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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

# CHEMICAL WEAPONS - FINAL RECORDS (PV)

1990 SESSION



**PV**

COMPILED AND EDITED BY:

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT DIVISION OF  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE CANADA

OTTAWA, CANADA

JANUARY 1991





CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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
Dept. of External Affairs  
Min. des Affaires extérieures

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This volume is a compilation of the final records (PVs) of the Conference on Disarmament, 1990 session relating to Chemical Weapons. It has been compiled and edited to facilitate discussions and research on this issue.

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OTTAWA, CANADA

JANUARY 1991

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM TO THE SECRETARY

Dept. of External Affairs  
Min. des Affaires extérieures

MAR 28 1991

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(The President)

... We shall now proceed to the order of business for today. There are a number of urgent organizational matters which need to be settled to permit the Conference to start its consideration of matters of substance. I refer to the adoption of the agenda and programme of work, as well as the re-establishment of subsidiary bodies on various items on the agenda. I hope, in particular, that we can soon resume our work on a convention banning chemical weapons, in the spirit of the agreement achieved in the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference. I am encouraged by the progress noted in my consultations on the mandate to be adopted for the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. Early agreement on that text will make it possible to intensify our negotiations under the dynamic chairmanship of Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden. I am expecting that we shall re-establish today the Ad hoc Committees on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons and on Radiological Weapons, with their present mandates, and appoint their Chairmen. As the agenda item entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space" is one of the major issues before the international community, I also hope that the Ad hoc Committee dealing with that question will begin its work without delay. I believe that, if we succeed in taking the relevant decisions quickly, the Conference will have made a good start.

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(Mr. Komatina, Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations)

... "I have often stressed the overriding importance of the early conclusion of a multilateral agreement on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, transfer and use of chemical weapons, and on their destruction. In 1989 political consensus was advanced in the international community on the urgent need to agree on such a convention. There now exist ever-growing resolve and an explicit pledge to deal with pending problems at the earliest possible date. The Final Declaration of 149 States at the Paris Conference testified to the truly universal awareness of the need to eradicate chemical weapons for ever. In that connection, I also commend the initiative of the Government of Australia to strengthen and expand co-operation between the chemical industry and Governments by convening a Government-Industry Conference in Canberra.

"Once again I appeal to the members of the Conference on Disarmament, as a matter of high priority, to use the political momentum generated by all those events and intensify during this current session the negotiations for the final elaboration of the convention. There is no justification for unnecessary delay. I am confident that all States will abide by their commitments to achieve that objective.



(Mr. van den Broek, Netherlands)

... I have said a great deal about Europe, and I hope that the Conference will forgive me for this. Two lessons can be learnt from the dramatic changes on the political scene. The first, which I have just mentioned, is the connection between security, arms control and domestic and foreign political structures. Weapons are basically a symptom and not the cause of political problems. The second lesson is that the vanishing of tensions between East and West makes it all the more imperative to consider security and the factors which threaten it on a more global scale. Although the confrontation between East and West is diminishing, there is no general decline in the number of weapons and potential conflicts in other parts of the world. On the contrary, proliferation continues: chemical weapons, conventional weapons, missiles and the technology to produce these missiles. Other categories have officially been banned, but the ban is cracking dangerously; this applies to biological weapons. In the field of nuclear weapons the non-proliferation Treaty has stemmed but not prevented efforts towards proliferation. Let me now examine a few of these questions briefly, because you, distinguished delegates to the Conference on Disarmament, have such an important role to play in this regard.

The 1980s have shown how much suffering can be inflicted when States strike each other's cities with missiles. I do not wish to hide the fact that I am deeply concerned about the increasing number of States which are acquiring ballistic missiles, either by importing them or by producing them themselves. These missiles can be equipped with conventional warheads, but are also suitable for chemical and nuclear warheads. At the same time as radical reductions in stocks of nuclear missiles have been proposed or already implemented between East and West, there is a threat of missiles - sometimes with the same range as the category banned - being developed and introduced in other parts of the world. I therefore believe that we must call a halt to the proliferation of missiles and missile technology. This is a global problem for which effective solutions must be devised in as broad a framework as possible. It would appear that the Missile Technology Control Régime, set up by a small number of countries, offers a promising basis for this. The Netherlands takes a sympathetic attitude towards this régime, since it is our political conviction that no opportunity to safeguard stability on a world scale should be missed. We are therefore seriously considering the question of acceding to the Missile Régime.

(Mr. van den Broek, Netherlands)

... Furthermore, we must ensure that nuclear arms reductions between East and West are not followed by a build-up in other parts of the world. The difference with the proliferation of missiles and chemical weapons, however, is that the dangers of nuclear proliferation were recognized years ago. The non-proliferation Treaty, for which the fourth review conference will be held here in Geneva in the late summer, remains of vital importance for world stability. Strict compliance with non-proliferation standards remains a corner-stone of Netherlands policy. We should endeavour to strengthen these standards further on the basis of a meaningful and thorough assessment of the implementation of the Treaty as a whole. The number of States which are party to the NPT is steadily increasing, and I would call upon those countries which have yet not acceded to it to reconsider their stance.



(Mr. van den Broek, Netherlands)

If there is one negotiating process which has been the subject of changing opinions in recent years, it is the negotiations on a chemical weapons treaty. Not only has the subject of chemical weapons changed from being a predominantly East-West affair to being a world-wide issue, but attitudes to the verification of such a treaty have also undergone a drastic change. If we had concluded a treaty in the 1970s, it would presumably have been inadequate, and we would probably have regretted it. Now that agreement has been reached on routine inspections in their various forms and challenge inspections on an "anywhere, any time" basis, the situation is completely different.

There has certainly been no lack of interest in the subject. It is, however, ironic that it has been the renewed and intensive use of chemical weapons which has shocked the world community into realizing that the only answer is a comprehensive world-wide ban on chemical weapons. Against this background, Governments have rightly taken measures to curb the present proliferation of chemical weapons, including export control measures and action to enlist the co-operation of the chemical industry. However, without the prospect of a treaty for the total elimination of these weapons once and for all, these measures will not be effective in the long run. The present export control measures are therefore of a temporary nature, and will remain in force until agreement on a truly universal ban on chemical weapons has been reached.

Negotiations are admittedly proceeding slowly. However, judging from the effort and work being put into ensuring that a treaty is completed in the foreseeable future, the problem involves not so much a lack of political will as the intractable nature of the subject itself. One of the main difficulties, as we know, is the vital need for an effective verification system. The outlines of such a system are beginning to take shape; we have certainly advanced considerably since the last time I had the privilege of addressing the Conference on Disarmament in July 1987. This year a good deal of attention will again have to be devoted to routine inspections and above all to ad hoc verification measures for plants which are capable of producing chemical weapons but are not subject to routine inspections. Other important subjects are the development of procedures for challenge inspections and the verification of the destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles - subject, I would add, to appropriate environmental safeguards. We will also have to ensure that the full prohibition of the use of chemical weapons, including during the 10-year transitional period following the treaty's entry into force, finds a proper place in the convention.

Finally, we shall have to consider ways and means to get the treaty accepted worldwide. An important pre-condition for this is that all States which are not members of the Conference on Disarmament should be able to attend the negotiations as participants if they wish to do so; this is an important means of furthering world-wide adherence to the treaty. It should also be made crystal clear that destruction of all chemical weapons is the principle objective; we do not want "haves" and "have-nots".

I should like to take this opportunity to express my respect and admiration for the tremendous effort which has been put into this matter here and at the bilateral negotiations. The results of the bilateral rounds



(Mr. van den Broek, Netherlands)

between the United States and the Soviet Union will certainly have a positive effect on the work here in the Conference on Disarmament. I should also like to thank the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Morel of France, for his tireless efforts over the past year. I wish his successor, Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden, every success, and assure him that he can count on the full co-operation of the Dutch delegation. We have certainly not yet reached the end of our exercise, but there is a glimmer of light at the end of the tunnel. On the basis of what has already been achieved and the detailed nature of the discussions on virtually every aspect of the chemical weapons treaty, it should be possible to resolve the remaining major issues this year and to wind up the negotiations promptly thereafter. If we demonstrate the political and, I should add, the practical will, this should be feasible, and we will soon be on the home stretch.

Speaking of practical will, I would like to stress how important it is to gain practical experience with the verification system to be established under the convention. In that context, trial inspections have proved to be extremely useful. You are aware of the trial inspection held in a chemical plant in the Netherlands last spring. We now intend to organize a trial challenge inspection in a military installation in the near future. Its results will be communicated to the Conference on Disarmament at an early date.

With the end of the negotiations now, as we hope, in sight, I wish to repeat my offer to host the international organization responsible for the implementation of the chemical weapons treaty in the Netherlands. We propose The Hague, due to its central location and accessibility and because it is the seat of other international organizations such as the International Court of Justice. The Netherlands also has a sophisticated chemical industry and laboratories which can lend assistance. I hope that the conviction and dedication with which my country has continuously supported the negotiations will earn your support. I intend to provide you with the details of the Netherlands offer in the near future. I gather that my friend Alois Mock will be making similar proposals on behalf of Vienna. Consider us to be friendly rivals.

I do not wish to conclude without pointing to the rediscovery and proliferation of a category of weapons which was banned in a treaty over 15 years ago, but which unfortunately seems to have regained its attractiveness for military purposes. I refer to biological weapons. We must combine our utmost efforts and imagination to stop the abhorrent abuse of substances and equipment otherwise used for legitimate purposes. In the Netherlands we are examining the possibility of taking steps at the national level. For some time the Government has been engaged in contacts on this matter with Netherlands-based companies and institutes of international repute which are active in the field of biotechnology. We are now considering the possibility of issuing a paper to raise awareness of this problem among relevant companies and institutes. Further measures cannot be excluded.

It would be highly ironic if these horrific weapons, which we had hoped to banish, were once again to acquire a place in countries' arsenals, at a time when so much progress is being made in many areas of arms control. I fear that we are also paying the price for the absence of a verification mechanism in the biological weapons Convention, which as it stands represents



(Mr. van den Broek, Netherlands)

little more than a political commitment to abandon these weapons. The international community has attempted to close the gap between this commitment and the need to verify compliance with the Treaty to some extent by means of the confidence-building measures drawn up three years ago. The Netherlands contributed to their coming into being. This should not close our eyes for the fact that even if there had been a verification system, water-tight control, would still have been extremely difficult, given the ease with which biological weapons can be manufactured in secret.

The third review conference on the biological weapons Convention will be held in September 1991. We should already be reflecting about ways and means of strengthening the treaty and verifying compliance, in order to halt and reverse the continuing proliferation. It is therefore high time that we embarked on international consultations on these matters. I am considering making a Dutch contribution to this process by inviting a number of interested countries to attend a seminar-type conference on this vital issue in the Netherlands.



(Mr. Mock, Austria)

The Conference on Disarmament is resuming its work at a time when disarmament prospects are highly encouraging. The international political climate favours the conclusion of efforts designed to reduce military confrontation considerably and consolidate peace and stability. Hence it is essential, given this dynamic trend for the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, the single global framework for disarmament negotiations, to make an appropriate contribution and enable decisive progress to be accomplished. Here we are thinking first and foremost of the conclusion of work on the convention on the prohibition of the use, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. In this area, several new initiatives were put forward last year. Thus, prospects for the early conclusion of the convention have considerably improved.

In January last year, in Paris, 141 States condemned the use of chemical weapons and emphasized the need to conclude a convention on chemical weapons at an early date. In September 1989, the Government-Industry Conference against Chemical Weapons held in Canberra intensified dialogue on the world scale between government and industry representatives and clearly showed the chemical industry's full support for the future convention.

Bilaterally, the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the United States and the USSR, Messrs. Baker and Shevardnadze, in Wyoming, led to real progress. On that occasion, the Ministers reached agreement in the area of data exchange and trial inspections in advance of the conclusion of a convention. Subsequently, we learned with keen interest of the proposals that President Bush tabled in his address to the forty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly. We believe that his statement and the favourable reaction of the Soviet Foreign Minister constitute an encouraging sign. Lastly, we would mention the great significance of the meeting between Presidents Bush and Gorbachev in Malta.

Given this wealth of ideas and initiatives, we share the view of those who consider 1990 to be a crucial year for decisive progress in negotiations, particularly on the question of chemical weapons. The hope of arriving at a convention on the prohibition of the development, manufacture and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction, is shared well beyond the ranks of the 40 member States of the Conference on Disarmament, who have for many years been working on the drafting of this specific and complex agreement. The effectiveness of this convention depends to a major extent on the widest possible participation. Austria believes that all States that so wish should be granted the opportunity to participate in the drawing up of the convention, as has been stated by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands and in the Paris Declaration. This alone can offer an assurance that the text of the convention will take account of all specific concerns.

Concurrently, we believe that it is of particular value to the future convention to conduct an exchange of appropriate data in advance in order to promote mutual trust and the early signature of the convention by the greatest possible number of States. In this context, I have pleasure in announcing

(continued)



(Mr. Mock, Austria)

that Austria will shortly be submitting two working papers to the Conference: a complete report on the trial inspection conducted in autumn 1989 at a chemical industry facility, and updated data on chemical industry production. Austria is prepared to do its utmost to contribute to the early conclusion of the chemical weapons convention.

Complete and effective verification of the convention remains the principal difficulty in the negotiations. The purpose of any system of rules should be to arrive at a degree of monitoring that precludes the production or stockpiling of militarily significant quantities of chemical weapons. This purpose seems capable of achievement. The need for effective verification should not, however, delay the conclusion of our work. This means, in our view, that certain limitations upon the monitoring of the convention should be accepted. In other words, we should weigh the wish for effective verification against the need for the early conclusion of this work. Reports of the growing proliferation of chemical weapons clearly show that time is working against us.

The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, as a body of member States responsible for monitoring compliance with contractual obligations, will have to perform essential and very specific tasks. Hence the composition of its decision-making bodies is of particular importance, and should take account of political and geographical criteria, as well as criteria relating to the volume of chemical industry production. Austria recognizes the considerable importance of this organization. Two years ago in this very forum I first indicated that Austria was prepared to host this organization. Bearing in mind the progress achieved in the negotiations, I should now like to make this a concrete offer. In making this proposal and inviting the future Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to Vienna, Austria also hopes to give new impetus to the negotiations regarding the structure and functions of the organization. This invitation issued on behalf of Austria, a neutral State in perpetuity, is fully in harmony with its consistent policy of peace and international co-operation. My country has already shown in the past that it was prepared to contribute to the work of international organizations, not only in a general way but also in a specific way. This was demonstrated, for example, in the construction of the Vienna International Centre, home to the official headquarters of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations Office at Vienna and the United Nations Industrial Development Organization. The Vienna International Centre was entirely financed by Austria and is made available to its users for a token rent of one schilling per year.

Austria is prepared to host the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons on identical terms to those granted to the organizations which have already installed themselves in the Vienna International Centre. Firstly, Austria will make available to the organization adequate premises for the staff required during the preparatory phase, during the chemical weapon destruction phase and during the subsequent phase of permanent monitoring. Austria intends to make available to the organization initially a provisional headquarters with offices accommodating between 450 and 600 persons. This building, located in the centre of Vienna and with a net surface of 6,300 square metres, would be renovated and made available to the organization free of charge. Once the expected size of the organization is known, it is



(Mr. Mock, Austria)

planned to construct a new building at the Vienna International Centre or in its immediate neighbourhood to house it permanently. For this permanent headquarters Austria would also provide the land and bear the construction costs of the building.

Secondly, in order to place the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons on an equal footing with the international organizations already in Vienna, Austria would grant the organization and its staff the same privileges and immunities as those enjoyed by the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations Office at Vienna and other similar organizations.

Thirdly, in the event that the conferences of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons were too large to be held at the organization's headquarters or at the Vienna International Centre, Austria would bear the cost of hiring appropriate conference rooms. In the course of the spring session of the Conference on Disarmament, Austria will submit a working paper containing details of this offer.

To highlight Austria's interest in an early solution to outstanding questions relating to the convention on chemical weapons, but also within the context of the possible establishment of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in Vienna, the federal Government has adopted a programme of research on the verification and monitoring of the chemical weapons convention. Funding of 3 million schillings has been made available for this programme for the current budgetary year. This initiative will enable us, on the one hand, to set up a highly qualified group of experts in monitoring of chemical weapons and, on the other, to draw up proposed solutions in the negotiating areas that remain outstanding. These proposals could be submitted to the Committee on Chemical Weapons.

Austria makes this offer as a State observing permanent neutrality and in its capacity as a host country for organizations and international conferences. We seek in this way to contribute to closer co-operation between States. My country also sees this offer as the continuation and logical consequence of the tireless efforts that it has been pursuing for decades for peace and disarmament in the world. In this connection I should like to recall that 30 years ago Austria participated for the first time in United Nations peace-keeping operations. Thousands of Austrian soldiers have participated in such United Nations operations. In 1988 the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to pay tribute to this United Nations commitment. Austria's policy in this field was confirmed at the international level by the establishment in Vienna of the third headquarters office of the United Nations. The new Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons could also benefit from the international profile of Vienna and the infrastructure built up in our capital over a period of more than 10 years. The organization would enjoy numerous advantages: the possibility of direct communications with the United Nations system; the possibility of pooling experience with IAEA, an organization established in Vienna since 1957, which has acquired a vast stock of knowledge regarding inspection missions; the possibility of realizing savings through the shared use of technical facilities; and work facilitated by long experience of international conferences and the requisite human and technical resources. The future staff will enjoy the professional and personal advantages that can be offered by a city which has been open to



(Mr. Mock, Austria)

international life for many years. I might mention the existence of 10 international schools, with instruction in 8 languages, 3 foreign-language theatres, and also the presence of churches and places of worship belonging to 10 religions. Finally, I should like to add that the opening up of the borders between East and West is particularly tangible in Vienna, and this in itself constitutes a factor conducive to international disarmament efforts.

The recent welcome progress achieved in the area of disarmament is also to be observed in other exchanges which are under way in Vienna: I am referring to the talks on confidence- and security-building measures and the negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe.

In view of the very effective competition from the Netherlands it is quite clear that I have had to advance very detailed arguments.

Allow me to conclude my comments on chemical weapons with a brief comment on the forty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly. We welcome with satisfaction the report of the group of experts on procedures for verification in the event of the use of chemical weapons, and we view it as an invaluable instrument which could serve as a basis for measures to be taken by the United Nations Secretary-General. In the area of biological weapons the delegation of your country, Mr. Minister, and the delegation of Australia, as well as our delegation, closely co-operated at the General Assembly and successfully redrafted the United Nations General Assembly resolution on this issue. Bearing in mind the Austrian chairmanship of the second review conference in 1986, which was crowned with success, and thinking ahead to the next review conference in 1991, we attach considerable importance to the results achieved in New York, and to active preparation for this conference.



(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

Bearing in mind the changing international situation and the importance that the Government of Mexico attributes to the work that has been assigned to us, allow me to read the message that President Carlos Salinas de Gortari has addressed to the Conference:

"Today the Conference on Disarmament is once again taking up its important task, at a time of renewed hope in disarmament. The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have begun talks and negotiations on a number of issues, beginning with nuclear disarmament, and the community of nations is witnessing the emergence of fresh and encouraging developments in the search for international peace and security.

"The Conference on Disarmament now has before it a major opportunity to translate this climate of détente into specific agreements on the priority issues: nuclear disarmament, and more particularly the cessation of all nuclear tests, and the elimination of chemical weapons.

"Disarmament has been under discussion at the Palais des Nations in Geneva for over a half a century. We ought now to move forward along the path marked out by the United Nations to achieve a safer world with fewer weapons. The ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament under effective international control remains as valid today as it was in 1962 when this Conference began its work.

"As members of the Conference on Disarmament, all of us have a duty and an obligation to fulfil the hopes of the peoples of the world, to banish the spectre of war and its deadly instruments. The bilateral understandings should be followed by disarmament agreements negotiated on a multilateral basis. The most pressing issue is the total suspension of nuclear tests. A number of possibilities are open to us in order to achieve that objective.

"The elimination of chemical weapons is also a matter of priority. The international community is entitled to demand the rapid conclusion of a convention in this field. We need to draw up a comprehensive programme of disarmament to serve as a framework of our efforts. Not one of us, moreover, is unaware of the close link between disarmament and economic development.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

... A militarily epochal bilateral super-Power agreement on 50 per cent cuts in strategic nuclear weapons is under way. Likewise, an agreement on significant conventional arms reductions in Europe is expected to materialize this year. The super-Powers are negotiating a bilateral agreement to cut back most of their chemical weapon arsenals, as a step towards a global comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. In addition to negotiated disarmament measures, several countries in both East and West - including the Soviet Union and the United States - are now taking unilateral steps to reduce their military forces and restructure them in more defensive postures. Furthermore, President Bush has just proposed significantly larger conventional forces reductions in Europe than those that had been envisaged in Vienna, while some East European countries are negotiating with the Soviet Union on complete troop withdrawals this year.



(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

While it is still too early to designate 1990 as the year of disarmament, I think one may fairly argue that we are beginning to see the contours of emerging, parallel disarmament measures: negotiated agreements or unilateral undertakings on strategic and other nuclear weapons, on chemical weapons, on conventional forces, on further confidence-building measures.

Regrettably, however, progress in global multilateral disarmament efforts has been slow compared with the recent record of the bilateral talks and the regional European negotiations. To the general public this is an enigma. If the major military Powers are seeking real disarmament, they ought to work actively for global agreements.

Over the last few years, we have become very familiar with the claim that the comprehensive chemical weapons convention will be concluded soon. Such statements cannot credibly be repeated for ever by diplomats, politicians and governments. The "rolling text" is in itself a significant achievement. If there is political will there are no insurmountable obstacles. We must be in a position to say how soon a chemical weapons convention can be expected.

In Sweden's view, the negotiations themselves could be concluded in a year's time, given the political will on all sides. A declared political commitment to reach agreement in a specified time frame has appeared conducive to reaching agreement in other negotiations. A corresponding public commitment to an agreed deadline has been considered in the chemical negotiations.

1989 started under the best auspices. The Paris Conference early last year seemed to have provided the necessary impetus and sense of urgency. My Government was convinced that the Paris Declaration, endorsed by some 150 States, with representation at a high political level, constituted a true commitment to the early conclusion of a chemical weapons ban by all participants. No one has better personified that commitment than the Ad hoc Committee Chairman for 1989, Ambassador Morel. Sweden is grateful for his energy, resourcefulness and unswerving loyalty to the task entrusted to him. We would like to thank him and to acknowledge our appreciation of the achievements made in the negotiations under his chairmanship.

The 1989 results of the chemical negotiations are very valuable. The protocol on inspection procedures, the annex on confidentiality, the annex on chemicals, the inclusion of a practically unbracketed annex I to article VI in the "rolling text", the progress on final clauses and on articles VII and VIII, the first texts on the composition of the Executive Council and the further elaboration of article IX, part 2 - all bear witness to the intensive and fruitful work carried out during 1989.

But however significant these results, they still do not constitute a breakthrough. The Paris Declaration had led us to expect a breakthrough.

We have still not been able to translate our common ground regarding challenge inspections into treaty language. We still do not know what a ad hoc verification system would look like. There is no broadly acceptable formula for the Executive Council's composition and decision-making. There are still widely disparate views on the principle that a total prohibition of



(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

use should take effect at the same time as the convention comes into force. To a great extent, solutions to these problems are already available. What is needed is the political will, the commitment and the courage to really negotiate, to make choices, and to compromise.

The greater momentum of the bilateral consultations between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1989 is a good sign. The Committee has benefited from some of the results. Furthermore, one sign of good intentions is the bilateral memorandum of understanding regarding the exchange of data, confidence-building visits and ultimately inspections prior to the signature of the convention. It is disappointing, however, that the bilateral agreement on the order of destruction of chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities, confirmed and announced at the meeting at foreign minister level in Wyoming in September, has not yet been communicated to the Conference on Disarmament.

It seems that the delay is due to the emergency of potentially crippling reservations, which would allow certain States to retain chemical warfare agents until - in their unilateral judgement - all States capable of making chemical weapons subscribe to the convention.

Sweden fully shares the concern about ensuring global adhesion to the chemical weapons convention. However, reservations of this type risk doing the opposite by leaving a glaring loophole in the régime, thereby providing an excuse for other countries to retain - or to acquire - chemical weapons as well. In the Swedish Government's view, it is of vital importance that all States wishing to participate in the negotiations should be allowed to do so in accordance with the 1989 Paris Declaration.

1990 will be a crucial year in the negotiations on the chemical weapons convention. A definite breakthrough must now come.



Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico): On behalf of the Group of 21, I should like to make the following statement on the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.

"The commitment of the international community to banning chemical weapons has been emphatically expressed on several occasions in the last year by Governments in unilateral statements as well as in the General Assembly of the United Nations, at the Ninth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, and at the Paris Conference, and by governments and industry together at the Canberra Conference. This commitment, and the repeated declarations of political will to this end, must be reflected in our work for 1990.

"It is essential that rapid progress be made on the political issues which are still outstanding, along with progress on technical issues. It is a serious concern of the Group of 21 that the substantive progress on primarily technical issues has not been accompanied by progress on some political issues of great importance to the Group, such as use of chemical weapons, assistance, sanctions and the Executive Council. A proper balance must also be established between rights and obligations for all the future parties to the Convention, in order to secure universal adherence to this important instrument of international law. This must be clearly reflected in the negotiations if they are to lead to a successful conclusion, thereby ridding the world of the threat of use of these awesome weapons of mass destruction.

"The conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons, which took place in Paris between 7 and 11 January 1989, in its Final Declaration, adopted unanimously by all participating States, stressed the urgency and the priority of the task entrusted to the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and called on the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva 'to redouble its efforts, as a matter of urgency, to resolve expeditiously the remaining issues and to conclude the convention at the earliest date'.

"At the Government-Industry Conference held in Canberra from 18 to 22 September last year, the urgency of concluding a convention totally banning chemical weapons was further underlined.

"On 15 December 1989, the forty-fourth session of the General Assembly unanimously adopted two resolutions which refer to the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. Resolution 44/115 A, on 'Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons' expresses the regret of the General Assembly that 'a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction has not yet been concluded'. It 'again urges the Conference on Disarmament, as a matter of high priority, to intensify, during its 1990 session, which will be of pivotal importance, the negotiations on such a convention and to reinforce its efforts further



(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

by, inter alia, increasing the time that it devotes to such negotiations, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives, with a view to the final elaboration of a convention at the earliest date, and to re-establish its Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for that purpose with the mandate to be agreed upon by the Conference at the beginning of its 1990 session'. Resolution 44/115 B, on 'Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and to support the conclusion of a chemical weapons convention', specifically 'urges the Conference on Disarmament to pursue as a matter of continuing urgency its negotiations on a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction'.

"Thus, less than two months ago, the General Assembly emphasized the urgency of the negotiations on the CW convention and urged this Conference to negotiate with a view to its final elaboration. The General Assembly also stressed that the convention should embrace inter alia the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons. All these points must be reflected in the mandate for the negotiations.

"The Group of 21 therefore continues to believe that the mandate to be adopted by this forum should include a reference to the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons, in order to be consistent with the General Assembly resolutions 44/115 A and B and with the language enshrined in the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference. The phrase 'except for its final drafting' should be deleted from the text of the mandate in order to convey to the international community our full acceptance of the responsibility entrusted to the Ad hoc Committee as contained in the three texts referred to above, which the States represented here adhered to without exception. As the General Assembly and the Paris Conference stated, the negotiations should be concluded at the earliest date. This must be clearly expressed in the mandate.

"The Group would like to emphasize the importance it attaches to all the aspects of the mandate and the conduct of the negotiations which have been outlined in this statement."



Mr. ELARABY (Egypt):

... I take the floor today, very briefly, to present to the Conference on Disarmament a report on the national trial inspection carried out by Egypt. The report is contained in document CD/958 of 23 January 1990. The trial inspection was conducted at one of our chemical plants in a Cairo suburb at the end of last summer. The principal objectives of the trial inspection were to verify whether data on the production and processing of the chemical substance covered by the inspection were consistent with the records; that the facility was not being used to produce any chemical listed in schedules [1] or [2]; and that the reaction could not be stopped at a specific stage with a view to producing another chemical listed in schedules [1] or [2].

In the course of the national trial inspection it became clear that several provisions of the draft convention concerning verification by inspection on a routine basis require further study. Other questions also arose with regard to access to confidential information and protection of confidentiality. The report contains a list of these issues. I wish to add that my delegation is ready to discuss this trial inspection with other delegations in the Conference on Disarmament with a view to improving procedures for genuine routine inspections.

I shall be asking for the floor at a later stage to express my delegation's views on the items on our agenda.



(Mr. Azambuja, Brazil)

The time has come for us to proceed to a thorough re-examination not only of some of our goals, but of our ways and means of approaching them. This task could be handled, I think, at least in its preliminary stage, by a small group of our most experienced members. The Group of Seven or some such informal team could possibly be given a new lease of life and proceed as soon as feasible, with the assistance of our Secretary-General, who has the wisdom and the imagination to be of great assistance in this exercise. Before the end of the first part of our session we could have the core proposals from this Group, which we would then examine in depth at informal plenary sessions.

Unless we effectively broaden our working agenda, this Conference could shrink to no more than a de facto preparatory committee for the future convention on chemical weapons, and only later seek new missions to accomplish. This is a minimalist approach and one that falls far short of the expectations of the international community, one that would make a mockery of our many declarations and resolutions and one fraught with the danger of the long agony of a progressively more enfeebled negotiating body.

I leave these thoughts with the Conference, with the conviction that the time has come for aggressively creative new thinking, and that we have "in-house" the ability and the experience to suggest ways and means for our renewal and for enduring and perhaps even greater usefulness in a dramatically altered international political environment.

So much for what I think we should urgently do of a structural nature with this Conference, to enable it to catch up with the pace of events in the outside world. We are heartened to see that a very large number of non-member States have sought to join us as observers. We support all their applications - which should be dealt with as a package and immediately - and we are sure that all of us can only benefit from the widest possible enlargement of our universe of active players.

We have already praised Ambassador Pierre Morel of France for what he did as a leader of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. We feel no reluctance to do so again. We could not ask for more diligence, creative imagination and unflagging enthusiasm. He has brought us close to completing the task, and I feel confident that Ambassador Carl-Magnus Hyltenius will prove quite an able successor.

On the overall question of chemical weapons, I would like to make just a few additional remarks. My delegation is persuaded that we are ready to complete - in a relatively short time - a very competent draft, capable of gaining immediate universal adherence, that would constitute a truly universal and non-discriminatory convention banning chemical weapons. We are further persuaded that a draft of this breadth would command such immediate and overwhelming support that no country could afford to be perceived as a non-signatory. The Paris Conference gave us a valuable measure of the amount of repudiation and moral condemnation that such weapons provoke. A major conference for the signature of the Convention - and at the highest level - would command such prestige and moral authority that a realistic evaluation would indicate that no Government could refrain from acceding. Failure to become a party would entail an unacceptable degree of suspicion and isolation.



(Mr. Azambuja, Brazil)

This conviction leads me to the thought that, while we whole-heartedly support energetic and creative efforts by our Conference through its Ad hoc Committee and its prestigious working groups, we should be wary of inviting further ideas and constructs, and that what we have already on the table in front of us is an excessive menu of both concepts and instruments for action. We may be fast approaching the point - if we are not there already - where further refinements of principles and procedures might become counter-productive and lead to a blurring of vision and dispersion of focus. We all know that an over-abundance of time is almost as bad as a shortage in terms of the quality of the final product.

Not only are we endangered by an excess of ideas and contributions; we also risk losing the momentum that has been built up, and which has to a not inconsiderable degree been dissipated throughout the inconclusive year of 1989. In other words, and with great candour: in my view we have a manageable task on our hands; we have assembled virtually all the necessary building-blocks; as a body, and with appropriate expert assistance, we are quite competent to complete the task. World opinion is behind us. So is the overall sympathy of chemical industries everywhere. The international climate is frankly encouraging and relaxed. If, with all these advantages, we fail to deliver our product within a reasonable time frame, my assessment is that this Conference will be hard put to it to justify its existence and continued relevance.

My optimism does not lead me to overlook the fact that there are serious questions still outstanding, regarding which positions are rather far apart. Among them I would list some unresolved items relating to scope, the relationship of the future chemical weapons convention to the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the order of destruction, the composition and decision-making of the Executive Council, challenge inspection and assistance. I do not include article XI on this list, for I consider that differences around this matter are narrowing. Even if the list seems impressive, at first sight, we should remember that many of these issues involve political decisions - the sort of give and take that normally only occurs in the final stages of negotiations, when the goal is in sight and all bargaining chips have been used. If all of us could be convinced of the urgency of concluding our draft convention, these outstanding items would certainly be of no great account. A division of duties between the Committee as a negotiating forum (tasked with drafting the body of the convention), the preparatory committee (to which we could entrust the finalization of some more detailed and technical parts of the convention) and the future organization (to which we could leave its final actual implementation) could be a way of looking at the negotiations in a new light and from a reinvigorating perspective.

As this is my first statement to the 1990 session of the Conference on Disarmament, I could not but acknowledge and comment on some of the events that have occurred since September last: the fast and far-reaching changes in the international political landscape - against a background of persistent sluggishness in addressing the so-called North-South problems; the fact that our negotiating forum has yet to succeed in incorporating these new sources of energy into its machinery; the need to proceed to the requisite rethinking of



(Mr. Azambuja, Brazil)

our structure and ways of doing business; the tireless work done by the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons in the 1989-1990 session and the great hopes we can have for its future work, if the negotiators keep in mind the need to succeed in a reasonable time frame.

My two main themes this morning are linked in a multiple way. New thinking should lead to more trust and consequently to the more speedy completion of a CW convention, banning for ever this abhorrent means of warfare. The success of this body in negotiating a multilateral convention of such importance would also, in turn, reinforce trends towards a more harmonious and peaceful international scene. Let us pursue these two objectives simultaneously - the modernization of our working methods and the completion of our first multilateral disarmament agreement in many years. My delegation will contribute to the best of its ability to the attainment of these worthy and urgent objectives.

Mr. GARCIA MORITAN (Argentina) (translated from Spanish):

In my first statement before the Conference on Disarmament I have the satisfaction of reading the following special message addressed to this body by the President of Argentina, Carlos S. Menem:

(Mr. García Moritán, Argentina)

... "The convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons which is being drafted by this Conference must not be delayed. It is time our negotiators found the formulae that will enable us to harmonize all our positions and deal with outstanding issues as soon as possible. I have given clear instructions in this regard to the Permanent Representative of my country in those negotiations.

(Mr. Hou, China)

... The distinguished representative of Mexico, Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch, in his capacity as the co-ordinator of the Group of 21, made a statement on behalf of the Group on the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons in the plenary on 6 February. My delegation concurs with and supports the statement. It is our consistent position that the future convention on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons should expressly stipulate a ban on the use of such weapons. This also represents the universal demand of the international community. The Final Declaration of the Paris Conference and the relevant resolutions of the forty-fourth session of the General Assembly all emphasize this point. We therefore share the view that the mandate to be adopted for the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons should indeed be improved, and that it is appropriate to include a reference on the prohibition of use. We are ready to continue to carry out constructive consultations with you, Mr. President, and with other delegations, in a spirit of active co-operation, so as to bring about an early start to substantive work in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.



(Mr. Morel, France)

... As agreed at the last meeting of the summer part of the Conference's session, the Ad hoc Committee held open-ended consultations from 28 November to 14 December 1989, followed by a session of limited duration during the period from 11 January to 1 February 1990. This work led to a new version of the "rolling text" (CD/961), which I have the honour to introduce today. Before putting forward a few ideas at the end of a year as Chairman, I should like to comment point by point on the results of this inter-sessional period, which has been very useful in that, in keeping with established practice, it has enabled us largely to put the finishing touches to work already begun during the session itself. Six documents which are new or have been redrafted since the previous report have thus been drawn up.

First of all, the Protocol on inspection procedures. The agreement on a new text - which from now on, in the new version of the "rolling text", replaces the former "Guidelines on the international inspectorate" - rounds off several years of intensive work under the competent guidance of successive group chairmen, and this year particularly the Chairman of Group 1, Mr. Rüdiger Lüdeking, with very active support from many delegations. This commitment was legitimate given what was at stake, namely the development of one of the fundamental tools of the draft convention - verification. I think I can say without exaggeration that, imperfect and incomplete though it may be, this new text represents one of the important achievements of the 1989 session. We now have an outline of a code regulating the practical arrangements for inspections, the precise conduct of inspectors in terms of their rights and duties, and the obligations of States. The structure adopted enables us to draw a precise distinction between general provisions in the area of inspection procedures and specific aspects within the context of various types of inspection. Where the former are concerned, the new text contributes invaluable elements in the area of definitions and, more generally, a more structured presentation in terms of the successive stages of the inspection. As regards routine inspections, important clarifications have been added on the use of continuous monitoring systems.

The work on challenge inspections has enabled us to develop the concept of managed access, particularly in respect of the requirements of confidentiality, and to outline the role of the observer of the requesting State. Finally, a few basic elements, which should be of use for further study of the question, have been incorporated into the procedures governing cases of the alleged use of chemical weapons.

Secondly, the final clauses have been completed, with article XIV, on duration and withdrawal, article XVIII, on the deposit of instruments of ratification and accession, and article XX, on languages and authentic texts, which thus round off the overall structure of the convention as it appears in appendix I of the report. In this way, thanks to the Chairman of Group 2,

(continued)



(Mr. Morel, France)

Mr. Mohammed Gomaa, the Committee has brought to a successful conclusion the complex work that had begun on the basis of the results of consultations conducted during the 1988 session by the Chairman of the Committee, Ambassador Sujka - results which existed in various versions and which did not commit delegations. It now remains for us to resume work on those matters that still appear in appendix II, namely, article XII, on international agreements, whose presentation has been improved, article XIII, on amendments, which was drawn up during the session, and various questions which have so far not been drawn up in the form of articles, namely, the settlement of disputes, reservations, the status of annexes and, above all, sanctions.

Thirdly, regarding the scientific advisory board, intensive work on the part of the Chairman of Group 3, Mr. Rakesh Sood, has enabled us, while remaining mindful of the legitimate concerns of various delegations, to define in article VIII the general architecture of this forum, which had already been outlined during the session. It seems to me - and the course of the negotiations can only confirm this - that we all acknowledge the need to draw in an appropriate way on the competence of representatives of the international scientific community, in order to adapt the future convention in the light of the development of science and technology, which are changing at an ever greater rate. But we are also concerned to avoid the risks of interference between this new subsidiary body and the operation of the tripartite institutional order established under the convention. This dictated a cautious approach, which led to the balanced arrangement described in the draft convention: an advisory role for the scientific board, which does not detract from its importance; linkage between the board and the Conference of States Parties, on the clear understanding that it will act in close symbiosis with the Director-General. The clarification of these basic concepts, which has now been achieved, should enable us in future to make progress on the work which remains to be done in due course, on the board's mandate, its organization and its operation in practice.

Fourthly, thanks to a generous spirit of conciliation on the part of delegations, the Chairman of Group 4, Mr. Johan Molander, was able, in the first place, to complete successfully a substantial revision of annex 1 to article VI, which in its new version, practically free of square brackets, reflects the agreement among all delegations on the specific conditions governing the limited production of prohibited chemicals on this schedule. The régime applicable to schedule 1 chemicals has thus been very markedly clarified. This refinement has, first of all, enabled us to define the framework for authorized manufacture properly, with the possibility of synthesis for protection purposes in a laboratory other than a small-scale facility. It was also accepted that it was not desirable to seek to control laboratories synthesizing less than 100 grams of such chemicals per year, which considerably facilitates verification and enables us to preserve the confidentiality needed by laboratories engaged in research for medical or pharmaceutical purposes.

Group 4 was also able to devote its last few meetings in January to arrangements for revising the schedules of chemicals and guidelines for the schedules. Its point of departure was suggestions presented during the summer part of the session and an initial paper on general problems proposed in



(Mr. Morel, France)

December. The debate was particularly interesting as it bore on an essential and so far barely studied point - the smooth running of the technical apparatus of the convention after its entry into force. The debates dealt essentially with decision-making arrangements, and led to a new text inserted in the annex on chemicals.

For the schedules this document suggests an evaluation of the Executive Council's proposal for a revision, along with a recommendation to States Parties; their agreement could be secured either tacitly or after formal acceptance by a yet-to-be-defined majority of States. In the absence of such approval, the proposal could be submitted to the Conference of States Parties, either at a regular or at a special session. As far as the guidelines are concerned, the machinery adopted, which is more restrictive, provides for an initial assessment by the Executive Council, followed by a recommendation to States Parties; the decision should in any event be taken by the Conference of States Parties.

Fifthly, in reviewing the work of the groups during the inter-sessional period, I must now recall that it was agreed last August to deal in Group 5 with the very important question of security during the destruction period. Consultations begun by the Group's Chairman, Dr. Walter Krutzsch, when the inter-sessional meetings resumed indicated that in the absence of the paper which was expected from the two countries which have declared that they possess chemical weapons, the conditions for useful work on the subject had not yet been met. But I should also note that developments in the past few months, and particularly the past few days, have confirmed that this necessary preliminary of bilateral work, which is eagerly awaited by the Committee, is well under way. It will then be for the Committee to resume this year, on a new basis, the in-depth consideration of this question, which is of interest to all delegations. I also wish to note that, towards the end of the inter-sessional period, some brackets and major footnotes to articles IV (Chemical weapons) and V (Chemical weapons production facilities) were deleted, which will facilitate the resumption of the Committee's work on this subject.

Sixthly, on challenge inspection, work continued up to the last few days of the inter-sessional period to finalize, in what was deemed the most appropriate manner, the document which had been under preparation throughout the year on this question, in order to define the essential elements which should appear in the second part of article IX of the draft convention. Regarding paragraph 5 of this text, it was considered a little early to clarify the concepts of alternative measures and managed access. On paragraph 6, in contrast, the discussion taken up again on the basis of language outlined in December enabled us, following very interesting and fruitful exchanges of view, to define two aspects of the final phase of consideration of the report after the completion of the inspection proper - namely, the provision of information to the parties and the Executive Council, and the role that can devolve upon the latter. It was not, however, possible to settle everything at a stroke, and at the end of our work, if I may put it like that, I had occasion to stress that we had not yet taken a decision on the decision-making process. But I feel that the new sequence outlined in paragraph 6, like the text as a whole, offers a sound framework for subsequent



(Mr. Morel, France)

reflection, and may be the beginning of a compromise between the various points of view as to the role that should devolve upon the requesting State, the requested State and the organs of the convention.

As for its placement, it was finally agreed that appendix II should continue to be the home of this text, which stems from consultations with all delegations, and which now replaces the former text that was drawn up in 1987 by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Ekéus, and added to in 1988 - a text which on his sole responsibility represented a first representation of the various points of view. An introductory section preceding the new document, as well as the various footnotes, clearly show that this is a step forward to be followed up in the context of ongoing work, namely, the elaboration of article IX, part 2. Bearing in mind the importance of this procedure, which all delegations consider to be the corner-stone of the system of verification under the future convention, I venture to stress that this is an urgent task.

Seventh and last, I would like to mention that during the inter-sessional period the Committee benefited from the very intensive work of the Technical Group on Instrumentation created last June and chaired by Dr. Marjatta Rautio. As this work is not a direct part of the negotiations, it was deemed preferable not to insert the Group's final report, which was distributed on 22 January as document CD/CW/WP.272. However, its principal elements are mentioned in paragraph 7 of the introductory part of the "rolling text", and I should like to take this opportunity to stress that this first methodical inventory of the technical and scientific facilities and procedures necessary for the proper implementation of the convention has been very enlightening for all delegations. This report offers a first overall picture and outlines avenues of research for the experts. The work of the Group also made it possible to identify various technical adjustments necessary to arrive at more coherent procedures. More generally, it enabled us to measure to what extent the Committee increasingly required the support of experts to prepare, as of now, for the smooth practical implementation of the future convention.

Allow me to conclude this year as Chairman of the Committee by presenting a few more personal comments. Let me say first of all that it was a fascinating experience, conducted in the course of a year which in many ways was exceptional, in many areas, of course, but also where chemical weapons are concerned, with a remarkable series of decisive initiatives which I need not recall here. Though less spectacular, the speeding up of negotiations within the Conference on Disarmament has been an integral part of this unprecedented sequence, which highlighted the growing importance accorded by the international community to disarmament in the field of chemical weapons. We may regret that in the course of the session it was not possible to complete the task assigned to us, but we must properly weigh up what finalization means. The disappointed expectations of a decisive breakthrough which would resolve the "outstanding problems" at a stroke does not entirely correspond to what remains to be done. At the risk of stretching this strategic metaphor, I will observe that the entire front has moved and that we will succeed in concluding the convention by dealing with it as an integrated and coherent whole.



(Mr. Morel, France)

Specifically I believe that after a year of intensive work on all aspects of the convention we can and must begin to regard the convention as a whole which has already begun to settle into coherence and balance. By the same token, that which remains to be done can in a way be identified in terms of the edifice already built. By proceeding thus by deduction we will be better able to single out the most important areas on which real decisions have to be taken.

Does this mean that the completion of the negotiations now depends only on a few political decisions? I am not convinced of that. At the risk of repeating myself, the experience of the session now coming to an end leads me to observe that politics and technical matters cannot be completely dissociated. Certainly we should avoid getting bogged down in perfectionism or secondary considerations, but we should also beware of believing that we can find a sort of "leg-up" to overcome real difficulties. Yet the approach we have developed little by little together in the course of this year offers two interesting and complementary directions for the last phase of our work. It is a fact that the major questions can be truly settled only if we embark on in-depth work, where the precision of what is known as technical work necessarily has a place. But it is equally true that a number of other technical issues related to the smooth application of the convention can, with the agreement of all delegations, be detached from the negotiations proper and settled in parallel, without being deferred until later.

In the course of this session, we have also better appreciated to what extent the convention had to be universal and hence benefit from accession by all States, to begin with by enabling all States wishing to contribute to negotiations to do so. This broadening of the negotiating work has been the result of more active involvement of delegations of member States and at the same time a broader, more resolute contribution on the part of delegations of non-member States. New work habits have appeared, but we can surely move even further in this direction.

This is also the moment to mention the role of those I would call the "new interlocutors" of delegations, who, without directly participating in the negotiations, contribute essential elements - whether these be - first and foremost, of course - experts from industry, with whom an informal but permanent dialogue has now been established, and whose remarkable commitment in the trial inspections already prefigures the operation of the convention, scientific circles, whose vital contribution is better recognized today, the press, non-governmental organizations, and parliamentarians, who will be both our judges and our counterparts in each national legal system. This brief enumeration of so many partners whose role will constantly grow in this final phase of our work leads me to stress to what extent the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, while pursuing its unstinting daily task, should now size up its collective responsibility in respect of the convention. The more the convention appears as a whole which is in the process of being finalized - and it is more complete than it seems at first glance - the more we must be ready to commit ourselves together to bring it to the stage of full implementation. All delegations agree that about a year will be needed to complete the process - if, of course, the momentum is maintained. Since the calendar is no longer at issue, it remains for us to take the measure of all that this



(Mr. Morel, France)

entails, for us here in Geneva, and for our Governments, and to do so in a very political sense, not to say a moral sense. It is time to say, with Blaise Pascal, "Nous sommes engagés" - we are firmly committed to a difficult task.

It remains for me to thank all the delegations for their stimulating contributions throughout this session, their striking readiness to co-operate, and their encouragement, which has been of great assistance to me. More particularly I should like to thank the delegations in the extended bureau, especially those of the co-ordinators, the United Kingdom, Sweden and Poland, who were my daily partners. My gratitude goes to the five Group Chairmen, Rüdiger Lüdeking, Mohammed Gomaa, Rakesh Sood, Johan Molander and Walter Krutzsch, who have become true companions and friends, as well as Dr. Rautio. I also publicly thank the secretariat of the Ad hoc Committee, Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail, Secretary of the Committee, Ms. Agnès Marcaillou, Mr. Michael Cassandra and Ms. Cheryl Darby, thanks to whom the convention takes shape each day, and I also pay tribute to their exemplary devotion. This is also true of the interpreters, the translators and the conference officers. Lastly, may I be permitted to express my gratitude to the French delegation as a whole - Olivier de la Baume, Pierre Canonne, Michel Pouchepadas, Marie-Thérèse Desbois and Malika Cheniti? All that we have done here in the Palais and the Villa des Ormeaux, we have done together in a true team spirit, without which nothing is possible.

The time has come to extend my warm wishes for success to the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee for this session, Ambassador Hyltenius. These wishes may be expressed in a few words which speak for themselves: continuity, experience, competence, rigour, ambition. The fate of our convention is in good hands.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for introducing the report of the Ad hoc Committee, as well as for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I wish to express to Ambassador Morel our deep appreciation for the outstanding manner in which he has discharged his responsibilities as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, "une expérience passionnante" in his own words. His diplomatic skill, experience and dedication have considerably advanced the work of that subsidiary body, and I wish also to extend our congratulations to him for the progress achieved since he was appointed Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee.



(Mr. Chirila, Romania)

In the light of the dynamic progress in international life, the Geneva Conference, the sole framework for comprehensive negotiations for disarmament, must make a more significant contribution, both through negotiation of agreements and measures and through the encouragement of all the discussions and negotiations at all levels and in all areas of disarmament. One of the areas in which the Conference on Disarmament is called upon and in a position to make an immediate and decisive contribution is the negotiation of a convention on the prohibition of the use, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. Our position concerning chemical disarmament, which is fully marked by openness, a positive approach and determination, is in fact based on two equally important elements: first, my country's position of principle in favour of the banning and elimination of all weapons of mass destruction as soon as possible; second, the fact that Romania possesses no chemical weapons.

We would like to stress here, with all the vigour and determination deriving from the mandate entrusted to our delegation, that Romania has no intention of producing or acquiring chemical weapons in the future. We have firm and clear instructions to act with determination to ensure that the ongoing negotiations are intensified and lead as soon as possible to the conclusion of a universal convention to ban chemical weapons, on the basis of the "rolling text" of the draft. To that end we intend to participate actively in and contribute to the best of our ability to the finalization of the draft articles that are still under discussion. We are of course aware of the problems and difficulties, notable among them that of monitoring, guaranteeing the full implementation of the future regulations. We are in favour of a system of strict and effective monitoring, including facilities for manufacturing chemicals which could present a risk of any kind for the convention. At the same time, we share the practically universal concern to ensure that the future convention does not affect the development of the chemical industry or legitimate international co-operation for peaceful purposes. At the same time we welcome and are ready to support any initiative, gesture or act that will bring us closer as soon as possible to the objective that is imperative by virtue of the weight of the evidence, considerations of effectiveness and from all points of view, namely, the conclusion of a convention universally banning and totally eliminating chemical weapons for ever. In this context, we have learned of the official confirmation that the Soviet Union and the United States plan at the Soviet-American summit next June to conclude a bilateral agreement on the destruction of a part of their CW stockpiles until equal lower levels are reached. We hope that, far from shifting the centre of interest, the Soviet-American bilateral agreement, like any other action in the same field, will encourage and contribute to our negotiations here in Geneva in the multilateral context.

Ambassador Pierre Morel of France, who so assiduously and skilfully guided the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons during the preceding session, has just given us an overall picture of the efforts made and the results obtained. However, we cannot hide a certain feeling that, particularly where decisive - political - questions are concerned, the results could have been more significant, especially in view of the more favourable general conditions in recent times. The declaration introduced on behalf



(Mr. Chirila, Romania)

of the Group of 21 at the first plenary meeting of the session by Ambassador Marin Bosch of Mexico should of course be placed in this context. Our delegation is ready to support the proposals made by the Group of 21 in the 6 February declaration. At the same time, we have also seen the significance of reference made by Ambassador Morel in his personal remarks and in his statement to the risk of the illusion of a "leg-up". We will offer our full co-operation to this year's Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden, and we will do our best to make our modest contribution to collective action on the important and urgent problem of the conclusion of a universal convention on prohibition. We feel that in order to achieve these objectives we have to act with determination and without any prejudice or pre-conditions. In general we consider that, in the field of disarmament, the only approach is to act with perseverance and realism and to move forward gradually towards the achievement of agreements and measures without conditions or artificial linkages.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): Although I have not spoken before in this forum, and although I intend to make a more formal initial statement to the Conference in the very near future, I would like to take the floor now to make a couple of brief remarks.

First, I wish to inform members of the Conference on Disarmament that the United States delegation is pleased to have with us today United States

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(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

Congressman Martin Lancaster and members of his staff. Mr. Lancaster is visiting the United States delegation in his capacity as one of four members of the United States House of Representatives who have been appointed by the Speaker of the House, Mr. Foley as special arms control observers for the chemical weapons negotiations. Congressman Lancaster is making his second trip to Geneva in this capacity, and we welcome his presence among us today as clear evidence that United States interest in a CW convention extends well beyond the executive branch. The United States Congress follows our work here with keen interest. We look forward to working closely with Mr. Lancaster and his colleagues on Capitol Hill.

Secondly, I would like to draw the attention of the members of the Conference to the joint statement on chemical weapons which was issued in Moscow on 10 February, three days ago, by Secretary of State Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. Together with my Soviet colleague, Minister Batsanov, I participated in the Ministerial Meeting and in the preparation of this important bilateral statement. In the United States view, this statement reaffirms President Bush's strong commitment to progress in the multilateral negotiations for a CW convention and our expectation that those bilateral efforts will enhance our multilateral work. You will see that the statement, first of all, reiterates our joint commitment to conclude and bring into force a CW convention as soon as possible. Secondly, it announces our intention, simultaneous with the negotiations on a global ban, to pursue reciprocal obligations: inter alia a programme of co-operation with respect to the destruction of chemical weapons, including co-ordinating the destruction of substantial quantities of CW stocks down to equal low levels on each side. Third, as part of this agreement, we will co-operate on safe destruction technology and carry out further verification experiments. Fourth, we commit ourselves further to reduce our CW stocks down to a very small fraction of present holdings during the first eight years after a CW convention enters into force, and to complete elimination during the subsequent two years, if possible. Fifth, we agree to halt all CW production when a CW convention enters into force. And, finally, the two sides will work to develop common principles that underlie our efforts to prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons.

President Bush believes that as the countries with the largest CW stocks, the United States and the Soviet Union should take the lead in destruction. This will give impetus to the negotiations, in our view, by demonstrating how serious the United States and the Soviet Union are about getting rid of these weapons. Our proposal to destroy all but a very small portion of CW stocks in the first eight years of a convention, we believe, puts this convention on a faster track than the ideas some of our countries talked about before, which would have delayed entry into force until all essential States adhere. What we are saying now is - let us get the convention into force right away with the United States and the Soviet Union on board so that the benefits can be realized right away, and we can work hard to get the other necessary States on board. If we succeed over the first 8 years we can all go to zero in 10 years; if not, it is the United States interpretation that we will have to keep at it. At least we will have the convention with its reductions, production ban, export controls, secretariat, etc.



(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

In addition to passing out this statement to you today, my Soviet colleague and I will shortly be circulating this paper as a formal CD document through the auspices of the secretariat.

The PRESIDENT: In connection with the decision just taken, I wish to state the following:

As is well known, the Conference on Disarmament is a specialist body. It is the unique global multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. There is a tradition among CD members of concentrating in their discussions very much on the disarmament issues at hand. This has been the general practice as well for the non-members invited to participate. Many non-members have made contributions of outstanding practical value to our disarmament work. I trust - and am confident - that those non-members who we have just invited will make a constructive contribution to the negotiations and, as the case might be, pre-negotiations on the disarmament issues they have chosen. It is understood that, in accordance with the rules of procedure and the practice of the Conference, invitations extended to non-members are for the 1990 session. It goes without saying that any action from which our negotiations would not benefit would be most inappropriate. In fact, the participation of States non-members of the Conference should contribute to the universality of disarmament agreements.

Our negotiations on a convention banning chemical weapons have shown encouraging progress. This is all the more timely since we have witnessed in the recent past how much suffering chemical weapons may cause. May I therefore remind all delegations, those of member States as well as those of States wishing to accede to the status of participating non-members, that all States participating in the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical

(The President)

weapons made the following call in its Final Declaration: "In addition, in order to achieve as soon as possible the indispensable universal character of the convention, they call upon all States to become parties thereto as soon as it is concluded." In this context I note that all 30 States non-members that have addressed communications to us have indicated their wish to participate in our negotiations on chemical weapons.



Mr. BATSANOV: (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian):

... Although the session has just begun, we have already succeeded under your presidency, Sir, in solving a very important issue - the question of participation in the work of the Conference by non-member States. In the view of the Soviet delegation, your efforts and your contribution to the constructive solution of this issue deserve the highest appreciation. At the same time I should like to note that it proved possible to reach a positive solution to the issue of observers, as it is conventionally known, as a result of the flexibility and responsible approach displayed by a large number of members of the Conference. The Soviet delegation attaches due importance to this fact. I think that by adopting a positive decision on the requests submitted by non-member States of the Conference we are not simply helping to foster a favourable climate for the work of the Conference and the working bodies concerned - we are actually doing ourselves a service, because these are negotiations on disarmament, i.e. on the reduction and elimination of armaments which threaten all of us. To a considerable extent this relates to the problem of chemical weapons.

It is no accident that the Paris Conference stressed that all States wishing to contribute to the negotiations should be able to do so. The Soviet delegation has unswervingly supported and continues to support this appeal made by the Paris Conference, which is of fundamental significance in guaranteeing the universality of the future convention, and, to put it bluntly without beating about the bush, in order that none of us should ever become the victim of a chemical attack, that there should be no repetition of the

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(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

tragedies which have occurred in recent years. Hence the guaranteeing of the universal nature of the future convention is a goal in which all the members of the Conference on Disarmament, as well as all other States, should have a keen interest. This idea was also reflected in the recent Soviet-American statement on chemical weapons, adopted following talks in Moscow between the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Eduard Shevardnadze, and Secretary of State Baker of the United States. This statement has just been referred to by the distinguished Ambassador Ledogar of the United States, with whom (I hope he will forgive me) we expended a good deal of effort and nervous energy in Moscow to arrive in the end at what we consider a good statement.

Ambassador Ledogar has already described its content. Consequently, without repeating what has already been said I should like to note a few important points in this connection. The statement reaffirms the aim of finalizing the convention at the earliest date. The statement also stresses the desire of both parties, even as the multilateral negotiations proceed, to draw up a bilateral agreement on reciprocal obligations, including, *inter alia*, the destruction of a considerable part of the two countries' chemical weapons stockpiles. In this connection I should like to stress that in the view of the Soviet Union, such an agreement should contain provision for both the elimination and reduction of chemical weapons stockpiles (this is certainly correct) and the cessation of the production of chemical weapons. In the statement adopted as a result of the recent meeting of ministers stress is laid on the readiness of both sides to reduce their stockpiles of chemical weapons down to very low levels in the first eight years after the convention enters into force. Of course, all remaining stocks of chemical weapons will have to be eliminated, as the statement says, over the subsequent two years. Our position in this regard is unequivocal. We are in favour of the reaffirmation of the already agreed 10-year period for the elimination of all stockpiles of chemical weapons. Of course we agree that all States which are capable of possessing chemical weapons should accede to the convention.

Moreover, we consider that work to this end should begin now, without any delays. At the same time we are far from convinced that the completion of the process of elimination of chemical weapons in the course of the already established 10-year destruction period should be made dependent on accession to the convention by one particular State or another. We are experiencing serious concern in connection with the implications of such an approach, although, as I have already said, we subscribe to the aim of securing participation in the convention by all relevant countries. In the statement it is asserted - and we also deem this to be important - that a multilateral convention should contain a provision whereby all production of chemical weapons must cease from the moment of its entry into force.

In conclusion I should like to say the following. We sincerely welcome all those who, in keeping with the decision just adopted in the Conference, will join us in our work. We can see a continuation and a strengthening of the tendency towards an increase in the number of countries which manifest not theoretical but practical interest in our work. This applies not only to negotiations on chemical weapons, but also to a number of other bodies which either operate within the framework of the Conference on a permanent basis, or else are set up on an annual basis. In supporting the decision just adopted,



(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

our fundamental premise is that all the countries involved will be participating in our work in the most constructive fashion, remembering that our common purpose is to move forward along the path of arms limitation and disarmament, and that this can be achieved only if you respect your negotiating partner and if you set yourself the goal of progress at disarmament negotiations. It is quite obvious that a different approach - the introduction of elements of confrontation - cannot either lead to success or earn respect. For my part, I should like to state that we will always be ready to lend the necessary support and co-operation to non-member States of the Conference which are going to participate in our joint work.

Mr. REESE (Australia): I take the floor today to speak about the participation this year of 30 non-member States in the Conference on Disarmament. I would hope to have a subsequent opportunity in the course of the Conference to speak about the broader interests Australia has in the area of arms control and disarmament.

Australia welcomes the interest shown by the 30 non-member States in applying to participate in the work of the Conference and in the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons in particular. Australia supports the principle of the universality of participation in the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, which was endorsed at the Paris Conference. We see that participation as contributing to universal adherence to the Convention. The constructive participation of non-members in the negotiations is, therefore, important. We welcome the substantive contribution which a number of non-members have already made to the Committee's work, and we look forward to that contribution continuing.

In the critical year ahead of us in the Committee we would hope that all participating non-members ensure that their contributions are of a positive character and will help us in our negotiations to conclude the chemical weapons convention.



(Mr. von Stulpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

I would, at this juncture, where we have overcome potentially substantial problems for our negotiations, thank all those participating States and all those member States who have contributed in a responsible and positive way. I would also thank those who have particularly contributed to our negotiations, especially in chemical weapons, over time. I cited as a particular token of fidelity and engagement the delegation of Finland, which has contributed as much, if not more, than member delegations. I may utter the wish that all delegations having the right to participate, members and non-members, contribute more than their presence. What my delegation would regret would be participation not with a material object in view but the perceived behaviour of other States.

Also, the plenary should abide by rule 30 of our rules of procedure, which clearly says that it is the right of any member State of the Conference to raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

The CD, which I knew almost four years ago, had strong elements then of confrontation and verbal battles. In the last years, though, we have become more reasonable and more reasoned. We have concentrated more on our work at hand, we have put more impetus in the matters of multilateral disarmament. I hope that all participating States will accept this new and more fruitful style of our Conference. What my delegation hopes for is mainly useful and future-orientated work in the field of chemical weapons, our main course. All States carrying responsibility here - some more, some less - let us all live up to our respective responsibility.

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Mr. NASSERI (Islamic Republic of Iran):

... On the issue just decided, I wish to make the following statement, and in doing so, I hope that I can be pardoned for being a bit frank as the

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(Mr. Nasser, Islamic Republic of Iran)

sensitivity of the issue obliges me to be frank and straightforward. This important session of the Conference has commenced its work amidst great enthusiasm as we all anticipate great progress in various areas of disarmament, including above all in the negotiations on the chemical weapons convention. Many have contributed in the past to the gradual but solid development and evolution of this very comprehensive convention. The tireless efforts of Ambassador Morel were particularly timely as they fully prepared the ground for this year's important deliberations under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Hyltenius and his knowledgeable colleagues.

There is, indeed, good reason for enthusiasm as developments are all encouraging. Collectively they have given rise to the valid perception that the convention is no longer a distant hope but something that is very much for real and very close at hand. It is also understandable that more countries should now wish to participate in the work of the Conference, which would indeed welcome this as another sign that the Conference is moving in the right direction and is able to produce results and achievements. Indeed, the Conference has benefited from the valuable contributions of a number of non-members who have participated in the past as active observers and who are invited with pleasure and gratitude to continue their participation.

However, considering the very delicate nature of the work of the Conference on Disarmament, particularly on the CW convention, we feel that we should not have become overly anxious. We still believe that we probably have. While we understand the political reasoning behind the new proposal on participation, we are very much concerned about its possible negative implications. This clustered "all or none" proposal may have seemed an easy way out of a possible political confrontation, something that we did not wish to see repeated in this forum again, but whether it can help the work of the Conference and the chemical weapons convention in the future remains doubtful. We believe it was perhaps inappropriate and much less fair to, in a way, put participants with distinguished records of positive contributions on the same footing as countries with the most verified record of use of chemical weapons, but, aside from the question of fairness, we have to be cognizant of the implications for our work. A case-by-case approach was a well-established procedure which gave the members a chance to review and decide on every application based on its merits. Active and positive participation was thus recognized, valued and welcomed. This, in turn, encouraged other countries to participate with the same positive notions and commitment. The new proposal may very well put an end to that useful trend and may even reverse it. We hope this will not be the case, as there have already been a number of statements which stressed the need for participation by non-members with a positive attitude in mind.

I am not suggesting that a full commitment to the CW convention before its finalization should be a pre-condition or prerequisite for participation. There may be States which are still examining the issue. This is their prerogative. But how about those who are fully committed in their official positions and in their practice not to the objective of the convention but quite the contrary? Our reservations on the application by Israel stem from a position of principle shared by many States in and outside our region.



(Mr. Nasser, Islamic Republic of Iran)

On the application of Iraq there were many reasons for objections. This is a State which still prides itself in official positions on having extensively used chemical weapons as a justified means of warfare, and is engaged in an aggressive chemical weapon production, development and stockpiling programme. Not a single sign thus far that they intend to reverse their decisions and policies regarding this matter - not a single sign.

We have been told that these States should be allowed in, so as to remove any possible excuse for a possible eventual refusal to join the convention. But is there any assurance in this? If we base our work on removing excuses for those who are only looking for excuses, we have probably entrapped ourselves in a never-ending process. Nonetheless, we have decided not to oppose their application for this year, after having received assurances from members and non-members alike that this is not an isolated move but a part of a collection of activities to ensure the universality of the convention and to help eradicate chemical weapons from the world and from our region. The sincere desire of many States which have approached us in the last weeks, along with the dedicated efforts of Ambassador Wagenmakers, have thus contributed to our decision.

I shall add as a personal note that this decision is also a gesture of goodwill to Iraq, which, through reciprocation, may lead to co-operation in other international issues, activities and organizations as well as contributing to peace and security in our region.

I can only reiterate at the end, as the President underlined, that this decision is limited to the current year. The matter stands to be reviewed and reassessed next year within the guidelines that the President set forward.



(Mr. de Rivero, Peru)

... In this connection we will support all the efforts that Ambassador Donowaki of Japan is making in order to arrive at a mandate and establish this ad hoc committee at last. At present the United States/Soviet bilateral negotiations are proceeding on limiting the number and yield of tests. It is possible that protocols on this subject may be signed at the forthcoming June summit to be held in Washington between Presidents Bush and Gorbachev. Moreover, the fourth NPT review conference, which is very closely connected with progress made in limiting and halting nuclear tests, is to begin next August. As we can see, there are a series of bilateral and multilateral negotiations that link up with our Conference through the limitation and cessation of nuclear testing. How, then, can we fail to set up the ad hoc committee? Not to do so would offer the clearest proof that the work of the Conference was out of touch with the realities of international life. This is an issue which has as much priority as that of chemical weapons. To reactivate it is to give the work of the Conference political symmetry; I say political symmetry because the Conference is now focusing the bulk of its work on chemical disarmament, to such an extent that it has been said here that the Conference is in fact becoming a preparatory committee for the chemical weapons convention. This does not in any way mean that we should ease up on the work of the Ad hoc Committee on chemical weapons. Quite the

(continued)



(Mr. de Rivero, Peru)

contrary: this thought is designed to bring some symmetry to the approach and strategy of our work. At the same time as we are revitalizing other priority issues, we should make an effort so that within a year at most we can come up with the text of a convention on the total prohibition of chemical weapons.

But, thinking aloud again, if we do not manage to do this, if we do not manage to produce this convention text after excessively focusing our work on chemical weapons, the Conference will be faced with a doubly difficult situation, having succeeded neither in finalizing a convention on chemical weapons nor in revitalizing and making headway in other important aspects of disarmament. How could we face the international community and justify these two consecutive years of concentration on chemical weapons without any results? Let us move ahead on chemical weapons, but let us also tackle other fronts. And here I wish to thank and congratulate Ambassador Morel of France for the way in which he chaired the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. Ambassador Morel has summed up the present status of the negotiations on chemical weapons with a strategic metaphor and a felicitous expression. In his strategic metaphor he says that "the front has moved" and that if the momentum is maintained we can finalize the convention within a year. His felicitous expression tells us that we are "firmly committed". I think that he is right in both aspects, and that the situation being handed on to us by Ambassador Morel, if we can make full use of it, is promising. I certainly believe that my dear colleague Ambassador Hyltenius, to whom we offer our full co-operation, will have a major responsibility to make sure that the front not only moves, but is broken, and that our full commitment leads to our goal.

In order to do this, it seems to me that we must pursue intensive work on the structural and basic aspects of the convention and not get entangled in a great deal of detail, precision and technicalities. Some sort of choice must be made with the elements we have before us, in order to construct the convention as rapidly as possible. Let us not strive to build it in baroque style. Let us make some sort of choice in order to separate what is important from what is secondary and produce an acceptable convention within a year.

In my capacity as Vice Co-ordinator, I should like on behalf of our Group to place on record the following statement on the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. Our Group welcomes the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and expresses its hope and belief that under the new Chairman, the intensive pace of negotiations towards the early conclusion of the chemical weapons convention will be continued. Once again, I would like to congratulate Ambassador Morel for the consistent and energetic manner in which he steered the work of the Committee last session. We look forward to the mandate for the Ad hoc Committee, we are



The PRESIDENT: The 535th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.

We shall now proceed, as announced earlier, to take a decision on working paper CD/WP.380, entitled "Draft decision on the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons". This text is now being circulated. The text I am proposing today is the result of lengthy consultations, and I hope that it will meet with your approval. If there is no objection, I shall consider that the draft decision is adopted.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I shall now turn to the appointment of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee. You will recall that, in its report to the Conference on the 1989 session, the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons recommended that Ambassador Carl-Magnus Hyltenius of Sweden should be appointed as its Chairman for the 1990 session. As the Committee has just been re-established, I intend now to formalize the recommendation whereby Ambassador Hyltenius will be appointed Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I wish to extend my congratulations, as well as those of the Conference, to Ambassador Hyltenius on his appointment. I am convinced that his diplomatic ability, knowledge of the subject and negotiating skills will provide outstanding leadership for the Ad hoc Committee at a decisive stage in its work. I wish Ambassador Hyltenius every success in the heavy responsibilities facing him.

I recognize the distinguished representative of Mexico.



Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): The Group of 21 is very gratified at the decision we have just taken to appoint Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden to chair the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. Those of us who work alongside him in the Group of 21 know his skills and human qualities, and we are sure that at this important stage in the work of the Committee he will be able to bring the work entrusted to it to a successful conclusion.

On behalf of the Group of 21 I should like to make the following statement following the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.

(continued in English)

On 6 February 1990 the Group of 21 made a statement with regard to the mandate of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. It set forth its position on elements that should be included in the mandate, that is, the time factor, the deletion of the restriction on final drafting and a reference to the prohibition of use.

The Group of 21 welcomes the inclusion of the first two elements in the mandate just adopted by the Conference. However, it is to the deep regret of the Group of 21 that the Conference has not been able to include a reference to the prohibition of use.

The Group of 21 has joined the consensus on the mandate in order to ensure the prompt resumption of the important work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. We continue to believe that the present mandate does not specify in clear terms that the prohibition of use is covered. This element is of paramount importance to the Group, as well as to the vast majority of other members of the Conference.

Mr. SUJKA (Poland): Mr. President, my delegation will have the opportunity to welcome the new colleagues who have recently joined us in our work in the Conference on Disarmament. I would, therefore, like to limit myself to expressing my personal satisfaction to see you in the Chair. I keep in my memory very pleasant impressions of our close contacts and co-operation from the years you and I were for the first time assigned to this body. May I also wholeheartedly congratulate Ambassador Hyltenius on his appointment as the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for this 1990 session, and offer him our full co-operation in his endeavours in fulfilling his very important job?

In my capacity as Item Co-ordinator, I should like on behalf of our Group to place on record the following statement on the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. Our Group welcomes the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and expresses its hope and belief that under the new Chairman, the intensive pace of negotiations towards the early conclusion of the chemical weapons convention will be continued. Once again, I would like to congratulate Ambassador Morel for the competent and creative manner in which he steered the work of the Committee last session. We have just adopted a new mandate for the Ad hoc Committee; we are



(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

particularly pleased to see in its new version the deletion of the phrase "except for its final drafting". In our Group's opinion, this is a significant improvement enabling us to enter the decisive stage of our negotiations on the comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons to meet the expectations of the world community for the final elaboration of the convention at the earliest date, as so clearly expressed in the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference, as well as during the Government-Industry Conference held in Canberra and in two unanimous resolutions of the forty-fourth session of the General Assembly.

Our Group supported deeper changes in the mandate along the lines proposed by the Group of 21. We attach special importance to the inclusion of a reference to the prohibition of use of chemical weapons, to be consistent with the scope of the future convention and with the language used in General Assembly resolutions 44/115 A and B and in the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference. Nevertheless, the most important task ahead of us is to start effective work on the convention without delay. This is why we have joined the consensus in accepting the mandate in its present form, which is, in any case, a very good and important improvement. We would like to express our thanks to you, Mr. President, for your able efforts to bring us to this compromise. However, we do hope that the course of negotiations on the chemical weapons convention will bring us during this session to the moment when we will be able once again to address the question of further changes in the mandate.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): I would like to join the other speakers in congratulating Ambassador Hyltenius on his being appointed to the post as Chairman of the CW Ad hoc Group. He and his very able delegation will have a big task ahead of them this year as our work on CW accelerates.

I would like to say a few words first about the reservation on the final drafting. In support of President Bush's initiatives on chemical weapons and his personal commitment to the early achievement of the chemical weapons convention, the United States has joined the consensus to accept the amendment to the Ad hoc Committee's mandate, dropping the phrase "except for final drafting". I must point out, however, that this amendment to drop the caveat will in no way change the United States' requirement for full debate of the remaining substantive issues. Thus, we wish to clarify that elimination of the caveat against final drafting does not mean that we have now entered the final stage of the CW negotiations. The United States believes that there is considerable work remaining before reaching this stage of final drafting. It is our understanding that final drafting would only start after the substantive issues in the negotiations have been resolved. Having said this, I would like to underscore the United States' readiness and the readiness of my delegation to help resolve those remaining issues.



(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

On the issue of incorporating into the mandate the word "use", let me say the following. As we all know, the 1925 Geneva Protocol bans the use of chemical weapons, but many States, including many here around this table, entered into a reservation giving the reserving State the right to use chemical weapons in response to a chemical weapons attack against the reserving State or its allies. It is essential that the United States retain the right to retaliate in kind to chemical weapon attack on the United States or its forces as long as we possess chemical weapons. We thus need to preserve this security option during the transition to a régime banning all chemical weapons. Furthermore, it is the view of the United States that it is inappropriate to single out or emphasize only certain areas in the chemical weapons mandate. In our draft text the parties would also undertake not to acquire chemical weapons, not to retain chemical weapons, not to transfer them, not to assist, encourage or induce anyone else to engage in any of the prohibited activities, and we are not adding all of those other prohibitions to the mandate.

I have been asked why it is that two days ago I circulated here in this body the text of a communiqué entered into by the United States and the USSR, where the word "use" was specified. I think the lesson there is very clear. When we are talking about use as an objective of the convention, we certainly stand by the words that are in our own text and the modifications to it that have come forward, but when the word "use" is a stalking-horse for some other purpose, we will continue to resist its being singled out for special attention in that regard.

Mr. HOU (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. President, today we are very happy to see that under your able guidance and through serious and constructive consultations we have ironed out some of the differences on the issue of the mandate for the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, so that the Ad hoc Committee can be re-established and start its work as soon as possible. This is the hope that our delegation has always held. For this I would like to congratulate you and the plenary. Within this short period of 10 days our Conference on Disarmament has achieved one success after another and created excellent conditions for smooth running of the future substantive negotiations. We would like to thank you for your fruitful leadership. At the same time we would like to thank the Group of 21 as well as all the other groups for their co-operative spirit and the active contributions they have made.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank the distinguished Ambassador of France, Mr. Morel, once again for his contribution during the 1989 session. I would like to express our appreciation for the excellent work accomplished by him and the chairmen of the five working groups. I warmly congratulate the distinguished Ambassador of Sweden, Mr. Hyltenius, who has been appointed as the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee. We believe that with his rich experience and diplomatic skill he will help the Ad hoc Committee to achieve new results. Our delegation will co-operate with you fully, Sir, as well as with the Ad hoc Committee.



(Mr. Hou, China)

We are very happy to see that some important improvements have been made in the new mandate. The phrase "except for its final drafting" has been deleted and the constructive formulation "at the earliest date", taken from the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference, has been incorporated. We have a positive evaluation of this achievement. At the same time we share the regret of the Group of 21 that we have not been able to achieve consensus on the inclusion of the important term "prohibition of use" in the mandate. I would like to say that the Chinese delegation has not changed its principled position that the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons should be included in the future comprehensive convention. Consensus on the inclusion of the prohibition of use in the convention was achieved in the early 1980s, and is already reflected in the "rolling text". We hope that this agreement will be embodied in the work of the new Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. We would like once again to express our hope that the constructive consultations and co-operative spirit among member States will enable the negotiations in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and in the Conference as a whole to achieve new progress.

Mr. REESE (Australia): The Western Group welcomes the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons under a mandate which, we believe, will enable the negotiations to proceed at full pace. We note that some differences remain among delegations in regard to the mandate. These can always be further addressed in the life of the Ad hoc Committee.

We would like to congratulate Ambassador Hyltenius on his appointment as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee. We know his qualities well, and see him as a most fitting successor to Ambassador Morel. I assure him that the Western Group looks forward to the closest co-operation with him in expediting the negotiations in this critical year as we move closer to the completion of a chemical weapons convention.

Mr. HYLTIENIUS (Sweden): I wish to take this opportunity to express my thanks to you, Mr. President, for your kind words, and to all my colleagues for their good wishes in connection with my appointment as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. I am grateful for the trust placed in my country and my delegation and in me personally. I am very much aware of the great responsibility which this task entails, and I can assure you that I will spare no effort to live up to this responsibility.

The convention is clearly within reach, thanks to the contributions made by all delegations and by the chairmen of the Ad hoc Committee. I should like to pay tribute in particular to my predecessor, Ambassador Morel, who led the work of the Committee in a very active and skilful manner. He embodied both the letter and the spirit of the Paris Declaration and made us literally redouble our efforts. Considerable progress was made on a number of issues, and this is in large measure due to the untiring efforts by Ambassador Morel and his working group chairmen.



(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

I note with satisfaction the improvement of the mandate for our negotiations, as well as the increasing number of participating non-member States.

In parallel to the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, other significant events have taken place. The United Nations has once again urged us to intensify our negotiations on a chemical weapons convention with a view to its final elaboration at the earliest date. Important conferences on chemical weapons have been held in Paris and in Canberra, and a constructive bilateral negotiating process is under way between the two leading military Powers, also in the field of chemical disarmament.

The impetus thus continues to build up. We have yet not had a decisive political breakthrough, but I hope it will come in the near future. Almost all the elements of the text are on the table. It is now primarily, but not exclusively, a matter of taking the necessary political decision in order to move to the final stages of our work. It is therefore with confidence in the opportunity which we now have that I take up my duties as Chairman.

Before concluding this brief statement, I wish to express my sincere thanks for the many pledges of co-operation and support that have been made to me both today and while I have been conducting consultations with my colleagues in preparation for this task. The Committee will start as soon as possible after the adoption of the report on the inter-sessional work. According to present plans it is envisaged that the first meeting of the Ad hoc Committee will be held on Wednesday, 21 February at 3 p.m.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Sweden for his statement. Does any other member wish to take the floor? It seems not.

I should like to recall that, as I indicated at our plenary meeting on Tuesday last, I intend to put before the Conference for adoption at our next plenary meeting on Tuesday, 20 February, the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons contained in document CD/961. I wish also to report to you that I am actively continuing my consultations on the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee under agenda item 5, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", and I hope that I shall soon be in a position to announce that, thanks to the co-operation of all members, an agreement has been reached on that subject.



(Mr Karhilo, Finland)

... In this forum Finland especially welcomes the new US-Soviet agreement on the gradual elimination of their chemical weapons. Although conditional, the commitments announced in Moscow on 10 February mark in a concrete way the recognition of the special responsibility which the great Powers - the possessors of the largest CW stocks - have ahead of complete CW elimination.

This mutual preparedness of the great Powers to start the destruction of the bulk of their CW stocks to equal low levels pending the conclusion of the CW convention is, in Finland's view, an important catalyst for resolving the remaining political problems in the multilateral CW negotiations. The focus of the negotiations in the CD must by their nature be global, but the bilateral progress in the CW issues is a valuable and necessary contribution to our talks in Geneva. We hope that the finalizing stage will soon be at hand and that the political commitments to the expeditious conclusion of the convention - made by the Paris and Canberra Conferences - will be redeemed this year.

During the last decade disarmament has become unthinkable without strict verification. Indeed, some earlier agreements, like the biological weapons convention, are today considered inadequate in this respect. The detailed provisions required for an adequate verification régime necessarily involve time-consuming drafting and testing of methods and instruments.

The verification of the CW convention will be more complex than in any disarmament agreement yet. Despite all the work that has been done on this subject, doubts are still occasionally voiced as to the verifiability of the convention. The relative ease and inexpensiveness of the manufacture of CW agents has been cited as a factor which renders the verification of compliance impossible.

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(Mr. Karhilo, Finland)

If we were to design a régime that covers all possible covert activities, the problems might well prove to be insurmountable. But we are not trying to do that. In our view, a disarmament agreement banning chemical weapons is effective when we can be sure that existing stocks are destroyed and that militarily significant chemicals are not produced or diverted for military purposes.

The necessary confidence that the purpose of the convention is fulfilled can, in our view, be achieved by the means already envisaged in the negotiations. The combination of routine inspections, challenge inspections and ad hoc verification measures allows a variety of ways to ensure compliance with the provisions of the convention.

The work of the Technical Group on Instrumentation has clearly proved that all the verification tasks involving chemical analysis can be adequately performed with currently available instruments and methods. This conclusion has been further reinforced by the inter-laboratory "round robin" experiment which was carried out by 10 laboratories last autumn. The results of this experiment will be introduced to the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons shortly. The Technical Group on Instrumentation identified in its report several items for further work in other than purely analytical fields. When properly addressed and focused upon, none of these items should prove to be unsolvable.

The development of technical means for verification has been the focus of Finland's contribution to the CW negotiations. Since 1973 the Finnish Research Project on the Verification of Chemical Disarmament has developed sensitive and selective analytical methods to meet the verification requirements of a chemical weapons convention. The project has from its start kept full academic openness as its hallmark. No aspect of the project is classified or otherwise restricted. The scientific results have been introduced to the CD annually in the form of the "Finnish blue books", which now total 14 volumes.

The appreciative comments that we have heard from many delegations in the CD over the years have been an encouragement to the scientists involved in the project, as well as to my Government, to enlarge the scope of our endeavours through new types of initiatives. One of those has been the holding and co-ordination of the inter-laboratory "round robin" experiment I have already referred to. Another has been a training programme in CW verification methods for analytical chemists from developing countries belonging to the Group of 21. The first course of the programme is now under way.

The interest shown in this training programme exceeded our expectations. A total of 25 highly qualified chemists from nine countries applied for the first two courses to be organized this year. During this initial year one chemist each from Brazil, India, Iran, Kenya, Nigeria and Pakistan will receive training in the two four-month courses for the use of analytical methods and relevant instruments in CW verification. The Finnish Research Project intends to continue with a similar training programme during 1991, for which an invitation will be circulated to the members of the Group of 21 in the near future. The applications presented for this year's courses will then automatically be taken into account.



(Mr. Karhilo, Finland)

The sole purpose of the Finnish Research Project has been to contribute to the CW negotiations. After the conclusion of the CW convention, the purpose of the project and its laboratory will be to contribute to the implementation of the convention. The organizational forms of the analytical work needed under the convention have not been discussed in detail so far. However, at this stage we can already pledge that whatever the organizational structures will be, the resources of the Finnish project, both scientific know-how and material facilities, will be dedicated to the service of the convention and the organization.

In this spirit, the Government of Finland has decided to offer these resources to be used as the core of the central laboratory of the CWC organization. The laboratory of the Finnish Research Project will meet the high requirements to be attached to such an international scientific institution. We believe that the best way to ensure the required high standard of quality, reliability and confidence for the analytical work is to base the organization's activities in this particular field on an established and well-known institution rather than on yet-to-be-created laboratories. The benefits of this approach are obvious.

A total ban on chemical weapons can be truly total only if it is universally adhered to. The universality of the convention will be its main pillar when it is in force, but is also the main factor behind the relatively slow progress in the negotiations. To take care of the interests of all nations in an equitable way and to assure them that no country will gain an undue edge, either military or technological, over the others is a demanding task. In order to achieve this, it is of the utmost importance that no country will be deprived of the possibility of participating in the negotiations if it wishes to do so. This basic requirement should be supported by other measures which serve the same goal of universality.

During the 1989 session we very much appreciated the extra care the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons took to encourage the observer delegations to participate actively, as well as to report on progress achieved to those delegations that are not represented at all in the negotiations. The regional efforts undertaken by Australia and Indonesia to promote awareness of CW issues is also a good example of possible measures. The Finnish CW verification training programme, too, is meant to serve the purpose of universality.

We wish the new Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden, every success in his demanding task of guiding the negotiations to a long-awaited final breakthrough.

I have spoken at length about CW issues, which relate to only one of the items before this Conference. This is due to the priority we attach to the rapid conclusion of the CW convention. I will now move to the first agenda item, "Nuclear test ban".



(Mr. Karhilo, Finland)

... In our view, the amendment conference should focus on giving political impetus to the cause of banning nuclear tests, in the same way that the Paris Conference did to the cause of banning chemical weapons. We hope that this view can be shared by other States parties to the Treaty.



Mr. BATSANOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): First of all I should like to welcome the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland, Mr. Karhilo, who is here in Geneva. His statement contained a number of important and interesting points. Finland has long since earned praise as an active participant in the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons, as well as other issues on the agenda of the Conference. It is making a considerable contribution to progress at the negotiations, particularly in the field of verification of chemical disarmament. This is greatly appreciated by the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union and Finland have agreed to co-operate in the development of procedures and means of verification, as was announced during M.S. Gorbachev's visit to Finland in October 1989. We hope that such co-operation will be of practical use to our negotiations here in this forum.

Today the Soviet delegation has taken the floor to present working paper CD/966. This is a report on a trial challenge inspection at a military facility conducted last year in the Soviet Union. Trial inspections at industrial enterprises, which were proposed in a Soviet initiative two years ago, have proved useful in the development and "fine tuning" of a system to verify the non-production of chemical weapons. At the same time they have prompted a number of States to think about the advisability of testing other verification procedures under a future convention, and in particular the important procedure of challenge inspection. The Soviet Union has not only supported this idea, but has taken steps to put it into effect.

When selecting a facility for the holding of a trial challenge inspection we bore in mind that under the future convention such an inspection may be conducted at any site or facility in a State party, without the right of refusal on its part. It is felt that the most typical grounds for challenge may be doubt based on the suspected covert storage or production of chemical weapons. Against this background the facility selected for the trial inspection was an arms depot at which chemical weapons are not and have never been stored. The area of the facility is about 3 square kilometres, and the perimeter about 7 kilometres. Located in the area are approximately 100 buildings and structure with a storage capacity equivalent to more than 1,000 railway wagons.

The trial inspection was conducted over a period of five days. The size of the inspection team, including observers, was 20 persons. They included armaments experts, specialists in CW detection and experts from the Soviet delegation to the Conference on Disarmament, who are very familiar with the background of the negotiations on this issue. The team owed its relatively large size to the fact that besides conducting the inspection it had to deal with all the organizational problems connected with the preparations for and the conduct of the inspection. While preparing for the inspection we tried to establish conditions as close as possible to actual ones. However, as this was a national exercise and the first one of its kind, some exceptions had to be made. In particular, the facility management was notified in advance of

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(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

the objectives of the inspection team and the timing of its visit, which of course would not be the case for actual inspections. However, no actions were accomplished in direct reaction to the team's visit to the facility. The inspection proper began with a meeting in which the team members and the facility management participated. Instruction was provided in accident protection. Then the inspection team was divided into four subgroups: a subgroup to study documentation, a subgroup to inspect buildings and structures, a subgroup to monitor means of transport and the facility perimeter; and a subgroup to work with the facility staff.

The principal focus of attention during the inspection was proper balance between the task of ensuring effective verification and that of safeguarding confidential information. The inspection team endeavoured to refrain from gathering information unrelated to chemical weapons. Nevertheless, a large amount of such information concerning the depot came to the notice of the inspectors. The inspection team visited 10 per cent of the installations located within the depot. However, that did not adversely affect the effectiveness of the inspection. In the first place all the types of buildings and structures were visited on a selective basis at the discretion of the members of the team. Secondly, although the facility management had designated the most sensitive areas which, it felt, had no connection with chemical weapons, the inspection team did not find the alternative measures proposed by the management sufficiently persuasive and visited those areas.

In selecting specific areas to be visited, the inspectors took into account such factors as the presence of air purification systems in storage areas, the presence of protective gear and decontamination equipment in and immediately next to storage areas, the presence of specially protected sectors, the absence of data on individual storage areas or other subdivisions of the facility within the overall system of documentation, separate record-keeping for individual subdivisions, or cases where items had been removed from storage areas immediately prior to the arrival of the inspection team, which came to light as a result of examination of the documentation and interviews with the facility staff. In this exercise the inspection team began its work with the least intrusive verification methods. The principle of "managed access" also governed the interviews with the facility staff. In the course of the interviews the representatives of the management who were present were able to reject those questions which, in their opinion, went beyond the purposes of the inspection, but if the members of the inspection team considered that a question was important, the situation was resolved between the leader of the inspection team and the facility director.

As a result of the trial inspection, the inspection team confirmed that there were no chemical weapons at the facility. It should be pointed out, however, that the steps and measures taken during the inspection proved to be sufficient to a large extent because the members of the inspection team were familiar with the designations of types of Soviet chemical weapons, and were thus able to dispense with the need to open the munitions in order to determine the types of charge used.



(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

Verification of the presence or absence of undeclared or unknown forms or types of chemical weapons is indeed a complicated task. To perform this task it may be necessary to open specimens of munitions, devices and containers. It would therefore seem advisable to consider the possibility of developing verification methods and equipment by means of which it can be determined without opening it that a given specimen is not a chemical weapon.

As a result of the inspection, the team drew up a number of conclusions and suggestions, which are also set out in the report presented today. In particular, the team came to the conclusion that in order to reduce the level of disclosure of sensitive information which is not CW-related, the management of a facility being inspected must be able during the inspection to propose alternative measures as a substitute for access by the inspectors to particularly confidential information. However, the test of acceptability of such alternative measures must in every case be that they are satisfactory to the inspection team. The results of the inspection also demonstrate that the international inspectorate must undertake to safeguard confidential information which may become known to the inspectors in the course of the inspection. Hence, for example, where no breaches are identified, the inspection report should contain a minimum of factual information and should not reveal the nature of the activities conducted at the inspected facility.

In presenting document CD/966, the Soviet delegation hopes that it will contribute to the constructive consideration of the challenge inspection problem and facilitate deeper investigation of issues related to such inspections.

In conclusion, I would like to say a few words in connection with the fact that in a few moments we will be adopting the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate Ambassador Pierre Morel of France for the successful completion of his work as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee. I believe the progress reflected in the report is due to a large extent to the tireless efforts of Ambassador Morel and his thorough approach to the complicated issues which are on the negotiating table, his energy and his flexibility. I should also like to congratulate Ambassador Carl-Magnus Hyltenius of Sweden on his election to the post of Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for this year, and to express the conviction that under his leadership we will be able to achieve a decisive breakthrough on the convention.

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The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement. That concludes my list of speakers today. Does any other member wish to take the floor? It seems not.

We shall now proceed to adopt the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, as contained in document CD/961. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the report of the Ad hoc Committee.

It was so decided.



(Mr. Somogyi, Hungary)

... Undoubtedly the viability of multilateral disarmament can best be proved by the speedy elaboration and conclusion of the chemical weapons convention. This appears to be the only issue on which the Conference on Disarmament is conducting substantive negotiations with the well-founded hope that, despite existing political, military, industrial, legal and other problems, the agreement can be concluded soon.

It is an arduous task to summarize the efforts of the past two years as regards the banning of chemical weapons and the destruction of their stockpiles. Work in this area has become increasingly intensive over the years. Last year the Ad hoc Committee of the Conference on Disarmament dealing with the question of chemical weapons accomplished an unprecedented amount of work, which was also reflected in the inter-sessional meetings of the Committee. Thus, the general desire expressed at the Paris Conference for a redoubling of efforts aimed at concluding the chemical weapons convention has, in the literary sense of the word, been fulfilled. At the same time we cannot ignore the fact that, despite the enormous amount of work accomplished, no agreement has been reached on the key elements of the draft convention.

(continued)



(Mr. Somogyi, Hungary)

This is all the more deplorable since last year we witnessed a number of promising events, such as the Paris Conference already mentioned or the commitment of the Canberra Conference to the cause of prohibiting chemical weapons.

The forty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly can also be cited here. At this session, American and Soviet statements heralded the sincere readiness of the two parties to radically reduce their chemical weapon stockpiles even before the conclusion of the convention. The meeting of the leaders of the two major Powers in Malta produced a further indication that an agreement on 80 per cent reductions in the two States' chemical weapon stockpiles could be concluded at the Soviet-American summit scheduled for early summer, and this was reaffirmed in the joint statement adopted at the recent Moscow meeting of their Foreign Ministers.

It is possible for the impact of these events to determine this year's activity in the Conference on Disarmament and enhance the prevailing optimism concerning the early conclusion of the chemical weapons convention. That requires the solution of such problems as the scope of the convention in its final form, or the unconditional prohibition of the use of chemical weapons, for example. Solving these questions could help finalize the technical, organizational and procedural aspects of the draft convention on the basis of the significant progress made so far.

A reliable verification system is a determining factor in the effective implementation of a future chemical weapons convention. The system, the main elements of which are already in place, will include the important mechanism of a non-refusable "challenge inspection". We believe that the useful idea of "ad hoc checks" could well be inserted into the existing structure of verification. This method of inspection based on an elaborate system of quotas could be an efficient part of the complex verification system and would provide the participating States with a further opportunity to display their openness and willingness to co-operate.

In this connection, we welcome and fully support the proposal officially put forward by the Foreign Minister of Austria at the opening session of the Conference on Disarmament that Austria should host the international organization to be set up under the terms of the future convention. Austria, which is not a full member of the Conference on Disarmament, has always displayed keen interest in a chemical weapons ban, and this new contribution provides further evidence of its commitment to the cause of the convention.

The Hungarian Government has repeatedly and concretely demonstrated its determination to promote actively, in every constructive way, the comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons, the destruction of their stockpiles, and the early conclusion of a convention thereon. This was manifested in the unilateral initiative put forward by our Foreign Minister at the recent session of the United Nations General Assembly, declaring Hungary's readiness to act in conformity with the future convention. That means that - besides reaffirming our chemical-weapon-free status - Hungary is ready to comply with all the provisions of the future convention even before it is concluded and enters into force. It also means that we intend to make a



(Mr. Somogyi, Hungary)

declaration on production, exports and imports of chemicals related to the convention. Furthermore, we are ready - on a reciprocal basis - to submit to verification the contents of that declaration, as well as our defence, industrial and trading activities relating to the convention. In accordance with that initiative, we hereby submit to the Conference document CD/969, containing a comprehensive declaration on production of and foreign trade in chemicals, as provided for in the relevant provisions of the convention.

I also wish to inform the Conference on Disarmament that as a part of the Hungarian initiative, a national body will be set up in the near future to continue the work which has been carried out informally in the last four years by an inter-departmental commission, and perform provisionally some of the duties of the national authority to be established in accordance with the convention. By operating this body, we intend to gather preliminary experience relating to the functioning of such a national authority.

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

... With the agreements reached in Ottawa on the "open skies" régime, a new element has been added to the disarmament process. The day before yesterday, the Soviet Union and the United States resumed their bilateral negotiations on chemical weapons. We expect this round to produce decisive impetus for the earliest conclusion of the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Finally, the results of the forty-fourth United Nations General Assembly session are on the Conference table.

Of course, one cannot speak of spectacular breakthroughs. But it would be just as wrong to underestimate what has been achieved at this General Assembly session. In our opinion, steps have definitely been taken in the right direction. The resolutions on a chemical weapons ban, in the nuclear field, on the use of science and technology for disarmament and on the issue of defensive security concepts offer a good many starting-points for the work of our Conference. The Vienna seminar on military doctrines reveals what relevance attaches to the last-named resolution of the forty-fourth United Nations General Assembly Session. We share the view already expressed in the course of our debate that the Geneva Conference should join in this international discussion, too.



(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

... All this goes to show that the year 1990 has made a promising start. Now let us contribute our share to ensure that it does, in fact, become the year of disarmament. What could serve this aim better than completing the convention banning chemical weapons? The German Democratic Republic has, without ifs and buts, pronounced itself in favour of the global, comprehensive and effectively verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons. It figures among those States which have declared that they do not possess chemical weapons, and applies strict export controls to dual-purpose chemicals.

We stand committed to the agreements reached in Paris and to the outcome of the Canberra Conference. We are in favour of making 1990 the crucial year in concluding a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons, as well as on their destruction. What encourages us in this endeavour is the joint Soviet-American statement on chemical weapons recently agreed in Moscow, as well as the readiness of the USSR and the United States to start reducing chemical weapons before the entry into force of the convention outlawing them. Furthermore, we are encouraged by the Soviet Declaration on cessation of the production of chemical weapons, and hope that this will not remain a unilateral move. We feel encouraged by the mandate of the CW Committee agreed upon some days ago here in this forum.

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(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

And, last but not least, we are encouraged by the report on the current state of negotiations presented on Tuesday. The outgoing Chairman of the CW Committee, Ambassador Morel, deserves our appreciation and gratitude for his committed and creative guidance of the negotiations.

The time seems ripe to get down to the final drafting of the convention - i.e. to focus work on the still outstanding essentials and on completing the articles: They encompass, in our view, verification measures, the order of destruction of chemical weapons and their production facilities, agreements on assistance in the event of the use or threat of use of chemical weapons as well as in economic and technological development, the definition of chemical weapons and the composition of the future executive council of the organization. A good many expandable starting-points were provided in the informal consultations on such key issues last year.

Now we think it is imperative to take decisions. It will certainly be no easy job, but it will be possible. As experience in other disarmament forums shows, a meeting of the Geneva Disarmament Conference at foreign minister level would be appropriate to give a powerful boost in this regard. An informal discussion on this matter would be worth while.

The provisions to be agreed on the verification of a chemical weapons ban are of special interest. In our opinion, such a verification system should, first, reliably guarantee that no chemical weapons are produced and that they will never be developed again. Secondly, it must be cost-effective and ensure reliable verification with the most efficient means. Thirdly, it must be feasible. And fourthly it should not lay unnecessary burdens on the chemical industry. Legitimate scientific, technological and commercial interests need to be taken into account.

Challenge inspections in cases of violation of the agreements have occupied a central spot in the disarmament accords at least since the conclusion of the INF Treaty. They constitute an important element of confidence-building and effective verification. This also goes for the prohibition of chemical weapons, for which the German Democratic Republic is ready to agree to radical verification provisions. We think that efforts are already needed, at the national level too, to determine which legislative and administrative measures can ensure that the comprehensive obligations under the convention are fulfilled correctly and on schedule. In the end, all efforts towards a chemical weapons ban hinge on a world-wide consensus that precludes any use of chemical weapons, stops their production and proliferation and reliably guarantees their complete destruction within a period of 10 years. If this was actually achieved, it would fulfil, at long last, a demand which the peoples raised 75 years ago under the spell of the lethal gas cloud of Ypres.



(Mr. Ogada, Kenya)

... Undoubtedly, the Conference has invested its energies in efforts to work out a convention banning chemical weapons with some tangible results. In the past year the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Pierre Morel of France was able to make progress on a number of outstanding issues relating to inspection guidelines, legal and technical issues and the other organs to be associated with the convention, as well as some highly political issues like challenge inspection.

The proposed convention is clearly taking shape, and it cannot be denied that the Paris international conference prohibiting chemical weapons and the Canberra Government-Industry Conference against Chemical Weapons have had a positive impact on the deliberations of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. My delegation would like to join those delegations that have already thanked Ambassador Morel and those who worked closely with him for their indefatigable efforts in advancing the work of the Ad hoc Committee. The quality of the present draft text of the convention banning chemical weapons indicates that the day is not far off when the convention will be ready for conclusion.

Ambassador Carl-Magnus Hyltenius of Sweden has taken up the chairmanship of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. We are convinced that he will be able to conduct the work of this subsidiary body to the satisfaction of all delegations, and that this may be the year the Ad hoc Committee reaches the finishing-line in its work to conclude the long-awaited convention prohibiting chemical weapons. Of course, this would require the extensive consideration of all outstanding issues, including those pointed out in the statement of the Group of 21 that was made in the plenary of this Conference on 6 February this year. We would like to wish Ambassador Hyltenius success in the tasks lying ahead of him.

It is understandable that the Conference on Disarmament has devoted so much of its time to the activities of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. The promise of a convention banning these hideous weapons spurs the Conference to focus its attention almost exclusively on this issue. It is to be hoped that this promise will hold to avoid disappointment and frustration within the Conference.

(continued)



(Mr. Ogada, Kenya)

The joint United States-USSR statement declaring that the two super-Powers are ready to undertake practical bilateral action with respect to the elimination of chemical weapons is certainly welcome news, and will no doubt benefit the work of the Ad hoc Committee. However, it should be remembered that the Conference has identified nuclear disarmament as a priority objective. Yet on issues related to nuclear disarmament the Conference has made little headway. At a time when the two super-Powers have signed and implemented an agreement eliminating a category of nuclear weapons, and when favourable prospects exist for their signing a treaty eliminating 50 per cent of their strategic nuclear forces, the efforts of this Conference to deal with nuclear disarmament issues have stagnated.

With regard to the verification regime in the future convention on CW, our basic position is that we are in favour of an effective, reasonable and feasible verification regime under the convention, including challenge inspection. In the mean time we maintain that challenge inspection should not go beyond the purposes, objectives and scope of the convention, and that its



(Mr. Qian, China)

... The United Nations has done a great deal of work in the field of multilateral disarmament. Many positive resolutions and documents on disarmament have been adopted at successive United Nations General Assembly sessions, SSQDs, the Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development and the international conferences on chemical weapons. The World Disarmament Campaign sponsored by the United Nations, and many special studies on arms reduction issues, have helped promote the disarmament efforts of all Governments and peoples. The Conference on Disarmament is playing a uniquely important role as the sole global multilateral negotiating body on disarmament and has, in particular, registered noted progress in the negotiations regarding a convention on the prohibition of CW.

One may recall that back in the early 1980s the United States and the Soviet Union continuously escalated the arms race between them and engaged in intense rivalry in many parts of the world. This was criticized and opposed by peoples of all countries, as the tension and confrontation between them constituted a grave threat to world security and stability. At the same time, their incessant arms expansion imposed a heavy burden on them and added to their fiscal and economic difficulties. Against this background, the two super-Powers have made some headway in arms control negotiations over the past few years. After a number of summit meetings and lengthy negotiations, they finally concluded a treaty on the total destruction of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles. Their bilateral negotiations on the reduction of strategic nuclear arms and on chemical weapons are gradually moving ahead. The CFE negotiations are also making headway. This is well received by peoples of all countries. It should be noted, however, that the above-mentioned progress is preliminary and limited, that there is still a long way to go as far as disarmament is concerned, and that there are numerous obstacles and difficulties on the way ahead. Even if the United States and the Soviet Union were to cut their strategic nuclear arsenals by half, they would still possess over 90 per cent of all the nuclear weapons in the world, more than enough to destroy the whole of mankind several times over, thus remaining the biggest threat to international security.



(Mr. Qian, China)

... The United States and the Soviet Union are applying the most sophisticated scientific and technological achievements to the development of space weaponry. This will inevitably extend the current arms race on land, at sea and in the air to a new arena - outer space - thereby adding a new threat to the world peace. It should be stressed, in particular, that many of the justified wishes and demands of the third world and small and medium-sized countries on the question of disarmament have not been given due attention. In the eyes of some big Powers, multilateral disarmament efforts seem to be negligible. More often than not, their significance and role are deliberately underestimated. Consequently, in the multilateral field, including this Conference, progress on a number of important disarmament questions is not satisfactory and in some cases has simply stalled. In recent years there have been obvious attempts to shift the pressure onto the third world by exploiting such issues as conventional disarmament and the prevention of nuclear and CW proliferation.

(Mr. Qian, China)

... China, as a non-chemical-weapon State that has historically suffered immensely from the scourge of chemical weapons, has consistently stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of CW and the early conclusion of a convention to this effect, so that the world will be genuinely free from chemical weapons. This year and the next will be of vital importance to the negotiations for a convention on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons. The United States and the Soviet Union have now indicated their intention to cut their chemical weapons by a big margin. This is a welcome development. In our view the key to the final solution of the problem of chemical weapons lies in the total destruction of existing chemical weapons at the earliest date by the countries possessing the largest chemical arsenals, and moreover in their refraining from producing or developing new types of chemical weapons.

With regard to the verification régime in the future convention on CW, our basic position is that we are in favour of an effective, reasonable and feasible verification régime under the convention, including challenge inspection. In the mean time we maintain that challenge inspection should not go beyond the purposes, objectives and scope of the convention, and that its



(Mr. Qian, China)

possible abuse must be strictly guarded against. Specific provisions should ensure a balance between the rights and obligations of the requesting State on the one hand and those of the requested State on the other, and give full play to the role of the future organization.

Mr. KOSIN (Yugoslavia):

... On a more concrete level, we are entering a year with more well-founded expectations for a movement from arms control to genuine disarmament, with clearer stands as to the goals of negotiations, with more specific proposals as to the means of their accomplishment, and a more precise time framework as regards the conclusion of the three most important negotiating undertakings.

(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)

I am referring to the strategic arms reduction treaty (START), the reduction of troops and arms in Europe and the conclusion of the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons and their destruction.



(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)

... Without neglecting any of the issues, in the immediate future we see three priority areas on which our efforts should be focused. I would begin with the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons as a most immediately attainable task. Its accomplishment would give our Conference, and the multilateral negotiations as well, unparalleled impetus. In this domain the Conference is, in many ways, doing a pioneer's job in creating a new model of international co-operation and communication in the scientific, technical, legal, political, economic and, of course, security fields.

As regards the work before us, we believe that the following are the key points. First, international political consensus has been significantly strengthened, together with an explicit pledge regarding the conclusion of a comprehensive convention as soon as possible. This was the outcome of the Conference in Paris, the United Nations resolutions, the ninth summit of the non-aligned countries, the bilateral contacts between the two biggest chemical weapons possessors, the talks with chemical industry representatives in Canberra, etc.

Second, there has been a fundamental rapprochement of views on the relativity of the military efficiency of chemical weapons. We have proof of this in agreements on the destruction of the bulk of the two big Powers' stockpiles, as well as the ever-increasing recognition that the possession of chemical weapons offers only an illusion of security.

Third, we are in the process of a continuous convergence of views on many important technical and political issues, including the essential verification aspects. It may be said that we now have an outline of the structure of the convention, and that even for more important controversial issues we can discern an infrastructure of political convergence.

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(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)

Fourth, international conditions for accelerating negotiations have never been so favourable, as is demonstrated by the parallel negotiations on strategic, nuclear and conventional disarmament which are entering their final stage.

Fifth, from what is known of the degree of agreement in the American-Soviet bilateral negotiations, they can represent a significant impulse. We expect it to be directly reflected at the Conference on Disarmament. We also hope to get more fundamental information, in particular on all aspects connected with the elimination of all stocks of chemical weapons. These weapons must be permanently eliminated and their legalization cannot be accepted on any pretext, least of all through unilateral withdrawal from the convention.

We do not underestimate the difficulties and differences when speaking of such matters as verification, inspection (in particular challenge inspection), technological co-operation, the composition and method of decision-making of the Executive Council, etc. We are not neglecting the complexity of these difficulties, but we believe they can be solved quickly if we keep in mind the high level of political accord reached on basic aspects. We have in mind, above all, the fact that an effective verification system is taking shape, be it a question of routine inspection or ad hoc verification of chemical facilities. The development of the challenge inspection procedure and the verification of CW destruction has progressed well. In dealing with the inspection issues as a whole, it is essential to commence with the common interest of all States parties in establishing the facts by way of inspection, while the rest is logically a matter of the functioning of the mechanism which should ensure consistent implementation of the convention. One of the most important tasks is to provide for a complete ban on the use of chemical weapons during the 10-year transitional period following the entry into force of the convention. We regret that, although strongly reiterated in the Paris Declaration, the question of the prohibition of use has not been introduced in the mandate of the Ad hoc Committee.

The composition of the Executive Council and the decision-making process in it are among the important unresolved and, as yet, least elaborated questions. It seems that the starting-point for solving these questions should be that the implementation of the convention will presuppose full co-operation on the part of the Executive Council with all the States parties, which underlines its operational and co-ordinative role. We think it also important to establish adequate communication with the United Nations.

Of great concern, however, is the fact that the problem of the security of non-aligned and under-developed countries, especially when dealing with technological co-operation and assistance in the event of the use or threat of use of chemical weapons, is not being given sufficient attention. It is not necessary to keep on proving that countries which do not possess chemical weapons, or have renounced them, will for a long time be in an unequal economic and security position. To solve these issues it is essential to state the principles of co-operation and solidarity. Universal accession to the convention can be achieved only if it becomes a truly multilateral instrument that respects the quality of all its members, with an efficient and cost-effective implementation mechanism.



(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)

Certain reservations already expressed as to the possibility that not all States will become parties to the convention seem somewhat premature - all the more so as this is the very purpose of the general endeavours of the Conference, including the participation of non-member States. A proposal still on the table concerning universal accession to the convention is that offered by the Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia at SSOD-III for the convening of an international conference under the auspices of the United Nations.

We do not want to underestimate the proliferation issue, but we hold the strong conviction that it can be solved only by the conclusion of a convention which would meet the needs of all countries.

We are of the opinion that conditions to accelerate the otherwise slow negotiations are improving. Therefore, besides a political decision, we need to focus on those problems which our Conference must and should resolve, and leave the other to organs yet to be created. The Committee, under the expert and dynamic leadership of Ambassador Morel, has gone a long way in clarifying many issues. We believe that as of now we could fix a time frame for the conclusion of the convention which would significantly stimulate the negotiations that have been going on for too long now. We are fully confident that Ambassador Hyltenius, with his knowledge and experience, will do all he can to have the controversial issues resolved as soon as possible.



(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

... Since the CD concluded its 1989 session, the pace of arms control and disarmament negotiations has quickened at all levels - bilateral, regional, and multilateral. Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister, Eduard Shevardnadze have met several times. These meetings have produced agreement on a number of arms control issues that we hope will help pave the way for progress on many fronts. Activities have not been limited, however, to bilateral meetings. Recently in Vienna the NATO countries have tabled yet again a series of new proposals to expedite early agreement on conventional force reductions in Europe. Also in the Vienna negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures, military leaders of the European countries, United States and Canada, have concluded earlier this month an unprecedented exchange of views on military doctrine, including on force structure, and military training. In Ottawa, the 23 countries of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization have come together to begin consideration of modalities for opening their skies to reciprocal, unarmed aerial surveillance flights, conducted on a routine basis - another great step towards increased openness and transparency. And in our own area, last September the Canberra Government-Industry Conference against Chemical Weapons brought together for the first time large numbers of government officials and chemical industry representatives.

As many speakers before me at this session have already noted, we are living in a time of profound change and opportunity. In our Conference, we have new possibilities to consolidate change and transition to a more peaceful world. It is our responsibility to seize these opportunities and make the most of them, and - if we can - to undertake new, binding commitments that can enhance global stability and security.

There are, of course, still disturbing trends. My Government, for example, is deeply concerned at the current proliferation of technologies that threaten peace and can lead to regional instabilities. We still have much to do. The Conference on Disarmament, as a multilateral negotiating body with representation from all regions of the globe, must continue to play its vital role.

Among the issues on the CD's agenda, the negotiation on a comprehensive, multilateral chemical weapons convention is a particularly high priority for the United States and others. President Bush is personally committed to the achievement of a chemical weapons convention at the earliest date, and you are

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(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

aware of the intense interest of the United States Congress as well. The United States has taken pioneering steps in the past on chemical weapons, presenting a draft treaty in this body in 1984, proposing mandatory challenge inspection, and releasing extensive information on the composition and location of United States CW stockpiles and production facilities.

Without in the least slighting the other important work of this Conference, I wish today in accord with rule 30 to address the CW issue as it appears from the United States' perspective. I look forward to addressing other issues on our agenda in a subsequent statement.

Since arriving in Geneva, I have heard recurrent criticism of the slow pace of work on the chemical weapons convention. Some say the political commitment made at Paris and Canberra last year has not been matched by efforts to resolve the remaining issues on a CW ban.

There may be some measure of short-term truth to this criticism, but for the most part it is a gross exaggeration. I think that many of us are so engrossed in our work that we are not seeing the forest for the trees. The scope and technical and political complexity of this convention are unprecedented. Many of the issues now before us are the difficult ones set aside in the past in favour of dealing with the more readily soluble issues.

It is easy to see just the trees - the sheer weight of detailed work needed to formulate the CW convention. We have to stand back to see the forest - that is, how far we have already come. We must not let political haste to get a convention lessen our commitment to a convention that will truly enhance security and that will work in practice. Our success won't be judged by how quickly we reach agreement but whether our legislatures and our people decide their national security interests have been met, and whether the treaty can be effectively implemented and verified.

The firm commitment of the United States to a multilateral, effectively verifiable CW convention has taken several forms. A very important one is our work with the USSR.

Convinced that greater openness can contribute to the prospects for an early multilateral convention, the United States and Soviet Union signed a memorandum of understanding in Wyoming in September 1989 regarding a bilateral verification experiment and data exchange. These significant steps will occur in two phases. Phase one, already under way, involves the exchange of general data on each side's chemical weapons capabilities and a series of visits to relevant military and civil facilities on our respective territories. The initial exchange took place on 29 December 1989. In phase two the sides will exchange more detailed data and permit on-site inspections to verify the accuracy of the information exchanged.

In addition to the increased confidence gained from such exchanges of data, visits and inspections, we believe the inspection experience gained, drawing largely on multilateral provisions elaborated to date in the "rolling text", will contribute much to our work here in the CD as we further elaborate and finalize such provisions for the convention.



(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

The sides also agreed in Wyoming to undertake a co-operative effort with respect to the destruction of chemical weapons. We agreed to reciprocal visits to monitor destruction operations of each other's side, and to the exchange of information on past, current and planned destruction activities and procedures.

To facilitate the entry into force of the convention at the earliest possible date, President Bush proposed in his 25 September United Nations speech that the United States and the Soviet Union begin to destroy a major portion of their CW stocks even before the convention enters into force. We believe this commitment would give an impetus to rapid completion of the convention. In this connection, I am pleased to be able to inform my colleagues that the United States, in a unilateral action completed just a few weeks ago, has now destroyed its entire stockpile of the incapacitating chemical weapon BZ. I will be providing more detail on this destruction later.

The United States no longer insists that all CW-capable States be parties to the convention from the beginning. Provided the Soviet Union is party to the convention, the United States will become a party at the outset. By year 8, we will have destroyed down to 2 per cent - that is, down to one forty-ninth - of our current stockpile. I want to emphasize and to make clear to the experts here that President Bush's proposal will require significantly faster and deeper United States and Soviet cuts than currently envisioned in the draft convention text.

The United States would destroy the remaining 2 per cent by year 10 of the convention provided that all CW-capable States have become parties.

There is already broad agreement in this body that to be effective a CW convention must include all States of concern. Our proposal is an effort to address this issue in a way that does not delay entry into force of the convention.

The 2 per cent residual is intended to provide an incentive to hold-out States to become parties to the convention. All States that join the convention must do their utmost to bring pressure to bear on any CW-capable States that remain outside.

We have already made substantial progress in implementing aspects of President Bush's initiative. Recently, the United States and Soviet Union agreed at the ministerial in Moscow to work out a bilateral agreement on reciprocal obligations pending the international convention including, inter alia, the destruction of the bulk of our CW stocks to equal low levels. The objective is to complete and sign such an agreement at the June 1990 Bush-Gorbachev summit meeting.

Incidentally, all of the United States-USSR documents I have cited have been presented by both our delegations in the English and Russian versions for circulation by the secretariat as CD documents.

The United States and the Soviet Union just last week began another round of bilateral discussions, which are concentrating on preparing the agreement for the June summit meeting and on implementation of the Wyoming memorandum of understanding.



(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

The United States shares the concern of many delegations about ensuring undiminished security during the period of transition to a world in which such chemical weapons no longer exist. We believe that the security concerns of all CD participants with regard to this period, as well as after, must be met in order to achieve the universality we seek.

In this regard, it is essential that States be just as candid about their own chemical weapons capabilities as they are quick to criticize those who admit to having them.

The way we see it, there is good news and bad news. There are more than 20 States that have or are seeking chemical weapons. The bad news is that only two States - the United States and USSR - have admitted to having a chemical weapon programme or capability, and some States have even falsely denied it. The good news is that a large number of delegations from States with CW programmes or intentions are present here in this room today and are participating in the CW negotiations, and thus have an opportunity to make a concrete contribution to progress. Here I address myself to the co-ordinators of the regional groups that represent more than 20 chemical-weapon-capable States here in this chamber. When they feel the need to give advice in the name of their groups to the United States and, I imagine, also to the Soviet Union, they should bear in mind, as we do, that they speak also on behalf of at least several CW-capable States.

In addition to the issue of undiminished security, the programme of work for 1990 outlined by the Chairman of the CW Ad hoc Committee lays before us a number of other very important technical and political issues. My delegation will actively participate in the attempt to find solutions to these issues as well.

Work will be taken up on procedures to investigate alleged use, provisions for ad hoc verification and guidelines for initial inspections. With regard to verification of alleged use, Canada and Norway, as well as the United Nations Secretary-General's expert group, have done much good work on this issue. The United States is pleased to hear of both the interest expressed in an ad hoc verification régime and the desire to take up this issue soon. We hope to provide the Conference with a proposal to break the deadlock on this subject in the very near future. With regard to guidelines for initial inspections, a number of CD documents on national trial inspections have highlighted the need for such guidelines. We agree that they are needed and work should be undertaken to develop such guidelines.

The work programme also addresses the order of destruction, technical criteria such as production capacity and thresholds, and guidelines for schedule 1. As noted in the Wyoming joint statement, the United States and Soviet Union have agreed on some procedures governing the order of destruction of chemical weapons negotiations. Our approach will be introduced into the CW negotiations very soon.

The United States has tabled papers on the issues of production capacity and thresholds and has participated in the development of the production capacity paper now in appendix II. We believe this material is a useful basis



(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

for discussion. We also hope for progress on the guidelines for schedule 1, but note that it is difficult to finalize such guidelines until the scope of schedule 1 is agreed.

Another important area of the work programme is the question of amendments. Much work must be done before agreement can be reached on procedures for amending the convention. We must also find ways to change less fundamental aspects of the convention by a mechanism less formal than an amendment procedure.

As I mentioned earlier, a number of the remaining issues are the most difficult, of great importance to all delegations and directly linked to the effective operation of the convention. Two such issues on our agenda this year - challenge inspection and the Executive Council - have eluded solutions for years. While we have made some progress in narrowing the focus on the unresolved aspects of these issues, much work remains to be done to meet the needs and concerns of all parties.

I have spent some time trying to outline the progress made to date on CW because I believe it is important for all of us to not lose sight of the substantial work that has been accomplished. At the same time, we still have some of the most thorny issues ahead of us. We must not slacken our pace, but we must continue to take the time required to develop provisions that will create a durable and universal convention that will enhance security while ridding the world of a class of weapons we all regard as abhorrent.



(Mr. Loeis, Indonesia)

... Let me now turn to the chemical weapons issue, which has become the main preoccupation of the Conference to date. In his statement of 15 February 1990, Ambassador Ledogar of the United States, inter alia, introduced the United States-USSR joint statement and echoed the reaffirmation of President Bush's strong commitment to progress on the multilateral negotiations in order to conclude a chemical weapons convention soon. It is within this context that I would like to note with satisfaction the content of the joint statement and support the strong commitment made by the two super-Powers to multilateral negotiations to ban chemical weapons. Without their commitment, the Conference on Disarmament is unlikely to achieve progress on this particular item of our agenda.

I do not hesitate, therefore, to make use of this opportunity to appeal to all parties, and especially the super-Powers, to fully commit themselves to speed up the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on matters in which they have a particular interest, as well as on questions which concern almost all States participating in the negotiations. As they commit themselves to do so in the prohibition of chemical weapons, it is only just and fair to request them also to embark upon multilateral negotiations on those issues I mentioned earlier.

(continued)



(Mr. Loeis, Indonesia)

The negotiations to totally ban chemical weapons during the 1989 session of the Conference on Disarmament, as well as the open-ended consultation recently concluded, have made considerable progress. Understanding in some aspects has been achieved, and divergences of views have been narrowed. We notice among other things that efforts to set up a verification régime under the convention to totally ban chemical weapons, as well as other matters pertinent to the smooth running of the convention, have persistently been expended by the Committee.

We are gratified to have been working with the scale of negotiations in the Committee and the wealth of ideas that delegations have submitted. The outgoing chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Morel, as well as the chairmen of the five working groups, deserve our appreciation and gratitude for the able and creative manner in which they guided the negotiations last year. At the same time, however, if we reflect on the commitment entered into by the international community to comprehensively ban chemical weapons, then we are astonished to learn that one of the most crucial elements of the future convention, the prohibition of use of chemical weapons, is excluded from the Committee's mandate.

United Nations General Assembly resolution 44/115 B specifically urges the Conference to pursue as a matter of continuing urgency its negotiations on a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction. The message is clear. The General Assembly has specifically stressed that the convention should include the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons.

The demand of the international community to ban chemical weapons results from the fear of the most dangerous consequences if such weapons were to be used. The great danger that chemical weapons pose to mankind is not the development, production or stockpiling of those weapons as such, but their possible use. Such a possibility will always exist as long as the development, production and stockpiling of these weapons are not totally eliminated. The prohibition and prevention of the use of chemical weapons therefore constitutes the core of the problem concerning the banning of chemical weapons, and should therefore be covered by the scope of the future chemical weapons convention.

Objections to the proposals to include use have been raised for a number of reasons. One of these suggests that the use of chemical weapons has been prohibited by the 1925 Geneva Protocol, and that there is no need to include such a prohibition in the future convention: another is that a new convention containing the same rules would weaken the instrument already in existence.

As we all know, the 1925 Geneva Protocol has a number of weaknesses. It conditionally bans the use of chemical weapons, and more than 40 States parties, among them all the great Powers, made reservations stating that they would not be bound by the convention vis-à-vis any State whose armed forces failed to abide by the Protocol. It also contains no mechanism to verify compliance, and it has been evident that it cannot totally prevent the use of these weapons. The effectiveness of the Protocol is therefore questionable, since it could be regarded as a "no first use" agreement.



(Mr. Loeis, Indonesia)

I now wish to refer to the question of the non-production of chemical weapons, a particular aspect of the convention which has been dealt with by international gatherings even during the preparation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. Lengthy and painstaking negotiations on this question at that time finally resulted in the agreement which prohibits only the use of these weapons.

After the signing of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, subsequent activities unsuccessfully attempted to establish a régime for the regulation of the non-production of chemical weapons. Documentation on the elaboration of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the negotiations to establish the future convention illustrate that it has always been possible to divert chemicals intended for peaceful purposes to weapon purposes.

Those exercises, as well as ours today, have shown the complexity of establishing a régime which could prevent any possible clandestine production of chemical weapons. Hence, if we wish to have a proper convention, the most viable way to prevent loopholes is the enforcement of a challenge inspection régime which could clear any doubts and which would disclose any act of non-compliance.

We notice that the essential elements necessary to arrive at concrete treaty language concerning the question of challenge inspection have been identified and discussed. They are now ready to be further negotiated in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. Challenge inspection, in my view, constitutes an ultimate source of confidence in the convention. It should be borne in mind, however, that recourse to it should be regarded as exceptional, and confidence in the convention should be built up, as far as possible, by other means which do not involve resort to an open expression of suspicion. An idea about verification measures based on an elaborate system of quotas has been tabled. This in my view, merits further consideration by the Ad hoc Committee, because the measure would grant the parties to the future convention the possibility of displaying their openness and their spirit of co-operation, thus reducing the need to conduct challenge inspections.



(The President)

... Reviewing now the practical business the Netherlands presidency had to transact, I observe the following. As usual at the opening of the annual session, the Conference had to deal with a number of organizational questions, which are required to provide appropriate frameworks for our consideration of substantive questions. Bringing about an effective, verifiable, truly global convention banning chemical weapons at the earliest date is a political priority. The sustained progress achieved in the negotiations in this multilateral body as well as in the bilateral rounds between the United States and the Soviet Union constitute a momentum in itself whose impact on our work on chemical weapons in the Conference on Disarmament cannot fail to be noticed.

In the Netherlands view it was vital to get the CW negotiations in 1990 started with a proper mandate as soon as possible. Establishing an appropriate mandate was a complex issue in itself. I felt very encouraged, however, by the positive and flexible attitude taken by all delegations. I therefore welcome the substantial improvement achieved this year in the mandate of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. This is a major step forward after several years of work under the previous, more limited mandate. The participation of an unparalleled number of non-member States in our work on a CW ban holds great promise for the universality of this CW convention, indeed a foremost requirement. Combining all these factors, I submit that our chances for success in relation to the conclusion of the long-desired CW convention are better than ever. Indeed, the time has come to reap the fruits of our efforts.

In assessing the organization of work of the Conference during the month of February, I would like to note that early agreement was reached on the establishment of the Ad hoc Committees on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons and on Radiological Weapons. Their recently appointed Chairmen, Ambassadors Negrotto Cambiaso and Varga respectively, are now consulting on preparations for the sessions of those subsidiary bodies.

We have also held consultations in connection with the first part of agenda item 7, entitled "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons". Those consultations indicated that it would be advisable to keep this matter under review and to deal with it whenever necessary, possibly at informal meetings of the Conference.

I would like to stress the importance of the decisions taken on requests from non-members to participate in the work of the Conference. During the month of February, we took action on an unprecedented number of

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(The President)

requests, 33 in all, a decision which, in my view, is a good augury for the development of our work. This is particularly the case in our negotiations on chemical weapons, in which all 33 States have been invited to participate. We are all aware of the outstanding contributions made by non-members in previous years and, as our negotiations on that subject intensify, I am sure that we shall continue to benefit from such participation.

... As I have had occasion to point out before, the Conference is a specialist body, engaged in the negotiation of agreements of universal scope. The fact that by now there are, in all, 73 members and non-members taking part in the work of the Conference augurs well for our efforts to achieve universally acceptable agreements. In making this comment, I have in mind of course, first of all, the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. As I said, our chances for success in the conclusion of a CW convention are better than ever. I said so with reference to external factors. But there is also an internal element of encouragement: the fact that the stewardship over the ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons is in the safe and trusted hands of Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden and that the three working groups are being coached by such competent leaders as Mr. Lamazière of Brazil, Mr. Meerburg of the Netherlands and Mr. Krutzsch of the German Democratic Republic. I would like to express once more our full confidence in this most dynamic team to which we have entrusted the leadership over the CW negotiations.



(Mr. Lukman, Nigeria)

Let me now address myself to the work you have done so far in negotiating a convention on the complete elimination of chemical weapons. We are pleased to note the tremendous effort made towards the attainment of this objective. Deep inroads have been made in areas that had been contentious and intractable. The issue of verification, and especially the politically charged question of challenge inspection, have seen substantial progress. Political, legal and institutional matters are also being addressed. This is the edifice on which the future convention will rest and must therefore be given the same consideration and attention as other issues. Of great importance to my Government is the question of universality. Universal adherence to the convention is essential for the complete eradication of chemical weapons. In this regard, the provision of incentives such as assistance and co-operation in economic and technological development is important.

Also of particular importance for the convention is the need to assure States that giving up the right to produce or acquire weapons would not leave a State party at the mercy of non-parties. For this reason nothing could be more reassuring to the States parties, especially the weaker ones, than provision in the future convention for collective and mandatory action in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter against any chemical weapon attack, be it from a State party or a non-party to the convention. This is the most important single inducement that can help to ensure the adherence of the weaker States to the future convention. The international community is anxiously awaiting the conclusion of the convention. There is therefore a need to keep up the momentum that the negotiations have acquired during the past year, so that the convention can be concluded at the earliest date. In this connection, I would like to state that Nigeria has no chemical weapons and does not intend to acquire them in the future.



(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

The past of our Conference contains some important chapters and many missed opportunities. Its present appears rather promising owing to the subject of chemical weapons, but its medium-term future is frankly uncertain. A couple of decades ago, Mrs. Alva Myrdal periodically invited us to think collectively about the course of our work. She described that exercise as a "mapping expedition". We might also think of the terms used by architects before they begun the construction of a building. They talk of a "critical path". Call it what you will, we must devote some thought to this matter. Unlike architects, we would be following our critical path after the building - that is, the Conference - had already been constructed. But on the other hand, there is much accumulated experience and, as we have observed, much good will among the delegates present here, who, if I may say so, form a sort of guild of craftsmen in the field of disarmament. So we must try and see the horizon more clearly. And we must begin by working for the credibility of this Conference. Where do we see here a reflection of the sense of urgency which usually appears in the resolutions of the General Assembly and informs the work and opinions of many non-governmental organizations? A second question is: what is going to happen in this room once the convention on chemical weapons has been concluded? Are we going to plunge again into the sterile pantomime of past eras? Will we then seek some item of little value to the international community simply in order to "produce something" and thereby make a good impression on the General Assembly? In a word, is there life after the CW convention?



(Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

The CW convention is in the immediate future the only possible multilateral agreement in a major area of disarmament. My delegation welcomes the prompt re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee with a mandate based on a reasonable compromise, and is convinced that under the leadership of Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden we shall be able to make considerable headway so as to come close to the conclusion of the convention.

Without at this stage going into the substance, I shall limit myself to two more general observations. The first concerns the need to conclude the convention at the earliest date in accordance with the recommendations of the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference and the relevant resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly. This would not only ensure the elimination of this abhorrent type of weapon, which is one of the major disarmament tasks, but would also have a great psychological effect as a proof of the ability of the international community to achieve measures of real disarmament. It would also add to the credibility of the Conference itself which has been seriously undermined in the past decade. From the political and organizational point of view alike, the moment is especially propitious for the mobilization of efforts aimed at the conclusion of the convention. There is a prevailing view that no big political, technical or procedural obstacles stand in the way of the negotiations; there is a mass of concrete proposals and ideas on outstanding questions; there is the new impetus provided by the recent Soviet-American joint statement. Finally, we have the collective wisdom and the dedication of the members of this body. As Ambassador Azambuja of Brazil observed, "we have assembled virtually all the necessary building-blocks" to complete our task.

My second observation concerns the need to ensure the universal character of the future convention and its rapid implementation after it is signed. We are of the opinion that some regional co-operative measures and activities before the conclusion of the convention may prove quite useful in this respect, as in view of the very nature of chemical weapons the most sensitive security concerns are likely to involve neighbouring States or States belonging to a given geographical region. These preliminary actions I am referring to might include declarations on possession or non-possession of chemical weapons, individual or joint political declarations of the States of a region indicating a resolve to become original parties to the convention, mutual trial inspections on a bilateral or broader regional basis, etc.



Mr. KOMATINA (Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations): The message, as you said, is addressed to the members of the Conference on Disarmament.

... "We welcome the progress achieved on a convention banning the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. While we recognize the complexity of the negotiations, we are aware of the continuing danger that chemical weapons may be used in regional conflicts. We urge the Conference to increase its efforts to overcome the remaining obstacles and conclude the treaty by the end of this year.

Mr. von STULPNAGEL (Federal Republic of Germany):

Maybe the sense of urgency and resolve prevailing in those forums will prove contagious. There is no reason why we should not set ourselves equally ambitious goals for the conclusion of the chemical weapons convention. Otherwise we risk being the last to change in a world of change, or those who did not change in time - as happened to the dinosaurs, you may remember. We all know that the necessary political and material prerequisites for the timely conclusion of our task of drafting a comprehensive and global convention effectively banning chemical weapons exist. Firstly, the Paris Conference held at the beginning of last year definitely made the elimination of existing chemical weapon stockpiles and production facilities, and the prohibition of any further manufacture, acquisition, storage, transfer or use of chemical weapons, a common cause of the whole international community. All States participating in that Conference called upon the Conference on Disarmament to redouble its efforts to resolve expeditiously the remaining issues with a view to concluding the convention at the earliest date. In addition, the world chemical industry strongly endorsed our negotiations at the instigation of the Australian Government at the Canberra Conference last year. Secondly, in terms of material preparation for an early convention, the Conference on Disarmament has over the last few years been engaged in particularly intensive negotiations covering all aspects. So the opportunity must be seized. The outstanding problems need to be addressed resolutely. Solutions to the key issues which have been under discussion for so long cannot be put off time after time.

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(Mr. von Stulpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

Allow me, therefore, to address one of those issues which is of truly crucial importance: challenge inspections. It has been under intensive discussion for almost three years now, so far without a solution. I am convinced that a solution to this problem would not only remove one of the main obstacles in the way of completing the verification system, but would also provide a strong stimulus to tackle the other as yet unresolved issues of the convention.

There seems to be agreement that challenge inspections are indispensable and a corner-stone of the whole verification system, since they constitute an all-embracing measure enabling all States parties, on an entirely equal basis, to clarify doubts about the compliance of others. Despite this basic common understanding, and despite all the efforts undertaken over the past years within the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, divergences of view seem to persist.

Following consultations conducted last year and earlier by the chairmen of the Ad hoc Committee, it seems to me that we have in some respects got bogged down. Divergences seem to have been unduly politicized. They have also gradually grown out of proportion. If we continue in this way we may thwart a solution which is both realistic and meets the requirements of effective verification.

What is needed now is a fresh look at the issues of challenge inspection - a look unclouded by some of our past discussions. The point of departure should be a consideration of the technical nature and the basic political characteristics of challenge inspections. Here some agreement seems to exist - as reflected in such catchwords as challenge inspection as a means to clarify doubts about compliance; the right of each State party to request a challenge inspection any time, anywhere; no refusal of the request; the right and obligation of the requested State party to demonstrate compliance; inspection to be carried out in accordance with the request in the least intrusive manner possible; the right of the requesting State party to observe the inspection; and the right of the inspected State party to protect sensitive equipment or information as far as possible. If there is agreement on these points, why is it not possible to include provisions to that effect in the "rolling text"?

Whenever technical aspects are accompanied by political and psychological sensitivities, our Conference starts to stall. Some say they want the philosophy of a subject to be clarified. Others insist that only the wording - even the final wording - should be at the centre of our deliberations. And in the process we lose the opportunity to take the necessary political decisions. This is the case with regard to challenge inspection too. The question is simply whether this verification method should be a factor of normal life or confrontational in nature. In considering this the following aspects should, in my view, be borne in mind. Firstly, challenge inspections are designed to be implemented on a regular basis, like other verification measures under the convention, but they are triggered by doubts about compliance. Secondly, at the same time, challenge inspections, like all other on-sit inspections, are intended to provide an assurance of compliance by not relying solely on declarations or assurances by State parties but by checking on the spot. In this regard all inspection



(Mr. von Stulpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

measures are of the same routine nature. Thirdly, challenge inspections may indeed be considered confrontational as they might imply an allegation of non-compliance. However, all inspections are in a way accusatory, as they can be interpreted as indicating disbelief in declarations made by States parties. Fourthly, the nature of challenge inspections is a matter of perception. Perceptions, as we all know, may differ between individuals. In any event challenge inspections must be considered a right and be accepted as an integral and indispensable element of the verification system. Finally, verification is intended to build confidence. Thus challenge inspections must also be perceived as a legitimate means to this end.

In considering and evaluating the elements I have just enumerated, one might wonder whether indeed the word "challenge" is consistent with the nature of the inspections in question, or whether it should not be replaced by a more neutral term like "inspections on request". A corresponding proposal has - as you will remember - already been made in this room.

I have dwelt on the "routine versus confrontational" issue in order to show that a problem-oriented approach may be helpful in settling some of the long-standing moot points in our discussion. I have raised this problem in order to prevent a situation where, in a field of truly multilateral interest, a field where serious multilateral disarmament is possible and achievable, we are outdistanced by bilateral solutions which, while welcome, raise the question of the capacity of this Conference to achieve the goals for which it was constituted.

Let me now address another facet which has gained significance in the discussion: the question of whether challenge inspections are primarily a bilateral or a multilateral instrument. On this issue especially it seems to me that realism and a sense of proportion are required. Otherwise we may get enveloped in futile "ideological" debate.

Challenge inspections should be considered multilateral, as they are part of a multilateral convention guaranteeing equal rights to each of its parties. Compliance is a concern of all parties. In their implementation, challenge inspections are bilateral, in so far as they are triggered by a request from an individual State party for inspections on the territory of another State party. This seems to be a legitimate procedure, as each State party should be able to seek reassurance if it has doubts about the compliance of another State party. If each State has the right to obtain this reassurance by requesting challenge inspections, this enhances confidence in the convention and is thus beneficial to the multilateral convention régime as a whole.

The "multilateral versus bilateral" issue has been at the heart of the discussions on procedures following submission of the report on the result of a challenge inspection. Diverging views have been expressed on the roles of the Executive Council and the requesting and requested State party with regard to the evaluation of the results of a challenge inspection. In dealing with this issue two basic considerations should be borne in mind. First, it seems unrealistic to assume that the Executive Council, a truly political body consisting of representatives of sovereign States, can be prevented from discussing the report of a challenge inspection communicated to it and



(Mr. von Stulpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

expressing its own opinion on whether or not the requested State is in compliance. Second, the requesting State or any other State cannot be prevented from drawing its own conclusions and taking those measures it considers necessary to maintain its national security, even if its assessment is not shared by the Executive Council. No individual State can be bound by decisions or measures adopted by the Executive Council which it perceives as jeopardizing its national security.

For me the following questions result from these basic considerations: Does the "bilateral versus multilateral" distinction have practical implications for the challenge inspection régime? If so, in what way would it have to be taken into account? Do possible actions of the executive Council or the requesting or requested States parties have to be prescribed or described in the convention? In cases of non-compliance, what is the difference in post-inspection procedures between routine and challenge inspections? Bearing these questions in mind, I wonder whether the issue cannot adequately be covered by the provisions on the political organs of the Organization as set forth in article VIII of the convention.

Let me in conclusion address another very important point concerning the challenge inspections régime - the question of protecting sensitive installations. This question has been widely discussed, and a number of provisions to this end have already been elaborated. I would just like to recall in this regard the provisions contained in the protocol on inspection procedures under the heading "Managed access".

It is on this point in particular that we were able to record a lot of progress last year. However, I recognize that the issue is a very delicate one, in particular since challenge inspections, as they are discussed in the framework of our negotiations, are very broad in scope and have no precedent in the history of arms control and disarmament. I also recognize that a merely conceptual discussion of the implications of the intrusiveness of challenge inspections and possible precautions and measures to protect sensitive information is not enough. The problem cannot be dealt with in the abstract. Rather, practical experience is needed.

To gain such experience we - like others - are currently undertaking a series of trial challenge inspections in military facilities. I am pleased to introduce today the report on our first trial challenge inspection in a military facility. The report has been distributed as an official document of the Conference today. Its results suggest that at facilities like the ammunition depot chosen for our first trial, an effective challenge inspection might be possible without sensitive information having to be disclosed. It was encouraging to see that what we have termed in our report "secondary indicators" may in certain cases do a lot to dispel doubts about compliance.

We would welcome a discussion on our findings within the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. And I am confident that such a discussion will contribute to the further clarification of the as yet unclear concepts of alternative measures and managed access. The question of whether and, if so, how alternative measures would differ from managed access has stimulated considerable discussion. It remains to be answered convincingly. In my view



(Mr. von Stulpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

we should discuss whether the notion of alternative measures is not outdated, and whether the concerns underlying this concept are not already covered by measures designed to protect sensitive equipment and information and, in particular, by what is now understood as constituting managed access.

At the end of last year we conducted another trial challenge inspection, which focused in particular on the methods and equipment needed in a challenge inspection. I hope soon to be able to provide a report on this trial inspection as well. We have planned further trial challenge inspections in order to gain a better insight into the possibilities of protecting sensitive installations, and also with a view to answering the question of the role of the observer of the requesting State party and to what extent he should have access to the inspection site.

We are looking forward to an in-depth discussion of the problem of challenge inspections. We hope that this issue will be discussed matter-of-factly, with determination and realism. We should in all frankness explain our positions and also address those aspects which may pose difficulties. A problem-oriented, unbiased approach seems to me to be best at this juncture. In concluding my statement today I wish to take this opportunity to pledge my delegation's full support for this year's Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Hyltenius. I am confident that with his experience and diplomatic skills he can lead the way, together with his dedicated collaborators and his able working group chairmen, Mr. Lamazière, Mr. Meerburg and Dr. Krutzsch, to the early conclusion of a chemical weapons convention.

Mr. WAGENMAKERS (Netherlands):

... I would like to make a short statement on behalf of the Western Group. I welcome the presence here of so many participants in the Women's Meeting for International Women's Day. We listened with great interest to the message addressed to the CD. Once more it was brought out that our Conference does not work in a vacuum - we are not a world in itself; we serve the world. We are aware of the expectations of the world community, and I would like to bring out our awareness of the recent changes in the world, the many positive changes in all parts of the world and also in Europe after the revolutionary year 1989, which adds to the topical relevance of our work in the Conference on Disarmament. Indeed, the Western Group attaches high priority to the early



(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

conclusion of a chemical weapons convention, and it is well known that we need to spare no effort and spare no energy to arrive at the early introduction of a truly global verifiable ban on chemical weapons. I need not underscore the great importance of nuclear items, and this body devotes considerable attention to them. At the same time, we are aware of the considerable progress in the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, which could well result soon in considerable reductions in their nuclear arsenals. I can assure our visitors today that we feel encouraged by their presence here. Their message delivered to us today constitutes a new and fresh element for our consideration.

Mr. BATSANOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian):

... Mr. President, since this is my first statement in March, I would like to congratulate you as you take up your important post and assure you that the Soviet delegation will provide you with full support and co-operation. I also feel that I must express our gratitude to the distinguished Ambassador of the Netherlands, Mr. Hendrik Wagenmakers, who guided the Conference through its work in February. Under his energetic and tactful leadership we managed to resolve a number of important matters, thus opening the way to a rapid commencement of work on the substance of the issues which we have on the agenda, in particular the prohibition of chemical weapons. It is this specific topic, or rather one of the concrete aspects of it, to which I wish to devote my statement today.

By agreement with the head of the United States delegation, Ambassador S. Ledogar, I am hereby providing information on the fourteenth round of the Soviet-American consultations on the prohibition of chemical weapons, which are being held in accordance with a decision adopted at the Geneva meeting of the leaders of the two countries in November 1985. The fourteenth round of bilateral consultations began on 20 February and is coming to an end today, 8 March. The round was preceded by a meeting between the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, E.A. Shevardnadze, and the United States Secretary of State, J. Baker, from 7 to 9 February in Moscow. At that meeting they adopted a joint statement on chemical weapons which contained an agreed overall framework for achieving the aim of eliminating chemical weapons world wide - an aim which the USSR and the United States consider as one of the most urgent tasks. In this connection, I would like to recall that the documents issuing from the Moscow meetings of the ministers



(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

relating to arms limitation and disarmament issues, including the chemical weapons issue, and the papers on the chemical weapons ban emanating from the Wyoming ministerial meeting in September 1989, have been distributed at the request of the delegations of the Soviet Union and the United States as official documents of the Conference on Disarmament with the symbols CD/973 and CD/974.

In accordance with the instructions given by the ministers at their Moscow meeting, the delegations at the round continued work on a bilateral agreement on the reciprocal obligations of the USSR and the United States pending the international convention including, *inter alia*, the destruction of the bulk of their CW stocks to equal low levels. It is planned that an agreement of this nature will be signed in June 1990 at a summit meeting. Both parties expressed the hope that such an agreement will confirm the commitment of the USSR and the United States to move towards the achievement of a global ban on the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction. The agreement under preparation is intended to speed up the elimination of chemical weapons throughout the world, and will also help to accumulate a certain level of practical experience in implementing chemical disarmament.

The parties firmly hold the position that the discharge of obligations under the bilateral agreement will not be a pre-condition for, and will not jeopardize, the conclusion and implementation of a multilateral convention banning chemical weapons.

In the fourteenth round good progress was achieved in the elaboration of the text of the future agreement, although there are a number of problems still to be discussed. The participants examined questions connected with the implementation of the Wyoming memorandum of understanding regarding a bilateral verification experiment and data exchange related to prohibition of chemical weapons. Agreement was reached between the parties on an exchange of seven visits to three categories of facilities (chemical weapons storage facilities, production facilities and industrial chemical enterprises) under phase I of the arrangements agreed in the memorandum. It was agreed that the first exchange of visits will involve visits to chemical weapons storage facilities at the beginning of June this year. The delegations to the round practically completed the elaboration of the programmes and other details for the visits to specific categories of facilities. During the visits the parties plan to discuss in detail the applicability of the procedures agreed at the multilateral negotiations to the specific facilities which will be visited.

In pursuance of the agreement reached at the ministers' meetings in Wyoming and Moscow, the delegations started discussing matters of co-operation between the USSR and the United States on technology and procedures for safe and expeditious as well as economically and environmentally sound destruction of chemical weapons. Highly qualified experts from both sides took part in these discussions. Agreement was reached on an exchange of visits to appropriate facilities in the USSR and the United States.



(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

The United States and the Soviet Union are conducting bilateral discussions on the prohibition of chemical weapons with the intention of helping to achieve further progress in the multilateral negotiations. Delegations at the round of talks discussed certain technical aspects related to matters still awaiting solution in the draft convention on the chemical weapons ban. In the multilateral negotiations the USSR and the United States have submitted proposals on the order of destruction of chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities. The parties reaffirmed their intention of working to speed up the multilateral negotiations in order to resolve the basic pending issues and complete the elaboration of the draft convention as soon as possible. The next round of bilateral consultations is scheduled for April this year.

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Mr. VARGA (Hungary):

... The Secretary of State of my country, Hungary, made a comprehensive statement in our Conference on our disarmament policy just recently. In my brief statement today I should like to associate myself with your congratulations addressed to the participants in the public gallery on the occasion of international Women's Day. My delegation acknowledges with thanks the message from the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar, on the same occasion. I am very pleased to see the festive flowers on your table, and I am happy also to have listened to the welcoming words by the distinguished representative of Sweden, Ambassador Hyltenius, and those of Ambassador von Stülpnagel of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Wagenmakers of the Netherlands and Mr. Batsanov of the Soviet Union addressed to the representatives of the non-governmental organizations and women's organizations honouring our conference and manifesting a vivid interest in our work. In acknowledgement of all these tributes my delegation feels honoured to wish all women participants and our honourable guests in the gallery today - as I do on behalf of my Eastern European friends too - the best of luck, happiness and success in their family life, work and social activities. I reiterate also with renewed hope my delegation's efforts to continue to work in this

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(Mr. Varga, Hungary)

distinguished Conference in concert with every delegation to attain our common goals - a world without arms and fear, progressing uninterruptedly with the elaboration of effective international agreements banning chemical weapons and contributing to disarmament in other fields as well. I am happy to observe among the reasons why the present international conditions are propitious for positive developments the negotiations between the United States of America and the Soviet Union, the two super-Powers, leading hopefully towards nuclear disarmament, the European conventional force reduction talks, the fading away of the numerous hotbeds of war in the world, the Eastern European spring in democracy, their striving for sweeping political, economic and social reforms, and so on. I am confident that our negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament will help to create favourable conditions for a more peaceful world, in justice and security for the betterment and benefit of mankind.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America):

... Two weeks ago, I had occasion to address the Conference on chemical weapons. Chemical weapons is not my main topic this morning, but I would like to underscore the thrust of Minister Batsanov's statement last Thursday. My Government is pleased with the productive nature of the CW United States-Soviet bilateral round just completed. Our joint progress in reaching a bilateral agreement on destruction of chemical weapons stocks can only further efforts in this body to finish drafting a multilateral CW convention at the earliest date.

Chemical weapons are high on the United States Government's arms control agenda. Let me turn to the subject of nuclear weapons, another item on this agenda. We start from the fact that for more than 40 years, a strong nuclear deterrent has been necessary to ensure the security of the United States. It has helped preserve the security and freedom of our allies and friends. The long European peace of the last 45 years has, I believe, led to the situation we have today, in which the winds of freedom are sweeping through so many countries. The long period of stability has purchased time in which our attention could turn from survival to human and political rights.



(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

... The United States has worked in good faith to make the CD a viable institution. We have sought to make arms control work, to establish principles and reach agreements that would improve the security of everyone. We have also learned our limits: for instance, we have found that setting examples which we are assured others will follow often results in pressure for more examples, with little attention to whether anyone has followed the original example. When we unilaterally declared our CW stocks, only the USSR followed our example. We are still waiting for other declarations. This atmosphere is not helpful to the CD's objectives, and it makes it harder for my country to place its full confidence in this Organization's work.

Mr. OMAR (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (translated from Arabic): I am happy and honoured to address this august Conference for the first time. Allow me, Sir, to express our congratulations to you on taking up the presidency of this Conference for this month. We are sure that your wide experience will be of the greatest assistance in the attainment of excellent results. I wish to express our gratitude and appreciation for the endeavours of your predecessor, the Ambassador of the Netherlands, who guided the work of this Conference during the month of February. I would like also to express our appreciation to you and to all the members of the Conference who responded positively to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya's request to participate as an observer in the plenary meetings of the Conference and its Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.

Although our participation last year was limited owing to our limited experience in the field, we intend to develop our participation in the future in co-operation with the developing countries, in order to make it more effective. I am happy to be addressing the body which was assigned by the General Assembly to consider the question of disarmament referred to in paragraph 1 of article 11 of the Charter of the United Nations. This question relates closely to the purposes of the United Nations, particularly the maintenance of international peace and security and the development of friendly relations among nations. If these purposes are achieved in the manner envisioned, they will provide all nations, and particularly the nations of the third world, with real opportunities for economic and social progress and development.



(Mr. Omar, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya)

The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya expressed its overall views on the question of disarmament in the statement delivered by the Secretary of the People's Committee of the People's Bureau for Foreign Liaison and International Co-operation before the Paris Conference in January 1989. He said:

"Complete and comprehensive disarmament under effective international control is the ultimate aim which the peoples of the world are pursuing. All States, and particularly those which possess nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, have the obligation to strive resolutely and diligently to achieve this objective while totally respecting the purposes and principles expressed in the Charter of the United Nations, in accordance with the priorities defined in the Final Document of the tenth special session of the United Nations General Assembly on Disarmament, namely the elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons and conventional weapons".

This comprehensive view, which is shared by many States, stems from a full awareness of the appalling dangers facing our planet as a result of the production, stockpiling and possible use of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. In fact, the scenes of mass destruction caused by atomic bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan still haunt the minds of present-day generations. Thousands of persons are still suffering from their painful and lethal effects. Moreover, we are still suffering directly from the scourge of two world wars and their residual legacy in the shape of minefields laid by belligerent armies in our territory. My country was the first in the African continent and in the world as a whole to fall victim to the use of chemical weapons after the First World War. It is a proven historical fact that, on 31 July 1930, the Fascist colonial forces dropped 24 mustard gas bombs, weighing 21 kilograms each, over the peaceful oasis of Tazirbou in central Libya, thereby causing considerable loss of life among men, women and children.

My country has given practical expression to its awareness of this danger through its endeavours, within the international community and the United Nations system, to ensure the adoption of measures to speed up the process of comprehensive disarmament, to consolidate and maintain international peace and security. As part of these endeavours, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has acceded to the following international instruments: the partial test-ban Treaty, the outer space Treaty, the Geneva Protocol for the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. Moreover, my country has worked for the conclusion, within IAEA, of a convention on the inspection of nuclear installations for peaceful purposes.

My country has followed with great interest the progress of negotiations on arms control and disarmament and is happy to note that these negotiations are being conducted actively at all bilateral, regional and multilateral levels. In the statement issued by the People's Committee of the People's Bureau for Foreign Liaison and International Co-operation on 13 February 1990,



(Mr. Omar, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya)

my country welcomed the Soviet-United States statement issued in Moscow concerning the agreement by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the two countries on the need to eliminate chemical weapons throughout the world and their determination to work for the signature and application of a multilateral agreement prohibiting the production and use of chemical weapons and providing for the world-wide elimination of the stockpiles of such weapons. My country, having already expressed its hope that this agreement will be applied fully, and having reiterated its clear position in regard to these and other types of weapons of mass destruction, calls for the adoption of more far-reaching measures for the elimination of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and the destruction of the stockpiles of these weapons in order to protect mankind from their dangers and preclude any possibility of their use. This statement was issued as an official document of this Conference (CD/970) on 20 February 1990.

Moreover, in paragraphs 23 and 24 of the Great Green Document on Human Rights, which was issued as an official document of the United Nations General Assembly under the symbol A/44/331 on 19 June 1989, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya adopted the following principles regarding the arms trade, the cessation of arms production and atomic, biological and chemical weapons:

"23. The members of the society of the Jamahiriya believe that peace among nations can bring about well-being, prosperity and concord, and they call for the abolition of the arms trade and an end to the manufacture of arms, since it represents a squandering of the wealth of the masses, constitutes a burden on individuals, because of taxation, and presents mankind with the spectre of mass destruction.

"24. The members of the society of the Jamahiriya call for the abolition of atomic, biological and chemical weapons and means of mass destruction and for the destruction of existing stockpiles. They call for the release of mankind from atomic plants and the threat of nuclear waste."

My country is also following with you the sincere efforts aimed at the drafting and conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction.

I do not believe, and nobody believes, that there is any ambiguity in the Libyan position regarding nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons. However, all of you are aware of the White House announcement on 7 March that "available evidence suggests that chemical weapons are being produced at the Rabta plant in Libya", and that this called for international efforts to shut down the facility. "We are very seriously concerned about this development", said White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater in reference to the plant. He said the Rabta facility was dangerous and becoming more so. There was a necessity for heightened international vigilance of Libyan procurement activities and for vigorous efforts to stop the Rabta operation, he declared. He also said that the Administration had expressed its serious concern to various Governments, and that the international community should step up its efforts to deny Libya the ability to continue operating the plant. "This is a subject we have under



(Mr. Omar, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya)

continual discussion with our allies and others and we intend to press ahead with those discussions in the coming days". Answering questions, the spokesman said: "We certainly would urge all countries to survey their internal situation, inventory their chemical production facilities and make their own judgements that they are not a source for any of these chemicals". The spokesman urged his questioners to focus not on who was giving the Libyans the chemicals but rather on the Libyan leader and on the country that was producing chemical weapons. When he was asked to define what he meant by vigorous efforts to stop the operation, Mr. Fitzwater replied that he was not willing to speculate on specific efforts, but that nothing was ruled out.

Immediately after the White House announcement, the People's Committee of the People's Bureau for Foreign Liaison and International Co-operation issued a statement in Tripoli which denied all these allegations and reaffirmed the full commitment of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to all international instruments and efforts aimed at the prohibition of the production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and expressed Libyan readiness to co-operate with any constructive international efforts to that end. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has repeatedly explained to the whole world the nature of the Rabta plant. In its statement issued in document CD/970, Libya invited States and companies throughout the world which were concerned with the production of pharmaceuticals to participate with us in the production of medicines and medical equipment. In fact, Libya took a further step when the General People's Congress, on the conclusion of its sixteenth session on 9 March declared its support for any measures that might be adopted by the international community in regard to the verification and inspection of chemical weapons, provided that those measures were applied to all States. The same statement was also made by our Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York on 8 March.

As you are aware, this is not the first time that the United States Administration has made such allegations against the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. Likewise, this is not the first time that the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has denied these unfounded allegations by the United States Administration. However, the fact remains that these announcements and this intense propaganda campaign raise many questions concerning their nature and their real underlying motives.

I do not wish to prolong my statement. However, in view of our firm position to which I have already referred, I would like to question the reason why Libya has been singled out by the United States. The distinguished representative of the United States of America stated before this Conference, on 27 February 1990, that there are more than 20 States that have or are seeking chemical weapons. The question once again is: Why single out Libya? I would also ask him whether his list includes Israel. If so, could the United States Administration inform the Conference or international public opinion about the types of chemical weapons that Israel possesses or is producing, and whether the United States Administration dare say about Israel what it is alleging about Libya? The same questions can be raised regarding South Africa and its co-operation with Israel in this field. By what right does the United States Administration set itself up as prosecutor and judge



(Mr. Omar, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya)

while the international community is considering this matter? In fact, the United States Administration is seeking a pretext to commit yet another of its repeated acts of aggression against Libya. The United States declarations contain an open threat to use force against Libya, in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and international law. Such an act would have an adverse effect on the peace and security of the central Mediterranean region. The United States Administration seems fond of committing aggression against small peoples, as has happened in a number of cases, most recently in Panama. Such declarations also imply a hostile incitement to States not to deal with Libya, in an attempt to expand the scope of the economic embargo which the United States has imposed on Libya in total disregard of the obligations of the United States, as a major Power, to preserve international peace and security and to promote friendly relations among nations.

I urge the members of the Conference on Disarmament to show understanding for the Libyan position on this matter. I hope that the United States Administration will heed the rule of law and wisdom and resort to dialogue instead of provocation and the threat of force.

CD/PV.542

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Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): I would simply like to state our regret at the Libyan choice of this forum to make its response to statements about Libyan chemical weapons capabilities that were made in Washington. The White House spokesman has commented on this matter in some detail; those comments were not made in the context of our negotiations here, but since the representative of Libya has raised them here this morning, I can only state that my authorities stand by those comments.



(Ms. Wilde, New Zealand)

I say this notwithstanding the important work being done here on the negotiation of a comprehensive chemical weapons convention. New Zealand fully supports the work of the CD on chemical weapons. We pledge our support for, and co-operation with, the Ad hoc Committee in its work. The point I am making is that expectations have changed over the past few months. As Presidents Bush and Gorbachev have done with START and CFE, the CD needs to set a self-imposed deadline for the completion of a CW text. That would help ensure that the momentum generated by the Paris and Canberra conferences is not lost. It would demonstrate that the CD is able to adapt to the accelerating pace of change in world security affairs. It would put political pressure on all States to find solutions to outstanding problems - for who wants to be seen to be standing in the way of the convention?

Last year under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Morel, the chemical weapons Ad hoc Committee made useful progress in redefining the "rolling text", and reconciling some of the outstanding differences. I refer in particular to the newly developed annex on chemicals, the protocol on inspection procedures, and the valuable work done by the Technical Group on Instrumentation.

The Instrumentation Group's report makes clear, once and for all, that the technical requirements of the convention's verification régime can be met by modern technology. Equally the protocol on inspection procedures reflects the considerable degree of consensus that exists on the requirements of an inspection régime.

I am heartened that verification difficulties at the technical level are now seen as problems to be solved, and not as convenient excuses to delay arms control. Such an approach augurs well for the resolution of more fundamental political issues. I am confident that under its new Chairman, Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden, the Committee will address these remaining differences in a constructive fashion.

The recent agreement by the super-Powers to proceed to substantially reduce their chemical weapon stocks provides further impetus for work here. Their decision to cease all chemical weapons production when the convention enters into force will have a very positive impact on the talks in the CD. However, New Zealand cannot support the super-Powers' decision to keep a residual stockpile of chemical weapons until all chemical-weapon-capable States adhere to the convention. We have very real concerns about the implications of this approach for an effective and all-embracing multilateral agreement.

There is growing awareness, in the South Pacific region, of the chemical weapons issues before this Conference. For this, and for its wider efforts in pursuit of chemical disarmament, New Zealand would like to take this opportunity to commend the Government of Australia.



(Ms. Wilde, New Zealand)

In our view the regional seminar on chemical weapons and the Government-Industry Conference held in Australia last year were particularly useful initiatives. The Government-Industry Conference heard the first collective statement by the world's chemical industry giving a commitment to assist in bringing about a total chemical weapons ban.

We believe that finishing work on the "rolling text" on chemical weapons at this session is the CD's most pressing task if the Conference is to retain credibility.

Arms control in chemical weapons has also highlighted another problem: arms disposal. The destruction of chemical weapons is not easy. It is in everyone's interests that it be done in any environmentally safe manner. This issue is causing some anxiety to Pacific nations, which have long protested at the use of their region for nuclear weapons testing in which they want no part. Now countries of my region are watching carefully the proposals made for the destruction of chemical weapons there. Small Pacific islands may seem remote from the huge continents of the world but, together with the Pacific Ocean, they are the homes and life-support systems of the many peoples of the region. We do not want the delicate ecosystem damaged any further by new intrusions.

Despite the importance of chemical weapons, the focus of the Conference cannot remain that subject alone. The Conference's work on other areas must be advanced. I am particularly concerned at the prolonged inability of the Conference to agree on a mandate for a committee to debate item 1 - a nuclear test ban.



(Mr. Velayati, Islamic Republic of Iran)

... This is particularly significant in our region. It may seem today that Europe is the centre of the world. Well, this may be a valid assessment in a narrow time span. But history has largely been developed, shaped or affected by events in the Middle East. After all, this is a region that has given birth to three of the greatest prophets of God. The area from the Persian Gulf to the North of Africa can rightly be called the mirror of history and the mirror of the world.

This is most valid in regard to the CW convention. As the victim of the most extensive and horrendous chemical attacks we have a heartfelt desire for a ban on these weapons. We have suffered the catastrophic effects of chemical weapons on our military personnel as well as our civilians. We have also been a first-hand witness to the holocaust in Halabja which, on its second anniversary, still brings people to shivers, tears, anger and outrage. Thus, to us, there is not just an obligation, but a deep moral and inner urge for the abolishment and complete eradication of these barbarous weapons.

Yet, against this background, our country is faced with a complex paradox. In our immediate vicinity, we have a country that has waged a devastating war against us and, through it, has used chemical weapons at will. Even now, after the cease-fire, it is engaged in an extensive and ambitious programme of development and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons. This is aside from potential threats from some other countries in the region, which are continuously arming themselves with advanced and sophisticated weaponry.

Under these conditions, we have two options. One is to follow logic and reason and convert capabilities and expertise in the field of chemical weapons acquired during the course of the war into practice as a deterrent vis-à-vis immediate and potential threats. The other is to follow our urge and set our hopes on a still ambiguous convention, and be prepared for a possible risk, or perhaps serious jeopardy, to our security. Despite the odds, we have decided to follow our urge, but we need assurances.

We do not intend to set pre-conditions. But there are necessities arising from the merits of the situation. Let us not forget that the Iraqi use of chemical weapons, followed by a chemical and missile build-up in the area, was a prime factor in giving momentum to the CW convention. Therefore for the success of the convention, there has to be genuine adherence to and full implementation of the convention in our region.

To be frank, if the convention were ready today, the chances of its success in our region would be somewhere near zero. Without undermining the importance of the understandings at the level of major CW-producing countries,

(continued)



(Mr. Velayati, Islamic Republic of Iran)

special attention should be maintained on the question of security in our region throughout the negotiations. Therefore, to assure success of the convention, in a broad and general scope, the following needs to be realized.

The continuation of a "no war, no peace" situation breeds tension in the region and keeps hostilities at the threshold of danger. In such an atmosphere countries with capabilities will find it very difficult to give away the CW option. Diplomatic efforts should therefore be mobilized to bring resolution 598 to the stage of immediate implementation.

Once the conflict ends, the two sides, as well as the other countries in the region, will be in a position to engage in a constructive dialogue, not as immediate or potential enemies or supporters of this or the other side, but as neighbours with common objectives and goals. The task can take the form of intensive and informal discussions, at first, to bring into the open the threat perceptions of each country - much like the current CSCE exercise in Vienna.

This may be followed by formal collective security arrangements in the region, including measures to prevent war and for reduction of arms as well as eradication of chemical weapons, on the understanding that the latter is an independent, more urgent issue.

The convention must be as foolproof and as intrusive as possible. We cannot risk our security and give up the CW option now in exchange for a weak convention at the end. In the past, the mistrust between the major producing countries was a prelude to a more concrete and detailed approach. At the same time the prospects for early realization of the convention were dim. Now, with changes in relations, issues may be simplified. The chances for an early convention can therefore be much higher now. But we should avoid over-simplification which may compromise the intrusive and binding character of the convention.

A high degree of automaticity must be maintained in the convention. Iran has been a victim of chemical weapons as well as political selectivity. We cannot therefore leave our security at the mercy of political decisions. Automaticity should include: firstly, a mechanism that ensures the availability of all relevant information, including information on possible violations, to all member States without any political prejudice; secondly, the concretization of routine and challenge inspections and inspections in the event of alleged use in a manner not hampered by political decisions; thirdly, provisions for sanctions and other punitive measures based directly on technical reports and not political decisions in cases of violations, and particularly in cases of use; and fourthly, a level of automatic assistance to the victims of use or the threat of use.

The element of timing and the order of destruction is also significant. We believe the 10-year period is too long and can make many things unpredictable. With political will, technical problems may be surmounted to reduce this time span. Moreover, the order of destruction should be formulated not just on a quantitative but also on a qualitative basis. This, for us, has tremendous security implications and we need to be quite watchful of it.



(Mr. Velayati, Islamic Republic of Iran)

The convention should indeed be universal. Though the notions of non-proliferation are gradually fading, they are not yet fully disposed of. On the other hand, it should be stressed that the availability of chemical technology for civil use must not be compromised by the convention. Technological assistance for developing countries is thus underlined.

As far as the Organization is concerned, we believe that the countries most affected need to have a better chance for representation.

I should add that, as regards our region, it is imperative that the countries concerned should join the convention simultaneously. Moreover, while we share the concerns about proliferation of nuclear arms in our region and its parallels with chemical weapons, we do not feel that there has to be a direct link if this would compromise the fate of the CW convention. In fact, we should strongly pursue the issue of nuclear proliferation in our region during the fourth NPT review conference.

(Mr. Arteaga, Venezuela)

... We attach major importance to all actions designed to lead to the completion of the convention banning chemical weapons. We agree with others that the Paris and Canberra conferences helped to bring about awareness in public opinion and motivate the sectors most directly concerned in the application of the future convention. All this, taken together with the results of the meeting between Secretary of State Baker and Minister for Foreign Affairs Shevardnadze in September 1989 and last month, give grounds for a degree of optimism about the future evolution of the negotiations. We take note of the recent joint statement describing the outcome of the last meeting, which indicates the intention of the two Governments to reach a bilateral agreement on the destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles. It is to be hoped that this proposal will lead to tangible results in the negotiations taking place here, and that the total destruction of all chemical weapons will be carried out without further delay.

As we announced at the last United Nations General Assembly, Venezuela, desirous of making a contribution to international efforts to prepare the necessary conditions for the rapid implementation of the future convention, has taken the initiative of organizing in Caracas, in the middle of this year, a regional seminar for participants from Latin American and Caribbean countries. The purpose is to familiarize the States that are not members of the Conference on Disarmament with the scope, purposes and objectives of the convention, as well as the verification machinery that is to be established. In due course we will provide further information about this event.



(Mr. Arteaga, Venezuela)

Chemical weapons form an area where we have seen progress and a display of political will which somehow should also spread to other items of our agenda. Consequently we are happy to note the progress made during 1989 and at the beginning of this year in the negotiations in the Ad hoc Committee. The intensification of efforts in the Committee under the skilful leadership of Ambassador Morel led to progress in overcoming some of the existing difficulties. We would like to thank Ambassador Morel for the work that he accomplished, and to express our satisfaction at the results achieved. Now we see with pleasure that a representative of the Group of 21 is chairing the Ad hoc Committee for this year - Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden, to whom we offer our full co-operation.

One of the sectors which is worth highlighting is that of verification, with the preparation of a text on inspection procedures that is now serving as a basis for continued consideration of this point. Another of the areas in which progress has been made is that of technical aspects, in the areas of definitions, schedules of chemical substances and review arrangements, the declaration and verification régime, and soon. Unfortunately in the Committee progress has not been made to the same extent in the consideration of other important items, some of them of a political nature, such as those concerning assistance, economic and technological development, sanctions and the aspect relating to reservations. The intensive consultations held on two important issues - article IX, on challenge inspections, and the issue relating to the composition of the Executive Council - led to better understanding of the subject, although major differences still persist. We do not undervalue the improvements made in the mandate of the Committee for this session, but we are concerned that it contains no reference to the question of the prohibition of use. This is a point that deserves special attention.

As the negotiations proceed in the Committee, it becomes increasingly desirable to examine the question of the financial implications that will arise under the future convention on chemical weapons. Venezuela has placed on record its concern at the size and complexity of the organization for the prohibition of chemical weapons which is being outlined within the context of the convention, especially because of the financial burden that its operations would impose on the States parties to the instrument. There is a need for a clear definition of the principles that will serve as the basis for apportioning the cost of the functioning and the operation of the organization. The Ad hoc Committee should examine this matter carefully. We think it appropriate to reiterate the message of the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference.



Mr. ELARABY (Egypt):

... On behalf of the Group of 21, I should like to make the following statement.

The Group of 21 is committed to the early conclusion of the negotiation by the Conference on Disarmament of a non-discriminatory convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction. This convention should be of universal adherence.

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

The Group of 21 reaffirms its position that the future convention on chemical weapons should prohibit the use of such weapons under any circumstance from the date the convention enters into force. In the view of the Group of 21, this undertaking has already been agreed to in article I, paragraph 3 of the draft convention.

To this end all chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities shall be destroyed during the destruction period of 10 years as stipulated in article IV, paragraph 5 and article V, paragraph 8, and as reflected in the agreed proposal by the two major chemical weapons possessors on the order of destruction. This undertaking shall be without any reservation. The stocks and facilities shall be monitored by the future organization for the prohibition of chemical weapons until their total destruction not later than the end of the destruction period.



(Mr. Houlliez, Belgium)

... On several occasions Belgian delegations in New York or here in Geneva have expressed their apprehension at the growing number of countries acquiring ballistic missiles or the technology to produce them or to increase their range, in particular if this phenomenon goes hand in hand with nuclear or chemical capabilities. The proliferation of ballistic missiles in several areas of tension is creating a new security problem, not so much in a global context as in relations between neighbouring countries which often are or consider themselves to be developing countries. It should not be forgotten that among those countries which possess missiles, several have the means to develop chemical or even biological weapons, and some even have the technology to produce nuclear weapons. The number of States which can pose a threat to their neighbours is steadily increasing despite the economic problems which these countries are often facing and the increased risk of proliferation even towards terrorist groups. In most cases this proliferation is due to technology exports or the relative ease of increasing the range and accuracy of imported missiles.

CD/PV.544

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(Mr. Houlliez, Belgium)

... At the last session of the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, the Belgian delegation listed the various reasons which led it to resume negotiations on a chemical weapons convention with optimism: the Paris and Canberra conferences, the restructuring of the subsidiary bodies, President Bush's proposals and so on. Since then we may add to these grounds for optimism the encouraging developments in the inter-sessional meetings, which, thanks to the efforts of the Chairman of the Committee, Ambassador P. Morel, have made significant progress possible in the "rolling text". We can also add the contribution made by the documents produced by the bilateral American-Soviet negotiations, the prospects for destruction of American and Soviet stocks even before the Convention enters into force, the improvement in the mandate and the co-operation of a continually growing number of non-member countries in the work of the Ad hoc Committee, a better assurance of large-scale accession to the future convention.

Belgium, which attaches absolute priority to the negotiations on chemical weapons, is aware of the number of important problems still to be settled, such as various aspects of verification, the composition and powers of the Executive Council, the measures to be considered after violations have been detected, the order of destruction, some of the final clauses and co-operation. As we embark on consideration of these problems, and also during the finalization of other parts of the convention, we must draw a



(Mr. Houlliez, Belgium)

distinction between substantive problems which can be solved only by means of policy decisions often involving compromises between two different overall approaches (for example multilateralism and bilateralism) and technical details which are of undoubted importance but could be resolved by the preparatory committee or elaborated upon after the convention enters into force. My delegation is afraid that an over-technical approach involving the creation of too many study groups will confirm the risk of concentrating too much time and effort on non-essential aspects. We must also bear in mind that the prime aim of our negotiations is to produce a convention laying down a complete and universal ban on chemical weapons once and for all. This objective has a vertical dimension, namely, the destruction of all chemical weapon stocks belonging to a given State, and the destruction of its CW production facilities, and also a horizontal dimension, namely, the universal nature of the effective, complete and verifiable renunciation of chemical weapons. Belgium believes that we should be able to expect that both dimensions of this objective will be achieved.

For Belgium it is essential for States to state unequivocally their commitment to renounce chemical weapons completely within the context of the future treaty which will provide the legal framework for this commitment. We have always been aware that this treaty would achieve its objective in all its dimensions only if the international community, by acceding to it in large numbers, demonstrates its joint resolve to prove that nothing can any longer justify the maintenance of the CW option. The final aim of our work is not so much to conclude a treaty as to provide ourselves with an effective legal instrument which has every chance of leading us towards the effective, complete and verifiable renunciation of chemical weapons. To achieve this aim, three crucial stages have to be traversed successfully: the conclusion of the treaty, its opening for signature and ratification by all States, which will be the gauge of its universality, and the expiry of the transitional period when the aim of the treaty will have to be achieved in both the vertical and the horizontal dimensions.

In this Conference we are concentrating on the first of these stages in order to ensure, to the greatest extent possible, that the subsequent stages are successfully negotiated. When working on the text of the convention, our Conference must also be aware of the need to reconcile a system which provides as many guarantees of compliance as possible, so as to build confidence, and operation at a reasonable cost, which will enable all countries, great or small, to participate on an equal footing. The verification system has to be sufficiently close-knit to discourage any inclination to violate the provisions by the risk of being caught out in prohibited activities, but it would be too much to seek absolute guarantees. If the risks of violation are greater for chemical weapons because of the many facilities which can produce them and the problems of detecting them, as compared with nuclear weapons, we must also be sufficiently realistic to acknowledge that the numbers of victims in a nuclear conflict would be much higher. We therefore find it illogical to provide for verification systems - and I am thinking in particular of ad hoc inspections of undeclared facilities - whose cost might represent 10 or more times the budget of the IAEA inspection operation, that is to say about \$25 million per year. Finally, I would like to say that we should pursue our efforts on chemical weapons with the aim of concluding a convention providing for a total ban in the near future because, as several colleagues



(Mr. Houlliez, Belgium)

have already stressed, time is not on our side. This means that any other measure, even if it is effective in present circumstances, cannot replace a convention drawn up by 40 countries which represent the whole world in its geographical and political dimensions.

With the happy prospect of a convention taking shape in the fairly near future, I wish to confirm that Belgium remains ready to host the headquarters of the organization.



(Mr. Rasaputram, Sri Lanka)

... There is a widely shared optimism that a convention banning chemical weapons is within reach. The energetic and imaginative leadership of Ambassador Morel last year made noteworthy contributions to pave the way towards that goal. We are confident that under the able and dynamic leadership of Ambassador Hyltenius, the Ad hoc Committee will take decisive steps towards completing this task.

My delegation shares the view that most of the technical infrastructure of the convention is in place. Very useful work done last year on the annex on chemicals, the protocol on inspection procedures and the thorough and practical work on instrumentation has greatly contributed to this accomplishment. We are particularly pleased with the work on instrumentation ably chaired by the Finnish delegation. The outcome of this work indicated that the complex verification requirements of the convention could be expected to be met by the technological means available. We appreciate the initiative taken by Australia in bringing together private sector chemical industry and government representatives. It seems to us however that if we are to maintain the momentum generated by the Paris and Canberra conferences we have to take decisive steps towards completing the task without dampening the enthusiasm that has been aroused. The time has now come to address remaining issues in a political perspective with a view to arriving at speedy and lasting decisions through compromise, consultation and consensus. Ambassador Morel's cogent observations at the end of the Ad hoc Committee's session last year are still valid: "Our time is not infinite, and ... the convention now being finalized will produce practical results only if it is universal in its application." Technical competence alone will not facilitate the early conclusion of the convention.

We are inclined to believe that a time frame for the conclusion of the convention could now be considered as a via media for seeking solutions to remaining issues. The questions relating to scope, the composition and decision-making of the Executive Council, challenge inspection, assistance, the order of destruction, economic and technological development and the convention's relationship to the 1925 Geneva Protocol are issues which require political decisions in a spirit of compromise, bearing in mind the realities of desired universality. One could argue that these issues are politically interrelated in a manner that perhaps requires solutions in a package form during the terminal phase of negotiations. We therefore believe that a sense of timing should be infused into our negotiations in order to provide a proper framework for compromises. These efforts can take place parallel to the technical work that still has to be done in the working groups of the Ad hoc Committee. What must be avoided however is loss of focus in technical discussions risking reopening of the areas of agreement and convergence. The energetic efforts deployed by Ambassador Hyltenius to meet these challenges with a sense of realism give us hope and optimism.



(Mr. Rasaputram, Sri Lanka)

The key to the success of the future convention on chemical weapons will be its appeal to universal adherence. The other day the Group of 21 made unequivocally clear its commitment to a non-discriminatory convention embodying a comprehensive ban on the entire chemical weapons cycle. With the political authority flowing from the Paris consensus, such a convention can and should command universal adherence on its own merits. My delegation believes that universal adherence could best be ensured not by tactical means but by making the convention attractive to all countries in terms of their security and related economic and political considerations. Compromises on remaining issues, we believe, are possible in a way that would promote this objective by preserving the multilateral character of this instrument in its broadest sense. It is therefore necessary now to make a renewed effort to tackle the outstanding political issues with a view to taking a decision. Any deflection of the time available to matters of which some could best be handled by a preparatory commission could only lead to a diffusion of focus and loss of momentum. My delegation therefore hopes that such a situation will be avoided and decisive steps will be taken towards the final phase of our negotiations.

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(Mr. Kamal, Pakistan)

... Even though we are concentrating all our energies on the early conclusion of a chemical weapons convention, a goal in which my delegation is duly participating, we cannot ignore the fact that the question of a nuclear test ban remains the most pressing item on our agenda. This is a reflection, in the first place, of the primary importance which the cessation of nuclear testing occupies within the process of nuclear disarmament, and secondly, of our failure to achieve a comprehensive test ban, despite years of discussion and debate in a variety of international forums. No other question in the field of disarmament, it has been rightly said, has been the subject of so much study and discussion. And yet the prospects of a comprehensive test-ban treaty appear today to be as bleak as they were in 1962.



(Mr. Donowaki, Japan)

... The chemical weapons convention, after so many years' hard work in this forum, is approaching completion, and Japan takes the strong view that this year should indeed become a critical year in settling remaining major substantive issues for negotiation, as was declared at the Canberra Conference last September.

When we reflect upon various factors which may have led us to the present fairly successful outlook, it should be noted that the sound progress of our negotiations owes much to the two successful meetings held to promote a total ban on chemical weapons, in Paris and Canberra. We should also pay due regard to the bold steps taken by the United States and the USSR in declaring their chemical weapons stocks, accepting the principle of on-site intrusive inspections as a means of verification, and, most recently, announcing their readiness to destroy the bulk of their stocks down to equal low levels, pending the adoption of the international convention. An agreement to this effect is expected to be signed at the United States-Soviet summit meeting in June this year.

My delegation also supports the strong appeal made by the United States to all CW-capable States to follow the United States and the USSR in declaring basic data concerning their CW stocks as early as possible, because by so doing in the spirit of more transparency and mutual confidence-building we should be able to better secure the universality and success of the CW convention.

The chemical weapons convention, which might not have been achievable if we still lived in the days of East-West confrontation at its darker stage, may well turn out to be the first significant multilateral convention of the new

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(Mr. Donowaki, Japan)

decade, which may belong to a new era, and our Conference on Disarmament may establish its position as a forum which, after a long period of inability to carry out its tasks, is now being activated to serve the requirements of the new times.

Allow me to make a few more observations on this very important negotiation we are engaged in as a matter of highest priority at this moment. Japan believes that it is time for us now to pay more attention to tackling the key issues of a political nature, renewing our political commitment to the elimination of chemical weapons. Then, for the remaining technical questions, active participation by experts from industrial and academic circles will serve as a lever for acceleration of the negotiation.

As one of the major chemical industry nations, Japan wishes to reiterate the importance of the verification régime with respect to non-production of chemical weapons. The verification of destruction may be over in 10 years after the entry into force of the convention, but the verification of non-production will last indefinitely and affect a far greater number of States. In this field, we are trying to create a truly epoch-making mechanism which may serve as a model for future disarmament conventions. In working out a verification régime for non-production, we will have to respond to the need to ensure the fulfilment of the purposes of this convention, and at the same time the requirement of keeping the cost of verification down to a reasonably low level. In order to work out such a régime of verification that would be reasonably effective and reliable, it is extremely important to try to have a fairly accurate picture of the chemical industry situation prior to the conclusion of this convention. From this point of view, Japan hopes that under the recently proposed system of "technical support" for the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, a data base on the chemical industry will be worked out as one of its activities. About one week ago, Japan presented the Ad hoc Committee with data on its chemical industry, and hopes that this will contribute to the deliberations by the Committee on such problems as the cost of verification, annexes to article VI, production thresholds and so forth.

Furthermore, my delegation wishes to reaffirm Japan's hope that its technologies might make some contributions to the resolution of difficult problems related to the CW convention, such as that of effective verification. As an example of such efforts, my delegation wishes to draw the attention of the Conference to the United States-Japanese agreement reached in Washington on 7 March under which the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute will work together in an experiment to test the reliability of remotely monitored sensors which operate unattended for long periods of time.

Now I should like to address myself to another important subject of my intervention today. Many questions are asked as to the adequacy of the Conference on Disarmament in adapting itself to the requirements of the new times. As I suggested at the beginning of my speech, it may well be that the recent encouraging developments in the East-West relationship have made it



(Mr. Donowaki, Japan)

possible for the Conference to achieve major breakthroughs in the CW negotiations. In that case, we should try hard to achieve other breakthroughs in other long-standing issues before the Conference, thus turning this forum into a real working body serving the requirements of the new times.

Of course, what I have in mind are the issues of nuclear disarmament. Our colleague from Peru, Ambassador de Rivero, was so right in his speech on 15 February at this plenary session in pointing out that the reactivation of the ad hoc committee on the cessation of nuclear tests would "give the work of the Conference political symmetry". With respect to both nuclear and chemical weapons the two super-Powers are the largest possessors, and their reduction and ultimate elimination, as well as non-proliferation, are matters of great importance today not only to the two super-Powers but also to the entire world community. Thus, multilateral negotiations are closely linked to bilateral negotiations. Furthermore, as in the case of chemical weapons, advance in the dialogue and a co-operative relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union in recent years have made it possible to achieve significant breakthroughs in their bilateral talks in the field of nuclear disarmament. Japan whole-heartedly welcomes these developments, and is convinced that they are bound to be reflected in multilateral negotiations here in this forum.

Mr. NEGROTTO CAMBIASO (Italy) (translated from French):

... None of you, I believe, will be surprised if my first statement is entirely devoted to the negotiations for the total and universal prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons. Many speakers have already stressed their central role in the present context of our work; and you are all, I think, familiar with Italy's commitment in this area, at the political level - I would say - first of all, here and elsewhere, in constantly repeating opportune et importune, as St. Paul would say, our conviction of the importance and urgency of the problem. We are now entering a phase of the negotiations which we all consider to be the final stage, while divergences remain among us concerning the consideration of the time factor and questions requiring prior solution.

In numerous statements made by eminent colleagues who have long been participating in these negotiations, it has been maintained that we are involved in a way in a race against time. I fully subscribe to this statement. If we are not able to speed up the pace of our deliberations, we will face the risk of a growing dyscrasia between the evolution of the real situation and the ideal point towards which our debates are converging.



(Mr. Negrotto Cambiasco, Italy)

The present situation in fact is one of real discrimination. Theoretically, today we have reached the high point of discrimination. Italy does not possess chemical weapons and does not know how many other countries, aside from the United States and the Soviet Union, have such weapons at present. The convention represents the only means of achieving a progressive reduction of the anomalies until they are eliminated. Hence what is discriminatory, as we see it, is not the convention but rather its absence. For this reason Italy, which rejects this horrible category of weapons at the conceptual and at the political level, also feels the need for the rapid finalization of the convention, as an imperative that stems from its own perception of security: a convention which will free the Earth of all chemical weapons within 10 years after it enters into force; which, through effective surveillance, will prevent any covert production; and which, at the same time, inter alia as a result of appropriate co-operation measures, will make this attractive and acceptable to all.

Today emphasis is rightly placed, in all disarmament sectors, on the increasing importance of measures for building confidence. This has been and is still being discussed a great deal, and not without tangible successes, in the European negotiations. Consequently we wonder whether even in the CW negotiations, aside from the essential question of verification, the individuation of common ground in the area of assistance and technical co-operation might not constitute per se an important element of confidence-building and an additional encouragement to become a party. I have already referred to our perception of the convention as being the only means for reaching a more pacificatory situation. In this respect the question of assistance seems to us to be of special political importance, in the transitional period but also beyond.

Challenge inspections are, in Italy's view, the confidence-building measure par excellence. Intensive efforts have been made to uphold the merits of a purely bilateral, or alternatively a purely multilateral approach, in a debate which seems to be heading towards more balanced consideration of this dilemma, in which the two aspects are merged one into the other in a relationship of complementarity. Indeed, the very originality of this treaty lies in a balanced combination of bilateral and multilateral elements. Thus while the starting-point of challenge verification falls essentially, within the bilateral sphere, subsequent intervention by the multilateral organization implies inevitably, as my delegation sees it, that the final evaluation of the possible existence of a violation, as well as any decisions resulting from that evaluation, would fall to the body whose task will be to ensure that the convention is observed.

I would now like to express a few ideas concerning the problem of universality. This is a question which goes beyond a confidence-building measure, of which it is in a way the prerequisite. I do not think anyone would deny that the convention must be universally accepted if we hope that at the end of the transitional period chemical weapons will truly be eliminated from the Earth. Differences remain, however, concerning the most effective means of reaching that point. In this respect we deem it important not to forget the diversity of perceptions of security which exist in different countries, which sometimes face specific difficult situations. Thus in the present phase



(Mr. Negrotto Cambiasco, Italy)

of major change and movement on the international scene, the regional dimension may be seen as a more and more independent variable as compared to the bipolar order, where security perceptions at the national level may influence analyses and cause security requirements to be overestimated.

Italy is ready to accede to the convention immediately when the time comes, within the desirable context of co-ordinated accession by a number of countries. Italy is also willing, through the strong relations of co-operation which it maintains with the countries of its own region, to continue exchanges of view on the problem of universality with all the countries sharing its concerns and interests.

In a Europe which is no longer squeezed between walls and curtains, a process is emerging which - as the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs said in Vienna - could bring about the rediscovery of a civilization where we are ultimately "enemyless". The conclusion of our negotiations on chemical weapons would not only produce the most ambitious result ever achieved within a multilateral disarmament system, but could also become a driving element for subsequent achievements, perhaps within the context of an updated role for the Conference on Disarmament. We have to seize the momentum, as our English-speaking friends say, borrowing from Latin the idea of a period of time which is never complete - and certain events in the last few days are here to remind us of this truth. In the final analysis, these are encouraging signs which must be consolidated. But hope cannot be the monopoly of one continent or of a few countries, however important they may be. This is why we greatly appreciate the efforts which are being made towards the strengthening of all aspects of the future convention, even if it is not always easy for us fully to understand the need, at this stage, to get bogged down in prolonged debates on aspects which are essentially technical or of a drafting nature, or in conceptual disputes which run the risk of turning us away from what is essential. On technical aspects, in particular, we too are convinced that they could usefully be entrusted to a specific mechanism of the type proposed by the Australian delegation on behalf of the Western group: its very *raison d'être* is to speed up the pace of the negotiations. Likewise, we are in a position to confirm our full agreement on sending certain problems to the Preparatory Commission, or to a phase following the finalization of the convention, in the framework of the decision-making powers of the future organization.

The complexity of the problems of substance which still await solution should certainly not be underestimated; we have them all well in mind. Nevertheless we believe that it is possible to tackle the substance directly, under an overall approach which goes beyond excessive attention to specifics, without invoking an insufficient level of readiness or the need for a prior solution to other related technical aspects. Consequently, we appreciated the initiative taken by the Chairman of the Committee, Ambassador Hyltenius, designed to encourage a parallel and more general process of reflection, which, by freeing us from the grip of routine and our set roles, will force us to show our full hands.

Lastly, I would like to express Italy's appreciation for the efforts undertaken by the American and Soviet delegations. We are counting on them, and we are awaiting further progress, which could also contribute to the



(Mr. Negrotto Cambiasco, Italy)

accomplishment of our work. The Italian delegation is inspired by the speed and the concrete nature of the bilateral CW negotiations. They benefit from the existence of a political deadline, but also from a different structuring of meetings, similar to that which was adopted in Vienna. We wonder whether we could not try to do the same ourselves, beginning with the chemical weapons negotiations. Shorter sessions would enable us to cope better with the requirements of such complex negotiations. I will simply add that my country would be willing to consider the adoption of a division of work into four annual sessions, within as short a period of time as possible.

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Mr. BENHIMA (Morocco) (translated from French):

... The Conference's resolute involvement in the elaboration of a convention on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons proves that this objective is within our reach. It is encouraging to note the substantial progress made last year on certain fundamental issues relating to the future convention. In this context I would like to pay tribute to the excellent work done by the Ad hoc Committee under the skilful and dynamic chairmanship of Ambassador Pierre Morel. I hope that under the competent guidance of

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(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)

Ambassador Hyltenius the Ad hoc Committee will achieve a breakthrough which will clear the way for further progress. The consensus reached at the Paris Conference, the Canberra declaration and General Assembly resolution 44/115A are all calls to the Conference to step up its work.

The current intensification of the negotiations, particularly in the light of the progress made in the bilateral American-Soviet talks, should allow a substantial reduction in points of divergence - we hope it will - and bring us closer to the finalization of the convention. In this context, my delegation shares the view that the keystone of the future convention should be an adequate system to verify compliance with the obligations arising from the treaty. Only a rigorous verification system can create confidence amongst the States parties. The proliferation of procedures which are at present being studied seems to us to be a positive factor, because it proves that effective verification is within our grasp since it is the expression of unanimity. To this end, we consider it essential to provide the inspection machinery with adequate resources so that it can carry out its mission properly. This machinery will have to have the necessary powers to enable it to make a judgement concerning compliance with the norms of the convention and the inspection reports submitted to it. An atmosphere of trust and co-operation should govern the conduct and implementation of this operation. The team responsible for the inspection should benefit from understanding and assistance on the part of the national authorities of the country being visited.

The scope of the future convention is also an issue of great importance, making it possible to gauge the extent of our commitments and give them appropriate content in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations, and particularly the Final Document of 1978. Our task is to proceed to the elimination of the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their destruction, it being understood that the essential goal is the absolute prohibition of their use. On this latter aspect of the scope of the convention, my delegation, like all the members of the Group of 21, regrets the lack of consensus on the inclusion of the question of banning the use of chemical weapons in the mandate of the Ad hoc Committee. Since these elements represent the very reason why the convention exists, it goes without saying that its legal régime should be developed in such a way as to ensure that these postulates do not suffer from any exceptions. We must certainly set up flexible machinery which could help the parties to reach agreement on the entire text of the convention but that should in no way furnish a means by which the obligations entered into by all the parties could be weakened. It is just as necessary to arrive at unanimously agreed measures intended to deal with any situation which is not in accordance with the fundamental provisions of the treaty.

The realization of the international community's wish to produce a finalized chemical weapons treaty is above all a question of political will. This will is vital to ensure agreement by all concerned, particularly for achieving universality, a fundamental characteristic of this instrument without which our efforts would be in danger of being incomplete. The same political will should govern the search for consensus on the subject of the composition of the bodies responsible for monitoring the application of the



(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)

Treaty, particularly the Executive Council. The process of sketching out a number of criteria for the appointment of the future members of this Council should be pursued in the same spirit as last year in order to bring the different positions closer together. The main bodies of the future Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons should have the necessary power to do their job properly. These bodies, the product of the will of the international community, should take account of the aspirations of all the parties in a balanced and non-discriminatory way. This is a necessary condition to guarantee technological co-operation among the States parties and free access for all to the purely civilian applications of the chemical industry.

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Ms. SINEGIORGIS (Ethiopia):

... The decade of the 1980s which has just ended was a decade during which the international community showed particular concern over the spiralling arms race and exerted considerable efforts to achieve concrete disarmament measures. It is to be recalled that two United Nations special sessions devoted to disarmament, and a Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, were held between 1982 and 1988. At the close of the decade two other important conferences that dealt with chemical weapons were convened - the Paris Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and Other Interested States and the Canberra Government-Industry Conference against Chemical Weapons.

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(Ms. Sinigiorgis, Ethiopia)

... It is indeed encouraging that during the last few years steps have been taken by countries both at the bilateral and at the multilateral level in such areas as the reduction of conventional armed forces, the restructuring of military forces and other related confidence-building and security-building measures. More particularly, it is gratifying to note that the two super-Powers, having concluded the INF Treaty in 1987, are currently making progress in their negotiations on 50 per cent reductions in their strategic nuclear arms, and towards the banning of chemical weapons.



(Ms. Sinegiorgis, Ethiopia)

Regarding the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, we welcome the important progress made during the previous year under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Pierre Morel of France, whose dynamic and effective guidance has contributed substantially in laying a firm foundation for the convention. We are also confident that the Ad hoc Committee will achieve yet further results this year under the competent and energetic chairmanship of Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden.

The delegation of Ethiopia is satisfied that the mandate of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has been considerably improved this year by the agreement reached to include final drafting of the convention. This is a clear reflection of the fact that we have actually reached the stage where we are in a position to come up with one effective, global and verifiable CW convention. No doubt there are still some outstanding problems to be dealt with. But seen against the backdrop of the work done so far, we are of the view that by setting a time frame, we can face the challenge of resolving the remaining issues and conclude the convention at an early date. We also share the prevailing general optimism that a convention on chemical weapons is now within sight.

(Ms. Sinegiorgis, Ethiopia)

As His Excellency Ambassador Stülpnagel said in his statement to the CD on 8 March 1990, "there is no reason why we should not set ourselves equally ambitious goals for the conclusion of the chemical weapons convention. Otherwise we risk being the last to change in a world of change, or those who did not change in time". We concur with this assertion; and in our view, at present the remaining issues are more of a political than a technical nature and as such, in order to conclude the convention what is most required is a firm political will, which we hope will be adequately manifested.

... I need not remind this negotiating body that a lot is expected from us by the international community. Our achievements are bound to be measured against those lofty expectations. No doubt, a simple stock-taking of our work would clearly reveal that we have no reason to be proud except for the chemical weapons negotiations which are nearing their final stage. Unfortunately, however, even the progress we are witnessing in the chemical weapons negotiations still falls far short of our expectations due to lack of sufficient political will. In the light of the present conducive international atmosphere, which in the view of the Ethiopian delegation is indeed a unique period in contemporary history, we would be judged severely if this opportune moment were to slip by without meeting the challenges posed by mankind's quest to free the world from the threat of all weapons of mass destruction, and in particular the threat of a nuclear holocaust.



(Mr. Bondevik, Norway)

... This session of the Conference on Disarmament is particularly focused on the negotiations on a chemical weapons convention. We should now be ready to fulfil our commitment from last year's Paris Conference to intensify negotiations with a view to finalizing a global, comprehensive and effectively verifiable ban on chemical weapons at the earliest date.

The revised and improved mandate of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons permits the Conference to include the final drafting of the convention in the work of this session. It should now be possible to solve the remaining technical and political issues, and make 1990 a decisive year for the convention.

We fully recognize, however, that important, sensitive and complex issues have yet to be solved. The system of verification of non-production is one such issue. The Conference will have to find verification measures for plants producing dual-purpose chemicals which are not part of the regular routine inspection system. The national trial inspections have provided a great deal of valuable experience and information, which has been useful both for the negotiations and for the national authorities and industries involved in this work.

I am pleased to be able to report to this forum that Norway conducted its first national trial inspection in February of this year. The facility inspected was an organic chemical production plant producing a commercial product by application of a schedule 3 chemical. The inspection showed that it was possible to verify that the schedule 3 chemical was used in legitimate production, and that the flow of the schedule 3 chemical could be easily followed as well as accounted for. A report to the Conference about this inspection and our experience with it is under preparation and will be presented to the Conference before the end of the first part of the 1990 session.

The United States and the Soviet Union have declared that they possess chemical weapons. It is of paramount importance to the negotiations that all countries possessing such weapons make similar declarations and draw up plans for their destruction. All chemical-weapon States should furnish information about the location, composition and size of their stocks. This is not only important as a confidence-building measure, but must also be considered a prerequisite for universal adherence to the convention. Likewise all countries not possessing chemical weapons should make declarations to that effect. Norway has no chemical weapons and we have firmly stated that such weapons will not be stationed on Norwegian territory.



(Mr. Bondevik, Norway)

The progress in the bilateral consultations on chemical weapons between the Soviet Union and the United States is, of course, of great significance to progress in the multilateral negotiations. These two countries have a particular responsibility to contribute to a convention that would be accepted by the entire world community.

Norway continues her research programme on verification of alleged use of chemical weapons, carried out by the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment. The programme is based on field experiments designed for such verification. Another research report will be submitted this summer. In this connection, I would like to express my support for those who advocate that a complete prohibition of use of chemical weapons must be given a proper place in the convention.

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(Mr. Fernández Ordóñez, Spain)

... There is a non-proliferation issue which gives cause for concern: the proliferation of ballistic missiles with not only a conventional or chemical capability but also a nuclear capability. Spain is a party to the missile technology control régime and we hope that all countries with a technological capability in this area - not only European countries, but those belonging to any continent - will also join. I think that today, in the light of certain news items we have been reading about in the newspapers in the last few days and of which we have direct knowledge, we have reasons to be very concerned about the possible use of this kind of missile in regional conflicts, so that it is worthwhile to reiterate with the greatest vigour the appeal for the universal adoption of measures in this area of missile proliferation.

... I have left until the end of my address any mention of the serious problem of chemical weapons. I have pointed out in various international forums, and I wish to reaffirm here, that Spain gives absolute priority to the search for a solution that will make possible the world-wide eradication of these particularly hateful weapons. Spain does not produce such weapons,



(Mr. Fernández Ordóñez, Spain)

Spain does not possess such weapons, and we consider it a matter of the greatest urgency to conclude the multilateral convention to ban their production, development, use or storage. Spain is aware of the difficulties involved in verification, but this difficulty should not serve as an excuse to delay a universal agreement. On the contrary, it should be an incentive so that all States make the necessary efforts. This urgency is underscored by the recent use of this kind of weapon in certain conflicts, and I would like to add in talking about verification that the intrusive nature of the verification machinery that will have to be incorporated into the convention should in no way be perceived by the chemical industries or by certain countries as institutionalizing interference in matters of industrial secrecy or interference in the development of chemical industry for peaceful or beneficial purposes. It is simply a question of accepting certain measures that provide the international community as a whole with an assurance that the horrors of chemical warfare have been eradicated. In this context, my Government welcomes the progress made in the bilateral talks between the United States and the Soviet Union, although this agreement is not sufficient because of course it is limited exclusively to the bilateral level. Spain believes it is necessary to continue to pursue the policy of non-proliferation of chemical precursors. We favour this complementary policy of non-proliferation, which is another way of achieving the ultimate goal of eliminating this threat. Spain considers that the multilateral convention on chemical weapons is not only a desirable goal but an imperative, and consequently it welcomes the national initiatives presented in this body in the form of declarations of non-possession or non-production, reports on national trial inspections or reports on the future composition and structure of national authorities. In this context I wish to announce the intention of the Spanish Government to make similar contributions in this forum, so as to add our efforts to those already being made in this Conference.



(Mr. Pagac, Czechoslovakia)

... Turning to the work of the Conference on Disarmament, I would like to stress two areas in which my country has traditionally been involved. These priorities for us are the nuclear test ban and the chemical weapons convention. My delegation appreciates all activities which can contribute to the cessation of nuclear weapon testing. We highly esteem the tireless efforts of Ambassador Donowaki to reach consensus on a drafting mandate for an ad hoc committee on item 1 of the agenda based upon the Czechoslovak proposal, the "Vejvoda text" (CD/863).

... When we resumed our negotiations on the convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons, we did so under the favourable impact of the Paris and Canberra conferences, and, moreover, in the light of the bilateral talks between the Soviet Union and the United States. Under the chairmanship of Ambassador Morel the intensity of work was increased, and with the active assistance of technical and legal experts we have achieved important results in elaborating the "rolling" text. We are convinced that under the skilled guidance of Ambassador Hyltenius the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons will proceed successfully to the final drafting of the convention.

Czechoslovakia has consistently adhered to the principles and purposes of the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, which was signed as long ago as 1925. In this context, Czechoslovakia welcomed the

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(Mr. Pagac, Czechoslovakia)

conclusion last year of the work of the expert group of the United Nations Secretary-General that prepared technical guidelines and procedures for the timely and efficient investigation of reports of the possible use of chemical, bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons.

In reply to the request made in resolution 44/115 B, Czechoslovakia informed the Secretary-General of the United Nations that it is ready to provide 2 consultants, 15 qualified experts and 5 laboratories for examination and analyses in the event of an investigation of reports of the possible use of chemical or biological weapons. The experts selected are highly qualified in the fields of analytical and organic chemistry, biochemistry, biology, virology and toxicology. They are prepared to take steps to solve the problem of the use of chemical or biological weapons, including assistance. On the instructions of my Government I have asked the secretariat of the Conference to distribute the aforementioned list as a CD document (CD/980), which is now being circulated.

Czechoslovakia believes that the list of experts and laboratories may be of interest to the Conference on Disarmament, since it is ready to involve both these experts and the laboratories in implementing the future convention and in particular in the work of the organs of the future Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Moreover, presentation of these data by a number of countries may result in more contacts between scientists, which will promote an extensive exchange of views, scientific publications or scientists themselves. Consequently, more effective measures not only against chemical weapons but also against highly toxic substances in general, including protection of the environment, could be discussed.

We believe that it may be a useful contribution to our deliberations here in the Conference to release information on chemicals and facilities relevant to the future chemical weapons convention. Therefore, Czechoslovakia will continue to present data on its chemical industry as it did for the first time in document CD/949.



(Mr. Sharma, India)

... We firmly believe that the time has come for the international community to engage in collective introspection on our present predicament. Serious consideration needs to be given to the attitudes, policies, doctrines, institutions and instruments required for a nuclear-weapon-free world, which it is in our hands to realize. In particular, the misplaced faith in the relevance of nuclear weapons for keeping peace and enhancing security needs to be speedily discarded. An air of cautious optimism and hope is all that we can allow ourselves at this stage. The recent signs of a turning-point that we have perceived are vulnerable. These cannot be nurtured in a world order based on any form of domination or divisiveness, whether political, economic or military. At SSOD-III, India proposed the outline of a nuclear-weapon-free and peaceful world order in the form of an action plan, which called upon the international community to negotiate a binding commitment to general and complete disarmament under effective international control. While nuclear disarmament constitutes the central motif in each stage of the plan, it is supported by collateral and other measures to further the process in a comprehensive manner that would enhance global security. It includes proposals for banning chemical weapons and other weapons of mass destruction,

(Mr. Sharma, India)

bringing to a halt and reversing the arms race, using scientific and technological developments for the benefit of mankind and reducing conventional arms and armed forces to the minimum levels required for defence purposes, and sets out principles for the conduct of international relations in a world free of nuclear weapons. The action plan has been tabled in the Conference on Disarmament as CD/859 of 15 August 1988. We believe that the action plan will always be relevant in a world which seeks an alternative structure of inter-State relations.



(Mr. Sharma, India)

... The stagnation in the process of negotiations on the agenda items mentioned above is not due to inherent faults in the Conference on Disarmament, which is an institution of our times and subject to the policies of the Governments that make up the CD. If the CD has not lived up to the hopes that accompanied its birth, it is largely a reflection of our individual and collective failings. On the positive side of our efforts, we have the negotiations towards a chemical weapons convention. We are happy to note that the efforts of Ambassador Morel of France, as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons last year, are being matched this year by his able successor, Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden, as we move forward towards a convention. We welcome the bilateral agreement between the United States and the USSR on the destruction of their CW stocks and CW production facilities, which has undoubtedly given impetus to our work in the CD.

Our common aim is the conclusion of a comprehensive and effectively verifiable convention which ensures that all existing chemical weapons stocks and chemical weapons production facilities are eliminated and that further development, production, acquisition, transfer and use of these weapons is prohibited. If we want a convention that will attract universal adherence, it should be non-discriminatory and should provide for equal rights and obligations for all States, whether or not they possess chemical weapons and whether or not they have a large chemical industry. The convention should ensure the unimpeded right of States parties to develop, produce, use, exchange and transfer chemicals and technology for peaceful purposes and should not hinder or impede international co-operation in peaceful areas of chemical industry development. If the proposed convention is to build on the 1925 Geneva Protocol, it should be able to abrogate the "right" to retaliatory or second use of chemical weapons as long as these weapons exist after the entry into force of the convention, i.e., during the 10-year destruction period. Otherwise, we would be left, during this period, with a fragile and inefficient system which would undermine the possibility of attracting universal adherence to the convention. The provisions of article X, on assistance, should be adequate to deter any possible aggressor against a State party to the convention. Adherence to an international agreement cannot be forced. But it can be urged by demonstrating the advantages of the system of collective security offered by disarmament.

(continued)



(Mr. Sharma, India)

Similarly, article XI on economic and technological development should ensure that no arbitrary restrictions or export controls are imposed against another State party once the treaty is in place with its attendant verification system. The significance of the CW convention lies as much in the world community successfully abolishing an abhorrent class of weapons as in the successful example it would create of the universal approach which should characterize other deliberations of the Conference. We still believe, as we suggested earlier, that the Conference on Disarmament should take advantage of the political momentum by setting itself a deadline to conclude its negotiations on a chemical weapons convention.

(Mr. Al-Ketal, Iraq)

... Since the Paris Conference on chemical weapons, our Conference has continued its discussions on the total prohibition of these weapons and the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles. During this period, several conferences and symposia have been held on this subject in various regions of the world, including the Canberra Conference held in September 1989. No observer at these conferences would have any difficulty in acknowledging the following facts which have characterized international efforts in this field. Firstly, the Paris Conference greatly furthered international efforts, and the efforts of the Conference on Disarmament in particular, to draft an international treaty totally prohibiting the production and utilization of chemical weapons. However, the slow progress of negotiations and the persistence of obstacles and numerous problems that are as yet unresolved have diminished the momentum engendered by the Paris Conference. Secondly, the Conference on Disarmament achieved limited progress in negotiations last year, given the fact that many issues and problems were raised in regard to various aspects of the draft international convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Moreover, some countries participating in the negotiations attached more importance to the non-proliferation of chemical weapons than to the elimination of the weapons which they already possess. Some countries have opted for a policy of placing greater constraints on the transfer of various products and technologies to prevent their use in the production of chemical weapons. Such measures not only violate the incontrovertible right of countries to acquire the technology and materials needed for development; they also constitute a violation of the Paris Declaration on chemical weapons, a declaration which was drafted by those countries themselves. Thirdly, since the signing of the INF Treaty between the United States and the USSR, the nuclear-weapon States have adopted no practical measure for the control of nuclear weapons, or for the complete prohibition of nuclear weapon tests - despite the appreciable improvements that have occurred in East/West relations and the fundamental changes that have taken place in recent months in Europe.

Our presence in this Conference stems from our desire to participate seriously in all international efforts in the field of disarmament in accordance with the concepts and principles that I outlined at the beginning of my statement. However, we will not agree to become a party to any effort aimed at making negotiations on chemical weapons a pretext to prevent



(Mr. Al-Ketal, Iraq)

developing countries from having access to chemical technology and products or to impede a transfer of technology in this area. Hence, we call upon the Conference on Disarmament to adopt a clearly defined position on the transfer of technology, products and information, and to refuse to allow its efforts to be exploited for the purpose of impeding development in the developing countries.

With regard to the convention on chemical weapons, I have some comments to make. The convention must be drafted in such a way as to make it universally acceptable. The crucial issues in this connection include the legitimate, actual needs of the developing countries, and primarily security guarantees against the use or threatened use of nuclear weapons. The convention will be widely supported if it contains a binding commitment on the part of the nuclear-weapon States to take nuclear disarmament measures as a corollary to chemical disarmament measures. They should also enter into a commitment not to resort to the use of nuclear weapons, along the lines of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 on the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons and toxic gases. In this connection, we would like to express our satisfaction of the fact that our efforts have taken a step forward through the agreement to hold a Conference to review the partial test-ban Treaty in order to examine proposed amendments which we hope will convert this treaty eventually into a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. Our support for these measures does not signify premature optimism at the possibility of such a result, because that will depend on the attitudes adopted by the nuclear-weapon States during the review conference. The attitudes that these States have hitherto manifested do not make us particularly optimistic in this regard. In these negotiations, it would be particularly inadmissible for nuclear armament to remain isolated from the focal point of interest, thereby leaving this question in suspense and unresolved.



(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

... I shall now turn to the chemical weapons convention. At the outset, I wish to pay tribute to the efforts of the former Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Pierre Morel of France, and the five chairmen of the working groups, for their tireless efforts and their dedication to expediting the preparation of the draft convention. I also welcome the new Chairman, Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden, and wish him success in his task.

Since I last addressed the subject of chemical weapons in plenary in August 1989, many events have taken place, including the Canberra Government-Industry Conference against Chemical Weapons, the United States-USSR memorandum of understanding in Wyoming, the Ninth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, the forty-fourth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations and the Soviet-American joint statement of 10 February 1990. Yet a breakthrough towards a comprehensive convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons seems at present to be still beyond our reach. We recognize that a considerable degree of progress has been achieved.

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(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

We do, however, realize that we still have a long way to go to finalize the convention. This may be partially attributed to the fact that the 1989 session dealt mainly with "technical" issues. We understand very well the importance of resolving such technical aspects. In the course of the current session we hope meaningful progress can also be made on the political aspects of the draft convention.

Today, I wish to put before the Conference my delegation's reflections on some of these remaining questions.

An issue which attracts special attention, though from different standpoints, is that of the relation of the future convention on chemical weapons to other international agreements. It is our understanding that, in accordance with the general rules of international law and article 30 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the chemical weapons convention, being a subsequent legal instrument on the same subject-matter, prevails over any existing international agreement covering the same subject-matter from the moment of its entry into force. Our work would be undone if unilaterally declared "rights" under the 1925 Geneva Protocol were transferred and thereby somehow eternalized in a comprehensive chemical weapons convention. Such attempts should be resisted in order to establish a non-discriminatory convention that contains one single universally applicable legal régime.

My delegation has raised this issue in the past. We consider it a political and not a legal one. No resolution to this problem has materialized, and it seems appropriate to propose that concerned delegations should consult further on this matter. We do hope that Ambassador Hyltenius will be able to reach a successful conclusion on this topic in his consultations on undiminished security.

Amendments are another important issue. This is a substantive and not a procedural matter. It entails highly political and legal considerations. It is the manner by which the parties to an agreement may alter the fundamental obligations when the need arises. With this in mind, the provisions on amendments, regardless of their formulation, should under no circumstances provide for a discriminatory régime that would consequently materialize in dual or multiple legal undertakings. The general rules contained in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties may serve as guidelines in this respect.

A very important issue is that of sanctions. My delegation has been following closely the preliminary deliberations on this subject. The discussion over this question has clearly demonstrated the highly delicate political nature of the problem. It should be pointed out that the concept of sanctions is much wider than the incorporation of provisions on penal and punitive measures. We should strive for credible security guarantees. It is true that some of the material relevant to this subject is already scattered among the provisions of the draft convention. The end-product, however, should not be a weakened and fragmented edifice on the question of measures to redress situations of violation of and non-compliance with the convention. A clear-cut and credible provision should be expressly incorporated in a



(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

separate and individual provision, the details and specificities of which may be referred to in relevant provisions, as currently demonstrated in several draft articles. The issue of sanctions will be one of direct cross-reference and linkage between the future Organization and the Security Council, which is the organ vested with primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Confidentiality cannot be delinked from the issue of verification. We have not yet been able to solve the difficult equation of verification versus confidentiality. Trial inspections have had a role in demonstrating this fact. It is true that a degree of progress in the work on confidentiality and on the guidelines for inspections has been achieved. However, a comprehensive solution to this problem is not in sight. The solution to it should be in the view of my delegation well founded on the inviolability of proprietary rights and information.

Challenge inspections are dependent, in our view, on the outcome of the work on confidentiality. It is highly sensitive and political because it affects the national security of each State party to the convention. The true test of the success of this device hinges on ensuring that no abuses are committed.

On the organizational aspects of the convention, I wish to emphasize the role of the Executive Council. The size and decision-making mechanism should be determined on the basis of the limits of the functional requirements, that is to say, the rapidity of convening meetings and the ability to take timely decisions. All States parties to the Convention should have an opportunity to serve on the Council. My delegation, moreover, does not subscribe to any attempt to create permanent seats.

My delegation has studied attentively the proposal put forward by the Soviet Union and the United States on the "Principles and order of destruction of chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities". We subscribe to the view expressed in paragraph 2 (a), which stipulates that "Each State party should destroy all chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities ... beginning not later than 12 months, and finishing no later than 10 years, after the convention enters into force". We take it that such an obligation will not be subject to any reservation.

The Conference on Disarmament has been asked to take a decision on the creation of a new additional group in the context of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, to provide "Technical support for the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee". My delegation has studied this proposal. We appreciate the rationale behind it. However, we recognize the practical problems that lie ahead. One of these is the financial implications of this mechanism. The practical consequence of this is that the envisaged mechanism will result in a one-track dialogue of experts belonging to one group of States without due regard to equitable political and geographical distribution. Our preference is to channel all work through the subsidiary working groups of the Ad hoc Committee.



(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

Before concluding my remarks on this item, I wish to refer to the statement made by the Ambassador of Sri Lanka on 22 March when he pointed out that "it is ... necessary now to make a renewed effort to tackle the outstanding political issues with a view to taking a decision. Any deflection of the time available to matters of which some could best be handled by a preparatory commission could only lead to a diffusion of focus and loss of momentum". I believe that this point needs to be carefully considered by us.

Our aim is to conclude a convention which will be universally adhered to. One way of approaching this objective is to consider ways and means of involving all United Nations Members in the actual preparation of the convention at a certain stage. An open-ended preparatory commission to precede or follow a ministerial conference could positively contribute towards the universality that we all aspire to attain, and could serve as a useful tool in our quest to encourage universal adherence.

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Mr. GARCIA MORITAN (Argentina) (translated from Spanish):

... The Conference on Disarmament is the only negotiating forum for disarmament in which States from Africa, America, Asia, Europe and Oceania participate. This geographical representation confers on this body a unique character and gives it an advantage in concluding universal disarmament treaties which has not been fully utilized up to now. The negotiations on a comprehensive chemical weapons ban offer an example of the special characteristics of the Conference and show to what degree it is possible to advance multilaterally, even when sensitive and complex technical and political aspects are being dealt with, provided there is political will. This is particularly significant if we recall the context in which the structure of the convention began to develop. At that time the principal military Powers in the CW field, whether or not they were members of military alliances, maintained positions and views that originated in security perceptions stemming from a climate of confrontation. No doubt these circumstances affected the pace of work, but - and it is important to point this out - they did not prevent progress. It is, to some extent, understandable that the initial process was characterized by numerous precautions that left their mark on the negotiations. I wonder to what extent we should, today, continue to apply the same logic, and I can well imagine the queries that an inexperienced observer might raise on pausing to examine the text contained in document CD/961. As far as some aspects of the draft convention are concerned, it would seem that the fact that the convention is

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to be implemented in future decades, and that therefore it cannot be viewed on the basis of past perceptions, is totally forgotten. One gets this feeling mainly because certain propositions regarding security are maintained as though they were dogmas. It is as if we did not allow reality to shed its light in the Council Chamber. And of course these propositions give rise to an entire body of provisions whose complexity increases in a geometric proportion to the degree of confidence pursued.

In order to avoid the paradox of drawing up an instrument whose assumptions do not fit in with the international trends that make it feasible, perhaps we should make a major effort to place security for all on a footing more in keeping with the times. We could thus envisage the simplification of the complex and burdensome mechanisms and procedures stipulated in the convention. It is highly unlikely that there could be a more effective guarantee of confidence than the transparency brought about by an international climate characterized by rational negotiations, the generation of a network of industrial, technological and scientific interests and intense international co-operation. My delegation is convinced that we are moving towards that goal. For that reason we consider it essential to maintain the momentum of international efforts to ban chemical warfare.

Several major events in 1989 brought the subject to the forefront of international attention. The multilateral negotiations on a convention continued to add to the enormous amount of work carried out since 1984, to take the date of the first negotiating mandate. In that climate of increasing interaction and understanding, there were bilateral agreements and initiatives that gave renewed vigour to the process and highlighted in particular the will of the United States and the Soviet Union to move forward towards the objectives of the convention. Now, in the final stage, the starring role in our opinion ought to be, and can only be, played by the Conference on Disarmament. In 1990, we would like to see in this room the eminent persons that made 1989 such a special year in the field of chemical weapons.

It is only logical that each of us around this table tends to highlight different aspects of the draft convention. From the standpoint of a State such as my own that has never possessed chemical weapons and does not possess them now, the effectiveness of this instrument depends basically on its ability to create a system that does not jeopardize the ensemble of elements that make up its perception of security. For developing countries, this implies taking into account indivisible factors of a political, economic and technological nature.

In August 1987, the then Argentine representative at the Conference on Disarmament, Ambassador Mario Cámpora, said that "the chemical weapons convention as we have known it so far would be a non-discriminatory treaty, since all the parties would be on an equal footing once the process of destruction of chemical weapons and existing production facilities had been completed. At that stage the treaty will serve as a model, because it will be unlike the non-proliferation Treaty, which lays down in law the existence of two categories of States: those that possess nuclear weapons and those that do not. ... Thus we have within our reach the possibility of drawing up a



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treaty that would not be discriminatory from the political and military standpoints. It is also important that it should not be discriminatory from an economic and technological viewpoint".

This means that as of its entry into force, the convention must strike a proper balance between rights and obligations. For example, we should begin to consider including elements to compensate for and reduce the existing asymmetry among States parties during the 10-year period in which existing stockpiles will be destroyed. Furthermore, it implies agreement on a clear ban on the use of chemical weapons in any circumstances, as well as verification of compliance. The possibility that a State party to the convention might reserve the right to retaliate during the period of destruction cannot be justified in our way of seeing things, even from a military standpoint, inasmuch as the concept of chemical deterrence has fewer and fewer advocates. For the convention to be effective, basically, it must set up a rapid and transparent destruction mechanism. We share concern regarding the environment, and we believe it is indispensable to seek the assistance of the scientific community in order to find non-polluting methods that will allow us to reduce significantly the period of 10 years which has remained static so far. It would be unforgivable if we did not make every possible effort to minimize the Convention's legal weakness during this period. Linking the destruction of all chemical weapons to accession by certain States would seem to be equally unfavourable to the stability of the instrument. In our view, the purported aim of encouraging accession in this way could turn out to be counter-productive and foster tendencies that would in no way contribute to creating a chemical-weapon-free world. It is also important that we should endeavour to discourage initiatives that might lead a State to deem it prudent to wait until the end of the period of stockpile destruction before studying the desirability of acceding to the convention.

As is generally known, the verification system provided for in the draft convention is unprecedented in multilateral and bilateral disarmament treaties. It is clearly important to achieve an adequate verification system. But it is equally important to take into account the costs and benefits so that it does not constitute an excessive financial burden. In this regard, it might be necessary to consider, for example, whether it is appropriate to continue having a broad definition of chemical weapons embracing all toxic chemicals and not just those listed in the schedules, since that would mean that chemical activities in general would be subject to control and verification. It is necessary to draw a distinction between the need to implement an adequate inspection system and the aim of regulating chemical industry activity as a whole. For the sake of the convention's viability, there is a need to devise a verification régime which prevents interference that is not justified by the aims of the inspection. In this regard, the concept of "managed access", in so far as it entails the right to protect legitimate interests, provides a practical basis.

As regards various aspects of the convention now being negotiated, some delegations have attempted to press on us the concept of "CW-capable States". The debate on the general verification system which took place during the 1989 session demonstrated that different aims are being pursued on this



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matter, on which we would prefer not to draw any conclusions. However, we feel it necessary to point out that it is not particularly wise to put on an equal footing for the purposes of the convention countries that have stockpiles and those that have civil chemical industries of a certain size. There are only two types of State under the convention: those that possess chemical weapons and those that do not. Any additional category seems to be aimed more at supporting oligopolistic approaches rather than contributing to meeting the objectives of the convention. In this regard it would seem useful to put aside this concept that we have inherited from the joint Soviet-United States statements in the form of the expression "chemical-weapons-capable States".

When we design the Executive Council we should draw on the experience of the last four decades to improve on models that have not always proved satisfactory. The representativeness of this body must respond to objective guidelines and its size to practical needs. Membership should be based on the criterion of equitable geographical distribution. Furthermore, in terms of the effective application of the convention, the Council should adequately represent the entire international community. If we consider the membership of other executive organs of international organizations, they have around 50 members. The closest model is IAEA, whose Board of Governors works with 35 members; there have never been any complaints about its efficiency. In present international circumstances we would not be surprised if there were schools of thought once again evaluating the United Nations approach based on five regional groups. Bearing in mind what has been said by other delegations in favour of the industrial factor, we would not object to its being taken into account at the regional level. A system of counterweights would thus be achieved, avoiding an obvious imbalance in favour of the highly industrialized countries.

Before concluding, I should like to refer to the question of the prompt entry into force of the convention and various initiatives that States may adopt in pursuit of that objective. In 1987 we mentioned the possibility of reaching a political agreement at the regional level on arrangements for acceding to the convention. For that reason we support the proposal made by the distinguished representative of Venezuela, Ambassador Arteaga at the plenary meeting on 15 March, for a meeting of Latin American and Caribbean countries to publicize the draft convention in order to create the conditions necessary for the convention's speedy entry into force. We hope that those regions that have not yet done so will follow suit.

Regional initiatives could go hand in hand with global initiatives to promote confidence in the convention. In this respect we could promote the idea that States which maintain reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol should withdraw them, as Australia and New Zealand did in 1989. In this way the international legal régime banning chemical warfare would be strengthened while at the same time greater transparency and predictability in the international conduct of States would be achieved. In the same spirit it would be indispensable for those States which apply export controls to chemicals to issue declarations making it clear that these provisions would not be applied to States parties to the convention. A universal convention



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which is to be applied in the coming century requires a political understanding to avoid the unilateral or plurilateral establishment of requirements additional to those already agreed to in the convention in order to participate in international co-operation in the peaceful uses of chemistry

Reality is providing us with many surprises. We hope that this climate will spread to the Conference on Disarmament and that in 1990 the surprise will be the finalization of the draft convention.

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The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 550th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

... In view of the sea change in threat perceptions following upon the transformation in the international environment, we believe that the Conference on Disarmament must pay special attention to the early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and a chemical weapons convention. The Conference on Disarmament must also examine issues which are increasingly engaging the attention of the international community, such as regional disarmament and naval disarmament.

CD/PV.550

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Mr. CESKA (Austria):

... My statement today will not deal with the question of chemical weapons; let me point out, however, that Austria has finalized and will submit to the Conference before the end of the spring session a comprehensive report on an Austrian national trial inspection.



**Mr. KOSIN (Yugoslavia):**

... At today's session of the Conference on Disarmament I would like to present document CD/982 on the national trial inspection conducted in my country in the month of February this year.

Ever since the beginning of the negotiations on the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons, Yugoslavia has supported all the proposals related to verification measures. We are of the opinion that a verification system has to be efficient and cost-effective on the one hand, and on the other should include a well-balanced set of verification measures and should safeguard the sovereignty of all parties to the convention. The work to date within the Ad hoc Committee gives reason for optimism that these requirements will be met.

The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia neither produces nor possesses chemical weapons. However, we consider that last year's national trial inspection activity, which is being continued this year too, represents, as has been pointed out several times at the Conference, an important step in creating confidence among the parties to the convention and creating pre-conditions for multilateral inspection.

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(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)

As early as 1984, in document CD/482, Yugoslavia submitted a proposal on the scope of national verification, and the role, tasks and composition of the national team. Document CD/613 of 10 July 1985 contains a proposal whereby large-scale chemical industry production facilities should be subject to national verification measures. Many countries have already indicated, through their national trial inspections, possible solutions to problems resulting from such procedures. They have shown that the task is not an easy one, and that it requires a clear definition of the volume of work to be done, the tasks of each member of the inspection team and the role of the facility representatives, which can be a very useful one in dealing with and defining complex operations.

Against the background of experience with numerous national trial inspections, we organized a routine inspection of a plant for the production of chemicals declared under schedule [3] of the annex to article VI of the draft convention, as we do not produce chemicals listed under schedule [2]. A national trial inspection was organized to check that the facility was not being used to produce any chemicals other than the declared ones, and that the quantity produced was equal to the quantity declared. The inspection also checked the applicability of the relevant provisions of the draft convention.

The facility concerned is part of the PIB company - Industry of Basic Chemistry, Baric-Beograd - which produces organic chemicals. The chemical which was the object of our inspection was phosgene, listed under schedule [3]. The trial inspection was conducted in two phases. First, on its initial visit, the inspection team toured the facility to get acquainted with the production programme. The initial visit took two days, after which the details of the inspection were agreed upon. The second phase of the trial inspection was conducted in one day; the actual procedure of the inspection did not interfere with the normal operations of the facility. This phase was followed by the preparation of the report of the inspection team.

Both on its initial visit and during the routine inspection, the inspection team was composed of five members. The team included a chemical engineer (team leader) and a specialist in physical and chemical methods of analysis, both of them representatives of research institutes. In addition, the routine on-site inspection was attended by representatives of the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs, the Federal Secretariat for National Defence and the Secretariat for the Chemical Industry in the Chamber of Economy.

The main conclusion of the inspectors on the basis of the information presented was that the characteristics of the facility corresponded to the standard features for the continuous production of phosgene. They concluded that a quantitative inspection of the process can be conducted either on the basis of the automatic records of raw materials and products (material balance), or on the basis of the inspection of technological parameters, also automatically recorded.

As it is specifically designed for the production of phosgene, the facility is not multi-purpose, and it is therefore doubtful whether such a facility can produce any other chemicals listed either under schedule [3] or under schedules [1] and [2]. In addition, several conclusions were drawn. A number of basic requirements have to be fulfilled for the inspection to be



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successful. Inter alia, there has to be, firstly, a precise description of the location of the facility, including the layout of the installations, together with the facility notification. A summary of the processes and operations which can be carried out in the facility should be attached.

Secondly, there should be a description of the process of synthesis of the chemical under inspection. This would offer data on the material balance of the processes, technological parameters and analytical methods for quality control of raw materials and products. The places and methods of sample-taking, the methods of analysis and all protective measures to be undertaken should be described with the assistance of the plant personnel. It was confirmed that the capability of a facility to produce other chemicals could also be established by inspecting the stocks of various chemicals and raw materials. The inspection team should include chemical engineers, specialists in monitoring and measuring instruments and automation, and specialists in physical and chemical methods of analysis, provided that at least one of them is a military expert.

A third requirement is the placing of limitations on the analyses of technological parameters. Some information on the production process can be of a confidential nature. However, if it is necessary to classify some information as confidential, it has to be determined in each case. The minimum set of technological parameters required for the successful conduct of an inspection should also be determined with the assistance of the facility personnel.

Fourthly, there is a need for proposals on a standard form of presentation of data on a plant in a report. Although it is clear that there are different plants and different production processes for the same or similar chemicals, we consider that for the successful conduct of an inspection it is necessary to propose a standard form of presentation both in submitting applications regarding chemicals and installations in a facility and in the report submitted to the inspection team.



Mr. LUDEKING (Federal Republic of Germany):

... The issue of verification of compliance is of crucial importance in our negotiations on a comprehensive global convention banning chemical weapons. And we knew from the outset that this issue would be one of the most difficult to resolve. Following intensive negotiations over the past years, a coherent verification system has been elaborated designed to reliably assure all States parties that the provisions of the convention are being complied with. This well-developed system consists of three basic elements: verification of declared CW stocks and production facilities, as well as their destruction; verification of non-production of chemical weapons, i.e. the monitoring of relevant non-prohibited activities in the chemical industry; and clarification and verification procedures in case of ambiguous situations and doubts about compliance. The conceptual approach underlying this verification system is sound. Last year's discussions on the pattern of verification testified to that. They also demonstrated that this approach is broadly accepted and considered to provide the basis for reliable and effective verification.

Last year's discussions in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons also focused on possible additional verification measures which are to supplement the existing ones already provided for in our "rolling text". As early as January 1988 my delegation put forward a proposal for ad hoc checks, a

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(Mr. Lüdeking, Federal Republic of Germany)

verification measure designed to complement the existing routine measures for the verification of non-production. We did so in an attempt to meet concerns expressed about the ease with which chemical weapons can be produced clandestinely in the chemical industry.

Ad hoc checks were designed to provide for a flexible, easily implementable and unintrusive means of verification at the disposal of the Technical Secretariat covering all facilities in the chemical industry which can be misused for the production of chemical weapons. Following our initial proposal, which was subsequently further developed in the course of the discussions (cf. CD/869 of 6 September 1988), other suggestions for strengthening the existing verification system have been put forward. In this regard I would like to mention specifically the very interesting and important proposal by the United Kingdom on ad hoc inspections.

The proposals which were put forward differed in their conceptual approach. However, the concerns which lay behind them were basically the same. The discussions on ad hoc verification, although they have not yet been conclusive, have contributed to greater awareness of the verification problem to be addressed by ad hoc verification. We welcome the determination of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Hyltenius, to press for an early solution to this still outstanding problem in our negotiations.

In yesterday's meeting of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons Australia presented a discussion paper which suggests an approach to ad hoc verification, which combines elements of the proposals of both the United Kingdom delegation and my delegation. This new proposal might provide a basis for our future discussions on the subject. It might also contribute to finding a solution to the issue of ad hoc verification acceptable to all. My delegation looks forward to in-depth consideration of the issue of ad hoc verification in the coming weeks. The proposal submitted yesterday by Australia provides an outline, which will have to be further fleshed out.

Since the extensive discussions undertaken in the course of the spring part of last year's session, my delegation has further explored the issue of national registers with a view to providing a manageable and effective solution. Our results are contained in a working paper, advance copies of which have been distributed this morning. In my statement today I have no intention of further discussing the concept of national registers suggested in our paper. Let me, however, just point out that in our view national registers are an indispensable element of any routine ad hoc verification mechanism as they would provide the necessary binding declaration basis. As such they would provide a comprehensive picture of the relevant parts of the chemical industry, listing all plant sites which can possibly be misused for the production of chemical weapons. In devising our approach for the establishment of national registers it was not only our aim to meet this objective. We also took account of the requirement that the approach must be feasible and easily implementable by States parties. In addition it had to be ensured that confidential information is protected. It is my hope that our proposal provides a good working basis. My delegation is looking forward to discussing it in detail during forthcoming meetings on the subject within the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.



(Mr. Lüdeking, Federal Republic of Germany)

My delegation presented its views on challenge inspections in some detail in a statement earlier this session. On that occasion we were also able to present a report on our first trial challenge inspection in a military facility. Today I would like to introduce the report on our second trial challenge inspection. The report has been distributed this morning as document CD/983. This trial challenge inspection, again conducted in a military facility, was intended in particular to provide practical experience with inspection methods and equipment. The results are encouraging: we were able to conclude that portable testing and analysis equipment already available can be put to effective use in a challenge inspection. We hope that our findings will be of help in the further consideration of the issue of challenge inspections. We are continuing our series of trial challenge inspections. And we will continue to report on the practical experience we gain through them to the Conference on Disarmament.

With a view to promoting progress in our chemical weapons negotiations my Government intends to hold a workshop devoted to verification issues on 14 and 15 June this year in Munster, located between Hamburg and Hanover in Lower Saxony. The workshop is to focus on technical aspects of verification, in particular the use of instruments and equipment. The inspection equipment which was successfully employed in our trial challenge inspection, and on which details are contained in the report I have submitted today, will be demonstrated. In addition, the workshop will provide an opportunity to get acquainted with procedures for the safe and environmentally sound destruction of chemical weapons employed at the Federal Armed Forces' destruction plant in Munster for eliminating old stocks of chemical weapons that were found after the first and second world wars.

On behalf of my Government, I have pleasure in inviting all heads of delegation of CD members as well as interested observer States to attend this workshop. In addition to the heads of delegation one further member from each delegation is invited to attend. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany will provide transport by special aircraft. It will also provide hotel accommodation and meals. It is planned that the aeroplane provided by the Federal Government will depart from Geneva on the morning of 14 June. The arrival of the return flight in Geneva is scheduled for approximately 5.30 p.m. on 15 June 1990. A written invitation with further details on the programme of the workshop will be provided as soon as possible. To be able to make the necessary arrangements for the workshop we would appreciate it if each delegation could inform us by 23 April 1990 whether it will participate in the workshop and, if so, who will be attending.



Mr. HOU (China) (translated from Chinese):

... People throughout the world have long aspired to and pressed for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of chemical weapons. Naturally, this has been a priority subject for in-depth negotiations in the Conference, on which world-wide attention is riveted. Since the spring session began, we have listened attentively to various ideas, views and proposals put forward by other delegations on this matter. Today the Chinese delegation would like to share some of its thoughts with other delegations, with a view to jointly exploring ways to deepen and advance the negotiating process. To begin with, I wish to point out that my Government has always attached great importance to and placed high hopes on the ongoing negotiations on the CW convention in our Conference. Premier Li Peng of the State Council of the People's Republic of China stated on 20 March in his report on the work of the Government to the National People's Congress that the Chinese Government hoped to see progress in the Conference on Disarmament in concluding an international convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Not long ago, during his first visit to the Conference, the Chinese Foreign Minister, Qian Qichenn, in a statement at the plenary meeting, outlined the basic position and propositions of the Chinese Government on a series of important disarmament issues, including the prohibition of chemical weapons. This once again reflected my Government's positive attitude to promoting disarmament and contributing to international peace and security. My delegation will, as instructed by the Chinese

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(Mr. Hou, China)

Government, work energetically towards the early conclusion of a convention on the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of chemical weapons.

The Chinese Government pursues an independent foreign policy of peace aimed at safeguarding international peace and security. China therefore has always firmly stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of chemical weapons, so as to free mankind once and for all from the danger and threat posed by such weapons of mass destruction. It is well known that China is a non-chemical-weapon State that neither possesses nor produces chemical weapons. The Chinese people fell victim to such weapons in the past, and even today such weapons abandoned by foreign aggressors during the war are discovered from time to time on our territory. In their utmost abhorrence of chemical weapons and chemical warfare, the Chinese people are determined to contribute to the early realization of a world free of chemical weapons. We wish to reiterate that the objective of the CW convention is to ensure the unconditional, complete prohibition and thorough destruction of chemical weapons and their production facilities, and a total and lasting ban on the production and use of chemical weapons. We also propose that pending the conclusion and entry into force of the convention, all chemical-weapon States should unconditionally undertake not to use or produce chemical weapons, while all other States refrain from the development, production and acquisition of chemical weapons.

It is gratifying to note that with the development in the international situation, some headway has been made in the field of disarmament. A series of important initiatives by the international community has generated good momentum for banning chemical weapons. The Paris Conference of January 1989 adopted a Final Declaration which reaffirmed the validity of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and urged the banning of the use of chemical weapons and acceleration of the ongoing negotiations on the CW convention. This was followed by the Canberra Government-Industry Conference against Chemical Weapons in September, which also provided a powerful political impetus for reaching the objective of prohibiting chemical weapons. Representatives from our Government and chemical industry took an active part in both conferences. We appreciate the French and Australian initiatives in this connection and the efforts of all participating States. The ninth non-aligned summit and the forty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly also adopted important resolutions and put forth numerous positive proposals on this subject.

Particularly noteworthy is the fact that over recent years, with the energetic efforts of the CD members and non-members and under the skilful guidance of successive chairmen of the CW Ad hoc Committee, negotiations on the CW convention have registered positive results. The basic structure of the future convention has already taken shape, and a large measure of consensus has been achieved on quite a few provisions. The ongoing negotiations are gathering momentum and developing in depth. It should be mentioned that last year, under the dynamic leadership of Ambassador Morel, the Ad hoc Committee did a great deal of useful work and achieved certain results. This year the Ad hoc Committee speedily set about its work upon its smooth re-establishment with a new and improved mandate, which dropped



(Mr. Hou, China)

the phrase "except for its final drafting" that had been there since 1984 and incorporated the positive wording "at the earliest date" contained in the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference. We appreciate this encouraging development. Currently, the re-established Ad hoc Committee, under the remarkable leadership of the experienced Swedish diplomat, Ambassador Hyltenius, is embarking on a positive exercise of in-depth negotiations. It is our hope and conviction that this year the Committee will register fresh progress as it approaches the critical stage of the negotiations.

Looking at the realities of the world today, one cannot but be keenly aware of the continued presence of disturbing factors of turbulence and instability. Threats to international peace and security remain. Mankind still lives under the threat of various types of barbarous weapons, including chemical weaponry. Although the Geneva Protocol banning the use of chemical weapons has existed for 65 years, from time to time its authority has been challenged and its effectiveness undermined. A small number of military Powers already possessing formidable chemical arsenals are pressing ahead with the production and modernization of such weapons. This undoubtedly poses a major obstacle to the negotiations on the convention. The harsh reality facing us is that the answer to the question whether and when a breakthrough in our negotiations is possible depends by and large on whether the countries possessing the largest chemical arsenals have sufficient political will to fulfil their special responsibilities in real earnest. Without looking back too far into history, the international community has been urging the super-Powers at least since the mid-1970s to make substantive progress in their bilateral CW negotiations at an early date and to contribute with actual deeds to the multilateral negotiating process. The international community expects them to renounce the use of chemical weapons, destroy their existing stocks and production facilities completely and halt the production and development of chemical weapons. We believe that such an unconditional commitment on their part will surely have the most positive bearing on the multilateral negotiations, thereby contributing to progress towards the objective of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of chemical weapons on a global scale. That is the logical course for the ongoing negotiation to take.

Recent years have witnessed an increase in the number of optimistic statements on the bilateral CW negotiations. Needless to say, substantive bilateral breakthroughs conducive to multilateral negotiations, once they do occur, should be duly welcomed. Years of negotiation between the United States and the USSR have so far yielded a certain measure of progress, with both sides announcing their readiness to reduce their huge CW arsenals. This is long overdue. No further progress is discernible, however, other than this vague expression of their intention to slash a portion of their CW arsenals within a relatively long time frame in the future. They have neither jointly pledged to halt CW production and improvement nor shown a common desire to refrain from the use of chemical weapons. This falls far short of the expectations of the Conference and the international community as a whole.



(Mr. Hou, China)

Alarmingly, not only is there an absence of commitment to the complete elimination and total destruction of existing chemical weapons, but also a new argument has been advanced for the retention of chemical weapons. It is held that even after joining the convention, a State party still has the right to retain a portion of its stockpiles should any country which it unilaterally and subjectively judges to be "CW-capable" not become a party to the convention. Furthermore, there are signs on their part indicating an attempt to keep their CW production facilities ready for resumption of production at any moment. The authors of this argument claim that this will enhance the universality of the convention. In fact, if anything this has set up new obstacles for the negotiations, and therefore has already caused widespread concern and opposition. The reason is simple and clear. Article I of the "rolling text" of the draft convention stipulates justly and unequivocally that the obligation regarding the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of chemical weapons and their production facilities should unconditionally apply to all States parties. If any State party is free to attach conditions to this fundamental obligation to meet its own needs, the very foundation of our negotiations will crumble and the nature of the convention will be changed. The convention will then at best be an instrument for quantitative restrictions or for CW non-proliferation. If the above-mentioned argument prevails, it will provide any State possessing chemical weapons and CW production facilities with a handy pretext for retaining a certain quantity of its stockpiles and production facilities, thus subjecting the numerous non-chemical-weapon States to a perpetual threat from chemical weapons. Obviously, this will either preclude the possibility of concluding the convention or lead to a convention of a discriminatory and unequal nature.

Here another closely related and important matter should be addressed, that is, the question of banning the use of chemical weapons. It is common knowledge that the prohibition of use constitutes one of the fundamental obligations under the future convention. Without this there will be no complete prohibition to speak of. It is precisely for this reason that since 1985 article I of the draft convention has contained the explicit obligation that "each State party undertakes not to use chemical weapons", to which no objection has been raised from any side. We have noted the reference to non-use in the recent United States-USSR joint statement, and we welcome this. However, in the multilateral consultations on the mandate of the CW Ad hoc Committee, there was downright rejection of the same reference, which cannot but make people feel puzzled. Its implications are even more disquieting when viewed together with the proposal that a portion of chemical weapons and their production facilities should be retained. Against this background, the Group of 21 non-aligned and neutral countries solemnly stated on 15 March that "the future convention on chemical weapons should prohibit the use of such weapons under any circumstance from the date the convention enters into force", that "all chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities shall be destroyed during the destruction period of 10 years", and that "this undertaking shall be without any reservation". The Chinese delegation would like to stress that it fully supports these reasonable



(Mr. Hou, China)

propositions of the Group of 21, which are in complete accord with our own. We hope to see the speedy removal of this new artificial obstacle, so that our negotiation returns to its normal track.

The verification of the CW convention, including challenge inspection, is an important issue of universal concern in our negotiations. It not only has a direct bearing on the sovereignty and important rights and interests of all States, but also concerns the authority, effectiveness and viability of the convention itself. For this reason, it should be the subject of serious and in-depth consultations and negotiations so as to find a just and reasonable solution acceptable to all. The Chinese Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen, set out the principled position of the Chinese Government in his statement on 27 February.

"... we are in favour of an effective, reasonable and feasible verification régime under the convention, including challenge inspection. In the mean time we maintain that challenge inspection should not go beyond the purposes, objectives and scope of the convention, and that its possible abuse must be strictly guarded against. Specific provisions should ensure a balance between the rights and obligations of the requesting State on the one hand and those of the requested State on the other, and give full play to the role of the future organization."

Firstly, this shows that China is in favour of an appropriate challenge inspection régime which is fair, reasonable and practicable. This régime should act as a deterrent to possible violations of the convention and contribute to timely detection and correction of such acts once they do occur. Such a challenge inspection régime will strengthen the effectiveness of the convention and confidence in it.

Secondly, I would like to point out that the principal objective of the convention is to enhance international peace and the security of all States through the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of chemical weapons. The sole purpose of verification, including challenge inspection, is to serve the realization of the principles and objectives of the convention. To this end, it should strictly function within the scope of the convention to ensure effective compliance. However, any abuse of the highly intrusive challenge inspection procedure, any attempt to use challenge inspection to unduly interfere in the political, economic, military, technical or other fields of the security of States parties that have nothing to do with the purposes and objectives of the CW convention, would not only infringe upon the rights and interests of the States parties, but would also endanger the very existence of the convention. Hence it is necessary to stress the principles governing verification unanimously adopted by UNDC and endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly in 1988. In these principles it is expressly stipulated that requests for inspections "should be used only for the purposes of the determination of compliance, care being taken to avoid abuses", and that verification arrangements should "avoid unduly interfering with the internal affairs of States parties or other States, or jeopardizing their economic,



(Mr. Hou, China)

technological and social development". These important principles are without doubt applicable to all forms of verification of international disarmament agreements, the highly intrusive challenge inspection being no exception.

Thirdly, given the complex realities in current international relations and the intrusive and sensitive nature of challenge inspection, the possibility of abuse of challenge inspection, like that of the violation of the convention, cannot be precluded. Both the violation and the abuse will compromise the authority and effectiveness of the convention, and should equally be guarded against. Appropriate and specific measures must therefore be instituted for such possibilities, so that in the event that violations or abuses of the provisions of the convention do occur, there will be timely detection, correction and, if necessary, adoption of sanctions.

Fourthly, it should be emphasized that challenge inspection in a global multilateral convention is an unprecedented novelty in the practice of international law, and should be treated with particular caution. With no precedent to guide us, we should follow strictly the 3 verification principles contained in the final document of SSOD-I and the 16 principles adopted by UNDC as the basis and yardstick of our work, and avoid going against them, for these principles have been formulated as a result of careful consideration by the representatives of all countries, taking into account the interests and concerns of all sides. It should also be pointed out that even in the arms control agreements between the two military alliances or the two super-Powers, including agreements and statements on chemical weapons, there has never been anything of such an absolute and all-embracing nature. Besides, multilateral agreements should not mechanically copy the provisions of bilateral ones, because there are significant differences between them. Any provision in bilateral agreements is based on equality and reciprocity between the two parties, which can be described as two sides of the same coin. The situation in the multilateral field is far more complex and varied, as States parties to the future convention include various countries of the East, West, North and South with great differences in their political, economic, military and security circumstances, as well as the level and stage of their scientific and technological development. Issues such as how to prevent discrimination and ensure the equality and equal rights and obligations of all countries, and how to establish a balance between rights and obligations for countries of different categories, are by nature extremely difficult, yet must be properly resolved. Otherwise, the universality of the convention will be only an empty word. Precisely because of this it is clearly stipulated in the aforementioned principles adopted by UNDC that "verification arrangements should be implemented without discrimination" and that "all States have equal rights to participate in the process of international verification of agreements to which they are parties". Therefore, in addition to undertaking the obligation of being subject to verification, many non-aligned countries have expressed their wish to obtain rights for equal participation in verification, as well as the capabilities and means to exercise such rights. This is reasonable.



(Mr. Hou, China)

Fifthly, in our view, only at the initial stage of making the request is there somehow a bilateral dimension to challenge inspection. Once the request has been made and challenge inspection initiated, it becomes a serious matter of multilateral international relations. Therefore, it should be handled by the organization of the convention by normal international legal means rather than through bilateral ways and means. With regard to challenge inspection under the convention on chemical weapons, it is imperative to rely on the organization and its appropriate organs which should play the major role throughout the entire inspection process. Only in this way will it be possible to deal correctly with violations of the convention and redress them, prevent abuses as far as possible and handle the relationship between the various States parties in a fair, reasonable and balanced manner, including the respective rights and obligations of the requesting countries and the inspected countries.

Especially at present, when international relations are moving towards democratization, in settling disputes in multilateral relations no country should be allowed to be an omnipotent arbitrator playing at the same time the role of plaintiff, prosecutor, judge and investigator, while putting other countries in the position of defendants to be presumed guilty and sentenced without any right of appeal. Such a practice is both intolerable in the domestic law of any country and contrary to recognized international legal norms, and is therefore unacceptable. Naturally, to incorporate the above-mentioned principles and the sound suggestions made by many delegations into the relevant provisions and implementation procedures of the convention will require further in-depth study and consultation, as well as careful drafting.

The destruction of chemical weapons abandoned by foreign countries in the countries which have fallen victim to a CW attack constitutes an issue of principle which must be correctly resolved in the future convention. The abandoning of chemical weapons by a country on the territory of another not only concerns the past and the present but raises the possibility of a recurrence in the future. Thus it naturally concerns any potential CW-abandoning countries and attacked countries, that is to say the rights and obligations of all States parties are at stake. Therefore it is an issue directly related to the maintenance of peace and security. In this light, as a permanent international legal instrument of unlimited duration, the CW convention should contain equitable provisions of principle. It is only natural that the convention, as a minimum, should explicitly stipulate the responsibility of user countries and CW-abandoning countries for the destruction of chemical weapons in question. This is also a well-established principle in handling international armed conflicts and war liabilities, and should be reflected clearly as a rule of principle in the convention. Of course, the principle does not exclude appropriate specific arrangements by the countries concerned through consultations and negotiations. To require the attacked countries to bear responsibility for the destruction of the chemical weapons abandoned by other countries would be unfair and can only encourage the use of chemical weapons and aggression; it is therefore unacceptable.



(Mr. Hou, China)

I also wish to reiterate China's principled position and views on two important issues related to the convention - article X, on assistance, and article XI, on economic and technological development, in the "rolling text". The convention should explicitly stipulate that necessary international assistance should be provided to States parties attacked with chemical weapons. This is not only indispensable for their security, but will also serve as a deterrent and sanction against the use of CW. The convention should also encourage and promote the development of the civilian chemical industry, as well as strengthen international co-operation and exchanges in this regard. The Chinese delegation understands and supports the legitimate rights and interests and reasonable demands of the numerous third world developing countries in this regard. These two articles are also directly related to the important principle of the undiminished security of all States parties and the major issue of universal adherence, and should be appropriately addressed in the negotiations.

The realization of the objective of the complete prohibition of chemical weapons is an arduous task. We have traversed a long distance and made some progress, yet some complex and difficult issues have still to be resolved. We are fully convinced that we must and can reach our objective. The Chinese delegation will as always work in joint efforts with other delegations and contribute to the early achievement of this noble goal.

Mr. LEE (Republic of Korea): Mr. President, allow me to extend to you our warm congratulations on your taking up the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of April. I wish you every success in discharging your important responsibility. As Pakistan and the Republic of Korea have enjoyed a friendly and co-operative relationship, and as you yourself were the diplomat on the spot as Ambassador of Pakistan to my country and made an active contribution to furthering the ties between our two countries, it gives me particular pleasure to see you presiding over the Conference. My country has been invited again this year to participate as a non-member State in the plenary meetings and in two subsidiary bodies of the Conference, namely, the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and the Ad hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons. My delegation appreciates the decision and looks forward to making constructive contributions.



(Mr. Lee, Republic of Korea)

... Much effort has been devoted to negotiating a convention banning chemical weapons, as the issue has been the focus of world-wide attention and concern. Inter-sessional work by the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons was a reinforcing and complementary link to this year's negotiations. My delegation hopes that the spirit of accommodation and compromise will continue to be the guiding force in narrowing the remaining differences.

The international Government-Industry Conference against Chemical Weapons held in Canberra last year provided an excellent occasion to affirm the weighty responsibilities of industry in negotiations on chemical weapons, and demonstrated that progress is possible when political ideals and practical goals are linked. As my delegation stressed at the Canberra Conference, the development of chemicals for peaceful purposes and the protection of confidentiality are two important dimensions to which due consideration should continue to be given.

National trial inspections have contributed to the efforts to establish a common formula for verification. Much hope is placed on the realization of multilateral trial inspections in order to remove the remaining obstacles.

(Mr. Sene, Senegal)

... Hence the Conference on Disarmament must adapt to this new state of affairs, to the favourable international situation, in order to achieve concrete results in its area of competence so as to strengthen its credibility. In this connection we must welcome the considerable efforts that have been made by the Conference on Disarmament since last year to draw up a convention totally banning chemical weapons. The impetus which was thus given by the Paris Conference at the beginning of last year made the elimination of existing stockpiles and chemical weapon production facilities, as well as the total prohibition of the production, acquisition, stockpiling, transfer or use of these weapons, a common and irrevocable cause for the entire international community. In short, all the States participating in the Paris Conference undertook to redouble their efforts within the Conference on Disarmament to conclude a convention banning chemical weapons at the earliest date.

Thus, under the outstanding guidance of Ambassador Morel, the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons made remarkable progress last year. Thanks to his savoir-faire, Ambassador Morel contributed to the redefinition of concepts in the "rolling text" by reconciling the various points of view. In this connection we should point to the place of the new annex on chemicals, the protocol on inspection procedures and the work on techniques relating to the verification régime established under the convention, the progress made

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(Mr. Sene, Senegal)

on the final clauses and the texts concerning the membership of the Executive Council - all reference points for chemical arms control. Subsequently, the Conference of Governments and chemical industry representatives that took place in Canberra last year also showed the need for co-operation with those working in the chemical industry in the implementation of any convention completely banning chemical weapons. Most certainly my delegation is convinced that under the guidance of Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden, and working in a constructive spirit, the Committee will be able to attain the objectives assigned to it in a reasonable period of time. As of now, it is reassuring to see that the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to reduce their chemical weapons gradually. Even if certain aspects are conditional, the commitments announced show that the two Powers in question, which have the largest CW stockpiles, recognize their special responsibility with regard to the destruction of these stockpiles until low and equal levels are reached pending the conclusion of the convention banning chemical weapons. This is indeed a decisive element that gives a positive impetus to the multilateral negotiations and a guarantee for large-scale accession to the future convention on chemical weapons.

As my delegation stated at the Paris Conference, Senegal has no chemical weapons and has no intention of acquiring any. So far as it is able, Senegal wishes to make its own modest contribution to the rapid conclusion of the convention on chemical weapons.

(Mr. Sene, Senegal)

Of course, much remains to be done - we must keep our feet on the ground - to prevent wars and make military aggression throughout the world, an option that no Government could envisage and where military forces will have the role of preserving national independence and territorial integrity. Doubtless, what is happening today in Europe fills us with enthusiasm, because it marks a radical change in mentalities and in geostrategic outlook. At the same time, we know that this process started long ago, with the Helsinki Document in 1975, and covers a vast area ranging from economic co-operation to human rights. Yet will this happy period of dialogue and co-operation which is beginning between East and West do away with all the tensions here and there that are due to historical, political, ethnic, religious or socio-economic causes? Well, we think so, because we are convinced that human intelligence today is capable of building on the ruins of the old order a new, fairer, more prosperous, more fraternal order of greater solidarity. However, the establishment of a stable and lasting order of peace in Europe, which we ardently desire, cannot be separated from the rest of the globe in so far as strategic imbalances in other regions can have repercussions on world security and stability. And as we know, war is still raging in certain parts of the third world. We are even witnessing, according to certain sources, a build-up of nuclear weaponry in areas of tension among neighbouring countries, posing



(Mr. Sene, Senegal)

a new security problem, not to speak of the heightened risks of uncontrolled proliferation. The same sources discern a proliferation of ballistic missiles armed with chemical or nuclear warheads, as well as the spread of the requisite production techniques. Hence there is a need to find effective solutions in as broad a framework as possible in order to safeguard strategic stability and international security before these political hypotheses become reality.

... In concluding, we wish to emphasize once again that in this historical period where the super-Powers are taking initiatives with regard to nuclear disarmament and the banning of chemical weapons by accepting verification as an essential element in any arms limitation or reduction agreement, it is clear that today we are moving away from the certainties of the cold war and the balance of terror, and so much the better. The moment has therefore come to think deeply about the structure of the Conference on Disarmament under the critical eye of the new international situation that we must at all costs make more harmonious and more peaceful for the benefit of development. Because the true question is how to maintain peace and international security in the age of the absolute weapon, that is to say, the atomic bomb and weapons of mass destruction: chemical, biological or radiological weapons. Most certainly, we must pursue the priority objectives of the disarmament problématique by quitting well-worn paths, as was very appropriately pointed out by Ambassador de Azambuja of Brazil with all the authority, all the nobility of view, the enlightenment and the exhilarating eloquence for which we know him. Our best wishes go with him in his new post. Thus the task is to overcome differences of opinion and conflicts of interest, to broaden the basis of understanding and consensus approaches through dialogue and negotiation by adapting to the evolution of the international situation.



(Mr. Chirila, Romania)

... I should now like to make a few references to the negotiations concerning the draft convention on the elimination and prohibition of chemical weapons. In its statement of 13 February to the plenary of the Conference, our delegation expressed Romania's political willingness to work for the rapid conclusion of such a convention. This readiness remains; we are in favour of an effective universal convention with an appropriate verification régime. We have clearly stated that Romania has no chemical weapons, and it has no intention of producing or acquiring any. The strengthened mandate for the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons leads us to believe that the negotiations for the conclusion of a universal convention banning these weapons have now, so to speak, entered the final straight. In this regard progress concerning the structure of the future convention in particular has been significant. We greatly appreciate the efforts to deal with all aspects in detail, but as many other delegations have already emphasized here, we too consider that certain extended discussions, consultations and negotiations on purely technical or drafting issues could divert attention from essential, substantive issues which, in our view, should be dealt with directly, under a general approach, while avoiding unduly dwelling on one detail or another. We fully appreciate the determined contribution the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Hyltenius, has made in promoting the substantive work in order to clarify "sensitive" issues, to clear the way for the final drafting of the text of the convention. One problem cropping up very frequently in the discussion and negotiations is that concerning the universality of the future convention. We consider that the involvement of an ever-increasing number of countries in the negotiating process and the final adoption of the text of the convention by consensus are among conditions that favour the legitimate requirement of universality. Romania is ready to be an original signatory of a convention that is the result of such a process.



Mr. GIZOWSKI (Poland):

... My statement in the Conference today is connected with the presentation of a working paper on data relating to Poland relevant to the chemical weapons convention (CD/985), which has been distributed today. The data, reflecting the situation in Poland as at the end of 1989, were provided on a voluntary basis by the Polish bodies and institutions concerned in accordance with the format proposed in document CD/828 of 12 April 1988 presented by the Federal Republic of Germany. Details of the chemicals which are produced, processed or consumed in Poland are submitted in accordance with the tentatively agreed lists contained in CD/952 of 18 August 1989 and are based on the following thresholds: schedule 1 - 100 grams per year; schedule 2 - 1 ton per year; and schedule 3 - 30 tons per year.

By providing the data Poland wishes to join a considerable number of States which have already presented such information, as it shares their opinion on the importance of multilateral data exchange for our negotiations. We are of the opinion that a compilation of data relevant to the convention from all participants in the negotiations would facilitate the solution of outstanding issues. At the same time, the provision of such data prior to the signing of the convention will constitute one of a range of confidence-building measures in its support.

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(Mr. Gizowski, Poland)

It seems obvious and indisputable that progress in the negotiations might be faster and easier if they were built upon as much broad and comprehensive information as possible concerning both existing stockpiles of chemical weapons and their possessors and other data relevant to the convention. Such information enables us to foresee better the requirements of the future process of implementation of the convention, and to design properly and effectively appropriate verification mechanisms and the shape of the future organization. Openness and mutual confidence, particularly among States directly involved in our negotiations, whether members or non-members of the Conference, not only create a favourable atmosphere but also offer a substantial indication of genuine commitment to the completion of our work on the convention and a contribution to making it universal in character. We therefore invite other States to join in this voluntary exchange of data as soon as possible.

I would like to take this opportunity to make some observations on the present state of affairs in our negotiations on the convention. In many statements devoted to chemical weapons during the spring session, we have heard that the year 1990 should be a decisive one in our endeavours. We share this opinion. More than that, we consider that there are solid foundations for such an assertion. This is not only because of the favourable climate generated by the conferences in Paris and Canberra and the positive course of Soviet-American talks in this field. First and foremost, it is the progress made and material accumulated during the long years of negotiations which make the task of finalization of our efforts fully feasible.

The results accomplished by the Committee during this year's session to date under the skilful chairmanship of Ambassador Hyltenius also confirm that progress is possible on even the most complicated issues, providing that all parties display maximum flexibility and readiness to reach consensus. I have in mind especially the advancement of work on the order of destruction of chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities. At the same time, this is just another positive example of the favourable impact of developments in the bilateral area on multilateral negotiations. Overall, however, the readiness of all parties in the negotiations to join in a common search for a mutually acceptable solution in so complex and difficult a matter has contributed to the final outcome.

Furthermore, new prospects are emerging for starting a more serious and concrete discussion on ad hoc verification. In our opinion, proper design of this verification instrument could take care of the legitimate concerns of many delegations connected with the "capability problem". In addition to efforts by the Chairman of the Committee to move our work ahead on the definite shape of challenge inspection, so competently directed previously by Ambassador Morel, it may be hoped that the general pattern of verification of the future convention will finally be worked out. An agreement on the order of destruction of chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities, as well as the completion of a general pattern of verification, would create propitious conditions for resolving other difficult and still controversial issues. Use of the institution of "Friends of the Chair" seems to be the most effective form of work at this stage, allowing us to concentrate on narrowing divergent positions of delegations which attach special importance to a particular problem. I have the impression that it would be desirable to



(Mr. Gizowski, Poland)

make greater use of smaller formal or informal groups which would be able to prepare and present to the Committee proposals on resolving outstanding issues. We hope that this form of work will rapidly bring concrete and good results.

We also appreciate the extensive discussion arranged by the Chairman of the Committee on the subject of "undiminished security". This made it possible to look at a range of political aspects of the convention in a wider environment, and particularly their interrelationship and interaction. Undoubtedly, the search for a solution has to take this broader context into account.

The first part of the 1990 session is coming to an end. As a result of a new approach by the Chairman of the Committee we have made further steps ahead on the road to the convention. We are approaching that moment in the negotiations when every participant must look more clearly at the distance already covered and that which is ahead of us in the context of the direct interests of the State he or she represents. The rights and obligations which are becoming more and more distinctly defined in the draft convention require substantive analysis from the point of view of their conformity with the political, military, economic, scientific and technological interests of each particular country.

Poland, being a country which does not possess or intend to possess chemical weapons, will naturally not have the same attitude towards such issues as the order of destruction, undiminished security, verification mechanisms and so forth as chemical weapons possessors. Our approach to the negotiations on these issues will be more general and indirect, whereas for them these issues are of direct and particular interest. On the other hand, we will have a special interest in negotiations on such issues as, for example, verification of chemical industry, assistance or co-operation. There will also be a different scale of obligations on Poland arising from our participation in the convention in comparison with "CW-capable" States.

At the same time global, regional and individual interests will become more and more visible. We will have to identify them at the right moment, single them out and seek proper compromise solutions. In our opinion, the advanced stage of negotiations on the chemical weapons convention now requires a different approach which more accurately and concretely provides opportunities to identify general - which means global - interests; particular - which means regional - interests; and individual interests. We should aim at the establishment of a mechanism for the future convention which will ensure an appropriate balance between rights and obligations.



(Mr. von Stülpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

... The subject which has occupied most of my attention during my term of office here in Geneva has been chemical weapons. This is not only because my Government attaches the highest priority to the early conclusion of a comprehensive, global and securely verifiable ban on chemical weapons. The conclusion of a chemical weapons convention is an historic opportunity that the Conference on Disarmament must not let slip out of its hands. To speak for those who have suffered from chemical weapons use, it is no exaggeration to say that the Conference on Disarmament has to meet its responsibility to mankind. There is no time to lose to translate the existing overwhelming consensus of the international community for a global ban into an effective convention. As I have said before: time is not on our side. Reports meant to be alarming on a rapid spread of chemical weapons are indeed alarming. We are called upon to prevent these ghastly weapons from becoming an accepted means of warfare. Determined action is called for. Interim measures like export controls to prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons, even when effectively applied, are clearly not sufficient. The same goes for the Geneva Protocol, which has proven to be painfully inadequate. The only means of establishing a global accepted norm is to make possession of chemical weapons illegal. To renounce the option of acquiring chemical weapons will not find sufficient incentive as long as arsenals of chemical weapons continue to exist.

For almost four years I have hoped that we would be able to conclude a convention soon, my hopes not being founded on illusions but on an assessment of the state of work in our negotiations. I always believed in a common resolve to come to terms with the issues involved in our negotiations. I am convinced that it would have been possible. Let me again stress that there is no reason in my view why we should not approach our task of concluding a convention in as ambitious a manner as we see now being displayed in other forums, and for which we are grateful. As I said in my previous plenary statement on 8 March: "Otherwise we risk being the last to change in a world of change, or those who did not change in time".

I think we all know that the necessary political and material prerequisites for the timely conclusion of our task of drafting a comprehensive and global convention effectively banning chemical weapons exist. I cannot help but observe that we are in many instances discussing

(continued)



(Mr. von Stülpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

the same issues time and again, looking at them from various angles, trying to elaborate certain parts further. I have had an impression of *déjà vu* many times. Belabouring problems is not necessarily the best recipe for arriving at better solutions. Rather, the risk is real that we will get bogged down in unnecessary details and lose sight of the imperatives of our task. We have lately started an extensive drafting exercise which in my view is - before we have come to the necessary principal conclusions - a rather lofty undertaking. A question still persists: How can we make the sense of urgency and resolve prevailing in Vienna and in the bilateral Geneva negotiations contagious so that we too can achieve something concrete? If we cannot come to grips with the early conclusion of a global CW convention, we will no longer be able to demonstrate that multilateral disarmament can keep abreast of international developments and disarmament and arms control efforts on other levels.

Having said this, I have wondered a number of times about the protracted and vigorous yet futile debates on other items on the agenda of our Conference. Knowing full well that at this juncture we are not able to bridge existing differences and that these items are not ripe for serious negotiations, we continue to dwell on them with relentless joy. For chemical weapons at least we had the Paris consensus of 149 States. For the other subjects on our agenda there is certainly much less consensus, much less chance to get anywhere. The Conference on Disarmament is a negotiating forum, indeed the only international negotiating forum, and should negotiate in earnest an instrument of international law where this proves possible. If the Conference on Disarmament fails to fulfil this task entrusted to it even in fields where there is consensus, it is not only faced with a drastic loss of credibility.

(Mr. Azambuja, Brazil)

... In my statement before this Conference in February last I shared with you some of the ideas I had on the need to make this body more effective and useful in this era of fast change. I will no longer be able to participate in the day-to-day business of the CD, but I am sure that this forum will make a major contribution to the achievement of our ultimate goal of achieving peace through disarmament. I hope that the chemical weapons convention, to which you have devoted so much hard work, will be concluded soon and thus confirm the capacity of this body to help build a new order in the field of security. My thoughts and my best wishes will always be with you in your endeavours, and I hope from time to time to come back to this room and share my thoughts with you and learn from your collective wisdom and concern.



Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America):

... Because today's plenary meeting marks the end of the spring part of our 1990 session, I have taken the floor in order to provide information to the Conference on the fifteenth round of the United States-Soviet consultations on the prohibition of chemical weapons, which is currently under way and will end the day after tomorrow. My statement is made by agreement with the head of the Soviet delegation, Minister Serguei Batsanov, and supplements his statement to the Conference made on 8 March.

Since the end of the fourteenth round on 8 March, United States-Soviet discussions of a chemical weapons ban have continued in an intensive manner. During their meeting in Washington from 4 to 6 April, United States Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze reviewed progress in the discussions and provided further guidance for our two delegations.

(continued)



(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

In this round, the delegations have devoted particular attention to completion of a bilateral agreement on reciprocal obligations of the United States and the Soviet Union pending a multilateral convention including, inter alia, the destruction of the bulk of their CW stocks to equal low levels. Further progress was made and discussions are continuing in an effort to resolve the remaining issues as soon as possible.

In the discussions, both sides emphasized that in their destruction activities under the bilateral agreement the highest priority would be given to safety of people and protection of the environment. They also have agreed that under the agreement the CW stocks of both sides will be reduced to a level of 5,000 tons (i.e. equal to approximately 20 per cent of the current United States stockpile). The sides concur that, once the multilateral convention comes into force, its terms will take precedence over those of the bilateral agreement.

Another priority area during the fifteenth round has been implementation of the Wyoming memorandum of understanding. The sides continued their efforts to build confidence between the United States and the Soviet Union regarding the chemical weapons capabilities of the other side. In this connection, the delegations exchanged detailed information in preparation for the exchange of visits to chemical weapons storage facilities that will take place in June. Planning continued for the additional visits that will take place in August and in early 1991. Overall, there will be seven visits in each country, covering chemical weapons storage facilities, chemical weapons production facilities, and industrial chemical production facilities. The sides anticipate that, in addition to building confidence between the United States and the Soviet Union, these visits will provide valuable insights into the application of the provisions of the multilateral convention to such facilities.

Building on the very useful exchanges that took place during the fourteenth round, the delegations during the current round have intensified their work regarding bilateral co-operation in the field of destruction of chemical weapons. The goal of this co-operation is to facilitate safe and expeditious elimination of chemical weapons. For these discussions the delegations were reinforced by experts who are directly involved in the destruction programmes of the United States and the USSR. A number of special meetings devoted to destruction of chemical weapons took place. The experts exchanged detailed information on the programmes under way in each country, including the technology employed and the special difficulties that need to be dealt with.

In view of their desire to accelerate the conclusion of a multilateral chemical weapons ban, the two delegations are also conducting discussions for that purpose. During the round, suggestions for refining definitions and the guidelines for schedule 1 were communicated to the Chairman of the appropriate Working Group. The two sides are also discussing ways to promote the universality of the multilateral convention.



(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

The fifteenth bilateral round will conclude on 26 April. Bilateral discussions on a chemical weapons ban will continue during the meeting of ministers scheduled for mid-May and at the summit meeting between President George Bush and President Mikhail Gorbachev. It is the jointly expressed hope of both countries that the new bilateral CW agreement can be signed at the summit meeting and that it will be possible to report further progress toward a global, comprehensive chemical weapons ban.

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Mr. ELARABY (Egypt):

... I am pleased to take the floor today to invite the attention of the Conference to a letter dated 16 April 1990 which the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt addressed to the Secretary-General on a proposal to establish a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. The letter is contained in document CD/989, which has been circulated today.

The rationale of the proposal is to spare a region fraught with tension from the scourge of a possible recourse to any type of weapon of mass destruction. In this context it is appropriate to recall that as far back as 1948 the Commission for Conventional Armaments advised the Security Council that it considered that "weapons of mass destruction should be defined to include atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons, and any weapons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above". This definition seems to be still valid. We believe that means of delivery should also be included in the proposed ban. This lofty objective requires the conclusion of credible and verifiable regional measures to ensure the total absence of all such weapons from the Middle East.

Since 1974 Egypt has presented annually to the General Assembly a proposal for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. The international community has resolved that nuclear weapons are the most lethal and devastating weapons of mass destruction. Consequently, it has assigned the highest priority to the task of removing the threat of nuclear war. Our proposal has been endorsed by the General Assembly by consensus ever since 1980. A highly qualified group of experts appointed by the Secretary-General is now in the process of finalizing a report which the Secretary-General will subsequently submit to the General Assembly.

Egypt recognizes, however, that the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone needs to be strengthened by including other weapons of mass destruction. The rapid pace of progress in the production and development of weapons of mass destruction necessitates the adoption of a more comprehensive approach. For the sake of ensuring peace and security to future generations in our region, Egypt deems it imperative now to advocate the importance of widening the scope of the zone to comprise all weapons of mass destruction.



(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

It is the considered opinion of the Government of Egypt that the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East merits urgent attention and serious examination. The document circulated today is self-explanatory. I believe a careful perusal of its contents will contribute to a better and more profound appreciation of our proposal. It is our earnest hope that this proposed comprehensive approach will command the active support of all concerned States as well as the international community as a whole.



(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

I begin my comments on this item by offering my belated, but no less sincere, congratulations to our Swedish colleague, Ambassador Carl-Magnus Hyltenius, on his appointment as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. The Swedish delegation, particularly in the person of Ambassador Rolf Ekéus, has long played a signal role in providing leadership in our efforts to develop a convention banning chemical weapons. My delegation and I look forward to continuing our full co-operation with Ambassador Hyltenius and his delegation in this most important work.

Indeed, I do not exaggerate if I suggest that the negotiation of the chemical weapons convention is the single most important task confronting the Conference during its 1990 session. Almost daily, it seems, we are being reminded that the threat posed by the existence of chemical weapons not only continues but is in danger of growing. And this notwithstanding the several important and encouraging developments that took place during 1989, both in terms of the progress achieved by the CW Ad hoc Committee under Ambassador Morel's inspired and energetic leadership, and in terms of the separate but closely related meetings in Paris, Canberra, and Jackson Hole, Wyoming. For my Government, it is critically important, therefore, that, under the spur of the continuing threat of chemical weapons, the momentum provided by these developments must be continued and must be rapidly translated into concrete progress in resolving our remaining differences.

In this respect, I am happy to note that, at this midway point in our formal session, there are several solid signs that some of our outstanding problems are well on the road to resolution. The various working groups have been particularly assiduous in tackling the difficult technical, practical, and legal issues before them, and I congratulate them and their chairman for their efforts.

Most significant to date, perhaps, may be the success so far achieved by Working Group B in developing appropriate texts on the crucial issue of the order of destruction of chemical weapons and CW production facilities. Thanks in large measure to the important contribution here from the United States and Soviet delegations, we are getting closer to resolving what has been one of the more difficult issues facing us. However, we are not yet out of these woods and further efforts need to be made.

My Government is especially impressed and pleased with the success Working Group C has had in addressing the immensely complicated set of legal issues involved in our consideration of sanctions, amendments, and settlement of disputes. Barely a year ago it might have seemed to a casual observer that these issues were intractable, but, thanks to the constructive spirit of compromise shown by delegations, it now appears that solutions are being identified that should meet the various concerns of all negotiators.

Working Group A has also been successful in continuing and completing the work begun last year on the protocol on inspection procedures. My Government has noted in particular the serious attention that has most recently been given to the issue of procedures for the investigation of alleged use, a subject that has long been of special concern to Canada. In this latter respect,



(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

I might note that my delegation is in the course of distributing to the secretariat copies of a report prepared by one of the experts advising the Verification Research Unit of the Department of External Affairs and International Trade Canada on "Verification methods, handling, and assessments of unusual events in relation to allegations of the use of novel chemical warfare agents". This report develops a methodology for the examination of allegations of the use of novel CW agents and focuses on the need for epidemiological studies and on the type of national infrastructure that might be appropriate to oversee such investigations for a future Canadian national authority. While its general application might seem particularly relevant to longer-term objectives, my authorities hope that it may also prove useful to our ongoing discussions in these negotiations of the problem of novel CW agents.

The other development of particular significance that I wish to take note of here is the work that Working Group A has most recently begun on the question of ad hoc verification, based upon the discussion paper that was submitted earlier this month by our Australian colleague, Ambassador Reese. After careful consideration of the various approaches and proposals in this area, my Government has come to the conclusion that the concept of ad hoc verification must be an essential part of the structure that we are trying to develop to ensure the effective verification of the convention. In our view, ad hoc verification offers the most satisfactory means short of challenge inspection of ensuring that facilities relevant to the goals of the convention are subject to appropriate verification. We are therefore particularly hopeful that, early in the summer session, Working Group A will have productive exchanges on this proposal that will lead to the development of appropriate treaty language.

In highlighting some of the achievements to date in the 1990 session, I have been very conscious of the need to slight neither the other encouraging developments that have taken place nor the magnitude of the tasks that remain. My primary purpose in addressing these particular items has been to suggest that the momentum of 1989 is being continued and we are making considerable progress towards our ultimate goal. This has been due to the conscientious and constructive attitude that the negotiators have been taking towards their work. My Government fully expects that, if this attitude is maintained and strengthened during the summer session, we will have gone a very long way towards resolving most, if not all, of the remaining outstanding problems.

I should, perhaps, not need to add that my Government is fully committed to doing all that it can to assist in realizing our final goal. In closing my comments on this item, I should note, however, that to this end my delegation will also be distributing through the secretariat a number of other documents for the use of delegations in their work. Some of these documents I shall describe in a few moments, but I should like to note here that, as in previous years, we are distributing the latest compendiums of documents comprising the plenary statements and working papers of the 1989 session.



(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

This morning I am also pleased to be able to table a paper describing Canada's first national trial inspection, which is designated CD/987. Since Canada currently has no significant production of schedule 2 chemicals and there was no suitable plant available at the time that could be used as a substitute Canada was unable to participate in the earlier phase of this exercise. However, in keeping with the move to expand the national trial inspections into other areas, such as challenge and ad hoc inspections, Canada decided it could best contribute through an inspection at a simulated single small-scale facility for schedule 1 chemicals.

The trial was carried out in a facility based on an organic synthesis laboratory at the Defence Research Establishment Suffield, where research quantities of schedule 1 chemicals are occasionally prepared for protective purposes. The practicality of the inspection procedures in the "rolling text" was thoroughly tested and a number of suggestions are made in the paper for modifications and improvements. In addition, it was found that the model for facility agreements for single small-scale facilities found in appendix II was more appropriate for larger dedicated facilities and required some adaptation in order to be used for a laboratory. It is our hope that the results of this trial will prove to be a useful contribution to the work of the ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. Further national trial inspections are being considered in Canada, and results will be reported when available.

There are in addition two other papers which we have also asked the secretariat to distribute to you. The first we originally made available in September 1989 during the Canberra Government-Industry Conference against Chemical Weapons. This report, which is entitled "Role and function of a national authority in the implementation of a chemical weapons convention", was prepared by Dr. Ronald Sutherland of the University of Saskatchewan. The report reviews the obligation to the chemical weapons convention of a State party that does not possess chemical weapons. It attempts to assess how such a State party can demonstrate compliance using existing organizations and also suggests the probable costs involved. We hope that this report will be of help both in furthering work on the "rolling text" and to Governments contemplating the establishment of a national authority.



(Mr. Han, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

... The Conference on Disarmament has undertaken this year's work with a new life power against the background of the changing international situation. It is the hope of all participants that it will be possible to submit a draft convention on chemical weapons next year at the latest. It is also the expectation of the international community. The bright prospect for chemical weapons is due to the energetic efforts of Ambassador Morel and his colleagues through difficult technical problems and such significant international meetings as those of Paris and Canberra. I express appreciation once again of these efforts. I am convinced that the final work will result in success under the guidance of Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden, the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons this year.



(Mr. Sharma, India)

My delegation has taken the floor today to present document CD/988, which contains the results of a national trial inspection conducted by India in the context of the proposed chemical weapons convention. The trial inspection was carried out in August 1989 at Searle India, Bombay, a multi-purpose unit manufacturing various drugs. For the purposes of the proposed convention, the facility is manufacturing diisopyramide phosphate from DIPC alcohol which is initially converted into DIPC hydrochloride (DIPC HCl) and then to nitride pyramixetosylate. Another product - propantheline bromide - is also produced by esterification of xanthanoic acid with DIPC HCl. The chemical DIPC HCl is listed in schedule [2] in the current "rolling text".

The inspection was carried out in accordance with the provisions contained in document CD/CW/WP.213 to identify effective means of verifying that the production, processing, consumption and transfer of chemicals are consistent with purposes not prohibited by the proposed chemical weapons convention. The intent of the trial inspection was to develop an adequate system of verification and establish the degree of intrusiveness required while protecting commercial confidentiality. Experience gained from the inspection was very useful in this regard.

Within the proposed convention, verification is one of the most complex areas. A considerable amount of work has been done, though some issues still need to be resolved. The scale of the exercise adds to the complexity. Our approach to the verification issue is based upon certain principles. We believe that these provide an effective set of guidelines for tackling the problems relating to non-production as well as those related to challenge inspection. While the conclusions drawn from the national trial inspection conducted by India are self-evident from document CD/988, which has been circulated today, I would like to reiterate that the principles of universality and non-discrimination are among the most important for any international agreement. For the chemical weapons convention to succeed in enhancing global security it has to be based on universal multilateralism.

The verification régime must be appropriate and adequate, and it should not unduly interfere with legitimate activities. The balance between "appropriate" and "adequate" is a delicate one. With greater interaction with the chemical industry, it should be possible to find the right balance. In developed countries, the importance attached to the fact that verification activities should not be unduly intrusive or interfere with normal commercial activities, especially in sensitive areas of research and development, and also maintain confidentiality of sensitive information, is appreciated. For the developing countries, the additional natural correlated concern is that verification measures should not in any way jeopardize the development of a peaceful chemical industry, which plays a crucial role in national planning and the national economy. Greater openness and transparency will be an important confidence-building measure and lead to increased peaceful co-operation among the developed and developing countries. The development of a verification régime on the basis of these principles can give us a régime acceptable and beneficial to all.

A similar approach can also help us in furthering our work on challenge inspection. Such a measure is likely to be invoked as a last resort, when all other measures have been tried and found inadequate. The procedure should



(Mr. Sharma, India)

therefore reinforce this conclusion. A challenging State has a far-reaching right, but it has to be curtailed by the obligation not to abuse it. The challenged State is obliged to accept such intrusive inspections provided for within the convention, with a right also to satisfactorily demonstrate its compliance with the convention through alternative measures. In view of the political nature of this exercise, it is necessary to balance the rights and obligations of both sides. When the procedures in the post-inspection phase are finally amplified, the principles elaborated above can enable us to develop an effective mechanism that will reflect a truly objective multilateral character.

(Mr. Loeis, Indonesia)

... I have spoken about many issues, which mostly concern nuclear weapons and the effective functioning of the Conference in relation to the present international climate. It may be premature now to judge the work of our Conference. It seems to me, however, that the Conference runs a risk of being outpaced by political events prevailing in the relations among members of the international community, particularly in the East-West context. As the two super-Powers have done well with the strategic arms reduction talks and the negotiations on conventional forces in Europe, I believe that the Conference should match them by setting a self-imposed time frame for the early conclusion of the CW convention if it is not to lag behind.

My delegation is heartened that a number of the obstacles at the technical level which have long impeded efforts to devise a verification régime have now been removed. Such circumstances facilitate the resolution of the remaining political issues. The time is now ripe to elaborate the questions which are more political in nature, such as the crucial issue of universal adherence.

There are many aspects to take into account if we wish to conclude a convention which can attract universal adherence. In addition to the points it raised during its last intervention, my delegation feels that it is of paramount importance that the convention should be non-discriminatory. In particular, it should ensure equal rights and obligations for possessor as well as non-possessor States.

The paramount importance of provisions concerning sanctions, assistance and protection against chemical weapons, and economic and technological development has been mentioned by many speakers during the course of the spring session. My delegation would like to echo the view expressed in this respect by other delegations that provisions which take into account the interests of States which do not possess chemical weapons should be included in the convention. This would, I believe, lead to universal adherence to the convention.



(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

The negotiations on a CW convention yielded further progress this spring - this is our assessment. We regard the drafting of texts on article IV and the annex to article IV, as well as article V and the annex to article V, as an achievement of real significance. The close co-operation between the Soviet Union and the United States produced results which contributed to agreement on important provisions concerning the destruction of CW and CW production facilities. Furthermore, procedures for the investigation of the alleged use of chemical weapons have been developed, and the inspection protocols and annexes have been further streamlined. Solutions are taking shape on a number of legal issues, such as amendments, settlement of disputes and measures to redress a situation and to ensure compliance. We deem it especially remarkable that this year progress has not been confined to provisions of a merely procedural character, but has been extended to matters of substance.

This is all the more important since other matters of substance, such as completion of the verification system by solving the questions of ad hoc inspection and inspection on request, are still awaiting solution. We should make use of the recess to further address these issues. Material offered by the delegations of Australia and the Federal Republic of Germany will be helpful in this regard. We believe that the paper on article IX provided by the Chairman of the ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons deserves special attention. It should be regarded as a bold attempt to overcome a stalemate which has hampered progress on this important subject for a rather long period, adversely affecting the whole of our work on the convention. We would hope that all delegations, especially those which so far have had difficulties with

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

the existing concepts in this field, will open-mindedly approach the ideas in the Chairman's paper. We see a chance that the optimistic start to this year's work will yield further results. My delegation will spare no effort to advance our work on a subject which is of crucial importance to our Government.

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

... The Government of the German Democratic Republic seeks a drastic reduction in all German armed forces. The German Democratic Republic renounces the production, transfer, possession and development of ABC weapons and would like to see a unified Germany take a similar position. Moreover, it favours a global ban on chemical weapons before the end of this year.



The PRESIDENT:

... On chemical weapons, we were able to improve the mandate of the Ad hoc Committee this year. I hope that we can achieve reasonable flexibility in national positions, particularly on some of the political aspects of the negotiations, so that a chemical weapons convention can be concluded at the earliest.

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(The President)

... The negotiations that have made the greatest progress in this Conference are undoubtedly those concerning the chemical weapons convention. In this regard Ambassador Hyltenius, as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, has shown commendable dynamism and efficiency. Under the present circumstances the speediest possible conclusion of the convention is incumbent on the entire international community. We should demonstrate that we can achieve concrete and effective results, multilaterally, that would complement the positive agreements recently reached by the countries possessing the largest stockpiles of chemical weapons. There is an urgent need to arrive at a unified and comprehensive text for a convention providing for the total and final prohibition of chemical weapons, as well as the complete destruction of existing stocks, within the transitional period laid down in the agreement. The text should meet the aspirations of all our countries and should enshrine a universal and non-discriminatory régime for the elimination of chemical weapons. With respect to the bilateral aspect of the present political situation, and without prejudice to extensive and detailed analysis of the situation, I must place on record the general welcome given to the results obtained a few days ago at the presidential summit meeting in Washington between the heads of State of the United States and the Soviet Union. There is no doubt that the 35 per cent cut in the stocks of strategic weapons held by these two Powers will influence the approach this Conference must adopt to halting the nuclear arms race, and we hope that this is a step that will immediately be followed by others, as we move towards the aim of general and complete disarmament. Special mention should be made of the bilateral agreements concerning the destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles. The substantial percentage to be destroyed under the agreement, and the link between the destruction of the remaining percentage and the conclusion of the convention on a chemical weapons ban which is under negotiation in this forum, should spur our countries on to exercise maximum political will in this Conference.



(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

It is the view of my Government that all military forces should be dealt with in the appropriate forums, and that no single category of weapons, be they nuclear, chemical or conventional, can be excluded in the search for security at lower levels of armaments. Sweden would like to challenge those who may wish to pursue a selective logic, arguing in favour of disarmament and openness in certain fields, but not in others. Furthermore, time will show that it is essential to prevent the circumvention of agreements reached in other areas by means of changes in naval force structures. And maybe it is time for a little optimism in this respect. It now seems possible that sea-launched cruise missiles will be encompassed in forthcoming bilateral agreements. This may be a breakthrough.

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(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

Sweden welcomes the important agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union to halt the production of chemical weapons and to start the destruction of the bulk of their chemical weapons stocks. The logical consequence should be an undertaking to proceed with the destruction of their entire chemical weapons stocks. It is therefore with some disappointment that we have learned that the idea of keeping 2 per cent of the stocks until all chemical-weapon-capable States have joined an international chemical weapons convention has survived the summit meeting. Only on the basis of an unambiguous undertaking not to use chemical weapons and to destroy them entirely can the work on a chemical weapons convention in Geneva be crowned with success.

The United Nations General Assembly stated last autumn that the 1990 session of the Conference on Disarmament would be of pivotal importance in the negotiations on a chemical weapons convention. There are in fact several reasons for viewing the situation with some optimism. The mandate for the negotiations was improved at the beginning of this year's session. An increasing number of States are participating in the negotiations, and progress has been made in all the working groups. The two leading military Powers have contributed significantly to the work of this Conference on a multilateral chemical weapons convention by submitting several texts, most recently on the order of destruction of chemical weapons and on chemical weapons production facilities. It is crucial that they continue to contribute actively to these negotiations and that they now devote even more effort to this work.

It is also a source of satisfaction that an increasing number of States are conducting trial inspections to test the viability of the draft "rolling text" and to prepare themselves for the entry into force of the convention. In this context, I should like to mention that Sweden has just carried out a trial inspection under article IX at a military facility. The Swedish delegation will submit a report on this inspection as soon as possible.



(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

The consultations conducted by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee have clearly borne out the importance that all delegations attach to universal adherence to the Convention. My delegation welcomes initiatives to hold regional conferences on this vital subject. The conference at Ma'in in Jordan last month made an important contribution by highlighting the particular implications of the chemical weapons convention in the Middle East.

This year, the work of the Committee has largely focused on the political issues. It is high time that agreement was reached on at least some of them. For example, it should not be too difficult to agree on article X on assistance and protection, article XI on economic and technological development, and article XIII on amendments. As regards another, more difficult issue, namely article IX, the Chairman has presented a comprehensive draft text in an attempt to make a new start on the basis of the useful work done under previous chairmen. If this draft can be accepted as a basis for negotiations, it would be a decisive step forward. Work could take place in parallel on all aspects of verification in the convention. It should then be possible to bring this work to its conclusion before the end of this year's session.

The Convention is within reach. Decisive efforts should now be made to resolve the remaining problems. No obstacles must be allowed to impede agreement on a non-discriminatory convention which will ensure the complete prohibition of the use of chemical weapons and their total elimination. Several avenues must be explored to ensure universal adherence. All States which are participating in the negotiations here in the CD should consider making a declaration of intent, individually or collectively, to become original parties to the forthcoming convention. Sweden for its part intends to become one of the original parties to the convention. In this context, I propose the convening of a well-prepared conference at ministerial level, aimed at achieving the simultaneous signing by all States.

The decision by the United States and the Soviet Union to place two of their intermediate-range nuclear missiles side by side in museums in Moscow and Washington is profoundly symbolic. As the super-Powers eventually approach the final elimination of their strategic nuclear weapons, it would be equally appropriate if they similarly reserved a couple of strategic missiles as well to be exhibited in museums. Likewise, I hope that, here in the Conference on Disarmament, we will soon be in a position to consign the last chemical weapons to a museum. A museum is where these weapons rightly belong.



(Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

... We have all been impressed by the recent summit between Presidents Bush and Gorbachev. Though higher-level contacts between the two great Powers have recently ceased to be unusual, every new meeting of this kind is rightly regarded as a most significant event in international life. The last one is no exception, in spite of the fact that this time, the mass media did not provide, in my opinion, the same extensive coverage of the event as they did on previous occasions. I am sure that our Soviet and American colleagues will generously help us fill this information gap - something that we are also becoming used to in the Conference on Disarmament. Especially since the results of the meeting in the field of disarmament, which we wholeheartedly welcome, have a direct bearing on the CD. This is particularly true for the agreement on chemical weapons. We hope that it will help speed up the conclusion of the multilateral convention under negotiation in the Conference.

Mr. BRECKON (United States of America):

... When Ambassador Ledogar reported to you on 24 April regarding the results of the fifteenth bilateral round of United States/USSR discussions on chemical weapons, he expressed the joint hope of both countries that a new bilateral chemical weapon agreement would be signed at the summit meeting, and that it would be possible to report further progress toward a global, comprehensive chemical weapons ban. I am pleased to report that this hope has been fulfilled. On 1 June, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev signed a bilateral agreement which calls for the destruction of the vast bulk of the United States and Soviet declared chemical weapons stockpiles, with on-site inspections to confirm that destruction has taken place. To promote the objective of a global ban, both countries have agreed they will not produce chemical weapons when the bilateral destruction agreement enters into force or thereafter, and they will encourage all chemical-weapons-capable States to follow suit.

Key provisions of the bilateral CW destruction agreement are as follows: destruction of the vast bulk of declared stocks to begin by the end of 1992; destruction of at least 50 per cent of declared stocks by the end of 1999; declared stocks to be reduced to 5,000 agent tons by the year 2002; both countries agree not to produce chemical weapons upon entry into force of this agreement and thereafter without waiting for the global chemical weapons ban; on-site inspections during and after the destruction process to confirm that destruction has taken place; annual exchanges of data on the stockpile levels to facilitate monitoring of the declared stockpiles; details of the inspection procedures will be worked out by 31 December 1990; both countries will co-operate in developing and using safe and environmentally sound methods of



(Mr. Breckon, United States)

destruction; the United States and USSR will take steps to encourage all chemical-weapons-capable States to become parties to the multilateral convention. Both countries took an initial step in this direction by exchanging data on declared chemical weapons stockpiles in December 1989.

The bilateral United States-Soviet agreement was designed to provide new impetus to the conclusion of a comprehensive verifiable global chemical weapons ban at the earliest possible date. Toward that end, both countries have agreed to accelerate their destruction of chemical weapons under a global chemical weapons convention so that by the eighth year after it enters into force, the United States and USSR will have reduced their declared stocks to no more than 500 agent tons. In addition, the United States and USSR will propose that a special conference be convened at the end of the eighth year of a multilateral convention to determine whether participation in the convention is sufficient to complete the elimination of chemical weapons stocks over the following two years. In this regard, you should note that we will have specific modalities to propose regarding the procedures that will apply at this eighth-year conference, to ensure that its objectives regarding participation are achieved.

The summit meeting was also the occasion for the United States and USSR to release a joint statement on non-proliferation. This statement addresses the problems of proliferation in the nuclear weapons, missile technology and chemical weapons fields, notes our agreement to work closely together and with other members of the international community to develop and put into action concrete measures against the proliferation of these types of weapons, and calls on other nations to join a renewed commitment to effective non-proliferation measures as a means of securing international peace and stability and as a step toward the effective limitation world-wide of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, missiles, and missile technology. Of specific interest to this Conference, the joint statement reaffirms the commitment of the United States and the Soviet Union to a global, verifiable ban as the best long-term solution to chemical weapons proliferation. In this statement, the United States and the USSR further undertake to expedite the CW negotiations with a view to finalizing the draft convention at the earliest date.

In closing, may I add that the summit meeting recorded significant and concrete achievements in a number of other relevant areas as well. My statement this morning, however, is intended to address just those areas of immediate importance for the future work of the Conference. In this regard, Minister Batsanov and I will be asking you to circulate as Conference documents the texts of the bilateral CW agreement and the joint statement on non-proliferation.



Mr. DIETZE (German Democratic Republic):

... Mr. President, my statement today refers to item 4 of the Conference's agenda, i.e. the negotiations on chemical weapons. Like many other members of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, the German Democratic Republic accords high priority to the conclusion of work on the convention on a general, comprehensive and effectively verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons at the earliest date. In order to encourage the speedy continuation of the negotiations on a CW convention and to gain experience in translating the already elaborated parts of the convention into practice, trial inspections were conducted in the German Democratic Republic, also in the field of challenge inspection. The three working papers I should like to introduce

(continued)



(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

today are based on the experience gained by such an inspection in a chemical industry plant. The report on an inspection in the military field will presumably be submitted to you soon.

I should like to offer some explanatory remarks concerning the documents at hand. The inspection was carried out in March of this year in the WOFATOX factory of Chemistry AG, Bitterfeld, a facility producing the organophosphorous pesticide parathion-methyl. The aim of this inspection was to develop and test an inspection methodology for challenge inspections in industrial plants. Inspection procedures and time frames were not the primary objectives of the trial.

The results and preliminary conclusions are set forth in working paper CD/996 entitled "Report on a Trial Challenge Inspection in a Chemical Industry Plant" before you.

A detailed description of the inspection methodology developed is contained in the second document, CD/997, entitled "Inspection Methodology for Challenge Inspections in Industrial Chemical Plants". The approach designed for our trial challenge inspection was a "layered inspection methodology", i.e. a step-by-step approach. More intrusive steps were triggered off by the results of the preceding less-intrusive inspection layers. That approach was considered to allow an inspection team to develop its actual inspection strategy depending on the specific situation at the site. Four such inspection layers were designed.

The third working paper, CD/998, addresses questions concerning chemical analytics and a prototype measuring instrument, i.e. a portable PC-supported ion mobility spectrometer, which was tested in these experiments for verification purposes. This instrument was used in laboratory experiments and in the actual inspection. It was to demonstrate the feasibility of exploiting memory effects in a chemical plant in order to identify residues of former production at trace level.

Thanks to the support of Mrs. Rautio, the prototype instrument was introduced in the Technical Group on Instrumentation last Tuesday and a detailed description was presented to our distinguished experts.

It is not by chance that questions of methodology have been in the focus of our investigations. Thereby, the delegation of the German Democratic Republic is continuing the work it commenced on this issue in its working papers CD/CW/WP.198 and 208. We are acting on the assumption that a sound inspection methodology, especially for challenge inspections, can conduce, firstly,

- to carrying out such inspections with a high degree of efficiency and credibility; and secondly,
- to excluding the unjust disclosure of confidential information.



(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

We deem it instrumental that such an inspection methodology, which is founded on objective criteria and applied according to the specific circumstances, ensures the stability of the verification régimes of the CW convention. The elaboration, improvement and streamlining of such verification methodologies will surely be within the responsibility of the future CW organization's technical secretariat. By the working papers at hand, my delegation intends to contribute to a better understanding of the nature of challenge inspections and to help resolve still outstanding problems.

Mr. GARCIA MORITAN (Argentina) (translated from Spanish):

... There has been no slackening in the international dynamic since we ended the first part of this year's session - far from it. We have witnessed events tending to confirm a period of change and revision of patterns which seemed to be immutable elements of reality. Meanwhile, another summit meeting of the Presidents of the two States which have major arsenals of nuclear, chemical and conventional weapons has marked the continuity of dialogue at the highest level on matters of international security.

From the results announced by the press, one may hazard the guess that both super-Powers continue to be reasonably committed to the objective of reducing their nuclear arsenals even further. However, the information at our disposal is scanty and we confess that we are somewhat surprised that the delegations whose Heads of State were the protagonists in such an important international political event have not informed the plenary of the Conference about the results of the summit meeting.

We have been told about a bilateral agreement on chemical weapons and the adoption of a joint declaration on the non-proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons and missile technology. Beyond that, the Conference on Disarmament knows little. The implications of this fact deserve attention not only from the point of view of the oft-mentioned complementarity of the multilateral and the bilateral system but also, and perhaps much more, when we see that the summit dealt with and agreed on documents in such fields as nuclear testing, which, let us remember, is still the item that heads the agenda of this Conference.



(Mr. Garcia Moritan, Argentina)

... Without prejudice to the option of speaking again on this subject in greater detail on another occasion, I consider it important to point out that the emergence of two negotiating authorities on the same subject - chemical weapons - one in a multilateral framework and, simultaneously, the other in a bilateral one between the United States and the Soviet Union, is beginning to show some jagged edges that I would venture to describe as disquieting.

No one can doubt that it is a good thing for the two super-Powers to reach agreement on the elimination of weapons. However, in the specific case of chemical weapons, there exists an ongoing intense multilateral process in which many of our countries are investing a significant amount of political energy and willingness to commit ourselves. In view of this reality and of the existence of a rolling text which, given the necessary political will would now be a treaty, it must be noted that bilateral agreements and arrangements are beginning to take shape that are attached like juridical artificial limbs to the general text of the convention, generating a two-track method of negotiation, in which States negotiate with one eye on a table seating 40 States (plus observers) and the other on what may be negotiated in other, more limited forums.

We believe that the trend we are referring to is harmful in that it ultimately legitimizes an implicit veto that reintroduces situations which we thought were a thing of the past in multilateral negotiations on disarmament and which establish categories - perhaps it would be more appropriate to call them hierarchies - of States, depending on whether or not they possess the

(Mr. Garcia Moritan, Argentina)

weapons that are to be eliminated. This is not the approach which, in our view, should be given priority if we are seeking a convention with universal participation.



(Mr. Karhilo, Finland)

... Mr. President, the bilateral agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States on the destruction of the bulk of their chemical weapons, which

(continued)



(Mr. Karhilo, Finland)

was signed at the Washington summit, is a timely one. It is self-evident that the countries with the largest arsenals should be the first in the disarmament process. By starting the gradual elimination of their chemical weapons these two countries are assuming in earnest their responsibility for the successful conclusion of the CW negotiations in this Conference.

The commitment by the United States and the Soviet Union to work for an early conclusion of the global CW convention and to give precedence to the provisions of that convention over the terms of their own bilateral agreement should be a catalyst to our efforts. It is now up to the international community as a whole to make sure that the precedence given to the global convention will in practice lead to a faster rather than to a slower timetable for the destruction of existing stocks in their entirety.

Finland has consistently emphasized that the commitment to destroy all chemical weapons within the 10 year period should be unconditional. We have also felt that an attempt to determine who is CW-capable and who is not may become a wild-goose chase which can only be satisfactorily solved when all countries are included. If completion of the destruction is linked to the findings of a conference close to the end of the 10 year period, a degree of uncertainty of the final outcome would prevail, unless participation is universal from the beginning. In the latter case, examination of the participation of the convention would become a theoretical exercise and all parties could be assured of total destruction of chemical weapons from the outset. Consequently, universality and its achievement is a vital goal, which we have to keep in mind when we discuss the details.

For many countries, as for Finland, the chemical weapons convention is primarily a security treaty which deals with weapons, not with chemicals as such or with industrial development. For these countries, the convention has to provide for increased or, as a minimum, undiminished security either in their particular setting or in general. However, for a larger number of countries chemical weaponry is not a primary factor. When they join, they are, however, equally subjected to intrusive inspections and have to pay their share of the costs of the organization. If we are to achieve universality, the convention has to be made attractive to this latter group of countries as well. Hence there is a necessity to include in the Convention also a component, such as article XI, which provides the necessary incentive to join. It cannot be disregarded either that for a number of countries for whom the security concerns are of primary importance, article XI provides an important additional incentive.

For its own part Finland intends to be among the original parties to the convention.

Mr. President, I would like now to deal in more detail with a number of specific aspects of the future convention.

As is well known in this Conference, Finland has for a long time centred its own activities on verification analysis and instrumentation. We have been glad to see that interest in these technical issues has been growing rapidly



(Mr. Karhilo, Finland)

during the last year or so. Meetings of the Technical Group on Instrumentation seem to become a regular part of the work programme rather than remain isolated events. There is also a growing tendency to increase national resources devoted to CW verification research.

It is often said that once the remaining political issues are resolved, the other pieces will fall into place. But it is also true that the speed of dealing with these other pieces is largely determined by the technical credibility of the proposed verification régime. Many of the technical details can and indeed must be left to the Preparatory Commission. Nevertheless, before that can be done there must be a clear understanding of the technical requirements of the convention and of the ways to meet them reliably.

As a first attempt to test and possibly improve the reliability of the analytical methods that the verification mechanism depends on, 10 laboratories organized an international inter-laboratory comparison test, a so-called round-robin test, last autumn. The Finnish Project on the Verification of Chemical Disarmament acted as the co-ordinating laboratory of that test. A summary of the results of that test was circulated in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons last April (CD/CW/WP.288). The full account of all the findings has been prepared and will be circulated shortly in the Blue Book series. A second round-robin test with more laboratories participating will be conducted later this year. It is our view that comparison tests of this kind should in time become routine exercises in international methods development.

The second novel activity that Finland has been engaged in is the training programme on CW verification methods for analytical chemists from developing countries. The first four-month long course was completed in May this year. I am glad to report that the course surpassed our highest expectations. That, of course, is as much due to the dedication and enthusiasm of the participants, who came from Brazil, Kenya and Pakistan, as to the organizers themselves. A detailed report of the experiences gained during the programme will be prepared for the Blue Book series next year on the basis of experience gathered from three courses by then.

The second training course will start in the coming August. The invitation to nominate candidates for next year's two courses was circulated some time ago and we hope to receive the nominations before 15 September. I can also add that, as of next year, we will be able to increase the number of participants in these courses so as to reach eight chemists per year.

Finland fully shares the concern of the international community of the spread of chemical weapons. We have passed new legislation to control the export of CW precursors. This new legislation which enters into force next month covers a list of 37 precursors under export-licensing requirements. Thirteen additional precursor chemicals will be placed on a warning list. As appears from the Finnish data relevant to the CW convention as provided to the Conference (CD/CW/WP.297) there is no production in Finland of any of the scheduled substances, except in laboratory quantities for protective and research purposes. There are only four facilities altogether which use five of the Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals in their processes.



(Mr. Karhilo, Finland)

Mr. President, the detailed structure of the technical secretariat of the future organization has not yet been subject to discussion. However, with regard to the laboratory side of the organization we have worked on the assumption that there will be a need for a central laboratory and a global network of other designated laboratories. The central laboratory would be the primary tool of the technical secretariat for organizing the necessary analytical work, for maintaining the high quality standards, and for any research and development programmes the organization may wish to undertake. The designated laboratories would perform the duties which in the present rolling text are assigned to off-site laboratories.

It is with these considerations in mind that the Government of Finland has made the offer to place our own existing verification laboratory at the disposal of the future organization for use as the central laboratory.

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(Miss Solesby, United Kingdom)

... Of particular relevance to our work here in Geneva for a chemical weapons convention is the solemn statement made by Ministers that "all allies hereby state their intention to be among the original signatories to the [chemical weapons] convention and to promote its early entry into force. We call on all other States to undertake a similar commitment".

Ministers express satisfaction with the United States/USSR Agreement that will drastically reduce both sides' stocks of chemical weapons. They believe that this will provide great impetus towards the earliest possible conclusion of the convention being negotiated here in Geneva, which remains a goal of all members of NATO. Ministers also reaffirm their determination to work to prevent the proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons and all missiles capable of carrying such weapons.



(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

... Another important reason for ensuring stability is that the world today still carries the burden of over-armament characterized by huge arsenals of nuclear, chemical and conventional weapons. Our country, too, has accumulated a large amount of weapons. We are fully conscious of the responsibility that this imposes upon us. For a whole series of domestic reasons and foreign-policy considerations, the Soviet Union is now no less interested than other States - possibly even more so - in the steady advancement of the arms control and disarmament process. However, disarmament is, of course, not an end in itself but only one of the means for building the secure, democratic and civilized world which we need and part of which we wish to be. But without disarmament it is impossible to create a new world order and new security structures.

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

... A serious cause of the continuing threat of the proliferation of nuclear weapons lies not in the fact that the efforts of the USSR and the United States in the field of nuclear disarmament are allegedly insufficiently effective as yet, but rather in a growing potential for instability and a high

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

concentration of non-nuclear weapons in various parts of the world. In this respect the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is an integrated problem and is linked with the search for solutions to other regional disarmament issues (in particular, non-proliferation of chemical weapons, missiles and missile technology, limitations on the arms trade, etc.), as well as the reduction of tension in zones of potential conflict and crisis situations. At the summit meeting the USSR and the United States adopted a comprehensive statement setting out specific avenues for interaction between them in various of these areas, as well as for co-operation with other countries. It reflects a common recognition of the fact that the accelerating process of arms reduction must be strengthened with measures aimed at countering the spread of weapons throughout the world. The USSR and the United States have also made substantial efforts to settle regional conflicts.



(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

... In conclusion, a few words on chemical weapons. It is generally recognized that in present circumstances the most promising direction in the work of the Conference is the drawing up of a convention on this subject. Great importance is attached to the Soviet-American agreement on chemical weapons in this regard. The USSR and the United States are to begin to implement its major provisions without waiting for the convention to be concluded. The obligation not to produce chemical weapons is of special importance, in our view, within the context of this bilateral agreement. Indeed, it is a corner-stone of the future multilateral convention. And the fact that the USSR and the United States have agreed to assume such an obligation without waiting for the convention to be completed is, in our view, convincing evidence of the readiness of the parties to the bilateral agreement to work for the early conclusion of the multilateral convention. For the USSR, this also means that its unilateral decision to stop production of chemical weapons (and this was done in 1987) will be formalized as an international treaty, thus settling unequivocally and irrevocably the question of whether Soviet society will devote new resources to the production of chemical weapons.

The bilateral agreement provides that, at the multilateral negotiations, the USSR and the United States will introduce a proposal to hold a special conference at the end of the eighth year after the convention enters into force, to decide by a majority vote whether the participation in the convention is sufficient for the final destruction of chemical weapons. The joint statement contains details of this proposal. In this connection, I would like, not just on behalf of my delegation, but also on behalf of the United States delegation, to draw the attention of the distinguished delegates to a working paper in the CD/CW/WP.... series, but I think without a number as yet - this is an advance copy which is before you. Both our delegations plan to dwell in greater detail thereon in due course and in the appropriate context, and this step has been undertaken in pursuance of the bilateral agreement signed on 1 June in Washington.

Now turning back to my own statement, I would like to stress that here we have a compromise proposal that takes into account both elements of the United States proposal known as the "2 per cent" proposal, and the criticism of that initial American proposal by the USSR and a number of other participants in the negotiations. Both the need to evaluate participation in the convention by States which are important from the point of view of its



(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

effectiveness, and the importance of avoiding incentives to acquire chemical weapons, are taken into account. Moreover, this proposal stimulates States possessing chemical weapons to become original parties to the convention.

Finally, with all due respect to those who have criticized this proposal, I would like to say that I do not in any way share their perception of attempts to impose some sort of Soviet-American diktat, or a wish on the part of the two countries to force their decisions upon other participants in the negotiations. The bilateral agreement clearly states that the two sides have agreed to introduce the proposal - and I stress, the proposal - at the Conference on Disarmament. And this, of course, is the legitimate right of every participant in the negotiations. For our part, we are satisfied with this joint approach and we will champion its advantages in our future work. At the same time, we consider it essential to step up efforts to solve the problem of the universality of the future convention.

In this connection, I should like to return to the statement adopted by the NATO foreign ministers at Turnberry, and specifically the passage in which the members of the North Atlantic bloc state their intention to be among the first to sign the future convention. We welcome that declaration. Of course we also welcome the even more far-reaching statements made here by Sweden and Finland concerning their readiness to become original participants. We have great hopes that during the summer session of the Conference, the multilateral negotiations on chemical weapons will acquire new dynamism, which, unfortunately, they have sometimes been lacking in recent times. Strictly speaking, not much remains to be done, and it is important to lay a solid foundation within the remaining time to solve all outstanding issues, first and foremost those concerning definitions and challenge inspections, ad hoc inspections, assistance to victims of CW use, etc.



(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

... I hope that the latest agreement between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the destruction and non-production of chemical weapons and measures to facilitate the multilateral convention on banning chemical weapons will serve as a catalyst in our common endeavour to achieve the early conclusion of a global convention. I also believe that the future convention on the banning of chemical weapons is a unique one with its innovative approach to a number of traditionally extremely difficult problems. I am confident that the carefully crafted procedures on verification and implementation will serve as a model for future multilateral disarmament agreements.

It is a pleasure for me to announce that the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic has decided to withdraw the reservation it made on the ratification of the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. In our view such a step constitutes an important measure to strengthen the prohibition régime envisaged in the Protocol.

(The President)

... On 14 and 15 June, at the kind invitation of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, almost all the representatives accredited to the Conference on Disarmament visited the training and research centre at Munster, enabling us to acquaint ourselves on the spot with the various aspects and stages of the process of detection and destruction of chemical weapons, as well as the practical application of some verification methods. On behalf of my delegation and the Conference I wish to request Ambassador von Wagner to convey to his Government our gratitude for its kind hospitality and the excellent organization of that most useful visit.

As you know, the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has also resumed its work under the capable guidance of Ambassador Carl-Magnus Hyltenius of Sweden. With respect to this item I should mention in particular the meeting

(The President)

taking place currently with representatives of the chemical industry which is due to end tomorrow and which, I think, will be very useful in ascertaining the views of the private sector on the various aspects of the draft convention, for example the question of confidentiality.



(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

... The advanced state of negotiations on the convention on the elimination of chemical weapons and a favourable political climate amplified by the recent actions of the two major possessors of these weapons permit me to conclude that the Conference on Disarmament is capable of finalizing its work on the convention in the very near future.

Poland actively participates in the efforts towards this goal. The Polish Government reaffirms its readiness to be among the original signatories of the convention. Poland also wishes to declare its willingness to abide by the provisions of the convention prior to its entry into force. My country neither produces nor stockpiles chemical weapons. It has no intention of doing so. We are prepared to accept - on the basis of reciprocity - verification of declared data with respect to all Polish military facilities, as well as the chemical industry and business activities within the scope of the convention.

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Mr. MECKEL (German Democratic Republic) (translated from German):

... The German Democratic Republic has renounced the production, proliferation and possession of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and would like to see an article to the same effect included in the constitution of a unified Germany. Chemical weapons as well as all nuclear weapons have to be withdrawn from German soil. It is our objective that a future Germany should resolutely stand up for disarmament in Europe and the world at large. Part of the arms spending by the two German States could be used to fund an all-German development policy. Over and above this, I support the proposal made by Willy Brandt and the Federal President Richard von Weizsäcker to make available one third of the resources saved in the future through armament cuts for economic growth in developing countries.

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(Mr. Meckel, GDR)

In many United Nations resolutions and declarations the international community has come out in favour of complementary disarmament talks at the bilateral, regional and global levels. However, a glaring contrast has become apparent of late between rapid progress in Soviet-American and European talks, on the one hand, and a failure to make sufficient use of global bodies, on the other.

The prohibition of chemical weapons, which is an issue of the utmost priority, especially here at this Conference, constitutes the only exception so far.

By speedily finalizing a convention, your Conference would make a substantial contribution to the process of disarmament, lending it a global dimension. A universal ban on these weapons of mass destruction would constitute the best foundation for harnessing chemistry, free from distrust, to the advantage of all States and peoples.



Much has been accomplished in recent years. The agreement signed in Washington to reduce the CW arsenals of the Soviet Union and the United States is generating fresh momentum. The agreed termination of the manufacture of chemical weapons is a landmark decision that may become the starting point for practical action to finalize the convention shortly.

I would like to submit the following suggestions for consideration:

First, could not the other States owning chemical weapons also cease to manufacture these weapons of mass destruction and provide information about their stockpiles?

Second, could not all other States renounce the acquisition of chemical weapons and declare that? Even before the convention takes effect the non-proliferation of chemical weapons must become a well-established law of international life;

Third, could not the participants in the Disarmament Conference seize the unique opportunity of the international climate to intensify their work for the banning of all chemical weapons?

And finally, should not every effort be made even today to make the convention a truly universal agreement after its completion?

The treaty will truly be effective if it bans chemical weapons outright, thus enhancing the security of all parties and of the world at large.

As we see it, the purpose of a reliable system of verification would be to ensure compliance with the treaty and to build confidence.

It must be effective as well as cost-effective and realistic. For this reason we support efforts to improve the monitoring of civilian chemical industry through ad hoc inspections so that the international community may be certain that no chemical weapons are being produced.

Inspections on challenge that may take place at any time and at any place remain a last resort for settling problems relating to compliance with treaty provisions. Given the sensitive nature of this issue, it will be necessary to find prudent and well-balanced solutions. The proposal put forward in April by the Chairman of the Chemical Weapons Committee marks such an approach to this key political question.

Negotiations should, at any rate, focus on the still open key issues, notably in the domain of verification. They must not get bogged down in technical details of secondary importance, which can be resolved even after the conclusion of the convention.

Surely, it would be appropriate now to conduct the negotiations without any major interruptions to the point where the convention can be concluded. The Committee Chairman should receive the necessary mandate.

What counts in the period ahead is the will to succeed. On balance, it would seem that the time has come: to reach a fundamental understanding on those basic obligations under the convention which have been more or less finalized; to map out the road for the solution of questions that remain open;



to fix a time-scale for the final stages of the work. The forthcoming session of the United Nations General Assembly could be the proper forum for reaching such an agreement. I believe that the objective of banning a whole class of weapons of mass destruction justifies the effort.

The increased number of participants, attributable to the presence of new observers this year, will make for a wider representation of interests and for greater international acceptance of the convention. Simultaneously, the dialogue on accession should be conducted within a regional framework. We are in touch with member States of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and of NATO. Australia has set a good example with the initiative it has taken. The commitment of the general public - I am thinking of the recent seminar on chemical weapons of the Society of Friends (Quakers) in the Middle East - also deserves our respect.

It is beyond any doubt that the two German States or a united Germany will sign the convention as soon as it has been finalized. This is, among other things, our debt to history. It was German troops who were the first to employ chemical weapons at Ypres in 1915.

I would like to assure you that the German Democratic Republic will continue to play an active part in the negotiations as long as it exists and will take its commitment into a united Germany. We will give others the benefit of our experience from trial inspections and from the development of verification technology, and we are prepared to take further confidence-building measures. Let me tell you that my delegation chairing a working group will do its utmost to promote the solution of such important aspects of the convention as sanctions and the resolution of disputes.

Together with the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic will make arrangements for the implementation of the projected convention in a united Germany.

In the shape of the Biological Weapons Convention, an agreement to ban an entire class of mass destruction weapons has been in force for 15 years. If the convention were strengthened by verification measures, this would surely have a major effect in terms of confidence-building. This is what we expect the next Review Conference to do. Scientists in my country want to contribute to this goal by arranging an international colloquium on the prevention of a biological and toxin arms race, due to be held at Kühlungsborn, German Democratic Republic, in September this year.



Mr. VAERNO (Norway):

... I have asked for the floor today in order to present two working papers. The first paper deals with verification of alleged use of chemical weapons and is based on research carried out by the Division for Environmental Toxicology at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, while the other paper summarizes the results of an international symposium on seismological aspects of nuclear test ban verification, which was held in Norway earlier this year.

The first working paper (CD/1008-CD/CW/WP.298), on verification of alleged use of chemical weapons, gives a summary of this year's research report. It represents a continuation of the work being carried out at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment on this subject since 1981 and reported to the Conference on Disarmament in annual reports. During the current year, the Defence Research Establishment conducted an investigation to optimize the sample preparation method referred to as sorbent extraction. The aim of the investigation was to find a general procedure which can be used for screening samples suspected of being contaminated with chemical warfare agents.

The sorbent extraction technique is based on the principle of absorption of chemical compounds from an aqueous solution passed through a cartridge containing a polymer sorbent. With this technique the chemical agents are retained on the sorbent. This procedure has the advantages of not requiring advanced laboratory equipment and of being executable in the field close to a contaminated area. The sample is concentrated on a cartridge, thus reducing the quantity of material which has to be transported back to the laboratory and also making it easy to handle.

There are several factors which may affect the efficiency of sorbent extraction used in verification of alleged use of chemical weapons. In this report different non-polar sorbents have been tested to find which is most efficient in retaining the chemical warfare agents tabun, sarin, soman, VX, mustard gas and some related phosphorous compounds from aqueous solutions.

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(Mr. Varenø, Norway)

Both the amount of sorbent and the sample volume have been examined to find the optimal combination. Another factor which I would like to stress in particular is the temperature conditions for the samples, both during storage and transport. This has been studied to find the requirements needed to prevent degradation of the chemical warfare agents and thereby increase the possibility for a reliable verification.



Mrs. RAUTIO (Finland): I have asked for the floor to introduce the latest Blue Book, which has been circulated and will be issued as a CD document (CD/1009). Rather than being a totally Finnish contribution to the Conference on Disarmament, the 1990 Blue Book presents a detailed description of the results of an interlaboratory comparison (round-robin) test of which a working paper (CD/CW/WP.288) has already been circulated jointly by Australia, Canada, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

The aim of the exercise was to test existing procedures for sample preparation and analysis and to determine whether standard operating procedures would be required for the future Convention. It was not the intention of the exercise to choose laboratories for verification purposes as this will be the task of the Preparatory Commission.

Each laboratory received similar air and soil samples. The laboratories were free to choose their own methods for sample preparation and analysis, on the condition that all methods and instruments should be described in detail. The main objective was to identify agents and their degradation products qualitatively. After all laboratories had reported their findings the laboratory which had prepared the samples provided details of sample preparation, spiking chemicals and their concentrations in the samples. The experimental details of the test were discussed by the analysts in a meeting at the end of March. Before publication the draft of the Blue Book was sent to the participating laboratories for review.

All participating laboratories considered the round-robin test very useful. The samples were planned in such a way that the capability and skill of the laboratories would be demonstrated. The test showed the importance of proper handling of the samples during transport and in the laboratory before the samples are prepared for analysis. Sample-preparation is the most important step in the whole analytical procedure. Mistakes during sample-preparation cannot be corrected later on and thus they could jeopardize the final results. The exercise also clearly demonstrated the potential of the present analytical methods. It showed the value of chromatographic methods for screening purposes and the feasibility of obtaining unambiguous identification of chemical warfare agents in environmental samples by two independent spectrometric methods.

In the present report the term "Standard Operating Procedure" has been revised to "Recommended Operating Procedure" in order not to discourage laboratories from developing new and better methods.

Chapters 2 to 5 of the report comprise descriptions of the procedures used by the laboratories and relevant conclusions from the test are drawn in chapter 6. Chapter 7 presents the Recommended Operating Procedures as discussed by the analysts. However, as the time was too short to allow agreement of details of the procedures, some of them may reflect the views of the Finnish laboratory only and we acknowledge full responsibility for that. These procedures should be regarded as a basis for further discussions following the second round-robin test and not as the ultimate recommended procedures.



(Mrs. Rautio, Finland)

The Finnish CW-Project has drawn from this experiment the conclusion that continuous method development for sampling, sample-preparation, and analysis during the forthcoming years of the chemical weapons convention will be important to the success of the implementation of the convention. This analytical field cannot afford to stand aside from the research and development which lies at the very heart of science. Accordingly, method development will be one principal task of the future verification laboratories supporting the implementation of the convention. We nevertheless believe that the methods actually used for verification analyses will have to be approved by the Technical Secretariat in order to create confidence among States Parties that the results of the analyses do not vary from one laboratory to another. Recommended Operating Procedures, tested by all verification laboratories, could be used as the first choice in the analysis. In addition to the approved methods, the laboratories may well use methods they themselves have developed and found superior to the approved ones. Such new methods could, after due evaluation and testing, become Recommended Procedures. This approach would encourage the laboratories to improve their own methods with a view to getting them accepted as Recommended Procedures.

This principle of continuous development means that the future Technical Secretariat has to arrange the testing of new methods and get them approved as soon as possible. The merits of such testing are clearly demonstrated in the present round-robin test.

A compilation of Recommended Procedures would be invaluable to laboratories of countries without long experience in the analysis of chemical warfare agents but which should be able to acquire necessary technical competence to do verification analyses. This is important for the National Authorities for the implementation of the future convention and would also facilitate participation in the international verification as a designated laboratory. In this way recommended procedures could support wider geographical distribution of designated laboratories and universal adherence to the convention.



(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

... The complexity of the problems that we have to solve stems from the fact that we are a multilateral forum dealing with global disarmament. Furthermore, tremendous differences can be seen not only between States' interests but also between the concrete situations in various regions. Here it is particularly hard to find common denominators. This is an objectively difficult task and it cannot be fully accomplished by remaining within the framework of the problem of disarmament, for disarmament - particularly global disarmament - is not an isolated process. Here there are bound up into one bundle both the problems of regional conflicts and such global "sore points" as development strategy, prevention of the spread of technologies facilitating the development of nuclear or chemical weapons, missiles or other arms, and the problems of strategic stability and global and regional military balances. Therefore, the resolution of the problems of global disarmament does not, of course, depend solely on the reform of the Conference.

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

... That global multilateral disarmament negotiations are really possible is shown by the work on the banning of chemical weapons. It represents the first, experiment of its kind, and consequently an especially valuable one, an experiment in thrashing out answers to literally all the questions in a truly multilateral organ. Going together with it, and, as we see it, going together not badly on the whole, are the bilateral Soviet-United States efforts. As yet there is no other experience of the close co-existence of multilateral and bilateral negotiations. All in all, the negotiations on chemical weapons have already yielded many useful lessons for negotiating theory and practice, lessons that it still remains to understand.



(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

... Would it not be better to vary the time for the discussion of specific issues? Or at any rate, not to deal with everything at once? Besides, reorganizing work in this way would be a factor of discipline. For example, if delegations knew that the Ad hoc Committee on Outer Space was planning to sit in, say, May-June, they would get relevant instructions ready by that time. During the rest of the time the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee could hold consultations with delegations. In general, in any one session - especially if they are to be shorter than at present - attention should be concentrated on substantive work on not more than two or three issues. Apart from everything else, that would make possible better planning of experts' participation and, perhaps, reduce delegations expenditure in connection with the stay of experts in Geneva. Of course, in the present circumstances the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons should sit without any time-limits.



(Mr. Waldegrave, United Kingdom)

... The recent United States/Soviet bilateral agreement on chemical weapons is a significant and welcome advance. It should give a new impetus to the multilateral negotiations here in the Conference on Disarmament.

But most would say that, in contrast to the other arms control negotiations I have mentioned, the search for a multilateral global chemical weapons ban has already taken too long.

We have to look back to the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the last multilateral agreement on chemical weapons. That treaty governed use in war only, not production or possession.

Recent years have seen a spread of chemical weapons. More countries now possess these weapons than since 1945.

There was one major conflict in the 1980s (the Gulf War) in which chemical weapons were used on a greater scale than in any conflict since the First World War. The leader of one country recently boasted of his possession of new binary weapons.

Has the genie escaped the bottle? Can we still achieve a global chemical weapons ban? Do enough countries actually want a convention? Or are we engaged here in an elaborate charade, going through the motions without affecting the main issues? A process which produces an ever longer and more complex "rolling text", but which leaves the key problems unsolved?

Talks have been going on in Geneva about a chemical weapons ban since the 1960s. First in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference, then in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, and since 1979 in this body. The negotiations have lasted a quarter of a century. We politicians have the duty to ask: why so long? Why haven't the problems been resolved? Why can't chemical weapons match the success of other arms control negotiations? Are these talks dead on their feet or are they going somewhere?

Those of us around this table must believe there is hope, and that it lies here in the Conference on Disarmament, the only forum for global arms control negotiations. We look to multilateral diplomacy to deliver the goods. The United Kingdom view can be stated simply. Anything less than world-wide agreement on chemical weapons would not address the whole problem. But it is not simply a question of negotiating more productively here. There are practical problems which require detailed investigation by member States.

(continued)



(Mr. Waldegrave, United Kingdom)

Of course, I am aware of the enormous efforts made in the Conference on Disarmament to resolve the extremely difficult problems presented by chemical weapons. I do not underestimate the commitment and will to succeed of those involved here.

One thing is very clear. We must not take the easy way out: we must not follow the example offered by the Biological Weapons Convention of an agreement without effective verification. If a declaratory agreement could meet our concerns, we could agree on a text today. But that would leave the underlying security concerns about chemical weapons unaffected and unresolved.

So, in approaching these talks, we are seeking reassurance that all parties will abide by the terms of the convention. That reassurance must be clear and reliable.

For this reason in our view verification is the top priority. An effective verification régime is crucial for the convention to work.

And challenge inspection is the key to effective verification. There are two reasons for this. The first is the secrecy and evasion traditionally surrounding chemical weapons. Many possessors of chemical weapons have yet to own up. How many countries represented here believe that the three States which have acknowledged their possession of chemical weapons are the whole story? The second reason is the lack of distinctive signature for chemical-weapons-related facilities and systems. If there was such clarity, then chemical weapons would be as recognizable as, say, a tank or aircraft. We could then recognize, count, measure, weigh and in other ways assess the effectiveness, the military value of chemical weapons. But we cannot do this with confidence.

We need therefore a rigorous, wide-ranging verification mechanism covering undeclared as well as declared facilities as a safety net to provide confidence in treaty compliance by signatories. An unverifiable convention would be worthless.

Challenge inspection is the key to effective verification. Yet there are concerns about the implication for national security. Can challenge inspection be effective without putting at risk unrelated national secrets? I think the answer is in the affirmative.

The United Kingdom approach has been to put the feasibility of challenge inspection to the test. We believe the only way to get a convincing answer is to practice the procedures in as realistic a way as possible.

The detailed two-year programme of six trial inspections at United Kingdom Government-owned facilities covered some of our most sensitive security installations, including nuclear-weapons storage, nuclear-weapons research, development and manufacture, and a sensitive communications centre. We asked ourselves the hard questions. What would be the implications for physical security? Would inspections reveal the presence and location of sensitive non-chemical weapons stores? Would they compromise information on



(Mr. Waldegrave, United Kingdom)

non-chemical weapon stock-holding, throughput and capacity? Would they give access to classified weapon-design details, especially to nuclear-weapon design information? These are all difficult problems. But we think solutions have been found.

The paper I am tabling today as CD/1012 describes the main lessons from a very extensive work programme. We discovered that: managed access is the key to a balance between the protection of legitimate security interests and the degree of intrusiveness necessary for effective verification; there is no United Kingdom site so sensitive from the national-security viewpoint that we could not allow some form of access within the site, appropriately managed, to an international inspection team under the provisions on challenge inspection of a chemical weapons convention.

In short, the results of our research so far indicate that, as we say in English, "you can have your cake and eat it". But we also recognize that more practical research is needed.

Managed access within the site provides the solution. It is a process of negotiation about how best to demonstrate compliance between inspectors and inspected, which gives the former the access they need and the latter the protection they require. It provides a wide spectrum of techniques. They range from simple shrouding to rigorous methods of protection. Our trials allowed us to develop new techniques. One of these, a system of selective access, is described in some detail in our paper. We found it useful in a number of potentially difficult situations.

On the final form of challenge inspection, we think a challenge inspection régime should be capable of addressing any serious concerns about declared or undeclared facilities: there should be no sanctuary sites, safe from inspection. Challenge inspection should therefore be a regular element of the verification régime; it need not necessarily carry the assumption that the convention is being breached. For this reason, too, we should find a less combative title for this procedure, as others have suggested. "Inspection on request" is the obvious option.

We are conscious that the challenge inspection régime for the chemical weapons convention goes further, and is more all-embracing, than for any other arms control agreements. This is inconvenient, but also unavoidable if chemical weapons verification is to work.

Let me add a word about what challenge inspection is not. It is not a licence to spy. Nor is it a device to uncover commercial secrets. The inspection team have no automatic right to be told what actually goes on in any plant they visit. They may leave at the end of the inspection none the wiser about the nature of the activity or the product of the plant inspected. The inspectors' role is limited to satisfying themselves that, whatever else may be produced or stored on the site, the provisions of the chemical weapons convention are not being violated.



(Mr. Waldegrave, United Kingdom)

As I have said, we do not pretend to have all the answers. More work is needed on some aspects. Civil chemical plants were not included in our programme. Others may have particular concerns not fully addressed in our work.

We have been encouraged by reports from other States which are also undertaking trial challenge inspections. In many respects our experiences point in similar directions.

I hope the British paper will help provide a basis on which to build consensus on this key issue. The way will then be much clearer to resolve remaining issues.

I hope other member States too will carry this work forward as quickly as possible. If you doubt our findings, go and do the practical inspections for yourself and report back here to the Conference on Disarmament.

Finally, I would make an appeal for no more appeals. Too often we have heard that greater political commitment by parties concerned could bring these negotiations to speedy conclusion. Of course we want a convention, an effective convention, as soon as possible. But many of the remaining answers can only be found through research, investigation and trials not here, but in relevant facilities, both military and civil, in the territory of member States of the Conference on Disarmament.

This work should go ahead quickly. The clearest signal of political commitment to a chemical weapons convention that any State can give is to involve itself in this work back at home and to present concrete results here.

Verification is the key, and challenge inspection is the key to verification. Once we can resolve all the problems of challenge inspection, the long-sought goal of a verifiable chemical weapons convention will be in sight.



(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

The history of negotiations on chemical weapons is the longest of all the multilateral disarmament negotiations. The 1925 Geneva Protocol, in spite of its limited scope, is the first instrument whereby the community of nations expressed its rejection of this kind of weapon. However, in spite of the efforts made by the Conference on Disarmament and the organs which preceded it, the international community today, 65 years later, remains without a convention totally prohibiting chemical weapons.

Without wishing to make an exhaustive inventory of the deliberations on this subject, it is worth recalling that, at the end of the 1960s, hardly had the negotiations on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons been concluded than it was recognized that verification was one of the main obstacles to the conclusion of a convention totally prohibiting chemical and biological weapons. Despite this, it is being proposed that we draw a distinction between chemical and biological weapons and negotiate an agreement which would prohibit only the latter. In introducing this proposal, document ENDC/231 of 16 August 1968, the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Mulley, said:

"I recognize that the greatest difficulty we have to face is that of verification, since understandably parties to any arms control or disarmament agreement are entitled to be reasonably satisfied to the greatest practicable extent that other parties are carrying out their obligations under the agreement. This principle is well illustrated by the safeguards requirements of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (ENDC/226, article III). After much study, we have been obliged to conclude that no comparable system is possible for microbiological or chemical weapons. Any such system would be so intrusive as to be quite unacceptable, and even then could not be fully effective. The principal difficulty arises from the fact that almost all the material and equipment with which we are trying to deal have legitimate peaceful purposes; and it would be wrong to inhibit work of real value to humanity, in combating disease, for example, and impracticable to inspect every laboratory in every country. We must accept, therefore, that no verification is possible in the sense of the term as we normally use it in disarmament discussions.

Thus, we must make a choice - balance the risks of evasion if we go ahead with the formulation of new obligations, against the risks for the world if we do nothing and allow the fears of eventual use of microbiological methods of warfare to continue and intensify. My choice is emphatically to go ahead; we cannot afford to do nothing. While we cannot offer a fully effective system of verification, and we believe it is beyond the wit of man to devise one, we can provide arrangements which will satisfy States, given the intractable nature of the problem, that they will not be exposing themselves to unacceptable risks."

Right from the beginning serious reservations were entered about this proposal. It was pointed out, inter alia, that it would be tantamount in practice to postponing indefinitely the total prohibition of chemical weapons. Nevertheless, three years later, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament concluded its work on the draft Convention on the Prohibition of



(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. A few months later, the convention was to be approved by the United Nations General Assembly in its resolution 2826(XXVI) of 16 December 1971.

The speed with which the negotiations on this Convention were concluded illustrates a very simple point: when there is political will to achieve an agreement - irrespective of the reasons that gave rise to the instrument - not even the absolute impossibility of succeeding in verifying its observance can prevent it.

Furthermore, it is a regrettable fact that today, more than 20 years after the introduction of the proposal to deal separately with chemical and biological weapons, the fears then expressed that this would be tantamount to postponing indefinitely the total prohibition of chemical weapons are being confirmed.

In spite of the changes in the mandate of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, in spite of the tireless efforts of its Chairman, Ambassador Hyltenius and the chairmen of the three Working Groups to advance the negotiations, both on the technical aspects and on the political aspects of the draft convention, my delegation has the impression that we are losing the impetus or "momentum" generated initially by the Paris Conference of January 1989 and strengthened by a series of international meetings which confirmed the urgency of concluding a convention totally prohibiting chemical weapons.

As we approach the end of this session of the Conference, and before we get down to the tedious task of "negotiating" the report we shall be presenting to the General Assembly, it would be worthwhile giving some thought to the reason why, on the subject on which we are focusing a high percentage of our energies - as is demonstrated by the statements in plenary, the tremendous number of working documents and the conference services assigned to the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons - it would seem that we are moving further away from the original objective of attaining a convention comprehensively banning chemical weapons.

A few weeks ago, at the Washington summit, the United States and the Soviet Union signed an agreement on the destruction and non-production of chemical weapons and the means of facilitating a multilateral convention prohibiting such weapons. We hope it will shortly enter into force so that the commitment to cease production of chemical weapons will be put into effect and the process of the destruction of these weapons will begin.

The Government of Mexico has stated that it neither possesses chemical weapons nor has any intention of acquiring them. So it is difficult for us to accept that the principal possessors of chemical weapons should arrogate to themselves the right to keep a percentage of their arsenals and reserve to themselves the right of veto, to determine, eight years after it enters into force, whether participation in the multilateral convention is sufficient to proceed to the total elimination of chemical weapons. If all our countries



(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

were to adopt such an attitude, there would be no disarmament treaties at all. Furthermore, we were surprised at the speed with which a set of unilateral conditions contained in a footnote to a document was transformed into a bilateral understanding.

Although my delegation welcomes the fact that this agreement reflects the efforts which have for so long been going on at the multilateral level, we regret that, in referring to the negotiations of the Conference on Disarmament, there is no concurrence with the objective of attaining a comprehensive, universal and non-discriminatory convention. Bilateral and multilateral negotiations on disarmament should facilitate and complement each other; progress at the bilateral level should not be used to postpone or impede action at the multilateral level.

The Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons is embarking on the difficult process of attempting to make progress in its deliberations in what has up to now been known as the "rolling text" and which we hope will shortly be transformed into a draft convention that can be submitted to the United Nations General Assembly for adoption. We would like now to make some comments on the questions considered at this session.

The open-ended consultations on "undiminished security" have been a forum in which there has been frank debate of essential matters regarding the draft convention which is under negotiation. They have reflected the general interest in attaining a convention that would attract universal adherence and the impracticality of concepts such as that of "chemical-weapons-capable States".

The question of verification has been the subject of particular attention at this session. It has been examined both in Working Group A and in the consultations held by the Chairman of the Committee on article IX of the draft convention. In this regard, we believe that, although certain details still need refining, the "rolling text" already contains the fundamental elements of an adequate verification régime.

In this context, the initiatives aimed at seeking perfection in the verification régime could be interpreted as delaying tactics or lack of political will to conclude the negotiations on the draft convention. We were therefore surprised that the delegation of the United Kingdom should have stressed that we should not take the easy way out, that we should not follow the example of the Biological Weapons Convention, and that verification has the highest priority.

Of course, verification is a basic element in agreements on arms limitation and disarmament, but the conclusion of negotiations on the total prohibition of chemical weapons should not be subject to the perfecting ad infinitum of the verification régime. Ad infinitum would mean in this case ad Kalendas Graecas.

Verification of compliance is intimately linked with States parties' perceptions of security. The climate of détente and greater openness and transparency has already begun to have positive effects on our deliberations,



(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

as is shown by the growing acceptance of the concept of "challenge inspections". My delegation hopes that the bold initiative of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee in presenting a proposal for article IX as a whole will enable the deliberations on this question to advance. We also hope that the consultations by Ambassador García Moritán on article X, concerning assistance and protection against chemical weapons, will, in the medium term, enable the text to be transferred to Appendix I. In addition, we regret that article XI, concerning economical and technological co-operation in the field of peaceful chemical activities, should not have been the subject of the slightest consideration at this session.

Once again the Committee has opened its doors to representatives of the chemical industry for an exchange of views, both on the content of the draft convention and on the implications of its future application to activities of the chemical industry for civilian purposes. The frank dialogue which characterized those sessions of the Committee and the Industry Statement adopted within the content of the Government-Industry Conference against Chemical Weapons held in Canberra in September last year revealed the broad support of the chemical industry for the conclusion of our negotiations.

In so far as possible, the negotiations of the Conference on Disarmament will continue to give attention to the concerns expressed by the industrial representatives, but we should not forget that the fundamental objective of a convention prohibiting chemical weapons is the strengthening of the security of States, and not the protection of industrial interests. In any case, we should also bear in mind that trade unions in the chemical industry have begun to show interest in our negotiations, and we believe that the Committee should examine the comments that they have made on our draft convention.

In a few days the Committee will conclude its work so that the secretariat can begin the processing of the report that will be included in the one we shall be submitting to the United Nations General Assembly. My delegation fears that this report will not respond satisfactorily to the expectations expressed in resolutions 44/115 A and B and 44/119 D.

At times it might seem that the topic of chemical weapons is the only one on our agenda. In fact it does constitute the most immediate challenge to the credibility of the work of the Conference on Disarmament as a multilateral negotiating body for disarmament agreements.



(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)

... It is in this light that we see more favourable conditions for accelerating the pace towards disarmament. Such an assessment is continually being reaffirmed. Although we may differ in opinion as to the extent to which the last summit between the two big Powers has met all our expectations, it seems to us that it basically confirmed the continuity in the disarmament negotiations intentions. We welcome the general accord to conclude, in the near future, agreements on the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons, on the limitation of nuclear testing, on the obligation to destroy the bulk of chemical arsenals, on the halting of chemical arms production, on the intensification of negotiations on conventional weapons in Europe, etc. These accords can give strong impulse to the work of our Conference. Although, in our view, less was achieved than had been announced, we wish to believe that the horizon is more clear and that the most important disarmament agreements are at hand's reach. We are heartened by the information offered us by the distinguished Ambassadors, Mr. Burt and Mr. Nazarkin, on bilateral negotiations.

... While not ignoring any problem on the agenda, our efforts, in the immediate work of our Conference, should continue to be focused on three priority questions, namely, items 1, 4 and 5. By treating these questions in a substantial way, and by making real progress, we can strengthen the role of the Conference. We support, of course, all the efforts to enhance the effectiveness of the Conference by improving its method of work and its organization. However, our credibility will depend, first of all, on how capable we are in solving problems which are ripe for it, in clarifying that which should be clarified as soon as possible and in defining that which should be defined. In doing so we must always keep in mind that our Conference is a negotiating body, the ultimate aim of which is the dialogue on all negotiating, pre-negotiating and deliberative levels, leading to the concluding of disarmament agreements.

(continued)



(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)

Among these priorities come the negotiations on the convention on chemical weapons, as most promising in being resolved. We believe we are now in a truly critical phase, which cannot even stand slowing down without risking to fall back. We ask ourselves why, after obvious progress in 1987 and 1988, after repeated political impulses from numerous international gatherings in 1989 and 1990, the negotiating pace seems to have been more or less slowed down. Having in mind that the complexity of problems requires workable and durable solutions, we are finding it more and more difficult to see where we now stand. Political consensus is constantly being renewed, commitment of intentions reaffirmed, convergence of views is permanently evolving, the position of main possessors and producers of chemical weapons are practically identical, and still we have the impression we are turning in circles and, at times, even that which seemed agreed upon is questioned.

We do not yet have answers to these questions and they might even be too critically intoned. We have to start, however, asking them instead of being satisfied with marginal advances. This has to be done the more as we believe that the participation of a greater number of non-member States in negotiations, an improved mandate of the Committee itself, the submission of important bilateral documents on the destruction of chemical weapons and production capacities, the generalization of efforts in carrying out trial inspection, the convening of fruitful meetings with chemical industrial representatives - create a realistic basis for speedier work.

We see the two big Powers' agreement on the gradual elimination of chemical weapons and the halting of their production as a confirmation of their orientation towards concluding the multilateral convention we are negotiating in the Conference on Disarmament. The ambiguity on retaining the last stage of destruction of all arsenals poses, however, a number of questions related to the conceptual basis and security purpose of the convention. With no aim of questioning the proclaimed intention whereby such ambiguity serves as an incentive to achieve the convention's universality, we are inclined to believe that in practice it will serve as an incentive to the production and even proliferation of chemical weapons. It is needless to repeat that this will pose many problems related to the security of a number of countries.

The universality of a convention is, of course, vital. It will be effectively achieved only if we offer the international community a good, that is global, indiscriminatory and verifiable convention, acceptable to all countries, first of all from the point of view of undiminished security. The most important element in making it acceptable is precisely an unambiguous engagement towards a total elimination and unconditional ban on chemical weapons.

We feel that the conditions are ripe for the Committee's programme of work to be more intensively focused on those questions that have not yet been sufficiently or that have been reviewed only in passing. Here we refer to questions relating to a precise definition of chemical weapons and all that relates to production plants. It is only on the basis of such definitions that we can secure confidence-building when declaring chemical weapons and production plants. Such definitions are indispensable also in negotiations on the character and scope of verification, as they would indicate what type of



(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)

inspection should be carried out in a given plant. The interesting exchange of opinions at meetings with industry representatives on ad hoc verification, confidentiality and schedules of chemicals are a good basis for work on these questions. This is why we would urge the Ad hoc Committee to speed up negotiations on all of these questions, which would also quicken negotiations on the role, composition and decision-making process of the Executive Council.

Political problems relating to assistance, to protection in case of use or threat of use of chemical weapons and to economic and technological development require immediate action. It is high time also that the President's proposal be taken into more articulate discussion as an already elaborated basis for an agreement on the key issue in article IX. In fact, the division between political and technical questions is only conditional, since that which can seem to be a minor technical question to one country, to another may be an extremely relevant one for its development and future.

In spite of all the uncertainties, the situation can be viewed with certain optimism. I wish to point out that Yugoslavia intends to be an original signatory of the convention.

(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)

... This is why it does not suffice that we merely keep each other informed, but we have to simultaneously and meaningfully engage ourselves in all areas. Commitments of intentions must become commitments to results. Every effort should have support, but it should also be expanded and enlarged to meet the needs of the entire international community. That is the case with, for example, non-proliferation of chemical weapons and missile technology agreements, for which true solutions can be found only in a wider disarmament context. They cannot be an aim in themselves, not because the aims are debatable, but to avoid uneven responsibility and security.

Mr. CHIRILA (Romania) (translated from French):

... My statement at today's plenary meeting is prompted by the distribution, under the symbol CD/1014, of a working paper with data concerning Romania on matters of relevance to an issue that is the subject of intensive negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament, the future universal convention on the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons.



(Mr. Chirila, Romania)

Delegations now have the document before them. This working paper submitted by our delegation, like other texts containing information on the same topic that have already been submitted by other delegations, reflects the desire of Romania too to contribute to confidence-building and the acceleration of the negotiating process. That is not to say that we are necessarily in favour of a protracted "pre-convention" process: it might, as is already being said, cause us to lose the rhythm or even miss the right moment.

The information that we are presenting in document CD/1014 follows closely the lines of document CD/828, which since April 1988, when it was submitted by the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany, has provided the reference framework for those undertaking this exercise of more direct contact between the national context and the international context of the problem prior to the realization of the convention.

Our document is divided into two parts. The first part is a compilation of information that is both concise and clear and reiterates declarations that Romania has already made to the Conference, in particular in my statement of 13 February this year. In substance, it says that Romania does not possess chemical weapons, that there are no such weapons on its territory and that my country has no intention of producing or acquiring them either now or in the future. In this context, permit me to remind you that on 19 April this year we also made in the plenary of the Conference a declaration of Romania's complete readiness to be an original signatory of a universal convention totally banning chemical weapons.

The second part of the working paper submitted by my delegation provides full data on the production, use, import and export of chemical products in Romania. It will be clearly seen that in Romania there is no production of, or, in general, any performance of operations with substances listed in Schedules 1 or 2 of the "rolling text" of the draft convention.

As for Schedule 3, Romania produces 7 substances in 11 plants, in amounts of between 30 and 9,000 tonnes a year. All these products are intended for use within the country as intermediates in the manufacture of medicines, colourings, pesticides and other products of the civilian chemical industry. The document provides information on location and information on production and rated capacities. The data on imports and exports shows that production of the seven substances in question is undertaken solely for internal, civilian use.

Even with a chemical industry which is not on a level with the countries that are highly developed in this sphere, Romania is aware of the responsibilities that it will have to bear in the international system to implement and verify the future universal chemical weapons ban. I would like to take this opportunity to inform the Conference that to a certain extent, with the means currently available, the Romanian authorities have already taken some measures to set up a group of experts who could, when the time comes, take on the activities of a national authority with specific responsibilities for the implementation of, and compliance with the obligations deriving from the future convention. Moreover, we believe that



(Mr. Chirila, Romania)

the working paper that Romania has submitted to the Conference today could well provide a starting point for the national register advocated in the draft convention.

Finally, I wish to emphasize that we are ready to co-operate with all States or international bodies in increasing confidence and transparency in this highly sensitive area, inter alia through the training of specialists in the field of verification for a universal chemical weapons ban.

Mr. GROZDANOV (Bulgaria): I have asked for the floor in order to make a very brief statement in connection with the circulation of document CD/1017. But before proceeding, may I be allowed to extend to you, Ambassador Sujka, the warm congratulations of my delegation on seeing you in the Chair during the busiest time of the summer session. My delegation would also like to express its appreciation for the work done by your predecessor, Ambassador de Rivero of Peru, in the month of June.

As delegations must be aware, today my delegation has tabled an official document of the Conference on Disarmament entitled "Submission of data in connection with the Convention of the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons". The provision of this data by the Bulgarian Government is intended as a confidence-building measure and is an expression of its profound desire to stimulate negotiation on the speedy conclusion of a chemical weapons convention.

The contents of document CD/1017 speak for themselves. Bulgaria does not have chemical weapons on its territory, either its own or stocks of another party, and has only one chemical, hydrogen cyanide, that falls under the projected scope of the convention.

However, under instructions from my Government, I avail myself of this opportunity to state once again the readiness of the People's Republic of Bulgaria to sign the future chemical weapons convention as soon as it is open for signature. We believe that such statements enhance the prospects for a timely solution of the remaining outstanding issues in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and we expect similar moves by all other States concerned.

Mr. KAREM (Egypt): On behalf of Ambassador Elaraby, I would like to make the following statement:

"I have asked for the floor to make a statement on behalf of the Group of 21, but since this is the first time I take the floor during this month, allow me to express my heartfelt congratulations to you for



(Mr. Karem, Egypt)

assuming the presidency during the month of July. I am confident, Mr. President, that under your able and experienced leadership the work of the Conference on Disarmament is in good hands. At the same time, I would like to express to Ambassador de Rivero of Peru and to the delegation of Peru our sincere appreciation for providing able leadership during the month of June. Now I would like to make a statement on behalf of the Group of 21 and the statement reads as follows:

'The Group of 21 takes note of the bilateral agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on destruction and non-production of chemical weapons and on measures to facilitate the multilateral convention on banning chemical weapons signed on 1 June 1990. It considers the decision by the USSR and the United States of America to halt the production of chemical weapons and to start the destruction of their declared chemical weapons stockpiles to be an important and positive step. The Group hopes that this agreement will enter into force in the near future.

However, the Group of 21 regrets the proposed revisions to the present draft convention as contained in CD/CW/WP.303, which will have negative effects because they inter alia put conditions and postpone the decision for the total elimination of chemical weapons, give rights to States based on the possession of chemical weapons and create a situation of legal uncertainty about the scope and the implementation of the multilateral convention. The Group emphasizes that the ultimate goal must be a non-discriminatory convention of universal adherence.

The Group of 21 is convinced that the bilateral agreement should not be the model for a multilateral treaty and believes that there should be no deviation from the principal undertakings in the present draft convention. In this regard, the Group of 21 is of the view that the total destruction of all chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities should be unconditional and decided from the very conclusion of the convention, as already provided for in the present draft convention, so that by the end of the 10-year destruction period all chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities would be totally eliminated. This undertaking should be without any reservation.

The Group of 21 reaffirms its position that the future convention on chemical weapons should prohibit the use of such weapons under any circumstances from the date the convention enters into force. This undertaking is already provided for in article I, paragraph 3, of the draft convention.

The Group of 21 opposes any measures which are aimed at establishing a non-proliferation régime in the field of chemical weapons. In its view, non-proliferation in all its aspects can only be achieved through a total and comprehensive ban on chemical weapons'.

That concludes the statement on behalf of the Group of 21".



Mr. BATSANOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The Soviet delegation has asked for the floor to clarify certain matters relating to the bilateral Soviet-American agreement on chemical weapons mentioned today by a number of speakers.

First of all, I would like to express our gratification at the fact that, in the statement by the Group of 21, such key provisions in the bilateral agreement as the obligations not to manufacture chemical weapons and to destroy a considerable part of the stocks of these weapons in so far as concerns the USSR and the United States, are viewed as both important and positive. The Soviet delegation shares the hope of the Group of 21 that the bilateral agreement can come into force in the near future.

To contribute towards this, we intend to make every effort for the possible elaboration together with the United States delegation of the documents which are provided for in this bilateral agreement, and in particular the document on inspection procedures.

Permit me to refer now to the proposals contained in the document CD/CW/WP.303. The Soviet delegation shares the view expressed by the distinguished representative of Egypt on behalf of the Group of 21 that as the ultimate goal we must aim at a convention on chemical weapons that is non-discriminatory in nature and universal as regards the range of the parties to it.

But it is precisely to the attainment of that goal that the proposals contained in document CD/CW/WP.303 are directed. We may differ in our views about how best to reach this ultimate goal, what course to take towards it, but as regards the goal itself, there, I think, there are no differences at all.

I would like to stress too that the proposals contained in this document are already a compromise between what one would think to be irreconcilable positions held by the parties. It is, probably, an axiom that each of us is almost always more pleased by his own initial position, than by the compromise that is reached when positions are merged. But, you know, the essence and the drama of negotiations both lie in the fact that reaching agreements inevitably entails sacrificing positions that seem to us beyond reproach.

In any case, we are for the serious discussion of this proposal and its various aspects and the finding of a mutually acceptable solution.

I do, however, feel that we would be avoiding unnecessary polemics if from the very outset there is some clarity: this proposal does not affect the obligation of complete destruction of chemical weapons set out, as you know, in article I of the draft convention.

(continued)



(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

The Soviet delegation would like to confirm its position in favour of an unconditional ban on the use of chemical weapons within the framework of the draft of the future convention.

In conclusion, I think it necessary to emphasize that, as has already repeatedly been declared by the Soviet delegation, by the Soviet Union, including together with the United States, the best long-term solution to the problem of the spread of chemical weapons is, in our view, the conclusion of the convention that we are working on here, that is, a convention on the general and complete prohibition of chemical weapons.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): I would just like to make a few brief remarks also directed to the statement we have just heard from the spokesman for the Group of 21. Like my Soviet colleague, the United States has very similar reactions to the comments by the Group of 21 on the bilateral agreement reached between the United States and the USSR in Washington on 1 June. We welcome the comments in the Group of 21 statement which express acceptance and recognition of, I believe the words were, "important and positive" elements in the bilateral agreement, but we also regret that some of the other conclusions seem to be based on misunderstandings or misinterpretations of the intent or of the projected result of what it is we are proposing in CD/CW/WP.303. The United States has asked for an opportunity, hopefully some time during this week and in co-operation with the Soviet Union, to explain in more direct detail what is the purpose and what is the intent of our proposals, especially with regard to the eighth-year review conference and the 98 per cent pause. We hope to have that opportunity, as I indicated, in the very near future. In my association with Ambassador Batsanov's remarks, that does not include his remarks about retaliatory use.



(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

My third subject today is chemical weapons. Regrettably, we have to admit that negotiations on chemical weapons do not progress with the speed which we all desire. Perhaps this is inevitable, perhaps not. I would like to see it more philosophically, as a fact of our negotiating life in the CD. The achievement on a total ban of chemical weapons should indeed be the highest priority of this Conference. The Netherlands would therefore like to offer some suggestions for speeding up the negotiations.

In our view, the negotiations at this moment hinge on two major and interrelated issues, i.e. challenge inspections and routine inspections. Challenge and routine inspections are the two pillars which support one and the same basic structure which we all strive for: compliance with a chemical weapons ban. Challenge and routine inspections, including ad hoc verification, not only complement each other, but are also strongly interrelated. The more encompassing one system is, the less often we need the other.

We believe that the present "rolling text" pivots upon the concept of challenge inspections: the solution to this issue, which will mainly consist of the development of adequate procedures for managed access, might well put many other remaining problems into another, more benevolent light. My delegation is therefore very pleased with the conclusion of the British Minister of State, William Waldegrave, that in the view of the United Kingdom there is no site so sensitive from the national security viewpoint that some form of access within the site, appropriately managed, could not be allowed to an international inspection team. On a preliminary basis we came to the same conclusion. The fact that the United Kingdom could draw such a conclusion after six elaborate trial inspections in different types of sensitive installations - not one country has matched their efforts in this field - should be taken into account very seriously by all of us.

We believe that the problems of challenge inspections can only be solved through the medium of properly agreed procedures for managed access. If we concentrate on those, we might be able to solve the problems of the original and unique concept of challenge inspections: anytime, anywhere, without the right of refusal.

Why is that so important? Besides the fact that there exists an emerging consensus that challenge inspections are not just a unique method of last resort to determine compliance, the concept of challenge inspections has acquired not only a political, but also a philosophical connotation: it is opening up the world for arms control and disarmament; it is a real step towards our stated common goal: "general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control". If we weaken the original character of challenge inspections, doubts would be raised about the effectiveness of the chemical weapons ban as a security treaty. Consequently, political support for the treaty would be lost. There are those who advocate a filter mechanism to determine whether a challenge request constitutes a "détournement de pouvoir". The Netherlands believes that the introduction of such filter mechanisms would seriously harm the effectiveness of challenge inspections.



(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

Legend has it that a hole in a dyke can be plugged with a finger. This is not so. From hard experience we have learned that, unless you build solid dykes, you will drown in the flood. For those who have serious national security problems, solutions can be found through properly negotiated and agreed procedures for managed access, as was proven by the United Kingdom. The example of the IAEA and the role accredited to its Board of Governors shows that rules and regulations can be found to secure an impartial and proper procedure for international investigations in national installations. We should proceed accordingly. It is not by talking neatly that we can convince other States. It is through their own experience and practice that States can eventually solve problem areas. We therefore urge States which have not yet done so to engage in such trial challenge inspections.

We ourselves have done the same. I take pleasure in presenting today our own report on the first trial challenge inspection at an operational air base in the Netherlands. The document will be distributed as CD/1018, concurrently CD/CW/WP.307. A more detailed introduction has already been given in the Ad hoc Committee yesterday.

The other pillar of our verification system is constituted by routine inspections. The "rolling text" provides for an elaborate system of such inspections that covers facilities which have been declared to produce scheduled chemicals. It does not, however, cover all those plants which are quite capable of producing chemical weapons and their precursors but which have not been declared.

Of course, such facilities would be subject to challenge inspections. My delegation, however, looks upon such inspections as a procedure of last resort: it is essential for the convention, but not for routine use. Easy access to the chemical industry, in a non-intrusive and routine manner, would be a confidence-building measure of major importance. The recent proposal by Australia on ad hoc verification would fully meet our concerns: it would establish the missing link in the envisaged verification system. It is therefore an element of great concern to the Netherlands Government to find that efforts are made to block further consideration of this issue, even before the different elements of the proposal have been properly discussed and elaborated. We, for our part, are determined to pursue this issue, which is an essential element of the verification system as a whole.

If my memory serves me right, it was the German Democratic Republic which had, on occasion, suggested that a ministerial meeting might be opportune to push our work further. At the time, the idea as such did not particularly appeal to us, as we would have preferred to solve the problems before any ministerial conference. In view of the structure of the CW negotiations and its prolonged history and of the fact that we do need results in the light of growing dangers of proliferation, we have come to the conclusion that a ministerial meeting might after all be worthwhile.

The CD could envisage such a meeting at the beginning of our negotiating period next year. On that occasion Ministers could not only set a deadline for the termination of the negotiations later that year, but also give directions on the lines along which problems should be solved. Second, Ministers might want to meet again later that year, just before the expiry of



(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

the deadline. The remaining problems would all have to be solved then and there. Ministers could then also consider the follow-up, including the manner in which universality of adherence to the convention could be achieved. In this context, it is proper to recall the intention of the North Atlantic allies, as stated in the final communiqué of the Turnberry ministerial meeting (document CD/1006), to be among the original signatories to the CW convention and to promote its early entry into force.

In the meantime, we here at the negotiating table have to do all we can to achieve consensus treaty language. We must make full use of any intersessional period that becomes available. And in the daily pursuit of our common responsibilities in establishing the desired chemical weapons ban, we should not shy away, where necessary, from vigorous action.

Finally, Mr. President, you will have noted the keen interest of the Netherlands in the issue of the seat of the chemical weapons treaty Organization. In a few weeks time I hope to be able to shed more light on the particular details of our proposition.



(Mr. Wayarabi, Indonesia)

During these past few years there has been widely shared expectation that the chemical weapons convention is within reach. The insertion of the provisions concerning the annex on chemicals and the protocol on inspection procedures in the "rolling text" of last year, as well as the achievements accomplished during the spring session on matters relating to verification, have further increased the grounds for optimism. At this summer session, my delegation has also noted with satisfaction the efforts of the Ad hoc Committee's Chairman, Ambassador Hyltenius, in trying to set provisions concerning on-site inspection on request by a State or States parties to another State party. The idea to amend the well-known wording of "challenge inspection" to "inspection on request" is constructive. As I mentioned in my previous statement, this type of verification should not be conducted on the basis of a strong motivation of suspicion. The idea to abandon the use of the word "challenge" would lessen the notion of suspicion in the implementation of this set of provisions.

Admittedly, much progress has already been achieved on the elaboration of the detailed provisions of numerous parts of the convention. Moreover, the setting of the provisions, which are relevant to the latest developments in the relations among States, has also been attempted with regard to inspection on request.

A slight apprehension has, however, emerged recently concerning the pace of progress in the negotiations. For a country like my own which has never produced or possessed chemical weapons - nor will it ever - the idea of linking the destruction of all chemical weapons to the adherence of certain categories of States has caused uncertainty concerning the desired universal adherence to the Convention. Such a linkage could, I believe, lead to the continuing existence of such weapons by, inter alia, inducing States which have not possessed chemical weapons to acquire them prior to the entry into force of the convention. Such an approach also implies legitimizing acts of coercion of a weaker State or States by a stronger State, thence endangering the goal of universal adherence. There is a shared conviction that one of the

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(Mr. Wayarabi, Indonesia)

most feasible ways to attract the adherence of States which as a result of particular circumstances possess - or will possess - chemical weapons lies in the need to set up an appropriate approach to discourage such States from choosing the chemical weapons option.

There is also widespread belief that, as we wish to conclude a convention with universal adherence, then we should, indeed, consider the interests of the majority of States which do not possess, or intend to possess, chemical weapons. This implies that the convention should provide a guarantee for the unimpeded right of every State party to develop, produce, use, exchange and transfer chemicals and chemical technology for peaceful purposes. The convention should not hinder international co-operation, nor trade in chemicals for peaceful purposes.

As a non-chemical-weapon State, my country has always stood - and will continue to do so - for the total prohibition and destruction of all existing chemical weapons. Although we do not possess such weapons, there is a foreseeable possibility that we might have to destroy chemical weapons which were abandoned in our territory. As this matter is going to be taken up in further consultations, my delegation would only wish to reiterate its deeply held principle that the discovering State should not be burdened with the responsibility of destroying the abandoned chemicals.

My delegation was made even more aware of the magnitude of the difficulty of protecting civilians, as well as other targets from a chemical weapon attack, when visiting the Münster chemical weapons destruction and training facilities thanks to the generous invitation of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. We indeed realize that such protective actions which are to be carried out in a dense tropical area such as my own country would be a tremendously delicate and costly task. Despite the need for assistance deriving from the foreseeable difficulties, it is also my belief that a commitment for compulsory assistance from the "haves" to the "have nots", constitutes a means of deterring from the use or threat of use of chemical weapons. My country therefore attaches great importance to the inclusion in the future convention of a provision for assistance which could fully satisfy the imperative need for such assistance in case of attack or threat of attack of chemical weapons.

A convention which is effective and verifiable and which attracts universal adherence requires a verification system which creates confidence among States parties with regard to compliance with the convention. Such a verification system needs first of all a set of solid routine verification régimes, and I believe that the establishment of an inspection system which permits the conduct of an inspection measure to ensure compliance by any State party at any time and at any place is also necessary. Since the establishment of these sets of verification systems is the subject of intensive negotiations, my delegation would prefer that all members of the Conference be invited to finalize the establishment of those two sets of verification systems before we embark upon examination of other verification systems.



Mr. DIETZE (German Democratic Republic): My statement today refers again to item 4 of our agenda. Already on 21 June, when presenting three working papers on a trial challenge inspection in the German Democratic Republic's chemical industry, I announced that a similar national trial was carried out in the military field. Today I am in a position to introduce with document CD/1020 the report on the experience acquired by us during that inspection. I consider it of utmost importance that the efforts made here in Geneva at the negotiating table towards bringing about a solution to the difficult issue of inspections on request are fostered and supplemented by intensive practical research work in our countries.

Permit me now, without going into detail, to offer some explanatory remarks concerning the document on hand. The inspection was carried out in March 1990 at an army ammunition depot belonging to a military district of the National People's Army. It was conducted on the understanding that the German Democratic Republic does not possess any chemical weapons and has not deployed on its territory any such weapons of another country. The inspection had been prepared taking into account the "rolling text" of the draft convention on chemical weapons, as well as the experience gained in the implementation of the INF Treaty and of confidence- and security-building measures.

The basic aim of that inspection was to test existing conceptions on challenge inspections - or as we now call it, inspections on request - and make national preparations for the implementation of the convention.

(continued)



(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

Specifically, the following objectives were pursued: to dispel the suspicion that chemical weapons are stored at the site; and to identify the extent of the tasks to be performed in inspecting a military facility.

The conclusions from our trial inspection were largely identical with those drawn by inspectors in the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Federal Republic of Germany. At this juncture, let me draw your attention to only some of our findings.

First, it can be said that the combined consideration of circumstantial characteristics and on-site checks produced sufficient evidence that chemical weapons did not exist at the site. Second, the composition of the team, with experts from different fields, including military ammunition specialists, military experts for protection against chemical weapons and specialists for storage management, proved to be the right approach. Third, apparently, it remains a difficult question to determine in advance the size of an inspection team. In order to fix the number of inspectors and the duration of the inspection beforehand, it would be necessary to have prior knowledge of the operational purpose of the site to be inspected. Having only data concerning the size of the site, as envisaged in the "rolling text" of the draft convention, does not, in this context, allow a clear-cut decision on the number of inspectors needed.

Before winding up my statement I would like to bring to your knowledge another piece of information. Only recently, publications on the alleged storage of chemical weapons in the German Democratic Republic have again appeared, giving rise to the suspicion that the explicit declarations of my Government stating the contrary do not correspond to the facts. In order to dispel these rumours, an inspection team of the Federal Republic of Germany was invited to inspect facilities of its choice of the National People's Army. This invitation was accepted and three facilities were inspected by the team of the Federal Republic of Germany. In doing this, we made use of the means to resolve a problem through bilateral efforts, as it is provided for in the Chairman's draft of article IX, section on consultations, paragraph 3, which stipulates the right of States parties to arrange by mutual consent for inspections.

Although final evaluations of the inspection results are still being made, we have received preliminary information saying that minor quantities of Schedule 1 chemicals for protective purposes have been found in the inspected places, which range far below the envisaged 1-tonne threshold, but that no chemical weapons were discovered. More details on that confidence- and security-building measure will certainly be made available to you soon.



(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)

The intensive work done by the chemical weapons Committee this session under the active and competent chairmanship of Ambassador Hyltenius is worthy of mention. The stages already passed heighten our eagerness to arrive soon at the conclusion of a convention constituting, by reason of its universal nature, a disarmament measure of considerable import. We are convinced that the convention being negotiated should draw most of its effectiveness from the universality of the obligations that will derive from it and from its non-discriminatory régime. The establishment of an organization responsible for watching over the application and observance of the provisions of the convention is of interest to us, for that organization will be the first of its kind in the sphere of disarmament. It is of the utmost importance to give thought without delay to the conditions that will ensure that the proposed organization functions as well as possible. A balanced spread taking into account the whole range of diversity seems to us one of the keys to the organization's success.

As regards verification and monitoring, it can be seen from the Committee's work that it is possible to devise a reliable system, despite the complexity and delicacy of the task. But, in the final analysis, the best thing for such a system would be for it to inspire confidence between the parties and ensure their co-operation in chemical disarmament without seeking to become an obstacle to the transfer of technology for civilian applications in the cause of development. We also think that the verification system should not preclude a degree of flexibility in order to avoid prohibitive costs that might compromise its efficiency and paralyse its action.

Before leaving this point, I should like to express our profound satisfaction at the agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on chemical weapons. We welcome the provisions concerning the halting of the manufacture of those weapons and the destruction of a substantial proportion of the stockpiles of them, for the treaty will undoubtedly give a favourable stimulus to the work of the Ad hoc Committee, providing we all remain firmly attached to the principle of total and complete prohibition and that the future convention is not marred by any form of discrimination. In other words, the convention should ensure that the obligations of the States parties are perfectly alike.



(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

I shall now turn to item 4, the chemical weapons convention. At the outset, I wish to pay tribute to the efforts of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Hyltenius, and the members of the Swedish delegation. I wish also to thank the three chairmen of the working groups entrusted with the preparation of the convention on chemical weapons. I would also like to express my delegation's appreciation for the meticulous work of Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail and his assistants.

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(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

The year 1990 has witnessed some major developments relating to the chemical weapons convention. Perhaps the most significant is the American-Soviet bilateral agreement on the destruction of their chemical arsenals. The bilateral treaty, in the view of my delegation, is, no doubt, a positive and important step. It is in its bilateral context that we wholeheartedly welcome the treaty. It is, indeed, considered as a confidence-building measure between the two super-Powers which should have a positive effect on our multilateral disarmament efforts. It is a logical conclusion that the multilateral convention may and should draw upon this bilateral agreement as an existing legal document covering the same subject-matter.

The difference between the bilateral and the multilateral convention, as we see it, is conceptual. The bilateral convention is a measure of disarmament and confidence-building; it may remain for a number of years as a unilateral step towards chemical non-proliferation. The multilateral convention, on the other hand, should be a universal effort aiming at a comprehensive ban on a whole generation of weapons of mass destruction with no place on board for non-proliferation. The chemical weapons convention should ban for all time the entire stocks of States parties as a conditio sine qua non. A concealed reservation to the total ban in the event of the non-adherence of all capable States is, in the view of my delegation, self-defeating and could be detrimental to the very purpose of the convention.

Having reflected on the conceptual aspect of the future chemical weapons convention, I wish to address some aspects of the actual draft.

On the issue of ad hoc verification, I would like to state that my delegation does not believe that there are propitious circumstances for taking it up now. The outcome of the very important consultations conducted by Ambassador Hyltenius on the question of challenge inspections will be a decisive element for my delegation's position regarding ad hoc verification.

On the question of challenge inspection, I believe that there is general agreement that it entails high political value. Consequently, the mechanism provided for in article IX should be equivalent to the legal context of that article. In our view, the role of the Executive Council should be predominant throughout the process of the challenge procedure and its aftermath. This should not, however, mean excluding the role of the other organs of the Organization as appropriate.

With regard to the Executive Council itself, I wish to reiterate my delegation's position that the composition and decision-making mechanism should be determined on the basis of its functional requirements, that is to say, the ability to convene meetings rapidly and the ability to undertake timely decisions. All States parties to the convention should have an opportunity to serve on this Council. We do not subscribe to any attempt to create permanent seats.



(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

The question of amendments is another important issue. It is a substantive and not a procedural issue. The parties to an agreement may alter the fundamental obligations through amendments. With this in mind, the provision on amendments should under no circumstances provide for a discriminatory régime that would consequently materialize in dual or multiple legal undertakings. It is to be pointed out, however, that my delegation is not advocating a rigid amending procedure. We would not like to see a non-amendable convention which would obstruct the normal life of the convention. Therefore, the general rules contained in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties should be well observed in the preparation of this clause.

Another pending issue is that of settlement of disputes. There is no provision at present in the draft convention on this subject. Certain references, however, exist, scattered among some articles. They are confined to one method of dispute-settling, namely negotiation. Adequate means for the resolution of disputes should be provided for. The sequence of proceeding from one method to another should be left to the choice of the parties to the dispute. The time element should be observed in each phase, and the outcome of the settlement could be binding, depending on the method chosen by the parties. The proper place for provisions on dispute settlement would therefore be a separate article in the final clauses encompassing all the dimensions of the dispute-settlement question.

It will be recalled that my delegation proposed in 1988 the insertion of a provision dealing with sanctions should any State (party or non-party) violate the convention. These sanctions, in our view, were regarded as guarantees to ensure compliance. In some cases non-compliance with the convention may constitute a threat to international peace and security. The Egyptian delegation has, therefore, suggested that a clear relationship should be established between the Executive Council and the Security Council. Such a relationship has not yet been clarified.

In our view, the Executive Council should consider any non-compliance and should, if the need arises, convey its conclusions and recommendations to the Security Council. To confine the role of the Executive Council to providing the Security Council with information would be inadequate. The Executive Council has a responsibility to ensure that the Security Council is in a position to take the necessary measures. This necessitates empowering the Executive Council to submit its conclusions and recommendations to the Security Council.

Our aim is to conclude a convention that will be universally adhered to. Many views have been advanced on how to reach this goal. As I indicated before this Conference in 1988, one way of approaching this objective is to consider ways and means to involve, at an appropriate time, all United Nations members in the actual preparation of the convention. An open-ended preparatory commission to precede or follow a ministerial conference could positively contribute towards the universality that we aspire to attain and could serve as a useful tool in our quest to encourage universal adherence.



(Mr. Morel, France)

... Multilateral disarmament is one of the instruments that enable these various transformations to be fitted into an overall perspective. Each forum has, of course, its *raison d'être*, and one cannot negotiate everywhere on all the issues. But there is already de facto combination of the three negotiating forums for, first, the reduction of strategic weapons (START), and the negotiations on space in a bilateral framework, then the negotiations on the reduction of conventional forces (CFE) and the confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) of 35 nations in a regional framework and, lastly, the prohibition of chemical weapons in a multilateral framework, here. These three exercises are subject to similar timetables, since a

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(Mr. Morel, France)

two-fold result must be achieved by mid-November in Vienna, the START talks must be completed by the end of the year and the chemical convention must be completed next year. Furthermore, they are linked in substance: any delays in the chemical negotiations relative to the other two would give increased military significance to the existing stockpiles and means and could jeopardize the general movement towards disarmament which is now under way in earnest. Putting the negotiations in perspective in this way highlights the special responsibility that is ours. I shall be coming back to that later in my statement.



(The President)

... Next month we are going to register the progress made during the 1990 session of the Conference on Disarmament. Let us hope that the report on our activities prepared for the General Assembly of the United Nations will bring us closer to the goals established at the beginning of the session. It is especially important in the case of the negotiations on a chemical weapons ban. We had to spare no efforts in registering real progress in this area, to meet the expectations expressed so clearly by the world community.

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(The President)

... There is unanimous recognition of the efforts made in your Conference to negotiate a universal convention on the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons. Along with the pursuit of, and involvement in the negotiating process, Romania has this year - as have other countries too - made significant gestures, in particular as regards confidence-building and measures to encourage at the political level the completion of the convention. Thus, as we stated in the plenary of the Conference, Romania does not produce and does not have chemical weapons and does not intend to produce or acquire such weapons in the future. Likewise, Romania is prepared to become an original party to a convention with universal participation on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Inspired by the will to contribute to progress in the work on elaborating the draft convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons, the Romanian delegation recently provided, in a working paper of the Conference, full data on the production, possession or

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(The President)

non-possession, use, import and export of substances produced by the civilian chemical industry which might be of relevance to the goals of the future convention. We wish to express the hope that the progress achieved in elaborating the "rolling text" of the draft convention and the moves that are still awaited from the countries involved in the negotiations will lead in the near future to the achievement of universal, comprehensive and balanced rules, including provisions on effective international control, for the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons.



(Mr. Morel, France)

I now come to chemical disarmament, which was once again the subject of intensive work, thanks to the very active chairmanship of Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden, with the assistance of his delegation, thanks to the work of the chairmen of the various Groups, Mr. Lamazière of Brazil, Mr. Shahbaz of Pakistan, Mr. Meerburg of the Netherlands and Mr. Krutzsch of the German Democratic Republic and thanks, lastly, to the secretariat team led by Mr. Bensmail. I should like to take this opportunity to thank them all.

The efforts were untiring, with the mixture of patience and boldness without which it is not possible to draw along the inevitably complex whole that the Committee represents. The work was of high quality, delegations spoke in greater numbers, with more contributions by non-member countries, we derived still greater benefit than in the past from the contributions of the experts and we developed a precise and mutually enriching dialogue with the experts from industry.

And yet many agree today, with concern, that the negotiations seem to be hesitating before the major choices that still have to be made. Such a situation is not surprising; it is part of the difficulties inherent in the closing weeks of the session when, on each of the points dealt with during the year, a formal decision has to be taken to include the results in the "rolling text".

The difficulty is that this time the hesitation is lasting longer than usual and concerns a number of fundamental elements of the draft convention. But this, again, is no cause for surprise. Each delegation must be able to express its views, and the sooner the better. The negotiations have suffered too long from silence, dilatoriness and ambiguity. It is in the interests of all that all the cards should be placed on the table. Discussion cannot be suspended when a question has been clearly put, and that goes for all subjects, without exception. On the other hand, restarting from zero each time is impossible. In each of the important debates which have marked the development of the negotiations, and there has been no shortage of them, resolving the problems, achieving a compromise acceptable to all the parties and in keeping with the general trend of the negotiations, has meant starting from the work already accomplished - especially since the establishment of the "rolling text".

That text is, in effect, our memory, with all that that implies: continuity; a single reference framework; the structure, order and status of the texts, but still more perhaps, internal coherence between the various parts of this complex document, a coherence without which the convention would only be a collection of more or less disparate chapters.

Thus the inquiring mood which has affected the Committee in recent weeks should be neither dramatized nor underestimated. To our mind, things must be looked at, now and always, from the viewpoint of the completion of the convention, the only one which has any sense for us since the Paris Conference, which imposes on us an obligation of result. It is, indeed, becoming more and more clear that all the major questions now being asked or revived are closely\*interlinked and cannot, therefore, be resolved by this or that compromise or particular expedient, on a case-by-case basis. They can



(Mr. Morel, France)

only be resolved by general intensification of the negotiations, which implies resort to political choices. Far from discouraging us, this analysis of the situation should lead us to the obvious conclusion: the negotiations must now be advanced, by a political decision, into their final phase, which will be next year's session. It is with this in mind that I would now like rapidly to go through the main points on which a decision is required.

First, nothing is more important than verification, and inspection on request determines the system as a whole; we are all agreed on that. The debate is now reduced to the essentials and it is time to accept the full consequences of our choices. We have to decide between two things. Either inspection under article IX, the keystone of the system, is triggered without any precondition, and that is certainly the obvious meaning of the very general phrase "at any time and anywhere" which requires no qualification of any kind; the inspection then proceeds according to the mandate, with recourse, as necessary, to the formula of controlled access, which enables full account to be taken of the security interests of the inspected State. At any rate the parties are assured of obtaining the results for which inspections are intended, that is the collection, first and foremost of facts. Or inspection is subject to a precondition, a priori according to a particular general criterion to be established independently of the conditions on the spot, and the inspection changes nature, even before it has begun, to become an exchange of arguments carried out either in capital cities or at the headquarters of the Organization or at the point of entry to the country inspected or around a facility perimeter - in short, negotiation carried out in difficult circumstances, and not a procedure of fact-finding.

In our view, it is clear that the latter approach can only multiply the obstacles and empty of its substance the *raison d'être* of the procedure under article IX, namely the determination in all circumstances of whether or not there has been a militarily significant violation of the convention. If in certain cases it is from the outset impossible to obtain such an assurance, the whole verification system is called in question.

An in-depth debate within the Committee is therefore essential, and if possible in the two weeks that remain to us before the transmission of the groups' reports, since as things stand the decisions to be taken on the Chairman's text of article IX can only be provisional arrangements. We shall at least go away with clearer ideas about our respective positions, instead of being left with the past few days' inconclusive exchanges of views on questions of terminology which are not commensurate with the magnitude of the problem.

Similarly, the debate should continue on the question of ad hoc inspections, which are a response to practical questions stemming directly from the results of a large number of trial inspections carried out in more than 20 countries. The question is thus clearly a real one, and I do not see what we would gain by saying that the debate is unnecessary or does not suit certain people. If I may put it this way, the facts are even more obstinate than the delegations which brought up the question of ad hoc verification before the Committee.



(Mr. Morel, France)

I would like to conclude on this topic by remarking that a certain number of questions and objections concerning provisions currently established or proposed in the "rolling text", concerning verification in its various forms, show that each country would be well advised to carry out on its own account one or even several national trial inspections, particularly an inspection on request, and even better, to report to the Committee on the matter.

Perhaps this would be a way of moving the discussion forward. Experiments, trial measures, are not, of course, the whole answer. We are aware of the political stakes inherent in any verification system and it is taking them fully into account that the whole system has been built up, with the guarantees and counterbalances that characterize it. But the way things are now, we shall, unless we base ourselves on concrete, shared experience, remain at the stage of a theoretical discussion incapable of yielding progress.

With respect to the principles and order of destruction, the incorporation of the Soviet-United States agreement in the text of the convention means that we now have for articles IV and V and their annexes a structure that is clear, precise and acceptable to the great majority of delegations. My delegation has stressed this point too often during the past five years - and for long amid general indifference - not to bid due welcome to this vital result. Group B, which has been extremely productive, has also clarified the definitions of article II and resolved the thorny issue of the guidelines for Schedule 1.

But I would like to dwell for a moment on the bilateral American-Soviet agreement. It has been recently the subject of rather excessive criticism which may lead to its misappreciation. Let us begin by recognizing that we owe to it the beginnings of a solution on a major question of the order of destruction; next let us acknowledge that this agreement, far from setting up a parallel or competing régime relative to the convention, is arranged in accordance with that instrument and aims at anticipating its effects for the two signatories; lastly, the effect of the agreement is to end the chemical-weapons production programmes of the two declared possessors. Who today is prepared to take on a comparable commitment among the producing countries, either presumed or potential, and which have so far declared nothing with respect to their real capacities? It seems to us then, in short, that we should keep a sense of proportion here. The so-called 2-per-cent question is a delicate one, it is true, but I see that the two signatories to the agreement recognize themselves that the solution they are proposing is imperfect in comparison with the convention. Since we are all seeking universality, let us try to find together, on the basis of this proposal and others the means to ensure the adherence of all countries to the convention.

The legal questions have both advanced and become more important. For the first time, we have a practical, coherent procedure for amending the convention. We should therefore draw the necessary consequences from the situation and adopt it in Appendix I. We have also made progress on the peaceful settlement of disputes by clearly leaving the choice to States and by spelling out the role of the Executive Council. Things are less well advanced as regards sanctions, and that is not surprising, since the Committee only took up this question last year; but we have, nevertheless, made very good



(Mr. Morel, France)

progress in drawing up the guidelines to serve as a basis for the drafting of the relevant article. At the same time, the question of the relationship between the convention and the 1925 Protocol, that is, of usage, is of growing importance and must be handled with all the requisite tact. It is, to be sure, regrettable that not all delegations are of exactly the same opinion on this point. But is the case a unique one? Is it a reason for retreating into an all-or-nothing attitude? For my part, I prefer to see in it an obligation for all delegations to seek together the means of linking two legal instruments that, while they are very different, are both, for reasons peculiar to each of them, essential and that go in the same direction.

This kind of balanced approach has shown its worth on another highly controversial subject, that of assistance, for which Ambassador García Moritán of Argentina has consolidated remarkably the first bases that were laid last year. A real compromise is now possible for the purposes of finalizing article X. Let us take this opportunity which has been patiently developed from contrary approaches. It concerns an important, sensitive subject of exemplary value.

Similarly, we are convinced that a compromise is possible today with a little effort on all sides, with regard to article XI on economic and technological co-operation.

This leads me to the very useful dialogue that we had recently with representatives of industry on confidentiality and product lists. We moved beyond exchanges of views setting two contradictory approaches against each other to recognize together that between the present stage and the full implementation of the convention well planned transitions will enable the convention to be adapted, to some extent, to the realities of industry without sacrificing the prime imperative of the security of States parties.

Lastly, it should be noted that no progress has been possible during this session on institutional matters, especially for the Executive Council, which cannot be left, as some believe, to the last quarter of an hour or worse still, until after the convention. It would be too easy and perhaps fatal for the proper functioning of the future Organization. There cannot be a good convention without clearly defined institutions.

May I add at the end of the list another question that is still unresolved, that of old chemical weapons, which has been very disappointing? The first round of consultations held in the spring gave hope that it would be possible to establish directions. But since then that initial result has dwindled and the substantive treatment of this still uncertain subject will have to be postponed. But I would draw from this a more general lesson which applies both to the historic sequels of old conflicts and to certain regional situations to which some are too ready to refer in order to establish a link between chemical disarmament and nuclear disarmament. You cannot ask the convention to settle questions that are not within its purview, whether these are unsettled consequences of past wars or current regional crises.

Having thus rapidly reviewed the main topics, I come back to what I said at the outset about the general hesitation which seems to have taken hold of the Committee to try to understand the situation in which we now find



(Mr. Morel, France)

ourselves: the negotiations are at once coming to maturity and seizing up and it is no longer possible to deal with questions on a case-by-case basis. What we have is, so to speak, a vehicle that is both advancing and going backwards, and this situation cannot last. Preparations must therefore be made to deal with the main topics together, and that can only come about through a collective political approach. It seems to us that the time has come to resort to the formula of a ministerial conference, but taking care to spell out the conditions of it very clearly, because the undertaking would be pointless unless it led to the conclusion of the negotiations.

We therefore propose that the Conference begin its next session in January 1991 by meeting at the ministerial level to examine the status of the negotiations at that time, identify the approaches needed to complete them, set a relatively short time-limit and give the corresponding instructions to delegations. The latter would then get down to work with the conclusion of a final agreement clearly in mind and would negotiate under the ministers' direct control. Then, when the time came, the ministers would return to Geneva to settle the final outstanding points requiring a decision at their level and to sign the final text of the convention.

It goes without saying that these two ministerial meetings, which would conform in all respects with the working conditions and procedures peculiar to the Conference on Disarmament, would be open to all the countries wishing to participate in the final phase of the work as non-member States. There must be no political or material limit that could be used against a country wishing to contribute to the negotiations, as was explicitly agreed on the occasion of the Paris Conference, and the experience of the past two years has shown how the Conference has been able to accept a growing number of non-member countries.

I know that it has been proposed, with a comparable concern for universality, that a meeting of this kind should be held in the context of the United Nations. But the negotiations cannot be re-opened elsewhere, and still less split into two; that would, in our view, be to ensure failure. It should also be recalled that the Conference on Disarmament is responsible for carrying these negotiations through to the end and the United Nations General Assembly does not fail to remind it of that each year. Lastly, a precise political mandate was entrusted to us by the 149 participants in the Paris Conference with a view to completion of the negotiations without delay. The time has come to draw all the consequences from this and to assume our responsibilities together.

What we have to do between now and the ministerial overture that we and other countries, in particular the German Democratic Republic, Australia and the Netherlands, are proposing is relatively simple. It is immediately to publish as many agreements as possible in Appendix I to the "rolling text" and where that is not possible, to preserve unchanged the latest results of the work that has been done in order to take them up again intensively in mid-November at what should be virtually a plenary session of the Committee. The Committee would then prepare the new version of the report that would serve as a basis for the meeting of ministers and the final phase of negotiations.



(Mr. Morel, France)

... I have tried to show how we can take advantage of the opportunity now open to us in order to get multilateral disarmament under way again, not artificially, but in response to the needs of our time. Perhaps it will be necessary to mobilize the resources of the Conference a little more and to set ourselves, step by step, more precise objectives. But is it possible to do otherwise, that is, to continue as if nothing had happened? We are all participants together in a great undertaking which is often difficult, sometimes disappointing and always complicated. It does, however, enable us to prepare the world of tomorrow, in which the methods of multilateral disarmament will make it possible to prevent and manage, worldwide, what are already being called "major risks". In point of fact, the chemical weapons negotiations show us that this is just what we must do as of now, and urgently.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of France, His Excellency Ambassador Morel, for the statement he has just made, for the kind words he addressed to the Chair and for his expressions of sympathy and encouragement regarding developments in my country. I assure him that his message has been understood. I believe that Ambassador Morel's statement goes beyond strictly technical concerns with regard to disarmament in the narrow sense. His Excellency placed the debate within our Conference

(The President)

in a global political and strategic context at the same time as he set out a philosophy of security and disarmament and a very pertinent synthesis of our work during this year's session. I would particularly like to draw attention to his comments concerning the negotiating of the "rolling text" of the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. They are all the more significant as they come from the architect of the Paris Conference on chemical weapons. I am sure that delegations will have noted Ambassador Morel's exposition of the idea of a ministerial conference to conclude the negotiations on the draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.



(Mr. García Moritán, Argentina)

... Before concluding, I would like to refer briefly to item 4 of our agenda, namely the negotiations on the convention on chemical weapons. The final stage of the negotiation of the convention on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons requires from us all a series of additional efforts to continue fostering the balance and coherence of the draft convention and to accelerate the negotiating process. At the same time, we are of the view that all the States committed, like mine, to the successful conclusion of the negotiations, must focus with particular emphasis on the practical aspects of the convention, and on the attributes of those future mechanisms, in order to ensure its effectiveness.

In that context, and with the intention of keeping properly abreast of the negotiations at this crucial stage and laying the foundations for the operation of the convention in our country, the President of Argentina has recently set up, by Decree No. 1252, the Commission for the Study of the draft Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. The fact that the Commission has been created by a decision of the executive branch rather than through recourse to lower-level administrative procedures is clear proof of the interest and expectations there are in the highest organs of my Government with regard to the successful conclusion of these multilateral negotiations and the immediate entry into force, with the widest possible membership, of the resulting instrument.

(Mr. García Moritán, Argentina)

The Commission's functions include the analysis of the various issues involved in implementing the convention. Among its purposes is, therefore, the making of a nation-wide inventory of the points relevant to the draft convention in order to evaluate them and to formulate the necessary recommendations.

Finally, I would like to stress that the Commission will be the necessary bridge towards the establishment of the National Authority to be set up in conformity with article VII of the draft convention. This will ensure the dissemination of knowledge of the provisions of the draft among the sectors concerned and facilitate the elaboration of the legal and administrative procedures necessary for the effective implementation of the convention as soon as it comes into force.



(Mr. Králík, Czech and Slovak Federal Republic)

... The field in which most attention is focused and in which we have made most progress, although the ongoing talks might not indicate this, is the outlawing of chemical weapons. One of the most discussed questions is the problem of control.

Systematic verification under the chemical weapons convention will only cover facilities which have been declared by the State parties. However, prohibited activities might occur at facilities which have not been declared or were declared, but not as subject to international monitoring. To assure full compliance with the projected convention, additional verification methods are discussed. In case of serious suspicion or allegation of a breach of the chemical weapons convention, challenge inspection might be applied. In principle, challenge inspection can be applied to both military and civilian facilities. To learn the practical problems of this type of inspection, many States participating in the Conference on Disarmament have made trial challenge inspections at both civilian and military facilities. Challenge inspection has both political and technical aspects. Czechoslovakia believes that challenge principles on the base of its obligatory character, without right of refusal, any time, anywhere and at short notice, are in agreement with its previous statements. The technical aspects of challenge might be solved on a practical level by evaluation of real experiences from national

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(Mr. Králík, Czech and Slovak Federal Republic)

experimental challenge inspections. Czechoslovakia agrees with the proposal of the United Kingdom to conduct national challenge inspections by a number of countries participating in the Conference on Disarmament, as was suggested in United Kingdom documents CD/921 and CD/1012.

This challenge inspection - now inspection on request - was conducted in the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic at the beginning of July. I am now submitting to this disarmament Conference two documents, CD/1021 and CD/1022. One of these is concerned with the inspection of a military facility and the second is concerned with the inspection of a civilian chemical plant. Our experiences, which are summarized in the conclusions of both documents, could be of some importance for further negotiations in this field. However, a very important conclusion - and that is why I am reiterating our support for having as many States as possible conduct their own trial inspections - stems directly from this for every State and that is that this will point out the many questions or difficulties which will have to be solved by its joining the convention. It will show what technical, legal, personnel, military and other problems will arise for a given State when the convention enters into force.

Let me, in addition, express my personal opinion on this question: Talleyrand has already pointed out that "war is much too serious a thing to be left only to military men". Therefore it is very good that all these technical questions which have been discussed in the framework of the convention on chemical weapons are being verified in practice, at least partially, by so many experts. It is not just a challenge inspection, but there are also, for instance, a whole range of national trial inspections which have been carried out by many countries which have taken part in the Conference on Disarmament in past years. There is also the Finnish initiative about an inter-laboratory round-robin test, along with many other programmes. These practical experiences open the way to compromise solutions within the text of the future convention.



(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

... Mr. President, let me now turn to the ongoing negotiations in the Ad hoc Committee on chemical weapons. My delegation notes with satisfaction the tremendous resources and efforts of the Chairman, Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden, in ensuring continued progress. I believe that the outstanding issues in the convention can be resolved if a sense of urgency is injected into the negotiations.

This brings me to our concern for chemical weapons, which must go far beyond the periodic expressions of abhorrence about their use. After all, those who have been accused of using these weapons are not solely or even necessarily the producers. Naturally, humanitarian concern about the effect of this category of weapons of mass destruction is well and good; however, we should go beyond that and tackle the issue from the source and the maintenance of international peace and security must not rest solely on the presumption of the highest standard of behaviour by some States. If the use of chemical weapons is reprehensible, so should be their development, production, stockpiling and transfer. International emotion should not only be whipped up when there is suspected use of chemical weapons. There must be a sustained international effort to eliminate these weapons from the arsenals of those who possess them.

We have come to a crucial stage in the consideration of this agenda item. Ambassador Hyltenius's consultations on a number of issues, especially on challenge inspection, have not only helped to illuminate the very complex and sensitive nature of the issues, but are also helping the Committee to find its way, as it were, through the maze. The Chairman's proposal on challenge inspection, now christened inspection on request, has received considerable attention. Specific issues like the mandate, the role of observers, the

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(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

powers of the Director-General, alternative measures, managed access and the report deserve mention. I will however direct my comments to two of these issues, namely, the observers and managed access.

My delegation agrees with the prevailing view that an observer should be present during an inspection. It is only his presence that can reassure the requesting State, without necessarily calling into question the impartiality and integrity of the inspection team. My delegation also endorses the view that his role is to observe the conduct of the inspection, although the extent of access he can be granted is not yet clearly defined. An observer who is not granted sufficient access will have good grounds not only to complain of, but also to reject the outcome of an inspection exercise, especially if the report indicates that no violation has taken place. An observer so affected will particularly feel aggrieved if the inspected State party denies him access. My delegation would prefer that any decision to refuse access to an observer should be left to the inspection team.

The proponents of managed access have always felt that challenge inspection, or inspection on request, should be conducted with some degree of flexibility, some leeway, for an inspection exercise could otherwise be dead-locked. It is hoped that, with managed access, the inspection team would have the access needed for effective verification, while the inspected State party would also have the protection of its national security it requires. This places a very weighty responsibility on the inspection team, which may invariably have to arrange the managed access in conjunction with the inspected State party. However, there could be a source of friction between States parties and inspection teams; to forestall such a development, there is the need to elaborate general guidelines on managed access.

Significant progress has been recorded in the elaboration of settlement of disputes and amendments. The issue of sanctions, now referred to as "measures to redress a situation", is of great interest to my delegation. Firstly, there is a need to ensure that the various organs of the Organization that will be involved in these measures are given the scope to perform their duties. In particular, the Conference of the States Parties, the highest organ of the future Organization, should be able to make recommendations when reporting to the Security Council any case of grave threat to international peace and security arising from a serious violation of the convention. My delegation does not share the view that such recommendations amount to an encroachment on the powers and prerogative of the Security Council.

Secondly, the convention needs to be fortified with provisions that will permit the adoption of swift and effective measures against any contravention of the convention and threats to States parties. My delegation therefore welcomes the provision for the Conference of the States Parties to recommend collective measures to States parties against possible violations. A provision such as this will reassure States parties of their security, attract more adherents to the convention, and enhance its universality, another area of interest to my delegation.



(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

Considerable attention has been given to the issue of universality of the convention. In this regard, it has been stressed that the convention must above all be non-discriminatory. My delegation agrees entirely with this view. We note with satisfaction the recent United States-Soviet bilateral Agreement on Destruction and Non-Production of Chemical Weapons. The Agreement, however, does not provide for total and unconditional destruction of their chemical weapons stocks, nor the extensive verification provisions required for a global chemical weapons convention. Only complete and unconditional destruction of all stockpiles as provided for in the draft convention can ensure the universal and effective prohibition of chemical weapons.

(Mr. Calderón, Peru)

... I would now like to refer briefly to two proposals that my delegation is submitting to the Conference today within the context of the negotiations now under way in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. My delegation is perfectly aware that this is not the time to embark upon a substantive discussion of new proposals. However, we hope that, with the circulation of these proposals as official documents of the Conference, there could at least be some preliminary discussion, subject to preparing more thorough analysis during the inter-sessional period and in 1991.

Before introducing the proposals, I would like to emphasize that my delegation believes that the Ad hoc Committee entrusted with the task of negotiating a convention on the total prohibition of chemical weapons cannot continue its work indefinitely. Next year, then, it will be necessary to set a deadline for the conclusion of its work and it will also be necessary to clarify its mandate once and for all, so that the Ad hoc Committee is also in a position to negotiate the prohibition of any type of use of chemical weapons. Because of its choice of 1991 as a time-limit, my delegation can agree with what was said by the distinguished Ambassador of France, Mr. Morel, to the effect that the political work could well be intensified next year with a view to the prompt conclusion of the negotiations that are now under way.

The first proposal, contained in document CD/1024, refers to the environment and aims at the inclusion in the future convention of a new article referring to this important topic. In the opinion of my delegation, the underlying principle in humanity's obligation to protect its natural environment is that all human activity should be carried out without detriment to the ecological integrity of the environment. Whether it is an industrial activity or chemical recycling, it cannot disregard this fundamental principle unless it prefers to value immediate returns on investment over the quality of life.



(Mr. Calderón, Peru)

Within the context of the future convention, there are, in the opinion of my delegation, two cases in which there may be damage to the environment. The first concerns the period of destruction, which entails the handling, transport, destruction proper and disposal of thousands and thousands of tonnes of highly toxic chemical waste. At this point, no one can deny that this involves a risk, however small, of accidents and of damage to neighbouring populations and the environment. At any rate, my country's intention is to strengthen measures to provide material security and to remind people that, when we talk about chemical disarmament, what we have in mind is not only to ban a particular type of weapons of mass destruction, but also to spare humanity the risk of seeing itself involved in a massive catastrophe as a result of error or negligence in the process of destroying these weapons.

The second case in which there might be environmental damage is that of the development of the chemical industry for purposes not prohibited by the future convention. Here we assume the most optimistic scenario, namely, scrupulous compliance with the ten-year destruction period, followed by the continued expansion and development on authorized chemical industry. However peaceful a facility's activity, the risk of accident will be present: the tragedies of Seveso and Bhopal, the consequences of which are still being felt today, are dramatic proof of that. This is why the Organization to be set up cannot remain indifferent, or on the sidelines in the case of accidents arising from the peaceful development of the chemical industry.

Lastly, the proposal suggests establishing an assistance and environmental protection fund to make possible the promotion in developing countries of prevention and environmental decontamination programmes. Running this fund would be the responsibility of the Organization.

Without looking far afield, last night I found out about the environmental questions now arising in a neighbouring country because it is apparently intended to begin building a citric acid factory there. As the world's population increases, the space available on this planet decreases and the environment becomes a very valuable asset.

To conclude, a few words about the second proposal, which appears in document CD/1025. Originally introduced by Peru in the Ad hoc Committee in 1988, this proposal, for a "clause of automatic nullity" is an updated version that we place before the Committee in connection with the issue of universality, the political implications of which call for informal treatment in the light of the objectives pursued by the future convention. My delegation believes that the fundamental requirement is to ensure that the multilateral instrument to be adopted can, right from the outset, enjoy the unanimous support of the international community, which is why it must be, among other things, non-discriminatory. For this reason, we propose that if, at the end of the ten-year period for destruction, the Organization is not in a position to declare that all the States parties have carried out the obligations specified in article I, the obligations shall cease for all States parties not possessing chemical weapons.

I would like to stress that both proposals are in addition to others and could suffer the same fate with respect to the "rolling text". We have no doubt that, in the end, the outcome of the negotiating effort will be satisfactory to everyone.



Mr. KAMAL (Pakistan):

... As we approach the end of this year's session of the Conference on Disarmament I wish to address the subject of the chemical weapons convention, to which we have devoted a great amount of time and effort over the last few years and which, despite the various obstacles, continues to hold the maximum degree of promise among the various items on our agenda. The negotiations on this convention have now reached a stage where an end is in sight, but not yet quite within our grasp. The intensity of our negotiations on this subject is a reflection of the international consensus which exists on the need to ban chemical weapons, and it is our hope that this commitment on the part of the international community will be sustained till the achievement of our final goal.

Before I address some of the specific issues being discussed in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, allow me to state once again that Pakistan neither possesses chemical weapons nor desires to acquire them. Consequently, we have a deep and abiding interest in a comprehensive, effective and equitable treaty that would prohibit the development, stockpiling, acquisition and use of chemical weapons and ensure the total destruction of existing stockpiles, facilities and delivery systems of chemical weapons. At the same time, we would not favour any partial or discriminatory approach to the prohibition of chemical weapons, since this would leave the door open for the use of chemical weapons and discriminate against the developing countries which do not possess the capability to produce such weapons.

There is no doubt that the procedures for verification included in the convention will constitute its backbone and will be essential to provide the assurance that the obligations regarding the destruction of stockpiles and facilities and for the non-acquisition of chemical weapons are being complied with by all parties. It is also clear that verification will involve a combination of national and international means, and that international verification will, in certain circumstances, entail intrusive procedures to

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(Mr. Kamal, Pakistan)

ensure compliance. Based on these assumptions, we have been developing a verification régime which has two key components, namely, routine inspection and challenge inspection. Even though our negotiations have not yet been concluded on these two systems of verification, and we are still not clear as to their final shape, we have witnessed a recent effort to introduce another element in the verification régime, to be now called by its authors ad hoc verification. Without repeating the arguments that one has heard in the Ad hoc Committee against the need for such a system, I would only like to point out at this juncture that this concept has also been debated in the past and its proponents have not been able to make out any convincing case for the injection of this third concept into the verification régime. We believe that the procedures presently being discussed are adequate, and that there is no need for another régime which could politicize the Technical Secretariat by giving it the right to initiate disguised challenge inspections against States parties. We hope that the proponents of this concept will accept the fact that there is, as yet, no agreement even on the need for a further detailed discussion of the concept of ad hoc verification in the Ad hoc Committee.

The procedures for challenge inspection will have a crucial place in an effective verification régime which would be required to deter violations, as well as to create confidence in compliance. There is general recognition that challenge inspections should be mandatory, with States having no right of refusal. However, as regards the actual conduct of the inspection, procedures still need to be evolved that will reconcile the demands of an effective inspection with the legitimate right of States to protect sensitive information and installations which are not related to chemical weapons. Moreover, the whole range of issues connected with follow-up to the submission of the inspection report still need to be addressed adequately. We believe that, once doubts have been raised publicly about compliance with the convention, the matter can no longer be regarded as one of concern only to the requesting and requested States, to be resolved by them bilaterally. Every party to the convention has an interest in seeing to it that the inspection is carried out in an effective manner and that a clear-cut finding is arrived at on compliance or otherwise. It is obvious that the Executive Council is the appropriate organ to make such a determination.

My delegation fully supports the initiative taken by Ambassador Hyltenius to arrive at some textual language for article IX, and we have been actively participating in the negotiations being conducted by him. Care has, of course, to be taken that the concerns of no States are marginalized.

The composition of the Executive Council continues to be a difficult question and, as we enter the final phase of our negotiations, there is an increasing need to address the matter. My delegation believes that the Executive Council should not be so large in size as to weaken its capacity to take decisions, nor should it be so small as to deprive it of a truly representative character. Its precise composition should be based on the geographical divisions recognized by the United Nations. We disagree with arguments calling for the establishment of an organizational set-up which would give a privileged position to the developed nations at the expense of developing countries. We realize the existing inequalities in today's world, but we cannot support their being institutionalized in an international agreement which draws its strength and validity from the basic objectives of comprehensiveness and globality.



(Mr. Kamal, Pakistan)

We share with most delegations the view that the Executive Council should consist of about 25 members. However, we also believe that the convention should provide for an increase in the membership of the Executive Council once the total number of States parties goes beyond a certain figure, or when States parties agree to expand its membership.

As the Executive Council would be the supreme political organ under the convention, it is imperative that it should have an effective decision-making mechanism. The consensus principle, by giving every member virtually the right of veto, would be a prescription for paralysis, especially in situations where decisions or actions are most required. On the other hand, a significant number of States may be reluctant to accept decisions by a simple majority, especially where substantive matters are concerned. There is also the additional question of determining what is substantive and what is procedural. The dilemma could be resolved by basing all decisions, procedural and substantive, on a qualified majority of States present and voting. Such a solution would not only be unambiguous, but would also have the merit of being simple and effective.

My delegation has taken a particular interest in articles X and XI of the convention, dealing respectively with assistance and economic and technological development. Some delegations continue to approach these matters from a rather narrow angle and see them as another North-South issue. In fact, insinuations have been voiced that these articles are being used to establish an "aid programme" under the convention. Nothing could be further from the truth.

The idea behind these two articles is closely linked to the objective of universal adherence to the convention and the strengthening of its viability. It is our belief that if States were assured that, by becoming parties to the convention, they would be able to rely on effective assistance from other States parties in the event of an attack or a threat of an attack, the incentives for adhering to the convention would be substantially increased. Conversely, a State will not become a party to the convention or, having become one, might withdraw from it unless it can count on guaranteed assurances of assistance from States parties in meeting a demonstrated threat to its security. Consequently, a provision which assures mandatory assistance to a State party subjected to an objectively verified attack or a threat of attack would go a long way in encouraging universal adherence to the convention, especially adherence by non-chemical-weapons States such as my own.

We have been participating in the consultations undertaken by Ambassador García Moritán, and we hope that we will be able to arrive at a text for article X which will adequately provide for the concerns that I have just enumerated.

The undertaking that we are seeking under article XI for the promotion of international scientific and technological co-operation is not new. Similar clauses exist in two other multilateral disarmament agreements, namely the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Biological Weapons Convention. The case for such a provision is all the greater in view of the generally recognized interrelationship between disarmament and development, and the increased confidence that compliance with the convention would generate.



(Mr. Kamal, Pakistan)

My delegation's views regarding the bilateral Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on the qualified destruction and non-production of chemical weapons have been adequately expressed in the plenary statement made on behalf of the Group of 21 on 24 July 1990. Nevertheless, I wish to reiterate today that efforts to introduce concepts in the convention which would result in undermining its universal and non-discriminatory character and scope would be counter-productive.

In concluding, I would like to express our hope that all delegations will capitalize on the existing international consensus on the need for a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. We must resist the temptation of a less-than-comprehensive ban, or of interim or discriminatory measures which can only jeopardize the existing consensus and wash away the serious work done so far. Also, an inordinate delay or too laboured a rate of progress towards a comprehensive ban could lead to an erosion of world-wide interest in the subject. Thus, the early conclusion of a chemical weapons convention is not only desirable, but would also provide a significant boost to the Conference on Disarmament and reinvigorate the multilateral disarmament process.



(Mr. Bottai, Italy)

... For this reason, my country considers very positively the fact that the Conference on Disarmament has undertaken a process of revision of its future role in the perspective of the conclusion of the chemical-weapons negotiations. It would seem to us difficult in this respect to refrain, sooner or later, from taking into account any suggestions about the revision of the agenda, especially when the current list will have been fully discussed. I would avail myself of this opportunity to express the wish that the process of revision under way will continue beyond the current session in accordance with the modalities which will be agreed upon as most appropriate.

The primary objective of the Conference will remain the conclusion at the earliest date of the negotiations on a chemical-weapons ban. On this point there seems to be wide agreement among us, although we should be aware that by expecting to foresee in advance all the possible details and scenarios we run the risk of delaying negotiations for a number of years to come.

In Italy, we are convinced that the level of technical sophistication already achieved in the negotiations is more than sufficiently elaborated to allow for the concrete and final expression of political will, when the parties usually find the necessary boldness to come to a conclusion. However, we do not feel disheartened by the insufficiency of results so far achieved in the current advanced stage of negotiations. We have noted the Soviet-American agreements, particularly important for their commitments on the cessation of the production of chemical weapons, probably to be implemented even before the completion of the multilateral negotiations. A certain amount of exploratory activity has also been undertaken in this forum on some of the fundamental elements of the convention, and we are confident that such efforts have not been in vain. It is, however, difficult to ignore that negotiations are at a standstill on almost all the most sensitive issues at stake.

In the field of verification we register differing views on how to strike the appropriate balance between reliability of the system and concerns aimed at protecting, during its implementation, fundamental interests in terms of national security. Whenever ambitious and innovating goals are set forth, it would seem almost inevitable that each one should be ready to pay a certain price. All the more so, if we were to take into account the various experiments carried out by different countries that have produced encouraging results as to the possibility of combining the two concerns. We ourselves had reached those same conclusions in 1988, in the initial inspections carried out at some Italian chemical facilities by experts of international level.

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(Mr. Bottai, Italy)

Preserving the effectiveness of the future verification system of the convention is, therefore, of vital importance to all, although in doing so we should not neglect the requirements of specific regional concerns. In a negotiating process aiming at wide-ranging and global objectives, like the one we are conducting, such concerns will have to be taken into account in the appropriate way.

Achieving a universality of accessions to the convention requires therefore an effective and reliable verification system, reassuring for all, but it also needs a convention and an organizational structure likely to promote true participation by all. Participation in the future convention could not therefore merely rely on a political imperative as a result of some indirect form of international lobbying. We therefore still believe that the provisions of the convention dealing with co-operation, assistance and protection should not be neglected, since they can make visible the collective solidarity among the States parties. It would also seem appropriate in our view to set up an Executive Council whose powers and functions would ensure full effectiveness of functioning while providing for a composition sufficiently wide as to offer all States a concrete opportunity, rather than a merely theoretical one, to assume their respective responsibilities on a basis of equality.

The establishment by a number of Governments of a final time-frame or deadline for the negotiations had been envisaged by my country at various junctures, at a political level too, in order to provide for the necessary political drive towards the final stage of the negotiations. We believe, now more than ever before, in such a need. The proposals put forward in recent days about the call for a meeting of the Conference at ministerial level, to be held at the beginning of our next session and designed to provide negotiations with the necessary impetus for the final stage, would indeed meet our full expectations. We are therefore ready to examine any proposal, irrespective of its procedural implications, likely to provide us with a clear scenario for our aims.

Concluding on this point, I would like to stress that the Conference on Disarmament has an enormous achievement at hand. I do not think it would be purely rhetorical to say that a chemical-weapons ban would be an accomplishment without any comparable term of reference in the history of disarmament negotiations. It would represent the first agreement of its kind, one of universal appeal and with far-reaching provisions about international co-operation. We trust that the conclusion of the chemical-weapons ban will inject new dynamism in multilateral disarmament, one which this body will be able to profit from, taking stock of positive as well as negative experiences.



(Mr. Arteaga, Venezuela)

... Mr. President, one of the main responsibilities of the Conference on Disarmament is the negotiation of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The Ad Hoc Committee dealing with this item has expended considerable effort on the achievement of that objective, an objective that we hope will be or can be reached above all else as rapidly as possible.

An element that must characterize this instrument is universality. To achieve this, the Convention must fix as its scope total and complete prohibition. It must not entitle States which have chemical weapons to establish certain arsenals or to delay the destruction of all chemical weapons and their production facilities.

In this connection and with regard to the bilateral agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union concerning chemical weapons, we welcome their decision to halt the production of these weapons and to begin their destruction. Nevertheless, as regards the multilateral process of destruction to which all the States parties to the convention would be committed, we cannot accept any premise that provides for the maintenance of certain arsenals till the end of the process of destruction.

Another important aspect in negotiating the convention is the system of verification. This machinery will have to include a procedure that would operate spontaneously for verifying compliance with the obligations established by the convention, and a verification procedure that would operate upon request for determining the truth of any accusation alleging violation of the convention. Furthermore, the verification machinery must be as non-intrusive as possible.

Consequently, we recognize the need for this instrument to include effective provisions for ensuring compliance. The system to be established should be as efficient, simple and, as we have stressed on other occasions, as least costly as possible.

Before concluding this statement, I would like to reiterate our announcement at the beginning of the session that the Government of Venezuela intends to organize a regional seminar, for Latin America and the Caribbean,



(Mr. Arteaga, Venezuela)

on chemical weapons. For reasons of force majeure this seminar has been postponed to the first half of next year. Consultations are now being carried out with the Secretariat of the United Nations on finalization of the details.

The seminar will seek to familiarize all the States of the region with the scope, purposes and objectives of the convention as well as with the verification machinery that will have to be established.

Mr. von WAGNER (Federal Republic of Germany):

... Mr. President, this year's session of the Conference on Disarmament is drawing to a close. It is time to take stock and render account of what we have achieved in the course of this session, in particular with regard to our most urgent task, the elaboration of a universal convention providing for a complete and effective ban on chemical weapons. Reviewing the state of our negotiations on chemical weapons, we are at a historical juncture, particularly promising and favourable for disarmament. This is a time to seize existing opportunities, which in our case means to translate the consensus of the international community - as it manifested itself at the Paris Conference - into a comprehensive and global convention effectively banning chemical weapons.

However, I cannot help but feel disappointed. Despite the untiring efforts and the excellent work of this year's Ad Hoc Committee Chairman, Ambassador Hyltenius, we have failed to resolve some as yet outstanding key issues in our negotiations. Progress has been slow. The pace of our negotiations seems to have slackened compared to last year. Indeed, during the past few weeks, I not only had the impression that we were dragging our feet but that we were also faced with a possible retrogression in our negotiations. This picture is all the more disconcerting as the necessary political and material prerequisites for the timely and successful conclusion of our chemical weapons negotiations exist. History does not repeat its offers.

The state of our work on verification issues and, in particular, the discussions during the summer part of the session on ad hoc verification and challenge inspections have given cause for concern. Challenge inspections are considered to be an indispensable element and a corner-stone of the verification system. It is, as the Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom, Mr. Waldegrave, recently put it,

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(Mr. von Wagner, Federal Republic of Germany)

"the key to effective verification". My delegation therefore has always attached great importance to this issue in our negotiations. We have consistently advocated a rapid solution to this problem. This would not only remove one of the obstacles in the way of completing the verification system, but would also provide a strong stimulus for tackling the other yet unresolved issues of the convention. In spring, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Hyltenius, in a bold and commendable effort to bring the discussions on the issue to a successful conclusion - discussions which have been intensively pursued now for more than three years - put forward a new draft of article IX. This proposal by Ambassador Hyltenius underwent two revisions, which resulted in a considerable improvement of the text. Recently, however, new amendments to the text have been presented which could be understood to amount to changing the basic characteristics of the challenge inspection régime. These very characteristics have been discussed over a number of years now and clearly a consensus had seemed to emerge on them. Therefore, it will be our task to ensure that ways are found to come back to this road and find solutions which make it possible for everyone to share this consensus.

I should not dwell at length on the issue of challenge inspections, since our views are well known and my predecessor, Ambassador von Stülpnagel, on 8 March of this year already made a plenary statement devoted in its entirety to this subject. However, in view of recent developments, let me make a few specific additional observations.

Owing to the limited coverage of routine verification and the risks of circumvention, we need an additional verification measure, with the help of which all States parties are able to clarify doubts about the compliance of others. If we were to restrict challenge inspections to what might be called "relevant" facilities, we not only create a definitional problem but also imply an overall reduction in the coverage of challenge inspections that reduces the stringency and effectiveness so far sought by these inspections. We are convinced that because of the peculiar verification problems posed by chemical weapons, each State party should have the right to request a challenge inspection. Only in this way can all States parties be given the necessary assurance of compliance and the verifiability of the convention be assured.

There should be no sites exempted from the challenge inspection régime, if the verification system of a chemical weapons convention is to work. As the experience with our national trial challenge inspections has shown, it is possible to grant access even to very sensitive facilities. We found that "managed access" procedures can sufficiently ensure that sensitive installations and information are protected. Following our experience we would suggest that the concept of "managed access", which has already to some extent been elaborated in the protocol on inspection procedures, be made a focal point of our discussions. In its Working Paper (CD/1012) of 11 July 1990 the United Kingdom presented an analysis of the results of the trial challenge inspections they had nationally conducted at military facilities. We have particularly welcomed this paper because it represents an important input into our negotiations. It should, in particular, stimulate further thinking on the issue of "managed access".



(Mr. von Wagner, Federal Republic of Germany)

Furthermore, I wish to point out that it is on the basis of experience gained from our national trial inspections that we fully support the conclusions drawn in the Working Paper of the United Kingdom.

In this context I would like to introduce Working Paper CD/1026 (CD/CW/WP.315), which is in front of you, on various verification instruments demonstrated during the Workshop in Münster in mid-June, to which all member and observer States of the Conference on Disarmament had been invited.

Some of the instruments and methods described in our Working Paper are already available to inspection teams confronted with the task of verifying compliance effectively in the least intrusive manner. They have proved, under increasingly realistic circumstances, to be extremely useful in the conduct of different types of inspections, whether ad hoc or challenge. Others are being developed under our national research and development programme on verification instrumentation.

Another issue in the field of verification is ad hoc verification. We consider this to be an important element, complementing and strengthening the verification of non-production in article VI. As early as January 1988, we submitted a proposal on ad hoc checks in order to make a constructive contribution to resolving a problem that was raised by a number of delegations: the potential of existing facilities in the chemical industry, in particular those which are not declared under any of the annexes to article VI, to produce chemical weapons. We conceive of ad hoc verification measures to be a non-intrusive instrument of a routine character, its main purpose being to verify the absence of substances listed in the "Annex on chemicals". Such non-intrusive checks would cover those parts of industry which might possibly be misused for the production of chemical weapons. As with other routine verification measures, the selection of facilities to be inspected by ad hoc verification measures would be made on the basis of the declarations to be submitted by all States parties. These declarations would be made in the form of national registers which, in accordance with an agreed format, would list all relevant plant sites of the chemical industry.

We have made a specific and concrete proposal on the establishment of national registers in document CD/984 of 10 April 1990. The reactions we have so far received on our proposal are encouraging and we are convinced that with the broad approach we have adopted - the ability to produce chemical weapons is hard to define unambiguously - we have pointed the way to a manageable and easily implementable solution. We stand ready to continue in-depth discussion on this proposal.

Following the preparatory work that has been undertaken over the last two years, we are somewhat disappointed that it was not possible to make any progress on ad hoc verification this year. The discussion paper (CD/CW/WP.286) of 11 April 1990, which Australia put forward on behalf of the Western Group, provided a good outline of an overall approach to ad hoc verification. This paper was followed by a Working Paper of the United States (CD/CW/WP.300 of 27 June 1990), which proposed draft treaty language. For my Government it is disappointing that the opportunities provided by these papers have not been seized. We would have preferred a drafting exercise that would have helped to clarify the various positions. I know that there are some delegations that in



(Mr. von Wagner, Federal Republic of Germany)

the course of this summer have expressed general reservations as to the need of ad hoc verification measures. We respect that. However, we just cannot ignore a concern that has been expressed by many delegations, namely with regard to the ease with which chemical weapons can be produced clandestinely in existing facilities of the chemical industry. Ad hoc verification measures are to address this concern. And it would only be prudent before any final decision is taken to sufficiently explore this issue. Thus, we hope that the forthcoming inter-sessionals will be used to this end and that a result-oriented approach will be adopted.

Mr. President, it is due to recent developments in our negotiations that I have devoted my statement today to verification issues. This should in no way mean that there are no other issues which require determined actions on our part. Indeed, we are somewhat concerned that such important aspects as article X (assistance), article XI (economic and technological development) have also not been resolved. My delegation recognizes the interest that many delegations place in these two articles and the hope that that interest should sufficiently be taken into account. A solution to these issues is now long overdue. We are convinced that a solution acceptable to all is feasible and we are prepared to work constructively for an early and successful conclusion of our negotiations on those two items.

Without going into detail, and despite the shortcomings mentioned above, I would like to express my appreciation and gratitude for the progress achieved on a wide variety of subjects. We are indebted to Mr. Meerburg for carrying forward the work on many technical issues and, in particular, the solution of the long-standing question of order of destruction. I was also particularly impressed by the imaginative approach that Dr. Krutzsch took on such difficult issues as amendments, settlement of disputes and measures to redress a situation. His efforts were crowned by success and even though it was not possible to arrive at a solution to the latter issue, acceptable for inclusion in appendix I, a solid basis has been laid for further work on it.

Mr. President, this analysis of the current situation in our negotiations shows us that much work remains to be done. We have to face the situation as it is and we have to try to overcome existing difficulties. The international situation and the great progress made in other areas of arms control should stimulate us to work hard and try to resolve the remaining key issues of our negotiations with the necessary urgency and in a constructive spirit. We can thereby prove our seriousness about concluding a multilateral convention and should have a good chance for success in our endeavour.



Mr. OCHSNER (Switzerland):

... We can hardly ignore major events outside of the conference room and continue as if nothing has happened. While we were quietly doing our paperwork, the situation in the Middle East has seriously deteriorated in a way that discussions on the details of a chemical weapons convention could become partially obsolete for the time being. Once the situation is redressed however - a difficult and dangerous process to be carried out by people other than by disarmament and arms control specialists of diplomacy - it could be indicated to continue the negotiations, and we will need an inventory of what has been accomplished hitherto. Some political obstacles may hopefully have been removed by then. That is why from our point of view the Conference has to finish its work of the 1990 session in the field of chemical weapons according to pre-planned dispositions whatever happens.

Mr. President, being close to the end of my assignment as an observer to the Conference on Disarmament, I would like to give you some personal opinions and confine my intervention just to two points - in the field of the chemical weapons sector and the role of non-Members - points of practical significance, and I would be very much obliged to you if you would be kind enough to allow me the floor for a couple of minutes.

Beforehand, however, I set great importance on expressing my delegation's gratitude to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on item 4, Ambassador Hyltenius, for having conducted this session's work with much competence and perseverance and, in addition, for having continued the tradition created by his predecessor, Ambassador Morel, of holding contact meetings with the non-Member States - which, indeed, must appear most indicated in view of their increased number and the declared goal of universality of the chemical weapons convention. Furthermore, we think that the most useful role played by the Swedish delegation, above all in the CW negotiations, deserves full recognition and shows clearly that the size of the population of a country does not necessarily reflect its possibilities or its limitations of making a precious contribution in a particular matter of worldwide interest. I can only regret that it was not practical for us to give more support to the Committee's endeavours. For small delegations with a rather modest back-up it is, as a matter of fact, quite a demanding task to serve this Conference effectively, particularly in technical matters, and not to content themselves with mere talking. That is why, admittedly a little bit late, we are striving to make a build-up, and that is, on the other hand, also the reason why our delegation has, up to this day, rarely asked for the floor in order to avoid needless delay.

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(Mr. Ochsner, Switzerland)

Now to the points I would like to bring forward in all due brevity. First, a word on the state of our work in the light of the political goal No. 1 of a possible CW convention, namely universality. As every newcomer realizes nearly right from the beginning, multilateral negotiations on an extremely complex and complicated matter require from everybody, particularly from the working group leaders, and the chairman, a patience going far beyond imagination. To bring about a consensus of 40 States parties appears sometimes nearly impossible particularly if no deviation from the ordinary diplomatic rites, as for instance advance inquiries, is permitted.

The situation becomes even more delicate if universality of the convention is envisaged, because this would actually require the approval of States non-members of the Conference, since complete adherence is one of the main concerns.

Nevertheless, a certain number of topics could be brought ashore this year, and numerous subjects are in a high degree of maturity. But on the whole, despite intensive efforts, relatively little has been achieved. Ambassador Morel in his last week's brilliant analysis of the future path to take has rightly pointed out, in our view, that general hesitation has got hold of the Committee. Indeed, an atmosphere of confidence has not been established to a sufficient degree and the feeling that we are sitting in the same boat has up to now not seemed to prevail everywhere. A considerable amount of optimism is required to sustain the belief that the convention in its present contours could be finished by end of next year if the continuing slow chessplay is perpetuated.

One of the root causes of our difficulties lies in the behaviour of States feeling themselves not in a situation permitting their renunciation of chemical weapons or, at least, of an option, and this must inevitably produce reactions of the great Powers - namely to maintain security stocks.

The problem is how to bring about a change, how to get out of the vicious circle.

Ambassador Morel's recommendation, based on similar ideas originated earlier, is to use the tool of a ministerial conference, a well-known political instrument to get the impetus for the final phase. In order to be precise, I quote in French: (translated from French)

"We therefore propose that the Conference begin its next session in January 1991 by meeting at the ministerial level to examine the status of the negotiations at that time, identify the approaches needed to complete them, set a relatively short time-limit and give the corresponding instructions to delegations. The latter would then get down to work with the conclusion of a final agreement clearly in mind and would negotiate under the ministers' direct control." (CD/PV.570, p.16)

(Continued in English)

Mr. President, distinguished delegates, there can be no doubt that this is, at this particular time, the logical approach to the solution.



(Mr. Ochsner, Switzerland)

The problem will be in what way the ministers will establish the guidelines or instructions for their delegations. Will they be able and ready to give appropriate guidelines offering sufficient freedom of action? Will they be able to roughly co-ordinate their directives before the negotiators - you - will be sent back to work? The ministers will presumably be advised by the same specialists who are in charge of formulating your instructions. I have been at the job now for quite some time and have observed that many delegations, and among them very influential ones, are working under remote-control conditions, so to say, which does not facilitate speedy results. But, as the chances of a rapprochement have probably improved in this sector in the meantime, it should consequently be easier to give broadminded instructions. It will be crucial to create the best possible conditions for the 1991 session - the session of the expected breakthrough in many fields.

My second point, if you permit, is this. In view of the desirability or even necessity of universal adherence, a better integration of the non-member States appears indispensable. Although the possibilities for participating in the Conference have been de facto enlarged, the interest in contributing to the outcome of the negotiations has stayed rather modest, the well-known outriders or foreriders excepted. In the last non-members meeting of 1 August, just 12 out of 38 delegations showed up, particularly those which are attending the meetings anyway. The number of non-member States admitted to follow the negotiations as such is not yet a guarantee of their co-operation and even less of their readiness to sign the convention. Efforts from both sides are required to get more participation.

Maybe the present non-member status will remain unsatisfactory as long as non-member countries have no access to the so-called regional groups and their opinions normally come to nothing, ending practically in smoke.

Some consideration should be given to this point. It would be of particular interest to know the bureau's philosophy in this respect. I have taken up this problem in apprehension of a possible negative outcome of the whole exercise rather than because we were suffering from the low profile of our country as a non-member State

Mr. President, distinguished delegates, time flies, and quite a number of key problems are still unresolved. But universality must be secured as soon as possible.

It might be of some help, under these circumstances, if all States of a certain strategic importance would show the flag, i.e. deliver a "declaration of intent" going beyond the Geneva Protocol already confirmed in January 1989 at the Paris Conference. The objection to such an enterprise, of course, will always be: What convention? But we think the work of the Committee has sufficiently progressed to identify the main obligations of the engagement to be entered into. Declared intentions - or obvious mental reservations - to make use of CWs must be denied at once - this is the minimum. What is the value of a declaration of intent? It is true that such an act is not legally binding, and the way to hell is paved with good intentions but it would not be so easy to justify the renunciation of a moral obligation.



(Mr. Ochsner, Switzerland)

My delegation therefore supports the idea of a simultaneous delivery of declarations as mentioned before, preferably at a meeting of foreign ministers of both member and non-member States of the Conference at the outset of the 1991 session, as already proposed by other delegations.

Those are some remarks by an observer who has had the opportunity of following the Conference's meetings over an extended period of time.

Although the drafting of the convention is not yet completed, Switzerland has already started with the first preparations for national implementation.

Finally, I would like to remind you of the assurance given by Secretary of State Jacobi that we are willing to undertake a special effort to support the preparatory conference. We can only hope to be requested to keep our promise in a foreseeable future.



Mr. SHANNON (Canada):

... The only item I intend to address today is the item on chemical weapons. I will offer some Canadian comments on the progress achieved to date in the 1990 session. I also wish to address the priorities my Government attaches to particular aspects of our negotiations on the proposed chemical weapons convention. Further, I will introduce two Canadian technical studies relating to the issues of toxicity determination and the possible costs of operating an international inspectorate. Lastly, I wish to address our recently submitted report on the latest national trial inspection conducted by my authorities.

Mr. President, as we are in the final weeks of the formal 1990 session, it would seem appropriate to offer a Canadian assessment of our achievements to date. In our view, some very useful and important work has been accomplished in the summer session.

Ambassador Hyltenius, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, has advanced work on article IX by taking a fresh look at the material upon which such an article could be based. Under his overall direction:

Working Group A has further considered ways of improving the "protocol on inspection procedures", in particular the section on "alleged use" and the overlaps with the annexes to article VI, and has begun examining the proposal for ad hoc verification;

Working Group B has been particularly successful in finding solutions to some critical technical issues related to articles IV, V and VI, in particular on thresholds, definitions, and dates, and on elements of the question of the "order of destruction";

Working Group C has carefully worked out texts on "amendments", "settlement of disputes", and "measures to redress a situation" which seem to enjoy a high degree of general support and which offer the hope that these issues might well now be on the way to final resolution;

(continued)



(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

Lastly, the various "friends of the Chair" on such issues as article X, "old chemical weapons", and "jurisdiction and control" have made very laudable efforts to develop consensus approaches to these long-standing issues.

Notwithstanding these advances, however, we are disappointed and disturbed that more was not achieved during this past summer, particularly given the sense of heightened expectations that seemed to prevail during the spring session - expectations that my delegation certainly shared, as I indicated in my statement of 24 April.

This failure to achieve greater progress is surprising also in view of the signing, on 1 June, of the United States/USSR bilateral agreement for the cessation of CW production and the destruction of all but 5,000 agent tonnes of their CW stockpiles by 31 December 2002. My Government welcomed that agreement and hoped that it would further facilitate the early conclusion of our multilateral negotiations here in Geneva.

In saying this, I should note that my delegation is not one of those that believe that all it will take to wind up our negotiations and produce a draft convention for signature is sheer political will. Certainly that will be necessary, but there yet remain a number of major, crucial issues to be resolved. There are also important technical questions that still need to be thoroughly addressed if we are to produce a truly effective convention.

The reasons for this limited progress seem as varied as they are elusive. Some have indeed pointed to an alleged lack of willpower. Or perhaps there is an unreadiness in some quarters to accept that we might actually be on the verge of a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. Others might point to an insidious, dangerous, degradation of the overall negotiating climate, where chemical weapons proliferation is increasing and where chemical weapons are seen by some - erroneously, we believe - as a "poor man's" weapon of mass destruction.

Quite irrespective of the current situation in the Middle East, that area has been a source of particular concern for some time because of the approach of some States in the region to chemical weapons. Chemical weapons were used there not long ago and, recently, threats to use CW have been made which then provoked counter-threats. We call upon all countries to refrain from such potentially inflammatory statements. These can only contribute to heightened tension and greater uncertainty. Canada firmly believes that chemical weapons should have no place in the armouries of modern nations, and that the only road to real security against the chemical weapons threat lies in the negotiation of a global ban on chemical weapons, on which we in the Conference on Disarmament are now actively engaged.

The Canadian Government's position is very clear: we firmly support the goal of a total ban on chemical weapons. And we want to see this achieved as soon as is feasible - not tomorrow or next week, but also not 5 or 10 years from now. Delay can only add to the risk of greater proliferation and greater use of chemical weapons.



(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

We also want a convention that realizes our goal of a total ban to be global, comprehensive, and effectively verifiable. These three terms are not just catchwords; in our view they are essential if there is to be a total ban.

By "global", we mean a convention to which all of us here (members and observers alike) - and the approximately 80 other States not participating in these negotiations - will wish to become parties. We seek a convention which has addressed the security interests of CW-possessors and non-possessors alike. In this respect, we have carefully noted the recent statements of the Egyptian representative, speaking on behalf of the Group of 21, of the Chinese representative, and of the representatives of the United States and the USSR concerning the latter's joint proposals for revisions to the draft convention, contained in document CD/CW/WP.303. My Government believes that the issues raised and the related concerns and differences of view expressed by these and other speakers are vitally important to the nature of the future convention. They must be addressed by us in a thorough and frank manner in our actual negotiations, as opposed to being aired in statements in plenary.

By "comprehensive", we mean a convention that bans the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons; that provides for the complete destruction of all chemical weapons stocks and all chemical weapons production facilities; and that otherwise encompasses all activities that might be relevant to its goals. A convention that does not unequivocally provide these results raises serious concerns in our mind. These concerns stem from our position on globality. The convention must attract the widest possible adherence. The surest path to widest adherence is through the convention's comprehensiveness, i.e. complete destruction of all chemical weapons stocks and all chemical weapons production facilities by the end of the envisaged 10-year destruction period as is provided for in the current rolling text. To Canada, this implies an undertaking at the outset of the convention to pursue these destruction processes to their completion.

By "effectively verifiable", we mean a convention that empowers the implementing organization with the means and authority to investigate, inspect and pursue any activity that might be related to non-compliance with the convention.

While all three criteria are essential, I should like to underline the importance of the last, and truly effective verification régime. This in our view would be the only way to provide us with the necessary confidence in, and the means of ensuring, a total ban. The implementing organization must not only be responsible for supervising or monitoring the complete and final destruction of declared stocks and production facilities, and the activities of declared facilities producing scheduled chemicals; it must also be able to investigate activities and, as necessary, inspect undeclared facilities.

We are therefore convinced that, to be effective, the verification régime under the convention must be as complete as possible and intrusive to an extent not hitherto realized under any other arms control agreement. In the first instance, this means a challenge inspection component of exceptional rigour. Whether we call it "challenge inspection" or "inspection on request"



(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

or however we may characterize it, it stands as the ultimate safety net of the convention - the final means under the convention whereby a State party can seek assurance that other States parties remain in full compliance with their obligations.

Notwithstanding the well-understood apprehensions of some negotiators, we are also convinced that a highly intrusive challenge inspection régime - one that includes access to any site and which ensures that, if it so wishes, the State initiating the inspection process may be represented during it by the presence of an observer - can be made to work without unduly compromising those concerns. In this respect, we have noted the recent statements of Mr. Waldegrave, of the United Kingdom, and the paper he introduced (CD/1012) reporting on his country's experiences in conducting national trial challenge inspections. We also have noted the statement of Ambassador von Wagner, of the Federal Republic of Germany, on 7 August, in which he introduced paper CD/1026. While we recognize that the results of the United Kingdom national trial inspections and those of similar trial inspections elsewhere may not be accepted by some as conclusive, they are highly instructive and offer a concrete basis upon which negotiators can more knowledgeably approach the remaining difficulties with this aspect of the verification issue.

But even when we have satisfactorily resolved the challenge inspection issue, Canada still believes that the verification system for the convention would require additional measures if it is to be effective, measures which would go beyond those of article VI and which would enable the international inspectorate to inspect undeclared facilities, but without invoking the full panoply of article IX: in short, ad hoc verification.

To our minds, ad hoc verification provides the means whereby the international inspectorate can, in a routine manner and with the minimum necessary amount of intrusiveness, periodically "sample" the activities of undeclared facilities and thereby ensure that there are no activities going on at such facilities that would threaten the purposes of the convention. From this perspective, ad hoc verification should not be seen as a substitute for or an extension of challenge inspection; rather, it complements the régime by providing another needed component for effective verification.

We regret that this summer's discussions have revealed that, despite what we had thought were clear explanations of both the Australian paper (CD/CW/WP.286) of 11 April and the United States working paper (CD/CW/WP.300) of 27 June, there is still a considerable amount of concern and uncertainty about what ad hoc verification would involve. We hope that during the next few months, particularly in the intersessional discussions, we and other supporters of the concept will be able to better explain both our reasons for recommending it and its implications. At the same time, we would expect that other negotiators will approach further discussions on this issue with an open and constructive mind.



(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

We are convinced that if we can develop a fully effective verification régime - one that incorporates both a rigorous challenge inspection component and an ad hoc verification component - we will have leapt over perhaps the biggest remaining hurdle to the realization of the convention. There are, as indicated, a number of other major problems that are critical to ensuring the globality and comprehensiveness of the convention, but we believe that they, too, can be best addressed through a constructive and open-minded attitude. My delegation therefore entertains high hopes for the fruitfulness of our forthcoming intersessional discussions and during the next session, accentuated somewhat by the tang of our disappointment with the limited results of the current session.

To assist in these future deliberations, my delegation will soon be circulating, through the secretariat, two further papers for consideration by other delegations in the months to come. The first of these is a study that addresses the issue of the costs of maintaining an international inspectorate. This study, which was conducted by an expert consultant on behalf of the Verification Research Unit of the Department of External Affairs and International Trade, Canada, builds upon the very useful work done some years ago by the Netherlands and United Kingdom delegations, as well as others, and also takes into account more recent data that have become available, particularly about stockpiles and facilities.

For each type of inspection or other verification activity envisaged under the convention, the study posits a series of assumptions about the number of sites involved, the likely size and tasks of the inspection team, the number of days required to complete those tasks, and the possible unit cost of each inspector, and thereby calculates the costs of each form of inspection and the cumulative cost of maintaining the inspectorate. I should like to underline that, in positing such assumptions, the study by no means intends to suggest that the figures cited should be regarded as categorical or definitive. Nor, indeed, do such assumptions represent the judgement of the Canadian Government on what such figures should be. But they do represent a serious attempt, on our part at least, to begin to make educated estimates of the general scale of the effort required. As such, they are intended to engender reflection, further discussion and debate. It is therefore our hope that this study will be considered useful and will help further discussion of the financial implications of the verification régime envisaged under the convention.

The second study that we will be circulating examines and assesses procedures for toxicity determination. This is an internal study that was carried out to assist the Canadian Government and our delegation in determining how to address this topic when and if it arose again in our negotiations. While this topic is not currently being addressed in discussions, it underlies many of the technical aspects that are still under consideration. We believe that the results of our study are interesting and warrant being shared with other delegations in order to assist negotiators in reaching a rational approach to the question of toxicity.



(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

Lastly, I should like to inform you that we have just circulated document CD/CW/WP.319, of 10 August: a report on a national trial inspection that the Canadian authorities recently carried out, our first such inspection of a commercial facility. This trial inspection involved an examination of the consumption of a simulated "schedule 2" chemical at a pharmaceutical plant. The main focus of the trial inspection was the use of auditing procedures to determine how effective these would be in tracking a particular chemical. I should like to note that one interesting result appears to be that such procedures could be used without encroaching seriously upon confidential business information. Another significant feature was that the presence of a foreign observer - in this case an official from the Netherlands Government - did not increase the confidentiality concerns of the facility being inspected.

Mr. President, I hope that the foregoing comments and the studies and reports noted will be seen as constructive and concrete demonstrations of my Government's firm commitment to negotiating an effective, total ban on the production, possession and use of chemical weapons. Notwithstanding our disappointment that more has not been achieved, we continue to have high expectations that a successful conclusion to our negotiations in the near future is within our grasp. It is in that frame of mind that my delegation will be approaching our intersessional discussions and the 1991 session.

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(Mr. Sang Ock Lee, Republic of Korea)

... With reference to the Conference's work on the convention to ban chemical weapons, the concrete results born out of the agreement signed between the United States and the Soviet Union at their summit in Washington in May-June have evidently contributed to promoting heightened expectations over the prospect of the positive impact it may give to the multilateral negotiations on a chemical weapons ban. On the other hand, the frustration voiced over the pace of the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament may well be illustrative of the underlying importance of resolving key issues such as inspections on request.

My country's commitment to the ban on chemical weapons is full and definite. At the Ministerial Conference on Chemical Weapons held in Paris in January last year, the Foreign Minister of my country made it clear that the Republic of Korea is not in possession of chemical weapons, nor has it the intention to acquire or produce them.

The Workshop on Chemical Weapons in Münster in June, hosted by the Federal Republic of Germany, provided us with a valuable opportunity to familiarize ourselves with the destruction and verification aspects of chemical weapons. It was a very useful and enlightening experience; particularly the magnitude of costs and safety measures involved with destruction struck us as another important dimension of the problems deserving much attention and consideration.



Mr. NASSERI (Islamic Republic of Iran): In the Name of God, the Beneficent, the Merciful.

... I have pleasure today, Mr. President, in presenting the advance copy of the national trial inspection carried out in the Islamic Republic of Iran to assess the degree of applicability of the procedures and provisions of the convention we have agreed upon so far. It was not too difficult to gain the support and, in fact, the decision of the Government to move forward with the inspection, because it was well in line with the importance and serious attention that my country attaches to the early conclusion of a comprehensive convention on the prohibition of the production, development and use of chemical weapons. To receive the full and solid co-operation of all the departments, institutions and industry concerned proved, however, to be a more demanding task, and it required tireless efforts by the organizers to enable them to carry on with the inspection as originally planned and to meet the schedule.

The aim, as I said, was to evaluate how far the agreed provisions are applicable and also to provide the possibility of sharing the views and experience with the delegations involved in these negotiations. The preparatory work, from the inception to submission of the final report, took about one and a half months. The actual inspection was carried out in two days, with 14 experts involved. The inspection site was a plant producing DDVP, which is an agent for production of insecticide. The team consisted of specialists in toxicology, chemical analysis, chemical engineering, instrumentation engineering and industrial-military management. The objective was to conduct a routine inspection in accordance with the provisions of document CD/961.

(continued)



(Mr. Nasser, Islamic Republic of Iran)

The results of this meticulous inspection can be summarized as follows:

Analysis of the samples taken proved that no chemical was produced other than what had been declared before. In order to verify the results, analysis was made, partly inside the plant and partly outside. Samples were also sent to the Department of Chemistry of Tabriz University, where the results corroborated the previous ones;

With the experiences gained during the course of the war, the scientific potential and knowledge of the Iranian experts was at a very good level;

Industrial auditors checked the records to account for the receipt and delivery of chemicals - which showed no inaccuracy in the data provided.

On the basis of this trial inspection and with the practical experiences gained from it, we wish to make the following observations and recommendations for consideration in the convention:

1. The trial showed that implementation of routine inspection is well possible but, with the help of qualified personnel, time and expenses of the inspection will be economized. In this regard, it is advisable to have special training courses for the inspectors.
2. The cost of the routine inspection in Iran was about 40 to 45 thousand dollars. In the light of the high cost of inspection and also the large number of chemical plants, it is suggested to categorize plants and inspection accordingly, so as to optimize the inspection costs.
3. The general volume of routine inspection reports is estimated to be very high at the international level. In order to strengthen the operational methods of inspection, there is a need to define and establish norms for observation and information-gathering for various needs of inspection. The result of unification of the assessment system will be the speedy conclusion of reports by the organization of the convention.
4. The inspection revealed that although existing defined equipment is sufficient, yet there is a need for making the analysis equipment more mobile so that chemicals of low concentration can be identified on site. In this connection, efforts which are now under way by Finland to identify more efficient methods of analysis of chemical agents and the development of the means of instruments required should be valued and appreciated.
5. Among other important issues for the future is standardization methods of analysis and means of calibration of equipment, and establishment of a data base by the organization. It is therefore high time that measures be taken in this regard.



(Mr. Nasser, Islamic Republic of Iran)

Mr. President, while I have the floor, I would like now to take the opportunity to make a few remarks with regard to the convention on chemical weapons. The Islamic Republic of Iran, having faced the bitter experience of the use of chemical weapons, has done its utmost to sensitize the international community in order to pave the way for an effective and comprehensive convention on the total elimination and prohibition of the development, stockpiling, production and use of chemical weapons. The history of the use of these weapons in the past vividly testifies to the need for a comprehensive convention with clear and unambiguous provisions for its implementation. The convention which is now under negotiation has great security implications for Iran and hence we follow the deliberations of the Conference on Disarmament on this subject with great care, attention and interest.

For the conclusion of the chemical weapons convention, the historical approach is a plausible one, but the impact of science and technology in various fields, such as chemistry, chemical engineering, mechanics and bio-technology, should also be studied and be taken into account. This convention is to be an important international instrument which has to prove its applicability for generations to come. This first real and universal experience in disarmament should be crowned with success. In this respect, the trend of progress of such weapons - which will create a potential capacity in shadow - should be carefully studied and identified, and necessary measures should be taken in response to technological and scientific development.

Therefore, our scientific, legal and technical discussions and deliberations should be based upon a scenario approach in order to prevent any possible loopholes in the future. Such an approach will enable us to foresee all contingencies and work out necessary measures in the convention.

There is no doubt that we are working for a multilateral convention in which States with different industrial and scientific capabilities are expected to join. Their security requirements also differ with respect to their regions, which dictate various degrees of security priorities. These topics were taken up this year in the Chairman's open-ended consultations on undiminished security. I have to note with some regret that these exchanges of candid views did not continue.

It is important to remind the Conference that the conditions leading to a bilateral agreement, which is based upon a balance of hidden capacity of chemical weapons production, differ drastically from those of a multilateral accord, which should be based upon a clear perception of security for all. It is therefore not advisable to hastily translate such an agreement into a multilateral accord and persuade the negotiating parties to follow the same prescription. There is no doubt that many positive and productive deductions can be drawn from the bilateral agreement, provided that other pertinent conditions be taken into account before efforts are made to generalize them. Our work should be based upon "precision" and "speed", the basic requirements for a successful conclusion of the convention.



(Mr. Nasser, Islamic Republic of Iran)

Before closing, I would like to register the sincere thanks and appreciation of my delegation to the relentless efforts and patience shown by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden, who enabled us to enter into more meaningful and deep discussions this year. Notwithstanding the outcome of the work of the Ad hoc Committee for 1990, his valuable contributions will be highly appreciated.

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(Mr. García Moritán, Argentina)

... It should also be remembered that, as is the case in other fields such as chemical weapons or outer space, any agreement to ban nuclear weapon tests completely will have to include provisions to cover the interests of States in all the peaceful applications of nuclear power. Brazil and Argentina, as everyone is aware, are among those States which for many years have vigorously pursued programmes for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Thus, to the unquestionable priority that both our countries recognize to the security aspects of such an agreement, we add the priorities that derive from our technological development needs.

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Mr. BATSANOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian):

... Today the Soviet delegation would like to share its views on the main item on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament - the question which consumes most of our time and effort and which, at the same time, is the most promising. I am speaking of course about the prohibition of chemical weapons. In addition, I propose, in view of the review conference of the 1972 Convention to be held next year, to touch upon the problem of bacteriological biological weapons.

(continued)



(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

But first, the negotiations on chemical weapons. The Ad hoc Committee chaired by the distinguished representative of Sweden, Ambassador Hyltenius, whose efforts we appreciate so highly, has basically finished its work for this session. We already know what new provisions will be included in its report and what changes will be made in the "rolling text". On comparing this text with the previous one, in document CD/961, one comes involuntarily to the rather unpleasant conclusion that not that much progress has been done this year.

Actually, this fact, of itself, need not be and is not so depressing, since often in negotiations periods of rapid progress are followed by periods of reflection and preparation of new breakthroughs. The main reason for our concern at the present state of affairs is some trends that have emerged in the negotiations this year and manifested themselves throughout the summer.

Above all, we are truly concerned over the lack of progress in resolving key political aspects of the question of banning chemical weapons. After all, not many of those aspects were left. At the beginning of this year the Soviet delegation called for focusing attention precisely on the search for solutions to them. Searching there has indeed been, but we are not much closer to the solutions. All too often forward movement has been bogged down in endless discussions over details which, despite their importance, do not determine the essence of States' rights and obligations under the future convention.

Of course, we still have some leeway for working out technical details, but to my mind it will be extremely small if nothing changes on the main issue, namely the extent of agreement on the key aspects of the future convention. On that, more often than not, we are going round in circles, a fact which does not bring us any closer to final results. Sometimes we even witness backward movement, with the sudden revival during the negotiations of positions already abandoned by their authors and taking no account of the tremendous amount of work done over the past few years. Moreover, sometimes we engage in a kind of diplomatic minuet, with old positions being taken up by people who convincingly criticized them in the past.

In this respect, we cannot but agree with Ambassador von Stülpnagel, who, in his farewell statement at the Conference on 24 April this year, said that belabouring problems is not necessarily the best way to arrive at better solutions and diagnosed us as sometimes simply lacking the will to achieve results. Unfortunately, several months after the departure of Ambassador von Stülpnagel his words still remain valid.

Nevertheless, we do not share the view sometimes heard in the corridors that lately the situation in the negotiations on banning chemical weapons has seriously deteriorated. The difficulties we are faced with today are rather the result of the fact that concerns which until recently remained latent are now starting to surface. We are going through a complex and sometimes painful process of maturing of the major political problems whose resolution should pave the way for a final breakthrough in the negotiations.

I believe that the experience gained at this session gives us grounds for suggesting the preparation of a package solution to these problems. The point of it, in our opinion, would be to undertake a political search for proper



(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

balances between the interests of the negotiating States over the entire subject-matter of the negotiations. Indeed, today the question of the future convention is increasingly taking on a political dimension. The time is coming for responsible, principled solutions, which probably cannot be arrived at solely through the language of the draft Convention and the annexes.

We therefore support the idea of convening, in the relatively near future, a special meeting of the Conference on Disarmament at the level of Foreign Ministers, about which the Ambassador of France, Mr. Pierre Morel, in particular recently spoke so convincingly. We believe that the purpose of meeting should be to overcome the remaining obstacles in the way of the convention. At such a meeting the ministers could, for example, approve the main provisions of the convention and give delegations instructions to finalize as soon as possible the necessary technical documents and annexes to the convention so that the draft could be opened for signature by Heads of State or Government before the end of 1991.

Sometimes doubts are expressed about whether it is advisable to convene a ministerial meeting if it does not go beyond repeating old positions and making general appeals while the problems would remain unresolved. In our view, a meeting of that kind is, indeed, unnecessary. But what is being talked about is a productive meeting. For that, we feel, there must be agreement in principle as soon as possible on beginning the practical preparations for a meeting having as its focus the development of a package of understandings of principle.

Let us consider the following scenario. Although I am not certain that it is altogether the correct one, perhaps it may be advisable to ask the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Hyltenius, who this year made such a tangible contribution to our negotiations, to initiate as of now consultations on the question of convening a ministerial meeting so that definite decisions could be reached in New York.

Of course, an essential, but by no means the only condition for the success of a ministerial meeting is that we should all understand clearly exactly what we expect from the convention and what problems we want to resolve through it. It goes without saying that for anyone to be without instructions for protracted periods does not facilitate negotiations. There is a Russian proverb: seven persons do not wait for only one. And here we sometimes find ourselves in a situation where seventy parties must wait for one. But this seems to be our fate at multilateral negotiations.

The work carried out by the Ad hoc Committee this year has, in our view, helped to identify clearly enough the set of problems on which political solutions are needed. These include: the verification system and, first of all, challenge and ad hoc inspections, ensuring the universality of the future convention, the question of non-use of chemical weapons, as well as assistance in protection against chemical attacks; co-operation in peaceful chemistry; and sanctions. In addition to these problems, but somewhat separate from them, are the question of the composition of the Executive Council of the international organization and the question of its financing. I should like to dwell on some of these issues.



(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

As stated by many representatives who took the floor before me, for the future convention to be an effective tool for ensuring security, it must have an effective verification mechanism. Such a mechanism is inconceivable without challenge inspections, that is to say, inspections which, as the President of the United States, Mr. George Bush, said, must create confidence that the stocks declared really do constitute all the stocks, and that the facilities declared are indeed all the facilities. If that is so, then the essence of the problem is how to conduct such inspections at facilities not declared by States under the convention.

There is probably no need to recall in detail that the Soviet Union's attitude towards this form of international verification suggested by the United States in 1984 has not always been positive. At first, what prevailed in our approach was apprehension that abuse of such inspections might result in the disclosure of sensitive information not related to the convention. However, in 1987, after assessing the needs of verification from the point of view of the total banning of chemical weapons, from the point of view of the specific tasks our convention must fulfil and in the light of the declared positions of other participants in the negotiations, the Soviet Union made an important political decision to support the inclusion in the convention of provisions on irrefusable challenge inspections with respect to any location or any facility at any time upon the request of any member State and without any exceptions.

As a result of joint efforts by the participants in the negotiations, and of consultations held by the chairmen of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons over several years, we were, I think, able to formulate by the beginning of this a generally acceptable concept of challenge inspections. It combines the possibility of inspecting any location with measures, based on the use of alternative methods of inspection and the concept of managed access, to prevent abuse. What is more, this approach has proved itself in several trial inspections conducted by negotiating parties. The Soviet Union has also conducted its own national challenge inspection, and with the same conclusions, although it must be said that it is the United Kingdom which has the richest and most valuable experience in this field.

In the opinion of the Soviet delegation, the document on challenge inspections prepared by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons in April and then improved during the summer consultations is a good basis for agreement. In particular, we consider a good idea the provision in that document to the effect that, where necessary, the decision as to the suitability of alternative measures shall be taken by the Director General of the future organization. The Soviet delegation regrets that this language has not been included in the draft convention, where we would like to see it. We hope that the work on the Chairman's document regarding the text of article IX of the convention will be continued and finalized during the inter-sessional period.

In our view, it is also important to make further efforts to develop the important verification measure of ad hoc inspections. Obviously, the final solution to this question cannot be found outside the context of the verification system as a whole, including both challenge inspections and routine inspections, since each of these measures must play its specific role



(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

in the mechanism of the future convention, complementing the others. On the other hand, the work already done on ad hoc inspections has revealed a whole range of interesting approaches capable, to our mind, of increasing the objectivity of the verification system and making it more flexible.

As for the Soviet Union, it supports the idea of conducting ad hoc inspections both at the request of States parties and at the initiative of the bodies to be set up pursuant to the convention, on the basis of agreed yearly quotas which would not put any State in a disadvantageous position. From that point of view, we welcome the document on ad hoc inspections introduced by the United States delegation. We believe, however, that the pivot of the proposal on ad hoc inspections - the idea of establishing registers of national chemical industries - is not yet fully developed. Perhaps the difficulties which some delegations are experiencing with respect to the concept of ad hoc inspections stem precisely from lack of clarity as to precisely which facilities would be subject to such inspections and, hence, what in practice these inspections can add to routine inspections and challenge inspections.

The results of the present year have shown that ultimately both the success of our negotiations and that of the convention in general depend on finding a solution to the problem of universality of the future convention. It seems rather difficult to find a single, universal formula for the solution of the universality problem. In this respect, States' declarations of their intention to become original signatories of the convention, regional initiatives, the involvement of parliaments, to bilateral diplomatic contacts, and work within the United Nations framework, including at the forthcoming session of the General Assembly, all merit attention and support. It might also be worthwhile considering establishing a system of additional incentives to join the future convention and the possibility of introducing additional restrictions on the export of specific chemical products to countries that refuse to become parties.

Ensuring for the future convention universality guaranteeing the destruction of chemical weapons all over the world is the aim of the proposal by the USSR and the United States which provides for the convening at the end of the eighth year after the convention's entry into force of a special forum to determine whether the participation in the convention is sufficient for proceeding to the complete destruction of the remaining minimal stocks of chemical weapons. This proposal has caused varying responses and at times criticism. With all due respect to the views of those who do not agree with the essence of this proposal, I would like to try to clarify certain misunderstandings, which I believe lie at the basis of this criticism.

First of all, there is and can be no question of changing the future convention into a non-proliferation treaty. The USSR/United States proposal does not repeal to any degree the obligation completely to destroy chemical weapons, not to mention chemical weapons production facilities. On the contrary, the point of it is precisely that all States without exception should be in an equal position as regards chemical weapons. Moreover, this proposal is designed, at least in the view of its authors, to encourage States that today have chemical weapons to join as soon as possible in the process of confidence-building and openness and to be among the first parties to the future convention. Lastly, it should be noted that, unlike the now familiar



(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

original idea of 2 per cent, the decision to proceed to the final stage of chemical weapons destruction will not be taken individually by the States possessing chemical weapons but will be a matter for consideration at a conference of all the parties to the convention. We are prepared for a substantive discussion of the proposal to hold such a conference in order to study all the problems in detail and to arrive at a mutually acceptable solution.

Naturally, the universality of the convention depends in large measure on its content, on how far it meets the future parties' vital security interests. From this point of view, a key issue is how the convention resolves the problem of prohibiting the use of chemical weapons. For its part, the Soviet delegation is firmly in favour of including in the convention an obligation for absolute and unconditional prohibition of any use of chemical weapons.

At the same time, we support the proposal to work out collective measures to counteract the use of chemical weapons. To that end, there might be concluded between States parties and the Technical Secretariat special agreements specifying the forms, types and order of assistance to be provided pursuant to decisions of the Executive Council. Such machinery for mutual assistance might include, as an integral component, a voluntary fund to provide assistance to States parties in the event of the use against them of chemical weapons. The fund could be made up of contributions in cash and in kind, including the provision of means of protection against chemical weapons. Moreover, we are prepared to support the proposal that if chemical weapons are used against a State party to the convention, the Director General could take a decision, in consultation with members of the Executive Council, to provide emergency assistance to that State party, primarily assistance of a humanitarian nature.

The road to ensuring the universality of the convention passes as well through practical preparation by States parties to participate in the agreement. Such preparation may take various forms. It may include trial inspections, co-operation in the development of instruments, establishment of national structures to ensure compliance with the convention, and lastly the drafting of required changes in national legislation. In this respect, we welcome the decision by the President of Argentina to establish to study questions pertaining to the future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons a national commission which, as Ambassador García Moritán stated, is intended as a prototype of a national body for the implementation of the convention.

We also welcome the efforts by Finland to establish a laboratory network for the future convention, and in particular we state that the Soviet Union is ready to participate in the inter-laboratory test scheduled for this autumn. The USSR has designated the laboratory of the Shikhany military facility for this test.

For the Soviet Union, practical preparation for participation in the future convention is basically connected with the implementation of the bilateral USSR-United States Agreement on the non-production and destruction of chemical weapons, and to the Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding regarding a verification experiment and data exchange.



(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

A national chemical weapons destruction programme is currently under consideration in the Soviet Union. The draft programme was submitted in April of this year to the Supreme Soviet and is now being examined in the Supreme Soviet's subsidiary bodies. The draft, in the preparation of which 18 ministries and government departments took part, contains several options for the destruction of USSR chemical weapons stocks - options which differ from one another both as to the number of destruction facilities planned and their location, and, of course, as to cost. The extreme options provide either for the setting-up of a single national destruction centre or for the construction of destruction facilities at every chemical weapons storage site. Priority attention is given to the protection of the environment, of facility personnel and of the population in the area of facilities. For our part, we intend to spare no effort to implement the provisions of the bilateral agreement, which provides for destruction to begin no later than 1992, for the annual rate of destruction to attain 1,000 tonnes in 1995, for 50 per cent of stocks to be destroyed no later than 1999, and for reduction to the level of 5,000 tonnes by the year 2002.

On the whole the USSR-United States process of data exchange and visits to the respective military chemical facilities in both countries pursuant to the Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding is developing successfully. The first exchange of visits to chemical weapons storage facilities took place early in June. The end of August will see the completion of the second round of visits, which are much broader in scope, and during which Soviet and United States experts will visit a number of chemical weapons production and storage facilities as well as civilian chemical plants. The visit of Soviet experts to the United States has already taken place and soon there will be a return visit of United States experts to the USSR. The USSR and the United States plan to complete the programme of visits in the framework of the first stage of the Memorandum early next year.

In conclusion, I would like to share some views concerning the Review Conference of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, to be held in September 1991. I believe that the experience of implementation of this Convention has shown its weak point: the absence of a system of effective verification of compliance and the lack of a well-developed mechanism for the implementation of confidence-building and openness measures. This situation may be explained to a large extent by the period during which the Convention was drawn up and by the approaches of the time to issues of international verification of compliance with disarmament agreements. Nevertheless, the Convention is an example of the great responsibility shown at that time by all States, which demonstrated in practice that, when there is political will to conclude a disarmament agreement, even the absence of a solution to the verification problem is not an obstacle.

A great deal has changed since then: verification and openness issues have ceased to be a stumbling-block in negotiations. At any rate, that is our hope. The experience of collective work on the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons provides an ample picture of what a system of international verification and openness in the framework of a multilateral treaty may look like under the new conditions. We believe that the time has come to reconsider



(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

approaches to the Biological Weapons Convention from these positions - bearing in mind, of course, the particularities of the subject-matter of that Convention.

The Soviet delegation believes that verification of compliance with the Convention could include, for example, exchange of agreed data; inspections at declared facilities; and challenge inspections of those sites and facilities with regard to which suspicion of breaches arises. We reaffirm our support for the idea of setting out agreed measures to strengthen the verification system in an additional protocol to the Convention.

Thought might, for example, be given to the following possibility for resolving this problem. States parties to the Convention would compile national biological registers listing all facilities P4 of biological protection, as well as all facilities with a lower level of protection if they carry out work on protection against biological weapons (irrespective of who orders that work) or perform any other activities on instructions from the Ministry of Defence. Facilities included in national biological registers would be subject to a kind of "initial inspection" and thereafter to inspections at any time, without the right of refusal. If necessary, a quota system could be devised for inspections of this kind. In addition, the verification mechanism might include challenge inspections at undeclared facilities. Of course, it would also be necessary to develop and to agree upon inspection procedures that would enable the facts to be established in cases of breach of the Convention but would not lead to the disclosure of confidential information that was not relevant to such cases.

As to confidence-building and openness measures, they might include roughly the following steps: exchanges of visits to facilities that would be declared under the data exchange; encouragement for declassification of activities of relevance to the Convention; exchange (and secondment) of scientists, including scientists working at declared facilities; organization of joint research, primarily research on prevention and treatment of natural disease caused by agents that are potentially dangerous from the point of view of biological and toxin weapons; establishment of an international data bank on activities performed in various countries that are of direct relevance to the Convention. All these measures might be considered at the forthcoming Review Conference of the Convention.

An important direction for efforts to prepare a successful Conference might be expansion of the participation of States parties to the Convention, as well as of other countries, in the exchange of relevant data, as provided for in the recommendations of the previous, 1986 Conference. Without general participation in already agreed confidence-building measures and scrupulous implementation of the initial agreements on that score, it would be difficult to talk about the agreement and execution of new, broader measures in this field.

The ban placed on biological weapons by the Convention must become truly global, and that naturally requires accession to the Convention by all States. We urge all States that have not yet done so to become parties to the Convention as soon as possible.



(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

The Soviet Union considers the forthcoming 1991 Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention to be an important event. We believe that forum should assess the results achieved since 1986 in increasing the effectiveness of the Convention and agree upon further measures to strengthen the régime established under the Convention. The Soviet Union intends actively to participate in efforts to ensure the success of the Conference and is ready favourably to consider any constructive ideas and proposals from other countries aimed at strengthening this very important international agreement in the field of actual disarmament.

CD/PV.574

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Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America):

... As the Conference on Disarmament winds up its 1990 session, I want to take a moment to look at the chemical weapons negotiations and share some observations about where we have been and where we have yet to go. When I first arrived here in Geneva, in January this year, there seemed to me to be great optimism and enthusiasm that a chemical weapons ban was within sight. All of us were transfixed by the political changes sweeping across Europe. Arms control and security negotiations, so long tended, were finally beginning to bear fruit. Conclusion of a strategic arms reduction treaty seemed imminent. Agreement on significant reductions in conventional arms in Europe was within grasp. On chemical weapons, the prospect of a bilateral agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union could be seen on the horizon. All these events combined to fuel expectations that 1990 might also be the year we gave real impetus to the multilateral chemical weapons convention.

Progress has, however, not been what we had hoped for this year. For the United States part, our review of chemical weapons issues was only concluded this month. But many others in this room contributed to the delay as well and, as the United States made its conclusions known on several vital questions, a certain atmosphere of recrimination and finger-pointing replaced the dispassionate discussion of national perspectives that should be the medium of serious negotiation. We are likely to conclude this session of our Conference, I regret to say, on a sour note.

Actually, we did get many things done. Much of our progress centred on legal and institutional issues. Development of the two-tiered approach for changing and amending the treaty was significant. To be effective the convention cannot be frozen in time. It needs to be flexible and mutable, adaptable to advances both in science and in verification technology. At the same time, it needs to be able to withstand erosion or elimination of the core of the treaty - those fundamental obligations which will make the convention a truly comprehensive ban. The work we accomplished here this year ensures that the convention will be able to do both.



(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

Some progress was also made in incorporating provisions in the convention on settlement of disputes and sanctions. The United States was initially sceptical. Consultations with delegations here, and review of your arguments in Washington, however, persuaded us that the chemical weapons convention might usefully include such provisions. Each sovereign party must, of course, make decisions for itself about whether others are complying with their obligations under the convention. The treaty organization might, however, recommend or suggest to States parties measures which could include sanctions in response to violations.

We have pressed further ahead on jurisdiction and control. We will all need to decide the extent to which each of us is able to enforce our laws with respect to activities in the private sector and outside the boundaries of our countries. The United States is confident that we will succeed in narrowing our differences.

The order of destruction for eliminating chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities was worked out and incorporated into the rolling text. This complex, technical section provides the framework for States' preparations and plans, and sets out a practical system which can accommodate the destruction requirements, not only of the two States that have already declared their chemical weapons but also of those that have yet to do so.

We also made important progress on a number of technical issues, including agreement on a common definition of production capacity and thresholds for monitoring the chemical industry, and on provisions for declaration of past transfers of chemical weapons. We also made some progress in the area of schedules and guidelines, where nearly all of us agree on the importance of covering toxins under this convention.

Another issue on which there has been movement is "old chemical weapons". No one disputes that under the convention chemical weapons will not be retained and will be declared and destroyed. All of us seem to accept that the presence of chemical weapons on the territory of a State party will trigger the obligation to declare their existence, regardless of whether they are that State party's or another country's chemical weapons. We all acknowledged this year, however, that the circumstances for chemical weapons being present on a country's territory differ. These differing circumstances give rise to the differences in approaches and attitudes concerning countries' responsibilities for the disposition of old chemical weapon stocks. The United States believes we will ultimately find a solution. We are confident that this can be done without opening up questions of reparation or debates about history.

The United States believes that this body has made remarkable progress toward the conclusion of a comprehensive and global chemical weapons ban since active negotiations got under way six years ago. If the pace has not met everyone's expectations recently, perhaps it is because the problem has changed since we first began. The primary goal then was to bring the United States and the USSR together to eliminate their chemical weapons capabilities. For a sizeable number of delegations around this room, a chemical weapons ban was an East-West, a United States/Soviet problem. CW is no longer primarily a United States/Soviet problem. The United States and the Soviet Union are the



(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

only two countries in this room which have publicly declared themselves to be chemical-weapon States and taken active steps to begin eliminating their capabilities. For our part, the United States' new chemical weapons destruction facility at Johnston Atoll in the Pacific began test destruction operations last month with nerve-agent-filled munitions, in preparation for full-scale operations in 1991. This past June we also successfully completed destruction of the entire United States stockpile of the incapacitating agent BZ.

The plain truth is that as I speak the United States is chemically disarming. Not only has the United States ceased its production of chemical weapons, but it has also actually begun the process of dismantling nearly all its deterrent capability.

In June, the Soviet and United States delegations jointly tabled a proposal that our two Presidents thought might help promote universality. In that agreement, our two countries agreed to cease production and begin destroying our stocks before the multilateral treaty is even concluded. We have further agreed that, within eight years of the treaty's entry into force, we will both have destroyed all our chemical weapon stocks except for 500 agent tons - in other words, between 98 and 99 per cent of what we started with. If at that point we have been joined by the countries that have turned what began as a bilateral problem into a global threat, then we will destroy the remaining stocks as well.

The United States and the USSR did not make this proposal to divide these negotiations or, as some claim, to turn the comprehensive convention into a partial ban. The only way it will be a partial ban is if others - many of whom are here today - fail to do their part. We do not want or intend to retain chemical weapons indefinitely. Quite the contrary. The United States wishes to see all chemical weapons - and I emphasize the word "all" - eliminated. But we will not be the only chemical-weapon States to eliminate our stocks, while others who are part of the global CW threat stay out of the convention. This would plainly be discrimination in reverse, something we are astonished to hear advocated by countries traditionally so committed to equality.

No one here today can know with any certainty which States will have adhered and which will have chemical weapons eight years into the treaty régime. The United States believes stability is best enhanced by assessing the situation together at the eight-year conference. If our critics have constructive ideas for better ways to accomplish this, we will be happy to hear them.

A similar misunderstanding of United States intentions seems to centre on how this convention deals with responses to the use of chemical weapons during the destruction period. On the one hand, some delegations see this issue very narrowly as the types of assistance others would be obligated to give to them. Others see it as a way of pre-establishing procedures and arrangements for facilitating and expediting the provision of assistance in the event they or others are attacked or threatened with chemical weapons. The United States is willing to discuss various approaches to assistance, but we consider assistance to be only one aspect of how to respond to the use of CW. Another



(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

aspect is deterrence, i.e., the counterthreat of retaliation so long as CW stocks remain. This is the aspect, though, that no one wants to discuss in terms of the real world.

The United States has said simply that, if we are attacked with chemical weapons, we must have a variety of response options, including the option to respond in kind so long as we still have some chemical weapons. We earnestly wish that such precautions were unnecessary. But, as the sad developments of the last two weeks show all too clearly, setting a good example is not enough. The United States must ask why many delegations seem more concerned about the United States than about outlaw States that are all too ready to brandish their well-practised CW capabilities in support of aggressive designs.

The United States delegation would like to think that this summer has been one of the last stages before bringing our negotiations to conclusion. We need to be realistic though. What lies ahead is resolution of issues which have confronted and confounded us since 1984. The polemics and procedural challenges we have all witnessed this summer are indications to me that we have reached the inevitable phase in our work when the tough questions are at last on the table.

When we return to these negotiations later this fall and next year, the United States delegation will be ready to roll up its sleeves and grapple with the remaining issues.

We will want to hear then more from our Chinese colleagues about their new challenge inspection proposals. We would like to hear from our Peruvian colleagues about the ideas they have just proposed for protecting the environment. We want to have a real exchange with non-aligned delegations on the interrelationship of routine, ad hoc, and challenge inspections, and we want to explain why we believe a three-part verification system creates the most effective and least confrontational régime possible for building confidence in compliance.

The United States has no hidden agenda. We continue to be committed to concluding a comprehensive and effectively verifiable convention banning chemical weapons. The agreement the United States adheres to, however, will not be a lowest-common-denominator arrangement set forth in ambiguities that paper over real differences. We understand the reluctance, particularly after weeks of negotiating, to accommodate late-coming positions or controversial views. But none of us will let our vital security interests be overridden.

It says something about the artificial, rarified atmosphere of this Conference that we are concluding our work for the session by concentrating so intensely on footnotes and brackets, while in the real world the aggressive use of chemical weapons is boldly and quite credibly threatened. Let us move our work to conclusion in a spirit of compromise, excluding extraneous goals, so that the force of legal obligation and deterrent power of effective verification prevent this from happening again.



(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

... It is not presumptuous to express here my expectation that the Conference on Disarmament will conclude its most important work in the course of the next year and will agree on the convention on a global, comprehensive and effectively verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons. It is not only a must, it is also a want on our part. Nobody can relieve us of this task. As has become manifest during this year's disarmament session, this can only be achieved with each other and not without one another, but in no way against each other. Certainly, the prohibition of a whole category of weapons of mass destruction, the complete destruction of chemical weapons and their production facilities is not an easy exercise. However, the time is ripe for it. The idea of convening a Foreign Ministers' meeting on this matter, which is gaining ground, raises well-founded hopes that the last stage of negotiations

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

can be started. In a time of rapid change, in which chances and risks lie closely together, as recent developments show, the speedy conclusion of a CW convention would be a decisive contribution to lasting stability.

Such a Foreign Ministers' meeting - if possible, at the beginning of the 1991 session - could provide the urgently needed political impulse for it. If this meeting is to be of benefit, I am convinced it has to deal with the final negotiating package which contains the still pending essentials of a global CW ban. The meeting should agree on both the mandate and guidelines of negotiation and be in a position to set a date for the conclusion of the negotiations. It could also confirm what has already been agreed and could come to an understanding concerning the date of the final round at Foreign-Minister level.

I know about the concerns, I also know about the prejudice and the existing scepticism. But we have to do it, if we do not want to dash the people's hope of peace and a secure future.



Mr. HYLTIENIUS (Sweden): Before introducing to the Conference the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, which I have had the honour to chair during the 1990 session, I should like to congratulate you, Mr. President, on the effective manner in which you are performing your duties as President during this month. I should also like to thank your predecessor, Ambassador Sujka, for the skill with which he carried out this task in July.

It is with much regret that I note that my distinguished colleague and friend, Ambassador Reese of Australia, will leave the Conference soon. He has made outstanding contributions to our work. I wish him every success in his future important functions.

The report of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, which is contained in document CD/1033, was adopted by the Committee on 10 August. It contains, as in earlier years, three parts: a technical part; Appendix I, the so-called "rolling text" proper; and Appendix II, which includes material for future work.

(continued)



(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

In the technical part, I should like to draw attention to the fact that the mandate was changed this year, most notably by the deletion of the phrase "except for its final drafting". Among the positive developments this year reflected in this part of the report is also the increased participation of States not members of the CD. This bodes well for the efforts to achieve, eventually, broad adherence to the convention, once it has been concluded.

You may also note that the Technical Group on Instrumentation was re-established under the leadership of Ms. Rautio of Finland and, further, that several days were devoted to a special meeting with representatives of the chemical industry. In that connection, meetings devoted to specific topics were chaired by Mr. Molander and Mr. Santesson of my delegation. I should like to express my deep gratitude to Ms. Rautio, Mr. Molander and Mr. Santesson for their important contributions to our work.

May I also draw the attention of the Conference to the inter-sessional work foreseen for the period of 26 November-21 December 1990 and to the resumed session recommended to be held on 8-18 January 1991. On the basis of extensive consultations which I have undertaken with the Working Group chairmen, with the Friends of the Chair and with delegations, I should like to propose the following subjects for the inter-sessional work:

Working Group A: review of verification parts of the annexes to articles IV, V and VI; review of the Protocol on Inspection Procedures, Parts I and II;

Working Group B: annex on chemicals and related issues; article III;

Working Group C: measures to redress a situation; settlement of disputes; amendments (improvement of the text); financial aspects of the Organization.

I also propose to ask the Friends of the Chair to continue their work on article X and on jurisdiction and control, while I should conduct consultations on article XI and on the general pattern of verification. Finally, it is proposed that the Bureau prepare proposals for editing of the "rolling text", which can be dealt with during the inter-sessional work.

In the concluding paragraph of the technical part, reference is made to the appointment of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for next year. Since the report was adopted on 10 August I have continued my consultations on this question. I am pleased to inform you that my consultations have indicated that there is consensus on the recommendation that the Conference on Disarmament appoint the Leader of the Soviet delegation, Ambassador Sergei Batsanov, to be Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for 1991.

The Friends of the Chair have carried out difficult tasks in working on solutions to some specific problems, namely on article X, on old chemical weapons and on jurisdiction and control. I am very grateful indeed to



(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

Ambassador García Moritán of Argentina, Ambassador Morel of France and Ambassador Reese of Australia for accepting to undertake this work. Due to their skill and dedication it has been possible to advance the work on these issues. Some of the results are reflected in the report which I am submitting today.

The Chair conducted open-ended consultations on the question of undiminished security, which soon came to focus on the question of universal adherence to the forthcoming convention. Open-ended consultations were also conducted on various aspects of the Executive Council and on article IX. Much work was done, especially on article IX, and it is the hope of the Chair that this work will not prove to have been in vain. Also, outside the Conference many countries worked on this issue through trial inspections and shared their experiences with other delegations by submitting reports on them in the form of working papers.

The Committee had three Working Groups. Working Group A, on verification issues, was chaired by Mr. Shahbaz of Pakistan and earlier by Mr. Lamazière of Brazil and then temporarily by Mr. Molander of Sweden. Working Group B, on technical matters, was chaired by Mr. Meerburg of the Netherlands, while Working Group C, on legal and institutional questions, was chaired by Mr. Krutzsch of the German Democratic Republic. Substantive and important progress has been made in all the three Working Groups. I should like to express my sincere appreciation and warm thanks to the Working Group chairmen for their untiring efforts and commitment, which have brought the convention closer to its completion within their respective issue areas.

The substantive parts of the report reflect the diligent work carried out this year and the many changes made in the "rolling text". They are well known to delegations, and I will therefore only deal with them briefly.

Among the achievements, I should like to mention especially the texts included in appendix I on verification of alleged use of chemical weapons, on the order of destruction, on amendments and on the settlement of disputes. There are also many other additions and improvements in the text in other parts of the draft convention.

Among the new material in appendix II, I should like to draw your attention to the texts on jurisdiction and control, on old chemical weapons and on measures to redress a situation.

My warm thanks also go to the Secretary of the Ad hoc Committee, Mr. Bensmail, to the Deputy Secretary, Ms. Marcaillou, and to their assistants, Ms. Darby and Ms. Roux, for their very professional work and invaluable assistance. I wish also to express my thanks to the interpreters and all the technical staff who have contributed to making our work proceed in an effective and smooth manner.



(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

This year, 1990, has been a year when the political issues have been brought to the forefront. New important elements have been added to the draft convention, and further substantive progress has thus been made towards its completion. At the same time I must note, like last year's Chairman, that the political breakthrough that many of us had hoped for has not occurred this year either. Instead, previously hidden political problems have been highlighted. This is a stage we must get through in order to complete our work. I can only hope that this will be possible in the near future. Time is not working in our favour. Political declarations must soon be translated into a more flexible attitude and a will to make compromises at the negotiating table.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for his introduction of the Committee's report and for his kind words to the Chair. I should like to congratulate him on the conclusion of the work of the Committee, which has been very intensive during his chairmanship. I particularly wish to emphasize here the personal merit of Ambassador Hyltenius and the three co-ordinators of the Working Groups in their joint efforts to move forward the negotiations in this organ of the Conference. I am sure that delegations will have taken note with interest of Ambassador Hyltenius' suggestions regarding the consultations in the inter-sessional period.

Mr. WAGENMAKERS (Netherlands): First of all, I take pleasure, Mr. President, in offering you my delegation's congratulations on your assumption of the Chair.

We do not know yet when the negotiations on a convention banning all chemical weapons will be concluded. We were more optimistic about a swift conclusion at the beginning of the summer session than at the time when this year's session of the Conference is coming to an end. Nevertheless, we still expect the CW convention to be finalized next year, or in 1992 at the latest. It is, therefore, not too early to consider some consequences of the final outcome of the negotiations. In particular I would like to say a few words about the question of the future seat of the CW treaty Organization, for which The Hague has been proposed as a candidate, first during SSOD-III and again at the opening of this year's spring session of the Conference on 6 February.

After the signature of the convention, a Preparatory Commission will be established to set up the chemical weapons disarmament organization, or "Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons" as it is presently called in the "rolling text". For all practical purposes the Preparatory Commission should preferably have its seat in the same city as the Organization itself. In this way, the Commission could be smoothly transformed into the Conference of States Parties and the Executive Council after the entry into force of the convention. Furthermore, the Commission would be closely involved with the Technical Secretariat in statu nascendi, including its inspectorate and its laboratory.



(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons will have a unique character. To establish it in the vicinity of the IAEA would have advantages but also disadvantages. One may expect in such a case that the IAEA Board of Governors and the Executive Council of the CW Organization would, to a large extent, consist of the same persons. This could lead to continuous comparisons between established nuclear safeguards practices on the one hand, and verification measures under the CW convention on the other. But the verification measures required under the CW convention are very different: they have a wider scope and are on occasion more intrusive, albeit generally less precise than nuclear safeguards. Maybe we should also keep in mind that the CW Organization might not follow the United Nations salary system because of its need for some highly qualified experts. This would be more difficult to achieve in a "UN city", or could lead to undesirable tensions between different organizations.

At the first day of this year's spring session, the Netherlands' Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hans van den Broek, repeated his offer to make The Hague the seat of the Organization. Today, we introduce a bid-book which contains a concrete proposal highlighting the substantial financial aspects of that offer. Let me quote directly from the bid-book just circulated, page 13: "The Netherlands is prepared to bear the costs of leasing a building to house the Preparatory Commission and the treaty Organization during the preparatory phase and for a considerable period of time after the signing of the treaty, which would cover half of the transitional period. The Netherlands would also meet the costs of furnishing and equipping the accommodation. One matter requiring further attention during the preparatory phase will be the training of inspectors. The Netherlands is studying the possibility of providing training facilities free of charge".

The bid-book also outlines some further advantages of The Hague as the seat for this particular Organization. These advantages include the presence near The Hague of a renowned laboratory in the CW field, which could be used as a basis for the laboratory needed by the Technical Secretariat. For years, Dr. Ooms, whom you all know, was the Director of that Laboratory. Another asset of The Hague, certainly in view of the foreseeable occurrence of short-notice inspections, are the excellent world-wide airlinks available at Schiphol International Airport, half an hour by train from the railway station which lies in the vicinity of the proposed premises for the CW treaty Organization. I may point out that several options for suitable modern office buildings in the centre of The Hague have been indicated in a bid-book.

One other important ingredient for an easy life in this internationally oriented city is the fact that English is generally spoken fluently, as well as often German and French or other languages. Furthermore, The Hague and the Netherlands as a whole offer a range of international educational institutions, foreign television stations, foreign-language theatres, etc.



(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

As you all know, the Netherlands, as a member of the Conference on Disarmament, has, from the beginning, actively participated in the chemical weapons negotiations. Numerous contributions have been made in the form of technical and other working papers and in the form of chairmanship of working groups. CW research in the Netherlands has been geared towards the achievement of the convention. We were the first to organize a trial inspection in 1986, followed by an international workshop.

We sincerely hope that members of the Conference will take all these elements into account when deciding on the seat of the future Organization.

CD/PV.575

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Mr. REESE (Australia):

... In making a farewell statement to the Conference on Disarmament I am conscious that my time here has been short. Nevertheless, I have experienced two years of intensive negotiations in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons aimed at completing the chemical weapons convention. In the second of these two years my delegation co-ordinated the Western Group in the negotiations.

The energy put into negotiations following the Paris Conference in 1989 resulted in progress being made on many parts of the convention. This should have brought us closer to the completion of the convention. Yet I leave Geneva concerned that this summer we are still some distance from the conclusion of the convention and that there is apprehension that the negotiations are faltering.

We have made valuable progress this year in areas of importance to the convention, such as the main legal aspects, the order of destruction of chemical weapons and a number of technical aspects.

At the beginning of this year, however, we were all aware that progress needed to be made on the central issue of the convention - verification. At the end of this session any assessment would have to conclude that we have failed in this objective. We have failed because of the time it has taken some delegations to put their policies forward and because the differences in approach to the issue are still too wide to bridge. Related to the

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(Mr. Reese, Australia)

difficulties we have experienced in developing article IX of the convention in regard to the process of challenge inspection, or inspections on request, is the reluctance among delegations to address the problem of decision-making by the Executive Council of the convention in regard to the inspection process.

Australia's approach to verification is predicated on the requirement for an effectively verifiable convention in which we can have confidence in States parties' compliance. This is a matter of critical national security for us. We are concerned about any approach to compliance which would give to the requested State a right simply to refuse an inspection team's access to a suspect site on the basis of the requested State's contention that the site was not relevant to the convention. We recognize the importance of protecting sensitive matters of national security, but believe that a combination of right of access, balanced by some management of that access, would enable the effective operation of the convention. Trial inspections of military facilities conducted by the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany suggest that a satisfactory balance can be struck between the requirements of the inspection process and the security concerns of the inspected State.

I would like to touch on one other area of verification, the proposal for a system of ad hoc inspections. A number of delegations have made clear that they believe the concept should be explored further as part of the overall approach to verification. It offers the possibility of a verification system additional to routine inspections and challenge inspections which would strengthen the level of deterrence of the convention without the same degree of intrusiveness as a challenge inspection.

I do not think that ad hoc inspections can be dismissed as "Disguised challenge inspections" without first having the opportunity to discuss the concept further in the Ad hoc Committee. Yet, some delegations are unwilling to agree to this further discussion. I think it inimical to our processes for delegations to prejudge an issue. It is possible, of course, that, when the whole verification package is finally developed, Governments will not see a need for ad hoc inspections, but we cannot make that judgement now.

Verification may be thought of as a microcosm of the convention, requiring a balance of interests and a willingness to keep a sense of proportion and overall practical balance. It is essentially a political act of assurance among the States parties. Thus, efforts to reduce the elements of confrontation and to increase the sense of shared mutual obligation and support should be the centre of our efforts. The current conceptual framework is adequate in its political content and feasible in its commercial impact. It deserves to be supported, completed and adopted.

In this negotiating period the various approaches to ensuring universality of the convention have caused divisions among us. Our common goal is a convention which is universal in its application, and it is no accident that the issues we find most difficult to resolve are all directly related to this common goal. It is evident that there is no single path to



(Mr. Reese, Australia)

universality. There needs to be more flexibility on the part of delegations in this area. Where a proposal is not favoured by some delegations, there should be a greater attempt at an exchange of views to determine the best way of finding common ground.

The chemical weapons convention will offer a package of measures that will be unprecedented in the security and commercial areas. The willingness of States to accept this uniquely complex, politically sensitive and commercially intrusive treaty depends on a subtle balancing of many interests. Because of these complexities, it has taken so many years to get to the point where the convention is within sight. This situation requires all parties to the negotiations to intensify efforts to get the convention concluded.

I think we were all aware that the issues of verification and the character of the Executive Council were going to be the most difficult issues to resolve in developing the convention. We are not at that point, and that may be the reason for the current sense of faltering. But it is also a time when the international community's need for the elimination of chemical weapons could not be more apparent. Recent developments in the Persian Gulf bring home to all of us the concern that while chemical weapons exist there is the danger that they might be used. We believe that the coming decade will see either a worsening of chemical weapons proliferation, in which chemical weapons will become a common feature of many national arsenals, or the effective functioning of an international authority dedicated to the oversight of a total ban on these weapons. It is the moment for us to assess carefully the point we have reached in the negotiations and to determine the best way forward.

In Australia's view, the negotiations are now in need of clear political direction in the absence of which the negotiations may well flounder. A number of other delegations have recently expressed a similar view. Now that the structure and content of the convention is apparent, or, as another delegation has put it, now that all the main issues are on the table, it is essential for Governments to focus on bridging the remaining differences, and particularly in the critical area of verification.

While we do not think artificial deadlines are appropriate, the fact is that setting deadlines is often the only way to bring sufficient concentration and attention to detail to get matters resolved. The alternative is too easily a leisurely pace which leads to opportunities lost as one or several of the many ingredients change. In this regard, we were pleased with the more substantial and comprehensive industry input at the meetings held in June. We welcome the significant achievements in the bilateral agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union. Those agreements need now to be translated into the multilateral environments, since the problems posed by chemical weapons cannot be resolved by bilateral measures alone. We agree with the ideas proposed by some delegations for ministerial meetings in the first half of 1991, to be followed, we believe, by the presentation of the completed convention to the United Nations General Assembly at its forty-sixth session.



(Mr. Reese, Australia)

Of course, a ministerial meeting would need to be well prepared, and in this regard we welcome the informal consultations which Ambassador Hyltenius will undertake between now and the inter-sessionals.

The Conference cannot be allowed to squander the responsibility which we have to the international community to complete the convention as a matter of urgency. The negotiating session in 1991 must be the period for that completion.

Finally, on the subject of chemical weapons I would like to pay tribute to the two chairmen of the Ad hoc Committee during my time here. Both Ambassador Morel in 1989 and Ambassador Hyltenius this year, gave strong leadership to the Committee's work. Both of them showed great professional skills, creativity and tirelessness in their efforts to keep us moving forward. The role of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee is of great importance and I am pleased that the Committee will again enjoy leadership of a high standard in the Chairman for 1991, the head of the Soviet delegation, Mr. Sergei Batsanov.

Of the other issues before the Conference I should like to comment on the constructive outcome of the review of the functioning of the Conference conducted by Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan. Bearing in mind the failure of the Group of Seven's earlier attempts to improve the functioning of the Conference, I was sceptical about the prospects for Ambassador Kamal's consultations. He deserves full credit for his skilled and productive consultations, which will lead to some practical and time-saving improvements in the operation of the Conference.

Given the extent of improvement in the international political climate, I regret that some delegations were not more responsive to proposals for a more critical look at the Conference's agenda - an agenda which was adopted in 1979 following the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The lack of substantive progress on a number of those agenda items would, at the least, suggest that, more than ten years later, there was scope to set them aside and consider issues which might lend themselves to more fruitful discussion.

To contend at this stage that consideration of the decalogue from SSOD-I simply requires more "political will" scarcely seems an adequate answer. For Governments to continue to commit resources to the Conference on Disarmament after the chemical weapons negotiations there will need to be changes made to the agenda. Others before me have suggested areas such as conventional weapons and a regional approach to disarmament as possible issues for the Conference on Disarmament to take up. As we look to improvements in the performance of the Conference on Disarmament, our approach should have in mind multilateral arms control and disarmament as a whole. We should ensure therefore that such changes are undertaken in conjunction with the equally necessary reform of the Disarmament Commission.



(Mr. Chadha, India)

... Let me now turn to the subject of the chemical weapons negotiations. The necessary framework to deal with the pending issues was set up at the beginning of this year through the resourceful and methodical leadership provided by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Hyltenius, and his hardworking delegation. Yet, as the session draws to a close and we take stock of the situation, our feelings are mixed. Undeniably, we have made some progress, but, against the background of the political will and the sense of urgency expressed in Paris last year, the progress has been disappointing.

We must recognize that time is running out and accept the political fact that the only way to rid mankind of chemical weapons is through the conclusion of a comprehensive and effectively verifiable convention which ensures that all existing chemical weapons stocks and chemical weapons production facilities are eliminated; and that the further development, production, acquisition, transfer and use of these weapons is prohibited. Interim measures designed to prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons, apart from not being effective, also run the risk of opening up a parallel track which could easily derail ongoing negotiations and confuse the objective towards which we are working. Political reality dictates that the risk does not merely come from the possible use of chemical weapons, but from their very existence, and the only way to address this reality is to find a politically viable solution.

A convention that can enjoy universal adherence must be non-discriminatory, must provide for equal rights and obligations of all States, whether or not they possess chemical weapons, and whether or not they have a large chemical industry. It must contain an effective system of verification that reassures all States parties about compliance. To this end, my delegation is willing to discuss all details regarding such a verification system in any form. It is only through a sustained and frank dialogue that the different perceptions can be resolved, and not through polemics and procedural wrangles that we have witnessed recently, which only retard our progress. The convention should ensure the unimpeded right of States parties to develop, produce, use, exchange and transfer chemicals and technology for peaceful purposes and should not hinder or impede international co-operation in the development of the chemical industry for such purposes.

Adequate provision has already been made in the draft convention for consultations, co-operation and fact-finding; and the periodic conferences of States parties would provide an opportunity for continuous review of the working of the convention. The proposed provision for a special conference of States parties to review the implementation of the principles and objectives of the convention eight years from its entry into force, a conference in which those who possess chemical weapons would be accorded special privileges, far from achieving the desired objective of universality, would in fact have the opposite effect, as States may tend to shy away from joining a convention

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(Mr. Chadha, India)

whose future is uncertain and which does not ensure their security from the very beginning. If at all, such an assessment needs to be made on the convention's entry into force by all States which subscribe to it, on an equal footing. The ideal way to ensure universality is to make the convention attractive for those who join it. To this end, the interests of those who possess chemical weapons must be matched by the interests of those who do not, and who will accept curbs on their chemical industry - which plays an important role in their development - in the hope of achieving enhanced security.

On the subject of challenge inspection, India was among those who welcomed the approach adopted by Ambassador Hyltenius. We believe that, once a request for challenge inspection is received, the area of interest is enlarged and becomes the concern of all States parties, who are then legitimately involved in seeking a reassurance that the convention is not being violated. The multilateral character of challenge inspection, therefore, needs to be ensured.

Preliminary discussions have also been held on the subject of the composition of the Executive Council. We believe that the Council must be representative of the interests of all States parties. However, in practice it is possible that certain parties will serve on the Executive Council more frequently than others, in accordance with accepted criteria. This need not be seen to detract from the basic principles of equitable geographic balance, non-discrimination and the need for universal adherence.

We shall be having detailed discussions on Schedules during our inter-sessional work. In our view, specific chemicals should be included in Schedule 1, rather than whole families of chemicals or analogues. Each individual chemical should be assessed for its toxicity level and application range. If found to have no civilian application, a specific chemical could then be included in Schedule 1. Research should also be allowed on those chemicals which have more applications than just weapons use. Adopting a very narrow view on the thresholds for Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals will only stifle the chemical industry. The interests of security have to be matched with the objectives of development. It is with this aim in mind that my delegation has always adopted an attitude of flexible dialogue on all aspects and forms of verification for the proposed convention.

I am sure that we all share the sense of urgency and realize that the chemical weapons negotiations are at a critical stage. Taking the priority of the nuclear issues into account, we hope that the Conference on Disarmament will set itself a time-frame within which to conclude its negotiations on a chemical weapons convention.



Mr. BATSANOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Today I would like to present joint information by the USSR and the United States of America on the sixteenth round of bilateral consultations on the prohibition of chemical weapons, which was held here in Geneva from 7 to 16 August 1990. During 1990, the USSR and the United States have been actively conducting consultations on questions relating to a chemical weapons ban that complement the multilateral negotiations on the convention. On 8 March and 24 April the Conference on Disarmament was provided with information on the fourteenth and fifteenth rounds of these consultations respectively and today, by agreement with the head of the United States delegation, Ambassador Ledogar, I am presenting information on the sixteenth round.

During this round the delegations began to develop a document on inspection procedures which will contain detailed provisions about the implementation of inspection measures within the framework of the Agreement signed by the Presidents of the USSR and the United States on 1 June 1990 on

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(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

destruction and non-production of chemical weapons and on measures to facilitate the multilateral convention banning chemical weapons. It is planned to conclude the preparation of the document on inspection procedures by 31 December 1990.

An understanding was reached during this round that the document will consist of four sections dealing with general provisions on the preparation and conduct of inspections and inspections at chemical weapons destruction facilities, storage facilities and production facilities. In drawing up the document on inspections, the sides have agreed to utilize to the maximum extent the already available provisions from the draft convention on a chemical weapons ban which is on the negotiating table of the Conference on Disarmament. This approach is intended not only to accelerate the preparation of the bilateral document, but also to provide valuable experience for the practical implementation of the provisions worked out at the multilateral negotiations and concerning verification of the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons.

As is known, with a view to gaining experience and facilitating the elaboration and implementation of the future convention, the USSR and United States also agreed within the framework of the bilateral Agreement of 1 June 1990 to conduct bilateral trial challenge inspections. During the sixteenth round the delegations started to prepare detailed provisions for such trial inspections, including the number and location of facilities to be inspected and the procedures to be followed. A preliminary understanding was reached on the conduct of two trial inspections. The discussion of issues concerning trial inspections will be continued in order to reach agreement on the requisite arrangements.

During the round, special consultations continued on questions of co-operation between the USSR and the United States with respect to methods and technology for the destruction of chemical weapons. Highly qualified experts from both sides who are directly involved in the preparation and execution of national programmes for the destruction of chemical weapons in the USSR and the United States participated in these discussions. There was an exchange of information on the state of implementation of these national programmes. The experts also discussed issues concerning: the preparation of the Soviet and United States safety and remissions standards, including monitoring by instruments of compliance with them; the transport of chemical weapons for destruction; the prevention of accidents at chemical weapons destruction facilities and the handling of emergencies; and control of the process of chemical weapons destruction. Both sides were of the opinion that these were useful discussions.

In accordance with the existing agreement, on 21 and 22 August 1990 a group of United States specialists will be visiting the Soviet Union's Chapaevsk training centre for personnel of chemical weapons destruction facilities. During this visit there will be, inter alia, discussions on matters related to the technology for destroying chemical weapons based on



(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

phosphoro-organic compounds. A visit by a group of Soviet experts is planned for this autumn to the destruction facility on Johnston Atoll, which in July of this year began actual operations on the destruction of United States chemical weapons.

Discussions continued during the round on matters relating to the implementation of the Wyoming Memorandum. They concerned both the exchange of data which has taken place and the visits already made to Soviet and United States facilities in the context of the Memorandum.

Particular attention was devoted during the round to questions concerning the preparation of a multilateral convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Both sides expressed concern over the slow pace of the negotiations. The delegations reviewed the basic questions still unresolved in order to compare the USSR and United States approaches and to determine the likelihood of the early attainment of consensus in the multilateral negotiations.

Despite being relatively short, the sixteenth round of the bilateral consultations - which, as I have already said, lasted from 7 to 16 August - proved a very rich one from the point of view of both the amount of work accomplished during the ten days and of the results achieved. The parties agreed to conduct the next round of bilateral consultations during the autumn of 1990.

That is the end of the joint information which I was presenting on behalf of the two delegations and now, if I may, I would like to say a few words on my own behalf. First of all, I would like to join those representatives who have already taken official farewell from the distinguished Ambassador of Australia, David Reese, who will shortly be leaving Geneva and undertaking important new functions in his capital. I would like to wish him all the very best and every success. His stay here in Geneva was not a long one, but I think we all felt that Ambassador Reese did very productive work here.

Lastly, in presenting his report on the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Hyltenius informed the Conference that agreement has been reached and that I am to be appointed Chairman of this Ad hoc Committee next year. I would like to express my sincere thanks to all delegations for their support and understanding and, of course, to assure you that if I am indeed to assume this post next year, then I, personally and the Soviet delegation will endeavour to perform its duties with honour.



The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I declare open the 576th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. In keeping with its programme of work, the Conference will today consider and adopt the reports of the ad hoc subsidiary bodies and the annual report to the forty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly.

... As I announced earlier, I shall submit the reports of the Ad hoc Committees for adoption by the Conference in the order in which they were introduced by the Chairmen.

I propose that we proceed now to the adoption of the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, which is contained in document CD/1033. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts that report.

It was so decided.



Mr. HOU (China) (translated from Chinese):

... This year is the first year of the decade of the 1990s. It is also the first year of the third Disarmament Decade as proclaimed by the United Nations. The 1990 session of the CW was convened against the background of momentous changes in the international situation. The international community, therefore, placed high hopes on us. They expected us to make new contributions to the endeavour of putting an end to the arms race and promoting disarmament. Today, when we are taking a sober and objective stock of the work of the CD, we must be fair and point out that enormous useful work has been done and some positive results have been achieved at the CD this year. The determination of the entire international community to safeguard the completeness and thoroughness of the goal of the convention banning all chemical weapons has made it possible to usher our negotiations into an even more important stage. The re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban after an interregnum of seven years has given people new hope for the future. Many countries have shown greater concern over such major issues as the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the arms race in outer space, the promotion of disarmament and prevention of nuclear war. They have also advanced series of positive proposals and rational positions. Another encouraging phenomenon is that there are more and more non-member States participating or showing interest in the work of the CD. This year's consultations on the improved and effective functioning of the CD have yielded some preliminary results which constitute a good beginning for further consultations to be carried out next year from which people have reason to expect more substantive progress.

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(Mr. Hou, China)

... Recently the evaluation of the results of the negotiations on the convention on chemical weapons has become a focus of much discussion. The Chinese delegation is of the view that, under the leadership of Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden, the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has done a great amount of work and achieved some noticeable progress in the past year. For this we must give due credit and must not negate everything. The existence of some differences and disputes is nothing but normal. Truth fears no debate, which only marks a further deepening of the negotiations, if we face the differences squarely and try to overcome them. At the same time, we are fully aware of the new opportunities, as well as the grave challenges, the CD is faced with on its way to an early conclusion of a CW convention.

It is the view of the Chinese delegation that the practices at the CD have provided us with some useful experiences and ways to improve our work. First of all, we must bear in mind and persist with the ultimate aim of our negotiations, namely, a convention on the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of chemical weapons. It is the only commonly shared basis for the negotiations on the convention, a basis which we laid down a long time ago. It is also the linchpin on which hinges the success or failure of our negotiations. Facts have shown that when we persist with this aim and maintain this basis, we will be able to move the negotiations forward and make new progress; if this aim is forgotten or tampered with, the nature of the convention will be changed and the basis of our negotiations shaken. That is bound to lead our negotiations astray. Undoubtedly, we must try our best to prevent this from happening. There is a Chinese saying which goes, "It is better to take one concrete step than make seven dozen hollow declarations".

The Chinese delegation also considers it important to grasp all the important issues in our negotiations and make reasonable overall arrangements so that they can be discussed in parallel with each other and in a balanced manner. Over the years we have spent a lot of time and energy on consultations concerning article IX. That is entirely necessary, but at the same time we must not lose sight of the fact that this issue cannot be dealt with separately and in isolation. Verification is not the only, much less the most, important issue. The issue of the utmost importance is to guarantee that the prescribed nature and objective of the convention will not be changed, whereas verification is but a means, albeit an important one, to realize that objective. We must see not only the trees but also the forest, and must not overlook some very important issues. Facts have demonstrated that, while emphasizing the issue of verification, it is also necessary to accord due importance to such issues as the complete prohibition of the use and the thorough and unconditional destruction of chemical weapons; assistance; undiminished security, and old chemical weapons, giving them priority, or at least discussing in parallel. Otherwise we may commit the mistake of evading

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(Mr. Hou, China)

important matters to dwell on trivia or, as the Chinese saying goes, "dropping a melon to pick up a sesame seed". Certainly, we should prevent such things from happening.

Finally, the principle of equality, fairness and mutual respect should be abided by in our co-operation and negotiations. Consisting of a great number of United Nations member States, the CD and its subsidiary bodies should follow the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations in their work. Rule 3 of the rules of procedure of the CD stipulates explicitly that "All member States of the Conference shall take part in its work in conditions of full equality as independent States, in accordance with the principle of sovereignty enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations". Represented here are both developed and developing countries; both European countries and countries from other continents; both countries belonging to the two military blocs and non-aligned countries and countries not belonging to any group. In a word, we have here countries coming from all points of the compass: north and south, east and west, which, due to their different historical and cultural backgrounds and different social systems and ideologies, are bound to have different views and opinions on certain issues. This is nothing but normal. The crux of the question is to co-operate widely on a basis of the principle of independence, mutual respect and sovereign equality, to respect and adopt a correct approach to views and opinions that are different from one's own and to preclude the introduction of political and ideological differences into the work of the CD. In this spirit we can improve our work and keep up with the trend of democratization prevailing in international relations. The Chinese delegation will, as always, co-operate with all other delegations and make concerted efforts to work for the early conclusion of a convention on the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of chemical weapons.

Looking back upon the past and the serious problems we have faced, it is sometimes unavoidable for us to have some complaints and experience a sense of disappointment. However, when we look into the future and remind ourselves of the important mission and responsibilities entrusted to us, we have every reason to be confident. As pointed out by a famous American, "We must accept finite disappointment, but we must never lose infinite hope". We also appreciate the remark of England's Samuel Johnson: "Where there is no hope, there can be no endeavour". We also share the optimism of Maupassant as expressed in his famous dictum, "Man lives in hope". With high hopes let us brace ourselves to meet the new opportunities and challenges lying ahead.



(The President)

... In this context, during six months of intensive work certain steps and developments have been made in the Conference. As to the specific, immediate results that have been achieved, it must be recognized, as many people have already pointed out, that the session has been frustrating in some ways, whether as regards the negotiations on the draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, or with respect to all the nuclear disarmament issues, the prevention of an arms race in outer space or other important items on the Conference's agenda.

I would like to confine myself to a few points concerning possibilities and constructive, forwarding-looking approaches. With respect to the negotiations on a convention for the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons, following a focusing of effort which warranted more significant results, it remains for us to hope that, since we now have a better knowledge of the key issues remaining to be resolved and the interests and positions that have to be taken into account, we shall be able, with the necessary political will, to make substantial progress in the near future. With respect to nuclear issues, maximum advantage must be taken of the steps made towards the elaboration of a more structured framework for a substantive debate - I am referring, of course, to the Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban and the special informal meetings on agenda items 2 and 3. In this context, we should note in particular the idea repeatedly expressed here recently that care and action should be taken to maintain and in as far as possible consolidate the consensus on the establishment and operation of an ad hoc committee on item 1 of the Conference's agenda. Generally speaking, providing a framework for consideration and, as appropriate, negotiation on all the questions on the agenda of the Conference must be a priority concern in the future too.







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