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
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DOCS

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

NUCLEAR TEST BAN
COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY (CTBT)
FINAL RECORDS (PV)

1990-93 SESSIONS



COMPILED AND EDITED BY:
NON-PROLIFERATION, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT DIVISION OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
OTTAWA, CANADA



JANUARY 1994


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PREFACE

PV

This volume is a compilation of the final records (PVs) of the Conference on Disarmament during its 1990, 1991, and 1992 sessions relating to a Nuclear Test Ban. It has been compiled and edited to facilitate discussions and research on this issue.

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2	CD/PV.534	11-12	Romania/Chirila	13.2.90
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27	CD/PV.562	3	Norway/Vareno	5.7.90
28	CD/PV.565	4-6	Japan/Donowaki	17.7.90
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	CD/PV.565	13-14	UK/Kenyon	17.7.90
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51	CD/PV.592	5-6	Netherlands/Wagenmakers	23.5.91
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61	CD/PV.602	4	Argentin and Brazil jointly/Garcia Moritan	15.8.91
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100	CD/PV.648	2-3;5	Mexico/Marin Bosch	25.3.93
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(The President)

... We shall also consider other proposals dealing with the manner in which the Conference should consider other agenda items. In that connection, I should like to recall that we still need to find appropriate organizational frameworks for the nuclear issues on the agenda. In particular, I wish to stress the importance of the informal individual consultations held last year by the representative of Japan, with the encouragement of successive Presidents of the Conference, on an adequate mandate for an Ad hoc Committee under agenda

(The President)

item 1, entitled "Nuclear test ban". I understand that those consultations will continue. I welcome the initiative taken by the representative of Japan, and I wish him success in his efforts. Of course, I remain available to assist him and other members in their efforts.

(Mr. Komatina, Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations)

... "The Conference on Disarmament remains entrusted with the consideration of other important subjects of a global nature which continue to require urgent multilateral action. The United Nations has repeatedly assigned the highest priority to the issue of cessation of all nuclear test explosions. The encouraging signs witnessed in the bilateral negotiations should be further advanced. However, I remain convinced that a complete ban on such tests can pave the way to nuclear disarmament and rid the world of the nuclear menace. The Conference on Disarmament has an irreplaceable role to play in that respect. Efforts to amend the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963 and turn it into a comprehensive test ban reflect widespread concern over the present situation.

(Mr. van den Broek, Netherlands)

... Further restrictions must be placed not only on the scale of nuclear weapons themselves but also on their testing. The present situation, where the threshold test-ban treaties between the Soviet Union and the United States have still not entered into force, is unsatisfactory. There is, however, hope that this situation will change in the very near future. The path to further reductions in the number and yield of tests is therefore open, and we sincerely hope that the two super-Powers will not hesitate to follow it in the interests of the longer-term perspective of a comprehensive test ban.

Some parties to the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty have said that such a road to a comprehensive test ban will take too long. They have taken the initiative of convening an amendment conference to turn the PTBT into a CTB. However sympathetic their motives may be, this approach in my view is almost certainly bound to fail. Opinions on the desirability of a comprehensive test ban are still far too divergent. It is therefore fitting that I should emphasize the following: at the time of the conclusion of the partial test-ban Treaty it appeared that the only realistic way to reduce and control nuclear arms was to cut down increasingly on nuclear tests. Today, however, the chances of agreement on a radical reduction of nuclear weapons by the United States and the Soviet Union seem more favourable than ever before: INF, START and - why not? - START II, SNF. This development should be included in our approach towards nuclear tests. As long as nuclear weapons cannot be eliminated entirely, we all agree on the desirability of stabilizing their numbers at as low a level as possible in their role as a deterrent. This should also mean reducing nuclear tests to a minimum. Such an approach should be feasible both technically and politically.

(Mr. Mock, Austria)

... The conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty remains a priority goal on the international disarmament agenda. Although in 1989 it was not possible to set up a committee within the Conference on Disarmament, we hope that this year it will be possible to agree on a mandate. Austria fully appreciates the work of the Group of Seismic Experts, which is to develop a model international seismic data exchange system. Since the first phase, namely the large-scale test, was completed in 1989, we hope that the second and third phases will demonstrate the satisfactory operation of an international monitoring system. Austria will continue its sustained participation in the work of the Group of Experts, and will make the necessary information available to it at the current stage of the work.

(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

Bearing in mind the changing international situation and the importance that the Government of Mexico attributes to the work that has been assigned to us, allow me to read the message that President Carlos Salinas de Gortari has addressed to the Conference:

... "The Conference on Disarmament now has before it a major opportunity to translate this climate of détente into specific agreements on the priority issues: nuclear disarmament, and more particularly the cessation of all nuclear tests, and the elimination of chemical weapons.

... "As members of the Conference on Disarmament, all of us have a duty and an obligation to fulfil the hopes of the peoples of the world, to banish the spectre of war and its deadly instruments. The bilateral understandings should be followed by disarmament agreements negotiated on a multilateral basis. The most pressing issue is the total suspension of nuclear tests. A number of possibilities are open to us in order to achieve that objective.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

... Secondly, all obligations laid down in the Treaty must be fulfilled. As I have already said, the non-nuclear-weapon States which are parties to the Treaty have done their share. The obvious way for the nuclear-weapon States to honour their commitments under the Treaty and ensure its prolongation would be to drastically reduce their arsenals of nuclear weapons and to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty - the key to nuclear disarmament.

A comprehensive test ban is crucial for efforts to end the nuclear arms race. More than a quarter of a century ago, in the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty, three nuclear-weapon States expressed their determination to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time. More than 21 years ago, in the non-proliferation Treaty of 1968, they restated the determination they had expressed five years earlier. Today, more than 26 years after the conclusion of the partial test-ban Treaty, negotiations on a comprehensive test ban have still not commenced.

The minimum contribution of the nuclear-weapon States to the review conference and the prolongation of the Treaty would be to agree to start negotiations on a comprehensive test ban. The demand for a comprehensive test ban is highly topical this year for two reasons. One reason is the review conference regarding the non-proliferation Treaty. Another reason is that efforts are in progress to convene an amendment conference to the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty. The objective stated is to transform the partial test-ban Treaty - which prohibits nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, but not under ground - into a comprehensive test-ban treaty. It is to be hoped that the nuclear-weapon States will correctly assess the political signals emerging from the initiative to convene such an amendment conference. It is to be hoped that they will allow the amendment conference to become the catalyst required to start negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, speedily and in good faith.

For decades, my Government together with the vast majority of States has urged the Conference on Disarmament to initiate such negotiations, and has worked very actively towards this end, but so far in vain. My Government continues to consider such negotiations urgent. In fact, they are acquiring added urgency. And Sweden continues to believe they belong in the Conference on Disarmament.

(Mr. Chirila, Romania)

... The negotiation and conclusion of a universal treaty for the cessation and complete prohibition of nuclear tests remains a priority objective on the international disarmament agenda and the agenda of our Conference. Even if it was not possible to set up an ad hoc committee to consider this subject last session, we hope that such a forum for work and negotiations can be set up this year. We welcome and support any efforts to that end, and we have taken note of the willingness of Ambassador Donowaki of Japan to continue the efforts of his predecessor, Ambassador Yamada, on this subject. At the same time we consider that any action to achieve this objective by stages should also be welcomed and placed in the general context of the need to achieve a comprehensive and final solution. We fully appreciate the work of the Group of Seismic Experts to define and install a model international data exchange system for the detection of seismic events, for use in identifying nuclear tests. We will not fail to do our best to support this activity, inter alia through direct involvement and participation.

The Geneva Conference must also continue to concern itself and to seek the most promising ways to consider and negotiate questions designed to halt the nuclear arms race and achieve disarmament in this field. We cannot but fully share the view that so-called "nuclear deterrence" is in fact likely to perpetuate the nuclear arms race. We are for, and we support, agreements to reduce nuclear weapons until they are totally eliminated. Such agreements should be negotiated both between the nuclear-weapon States and, in a broader context, with participation by all, on problems of concern to all. In the first category falls the conclusion of an agreement on 50 per cent reductions in the strategic weapons held by the United States and the Soviet Union, and the beginning of negotiations to eliminate tactical nuclear missiles in Europe. Also in the nuclear context, our Conference should not lose sight of, and should find ways to achieve effective progress in, efforts to provide security guarantees to the non-nuclear-weapon States so that they are not attacked by or threatened with nuclear weapons. We welcome the almost immediate re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee to consider this problem. In carrying out its work the Conference on Disarmament should also bear constantly in mind the prospects and questions which arise from the fact that this very year Geneva will once again host the conference entrusted with the task of reviewing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as

(Mr. Chirila, Romania)

well as the fact that the international agenda also includes the convening of a conference to consider the proposal to amend the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty by extending it to cover underground zones.

(Mr. de Rivero, Peru)

... Another item on our agenda that could be revitalized in order to bring our Conference into the mainstream of international trends is, I believe, to reach agreement amongst ourselves once and for all on a mandate to establish the ad hoc committee on the cessation of nuclear tests. Whether or not an ad hoc committee is set up on this major issue could be a significant indication that the Conference is not keeping abreast of international political trends that are occurring around it.

In this connection we will support all the efforts that Ambassador Donowaki of Japan is making in order to arrive at a mandate and establish this ad hoc committee at last. At present the United States/Soviet bilateral negotiations are proceeding on limiting the number and yield of tests. It is possible that protocols on this subject may be signed at the forthcoming June summit to be held in Washington between Presidents Bush and Gorbachev. Moreover, the fourth NPT review conference, which is very closely connected with progress made in limiting and halting nuclear tests, is to begin next August. As we can see, there are a series of bilateral and multilateral negotiations that link up with our Conference through the limitation and cessation of nuclear testing. How, then, can we fail to set up the ad hoc committee? Not to do so would offer the clearest proof that the work of the Conference was out of touch with the realities of international life. This is an issue which has as much priority as that of chemical weapons. To reactivate it is to give the work of the Conference political symmetry; I say political symmetry because the Conference is now focusing the bulk of its work on chemical disarmament, to such an extent that it has been said here that the Conference is in fact becoming a preparatory committee for the chemical weapons convention. This does not in any way mean that we should ease up on the work of the Ad hoc Committee on chemical weapons. Quite the

(Mr. de Rivero, Peru)

contrary: this thought is designed to bring some symmetry to the approach and strategy of our work. At the same time as we are revitalizing other priority issues, we should make an effort so that within a year at most we can come up with the text of a convention on the total prohibition of chemical weapons.

(Mr. Karhilo, Finland)

... I have spoken at length about CW issues, which relate to only one of the items before this Conference. This is due to the priority we attach to the rapid conclusion of the CW convention. I will now move to the first agenda item, "Nuclear test ban".

(continued)

(Mr. Karhilo, Finland)

A comprehensive nuclear test ban is needed to curb the qualitative refinement of nuclear weapons. Finland, like many other countries, considers that the international nuclear non-proliferation régime embodied in the NPT would be strengthened by the complete prohibition of all nuclear tests and explosions. However, we have difficulty agreeing with those who, in addition, maintain that a comprehensive test ban is a prerequisite for the preservation of the non-proliferation régime. Such a linkage could do a disservice to both.

One of the key concerns regarding a comprehensive test ban is - not surprisingly, I might add - its verifiability. Here, as in connection with the CW convention, we think it can be done. The appropriate technical means are already available. Our own research conducted by the Finnish Research Project on Seismological Verification of Nuclear Tests has convinced us on that score.

However, we are equally convinced that there is no short-cut to a test ban. Verification provisions need to be carefully worked out and tested. The appropriate forum to do that is this Conference and, within it, the Group of Scientific Experts. Finland participates actively in the work of the GSE, as well as in the important ongoing GSETT-2 data exchange experiment.

In order to be optimal, seismic verification facilities should be evenly distributed round the globe. However, the network of seismographic stations in the southern hemisphere is scattered. In order to contribute to the improvement of this situation, Finland has for a decade co-operated with Zambia in establishing a seismic network, training the operators of the network and, most recently, assisting the Lusaka seismic station to participate in the GSETT-2 experiment.

The valuable work done by the GSE cannot, however, conceal the fact that the Conference has not been able to establish an ad hoc committee on a nuclear test ban. Its establishment now and a good start to its deliberations would facilitate the successful outcome of the NPT review conference later this year.

Finland looks forward to this fourth NPT review conference as an opportunity to strengthen the international non-proliferation régime. Finland and the other Nordic countries have already outlined a number of practical measures in this regard. My country is a firm supporter of the NPT. Indeed, in our opinion, it remains the single most significant disarmament measure undertaken by the international community so far. We are also a firm supporter of a comprehensive test ban. However, in the light of the present realities, it is doubtful whether the suggested amendment of the partial test-ban Treaty to make it a comprehensive one is the practical answer to the test ban issue. Nevertheless, as a party to the test-ban Treaty Finland will, as we have already informed the depositaries, attend the amendment conference and will do so in a constructive spirit.

In our view, the amendment conference should focus on giving political impetus to the cause of banning nuclear tests, in the same way that the Paris Conference did to the cause of banning chemical weapons. We hope that this view can be shared by other States parties to the Treaty.

(Mr. Somogyi, Hungary)

We can also welcome the fact that, as a result of three years of Soviet-American negotiations, the fate of the two bilateral treaties signed a decade and a half ago, but never ratified, can finally be settled. The verification protocols to be attached to the 1974 and 1976 treaties on the limitation of nuclear explosions for military and peaceful purposes appear to be ready for signing at the upcoming Soviet-American summit, and that would lead to the long-awaited ratification of the two treaties.

(Mr. Somogyi, Hungary)

... The comprehensive nuclear test ban is formally high on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. Yet in the past couple of years all efforts aimed at setting up a subsidiary body on this item have proved futile. Those present here might agree that in past decades all the possible arguments in favour of a comprehensive test ban have been put forward in this hall, yet we still lack a multilateral legal instrument that would outlaw all nuclear explosions once and for all. This issue of wider importance in arms control and non-proliferation has, unfortunately, not yet secured the consent of certain nuclear-weapon States. We do hope that the signing of the already mentioned verification protocols to the threshold test-ban treaties will be followed by Soviet-American talks on further limiting the number and yield of nuclear test explosions. In spite of the difficulties encountered, the endeavours aimed at achieving a comprehensive nuclear test ban must not be abandoned. The key role of the CD in this field is evident and indispensable. Embarking on substantive work cannot be delayed in those areas where the realities make it possible, and the issue of verification is such an area.

It is to be hoped that an attitude based on realism and a spirit of compromise will prevail at the conference to be convened to consider amendments to the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty. In our view, the amendment conference could become a milestone in solving the problem of nuclear testing by contributing to the creation of an international consensus in favour of a comprehensive test ban. It is evident that the final solution can be envisaged only on a global scale with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States. We believe that every opportunity should be taken to promote politically the cause of a comprehensive nuclear test ban. But such activity must not lead to irrational confrontation which would hardly serve the achievement of our common objective.

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

... Regarding nuclear disarmament, there are several urgent issues that remain pending. The year 1990 offers a chance to generate momentum in these subjects. All are awaiting a treaty on 50 per cent reductions in Soviet and American strategic offensive weapons. And all are expecting agreements between the USSR and the United States on substantial cuts in the number and yield of their nuclear test explosions. A conference on the extension of

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty to underground testing is in the offing. In September the fourth review conference on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is to be held. My country supports these initiatives.

We also consider that the Geneva Conference on Disarmament should pull its weight and concentrate henceforth on the substantive issues pertaining to a nuclear test ban, the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. Is it not opportune now to establish a committee of this conference dealing with all aspects related to a test ban - especially since almost all members have come out in favour of it? I should like to assure Ambassador Donowaki of Japan of our delegation's unqualified support in his endeavours towards this end.

The German Democratic Republic advocates an immediate ban on nuclear weapon tests. It was in this spirit that our delegation submitted a working paper on the verification of a nuclear test ban. The Group of Scientific Experts has carried out important spadework for a verification system to monitor compliance with a comprehensive nuclear test ban. We believe it is time to clarify the aspects of such a system that go beyond seismological questions in an appropriate forum - be it a new expert group or a GSE enlarged by an amended mandate.

(Mr. Ogada, Kenya)

... No other single action could demonstrate the commitment of States to nuclear disarmament better than the achievement of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. We are aware of the great efforts that have been made towards establishing an ad hoc committee on a nuclear test ban, and the commendable role played by the delegation of Japan in this regard. We commend Ambassador Donowaki for agreeing to continue the efforts already initiated by his predecessor on this important issue. This is a good sign which indicates the undiminished interest of delegations on this specific issue.

We do remember that on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty, a treaty which prohibits the testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, some members of this Conference rightly proposed an amendment conference to expand the Treaty into a comprehensive test-ban treaty by prohibiting underground nuclear tests. This amendment conference, we have been informed, will take place early next year. The fact that more than a third of the States parties to this partial test-ban Treaty supported the request for an amendment conference is a clear political indication that many countries are willing to exploit any avenue that could possibly lead to the realization of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. My delegation does not see the aims of the amendment conference on the nuclear test ban issue as conflicting with those of the Conference on Disarmament, but as moving parallel to each other.

An event that will take place later this year and is also related to the nuclear test ban issue is the proposed fourth conference to review the non-proliferation Treaty. In this Treaty, the nuclear-weapon States parties to it assumed certain obligations which were expected to be fulfilled in good faith. The obligations assumed by the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT have been evidently fulfilled. One of the obligations assumed by the nuclear-weapon States was the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, and the continuation of negotiations to this end. This and other obligations undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States have yet to be fulfilled. Naturally, it is expected that a host of questions on the unfulfilled obligations contained in the non-proliferation Treaty will be presented during the fourth review conference. It is hoped that answers to these questions will be convincing, as they will have a bearing on the 1995 conference to determine the future of this treaty, which has to a large extent served the international community adequately in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Qian, China)

... China understands the urgent desire of the third world countries and the non-nuclear-weapon States for a comprehensive nuclear test ban at an early date. It has always exercised the utmost restraint and prudence towards nuclear tests, and has conducted only a very limited number of such tests. We will continue to do so in the future. It is our position that the objective of a comprehensive nuclear test ban should be reached in the context of an effective nuclear disarmament process. The United States and the Soviet Union have conducted the most nuclear tests, amounting to about 1,600 to date. Therefore, they have the obligation to take the lead in halting all nuclear tests and carrying out nuclear disarmament so as to create conditions for a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests. The Chinese delegation is ready to join in the work of the ad hoc committee on a nuclear test ban as soon as it is established by the CD. The Chinese departments concerned and experts are studying the technical aspects of the international seismological data exchange experiment, and positively considering participation in it, so as to accumulate experience for the future establishment of an effective international verification mechanism for a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)

... My delegation attaches high priority to the issue of nuclear tests. We support the positive efforts being made in bilateral negotiations, which should evolve towards a comprehensive agreement. We are, however, of the view that without a total nuclear test ban the nuclear arms race would be nurtured even by tests on the lowest level. We are firmly in favour of more active involvement by the Conference on this issue by way of the establishment of an Ad hoc Committee. The proposal for the convening of a conference to amend the PTBT is an indispensable effort towards joint action by the international community. We must always keep in mind that constructive dealing with this issue strengthens the non-proliferation régime. Any marginalization of Conference activities on nuclear issues is unacceptable, nuclear disarmament having by its very definition a universal character. Also, we cannot neglect the fact that the proliferation of missile technology, which we are increasingly being warned about, is primarily an important component of the nuclear arms race. It is now being acknowledged that in order to solve these issues, multilateral efforts are indispensable and hence require the strengthening of the role of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Mr. Loeis, Indonesia)

... In pursuit of a de-escalation of the nuclear arms race, no measure would have such a decisive impact as a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapon testing. Despite all the solemn reaffirmations of obligations stipulated in the existing treaties, no tangible result has been forthcoming in attaining this paramount objective. Efforts to conclude a treaty to comprehensively ban nuclear testing have been obstructed on political and technical grounds and, at this Conference, consideration of this issue has long been blocked by procedural difficulties. It is regrettable, therefore, that our deliberations on one of the priority items of the Conference for over a decade has not produced any result.

In spring 1989 my delegation questioned how the Conference had been able to set up an Ad hoc Committee on item 1 in 1982-1983 but had failed to do so in 1988 and 1989, when the world political climate showed a degree of improvement. I believe this question is still cogent. Today, when new

(Mr. Loeis, Indonesia)

political ideas surface and concordance has gradually overruled confrontation, there should be no impediment preventing the Conference from setting up a Committee with a mandate to negotiate a treaty to comprehensively ban nuclear testing.

We have acknowledged in the past that negotiations to draw up a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty have not been possible due to the inadequacy of the state of the art of verification. We were told that tests are needed to ensure the reliability of the existing arsenals. Now I am wondering if these two assertions are going to be elucidated to take the following into account. Firstly, the great strides which have been made in science and technology could, in my view, erase any technical impediment in monitoring compliance with a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. Secondly, the leaders of the super-powers have professed recently that the two States are entering a new era of relations. For this reason, I doubt that there is still the necessity for them to ensure the reliability of their existing nuclear arsenals. As just pointed out by Ambassador Marko Kosin of Yugoslavia in his statement, the heads of State or Government of non-aligned countries reiterated, inter alia, at their recently concluded summit meeting that "the immediate suspension and comprehensive ban on nuclear tests remained one of the highest priorities of nuclear disarmament". They further mentioned that the ongoing process of disarmament could be quickened and its coverage widened through the common endeavour of the entire international community. We should therefore tackle all aspects of the test ban issue in a concrete manner, because further procrastination could harm not only the cause of a comprehensive test ban but also confidence in the Conference on Disarmament as an effective multilateral disarmament body. In this respect, I wish to express the appreciation of my delegation to you, Mr. President, and to the Ambassador of Japan for having conducted consultations in search of a consensus on the mandate to establish a committee on agenda item 1.

(The President)

... I felt it my duty, immediately after the opening of the annual session, to renew, the presidential consultations on the question of a mandate for an ad hoc committee on agenda item 1, entitled "Nuclear test ban". These consultations are still going on. I take it that all delegations are aware of the high political relevance of these probings, especially this year. As I announced at the beginning of the session of the Conference this year,

(The President)

Ambassador Donowaki willingly agreed to continue the efforts of his predecessor, Ambassador Yamada, who, in the wake of his presidency of March 1989, initiated a dialogue in search of a consensus on the mandate for an ad hoc committee under agenda item 1. Since then, we have heard a number of plenary statements expressing strong support for the worthy efforts being made by the leader of the Japanese delegation. According to Ambassador Donowaki, the dialogue conducted by his predecessor and himself on an informal and individual basis proved to be encouraging. It has been found that a great number of delegations indeed wish to start substantive work on nuclear testing issues in the Conference. Also, on an individual and informal basis, Ambassador Donowaki confirmed the conviction of his predecessor that the draft mandate contained in document CD/863 could be used as a starting-point to formulate a consensus. It is my wish that delegations would show readiness to pursue all avenues in order to disentangle ourselves from an impasse and arrive at a solution. We know that we are close to a consensus on the text of the mandate so that the Ad hoc committee can start its work as early as possible.

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 539th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

... Allow me to thank Ambassador Hendrik Wagenmakers of the Netherlands for the very effective and able manner in which he discharged his responsibilities during the month of February. He showed once more his diplomatic skill and experience in the field of disarmament and advanced substantially the organization of our work for the annual session. In that connection, I pledge to all of you the commitment of the Nigerian delegation to actively continue to deal with all those matters which are still subject to consultation. I intend to engage in renewed efforts with the objective of re-establishing the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space at the earliest possible date, and to conduct consultations on agenda items 2 and 3 in the next few days. I have taken note of the statement of my predecessor concerning the consultations being conducted by Ambassador Donowaki of Japan on agenda item 1, and I welcome his untiring efforts in this respect, particularly keeping in mind the outstanding manner in which he represented Japan in my country, Nigeria, before joining us here in the Conference on Disarmament. I should like, for my part, to encourage him to continue with his valuable contribution to our work. As you know, my country attaches great importance to the question of a nuclear test ban, and I shall spare no effort to promote agreement on that subject, including of course making myself available to assist Ambassador Donowaki and other colleagues dealing with this subject whenever necessary. Among the questions still pending, we should also discuss the expansion of the membership of the Conference and its improved and effective functioning. I also assure you that I shall be at the disposal of all members in the consideration of these issues and other matters before the Conference. By the same token, I am sure that I will greatly benefit from your advice and experience in our common tasks.

(Mr. Lukman, Nigeria)

... There is ample evidence that sophisticated technologies are being employed for the development of a new generation of nuclear and conventional weapons. We are now witnessing the qualitative refinement of nuclear weapons to compensate for the quantitative reductions in many instances. A nuclear test ban continues to be the most important item on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. The Secretary-General of the United Nations rightly observed in his message to the current session that "the United Nations has repeatedly assigned the highest priority to the issue of cessation of all nuclear test explosions. The encouraging signs witnessed in bilateral negotiations should be further advanced. However, I remain convinced that a complete ban on such tests can pave the way to nuclear disarmament and rid the world of the nuclear menace".

If a problem can be solved by the amount of attention it has received, then the complete prohibition of all nuclear testing ought to have been achieved long ago. The partial test-ban Treaty of 1963 underlined the importance of bringing nuclear testing to an end. Both the PTBT and the NPT, to which Nigeria is a party, imposed concrete obligations on depositary Governments; to "seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end".

Nigeria is convinced that if the objectives of nuclear disarmament are to be attained, the utmost priority must be accorded to a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. This important disarmament measure is a challenge to all States in achieving the eventual elimination of all weapons of mass destruction. Logically, adherence to the treaty has to be universal, as a CTBT will reinforce mutual trust and confidence-building measures not only between the super-Powers and their allies, but also in all regions. The commitment of nuclear-weapon States in negotiating a comprehensive test-ban treaty is no doubt essential. It bears repetition that the role of the Conference on Disarmament in negotiating such a treaty should never be in doubt. No obstacle should be put in its way in negotiating an instrument of such vital importance towards the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Lukman, Nigeria)

We note with satisfaction that the process of convening an amendment conference to convert the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty into a comprehensive test-ban treaty has already received the support of many States parties. Nigeria supports this bold initiative already endorsed at Belgrade last August 1989 at the summit of the Non-Aligned Movement.

(Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

... In conclusion I shall briefly touch upon the question of the nuclear test ban. Everything on this matter seems to have been said. Let me, however, stress once more the conviction that the halting and total prohibition of nuclear testing is the principal means of curbing the nuclear arms race, especially in the context of an initiated process of real nuclear disarmament. Let us hope that during this part of the session the Conference on Disarmament will finally assume its responsibility in this sphere, and I wish Ambassador Donowaki of Japan early success in this regard.

Mr. KOMATINA (Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations): The message, as you said, is addressed to the members of the Conference on Disarmament.

... "A comprehensive test-ban treaty is a vital first step towards ending the nuclear arms race and proceeding with disarmament. As long as testing and weapons production continue, the significance of disarmament agreements such as the INF Treaty could be reduced to a minor notation in the history of an unrelenting arms race. Therefore, we urge you to

(Mr. Komatina, Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations)

establish an ad hoc committee on a comprehensive test-ban treaty with a view to the negotiation of a treaty and, furthermore, to establish an ad hoc committee to address the question of the cessation of the arms race and nuclear disarmament.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America):

... Nuclear deterrence remains a critical component of United States security strategy. As Secretary of State Baker said to the Supreme Soviet last month, as long as we must rely on nuclear weapons to secure peace by deterring aggression, we will need a safe, reliable and modern stockpile. That means we will continue to need to conduct some underground nuclear tests.

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(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

The United States adheres to a step-by-step process towards further limits on nuclear testing. We remain committed to a comprehensive test ban as a long-term goal. However, as Under-Secretary Karhilo of Finland astutely observed in his speech here on 20 February, there is no short-cut to a CTB. It must be built as you would build a bridge across a chasm, laying plank by plank on a solid foundation so that it will remain strong and reliable for generations.

The United States seeks a CTB in the context of a time when we do not have to depend on nuclear deterrence to ensure international security and stability, and when we have achieved broad, deep and effectively verifiable arms reductions, substantially improved verification capabilities and greater balance in conventional forces.

Let me pause here for a moment to focus on the question of verification. A CTB without adequate verification is not a treaty; it is a temptation. Much work remains to be done to develop a credible system for verifying compliance with a CTB in spite of the popular belief that the technology is available now. The United States for its part, continues to support the work of the Group of Scientific Experts and will fully participate in its Second Technical Test. We are deeply disappointed that so many States, including some that regularly call for a CTB, have not seen fit to take part in this important experiment.

The United States is grateful for the efforts of Ambassador Donawaki of Japan and his predecessor, Ambassador Yamada, to find a consensus on a mandate for an ad hoc committee on item 1 of our agenda. Let me be clear. The United States and the Western Group are willing to re-establish an ad hoc committee and have been since 1984. For two years, we have been ready to set aside our own proposed mandate text in order to work towards consensus on the basis of the compromise text drafted by Ambassador Vejvoda. The United States is still willing to do that. We are puzzled that others are unwilling to do the same. None the less, the United States has been actively pursuing reductions of nuclear arms in bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union. I believe an objective observer must be pleased - and heartened - by the progress we have made. The INF Treaty has been in place for more than 20 months. At the February United States-Soviet Ministerial in Moscow, major steps were taken in negotiations on reducing strategic weapons, and our nuclear testing delegations are working diligently to complete the protocols for the threshold test ban and peaceful nuclear explosions treaties in time for signature at the summit this coming June.

(Mr. Omar, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya)

... My country has given practical expression to its awareness of this danger through its endeavours, within the international community and the United Nations system, to ensure the adoption of measures to speed up the process of comprehensive disarmament, to consolidate and maintain international peace and security. As part of these endeavours, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has acceded to the following international instruments: the partial test-ban Treaty, the outer space Treaty, the Geneva Protocol for the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. Moreover, my country has worked for the conclusion, within IAEA, of a convention on the inspection of nuclear installations for peaceful purposes.

(Ms. Wilde, New Zealand)

... Arms control in chemical weapons has also highlighted another problem: arms disposal. The destruction of chemical weapons is not easy. It is in everyone's interests that it be done in any environmentally safe manner. This issue is causing some anxiety to Pacific nations, which have long protested at the use of their region for nuclear weapons testing in which they want no part. Now countries of my region are watching carefully the proposals made for the destruction of chemical weapons there. Small Pacific islands may seem remote from the huge continents of the world but, together with the Pacific Ocean, they are the homes and life-support systems of the many peoples of the region. We do not want the delicate ecosystem damaged any further by new intrusions.

Despite the importance of chemical weapons, the focus of the Conference cannot remain that subject alone. The Conference's work on other areas must be advanced. I am particularly concerned at the prolonged inability of the Conference to agree on a mandate for a committee to debate item 1 - a nuclear test ban.

New Zealand's commitment to a ban on all testing, by all States, in all environments, and for all time, is well known. It is shared by most countries. At the most recent General Assembly, 145 countries supported our resolution calling for such a ban as an urgent arms control measure. Of the 6 countries which opposed or abstained on the resolution, 5 are members of this Conference. I appeal today for greater flexibility to enable this Conference to begin to address this important issue.

The United States and the USSR have made good progress in almost completing the verification régimes for the threshold test-ban Treaty and the peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty. But the fact is that both of these treaties were signed over a decade ago. They are not a substitute for a comprehensive test ban and will not put any real brake on the development of nuclear weapons. We urge all testing States to work towards a comprehensive test ban at the earliest possible date.

Nevertheless the two threshold treaties, despite their drawbacks, can contribute towards this goal through their verification régimes, which provide further proof that monitoring compliance with a comprehensive test ban is possible. In fact determining that an explosion has occurred is easier than measuring its size.

(continued)

(Ms. Wilde, New Zealand)

It is with the objective of verification in mind that New Zealand is active in this Conference's ad hoc seismic group and its second major technical test now under way. Our seismic network stretches from Rarotonga to the Antarctic, making a significant contribution to the global nature of the test. We have also recently upgraded our seismic facilities and data communications network.

We urge all States to participate to the fullest extent possible in the test. The wider the participation, the stronger will be the message that there are no verification problems in the way of negotiating a comprehensive test ban.

Finally on this subject, I wish to pay tribute to last year's strenuous efforts by Ambassador Yamada of Japan in trying to achieve agreement on a mandate for an ad hoc committee on testing. It is a great shame that his efforts were not successful. I know that his successor, Ambassador Donowaki, is making equally strenuous efforts to resolve the impasse, and I understand that these are producing some positive developments. This is welcome.

Frustration at lack of progress on a test ban has already led many States to seek amendment of the partial test-ban Treaty. To achieve that would still require a dramatic change of attitude to a comprehensive test ban on the part of some depositary parties, which unfortunately does not seem likely at present. However, I believe that the amendment conference can serve a useful purpose by providing what this Conference has so far failed to provide - an in-depth exchange of views on testing. It is unfortunate that, in the PTBT context, not all testing States will be involved. But discussion of these issues is long overdue.

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(Mr. Velayati, Islamic Republic of Iran)

... For more than 20 years the have-nots of the non-proliferation Treaty have lived up to their obligations in good faith while the nuclear-weapon States have not respected their duties stipulated in article VI of the Treaty. While horizontal proliferation is a risk, vertical proliferation is a reality. The opponents of the Treaty rightly argue that those who have remained outside have benefited more than those who are in.

As long as the "nuclear" items on the agenda of this Conference are almost dead issues, negotiations on a comprehensive test ban remain pending and no agreement is reached for a legally binding convention or instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, the States parties to the NPT will be sceptical and the NPT will remain a vulnerable Treaty.

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

... This goes particularly for the prohibition of nuclear weapon testing. Here lies the key to curbing the nuclear arms race and considerably restricting the qualitative refinement of nuclear weapons. We believe that 45 years after the first nuclear weapon test was carried out, it is more than advisable to start work on basic elements of a test-ban treaty. A favourable aspect in that context is the development of national technical means of verification. This is also borne out in the results achieved by the Group of Seismological Experts and in the Soviet-American verification experiment. It is precisely for these reasons that the German Democratic Republic has actively participated in the start-up tests for the global seismic data exchange test, GSETT-2. And it is for these reasons that my country figures among those States participating in phase 2, which is to start this year.

(continued)

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

Let me also reaffirm my country's support for action either to amend the GSE's mandate on aspects of a verification system for monitoring a comprehensive test ban which go beyond the questions of seismology, or to establish a new expert group on this item. Preparing for effective verification is the underlying aim of other proposals. Our delegation circulated a pertinent working paper (CD/902) last year, suggesting the development of procedures for on-site inspections. In our view; such a method could help verify the decommissioning of nuclear testing sites and could assist in detecting and identifying seismic events whose status is unclear. Detailed documentation on these questions is under preparation.

As has already been outlined in the general debate, the German Democratic Republic considers that a subsidiary organ of the Conference should be set up to discuss the nuclear test ban in a business-like manner. We hold that Czechoslovakia's proposal submitted in document CD/863 could be a practical solution provided all sides display their good will. The outcome of yesterday's presidential consultations is encouraging in this regard. Like any attempt at compromise document CD/863 does not of course correspond to what we consider the optimum, but it could help make a fresh start.

Here it is to be added that the German Democratic Republic has from the very beginning endorsed the initiative of non-aligned countries for a conference on the broadening of the 1963 Moscow Treaty. We do so since we believe that in the wake of such a conference the CD could be given decisive momentum. The wrangling about the date of this amendment conference seems to be over. This can be gathered from the compromise recently agreed upon in New York. Our delegation considers that work should now be focused on substantive preparations for this conference. The German Democratic Republic is willing to play its part in solving the related problems.

More than a quarter of a century ago, in the preamble to the Moscow Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, the original parties undertook "to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to this end, and desiring to put an end to the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances". Never before, we think, have the prerequisites been more propitious for carrying out this commitment than today. Let us take the necessary steps to this effect now. This would create a new dimension of confidence which would be of advantage to the disarmament process as a whole.

(Mr. Arteaga, Venezuela)

... Although it is true that the nuclear Powers bear primary responsibility in disarmament negotiations and that we welcome any bilateral agreements that can be reached, it is always a good thing to remember that the international community has a vital interest in helping to ensure that such negotiations produce reliable results. Hence we persist in emphasizing the close interdependence and complementarity between bilateral and multilateral efforts. Until now the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating body on the subject, has not been able to play a role commensurate with the

(Mr. Arteaga, Venezuela)

responsibilities entrusted to it. Since its establishment it has not been able to establish ad hoc committees on the items relating to nuclear disarmament and the prevention of a nuclear war, nor has there been consensus on the re-establishment of the ad hoc committee on the nuclear test ban. Above all, however, we continue to hope that this Conference, prompted by recent international events, will begin to play fully its proper role, and that the efforts being pursued at the bilateral and regional levels will lead to results in this forum.

Venezuela attaches high priority to the conclusion of a treaty designed to introduce a complete ban on nuclear testing - without doubt, an objective of the greatest importance which has proved elusive so far. It is for this reason that, along with a representative group of countries, we took the initiative of promoting the conversion of the partial nuclear test-ban Treaty into a treaty that would enshrine a total ban on testing. To this effect we have proposed the convening of an amendment conference. Here we may recall the content of the message from the Secretary-General of the United Nations which was read out by his personal representative, Ambassador Komatina, to the effect that efforts to amend the partial nuclear test-ban Treaty of 1963 and turn it into a comprehensive test ban reflect widespread concern over the present situation. It should be remembered that in the Conference on Disarmament, during the 1989 session, Ambassador Yamada of Japan held consultations about the possibility of adopting an appropriate mandate for the establishment of the committee. Ambassador Donowaki continued these consultations, which should open the way once and for all towards the prompt and full consideration of this important subject.

(Mr. Houlliez, Belgium)

... Hence we believe that the improvement in the global system of international relations, while benefiting from changes in the European theatre, in the broadest sense of the term, should lead to new efforts in arms control and disarmament. My delegation is convinced that the Conference on Disarmament has a principal role to play in this attempt to broaden confidence and openness to the world as a whole. If the Conference is to have a chance to contribute here, all the participants will have to decide to rise above the traditional controversies on the role of the Conference which regularly lead us to deadlock, for example, on items 1 (nuclear tests) and 5 (outer space). All delegations are aware of the limits within which these committees can operate, and yet the formula which allows us or would allow us to resume work is or was the cause of considerable delay in starting work. On the subject of the mandate for an ad hoc committee on the cessation of nuclear tests, it is logical that in the search for a compromise each group should proceed from a common basis, which, in this particular case, takes the form of the Vejvoda text - the basis on which the praiseworthy efforts of Ambassadors Yamada and Donowaki could be continued.

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(Mr. Houlliez, Belgium)

Attempts to create more favourable negotiating conditions unilaterally or to bring pressure to bear through parallel initiatives can only reduce the chances of finding a solution. Consequently, my delegation welcomes the flexibility and moderation which has been shown recently by all the groups, and hopes that the ad hoc committee will be established as soon as possible.

The Conference on Disarmament is the only forum which offers the possibility of reaching the final objective, which, as far as Belgium is concerned, is still the complete cessation of tests once and for all. But this requires realism, in other words a gradual stage-by-stage approach. It is our firm hope that the 1974 Treaty on the limitation of underground nuclear weapon tests and the 1976 Treaty on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes will soon be ratified and that the bilateral consultations between the United States and the USSR on limiting tests will resume in the fairly near future. I might also mention the possible consequences of the positive prospects concerning the conclusion of the negotiations on 50 per cent reductions in strategic nuclear weapons. As for the prevention of an arms race in outer space, my delegation is convinced that, even within the framework which guided the work of the Ad hoc Committee in 1989, it is possible to tackle and to examine in depth almost all the aspects relating to this matter. It is true that the two super-Powers are engaged in a bilateral negotiating process which, we hope, will soon bear fruit, but it is equally true that activities in space are not the prerogative of only a few, in particular as regards verification and confidence-building measures which can be carried out in space. Hence my delegation believes that talks should also continue multilaterally. Consequently, it expresses satisfaction that the Ad Hoc Committee has been re-established in a spirit of constructive co-operation shown by all the parties. It also wishes to express its warm congratulations to Ambassador Shannon on his election as Chairman of this Ad hoc Committee.

(Mr. Rasaputram, Sri Lanka)

... The question of a comprehensive nuclear test ban has now become more topical and urgent. This is not only because persistent international endeavours for nearly three decades have failed to bring about a halt to nuclear testing but also because of recent developments and forthcoming events related to a CTBT. A comprehensive nuclear test ban remains one of the most decisive steps against the emergence of nuclear weapons and more nuclear-weapon States. If the risk of nuclear proliferation is real, the opportunity to erect an effective barrier against such an undesirable development through a CTBT is also real. The commitments enshrined in the letter and spirit of the partial test-ban Treaty and the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty to seek the discontinuance of all test explosions for all time reflect this reality. The large majority of parties to these two instruments are puzzled and frustrated that persistent international calls to conclude a CTBT have remained unheeded. If the major nuclear Powers now recognize that they have built up excessive nuclear arsenals and that security could be achieved at lower levels of those armaments the need for continued testing seems unclear. The argument that continued testing will be needed to ensure the safety and reliability of a reduced nuclear stockpile seems to ignore the fact that reliability and safety requirements could be met without resorting to nuclear test explosions. These contradictions give rise to suspicions among those who perceive a need to produce nuclear weapons that vertical proliferation will continue. This is a blow to the international norm established and nurtured by the non-nuclear parties to the NPT. The difficulties of verifying a CTBT can no longer be invoked as a stumbling-block to the conclusion of a test ban. The United States-Soviet bilateral talks on nuclear test limitations provide increasing confidence and prove that given the political will verification problems can be effectively negotiated. As a matter of fact, the United States and the USSR are reported to have made good progress in finalizing necessary verification measures for the threshold test-ban Treaty. The commonly held technical opinion is that technical difficulties in verifying a complete test ban will be much less burdensome than those associated with threshold verification now being finalized.

(continued)

(Mr. Rasaputram, Sri Lanka)

Tangible progress in commencing negotiations towards a comprehensive test ban is clearly a step that will be commensurate with the positive developments that we see in the field of nuclear disarmament. Although a few countries hold a different opinion about a time frame for concluding a nuclear test ban, it is considered as a desirable objective by all. Even if we were to address verification issues, this has to be done in the context of a possible structure of a treaty. Initiating a process towards negotiations on that basis will not prejudice anything, as we all know that such negotiations cannot be concluded within a short period. Given the various dimensions of a CTBT it is undeniable that such a measure should be negotiated multilaterally. We eagerly await the outcome of Ambassador Donowaki's untiring efforts in this regard.

The overwhelming majority of parties to the partial test-ban Treaty have made use of the due legal process provided for in the Treaty to convert that instrument into a comprehensive test-ban treaty. We are gratified at the constructive dialogue that has taken place in this context among the parties, including the depositary Governments. Sri Lanka, being one of the initiators of the proposal, looks forward to a constructive amendment conference which could provide the necessary political impetus to find a way forward for the realization of the purposes enshrined in the partial test-ban Treaty.

(Mr. Kamal, Pakistan)

... Even though we are concentrating all our energies on the early conclusion of a chemical weapons convention, a goal in which my delegation is duly participating, we cannot ignore the fact that the question of a nuclear test ban remains the most pressing item on our agenda. This is a reflection, in the first place, of the primary importance which the cessation of nuclear testing occupies within the process of nuclear disarmament, and secondly, of our failure to achieve a comprehensive test ban, despite years of discussion and debate in a variety of international forums. No other question in the field of disarmament, it has been rightly said, has been the subject of so much study and discussion. And yet the prospects of a comprehensive test-ban treaty appear today to be as bleak as they were in 1962.

During the latter half of the 1970s, we were informed that the trilateral negotiations then in progress between the signatories offered the best way forward and that multilateral negotiations would interfere with and complicate the trilateral talks. However, after 1980, the trilateral negotiations were not resumed and the working groups set up in 1982 and 1983 wound up in abstract discussion. Since 1984, it has not been possible to set up a subsidiary body on the subject because of the opposition of a group of States to giving it an appropriate mandate. It is unfortunate that the mandate question continues to frustrate efforts to set up an ad hoc committee empowered to exercise substantively all relevant aspects of a nuclear test ban.

It is this frustration with the lack of progress in the Conference which has prompted more than 50 signatories to the partial test-ban Treaty to seek an amendment conference so as to convert it into a CTBT. We have heard arguments around this table that the appropriate forum to negotiate a test ban is the Conference on Disarmament, and that this objective cannot be achieved by convening an amendment conference. While we have no quarrel with the first argument we feel that countries which are sincerely interested in a test ban should use whatever means are available at their disposal to achieve their goal. If the initiative for an amendment conference is successful then it will have been well worth the effort.

(Mr. Donowaki, Japan)

... Of course, what I have in mind are the issues of nuclear disarmament. Our colleague from Peru, Ambassador de Rivero, was so right in his speech on 15 February at this plenary session in pointing out that the reactivation of the ad hoc committee on the cessation of nuclear tests would "give the work of the Conference political symmetry". With respect to both nuclear and chemical weapons the two super-Powers are the largest possessors, and their reduction and ultimate elimination, as well as non-proliferation, are matters of great importance today not only to the two super-Powers but also to the entire world community. Thus, multilateral negotiations are closely linked to bilateral negotiations. Furthermore, as in the case of chemical weapons, advance in the dialogue and a co-operative relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union in recent years have made it possible to achieve significant breakthroughs in their bilateral talks in the field of nuclear disarmament. Japan whole-heartedly welcomes these developments, and is convinced that they are bound to be reflected in multilateral negotiations here in this forum.

When we consider the question of nuclear disarmament, the major efforts currently being exerted fall into three areas, namely the reduction of nuclear weapons, non-proliferation of those weapons, and a nuclear test ban. These three areas are interrelated, and a good balance among them will always have to be kept in mind. In all three areas, this year is expected to become a critical year. In the area of reduction of nuclear weapons, a START agreement is expected to be reached between the United States and the Soviet Union. In the area of non-proliferation, the fourth NPT review conference is scheduled to be held. In the area of a nuclear test ban, the protocols for the threshold test-ban and peaceful nuclear explosions Treaties are expected to be signed at the coming summit meeting between the United States and Soviet Union.

It is under such circumstances that the role and usefulness of the Conference on Disarmament, the only multilateral negotiating forum for disarmament, is being questioned. There is no doubt that, by resuming substantial work on nuclear test ban issues, the Conference will be able to make a valuable contribution in working out the best possible multilateral approach to this question, which would complement bilateral efforts being made between the United States and the Soviet Union.

It was from this viewpoint that my delegation has actively taken part in an effort to re-establish the ad hoc committee under agenda item 1. My predecessor, Ambassador Yamada, initiated a dialogue for this purpose when he was the President of the Conference for the month of March last year. In order to disentangle ourselves from the impasse of conflicting group positions, he consulted each delegation on an informal and individual basis.

As was announced by your predecessor, Ambassador Wagenmakers, at the beginning of the session of the Conference of this year, I willingly agreed to continue the efforts initiated by my predecessor. At the outset of your

(Mr. Donowaki, Japan)

presidency, you too kindly encouraged me to continue the efforts. I should like to take this opportunity to express sincere appreciation for the kind words of encouragement and support extended to myself and to my predecessor by a number of delegates at the sessions of this Conference.

It was only with such continued support and warm understanding by my colleagues around this conference room that we began to break new ground in our common endeavour to disentangle ourselves from an impasse. I was extremely encouraged to see that, on the 14th of this month, you, Mr. President, successfully conducted a presidential consultation by inviting all the group co-ordinators for agenda item 1, and confirming that all groups agreed, without prejudice to their preferred draft mandates, to work towards consensus on the basis of the draft mandate embodied in document CD/863. China also stated that it supported this approach and expressed its readiness to participate in the work of the ad hoc committee when it is re-established. This new development indeed represents a major break-through, and confirms the readiness of the Conference to resume substantial work in the ad hoc committee under agenda item 1.

My delegation hopes that all groups and each delegation will continue to show as flexible and constructive an attitude as possible on this question, so that the Conference will be able to resume, as speedily as possible, substantial work on the agenda item. My delegation will spare no efforts in facilitating such a process by doing whatever is necessary, and in co-operation with all other delegations.

As for the handling of the work of the ad hoc committee to be established, my delegation wishes to stress the importance of avoiding a repetition of rhetorical and political rituals. The deliberation will have to be concrete and realistic. Japan also realizes that the peace and stability of the world will continue to be based on the balance of power and nuclear deterrence for the time being. As a member of the Western group of nations sharing common ideals and values, Japan feels that the only practical way to cessation of all nuclear tests lies in maintaining a balance of nuclear weapons at ever-lower levels, and gradually reducing all nuclear test explosions and bringing them under effective control. In other words, the approach to this question should be exclusively within the practical framework of a step-by-step approach.

Therefore, Japan welcomed and supported the joint statement made by the United States and the Soviet Union on 17 September 1987, in which a stage-by-stage approach to the nuclear test ban problem was announced. Japan strongly hopes that the United States and the Soviet Union, after the expected signature of the protocols for the threshold test-ban and peaceful nuclear explosions Treaties at the coming summit meeting, will proceed to the next stage of negotiations in this field, and that the bilateral United States-USSR negotiations and the multilateral deliberations in this Conference will be closely interrelated and reinforce each other.

Lastly, I cannot fail to refer to the very significant contributions being made by the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to detect and identify seismic events (GSE). The GSE is now at a very important stage of its work in

(Mr. Donowaki, Japan)

putting its conceptual design of a modern international seismic data exchange system through a testing operation. I note with great satisfaction that the second phase of the Group's second large-scale technical test (GSETT-2) has recently started, and hope that it will produce a number of successful and meaningful findings, which would contribute a great deal in formulating a reliable mechanism for detecting underground nuclear explosions. With a view to enhancing further the value of the GSE's work, I would like to call on those countries which have not yet done so to join this important experiment.

At the same time, we may be coming to a point where we should start thinking seriously about multiple facets of verification from a broader perspective and give proper guidance to the work of the GSE. I feel that by doing whatever is needed in our endeavour to work out a reliable and effective system of verification in the field of a nuclear test ban, the Conference on Disarmament will be carrying out the work most needed at this time of history full of promises and anxieties.

(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)

... The expected results of the future START agreement will, in spite of their scope, remain limited. Even after such an agreement, the arsenals of the two super-Powers will still contain no less than 30,000 nuclear warheads. The result will be continued serious disquiet at the risk of a nuclear holocaust, and for the future of détente in international relations. This is why we will not cease repeating that no nuclear disarmament process, however broad it may be, will be complete as long as it is not based on a nuclear test ban. In this respect we are bound to note that our Conference has been making persistent efforts for more than five years to agree on the terms of the mandate of the ad hoc committee on a total nuclear test ban. In this context we cannot but welcome the actions which the delegation of Japan has been pursuing along these lines for a year now. We are very grateful to Ambassador Donowaki for his willingness to continue the consultations led by his predecessor, Ambassador Yamada, in looking for a consensus on the mandate of the committee in question. I would like to assure him of our full support and co-operation. In the view of my delegation, the formulation of the terms of this mandate does not matter very much, as long as the prime goal of the committee is the conclusion of a treaty containing internationally binding legal norms and directed towards a total nuclear test ban. The re-establishment of this committee in the coming weeks will certainly make a positive contribution to the success of the fourth conference of States parties to review the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty, which is to take place next summer.

(Ms. Sinegiorgis, Ethiopia)

... It would be no exaggeration to say that there is growing frustration among the majority of the members of this body because an honest review of the work of the Conference to date reveals the grim picture that very little progress has been registered on the major issues of our agenda. Indeed, if we take only the very first item on our agenda, "Nuclear test ban", despite the high priority attached to it and the prevailing urgent desire by the international community to achieve a comprehensive test-ban treaty at an early date, nuclear tests are still being conducted and the sophistication and

(Ms. Sinegiorgis, Ethiopia)

proliferation of nuclear weapons continues to be humanity's major preoccupation. The lack of an adequate verification mechanism, which is the usual argument for delaying negotiations on this important issue, cannot of course be considered valid. Notwithstanding this and despite the unceasing efforts and numerous initiatives made so far, the CD has not been able to set up an ad hoc committee, let alone begin substantive negotiations on a comprehensive test ban.

In this respect, my delegation highly appreciates the consultations being carried out by His Excellency Ambassador Donowaki of Japan on the establishment of an ad hoc committee on the basis of the Vejvoda proposal, without prejudice to our original positions, of course. The progress report by His Excellency Ambassador Donowaki in his statement of 27 March 1990, that all groups have agreed to work towards consensus on the basis of the draft mandate contained in document CD/863, is indeed encouraging. In particular, we are satisfied by his assessment that "this new development indeed represents a major breakthrough, and confirms the readiness of the Conference to resume substantial work in the ad hoc committee under agenda item 1". We hope that this positive trend will allow us to establish the ad hoc committee on a CTB before the end of our spring session. In our view, the current international situation is favourable for such an undertaking - and we should seize this opportune moment to deal with the issue as expeditiously as possible.

(The President)

... I would have been pleased to welcome the re-establishment of the all-important Ad hoc Committee on agenda item 1, "Nuclear test ban". I am sure that all members noted the statement made last Tuesday by Ambassador Donowaki of Japan in connection with the determined efforts that he has undertaken to obtain agreement on a mandate for an ad hoc committee under agenda item 1. His efforts will continue and I hope will succeed. At least, he has moved to a new stage in his consultations, that of drafting. This has been a welcome development during the month of March.

(Mr. Bondevik, Norway)

... Let me now turn to another priority agenda item in the Conference on Disarmament, the question of a nuclear test ban. At last year's session, the Conference did not succeed in reaching agreement on a mandate for an ad hoc committee on this issue. In our view, the draft mandate tabled by Czechoslovakia in 1988 would permit a committee to start substantive work on specific and interrelated test ban issues. In any case, these issues will have to be dealt with in detail before a test-ban treaty can be concluded. It is our wish that the ongoing efforts to reach agreement on a mandate will be successful.

In our view, the question of a comprehensive nuclear test ban should be given the highest priority by the Conference on Disarmament once the chemical weapons convention has been concluded. This effort should go hand in hand with a reduction of the role of nuclear weapons in military doctrines and defence structures.

Norway will continue her active participation in the Group of Scientific Experts towards the establishment of a modern global network for the exchange of seismic data. The global seismological network proposed by this Group will be an essential part of a future verification system. Rapid advances in recent years in computer and data communications technology have opened up new possibilities for improving the effectiveness of such a global network. The main phase of the large-scale experiment on the global exchange of seismic data carried out by the Group of Scientific Experts is scheduled for the autumn of this year, and we are looking forward to the results.

Norway is actively participating in this global data exchange experiment by providing data from her seismic array stations. The two regional arrays in Norway provide for excellent detection of small seismic events over a large portion of the northern hemisphere. A global network capable of providing a valuable analysis of weak seismic events is crucially important if we are to create confidence that a test ban is being complied with. This is the background for the Norwegian proposal that the global seismological network should as far as possible incorporate establishment of this type of array.

(Mr. Bondevik, Norway)

The NORSAR organization is prepared to offer technical assistance to seismological institutions that are interested in establishing such arrays. This aspect of international research co-operation represents a serious effort on our part to contribute to the solution of the verification issues relevant to a nuclear test ban. We attach great importance to maintaining NORSAR as a research facility open to scientists from all countries.

The role of regional seismic arrays and their use in nuclear test ban verification was the subject of an international symposium organized in Oslo by NORSAR and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in February this year. More than 70 experts from 21 countries attended the symposium. The Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, Ambassador Komatina, honoured the symposium with his presence. A report is being prepared and will be presented to the Conference during the second part of this year's session.

(Mr. Fernández Ordóñez, Spain)

... In 1991 a conference for the amendment of the partial nuclear test-ban Treaty will be held on the initiative of a group of countries which seek to convert this partial test-ban Treaty into a comprehensive test-ban treaty. We endorse the possibility of a total ban, but we think that the best ally of the disarmament process is a gradual and realistic approach. Consequently, in order to bring about the total banning of nuclear tests, we must start by making the necessary joint efforts to reduce nuclear weapons on our planet gradually until we have eliminated them. We hope that during 1990 it will finally be possible to ratify the two treaties of 1974 and 1976 on the limitation of nuclear explosions for peaceful uses.

(Mr. Pagac, Czechoslovakia)

... Turning to the work of the Conference on Disarmament, I would like to stress two areas in which my country has traditionally been involved. These priorities for us are the nuclear test ban and the chemical weapons convention. My delegation appreciates all activities which can contribute to the cessation of nuclear weapon testing. We highly esteem the tireless efforts of Ambassador Donowaki to reach consensus on a drafting mandate for an ad hoc committee on item 1 of the agenda based upon the Czechoslovak proposal, the "Vejvoda text" (CD/863).

Luckily enough, we are now in a situation where all the technical prerequisites for a comprehensive nuclear test ban have either already been met or can be met in a relatively short span of time. Technology which can be employed for future verification measures has recently improved to such an extent as to become highly reliable. It is therefore encouraging to observe the current results of the Second Technical Test (GSETT-2) organized by the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. Since it is understood that for full functioning of the eventual future verification system, the participation of as many States as possible is needed, Czechoslovakia hereby expresses its readiness to take part in GSETT-2 in keeping with its technical capabilities.

As for on-site verification, we believe it may be a significant step forward. Nevertheless, that system will always be limited to known test areas; only observers from some States can be present, and perhaps for a limited period of time. On the other hand, GSETT-2 offers the prospect of a system open to every State, a system operating independently 24 hours per day and checking the entire surface of the Earth. Current advances in measuring technology and world-wide data transmission should guarantee its sound operation. In this regard, I would like to say how highly we appreciate the activities of both the Swedish and the Canadian delegations. Czechoslovakia is ready to co-operate with all States in the exchange of technology, data and experience in the course of GSETT-2.

(Mr. Sharma, India)

... This is the vision and backdrop against which we look at the activities of the CD, the sole forum of the United Nations for negotiation of disarmament agreements. My delegation attaches the highest priority to the first three nuclear issues on our agenda. Our record on these items has been disappointing. We still find ourselves unable to set up an ad hoc committee on agenda item 1. For many years, the General Assembly has adopted resolutions with overwhelming support regarding the urgent need for a comprehensive test-ban treaty and reaffirming the responsibility of this Conference in the negotiation of such an agreement. Partial or gradual approaches evade the issue and cannot provide the answer to this universal concern. In the Mexico Declaration, circulated as CD/723 four years ago, the leaders of the Six-Nation Initiative offered to monitor a test ban in co-operation with the United States and the USSR. The twenty-ninth session of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events has just ended. Very soon, phase 3 of GSETT-2, to develop a global system for seismic data exchange, will get under way. It is time an ad hoc committee on this item was established to provide the necessary political framework within which to consider the important results of GSETT-2. Ambassador Yamada of Japan and his successor Ambassador Donowaki have undertaken intensive consultations with all delegations to try and resolve the issue of the mandate for this committee. We are appreciative of their efforts. It is encouraging to note that there is a narrowing of differences. The flexibility shown by a majority of the members of the CD has to be matched by others if an ad hoc committee is to be established during this year. The situation is much the same on items 2 and 3 - "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" and "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters" - where, once again, we have had to resort to discussing these topics, which should be of central concern to the CD, in the form of informal plenary meetings. While we welcome progress achieved in bilateral negotiations, nuclear-weapon States should, in keeping with respect for the security concerns of non-nuclear nations, accept the obligation to take positive and practical steps towards the adoption and implementation of concrete measures towards nuclear disarmament. Whatever the differences in the theoretical models used, there is a clear consensus among all experts that even a limited nuclear exchange would produce catastrophe for our biosphere. Conventional wars cannot under any circumstances be equated with nuclear war. It is by now a truism that if nuclear weapons are ever used, it will not matter who used them first. It is, therefore, clear that nuclear weapons cannot be used for any kind of defence. Pending the achievement of complete nuclear disarmament, the only way to eliminate the threat of a nuclear holocaust is to conclude a convention that would prohibit the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, delegitimizing nuclear weapons as the currency of power.

(Mr. Al-Ketal, Iraq)

... Since the Paris Conference on chemical weapons, our Conference has continued its discussions on the total prohibition of these weapons and the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles. During this period, several conferences and symposia have been held on this subject in various regions of the world, including the Canberra Conference held in September 1989. No observer at these conferences would have any difficulty in acknowledging the following facts which have characterized international efforts in this field. Firstly, the Paris Conference greatly furthered international efforts, and the efforts of the Conference on Disarmament in particular, to draft an international treaty totally prohibiting the production and utilization of chemical weapons. However, the slow progress of negotiations and the persistence of obstacles and numerous problems that are as yet unresolved have diminished the momentum engendered by the Paris Conference. Secondly, the Conference on Disarmament achieved limited progress in negotiations last year, given the fact that many issues and problems were raised in regard to various aspects of the draft international convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Moreover, some countries participating in the negotiations attached more importance to the non-proliferation of chemical weapons than to the elimination of the weapons which they already possess. Some countries have opted for a policy of placing greater constraints on the transfer of various products and technologies to prevent their use in the production of chemical weapons. Such measures not only violate the incontrovertible right of countries to acquire the technology and materials needed for development; they also constitute a violation of the Paris Declaration on chemical weapons, a declaration which was drafted by those countries themselves. Thirdly, since the signing of the INF Treaty between the United States and the USSR, the nuclear-weapon States have adopted no practical measure for the control of nuclear weapons, or for the complete prohibition of nuclear weapon tests - despite the appreciable improvements that have occurred in East/West relations and the fundamental changes that have taken place in recent months in Europe.

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(Mr. Al-Ketal, Iraq)

... With regard to the convention on chemical weapons, I have some comments to make. The convention must be drafted in such a way as to make it universally acceptable. The crucial issues in this connection include the legitimate, actual needs of the developing countries, and primarily security guarantees against the use or threatened use of nuclear weapons. The convention will be widely supported if it contains a binding commitment on the part of the nuclear-weapon States to take nuclear disarmament measures as a corollary to chemical disarmament measures. They should also enter into a commitment not to resort to the use of nuclear weapons, along the lines of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 on the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons and toxic gases. In this connection, we would like to express our satisfaction of the fact that our efforts have taken a step forward through the agreement to hold a Conference to review the partial test-ban Treaty in order to examine proposed amendments which we hope will convert this treaty eventually into a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. Our support for these measures does not signify premature optimism at the possibility of such a result, because that will depend on the attitudes adopted by the nuclear-weapon States during the review conference. The attitudes that these States have hitherto manifested do not make us particularly optimistic in this regard. In these negotiations, it would be particularly inadmissible for nuclear armament to remain isolated from the focal point of interest, thereby leaving this question in suspense and unresolved.

Mr. DAHLMAN (Sweden): It is a pleasure to report on the Group's recent meeting, held from 19 to 29 March, and to introduce its progress report contained in document CD/981, which is in front of you today. This was the twenty-ninth session of the Group, and experts and representatives from 27 countries and the World Meteorological Organization attended. We enjoyed the excellent eminent services provided by the secretariat throughout the session. We greatly appreciated their efforts and we are very impressed by the way they handled our technical material.

The second phase of the Group's Second Large-scale Technical Test which we refer to as GSETT-2, started on 16 January 1990. This phase, which will continue until our summer meeting, is designed as a gradual build-up of the testing of the entire system. The initial part of this phase involved the trial testing of existing facilities of the global system one day per week for eight weeks. The recent meeting of the Group had two main purposes: to review the results of this test period and to plan the remaining stages of GSETT-2.

The results of this first co-ordinated test of the components of the global seismic system of available facilities was quite satisfactory. Valuable experience was obtained by participating countries and facilities as well as by the Group as a whole. This was made possible because of careful planning guided by the co-ordinator of GSETT-2, Mr. Peter Basham of Canada, and the dedicated work of a large number of scientists and technicians at participating facilities around the world.

To operate a system in the real world differs considerably from conceptually designing it. Some of you may recall that during the Group's Technical Test in 1984, we received a message from one station saying "no data

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(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

available - seismometer stolen". This time considerable interruption occurred in data transmission when a communication computer at one of the experimental international data centres was the object of a similar crime.

Twenty-one countries participated in this initial stage of the global test by establishing and operating national data centres usually referred to as NDCs. These 21 NDCs provided data from 46 seismological stations in all. The data volumes contributed by the stations are considerably larger than in the 1984 test, which involved only parameter data. A total data volume corresponding to about 60,000 pages of typed information was exchanged during these eight days. This is about half the size of the Encyclopaedia Britannica. Only the future will tell whether our data contain as much valuable information as those prestigious volumes.

The procedures for operating an NDC, collecting and compiling seismological data and transmitting such data to experimental international data centres are now well established. All countries which tried to establish and operate a national data centre were quite successful in doing so. This should encourage more countries to engage in the experiment.

Broader participation and better coverage of the globe is essential if we are to meet the objectives of GSETT-2. These objectives are, as you may recall, to test the individual components of a modern data exchange system as specified in the Group's fifth report (contained in CD/903), and to test the interaction of these components in a realistic environment - that is, to demonstrate that the system is able to cope with all the seismic events that are observed around the globe.

The Group noted with satisfaction that efforts are under way in some 10 additional countries to join the experiment and to establish national data centres. To encourage even wider participation the Group decided to reduce the technical requirements for participation in the experiment. While maintaining that the prime purpose of GSETT-2 was, and still is, to routinely exchange and analyse level II or wave-form data, the Group agreed that countries that today do not have facilities available for the routine exchange of digital wave-form data may participate by contributing level I or parameter data only. It is now technically possible for every country operating a seismological station - and most countries in the world actually do - to participate in GSETT-2. I do hope this will encourage additional participation in areas where we have only few participants today, in particular in South America, Africa and some parts of Asia.

The Ad hoc Group has for many years enjoyed close co-operation with the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) for global data exchange through the WMO GTS, which is their Global Telecommunication System. The Group and the WMO representatives agreed that further preparatory work was needed to utilize this communication system during GSETT-2 as well.

The Group welcomed a suggestion by WMO that it should be represented in Geneva between 21 and 28 May 1990 at the forthcoming meeting of the World Meteorological Organization's Commission for Basic Systems Working Group on

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

the Global Telecommunication System to further discuss this issue. The Ad hoc Group suggests that, on the understanding that there are no financial implications for the Conference on Disarmament, Mr. Peter Basham, Canada, assisted by Mr. Shigeji Suyehiro of Japan, should be requested to represent the Group at this meeting.

The experimental international data centres which we usually refer to as EIDCs, are operated in Canberra (Australia), Stockholm (Sweden), Moscow (USSR) and Washington in the United States. These centres are key elements of the system being tested during GSETT-2. Much effort and money have been devoted at these four centres to establishing adequate communication facilities and developing and introducing the hardware and software necessary to fulfil their demanding tasks. The introduction of the routine exchange and analysis of wave-form data, which are expected to substantially improve the quality of the results provided by the system, has significantly expanded the tasks of the EIDCs.

There is a saying that he who makes a journey has something to tell. This also applies to those who make scientific experiments. You thereby create new knowledge which is otherwise not available. Such valuable experience was gained at the experimental international data centres during the recent test period. It was found that the work-load was much heavier than expected and that the internal operations of the EIDCs have to be streamlined to allow for continuous operation over an extended period of time. To utilize the full potential of the wave-form data, the seismological methods and procedures have to be further developed and tested. Co-operation among the EIDCs to arrive at a common solution, a process usually referred to as reconciliation, is an important element of the analysis procedure. This was, however, not tested during this initial phase, mainly due to the overload at the EIDCs.

In the light of the experience accumulated so far, the Group revised its preliminary plans and instructions for GSETT-2, and agreed on a revised schedule which is annexed to the progress report.

During the time period until the Group's next session, phase 2 of GSETT-2 will continue with a number of activities, gradually building up to the envisaged full-scale operation of the system to be tested. These activities include the establishment of new national data centres in countries joining GSETT-2 and the establishment and testing of appropriate communication channels between these NDCs and EIDCs. Also included is work to improve the seismological procedures at EIDCs for analysis of wave-form data in particular, and the testing of such procedures among the EIDCs. An informal meeting of experts primarily from the four EIDCs will be hosted by the United States in early June 1990 to review the results of this work. A preparatory operational test will also be conducted involving the exchange of data from all participating stations and the processing of these data at the EIDCs for four days in late June.

The Group also discussed the schedule for phase 3, which is the main phase of GSETT-2. To be able to develop the analysis procedures to take full

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

advantage of reported data, in particular the wave-form data, and to enable additional countries - and this is important - to make the necessary preparations, the Group decided to revise the preliminary schedule. The Group now plans to divide the third phase into two parts. The first part consists of one full week of continuous operation of the entire system to be conducted in late autumn, tentatively mid-November, this year. The second and main part of phase 3 will be a full-scale operation for a continuous period of about two months in April and May 1991. Such a schedule, which allows for both intensive testing and careful analysis and evaluation, is considered by the Group to provide the best foundation on which to build a scientifically sound assessment of the proposed system.

The Ad hoc Group suggests that, subject to approval by the Conference on Disarmament, its next session should be convened from 30 July to 10 August 1990, in Geneva.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Chairman of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events for introducing the report contained in document CD/981. Does any other delegation wish at this stage to address the progress report of the Ad hoc Group?

As is the practice in the Conference, I shall put the recommendations contained in paragraphs 9 and 13 of the progress report before the Conference for adoption at the plenary meeting to be held on Thursday, 12 April. The recommendation contained in paragraph 13 relates to the suggested dates for the next session of the Ad hoc Group - 30 July to 10 August 1990. As regards paragraph 9, the secretariat has circulated today the draft of a letter that I as President of the Conference will address to the Secretary-General of the World Meteorological Organization in connection with the participation of a member of the Seismic Group in the next session of the WMO Commission for Basic Systems Working Group on the Global Telecommunication System. I am doing so to comply with rule 11 of the rules of procedure, which provide that the President shall, in full consultation with the Conference and under its authority, represent it in its relations with other international organizations. If there are no objections to the text of the letter before the plenary meeting of Thursday, 12 April, that letter will be sent as drafted.

The PRESIDENT:

... In view of the sea change in threat perceptions following upon the transformation in the international environment, we believe that the Conference on Disarmament must pay special attention to the early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and a chemical weapons convention. The Conference on Disarmament must also examine issues which are increasingly engaging the attention of the international community, such as regional disarmament and naval disarmament.

(Mr. Ceska, Austria)

... Austria attaches considerable importance to a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. Austria's participation, since 1979, in the work of the Ad hoc Group of Seismic Experts entrusted with the task of preparing a feasible verification system for a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty is a clear reflection of its interest in working for a rapid solution of all outstanding technical questions involved. Austria is aware of the significance of the current working phase, and will do its utmost to further enhance its contribution in this field. However, as the elaboration of a comprehensive verification system should constitute a conditio sine qua non for the conclusion of such a treaty, this will probably take additional time. In this context let me say that, after over 20 years of listening to arguments explaining why comprehensive and satisfactory verification does not seem to be feasible, we are very satisfied to find ourselves in a position to state today that it is in fact feasible.

Financial arguments do not seem to stand in the way of verifying a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty, since one year of operating a comprehensive verification system in its form as currently envisaged would only cost the equivalent of one nuclear weapon test. Therefore, we expect the nuclear-weapon States to make provision for the necessary financial contributions for the world-wide installation of such a verification system as a first and most logical expression of the "peace dividend".

As far as the outstanding technical questions are concerned, we hope that the envisaged work programme for phases 2 and 3 of the practical test in 1990 and 1991 will lead to final conclusions. In this regard, the participation of as large a number of States as possible seems to be of the utmost importance for raising global awareness and eventually facilitating the world-wide implementation of such a verification system.

(Mr. Ceska, Austria)

As far as the initiative aiming at the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban régime by amending the partial nuclear-test-ban Treaty is concerned, let me state that Austria does not consider the forthcoming amendment conference an adequate means to achieve this goal. In particular, the amendment of an existing treaty prior to final solution of outstanding technical as well as political problems cannot be regarded as a feasible option.

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

... The repeated calls for an urgent comprehensive test-ban treaty by the vast majority of the Member States of the United Nations General Assembly constitute authoritative support for the work of the Conference on Disarmament on a CTBT. My delegation notes with satisfaction that the efforts carried out last year by Ambassador Yamada of Japan, and continued this year by his successor, Ambassador Donowaki, have created better conditions for a dialogue on the issue of a mandate for an ad hoc committee on a nuclear test ban. I hope that there will be enough flexibility in the Conference to agree on a reasonably balanced mandate, allowing us, at last, to get down to business on a CTBT. An ad hoc committee should be established without further delay.

Already in the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty expressed their determination to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time. The initiative to try to advance the issue through an amendment conference, with the aim of transforming the Treaty into a comprehensive test-ban treaty, is an expression of the frustration over the lack of results on this issue in the Conference on Disarmament.

The Soviet Union and the United States are about to reach agreement on verification arrangements for their bilateral threshold test-ban Treaty and peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty. Thresholds of 150 kilotons do not impose meaningful limitations on nuclear testing. If linked to the early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, a lowering of the threshold to yields below one kiloton would be a significant advancement towards such a treaty. In such a context, agreed reductions in existing nuclear-weapon stockpiles would be truly effective.

On the important issue of verifying a nuclear test-ban treaty, considerable progress has been achieved. The Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts has, through close international co-operation, developed a global seismic verification system. A modern design of this system is now being tested. The experiment is proceeding successfully, but there is a need for increased participation in the test in order to achieve a more global distribution of seismic stations. In fact, many countries have technical facilities making it possible for them to participate in this global experiment. It is important that more States should take the necessary political decision allowing for broader participation. This would effectively contribute to the development of a global seismic verification system.

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(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

Among other verification measures for a comprehensive test-ban treaty, the monitoring of atmospheric radioactivity may be mentioned. It has on a number of occasions been discussed in the Conference on Disarmament, and Sweden has proposed that a global system should be established for this purpose. On-site and in-country monitoring stations, as well as satellite-based surveillance systems, can also play an important part in verifying a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

On the basis of an extended mandate, the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts should start deliberations on these verification techniques too, drawing on the experience developed over a long period of time in this Group.

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

... All avenues should be explored in order to find new ways to reduce the nuclear weapon arsenals. In parallel, one measure of both practical and symbolic significance of the highest order would be the establishment here in the CD of an ad hoc committee on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Sweden has further proposed to the General Conference of IAEA that all transfers of weapons material to peaceful use should be verified through the application of Agency safeguards. If the nuclear material cannot immediately be used within peaceful programmes, the Agency's statute provides an instrument for storage under its custody.

(Mr. Watanabe, Japan)

Today, on behalf of a group of Western countries, I would like to speak on the progress report on the twenty-ninth session of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, contained in document CD/981, which was introduced by Dr. Ola Dahlman of Sweden on 5 April.

The delegations on whose behalf I am speaking highly appreciate the continued excellent work carried out by the Group, under its mandate set out in CD/46, in "elaborating instructions and specifications for international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events ... which might be established in the future for the international exchange of seismological data under a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapon tests covering nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes in a protocol which would be an integral part of the treaty".

We note with great satisfaction that the second phase of the Group's Second Large-scale Technical Test (GSETT-2) started successfully on 16 January 1990. Dr. Dahlman stated that "to operate a system in the real world differs considerably from conceptually designing it", but we are confident that the success of the phase 3 full-scale experiment now planned for the first half of next year has been made more likely by improved preparation to be conducted under the revised schedule of remaining GSETT-2 activities.

We share with the group its satisfaction that efforts are under way in some 10 additional countries to join the experiment and to establish national data centres. We welcome the Group's decision that countries able to contribute only level I data may now also participate in GSETT-2. And we sincerely hope that together with the rescheduling of future activities, this will encourage those countries which have not yet done so, especially in South America, Africa and Asia, to join in the work of the Group.

Before concluding, we would like to express our sincere appreciation to the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), which has made its Global Telecommunication System available to the GSE. Its continued co-operation will be essential for the success of GSETT-2.

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

... The group on whose behalf I have the the honour to take the floor attaches great importance to the work of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts. By devising and testing a global seismic data exchange system, the GSE renders a significant contribution to setting up the scientific and technological basis for verification of compliance with a future comprehensive test-ban treaty. In so doing, the Ad hoc Group is effectively contributing to the work on a nuclear item which falls to the responsibility of the Conference on Disarmament.

We are satisfied with the progress achieved so far in the experiment on the exchange of level II data. Wide experience has been gained in this process, which is valuable for its continuation and successful conclusion. At this juncture, I should like to express our gratitude and appreciation to all scientists from the countries participating in GSETT-2 for the purposeful work accomplished by them and, in particular, to Dr. Dahlman (Sweden) and Dr. Basham (Canada) for their dedicated activities in this endeavour.

As it was stated by Dr. Ola Dahlman on 5 April 1990 here in this forum, the Group of Scientific Experts, during its spring session, carried out comprehensive work with a view to solving manifold organizational and scientific and technological questions connected with this experiment. We welcome the activities planned to settle several problems that remain pending, especially in connection with the processing of the amount of transmitted data, which was much larger than anticipated. The co-operation with WMO will be conducive to finding answers to the unresolved questions concerning data transmission. We agree with the revision of the preliminary schedule for GSETT-2, as well as with paragraphs 9 and 13 of the progress report on the twenty-ninth session of the GSE.

Our Group considers the broadest possible participation by States in GSETT-2 to be of major importance. This would help improve the conditions for testing the concept for a global data exchange system specified in the GSE's fifth report in a realistic environment. So far 21 countries, some of them having strongly differing starting positions in terms of science and technology, personnel and finance, have successfully participated in the experiment. We welcome the fact that more States, among them countries from our Group, have expressed their intention of taking part in future GSETT-2 activities and are making preparations in this regard. The decisions of the Ad hoc Group to reduce the technical requirements for participation in the experiment are appropriate for encouraging even wider participation in this important experiment.

The advanced stage in the work of the GSE offers opportunities for the Conference on Disarmament to consider broadening the scope of its deliberations of verification methods for a future CTBT. This includes, inter alia, the elaboration of procedures for on-site inspections, satellite remote sensing and atmospheric radioactivity surveillance. The countries on

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

whose behalf I am speaking consider that substantive work should be started by experts in the Ad hoc Group with an extended mandate or in another appropriate organizational framework which goes beyond questions of seismology.

In conclusion, permit me to make another remark regarding the establishment of an ad hoc committee on agenda item 1. We welcome the fact that all groups have agreed, without prejudice to their preferred draft mandate, to work towards consensus on the basis of the draft mandate contained in document CD/863. This signals increased readiness to resume substantive work on agenda item 1, "Nuclear test ban". We hope that it will be possible to set up a committee on this agenda item at the very beginning of the summer session. As was emphasized in the plenary debate, this would provide the necessary political framework for consideration of the important results of GSETT-2.

Mr. HOU (China) (translated from Chinese): The Chinese delegation listened carefully to the progress report on the twenty-ninth session of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. We would like to welcome the successful conclusion of the twenty-ninth session of the Group. The Chinese delegation expresses its appreciation of the constructive work of the Group of Scientific Experts. We are also appreciative of the positive efforts made by the Chairman of the Group, Dr. Dahlman of Sweden, and its Co-ordinator, Dr. Basham of Canada. En passant I would like to say that the appropriate departments and experts in our country are seriously considering participation in international data exchange experiments on seismic events. We have noted that the meeting of the Group has decided to postpone phase three of the large-scale experiment. This will lead to better results in the experiment on a larger scale.

The PRESIDENT: You will recall that at our last plenary meeting, I announced that we would take action today on the recommendations contained in paragraphs 9 and 13 of the progress report of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events.

In connection with paragraph 9, the Chair circulated, at the plenary meeting held on 5 April, the draft of a letter that I as President will address to the Secretary-General of the World Meteorological Organization in connection with the participation of a member of the Ad hoc Group in the next session of the WMO Commission for Basic Systems Working Group on the Global Telecommunication System. It was noted at that plenary meeting that, if no objections were raised before today's plenary meeting, the letter would be sent as drafted. No objections have been received and, accordingly, I shall proceed as indicated.

(The President)

In connection with the recommendation contained in paragraph 13 of the Ad hoc Group's progress report, we are invited to adopt it in order to determine the dates for the next session of that subsidiary body. The Ad hoc Group has proposed that its next session should be held between 30 July and 10 August 1990. If there is no objection raised I shall take it that the Conference adopts that recommendation.

It was so decided.

(Mr. Sene, Senegal)

... It goes without saying that the chemical weapons ban is not the only focal point on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. The complete prohibition of nuclear testing is also a priority issue. In this very connection it is to be regretted that the Conference has still not managed to agree on a mandate for a committee to examine this issue. Nevertheless, a tribute should be paid to the vigorous efforts that Ambassador Yamada of Japan made last year to try and pin down the mandate of an ad hoc committee on nuclear tests. It is to be hoped that Ambassador Donowaki, who is continuing those efforts, will meet with success and find the way out of this impasse.

The United States and the Soviet Union have made progress in virtually concluding the development of the verification régimes provided for in the treaty on the limitation of underground tests and the treaty on peaceful nuclear explosions, but it is true that we have had to wait almost 10 years since the signing of these two instruments in order to devise verification systems that show nevertheless that it is possible to guarantee compliance with a test ban. Others are proposing a conference to convert the partial nuclear test-ban Treaty into a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty by jointly involving the international community. This, of course, is an interesting approach. Even if there is no short-cut in this field, as some believe, we should work out the terms for negotiations on this issue in order to persevere, on the basis of consensus, with the elaboration of a reliable and lasting system. In any event, all the multilateral questions relating to nuclear weapons are within the purview of the Conference on Disarmament. Consequently my delegation considers that the Conference on Disarmament should spare no effort to concentrate henceforth on the substantive issues concerning a nuclear test ban, the cessation of the arms race and nuclear disarmament. It must be recognized that the Conference on Disarmament has not really made decisive progress on these last two issues either, whether from the point of

(Mr. Sene, Senegal)

view of a structured debate on the cessation of the nuclear arms race or on the negotiation and elaboration of principles and confidence-building measures for nuclear disarmament, which of course would be inseparable from prevention in the field of nuclear proliferation.

... The fourth NPT conference is to consider the validity of the Treaty after 1995. Senegal will participate in this forthcoming review conference with the hope that there will be consensus on the validity of the Treaty after 1995, which will make it possible to strengthen the universality of this disarmament instrument in the interest of peace and world security. In fact, the halting and banning of nuclear tests constitute the best means of fighting for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, especially as a real process of nuclear disarmament has begun. In the meantime, the non-nuclear-weapon States demand negative security assurances within the framework of an international instrument or a formula legally binding on all the parties. Since the nuclear-weapon States made unilateral declarations of negative security assurances, the Conference on Disarmament has been unable to arrive at a legal arrangement in due form despite the broad consensus which, moreover, is based on the rules of international customary law concerning the prohibition of any resort to force except in cases of self-defence. It is true that, through their declarations on negative security assurances, the nuclear-weapon States have acknowledged that resort to such weapons could only be contemplated in a much smaller number of cases than resort to conventional weapons. At the very least it is to be hoped that the Conference on Disarmament will make progress on this matter by drawing up an arrangement or measures of an internationally legally binding nature.

(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)

... The Conference should make use of all the opportunities it has at its disposal, ranging from plenary sessions and ad hoc bodies to informal meetings, open presidential consultations, expert bodies and scientific round-table discussions, etc., to maintain a permanent, substantive exchange of opinions and proposals in search of common ground for negotiations. A more flexible approach to the mandate under item 1 (NTB), and the acceptance, for the first time, of informal sessions for item 3 on the agenda, for example, show the beginning of a slightly pragmatic approach to the work of the Conference.

Mr. CHIRILA (Romania) (translated from French):

... In its statement of 13 February to the plenary of the Conference, our delegation had the opportunity of describing the general features of the Romanian position, its hopes and especially its complete readiness to support and contribute to the efforts aimed at bringing about a broad, continuous and dynamic process of disarmament at all levels and in all aspects. Thanks to the tireless efforts made by you and your predecessors, Ambassador Wagenmakers of the Netherlands and Ambassador Azikiwe of Nigeria, a concrete working context has been designed to bring about what we all agree to be necessary - the negotiation and above all the conclusion of agreements and measures agreed at the multilateral level, with universal scope, in the area of disarmament. Our debates and negotiations have highlighted in particular the fact that the more favourable political climate today offers conditions and hopes, but also imposes requirements, responsibilities and additional efforts to bring about meaningful results in the area of disarmament, inter alia and above all within the Geneva Conference. The discussions have also revealed that nuclear issues are still viewed as priority issues for this Conference. Our delegation takes note with satisfaction of the fact that, thanks in particular to the efforts of Ambassador Donowaki, more favourable conditions now obtain that could lead to a more specific dialogue on the question of a substantive mandate for an ad hoc committee on a nuclear test ban. We hope that the Conference will soon find the flexibility and consensus which are so much needed to produce a reasonable, balanced mandate which can offer the required conditions for a substantive and well-targeted examination of this issue.

Concerning the important problem of the verification of a test-ban treaty, considerable progress has been made. The Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts has developed a global system of seismic verification. My delegation is particularly pleased since, starting with this session, Romania has been participating in the Ad hoc Group and is going to commit its technical capabilities to the global international test that will produce its conclusions in 1991. We believe that, in order to guide other political decisions concerning participation in an international test of this nature, ways and means should be found, especially in areas hitherto insufficiently represented, to offer basic technical assistance and supplementary international co-operation. We consider that, in particular, the four international centres that have been established to test the global system seismic verification may be increasingly bearing this need and possibility in mind.

(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

As I indicated at the beginning of this statement, I will not be dealing today with some other items on our agenda, such as items 6 and 7, negative security assurances and radiological weapons, although I must admit that, when Ambassador Ceska of Austria referred to these two items in his own recent statement, I took satisfaction that his down-to-earth and pragmatic approach to them closely approximated our own views. Nor will I say anything at this time about the first item on our agenda, "Nuclear test ban", except to express the strong hope, which so many among us clearly share, that Ambassador Donowaki's continuing patient exploration of the mandate issue will soon be answered by success.

(Mr. Loeis, Indonesia)

... Concerning item 1 of our agenda, my delegation appreciates the tireless endeavours expended by Ambassador Donowaki in attempting to resolve the difficulties in establishing an ad hoc committee to deal with this item. It is encouraging to note that a path has been found towards a convergence of views concerning the mandate for the establishment of an ad hoc committee. In this regard, I would hope that at the beginning of our summer session, the ad hoc committee could be established.

The majority of States are waiting for concrete results from the work of the Conference in this particular field. Since the original parties to the partial test-ban Treaty proclaimed their commitment through the preamble of the Treaty almost 30 years ago, it is only natural that we, particularly the non-nuclear-weapon States, are impatiently awaiting the materialization of that commitment. It was not the non-nuclear-weapon States which initially commenced making commitments which sought to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, and which were determined to continue negotiations to this end. It is therefore fully understandable that the majority of States, almost all of which are non-nuclear-weapon States, are anxious to see a concrete result emerging from any negotiation to ban nuclear testing comprehensively.

The fourth review conference of the non-proliferation Treaty is scheduled to be held in August this year. In this respect, my delegation has been following with serious interest the assessments made during the course of this spring session on matters pertinent to the implementation of this international legal instrument. However, my delegation's view concords with that of the speakers who affirmed that the Treaty has been far from successful in curbing the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons.

At the risk of repeating myself, I wish to reiterate that under article VI of this instrument, nuclear-weapon States have committed themselves to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament. Since this year will mark the twentieth anniversary of this Treaty, my delegation would only like to express its profound hope that this commitment will produce more concrete results in the near future.

(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

... As we near the end of our spring session we would like to make a few comments on the item concerning a comprehensive test ban. Twenty-seven years after the signing of the Moscow Treaty, and twenty years after the entry into force of the non-proliferation Treaty, not only has the agreement promised by the depositary States of both those instruments not been concluded, but this single forum for the negotiation of disarmament agreements is not even holding negotiations on the matter. If there is one item on our agenda that is worthy of inclusion in the lists of Robert Leroy Ripley it is without doubt that of the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear tests. Believe it or not, in 1963 the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union proclaimed themselves "determined to continue negotiations" to achieve "the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time". And believe it or not, in 1968 those same three States reiterated that same "determination" in the preamble of the NPT. Some determination! We do not know if Ripley ever defined the verb "to determine", but our dictionary tells us that it means "to establish the boundaries of something" or "to resolve". In other words, since 1963 those countries have been resolved to put an end to all nuclear weapon testing, only they have yet to do so.

For years the international community has assigned the highest priority to a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. This was reaffirmed in December of last year by the General Assembly in its resolution 44/105. That resolution recalls that the question, "which has been examined for more than 30 years and on which the General Assembly has adopted more than 50 resolutions, is a basic objective of the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament". It also recalls that over five years ago the Secretary-General - and I continue to quote from resolution 44/105, as if it were, as we have been told, a kind of holy writ - "emphasized that no single multilateral agreement could have a greater effect on limiting the further refinement of nuclear weapons and that a comprehensive test-ban treaty is the litmus test of the real willingness to pursue nuclear disarmament". Last autumn, on the occasion of Disarmament Week, the Secretary-General himself pointed out that "unless the present positive momentum in bilateral negotiations on various nuclear questions, including the urgent need for the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, is soon translated into concrete undertakings, the risks of both vertical and horizontal proliferation will become more acute".

Since the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty in 1963, this Conference has been unable to move forward substantially in working out a multilateral agreement banning all nuclear weapon tests. Since 1984 it has not even been able to establish an ad hoc committee to examine the question. In the course of this spring session we were told that there was a possibility of setting up such an ad hoc committee provided that all the groups were prepared to accept the proposed mandate contained in document CD/863. That was over a month ago and, in spite of Ambassador Mitsuro Donowaki's intense efforts, we have not yet been able to establish the ad hoc committee - with the modest mandate proposed - because of the opposition of some delegations of the Western Group.

(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

The flexibility shown by the other members of the Conference, including the Group of 21, to which Mexico belongs, has not been matched by others. It is obvious that we are not going to go on waiting indefinitely for certain parties to accept what they themselves have proposed.

During the 1960s we heard repeated promises by the three depositary States of the partial test-ban Treaty, promises concerning the prompt cessation of all such tests. That has been the basic working premise for the consideration of that item here and in the General Assembly. That also formed part of the balance in the obligations assumed in the NPT by the non-nuclear-weapon States on the one hand, and the nuclear-weapon States on the other. The NPT does not speak solely of horizontal non-proliferation; the measures it provides for in order to stem vertical proliferation are also clear. And a comprehensive nuclear test ban is the key measure in this regard. Neither the Moscow Treaty nor the NPT speak of a partial ban on underground nuclear tests. Nor do they speak of limiting such tests to a certain threshold, still less of a 150-kiloton threshold or limit or of "reducing" such tests "to a minimum". The threshold agreed bilaterally by the United States and the Soviet Union in the 1974 Treaty is equivalent to over 10 times the yield of the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima in 1945. Some threshold! With regard to the number of tests, the situation is equally disheartening. Between 1945 and August 1963, when the Moscow Treaty was signed, the annual average of nuclear tests conducted by the two super-Powers was some 28 tests per year. Between August 1963 and 1974, when the threshold test-ban Treaty was signed, the average was about 48. Between 1975 and 1988 the average was around 36 tests per year. In short, as the heads of State or Government associated with the Six-Nation Initiative on peace and disarmament stated in their Stockholm Declaration of 21 January 1988, "any agreement that leaves room for continued testing would not be acceptable" (A/43/125 - S/19478, annex).

The régime and perhaps the very concept of non-proliferation is being undermined by the Moscow Treaty and NPT depositary States themselves. What would be the reaction in Latin America or in the rest of the world if the depositary government of the Treaty of Tlatelolco were the first to stop properly complying with its provisions? A couple of months ago, on 14 February, the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Dr. Hans Blix, stated in an address to the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva: "I should in fairness point out that while 'horizontal proliferation' is a risk, 'vertical proliferation' is a reality". And he added: "The nuclear-weapon States, especially the super-Powers, are very active to prevent further proliferation. There is perhaps something paradoxical about nuclear-weapon States desperately urging non-nuclear-weapon States not to do what they themselves seem to find indispensable to continue doing, namely, develop nuclear weapons".

Over the past few years, some statements have been heard and some events have occurred which are frankly discouraging. In September 1987, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to conduct the "nuclear testing talks". The aim of those talks is not to prohibit all nuclear tests, but rather to trace out an extended programme of "step-by-step" negotiations on nuclear tests and their verification. The position of the United States Administration announced in 1988 and repeated on several occasions,

(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

including 18 October of last year, during the forty-fourth session of the General Assembly, by the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, is to regard the complete prohibition of all nuclear tests as a long-term goal, since his country's security and that of its allies depends, and will continue to depend, on the deterrent capacity of its nuclear arsenal. That same day in the same First Committee of the General Assembly, the representative of the United Kingdom reiterated his Government's identical position, stating that "an immediate move to a comprehensive test ban would be premature and perhaps even destabilizing. For the foreseeable future the United Kingdom's security will depend on deterrence based, in part, on the possession of nuclear weapons. That will mean a continuing requirement to conduct underground nuclear tests to ensure that our nuclear weapons remain effective and up to date".

At the beginning of January this year, the United States announced that, in relation to the nuclear testing talks, it had not identified any further limitation on nuclear testing (beyond those already laid down in the threshold test-ban Treaty) that would be of national security interest. The Soviet Union responded on 30 January that the new attitude of the United States could undermine support for the "step-by-step" cessation of nuclear tests.

Last month was the twentieth anniversary of the entry into force of the NPT. In 1995, in accordance with article X, paragraph 2, of the Treaty, "a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision", says the article, "shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty". So the 1995 conference will be rather different from the NPT review conferences that are held every five years in accordance with article VIII, paragraph 3. At those conferences the States parties have been reviewing the NPT's operation "with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized". Following each such review, the parties have attempted - not always successfully - to adopt a declaration by consensus. This occurred in 1975, 1980 and 1985, and the same may be expected to happen this summer at the fourth review conference. In 1995, however, a majority - and not a consensus - of the 142 States parties will have to decide whether or not to extend the Treaty's life. Consequently, over the next five years the international community, and in particular the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT, will have to consider in different forums the operation and the future of the present nuclear non-proliferation régime. One such forum will be the NPT fourth review conference, to be held in a few months, whose third and final preparatory stage began yesterday. In parallel, in a few weeks, the Moscow Treaty amendment conference will begin in New York. That will be another forum which will have before it various aspects of the question of nuclear testing with a view to finding a formula to convert it into a complete ban.

In conclusion, this Conference's situation regarding the question of a comprehensive nuclear test ban is thus becoming more and more delicate, and the coming years may prove especially difficult, not to say decisive, for its credibility. If in the near future we do not start to see concrete progress

(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

on a comprehensive test ban, there will also be further erosion of the faith many countries have placed in the non-proliferation Treaty. Obviously those countries will have to take this seriously into account when in 1995 they are called on to take a decision on extending the life of the NPT.

The PRESIDENT:

... The first three items on our agenda deal with nuclear issues. On item 1, the nuclear test ban, my understanding is that Ambassador Donowaki is continuing his consultations. We look forward to the day when he will have something positive to report to us during the summer session.

(The President)

... On negative security assurances, in view of some important events on the nuclear disarmament agenda for this year - the NPT review conference and the amendment conference of the PTBT - it is my hope that progress will be achieved on this issue, particularly in view of the very large consensus on the matter in the General Assembly.

... During the spring session also, the Conference adopted the progress report on the twenty-ninth session of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. The Group's usefulness has been acknowledged by delegations, and one expects that it will be able to successfully conclude its Second Technical Test as planned.

(The President)

... This year's session of the Conference on Disarmament is also particularly important as we are on the eve of the fourth review conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Undoubtedly there is a close link between the work of this Conference and the positive atmosphere surrounding the preparations for the NPT review conference, and in fact this has played a role in ensuring that countries with major nuclear capabilities that are not members of the NPT wish to attend the august conference as observers. This atmosphere should be encouraged and promoted by our forum. In this context I must say that we should give the highest priority to the establishment of an ad hoc committee to consider the matter of a nuclear test ban. This subject is one of the corner-stones on which the progressive advancement of the work of this Conference should be built, and there can be no justification for the fact that since 1984 we have not managed to undertake a constructive debate on this issue within a subsidiary body of the Conference on Disarmament. In the light of the great capacity of this forum to solve organizational problems it is paradoxical that we have not been able to reach an agreement on this issue, particularly bearing in mind the general convergence of positions that has emerged with respect to the mandate of a subsidiary body. It is for this reason that I am of the view that we can delay no further in the prompt adoption of a substantive decision towards initiation of the work of an ad hoc committee on the matter of the total cessation of nuclear tests. I assure you that I will make every effort during the present month so that the consultations being carried out with such competence and diplomatic skill by Ambassador Donowaki meet with success. I invite him to redouble his efforts in view of the short time left during the current session to conduct substantive work jointly on this important agenda item. It goes without saying that I stand fully ready to co-operate with Ambassador Donowaki whenever he deems it necessary.

Mrs. THEORIN (Sweden):

... It should be recalled, moreover, that the two super-Powers had previously agreed that, ultimately, their bilateral negotiations "should lead to the complete elimination of nuclear arms everywhere". Nuclear test explosions are carried out for the progressive refinement of nuclear weapons. And nuclear testing continues. Modernization is the main driving force from behind these tests. But the international community can never accept that quantitative reductions may be offset by qualitative improvements.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

A comprehensive nuclear test ban would still be the single most effective measure to bring the nuclear arms race to a halt. A CTB would effectively promote quantitative reductions and would hamper qualitative improvements and the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The test-ban issue is particularly topical this year in view of the fourth review conference of the non-proliferation Treaty in August-September. Furthermore, the amendment conference of the partial test-ban Treaty will be convened in January 1991. These developments must generate the additional political stimulus required to permit a breakthrough, at long last, on the comprehensive nuclear test-ban issue in the Conference on Disarmament.

In the partial test-ban Treaty, nearly 27 years ago, the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty undertook to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and expressed their determination to continue negotiations with this objective. In the non-proliferation Treaty, more than 20 years ago, they undertook to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date. A slow, gradual approach, which justifies continued testing, sustains the nuclear arms race. The two threshold agreements between the super-Powers are technically and militarily meaningless. Threshold arrangements can only make genuine contributions to nuclear disarmament if they are linked to the early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and the swift phasing out of nuclear tests.

An effective nuclear test-ban treaty, with universal adherence, must be negotiated in a representative multilateral body. Complete draft treaty texts are on the table. In the Conference on Disarmament, where all five nuclear-weapon States are represented, the appropriate negotiating mechanism is already at hand. What is needed is the political decision to set it in motion.

It has to be added that there is strong international opinion against continued nuclear tests by the principal nuclear testing Powers. In the current international atmosphere, these Powers should declare a nuclear test moratorium in anticipation of a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

Over the years, the Conference on Disarmament has made considerable progress in its work on test-ban verification. The Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts has elaborated a system for global seismic verification, which is currently being tested. Other verification techniques - such as the monitoring of airborne radioactivity and satellite-based surveillance of the infrastructure - could also be developed and could usefully be entrusted to the Group of Scientific Experts for deliberation. The global and reliable exchange of data is of crucial importance.

The verification issue can no longer be used as a pretext for not even negotiating a nuclear test ban. This is a political, not a technical matter.

There seems to be a declared willingness on all sides in the Conference to contemplate a mandate for an ad hoc committee on the nuclear test ban. With sufficient flexibility in the Conference, an ad hoc committee could be established with a reasonable mandate at the commencement of this summer

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

session. This would be a constructive response to the repeated calls by an overwhelming majority of the United Nations General Assembly for action by the CD. This single measure could contribute greatly to a successful fourth review conference of the non-proliferation Treaty in just two months.

Efforts to prevent a nuclear arms race and a proliferation of nuclear weapons are as old as the technology for developing such weapons. These efforts have failed to prevent a nuclear arms race. And these efforts have not succeeded in preventing the acquisition of nuclear weapons by a handful of States. Nevertheless, 20 years ago these efforts were crowned with significant partial success when the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons entered into force.

Today, more than 140 States have acceded to the Treaty. In two months' time, the fourth review conference of the non-proliferation Treaty will be meeting in Geneva. I want to take this opportunity to comment on some major aspects of the NPT and the forthcoming review conference, where many of us will be meeting again.

The Preparatory Committee has concluded its work in a constructive spirit which gives us reason to hope that the review conference itself will produce concrete and positive results. In Sweden's view, that conference stands out as a major international political event. All parties to the Treaty should do their utmost to bring the fourth review conference to a successful conclusion. It is extremely important that the NPT, the corner-stone of the international non-proliferation régime, should be further strengthened. In order to facilitate the success of the review conference in 1990 and the prolongation of the Treaty in 1995, I strongly urge the nuclear-weapon States to continue nuclear disarmament and move towards a test ban.

(Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

... We must all work together to build a system of collective and comprehensive security. The most urgent task along this road is the removal of the threat of nuclear war - a task which can be resolved most effectively through the complete elimination of the means of nuclear warfare. We

(Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

therefore welcome the resolve of the super-Powers to remove a considerable portion of the nuclear weapons hanging over the world like the sword of Damocles. We have the right to ask the other nuclear-weapon States, even if their arsenals are smaller, also to commit themselves in a manner corresponding to their responsibility as possessors of such awesome weapons. We have every reason to insist on a universal and clear-cut renunciation of the nuclear option by everybody. We also have the duty to help uphold the non-proliferation régime through, inter alia, the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban, a ban on all space weapons, negative security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States and other measures, the adoption of which will be our Conference's contribution to the general public demand and aspiration for lasting peace and common security.

(Mr. Garcia Moritan, Argentina)

... Another item, Mr. President, where reality outside the Conference and its negotiating activity contrast, although this time with the same tone of irrelevance, is that of nuclear tests.

At the bilateral level, the United States and the Soviet Union have at long last agreed on the details relating to verification of the Threshold Agreements of the early seventies. This should now enable their respective legislative bodies to ratify the treaties, whose real impact on military-strategy matters, in our opinion, is nil.

This Conference on Disarmament, meanwhile, accompanies that process without reaching agreement on the terms of a mandate whose features in any case ensure that a treaty on a complete nuclear test ban would be far from imminent.

At the same time, the process of the Amendment Conference of the Moscow Treaty is moving forward, providing further evidence of the way in which the Conference on Disarmament has put itself on the sidelines on this issue.

(Mr. Karhilo, Finland)

... Mr. President, nuclear test explosions continue to be a divisive issue in international disarmament discussion. It took the leading nuclear Powers a decade and a half to agree on how to verify the "threshold" treaties. Meanwhile, non-nuclear weapon States have in vain made efforts to make the commonly agreed goal of a comprehensive test ban more attainable. Positions have hardened and frustrations grown.

Finland remains firmly committed to the achievement of a nuclear test ban treaty as a strong priority of the international community. We regard a comprehensive, universal and verifiable test ban as the surest way to slow down the qualitative development of nuclear weapons. In our view, the Amendment Conference of the Partial Test Ban Treaty should be utilized as a unique opportunity for the nuclear and the non-nuclear-weapon States to embark on a common road leading to test ban. Realistically thinking it will not be a freeway, but the common goal should be reconfirmed and negotiations begun without delay. Fresh ideas from all sides would help loosen and perhaps open the knots.

It is Finland's view that nuclear testing has never been a matter for the nuclear-weapon States only. Environmental concerns, *inter alia*, contributed to the signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963. New evidence suggests that there is no such thing as environmentally safe underground testing either. Safety measures at the test sites are being questioned by countries which fear that they get their share of radioactive particles from test explosions. In Finland's opinion, the best way to dispel such doubts would be for independent experts to be invited to familiarize themselves with safety measures at the test sites.

Within the Group of Seismic Experts (GSE) at the Conference on Disarmament-the building and testing of the seismic network for the verification of underground nuclear tests as well as all kinds of seismic events will continue. The results from the on-going GSE Second Technical Test (GSETT-2) will give valuable information on how to further develop the seismic methods and their transmission, which is the truly global way to manage test-ban verification. However, eyes should be kept open also to complementary verification and control methods if they can help to increase the reliability of test-ban supervision.

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

... If we were to look for the most glaring example of the international community's impotence to solve the tasks it has set itself within a few decades, the problem of nuclear tests would be among the major candidates. The fact that the Conference has failed to take action in this regard undermines its authority. At the same time it is obvious that a test ban is not only a measure to curb the nuclear arms race but a very important means of ensuring the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The time has truly come,

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

we believe, to establish an ad hoc committee on this issue, which could set to work, and the sooner the better. The Czechoslovak proposal for a mandate for this committee might provide a basis, and this has been recognized by all. Essentially, the discussion is about words. Maybe it would be better to stop this dispute and agree to accept the draft mandate as it is? It is a suggestion based on compromise, which emerged after long disputes and discussions. In this connection, I should like to reaffirm once again my delegation's support for the efforts being undertaken by the distinguished Ambassador Donowaki in this direction. We see no contradiction between the Conference's starting work on the testing issue, which will inevitably be of a step-by-step nature, and the step-by-step approach which the USSR and the United States agreed upon as a basis for negotiations on nuclear testing, although the stage-by-stage approach may of course take different concrete forms.

Protocols to the Soviet-American threshold treaties of 1974 and 1976 have been signed, and this means that the first aim of the bilateral Soviet-American talks has been achieved. In accordance with the existing agreement, we support the continuation of these bilateral negotiations for the purpose of considering further limitations on the number and yield of nuclear tests. The Soviet Union has suggested resuming them in September, and we expect a positive reply from the American side.

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

... I have been in Geneva for more than five years. For me personally they have been fascinating and highly rewarding. I shall always cherish the fond memories of my personal friendships, official contacts and co-operation with my colleagues. I have tried my best to benefit and learn from them. I have always admired and respected my colleagues' deep knowledge of disarmament problems and diplomatic skill in conducting negotiations. In my diplomatic career I have been associated with the Conference on Disarmament for more than 10 years. I share the view that the Conference on Disarmament has inherited too much from the past, such as its agenda, its decision-making process and the organization of its work. It is evident that the Conference on Disarmament should take steps to adjust itself to the present reality. This is a process that will require serious negotiations and can be realized gradually. I firmly believe in the Conference as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, and I am sure that the collective efforts and political wisdom of its members will find the right solution to the important question of the improved and effective functioning of the CD. And, in the light of the improved international climate, I have every reason to be optimistic and expect that the time will come soon when constructive and productive negotiations will commence on a number of priority issues, in particular the comprehensive nuclear test ban and nuclear disarmament.

(The President)

During these 17 days in which I served as President, I had a particularly close view of Ambassador Donowaki's efforts to finalize the establishment of the ad hoc committee on agenda item 1. While I have taken an impartial position as President, and that will always be the case, I cannot remain neutral in the face of the delay in establishing an ad hoc committee on a nuclear test ban in this Conference. The setting up of such a committee is indispensable, and this must take place in the immediate future if there is to be symmetry in the work of this Conference. By that I mean that the intensive work that has been done in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons must also be balanced by similar efforts in dealing with the nuclear issues, particularly the question of the nuclear test ban, and also within an ad hoc committee. I am sure that the establishment of such an ad hoc committee will in the future strengthen the legitimacy of the Conference on Disarmament in promoting discussions on the nuclear test ban at a time when we are witnessing new and positive trends in nuclear and conventional disarmament and arms control, and, above all - I wish to stress this point - it would in the future prevent bitter discussions at the forthcoming conference to review the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Inflexibility in respect of setting up an ad hoc committee on item 1 would, I sincerely believe, create an unnecessary atmosphere of confrontation within the positive climate that now exists for the holding of the fourth conference to review the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. I hope that common sense and a spirit of compromise will finally prevail, and that in the first week or two of July my successor Ambassador Sujka of Poland will be able to announce the setting up of the ad hoc committee which has been called for on so many occasions.

CD/PV.561

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... Poland also attaches importance to other items on the agenda of the Conference, including the questions of a nuclear weapons test ban and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

I wish to convey my best wishes to all the delegates and to express the hope that our patient search for solutions and the building of wide platforms of understanding will be conducive to reaching specific results in the work of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed): Krzysztof Skubiszewski,
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Poland".

That concludes the message of His Excellency the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland.

Allow me now to make some brief comments on those matters relating to organizational arrangements which are before the Conference. I have in mind in the first place the important question of agreeing on a mandate for an ad hoc committee on agenda item 1, "Nuclear test ban". Ambassador Donowaki of Japan has actively continued his consultations on that subject and, thanks to his able and untiring efforts, there is a widespread feeling that we are not far from agreement. At the same time, an element of urgency is becoming more evident. I do hope that, with the co-operation of all of us, Ambassador Donowaki will succeed in his endeavours. Of course, I am available to support him whenever he would consider it appropriate.

... A total nuclear test ban continues to be of the utmost relevance to nuclear disarmament. The recent agreements reached between the USSR and the USA with a view to putting into effect their treaties on the limitation of underground nuclear tests and on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes are important and should soon be followed by further agreements on the reduction of the number and yield of such tests.

We are also in favour of preparing the ground in a multilateral framework for a comprehensive nuclear test ban. This is what pressure groups all over the world expect your Conference to do.

The international seismic data exchange system for global test-ban monitoring developed by the Group of Scientific Experts has provided an important foundation for more substantial political advances. This has led to the German Democratic Republic taking part in the international experiments for the exchange of complete seismic registrations. Now the time has come for the Conference to start a comprehensive discussion about all issues involved in a test ban.

We consider the convening for early next year of an Amendment Conference to the Partial Test Ban Treaty, which was signed in Moscow in 1963, to be an expression of the world-wide interest in a speedy termination of nuclear test explosions. This conference must lend momentum to the relevant activities on all levels.

(Mr. Varend, Norway)

... The second working paper I have the honour to introduce today, gives a summary of the results of the International Workshop on Seismological Aspects of Nuclear Test Ban Verification which was held in Norway in February of this year. A total of 76 scientists and representatives from 21 countries participated in the Workshop. The working paper is contained in document CD/1010.

The main theme of the Workshop was the role of regional seismic arrays in a test ban monitoring context. The participants were given an introduction to the two arrays of this type installed in Norway, NORESS and ARCESS, and they also attended a demonstration of the associated computer processing and data analysis facilities.

During a three-day scientific symposium, a total of 30 research papers were presented, addressing many of the outstanding problems and the state-of-the-art in seismic monitoring. In particular, several presentations focused on results using NORESS and ARCESS data, and the excellent capabilities of these arrays were clearly documented. A summary of the contributions is annexed to the working paper, and complete proceedings will be distributed to participants in the Group of Scientific Experts (GSE) later this year.

At the time the Workshop took place, GSE was in the process of conducting its first preparatory data exchanges for its ongoing technical test, GSETT-2. We are encouraged by the results achieved so far during this test, as reported in the progress report from the twenty-ninth session of the GSE. We hope that at its forthcoming thirtieth session GSE will be able to report on further progress in this important undertaking.

Norway is participating in GSETT-2 by contributing seismic data from both the NORESS and ARCESS regional arrays. In this connection I would like to recall Norway's earlier proposal to the Conference on Disarmament contained in document CD/714, that the NORESS/ARCESS array concept could serve as standard for seismic stations within the global network as envisaged by GSE. We are confident that the results from GSETT-2 will confirm the important contributions that arrays of this type can make within such a future global network.

Mr. DONOWAKI (Japan): Mr. President; I should like to report on the result of the consultations on the question of a mandate for the establishment of the ad hoc committee on agenda item 1. However, since it is the first time I take the floor this month, please allow me to extend to you my delegation's congratulations on your assumption of the very important post of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. My delegation is pleased to see you in the Chair and to see that under your able and skilful guidance our work is making steady headway. In particular, the strong initiative you personally took by inviting co-ordinators of agenda item 1 to the last three presidential consultations contributed immensely to making it possible for us to arrive at the stage where we find ourselves today after so many months and so many years.

Now, I shall make a factual account of consultations conducted by my delegation on the question of a mandate for the establishment of the ad hoc committee on agenda item 1, "Nuclear test ban." As is well known, the consultation was initiated by my predecessor, Ambassador Yamada, when he was the President of the Conference in March last year. The Conference had been prevented from substantial work on the agenda item since 1984 due to the deadlock caused by conflicting group positions on the question of the mandate. Therefore, Ambassador Yamada embarked upon a process of a series of

(continued)

(Mr. Donowaki, Japan)

dialogues with each delegation on an informal and individual basis, in search of a way to disentangle ourselves from the impasse. Successive Presidents for the remaining months of last year encouraged Ambassador Yamada to continue his consultations. As early as at the end of last year's session of the Conference, Ambassador Yamada was convinced that the draft mandate contained in CD/863, which in turn was produced by Ambassador Vejvoda when he was the President of the Conference in 1987, could in fact be used as a basis to work out a consensus mandate, and this was stated in Ambassador Yamada's farewell speech before he left Geneva.

At the beginning of this year's session of the Conference, as was stated by the President of the Conference at the time, Ambassador Wagenmakers of the Netherlands, I willingly agreed to continue the consultations initiated by my predecessor. As a result of the continued consultations, I also could reconfirm for myself the conviction that the draft mandate in CD/863 could be used to disentangle ourselves from the impasse of conflicting group positions. By the end of February this year, all the groups, except for the Group of 21, expressed their readiness to take the draft mandate contained in CD/863 as a basis for negotiating a consensus mandate, without prejudice to their respective preferred mandates. However, due to the non-negotiating character of the Vejvoda draft mandate, the Group of 21 had to take a little longer time to consult within the Group. On 14 March, at the presidential consultation which was presided over by Ambassador Azikiwe of Nigeria, and to which agenda item 1 co-ordinators were also invited, the Group of 21 stated that it would not object, without prejudice to its position on this question as set out in document CD/829, to the taking of the Vejvoda draft mandate as a point of departure for consultation aimed at reaching agreement on a mandate for the ad hoc committee, if all other delegations were prepared to do so. This demonstration of flexibility on the part of the Group of 21 was appreciated by all other groups. The delegation of the People's Republic of China also expressed its readiness to go along with whatever consensus was reached by all other groups, as well as its readiness to participate in the work of the ad hoc committee when it was established.

Thereafter, there were several occasions where agenda item 1 co-ordinators met either by themselves or at the presidential consultations upon invitation. At these meetings it became clear the the Group of Eastern European Countries and Others, as well as the People's Republic of China, could accept the draft mandate in CD/863 without any wording changes, if other groups could do the same. The Western Group could not express its views because delegations were waiting for instructions from their capitals. The Group of 21, although it did not propose any amendments, was not in a position to state that it could accept the draft mandate without any amendments before it was informed of the position of the Western Group. Thus, it was the turn for the Western Group to take time for consultation.

On 3 July, at an extraordinary presidential consultation convened by you, Mr. President, a Group of Western Countries informed all other groups that it decided to accept, in a spirit of compromise, the draft mandate contained in CD/863 without any changes, and proposed that other groups should do the same. The Group of Eastern European Countries and Others, as well as the People's Republic of China, expressed willingness to agree to the proposal, but the Group of 21 expressed its wish to be given a little more time.

(Mr. Donowaki, Japan)

Finally, on 11 July, at the presidential consultation, the Group of 21 informed the rest of the groups that it also decided to accept the draft mandate contained in CD/863 without any changes, in a spirit of compromise and flexibility, which was welcomed by all the rest of the groups.

Mr. President, it is with sentiments of profound gratitude to you personally, and also to all the delegations around this table, as well as to Secretary-General Ambassador Komatina and his deputy, Ambassador Berasategui, that I can report to you of the successful completion of my delegation's consultation on the question of the mandate for agenda item 1. On behalf of my predecessor and myself, and on behalf of my delegation, I wish to express our utmost appreciation of the warm words of encouragement expressed to us on a number of occasions, and also of the generous support and understanding extended to us during the last 16 months. My statement will be far from complete without expressing also our thankfulness to the dedicated wisdom of Ambassador Vejvoda of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic for leaving us with a very thoughtful draft text of a mandate which is no other than the one we have in front of us today. I would like to ask Ambassador Králík to convey my delegation's appreciation and best regards to Ambassador Vejvoda.

Lastly, let me add one further point. In 1982 and 1983, when we had an ad hoc committee on agenda item 1, two nuclear-weapon States did not participate in the work of the Ad hoc Committee, which was regretted by all the rest of the delegations at that time. This time, although the participation of France has not yet been promised, the People's Republic of China has, as I reported earlier, made it clear that it would participate in the work of the ad hoc committee when it is established, and I am confident that this very significant and very positive step taken by our Chinese colleague will be whole-heartedly welcomed by delegations around the table.

The PRESIDENT: The 565th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.

As a result of the informal meeting just held, I invite the Conference to take action on several organizational questions. I suggest that we take up, first, document CD/WP.387, containing a draft decision for the mandate of an ad hoc committee under agenda item 1, entitled "Nuclear test ban". If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

I shall now put before the Conference for decision the appointment of the representative of Japan, Ambassador Mitsuro Donowaki, as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee just re-established. I understand that there is agreement on his appointment.

It was so decided.

Mr. DONOWAKI (Japan): I am indeed honoured and overwhelmed by the support and trust extended to me by you, Mr. President, and by all the Groups and delegations here. In accepting the nomination humbly, I wish to make myself clear about my willingness and readiness to serve as best I can all of you in chairing the work of the Ad hoc Committee which has just been established.

I certainly look forward to working together with all the delegations with the support of our secretariat, in trying to set ourselves on the right track in our quest for a truly meaningful approach with respect to the task assigned to us under the mandate which has just been adopted by us. The task entrusted to the Ad hoc Committee is of great importance and, at the same time, of enormous complexity with far-reaching political implications. How competent the Ad hoc Committee will be in dealing with the challenge is bound to be closely followed not only by our capitals but also by various quarters of the world outside this conference room. Whether our Ad hoc Committee will be able to make any meaningful progress in its deliberations of the agenda item will largely depend upon our own ability, resourcefulness and resolve. Therefore, as the newly appointed Chairman, while I pledge to dedicate myself to serving you as best I can, I humbly request all my colleagues to demonstrate as much as possible the spirit of compromise, co-operation and flexibility which has been demonstrated abundantly during the course of the consultations conducted by my delegation on the question of the mandate for agenda item 1.

Mr. WAGENMAKERS (Netherlands):

... Today I would like to make a statement on behalf of a Group of Western States and the wording of the statement is as follows:

"On behalf of the delegations of Australia, Belgium, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States of America and of my own delegation, I would like to make a statement about the decision that we have just taken to establish an ad hoc committee under item 1 of our agenda.

Before addressing the subject matter itself, we would like to thank Ambassador Donowaki of Japan and, through him, his predecessor Ambassador Yamada, for the work they put into bringing the Conference to this point. We also congratulate Ambassador Donowaki on his appointment to chair the Ad hoc Committee. The consensus now established will permit our Conference to restart detailed work under this agenda item after a long delay.

We look forward to detailed discussion in the Committee of the various substantive issues relating to verification and compliance as well as structure and scope. We as a group and as individual States are ready to participate fully.

We are pleased that the Conference agreed that the Committee should be established taking the wording of the draft mandate contained in document CD/863, the work of our former President, Ambassador Vejvoda, without any change.

We are firmly of the belief that the Conference on Disarmament, as the only global multilateral negotiating forum for disarmament questions, is the most appropriate place for in-depth discussion of multilateral aspects of a nuclear test ban.

In our view, consideration of the question of a nuclear test ban is still at the exploratory stage. It is therefore proper that the mandate which we have given to the Committee does not require it to enter into negotiation of a treaty text. Before that stage can be reached there is much work to be done, examining the complex of issues appertaining to this topic, for which this mandate is completely adequate.

Since the Conference on Disarmament last had an ad hoc committee on this subject, much as been done relevant to the question of nuclear testing, and particularly in development and implementation of verification methods. We have in mind the important work of the Group of Scientific Experts, and, in the bilateral field, the procedures developed

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

by the United States and the Soviet Union for verification of the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. However, much more needs to be done to address the full range of verification issues.

It should be noted that formation of this Committee is consistent with the principal aim of the Partial Test Ban Treaty, as restated in the preamble to the non-proliferation Treaty.

It is our conviction that we should use to the full the limited time available to the Committee in this latter part of the summer session. We would therefore propose that work should begin immediately with a preliminary exchange of views covering the whole range of issues and that the question of a detailed work programme should be looked at in parallel.

We believe that establishment of an ad hoc committee in the Conference on Disarmament to deal with a ban on nuclear testing will help us toward our ultimate goal: a world free of nuclear weapons, in peace and stability."

Mr. CHADHA (India): I am taking the floor on behalf of the Group of 21. May I, at the outset, say how happy we are in the Group of 21 to see you, Sir, preside over our deliberations this month. We would like to pay a warm tribute to you and to Ambassadors Yamada and Donowaki for the untiring efforts which have led to the decision we have just taken for the establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on agenda item 1, entitled "Nuclear test ban", an event which has been anxiously awaited by the Group of 21 for so long. The Group would like to extend its felicitations to Ambassador Donowaki on his well-deserved election as the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee. We have no doubt that, with his experience and diplomatic skill, of which he has given ample evidence in the course of the informal consultations which made today's decision possible, he will be eminently successful in guiding the deliberations of the Ad hoc Committee to a fruitful conclusion.

No issue in the field of disarmament is more urgent and crucial today than putting an end to nuclear tests. A comprehensive test-ban treaty is long overdue. The Conference on Disarmament as the single multilateral negotiating body has the primary role in negotiations to achieve this objective, and its achievement will enhance its credibility.

The objective of a nuclear test ban has been repeatedly emphasized in numerous documents adopted unanimously by the United Nations, including the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and in the declaration adopted by the Heads of State or Government of the Non-aligned Summit in Belgrade. As a significant contribution to the aim of halting and reversing the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, the Group of 21 has consistently advocated and has continued to attach the highest priority to a nuclear test ban. Despite this commitment of the

(Mr. Chadha, India)

international community, and the recent upturn in the world political climate, there has been no let-up in the qualitative improvement in nuclear weapons. It has been recognized that a ban on nuclear tests will contribute effectively to the arresting of the nuclear arms spiral.

Since 1984 the Group of 21 has made efforts to establish an ad hoc committee with an appropriate mandate on a nuclear test ban and has repeatedly demonstrated flexibility by advancing various proposals in the search for consensus towards this end. At the beginning of the annual session of the CD this year, the Group had again reiterated that the draft mandate contained in document CD/829 was best suited to accommodate the different positions of all delegations represented in the CD and constituted a sound basis for developing a consensus. This draft mandate had been found acceptable by the Group of Socialist States and the People's Republic of China.

In the spirit of further compromise and flexibility, and in order to facilitate the setting up of an ad hoc committee on item 1 in the CD, the Group of 21 had not objected to the taking of document CD/863 as a basis for a mandate for the ad hoc committee. Without prejudice to its continuing preference for a mandate like the one contained in CD/829, the group has decided not to object to the taking of CD/863 as a mandate for the establishment of the Ad hoc Committee this year.

The Group of 21 considers it essential that the setting up of the Ad hoc Committee should lead to concrete negotiations towards a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty on an urgent basis, and that the committee should not get bogged down in an endless debate on a work programme or on verification prerequisites while the central issue of negotiating a treaty on a nuclear test ban remains unresolved. In view of the fact that the Committee will function for a short period this year, the Group is of the opinion that the CD session next year should be fully utilized for attaining the goal of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty.

The Group of 21 is convinced that the available techniques of verification, both national and international, are already sufficient to support a comprehensive test-ban treaty, which should aim at the general and complete cessation of nuclear testing by all States in all environments for all time.

The international community has recognized that questions relating to verification and compliance can only be considered in tandem with other aspects of a treaty. Paragraph 31 of the Final Document of SSOD-I states: "Disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and ensure that they are being observed by all parties. The form and modalities of the verification to be provided in any agreement depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement".

The Group believes that the nuclear test-ban treaty should be non-discriminatory and comprehensive in character so as to attract universal adherence and should include a verification system that is universal in its application, non-discriminatory in nature, and guarantees equal access to all States.

Mr. DIETZE (German Democratic Republic): The Group of Eastern European and Other Countries, on whose behalf I have the honour to take the floor, welcomes the fact that, after years of consultations, the Conference on Disarmament is in a position to agree on a mandate for the Ad hoc Committee on item 1 of its agenda "Nuclear test ban". It reflects, in our opinion, the declared readiness and political resolve to start dealing with all aspects related to a nuclear test ban in the framework of the Ad hoc Committee to be established. This will give us the opportunity to do substantive work within the Conference on Disarmament on test ban issues, in general, and on related specific issues, such as structure and scope as well as verification and compliance.

Let me take this very occasion to express our appreciation to Ambassador Donawaki and, through him, to Ambassador Yamada for the strenuous efforts undertaken to reach consensus today, 45 years after the first nuclear test, on this crucial matter.

And let me also express our satisfaction that the mandate proposed in document CD/863 was a solid foundation to find a consensus.

Pursuant to the mandate agreed upon, the Ad hoc Committee will take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives. In addition, we believe that the Committee will draw upon the knowledge and experience accumulated over the years.

The Eastern Group would welcome it if the Ad hoc Committee would settle down to work as soon as possible. For that reason, we are prepared to start the work of the Ad hoc Committee immediately, based on the main elements contained in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the mandate agreed upon just now. Such an approach would keep the momentum gathered and would allow us to proceed with the practical work related to a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

At the same time, the Eastern Group is supporting the idea that we should use the forthcoming months to prepare a more detailed programme of work for the Ad hoc Committee so that it can proceed with its work without delay at the beginning of the Conference's 1991 session.

Finally, I would like to use this opportunity to express the extreme pleasure felt by the delegations of the Eastern Group at seeing a representative of Japan presiding over the Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban in the weeks to come. We are convinced that Ambassador Donowaki, thanks to his personal commitment, his great experience and diplomatic skill, will enable the Committee to gain the momentum to which I have already referred. I assure Ambassador Donowaki of our fullest support. I do this especially in my capacity as Group Co-ordinator for item 1 of our agenda.

Mr. HOU (China) (translated from Chinese):

... Mr. President, under your presidency, this plenary meeting has just adopted by consensus a decision on the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on item 1 of the agenda of the Conference, namely "Nuclear test ban". This marks a new progress made by the Conference in this field of great importance. The Chinese delegation would like to extend its congratulations to you and to all other delegations and express its appreciation for your energetic and effective inspirations, as well as the spirit of compromise manifested by all sides. Here I would like to mention in particular the tireless and unyielding efforts made by the distinguished Ambassador of Japan, Mr. Donowaki. The Chinese delegation congratulates the representative of Japan, a close neighbour of China, on his assumption of the chairmanship of the Ad hoc Committee and hopes that under his guidance the Ad hoc Committee will achieve substantive results.

Like all other countries of the international community, China has always attached a great importance to the question of a nuclear test ban, which is one of the priority issues on the Conference's agenda. The re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee after an interregnum of six years is the result of the strong demand and the relentless efforts of the whole international community in general and the vast number of third world countries, including the non-aligned countries in particular. For this reason, the Chinese delegation would like to express its appreciation to all sides concerned, and particularly the Group of 21, for their relentless efforts and outstanding contributions.

(Mr. Hou, China)

In his important statement made at the Conference on Disarmament not long ago, the Chinese Foreign Minister, Mr. Qian Qichen, expounded comprehensively the principles of the Chinese Government on the issues of nuclear disarmament and a nuclear test ban. Having all along stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all nuclear weapons and made unremitting efforts to this end, China sympathizes with, and understands, the ardent desire of the vast number of third world countries and other non-nuclear-weapon States for the early realization of a complete prohibition of nuclear tests. It is in this spirit that the Chinese delegation welcomes the statement on this issue of a nuclear test ban just made by the Group of 21. As is known, China has always exercised the utmost restraint and prudence as regards nuclear tests. China is actively preparing itself for its participation in the test of international seismic data exchange. Here I would like to reaffirm that the delegation of the People's Republic of China will take an active part in the work of the Ad hoc Committee and together with all other delegations work for the early materialization of a nuclear test ban and effective nuclear disarmament.

Mr. de la BAUME (France) (translated from French): As the Conference will have noted, my delegation did not object to the consensus on re-establishing an ad hoc committee on item 1 of the agenda, "Nuclear test ban", nor did we oppose the adoption of a mandate for the Ad hoc Committee in accordance with document CD/863.

However, my delegation would like to remind the Conference of the content of the statement it made in plenary on 18 July last year. I quote: "We shall refrain from participating in any exercise which corresponds to a conception of nuclear disarmament that we do not share". France's position of principle on the subject is well known and has not changed. My delegation will have occasion to revert to it at greater length when the time is ripe.

Mr. KENYON (United Kingdom): The United Kingdom was one of those Western member States on whose behalf Ambassador Wagenmakers has just spoken. We fully associate ourselves with his statement regarding the establishment of an ad hoc committee to discuss nuclear testing issues in accordance with item 1 of our agenda. We will play a full part in the work of the Committee. The policy of my Government on the matter of nuclear testing is well known. For the foreseeable future, the United Kingdom's security will depend on deterrence based, in part, on the possession of nuclear weapons. That will mean a continuing requirement to conduct underground nuclear tests to ensure that our nuclear weapons remain effective and up-to-date. A comprehensive test ban remains a long-term goal. Progress will be made only by a step-by-step approach. This must take account of technical advances on verification, as well as progress elsewhere in arms control and the attitude of other States. My delegation looks forward to discussing all these issues in the Ad hoc Committee. We hope its substantive work can begin soon so that some of the important ground can be covered in the weeks ahead. We plan to make an active contribution.

(Mr. Kenyon, United Kingdom)

Finally, may I add our congratulations to Ambassador Donowaki on his appointment to chair the Committee and his efforts in bringing about consensus on a mandate. This makes his appointment particularly appropriate. I am sure he will bring the same distinction to his new role as the Chairman of the Committee.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): The United States is also pleased that the Conference on Disarmament has now formed a committee to work on item 1 of its agenda, "Nuclear test ban". We have heard today important statements from Groups and from individual States. As a nuclear-weapon State with responsibilities to others that go beyond our own direct national defence and far beyond our national boundaries, the United States has a profound interest in this topic. The United States general views were also represented in the statement given a few minutes ago by Ambassador Wagenmakers on behalf of a group comprising most of the Western countries. But let me give the Conference some brief additional comments that relate to the national position of the United States.

The position of the United States with regard to a test ban has not changed. In a spirit of compromise to facilitate the formation of the Committee, we have set aside our reservations about document CD/863 and agreed to accept that non-negotiating text as the mandate. It is our intent to participate fully in the work of the Committee, listening carefully to the views of others, presenting our views and sharing the results of our research and relevant technologies. A comprehensive nuclear test ban remains a long-term United States objective. Such a ban must be viewed in the context of a time when the United States no longer needs to depend on nuclear deterrence to ensure international security and stability. And when the following have been achieved: broad, deep and verifiable arms reductions; greatly improved verification capabilities; expanded confidence-building measures; and greater balance in conventional forces.

In sum, the United States will continue to approach the question of a nuclear test ban with a step-by-step approach which takes into account the security criteria I just mentioned. Only in this way can we prudently preserve our security and the security of others to whom we have commitments as substantial political change proceeds in the international arena.

Mr. SMIDOVICH (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The USSR delegation fully subscribes to the views expressed by Ambassador Dietze in his statement on behalf of the Group of Eastern European and Other Countries, of which the Soviet Union is a member.

The USSR delegation intends to take a most active part in the work of the recently established Ad hoc Committee in all areas of its activity. The aim of our efforts remains unchanged: the earliest possible full ban on nuclear-weapon tests. The Soviet Union's main approaches to the achievement of this aim were set out in the statement by the Head of the USSR delegation to the Conference on Disarmament, S. Batsanov, on 28 June this year. Thank you very much.

Mr. HYLTEINIUS (Sweden): Mr. President, let me first congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of this Conference. This month, we have already been able to register a major achievement in the decision to establish an ad hoc committee on the nuclear test ban. I am convinced that we will continue to work and to make progress under your stewardship characterized by your experience, tact and your sense of humour. I would also like to express the gratitude of my delegation to Ambassador de Rivero for the skilful manner in which he guided our work in the month of June.

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

... The nuclear items on our present agenda have received very little attention in the form of structured work. After having for so many years been overdue, the nuclear test-ban issue will, however, now be treated in an ad hoc committee. The Swedish delegation welcomes this positive development. A nuclear test ban would be an unequivocal manifestation of political will on the part of the nuclear-weapon States to bring a halt to continued qualitative improvements of nuclear weapons. It would, furthermore, be an important contribution to efforts to prevent horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. The instrumentality of a nuclear test ban in bringing about a cessation of the nuclear arms race and promoting nuclear disarmament cannot be questioned by anyone. A CTBT would be the single most important contribution to nuclear disarmament.

A nuclear test ban is of great relevance to agenda item 2, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". Other measures have been identified, inter alia in connection with the informal plenary meetings that have taken place this year. In some instances, similar or identical measures

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

are also pertinent in the context of the prevention of nuclear war and to item 3 on our agenda. My delegation would have no difficulty in merging items 2 and 3. The essential thing is to bring about a more structured approach to these issues than hitherto. Various ideas have been discussed that could usefully be systematized by the secretariat in the form of a compilation.

(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)

... It is in this light that we see more favourable conditions for accelerating the pace towards disarmament. Such an assessment is continually being reaffirmed. Although we may differ in opinion as to the extent to which the last summit between the two big Powers has met all our expectations, it seems to us that it basically confirmed the continuity in the disarmament negotiations intentions. We welcome the general accord to conclude, in the near future, agreements on the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons, on the limitation of nuclear testing, on the obligation to destroy the bulk of chemical arsenals, on the halting of chemical arms production, on the intensification of negotiations on conventional weapons in Europe, etc. These accords can give strong impulse to the work of our Conference. Although, in our view, less was achieved than had been announced, we wish to believe that the horizon is more clear and that the most important disarmament agreements are at hand's reach. We are heartened by the information offered us by the distinguished Ambassadors, Mr. Burt and Mr. Nazarkin, on bilateral negotiations.

... While not ignoring any problem on the agenda, our efforts, in the immediate work of our Conference, should continue to be focused on three priority questions, namely, items 1, 4 and 5. By treating these questions in a substantial way, and by making real progress, we can strengthen the role of the Conference. We support, of course, all the efforts to enhance the effectiveness of the Conference by improving its method of work and its organization. However, our credibility will depend, first of all, on how capable we are in solving problems which are ripe for it, in clarifying that which should be clarified as soon as possible and in defining that which should be defined. In doing so we must always keep in mind that our Conference is a negotiating body, the ultimate aim of which is the dialogue on all negotiating, pre-negotiating and deliberative levels, leading to the concluding of disarmament agreements.

(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)

... I believe there is no need to repeat the significance of the Conference's engagement in dealing substantially with the problem of nuclear testing - especially now, in the context of the Fourth NPT Review Conference, which cannot circumvent either element of the non-proliferation régime, including cessation of testing, peaceful exploitation of nuclear energy, nuclear disarmament and so on. As has been repeated several times, the complete cessation of testing, that is the conclusion of a CTBT, would be the most effective single measure in checking the nuclear arms race, the most secure and the shortest way towards nuclear disarmament and the slowing down of the qualitative development of nuclear weapons. In connection with this we should underline the significant work already done by the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts on enhancing verification by elaborating a global system of seismic verification, and which is also prepared to test the system's new verification techniques.

The signing of the Protocols on Verification of the so-called threshold agreement is, of course, a measure we welcome. These gradual steps have, however, to be put in a context of predictable advance towards the conclusion of the agreement on a comprehensive ban on all nuclear tests in any environment and for all time. Unfortunately, such an objective has not yet been accepted by all nuclear Powers.

We highly welcome the agreement on setting up the Ad hoc Committee on a NTB, as the culmination of year-long efforts to have the Conference take part in resolving this key issue of nuclear disarmament and so confirm its role in treating nuclear issues. We are grateful to Ambassador Donowaki of Japan, who, together with Ambassador Yamada, successfully carried out consultations which led to a reasonably balanced mandate.

The Conference is a representative enough body that cannot avoid its responsibility in treating this problem, especially now when the time of deep re-evaluation of all military and defence doctrines has begun. We are convinced that the Conference can give a significant contribution to this

(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)

issue in spite of the differences of opinions. We hope that the founding of the Committee will be an opportunity for a genuine debate on this key issue. The mandate itself offers a sufficient framework for a well-structured exchange of views as a basis for next year's substantial work. We believe that this exchange of views should not be a repetition of well-known positions on nuclear disarmament, but a focused, substantial discussion on specific, concrete aspects of the nuclear test ban.

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

... In the debate on nuclear disarmament one cannot avoid mentioning the issue of testing. Early next year a major conference will take place to look into the possibility of converting the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water into a comprehensive test-ban treaty. We understand and respect the concerns of those States which have called for this "PTBT amendment conference". There is no doubt that, according to the Treaty, States have the right to call for or to propose amendments. If the Netherlands has any doubts concerning the expediency of such a conference, it does so mainly for practical reasons. It seems to us that the positions of various States on the issue of a comprehensive test ban are still much too far apart. Consensus on the issue eludes us so far. It seems, therefore, that the outcome of the conference will almost certainly not meet the hopes and efforts of the States which originally came forward with the idea of a Treaty amendment conference. After all, it is because of the fact that certain divergences of view proved insurmountable at the time of its creation, that the Partial Test Ban Treaty was given only limited scope. There is no indication that this situation has changed, notwithstanding the progress in seismic verification methods. The call for amending the Treaty is therefore premature.

Despite the doubts which my Government harbours on the procedure and the possible outcome of the Treaty amendment conference, it will participate in a positive spirit. A debate on the issue of nuclear tests might well lead to a better understanding of the issues involved. This would serve us all.

In the CD we have just reached agreement on the establishment of an ad hoc committee under agenda item 1, "Nuclear test ban". It took the CD years to achieve consensus on the re-establishment of an ad hoc committee. It was, indeed, an almost painful process and this by itself is a clear token of the complexity of the issue as well as of the clear emotions it carries with it. Here again we find no room for radical and simple solutions.

The Netherlands position on nuclear-testing limitations is clear and has been explained on a number of occasions: nuclear tests should be reduced both in number and in yield, concurrent with the ongoing process of deep reductions in nuclear arsenals. We do subscribe to the goal of a CTBT, the realization of which should be seen in the context of a process of disarmament. Along the

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(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

road of reducing both nuclear weapons and the reliance on those weapons in the strategy of dissuasion, halting tests could be contemplated as a further stimulus to rid the world of nuclear weapons eventually.

Does this mean that the role of the Conference on Disarmament on the issue of a nuclear test ban is condemned and reduced to be a marginal one? No! The fact that the Ad hoc Committee's mandate provides for the initiation of substantive work on specific and interrelated test-ban issues, including verification and compliance, as well as structure and scope, in the framework of an ad hoc committee, is a clear indication of our common commitment. All of us do attach major political importance to paving the road, or, if you prefer, to preparing the ground for future negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

There are numerous aspects to be discussed, e.g. matters like an international seismic monitoring network, assessment of present and potential capabilities for monitoring compliance, the necessary institutional arrangements, other specific verification problems and new technologies. Solving these issues will be crucial for a future test-ban treaty. In view of their complexity it cannot be excluded that the actual agreement itself, the total cessation of nuclear tests, when time is ripe, will turn out to be the easiest part of all. In saying so, I refer to the encouragement to be taken from the agreements reached by the Soviet Union and the United States on threshold test-ban verification. We do hope and expect that they will continue along the same road and will speedily address the important issue of further limitation of the number and yield of tests. We note the call by the USSR for the next bilateral round to start in September next.

There is also the ongoing work of the Group of Scientific Experts. The GSE have indicated to the Conference on Disarmament their desire for proper political impetus and direction. We believe this is indeed opportune, since the occasion to do so presents itself now. The Netherlands has actively contributed to the work of the GSE. It is clear in our view that seismic methods are the corner-stone for effective verification of a future treaty. The experience with GSETT-2 will, in our opinion, be quite telling in this regard. Even with the limited detection capability in the Netherlands we were already able to identify 65 per cent of all underground nuclear explosions in 1989. International exchange of data will lead to substantial detection and identification capabilities.

In the CD there are a number of practical and specific steps in this regard that we could take: the President of the Conference could convey to the Chairman of the GSE a message of unconditional support for the work of the GSE and for the ongoing GSETT-2 experiment in particular; the CD could ask the GSE to make an assessment of present and potential seismic detection and identification capabilities. In the first GSE report such an assessment was made, but that is more than 10 years ago; nuclear-weapon States could be called upon to provide information about the precise time, location and yield of their nuclear tests. This information should be given soon after the nuclear test and be passed on to our respective national seismology divisions. It would help them considerably in their research.

(Mr. Wayarabi, Indonesia)

... In this connection, my delegation is pleased to note the establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. In this respect, I wish to pay tribute to Ambassador Donowaki of Japan, and to his predecessor, Ambassador Yamada, as well as to the President of the Conference for the month of July, Ambassador Sujka of Poland, for their tireless endeavours to finally establish the Committee.

It is to be noted that the Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban only started working in the second week of July and will continue during the first two weeks of August. There will be only four weeks left for the Committee to discuss matters relevant to its work prior to the period when the Conference starts discussing its report to the United Nations General Assembly. The four weeks envisaged will be quite insufficient for even an elaboration of a programme of work, let alone for a discussion on substantive issues. I suggest, therefore, that the very precious time still available be fully utilized to discuss and decide matters relevant to the future work of the Committee. We should take a decision by the end of this summer session on the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban at the beginning of the next spring session, in order that the work towards the total elimination of nuclear testing is undertaken as expeditiously as possible.

In discussing the question of a nuclear test ban, I wish to refer to the contents of the preambular paragraphs of the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty. It should be recalled that the original parties proclaimed as one of their principal aims the speediest possible achievement of an agreement which would eliminate the incentive to produce and test all kinds of weapons, including

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(Mr. Wayarabi, Indonesia)

nuclear weapons. It is solemnly accepted therefore that the ultimate objective of the PTBT is a total ban on all nuclear tests. Within the Conference, as well as in New York, attempts have been made for some years now to lead us to that goal. With the decision to convene the PTBT amendment conference, avenues are open to us today both in this Conference and in New York. Yet, the establishment of an Ad hoc Committee in the Conference and the forthcoming PTBT amendment conference should not infringe on one another. The work of the Ad hoc Committee and that of the PTBT amendment conference to be held in January 1991 should, on the contrary, be in tandem with, and mutually complement each other.

Indonesia has long since adhered to the Treaty and has never sought nuclear weapons options for its defence purposes. In the light of the latest developments in this Conference, as well as of the preparations for the amendment conference of the PTBT, my delegation entertains optimism that universal acceptance of the stand taken by the majority of non-nuclear-weapon States, including my own, will hopefully gain ground in the near future. The era in which the major protagonists have overcome the legacy of decades of suspicion and mutual distrust does not need any nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)

... It is beyond doubt that the banning of nuclear tests is among our priorities. We cannot, therefore, but welcome the Conference's decision to re-establish the Ad hoc Committee to look into this matter. Tribute is also due to the persistent action undertaken with discreet efficiency by Ambassador Donowaki, action that crowns the efforts begun by his predecessor Ambassador Yamada. We regret, however, that the Committee does not have a negotiating mandate. In the circumstances, the limitations and constraints that weigh on the Committee's activities must be offset by willingness to ensure its continued existence.

The banning of nuclear tests has never been considered as an end in itself. On the contrary, it is seen as a necessary and indispensable stage in the long process of dismantling and eliminating nuclear weapons. It is, to our mind, there that lies the purpose of drafting a treaty on a comprehensive nuclear test ban. It is a matter of strengthening confidence, of striving to define a mutually agreed concept of security based on the search for peace and stability. We should like to express the hope that the Committee to which the study of this question has just been entrusted will make a decisive contribution towards the achievement of that goal.

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

... One of the most important items inscribed on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament is the nuclear test ban. Over the years, many States, including my own, have argued that no genuine cessation of the nuclear arms race would be possible without achieving a comprehensive test ban.

In 1980, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, with the assistance of a group of four experts, published a study on a comprehensive test ban where he stated that achieving a test ban was of vital importance as an "indispensable first step towards halting the nuclear arms race". The said report stated in paragraph 15, and I quote:

"As a result of the failure to stop nuclear testing, many States became disillusioned and increasingly discontented. Non-nuclear-weapon States in general came to regard the achievement of a comprehensive test ban as a litmus test of the determination of the nuclear-weapon States to halt the arms race".

My delegation would like at this stage to pay tribute to the important efforts exerted by Ambassador Donawaki of Japan to bring to fruition the tireless efforts of his predecessor, Ambassador Yamada, who is now, I may say, a very valued and active Ambassador in Cairo. We are happy to note the consensus reached on the Czechoslovak mandate contained in document CD/863 which my delegation accepted as a point of departure. We hope that this important body will proceed to work promptly on the subject-matter and avoid unnecessary entanglement in procedural wrangles at the cost of substantive achievements.

The Ad hoc Committee should, in the view of my delegation, agree on an acceptable programme of work that would take into consideration the necessary elements of elaborating a framework, structure and scope of a draft treaty which should include, by definition, acceptable and verifiable means of verification and compliance. The excellent work achieved so far by the scientific group of seismic experts should be utilized by Ambassador Donowaki to enhance the work of this Ad hoc Committee. My delegation considers that this Committee should facilitate the work of, and become a catalyst for the upcoming NPT Review Conference and the amendment conference of the Partial Test Ban Treaty by allowing for progress in reaching an early agreement on a nuclear test ban.

The PRESIDENT: The 569th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.

... I hope it is a great satisfaction to all of us that we were able to find a compromise solution to a long-standing item on our agenda, namely re-establishment of an ad hoc committee on a nuclear test ban. Let me convey once again my sincere congratulations to Ambassador Donowaki of Japan, as well as to his predecessor in this endeavour, Ambassador Yamada. Their patient but tireless efforts, their innumerable consultations here in Geneva and outside finally were crowned with success. At the same time it is our common success, because it is also a reflection of the spirit of co-operation and compromise so needed in our joint efforts in search of a consensus. I would like also to congratulate Ambassador Donowaki for his appointment as the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. We are confident that under his able chairmanship we will continue to pave the way for future negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty.

(The President)

In the months ahead there will be a very active debate on nuclear disarmament, including the Fourth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the "PTBT amendment conference". At the same time the Conference on Disarmament remains an important forum of this debate. Just yesterday the Group of Scientific Experts resumed its work related to the GSETT-2 experiment. Today we are completing our series of informal meetings on agenda items 2 and 3. During these meetings we had also an opportunity to address various issues related to the strategic arms negotiations, which no doubt have an important bearing on the whole nuclear disarmament debate.

(The President)

... At the same time, Romania attaches due importance to the other items on the agenda of the Conference, in particular those aimed at nuclear disarmament and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. While supporting the goal of a total nuclear test ban, Romania accepts the principle of achieving this goal step by step. It welcomes any agreement on the limitation of underground tests and is ready to support any new moves in that direction. It is with particular pleasure that we noted the Conference's recent decision on the creation of an Ad hoc Committee on a nuclear test ban. We wish to make the most concrete contribution we can to the substantive consideration of this topic in order ultimately to attain the prohibition of all nuclear tests. It is in the same spirit that my country participates in the work of the group of experts on the detection of nuclear tests by seismic means and the international programme under way in this field.

... That ends the message from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Romania addressed to the Conference on Disarmament.

(Mr. Morel, France)

... Our country, therefore, has always considered that deterrence is defensive by its very nature. It precludes all superfluity, but it implies the maintenance of forces' credibility and the exercise of technological vigilance taking into account the state of the international environment and cannot, in the present circumstances, do without nuclear experiments.

... This, then, is the fundamental reason for our position of principle on the question of a nuclear test ban, a ban to which we cannot subscribe in the form now given to it, namely that of a kind of preliminary to nuclear disarmament. The halting of tests is an integral, inseparable part of the whole of nuclear disarmament.

While continuing with its experiments, France has recently reduced the annual number of its explosions from eight to six. In that regard, it is following a policy of transparency which has made it possible for several international teams of independent specialists to come and verify on the spot the harmlessness of the French tests and pursuant to which my Government is now notifying each test carried out. Thus, from 18 to 20 April last, France was host in French Polynesia to a team of 30 doctors, including 10 members of the French branch of the Association of Doctors for the Prevention of Nuclear War, an organization which received a Nobel Peace Prize in 1985, and the team was able to carry out its inquiry freely at the Mururoa site and to hold a press conference in Tahiti during which it concluded that the French tests had no impact either on public health or on the environment.

Here, and as it announced in July last year, my delegation did not obstruct the consensus of the Conference with respect to the re-establishment of an ad hoc committee on a test ban. But, as its position of principle remains unchanged as to the priorities in nuclear disarmament, it does not see how it could join in an exercise which contradicts those priorities.

We are ready, however, to participate in the parallel technical activities that in no way prejudge the political aspects of the question. That is why we participated in the seminar organized at the beginning of the year in Oslo on regional seismic detection stations and are participating, for the second time, in the experimental exchange of seismic data which is now under way in connection with the work of the Group of Scientific Experts.

(Mr. Králík, Czech and Slovak Federal Republic)

... Allow me to put forward, from the standpoint of this criterion, our position on those questions which deserve the closest attention and greatest effort on the part of all regions represented at this Conference. These are in particular items 1, 4 and 5. I wholeheartedly concur with the opinion of

(Mr. Králík, Czech and Slovak Federal Republic)

several other delegations that in order to make substantial progress this Conference must concentrate its efforts on a smaller number of agenda items. I highly value the consensus of all the participants in this room for a renewal of the Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. Our delegation is particularly pleased by this because the Committee began its work on the basis of the draft mandate proposed by Czechoslovakia in 1988. We look forward to seeing this Committee, in keeping with its mandate, contribute towards achieving that long-anticipated goal - a general and total ban on nuclear weapons testing. In this context, we want to express our conviction that the global ban on nuclear testing is the most effective measure on the path to the total elimination of that "inheritance of Satan", humankind's immense nuclear arsenal. And not just that. This ban also represents a stable barrier against the qualitative development of nuclear weapons. We believe that the work of this Committee is directed toward determining concrete aspects of the nuclear test ban. In this respect, the amendment conference to the PTBT, to be held in New York next January, will certainly make a contribution. The broadening of the scope of the Moscow Treaty of 1963 to include underground explosions too closes the logical circle of nuclear testing. In this connection, we want to express our support for the view that it would be very appropriate to limit the possibilities for simply exchanging military explosions for detonations for peaceful purposes by making this ban also cover the latter.

Mr. AZIKIWE (Nigeria):

... While acknowledging the importance of these bilateral developments, my delegation believes that disarmament is an issue of concern to all States. Bilateral efforts should therefore complement the work of the Conference on Disarmament, the single multilateral negotiating forum. We must ensure that the intrinsic qualities of this body are fully utilized for the purpose of securing global disarmament measures. By proclaiming the Third Disarmament Decade last May in New York, the United Nations Disarmament Commission underlined the need for the international community to seek early reduction of nuclear weapons and work towards a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

Nuclear items which have been accorded the highest priority in our agenda have received very little attention in our work. We welcome the recent re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban after almost seven years. We are grateful to Ambassador Donowaki of Japan for his tireless efforts in ensuring that the Ad hoc Committee was established. We are also grateful to his predecessor, Ambassador Yamada, whose perseverance and diplomatic skills are noteworthy. We share the view expressed last Tuesday by Ambassador Nabil Elaraby of Egypt in his statement that the Committee "should also agree on a programme of work that would take into consideration the necessary elements of elaborating a framework, structure and scope of a draft treaty which should include, by definition, acceptable and verifiable means of verification and compliance". Indeed, the international community expects to see negotiations leading to a very rapid process of elimination of nuclear

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(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

weapons. It is therefore with profound consternation that my delegation continues to hear of the supposed continuing validity of the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, and the intention of some nuclear-weapon States to retain nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future.

We are familiar with the arguments against a comprehensive test ban. My delegation appreciates the emotional and political fear and fixations about inspection and verification arrangements. But if the risk is that of daring the good faith of one another and not of mutual annihilation, it should be taken before it is too late. If the risk is not to diminish their current military capabilities, but to avoid the spread of nuclear weapons, it should be taken now. If the risk is not to challenge their present leadership roles in the world, but to enhance the performance of the primary responsibility assigned to them through the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security, that risk should be taken now to ban all nuclear tests.

My delegation is encouraged to press this point because both super-Powers have hitherto always respected the agreements they have reached. We opened this session amidst further relaxation of East-West tensions and the prospects of reversing the decades of nuclear armament. As East-West tension appears to have subsided, the time is ripe for the nuclear-weapon States to extend the new spirit of co-operation to a comprehensive test ban.

My delegation is aware of the complexities of the issues involved in the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament. This notwithstanding, we are greatly worried that the CD has very little to report - and this has become the rule rather than the exception - except a catalogue of discussion and more discussion - although we all recognize that a CTB is an indispensable step on the road to positive nuclear disarmament.

Mr. CALDERON (Peru) (translated from Spanish):

... I should also like to pay tribute to Ambassador Mitsuro Donowaki and his predecessor, Ambassador Yamada, who, by their experience and persistence, made possible the establishment of the Ad hoc Committee to deal with the topic of a nuclear test ban. We hope that, as from 1991, that Committee will be able to embark on substantive discussions concerning the structure and scope of a convention that will ban nuclear testing in all environments. To have achieved such a result after six years of untiring efforts is undoubtedly a first step in the right direction. We are convinced that rather than being the product of a specific set of circumstances, the important achievement on item 1 of our agenda is a genuine reflection of our resolve to avoid any further postponement of substantive work of the negotiation of a definitive nuclear-test-ban treaty. In this connection, my delegation hopes for a successful outcome to the work of the Group of Scientific Experts which is now meeting.

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(Mr. Calderón, Peru)

... However, concerning the first case, that is, the refinement of the mandate or the agreeing of the programme of work of an existing subsidiary organ, my delegation would like to restate the point of view it expressed at the inaugural meeting of the Ad hoc Committee on item 1 to the effect that, in

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(Mr. Calderón, Peru)

addition to the inter-sessional work entrusted to the President of the CD, on some specific topics the chairmen of the relevant subsidiary organs might pursue their consultations in order eventually to be able to hand over to their successors a more fluid situation that would facilitate the next year's negotiations. A specific example might well be agenda item 1, on which Ambassador Donowaki could continue holding consultations during the inter-sessional period in order to have a suitable programme of work next year.

(Mr. Bottai, Italy)

... Let me finally devote a few words to the nuclear items, a subject of considerable sensitivity for Italy's public and political opinion. It is a great pleasure for me to convey my congratulations to the Ambassador of Japan and to all the members of the Conference for the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on the prohibition of nuclear testing. The resumption of the necessary consensus on such a complex issue, after so many years of unsuccessful attempts, certainly represents a positive development, jointly with other similar developments in the same field.

... Italy still believes that a nuclear-test ban is an important objective in disarmament which should be attained through a gradual approach allowing for decreasing testing exercises. Solving problems connected with seismic-verification techniques, with the setting up of an international

(Mr. Bottai, Italy)

data-exchange network and with identification of other reliable systems of detection, requires further study. We trust that these objectives will be reached in a speedier way so as to avoid the repetition of experiences such as the one on the so-called negative security assurances. We hope that the long period of time unproductively spent in the search for a formula meant to combine the divergent strategic concepts of the nuclear-weapon States with the expectations of the non-nuclear-weapon States, not to be attacked or to be threatened by nuclear attack, will be considered in the light of recent international developments as belonging to the pre-history of disarmament.

It is necessary to make sure that the remaining time available to the Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear testing will be used to prepare the ground for its rapid and uncontroversial re-establishment at the next session of the Conference, in order to allow for an expansion of debate on substantial issues on the basis of a realistic programme of work. These developments will certainly be beneficial to the Group of Scientific Experts now working again in Geneva, to whose activity our country also will provide a contribution through our national seismic-verification means.

(Mr. Arteaga, Venezuela)

... We are well aware, however, that holding more or less meetings, whether in spring or in summer, will not make us able to cope properly with today's challenges unless there is the necessary political will to negotiate for concrete actions. For the same reason we do not think, for example, that a change in the Conference's agenda can of itself become significant. The items, priorities and desires, however they may be worded, are clearly defined. It is the fundamental issues concerning nuclear weapons, chemical weapons and other weapons of mass destruction that have to be resolved. Among them, we have an unrelinquishable desire to achieve a nuclear test ban. We must try to clear the road before us without taking on responsibilities that will make our work even more difficult and quixotic and may divert us from our central purpose.

In any case, we must persistently stress the reasons and objectives that brought this body into being. The 1990s will be crucial in many ways and will be faced with many dilemmas. Are we going to conform to a world based on nuclear deterrence, with the constant perfection of nuclear weapons?

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(Mr. Arteaga, Venezuela)

Mr. President, following the traditional exercise of prolonged procedural negotiations, it proved possible to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on agenda item 1, nuclear test ban. Of course, we are aware that it has a limited mandate, but even so we think that the Committee can serve as a catalyst for structuring a deeper and more systematic effort that will make genuine results possible.

The halting of nuclear weapon tests seeks to limit the improvement of nuclear warfare systems, thereby promoting stability and confidence in international relations. Continuation of nuclear testing would have adverse consequences at this new stage of international relations that we all hope will produce many beneficial and lasting developments.

Without such a ban the way will remain open for the emergence of new nuclear weapons, increasing the dangers inherent in vertical and horizontal proliferation. The perfection of new weapons through nuclear tests would hinder the implementation of such concepts as verification, making it more difficult and complex to adopt future disarmament agreements. Furthermore, the credibility of the legal instruments concerning non-proliferation would be even further eroded. These concerns are particularly relevant now, in view of the Fourth Review Conference on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, one of whose main items concerns the nuclear test ban. The delegation of Venezuela wants the NPT to become a universal and effective instrument; we still believe in its possibilities and do not wish it to become increasingly compromised.

There cannot be a gradual, step-by-step approach to a nuclear test ban, because that would not prevent the modernization of nuclear weapons and consequently would not help to stop the qualitative improvement of testing. The aim of a complete ban of nuclear tests must be attained by an all-embracing approach, one of total prohibition. The holding of a conference to amend the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, with the aim of converting that instrument into an agreement for the complete prohibition of nuclear testing, constitutes an element supplementary to the work which the Conference on Disarmament must do to bring about negotiations in this area.

Mr. RI TCHEUL (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) (translated from French):

... Secondly, there must be a ban on nuclear tests for the perfection of nuclear weapons, which could reverse the nuclear disarmament process and sow distrust for nuclear disarmament practices; States which have such weapons should promise to implement the ban. If that promise precedes the adoption of the nuclear test-ban treaty as a whole, that will be an expression of political goodwill which will offer good prospects for the preparation of the treaty. With that in mind, it is encouraging to see the Ad Hoc Committee on a nuclear test-ban treaty, which ceased to function seven years ago resuming its work in the month of July, and we hope that it will make progress speedily in the activities and make up for the time that has been lost.

(Mr. Sang Ock Lee, Republic of Korea)

... The Conference on Disarmament saw the establishment of an Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, and the preparatory consultations held in New York paved the way for the convocation of the Amendment Conference of the Partial Test Ban Treaty in January next year.

Mr. DAHLMAN (Sweden): I am pleased to report on the Ad hoc Group's recent meeting, held from 30 July to 9 August, and to introduce the progress report which is in front of you in document CD/1032. Experts and representatives from 27 countries and the World Meteorological Organization attended the session.

Last week I had the privilege of attending a meeting with the Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban together with Mr. Frode Ringdahl, Scientific Secretary of the Ad hoc Group, and Mr. Peter Basham of Canada, Co-ordinator of the ongoing large-scale technical test. We greatly appreciated this opportunity to review in some detail our present activities and to have an interesting exchange of views on verification issues and on the work of the GSE. I hope that, in its deliberations on test ban issues, the Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban will benefit from results already presented by the Group and from results which are to be obtained through our ongoing large-scale technical test. I am sure that the Ad hoc Group in turn will benefit from results to be expected from the NTB Committee.

I will be quite brief in my presentation today, one reason being the presentations already made in the NTB Committee. Another reason is that the Group at present is engaged in the technical planning of further stages of the large-scale technical test (GSETT-2). The overall results will be of much more interest, I am sure, to members of the Conference than the technical and detailed arrangements that need to be made for such an extensive global exercise.

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(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

In the overall process of carrying out GSETT-2, the sessions of the Ad hoc Group in Geneva are just the tip of the iceberg. The main part of the work is being done at observatories, laboratories and communications facilities around the world, where hundreds of scientists and technicians are working to make the test possible. Their dedicated work and efforts deserve high appreciation. Our high appreciation also goes to the secretariat for its dedicated support of the Group during its session in Geneva. The Group is at present in the middle of GSETT-2. We are proceeding, as planned, with preparatory experiments to prepare all facilities for the full-scale operational test, tentatively scheduled for April and May 1991. We are gradually improving our performance, people are becoming better trained, communication lines are being established and put to work, and errors in the extensive computer programs used at National and International Data Centres are being discovered and corrected.

Since its meeting in March, the Group has in addition to national and bilateral activities conducted one co-ordinated trial test during the period 19-27 June. Twenty-five countries participated in this test, contributing data from, in all, 53 seismological stations. This is an improved participation as compared to a similar test early this year, when 21 countries and 46 stations participated. The Group also noted with satisfaction that a number of additional countries have expressed their intention to join the experiment and are presently making necessary preparations. Although the participation is gradually increasing, I would like to reiterate that an even broader participation is essential for meeting the overall objective of GSETT-2.

To facilitate such broader participation in the test, the Group decided, at its March meeting, to reduce the technical requirements for participation. While maintaining the prime purpose of GSETT-2, that is routinely to exchange and analyse Level II data, the Group agreed that countries that today do not have facilities available for the routine exchange of digital waveform data, or what we call Level II data, may participate by contributing Level I, or parameter data only. It is now technically possible for every country operating a seismological station - and most countries in the world actually do - to participate in GSETT-2. I do hope this will encourage additional participation in areas where we today have only few participants, in particular in South America, Africa and some parts of Asia.

While it is important that countries contributing to GSETT-2 participate in the GSE sessions in Geneva, there may be States which find it difficult to provide experts to attend those sessions, but which nevertheless wish to participate in the large-scale technical test. The Co-ordinator of GSETT-2, Mr. Basham of Canada, and myself are prepared to work closely with any country which might wish to participate in that way.

In early June 1990 an informal meeting was hosted by the United States at which technical experts, primarily from the four Experimental International Data Centres, participated. The results of this meeting provided a valuable basis for discussions on how to further develop the procedures and computer programs to be used at the Experimental International Data Centres. This work

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

is focused on how to utilize efficiently the waveform data that now is routinely available. This issue still presents a number of technical and scientific challenges.

As you may recall, on 12 April (CD/PV.551), the Conference on Disarmament approved a proposal by the Ad hoc Group that Mr. Peter Basham of Canada, assisted by Mr. Shigeji Suyehiro of Japan, should represent the Group at a World Meteorological Organization meeting to discuss the use of its Global Telecommunication System, GTS, during GSETT-2. Mr. Basham attended this meeting in late May and provided the appropriate World Meteorological Organization authorities with the Group's requirements for telecommunication circuits to be tested in GSETT-2. Discussions with WMO made it clear that bilateral or multilateral arrangements are needed among the countries concerned to ensure reliable communications.

The overall purpose of GSETT-2 is to obtain practical experience for evaluating the concept of a global seismological verification system described in the Group's fifth report (CD/903). Evaluation and assessment of the results of the tests conducted is thus an essential element of GSETT-2. During its session, the Group discussed evaluation criteria for GSETT-2, based on draft guidelines worked out by a specially appointed study group. A tentative evaluation scheme will be tested during the forthcoming experiment this autumn.

The Group spent considerable time during the session planning the further activities of GSETT-2. Until the Group's next session, GSETT-2 will continue with a number of activities, preparing ourselves for the full-scale operational test. In addition to preparatory work and testing at National and International Data Centres, a co-ordinated experimental exchange of data will be carried out during the period 15 October-2 November 1990. This test will facilitate the establishment of reliable means of communication, which is a fundamental element of GSETT-2.

The full-scale test of GSETT-2, referred to as Phase 3, will be carried out in two parts. The first part will take place this autumn from 26 November to 2 December. It will involve the exchange of both Level I and Level II data obtained from all participating stations for 7 consecutive "data days" and processing of that data at the four Experimental International Data Centres. To operate the system for 7 consecutive "data days" - which means that, taking into account all the processing at EIDCs, the whole system will operate for 14 days - will be an important test of the ability of the system to cope with large volumes of data for an extended time period. It will thus pave the way for the second and main part of Phase 3 of GSETT-2, full-scale operation of the system for a continuous period of about two months, which is tentatively scheduled for April and May 1991.

The Ad hoc Group suggests that, subject to approval by the Conference on Disarmament, its next session should be held at Geneva from 11 to 22 February 1991.

Mr. GARCIA MORITAN (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): My statement this morning is rather unusual because I am speaking on behalf of the delegations of both the Argentine Republic and the Federative Republic of Brazil.

Our two countries have greatly appreciated the re-establishment by the Conference on Disarmament of a subsidiary body to deal with the item which rightly holds first place among those the Conference has to consider with the aim of ensuring international peace and security. The Conference has been able to establish an institutional framework to serve as a setting for an exercise which, under the terms of the mandate we have given the Committee, will be of a practical nature and can be defined as the first step towards the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. As countries which have voluntarily renounced the nuclear military option, Brazil and Argentina are ready to play an active and constructive part in this undertaking. In this regard, we feel prompted to offer a few preliminary remarks.

First of all, we believe that there should be no doubt as to the final goal of the exercise. We are here to draw up a comprehensive agreement that will put an end to all test nuclear explosions in all environments by all States for all time. This seemingly simple statement nevertheless requires us to bear in mind that the task before us, no matter how quickly or in what order we set about it, must be guided by the objective of a universal, non-discriminatory agreement. That is not one objective among many, it is the central aim of the process we are about to undertake. Any attempt to belittle it, or to put undue emphasis on lesser topics, would be a sure recipe for failure and deadlock of the kind that has previously frustrated efforts by the Conference to advance towards this elusive goal of the international community.

The Committee's mandate clearly indicates that we have to concentrate our work on four main areas: structure, scope, verification and compliance. It further states that these are interrelated issues. In this specific context, interrelationship acquires a special meaning, since it rules out the repetition of scenarios familiar to this Conference at past sessions, when our delegations met here to address various aspects of the verification arrangements provided for an agreement that paradoxically was not itself subject to direct consideration in this body. So we were confronted with an unquestionably anomalous situation, which has fortunately been corrected.

(continued)

(Mr. García Moritán, Argentina)

In our view, there are no insurmountable technical obstacles to the conclusion of a verifiable comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. What is more, in recent years significant progress has been made both technically and conceptually on the issue of verification, rendering a lengthy debate on the subject unnecessary. The general approach will, in our view, have to be open and at the same time have to avoid selective treatment, since each element of the mandate will have to be analysed in the light of the progress made in the consideration of the others.

A comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty is a logical concomitant of an international situation which is developing positively and, as has recently been acknowledged by one of the existing military alliances, enables us to envisage a world where the role of the nuclear component of existing arsenals will be substantially diminished. As we all know, nuclear weapon tests today have a clear purpose: the updating of existing arsenals and the incorporation into them of new, more accurate and lethal systems. Not only is this modernization process stimulated by the nuclear tests the nuclear Powers conduct; such tests could be said to be an essential prerequisite of it. In brief, nuclear weapon tests are necessary tools for the continuation of the strategic arms race in its highest and most sophisticated form. The rate at which nuclear tests are being carried out confirms that their essential purpose is the development of new generations of these weapons. It would certainly be most difficult to design new weapons without the support of test explosions.

The clear conclusion for us onlookers in this costly contest is that if the road to a nuclear test ban is blocked, then this must be construed as a lack of political will to leave the arms race definitively behind. In this context, if the talks between the two major nuclear Powers on their strategic systems become a vehicle for the modernization of their respective arsenals, then it makes perfect sense to refuse to adhere to a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapon tests. How can we reconcile the fact that, perhaps very shortly, two military alliances may be signing a solemn declaration that they no longer regard each other as adversaries with the continuation of these test programmes? These activities seem to demonstrate not only that there is a lack of interest in resolving one of the most pressing items on the Conference's agenda, but also that proliferation in all its dimensions continues without respite. Nor should it be forgotten that refusal to enter into negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty is not consistent with legally binding obligations stemming from a variety of international instruments.

A treaty such as we have in mind must, in order to have at least a modicum of credibility, be drawn up with the active participation of all the Powers at present carrying out nuclear weapon tests. At the same time, it should not become an instrument whereby continued testing is condoned through phased schemes that guarantee and permit it at lower yields.

The foregoing is merely to say that, in order to avoid prompt frustration, our efforts must bear the stamp of credibility and consistency between our presence here and our respective national security policies.

(Mr. García Moritán, Argentina)

Our statement thus far has focused on the responsibilities of nuclear-weapon States, in other words, States that carry out nuclear test explosions. All of them, without exception, bear a primary responsibility for this process since it is they who will actually have to halt testing. It must be recognized, however, that a multilateral effort of this kind comprises a larger number of participants. That is why, given the interests at stake, the task at hand is essentially multilateral. Its implications and scope will determine relations of complementarity with other existing instruments governing States' nuclear activities: for example, in our own region, with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco). This example, which can also be applied to other areas such as the South Pacific, will call for a detailed effort of compatibilization between different norms.

It should also be remembered that, as is the case in other fields such as chemical weapons or outer space, any agreement to ban nuclear weapon tests completely will have to include provisions to cover the interests of States in all the peaceful applications of nuclear power. Brazil and Argentina, as everyone is aware, are among those States which for many years have vigorously pursued programmes for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Thus, to the unquestionable priority that both our countries recognize to the security aspects of such an agreement, we add the priorities that derive from our technological development needs.

The peaceful course of our nuclear programmes is and always has been aimed at the attainment of a level of development that will enable us to take autonomous decisions in the energy field. In a highly technological world, with serious supply problems, not having our own scientific and technological base would create a situation of technological dependence that would seriously affect our shared objectives of economic and social development. Therefore we believe that, in elaborating something as special as an international treaty to halt nuclear weapon tests and including mechanisms for ensuring compliance, care must be taken to avoid provisions which might create unnecessary controls or additional constraints on the transfer of technology for peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Argentina and Brazil are carrying through a policy based on these principles: co-operation, openness and mutual confidence are its linchpins. This nuclear co-operation, which extends to the private sector in both States, has become closer since the taking of the political decision to promote and expand economic integration. The degree of mutual confidence thus generated between us could hardly be matched, in its practical outcome, by any existing mechanism of international control. Precisely because we do not ignore the importance of the security aspects related to nuclear activities, we have set up unique instruments of co-operation and harmonization for our joint policy on the major international issues in the nuclear sphere. These instruments are well known, and perhaps the experience we have so far gained bilaterally in Latin America could be helpful when it comes to setting up the machinery to link the comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty with existing international and other accords. Similarly, we wish to restate our commitment to the development of peaceful nuclear technologies without hindrance and free from measures re-establishing in international relations hierarchical orders which have proved not only inefficient but, even worse, unjust.

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

... It is owing to the initiative of many in this room and thanks to the readiness for compromise of all that we tried this year to design the architecture of a future comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. All groups have submitted their ideas thereon. They should constitute building components for the co-operative preparation of such an important treaty. Admittedly, the distance to be travelled along this road is still long, and this is underscored by critical debates we had on this subject. Questions are posed whether the one or other issue raised is a gambit by one or other group. Some fear that the two super-Powers would disregard the others, and so on. Here lie reasons why the Conference's work in the field of a nuclear test ban has so far been limited in scope. To surmount these obstacles is, I think, the very aim of our decision jointly taken in July this year on the establishment of an Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban.

This calls for confidence and this calls for the ability to recognize and make use of new developments which are going on. I trust that this will be the case. Furthermore, I trust that thereby we will be able to terminate the arms race on Earth and to prevent it in outer space.

It was Emmanuel Kant who, 200 years ago, described the "condition politique" in the following way: "The necessity to decide reaches farther than the possibility to recognize". That this holds true, more than it did ever before, is indisputable. As a realist, I also know that we cannot build today's security on visions for tomorrow. On the other hand, as actors in this Conference, we also know full well that we must create the foundation for future security today. And for it to come true, we need visions.

My vision is that the treaty on the reduction of conventional armed forces in Europe will be agreed upon at the CSCE summit in Paris, that it will be followed by a second treaty on confidence- and security-building measures, that the START negotiations between the United States and the USSR will be wound up successfully and concluded at the end of this year, that 1991 will become the year when a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons is concluded, that positive results in the Soviet-American negotiations on nuclear explosions will sooner or later lead us to the negotiating phase on a

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

nuclear-test-ban treaty, that defensive military structures and security concepts can become a central item of this Conference - if it is right that we do not want military confrontation, but strive for the prevention of war.

(Mr. Reese, Australia)

This year the Conference reached agreement on a mandate to enable the Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban to be reconstituted. Australia welcomes that development.

Our commitment in the United Nations General Assembly and elsewhere to securing an NTB is well known. We continue to regard the attainment of an NTB as a matter of urgency, because of the contribution it can make to halting vertical proliferation as well as horizontal proliferation. In the absence of agreement on a negotiating mandate for an NTB we believe that much useful work which will be necessary to put an NTB in place can be undertaken in the Ad hoc Committee. We look forward to getting on with that work.

The Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons began in Geneva yesterday. Along with other States parties to the NPT we will be working for a positive outcome to the Conference. We place the greatest importance on this Treaty because of the unique contribution which it makes to the nuclear non-proliferation régime. The non-proliferation achievements of this Treaty should not be put at risk to achieve other goals, including that of a nuclear test ban, important as such an objective is. We must work for both objectives. We must ensure that the NPT can continue beyond 1995 to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The increased interest in the NPT, represented by additional signatories and the participation as observers at this Conference of the nuclear-weapon States France and China, is a most encouraging augury.

(Mr. Chadha, India)

... Among the nuclear issues on our agenda, the Conference has managed to set up an Ad hoc Committee on item 1, "Nuclear test ban", after a gap of seven years. This was made possible by the spirit of compromise shown by all. We, on our part, had accepted the compromise in the hope that this would mark the beginning of a sincere effort to embark on preparatory work towards the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. We must, therefore, place on record our deep sense of disappointment at the fact that, even before we have agreed upon the programme of work, doubts have arisen about the continuance of the Committee. If its establishment at this session is not to be seen as an eyewash for the commitments towards nuclear disarmament in the context of the forthcoming NPT Review Conference and the PTBT amendment conference, this Ad hoc Committee must resume its work without delay at the beginning of the 1991 session. Most of the nuclear "arms control" agreements, including the INF Treaty, have left the loophole of allowing for the military use of the fissionable material which will be made available as a consequence of the destruction of the delivery vehicles. The development of the third-generation nuclear weapons can be effectively impeded only by a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty which aims at the general and complete cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons by all States in all environments for all time. This goal cannot be attained as long as even one of the nuclear-weapon States remains outside these negotiations, as long as nuclear weapon tests are thought necessary for maintaining a "credible" policy of nuclear deterrence and as long as a comprehensive test ban is treated only as a long-term goal. The aim of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, and consequently its scope, should be to prevent the testing of nuclear weapons and thereby to inhibit, in a non-discriminatory way, the proliferation of nuclear weapons in their horizontal as well as vertical dimension. It cannot be conceived as an instrument designed to curtail technological progress to perpetuate the division of the world into two categories of nations. The interests of the nuclear-weapon States must be taken into account on a basis of complete equality with the interests of the non-nuclear-weapon States. In deciding upon the scope of the treaty we must bear in mind the fact that all the existing international instruments which refer to nuclear tests contain separate provisions for peaceful nuclear explosions.

Mr. DONOWAKI (Japan):

... Today, I am going to take the floor as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on agenda item I, "Nuclear test ban", and I am happy to introduce to the Conference the report which is contained in document CD/1035. As we know, the Ad hoc Committee was established on 17 July, since when it has had four substantive meetings: on 20 July, 27 July, 6 August and 9 August, and two meetings in order to adopt its report. Throughout those meetings on substance, the discussion was very fruitful and lively and touched on various issues relating to the scope, structure, compliance and verification; the progress of the discussions is contained in this report. Also, at the meeting of 6 August, the Committee had an opportunity to hear from the officials of the Ad hoc Group of Seismic Experts which proved to be useful indeed to the work of the Committee. Also, at the suggestion of various delegations, the Committee had an opportunity to hear from the chief negotiators in the bilateral talks on nuclear testing between the United States and Soviet Union. As Chairman, I should like to express again gratefulness for all the kindness of the delegations of the United States and Soviet Union in making those two chief negotiators available to appear at our Conference.

I will not go into the detail of the report because the contents have already been discussed to the full in the Ad hoc Committee and the text has been circulated to you by the secretariat. In general, it was the agreement of the Ad hoc Committee that, in spite of the short time it had at its disposal, the Committee carried out a preliminary examination of specific and interrelated test-ban issues. And, bearing in mind the long lapse we had for seven years before the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee, it was

(continued)

(Mr. Donowaki, Japan)

recognized by the Committee that those initial discussions we had in the Ad hoc Committee were useful in preparing for the future consideration of the issue. There was also agreement that substantive work on the agenda item should continue at the 1991 session of the Conference.

I should like to also refer to one aspect of the work of the Committee. The Committee, when it was established, decided not to agree on the programme of work for this year because of the shortness of the time it had, and the mandate of the Ad hoc Committee was taken as a de facto programme of work for this year. On the other hand, as Chairman I conducted prior consultations on the question of a programme of work for possible future reference, and such an exercise was regarded as useful in order to save time for the future Ad hoc Committee at the beginning of the session when it is to be re-established. And such prior consultation has been conducted by myself. However, as stated in paragraph 31 of the report, the work has not been completed and there have been many suggestions that during the inter-sessional period of the Conference on Disarmament the work should be continued. I realize that, unlike in the case of the very important negotiations on the chemical weapons convention, where the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee is authorized to continue negotiations, the Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban does not function in that manner. However, because of the suggestions made, I have agreed to continue, not as Chairman, but as an individual, the consultations among the members of the Conference on the question of the programme of work during the inter-sessional period. And since I understand that, in accordance with new procedures which are going to be adopted, the outgoing President and the incoming president of the Conference are indeed in charge of those questions, I hope you will give me appropriate guidance.

(The President)

I now submit to the Conference for decision the recommendation in paragraph 16 of the progress report of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events contained in document CD/1032 concerning the dates for the next session of the Group, namely 11-22 February 1991 in Geneva. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts that recommendation.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French):

... We now have to adopt document CD/1035 containing the report of the Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts that report.

It was so decided.

I have taken note of Ambassador Donowaki's willingness to make himself available to help in the process of informal consultations on the programme of work of the Ad hoc Committee. I should like to assure Ambassador Donowaki that I shall remain in close contact with him and the future President of the Conference on this matter.

Mr. CHADHA (India): I am making this statement on behalf of the Group of 21 on the report of the Ad hoc Committee on item 1 of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, namely "Nuclear test ban", which we have just adopted.

The mandate of the Ad hoc Committee represented a compromise which was made possible due to the spirit of accommodation shown by all groups. On its part, the Group of 21 had agreed to the mandate despite its strong feelings in favour of a stronger negotiating mandate in a spirit of give and take and in the earnest hope that the establishment of the Ad hoc Committee would mark the beginning of sincere efforts towards the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

So far the Committee has been able to hold only very preliminary discussions. Obviously, if the expectations which we have from the work of this Committee are to be fulfilled it will have to resume its work without delay at the commencement of the 1991 session of the Conference.


However, the Group of 21 notes with deep regret that, even before the Ad hoc Committee has agreed on a programme of work, doubts have been cast on its re-establishment at the beginning of the 1991 session. The Group of 21 expresses the hope that the delegations which are not yet in a position to commit themselves to the re-establishment of the Committee at the beginning of the 1991 session will reconsider their position and will join in our common endeavour towards the agreed goal of a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

Mr. HOU (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. President, today under your able guidance we will have finally finished and adopted the final report to be submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations. It is the result of the joint efforts of all the delegations and the crystallization of the positive progress the CD has achieved in the year of 1990. At this juncture, when the work of the 1990 session of the CD is coming to a smooth conclusion, the Chinese delegation wishes to express its gratitude to you for the outstanding contribution you have made at the last stage of this session and to extend its congratulations to all the other delegations. We would also like to express our appreciation to Ambassador Hyltenius, Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Shannon, Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Outer Space, Ambassador Varga, Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, Ambassador Cambiaso, Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Security Assurances to Non-nuclear-weapon States, and Ambassador Donowaki, Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, for the tremendous efforts they have made.

... This year is the first year of the decade of the 1990s. It is also the first year of the third Disarmament Decade as proclaimed by the United Nations. The 1990 session of the CW was convened against the background of momentous changes in the international situation. The international community, therefore, placed high hopes on us. They expected us to make new contributions to the endeavour of putting an end to the arms race and promoting disarmament. Today, when we are taking a sober and objective stock of the work of the CD, we must be fair and point out that enormous useful work has been done and some positive results have been achieved at the CD this year. The determination of the entire international community to safeguard the completeness and thoroughness of the goal of the convention banning all chemical weapons has made it possible to usher our negotiations into an even more important stage. The re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban after an interregnum of seven years has given people new hope for the future. Many countries have shown greater concern over such major issues as the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the arms race in outer space, the promotion of disarmament and prevention of nuclear war. They have also advanced series of positive proposals and rational positions. Another encouraging phenomenon is that there are more and more non-member States participating or showing interest in the work of the CD. This year's consultations on the improved and effective functioning of the CD have yielded some preliminary results which constitute a good beginning for further consultations to be carried out next year from which people have reason to expect more substantive progress.

(The President)

... I would like to confine myself to a few points concerning possibilities and constructive, forwarding-looking approaches. With respect to the negotiations on a convention for the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons, following a focusing of effort which warranted more significant results, it remains for us to hope that, since we now have a better knowledge of the key issues remaining to be resolved and the interests and positions that have to be taken into account, we shall be able, with the necessary political will, to make substantial progress in the near future. With respect to nuclear issues, maximum advantage must be taken of the steps made towards the elaboration of a more structured framework for a substantive debate - I am referring, of course, to the Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban and the special informal meetings on agenda items 2 and 3. In this context, we should note in particular the idea repeatedly expressed here recently that care and action should be taken to maintain and in as far as possible consolidate the consensus on the establishment and operation of an ad hoc committee on item 1 of the Conference's agenda. Generally speaking, providing a framework for consideration and, as appropriate, negotiation on all the questions on the agenda of the Conference must be a priority concern in the future too.



1991

(Mr. Komatina, Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations)

"One of the issues in the nuclear field which has constantly attracted a great deal of attention is that of the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests. The deliberations at the PTBT Amendment Conference, which ended its work last week, have shown that, despite the differences in approach to the whole issue, there is overwhelming support on the part of member States for a significant role by the Conference on Disarmament in dealing with the various aspects of such a ban. There is also a growing realization that the reduction of the numbers and yields of tests can only be understood as a means of achieving the goal of ending all nuclear tests for all time. The setting up of an Ad Hoc Committee on this question was a step in the right direction. It strengthens the role of the Conference on Disarmament in arriving at a global solution.

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) (translated from Spanish):

... During last year the question of a comprehensive nuclear test ban was examined in detail by the international community. Here, it was at last possible to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on this priority item and in the General Assembly there were extensive consultations aimed at merging the two texts that have been adopted year after year. Moreover, at the fourth NPT review conference the item was the subject of intense discussions and over the past two weeks the Moscow Treaty Amendment Conference examined in detail several aspects of the question, including that of the verification of a comprehensive test ban. On the other hand, in 1990 it was not possible to advance substantially towards the conclusion of a convention on the elimination of chemical weapons, notwithstanding continual meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee on the matter and the persevering efforts of its Chairman, Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden.

(Mr. de Rivero, Peru)

... The foreseeable results of the PTBT Amendment Conference constitute another factor that should prompt us to moderation. And negotiation and co-ordination between States call for a will and an effort that go beyond mere good intentions. New political conditions must be created that will make it possible for a treaty on the total prohibition of nuclear tests once and for all to be negotiated as rapidly as possible. But this should be viewed as a process to be pursued in parallel with and not in conflict with the question of the extension of the NPT, bearing in mind that the fate of the NPT beyond 1995 will depend on how all its provisions have been respected. It is this constructive spirit and quest for consensus that should inspire the Conference on Disarmament to include in the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons the prohibition of use of all forms of these weapons of mass destruction. From the time that the prohibition of the use of force was enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, there has been no place in

(Mr. de Rivero, Peru)

international law for the right to reprisals. The only exception to this principle is self-defence, which is provided for in Article 51 of the Charter, on the terms that are stated therein. It is to be hoped that this year the scope of the future convention will be defined on the basis of the norms laid down in the Charter of the United Nations.

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): The comprehensive nuclear test ban has been at the top of the list of priority items in this Conference since its establishment in 1962. It could even be said that the then Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) was set up specifically to bring about a comprehensive test ban.

"Such an agreement will be an important first step in bringing the arms race under control. It will be the foundation for the establishment of the necessary confidence, which must be built upon in order to ensure that other more far-reaching disarmament measures will be concluded and faithfully carried out. Such a treaty can serve to restrict and inhibit other countries from producing their own nuclear weapons. Finally, it will prevent further increases in the radioactive fall-out from nuclear tests."

This assessment, which was voiced by the representative of the United States in this very room on 27 August 1962 (ENDC/PV.75), summarizes the position of the overwhelming majority of the international community on this item.

A year later, in August 1963, the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water was opened for signature. The two sole substantive provisions of the Treaty are the partial test ban (without provision for a verification system) and the possibility (contained in article II) of amending it. In the preamble to the Treaty, the original parties - the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union - undertook to seek "to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to this end, and desiring to put an end to the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances".

More than a quarter of a century and hundreds of underground nuclear tests later, the international community still has no CTB. In this Conference, where we are supposed to be negotiating such a treaty, it has not even been possible to secure agreement on establishing a subsidiary negotiating body. This is the reason for the growing impatience of many Member States of the United Nations, impatience which, year after year, has taken shape in numerous General Assembly resolutions and urgent appeals from political leaders, parliaments and governmental and non-governmental organizations. In view of the deadlock in this Conference, a group of countries decided in 1988 - the silver anniversary of the partial test-ban Treaty - to submit for the consideration of the parties an amendment to this Treaty. The proposal made by Indonesia, Peru, Sri Lanka, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Mexico was distributed in this very Conference on 5 August 1988 (CD/852). The purpose of the amendment is to convert the Treaty into a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. It is composed of three parts.

(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

Firstly, the addition of an article VI, stating that "Protocols annexed to this Treaty constitute an integral part of the Treaty". Secondly, the text of protocol I broadening the test ban to cover tests underground or in any other place not described in article I of the Treaty itself. Thirdly, protocol II on the verification of the comprehensive ban.

In pursuance of article II of the Treaty and of the request of the majority of the States parties and of the General Assembly of the United Nations (in resolutions 41/46 B, 42/26 B and 44/106), an Amendment Conference was convened whose first organizational phase took place at United Nations Headquarters from 29 May to 8 June 1990. There the provisional agenda for the Amendment Conference was agreed on, its rules of procedure were adopted and the States parties, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, were requested to present to the Conference their views on the verification of a CTB.

On 30 November 1990, the six States which had initiated the amendment conference proposal distributed a draft protocol II on verification of a comprehensive test ban (PTBT/CONF/6). However, in view of the attitude adopted by two of the original signatories - to whom the Treaty gives the right to veto any amendment - it was obvious that the amendment could not be adopted in the second phase of the Conference, which was held, also in New York, from 7 to 18 January 1991. Fully aware of the foregoing, the General Assembly, in resolution 45/50 of 4 December 1990, recommended that "arrangements be made to ensure that intensive efforts continue, under the auspices of the Amendment Conference, until a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty is achieved". But the breadth of the general debate in the plenary and the discussion of the protocol on verification in the Committee of the Whole, as well as the active participation of non-governmental organizations, highlighted the broad international support built up by the six-nation initiative. Hence the vast majority of the parties managed to reach an agreement on a follow-up mechanism which would enable the Conference to continue its work after 18 January.

The six sponsors, along with the Philippines, Nigeria, Senegal and Tanzania, submitted a draft decision reading as follows:

"Acknowledging the complex nature of certain aspects of a comprehensive test ban, especially those with regard to verification of compliance and possible sanctions against non-compliance, the States parties were of the view that further work needed to be undertaken. Accordingly, they agreed to reconvene the Conference no later than September 1993 and to establish an inter-sessional working group, composed of 15 to 20 countries, in order to continue the consideration of verification of compliance with a complete test-ban treaty. The working group will submit a report to the Conference at its reconvened session."

(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

Subsequently, guided by a spirit of compromise, the six countries modified their proposal in the following way. The first part remained exactly as I have just read out, while the second read:

"Accordingly, they agreed to mandate the President of the Conference to conduct consultations with a view to achieving progress on those issues and resuming the work of the Conference at an appropriate time."

This was the decision that the Conference adopted at the conclusion of its second phase on 18 January. Its President, Foreign Minister Ali Alatas of Indonesia, will now have the task of continuing his skilful conduct of the work of the Conference. And in order to fulfil his mandate and ensure the success of the Conference, he will need the co-operation of all the parties to the Treaty.

When protocol II was discussed in the Amendment Conference, it was suggested, inter alia, that this Geneva Conference should also look at this document (CD/1054), which I now have the honour to present on behalf of the delegations of Indonesia, Peru, Sri Lanka, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Mexico. Likewise we have asked for it to be made available to the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, whose mandate, I would like to say in passing, could perhaps benefit from a few adjustments.

Draft protocol II consists of a preamble, eight articles, three annexes and an appendix. The first three articles describe the "treaty institutions" - the organization and its main bodies. One would be the assembly and its technical committee, in which all States parties would be represented. The other would be the secretariat, headed by a secretary-general, which among other functions would give technical support to the committee. Articles IV and V cover operating procedures, that is to say monitoring techniques and reports to be prepared by the secretariat. The next two articles indicate the "obligations of the parties" with regard to co-operative measures and additional monitoring procedures. The final article refers to the fact that the annexes and appendices would be integral parts of the protocol. Annex 1 describes the permanent global monitoring network, including monitoring stations, station operation and site selection. A preliminary list of the initial stations is given in appendix 1. Annex 2 deals with the way in which the secretariat could carry out temporary localized monitoring, and with station equipment and operations. Annex 3 refers to procedures for on-site inspection.

There is nothing esoteric about the content of draft protocol II. It is based on the already very long list of proposals designed to bring about proper verification of a CTB. One of the first was contained in the "draft treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in all environments" (ENDC/58) submitted to the Conference by the United States and the United Kingdom in August 1962. This proposal sought the establishment of a scientific commission, an international staff and a verification system with a network of stations and on-site inspection.

(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

The six delegations - I am about to conclude, Mr. President - hope that our draft protocol II to the 1963 Treaty will be given careful consideration by this Conference and its subsidiary bodies. We are prepared to improve it and consider it along with other proposals that have already been tabled.

The PRESIDENT:

... I am also conducting consultations in connection with the re-establishment of the subsidiary bodies under agenda items 1, 4 and 5, so that we can implement the agreement already obtained in connection with those items. No agreement seems in sight in connection with the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee under agenda item 8. We also need to appoint the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on negative security assurances, and I do hope that during the coming days I shall have a recommendation to proceed to substantive work in that subsidiary body.

(Mr. O'Sullivan, Australia)

... Turning briefly to other items on our agenda the Australian Government looks forward to the early re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. There is useful work to be done under its existing mandate. We wish that a comprehensive test ban be achieved at an early date and that nuclear testing become a relic of the past. We have noted that the Soviet Union and the United States and to a lesser extent France have reduced nuclear weapons tests in recent years. We consider these to be moves in the right direction. We hope the number and yields of nuclear tests continue to decline.

The cessation of nuclear testing is one of the items on the CD's agenda relevant to the broader objective of nuclear non-proliferation. We are concerned that the NPT treaty embodying the norms of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons could not be reviewed last September in a way that led to an agreed final document. We nevertheless welcome the thorough review that took place and wish to see the recommendations agreed on addressed in the International Atomic Energy Agency and elsewhere. We consider that the NPT has made a major contribution to international peace and security. It has served the security interests of its adherents. We wish to work with others to improve its functioning in the period leading up to its extension conference in 1995. We consider it vital that all members of the Treaty demonstrate through their actions and their statements that they are living up to their obligations under the Treaty and that the Treaty be extended on an assured basis. We hope that the next five years will see a greater commitment by all States to a world free of nuclear proliferation and in this regard we warmly welcome the recent statements by the Presidents of Argentina and Brazil.

(Mr. Ngoubeyou, Cameroon)

... The question of a nuclear test ban has been on the Conference's agenda virtually since its inception. This complex issue lies at the core of the efforts being made by the international community, bearing in mind that a comprehensive test ban would put an end to the qualitative improvement of existing arsenals and help decisively to curb the nuclear arms race. Despite intensive and painstaking negotiations during the fourth NPT review conference and the PTBT Amendment Conference, no agreement was reached on a legal instrument banning all nuclear testing in all environments for all time. In view of the importance of this question in the disarmament process, its links with the question of the extension of the NPT and its relationship with the problem of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, it is important that the Conference on Disarmament, in accordance with General Assembly

(Mr. Ngoubeyou, Cameroon)

resolutions 45/49 and 45/51, should be able to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban during this session to carry forward the work begun in the Conference in 1990, focusing on substantive work on specific and interrelated test-ban issues, including the structure and scope of the future test-ban treaty as well as verification and compliance with obligations freely entered into.

(Mr. Loeis, Indonesia)

... Resolution 45/49 of the United Nations General Assembly appeals to all member States of the Conference on Disarmament to "promote" the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, at the beginning of its 1991 session, with the objective of carrying out multilateral negotiations for a treaty on the complete cessation of nuclear test explosions. The General Assembly recommends that the Ad Hoc Committee should comprise two working groups dealing with the following interrelated questions: firstly the contents and scope of the treaty, and secondly compliance and verification. United Nations General Assembly resolution 45/51 also urges the Conference, inter alia, in addition to re-establishing the Ad Hoc Committee on an NTB, to take into account the progress achieved by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, including work on the routine exchange and use of wave-form data, and other relevant initiatives or experiments carried out by individual States and groups of States.

Over the years, the General Assembly has adopted numerous resolutions calling for a comprehensive test ban so as to achieve the goal of a comprehensive nuclear-weapon test-ban treaty. At the risk of being repetitive, let me restate that the preambles to the partial test-ban Treaty and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, two treaties which my country strictly adheres to, stipulate that the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons by all States in all environments for all time is a fundamental goal to be realized. The recently concluded PTBT Amendment Conference revealed certain elements which might be beneficial for the work of the Conference in pursuing the goal mentioned earlier. Considering these recent developments, the Conference is at the moment gaining momentum in its endeavours toward the achievement of a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

At the PTBT Amendment Conference, it was widely held that the Amendment Conference produced a stronger international commitment to a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Some constructive ideas were also outlined.- among other things, a suggestion that the verification proposals presented to the Amendment Conference, including the draft protocol proposed by the co-sponsors of the Amendment Conference, should be transmitted to the Conference on Disarmament for further consideration. For the benefit of our deliberations at this forum this suggestion should be given adequate consideration.

Confidence in the technical aspects of verification as a determining factor which can motivate the cessation of nuclear weapon testing by nuclear-weapon States is of great significance, as was pointed out by a number of delegations during the Amendment Conference. There were also many convincing arguments to the effect that the available techniques of verification, both national and international, are sufficient to sustain a comprehensive test-ban treaty. It was pointed out at the Amendment Conference

(Mr. Loeis, Indonesia)

that scientific evidence proves sufficient for a nuclear test ban verification system, taking advantage of currently available technological and scientific means.

A large number of delegations at the Amendment Conference suggested that seismic monitoring has a vital role to play in the verification system of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. There was, however, widespread recognition that seismic monitoring may not be adequate to instil confidence in a comprehensive test-ban treaty. In this regard, some delegations welcomed the various proposals made in the Amendment Conference concerning the monitoring of airborne radiation, satellite surveillance and on-site inspection, which all merit further consideration. The importance of the work being undertaken by the Group of Scientific Experts on seismic events was also emphasized during the Amendment Conference.

As for the institutional aspect of the envisaged comprehensive nuclear test-ban régime, some suggested at the Amendment Conference that the proposal concerning verification should be presented to the Conference on Disarmament so that it might be further elaborated. From the perspective of the work of the Conference on Disarmament, such a proposal is encouraging. It provides evidence that the Conference on Disarmament, and especially its Group of Scientific Experts, is considered by States parties to the Treaty as worthy to deal with the question of verification of the nuclear test ban. It is only natural therefore that the Conference on Disarmament should resume and increase the substantive work it initiated last year in the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban with renewed determination and vigour. Since the question of a nuclear test ban is of paramount importance for the Conference to deal with, my delegation would wish the Conference to have an opportunity to assess the work undertaken at the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban by the end of the Conference's session.

In touching upon the elaboration of the comprehensive nuclear test-ban régime, I wish to underline one of the most crucial points made by the Group of 21 during last year's session of the Conference. It was stressed that such a comprehensive nuclear test-ban régime should be non-discriminatory and comprehensive in character so as to attract universal adherence. It should include a verification system that is universal in its application and non-discriminatory in its nature, and guarantees equal access to all States. My delegation is of the belief that a test-ban régime which confers exclusive rights on any States to continue to carry out nuclear testing would inevitably be met with suspicion and mistrust by others which are not accorded equal rights.

Mr. de RIVERO (Peru) (translated from Spanish): My delegation has asked to take the floor this morning in order to refer to agenda item 1, Nuclear test ban. According to the final declaration of the first session of the United Nations General Assembly on Disarmament, this item is of the highest priority, and that has been my country's view for many years. This Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating forum on

(Mr. de Rivero, Peru)

disarmament, has the mandate from the international community to carry out concrete and substantive negotiations. On many occasions in this very body Peru has restated the urgent need to initiate negotiations with a view to bringing about, in the shortest possible time, a complete nuclear test ban valid for all environments and all forms. The fact that to date the Conference on Disarmament has been unable to satisfy this just demand, which is a response to the democratic outcry of the overwhelming majority of the countries of the world and the man in the street, indisputably calls into question the binding nature of this sole multilateral negotiating forum which in 1978 received by consensus a clear and emphatic mandate from the United Nations General Assembly to negotiate agreements in the area of disarmament on matters of particular importance for the cessation of the nuclear arms race.

There is no valid reason to justify the indefinite postponement of the start of negotiations. Nor are member States of the Conference on Disarmament in a position to sacrifice deep-seated positions of principle, based on democratic sentiments of their peoples, while awaiting the bon vouloir of one or two delegations. Starting negotiations on a CTBT does not necessarily oblige member States of the Conference on Disarmament to conclude a treaty in six months or a year. As in the area of chemical weapons, where nobody doubts the good faith of the States that are represented here, negotiations on a CTBT could very well take a few years to reconcile positions that are still divergent as regards the structure and scope of the future CTBT. Nevertheless, my delegation is concerned that a degree of intolerance and inflexibility persists with regard to a matter that would in no way tie the hands of member States, but does definitely jeopardize the realization of an aspiration that is based on international law and the demands of the peoples of other countries and the obligations incumbent on members of the Conference on Disarmament.

In 1990, Peru joined the last-minute consensus that allowed the Ad Hoc Committee on agenda item 1, Nuclear test ban, to be established. On that occasion my delegation, along with the distinguished delegations of the Group of 21, was practically forced to make a major concession: it left in abeyance its position contained in document CD/829, which was the result of a mature and responsible decision by the group on the comprehensive nuclear test ban. This made it possible for a preliminary exchange of views to take place under the chairmanship of the distinguished Ambassador Donowaki, which had the virtue of bringing the discussions up to date. At the same time consultations on the work programme were carried out as the best way to facilitate matters for this year. At the end of the exercise my delegation was amongst those that were surprised at the reluctance of one group to include in the final report of the Ad Hoc Committee an unequivocal reference to its re-establishment at the beginning of the 1991 session. So we had to agree to a report that in the end subordinated the fate of the Ad Hoc Committee to the outcome of the fourth NPT review conference and the PTBT Amendment Conference. Yet again the Group of 21 was presented with a fait accompli and faced, in addition to the immediate negotiation of a CTBT, the problem of the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee.

(Mr. de Rivero, Peru)

During the fourth NPT review conference an offer was made for the immediate re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee as a way of avoiding a commitment to begin immediate negotiations on a CTBT. And the review conference was unable to adopt a final declaration precisely for that reason. A similar situation was seen in the PTBT Amendment Conference, which was unable to find a formula which would enable us to respond to the justified expectations of the non-nuclear-weapon States. So matters continue, and we find ourselves in this Conference virtually obliged not to negotiate, lacking any alternative but to repeat the exercise of 1982 and 1983, with the difference that in 1995 - that is to say, very soon - the States parties to the NPT will have to take a decision on the number of years that the Treaty should continue in force. This year we will have to decide at the forthcoming General Assembly on the date when the work of the Preparatory Committee for the NPT extension conference should start. And it is precisely because of these time constraints that the Conference on Disarmament must make an exceptional effort to enable immediate negotiations to take place.

As I have already said, negotiating does not mean concluding a treaty immediately. Negotiating - a negotiating mandate - is first and foremost a political gesture to reaffirm good faith in complying with commitments entered into. When, in article I, paragraph 3, of the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, the United States and the Soviet Union undertook to continue their negotiations with a view toward achieving a solution to the problem of the cessation of all underground nuclear weapon tests, it is clear that they did not rule out negotiations in the multilateral arena, and it is the unwillingness to start such negotiations that is now untenable, even though the cessation of nuclear tests is still considered a longer-term objective.

This morning my delegation cannot but place on record its dissatisfaction at the serious setbacks facing the Conference on Disarmament in carrying out the mandate with regard to agenda item 1. In view of the important deadlines that we have ahead of us in the next few years, my delegation is prepared for this year, and for this year alone, to join the consensus regarding the mandate adopted last year. However, my delegation believes that this situation involving deliberations but no negotiations on an item of the highest priority cannot be perpetuated in the future. It will be necessary to provide for a start to negotiations on a CTBT at the very latest by next year, in 1992, if this Conference wishes to form part of a new international order and to keep its status as the sole multilateral negotiating forum.

In this life everything has an end and nothing, absolutely nothing, can remain unchangeable indefinitely.

The PRESIDENT: That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other representative wish to take the floor?

As I announced at the opening of this plenary meeting, I shall now put before the Conference for action a number of decisions relating to organizational arrangements under agenda items 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6. We shall proceed in the order in which the items appear on our agenda. Accordingly, we shall begin with agenda item 1, entitled "Nuclear test ban". In that connection, the secretariat has circulated today a draft decision on the

(The President)

re-establishment of an ad hoc Committee to deal with that item. The draft decision appears in document CD/WP.403. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I now wish to invite the Conference to appoint the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee. I am informed that there is consensus on the appointment of Ambassador Indrajit Singh Chadha of India as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee. Shall I take it that the Conference so decides?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I extend to Ambassador Chadha, on behalf of the Conference, our congratulations on his appointment to the important post of Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee and wish him every success in discharging his heavy responsibilities.

In connection with the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on item 1, I wish to recall that Ambassador Donowaki of Japan very kindly made himself available to help in the process of informal consultations on the programme of work of the Committee. I am grateful for the assistance provided by Ambassador Donowaki in that respect and I am sure that the work he performed on that subject will be very helpful to the incoming Chairman.

Mr. RICUPERO (Brazil): The conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty is the most urgent item on the agenda of this Conference and is long overdue. This Conference, as the single multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, has the primary role in negotiations to achieve that objective. The need for a nuclear test-ban treaty has been repeatedly emphasized in numerous documents adopted unanimously by the United Nations, including the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. As a significant contribution to the aim of halting and reversing the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, the Group of 21 has consistently advocated and has continued to attach the highest priority to a nuclear test ban.

In a spirit of compromise and flexibility, and in order to facilitate the setting up of an ad hoc committee on item 1 in the Conference on Disarmament, the Group of 21 did not object to document CD/863 being taken as the basis for the mandate of the Committee when it was established late in the 1990 session of the CD. This acceptance was without prejudice to its continuing preference for the mandate contained in document CD/829.

We accept that the Ad Hoc Committee will now be able to resume its work. Its mandate, however, continues to be much below the expectations of the Group of 21. The Group exceptionally accepts the present mandate, and such acceptance does not imply that the Ad Hoc Committee should be allowed to work indefinitely on the same basis. The Group believes that a clear negotiating

(Mr. Ricupero, Brazil)

mandate is necessary to ensure the conclusion of a nuclear test-ban treaty which will play a fundamental role in contributing to the cause of disarmament.

It should be recalled that the achievement of a nuclear test-ban treaty was envisaged in the preamble to the partial test-ban treaty of 1963, which embodied the objective of continuing negotiations "to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time".

The Group of 21 would like to put on record that it accepts the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban on the basis of last year's mandate only for this year, in order to allow it to begin its work as soon as possible. It does so on the understanding that the results of the Committee's work and its mandate will be reviewed at the end of our session.

In recognizing the efforts of Ambassador Donowaki of Japan, we should like to congratulate Ambassador Chadha of India on his election to chair the Ad Hoc Committee this year.

Mr. CHADHA (India):

... I am indeed greatly honoured by the trust and confidence which has been reposed in me by electing me as the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on agenda item 1, "Nuclear test ban". It will be my endeavour to carry forward the task so ably initiated by Ambassador Donowaki last year, to the best of my ability; and I am confident that in doing so I can count on the support and co-operation of the members of the CD as well as of the secretariat. I would like to take this opportunity to pay a warm tribute to Ambassador Donowaki for the outstanding leadership he provided during the formative stages of the work of the Committee upon its re-establishment last year.

The task which has been assigned to this Committee is of great importance and, at the same time, of enormous complexity with far-reaching political implications. This is abundantly clear from the fact that it took us so long to agree upon the new mandate of the Committee, which was able to resume its work after a long gap of seven years. That we were eventually able to resolve our differences bears testimony not only to the importance which the members of the CD attach at the present juncture of international relations to the resumption of work in this area, but also to their willingness to accommodate the points of view of one another. It is my earnest hope that the same spirit of compromise, co-operation and flexibility which characterized the negotiations on the mandate will continue to prevail in the future and will facilitate the accomplishment of our task.

In reviving this Committee last year, we reaffirmed our commitment to the goal of a comprehensive test ban. The attainment of this goal will call for dedicated work and renewed determination to overcome the obstacles which still

(Mr. Chadha, India)

remain. Our deliberations will be followed with considerable interest by all those who are dedicated to the cause of disarmament and peace; and I hope that we shall not disappoint them.

Mr. CHADHA (India):

... Resolution 45/62 C adopted at the forty-fifth United Nations General Assembly session requests the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc committee at the beginning of its 1991 session on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament with an adequate mandate in order to allow a structured and practical analysis of how the Conference can best contribute to progress on this urgent matter. Resolution 45/59 D, also adopted at the forty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly, calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to agree, through a joint declaration, to a comprehensive nuclear arms freeze, which would embrace, besides a comprehensive test ban on nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles, the complete cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes under appropriate and effective measures and procedures for verification. The General Assembly, through these widely supported resolutions, has requested the Conference on Disarmament to submit a report to its forty-sixth session on the implementation of these resolutions. The Group of 21 regrets that despite the preliminary work carried out on the subject during previous years, it has still not been found possible to set up an ad hoc committee on this item.

Mr. HOU (China) (translated from Chinese):

... Under your able guidance, Mr. President, steady new progress has been made in the work of the Conference. In addition to other ad hoc committees, the ad hoc committees on an NTB, chemical weapons and outer space have been re-established today. New decisions have been taken on important agenda items such as nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war. In this connection, I wish to extend our congratulations to you as well as to the Conference. Our felicitations also go to Ambassador Chadha of India, Mr. Batsanov, head of the Soviet delegation, and Ambassador Moritán of Argentina on their appointment as chairmen of the three committees. We are convinced that with their outstanding skills and rich experience, they will guide the committees to new achievements. Here I would like to offer them as well as the officers of the Conference the close co-operation of the Chinese delegation. At the same time I would like to express once again our thanks to Ambassador Donowaki, Ambassador Hyltenius and Ambassador Shannon, the chairmen of the three ad hoc committees in 1990, and their officers, for their outstanding work and contributions.

(The President)

(On the important question of a nuclear test ban, I hope that the Ad Hoc Committee will be able to start substantive work soon under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Chadha of India on the basis of the decision we have taken a little while ago. The very fact that it was possible to re-establish this Ad Hoc Committee despite strong views held by the delegations concerning the terms of reference of this Committee signifies the great importance attached to this question. I have no doubt that the same spirit of compromise and understanding will prevail in carrying out the substantive work of the Committee in a way that will contribute to the achievement of a nuclear test ban, which is one of the highest-priority items on our agenda. I would like to express my deep appreciation to Ambassador Donowaki of Japan, who conducted painstaking and skilful consultations last year and during the inter-sessional period. His efforts have contributed in no small measure to facilitating substantive work on this item.)

(The President)

... The greatest threat that faces mankind is the danger of nuclear war. It is therefore proper that the nuclear issues are at the top of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. It is a source of satisfaction that the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban was re-established last year. It has now been established again, and it is my hope that it will very soon get down to substantive work. Statements made in this Conference testify to the importance that many delegations attach to this issue.

(Mr. Gros-Espiell, Uruguay)

... I also wish to say a very few words on the relationship between the processes of arms limitation and regulation in the light of disarmament and the protection of the environment, the basic issue of the present day. The relationship between these two concepts is clear, and if we do not develop an appropriate and rational process of limitation and regulation of arms build-ups, if we do not properly tackle the question of nuclear tests and nuclear explosions, then we will be contributing to the dreadful problem of the deterioration of the environment. The Convention of 10 April 1972 on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques is an example, a first step towards using treaties to handle this relationship between two issues of vital importance for the future of mankind. But this is a convention that deals with only one aspect of the problem, having been drawn up in 1972. Since then 18 years have passed, and today the problem of environmental protection has acquired a seriousness and urgency and a pressing need for solutions which goes beyond what could have been imagined at that time. This means, in my view and in the view of the Government of Uruguay, that we must tackle this problem head-on, and that the issue must be dealt with in a frank and thorough manner at the Conference on Environment and Development which is to be held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992.

(Mr. Tomic, Chile)

... I would not wish to conclude this statement without referring briefly to the topics at the centre of the Conference's attention at its present session. I refer to chemical weapons, nuclear testing and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. As far as chemical weapons are concerned, my country has repeatedly advocated the prompt signature of a convention expressly prohibiting the production, stockpiling and use of this type of weapons, as well as the complete destruction of those that already exist. We said so in this forum in 1989, and also mentioned the fact at the ministerial conference in Paris. Unfortunately, the political drive that was generated at this latter important meeting has disappeared. My country considers that in order to attain the objective of banning these deadly weapons once and for all, the support of all nations or the great majority of them is necessary.

(Mr. Tomic, Chile)

... In the area of nuclear testing, Chile supported the initiative submitted by Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Sri Lanka, Venezuela and Yugoslavia to amend the Moscow Treaty and make progress towards a total nuclear test ban. We took this position on the basis of the following considerations: The commitment made by the nuclear Powers themselves to achieve substantial progress in favour of nuclear disarmament, in conformity with the provisions laid down in the preamble and in article IV of the partial test-ban Treaty; our concern about the prolongation and stagnation of these negotiations; the climate of greater security and confidence that has substantially reduced the risk of war between the super-Powers, and which has made it possible and necessary for the international community to act with greater political decisiveness; and finally, the concern of quite a number of countries, including Chile, with regard to the fact that the refusal to accept the complete cessation of tests may come to be interpreted as an expectation of the modernization of existing nuclear arsenals on the part of the nuclear Powers.

The results of the Amendment Conference held last January were rather meagre, in our view. Nevertheless, we think that it had the great merit of serving as a means to express a desire which has long been held by world public opinion, especially in those countries that have no nuclear weapons. Therefore we consider that the mandate given to the President of the Amendment Conference, to commence informal consultations on possible points of consensus, is encouraging. As the Conference on Disarmament is the sole forum for multilateral negotiations, the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee last year was an important step and we only regret that for 1991 this group does not have a genuine negotiating mandate.

Chile's interest in participating actively in efforts designed to bring about a cessation of nuclear tests led it to apply last January to be allowed to participate in the committee of scientific experts to examine international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events. Drawing on the unenviable experience that our country, for geological reasons has built up in

(Mr. Tomic, Chile)

seismographic matters, I might add that our intention is not to co-operate only with the above-mentioned committee, but also in the GSETT-2 technical experiments which will take place between next April and May.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America):

... Last year in a statement to the Conference on Disarmament I said that the United States and the Soviet Union made important progress in the area of nuclear testing verification by the signing of the protocols to the threshold test-ban Treaty and the peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty. Both these protocols were made available informally to the members of the Ad Hoc Committee on agenda item 1 during their meeting of 9 August 1990.

Today I want to inform the Conference that the United States and the Soviet Union exchanged instruments of ratification and protocols for the two nuclear testing treaties in Houston, Texas, on 11 December 1990. I am at the same time requesting that the 1974 United States-USSR threshold test-ban Treaty and the 1976 United States-USSR peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty together with their respective protocols become official documents of the Conference on Disarmament.

CD/PV.585

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(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

... Ratification and exchange of instruments brought into force the 1974 threshold test-ban Treaty and the 1976 peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty banning underground nuclear weapons tests with yields exceeding 150 kilotons. When President Bush signed the instruments of ratification he expressed the hope that the treaties "will lead to even more important advances in arms control and the preservation of world peace and security."

Mr. DAHLMAN (Sweden): I am pleased to introduce today the progress report of the recent meeting of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, contained in document CD/1065. This meeting, which was the thirty-first session of the Group, took place between 11 and 21 February 1991. Experts and representatives from 26 countries participated. Representatives from WMO participated during discussions on data communication. The Group enjoyed throughout the session the eminent services of the secretariat. This session was the last in a series of meetings to prepare for full-scale testing within the Group's Second Large Technical Test, usually referred to as GSETT-2. I can report today that we have now completed our preparatory work and have decided to conduct the full-scale test later this spring, from 22 April to 9 June 1991.

As part of GSETT-2, two preparatory tests have been conducted since our last session in August 1990. A data communication experiment conducted in October-November 1990 turned out to be most useful in sorting out a number of practical communication problems. A one-week trial experiment conducted between 26 November and 2 December 1990 involved not only data transmission but also seismic recording and data analysis at 24 national and 4 experimental international data centres (usually referred to as EIDCs). It showed that the procedures established for GSETT-2 with very few exceptions worked well and that in general they had been properly implemented in those countries which participated in the test. Also the communications between national and experimental international data centres and the high-speed connections among the EIDCs proved with few exceptions to function in a satisfactory way. The Group expects no particular difficulties in solving the few remaining technical problems. It is the opinion of the Group that the facilities that have been participating in the preparatory work and in the various trial tests are now well prepared for the full-scale testing.

Thus far, 28 countries have indicated their intention to establish national data centres and to participate in the upcoming main phase of GSETT-2. This participation is essential for the full-scale experiment. Several additional countries have expressed an interest in participating in GSETT-2 if the necessary arrangements can be completed in time for the start of the main phase. Such participation will improve the results of the experiment and is strongly encouraged. The Group expressed its appreciation for the efforts of Finland and Austria in supporting the participation of Zambia and Peru. The Ad Hoc Group has on a number of occasions stressed the importance of broadening participation in GSETT-2 to meet the objectives of the large-scale test.

One important purpose of GSETT-2 is to demonstrate that a global system can operate in the real environment, that is, cope with all the earthquakes that occur around the world. If large areas do not contribute data from any stations a large number of earthquakes will go undetected and this will reduce the actual load on the system and make the test a little bit less realistic and the results more difficult to assess. I still hope that more countries which so far have not joined the test will find it possible to do so. You can rely on the co-operation of the co-ordinator of GSETT-2, Mr. Basham of Canada, and myself in bringing about the necessary practical arrangements.

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

As I have said before, this full-scale testing is a large undertaking involving hundreds of scientists, engineers and technicians at seismological centres and communication facilities around the world. To my knowledge this is the largest single multilateral experiment ever undertaken for the purpose of testing a component of a verification system for arms limitation and disarmament.

The actual conduct of this test is one important undertaking. To evaluate the results and to draw the relevant conclusions from these results is another important step which also requires careful planning. The Group discussed criteria for such an evaluation on the basis of material presented by a specially appointed study group. To allow for a comprehensive evaluation, pertinent information has to be collected systematically during the test, and the Group agreed on guidelines for the collection and compilation of the necessary information.

The material thus compiled and the experience gained at national and experimental international data centres will form the necessary basis for the evaluation of GSETT-2. This evaluation is not only aimed at clarifying the factual results of the test, it should further and most importantly provide an assessment of how these results will affect the design of the global system and what modifications, if any, need to be made to the preliminary design presented in March 1989 in the Group's fifth report (CD/903).

The Group believes it will be important for some facilities to remain available during 1992 to conduct additional tests that might be required for a successful evaluation of GSETT-2.

The Group intends to present a preliminary report on the results of GSETT-2 at its next session. The comprehensive report, including an analysis of the consequences of the results of GSETT-2 for the overall system design, will be submitted in 1992, hopefully as early as during the spring session.

Although the Group's attention is presently focused on the successful conduct of the full-scale test, the Group had a preliminary discussion on its activities beyond this test. A wide range of issues were raised in the Group during this discussion. One such issue was whether a global system should contain four international data centres or if one such centre would be sufficient. Most countries operate national seismological networks to monitor with high sensitivity the occurrence of local earthquakes on their territories. The question was raised if and how such locally recorded data could be used to assist in clarifying events observed by the global system. Also mentioned was the possibility of monitoring the oceans using hydroacoustic recordings, and the use of on-site inspections and satellite photos to assist in the interpretation of seismic events. It was further suggested that a system to monitor atmospheric radioactivity could utilize the same principles of design and technical and administrative infrastructure as the global seismological system.

There was general agreement in the Group that much valuable work could be conducted under its current mandate. The Group expects to take up this item again and develop specific suggestions based also on the results of the evaluation of GSETT-2.

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

However, the Group considers that it would be useful to acquire further information on modern global satellite communications soon, and suggests that, on the understanding that there are no financial implications to the Conference on Disarmament, the International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT) should be invited to send a representative to the next session of the Group to discuss possibilities for the use of INMARSAT in the development of the communications aspect of a future global seismic data exchange system.

The Ad Hoc Group suggests that its next session, subject to approval by the Conference on Disarmament, should be convened from 29 July to 9 August 1991.

Mr. GARCIA MORITAN (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): This morning the Conference on Disarmament received the report of the Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. We are grateful to its Chairman, Dr. Ola Dahlman, for his presentation just now, which enables us to become a little more familiar with the content and the work of that scientific group. We have noted, inter alia, that the Chairman of the Group of seismic experts has felt compelled to clarify the scope of some terms of a political nature contained in the report. It is logical that that should be so, because the Group of Experts has a responsibility which is confined to the technical field and which consists precisely in considering international co-operation to detect and identify seismic events. Meanwhile, political assessments, as we all know, are a matter for the Ad Hoc Committee chaired by the distinguished Ambassador of India on the item of the nuclear test ban.

It is obvious that maybe political judgements are becoming increasingly necessary since it is difficult to understand the continuing delay in the initiation of appropriate negotiations on a treaty banning nuclear weapon tests once and for all. I think the time has come for the Group of seismic experts to carry out its work in harmony with what is taking place in the Ad Hoc Committee. I think that it can no longer continue to work without a political orientation. And consequently it is perhaps also necessary for the Conference to analyse its mandate to determine the appropriateness of linking its activity to political work, to see also whether the technical issues under its consideration are sufficient in respect of the verification of a nuclear test-ban treaty, whether it would be a complementary method and not a sole method in the task of verifying a treaty banning nuclear weapon tests. We consider that the task of the Group of seismic scientists is incontestably important. We are grateful to them for their efforts. Technicians from our delegation have at some time participated in analysing their work and we are certainly very grateful to them for their work. Now we will have to see what the political link is with the Ad Hoc Committee. We will also have to look at other methods of verification.

(Mr. Garcia Moritan, Argentina)

These are a few very preliminary comments to which my delegation intends to revert. We shall conduct a thorough analysis of the report contained in document CD/1065 to see whether we can find ourselves in a position to adopt it in due course.

The PRESIDENT: You will note that paragraph 15 of the progress report contains a recommendation concerning the next session of the Ad Hoc Group, to be convened from 29 July to 9 August 1991. I shall put that recommendation before the Conference for adoption at our next plenary meeting on Thursday, 7 March.

As regards paragraph 14, this contains a suggestion from the Ad Hoc Group that, on the understanding that there are no financial implications for the Conference the International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT) should be invited to send a representative to the next session of the Ad Hoc Group. The secretariat has circulated the draft of a letter that I, as President of the Conference, will address to the Director-General of that organization. I am thus complying with rule 11 of the rules of procedure, which provides that the President shall, in full consultation with the Conference and under its authority, represent it in its relations with other international organizations. If there are no objections to the text of the letter before the next plenary meeting, I shall then proceed to send the letter as drafted.

Mr. KOMATINA (Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations): The statement addressed to the members of the Conference on Disarmament by the participants in the women's conference on the relationship between arms and the environment reads as follows:

"One year ago, we, the participants of the 8 March Women's Gathering, addressed you the members of the Conference on Disarmament, regarding the issues on the agenda before you in view of the dramatic changes in Europe, and our concerns for the health and environmental consequences of nuclear radiation from weapons production and testing. We were very pleased to note that during subsequent months, several of the Conference's members and non-members addressed these issues in their statements to this body, and to the partial test-ban Treaty Amendment Conference held in New York during January of this year.

(Mr. Calovski, Yugoslavia)

... It is indisputable that the freeing of the world from the terror of arms of mass destruction is a priority task of this Conference. It is normal and justifiable that the complex of nuclear disarmament should be a priority agenda item of the Conference. There is no doubt that, for example, the halting of all nuclear tests is one of the most urgent goals to be reached within this Conference.

We support the bilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament, but they cannot replace multilateral negotiations and agreements. A broad consensus has been reached on the need to have the negotiations on the prohibition of nuclear tests intensified at this very Conference, and we believe that in this respect there should be no hesitation, the more so since present scientific and technological knowledge and instruments make possible a high level of safety in matters of control and verification. Yugoslavia is of the opinion that a moratorium on nuclear tests by all nuclear Powers would facilitate the signing of a comprehensive agreement on their prohibition. The results of the Amendment Conference held in New York are well known, and we support the agreement that further efforts should be made within the Conference on Disarmament.

(Mr. Calderón, Peru)

My delegation has taken note with great interest of the report submitted by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, contained in document CD/1065. Peru supports this eminently technical effort designed to put the finishing touches to a fundamental aspect of the future machinery for verification of the comprehensive nuclear test ban. And this is why it stresses the importance of avoiding the politicization of this Group, in order not to distort the important test under way. What the Conference would be well advised to do is consider to what extent and in what way the mandate of the Group of Scientific Experts can be improved upon so that its efforts properly fit in with the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on agenda item 1. Without complicating things, our efforts should be directed towards ensuring that the Group of Scientific Experts tackles other technical aspects also relating to verification.

Before concluding, I should like to place on record my country's gratitude to the Government of Austria for the valuable technical support that is making it possible for Peruvian experts to participate in the second technical test (GSETT-2). Due to the vagaries of geography, Peru has experience in this matter, aside from Lima's being the headquarters of the regional seismology centre (CERESIS). Hence the Austrian co-operation is highly opportune and much appreciated.

The PRESIDENT: I should now like to turn to another subject. You will recall that, at our last plenary meeting, I indicated my intention to put before the Conference for adoption the recommendation contained in paragraph 15 of the report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events (CD/1065), concerning the dates of its next session. In that connection, I wish to report to you that further consultations are needed before we take up this question again. I shall keep you informed of the results of those consultations.

You will also recall that, at our last plenary meeting, I circulated the draft of a letter that I would address, as President of the Conference, to the Director-General of the International Maritime Satellite Organization, inviting that organization to send a representative to the next session of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts. I noted at that time that, if no objections were received before this plenary meeting, the letter would then be sent. No objections have been received by the secretariat and, accordingly, I shall proceed with the dispatch of the communication as suggested, the only change being the deletion of the reference to the dates indicated for the next session of the Ad Hoc Group, which as I just said are to be the subject of further consultations.

(Mr. Ceska, Austria)

... For more than 20 years the international community has been striving towards the conclusion of a treaty banning all nuclear explosions in all environments. One outcome of these continuing efforts was the partial nuclear test-ban Treaty concluded in 1963. Although limited in its scope, as underground testing has not been prohibited and no verification measures adopted, it is still a major arms control agreement. In order to advance to a CTBT, six countries initiated the holding of the so-called PTBT Amendment Conference in order to achieve a CTBT by way of amending the PTBT. This Conference allowed a comprehensive discussion of all related questions. We regret, however, that no consensus agreement could be reached and that voting on final language proved necessary.

Now that this item is back on the Conference's agenda, let me state that we welcome the consensus reached to continue the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on a CTBT. In our understanding, this Committee may deal with questions regarding the scope of a CTBT as well as the general pattern of verification of such a treaty. Present efforts should concentrate on finalizing the technical part of the envisaged global seismological network. Furthermore, additional efforts seem necessary to guarantee its global application. To enhance participation by all regions in this endeavour, Austria has made technical co-operation arrangements with Peru in view of the fact that the Latin American continent needs to be more fully represented.

(The President)

... In connection with the fact that the Soviet representative is performing the duties of President of the Conference from this week onwards, the Foreign Minister of the USSR, A.A. Bessmertnykh, has requested me to convey to the Conference on Disarmament and all the delegations taking part in its proceedings, as well as the Secretary-General of the Conference, his wishes for success in resolving the tasks of the utmost importance which are on the agenda of this forum. He also instructed me to underline the unchanging nature of the Soviet Union's consistent course towards lower levels of military confrontation, and towards real disarmament. As regards the Conference on Disarmament, Minister Bessmertnykh asked me to note that this involves first of all the earliest possible completion of negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons, ensuring a qualitative shift in considering the problems of the complete prohibition of nuclear tests and the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and a constructive search for mutually acceptable solutions on other agenda items of this unique multilateral negotiating forum.

(Mr. Garvalov, Bulgaria)

... Proceeding from these basic guidelines, the Bulgarian delegation will submit to this Conference the concrete position of the Bulgarian Government on the outstanding issues. Another important issue for us is that of "negative security guarantees". The way in which they have been tackled so far is reminiscent of another era. The sweeping changes in the international political climate are an encouragement to believe that this issue can be resolved. There is room for a fresh look and flexibility on the part of all States, both nuclear and non-nuclear. Bulgaria is satisfied that, following a protracted pause, it has become possible to set up a working body on the nuclear test ban. There is perhaps no other problem in the field of disarmament where the ink and the words have flowed so freely and in such quantities. May I just say that a comprehensive treaty banning all nuclear tests in all environments and for all time is achievable both in one step and in several steps? The Conference on Disarmament can and should play an active role in this process. There should be no obstacles in the way of the Conference. It will be advisable to concentrate all efforts on such an important aspect as verification, for instance.

(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

... In seeking to broaden the basis of the non-proliferation régime, therefore, greater attention will have to be paid to the issue of nuclear disarmament by all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States. As the START negotiations will result in only about a 30 per cent reduction, the remaining arsenals of the two super-Powers will still be far above the level of the other three nuclear-weapon States. The gap will be further compounded if modernization is to continue. Nuclear disarmament cannot be said to acquire a multilateral irreversible character until it involves all nuclear-weapon States

(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

and all categories of nuclear weapons. It cannot be irreversible until there is a complete freeze on nuclear arsenals and a stop to modernization. Indeed, efforts to limit, reduce and eliminate such weapons are often outpaced by rapid scientific developments and the application of new technological advances to the fresh acquisition of weapons or qualitative refinement of earlier weapons. An indispensable measure in this respect, which should complement negotiations for deep reductions in nuclear arsenals and means of delivery, is the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Such a treaty will in the view of many, have the dual effect of impeding the evolution of a new generation of nuclear weapons as well as constraining those that wish to be newcomers to the nuclear weapons club.

At a time when the super-Powers have committed themselves to negotiated reductions of their nuclear arsenals on a continuous basis, it is incomprehensible that the rationale for a CTBT should be lost on them. It is a basic step forward towards a credible non-proliferation régime. The recently concluded Amendment Conference in New York provided an opportunity in this regard. Much as we cannot disguise our disappointment over the inability of the Amendment Conference to reach a consensus on the draft declaration, it would however be erroneous and misleading for anyone to conclude that it was a failure. Apart from being a significant landmark in the efforts of the international community to achieve a comprehensive test ban, it overwhelmingly voted "to mandate the President ... to conduct consultations with a view to achieving progress on those issues [verification and sanctions] and resuming the work of the Conference at an appropriate time". Indeed, the Amendment Conference is the strongest signal ever that the international community has sent to the nuclear-weapon States on the issue of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

In the Secretary-General's message to the Conference on 22 January he affirmed that "despite the differences in approach to the whole issue, there is overwhelming support on the part of Member States for a significant role by the Conference on Disarmament in dealing with the various aspects" of a nuclear test ban. Thus we believe that there is an obvious need to keep active this initiative in the immediate future, to take stock of those negotiations between sessions and give necessary political momentum at the appropriate time.

(Mr. Donowaki, Japan)

... The second issue I wish to take up today in connection with the role of the CD in the changing world of today is the question of a nuclear test ban. The establishment last year of the Ad Hoc Committee on this issue, and its subsequent re-establishment this year, represented a truly significant change in the attitude of CD delegations, as compared to the preceding seven years' sterile impasse. Of course, this was due to the spirit of compromise and flexibility demonstrated by all the groups and delegations of the CD. My delegation was particularly pleased to see that after the fourth NPT review conference in September last year, and after the PTBT Amendment Conference of January this year, the same spirit prevailed again in the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee.

In spite of recent remarkable achievements in the United States-Soviet nuclear testing talks, slow progress towards a comprehensive test ban has over the years been a source of strong discontent among a number of non-nuclear-weapon States, and in order to apply international pressure for the early realization of a CTB, a confrontational approach might have been a natural choice. In the CD also, when the establishment of an ad hoc committee was considered in the last few years, delegations were divided into two camps, one refusing to begin the work if it was a negotiation and the other refusing to do so unless it was a negotiation. Such a stalemate now appears to have been overcome thanks to the spirit of compromise and flexibility. Furthermore, my delegation was pleased to note that, under the skilful chairmanship of Ambassador Chadha, the NTB Ad Hoc Committee appears to be getting down to business - to the business of having a meaningful dialogue. Indeed, it is my delegation's belief that once we are engaged in a dialogue, and succeed in deepening common understanding on the nature of a nuclear test ban, we should be able to work out together a satisfactory solution to the problem based upon such a common understanding. On the other hand, although Japan stands for nuclear disarmament and for the early realization of a CTB, Japan is of the opinion that since the question of a CTB is a very complex and

(Mr. Donowaki, Japan)

delicate matter involving the security of nations, its realization will have to be on a step-by-step basis. On this and other points of importance, my delegation has been and will continue to be expressing its views in the NTB Ad Hoc Committee in more detail. My delegation wishes to reiterate its expectation that the substantive work resumed in the Ad Hoc Committee will prove to be successful and fruitful, leading us ultimately to a satisfactory solution of this long-standing historic issue.

(Mr. Donowaki, Japan)

When we take a look at our agenda in the CD as adopted (CD/1049), we realize that as many as three items are nuclear-related and that pertinent issues including the BWC are not given any place. Of course, my delegation recognizes the importance of a nuclear test ban, and will continue to work hard for its early realization. None the less, there is no denying that the idea of giving this agenda item such high priority was a by-product of the culmination of the cold war era. Some 10 years ago when there was no realistic possibility of a reduction in nuclear arms, a nuclear test ban, however unachievable it might actually have been, might have had its own appeal as the most important step forward in the direction of nuclear disarmament. Today we find ourselves, let us hope, in a vastly different world. My delegation is aware that the agenda of the CD has its own history. Often it is explained that our agenda is based on the famous "Decalogue", which in turn is said to have taken into account the relevant provisions of the documents of SSOD I and II. Then the question may arise: How come the Decalogue appears to be more flexible, allowing more room for the inclusion of the urgent subjects of our times, including the BWC, as agenda items of the CD? It is against this background that my delegation was pleased to see the resumption of the informal open-ended consultations on the improved and effective functioning of the CD under the chairmanship of our esteemed colleague, Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan. In this fast-changing world, the CD must certainly work hard to meet the requirements of our times by concluding, as early as possible, the long-standing CWC negotiations, and by placing on its agenda the most appropriate and urgently required items of our times.

(Mr. Arteaga, Venezuela)

... One of the paramount items before the Conference on Disarmament relates to the nuclear test ban. The most effective way of achieving this goal, which all share, lies in the signature of a treaty on this issue. The continuation of nuclear testing could have an adverse affect on efforts aimed at strengthening the legal non-proliferation régime. That turns this question into one of the most complex challenges the international community must confront during this decade. The signature of a treaty containing a general and complete ban on these tests would be beneficial to the international system, since this measure would act as a political deterrent to any initiative by a State or group of States aimed at increasing horizontal proliferation with its inherent dangers. If, however, these tests continue to be carried out, they would undoubtedly offer some non-nuclear States the political excuse to remain aloof from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which in turn would confirm the discriminatory nature that a good number of States ascribe to it.

We are convinced that the maintenance of the policy of nuclear testing should not shelter behind the alleged need to guarantee the reliability, effectiveness and safety of nuclear arsenals, or the inadequacies of current verification measures. In our view these arguments or excuses constitute

(Mr. Arteaga, Venezuela)

dilatory tactics that seek to sidestep a security goal shared by all States. Consequently, we believe that delays on this issue would undermine the future international order to which we all aspire. The signature of a treaty of this kind would generate a positive impact on the reversal of the arms race. As regards the non-proliferation Treaty, we believe that its substantive extension after 1995 will obviously be linked to the enactment of that disarmament measure in the short term, as was reflected in the negotiations at the fourth review conference.

In order to complement the work of this body, and without attempting to disregard the paramount responsibility devolving upon the Conference on Disarmament, Venezuela, along with five other nations, urged the holding of the recent conference to amend the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty with the firm resolve to seek compromise formulas designed to eradicate that practice. In putting forward this type of proposal, we were prompted by a constructive spirit based on principles set forth in the Treaty itself. On behalf of the six States which sponsored the amendment proposal, the delegation of Mexico submitted document CD/1054, containing a draft of protocol II on verification of the amendment we proposed to the Treaty. We hope that the Ad Hoc Committee will give this document proper consideration. In the same context, the delegation of Venezuela welcomes the declaration of Foz do Iguazú adopted on 28 November 1990 by the Presidents of Argentina and Brazil, in which the two heads of State reiterated their countries' readiness to use nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes, the desire to promote the full entry into force of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), and the possible signature of a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, with its positive impact as regards verification. Certainly this type of political event once again reaffirms the conviction and commitment of Latin America to non-proliferation and disarmament.

(Mr. Mantuba, Zaire)

... In my humble opinion the Conference has neither reflected nor paused to see to what extent the changes that have occurred could reorient our Organization. Just recently, the regret expressed by the august representative of Peru, Dr. Calderón, on the Conference's inability, over a period of nearly 12 years, to conclude even a treaty on one of the items on the agenda, shows sufficiently well the seriousness of the illness from which our Conference is suffering. But if we really cannot perform the main function for which this organ was created, what can be its justification? Unless we are careful, the Conference on Disarmament runs the risk of becoming a debating society for plenipotentiaries whose main purpose is merely to set forth and highlight their different points of view. How could you explain that to this day we are still in the midst of doubts and hesitations and consultations to find a decisive solution concerning the expansion of the membership of the Conference? It is, moreover, surprising to find that certain States are opposed to increasing the number of members from 39 to 44. It is high time for the Conference to be flexible on this subject; because our common aim is to bring about a new network of international security relationships where each State, big or small, must make its modest contribution. Whether members, observers or others, every time world peace is threatened, all world States experience a lack of security and all have the same concern - peace. It is true that the Conference's overall record is not totally negative; for it is agreeable to acknowledge the establishment of certain ad hoc committees on a few items on the agenda. But what course will they take, and what will their aim be? For instance, taking agenda item 1 on nuclear testing, the eminent Ambassador of Morocco, Mr. Benhima, was among the outstanding speakers last year who deplored the fact that the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban did not have a negotiating mandate. I am afraid that this year the situation will be almost identical. Nothing will surprise us when we bear in mind that the interests of these five major nuclear-weapon Powers are closely connected. As regards chemical weapons, as everybody knows, their history is the longest

(Mr. Karhilo, Finland)

... Another issue that I would like to touch upon here is the nuclear test ban. A comprehensive test ban has for many years been a very contentious issue on the disarmament agenda. For several years the issue could not even be discussed in an ad hoc committee of the Conference on Disarmament. In the PTBT Amendment Conference last January there was broad agreement that test ban issues should be further pursued in the CD. It has been gratifying to note that the discussion in the Ad Hoc Committee has been profound and has been conducted in a constructive atmosphere. However, it is clear that the basic differences of opinion have not narrowed. This present reality should not be allowed to become an impediment to useful work which aims at important future results.

The verification requirements of a CTB are one suitable topic for discussion. The work of the GSE in the field of seismic verification provides a good technical basis for these discussions. It is satisfying to see that the number of countries participating in the GSE is increasing, although the geographical distribution still remains uneven.

(Mr. Karhilo, Finland)

Seismic monitoring would not be the only necessary method for the verification of a test ban. Supplementary means must be used to detect possible treaty violations. These means include, for example, radioactivity monitoring and satellite monitoring as well as aerial and on-site inspections. These elements of a possible comprehensive verification system could usefully be considered in an appropriate manner in the CD. Document CD/1054 provides valuable material for further discussion in the Ad Hoc Committee. Further useful material for the deliberations can perhaps be found in the verification protocols of the recently ratified threshold test-ban treaties between the Soviet Union and the United States.

The two threshold treaties merit a further comment. They constitute the first steps taken in the area of nuclear testing since the conclusion of the partial test-ban treaty. They are, as such, significant in their own right. The obstacle to their ratification, an adequate verification system, was overcome. Therefore we have reason to believe that the next steps towards further limitations on the number and yield of tests could be taken in the not-too-distant future. A comprehensive nuclear test ban remains a long-term goal. Yet a substantial step towards the further reduction of nuclear arsenals and the prevention of nuclear war is in the making. The START treaty is within reach and will hopefully be finalized soon. By reducing the strategic nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union by a third, the treaty would become a concrete demonstration that the role for nuclear weapons is further diminishing and that gradual nuclear disarmament is advancing.

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

We have, during this year's CD winter session, witnessed an intensive debate in the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. The Netherlands welcomes the resumption of the Committee's work and the active participation of many CD members in that debate. There are many subjects which have to be studied in depth in order to increase the understanding of the problems involved. During this spring session of the Conference on Disarmament, the Committee will focus its attention amongst others on the scope of an eventual test ban as well as on verification issues in relation to such a ban.

Indeed, the single issue of the scope of a test ban is not as simple as it appears to be. It involves the problem of defining what a nuclear test is. The definition of a nuclear test could, for example, take the yield of an explosion as one of its main focal points. When the yield goes down, other factors must, increasingly, also be taken into consideration. Modern technology has increased the range of applications where atoms are split or fused. For example, certain technologies to harness fusion power for energy production use very small contained nuclear explosions. Thus, it is one of the matters we have to study carefully. What also should be avoided, in a future test ban, is a prohibition of nuclear tests which leaves open the option of peaceful nuclear explosions. So-called peaceful nuclear explosions can easily be misused for nuclear weapon tests. On the other hand, a test ban should not become an impediment to peaceful nuclear research or nuclear cooperation. Hence my observation that at very low yields, one will have to look at other factors if we want to determine the parameters for a nuclear test ban.

The verification of a test ban is another tricky issue. A test ban should be a comprehensive one, i.e. a prohibition of nuclear tests as has already been established in the partial test-ban Treaty and a prohibition of underground testing. It is clear that seismic methods alone are not sufficient for the verification of such a comprehensive ban. We will also have to look at subjects like monitoring of radioactivity in the atmosphere and satellite observation, notably for the verification of a test ban above ground or water. There might have to be substantial reliance on national technical means owned by a small number of States.

In my own country we had a brief look at the way the monitoring of atmospheric radioactivity is done. In the Netherlands we have modern networks geared towards monitoring nuclear accidents and other nuclear fall-out. These systems are not very well suited to finding a single atmospheric test. However, we have a rather sensitive high-volume air sampling station which could identify any debris of a nuclear explosion in the atmosphere. Few such stations exist, however, in the world, and most are to be found in the northern hemisphere. Standardization of stations is also a considerable problem. For the verification of the prohibition of nuclear tests under water, we will have to look at other measures, like the application of hydro-acoustic technologies.

Up to now the Conference on Disarmament has made considerable efforts to study ways and means of seismic verification of a prohibition of underground nuclear explosions. Yes, considerable progress has been made, but a lot remains to be done. A preliminary conclusion is that on the basis of

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

presently existing worldwide seismic capacities, it should be possible to identify underground explosions down to a yield of 10 to 15 kilotons. However, the costs of a worldwide seismic system will rise sharply if yields lower than 10 kilotons are to be identified. On the basis of present technology it seems not feasible to establish a seismic network which could identify all underground nuclear explosions.

Somewhere a line will have to be drawn, when we try to find our way through the Bermuda Triangle of what is politically desirable, technically feasible and financially viable. A considerable amount of further study in the Ad Hoc Committee is therefore necessary. The Netherlands will contribute actively to this debate and will introduce a paper on aspects of verification of a test ban later this year.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian):

... I would now like to turn to the issue of the progress report of the thirty-first session of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. It is contained in document CD/1065. In this connection I put before the Conference for adoption the recommendation contained in paragraph 15 that the next session of this Ad Hoc Group should be convened from 29 July to 9 August this year. I see no objections to the adoption of this recommendation, and therefore I take it that the Conference adopts it.

It was so decided.

(Mr. Sene, Senegal)

... Today, the delegation of Senegal is very pleased to note that the vast majority of delegations feel we are approaching the final objective - the prompt conclusion of a universal and non-discriminatory convention on chemical weapons. Under your skilful and devoted guidance, Madam President, we are sure that we will find positive solutions to the major issues of inspections on request and universal accession to the convention, as well as other equally important outstanding issues such as the protection and decontamination of the environment, particularly during the process of destruction of the major CW arsenals. At the global level the principled proposals of the delegation of Senegal on the nuclear test ban, the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the prevention of nuclear war, including the mandates of the ad hoc committees dealing with these issues, have remained unchanged and are well known to all and reflect the positions that have been upheld by the Group of 21.

(Mr. Hogg, United Kingdom)

... I would like to turn now to the major and wide-ranging contribution to arms control made by the Conference on Disarmament. We believe the issue of nuclear testing remains best handled here in the Conference on Disarmament. That is why we supported the establishment of a mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban last year. I reaffirm our adherence to the partial test-ban Treaty, our compliance, though we are not a party, to the threshold test-ban Treaty, and our commitment to a comprehensive test ban as a long-term objective, reached on a step-by-step basis in the context of general and complete disarmament. The United Kingdom will continue to contribute to the work of the Ad Hoc Committee.

(Mrs. Hernes, Norway)

... The achievement of a total and permanent ban on all nuclear testing is another important Norwegian disarmament objective. In our view, a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty is essential in order to halt the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons effectively. The Conference on Disarmament is the appropriate forum for dealing with this issue.

I would like at this juncture to emphasize the concern of my Government about the environmental and health risks associated with nuclear testing. This is an additional reason to discontinue all nuclear tests.

There seems to be general agreement on the goal of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, but there are divergent views on how to achieve this goal. In our endeavours towards this end, the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban established by the Conference has an essential role to play. We will need to agree on various specific and interrelated issues before a test-ban treaty can be concluded.

I also think we agree that an effective system of verification is a main prerequisite for a successful, comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Norway attaches great importance to the work of the Group of Scientific Experts and their GSETT-2 experiment, testing a global network for exchange of seismic data as the most important basis for a future system of verification of a test-ban treaty. Norway is actively participating in this global data exchange experiment by providing data from her seismic array stations through the Norwegian Seismic Array (NORSAR).

As the GSETT-2 experiment is approaching its final stage, we should now give careful thought to the question of how to proceed with the technical aspects of the verification issues. Important tasks still remain for the GSE in preparing for the future treaty as far as seismic verification is concerned. The future activities of the Group could also be extended to other means of verification relevant for a CTB treaty.

(Mr. Nakayama, Japan)

... Turning to the question of a comprehensive nuclear test ban, which is one aspect of nuclear disarmament, we may recall the fourth NPT review conference of last year, where arguments were made that there should be a linkage between the realization of a CTB and the extension of the NPT. What has to be taken into consideration is not only the question of a CTB, but the overall progress of nuclear disarmament. In this context, I highly value the full implementation of the INF Treaty, and strongly hope for the early conclusion of the START treaty as well as its further continuation in the new round of talks on United States-Soviet nuclear disarmament. Of equal importance is progress towards the next stage of the United States-Soviet nuclear testing limitation talks. In addition, the three other nuclear-weapon States, aside from the United States and the Soviet Union, may be asked to seriously address the question of nuclear disarmament. Also, I should like to remind the Conference that Foreign Minister Abe proposed in 1984 a step-by-step formula as a way to achieve a CTB. Japan continues to uphold the proposal as the most realistic choice in pursuing a CTB within the framework of overall nuclear disarmament.

In this respect, I should like to pay a high tribute to the resumption of substantive work by the nuclear test ban Ad Hoc Committee that was re-established last July at the Conference on Disarmament after a seven-year interval. Ambassador Donowaki of my country chaired the Ad Hoc Committee

(Mr. Nakayama, Japan)

last year. This year again, I am told, the Committee is engaged in a lively in-depth discussion of the subject under the chairmanship of Ambassador Chadha of India. May I express the hope that, through a dialogue between the nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, common understanding will be deepened? Based upon such understanding, I hope that concrete and feasible steps will be discussed in order to bring us closer to the final goal of a CTB.

I should also like to say a few words about the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts of the Conference on Disarmament created for the purpose of establishing a seismic verification system that would supplement a nuclear test ban. Japan, as one of the nations with advanced seismology-related technologies, including seismic detection technology, has been actively participating in, and contributing to, the work of the Group over the years. I have high respect for the work of the Group. This year, the Group is to carry out GSETT-2 - the second large-scale test of the global data exchange system as a critical test in their search for the establishment of an international underground nuclear test detection network. I hope that the test will meet with success. At the same time, may I express the hope that the Conference will give full consideration to possible future tasks to be taken up by the Group of Scientific Experts?

(Mr. Graham, New Zealand)

... I would now like to turn to the question of nuclear weapons. This remains an issue of great concern to the New Zealand Government and to New Zealanders. For too long the inability of the nuclear-weapon States to cut their arsenals frustrated many countries, including my own. Our frustration was accentuated by the testing of nuclear weapons in the Pacific. Despite the improvement in East/West relations, this testing regrettably continues. We remain firmly opposed to it.

... New Zealand believes that universal membership is important for the strength of the NPT. That is why we have welcomed France's decision, in principle, to accede to the Treaty. Equally we welcome the accession of Tanzania and Zambia. We hope that this will lead to the situation before long where all the nuclear-weapon States are members of the NPT, and where all of

(Mr. Graham, New Zealand)

them participate in this Conference's Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. We also support efforts to increase the effectiveness of the non-proliferation régime, including the application of full-scope safeguards to all nuclear transfers. It has therefore been a matter of particular concern to New Zealand that a country in our Asia/Pacific region with substantial nuclear facilities has until now declined to honour its treaty obligation to conclude a safeguards agreement. Bilateral disputes are no grounds for a party to ignore the obligations which it has undertaken vis-à-vis all other parties to the Treaty. I am pleased that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has now decided to conclude a standard safeguards agreement with the Agency. We look forward to the completion of an unconditional agreement as soon as possible.

I shall be speaking this afternoon in the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, where I shall set out New Zealand's position on nuclear testing in detail. This has been a long-standing concern for New Zealand Governments. The need for a comprehensive test ban has not diminished. Indeed, increasing world concerns about the potential spread of nuclear weaponry make it all the more important for the nuclear-weapon States to agree to a total test ban. The technical aspects of a nuclear test ban have always been important. That is why we participate in the Ad Hoc Seismic Group and in the Group's technical test, the full-scale phase of which was completed only a few days ago. I shall be introducing in the Ad Hoc Committee a discussion paper on the verification of a CTB, which I hope will contribute to consideration of that topic.

(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)

... A few weeks ago we welcomed the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. This Committee, which, under the chairmanship of Ambassador Chadha, has focused on the structure and scope of a possible prohibition of nuclear tests, as well as the related verification methods, has prompted great hopes since such a ban is undoubtedly the cornerstone of any effort aimed at nuclear disarmament. That is all the more obvious in that their continuation - aside from the fact that it has reduced confidence and generated new environmental problems - forms part of the escalation in the refinement of armaments and thus nullifies the efforts made in the field of vertical nuclear arms reduction. Hence, there is an urgent need to come to grips with this problem by embarking on genuine negotiations aimed at prohibiting such tests. Otherwise it would be futile to aspire to putting an end to the proliferation of nuclear armaments. I should like in this connection to convey my delegation's congratulations to the French delegation following the announcement of France's intention to accede to the NPT.

(Mr. Hlaing, Myanmar)

... A comprehensive nuclear test ban would be the single most effective measure to bring the nuclear arms race to a halt. A comprehensive test ban would not only promote quantitative reductions but also hamper qualitative improvements of nuclear weapons. Although the amendment conference of the partial test-ban Treaty which was held in New York in January 1991 ended without being able to reach a consensus on the draft declaration, it could not be construed as a failure. Despite the differences in approach to the whole issue, there is overwhelming support on the part of the member States for a significant role played by the Conference on Disarmament in dealing with various aspects of a nuclear test ban.

If we study the agenda of the CD, we will find that the nuclear issues are placed at the top of the agenda, which signifies their importance. The fact that the Conference was able to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on agenda item 1, Nuclear test ban, at an early date despite strong views held by some delegations concerning the terms of reference of the Committee, testifies to the importance attached to the question. In this connection, the delegation of Myanmar would like to express its deep appreciation to Ambassador Donowaki of Japan for the very valuable contribution made by him during the formative stages of the work of the Committee during last year and during the inter-sessional period. We are also confident that Ambassador Chadha of India can further improve on the good work done by Ambassador Donowaki.

(Ms. Baljinnyam, Mongolia)

... Mongolia has consistently advocated the achievement of a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing, considering that this would constitute a reliable guarantee to halt the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. My Government welcomes the decision of France to join the NPT and hopes that similar action by other nuclear and militarily important States will make a valuable contribution to the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime and indeed international security as a whole. It is our firm belief that the end of the cold war and the emerging new pattern of international relations based on confidence and cooperation make the old arguments for the continuation of nuclear tests obsolete and unconvincing. We fully agree that a CTB will need a highly effective and reliable verification system and a lot of complex technical work is needed to elaborate such a system. The Conference on Disarmament and its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban will play an essential and indispensable role in this endeavour.

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(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

... Before I conclude, let me say a few words about a nuclear test-ban treaty. Canada is a strong supporter of the objective of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and we have been active in advancing this goal here and at the United Nations General Assembly, in the First Committee. We recognize that conditions are not yet ripe for the conclusion of a CTBT. None the less, we believe that much valuable work can be done in this forum that will contribute to the eventual realization of this goal. Furthermore, we believe that bilateral negotiations on nuclear testing between the United States and the USSR can conclude additional significant interim steps on the road to a CTBT that could include limitations on the yield and number of tests. We urge the United States and the USSR to pursue the negotiation and implementation of

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(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

such interim measures. Important as the CTBT goal is, Canada is convinced that it is not in the interest of international security to link progress toward this specific objective with the extension of the NPT, as was suggested by some at the fourth review conference of that Treaty, last year.

(Mr. Park, Republic of Korea)

... As a responsible member of the international community, the Republic of Korea will spare no effort to help facilitate the implementation of the noble task of this Conference. Finally, in concluding, allow me to express the fervent wish of the Korean Government that the Conference on Disarmament, the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, will make a positive contribution to the promotion of world peace and security by successfully concluding the chemical weapons convention as early as possible, and that a breakthrough on other major issues of the CD, such as the nuclear test ban, will be made in the near future.

(Mr. Rahardjo, Indonesia)

... While recognizing the importance of the total elimination of weapons of mass destruction, in particular chemical weapons, we should not lose sight of the need to pursue the efforts towards a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing, which is long overdue. It has been noted that the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban has resumed its work. We recognize that the progress of the work in the Committee in stemming further qualitative improvements of nuclear weaponry falls far short of expectations. There is still a tremendous amount of work ahead of us in order to conclude a comprehensive nuclear test-ban regime which will be universally adhered to. The resumption of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee is expected to be a good beginning. We hope that its endeavours will be instrumental in the overall effort to establish a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

During the PTBT Treaty Amendment Conference some constructive ideas were outlined. It was suggested inter alia by some that the verification proposals, namely the draft protocol presented to the Amendment Conference by the co-sponsor of the Conference, should be transmitted to the Conference on Disarmament for further consideration. My delegation is pleased to learn that the draft protocol regarding the verification of a nuclear test-ban treaty submitted by the co-sponsor of the PTBT Amendment Conference has been taken up by the Ad Hoc Committee. We hope that its result will contribute to the overall endeavours directed toward the establishment of a CTBT. As exemplified by a large number of United Nations General Assembly resolutions on a CTBT, and a clear mandate to the Conference as stipulated in the Final Document of SSOD-I, my delegation shares the view that a mandate to negotiate should be given to the Ad Hoc Committee in order to make the Committee work more effectively.

Mrs. THEORIN (Sweden):

... A totally new Europe is emerging. A Europe that has left entrenched rivalries behind, that has moved beyond the cold war. One element in the political transformation of Europe has been agreements on comprehensive military confidence-building measures and major reductions of conventional armed forces involving highly intrusive verification provisions. I would like to make reference here also to the declining trend in the total numbers of nuclear-weapon tests. In the Soviet Union, in particular, there has been a

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(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

marked decline in nuclear-weapon tests, in part due to popular opposition for health and environmental reasons to such tests. Also the Nordic countries have to the Government of the Soviet Union expressed their serious concern.

The decline in testing must not, however, obscure the fact that tens of thousands of nuclear weapons remain in the arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States. We must not overlook the fact that, in spite of the incipient quantitative reductions, the qualitative development of nuclear weapons continues. The real purpose of testing is, no doubt, to develop more effective nuclear weapons. Nor must we forget that, in spite of the improved political climate, the testing of nuclear weapons continues. Furthermore, an end to nuclear testing would be a clear manifestation of a genuine will to pursue nuclear disarmament. It would also be a proof of our commitment to save and protect the environment. An end to testing would clearly demonstrate that we share and respect the worries expressed by millions of people as regards the environmental effects of nuclear testing.

The importance of a comprehensive nuclear test ban has long been widely acknowledged by the international community. For more than 30 years, the total prohibition of testing of nuclear weapons has been considered crucial to halting the nuclear arms race and a way of curbing horizontal and vertical nuclear proliferation. Year after year, the General Assembly of the United Nations has underscored the urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

The momentous changes in world politics, the end of the cold war, the actual reductions of nuclear weapons, and the prospects for further significant cuts in the nuclear-weapon arsenals, the breakthrough for intrusive disarmament verification methods, progress in the efforts to halt nuclear-weapon proliferation and the declining trend in nuclear-weapon testing are developments which suggest that the time has come to start negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. It is against this background that Sweden is today introducing to this Conference a draft comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

The partial test-ban Treaty, which bans nuclear-weapon test explosions, and any other nuclear explosions, in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, has, for obvious reasons, reduced radioactive contamination of the atmosphere. As a disarmament measure, however, it has been of marginal importance since the Treaty does not contain provisions prohibiting underground nuclear explosions.

The Swedish position as to the need for urgent negotiations on a comprehensive test ban has not changed in the last decades. Together with a vast majority of other States, Sweden has consistently worked for a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

The partial test-ban Treaty of 1963 expresses the commitment to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time. This commitment is reaffirmed in the non-proliferation Treaty of 1968.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

After close to almost three decades, still no negotiations are being conducted on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. On the contrary, it is even being stated that such a treaty is only a long-term goal.

Fundamentally, the case for ending nuclear testing rests on the need to put an end to a mad security system built on nuclear deterrence. However, there are also widespread concerns about the collateral effects of nuclear testing.

The United Nations study on nuclear weapons, which I had the privilege of chairing, provides an account of medical and environmental effects of nuclear-weapon production and testing. In my judgement, it is becoming increasingly difficult for the nuclear-weapon Powers to justify continued nuclear testing. To the vast majority of States it is not acceptable that year after year goes by without serious efforts to achieve a test ban - indeed, without even starting negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. The re-initiation of negotiations on this matter has been urgent for many years. To refuse to negotiate a comprehensive test-ban treaty defies the will of the overwhelming majority of States.

The draft comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty that Sweden is introducing today is a revised and considerably extended version of the draft treaty submitted by Sweden in 1983 (CD/381 of 14 June 1983). The major changes have been undertaken with regard to the protocols of the draft treaty, dealing with a verification system and organizational matters.

In this new draft, we have tried to take into consideration developments during the last few years, above all in the United Nations, in the Conference on Disarmament and at the PTBT Amendment Conference, including protocol II of the proposals for amendment of the partial test-ban Treaty. We have of course also considered new working papers, proposals and contributions from individual countries. We have also taken into account the rapid scientific and technical developments.

Specifically, we recognize and have made an effort to build upon achievements in the realm of disarmament verification in recent years. We have, therefore, redrafted our proposals with regard to the organization which will oversee the overall function of the treaty and its verification arrangements. As envisaged in the new Swedish draft, the principal organ of the organization to oversee compliance with the treaty is the conference of the States parties. The other organs to be established are the executive council and the technical secretariat. In this context, we have not only made use of the terminology in the draft chemical weapons convention. We have also to a certain degree built on the conceptual approach in the negotiations on that forthcoming convention. In this context, we have built furthermore on the verification provisions of the threshold test-ban Treaty.

With regard to verification we have, of course, taken special account of the progress made in the Group of Scientific Experts of the Conference on Disarmament. The technical achievements in the field of verification are such that effective international verification of a CTBT is now possible.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

The question of verification is no longer a technical one, but of a political nature. Given political preparedness to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty, the effectiveness of the verification regime is largely a question of the amount of resources which are allocated for this purpose.

An adequate verification system is a most important element in a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The legitimate right and duty of all States to participate in the verification of international treaties to which they are parties must be recognized. This political recognition must be supported by international technical arrangements that make it possible for all parties to gain access to the results obtained through the verification machinery. International cooperative measures are a cornerstone of the verification arrangements of this draft treaty. Sweden is committed to the work of establishing such international verification arrangements.

In a world where the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons is obvious, a comprehensive test-ban treaty must be designed so as to encourage the widest possible adherence. It must, therefore, be non-discriminatory. The rules should be the same for all.

The draft treaty and its three protocols, containing measures such as seismic monitoring, surveillance of airborne radioactivity, satellite observation and on-site inspection, are altogether aimed at establishing a basis for an effective verification system. All in all, I hope that the new draft treaty submitted by Sweden will provide a political and technical basis for intensified work on the CTBT issue in the Conference on Disarmament.

Nuclear testing demonstrates that nuclear-weapon States insist on retaining the option of further developing these weapons of Armageddon. The continuation of nuclear-weapon testing is not in harmony with current trends in world politics. Neither is testing compatible with a concern for the environment and our common future. The ending of nuclear tests would be a major step towards the elimination of nuclear weapons. The prohibition of nuclear test explosions will also be instrumental in preventing the proliferation of such weapons.

The Conference on Disarmament is the proper forum to negotiate a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Indeed, it is the very first item on its agenda. We can afford no more procrastination. The recent dramatic improvement in world politics shows every nation that the time has come to negotiate such a treaty. Let us start now.

(Mr. Neagu, Romania)

... Romania welcomes the resumption of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban and the active participation in its debates. Much work is still ahead of us in order to conclude a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban regime which could be universally adhered to.

(Mr. Neagu, Romania)

Committed as it is to the aim of a complete test-ban treaty, Romania accepts the principle of reaching this objective gradually, in stages, on a step-by-step basis. The Romanian Government will welcome any agreement on further limitation of underground nuclear tests and any new step in this direction.

We noted with interest the considerable progress that has been made in the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. Romanian experts actively participate in the experiments that are presently taking place in this field. Now we received a new updated Swedish draft comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty so ably introduced by Ambassador Theorin. This text will have all the attention of my delegation.

Mr. ROBERTSON (Canada): I would like to take the opportunity provided by this plenary to inform the representatives of both CD member States and participating non-members of a presentation that Canada will be making on Monday afternoon, 5 August, in connection with the work of the Group of Scientific Experts.

Dr. Kin Yip Chun of the University of Toronto Geophysics Division has been conducting seismic research on behalf of our verification research programme. On the afternoon of Monday, 5 August, probably in room VII, he will present a layman's briefing, designed for non-experts, on certain aspects of his work, which will focus on further developments of seismic monitoring methodologies. That briefing will be immediately followed by a more detailed technical briefing for interested experts in the field of seismology who are here for the meeting of the GSE. We will also ask the secretariat to circulate a written invitation to delegations concerning Dr. Chun's presentation.

Mr. CHADHA (India):

... As I approach the end of my tour of duty at Geneva, I would like to say a few words regarding my impressions of the work relating to the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, which, as you have just recalled, Mr. President, I had the honour to chair this year. The Ad Hoc Committee, as we are all aware, was set up after a gap of seven years for a brief period last year and was re-established this year with a non-negotiating mandate. This was made possible by the spirit of compromise shown by all. The underlying expectation was that the deliberations in the Committee would prepare the ground for the eventual conclusion of a nuclear-test-ban treaty. We proceeded with our task by identifying four major topics for discussion this year. These were taken up in two clusters, viz., (i) structure and scope, and (ii) verification and compliance. In the course of the next couple of weeks, the Committee will be further enriched by interaction with representatives of the Group of Scientific Experts. The quality of the debate was extremely high; which was indicative of the interest of delegations in the issue of a nuclear test ban. Personally, I received full cooperation from the bureau members and other delegations in the conduct of these deliberations, for which I am most grateful. It would be remiss of me not to mention the extremely competent work put in by the secretariat; and the interpreters, who had to deal with some complex terminologies.

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(Mr. Chadha, India)

The exchange of views in the Committee brought out the universal recognition of the importance of the multilateral consideration of the question. The need for the Committee to be provided with a negotiating mandate continues to be underlined by most delegations. The view has also been expressed that all nuclear-weapon States must participate in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee. While there was general acceptance of the final goal of a nuclear test ban, differences still remain on its timing and modalities. It was recognized that the achievement of a comprehensive test ban is only a partial measure in the overall goal of complete nuclear disarmament and that its importance cannot be belittled in this context. There is no doubt that a global nuclear-test-ban treaty would stem proliferation both vertically and horizontally and this would be a genuine non-proliferation measure. It was pointed out during the discussions that while a comprehensive test ban was desirable, even a one-kiloton ceiling on tests could seriously curtail the development of a new generation of nuclear weapons. This lends credence to the view that a nuclear-test-ban treaty has to be achieved quickly, lest the problems of verification become intractable. As far as verification is concerned, though there has been a widely held view that seismic methods would be adequate to detect and identify major underground nuclear explosions, it has been pointed out that an acceptable level of certainty and compliance could be achieved by looking at other methods as well, such as measurement of radiation, satellite monitoring, acoustic methods, on-site inspections and other relevant measures. The work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts has been widely commended. It has been stated that the overall technical work of the Group should be seen in the political context and the guidance of the Ad Hoc Committee is essential in this respect. In this context, many delegations held the view that the GSE should be given clear and precise future tasks as quickly as possible.

The Committee also benefited from a number of concrete proposals on verification as well as on the structure of the future nuclear-test-ban treaty. The contribution of Sweden, which was made today, will further enrich the Committee's work. A nuclear test ban is more easily verifiable than most other disarmament measures. However, a decision whether or not to go ahead with the treaty would not be based only on this consideration. It would be essentially a political decision based on governmental calculations of national security and international stability. It is important that such a decision, which would help save resources needed for peaceful purposes, diminish the dangers to the environment and improve the international political climate, leading further to other disarmament measures, is taken at the earliest possible time. It is my hope that the report of the Ad Hoc Committee this year will identify specific issues for future work. It is important that delegations concentrate on a list of priorities in order to sustain an interest in this item next year and beyond. It is my experience that delegations have already shown flexibility in this regard and this should not pose insurmountable problems. I intend to hold further consultations in the course of today on this important question.

Mr. von WAGNER (Germany): Mr. President, forgive me for asking for the floor without being inscribed on your list. I take the floor to announce the following.

The German delegation has pleasure in informing you about a technical presentation on "Lessons learnt from GSETT-2: A proposal for an open seismic stations concept" by the German representatives to the GSE, Prof. Dr. Harjes and Mr. Henger. In this presentation, an alternative to the currently used concept of national and international data centres for the verification of a future NTB will be suggested. The open seismic station concept would result in significant advantages, such as immediate and unhindered access to seismic wave-form data by all participants at any time; retrieval of data on a need-to-know basis, thus reducing the requirements for communications; and, finally, costs for data transmission will be lowered considerably.

The presentation will take place at 3 p.m. on 7 August 1991 in room XVI on the fifth floor of the Palais des Nations, and it will be followed by a reception in the Delegates' Restaurant on the eighth floor of the same Palais. The German delegation would be highly honoured if delegations could find time to attend the presentation and to take part in the reception in the Delegates' Restaurant.

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(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)

... Among the vital issues on the agenda is a comprehensive nuclear test ban. The conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty has been urged by the United Nations General Assembly, because it will lead inevitably to the prevention of both horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. Guided by this conviction, my delegation welcomed the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee last year, even though its mandate remains very limited. Guided also by the conviction that the complete prohibition of nuclear tests is an indispensable step along the path to nuclear disarmament, my delegation welcomes with interest the new draft treaty tabled by Sweden. We are

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(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)

convinced that it will enrich deliberations on this issue, in particular through its provisions related to verification procedures and those concerning the organization. It is clear that the negotiation of such a draft treaty can take place within the Conference only if the Ad Hoc Committee has a mandate authorizing it to engage in this work. Our determination to consider this draft jointly could be demonstrated by giving the Committee a mandate to discuss it in a useful and constructive fashion.

The PRESIDENT:

... I also take note of progress made in the second meeting this year of the Group of Scientific Experts and the completion of the GSETT-II experiment; the acceptance of Malta as the thirty-seventh CD non-member participant this year; and also the work done by Ambassador Kamal's open-ended consultations on improved and effective functioning. It is my hope that in addition, our discussions on report-writing will encourage those responsible to minimize the time devoted to it so as to allow us to spend more time working on substantive CW issues. In this connection, I welcome the decision confirmed here today to reduce the plenary meetings scheduled for the next two weeks to one per week.

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Mr. GARCÍA MORITÁN (Argentina) (translated from Spanish):

... A little more than a year ago we and the distinguished delegation of the Federative Republic of Brazil began the practice of making joint statements at this Conference on substantive questions of common interest. At that time I had occasion to set forth some joint general comments in relation to the first item on our agenda. At the beginning of the current session, the distinguished Ambassador Rubens Ricupero - whom I will miss very much following his departure from this conference - addressed the Conference in connection with the Declaration on Common Nuclear Policy signed by the Presidents of our two countries at Foz do Iguaçu in November 1990. On that occasion, the Ambassador of Brazil said that the joint machinery and procedures established by our countries in the nuclear field were the corollary and natural result of broad, stable and close cooperation embracing all major fields. These achievements in turn proved that confidence-building in the nuclear field could be achieved through close cooperation in the technical and political fields on the basis of openness and transparency.

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(Miss Solesby, United Kingdom)

... We welcome the successful completion and continued implementation of the INF Treaty which has eliminated an entire class of nuclear weapons. We welcome too the exchanged instruments of ratification and protocols between the United States and the Soviet Union for the two nuclear testing treaties, the threshold test-ban Treaty and the peaceful nuclear explosion Treaty, on 11 December 1990 in Houston. We also welcome the START Treaty recently signed by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev which represents a major achievement in securing a more stable, predictable balance at lower levels of strategic nuclear forces. Once ratified, this treaty will reduce, over seven years, each side's strategic nuclear weapons from their current level of between 10,000 and 11,000 weapons down to between 8,000 and 9,000 weapons.

Mr. DAHLMAN (Sweden): I will today introduce the progress report of the recent meeting of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, contained in document CD/1097. This meeting, which was the thirty-second session of the Group, took place between 29 July and 9 August 1991. Experts and representatives from 28 countries participated. Representatives from the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the International Maritime Satellite Organization, usually referred to as INMARSAT, participated in parts of the session. The Group enjoyed throughout the session the eminent services of the secretariat.

I am pleased to report to the CD on the successful conduct of the Group's Second Large Technical Test - usually referred to as GSETT-2. The test was conducted as planned between 22 April and 9 June 1991 and included six weeks of continuous data recording and reporting. As I have reported to the CD on earlier occasions this full-scale test has been carefully planned, and detailed instructions were prepared under the guidance of the coordinator of the test, Mr. Peter Basham of Canada. Several preparatory tests have also been conducted during the last two years. This approach, by which facilities needed for the full-scale test were gradually built up in participating countries, turned out to be most useful.

Thirty-four countries participated in the full-scale test. This is an increase of 10 countries compared to the preparatory test. The Ad Hoc Group very much welcomes this broadened participation, which includes also countries in Africa and South America. To a great extent this increased participation was obtained thanks to international cooperative efforts at a national and institute level. Countries having expertise and facilities supported, through bilateral arrangements, the establishment and operation of stations and national data centres in countries having less expertise in seismology.

The cooperative spirit among all participants in the test has been a cornerstone in our test without which we would never have succeeded. Many presentations in the Ad Hoc Group described and welcomed this cooperation and described how instruments, computer hardware and software were exchanged among participating institutes and how experts went to stations or data centres in other countries to help installing new equipment or to make existing computers and programs run properly or even to cope with the heavy workload during the conduct of the experiment.

This experiment has been a practical demonstration of close and successful international cooperation.

I will now try to describe the size and complexity of this full-scale test. The 34 participating countries contributed data from in all 60 seismological stations on all continents including Antarctica. Data were reported on a daily basis from these stations through national data centres to the four experimental international data centres operated in Australia, Sweden, the United States and the Soviet Union. In all more than 30,000 messages were exchanged during the six-week period. Information on more than 100,000 observed seismic signals were reported by the national data

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

centres. These reports contained both parameter or level I data, giving a summary description of the observed signals, and the complete and thus more voluminous wave-form or level II data. The total amount of information exchanged would in expert language be described as over 1 gigabyte of data. To get an idea of the large amount of information involved we might think of this 1 gigabyte converted into statements in this very room. It would correspond to a statement that would go on for eight hours a day, seven days a week and that would last for the rest of this century.

The analysis of the 100,000 reported signals conducted at the four experimental international data centres made it possible to define and locate in all 6,000 events all over the globe. Nature challenged us - following a large earthquake in the Caucasus on 29 April several hundreds of aftershocks occurred during a short time. The large amount of data generated by these earthquakes stressed the system and caused overload at several centres, which was a useful experience.

To handle and exchange this amount of information on a global scale is a substantial undertaking even using modern communication technology and computers. We have challenged modern technology and utilized the most modern computer and communication systems available to cope with our task. We have successfully concluded a most extensive and complex experiment which goes beyond what has ever been conducted for scientific purposes in the field of seismology. It is also to my knowledge by far the most extensive multilateral test ever conducted for arms limitation and disarmament purpose. We did not get this for free.

The successful outcome of the test is the result of dedicated work by hundreds of people at seismological stations, and at national and international data centres, who by their enthusiasm, skill and long working days overcame the many practical problems that occurred throughout the test. On behalf of the Ad Hoc Group I wish to express our great appreciation to all these people around the world who so successfully contributed to our work.

At its session the Group reviewed the results and experience obtained at national and experimental international data centres. A large amount of information was brought forward, and only a tentative analysis and assessment could be made during the two-week session. Some preliminary results are compiled and annexed to the progress report; please allow me to make some preliminary comments in that regard.

Despite welcome participation in the full-scale test by a number of new countries the global distribution of participating stations is still uneven with almost half of the participants coming from Europe and few participants in Africa, Central and South America. The test demonstrated the power of the modern array stations, and a vast majority of the observations during the test came from such stations. We have to consider how to utilize this technology, which is becoming cheaper, on a global scale. The demonstration by Germany, to which also members of the CD were invited, was most timely and showed an interesting concept of a "CD station" built on modern technology.

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

The national data centres seem to have been working in a satisfactory way all over the globe. Much effort has been put into these facilities, and it is important to consider how to maintain these facilities which are of crucial importance for a global system.

The international data exchange, between national and international and among the international data centres, which caused great problems during the preparatory experiments, now worked in a most satisfactory way. Data arrived promptly, and only a couple of hundreds out of 30,000 messages were lost, which is a remarkably low figure. It should be possible to improve the communication system even further by using a more homogenous system. Today a great variety of means are being utilized.

Analysis at the experimental international data centres was conducted utilizing both parameter and wave-form data. Parameter data were processed using an essentially automatic procedure, whereas the analysis of wave-form data requires interactive analysis where a seismological expert interacts with a graphic computer screen. The experimental international data centres managed, by and large, to cope with their heavy workload. The time available for comprehensive analysis of wave-form data was however limited. Further analysis of the valuable database collected during the experiment is needed to fully evaluate the full potential of the wave-form analysis. It is expected that such additional analysis will be undertaken at the experimental international data centres prior to the Group's next session.

The purpose of the experiment was, as its name indicates, to test the various technical components of the system. In addition, however, valuable information of a more basic character was obtained. A thorough analysis of this extensive material will take considerable time and has to be conducted in close cooperation with scientific institutions around the world. I will however make a few preliminary observations. The problem of associating observed signals to defined events is still a serious one, and almost half of the signals observed during this test were unassociated in the present analysis. The system designed by the Group is essentially a teleseismic system based on observations in the range of 2,000 to 10,000 km from the stations. It has been clearly demonstrated during this test and in the national scientific contributions to the Group that the observation capabilities at regional distances, e.g. up to 2,000 km from the stations, are very good. This might have an important implication on the design of the system. A third important issue is how to handle, in the context of the global system, the information provided by national seismological networks in individual countries, which is often of very high quality.

The Ad Hoc Group noted that a comprehensive evaluation of the results of GSETT-2 will be a substantial undertaking. It has established five study groups, each headed by a convener, to deal with different aspects of this evaluation work. The Ad Hoc Group will make all efforts to complete a report on a comprehensive evaluation of the technical aspects of the test during the

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

spring session of 1992. The full seismological evaluation will need considerably more time, and will be reported on later. In this regard, the Group believes it will be desirable to have facilities available to the extent required for a successful evaluation of GSETT-2.

At the invitation of the Conference on Disarmament a representative of the International Maritime Satellite Organization, INMARSAT, attended a session of the Group and presented information on their global system for information exchange. INMARSAT also conducted a demonstration of its system, which was attended also by members of the Conference. INMARSAT now offers an interesting possibility of providing information exchange on a global scale from seismological and other monitoring stations located in areas where other high-quality means of communication are not available. The Group expressed its appreciation to INMARSAT for its valuable contribution to the Group's work.

The Ad Hoc Group continued preliminary discussion on its future work. It expressed the view that much valuable work can be conducted under its current mandate with regard to international cooperative measures to detect and identify seismic events. The Group expects to be able to develop specific recommendations in this regard during its next session, taking into account the results of GSETT-2.

The Ad Hoc Group suggests that its next session, subject to approval by the Conference on Disarmament, should be convened from 2 to 13 March 1992.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group for introducing the report, as well as for the useful information that he has given the Conference. With regard to the report in document CD/1097, the Ad Hoc Group transmits to us a recommendation contained in paragraph 19 under which it would meet next from 2 to 13 March 1992. I propose to submit the recommendation to the Conference at the next plenary meeting on Thursday, 22 August. Obviously any delegations that wish to make comments on the report contained in document CD/1097 can do so in the plenary then or later as they wish.

(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

... Although there are major challenges ahead, the two nuclear-weapon States must strive to maintain the momentum as there is no room for complacency. We cannot afford the resurgence of old tensions. The strategic arms control agenda is far from exhausted. START is just the beginning of a continuous process towards nuclear disarmament. There is much we can learn from the implementation of the INF Treaty. Its value lies in the promise of providing the basis for a more far-reaching agreement on the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons. We should however bear in mind that the ultimate goal of the bilateral negotiations is for a total and complete elimination of all nuclear weapons. It is against this background that we call on the Conference to take such measures that will lead to immediate commencement of multilateral negotiations on the nuclear test ban as a matter of priority. We look forward to the early establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee with a negotiating mandate at the next session.

CD/PV.603

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Mr. BRODODININGRAT (Indonesia):

... While my delegation warmly welcomes these achievements, we nevertheless continue to believe that a comprehensive nuclear test ban is an essential step in halting the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapons. It has been generally acknowledged that the development of new nuclear weapons will only complicate efforts to reverse the global arms race. The speedy achievement of a comprehensive nuclear test ban is, therefore, a global concern. The Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban has been established this year with the mandate to initiate, as a first step towards achieving a nuclear-test-ban treaty, substantive work on specific and interrelated test-ban issues, including its structure, scope and those of verification and compliance. It is encouraging to note that the Committee has, *inter alia*, addressed the questions of the possible establishment of a permanent global monitoring network, temporary localized monitoring and on-site inspections. The scientific Group on seismic events has also held a series of meetings including a very useful one with the Ad Hoc Committee. The draft protocol II of the PTBT on the verification of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, and the draft of the comprehensive test-ban treaty, as contained in document CD/1089, has also been discussed and in our view is still in need of further elaboration.

Although for those of us who have consistently advocated the establishment of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, the work carried out in the Committee has somewhat fallen short of expectations, its intensive debate has indeed been an

(Mr. Brotodiningrat, Indonesia)

encouraging sign hopefully leading towards more serious negotiations. Given the complexity of the question of a nuclear test ban and in view of the need for further substantive work, we believe it is imperative that the Conference allow the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban for the coming 1992 session. In the same vein we would like to recall once again that, as stipulated in the preambular paragraph of the 1963 PTBT, the original parties proclaimed that one of their principal aims was the speediest possible achievement of an agreement which would eliminate the incentive to produce and test any kind of weapons, including nuclear weapons. Therefore, we continue to believe that the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban and the process of achieving a comprehensive test-ban treaty through the amendment of the 1963 PTBT should complement each other.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I now intend to put before the Conference the recommendation contained in paragraph 19 of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, which has been circulated in document CD/1097. The recommendation provides that the Ad Hoc Group will meet in Geneva from 2 to 13 March 1992. If there are no objections I shall take it that the Conference adopts that recommendation.

It was so decided.

(Mr. Ri, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

What is currently threatening the existence of humanity itself is, first and foremost, an enormous quantity of nuclear weapons deployed in different parts of the globe. The reduction and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in all their forms, a ban on nuclear testing to prevent qualitative enhancement, and their complete abolition, constitutes the unanimous demand of the peoples of the world. Although a number of positive initiatives and measures have been adopted to reduce nuclear weapons, problems here and there still arise which prompt a great deal of concern on the part of humanity. Since this is just a beginning, as long as new nuclear tests continue in order to improve the quality of these weapons, which offsets and goes far beyond the cuts, and as long as the changes to promote the dismantling of nuclear weapons on foreign soil have no practical effect. We hope that on the basis of their international obligations to dispel the disquiet of the peoples of the world, the nuclear super-Powers will adopt measures to bring about the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the region most threatened by nuclear war, first and foremost, so that their promise can be fulfilled constantly.

Mr. SHAH (India):

... I have taken the floor to present the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban which is on the table today as document CD/1106. Having presided over the Ad Hoc Committee only during its last stage of the final consideration and adoption of its report to the Conference, my task has been easy. The harder work had already been accomplished over the year by my predecessor, Ambassador Chadha. Even before the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee this year, there were many questions as to what the Ad Hoc Committee would be doing and how it would go about its work. The fact that its work has gone smoothly and it was conducted in a cordial and constructive atmosphere owes much to the excellent cooperation all delegations extended to my delegation throughout the year.

Before his departure, at a plenary meeting on 25 July, Ambassador Chadha gave his impressions of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee. I should like to refer delegations to that statement again. A spirit of compromise was manifest during the organization of the work and the quality of the debates on the three clusters of questions which the Ad Hoc Committee had assigned itself, namely general debate, structure and scope and verification and compliance, was indeed high.

I should like to emphasize that the report in front of you today represents a serious and considered, and at times highly technical, exchange of views held this year. The goal was to lay the groundwork for eventual negotiations on a nuclear test ban. The goal, I believe, has been largely achieved. The report deals with substantive issues. It touches on the main questions relating to the achievement of a nuclear test ban. As we are all aware, nuclear testing is not only a technical issue, but also a highly political issue connected directly to the defence and security concerns of States. In a rapidly changing world, a phrase which tended in the past to be a cliché, but now has taken on new significance, it is even more imperative that the security concerns of all sides must be respected. I believe the report presents in a balanced manner the genuine differences of perception of security needs that continue to exist with relation to a nuclear test ban.

(continued)

(Mr. Shah, India)

Bearing those differences in mind, the Ad Hoc Committee accomplished an important task: the international community represented here in this negotiating forum has kept the question on its agenda, in the context of a subsidiary organ, exploring the areas of agreement and disagreement and preparing for future work. An important contribution to future work on the item was made in the agreement reached by the Ad Hoc Committee to recommend that it be re-established at the beginning of its 1992 session. I definitely endorse this recommendation.

Allow me to express my appreciation to the delegations participating in the work of the Committee this year. Allow me also on behalf of Ambassador Chadha and my delegation to express a special note of thanks to all ambassadors who took a special interest in the deliberations and in particular the group coordinators: Mr. José Felício of Brazil, Mr. Max Gevers of the Netherlands and Mr. Vladimír Gaspar of Czechoslovakia. I also thank Mr. Zhang of China for his contribution. It would be remiss of me not to mention the excellent support my delegation received from Mr. Cassandra and Mrs. Cummins from the secretariat. Both of them worked extremely hard for the sake of the successful conduct of the Ad Hoc Committee's work. Finally, may I, on behalf of the Ad Hoc Committee, thank all the interpreters responsible among others for the efficient translation of complicated terminology which contributed to the smooth conduct of our meetings this year?

(Mr. Azambuja, Brazil)

... About two years ago, when I was the representative of Brazil to the Conference on Disarmament, I stated that - and I am quoting myself - "verification will undoubtedly be the crucial subject of disarmament negotiations, multilateral or bilateral, from now to the end of this century". I am very glad to see today that many countries seem to share those views. Proposals were presented aiming at the establishment of a verification regime for a nuclear test ban; measures to strengthen the biological weapons Convention may also be examined at the forthcoming review conference of that Convention, to take place over the next weeks in Geneva. Another evidence of the importance of this subject is the careful attention it received in this year's session of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.

(Mr. Azambuja, Brazil)

... At this moment, we are negotiating the chemical weapons convention with renewed enthusiasm, thanks to the positive evolution in the positions of the United States of America and the Soviet Union, which permitted the adoption of an unconditional prohibition of chemical weapons in article I of the draft convention. But besides chemical weapons we continued to debate on important items of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. In this connection, I would like to note the new dimension given to the consideration of item 1, Nuclear test ban.

(Mr. González, Chile)

... My delegation is very much aware of the need to give priority to work on chemical weapons and supports that decision, but it cannot go along with the idea of postponing all the other items in such a way as to convert this Conference into a preparatory conference for the chemical weapons convention. That is why we recognize the great value of the initiative recently submitted by Sweden in document CD/1089, containing a revised version of its own draft treaty on a comprehensive nuclear test ban, which had been submitted in 1983. We believe that that initiative is a useful and timely contribution which has come at a time when the Committee in question, like several others, is stagnating because of a lack of political will to deal with substantive matters. We would therefore venture to propose that among the measures studied annually by the Conference for improving its functioning, we should include next year the permanent establishment of the ad hoc committees with clear-cut and well-defined mandates, so that it is not necessary to devote long weeks each year to discussing how they should be re-established.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of the Soviet Union for his statement. I have no other speakers on my list. I suggest that we move on to adopt decisions on those ad hoc committee reports that have yet to be approved. We will do so following the order of their introduction in plenary. We will begin with the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, contained in document CD/1106. If there are no objections, I will take it that the Conference adopts the report.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish):

... This year, too, useful work has been done on the nuclear test ban, which is a topic of vital importance. We are all aware of the difficulties which existed in the past as regards re-establishing the Committee on this item. In the 1990 session the decision on its re-establishment was adopted perhaps rather late, as a result of which it had very little time to complete its work. This year the decision was taken in good time, which allowed a more structured debate on the various aspects involved. Significant differences remain but, as we see it, there is greater understanding of the various

(The President)

positions and proposals submitted. It is to be hoped that the Committee will continue its work, taking into account the ground already covered as well as the need to channel its work towards an objective that is essential and cannot be deferred - the establishment of a complete nuclear test ban.

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(Mr. Komatina, Secretariat)

... "The time has arrived when the world realistically expects the nuclear Powers to reassess their need for nuclear testing. We are all keenly aware of the strong divergent perceptions that still persist on the timing of a nuclear test ban. I for one, however, strongly believe that a test ban is an indispensable step towards a world without nuclear weapons. I support the dialogue begun in the Conference on this issue and encourage it to continue to seek the achievement of this goal.

(Mr. de Rivero, Peru)

... Before concluding, I would like to highlight once again the importance that my delegation attaches to agenda item 1 of this Conference, a complete nuclear test ban. Last year, the Ad Hoc Committee was able to conduct more exhaustive work, thus complementing the work done in 1990. However, it cannot continue indefinitely to follow a methodology which excludes the negotiation of a comprehensive treaty that would ban tests once and for all. The major historical changes that I have referred to this morning, as well as the nature of the new threats and cases of instability facing the world and the regions, compel this Conference to move forward towards the negotiation of a comprehensive treaty on a complete nuclear test ban. No argument can serve to justify delay. This year, the Conference must take a further step towards giving concrete form to that goal, which is shared by the majority of mankind.

(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

During the last General Assembly it also proved possible to merge the two texts which for many years had been adopted in parallel on the question of a comprehensive nuclear test ban. The new text is contained in resolution 46/29, adopted by a vote of 147 for and 2 against, with 4 abstentions and 13 delegations absent. That vote reflects the firm position of the overwhelming majority of the international community in favour of

(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

putting an end to all nuclear testing once and for all. In this so-called "new world" nuclear weapons have no justification, if ever they had one. Furthermore, as was pointed out a year ago by Gerard C. Smith, a former Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency of the United States, "it is difficult to conceive of any single measure that would do more to stem the spread of the nuclear scourge than a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing". That quotation is taken from Arms Control Today, November 1990. Ambassador Smith is not the first senior official of a nuclear-weapon State whose opinion on nuclear testing changed after he left Government service. At a recent seminar held in Princeton, New Jersey, we noticed that something similar is happening in the scientific community, especially among those atomic physicists involved in nuclear testing programmes who, once retired, give up trying to justify such tests and instead work for a ban.

Mexico continues to advocate the prompt conclusion of a treaty that will ban all nuclear tests. Together with other countries we have proposed an amendment to the partial test-ban Treaty in order to convert it into a CTBT. That process will continue this year with a series of consultations to be conducted by the President of the Amendment Conference, Foreign Minister Ali Alatas of Indonesia. But that should not serve as an excuse for the CD to continue dodging this priority issue. Two years ago, as a result of the flexibility of the majority of its members, the CD re-established the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, but without a negotiating mandate. In spite of this, the Committee's work was useful, though we consider that in 1992 it will be difficult to improve on what we have already achieved in the discussions of 1990 and 1991 under the leadership of Ambassadors Donawaki and Chadha respectively. We should now move from discussions to the negotiation of the provisions of a CTBT.

(Mr. Batsanov, Russian Federation)

... Russia resolutely advocates the prohibition of all nuclear testing. It is faithful to the year-long moratorium on nuclear explosions declared in October 1991 and hopes that other nuclear Powers will also refrain from nuclear testing. In the opinion of the Russian leadership, a climate of mutual restraint would further the achievement of an understanding on not carrying out such tests altogether. It is also possible to reduce the number of tests in stages.

In the interests of ultimately solving this task a proposal has been addressed to the United States to resume bilateral talks on the further limitations of nuclear testing.

(Mr. Kozyrev, Russian Federation)

... We are, of course, in favour of activating the work of the Conference in such an important field as the prohibition of nuclear testing.

(Mr. Lang, Austria)

... We also continue to attach considerable importance to a comprehensive nuclear test-ban and are of the opinion that a comprehensive verification system should be indispensable. That is why Austria has participated for more than 12 years in the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Seismic Experts whose task is to develop a feasible verification system for a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. In particular, a joint Austrian-Peruvian project has been designed to widen the technical part of the envisaged global seismological network to Latin America, a project that we still sponsor.

(The President)

While consultations have advanced, we still need to agree on an appropriate organizational arrangement for agenda item 1, "Nuclear test ban", and agenda item 8, "Comprehensive programme of disarmament". It is now my duty to identify a special coordinator for each of those agenda items.

Accordingly, I have decided to appoint as special coordinator for agenda item 1 the former Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Shah of India. For agenda item 8, the special coordinator will be Ambassador Zahran of Egypt. They are not here with us at this moment but I wish them success in their endeavours to obtain consensus on those items.

Distinguished representatives, at this point, with your permission, I would like to make my concluding statement.

... We were successful in reaching agreement on the establishment of three other subsidiary bodies - Ad Hoc Committees - on Radiological Weapons; on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons; and on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. We were very close to an agreement on the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on the Nuclear Test Ban, and I do hope that we will be able to start substantive work on this extremely important item as soon as our distinguished colleague, Ambassador Shah of India, in his capacity as Special Coordinator for this item, concludes his consultations on the pending issue of the mandate.

(Mr. Genscher, Germany)

... We consider it necessary to achieve, at long last, a negotiating mandate for a test ban agreement. An agreement banning nuclear explosions for test purposes must be concluded at the earliest possible moment.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): With regard to the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, the special coordinator, Ambassador Shah of India, has actively continued his consultations and I hope that we shall have some good news soon. The other matter that we must consider was taken up by the General Assembly in its resolution 46/36 L, entitled "Transparency in armaments". I propose to continue the consultations begun by my predecessor on the proposals presented in order to better respond to the General Assembly's request. We shall hold an informal consultation, open to all members of the Conference, at 10 a.m. on Tuesday, 25 February, in this conference room, with interpretation services.

CD/PV.614

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(Mr. Kostarczyk, Poland)

... The Conference on Disarmament also has a standing obligation to deal effectively with the question of a nuclear test ban - which constitutes part and parcel of the non-proliferation regime.

CD/PV.615

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(Mr. Bottai, Italy)

... We ask ourselves at this stage whether we are not already witnessing the first moves towards a post-nuclear era, given the fading role of the once dominant nuclear arsenals in international strategic relationships, as we perceived it for over 40 years. The surviving threat seems to be today more connected with certain risks of proliferation and tensions in some regional

(Mr. Bottai, Italy)

frameworks or with the possibility of errors or miscalculations, rather than actual escalation into a global conflict. It thus seems unavoidable that questions like the prohibition of nuclear testing, to which the CD has for a long time devoted its attention without being able to remove all the persisting reservations, will need to be addressed with a renewed sense of urgency so as to keep pace with the great progress already recorded or anticipated in the field of nuclear arms reductions. Italy, having long shared the view that the elimination of nuclear testing cannot be dissociated from the problem of the size of existing arsenals, is therefore of the view that conditions are now ripe to pursue, from a technical as well as from a political perspective, the objective of a total ban on nuclear testing, through reliable means of verification. Please allow me to note that such an objective would meet widely shared expectations in public opinion and political circles in my country.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French):

... I would also like to inform you that the consultations to conclude an agreement on the mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee on agenda item 1, entitled "Nuclear test ban", have continued over the past week and that a new text submitted by the representative of Japan, Ambassador Donowaki, is now before the Group of 21 for consideration. I hope that our consultations will be crowned with success in the next few days, in order to enable us to continue consideration of this important question. I will keep you informed about this matter.

(Mr. Donowaki, Japan)

Now, I wish to turn to the question of a nuclear test ban briefly. I am not speaking on behalf of the group of some Western States as their coordinator on the subject item, but in a national capacity, since my Government has traditionally attached special importance to this issue. Japan has over the years been working for the early realization of a nuclear test ban, and continues to regret the fact that underground nuclear testing, although decreasing in frequency in the last few years, is still being carried out by nuclear-weapon States.

Therefore, Japan was greatly encouraged by the re-establishment of the nuclear test ban Ad Hoc Committee in the CD two years ago, and to see that its substantive work was continued last year also under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Chadha and Ambassador Shah of India.

As I have stated on many occasions, the issue of a nuclear test ban has over the years turned into a highly emotional political issue. The nuclear arms race during the peak years of the cold war had the effect of horrifying the world with the prospect of a nuclear holocaust. Nobody could stop the dangerous arms race. If so, couldn't the nuclear-weapon States at least commit themselves to a nuclear test ban? The nuclear arms race would become impossible then, and nuclear disarmament possible. In this way, the nuclear test ban issue came to acquire a highly political and symbolic character. Confrontation instead of dialogue became a normal phenomenon whenever the issue came up for debate.

One of the healthy effects of the ending of the cold war may be the possibility to look at the issue of a nuclear test ban in its proper perspectives. The discussions that took place in the PTBT Amendment Conference already indicated such a new trend. The deliberations on the issue in the NTB Ad Hoc Committee last year, in which my delegation participated actively, proved that dialogue, instead of confrontation, was both possible and meaningful. We were able to listen to detailed reasoning as to why nuclear testing had to be continued as long as there remained a need to rely on nuclear deterrence, even though its priority might have gone down. If that was the case, could a step-by-step approach offer a solution? Similarly, in view of the growing concerns about the proliferation of nuclear weapons, could a regime of a nuclear test ban be established with a sufficiently reliable mechanism of verification and compliance? These are precisely the questions that the Ad Hoc Committee should continue to deal with.

My delegation is convinced that the CD is the only appropriate place where the issue of a nuclear test ban should be addressed, since we have the presence of all five nuclear-weapon States and since the CD is the only multilateral negotiating body on disarmament. It was for this reason that my delegation was much concerned about the delay in the re-establishment of the NTB Ad Hoc Committee this year. Fortunately, as a result of several presidential consultations and several meetings among item coordinators on the subject, agreement on the mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee now appears to be near at hand, and let us hope that the CD will not fail to fulfil its responsibilities on this subject either. Departing from the prepared text, I should like to say that until the end of this session tomorrow, I myself will

(Mr. Donowaki, Japan)

cooperate with you, Mr. President, with the Special Coordinator on this subject item, Ambassador Shah of India, and with all my colleagues to do our best to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee as soon as possible.

(Mr. Shah, India)

... We are encouraged that there are some positive signs of changes in the thinking of at least some nuclear-weapon Powers on this crucial issue and at this crucial juncture. In his address to the Conference on Disarmament of 12 February 1992, Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev of the Russian Federation acknowledged that the total elimination of nuclear weapons would offer the best solution. We invite those who believe in it to work with us in reaching that goal. We are encouraged that the early conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty has been advocated not only by the Russian Federation but by many countries even within the Western group. We see greater acceptance of the need for a fundamental review of the entire military and strategic situation in the world and consequently the revision of old military doctrines including nuclear deterrence. In keeping with our long-standing proposal for an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, we were heartened by the proposals made by Foreign Minister Kozyrev regarding non-targeting of strategic nuclear weapons, taking these weapons off their alert status and keeping delivery vehicles and warheads separate. We see progress in the thinking, notably of the Russian Federation, that all nuclear-weapon States should join the process of nuclear disarmament.

(Mr. Shah, India)

... Given the fact that all States are concerned with nuclear disarmament, we believe that the ideas outlined above should be discussed in a comprehensive manner and in a formal setting in the context of agenda items 2 and 3 of this Conference. The issue of a nuclear test ban has assumed increasing importance in the present-day context. It is therefore logical to hope that the Ad Hoc Committee on agenda item 1 of the CD this year should be re-established with an improved mandate after thorough discussions which were undertaken in the Ad Hoc Committee last year. On many occasions in the past, my delegation has pointed out that while a lot of groundwork has already been done on the issue of a nuclear test ban, the stage has now been reached when there should be a consensus amongst States to seriously negotiate on a nuclear-test-ban treaty. It is heartening that a large number of countries in Europe have begun to see the need for a nuclear-test-ban treaty. It is our hope that all member States of the CD will soon arrive at a consensus on this issue.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French):

... I will now pass to another matter. The Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events had intended today to introduce the sixth report on the Group of Scientific Experts' second technical test, GSETT-2, and the Ad Hoc Group's progress report. Mr. Ola Dahlman has informed me that as he is indisposed he has been unable to leave Sweden and therefore cannot speak to you as planned. He asks me to inform you that the English text of the sixth report on the Group of Scientific Experts' second technical test has been distributed today as CD/1144. The text of the document in all the other official languages of the Conference will be distributed during the break between the first and second parts of the annual session. The text of the progress report, on the thirty-third session of the Group has been distributed today as CD/1145 in all the official languages of the Conference. Consequently, Mr. Dahlman will be introducing these two reports at the plenary session on Thursday, 14 May. In accordance with our usual practice, I will place before the Conference for adoption the recommendation contained in paragraph 11 of the progress report at the plenary meeting scheduled for Thursday 21 May. The recommendation relates to the date of the next session of the Ad Hoc Group, which should take place between 27 July and 7 August 1992. The Conference will also be taking note of the sixth report on the Group of Scientific Experts' second technical test contained in document CD/1144.

I would also like to inform you that the consultations on the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee under item 1 of the agenda, entitled "nuclear test ban", will have to continue before the Conference is in a position to take a decision. I have already referred to the role played in these consultations by our friend Ambassador Donowaki, and I would like to thank him very much for the way in which he has worked to try to achieve an agreement. The special coordinator on item 1 of the agenda, Ambassador Shah of India, will be holding informal consultations open to all

(The President)

delegations tomorrow, Friday 27 March at 3 p.m. in this conference room; interpretation will be provided. I hope that we will then be able to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee at the beginning of the second session of the Conference.

Mr. DAHLMAN (Sweden): I regret that this report on the meeting of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts earlier this spring is coming this late. I am however pleased to report today on the session by the Ad Hoc Group held from 2 to 13 March 1992 and attended by experts and representatives from 25 countries and to introduce documents CD/1144 containing the Group's sixth main report and CD/1145 containing the Group's progress report.

I have on earlier occasions reported to the Conference on the results of the Group's second large-scale technical test, usually referred to as GSETT-2, and I will today only briefly summarize the results presented in CD/1144. During the Group's next session a number of appendices to this report will be compiled, containing detailed technical and scientific material.

The development of any advanced technical system is a dynamic process, in which proposed technical concepts are tested in practical experiments and the system design is modified according to the experience thus gained. The Ad Hoc Group has since its very beginning followed this principle in its development of a global seismological verification system.

The first global system was designed in 1978 (CCD/558), and was based on the exchange of pre-analysed "level I" data only. This system, which provided for the exchange of only limited amounts of data, was tested in the Group's first large-scale experiment, which we usually refer to as GSETT-1, in 1984 (CD/720).

Based on the experiences of that test and utilizing the rapid scientific and technological development, inter alia in information technology, the Ad Hoc Group effected a comprehensive redesign of the system. The modernized system, presented in 1989 (CD/903), was a system based on the exchange of wave-form data on all detected signals - "level II data" - and the routine analysis of this large data volume at international data centres.

The purpose of the recent test of GSETT-2 was to test the methods and procedures developed by the Group, going beyond what is routinely used for scientific purposes. The test was carried out in four phases: a first phase where experimental facilities and procedures were established around the world; a second phase where a number of short-term preparatory tests were conducted. The third phase was the full-scale test where the entire experimental system was operated continuously for 49 consecutive days from

(continued)

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

late April to early June 1991. Thirty-four countries participated in this main phase providing data from in all 60 seismological stations located in all continents. The individual countries and their national data centres were linked by modern means of communication to one or more of the four experimental international data centres operated in Canberra, Moscow, Stockholm and Washington, D.C.

The fourth phase, the evaluation of the test, is still continuing. Report CD/1144 summarizes the technical and operational results gained so far. In addition, a unique seismological database has been compiled during the test, which will be of interest to the wider seismological scientific community. Thanks to efforts by the United States delegation all data collected during GSETT-2 are now easily and generally available on two CD discs. This in itself is an illustration of the dramatic technological development, where data volumes which could barely be handled by the most advanced computers of yesterday can today be stored on CD discs and be analysed on personal computers available to all of us. This also illustrates the need to continuously update and modernize the global seismological system. In a broader perspective it stresses the need that modern technology be fully utilized also in support of arms limitation and disarmament efforts.

The GSETT-2 has provided the Group with most valuable results and experiences which will form a basis for reassessing the design of the system proposed in 1989 (CD/903). Such a reassessment, which will take into account also recent scientific, technological and other developments, will be reported on during the spring session of 1993.

Now that the main phase of GSETT-2 is successfully completed I would like to pay tribute in particular to some of my collaborators. Mr. Peter Basham of Canada has made a most valuable contribution as Coordinator of the Test. Dr. Frode Ringdal, Norway, the Groups Scientific Secretary, has as always successfully carried the responsibility of compiling our reports. The Group Secretary, Mr. Cassandra, and the secretariat here in Geneva have done excellent work not only in supporting the Group during its session but also in the preparation and translation of the report. The Group noted with appreciation the convening of an informal technical workshop by the United States in Dallas, Texas, from 3 to 5 December 1991, to assist in the evaluation of the results of GSETT-2. The Australian delegation has recently hosted a workshop in Canberra to evaluate the seismological method used at experimental international data centres.

The Ad Hoc Group continued its discussions on future work remaining under its current mandate. As I have just mentioned the next step in the dynamic process of developing the system is to analyse the implications for the present system design of the results obtained in GSETT-2 and of recent scientific, technological and other developments. This reassessment of the existing system design is likely to highlight certain issues and the Group tentatively identified a number that deserve careful attention in the Group's future work. I will comment briefly on some of these issues.

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

The seismological station, the sensor, is the most critical component of a global seismological verification system. The technical quality of the stations, their proper siting at locations with good receiving conditions and an appropriate global distribution of the stations are fundamental to obtain a capable system. The Ad Hoc Group considers that the further development and testing of a standardized seismological station, usually referred to as a CD station, to be used worldwide, is an important future task. An interesting option in this context is the possibility of introducing the "open station" concept by which data are made easily available by remotely accessing the computer systems of the individual stations. The selection of sites for seismological stations all over the globe and the deployment of experimental stations to conduct test recordings would provide information of great importance for the design of a global system. Studies of alternative global networks and estimates of their expected capabilities would be another important task. Such studies should include also estimates of operating and investment costs.

The present concept of a global system includes four experimental international data centres, and four such experimental centres have also been utilized in the two main tests. Recent developments have made it interesting, however, to study the feasibility of reducing the number of international data centres and maybe go as far as having only one.

The Ad Hoc Group regards continued testing on a bilateral and multilateral basis with the widest possible global participation as an essential element also in its future work. The Ad Hoc Group plans to continue the discussion of its future work, including the incorporation of new technologies, at its next session.

The Ad Hoc Group suggests that its next session, subject to approval by the Conference on Disarmament, should be convened from 27 July to 7 August 1992.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank Mr. Ola Dahlman, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, for introducing the reports issued as CD/1144 and CD/1145. Following the customary practice, I will submit to the Conference for adoption at the plenary meeting scheduled for Thursday 21 May the recommendation appearing in paragraph 11 of the progress report. The recommendation set out in paragraph 11 relates to the date of the Ad Hoc Group's next session, which, as Mr. Ola Dahlman has just announced, is to be held between 27 July and 7 August 1992. The Conference will also take note of the sixth report on the Group of Scientific Experts' second technical test (GSETT-2), contained in document CD/1144.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I declare open the 621st plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

As I announced at our last plenary meeting, I will submit today to the Conference for decision, once we have come to the end of the list of speakers, the recommendation contained in paragraph 11 of the progress report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events concerning the dates scheduled for the next session of the Ad Hoc Group, that is to say from 27 July to 7 August 1992. I will then invite the Conference to take note of the sixth report on the Group of Scientific Experts' second technical test (GSETT-2). Also as announced at the 620th plenary meeting, we will hold today, immediately after this meeting, an informal meeting that will be devoted to the substance of agenda item 3, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters".

(Mr. Brahimi, Algeria)

It is, in the first place, high time to honour the commitments entered into under that Treaty by the nuclear States, involving, in particular, the negotiation of concrete measures of nuclear disarmament, such as the negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. In the same way, it is equally appropriate for those States that have voluntarily renounced the nuclear option to benefit in return, in a legally binding international instrument, from guarantees against the use and the threat of use of nuclear weapons. And finally, it remains important to guarantee equal access for all to nuclear technology in the field of the peaceful use of nuclear energy for development.

(Mr. Sene, Senegal)

... This is also the place to recall that at its summit held in Cairo in 1964, the Organization of African Unity adopted a declaration making Africa a denuclearized zone, and we are happy that the Government of South Africa, which was not present, but whose efforts to dismantle apartheid we are following with interest today, has agreed to submit its atomic plants to IAEA checks. It is also understood that despite the differences of opinion on time-frames, the banning of nuclear tests is first and foremost an essential stage in mankind's march towards a denuclearized world. But in the meantime there is a need to devise effective legal arrangements which would offer non-nuclear-weapon States guarantees against the use or threat of use of these weapons. This is also the place and the moment to welcome the impetus given by the important INF, CFE and START treaties and by certain unilateral measures announced by nuclear Powers which quite obviously enhance the scope for multilateral negotiation.

Mr. MANGACHI (United Republic of Tanzania):

... My Government fully subscribes to the objective of achieving general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. In this vein the United Republic of Tanzania has been following the disarmament initiatives with very keen interest. Besides her participation in the United Nations disarmament conferences, Tanzania has also played an active role in the six-nation initiative on nuclear disarmament which included Argentina, India, Mexico, Sweden and Greece. These nations issued the Delhi Declaration on 28 January 1985 appealing for an all-embracing halt to the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. They also urged the prohibition of the development, testing, production, deployment and use of all space weapons. A complete test ban would ensure that nuclear arsenals do not grow while negotiations proceed. The test ban must be immediately followed by substantial reductions leading to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. To further confirm our full commitment to the goal of non-nuclear weapons proliferation Tanzania acceded to the NPT on 26 May 1991.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the Chair. I have no more speakers on my list for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? I see none.

As I announced to you at the beginning of this meeting, I now intend to submit to the Conference for adoption the recommendation contained in paragraph 11 of the progress report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events (CD11/45). The recommendation provides that the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts will hold its next session from 27 July to 7 August. If there are no objections, may I take it that the Conference adopts the Ad Hoc Group's recommendation? I see no objection.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I now invite the Conference to take note of the sixth report on the Group of Scientific Experts' second technical test (GSETT-2), distributed as CD11/44. May I consider the Conference takes note of the sixth report? I see no objection.

It was so decided.

Mr. ERRERA (France) (translated from French):

... On 8 April, the French Prime Minister announced that, on the instructions of the President of the Republic, France was suspending nuclear testing for 1992. This decision reflects the three main features of the policy pursued by France in the sphere of international security: its constant attitude of restraint, its determination to combat the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and its resolve to contribute to nuclear disarmament.

In order to meet its legitimate security needs, to preserve its independence and vital interests, France has opted for a strategy of deterrence, which remains the keystone of its defence policy. France made this choice in specific geopolitical circumstances and in a context of East-West relations which is well known. It will remain our choice for as long as the conditions for the elimination of nuclear weapons have not been met. Hence deterrence remains an imperative for us, with all its strategic and technological constraints. It remains at the heart of our defence system. Our doctrine, which is purely defensive, has always been based on the possession of autonomous nuclear forces maintained at a strict level of sufficiency, taking into account the imperatives of the international environment. We have always been guided by the principle of restraint, and this restraint has taken the form of deeds. First, our constant concern for a strict limit on the number and yield of our tests, which have been intended to maintain our defensive systems at the threshold of credibility and to meet their security and safety needs. Next, our de facto compliance, from 1975 onwards, with the provisions of the Moscow partial test-ban treaty, as well as the yield thresholds laid down in the 1974 and 1976 American-Soviet treaties. And last, a progressive reduction in the number of our tests, which fell to six per year, along with a redefinition of our programmes. As is well known, this attitude of restraint adopted by France has been accompanied by a policy

(Mr. Errera, France)

of transparency vis à vis the international community. Independent international missions were able to come and verify on the spot that our experiments presented no danger either for the populations involved or for the environment. The most recent was carried out by an IAEA laboratory, to conduct comparative measurements of radioactivity. Finally, it is public knowledge that for some years France has been notifying the international community of the tests it has carried out, providing indications of yields.

(Mr. Errera, France)

... It is on the basis of this general analysis that France has decided to take part in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Conference on Disarmament on a Nuclear Test Ban, when it is re-established. We will participate in an open-minded manner without preconceptions, in order to identify jointly the prospects but also any conditions and obstacles there may be in this area. The Committee's mandate adopted in 1990 and 1991, and basically renewed this year, should allow an in-depth examination of the specific issues relating to a nuclear test ban, whether with regard to structure, scope, verification or compliance. However - and this is no secret - the negotiation of a test-ban treaty remains in our view inseparable from progress in nuclear disarmament in the framework of general and complete disarmament. As far as verification is concerned, my delegation attaches great importance to the continuation of the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts in seismology, in which it has already participated in the context of data exchange trials, and in which it will play a full part. In short, our decision, as everyone will understand, is a gesture of goodwill intended to encourage what we see as a positive trend, and one we think it our duty to reinforce, in the area of nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The coming months will undoubtedly be decisive. The reality and the pace of the measures expected by everyone will be a crucial element in our future attitude. As the French Prime Minister stressed, also on 8 April: "In 1993 we shall see whether the example has been followed and whether reason has moved forward". Let everyone shoulder his responsibilities fully, and the security of all will be able to move forward.

(Mr. Králik, Czechoslovakia)

... Just briefly on the other points on the agenda. I am delighted by the announcement of France that it will take part in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. This is an example of a new approach to the substance of the matter and it will surely have very positive implications for further developments in this exceptionally important and closely followed question. I do hope that the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban will be established soon. In the same breath, I would like to add that I foresee a close relationship between the complex solution of questions connected with nuclear testing and negative security assurances. As last year's Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on NSA, I believe that because of improved international conditions, the time is ripe now for this anticipated shift. After the completion of the chemical weapons convention, in which I firmly believe, the problems of outer space will then come to the fore. All that is needed to make this happen are those measures of mutual trust and a beginning of the same cooperation which I have witnessed during the last few months in the question of transparency in armaments.

(Sir Michael Weston, United Kingdom)

... My Government is committed to a comprehensive nuclear test ban as a long-term objective. However, as we have frequently stated here, so long as nuclear weapons contribute positively to global security, and the United Kingdom's own nuclear weapons contribute positively to our security and that of our allies, we foresee a need to test, from time to time, to ensure that our nuclear weapons remain safe and effective. Under these circumstances, the role of the Conference on this question can in our view only be as a forum for the exchange of views on the necessary practical means for establishing the test ban when the time becomes ripe for its implementation. We are happy to contribute to work on this basis. We also support, for the same reason, the continuing work of the Group of Scientific Experts, whose second technical test has been an important feature of the past 12 months.

CD/PV.623

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(Mr. Yumjav, Mongolia)

... We have a clear mandate from the United Nations General Assembly concerning the nuclear test ban. General Assembly resolution 46/29 reaffirmed the particular responsibilities of the Conference on Disarmament in the negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, and in this context urged the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee in 1992. The above-mentioned resolution also requested the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its substantive work on specific and interrelated test-ban issues, taking into account all relevant proposals and future initiatives. Therefore,

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(Mr. Yumjav, Mongolia)

my delegation feels that the Ad Hoc Committee should be re-established as soon as possible. It is encouraging to note, moreover, that this year yet another nuclear-weapon State will participate in the work of that Committee.

The Mongolian delegation welcomes the decision of France to suspend the testing of nuclear weapons for 1992, regarding it as an important contribution to nuclear disarmament. It is our hope that other nuclear Powers will follow suit.

Mr. O'SULLIVAN (Australia):

... I would like to comment on two issues this morning, and with the words of Pericles ringing in my ears, I trust I am venturing on to glory, not on to disaster. I want to first of all express the regret of the Australian Government that it has not proved possible so far to establish a committee

(Mr. O'Sullivan, Australia)

on banning the testing of nuclear weapons. The impasse in this Conference, however, is not matched by a similar stasis in the real world. I note, for instance, that there is a very important decision by President Mitterrand to have a moratorium on French nuclear testing for this year, one which we, Australia, greatly welcome and we think is of great significance. Recently, there has been a major statement of importance by the Prime Minister of Canada. There has been press speculation, which I understand is well founded, about a whole series of ideas taking place within the United States national security bureaucracy about ideas for limiting - perhaps even banning - testing. And, of course, going in the opposite direction, we have had a recent and massive Chinese test. So things are going on in the real world while we, unfortunately, are not considering them here. There are real questions being raised about what use nuclear weapons now have in the sort of world we have moved into. Is there a need to test them? Can their safety be assured by means other than testing them? These are questions that we think ought to be debated here, and we want to record our frustration and our disappointment that the Conference on Disarmament so far has proved unable to establish a committee to do that. So, we look forward to some changes.

Mr. GONZALEZ (Chile) (translated from Spanish):

... My delegation did not intend to take part in the debate in this plenary. However, we believe that the statements we have heard this morning give rise to a number of interesting ideas and in this sense we believe that the distinguished Ambassador of Australia has shed some light which we deem particularly important, and a few questions remain which it would be a good idea for us to be able to consider subsequently. I am specifically referring to the nuclear item, the item on nuclear testing and everything related to this important matter. He spoke to us of the differences or discrepancies between what is debated in the Conference on Disarmament, or rather the lack of intent and political will to debate items which are on the agenda, and what is happening in the real world. That real world also includes Latin America. Latin America, we believe without boasting, is giving a very specific example in terms of the establishment of clear parameters on the prohibition of nuclear weapons. Your own country, Mr. President, and Brazil have signed an important declaration on this matter. My country, along with Argentina and Brazil, is carrying out important negotiations in terms of applying the Treaty of Tlatelolco if matters so indicate. I would say that there is a very tangible, very clear and very determined political will in different areas of the world on the nuclear issue which this Conference cannot afford the luxury of evading. Hence in this sense we would like to endorse fully the concerns put forward to us so clearly this morning by the distinguished Ambassador of Australia, and we cannot fail to do so bearing in mind the background which, in the case of Latin America, represents keen concern on such a crucial subject.

(Mrs. Hernes, Norway)

... For many years the achievement of a comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT) has been a central Norwegian foreign policy goal. A total, permanent ban on all nuclear testing is essential in order to halt effectively both the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. Other important reasons for the discontinuation of all nuclear test explosions are the environmental and health risks associated with underground nuclear explosions. Accidents and venting may occur and could have serious consequences, and this is why my Government is concerned about nuclear tests on Novaya Zemlya, which is an archipelago located in a vulnerable Arctic environment. The CD is the appropriate forum to deal with the issue of a nuclear test ban. We regret that it has not yet proved possible to establish a working group on the test ban issue in the CD.

Norway attaches great importance to and takes an active part in the efforts of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to design and test a global seismic network which could monitor a comprehensive nuclear test ban. An up-to-date global seismic network would form an essential part of the verification regime of a CTBT. The large-scale GSETT-2 experiment undertaken by the Group last year will provide an excellent basis for the Group's further work in revising the initial design concepts for such a global network.

We welcome the Russian moratorium on nuclear tests and hope that this unilateral test ban will be continued beyond its present scope. I also welcome the French decision, announced by President Mitterrand on 8 April, to abstain from further testing this year. But the time spans of earlier moratoriums on nuclear test bans have proved to be limited. Experience shows that if such unilateral steps are not followed by other countries, there is

(continued)

(Mrs. Hernes, Norway)

growing pressure to resume testing. The aim must therefore be to secure a negotiated permanent global test ban. Meanwhile, we urge all nuclear-weapon States to halt their nuclear testing activities.

Some time ago Foreign Minister Stoltenberg took the initiative to prepare an expert report on questions related to a comprehensive test-ban treaty. In cooperation with the Norwegian Advisory Council for Arms Control and Disarmament, we invited a group of internationally recognized experts to prepare contributions to the report. The report, which was finalized at a workshop in Oslo in March this year, calls for a comprehensive test-ban treaty by 1995. The concluding chapter of this report, distributed as document CD/1151, states that the reasons usually put forward for continuing nuclear tests are losing credibility and that the environmental effects of continued testing and the dangers of nuclear proliferation are the two overriding issues necessitating a CTB.

There is reason to believe that the non-proliferation regime will be strengthened by a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the only global instrument through which States can make a formal commitment not to acquire or to assist other States in acquiring nuclear weapons. It is especially encouraging to note that a number of States have recently acceded to the non-proliferation Treaty, among them South Africa and the nuclear-weapon State China. France has decided to follow suit. The intention of the new republics in the former Soviet Union to adhere to the NPT is also an important step towards universal adherence to the Treaty. It is now essential that the safeguards control system of IAEA be further strengthened and that the organization be provided with adequate financial resources to maintain a credible level of supervision.

(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

... As we look forward to the early conclusion of the chemical weapons convention, the threat posed by nuclear weapons continues to loom large in our minds. The issue of a nuclear test ban and indeed nuclear disarmament remain priority items on our agenda. Nigeria has always expressed the view that the acquisition of nuclear weapons cannot guarantee genuine international peace and security. Thus, we have consistently called for urgent and concrete measures towards nuclear disarmament. My delegation welcomes the decision by France to suspend nuclear weapons testing in 1992 and to participate in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. We also welcome the recent signing of the Protocol to the START Treaty in Lisbon by the United States, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. However, we believe that unilateral and bilateral initiatives only complement multilateral efforts. The Conference on Disarmament as the sole multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament has the responsibility of initiating negotiations on a nuclear test ban.

(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

My delegation is disappointed that the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban has not been re-established due to lack of agreement on an appropriate mandate. We must not allow the golden opportunity provided by the recent initiatives on the reduction of nuclear arms to elude us. The post-cold-war era has created a favourable political environment for the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee with a negotiating mandate.

The world is in need of an effective international agreement that bans nuclear weapon testing in all environments for all time. The international community must take necessary measures to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. A comprehensive test ban will be the first step in this direction. This would strengthen the present non-proliferation regime and ensure universal adherence.

(Mr. Almusawi, Iraq)

... Furthermore, despite the extreme importance attributed by the international community to a chemical weapons ban, this question should not be the sole focus of attention from this unique multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament. Progress should be made in other areas, particularly those falling within the competence of the ad hoc committees on nuclear weapons, given the maximum priority that the tenth special session of the United Nations General Assembly attributed to effective measures for nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war.

The decades that have passed since the establishment of this negotiating forum without effective measures having been taken on the items relating to nuclear disarmament are lost decades. However, hope remains that the ad hoc committees on nuclear weapons will be given appropriate mandates allowing them to embark on negotiations on halting the nuclear arms race, on a nuclear test ban, and on nuclear disarmament.

(Mr. Zahran, Egypt)

... These measures have extended to another field, namely conventional weapons in Europe, and I refer specifically to the Paris Charter which contains important provisions that will take European security into new horizons. We have followed the changes which have altered the political map of what was known as the Soviet Union and seen the emergence of the new Commonwealth of independent republics. The question now is: as we approach the twenty-first century, does the world of today need the huge quantities of nuclear weapons which remain stockpiled? What is the point of the policy of nuclear deterrence still upheld by some nuclear States while we are taking unremitting steps towards collective security? If we speak of nuclear deterrence, against whom is it needed? This leads to another question on the usefulness of continuing nuclear testing with the aim of developing advanced modern generations of nuclear weapons, or of testing their suitability for use. International peace and security cannot be realized through stockpiling nuclear weapons. The maintenance of international peace and security is not based on a fragile balance of deterrent capacity and strategic balance. In fact, genuine peace can only exist in a world where cohesion and cooperation reigns among nations.

(Mr. Arteaga, Venezuela)

... Little time is left to us. Let us avail ourselves of this opportunity to respond decisively to the expectations of the international community. Let us set an example of the ability that this Conference can and must have to produce concrete agreements of global scope. In this way, the Conference on Disarmament will finally provide the international community with a noteworthy product of its work, and, through this stimulus, will be able to focus its attention on other fundamental items such as the nuclear test ban and the prevention of the arms race in outer space.

(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)

... No one can question the great importance of nuclear disarmament and the consequent obligations falling on our Conference. The work dealing with chemical weapons should not lessen our determination to make progress on this issue of vital importance for the future of mankind. The time has come to better organize our endeavour to make the Conference on Disarmament play a more active role as far as nuclear disarmament is concerned. The developments in international relations, however encouraging they are, require us to be vigilant because the risk remains that the process might go awry or that there might be a confrontation, and it is our responsibility to stimulate further efforts at the multilateral level. In this connection, my delegation wishes to draw attention to the crucial importance of a complete ban on nuclear tests. The work carried out by our Conference on this issue, despite its limited nature, has shown the priority that should be given to a ban on such tests. Their continuation gives further impetus to the nuclear arms race, in both its quantitative and its qualitative aspects. A treaty completely banning nuclear tests is therefore essential to the goal of genuine, verified nuclear disarmament. Important statements were made on this matter during the first part of the current session of the Conference. We welcome in particular those made by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Russia and Germany, who called for the negotiation of a treaty in this area. Likewise, the announcement made recently by the French Government that it was suspending its tests in the Pacific will promote the objectives pursued by the Conference and should be welcomed. All these steps offer the Conference on Disarmament an historic opportunity that it must grasp in order to embark on genuine negotiations on what has now become a priority issue, because the threat of nuclear proliferation will persist in the absence of concrete results in this area of decisive significance for international security.

(The President)

... We are now entering the final stretch of a set of negotiations and it is inevitable that queries will arise about the future of the Conference once the chemical weapons negotiators take a rest from their efforts. In our opinion the responses to these existential queries facing the Conference are on the table and are called, for example, regional disarmament, confidence-building measures, prevention of an arms race in outer space, cessation of nuclear tests, nuclear disarmament, transparency in armaments, non-proliferation in a broad sense, transfer of dual-use technologies. I think that the ground is very large and very concrete. It is not a matter of a list of recipes for the polemics or the dialogues of the deaf characteristic of an era that is now - thank God - behind us, but a really operational agenda. As from 1993 we will

(The President)

have to put some order in our work and make headway in those areas where conceptual clarity is greater so that a start can be made on pre-negotiating work, subsequently moving on to broach other subjects. I also think that in 1993, as I said in my opening statement, the Conference on Disarmament should give satisfaction to those States which are not members of the Conference and which for a long time now have been waiting for the honouring of a commitment that all of us assumed quite some time ago, which is the enlargement of our body. To my mind the Conference should give a very clear and prompt indication on this matter, and perhaps we should all give some thought to the desirability of giving a clear indication in our report to the General Assembly this year.

(Mr. Vargas, Chile)

... Apart from the broad issue of general disarmament, I wish to underscore, as subjects of special urgency, the total cessation of nuclear-weapon tests, what are known as security assurances for non-nuclear States, the total prohibition of chemical weapons, the protection of outer space and the item that is being analysed by the Disarmament Commission relating to the role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields.

... Let us also recall that the cessation of nuclear testing was proposed for the first time in 1954 by the then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India. Since then, major efforts have been made in the United Nations, in the Geneva Committee on Disarmament, in PTBT review Conference and at the third and fourth NPT review conferences. Never has a measure limiting nuclear weapons been the object of so much dedication for so long and with so much persistence. It is our hope that the voluntary moratorium announced by Russia and France will become a permanent reality and that soon a treaty on a complete nuclear test ban can be agreed which will be the expression of a genuine and universal regime of non-proliferation.

(Mr. Robertson, Canada)

... Sixth, the basic bargain implicit in the non-proliferation Treaty is a commitment of the nuclear Powers to reduce nuclear weapons in return for a commitment by the non-nuclear Powers not to acquire any such weapons. The 1995 review conference must confirm that bargain. To pave the way, our Prime Minister suggested that it would be reasonable for all nuclear-weapons States to agree now on a moratorium on testing these weapons. In his view France deserved full marks for its unilateral moratorium announced in April.

(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

... We should now like to turn briefly to the question of what will happen in the Conference on Disarmament once the Convention is concluded. In other words, will there be any life in the Conference after chemical weapons? The answer to this question - which many of us have been trying to answer for some years - holds the key to the Conference's future.

It is understandable that in a last intense collective effort the members of the Conference should have concentrated primarily, in some cases exclusively, on the negotiations on chemical weapons. In doing so, however, they have left aside some of the questions on our agenda, beginning with nuclear disarmament, and more particularly the complete cessation of nuclear

(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

tests. In point of fact, this year's report by the Conference to the General Assembly, apart from the chapter on chemical weapons, will be more discouraging than in previous years. On none of the other seven items has there been any progress, and in some cases it could even be said that ground has been lost. To put it another way, while prompt conclusion of the Convention on Chemical Weapons will undoubtedly be clear evidence of the Conference's robust state of health, the situation with regard to the other items on our agenda points towards a highly pessimistic diagnosis. The bells that will no doubt ring out when the Convention on chemical weapons is concluded could end up sending another signal. They could be sounding the death-knell of the Conference itself.

Sir Michael WESTON (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland):

... I am pleased to announce that, as part of a wider programme of cooperation on seismological research, the United Kingdom and the Kingdom of Swaziland have agreed to become working partners in the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. This partnership will begin at the next session of the Ad Hoc Group from 27 July to 7 August, when we will table a joint paper analysing seismograms recorded from 1973-1976 during the operation of a temporary seismic station in the Kingdom of Swaziland.

This agreement coincides with an offer of practical assistance from the United Kingdom with the establishment of a seismic station in the Kingdom of Swaziland. The United Kingdom looks forward to close cooperation on seismological research with the Kingdom of Swaziland, and believes the establishment of a seismic station in the Kingdom of Swaziland will make a valuable contribution to the work of the Ad Hoc Group by developing the network of seismic stations in the Southern Hemisphere.

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(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

... Over the years, a nuclear test ban has had the first priority among the nuclear issues, at least on a more general political level. The ultimate goal seems to be shared by all States, but differences of opinion remain on the urgency of this matter.

The overwhelming majority of the Member States of the United Nations has repeatedly called on the Conference on Disarmament to substantively consider a comprehensive test ban. Last autumn, this world-wide opinion was clearly demonstrated by the massive support for the merged resolution on this issue (resolution 46/29) at the forty-sixth session of the General Assembly. Against this background it is obvious that the question of a nuclear test ban remains highly topical and that it should continue to be allocated a separate item on the agenda of the CD.

(Mr. Morales, Cuba)

... The amendment of the agenda of the Conference is, in the opinion of the Cuban delegation, one of the most important, serious and delicate questions we shall have to examine with a view to finding a compromise solution reflecting the interests of the majority of the members of the international community and not the desires of a small group of countries. On the new agenda of the Conference we should therefore keep those items which enjoy wide support and what we must do is find a way that will lead us to solutions consistent with the interests of the majority, demonstrating the necessary political will to this end and refraining from obstructive practices which have to date impeded the conclusion of agreements on matters identified as priority issues by the international community. I am referring most particularly to the items related to nuclear disarmament. The question of the total prohibition of nuclear tests is, in the opinion of the Cuban delegation, one that ought to appear in any version of the agenda of this Conference, since the set of problems associated with it is the essential prerequisite for any comprehensive and irreversible process of genuine multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament. The draft comprehensive test-ban treaties that have been put before the Conference on Disarmament will be useful in this endeavour.

The PRESIDENT:

... Turning then to matters of substance, I would first of all want to put on record that it is a matter of regret to my Government that we have not been able to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. As you will remember, I expressed my frustration at the impasse in our Conference some weeks ago in the hope that, by articulating the disappointment that many of us

(continued)

(The President)

felt about the difficulties with the re-establishment, there might have been greater efforts to get the Committee into place. But that has not proved to be so up to this point. I recall that the last time the Conference went through a whole annual session without having the Committee, in fact it took several years, I believe seven, before the Committee was finally re-established.

But, of course, there have been many developments of interest in the search for a nuclear test ban, even this week indeed, which ought to have been considered here. These include, not least the moratoriums on testing by France and by Russia and the announcement today by France of its accession to the NPT, which I wholeheartedly welcome of course. Given the very different political climate now, I believe it would be almost inexplicable to our Governments and to the wider interested public if the Conference on Disarmament continued to be unable to address this subject. I certainly anticipate the early re-establishment of this Ad Hoc Committee next year.

(Mr. Lang, Austria)

... In any event, one area in which it will be intrinsically impossible for any region to turn in on itself, and one to which the Conference on Disarmament must attach priority importance, is that of nuclear testing. We might recall that the explosive force of all nuclear tests carried out since 1945 is equivalent to that of 40 Hiroshima bombs. Far too often these tests have devastating effects on the regions affected. Hence the continuation of nuclear tests seems to us to be irresponsible from both the medical and the environmental viewpoints. In this regard the letter which the President of the French Republic, Mr. François Mitterrand, sent to the heads of State of the other nuclear Powers on 8 April proposing the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests is a promising development and the respective commitments of France and the Russian Federation to suspend tests temporarily are encouraging. Nevertheless, there has not yet been any definitive abandonment of these tests - quite the contrary, nuclear explosions follow one after another. The arguments submitted in favour of such tests, namely that they are necessary in order to improve the security systems for nuclear weapons, to check the reliability of stockpiled nuclear warheads and to modernize nuclear arms, are very questionable.

Austria has always been committed to the cessation of all nuclear tests. It ratified the Moscow partial nuclear-test-ban Treaty in 1964 and has always spoken out in favour of United Nations resolutions advocating a total ban. Austria will vigorously maintain this position and will provide support for efforts to conclude a complete nuclear-test-ban treaty - all the more so since on behalf of my Government and by means of this statement I have the honour to transmit to the nuclear powers represented in this forum an appeal from the Chamber of Deputies of the Austrian Parliament, the Nationalrat. This appeal, dated 5 June 1992, calls for an immediate end to all nuclear tests without waiting for the creation of an international commitment to that end. In that context, it therefore goes without saying that we appreciate the study also calling for the cessation of nuclear tests, submitted to the Conference on Disarmament by Norway on 1 June in document CD/1151. Echoing Ambassador O'Sullivan of Australia, we hope that the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban will not be too long in coming.

(Mr. García Moritán, Argentina)

... This leads us to mention again a matter that was tabled by Argentina here and in New York two years ago: the need to draw up a new operational agenda that can realistically and practically meet the security challenges of the last five years of the century. The recent report prepared by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Dr. Boutros-Ghali, entitled "An agenda for peace", reminds us what the circumstances are and what the questions are we have to take up. Today it would seem that the most urgent questions on the international security agenda relate to peace-keeping, transparency in armaments, the nuclear testing issue, the strengthening and consolidation of agreements to eliminate and reduce weapons of mass destruction, and prevention of an arms race in outer space.

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Mr. WADHWA (India): Mr. President, the delegation of India is extremely pleased to see you presiding over our work in this crucial period, and we wish you well in your important task. First of all, I would like to apologise on behalf of Ambassador Shah, who was supposed to report today personally on his efforts as special coordinator for agenda item 1, "Nuclear test ban", but has been unable to attend this plenary meeting due to other urgent commitments elsewhere in the Palais. Allow me, on his behalf, to read out the following report of the special coordinator on agenda item 1, "Nuclear test ban".

At the Conference's 612th plenary meeting on 13 February 1992, the President of the Conference appointed me as special coordinator to seek agreement on organizational arrangements for agenda item 1. During the course of the three sessions of the CD this year, I have carried out active and intensive consultations with delegations, bilaterally and through open-ended meetings, to ensure that there would be agreement among all delegations to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee with a mandate acceptable to all. A series of proposals on a draft mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee's re-establishment were put forward and considered, along with a proposal for a programme of work for the 1992 session, which for some delegations was an important component of the package. Throughout these consultations, I found a general agreement among all delegations to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee this year and to start its work quickly. The growing importance of agenda item 1 was recognized by all delegations.

An overwhelming majority of delegations expressed willingness to give a mandate to the Ad Hoc Committee to continue, as a step towards achieving a nuclear-test-ban treaty, substantive work on specific and interrelated test-ban issues. A growing number of delegations felt that the Conference on Disarmament must immediately begin serious and sustained consideration of agenda item 1, particularly in the light of the conclusion of negotiations on a chemical weapons convention. While substantial progress was made on improving the previous mandate, no final agreement has been possible up to now. It is my hope that the results achieved so far this year will not be lost sight of when efforts are continued next year to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee at the beginning of its 1993 session. In view of the overwhelming interest in this item among the members of the CD, I would

(Mr. Wadhwa, India)

recommend that the CD re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee at the beginning of the 1993 session and make urgent efforts towards a negotiating mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee.

Mr. DAHLMAN (Sweden): I am pleased to report today on the recent session of the Ad Hoc Group held from 27 July to 7 August 1992 and attended by experts and representatives from 27 countries, and to introduce document CD/1163 containing the Group's progress report.

The work of the Ad Hoc Group has during the last years been concentrated on the conduct and the evaluation of the Group's second large-scale technical test (GSETT-2). The Group is now about to finalize the reporting of this successful undertaking. A summary of the main results was presented to the CD earlier this year in CD/1144.

At this session the Group completed five quite voluminous appendices to this report. These appendices, which are an integral part of the Group's sixth report, contain a detailed account of the test and of the scientific and technical results obtained. This information will be useful for the Group's further work. Due to their technical nature the appendices will not be circulated within the CD but kept as documents of the Group and be available through the secretariat. The secretariat has as always done excellent work in supporting the Group.

The seismological evaluation is now the only remaining item of GSETT-2 to be reported on. This evaluation requires considerable effort and access to reference material for the actual test period provided by scientific institutes around the world. The Group continued its discussion of this issue and agreed to focus the seismological evaluation on the detection and location capabilities achieved during GSETT-2. The Group plans to finalize a report on this evaluation at its next session.

The backbone of the Group's work is results from national investigations conducted in individual countries or in cooperation between countries. Some 40 reports on such investigations were presented during the session. I will choose a few examples from this important flow of information.

Several investigations illustrated the high detection and location capabilities obtained by national or regional networks of seismological stations. Such networks can, as will be discussed later, be useful also in the context of global monitoring.

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

The detection capabilities of individual stations are critically dependent on the prevailing background disturbances or noise at the actual site. Based on data obtained from GSETT-2 a thorough investigation of the noise situation at stations around the globe was presented. This showed a most significant variation between sites and clearly illustrated the importance of selecting the sites carefully to obtain seismological stations with high performance.

In addition to detecting individual events that occur it might, in a monitoring situation, be important to know that no events above a certain level have occurred in a given region during a specific time period. A national investigation described a method to estimate the actual monitoring capability of a certain region from the analysis of continuously available noise data.

In my last example of national contributions, satellite photos were used to pinpoint the precise locations of open-pit mines from which seismological signals were recorded, thereby helping in calibrating the seismological observations. This illustrates the usefulness of combining various technologies in developing a monitoring system.

The Group devoted most of its efforts during the session to discussing the reassessment of the concept of the global monitoring system described in its fifth report (CD/903). The discussions were focused on the overall design of the system and provided a basis and an outline for the Group's future work.

The Group noted that many of the results and experiences obtained in GSETT-2 will be important in reassessing the overall concept of the system and its various components. Some of the more important are as follows.

First, the need for a network with adequate global coverage of high-quality stations, especially arrays. GSETT-2 showed a strong regional variation in detection and location capabilities reflecting not only the uneven station distribution but also strong variation in station sensitivities and capabilities. The seismic arrays again proved to be most useful.

Second, the need to take into account information from local and regional seismic networks; such modern and high-performance networks are today operating in many parts of the globe and could provide information of great importance for a global monitoring system.

Third, the future use of only one international data centre (IDC) in the global system; during GSETT-2 four experimental IDCs were used, which provided valuable experience. Technical and other developments not only make it possible but also desirable to use only one IDC to serve the future system.

Fourth, the need to improve and automate analysis procedures. GSETT-2 provided the EIDCs with a large amount of wave-form or level II data. The full potential of these comprehensive recordings was not fully utilized during the test due to lack of adequate analysis methods and procedures.

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

Over the last decade, scientific and technological developments have been significant not only in seismology, but also in information technology, an area of great importance for global seismological monitoring systems. The Group firmly believes that the design of the global system should fully utilize recent developments in science and technology. The Group identified the following areas as being important for the overall system concept: the rapid developments in global telecommunication, making high-speed communication available globally; the general availability of high-performance computers and methods and procedures for data management and analysis; and finally, the developments in regional seismology, i.e., that based on seismological observations at distances of less than 2,000 km, making it possible to fully utilize data from national and regional networks.

In considering preliminary design concepts the Group also tentatively discussed the various products that might be available to the users from alternative system designs. Although this question requires further consideration, the Group noted that it would be desirable to estimate the detection, location and identification capabilities of alternative system designs. It further considers that the issues of redundancy, data authenticity, reliability and security are important.

As to the overall conceptual design, the Group agreed on the following tentative framework for studying design options. In its work so far the Group has been focusing on a global network of some 50 stations as the basis of the system. The Group is now considering alternative global networks of high-quality arrays and single stations. The networks should be modelled based on the results of the best stations in operation during GSETT-2. The number of stations in the networks could be extended or reduced to demonstrate networks of varying sensitivity. By estimating costs for each alternative network a cost-capability relation for the monitoring systems might be illustrated. The global network should be complemented by national and regional networks primarily used to report on seismic events occurring within their territories.

The system should contain only one international data centre. This should be built on the experience gained at the four experimental IDCs operated so far. Special efforts should be made to improve quality control, automation and procedures for wave-form analysis. The IDC should be able to receive and process continuous wave-form data should that prove to be valuable.

The Ad Hoc Group established nine working groups of participating experts to elaborate on the following topics relevant to the design of the global system: overall concepts, station design, site selection, network studies, seismological procedures, establishment of a single international data centre, communications, interaction by the IDC with national and regional networks, and cost estimates. These working groups became actively engaged during the session in defining their main tasks, which should be elaborated on between now and the Group's next session.

The Canadian delegation has invited GSE experts to a workshop in November 1992. This will provide a valuable opportunity to continue discussions within and among the working groups.

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

The Ad Hoc Group noted with appreciation the convening of a similar informal technical workshop by Australia in Canberra from 27 April to 1 May 1992, which proved useful in evaluation of the results of GSETT-2.

The Group has on earlier occasions benefited from technical discussions with international organizations such as the World Meteorological Organization and INMARSAT, and representatives from these organizations have participated in the Group's meetings as observers at the invitation of the Conference on Disarmament.

The Ad Hoc Group now considers it to be useful to share with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) the GSE technical concepts for the global exchange of seismic data in order to determine if IAEA has particular technologies or experiences that might be useful to the Group in its work. To this end, the Ad Hoc Group suggests that, without any financial implications to the Conference, IAEA should be invited to send an observer to attend the Ad Hoc Group's next session.

The Ad Hoc Group suggests that its next session, subject to approval by the Conference on Disarmament, should be convened from 15 to 26 February 1993.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank Dr. Dahlman, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, for introducing the Group's report. I shall put before the Conference for decision at our next plenary meeting the recommendation contained in paragraph 15 of the report concerning the dates of the Group's next session.

We have now come to the end of the list of speakers. Are there any other delegations that would like to take the floor? Mr. Siahaan of Indonesia, you have the floor.

Mr. SIAHAAN (Indonesia): I take the floor on behalf of the Group of 21 to place on record our disappointment concerning the inability of the Conference on Disarmament to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on agenda item 1, "Nuclear test ban", this year. This failure occurs despite the renewed effort to that end, the improved international political climate and the overwhelming endorsement in the United Nations General Assembly of the call for the early conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

The Group of 21 has consistently advocated and attached utmost importance to the urgent conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Bringing an end to nuclear tests for weapons purposes is the most urgent and crucial issue in the field of disarmament. A comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty is long overdue. The Conference on Disarmament as the single multilateral negotiating body in this field has the primary role in carrying out negotiations to achieve this objective.

(Mr. Siahaan, Indonesia)

Today we note the progress achieved by the signing of the INF Treaty, the START Treaty, as well as unilateral measures and the recent agreement between Presidents Bush and Yeltsin to make significant reductions in the nuclear arsenals of their two countries. These are positive developments, but these could not make a CTBT less essential. Besides, bilateral and multilateral efforts should be complementary.

The conclusion of a CTBT will be a significant contribution to the aim of ending the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons as well as preventing their proliferation. Proliferation in all its aspects must be stopped, and nuclear weapons cannot be considered as a legitimate source or means to enhance the political status of countries. Moreover, a CTBT would also help to alleviate the concern about the environmental and health risks associated with underground nuclear testing.

It is encouraging to note that the Russian Federation and France have announced voluntary moratoriums on testing. The Group of 21 urgently calls on the other three nuclear Powers to make similar commitments and expects all nuclear Powers to then continue with the moratoriums until the actual treaty is signed and ratified.

As has been repeatedly demonstrated in the past, in this year's session of the CD the Group of 21 has shown flexibility in the search for a consensus on the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee as evidenced by the various proposals put forward to that end. But the Conference on Disarmament has met with a setback in this regard, as a result of the obstacles laid down by certain nuclear Powers belonging to one group, despite the willingness of the vast majority of the members of the Conference on Disarmament to engage in serious negotiations. The flexibility of the Group of 21 on the draft mandate should not be misconstrued. It will not be useful to re-establish a subsidiary body if it will not be able to achieve its objective. To ensure progress in its work towards achieving a nuclear-test-ban treaty at an early date, the subsidiary body should be provided with an adequate negotiating mandate.

In conclusion, the Group of 21 urges that the Ad Hoc Committee on agenda item 1, "Nuclear test ban", be re-established at the beginning of the 1993 session of the Conference on Disarmament with an adequate negotiating mandate.

(Mr. Hlaing, Myanmar)

... A number of significant developments which have a direct bearing on the question of a nuclear test ban have taken place recently. These include, inter alia, the following:

The number of nuclear tests by the nuclear-weapon States has significantly declined in the post-cold-war era;

Some nuclear-weapon States have recently announced a moratorium on nuclear-weapon tests;

The announcement by France of her decision to ratify additional Protocol I to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the announcement made by the French delegation that it will participate in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban when the Ad Hoc Committee is re-established.

It is regrettable that, while a number of significant developments having a direct bearing on this question have taken place recently, the CD should find itself unable to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban during the 1992 session. We hope that the CD will be able to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban with an adequate negotiating mandate to commence its substantive work at an early date in its 1993 session.

Mr. FELICIO (Brazil):

... Briefly let me revert to the presentation of the report by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts in charge of considering international cooperative measures to detect and identify seismic events. In paragraph 14 of the report of that Group it is suggested that IAEA should be invited to send an observer to attend its next session. It is the understanding of my delegation that IAEA will be invited to share the experience it might have on technical aspects of data management and transmission. May I suggest that when the invitation is addressed to IAEA it be done in those precise terms? I would also suggest that, when addressing the invitation to IAEA, it should be referred to by its proper name of International Atomic Energy Agency, and not "authority" as the Agency is called in the report.

Mr. GONZALEZ (Chile) (translated from Spanish):

... This morning we were disagreeably surprised to hear the announcement made by the distinguished friend, and I emphasize the word friend, the representative of Argentina, Ambassador Roberto García Moritán concerning the ending of his tenure as representative of his country in this Conference. Apart from the ties of friendship that unite us with Ambassador García Moritán we feel it is right to emphasize that his contribution in the Conference on

(Mr. González, Chile)

Disarmament has been professionally and technically speaking of the highest value and has helped to bring about an atmosphere of greater trust, greater predictability in relations between States on this subject and at the same time he has carried forward a number of initiatives together with other Latin American countries, and specifically my country, which we certainly particularly appreciate. We should therefore like to state explicitly for the record that Ambassador García Moritán's departure is a matter of regret to the delegation of Chile and we hope that we will be able to work with him and continue to work with him on these subjects, in some other place. Ambassador García Moritán in his farewell statement gave us a rapid and conceptual analysis of the need to restructure the Conference on Disarmament's agenda, something to which my country attaches the highest importance. Some of the points he raised, if not all, are of particular importance for Chile, such as a halt to nuclear testing and the building of a greater climate of trust in general. In this regard we should like to recall that it was the distinguished delegation of Argentina, and specifically Ambassador García Moritán, who a few years back submitted an initiative for the creation of a climate of encouragement in confidence-building measures under the item on prohibition of an arms race in outer space, a topic of crucial importance, bearing in mind the fact that a number of events have come about which it is really important to settle, such as that related to space debris, for example, and the subsequent need to reformulate or recast certain articles of the registration Convention. Finally, on similar lines, we should like to reiterate what we have already said on two occasions in this forum, concerning the possibility our country is considering of holding, together with other Latin American countries, a Latin American conference in Santiago on mutual confidence-building measures, which to our mind is absolutely consistent with what has been said earlier.

Mr. TANAKA (Japan):

... I have asked for the floor to make the following statement on behalf of the Western Group.

Last Thursday, we listened to the report of Ambassador Shah, special coordinator for agenda item 1, "Nuclear test ban". We would like to express our sincere appreciation to Ambassador Shah for his untiring efforts in the search for agreement to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on an NTB.

We also heard a statement on behalf of the Group of 21 on this issue, to which I wish to refer briefly.

The Western Group also regrets that it has not been possible to agree on establishing an Ad Hoc Committee during this session of the CD. We also attach great importance to the issue of an NTB, and we wanted to see this Ad Hoc Committee re-established as early as possible. Last year we did useful work with an adequate mandate and we wanted to continue substantive work in the Ad Hoc Committee this year.

However, this year's experience has shown that if discussions on a mandate are allowed to become too protracted the true objective, substantive work on the agenda item, can be lost.

This year, we witnessed important developments in the field of nuclear testing, which should have been discussed in the Ad Hoc Committee. We regret all the more the failure to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee in that, with the participation of all five nuclear-weapon States, after France's decision to join, the work in the Committee could have been particularly useful.

(Mr. Tanaka, Japan)

We hope that the Ad Hoc Committee on an NTB will be re-established at the beginning of the 1993 session with a mandate acceptable to all delegations, and we hope that this year's annual report of the CD will reflect such an intention.

Mr. BRODININGRAT (Indonesia) (translated from French):

... We have witnessed a number of major disarmament achievements such as the completion of the INF Treaty, the signing of the START agreement, unilateral declarations made by a number of nuclear Powers to further reduce nuclear armaments, as well as the Washington agreement concluded by Presidents Bush and Yeltsin to make further reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the two countries. In the same vein our hopes for further progress have been bolstered by the recent accession to the non-proliferation Treaty of two nuclear-weapon States, China and France, the intention of new republics in the former Soviet Union to follow suit and the adoption by France of a moratorium on nuclear testing.

(Mr. Brotodiningrat, Indonesia)

... Now that the negotiation on the chemical weapons convention is approaching completion, a pertinent question that springs to mind is how the Conference on Disarmament will function as a negotiating forum in the future. We find it an unfortunate irony that the improving situation in the international scene fails to find reflection in the work of the CD. It is indeed disheartening for us to note from this year's balance sheet that, except for the work on the chemical weapons convention, almost no progress has been registered on the rest of the agenda. We are particularly disappointed with the failure of the Conference to establish this year an ad hoc committee on a nuclear test ban. My delegation continues to believe that the prompt realization of a comprehensive test ban is indispensable for the effective prevention, not only of the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, but also of environmental and health risks associated with underground nuclear explosions.

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(The President)

I suggest that we should now move to the adoption of the recommendation contained in paragraph 15 of the progress report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, concerning the dates of the next session of the Group, which proposes to meet between 15 and 26 February 1993. May I take it that the Conference adopts this recommendation?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): In accordance with the timetable of meetings for this week, immediately after Thursday's plenary meeting, the Conference will hold informal consultations, naturally with interpretation services, on outstanding issues related to the drafting of our annual report to the General Assembly. Specifically, it will examine the paragraphs relating to agenda items 1, 2 and 3. As was decided at last week's presidential consultations, the paragraphs relating to item 1, entitled "Nuclear test ban", will be circulated to the special coordinator appointed by the Conference on this agenda item, Ambassador Shah, the representative of India, and to the group coordinators, for preliminary study before the informal consultations. The paragraphs of the annual report dealing with agenda item 9, "Transparency in armaments", will be considered under the chairmanship of the representative of Egypt, Ambassador Zahran, who will hold an informal meeting on Thursday morning immediately after our consultations on items 1, 2 and 3. I very much hope that we will complete our work on the annual report by the end of this week, so as to enable the secretariat to prepare the revised version of the report. I am also counting on cooperation on the part of delegations participating in the consultations on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference, who are to meet for the last time on Thursday at 3 p.m. precisely.

Mr. NEGROTTA CAMBIASO (Italy) (translated from French):

... Given the dramatic and unexpected developments in certain regions of Europe, we are compelled to acknowledge that there is no region of the world that can be described as exemplary or considered totally free from irrational and deadly armed violence. Hence we must regrettably recognize how difficult it is for the international community to identify and implement the appropriate responses when the fire has already spread, whether we are speaking of armed violence or the scandal of the death of whole populations through famine, often as a result of such violence; or when we seek to restore the international rule of law that has been flouted. It is for that reason

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(Mr. Negrotto Cambiaso, Italy)

that I wish to reaffirm once again, on behalf of my country and on my own behalf, my full confidence in the role of the Conference on Disarmament, a role that is both major and pressing. We are convinced that this Conference, if its membership and responsibilities are updated, will be able to make a major contribution to laying the groundwork for the prevention of certain tragedies: by providing the international community with a preventive network of specific arrangements and above all by giving its organs effective and credible means of monitoring their implementation. As we have often repeated in respect of chemical weapons, the same approach applies, in our view, to the urgent monitoring of the transfer, production and stockpiling of weapons by international bodies; to outer space, where international measures to monitor its utilization, and even certain limitations on that utilization, now seem possible and necessary; to the nuclear test ban, where the time lost this year must be made up in the very near future, in keeping with the progress announced or achieved in the reduction of stockpiles, as well as widespread expectations on the part of the public.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America):

... I am digressing today from our most important CWC goal for a few moments to consider agenda item 1, "Nuclear test ban". The United States fully concurred with the statement of the Western Group read by Ambassador Tanaka on 18 August. However, the absence this year of any meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban has deprived the United States, as well as other nations, of the opportunity to make its contributions in that body. Therefore, I must try to compress today in a few sentences what we would have elaborated in detail in meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee, had it been formed.

We intended, for example, to build upon the excellent exchange of last year on nuclear testing - why testing takes place; its relationship, if any, to nuclear non-proliferation; its verifiability; and many other topics. We also planned to comment on the implications for nuclear testing of the dramatic changes brought about by the START Treaty, the 17 June 1992 Joint Understanding on further strategic reductions, and other steps taken by States of the former Soviet Union and the United States. These changes will reduce the nuclear forces to less than one third of the 1990 level. We also wanted to review recent changes to the nuclear testing policy of the United States. Time no longer permits us to do that in detail; consequently, I am setting forth only the main points.

First, the purpose of all United States underground nuclear testing is to evaluate and improve the safety of the nuclear stockpile, and to maintain the reliability of our sharply reduced nuclear deterrent. This will be a continuing requirement as long as the need for a nuclear deterrent exists.

Second, the United States will conduct only the minimum number of tests necessary for these purposes. We now anticipate not more than six tests per year over the next five years. This level is a small fraction of the numbers of tests conducted in the 1970s and early 1980s.

And third, the United States will limit the yield of nuclear tests to the minimum necessary. We now anticipate not more than three tests per year in excess of 35 kilotons.

Unfortunately, despite the painstaking efforts of our exceptionally capable colleague from India, the activities of the Conference on Disarmament with respect to an Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban were a model of how not to do business. The 13 August statement of the Group of 21 alleges that certain nuclear Powers of the Western Group laid down obstacles to re-establishing the Ad Hoc Committee. This is simply untrue. The position of both the United Kingdom and the United States - that the time is not right for

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

a negotiating mandate for the Committee - is well known to everyone. The United States reluctantly engaged in discussions to try to change last year's mandate, which was perfectly serviceable, in hopes that minor changes could lead to the establishing of the Committee.

It is now perfectly clear that no programme of work and no changes in the mandate would have enjoyed consensus. If those very few States that could not accept the mandate of last year had simply said that there was no point in having a committee without a negotiating mandate, we could have saved ourselves many wasted hours spent posturing over a programme of work and tinkering with the wording of a mandate.

The United States and nearly all other members of the CD believed that a structured dialogue on nuclear testing would have benefited the Conference; one or two other States did not so believe. In the future, let us spare ourselves the futility of empty shadow-boxing over procedure. Let us be candid enough to set aside issues where we have unbridgeable differences, and focus on those issues that promise success.

(Mr. Bisley, New Zealand)

It is of course true that included within the Conference on Disarmament's mandate is consideration of what many believe to be three fundamental nuclear issues. On two of them not even preliminary work has been agreed. And on the third, the item on a nuclear test ban, the Ad Hoc Committee has met for only 18 months in the past 9 years.

Last year New Zealand introduced in the United Nations General Assembly First Committee a resolution urging the re-establishment of the Committee in 1992 and requesting it to intensify its substantive work. That resolution was adopted by an overwhelming majority, reflecting the international community's conviction in the value of a CTB as an arms control and non-proliferation measure. That the Committee has not been re-established this year was therefore a great disappointment to New Zealand. We hope, indeed expect, that delegations will find the flexibility necessary to advance this issue early next year.

We hope for much from the Committee, not just because of our national position on the responsibility of the Conference on Disarmament in the negotiation of the CTB treaty, but also because abrogation of that responsibility would signal the Conference on Disarmament's inability to build on its chemical weapons success in a positive way. It would signal a loss of direction, and lead many to question the viability of the Conference on Disarmament and the continuing need for this kind of multilateral disarmament negotiating body.

For these reasons, New Zealand will, with others, be promoting at this year's United Nations General Assembly a resolution drawing attention again to the Conference on Disarmament's particular responsibilities in the negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. If these responsibilities are shirked, we fear for both the objective of a CTB, and for the Conference itself. A Conference which does not substantively address an issue as important to many as that of nuclear testing leaves itself open to critical scrutiny by Governments, and by the world community.

(Mr. de Rivero, Peru)

... We are aware of the work which you, Sir, will have to undertake in the inter-sessional period in connection with this very important subject on the agenda, and I would now like to inform you that my delegation would prefer a shorter, selective agenda focusing on the urgent issues, on the basis of the 1978 Decalogue, in which it would be really possible to commence negotiations with a view to the conclusion of agreements in the future. Addressing topics as complex as nuclear disarmament in a sweeping and global way could simply mean not wishing to do anything about them. In this context, my delegation ventures to propose for 1993 just five topics for the agenda, of which two at least should be the subject of intense negotiations in order to keep up the momentum in this Conference which was achieved with the finalization of the negotiations on the convention on chemical weapons. These specific topics would be as follows.

First of all, a total ban on nuclear tests. On this subject, no member State of this negotiation body should lose sight of the fact that the NPT sets a deadline which will expire without fail in 1995. And that to ensure the indefinite extension of this multilateral instrument, negotiations must be begun for the suspension of nuclear testing. Therefore in 1993, in the view of my delegation, the Ad Hoc Committee on this question should be re-established with a negotiating mandate and with the additional task of modifying the mandate of the Group of Scientific Experts to take account of the urgent need to devise a verification system which can be applied to this type of prohibition. In saying this, my delegation thanks the Austrian Government for the continued cooperation which it has extended to the Peruvian expert, and believes that only a concerted international effort in this field will enable the Group of Scientific Experts to complete its works rapidly.

(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)

... The success of the Conference in the field of chemical weapons deserves to be consolidated. To do this, we must, without delay, add tangible progress in the other areas within the mandate of the Conference, in particular in the nuclear field. This is a requirement that we have to meet all the more speedily as the international community keeps calling on us to do so. In this context, Morocco welcomes the recent decisions adopted by France, China and South Africa, announcing their accession to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty. These initiatives, as well as the move by the United States to cut back on its nuclear tests, are along the right lines and will henceforth allow the Conference to view optimistically the prospect of a total ban on nuclear testing as a decisive step towards nuclear disarmament. We have always welcomed with relief the agreements reached by the two main nuclear Powers and their initiatives to bring about a substantial reduction in their arsenals. However, we continue to believe that only nuclear disarmament will put an end to the threats cast over the whole of mankind by this type of weapon. In this regard, the cessation of nuclear tests constitutes a high-priority objective. We express the hope that at its very next session, the Conference on Disarmament will give the Ad Hoc Committee a precise mandate to achieve this aim. The same can be said for the subject of negative security assurances, which remain fundamental for the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, who continually call for legally binding rules to be drawn up in this area. We hope that all the nuclear Powers that are parties to the non-proliferation Treaty will contribute to the development of a process leading towards this objective. The recent declarations made by France on this subject give us grounds for satisfaction.

(Mr. Skogmo, Norway)

... After concluding the CW negotiations, the time is now ripe for the Conference on Disarmament to embark on a substantial discussion of the future of the Conference, including both its agenda and its structure. Norway sees a continued need for a multilateral negotiating body for global arms control agreements, building on regional achievements, but with the overriding aim of creating increased global security. You have all received an experts' study on a nuclear test ban, CD/1167, produced on the initiative of the Norwegian Foreign Minister. We hope that this study will provide food for thought, and that it demonstrates both the urgency and the practicability of addressing the issue of a nuclear test ban in the Conference on Disarmament. The experts' study calls for a nuclear-test-ban treaty by 1995. The CD has also important tasks ahead of it concerning non-proliferation issues, transparency in armaments, as well as other relevant confidence-building measures of a global nature.

(Mr. Tóth, Hungary)

Translating this need into actual terms of the Conference calls for the review of the present agenda. We are positively convinced that some of the traditional issues, like the problem of a nuclear test ban or the question of security assurances, have not in the slightest way lost their significance. Other items, however, seem to have produced fruitless wrangling over the years or, in the extreme case, a silent acquiescence in the unchangeable. Hence, the review of the agenda must be twofold. On the one hand we have to boldly dispose of issues which used to have their role in the past but seem to have no future at all. On the other hand we have to identify certain new areas where the CD has the opportunities to meet the new challenges of the security environment. The CD should concentrate on a limited number of issues where results can realistically be expected. On other issues political support should be accumulated to a critical mass paving the way for meaningful negotiations on them.

(Mr. Shah, India)

... There is nothing wrong with the CD and there is no need to worry about life in the CD after the CWC. The malady, if at all, lies in excessive caution and the lack of political will to allow the CD to fulfil its role as a negotiating forum. And if anybody has any doubts about the CD's agenda, let me venture to suggest that you will never go wrong if you select agenda item 1, namely an NTB, for negotiations next year.

(Mr. Semichi, Algeria)

... On 13 February this year, Ambassador Shah of India and Mr. Koikai of Kenya, on behalf of 19 developing countries, noted the fact that certain delegations had prevented the implementation of General Assembly resolutions 46/37 C and 46/37 D, which called upon the Conference on Disarmament to prepare two draft conventions, one on the complete cessation of nuclear tests and the other on prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. In March, on behalf of the Group of 21, Ambassador Nasser of Iran deplored the fact that the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Space had not been given a negotiating mandate as provided for in General Assembly resolution 46/33. Also in the month of March, Mrs. Bauta Solés, our colleague from Cuba, noted on behalf of 20 developing countries that it had proved impossible to re-establish an ad hoc committee on the question of the comprehensive programme of disarmament, though this had been explicitly recommended in resolution 46/38 B. On 24 March 1992, following the accession of China to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty, that country's delegation proposed a number of measures that would lead to the progressive prohibition of all nuclear weapons. Two days later, on 26 March, Ambassador Shah of India delivered an important report showing how the approach to the non-proliferation question was misdirected and recalling the plan of action proposed by his country in 1988 to the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament for the step-by-step elimination of all weapons of mass destruction.

For several years now in this body many countries have noted with concern a kind of downgrading of the order of priorities. Nuclear disarmament, which lay behind the very idea of creating the Conference on Disarmament, seems to be considered to be too serious a matter to be the subject of genuine negotiations within this Conference. And, now that the convention on chemical weapons has been completed, we have serious fears that efforts are going to be

(continued)

(Mr. Semichi, Algeria)

made to impose a new topic on us which would lead to the delaying or even cancellation of work on nuclear issues. Here in this very body on 21 May last the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Algeria noted the unusual situation whereby "despite the repeated appeals of the General Assembly calling on this Conference to embark without delay on structured negotiations on nuclear questions, with a view to concluding one or more international agreements on these nuclear weapons, it has not been possible for the commitments entered into at the very moment when the Conference was created to be honoured". The concern which he stressed, and which is shared by most delegations present here, was "all the greater since, by a strange paradox, the body seems to be agreeing to abandon the fundamental theme of disarmament policy and relinquish its original mission of warding off the nuclear peril". This concern is of the greatest relevance now that we are approaching 1995, which will see the holding of a review conference that is decisive for the future of the NPT, and the failure of the fourth NPT review conference and the reasons for it have to be given serious thought. First of all it is high time that the nuclear States honoured the commitments they entered into under that Treaty, which involve in particular devising concrete measures of nuclear disarmament, beginning with a ban on nuclear tests, verified under a treaty. At the same time, justice should be done to States which have voluntarily renounced the nuclear option by protecting them in a legally binding international instrument against the use or the threat of the use of nuclear weapons. And it is important that all should be guaranteed equal access to nuclear technology for civilian purposes.

Hitherto Algeria has not acceded to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty for reasons of principle that are known to all: it does not accept the discriminatory nature of the Treaty. Like others, it considers that mankind is threatened not only by the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons but by the very existence of such weapons. It is therefore for their complete eradication once and for all. It considers that the nuclear States have a special responsibility in the universal disarmament effort and that they must fully respect their commitments as a quid pro quo for disarmament by the other States parties to the Treaty, in particular by halting vertical proliferation and the qualitative improvement of their nuclear strike capabilities. We do not understand what purposes these processes are aimed at, and consider them to be a perversion of the very spirit of the Treaty. My country has repeatedly confirmed that it has no military nuclear ambitions. It regularly submits its facilities to checks and surveillance by the International Atomic Energy Agency, with which it maintains excellent relations. It is working actively in the Organization of African Unity and other multilateral organizations to make Africa a continent free of nuclear weapons and all weapons of mass destruction. It supports the initiative presented by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak to make the Near East a region free from all weapons of mass destruction, and is working to ensure that the effort of the international community to dismantle weapons of mass destruction in that region is extended to all who possess such weapons.

We wish to recall with satisfaction the proposal made here last February by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs for the Conference on Disarmament to be associated with measures aimed at greater transparency in the monitoring of nuclear weapons. We consider this is a step in the right direction. We

(Mr. Semichi, Algeria)

hope that as of the first session next year the committee on a nuclear test ban will be established with a mandate offering the prospect of the implementation of a convention completely and finally banning such tests. In this context, I would like to recall the obvious link between the two items on the nuclear test ban and security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States - a question which is of great concern to us. The disarmament effort associated with the end of the cold war is of course encouraging, but we hope that in the future it will no longer entail merely the withdrawal of obsolete weaponry or its export to third countries.

... With respect to next year's work, we believe like many delegations that the Decalogue laid down by the first special session of the Conference on Disarmament, in 1979, is in many ways outmoded. The fact that such a new topic as transparency in armaments is being discussed not only shows that the international community is tired of the senseless build-up of weapons over the past 20 years to the detriment of the economic and social development of a good part of the planet, but also that the Conference on Disarmament is capable of responding to the new challenges arising from the need to limit this squandering of resources. In this context we believe that most of the

(Mr. Semichi, Algeria)

agenda items on this year's agenda should be taken up again for consideration next year, and that priority should be given to matters relating to nuclear disarmament and confidence-building measures. The negotiation of treaties on the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities, an idea that we share with its Swedish sponsors, the cessation of nuclear tests and assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States might be an excellent order of priority. Lastly, with respect to matters relating to the improvement of working conditions in the Conference of Disarmament and its enlargement, the Algerian delegation considers that the outstanding work done under the leadership of Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan should not only continue but should, as of the beginning of next year, lead to concrete measures to make our activities more effective.

(Mr. Lyons, Ireland)

... As regards the agenda, the experience of the chemical weapons negotiations suggests to us that the Conference can be most effective when it addresses itself to a limited range of subjects and deals with them in an intensive way. My delegation would see considerable merit in rationalizing the current agenda, particularly by combining to the extent possible existing agenda items. In our view, transparency in armaments and the question of a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing should now have a high place among the Conference's priorities. The great majority of the international community have made it clear that they wish to see progress in the Conference on Disarmament on the comprehensive test ban. The response of the Conference to this wish will have important implications for its credibility as an instrument of the international community as a whole. We hope that there can be early agreement on the setting up of ad hoc committees with mandates to negotiate on these important issues.


(The President)

... This brings us to section A (Nuclear test ban). In paragraph 26 the secretariat has added a reference to the fact that the Conference recently adopted paragraph 15 of the progress report on the thirty-fourth session of the Ad Hoc Group of Seismic Experts, as well as a sentence concerning the invitation to IAEA which we examined last week. In paragraph 28 the secretariat has also added a subparagraph (b) referring to document CD/1167. Are there any comments? There are none.

Section B (Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament). I give the floor to Mr. Calderón, of the delegation of Peru.

Mr. CALDERON (Peru) (translated from Spanish): I did not want to interrupt the steady progress through this document only in order to point out that in the Spanish version of section B, paragraph 34, page 14, the last part of the sentence should be deleted so as to bring it into line with the English text, which is correct. I repeat: in paragraph 34 it is necessary to delete the Spanish phrase "with a mandate acceptable to all delegations", which it was agreed to remove.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): That will be done in accordance with Mr. Calderón's wishes. Now we move to section B (Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament). I observe that there are no comments. I thank the delegations for their understanding.



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(The President)

... The Conference on Disarmament should pursue its efforts towards the creation of a broader system, capable of reducing the number of all weapons of mass destruction, with a view to their total elimination, and prohibiting the testing of such weapons. The creation of a comprehensive regime may not be immediately in sight, but it should be recognized that a window of opportunity to that end is now open. And we may choose an approach based on the concept of building blocks, so as to gradually achieve these broad non-proliferation objectives. Each sectoral disarmament agreement, multilaterally agreed and with appropriate verification mechanisms, should be part of the non-proliferation regime we envisage. Transparent rules, multilaterally negotiated, should be added to those agreements, in order to regulate, in a safe and non-discriminatory way, international transfers of dual-use technology. With rules which are equally valid for all, it will be easier to prevent non-peaceful uses of the so-called sensitive technologies. At the same time, such rules must not create excessive or unjustifiable obstacles to the legitimate use of technology for development needs.

One of the first steps towards a full-scope non-proliferation regime should be the conclusion of a treaty prohibiting once and for all the testing of nuclear weapons. Declarations coming from nuclear-weapon States expressing their intention to limit or suspend those tests are most welcome. The announcement by President Mitterrand just last week concerning the readiness of the French Government to suspend its nuclear tests indefinitely as long as other nuclear-weapon States follow the same path was wholeheartedly welcomed

(continued)

(The President)

by Brazil. However, it would be regrettable if such promising initiatives did not carry enough political force to ensure their translation into binding multilateral commitments.

Interesting positions were heard in the plenary of the Conference on Disarmament last year with regard to the prohibition of nuclear tests. I would like to recall two of them. Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, of Germany, said: "We consider it necessary to achieve, at long last, a negotiating mandate for a test-ban agreement. An agreement banning nuclear explosions for test purposes must be concluded at the earliest possible moment". Along the same lines, Ambassador Bruno Bottai, Secretary-General of the Ministry of External Relations of Italy, stated: "Italy, having long shared the view that the elimination of nuclear testing cannot be dissociated from the problem of the size of existing arsenals, is therefore of the view that conditions are now ripe to pursue, from a technical as well as from a political perspective, the objective of a total ban on nuclear testing, through reliable means of verification".

The great majority of countries seem to agree with the gist of those statements. This is in fact the message contained in successive resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, carried with great support, which reiterate in no unclear terms the instruction to the Conference on Disarmament to conclude a treaty banning nuclear tests for ever, in all environments. The aspiration of the international community cannot be expressed in a more eloquent way. It should be heard by all.

It should be a matter of juridical as well as political logic to complement the non-proliferation Treaty with a total ban on nuclear tests, thus making it a more balanced instrument. The preamble of the Treaty already calls for that prohibition. If concrete steps are taken in that direction, together with agreement on the part of the nuclear-weapon States to eliminate their arsenals, we will surely be brought nearer to a more effective and universally accepted non-proliferation regime.

My country has already decided not to conduct any kind of nuclear test, not even the tests for supposedly peaceful purposes foreseen in the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The same commitment was entered into by Argentina and Brazil in their agreement for the exclusively peaceful uses of nuclear energy, adopted in Guadalajara, Mexico, on 18 July 1991.

My Government is promoting additional initiatives in the nuclear field and, in coordination with other interested Latin American countries, is taking the last steps towards bringing the Treaty of Tlatelolco fully into force.

Brazil shares the willingness of most countries to contribute to the establishment of a comprehensive non-proliferation regime. This requires a constructive approach from those few countries possessing weapons of mass destruction. The countries that have non-proliferation commitments have the right and are morally entitled to request from the military Powers legal disarmament commitments, vertical non-proliferation obligations and the prohibition of testing of weapons of mass destruction.

(Mr. Berasatequi, Secretary-General of the Conference
on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the
Secretary-General of the United Nations)

... "Given the achievement of the momentous START 2 agreement, the increase in accessions to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty, and the moratoria on nuclear testing in place in a number of nuclear-weapons States, it would seem a propitious time for the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its efforts towards a comprehensive nuclear test free ban. A halt to the testing of such weapons would give further impetus to the objective of total nuclear disarmament. In the meantime, the question of security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States should be pursued with renewed vigour.

(U Ohn Gyaw, Myanmar)

... We are now just two years away from the fifth NPT review conference to be held in 1995. The review conference will be a crucial meeting at which States parties will consider and decide on the extension of the NPT beyond its expiry date in 1995. Myanmar takes the view that certain existing flaws in the present NPT regime and the security interests on non-nuclear-weapon States require a careful reassessment of mutual rights and responsibilities between nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States before a decision is taken on the further extension of the NPT. In order to ensure that there exists an improved and acceptable balance between the rights and responsibilities of nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States, nuclear-weapon States on their part should take appropriate and adequate measures to accommodate the security interests of non-nuclear-weapon States on two crucial issues. These two issues are a comprehensive nuclear test ban and negative security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States.

... There is a widespread feeling among the members of the CD that the Conference should at its 1993 session direct its concentrated efforts to a few selected priority items. We share this feeling. One such priority item is agenda item 1: "Nuclear test ban". Myanmar endorses the view that an end to nuclear testing by all States in all environments for all time is an essential step in order to prevent the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapons and their further proliferation. A number of significant developments have taken place in the past year in this area.

France has observed a nuclear testing moratorium during 1992. The Russian Federation has observed a nuclear testing moratorium during 1992 and has announced its decision to extend the moratorium at least until the middle of 1993. The United States has put in place a nuclear testing moratorium for nine months with effect from 1 October 1992.

At the 1992 session of the CD, the delegation of France declared its intention to participate in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, if the Ad Hoc Committee was re-established during the 1992 session of the CD.

It is regrettable that, despite all these positive developments, the CD found itself unable to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban at its 1992 session. We hope that the renewed interest and the renewed sense of urgency shared by many members of the CD to address this question in a substantive manner will contribute to the speedy re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban at this year's session and towards achieving significant progress in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee.

(U Ohn Gyaw, Myanmar)

The forty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly adopted on 9 December 1992 resolution 47/47 on a comprehensive nuclear test ban. My country was one of the co-sponsors, and it was passed by an overwhelming majority of affirmative votes. It is interesting to note that a nuclear-weapon State which in previous years cast negative votes abstained this year. We believe that in pursuance of the above-mentioned resolution, the CD should take a speedy decision to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban on the basis of the draft mandate reached last year as the result of consultations under the coordinatorship of Ambassador Shah of India. The Ad Hoc Committee, once it is thus re-established, should immediately start its substantive work, addressing the issues of structure and scope and of verification and compliance.

Mr. GRAHAM (New Zealand):

... But the Conference cannot afford to rest on its laurels. Changes have occurred in the international security arena. In many cases the changes are positive, stemming from the bridging of the old East/West divide. The two most heavily armed States have made sweeping cuts to their nuclear arsenals. More are planned. Nuclear testing is being reduced and most nuclear Powers have undertaken unilateral moratoria. As direct manifestations of the cold

(Mr. Graham, New Zealand)

war are being swept away, mutual confidence and cooperation are replacing mutual deterrence as the basis for global security. Unfortunately, however, the cold war produced secondary effects, longer-term solutions to which still have to be found. It distorted normal processes of adjustment and shared development which should have enabled neighbouring ethnic groups to share in the bounty of an increasingly more prosperous world. The results of such distortions linger on. We are confronted with areas of grave tension, of which the conflict in the former Yugoslavia is among the worst. Such tension cannot be dissipated overnight, and will require political will, first and foremost on the part of those most immediately involved. But faced with such tragedies the United Nations is also establishing a new and vital role for itself in peace-making as well as peace-keeping. As events in former Yugoslavia and Somalia unfold, the United Nations will be tested and, we all hope, will not be found wanting.

(Mr. Graham, New Zealand)

... New Zealand is gratified to see that item 1: Nuclear test ban is accorded a high priority by many delegations. Our efforts to promote a halt to nuclear testing, by all States, in all environments, for all time, are well known. So too is our belief that the CD has responsibility for negotiating a treaty to secure that objective. New Zealand has welcomed recent decisions through which most NWS have undertaken self-imposed testing moratoria. Such moratoria are useful as confidence-building measures, and are proof that nuclear-weapon States consider their security can be maintained without testing at least for the present time. We hope existing moratoria however continue, and that all nuclear-weapon States follow the example now being set by others.

But moratoria are no substitute for a multilateral treaty binding nuclear and non-nuclear States alike to forswear nuclear testing. Such a treaty is, in New Zealand's view, an essential step in order to prevent the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and their further proliferation. It would also strengthen the philosophical and the practical bases underlying global non-proliferation efforts. In this regard New Zealand's view is shared by the other 158 countries who supported resolution 47/47 at last year's General Assembly; who reaffirmed the particular responsibilities of the CD in negotiating a comprehensive test ban; and who urged the Conference to intensify substantive work on this issue in 1993. Bearing in mind that support, and noting the outcome of the recent consultations, I am hopeful that the Conference will waste no time in forging ahead with work under item 1: Nuclear test ban at this session. The international climate is now right for real progress to be made. We cannot talk of deadlines, but can we not think in terms of some sort of broad time-frame? Is it unreasonable to think that, with the very wide support I have mentioned, the resolution could be transformed into a treaty within three years?

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Only a few days after the signature of the Convention on the elimination of chemical weapons in Paris, the Conference on Disarmament is resuming its work in this, its thirty-second annual session and the fifteenth in its new era. This new era began as a result of the special session of the General Assembly on disarmament in 1978 and for many years was characterized by its lack of results. Last year, however, it successfully rounded off a long and complicated process of negotiations on a subject of vital importance and in 1993 we must do everything within our power to pursue negotiations on other priority issues, beginning with a complete ban on nuclear testing. And we must begin these negotiations as soon as possible.

(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

... For my delegation the subject of the complete prohibition of nuclear testing is of crucial importance. One hundred and fifty nine countries voted in favour of resolution 47/47 which the General Assembly adopted on this subject. My delegation had the honour to introduce this resolution on behalf of 100 or so co-sponsors. The resolution had just 4 abstentions and one single vote against. Changes are approaching in some governments and we should take advantage of the voluntary or de facto moratoriums in the testing programmes of four of the five nuclear-weapon States. The industrial-military complexes have apparently begun to shrink. The case of the scientists dealing with nuclear testing is one example of this. Resuming nuclear testing would mean reversing this trend. At the same time, the situation that is prevailing at present in certain nuclear-weapon States is conducive to a total ban on nuclear testing. Nevertheless, no one can guarantee that the groups that are still advocating the continuation of the nuclear arms race will not regain decisive influence in the future.

The issue of the complete cessation of nuclear testing should also be viewed in the broader context of nuclear disarmament. Here we will just indicate two aspects: firstly, just a few weeks ago the Presidents of the United States and Russia signed the START II agreement, which, if it is fully implemented, will constitute a historic step towards nuclear disarmament. Mexico has advocated the total elimination of weapons of mass destruction through the conclusion of international legal instruments. And the codification of international law in this area should be pursued with renewed energy. The elimination of chemical weapons, as with the ban on biological weapons 20 years ago, should be seen as part of a process that will end only when we also eliminate nuclear weapons. Until then, there will continue to be an unacceptable situation, since there are countries that have renounced the possession of nuclear weapons while others continue to develop them and in the case of still others we do not know for certain whether they have them or not. We are also concerned that, while attempts are being made to bring about drastic reductions in nuclear stockpiles, new doctrines are arising such as the doctrine of minimal nuclear deterrence, which could not only be an indication of a determination to continue maintaining a nuclear monopoly, but also points to the stagnant and sometimes confused thinking of the so-called strategist of the cold war.

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

... In the old style, there remains work to be done on nuclear testing in order to arrive at a nuclear test ban; we might eventually be implicated in, for example, work concerning the negotiation of verification provisions for the biological and toxin weapons Convention. If we abide by the definition of weapons of mass destruction drawn up by the Security Council Commission for Conventional Armaments, we might continue our efforts to reach agreement on the long-deadlocked issues concerning radiological weapons. And, of course, there we are already confronted with an element of change. We, in our delegation, have invariably taken a dim view of the American-Soviet proposal for the establishment of a convention banning radiological weapons alone, non-existent weapons. However, if this trite subject is dynamized into also

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

covering a prohibition of attacks on certain nuclear facilities, we are all for it. In the wake of the persistent damage caused by the Chernobyl accident, we continue to believe that it is a foremost duty of the Conference on Disarmament to establish such a ban.

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

... The present agenda and membership of the Conference on Disarmament reflect the bipolarity of the old world order. It is therefore not surprising that looking at the agenda, one finds that it bears little relevance to the situation and the realities of the present day. The agenda is a direct result of the special session on disarmament of 1978. That session has had great significance for our work. We should of course also realize that much of its nuclear component was eventually dealt with outside the framework of the Conference on Disarmament. Disarmament is an internationally practised day-to-day reality now, no matter where the Conference on Disarmament stands. Our work on the present agenda of the Conference on Disarmament is not yet entirely finished, but the present-day irrelevance of some of its subjects should lead us to take a closer view at the agenda as a whole.

It might be useful for example to integrate the nuclear issues into one nuclear item: under such an item, we might set up an Ad Hoc Committee or working groups on sub-items, the membership of which could vary and would reflect the interest of the respective members of the international community. Nuclear testing remains of course a priority issue which justifies the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee without further delay.

The PRESIDENT: The 637th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.

As I announced this morning, we shall proceed to the question of the organization of the work of the Conference, as contained in the draft presidential statement circulated this morning by the secretariat. As you know, we suspended the plenary meeting this morning in the expectation that

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(The President)

all members would be in a position now to proceed with the presidential statement. Before I proceed to read out the presidential statement, I should like to ask whether we are ready to go along with it now. I hear no remark and no one asking for the floor, so I will now read out the presidential statement.

"1. There is an understanding in the Conference that, at the outset of its 1993 session, the Conference decides to adopt as its agenda the agenda of its 1992 session, while noting that its ongoing consultations on the review of this agenda will be intensified:

1. Nuclear test ban.

... "2. The Conference further agrees, without prejudice to any future decisions on the organizational framework of other items, to begin its work immediately on: 'Nuclear test ban', 'Prevention of an arms race in outer space', 'Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons' and 'Transparency in armaments'. For this purpose, the Conference establishes ad hoc committees on these items with the following mandates:

- Nuclear test ban: the result of the 1992 consultations conducted by the special coordinator on this item (CD/1179);

(Mr. Neagu, Romania)

... The conclusion of a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing has become a major issue in the context of the non-proliferation Treaty, of nuclear disarmament in general. The pressure for a comprehensive test ban has arisen especially in United Nations forums, including the First Committee of the General Assembly and the Disarmament Commission, and in our Conference on Disarmament. Work has also been done on the issue of seismic verification of a test ban in the Group of Scientific Experts under the auspices of the Conference on Disarmament. The PTBT amendment conference served to bring the problems into prominence once again amongst participating States. At the same time, the recent United States decision on nuclear tests proves that approaches to this problem are changing in a constructive direction. A comprehensive ban on nuclear testing would decisively contribute to halting the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and thus would be a significant step leading to the goal of the elimination, in the long run, of all nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Neagu, Romania)

We deem it necessary that, in light of the emerging favourable situation, the CD should impart a new impulse to our progress towards a complete ban on nuclear tests and step up efforts to find generally accepted and effective practical solutions to the remaining problems in this domain. The recent re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban provides the necessary framework for fruitful discussion aimed at concluding a treaty banning all nuclear explosions for test purposes at the earliest possible time. However, my delegation does not subscribe to any linkage between the achievement of a comprehensive test ban and the decision to be taken on the extension of the NPT. Any weakening of the non-proliferation regime and any spread of nuclear weapons beyond the States which have them already will undermine international security, and we simply cannot afford to take that risk.

(Mr. Moussa, Egypt)

CTBT and security assurances are other such issues. It is our sincere hope that your Conference will generate agreements on these issues of paramount importance to nuclear non-proliferation. And, without prejudice to negotiations that may be occurring bilaterally, we do believe that the Conference on Disarmament can play a constructive role in limiting vertical and horizontal proliferation, and in adopting further, more comprehensive measures to ensure the security of non-nuclear States against the use of

(Mr. Moussa, Egypt)

nuclear weapons. A new look by you all at the concept of positive and negative assurances is required and opportune, now that the counterbalancing complexities of the NATO-Warsaw security relationships are behind us.

(Mr. Chandra, India)

It is in this context that India proposed at SSOD-III an outline of an action plan for achieving our goal of a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world order. The central focus of this action plan is the elimination of all nuclear weapons in three stages, recognizing the need for flexibility in staging some of the measures proposed. Among the nuclear disarmament measures envisaged in the plan are a ban on the production of nuclear weapons and weapons-grade fissionable material, a moratorium on testing of nuclear weapons, a comprehensive test-ban treaty and negotiations on an international convention outlawing the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. It also envisages the eventual elimination of all weapons of mass destruction. This plan, tabled as CD/859 on 15 August 1988, is still eminently relevant.

(Mr. Chandra, India)

... My delegation does not share apprehensions about the diminishing role of the Conference on Disarmament after the chemical weapons Convention. There are a number of items on the agenda of the CD which are as important as the CWC and the CD will contribute greatly to the disarmament process by taking them up for negotiations. There is no lack of agenda items to be negotiated. The danger lies in the lack of political will, fear of transparency and deliberate downgrading of the multilateral process in priority areas of disarmament. The CD should be allowed to fulfil its role as a negotiating forum and concentrate on concrete negotiation on its agenda items 1 to 3 concerning nuclear disarmament.

The PRESIDENT: The 639th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.

Consultations have been proceeding on the question of the chairmanships of the ad hoc committees which were set up last week. As a result of these consultations, I can invite you to take action on the appointment of the chairmen of two ad hoc committees, namely, Nuclear test ban and Prevention of an arms race in outer space. I propose that we take up first the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban and appoint as Chairman Ambassador Yoshitomo Tanaka of Japan.

It was so decided.

(Mr. Berdennikov, Russian Federation)

... It seems to us that new conditions are now beginning to take shape, much more favourable than in the past, for solving one of the key tasks in the field of nuclear disarmament - the prohibition of nuclear testing. Currently three nuclear States, Russia, the United States of America and France, are observing officially declared moratoriums. This fact alone points to the possibility of making progress towards agreement on a test ban. We also believe that in the very near future all the nuclear States will be able to give definite support to a start to negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on the prohibition of the nuclear weapon testing. As for Russia, we are ready for such negotiations. We also believe that special contacts on the issue are warranted among the five nuclear Powers. Therefore we support the proposal made by France last November that the representatives of these States in the Conference on Disarmament should take up the joint consideration of these issues. In our opinion experience with the negotiations on chemical weapons demonstrates the possibility of combining multilateral, bilateral and other forms of negotiations in the framework of the Conference on Disarmament in the best possible way. One of the guarantees that a new nuclear arms race will not be unleashed is our proposed arrangement concerning a verifiable ban on the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, which would go a long way towards solving the problem of the irreversibility of nuclear disarmament.

(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

... Confidence-building measures are without a doubt an important element for international security and must be promoted at every level. Globalization must be taken to mean that all States must undertake to implement them. However, it is the major military Powers that must show an example, in the first place by accepting globalization, without delaying its implementation. The system of agreements and treaties inherited from the cold war period, among them the Final Document of 1978, provides a solid framework for making progress with the disarmament process. The challenge today is not only to put that inheritance into practice, but to supplement the negotiating effort on weapons of mass destruction. Nuclear technology cannot be uninvented, but the production of nuclear weapons can and must be banned. There must also be a halt to the qualitative improvement of existing arsenals. The complete elimination of nuclear weapons remains a priority objective for the international community. The gradual reduction of the number and yield of nuclear tests is an approach that has been proved to be ineffective. It would be a shame to miss the opportunity to ban testing completely, at a time when circumstances are so conducive. We must make this a short-term objective.

(Baroness af Ugglas, Sweden)

... Four of the five nuclear-weapon States are currently observing a temporary cessation of nuclear testing. Sweden urges all nuclear-weapon States to declare moratoria and to extend existing moratoria when they expire. It is to be hoped that this process could lead to an agreement in the near future on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

(Baroness af Ugglas, Sweden)

... First, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons must be given the highest priority. A test ban is an essential step towards the goal of nuclear disarmament. It is my understanding that the existing moratoria might develop into substantial negotiations on this issue. Efforts in the field of non-proliferation should also include transparency and control regarding transfers of nuclear technology and sensitive expertise, a ban on attacks on nuclear facilities and possibly other issues.

... I note with satisfaction that, during this session, the CD has already decided to establish ad hoc committees in four important areas: a nuclear test ban, negative security assurances, the prevention of an arms race in outer space and transparency in armaments. This I find very encouraging and it clearly demonstrates the determination of the Conference on Disarmament to go to work on important issues of substance without losing time in procedural debates.

(Mr. Dembinski, Poland)

... To turn to more substantive business at hand, my delegation finds it heartening that the Conference on Disarmament - by adopting its agenda and programme of work for 1993 - has displayed a commendable meeting of minds with the Secretary-General who urged in his report that "efforts [should] be focused by the CD on well-defined and urgent issues". The Conference on Disarmament has complied. Given the existing and emerging new threats, the Conference's focus is unmistakably on weapons of mass destruction. The nuclear-test-ban issue, where substantive progress, let alone solution, has eluded this body for years, now appears to stand a fair chance of productive consideration. Indeed, we believe that by building on past achievements referred to above, especially the START II accord, it should be possible to proceed with a constructive pace of work in the Ad Hoc Committee concerned. The current nuclear test moratoria put into effect by several nuclear Powers create a climate conducive to meaningful progress towards a comprehensive and early ban on nuclear testing. Efforts in this regard - and in nuclear disarmament in general - would obviously stand a better chance if the negotiating process could be enlarged to include all nuclear-weapon States.

(Mr. Brotodiningrat, Indonesia)

Turning to the concept of revitalization, we only hope that the substantial achievements, in nuclear disarmament listed in the report will serve as an encouragement to build upon rather than a brake on further endeavours. In this post-cold-war era, the goal set by the international community for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons remains valid. In this context, we agree with the Secretary-General that a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing would be a significant step leading to that goal. With regard to the question of proliferation control we are looking forward to the non-proliferation Treaty review conference in 1995, which should provide an opportunity to redress the existing inequities and asymmetries. In this regard, the readiness of the nuclear-weapon States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty to fulfil their solemn obligations will help ensure the success of the Treaty's extension.

(Mr. Lanús, Argentina)

... Secondly, we agree with the Secretary-General when he states that the Conference should address well-defined issues. This is something that brooks no procrastination, especially when we see that items of indisputable importance still await more specific and systematic consideration by the Conference. In our opinion, the Conference has an irreplaceable role to play in such areas as the prohibition of nuclear tests, transparency in armaments, the prevention of an arms race in outer space and non-proliferation, an item on which we have taken but a few timid steps and which requires the inputs that can be made from here and the bodies that are traditionally responsible in this area.

(Mrs. Bauta Solés, Cuba)

The disarmament and arms limitation process has its own momentum and must retain its independence in organization without neglecting the relationship between this process and others under way in international relations as a whole, as in the interrelationship between peace, disarmament and development. It is clear that there is a need for joint deliberation in order to achieve a common understanding about ideas put forward in the Secretary-General's document, including integration, globalization, revitalization and others. As the delegation of Mexico stated in the last plenary, we consider that the priorities set forth in the 1978 Final Document remain and that the conclusions set out in the Declaration adopted that year also remain valid. This does not exclude the possibility of identifying specific areas within those priorities on which to focus our efforts now, to help the Conference on Disarmament to achieve new results, particularly as the priorities laid down do not prevent the parallel analysis of any question seemed appropriate. Negotiations to achieve nuclear disarmament must be carried out at every level, bilateral, multilateral and the two avenues of work should mutually and appropriately complement one another. In this process, the complete prohibition of testing must remain the top priority, and as long as talks are continuing in this field, all the nuclear Powers must adopt indefinite moratoriums on testing.

(Mr. Barbuda, Brazil)

... Though we are not a party to the NPT, we hope that the 1995 review conference could provide the opportunity also for a reappraisal of the doctrinal foundations of the Treaty in order that it may reflect the realities of the post-cold-war era, in particular the circumstance that nuclear deterrence theories have lost their consistency. In this context, the conclusion of agreements banning nuclear tests and providing "negative security assurances" would be an appropriate corollary to the NPT, which would certainly turn the nuclear non-proliferation regime into a more balanced one. As to the role of the non-proliferation regime of the NPT, I would like to recall that the experience of my country shows that there are other effective means of ensuring non-proliferation.

(Mr. Don Nanjira, Kenya)

... We have taken note of the fact that the First Committee of the General Assembly, the Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament have undertaken efforts to respond to the new circumstances by adapting their structures, methods of work and functions to fit in with the new realities. Here in the Conference, consultations have indicated the need for this body to address its agenda and membership. We consider the decision by the Conference to establish subsidiary bodies on a nuclear test ban, the prevention of an arms race in outer space, negative security assurances and transparency in armaments as a response to the new realities. We hope that concrete progress will be achieved in the near future on all or some of these issues. We share the view that nuclear issues on the agenda of the Conference still remain priority issues. My delegation should take the liberty to discuss these important issues in the plenary and subsidiary bodies established to consider issues of the nuclear test ban and negative security assurances pending the final outcome of the consultations on the agenda of the Conference.

(Mr. Zahran, Egypt)

... We still believe that the highest priority must be given to nuclear disarmament and the prevention of a nuclear arms race, in conformity with the United Nations Declaration on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear and Thermo-nuclear Weapons adopted by the General Assembly in resolution 1653 (XVI). It is also our firm view that non-nuclear-weapon States should be provided with necessary and sufficient guarantees against the use of this type of nuclear weapon in addition to those provided by Security Council resolution 255. We hope that the parties concerned will soon agree to a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing. We believe that by choosing to address nuclear weapons as the first specific category of weapons in his report, the Secretary-General accurately reflected the priority that must be given to this issue.

(Mr. Yumjav, Mongolia)

... Mongolia supports in principle the main priorities in the field of disarmament set forth in the Secretary-General's report. Now the chemical weapons Convention, an important milestone in the global disarmament process, is finally concluded. We believe that efforts of the international community should be concentrated on such issues as NTB, non-proliferation of weapons, especially nuclear weapons, negative security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States, conventional armaments and confidence-building measures.

(Mr. Yumjav, Mongolia)

The Mongolian delegations supports the United Nations Secretary-General's view that the efforts of the CD might be focused on well-defined and urgent issues. I am convinced that in coming years the priority agenda items in the CD will be NTB, negative security assurances, transparency in armaments and outer space. In our view, another pressing issue to be addressed in the CD is non-proliferation in all its dimensions. We believe that such important issues as regional disarmament and confidence-building measures should also be included in the agenda of the Conference. My delegation has no objection that certain questions on the present agenda of the CD be merged and restructured, as suggested, for example, by our Swedish colleague.

(Mr. Arteaga, Venezuela)

... Our delegation recognizes the significance of the signature of bilateral agreements on the reduction of strategic arms and the adoption of unilateral measures recently; none the less we believe that the policy of arms control in more favourable circumstances for cooperation and dialogue should not replace disarmament as a means of strengthening peace. While agreeing that it is necessary to avoid handling disarmament matters in a compartmentalized manner, we also continue to believe that the paramount responsibility in the adoption of concrete disarmament measures continues to fall on the main military powers; the appropriateness of dealing with urgent issues in the sphere of disarmament should not lead us to avoid efforts to promote the elimination of certain categories of weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear weapons, and negotiations on an agreement for a total nuclear test ban.

... Certainly the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has become a matter of great concern. Its handling requires the application of a two-dimensional approach combining the effective adoption of disarmament measures and the use of diplomacy in the broad sense of the term, through the holding of effective negotiations. Along these lines we consider that the adoption of an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear testing would have positive effects for the maintenance of international security. In view of the changes that have occurred in the international political scene, it is essential to discard perceptions linked to bipolarity; technical arguments

(Mr. Arteaga, Venezuela)

cannot continue to be used to justify nuclear testing. In any event we cannot fail to refer with satisfaction to the nuclear moratoriums declared by various Powers.

(The President)

... Current global changes and recent disarmament agreements have the potential of radically altering also the rationale of nuclear-weapon States with regard to continued testing of nuclear weapons. The unilateral moratoria on nuclear tests introduced by France, the Russian Federation and the United

(The President)

States have created favourable conditions for arriving at an early agreement on a nuclear test ban. The adherence of all nuclear-weapon States to the non-proliferation Treaty has created the necessary political environment conducive to concluding an agreement on appropriate security assurances to non-nuclear weapon States. This short review is meant to indicate that the new developments in the international environment open a wide range of possibilities for useful work to be done by the Conference on Disarmament in the future.

(Mr. Blomberg, Finland)

... The nuclear testing moratoria followed by France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States open new prospects for arms control. We urge all nuclear-weapon States to suspend their testing activities. The geographical proximity of the Novaya Zemlya testing area to Finland gives special emphasis to our interest to see testing discontinued and banned.

(Mr. Blomberg, Finland)

... The nuclear-test-ban issue is one of the four priority areas in which the CD has agreed to start work. The CD is the most appropriate body to deal with this global issue. We hope that the time is ripe to proceed towards a comprehensive test ban. Recent developments have certainly raised new expectations.

Mr. VAERNO (Norway):

... I have asked for the floor today mainly to address the Norwegian view on the ongoing consultation regarding the future structure and agenda of the Conference; other representatives of my country will follow up with more in-depth statements at a later time. The Conference on Disarmament represents the sole negotiating body for global disarmament issues. There is a need to maintain the Conference as a forum for real negotiations. After a few words on the possible extension of the Conference, here I would like to also refer to my esteemed colleague Ambassador Blomberg. At present more than 20 countries have applied for membership in the Conference on Disarmament. Norway is among the applicants, and has since 1986 been the endorsed Western candidate for membership. We have for several years actively participated in an observer capacity in the work of the Conference and we thus feel like Finland that we all, as observers, have contributed substantially to the negotiations. In connection with the preparation of the chemical weapons Convention, Norway submitted to the CD on a regular basis technical studies on verification of possible use of chemical weapons. Norwegian experts are also taking an active part in the efforts of the CD's Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to design and test a global seismic network which could monitor a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

(Mr. Vaerno, Norway)

... We have noted with pleasure that the Conference has established an agenda for 1993, focusing on various important issues such as the question of a comprehensive nuclear test ban and transparency in armaments. This provides a good basis for meaningful work in the 1993 session. As is well known, Norway attaches particular importance to the issue of a nuclear test ban. This matter was emphasized by the Norwegian State Secretary Mrs. Helga Hernes when she addressed the Conference in June last year. Norway will continue to participate actively in the elaboration of a verification regime for a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The Norwegian Seismic Array (NORSAR) has since its establishment in 1968 played a key role in this regard. After the successful completion of the chemical weapons Convention, the test ban issue should assume top priority. In this regard Norway welcomes the unilateral moratoria on nuclear testing by France, the Russian Federation and the United States. Now we have an historic opportunity for such a comprehensive test-ban treaty. One prerequisite for such a treaty is that none of the nuclear-weapon States resume their testing. We hope that these moratoria will be continued. Lack of substantial progress on the test-ban issue before the 1995 conference of the non-proliferation Treaty might have negative consequences for the extension of the duration of the Treaty. Norway favours an indefinite extension of the NPT.

(Mr. Goonetilleke, Sri Lanka)

... One of the priority objectives of this Conference my delegation supports is the need for an effective treaty to outlaw all nuclear test explosions. In this field there have been a few encouraging developments, including voluntary observance of nuclear test moratoria by major nuclear Powers and a downward trend in the number of tests carried out since 1987. It is also heartening to note that all major nuclear Powers, with the exception of two new republics of the former Soviet Union, have eventually become parties to the NPT. Despite all these positive trends, the potential for nuclear proliferation, both vertical and horizontal, will continue to exist as long as tests for new qualitative improvements and new types of nuclear weapons are not completely discontinued. In this regard, it should be emphasized that it is neither rational nor reasonable for the non-nuclear-weapon States to rely solely - I repeat, to rely solely - on the good will of the nuclear-weapon States, which is implicitly manifest in their self-declared moratoria. One of the most effective international measures to prevent further proliferation still remains a legally binding ban on nuclear test explosions through a verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. The Conference should now seize the opportunity to commence substantive negotiations in this direction.

(Mr. Goonetilleke, Sri Lanka)

... As we progress towards the NPT review conference in 1995, several genuine questions come to our mind. What would the United States and the Russian Federation intend doing with more than 8,000 nuclear warheads they will have between them after the year 2003? Against whom will these, and the weapons in the hands of other nuclear-weapon States be used? How secure and safe will future generations be with so many nuclear warheads in the hands of those two countries and others? Will the present nuclear-weapon States be more responsible with those weapons in their arsenals than the others who may have crossed the threshold since 1970? What kind of new strategic doctrines will be put forward to justify the continued possession of nuclear weapons, the continuation of new tests and research, and the development or invention of new types of weapon? What kind of incentives will there be for the threshold countries to become parties to the NPT, if the nuclear-weapon States continue testing, developing and stockpiling more sophisticated nuclear weapons beyond the year 2003?

(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

... Finally, the theme of revitalization. We must build upon our past achievements. For the past six months we have sensed a new confidence in this group that results from the successful conclusion of the negotiation of the chemical weapons Convention and we can praise, with justification and without exaggeration, the remarkable progress that has been achieved in reducing the nuclear arsenals of Russia and the United States of America. But time moves

(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

on and we are now presented with a chance to make further progress on the arms control agenda, namely, the negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. We have moved quickly here to establish a working group on negotiating a nuclear test ban. Currently three nuclear-weapon States have declared testing moratoria. The Foreign Minister of France has proposed that representatives of the five nuclear-weapon States meet to consider how to advance this issue. These are all positive steps, but we need a clear signal from the five that they are prepared now to negotiate a test-ban treaty. One thing is clear: the immobilism of the cold war is over. The world community is no longer prepared to watch the CD engage in endless debate over the minutiae of a test ban as it was during the 20 years of the chemical weapons negotiations. We must begin negotiations immediately and we should aim to complete them by the summer of 1995.

(Mr. Schallenberg, Austria)

... To introduce the second subject of my statement, that is to say the nuclear threat, I should like first and foremost to announce that Austria welcomes the re-establishment of an ad hoc committee on a nuclear test ban. Indeed, we greatly hope that this committee will successfully conclude the substantive work which it has begun in accordance with its mandate. We would welcome the conclusion of this work as soon as possible. Negotiations on a treaty for a comprehensive nuclear test ban could thus begin without delay. At this stage I should like to recall that on 5 June last, the Chamber of Deputies of the Austrian parliament, the Nationalrat, the National Council, called for an immediate halt to all nuclear tests even before an international obligation is established to this end. The Deputies also requested the Austrian Government to continue its policy of rejecting all nuclear tests, given that the latter constitute an enormous danger for the environmental health and balance of the world as a whole. They also encouraged our Government to support relevant proposals to reduce nuclear arsenals and promote the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Schallenberg, Austria)

... In the run-up to the NPT review and extension conference in 1995, the moratoriums on nuclear tests augur well. I should like to recall in this context that since acceding to the NPT in 1969, Austria has always firmly supported it in all its aspects. It has actively participated in the periodic review conferences. Between now and the 1995 review and extension conference, Austria will continue to work for the indefinite extension of the NPT and will endeavour to promote the universal nature of this instrument, whose importance is paramount for international security. We are also encouraged to note that the NPT has 16 additional parties since the fourth review conference in 1990, and that all the nuclear-weapon States are now party to it, at least as defined by the treaty itself. We think this is all the more important as the management of nuclear power, together with management of the environment, represents the major challenge for the survival of mankind.

(Mr. Pérez-Villanueva, Spain)

... With regard to regional measures, it is perfectly appropriate to think about drawing up a long list of measures that could defuse conflicts of this nature whose impulses "become a threat to international peace and global security", to quote the words of Ambassador Wagenmakers before this plenary a few days ago. Confidence-building measures are in our opinion an important prerequisite for any disarmament and arms control agreement: they help to eliminate unknown quantities, dispel misgivings and finally better quantify genuine security and defence needs. In nuclear matters, Spain considers that the time is right to consider the desirability of starting negotiations with a view to the conclusion of a treaty to institute the cessation of nuclear tests. This step alone would not suffice to reduce and eliminate atomic weapons. But it is a necessary step, and in our view there is a growing state of mind, reflected, moreover, in unilateral decisions taken by the nuclear-weapon States, favourable to a decision of this type. The Conference on Disarmament could also be the appropriate place for the international community to become fully aware of the progress made in nuclear disarmament by unilateral or bilateral decisions, and the moderation and self-restraint with which some of the nuclear-weapon States have been planning and conducting tests in recent years. We truly think that this new situation constitutes a favourable environment for the initiation of negotiations on the cessation of nuclear tests at the appropriate time.

(Mr. Gyarmati, Hungary)

... Though the welcome increase in the number of States parties to the NPT and the milestone agreements reached in the field of nuclear disarmament have contributed to the improvement of the political environment surrounding the NPT, we cannot yet lean back and relax. The extension and review Conference of the NPT, due in 1995, will raise a whole series of challenges the international community has to live up to. In this context, we strongly believe that the highest priority already during the preparatory phases of the Conference should be assigned to the indefinite extension of the duration of the Treaty. Both this goal and the global acceptance and authority of the NPT can best be served by the further development of verification means available for IAEA and by the appropriate implementation of article VI of the Treaty. In addition to the sweeping cuts in the nuclear arsenals of the two major Powers - and at a next stage of all nuclear-weapon States - the NPT regime would also benefit from real progress in the fields of comprehensive prohibition of nuclear testing, the provision of security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States and the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities. This latter issue does not currently appear amongst the

(Mr. Gyarmati, Hungary)

priorities of the Conference on Disarmament for the 1993 session, yet we continue to consider it highly relevant to our - and others' - national security, taking also into account some specific regional concerns.

(Mr. Hou, China)

... The relevant resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly emphasize that the effective curbing of the nuclear arms race, the realization of complete nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war remain a pressing task for the international community and a priority agenda item for the Conference on Disarmament. In recent years some new developments have been witnessed in this respect, like the two START treaties between the United States and the Russian Federation. China welcomes these steps in the right direction and hopes that these treaties can be put into full implementation at an early date in order to reduce the danger of nuclear war. At the same time, the international community has pointed out that the reduction plans involved are preliminary, since even if their implementation is completed according to schedule by the beginning of the next century, these two countries will still possess over 90 per cent of the total nuclear arsenals of the world, sufficient to destroy the globe several times over, not to mention the fact that the modernization of nuclear weapons and the arms race in space remain unchecked. Therefore, the tasks for nuclear disarmament are as strenuous as ever. People of all countries have long aspired to and made unremitting efforts for the early realization of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all nuclear weapons. In this respect, States with the largest nuclear arsenals are bound to bear special responsibility in taking the lead to stop the testing, improvement, production and deployment of nuclear weapons, drastically reduce their nuclear arsenals and check the arms race in outer space, thus making their due contribution to comprehensive nuclear disarmament.

(Mr. Hou, China)

... China fully understands the strong aspiration of the numerous non-nuclear-weapon States for a ban on nuclear testing and believes that a nuclear test ban, as a specific step in the cause of nuclear disarmament, will have some effect in containing the development of nuclear weapons and must be achieved in the framework of complete nuclear disarmament. From the very beginning China has adopted a highly prudent and restrained attitude towards nuclear testing. We long ago ceased nuclear testing in the atmosphere. We have conducted only a very limited number of tests, the smallest number among the nuclear-weapon States. China has always been in favour of putting the issue of a nuclear test ban on to the agenda of the Conference for intensive and extensive deliberations. China has also constructively supported the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban and actively participated in the work of GSE and GSETT-2. The Chinese delegation appreciates the efforts made by Ambassador Tanaka of Japan, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban.

Mrs. ZAFRA (Colombia) (translated from Spanish):

... A few weeks ago we attended the ceremony for the signature of the Convention for the prohibition of chemical weapons in Paris. Colombia was one of the 130 countries that signed this international instrument and we are pleased with that. Following the arduous task of negotiating this Convention here in this forum, some think that the Conference on Disarmament now has no agenda for its work. We are not of that opinion. Nuclear disarmament is a

(Mrs. Zafra, Colombia)

major task that still lies ahead of us. If agreements can be arrived at for the prohibition of biological weapons and chemical weapons, why cannot a convention be concluded for the prohibition of nuclear weapons? Within this context a first concrete and effective step could be a complete nuclear test ban. The present moratorium on nuclear testing by various countries that possess nuclear technology, we believe, provides a favourable opportunity. Thus the conclusion of an agreement on negative assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States would be desirable, without of course losing sight of the real objective of nuclear disarmament.

The PRESIDENT:

... Since the Conference on Disarmament opened on 19 January, we have made worthwhile progress on furthering our work, including an important early agreement to focus on four items of our agenda dealing with a nuclear test ban, transparency in armaments, negative security assurances, and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Conference on Disarmament has also responded to the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations entitled "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era" with a number of recommendations, most notably, in Canada's view, the emphasis placed on reinforcing regional approaches to security concerns and the commitment to intensify consultations on improved and effective functioning of the Conference.

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(The President)

... Again, wearing my Canadian hat, I would like to turn to the Conference on Disarmament agenda. The primary role of the Conference on Disarmament is of course to negotiate global arms control and disarmament instruments. The Conference on Disarmament can also usefully conduct pre-negotiation discussions, as it currently does on a nuclear test ban, and on outer space. But the actual negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament of a comprehensive test-ban treaty to eliminate all nuclear testing in all environments for all time remains a priority Canadian objective.

The current situation gives grounds for optimism about the prospects for the negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Of the declared nuclear Powers, the French moratorium has been extended. The legislated American moratorium does not run out until July of this year, and our understanding is the United States Congress has mandated the pursuit of an agreement on banning testing for several years into the future. For its part, Russia has extended its moratorium until July 1993.

Momentum, once slowed, is very difficult to re-establish. Canada urges these nuclear-weapons States and those who have not yet declared a moratorium to seize the present opportunity and make meaningful progress towards a verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty.

(Mr. Berasategui, Secretary-General of the Conference
on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the
Secretary-General of the United Nations)

... "We wish to underline four specific issues that are of particular concern to us at this time:

"1. We welcome the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, and urge you to begin negotiations in order to reach a speedy conclusion on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. France, the Russian Federation and the United States are observing moratoria on nuclear weapons testing at this time. We congratulate them and urge them to decide on extending them further. We call on China and the United Kingdom to also declare moratoria of their own. This is the time for the Conference on Disarmament to move ahead with the negotiations for a treaty to prohibit all nuclear-weapons testing for all times.

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Mr. NORBERG (Sweden): My intervention today will be wholly devoted to the question of a nuclear test ban. As is well known Sweden has since long worked for a ban on all nuclear tests. Therefore, it is with great satisfaction that my delegation has noted the early establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban during this session of the Conference. It should be recalled that the General Assembly of the United Nations last fall approved the resolution on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty with a larger majority than ever. In the resolution all States are urged to seek to achieve the early discontinuance of all nuclear-test explosions for all time.

At present four of the five nuclear-weapon States are in practice observing a moratorium on nuclear testing. This moratorium creates a favourable climate for progress towards a comprehensive test ban. A prolongation of the moratoria as well as adherence to the moratorium by all nuclear-weapon States should vigorously contribute to maintain the momentum.

The world has been changing fast during the last few years. The same considerations are no longer valid and previous positions are being modified. My delegation has listened with great interest to the views expressed so far,

(Mr. Norberg, Sweden)

not least by the five nuclear-weapon States, at the meetings this year of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. Even if positions have not yet been worked out in detail, it is our impression that, in the new international context, there is now a real chance to make progress towards a nuclear test ban.

At this juncture, it is extremely important that all delegations make an extra effort to reconsider old positions and try new ways to achieve a nuclear test ban. One of the main reasons for ascertaining a nuclear test ban, namely to halt the nuclear arms race among the present nuclear Powers, has possibly become less significant as the world is now in fact experiencing nuclear disarmament. Yet a halt to nuclear tests remains equally essential for other reasons, first and foremost as a means to halting the risk of nuclear proliferation. A total test ban would also eliminate possible environmental and health hazards connected with nuclear explosions.

Sweden in 1991 presented a draft comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, contained in document CD/1089 of 31 July 1991. This proposal is still on the table. My delegation has concluded, however, that due to developments since the proposal was submitted, some modifications are necessary. As to the scope of a treaty, Sweden has concluded that a ban should be total and comprehensive, thus including also an outright prohibition of all peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs). There are, in the view of the Swedish delegation, several good reasons for such an approach. First, all PNEs imply a problem since experience gained from them might be used in the development of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, it seems to my delegation that there are increasing doubts as to the possibility of using PNEs for any practical purpose, particularly taking into account the risks for the environment. My delegation would be interested to listen to views from other delegations on this matter and other aspects of our original proposal. Considerations of this nature should, therefore, cause us to strongly stress, in the preambular part of a treaty, the non-proliferation effects of a nuclear test ban and to include in the treaty a PNE prohibition.

Developments of the last few years would also seem to call for a review on the section of a test-ban treaty dealing with verification issues. It is clear to my delegation that a worldwide seismic network should constitute the core of a comprehensive system for verification of treaty compliance. It is important to further study also other methods than a seismic network. In the Swedish draft other methods of verification are also included, such as the surveillance of radionuclides in the atmosphere, the use of satellite data and on-site inspections. In the view of my delegation the Group of Scientific Experts could take on this task. However, also other ways of dealing with this task should be considered without delay.

A discussion is also called for concerning the institutional arrangements for verifying compliance with the treaty. The verification system of the chemical weapons Convention is a historic achievement and could, no doubt, give inspiration and new ideas for the verification of a CTB. Nevertheless, it is important to ask if, in the nuclear field, the best and most cost-effective solution really is to create a new specialized organization for

(Mr. Norberg, Sweden)

verification. Perhaps we should first explore the possibilities to utilize the competence and experience gained by the International Atomic Energy Agency also for this purpose.

As pointed out by Sweden's Foreign Minister in her statement to the Conference last month, Sweden strongly believes that the present positive international atmosphere resulting from the end of the cold war and the conclusion of the START agreements and the chemical weapons Convention should be fully utilized in the negotiations aimed at completing a comprehensive test ban. In this context, we consider it of utmost importance that the current moratoria observed by nuclear Powers be extended in order to ensure a positive atmosphere.

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) (translated from Spanish):

... The year 1993 began very well for disarmament. In January the Convention on the elimination of chemical weapons was signed and the United States and the Russian Federation also signed the START Two agreement. We nurture the hope that 1993 will also end well. Substantive progress is expected in various spheres, including the four that we have decided to focus on in our annual meeting: the complete prohibition of nuclear testing, negative assurances, outer space and transparency in armaments. It is true that the Ad Hoc Committee on the first of these subjects still has no negotiating mandate and that many countries consider the task that has been assigned to it for the coming months to be modest in the utmost. However, we feel that in this sphere there could be changes very shortly in the positions of some nuclear-weapon States. We are therefore awaiting an announcement that could

(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

have very important consequences for nuclear disarmament. We consider that the time is ripe to achieve a CTBT and we have the hope that the political leaders will make use of the opportunity.

(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

... In concluding I should like to offer a few thoughts that we shared a few days ago with the members of the Trade and Development Board when considering the subject of the possible establishment within UNCTAD of an ad hoc working group to explore the issue of structural adjustment for the transition to disarmament. After four decades of an unbridled arms race, the international community is moving towards détente and a reversal of that trend. How to demilitarize the economy - at the worldwide and national level - is one of the biggest challenges we face today. For years, some of us have been emphasizing the imperative need to put an end to the arms race, underlining the close relationship between disarmament and development, proposing and supporting practical measures. For example, we advocated a reduction in the military budgets of all countries, particularly the main military Powers. We have also examined on many occasions the economic benefits that could flow from general demilitarization. Now that a new era seems to be dawning in international relations, many countries, including almost all those that took part most enthusiastically in the arms race, are falling over themselves to reduce the economic burden of the arms build-up. Chemical weapons have been abolished, the nuclear arsenals of the two main military Powers are going to be reduced, nuclear tests have been temporarily suspended in three nations, the Register already mentioned has been established within the United Nations, as I have already said, the nuclear-weapon-free zones are being consolidated, some military bases are being closed, military budgets are being reduced, and a new atmosphere is already being felt in the multilateral disarmament forums.

(Mr. von Arx, Switzerland)

... It is along these lines that my delegation could follow the draft decision presented by the delegation of the United States on 22 March concerning "transparency in armaments". And since today we are going to receive the report of the Group of Scientific Experts, I wish to point out that Switzerland actively supports the efforts being made by this group and is in favour of an expansion of the activities of this very group.

(Mr. Ghikas, Greece)

... That is why our agenda matters so much. Chemical weapons are but part of the problem. As long as arms regulation does not cover, in an equal manner, nuclear, biological and conventional weapons, all hard-won credibility risks being lost. Some steps in the right direction have already been taken. An Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban has been re-established. That could lead, in due course, to a treaty for a comprehensive nuclear test ban. Besides the present moratoria on nuclear tests by the United States of America, the Russian Federation and France are positive contributions to that end. Nevertheless, the non-proliferation Treaty has to be adhered to worldwide. We urge all countries which formed part of the former Soviet Union and possess nuclear weapons to do so as soon as possible. And we hope that the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will reconsider accordingly its recent decision in this respect. The bold measures provided for by the chemical weapons Convention have been stated on several occasions. I would have thought that, however bold, those measures are by no means original. Anyone having dealt with arms control issues at the regional level, notably at the European level, would be familiar with all notions contained in the said Convention, including the famous "challenge inspections" that is to say the cornerstone of the Treaty on conventional forces in Europe, inasmuch as it describes in so many details locations to be inspected and inspection modalities. Which proves in turn, the extreme usefulness of regional arrangements both as a complement and as a pattern for global agreements.

Mr. DAHLMAN (Sweden): I am pleased to report today on the recent session by the Ad Hoc Group held from 15 to 26 February 1993 and to introduce the Group's progress report contained in CD/1185. The session was attended by experts and representatives from 27 countries. Upon invitation by the Conference on Disarmament, a representative of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) attended the session. He reviewed, from a technical perspective, IAEA activities with special emphasis on monitoring the non-proliferation Treaty. It might in this connection be appropriate to point out the differences between the principles guiding the IAEA monitoring and those underlying the work of the Ad Hoc Group. IAEA is in its monitoring of the NPT collecting data primarily on the flow of nuclear material through declared facilities. Based on these data IAEA makes its own analysis and draws its own conclusions which are then reported to the member States. The basic data are however not made available but kept within IAEA.

The basic principle of the international verification system considered by the Ad Hoc Group is that of a service organization for participating States. It should provide free and easy access to all data obtained from a global network of recording stations. It should further provide routine compilation of data and analysis results obtained at the International Data Centre using standardized procedures. Conclusions, e.g. as to the nature of observed events, should, however, be drawn by individual States and not by the International Data Centre. It further became evident that the data volume within the IAEA monitoring system is only a small fraction of that anticipated in the seismological system or that exchanged in the Group's latest large-scale test.

At its session the Group concluded its work on the second large-scale technical test (GSETT-2) by finalizing a report on the seismological evaluation. A summary of this report is annexed to the progress report and the full report was adopted as a conference room paper of the Group and is thus available to the CD. The Group expressed its appreciation to

(continued)

(Mrs. Bauta Solés, Cuba)

Professor Harjes of Germany, who coordinated this evaluation and drafted the report.

Many of the issues brought up in the evaluation report have been touched upon by the Group at earlier occasions and have also been reported to the Conference on Disarmament. I will however make a few observations and highlight some of the conclusions. Seismological array stations, where a number of sensors are placed in a specific pattern to form a receiving antenna, proved to be most valuable and contributed 75 per cent of all the observations made during GSETT-2. Thus, as the progress report states, the global network of stations should include arrays to the greatest degree practicable. It was documented that the background disturbances, which limit the detection capability, varied by a factor as large as 10 between participating stations. This stresses the importance of taking great care when siting monitoring stations. I have on earlier occasions reported on the uneven station distribution on the globe and its consequences. The evaluation showed that the detection capability during GSETT-2 corresponds to magnitude 2.5 in the northern part of Europe to be compared with magnitude 5 in large areas of the southern hemisphere. As magnitudes are logarithmic values this means that the detection capability is 300 times higher in northern Europe compared to most parts in the southern hemisphere. Also the accuracy by which an event could be located is influenced in a similar way. Location errors of about 10 km in northern Europe should be compared to uncertainties exceeding 100 km or more observed in the southern hemisphere. If we want to achieve a verification system with high capability to observe events in all parts of the globe it is important to establish stations in areas which today are lacking high-performance equipment.

The Group noted that future monitoring environments and specific monitoring requirements will be set by participating States and may change over time. It is therefore impossible to establish a priori detailed requirements for the system. The Group however agreed that it would be necessary to conduct a cost-performance analysis of global seismic verification systems of different configurations. In a national contribution presented to the Group a first attempt was made to use computer modelling to identify optimal network configurations for given numbers of stations, either arrays or single stations. Additional such modelling will be needed, together with experimental data such as those obtained during GSETT-2, to establish a realistic cost-performance analysis for systems of different configurations and thus facilitate the efforts to achieve a cost-effective system.

The focus of the Group's efforts during the session was in-depth discussions on the reassessment of the existing concept of a global system as presented in the Group's fifth report (CD/903). The revised modernized system can, in a way similar to the one tested during GSETT-2, be divided into three components: a global network of stations, national data centres and an international data centre.

The global network of stations is to be composed of three parts. The Group refers to it as a three-tiered network. The first tier - the alpha network - provides event detection. It would tentatively consist of a global network of 40-60 high-performance array and single stations that would transmit continuous waveform data to the International Data Centre. The

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

number of stations in the alpha network, their individual capabilities and their distribution thus determine the overall detection capability of the system. The second tier, the beta network, would provide data primarily for estimation of locations and depths of the events detected by the alpha network. The number of beta stations could be substantially larger than the number of alpha stations. The beta stations will make waveform data immediately available to the International Data Centre upon request as needed. The third tier, the gamma network, would comprise national and regional networks as available. These networks have been established primarily for the surveillance of national and regional seismicity. Data from the gamma network will be requested on a case-by-case basis to facilitate the analysis of events for which further data is considered useful.

The second component of the international system is the national data centres. Such a centre will be the gateway from a participating State to the International Data Centre and to other national centres, through which data and information will be exchanged. An International Data Centre (IDC) will be the third component of the system. The Group now considers that one such centre would be sufficient. The Group appreciates the offer by the United States delegation to provide a prototype IDC in Washington, D.C. for use in cooperative development and demonstration of the single IDC concept. The functions of the IDC will in principle be unchanged. The IDC is however supposed to work on a tighter time-scale and to produce a preliminary bulletin within a few hours of the occurrence of an event. The IDC will also base its work almost entirely on waveform data obtained automatically from the alpha and on request from the beta network.

High-speed communications are an essential element of the global system. In contrast to the situation which existed only a few years ago, high-capability global communications are now widely available and can be implemented as needed.

The Group considered a tentative time schedule for its future work, with the aim of beginning global testing of the new proposed concept by 1 January 1995. The Group is in its work critically dependent on a number of activities that take place between its sessions both in individual countries and as cooperative efforts among countries. The Group noted with appreciation the convening of an informal technical workshop in Canada from 17 to 22 November 1992. The results of that workshop greatly facilitated the Group's work during this session.

Education and training is of fundamental importance in establishing seismological facilities in new areas. The Group expresses its support to the efforts by Egypt to provide basic seismological training and information on the work of the GSE to scientists in African and Arab countries. The Group also expresses its support to those countries which assisted Egypt in this important work.

Mr. Michael Cassandra, who has for 10 years been serving as the Group's Secretary, has now left to meet new challenges. On behalf of the Group I would like to express to Mr. Cassandra our sincere thanks for his most valuable contribution to the work of the Group. Mr. Cassandra is succeeded by

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

Ms. Jenifer Mackby and I very much welcome Ms. Mackby as our new Secretary. I would also like to express the Group's appreciation for the services provided by the secretariat throughout the session.

The Ad Hoc Group suggests that its next session, subject to approval by the Conference on Disarmament, should be convened from 26 July to 6 August 1993 in Geneva.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): The United States welcomes the remarks by Dr. Dahlman on the progress being made by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts and we thank him for presenting this information to the Conference. The United States remains committed to supporting the work of the GSE. To ensure that the system concepts are fully tested in a realistic environment, as Dr. Dahlman has pointed out, the United States has offered to provide a prototype International Data Centre in Washington, D.C., for use in the cooperative development and testing of a data exchange system. Furthermore, I would underline the point that Dr. Dahlman alluded to that if future tests of the GSE data exchange system are to be fully successful, a more uniform distribution of global stations should be used than in previous tests. The United States therefore hopes the Conference on Disarmament will encourage additional countries to cooperate and participate in the work of the GSE.

The PRESIDENT: I wish to thank Ambassador Ledogar of the United States for his statement. Are there any other delegations who wish to take the floor to comment on Dr. Dahlman's report? If not, I should like to inform you that, in accordance with the practice of the Conference, we shall consider the recommendation contained in the progress report, concerning the dates for the next session of the Ad Hoc Group, at the opening of the second part of the annual session of the Conference.

(The President)

The future of the CD is in our hands. This body can become more active, and more relevant, or it can atrophy. If the former is to be our future, we certainly need to become more action-oriented. The draft CD decision proposed by the United States was an example of something that was action-oriented. The draft decision would not have obligated anyone. It simply stated the obvious by encouraging participation by CD members and CD non-member participants. The Register after all will only be successful if participation is great. In addition, the United States proposed that we exchange national submissions to the Register among ourselves here in Geneva. Those data would have already been public in New York.

My delegation therefore is saddened at this turn of events. Is this the same body which looks to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty? Is this the same body that wants to achieve some progress in negative security assurances or outer space arms control? In Washington and elsewhere, people will draw their own conclusions about the utility of the CD when worthwhile goals like the United Nations Register, a measure which, as has been pointed out, was approved without a single negative vote by the United Nations, and one which seeks to build confidence and openness among States worldwide, cannot be endorsed by the CD.

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 649th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

... You will recall that, at the last plenary meeting of the first part of the annual session, the President announced that he intended to put before the Conference at the beginning of the second part of the session the recommendation contained in paragraph 13 of the progress report on the thirty-fifth session of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, circulated as document CD/1185, concerning the dates for the next session of the Ad Hoc Group. Accordingly, I shall proceed to do so at this plenary meeting, once we have listened to the speakers inscribed to address the Conference today.

Mr. O'SULLIVAN (Australia):

... I would like to offer some comments on the latest progress report to this Conference from the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, contained in document CD/1185, to which you have just referred and which we will consider later this morning.

Might I at the outset underline Australia's appreciation for the ongoing work of the Group, and in particular of Dr. Dahlman, its Chairman. During long years of political stalemate, the quiet work on seismic verification undertaken by the GSE in fact represented the only tangible progress being made under the Conference's auspices towards the achievement of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty.

I express Australia's thanks to those concerned: their patient work has left us with a solid technical basis on which to construct the multilateral legal undertakings of a CTBT.

(continued)

(Mr. O'Sullivan, Australia)

The report we have before us today confirms that the seismic technique offers the international community a technology which is sufficiently reliable to form the core of a future CTBT verification regime.

This core will, of course, need to be supplemented and complemented by other verification techniques. As the report indicates, further enhancement of the seismic technique and development of technical approaches to the future global verification network will also need to be pursued.

However, the central leg of a "verification pack" for a CTBT, a credible global deterrent against future nuclear testing, is clearly visible.

I make these initial remarks because it seems to my delegation that the cumulative effect of international developments affecting the nuclear-test-ban issue is such that the world community - and the Conference on Disarmament in particular - will very shortly be looking to reap fruit from the GSE. Fruit in the shape of a fully mature scheme for the practical and credible application of the best seismic science available to verifying compliance with a CTBT.

In this context, Australia supports the declared and legislated public policy position taken by the United States, most recently in President Clinton's 23 April statement: we share the belief that achievement of a CTBT should be a high-priority and time-bound process.

At the 1992 session of the United Nations General Assembly, the international community gave unprecedented levels of support to a resolution calling for progress towards a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. We have also witnessed an unprecedented level of constructive activity by the nuclear-weapon States in applying testing moratoria, in proposing pre-negotiating consultative frameworks, and in agreeing and implementing deep cuts in existing arsenals of nuclear weapons.

Some of these initiatives have been favoured with the appropriate positive public recognition. Some have been carried through more modestly and with little fanfare.

Nevertheless, Australia believes that the atmosphere of the CTBT discussion has changed fundamentally, and that momentum towards negotiations will continue to build, including specifically here, in the Conference on Disarmament.

As its mandate shows, the GSE is a subsidiary technical body of this Conference. Its role is to inform in a technical sense a particular political discussion being pursued among national delegations in the Conference (or more specifically in the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban). This implies a close and collaborative relationship which, I regret to say, has probably been the exception rather than the rule over previous years, chiefly due to stagnation of political discussions.

(Mr. O'Sullivan, Australia)

Times are changing, however. There is a sharper focus in the Ad Hoc Committee on comprehensive nuclear-test-ban issues and on the practical implications. Australia considers that delegations individually - and perhaps the Conference as a whole - need to ensure that the GSE is fully informed as to the political debate in the Ad Hoc Committee and the options available. On the other hand, the time has come in our view for the GSE to re-examine its reporting. The CTBT verification implications of the fine seismic work the GSE undertakes need to be immediately and clearly intelligible to non-scientific members of the Conference. Increasingly, there will be demand for the GSE to address with the best scientific information available the actual and immediate negotiating needs of this forum.

Without such a collaborative approach, this Conference would be hard-pressed to complete a CTBT negotiating mandate satisfactorily. What was satisfactory when the GSE was effectively a substitute for political discussion in the Conference will not be satisfactory for supporting our future negotiations, or even serious pre-negotiation.

Australia consequently is prepared to accept the GSE's proposal to meet again in Geneva from 26 July to 6 August 1993 which is contained in the last or second-last paragraph of the report we will consider in a few minutes. We see this as an opportunity for significantly advancing work on seismic verification - a top priority - in accordance with the political priorities alluded to above. The meeting will also provide an opportunity for re-examination of the working relationship between the Conference and the GSE, and should result in a better-defined and more productive working partnership.

Australia has carefully considered and noted the contents of document CD/1185. We endorse the vast majority of it, and welcome the emerging technical consensus on the possible configuration of a global network of seismic stations. We particularly welcome the generous offer of the United States to provide a prototype international seismic data processing centre for use in collaborative development efforts. We also commend to other delegations the GSE's report on the GSETT-2 trial.

That said, we find it necessary to comment on a number of aspects of the report with which we are not able to agree, and which Australia believes underline the need for a closer, more sensitive, and more accountable relationship between the Conference and the Group.

The output of the GSE needs to be more readily comprehensible to the negotiating forum it serves. This affects both style and content of current reporting. Excellent science deserves excellent interpretation into the language of laymen. The intention after all is to inform a non-scientific negotiating forum. This involves providing technical answers to essentially political questions which both the subject matter itself and the negotiators raise. Equally it implies a readiness for the technical forum to ask for political guidance when formulation of technical answers requires better definition of political options under consideration.

(Mr. O'Sullivan, Australia)

This is a matter of common sense and intelligent interaction, both of which are entirely consistent with the GSE's mandate. However, the current culture of relations between the Conference and the GSE seems in need of some adjustment in order to realize such an objective.

Secondly, Australia was disappointed to note that what we understand to be the growing political urgency of finalizing details of a global approach to seismic verification is not reflected in CD/1185. Like other members of the Conference, we would have hoped for clear details of technical issues still outstanding, and an accounting of the firm strategies and timetables developed by the GSE in order to finalize the necessary seismic development work in a time-bound way.

In particular, we should like to know more of the costs of the options for a seismic verification network, so that we can consider more realistically States parties' obligations under a CTBT.

Thirdly, we were interested to note a number of comments in the report which appear to assume particular outcomes on questions which fall within the political negotiating authority of the Conference, where there is as yet no political agreement.

To our knowledge, contrary to the implication of paragraph 8 of CD/1185, there is no agreement in the Conference that a future verification data network for a CTBT will be restricted to "seismic" data. In the light of forthcoming discussions on non-seismic verification in the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, an a priori exclusion of "non-seismic" (even if seismic-related) data seems a particularly curious and unhelpful assumption.

This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the previous report of the GSE, CD/1163 of August 1992 specifically envisaged "continuing the discussion of its future work, including the incorporation of new technologies" at the thirty-fifth session. We would appreciate reporting which reflects GSE discussion of how its ongoing work is making provision for the incorporation of the various new and non-seismic technologies which might be relevant.

Likewise, we were interested to note an assertion towards the end of paragraph 9 of the report to the effect that interpretation of any verification data will reside with individual participant States and is "not a role of the international data centre or part of the global system". Any such decision, if taken forward into a CTBT, would of course have far-reaching implications for the verification regime. It would clearly be a political rather than a technical choice. As such, it is yet to be made by negotiators.

(Mr. O'Sullivan, Australia)

It may be necessary for the purposes of GSE technical development work to focus on an artificially truncated version of the data network which may eventually be required by negotiators. Nevertheless, it is essential that ongoing work take account of the fact that different models, most of which involve central data processing and analysis/interpretation, are under active consideration by Conference delegations.

We consider the final CTBT outcome is much more likely to involve a central organization charged by States parties with central data processing and analysis functions. We see no reason to believe that the political and practical considerations which led negotiators to adopt this verification and compliance strategy in other multilateral arms control instruments (such as the NPT and the CWC) should be inapplicable a priori to a CTBT. Rather, there are clear political and practical benefits to a verification and compliance mechanism which is driven by a multilateral and therefore impartial organization capable of representing in an informed and engaged manner the interests of all States parties. I note that in any case even central processing of seismic data so as to resolve "simple" technical inconsistencies must of necessity involve exercise of some central analysis functions.

I raise these points to indicate the potential for a more productive symbiosis between the Conference and its technical advisers. At present, there is a risk of the high-quality technical seismic work not being appreciated for the major achievement which it represents, and of the Conference not gaining the full benefit of the GSE's expertise in designing a CTBT verification regime based on "good science".

On the other hand, without better contact and habits of communication between the GSE and the Conference which it serves, there is also a risk of excellent scientific resources being wastefully deployed other than in full cooperation and coordination with the thinking of negotiators.

Measures which might assist this process might include:

Revision of the format and content of the GSE's regular reporting to the Conference, and of the Conference's formal communication with the GSE (including responses to reports);

Secondly, more Conference on Disarmament delegations deciding to participate in the work of the GSE;

Thirdly, measures to be taken by individual delegations to strengthen their international policy and technical coordination (more diplomats for instance, attending GSE, and GSE delegates to attend the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban and so on); and,

Finally, more regular informal but structured links between the GSE and the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban.

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) (translated from Spanish):

... On the resumption of the work of this Conference, the delegation of Mexico would like to make a brief statement on the main item on our agenda, namely, the complete prohibition of nuclear testing. During our recess there have been some important developments on this and other matters relating to nuclear disarmament.

Just a few days ago the forty-sixth World Health Assembly adopted a resolution in which it sought an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on the following question: In view of its effects on health and the environment, would the use of nuclear weapons by a State in war or other armed conflict be a breach of its obligations under international law, including the WHO Constitution?

Over the past month the annual session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission took place; at it we managed to conclude successfully a document on regional disarmament. We salute and appreciate the work of Ambassador Hoffmann of Germany as chairman of the working group concerned. The Commission was, however, unable to conclude its work on the science and technology item. Nor was there any significant progress on nuclear disarmament. It would appear that there are delegations that are much more interested in conventional or regional disarmament than in the questions related to the priority topics of the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction, and most particularly nuclear weapons. Ambassador Shannon will surely have had evidence of this during his term of office as the President of this Conference on Disarmament.

During the past week some of us also attended in New York the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 1995 Conference for the review and extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the NPT). It was evident there too that some delegations, almost all of them belonging to the group of eastern European countries and the western European and other groups, prefer a rather perfunctory, closed-door preparatory process. We on the other hand, along with the non-aligned countries, advocate a transparent preparatory process that is to say, one open to the public, to non-governmental organizations and above all to those States that are not parties but are interested in attending. Likewise, we are convinced that the 1995 NPT Conference needs very thorough preparation. For every international conference over the past few years, including last year's UNCED and the human rights conference this coming June, there has been very detailed preparation of final documents - in whose elaboration, I might add, non-governmental organizations played, precisely at the urging of the western and other countries, an important role.

(continued)

(Mr. Marin Bosch, Mexico)

A great majority of delegations to the Preparatory Committee of the 1995 Conference stressed the importance for the future of the NPT of the early conclusion of a treaty banning all nuclear tests forever (a CTBT). We share the opinion that the international situation regarding this question is particularly favourable now. And we also share the view that this situation may not last long.

Three nuclear-weapon States are observing a moratorium on testing and in a fourth country there is a de facto moratorium. These moratoria have been declared unilaterally and have had a very positive impact. Their unilateral interruption would without any doubt provoke a chain reaction in other countries and we would very soon revert to the practices of the past instead of striving for a less heavily armed and therefore less insecure world. It is therefore necessary to obtain the extension of these moratoria while the multilateral negotiation of a CTBT is getting under way. In the meantime we must work intensely in the Ad Hoc Committee so determinedly chaired by Ambassador Tanaka. We await with interest the distribution announced by Sweden of a new version of its draft test-ban treaty.

My Government has followed with interest the evolution of the policies on nuclear testing of France and of the United States and Russia. It has been a very positive evolution. We welcome the French initiatives in this area. As for the United States, we are gratified by the efforts being made to achieve by 30 September 1996 a multilateral agreement for the total prohibition of these tests pursuant to the legislation adopted by Congress last year. We are convinced that the negotiation of a CTBT in a multilateral disarmament forum such as this one is the best way to attain what is one of the main goals the international community has set itself on disarmament. Among other things, it would ensure the strengthening of the regime for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, avoiding the emergence of further nuclear-weapon States and the continued qualitative development of the existing arsenals.

At present the new United States Administration is studying various options in this respect. In that Government there are those who advocate a nuclear test ban that would only cover the tests over one kilo ton. Others have insisted that the programme of tests contemplated by existing legislation be carried out until 1996. Finally, others have defended the thesis, which we share, that the time has come to ban all nuclear tests. The latter argue with reason that the benefits to be derived from a CTBT are very much greater than the advantages that might be obtained from a limited nuclear test programme. It is obvious that the new Administration in Washington is divided on the question. The final decision will have to be taken by President Clinton. He will have to choose between going down in history as the last post-war President to have carried out nuclear tests or the first to have stopped doing so. The choice is his.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Bulgaria for his statement and for his kind words to me and to my delegation.

I will now therefore turn to the issue that I announced at the beginning of the meeting. I intend now to put before the Conference for adoption the recommendation contained in paragraph 13 of the progress report on the thirty-fifth session of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, concerning the dates for the next session of the Ad Hoc Group, which are in fact from 26 July to 6 August. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts this recommendation.

It is so decided.

(The President)

... "Nuclear test ban" is one of the important items on the agenda of the Conference and has the attention of many delegations. Fully understanding the urgent demand of all the non-nuclear-weapon States for a nuclear test ban, China has also adopted a very prudent attitude of self-restraint towards nuclear tests and sincerely hopes to see the issue solved within the framework of complete nuclear disarmament. We are pleased to note that this year the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban was established at an early date and that it has begun its work quite expeditiously under the leadership of its distinguished chairman, Ambassador Tanaka of Japan. China will as in the past take part in the Ad Hoc Committee in a constructive spirit, and wishes it progress in its work.

(Mr. Holst, Norway)

... In the area of seismic verification, over the years Norway has devoted considerable resources to seismological research relevant to a comprehensive nuclear test ban. The operation of the Norwegian Seismic Array (NORSAR) and the associated research activities form key elements in these efforts. Norway has introduced several working documents reflecting the main results from this programme.

(Mr. Holst, Norway)

Our national expertise in the field of seismological verification of a test-ban treaty has been built up around the NORSAR facilities. The research at NORSAR has focused on the development of techniques for detecting, locating and identifying small seismic events, using very sensitive high-frequency arrays. The important role of arrays in a global network has been demonstrated. There is consensus in the Group of Scientific Experts (GSE) that such arrays should form a backbone of any future monitoring system.

We note with satisfaction that the GSE is preparing to conduct global tests of a revised system of a comprehensive test-ban treaty monitoring within two years (GSETT 3). Through NORSAR Norway is prepared to take an active part in this work. This summer we will celebrate the twenty-fifth anniversary of the agreement between the United States of America and Norway establishing NORSAR. The Norwegian Government is proud indeed of the valuable work performed by NORSAR during this quarter of a century.

For Norway, a comprehensive nuclear test ban remains an objective of the highest priority. The unilateral moratoria on testing now in force for a majority of the nuclear-weapon States are most welcome. They also provide a historic opportunity which we must not fail to seize. We are indeed heartened by the Clinton-Yeltsin declaration from Vancouver in which the two presidents agreed to commence negotiations on a comprehensive multilateral nuclear test ban at an early date. We also support the French proposal for consultations among the five nuclear-weapon States on the nuclear-test-ban issue.

The nuclear-weapon States carry the main responsibility for concluding a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Negotiations should commence at an early date and proceed in parallel with the preparations for the NPT Review Conference. Such parallelism would greatly facilitate the preparatory work and contribute to a successful outcome of the 1995 conference. Indeed, I am genuinely worried that failure to produce such parallelism and to negotiate with urgency and in good faith for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty could put the whole NPT Conference in serious jeopardy.

Let me list very briefly the reasons why we attach such great symbolic and substantive importance to the early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty:

(1) It symbolizes the end of the nuclear arms race which shaped and distorted international relations during the period of the cold war. Nuclear weapons of course, do not lend themselves to disinvention but they may be reduced, dismantled and destroyed, and their further development stopped;

(2) It projects a much reduced role for nuclear weapons in national and international security strategies, thus reducing incentives for proliferation;

(3) It constitutes a necessary and reasonable quid pro quo of the nuclear-weapon States for general commitment to a viable and equitable non-proliferation regime;

(Mr. Holst, Norway)

(4) It provides a concrete basis for cooperative undertakings among the nuclear-weapon States, thereby deepening and broadening the emerging great-Power consensus;

And finally, (5) it provides additional insurance against nuclear pollution of the environment. We have numerous examples of venting of radioactive debris following underground tests. My country is particularly concerned on this score, since the only remaining Russian nuclear test site is at Novaya Zemlya, very close to Norwegian territory and in an ocean area with a fragile ecology of enormous importance for the harvesting of major fish stocks.

A comprehensive nuclear test ban is possible. The problem of verification can be solved. The basis for a comprehensive-test-ban-treaty verification system presumably would be a global monitoring network of sensitive seismic stations. Such a system should make use of the most recent technological advances and also incorporate high-quality stations of the array type. On-site challenge inspection, use of satellite imagery, measurement of airborne radionuclides and other supplementary verification measures can also be envisaged. Problems of verification no longer constitute legitimate obstacles.

Over the years many reasons have been put forward in favour of continued nuclear testing. The alleged need to ensure confidence in the nuclear stockpile and to improve the safety and security of nuclear weapons are now the main arguments against the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Reduced numbers of warheads contribute to enhanced overall safety and control. Older weapons should be destroyed first, leaving the safest and most secure warheads in the stockpiles. Elimination of the need for high-readiness responses allows nuclear weapons to be stored and secured in the safest way. Weapons may be retrofitted with advanced permissive action links, etc. Warheads may be re-manufactured to original specifications if problems arise or according to agreed schedules. There is now fairly broad agreement among experts that the relevant problems can be solved by programmes of stockpile inspection and non-nuclear tests.

In the past, the principal argument for nuclear testing was the development of new and more sophisticated nuclear weapons. This argument is no longer compelling. The perceived necessity of developing new warheads was often justified by the objective of strengthening deterrence and preventing unilateral advantages from accruing to the adversary in the nuclear arms race. Such perspectives no longer animate or should be permitted to animate policy-making and outlooks in the post-cold-war era.

(Mr. Holst, Norway)

... May I, in conclusion, return to the issue of nuclear testing. Continued nuclear tests provide a particular focus on radiation risks. Public opinion in northern Europe, and in my country in particular, is increasingly concerned about the danger of radiation from nuclear waste in adjacent waters or on land, from nuclear accidents, or from accidental venting from nuclear tests. There is also the danger that nuclear tests could destabilize nuclear waste that has been dumped in areas surrounding the test site.

(Mr. Brotodiningrat, Indonesia)

... Without belittling those successes, it would nevertheless be less than candid on our part not to point out that the long-overdue fulfilment of obligations under the Treaty by a number of States parties have always raised considerable concerns amongst the majority of States parties advocating the full and non-discriminatory implementation of the Treaty ever since it came into force. Such unfulfilled obligations as those relating to article VI and preambular paragraphs 9 and 11 on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament and the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, as well as the unsatisfactory implementation of article IV on the promotion of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, have become the bone of contention between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT, thus eroding the authority of the Treaty.

(Mr. Brotodiningrat, Indonesia)

... Finally, considering the fact that the fundamental objectives of the NPT have yet to be achieved, we find it imperative that in the preparations for the 1995 NPT conference we begin to launch vigorous efforts to improve the implementation of the Treaty in order to ensure its effectiveness, and hence its future beyond 1995. In this context, the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT, including my own, have on many occasions urged all nuclear-weapon States to honour their commitments under the Treaty in good faith in order to achieve, inter alia, nuclear disarmament at the earliest

(Mr. Brotodiningrat, Indonesia)

possible date. As a starting point, my delegation wishes to suggest converting the temporary moratorium on nuclear testing, which the majority of the nuclear-weapon States have so far observed, into a permanent one. Hopefully before the 1995 NPT conference, we shall already be able to gradually develop it into a legally binding agreement in the form of a comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT). My delegation believes that the establishment of a CTBT before the 1995 NPT conference will help ensure the future of the Treaty beyond 1995.

(Mr. Sene, Senegal)

... However, in view of certain shortcomings and inadequacies, can we believe that IAEA has all the human, financial and technical resources necessary to assume its crucial role in the field of monitoring of nuclear facilities?

(Mr. Sene, Senegal)

In other words, is IAEA properly equipped to discharge its international legal responsibilities as regards the application of safeguards at a time when significant discoveries are being made regarding the nuclear fuel cycle? The answer lies in the question. More precisely, we believe that an efficient, functional verification system is a fundamental requirement for the NPT. So all progress in the area of expertise and competence regarding verification will be of incalculable value for international non-proliferation efforts. In fine, no better service could be rendered to the worldwide credibility and authority of the NPT than to strengthen the verification machinery of the IAEA and execute the provisions of article VI of the Treaty properly. In addition, the NPT would benefit from genuine advances if things opened up as regards the total prohibition of nuclear tests, the provision of security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States and the banning of attacks against nuclear facilities. It is quite clear that the need to achieve a comprehensive nuclear test ban has become a crucial issue connected with the NPT and with nuclear disarmament in general. My delegation considers that it is because of all these factors that we must prepare for the forthcoming NPT Review Conference in 1995 in the certainty that the Treaty, which is indispensable in all respects, must remain in force indefinitely.

... Therefore the nuclear-weapon States that have declared a moratorium on nuclear testing and those that have not yet done so should take the opportunity to commence negotiating a verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty. Our aim is to establish a system for controlling the proliferation not only of weapons of mass destruction - nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, but also of long-range delivery vehicles and dual-capability technologies. In any event, verification measures should be balanced and equitable, and to be effective they should not impede the use of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes.

Mr. SHANNON (Canada):

... The preceding two months have been a busy period for all of us and have included an active work programme by all ad hoc committees. Many CD delegations were present at the three week UNDC session in New York from April 19 to May 10 and at the NPT Extension Conference Preparatory Committee from May 10-May 14. The session now before us also promises to engage us in a focused way as we address the most pressing issue before us, i.e. the negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

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(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

... In my March 18 statement on assuming the presidency of the CD, I spoke of some issues of particular importance to Canada: the negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty in the CD; the NPT, CD membership; and finally transparency in armaments. I would like to briefly take up these issues again.

Canada welcomed the commitment made by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin in Vancouver this year to negotiate a multilateral nuclear test ban at an early date. The place is the CD; and the time is now. Canada urges the United States of America, France and Russia to continue with moratoria on nuclear testing; and urges the United Kingdom and China to follow suit.

Nuclear testing in whatever form large or small, for safety or qualitative reasons - is in our view a vestige of a bygone era. The realization of a CTBT has long been a Canadian objective. We must seize this opportunity and summon the political will and energy to negotiate a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

On verification, which is crucial to a meaningful CTBT, Canada is actively participating in the work of the group of scientific experts which is considering international cooperative efforts to detect and identify seismic events in support of a CTBT. On May 27, when the NTB ad hoc committee starts its second session's work, we will contribute a paper on non-seismic technologies which will outline two presentations Canada will be making to the Committee.

The GSE mandate has been criticized by some as being inflexible. Some say it does not allow for discussion on non-seismic technologies in support of a CTBT. However, presentation of the NTB ad hoc committee of papers on non-seismic technologies underscores the fact that other mechanisms for detection and verification can be examined under the aegis of the NTB ad hoc

(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

committee. Ambassador Tanaka, the very able Chairman of the NTB ad hoc committee, can count on full Canadian participation in the work of his committee both at the technical and at the decision-making level.

(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

... I have touched briefly today on four key disarmament issues, the CTBT, the Non-proliferation Treaty, membership in this august body and transparency in armaments. Of course, the first two issues are of paramount importance. Unlike the NPT, however, where there is an established process in place which we hope will lead to its indefinite extension, we lack in the CD even a negotiating mandate for a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

I wish to stress my Government's view that the time is ripe to act rapidly on the question of the negotiation of a CTBT. In the Canadian view, there is no better way to demonstrate the need for, and therefore the continuing relevance of the CD.

(Mr. Kooijmans, Netherlands)

It would seem that the negotiating process in the CD should, in addition to the conclusion of a nuclear test-ban treaty, focus on codes of conduct, confidence-building measures and regimes of a similar nature. The CD may be guided in that respect by the Security Council's assessment that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to international peace and security. For its part, the General Assembly has set out important objectives for the arms control and disarmament agenda of the 1990s under the heading "Transparency in armaments". These two examples are an expression of the increasing consensus of opinion within the international community on what constitutes acceptable behaviour among its members. By shaping such normative values, the Security Council and the General Assembly respectively have provided criteria by which the action of all States can be evaluated.

(Mr. Kooijmans, Netherlands)

... My Government welcomes the Vancouver Summit Declaration by the Russian Federation and the United States, which holds out the prospect of further concrete nuclear arms control and disarmament measures and talks on a ban on nuclear testing. My Government looks forward to the early conclusion of a treaty banning nuclear tests. It would strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime and complement the nuclear disarmament process, as agreed between the Russian Federation and the United States. Eventually, all the nuclear-weapon States should be involved in negotiations on nuclear disarmament. I hope that negotiations on a nuclear test ban in the CD can begin soon. Extensive work on the seismic component of verification of a nuclear test ban has already been done. While other verification methods will also be required, I am confident that the CD will be able to work out a proper multi-faceted verification regime for a nuclear test ban.

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Mr. NORBERG (Sweden):

... In February this year, the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Baroness Margaretha af Ugglas, addressed the Conference on Disarmament and stated, inter alia, that the Conference must give the highest priority to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. A comprehensive nuclear test ban is an important instrument in preventing the further proliferation of nuclear weapons and an essential step towards the goal of nuclear disarmament. As I recalled in an intervention in this forum about two months ago, the General Assembly of the United Nations last fall approved the resolution on a comprehensive test-ban treaty with a larger majority than ever. In that resolution all States are urged to seek to achieve the early discontinuance of all nuclear test explosions for all time.

In the same intervention I also reminded the CD that Sweden two years ago presented a draft comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty, contained in document CD/1089* of 31 July 1991. I stated that that proposal was still on the table, but that my Government had concluded that, due to the development since the proposal was submitted, some modifications were necessary. My delegation will today at the meeting with the Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban present and circulate a revised draft treaty. First the revision

(continued)

(Mr. Norberg, Sweden)

contains a prohibition not only of all nuclear weapon test explosion but also of any other nuclear explosion. The reasoning is that Sweden has concluded that a ban should be total and comprehensive, thus including also an outright prohibition of all so-called peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs). There are, in the view of the Swedish delegation, several good reasons for such an approach. The most important is that all PNEs imply a problem since experience gained from them might be used in the development of nuclear weapons. A ban on PNEs is thus an important non-proliferation measure. Furthermore, it seems to my delegation that there are increasing doubts as to the possibility of using PNEs for any practical purpose, not least taking into account environmental hazards.

The second main feature in the modified proposal is that the International Atomic Energy Agency would be entrusted with the verification of compliance with the treaty. The reason is that Sweden finds it questionable whether, in the nuclear field, the best and most cost-effective solution really would be to create a new specialized organization for verification. My Government has, after reconsidering this question, come to the conclusion that it would be a better solution to use the competence and experience gained by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Of course, additional resources and additional expertise have to be brought to the organization. Still it is the view of Sweden that using the International Atomic Energy Agency would be a better and more cost-effective solution than establishing a new specialized organization for the purpose of the treaty.

One of the main reasons for achieving a nuclear test ban, namely to halt the nuclear arms race among the present nuclear powers, has possibly become less significant as the world is now in fact experiencing nuclear disarmament. Yet a halt to nuclear tests, and to nuclear explosions in general, remains equally essential for other reasons, first and foremost as a means to halting the risk of nuclear proliferation. This new situation is reflected in the preambular paragraphs of the modified Swedish draft treaty, where besides the importance of further steps towards nuclear disarmament is also stressed the importance to take effective measures against the proliferation of nuclear arms.

It is my hope that the revised Swedish draft will serve as a fruitful input in the discussion on a nuclear test ban. This year an ad hoc committee on the issue is working. It is important to use that forum to accelerate the discussions. At present four of the five nuclear Powers are in practice observing a moratorium on nuclear testing. A favourable climate for progress towards a comprehensive test ban should therefore exist. A prolongation of the existing moratoria, as well as declarations of a moratorium by all nuclear-weapon States, would vigorously contribute to maintaining the momentum. Therefore, Sweden appeals to the nuclear-weapon States not to resume testing in order to confirm the present positive trends towards a nuclear test ban.

Mr. HAN (Democratic People's Republic of Korea):

... The Conference on Disarmament has begun the second part of its session when world peace and security are being threatened by many factors. It is, as ever, an important task for the Conference on Disarmament to rapidly improve its functions and role and take international measures in a responsible manner on the immediate problems as well as long-term problems relating to disarmament. A comprehensive test-ban treaty, realization of nuclear non-proliferation and cessation of large-scale sale of sophisticated weapons become first major steps to achieving the goal for complete abolition of nuclear weapons and drastic cut in armament.

However, it throws new apprehensions and concerns to the international community that temporarily suspended nuclear tests would be resumed and nuclear technologies and/or materials are proliferated from the nuclear-weapon States to other regions in overt or covert forms. The reports that a large quantity of plutonium and nuclear materials have been transferred from the European nuclear-weapon States to the Far East region arouse deep misgivings among the people in this region where the atomic bombs were first used. The Conference on Disarmament, whose primary task is nuclear disarmament, should render a deserved concern to the fact that nuclear materials are concentrated and sales of highly explosive, modern weapons are on rise in the tensioned Far East region. These phenomena will undoubtedly further aggravate the existing tensions and pose a serious menace to the peace and security of this region.

(Mr. Urrutia, Peru)

... A comprehensive nuclear-test-bank treaty (CTBT) should be this Conference's first priority. We firmly hope that the positive trends in the current context will be confirmed and that we will soon be able to begin preliminary work on the drafting of the treaty here. In this context we should like to express our gratitude to Sweden for submitting a new version of its draft treaty, and to Ambassador Tanaka of Japan for the effective manner in which he has been conducting the work of the Ad Hoc Committee. We hope that the draft decision submitted by the Group of 21 on this item will receive the support of all the members of the Conference.

Peru supports the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1995. This Treaty constitutes the corner-stone of the world's non-proliferation regime and, far from questioning it in one way or another, we must reaffirm our confidence in it, extend it indefinitely and do everything necessary to achieve full compliance with each and every one of its provisions. The same principle of pacta sunt servanda which we apply in good faith in all our international commitments must be demanded here without any discrimination whatsoever. The full realization of the objectives and purposes of the Treaty will derive from the firm political will of the States parties rather than from a sword of Damocles hanging threateningly over it. The Conference on Disarmament can and must contribute to the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime. The beginning of work to draft a treaty for the cessation of nuclear testing and the search for an instrument acceptable to all providing security assurances against the use of nuclear weapons, inter alia, would be two steps which in themselves would justify the efforts of this Conference, without detracting from the others. We appeal to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to reconsider its decision to withdraw from the non-proliferation treaty.

Mr. VALENTINO (Malta):

... The year 1995 will be an important year for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, an instrument which is vital for international peace, international security and overall global economic progress in the world. The effectiveness of the non-proliferation Treaty is seen as a universal treaty that impedes the spread of nuclear weapons and sets the mechanism for general and complete disarmament. The preparatory process for the 1995 review and extension conference of the non-proliferation Treaty should be an opportunity for States parties to redouble their efforts in attaining the objectives of non-proliferation and strengthen the non-proliferation Treaty. It is our view that the non-proliferation Treaty should be extended indefinitely, and that at the 1995 extension conference commitments be made by the nuclear Powers to reduce further their nuclear weapons and for non-nuclear Powers not to acquire these weapons. The nuclear-weapon States have the main responsibility for strengthening the non-proliferation Treaty and in the light of the Clinton-Yeltsin declaration take the opportunity to negotiate with urgency and in good faith a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Such a process would definitely facilitate in a positive manner the outcome of the 1995 non-proliferation Treaty conference. Banning tests will not guarantee that proliferation can be prevented. However, a test-ban treaty will help reduce incentives for proliferation.

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) (translated from Spanish):

... When the history of multilateral efforts for the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty is written, we will have to examine dozens and dozens of files in order to facilitate this examination of what we hope will be the final phase of these efforts by the international community, and in view of its indisputable interest for the members of the Conference on Disarmament, the delegation of Mexico has requested the secretariat to distribute as an official document of the Conference the text of a letter dated 14 June 1993 which the forty-third Pugwash Conference sent to the President of the United States on the question of nuclear testing. As you know, the Pugwash Conference was held recently in Sweden.

My delegation would also like to suggest that the Conference on Disarmament should continue the consideration in an informal meeting, and in the presence of the observers, of the draft declaration contained in document CD/1200/Rev.1 of 11 June. As you know, this text was revised in the light of the discussions that we held in the Conference in an informal meeting on 9 June.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Mexico for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. The document mentioned by him has been received and will be circulated.

It has been proposed by the Mexican representative that the CD should hold an informal meeting to discuss document CD/1200/Rev.1 submitted by the Group of 21. Under rule 19 of the rules of procedure of the CD, the holding of such an informal meeting requires a consensus on the part of the CD. Does anyone wish to express an opinion on the holding of such an informal meeting? Please allow me to add that the Group of 21 has expressed the view that the informal meeting should be held after the conclusion of today's plenary. I now give the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom.

Sir Michael WESTON (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): Mr. President, let me begin by congratulating you on your assumption of the presidency. My delegation would wish to consider this proposal before agreeing to it and, therefore, we would see some difficulty about having the meeting immediately after this plenary.

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Obviously we understand that delegations might require more time to consider documents and proposals, but I would like to point out that it has been more than a week now since the original text was submitted, and the revised version has been available since 11 June, in other words for six days now. So with all due respect, my delegation thinks that there has been sufficient time for examining the text which, as I said, was revised in the light of our discussions here on 9 June.

Sir Michael WESTON (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): I am afraid I am somewhat confused. At the Presidential consultations yesterday, which unfortunately I was not able to attend myself, I understand that the representative of the G.21 said that the Group had not at that stage decided on what they wished the Conference to do with this statement; whether it was indeed intended to be a statement by the G.21 or a draft of a statement to be made by the Conference. As I understand it, this was to be considered further by the G.21, so this strengthens my view that we do need time to consider this matter.

Mr. FELICIO (Brazil): Mr. President, I am glad to see you chairing this meeting and I would like to convey to your delegation the thanks of the delegation of Brazil for the efficient manner in which you are conducting our work.

I take the floor in the first place to support the proposal by the Ambassador of Mexico that we continue consideration in informal plenaries of the proposal made by the G.21 of a draft decision by this Conference calling upon ourselves to negotiate in an expeditious manner a nuclear-test-ban treaty. This was the sense of the proposal as far as I can recall.

I also take the floor to thank you for having proposed to us that non-member delegates participate in the informal plenary. I think this is a wise proposal and in this way you are asking us in a collective manner to decide upon an important question. I congratulate you on this also.

Finally, I would like to reiterate the expectation of my Government that the Conference on Disarmament decides expeditiously to take this decision which is reiterated by many countries in this forum, in the United Nations and elsewhere, that we should negotiate as fast as possible a nuclear-test-ban treaty.

Sir Michael WESTON (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): I'm afraid my bewilderment increases. This is now being described as a draft decision. The paper before us talks of a draft statement. I think this confirms the report I was given of the discussion yesterday, when no one seems to be clear what it is that is proposed. Until there is a clear explanation of what is proposed, we cannot get instructions on it. As things stand, as I made clear a week ago when we last had these discussions, my delegation would not be able to go along with a decision or a statement containing these sentiments.

Mr. QUIROS (Peru) (translated from Spanish): My delegation, too, wishes to express its appreciation for the very able way in which the Ambassador of China and the delegation of China have been guiding the work over the past four weeks. I have taken the floor because yesterday my delegation participated in the Presidential consultations on the sixth floor, in its capacity as the delegation that will be coordinating the work of the Group of 21 as from next Monday. Unfortunately, no doubt for important reasons, our coordinator until this Friday, the Ambassador of Zaire, is not in the room, but I would like to say that in the consultations yesterday the delegation of the United Kingdom raised the question of whether document CD/1200/Rev.1 referred to a draft statement that would be made by the Group of 21 on its own behalf, or whether this was a proposal of the Group of 21 for a Conference on Disarmament statement. The Ambassador of Zaire yesterday - regrettably there was no simultaneous interpretation - spoke in French and made it clear - and since he is not here I will take the opportunity to do so - that this was a proposal by the Group of 21 for a statement by this body, the Conference on Disarmament. So my colleague from Brazil, no doubt through a slip of the tongue, referred to a draft decision. In short, it is a draft statement being proposed by the Group of 21 in order that, if there is consensus, it will be made by the Conference on Disarmament, and I would be grateful if the Ambassador of the United Kingdom could pass on this message to his Group, could discuss it and then as soon as possible we might be able to have an informal plenary to discuss it.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Peru for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the Chair. From the discussion we have just had, at present it appears we have no consensus on this issue. I will continue to hold consultations on the matter, and also invite the incoming President to participate in the relevant consultations. I now give the floor to the representative of Mexico.

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): As far as I know, in order to hold an informal meeting on a given subject, it is not necessary for there to be consensus on that subject. This is why they are informal. What we are asking for, and we repeat this now, is an informal meeting to discuss the content of the text of the statement that is to be found in CD/1200/Rev.1, and we have asked for this meeting to be held now, after this plenary meeting, and in the presence of the observers. I wonder whether there is any objection to this proposal.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Mexico for his statement. The distinguished representative of Mexico raises the issue of whether the holding of an informal meeting today to discuss document CD/1200/Rev.1 can be the subject of consensus, and I would like to hear views from delegations. I now give the floor to the representative of Cuba.

Mrs. BAUTA SOLES (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): Those familiar with the Conference on Disarmament know that very often we are bound by precedent. On 25 March last, in this room, a proposal was put before the Conference, and some delegations asked for the proposal to be considered in informal consultations. The same view, but as a contrary request, that is, that the proposal in question needed further thought and therefore it was not possible at this time at least to hold an informal meeting, was expressed by other delegations, including my own, leading to a situation which clearly demonstrated that there was no consensus in the room for the holding of informal consultations. Now we are in the same situation. Despite that, the informal consultations were in fact held on the 25th. Now we are in the same situation, but in reverse, in a certain sense. We might say that there is a group of delegations, those that suggested last time that there was no consensus on the substance to allow the informal consultations, which are now asking for informal consultations, and those who at that time insisted that despite the fact that there was no consensus we should have informal consultations, are now saying that there is no consensus in order, in this case, to follow a similar path. Anyway, what my delegation wishes to say is that there is a precedent, and if we are going to follow the precedents, it is not essential for this forum, at this moment, and if we are to follow the precedent set on 25 March last, this forum would not require consensus in this room just as it did not require a consensus on 25 March last in order to adopt the solution of informal consultations. Everything I have said here is to be found in the proceedings and records of this Conference, so that I do not understand how we can act in an ambivalent manner with regard to this procedure at this moment. What is involved in any event, something I think that will redound to the benefit of the Conference, is to sit down to discuss a proposal and try to see whether there is an area of common ground on which we can all achieve a compromise which will satisfy us. Obviously, if we do not hold the discussion we are not going to achieve any final result, which, ultimately, in view of the flexibility shown, even extending to changes in the original text, might benefit us and satisfy us all. Therefore my delegation would also be inclined to favour respecting the precedent set on 25 March last, in which, despite the express opposition of delegations here that asked for more time to analyse the substantive proposal that had been put before us, we held actual informal consultations in this case. I have ventured to refer to this precedent because my delegation is concerned at the disorganized way in which we seem to be tending to proceed in this room.

Sir Michael WESTON (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): I should be clear. I am not objecting to holding an informal meeting at some stage on this, though we have already had one, or indeed effectively two, informal meetings on the subject from which it became clear, and the President drew the conclusion, that there was no consensus, and I am

(Sir Michael Weston, United Kingdom)

afraid that remains the case, but there is certainly no possibility of there being consensus if we are not given time to consider the new document, and for me at any rate it is new - I only saw it for the first time this morning; I'm surprised that it has been around for six days. My problem is compounded by the fact that according to the record which I have been given of yesterday's Presidential consultations, the President concluded that the matter would be discussed further once the G.21 had decided what they wanted to do with the paper and after Groups had been informed, and it was on that basis that I did not attempt to get any instructions before this meeting, and I think it is only reasonable that we should be given a chance, if there are important changes - I don't immediately see them, and my guess is that I am going to continue to have difficulty with this text - but if I am to try to get instructions on it, then we need time and I don't think I will be the only delegation in that position.

Mr. HOFFMAN (Germany): First of all, let me congratulate the Chinese delegation on the able way they have led us in our deliberations.

I am really curious as to where this document has been these last six days. I saw it only yesterday afternoon and I made it available immediately to the capital, but I am in the same position as my United Kingdom colleague. I have no instructions on this. I am not opposed to holding an informal meeting where I can listen but not participate; I have no problem with this. My problem is one of the basic question as to whether we need consensus for an informal meeting or not. I don't think that we had a precedent on 25 March where we changed our rules of procedure. In our rules it says clearly in rule 19 that arrangements such as informal meetings can be agreed by the Conference, and agreement, of course, is under rule 18 by consensus. I don't think we have changed this on 25 March I'm afraid, so if there is no consensus in this room on holding an informal meeting, I'm afraid we will not have one - this is my reading.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Germany for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the Chair. From the discussion it appears that no one objects to the holding of an informal meeting, but there are different ideas as to when the meeting should be held. If it is agreeable to all, the President will consult with the incoming President concerning when an informal meeting shall be held to discuss document CD/1200/Rev.1, and hopes that we can reach an agreement. I now give the floor to the representative of Kenya.

Mr. KOIKAI (Kenya): Mr. President, my delegation would also like to join all those other delegations that have warmly congratulated your delegation on the very able manner in which you have been conducting the work of this Conference during your presidency.

We have been discussing a very important issue, and the question of timing on the discussion of this paper has been at issue during this morning's discussion and my delegation, being a member of the Group of 21, would have desired that we hold an informal meeting this morning, but as it has been revealed from the discussion, this will not be possible. I would therefore

(Mr. Koikai, Kenya)

like to propose, Mr. President - in spite of the fact that you have stated you and the incoming President will hold consultations on the most appropriate time to have a discussion on this paper - I would like to propose that such an informal meeting could be held after the next plenary meeting scheduled for Tuesday, 22 June. I am sure that all delegations that have not had instructions from their capitals might receive such instructions, and we could deal with this matter expeditiously on Tuesday.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Kenya for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Spain.

Mr. PEREZ-VILLANUEVA (Spain) (translated from Spanish): My congratulations to you and your delegation on taking up the presidency of the Conference, and my offer of unlimited cooperation to the extent that I can be of help. Two points very briefly. I would like to thank you and the delegations of Mexico and Brazil expressly and formally for the wish you have expressed to set up an arrangement for addressing this matter that is before us at the moment, an arrangement which would allow my delegation to attend a discussion which is of great interest to it. And in the second place, the second point is that I hope that whatever decision is taken regarding the time and format of the meeting, whatever decision is taken by the Conference in this plenary for dealing with this topic, I hope that it will enable my delegation to attend.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Spain for his statement. The distinguished delegate has made a concrete suggestion - that after the next plenary, that is to say after next Tuesday's plenary, an informal plenary should be held to discuss document CD/1200/Rev.1. The President would like to hear suggestions from delegates. There are no other suggestions.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): Another related issue is that of the participation of non-members in the informal meeting to be held next Tuesday. From the discussions it appears that there is no opposition to their participation. So may I take it that we have decided on the matter?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish):

... I have no speakers on my list for today. As you will probably remember among the measures for the improved and effective functioning of the Conference it was decided last year that, if there were no speakers, it would be possible to cancel the Tuesday plenary meetings. However, we agreed with the secretariat to keep the plenary meeting scheduled for today since the Conference had anyway to hold an informal meeting to consider document CD/1200/Rev.1, which contains a draft statement by the Group of 21 on the total suspension of nuclear tests. If any delegation considers it appropriate to make a statement at the last minute, it will have the possibility of doing so now. Does any delegation wish to take the floor? Since none does, I shall suspend this plenary meeting as several delegations this morning have asked me for it to be resumed after our informal consultations. I will therefore convene immediately the informal meeting scheduled for today. It is understood that, as was stated by the President during the plenary meeting last Thursday, delegations of non-member States that participate in the work of the Conference may, if they so wish, participate in the informal meeting.

(Mrs. Carvalho de Plasa, Mexico)

The Government of Mexico is convinced that the Conference on Disarmament made an excellent start to its work in January. We believe that this points to a potential for progress, a new spirit, new prospects and a brighter future for this forum, and therefore we are now wondering what has happened to the draft statement on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Everyone here is sure to wonder whether there is an echo in the Council chamber, because they will imagine that they have already heard these words here before.

We are disappointed but not surprised that we have not managed to adopt what we thought was a simple decision to support a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. A little over three weeks ago, on 3 June, we proposed that the Conference on Disarmament, in its capacity as a corporate body and an autonomous organ of the United Nations, should adopt measures to ensure the success of the negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Certainly, quite a number of consecutive United Nations resolutions have been adopted on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, in 1992 with just one vote against. However, our proposal suggested that the Conference should find some way of supplementing what had already been done in the United Nations. In addition, the complete prohibition of nuclear testing is an item on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. It is the first item that the Conference on Disarmament has included on its agenda since its establishment in almost 14 years of existence. We regret that two or three delegations have decided to thwart this modest proposal by resorting to the technique of the pocket veto. What is most disturbing though, is that there are apparent signs that some of the countries represented here really object to a comprehensive nuclear test ban and are obviously frightened of it.

The future of the Conference on Disarmament is in our hands. This body can become more active and gain more interest or wither away. If we seek the former for the future, then we will undoubtedly have to be more action-oriented. The draft statement proposed by the Group of 21 is an example of something action-oriented. This draft statement would not have been binding for anyone. It just set forth what was known to all and encouraged participation by the members of the Conference on Disarmament and the non-member participants in the Conference. After all, a comprehensive nuclear test ban will be successful if it enjoys broad participation.

The Conference on Disarmament is about to end its second session and we have lost an opportunity. We regret that a forum whose members often complain about the lack of progress has not been able to come out clearly in support of action on an issue that is of concern to us all and incumbent on us all.

Mr. ERRERA (France) (translated from French): Since we are in formal session, I formally reiterate the congratulations I extended to you a while ago for success in your presidency. I do not wish to enter into a controversy, though this room might derive some benefit from one from time to time. I would simply like to say two things having listened very carefully to

(Mr. Errera, France)

what has just been said by the distinguished representative of Mexico. These two things are the following. First, I note that the delegation of Mexico had little confidence, few illusions as to the outcome of the debates, since it had already prepared a purple passage challenging and criticizing the result obtained. The second point is more bothersome. It is no secret that we are rather keen defenders of the Conference on Disarmament and the central role - that is the word I think I used last week - the central role which the Conference on Disarmament should play in any negotiations, if there are negotiations, and if we take part in them, on a nuclear-test-ban treaty. Consequently I regret the type of criticism which has been levelled at the Western nuclear Powers, since that is how they were implicitly designated, and the "pocket veto" they apparently have. I will not dwell on this matter because a lot could be said about past cases. I will merely say the following. If the Conference on Disarmament is to play a real, effective, central role today in negotiating a nuclear-test-ban treaty, then we must stop using the technique which was current for many years during which the Conference on Disarmament made no progress in any field whatsoever, a technique whereby responsibility was attributed to a certain number of countries. Doing this today will discourage a number of governments from using the Conference on Disarmament to pursue the objective which is close to the heart of so many delegations, that of a test-ban treaty. I am not seeking to create controversy when I say this; I say this seriously because we are at a point, and in a short time we will perhaps be at a point, where important decisions will have to be taken, and these decisions should not be jeopardized by impressions which those who resort to these practices would certainly not wish them to produce.

Sir Michael WESTON (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): Madam President, thank you very much and now since we are in a formal meeting, let me offer you my delegation's congratulations on your assumption of the presidency and assure you of our full cooperation.

I haven't really very much to add to what I said in our informal meeting just now and in our formal meeting last week. However, I would like to echo the remarks of the distinguished representative of France. Quite apart from the substance of this matter, my delegation does, as I have said, sincerely doubt the utility of a statement of this kind. It seems to us to contrast very vividly with the serious and constructive and useful work which we have been doing this year in the Ad Hoc Committee on NTB under Ambassador Tanaka's wise guidance. In the view of my delegation that is the best way to make progress to the eventual aim of a CTBT, an aim which we all share.

Mr. FELICIO (Brazil): Let me formally welcome the delegation of Cuba to the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament.

With regard to this proposal made by the Group of 21 of a draft statement contained in document CD/1200/Rev.1 dated 11 June 1993, my delegation would like to state that this proposal is perfectly in line with the resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly and approved there by the vast majority of States parties. That is why my delegation saw no harm and no offence in such a draft proposal that simply urges the States members of the Conference on Disarmament to contribute to the early attainment of a multilateral legal regime on a comprehensive nuclear test ban and reaffirms the responsibilities of this Conference in the negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

Mrs CARVALHO de PLASA (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): It is certainly not the intention of my delegation to argue in this plenary meeting with any delegation, but I think it might be useful if I were to make the two clarifications. First of all, my delegation did not just prepare one statement, my delegation prepared three statements - one for the informal meeting to introduce the document, another to express pleasure at the adoption of the statement, because my delegation ardently hoped that this would be the case, and another in case it was not adopted. As my delegation cannot improvise in such cases and prefers to be very careful, that is why my delegation had this in writing. Secondly, the term "pocket veto" can certainly not be attributed to the delegation of Mexico. As the distinguished representative of France knows well, this term has been used here and, in the same context by another delegation.

Mr. BARBUDA (Brazil):

... The purpose of my taking the floor today is to convey to you and to all distinguished representatives of members and observer delegations the farewell message received from the head of the Brazilian delegation, Ambassador Celso Amorim. It was Ambassador Amorim's intention to be in Geneva today and address the Conference on Disarmament, but important duties kept him in Brazil for some more days. I will read his message now.

(Mr. Barbuda, Brazil)

... "I was also fortunate to have presided the Conference when the United Nations disarmament machinery was being reassessed. The Conference on Disarmament then gave proof of its vitality with the prompt establishment of four ad hoc committees and the early start of its substantive work in the 1993 session. Two Friends of the President, Ambassadors Marín Bosch, of Mexico, and O'Sullivan, of Australia, were nominated before I concluded my period as President to conduct consultations on the issues of the agenda and of the membership of the Conference. I wish them a successful conclusion of the important tasks entrusted to them.

(Mr. Barbuda, Brazil)

... "We have witnessed rapid changes in the world in recent years together with the opening of an unprecedented window of opportunity for this Conference to reaffirm its efficiency as a negotiating body. Results are expected from the Conference now in nuclear disarmament, in particular the prohibition of nuclear tests, in conventional weapons control, and in ensuring that advanced technologies, such as those used in outer space, are not diverted to non-peaceful purposes.

(The President)

... The expectations regarding the first item on our agenda, that of a comprehensive nuclear test ban, marked the beginning of the work of the Conference this year. Recent developments prompt us to think that steps are being taken in the right direction, which we assess at its proper value and we hope that the objective set will be achieved and that this forum will include in the list of its achievements the conclusion of a multilateral nuclear-test-ban treaty. We also hope that possibilities will open up for other "nuclear" items on our agenda, among which that of negative security assurances for non-nuclear States is of special interest. We recognize the importance of the arms control negotiations carried out by the nuclear Powers as a step towards what should be the final objective of any efforts in this regard - the total elimination of this class of weapon through a multilaterally negotiated and verifiable agreement. For our part, we will only reiterate Cuba's decision in respect of its accession, once the rest of the Latin American countries do so, to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, whereby nuclear weapons are banned in our region.

Mr. TIRONI (Chile) (translated from Spanish):

... I have asked for the floor this morning so as to convey the contents of the following official statement made by the Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 13 July of this year.

"The Government of Chile has welcomed, with great satisfaction, the recent announcement by the President of the United States of America of an extension of at least 15 months in the moratorium on underground nuclear testing, as well as the statements made along the same lines by the Governments of France and the Russian Federation. It is confident that all the nuclear States will work together to strengthen this agreement and enhance its influence over time. In this way, in addition to constituting an important step forward towards a worldwide ban on atomic testing, this will favour the creation of a more favourable international climate which will promote confidence among States and

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(Mr. Tironi, Chile)

permit sustainable, balanced and peaceful development in all regions of the world. The decision of the United States Government considerably eases the task of the 1995 review conference on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), particularly because of the impetus it can give to improving the present nuclear non-proliferation regime with a view to enhancing the possibility of extending the NPT well beyond 1995 and ensuring that its provisions are implemented in a more universal scale.

"The Government of Chile trusts that henceforward the agenda of international forums will give greater priority to negotiations designed to lead to the signing of a treaty banning all nuclear testing. It will therefore continue its endeavours to ensure that the United Nations Conference on Disarmament gives priority to consideration of a new treaty as an aspiration which is absolutely realistic and in keeping with the changes that have taken place on the international scene."

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America):

... In this regard, President Clinton made a radio address on 3 July to announce that the United States Government had completed an extensive review of its policy on nuclear testing and a comprehensive test ban. As a result of the review, the President decided that the United States will extend the current moratorium on United States nuclear testing at least through September 1994, as long as no other nation tests. He has called on other nuclear-weapon States also to refrain from nuclear testing. We believe that this decision will improve the atmosphere for negotiations on a CTBT and discourage other nations from developing their own nuclear arsenals.

In this regard, President Clinton has placed high priority on beginning negotiations toward a multilateral comprehensive ban on testing of nuclear weapons. We are already undertaking consultations with the other declared nuclear-weapon States as well as other interested States in anticipation that negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty can begin as soon as possible. With the support of other interested States, we hope we can conclude a multilateral CTBT in a timely fashion. Our support for a CTBT reflects the ending of the cold war, as well as our deep concerns about emerging new threats to international security, stemming from proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

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(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

The major changes that have occurred in the world have highlighted the need to do our utmost to strengthen international measures against proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. President Clinton believes that a CTBT could make an important contribution to this effort. In this connection, we are also urging all countries that have not yet become parties to the non-proliferation Treaty to do so, as non-nuclear-weapon States.

The United States believes the nuclear-weapon States have a unique responsibility to establish a new international norm in regard to nuclear testing that would apply equally to all countries, and a special role in negotiations on a CTBT. If we are to achieve a CTBT, all of the nuclear-weapon States need to support this goal on testing. The United States has this in mind, particularly as we consult with the other nuclear-weapon States. At the same time we are also considering how to move toward a multilateral process that will command broad support for a CTBT. We believe the Conference on Disarmament will have an important role to play in this effort.

Let me make clear a few additional points. President Clinton wants to negotiate a multilateral ban on all nuclear-weapons tests. We do not seek another threshold test-ban Treaty. The President considered and rejected the option of proposing a one-kiloton threshold. We are seeking a comprehensive test ban, not a limited or threshold test ban.

On verification, we believe the treaty should include verification measures that ensure confidence without imposing unreasonable burdens or risks for the parties.

This week and next, the CD's Group of Scientific Experts (GSE) is again meeting here in Geneva. Many CD members and non-member participants have been very active in the work of the GSE, developing concepts for an international seismic data exchange. We see an important role for the GSE and its work in the formation of an international CTBT verification regime.

With the full support of the Governments represented in this chamber, and of other interested States, we hope we can conclude a CTBT as quickly as possible. We want to work together to pursue this objective.

I would note that we have circulated as a CD document (CD/1205) the text of President Clinton's 3 July radio address.

Mr. NGUYEN (Viet Nam):

... In the recent past the world still witnessed the tension between the two super-Powers, between East and West. With intermediate-range nuclear missiles deployed in both East and West Europe, the danger of an annihilating war was just minutes away. The sword of Damocles was still hanging over the head of mankind. However, the signing of the INF Treaty between the Soviet Union and the United States changed the nuclear disarmament picture by a large measure. Going beyond arms control and arms regulation, the INF Treaty, by providing for the elimination of a whole class of weapons, more importantly nuclear weapons, for the first time made the notion of a disarming world, regarded just years before as a Utopia, a political reality of our times. The conclusion of the START agreements respectively in 1991 and 1992 between the Soviet Union, then Russia, and the United States added bright colour to the picture. With those agreements fully implemented by the year 2003, the numbers of deployed nuclear warheads will be reduced to 3,000-3,500 on each side compared with a total of 50,000 on both sides by the late 1980s. The number of nuclear tests has also decreased substantially with testing moratoriums still in effect in the former Soviet Union, the United States and France. In this connection, the statements of the Russian Federation and the United States on the prolongation of the nuclear test moratorium were indeed another positive step forward in the right direction. All these are positive developments that we have on more than one occasion welcomed and highly

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(Mr. Nguyen, Viet Nam)

appraised. However, I have only described the bright side of the nuclear disarmament picture. The other side of the coin remains. For all the reductions that have been made or are to be made, the world still has to live with thousands of nuclear weapons capable of destroying our entire civilization many times over. The danger of an annihilating war has been reduced but not yet eliminated. After all, less insecurity and more security are two different concepts. The nuclear weapon is not just one among many types of weapons. Hiroshima and Nagasaki remind us that we do not have and cannot have security having only thousands of nuclear weapons instead of tens of thousands. Putting aside the effects of radiation, we do not need even 1,000 nuclear weapons to create a "nuclear winter". With transformations in international relations and in the concept of security, it is high time we must get answers to the questions what nuclear deterrence is all about and whether the possession of nuclear weapons does really help protect one's legitimate security interests. Forgetting for now the question of who are right and who are wrong, keeping in mind the highest priority that we continue to attach to nuclear disarmament and to the prevention of nuclear war, the impasse prevailing in the work of the Conference on nuclear issues is depressing. While the reestablishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban constitutes a positive step this year, it is urgent that the Conference start serious negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test ban, conclude the negotiations on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and give serious consideration to the need to negotiate a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. In this regard, my delegation deeply regrets that the draft decision of the Group of 21 calling for a start to negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty in the CD has not gained consensus. I believe that any achievement of our deliberations in this connection will have a good impact on the proceedings of the 1995 review and extension conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which we all want to be a success.

(Mr. Tanaka, Japan)

... Japan regards the nuclear-test-ban issue as one of the major priorities of nuclear disarmament. Therefore, I feel much honoured to be chairing the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, and pleased with the progress the Committee is making, thanks to the active cooperation rendered by the delegations.

I have taken the floor today to register Japan's appreciation of the decision made by President Clinton of the United States of America to extend its moratorium on nuclear testing at least through September of next year, as long as no other nation tests. The Japanese Government has already announced that it welcomes the United States decision, which contributes to strengthening the international trend toward a comprehensive test ban, and has stated that Japan strongly expects that all other nuclear-weapon States will also exercise self-restraint in nuclear testing. In this context, we welcome the decision by France and the Russian Federation to renew their commitments to the moratoria and their support for a CTB. Indeed we appreciate various initiatives which led to the extended moratoria of today, and would welcome any further positive decisions to be made by other nuclear-weapon States.

As it is Japan's long-standing objective to achieve a comprehensive test ban, the Japanese delegation which is currently in the Chair of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban is prepared to make every effort, with the cooperation of our colleagues here, for the Conference on Disarmament to make a timely and important contribution to the accomplishment of a comprehensive test ban. For the purpose of facilitating this process, Japan is planning to host a workshop on NTB verification towards March 1994. Furthermore, I, speaking in my national capacity, should like to propose that the Conference on Disarmament should now consider giving a negotiating mandate to the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban in a timely manner.

(Mr. O'Sullivan, Australia)

... Just as the changes in political choices have permitted these major changes in politico-military relations, so they also have their consequences at more precise levels. The question of the utility of nuclear weapons for instance seems ready for reconsideration. So does the argument that nuclear weapons forces need to be modernized. If we are at the start for the first time of a real programme of nuclear disarmament, the idea that a new generation of nuclear weapons should be produced seems particularly bizarre. The question also naturally arises in these circumstances as to the need for any further production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. Since the existing amounts of plutonium and highly enriched uranium are apparently more than adequate for the declining numbers of nuclear weapons, would it not be possible now to codify the cessation of such production in a legally binding instrument that, by including adequate verification arrangements, also reassures the international community that such material is not being covertly produced or acquired?

And most interestingly and importantly, we have the recent extensions of the previously existing moratoria on the testing of nuclear weapons by the United States, Russia and France, and by extension, by the United Kingdom. We note also that although China has not formally announced a moratorium on the testing of nuclear weapons, it has not tested in fact since September 1992. We hope China will soon take the opportunity to join other nuclear-weapon States in formalizing a testing moratorium, and to confirm that it too will adopt a "no first test" policy. Thus, the scene is set for early commencement of negotiations to convert the existing moratoria - whether formally announced or not - into a permanent ban via a treaty of unlimited duration, and in so doing to garner additional non-proliferation benefits for the whole international community.

Australia's Foreign Minister, Senator Evans, has publicly welcomed the decisions of Presidents Clinton, Yeltsin and Mitterrand to continue their existing restraint. Together with the decisions of the United Kingdom and China, this restraint holds out the prospect that 1993 will be the first for

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(Mr. O'Sullivan, Australia)

many years when there has been no testing of nuclear weapons. This is a result which will be heartily welcomed in Australia and around the world.

I should note in passing that the political climate for the indefinite extension of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty will be considerably enhanced by the ending of nuclear testing and by the commencement of negotiations for a legally binding, effectively verifiable, universally applicable, multilaterally supported and enduring comprehensive test-ban treaty. Thus, in our view, a CTBT offers significant disarmament and non-proliferation benefits that should be promptly realized.

In this effort, we believe the CD has an essential role. We do not mean to exclude a separate caucussing by the P5. On the contrary we understand why it will be necessary for the former testing Powers to consider together aspects of a test ban, and we acknowledge the significant contribution that will be required from them. We therefore welcome the French proposal for such parallel discussions here in Geneva. But we cannot accept the model of the past when the CD or its predecessors were simply used as the delivery point for a treaty negotiated elsewhere. We see the CTBT as having major benefits because it will stop the continuous evolution of new generations of nuclear weapons - so it will be an effective disarmament measure, and because it will provide effective mechanisms to ensure that States parties are not clandestinely undertaking tests or preparation for testing of nuclear explosive devices - hence it will be an effective instrument and a concrete and symbolic measure of non-proliferation. To obtain these dual benefits, only a multilateral negotiation representing a broad spectrum of international opinion would be a credible forum. Of course, it could in theory be done somewhere else other than in the CD. But the time and effort to create an alternative forum would be onerous, and the result, in our view, unlikely to be better than the CD and quite possibly worse.

In the successful conclusion of the CWC, the CD demonstrated it had the capacity to deliver a high-quality, complex, politically sensitive package which met the declared needs of the international community. Why should we assume it cannot do the same for a CTBT which, after all may not be as technically complex in some respects as was the CWC? For Australia, we think the Conference on Disarmament needs to get down promptly to its work of negotiating a CTBT. We should move expeditiously - I mean during this session - to transform the Group of Scientific Experts into a more active collaborator with us, the negotiators, or if that is not possible to find other appropriate structures. On 24 June, in the NTB Ad Hoc Committee, Mr. Cole of our delegation offered some precise options about how that could be done. We do not have an inflexible or prescriptive approach, but we do want results: we want to draw the useful scientific preparatory work which has been going on patiently for so long into a negotiating context.

We believe preparations should now commence for the formal start of negotiations. I note in passing the comment just made by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee that Japan also favours the formal start of such negotiations, and we endorse the Chairman's comments. As I mentioned, we recognize that preparation will be needed by the P5, and we urge them to

(Mr. O'Sullivan, Australia)

expedite their internal reflection and discussions so that we can all get on with our collective effort: It would also send a useful signal about our determination to make the CD an active negotiating body if we could decide promptly on a negotiating mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee. We would then be in a position to commence negotiations forthwith. We hope that this year's Ad Hoc Committee might continue its work during the available slots between September 1993 and January 1994. Depending on progress, it could work further on developing the integration of seismic and non-seismic verification techniques. We could consider establishing a working group of the AHC on verification, along the model successfully utilized over a number of years in the CWC negotiations. We could also consider a working group on legal and institutional issues. We think that there could be some consideration of who might serve as next year's Chairman of the NTB Ad Hoc Committee.

We think that we should set ourselves the deadline of completing a CTBT by the end of the 1995 CD session, sending the completed text to the UNGA that year and having the treaty open for signature early in 1996. In any event the aim for 1994 should be to produce a largely concluded treaty framework with a largely completed verification package. Such a result would give confidence to the international community that a CTBT could indeed be concluded by the end of the 1995 session, as I have suggested.

After thousands of nuclear tests it seems 1993 will see a decisive break with the pattern of the past 47 years. It is time to codify this long-desired and highly favourable development, to link it to strategically stabilizing benefits and to embody it in an indefinite legal instrument that gives credible assurances of compliance. Such a treaty will be a further demonstration of multilateral cooperation by all those who want a world based on mutual respect, proper regard for legal norms and the increased flow of technology, materials and equipment for peaceful purposes.

Mr. NEAGU (Romania):

... Romania welcomes the decision of President Clinton of the United States to extend the moratorium on United States nuclear testing at least through September of next year as long as no other nation tests. We are happy to note that the response of other nuclear-weapon States is, in general, prompt and positive. The new American initiative gives the long-expected by the international community answer to ensure the cessation with a view to ban

(Mr. Neagu, Romania)

their nuclear tests. We are especially appreciative of the pledge "to negotiate a comprehensive test ban". The extension of the current moratorium and the organization of consultations and negotiations aimed at concluding a comprehensive treaty of universal vocation open a new vista for the efforts that are made to halt the spread of nuclear technology in weapons and strengthen the regime of non-proliferation of nuclear and other mass destruction weapons and the missiles than can deliver them. This will greatly ease the task of the NPT review conference in 1995 to attain the objective of unconditional and indefinite prolongation of the non-proliferation Treaty. The new American initiative represents also an important contribution to the stimulation of the positive processes in international relations, to the consolidation of stability, security and peace in the world. My country and my delegation at the Conference on Disarmament are ready to join immediately the efforts aimed at negotiating a treaty on the comprehensive cessation of nuclear tests.

Mr. ERRERA (France) (translated from French):

... Last 4 July, in a communiqué from the office of the President of the Republic, France stated that it was in favour of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty provided that it was universal and verifiable. It also declared its willingness to participate actively in negotiations to this end. The same communiqué stated that France would at the same time ensure that its deterrent capability would be preserved in the context of progress in technology, and would also see to it that its partners complied with the commitments they had entered into. Today I should like to explain the meaning and the implications of this initiative.

Firstly, it bears witness to France's unswerving resolve to combat the proliferation of nuclear weapons; to guarantee at the same time credibility for its deterrent force while complying with the principle of strict sufficiency that it has always abided by. On these two points, France intends to shoulder the responsibilities incumbent on it. As the United Nations Security Council emphasized at its summit meeting on 31 January 1992, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, like the proliferation of the other weapons of mass destruction, constitutes a threat for international peace and security. France is all the more determined to avert this risk since its security, and that of Europe, is particularly concerned. It was with this major concern in mind, and taking into account the incipient process of reductions in the American and Russian arsenals, that France decided in April 1992 to suspend its nuclear testing temporarily and is now ready to negotiate a test-ban treaty. In so doing France is mindful of its security interests. These remain unchanged: today as in the past, the aim is to

(Mr. Errera, France)

guarantee the credibility of its nuclear capability, with the constraints that this involves. For this reason a high-level group of experts was instructed to check that the suspension of testing was not detrimental to our deterrent force. France must take into account simultaneously the level of nuclear capabilities which in any event will remain in the world beyond the year 2000, the risks of proliferation in various parts of the world, and the ability of certain nuclear Powers to exploit their technological lead in order to gain a strategic advantage.

Secondly, it is with these various considerations in mind that France is now addressing the issue of negotiating a nuclear-test-ban treaty. In order to be acceptable, such a treaty should in our view be universal and internationally verifiable. Such a treaty should in the first place be universal: today the only justification for a halt to nuclear testing is to prevent certain countries from making progress in the ambition to acquire nuclear weapons. Consequently, any constraints imposed on the nuclear Powers would be justifiable only if they were applied at one and the same time to everyone, and primarily to the threshold countries. Otherwise - as I have already said in another forum - the legitimate nuclear Powers would find themselves in the absurd position of having to give up their rights while the proliferating countries would continue to pursue their clandestine programmes freely. This treaty should also be internationally verifiable: for the same reason, it is essential that the definitive cessation of testing should be subject to an internationally effective verification regime forming an integral part of the treaty, so as to offer the parties a guarantee that it will be respected. These two reasons make it necessary, in our view, to give the negotiating process a multilateral character from the outset, in order to involve the entire international community in it. The Conference on Disarmament is, in our view, the only possible negotiating forum. It already has this issue before it. It is the repository of expertise in disarmament issues. The five nuclear Powers are represented here. Lastly, it is based on the rule of consensus: as was shown by the negotiations on the chemical weapons Convention, this rule, far from preventing the conclusion of an agreement, facilitates compromise and paves the way to universality. Obviously it will still be possible, as we ourselves had suggested, as the Ambassador of Australia reminded us, for the representatives of the Five in Geneva to consult closely, and for a satisfactory relationship to be sought between the Conference on Disarmament - which will negotiate the treaty - and the five nuclear Powers, consultations among whom, in parallel to the multilateral negotiations, are undoubtedly useful. What is vital in our view is that there should be no separation, either in space or in time, between these two processes which in our view are inseparable. It would be incomprehensible for the nuclear Powers to negotiate a test-ban treaty among themselves alone if the real objective of such a treaty, as we were reminded recently by the representative of Sweden, is no longer so much to put an end to the arms race between two over-armed Powers as to combat the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

For the same reason it would not be any more acceptable or reasonable to delink the negotiation of a treaty from its verification regime, otherwise

(Mr. Errera, France)

verification might become a secondary element, whereas, if our real concern is indeed the risk of proliferation, it must be the key element. It is no insult to anyone to say that we are no longer in 1963, when two States could take the liberty of negotiating the Moscow partial test-ban Treaty and then submitting it to the international community for acceptance. Who can believe that after 146 States have signed the chemical weapons Convention negotiated within the Conference on Disarmament, the international community would agree to be excluded from the negotiations on a nuclear-test-ban treaty which it has been demanding for so many years? How could one justify the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, not being the central body for such negotiations?

Thirdly and lastly, it should be clear to all that in the view of my country any future agreement on a halt to testing would make sense and would be acceptable only if the basic conditions which would make it possible were not altered. This means among other things that the undertakings entered into by all concerned should be fully respected, whether we are talking about disarmament or non-proliferation. We have particularly in mind the main instruments which determine and will determine our assessment of the strategic situation, inter alia the ABM Treaty, the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, the START process and of course the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

(Mr. Hoffmann, Germany)

... My delegation takes the floor today in order to express the satisfaction of my Government with regard to the recent developments on the issue of a nuclear test ban. We welcome the decision of the United States Government, as explained by my distinguished American colleague just a few minutes ago, to extend the moratorium on nuclear testing, and to commit itself to multilateral negotiations towards a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

It is with equal satisfaction that the German Government takes note of the statements of other nuclear-weapon States on the same issue. In our understanding, none of the nuclear Powers will resume testing first in the foreseeable future, a situation which will create a positive environment for multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

The German Government attaches great importance to the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty which will have a considerable impact in the realm of nuclear non-proliferation. It is our goal to achieve a universally applicable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty within the near future. This treaty must be internationally verifiable and its verification provisions should be negotiated together with the substance of the nuclear test ban. We are convinced that the only possible and appropriate forum for negotiating such a treaty is the Conference on Disarmament. The five nuclear Powers carry a special responsibility in the field of nuclear testing. However, in view of the universality of a future treaty we are striving for, all aspects of a comprehensive test-ban treaty should be negotiated in this forum. I therefore agree with the statement of my French colleague we just heard.

The German Government acknowledges the fact that promising future negotiations need solid and substantive preparations. Nevertheless, we think that official negotiations should start in this forum as soon as possible. We believe that the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, for the time being, should continue its successful work along the lines decided upon earlier this year. However, before the end of this session the Ad Hoc Committee should be in a position to discuss the mandate for future negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

(Mr. Sannikov, Belarus)

My delegation has taken the floor at today's plenary meeting in order to make a brief informative announcement. But before doing so, I should like to welcome the decision of the Governments of Russia, the United States and France in extending the moratorium on nuclear testing and express the hope that the Conference on Disarmament will be the forum that draws up arrangements for a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

(Mr. Chandra, India)

... I would like to confine my remarks today to the comprehensive test-ban treaty. President Clinton's recent announcement extending the United States moratorium on nuclear testing to 30 September 1994 and placing priority on commencing negotiations towards a multilateral comprehensive test-ban treaty has been welcomed by my Government. A comprehensive test-ban treaty has a very important place among all the measures envisaged in the context of nuclear disarmament. Indeed, as one commentator put it, a CTBT is "the most sought-after and most elusive of arms control measures of the nuclear age". In this context, it is also not irrelevant to recall that the first initiative for a ban on nuclear testing was taken by India's first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, as early as 1954. Since then, India has repeatedly called for cessation of nuclear-weapon testing. In 1988, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, while addressing the third special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, called for a moratorium on testing of all nuclear weapons and initiation of negotiations for a comprehensive test-ban treaty in the first stage for achieving the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world order. Unfortunately, these calls were ignored and the opportunity to cap the proliferation of nuclear weapons was missed.

It has been said that the history of disarmament negotiations is a history of missed opportunities. This is certainly true of the proposal for a ban on all nuclear-weapon test explosions. On at least three occasions during the past 30 years, a test-ban treaty seemed to be imminent: in 1958 when an East-West conference produced a report on the feasibility of detecting nuclear explosions; in 1962-1963, when lack of agreement in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament on the number of mandatory on-site inspections per year was alleged to be the sole obstacle to a test-ban treaty; and in 1979-1980, when the United Kingdom, United States of America and the former USSR appeared to be making progress towards conclusion of a treaty in their trilateral negotiations. The international political climate today presents a golden opportunity to the international community to put once and for all an end to nuclear-weapon testing. Let it not be said that we have once again failed to seize it. I would therefore like to fully support the proposal made this morning by Ambassadors Tanaka and O'Sullivan that the CD give a negotiating mandate to the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban.

The scope of the comprehensive test-ban treaty we should aim at has been clearly spelt out in the preamble of the PTBT of 1963, which recognized that its objective was to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all tests of nuclear weapons for all times. In our view, therefore, a treaty on nuclear test ban, which would be comprehensive in character, should have three essential characteristics, namely, (i) It should cover all States including the five nuclear-weapon States; (ii) It should extend the prohibition on the testing of nuclear weapons to the underground environment as well; (iii) It should do so for all time. The verification system to be developed must be non-discriminatory in character in the sense of providing equal rights and obligations to the States parties to the proposed treaty including equal

(Mr. Chandra, India)

access. The aim of the CTBT and consequently its scope should be to prevent the testing of nuclear weapons and thereby to inhibit in a non-discriminatory way proliferation of nuclear weapons in their horizontal as well as vertical dimension. It cannot be conceived as an instrument designed to curtail technological progress or to perpetuate the division of the world into two categories of nations. In the promotion of achievement of a nuclear test ban, the interests of the nuclear-weapon States must be taken into account on the basis of complete equality with the interests of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

A compelling reason why CTBT has become a matter of high priority is to prevent the development of "third generation" nuclear weapons. It would, of course, at the same time help reduce the chances of horizontal proliferation. In our view, a comprehensive test-ban treaty would go a long way in arresting the nuclear arms race and bringing to an end the development of more lethal warheads. We hope that all the nuclear-weapon States will respond positively to President Clinton's announcement and engage purposefully in multilateral negotiations for an effective and verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty, which has long been a goal of international disarmament community. Any limited bilateral or regional approach to this issue which concerns all States would be inappropriate, and, accordingly, a comprehensive test-ban treaty should be negotiated multilaterally.

The START-II agreement signed between the United States and Russia at the beginning of this year, and now the possibility of beginning negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, demonstrates that it is possible to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race with a view to achieving nuclear disarmament. We believe that movement towards such an objective would be facilitated if in future all nuclear-weapon States could also agree to a universal freeze on future development and deployment of nuclear weapons. We also urge all nuclear-weapon States to simultaneously commence negotiations for an agreement to prohibit the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

... On behalf of the member countries of the Group of 21 of the Conference on Disarmament, I should like to make the following statement.

(continued in English)

The G-21 welcomes the statements made by France, the Russian Federation and the United States regarding the extension of their nuclear-testing moratoria. Those announcements, together with the statements made today, are encouraging. The Group of 21 reiterates its readiness to begin at once here, in the Conference on Disarmament, negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty (CTB) that will attract universal adherence and be internationally verifiable.

Mr. SABOIA (Brazil):

... I have been instructed to make a statement with regard to the positive development we have witnessed in the past few weeks in relation to the suspension of nuclear tests in certain nuclear-weapon States. While fully endorsing the statement just made by the Ambassador of Mexico on behalf of the Group of 21, I would like to inform the Conference on Disarmament regarding the official reaction of the Brazilian Government to the recent announcement by the United States of America that the nuclear tests would remain suspended in that country at least until September 1994. The following text has been released to the press:

"The Brazilian Government welcomes with special satisfaction the announcement by President Clinton that the United States of America will extend at least until September 1994 the present moratorium on nuclear tests. Brazil urges the other nuclear-weapon States to do likewise and keep the tests suspended. In this sense, the positive steps taken by France and the Russian Federation are also welcome. President Clinton's initiative is an important step in the direction of the multilateral negotiation of a treaty for the complete prohibition of nuclear tests.

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(Mr. Saboia, Brazil)

This treaty will be a crucial phase in the process leading to total nuclear disarmament, which remains a permanent goal of Brazilian foreign policy."

Let me also put on record that my Government saw with pleasure the confidence expressed by the American Government on the possibility of an early conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty - a point which has been further elaborated in a statement made at the present meeting by Ambassador Ledogar. For Brazil, the Conference on Disarmament has a central role to play in the negotiation of a CTBT, which should contain indisputable and reliable verification mechanisms. It is the position of the Brazilian Government that the early conclusion of a new international instrument on nuclear tests, equally binding on all countries, will represent an important step towards universality in the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. I note with appreciation the positive statements made by previous speakers to the same effect.

Mr. DEMBINSKI (Poland):

... I have asked for the floor to put on record the profound satisfaction of the Republic of Poland over the further extension of the moratorium on nuclear-weapon tests. President Bill Clinton's decision to "extend the current moratorium on United States nuclear testing at least through September of next year, as long as no other nation tests", President Boris Yeltsin's announcement that "Russia's moratorium will now remain in force as long as the moratoria declared by other nuclear-weapon States are observed", the joint communiqué of President François Mitterrand and M. Balladur that for the time being France would not resume its testing and the concurring positions of China and the United Kingdom - they all indicate the onset of fair weather for the efforts pursued in the Conference on Disarmament to elaborate a comprehensive nuclear test ban. The window of opportunity thus created to make yet another, perhaps decisive step to buttress the non-proliferation regime must not be missed by the international community, in the first place by this body.

In the view of my delegation, owing to the determined efforts of the Conference's subsidiary body - the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban - we are now better prepared than ever to embark on informed, constructive and purpose-oriented efforts toward our long-elusive goal. The series of meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee with the participation of experts, the benefit we all

(Mr. Dembinski, Poland)

had of their learned presentations on diverse aspects of seismic and non-seismic verification techniques and their mutual interrelationship have played an invaluable educational role in better preparing us to deal effectively with the verification issue. We owe gratitude both to the experts and to the delegations which made their expertise available to the Ad Hoc Committee.

In conclusion, let me place on record that my delegation welcomes the important statement of the representatives of the United States and France in which they have expressed their commitment to actively engage in a negotiating process in the Conference on Disarmament leading to early achievement of a CTBT.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish):

... Exactly 30 years ago today, three nuclear-weapon Powers signed the Treaty banning nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. The Treaty, which has for many years represented a partial solution to the problem of banning such tests completely, was opened for signature on 8 August 1963. Many States are parties to that important document and probably others would be too if it had not been negotiated in a restricted setting but in a multilateral negotiating body representative of the international community. On this anniversary, we shall, after this plenary meeting, have an informal meeting to consider the draft decision on item 1 of our agenda tabled by the delegations of Australia, Mexico and Nigeria and today distributed as document CD/1209. The informal meeting will also be open to non-member States taking part in the work of the Conference. In the course of this morning you will have received another draft decision which we hope will be taken up in the informal meeting.

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) (translated from Spanish):

... Thirty years ago, on a day like today, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union signed in Moscow the treaty banning nuclear-weapon testing in the atmosphere, in outer space

(continued)

(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

and under water, the partial test-ban Treaty. Up to 1963 there had been some 600 nuclear tests, almost all of them in the atmosphere. Since that time there have been 1,350 more, almost all of them underground.

Thirty years ago, President Kennedy said that the partial test-ban Treaty was the first practical outcome after 18 years of endeavour. Like the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the others members of the Eighteen-Nation (disarmament) Committee of that time, Mexico pointed out that the partial test-ban Treaty was a "first step" towards a comprehensive nuclear test ban and towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control. It must not be forgotten that those were the main objectives of the Eighteen-Nation Committee. In signing the treaty, the United States Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, said "It is [...] not yet possible for us to guarantee what the significance of this act will be. History will eventually record how we deal with the unfinished business of peace" (document reference ENDC/PV.150).

Over three long decades that task of peace has remained incomplete. According to the sources checked, since 1945 the annual average number of tests has been around 40. In the first 18 years of the nuclear era there was an average of 33 tests a year. Since the Moscow Treaty the average has been 45 per year. Clearly the power of the explosions ought to be considered and account should be taken of the fact that up until 1960 there was only three States that had carried out nuclear tests, but it cannot be denied that the figures are telling. The total number of tests per country is as follows: United States 965, Soviet Union 715, France 210, United Kingdom 44, China 38, India 1. In total 1,950, including 23 joint United States/United Kingdom tests. We invite the representatives of these six countries, and any other country that has carried out tests in secret, to tell us if there is any mistake in the figures.

Former anniversaries of the Treaty of 1963 did not go unnoticed in the Eighteen-Nation Committee nor in the CCD. Anyone interested in the matter can easily consult the records: in CCD/PV.619 you will find the statements made on the tenth anniversary of the Treaty; in document CD/PV.231, those of the twentieth anniversary, and in CD/PV.472, the verbatim record of the twenty-fifth anniversary. On those occasions, on other anniversaries, and in the thousands of statements on the topic, emphasis was laid on the lack of political will on the part of one or more nuclear-weapon States to enter into negotiations on a comprehensive test ban as stipulated in the Moscow Treaty and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the NPT. The speeches and documents on this subject over three decades are a clear indication of the international community's interest in this item, and at the same time they reveal constant frustration at the lack of progress.

To get an idea of the time that has passed since the signing of the partial test-ban Treaty, just consider this: more than half the people today living on the Earth were not born at the time. The current President of the United States was barely fifteen years of age when he learned who

(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

President Kennedy was. The Beatles were beginning to become known abroad, the Viet Nam war was gearing up, General de Gaulle was presiding over the destiny of France and the Evian agreements had been signed only a year before. Mr. Khrushchev was consolidating his position as the supreme leader of the Soviet Union, nobody in China was yet talking about cultural revolution. Prime Minister Nehru was helping to create the non-aligned movement and no moves had yet been made to establish UNCTAD. Mexico was beginning talks that would lead to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and the United Nations scarcely had 110 members.

Unlike past anniversaries, this year there is something to celebrate. To begin with, we have recent announcements by the United States, the Russian Federation and France to the effect that they will continue to observe their unilateral moratoria on nuclear testing. What is more, we know that consultations on the opening of negotiations, I say again, negotiations on a multilateral legal instrument imposing a comprehensive and permanent ban on nuclear testing have been stepped up. This was clear from our meeting on Thursday, 29 July. Indeed, that meeting could without exaggeration be said to have been a historic one. It is our hope that it will be a watershed in efforts by the international community, but particularly this Conference, to arrive at a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. I must confess that for the delegation of Mexico that meeting dispelled doubts that we were recently beginning to have about the direction the Conference was taking. In June there was a risk that, despite positive signals from several capitals about a comprehensive test ban, the CD would revert to past practice and fall once again into the kind of indolent, soporific state that was characteristic of it for more than a decade. After the recent break, however, new prospects have opened up that some might go so far as to describe as proof positive that past practices really have been left behind. That is what we believed last year when the negotiations on the Convention on Chemical Weapons concluded, and what we believed at the beginning of this year when we got the work of the Conference on Disarmament off to a good start. Fortunately, we can believe it again today.

Today, as yesterday, our objective is to put an end for ever to nuclear testing. Like other Governments represented here, Mexico has done everything in its power to achieve this. In the Conference on Disarmament and the General Assembly, we have worked for a comprehensive test-ban. In the NPT review conferences we have pressed the point, stressing the indisputable link between a comprehensive test ban and the limited duration of the Treaty. We were, moreover, one of the initiators of the partial test-ban Treaty amendment conference. This is a course of action we have to continue to explore because it offers advantages that should be exploited in order to achieve the objective of a comprehensive test ban. Next week we will take an active part in consultations convened pursuant to General Assembly resolution 47/46 by the President of the Conference, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, in New York.

But despite calls from the General Assembly and the wishes of almost the entire international community, we still do not have a comprehensive test ban. The reason is quite simple. Neither we nor anyone else has been able to get

(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

around the lack of political will among the nuclear-weapon States. Today the situation has changed. What we have to do now - and it really is a terribly urgent task - is to ensure that the unilateral moratoria recently extended by three countries are made permanent, and that the other two nuclear-weapon States follow that example. We must begin as early as possible on multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test ban that will be universal and internationally verifiable. As suggested in document CD/1209, we should do it today, in the Ad Hoc Committee, and continue to a swift and successful conclusion. Actions speak louder than words - let's get to work!

Mr. BLOMBERG (Finland):

... Mr. President, the end of the Cold War has fundamentally reduced the danger of nuclear war. Nuclear doctrines are under thorough review. Not only has the change in the political situation made the use of nuclear weapons a more remote possibility, but nuclear weapons are being deeply cut and extensively withdrawn from forward positions. This development should be encouraged by the whole international community. Today, 30 years after the signing of the partial test-ban Treaty, Finland joins the call for a rapid move towards a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing.

We have heard with satisfaction the statements by the nuclear-weapon States on continuing restraint in testing activities. Suspension of testing is an important step in the process towards complete cessation of all nuclear explosions. This suspension should not prove to be only temporary. The international community should seek a multilateral treaty banning all nuclear explosions in all environments. The Geneva Conference is the best forum for such a task. The negotiations should start without delay. We hope that the process could be facilitated through consultations between the nuclear-weapon States.

(continued)

(Mr. Blomberg, Finland)

A universally applicable and internationally verifiable test ban should be designed to reduce the dangers of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, which is a major challenge for the international community. It would strengthen international security and represent a further step towards nuclear disarmament. A comprehensive test ban would entail environmental benefits. Past years bear witness to environmental and health impacts related to underground explosions, risks that have not always been fully eliminated. We have been particularly interested in the environmental impacts of nuclear testing at the Novaya Zemlya site, the testing area closest to Finland.

A treaty banning nuclear testing should include a verification regime which gives sufficient guarantees that violations will be discovered and does so at reasonable cost. The core of this verification regime would be a global seismic network. The technical groundwork for seismic verification has been laid by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts. Finland has participated in this work for many years. During the extensive expert work we have become convinced that, with present levels of technology, a seismic monitoring system is capable of detecting and identifying with a high degree of confidence any underground nuclear explosions. However, the seismic network needs to be strengthened, in particular in the southern hemisphere.

The seismic network would have to be complemented with additional verification measures. A number of non-seismic measures that should be considered in order to arrive at an optimal verification package were discussed during the second part of this year's session. This has been valuable work in the Ad Hoc Committee. At this point we can foresee that the verification regime should include provisions for on-site inspections. Furthermore, the verification regime could benefit from such measures as prior notification and observation of certain activities, measurement of airborne radioactivity, satellite verification and hydroacoustic measurement. The technical element, in particular the seismic work, will be of major importance once the negotiations start. The result we are seeking, a treaty banning all nuclear testing, will be built through a process in which all the elements form a whole. We expect rapid progress. Now we hope that this work can be organized without delay and that the Ad Hoc Committee will be given a negotiating task. We would be prepared to continue this work during the inter-sessional period.

I would like to add that Finland welcomes the revised draft text for a comprehensive test-ban treaty presented by the delegation of Sweden in the plenary on 3 June. The proposal to entrust IAEA with verification is interesting and should be carefully considered as the demands made by the verification package and the tasks required of the central organization take shape. Naturally, it is up to the negotiators to arrive at effective and cost-efficient solutions.

Sir Michael WESTON (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland):

... The United Kingdom has always made clear its support for the goal of a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB). For some time we have viewed this goal as one that could only be achieved in the long term. But the realization of a negotiated end to nuclear testing is now much nearer, and it will soon be possible to enter into multilateral test ban negotiations.

(continued)

(Sir Michael Weston, United Kingdom)

We are fully committed to such negotiations, and it will be a major objective for the United Kingdom to achieve a verifiable CTB, with as wide adherence as possible, in a form which genuinely strengthens our non-proliferation efforts. Our view of a ban will be conditioned by the degree to which it meets these important criteria.

The proliferation of nuclear weapons - and of other weapons of mass destruction - poses a real threat to global stability and security. The international community must therefore intensify its efforts to constrain the spread of nuclear weapons materials and expertise. The nuclear Powers must contribute to this process, and are doing so. The global non-proliferation regime has many facets. At its heart stands the Non-Proliferation Treaty, supported by the IAEA safeguards system and national export controls. We believe a comprehensive test-ban treaty could add to this regime, most importantly by preventing proliferators from developing sophisticated nuclear weapons. A test ban will not prevent a determined proliferator from acquiring the capability to manufacture a basic explosive device. But if States can be prevented from developing their knowledge and expertise of weapon design, then a nuclear test ban will have made a significant contribution to non-proliferation.

Another important objective for us - to ensure we have a high level of confidence in our ability to maintain the safety and reliability of our independent nuclear deterrent - will remain indispensable. A CTB will pose particular challenges in this regard, but the British Government believes that the non-proliferation advantages of a CTB are sufficiently important to warrant the decision to give it full support.

As for CTB negotiations, the United Kingdom will not be aiming to achieve a Treaty which restrains only the five nuclear weapons States, as defined in the Non-Proliferation Treaty, but one which applies equally to all parties, and which binds as many countries as possible. For a CTB genuinely to help our efforts to counter the threats posed by nuclear proliferation, we also believe an effective verification regime is necessary. Only if a potential proliferator knows that any nuclear test is likely to be detected and identified as such, and that appropriate sanctions will be imposed, will he be deterred from acting in breach of his treaty obligations. The discussion of non-seismic means of verification in the NTB Ad Hoc Committee this year has been very valuable, complementing the ongoing work of the Group of Scientific Experts in developing an international seismological system. This work must be continued in order to establish which measures are needed to make up an effective verification regime. As we have made clear previously, we believe seismic monitoring will be essential, though not sufficient on its own.

We recognize the importance of multilateral negotiations in achieving a CTB that contributes to non-proliferation in this way, and we are ready to play our part in working constructively to achieve a negotiated ban. We believe that we and the other nuclear- weapons States have a particular responsibility for ensuring the success of the negotiations. We shall aim to discuss the way ahead with them, and to keep in close touch as the negotiations proceed. At the same time, we have welcomed the positive and

(Sir Michael Weston, United Kingdom)

constructive atmosphere of discussions in the NTB Ad Hoc Committee of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) this year, and it will be important to build on the work already done. We believe the CD should have a key role in negotiations when they get under way, and we look forward to continuing to work together towards the attainment of our shared goals.

As a post-script, let me take this opportunity to confirm the accuracy, according to our records, of our distinguished Mexican colleague's statement that the United Kingdom has carried out a total of 44 nuclear tests.

Mr. GEHR (Austria).

... I would like to take the opportunity of today's commemoration of the thirtieth anniversary of the "Treaty banning nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and underwater" (PTBT), to place once again on record the long-standing Austrian support for a comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT). Allow me also to remind you that on 14 April 1988 the Austrian Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Alois Mock, urged in this very room the conclusion of such an international and legally binding instrument. As to the PTBT itself, its signature by three nuclear Powers on 5 August 1963 was undoubtedly a major achievement on the way to the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, a goal set by the more than 110 States that have ratified the treaty up to today. It is worth while noting, by the way, that back in the early sixties the PTBT already explicitly acknowledged that test explosions indeed lead to the contamination of man's environment and have therefore to be put an end to.

After 30 years of untiring efforts, we have now good reasons to be optimistic about an early conclusion of a CTBT. The most recent announcements made by the Presidents of the United States of America, the Russian Federation and France to extend the test-ban moratoria of their respective countries have clearly confirmed the trend towards the achievement of a CTBT.

(continued)

(Mr. Gehr, Austria)

This trend came into view on 24 September last year, when the United States Congress passed the Energy and Water Appropriations Bill prohibiting testing after 30 September 1996, unless another State conducts a nuclear test thereafter.

Anyway, the extension of the three moratoria is an indication of the validity of the argument that the safety of nuclear arsenals can nowadays be controlled through methods other than nuclear explosions.

My delegation has equally taken note of the commitments made by some nuclear Powers to move towards a multilateral process aiming at achieving a CTBT. Austria cannot but warmly welcome this development, which will prove instrumental in enhancing the confidence of all nations in the continuity and reliability of the disarmament policy of those nuclear Powers.

Austria's conviction that a comprehensive CTBT verification system is both necessary and possible has lately been more than confirmed. It is indeed the perspective of such a system which motivated Austria's active participation in the Group of Scientific Experts (GSE).

As to the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban itself, we have been witnessing during the last session an impressive display of various methods available for the verification of a CTBT. Thereby, we have been given a welcome opportunity to reassess the advantages and shortcomings of each of the non-seismic monitoring techniques. I am sure that studies and discussions on how the various techniques could complement each other would enhance the work on NTB verification significantly. However, it is now time to move a step further.

The need for progress on our way to a CTBT is what induces my delegation now to pay tribute to the contributions Sweden has made in favour of the achievement of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. In particular, the revised version of its CTBT draft (CD/1202) is in our view a very timely initiative. Three new elements which were outlined by Ambassador Norberg on 3 June 1993 do, in our view, carry considerable weight: firstly, the scope of the prohibition is a really comprehensive one, since it encompasses so-called peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs); secondly, the Swedish CTBT draft favours an agreement of unlimited duration; finally, the new draft entrusts the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with the implementation of its verification provisions rather than calling for the creation of additional bureaucratic machinery. This option has undeniable merits from the point of view of practical efficiency and cost-effectiveness. In this connection, we believe that there would indeed be considerable benefit in making use of the IAEA's experience. We therefore support the view expressed by the Australian delegation on 3 August 1993 to invite a representative of this organization to assist the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban.

In any case, the time is now ripe for preparations for a swift start to CTBT negotiations early next year with a view to completing them by 1995. The Swedish draft should be a good basis for these negotiations. 1995 will be a crucial date for nuclear arms control, since the NPT Extension and Review

(Mr. Gehr, Austria)

Conference is due to be held in that year. Although we know that there are delegations which do not see a direct link between this 1995 conference and the negotiations on a CTBT, it is nevertheless recognized by all that substantial progress on a CTBT will not fail to facilitate a positive outcome of the NPT deliberations.

At the end of my statement, allow me to express the hopes of my delegation that in an historic perspective, the thirtieth anniversary of the PTBT will mark the beginning of an era free of all nuclear test explosions. Let us take this opportunity all together and start negotiations without delay.

(Mr. Zemskov, Russian Federation)

In the disarmament field Russia's attention is concentrated on the following basic issues: practical reduction of arms levels to the limits provided for in existing bilateral and multilateral agreements; efforts to prevent the proliferation of all types of weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and the latest military technology; the elaboration of further arms control measures in areas where such measures have not yet been taken; and further improvement of confidence-building and security-building measures in relations among States. These aims, we believe, reflect the positive processes which are now occurring in the world and will undoubtedly help to make them irreversible. A vital role in achieving these aims, first and foremost in the elaboration of further steps in arms control, can and should be played by the Conference on Disarmament, the unique global negotiating forum. We are convinced of the need to draw on the experience built up by the Conference in recent years, especially during the negotiation of the Convention banning chemical weapons, in order to achieve results in work on other priority questions on the disarmament agenda. Here it is important to speed up the translation into legal treaty language of the discussions in our forum, whether it be on nuclear tests, negative security assurances or on outer space.

I would now like to examine one item on our agenda where I think we can really count on practical results. I refer to the elaboration of a verifiable agreement on a comprehensive nuclear test ban. It seems to us that conditions for solving this problem are more favourable than at any time since nuclear weapons first appeared. Nuclear testing grounds all over the world have already been silent for some considerable time. In Russia - which from the moment of the proclamation of its independence has not conducted a single nuclear explosion - under a decision taken by President B.N. Yeltsin on 5 July 1993 our moratorium on nuclear tests has been extended for as long as the moratorium declared by other States is observed de jure and de facto by them. In this connection I would also like to welcome the decision of the United States Administration to extend its moratorium on nuclear explosions, as well as the statement made by President François Mitterrand of France, who unambiguously rejected a unilateral resumption by France of nuclear tests after the expiry of the moratorium on nuclear explosions it declared on 8 April 1992. We express the hope that other nuclear States will also continue to show restraint and refrain from conducting nuclear tests.

There has also been a breakthrough on the issue of conducting negotiations on a nuclear test ban. Here we believe the agreement reached by the Presidents of Russia and the United States of America in Vancouver to the effect that negotiations on a multilateral nuclear test ban should begin in the very near future is of special significance. We cannot but note the positive contribution which France has been making with its initiatives for a rapid start to multilateral negotiations on this subject. We believe that the discussion we had at the last plenary meeting on the question of nuclear tests also testifies to the fact that the issue of starting a multilateral negotiating process is now ripe for solution.

(Mr. Zemskov, Russian Federation)

I would now like to set out in more detail our views on the most appropriate and productive way of building the negotiating process in order to produce a test-ban treaty.

First, we believe that from the very outset it would be appropriate to bring into operation parallel machinery for elaborating such a treaty, that is to say, during negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, and for that purpose to draw up and adopt a negotiating mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee, and also within the context of consultations among the five nuclear Powers. These two forums should interact closely, reinforcing each other. In no circumstances should there be confrontation between them. An important precedent for such parallel work, as we know, can be found in the elaboration of the chemical weapons convention, which was conducted both within the Ad Hoc Committee within the Conference on Disarmament and also in the bilateral consultations on this topic between the USSR (later Russia) and the United States of America. Such machinery for the talks will, we believe, be important to ensure that from the very outset they involve not only the nuclear Powers but also other States, including the "threshold" countries. By using this machinery we could also count on greater impact in terms of the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Thus we are proposing well-balanced decisions, on the one hand giving the Conference on Disarmament a substantive role in elaborating a draft treaty from the very outset, and on the other hand providing the nuclear Powers with the opportunity, as was rightly noted in the statement made by the distinguished representative of Australia at the last plenary, of making a "significant contribution" to the elaboration of such a draft.

Secondly, we expect that the distinguished Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, Ambassador Tanaka, will, with his customary drive, get down to consultations in order to produce by the end of this session a generally acceptable negotiating mandate for his Ad Hoc Committee so that, on the basis of this mandate, we can begin multilateral negotiations in January 1994, when our Conference meets again, or earlier if so decided. It would seem appropriate to take as the basis of our work the draft treaty on a comprehensive nuclear test ban which was tabled by Sweden.

It is our belief that agreement on a negotiating mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee would be a major accomplishment of the Conference on Disarmament in 1993. There would be no shame in providing information on this in our annual report to the General Assembly, which, I hope, will adopt a consensus resolution supporting efforts by the Conference in this field.

Thirdly, concerning the consultations among the five nuclear Powers, in our view they could begin as early as September 1993, right here in Geneva. Of course the "five" would continue to meet after the multilateral negotiations began, and work closely with them. We do hope that these comments will find understanding on the part of our distinguished colleagues. I would like to stress the special importance of beginning negotiations on a nuclear test ban in the context of the preparations for the conference on the

(Mr. Zemskov, Russian Federation)

non-proliferation treaty scheduled for 1995, especially as regards creating the right climate for extending the treaty without limit and making it universal in nature.

(Mr. Brotodiningrat, Indonesia)

... My sole purpose in requesting the floor this morning is to convey the message of H.E. Mr. Ali Alatas, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, in his capacity as President of the PTBT Amendment Conference, on the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of the signing of the Treaty. The message reads as follows:

[The text of the message read by Mr. Brotodiningrat has already been issued as a Conference document (CD/1210).]

Mr. DUBOIS (Canada)

... In early July, Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton announced the extension of the moratoria on nuclear testing. The United States also announced that they plan to initiate discussions with the other nuclear weapons States on modalities and objectives of negotiations for a comprehensive test-ban treaty. France, the United Kingdom, and China have responded positively. These announcements are indeed welcome developments and they bode well for an early start to CTBT negotiations which, as we have stated on numerous occasions, should take place in the Conference on Disarmament. A CTBT would respond to a longstanding and central Canadian arms control objective.

Canada favours negotiations towards a CTBT in a multilateral forum such as the Conference on Disarmament; at the same time realizing that such negotiations must be predicated upon the kind of political will and leadership that has been demonstrated last month by the nuclear weapons States. It is essential, therefore, that the CD take stock of its own resources and expertise which might contribute towards facilitating a successful negotiation of a CTBT. The international community must make its contribution to a strong

(Mr. Dubois, Canada)

and effective CTBT. The final agreement must be open to signature by all and contain strong verification procedures. This process would, in our view, increase in credibility and international acceptance if the CD could agree to expand its membership to include all those wishing to be members of the CD and ultimately party to the CTBT.

Canada is pleased with the positive and constructive responses of the other nuclear-weapons States to President Clinton's important initiative. We also urge them to continue their existing moratoria on nuclear testing. There is no reason why we cannot launch these negotiations now and my Government supports initiatives to review at an early stage the mandate of the NTB Ad Hoc Committee in order for it to negotiate a CTB. We are now engaged in the NPT extension process and an early start of CTB negotiations would give an important psychological boost to a successful NPT Review and Extension Conference in 1995.

On 3 June 1993, our Swedish colleagues made a valuable contribution through their tabling of a revised version of a draft CTBT, which builds upon CD/1089 of 25 July 1991. In our view, the Swedish papers provide focus to certain key issues, while recognizing that many details will need to be filled in once negotiations get under way. It is always useful to have at hand a significant body of relevant information to facilitate the negotiations, especially when this includes a vision of what the end-product might comprise.

There is, of course, a wealth of material upon which to draw. All of the attention now being directed to non-seismic technologies, and to their potential to play a supportive role in a verification regime, can only be helpful to the elaboration of a treaty that can be effectively verified. The Canadian position is that the elements of any verification regime are already very well-defined, based on the work of the GSE, and could be put in place within a reasonable period of time.

In this regard, we note that the last GSE report to the CD (CD/1185, 2 March 1993), based on earlier tests and their evaluations, elaborated a concept of a system for international seismic data exchange which would provide States with data and information to meet their national CTB verification needs. The GSE is now moving through the design stage with the aim of beginning global testing of the proposed concept at an early date.

Canada fully supports this effort by the GSE and its contributing participants. In our understanding, this would not be another test to compile data along the lines of the two others that have already taken place in 1984 and 1991. It would, in fact, constitute the initial phase of establishing the architecture that could then be called upon to serve the needs of a CTB treaty.

(Mr. Dubois, Canada)

It is also the Canadian view that our current deliberations and future negotiations must continue to include the contributions that other non-seismic technologies can make to CTB verification. Let me be clear on this point. While it is our position that all of these various options are on the table and merit serious consideration, they should not constrain our rapid progress to conclude a CTB. In fact, it is our firm belief that a package of seismic and non-seismic verification measures could be put together and ready to go within a relatively short period of time.

As an active participant in the GSE, Canada supports the role for a seismic monitoring network, although a number of the parameters of the network will need further refinement as the work of the GSE progresses. Furthermore, Canada supports continued exploration in the CD of the relevance of the methodology and the parameters of a hypothetical network for radionuclides monitoring.

The 1991 Swedish draft text specifies the establishment and operation of a satellite image processing centre which would serve as a means by which States parties might acquire data from available satellite systems. Canada strongly endorses such a monitoring system. Delegations will remember that in May 1993 the Canadian CD submission on non-seismic technologies significantly updated the understanding of the types of sensors and imagery available from current commercial satellite systems and how these systems are evolving. The CD should continue to examine the role of overhead imagery for CTBT verification.

A number of non-seismic technologies and their potential applications, which were included in the Canadian submission to the CD in May 1993 and the subsequent presentations, clearly have relevance to verifying a CTBT. Canada will continue to support the CD in its exploration of these methodologies and consider making further submissions on selected ones in the search for an effective yet affordable verification regime.

Clearly, in 1993, the understanding of the performance and design requirements of a seismic network has advanced considerably, through the work of the GSE and active contributions of its individual participating States. The 1992 Verification Conference in Montebello, Quebec, made a particularly significant contribution in this regard. Major gaps in knowledge remain, however, and these relate to four items: (a) assessments of effectiveness; (b) detection standards; (c) other design parameters; and (d) cost, including cost-effectiveness. The GSE will need some direction from the CD on these matters, if it is to move to fill these knowledge gaps as it proposes to do through testing the concept by January 1995.

The Canadian submission to the CD in May 1993 and subsequent presentations sought to fill some of the information gaps, both with regard to chemical detection from the air and at ground level, and with regard to the other technique of surveillance of atmospheric radionuclides. In both of these cases, much work needs to be done, in order to determine performance capabilities, effectiveness and cost parameters. Much of the required

(Mr. Dubois, Canada)

information, however, could only be obtained from countries that have conducted nuclear tests. One of the reasons for the Canadian submission and presentation in May 1993 was to attempt to prompt countries that have, or could get, the information to do so and share it with others.

In sum, the Swedish text puts down the appropriate markers with regard to airborne sensing and inspection, and ground level inspection. The operational parameters will need, however, to be further explored through trial inspections and more detailed consultations with knowledgeable experts.

It is important to utilize to the maximum extent what we have learned so far, as a foundation for our continuing efforts towards achieving a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty, as directed by the mandate of the NTB Ad Hoc Committee. To accomplish this, Canada has concluded that the time has come to provide a process whereby the input of technical experts can be more productively consolidated within our substantive work on specific and interrelated test-ban issues, including structure and scope as well as verification of compliance.

We have come to the conclusion that this can be best done by adding related technical strands to the existing seismic focus of the Group of Scientific Experts, as suggested by Australia on 24 June. We note in particular, in this context, that work needs to be done on the relevance and feasibility of atmospheric radiation, infrasound and hydroacoustic monitoring. These methodologies have data collection, analysis and dissemination requirements similar to those of a global seismic network and, thus, the GSE's experience may make that body an appropriate forum for exploration of these non-seismic methods. Of course, different technical expertise would be required to deal with these new subjects in the GSE. The GSE may also need to modify the organization of its work to accommodate these new responsibilities. In the final analysis, the GSE has been structured in such a way as to be responsive in its support of the CTBT negotiations.

To recap my comments:

As an active participant in the GSE, Canada supports the role proposed in the Swedish paper for a seismic monitoring network, although a number of the parameters of the network will need further refinement as the work of the GSE progresses.

On balance, Canada supports continued exploration in the CD of the relevance of atmospheric radionuclides monitoring for CTBT verification and the parameters of a hypothetical network for such monitoring.

Canada will remain actively committed in the CD to the role of overhead imagery for CTBT verification. Absence of this verification methodology from a CTBT text would be a serious omission.

(Mr. Dubois, Canada)

A number of other verification methodologies which have emerged in the past few years clearly have relevance to verifying a CTBT. Canada will continue to support the CD in its exploration of these methodologies and consider making further submissions on selected ones.

Canada supports continued exploration in the CD of on-site inspections for CTBT verification. "Challenge" inspections, and perhaps in some special cases routine and close-out inspections, are needed for effective CTBT verification.

To conclude, it is worth emphasizing that, except perhaps with respect to work on an international seismic data exchange network, we are still in the early phase of our efforts to redefine a viable and effective verification package for a CTBT. We all recognize that the seismic data exchange network will likely form the core verification method for a CTBT. In Canada's view, other methods also have a valuable contribution to make for test ban verification. To the credit of Sweden, its draft treaty underlines the value of using a variety of complementary verification methods. Operating synergistically, such a package of methods can provide the most cost-effective approach to CTBT verification in the long run. We must concentrate on constructing a verification system that will stand the test of time. It must be flexible enough to adapt to new circumstances such as the advent of new verification requirements and methodologies. It must be resilient enough to withstand heightened political tensions; indeed, it must provide a bulwark for refuting inaccurate suspicions about violations that might exacerbate tensions.

Mr. ROTH (Sweden): As has been referred to and eloquently elaborated upon by several speakers here today, on this very day 30 years have elapsed since the signing of the partial test-ban Treaty. In the preambular part of that Treaty, the Parties to the Treaty agree to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time. Now, 30 years after signing, negotiations on a comprehensive test ban have still not begun. However, developments recently give us concrete hope that in fact such negotiations will soon take place. As my country has consistently advocated a comprehensive test ban, my delegation warmly welcomes the extension of the moratoria and the positive stance towards negotiations on a comprehensive test ban that has emerged lately. Now, it is important not to lose momentum but use the positive atmosphere to commence negotiations on a CTB treaty.

(Mr. Roth, Sweden)

In the view of the Swedish Government, the Conference on Disarmament is the proper forum to pursue this effort as it should be aiming at a universal and internationally verifiable treaty. Therefore the negotiations should have a multilateral character. The Conference on Disarmament is the sole multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament matters and also has the expertise to pursue such negotiations.

My delegation has endeavoured to contribute to negotiations on a CTB by submitting draft treaty texts; the latest text was submitted at the beginning of June this year and my delegation has no unfavourable comments on that draft proposal. My delegation intends to supplement our proposal with annexes, especially on the verification system. However, my delegation intends to consult further before finalizing the new draft annexes. In this way, we aim at taking into account, inter alia, the discussions and hearings held lately in the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban on non-seismic methods to be used in a verification system.

Mr. ERRERA (France) (translated from French): I asked for the floor on a specific point. In his statement just now, the representative of Mexico awarded France a number of tests, 210, I think, nuclear tests, if memory serves me aright. Everybody knows the legendary generosity of the Ambassador of Mexico and, indeed, our own too, but in this instance I think we have as usual to try and be modest, and I don't know if I should say I'm pleased or sorry to tell the most distinguished Ambassador of Mexico that the number of tests carried out by France is 192 and not 210.

(Mr. Nasser, Islamic Republic of Iran)

... True that there has been movement in reducing the number of nuclear warheads. True also that prospects for a nuclear test ban seems more realistic today. But these are not enough. A comprehensive test-ban treaty would be an important effective instrument to prevent further proliferation of nuclear arms in all its aspects. We shall not forget, nonetheless, that it will still be another instrument for the purpose of ensuring non-proliferation. As such, and in the absence of a well-defined and established programme for nuclear disarmament, one cannot be certain of a world free of nuclear weapons at some envisaged time in our future. Yet, even for the nuclear test ban, despite encouraging signals, there are still arguments against immediate action and calls to continue business as usual. Negotiations for a comprehensive test-ban treaty thus remain pending.

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Baron GUILLAUME (Belgium) (translated from French): Welcoming the moves made recently by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin to extend their moratoriums on nuclear testing and by President Mitterand to participate actively within the CD in negotiations on a universal and internationally verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty, I should not like to let slip the opportunity now given to me to comment on the two drafts, a draft decision and a draft mandate, which have been submitted to us and to reiterate Belgium's position on the subject.

Like other delegations which have already taken the floor, and in keeping with the habitual procedure within the CD, our preference, while we would not reject the draft decision route if there were consensus on it, goes rather to the second proposal. It has the advantage of going straight to the desired end, that of giving the Ad Hoc Committee a negotiating mandate. In our view, a comprehensive test-ban treaty should, moreover, have to have the following characteristics: it should be negotiated from the outset in all its aspects within the Conference on Disarmament; it should be of universal application and internationally and effectively verifiable. There in brief you have the content in which we view our participation in the negotiations, which we hope will soon begin, for a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I have no further speakers on the list for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor?

As announced at the beginning of this plenary meeting, I shall now suspend the meeting and convene the informal meeting devoted to item 1 of our agenda, "Nuclear test ban". In order to permit additional consultations on that topic, we shall resume the plenary meeting in 20 minutes' time. Once consideration of this first matter is complete, we shall devote a few minutes to the draft communication to the International Atomic Energy Agency which the secretariat has circulated today, so that we can finalize our decision on it when we resume the plenary meeting.

The plenary meeting is suspended. We shall meet again in 20 minutes in this room.

The meeting was suspended at 10.55 a.m. and resumed at 12.15 p.m.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): The 659th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.

The Conference has before it a draft decision circulated by the secretariat and dated today concerning agenda item 1. I understand that the text of this draft has been the subject of intensive consultations as a result of which there is a consensus concerning it, subject to one slight change in the first preambular paragraph, namely the deletion of the word "recent". That being the case, and if there is no objection, I shall submit the draft as amended to the Conference for decision. Do I take it that the Conference adopts the draft?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I should say that this decision is without prejudice for the consultations being conducted in New York to the same end as we are seeking and with a view to facilitating the negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): Mr. President, even though sometimes in the fast lane things happen rapidly, I did just join a consensus on behalf of the United States in favour of the decision which you placed before us, but I feel constrained to make a certain explanation of my action in that regard. It is an explanation in the nature of making clear that from the United States perspective, this CD decision says what it does say but it does not say what it does not say. By that I mean that for us we are not agreeing hereby to commence CTBT negotiations in the CD now, but rather we are agreeing to do so later, after we have first reached agreement on the specific mandate for our Conference's nuclear testing Committee. As our British colleague pointed out last week, we believe as he does, that the five nuclear-weapon States have particular responsibility for ensuring the success of the negotiations and, in that regard, the United States is continuing discussions with the other four on the question of the way ahead in these negotiations. Even as these discussions continue for us, we have agreed it would be appropriate as the decision states for the NTB Ad Hoc Committee Chairman to conduct informal consultations on how to organize the negotiations, including on this specific mandate.

Mr. QUIROS (Peru) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, I have asked for the floor in my capacity as Coordinator of the Group of 21; I am sure that Ambassador Urrutia would have liked to have been in this room now, at what I would term a historic moment for the work of the CD, but as he is attending another meeting, I am taking his place. On behalf of the Group of 21, I would like to extend our warmest congratulations to you for the excellent work you have done and which has enabled us to take a step forward that I am sure will go down in the annals of this Conference and, I believe, opens up a new stage in what lies ahead of us. The Group of 21 considers that the decision that has just been adopted provides the opportunity the Group has been seeking for many years of initiating a comprehensive test-ban treaty that is universal and internationally verifiable. We offer you our warmest congratulations and the Group is ready to go on very actively and to participate very actively in the consultations Ambassador Tanaka will be holding in order to have a mandate as soon as possible, as stated in the last paragraph of the decision.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I am very grateful to the representative of Peru, especially for his kind words, but I must say that the outcome is the fruit of the efforts of all delegates and delegations to bring the various positions closer together and to seek flexibly and in a constructive spirit for the decision we have adopted. I may have played some role, but that role would not have been possible without the understanding and flexibility shown by a large part of the delegations present here and involved.

Mr. ERRERA (France) (translated from French): Mr. President, I too welcome the consensus that has just been achieved on the document and extend my congratulations to you. We are particularly gratified because the document includes two points that we and, I think, many others, have viewed as essential from the outset. The first concerns the nature of the treaty to be negotiated within the Conference on Disarmament. That nature has to do with the fact that, as we have said on several occasions, the major objective that we are pursuing is the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and,

(Mr. Errera, France)

in so far as that is our objective, we have always felt that a test-ban treaty must be universal, by which I mean not only as regards accession, but also as regards participation, the involvement from the outset of all the players, and secondly that it must be really and internationally verifiable in order to be genuinely deterrent. The second point that we felt to be essential and that is contained in the decision that we have just taken concerns the negotiating forum. We, like many others - I would say like everyone, have made it very clear from the outset that, for the objective we have set ourselves to be attainable, the treaty must be negotiated multilaterally and, as the Conference on Disarmament is the international community's sole negotiating body and is representative of the international community where disarmament is concerned, it is logical that it should be the negotiating forum; that, too, is contained in the document. We are also pleased that a clear signal has been given to the Ad Hoc Committee amending its negotiating mandate as regards principles. That corresponds to the wish expressed by Ambassador O'Sullivan for the giving of a signal, a clear political symbol; that has been done in the penultimate paragraph. That is what I would call a decision of principle, one free from conditions, even though, as stated in the last paragraph of the document, consultations are naturally to be held to determine the contents, the details of the mandate. Those are the reasons for our satisfaction. As for the role of the five nuclear Powers, I will simply repeat what we have always said, namely that consultations between the five nuclear Powers in Geneva, in parallel with the negotiations in the Conference - that is to say, at the same time and on the same topics, will certainly be of use.

Mrs. CARVALHO DE PLASA (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): It is with a feeling of great satisfaction that I am taking the floor in this plenary meeting and this time I have not prepared any statement, so I shall be extremely brief. We have taken the first step in a process that started 30 years ago and that we celebrated some days ago, and we are now in a position to complete a peace process to which we are all dedicated. For that reason, because of the decision which you have just put before us and which our Coordinator rightly qualified as historic, allow me to express our sincerest thanks to you, Mr. President, for your efforts and to those who made their contribution in the consultations which finally produced the result that we now have and all welcome.

Mr. TANAKA (Japan): My delegation welcomes the decision just adopted to give a mandate to negotiate the CTB. I, as the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on NTB, feel greatly honoured at having been entrusted with the important task by this decision. I am intending to start my preparations immediately to implement this decision and I shall do my best and hope that all the delegations will cooperate fully for the smooth preparation of the CTB negotiations.

Mr. O'SULLIVAN (Australia): First of all, Mr. President, I would like to thank you for the energy and the determination that you have shown over the last weeks to bring us to this very satisfactory and very happy outcome that we have achieved this morning, and I think that, although you are suitably modest, you were also not really entirely accurate in excusing yourself from a central and very happy role in this outcome and I thank you. I should also like to thank my colleagues from Mexico and Nigeria for allowing the Australian delegation to work with them in the early stages of the deliberations which led up to our decision this morning and I would also like to thank the other delegations around the room who in various ways and at various points showed flexibility that is reflected in our document. It is a good example of how this Conference can work effectively. As others have said, I believe this decision we have taken will send a powerful political signal of our collective determinations to get on with the work that many of us have been looking forward to for so long. It also demonstrates again in a very clear way the utility of this forum as a negotiating body that can, with determination, attack the problems before it. So, we see this as the start of a journey that many of us have been awaiting impatiently for a long time and the signal that we are starting it is something that we entirely welcome. To assure the last speaker, the Ambassador of Japan, Australia will be ready whenever he is, to commence collaboration with him to start the consultations that are mandated in the last part of our decision.

Mr. KAMAL (Pakistan): Mr. President, we have taken an important decision today which is the first step towards an objective to which many have aspired for several years. I would like to assure you that in the follow-up of this decision over the coming months and year, you will have the full support and cooperation of the Pakistan delegation for an objective to which Pakistan is fully committed.

Mr. ADEKEYE (Nigeria): My delegation wishes to place on record its satisfaction that the Conference has been able to adopt this historic decision. I therefore wish to congratulate you, Mr. President, for the efforts in ensuring that the Conference has been able to reach consensus on this decision. Finally, I wish to pledge our full support to the distinguished Ambassador of Japan, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, in his task ahead.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): As we agreed in the informal meeting a few minutes ago, and pursuant to rule 41 of our rules of procedure, I shall transmit to the Director-General of IAEA the communication that was distributed today.

I have no further business to deal with in this plenary meeting. Permit me, then, to make my closing statement at the conclusion of Cuba's presidency.

I have to say before I read my text that this is a statement that I have had to redraft and to which I have had to make a number of changes, sometimes on a positive note and at others with what, I felt, had to be some pessimism

(The President)

and an appeal to everybody to try to reach the decision. However, that is life and even more so the business of negotiation, and the way things have worked out we now have the decision and I have, of course, had to change my statement again.

Today, our presidency of the Conference on Disarmament comes to an end. During this period there have been events that I consider to be of importance for the Conference and for the interests of our countries. I am referring to the positive developments concerning item 1 of the agenda of the Conference, the total ending of nuclear tests. I hope that the stimulus given in this respect by the important political decisions adopted by a number of nuclear countries, by the result that we have attained, and by the intensive negotiations will swiftly bear fruit with the conclusion in this forum of a new internationally verifiable multilateral agreement that will attract universal accession.

The favourable negotiating climate as regards item 1 of our agenda has enabled us to adopt today an important decision that will unquestionably help to further the achievement of our objectives and hopes in this respect. It has also enabled us to decide to issue an invitation, at a date to be decided later, to a representative of the International Atomic Energy Agency, who will engage in exchanges with delegations on the possibility that the Agency will one day play a role in the verification of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

(The President)

... The Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement, while welcoming the conclusion of the Chemical Weapons Convention, gave priority to negotiations and other items on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, such as a nuclear test ban, the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, the prevention of nuclear wars, security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. They emphasized the need to reinvigorate multilateral disarmament endeavours and, in this context, they called for broader and more active participation by non-aligned countries in the Conference on Disarmament.

(The President)

... The historic developments which we have recently witnessed with respect to the nuclear test ban are highly encouraging and welcome. They are a source of hope for us. I would like in this connection to congratulate the Governments of the United States, France and the Russian Federation for their decision to extend their voluntary nuclear testing moratoria and for their support for the early commencement of negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. I also wish in this respect to express Egypt's full satisfaction at the adoption by the Conference on Disarmament, at the last meeting on 10 August held under the chairmanship of the Ambassador of Cuba, of a decision calling upon the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban to conduct consultations during the inter-sessional period, that is from 3 September next to 17 January 1994, on the specific mandate for, and the organization of the negotiations for a CTBT. We hope that these consultations will yield positive results. Here I wish to pay tribute to Ambassador Tanaka of Japan, who has shown remarkable foresight in choosing to dedicate much of this year's time in the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban to expert presentations on the various aspects of verification of a CTBT. These presentations have helped us all to understand the benefits and drawbacks of each specific verification technique, be it seismic or non-seismic. We are now in a much better position to embark on an active negotiating process in the Ad Hoc Committee in accordance with operative paragraph 7 of General Assembly resolution 47/76.

(The President)

For its part, Egypt hopes that we can rapidly proceed to the adoption of a specific negotiating mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee and then go on to the negotiating phase on the basis of already existing drafts. In this respect we express our appreciation to the delegation of Sweden for the updated version of a draft comprehensive test-ban treaty contained in document CD/1202 and we will carefully study this draft. Egypt is prepared to make full use of the inter-sessional period so as to proceed as expeditiously as possible to that end.

(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)

... Here, two points seem to us to require attention: the nuclear test ban and security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The conditions are now to hand for furnishing the Conference with the instruments needed to begin negotiations in these two areas of fundamental importance for the maintenance and reinforcement of the non-proliferation regime.

In this regard, my delegation welcomes the positive attitude of the major nuclear Powers, which say they are ready to take part in negotiations on a treaty to ban nuclear tests of all kinds. The impact such a treaty would have on the success of efforts to stop the qualitative improvement and proliferation of nuclear weapons is undeniable. My delegation hails the recent decision by the United States, France and Russia to extend the moratorium on nuclear testing. This decision will help to create a climate of confidence favourable to the opening of negotiations. The Conference, as the only multilateral body, is clearly the appropriate forum in which to conduct such negotiations. Hence my delegation welcomes the decision taken by the Conference on 10 August and hopes that the talks that the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee will hold during the inter-sessional period to hammer out the details of the Ad Hoc Committee's mandate will be successful.

(continued)

(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)

Besides dispelling all the concerns about environmental damage, a nuclear test ban would undoubtedly increase the chances of success at the NPT Review Conference for which preparations are already under way; the NPT is, in the eyes of the international community, an essential tool for the maintenance of peace and security. The ban would also illustrate the will of all nuclear Powers to embark upon general and complete nuclear disarmament, which alone can free humanity from this terrifying weapon whose use is a denial of the highest values of civilization.

Pending the attainment of this object, the non-nuclear-weapon States are entitled to demand and obtain suitable assurances against the threat or use of such weapons. For this reason we favour the swift adoption of a legally binding international instrument.

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

... Last Tuesday, 10 August 1993, the Conference on Disarmament achieved a genuine breakthrough. The Conference on Disarmament decided to give its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate a comprehensive test ban. Furthermore, the Conference requested the Chairman of its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban to make the necessary arrangements to conduct consultations during the period between 3 September and 17 January on the specific mandate for, and the organization of, the negotiation.

The breakthrough on the test-ban negotiations has to be perceived in the broader context of general political developments outside the Conference, especially those that recently occurred. Inside the Conference the breakthrough was greatly facilitated by the recent initiative taken by the delegations of Australia, Mexico and Nigeria to introduce a pertinent draft decision. I would be remiss if I did not pay tribute to those three delegations, as well as to the then President, Ambassador Pérez Novoa, who availed himself in a most professional way of the opportunity offered.

This is an achievement by itself. Let us take advantage of this window of opportunity and not lose time on trivial procedures. Allow me, to present briefly the Netherlands' conceptualization of the test ban as an arms-control measure. Secondly, I would like to map out the views of my delegation on the specific modalities for our future negotiations.

First, the place of a test ban as an arms-control measure. We did at the time welcome the declaration of Vancouver of 4 April 1993 in which Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed that negotiations on a multilateral nuclear test ban should commence at an early date. Looking at this decision in perspective, one could say that it was a landmark in a process: both a political one which saw a major transformation of the situation in Europe; and a corresponding evolutionary process in the notion of security: from nuclear forces becoming weapons of last resort in 1990, to important arms-control agreements (START-I, the Lisbon Protocol and START-II), to increased attention to non-proliferation in a diffuse and volatile world.

The recent decisions of the Presidents of France, Russia and the United States of 2 July to extend the moratoria on nuclear testing and thus to seek an end to nuclear testing altogether are another landmark in that process. Nuclear arms control and disarmament and the different security equation in the 1990s have thus greatly facilitated opportunities for negotiations on a comprehensive test ban.

According to the Netherlands, an end to nuclear testing fits into the broad picture of international security related to nuclear weapons, both nuclear arms control and disarmament and the goal of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is of

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

immediate relevance to worldwide security. The proliferation of nuclear weapons constitutes a threat to international peace and security, as indicated by the Security Council on 31 January 1992. A nuclear test ban would contribute to ongoing efforts to prevent States from developing a nuclear weapon programme.

A nuclear test ban remains therefore of paramount importance and my Government welcomes the prospects of early negotiations on a nuclear test ban in our Conference on Disarmament. These negotiations would inter alia enable the international community to witness the realization of the goals set out in both the PTBT and the NPT: a discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time. This would no doubt further strengthen the international norm against non-proliferation as embodied in the NPT, the future of which will be discussed and decided not too long from now.

Now, some considerations on the specific modalities of our future negotiations. My Government looks forward to the early conclusion of a treaty banning all nuclear tests, that is, not just nuclear weapons tests, but also the so-called "peaceful nuclear explosions". A total ban would strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime and complement the nuclear disarmament process.

Negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament should be on the full set of issues relevant to a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty and not be limited to partial issues like verification. The ban must be negotiated here in Geneva, in the CD. It must subsequently have universal coverage: all States should abide by it. It should also be internationally and effectively verifiable. It is only thus that the goals of non-proliferation, to which we all profess to subscribe one way or another, can be served.

The issue of verification of a nuclear test ban has received attention in the CD since the 1970s. Extensive work on the seismic component, the core of the verification of a future test ban, has already been done. All along the Netherlands has gladly contributed to the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. We are grateful for the promising results obtained so far. Preparations to test the full seismic component of the future verification system are well under way. In that respect the GSETT-3 exercise is of eminent importance. Other than seismic technologies will also be required, and I would like to take this opportunity to thank the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, Ambassador Tanaka, for having guided us through a successful session concentrated on non-seismic techniques from which my delegation has drawn great benefit.

I am sure that Ambassador Tanaka's inter-sessional consultations - the new task entrusted to him by the Conference - will lay a sound foundation for the CD's work in 1994. I gladly pledge my delegation's complete and unreserved support for Ambassador Tanaka's efforts. I am confident the CD will be able to negotiate successfully a multi-faceted verification regime for a nuclear test ban.

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

It is encouraging to note that the five declared nuclear-weapon States have stated that they will engage in consultations here in Geneva parallel to the work in the CD and on the same subjects as addressed by the CD. In the CD, such consultations could well result in a coordinated effort and input in the CD negotiations, allowing these to move swiftly and expeditiously. Although setting precise time-frames for the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament does not seem appropriate today, we would expect them to be brought to fruition in not too distant a future.

Through its breakthrough of 10 August, the Conference on Disarmament reached a landmark. We witness the beginning of a new process which will, within a short period of time, lead to full-fledged negotiations, unconditional if you prefer that qualification, on a nuclear test ban. We are at a starting point. Let us not make a false start!!

Mr. SEMICHI (Algeria) (translated from French):

... I will begin by expressing the relief felt by the entire international community at the agreement just reached on the negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, agreement made possible by the nuclear Powers' courageous decisions to extend the moratoriums on nuclear tests. The urgency of concluding a test-ban treaty is becoming ever greater with the approach of the

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(Mr. Semichi, Algeria)

deadline of 1995, a date that will undoubtedly bring a clarification of many countries' nuclear options, and that precisely in the light of the results of the Review Conference on the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

In this respect I would like to remind the Conference that in recent years the international community has on several occasions spelt out the philosophical basis for a comprehensive test ban by describing such a ban as the first step towards a totally denuclearized world. It has never been a matter of giving legal sanction to a situation by definitively dividing the world into countries which have nuclear weapons and countries which do not. My country is anxious that this aspect of the negotiations should not be overlooked, particularly now that, after years of shilly-shallying and after having described the halting of tests as an ideal, the representatives of certain nuclear Powers seem to wish to convince us that the Non-Proliferation Treaty has created a special category of subjects of international law, what the nuclear Powers call "legitimate" nuclear Powers, as opposed to other Powers or States that they designate by the strongly negative term "proliferators".

That is not merely a rhetorical device, but, just as it would be unrealistic to think that States that have expended huge amounts of effort and money in the context of nuclear rivalry will unilaterally get rid of their arsenals, so it would be unrealistic to think that the current non-nuclear-weapon States, some of which suffered from foreign domination for centuries, will agree to the perpetual minimization of their status as subjects of international law and grant a limited group of Powers the option of nuclear blackmail. That is why, in our view, real deterrence, deterrence that is politically legitimate and acceptable from the humanitarian point of view, is deterrence that, drawing on the principle of the equality of the rights of States and peoples, is founded on the idea that no State should possess categories of weapons that are, as a matter of principle, prohibited for other States. At this stage of international relations, that may seem utopian. None the less, humanity must work to that end in order to preserve international peace and security.

Like the majority of the members of the international community, we do not subscribe to the idea that adherence to a convention that limits or prohibits in itself constitutes good international conduct. On the contrary, we are convinced that it is practical and voluntary respect in good faith of both the letter and the spirit of such a convention - even if scruples of principle may momentarily prevent formal adherence - which establishes the proper norm of international conduct. In the same way, we believe that the value of agreements to reduce or ban weapons should not be undermined by a purely formal legalism which, based on the idea that anything that is not formally prohibited is permitted, would lead to a never-ending race between technology and international security arrangements. When we see that there was an interval of nearly 50 years between the beginning of nuclear testing and the emergence of consensus to end it, or when we know that it took a century from the time of their first use for chemical weapons to be formally

(Mr. Semichi, Algeria)

banned by an international convention, it is tempting to agree with the sceptics who feel that the world will never be safe from weapons of mass destruction.

The dominant powers long interpreted multilateral treaties so as to legitimize their preeminence, which was often only that of their weapons. At the same time they refused to admit that the continuation of a race to develop ever more sophisticated arms with ever more "surgical" accuracy was less a reflection of real security or defence needs than of their inability to undertake the necessary conversion of their cumbersome arms industries. The pretext of the cold war no longer being valid, those with direct interests in the military-industrial complexes are now seeking among the upheavals of all sorts shaking the countries of the South elements which might serve as an excuse for their Governments to apply the old policies, either by intervention in the internal disputes of the weaker countries or by maintenance of a frantic rate of renewal of the military technologies that destabilize the balances needed for peace, revive the climate of uncertainty and suspicion and swallow up the funds needed for development. In this respect, my country feels that the excessive arms manufacturing capacity in certain countries and those same countries' propensity systematically to seek military uses for all the fruits of human genius fundamentally discredit their professed commitments to transparency or disarmament. Transparency must not, we feel, be used to distract attention from the need to put an end to the arms race and to undertake the conversion of the tools of arms production.

Mr. GOONETILLEKE (Sri Lanka):

... President Clinton's recent announcement extending the United States moratorium on nuclear testing has generated a worldwide response rekindling the long felt need to commence concrete negotiations of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban regime on a solid footing. This is a welcome sign in the field of disarmament. The Government of Sri Lanka welcomed the United States initiative with enthusiasm. Similarly, Sri Lanka is further encouraged by the announcements made by the Russian Federation and France, which reinforce international endeavours towards nuclear disarmament. My delegation sincerely welcomes similar commitments from the remaining two nuclear Powers, which will no doubt further consolidate the nuclear disarmament initiatives, including the conclusion of a CTB.

(Mr. Goonetilleke, Sri Lanka)

We are convinced that a multilaterally-negotiated CTB will constitute one of the main universal instruments to hold back nuclear-weapons proliferation, both vertical as well as horizontal, and to reverse the nuclear arms race in this post-cold-war era.

My delegation is heartened by the decision of the Conference to initiate the negotiation to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty, which has long been a goal of the international community in this regard, I wish to register my delegation's sincere appreciation to the delegations of Australia, Mexico and Nigeria who jointly put forward the original proposal, thus enabling us to take the above decision. Sri Lanka fully shares the thrust and the main objective of this proposal, namely to give a negotiating mandate to the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban to undertake multilateral negotiation to conclude a universally applicable and internationally verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. The draft mandate presented by Australia in keeping with the spirit of the above proposal equally deserves the support of the member States.

As the Chairman of the G-21 stated, I wish to underline the desirability of commencing consultations in the Ad Hoc Committee, beginning in the inter-sessional period this year, with a view to concluding negotiation of a CTB by the end of 1994.

My delegation recognizes the considerable preparatory inputs so far contributed by the Ad Hoc Committee on NTB under the skilful guidance of Ambassador Tanaka of Japan and his predecessors. We also note with satisfaction the valuable contribution of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events and other experts who presented various non-seismic verification methods. My delegation associates itself with the views of many other delegations that the verification regime, being one of the most important aspects of the CTB, should be an internationally verifiable one. In this context, the seismic methods should constitute the core of such a verification regime, due to the fact that the international community in general has wider accessibility to such standard techniques and in view of their cost-effectiveness in comparison to non-seismic techniques.

My delegation also appreciated the valuable contribution of the Swedish delegation, particularly by presenting its revised draft proposal for a CTB which is now being studied in our capital. While awaiting observations from relevant national authorities, we hope that this draft proposal will receive the consideration it merits when the Ad Hoc Committee commences its negotiations.

(Mr. Goonetilleke, Sri Lanka)

... The States parties to the NPT are passing through a preparatory process for the 1995 NPT Conference. Conclusion of a CTB as well as concrete and positive measures to conclude a multilaterally negotiated universal treaty for negative and positive security assurances until such time the existing nuclear arsenals are completely eliminated and the nuclear arms race put to an end will strengthen our hands to consider the question of indefinite extension of the NPT when we face the 1995 Review Conference. In these disarmament endeavours my delegation will continue to cooperate with this Conference as well as with other fora. Success in such international disarmament endeavours, including nuclear disarmament, will be one of the main pillars of a stable new world order, to which we have been aspiring all along.

(Mr. Zemskov, Russian Federation)

... Furthermore the initiation of multilateral negotiations on the elaboration of a comprehensive test-ban treaty would contribute effectively to the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the success of the 1995 conference. The consensus decision by our forum on this issue was highly appreciated in Moscow. For the first time in the long history of discussion of this problem, all five nuclear Powers, together with other participants in the Conference, agreed to work for a comprehensive nuclear test ban. This step taken by the Conference is, of course, only the beginning of painstaking work on the text of the treaty and we intend to take a very active part in this endeavour. It is important to ensure that this process continues in a favourable atmosphere of silence at the nuclear test sites.

Our approaches to the practical side of this issue, that is how to organize the negotiations, have already been outlined. I would like to confirm that we are in favour of parallelism in the negotiating process: on the one hand, multilateral negotiations within the framework of this CD in accordance with a clear mandate defining the specific parameters of such negotiations and the scope of the problems, and on the other hand consultations among the five nuclear Powers as an important element of the overall work on the treaty.

Mr. SLIPCHENCKO (Ukraine):

... Assessing the achievements of the current session, we should undoubtedly refer first of all to the adoption by the Conference of the landmark decision giving its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty as a universal, internationally and effectively verifiable document. It is perfectly clear at this moment that the road leading to the eventual conclusion of a CTBT will be an arduous one, but it is equally evident that by having embarked upon it the Conference has reaffirmed its unique status as the most authoritative negotiating body on disarmament and international security.

This brings the Conference at least one step closer to the fulfilment of its ultimate mandate, which is to be reaffirmed as universal and complete disarmament. However distant and even elusive this goal might seem, it will never lose its moral allure of an historic challenge confronted by humanity. It is within this conceptual framework that we regard a CTBT as an extremely

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(Mr. Slipchencko, Ukraine)

important instrument of the reinforcement of the international regime of non-proliferation and thus of raising the level of stability in the development of the entire system of international relations. I would say in this connection that the role of the Conference should not be perceived as the one of the guardian at the doors of the nuclear club. It should be always aware of its general mandate, which is reflected in the very name of the Conference on Disarmament.

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(Mr. Slipchencko, Ukraine)

... We are equally committed to being an active part of the multilateral effort to negotiate a CTBT, which has entered a practical phase, and to looking for new approaches in order to ensure progressive development on other issues and the efficient functioning of the Conference itself. Recent proposals tabled at this forum by the Special Coordinator, Ambassador O'Sullivan, could provide Ukraine and other countries with new opportunities in this respect. I hope that the Conference will not fail to submit to the General Assembly a consensus decision on this matter.

Mr. DALMAN (Chairman, Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts): I am pleased to report today on the recent session of the Ad Hoc Group, held from 26 July to 6 August 1993, and to introduce the Group's progress report, which is contained in document CD/1211.

The session was attended by experts and representatives from 29 countries. The broad participation in the group, with translation into all United Nations languages and an increased amount of working documents, put an increased burden on the secretariat. The Group appreciates the efforts by all concerned to cope with this situation.

Mr. President, let me at this time join in the words of appreciation that you expressed to Mr. Michael Cassandra, who is leaving Geneva today, for the outstanding contribution he has made over the years to the work of the Group of Scientific Experts.

Before commenting on the progress report, it might be appropriate at this moment to briefly summarize the GSE activities. The Group of Scientific Experts was established by the CCD in 1976 to consider international cooperative measures to detect and identify seismic events. Through its initial work, the Ad Hoc Group established the basic principles and the general structure for the international exchange of seismological data for monitoring purposes. The guiding principles and the general structure have remained essentially unchanged despite the almost revolutionary technical development of the system that has taken place.

The system has consisted since its beginning of a global network of seismological stations connected through national data centres to an

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(Mr. Dalman, Chairman, Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts)

international data centre. The system has been looked upon as a service facility for participating countries by providing easily accessible data collected on a global scale for national assessment. The system and its International Data Centre are not supposed to make any final assessments as to the nature of the event, that is, to distinguish between earthquakes or explosions.

In the early days the system was based on the exchange of parameter data obtained through the analysis of regional recordings at national data centres. These parameter data contained the information to allow the detection and location of the event by the International Data Centre. The reporting also contained a so-called identification parameter, describing, for example, the shape or the frequency content of the signals, to assist participating countries in the interpretation or identification of events. A lot of work was done at that time to develop and test suitable such identification parameters. This limited reporting constrained to parameter data only, which corresponded to about one written page per day, was partly due to the limited technical data transmission capabilities of those days. The main reason was, however, the political concern at the time about exchanging large volumes of original recordings.

The political climate has changed and the constraints have been lifted. Over the years the system has gradually been developed through research efforts, through the installation of new technical facilities in individual countries and through efforts within the Group to modernize the system so as fully to utilize the scientific and technological developments. The experimental system now being proposed by the Group thus differs considerably from the original system, not only in technical design, but also in capability.

The new system which was presented to the Conference on Disarmament following the Group's meeting in February this year is based on the on-line transmission of data from a global network of high-quality stations to an advanced International Data Centre. The system is designed to meet far-reaching technical and operational requirements. Most of these stations are array stations, where many sensors are emplaced to form an antenna to improve signal detection. This primary, or Alpha network is supplemented by a larger number of stations, referred to as the Beta network, from which data is retrieved by the International Data Centre as required. Individual countries may contribute additional data, called gamma data, as they see fit in order to facilitate the analysis of an event.

The system is thus now based on the on-line exchange of complete recordings, which means that all information is available to all participants. This has made the exchange of special identification parameters, which was a most essential element in earlier versions of the system, unnecessary, as such parameters can be calculated from the original data in a manner that suits the actual need by the individual countries receiving this data.

The Group has, during its session, elaborated functional requirements for the components of this new International Seismic Monitoring System. These elaborations have been based on material provided by a number of working

(Mr. Dalman, Chairman, Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts)

groups. Several of these working groups have thereby finalized their work. An annex attached to the progress report summarizes these elaborations. This annex presents the objectives and the overall concept of the system, which I have already briefly outlined. It further contains the technical specifications for the stations to be used and for the International Data Centre. Based on the experience from previous tests and on results of computer simulation, the GSE now proposes a specific network of 52 Alpha stations to be used in the forthcoming experiment, which we refer to as GSETT-3. GSETT-3 thus differs substantially from previous large-scale tests as the Group now proposes a specific network. This experimental network has an estimated detection threshold of about magnitude 3.5 in most parts of the globe, somewhat lower on the continents. To achieve a detection threshold on magnitude 3.5 and even somewhat better in most parts of the world is the most significant improvement of today's capability. GSETT-2, which utilized data from available stations and which did not attempt to create an optimized network, provided a detection capability of magnitude 4.5 or less. This means that the experimental network now proposed is estimated to have a detection capability at least 10 times that obtained during GSETT-2.

Annex 1 contains a tentative distribution of the Alpha stations, containing 27 array and 25 three-component stations, based to the extent possible on existing facilities. This distribution may be somewhat modified during the further planning of the experiment. Those countries which have stations that will form part of the experimental network are urged to make formal commitments to contribute these facilities to GSETT-3.

The Group has established a tentative plan and schedule for the implementation and testing of the experimental system. The intention is to start the full-scale testing on a global scale by 1 January 1995. Work is already under way, not only to define the system and the functional requirements of its components, but also to develop the experimental International Data Centre in the United States.

The Ad Hoc Group has established three working groups with great responsibilities to handle GSETT-3: one for planning, one for operation and one for evaluation. As GSETT-3 is to be a major undertaking by the Group, the overall coordination will be conducted by the Chairman and the Scientific Secretary. The Group is paying special attention to a continuing evaluation of the test to be able to provide the Conference on Disarmament and the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban with experience and results as GSETT-3 evolves.

The Group considered during its session the cost of establishing and operating seismological systems and focused on the experimental system to be utilized during GSETT-3. In my presentation to the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban on 5 August, I discussed the issue of cost estimates at some length and I will today only briefly summarize the Group's present analysis, which is annexed to the progress report.

The Group stresses that careful analysis is required to make cost estimates with reasonable accuracy. Such an analysis must be based on fairly detailed knowledge, not only of the geographical extent of the system but also

(Mr. Dalman, Chairman, Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts)

of the operational requirements such as reliability, security and redundancy. Estimates of investment cost for stations in virgin areas are quite uncertain, as the main part of the cost usually is not instrument or equipment cost but rather construction cost or cost of necessary infrastructure, which may be quite difficult to estimate without careful site surveying. The running costs for a given facility could vary considerably from one country to another depending on labour cost and also on administrative regulations, which, for example, makes transmission cost, which is a significant running cost, several times higher in one country than in another. The administrative overhead, which depends on the organizational framework of the system, could also be a most significant part of the overall cost. The Group has made estimates of the investment and running cost of the experimental network to be used in GSETT-3. As this network is based to a large extent on existing facilities, these estimates should be fairly accurate. The experimental network proposed makes maximum use of early investments estimated to be about 150 million United States dollars. New investments needed to bring the system up to the desired station distribution and technical quality are estimated at 20 million dollars. This includes 3 million dollars of new investment in the prototype IDC now being established in the United States. The total running cost of the entire system is estimated at 25-30 million dollars per year. The Group has not discussed how these costs should be covered.

The Group received during its session briefings from individual delegations on activities of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, especially on its hearings on non-seismic verification techniques. These presentations were much appreciated, and I hope this dialogue between the Committee and the Ad Hoc Group will be developed. To this end, the Group decided to invite the Chairman of the Committee to its next session to present issues dealt with by the Committee that are relevant to the work of the Ad Hoc Group.

The Group received and discussed proposals for work on seismic event identification methods and non-seismological monitoring techniques and a proposal for the expansion of the mandate of the Group to include also considerations of non-seismological methods. No consensus was reached on these proposals. It was, however, agreed that I should undertake informal consultations on these issues and report the result at the next session of the Group.

Informal technical meetings held between the Group's formal sessions have over the year contributed significantly to the progress of the Group. The Group noted with appreciation that two such technical meetings had been convened since the Group's previous session. One meeting, hosted by Italy in Rome from 1 to 3 March 1993, was focused on seismological procedures. The other meeting, hosted by the United States in Landsdowne, Virginia, from 29 June to 2 July 1993, considered issues related to the planning of GSETT-3. Many participants in the Group attended and contributed to these two meetings. As to the continued contacts with the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Group appreciated the offer of Dr. Duma of Austria to act as a contact person to maintain informal contacts with IAEA. The Group had earlier similar arrangements with the World Meteorological Organization.

(Mr. Dalman, Chairman, Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts)

The Group considers that the establishment and testing of the proposed experimental system which we refer to as GSETT-3 is a logical next undertaking. GSETT-3 will provide valuable information and experiences that continuously could be made available to the Conference on Disarmament and to the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. The experimental system will also provide an infrastructure that might prove valuable in the establishment of the ultimate verification system.

The Ad Hoc Group has been serving the Conference on Disarmament for 17 years. When the CD now is focusing its efforts on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, the Group is ready to continue serving the Conference to the best of its ability and to carry out the tasks entrusted to it. To that end, the Group suggests that its next session be convened from 7 to 18 February 1994 in Geneva or at the date that is most responsive to the needs of the Conference on Disarmament. In addition, the Ad Hoc Group recognizes that, depending on the activities of the Conference on Disarmament, it may become necessary to meet more frequently than in the past.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank Mr. Dahlman, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, for the presentation he has given us of this valuable progress report. You will notice that the progress report contains in its paragraph 13, a suggestion to the effect that the next session of the Group be convened in Geneva from 7 to 18 February 1994, that is next year, or at a date that is most responsive to the needs of the Conference on Disarmament. This suggestion, of course, relates to the recent decision of the Conference to give to the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate a comprehensive test-ban treaty. It is in that light that we should understand the last sentence of paragraph 13 by which the Ad Hoc Group recognizes that, depending on the activities of the Conference on Disarmament, it may be necessary for this Group to meet more frequently than has been the case so far and in the past. However, for the moment we should consider the dates recommended by the Ad Hoc Group, keeping in mind the possibility of adjusting these dates depending on the arrangements of the Conference. And therefore at our next plenary meeting on Thursday, 26 August, I will put to you a recommendation concerning the dates for the next session of the Group, with the proviso that those dates might be adjusted in order to respond to the needs of the activities of the Conference on Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I declare open the 663rd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

... I wish to inform you that, as announced at the previous plenary meeting, I intend to propose to the Conference that it should consider taking action at the end of the meeting on the recommendation contained in paragraph 13 of the progress report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, as well as the report of the Chairman of the open-ended consultations on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference, which has been circulated as document CD/WP.446.

(Mr. Lever, United Kingdom)

... In addition to concrete achievement in the field of nuclear arms control there is also the prospect of the achievement of a comprehensive test ban. The preamble of the NPT recalled the determination expressed by the parties to the limited test-ban treaty to seek an end to all nuclear tests. Momentum is now gathering towards the realization of this goal, a process in which the United Kingdom is ready to play a full and constructive part. We welcome the recent decision to give the Conference on Disarmament's Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a new mandate in preparation for these negotiations. We hope that the membership of the Conference on Disarmament can be expanded before substantive negotiations begin in the New Year. A carefully negotiated comprehensive test-ban treaty, to which all CD members are parties, will reinforce efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. We look forward to adding such a treaty to the list of achievements of the Conference

(Mr. Lever, United Kingdom)

on Disarmament itself. But our commitment to work constructively for a comprehensive test-ban treaty reflects our assumption that the non-proliferation Treaty will remain in force as well.

Mr. BRODININGRAT (Indonesia):

... One of the most topical issues to date is, without doubt, that of the comprehensive test ban. In this regard, let me, at the outset, join other delegations in welcoming the decision taken by the Governments of the United States of America, France and the Russian Federation to prolong the moratoria on their nuclear testing. We further hope that the other nuclear-weapon States will soon join this beautiful concert of silence on the nuclear-testing sites, and thus open the window of opportunity even wider for a definite CTBT. Consistent with its fundamental policy towards the total elimination of all weapons of mass destruction, to which a CTBT would certainly contribute, Indonesia has always been active in any collective efforts undertaken by the international community with a view to concluding the treaty. During the cold war era, when attempts toward this end through the Conference on Disarmament were stalemated by the super-Powers' rivalry and bloc politics, six non-nuclear-weapons States members of the Conference on Disarmament, namely Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Sri Lanka, Venezuela and the former Yugoslavia, launched the initiative to achieve a CTBT through the amendment conference of the partial test-ban Treaty (PTBT), which was eventually held in 1991. Unfortunately, this road too was prevented from reaching its final destination.

(continued)

(Mr. Brotodiningrat, Indonesia)

To date, with the positive change in the international political climate, a fresh momentum is gathering for renewed and, hopefully, more serious efforts toward the conclusion of a CTBT. Therefore, alongside the initiative taken in the Conference on Disarmament, Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, in his capacity as President of the PTBT amendment conference, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 47/46, called a special meeting of the States parties to the PTBT on 10 and 11 August 1993 in New York, for the express purpose of examining the feasibility of reconvening the amendment conference later this year. The following are the conclusions drawn by the President at the end of the special meeting. Firstly, the special meeting of the States parties to the PTBT directed their attention to the fact that consideration of a CTBT has been under way on three tracks, namely at the Conference on Disarmament, at the amendment conference and in the consultations among the nuclear Powers. Secondly, some delegations attending the meeting expressed their own preference as to the forum in which a CTBT should be pursued. There was none the less a general consensus that the work on a CTBT in the three different forums should be mutually supportive and complementary. Thirdly, the special meeting also welcomed the decision of the Conference on Disarmament to give its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate a CTBT. Fourthly, the States parties entrusted further the President of the amendment conference with the task of continuing his consultations with the State parties as well as the non-States parties to the PTBT and holding another special meeting early in 1994, in order to review developments and assess the situation regarding a CTBT and to examine the feasibility of resuming the work of the amendment Conference later that year. As far as my delegation is concerned, in view of the capital importance that we attach to a CTBT, we would prefer to keep all options open, particularly at a time when a CTBT has assumed added urgency in relation to the approaching 1995 NPT conference. In my delegation's view, the conclusion of a CTBT will certainly strengthen the existing non-proliferation regime, in particular the vertical aspect of proliferation. It could also serve as a litmus test of the nuclear-weapon States' commitment to nuclear disarmament.

Mr. VENERA (Czech Republic): Mr. President, it is an honour for me to address this central body of multilateral negotiations on disarmament which works this month under your distinguished and brilliant presidency. Allow me to thank on this occasion Ambassador Pérez Novoa of Cuba for the excellent manner in which he presided over our Conference during the past weeks. The Czech Republic attaches great importance to its deliberations which in the past led to the conclusion of such important disarmament treaties as the

(Mr. Venera, Czech Republic)

non-proliferation Treaty, the partial test-ban Treaty or quite recently the Convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. Czechoslovakia participated actively in the elaboration of these agreements and in their application. As one of the successor States to the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic we therefore feel associated with what the Conference on Disarmament has achieved so far.

As the Conference concentrated in the past years on the elaboration of the chemical weapons Convention, it should also in the nearest future focus on one or two "promising" issues so that it does not take another decade before new agreements are delivered. The arms race of the cold war period assured a lot of work to be accomplished by institutions like this Conference and it should be accomplished without undue delay. All agenda items should be addressed with equal responsibility. However, some will require longer-term efforts while other tasks seem both urgent as well as achievable in the foreseeable future. A nuclear test ban is an urgent issue since continued nuclear-weapon testing could hardly contribute to the success of the NPT review conference and the required prolongation of the functioning of the Treaty already in 1995. It also seems achievable in view of the constructive approach of the nuclear-weapon States embodied in the ongoing moratorium on nuclear tests. We are looking forward to the early opening of multilateral negotiations on the comprehensive test ban. They will not need to start from scratch; a number of verification issues of the future test ban have been usefully discussed both in the GSE as well as in the relevant working group. The Czech Republic intends to assure an active participation of its experts in the GSE and its share in the future transmission of seismic data which will be essential for CTB verification.

(Mr. Ri, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

The decision taken this year, marking the thirtieth anniversary of the adoption of the partial nuclear test-ban-Treaty by the Conference on Disarmament, to begin negotiations for a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty (CTBT), may be described as historic. Its scope is very vast, even though this is but a first step, given the time and efforts devoted to the achievement of this objective. It is common knowledge that nuclear testing involves many politico-military dimensions and immeasurable risks. Nuclear tests themselves represent a most dangerous arms race among the nuclear Powers and constitute a principal source of nuclear arms proliferation. If we do not achieve a halt to all nuclear tests, it will not be possible to avoid nuclear multipolarization, which would enable each of the nuclear Powers to become a pole, and the race for nuclear superiority among a number of poles would lead to a danger incomparable to the era of the bi-polar cold war. Then the moratoriums on nuclear testing announced last year and the decisions to extend the moratoriums on nuclear testing, taken respectively by the United States, the Russian Federation and France, prompted the support and active encouragement of the international community, the States possessing nuclear weapons must certainly have become resigned to the imminence of a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

At the present time certain countries have become very active to become permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations. When we note that the five countries which are currently permanent members of the Security Council are all nuclear-weapon States, the intentions and the efforts of a country which is already adequately endowed with nuclear facilities and has the capacity to produce nuclear weapons at any time in seeking membership pose a serious problem for the international community. My delegation fully supports the initiative taken by a number of representatives to begin without delay the negotiation of a CTBT, now that conditions and the climate are favourable, and to conclude it in 1995.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America):

... I am taking the floor to acknowledge the excellent report that Dr. Ola Dahlman introduced last week, and that we are approving today, on the recent meeting of the Group of Scientific Experts (GSE). My Government is pleased that preparations for GSETT-3 are well under way. Like others, we attach great importance to this seismic experiment, and the recent GSE report provides important details about the experiment's schedule and preparation. I would like to take this opportunity, as we have done in the past, to stress the importance of wide participation in the upcoming GSETT-3 experiment. Delegations in this room can contribute to its success, but participation across each hemisphere is extremely important.

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

My delegation was gratified that the recent GSE session saw many opportunities for valuable exchanges between GSE and the nuclear test ban Ad Hoc Committee. These exchanges continued to show that both bodies have much to gain by interaction and discussion. Accordingly, we believe that it would be worth while for CD delegations to gain a better insight and understanding of the GSE international data centre located in Arlington, Virginia, near Washington D.C. This centre will be used during the upcoming GSETT-3 experiment.

To that end, I have the pleasure to announce that the United States Government is inviting interested heads of CD delegations or their representatives to visit this centre during the upcoming United Nations First Committee session. The United States GSE delegation will host this event, and my Government is looking at the time frame of between 1 November and 4 November. The United States currently envisions that this will be a one-day affair, with CD delegates travelling from New York and returning, at their own expense, for briefings and demonstrations of the capabilities of the international data centre.

The United States delegation believes that such an event will help to go a long way in understanding technical seismic capabilities in the GSETT-3 context, and their possible application to the verification of an eventual comprehensive test-ban treaty. I am happy to extend this verbal invitation and I will follow up with details at a later stage.

Mr. BAATI (Tunisia)

... Our attachment to peace and security has on many occasions been reflected in the prompt signature and swift adoption of the international instruments negotiated in the field of disarmament. Tunisia's participation in the Paris

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(Mr. Baati, Tunisia)

Conference and its prompt signing of the Convention on chemical weapons offer further signs of its faith in the effectiveness and solidity of the commitments negotiated in the transparent and multilateral forum of the Conference on Disarmament. This signature corroborates our commitment to work with others for a further reduction in chemical weapons and weapons which represent a source of danger and our desire to promote the establishment of lasting peace and security in the world. At a time when we welcome the latest initiatives by President Clinton followed by those of Presidents Yeltsin and Mitterrand on the extension of the moratorium on nuclear tests and the decision taken by consensus in this Conference to initiate the process aiming at the negotiation of a treaty relating to the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, we cannot conceal our disappointment at seeing Tunisia deprived of the possibility of contributing in a full and proper manner to this collective endeavour as a full member of the Conference on Disarmament. Finally, I should like to add that this matter will continue to be the subject of consultations between Tunisia and certain members of the Conference on Disarmament.

(The President)

I now invite the Conference to proceed to the adoption of the recommendation contained in paragraph 13 of the progress report on the thirty-sixth session of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, as indicated in document CD/1211, which has been circulated. In accordance with that recommendation, the Ad Hoc Group will be convened from 7 to 18 February 1994 in Geneva, or at any other date that might be most appropriate to the needs and the work of the Conference on Disarmament. It is of course also understood that, depending on the activities of the Conference, it may become necessary for the Ad Hoc Group to meet more frequently than in the past. Accordingly, the proposed dates are subject to adjustment or change whenever the Conference deems necessary. We may also convene the Ad Hoc Group for additional sessions if necessary, and if there is no objection I shall take it that the Conference so decides.

It was so decided.

Mr. ERRERA (France) (translated from French): Mr. President, allow me first of all to tell you how happy my delegation is to see you presiding over our work at a time that is so critical for the future of the Conference on Disarmament, whether as regards the expansion of the membership or the forthcoming negotiation of a nuclear-test-ban treaty. We wish you all the best in your mission and naturally assure you of the full support of our delegation.

The Conference on Disarmament has just adopted by consensus, paragraph 13 of the report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events (CD/1211). On this occasion my delegation would like to stress the following points. As the Chairman of the Group of Scientific Experts (GSE) himself said at our last plenary meeting, this Group was set up in 1976 and over the last few years has been working on the basis of a project which dates back to that time. As all of us will remember, the nuclear-test-ban treaty envisaged at that time by three countries, provided only for a lightweight, national verification regime. That is why under the seismological network as designed at present the detected data will be retransmitted only to participating States to be analysed by each of them for purposes of national verification.

Today we find ourselves in a new context: the Conference on Disarmament in its recent decision CD/1212, undertook to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty which is global and internationally and effectively verifiable, in order to contribute to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects. We therefore believe that it is important for the Conference to review the present concept of a seismological network in the light of these criteria and adopt the necessary decisions to ensure that this network can meet the requirements of negotiations on the future treaty. My delegation has taken note of the readiness of the Group of Scientific Experts to change the pace of work it has followed hitherto. But it is not just a matter of the pace at which the Group works - it is the whole of its task which is now indissolubly

(Mr. Errera, France)

linked to the future negotiations. Therefore, in the eyes of my delegation the fact that the Conference on Disarmament has adopted paragraph 13 of the report of the GSE today can in no way prejudice the overall concept of the verification regime for a future comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, nor the arrangements for its implementation, which can stem only from the negotiation of such a treaty by the Conference on Disarmament.

Mr. TANAKA (Japan): I have taken the floor to present the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, which is on the table today as document CD/1220. In preparing the report we followed the recommendations of the meeting on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference,

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(Mr. Tanaka, Japan)

chaired by Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan, and tried to make it as short and concise as possible, focusing on the factual progress made in the Committee during this year's session.

Let me express how pleased I am to have chaired the Committee this year. The Committee benefited from a constructive and positive atmosphere throughout the session on the issues under its mandate. The Committee has engaged in useful discussions to mark a long step towards achieving a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Furthermore, the decision of the Conference on 10 August (CD/1212) to give a negotiating mandate to the Committee made the Committee jump to a new stage.

This year a lot of important and unprecedented events happened. The delegation of France participated in the work of the Committee for the first time, and thus all the acknowledged nuclear-weapon States participated. We devoted the whole second part to discussions of non-seismic verification technologies, and all the meetings then enjoyed expert contributions. As a result the Committee's discussions on verification have been much enriched. Finally, we now have the decision that we will negotiate a CTBT.

I really feel honoured to be able to associate myself with the great accomplishments of the Conference, and strongly endorse the recommendation of the Committee that it be re-established at the outset of the 1994 session. Furthermore, I sincerely hope that this report, incorporated in the CD report, will be given due attention by the United Nations General Assembly so that all the Member States of the United Nations may duly appreciate the progress made in the CD this year and the important mission which the CD and its Ad Hoc Committee on an NTB will pursue next year with a view to achieving a CTBT.

Allow me now to thank all the delegations, both members and non-members of the CD, who participated in the work of the Committee, for their contribution. My special appreciation goes to the group coordinators, Australia, Mexico and the Russian Federation, as well as China and Sweden. I would also like to express my deep thanks to those delegations who contributed greatly to the work of the Ad Hoc Committee by way of providing the Committee with highly competent experts. It would be remiss of me not to mention the excellent support my delegation received from the secretariat headed by Ambassador Berasategui, and especially from Mr. Cassandra, Secretary of the Ad Hoc Committee. Finally, on behalf of the Committee I should like to thank the interpreters for their efficient translation of complicated technologies which contributed to the smooth conduct of our meetings this year.

I continue to have the honour to conduct consultations during the inter-sessional period. I am determined to do my best and I look forward to receiving equally determined cooperation from my colleagues and the secretariat.

Mr. LAMPREIA (Brazil):

... There is an obvious need under present world conditions to proceed to a revision of the conceptual basis of the policies that support the existence of nuclear weapons and, as a corollary, the improvement of existing nuclear arsenals. The constructive attitude taken by nuclear-weapon States in extending their moratoria on nuclear tests shows that there is an accrued sensitivity to these issues. In the last few years the Conference was able to concentrate efforts on the elaboration of the chemical weapons Convention, without detriment to negotiations in other areas. Recent developments and the positive mood prevailing have made it clear to my delegation that the same procedure should now be applied to the elaboration of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. In this regard we believe that we should set a target date for the conclusion of the CTBT. The timetable first suggested by Ambassador O'Sullivan in the 29 July plenary, although ambitious, seems to be a good proposition. In order to expedite our work and to make a target date feasible, there is an obvious need to give a broad negotiating mandate to the Ad Hoc Committee on CTB. There is also a need for the consultations with which its Chairman, Ambassador Tanaka, has been entrusted to provide a comprehensive proposal containing not only the mandate but also well-defined working procedures for the Ad Hoc Committee.

Mr. BERNHARDSEN (Norway):

... The Conference on Disarmament has discussed expansion of its membership for more than 10 years without being able to come to an agreement. My delegation was therefore pleased to see the results of Ambassador O'Sullivan's delicate consultations, which for the second time put Norway on a list of possible new members. We are indeed honoured to be invited to join the CD as full members. My country has on many occasions declared our readiness to take on the responsibilities that follow from full membership. The CD is shortly to engage in crucial negotiations on a nuclear test ban. We believe that the CD would have benefited from a broader membership in these as well as in other important subjects on the CD's agenda. Norway, we are sure, could make substantial contributions to these negotiations. Obviously my delegation as well as my authorities in Oslo are greatly disappointed at seeing yet another opportunity slip away for reaching agreement on an expansion of the CD. We believe the package proposed by Ambassador O'Sullivan under the circumstances may be the closest possible to a consensus and that this indeed is a unique opportunity to achieve a most overdue expansion of the Conference. My delegation still hopes that a solution could be found in the hours remaining of this session.

(Mr. Hou, China)

... The Chinese delegation is of the view that the expansion of the membership of the CD is an important, sensitive and complex issue. Its solution is a process of evolution. It cannot be dealt with in a totally perfect and instantaneous manner. We think that the proposal put forward by Ambassador O'Sullivan is a positive compromise in this process of evolution. The Chinese delegation has always actively participated in the consultations and has made its own contributions. We originally intended to join the consensus on this proposal, and we are ready to welcome the new members. It is regrettable that we failed to achieve a consensus today. We understand the sense of disappointment expressed by many delegations of members and non-members. We sympathize with their sentiments. At the same time, we also agree with their views that we must continue to strive. The Chinese delegation would like to stress that the CD is the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. The CD must be further strengthened and expanded on an appropriate basis, particularly at present, when the CD faces new challenges and new opportunities. The CD finds itself at a very important stage. It faces the problem of a solution of NSA, TIA and very soon it must initiate a negotiation on CTBT. Under these circumstances, it requires more than ever the broad participation of the international community. Broad representation is very important. This will contribute to the further improvement of the efficiency of the CD and the strengthening of its role. For this reason, the Chinese delegation hopes that all parties will continue to make an effort and show the necessary spirit of compromise and cooperation, speed up consultations and bring about a proper solution to the membership issue as soon as possible, so that the world community will not be disappointed. The Chinese delegation would like to pledge that, as always, it will continue to participate in the consultation and work for the early achievement of a consensus on this matter, so that we can welcome the new members as soon as possible and work together with them to meet the new challenges and opportunities.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): Last but not least, I put before the Conference for adoption the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, circulated in document CD/1220. Does the Conference adopt the report? I believe that you are happy to do so.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT:

... Section F, "Improved and effective functioning of the Conference". Are there any comments? None. Section G, "Communications from non-governmental organizations". Are there any comments on section G?. Now we shall proceed to chapter III, entitled "Substantive work of the Conference during its 1993 session", which appears in paragraphs 22 to 28 of the document. Are there any comments on this part? No comments. Then, section A, "Nuclear test ban". Are there any comments? None, thank you. We shall now move to section B, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". As agreed at the previous informal meeting, we have added a sentence in paragraph 32, and there are also references in paragraphs 34, 40 and 41, as previously agreed upon, and in section B we have also added document CD/1221. These additions were agreed upon at the previous informal meeting to amend these paragraphs that I have just referred to. Are there any comments? I see none.

Mr. PAC (Poland): Mr. President, in connection with the adoption of the CD report for 1993, in my delegation's capacity as the coordinator of the East European Group and on its behalf I should like to place on record the Group's interest in the chairmanship of the Ad-Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban when such a subsidiary body of the Conference on Disarmament is re-established at the beginning of the CD 1994 session. As will be recalled, the regional group of Eastern Europe has not yet had the opportunity to chair that particular Ad Hoc Committee.

Mrs. BAUTA SOLES (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, I would like first and foremost to congratulate you on the result of our work that we have just adopted, and also to congratulate the rest of our colleagues. The point that has just been raised by the coordinator of the Eastern European Group undoubtedly merits further consideration, and it is my delegation's formal suggestion that this is a point on which you should carry out the necessary consultations. With this Commission, which is a formal proposal by my delegation, I would like to thank you for having given me the floor.

(Mr. Berasategui, Secretary-General of the
Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative
of the Secretary-General of the United Nations)

... Moving to more serious things, I do not intend to philosophize on the work of the Conference, what it should do or what it should be. It would be pretentious on my part to try to do so. But I do think that I can share with you the satisfaction that the Conference has managed to initiate the process that will lead to the negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. This decision reaffirms the responsibilities of the Conference as the international community's multilateral negotiating body on disarmament.

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(The President)

... As already stated, the Conference on Disarmament agreed this year to set up four ad hoc committees, all of which I believe were able to achieve significant progress during the 1993 session. We can also say that the most significant breakthrough this year was achieved in the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban under the experienced and able chairmanship of Ambassador Tanaka of Japan. By deciding to devote much of the Committee's time, including the numerous expert presentations, to verification techniques, whether seismic or non-seismic, the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban was able to achieve positive results made possible by the declarations of the Governments of the United States, France and the Russian Federation to extend their voluntary moratoriums on nuclear testing which culminated in the adoption by the Conference of its resolution contained in document CD/1212, which constitutes a landmark in the history of disarmament negotiations, bearing in mind the positive effect that this will have on the NPT review and extension conference in 1995. The decision by the Conference on Disarmament is a landmark, as I said, in the history of disarmament negotiations. As President of the Conference on Disarmament during its inter-sessional period, I would like to assure Ambassador Tanaka that I will make every effort to facilitate the discharge of the tasks entrusted to his Committee by the Conference on Disarmament's above-mentioned decision. In addition, I am also confident that the inter-sessional period will be further put to good use by finding a negotiating mandate on a CTBT and by reaching agreement on the basis upon which our negotiations in this regard will be built in the 1994 session.

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