



INFORMATION DIVISION
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
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Statement on External Relations by Mr. L.B. Pearson,
Secretary of State for External Affairs, in the
House of Commons, on March 3 and 7, 1950.

I welcome the opportunity that this occasion affords of making the customary statement on international affairs generally, in order to initiate a debate on the subject. I welcome the opportunity because it is, as all hon. members will agree, a matter of the highest importance that the people of this country, whose future has been and will be so deeply affected by international developments, should be kept as fully informed as possible as to the general policy now being pursued by their government in this field.

The best way of keeping our people so informed apart from discussions such as we are having today and discussions before our committee on external affairs, is of course to make as many facts as possible available to them in as accessible a form as possible. That is being done in a number of ways by the department over which I have the honour to preside. On Tuesday last, for instance, I tabled in the house the annual report of the Department of External Affairs, which gives a brief but I think comprehensive review of the activities of the department in the calendar year 1949, and makes it unnecessary for me to give at this time a detailed review of those activities.

The department also publishes annually a report entitled "Canada and the United Nations." That report for 1949 will be tabled shortly. A volume contains not only a review of the activities of the United Nations and Canadian participation in them, but also includes a broad selection of relevant documents. It will show, if anything is needed to show, Mr. Chairman, how seriously we take our membership in the United Nations. I will also show the contribution we are trying to make to the organization which still remains, and will remain, the foundation of our international policy, and in the long run our best hope for peace.

The department also publishes a monthly bulletin entitled "External Affairs", which is circulated pretty widely, and also texts of treaties and publications on international affairs generally, as well as reference papers and material of that kind. Thus we are trying to give the people of the country, as well as members of this house, as much information on external affairs as we can. But it may be said,--in fact it has been said on previous occasions in this house,--that this is merely information about what we have done; that we should give more information to the house and to the public about what we are doing, what we propose to do, and why. Up to a point, of course, I agree with that. At the same time, as I have tried to point out before, you cannot effectively carry on delicate diplomatic negotiations by giving

sort of running account of the details of those negotiations as they are going on. We should of course make quite clear in advance the principles which guide us in these discussions. We should give the details of the negotiations when we can, and we should always give the result of these negotiations to the public. I think we do try to do that,

In my review today I will not devote much of my time, indeed possibly any of my time, to Commonwealth affairs--not because I do not appreciate their importance, but because I attempted to discuss them in relation to the Commonwealth conference at Colombo. Nor do I intend to devote very much of my time to Far Eastern affairs, for the same reason. But I cannot let this occasion pass without answering, or attempting to answer, one or two questions which were asked me last night by the hon. member for Vancouver-Quadra (Mr. Green), which deal with the Far East.

In respect to one of these questions I think the hon. member misunderstood what I tried to say last week in the discussion on this subject. Last night, in referring to the Commonwealth consultative committee, he said that I had made no statement as to whether or not we would join that committee. But I hoped that I had made it clear the other day that if and when an invitation comes from the Australian government--I think we have not received it yet--to join the meeting in Canberra, which will be devoted to this subject, we shall be very glad indeed to accept it and be represented at the meeting or on the committee if one is set up at that time.

The hon. member was also critical of our lack of leadership in regard to a Pacific pact. I attempted to deal with that matter in my statement last November 16 on the external affairs estimates. I pointed out at that time that the situation in the Pacific in regard to a regional pact of this kind was certainly not the same as the situation in the Atlantic, which had made desirable and necessary, the signing of the North Atlantic Pact. My view in that regard was not weakened, but indeed was confirmed by the recent Commonwealth meeting at Colombo. If we had taken the lead in regard to this matter--we should not of course hesitate to take leadership when the occasion demands it--we would have found that at least two of the countries most directly concerned with regional security in the Pacific, namely, the United Kingdom and India, would not have been able to support our lead, or at this time support the idea of a Pacific regional pact. Also we knew then, as we know now, that the United States would not be able to participate at this time in negotiations leading up to that kind of pact. One reason for that attitude on the part of the United States and the United Kingdom is no doubt the fact that a conference for this purpose, Mr. Chairman, would certainly have to include China and the U.S.S.R., if they were willing to accept the invitation to participate. It would be somewhat embarrassing to issue an invitation to China at this moment to a meeting of that kind. If the invitation were being issued by the government of the United Kingdom it might be addressed to a different post office than that to which it would be directed if it were to be issued by the government of the United States. And if it were being issued by the government of Canada it might be addressed to a different post office in the future than that to which it would be directed if we issued the invitation now. Therefore there are obviously practical difficulties in the way of calling a Pacific conference to draw up a Pacific regional pact.

When I say that, I do not wish to have it understood that the government is opposed to the idea of a regional pact for the Pacific. If and when the circumstances should make it desirable, we

ould give that matter the same kind of consideration, as we gave the idea of a North Atlantic Pact.

In a review of international affairs, no matter how brief, is not possible to ignore completely international economic questions, Mr. Chairman. Indeed, in this field it is not easy to know where political questions end and economic ones begin. The importance of sound economic and social policies in our relation to communism and to the communist states is obvious, because our longest longrun defence against communism is wise and progressive social and economic policies. The same importance attaches to the economic relationships between the free democratic states. Economic co-operation along the right lines can and should bring us closer together. The lack of such co-operation can divide friendly states. There are signs now that, if we are not careful, our unity and ability to work together may be weakened by international economic difficulties.

If, for instance, we let the free world freeze into dollar and sterling areas, between which trade relations and commercial intercourse become difficult, that might ultimately prejudice political relationships. And so we are becoming, all of us, I think, more conscious than ever of these international economic difficulties as we realize that the post-war dollar assistance programme may run out before the countries which have been assisted have recovered from the destructions and the dislocations of the war to a point where they can balance by their own efforts their trade with more fortunate countries such as Canada at a satisfactory level. What should be done in these circumstances by all of the countries concerned, and not merely by our own, is probably the most important question in the whole field of international economic affairs today. My hon. friends opposite keep emphasizing that economic and trade difficulties are increasing. They criticize the government because we have not done more to remove them--especially because we have done so little, as they put it, to maintain and develop trade between Canada and the sterling area. I think that they minimize the external problems which have caused these difficulties and maximize the alleged deficiencies of the government, its sins of omission and commission in dealing with them. Yet, while inveighing against the government, what remedy do they suggest? At the present time, as I understand it, their principal proposal is a Commonwealth economic conference, as a possible cure for trade ills from which we may be suffering.

Well, we have had a good many Commonwealth meetings during the last couple of years, and many of them--indeed most of them--have concerned trade. But hon. members opposite say that these meetings have been merely the concern of peregrinating, perambulating representatives, acting on their own by sporadic individual efforts. But what we want now, they go on to say, is a full-scale, large-scale Commonwealth economic conference of the 1932 variety, with everybody there, to discuss everything--not merely the minister for external affairs in Ceylon drinking tea, but everybody, in London, selling food--and, according to the hon. member for Kamloops (Mr. Fulton), even discussing questions of migration and emigration. In short, bigger and better conferences, where decisions will be taken on the spot, possibly by a sort of serial super-cabinet conference.

Well, I suggest, that our way is better, where, in addition to these formal conferences--and they are of course desirable at times--ministers concerned, after full discussion in cabinet, where policy is agreed upon, meet, whenever occasion requires it, their opposite numbers in London or elsewhere to try to solve particular problems by arrangements which are then ratified by the

respective governments. And in between such meetings, periodic conferences of the standing Anglo-Canadian trade committee, which consists of high officials. Of course there is also contact maintained every day in other ways between Commonwealth governments on these questions.

Let us look at the record in this respect. In the last two years Canada has participated in four general international economic conferences, five Commonwealth economic and trade meetings, three tripartite trade discussions in which the United Kingdom was involved, as well as four international trade and economic meetings called for various purposes.

I suggest that the remedy is not through conferences, though they can help very greatly at times. Nor is the remedy, I suggest, through the waving of a magic wand over inconvertibility, converting it into convertibility. The remedy, which is easier to prescribe than to take, is through the acceptance, not merely by Canada, but by all free democratic countries, of sound financial and trading policy, by sterling countries avoiding the creation of high-cost restrictive and discriminatory areas, and by dollar countries on the other hand adopting policies which will permit the sterling debtor countries to export more goods and services, thereby making it possible for these countries to balance their international trade by their own efforts and at a high level.

We think that Canadian policies have been designed in the international economic field to that end, and are becoming increasingly effective for that purpose. Our imports, for instance, were 92 per cent of our exports in 1949, an increase of six per cent over 1948. The imports of the United States of America for eleven months of 1949 were 55 per cent of exports, a decrease of six per cent as compared with 1948.

Having mentioned the United States of America I should like now to go on for a few moments to deal briefly with our relations with that country. Those relations of course continue to be friendly, and are conducted with that good will and mutual understanding which makes it possible to find mutually satisfactory solutions to nearly all the problems that appear--and a good many to appear between us.

Sometimes the government is charged with not taking action which would otherwise be desirable because if we did, it would provoke the United States. Well, Mr. Speaker, it is of course only common sense and good diplomacy not to provoke anyone unnecessarily, especially a good friend and great neighbour. Provocation is not a good basis for diplomacy, either domestic or international. Therefore before we take action which has international repercussions we try to study the effect of that action on our friends, as I hope they do in respect of action which affects us. But I can assure the house that when action has to be taken in a certain way--that is, international action--to advance Canada's best interests, we take it. If we do not put a chip on our shoulders, as some ardent spirits would have us do, to prove how independent we are, this does not mean that our policies are decided by any other nation. They are not--though naturally in this interdependent world they cannot escape being influenced by the policies of others.

In the review of external affairs which I made in the house on November 16 I mentioned certain questions which had arisen in our relationships with the United States, questions which were in need of being solved in that co-operative spirit which characterizes our relations. I am glad to report that progress has been

ade in the solution of these matters.

Among our problems at that time were certain difficulties which we were experiencing in the implementation of the bilateral air agreement which was signed on June 4, 1949. Chief amongst these difficulties was the inability of the United States authorities to issue a licence to Trans-Canada Air Lines to operate the Montreal-New York route, one of the new routes granted to Canada in this bilateral agreement. The United States authorities were enjoined from granting this licence because of legal proceedings taken in United States courts by Colonial Air Lines challenging the legality of this air agreement. In the meantime the Canadian aeronautic licensing authorities charged Colonial Air Lines with failure to live up to obligations assumed in its own Canadian licence which was granted by virtue of the bilateral agreement.

Subsequently, as hon. members know, discussions were held in Ottawa, and it was agreed that some of the new rights which Canada had granted the United States under the agreement would be held in abeyance pending the outcome of these legal proceedings in the courts of the United States. These difficulties have now been removed. On February 5 Colonial Air Lines suspended its legal proceedings, and the United States authorities are now completing procedural steps which will enable them to license Trans-Canada Air Lines to operate between Montreal and New York; and all the new rights granted to Canada under the 1949 agreement are expected to come into full effect within the next few weeks.

I also described last November the difficulty which had been experienced at the border by some Canadians wishing to visit the United States. Since then officials of my department, together with the director of immigration, met with their opposite numbers in the United States to discuss these border difficulties which were causing some concern throughout Canada. At this discussion, which was held I think on December 15 last, the full range of problems involved was examined in great detail and conclusions were reached which will substantially lessen the number of unfortunate incidents in the future.

As I told the house a few days ago, we have signed a new treaty with the United States government covering the diversion of water at Niagara Falls. When I tabled that treaty I said, and I should like to emphasize it now, that we are not any the less interested in the St. Lawrence waterway development because we have the Niagara problem, as we think, satisfactorily solved. The President of the United States, in his annual message on the state of the union on January 3 last, recommended that approval be given at the present session of congress to the St. Lawrence agreement. It is still our strong hope that congress may soon be able to give its consideration to this important project.

When I addressed the house in November last I think I stated that negotiations were in progress with the United States government regarding the rights and privileges enjoyed by United States forces in Newfoundland. Those discussions are continuing satisfactorily, but, as a great many difficult and complicated questions are involved, they have not yet reached conclusion.

If I may now leave the United States I should like to say a few words about the situation in Europe.

In the free and democratic countries of Europe there has been a continuing revival of confidence and of stability since I last made a report to the house on this matter. I think this is due in very large measure to the reassurance which the North

Atlantic treaty has brought and will bring increasingly as the delivery of arms and equipment goes forward. It is due also to the stimulus of economic aid from North America and to the revival of national energy and national spirit in those countries. They are still recovering from the shocks of war and of enemy occupation, but for a full return to strength there is one essential condition--there must be a sense of security.

Of course it is in the interests of the Kremlin to prevent those conditions from being fulfilled. Communist propaganda in those countries seeks to turn away men's thoughts from constructive activities and to create and maintain an atmosphere of fear and pessimism. Through exploiting the fear of war, the communists, under orders from Moscow, then launch "peace offensives" designed to weaken those essential defensive measures which their own aggressive policies make necessary--the same kind of peace offensive which is now being carried on in this country by the same kind of leadership and for the same purpose. In the European continent, whose inhabitants have vividly in their memories the full horrors of war, it is not hard to find soil in which to plant these propaganda seeds, but they fortunately have been prevented from growing in recent months through the growth of confidence in the countries concerned. We can, I think, be reasonably sure that these sinister plans will not have any success in our own country, even though they may deceive and confuse some sincere and well-intentioned people.

Communist plans in Europe have also to some extent been frustrated by their own crude and violent tactics. The workers, even the communist workers, are getting tired of being forced into political strikes and sabotage by a little group of Moscow-appointed leaders who always put the directive of the Kremlin before the interests of their own country and of the working class. While the communists are still strong in some of these western European countries, I think their game is becoming more and more apparent to the people. There are indications of this tendency in the defeat of the communists in the elections in Finland, and in the complete elimination of the communist candidates in the recent election in the United Kingdom.

No better evidence, in fact, could be found of the greater strength of the democratic forces in the western world than the present position of the communist party in countries which have free elections. From the high point of their influence in the period immediately following the war, these parties have rapidly diminished in numbers and in strength. This change was not brought about by suppression or persecution. The communists have been left to the judgment of the electors, and only when they have taken illegal action to betray their country, or to disturb the peace, have they suffered penalties under the law. This confidence in the free processes of democracy has, I think, been justified.

In the United Kingdom, for instance, during the recent election the communists were allowed to participate fully in the campaign. They were given free time on the government radio. They were given every opportunity to win votes. They made every kind of insidious appeal for such votes, from demanding higher wages for all, immediately, to pandering to the lowest form of anti-American prejudice. But what happened? By the will of the electors no single communist, nor communist sympathizer, has been returned to the British House of Commons. They polled an infinitesimal proportion of the vote and the great majority of them lost their deposits. Here is good evidence that in the face of outside danger, people in the free world can close their ranks.

On the other hand, in the dark spaces behind the iron curtain conditions get worse and the Soviet government is attempting to seal off every possible contact between the unfortunate peoples of those satellite countries and the outer free world. Not the smallest glimmer of western light is now allowed to penetrate. Countries like Czechoslovakia, with its old parliamentary traditions, its great cultural heritage, its long-standing connections with the west, are to be put into permanent quarantine against the infection of freedom. So great is the nervousness of the Kremlin and those who take the Kremlin's orders in Prague, that even the normal social friendliness of two junior members of our legation staff towards their acquaintances in that city is regarded as dangerous and subversive. Charges have to be trumped up against them so that they can be expelled from the country. Against action of that kind we have, of course, means of retaliation which we shall certainly not hesitate to use against any country which invites and deserves it.

This communist policy of isolation and expulsion is revealing. It throws a sombre light on the fear which haunts the rulers of the Soviet Union that the countries which they have drawn or forced into their orbit, realizing that their national interests are being sacrificed to Moscow, may react as Yugoslavia has already reacted. Hence the repeated purges of the personnel of these governments. Hence the series of monstrous trials and forced confessions and savage sentences in Budapest, Sofia, Bucharest, Warsaw and Prague. Hence the accusations of espionage and plotting against western diplomatic missions and individual western nationals in these countries. One must feel the deepest sympathy for the peoples of Soviet satellite countries whose governments are being compelled by Moscow to carry out policies so plainly contrary to their national interests. But I suggest the lesson of these events is not going unnoticed on this side of the iron curtain, where many waverers in many countries will hesitate before committing themselves to communism when they have such abundant evidence that it is being used as a facade for the new Russian imperialism.

In combating these dangers one of our greatest sources of strength remains the United Nations, where they can be publicly exposed, and the North Atlantic Treaty, under which we can defend ourselves collectively against the aggression which might result from them. This treaty, I am glad to say--and the Minister of National Defence may and probably will have more to say about this matter when his estimates are introduced--is now a going concern, though very much remains to be done.

Since the last session of parliament the defence and military committees have met in Paris to approve programme of the Military Production and Supply Board and the Defence Financial and Economic Committee, as well as the broad principles on which defence planning by the various regional groups can be carried on. Since the meetings in Paris, problems of military production and supply and financial questions concerned with the implementation of the North Atlantic Treaty have been under investigation by the appropriate committees, and planning has now begun in the various regional groups. We are getting down to the detailed problems of working out an effective system of collective defence for the north Atlantic region.

As planning for military production and supply under the North Atlantic organization gets under way--and it is now under way--account should of course be taken of the needs of specialization in production and of the availability of productive capacity in all the north Atlantic nations. Means must also be found for overcoming

existing difficulties which impede the transfer of equipment and supplies among the north Atlantic nations so as to permit the maximum use of their productive capacities. Solution of these difficulties is necessary if full advantage is to be taken, for instance, of Canada's present and potential productive capacity by the north Atlantic countries. The responsibilities of membership under the North Atlantic Treaty cannot of course be discharged merely by setting up committees or staffs of experts for research and planning, however useful this may be. Such responsibilities can only be fulfilled by the governments and the peoples concerned.

Under the mutual aid and self-help article of the treaty we in Canada are committed to participation in this collective enterprise in the manner in which such participation will be most effective. But until investigation of the needs of our partners is more complete, and until military planning in detail is further advanced, it would be premature, I suggest, to predict the appropriate form and scale of our participation. It will of course have to be related to the capacities and requirements of our economy and the economies of all the other signatories.

I should like to conclude the brief mention I have made of this particular subject by quoting a paragraph from a very significant book entitled "Modern Arms and Free Men", by Dr. Vannevar Bush, in which he said:

The race--

He is referring to the race for security, indeed the race for survival.

--can be lost, as all long races that depend upon man's endurance can be lost, either by doing too little or by trying to do too much too soon.

He went on to say:

It will profit us little to have stocks of bombs and planes and then to bring our governmental and industrial systems crashing down about our ears. This is a long, hard race we are embarked upon. We had better settle into harness for the long pull and mark well how we use our resources.

The world situation has been changed, not only by the developments which I have attempted to sketch briefly, but also by the realization that the perils of the atomic age will increase through the manufacture of atomic weapons of ever-increasing destructiveness, culminating, if it is culmination, in the so-called H bomb. On this question--and reference has already been made to it in the house during the present session--I suggest that our policy as to atomic weapons should be twofold. On the one hand, we of the free world must continue to strive by every means possible--and I hope to elaborate on this somewhat in a moment--for that kind of international agreement for the effective control of atomic energy that will give us some real chance of security against the horrible possibility of atomic warfare. On the other hand, so long as the danger of such warfare remains, we together with friendly states with whom we can co-operate, must do our best to see that we do not lag behind in the development of knowledge and skill in the field of atomic energy. It is important also to convince, if that is possible, those with whom we find it difficult to co-operate that atomic weapons will never be used by us for any aggressive purpose.

The hon. member for Saskatoon (Mr. Knight) said the other night, in what I thought was a very thoughtful speech:

Somehow or other the people of the world will have to get together and solve this problem.

He was referring to the atomic problem. He also said in the same speech: "We must learn somehow or other to break that cycle" which is preventing results. "Somehow or other"--but how! He asked for some reassurance on these matters which would be a renewal of faith, and he was disappointed that I had not been able to give him such reassurance in my earlier statement. To be perfectly frank, reassurance is not easy in the light of present circumstances, but I know he can be assured as can all other hon. members of the house, that so far as the government is concerned we will do our best and not lag behind in the search for a solution to this problem.

When a man finds himself struggling against a blizzard, a moment comes when because of fatigue and despair he longs to lie down, relax and die. There are times, when we must all feel as though, in the international field, we were pushing through a bitter and blinding blizzard. But it would be fatal to yield to the temptation merely to sit it out, just as it would be fatal to yield to the temptation to panic and frantically rush in new directions without any knowledge of where they may lead. So far as Canada is concerned--and I am sure we all agree on this--I know there will never be any lack of willingness to search for a solution to this and the other problems which divide us from the communist world.

None of these problems is insoluble. Atomic energy need not destroy us; it can open for us a great age of human progress. Nor is there anything insuperable in the questions which have arisen about the future of Germany and Japan. Between the communist and non-communist worlds some modus vivendi, some agreement to live and let live, can be worked out. But this can never happen except through a process of genuine and mutual compromise and accommodation. If there remains any doubt about the desire of the western powers to find a basis for such compromise and accommodation then of course we must try to sweep away that doubt. This may require a great new effort on everybody's part--possibly some new high level meeting, possibly a full dress conference of the powers principally concerned, the fifteen, sixteen or seventeen powers if you like, on all forms of disarmament, including atomic disarmament; or it may require something else. It might suggest a meeting of the United Nations assembly in Moscow, an invitation to which may not be too easy to obtain. If, for example, direct negotiations amongst the great powers would initiate a process of settlement, no one should object to them on the grounds of procedure or prejudice. In this respect, I agree with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who not long ago said that he was in favour of great power negotiations, and I quote from his statement:

. . . all the time, and on all levels . . . inside the United Nations and outside the United Nations.

Certainly, we must not become fixed in any rut, atomic or otherwise, or assume that any scheme we put forward is necessarily final or perfect.

The World Council of Churches, meeting recently at Geneva, made a moving plea for such negotiation in the following terms:

Governments of nations have an inescapable responsibility at this hour. The world is divided into hostile camps through suspicion and distrust and through failure of nations to bring their mutual relations within an agreed system of justice and order. As representatives of Christian churches we appeal for a gigantic new effort for peace. We know how strenuously governments have discussed peace in the past. But sharp political conflicts continue, and atomic danger develops uncontrolled. We urge governments to enter into negotiations at once again and to do everything in their power to bring the present tragic deadlock to an end.

We must all agree, of course, with that. It is essential however that any new move designed to insure peace by removing international differences must be taken only after the most careful preparation. At the same time the free peoples must make it equally clear, as they can do, that they are not for a moment prepared, because of anguish over the present situation, of fear or insecurity, to make any unrequited sacrifice, through which they would weaken their position in return for nothing. There is no use in giving way to unreasoning panic. We are stronger now than we were. But however strong we might become, it would be folly to base one's policy on strength alone. As has been said, the first obligation of diplomacy is to avoid a situation where power alone talks. We can and should, therefore, reaffirm our desire to seek again, through negotiation, a settlement of the divisions which now beset the world.

Even in the best circumstances, however, a settlement of the problems which divide the communist world from the free world will not be easily reached. Some new interventions, such as those suggested by the member for Rosetown-Biggar (Mr. Coldwell), in his interesting analysis of the present crisis, might be a useful beginning for such a process. Certainly this government would give every support to any new beginning which gave any promise of success. Let us not forget, however, in our determination or desire, our anguish to do something, that the road ahead will in any case be long and difficult. We shall have to walk it with patience and with caution, with persistence and with realism. If a new approach, for instance, did not get us anywhere--there is always that possibility--we must not even then give way to the inevitable reaction of despair which would follow.

This point is well put in a leading article of the February 18 issue of the Economist, which no doubt some hon. members have read. One paragraph of that article reads as follows:

Behind the hopes of a quick agreement with Russia lies more than a trace of the belief that peace can really be had quite cheaply, by a single bargain, and not, as is the grim truth, by an intelligent, costly and sustained political effort lasting over a generation. Repeated talk of settlements and agreements and pacts can divert the attention of both statesmen and peoples from the fact that the only possible diplomacy for the western world--that of agreement through strength--is about the most difficult diplomacy that democratic nations can be asked to sustain. It means that for years to come a measure of military preparedness and a high degree of economic stability will have to be maintained throughout the non-communist world.

I suggest we will also need a high degree of democratic unity to face the communist policy of aggression, directed from one, and only one, centre, and without the limitation of scruples

or sincerity or morality. We must, I know, pay the price for freedom, national and individual, by differing and disputing among ourselves on occasions. So we have congress versus parliament; dollar versus sterling; Commonwealth associations versus European federation; security by military strategy versus security through social and political strength; international obligations versus domestic responsibilities. Every democratic state has these conflicts within its borders, and every group of states has them between its members. We should be careful, however, to see that they are not permitted to weaken us unduly as we face the dangers ahead.

At some point in the encircling barrier of unsolved problems which hems us in at the moment, there may be some new opening upon which we could begin to work. With patience and with diligence we must search for this opening, and, when we find it, set about expanding it with every tool of diplomacy and negotiation that we have available. We shall not, I suggest, facilitate this search by permitting our hunger for peace to lead us into unrealistic and specious courses. On the other hand we shall only hinder it by bellicose declarations that all is perfect on our side, and anyway we can lick Joe Stalin!

I should like in the very few minutes that remain, to turn to what the Soviet Union is doing or is not doing in the particular field of atomic energy control.

During the past three or four months, while the United States has been going through the throes of its most difficult and fateful decision as to whether or not to push ahead with the development of the hydrogen bomb, because of the absence of agreement on the international control of atomic energy, the Russians have quietly and energetically been cultivating the impression, with some success, that they had already made new proposals for such agreement which we had turned down. Inferences are drawn from vague and speculative press reports that have passed the Moscow censors, as well as from some of Mr. Vishinsky's remarks on atomic energy in the last United Nations assembly, hinting that they have offered concessions which we are ignoring. Nothing could be more misleading or further from the truth. Nothing could be more dangerous than that this impression should spread.

Until last September our public were not particularly well informed as to what the Soviet position on atomic control actually was. Last autumn, therefore, when Mr. Vishinsky offered the assembly, as if it were something new, what he called strict inspection and effective control as an integral part of an atomic energy agreement, many people naturally thought that concessions were being made, and that at last the deadlock was being broken. Perhaps Mr. Vishinsky's intention was to concede and not to confuse, but some of his statements at that time seemed more like double talk, and in some cases were even mutually contradictory. In the course of the recent debate at Lake Success, he said everything about everything. If one makes a close and careful analysis of his statements as I have, it reveals nothing that could not be interpreted as being wholly consistent with the Soviet proposals of June, 1947, which did not provide anything approaching adequate international inspection and control.

If Mr. Vishinsky meant us to read something new and different into his words, I hope he will make that clear to us at the first opportunity. It is of the greatest importance that we should know. At the moment we certainly cannot find out at Lake Success. Hon. members will recall that the assembly last autumn directed the six permanent members of the Atomic Energy Commission, among other things, to discover what the new--if they were new--Soviet proposals

on atomic energy control meant. But the Soviet representative walked out of the meeting without clarifying his own position in any respect. When these talks are resumed, as I hope they will be, maybe we shall be able to get that clarification, which must be insisted on because it is vital to the whole question.

To be specific and definite on this point, sir, I should like to draw the attention of the house to a comparison of what Mr. Vishinsky said in his main speech on this subject to the general assembly last November and what was proposed by the Soviet representative at the twelfth meeting of the Atomic Energy Commission on June 11, 1947.

In summing up Soviet views on inspection--and this is the crux of the problem--Mr. Vishinsky made six points last November, which were simply a condensed rewording of the original Soviet proposals. On the heart of the matter, Mr. Vishinsky said that there should be --and I am quoting from his statement--"periodic and special investigation of the activities of enterprises extracting atomic raw materials"; that is, periodic and special investigation by some international atomic authority. That sounded fine. The Soviet proposals a couple of years previously said, and I quote from them:

The international control commission shall periodically carry out inspection of facilities for the mining of atomic raw materials and for the production of atomic materials and atomic energy. . . and carry out special investigations in cases where suspicion of violations . . . arises.

All that Mr. Vishinsky added to that statement was that he wished--

--to make it quite clear that periodic inspection means inspection at intervals, but intervals as determined by necessity and by decision of the international control commission whenever that commission deems it fitting that such inspections should take place.

That is all very well as far as it goes, but it does not go far enough to give us that security under international control which is essential if we are to sign any international agreement. For instance, it does not allow for international inspectors to be on the job all the time, which we think is essential; nor does it explain how the international control commission could determine whether any country had declared all of its production facilities.

The Soviet union has added nothing to the most inadequate section of its proposals; for Mr. Vishinsky did not explain how "special investigation" could work in a country which would not allow inspectors to go anywhere except to the atomic establishments which it chose to declare. There is still nothing in the Soviet proposals to prevent a country hiding away, in a remote corner of its territories, a whole series of atomic installations which it would not necessarily declare, and which the inspectors would therefore never know anything about because they could go only where they were shown, and then only at intervals.

We must be careful when we examine proposals of the kind which I have indicated; and we must be especially careful to see that the interpretation given to those proposals in our own country is not false and misleading, if we can prevent it. I am not, however, so much concerned at the moment with trying to indicate where the blame for failure lies as in finding a possible

way out of the deadlock. I therefore repeat that in this search, which is literally one for survival, we must keep open every road, every by-path and every trail which may lead us to the objective we all so ardently desire to reach. But we must, at the same time, take every necessary measure, moral, economic and military, to defend ourselves collectively against aggression from those reactionary subversive forces which have hitherto blocked the road to peace.

...A discussion on external affairs was initiated in the house last Friday on a motion to go into supply. The discussion was not completed on Friday evening, and therefore this motion [to refer the estimates of the Department of External Affairs to the appropriate Standing Committee of the House] will give hon. members a further opportunity to discuss our external affairs generally, if they so desire. It will also give me the opportunity, I hope, one of which I am now taking advantage, to deal with some of the points raised last Friday, and to answer some of the questions addressed to the government at that time. I hope it will also give me an opportunity to clear up some of the confusion and misconceptions which I think might be created by some of the statements then made.

The hon. member for Peel (Mr. Graydon), in his interesting contribution to this debate, said that in discussions of foreign affairs the dice, in a sense, were loaded against speakers on the opposition side of the house because, naturally, they did not have access to all the confidential information at the disposal of the government. Of course, in a sense that is true, and up to a point must necessarily be true. But we do try to keep the house as fully informed as possible about these matters. When there are questions of very general interest and of great importance, I think it would be quite proper for leaders of the opposition parties to receive confidential information from government members on those questions; and if there are questions of a kind which preoccupy leaders of opposition parties or other hon. members, I hope I may be able to show to them confidential information bearing on these matters.

So far as loading the dice is concerned, I would only say that in the discussion we have already had the leader of the opposition (Mr. Drew) spent a good deal of time dealing with the situation in China and the recognition or non-recognition of the communist government in that country. I would point out that we had already supplied him with a memorandum which included a great deal of confidential and, in fact, top-secret information on that subject--a procedure which I think it was proper for us to follow.

The hon. member for Peel stated once again that it was time we told the House of Commons and country more about the policies of the government in matters of external affairs. The graphic expression he used was that we should roll up the blinds in the East Block. I am not quite sure what he meant by that, but I hope he will take the opportunity to go into the matter in a little more detail, possibly at the hearings before the committee--because, so far as I am aware, there is no foreign office in any democratic government that makes more information available to the public and to parliament than we do. Not only are we willing to roll up the blinds, but, on appropriate occasions, we shall be happy to open the windows of the East Block as well, even though it may mean that at times we will find ourselves sitting in a draft.

In the statement he made last Friday evening concerning

external affairs the leader of the opposition complained that in the statement I had made earlier in the afternoon I had ignored China. In his words, it appeared as if I was almost unaware of China's existence so far as that statement was concerned. He suggested it would have been better if I had been able to give the house some information on the question of the recognition or non-recognition of the communist government in China.

On that point I would say that this is a matter now before the government for consideration. It is a very difficult and complicated question indeed, as will be apparent from the fact that countries such as the United Kingdom and India have recognized the communist government in China, while other countries such as the United States and France have not done so. Therefore the question arises whether the government, in the midst of difficult and somewhat delicate discussions on the matter, should make public at this time all the arguments for and against a particular course of action.

I can assure you that when in the light of all the facts a decision is made, it will be given immediately to the House of Commons and to the country. Of course under our parliamentary system that decision is the responsibility of the government--as indeed the leader of the opposition himself indicated the other night. At that time he warned us of haste in this matter. To use his own words:

We are under no compulsion to act hastily, but I believe we are under great compulsion as a nation to act with caution, with great care and after a full examination of all the consequences that would flow from recognition at this time.

I agree entirely with that, and indeed we are acting with great caution. One reason for delay--and it is only one reason, of course--is to give to hon. members a chance to state in this house their point of view on this question. Indeed, the request was made to the government by hon. members opposite that they should be given an opportunity to express their point of view on this matter before we came to a decision. They have had that opportunity. The C.C.F. party has indicated its position. The Conservative party, through its leader and the Conservative members in the house, have had an opportunity to express their views. As a result, these views will be of value to the government in coming to a decision.

In his statement the other night it seemed to me that the leader of the opposition jumped to a completely wrong conclusion on inadequate evidence when he said that a decision seems to have been made. The evidence he quoted for coming to that conclusion was a statement made by General McNaughton. The leader of the opposition used these words, as reported at page 462 of Hansard:

Let us see what it was that was under consideration in the remarks of General McNaughton when he made it quite clear that early recognition is under consideration or has actually been decided upon.

Those remarks of General McNaughton, indeed his whole statement, meant nothing of the kind. In the statement to which reference has been made, General McNaughton said--and I quote from his speech as it was quoted at page 459 of Hansard:

Unfortunately the further progress of these meetings--

That is, meetings of the atomic energy group consisting of the permanent members of the Security Council plus Canada.

--has been held up by the Soviet refusal to participate as long as the Chinese delegate represented the nationalist government. However, there is reason to expect that the meetings will again be resumed shortly when this difficulty has been overcome.

That was a personal statement of General McNaughton with respect to the composition and the hearings of the atomic energy group, an agency of the Security Council of the United Nations. I can assure you, Mr. Speaker, that in those statements General McNaughton was not referring in any way to discussions on this matter by the Canadian government. General McNaughton has not been informed of, nor is he indeed greatly concerned with, such discussions. The meaning of his statement is quite clear. He was talking about a group appointed by the Security Council to discuss atomic energy questions. The composition of that group and the representation of China on that group would be determined by a decision of the Security Council of the United Nations. General McNaughton apparently thought at that time that there might be added to the five members out of the eleven of the Security Council who have recognized China, one or two others; that this would change the balance in the Security Council and might thereby make a change in the composition of the atomic energy group. But General McNaughton could not have been referring to Canada in that connection, because Canada is not now a member of the Security Council and would not be concerned in any such change in it.

In our discussion the other night the leader of the opposition devoted some time to "recognition" in international law. In discussing the question he quoted from a recognized authority in that field, Professor Lauterpacht. It seems to me that there has been a good deal of confusion in people's minds as to what is meant by recognition, and I think this might be a good opportunity to clear the matter up so far as I am able to do so. It is of immediate importance now in connection with this particular problem of China.

In considering this matter we must distinguish between recognition of a new state and recognition of a new government. The two things are quite different. Under recognition of a new government we must distinguish between de facto recognition and de jure recognition, between implied recognition and express recognition. We must distinguish between recognition of a government whose authority has been challenged and is still under challenge, and recognition of a government whose authority is no longer being challenged by any alternative form of government. Then finally we must distinguish between recognition on the one hand and diplomatic representation on the other--this is quite a different matter, although the two things were certainly confused, I thought, the other night.

In connection with China we are dealing at this time only with recognition of a new government, not recognition of a new state. In deciding whether recognition should or should not be given to a new government certain criteria--certain conditions, if you like--have been laid down by authorities on international law, such as Oppenheimer, Brierly, Jessup, Lauterpacht and others. But these conditions, of course, have never been, and were never meant to be, applied rigidly and without exception. I mentioned some of these criteria in my statement last December when I was talking about this Chinese question. I said then that if the

particular conditions which I mentioned were fulfilled in China to our satisfaction, and I quote from my words, we "would have to face the facts which confront us."

The four conditions--I think three of them were mentioned last Friday night by the leader of the opposition, but there are at least four, are as follows. One is the effectiveness of the authority of the government concerned. The second is the independence of the government concerned--something that is not always easy to determine, especially in the case of countries like Tibet, Viet Nam and China. The third is the ability and the willingness of the government concerned to carry out its international obligations. That condition, of course, cannot always be applied too rigorously and too exactly. If it were always applied in that way we might today be recognizing the government of Mr. Kerensky in Moscow. Finally there is the question of acceptability of the new government by the people over whom it exercises authority.

In dealing with this fourth question, acceptability--and it is an important question--Professor Lauterpacht, the authority previously quoted, has stated, and I think he is right, that acceptability does not necessarily mean now acceptability by--and I quote his words--"freely expressed popular approval." There must be other evidence. There must be the question of the people's resistance to the challenger of the government, or the reaction of the people to the new government--how they accept the new government's rule. But in dealing with this question the other night the leader of the opposition said that the United Nations resolution passed in 1946 establishes once again the principle that acceptability must be by freely expressed popular approval. I should like to refer to that part of his statement. He said that in 1946 a resolution of the United Nations Assembly was passed dealing with Franco Spain, and that its purport was that a decision was made by the United Nations that there would not be recognition of the government of Franco Spain until it was a government with the consent of the governed. He then went on to argue that it altered the existing system of international law in so far as this point is concerned, because this was a resolution of the United Nations, and as the leader of the opposition said at that time:

This--

The reference is to the resolution.

--becomes a most emphatic statement of international law, and remains so until it has been repealed.

On that point I should only like to remark that resolutions of the United Nations do not make international law by their passage at Lake Success. It has been well established there, and it is accepted by every delegation attending the United Nations, that a resolution of that body is not international law. It is an expression of international opinion, but it does not of itself alter international law, and, as I understand it, it did not alter international law on this occasion.

Furthermore this particular resolution had nothing whatever to do with recognition. It was a resolution which concerned the government of Spain. Among other things it was a resolution against the participation of the present government of Spain in meetings of the United Nations, and it was a resolution for the recall of ambassadors and ministers from Madrid. It did not concern in any way, shape or form the recognition of Franco. As

a matter of fact it did not even recommend a diplomatic break with Franco. It merely recommended that ambassadors and ministers should be withdrawn from Spain. It did not recommend that diplomatic missions should be closed, and they have not been closed since the resolution was passed.

Therefore I suggest there is no use in trying to draw an analogy on this occasion between our attitude towards Franco Spain and our possible attitude towards the government of China. As a matter of fact, the Canadian government recognized the Franco government of Spain in 1939, and has not withdrawn or altered its recognition since that time.

Another argument which was made the other night against the recognition of communist China by the leader of the opposition-- and I quote him again--was when he said:

In that area recognition of China would be regarded almost as a fatal blow to Viet Nam....

He was referring to the new state of Indo-China. If that is true, then in that area Burma, India, Pakistan, Ceylon and the United Kingdom all have struck that fatal blow because they have all recognized the communist government of China. The government of Indonesia, now a very important state in that area, has said that it will be glad to recognize the government of communist China as soon as that government recognizes it. Nevertheless the leader of the opposition said, with reference to the opinion that it would be a fatal blow to Viet Nam:

...that is the view publicly expressed by men with a great deal longer experience than the Secretary of State for External Affairs in this government.

That might well be the case, but if so it would be helpful in our discussion of these matters if we knew who were the gentlemen who advocated that course. Furthermore, on this point the statement was made by the leader of the opposition that we had already recognized the state of Viet Nam,, and when I shook my head the other evening to negate his statement I was met merely by the reply which I have just quoted. What I wanted to point out at that time, and of course can point out now, is that we have not recognized the state of Viet Nam at this time.

In dealing with this matter the leader of the opposition rejected the argument that if we did not recognize communist China the Soviet delegation would walk out of the United Nations, and that would be blackmail. I entirely agree with him. It is blackmail, but it will have nothing to do with our decision on this matter one way or the other. I have already condemned as childish arrogance that kind of tactic on the part of Soviet delegations and their satellites, and I entirely agree with the leader of the opposition that we should not submit to such tactics.

In dealing with this point the other night the leader of the opposition added that such walkouts render the United Nations impotent. They are of course unfortunate in relation to the efficient conduct of the work of the United Nations, in one sense; they bring the United Nations into disrepute, but not as much disrepute as they bring on the delegations who walk out. They do not make the United Nations impotent, and should not be allowed to do so. Indeed, since these walkouts have occurred we have had continuous meetings of some of the most important agencies of the United Nations, including the economic and social council, which has never been able to do its work so expeditiously and

effectively as on the occasion when there was no Soviet delegation present. Furthermore, the Security Council has been meeting since these walkouts occurred.

The situation in regard to recognition of communist China and its effect on the United Nations was referred to by the leader of the opposition the other evening when he said that only two proponents of recognition were now in the Security Council, and only three in the other agencies of the United Nations. As a matter of fact the situation is that in the general assembly of the United Nations there are fifteen members who have recognized communist China. Of the eleven members of the Security Council, five have recognized communist China. Of the twelve members of the Atomic Energy Commission, five have recognized the government of communist China. In the Economic and Social Council seven have recognized it; in the International Labour Office, seventeen; in the Food and Agricultural Organization, sixteen and so on. More members of the United Nations have taken this step than was indicated the other evening by the leader of the opposition.

The fact is that in some of these agencies we are approaching a position where a majority of the members concerned may be representatives of governments which have recognized the new government of communist China. If we reach that position in fact, those states which have not concurred in such recognition will be confronted by a very difficult situation indeed. If we find ourselves in the minority, should we walk out? Of course that would be absurd; but if we do not walk out and we do not recognize communist China, then the alternative is to remain there and work with delegations from communist China, and by so doing give them a form of recognition. All this shows how complicated and difficult the problem is.

In his remarks the other evening the leader of the opposition stated, with great emphasis, great eloquence and great impressiveness, I thought, that we had to stem the Red tide in Asia. Well, so we do; but how? When he attempted to answer that question I venture to suggest that he got into the same kind of difficulty I often get into when I make general statements and then try to follow them up with concrete observations. He did say, however, that in answering that question we should not fall into the language of diplomatic mumbo-jumbo. I entirely agree with that. When he attempted to answer that very important question himself he set out certain things which I might just mention--and I hope I am putting them correctly.

First he said there should be no hasty recognition. I entirely agree; and I do not think we can be accused of undue haste in this matter. He said that recognition should not be granted until certain conditions were fulfilled, and those conditions he enumerated in his statement. I think the most important one--and I hope I am quoting him correctly--was that there shall be common action, that there shall be a clear and universal pattern of strategy which will be known to the people of the free nations, and which will be known in the clearest detail to the nations which threaten our peace and security. Certainly, he went on to state, there should be no recognition of the Mao regime until those conditions are fulfilled.

Well it is going to be a little difficult at this date to agree on a common policy, which was a condition he suggested before we could give recognition; because no such common policy is possible as long as some of the states out in that portion of the world have already recognized communist China. On that point the hon. gentleman quoted from a statement of Mr. Anthony

Eden, the former Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in London, to the effect that we should be very careful on the question of appeasement and hasty recognition. I venture to read into the record again one paragraph of the statement by Mr. Eden quoted by the leader of the opposition, as it appears at page 465 of Hansard:

As regards actual recognition, there is a fair field for argument on practical as well as on legal grounds. It is a real misfortune that in this, as in other Far Eastern matters, we should be acting piecemeal. . .

That was the quotation given by the leader of the opposition the other evening. The copy of Mr. Eden's statement on that occasion which I have seen, and which I would like to put on record, adds a few words to that quotation; and I now quote from the text of Mr. Eden's statement:

As regards actual recognition, there is a fair field for argument on practical as well as on legal grounds. The decision to recognize is no doubt eventually inescapable. . .

Those are the additional words in my text.

The third condition laid down by the leader of the opposition---though I do not know whether you could call it a condition---was that we should agree on help to the peoples of Asia; and I am sure there will be no difference of opinion on that.

The fourth suggestion he made was in his reference to a Pacific pact, and on that very important question he quoted me as follows---I refer to his words as reported at page 464 of Hansard:

The proposal has been put forward in this house on different occasions by the hon. member for Vancouver-Quadra (Mr. Green), that a Pacific pact to complement the Atlantic pact should be brought into being. Today the Secretary of State for External Affairs said that that could not be done because if the nations of the Pacific were to be invited to consider a Pacific pact it would be necessary to invite Russia and China.

That is not exactly what I said. I said that would be one consideration, whether it would be possible to invite Russia and China to a conference which would be discussing a regional pact in the Pacific. Of course I am not quite so naive as to suggest that if an invitation of that kind were sent, and if it had the conditions which normally attach to such invitations, the Russians would accept it. I am not even sure whether it would be of any use to send them such an invitation. My argument against a Pacific pact at this time, which is not mentioned in this statement, was that in my opinion it would be futile and unwise to proceed with a conference to negotiate a Pacific security and mutual guarantee pact at a time when the United States, the United Kingdom and India have indicated that they would not be able to participate in any such conference. Surely that serious argument is enough to explain why we have not accepted certain advice which has been given us in this house to push ahead with a Pacific pact at this time.

I thought I had made my position perfectly clear on this matter both on Friday and on previous occasions, and that in doing so I had not lapsed into the diplomatic language of mumbo-jumbo. If, however, the situation in the Pacific should change and should become analogous to the situation that obtained in the Atlantic when we proceeded to work out the North Atlantic Pact, then certainly we would have to reconsider our attitude toward this matter.

Finally the leader of the opposition made a strong and eloquent appeal against anything which might be interpreted as appeasement of communist aggression. I agree with him, though appeasement is one of those very difficult and dangerous words which can be interpreted in many ways. If by appeasement we mean prejudicing our own security or the security of the democratic world by making extorted and unnecessary concessions to a possible aggressor in the hope that it might keep him quiet; or if we mean assisting, encouraging and strengthening those whom we thought had aggressive designs, then of course I am sure everyone in this house is against appeasement. But it is a dangerous word, which should not be used carelessly. Appeasement is not the same as peace, nor is it the same as a desire for peace.

In his statement last Friday evening the leader of the opposition also said as reported at page 465 of Hansard:

Every word I have spoken is a word to urge upon this government the duty to say in no uncertain terms, no matter what may be said by other governments in the world: "Appeasement is going to go no further; we have learned the lessons of the past and there will be no truck and trade with tyranny of this kind unless and until they are at least prepared to accept the ordinary standards of international conduct."

In my statement I said, as reported at pages 429-30 of Hansard:

So far as Canada is concerned ... there will never be any lack of willingness to search for a solution to this and the other problems which divide us from the communist world.

I suggest there is no contradiction between the two statements. In this connection I referred to the necessity of genuine compromise and accommodation; and I made it abundantly clear, I hope, that the Canadian government was fully aware of the danger of appeasement of the kind I have just indicated, but at the same time was conscious of a duty to keep searching for some way out of the present impasse.

Last Friday the hon. member for Peel spoke in a similar vein, with perhaps fewer qualifications than I gave, when he said, as reported at page 454 of Hansard:

...the most vital job at the hand of every responsible nation of the world today is somehow to find the way to stop the present aimless international drifting...

This, I remind the house, is a quotation from a speech made by the hon. member for Peel.

...which is causing no end of alarm to the ordinary citizens of the world, because they have a revolting fear that a continuation of this squaring off of one group of nations towards another may end in another armed holocaust.

With those words, Mr. Speaker, I entirely agree.

S/A