- Then, what reasons are explaining for the DPRK to pursue the nuclear weapons? Some plausible motivations from the DPRK's standpoint might be the followings: (1) nuclear weapons

could be the ultimate guarantor for the security of the DPRK in he uncertain future; (2) nuclear weapons could serve as a hedge against possible ROK/US military retaliation for some future the DPRK's military adventurism; (3) the DPRK could enjoy greater freedom of military provocation and terrorism; (4) the DPRK would hardly abandon voluntarily the program unless they be forced due to its long-term and heavy investment.

- Very recently this year, Russia's External Intelligence Service released a report, in which the former KGB disclosed that the DPRK is developing nuclear weapons. This is the very first time that the DPRK's nuclear weapons program was made public by an intelligence organization of Russia, which has a long-standing military pact with Pyongyang. According to the Russian expose, Pyongyang is now standing on the threshold of developing nuclear bombs, in which experts of the DPRK's Army are directly participating.

- If the DPRK should successfully develop nuclear weapons, then (1) the possibility of arms control will virtually vanish; (2) The military tension on the Korean peninsula will be greatly heightened; (3) the regional stability in Northeast Asia will be seriously in danger.

- Regarding the DPRK's nuclear issue, General RisCassi, current commander of the USFK, said by reflecting Washington's view that even if North Korea succeeded in developing nuclear weapons, South Korea would be protected by the US nuclear umbrella under the ROK-US mutual defense treaty. Commenting on possible miliary strikes against North Korean nuclear facilities, the general said it might be a problem as the action could escalate into a larger military confrontation. He said it is more important for the US to make diplomatic efforts to persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear program and support nuclear negotiations between the two Koreas. Seoul's position on the nuclear issue is basically the same as the Washington's view.

- Then, we should raise a question: what if all the deplomatic efforts fail? A possible course of action by the international agencies is that (1) IAEA decides to invoke a special inspection of the DPRK's nuclear facilities; (2) IAEA sends a message to Pyongyang in the name of IAEA Director General; (3) if no response from the DPRK, IAEA makes one more request with a dealine; (4) if the DPRK still refuses to accept a special inspection or fails to respond to its request, IAEA brings the issue to the UNSC.

- However, it is doubtful whether the UNSC can decide on measures to put pressure on North Korea: (1) it is unlikely that all UNSC members will act together, as they did in dealing with the Iraq case; (2) China is not expected to willingly join the other powers in imposing any form of

sanctions against North Korea; (3) Neither is the US likely to take immediate actions on its own. Such an action will be possible only after President Clinton completes appointment of new officials who will deal with East Asia policy. In addition, Whasington is facing more urgent foreign policy issues such as Somalia, the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and the Middle East peace talks. The US will, therfore, allow the IAEA to deal with the DPRK's nuclear problem for some time, providing indirect support only.

- The two Koreas agreed to implement mutual nuclear inspections in their joint declaration on denuclearization of the Korean peninsula signed on Dec, 1991. The Joint Nuclear Control Commission(JNCC) was formed in March 1992 to handle follow-up measures, and convened 13 times in the past year but has failed even to draw up inspection guidelines.

- The bilateral nuclear talks hit a deadlock recently after Seoul and Washington announced '93 schedule for their joint military defense exercise(Team Spirit). The possibility that the two Kores would meet any time soon to discuss nuclear matters is very low, considering the hard stance the DPRK has taken aginst the annual T/S exercise. Meanwhile, the DPRK threatened to boycott IAEA inspecions if the ROK-US T/S exercise was held as scheduled in March 1993.

- The deadlock over the mutual inspection issue is not likely to end anytime soon, and will likely remain as the main stumbling block in inter-Korean relations. Working level nuclear negotiations have reached a limit; what remains is for North Korean leaders to make a political decision. The choice for North Korea is to continue its nuclear program with refusing mutual inspections and remain isolated, or to abandon its nuclear program with accepting mutual inspections and live harmoniously with its neighbors.

- The North Korean nuclear issue is not only an inter-Korean issue, but also an international one. Therefore, the US, Russia, China, Japan and all other concerned countries must take a strong stance in favor of inter-Korean inspections. Multinational cooperation on this issue must include carrots as well as sticks, since North Korea's key task is to secure economic aid from advanced countries.

PROSPECTS OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN KOREA

- The Korean peninsula is in a period of transition toward a more positive security environment. However, new instability is likely to characterized this period. Despite North Korea's desperate economic situation, Pyongyang continues to build up its military capabilities. The worst scenario

would be North Korean failure in its domestic economy and/or foreign policies, which might thereby lead to military adventurism. Another scenario would have North Korea adopt the Chinese-market reform model, but this is unlikely.

- Instead, it is likely that North Korea will gradually open its economy in its very limited areas, and continue dialog with Seoul while tightening the political reigns domestically. However, there is little reason to expect fundamental change in these area under Kim's regime. We might have to wait for a post Kim regime which will surely prefer openness, arms control and peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas.

ARMS CONTROL IN THE NORTH PACIFIC:

THE ROLE FOR CONFIDENCE BUILDING AND VERIFICATION

CO-OPERATIVE RESEARCH WORKSHOP

19-21 February 1993

ROYAL ROADS MILITARY COLLEGE
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APPENDIX

A CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS RELATED TO ARMS CONTROL AND REUNIFICATION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA: DECEMBER 1991 - DECEMBER 1992

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CHRONOLOGY

December 1991: During the 5th round of Inter-Korean PM talks held in Seoul, North and South Korea sign agreement on "Reconciliation, Non-aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation." (13th) [KJDA-S]

President Roh Tae Woo declares that there are no nuclear weapons in S. Korea, urging N. Korea to abandon its nuclear development program. (18th) [KJDA-S]

Kim Il Sung in conversation with US Representative Stephen Solarz, reiterates that his country has neither the intention nor the capability to make nuclear weapons. (19th) [KJDA-S]

North Korean Central News Agency announces that Kim Jong Il is appointed Supreme Commander of the DPRK People's Armed Forces. (25th) [KJDA-S]

N. Korea, during an inter-Korean working-level meeting on nuclear issues at the truce village of Panmunjom, declares that it will not possess nuclear reprocessing or uranium enrichment facilities. (26th) [KJDA-S]

North and South Korea initial "Joint Declaration for Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula". (31st) [KJDA-S]

January 1992: Bush visits in Seoul with Roh Tae Woo to discuss major bilateral issues, including trade and North Korea's nuclear development program. (5th) [KJDA-S]

South Korea and US agree to cancel this year's Team Spirit (7th) [KJDA-S]

Meeting in New York between Arnold Kanter, US undersecretary of state for political affairs, and Kim Yong Soon, international secretary of the North Korean Workers' Party to discuss Pyongyang's nuclear program (22nd) [KJDA-S]

Yonhap reports that US proposes simultaneous inspection of a US air base and N. Korean nuclear installations (23rd) [KJDA-S]

US CIA director claims N. Korea hiding parts of a nuclear weapons program (25th) [KJDA-S]

S. Korean foreign ministry announces that Seoul wants mutual inspections of nuclear facilities by May at the latest (26th) [KJDA-S]

January 1992...N. Korea signs nuclear safeguards agreement with IAEA, meeting NPT obligation after 6 years delay (30th) [KJDA-S]

February 1992: N. & S. Korea initial an agreement on the formulation and operation of 3 subcommittees to implement Reconciliation agreement. (7th) [KJDA-S]

Daewoo Chairman Kim Woo Chong met Kim Il Sung and PM Yon Hyong Muk to discuss $10-20 million investment to establish 8 light industrial factories in N. Korea. Kim Woo Chong also met the staff of about 13 economic ministries where he found officials "very open" about the difficulties facing the economy. [Far Eastern Economic Review "Briefing" (FEER-B), Feb. 20]

President Roh Tae Woo signs the Reconciliation and Denuclearization agreements (17th) [KJDA-S]

6th high-level PM talks begin and Reconciliation and Denuclearization agreements come into effect (19th) [KJDA-S]

Kim Il Sung meets S. Korean PM Chung Won-Shik, and denies that his regime is trying to produce nuclear weapons (20th) [KJDA-S]

Douglas Paal, Senior Assistant to President Bush quoted as saying that the US wants N. Korea to ratify IAEA accord and implement mutual inspections between the two Koreas by June. (24th) [KJDA-S]

IAEA demands that N. Korea accept inspection by June, threatening that it will go to the UN Security Council if Pyongyang refuses. (24th) [KJDA-S]

CIA Director Robert Gates claims North Korea is hiding parts of its nuclear program. (25th) [KJDA-S] The US govt believes N. Korea may be only months away from having nuclear weapons capability, the Washington Post reported Feb. 23. Intelligence officials also revealed that satellite photographs indicate N. Korea is digging tunnels in an effort to hide nuclear weapons components from international inspectors and protect them from possible attack by the US or S. Korea. [FEER-B, Mar. 5]

February 1992...The Associated Press reports that North Korea is strengthening the defenses of its nuclear facilities in Yongbyon with tunnels and anti-aircraft weaponry. (26th) [KJDA-S]

ROK defers the approval of application filed by the Daewoo Group to build light-industry plants in Nampo, North Korea. (28th) [KJDA-S]

March 1992: Ronald Lehman, director of US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency quoted in The Korea Herald urging South Korea to push for mutual, trial inspections of suspected nuclear sites by April 18th. (3rd) [KJDA-S]

General Robert W. RisCassi, Commander of the ROK-US CFC, testifies before the Senate Armed Services Committee that N. Korea could develop a complete nuclear weapon with delivery system by 1994. (6th) [KJDA-S]

First meeting of the Inter-Korean Political Committee (9th) Vantage Point [VP] The meeting ended by only revealing disagreements on most issues. [North Korea News (NKN) N.622]

Seoul's American Chamber of Commerce is urging US govt to ease restrictions on trading with N. Korea. [FEER "Intelligence" (I), Mar. 12]

North Korea has finally got its own dissident organization, albeit one based in Russia. Called the National Salvation Front for Democratic Unification of Korea, its central committee has 13 members - all exiled members of Kim Il Sung's govt. The front's goal is the non-violent overthrow of Kim by opening contacts with dissidents in Pyongyang. [FEER-B, Mar.12]

In the first meeting of the North-South Korean Military Subcommittee, both sides fail to agree even on the agenda for the meeting. (13th) [KJDA-S]

Premier Yon Hyong-muk sends a letter to his southern counterpart Chung Won-shik, criticizing the south Korean govt for "trying to connect inter-Korean PM talks with the nuclear issue." (17th) VP

First meeting of North & South joint subcommittee on exchanges and cooperation failed to reach agreement on specific programs including family reunions. (18th) [KJDA-S]

March 1992... During the first inaugural meeting of the North-South Joint Nuclear Control Commission South Korea has proposed that the two Koreas hold regular inspections of their nuclear sites four times a year and special inspections twelve times a year, and the North has suggested that the inspections be made separately for nuclear weapons, nuclear weapon sites, nuclear facilities and nuclear materials. They failed to reach an agreement on any of the proposals. (19th) [KJDA-S]

Delegates to the Inter-Korean Exchanges and Cooperation Subcommittee meet. Both sides fail to narrow differences on basic positions concerning the inter-Korean exchanges. (25th) VP

April 1992: General Robert W. RisCassi, Commander of the ROK-US Combined Forces Command, said to the US House of Representatives Armed Services Committee that American air and ground combat forces are being adjusted to help deter any invasion by North Korea. (2nd) [KJDA-W]

North Korea announced a 6.2 percent increase in its annual state budget this year with defense spending accounting for 11.6% of total expenditure. That proportion, compared with 12.1% in terms of actual spending last year, is the smallest in decades. (8th) [KJDA-W]

The North Korean parliament ratified an agreement meant to open its nuclear facilities to international inspection. but the Supreme People's Assembly decision on ratification included this clause: "Presupposing that any country that joined the NPT will not deploy nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula nor present a nuclear threat to us. (9th) [KJDA-W]

South Korea and China have initialled an investment guarantee pact in Seoul granting each other most-favoured nation status on investment and business activities. (11th) [KJDA-W]

South Korea and China have agreed to maintain close contacts and to consult on regional security, including North Korea;s nuclear problem, and economic ties. (13th) [KJDA-W]

April 1992... The transfer of power from Kim Il Sung to Kim Jong Il is now in the final stage, analysts in Seoul say in the wake of a North Korean Central News Agency report on April 2 describing Kim Jong Il as "head of our party, the state and army." [FEER-B, Apr.16]

According to an interview in the Washington Times, North Korean President Kim Il Sung said he was ready to bury the hatchet with the US and wanted it to open an embassy as soon as possible. (16th) [KJDA-W]

Third inter-Korean Exchanges and Cooperation Subcommittee meeting held. South and north agree in principle to open a shipping route between Inchon and Nampo. (10th) VP

Fourth meeting of the inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Subcommittees. South and North Korea agree on basic accords concerning the formation, functions and operations of a joint subcommittee for personnel exchanges and economic cooperation. (28th) VP

May 1992: North Korea submits its initial report on nuclear materials and facilities subject to the Safeguard Agreement with IAEA. (4th) VP

7th round of inter-Korean premiers' talks open. South and North Korea agree to exchange visitors in celebration of Liberation Day on August 15. Both sides also agree on the opening of liaison offices at Panmunjom and the formation of three joint commissions to implement the inter-Korean accord. (6th) VP

Kim Jong Il has vowed to achieve reunification "in the lifetime" of his father. [FEER-B, May 7]

The North Korean Foreign Ministry, in an official statement, emphasizes that the question of the inspection of "U.S. nuclear bases" in South Korea must be solved without delay. (10th) VP

Members of the Inter-Korean Joint Nuclear Control Commission hold their fourth meeting. Both sides agree to work out procedures for the mutual inspection of nuclear facilities. They also agree to hold the next meeting on May 27th. (12th) VP

May 1992... The US and S. Korea are in agreement that Washington should not upgrade the level of its diplomatic contact with N. Korea unless Pyongyang accepted bilateral inspection of nuclear facilities with Seoul, according to Foreign Minister Lee Sang Ock on 13 May. The US inspectors want to be include in South Korean teams looking at N. Korean facilities, according to Seoul officials, as N. Korean inspectors propose to examine US as well as S. Korean bases in the south. [FEER-B, Jun.4]

Delegates of Inter-Korean Joint Nuclear Control Commission meet for their first round of working-level contacts to discuss procedures regarding the mutual inspection of nuclear facilities. (15th) VP

South and North Korea open liaison offices in Panmunjom and form three joint commissions - the joint military commission, the joint commission for economic exchanges and cooperation, and the joint commission for social and cultural exchanges and cooperation. (18th) VP

The UN Command announced that three heavily armed North Korean infiltrators were intercepted and killed by South Korean security guards during an exchange of fire in the southern section of the DMZ. (22nd) [KJDA-W] South Korea has demanded a meeting of the military armistice commission to discuss the 22 May shootout in the southern sector of the DMZ. The incident has raised concern that the North might torpedo the ongoing political and military talks to promote detente with Seoul. The North has refused to convene an armistice commission meeting for over a year, after a South Korean army general was appointed to head the Southern delegation, replacing a US general. [FEER-B, Jun 4]

IAEA inspection team arrives in Pyongyang to tour nuclear facilities in the North. (25th) VP

North Korean Red Cross Central Committee Chairman in a telephone conversation with his South Korean counterpart, proposes to hold the inter-Korean working-level contacts on June 6 to arrange procedures for exchanging family visits. (28th) VP

June 1992: Yon Hyong-muk, premier of North Korea, sends a telephone message to South Korean counterpart Chung Won-shik, and threatens to cancel the family exchange program. (4th) VP

The US House of Representatives approved a $270 billion military budget that cuts funds to station US troops in Europe, Japan and South Korea. (5th) [KJDA-W]

June 1992... Red Cross officials meet for second round of working-level talks to arrange the family exchange program. They agree that exchange visits will take place August 25-28.(12th)VP

IAEA Director General Hans Blix "said that North Koreans told him the nuclear reprocessing plant was 80% ready in terms of civil engineering and 40% ready in terms of equipment. [VP June 1992, p.14]

Following a US-Russia summit the two countries made a joint public statement calling on North Korea to comply with its obligations under the NPT and to accept international and bilateral inspections. (17th) [KJDA-W]

The 5th meeting of the inter-Korean Military Subcommittee held to discuss the adoption of subsidiary documents for the implementation of the nonaggression accord and the installation of direct telephone lines linking the military authorities of South and North Korea. (19th) VP

Russian President Boris Yeltsin reaffirmed Moscow's full support of inter-Korean nuclear inspection to verify denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. He also told the visiting South Korean Foreign Minister that the 1961 treaty between Moscow and Pyongyang is no longer effective in content though it is still alive in form. (30th) [KJDA-W]

July 1992: According to a senior US administration official US President George Bush and Japanese PM Kiichi Miyazawa agreed during the latter's visit to Washington that Japan would not normalize relations with North Korea unless Pyongyang accepted simultaneous inspections of nuclear facilities with South Korea. (1st) [KJDA-W]

US Ambassador to Seoul Donald Gregg has urged North Korea to accept mutual inspection of nuclear facilities with South Korea, pledging American military bases in the South would be open to the North in return for its opening. (3rd) [KJDA-W]

Mainichi reports that North Korean Workers' Party Secretary for International Affairs Kim Yong-sun said formally during his talks with a senior US administration official in January that North Korea would, in a shift toward a more realistic policy, accept a continued US troops presence in South Korea to be withdrawn gradually after the two Koreas were reunified. (5th) [KJDA-W]

July 1992... The spokesman for the North Korean Foreign Ministry, at a Pyongyang press conference, calls for verification of the withdrawal of nuclear arms from South Korea. (5th) VP

The second inspection team form the IAEA flies into Pyongyang to tour nuclear facilities in North Korea. (7th) VP

Prime Minister Chung Won-shik proposed, in a letter to his Northern counterpart Yon Hyong-muk, to exchange a former North Korea army officer and other North Koreans being held here for South Koreans detained in the North. (7th) [KJDA-W]

North Koreans rejected South Korea's bit to swap captives, brushing it aside as "unrealistic." (8th) [KJDA-W]

Ahn Byong-su, spokesman for the North Korean-side of the Inter-Korean High-Level (Premiers') Talks, states again that Li In-mo, a former North Korean agent, must be repatriated to the North before the family exchange visit program can take place. (12th) VP

The 5th round of the inter-Korean Red Cross talks are held an Panmunjom. The two sides fail to make any progress on procedural matters to carry out the family visit program. (14th) VP

The 10-member North Korean economic delegation led by Deputy Premier Kim Dal-hyon arrives in Seoul via the truce village of Panmunjom in order to "promote inter-Korean cooperation and exchanges." (19th) VP

Deputy Premier Kim Dal-hyon tours 13 key industrial complexes in South Korea to seek investment and technology transfer to North Korean industries. [FEER]

President Roh Tae Woo responded favourably to a North Korean request for economic assistance promising to send a team to conduct feasibility studies of joint ventures in a North Korean industrial complex. Roh made the pledge after North Korea Deputy Premier Kim Dal-hyon called for help in Pyongyang's building of a major industrial complex of light industries in Nampo, a port city about 40km southwest of the North Korean capital. (24th) [KJDA-W]

July 1992... Negotiators from North and South Korean meeting at Panmunjom on 28 July have agreed to open at least 2 sea routes to allow travel and possibly the exchange of goods between the two countries. The agreement also provides for opening an overland route between the 2 sides, though they have yet to specify which land or sea routes are to be used. [FEER-B, Aug.6]

While Seoul officials refuse to give exact figures, observers say the number of defections of North Koreans abroad increased significantly after 1989. [FEER-B, Aug.6]

A US Defense Department report says the US plans to maintain key infantry and air force units in S. Korea as a deterrent to war on the Korean peninsula. But, according to the report, it could consider disbanding the ROK-US Combined Forces Command when the North Korean threat eases substantially. (28th) [KJDA-W]

August 1992: Members of the inter-Korean Military Subcommittee meet at Panmunjom for their fist contact to discuss inter-Korean nonaggression. (3rd) VP

The 8th round of inter-Korean Red Cross talks are held in Panmunjom. The two sides failed to work out details regarding the visit program. (7th) VP Red Cross officials from North and South Korea broke off their talks, scuttling their original pledge to allow reunion of families by 25 Aug. this year. North Korean officials insisted that the reunions could not proceed unless the South stopped demanding bilateral nuclear inspections. [FEER-B, Aug.20]

In an exclusive interview with the Korea Herald, President Roh Tae Woo said now is not the proper time to push for a collective security system in the Asia-Pacific region. (14th) [KJDA-W]

Pyongyang criticizes the annual South Korea-U.S. joint Command Post exercise, "Focus Lens," which started on August 17. (18th) VP

South Korea and the People's Republic of China established diplomatic relations formally ending more than 40 years of Cold War enmity. (24th) [KJDA-W]

South Korea and Russia initialled a treaty on basic relations that suggests regular meetings between top officials of the two countries. The treaty also prohibits either side from using armed threats or exercising force against the other. (26th) [KJDA-W]

August 1992... South Korea has lifted the six-month old restrictions on trips to North Korea by South Korean entrepreneurs to discuss economic exchanges. This decision is designed in part to foster a good atmosphere for next month's eighth round of inter-Korean PM talks in Pyongyang. (29th) [KJDA-W]

The 8th round of the inter-Korean Nuclear Control Commission is held in Panmunjom, but the two sides fail to make substantial progress in negotiations to work out arrangements for mutual inspections of nuclear installations. (31st) VP

A team of the IAEA officials led by Wily Theis, a section chief in the IAEA Safeguards Department, arrives in Pyongyang for the 3rd ad hoc inspections. (31st) VP

September 1992: Russian Ambassador to Seoul Alexander Panov called for diplomatic recognition of North Korea by the US and Japan to complete cross recognition of the two Koreas by four surrounding powers. (3rd) [KJDA-W]

Dissident Kim Nak Jung arrested in South Korea on 7 Sept. on suspicion of spying for North Korea for the past 36 years. [FEER-B, Sept 17]

South Korean Prime Minister Chun Wok Shik led a 40 member delegation to North Korea for talks on family reunions and economic exchanges. Prospects for agreement look slim due to the North's refusal to accept bilateral inspections of nuclear facilities. [FEER-B, Sept. 17]

The prime ministers of S. & N. Korea signed and put into effect three agreements to implement an inter-Korean basic pact signed late last year. The agreement on non-aggression, reconciliation and exchange, however does not include many fundamental and controversial issues such as the recognition of each other's govt in the political area and prohibition of arms buildup along the DMZ. (17th) [KJDA-W]

Speaking before the UN General Assembly, President Roh Tae Woo urged North Korea to submit to inter-Korean nuclear inspections as soon as possible. Roh also proposed an international forum for lasting peace in Northeast Asia among all countries concerned, including the US and China. (22nd) [KJDA-W]

October 1992: The National Security Planning Agency has arrested 62 people for allegedly spying for Pyongyang and setting up a southern branch of the North communist party. The agency said the north smuggled one of its spies to set up espionage rings to run operations aimed at uniting the two Koreas under a communist regime by 1995. [FEER-B, Oct.15]

There will be no reduction in the 37,400 US troops in South Korea until "uncertainties" over North Korea's nuclear weapons program are "thoroughly addressed," according to an 8 Oct. communique following the annual meeting between US Defense Secretary Dick Cheney and South Korea's Defense Minister Choi Sae Chang. The decision extends a moratorium on a planned pullout of 6,500 troops by 1995. [FEER-B, Oct 22]

November 1992: South Korean President Roh Tae Woo and Japanese PM Kiichi Miyazawa, holding a day-long working session in Kyoto on 8 Nov., have agreed to press for N. Korea's acceptance of bilateral nuclear inspections with the South, according to S. Korean presidential spokesman Kim Hak Joon. [FEER-B]

December 1992: North Korea's PM has been replaced. Yon Hyon Muk has been demoted, reportedly for his failure to push through economic reforms, analysts in Seoul say. South Korean officials expect new Prime Minister Kan Song San's emergence to signal an increase in economic cooperation between the two countries. [FEER-B, Dec.11]

Pyongyang on Dec. 19 announced its decision to boycott the 9th round of inter-Korean premeirs' talks scheduled to take place in Seoul beginning December 21. The North Koreans had demanded the South Korean side to scrap its plan to resume next spring's "Team Spirit," and to notify the North of the decision by December 15th. [NKN N.663]