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DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT:

BY WHOM - FOR WHOM?

DEVELOPPEMENT DEMOCRATIQUE:

POUR QUI - PAR QUI?

BACKGROUND ARTICLES

ARTICLES DE FONDS

WILLSON HOUSE, MEECH LAKE

MAISON WILLSON, LAC MEECH

MARCH 21-22, 1991

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**I DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT:
THEORETICAL APPROACHES**

Democratic Growth or Gridlock?

Georges Berthoin

THE DEMOCRATIC PROSPECT is a subject of broad and growing interest. People of diverse cultures, historic experiences, political conditions, and responsibilities come together with increasing frequency to understand and build on their quite varied democratic experiences. What those individuals usually have in common is the search for freedom—as much freedom as possible. Whatever their unique background, people seek to find security, acquire knowledge, and inherit the wisdom accumulated by their forefathers, enjoy political and social accommodation, and find the means of self-subsistence to perpetuate the chain of generations.

They understand and share these basic human needs. Although each society finds its inherent justification vis-à-vis its aims and goals, in transforming itself into a political framework of predictability and security, the task is to find harmony. The *raison d'être*, the legitimacy of conferences of democrats, is to transform into reality these human rights. The concept of human rights belongs not to one particular culture or to a particular political group but to mankind as a whole. A political

structure can only find its true sense, its real finality, its truth in as much as it will meet these human rights.

Human rights precede the state. They exist, whatever organizational form it takes. They are the very expression of human nature, inalienable and universal. They are inherent in each human being who is their living testimony, their origin, and their finality. Society is more important than the state. The power of the state must serve man. It is within this relationship that any durable political regime finds its own legitimacy.

Then, one faces the fundamental alternative. A state finds its definition in the free expression of society: "government of the people, by the people, for the people," that is, democracy. Or a state denies the free expression of society and puts down the people through confiscation of their responsibilities, rights, and duties, that is, dictatorship. The difference between the two political systems becomes striking when conflicts break out between society and the state. In a democracy, the people change the leaders, in a dictatorship, the leaders try to change the people.

It is a fact that political systems where the state does not accept the people as they are, or wish to be, abound in history as in contemporary times. All have in common their instability, their defensive attitudes, and their fragility. It is also a fact that, in

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the long run, the strength of society prevails and leads to democracy as political structure, which allows the expression and realization of human rights, as a permanent and universal value. Today Bai Huan, a leading Chinese writer and poet, can proclaim in Shanghai, "Democracy is a universal right." Ahmed Ben Bella, former leader of the Algerian Revolution, acknowledges likewise that "the Algerians are hungry for democracy." In Chile, Pakistan, and Poland, the call for democracy shows how various circumstances, cultures, and religions cannot be an obstacle to the expression of this compelling necessity common to all mankind: political participation.

Suggesting the quasi-mechanical power and the historical determinism of the democratic upsurge must not lead to ignoring the problems it has to face. By definition, democracy is not a fixed, ossified, form of political structure. It expresses a society in constant movement and evolution. Its leaders are permanently placed at the crossroad of what is desirable for the individual and possible for all. Always responsible to the free and regular judgment of the people, they must avoid the dangers of disorganization, helplessness, and obsolescence. They must express both liberty and authority but avoid excess in either.

Hence, democracy, as a political system, expresses society in its needs for flexible change. Furthermore, it provides society with the permanent stability and security that society demands in order to exist. Both are the cause and the consequence of each other. The democratic leader has the formidable task of culling inspiration from the inner logic of both these requirements. He must be from one and from the other. He jointly represents

the people who delegate and control and the state which receives a mandate and must take action. This goes beyond any precise science and explains why politics, when democratically practiced, is an art. The more one departs from dictatorial forms of government toward greater forms of democracy, the more one distances oneself from scientific conceptions (for example, Marxism) to reach pragmatics. Winston Churchill, Charles de Gaulle, and Ronald Reagan, for example, pursued such a pragmatic course.

When information was accessible to few people, active society was limited to a small number. Democratic leadership seemed to be fairly easy. Today, the nature, extent, and speed of change involve a vast number of people. Active society includes everybody, everywhere. The exercise of democracy becomes the responsibility and the demand of the masses. Being more fundamentally comprehensive, democracy, to remain operative, legitimate, and true to its own nature, becomes more complex and as such more vulnerable.

Beyond the purely political aspect, democracy must nowadays address itself to culture and economy. Cultural traditions that enable each human being to find a reassuring and solid answer to the challenges of life are often disrupted. The process of assimilating the new and the unknown is cluttered. The different modes of relation with others seem to become obsolete. What binds men is deteriorating at the very moment when material progress is creating interdependence. This challenge, to all cultures, is found automatically in political societies—be they dictatorial or democratic. It is twofold: on one hand, the masses feel able to become omnipre-

sent and demanding authors of their own destiny; on the other hand, they need new reassuring contexts.

Man needs bread, too. Democratic principles, whatever their intrinsic values, do not mean much to an empty stomach. Even those who have reached enviable standards of living expect that democracy will be able to deliver. The Marshall Plan recognized this situation and organized a coherent recovery program of economic and social means to make Western Europe safe for democracy. A democracy must, in order to face modern challenges, account for the fate of the underprivileged and more generally the fairness of everybody's conditions. From the beginnings of mankind, religious orders have taken up this demand for compassion and charity. Today, democracy must address itself to the economic and social demands of society. This point needs more extensive recognition. Such a challenge does not lead to state interventionism where public authorities assume functions normally undergone by components of society. An attitude of benign neglect of economic and social factors, however, could jeopardize the very structure of society and, in so doing, the state would forfeit one of its functions. Britain, the United States, West Germany, and others are impressive examples of the way this fine-tuning is possible and successful.

The vulnerability of democracy depends on the ways it responds to society's demands, beyond the political demands. Democracy cannot durably exist without them. It finds unique strength in its recognition of the liberty of each human being to express them. The more people extend the area of their own liberty, the larger the basis and content of democracy. It accompanies and illustrates this move-

ment. Through it, it finds growing legitimacy and increased means of action. Automatic adaptation to the requirements and needs of society takes place through institutions that result from free consultation of the people. Through individuals' a priori choices on the basis of their political programs and afterward through their judgment on their records, the state keeps in harmony with society.

Democracy has other challenges that could be opportunities: the globalization of the world and the multiplication of actors within different cultures. As a system, democracy must demonstrate adaptability to different societal realities. One consequence is that various forms can exist. The only prerequisite common to all must remain the respect of human rights. The Western form of democracy is one of many. Even within the Western world, variations exist. For example, the way democracy works in Canada, France, Japan, Spain, Sweden, or the United States is not identical. Cultural, behavioral, historical, climatic, religious factors explain the differences. This means, therefore, that when democracy prevails in a given country, it is not a victory of the West or the United States, but a victory of the people of that country for themselves. If one day the Soviet Union becomes a democracy, the event should be celebrated as a victory for the people that compose this entity and nobody else.

This leads to another challenge: national sovereignty. As the world becomes interdependent, man wants to fight against his fears of boundless, cosmopolitan new spaces. He stresses the identity of what he believes or to what he wants to belong. He feels the need to take refuge in and return to the fundamentals, whether national, religious, or ethnic. Democracy, through

its flexibility and its direct link with the people, represents the national vector for this demand of sovereignty. Herein lies a dangerous dilemma.

On one hand, democracy represents and guarantees the best expression of national sovereignty. On the other, it must be capable of innovations often in advance of the consciousness, traditions, even prejudices of society and adapt its functions to the new requirements of people and technological necessities. It is supposed to address itself altogether to the inner contradictions of the individuals it freely represents. Producers would like to be protectionists; consumers, free traders; spiritual beings, fundamentalists; tourists, tolerant citizens of the world.

Two main trends characterize the present challenges: devolution of power nearer to the individuals and internationalization of main elements in modern society. Being more informed, better equipped, and more involved in the quest for his identity, man wants to bring nearer to home the centers of power to which he will delegate authority. Power must move closer to people, no longer functioning at arms length from them. Democracy is transformed by this general trend through various processes of decentralization, devolution, and regionalization. This brings about an erosion of traditional national sovereignty and tensions between centrifugal and centripetal forces. Forms of internal federalism become necessary, and more systematic use of democratic procedures provides the answers. Large federal systems, such as Canada and the United States of America, show that the solution to these tensions, spreading around the world, is not less democracy but more democracy. Democracy provides the adaptability and flexibility required by the growing in-

volvement of the people and the increased means that modern sciences put at their disposal.

The other challenge all political societies face is the technological evolution that is eroding traditional frontiers behind which national sovereignties lived and prospered. Ideas, people, goods, dangers involve the whole of mankind. Everybody is aware of them because satellites take photographs of Earth from space. Nowadays, this fact is universally recognized but not yet managed. In addition to the economic, social, cultural, and regional dimensions, this planetary dimension is the greatest challenge to democracy.

Today, democracy must reconcile itself with national sovereignty which by nature rejects outside interference while it has to accept and integrate the necessity of international cooperation. Because of the principle of government of the people, by the people, for the people, a government must accept contacts, cooperation, and integration with other peoples who have the same demands of sovereignty. This new type of interrelation and its practical consequences seem contrary to sovereignty. The challenge is serious because applying the democratic principle to the global level can be perceived as betraying the very sovereignty of the people, who are accustomed to expressing it exclusively within the limit of national boundaries.

Often ignored or misunderstood as a purely economic and protectionist device, the European Community provides the beginning of a very advanced, daring, and practical solution. Building from centuries-old European societies, treaties since 1952 have established a democratic process with constitutional delegations. The institutions thus created found their dem-

ocratic legitimacy through the creation of the European Parliament. The 12 sovereign member states, on a universal suffrage basis, jointly elect the members of this parliament. Democracy was therefore introduced on a level where diplomacy traditionally prevailed. Can such an example be applied elsewhere in the world and for the whole of mankind? This question cannot be avoided because the world is engaged in such an irresistible process of interdependence. There is no easy answer. Perhaps the experience of the European community is not acceptable elsewhere. A certainty prevails, however: the problem of world management remains and demands an answer. Democracy would gain a historical victory if it could provide a response to this challenge. Therefore, democrats around the world should study the theoretical and practical aspects of the European Community in its institutional mechanisms and political choices.

Some might wonder if, at this juncture, dictatorship might not offer better prospects than democracy. Despite the formidable means dictatorship can mobilize and master, it is becoming gradually ineffective vis-à-vis the global diffusion of information, knowledge, and hopes. Dictatorship can prosper for a while behind tight national borders. This cannot last as technological development relativizes its means of action through internationalization. The nature and speed of change demand constant flexibility and adaptability, which, by nature, dictatorship does not have and cannot sustain without risking changing itself into a democracy. Because dictatorship does not accept the free and regular consultation of the people, it cannot avoid a growing gap between itself and the people. Its own nature prevents it from being fully aware of society's ex-

istence and importance. Society exists by itself and cannot be prevented from existing. If ignored, dramatic upheavals become unavoidable. The modern world has seen these political earthquakes become increasingly frequent and violent. Then suddenly aware, dictatorship becomes afraid of society, and tyrants pursue the people, as demonstrated by the referendum in Poland or in Chile. At the very moment democrats rejoice, a very serious challenge faces them: is it possible for a dictatorship to transform itself into a democracy without provoking grave tremors putting everybody at risk?

Where it is already in existence, democracy must remain the valid example of modernity. Its mechanisms permit such an adaptation. The wisdom of its people, collective and individual ethics, and political know-how of the leaders will provide the answer: it must remain an attractive, fair, and reliable system of government. The great challenge remains its attitude when and where transitions toward democracy take place.

The tribute paid by dictatorship to the natural superiority of democracy provides an answer. In effect, almost all dictatorships feel the need to look for the formal appearances of legitimacy. Because dictatorship cannot rely for long on sheer brutal force, it recognizes and compares itself with the very essence of human society. Through more or less formal delegations of power or through votes, even with 99.9 percent majorities, or through limited periods of authoritarian rule, dictatorships try to borrow democratic clothes to woo the favors of the people. Examples of this process abound nowadays.

At this juncture, democracies meet their most challenging responsibilities. Western countries found the way to democracy to be long and complex.

This should not be forgotten when one looks at similar efforts in different parts of the world. The modern way in the same direction could be to evolve from a state of complete dictatorship, authoritarianism, or totalitarianism to reach a stage when the rule of law prevails and the formal aspects of constitutional or international law become a reality. Then, within this system, the formal democracy will gradually transform itself into a true democracy by involving the people more directly. Transitions of this nature are and were possible. Greece, Portugal, and Spain are impressive examples of the successful outcome of what so many experts thought impossible.

This supposes a certain sense of re-

sponsibility on the part of existing democracies to have guidelines when new democracies are emerging. One should be aware that democracy sets an example by being responsible and should continue to do so. One should respect the history and culture of the countries undergoing the change to democracy. One should respect their national sovereignty and refrain from state interference. One should remember that world public opinion has existed for years and that, by addressing it with tolerance and vigor, one can reach all corners of the earth and therefore change the course of history. One of the discoveries of modern times is that, if there is determinism in human evolution, it leads mankind toward democracy.

England, the United States, and the Export of Democracy

Enrique Krauze

NOT LONG AGO, the Mexican media announced that the U.S. government had developed a program to promote democracy in the hemisphere. The official document recognized that "the American people find it more expeditious to work with democratic governments than with authoritarian regimes," and it announced a continent-wide meeting to be held in mid-1989 to approve and "proclaim the Magna Carta of Pan-American democracy." Not one editorialist took the trouble to criticize the news by asking the obvious question: Since when has the United States been so interested in hemispheric democracy? In fact, the editorials did not miss the point: showing their natural scepticism, those who transcribed the document simply put the word democracy in quotes.

This short anecdote reveals a long-standing mistrust. It illustrates the problem the world's most powerful democracy will have if it persists in exporting its own political system. The problem is not the system itself: democracy is the best system invented by man thus far. Nor is there an alleged cultural resistance or incompatibility that would make adopting Western-style democracy difficult in

countries that have lived with other traditions for centuries. The problem lies in the poor track record the United States has in the hemisphere and in the inadequate U.S. understanding of its misbehavior.

Throughout history, not all the powerful democracies—or, for that matter, all democratic empires—have had the same limitations. England provides the clearest example of this. A cursory inspection of a map of the former British empire reveals a constellation of democracies. Let us leave aside the most obvious ones, that is, those that were founded directly by British immigrants: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and of course the United States. Small Caribbean islands which live, or have lived, under the British flag are democratic: the Bahamas, St. Lucia, St. Vincent. Others, such as Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad, have survived the most difficult test of democracy and—with the exception of Grenada—have established and removed quasi-totalitarian regimes in a peaceful manner. On the mainland, Belize is a model democracy. Furthermore, one must ask oneself if the resistance along the Misquita coast of Nicaragua does not owe at least something to the liberal English tradition that dominated the region until the end of the nineteenth century.

One can rightly say that the British were less successful in passing along democracy to the African colonies.

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ROBERT A. DAHL

**/ Dilemmas of
Pluralist
Democracy**

Autonomy vs. Control /

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8

Remedies

In a political system as large as a country, a plurality of relatively independent organizations is necessary not only for mutual control but also for the democratic process. Applied on the scale of a country, the democratic process in turn makes relatively independent organizations both possible and inevitable. Yet a problem arises—which I have called the problem of democratic pluralism—because while necessary, desirable, and inevitable in a democratic order, organizational pluralism may also play a part in stabilizing inequalities, deforming civic consciousness, distorting the public agenda, and alienating final control over the public agenda by the citizen body.

For reasons explored in chapter 3, the specific shape of the problem varies in different democratic countries. Because of variations in patterns of conflict and cleavage, concrete political institutions, and the inclusiveness and concentration of organizations, remedies that may be appropriate in one country may be unnecessary or undesirable in another. In this final chapter, therefore, I want to focus on possible remedies appropriate to the shape of the problem of democratic pluralism in the United States.

Limiting Factors

Certain remedies that many people find attractive must be ruled out because of limiting factors. By a limiting factor I mean something that is either inherent in democratic pluralism or necessary to

its existence, so that in order to remove it we should have to destroy democratic pluralism itself. One such limiting factor is of course democracy or, more accurately, the attempt to apply the democratic process to the government of a country. To deal with the problem of democratic pluralism by getting rid of large-scale democracy, as some small-scale democrats seem to envision, would eliminate the problem but not solve it. We would then face a far more formidable difficulty. If in order to remedy the defects of organizational pluralism as it now exists in the United States we were simply to abandon the effort to create large-scale democracy, we would have to adopt one of three alternatives: abolish the state altogether; create a non-democratic state; or break the United States into somewhere between a thousand and a hundred thousand completely autonomous microstates. Since each of these alternatives would leave most Americans much worse off and would surely re-create, though in different form, all the defects now attributed to organizational pluralism, I accept as an irremovable limit on solutions the continuation of the American experiment with large-scale democracy.

Following from the first limit is a second, or rather a set of limits: the democratic dilemmas described in chapter 5. When different groups of citizens set forth conflicting claims to autonomy and control, principles drawn from democratic ideas, general theories of justice, or specific constitutional principles will not necessarily yield a solution that is either unambiguous or incontestably desirable. For example, we cannot properly deny political autonomy and control to certain citizens on the purely substantive ground that they are able thereby to inflict harm on others; for it is likely that any alternative allocation of autonomy and control will also enable some people to harm others. To propose that we resolve such issues on purely utilitarian grounds raises both substantive and procedural problems. Substantively, aside from all the familiar difficulties in a utilitarian appraisal of costs and benefits a more basic difficulty arises when a strictly utilitarian solution confronts claims based on fundamental rights. In addition, some sort of procedure is needed for arriving at judgments about such cases. Even if the legitimacy of the majority

principle were granted, to propose that all jurisdictional issues be settled by a majority decision runs squarely into the question, Which majority is rightfully entitled to settle jurisdictional questions? If one set of contestants is more numerous and more inclusive than another, should the more inclusive majority always prevail? To justify control by the more inclusive majority as invariably a matter of right is easily rebutted by counterexamples. And a justification based only on utilitarian considerations, such as "the greatest good of the greatest number," will once again clash with claims to autonomy justified by appeals to fundamental rights.

In the same way, to justify a grant of political autonomy on the utilitarian ground that concentration of power and political resources is dangerous, and decentralization is therefore desirable, fails to meet the argument that on some matters, including fundamental rights, uniformity is desirable; and uniformity requires centralization and concentration. And so on. I do not mean to imply that reasonable solutions can never be found. Moreover, certain constitutional and political principles would help to guide a country through its conflicts over autonomy and control. But we cannot expect any solution to the problem of democratic pluralism to escape scot-free from the fundamental democratic dilemmas described in chapter 5. For we live in a world where ideal solutions frequently cannot be found, even at the theoretical level. We may, nonetheless, sometimes arrive at satisfactory solutions.

Closely associated with the first two limits is a third. For reasons discussed in the last chapter, we must reject Type I solutions altogether. Yet not all Type II solutions for large-scale democracies are equally desirable.

Finally, and partly as a consequence of the others, a limit is set by the need for some decentralization of economic decisions to relatively autonomous units, including productive enterprises, and consequently also for a system of market controls. The need for decentralization and markets limits solutions not only for economies in which economic enterprises are mainly owned privately but also for those in which the means of production are mainly owned socially

or publicly. For reasons explored in chapter 6, a centrally directed economy, whether owned privately or publicly, is likely to be incompatible in the long run with the existence of democratic controls. For either the Guardians at the Center must be made independent of democratic controls in order to insure that they can "rationally" direct all important economic decisions from the Center, in which case the incompatibility exists by definition; or else they are subject to democratic controls, in which case (as I argued in chapter 6) popular and legislative pressures would make a mish-mash of the detailed, "rational," comprehensive plans of the Guardians. If on these (and other) grounds we reject the solution of a centrally directed economy, it follows that decentralization of important economic decisions is necessary.

Decentralization means, of course, that decision makers at some centers other than *the* Center exercise some autonomy over some decisions. Like the Center in a command economy, these relatively autonomous centers might constitute *the* Center of a local command economy. However, this solution would not only recreate, though on a smaller scale, the problem of how the control of the Guardians in a centrally directed economy can be reconciled with democratic controls; it would also generate a new problem: coordination. Either the decisions of the various centers would not require coordination; or the centers would (somehow) spontaneously coordinate their decisions without benefit of any external controls; or their decisions would be coordinated by some system of external controls that would limit, in some respects, the autonomy of the decision makers at the various centers.

As solutions in a complex economy, the first two are absurd, and so far as I am aware, no satisfactory model exists along either line. External controls might be exercised by higher governmental officials, by market forces, or by both. If market controls were entirely absent, an impossible burden of information and communication would be placed on higher officials responsible for coordinating the decisions of officials in the relatively autonomous centers. Moreover, in order to enforce their coordinating decisions, higher offi-

cialists would need effective sanctions, and these would necessarily reduce the autonomy of the various centers. Without some system of market controls, then, not only would a decentralized economy be highly inefficient but, in order to achieve more efficient coordination, one of two developments would almost certainly occur in the long run. Either the relatively decentralized system would be transformed into something much closer to a centrally directed economy; or else some of the heavy burden of coordination would be shifted from higher officials of government onto the market. If for reasons already considered we reject the one alternative, only the other remains, and our fourth limit follows.

If we accept these limits, would it be possible to remedy the defects of organizational pluralism in the United States?

Inequalities in Political Resources

The Standard Solution: Floors and Ceilings

If the problem of inequality in political resources is old and familiar, so also are many of the remedies. The classical remedy was to ensure that at least one crucial political resource, the vote, would be equally distributed among all citizens. While universal and equal suffrage is necessary for the democratic process, however, it has long been known to be insufficient because the vote is only one kind of political resource. Because social resources are unequally distributed, and because many kinds of social resources can be converted into political resources, political resources other than the vote are unequally distributed.

A more recent remedy is to impose minima and maxima on political resources. By putting floors under the social resources available to all citizens—for example, by universal, free, compulsory education and a basic income supplied by social security and welfare payments—minimal political resources are guaranteed to all citizens. In addition, ceilings are placed on the extent to which certain social resources, mainly money, can legally be converted into political resources—for example, by limits on campaign contributions.

Only with the suffrage, however, have the floor and the ceiling been brought together. With other resources, the difference between minima and maxima allows great inequalities in social resources to be converted into great inequalities in political resources. For example, differences in education, occupation, financial resources, and access to organizations greatly affect the extent to which different American citizens participate in political life, the ways in which they participate, and their effectiveness in gaining a response from government officials. Education appears to have the greatest impact on political participation (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980, 23ff.); and education is loosely correlated with other resources: occupation, income, and access to organizations. Since it would be preposterous to reduce inequalities in political resources by imposing a ceiling on education, the alternative is substantially to increase the minimum level of education, which would require a far larger allocation of resources than at present to the task of re-educating the less educated.

Or consider financial resources. Beyond a moderate level income does not seem to have much effect on *levels* of participation. But access to money enables some people to participate more effectively in certain ways—by campaign contributions, for example. To be sure, the effects of large campaign contributions are often exaggerated. In spite of prevailing myths, a candidate does not often become the lackey of a large donor; what a contributor often does gain, however, is the potential influence provided by easier access to an elected official and a more sympathetic consideration of the donor's requests (Staehler 1979, 22). And although the legal ceilings on campaign contributions are now far below the financial resources of the rich, they are well above the financial resources of most citizens. To bring the ceilings down to the level suitable to citizens of median income would still leave the limits much above the level of the most disadvantaged, and in addition might drastically reduce campaigning. Inequalities in financial and organizational resources also generate inequalities in opportunities to influence the beliefs and actions of other citizens. Finally, differences in financial resources

contribute to differences in education, for wealthier citizens and communities can afford to spend more on the education of their children, and do so. As a result, differences in influence are somewhat self-maintaining.

The Extent of Economic Inequality among Americans

That gross economic inequality has persisted among Americans for many generations is hardly an obscure or even highly contestable fact. In the 1890s the Farmers' Alliance and the Populists publicized data showing great inequality in the distribution of wealth and income. Scholars also published estimates; in 1893 one political economist calculated that 0.33 percent of the population owned 20 percent of the national wealth, while 52 percent owned only 5 percent (Pollack 1962, 76). Since that time, and particularly during the last twenty years or so, the data have become more reliable, more easily accessible, and probably better known. Familiar as they may be, the figures bear repeating.

Despite widespread views to the contrary, the net effect of taxes and transfer payments in altering the distribution of wealth and income has been comparatively modest. This is not to say that transfer payments are of trivial importance, for they are not. As in many European countries, in the United States taxes and transfer payments have become important instruments of public policy. As a proportion of total personal income, transfer payments nearly doubled between 1965 and 1977, increasing from 7.6 percent in 1965 to 13.8 percent in 1977. Most of this increase was in retirement benefits, which constituted 6.4 percent of personal income in 1965 and 11.3 percent in 1977. However, transfers of other kinds—primarily unemployment compensation and income maintenance programs, including food stamps—also increased (U.S. Census Bureau 1980, 446). The main effect of transfer payments on incomes, then, has been to sustain the incomes of the elderly and the bottom fifth of households (Thurow 1980, 157–60).

After half a century of the American welfare state, however, the after-tax distribution of wealth and income remains highly unequal.

Because the largest share of transfer payments draws on payroll taxes, which are progressive only in the lower range of wage and salary income and regressive beyond that range, the main effect is to redistribute income within the bottom half, principally from employed workers to retired and disabled persons. The bottom one-fifth of households, which received 4.1 percent of per capita household income in 1948, still received only 5.6 percent nearly three decades later in 1977 (Thurow, *ibid.*). These figures do not include income from accrued capital gains, which more than double the income share of the top 1 percent of all households (Pechman and Okner 1974, 46; Thurow, 168). Of course capital gains reflect wealth. Though wealth is even more unequally distributed than income, like income the distribution of wealth has not undergone much change. The top 1 percent of Americans owned 23.3 percent of personal wealth in 1945 and 20.7 percent in 1972. About 4 percent of the adult population own more than a third of all financial assets. The top 1 percent own 57 percent of all corporate stock, 60 percent of all bonds, and 26 percent of all net worth (U.S. Census Bureau 1980, 470). It is sometimes contended that figures like these exaggerate inequality because people acquire wealth as they grow older, and inequality in wealth is therefore mainly a function of age. The fact is, however, the wealth is distributed just as unequally within age groups as for the adult population as a whole (Smith et al. 1973, 7).

Sometimes findings like these are thought to demonstrate the existence of a ruling class. They do not. What they demonstrate is the existence of great inequality in the distribution of economic resources; and insofar as economic resources are convertible to political resources, the figures also demonstrate severe inequality in the distribution of political resources. There is no satisfactory formula for specifying an average rate at which economic resources can be converted into political resources. Probably none can be constructed. But consider the following. In 1969, the latest year for which good data seem to be available, the average net worth of all adults, or 122 million persons, was \$25,000. For 95.6 percent of all adults, comprising 117 million persons, it was \$17,000. At the same

time, 103,000 persons comprising the wealthiest 0.1 percent of the adult population had a mean net worth of around \$2,446,000 (calculated from Smith et al., table 1). Thus the average person in the wealthiest stratum had almost 100 times the economic resources of the average American citizen, and 144 times the economic resources of most citizens. Even if the conversion rate from economic to political resources were low and decreasing, such a distribution would create distinctly unequal classes of citizens.

In the election system that prevailed in Prussia from 1850 to 1918, voters were divided into three strata based on property, each of which was entitled to one-third of the popularly elected representatives. The smallest and wealthiest stratum comprised around 5 percent of the voters, the intermediate stratum around 13 percent, and the largest and poorest around 82 percent. Thus 18 percent of the voters were guaranteed 67 percent of the representatives. Not surprisingly, this system engendered deep resentments that helped to poison political life both in Prussia and in the Reich (Sternberger and Vogel 1969, table A-4, p. 348; Rokkan 1962, 76-77). If such a system were proposed for the United States, Americans would be outraged and their outrage would be fully justified on democratic grounds; for institutionalizing voting inequality in this way violates the most elementary requirements for political equality in a democratic republic. But does not the institutionalization of inequalities in wealth and income, and thus in political resources, also violate these requirements?

How Economic Inequality Has Been Reduced in Some Democratic Countries

In some democratic countries, the distribution of income, one of the prime components in economic inequality, is markedly less unequal than in the United States. These countries include the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, Britain, and Japan. It follows that the extent of economic inequality in the United States is not inherent either in a market-oriented and privately owned economy or in polyarchy and organizational pluralism.

The explanation for the difference, as David Cameron has shown, is primarily political. Among the twelve democratic countries he examined, the distribution of after-tax income is only weakly related to the level of economic production. To be sure, countries like Italy and Spain have lower levels of per capita gross domestic product and greater inequality in incomes. But among all twelve countries the relation is so slight as to offer little hope that income inequality can be significantly reduced by economic growth. Moreover, despite plausible hypotheses to the contrary, income inequality is not related (either positively or negatively) to high rates of growth; or (positively) to the proportion of young people receiving higher education; or (negatively) to the extent of middle-class advantage in access to higher education. *The most important factor by far is simply the extent to which social democratic and labor parties have played a significant role in the government:* income inequality tends to be least in countries where they have. By means of higher levels of employment and expenditures on social security, health, and income maintenance, governments responsive to social democratic and labor parties have raised the after-tax incomes of the bottom fifth; and by higher marginal tax rates on incomes they have reduced the after-tax incomes of the top fifth (Cameron 1980).

For all the emphasis on equality in the American public ideology, the United States lags well behind a number of other democratic countries in reducing economic inequality. It is a striking fact that the presence of vast disparities in wealth and income, and so in political resources, has never become a highly salient issue in American politics or, certainly, a persistent one. When concern has surfaced in mainstream politics it has not led to much more than rhetorical denunciation: the only lasting product of Theodore Roosevelt's renowned attack on "malefactors of great wealth" was the phrase itself.

Why Economic Inequality Is Not a Political Issue among Americans
To explain why economic inequality has not been an issue in American politics, one must go beyond the standard response of the Left

that Americans have been brainwashed (or coerced) by the wealthy, an explanation that is sometimes also used to account for the inability of a socialist movement to make headway in the United States. The weakness of this response, as I pointed out in chapter 3, is that it fails to explain why in practically every European country privileged elites who stood at the top of a concentration of wealth, income, status, education, and authority in government that was generally far more acute than in the United States nevertheless were unable to prevent politically important socialist movements from developing; or why socialist movements in many of these countries succeeded in making a political issue of distributive questions; or why in some European countries socialist movements brought about considerably more redistribution than reform movements have ever managed to achieve in the United States. If the United States is a deviant case, its deviance cannot logically be attributed to a historical factor common to both the United States and European countries.

The United States did deviate from European countries, however, in at least one crucial respect: its ideological development. It is probably in this singularity that we must search for an explanation. From the American Revolution onward, the ancient problem posed by the presence of unequal wealth in a republic was met by at least three different ideological perspectives. In the ideology of Federalist republicanism, social and economic stratification was an inevitable, natural, and (within limits) desirable fact of social life to which politics, even in a republic, must adapt. So John Adams. At the other extreme, an occasional radical democrat like Thomas Skidmore contended that inequalities in the distribution of property were a definite threat to republican government, that property rights were subordinate to the fundamental right of self-government, and that in order to prevent gross inequality and preserve a republican polity, the government should intervene in a systematic way to regulate the distribution of property.

Aspects of both these perspectives were fused in the ideology of agrarian democratic republicanism that developed under the tu-

telage of men like Jefferson, Madison, and the writer John Taylor, Jefferson's ally. These advocates of an agrarian democratic republic agreed that social and economic inequalities would, if allowed to go unchecked, undermine the political equality they assumed to be essential to a democratic republic. In their view, however, the best guarantee of republican government was a body of citizens whose freedom and independence rested on individual ownership of property in land: a body of free farmers. The agrarian democratic republicans were not wildly unrealistic in believing that such a body of citizens could and would exist in the United States—among white males, at any rate. But in direct opposition to radical democrats like Skidmore, their solution did not seem to them to require direct government regulation of wealth or incomes. For the most important element in their solution lay readily at hand; it fit neatly into Locke's justification for property, and therefore (unlike Skidmore) it required no challenge to the primacy of property rights.

This providential element, which existed independent of human intentions, was the seemingly limitless supply of comparatively cheap land. As in Locke's justification of private property, but quite unlike the actual situation in Locke's England (or in any European country), in America the availability of land depended much less on conscious civic deliberation and design than on the bounty of nature. To be sure, the government might have to intervene to ensure that citizens would have adequate opportunities to acquire property in land. Opening up and protecting access to the land by (white) settlers would of course require some action by the federal government. But in contrast to Skidmore's vision of a democratic government that would deliberately regulate the distribution of wealth in order to insure political equality, in the ideology of agrarian democratic republicanism political equality would be an inevitable by-product of an equal opportunity to acquire property.

Now a key assumption of this solution was an implied boundary that sharply distinguished political from economic life, public matters from private affairs, and a sector of social relations in which authority definitely ought to be democratic from a sector in which it

need not be. The polity, which had to do with public affairs, ought of course to be governed democratically by its citizens. The economy, however, constituted a sphere of private relationships in which productive enterprises (that is, farms) ought to be governed by their owners; and owners were entitled to govern not only themselves but any other adults who might choose freely to associate themselves in the enterprise. Naturally if the economic order had been seen as public, not private, the entire assumption would have broken down. But in the agrarian society the distinction between the public and political on the one side and the private economy of farming was hardly a contestable matter.

While Skidmore's solution of regulating distribution won almost no support, the solution of equal opportunity to acquire a farm and, as a result, to become the political equal, in a rough sense, of other farming citizens quickly gained a wide following. A fundamental and lasting way of thinking about solutions to the dynamics of inequality entered deeply into American national consciousness (cf. Pole 1978, 117-47). To be sure, the realities of American life diverged, sometimes quite visibly, from what Richard Hofstadter called "the agrarian myth" (1955, 23ff.). Most notably, a civic equality derived from an equal opportunity to acquire property in land offered no solution to the inequalities that prevailed both in the cities and in the slave economy of the South. If either the economy of urban commerce and finance or the economy of slavery were to spread, the social foundations of an agrarian democratic republic would be destroyed. In the face of dangers like these, some who endorsed the emerging ideology recognized that policies might be needed to check the accumulation of wealth among the few at the expense of general equality among the many. Thus Noah Webster contended that "an equality of property, with a necessity of alienation, constantly operating to destroy combinations of powerful families, is the very soul of a republic" (Stourzh 1970 in Pocock 1975, 534). And, as Hamilton's program came clearly into view, an alarmed Madison proposed that laws be enacted to withhold "unnecessary opportunities for the few to increase the inequality of property by

an immoderate, and especially unmerited, accumulation of riches." Laws should silently "reduce extreme wealth towards a state of mediocrity, and raise indigence towards a state of comfort" (Pole, 122). In effect, Madison proposed that there should be both a floor and ceiling on wealth.

Yet nothing much ever came of these ideas. To explain why proposals for directly regulating the distribution of wealth came to nothing, we need to look beyond the fact that some of the best-known advocates of the ideology of agrarian democratic republicanism were often landholders of substance and sometimes slave-owners as well. For the socioeconomic position of the advocates fails to account for the broad acceptance of their views and the rejection of solutions like Skidmore's. In understanding why the agrarian myth and its solution of equal opportunity won out over its rivals, it is important to keep in mind that even by 1820, 92 percent of the American people still lived in rural areas and over 70 percent of the work force was engaged in farming; in fact, people in farming occupations remained a majority of the work force until the 1870s.

To farmers, the ideology would have made a great deal of sense. To begin with, equal access to land was obviously a far easier policy for state and federal governments to carry out than attempting to set limits on landholdings. The idea of equal opportunity to acquire land was also consistent with the right to property; in contrast, as Skidmore himself made clear, to regulate distribution by limiting ownership challenged the sanctity of that right. In addition, equal opportunity appealed to the strength of acquisitive desires, and to the social value of stimulating incentives for hard work, risk taking, foresight, and efficiency; whereas the main appeal of regulating distribution would be either envy or the abstract moral ideal of political equality.

Equal opportunity would also have fit better with a farmer's sense that successful farming ought to be rewarded, while putting floors and ceilings on wealth would have looked like rewarding failure and penalizing success. Moreover, if there were a large supply of cheap land accessible to those willing to make the effort to

acquire, develop, and work it, in a society of free farmers the size of farms would be to some extent self-limiting anyway. Finally, while the policies of federal, state, and local governments were not unimportant to farmers, farmers were remarkably independent of all governments, which by European standards had almost no coercive means they could successfully apply against any significant group of recalcitrant white citizens, particularly farmers. Taken all around, then, it must have seemed reasonable for citizens associated with farming—and most citizens were—to believe that if the government were to do no more than provide an equal opportunity for citizens to acquire land, they would all have a rough equality—at least would not be dangerously unequal—in their access to political resources.

This perspective became so deeply rooted that by the 1890s when the social foundations of agrarian republicanism were visibly disappearing, neither the Greenback movement, the Farmers' Alliance, nor the Populists endorsed the idea of deliberately redistributing wealth and income, even though they turned, far more than their predecessors had ever done, directly to the government for assistance. It is true that among the items in the platform of the Alliance and the Populists was a call for a "graduated income tax." But the income tax was so minor an objective that the historians of the agrarian revolt have virtually ignored it (Hicks 1961, Goodwyn 1976, Pollack). The main thrust of the agrarian movement was not to put a ceiling on the accumulation of private wealth but to construct a low floor under farmers' incomes.

Even so, the Populist challenge was decisively defeated. Farmers shrank into an even smaller fraction of the population (3.3 percent of all households in 1978). Farming was more and more transformed into a business that became fully integrated into the new economic order of commercial, industrial, and financial capitalism. Ironically, however, with astonishing ease the older ideology was adapted to the radically different structure of the new economic order. As before, political equality would prevail among a citizen

body of property owners. As before, the task of government was to ensure fair opportunities to acquire property—in consumer goods, homes, business enterprises, securities, and so on. As before, radical democrats and socialists who proposed that wealth be more directly regulated in order to ensure political equality among citizens were, like Skidmore a century earlier, a minority voice outside the mainstream of American political life.

Yet if discrepancies had already existed between ideology and reality during the agrarian period, by 1900 economic inequality had become immense, and it has remained so to the present day.

Why Economic Inequality May Become a Political Issue

Despite the fact that the unequal distribution of economic resources, and hence political resources, has never become a steady and major issue in American political life, there are reasons for thinking that it may become so in the future. To begin with, because the facts will not go away it would take only a slight shift in public concern to bring them to the forefront of political discussion and public attention, in the same way that rates of inflation, changes in the consumer price index, unemployment figures, budget deficits, and so on have been given currency. If economic growth were persistently low, distributive issues would probably become more urgent; for when everyone's slice of pie is smaller than expected, more people will be inclined to wonder whether their own slice has been fairly apportioned.

In addition, certain changes in the way the economy is likely to be perceived in the future would almost certainly help to make distributive issues more salient. In the ideology adapted from agrarian democratic republicanism the economy is perceived to be a "private" sector sharply distinct from the public sector of government and politics. But a distinction that no doubt seemed intuitively correct in the agrarian order now clashes much more forcefully with the actualities of economic relations in the economic order of corporate capitalism. While the distinction between public and private

relations not only retains its usefulness but becomes even more crucial than before, it is surely a misperception to see large economic structures as private, for, like the government of the state, in a realistic sense they are public.

Consider economic growth. In his monumental statistical study of the sources of economic growth in the United States from 1929–1969, Denison found that total national income grew at an annual rate of 3.33%. A little more than half of the annual increase Denison accounted for by changes in inputs of labor and capital. Of these inputs, changes in labor inputs were considerably more important than changes in capital inputs: 1.3% as against 0.5% for capital inputs. Of the labor inputs, changes in the amount of labor employed added about one percent annually to national income. The increased educational levels of the employed added another 0.4%. Together, these were more than sufficient to offset small losses resulting from a shortening of the hours of work during this period. A little less than half the annual increase in national income—1.5% to be exact—Denison accounted for by increases in output per unit of input, or what most of us would call greater productivity or increased efficiency. Of the factors that produced greater productivity, the largest (accounting for an annual increase in national income of 0.9 percent) is attributed to advances in knowledge (plus factors not elsewhere classified). Economies of scale accounted for slightly under 0.4 percent (calculated from Denison 1974, table 9-4, p. 127).

It is immediately obvious that little growth in the American economy can be attributed to the actions of particular individuals. Certainly growth is not attributable primarily to the insight, foresight, savings, or skills of the owners or managers of industry. The size of the labor force, its educational levels, increase in human knowledge, economies of scale made possible by the size of the country: who can make a rightful claim to having caused these changes, who engineered them, who controlled them?

Or consider the question of allocating the fruits of economic growth. Who ought to receive what shares? And how should the

“decision” about shares be made? One answer is that shares in the growth in national income ought to be allocated according to individual or group contributions. If the contributions are traceable to social factors, however, and not to specific individuals or even to definite groups, how are we to make the allocations? How, for example, ought we to allocate the growth in national income resulting from increases in knowledge, in the magnitude and education of the labor force, in economies of scale? If the European Common Market provides greater economies of scale for European firms, to whom should the increases in the national income of the Common Market countries be allocated? Or take the broader question of an economic “surplus.” Let us suppose (without making too much depend on it) that we think of a nation’s economic surplus as a hypothetical sum consisting of what remains, if anything, after total national income is distributed in personal incomes sufficient for the subsistence of the population. Needless to say, “subsistence” is itself in large part socially defined. Whatever the prevailing social definition of “subsistence” and “surplus” may be, however, a country could allocate its surplus through different processes and in varying amounts for various purposes. Like the surplus itself, any “decision” about how to distribute it will be in some sense a social decision, for it is a complex of innumerable individual and collective choices, including many by enterprises and some by governments. To what purposes ought the surplus be put? Higher personal incomes? Renewing the existing stock of plant and equipment? Increasing and improving that stock? Improving the health or education of citizens? More leisure? And how much for each purpose? Few matters should be of greater public concern than answers to questions like these, few choices have greater consequence for so many people, few decisions made by governments are as important as the social decision about the distribution of the economic surplus—or, more broadly, the distribution of the national income.

Finally, consider a larger firm. A large firm is inherently a social and political enterprise. It is inherently *social* in the sense that

its very existence and functioning depend on contributions made by joint actions, past and current, that cannot be attributed to specific persons: the arrow of causation is released by "social forces," history, culture, or other poorly defined agents. Without the protection of a dense network of laws enforced by public governments, the largest American corporation could not exist for a day. Without a labor force the firm would vanish. It would slowly languish if the labor force were not suitably educated. Who then provides for the education of its skilled workers, its white-collar employees, its executives? One of a firm's most critical resources is language. Language comes free, provided by "society" and millennia of evolution. Concepts, ideas, civic orientations like the famous Protestant ethic, the condition of science and technology: these are social. Who has made a larger contribution to the operation of General Electric—its chief executives or Albert Einstein or Michael Faraday or Isaac Newton?

A large firm is also inherently a *political* system because the government of the firm exercises great power, including coercive power. The government of a firm can have more impact on the lives of more people than the government of many a town, city, province, state. No one disputes today that the government of a city or a state ought to be a public, not a private matter. One who supports democratic ideas would also hold that people who are compelled to obey public governments ought to control those governments: no taxation without representation. Should this reasoning not apply also to the government of a large economic enterprise? If not, why not? (Dahl 1973).

If the economy and economic enterprises are social, if they are truly public entities, if like the government of a city, state, or nation their governments exercise great power, if they are political systems—then how ought these "public" institutions to be governed? If the economic surplus is socially defined and socially created, then by what means should it be allocated, and according to what principles of distribution?

It is unlikely that these questions can forever remain beyond

political discussion in the United States. The ill fit between the perception of economic institutions as private, and their qualities as social and public, creates a discordance that probably cannot be indefinitely sustained.

Three Stages

While one can foresee how distributive issues might become more important in American political life, for reasons suggested in chapter 6 I doubt whether it is possible to prescribe a specific principle of distribution that can be shown to be superior to every alternative, much less to predict how much and in what ways Americans, after extensive political discussion of alternatives, would then choose to change the prevailing distribution of wealth and income. As I suggested in chapter 6, a number of reasonable distributive principles can be advanced; none looks to be clearly decisive against the rest, or still other possibilities; before any principle became binding it would have to be plunged into the heat and turbulence of the political cauldron; and what might finally be forged as a workable principle would probably be stronger politically but weaker philosophically than the abstract principles debated by moral and political philosophers.

It is possible, however, to foresee three stages of change. The first would be a change in civic orientations of the kind that I have just described. In the second stage, the United States would use employment, income maintenance, and tax policies to reduce economic inequality in the fashion already achieved in a number of other democratic countries. This would be a catch-up phase. In time, however, the second stage would run its course, because of electoral resistance, as it already seems to have done in the Scandinavian countries, and probably also because of increasingly disadvantageous tradeoffs with economic efficiencies, growth, and incentives. The third stage would require structural changes in the economic order that would simultaneously foster economic incentives, efficiency, and political equality. This stage has not been

reached in any democratic country, though new proposals along these lines have begun to emerge. Meanwhile, the United States still stands before the threshold of the first stage.

Civic Orientations

Insofar as American civic consciousness is deformed by individual and group egoism, two possible solutions might be considered. We might hope (somehow) to foster greater civic virtue among Americans by strengthening commitments to the general good. Or we might strengthen enlightened egoism—what Tocqueville in his description of Americans called “self-interest rightly understood.” Although the first seems nobler, it is less likely to succeed. In the last chapter I explained why neither moral nor organic civic virtue looks promising. I also suggested that the high coincidence of individual and collective interests required for individualist civic virtue is unlikely to exist among a large aggregate of persons, no matter what structural alternatives one might presume them to have adopted.

It might be thought that if individuals and organizations were sufficiently enlightened in pursuing their own interests, then they would perceive among themselves a perfect harmony of interests. Although the idea of an existing or attainable harmony of interests sufficient to rid us of our political conflicts is perennially attractive to some people, it is an illusion, and like many illusions it is a dangerous one. A common form of the illusion is to suppose that if Americans, say, were only to acquire a better understanding of the interests that in some sense “really” exist among them, they would develop a consensus as to their general good and the means to attain it; and, as a result, political conflict would dramatically diminish in intensity and frequency. The lethal defect in this view is that on some questions, “objective” conflicts of interest are sharp and real. The distribution of wealth and income is an example. Is it imaginable that a more equitable distribution of wealth and income could ever be achieved in the United States without intense political conflict?

While this illusion is more likely to be found among liberals and conservatives than among radicals, another form is more common among Marxists and radicals of left and right. This is the belief that some structural transformation would produce such profound harmony of interests that, following the appropriate changes in consciousness, the identity between individual and collective interests would be apparent to all and political conflicts would wither away. Socialists, for example, often appear to believe that replacing capitalism by social ownership and control of the economy would do the trick. But even if we were to adopt the unwarranted assumption that all serious political conflict is grounded in economic relationships, for reasons discussed in the last two chapters no unique answers can be found to a number of critical questions about the specific principles, structures, and processes required to achieve social ownership and control of the economy. How much autonomy should be granted, to which economic enterprises, on what kinds of decisions? How should enterprises be governed, both internally and externally? According to what distributive principles should the economic surplus be allocated? By what process of decision making?

After more than a century of dispute, socialists continue to disagree radically, insofar as they make any serious attempt to answer specific questions like these at all. It is therefore absurd to suppose that a single answer is likely to gain a general consensus. Conflicting proposals, rooted partly in conflicting conceptions of interests, would produce political conflicts. In addition, other cleavages—occupations, religion, language, ideology, local and regional attachments—would persist. And sometimes they would become entangled with economic questions; for example, how much of the economic surplus of advantaged regions should be transferred to disadvantaged regions? And so on.

One element of an enlightened civic consciousness in a democratic and pluralist system, then, would be a general acceptance of political conflict as an inevitable and entirely appropriate aspect of political life. An enlightened citizenry would understand that whenever the democratic process is applied to a large number of persons,

Type I solutions become impossible, and consequently only Type II solutions for large-scale systems are attainable.

A second element of an enlightened civic consciousness, however, would be a deep concern for ways of strengthening civic virtue by achieving a greater convergence of interests and a corresponding reduction of conflicts. Within the limits of Type II solutions and other limits I mentioned earlier, several changes would help to bring about a greater convergence of interests among American citizens. To begin with, the incentives of individuals, groups, and organizations to search for jointly beneficial solutions to public problems and their capacity to perceive their common interests and to cooperate in achieving them might all be made stronger. So stated, the proposal sounds purely anodyne. But it entails concrete consequences. If the interests of all citizens were perfectly harmonious on all public matters, political conflict would vanish and politics with it; but if the interests of all citizens on all public matters were strictly conflicting, a democratic order, and perhaps any political order, would be impossible. Although a perfect identity of interests is likely to remain a rare phenomenon among Americans, strictly conflicting, exclusive, and competitive interests—zero-sum conflicts—are also unlikely to predominate. The interests of different citizens involved in political conflicts are often neither perfectly harmonious nor strictly conflicting, but complementary. The interests of citizens would be perfectly complementary if, though not identical, the actions of each to achieve his or her ends would create benefits at no cost to the others. Perfect complementarity is no doubt rare. But interests are often imperfectly complementary, in the sense that for each actor the gains from cooperating with others outweigh the costs on balance. Conflicting interests make political life necessary; but complementary interests make it possible.

Citizens might come to perceive greater complementarity of interests, and therefore be more willing to cooperate, if they were more alike in their objective circumstances. A moment ago I suggested that it might be possible to reduce some of the great socioeconomic differences among citizens that result from extreme dif-

ferences in wealth and income. Such a change, I suggested, is unlikely to be achieved without political conflict. However, some ways of bringing it about would probably cause less conflict than others. Meanwhile, the point to keep in mind is that as long as citizens are vastly unequal in the resources they have at their disposal, including their political resources, they are unlikely to perceive great similarity in their interests, nor do they have objective grounds for doing so. If "the general good" conflicts with one's own interests, one cannot realistically expect many citizens to act altruistically to sacrifice their own interests for the benefit of others, least of all those who perceive themselves to be significantly worse off than others.

In addition, certain integrative institutions might be strengthened, a question to which I now turn.

The Public Agenda

I suggested in chapter 4 that in comparison with a number of other democratic countries American political and economic institutions are less integrative and more fragmenting. That the political institutions should be weak in their capacity for integration is hardly surprising, since both the constitutional structure and extraconstitutional organizations like the political parties were shaped by a perspective that strongly emphasized the dangers of concentrating power and the necessity of allocating it to relatively independent centers. Although the Framers believed that by granting the states too much autonomy and the central government too little control the Articles of Confederation failed to provide adequately for national integration, they had no wish to cure the defects of the Articles by a too generous concentration of power in the new constitutional system. Political beliefs influenced by Hume, Montesquieu, and British constitutional doctrine (a doctrine swiftly outmoded by British practice) were reinforced by the evident political realities of the time, for even within the Constitutional Convention some delegates contended that the changes under consideration were dan-

gerously centralizing, and a few left to join other anti-Federalists in opposition to the proposed Constitution. Consequently, in their search for solutions that would overcome the fragmentation of the Articles and yet avoid a concentration so great as to cause the Constitution to be rejected or, still worse, encourage tyranny if it were accepted, the Framers gave impetus to a stronger centripetal thrust in American political institutions than exists in a number of other democratic countries.

Four further consequences followed from the constitutional system, the political theory it reflected, and civic orientations that were to become widely diffused among Americans. The first, intended by the Framers, was to impede the operation of majority rule. In few other democratic countries are there so many obstacles in the way of government by electoral and legislative majorities. The second, unforeseen by the Framers but consistent with their intentions, was to ensure that when political parties developed, as they soon did, they would be more decentralized, more fragmented, less cohesive. And they would be less able to organize a majority coalition capable of uniting on and carrying out a set of policies than would the party systems that were later to develop in many other democratic countries, including a number of countries with multiparty systems. The third consequence, which was also unforeseen but contradicted the intentions of the Framers, was to make it relatively easy for pressure groups to influence decisions in behalf of objectives that are often narrow and highly particularistic. This consequence is not independent of the second. As E. E. Schattschneider pointed out several generations ago, the strength of parties in policy making tends to be inversely related to the strength of pressure groups, and in the United States the joint effect is a markedly weakened capacity for political integration (Schattschneider 1942, 192 and *passim*). Since the 1960s, fragmentation has been increased even further by the disintegration of the major parties into loose confederations of autonomous groups organized to advance the individual political fortunes of particular candidates—a

development, as Schattschneider forecast, that has been paralleled by a rapid proliferation of narrow pressure groups.

The fourth consequence, like the third, was both unforeseen and clearly contrary to the intentions of the Framers: the development of the presidency into the main integrative force in the political system. From Jackson's time onward, the president has become the exclusive claimant to a mandate from a national majority and the only national official with some capability for forming and maintaining a majority coalition in both the electorate and Congress large and cohesive enough to carry out a program of reform against the resistance of well-entrenched minorities. The upshot, which the Framers failed to foresee, is an office of unstable and at times dangerous power. The antimajoritarianism of the constitutional system, the relative independence of president and Congress, the weakness of political parties, and the correlative strength of pressure groups have encouraged presidents to overcome the designed limits of the office by concentrating great political resources in the presidency and employing them in ways that are beyond the effective control of Congress, the courts, and the electorate. When reaction sets in against this excessive concentration of presidential power, the result is presidential ineffectiveness (Dahl 1977, 1980a).

Even without changing the Constitution, the political system does contain some potentialities for greater integration. The Budget Reform Act of 1974 provides an excellent example. Before that act was passed, budgetary decisions in Congress were a striking illustration of the irrationalities of an excessively fragmented process, for neither house of Congress had ever provided itself with an opportunity to consider either the sum total of expenditures that would result from piecemeal authorizations and appropriations or the relation between total expenditures and total revenues. A greater opportunity for irrationality in fiscal policy can hardly be imagined. In 1974, however, Congress transformed its fragmented system into a deliberately integrated budgetary process. Although fragmenting pressures persistently endanger the survival of that re-

form, it demonstrates that the constitutional framework by no means stands as a barrier to an increased integrative capacity.

The political parties provide another example. Their recent disintegration—the Democratic party in particular—is partly a result of reforms that were undertaken in a deliberate effort to “democratize” control over nominations and programs, though with an inadequate grasp of their disintegrative effects. Not only are these reforms reversible, but additional changes could further strengthen the integrative capacity of the party system: for example, more campaign funds could be channeled through the national committees, and campaign funding by the proliferating political action committees could be restricted. Moreover, if Americans ever had a mind to, they could, within constitutional limits, also transform their shambles of a two-party system into a multiparty system. Paradoxically, with four or five parties, each considerably more cohesive than either of the two loose confederacies, the process of forming legislative coalitions might be considerably more integrative than it is at present or has generally been in the past.

Yet the relative independence of president and Congress and the built-in conflict their independence creates cannot be remedied without a constitutional change far more fundamental than anything that Americans have until now been willing to consider. In designing the presidential office, and its relations to the electorate and the national legislature, the Framers had very little experience to go on; they found it exceptionally difficult to decide on a design, since every proposed solution seemed defective; and the particular design they finally settled on seems not to have been based on any profound rationale (Dahl 1981, 58ff.). Whether by accident or design, for the first century and a half the presidency, though occupied for the most part by men of stunning mediocrity, appeared to work satisfactorily. It no longer does. If the Framers were to assemble today, a vastly richer body of American and comparative experience would surely compel a different choice—probably something along the lines of the design they thrice adopted (a chief executive chosen

by the national legislature) before turning finally to their solution of a president chosen independently by a college of electors (*ibid.*, 66).

The weak integrative capacity of the political institutions is duplicated in American economic institutions. As we saw in chapter 4, economic organizations—businesses and unions in particular—are neither sufficiently inclusive nor sufficiently centralized to make a system of national bargaining either possible or desirable. Because the economic organizations are decentralized, negotiators would find it difficult and often impossible to bring about compliance with the terms of a national agreement; because the organizations are far from inclusive, in arriving at their agreements negotiators would have little incentive for taking into account the interests of the majority of people outside their organizations.

Great risks are entailed in a system of national bargaining by economic organizations that are both centralized enough to insure compliance with their agreements and inclusive enough to compel negotiators to consider the short- and long-run interests of a large and representative share of the population. But consider the alternatives: (1) Maintain the present system of decentralized bargaining by exclusive associations, which are strongly motivated to pass on the costs of their bargains to others not involved in the bargaining process and, like Congress before 1974, have neither incentive nor opportunity to consider the general and long-run consequences of their decisions. (2) Maintain decentralized bargaining but (somehow) make the organizations more inclusive, which would do nothing to increase the capacity for integrated decisions. (3) Eliminate the need for negotiation and bargaining by prohibiting all economic associations other than the individual firm, a policy that by requiring the prohibition of trade unions would be impossible to carry out today in any democratic country and, if it were possible, could be executed only at an excessive cost to fundamental rights. Or (4) Impose national economic policies without the consent of the economic organizations, and unions in particular, a task that has proved to be impossible in all democratic countries.

Alienation of Final Control

In the United States the extraordinarily successful adaptation of the ideology of agrarian democratic republicanism to the economic order of corporate capitalism that replaced it gave powerful support to the belief that, like farms, corporate enterprises should be privately owned and controlled by and in the interests of their owners. Yet when giant corporations make decisions that have enormous consequences for millions of persons who do not control those decisions, their legitimacy persists in uneasy tension with the democratic ideology to which most Americans also subscribe. On the landscape of a democratic country great corporations loom like mountain principalities ruled by princes whose decisions lie beyond reach of the democratic process.

It would be easy to diagnose the problem simply as an obvious conflict between democratic criteria and the private governments of corporate enterprises and to prescribe as the obvious solution democratic control over their governments. But the diagnosis risks ignoring the complexity of the problem and thus encourages simplistic and self-defeating solutions.

Alienation and Rights to Autonomy

As we saw in chapter 3, it is not always a simple matter to judge whether a people has alienated its rightful control over public matters. For the mere fact that an organization makes certain important decisions independently of the central government of the state is clearly not sufficient to establish alienation, even if the central government could not exercise control over those decisions, either constitutionally or de facto.

For we must first determine whether an organization's autonomy (with respect to some identifiable range of decisions and in relation to certain other actors or classes of actors) is derived from a fundamental right of its members. In chapter 3 I argued that whenever autonomy derives from a fundamental right of the members of an organization, it would be wrong to say that the demos and its rep-

resentatives have irrecoverably lost, i.e., alienated, their final control over the public agenda; for they cannot alienate control over decisions they are not entitled to control. For example, if citizens possess a fundamental right to form and support political parties that can act independently in developing programs, nominating candidates, running campaigns, communicating with the public, and so on, then the fact that the government has no authority to deny to parties their autonomy on these matters can hardly be taken as evidence that the demos has alienated its control over public matters.

To be sure, determining fundamental rights in concrete instances is an exceedingly difficult problem, both substantively and procedurally (Dahl 1980b). But that problem is inherent in both democratic theory and practice, whether the theory be monistic or pluralistic, whether democratic institutions are on the small scale of the city-state or the large scale of representative government in a nation-state, and whether the constitutional system is unitary or federal. It would therefore be unreasonable to insist that to remedy the deficiencies of democratic pluralism one must first provide a unique solution to the problem of fundamental rights. One possible solution that has been adopted in a number of democratic countries is a system of legislation cum judicial review, under a written constitution that specifies certain fundamental rights. This is not, of course, the only solution, either theoretically or in practice, and not all democratic countries have adopted it. Yet in all democratic countries certain rights are held to be fundamental, in the sense that infringing them is considered impermissible, and processes exist for determining what these rights are and for ensuring their enforcement. Consequently, I shall assume that an acceptable process is available for determining fundamental rights and deciding whether an organization's claim to autonomy is derived from one or more fundamental rights.

Among the rights that might justify an organization's autonomy on certain matters, four are particularly relevant here. (1) Some political rights are necessary to the democratic process, in the sense

that infringing on these rights would constitute an impairment of the democratic process itself. In chapter 2, I indicated what some of these are. (See also Dahl 1980b). (2) Arguably, in a large democratic order, citizens with common problems have a right to establish smaller democratic units for making decisions that essentially affect only themselves. (3) If freedom is a good, then freedom of choice may be in some sense a fundamental right. As everyone knows, to determine the zone of free choice that ought to be protected as a fundamental right is notoriously difficult and controversial: witness the question of abortion. I do not mean to confront the problem here. Yet it is important to recognize that whether we believe a claim to autonomy to be justified by freedom of choice as a value depends partly on where we mean to place the burden of proof. If we were to insist on a negative principle, autonomy would be denied to an organization except on a showing that the organization's autonomy is derived from a fundamental right or is justified on grounds of social utility. But under a positive principle, autonomy would be permitted to an organization except on a showing that the organization's autonomy (with respect to certain sets of decisions and in relation to certain other actors) is not, in this instance, a fundamental right *and* on balance is socially undesirable. The negative principle presupposes that autonomy tends to be undesirable; the positive principle, that it tends to be desirable. The negative principle reflects a bias toward centralizing control over decisions in the government of the state and against the decentralist thrust of organizational pluralism; the positive principle reflects a bias toward, not against, decentralization. Because of the intimate connection between freedom and political autonomy, the positive principle represents a commitment to freedom as both a value and a fundamental human right; whereas the negative principle implies that freedom is a danger and, at most, a privilege granted by a demos through the state. (4) Finally, a right to own property, and thus to use one's property as one chooses, might be understood to be a fundamental right, comparable to the other kinds just enumerated.

To the extent that the autonomy of various governmental, polit-

ical, and economic organizations in the United States is derived from fundamental rights like these, final control over the public agenda has not been alienated.

Moreover, even when an organization's autonomy cannot be justified as a fundamental right, it might still be justified on grounds of general utility or efficiency. That is, the results of relatively independent decision making on certain matters by certain kinds of organizations are, on balance, beneficial to the collectivity. On these grounds it might be contended, for example, that business firms (whether privately or socially owned) ought to be relatively independent of one another and the government in their decisions about inputs, outputs, and prices, but subject to market controls. Conversely, if the results of an organization's independent decisions were on balance harmful to the collectivity—as decisions to dump chemical wastes in water supplies would be—then to prevent social harm an organization's autonomy could properly be restricted or done away with altogether. In a democratic order, judgments like these ought to be made by the relevant demos and its representatives, acting through democratic procedures and institutions. Indeed, conflicting judgments on such questions comprise a substantial part of political controversy in democratic countries.

Of course an organization might possess autonomy over some decisions as a matter of fundamental right, while its autonomy on other matters might be justified, if at all, only on grounds of social utility. For example, though citizens have a fundamental right to organize independent political parties for a variety of purposes and activities, the government of the state might properly regulate parties in order to protect the rights of members and to ensure that parties perform their functions effectively and efficiently.

Corporate Autonomy, Rights, and Utility

We can now see why in a democratic country the autonomy of private business firms is on a rather different footing from the autonomy of the other kinds of organizations mentioned in chapter 2, and particularly their nearest analogues, political, governmental, and

trade-union organizations. For the political rights necessary to the democratic process directly require a substantial measure of independence for organizations that facilitate the exercise of these rights, such as political parties, interest groups, lobbies, newspapers, magazines, and so on. A certain measure of independence over some range of matters for local elected governments might also be derived from a right of citizens to establish smaller democratic units for making decisions that essentially affect only themselves—though social interdependence considerably diminishes the zone of rightful local autonomy. Independent trade unions are more problematical; yet a strong case can be made that they are necessary both to democratic rights and to freedom of choice.

Obviously, it would be a very complex undertaking to survey the exact boundary between the zone of independence that organizations like these rightfully possess and activities that might be regulated by the government of the state, prohibited altogether, or transferred to government bureaucracies subject to control by the demos and its representatives. I think, however, that for a variety of political and governmental organizations, and probably certain "economic" associations like trade unions, such a boundary would secure a large area of autonomy derived from fundamental rights. To conclude that the government of the state could not control organizational activities within this privileged zone would not therefore establish that the demos had alienated final control over public matters to "private" decision makers.

But privately owned and controlled economic enterprises, particularly in the form of very large corporations, are a different story. For a large corporation is, as I said earlier, a political system, analogous in important ways to the government of the state. Yet the government of a large corporation differs radically from the government of the state in a democratic country, because neither in theory nor in practice are corporate governments democratic. Is the autonomy of large corporations justified, however, as necessary to fundamental rights?

1. It might be argued that by decentralizing decisions and political resources, an economic order of relatively independent firms gives support to the democratic process, and at any rate helps to prevent the concentration of power and resources that in the long run would probably undermine the institutions of polyarchy. The argument is, I believe, valid. But it is an argument for decentralization and not necessarily for decentralization to privately owned firms. In principle the argument would be met by decentralization to socially owned or employee-owned firms (Dahl 1971, 57ff.), either of which might in principle be democratically controlled.

2. It might also be argued that corporations are like local democratic governments, except that in the corporation the citizens are the stockholders. But "stockholder democracy" is a contradiction in terms, since it flagrantly violates the principle of equal voting. However, the claim might be justified if all those who were most directly affected by the decisions of a firm were, like citizens of a local government, ensured an equal vote in governing the firm or in voting for a representative government of the firm. But surely those most directly affected would include the employees; in that event, relative autonomy for firms owned socially or by employees and governed democratically might indeed be justified on grounds of fundamental rights.

3. It might be argued that economic decision making in a privately owned, competitive economy is reducible to private exchanges among individuals each of whom is free to agree or not agree to the exchange. This, the view of classical liberal theory, became an assumption of neoclassical economics. Under the positive principle of autonomy, it would seem to follow that every person is entitled to freedom of choice on any matter except where the exercise of free choice could be shown to be (a) socially harmful and (b) not a fundamental right. Although, as I have already said, making judgments of this kind is notoriously difficult, in my view this orientation is nonetheless a valid one. Yet while we might imagine an economy, as neoclassical economists did, in which all transactions

are reducible to voluntary exchanges among freely acting persons, when we descend from that imaginary realm to the actual world we realize how different the two are.

To begin with, as I pointed out in chapter 6, if the initial distribution of resources is unjust, then the outcome of the whole network of transactions that depend on that distribution is also unjust. In a democratic country, therefore, people might reasonably choose to remedy an unfair distribution of resources by using their government to redistribute resources, or to regulate particular transactions, or both. Moreover, because wealth, income, education, information, access to organizations, and many other resources are unequally distributed among different persons, in practice the persons who are actually involved in exchanges are not equally "free" to accept or reject a proposed exchange. To take a familiar and flagrant case, in nineteenth-century mill towns, children were not "free" to work or not to work in the mills—nor, for that matter, were their parents. Hence people in a democratic country might also reasonably use the government of the state to regulate or prohibit transactions marked by unequal bargaining power. Finally even among freely acting individuals, transactions may have harmful effects on others who are not parties to the transaction. These famous "externalities" so much discussed by economists also provide reasonable grounds for governmental control over the decisions of actors engaged in "private" exchanges.

If these and other discrepancies between our actual world and the imaginary world of free choice were to be removed, I have no doubt that the domain in which relatively autonomous "private" decision making would be justified as an exercise of free choice would greatly expand; and conversely, the proper domain of governmental control would shrink correspondingly. A fair distribution of income would itself significantly enlarge the domain of unregulated free choice. For innumerable choices that are now regulated in order to offset the consequences of an unfair distribution of income could now be justifiably regulated. Yet, as we know, the United States is

a long way from achieving—or collectively attempting to achieve—a fair distribution of income. And even if we did manage to bring about a fair distribution of income, many of the other discrepancies between the real world and the heavenly universe of neoclassical economics cannot be eliminated, particularly, perhaps, the externalities that are ineradicable in a highly interdependent society.

4. It seems to be widely believed in the United States that the boards and managers of privately owned corporations do not actually make decisions on public matters because their control is derived from a fundamental right to property; and consequently they are merely exercising their right to decide matters in the interests of the owners. It is true, of course, that if the control of owners and managers is derived from a fundamental right in property, then the autonomy exercised by managers in behalf of owners of private enterprises would not constitute an alienation of public matters to private firms. For on this assumption what they do is a private affair.

Although this defense undoubtedly has great ideological strength, it is badly flawed theoretically. For the justification of private property as a natural, inalienable, or fundamental right provides scant justification for the existing ownership and control of large corporations. Insofar as a right to property is justified by the principle that one is entitled to use the products of one's own labor as one chooses, then surely the privileged position of stockholders is unjustified. On this principle, indeed, the employees would have an even more fundamental claim to own and control the firms for which they labor. Moreover, we saw earlier that economic production, growth, and a surplus over survival requirements are attributable more to social than to individual contributions and hardly at all to capital investment. Thus the principle would lead to the conclusion that the control and ownership of the economy rightfully belongs to "society." If so, means must be found for "society" to exercise the control to which it is entitled by virtue of its collective ownership. However, the inalienable right of an individual to property might also be justified on the ground that a freedom to acquire some level of material

resources and to use them as one chooses is essential to many other freedoms (and hence a right to property is essential to the effective exercise of many other rights). Like the other, this principle fails to justify an exclusive claim to ownership of corporations by stockholders or other investors. Again, it would provide even stronger support to a claim to ownership by workers. Moreover, on this principle every person would be entitled to some minimal supply of whatever resources are necessary to "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." Yet to say that every one is entitled to a minimum does not imply that anyone is entitled to more than the minimum—and certainly not to an unlimited supply of resources.

Solutions

The anomaly will not go away. Many important decisions on public matters are neither on the public agenda nor decided by a democratic process. Consider two possible solutions.

1. For generations it evidently seemed altogether obvious to many socialists that the appropriate solution was to transfer ownership and control of economic enterprises directly to the central government of the state. In its limited version this solution means nationalizing certain key industries; as a general solution it means erecting a centrally directed economy. Considered abstractly—and for many years abstract speculation ran well ahead of experience—the solution seemed to many socialists the very perfection of the democratic process. Beginning with the demos and concluding with a specific administrative decision, the entire process was to be simply an extension of popular sovereignty. Within limits set by the preferences of the demos, or at least a majority, the representatives would make laws. Within the limits set by the legislature, the executive would make its decisions in turn. And so down through the chain of decision making through the industry chief right down to the last subordinate.

As everyone knows, however, bureaucracies are almost never mere agents of legislatures and executives. Officials in bureaucra-

cies are motivated by concerns for their own power, status, income, security, popularity, policies, and ideology. Consequently, their goals rarely coincide fully with the laws and policies determined by their superiors. Because bureaucratic officials generally have access to enough resources for them to acquire considerable autonomy vis-à-vis their superiors, and strong incentives for doing so, they cannot usually be fully controlled by their superiors. As a solution for a small number of industries or firms, nationalization may secure a satisfactory measure of democratic control over bureaucratic decision making. But the more widely the bureaucratic solution is extended, the more difficult it will be for elected officials to control their nominal subordinates, and so the greater likelihood that the demos and its representatives will alienate their control over decisions on public matters to bureaucratic officials. Is a "public" bureaucracy independent of democratic controls any more desirable than a "private" bureaucracy independent of democratic controls? In one sense, both are private.

2. We return full circle to the conclusion at the beginning of this chapter that a limiting factor on all solutions is the need for some decentralization to relatively autonomous units in which decisions are regulated in part by markets and competition. Outside the unworldly realm of neoclassical theory, however, competition and markets will never regulate decisions so fully as to dissolve all economic activity into nothing more than fair exchanges among independent persons, exercising their full freedom to choose what is best for themselves and affecting only themselves. A satisfactory solution would therefore require at least two changes. First, the distribution of income would have to be fair. Second, decisions that would remain discretionary because of the inevitable looseness of regulation by the market would be subject to democratic control. But democratic control requires an appropriate demos. The solution of centralized bureaucratic administration of the economy was fatally flawed precisely because it implicitly assumed that the only appropriate demos for exercising final control over important eco-

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conomic decisions was, in practice, the people of a country. But both fundamental rights and social utility provide adequate grounds for holding that different matters should often be subject to control by different bodies of citizens—just as they are by the governments of municipalities, states, and the nation. There is no good reason, then, why different kinds of economic organizations and different kinds of decisions made by the same organization could not be subject to democratic control by different citizen bodies; and as I have tried to show throughout this book, there is every reason why they should be.

In determining what discretionary decisions should properly be on the agenda of a particular demos, I do not see how the conclusion can reasonably be avoided that for those decisions which most affect their lives all the employees of an economic enterprise must be included in the demos. And to satisfy democratic criteria, citizens of a firm would have to possess equal votes.

I am aware that a solution along these lines is bound to encounter many objections and many genuine difficulties. Conceivably, an economic order fully under democratic controls would be unacceptably inefficient. But it is premature to adopt such a conclusion. Creative thought has only just begun its slow liberation from the intellectual hegemony of three misleading visions—the old monistic vision of a democracy untroubled by a multiplicity of relatively autonomous organizations and two competing visions of an economic order, one in which all the classical problems of ruling dissolve into voluntary transactions among free individuals, the other in which the economic order is democratized by means of the hierarchies of bureaucratic socialism. With these three great myths behind us, we may stand on the threshold of a period of creativity in searching for solutions to the problem of the economic order. There are signs that this may be so: the rapidly growing interest in possibilities for workers' participation or control; plans intended not only to redistribute ownership and control but also to strengthen incentives and increase funds for investment, like the Meidner plan in Sweden and the "wages fund" of the Danish Social Democratic

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party; American proposals for employee ownership; and many others. Ways of achieving an economic order that is both efficient and democratically controlled are yet to be fully explored.

I cannot say, of course, whether the changes in structures and in civic orientations necessary to remedy the defects in the American system of organizational pluralism will come about. To the extent that they do not, however, the United States will surely fail to achieve the best potentialities of pluralist democracy.

FREE DEM IN THE WORLD.

RAYMOND D. CASTLE (LONDON:
LARSENWOOD PRESS, 1986)

Will More Countries Become Democratic?

Samuel P. Huntington

What are the prospects for the emergence of more democratic regimes in the world? This question has intellectual and policy relevance for the 1980s. During the 1950s and early 1960s, scholars concerned with this issue were generally optimistic that decolonization and economic development would lead to the multiplication of democratic regimes. The history of the next decade dealt roughly with these expectations, and people became more pessimistically preoccupied with the reasons for the breakdown of democratic systems. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, the prospects for democracy seemed to have brightened once again, and social scientists have responded accordingly. "Transitions to democracy" became the new focus of attention. The optimists of the 1950s were rather naively optimistic; those of the 1980s have been more cautiously optimistic, but the optimism and the hope are still there. Coincidentally, the Reagan administration moved far beyond the Carter administration's more limited concern with human rights and first launched "Project Democracy" and "The Democracy Program" to promote democratic institutions in other societies, and then persuaded Congress to create a "National Endowment for Democracy" to pursue this goal on a permanent basis. In the early 1980s, in short, concern with the development of new democratic regimes has been increasing among academics and policymakers. The purpose of this article is to use social science theory and comparative political analysis to see to what extent this new, more cautious optimism may be justified.

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This issue is important for at least four reasons. First, the future of democracy is closely associated with the future of freedom in the world. Democracies can and have abused individual rights and liberties, and a well-regulated authoritarian state may provide a high degree of security and order for its citizens. Overall, however, the correlation between the existence of democracy and the existence of individual liberty is extremely high. Indeed, some measure of the latter is an essential component of the former. Conversely, the long-term effect of the operation of democratic politics is probably to broaden and deepen individual liberty. Liberty is, in a sense, the peculiar virtue of democracy; hence, if one is concerned with liberty as an ultimate social value, one should also be concerned with the fate of democracy.

Second, the future of democracy elsewhere in the world is of importance to the United States. The United States is the world's premier democratic country, and the greater the extent to which democracy prevails elsewhere in the world, the more congenial the world environment will be to American interests generally and the future of democracy in the United States in particular. Michael Doyle has argued quite persuasively that no two liberal societies have ever fought each other.¹ His concept of liberalism differs from the concept of democracy employed in this paper, but the point may well be true of democratic regimes as well as liberal ones. Other things being equal, non-democratic regimes are likely to pose more serious challenges to American interests than democratic regimes.

Third, "a house divided against itself," Abraham Lincoln said, "cannot stand. . . . This government cannot endure permanently half-slave and half-free." At present the world is not a single house, but it is becoming more and more closely integrated. Interdependence is the trend of the times. How long can an increasingly interdependent world survive part-democratic and part-authoritarian and totalitarian? For the Soviet bloc and the Western World, that point may still be some distance in the future, but tensions arising out of the growing interaction between totally different political systems are almost inevitably bound to increase. At some point, coexistence may require a slowing down or halting of the trends toward interdependence.

Fourth, the extension or decline of democracy has implications for other social values, such as economic growth, socioeconomic equity, political stability, social justice, and national independence. In societies at one level of development, progress toward

one or more of these goals may be compatible with a high level of democracy. At another level of socioeconomic development, conflicts may exist. The question of the appropriateness of democracy for poor countries is, in this context, a central issue. But even highly developed societies may achieve their democracy at some sacrifice of other important values, such as national security.

In addition, if it is desirable to extend the scope of democracy in the world, obviously it is necessary to know what conditions favor that in the late twentieth century. Empirical analysis is necessary to answer the question: What policies should governments, private institutions, and individuals espouse to encourage the spread of democracy? To what extent do efforts such as those of the Reagan administration have an impact, positive or negative, on the state of democracy in the world, and at what cost in terms of other social values and national goals?

The first step in evaluating the prospects for democracy is to define the dependent variable with which we are concerned. Definitions of democracy are legion. The term has been applied to areas and institutions far removed from politics. It has also been defined as an ideal impossible of human achievement. For Peter Bachrach, for instance, a democratic system of government has for its paramount objective "maximization of the self-development of every individual." Robert Dahl says a democratic political system is one which is "completely or almost completely responsible to all its citizens."² Such definitions may be relevant to normative political theory, but they are not very useful for comparative empirical analysis. First, they are often so vague and general that it is virtually impossible to apply them in practice. How does one judge whether a political system is attempting to maximize the self-development of individuals or is completely responsive to all its citizens? Second, democracy may also be defined in such broad terms as to make it identical with almost all civic virtues, including social justice, equality, liberty, fulfillment, progress, and a variety of other good things. Hence it becomes difficult if not impossible to analyze the relationship between democracy and other social goals.

For comparative analysis a more empirical and institutional definition is desirable, and this paper follows in the tradition of Joseph A. Schumpeter. A political system is defined as democratic to the extent that its most powerful collective decision-makers are selected through periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the

adult population is eligible to vote. So defined, a democracy thus involves the two dimensions--contestation and participation--that Dahl sees as critical to his realistic democracy or polyarchy.³

The Record of Democratic Development

The historical emergence of modern democratic regimes falls into four phases. What could reasonably be called a democratic political system at the national level of government first appeared in the United States in the early nineteenth century. During the following century democratic regimes gradually emerged in northern and Western Europe, in the British dominions, and in a few countries in Latin America. This trend, which Alexis de Tocqueville had foreseen in 1835 and which James Bryce documented in 1920, appeared to be irreversible if not necessarily universal. Virtually all significant regime changes were from less democracy to more democracy. Writing at the end of this period, Bryce could well speculate as to whether this "trend toward democracy now widely visible, is a natural trend, due to a general law of social progress."⁴

The trend was reversing, however, even as he wrote. The year 1920 was in many aspects the peak of democratic development among the independent nations of the world.⁵ During the following two decades, democracy or democratic trends were snuffed out in Germany, Italy, Austria, Poland, the Baltic states, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Argentina, Brazil, and Japan. The war fought to make the world safe for democracy seemed instead to have brought its progress to an abrupt halt and to have unleashed social movements from the Right and the Left intent on destroying it.

The aftermath of World War II, on the other hand, marked another dramatic, if brief, spurt in the multiplication of democratic regimes. With the support of its allies, the United States imposed democracy on West Germany, Austria, Italy, and Japan (where it took root), and attempted to do so in South Korea (where it did not). Coincidentally, the process of decolonization got underway with newly independent countries usually adopting at first the political forms of the imperial powers. In at least some cases, such as India, Israel, Ceylon, and the Philippines, the forms of democracy were accompanied by the substance also. Other countries, such as Turkey and some Latin American states,

moved to emulate the political systems of the victorious Western powers. By the early 1950s, the proportion of democracies among the world's independent states had reached another high.

The fourth period in the evolution of democratic regimes, from the early 1950s to the 1980s, differs from the other three. In each of them, there was an overwhelmingly dominant trend, either toward the extension of democracy (1820-1920 and 1942-1953), or toward its reduction (1920-1942). In each period there were very few, if any, significant regime shifts against the dominant trend. The thirty years from the early 1950s to the early 1980s, however, were not characterized by a strong move in either direction. The trends were mixed. As we have seen, the number of democratic regimes seemed to expand in the 1950s and early 1960s, to shrink in the middle-late 1960s and early 1970s, and then to expand again in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Overall, however, the net record of change in the state of democracy in the world was not very great. It would be difficult to argue that the world was more or less democratic in 1984 than it had been in 1954. Indicative of this relative stability, albeit for a much shorter period of time, are Freedom House's estimates of the proportion of the world's population living in "free" states. In the first such estimate, in January 1973, 32.0 percent of the world's population was found to live in "free" states. In the next year, the percentage increased to 36.0 percent. During the following ten years, except for the two years India was under emergency rule (when it was 19.8 percent and 19.6 percent), the proportion of the world's population living in free states never went above 37.0 percent and never dropped below 35.0 percent. In January 1984 it was 36.0 percent, exactly where it had been ten years earlier.⁶

The overall stability in the extent of democracy does, however, conceal some important developments in both directions. With a few notable exceptions, almost all colonies that achieved independence after World War II shifted from democratic to nondemocratic systems. In contrast, a few countries moved in the opposite direction. These include Spain, Portugal, Colombia, Venezuela, Greece, and the Dominican Republic. Several South American countries, including two with long-standing democratic systems (Chile, Uruguay) and two with less stable populist systems (Brazil, Argentina), became bureaucratic-authoritarian states, with military governments intent upon fairly sustained rule. By the end of 1983, however, Brazil had made substantial progress back towards a democratic system, and Argentina had a democratically elected government. Many other countries (including Peru,

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Ecuador, Ghana, Nigeria, and Turkey) seemed to oscillate back and forth between democratic and undemocratic systems, in a pattern traditionally characteristic of praetorian societies. In East Asia: Korea, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines became less democratic, Taiwan remained undemocratic; the Indochinese states succumbed to a ruthless Vietnamese totalitarianism; and Thailand and Malaysia remained partially democratic. Finally, efforts to move Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland toward more democratic politics were halted directly or indirectly by Soviet action.

Any estimate of the future of democracy in the world must be rooted in an explanation of why these mixed trends prevailed between the 1950s and the 1980s, and hence whether the overall stability in the prevalence of democratic regimes in the world will continue. Ancient and modern political analysts have many theories to explain the rise and fall of democratic regimes. To what extent do these various and conflicting theories explain what happened and did not happen after World War II and what could happen in the 1980s?

Thinking about the reasons for the emergence of democratic regimes has typically had two foci. One approach has focused on the preconditions in society that favor democratic development. A second approach has focused on the nature of the political processes by which that development has occurred. Each will be considered in turn.

Preconditions of Democratization

In 1970, Dankwart Rustow published a penetrating article on "transitions to democracy," in which he criticized studies that focused on "preconditions" for democratization because they often tended to jump from the correlation between democracy and other factors to the conclusion that those other factors were responsible for democracy. They also tended, he argued, to look for the causes of democracy primarily in economic, social, cultural, and psychological, but not political, factors.⁷ Rustow's criticisms were well taken and helped to provide a more balanced view of the complexities of democratization. It would, however, be a mistake to swing entirely to the other extreme and ignore the environmental factors that may affect democratic development. In fact, plausible arguments can be and have been made for a wide variety of factors or preconditions that appear to be associated with the

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emergence of democratic regimes. To a large extent these factors can be grouped into four broad categories--economic, social, external, and cultural.

Economic wealth and equality.

In his critique, Rustow gave special attention to an influential article published by Seymour Martin Lipset a decade earlier. In that piece, Lipset highlighted the seeming correlation between high levels of economic development and the prevalence of democratic political systems among European, English-speaking, and Latin American nations. The "more well-to-do a nation," he postulated, "the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy."⁸ His study stimulated a flood of further analyses that criticized, qualified, and refined his argument. Whatever the academic hairsplittings, however, his basic point seemed to make sense. "There is," as another scholar put it in 1960, "a positive correlation between economic development and political competitiveness."⁹ A quarter century later, that correlation still seemed to exist. In 1981, for instance, a comparison of the World Bank's ratings of countries in terms of economic development with Freedom House's ratings of them in terms of liberty showed these results--two of thirty-six low-income countries were classified "free" or democratic, fourteen out of sixty middle-income countries were so classified, and eighteen out of twenty-four countries with industrial economies were so classified.¹⁰ As one moves up the economic ladder, the greater are the chances that a country will be democratic.

The correlation between wealth and democracy is thus fairly strong. How can it be explained? There are three possibilities. First, both democracy and wealth could be caused by a third factor. Protestantism has, for instance, been assigned by some a major role in the origins of capitalism, economic development, and democracy. Second, democracy could give rise to economic wealth. In fact, however, high levels of economic wealth require high rates of economic growth and high rates of economic growth do not correlate with the prevalence of democratic political systems.¹¹ Hence, it seems unlikely that wealth depends on democracy, and, if a connection exists, democracy must depend on wealth.

The probability of any causal connection running from wealth to democracy is enhanced by the arguments as to why this would be a plausible relationship. A wealthy economy, it is said, makes

possible higher levels of literacy, education, and mass media exposure, all of which are conducive to democracy. A wealthy economy also moderates the tensions of political conflict; alternative opportunities are likely to exist for unsuccessful political leaders and greater economic resources generally facilitate accommodation and compromise. In addition, a highly developed, industrialized economy and the complex society it implies cannot be governed efficiently by authoritarian means. Decision-making is necessarily dispersed, and hence power is shared and rule must be based on consent. Finally, in a more highly developed economy, income and possibly wealth also tend to be more equally distributed than in a poorer economy. Since democracy means, in some measure, majority rule, democracy is only possible if the majority is a relatively satisfied middle class, and not an impoverished majority confronting an inordinately wealthy oligarchy. A substantial middle class, in turn, may be the product of the relatively equal distribution of land in agrarian societies that may otherwise be relatively poor, such as the early nineteenth century United States or twentieth century Costa Rica. It may also be the result of a relatively high level of development, which produces greater income equality in industrial as compared to industrializing societies.

If these arguments are correct, economic development in the Communist world and the Third World should facilitate the emergence of democratic regimes. Yet one must be skeptical as to whether such an easy conclusion is warranted. In the first place, there is the question as to what level of economic development is required to make possible the transition to democracy. As Jonathan Sunshine has conclusively shown, the countries of Western Europe generally became democratic when their per capita gross domestic products were in the range of \$300-\$500 (in 1960 dollars). By 1981, perhaps two-thirds of the middle-income developing countries had reached or exceeded that level of development. Most of them, however, had not become democratic. If the economic theory holds, the level of economic development necessary to facilitate the transition to democracy must be higher in the late twentieth century than it was in the century prior to 1950.¹² In addition, different countries may still transit to democracy at widely varying levels of development. Spain, after all, did grow extremely rapidly during the 1950s and 1960s and did become democratic after the death of Francisco Franco in the mid-1970s. Could this have happened without the industrialization, urbanization, and development of the middle class that were central to

Spanish economic growth? Quite probably not. Lopez Rodo was at least partially right when he had earlier predicted that Spain would become democratic when its per capita income reached \$2,000 per head.¹³ But then what about Portugal? It made a simultaneous transition to democracy, without having experienced the massive economic development of Spain and while still at a much lower level of economic well-being.

In addition, what about the experience of the southern cone states of Latin America? They too went through major processes of economic development and yet turned away from democracy, a phenomenon that led Guillermo O'Donnell to develop his theory of bureaucratic authoritarianism that posited just the opposite of the Lipset wealth-democracy theory. Instead, O'Donnell argued that economic development and particularly the strains produced by a heavy emphasis on import substitution led to the emergence of new, stronger, and more lasting forms of authoritarian rule.¹⁴

There is also the experience of the East Asian newly industrializing countries. In the 1960s and 1970s, these countries not only had the highest economic growth rates in the world, but they also achieved those rates while in most cases maintaining very equitable systems of income distribution. Yet none became more democratic and two of the most notable economic achievers, Korea and Singapore, became less so.

At the same time, the economic theory may still serve a purpose in terms of focusing attention on those countries where transitions to democratic or other types of modern political systems are most likely to occur. As countries develop economically, they can be conceived of moving into a zone of transition or choice, in which traditional forms of rule become increasingly difficult to maintain and new types of political institutions are required to aggregate the demands of an increasingly complex society and to implement public policies in such a society. In the 1981 World Bank ordering of countries by level of economic development, the zone of choice might be conceived as comprising the top one-third of the middle-income countries, that is, those running from Number 77 (the Republic of Korea) up to Number 96 (Spain). To these should be added Taiwan, which in terms of per capita income fits in the middle of this group. Of these twenty-one countries:

7 were democracies, including 4 (Spain, Venezuela, Portugal, Greece) that transitioned to democracy after World War II, 2 that became democratic on independence (Israel,

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Trinidad and Tobago), and 1 that had sustained democracy for many years (Costa Rica);

4 were the bureaucratic-authoritarian (B-A) states of the southern cone (Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay);

4 were the newly industrializing countries (NICs) of East Asia (the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong);

2 were Communist (Rumania and Yugoslavia);

and the remaining 4 (Algeria, Mexico, Iran, and South Africa) were resource rich, ideologically diverse, and politically undemocratic.

Two years later, this group of countries, now labeled by the World Bank as "upper middle income countries" had been reduced by the graduation of Spain into the category of "industrial market economies," but had been enlarged by the movement upward of Malaysia, Lebanon, and Panama, and by the Bank's transfer into it of Iraq from the category of "high income oil exporters." 15

If the wealth theory of democracy were valid, one would predict further movement toward democracy among the twenty-odd states in this group, perhaps particularly on the part of the East Asian NICs and the B-A states of South America. Experience suggests, however, that what is predictable for these countries in the transition zone is not the advent of democracy but rather the demise of previously existing political forms. Economic development compels the modification or abandonment of traditional political institutions; it does not determine what political system will replace them. That will be shaped by other factors, such as the underlying culture of the society, the values of the elites, and external influences.

In the late 1950s, for instance, both Cuba and Venezuela were reaching the level of economic development where the traditional sort of military despotism to which each had been subjected for years (Fulgencio y Batista Zaldívar, Marcos Perez Jimenez) was no longer adequate for the needs of the society. These military despotisms came to their ends in 1958 and 1959. Batista collapsed in the face of an armed revolutionary movement that rapidly seized and consolidated power, nationalized private property, and installed a pervasive Marxist-Leninist dictatorship. The Perez Jimenez regime collapsed as a result of the withdrawal of support by virtually all the major groups of Venezuelan society. That collapse was accompanied, however, by the negotiation of a series of pacts among Venezuelan leaders representing the major political and social groups that set the framework for a democratic politi-

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cal system.¹⁶ By the late 1950s, the days of traditional personalistic despotism in Cuba and Venezuela were numbered; what was not fixed was what would replace them. Fidel Castro chose to lead Cuba in one direction; Romulo Betancourt chose to lead Venezuela in a very different one. Fifteen years later in somewhat comparable circumstances King Juan Carlos and Adolfo Suarez in Spain and Antonio Ramalho Eanes in Portugal made similar choices on behalf of democracy. In another case, by the mid-1970s the rapid economic development of Iran had clearly undermined the basis for the Shah's regime. The Shah did not attempt to develop a broader, more participatory set of democratic institutions. His inaction, combined with the decision or lack of decision by the military leaders and the political skill of the mullahs, opened Iran to a religious revolution. Different and earlier decisions by Iranian leaders in the 1960s and 1970s might have moved Iran in a more democratic direction.

If the concept of a transition zone is valid, economic development produces a phase in a nation's history where political elites and the prevailing political values can shape choices that decisively determine the nation's future evolution. The range of choice may be limited. In 1981, for instance, all countries with per capita gross national products of \$4,220 or more (aside from the small oil-exporting states and Singapore) were either democratic or Communist. Conceivably, transition zone countries could make other choices. Iran is obviously in the fanatic pursuit of a different course; possibly the East Asian NICs and the Latin American B-A regimes may find other alternatives. To date, however, those countries that have come through the transition zone have almost always emerged as either democracies or as Communist dictatorships.

Social structure.

A second set of often-discussed preconditions for democracy involves the extent to which there is a widely differentiated and articulated social structure with relatively autonomous social classes, regional groups, occupational groups, and ethnic and religious groups. Such groups, it is argued, provide the basis for the limitation of state power, hence for the control of the state by society, and hence for democratic political institutions as the most effective means of exercising that control. Societies that lack autonomous intermediate groups are, on the other hand,

much more likely to be dominated by a centralized power apparatus--an absolute monarchy, an oriental despotism, or an authoritarian or totalitarian dictatorship.¹⁷ This argument can be made on behalf of groups and pluralism in general or on behalf of particular groups or types of pluralistic structure which are singled out as playing a decisive role in making democracy possible.

According to one line of argument, pluralism (even highly stratified pluralism) in traditional society enhances the probability of developing stable democracy in modern society. The caste system may be one reason why India has been able to develop and to maintain stable democratic institutions.¹⁸ More generally, the argument is made that societies with a highly developed feudalism, including an aristocracy capable of limiting the development of state power, are more likely to evolve into democracies than those that lack such social pluralism. The record of Western Europe versus Russia and of Japan versus China suggests that there may well be something to this theory. But the theory fails to account for differences between North America and South America. Tocqueville, Louis Hartz, and others attribute democracy in the former to the absence of feudalism. The failure of democracy in South America has, conversely, often been attributed precisely to its feudal heritage, although the feudalism that existed there was, to be sure, highly centralized.¹⁹

The theory that emphasizes traditional pluralism is, in a sense, the opposite of the one that emphasizes wealth as a precondition of democracy. The latter makes democracy dependent on how far the processes of economic development and modernization have gone. The traditional pluralism theory, in contrast, puts the emphasis on where the process started, on the nature of traditional society. Was it, in Gaetano Mosca's terms, primarily a "feudal" or a "bureaucratic" society? If pushed to the extreme, of course, this theory implies societal predestination: it is all determined in advance that some societies will become democratic and others will not.

The most significant manifestation of the social structure argument, however, concerns not the existence of a feudal aristocracy, but rather the existence of an autonomous bourgeoisie. Democracy, the Marxists argue, is bourgeois democracy, reflecting the interests of that particular social class. Barrington Moore has restated the proposition succinctly in a more limited formulation: "No bourgeois, no democracy."²⁰ This argument would seem

to have much to commend it. The failure of democracy to develop in Third World countries despite their economic growth can, perhaps, be related to the nature of that growth. The leading roles have been played by the state and by multinational enterprises. As a result, economic development runs ahead of the development of a bourgeoisie. In those circumstances where a bourgeoisie has developed, however, the prospects for democracy have been greater. The move to democracy in Turkey in the 1940s coincided with the move away from the etatism of Kemalism and the appearance of a group of independent businessmen. More significantly, the ability of a developing country to have an autonomous, indigenous bourgeoisie is likely to be related to its size. Countries with small internal markets are unlikely to be able to sustain such a class, but large ones can. This may be one factor explaining why India (with one short interlude) has sustained a democratic system, and why Brazil, which is also developing a vigorous indigenous bourgeoisie, steadily moved away from bureaucratic authoritarianism in the 1970s and early 1980s. In South Africa, businessmen have been among those most active in attempting to ameliorate apartheid and broaden democracy in that country.

The seemingly important role of an autonomous bourgeoisie for the development of democracy highlights the question of the relation between economic system and political system. Clearly political democracy is compatible with both a substantial role in the economy for state-owned enterprises and a substantial state welfare and social security system. Nonetheless, as Charles Lindblom has pointed out (in a volume that otherwise highlights the conflict between the business corporation and democracy), all political democracies have market-oriented economies, although quite clearly not all market-oriented economies are paired with democratic political systems.²¹ Lindblom's message would seem to be like Moore's--a market-oriented economy, like a bourgeoisie, is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the existence of a democratic political system.

Why should this be the case? At least two reasons suggest themselves. Politically, a market economy requires a dispersion of economic power and in practice almost invariably some form of private property. The dispersion of economic power creates alternatives and counters to state power and enables those elites that control economic power to limit state power and to exploit democratic means to make it serve their interests. Economically, a market economy appears more likely to sustain economic growth

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than a command economy (although the latter may, as the Soviet and East European cases suggest, do so for a short period of time), and hence a market economy is more likely to give rise to the economic wealth and the resulting more equitable distribution of income that provide the infrastructure of democracy.

A third source of autonomous social pressure in a democratic direction may be provided by labor unions. Historically, unions played this role in Western Europe and the United States. In the contemporary world, unions have also had a role in the struggles against the racist oligarchy in South Africa, against military rule in the southern cone, and against the Communist dictatorship in Poland. At the same time, the experience of these cases also suggests the limits on the extent to which, in the absence of affiliated political parties, labor unions can affect political change.

Under some conditions, communal (that is, ethnic, racial, or religious) pluralism may be conducive to the development of at least limited forms of democracy. In most cases of communal pluralism, democracy can operate only on a consociational rather than a majoritarian basis.²² And even when it is organized on a consociational basis, it will often break down as a result of social mobilization that undermines the power of elites or as a result of the intrusion of external political and military forces (as in Cyprus or Lebanon). Even in the best of circumstances, consociational democracy can often only remain stable by in effect becoming consociational oligarchy (as in Malaysia), that is, by sacrificing contestation in order to maintain representation.

External environment.

External influences may be of decisive importance in influencing whether a society moves in a democratic or non-democratic direction. To the extent that such influences are more important than indigenous factors, democratization is the result of diffusion rather than development. Conceivably, democracy in the world could stem from a single source. Clearly it does not. Yet it would be wrong to ignore the extent to which much of the democracy in the world does have a common origin. In 1984, Freedom House classified fifty-two countries (many of them extremely small) as "free."²³ In thirty-three of those fifty-two countries, the presence of democratic institutions could be ascribed in large part to British and American influence, either through settlement,

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colonial rule, defeat in war, or fairly direct imposition (such as in the Dominican Republic). Most of the other nineteen "free" countries where democracy had other sources were either in Western Europe or in South America. The extension of democracy into the non-Western world, insofar as that has occurred, has thus been largely the product of Anglo-American efforts.

Ever since the French Revolution, armies have carried political ideologies with them. As we have indicated, where American armies went in World War II, democracy followed (in four cases enduringly, in one case temporarily). Where Soviet armies went, communism followed. Military conquest is clearly one way of extending democracy and other political systems. Historically, however, Western colonialism has been the most important means of diffusing democratic ideas and institutions. The enduring results of such colonialism have, however, been rather limited. As of 1983, no former French, U.S., Dutch, Portuguese, or Belgian colony was rated "free" by Freedom House. Several former British colonies were. Myron Weiner has, indeed, emphasized that "every single country in the third world that emerged from colonial rule since the second world war with a population of at least one million (and almost all the smaller countries as well) with a continuous democratic experience is a former British colony."²⁴ British rule seemingly has a significantly different impact from that of other colonial powers. Only six countries meet Weiner's condition, however, and a much larger number of former British colonies have not sustained democracy. The question then becomes how to distinguish among former British colonies. One possibility is that the duration of democratic institutions after independence is a function of the duration of British rule before independence. The colonies where democratic institutions appear to have taken the firmest root are those such as India, Sri Lanka, and the West Indian Anglophone states, where British rule dates from the eighteenth century. The record of former British colonies in Africa, on the other hand, where British rule dates only from the late nineteenth century, is not all that different from that of the former African colonies of other European powers.

In large measure, the rise and decline of democracy on a global scale is a function of the rise and decline of the most powerful democratic states. The spread of democracy in the nineteenth century went hand in hand with the Pax Britannica. The extension of democracy after World War II reflected the global power of the United States. The decline of democracy in East Asia and Latin America in the 1970s was in part a reflection of the waning of

American influence.²⁵ That influence is felt both directly, as a result of the efforts of the American government to affect political processes in other societies, and also indirectly by providing a powerful and successful model to be followed.

Regional external influences can also have a significant effect on political development within a society. The governments and political parties of the European Community (EC) helped to encourage the emergence of democratic institutions in Spain and Portugal, and the desire of those two countries plus Greece to join the community provided an additional incentive for them to become democratic. Even beyond the confines of the EC, Western Europe has generally become defined as a community of democratic nations, and any significant departure by one nation from the democratic norm would clearly create a major crisis in intra-European relations. In some measure, a similar development may be taking place among the countries of the Andean Pact. The departure from the Pact of Chile and the addition of Venezuela in the mid-1970s, plus the transitions to democracy in Ecuador and Peru, then laid the basis for identifying pact membership with the adherence to democratic government.

In some regions, but most notably in Latin America, regional trends may exist. By and large, Latin American governments moved in a democratic direction in the late 1950s and early 1960s, then in an authoritarian direction in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and then once again in a democratic direction in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The reasons for these regional shifts are not entirely clear. They could be a result of four factors: simultaneous parallel socioeconomic development in Latin American societies; the triggering of a trend by the impact of one "pace-setting" Latin American society on its neighbors; the impact on Latin America of a common external influence (such as the United States); or some combination of these factors.

Cultural context.

The political culture of a society has been defined by Sidney Verba as "the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which defines the situation in which political action takes place."²⁶ Political culture is, presumably, rooted in the broader culture of a society involving those beliefs and values, often religiously based, concerning the nature of humanity and society, the relations among human beings, and the relation of

individuals to a transcendent being. Significant differences in their receptivity to democracy appear to exist among societies with different cultural traditions.

Historically, as many scholars have pointed out, a high correlation existed between Protestantism and democracy. In the contemporary world, virtually all countries with a European population and a Protestant majority (except East Germany) have democratic governments.²⁷ The case of Catholicism, particularly in Latin countries, on the other hand, is more ambivalent. Historically, it was often argued that a natural opposition existed between Catholicism and democracy. By and large, democratic institutions developed later and less surely in European Catholic countries than in Protestant ones. By and large, however, these countries also developed later economically than the Protestant countries, and hence it is difficult to distinguish between the impact of economics and that of religion. Conceivably, the influence of the latter on politics could have been mediated through its impact on economic development and the rise of an entrepreneurial class. With economic development, however, the role of the church changed, and in most Catholic countries now the church is identified with support for democracy.

Islam, on the other hand, has not been hospitable to democracy. Of thirty-six countries with Moslem majorities, Freedom House in 1984 rated twenty-one as "not free," fifteen as "partially free," none as "free." The one Islamic country that sustained even intermittent democracy after World War II was Turkey, which had, under Mustapha Kemal, explicitly rejected its Islamic tradition and defined itself as a secular republic. The one Arab country that sustained democracy, albeit of the consociational variety, for any time was Lebanon, 40 to 50 percent of whose population was Christian and whose democratic institutions collapsed when the Moslem majority asserted itself in the 1970s. Somewhat similarly, both Confucianism and Buddhism have been conducive to authoritarian rule, even in those cases where, as in Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, economic preconditions for democracy have come into being. In India and Japan, on the other hand, the traditional Hindu and Shinto cultures at the very least did not prevent the development of democratic institutions and may well have encouraged it.

How can these differences be explained? Both doctrinal and structural aspects of the religions could play a role. At the most obvious level, those cultures that are consummatory in character—those for whom intermediaries and ultimate ends are

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closely connected--seem to be less favorable to democracy. In Islam, for instance, no distinction exists between religion and politics or between the spiritual and the secular, and political participation was historically an alien concept.²⁸ Somewhat similarly, Confucianism in China was generally hostile to social bodies independent of the state, and the culture was conceived as a total entity, no part of which could be changed without threatening the whole. Instrumental cultures, in contrast, are "characterized by a large sector of intermediate ends separate from and independent of ultimate ends" and hence "ultimate ends do not color every concrete act."²⁹ The Hindu tradition, for example, is relatively tolerant of diversity. S. N. Eisenstadt has written that "the basic religious and cultural orientations, the specific cultural identity of Indian civilization were not necessarily associated with any particular political or imperial framework. . . ." ³⁰

As a whole, consummatory culture is thus more resistant to change, and when change comes in one significant element of the culture, the entire culture is thrown into question or is displaced and destroyed. In the instrumental culture, on the other hand, change can come gradually and incrementally. Hence, less resistance exists to the adaptation of new political forms, such as democratic institutions, and the process of adaptation can be an extended one that in itself facilitates the development of stable democracy.

With respect to the more narrowly political culture of a society, it seems reasonable to expect that the prevalence of some values and beliefs will be more conducive to the emergence of democracy than others. A political culture that values highly hierarchical relationships and extreme deference to authority presumably is less fertile ground for democracy than one that does not. Similarly, a culture in which there is a high degree of mutual trust among members of the society is likely to be more favorable to democracy than one in which interpersonal relationships are more generally characterized by suspicion, hostility, and distrust. A willingness to tolerate diversity and conflict among groups and to recognize the legitimacy of compromise also should be helpful to democratic development. Societies in which great stress is put on the need to acquire power and little on the need to accommodate others are more likely to have authoritarian or totalitarian regimes. Social scientists have attempted to compare societies along these various dimensions, but the evidence remains fragmented and difficult to systematize.³¹ In addition,

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of course, even if some beliefs and values are found to correlate with the presence of democratic institutions, the question still remains concerning the relationship among these in a developmental sense. To what extent does the development of a pro-democratic political culture have to precede the development of democratic institutions? Or do the two tend to develop more simultaneously with the successful operation of democratic institutions, possibly created for other reasons, generating adherence to democratic values and beliefs?³²

Process of Democratization

The classic model of democratization that has infused much discussion of the subject is that of Britain, with its stately progression from civic rights to political rights to social rights, gradual development of parliamentary supremacy and cabinet government, and incremental expansion of the suffrage over the course of a century. It is basically a linear model. Dankwart A. Rustow's model, based on Swedish experience--national unity, prolonged and inconclusive political struggle, a conscious decision to adopt democratic rules, habituation to the working of those rules--also involves a relatively simple linear progression. These "ingredients," he has argued, "must be assembled one at a time."³³ These linear models primarily reflect European experience during the century ending in 1920 and the experience of some Latin American countries (such as Argentina until 1930 and Chile until 1973).

Two other models have generally been more relevant than the linear model to the experience of Third World countries. One is the cyclical model of alternating despotism and democracy. In this case, key elites normally accept, at least superficially, the legitimacy of democratic forms. Elections are held from time to time, but rarely is there any sustained succession of governments coming to power through the electoral process. Governments are as often the product of military interventions as they are of elections. Such interventions tend to occur either when a radical party wins or appears to threaten the prerogatives of the armed forces, or when the government appears incapable of effectively guiding the economy and maintaining public order. Once a military junta takes over, it will normally promise to return power to civilian rule. In due course, it does so, if only to minimize divisiveness within the armed forces and to escape from its own

inability to govern effectively. In a praetorian situation like this, neither authoritarian nor democratic institutions are effectively institutionalized. Once countries enter into this cyclical pattern, it appears to be extremely difficult for them to escape from it. In many respects, countries that have had relatively stable authoritarian rule (such as Spain and Portugal) are more likely to evolve into relatively stable democracies than countries that have regularly oscillated between despotism and democracy (such as Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, Argentina, Ghana, Nigeria). In the latter, neither democratic nor authoritarian norms have deep roots among the relevant political elites, while in the former a broad consensus accepting of authoritarian norms is displaced by a broad consensus on or acceptance of democratic ones. In the one case, the alternation of democracy and despotism is the political system; in the other, the shift from a stable despotism to a stable democracy is a change in political systems.

A third model is neither linear nor cyclical but rather dialectical. In this case, the development of a middle class leads to increased pressures on the existing authoritarian regimes for expanded participation and contestation. At some point, there is then a sharp break, perhaps in the form of what I have elsewhere called the "urban breakthrough," the overthrow of the existing authoritarian regime, and the installation of a democratic one.³⁴ This regime, however, finds it difficult or impossible to govern effectively. A sharp reaction occurs with the overthrow of the democratic system and installation of a (usually right-wing) authoritarian regime. In due course, however, this regime collapses and a transition is made to a more stable, more balanced, and longer-lasting democratic system. This model is roughly applicable to the history of a number of countries, including Germany, Italy, Austria, Greece, and Spain.

Most theories of political development in general and of democratization in particular see these processes as involving a number of different elements. The sequence in which those components appear may have important implications for the overall results of the process. Several theorists have suggested, for instance, that the preferable overall process of development for a country is first to define its national identity, next to develop effective institutions of authority, and then to expand political participation. The "probabilities of a political system's development in a nonviolent, nonauthoritarian, and eventually democratically stable manner are maximized," Eric Nordlinger has argued, when this sequence occurs.³⁵ In somewhat parallel

fashion, it has been argued that the development of broad-gauged political institutions for political participation, such as electoral and party systems, must coincide with or precede the expansion of political participation if instability and violence are to be avoided. Similarly, Robert A. Dahl emphasizes the greater probability of success in transitions to democracy (or polyarchy in his terms) if the expansion of contestation precedes the expansion of participation.³⁶

All these theories thus emphasize the desirability for the eventual development of stable democracy of the expansion of political participation occurring relatively late in the sequence of change. However, given the widely accepted desirability of political participation (including in totalitarian regimes) and the major increases in social mobilization (such as urbanization, literacy, and media consumption) produced by economic development, the prevailing tendencies in the contemporary world are for participation to expand early in the process of development, and before or concurrently with contestation. This may be one reason why economic development in the Third World has not stimulated the emergence of more stable democratic regimes. At present, the one notable case where contestation has clearly developed in advance of participation is South Africa. Hence, according to the Dahl thesis, the prospects for democratic development should be greater in South Africa than elsewhere in Africa.

It is often assumed that since democracy, to a greater degree than other forms of government, involves rule by the people, the people therefore play a greater role in bringing it into existence than they do with other forms of government. In fact, however, democratic regimes that last have seldom, if ever, been instituted by mass popular action. Almost always, democracy has come as much from the top down as from the bottom up; it is as likely to be the product of oligarchy as of protest against oligarchy. The passionate dissidents from authoritarian rule and the crusaders for democratic principles, the Tom Paines of this world, do not create democratic institutions; that requires James Madisons. Those institutions come into existence through negotiations and compromises among political elites calculating their own interests and desires. They are produced when, as Kustow argued, political leaders decide "to accept the existence of diversity in unity and, to that end, to institutionalize some crucial aspect of democratic procedure." The political leaders may do this because they are convinced of the ethical and political superiority of democracy and hence view democracy as a desirable goal in itself. More

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likely, however, they will view democracy as a means to other goals, such as prolonging their own rule, achieving international legitimacy, minimizing domestic opposition, and reducing the likelihood of civil violence, from which they will probably suffer. Hence, whatever institutions are agreed on will, in Rustow's words, "seem second-best to all major parties involved."³⁷ One could paraphrase Reinhold Niebuhr: The ability of elites to compromise makes democracy possible; the inclination of elites to vengeance makes democracy desirable--for the elites.

In the decades after World War II, democratic regimes have usually been introduced in independent countries through one or some combination of two processes. Replacement occurs when an authoritarian regime collapses or is overthrown as a result of military defeat, economic disaster, or the withdrawal of support from it by substantial groups in the population. Its leaders are killed, imprisoned, flee the country, or withdraw from politics. The leaders of the now-dominant groups, which had not been actively involved with the authoritarian regime, agree among themselves to institute a democratic system. This agreement may be reached very quickly because of previous experience with democracy and because inauguration is seen as the "obvious" solution by the relevant political elites, as in Venezuela in 1958 and Greece in 1974. Or it may come about as a result of political struggle among elites with differing views as to the future of their country, out of which the leaders committed to democracy emerge successfully (as in Portugal in 1975-76). This process may involve, as it did in the case of Venezuela, a series of carefully negotiated pacts among the relevant groups that can cover economic policy and the role of institutions (such as the church and the army), as well as the procedures for choosing a government. One critical issue on which the constitutive elites must agree is how to treat those actively involved in the previous authoritarian regime.³⁸

The alternative process for inaugurating a democratic regime might be termed transformation. In this case, the elites within an authoritarian system conclude that, for some reason or another, that system which they have led and presumably benefited from no longer meets their needs or those of their society. They hence take the lead in modifying the existing political system and transforming it into a democratic one. In this case, while there may well be a variety of internal and external pressures favoring change, the initiative for such change comes from the rulers. Transformation involves, as Juan Linz put it, "change through

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reform rather than rupture."³⁹ Notable examples include, of course, Britain in the nineteenth century, and after World War II, Turkey in the 1940s, Spain in the 1970s, and Brazil in the 1970s and 1980s. The leaders of the transformation process typically confront all the problems of the political reformer, having to maneuver skillfully between the stand-patters opposed to any democratization, on the one hand, and the committed dissident and opposition groups demanding the immediate dissolution of the authoritarian system, on the other. Essential to their success is that they be seen as keeping control, acting from a position of strength and not under duress, and dictating the pace of change.

The replacement process requires compromise and agreement among elites who have not been part of the authoritarian regime. The transformation process requires skilled leadership from an agreement among the elites who are part of that regime. In neither case is agreement necessarily required between elites who are within the regime and those opposing the regime. This situation makes replacement and transformation possible, since reaching an agreement between out-groups and in-groups is far more difficult than reaching an agreement among out-groups or among in-groups. Except for Costa Rica in 1948, it is hard to think of a case where a democratic system of any duration was inaugurated by explicit agreement between the leaders of a regime and the leaders of the armed opposition to that regime.

"As long as powerful vested interests oppose changes that lead toward a less oppressive world," Barrington Moore has argued, "no commitment to a free society can dispense with some conception of revolutionary coercion."⁴⁰ His thesis is that liberty and democracy can be inaugurated by bloody revolution and that such a course may well impose fewer costs than the alternative of gradual reform. When in world history, however, has violent revolution produced a stable democratic regime in an independent state? "Revolutionary coercion" may bring down an authoritarian regime, but, except again for Costa Rica in 1948, guerrilla insurgencies do not inaugurate democratic regimes. All revolutionary opponents of authoritarian regimes claim to be democrats; once they achieve power through violence, almost all turn out to be authoritarian themselves, often imposing an even more repressive regime than the one they overthrew. Most authoritarian regimes are thus replaced by new authoritarian regimes, and a democratic succession usually requires minimum violence. "In the future as in the past," as

Dahl concluded his study of this issue, "stable polyarchies and near-polyarchies are more likely to result from rather slow evolutionary overthrow of existing hegemonies." 41

The Prospects for Democracy

This brief and informal survey of the preconditions and processes conducive to the emergence of democratic regimes argues for caution in any effort to predict whether more countries will become democratic. It may, however, be useful to attempt to sum up the modest conclusions which seem to emerge from this review.

With respect to preconditions, the emergence of democracy in a society is helped by a number of factors: higher levels of economic well-being; the absence of extreme inequalities in wealth and income; greater social pluralism, including particularly a strong and autonomous bourgeoisie; a more market-oriented economy; greater influence vis-a-vis the society of existing democratic states; and a culture that is less monistic and more tolerant of diversity and compromise. No one of these preconditions is sufficient to lead to democratic development. With the possible exception of a market economy, no single precondition is necessary to produce such development. Some combination of some of these preconditions is required for a democratic regime to emerge, but the nature of that combination can vary greatly from one case to another. It is also necessary, however, to look not only at what preconditions must be present but also at the negative strength of any precondition that may be absent. The powerful absence of one favorable condition, or conversely, the presence of a powerful negative condition, that overrides the presence of otherwise favorable conditions, may prevent democratic development. In terms of cultural tradition, economic development, and social structure, Czechoslovakia would certainly be a democracy today (and probably Hungary and Poland also) if it were not for the overriding veto of the Soviet presence. In similar fashion, extreme poverty, extreme economic inequalities, or deeply ingrained Islamic and Confucian cultural traditions could have comparable effect in Africa, Central America, or the Middle East and East Asia.

With respect to the processes necessary to bring about democratic development, a central requirement would appear to be that either the established elites within an authoritarian system or the successor elites after an authoritarian system collapses see

their interests served by the introduction of democratic institutions. The probability of stable democracy emerging will be enhanced to the extent that the transition can be a gradual one, that the introduction of contestation precedes the expansion of political participation, and that the role of violence in the transition is minimized. The probability of democratization decreases sharply to the extent that political life in a society becomes highly polarized and involves violent conflict between social forces.

Possibility of regime changes.

In terms of these generalizations, prospects for democratic development in the 1980s are probably greatest in the bureaucratic-authoritarian states of South America. Cultural traditions, levels of economic development, previous democratic experience, social pluralism (albeit with weak bourgeoisies outside Brazil), and elite desires to emulate European and North American models all favor movement toward democracy in these countries. On the other hand, the polarization and violence that has occurred (particularly in Argentina and Chile) could make such movement difficult. The prospects for a relatively stable democratic system should be greatest in Brazil. Beginning in the early 1970s, the leadership of the Brazilian regime began a process of distensao, gradually relaxing the authoritarian controls that had been imposed in the 1960s. By the early 1980s, Brazil had acquired many of the characteristics of a democratic system. The principal deficiency was the absence of popular elections for the chief executive, but those were generally viewed as certain to come sometime in the 1980s. The gradualness of the Brazilian process, the relative low level of violence that accompanied it, and the general recognition among elite groups of the importance of not disrupting it in any way, all seemed to enhance the prospects for democracy.

In Argentina, the economic and military failures of the authoritarian regime led to a much more dramatic and rapid transit to democracy in 1983. The probabilities of this replacement being sustained would seem to depend on three factors: the ability of the Alfonsin government to deal with the economic problems it confronted; the extent to which Peronista, as well as Radical, elites were willing to abide by democratic rules; and the extent to which military leadership was effectively excluded from power

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or came to identify its interests with the maintenance of a democratic regime. The two other southern cone countries with bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes, Chile and Uruguay, are the two South American countries that did have the strongest democratic traditions. As of 1984, however, in neither country had authoritarian rule lost its legitimacy and effectiveness to the point where it could no longer be maintained and a replacement process could occur (as in Argentina). Nor had the leaders of either regime embarked on a meaningful transformation process to democratize their system (as in Brazil). The Brazilian and Argentine changes, however, cannot fail to have impact on political development in the smaller countries.

The probability of movement in a democratic direction in the East Asian newly industrializing countries is considerably less than it is among the Latin American B-A states. The economic basis for democracy is clearly coming into existence, and if their economic development continues at anything like the rates it did in the 1960s and 1970s, these states will soon constitute an authoritarian anomaly among the wealthier countries of the world. The East Asian countries generally have also had and maintained a relatively equal distribution of income. In addition, the United States, Britain, and Japan are the principal external influences on these societies. All these factors favor democratic development. On the other side, cultural traditions, social structure, and a general weakness of democratic norms among key elites all impede movement in a democratic direction. In some measure, the East Asian states dramatically pose the issue of whether economics or culture has the greater influence on political development. One can also speculate on whether the spread of Christianity in Korea may create a cultural context more favorable to democracy.

Among other less economically developed East Asian societies, the prospects for democracy are undoubtedly highest but still not very high in the Philippines. The Marcos government is not likely to attempt to transform itself, and hence efforts to create a democratic system must await its demise. At that time, American influence, previous experience with democracy, social pluralism (including the influence of the Catholic Church), and the general agreement among opposition political leaders on the desirability of a return to democracy, should all provide support for movement in that direction. On the other hand, military leaders may not support democratic norms, and the existence of a radical insurgency committed to violence, plus a general proclivity to the use of violence in the society, might make such a transition diffi-

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cult. Conceivably, Philippine development could follow the lines of the dialectical model referred to earlier, in which (as in Venezuela) an initial experience with democracy is broken by a personalistic authoritarian interlude that then collapses and a new, more stable democratic regime is brought into existence by agreement among political leaders. The Philippine Betancourt, however, may well have been gunned down at the Manila airport.

Among Islamic countries, particularly those in the Middle East, the prospects for democratic development seem low. The Islamic revival, and particularly the rise of Shi'ite fundamentalism, would seem to reduce even further the likelihood of democratic development, particularly since democracy is often identified with the very Western influences the revival strongly opposes. In addition, many of the Islamic states are very poor. Those that are rich, on the other hand, are so because of oil, which is controlled by the state and hence enhances the power of the state in general and of the bureaucracy in particular. Saudi Arabia and some of the smaller Arab oil-rich Gulf countries have from time to time made some modest gestures toward the introduction of democratic institutions, but these have not gone far and have often been reversed.

Most African countries are, by reason of their poverty or the violence of their politics, unlikely to move into a democratic direction. Those African and Latin American countries that have adhered to the cyclical pattern of alternating democratic and authoritarian systems in the past are not likely to change this basic pattern, as the example of Nigeria underlines, unless more fundamental changes occur in their economic and social infrastructure. In South Africa, on the other hand, the relatively high level of economic development by African standards, the intense contestation that occurs within the minority permitted to participate in politics, the modest expansion of that minority to include the Coloureds and Asians, and the influence of Western democratic norms, all provide a basis for moving in a more democratic direction. However, that basis is countered on the other side by the inequalities, fears, and hatreds that separate blacks and whites.

In some small countries, democratic institutions may emerge as a result of massive foreign effort. This did happen in the Dominican Republic; in 1984 it was, presumably, happening in Grenada; it could, conceivably, happen at extremely high cost in El Salvador.

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The likelihood of democratic development in Eastern Europe is virtually nil. The Soviet presence is a decisive overriding obstacle, no matter how favorable other conditions may be in countries like Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. Democratization could occur in these societies only if either the Soviet Union were drastically weakened through war, domestic upheaval, or economic collapse (none of which seems likely), or if the Soviet Union came to view Eastern European democratization as not threatening to its interests (which seems equally unlikely).

The issue of Soviet intervention apart, a more general issue concerns the domestic pattern of evolution within Communist states. For almost four decades after World War II, no democratic country, with the dubious possible exception of Czechoslovakia in 1948, became Communist and no Communist country became democratic through internal causes. Authoritarian regimes, on the other hand, were frequently replaced by either democratic or Communist regimes, and democratic regimes were replaced by authoritarian ones. In their early phase, Communist states usually approximated the totalitarian model, with ideology and the party playing central roles and massive efforts being made to indoctrinate and mobilize the population and to extend party control throughout all institutions in the society. Over time, however, Communist regimes also tend to change and often to become less totalitarian and more authoritarian. The importance of ideology and mobilization declines, bureaucratic stagnation replaces ideological fervor, and the party becomes less a dedicated elite and more a mechanism for patronage. In some cases, military influence increases significantly. The question thus arises: Will Communist authoritarian regimes, absent Soviet control, be more susceptible to movement toward democracy than Communist totalitarian regimes?

The answer to that question may well depend on the extent to which Communist authoritarian regimes permit the development of a market-oriented economy. The basic thrust of communism suggests that such a development is unlikely. Communism is not, as Karl Marx argued, a product of capitalist democracy; nor is it simply a "disease of the transition" to capitalist democracy, to use Rostow's phrase.⁴² It is instead an alternative to capitalist democracy and one whose guiding principle is the subjection of economic development to political control. Even if it becomes more authoritarian and less totalitarian, the Communist political

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system is likely to ensure that economic development neither achieves a level nor assumes a form that will be conducive to democracy.

The United States and global democracy.

The ability of the United States to affect the development of democracy elsewhere is limited. There is little that the United States or any other foreign country can do to alter the basic cultural tradition and social structure of another society or to promote compromise among groups of that society that have been killing each other. Within the restricted limits of the possible, however, the United States could contribute to democratic development in other countries in four ways.

First, it can assist the economic development of poor countries and promote a more equitable distribution of income and wealth in those countries. Second, it can encourage developing countries to foster market economies and the development of vigorous bourgeois classes. Third, it can refurbish its own economic, military, and political power so as to be able to exercise greater influence than it has in world affairs. Finally, it can develop a concerted program designed to encourage and to help the elites of countries entering the "transition zone" to move their countries in a more democratic direction.

Efforts such as these could have a modest influence on the development of democracy in other countries. Overall, however, this survey of the preconditions for and processes of democratization leads to the conclusion that, with a few exceptions, the prospects for the extension of democracy to other societies are not great. These prospects would improve significantly only if there were major discontinuities in current trends--such as if, for instance, the economic development of the Third World were to proceed at a much faster rate and to have a far more positive impact on democratic development than it has had so far, or if the United States reestablished a hegemonic position in the world comparable to that which it had in the 1940s and 1950s. In the absence of developments such as these, a significant increase in the number of democratic regimes in the world is unlikely. The substantial power of anti-democratic governments (particularly the Soviet Union), the unreceptivity to democracy of several major

democracy and one whose guiding principle is the subjection of economic development to political control. Even if it becomes more authoritarian and less totalitarian, the Communist political

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polarization and violence in many societies all suggest that, with a few exceptions, the limits of democratic development in the world may well have been reached.

NOTES

1. Michael W. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part I, Philosophy and Public Affairs 12 (1983): 213ff.
2. Peter Bachrach, *The Theory of Democratic Elitism: A Critique* (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1980), 24, 98ff.; Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), 2. For a useful analysis of "rationalist" and "descriptive" concepts of democracy, see Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, "Democratic Elections, Democratic Government, and Democratic Theory," in David Butler, Howard R. Penniman, and Austin Ranney, eds., *Democracy at the Polls* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1981), 325-48.
3. Dahl, *Polyarchy*, 4-9. See also Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper and Bros. 1947), 269: "the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote."
4. James Bryce, *Modern Democracies*, 2 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1921), 1:24.
5. The proportion of independent states that were democratic was roughly 19 percent in 1920, 32 percent in 1929-30, and 24 percent in 1960. See G. Bingham Powell, Jr., *Contemporary Democracies* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 238.
6. See "The Comparative Survey of Freedom" compiled annually for Freedom House by Raymond D. Gastil, particularly *Freedom at Issue*, no. 17 (1973): 2-3; no. 70 (1983): 4; no. 76 (1984): 5. Freedom House classifies a state as "free" if it rates in first or second place on a seven-place scale for both political rights and civil liberties. The countries so classified all have the minimum features of a democratic political system, at least at the time of classification. While recognizing the importance of institutionalization, the Freedom House survey does not attempt to measure the extent to which democracy has become institutionalized. Thus, its 1984 survey, published at the very beginning of 1984, rated both New Zealand and Nigeria as "free," although the latter had presumably left the category as a result of the coup on New Year's Day.
7. Dankwart A. Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model," *Comparative Politics* 2 (1970): 337ff.
8. Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," *American Political Science Review* 53 (1959): 75.

the number of democratic regimes in the world is unlikely. The substantial power of anti-democratic governments (particularly the Soviet Union), the unreceptivity to democracy of several major

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9. James S. Coleman, "Conclusion," in Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960), 538.
10. World Bank, *World Development Report 1981* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 134-35; and *Freedom at Issue*, no. 64 (1982): 8-9. See also Seymour Martin Lipset's update of his earlier analysis, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics*, 2nd ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981) 469-76.
11. This is not to argue that authoritarian regimes necessarily have higher economic growth rates than democratic ones, although they may. See Robert M. Marsh, "Does Democracy Hinder Economic Development in the Latecomer Developing Nations," *Comparative Social Research* 2 (1979): 215-48; G. William Dick, "Authoritarian Versus Nonauthoritarian Approaches to Economic Development," *Journal of Political Economy* 82 (1974): 817-27; and Erich Weede, "Political Democracy, State Strength and Economic Growth in LDCs: A Cross-National Analysis" (Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Ill., September 1983).
12. Jonathan Sunshine, "Economic Causes and Consequences of Democracy: A Study in Historical Statistics" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1972) 115ff.
13. John F. Coverdale, *The Political Transformation of Spain after Franco* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979), 1.
14. Guillermo A. O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism in Latin America* (Berkeley: University of California, Institute for International Studies, 1973), 3-15, 113-14. For analysis of this theory, see David Collier, ed., *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979).
15. World Bank, *Development Report 1981*, 134-35, and *World Development Report 1983* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 148-49.
16. See Terry Karl, "Petroleum and Political Facts: The Transition to Democracy in Venezuela" (Latin American Program Working Paper 107, The Wilson Center, 1981).
17. Those who hold a more Rousseauistic conception of democracy will, of course, tend to see intermediate groups as obstacles to the realization of true democracy. For a balanced analysis of these issues, see Robert A. Dahl, *Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy: Autonomy vs. Control* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982). For a general argument for intermediate groups as a bulwark against totalitarianism, see William Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959).
18. See Lloyd I. And Susanne Hoerber Rudolph, *The Modernity of Tradition: Political Development in India* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), 15-154.
19. For elaboration of these themes, see, among others: Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1955), and idem, ed., *The Founding of New Societies* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1964), especially Richard M. Morse, "The Heritage of Latin America"; James M. Malloy, ed., *Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977); Howard J. Wiarda,

"Toward a Framework for the Study of Political Change in the Iberic-Latin Tradition," *World Politics* 25 (1973): 206-35; Claudio Veliz, *The Centralist Tradition of Latin America* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979).

20. Barrington Moore, Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), 418.

21. Charles E. Lindblom, *Politics and Markets* (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 161-69.

22. See primarily the works of Arend Lijphart, particularly *The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands*, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975) and *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Evaluation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977).

23. *Freedom at Issue*, no. 76 (1984): 8-9.

24. Myron Weiner, "Empirical Democratic Theory," in Myron Weiner and Ergun Özbudun, eds., *Comparative Elections in Developing Countries* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, manuscript, 26 [italics in original]).

25. Samuel P. Huntington, *American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), 246-59.

26. Sidney Verba, "Comparative Political Culture," in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., *Political Culture and Political Development* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965), 513.

27. For the statistical correlation between Protestantism and democracy, see Kenneth A. Bollen, "Political Democracy and the Timing of Development," *American Sociological Review* 44 (1979): 572-87.

28. See Daniel Pipes, *In the Path of God: Islam and Political Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1983), 48-69, 144-47.

29. David E. Apter, *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 85.

30. S. N. Eisenstadt, "Transformation of Social, Political, and Cultural Orders in Modernization," *American Sociological Review* 30 (1965): 668. In contrast to the Hindu tradition, Eisenstadt writes, "the identity between political and religious communities represents a very important similarity between the Chinese and Islamic societies" (p. 663).

31. See Pye and Verba, *Political Culture and Political Development*; Dahl, *Polyarchy*, 124-87; Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963); David McClelland, *The Achieving Society* (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand, 1961).

32. For arguments on the priority of democratic values, see the case Dahl makes on Argentina, *Polyarchy*, 132-40, and Jonathan Tumin's amendment of Barrington Moore in "The Theory of Democratic Development: A Critical Revision," *Theory and Society* 11 (1982): 143-64.

33. Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy," 361.

34. Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 72-78.

35. Eric A. Nordlinger, "Political Development: Time Sequences and Rates of Change," *World Politics* 20 (1968): 494-530; Dankwart A. Rustow, *A World of Nations* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1967), 126ff.; Leonard Binder et al., *Crises and Sequences in Political Development* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971), 310-313.

36. Dahl, *Polyarchy*, 33-40; Huntington, *Political Order*, esp. pp. 32-59, 78-92. See also Richard A. Pride, *Origins of Democracy: A Cross-National Study of Mobilization, Party Systems, and Democratic Stability*, *Comparative Politics Series*, Vol. 1, (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1970).

37. Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy," 355-57.

38. John J. Herz, "On Reestablishing Democracy after the Downfall of Authoritarian or Dictatorial Regimes," *Comparative Politics* 10 (1978): 559-62.

39. Juan Linz, "Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration," in Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, eds., *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 35.

40. Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship*, 508.

41. Dahl, *Polyarchy*, 45.

42. Walt W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), 162.

La démocratie flambée

Par IGNACIO RAMONET

• L'amour de la démocratie est celui de l'égalité •
Montesquieu.

DES piliers politiques fondamentaux, sur lesquels reposait depuis 1945 l'ordre du monde, se sont paisiblement effondrés au cours des dernières semaines. Les décisions adoptées lors des récents sommets de Londres, de Houston et du Caucase montrent que la prodigieuse accélération de l'histoire, commencée en novembre 1989, se poursuit. La plupart des certitudes en matière de géostratégie se brouillent, remplacées par un sentiment dominant : l'incertitude. Avec la disparition d'une perception claire de l'adversaire, les Etats ne parviennent plus à discerner l'ami de l'ennemi. Or l'ennemi est une entité structurante, sa disparition entraîne un affaissement du système de défense et une crise d'identité.

De la guerre froide, l'Occident avait fait l'alpha et l'oméga de son interprétation du monde ; sa « victoire froide », largement inattendue, détruit soudain le sens de toute l'architecture diplomatique. Le surarmement, naguère indispensable, apparaît désormais aux Etats des blocs comme une inutile extravagance. Presque partout on réclame une rapide réduction des dépenses consacrées à la défense.

Les récents événements de l'Est apparaissent, à certains, comme le « triomphe de la démocratie bourgeoise apolitique » et constitueraient la preuve que « l'histoire n'est pas faite par la politique, mais par l'économie (1) ». On en déduit que les problèmes économiques vont dominer les relations internationales au cours des prochaines décennies.

La hiérarchie des nations s'en trouverait modifiée. A l'ère des deux superpuissances, fondée sur le nucléaire, succéderait l'ère des trois superriches, « une diplomatie, selon M^{me} Jane Kirkpatrick, dominée par la *troïka* Allemagne-Japon-Amérique, et reposant sur la puissance économique de ces trois nations (2) ». Déjà la RFA, princi-

pal bénéficiaire de la nouvelle donne internationale, semble montrer que le mark est une arme terriblement efficace. Une douce euphorie s'installe : « Il semble clair que le monde se dirige vers un boom économique (3) », affirme-t-on, non sans imprudence ; et, à Houston, les Sept déclarent à l'adresse du monde, dans cette perspective, vouloir faire de ces dernières années du siècle, « la décennie de la démocratie ». Bref, l'Occident apparaît content de soi.

Il semble oublier que la démocratie est un long cheminement, qu'elle demeure sans cesse perfectible, et qu'elle est en permanence façonnée, polie par les revendications des citoyens insatisfaits. Le régime démocratique peut ainsi corriger les excès du capitalisme car l'objectif de la civilisation n'est pas la productivité en soi, mais bien le bonheur des hommes.

AU lieu de plastronner, ces pays riches ne devraient-ils pas méditer sur leur coupable silence devant la permanence des injustices ? Pourquoi la croissance économique ne permet-elle pas la réduction des inégalités ? Aux Etats-Unis, « en 1990, les 2,5 millions d'Américains les plus riches vont percevoir la même masse nette de revenus que les 100 millions de personnes qui se trouvent en bas de l'échelle (4) », et en l'an 2000, 11,9 % de la population du monde produira 56,7 % de sa richesse, en saccageant l'environnement. On sait qu'en France un chômeur sur deux ne perçoit aucune indemnité et que les revenus du travail progressent moins que ceux du patrimoine ou de l'épargne.

Silence aussi des démocraties quand elles négligent, au Sud, les



ODILON REDON. - « Le silence » (1911)

3 milliards d'hommes vivants au bord de la famine et où une personne sur trois vit avec moins de 6 F par jour. Elles restent pratiquement muettes sur les solutions qui permettraient de résoudre le problème de la dette (1 322 milliards de dollars) principale cause de la stagnation des tiers-mondes. Beaucoup de régimes dictatoriaux du Sud ont été soutenus, au nom de l'alliance anticommuniste, par l'Ouest qui a longtemps gardé le silence sur les nombreuses atteintes aux droits de l'homme. Qu'en sera-t-il désormais ? Ça et là, de vertueux appels au rétablissement des libertés sont lancés. Mais, chacun le sait, une démocratie sans développement n'est qu'une illusion.

A l'heure de la mondialisation, la démocratie demeure une aspiration universelle. Les citoyens peuvent-ils accepter que cet idéal soit dilapidé, gaspillé, flambé par des Etats qui en font un simple cadre juridique, rabaisant l'homme et glorifiant avant tout les égoïsmes et le profit ?

(1) *Time*, 28 mai 1990.

(2) *La Tribune de l'Expansion*, 18 juillet 1990.

(3) *US News and World Report*, 16 juillet 1990.

(4) *La Tribune de l'Expansion*, 25 juillet 1990.

nuclear holocaust, thereby changing his policy while maintaining a consistent posture—courtesy of the metaphor.

Finally, the metaphor helps us to predict Reagan's future policy. A serious consequence of the absence of metaphor has been anxiety over the direction of Reagan's Central American policy. With the proviso that his policy could change, an understanding of the implicit metaphor leads us to conclude that an invasion of Central America is unlikely. Vigilance is defensive; costs are minimized; posturing is crucial. We can expect the threats toward the Sandinistas to continue. Invasion, however, would tilt vigilance toward aggression, and aggression is not Reagan's mandate.

That this invasion is conceivable, however, points to the danger inherent in the metaphor: Aggressive posturing could necessitate action, if that action is believed to be crucial to our credibility. Furthermore, the metaphor could so frighten our enemies and allies alike that it would be destabilizing in itself. Making the implicit metaphor explicit should protect us from this danger. Reagan should be aware that the domestic support for his foreign policy is based on the projection of the attitude of vigilance, a mood that is neither passive nor aggressive.

Reagan has concentrated on our military buildup, with its concomitant psychological confidence-building. But confidence also depends in large part on our ability to understand and describe our role in the world. One analyst noted before Reagan's first term, "Much depends on whether a new foreign policy emerges to transform vague and inchoate public moods into an articulate, consistent, and conceptually rich foreign policy."⁵ Reagan has not yet addressed this aspect of his policy. The Great Communicator needs a metaphor, and the metaphor is vigilance.

5. Richard Melanson, "A Neo-Consensus? American Foreign Policy in the Eighties," in *Neither Cold War nor Détente*, ed. Richard Melanson, 201.

PROMOTING DEMOCRACY IN THE THIRD WORLD: LOST CAUSE OR SOUND POLICY?

Stephen J. Solarz

TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY OR TO TOLERATE TYRANNY—that is a question that has perplexed and divided U.S. foreign policymakers for decades. The logic of *realpolitik* suggests that America's security concerns are too great and its resources too limited to attempt to remake the world in our own image. The logic of idealism suggests that we betray the values on which our country was founded if we fail to foster democracy. Realists and idealists can no doubt agree on the ways the United States would benefit if democracy were the rule rather than the exception as the basis of government among the nations of the world. Politically, democratic governments are more likely to share our broad foreign policy objectives and less likely to pursue those of our adversaries. Diplomatically, the spread of democracy would create an international environment in which it would be easier for the United States to muster support for its initiatives. Economically, the community of market economies would be strengthened, since political democracy tends not to be associated with centrally planned economies. Ideologically, we would be less estranged from other members of the international community and feel greater confidence at home about our role in the world. And from a humanitarian perspective, democracies generally show greater respect for human rights than other political systems.

The disagreement occurs over whether it is possible to remove the obstacles to political pluralism, particularly in the countries of the Third World. The conventional wisdom argues pessimistically that democracy is

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close to impossible in nations that are poor, rife with ethnic conflicts, and unblest by the traditions of the Enlightenment. We should not, it is said, ignore these underlying realities, particularly with respect to our security partners.

It would be naive to think that we can induce in the countries of the Third World a quick conversion to democracy. In many cases we simply lack the leverage to do so. In other cases, the need to cooperate with strategically important countries places limits on our ability to promote pluralism. Yet we should not surrender to sociological determinism or the imperatives of realpolitik. Democracy may be a rare political species in the Third World and it may at times seem endangered, but it is not extinct. It is important, therefore, that we understand why it is relatively uncommon, the circumstances under which it can be encouraged, and specifically how the United States can promote it.

For purposes of this discussion, democracy is defined as a political system with periodic elections with mass suffrage to select the nation's political leadership; freedom of organization for the purposes of political competition; peaceful transfer of power by established procedures; freedom of the press; freedom of political expression; an independent judiciary enforcing the rule of law.

Based on the above definition, how prevalent is democracy? The latest assessment made by Freedom House is instructive. At the end of 1983, fifty-two of the world's independent countries (31 percent) were designated "free," fifty-eight (35 percent) were designated "not free," and fifty-six (34 percent) were designated "partly free." These countries had an aggregate population of 4.647 billion, of which 35.8 percent was in free countries, 41.2 percent in not free countries, and 23.0 percent in partly free countries.¹ If the countries of the world are grouped according to their levels of economic well-being, the frequency of democratic government can be seen on the following table.

On the surface, the statistics confirm the common pessimism that democracy and poverty are as incompatible as oil and water. The usual explanation is that poor people care too much about the struggle for daily survival to worry about affairs of state. Because poor people are generally uneducated, so the argument goes, they are incapable of understanding the subtleties of politics and government policy. As a

1. Freedom House rates each country, on a scale of one to seven, on adherence to political rights and civil rights. States that rate one on the political rights scale "have a fully competitive electoral process and those elected clearly rule." Ratings of two to seven reflect a deviation from that standard. Ratings on the civil liberties scale assess freedom of the press, freedom of expression, legal due process, and personal freedom in nonpolitical areas. The cumulative judgment of "free," "partly free," and "not free" is made on the basis of these two scores. Raymond D. Gastil, "The Comparative Survey of Freedom 1984," *Freedom At Issue*, 76 (January-February 1984), 7.

Per Capita GNP (1980 US\$)	Number of Countries		
	Free	Partly Free	Not Free
Under \$400	2	10	26
\$400-\$1700	8	20	15
Cumulative	10	30	41
\$1,700-\$3,000	2	11	6
Cumulative	12	41	47
\$3,000-\$6,000	5	1	2
Cumulative	17	42	49
Over \$6,000	17	2	5
Cumulative	34	44	51

Source: Based on Raymond D. Gastil, "The Comparative Survey of Freedom 1984," *Freedom At Issue* 76:3-24 (Jan.-Feb. 1984), and The World Bank, *World Development Report 1983* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 148-149.

result, they become the prey of demagogues, who place excessive demands on the political system by seeking a fundamental redistribution of their society's wealth. Conversely, the more developed countries are less burdened by social conflict and their citizens are more politically sophisticated.

Although the statistics seem to indicate that the prospects for democracy increase as development proceeds, it should not be assumed that some iron law of politics is at work here. The exceptions to the rule are as provocative as the rule itself. In the first place, a country that achieves a relatively high standard of living and education level does not necessarily evolve in the direction of popular rule. South Korea and Taiwan in Asia, Uruguay and Paraguay in South America, and the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc countries are cases in point. Moreover, that pluralism and poverty have coexisted in some countries suggests that such coexistence is possible elsewhere. The countries of Western Europe, for example, generally made the transition to democracy when their per capita gross domestic products were in the range of \$300 to \$500 (in 1960 dollars). India, the most populous democracy in the world today, has a per capita gross national product of about \$260.00 and a literacy rate of 36 percent. In Latin America, democracy has returned to the poorer countries—like Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia—but not to all of the relatively wealthier countries, like Paraguay, Uruguay, and Chile. In fact, poverty and illiteracy are not necessarily barriers to good citizenship. A full belly and the right to vote are not mutually exclusive propositions. Literacy is not a prerequisite for distinguishing between good and bad leaders. In the favelas of Rio, the tomas of Lima, the barrios of Manila, and the shantytowns of Soweto, the poor have the capacity to make

judgments about their political interests and appreciate the chance to participate in determining their own destiny.

Some will argue that the impoverished, in pursuing their interests, frustrate sound development policy by demanding immediate benefits, to the detriment of longer-term capital accumulation and economic growth. Admirers of South Korea and Taiwan attribute their prosperity to restrictions on political freedoms. Democratic systems, including our own, have sometimes made bad economic policy choices in an effort to ensure "a chicken in every pot." Our own ability to substantially reduce the budget deficits of \$200 billion hardly constitutes a persuasive argument for democracy as a sound basis for making economic policy. Yet the capacity for error and the propensity for misjudgment are not characteristics only of democratic regimes.

Authoritarian systems are just as capable of economic mismanagement, precisely because they generally lack institutional means to foresee the errors of misguided policies or correct them once they occur. According to Indira Gandhi, that was one of the most important lessons she and other Indians learned during the 1975-77 Emergency. Similarly, Deng Xiaoping—not a democrat by anyone's definition—has concluded that a rigid centralization of power was a major cause of the disasters of the Mao period. The massive development projects of the military government in Brazil (which Brazilians now describe as "pharmonicos"), Augustus Pinochet's embrace of Friedmanism, and Stalinist policies in communist regimes were all formulated without resorting to the litmus test of public opinion. All have led to serious economic dislocations.

In addition, authoritarian systems sometimes adopt or continue counterproductive economic policies not because they mistakenly think they are correct, but for the sole purpose of preserving their narrow base of power. A major cause of the current food crisis in a number of African countries, for example, is a set of measures that fix the rural-urban terms of trade in favor of the cities, where the government is the leading employer. The price paid for social peace in urban areas has been a decline in agricultural productivity, exports of farm products, and foreign exchange earnings. Authoritarianism and bad policy can thus reinforce each other. Popularly elected governments, on the other hand, would presumably draw more support from the rural majority and be in a better position to balance competing interests, as is the case in India.²

Democratic systems do not make perfect economic policy. But they can place limits on the ambitious and often interventionist development

2. Robert M. Dunn Jr., "Africans vs. Food," *New York Times*, 21 July 1984. Africa's economic crisis is not solely the result of internal problems. Another cause of the African crisis is the international debt situation, which also has an impact on the prospects for democracy in the Third World.

policies characteristic of Third World governments and thus restore some of the power that citizens have lost over their economic lives. They do not drain off managerial talent from the private sector, as do centrally planned economies. And they operate under checks and balances, making it easier to correct mistakes once they occur.

A SECOND ARGUMENT AGAINST THE POSSIBILITY OF DEMOCRACY in the Third World concerns the social composition of many of the countries. According to this view, deep ethnic, racial, or tribal cleavages place inordinate strain on democratic institutions, which only function when political forces are capable of compromising their differences and respecting minority rights. This problem is thought to be especially serious in Africa, where the independent nations of the present are defined by the colonial borders of the past. The pressures placed by ethnic diversity on political institutions should neither be dismissed out of hand nor accepted with defeatism. They are obviously a greater obstacle in some countries than in others. Democracy may be uncommon in the ethnic mosaic of Africa, but it thrives amid the diversity that is India while it languishes in socially homogeneous South Korea. The United States and the Soviet Union are both ethnic melting pots, yet one is a democracy and the other is a dictatorship. In some cases, moreover, authoritarianism is less the result of communal conflict than the means that one ethnic group uses to sustain its dominance over another. This phenomenon is most common in Africa but not unknown elsewhere. In Taiwan, for example, the Kuomintang—dominated by mainland Chinese—effectively rules over the vast majority of indigenous Taiwanese.

Social pluralism does not rule out political pluralism; on the contrary, the latter can soften the abrasive effects of the former. Observers of recent events in Nigeria did not blame the end of the Second Republic on the country's 250 ethnic groups speaking 400 mutually unintelligible languages. Indeed, they saw democracy as the most effective way of protecting the rights of a patchwork of political forces. In countries with secessionist impulses, the use of force may be an effective—and even necessary—short-term method to suppress them. But the best long-term solution to the problem is to give those groups a stake in the system, for which democratic institutions are eminently suited.

A third line of argument against the possibility of democracy in the Third World focuses on the cultural context of the countries concerned. The bedrock of political pluralism, it is suggested, is a set of values associated with the Judeo-Christian tradition in general and with Enlightenment liberalism in particular. Among the norms in this Western package are individualism, freedom, respect for human dignity, and tolerance of the views of others.

cannot sustain democratic institutions. And since the countries of Asia and Africa sprang from the soil of philosophical traditions antithetical to liberalism and inclined toward autocracy, it is improbable that the graft of democracy will survive. As for the countries of Latin America, it is alleged that they trace their political roots to the relatively authoritarian Iberian nations that could not quite fit the requirements of pluralism to the realities of Catholic culture.

This is a particularly insidious argument, for it asks Westerners who believe in tolerance to accept political systems based on intolerance. The assertion might be more convincing were it not used so frequently by tyrants who ask that we apply our cultural relativism to their political absolutism. But even on its own terms the argument is unconvincing. In the first place, it is important not to confuse the idealist description of liberal Western values with the reality of North Atlantic culture. Americans of the late twentieth century are not rugged individualists, just as Englishmen and Frenchmen are not latter day versions of John Locke and Jean Jacques Rousseau. Indeed, individualism in the West is under siege from the dominating presence of large organizations of all sorts. In any case, Americans and Europeans have substantial respect for authority—in the family, in the work place, and in politics—once it has established its legitimacy. And Western ideologies contain deep anti-democratic strains, as the history of this century clearly illustrates. After all, both Marxism and fascism are Western ideologies.

Nor should we confuse the common idealist descriptions of Third World traditions with the complexities of their past development and with contemporary belief systems. Consider the example of Confucianism, which generally stresses the group over the individual, and which is often mentioned by those who stress the cultural obstacles to political democracy. Confucianism got its start and was attractive to China's ancient rulers precisely because of the rampant individualism of the time, not because people followed its precepts. In later centuries, as the Chinese state became stronger and more despotic, Confucian scholars refocused the ideology to make it a legitimate instrument for checking the excesses of tyrants and making them accountable for their actions. It should be no surprise, therefore, that the rulers of South Korea and Taiwan have emphasized the collectivist features of Confucianism to rationalize their authoritarian rule.

Indeed, any tradition worth the name probably has had to balance authority and individualism, freedom and control, conflict and harmony. Each contains at least secondary themes which are compatible with democracy. Some students of Indian politics suggest that democracy has succeeded there because of—not in spite of—the traditional idea of caste and the sense of group identity. Caste groupings have acted as interest

groups do in our society, and have become the building blocks of political parties. There seems to be no logical reason why the same should not be true for tribally based societies in Africa. Furthermore, it should be recognized that Western values have become a permanent fixture in the intellectual marketplace of the Third World. They represent, for some at least, the last best hope against dictatorships of the left and right, particularly when indigenous ideologies have proven themselves too weak to blunt the power of authoritarian governments. In Thailand, for example, Buddhism and respect for the monarchy have not been on their own a sufficient counter to periods of military rule and repression. Moreover, the most dangerous despotisms occur where enhanced state power has cloaked itself in tradition: Nazism in Germany, fascism in Italy and Latin America, tribalism or apartheid in Africa, Shiite Islam in Iran, Shinto in Japan, and Confucianism in other parts of East Asia. In this context, the noted sociologist Peter Berger has asserted:

What sort of institutional arrangements can one imagine that would reimpose constraints on the immensely powerful entity known as the modern state? What would be the "fundamental equivalents" of [Chinese] Imperial Censors? The answer is: arrangements similar to those embodied in Western democracy—institutionalized restraints on the powers of government, provisions for orderly succession, guarantees for critics of government actions, independent custodians of law and morality, and so on.³

Democracies are certainly not immune from abusing their citizens. The treatment of blacks in the United States is an obvious example, all the more regrettable because of the high-minded ideals that infused the American experiment from the outset. The only redeeming feature of our racist past is that it was the institutions of American democracy that brought an end to the hypocrisy. In the absence of such channels for change, government abuses are even more difficult to correct. It was not until Mao's death that China's "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" came to an end. Even then, existing institutions frustrated his opponents' efforts to institute reforms. Argentina's "dirty war" was a casualty of the Falklands War, and not of built-in mechanisms to ensure accountability.

A FINAL ARGUMENT AGAINST THE POSSIBILITY OF DEMOCRACY in Third World nations is that their need to preserve internal stability and defend against external threats is too pressing to allow political competition. According to this line of reasoning, a democratic system can function as long as national survival is not at stake, and only as long as all political forces place a higher priority on preserving the rules of the game than on

3. Peter L. Berger, "Democracy for Everyone?" *Commentary*, September 1983, 34.

their parochial interests. Regrettably, it is said, military challenges come from without and movements emerge from within committed to absolute goals and violent means. In either of these circumstances, the rights of the individual must be circumscribed to defend the nation. Many governments have been at least tempted to use the reality or threat of aggression or subversion to stifle dissent and justify repression. The U.S. government did so in the Civil War, in the Red Scare of the 1920s, in World War II, and in the McCarthy period. (There is, however, a retrospective consensus that these episodes were both unwise and unjustified.) Contemporary examples include Taiwan, South Korea, the Philippines, Cuba, Nicaragua, South Africa, Mozambique, and Angola. In all these cases the challenge of subversion is more the excuse for repression than the cause of it.

To be sure, defeating insurgencies under any circumstances is no easy matter. For a democratic government to do so is doubly difficult, as is confirmed by the attempts of the current Peruvian government to subdue the mindless terrorism of the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) confirms. Leaders like President Belaunde who are committed to peaceful change must be willing to use force or risk their incumbency. But other governments—like those of Thailand, Colombia, and the Philippines in the 1950s—have found that insurgencies can be more effectively dealt with when the threat of military suppression is accompanied by political overtures that give guerrillas an alternative to perpetual resistance. This suggests a broader point, that insurgencies begin when key social groups are kept outside the political system and have no apparent hope of entering. It is the absence of a political opening that fosters instability. Confrontation and violence are more likely in situations where peaceful change is impossible. Thus political liberalization and political stability reinforce each other. A corollary conclusion is that one-man regimes obsessed with ensuring loyalty are ultimately fundamentally unstable. Lacking the institutional mechanisms for sharing and transferring power, they are usually marked by intense struggles for power when the leader passes from the scene.

In addition, the history of some Third World nations suggests that authoritarianism can in fact cause the external threat that is used to justify the repression. At one time, leaders in Somalia and the Sudan promoted populism within authoritarianism and were willing to allow some autonomy for minority groups. Their neighbors (Ethiopia and Libya) were not able to exploit ethnic divisions for their own foreign policy purposes. As those regimes decayed, however, populism and autonomy disappeared and the groups that were previously tolerated felt they had no choice but to revolt. They attracted support from Ethiopia

There are some countries, such as South Korea, where the perceived threat is purely or primarily external. But even in cases where the threat is real, rather than manufactured for political effect, long-term restrictions on political freedoms are not always justified and are perhaps counterproductive. For every country that has used the fear of aggression to justify the absence of democracy, there are others that have successfully faced the challenge to their own security and simultaneously maintained their commitment to an open political system. In Western Europe, countries in the NATO alliance have faced for three decades the overwhelming might of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. With the partial exceptions of Greece and Turkey, they have never compromised the democratic principles that bind them together. In the Middle East, Israel, a country of three million people, faces the continuing enmity of 130 million Arabs. It has fought five wars in thirty-five years, but its democratic institutions continue to flourish. In South Asia, India has fought three wars with Pakistan and one with China. Yet with one two-year exception, it has maintained its commitment to democratic government.

These examples demonstrate that democracy, far from undermining the security of a country, can actually strengthen it—internally by giving its people a greater stake in the preservation of their way of life, and externally by increasing the sympathy of other democratically inclined governments. One of the considerations that led the United States to support Britain in its war against Argentina over the Falkland Islands was that Britain is a democracy and Argentina was a dictatorship. American support of Israel is clearly related to Israel's position as the only country in the Middle East that completely shares our commitment to democracy.

IT IS THUS CLEAR that economic and social realities, cultural traditions, and the threats of subversion and invasion are not in and of themselves adequate justifications for the absence of democratic government. Established democracies such as India, Botswana, and Venezuela demonstrate that political pluralism can be compatible with Third World conditions. Yet in the final analysis, there are other factors that can be critical in determining the political character of these nations. Most important of these is the choice of political leaders. Charismatic strongmen often measure the prospects for their country by the degree of political loyalty that they evoke. Many military juntas and civilian bureaucrats are tempted to rely on authoritarian mechanisms to facilitate the work of their institutions and to protect their own careers. These inclinations are as understandable as they are regrettable.

alizing some measure of governmental accountability to those who are governed.

Whether or not a ruling group reaches this conclusion appears to be particularly important when a country has reached a certain stage of economic and social progress, such as Taiwan and South Korea in the 1970s. At that point, a leadership choice for continued autocracy becomes locked in because the power of the state exceeds the power of its citizens. A choice for democracy, on the other hand, is likely to impart a legacy for generations.

A commitment by the elite to a pluralistic future is not all that is necessary, however. It must be accompanied by the development of institutions, such as political parties and an independent judiciary, to channel the flood of demands that occur when the sluice gates of participation are opened. Furthermore, a democratic government is only as good as its opposition, both in enforcing accountability on those in power and in developing a capacity to govern when the opportunity arises.

The predominance of national military establishments over civilian institutions has been a serious obstacle to an enduring transition to democracy in many countries. Possessing the tools of violence and an ideology that sometimes borders on paranoia, the armed forces come to regard themselves as guardians of the nation and arbiters of all significant issues. In the great majority of cases, the option of having no army at all, as in Costa Rica and Botswana, is impossible or unlikely. The generals and colonels lack a commitment to democratic rule, and must come to realize that democracy may not be a model of administrative or military efficiency, but it is, in the words of Winston Churchill, better than "all those other systems that have been tried and failed."

THAT THIRD WORLD LEADERS may have a democratic alternative gives the United States and other established democracies an opportunity to pursue that goal. We also have a strong interest in doing so.

First, if our political values are truly worthwhile, we should not apologize for promoting and fostering them. The Soviet Union does not shy away from making the case for its brand of communism. Similarly, it is important for the United States to say what it favors, not just what it opposes. Our young people in particular must have something to inspire them if they are to make the sacrifices that will be required to defend the cause of freedom in an extended geopolitical struggle. The advocacy of democracy, to dictatorships of both the left and the right, will infuse our foreign policy with a moral dimension, making it more than a reactive effort to stop communism.

Second, the spread of democracy contributes to peace. Not one of the fifty-plus interstate conflicts since 1816 have actively involved an established liberal democracy on both sides. Moreover, democratic countries are less likely to have violent interactions with nondemocratic states. Much more likely are conflicts in which authoritarian regimes fight each other or attack democratic ones.⁴ Why? The answer appears to lie in the diversity of contending interests that a democracy evokes plus institutional mechanisms like elections and a free press. Thus constrained, leaders in democratic societies cannot go to war unless they have convinced the people that the sacrifice of money, lives, and prestige serves a vital interest. During the Vietnam conflict, for example, an open American political system permitted a national reevaluation of whether U.S. security interests warranted a continued American combat role. Much less beholden to public opinion, the Soviet government will be less likely to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan. It is similarly doubtful that Vietnam will feel serious internal pressure to end its occupation of Cambodia.

Third, our own security interests can hinge on the internal political arrangements of our allies. Realistically, we may always have to rely on the support of some authoritarian governments in containing the advances of our adversaries. During World War II we joined with the Soviet Union—despite all its inhumanities—to defeat the greater threat of Nazi Germany. Since then, we have had as partners regimes whose systems were the very antithesis of ours. Even the Carter administration was unable to square completely its principled commitment to human rights with the pragmatic necessity of containing Soviet expansionism.

On the other hand, we should recognize that over the long term our security interests are best served when our allies have democratic systems of government. Justifying the American contribution to NATO and Japan would be far more difficult if those countries did not share our values. Our more authoritarian partners, because of built-in tendencies toward instability or decay, can become weak pillars on which to lean. Thus, rather than eschewing pressure for reform in countries like South Korea, the Philippines, Pakistan, or El Salvador, as the conventional wisdom suggests, the U.S. government should use its leverage to encourage pluralism precisely because their contribution to our defense is so vital.

South Korea is essential to peace in Northeast Asia and to the security of our ally Japan. Yet Seoul's repression of peaceful opposition increases the chances of instability and stimulates anti-Americanism. The growth of the Philippine Communist Party's New People's Army (NPA) seriously threatens long-term U.S. access to Subic Naval Base and Clark Air Field,

4. R. J. Rummel, "The Freedom Factor," *Reason*, 15 (July 1983), 32-36, 38.

upon which our forward defense strategy in the Western Pacific depends. The only way to stop the spread of the NPA cancer is for the Marcos regime to institute political, economic, and military reform, and time is running out. Pakistan will be in jeopardy should the Soviet Union choose to expand beyond Afghanistan. No matter how much military aid we send, however, it will be ultimately ineffective if President Zia ul-Haq fails to find political mechanisms to give all ethnic groups a stake in the system. Even if El Salvador has one-half the strategic importance President Reagan ascribes to it, it will not be a steady bulwark against the forces of hemispheric revolution unless the recent progress toward a more democratic system is accelerated and consolidated. Through the death squads and the indiscriminate slaughter of civilians, the Salvadoran armed forces did more to fuel the rebellion than to extinguish it. A lot will depend on the success of President Duarte's efforts to bring the security forces under control.

Some have warned that the United States should not push for political reforms in situations where our security interests are at stake because "the cure is worse than the disease." Iran and Nicaragua are the usual examples cited in support of this view. What those specific cases show, however, is that the cure was tried too late—after political reforms might have had a chance of heading off the Ayatollah Khomeini and the Sandinistas. By the time the Carter administration tried to direct attention to the political rot that had set in under Shah Reza Pahlavi and General Anastasio Somoza, the middle classes had deserted to the forces of revolution. And the governments that succeed authoritarian regimes are not invariably worse. Who would trade Raul Alfonsin for General Galtieri in Argentina, Felipe Gonzales for Francisco Franco in Spain, or Mario Suarez for Antonio Salazar in Portugal? We cannot be sure that the cure will invariably be better than the disease, but we should be aware that American interests generally are best served by promoting the cause of democracy in a timely fashion.

Fourth, there are countries in the Third World where domestic instability would significantly affect our security and political interests, although not as vitally as in South Korea or the Philippines. Chile, Indonesia, Taiwan, and Zaire all face complex leadership transitions as leaders who have long dominated the political scene near the ends of their careers. That these successions occur smoothly is in U.S. interests.

Finally, the pursuit of democracy reinforces other policy goals. Human rights abuses occur far less frequently in systems that are fundamentally accountable to the people and have institutionalized due process of law. In addition, past experience suggests that political

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES to promote democracy—supporting it where it exists and pressing for it where it does not—is neither naive nor irrelevant. It complements, or at least does not contradict, other interests, including security. But complex questions persist as to how we should pursue it and what expectations we should have for success. Should we, for example, rely on quiet diplomacy or engage in public criticism vis-à-vis authoritarian regimes? Obviously, there is no hard and fast rule. Authoritarian leaders generally prefer private overtures. No one likes to be publicly criticized. Yet opposition groups, especially those who are partisans of democracy, take heart from public statements by the United States. It is clear, however, that the effectiveness of private pressure increases when the possibility of public criticism exists. Also, private pressure and public praise are suitable in situations of gradual yet sustained progress; public criticism is more appropriate where stagnation prevails or when retrogression occurs.

Human rights statements, public or private, are not designed just to press for change in the abstract or to allow us to display our own virtue. There are people all over the world today who are alive who would otherwise be dead, who are free who would otherwise be in prison, because of U.S. efforts. President Alfonsin, for example, has paid tribute to Jimmy Carter for his human rights policy, saying that American efforts contributed to the restoration of democracy in Argentina and to saving the lives of hundreds. Alive, these courageous individuals can become the core of the loyal yet effective opposition on which democracy depends; dead, they are but a tragic memory.

Should we encourage similar changes in nondemocratic countries, or modulate our efforts and expectations according to the specific situations of different nations? No dictatorship should be immune from criticism or be vague as to where the United States stands. On the other hand, we need to take into account the points at which different systems start. American policy should be based on a given country's reasonable potential for political reform. Thus our effectiveness can be great in countries where a vital movement for democracy is already at work, such as in the Philippines, but weak where none exists, as in Saudi Arabia. When our security interests are involved, we cannot ignore either short-term exigencies or long-term needs for allies whose governments have the support of their own people. Some inconsistencies may result in what we ask of others, but we need not apologize. Sensible policy responds to different problems in different ways.

Should we use our foreign assistance to Third World countries as an instrument to encourage democracy? In many countries, our own secur-

the regime that receives the assistance. If, for example, North Korea expands its military forces, we have an obligation to help South Korea counter that threat. But the degree to which our levels of aid rise above that minimum should take into account the particular political system. This rightfully implies that countries that attempt to establish and sustain democracy should expect exceptional treatment. Within the aid framework, the United States should place greater emphasis on assistance that contributes specifically to political development. Reform of judicial systems also helps lay the foundation for democracy. Similarly, the limited attention currently given to political and human rights subjects in the International Military Education and Training program should be expanded and made more sophisticated.

Should the United States establish explicit conditions on the assistance it provides? The threat of cutting off aid to a particular country should be included as an option, since that may be the only leverage we have to achieve our goals. Legislated conditions are not the preferred course of action, for they deprive the executive branch of flexibility. But situations arise in which Congress, convinced that administration policy runs counter to the national interest, must impose conditions or else abdicate its proper role in the formulation of foreign policy. Recent experience suggests that legislation is generally effective when the objectives are stated clearly and their achievement easily verified.

What other steps should the United States take to promote democracy? Continued opportunities for students from Third World countries to study in this country, enhanced by ample scholarship programs like Fulbright-Hays, remain an important vehicle for conveying the virtues, and limitations, of democracy and for strengthening constituencies for political pluralism in home countries. Fellowship programs that have suffered budget cuts in recent years should be replenished without delay. Also very worthwhile are new departures like the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), which seeks to foster the institutional building blocks of political pluralism—political parties, a free press, a private business sector, and a free labor movement—in other countries. Modest amounts of external help can make a great difference, as West German political foundations showed in providing support for the forces of democracy in Spain and Portugal.

A more fundamental question, which can only be answered by experience, is how to mesh the activities of the Democracy Program in nondemocratic countries with other U.S. government bilateral relations. As noted above, the primary factor in bringing about political change in such situations are the choices made by incumbent political leaders. The American government has the access and the influence to convince those leaders of the paramount importance of democracy to their own national

interest. The private organizations that are to receive funding from NED can follow the U.S. government's advocacy in a coordinated and supportive way, but certainly not replace it.

Pursuit of a political objective in American foreign policy—through diplomatic pressure, through foreign aid, through foreign student programs, and through the Democracy Program—will be more likely to succeed if it takes place in the context of appropriate security and economic policies. We should not and cannot serve as the gendarme of the world, and should not take at face value apologies for authoritarianism on the grounds of security. Nonetheless, our global defense posture and policies do create a context for domestic politics around the world. If, for example, the countries of Asia believe that we do not take the growing Soviet military threat seriously, they will be less likely to listen to our entreaties about the virtues of democracy. On the other hand, if we seek to preserve the peace through arms control where possible and force buildups when necessary, the soil of democracy will be more fertile.

Similarly, our global economic policies should be designed to ensure that temporary economic crises do not grow so severe that democratic governments are placed in jeopardy. A case in point is the current international debt crisis, which primarily affects the new democracies of Latin America. The involved countries will have to contribute to solving the crisis, particularly by dealing with the causes of inflation. But the U.S. government has critical influence over the degree of sacrifice that is imposed on the peoples of the debtor countries, and thus on the political fallout of austerity. Our banking regulations dictate the point at which outstanding loans become serious problems. Our position in the IMF influences debt reschedulings and interest rates, and thus the debt service burden borne by these countries. Our trade policies affect how much debtor countries can export, and thus the overall balance of payments. We cannot stop the clash of interests over who should bear which sacrifices, but we can make such sacrifices less severe.

U.S. policy toward Third World countries should tread a careful yet purposeful path between well-intentioned moralism and callous indifference. If it is counterproductive to try to reshape the world in our own image, it would be equally inappropriate to ignore people who are struggling for a better political existence. Where democracy exists, we should work to sustain and support it. Where it does not, we should offer encouragement, especially when circumstances suggest that substantial progress is possible. The world will always have a plethora of political systems, but it will ultimately be a safer and more stable world if other countries share our cherished political values.

**II- DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT FROM THE TOP DOWN:
CAN DEMOCRACY BE SUCCESSFULLY IMPOSED ?**

apparent with the stepped-up activity of the leftist Democratic Popular Movement (MDP), Pinochet reminded US policymakers and the domestic opposition of the immediate threat to stability. The MDP, a reconstitution of the traditional leftist block of socialists, communists, and independent leftists, gave concrete expressions to General Pinochet's threat of a 'return to the past' and made credible his claim that the alternative to continuity of the authoritarian project would be 'chaos'. It also made US policymakers uneasy about the alternatives to General Pinochet: Pinochet might well be independent and unwilling to compromise the essence of his political project, but US policy was unlikely to be able to direct any regime change in Chile. Indeed, while the US under the Reagan Administration might well be pleased to support a Chilean version of the Philippines' Corazon Aquino—with the exclusion of the political left and continued influence of the military which that implied—it would be up to the Chilean opposition to bring down Pinochet and fashion a military-civilian agreement that would make that outcome possible.

Conclusion

In the short term only a military-civilian accord would allow government transition in Chile—and such an accord would be likely to focus initially upon a successor to General Pinochet rather than upon more basic constitutional issues. If the question of succession were resolved by selection and ratification of a civilian (or retired military) replacement for General Pinochet for the presidential term 1989–97, then serious political negotiations could begin concerning regime change through constitutional reform or adoption of a new Constitution. While the 1980 Constitution will eventually be replaced, it is impossible to predict with any specificity the provisions of the new fundamental charter which will follow—except to expect its accommodation to the reality of the re-emergence of social, political and economic pluralism.

In a sense the ultimate failure of the military dictatorship and its policies since 1973 was the survival of all the major political movements and groups entrenched in Chilean politics since the 1930s, and the creation of new groups in the face of state terrorism and institutionalised repression. This failure also represents a great challenge to a new generation of Chilean political leaders who will be required to forge a new political regime drawing upon the country's democratic past while reconciling it with the legacy and lessons of 'authoritarian democracy'.

Epilogue: political succession in the Third World

The literature on political succession in the Third World, in its broadest sense as the process by which one leader gives way to another, has overwhelmingly focused on the violent and unconstitutional overthrow of Third World governments—usually by military *coups d'état*, though also on occasion by revolution or urban upheaval. In concentrating on 'regular' succession, the replacement of one leader by another without violence, and within a generally controlled political environment, this volume not only breaks new ground, but also draws attention to important changes which have been taking place within Third World states themselves. Especially perhaps in the formerly colonial states which have become independent since 1945, this reflects the end of the post-independence era, during which 'newness' and artificiality were important ingredients in political instability, and a process of 'settling down' into political routines which reflect their own internal balance of power and the growth of an indigenous political tradition. The increasing salience of regular political succession in the newest and most artificial of all Third World states, those of sub-Saharan Africa examined in this volume by Arnold Hughes and Roy May, is the most striking evidence of a phenomenon apparent throughout the Third World.

Two immediate reservations must be made. The first is that violence is a vastly more important mechanism for leadership change in the Third World than in the industrial states, and is likely to remain so. Despite the growing role of regular succession, most leadership changes in sub-Saharan Africa, and many of those elsewhere, still take place by force. Among the states considered here, the constitutional accession to power of General Momoh in Sierra Leone, leap-frogging over senior politicians from the ruling party, must have at least partly reflected a calculation by the outgoing President that bringing in the army legally might be the only way to prevent it taking over by *coup d'état*; and even in African states where no coup has yet taken place, such as Kenya and Zambia, it must at least be an open question whether the succession to Presidents Moi and Kaunda will actually be decided within the present civilian political structure. Even constitutional successions, such as those

of Rajiv Gandhi in India and Joaquim Chissano in Mozambique, have taken place under the shadow of violent death, in at least one of these cases (and possibly both) by assassination. The South Korean succession, even if it should come about peacefully, will do so (as in Argentina and the Philippines) amidst the ruins of a collapsing dictatorship.

The second is that even regular succession is not necessarily to be welcomed, if its effect is simply to entrench and perpetuate a regime which itself is regarded as bad. The increasing stability of Third World regimes is due not only to their ability to reach some acceptable accommodation with the major political forces within the societies which they govern, but also to the growing sophistication and often ruthless application of the means of repression at the state's disposal—much of which is in turn supplied for the purpose by the regime's external allies. Many readers will, I suggest, be disconcerted and indeed dismayed by the extent to which both Brian Loveman and Andrew Nickson see the likely succession in Chile and Paraguay as taking place within the parameters established by the Pinochet and Stroessner dictatorships; and the one thing about which one can be certain in the succession issue in China and North Korea, is that the people of those two states will have no direct input into it whatsoever. Among all the cases of actual succession examined in this volume, it is only in India that the new ruler has had to confirm himself in power through an election offering the voters any effective choice; and among the cases of putative future succession, it is only in South Korea that there seems any prospect that such a choice will be available. Succession, in the great majority of cases examined here, is a process by which groups of people already in power seek to perpetuate that power, by no means always necessarily to their peoples' advantage. But none the less, other things being equal, stability is to be welcomed. Not only is violent political conflict destructive in itself, but a regime which is thinking of succession in the long term, will be able to order its resources more constructively than one which is thinking only of survival in the near future. While short-term survival often emphasises the role of force, long-term strategies are more likely to involve some attempt to meet the economic and welfare needs of the people.

The more stable a political system, however, the less succession will be an issue. Succession matters so much in many Third World states, because of the critical role played by the top leadership in managing the

itself. This is not to say that Third World political systems are mere personalist regimes, to be governed at their rulers' whim; there have been such regimes, of course, under a Bokassa or an Idi Amin, but they have been disastrous not only for their leaders, but also for the state itself. Most rulers are all too aware of the constraints imposed on them by domestic fragmentation and external dependence, and their task is to hold together the different elements of the political system through a set of relationships which, because of the weakness of institutions, are often essentially personal connections with the leader himself. Once the leader changes, his successor will then in turn have to build up his own network of power relationships, establishing his credentials with the same or a different coalition of interests, and seeking to build his personal strength through a direct appeal to the aspirations of his people. But because this process has to be gone through anew by each new leader, the period of succession is bound to be one of difficulty, and potentially of crisis.

It is a process which varies, obviously enough, with the nature and scale of the state concerned. In small states such as Tunisia and Sierra Leone, it may literally be a matter of dealing with individuals. Bourguiba's superbly arrogant 'System? What system? I am the system', exaggerated perhaps, is none the less not entirely ludicrous. In Sierra Leone, an extraordinary amount turned on the relationship between the two successive Presidents and a single Lebanese businessman. The politics of India or China is on an altogether different scale. Politicians must in some sense represent the interests, or control the power, not even of millions but of hundreds of millions. Yet at the top, all power is personal, and all politics turn on the decisions and capacities of a very small number of people—a point made particularly clearly by Rajiv Gandhi's attempts to grapple with the legacies of his mother's rule over India.

What ultimately makes stable succession possible is the shared interest of a wide range of key social sectors in the continuity of the state and the economy. Though some people, at some times, have an interest in violence and upheaval, most people for most of the time do not. Vincent Khapoya wisely points out that Kenyans looking across their borders to Uganda or Ethiopia, or even to Tanzania, are likely to shy away from radical change or personalist military rule. But at the same time, stability does not happen just because most people want it; there are plenty of war-torn areas in both Uganda and Ethiopia which testify to that. The weakness of political institutions in many Third World states amounts,

economic interests into political power, and thereby capitalising on a common interest in peace. It is then left to the leader to do what the institutions are unavailable to do, and either the capture of power by an unrepresentative leader, or its misuse by an unskilful one, can put the whole system at risk.

This need to assure stability by bridging the potentially dangerous chasm between one personal ruler and the next, must at least in part account for the fact that in no fewer than four of the fifteen countries considered in detail in this volume, the successor either has been, or is envisaged to be, a close relative of the incumbent ruler. One of these, Morocco, may as a monarchy be reckoned a special case, but it is not to be discounted for that reason. The durability of the Alawite sultanate, and Hassan II's ability to establish himself in power on his father's death, suggest that there may well be advantages in restricting the highest office to the members of a dynasty who bear a special symbolic status. But the most striking example is India. Subrata Mitra is undoubtedly right to dismiss the simplistic myth of dynastic rule, and to emphasise the institutional complexity of the exercise of power in India. But at the same time, Rajiv Gandhi was not just any airline pilot. Both the role of his brother Sanjay, and the speed with which Rajiv was called into politics on Sanjay's death, indicate a strong familial element in Indira Gandhi's style of rule; while the almost automatic turning to Rajiv Gandhi on his mother's death, in which as Mitra shows, India's politicians accurately reflected the feelings of her people, testifies to the place of the Nehru/Gandhi family as a powerful symbol of national unity and popular identification with government, across a very large part of a vast and diverse nation. In the moment of crisis prompted by Indira Gandhi's assassination, it was the family that was felt essential to provide reassurance and continuity. The other two examples of family succession considered here, North Korea and Cuba, are both, perhaps surprisingly, in Marxist-Leninist states. The Cuban case reflects the very small size of the original leadership cadre in the revolutionary war, and Raul Castro's status as, literally, a brother-in-arms, reinforced though this has been by his management of the military in post-revolutionary Cuba. North Korea is by contrast the most extreme and extraordinary example of deliberate dynastic succession, lacking the traditional legitimation of the Moroccan, the popular acclamation of the Indian, or the proved experience of the Cuban heir apparent.

One point which James Cotton's analysis brings out very clearly is the difference in perspective in looking at the succession, before and after the

great leap in the dark has taken place. Here is a leader who, unlike so many (Bourguiba in Tunisia, for example) has foreseen the need for deliberate measures to meet the crisis presented by his own death, and has provided for the succession as carefully as any politician can reasonably be expected to do. The problem is that a North Korea with Kim Il Sung in unfettered control is a very different place from a North Korea from which the Great Leader has been removed. What will happen then, only the future will show; but Cotton's analysis suggests that Kim Il Jong's fingers are simply not on the keyboard that is likely to be playing the tune after his father dies. Underlying this is a more general problem: that the leader in place will see the succession largely in terms of continuity, whereas for almost everyone else in the system, it represents the promise or threat of change. No matter how effectively the ruler has governed, he must have left unsatisfied the ambitions of at least some people who look to his departure for a chance to make their mark. He is likely, too, to have left debts which will be collected once the new regime takes over. Members of his entourage, perhaps of his family, will have used their power in ways that are held against them when their protector is removed. Policies associated with the old man, sacred if unsuccessful when he was in office, will have to be reversed—a process which is often most dramatic in the succession to communist leaders such as Stalin and Mao, and may be so again with Kim Il Sung. In the immediate aftermath of take-over, the new leader will often, like Moi in Kenya, be wise to proclaim that he walks in the 'footprints' of the departed great one. Quite apart from anything else, his predecessor's nominees will still be in all the positions of power to which he appointed them, and any step which instantly threatens them would be foolhardy. Over a period, however, he will need to broaden his constituency, meet at least some of the expectations aroused by his coming to power, move his own men into the posts that matter. One often very effective way of managing the transition is through a period of liberalisation, popular in itself, which at the same time helps the new leader to identify new people and policies associated with the national mood, while using popular reaction to single out the hangovers from the old regime which (or whom) he can safely dispose of. Once the new leader's men and measures are in place, and begin to attract adverse criticism of their own, then the repressive apparatus of the state may once again have to be used, as in Kenya, to protect them. Staying in the old leader's footprints is a confession of weakness, which at best leaves the successor a prisoner of the past, at worst leads to his downfall when he fails to find room for new

people and ideas. The only way in which he can make room, however, is to repudiate at least some of the people and policies which he has inherited. The politics of survival has little place for gratitude. President Moi in Kenya turned out Charles Njonjo, the kingmaker who brought him to power. David Fasholé Luke shows how President Momoh in Sierra Leone has moved out many of ex-President Stevens' intimates, prompting in the process an attempted coup. President Ahidjo in Cameroon picked his own successor in President Biya, yet soon found himself condemned to death, *in absentia*, in the wake of a bloody attempted coup, behind which his hand was detected. Small wonder that President Kaunda of Zambia, in the impasse which Kenneth Good so starkly analyses, apparently finds it impossible to leave office at all.

Succession is often a matter of changing not just men, but generations. Stevens in Sierra Leone, like Senghor in Senegal and Nyerere in Tanzania, was a leader of the decolonising generation, who handed over power to a man brought up, politically speaking, within the independent state. Generational change is especially difficult when it involves the transfer of power from a group of elderly men who are held together by some vital shared experience, to younger (even if late middle-aged) colleagues who lack this vital link with the heroic past. The Soviet Union in the last years of the Great Patriotic War generation of Brezhnev, followed in quick succession by Andropov and Chernenko, provides perhaps the least edifying example. In China, by contrast, as David Goodman shows, the twilight of the old Long March revolutionaries has been accompanied not by sclerosis, but by an extraordinary willingness to experiment, which may indeed be slowed once a new generation of technocrats raised in post-revolutionary China comes to power. Indonesia is another country where generational change is in the offing, due to the peculiar age structure of the officer corps, from which the successor to Suharto is almost certain to come. So too, despite the short life of its current regime, is Iran, where the Islamic revolution brought to power one of the most elderly groups of incoming leaders that the world can ever have seen. Revolutionaries usually reach power young, so that even after nearly thirty years in power, a sixty-year-old Castro and his colleagues still seem to have some time to go.

These are all cases in which the incumbent leaders face little threat to their rule, and in which the successor inherits a system which has at least the appearance of stability. The problems are greatly increased when the new leader takes over because the system through which the old one governed is already falling apart. One of the most critical groups of

Third World states, only partly represented among the case studies included in this collection, are those where a high level of political demand, especially in the urban areas, threatens or destroys the authoritarian basis of the existing government, and where a new leader faces both the high expectations of the masses who have brought him (or her) to office, and the continued power of the agencies of control inherited from the old regime. Only in Iran has a new regime brought to power by urban upheaval been able to destroy the institutions through which its predecessor governed. In the Philippines—currently the salient example of succession politics anywhere in the Third World—President Aquino by contrast ultimately depended on the defection of the military from the Marcos regime before she could claim the fruits of her election victory; and the construction of a stable governing coalition from her own volatile supporters and the remaining institutions of authoritarian rule presents an all but impossible task. Argentina and Brazil appear to have managed an equivalent transition rather more successfully, though in neither could a stable succession yet be said to have been fully secured. Among the states considered here, South Korea is currently undergoing the equivalent crisis of authoritarian succession, the outcome of which remains uncertain—though the combination of a homogeneous population and a rapidly growing economy must increase the chances that it can be managed successfully. There must be important differences for the prospects of peaceful succession to authoritarian rule between countries such as South Korea, Indonesia and Brazil, where dictatorship has been accompanied by rapid economic growth, and countries like Chile and Argentina where it has been accompanied by stagnation. Chile, Paraguay and Indonesia are the other states analysed in this volume where the prospects for stable succession to authoritarian rule must (especially in the two South American cases) be most open to doubt.

These cases of succession to authoritarian rule provide the only examples among the countries examined here where the succession is influenced to any appreciable extent by external pressures. The pattern is always the same. Dictatorial regimes which are supported by the USA, and which serve it well so long as dictatorship excites no very evident domestic opposition, become an acute embarrassment once it becomes clear that severe repression is needed to maintain them. The American perspective then abruptly switches. Whereas dictatorship was previously regarded as a stabilising factor, it is viewed as a destabilising one as soon as the level of opposition threatens to lead to its overthrow by a radical

regime, which will associate the USA with the ousted dictator. At this point, the USA looks for a centrist political leader who will be able to take over with popular support, thus associating Washington with the restoration of democracy. The Philippines, South Korea, Paraguay and Chile all provide examples of this policy at different stages of its development. The Soviet Union may similarly intervene in the succession politics of its client states, though it does not face the problem of justifying its support for dictatorial regimes to a critical domestic audience. In Afghanistan, just like the USA in South Vietnam, it has had to install a new leader who would protect its military and diplomatic investment, without arousing the same domestic hostility as his predecessor. In some states, such as South Yemen (PDRY) at the time of the civil war in January 1986, the USSR had become embroiled in factional conflict within the ruling party. In the communist states considered here, however—Cuba and North Korea, not to mention China—the domestic political structure has been resilient enough to avoid any evident Soviet involvement. Nor is there any indication of Soviet influence over the succession to President Machel in Mozambique, though some sources ascribe an important advisory role to Prime Minister Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe. On the whole, however, the evidence presented in this volume suggests that succession is overwhelmingly a matter for domestic political management; and that even when foreign powers have a high interest in the outcome, they usually do not have the leverage needed to influence it, and are obliged to work with whoever is thrown up by the domestic political process.

LITERARY PROFILE

Facing up to the Other: Carlos Fuentes and the Mexican identity

Steven Boldy

While occasionally described, especially in his home country Mexico, as a cosmopolitan and somewhat élitist writer, Carlos Fuentes has over some thirty years conducted with his country and culture a passionate, lucid and disturbing dialogue. Through his texts, Mexican culture has confronted, questioned, and in turn been questioned by, elements which differ from it, yet which in many ways constitute it, forming, deforming, alienating and renewing it: Spain and Europe; its big northern neighbour, about which President Díaz once exclaimed, 'Poor Mexico! So far from God and so near the USA'; and the celebrated, ignored, founding yet absent presence of the Indian culture within Mexico.

Carlos Fuentes, the Mexican novelist, essayist, dramatist, short-story writer, teacher, lecturer, ambassador and journalist was born in Panama City in 1928. The son of a diplomat, he was brought up in various foreign parts: Panama, Rio de Janeiro, Santiago de Chile, Buenos Aires. In Washington DC where he lived between the ages of eight and twelve, he nearly lost his Spanish language, began a combative, difficult and fertile relationship with Anglo-Saxon culture, and discovered, symbolically, how Mexican and how utterly foreign he was when faced with the hostility created by President Lázaro Cárdenas's nationalisation of foreign oil companies. From the mid-1940s to the mid-1960s, Fuentes lived in Mexico City, where he graduated as a lawyer. He later studied international law at Geneva.

With the frantic energy and utter dedication to life in its social, intellectual and political dimensions which has characterised him throughout his career, Fuentes was active as a cultural promoter. He helped, for example, to found the important *Revista Mexicana de Literatura*. It was during this period, in 1958, that he published what is often considered to be the novel *par excellence* of Mexico City: *Where the Air is Clear*, a vast fresco of the types and issues of the emerging modern city of the 1950s which formed a landmark in contemporary Mexican literature. His hostile fidelity to the city, and the subterranean continuity of his work, were demonstrated in 1987 when he published his novel of the asphyxiated, crumbling and nightmarish Mexican megalopolis of the 1980s (hyperbolically projected to the 1990s): the equally vast, bitterly grotesque and satirical *Cristóbal Nonato* (Christopher Unborn).

Since the late 1960s, Fuentes has mainly resided abroad, in Europe and North America. From 1975 to 1977, he was Mexico's Ambassador in France, a post from which he resigned in protest against the election as President of Díaz

Beyond Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism: Strategies for Democratization

Larry Diamond

THE WORLD OF the 1980s is a world of democratic ferment, struggle, and promise. The breakdown of Western Europe's last three dictatorships in the mid-1970s appears to demarcate a new and important phase in what many view as a global evolution beyond authoritarianism and totalitarianism. Since the transitions to democracy in Greece, Portugal, and Spain in the 1970s, most of the bureaucratic-authoritarian states of Latin America have followed with transitions of their own (back) to civilian, constitutional government. More recently, the democratic tide has begun to sweep through Asia, unraveling authoritarian regimes of long standing in the Philippines and South Korea, and bringing significant (and perhaps inadequately appreciated) democratic progress in Taiwan and Pakistan. Even in insular Burma, a rigid and long-standing one-party dictatorship is reeling.

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In the Caribbean, the corrupt and brutal dictatorship of the Duvaliers in Haiti was finally terminated in 1986, and now one of Latin America's most venal and wily autocrats, General Manuel Noriega of Panama, is under pressure. Less progress has been visible in Africa; however, ruthless dictatorships have been displaced in recent years in Uganda and Guinea, Sudan now has an elected civilian government, and an imaginatively planned transition to a third democratic republic is now well underway in Nigeria. Even among the communist states, pluralist thinking and mobilization in civil society are increasing, and so are the constraints on the ability of the communist parties to resort to the totalitarian formulas of the past in order to maintain their hegemony.

Viewed in this way, there appears to be a kind of global zeitgeist for democracy, even an inevitable trend toward democratic growth in the world. After all, democracy is the only form of government that commands widespread and deep legitimacy in the world today. The great competing ideologies of the twentieth century have largely been discredited. Fascism was destroyed as a vital force in World War II, and the appeals of Marxism-

conomic failures, and loss of revolutionary idealism of the existing communist

cies—must give serious pause to those who would argue teleologically for the

tion among individuals and organized groups (especially politi-

by the following components: a highly centralized, authoritarian

conomic failures, and loss of revolutionary idealism of the existing communist regimes. In addition, international attention to human rights conditions has increased dramatically within the past two decades, gradually compelling communist and authoritarian regimes to become more accountable before a growing network of international treaties, institutions, and public opinion forums. Incremental improvements, however small, in respect for elementary rights of conscience, expression, and organization create space in which citizens can mobilize for further liberalization of their regimes.

Yet if this picture is bright, it is also partly illusory. Most of the independent states of the world today are governed less than democratically, and a great many allow virtually no space at all for opposition and dissent. Raymond Gastil's invaluable survey, "Freedom in the World," counted little more than a third of the independent states of the world as "free" (which can be roughly interpreted as democratic) in 1987.¹ A disproportionate share of these were microstates of less than one million, and mostly less than a quarter million, people. Furthermore, the total number of democracies in the world has not changed much since the survey began in 1973.² This is not because political regimes have been stagnant since then; as noted above, there has been a good deal of movement. The problem is that movement has been in both directions. Although 15 countries that were under authoritarian rule at some point in the past 15 years are democratic today, 12 countries that had democratic government in that period do not have it today.

The frequency of democratic breakdowns in this century—and the difficulty of consolidating new democra-

cies—must give serious pause to those who would argue teleologically for the inevitability of global democratization. There is nothing inevitable about the progress, or the stability, of democracy in the world. The intrinsic openness and competitiveness of democracies imply a certain element of fragility, and, outside the deeply institutionalized polities of the industrialized West, this fragility has been acute. As a result, those concerned about how countries can move "beyond authoritarianism and totalitarianism" must also ponder the conditions that permit such movement to endure. To rid a country of an authoritarian regime or dictator is not necessarily to move it fundamentally beyond authoritarianism.

Some Conceptual Starting Points. It is symptomatic of the international momentum of democracy in the world that so many different kinds of regimes strive (and strain) to define themselves as democracies and that democracy is the term used to signify so many different visions of the "good" society. This is one source of conceptual confusion. Another is that many people conceive of democracy as not only a political but also a social and economic system, while others believe that a free, open, and competitive form of government is a valued goal in and of itself.

For various normative and scientific reasons, it is important to conceive of democracy purely as a political form of government, however much it may be enhanced by, or even to some degree dependent on, particular social and economic structures.³ Thus, democracy is defined as

a system of government that meets three essential conditions: meaningful and extensive *compe-*

tion among individuals and organized groups (especially political parties) for all effective positions of government power, at regular intervals and excluding the use of force; a highly inclusive level of *political participation* in the selection of leaders and policies, at least through regular and fair elections, such that no major (adult) social group is excluded; and a level of *civil and political liberties*—freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom to form and join organizations—sufficient to ensure the integrity of political competition and participation.⁴

Between totalitarian and authoritarian regimes—which allow little or no meaningful political competition, participation, and freedom—and democracies, a large number of regimes fall somewhere in the middle. Hence, semidemocratic are

those countries where the effective power of elected officials is so limited, or political party competition is so restricted, or the freedom and fairness of elections so compromised that electoral outcomes, while competitive, still deviate significantly from popular preferences; and/or where civil and political liberties are so limited that some political orientations and interests are unable to organize and express themselves.

At the most extreme end of the continuum opposite democracy lies totalitarianism. These regimes are distinct in the degree to which they control the lives of their citizens and eliminate all potentially competing sources of thinking and action in civil society. Building on the work of Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carl Friedrich, and others, Juan Linz defined totalitarian regimes

by the following components: a highly centralized, monistic structure of power, in which the ruling group "is not accountable to any large constituency and cannot be dislodged from power by institutionalized, peaceful means"; an exclusive, elaborate (totalist) ideology that legitimizes the regime and infuses it with a sense of historical purpose; the active mobilization of the citizenry for political and social tasks through a set of monopolistic institutions, including a single, mass mobilizational party, which together crowd out virtually all autonomous forms of social and political organization.⁵ Thus, society becomes totally politicized, and the boundary between the state and civil society disintegrates.

Authoritarian regimes may have some of the above elements. Generally, however, they do not have an elaborate and guiding ideology. They allow some but still very limited and controlled pluralism of political thinking, expression, organization, and action, even semiopposition. They otherwise do not so totally dominate the lives of their citizens, nor so thoroughly and organically control the social and economic infrastructures of civil society, such as productive establishments, labor unions, schools, voluntary associations, the mass media, and the church. Totalitarian regimes demand active demonstrations of loyalty to the party and state; authoritarian regimes are content to have their citizens not actively oppose them. At the same time, however, authoritarian regimes do not permit effective competition for political power, nor meaningful and widespread popular participation in the formulation of public policies, through elections or other means. Nor do they allow substantial levels of civil liberties.⁶

Sources and Facilitators of Democracy

To determine how societies can move beyond authoritarianism and totalitarianism, one must understand the variety of social, cultural, economic, and political factors that encourage, facilitate, and sustain democratic government. Thorough consideration of these factors is well beyond the scope of this essay, but a brief review may highlight some issues particularly salient to the problem of regime transitions.⁷

Historical Sequences and Democratic Transitions. The historical development of democracy in the advanced industrialized democracies and the transitions to democracy of the past decade or so have many unique and distinctive features, but most of these cases also share some common characteristics. These follow from the nature of democracy as a system of institutionalized competition for power. For such competition to become stable, some measure of mutual trust and confidence is necessary among the various contenders for power, a settled respect for the rules of the game, what Robert Dahl called a "system of mutual security."⁸

Historically, this type of mutual confidence and tolerance among power contenders was most likely to develop gradually, at first within a restricted political arena. Hence, the most successful path of democratic evolution was a sequence in which political competition first developed within a relatively small circle of opposing elites, then gradually expanded to incorporate an increasing proportion of the population as legitimate participants.⁹

Although legal limits on the extent of the franchise and other participatory rights are no longer feasible in a com-

petitive polity (as Dahl noted), the role of gradualism and sequencing in the development of democracy remains a salient lesson. Widespread political freedom, participation, and competition for power involve risks for the contending actors and for other established forces in society. To the extent this competition can be phased in gradually so that contending parties and candidates can learn to tolerate and work with one another—and so to trust that defeat will not mean elimination, that victory will be limited by accountability, and that power will be wielded responsibly—these risks and uncertainties can be diminished, and the prospects for a stable, nonviolent democracy increased.

This is not an argument for extending the lives of authoritarian regimes that have lost all legitimacy and are ripe for replacement. Quite often, the only way to arrive at—or return to—democracy is to rid the country of the authoritarian rulers and institutions quickly and decisively. This casting off occurs either because internal and perhaps external factors have converged to present a unique moment of democratic opportunity, or because the authoritarian regime has no sincere intention of relinquishing any degree of effective power and would use the promise of a democratic opening to frustrate the movement for democratic change and perhaps to identify then destroy its democratic opposition. The latter game is one that Mobutu Sese Seko has played repeatedly in Zaire.

The typical situation, however, is one in which the authoritarian regime more or less determines the timing, pace, and structure of its own exit, and in which a puritanical insistence by democratic forces on immediate and humiliating abdication will likely abort the prospective transition. As Linz wrote, "The strategy of a clean break

is only viable in a revolutionary or potentially revolutionary situation."¹⁰ Thus, a recent study of transitions to democracy in southern Europe and Latin America pointed to "a sequence of piecemeal reforms" as the most likely path of successful transition and emphasized the need for democratic oppositions to be willing to play within the initially very restricted games allowed them by authoritarian regimes early in the sequence, while seeking a negotiated solution and avoiding "widespread and recurrent violence."¹¹

The frequent necessity of such a gradualist, sequential approach is illustrated not only by recent European and Latin American transitions but by the one now unfolding in Nigeria. The Nigerian transition may be seen as a model of how power can be gradually transferred from authoritarian to democratic, elected figures at successively higher levels of authority. The elaborately sequenced, 5-year program began in 1987–1988 with the election of (nonpartisan) local governments and the formation of a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution. In 1989 the ban on political parties will be lifted, then new local governments will be elected on a partisan basis. In 1990 state legislatures and governors will be elected. In 1991 a national census is to be conducted (for the first time in 20 years), then in the fourth quarter local government elections are to be held once more. Scheduled for the first half of 1992 is the election and convening of a national assembly, to be followed later that year by the election and inauguration of a civilian president, marking the final stage in military withdrawal from power.

The value of this approach is that it gives competing political forces some time to gain experience with the risks and requirements of democratic elec-

tions and the responsibilities of democratic governance before the entire state structure is opened to political competition. Thus parties have a chance to form and mobilize in the open before they have to contest, and civilian politicians have some time to govern and compete at the state and local level before national power is contested. This more closely approximates the gradual opening of monarchial and other autocracies in Europe (and also the development of democratic mass parties and self-rule in such colonies as India and Sri Lanka). However, those democratic openings occurred over decades and generations, whereas this will take place within five years.

The issue of time represents one of the great dilemmas of the transition from authoritarianism. Democratic parties need time to develop their identities, leaderships, and organizations, free from the pressures of an imminent election in which everything will be at stake. As mentioned above, they also need time to develop among them the relationships of mutual tolerance and trust and respect for law that can only emerge gradually, through years of competition and cooperation and repeated elections. The less the previous experience with democratic parties and elections and the less favorable the social and economic conditions that promote democratic tolerance and restraint (see below), the greater the need for time.

Some countries cannot afford the luxury of time; the democratic opening appears as a brief moment of imperative that must be seized. In other instances, there may be no particular moment of authoritarian vulnerability or breakdown, but neither is there any inclination or capacity on the part of authoritarian rulers to surrender.

mit, or implement a carefully staged transition to democracy. Even when such a democratizing or liberalizing vision does exist, it may sour when the authoritarian regime realizes the full implications of what it has begun and tires of having to tolerate dissent and be held accountable by democratic forces in society and at lower levels of power. In still other instances, those authoritarian regimes that might in principle be willing to manage a gradual, phased institutionalization of democracy cannot sustain popular consent for such a lengthy period of continued rule at the top echelons of power. Moreover, once they have conceded that democratic rule is the preferred outcome of political evolution, ultimately the most legitimate form of government for the country, authoritarian rulers have undermined a major basis of their own legitimacy.

In the contemporary world of mass communications and rapid international diffusion, no highly mobilized and politically aware population seems willing to wait several decades for a regime to implement a long-term plan of democratization. Probably one reason why Nigeria's military regime has compressed so many phases of democratic transfer into so few years (five elections in three years) is that the country would not have stood for a significantly longer transition.

There are several steps that can be taken to attenuate these problems. An important one is to introduce, even into the authoritarian regime, institutions of democratic accountability and restraint of power. Particularly fundamental in this regard is the rule of law, which requires a professional, independent judiciary and police and autonomous institutions to monitor, check, and punish political corruption at any level. Associated with this but going beyond it is a relatively high

degree of civil liberty—freedoms of speech, the press, association, assembly, movement, and religion; freedom from terror, torture, degrading punishment, unjustified imprisonment, and unreasonable search and seizure. As O'Donnell and Schmitter noted, such individual and group liberties can exist alongside fairly authoritarian structures of power, and the process of liberalization seems almost invariably to precede or lead the democratization of power.¹²

An initial focus on liberalization may be a compelling strategy for three reasons. First, it is inherently desirable in its own right and often involves the termination of the most repugnant and appalling aspects of authoritarian rule. Second, it does not directly and immediately involve the transfer or surrender of power; hence, the risks to established interests of liberalization are significantly less than of democratization. Third, liberalization provides the citizenry with the legal space and means to push the process of transition forward to the transfer of power as well. In some situations,

the opening of certain avenues for autonomy of the society—like some forms of collective bargaining, lower level trade union elections, free elections in professional associations, political activity in the universities, protest by neighborhood associations, the support by the churches of certain forms of protest, a relatively autonomous cultural life, etc.—create . . . opportunities for opposition leaders and sometimes illegal parties to achieve a certain presence and basis of support.¹³

Two other principles can also attenuate the politically unpalatable nature of an extended transition to democracy. One is rotation of leadership. Among the most objectionable fea-

tures of authoritarian rule is its frequent personalization. The more personalized is a regime, the more it tends to be abusive, corrupt, and unaccountable. The longer a political leader remains in executive power, the more personalized, intolerant, unanswerable, lawless, and self-serving does his or her rule tend to become. To the extent that power rotates in a predictable and orderly fashion, even in an authoritarian regime, it will tend to be less abusive and more subject to checks and constraints, as the recent experience of Brazilian military rule suggests. Rotation of leadership can thus represent the first step on the road to constitutional government, while also setting a precedent for subsequent civilian heads of government.

A final principle that might increase the acceptability of a lengthy transition from authoritarianism, and in any case enhance the likelihood of eventual democratic success, is decentralization of power. The more people have control over their own immediate institutions and resources, the more inherently democratic is the society. In addition, decentralization of power promotes government responsiveness, ethnic tranquility, civil peace, and political system legitimacy. Hence, to the extent that the transition from authoritarianism begins not simply with a formal transfer of power at the local level but also with a meaningful and effective one, people may be more willing to abide the persistence for a time of undemocratic or semidemocratic rule at the center, and local government officials and politicians will gain more substantial experience with democracy.

All of this suggests that in many countries, a lengthy transition to democracy might well be more conducive to long-term democratic stability and success than a rapid one. Semi-

democracy can serve as a way station on the road to the full democratization of power at every level of government. Expansion or restoration of civil liberties and the rule of law and creation of powerful, elected local government structures can be early steps. Creation of effective arenas of elective power at the provincial, regional, or state level can be a later step, requiring in some countries significant devolution of power from the center. An elected national legislature can serve for some time alongside an executive still effectively controlled by the military, as in Indonesia or to a great extent Thailand.

Where the military remains firmly in control, openly or behind the scenes, negotiating with it a plan for gradual democratization of political institutions may offer the best hope for committed democrats. The situation may be more delicate and intractable in countries like Mexico or, to a more extreme degree, the Soviet Union, where the hegemonic party has spun a vast network of patrons, bosses, and bureaucrats whose statuses, careers, and livelihoods (and not infrequently huge fortunes) would be threatened by democratization and who would therefore fight it desperately.

Whatever the type of authoritarian regime, a crucial issue is what will press it to continue the transition. As in Turkey, the driving force may be a talented leader firmly committed to the process, such as Mustafa Kemal Ataturk or, after World War II, president Ismet Inonu.¹⁴ Such visionary leadership is rare, however, and rarely is it enough. Typically, the ruling structure in an authoritarian or semidemocratic regime includes many elements and interests firmly opposed to a transfer of effective power—"hardliners" in the language of O'Donnell and Schmitter.¹⁵ Their resistance will

not be overcome, and often a transition may not even be launched, without the convergence of enormous pressure from below, in civil society and perhaps from outside, in other countries.

Social Pluralism and Associational Life. One of the most striking findings to emerge from the Diamond, Linz, and Lipset study and other recent studies is the vital importance for democracy of a pluralistic, vigorously organized civil society, featuring a dense network of intermediate groups and voluntary associations independent of the state. This pluralism may take many forms: business and producer groups, trade unions, peasant leagues, cooperatives, student and professional associations, women's organizations, self-help groups, religious institutions, ethnic and tribal associations. They may pursue economic, social, and cultural goals or more explicitly political (though nonpartisan) ones, such as protecting civil liberties, guarding against electoral fraud, and educating and turning out voters.

Voluntary associations perform many functions in a democracy. They constitute, in addition to political parties, an alternative channel for articulating interests and making demands upon the government. Through their internal structure and functioning, they may serve as training grounds in democracy, increasing the political efficacy and capacities of citizens, recruiting new political leaders, stimulating participation in the larger political system and enhancing citizen commitment to democracy. Perhaps most important, such autonomous associations check the relentless tendency of the state to centralize and expand its power and to evade civic accountability and control. In this sense, they may constitute (as the press and broadcast media, the plural-

ism and autonomy of which are equally important to democracy) an informal branch of government in their capacity to provide alternative channels for political expression and additional checks on executive or legislative power.

Not surprisingly, then, virtually everywhere movements for democratization exist, there is an explosion of interest group organization and mobilization, what O'Donnell and Schmitter term the resurrection (although in some instances it is really a fresh evolution) of civil society. The forms this may take include:

the resurgence of previous political parties or the formation of new ones to press for more explicit democratization or even revolution; the sudden appearance of books and magazines on themes long suppressed by censorship; the conversion of older institutions, such as trade unions, professional associations, and universities, from agents of governmental control into instruments for the expression of interests, ideals, and rage against the regime; the emergence of grass-roots organizations articulating demands long repressed or ignored by authoritarian rule; the expression of ethical concerns by religious and spiritual groups previously noted for their prudent accommodation to the authorities;

as well as a testing early on of the limits of cultural dissent by artists and intellectuals; and the defection, much later, of economically powerful and privileged groups.¹⁶

The catalyst for this efflorescence of associational life may be a decision on the part of the authoritarian regime to expand civil liberties or a more subtle process of gradual liberalization. As noted above, one reason why liberali-

zation is such an important first step in the transition beyond authoritarianism is that it enhances the capacity of social groups to organize for their own interests and in opposition to political repression and injustice. Even more is this so with a transition from totalitarianism, where the establishment of even very limited freedoms of expression, association, assembly, and privacy of the person and home enable nascent democratic groups to take the first tentative steps toward the reconstruction of a boundary between the state and civil society. Once this line begins to be redrawn, the struggle for independent, mass-based interest groups, such as the Polish trade union, Solidarity, becomes the driving wedge of the quest not only for freedom but for democracy.

Nevertheless, a political initiative by the authoritarian regime is not the only possible source of this invigoration of civil society. It may also be spawned, and more lastingly, by economic and social changes that give rise to new interests which demand voice and recognition.

Legitimacy and Socioeconomic Change. Authoritarian regimes, particularly military regimes, face intrinsic difficulties in legitimating themselves. If the source of their legitimacy is the traditional nature of their authority, the customary ties of obedience to the king—and to various lower order patrimonial authorities—dissolve with the spread of education, communications, foreign contact, and modern doctrines of popular sovereignty. If authority is legitimate only by virtue of its charismatic nature, it will dissolve when the charismatic ruler passes from the scene, and often long before then unless he or she takes steps to rationalize and institutionalize personal authority. Rational-legal authority in turn presupposes rationality, legality, due

process, and other impersonal criteria that authoritarian regimes tend to contradict (although Max Weber did not mean to equate this form of authority with democracy per se).

To some extent, all regimes depend for their legitimacy on their record of performance, but democratic regimes also derive legitimacy from the democratic character of their rule and the identification of their citizens with democratic values. By contrast, authoritarian regimes appear unable to legitimate themselves durably through the same intrinsic political features. This is because few citizens in the world identify with and cherish authoritarianism per se. They do not value inherently the monopoly of power by a narrow party or bureaucratic elite. They do not applaud as fundamentally good and just the limitation and repression of basic civil and political liberties. Rather, they may accept these as necessary for the achievement of some higher good—economic growth, socialism, communism, the Islamic society, utopia. When utopia does not come, but rather the lack of constitutional and social restraints leads to an increasingly arbitrary, abusive, and decadent exercise of power, the legitimacy of the authoritarian or totalitarian regime (such as it may have existed) crumbles.

To the extent that the regime may, in a totalitarian fashion, control all the means of ideological reproduction, it may in the short run be able to manipulate its own legitimation far more powerfully than the supposedly mythicizing "bourgeois democracy" condemned in Marxian theory. However, as recent events in the Soviet Union and China so dramatically demonstrate, all regimes must ultimately answer for their performance. Regimes that cannot, over the long run, deliver

social and economic progress to the bulk of their citizens—or at least avoid

where two decades of extraordinary economic growth fashioned profound social changes, dramatic growth in

an argument against socioeconomic development, rather it is an appeal for simultaneous attention to political de

commitment to the process on the part of a country's political leadership. The

social and economic progress to the bulk of their citizens—or at least avoid deterioration in the quality of life—will encounter problems of legitimacy. These may eventually become so severe as to force those regimes to reform or risk collapsing under the weight of their own inertia.

The problem for authoritarian regimes, especially those that lack some institutional means for legitimation, such as a ruling party and mass-mobilizing ideology, is that socioeconomic progress and reform carry their own risks. As Samuel Huntington demonstrated a generation ago, "modernity breeds stability, but modernization breeds instability."¹⁷ "Social and economic change—urbanization, increases in literacy and education, industrialization, mass media expansion—extend political consciousness, multiply political demands, broaden political participation."¹⁸ As the traditional ties of peasant to lord, client to patron, and subject to ruler weaken, new and independent interests are generated, and new political and organizational capacities are acquired at the individual and group level.¹⁹ Demands proliferate both for the right to participate politically and for tangible and symbolic benefits. Political institutions must expand and adapt to make room for these new entrants or risk breaking down.

Democratic regimes often have their own rigidities, but their open and competitive political institutions provide a means and stimulus for adaptation to change. Authoritarian regimes tend by nature to be rigid in their scope for meaningfully incorporating new political demands for participation and influence. In time, these proliferating demands and expectations may congeal into a broad popular campaign for democratization. A classic instance is South Korea,

where two decades of extraordinary economic growth fashioned profound social changes—dramatic growth in education and literacy and in the size and political consciousness of the middle class; a more pluralistic, organized, and autonomous civil society; increasing circulation of people, information, and ideas; and much denser linkages with the industrialized democracies—that facilitated and fueled the transition to democracy. Many of the same processes and effects are apparent now in Taiwan and even to some degree in Pakistan.

These (and other) cases demonstrate the generic vulnerability of contemporary authoritarian regimes, particularly military regimes. Lacking strong legitimating principles, their "support is based on more unstable considerations, like the self-interest of those sustaining or accepting them."²⁰ Thus, they face a legitimacy contradiction, a kind of catch-22. If they do not perform, they lose legitimacy because performance is their only justification for holding power. However, like South Korea or Peru (under Velasco's reformist military rule), if they do perform in delivering socioeconomic progress, they tend to refocus popular aspirations around political goals for voice and participation that they cannot satisfy without terminating their existence. Similarly, if they succeed in meeting the critical threat or challenge (e.g., subversion, terrorism, political violence) that justified their seizure of power, they become dispensable, just as the generation of new challenges and interests with the passing of time makes them, with their inability to adapt, irrelevant.²¹

For democrats, the policy implications are not as obvious as they seem, if one recalls Huntington's warning that the process of modernization can be destabilizing. However, this is not

an argument against socioeconomic development, rather it is an appeal for simultaneous attention to political development—institution building. For socioeconomic development is not only an end in itself, not only a means to improve the physical quality of life. There is also considerable evidence that it fosters democratic changes in attitudes and values. It tends to make citizens more concerned about political and civil liberties, more demanding of government, more pluralistic in their organizational capacities and impulses, more hungry for free information, more opinionated and independent in their thinking, and less willing to abide authoritarian—not to mention totalitarian—rule.

Strategies for Democratization

Focused as it has been on the problem of transitions, the above review has considered only some of the factors that may affect the possibility for stable democracy. It has treated political culture and legitimacy as products of social and economic change and regime performance, but these also have roots in the cultural traditions and deep historical experiences of a country. It has not considered such important factors as the management of ethnic and religious cleavages, the relationship between the state and the economy, the constitutional structure and party system, the international environment, or the judgment, skill, and democratic commitment of political leadership. The latter two factors will come into sharper focus, however, as more tangible measures to move countries toward democracy are considered.

Domestic Political Actors. Obviously, the most favorable development for democratization is a firm and forceful

commitment to the process on the part of a country's political leadership. The experience of Nigeria from 1975–1979 under the leadership of generals Murtala Muhammed and Olusegun Obasanjo demonstrates the overriding influence that skillful, dedicated leadership can exert. General Obasanjo's faithful execution of the military regime's 4-year timetable for transition—following the tragic and potentially explosive assassination of Murtala Muhammed in a failed coup attempt only five months after the transition had been announced—must rank as one of the great examples of democratic statesmanship in recent times.

To begin with the obvious: the authoritarian rulers themselves have more scope than any other set of actors to move their country toward democracy. To the extent they are fundamentally committed to the process, firmly in control of the regime (in any internal conflict with hardliners or backsliders), and far-sighted in designing a realistic program and timetable for transition, the transition is more likely to bear fruit and to endure.

Without reviewing earlier suggestions about the structure and timing of the transition, one can note here the importance of building a political consensus around the framework of the transition. This is inherently a political problem; therefore, it requires skills of which authoritarian, particularly military, leaders may be short. Respected intellectuals, scholars, and religious and interest group leaders should be involved and consulted, and popular participation in the design of the new system should be encouraged. To the extent that a democratic constitution results from a broad process of popular debate, consultation, and participation, it is more likely to fit the country's sociocultural context and to

be widely accepted from the beginning as legitimate. This suggests that the membership of any constitutional drafting body should be openly announced, representative, and not only technically skilled but also politically sensitive to popular aspirations and concerns. It also argues strongly for a predominantly elective constituent assembly and sufficient freedom of expression to permit the open airing of individual and group views on constitutional issues. These features have characterized both Nigeria's previous transition to democracy and its current one.²²

The problem, of course, is that authoritarian rulers are typically, at best, reluctant democratizers and often thoroughly unwilling ones. Thus, various groups in civil society—and, among those countries trying to restore democracy, in the previous party system—must craft strategies for democratization that overcome or neutralize resistance from the regime. This problem is far better addressed elsewhere than here.²³ From the preceding discussion, however, two lessons are apparent. First, popular pressure is crucial in inducing a reluctant or unwilling authoritarian regime to launch a democratic transition and to stick to it. Second, each situation is unique in its balance of political forces within and between the state and the society. Hence, the extent and forms of popular pressure most likely to be effective vary from country to country and invariably (unless the regime is about to collapse) must be balanced by a willingness of opposition forces to negotiate with the regime in some coherent way. Here again the skill and judgment of political leaders (in both the regime and the opposition) emerges as an important and, in some cases, such as the Spanish transition,

The distinctiveness of political alignments in each country and the need for negotiations in turn imply several requirements for the democratic opposition. A crucial one is effective organization. Broad and sustained popular mobilization for democracy requires that individuals be organized into a number of groups that can gather resources, channel communications, coordinate action, inspire members, and recruit support. Another is effective leadership. Leaders of democratic organizations must be able to discern when the moment demands forceful demonstrations of public opposition to authoritarian rule—protests, petitions, marches, general strikes, civil disobedience, peaceful assemblies (but never violence)—and when the moment is ripe for negotiation or pregnant with the risk of backlash.

This implies something of a contradiction. Much of the value of civil associations lies in their provision of democratic experience, training, and socialization. However, effective mobilization for democracy requires that organizational leaders have sufficient command over their followers to control the level of popular action quickly and decisively. The more precisely democratic leaders can mobilize and demobilize the movement for democracy, the more effective they will be in negotiating the regime's withdrawal. The more that elements of the movement resist such coordinated direction, the weaker will be the negotiating hand of the democrats and the greater will be the risk that violence and chaos induce a backlash against democratization by hardliners in the regime, with the support of many elements of society whose fear of disorder is greater than their desire for democracy. To some extent, organizational

or at least representative and responsive, with provisions for some kind of collective, deliberative decision making) can in principle command this type of loyalty from its following. Nevertheless, the problem is very real. In the form of militant and often violent student protest, it came close to derailing the transition in South Korea and remains a source of difficulty for the democratic opposition to Pinochet in Chile.²⁵

This problem reflects as well a third condition for democratic organization: that it be coherent. The value of multiple, diverse associations is that they incorporate a broader range of society. The more numerous and diverse they are, the greater are the sociopolitical costs for the regime (not to mention the tactical difficulties) of repression. This diversity must have some coherence and coordination if it is to be effective; otherwise, competing organizations will pursue different strategies with different tactics (as in Chile), and the regime will be able to play one group off against another.

To summarize, then, democrats in civil society must strike a balance between passion and prudence, between militance and moderation, between creative participation and the demands of organizational loyalty and coherence. Across different authoritarian situations, as well as over time, the balance may change. Although the impetus for the transition must come from civil society, success depends on shrewd and able leadership and dense and resourceful organization. The former is a product of domestic culture, politics, and chance, but much can be done from abroad to aid the latter.

International Actors. No aspect of the struggle for democracy provokes more intellectual and political controversy than the role of international actors.

desirability and the possibility of effective international assistance for democratization. Although these normative and empirical issues are often intertwined in argument, they are separable.

Much of the normative opposition to international intervention begins with the assumption that it will do more harm than good. To be sure, official bilateral aid from such established democracies as the United States always serves a range of motives and interests, of which the promotion of democracy has typically not been a leading one, and often not one at all. Too often the United States has been content to support an authoritarian regime generously and uncritically (inter alia, those of the shah of Iran, Somoza, Marcos, Mobutu, Noriega) because it seemed to serve immediate, geopolitical U.S. interests. U.S. policies (both overt and covert) have sometimes served to undermine democracy, perhaps wittingly through economic sanctions and political pressure in Chile under Allende and at least unwittingly by vastly strengthening military and security establishments elsewhere in Latin America. The latter effect does not follow invariably from military assistance, rather from a level of aid that disproportionately inflates the resources and power of the military in relation to civil and political institutions and from a Cold War doctrine that disproportionately emphasizes the containment of communism and revolutionary insurgencies over the promotion of democracy and protection of civil liberties.²⁶

These objections argue not against international assistance but for a reorientation of it around democratic objectives. However, a more sophisticated approach maintains that even well-intentioned democratic assistance

be because it taints and delegitimizes the individuals and organizations that

"saved many victims of indiscriminate repression in the late 1970s, and was a factor in the international isolation

all democratic nations to have as many democracies in the world as possible and to have countries that are not fully

be distorted by the particular economic and geostrategic interests, be-

be because it taints and delegitimizes the individuals and organizations that receive it or because the dependence on such aid undermines the necessary process of citizens empowering themselves and defining and waging their own struggle for democracy, without which no resulting democratic regime can be authentic and enduring. Embedded in this argument are certain value assumptions that cannot be refuted, but empirically it is difficult to reconcile with historical or contemporary realities.

One consideration is that economic assistance can make a difference to new and struggling democracies. International assistance, especially generous U.S. support under the Alliance for Progress, helped keep the Colombian economy afloat during the difficult early years of the new regime in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Economic assistance also helped Costa Rica consolidate economic growth and democracy in the decades after 1946.²⁷ Democratic Botswana's vibrant economic development has been boosted by the highest level of per capita development assistance in sub-Saharan Africa. To be sure, unending aid dependence has serious long-term costs for the recipient country, but aid that is structured specifically to nurture a country through difficult straits or to help lay the foundation for self-sustaining growth can benefit both development and democracy.

Similarly, external political initiatives and diplomatic pressures can have a democratic impact. Given the importance of improving civil liberties as a first step toward democratization and an end in itself, one can certainly applaud the human rights initiatives of the U.S. government under president Jimmy Carter. In Argentina, for example, such pressure did not force the withdrawal of the military, but it

"saved many victims of indiscriminate repression in the late 1970s, and was a factor in the international isolation of the military regime."²⁸ In the 1978 elections in the Dominican Republic, political pressure from the Carter administration blocked a blatantly fraudulent attempt by the right-wing party to remain in power.²⁹ During the Reagan administration, shrewd and forceful, if decidedly tardy, diplomatic initiatives also helped to hasten the departures of Ferdinand Marcos from the Philippines and Jean Claude Duvalier from Haiti with a minimum of bloodshed and may have helped dissuade president Chun Doo Hwan from unleashing a possibly bloody and disastrous wave of repression against the recent popular mobilization for democracy in South Korea. In Europe, the democratic condition for membership in the European Economic Community (EEC) provided substantial long-term pressure for democratic transition and consolidation in the less developed south European countries (Greece, Spain, and Portugal), which had been "suffering a sense of exclusion" under authoritarian rule.³⁰ More recently, pressure from the EEC has helped to persuade Turkey to lift martial law and institute stronger protections for human rights.³¹

Thus, external efforts can aid the process of democratization, but they can also frustrate, retard, or subvert it. It matters greatly what type of entity the external actor is, what its real objectives are, how they are perceived within the recipient country, what form the aid takes, and to whom in the recipient country it is directed.

From decades of mixed experience and certain elements of an emerging normative consensus in the world, the following principles for international action may be advanced:

1. It is in the legitimate interest of

all democratic nations to have as many democracies in the world as possible and to have countries that are not fully democratic be governed as democratically as possible. This is so because freedom is more secure in one country when it is firmly planted in others (political regime trends and ideologies do diffuse across borders) and because "no two liberal societies have ever fought each other."³²

2. It is the legitimate business of all nations to be concerned about the status of human rights in any of them. The experience of genocide and other massive human rights violations in modern times compels a reconceptualization of the notion of sovereignty. At a minimum, a Hitler or Pol Pot or Idi Amin should be morally unacceptable to the community of nations, and another nation (such as Tanzania in the case of Amin) should be morally justified in aiding the citizens of a victimized country to resist and overthrow barbarous oppression.

3. True sovereignty resides not with the regime in control of the state of a country but with its people. When the people clearly indicate their rejection of the ruling regime, democratic governments and organizations are justified in offering them assistance to realize their political aspirations. This is not *carte blanche* for democracies to overthrow regimes they fear or dislike. Rather it is an argument for popular legitimacy as the fount of sovereignty and for reading unambiguous signals of the illegitimacy or delegitimation of an authoritarian regime as due cause for no longer according it the full respect and privileges of sovereignty.

4. Official external efforts to move a country toward popular sovereignty and democracy should place increasing emphasis on coordinated, multilateral efforts for at least two reasons. Multilateral initiatives will be less likely to

be distorted by the particular economic and geostrategic interests, beyond democratization, of any single powerful country. Because of this, multilateral projects will be less suspect as self-serving and neoimperialist within the recipient country. Where a democratic superpower has long been suspected and resented for its actions in the region—as with the United States in Latin America and Japan in East Asia—the advantages of multilateralism are particularly obvious and compelling. This may argue for creation of a new joint institution of the industrialized democracies to function, alongside the existing aid-giving organs of individual governments, to dispense economic and political development assistance. Certainly, it emphasizes the value of coordinating democratic assistance between the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and its counterparts in Australia, Canada, Europe, and Japan.

5. For many of the same reasons, more politically autonomous and non-governmental efforts are needed to aid democratic organizations and movements in authoritarian or newly democratizing countries. Aid that comes from nongovernmental organizations is less likely to be politically tainted or suspect and more likely to create enduring bonds of democratic cooperation across countries along functional lines: among journalists, intellectuals, bar associations, human rights organizations, women's organizations, student and youth groups, independent trade unions, business associations, and political parties of broadly similar orientation. In its brief five years of existence, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) has done an outstanding job of fostering such linkages and supporting creative and often valiant efforts to strengthen demo-

cratic pluralism and to open closed societies. Other examples of important nongovernmental efforts, on very different scales, include the work of the Socialist International and the Committee to Protect Journalists.³³

6. There is an urgent need for a new form of international organization representing exclusively the democratic governments of the world. Such a club of democracies would not supplant the United Nations or various regional organizations but would provide an institutional mechanism for the provision of multilateral assistance and the fashioning and coordination of multilateral strategies to foster democratization around the world. Further, it would provide a forum for democracies to study and discuss their common problems of consolidating, maintaining, and deepening democracy; extending it to other realms of society, such as the workplace; and improving democratic accountability, responsiveness, and openness. Finally, it would provide, through an increasingly dense network of cultural and political exchanges, a framework of mutual support and a medium of international status from which countries might regret to be excluded. Although there are reasons to be cautious in tying membership to economic benefits, such as freer trade and more generous aid, the more tangible the benefits of membership, the greater the incentive of countries to satisfy the political conditions for membership. At a minimum, creative means can be found to accentuate the special international status accorded to those countries with democratic political systems. The nature and scale of this organizational task are such that it could only be launched through the personal commitment of the elected leaders of major democratic countries in the world.³⁴

Strategies and Targets of International

Assistance. From these diverse sources, international assistance may pursue several strategies for democratization. First and most important, aid efforts should focus on fostering pluralism and autonomy in organizational life and the flow of information. This is particularly important because it builds the social and cultural foundation for democracy without dictating to a country what its constitutional structure should look like. Because it is one step removed from the distribution of state power, it is less immediately threatening, thus somewhat more palatable, to authoritarian rulers than explicit demands for their withdrawal from power. Anything that is done to increase the capacity and resources of the people to organize themselves (for a diverse range of purposes) independently of the state strengthens the democratic prospect. The same can be said for any initiative that improves access to objective information and reporting; fosters independent ideas, scholarship, and artistic expression; facilitates critical commentary and opinions; and encourages open debate between competing perspectives on issues. When such initiatives emerge from the grass roots of an authoritarian society—as with Solidarity in Poland, Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia, Radio Nanduti in Paraguay, or the black trade union movement in South Africa, or the Bangladesh Society for the Enforcement of Human Rights—they deserve material, technical, and moral support from the established democracies.

Second, external democratic actors need to encourage efforts to strengthen the rule of law in authoritarian regimes, as well as in transitional regimes, such as those in Central America or the Philippines, where judicial systems still suffer the scars of authoritarian rule and due process is

not secure. This involves supporting human rights organizations that monitor and expose abuses, aid the victims of torture and violence, provide them legal assistance, and educate the people about their rights; training judges, magistrates, court clerks, lawyers, paralegal workers, and human rights educators; supporting programs for legal outreach, legal aid, and various forms of non- or quasi-judicial conflict conciliation; funding legal schools, libraries, institutes, and professional societies; and training prosecutors and police in professional, democratic methods of law enforcement.

Most of the aforementioned activities and organizations feature prominently in the democratic assistance efforts of the National Endowment for Democracy and the U.S. Agency for International Development.³⁵ Indeed, a scholarly assessment of these two institutions' programs, in light of the growing accumulation of empirical evidence, must concede that policymakers already understand quite well what needs to be done to encourage and advance the process of democratization in developing and closed societies. Nevertheless, the current annual budget for NED (including its four core grantees) is only about \$16.9 million,³⁶ and the 1987 (fiscal year) budget for USAID's "Section 116(e)" activities—those specifically designated for the strengthening of civil and political rights—was only \$6.2 million.

This is a shamefully inadequate commitment of resources for the largest and wealthiest industrialized democracy, especially now that it claims to have the promotion of democracy and human rights as one of its major foreign-policy goals. Other U.S. government programs (in USAID and the U.S. Information Agency, among others) also expend funds in support of democratic pluralism and change, but

the total commitment remains slight in relation to any measure of U.S. resources or national security expenditures. The result is that although USAID and NED do many good works, thousands of worthy efforts around the world go unassisted and badly underfunded and others receive considerably less support than they could effectively use.

Indiscriminate funding will not improve the democratic prospect, but it is disingenuous to presume that funding does not limit what can be done. Building the organizational, informational, and legal infrastructures of democracy—not to mention other aspects of democratic development, such as improving the technical and substantive capacities of legislatures, local governments, and electoral administration—requires financial as well as human resources. Governments and organizations in the established democracies that profess a deep commitment to global democratization must reach much more deeply into their budgets to support it.

The above efforts involve methodically developing social pluralism and the rule of law. When the regime opens sufficiently to permit the existence of opposition parties, financial and technical assistance can also assist them in developing and mobilizing mass support. Reaching that point, however, may be difficult or treacherous, as it requires that the regime tolerate more explicit threats to its own continuation. Before that, a regime (again, if it is not rapidly collapsing) must be persuaded to permit some degree of freedom for groups to organize and alternative sources of information to surface and circulate. This crucial liberalizing step, and others that improve the human rights climate and the rule of law, may result largely from political processes and pressures

within the regime or the society, but even in these cases prudent and some-

1980, helped perpetuate the Pinochet regime, in part by boosting "his claims

ment assistance. Such a program must permanently and substantially reduce

should be no illusion that these will

within the regime or the society, but even in these cases prudent and sometimes forceful diplomatic and economic pressure can help them along.

Even if diplomatic pressure achieves only a grudging reduction in human rights violations by a dictator, such as Mobutu (whose departure from power may be difficult to envisage in the near term), that is important. When circumstances are ripe and societal forces are mobilizing convincingly for a transition to democracy, diplomatic pressure can be elevated to a focus on full democratization. The failure of U.S. sanctions and pressures, however, to force Noriega's departure from Panama (not to mention the full and genuine democratization of power in that military-dominated country) should signal the limits of even superpower influence and the complexities of trying to shape political events in another country. To return to an earlier theme, diplomatic pressure for democratization is much more likely to be effective if it joins with and is responsive to democratic forces inside the country and if it is coordinated with other democratic countries (especially in the region) that have cultural, economic, or political influence.

A fourth international strategy for democratization encompasses economic relations. Although democrats should always be cautious about taking steps that would make the subjects of an authoritarian regime suffer for the sins of their rulers, there are instances in which economic sanctions may constitute a potent form of pressure and an effective component of a larger strategy for isolating and shaming a regime internationally and for weakening its base of domestic support. Constable and Valenzuela concluded that U.S. support for multilateral loans to Chile, totaling \$2.2 billion since

1980, helped perpetuate the Pinochet regime, in part by boosting "his claims that he still has important friends in Washington. . . . Yet on the one occasion when substantive pressure was threatened—the 1985 multilateral loan abstentions—the dictator quickly lifted the state of siege."³⁷

A more important dimension of economic strategy, however, involves the need for financial assistance to new democratic regimes. Many of these regimes encounter, upon assuming power, a profound economic crisis resulting from the reckless management and even plundering of the economy by the previous authoritarian rulers. Although new democratic regimes may begin with a considerable reservoir of popular legitimacy and goodwill, they must eventually improve economic conditions if they are to survive. Indeed, economic reconstruction is now the most urgent and important challenge facing the new democracies of Latin America and the Philippines, one that seriously threatens their consolidation and survival. With crushing debt burdens that can never be repaid, yet that still sap the resources needed for new investment in economic recovery, these economies are trapped in catastrophic depressions that have seen living standards plunge back in time 10 or 20 years or more. Government policies and mismanagement may contribute to such declines, but huge debt service obligations leave the new democratic governments little room for policy maneuver, and people will only tolerate such depression and misery for so long before they turn to more radical, desperate, and violent solutions.

Nothing the industrialized democracies can do to foster democracy around the world would have as profound and immediate an impact as a far-reaching program of debt relief and develop-

ment assistance. Such a program must permanently and substantially reduce the foreign debt burdens of economically struggling democracies in the Third World; limit debt service payments to a level consistent with economic growth; and mobilize the substantial new financial resources necessary to rekindle economic growth. Simply providing new loans to roll over existing debts may stave off an international financial panic (and the collapse of individual banks), but it will not renew economic growth in the developing world. New democracies need and deserve the chance to make a new economic beginning for their peoples.

Opening Totalitarian Regimes. Totalitarian regimes are unique in their comprehensive control over individual and group life, but they are not unchanging or invulnerable. Indeed, an important element of the democratic ferment in the world today is the widening cracks in the totalitarian structures of the Soviet Union and China in particular. As Brzezinski recently argued, these cracks will likely continue to widen throughout the communist world because they derive from a fundamental contradiction between the need for participation and individual incentives "to transcend the phase of industrialization" and the need for "highly regimented, disciplined and bureaucratized non-participation" to preserve the hierarchical, centralized control of the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist state.³⁸

Some would regard the changes to date as sufficient to challenge the characterization of these countries as totalitarian any longer.³⁹ Even with the reduction of terror and repression and the modestly improving climate for dissent, critical expression, and independent organization, however, many totalitarian features remain. There

should be no illusion that these will be easily undone, for a distinctive feature of the totalitarian state is that it entrenches such a vast network of party and government apparatus whose privileges and power would be gravely threatened by any relaxation of centralized control. As Linz stated, "To be stable, posttotalitarianism can reject the totalitarian heritage only selectively and gradually, if it is not to lead to a revolutionary outbreak that could lead to a radical change of the system, endangering the continuity in power of the elite."⁴⁰

Democracies can do virtually nothing to change the structure of state power and the unaccountability of ruling groups in totalitarian or even post-totalitarian regimes. They can be prepared, however, to encourage political reformers within those regimes when they emerge, and to foster an international climate conducive to reform. In the contemporary world, where international contact and exchange are so fundamental to every dimension of national vitality and progress, the degree of economic, cultural, and political isolation must matter to any regime concerned about national development. To the extent that political and civil liberties in communist countries improve, democracies should be prepared to expand all manner of contacts with them. These contacts will in turn tend to further enhance social pluralism and democratic pressure over time. In this sense, linkage may be an appropriate concept: totalitarian regimes should know that their fuller acceptance into the world's most dynamic orbits of economic, scientific, technical, and cultural exchange depend on their liberalization.⁴¹ There should be tangible rewards for progress, which would generate incentives for further liberalization.

If one assumes, which unfortunately one must, that the major totalitarian regimes in the world are not about to simply collapse, then the transition from totalitarianism will inevitably be a gradual one, although certain phases of it may seem to (and perhaps need to) move with stunning boldness and speed. Hence, democratic nations must plan for a long, subtle struggle of engagement and stick patiently to a coherent strategy. Some obvious features of this strategy will seem familiar:

1. Democratic nations must closely coordinate among themselves their various interactions with totalitarian states, if pressure and incentives are to be effective.

2. Human rights concerns should be regularly and vigorously raised in diplomatic contacts, summits, and international forums. In particular, the Soviet bloc countries should be relentlessly, creatively, and forcefully pressed to honor their treaty obligations with regard to human rights.

3. Democratic countries should focus on initiatives to support the growth of independent associations and scholarship and the freer flow of information, ideas, and opinions. Ways should be found to offer financial and technical support to emergent pluralism in associational, intellectual, and creative life. Institutions in the democratic nations should seek to establish links and exchanges with such emergent groups when they form, and the survival and freedom from repression of those groups should be made a matter of highly visible international concern.

4. The flow of decentralizing technologies should be encouraged. The personal computer and the photocopy machine are serious threats to totalitarian rule because, to the extent that wide access to them exists, centralized control over the flow of information is

undermined. More generally, because economic vitality in a highly developed economy requires wide, decentralized access to and rapid flows of information, it is doubtful that a post-industrial level of development and affluence is attainable in a totalitarian (or even highly centralized posttotalitarian) society.⁴²

The above principles follow naturally from the preceding analysis, but they also raise a dilemma. Restraining contact and exchange with the industrial democracies enables those democracies to use their economic and scientific advantages as leverage to encourage the opening of totalitarian and posttotalitarian societies. The rapid development of those societies—especially their increasing exposure to the technologies and demands of the information age and the strengthening of autonomous forms of social and economic organization—may prove an even more powerful solvent of totalitarian structures and restraints. Policymakers must be sensitive to the costs and trade-offs involved. When a contradiction does arise, there is something to be said for pushing the development of pluralism forward as fast as possible through the proliferation of contacts, at the same time searching for individual and group recipients of contact that are as independent as possible from the totalitarian state.

Forging a Coherent Strategy

The world is shrinking. As international exchanges of goods, technologies, news, information, ideas, students, tourists, entertainers, athletes, novels, plays, and movies proliferate, people are slowly evolving elements of a common global culture. This is a subtle and diffuse phenomenon that is difficult to measure. It is visible in the spread of democratic values, norms,

and aspirations. It is helping to inspire many courageous movements for civil and political liberties, just as the growing density of political and economic ties may limit the options of regimes that would repress these movements.

The global movement for democracy today has momentum, but historically such moments of promise were cyclical swings and did not last. The challenge for committed democratic actors—individuals, institutions, and nations—is to fashion strategies for engaging authoritarian and totalitarian regimes that will be consistent over the long run and coherent and cumulative in their effects. The limits to international pressure for democratization are not only intrinsic but also self-imposed by democratic actors with short attention spans, inflated notions of their individual importance, divergent policies and priorities, and schizophrenic, zigzagging strategies of influence. Established democratic institutions and nations can advance the cause of democracy in other countries, but first they must get their own act together.

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4. *Ibid.*, p. xvi.
5. Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes," *Handbook of Political Science, Vol. 3: Macropolitical Theory*, Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds. (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), pp. 187-192.
6. *Ibid.*, especially pp. 264-274.
7. Some indispensable theoretical and empirical works are Lipset, *Political Man* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981, first published in 1960); Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963); Robert Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1971); Linz, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown and Reequilibration* (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978); G. Bingham Powell, Jr., *Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability and Violence* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982); and Samuel P. Huntington, "Will More Countries Become Democratic?", *Political Science Quarterly* 99:2, pp. 193-218. Much fuller discussions of the evidence and findings from the 26-nation comparative study may be found in Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, *Democracy in Developing Countries*; "Building and Sustaining Democratic Government in Developing Countries: Some Tentative Findings," *World Affairs* 150:1 (Summer 1987), pp. 5-19, and "Democracy in Developing Countries: Facilitating and Obstructing Factors," in Gastil, pp. 229-258.
8. Dahl, p. 36.
9. *Ibid.*, pp. 33-47.
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10. Linz, "The Transition from Authoritarian Regimes to Democratic Political Systems and the Problems of Consolidation of Political Democracy," paper presented to the International Political Science Association,

- Tokyo Round Table, March 29–April 1, 1982, p. 34.
11. Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). The quoted passages are from pp. 43 and 11. The book is part of the 4-volume *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*, O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds.
 12. O'Donnell and Schmitter, pp. 7–10.
 13. Linz, "The Transition from Authoritarian Regimes," p. 38.
 14. On their crucial contributions and the process of democratization in Turkey through *reforma* rather than *ruptura*, see Ergun Özbudun, "Turkey: Crises, Interruptions and Reequilibrations," in Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, *Democracy in Developing Countries: Asia*.
 15. O'Donnell and Schmitter, pp. 15–17.
 16. *Ibid.*, p. 49.
 17. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 41.
 18. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
 19. On these processes, see also Huntington and Joan M. Nelson, *No Easy Choice: Political Participation in Developing Countries* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976).
 20. Linz, "The Transition from Authoritarian Regimes," p. 18.
 21. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
 22. See Diamond, "Nigeria: Pluralism, Statism and the Struggle for Democracy," in Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, *Democracy in Developing Countries: Africa*, pp. 46–47, 75, 81–82.
 23. See in particular O'Donnell and Schmitter.
 24. Linz, "Innovative Leadership in the Transition to Democracy and a New Democracy: The Case of Spain," paper prepared for the Conference on Innovative Leadership and International Politics, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, June 8–10, 1987.
 25. See Arturo Valenzuela, "Chile: The Origins, Consolidation, and Breakdown of a Democratic Regime," in Diamond, Linz,

and Lipset, *Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America*.

26. On the substantial U.S. role in aiding the "militarization of the state" in Uruguay, see Charles G. Gillespie, "On the Relation Between State and Regime: Authoritarianism and Democratization in Uruguay," prepared for the Symposium on "Democratization and the State in the Southern Cone," 46th International Congress of Americanists, Amsterdam, July 4–8, 1988. For evidence of "a statistically significant and quite strong negative correlation" between U.S. military assistance during 1953–1963 and the subsequent stability (during the Johnson and Nixon administrations) of democracy in 17 developing countries, see Edward N. Muller, "Dependent Economic Development, Aid Dependence on the United States, and Democratic Breakdown in the Third World," *International Studies Quarterly* 29:4 (December 1985), pp. 445–469.
27. Jonathan Hartlyn, "Colombia: The Politics of Violence and Accommodation," and John Booth, "Costa Rica: The Development of Stable Democracy," in Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, *Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America*.
28. Carlos Waisman, "Argentina: Autarkic Industrialization and Illegitimacy," in Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, *Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America*. Eloquent testimony to the humanitarian and democratic impact of Carter's human rights policies in Argentina is also given by Guillermo O'Donnell, "Transitions to Democracy: Some Navigation Instruments," paper delivered to the Conference on Reinforcing Democracy in the Americas, Carter Center of Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia, November 17–18, 1986.
29. Howard J. Wiarda, "The Dominican Republic: The Mirror Legacies of Democracy and Authoritarianism," in Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, *Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America*; and Laurence Whitehead, "International Aspects of Democratization," in O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, eds., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives*, p. 37.
30. *Ibid.*, pp. 21–23. The EEC's condition is that "only states which guarantee on their territories truly democratic practices and respect for fundamental rights and free-

doms can become members of our Community."

31. *Ibid.*, p. 34.
 32. Huntington, "Will More Countries Become Democratic?", p. 194.
 33. For an extensive review of the democratization efforts of the SI, see Whitehead, pp. 25–31.
 34. An interesting recent development in this direction was the June 1988 conference in Manila of 13 "newly restored democracies" (Argentina, Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Greece, Honduras, Nicaragua, Peru, the Philippines, Portugal, El Salvador, Spain, and Uruguay). The group pledged solidarity on economic issues and mutual support in their struggle to renegotiate their foreign debts. Among other things, they also condemned terrorism, offered asylum for political refugees from dictatorships, and agreed to meet in 1989 in Peru in an effort to transform the conference into a permanent organization ("13 New Democracies Vow Mutual Support," *Los Angeles Times*, June 7, 1988). Although the inclusion of Nicaragua in the conference raises controversial problems about the group's identity, it is possible that this group of new, Third World democracies could join with the seven industrialized democracies whose leaders now confer annually to establish some kind of new international organization of democracies.
 35. See the National Endowment for Democracy, "The Challenge of Democracy: Advancing the Cause of Democracy Throughout the World," (Washington, D.C.: National Endowment for Democracy, May 1987); and USAID's annual list-
- ing of Human Rights Programs under Section 116(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.
36. The four core grantees are the Free Trade Union Institute, the Center for International Private Enterprise, the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, and the National Republican Institute for International Affairs. Together they were allocated over \$11.5 million (over two-thirds) of the \$16.875 million congressional appropriation for NEID during fiscal year 1988, leaving the endowment only about \$5.25 million to fund a wide range of other programs and initiatives.
 37. Pamela Constable and Arturo Valenzuela, "Is Chile Next?", *Foreign Policy*, no. 63, Summer 1986, pp. 74–75.
 38. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Crisis of Communism: The Paradox of Political Participation," *The Washington Quarterly* 10:4 (Autumn 1987), pp. 167, 168.
 39. A classic statement of the nature and dilemmas of "posttotalitarian" authoritarian regimes and the dynamics of "detotalitarianization" may be found in Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes," pp. 336–350.
 40. *Ibid.*, p. 342.
 41. Linkage of regime behavior (internal or international) to arms-control negotiations is a bad idea, however, because it presumes that arms control is a favor or gift of the democratic West to the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, rather than a matter of mutual security and survival.
 42. See Brzezinski, p. 168.

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Promoting Democracy

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11 ORGANIZING THE DEMOCRACIES TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY

Ira Straus

As the United States undertakes to promote democracy and considers the conditions of democratic success, we as a nation are entitled to some pride in the fact that it was the United States that for the first time in history made a real success of democracy. It was the United States that vindicated the reputation of democracy and overcame its negative connotations.

Tribal democracy has roots going back beyond recorded history. City-state democracy goes back more than 2,000 years, and for most of this period democracy has been equated with its city-state version—and consequently with turbulence, crudity, popular passions, and intolerance of culture.

Democracy on a broad geographical scale was a modern innovation. It began with British representative self-government and culminated in U.S. federalism. Its success gave democracy the new connotations of pluralism, tolerance, and stability. It made possible the phenomenal spread of democracy not only across the North American continent, but in the Old World as well.

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries a small number of people, surveying the instability of democracy in continental Europe, began to consider the broader implications of U.S. federalism for the spread and stabilization of democracy. Their work grew in two phases.

In the first phase, the British Imperial Federalists proposed the spreading of democracy throughout the British Empire and the closer uniting of the empire in a common democratic structure in order to stabilize the world-historical leadership of Britannic democracy in the face of the

supposed unreliability of all continentals. Their efforts came too late to achieve their highest goals, but they did have a positive impact on the development of democratic practices in India and in the emigrant dominions, and in the development of dominion status itself as a reform of the old imperial system.

The second phase, which still continues, was precipitated by the two world wars and by both the existence and the failures of the League of Nations. In 1939 Federal Union movements emerged in Britain and the United States, advocating the uniting of historically distinct nations on democratic federal principles. The movement had three strands: European Federalist, Atlantic Federalist, and World Federalist.

The World Federalist strand aimed to build a democratic world by first federating all countries. It has concentrated since 1945 on strengthening and reforming the U.N. system.

The European and Atlantic strands aimed to build a democratic world by first federating existing democracies. Their supporters inside and outside governments played vital roles in developing the European Communities and Atlantic and Trilateral Alliance systems—systems that have enabled democracy to spread and stabilize throughout free Europe for the first time in history. They have concentrated ever since on strengthening, enlarging and deepening these systems.

ORIGINS OF THE CCD PROGRAM

In the beginning of the 1980s, people with long experience in the efforts to unite European and Atlantic democracies formed Committees for a Community of Democracies (CCDs) in London, Brussels, Washington, D.C., and Seattle. Their initial aim was to develop plans for gradually linking the developed democracies (or member nations of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) more closely. After an initial "circle-group" phase, during which various proposals were floated in the several groups, an international CCD conference was held in London in 1982 to establish a common foundation for further work.

A new emphasis emerged in the London conference. Whereas CCDs had previously concentrated exclusively on uniting the industrial democracies, several participants now stressed the need to supplement this program by trying to bring all of the democracies of the world together in a loose association. This view was approved in the closing declaration in London. CCD-USA proceeded to develop the new idea of the London conference into two proposals: (1) for an intergovernmental association of the democracies of the world; and (2) for an international institute for democracy.

That same year, President Reagan addressed the British Parliament at Westminster and called for a campaign to "foster the infrastructure of

democracy" around the world. He thereby launched what came to be known as the Democracy Initiative, which was soon crystallized in the form of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). As will be seen, NED has come to play a major (and entirely legitimate and constructive) role in the effort described in this chapter.

The idea of organizing democratic solidarity was genuinely bipartisan and, indeed, international. During the 1984 presidential campaign, Walter Mondale proposed the establishment of an assembly of democracies, thereby raising CCD proposals high in the public domain. European ideas and experience of promoting democracy also provided important background for the president's speech at Westminster, for NED, and for the CCD proposals.

Unfortunately, NED was plagued from the start with funding troubles in Congress. It has managed only with difficulty to stay funded on a level of about \$18 million a year, and this is widely recognized as being far less than what is needed for its mission. We shall see how the constraints and uncertainties placed on its funding have been disruptive to those who have planned together with NED for the promotion of democracy.

CCD offered a way to fulfill the promise of the Democracy Initiative. Indeed, a presidential letter specifically praised CCD for having "taken up the challenge" of his Westminster speech, adding, "I hope that the international meeting you are about to convene will develop practical measures to help build meaningful cooperation at the inter-governmental level."

In July 1984, NED granted CCD-USA \$75,000 to fund the main portion of the first year's costs of preparing for a global association of democracies. The funding was earmarked specifically for organizing and conducting an international meeting in 1985 (Preparation for a Conference, PREFACE).

Preparing for PREFACE

In the initial stage a private meeting was preferred to a governmental initiative, because it would be freer from diplomatic commitments and from habitual national suspicions. The meeting had to be limited in size and yet include broad geographical representation, as well as expertise on international affairs, area and cultural matters, and democracy. To get broad participation, CCD-USA sought the cooperation of other associations in the field, such as Freedom House, the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, the Atlantic Council, and CCD groups abroad.

PREFACE was to lay plans for a further nongovernmental conference of all democracies (the "main conference") to complete the proposals for organizing democratic cooperation and to present them to governments for action. In particular, PREFACE would

1. propose agenda for the subsequent main conference, which would consider establishing an association of democracies and an institute for democracy;
2. make recommendations on the participation at the main conference, and
3. consider ways to develop further private support in as many countries as possible for closer cooperation among practicing democracies.

The subsequent main conference would still be primarily nongovernmental. The participants would be carefully selected from mainstream groups in the more than 50 practicing democracies. It would consider various areas for improved cooperation among democracies, ranging from trade and investment to journalism and terrorism, and would recommend permanent institutional means for such cooperation as it would deem advisable.

Gearing Up

CCD's first task in carrying through its program was to organize its volunteers and enlist capable personnel who understood its task. It engaged Charles R. Tanguy, a retired U.S. Foreign Service officer, as program director. It opened an office in downtown Washington, D.C. It established a newsletter—*CCD Courier*—to disseminate the substance of draft proposals and of reactions to them, so the process of discussion and consensus formation could be sufficiently advanced by the time PREFACE began that it would have a chance to get through its business in the few days its participants would be able to stay together in one place.

Samuel DePalma, an expert on international organizational affairs in the Department of State from 1947 to 1973, became CCD-USA president, while James Huntley, CCD's founding chairman, went on to other duties. DePalma had served in U.N., NATO, and Arms Control and Disarmament Agency posts until 1969, and had been assistant secretary of state from 1969 to 1973. Bringing with him considerable experience in international conferences and multilateral diplomacy, he assumed active leadership of the CCD project.

A working group of volunteers, which came to be dubbed the Gang of Six—Samuel DePalma, Robert Foulon (CCD-USA secretary), James Martin (CCD-DC secretary), Thomas Stern (treasurer), Ira Straus (editor) and Charles Tanguy—put together the plans for PREFACE in regular weekly meetings. The six were eventually augmented to seven with Eugene Rosenfeld (media relations) and continued as staff at the PREFACE meeting proper.

SUBSTANCE OF THE PROPOSALS

The proposal for an association of democracies had originated in the observation that there was no global forum of democracies. An asso-

ciation of democracies could enhance the prestige of democratic ideals and practices globally, much as the Council of Europe had done within Europe. It could also enhance solidarity and cooperation across North-South lines, both in economic matters and in the support of the development and stabilization of domestic democratic institutions.

An association could also be the sponsoring or governing body for a second organization: an international institute for democracy. This institute, independent of any particular national identity, could support needed academic studies on democracy, provide training and technical assistance, and help in finding the way through obstacles to democratic practices and to cooperation among democracies.

These two proposals were developed in some detail in the course of the preparatory discussions.

Association of Democracies

A draft for the proposal for an association of democracies was prepared, in consultation with the Gang of Six, by Raymond D. Gastil of Freedom House. It took as its point of departure the consideration that the democracies need to focus on their common values as a major concern in their international relations, above and beyond special economic and geopolitical interests. In fact, the solidarity achieved by working together to preserve and promote democratic practices could undoubtedly assist in harmonizing more concrete interests and encouraging cooperation in economic and other fields and could thereby enhance international peace and security.

The proposed association would therefore concentrate on promoting democratic political practices and human rights both among its members and in countries aspiring to democracy. It would not be a direct source of economic assistance but would help countries to perceive common interests and problems and thus facilitate economic cooperation in other forums. It might also take up such matters as common approaches to refugees from authoritarian countries and a concerted approach to terrorism.

In conjunction with an institute for democracy, the association would provide a forum for assessing the needs of new and fragile democracies and would foster mutual support for the protection and promotion of democracy.

Merely by providing visible solidarity for democratic practices and a feeling of identity with the democratic world, an association could help stabilize new and fragile democracies. By further showing that political and other benefits would accrue from democratic practices and membership, it could draw additional countries toward democracy.

An association of democracies could eventually have a charter and an institutional structure, but the first step toward this structure might be an informal forum, with periodic meetings of representatives of democ-

racies. Once formalized, the association might still be modest in size, with a secretariat staffed largely by seconded officials and a site placed at its disposal by a member government.

A preliminary listing, based on the work of Freedom House, showed the existence of 54 democracies then eligible for membership in an association. Once established by deposit of the requisite number of instruments of ratification, membership in the association would be open to any state that accepted the charter's principles and undertook to make its practices conform to them, subject to acceptance of the application by the existing membership. Default on these obligations could lead to suspension of membership.

Regional groupings of democracies, such as already existed in Europe, could be promoted under the aegis of the association as a way of overcoming the sense of powerlessness of small democracies. Such groupings, along with "coalitions of the willing" and functional affiliates, would be ways for the association to develop cooperation. A prime functional affiliate would be an international institute for democracy.

Institute for Democracy

The draft proposal for an international institute for democracy was prepared, again in consultation with the Gang of Six, by Ralph M. Goldman of San Francisco State University. It took as its point of departure the consideration that democracy is consistent with common human needs and involves forms and methods that are basically replicable and transferable, even though historical and cultural conditions may require adaptations.

The institute would assist in the establishment and improvement of democratic institutions and serve as a center for the development and promotion of democratic ideas. It would study conditions in which democracies thrive, provide information and training in democratic studies, and offer expert consultation in techniques and procedures of democracy—the administration of elections, the conduct of campaigns, the drafting of constitutions, the adjudication of human rights, and so forth.

The institute could produce studies on prospects and procedures for peaceful transition from authoritarian and totalitarian regimes to pluralistic democracy. Consultation teams visiting a country could study conditions relevant to democratic development and conduct seminars for leadership groups. An educational services division could assist in developing democratic curricula and instructional programs.

Research would come under five headings: democratic assessment data, democratic institutional development, democratic theory, relations among democracies, and program evaluation procedures. Publications could include scholarly monographs, popular multilingual pamphlets, and

materials to encourage prodemocracy productions in the private media.

The proposed institute would have an international governing board, chosen from distinguished democratic statesmen and political experts, to oversee operations, finances, and formal policy statements. The Association of Democracies might appoint this board, which in turn could select a small executive committee and appoint an executive director. The institute could in turn help the Association of Democracies in assessing a country's democratic qualifications or intentions and in identifying indigenous democratic groups.

The institute might establish small regional centers, probably linked with existing academic institutions. Funding would come from governments, private sources, and international organizations, in the form of endowment and project grants.

The institute could be launched with a core program that would inspire further development and funding. It was intended that, after PREFACE, a multinational group of experts would estimate prospective costs for launching the institute in this manner and survey potential sponsors, participants, and users of institute services.

The Democracies and the U.N.

A third proposal was prepared for PREFACE by CCD. Having spent most of his career in dealing with the U.N. system, De Palma found the continuing erosion of U.N. effectiveness a matter of deep concern. He had seen the division into North and South blocs grow and bring destructive confrontations. He proposed a caucus of democracies in the U.N. and UNESCO to ameliorate this situation.

The caucus would enable democracies to harmonize views on U.N. questions where common values and interests were at stake. It could meet at the beginning of each U.N. and UNESCO session, and as necessary thereafter, to review the U.N. agenda and try to concert approaches to particular items or to add its own items to the agenda.

Such a caucus would not constitute a bloc with uniform interests, nor could it seek to establish monolithic voting patterns. The caucus was later rechristened the Consultative Group of Democracies in order to emphasize this caveat. Like the association, it was not aimed against any existing international organizations, nor at duplicating their work, but rather at supplementing them, filling a major gap in international cooperation: cooperation among all democracies. This, DePalma was convinced, would help the other organizations function more effectively.

A caucus of democracies would strengthen the U.N. and UNESCO by drawing them back toward the democratic tenets that inspired their charters. It would advance human rights by encouraging an authentic and balanced approach to human rights questions in the U.N. system.

the association, it could implement projects consistent with the U.N. and UNESCO charters that those organizations might be unable to undertake. The caucus could be formed on the initiative of democratic delegations in the U.N.

PRE-PREFACE DISCUSSION OF PROPOSALS

CCD's initial dissemination of the draft proposals led to a wide-ranging discussion. Several matters received special attention, namely:

- Should the association begin informally, as an intergovernmental or even private forum, or formally, as a chartered intergovernmental organization? Or would it be best not to prejudge this, but simply to encourage the governments to go as far as they might prove willing?
- With what functions should the association begin? What functions should it eventually take up? What functions should it avoid?
- How could room for growth and development best be built into the charters of the association and the institute?
- Who should fund the institute—governments or private sources?
- What were the pros and cons for various countries of participation in these organizations? In particular, how could the program be made attractive to democracies in both the First and Third worlds, in view of the confrontational rhetoric that has tended to divide them in recent years?

Following are some of the highlights of this pre-PREFACE discussion.

Economic Aspects

It was generally agreed that the association should not be a source of economic aid. One respondent added that it must "skirt the issue of economic assistance initially" if it was to have any chance of getting off the ground in the United States, but this need not prevent it from discussing economic issues.

There were differing opinions on the idea of preferential trade arrangements for democracies. Most respondents found this attractive in general, but one warned that "U.S. experience with selective preferences and embargos has been bad. MFN (Most-favored Nation) and GSP [Generalized System of Preferences] for less developed countries have been the best principle; the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] and U.S. trade laws provide adequate protection against foreign dumping, subsidies, etc.; and it would be dangerous to depart from these agreements and principles which have developed on the basis of experience."

Two respondents were of the view that, despite the fact that it is so rarely mentioned—or perhaps for this very reason—there was a need for

"explicit discussion of the economic aspects of democracy: the role of free enterprise, free trade, property rights, and a strong middle class in promoting stable democracy."

Passive or Active?

One respondent drew attention to the different needs of an organization designed to agitate and press for democracy as distinct from one designed to gather and provide knowledge about democracy: "A *propaganda organization* would want a small, executive style leadership with highly centralized authority and access to media and operational communications links. A *passive organization* would want a wide membership with an emphasis on respected academicians/educational institutions and would invite prospective clients to come to its fountains of knowledge at their initiative, being careful to avoid any suggestion of funding or otherwise actively engaging itself on behalf of factious elements in potential democracies." This distinction corresponded to some extent to the distinction between the proposals for an association and for an institute. There were differing opinions as to the costs and benefits of combining both functions at times within a single organization.

It was generally felt that the institute should begin with one centralized location, where multinational contact would provide useful cross-fertilization.

One respondent questioned whether the institute could be competent to determine "the best methods of assisting democracy in emerging democratic states," since "this kind of decision is not an academic problem; it is a critical political decision." Others felt that this political decision would on the whole benefit by being informed by the work of an institute, and also by the moral background of solidarity provided by an association.

Informal or Intergovernmental?

Some respondents preferred an informal or even nongovernmental forum to a formal intergovernmental association, since the latter would cost the governments money and diplomatic time, which were already in short supply. Others suggested that the association should begin as an informal forum—perhaps as a meeting place for transnational political parties and other nongovernmental organizations—with the hope of later developing into an intergovernmental institution.

Most, however, held that the term *Association of Democracies* should be reserved for a formal intergovernmental institution, and that governments should be encouraged to go as far as possible. They anticipated considerable symbolic value in a formal proclamation of an intergovernmental association and regarded an informal forum as having far less value and staying power than a formal association. They argued that the

costs of staff and facilities of international organizations are practically marginal in view of the importance of their functions, noting that there has been gross overreaction on this point. They maintained that inter-democratic institutions in particular, because they have a meaningful basis in political solidarity, have been well worth their costs, and governments still regard them quite favorably.

The "informalists" and the "intergovernmentalists" shared some immediate tactics. Intergovernmentalists anticipated a few years' more work on the private level as preparation for official action. They also hoped that the transnational parties would come to give vigorous support to the establishment of an association as a means of enhancing their own significance. And they agreed that, if the governments were not willing to start out on a formal intergovernmental plane, an informal forum would be a positive interim step.

However, intergovernmentalists suggested that it would only harm the prospects of establishing an association if preparatory meetings and informal forums were already to be named an association or to be expected to get on with the substantive work of building solidarity among democracies. They anticipated that this would interfere with the preparatory work the informal meetings should be doing; and by giving them goals far beyond their capabilities, it would set them up to have their shortcomings cited as evidence against the value and feasibility of forming an intergovernmental association.

Leaving Room For Institutional Growth

There was also preliminary discussion of the future development of an association. All agreed that it would need room to grow, since there was not at present sufficient solidarity among all democracies for it to be given much initial authority.

Many tacitly assumed that, by beginning small, an association would have room to grow. Others maintained that room for growth must be consciously built into its charter. They cited the examples of the U.N. and the Council of Europe as institutions that began with many countries but few powers and, because they were dependent on unanimous consent for major changes, lacked the room they needed for growth.

Gastil's draft anticipated that the association would stimulate member countries to come together in other organizations. Examples would be a caucus within the U.N.; new functional organizations (the institute); new regional structures (on models like the Council of Europe, the European Communities, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations); and coalitions of the willing to act during crisis situations (such as the transition of a particular country to democracy).

One respondent suggested that stimulus to other organizations or

would not be easy for the association itself to gain new areas of authority. He suggested that the charter of the association include provisions for giving coalitions and functional organizations an affiliate status and for collaborating actively with them, so that people would come to see and speak of them as a common "world democratic system." The preamble to the charter could be worded to establish this as an integral part of the aims and outlook of the association. Groundwork could be laid by encouraging existing interdemocratic institutions to give expressions of support for the establishment of an association.

This concern was reflected in the warning by one delegate at PREFACE that, if the Council of Europe was to be used as a model for the association, it should be recalled that the council had proved an obstacle as well as an aid to initiatives for real integration among some of the European countries.

Ways of Promoting Democracy

Questions were also raised about how far the association should go in promoting democracy. Should it, for example, limit its membership to fully certifiable pluralistic democracies, or should it establish a category of associate or candidate membership for countries with elements of democracy and with an apparently sincere desire and intention to develop toward democracy? Should it work mainly by setting an example, improving the internal practices of existing democracies, and certifying elections as free and new democracies as members, or should it play an active role in transitions to democracy? Should it emphasize condemnation of nondemocratic governments and support of democratically oriented oppositions, or should it try to mediate between government and opposition, to build trust between them and to encourage a peaceful transition from repression to free election? Should it limit itself to moral support of democratic oppositions and condemn military intervention as an undemocratic practice, or should it overlook interventions in favor of democracy, or even expound terms and limits within which intervention would be legitimate?

The timeliness of these questions may be gauged by developments in Haiti and the Philippines. Recent strivings toward democracy remind us of how much is at stake when a struggle for democracy nears its climax—how frightening a tightrope may have to be walked if an undemocratic regime is to be eased out peacefully, and also how the tightrope may have to be abandoned and choices made rapidly and decisively if a struggle is not to end in failure and repression.

It will be important—historically important—to be ready to give a correct answer to these questions and to act on the answer in moments of crisis. The struggle for democracy is too serious a business to approach

to a crisis point. An association of democracies and international institute for democracy could play a valuable role in developing answers that would have the virtues of being firm, nuanced, consistent, and broadly backed.

North/South: Divergent Interests or Common Project?

A matter of special concern was whether First and Third World democracies could all agree on formulations that would enable them to join a single association.

One respondent raised with particular sharpness the political and public relations difficulties for Third World governments in joining an association. The association, he observed, could "provide a political forum for moderates to associate with other democracies and to endorse their democratic legitimacy." However, "Third World countries are weak and vulnerable to internal and to external pressures from the international world. What they typically want most of all are independence, security, and prosperity-growth-development. The G-77, the NonAligned, and other groups, e.g., OPEC and commodity cartels, are means toward these ends. Membership in the Association could give the impression of selling out to the North." The association could not add much to the existing economic and security arrangements as a way of inducing countries to join. On the other hand, the developed democracies might be leery of the whole thing "since there are more Less Developed Countries (LDCs) than developed democracies," and "the LDCs might be expected to turn the association into another General Assembly unless a system of weighted voting is used."

In response, it was pointed out that, though both First and Third worlds have grown suspicious of each other, all democratic nations have an interest in a common political orientation, and an association of democracies would serve this fundamental interest. It would also help in allaying suspicions over the long run. It would not break up any real solidarity that exists in the Third World but only the facade of solidarity that many Third World countries like to maintain against the First World. This facade serves the interests of radical regimes, but far from representing the true interest of moderate and democratic regimes, it is dangerous to their health and growth. The affirmation of the common value of democracy, bringing with it multilateral legitimation, could in the long run prove necessary for the very survival of some democratic regimes. The benefits would not be static but dynamic; democratic cooperation is a great multiplier. And by allaying suspicions, bridging the North-South gap, and developing cooperation among democracies, an association could make for mutual economic benefit and for a more stable international order.

PREFACE: THE MEETING PROPER

PREFACE convened at the Wingspread Conference Center, Racine, Wisconsin, on April 14, 1985 with 45 people present from 26 countries at all levels of economic development and representing nearly half of the world's practicing democracies: Argentina, Australia, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Fiji, France, Germany, India, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Mauritius, the Netherlands, Papua New Guinea, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Venezuela.

For four days the PREFACE delegates discussed and refined the proposals for an association of democracies, an institute for democracy, and a consultative group of democracies at the U.N. and other international organizations. They concluded unanimously that such organizations not only were proper but were needed as a matter of some urgency—except for one abstention, and that on the ground that the proposed institutions did not go far enough and would fail adequately to match the demands of a deeply interdependent world.

The PREFACE delegates even went farther than was anticipated, constituting themselves into the International Committee for a Community of Democracies (ICCD) and planning to establish CCDs in their home countries. This took the CCD-USA organizers by surprise. Before PREFACE it had been proposed only that citizens' committees for democratic solidarity be formed in the various democracies in order to advance the concepts of PREFACE and strengthen links with governments.

PREFACE endorsed plans to disseminate its conclusions through publications and seminars in several regions of the world, to develop them further in expert working groups, and to hold in the very near future the main conference, at which representatives from all of the democracies of the world would prepare definitive recommendations for official action by governments to create new mechanisms for cooperation among democracies.

PREFACE considered that the proposed institutions could be established in any order. They would all be likely to work together, and whichever came first could assist in the formation of the others. However, it was anticipated that the association would be the centerpiece of the system.

Bridging the North-South Gap

Several participants from the South were especially insistent in holding that these institutions were urgently needed as a way of helping to consolidate their democratic systems. Though they were aware that some people might suspect U.S. motivations in this connection, they

agreed that PREFACE had built a bridge between First and Third World participants by concentrating on working for democracy as a common value and interest.

PREFACE provided preliminary evidence against the fears expressed earlier by some First World commentators that Third World people would not want such an association; and preliminary confirmation for the major hypothesis underlying all of the proposed institutions: namely, that people from all democracies, if they meet in the context of considering action based on their shared concern for democracy, will be better able to discuss North-South differences constructively.

This did not mean that there were no contentious questions. Differing views were expounded on the amount of attention the proposed institutions should pay to economic needs and developmental studies. Also, some Europeans expressed concern that the new institutions might impinge on their existing arrangements for cooperation with developing countries. It was noted that the preoccupation with economic development in many countries would undoubtedly become a complicating factor in building solidarity around the value of democracy as a political structure. These issues were not, as a general rule, resolved, but it was agreed that they would have to be faced in the follow-through activities.

Refinement of the Institutional Proposals

After considerable discussion, almost all delegates insisted on starting with a formal intergovernmental association among such democracies as would be willing, while leaving room for the gradual or step-by-step building of the role of the association thereafter. Concerning the pace of work toward establishing the association in the first place, participants from Southern Europe and the Third World expressed a greater sense of urgency than participants from Northern Europe.

One of the most vexing questions was the structure and membership of the association bodies at the other levels—interparliamentary and private citizens—that were proposed.

There was much discussion of how the interparliamentary body should be related to the intergovernmental body, and whether it should admit democratic parliamentarians from nondemocratic countries. In the end it was agreed that the interparliamentary body should have a consultative status and be coterminous with the intergovernmental body, that is, should have the same member countries.

The purposes of the association were agreed to be the fostering of democracy and of cooperation among democracies by

- helping new and struggling democracies

- promoting free and pluralistic communications media
- furthering human rights
- considering the impact of economic and social problems on democratic systems
- combatting terrorism
- providing a forum for the resolution of mutual problems.

Also a matter of concern was the relation between the Institute and the association. On the one hand, it was considered essential to the credibility of the Institute that it have full academic freedom. On the other hand, it was considered that the association would have to rely on the Institute for research in order to provide background and objective validation for its own activities and assessments. It was concluded that the Institute should be fully independent of the association in structure but should share the purposes of the association, respond of its own free choice to association inquiries, and operate under the association's general aegis.

FOLLOW-THROUGH PLANS

PREFACE built considerable enthusiasm for its proposals, which led, as has been mentioned, to an unanticipated move by the participants to establish the ICCD with themselves as its founding members. Several participants who had long experience with international conferences described this as one of the best they had ever attended. In an era of conferencing, it might be appropriate to consider the reasons for this.

PREFACE was oriented toward the development of proposals for action. It considered the ideas for an association and Institute that had been developed over a period of six months by CCD, offered revisions and corrections, fleshed out important particulars, and boiled them down into more concrete and feasible proposals. It then passed these proposals on to expert working groups for further development, with a view to their final correction and endorsement at a conference of citizens from all democracies within the next year or two.

There have been many conferences that have sought to build solidarity simply by meeting, discussing, and socializing. PREFACE went farther. It was carefully crafted to work out ways to act together internationally for common concerns—concerns that would otherwise be left latent because of the impracticality of initiating action on them within the framework of national politics. This is what enabled it to build living solidarity.

PREFACE was further assisted by the procedure of semipublic advance preparation of the proposals and by the plans for follow-through

they had together to review the proposals as they had been developed and set them on a clear future course.

Before disbanding, PREFACE considered the plans for following through on the proposals. Having constituted themselves into the ICCD, many participants gave pledges to set up CCDs back home. There were strong statements in favor of bringing the proposals immediately to the attention of heads of government and getting action initiated. However, more gradual follow-through plans were also discussed and became the main focus for implementation.

Though not in any sense excluding or discouraging the possibility that a head of government would take the initiative on a PREFACE proposal and run with it, ICCD plans looked toward a big conference with participants from all practicing democracies within a few years. ICCD called in the meantime for workshops and seminars in various regions of the world. These interim meetings would work out specifics of the proposals and publicize them.

The big conference would give the proposals their final shape and promulgate them as the official ICCD proposals. Several delegates proposed to host it in their countries. Thereafter, it would remain only to impress the recommendations on the governments with all of the political weight that ICCD could bring to bear.

It was noted that funding would be essential for this program. Several PREFACE participants remarked how much more difficult it was to raise funds for charitable causes in their own countries than in the United States. Fund-raising was far from easy in the United States as well. Follow-up was slowed during the remainder of 1985 for lack of funds. The Pew Freedom Trust did award CCD-USA a grant toward a seminar in Africa on the PREFACE proposals. The Pew Trust also offered a \$100,000 matching challenge grant toward expenses of the All Democracies Conference. After several delays due to its own funding difficulties, NED awarded CCD-USA a grant toward an Asia-Pacific seminar.

THE BROADER SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROPOSALS: THE LINK BETWEEN UNITING AND THE FOSTERING OF DEMOCRACY

Now that it has been recognized that the fostering of democracy is a central aspect of the global purpose and policy of the American people, it is necessary to develop a broad strategy that offers specific and relevant guidance and yet is flexible and prudent.

The key to a long-range strategy for the spread and stabilization of democracy is the building of institutions for solidarity and cooperation among existing democracies.

Recent developments in the Iberian peninsula underline this point. A decade ago, Western European political foundations helped to rescue democracy in the Portuguese revolution, and this was one of the original inspirations for the Democracy Initiative. Today the Spanish government feels that visible solidarity with democratic Europe through the European Communities and NATO is needed to help stabilize its own democracy.

Institutions of cooperation among democracies are needed to establish a bond of solidarity between new and old democracies. They avert potential conflicts and bring out common interests among democracies. They vindicate politicians who stake their fate on democracy. They are an integral part of a new orientation toward democracy and can prove essential to the stability of new democracies.

Germany has shown how important this can be. After 1919 bad relations between Germany and older democracies pushed Germany toward Nazism. After 1945 new European institutions made for highly beneficial mutual relations and enabled West Germany to stabilize as a democracy. Support of European unification was (and thus far remains) the United States' finest hour in foreign policy, for it consolidated the peace and liberty that had been twice won at terrible cost.

Helmut Kohl reminded the Bundestag of this in February 1985. In the 1920s, he recalled, integration with the West, attempted in the Locarno Pact, had failed. Today the Federal Republic of Germany is based, in its constitution and founding treaties, on a commitment to "permanent" and "irreversible" integration with the West through the Atlantic Alliance and European unification. The choice of the West was a choice of "enlightenment . . . and the rule of law" as against any "special national courses."

Everywhere—in some countries most dramatically, in other countries more quietly—the spread and stability of democracy requires closer arrangements for solidarity among democracies. This has a direct bearing on the resurgence of democracy in Latin America.

Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay have joined Bolivia and Peru in returning to democratic rule. Yet each is experiencing serious problems, as are several other Latin democracies. They, along with the Philippines, will need strong political and economic support to maintain democracy. Now is the time to lay groundwork that could finally enable Latin democracy to be consolidated permanently.

The central task of democracy in the present era is to build and strengthen interdemocratic institutions on all levels and in all forms—regional, functional, and global—in order to show the solidarity of democracies worldwide, to develop cooperation among them, and to display international democracy as a plan for world order. The involvement of the United States in this task offers the nation a chance to

renew its historic role in the progress of freedom in the world.

Today there is a school of thought that questions the universal relevance of pluralistic democratic norms and regards it as a specimen of peculiarly U.S. naïveté that the United States should try to identify its interests with democratic self-government in other lands. However, friends of the United States abroad have never doubted the universal significance of these norms.

There is especially strong perception of both the role of the United States and the universal validity of democratic norms in countries where pluralistic democracy is new or fragile. This does not mean that they deny the United States a special role; only that they recognize the place of this concrete role in the growth of the universal norm. Giovanni Spadolini, minister of defense of Italy, has repeatedly called attention to the essential U.S. role as the "point of reference" for the spread, unification, and stabilization of democracy in Europe. And the universality of the norm and the struggle could hardly be expressed better than it was by Mario Soares, formerly prime minister and now president of Portugal, in his letter of endorsement of CCD's program.

I do not believe it possible to construct progressive and free societies without complete adherence to the elementary rules of democratic pluralism . . . To defend Democracy is, therefore, to safeguard the input of each of us in the definition of the common ways leading to general welfare. When this input is tampered with one opens the door to despotism and totalitarianism.

The world has known, and still knows, governments that sacrifice the liberty and justice owed every human being in order to indulge the egoistic interests of privileged minorities. History, however, has taught us that, sooner or later, freedom triumphs, since it has the strength of the ideals which are innate to human nature. Since to contribute to an acceleration of this inevitable process is the duty of every responsible citizen, it appears to me that the project which you intend to carry out deserves our full support.

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12 DEMOCRACY PROMOTION AND GOVERNMENT-TO- GOVERNMENT DIPLOMACY

William A. Douglas

Formal government-to-government diplomacy is insufficient for the most effective conduct of U.S. foreign relations. Official relationships of the United States are primarily with whatever regime—democratic or totalitarian—is in power in a foreign country. A U.S. program for promoting democracy abroad can provide a useful supplement to our official diplomacy. Certain problems would also accompany such an approach, although they are not as serious as some would expect. The opportunities arise from a dual-track diplomacy whose benefits for U.S. foreign relations would greatly exceed its costs.

DUAL-TRACK DIPLOMACY

By encouraging a division of diplomatic labor, the United States can maintain relations with both the incumbent governments of other countries and their political oppositions. As is normally the case, the Department of State and the U.S. Foreign Service can maintain official government-to-government contacts. A well-functioning U.S. democracy promotion program can enable private U.S. groups—political parties, trade unions, business associations, cooperatives, and the like—to relate informally to comparable private groups in other nations, including those associated with the opposition to the government in power. Thus, when a nation's government changes hands, some segment of U.S. society will already have ongoing political ties with the incumbent regime.

which a nation's government changes hands, some segment of U.S. society will already have conceived political ties with the incumbent.

**III-DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT FROM THE BOTTOM UP:
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND EMPOWERMENT**

Native Rights Movements

Thomas R. Berger



Mario Jurano - Xavante Leader.

ARC Photo

Allover the world we are witnessing a resurgence of Native culture, Native claims and Native pride.

The expansion of European powers, first Spain and Portugal, later France and England, and subsequently the consolidation of power in many states raised key questions: By what right do colonizers take the land and subjugate indigenous peoples?

We are struggling still with the implications of that question, though it does not arise in precisely the same terms as it did at the threshold of European occupation of the Native domain. Now we ask ourselves: What measures can be used to establish a fair and equitable relationship between dominant societies and indigenous peoples?

Most Native peoples have no wish to assimilate, and refuse to become proletarianized. Their fierce desire to retain their culture intensifies as industry, technology and communications forge a more deeply pervasive mass culture that excludes diversity. Native peoples the world over fear that, without political autonomy and land rights, they will be overwhelmed, faced with a future that has no place for the values that they cherish. Native peoples everywhere insist that their culture is the most vital force in their lives;


their identity as Natives is the one fixed point in a changing world.

When Native people talk about preserving their culture, some people become impatient. What, after all, is culture? Let me suggest that culture is knowing our own people, our language, our customs, our traditions. Culture is the comprehensive summary of standards, values, patterns of behavior, common attitudes, ways of life.

Culture, however, must have a material basis. This gives compelling urgency to the movement for self-determination and self-sufficiency among the world's indigenous peoples. In September 1984, when Pope John Paul II addressed Canada's Native peoples, he told them, "Native people are entitled to take their rightful place among the peoples of the earth." His message carried to indigenous peoples everywhere:

You are entitled to a just and equitable measure of self-determination, with a just and equitable degree of self-governing, for you a land base with adequate resources is also necessary for developing a viable economy.

Home Rule in Greenland, the Kativik regional government in northern Quebec, the idea of Nunavut, the uses that Native people have made of home rule



Shoshone, U.S.

boroughs in Alaska, and now the emergence of the tribal movement in Alaska—all these are manifestations in the Arctic and sub-Arctic of what is taking place in many other countries.

With the independence of so many Third World nations, the condition and the claims of indigenous peoples who are locked into nations they can never hope to rule must now be considered. They constitute a Fourth World, and it extends from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego, it encompasses the Ainu of Japan, the Aborigines of Australia, the Maori of New Zealand, the Sami of Scandinavia, and the tribal peoples of the Soviet Union, China, India, Southeast Asia and Africa. Indigenous peoples are rarely engaged in a struggle to separate from a central state; for the most part they want to retain control over their lives and land.

The struggles of indigenous peoples do not fit into convenient ideological or political categories. This has made possible the attempt by the Inuit Circumpolar Conference to transcend the Cold War, by inviting Native delegates from the Soviet Union to their triennial assemblies. This makes sense, for not only are they the same people, but also they face many of the same problems. In the Soviet Union, as far back as the 1920s, the regime decided that the tribal councils of the indigenous peoples of Siberia were inimical to the Communist Party's goals of industrialization and assimilation. Native hunting and fishing rights were curtailed. National Areas were established, and the indigenous peoples brought within them. In these National Areas, which serve as regional governments executing central policy, non-Natives predominate. For

instance, the Chukchis and the Eskimos, with a combined population of 12,000 in the Chukotsk National Area, are outnumbered by 70,000 Russians who have moved into the region and control the Communist Party and govern the area.

In Nicaragua, the Miskito Indians, together with the Sumo and Rama Indians, are trying to establish regional sovereignty within the state. The Sandinista regime has described them as an ethnic minority, but the Miskitos insist they are an indigenous people. Still the Sandinistas have refused to acknowledge the rights of the Miskitos. What is it the Miskitos want? It is what Alaska Natives want. They seek recognition by the Sandinistas of their claim to Native sovereignty. It is ironic that the United States backs a war in another country in part intended to uphold the rights of the Miskitos, but is not prepared to defend the rights of Alaska Natives.

President Woodrow Wilson espoused the idea of self-determination of peoples in the peace treaties that followed World War I and in the League of Nations. The Charter of the United Nations, which has the force of a treaty, affirms the idea of self-determination of peoples. In 1966, the General Assembly of the United Nations approved the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (which Canada ratified in 1976). The covenant asserts the right of peoples to self-determination. The principle is reaffirmed in the Helsinki Accords of 1975, to which the United States subscribes. It is the principle on which decolonization of the nations of the Third World has proceeded.

Since 1982, a United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations has met once a year in Geneva to formulate standards for the treatment of indigenous populations. In April 1985, Madam Erica Dues, chairperson of this working group, speaking in Quebec City, said that the principle of the self-determination of peoples applied also to indigenous populations, although it did not include the right of secession.

Article 2 of the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights also reaches the special situation of Native or indigenous peoples; specifically, it says that no people shall be deprived of their subsistence. Furthermore, Section 27 upholds the right of a minority "to enjoy their own culture." It reads:

In those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language.

Nations have an obligation to protect traditional forms of economic activity on which the cultural integrity of indigenous peoples depend. It is arguable that the principles reflected in the 1966 Covenant have entered the body of customary international law, and are binding even on those nations such as the United States, that have not yet signed the Covenant. Whether or not they have, the Covenant is ample demonstration that indigenous peoples, in their search for self-determination, occupy the moral high ground.

Many states, in fact, are fleshing out commitments to protect Native lands and to increase Native



Longest Walk for Indian rights, 1978, U.S.

©Ah-wesane Notes

autonomy. The new Canadian Constitution, adopted in 1982, has entrenched the existing aboriginal and treaty rights of Canada's Indigenous peoples, and a series of First Ministers' Conferences, which Native leaders have attended, have focused on Native self-government. The Norwegian Sami Rights Committee, in its 1984 report, has recommended that a Sami Parliament, similar to the Sami Parliament in Finland, be established in Norway. The Sami Rights Committee also recommends that Sami committees be set up to serve in an advisory capacity in municipalities and counties that have a Sami population.

There are stirrings in places where these issues were thought to be dormant. A report in 1983 dismissing Native Hawaiian land rights, far from quelling the land claims movement in that state, has fueled it. A government commission is now at work in northern Japan to consider the rights of Ainu. The coincidence of these several developments is striking: they will serve as a foundation for the continued development of international law on indigenous peoples.

Native peoples are making many proposals, and some of them are far reaching. They encompass renewable and non-renewable resources, education, health, social services, and public order and they extend to the shape and structure of political institutions. Proposals of this kind are no threat to established institutions. The US and other nations should regard them as opportunities to affirm our commitment to the human rights of indigenous peoples.

Many persons are inclined to dismiss Native claims of every kind as so many attempts to secure present

advantages by the revival of ancient wrongs. Why should anyone today feel guilty because of events that occurred long ago? Arguments of this kind are beside the point. The question is not one of guilt, present or past. The question is one of continuing injustice that is within the power of remedy.

If we wish to live in a world based on the rule of law, we must acknowledge that the claims of Native peoples are not ancient, half-forgotten, and specious. They are, in fact, current and contemporary. Arguments for the rule of law in international relations can never be soundly based until the powers that have dispossessed and displaced indigenous peoples accept the precepts of international law—precepts that now require a fair accommodation with Indigenous peoples.

If governments continue in their efforts to force Native societies into molds that they have cast, I believe they will continue to fail. No tidy bureaucratic plan of action for Native people can have any chance of success unless it takes into account the determination of Native peoples to remain themselves. Their determination to retain their own cultures and their own lands does not mean that they wish to return to the past; rather, it means that they refuse to let their future be dictated by others. □

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Special Issue on

THE CHALLENGE OF RURAL DEMOCRATISATION: PERSPECTIVES FROM LATIN AMERICA AND THE PHILIPPINES

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Editor's Introduction

by Jonathan Fox

The distribution of rural power in developing countries both shapes and is shaped by national politics. This volume addresses the question of why rural democratisation has proven to be so difficult across a wide range of national experiences. Transitions to elected civilian rule have recently been welcomed throughout the developing world, largely though not exclusively in Latin America. However, the relationship between such initial transitions and the longer-term consolidation of democratic systems of governance is far from clear. Elected civilian rulers have frequently failed to promote increased governmental accountability to the rural citizenry. While the implications are especially serious for countries with majority rural populations, authoritarian rural elites often retain significant political influence in predominantly urban developing countries, such as Brazil and Mexico.

Rural democratisation is an on-going process which develops, often unevenly, in the realms of both society and the state. Within civil society, it involves the emergence and consolidation of social and political institutions capable of representing rural interests *vis-à-vis* the state. Some may be specifically rural, such as peasant organisations, while others may be national associations, such as political parties, which develop a rural presence. For the state, rural democratisation requires effective majority rule as well as both formal and informal accountability to its rural citizens.

Rural democratisation cannot be separated from the challenge of democratising the state more generally. A focus on the rural political arena nevertheless raises a distinct set of analytical questions because the rural poor face particular internal and external obstacles when they attempt to hold the state accountable for its actions. In addition, the institutions usually thought to articulate and mediate the interests of civil society *vis-à-vis* the state, such as parties, trade unions, civic associations and the media, have a superficial or highly uneven rural presence in many developing countries.

This volume focuses on socio-political processes and institutions more than on specific rural development policies. Development analysts often

*Political Science Department, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Funding for this project was generously provided by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, together with the Joint Committee on Latin American Studies of the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council, with funds provided by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation. Jennie Purnell provided superb research and editorial assistance throughout the project. Betsy Aron, Jeffrey Rubin and Stephen Page also offered helpful comments. The articles which follow were first presented at a workshop held at the MIT Center for International Studies, together with related papers on Cuba, Ghana and India [Page and Purnell, 1989].

conflate rural democratisation with equitable rural development policy, confusing process with outcome.¹ To understand why so few states are accountable to most of their rural citizens, we need a more systematic understanding of both the dynamics of rural collective action, and of how rural politics affect national politics and development policy. Some development theorists have begun to integrate rural politics into their explanations of economic policy-making. Bates [1987], for example, shows how the under-representation of food producer interests allows urban-based governments to offer low crop prices, leading in turn to low production.² Nevertheless, much of the rural-urban bias debate tends to extrapolate rural power relations from an analysis of the distribution of the benefits of state intervention in the economy.³ To impute the balance of political power in the countryside from national economic policy outcomes neglects the dynamics of political factors which may well vary geographically, across policy areas or over time.⁴

The following articles explore both the limits and possibilities for rural democratisation in six diverse developing countries. This introductory chapter outlines the central analytical concerns which inform the volume and briefly describes the national case studies. It then examines three broad themes which emerge to varying degrees in all of the cases: the relationship between electoral and non-electoral politics; the concept of rural citizenship versus clientelism; and the articulation of direct and representative democracy.

RURAL COLLECTIVE ACTION AND NATIONAL POLITICAL CHANGE

While much of the literature on the transition to civilian rule emphasises, appropriately, the complex interaction between elite actors at key political turning points, analysis of the *consolidation* of democratic regimes requires the incorporation of a much broader array of political actors and processes. As O'Donnell [1988: 283] put it, 'if political democracy is to be consolidated, democratic practice needs to be spread throughout society, creating a rich fabric of democratic institutions and authorities'. This volume highlights one particularly intractable aspect of the broader problem of political practice and institution-building: the creation and sustenance of social and political institutions which effectively represent both the diverse and majority interests of rural people.

Our ability to grapple with this *problematique* is limited by the gap between most analyses of national and rural politics. The issue of democratisation has generated extensive literatures on both social movements and national politics; however, the convergence between levels of analysis, research questions and methodologies is often *ad hoc* at best. Analytical frameworks appropriate for national regimes devote little attention to the often more obdurate problem of 'subnational' democratic institution-building, and few approaches to national politics incorporate any systematic discussion of social movements.⁵ The contemporary discussion of regime transition in Latin America, for example, tends to concentrate on political elites and national political institutions, focusing

secondarily on urban social movements and rarely at all on rural social movements.⁶

Conversely, the burgeoning literature on Latin American social movements gives little systematic consideration to their interaction with the state. For example, few approaches account for the ways in which openings from above create opportunities for mobilisation from below. Most tend to treat the state as a monolithic 'black box', rather than disaggregating it to see how different agencies and policy currents create both limits and possibilities for democratic change [Fox, 1986; 1989b]. As Grzybowski points out in his contribution, much of this literature focuses on the 'newness' of these movements, and the social processes within them, neglecting to assess their impact, if any, on the broader political and institutional system.⁷

The extensive literature on peasant politics is dominated by a rich and eloquent discussion of violent peasant rebellion and revolution. More recently, researchers have turned towards 'everyday forms of peasant resistance'. Yet the dichotomy in the theoretical literature between grand historical cataclysms and the daily texture of local power relations excludes a great deal of rural political activity, and in particular, the dynamics specific to the many intermediate social and political institutions which link rural and national politics.⁸

The articles which follow do not assume that peasant political behavior is inherently qualitatively different from that of other social groups.⁹ The premise, rather, is that the obstacles faced by the rural poor are such that democratic collective action is often much more difficult in rural than in urban areas. These obstacles are of two types: those internal to rural social and political movements, and those which lie in the interaction between such movements and the state (both local and national).

First, collective action beyond the immediate village level is often constrained by factors largely *internal* to the process of articulating and defending interests: the difficulty of mass assembly, the relative dispersion of communities, the diversity of economic activities, the ecological context, and the daily precariousness of family survival, all of which heighten the many costs inherent in decisions to participate.¹⁰ Collective action *beyond* the community level is both important and difficult, however, because the principal state and private sector forces which constrain opportunities for rural people frequently operate at the regional level. Regional elites often control the electoral machinery, the judicial system, the economic terms of trade, the allocation of credit, and last but certainly not least, the principal means of coercion.¹¹ Rural poor people have shown, however, that under certain circumstances they are willing and able to overcome these constraints, mobilising for democratic participation in the decisions which affect their lives.¹²

The second set of obstacles are primarily *external* to rural movements: establishing respect for basic political freedoms is often more difficult in rural than in urban areas. The forces behind public and private sector coercion are usually more entrenched in rural areas, leading to more intense repression of democratic activity, especially local institution-

building efforts. The usual absence of mass media facilitates the use

the regime failed to create political institutions which

building efforts. The usual absence of mass media facilitates the use of violence with impunity, and limits access to political information. External intervention also frequently takes the form of 'divide and conquer' strategies which combine selective material incentives with threats of coercion. This vulnerability of formal democratic institutions encourages much of rural political activity to remain less than public, and therefore often invisible to outside observers. The on-going threat of external aggression is especially noteworthy during the early stages of national transitions to elected civilian rule, when rural democrats' hopes are raised but they still very much need the active support of urban allies for the creation and defence of rural political space. In the course of such transitions, anti-democratic national political forces usually ally with rural autocrats. The result may even be a sharp *increase* in the use of violence against the rural poor, in spite of an urban-based political opening at the national level.¹³

CASE STUDIES FROM LATIN AMERICA AND THE PHILIPPINES

This collection focuses on how democratic movements and institutions can emerge in national contexts which are often far from democratic. The authors apply institutional approaches to their analyses of the dynamics of political change, with an emphasis on key turning points within and across regimes. These studies deal with Mexican, Colombian, and Nicaraguan experiences of changes in rural political dynamics *within* regimes. The analyses of Brazil, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and the Philippines highlight continuity and change in rural politics *across* regime transitions.

Brazil

Much of the literature on Latin America's democratisation in the 1980s cast Brazil's return to civilian rule as a paradigmatic case of regime transition [O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986]. Analysts later recognized that many had underestimated the continuing influence of authoritarian power structures [O'Donnell, 1988]. Grzybowski analyses the relationship between rural workers' movements and national political change, showing how democratic political subjects emerged both within and outside of the official trade union structure, eventually becoming part of a national political alternative. While he stresses the importance of rural movements in transforming the political identities and practices of the workers themselves, Grzybowski also argues that the democratising potential of these movements is limited by their fragmentation, frequent defensive character, and inadequate links to national political institutions such as trade unions and political parties.

Colombia

Colombia's system of civilian political party rule often leads observers to characterise the regime as democratic [Peeler, 1985]. Nevertheless,

the regime failed to create political institutions which could effectively represent the majority of rural citizens. Zamosc analyses rural political dynamics from three distinct approaches: the growing consolidation of rural civil society; the contradictory relationships between peasants and political elites (as well as armed guerrilla counter-elites); and the drug mafia's growing challenge to the state's monopoly on the means of coercion. Representative rural citizens' organisations have increasingly attempted to hold the state accountable, while both government reformists and guerrilla organisations have attempted to increase their responsiveness to peasant concerns, but all are endangered by ongoing narco-military terrorism.

Mexico

Mexico's agrarian revolutionaries lost their war, official ideology notwithstanding. Peasants fought for land and liberty; what they got was land and the state [Tutino, 1988: 8]. Paré examines the history of rural corporatism in Mexico, focusing on how both the state and the organised peasantry have responded to the erosion of the agricultural economy and the regime's political legitimacy since the 1960s. She argues that the state has lost its traditional capacity to trade material concessions, albeit partial and selective, in exchange for political subordination. The more autonomous and participatory organisations that have emerged over the past two decades are both a cause and a consequence of the state's decreasing ability to control the peasant movement from above. Paré traces the roots of recent peasant demands for democracy and local political and economic autonomy, catalyzed by the hotly-contested 1988 presidential elections.

Bolivia

Rivera challenges many of the underlying assumptions in the democratisation literature, including many in this volume, in her analysis of the *ayllus* (indigenous communities) of northern Potosí. In the volume's only regional case study, Rivera focuses on an area where indigenous forms of social and democratic practice still survive, albeit threatened and marginalised by repeated attempts to impose individualistic or class-based Western conceptions of citizenship. Rivera argues that these political reforms have reproduced the authoritarian and paternalistic domination of the mestizo/creole urban elite over the indigenous rural majority. In her analysis, rural democratisation will require a radical reconceptualisation of citizenship, in accordance with Bolivia's multi-cultural reality.

Nicaragua

The Sandinistas were swept to power by a largely urban-based insurrection, but their victory created the first political opening in Nicaragua's

countryside. Ortega shows that while the rural poor quickly organised and gained official representation within the evolving political system, agrarian policy still gave priority to the state and large private farms until the mid-1980s. His analysis shows how different forms of political pressure, both inside and outside the state, combined to push for a pro-peasant shift in agrarian policy. Ortega integrates the role of local pressures from empowered poor peasants, many of them war veterans, with a focus on the changing balance of forces within the state, stressing the army's push for a more pro-peasant agrarian policy.

Philippines

The rural Philippines has a great deal in common with Latin America. Centuries of Spanish rule, followed by US conquest and tutelage, left the Philippines with perhaps the most polarised land distribution in Asia. The colonial and neocolonial concentration of large landholdings was the foundation for what Anderson [1988] terms 'cacique democracy'. More recently, the Philippines has experienced a pattern of populist and clientelist party competition, dictatorship, and return to civilian rule that is quite reminiscent of Latin American experiences.¹⁴ Lara and Morales' historical analysis of the Philippine peasant movement highlights the repeated efforts by the rural poor to gain some degree of political power, as well as the entrenched structural and institutional obstacles to rural political pluralism. They characterise the post-Marcos period as a 'blocked transition' to political democracy, and examine how peasants have responded to the changing array of political opportunities and constraints with new approaches to coalition-building, organisational forms, and economic initiatives.

COMMON THEMES AND QUESTIONS

In exploring the relationship between national political institutions and rural citizens' effective access to democratic rights in Latin America and the Philippines, the articles in this volume address three distinct but overlapping themes: the relationship between electoral and non-electoral politics; the contested nature of citizenship; and the complex interaction between representative and direct democracy.

Electoral and Non-Electoral Participation in the Countryside

The relationship between social movements, electoral politics, and democratisation is central to almost all of the articles in the volume. The consolidation of fully open, competitive electoral systems is constrained by the inability of many civilian regimes to extend effective democratic rights to the majority of their rural citizens. In Brazil, Mexico, Colombia and the Philippines, mass-based democratic social organisations have repeatedly attempted to participate in electoral politics despite limited political space. In all of these countries, coercion by local elites, often

backed by state security forces, is an important factor in local electoral politics, and national civilian governments have rarely intervened forcefully to defend the rural democratic process.¹⁵ As a result, threats of violence and retribution add to the resilience and 'competitive edge' of elite electoral machines.

National electoral politics are also affected by the entrenched power of rural elites. Brazil's civilian New Republic, for example, gives vastly disproportionate representation to rural states in the federal legislature. The lack of effective majority rule in much of the Brazilian countryside leads to electoral outcomes that give rural elites significant national as well as regional clout [Grzybowski, *this volume*]. In Mexico's highly contested 1988 presidential election, the official results showed a very strong correlation between opposition support and the degree of urbanisation [López et al., 1989: 33]. However, this was more an indicator of access to basic political freedoms and information than of political preferences. The official majority depended on a crucial fraudulent margin from the numerous rural districts which lacked sufficient freedom of assembly, organisation and information to permit independent scrutiny of the electoral process [Paré, *this volume*].¹⁶

Historically, the political exclusion of rural opposition movements by deeply flawed electoral systems has often led peasant movements to emphasise mass direct action and/or armed struggle as the principal route to change. Repression and fraud tend to polarise debates over political strategy into an electoral versus non-electoral dichotomy. None the less, in recent years, various rural opposition movements have developed political strategies that combine electoral participation, direct action and lobbying, along with economic, military, ethnic/nationalist and gender-based approaches. Peasant and rural worker organisations pursue multi-arena strategies in almost all of the countries dealt with here, combining efforts to build representative and autonomous economic interest groups with campaigns to build local bases of electoral support for allied political parties.

Participation in flawed electoral processes poses multiple challenges for rural democratic movements. In countries where vote-buying has long been widespread in rural areas, decades of fraudulent and ritualistic voting patterns are slowly and unevenly giving way, where alternatives appear increasingly viable, to more active and autonomous participation. Grzybowski, Lara and Morales, Paré, and Zamosc each argue this case in their contributions. But as Paré notes, more democratic social movements are not immune from the dominant political culture, and electoral pressures may create and exacerbate conflicts between party-linked and independent grassroots organisations. Lara and Morales note the Philippine opposition's attempts to weaken the traditionally clientelistic political culture through electoral campaigns that emphasised 'issue-oriented' politics and grassroots education. In general, however, violence and bribery, as well as enduring patterns of clientelism and limited access to information, limit the extent to which mass-based social and economic protest translate into party identifications and issue-based

voting behaviour, much to the frustration of party organisers trying to build on successful social mobilisation.

Nominally pluralist electoral systems do not necessarily guarantee effective rural access to political rights. Fully free and fair electoral systems lead, by definition, to uncertain outcomes [Przeworski, 1985]. Even in open systems, the rural poor may not necessarily be able to offer their own political alternative, but their numbers offer an incentive to urban political parties to favour land reform [Lehmann, 1974]. Entrenched elites therefore correctly perceive genuine rural political competition as a threat to highly unequal land tenure systems. Pluralist electoral systems combined with highly polarised social structures, as in Brazil, Colombia and the Philippines, therefore turn out to be among the most violent. In contrast, a history of land reform gives Bolivia's competitive electoral system a much less polarised social foundation.¹⁷

Toward Rural Citizenship

The process of rural democratisation involves a transition from clientelism to shared ideas of citizenship as the dominant principle regulating access to public services. Citizenship entails a set of non-contingent, generalised political rights, while clientelism refers to the inherently selective and contingent distribution of resources and power based on ties of personal and political loyalty [Schmidt, et al., 1977]. For the rural poor, such a transition involves transcending the status of 'followers', in which they are subordinated to their ostensible allies and vulnerable to external manipulation. Effective citizenship requires the capacity to participate autonomously in politics, and to take propositional action which actually shapes state decisions and enforces state accountability. The issue of clientelism versus citizenship often hinges on the balance of power within alliances between grassroots social movements, urban-based intellectuals and workers, and national political parties. The history of most such alliances, whether electoral or revolutionary, indicates that the rural poor should not expect their interests to be consistently represented by national elites.¹⁸ Few governments treat the basic material needs of the rural poor as fundamental citizenship rights.¹⁹ Even agrarian revolutionary legacies do not guarantee effective state commitments to the rural poor. In both Mexico and Nicaragua, for example, post-revolutionary state-building for years took priority over rural redistribution, until pressure from both below and within the ruling parties eventually led to the extensive implementation of pro-peasant agrarian reforms [Paré; Ortega, this volume].

The promotion of the self-organisation of the rural poor by religious activists and non-governmental development organisations had political consequences of national importance in many developing countries, notably Brazil, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, and the Philippines. The emphasis of these organisations on changing political attitudes and values is crucial to any democratic project.²⁰ It should be noted, however, that the democratising impact of religious and development organisations is more

often assumed than demonstrated. Rivera [this volume] argues that 'progressive' NGOs have imposed Western concepts of citizenship and participation on Bolivia's *ayllus*, undermined indigenous forms of political organisation and democratic practice, and consequently reproduced paternalistic and authoritarian patterns of domination. Conventional liberal, populist and socialist conceptions of political and economic rights tend to exclude women and indigenous communities, underestimating the importance and resilience of the ideas and structures which oppress them.²¹ Large numbers of rural people will continue to be excluded from citizenship rights until gender and ethnicity-based forms of domination, internalised as well as externally imposed, are challenged more consistently.

Distinguishing between clientelism and citizenship is perhaps most difficult in cases where the state plays a dominant role in structuring the system of interest representation. This is most often the case in single or dominant party systems, but even states with pluralist party systems play highly interventionist roles in rural politics, attempting to structure the weave of the rural social fabric by regulating property rights, channeling investment and subsidy flows, and defining a narrow range of legitimate channels for participation. Social science still has difficulty measuring degrees of representation in 'official' interest groups. In this kind of institutional environment, the transition from clientelism to citizenship may begin when the rural poor manage to carve out their own autonomous spaces, as they have within some otherwise state-controlled, 'transmission belt' type organisations. The articles on Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Nicaragua deal with this phenomenon. The creation of 'grey areas' of semi-representative political space within official organisations is quite common but little understood.²² Such organisations are often treated as 'black boxes', with little attention to shifts in the balance of power which may turn them from organs of control into more representative institutions.

The subjective character of citizenship raises the question of how rights are defined through political conflict. For citizenship rights to be effective, however they are defined, they must be generalised and guaranteed. This volume begins to explore the question of how and under what conditions the rural poor gain access to universal rights, rather than politically conditioned social and economic 'rewards'.

The [Dis]articulation of Representative and Direct Democracy

It is difficult to transcend the conventional dichotomy between electoral and non-electoral political participation, or to deepen our understanding of citizenship, without addressing the question of the relationship between representative and direct democracy. The two forms are potentially complementary and mutually reinforcing. Representative forms are often seen as more appropriate for political institutions, and direct democracy more viable for social entities [Bobbio, 1987: 43-62].²³ Most of the volume's contributors conclude that the broadening and

deepening of democratic social organisations may be essential for furthering political democracy in political systems which are not fully free and fair. Conversely, the consolidation of participatory democracy on any scale is certainly difficult in the absence of representative processes of governance that defend basic political freedoms.

In the countryside in most developing countries, the limits and fragility of the electoral process mean that representative, accountable political parties would be necessary but not sufficient to further the functioning of representative democracy. In polarised environments, a dense web of other associative civic institutions is also needed to defend the representative political process and to hold development bureaucrats accountable. The contribution of rural civil society to democratisation depends on civic associations which include democratic interest groups, self-help organisations, religious congregations, ethnic associations, and community-oriented economic enterprises. This theme appears in all the contributions to this volume.

The nature of the institutions most critical to rural democratisation depends on, among other factors, the identity and 'location' of the principal anti-democratic forces. In much of rural Latin America, for example, regional elites, embedded in both the state and the private sector, constitute the major obstacle (Fox, 1986).²⁴ As a result, regional organisations are often likely to be the most effective counterweights to elite domination, potentially increasing peasant bargaining power while retaining autonomy and accountable leadership (Huizer, 1985: 198-9). Either local or national peasant groups could arguably do the same, but local groups are easily isolated by their enemies, while national organisations are usually democratic only in so far as they are made up of representative regional building-blocks.

The contributors to this volume focus much more on the problems of limited representative democracy than on the challenge of democratising the organisations of rural civil society. More generally, analysts of social movements often fail to document their frequent assertions that the organisations they describe are indeed democratic. Representative democratic processes are not limited to the state; they are critical to the democratisation of large membership organisations as well. Regional peasant organisations may have the greatest potential to link direct and representative forms of democracy.²⁵ In this context, a regional organisation can be defined as one that brings together too many communities to be run by direct democracy alone; face-to-face forms of accountability and decision-making are therefore insufficient, requiring some degree of delegation of authority. Even if formal electoral processes work, however, internal democracy remains quite vulnerable because the leadership is often the only link among the many dispersed and diverse member communities. Horizontal linkages among member communities are therefore crucial for offsetting the concentration of power in the regional leadership (Fox and Hernández, 1989).²⁶

The national and local levels of analysis can be linked by mapping the rural political arena in terms of the uneven presence of relatively demo-

cratic counterweights. Analysts across the political spectrum agree that democracy depends on a plurality of independent social and political organisations, empowering citizens *vis-à-vis* the state and decentralising bargaining power among a range of social forces. The healthy sustenance of these building blocks depends in turn on their own internal power relations. Such organisations are most likely to be kept 'on track' by mutually reinforcing combinations of representative and direct democratic processes, keeping counterweights democratic with their own internal counterweights.

CONCLUSIONS

To what degree does the long-term consolidation of stable democratic rule in developing countries, particularly in Latin America, depend on overcoming the obstacles specific to the democratisation of the countryside?²⁷ The answer varies widely across cases and depends on assumptions about the foundations and nature of democracy itself. These concluding remarks focus on some of the many challenges which remain.

Rural democratisation in developing countries is likely to be driven primarily by a shift in the balance of forces within society, but since states regulate rights, such a process must also be expressed in the distribution of power *vis-à-vis* the state. States may well be occasionally responsive to rural protest movements, which may use a broad repertoire of actions to resist or veto state actions, but official responsiveness does not necessarily imply democratisation.²⁸ For example, a state may respond to the protests of those displaced by a dam project with some form of compensation. If the movements gain sufficient strength, perhaps the state might respond by slowing or even suspending the project. But democratisation implies that citizens have the right, as well as the power, to participate in the policy process. In a democracy, those to be displaced could potentially intervene beforehand in the debate over *whether* they should be displaced, as well as over who should benefit from water and energy policy more generally. Are these differences of degree or kind, and how do we develop better indicators for understanding such distinctions?

Shifts toward effective majority rule in developing countries are likely to be highly uneven, varying widely across regions and policy arenas. How do we 'unpack' states and rural societies, to begin to capture the diversity of their interactions? Rural civil societies in even the smaller countries under study here vary widely in their degrees of 'density', their social and institutional 'thickness', and are often riven with cross-cutting cleavages. No single type of social organisation or political structure is likely to be able to represent the diversity of interests and identities among the rural poor.

Our capacity for generalisation and cross-national comparison remains extremely limited. We still lack adequate analytical tools for understanding changing 'degrees' of democratisation in both state and society. It remains useful, however, to understand the process of rural democratisation in the most general sense as an institutionalised shift in the balance of

power, through a wide range of possible forms, towards effective majority rule combined with respect for minority and individual rights. This

power, through a wide range of possible forms, towards effective majority rule combined with respect for minority and individual rights. This approach highlights many of the reasons why the transition to multi-party civilian rule does not necessarily lead to the consolidation of democratic governance, particularly for rural citizens. This volume suggests that the consolidation of democracy in developing countries depends on the rural poor's capacity to gain both power and legitimacy in national politics.

NOTES

1. For example, about 65 per cent of the population of the Philippines is rural, and 70 per cent of the rural population is landless. Is the government of the Philippines undemocratic because it has not carried out land reform, or has it failed to carry out land reform because it is undemocratic?
2. Lipton [1977] set many of the terms of debate over rural versus urban bias in the development process, followed up by the thoughtful discussions in Harriss and Moore [1984]. See Kitching [1982] and Moore [1984a] for historical overviews of the debate. Potter and Unwin [1989] offer geographers' perspectives.
3. For exceptional African discussions, in addition to Bates [1981], see also Bratton [1987] and Mikell [1989]. Huizer's [1985] synthesis of the Latin American experience and Nolan and White's [1984] analysis of China's ambiguous record are also relevant. Key related works on South Asia include Herring [1983]; Kohli [1986] and Moore [1985]. Much of the discussion about the nature and causes of inequality, however, both within the countryside and in relation to the urban sector, assumes rather than analyses the dynamics of rural politics. See also Lipton [1989] for a recent exploration.
4. While the most important power imbalances often prevent key political issues from ever reaching the agenda and becoming points of overt contention [Lukes, 1974; Moore, 1984b], the study of observable conflict over state intervention in the countryside nevertheless can contribute significantly to our understanding of the determinants of state action.
5. The best studies of agrarian reform come closest to synthesising rural, regional and national politics. For useful references from the Latin American experience, see, among others, Cleaves and Scurrah [1980]; de Janvry [1981]; Lehmann [1974]; Petras and LaPorte [1971]; Rivera [1987]; Sanderson [1981] and Zamosc [1986]. See also note 3.
6. See, for example, Diamond, Linz and Lipset [1989]; O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead [1986]; Baloyra [1987]; Drake and Silva [1986]; Malloy and Seligson [1987]; Pecler [1985]; and Stepan [1989]. Calderón and dos Santos [1987] is a partial exception.
7. Boschi [1984] offers one of the most incisive English-language formulations of the analytical problem of the role of social movements and national democratic transitions. The Brazilian discussion is perhaps the most sophisticated in Latin America [Reis and O'Donnell, 1988]. In addition, see Fickstein [1989] for an important collection on Latin American social movements in English. Slater [1985] is also relevant. Gledhill [1988] offers one of the most thoughtful discussions of Latin American agrarian movements in relation to the European discussion of 'new social movements'.
8. Barrington Moore [1967] made the provocative and still-controversial argument that rural class actors often played determinative roles in shaping national development, even for today's industrial societies. The research which follows in this tradition, however, tends to focus either on the role of agrarian politics in specifically European contexts [Stephens, 1987], or on the role of peasants in revolutionary (and therefore exceptional) transitions in developing countries. Wolf [1969] and Walton [1984] are among the few to integrate multiple levels of analysis. Other theoretically significant works include: Popkin [1979]; Paige [1975]; Skocpol [1979, 1982]; Scott [1976]; Weller and Guggenheim [1982], and Tilly [1974]. The key works in the wave of research on 'everyday forms of resistance,' which has yet to 'take off' in Latin American studies, are

- Scott, [1986]; Scott and Kerkvliet [1986] and Colburn [1990]. Hart [1990] goes further, building in both state and gender.
9. Such approaches include, for example, well-known ideas about 'resistance to change', 'the limited good', predispositions to millenarianism, charismatic or authoritarian leadership, and inherently individualistic 'petty-bourgeois' aspirations for landownership. Cultural and institutional contexts shape the political behaviour of peasants as they do of all social groups. One can speak, for example, of political values that are unique to indigenous peasants, where traditional communitarian governance structures have survived [Rivera; *Paré; this volume*].
 10. Note that this discussion does not address the more strictly anthropological issues of collective action *within* rural communities, where kinship and face-to-face power relations play much more important roles. The premise here is that political participation *within* individual villages is necessary but far from sufficient to affect power relations *vis-à-vis* the state. For relevant discussions of rural collective action problems, in addition to references on peasant revolution cited above, see: Atwood and Baviskar [1987]; Cumings [1981]; Landsberger and Hewitt [1970]; Huizer [1985]; Olson [1986]; Tendler [1983]; Tilly [1974; 1978]; and Wade [1988]. Ironically, Olson's neoclassical discussion of the collective action problems of smallholders converges with Marx's well-known observation that their mode of production combined with poor means of communication and poverty, 'isolates them from one another instead of bringing them into mutual intercourse In so far as there is merely a local interconnection among these small peasants, and the identity of their interests begets no unity, no national union and no political organisation, they ... cannot represent themselves' [from 'The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte', in Shanin, [1987: 332].
 11. While the traditional operation of local power structures is well understood, their extraordinary capacity to change and adapt to 'modernization' has received less attention. There is a significant literature on local/regional 'bossism,' but it is rarely integrated into the study of contemporary national politics. Migdal [1988] is an important exception, framing the issue in terms of 'state weakness'. For works which integrate levels of analysis in Latin American cases, see, among others, Bartra [1975]; Fox [1986; 1989b]; Fox and Gordillo [1989]; Fox and Hernández [1989]; Gordillo [1979; 1988]; Kern [1973]; Huizer [1985]; Roniger [1987].
 12. A classic article by Shanin [1987] offers a concise typology of peasant political action: 'autonomous class action', externally 'guided political action', and 'amorphous political action' (either violent or passive).
 13. In the cases of civilian governments analysed in this volume, this challenge is especially pronounced in Colombia, Brazil, and the Philippines, where the use of coercion against the rural poor and their allies has increased since the early 1980s. [Amnesty International, 1988a; 1988b; 1988c; Zamosc; Grybowski; Lara and Morales; *this volume*]. State-sanctioned rural political violence is also a serious problem in Mexico, although measuring increases in incidence (as distinct from reporting) in the course of the evolution of the regime is difficult [Amnesty International, 1986; Fox, 1986; *Paré, this volume*]. In Nicaragua, the principal source of political violence against the rural poor is the US-backed counter-revolutionary army [Americas Watch, 1986 (and other annual reports); Ortega, *this volume*].
 14. We still lack a systematic comparison of rural power relations in the Philippines and Latin America. Cumings' [1989] analysis of South Korea is the most sophisticated Asian political comparison with Latin America. Most cross-regional comparative research has focused on industrial policy.
 15. In the Philippines, the peasant-based guerrilla army reportedly intervened in several areas to defend ballot boxes against landlord/army violence, facilitating the election of at least two of the most pro-land reform congressional legislators in 1987 [field interviews, 1987]. It should be noted that this coordination between reform and revolutionary forces was unusual, since most of the guerrilla forces ignored the elections. In contrast, government armed forces played the opposite role in the 1984 Nicaraguan elections, defending rural voters from counter-revolutionary terrorist attacks.
 16. While coercion was clearly a factor in some areas, official control over the mass media

- was probably most important, particularly television and radio. The viability of the electoral opposition was so new and unforeseen that blocking access to this information was an important factor in many rural citizens' political decisions (that is, whether and how to mobilise, to vote or to contest fraud). One must also acknowledge the very limited capacity of Mexican opposition parties to reach rural citizens, part of a more general gap between the development of civil society and the lagging party system [Fox, 1989a; Paré, *this volume*].
17. Although the Bolivian state is responsible for perhaps the least state coercion of any of the cases examined here, it still manages to deny effective political rights to significant numbers of indigenous people through cultural domination [Rivera, *this volume*].
 18. For partial answers to the question of 'who gets what' in such alliances, see de Janvry's [1981] overview of the Latin American land reform experience and Deere's [1984] detailed comparison of socialist land reforms. Kohli's [1986] analysis of the electoral and institutional constraints on elected leftist state governments in India is instructive, as is Herring and Edwards' [1983] analysis of the conditions underlying an exceptional Indian state employment programme for the landless. For an analysis of the classic Leninist conception of such alliances, see Kingston-Mann [1985]. One of the best treatments of alliances between poor and middle peasants with urban-based revolutionaries is Wolf [1969].
 19. The broadest, most universal access to certain key citizens' rights in Latin America is the case of the comprehensive social welfare rights extended to the Cuban rural population [Stubbs, 1989a, 1989b]. Cuban peasants can actually retire with adequate pensions, for example. The Cuban experience is based on high degrees of socialisation of property, political consensus, and foreign economic support that are unlikely to be reproduced, however. Orthodox socialist assumptions about necessary trade-offs between political and socio-economic rights are now widely questioned in Latin America.
 20. It remains an open question whether rural poor people 'learn' that they have rights through the *concientización* approach [Fals Borda, 1985], or whether institutionally-based outsiders simply reduce perceived risks and create relatively free spaces that did not exist before.
 21. Rural women, for example, have been systematically excluded from access to land under most Latin American agrarian reforms, not to mention the right to autonomous political participation [Deere and León, 1987].
 22. See also Fox and Gordillo [1989] on Mexico, and Purnell [1990] on Peru. The internal dynamics of rural mass organisations in communist regimes are much less well-understood. On China, see Nolan and White [1984], and Zweig [1989], among others. Stubbs [1989b] offers an instructive analysis of Cuban rural politics.
 23. Bobbio suggests that 'democratic progress' can be measured not 'by the number of people who have the right to vote, but the number of contexts outside politics where the right to vote is exercised' [1987: 56]. His argument weakens when he assumes that democracy necessarily proceeds from the political to the social sphere, rather than in a more interaction process [1987: 54].
 24. In El Salvador and Guatemala, in contrast, the national armed forces are clearly the principal obstacle.
 25. This must be highly qualified where there are deep cultural cleavages between regional and local leaders, as Rivera [*this volume*] points out in her analysis of the interaction between indigenous community governance structures and mestizo-dominated regional and national peasant unions in Bolivia.
 26. More generally, an organisation's structure and goals condition the extent to which it will effectively represent the interests of the rural poor. See Attwood and Baviskar [1987]; Hirschman [1984]; Leonard and Marshall [1982]; and Tendler [1983] for important contributions to the institutional political economy of rural membership organisations. Tendler's analysis of socio-economic 'spillover effects' and public goods is especially useful, showing how not-very-democratic leaders can act in broadly representative ways. One could frame many of the issues raised in this essay in terms of 'institutional spillover effects', to the degree that the increased accountability of state and social organisations to the rural poor can be considered a public good. When

- citizenship makes inroads against clientelism, it becomes difficult to limit access to the benefits of accountability.
27. Stable *democratic* rule must be distinguished from political stability more generally. Political stability and democratisation are not necessarily compatible, at least in the short run. If 'more democracy' in a polarised countryside means that the state becomes more accountable to the rural poor than to entrenched elites, then conflict is certainly likely. Yet such an alliance between the state and the rural poor can lay the foundation for political stability (although not necessarily accountability) in the long term, as in the classic case of Mexico's dramatic land reform of the 1930s [Paré, *this volume*]. Some analysts see rural political stability in developing countries as requiring a minimally equitable distribution of land, but minimise the importance of autonomous, representative organisations of the rural poor or the rupture of the state's alliance with rural elites for the prospects of actually carrying out such reforms effectively [Huntington, 1968; Prosterman and Reidinger, 1987].
 28. Jeffrey Rubin's comments highlighted this distinction [Page and Purnell, 1989].

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Rural Workers' Movements and Democratisation in Brazil

by Cândido Grzybowski*

This article analyses how rural workers constitute themselves as collective political subjects through their participation in social movements. Their role in Brazil's ongoing political transition is evaluated in the context of the authoritarian rural power structures still entrenched in the political system. Rural social movements contribute to democratisation in two respects: as counterweights to authoritarian agrarian elites and the state at the local and regional levels, and as vehicles for transforming and strengthening the political identities of rural workers themselves. Their political capacity is currently limited, however, by their lack of strong ties to intermediate institutions such as unions and political parties.

The movement developed, arose out of its own necessity. Maybe we were learning through practice, in day to day life. We have stumbled a lot in this struggle, and we go on learning. Many times people are obliged to do extra work and have to learn to struggle within their own circumstances, from the very situation in which they live. We had to be creative. What's interesting is that this was something created out of our own heads, all of us together. We discovered that this struggle was an alternative, the only alternative that we had in order to resist.

Chico Mendes¹
Leader of the Rubber Tappers' Movement
assassinated 22 December 1988

INTRODUCTION

This article analyses the relationship between rural workers'² movements, entrenched authoritarian power structures, and the political transition in Brazil. While Brazilian rural movements are extremely diverse, the focus here is on their common features and dynamics, and particularly on the new forms of participation and organisation employed by rural workers to

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PARTICIPATORY DEVELOPMENT: SOME PERSPECTIVES FROM GRASS-ROOTS EXPERIENCES

*Dharam Ghai**

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Introduction

In recent years, especially since the early 1970s, there has been an increasing interest in participatory approaches to development.¹ This interest is manifested at both the national and the international level and appears to be shared by individuals and institutions of widely divergent ideologies and backgrounds. At the international level, most multilateral and bilateral agencies have recognized the importance of participation both as a means and as an objective of development. Likewise, national plans in many countries pay a great deal of attention to the need for a participatory pattern of development. However, as tends to happen in situations of this sort, the growing consensus owes much to certain ambiguities in the concept of participation. Different authors and organizations give different interpretations to this concept. Often, these differences are a reflection of differences concerning the concept of development itself.

The notion of participation may be examined from different levels and perspectives. One distinction relates to participation in the public domain, the workplace and at home. The first aspect refers to all matters discussed and decided in public institutions—local organizations, national Governments, parliaments, parties etc. The

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second concerns factories, offices, plantations, farms and other workplaces. The third dimension refers to family relations and work at home. The latter is largely neglected in most discussions on participation. Yet, in relation to the time spent in different places, "home democracy" is at least as important as "work democracy" and is a crucial determinant of the welfare of some members of the family, especially the women and children.

A different but slightly overlapping distinction concerns participation at the local, national and international levels. Although there has been a good deal of discussion of participation promotion at the local and national levels, much less attention has been given to the implications of a participatory approach at the global level.² In view of the linkages and interrelationships between developments at these different levels, a satisfactory analysis of participation should be based on a recognition of interdependence among the different levels of aggregation. This is, however, a complex and daunting undertaking. This article has a more limited and modest purpose: to shed some light on the participatory approach to development through a study of selected grass-roots initiatives in a few Asian and African countries. This is done in the belief that these experiences yield fresh and exciting perspectives on the meaning and processes of development and contain within them elements of a self-reliant, egalitarian and participatory approach to development. They, therefore, offer a rich field from which to draw lessons with a view to strengthening the quality of development efforts in rich and poor countries alike.

In the light of the preceding remarks, the paper begins with a discussion of some alternative concepts of development and participation. This is followed by a brief description of nine grass-roots initiatives whose experiences are used subsequently to illustrate some aspects of participatory approaches to development. The paper then examines the themes of participatory processes and institutional framework, and of self-reliance and the role of outside assistance. There is then an analysis of these initiatives as economic enterprises, agencies of social reform and schools for democracy. The concluding section focuses on their strengths and limitations as alternative development models. The gender issues are discussed in various sections of the paper.

Alternative concepts of development and participation

The notion of development is an ambiguous one and is subject to different interpretations.³ We may distinguish three interpretations. First, development is often treated synonymously with economic growth and is thus interpreted to mean increases in labour productivity, declining share of agriculture in total output, technological progress, and industrialization with the consequent shift of population to urban areas. While these structural changes are generally

associated with economic growth, equating them with development shifts the focus to economic aggregates and away from living standards and human dimensions.

The second interpretation of development seeks to remedy this deficiency by concentrating on such indices of living standards as poverty, income distribution, nutrition, infant mortality, life expectancy, literacy, education, access to employment, housing, water supply and similar amenities. This way of looking at development brings it closer to the common-sense view and endows it with greater human reality. Nevertheless, the emphasis continues to be on economic and social indicators and individual human being and social groups tend to be off-stage passively supplied with goods, services and materials.

In contrast, the third view of development puts the spotlight on human potential and capabilities in the context of relations with other social groups. According to this view, development is seen in such terms as greater understanding of social, economic and political processes, enhanced competence to analyze and solve problems of day-to-day living, expansion of manual skills and greater control over economic resources, restoration of human dignity and self-respect, and interaction with other social groups on a basis of mutual respect and equality. This notion of development does not neglect material deprivation and poverty but the focus shifts to realization of human potential expressed in such terms as human dignity, self-respect, social emancipation, and enhancement of moral, intellectual and technical capabilities.⁴

The three ways of looking at development are not, of course, mutually exclusive. Indeed, the optimal pattern of development should embody elements of all three: the growth of human capabilities and potential must be accompanied by progressive reduction of material deprivation and social inequalities which, in turn, should flow from structural change and modernization of the economy. But in practice, these aspects of development seldom evolve in a harmonious relationship and typically emphasis on one or the other would have different implications for organization of economic activities, patterns of investment and design of programmes and projects.

As with development, the concept of participation is also riddled with ambiguities. Once again, it may be useful to distinguish between three different interpretations. One common usage of the term refers to "mobilization" of people to undertake social and economic development projects. Typically, the projects are conceived and designed from above and the people are "mobilized" to implement them. Their participation thus consists of their contribution of labour and materials, either free or paid for by the authorities. The projects, which generally tend to be of an infrastructural nature, are meant to benefit the rural poor. But in many cases the benefit may accrue

mainly in the form of employment generated during the construction phase. The distribution of the benefits from the assets and facilities created would depend upon a variety of factors such as the patterns of ownership of productive resources, the distribution of political power among social groups and the nature of the project. At their best, such projects may result in a widespread diffusion of benefits both in the construction and the subsequent phase. At worst, "participation" may result in free provision of labour and materials by the poor to create facilities that benefit primarily the affluent groups.

The second interpretation equates participation with decentralization in governmental machinery or in related organizations. Resources and decision-making powers may be transferred to lower level organs, such as local officials, elected bodies at the village or county level or local project committees.³ While this may make possible local-level decisions on the choice, design and implementation of development activities, there is no presumption that this need imply any meaningful participation by the rural or urban masses. Indeed, the distribution of political and economic power at local levels in many countries is such that decentralization may well result in allocation of resources and choice of development activities that are less beneficial to the poor than when such decisions are taken at the central level.

The third view of participation regards it as a process of empowerment of the deprived and the excluded (Gran, 1983; Oakley, 1987; Oakley and Marsden, 1984). This view is based on the recognition of differences in political and economic power among different social groups and classes. Participation is interpreted to imply a strengthening of the power of the deprived masses. Its three main elements have been defined as "the sharing of power and scarce resources, deliberate efforts by social groups to control their own destinies and improve their living conditions, and opening up of opportunities from below" (Dillon and Steifel, 1987). Participation in this sense necessitates the creation of organizations of the poor which are democratic, independent and self-reliant (Advisory Committee on Rural Development, 1979; International Labour Organisation, 1976).

One facet of empowerment is thus the pooling of resources to achieve collective strength and countervailing power. Another is the enhancement of manual and technical skills, planning and managerial competence and analytical and reflective abilities of the people. It is at this point that the concept of participation as empowerment comes close to the notion of development as fulfilment of human potentials and capabilities. This view of participation and development may best be illustrated through the experience of some grass-roots initiatives, to which we now turn.

Some grass-roots participatory initiatives

In recent years, there has been a huge expansion of small-scale development projects focusing on the rural and the urban poor and involving some sort of group action (Commission on the Churches' Participation in Development, 1981; Economic Commission for Latin America, 1973; Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 1979; Hirschman, 1984; United Nations, 1981; Wasserstrom, 1985; World Health Organization, 1982). These projects show a great deal of variation with respect to activities, organizational framework, financing arrangements, the sponsoring agencies, the role of outside assistance and the nature and extent of popular participation. They range from outstanding to disastrous judged by the criterion of participation as empowerment of the people. In this section we give a brief description of nine grass-roots experiences which, while displaying a great deal of diversity in respect of some aspects mentioned above, nevertheless share some characteristics as participatory initiatives. The nine initiatives considered here are the Grameen Bank (GB), the Small Farmers' Development Project (SFDP), the Self-employed Women's Association (SEWA), the Working Women's Forum (WWF), Sarilakas, Participatory Institute for Development Alternatives (PIDA), *Se servir de la saison sèche en savane et au Sahel* (Six-S), the Organization of Rural Associations for Progress (ORAP) and Action pour le développement rural intégré (ADRI).

Although they have several points in common, it is convenient to group them into four categories in accordance with their central characteristics. The first category, comprising GB and SFDP, illustrates innovative programmes to extend credit to the rural poor. SEWA and WWF represent pioneering efforts to organize poor women working in urban slums as vendors, home-based workers and casual labourers into trade-union type associations. The third category, illustrated by Sarilakas and PIDA, comprises initiatives to promote peasant groups and rural workers' organizations to struggle for their rights and to undertake collective initiatives to appropriate a larger share of the surplus generated by their economic activities. The fourth category, comprising Six-S, ORAP and ADRI, represents efforts to promote social and economic development through mobilization and pooling of labour and other resources, drawing inspiration from traditional self-help and mutual aid groups.

PROMOTING PARTICIPATION THROUGH CREDIT PROGRAMMES

The Grameen Bank was started in 1976 by a professor of economics at Chittagong University in Thailand as an experiment to provide credit to poor landless men and women in rural areas (Fuglesang and Chandler, 1986; Chai, 1984a; Hossain, 1984; Yunus,

1982). Initially supported by funds from some commercial and nationalized banks, it became an independent bank in 1983. At present, the Government has 25 per cent of the initial paid-up share of the capital with the remaining 75 per cent being held by borrowers of the bank. The GB, has received funds from a number of donor agencies, including the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the Asian Development Bank and the Ford Foundation. Membership is restricted to the poor, defined by a net-worth criterion.

Members organize themselves into groups of five persons and 10 such groups constitute a circle. The loans, which are quite modest in size, are given for a one-year period and the principal is repaid in weekly instalments over this period. The banking operations take place in weekly meetings held in the locality of the groups. The loans are granted for a wide range of economic activities such as trading, transport, processing, handicraft, cattle raising and simple manufacturing. There are separate groups for men and women, with the latter now accounting for two thirds of the total. The bank has experienced a rapid expansion in its activities, with the number of members increasing from fewer than 15,000 in 1980 to nearly 250,000 in 1988. The members have established a variety of social programmes such as family planning, schools, nutrition, sports and music, and have sought to promote social reforms.

The SFDP in Nepal is also a credit programme for the rural poor but, unlike the GB, it extends loans to small and marginal farmers (Agricultural Projects Services Centre, 1979; Ghai, 1984b; Ghai and others, 1984; Mosley and Prasad Dahal, 1987; Rokaya, 1983). It evolved from a pilot project launched in 1975 by the Agricultural Development Bank of Nepal (ADB/N) with financial and technical support from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The basic objectives of the project were to increase the incomes and standard of living of the rural poor, promote participation and self-reliance and adapt local delivery mechanisms of government agencies to the needs of the rural poor. The approach adopted was to encourage the rural poor to organize themselves in small groups with the assistance of a group organizer to receive credit for individual and group activities. The credit was provided on a group guarantee basis without any collateral.

Membership has expanded from about 440 in 1976 to about 25,000 in 1984 and perhaps 50,000 in 1988. It has attracted funds from a number of bilateral and multilateral sources. The programme comprises a wide range of economic, social and community activities, which are supported by an expanding training component. Economic activities include cultivation, livestock, horticulture, irrigation, cottage and rural industries and marketing. Social activities comprise health, education, family planning, maternal welfare, child

care and sanitation. Community projects comprise construction of roads, bridges, schools, meeting halls, water facilities, irrigation, biogas and social forestry. The bulk of economic activities are undertaken on an individual basis with, however, growing importance of group ownership and management in cottage industries, orchards and irrigation.

ORGANIZING SELF-EMPLOYED POOR WOMEN IN URBAN SLUMS

SEWA represents a pioneering effort to organize self-employed poor women in urban slums in Gujerat, India, into a trade-union type organization (Self-employed Women's Association, 1984). Until they formed a trade union in 1972, self-employed women were not recognized as workers by legislation or by society. Thus, their struggle related as much to their desire for recognition as legitimate workers as to improvements in income and working conditions. The initiative in forming SEWA was taken by an experienced woman trade unionist who had previously worked with a long-established textile labour association. Its membership is drawn from three categories of women workers: petty vendors and hawkers, home-based producers, and providers of casual labour and services. Started primarily as a movement for poor urban women, it has now spread to include women agricultural labourers and home-based workers in rural areas.

As a trade union for self-employed women, SEWA has worked to secure higher wages for casual workers, for those on contract work such as home-based workers and for suppliers of services such as cleaning and laundering. There has been a gradual extension to such workers of the protection and benefits provided by labour legislation to organized workers in modern enterprises. It has also instituted a credit scheme for vendors, hawkers and home-based workers to finance working capital and to purchase raw materials and tools. Credit was originally arranged through nationalized commercial banks but soon the women decided to form their own savings and credit co-operative. The co-operative has expanded rapidly in terms of shareholders, deposits and loans.

Further benefits have accrued to vendors, craftswomen and home-based workers through the formation of producers' co-operatives for vegetable and fruit vendors, bamboo workers, hand-block printers, spinning-wheel and handloom operators and dairy workers. The economic capacity of the members has also been enhanced by the provision of training courses in a wide range of skills such as bamboo work, block printing, plumbing, carpentry, radio repairs, simple accounting and management. Finally, SEWA has sought to solve some of the urgent social problems of its members through a maternal protection scheme, widow's benefits, child care and training of midwives.

The Working Women's Forum was started in 1978 at the

initiative of a woman activist with considerable previous experience in social and political work. It operates in the southern Indian States of Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka (Arunachalam, 1983; Azad, 1985; Chambers, 1985; Chen, 1982). Its membership of nearly 50,000 is drawn largely from poor urban women but there is also increasing representation from rural areas. It covers similar occupational groups as SEWA such as street hawkers, craft producers, home-based workers, and fisherwomen and dairy workers in rural areas. It also arranges loans for members from the commercial banks and increasingly from the Working Women's Co-operative Society, the savings and credit scheme set up by the members themselves. The repayment rates are above 95 per cent.

The WWF has also initiated a wide range of training schemes. It has organized extensive family planning and public health programmes, group insurance schemes, night schools for working children, campaigns against caste prejudice and discrimination, petty harassment and bureaucratic abuse suffered by its members, and educational sessions on workers' rights and minimum wages.

PROMOTING PEASANT GROUPS AND ORGANIZATIONS OF RURAL WORKERS

Sarilakas in the Philippines evolved out of an attempt by the Rural Workers' Office, Ministry of Labour, to organize rural workers. The initial attempts to promote rural workers' organizations suffered a series of setbacks owing to inadequate preparation, faulty approach and excessive economic expectations engendered by the "facilitators" (Rahman, 1983). With assistance from the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and exposure of the organizers to participatory initiatives in Sri Lanka, India and Bangladesh, the project adopted a different approach, with emphasis on group discussions and analysis of their socio-economic situation, reflection on the sources of their impoverishment and identification of feasible initiatives in a self-reliant framework. The new approach proved more successful in establishing durable participatory organizations in several villages resulting in a series of different initiatives such as the institution of collective savings schemes for purchase of inputs by marginal farmers, joint ownership and operation of agricultural machinery and rice mills, rehabilitation of irrigation facilities, enforcement of legislation on change from sharecropping tenancy to fixed-rent liability, protection of the fishing rights of small fishermen, land rights of sugar-cane growers etc.

PIDA in Sri Lanka was established in 1980 as a non-governmental organization for the promotion of grass-roots participatory groups. It is an action research collective with a membership of 15 or so animators working in 40 villages in various rural locations (Tilakaratna, 1985). It grew out of a UNDP-sponsored rural action

research and training project initiated in 1978. Its main objective is to promote participatory and self-reliant organizations of the rural poor which in turn can become the main vehicle of their economic and social advance. The key role in this process is played by animators who encourage villagers with similar background to come together for informal discussion of their socio-economic situation, the problems they face and the steps they might take to improve their living standards and working conditions. After initiating the process of group discussion and reflection, the animator attempts progressively to reduce his or her role, leaving it to the villagers themselves to conduct their inquiries, form groups and take initiatives to strengthen their economic position.

The initiatives can take a variety of forms. Some groups focused their attention on possible savings from purchases of consumer goods in village stores. They expanded their activities to procure and distribute a wide range of basic consumer goods and start thrift and credit societies, thus evolving co-operatives of the rural poor. The groups, which started from the production front, cut down their cultivation costs through a series of collective efforts, used their spare time to cultivate a common plot of land as a means of increasing their collective fund, initiated action to develop irrigation facilities and diversify crop patterns, established links with banks and obtained bank credit by demonstrating their credit-worthiness, thus eliminating their dependence on usurer credit, and bargained for improved access to public services.

Some groups began activities in produce marketing. They devised collective marketing schemes, explored and discovered new market outlets, delinked from village traders and intermediaries and retrieved the surpluses hitherto extracted by them, stored a part of the crop to take advantage of better prices and increased the value of the produce by processing. In the case of wage labourers, attempts were made to check leakages from their income streams by forming informal co-operatives for consumer, credit and thrift activities, and to obtain access to land or other productive assets, thus switching over from the sale of labour to farming either on a part-time or full-time basis.

MOBILIZING RESOURCES THROUGH SELF-HELP AND CO-OPERATIVE EFFORTS

Six-S was started in 1974 in Burkina Faso at the initiative of a local agronomist working with some foreign volunteers. The original motive was to take advantage of the long dry period from October to May to undertake a series of self-help social and economic activities to improve the living standards of the rural people (Egger, 1987a; Rahman, 1988; Sawadogo and Ouedraogo, 1987). The practice until then had been for the young people to migrate to urban areas and to

neighbouring countries in search of employment. One feature of this initiative was reliance on traditional Naam groups of mutual help and co-operation to promote a large-scale, self-help movement with numbers running into 200,000 and extension into other Sahelian countries such as Mali, Mauritania and Senegal.

The groups undertake a variety of income-generating, community and social activities. The first set includes vegetable gardening, stock farming, handicraft, millet mills, cereal banks, and production and sale of horse carts. Communal activities comprise construction of water dams and dikes, anti-erosion works, wells, afforestation etc., while social projects include rural pharmacies, primary health care, schools, theatres etc. Six-S provides credit to partially support such projects. Activities of communal benefit are subsidized through limited cash remuneration and food for work and free supply of the needed equipment. In turn, Six-S gets funds from member groups' contributions and external donors. All Six-S groups have a savings fund built with member subscriptions and receipts from income-generating activities.

There has been a rapid multiplication of groups in the region. The established groups assist new ones in a variety of ways. Farmer-technicians are employed by Six-S during the slack season to advise the groups and assist their activities. When some members of Six-S groups carry out an innovation or master a technique, they form a mobile school to transmit it to other groups. Thus, new ideas and innovations spread rapidly throughout the Six-S movement.

ORAP was started in 1981 by a group of concerned people in Matabeleland, Zimbabwe, to initiate a new approach to their development problems. It is essentially a support organization for self-reliant development in rural areas. Its first priority is to encourage and support autonomous organizations among rural people and to enhance their capability to analyse their own situation. (Chavunduka and others, 1985; Nyoni, 1986). As with Six-S, it also relied on traditional groups and practices of mutual help and co-operation. The basic units are village groups which federate into "umbrellas" and, higher up, to associations and finally to the Advisory Board of ORAP.

After a period of deliberation and analysis, the groups undertake a variety of economic and social activities, combining their skills and labour with material and financial assistance from external donors through ORAP. The activities include carpentry, netwire making, sewing, building, basketry, wood carving, livestock grazing, vegetable gardening, poultry-keeping, baking and grinding mills.

Considerable emphasis is put on training and development education activities. The prolonged drought in the region led ORAP to develop a food relief programme and subsequently to give priority to food production, with emphasis on recourse to traditional seeds and fertilizers, diversity of food produced, improved food storage

and cereal banks in the villages and improved water storage and local irrigation schemes. Recently, new emphasis has been put on organizing activities at the family units—a collective of 5 to 10 families—to meet their immediate needs such as wells for drinking water, sanitary latrines, improved baths, improved kitchens, as well as cultivation, food production, harvesting and thrashing corn.

Another recent innovation has been the construction, on a self-help basis, of development centres. These are multipurpose centres for meetings, workshops, organization of training courses in various technical fields, such as bakery, building, blacksmithing and marketing outlets.

ADRI is an organization of peasant groups in Rwanda. It owes its origin to an initiative taken in 1979 by a local agronomist to undertake "animation" work with peasant women in the Kabaye district (Action pour le développement rural intégré, 1986; Egger, 1987b). As in Six-S and ORAP, the basis of organization was traditional groups of mutual help. Some other groups sprung up in the area leading to the formation of an inter-group organization, Impuzamiryango Tuzamuka Twese (ITT). Activities undertaken by the group include collective cultivation of cash crops, social forestry, grain storage, consumer stores, livestock rearing, furniture making, brick making, beer brewing and grain mills.

Dissatisfaction with the Banque Populaire led the peasant groups to form their own savings and credit society, the Caisse de Solidarité (Solidarity Bank). This society plays a particularly important role in the management of external funds for group activities. All the groups assume responsibility for these funds, which serve both as a guarantee to donors and to generate collective interest in the repayment of funds by each group. Several groups have evolved into multipurpose co-operatives covering farming, marketing, artisan production and collective savings schemes. In one area, several groups have come together to form a fund with contributions from peasants particularly at harvest time, in cash or kind. The fund serves as a social security scheme for members covering death, fire, natural disasters, accident, sickness and finance of secondary education.

ADRI was formed to stimulate the expansion of such peasant groups to all parts of the country. It is a development non-governmental organization which assists peasant groups and associations through animation work and exchange visits, promotion of a wider federation of associations and provision of direct support to base groups on funding and implementing collective social and economic projects.

Participatory processes and institutional framework

CONTRASTING CONVENTIONAL PROJECTS AND PARTICIPATORY INITIATIVES

A conventional development project is conceived and designed from outside by national and international experts, together with the paraphernalia of pre-feasibility and feasibility studies, appraisal reports, specification of inputs and outputs, calculation of internal rates and sophisticated cost-benefit analysis. The people for whom all this is supposed to be done exist only in the abstract as numbers whose output and productivity are to be enhanced and whose "needs" are to be satisfied. Their participation in the preparatory phase, if they are lucky, may, at best, consist of some hastily organized meetings with the experts and bureaucrats at which they are "briefed" about the objectives and activities of the planned projects. In the implementation phase they are expected to carry out their pre-assigned roles.

Participatory development is radically different in approach, methodology and operation. As implied earlier, its central concern is with the development of the moral, intellectual, technical and manual capabilities of individuals. A development project is, therefore, regarded as a process for the expansion of these capabilities. This implies that the initiative in establishing the activities must be taken by the people themselves who should also be firmly in charge of their implementation and evolution. This in turn calls for an entirely different methodology in initiating and sustaining development activities.

Social activists and leaders of grass-roots initiatives worldwide are working with many different approaches and methodologies for participation promotion. There is no single blueprint. Indeed, such a concept would be contradictory to the very spirit of participatory development whose central purpose is the awakening of people's dormant energies and the unleashing of their creative powers. The grass-roots experiences described in the preceding section likewise reveal the diversity of approaches to participation promotion. It may be useful to discuss separately two dimensions of this theme, namely, methodologies and institutional framework for participation promotion.

METHODOLOGIES FOR PARTICIPATION PROMOTION

Whatever their differences, the nine experiences considered here have one aspect in common: the initiation of development activities is preceded by a preparatory phase involving interaction with and among the people concerned. The purpose, duration and intensity of

this interaction have tended to vary from one initiative to another. At one extreme, the interaction phase may consist only of understanding and accepting the basic objectives and operation of the project by the people before their enrolment as members. At the other extreme, this phase, extending over long periods, may involve intensive discussions and dialogue, analysis and reflection and conduct of field work and social inquiry, thus using the methodology of participation promotion associated with "conscientization" and "participatory action research".⁶ Depending on its scope and intensity, the preparatory phase may serve to install discipline, build confidence, indoctrinate or socialize members to the underlying philosophy and objectives of the initiative, raise consciousness, develop critical and analytical abilities, and promote group solidarity and democratic practices. Furthermore, these processes of participation promotion are not considered one-time isolated events preceding the initiation of development activities, but rather an integral part of the style of work within the association.

The initial phase in the establishment of peasant groups in Rwanda consists of animation and conscientization (Action pour le développement rural intégré, 1986). It is only after this phase that the peasants decide to form associations. The process also generates the array of activities to be undertaken by the group. Likewise, the Six-S puts a great deal of emphasis on animation work and group meetings. The emerging pattern of activities is seen as a reflection of people's situation, knowledge, experiences, capabilities and wishes.⁷ The WWF relies on spearhead teams and group organizers to initiate interaction with the potential members.

In ORAP, any material development work must be preceded and/or accompanied by continuous discussion and analysis of the reasons for undertaking a development activity. In principle, all groups must go through a discussion process to determine what their problems are, where they come from and how they can solve them. This approach is summarized graphically in the words of a member of a local group: "Before coming to ORAP, I didn't know how development started. Now I know that before development, there must be thoughts in mind" (Chavunduka and others, 1985).

SFDP and GB are first and foremost credit programmes. Before any activities are initiated, the group organizers in the former and bank workers in the latter undertake a socio-economic survey of the villages concerned. The target groups are then encouraged to come together for discussions among themselves and with the development workers. Out of this process emerge the groups which are the basic units around which the credit programme is organized. In GB, for example, the basic unit consists of a group of five landless persons. Before receiving loans, the groups go through an intensive instruction of one to two weeks on the philosophy, rules and procedures of the bank. The group members have to pass a test before they are granted

recognition. During this test the members must satisfy the bank staff of their integrity and seriousness, understanding of the principles and procedures of the GB and ability to write their signatures.

The methodology of "conscientization" and "applied action research" is perhaps applied most systematically in the activities organized by PIDA. A brief illustration of the work of PIDA in a village may convey the flavour of its approach to participation promotion (Tilakaratna, 1984). In 1978, a four-member team of development workers visited a village to explore the possibility of initiating a grass-roots participatory development process. The first step was to make a preliminary study of the socio-economic conditions in the village. The workers visited all households and initiated discussions with the people individually, as well as in small informal groups, on the problems at the village level. The main poverty group was identified as betel producers. The development workers continued discussions about the source of their poverty. Soon, however, they reached the stage where further progress called for more information on production and marketing of betel than they possessed. Two village groups volunteered to undertake the investigations and collect information on the working of the betel industry—a women's group to examine production and a youth group to explore the marketing aspects.

This investigation enabled the peasants to see for the first time the reality of betel farming, in particular how an impoverishment process had been created by the loss of a sizeable economic surplus at the marketing stage to the village traders who in turn sold betel leaves to state exporting firms. A group of betel producers then met to explore alternative marketing possibilities. An action committee formed by the group spent two months visiting various traders in the vicinity and exporting firms. After a series of setbacks and negative responses, the committee found one exporting firm which was prepared to buy directly from them provided the sales were channelled through the registered village co-operative. This immediately resulted in a doubling of the prices received by peasants for their betel leaves and greater price stability. The group grew in number and the incomes of the members expanded threefold owing to better prices and higher production. Subsequently, they formed their own multipurpose co-operative.

The co-ordinator of PIDA has described the underlying approach of participatory development as follows:

"The central element of a participatory process was identified as conscientization which was seen as a process of liberating the creative initiatives of the people through a systematic process of investigation, reflection and analysis, undertaken by the people themselves. People begin to understand the social reality through a process of self-inquiry and analysis, and through such understanding, perceive self-possibilities for changing that reality . . .

Conscientization leads to self-organization by the people as a means of undertaking collective initiatives. Each action will be followed by reflection and analysis generating a process of praxis as a regular ongoing practice. These interactive elements . . . were seen as the heart and soul of a participatory process" (Tilakaratna, 1985).

A Sri Lankan peasant summed it all up in these simple words: "The rust in our brains is now removed" (Tilakaratna, 1985).

THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

While discussion, analysis and reflection constitute the methodology of participation promotion in most of the initiatives considered here, the institutional framework provides the vehicle for the practice of participation. As might be expected, there is a great deal of variation in the organizational arrangements devised by them to conduct their work. However, one common characteristic they share is that in all cases members are organized into base or primary groups. Participatory development is inconceivable in the absence of such groups. The process of conscientization presupposes the existence or creation of small groups with a homogeneous socio-economic background. Beyond that the organization of small farmers, rural workers and urban poor in groups serves a number of crucial functions. First, it provides a forum for dialogue, analysis and reflection, thereby contributing to the capacity of the members to understand and find solutions to their problems. Secondly, membership in a group reduces individual insecurity and dependence and builds confidence. This is a vital function especially in societies characterized by social oppression, economic polarization and status hierarchies. Thirdly, the groups provide a mechanism for discussion, choice and elaboration of social and economic activities to be undertaken on an individual or joint basis. Fourthly, they constitute appropriate structures for the launching, ownership, management and operation of some projects. Fifthly, the groups serve to increase the effectiveness of government social and economic services by acting as receiving mechanisms. Sixthly, the formation of groups enables the poor to transform their individual weaknesses into collective strength, thus enhancing their bargaining power *vis-à-vis* other economic groups and exerting countervailing pressure against local power structures.

The group structure of some of the initiatives discussed here illustrates these points. In the GB, groups and the centre hold weekly meetings for banking transactions as also for discussions on other social and economic activities. Although the loan is given to the individual and he or she has ultimate responsibility for it, it must be approved by the group chief and the *centre chief*. The groups, therefore, assume responsibility for its repayment. The choice of

activity financed by the loan is left to the individual and the group. Group pressure plays an important role in ensuring the nearly perfect loan repayment record achieved by the bank. The group fund, consisting of personal savings and group tax for emergency and social security purposes, is operated by the groups. Joint enterprises such as shallow and deep tubewells, weaving and rice hullers are owned and managed at the level of individual groups, collection of groups, or centres. Construction, management and running of schools, community halls and other social activities would typically be organized at the level of individual or groups of several centres.

In the SFDP, the group plays a key role in investment decisions. The decisions on individual and joint loans are taken through group discussion and consensus, and the group provides the guarantee for the loan. The monthly meetings of the group also provide occasions for discussion and approval of annual and longer-term plans for social and economic activities.

In ORAP, the new emphasis is on base units comprising three to five families. A few of the family units come together to form production units. The activities to be undertaken emerge from discussions within these groups. Some of the projects are of a family nature such as cultivation and latrine and kitchen improvement, but others involve larger units such as irrigation, grain mills, food storage and community buildings. Mutual help and co-operation are organized through the family units or production groups. The Naam groups in the Six-S form the nucleus of a myriad of activities such as water catchment and storage schemes, reforestation, soil preservation, cereal banks, artisanal production and collective farming. They also operate credit and savings societies, provide guarantees for individual and collective loans, and organize a variety of welfare schemes and social activities. The peasant associations in ADRI constitute the core of the movement. A number of family, community and income-generating projects by peasant groups are gradually transforming themselves into multipurpose co-operatives.

The village groups promoted by PIDA and by Sarilakas seek to raise the living standards of their members through collective action designed to improve wages, secure access to land, reduce the burden of usury, and retain a larger share of surpluses through joint purchase, elimination of middlemen in marketing etc. In SEWA also exertion of pressure through collective power has been an important element in the benefits derived by its members. In addition to its function as a trade union of self-employed women workers, SEWA has organized members in co-operatives based on occupation. Social insurance, welfare and training programmes have also been organized.

While SEWA and WWF are exclusively women's organizations, GB and SFDP have separate groups for men and women, although SFDP also has a few mixed groups. In the other initiatives, on the

other hand, while there may be some separate groups for men and women, the common pattern is to have mixed groups. This has served to break down stereotypes of gender roles and has promoted solidarity and co-operation between sexes and generations.

While participation of members in the activities of the organization through base groups is a feature common to all these grass-roots initiatives, there is a great deal of variation concerning higher-level entities. Sarilakas and PIDA essentially act as promoters of self-reliant participatory organizations of the rural poor. The organizations thus formed may co-operate in a variety of ways, including joint projects, exchange of visits, information etc. but so far no attempts have been made to federate them into regional or national associations, although federations have emerged at municipality levels and across villages in Sarilakas and PIDA respectively. The parent body of the SFDP is the Agricultural Development Bank, which does not have any representation from the small farmers in its policy-making organs. While the original intention was to encourage regional and national associations of SFDPs, this has not materialized, although individual groups co-operate in a variety of ways. Essentially, the same remarks apply to the GB with the crucial difference that now 75 per cent of the paid-up share capital belongs to members and the 12-member Board of Directors includes four persons, including (preferably) two women, elected by the borrower shareholders.

The other organizations have ascending layers of bodies with representatives chosen from lower-level entities. For instance, in ADRI, the peasant groups come together into regional associations which federate into a national organization. Likewise, the ORAP organizational structure moves up from village groups to "umbrellas" to associations and the Advisory Board. WWF and SEWA have representative or general assemblies at the apex. The higher-level bodies consist of representatives elected from the lower ones. Some activities and services may be carried out at higher levels, for example, the development centres in ORAP are operated at the level of associations and the Solidarity Bank in ADRI is run at the apex as are the savings and credit co-operatives run by SEWA and WWF. Thus, in all these cases the organizational structure provides for participation in decision-making by the rank-and-file members of the movement.

Self-reliance and the role of outsiders

These initiatives have a diversity of origins. SFDP, PIDA and Sarilakas originated as government programmes with the support of international agencies. But PIDA and Sarilakas moved away from their official links to convert themselves into development non-governmental organizations. SFDP continues to be run as an ADB project but the bank operates in an independent manner. Although

GB was started as an experiment by an academic, it has been converted into a bank with joint ownership by the Government and the borrowers. It is also run independently of the government ministries. All the other initiatives originated with concerned professionals and social activists independently of official agencies. It is noteworthy that the key figures in the initiation and consolidation of these initiatives were nationals of these countries. This is an aspect of self-reliance which already sets them off from the great majority of development projects which are often conceived and designed by outsiders.

A key characteristic of these initiatives, both in their establishment and subsequent expansion, is the role played by development workers variously described as social activists, change agents, facilitators, group organizers, catalysts and animators.⁴ The success of these initiatives is in no small measure due to the approach and style of work adopted by these development workers. They do not possess any special technical skills but their human qualities are vital to the success of their mission. These include a deep understanding of the economy and society of the impoverished groups, compassion and sympathy with their plight, ability to inspire trust and confidence and to motivate and guide them, not in a paternalistic and authoritarian way, but in a manner to enhance their confidence and self-reliance. While many initiatives, such as for instance the GB, the SFDP and SEWA, continue to rely on a core of professional and administrative staff to run their activities, others such as PIDA and Sarilakas regard their primary objective as being the stimulation of self-reliant participatory organizations. The animators who perform this role are expected to be gradually phased out, and internal cadres and animators selected from within the village population to progressively take over their functions. Likewise, it is the policy of WWF to have members of that organization steadily take over as group and area organizers. It was noted earlier that Six-S increasingly relies on peasant-technicians and advanced groups to transmit knowledge and innovations to other members and groups.

Self-reliance has many other aspects and several of these are illustrated by the experiences of the participatory initiatives discussed here. In some ways, the most important element is growing control over economic resources and social environment resulting in greater confidence and reduction in insecurity and dependence, brought about on the one hand by the strength derived from membership of a group and on the other by a steady increase in individual intellectual, moral and technical capabilities. Indeed, it is this aspect of their experience that is repeatedly emphasized by members in discussions and evaluations of the impact of the initiatives. Another dimension of self-reliance concerns the mobilization of labour and other resources to launch income-generating

activities and infrastructural and service projects. This feature is common to all initiatives but is central to the African experiences.

Provision of credit is the cornerstone of GB and SFDP but plays a role of varying importance in other initiatives as well. It should be noted here that in most cases funds are made available on a loan basis to be repayable over a specified period and at commercial rates of interest, although the rates are lower than those charged by private money-lenders. It was noted earlier that in cases where a credit programme is a major component of their activities such as SFDP, GB, SEWA and WWF, the default rate is astonishingly low by any standards. This is eloquent testimony to the self-reliance with which these initiatives are undertaken.

Furthermore, almost all initiatives have engendered other schemes, which reinforces this self-reliance. The organization of collective savings for consumption and production loans and for emergency purposes is a common element in all initiatives. The Six-S, ADRI and ORAP have initiated various types of cereal banks to enhance food security. Some groups in ADRI have started schemes which represent the beginnings of a social security system. Similar schemes covering childbirth, death, widowhood, etc., have been launched by SEWA and WWF financed completely or partly by members' contributions.

The high rates of saving and accumulation achieved by many groups in these initiatives is further evidence of their self-reliant approach. In GB, for instance, together with interest payments, group fund and emergency fund, the members save a minimum of 25 per cent of the income generated by the bank loans. If to this is added savings for special projects and members' personal savings and investment, the savings rate in many cases may well amount to 50 per cent of the additional income. In an extremely poor community where meeting subsistence needs is an everyday struggle, such rates of saving can only be considered phenomenal.

Initiatives such as PIDA and Sarilakas push the concept of self-reliance to extreme limits. PIDA regards its role as assistance in the mobilization of efforts by the rural poor through animation work. It does not provide any technical assistance, extension services, grants or loans. The villagers themselves are expected to enhance their incomes and production and social welfare through collective actions of the type discussed earlier and through staking a claim for their share of resources from the commercial banks and government social and economic services. Even the animation and facilitation work done by external animators is for a limited period to be taken over at the earliest opportunity by internal cadres.

Most of the initiatives discussed here have been recipients of assistance from national, multilateral and bilateral sources. No conventional type of analysis has been undertaken of the effectiveness of this assistance. Except for the two major credit programmes,

the assistance received has been relatively modest. It has consisted for the most part of funds to start loan schemes, grants for training programmes, financing of workshops and occasional grants for equipment for production or infrastructural projects. No foreign experts have been attached to these movements nor have they benefited from technical co-operation and consultancy missions. These initiatives thus represent truly authentic indigenous attempts at self-reliant development at the grass-roots level.

Participatory Initiatives as economic enterprises

The initiatives we have been considering cannot be looked at as conventional development projects. They respond to the multifarious needs of their members. Efforts to improve the living standards of the members are certainly at the core of their concerns and often provide the motivation for the creation of the movement but both the leaders and the participants also stress objectives that go beyond material achievements. In this section, we discuss some economic aspects—leaving for later sections the social and political dimensions of the work of participatory initiatives. The pattern of economic activities undertaken by them has already been discussed. The intention here is to analyse briefly the nature of these activities and to make a rough assessment of their economic impact.

ECONOMIC BENEFITS TO MEMBERS

Provision of credit to individual members or to groups, directly or indirectly, plays an important role in all initiatives. Credit facilitates the purchase of stock in trade, raw materials, equipment, tools and agricultural inputs. Especially in densely populated poor countries, capital is an extremely scarce factor of production and carries high potential returns. Its value is further enhanced to the poor as institutional credit is largely unavailable to them and they must rely for urgent needs on money-lenders who impose 5 to 15 times the rates charged by commercial banks. The provision of credit thus contributes to increases in the incomes of the members by financing a higher turnover of their stock, improvements in tools and equipment, access to raw materials and inputs, and by the substitution of institutional loans for money-lenders' loans.

While detailed evaluation of economic activities of other initiatives is not available to the author, several surveys have attempted to quantify the economic impact of the credit programme of the GB and SFDP.⁷ There is naturally a good deal of variation in returns on individual activities but overall the investment programme financed by loans generated rates of return in the region of 30 to 40 per cent. Apart from the factors mentioned earlier, the contributory factors in the GB have been that the activities undertaken are familiar to

members; the skills and technologies are known and are relatively simple; the clients are not dependent, except in a few cases, on extension services or inputs from the Government. Furthermore, the participants themselves select the activities for which they seek loans. It may be assumed that they select activities they are confident of carrying out successfully. Group dynamics, emulation, competition and peer pressure are additional factors which have played a positive role in all initiatives of the type considered here.

Similar factors have been at work in the SFDP with the additional point that high yields in its projects have been possible in part because the credit programme has brought within reach of small and marginal farmers the Green Revolution package of improved seeds, irrigation and fertilizers. Impressive income gains to women vendors, hawkers and home-based workers in SEWA and WWF have also been made possible essentially through access to credit. As indicated earlier, the mere substitution of institutional credit for that of money-lenders—even disregarding higher turnover, better prices and improved technology—is a source of substantial gains in income. Rough estimates made for SFDP members showed that income gains from this source alone equalled those brought about by increased production.

Another way in which these initiatives have helped increase incomes, production and employment is through the pooling of labour and other resources under collective projects such as irrigation and water catchment schemes, soil conservation, reforestation, construction of access roads, cultivation of common plots, mutual help in ploughing and harvesting, food storage, cereal banks, transport, marketing and joint purchase of agricultural inputs. The list of such efforts is long and impressive. In Africa especially, activities of this nature have contributed to stability and increases in income and production, reduction of food insecurity and generation of fuller employment through the breaking of infrastructural bottlenecks, overcoming of labour shortages and introduction of improved techniques. Co-operation in pooling resources facilitated by institutional innovations inspired by traditional practices has been at the heart of gains achieved through these initiatives.

The third and related source of gains has accrued from the exertion of collective pressure and power to secure higher wages for jobs and contract work, enforcement of land and tenancy reform, fishing and forestry rights, implementation of the provisions of labour legislation, improved prices for raw materials and for processed foods. These gains have been the result of stronger bargaining and countervailing power, as well as of institutional reforms such as service and production co-operatives, collective funds, credit and thrift societies, and consumer stores. These aspects have been especially important in the work of PIDA, Sarilakas, WWF

and SEWA. This is a reflection of deep-seated social cleavages and economic polarization prevalent in many Asian countries.

Finally, some of these initiatives, especially in South Asia, have contributed to increased incomes through reduction of excessive expenditure on ceremonial occasions. These include dowries, birth and death ceremonies, and festivities of various kinds. Group discussions, solidarity and demonstration provide the necessary support for members to make the radical break from ancient practices. The gains accrue not only from direct reductions in expenditure but, even more importantly, from the savings in servicing of loans incurred by poor people at exorbitant interest rates from money-lenders and landlords, a debt trap from which they are unlikely to escape during their lifetime. Although no precise estimates are available of gains to disposable income from these sources, the rough estimates I made for SFDP members show that, even disregarding the interest charged by money-lenders, the average annual reduction in ceremonial expenditures was equivalent to 600 to 700 rupees—somewhat more than the gains realized from increases in income owing to production loans.

WIDER ECONOMIC IMPACT OF INITIATIVES

The final theme under this heading concerns the wider economic impact of the initiatives. It is possible for a programme to confer significant socio-economic benefits on its members while simultaneously generating strong negative effects on other segments of the society. Likewise a project with a mediocre rating in terms of the direct impact on intended beneficiaries may nevertheless generate beneficial indirect and side effects for the poor. All the initiatives considered here are doubly blessed: they bring significant social and economic benefits to members, while simultaneously generating positive spill-over effects on the poorer segments of these societies. These wider economic effects may be considered under three headings: "macro-economic" impact of project activities, assistance given by members to the fellow poor in their area or "technical co-operation at the grass-roots level" and the impact on national programmes and policies.

Although in aggregate terms most of these programmes are of negligible importance, they exercise significant influence at the local and regional levels. The macro-economic effects may extend to markets for labour, credit and goods and services. As far as the labour markets are concerned, the impact of activities undertaken under most initiatives is to intensify the utilization of family labour and shift the labour allocation from wage to self-employment. This may be the result of more intensive cultivation, non-farming activities, access to land, work on infrastructural projects and participation in training and social programmes. The effect is that, while the demand

for labour goes up, the supply of wage labour goes down. Other things being equal, this should contribute to an increase in wages for the poor and the unskilled. This indeed seems to have happened in the areas in which SFDP, GB, WWF and SEWA have been active.

Many of the activities launched under these initiatives result in the diversion of bank credit to the rural poor, the creation of new credit and savings schemes and the substitution of institutional credit for money-lenders' credit. Thus, by increasing the supply of institutional credit and reducing the demand for money-lenders' loans, these initiatives exercise a downward pressure on the terms for non-institutional credit. Since the rural and urban poor are the main clients and victims of credit from money-lenders, traders and landlords, this must be counted among the more important benefits to non-members generated by these initiatives.

Productive activities associated with these initiatives result in increased output and marketing of goods and services consumed by the poverty groups in rural and urban areas. These include such things as rice, maize, vegetables, fruits, meat, milk, eggs, cloth, household utensils, bamboo products, baskets, simple agricultural tools and services such as transport, storage, marketing and shopping. Typically, these are the goods and services of mass consumption and figure prominently in the expenditure patterns of the poor. Although the rise in the incomes of the members results in increased consumption of many of these goods and services, the net effect for most goods is to increase their availability. This in turn, by keeping the relative prices of such commodities lower than they might otherwise be, contributes to an increase in the real incomes of the poorer segments of the society.

The benefits from these initiatives also spread to other poor people through assistance rendered to them by members in a variety of ways. The pioneer groups must be looked upon as constituting a social vanguard whose impact radiates through the neighbouring communities. The members assist the fellow poor to form their own groups. This may happen at the initiative of the members of the established groups or at the request of the non-members who spontaneously wish to emulate their efforts. It is possible to quote instances from all the initiatives discussed here of the pioneer groups and animators being besieged by requests from others in the same or neighbouring villages for help in starting similar activities. This is perhaps the most important explanation of the rapid expansion of the membership of many of these organizations. Even where the entire set of activities is not replicated, some aspects of their valuable experiences are quickly disseminated to the neighbouring communities. Indeed the "bush telegraph" is the most effective vehicle of transmission of new ideas, techniques and practices among the peasantry and rural workers. To give some examples, SFDP members helped others with group formation, initiation of social activities and

community projects, credit and technical advice. In Khopasi and Jyamite villages, community irrigation projects were started at the initiative of the SFDP groups but non-members in the catchment area were invited to participate in the scheme through donation of labour and cash. The example of betel and coir yarn producers in establishing new marketing channels was swiftly followed by several neighbouring villages.

Likewise, the pioneering efforts of Six-S, ORAP and ADRI have spread rapidly to other parts of the country through demonstration effect and emulation. For example, the Groupement Naam de Somiaga in Burkina Faso helped set up 11 groups in six other villages. For their part, 42 villages assisted this group in the construction of a dam. Six-S has developed original methods for the transmission of skills through peasant-technicians who are paid by the organization to train other members and groups in new technologies, social innovations and management techniques. The principal vehicle for this is *chantiers-écoles* (training camps) organized on a regular basis during the dry season at the request of the groups. These range from soil conservation techniques to management of maize mills, from water pump maintenance to fenced livestock, and from cercal banks to nutritional centres. Each group assumes the responsibility of passing its special skills to others.

The impact of these initiatives is spreading farther afield. Six-S is already operating in four Sahelian countries and plans are afoot to extend its activities to the Niger and Chad. WWF is working in three States in southern India. Sister organizations to SEWA have been set up in about 10 other Indian cities such as Bhopal, Delhi, Lucknow, Mithila and Bhagalpur. Many international seminars, study tours and workshops have been organized around these initiatives. The South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) cadres have visited ORAP, the GB has attracted visitors from several Asian and African countries and has given technical assistance for the organization of credit programmes for the rural poor in Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Malawi. Perhaps the most dramatic example of the international impact of these initiatives is the role played by the managing director of the Grameen Bank in establishing small-scale credit schemes for the urban poor in Chicago and Arkansas, the latter at the request of the Governor of the State. That the leader of a credit programme for the impoverished masses of one of the poorest countries in the world should be advising on establishing similar programmes in the metropolis of one of the richest countries in the world is indeed a paradox of extraordinary proportions.

Each of these initiatives contains valuable lessons for official development programmes, projects and policies. It is one of the tragedies of the development efforts in our countries that these creative and original efforts at self-reliant development through mobilization of the limited resources of the impoverished groups

should have had so little impact on official development thinking and practice, at both the national and international levels. Fortunately, there are glimmers of hope. By way of example, we may mention that in Nepal the basic concept of credit for the rural poor based on group guarantee has been extended by the ADB/N to other villages where the SFDP is not operating. Likewise, many elements of the SFDP—formation of groups, channelling of credit for individual and group activities through the group, investment decisions by the groups—have been partially incorporated in several integrated rural development projects in the country. Several women's programmes have also drawn upon the experience gained in the SFDP. Its existence has enhanced the effectiveness of some support services and has put pressure on other institutions such as co-operatives and the Agricultural Inputs Corporation to improve their performance.

As another example, we may mention the success achieved by SEWA in projecting the problems of poor self-employed women at the national level. The efforts of the organization have had some impact on thinking and action concerning self-employed workers. After prolonged pressure from SEWA, the Gujarat Government set up the Unorganized Labour Board in 1980. The National Planning Commission added a chapter on the self-employed in the Sixth Five-Year Plan and the Prime Minister has set up a Commission on Self-employed Women, which appropriately is chaired by the originator and leader of SEWA.

Participatory Initiatives as agencies of social reform

The preceding sections have already touched on the role played by the participatory initiatives as instruments of social change. We discuss here four aspects of social progress: provision of social services and cultural amenities, change in family relations, emancipation of women and reform of antiquated and harmful customs and practices. Unlike many other development projects, the initiatives discussed here have integrated social and economic activities in their programmes. In this respect as in others, the leaders and organizers of these associations have simply followed the wishes of their members. ORAP, Six-S and ADRI have a wide range of social and cultural activities such as literacy, schools, nutrition, child care, help for the aged and the handicapped, village clinics, personal hygiene, music and dances. WWF organizes literacy classes, night schools for working children, family planning and nutrition education. SEWA has pioneered social assistance and welfare schemes for maternity, death, widowhood etc. The social activities of the GB comprise sanitation, health care, nutrition, education and family planning. The performance of the SFDP members has been superior to those of their neighbours in terms of literacy, education, family planning, sanitation and access to health services. It should be remembered

that, except perhaps for SFDP, the bulk of these social services is organized by the members themselves with contributions in cash and kind.

The second aspect relates to the effect on family solidarity. As mentioned earlier, it is a collective of three to five families that contributes the base units for many ORAP activities. The involvement of all members of the family in projects of direct benefit to them serves to promote family unity and harmony. In Six-S, the traditional Naam groups have brought together the old and the young, thus reducing generational tensions and promoting harmony among members of different age groups.

All the initiatives provide for full participation by women in all their activities either in mixed or in their own groups. This is leading to slow but profound changes in the social status and economic position of women, especially in South Asia. Membership in SEWA and WWF has given women, long subjected to subordination and oppression, a new sense of pride, dignity, personal worth and economic independence. All the South Asian initiatives have enabled women to increase their incomes and acquire some organizational and management skills in planning and implementing group activities. In many households, the participation of women in income-generating activities has created a new division of labour and a new pattern of relationships. In some of the households with women members of the GB, it was found that the male members had begun to perform some of the tasks traditionally done by women, for example, looking after the children. It was also noted that the economic activities undertaken by women in turn created new opportunities for male members of the family. The women may, for instance, husk rice, make bamboo and cane products, or look after milch cows, while the husbands complement the household economy by buying raw materials, selling processed rice, handicrafts, milk or meat. This has enhanced women's economic independence and social status within the extended family. The husbands and other male members in the household have accepted the new situation willingly and, in some cases, even enthusiastically.

Finally, participation in these organizations is leading to a reform of ancient but antiquated customs and practices. Reference was made earlier to the role played by these organizations in reducing burdensome ceremonial expenditures. More impressive is the progress being made by the initiatives in South Asia in combating the age-old practice of dowry and child marriages, in caste and ethnic prejudice and discrimination. There is also evidence of decline in drunkenness, gambling, crime, wife-beating and similar types of anti-social behaviour. All this casts an interesting light on the determinants of social attitudes and behaviour. It may be noted that government policies and programmes in many countries have long sought to bring about precisely this type of change but without much

apparent success. The experience of these initiatives shows that once the people are organized in voluntary, co-operative groups and are given the necessary motivation, they decide on their own to carry through social changes of far-reaching significance.

Participatory initiatives as schools of democracy

Grass-roots participatory organizations may be regarded as foundations of a democratic society. They promote the democratic cause in at least three ways. First, a representative and pluralistic democracy presupposes that all major social and economic groups in the country have a voice and a role in shaping national policies. For this to be possible, such groups should be able to articulate and press their views on vital issues of concern to them. Typically, in most poor countries, and in many rich ones for that matter, the weaker and more impoverished groups represented by the landless and marginal farmers in rural areas and the unemployed, casually employed and the poor self-employed in urban areas, have little voice and a limited role in influencing government policies on social and economic matters. Given their individual weaknesses, they can exercise pressure and influence only by forming their own organizations.

None of the initiatives considered here has articulated its role in political terms. But it is clear that in practice some at least have come close to representing the interests of their groups in the political and economic processes of their countries. SEWA and WWF have served as pressure groups in the struggle against certain vested interests that have opposed the reforms proposed by them. They have also sought to influence legislation on matters of interest to their members and have deployed their strength in relation to bureaucracy and political parties to promote the interests of their members. Likewise, Sarilakas and PIDA have enabled poor peasants, landless workers and fishermen to exercise their collective strength to enforce legislation, renegotiate contracts and generally enhance their bargaining power.

In some cases the members of these organizations are beginning to play a more direct political role. In Nepal, for instance, it is rare for the small farmers, tenants and sharecroppers to hold offices in co-operatives and ward panchayat (local government) bodies. It is, however, a common sight now in all project areas for SFDP members to participate in such organizations at the village level. To give just one example, in Khopasi, 32 SFDP participants served as ward members, 19 as panchayat members and 3 as members of the executive committee of co-operatives out of a total of 9. Likewise, in areas where the GB has opened its branches, there has been a perceptible increase in the influence and power exerted by its members in village affairs.

The second way in which these initiatives serve the democratic cause is simply by providing an example of an embryonic democracy

at work. In the section on the institutional framework of grass-roots initiatives, it was noted that base groups constitute the core of their organizations. These groups are generally run in an open democratic manner. The style of work is through discussions and dialogue and decision is reached through consensus. Some of the groups have devised original solutions to the problems faced by organizations as democratic entities at all levels, namely, those of accountability of leadership, prevention of concentration of power in the hands of office-holders and active participation by all members in the management of group activities. The betel producers, for instance, decided to limit the size of their membership to ensure that all members participate actively in and effectively control the economic activities of the group. The requests for additional membership were handled by assisting them to form new groups of their own. The insistence on keeping the members of the group to a manageable size is also characteristic of other initiatives. The Six-S and ADRI groups seek to prevent perpetuation of hierarchical division of labour by rotating the tasks among members. Office-bearers are chosen by election for limited periods. Some groups elect a different person to preside at each meeting. These organizations, therefore, promote the habit of group discussion, consultation, planning and implementation of group activities, and resolution of conflict through debate—qualities that constitute the foundations of a participatory democracy.

Thirdly, the grass-roots initiatives aid the democratic processes in poor countries by developing the intellectual, moral, managerial and technical capabilities of their members. This aspect has been discussed at length above. Suffice it to say here that in the last analysis it is these human capabilities that are the ultimate determinants of the vitality and creativity of a truly democratic society.

Conclusions

In this paper we have attempted to analyse the significance, processes and characteristics of participatory development through an examination of the experiences of a few grass-roots initiatives in Asian and African countries. In this concluding section we touch on the strengths and limitations of participatory grass-roots initiatives as models of development. But before addressing the issue, it is necessary to make some qualifying remarks on the initiatives analysed in this paper.

The analysis presented here has been necessarily selective, highlighting distinctive features and notable achievements of nine participatory initiatives. As such it has undoubtedly given an optimistic, perhaps idealistic, picture of the functioning of such initiatives. It is necessary to emphasize first that the initiatives considered here are among the most successful of numerous similar

efforts under way in third world countries. Secondly, there is a great deal of variation in the quality of performance between and within the different units of the initiatives discussed here. Thirdly, the account presented above has not discussed the many difficulties, setbacks and frustrations suffered by these initiatives. It is necessary to point out that these movements had to overcome a wide variety of problems at some stage or another and continue to face difficulties of organization, finance, know-how, staff and opposition or indifference from certain vested interests.

Despite these difficulties, the grass-roots initiatives considered here have achieved a wide measure of success. It may be useful to summarize what appear to have been the major contributory factors to their success. There are three elements in the participatory character of these initiatives which probably have contributed strongly to their good performance: work in the preparatory phase prior to initiation of activities, an institutional framework that allows for an assertion of members' priorities in the unfolding of the activities undertaken and the formation of groups as a basic unit in the organization. These features in turn owe much to the approach and human qualities of the leaders of these movements and their band of dedicated development workers.

Relatively quick positive results in terms of the satisfaction of the psychological and material needs of the members have been important in sustaining interest and commitment. The material achievements in the Asian initiatives flowed in large measure from the provision of credit and the wresting of a larger share of surpluses through enhanced bargaining power and co-operative activities, and in African experiences from co-operation in the mobilization of internal resources and attraction of outside funds for production diversification, infrastructural development and technological innovations. The organizational framework adopted facilitates the mobilization of labour and other resources, the institution of schemes for collective savings and social security, and the provision of social and economic services. At the same time, it allows for the initiation of activities of different sizes and with different modes of production and systems of management. Finally, these experiences demonstrate that a pattern of development rooted in grass-roots participatory organizations, while giving full play to individual and group initiatives, promotes a relatively egalitarian distribution of incomes and access to common services and facilities.

Despite its promising potential, the participatory approach to development has made little headway in official programmes and policies at the national or international levels. Even among the non-governmental initiatives, the success rate is relatively low. A full discussion of this apparent paradox cannot be undertaken here, but some of the relevant considerations may be noted. In the first place, the participatory approach to development is relatively new and few

in the "development establishment" have proper knowledge or full understanding of it. Secondly, as noted previously, many apparently participatory programmes provide little more than token representation of the beneficiaries and thus fail to arouse their interest or commitment. Thirdly, the participatory approach, especially in its empowerment version, tends to be mistakenly equated by the dominant groups with subversive or revolutionary doctrine. As such, many participatory initiatives have to contend with hostility, harassment and attempts at suppression. Certainly, relatively few attract resources of the type and amount reserved for more conventional development projects.

There are some additional difficulties which are perhaps inherent in a participatory approach. The pace and pattern of activities may evolve slowly and haltingly and in directions different from those envisaged initially. The initiatives are often of a limited size and dependent for their success on the leadership of an exceptional person and a small band of dedicated social activists. It is, therefore, difficult to replicate them on a nation-wide basis. Furthermore, while successful in handling simple operations, they lose their effectiveness when confronted with large-scale complex activities. Their expansion beyond a certain size is likely to provoke the antagonism of more powerful forces. There is some validity in these charges but the experience of some of the initiatives has refuted a few of them. It would, however, require a separate paper to do full justice to these issues.

NOTES

¹This article represents an effort to introduce to a wider audience a little known but particularly interesting and promising approach to development. It is based largely on the work I initiated in ILO on participatory organizations of the rural poor (PORP), co-ordinated by Anisur Rahman. I acknowledge my debt to him and to colleagues who participated in the PORP programme, as also to numerous but anonymous peasants and landless workers, both men and women, leaders of peasant groups and of participatory initiatives, social activists and sympathetic officials who have deepened my understanding of the social reality of the impoverished masses in rural areas of the third world. For comments on an earlier draft, I am grateful to Mohiuddin Alamgir, Orlando Fals Borda, Philippe Egger, Keith Griffin, Albert Hirschman, John Knight, Peter Oakley, Anisur Rahman, Amartya Sen and Fredj Stambouli. I alone am responsible for the views expressed here.

²At least one author has made the brave effort to explore the implications of participatory development at all these different levels (see Gran, 1983).

³Among numerous treatments of this subject, three may be mentioned here: Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation (1975), Sen (1983) and Wahidul and others (1977).

⁴A more restricted definition but along similar lines has been given by Sen (1983): "The process of economic development can be seen as a process of expanding the capabilities of people."

⁵For an extended discussion of the role of local institutions in development processes, see Ghai (1984).

⁶The classic work on conscientization is Freire (1972); see also Rahman (1985) and Fals Borda (1985).

⁷Sawadogo and Ouedraogo (1987) described this approach in these words: "C'est ainsi que nous animons les groupes-cibles en fonction de ce qu'ils sont, de ce qu'ils savent, de ce qu'ils vivent, de ce qu'ils savent faire, et de ce qu'ils veulent."

⁸The issue of self-reliance in relation to animators is addressed in Tilakaranta (1987).

⁹These have been summarized in my evaluations of GB (Ghai, 1984a) and SFDP (Ghai, 1984b). All subsequent information on these initiatives is taken from these sources.

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VIEWPOINTS

**IV - SUPPORTING DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT:
AVAILABLE INSTRUMENTS AND CHANNELS**

Statement

Secretary of
State for
External Affairs



Déclaration

Secrétaire
d'État aux
Affaires
extérieures

90/60

SOUS RÉSERVE DE MODIFICATIONS

NOTES POUR UNE ALLOCUTION

DU SECRÉTAIRE D'ÉTAT AUX AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES,

LE TRÈS HONORABLE JOE CLARK,

À L'OCCASION DE L'INAUGURATION

DU CENTRE INTERNATIONAL DES DROITS DE LA PERSONNE

ET DU DÉVELOPPEMENT DÉMOCRATIQUE

Montréal (Québec)
le 19 octobre 1990

Affaires extérieures et
Commerce extérieur Canada
External Affairs and
International Trade Canada

Canada

LE CENTRE INTERNATIONAL DES DROITS DE LA PERSONNE ET DU DÉVELOPPEMENT DÉMOCRATIQUE

Nous sommes ici pour inaugurer un centre, mais aussi pour célébrer une cause et réaffirmer un engagement. Cet engagement consiste à défendre et à promouvoir les droits de la personne ainsi que la démocratie dans le monde entier. Cette cause, c'est la création d'un monde où la justice et le respect des droits de la personne règnent partout. Cette cause et cet engagement sont au cœur de la politique étrangère du Canada. Ils sont tous deux enracinés dans les traditions et les valeurs de notre pays.

En ce début d'une décennie qui marque la fin d'un siècle, jamais nous n'avons eu autant de raisons d'espérer que le respect des droits de la personne dans le monde entier deviendra de plus en plus la règle et de moins en moins l'exception. Jamais autant de sociétés ne se sont converties à la démocratie ou y sont revenues.

Nous devons toutefois éviter de nous reposer sur nos lauriers, car le processus est à peine engagé. Dans certains pays, les vieux murs ont été abattus, mais de nouvelles structures restent à bâtir. Dans ces pays, l'ordre est fragile et l'avenir reste incertain. Par ailleurs, dans de nombreuses parties du monde, les barrières demeurent. Des barrières élevées par l'esprit et par le pouvoir. Des barrières qui privent les peuples de leurs droits et les empêchent de prospérer. Des barrières qui entravent le développement et confinent les membres de couches entières de la société à des existences incomplètes et minées par la pauvreté. Si nous avons gagné certaines batailles, il nous en reste beaucoup d'autres à livrer.

Pour gagner ces batailles, il faudra mener une action fondée sur une attitude qui considère les droits de la personne non pas comme un luxe mais comme un aspect intrinsèque de la condition humaine. Une attitude qui voit non pas une opposition mais une complémentarité entre développement et démocratie, entre sécurité et droits de la personne, entre stabilité et justice.

Depuis un an, cette nouvelle attitude apparaît très nettement en Europe, où en quelques mois, une structure dont nous craignons qu'elle ne soit permanente s'est effondrée, grâce à un triomphe de l'esprit humain qui nous a sidérés. Ce triomphe marque la fin d'un vieux système et le début d'un autre. Toutefois, ce nouveau système n'a pas encore pris forme, et détruire est plus facile que construire. La démocratie et les droits de la personne se sont vu donner une chance en Europe de l'Est. Il appartient aux peuples de ces pays - et il nous appartient - de ne pas la laisser passer.

Les peuples de l'Europe de l'Est n'ont pas rejeté le communisme parce qu'ils le jugeaient illogique ou immoral. Ils l'ont rejeté parce qu'il ne fonctionnait pas et ne remplissait pas ses promesses. Il les privait de nourriture tant pour le corps que pour l'esprit. L'effondrement du communisme représente la victoire non pas d'une idéologie mais du sens commun.

Cette attitude est partout en évidence. En Asie, en Amérique latine et en Afrique, des gouvernements et des peuples courageux épousent la cause de la démocratie parce qu'ils savent que le système qu'ils ont ne fonctionne pas et ne remplit pas ses promesses. Ils se rendent compte que les systèmes qui suppriment les sociétés finissent par s'autodétruire, que les systèmes qui empêchent un peuple de prospérer sont voués à la pauvreté, que les systèmes qui bafouent les droits de la personne au nom de la paix sociale sont des systèmes où la paix n'est qu'une trêve.

Les droits de la personne et la démocratie ne triompheront jamais s'ils sont considérés comme un luxe ou comme un danger. Ils doivent être tenus pour les fondements d'une société viable, stable et prospère. Cette perception se répand de plus en plus et contribuera de façon essentielle au triomphe de notre cause.

Que pouvons-nous faire pour encourager cette attitude et promouvoir ces concepts à l'étranger ?

Premièrement, nous devons absolument éviter d'imposer nos modèles à ces sociétés, piège dans lequel il est facile de tomber. Il n'existe aucun modèle de démocratie, aucun guide des droits de la personne. La démocratie et les droits de la personne ne peuvent pas plus être imposés de l'extérieur qu'ils ne peuvent être imposés d'en haut. Les systèmes politiques évoluent de l'intérieur. Ils doivent tenir compte des traditions, de l'histoire et de la dynamique des sociétés qu'ils régissent, sans quoi ils ne peuvent fonctionner et ne durent pas.

Deuxièmement, nous devons éviter de nous croire supérieurs, attitude à la fois arrogante et déplacée. Nos réalisations, qui sont importantes, nous les devons autant à la providence qu'à notre volonté, à la façon dont nous avons su tirer parti de la rare prospérité inhérente au Canada. En outre, nos réalisations sont dans de nombreux cas récentes et incomplètes.

Il a fallu attendre 1940 pour que les femmes de toutes les provinces du Canada puissent voter aux élections provinciales. Les Canadiens autochtones - femmes et hommes - ont été privés du droit de vote jusqu'en 1960, année où M. Diefenbaker a modifié la loi électorale.

De nombreux droits demeurent inexercés, incomplets. Les fileaux de la pauvreté, de l'analphabétisme, de la violence faite aux femmes, des préjugés et de l'intolérance, de la haine et de

la propagande sont des phénomènes qui ne s'arrêtent pas à la frontière entre le Nord et le Sud. Ils sont désagréablement présents au Canada.

Notre propre démocratie exige des soins constants, comme l'a amplement démontré l'impasse constitutionnelle du printemps dernier et comme en témoigne le fait qu'à de nombreux égards, nos institutions ont cessé de représenter notre société. Dans certains cas, elles sont devenues des caricatures: je pense non seulement aux comportements indignes auxquels nous assistons au Sénat, mais aussi à l'incivilité croissante qui règne au Parlement et au fait que dans leurs déclarations, les hommes publics canadiens dénigrent de plus en plus leurs concitoyens avec une regrettable désinvolture. Ces imperfections ne devraient pas nous condamner à l'inaction. Elles prouvent simplement que nous avons une tâche à accomplir au pays comme à l'étranger.

Troisièmement, nous devons être prêts à passer aux actes. Les sociétés qui se développent - tant politiquement qu'économiquement - n'ont pas besoin de menaces de claques. Elles ont besoin d'amis compréhensifs, des gens qui leur tendent la main au lieu de leur tourner le dos, des pays qui sont prêts à les aider à mettre en pratique ce que nous prêchons depuis longtemps.

Les sociétés qui ne sont pas démocratiques ont peu de chances de se développer. D'autre part, trop de sociétés sous-développées ont peu de chances d'accéder à la démocratie. On n'établit pas une véritable démocratie en créant des assemblées, en achetant des votes ou en élaborant des lois grandioses. La démocratie et les droits de la personne exigent des fondements de foi et de développement. Nous ne pouvons exiger la démocratie tout en refusant d'aider au développement. En apprenant aux gens à lire, on combat l'analphabétisme, mais on peut aussi aider à établir la démocratie. En aidant les gens à être productifs, on combat la pauvreté, mais on peut aussi favoriser la protection d'autres droits de la personne. Une aide au développement efficace contribue beaucoup plus à promouvoir la démocratie et les droits de la personne que tout sermon ou toute remontrance servie par l'Ouest ou le Nord.

Quatrièmement, nous devons être patients et compréhensifs. Nous ne pouvons pas exiger des autres pays qu'ils instaurent du jour au lendemain la démocratie ni un respect impeccable des droits de la personne alors que nous ne nous sommes jamais imposés une telle diligence. Nous devons être conscients que nos politiques d'adaptation structurelle, si elles sont mal appliquées, peuvent elles-mêmes miner les fondements de la démocratie et de la stabilité sociale. Les politiques d'adaptation structurelle sont essentielles à une croissance non inflationniste et à un développement durable. Toutefois, il faut

les élaborer de façon à préserver les fondements sociaux nécessaires à la croissance.

Cinquièmement, nous devons examiner sans détour la question des liens que nous établissons entre l'aide au développement et le comportement des gouvernements des pays concernés. Nous devons reconnaître ici qu'il n'y a pas de choix faciles. Nous pouvons détester certains régimes et abhorrer certains gouvernements. Toutefois, il ne faudrait pas punir des peuples pour des régimes qu'ils n'appuient pas, des régimes qui les punissent déjà. Par ailleurs, ces régimes devraient savoir que notre tolérance a des limites et qu'il existe des règles auxquelles nous ne dérogerons pas.

Je crois que l'aide canadienne au développement témoigne de cette façon de penser. Nous tenons compte du dossier d'un pays en matière de droits de la personne lorsqu'il s'agit de déterminer quelle quantité et quel type d'aide lui accorder. Toutefois, nous ne demandons pas des miracles. Nous ne nous attendons pas à ce qu'une société qui a été un enfer jusqu'ici devienne un paradis du jour au lendemain. Nous cherchons donc des signes d'amélioration et réexaminons la situation à intervalles réguliers.

De même, au lieu de couper l'aide complètement, nous décidons souvent de modifier le type d'assistance fournie. Lorsqu'un régime en arrive à violer systématiquement les droits de la personne, nous pouvons cesser de traiter avec ce régime. Toutefois, nous ne cessons pas de traiter avec la population du pays tant que nous pouvons l'atteindre. Nous évitons de la faire souffrir plus qu'elle ne souffre déjà. Aussi passons-nous par les ONG (Organisations non gouvernementales), les Églises et les organisations locales lorsque cela est possible pour faire parvenir l'assistance à la population sans aider ces gouvernements. Je ne prétends pas que cette façon de procéder soit toujours efficace à cent pour cent ou que les choix soient faciles. Je crois toutefois qu'il s'agit de la seule ligne de conduite à suivre.

Sixièmement, nous devons fournir les outils et les compétences nécessaires au bon fonctionnement de la démocratie ainsi qu'au respect des droits de la personne. Il peut s'agir d'observateurs chargés de surveiller les élections, d'experts constitutionnels, de spécialistes des droits de la personne, de boîtes de scrutin et d'ouvrages. Nous pouvons mener cette action bilatéralement ou multilatéralement.

Sur le plan bilatéral, cette année seulement, le Canada a aidé à la tenue d'élections en Roumanie, en Bulgarie et en Tchécoslovaquie. Nous aidons le Bénin à instaurer la démocratie. Nous collaborons avec l'ONU en envoyant des observateurs et des agents de la GRC en Namibie. Nous offrons nos compétences en

matière constitutionnelle tant aux Noirs qu'aux Blancs en Afrique du Sud. Nous avons envoyé des observateurs aux élections en Malaisie par l'intermédiaire du Commonwealth, nous avons participé aux efforts de l'OEA (Organisation des États américains) et des Nations Unies au Nicaragua, nous collaborons avec ces organisations à Haïti et nous sommes prêts à aider l'ONU à établir la démocratie au Sahara occidental et au Cambodge.

Sur le plan multilatéral, nous nous employons à promouvoir la démocratie et des droits de la personne au sein d'organisations régionales qui peuvent contribuer beaucoup à créer un climat de confiance dans de nombreuses parties du monde. Lors de la première assemblée annuelle de l'OEA à laquelle le Canada ait assisté en tant que membre, nous avons proposé la création d'une section du développement démocratique. Cette proposition a été acceptée, et nous tentons de faire établir des structures semblables au sein du Commonwealth et de la Francophonie. En Europe, nous avons pris l'initiative, à la conférence sur la dimension humaine de la CSCE (Conférence sur la sécurité et la coopération en Europe) tenue à Copenhague, d'appeler au renforcement des efforts en faveur de la règle du droit et des droits des minorités et proposé que l'OTAN mette son expérience de la démocratie au service de ses anciens adversaires de l'Est.

Il s'agit là de mesures pratiques et non de plans grandioses. Elles ne transformeront pas à elles seules le despotisme en démocratie ni la torture en tolérance. Toutefois, elles nous permettent de progresser. Elles visent à éduquer, à établir des institutions, à créer un climat de confiance et, ce faisant, à consolider les fondements de la démocratie et à accroître le respect des droits de la personne.

Enfin, je tiens à souligner que la collaboration joue un rôle essentiel dans la promotion de la démocratie et des droits de la personne. La réalisation de ces objectifs passe par une action politique, sociale et économique, mais aussi par la collaboration entre les sociétés ainsi qu'entre les divers secteurs des sociétés. Il s'agit des gouvernements, des milieux d'affaires, des syndicats, des Églises, des organisations internationales, des institutions indépendantes et des individus.

C'est pourquoi le Centre que nous inaugurons aujourd'hui est si important. Il pourra exploiter des ressources, établir des liens et mettre sur pied des programmes qui complètent les initiatives d'autres intervenants. En outre, il pourra exécuter des tâches que les gouvernements ne peuvent accomplir.

Pour agir efficacement, le Centre doit être indépendant. Nous avons tenté d'assurer dès le début cette indépendance qui ne peut être mise en question et qui procure au Centre une liberté et une crédibilité essentielles. Il arrivera évidemment que les

vues exprimées par cet établissement ne correspondent pas à celles du gouvernement. Toutefois, il serait étrange voire malsain qu'il en soit autrement.

Bien que nos chemins divergent parfois, ils sont parallèles et mènent à la même destination. Un monde où les droits de la personne et la démocratie soient non pas des objectifs à atteindre mais des réalités à célébrer, un monde où les droits soient non pas l'apanage de quelques privilégiés mais le propre de tous les êtres humains, un monde où nos enfants - et les enfants du monde entier - puissent vivre sans crainte dans la liberté, la prospérité et la justice.

Nous, Canadiens, dénigrons parfois nos propres réalisations. Il est vrai que nous avons connu des échecs. Toutefois, ce que nous avons construit ici est unique. Nous avons bâti un pays en invitant le monde entier à venir partager avec nous notre chance. Nous avons bâti une démocratie avec l'aide de millions de gens qui ont fui la tyrannie et cherché la liberté. Nous avons construit une communauté par la tolérance, le compromis, la compréhension.

L'engagement du Canada envers la justice et les droits de la personne est reconnu dans le monde entier. Nelson Mandela, les "refuzniks" soviétiques ainsi que les gouvernements de la Chine, du Sri Lanka, du Nicaragua, du Kenya et d'Haïti l'ont salué. Nous pouvons compter sur ce Centre pour diffuser ce message à sa manière - un message canadien, un message de persévérance et d'insistance, mais aussi d'aide et d'espoir. Un message qui nous rappellera nos propres réalisations et nous poussera à nous attaquer à de nouveaux défis.

Au nom du gouvernement du Canada, je vous souhaite un avenir des plus brillants. Je suis sûr que vous serez à la hauteur de la tâche qui vous est confiée.

Statement

Secretary of
State for
External Affairs



Déclaration

Secrétaire
d'État aux
Affaires
extérieures

90/66

SOUS RÉSERVE DE MODIFICATIONS

«DROITS DE LA PERSONNE ET DÉVELOPPEMENT DÉMOCRATIQUE»

NOTES POUR UN DISCOURS

DU SECRÉTAIRE D'ÉTAT AUX AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES,

LE TRÈS HONORABLE JOE CLARK, C.P., DÉPUTÉ,

À LA CONFÉRENCE INTERNATIONALE SUR LES DROITS

DE LA PERSONNE

AU BANFF SPRINGS HOTEL

BANFF (Alberta)

Le 12 novembre 1990

Affaires extérieures et
Commerce international
Canada
External Affairs and
International Trade
Canada

Canada

DROITS DE LA PERSONNE ET DÉVELOPPEMENT DÉMOCRATIQUE

L'année dernière à la même date, les bureaux de scrutin fermaient en Namibie. C'était la première fois que ce pays faisait l'expérience de la démocratie. Et les résultats ont été concluants. L'Assemblée constituante élue à ce moment-là s'est attaquée à la rédaction de l'une des constitutions les plus progressistes au monde. Et la dernière colonie d'Afrique est finalement devenue indépendante. Cette expérience a été une victoire pour la Namibie, une réussite pour les Nations Unies, et elle a indiqué à l'Afrique australe que la démocratie pouvait être obtenue pacifiquement, si chacun se donnait la main.

Ce jour-là, les Berlinoises de l'Est et de l'Ouest célébraient dans la rue et grimpaient par-dessus l'obstacle qui les avait séparés. Le mur était devenu une porte. Le peuple s'était révélé plus fort que le fil barbelé, plus puissant que les dictateurs et la police secrète.

Et la semaine prochaine, les dirigeants de 34 pays assisteront à Paris à une réunion au sommet de la Conférence sur la sécurité et la coopération en Europe (CSCE), qui est directement liée à la chute du mur. Ce sommet est l'expression d'une Europe entière et prospère, d'une Europe où la démocratie et les droits de la personne ne sont plus des concepts qui divisent, mais une réalité qui unit.

Ces événements sont le point culminant d'une année fertile en réalisations extraordinaires. Nous n'avons jamais eu autant de raisons d'espérer que le respect des droits de la personne devienne la règle plutôt que l'exception dans le monde. Les sociétés qui se rallient à la démocratie n'ont jamais été si nombreuses - en Europe, en Amérique latine, en Asie et en Afrique; pour certaines il s'agit d'une première expérience, tandis que d'autres renouent avec la démocratie.

Mais il est trop tôt pour se reposer sur nos lauriers. Le processus ne fait que commencer. Dans certains pays, les murs sont tombés: les vrais murs et les murs de l'esprit. Il reste cependant à édifier de nouvelles structures. Il est plus facile de défaire que de construire. Si de nouveaux systèmes ne permettent pas d'améliorer rapidement les conditions de vie, la démocratie risque de porter le blâme et les droits de la personne pourraient être à nouveau menacés.

Et dans bien d'autres parties du monde, les murs sont toujours debout. Les divisions créées par le pouvoir et la pauvreté, qui privent les gens de leurs droits les plus fondamentaux, qui partagent les sociétés entre ceux qui mènent et

ceux qui souffrent. Des murs qui confinent des pans entiers de la société à une existence à peine digne de ce nom. Le fait que nous ayons gagné des batailles nous dit qu'il en reste encore bien d'autres à livrer, encore bien des victoires à déclarer.

Les événements en Europe de l'Est, en Amérique latine et en Asie nous ont fait réaliser que les droits de la personne et la démocratie ne sont pas des luxes, et qu'ils ne sont pas le fait de pays développés ou riches. Ce sont des conditions qui rendent possible la richesse.

Il est tentant pour certains de prétendre que les peuples et les gouvernements se sont ralliés à la démocratie et aux droits de la personne parce qu'ils ont jugé que leurs vieux systèmes étaient immoraux ou incohérents. J'estime que cette façon de voir est erronée. Ces sociétés ont rejeté d'autres systèmes et d'autres approches parce qu'ils ne fonctionnaient pas, parce qu'ils ne permettaient pas de «livrer la marchandise». Ils niaient au peuple la nourriture du corps et de l'esprit. Le défi consiste à faire en sorte que le nouveau système fonctionne mieux.

Les gouvernements des nouvelles démocraties admettront peut-être que les sociétés totalitaires s'auto-détruisent. Ils reconnaîtront peut-être que les systèmes qui condamnent la prospérité sont voués à la pauvreté. Ils savent peut-être que les sociétés qui nient les droits de la personne au nom de la paix sociale sont des sociétés où cette paix n'est qu'une trêve. Néanmoins, les citoyens de ces pays-là tireront d'autres conclusions si les nouvelles expériences ne fonctionnent pas non plus. Si le peuple est frustré, si la prospérité demeure une vaine promesse, si la démocratie ne fonctionne pas, il y a vraiment lieu de craindre le retour des vieilles méthodes, des vieux régimes.

L'essentiel, c'est que les droits de la personne et la démocratie soient perçus, non pas comme un changement de style, mais comme les composantes indispensables des sociétés qui fonctionnent, des sociétés qui sont stables et prospères. Autrement, les droits de la personne et la démocratie disparaîtront aussi rapidement qu'ils auront vu le jour.

Ceux d'entre nous qui viennent de sociétés où la prospérité repose sur la liberté et où la stabilité se fonde sur la démocratie ont l'obligation de prouver que ce que nous avançons est universel non seulement en théorie, mais aussi en pratique. Ils ont le devoir de prêter leur assistance, non pas en qualité de prédicateurs mais à titre de partenaires.

C'est à la fois une question d'attitude et de gestes à poser, en sachant quoi faire et quoi éviter.

Premièrement, il faut éviter le piège facile qui consiste à se poser en modèles. Nos sociétés se sont développées de la façon qu'elles l'ont fait pour des raisons particulières qui ont à voir avec l'histoire, la tradition et la culture. Nos démocraties ne nous ont pas été livrées sur des plateaux d'argent. Elles ont dû être cultivées. Et c'est pourquoi elles ont pris racine.

Par ailleurs, elles diffèrent considérablement l'une de l'autre. Entre la social-démocratie à la suédoise, les traditions de Westminster et le capitalisme sans entrave des États-Unis, il n'y a pas uniformité. Et nous ne pouvons espérer retrouver cette uniformité chez les autres.

Deuxièmement, il faut être patient et ne pas exiger tout de suite la perfection. Les démocraties naissantes ne seront pas parfaites dès le premier jour. Les droits de la personne ne seront pas respectés dès le départ avec la rigueur que nous aimerions tous voir. Cela ne signifie pas qu'il faille trouver des excuses ou fermer les yeux sur les abus. Cela signifie simplement qu'il faut avoir des attentes et des exigences réalistes.

Nous avons mis des siècles à arriver où nous en sommes. Nous ne pouvons demander aux autres de faire en quelques jours ce que nous avons réalisé au fil des décennies. Et il ne faut jamais oublier que la démocratie fait son chemin ici aussi, qu'aucun d'entre nous n'est parfait et que nous pouvons tous être victimes de la pauvreté, de l'intolérance, de la propagande et des préjugés.

Troisièmement, il faut aller au-delà des beaux discours. Il est facile d'encourager ou de dénigrer les autres. Il est plus difficile d'être un compagnon de route ou un ami. Lorsque des pays choisissent d'adhérer à des options que nous avons préconisées, nous devons les aider concrètement et sans lésiner sur les moyens à mettre en pratique ce que nous prêchons depuis si longtemps.

Un autre élément entre aussi en ligne de compte, à savoir quel concours nous pouvons apporter à ces pays. Il est maintenant admis, je crois, que les sociétés qui ne sont pas démocratiques ont peu de chances de se développer. Et le contraire s'applique également. Il est peu probable que les sociétés sous-développées deviennent démocratiques. Il nous faut donc agir en conséquence.

Cela veut dire que nous ne pouvons pas exiger la démocratie tout en ignorant le développement. Que nous ne pouvons pas nous attendre à ce qu'un peuple affectionne le scrutin lorsque son estomac crie famine. Une aide efficace au développement servira davantage à promouvoir la démocratie et les droits de la personne

que les remontrances des pays occidentaux. Ce n'est pas en construisant des édifices parlementaires ou en surveillant des élections que la démocratie s'installera. La démocratie et les droits de la personne doivent reposer sur la confiance et sur le développement.

Les instruments du développement sont donc ceux de la démocratie et du respect des droits de la personne. Apprendre à un peuple à lire, c'est l'aider à se développer et à faire un pas dans la voie de la démocratie. Enseigner à un peuple à devenir productif, c'est lui donner les armes nécessaires pour combattre la pauvreté, mais c'est aussi lui faire franchir un autre pas dans la voie du respect des droits de la personne. Aider les femmes à participer au développement, c'est permettre aux familles de devenir plus prospères, c'est rendre les sociétés plus équitables, mais c'est aussi faire obstacle aux préjugés et à l'iniquité.

Quatrièmement, il nous faut reconnaître que de nombreux facteurs interviennent dans le bon fonctionnement d'un système démocratique. Toutes les démocraties sont fondées sur l'autorité de la loi et son application juste et équitable. Le développement de la démocratie est tributaire de l'établissement d'institutions et de processus juridiques et c'est à ce niveau que les pays occidentaux peuvent apporter leur aide.

Par ailleurs, les démocraties doivent bénéficier de la liberté de la presse. Elles doivent pouvoir compter sur une fonction publique professionnelle et impartiale. Elles doivent également jouir de la liberté de parole et de la liberté de réunion. Aider à établir les institutions et à réunir les compétences nécessaires pour garantir le respect de ces droits fondamentaux est un aspect de l'aide au développement qui sert à mettre une démocratie sur pied.

Cinquièmement, nous devons nous pencher franchement sur les conditions auxquelles nous soumettons l'aide au développement. Ce n'est pas une question facile à traiter. Elle présente souvent le choix difficile à faire entre l'appui aux droits de la personne et la lutte contre la pauvreté. Je crois qu'un peuple ne devrait pas être puni pour un régime qu'il n'appuie pas et qui le punit déjà. Nous pouvons effectivement abhorrer un gouvernement et détester un régime en place, mais ce dégoût ne devrait pas nous indisposer à l'égard du peuple.

Cela ne veut pas dire qu'il n'y a pas de limites. Il doit y avoir des normes fondamentales à ne pas mettre de côté. Les régimes en place doivent se rendre compte que la tolérance n'est pas absolue et que s'ils ont systématiquement recours à la cruauté pour gouverner, le reste du monde ne pourra faire autrement que de réagir.

L'aide au développement que le Canada accorde s'inscrit dans cette optique. Nous prenons en considération le bilan d'un pays en matière de droits de la personne avant de décider de l'ampleur et de la nature de l'aide que nous accorderons. Mais nous ne nous attendons pas à ce que les sociétés les plus répressives deviennent parfaites du jour au lendemain. Nous cherchons plutôt à déterminer les chances d'amélioration et nous évaluons les progrès faits chaque année.

Dans certains cas, plutôt que de mettre complètement fin à l'aide accordée, il nous arrivera de modifier le genre d'assistance. Si un régime donné viole les droits de la personne de façon systématique, flagrante et continue, nous couperons les liens avec ce régime, mais nous n'abandonnerons pas le peuple tant et aussi longtemps qu'il nous sera possible de rester en contact avec lui. Nous n'ajouterons pas à ses souffrances. Nous choisirons plutôt d'oeuvrer par l'intermédiaire d'organismes locaux - les églises et les organismes non gouvernementaux (ONG) - afin que les secours arrivent à destination sans pour autant venir en aide à ces gouvernements. J'admets que cette façon de procéder ne fonctionne pas toujours à merveille, mais je crois qu'elle est tout-à-fait correcte du point de vue moral.

Sixièmement, je pense qu'il nous faut éviter d'accorder de l'aide au développement comme s'il s'agissait d'une récompense. Ce sont pour des raisons bien tangibles que certaines sociétés réussissent plus rapidement que d'autres à mettre une démocratie en oeuvre et à assurer le respect des droits de la personne. Cela peut dépendre entre autres de leur niveau de développement. Si nous prenons la démocratie comme critère premier de l'aide au développement, nous pourrions nous retrouver en train de récompenser les riches et de punir les pauvres.

Septièmement, nous devons reconnaître qu'exiger la démocratie et préconiser un ajustement structurel peut présenter des contradictions. S'il est mal conçu et appliqué sans ménagements, l'ajustement structurel peut ébranler les bases de la démocratie et du respect des droits de la personne. Pour que les sociétés puissent vraiment s'épanouir sans connaître pour autant les effets d'une inflation destructrice, il faut un ajustement structurel. Mais il faudrait que nos institutions financières joignent leurs efforts à ceux des pays en développement afin que l'ajustement puisse garantir le maintien des fondations sociales sur lesquelles viendra s'appuyer la croissance.

Huitièmement, nous devons reconnaître l'importance primordiale du partenariat dans l'édification de la démocratie et le renforcement des droits de la personne. Tout comme il est impossible pour les démocraties de faire leur oeuvre si elles sont imposées, elles ne pourront être maintenues que si tous les éléments de la société sont mis à contribution. De même, les

gouvernements ne détiennent pas toutes les réponses. Il existe des ressources, des compétences et de l'expérience partout au sein de la société et il faut en tirer parti.

La solidarité au sein des sociétés peut être encouragée par des partenaires à l'étranger.

Voilà pourquoi le gouvernement du Canada a créé un organisme indépendant, le Centre international pour le développement de la démocratie et des droits de la personne à Montréal.

C'est aussi pour cette raison que nous insistons tant sur la démocratie et les droits de la personne au sein des organismes régionaux auxquels nous siégeons. En juin dernier, nous avons proposé la création d'un Groupe pour le développement de la démocratie au sein de l'Organisation des États américains (OEA) afin de fournir des compétences et de l'aide aux pays en voie de démocratisation. La proposition a été acceptée. Par l'intermédiaire du Groupe d'évaluation de haut niveau du Commonwealth, nous tentons d'établir un organe analogue au sein du secrétariat du Commonwealth. Nous explorons de semblables possibilités pour La Francophonie et nous encourageons le Groupe d'experts sur la coopération judiciaire à promouvoir concrètement le respect des droits de la personne et le développement de la démocratie.

Ces organes régionaux peuvent apporter de l'aide sous une multitude de formes:

- faciliter les échanges d'information et de compétences;
- dresser un répertoire d'experts en systèmes et institutions démocratiques;
- mettre au point des normes et des procédures régionales pour les élections;
- envoyer des missions d'observateurs lors de la tenue d'élections;
- coopérer avec les autres organismes régionaux et multilatéraux;
- et encourager le dialogue sur les principes et les valeurs démocratiques au sein de ces régions.

En Europe, le Canada a pris les devants à la Conférence de la CSCE sur la dimension humaine à Copenhague en proposant de renforcer les engagements et les droits des minorités. Nous discutons actuellement de la création, au sein de la nouvelle structure de la CSCE, d'un bureau chargé de veiller à la tenue d'élections libres et à la présence d'institutions démocratiques. Nous avons également encouragé l'OTAN à mettre en place des programmes - y compris des bourses - qui lui permettront de partager ses expériences démocratiques avec ses anciens adversaires.

Nous avons en outre créé un Fonds de coopération politique dans le cadre de notre Programme d'assistance à l'Europe centrale et de l'Est. Ce fonds servira à accorder des subventions et des contributions visant à favoriser le dialogue et la coopération avec ces pays afin d'encourager les institutions démocratiques, le pluralisme politique, la règle de droit et le respect des droits de la personne.

Au cours de la dernière année seulement, le Canada a contribué à la tenue d'élections en Roumanie, en Bulgarie et en Tchécoslovaquie. Nous avons envoyé en Namibie des observateurs et une centaine d'agents de la GRC pour assurer la stabilité de ce pays dans son cheminement vers la démocratie. Nous aidons aussi le Bénin qui est en train de se défaire du totalitarisme. Nous avons accepté en principe de participer à une mission d'observateurs du Commonwealth au Guyana et avons envoyé, par l'intermédiaire du Commonwealth, des observateurs aux élections qui ont eu lieu en Malaisie le mois dernier. Nous avons participé aux efforts de l'OEA et des Nations Unies au Nicaragua et nous travaillons avec ces deux organisations en vue des prochaines élections en Haïti. Enfin, nous sommes prêts à aider les Nations Unies à bâtir la démocratie dans le Sahara occidental et au Cambodge.

Ces activités ont trait aux élections. Mais nous dispensons d'autres genres d'aide à caractère moins logistique. En Afrique du Sud, nous tentons de contribuer à l'implantation d'une démocratie multiraciale. Les compétences canadiennes sont offertes à toutes les parties mais, question d'équilibre entre les forces en présence, nous fournissons une aide financière à la majorité noire pour des travaux de recherche, de consultation et d'élaboration en vue d'une constitution. Nous secondons également un projet de recherche de deux ans sur l'élaboration d'une constitution dans une Afrique du sud post-apartheid; c'est un professeur canadien de criminologie qui dirige le projet.

Il existe d'autres domaines où il convient de faire la promotion des droits de la personne et du développement démocratique.

L'alphabetisation en est un. Le fait de savoir lire et écrire permet de mieux participer à la vie politique et économique. Le Canada est déjà actif dans ce secteur et il continuera de l'être, notamment pour ce qui est des femmes et des enfants, qui sont les principales victimes de l'analphabétisme.

La liberté de presse offre un autre champ d'action. Une presse indépendante est un facteur important dans la lutte contre la corruption et les violations des droits de la personne et dans la défense de la liberté de presse et d'association. Par le passé, le Canada a accueilli des journalistes en provenance de nombreux pays en développement. J'estime qu'il y a place pour de

nouvelles initiatives dans ce domaine, entre autres en ce qui concerne les codes de déontologie, l'organisation d'une presse libre et le droit des médias.

Un troisième domaine d'intervention pourrait être la création de postes de protecteurs du citoyen. Cette institution offre aux citoyens un recours contre les abus juridiques. L'expérience du Canada en la matière pourrait certes intéresser d'autres pays.

Un quatrième domaine est celui de l'administration publique. Il est essentiel de pouvoir compter sur une fonction publique excellente, impartiale et bien formée qui veillera à l'application et au respect de la règle de droit, fondement même de la démocratie.

Mentionnons enfin la formation de la police. Le Canada a mis sur pied un programme unique en Namibie, où notre contribution à l'effort des Nations Unies a débouché sur une initiative visant à enseigner à la police namibienne des méthodes d'auto-formation. Une police professionnelle, qui connaît bien la loi, est un gage de respect de la démocratie et des droits de la personne.

Ce ne sont pas là des idées extraordinaires en soi et elles ne suffisent pas à transformer le despotisme en démocratie. Mais ce sont des petits pas dans la bonne direction. C'est de cette façon que l'on construit la démocratie et que l'on progresse. Ces étapes sont un outil de formation; elles permettent de bâtir des institutions et d'instaurer la confiance et, ce faisant, elles consolident la démocratie et garantissent davantage les droits de la personne.

Les démocraties ne sont pas pacifiques par définition. Cependant, les sociétés libres et développées sont moins susceptibles d'opter pour la guerre dans le cours normal des choses. Dans le village global où nous habitons, chacun a intérêt à réduire les occasions de conflit et à promouvoir la paix.

La guerre froide a faussé nos priorités et nous a amenés à négliger les problèmes mondiaux. Maintenant qu'elle est terminée, le monde peut enfin considérer la liberté et la justice pour tous comme un facteur de sécurité, et non pas comme un privilège réservé à quelques-uns.

La défense des droits de la personne et de la démocratie est au coeur de la politique étrangère du Canada. C'est un engagement qui correspond à la nature même de notre pays. Les Canadiens dénigrent parfois leurs propres réalisations. Mais ce que nous avons accompli ici est unique. Il faut le préserver et le faire partager. Nous avons bâti une communauté en invitant le

reste du monde à partager notre chance. Nous avons construit une démocratie avec des millions de gens qui ont fui la tyrannie pour choisir la liberté. Nous avons édifié une nation que Barbara Ward a déjà qualifiée de «premier pays à vocation internationale». Nous avons accompli cet exploit grâce à la tolérance, au compromis et à la compréhension. Et, sur le plan de la démocratie et des droits de la personne, nos réalisations, quoique imparfaites, font l'envie des autres.

Le monde extérieur reconnaît l'engagement du Canada envers la justice et les droits de la personne qui caractérise notre pays. Nelson Mandela le reconnaît, tout comme les «refuseniks» soviétiques, ainsi que les gouvernements de la Chine, du Sri Lanka, du Nicaragua, du Kenya et de Haïti. Nous maintiendrons et consoliderons notre détermination, car cet engagement définit nos valeurs et conforte notre volonté. Nous voulons un monde où la justice ne connaît pas de frontières et où les droits de la personne ne souffrent aucune exception.

ARTICLE BY THE FOREIGN SECRETARY, THE RT HON DOUGLAS HURD MP, FOR
BOW GROUP PARTY CONFERENCE SPECIAL

PROMOTING GOOD GOVERNMENT

Good government isn't a luxury. For much of the world's population, it makes the difference between life and death. Unfortunately, many millions of people are denied it. Instead of pursuing policies which could help relieve the burden of suffering, their governments have followed courses which have actually entrenched the dismal cycle of poverty, hunger and deprivation.

I believe that the prospects for breaking out of that cycle are better now than they have ever been, for two reasons.

First of all, because many countries in the old Communist bloc and in the developing world have finally understood how misguided and destructive their policies were.

Secondly, because we in the West have now emerged from the moral fog which sought to excuse - and even justify - the resort to such policies on the grounds that they were excusable for societies which had just won their emancipation from empire. Countries at an early stage of their economic development couldn't afford the luxury of the political and economic freedoms enjoyed by the West - or so the argument ran. Such double standards were, of course, deeply patronising; there is no reason why we should expect the Third World to accept lower standards than those which apply elsewhere. Poverty does not justify torture, tyranny or economic incompetence.

The realisation that good government goes hand in hand with successful economic development has taken a painfully long time. (There are still countries where it has not yet dawned.) For those of us who saw the post-colonial era as marking a new chapter of hope for the developing world, the pattern of events - with some notable exceptions, such as India - soon took on a depressing monotony. It was not long before constitutional rule and multi-party systems were eroded and single-minded demagogues tightened their grip on the apparatus of power.

The sixties and seventies saw the consolidation of authoritarian rule, with military juntas or one-party regimes installed in most of Africa (with a few honourable exceptions such as Senegal, Botswana and The Gambia).

Now, though, there are some hopeful signs of change. Even the Organisation of African Unity has recently called for more democracy in the continent. More importantly, several countries have set reforms in hand or announced their intention to do so. Mozambique has jettisoned Marxism and turned to free markets and Western investment. Benin has renounced socialism and is opening up its economy. In Somalia, the Government has said that it will hold multi-party elections next February. Zambia has announced a referendum next year on the future of its one-party system. President Mobutu of Zaire has agreed multi-party elections in principle and even President Mengistu of Ethiopia says he is prepared to mend his ways.

Of course the proof of the pudding will be in the eating, but there are some real grounds for optimism - not because road to Damascus-type conversions are suddenly all the rage, but because many governments have no alternative but to change their policies in the face of widespread popular discontent and growing demands for better government.

In Africa in particular, the impetus for reform is becoming more and more irresistible as living standards for the great bulk of the population continue to fall. During the 1980s, GDP per capita in the world's poorest continent fell by 2% per year on average. That decline has fomented social unrest which governments cannot simply ignore or suppress.

Meanwhile, the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe has deprived many developing countries of a model which used to lend the one-party system a sort of credibility - albeit a spurious one. As a result, more and more countries in the ex-Third World and among the non-aligned nations are starting to talk the language of open markets and more open societies. What is more, as the developing world ceases to be an ideological battleground between East and

West, so it is becoming harder for uncompromising regimes to count on support from one of the super-powers just because they display the right ideological credentials.

Here in the West (and even in the more unreconstructed outposts of Development Studies) - the blame for poverty and under-development is no longer laid at the door of "neo-colonialism". As the Economist recently pointed out, some of the world's poorest countries, like Haiti, Nepal and Ethiopia, have not for ages been part of any empire - and war-torn Liberia never was. The enthusiasts of limitless aid, of so-called "self-sufficiency" drives, and of central planning have now fallen strangely silent.

Hard evidence of the damage wrought by economic mismanagement continues to accumulate. A study by the World Bank has brought home the link between open trading systems and economic growth, with much of East and South-East Asia in the forefront. By contrast, those developing countries which had pursued "inward" or broadly protectionist trade policies had only achieved negligible economic growth over the last three decades.

The conclusion is inescapable and is certainly not lost on the Soviet leadership and the new governments of Eastern Europe: namely, that free markets, open trade and private property are the best way known to mankind for improving its standard of living.

The question now for the developed world is how best to encourage the trend towards better government. The principle of conditionality has been clearly laid down by the British Government, by the European Community, and by the USA.

This summer's summit of the G7 in Houston reiterated the principle in emphatic terms: "We and other countries should assist Central and Eastern European nations that are firmly committed to economic and political reform. Those providing help should favour countries that implement such reforms". The EC, the IMF, the OECD and other organisations are urgently examining the form which that help should take. As with Eastern Europe, so with the rest of the world: "We are determined to assist other peoples to achieve and

sustain economic prosperity and political freedom".

So the moral imperative is clearly understood. In practical terms, it means that we should state explicitly that we will reward democratic governments and any political reform which leads to greater accountability and democracy. The corollary is that we should penalise particularly bad cases of repression and abuse of human rights.

Those principles should increasingly inform our aid programme; they will require careful scrutiny of our aid commitments on a case-by-case basis. Wherever possible, we should use aid as a lever for better government - not only because that is right for the developing countries, but also because we owe it to the British taxpayer. Without a modicum of good government, aid tends to be wasted.

In fact, we do already insist on economic reform as the price of our aid. Amongst other things, that means recipient countries supporting their agricultural sector, and letting farmers earn a reasonable price for their produce. At the moment, food production in much of the world is not keeping up with population growth. Artificially low food prices mean that farmers get precious little return, and nowhere nearly enough to improve their productivity - by buying machinery or fertilisers, or simply building a channel to irrigate their crops.

Economic reform also means ending subsidies for special interest groups, and for loss making state-run industries in particular. It means keeping currencies competitive enough for exporters to be able to sell in world markets.

These are the kind of reforms which international institutions like the IMF routinely insist upon. It is important that we also encourage that kind of structural adjustment through our own bilateral aid, and through programme aid (i.e. help with balance of payments) in particular.

We also have to explain that sustainable reform is not just a

matter of sound economic policies, but of political reform as well. In the short term, an authoritarian or corrupt government may achieve some economic progress. In the longer term, however, such governments prove inefficient, and are unable to deliver social goods as effectively as governments which are accountable. The social unrest which they engender can put the survival of the government itself in jeopardy - a consideration which is certainly concentrating many minds at present.

Accountability must be a central plank of political reform. Without it, there can be little real pressure for greater efficiency. It goes hand in hand with political pluralism and, above all, with more open government. Openness and accountability are essential if bad policies are to be corrected, and if the decision-makers are to feel the consequences. They are also needed to root out corruption, which is particularly insidious in developing countries. Whilst corruption can function as a sort of lubricant in some societies, it is nevertheless profoundly inefficient. What is more, it saps the confidence of ordinary people in their own institutions - as the experience of Eastern Europe makes all too clear.

The other argument for more openness is that it makes it more difficult to conceal abuses of human rights. For we should be clear that we are not only talking about freedom from poverty and hunger, but freedom from the fear of torture and arbitrary arrest. We must underline to potential aid recipients that the two are complementary.

The recent World Bank report on Sub-Saharan Africa set out clearly the relationship between a free market economy where individual initiative is rewarded, and a legal system where individual rights are protected without fear or favour. If our dialogue with aid recipients is to extend to political structures as well as economic policy, we should find suitable opportunities to discuss in detail the mechanisms for safeguarding individual rights - including an independent judiciary, recourse to proper defence lawyers, and police accountability.

In every case, we will need to make a judgement about the most effective way to achieve our objective. In certain cases, it will make sense to voice our concern and condemnation as publicly as possible. In other cases, we will find the government in question more amenable to private representations, so that it is not seen to lose face.

There is another powerful argument for a proper legal framework: it is the only framework within which private property can be entrenched and put to full productive use. Producers will respond if they are given the right incentives; they need not only the right to private property, but confidence in their continuing right to enjoy that property under a settled system of law.

The Government is looking closely at the levers for better government which we have at our disposal. We are under no illusions that governments will make the necessary reforms because they like the colour of our eyes; they will do so if they see clearly that it is in their interest to do so.

The first thing we can do is to introduce good governance and human rights into our regular aid dialogue, and leave recipients in no doubt about our concerns. We will do so without casting any doubt on our commitment to humanitarian relief and direct aid to people.

We should make more rigorous and detailed assessments of recipients' overall performance.

We should try to introduce sensible criteria into the deliberations of the major international donor institutions. At this month's UN Conference on Less Developed Countries, the British Government argued that there is a strong connection between economic performance and the quality of government. Our efforts were successful: it was agreed that that fact should in future inform decisions about aid.

We should look carefully at the performance of the Commonwealth. A review of its role in the 1990s and beyond is under way: we welcome the fact that there is general agreement on the need for the Commonwealth to give proper attention to human rights and good government. The Prime Minister will underline that objective when she meets with other Commonwealth heads of government in the New Year.

We should continue to make conditionality a cornerstone of our policy towards the USSR and Eastern Europe. We must tailor aid to fit progress towards democracy and economic restructuring along market lines. Just handing out money would be like giving coins to a man who has holes in his pocket.

We should seek to reduce the potential for corruption, and help Governments to establish an open framework within which the private sector - and small businesses in particular - can flourish.

We should expose and condemn abuses of human rights when they are uncovered by the media, by our posts abroad, and by non-governmental organisations, like Amnesty International. The BBC World Service has an obvious role to play here, and in informing the world at large of the advance of democracy.

We should encourage good government with the sort of assistance which will strengthen key institutions like the judiciary and public administration. Assistance to law enforcement agencies should encourage responsibility and accountability - not the apparatus of repression.

We should strengthen democratic institutions and encourage freedom of the press, political pluralism and the dispersal of power. We should also look out for opportunities to support countervailing sources of power where it makes sense to do so, along with non-governmental organisations. Following consultations with all the political parties at Westminster, the Government will shortly finalise the shape of a British political foundation to help the consolidation of fledgling democracies.

We should help expose opinion-formers in the developing countries to the values and practices of liberal democracy through visits, training programmes for lawyers and journalists, and the exchange of information.

Above all, we need a concerted approach by all major aid donors if we are to make a real impact. Speaking to an African audience recently, the French President echoed the same concerns as our own. We must now build on the growing spirit of international co-operation and make sure that the promotion of good government takes its place alongside the calculations of self-interest which help shape the foreign policy of every nation state. More often than not, we will find that the two are mutually reinforcing.

The developing countries are in no doubt about our commitment to help them. Britain took the lead in reducing their burden of overseas debt. We have written off some £260 million worth of loans to the poorest African countries alone. And we have consistently urged an imaginative and flexible approach to debt relief. The Chancellor of the Exchequer's recent four-point plan could mean 18 billion US dollars being written off the debt of the world's poorest highly indebted countries.

So our credentials are good ones. We don't wish to proselytise and lecture. We are not so naive or presumptuous as to expect Westminster-style democracy all over the world. But we must help along a trend which is bringing democratic reform to countries as far apart as Chile, Namibia, Mongolia and South Africa.

We are slowly putting behind us a period of history when the West was unable to express a legitimate interest in the developing world without being accused of "neo-colonialism". Now that much of the world is dropping its ideological baggage, we should redouble our efforts to improve the well-being of millions of people who have known little other than poverty and oppression. That means better government - and we in the West must say so.

ENDS

renew its historic role in the progress of freedom in the world.

Today there is a school of thought that questions the universal relevance of pluralistic democratic norms and regards it as a specimen of peculiarly U.S. naïveté that the United States should try to identify its interests with democratic self-government in other lands. However, friends of the United States abroad have never doubted the universal significance of these norms.

There is especially strong perception of both the role of the United States and the universal validity of democratic norms in countries where pluralistic democracy is new or fragile. This does not mean that they deny the United States a special role; only that they recognize the place of this concrete role in the growth of the universal norm. Giovanni Spadolini, minister of defense of Italy, has repeatedly called attention to the essential U.S. role as the "point of reference" for the spread, unification, and stabilization of democracy in Europe. And the universality of the norm and the struggle could hardly be expressed better than it was by Mario Soares, formerly prime minister and now president of Portugal, in his letter of endorsement of CCD's program.

I do not believe it possible to construct progressive and free societies without complete adherence to the elementary rules of democratic pluralism . . . To defend Democracy is, therefore, to safeguard the input of each of us in the definition of the common ways leading to general welfare. When this input is tampered with one opens the door to despotism and totalitarianism.

The world has known, and still knows, governments that sacrifice the liberty and justice owed every human being in order to indulge the egoistic interests of privileged minorities. History, however, has taught us that, sooner or later, freedom triumphs, since it has the strength of the ideals which are innate to human nature. Since to contribute to an acceleration of this inevitable process is the duty of every responsible citizen, it appears to me that the project which you intend to carry out deserves our full support.

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PROMOTING DEMOCRACY

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12 DEMOCRACY PROMOTION AND GOVERNMENT-TO- GOVERNMENT DIPLOMACY

William A. Douglas

Formal government-to-government diplomacy is insufficient for the most effective conduct of U.S. foreign relations. Official relationships of the United States are primarily with whatever regime—democratic or totalitarian—is in power in a foreign country. A U.S. program for promoting democracy abroad can provide a useful supplement to our official diplomacy. Certain problems would also accompany such an approach, although they are not as serious as some would expect. The opportunities arise from a dual-track diplomacy whose benefits for U.S. foreign relations would greatly exceed its costs.

DUAL-TRACK DIPLOMACY

By encouraging a division of diplomatic labor, the United States can maintain relations with both the incumbent governments of other countries and their political oppositions. As is normally the case, the Department of State and the U.S. Foreign Service can maintain official government-to-government contacts. A well-functioning U.S. democracy promotion program can enable private U.S. groups—political parties, trade unions, business associations, cooperatives, and the like—to relate informally to comparable private groups in other nations, including those associated with the opposition to the government in power. Thus, when a nation's government changes hands, some segment of U.S. society will already have ongoing political ties with the incoming regime.

Though our embassy diplomats are expected to develop informational contacts with opposition forces in other countries, this is sometimes difficult if the incumbent host country regime disapproves of such contacts. In addition, informational contacts do not provide for the depth of understanding that develops when two democratic groups work together on programs. It is much easier for private U.S. groups—political parties and interest groups—to work with opposition groups than for the U.S. government to do so. In this way a democracy promotion program can facilitate effective U.S. foreign relations with other countries without having to depend upon an incumbent regime remaining in power.

This dual-track approach has been extremely useful for the conduct of West German foreign policy since the three major West German political foundations began their overseas activities. Together, the Social Democratic, Christian Democratic, and Liberal foundations have ties with a sizable majority of the world's democratic political movements.¹ These ties are ongoing regardless of which party in a country may be in power. The official West German diplomatic corps maintains government-to-government relations with whatever party or group—dictatorial or democratic—makes up the regime of the day.

Reinhard Meier, writing in the *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, noted that "the foundations themselves, and apparently the Bonn regime as well, regard this engagement abroad as a useful supplement to official channels of international cooperation. It is likely, in fact, that some connections and points of influence are established in this way that would not necessarily be open to direct representatives of the government."²

The division of labor between U.S. government diplomacy and private sector programs to promote democracy abroad may be especially useful in situations where the United States is allied with a particular nation but needs to distance itself from the present government in power there. These situations occur most often when harsh dictatorships are facing an immediate threat from forces also hostile to the United States, usually either from communist armies on their borders or Soviet-supported insurgencies within their territory.

In circumstances of this type, the United States may need to adopt two different postures simultaneously: (1) reaffirm U.S. commitment to the official alliance with that nation, particularly if failure to do so might encourage an invasion or increased Soviet support for the insurgency; and (2) dissociate the United States from the dictatorship so as to deprive the Soviets of the opportunity to charge the United States with collusion with yet another "right-wing dictatorship" that is suppressing its people. By making use of the dual-track division of labor, the U.S. government

can dramatize the U.S. commitment to the state-to-state alliance while U.S. political parties and other private groups engage demonstratively with the democratic opposition, thereby showing that Americans are not committed to the incumbent dictatorial regime. Since identifying the United States with rightist autocracies is a key issue for Soviet political warfare, the flexibility the United States can gain is of great importance.

Example of cases in which dual-track diplomacy could have served U.S. foreign policy well were the Philippines and South Korea during the first years of the 1980s. Given the important U.S. military interests in each of these nations, it was strategically vital to make clear to the communist powers that the United States could not and would not permit a communist takeover in either country.

It was also politically vital—in the eyes of the populaces involved and the world at large—for the United States as a society to dissociate itself from the regimes of General Chun Doo Hwan in South Korea and Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines. Both regimes, in different degrees and in different ways, were liabilities to the Western bloc, even while the countries they governed were vital to Western interests. Both regimes permitted, under varying degrees of repression, open opposition parties to exist. A U.S. private sector program of democratic development could have worked publicly with these oppositions. Private sector activities would have indicated where U.S. political sympathies lay, while the official U.S. embassies in Seoul and Manila could have reaffirmed U.S. strategic support for both nations rather than for the governments of the day.

Long-term democratic institution building would be, by far, the most important benefit for U.S. foreign policy. The private sector democracy-promoting effort would be a kind of preventive medicine—building solidly organized democratic political parties and interest groups as the infrastructure of long-term political and economic stability. Under present circumstances, official U.S. diplomacy is confined to observing passively political events in other countries before it can react to them actively. Thus, when political institutions collapse, as in Iran and Nicaragua, U.S. policymakers must deal with the problem on a crisis basis. Often it is easier, through patient effort over many years, to prevent crises than to try to resolve them in a few weeks or months by taking purely reactive measures.

The time for the United States to "do something" about Nicaragua was in the late 1960s and early 1970s when the Somoza regime appeared stable. A democratic alternative to that regime should have been built up while there was still time for such long-term organizing. The same was true for Haiti in the late 1970s and the early years of the 1980s. A democratic opposition in the Philippines, as we have noted, could have

similarly been strengthened. If a democracy promotion program can help democratic oppositions prepare to succeed the Duvaliers, Marcoses, Somozas, Stroessners, and Mobutus of the world, this would be a significant positive outcome for U.S. policy.

Recent history has demonstrated the folly of relying on such strongmen to provide "stability," while regarding efforts at democratic institution building as "destabilizing." There will be instances when the U.S. government will be unhappy with the democratizing efforts of U.S. private groups, viewing them as merely complicating an already difficult situation in a given country. However, the disadvantages that such cases will inflict on U.S. official policy will be vastly outweighed by cases in which U.S. private action supplements and strengthens official policy. Democratic governments, after all, tend to tilt toward the Western side in the world balance of power. Otherwise, successor governments of the dictatorial Left usually align with Moscow, whereas those of the dictatorial Right usually create new liabilities for the Western bloc.

PROBLEMS FOR OFFICIAL DIPLOMACY

Every public policy and program has positive and negative features. A democracy promotion program, with a dual-track approach as described, will be no different. There will be contradictions and a need for coordination. When the original legislation to create the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) was before the Congress in 1983, a number of questions were raised in Congress and the press about the seriousness of the contradictions. A common concern was that if a U.S. private sector program were to aid the opposition in a given country, the incumbent regime might take umbrage, with damage to U.S. government-to-government diplomatic relations.³

Experience indicates that this problem is not as serious or as frequent as some expected. The West German political foundations have been working all over the world with many opposition movements, with no major negative results for Bonn's official diplomacy. Also reassuring are the achievements abroad of U.S. labor unions, using U.S. government funding. Most of the nations of the world are governed by dictatorships, and trade unions are often the natural political adversaries of authoritarian regimes. U.S. labor, through its regional institutes for Asia, Africa, and Latin America, has conducted training and other programs with opposition unions in El Salvador, the Philippines, South Korea, Paraguay, Chile, and elsewhere. As in the West German experience, there have been few, if any, cases in which the U.S. labor institutes' programs have damaged U.S. government-to-government diplomacy with the related regimes. Even in the few instances in which the host

country's government has expelled a U.S. labor program—Peru in 1971 and El Salvador in 1973—there was little consequence for the warmth or frigidity of official diplomatic relations.

The Soviet Union, it should be recalled, has engaged in assistance to communist opposition movements throughout the world since the days of the Comintern, yet Soviet embassies go right on negotiating trade agreements and maintaining normal diplomatic transactions with many regimes they are trying to subvert. Here, too, the contradictions between the two tracks—official state diplomacy and nongovernmental political institution building—are less than might logically be expected. Only occasionally has a government forced Soviet dual-track policy to choose between state diplomacy and political institution building. One case was Egypt under Nasser. In this instance, the Soviet Union was obliged to end support of the Egyptian Communist party in order to achieve close official alignment between Soviet and Egyptian foreign policies during Nasser's later years in power.⁴ Most of the experience supports the conclusion that political aid, thoughtfully fashioned, to another regime's opposition does not necessarily upset official government-to-government relations.

Aiding Democracies

To find out why embitterment is rare, we must divide host country governments into democracies and dictatorships. The factors differ between the two types. In democracies the West German programs and the nascent U.S. program offer aid to the entire family of democratic parties and interest groups in these countries. This usually includes the party in power at some given time and so reduces the incumbent's grounds for complaining that aid is also going to the opposition. With the next throw of the electoral dice the governing party may well become the opposition, even more eager to receive foreign assistance. What is central in these democratic cases is that foreign assistance is provided in order to strengthen the entire democratic system in the host country, not simply to place a particular party into power. This is a principle that is readily understood by most of the foreign governments and parties in this category and explains their willingness to accept such aid.

Difficulties, however, do occur. One worst case scenario has the party in power in the United States aiding the opposition to a regime in another country.⁵ Can the two governments then have cordial diplomatic relations? An answer depends on whether or not the United States had been aiding the entire democratic spectrum, that is, the party in power as well as the opposition. Further, the U.S. political aid would presumably support programs of training, research, and organizing to enable all host country parties to become building blocks for a sturdy democratic polity.

It would be inappropriate for U.S. political aid to fund a particular party's election campaign costs.

Even in such worst case instances, government-to-government relations need not be altered to any great extent by the political aid activities. For example, when West German Social Democrats were in power under Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, this party's Friedrich Ebert Foundation had close ties with Venezuela's Accion Democratica party. When the Venezuelan elections were won by the Christian Democratic party, *Comite de Organizacion Politica Electoral Independiente (COPEI)*, *Partido Social-Cristiano*, official West German diplomatic relations with Venezuela were not seriously frayed. A major reason was that the governing COPEI party had its own connection with the West German Christian Democratic Konrad Adenauer Foundation. COPEI also understood, correctly, that the overall West German aid program was aimed at strengthening Venezuelan democracy in general, not at getting a particular party into power at a particular time.

Providing political aid may cause inconsistencies in the aid-giving country's own foreign policy more often than it damages relations with other governments. In his article on the German party foundations, Reinhard Meier notes that, in 1982, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation was giving aid to El Salvador's Christian Democratic party under President Napoleon Duarte while the Friedrich Ebert Foundation was aiding part of the coalition supporting the leftist insurgency against Duarte's government. "Since both foundations are financed from the government coffers in Bonn, the German taxpayer finds himself in the grotesque position of having his tax money channeled to two rival groups locked in mortal combat."⁶ While it makes sense to aid all the competing parties of a democratic polity, so as to strengthen the polity as a whole, it does not seem sensible to aid both sides in a civil war and thereby aggravate the war.⁷

What any political aid program, West German or U.S., undoubtedly needs is a system by which all parties in a donor nation arrive at a jointly accepted roster of democratic movements in each aid-receiving nation, so that political aid may be confined to the groups on the consensus roster. In the cases of Venezuela and El Salvador, for example, all the West German parties would probably have agreed that both major Venezuela parties are democratic and worthy of aid, but there would probably have been no consensus about which forces in the Salvadoran civil war were democratic. In a decentralized polity such as the United States, most government policies depend on some degree of bipartisan consensus, and a U.S. program to promote democracy abroad is especially dependent upon consensus. Therefore, while each U.S. party should be able to aid its associates abroad, all such aid should be limited

to indigenous groups and parties that Democrats and Republicans, liberals and conservatives, agree to be democratic in character. The NED can serve as the forum for arriving at such democratic rosters.

Aiding Dictatorships

Giving political aid to oppositions under dictatorial regimes may prove feasible for reasons other than those pertinent to democratic regimes. In the case of dictatorships, too, government-to-government consequences are less stormy than might be expected.

Many authoritarian regimes allow opposition parties to exist and even to contest elections. The elections are, of course, "managed" so that the opposition has little or no chance of winning. This does not diminish the fact that opposition groups are tolerated and held up by the regime—for the benefit of the United States and Europe—as evidence of its "democratic" character. If it is trying to project such an image, a dictatorial regime can hardly complain if the United States or West Germany endeavors to provide political aid to opposition groups. Since tolerating an opposition is a basis for claiming its own legitimacy, the dictatorship's inclination to vent displeasure by disrupting government-to-government relations with the foreign donor is mitigated.

Even more important is the fact that many dictatorships, particularly those along the periphery of the Soviet bloc, need the United States more than the United States needs them. They are more directly in the path of Soviet expansionism, certainly more vulnerable to communist subversion than, say, California or Maryland. These regimes may have little choice but to accept U.S. political aid programs in support of democratic opposition movements, just as they already accept—with more resignation than enthusiasm—the AFL-CIO training programs for their fractious labor movements. The communist threat to these dictatorships affords political leverage that the United States can use to obtain acceptance of responsible and effective U.S. democracy promotion programs. Sound programs need not perturb official U.S. diplomatic relations with such dictatorships.

In sum, for both democracies and dictatorships, the anticipated danger that U.S. political aid to the oppositions to incumbent regimes may cause friction in official government-to-government diplomatic relations turns out to be more theoretical than real. In contrast, a well-designed U.S. political aid program can provide the United States with a degree of access and flexibility in its foreign relations that has hitherto been impossible through strictly government-to-government transactions. The benefits of a dual-track program of democracy promotion far outweigh the real but minor costs to U.S. state-to-state diplomacy. On balance, a strong U.S. program of government-supported private sector political aid

to democratic groups and parties abroad can be effectively carried on in the short term and become overwhelmingly significant for U.S. foreign policy in the long term.

NOTES

1. On the West German *Stiftungen*, see chapt. 5.
2. Reinhard Meier, "Political Party Foundations in Bonn," *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, February 1982, p. 27.
3. For an example of this concern, see Henry Geyelin, "Some Crusade?" *Washington Post*, June 24, 1983.
4. John H. Kautsky, *Communism and the Politics of Development* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1968), p. 151.
5. Representative James Leach presented this scenario in the House debate on the original authorizing legislation for the NED. See *Congressional Record*, June 9, 1983, p. H-3816.
6. Meier, *op. cit.*, p. 27.
7. This view was also expressed by Representative Leach, *op. cit.*, p. H-3816.

13 ASSESSING POLITICAL AID FOR THE ENDLESS CAMPAIGN

Ralph M. Goldman

Political aid is a U.S. foreign policy concept whose time has come, particularly as it bears upon the promotion of democratic development. Arriving with political aid are all the issues attendant upon new concepts: definition of its meaning; operationalization of its component features; tactics of implementation in the field; evaluation of program effectiveness; assessment of overall contribution to democratic development. In the case of political aid for democracy, the concept is further burdened by the usual resistance to new policies, modest practical experience, shortages of committed resources, trial-and-error projects and programs, intuitive rather than systematic evaluations of results, and large debates about "best" models of democracy. Nevertheless, the U.S. policy of political aid, particularly in support of democratic development worldwide, is in its incipient stage and, in time, may well replace in importance military and economic aid as the principal foreign assistance program of this nation.

This expectation is currently difficult to support with evidence. Many will greet it with incredulity. Yet, we need only believe that major wars are obsolescent and that the world economy is rapidly becoming an integral whole in order to arrive at the realization that international affairs may well be on their way toward more familiar political forms of ideological and programmatic competition, that is, through party systems, organized interest groups, propaganda campaigns, elections, public debates, and other activities for which an effective program of

The International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development: Notes on Its Mission

Robert Miller

Résumé

Le Parlement du Canada a adopté en août 1988 une loi créant le Centre international des droits de la personne et du développement démocratique (CIDPDD). Dans cet article, l'auteur qui a travaillé à titre de conseiller pour le comité parlementaire ayant recommandé la création du Centre, propose de définir quel devrait être son mandat.

L'article décrit l'opposition qui a surgi lors des discussions menant à la création du Centre entre d'un côté, les tenants des droits de la personne, et de l'autre, les tenants du développement démocratique. L'auteur soutient que, plutôt que de chercher à éviter les affrontements, le Centre devrait les aborder et tenter de les résoudre par l'approche dite "démocratie et justice sociale" qui cherche à promouvoir la participation des peuples les plus faibles et les plus pauvres au développement démocratique.

Avec cette approche en tête, l'auteur recommande que le Centre établisse un programme pour l'Amérique centrale qui aiderait les pays de cette région à réaliser les réformes démocratiques auxquelles ils se sont engagés par la signature du Plan de paix Esquipulas. Il suggère que le programme prévoie : le soutien aux institutions et critères régionaux; la démocratie pour les moins bien nantis; et la participation au développement. Il conclut en exhortant le Centre à mettre en pratique ce qu'il prône, en étant ouvert dans ses débats internes et en poursuivant son mandat avec courage et imagination.

Introduction

With the passage of legislation in August 1988 to establish the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development (ICHRDD), Canada's international human rights policy is about to enter a new and potentially more creative period. The centre offers the promise of a more active and constructive Canadian human rights policy. Canada will do more than pass judgement on the human rights records of other countries; it will also try to help strengthen practices and build institutions that provide some protection for those rights.

The centre's promise, however, requires a human rights development strategy and a statement of mission for ICHRDD. Those are tall orders. It is difficult enough to agree on a definition of human rights, let alone devise a strategy for their development; moreover, the field of human rights is strewn with many ideological traps. In these circumstances, the first board of directors may be tempted to avoid trying to set a long-range course, preferring instead to get on with the "practical business" of devising programs and allocating budgets.

Unfortunately, that sensible way of doing things might reduce the centre right at the beginning to confusion, sterility, and irrelevance. Without a clear and compelling statement of mission, ICHRDD might become just a funder of competing conventional wisdoms, a human rights ambulance chaser in pursuit of the latest cause. Conversely, with a mission of its own, the centre can become a source of fresh thinking and a catalyst for practical Canadian assistance in human rights and democratic development.

The value of ICHRDD will depend on its commitment to think through what it wishes to be and do. These notes are intended as a contribution to carrying out that task.

Starting Points

The need for a statement of mission arises from the fact that the purposes of the centre, as set down in the act of parliament creating it, are broad and diverse. Nonetheless, the legislation and some of the thinking behind it provide our starting points.

The first thing to note is that the International Bill of Human Rights is the touchstone of the centre's mandate. The objects of the centre, as described in the legislation, are to undertake various activities "that give effect to the rights and freedoms enshrined in the International Bill of Human Rights, including, among those rights, the right to an adequate standard of living, the rights of persons not to be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the rights of freedom of opinion and expression and the right to vote and be elected at periodic, genuine elections in pluralistic

political systems." These and the many other rights enshrined in the bill suggest why allegiance to international human rights is not, by itself, sufficient to provide the centre with a clear mission.

It is, however, a big step in the right direction. In citing the international bill, the legislation makes clear that the establishment of the centre is not intended by Canada as an act of ideological imperialism. It is not a thinly disguised attempt to set ourselves up as judges of other countries or exporters of Canadian values and institutions. Quite the contrary, the legislation identifies Canada with an international rather than a bilateral or national approach to human rights. The centre's purpose is to provide Canadian resources and experience in helping to achieve widely-recognized, though often unrealized, international obligations.

The centre is also to work in support of the full range of rights set down in the international bill, that is to say, economic, social, and cultural rights as well as civil and political rights. This may seem somewhat redundant in that the Canadian aid program already attempts to support the economic and social development of Third World countries and peoples. It should be recognized, however, that civil and political rights are often prerequisites for the achievement of economic rights. In a 1987 submission to the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade (SCEAIT), Dr. Susan Zurbrigg of Halifax drew on her experience as a health care worker in rural India to illustrate this point:

To be effective, medical technology has to be accompanied by very basic changes in the economic precariousness of the poor majority, working conditions, wages—not high wages but just wages that will provide minimal calories for a family. The link to human rights is that unless there is some manoeuvring room for villagers to press for some accountability within the overall economic and political situation, those more fundamental socio-economic changes will not occur. As a result, the dollars we send in medical aid will be essentially wasted.

The notion of "human rights development" is the other important starting point in defining the mission of ICHRDD. In its 1986 report *Independence and Internationalism*, the Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations made a distinction between human rights "protection" that seeks to expose and to punish the violators of human rights and human rights "development" that tries to improve the underlying conditions that give rise to those violations in the first place. The committee acknowledged that the methods appropriate to human rights protection—international monitoring and sanctions of

various kinds—remain absolutely essential, but went on to say that these should be supplemented by cooperative human rights development programs as well, consisting of financial support, exchange programs, research, and technical assistance. To quote the report: "Canada should contribute to the long-term development of political, civil and cultural rights as it now contributes to long-term economic and social development through the aid program."

Human Rights vs. Democratic Development?

International in its orientation, inclusive in its mandate, and developmental in its approach, these starting points take us some way towards defining the role of ICHRDD. But the centre also confronts a major stumbling block which, if not overcome, will slow it down and make very difficult the development of a coherent and challenging mission. Here we refer to the uneasy relationship between the two sides of the centre's mandate, human rights and democratic development.

Following the government's acceptance in principle of the parliamentary committee's recommendation that it establish an International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development, the secretary of state for external affairs appointed two rapporteurs to provide advice on how the centre should be set up. After extensive consultations, the rapporteurs issued a report, in 1987, that strongly supported the concept of the centre but took exception to the term "democratic development," recommending instead that the organization be called the International Centre for Human Rights and Institutional Development. The government chose to ignore this advice, but it is worth considering why it was offered in the first place.

The rapporteurs wrote that many witnesses had warned them that the word democratic had "acquired an ideological, political and cultural meaning which differs profoundly from one region of the world to another," and that its use runs the risk of "being interpreted as an intention to impose on our cooperative programs in this area our own concept of democracy." They went on to say that others feared that democracy would "be perceived as indicative of the philosophy of the present USA [i.e., Reagan] administration." If these objections can be boiled down into a single proposition, it would seem to be this: the variety of democracy is so great that it makes impossible, or unacceptable, the sharing of democratic experience. Is this so?

It is true that the word democracy is used and often abused in many different ways around the world, although surely the same is true of the term human rights. It is also clear that the institutional expressions of democracy vary enormously and that it would be a great mistake to confuse any particular system with democracy itself. But

democracy also has a common, widely understood meaning—government effectively under the control of the people. Such essential elements of democratic government as freedom of speech and assembly and periodic and genuine elections, are contained in the International Bill of Human Rights and referred to in the legislation creating the centre. In short, there would seem to be about as much agreement around the world on what constitutes democracy as on any other aspect of human rights.

If that is true, what are the risks of the centre imposing "our own [i.e., Canadian] concept of democracy" on its cooperative programs? Unquestionably, there is some risk because we all tend to assume that our institutions and practices are the best way of doing things. But we run this risk in every area of international development, be it economic, social, scientific, or cultural. Canadians like to believe that they have been partially inoculated against cultural arrogance by the experience of fending off the embrace of their American neighbours, but the best curb on Canada running a democracy export business is the freedom of the rest of the world not to buy. Even if we wish to, Canadians rarely have the power to overreach themselves.

That brings us back to the last objection to the word democratic cited by the rapporteurs, that its use "will be perceived as indicative of the philosophy of the present USA administration." This may seem a passing problem, but in fact it is close to the heart of what many fear in the term democratic development. Former President Reagan, as part of his broader foreign policy goals, tried to mobilize the world in a crusade for democracy. The crusade had its overt and peaceful elements (for example, the establishment of the National Endowment for Democracy), but it had less overt and less peaceful elements as well, most notably the funding and managing of the Nicaraguan contras, a.k.a. the "freedom fighters." In the eyes of many who were not moved by the wisdom or the rightness of these latter policies, Mr. Reagan's crusade amounted to hijacking the word democracy for geopolitical goals.

So one is obliged to ask: Is democratic development just a modern, dressed-up version of gunboat diplomacy? Is it inherently interventionist and hostile to cooperation in international relations? It is not, although the Reagan legacy does put one on guard. The spirit of democracy points in quite a different direction, to the principles of self-determination and non-intervention in international affairs; and certainly, those are the principles that should guide Canada's own approach to democratic development. In practical terms, this means that requests for assistance should originate with people in developing countries, who should also determine the extent and forms of the assistance. Cooperation in democratic development also means that

all programs should be open to public view and debate, in both the recipient countries and Canada.

This approach takes us some way towards reconciling human rights and democratic development, but substantial problems remain. The Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development is situated on an old and deep intellectual fault line where two sets of values meet, the values of individual freedom and social equality. On one side of the line are those who associate human rights with the basic needs of the poorest people and with an agenda of economic justice and reform. For many of these people, Third World democracy is far too often a sham because it is controlled by traditional elites and serves to protect the *status quo*. On the other side of the fault line are those who see democratic development as the only means of social and economic reform that avoids revolution. They see this possibility as threatened from the right by those who are opposed to reform, and from the left by those who want solutions now to economic and social ills regardless of the consequences for civil and political rights.

Given these divisions, there is a risk that ICHRDD's programs will be developed in two quite separate and distinct spheres, the one emphasizing institutional democracy (legislatures, electoral systems, the judiciary and so on) and the other human rights focused on the needs of the poorest people, or what might be called popular democracy. This would be unfortunate, because either of the two tendencies without the other is dangerously incomplete. Institution-building can settle into complacent, legalistic tinkering that promotes democratic facades without much substance. Popular democracy, on the other hand, may mobilize people without strengthening the institutions and practices necessary to protect their civil and political rights.

Just because each approach is incomplete, it should be a major goal of the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development to build bridges between them. Rather than ignoring or trying to avoid the tensions between human rights and democratic development, the centre should derive strength from directly confronting and seeking to resolve these tensions. For want of a better term, we could describe this approach as "Democracy and Social Justice," the thrust of which would be to facilitate the participation of the weakest and the poorest people in democratic development. To illustrate how this might be done, we turn to the case of Central America.

Democracy and Social Justice in Central America

There can be few areas of the world where the debate among the meaning of human rights and democratic development has been as

intense or divisive as Central America, where it presents radically different versions of history and models of social and economic development.

On the one hand, there is the Nicaraguan model which describes itself as a revolution for economic and social justice, and thus a true democracy for the dispossessed. Its critics describe it as creeping totalitarianism masquerading as the champion of the poor, and charge that its real goal is the centralization of power not the emancipation of people. On the other hand, there is the Salvadoran model which its supporters describe as reform through electoral democracy and defend as the only alternative to repression and revolution. Its critics are less generous. They charge it with fraud, the intent or at least the result of Salvador's sham democracy being the effective continuation of military rule, large scale human rights abuses, and economic exploitation of the poor.

Until recently, there seemed to be little or no middle ground between these positions, or, if there was, it amounted to an ideological and political no man's land where people ventured at their peril. In those circumstances, there were few practical opportunities for bridging the differences, and certainly no opportunities which were attractive to a country as cautious in its foreign policy as Canada. What emerged instead was a two-track Canadian policy, with the government trying to be "evenhanded" in providing some aid to all countries (and therefore to all models of development) in the region, and the NGO community voting overwhelmingly for the Nicaraguan model while recommending an official Canadian boycott of the Salvadoran.

There is at least a hope that this utterly polarized situation is beginning to change. In Nicaragua the revolution may maintain itself in power, but it is presiding over an economy and society collapsing into ruins. Reconciliation of the ideologically irreconcilable begins to seem necessary to all sides, save the most extreme. In El Salvador, the spectre of unending civil war has begun to concentrate minds on the possibility of a negotiated settlement. In these circumstances, Canada can begin to make a greater contribution to helping Central America bridge the gulf between institutional democracy and social justice.

The Special House of Commons Committee on the Peace Process in Central America recommended, in 1988, that the government of Canada seize the opportunity, risky as it may be. The committee saw the combination of development, democracy, and peace in the Esquipulas II Agreement as the most promising, indeed the only, way ahead for Central America. As the title of the committee's report—*Supporting the Five*—makes clear, it is a road down which all five of the countries that signed the agreement must travel together. Virtually all of the committee's recommendations for Canadian and

international assistance pointed to the need for expanding regional dialogue and cooperation in Central America.

Supporting "the five" means, implicitly, that no model of development in Central America is seen as providing all the answers. It also means that no model of development is excluded from the dialogue; the Reagan administration, with its "four against one" policy, had tried so hard to exclude Nicaragua. The conclusion follows: the Central American debate about human rights and democracy, and the search for solutions, must continue. That points to the work of ICHRDD in the region.

An Esquipulas Program

As the special committee was preparing its report on Central America, the legislation to create ICHRDD seemed to be stuck in political limbo, written but not introduced in the Parliament and in danger of disappearing into the approaching storms of a federal election. The members of the committee were convinced that the centre could play an important role in Canadian policy towards Central America and so recommended that "the legislation be introduced expeditiously." The committee also recommended that the centre's board of directors establish an Esquipulas Program "designed within the framework of Esquipulas II to provide practical assistance for human rights and democratic development in all five countries. Particular attention should be paid to the development of women's rights." The committee did not spell out the details of such a program, but having regard to the principles on which ICHRDD was founded and what we have said earlier about democracy and justice, an Esquipulas Program might look something like this:

1) Regional Institutions and Standards

Central America has a long and unhappy history of receiving unsolicited advice from the outside world, followed by coercion. The Esquipulas Agreement expresses the desire of many Central Americans to manage their own affairs. Canada is given considerable credit in the region for recognizing and supporting that desire, and for being sensitive to the needs of Central Americans as defined by Central Americans. ICHRDD should give expression to that approach by strongly supporting the development of regional human rights institutions and standards.

The House of Commons committee saw a special opportunity to do this by supporting the development of a Central American Parliament. As provided for in Esquipulas II, the parliament is intended to serve as

a forum for legislators from all five countries, but not as a replacement for national legislatures. While lacking legislative clout, it is hoped that the parliament will advance the debate about alternative models of social and economic development and, in particular, human rights and democratic development. Looking further ahead, it is seen as the embryo for institutions, such as a Central American Court for Human Rights, to strengthen region-wide human rights practices and standards. Elections to the parliament could serve as a model for free and fair elections in the individual countries.

The initiative to create the parliament has progressed very slowly, and there is little that outsiders can do to speed things up, beyond words of encouragement. In the meantime, ICHRDD should promote the goals for which a parliament would be created by encouraging the formation of regional human rights networks. To some extent, the human rights movement has fallen victim to the polarization of Central American politics, as evidenced by the proliferation of governmental and non-governmental human rights commissions reporting very different versions of the human rights reality in the region. While not entirely avoidable, this politicizing of human rights can, if carried too far, destroy the credibility of human rights monitoring. ICHRDD could address this problem by sponsoring region-wide workshops and courses to debate, define, and develop human rights standards. In time, the networks so developed might have the capacity to investigate allegations of unfairness or bias in the work of human rights organizations.

The same regional orientation should inform the centre's approach to election-observing. While it remains important to send international teams to observe elections, ICHRDD should concentrate on the development of this same capacity within the Central American region, with the observer teams made up of nationals of the five Esquipulas countries. The centre should also support the development of Central American standards and procedures for election-observing.

2) Democracy for the Poor

The holding of "free, fair and honest elections" in the five signatory countries is a key provision of the Esquipulas II Agreement, and at the same time a matter of bitter contention in several Central American countries. During the 1970s and early 1980s, opposition political parties and popular organizations in Guatemala and El Salvador were attacked brutally by the military and death squads; their leaderships and memberships were decimated. As a result, it is charged that recent elections in those countries have been held in an atmosphere of tacit if not outright terror, a fact which together with sheer danger led the democratic left to boycott elections for some time. In the case of

Sandinista Nicaragua, there has been no comparable degree of repression associated with elections, but critics say that there has been a systematic campaign of more subtle intimidation and coercion by the government that renders elections fundamentally unfair. Here too, the opposition, or parts of it, has chosen to boycott the process.

Recent developments suggest that Central Americans across the political spectrum may be willing to give elections yet another chance. In El Salvador, social democratic party leaders associated with the FDR-FMLN have returned to the country from exile to participate in the 1989 presidential elections, and the FMLN itself has indicated a willingness to participate on certain conditions. In Nicaragua, the Sandinistas have committed themselves to an accelerated schedule for presidential elections, and to sweeping new guarantees for opposition participation. ICHRDD should do what it can to sustain this precarious revival of hope in electoralism by encouraging the regional monitoring of elections, as suggested above, and by supporting the effective enfranchisement of the poor.

What that means, simply, is that there is more to elections than the marking of ballots. Elections can be technically proper and efficiently run and yet occur under conditions that seriously compromise, if not entirely destroy, their legitimacy. When that happens, elections become part of a country's problems, not part of the solution. While it is true that elections can discriminate against any part of the population, in Central America they are far more likely to work against the interests of the poor. In most countries, *los pobres* (the poor) are less likely than the more affluent and better educated to participate in the electoral process, but this has very special significance in countries where a large proportion of the population is desperately poor. If ICHRDD wishes to support the consolidation of democracy in Central America, it should concentrate on supporting effective participation of the poor in democracy.

There is no simple, safe, or quick way of achieving that goal, although certainly part of the answer must lie in providing greater protection for the organizations—cooperatives, unions, and associations—that represent the poor. Peace Brigades International, for example, offers protection by supplying volunteers to accompany, 24 hours a day, human rights workers, union members, and others whose lives are threatened. It should be the highest priority of ICHRDD to support activities of this kind that aim to make electoral democracy a viable option for the poor. In this way, Canada will recognize the importance given to elections by the Esquipulas Agreement.

3) *Participation in Development*

Inequality is not only economic and political. It is also cultural, part of the social fabric. The economic exploitation that is visited on whole classes of people by society is often passed on in the form of exploitative personal and family relationships that further victimize the weakest and most vulnerable members of society. Here we speak especially of women and children in Central America.

In his report, *The State of the World's Children 1989*, the director-general of UNICEF lists "seven sins" of development, including development without participation and development without women. He notes that the women of developing countries are responsible for producing and marketing most of their crops; and that they carry the main responsibility for food preparation and home-making, for water and fuel, for nutrition and health care, and for the education of the young. Yet "in development assistance efforts to date, most of the education and training, the technology and the inputs, the investments and the loans, have gone to men." The inequality facing women in Central America is as severe as anywhere in the world, buttressed as it is by powerful cultural traditions.

What can ICHRDD do about such situations? First of all, it should demonstrate its understanding that human rights is an essential part of development, not a separate field of activity. Likewise, it should show its concern for the democracy of everyday life as well as the democracy of the ballot box. But how? The main responsibility for carrying out Canada's policies in support of economic development lies with CIDA. In recent years the agency has raised the priority given to the poorest people, to participation, and to women in development. Nonetheless, because development agencies have a multitude of competing and changing objectives, ICHRDD should develop a watching brief to help defend those priorities. ICHRDD should interest itself in the full range of Canadian aid activities in Central America to see that they remain, or become, supportive of participation in development. Similarly, the centre should be open to funding projects from "developmental NGOs" as well as "human rights NGOs."

Conclusion

In drawing these notes to a close, we would first repeat the central message: it is vitally important for ICHRDD to have a mission and equally important for that mission to draw together the two sides of the centre's mandate, human rights and democratic development. We have suggested what a "Democracy and Social Justice" program might look like in Central America.

There are two other points that we would like to make. The centre's mission outlined here will not be the only one proposed by its friends, or its enemies for that matter. With the establishment of ICHRDD, the debate about its future will just begin. Particularly in the first months, the discussions of the board of directors should go to the heart of questions about ICHRDD's mission. As soon as possible, the centre should establish a newsletter that reports candidly on these discussions and invites the comments of readers. In this way, the centre can practise what it means to encourage in others.

Finally, a comment on risk. Once the centre defines its mission, it should be pursued with courage and imagination. A major goal, as stated in the legislation, is to "help reduce the wide gap that sometimes exists between the formal adherence of states to international human rights agreements and the actual human rights practices of those states." In other words, the centre will seek to support only those things to which states have already declared their commitment, but it would be naive to assume that those states will invariably welcome ICHRDD with open arms.

Section 6(2) of the centre's legislation says that it can carry out its activities "in any jurisdiction outside Canada to the extent that the laws of that jurisdiction permit." That creates a gray area and leaves considerable discretion as to how much risk the centre can or should run. Whatever the answer, we think that ICHRDD should run more risk that diplomats are willing to run, which is why ICHRDD was created at arms-length from government in the first place. The point here is not to be bold or reckless, but to recognize that human rights development is inevitably a disturber of the *status quo*. Otherwise, why is it needed at all? It would be well, therefore, for the board of directors to buckle themselves in and prepare for the occasional spell of turbulence. They may be consoled by the words of an anonymous writer: "That which most of all calls forth our noblest capacities into action is always a hazard of some kind, never a certainty. It is when we are ready to stake our lives on something, or to make something so that is not so, that nobility begins to appear in human nature."

VI.

Canadian Parliamentarians on Human Rights

Résumé conjoint

Les trois articles de cette partie prolongent le débat sur les droits de la personne en direction des programmes d'aide du Canada. Les thèmes principaux en sont le rôle et l'efficacité des commissions parlementaires, abordant la question: le processus législatif doit-il être public ou secret, ainsi que les difficultés que pose le fait de rendre l'aide au développement conditionnelle au respect des droits de la personne.

L'honorable Jim Manly (NPD) soutient que le développement ne peut survenir dans un climat de répression et souligne l'importance de rendre visible publiquement les violations aux droits de la personne. De plus, il indique quelques faiblesses des programmes d'aide du Canada. D'abord, l'aide ne se rend pas toujours aux groupes les plus démunis. Ensuite, accorder de l'aide à des pays qui violent les droits de la personne est un geste contradictoire qui mine la crédibilité de tels programmes. M. Manly reconnaît des difficultés dans le fait d'utiliser les programmes d'aide comme moyen d'améliorer le respect des droits de la personne mais il demeure critique quant au secret dont le gouvernement entoure sa politique des droits de la personne.

L'honorable André Ouellet (Lib.) explique brièvement comment s'est élaboré le lien entre l'aide étrangère et les droits de la personne, dans la foulée des récents rapports parlementaires et gouvernementaux. Il renvoie à la notion de "modèle de violation systématique, flagrante et continue des droits fondamentaux de la personne" comme principal critère d'évaluation afin de guider les politiques

ANNEXE "B"

Draft for Discussion

THE INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
AND DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT:
A NEW APPROACH TO POLITICS AND DEMOCRACY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES?

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Introduction.

On August 15, 1988, the Government of Canada introduced Bill C-147 proposing the creation of the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development.¹ The Bill received Royal Assent on September 30, 1989.

The rationale behind the creation of the Centre is explained in the Report to the Right Honorable Joe Clark and the Honorable Monique Landry of June 30, 1987.¹ The report was commissioned by the Secretary of State for External Affairs to "examine how the Government might proceed with the creation of an institution which would have as its objective, the development, strengthening and promotion of democratic institutions and human rights in developing countries..."² According to the Report,

our discussions with Canadians and international interlocutors have persuaded us that while a wide range of activities in this area of democratic development and human rights is being undertaken by Canadian organizations...the possibilities for such activities have not been developed to their fullest...What also is lacking is a focal point for Canadian activity which would ensure the development of a body of experience and expertise, and the exploitation of the full range

¹ This paper deals exclusively with the "democratic development" dimension of the Centre's objectives.

of possibilities for the sharing of the Canadian experience. Such a focal point would also serve a networking role and provide for a sharing of information, experience and research among Canadians, international, multilateral, developing and developed country organizations, institutions and centres." 3

The Report clearly states that the purpose of the Centre should not be to export Canadian institutions.⁴ The original proposal for the creation of the Centre presented by the Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations⁵ also emphasized that Canada should not attempt to transfer its own political institutions. However, it is possible to conclude from the June 30, 1987 report,⁶ from the mandate received by the Special Rapporteurs that produced this document,⁷ and from the report of the Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations, 8 that the purpose of the Centre will be to promote liberal democratic practices and institutions in developing countries.⁹

The operational strategy to be used to achieve the Centre's objectives is not explicitly stated in any of the above mentioned documents. However, it is evident that the Centre will concentrate its efforts on the provision of financial and technical support to promote the advancement of democratic institutions and practices in the Third World. According to the June 30, 1987 report,

a governmental or non-governmental body in a friendly country... may undertake to make its own reforms, to strengthen its own institutions or to improve its own safeguards for human rights consistent with its international undertaking. If it needs human or financial resources to do so, it seems to us entirely appropriate for Canada, a trusted partner in

international development, and respected for its non-ideological approach, to respond. Canada should be able to offer financial assistance. It should be able to share the technical expertise that it has developed over the years in establishing its own institutions and that it continues to develop daily in refining them.¹⁰

Three conclusions emerge from the documents pertaining to the creation and organization of the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development. First, the objective of the new Centre is to promote the political development of developing countries along liberal democratic lines. Second, the rationale behind the creation of the Centre is based on the assumption that the Canadian experience can be useful in guiding that development. Third, the Centre will concentrate its work on the formal, technical aspects of democracy. That is, it will facilitate the establishment and development of democracy as a legal mechanism for conflict resolution in developing countries.

Attempts to promote the development and consolidation of democracy in developing countries are not new. Many efforts have been made during the post-World War II period to induce the political evolution of developing countries along liberal democratic lines. This paper will not review the history of these attempts. Rather, it will assess the main characteristics of the concept of Political Development particularly as it was articulated and promoted in the United States during the late fifties and sixties. As Richard A. Higgott points out, this was a period of optimism when it was believed that "the growth of 'scientific' social science would form the basis for rational exercises in social engineering."¹¹ A similar optimism seems to

lie behind the rationale, objectives and strategies of the Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development. An assessment of the concept of Political Development is, therefore, necessary to facilitate an understanding of the possibilities and obstacles the Centre will face in its attempt to promote the development and consolidation of democratic institutions in developing countries.

Political Development: An Assessment.

Social Science is riddled with concepts that do not fulfill the requirements of appropriate "data containers".¹² The concept of development is a good example of this problem because no agreement has been reached about the nature of this process, despite the extensive literature in this field. In a review of the concept of development, Kempe Ronald Hope pointed out that,

despite the existence of a great body of literature on the concept of development, there is still a great degree of ambiguity surrounding its meaning. Development has been defined in a number of ways incorporating various elements of the social, political, cultural and economic system. As such, despite some consensus on what constitutes underdevelopment there is no real agreement on what is meant by development.¹³

It is clear that despite the difficulties encountered by the academic community to define "development", the concept represents an attempt to control and manipulate the historical

evolution of the Third World.¹⁴ This attempt is based on the assumption that "there is a law of historical necessity that impels every society to try to attain the stage occupied by the so-called developed or modernized societies."¹⁵

The lack of a comprehensive understanding of development as a form of social change has not prevented the construction of the nebulous concept of "political development". The literature in this field is also extensive although our knowledge of the subject is partial and contradictory.¹⁶

The emergence of both "development" and "political development" has to be understood in a historical perspective because new interpretations of the world emerge in response to social and political circumstances rather than as pure intellectual creations of innovative minds.¹⁷

The developing world was caught between the hegemonic tendencies of the United States of America and the Soviet Union in the aftermath of the Second World War. In these circumstances, the theory and the practice of development were introduced into the Third World to facilitate its according to the political and economic interests of the capitalist industrialized countries of the West.

Development was simply equated with economic growth as it was measured by traditional economic indicators such as GNP and income per capita during the post-war years. J. B. Nugent and P. A. Totopoulos point out that this view of development rested on

the classical-neoclassical view of the world in which change is gradual, marginalist, non-disruptive.

equilibrating, and largely painless. Incentives are the bedrock of economic growth. Once initiated, growth becomes automatic and all-pervasive, spreading among nations and trickling down among classes so that everybody benefits from the process.¹⁸

Sociological, psychological and political "barriers to development" began to be identified in the 1960's.¹⁹ Joseph La Palombara argued that external inducements were necessary to facilitate the promotion of development "in the direction of freedom rather than tyranny".²⁰ The theories and the practice of Political Development and Political Modernization were introduced as a result of this concern. According to S.N. Eisenstadt political modernization,

can be equated with those types of political systems which developed in Western Europe from the seventeenth century and which spread to other parts of Europe, to the American continent, and, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to Asian and African countries.²¹

The concept of Political Modernization is used by Eisenstadt "as an attribute of history, as a specific historical transitional process and as a certain development policy in Third World countries."²² Political Development, from this perspective, means liberal democratic development. The objective of this process is nothing less than to recreate in the Third World the type of political systems that developed fortuitously in the West by means of external inducements.²³ Furthermore, while the political evolution of the West shows that democracy was often the result of radical and violent processes of change, Political Development was fundamentally concerned with achieving democracy while avoiding disorder and instability. ²⁴ Political Development was

then portrayed as "a continuous process of growth which is produced by forces within the system and which is absorbed by the system."²⁵ According to Eisenstadt

the central problem of modernization in a modern political system is the ability to deal with such changing demands. They must be absorbed in policy making while assuring continuity to the system. Sustained political growth thus becomes a central problem of political systems.²⁶

Thus, system survival is a central concern of the Political Development approach. This will become more evident in the discussion that follows.

Political Development can be characterized as an ahistorical, reductionist, voluntaristic, and conservative approach to political change in the Third World. In the social sciences, ahistoricism refers to the study of social phenomenon abstracted from time.²⁷ Two forms of ahistoricism are evident in the theory of Political Development. The first is that the political systems of the liberal democratic countries of the world are used as normative models for the Third World, without considering the historical factors that determined the emergence and consolidation of political processes and institutions in democratic societies. The second is that liberal democracy as a normative model is introduced in developing countries without due consideration to the historical factors that have shaped the political evolution of these societies, and that condition and limit the possibilities for the emergence of liberal democratic institutions in them. This ahistorical understanding of social and political change is intimately linked with the reductionist

view of politics that prevails in the Political Development literature.

Reductionist forms of analysis attempt "to reduce complex events to simple principles."²⁸ In other words, reductionist analyses attempt to explain "social reality by only one of its parts...."²⁹ The theory of Political Development deals with political phenomena in isolation from social, economic and historical factors. This reductionist approach to the study of politics in the Third World accounts for the voluntarist nature of the explanations provided by the literature in this field. In social sciences, voluntarism denotes any theory that stresses "the inviolability of free will which is an independent capacity of human beings to do as they please rather than react under compulsion."³⁰ Voluntarism, in other words, "denotes any theory that stresses the place of choice, decision, purpose, and norms in social action."³¹ Voluntarist explanations tend to ignore the role that structural factors play in conditioning and limiting human beings' freedom of action.

Political Development theory is voluntaristic because it implicitly or explicitly regards political institutions as if they were the result of conscious design. Political change is explained primarily as the result of political and technical intervention rather than as the outcome of multiple political, economic and international forces. Finally, the theory of Political Development is conservative because it attempts to promote democracy within the existing social order. The promotion

of gradual homeostatic change is, then, the practical objective of the Political Development approach.

The ahistorical, reductionist, voluntaristic and conservative nature of the theory of Political Development has had lasting effects on the programs of international cooperation in the field of politics. This can be seen in the tendency that prevails among many of the North American institutions and democratic development programs intended to promote democracy through the introduction of formal legal arrangements in the political systems of developing countries.³² This approach fails to recognize that democracy is both a formal mechanism for conflict resolution and an expression of a political consensus.³³ Democracy is not only a political technology but also a socially recognized delimitation of the scope and form of legitimate political struggle and dissent.³⁴ These two dimensions of democracy are intimately linked to each other. The effectiveness of democracy as a mechanism for conflict resolution depends on the existence of a consensus regarding the basic organization and nature of political life.

The existence of a political consensus in liberal democratic societies does not lead to the absence of conflict in these societies. It simply means that conflict is regulated and managed within socially accepted boundaries. From this perspective, it is important to distinguish between two types of conflicts: political conflict within the regime, and political conflict about the regime. ³⁵ Maurice Duverger explains that the

difference between these two forms of political conflict "resembles the distinction between a game played according to the rules, and a contest that is waged against the rules in order to establish new rules." 36 Conflict within the regime, such as electoral competition, is marginal in the sense that it does not affect the fundamental principles and institutions of a political system. Conflict about or over the regime, on the other hand, is fundamental in the sense that it questions the very basis of social and political life.

Elections and other democratic mechanisms for conflict resolution deal with marginal rather than fundamental social issues. Elections are effective mechanisms for conflict resolution when political disputes can be resolved with changes of government. However, elections were not designed as a mechanism for conflict resolution when political struggle and competition is about or over the nature of the regime. It follows that fundamental political disputes must be settled before elections can be used effectively. Giuseppe Di Palma points out that in the European experience,

elections were never used as a tool to bring about democracy. Similarly, they were never used to arrest liberalization at the threshold of democracy, by artfully constraining electoral participation and procedures. Nor were they ever successfully used to go beyond democracy, towards some kind of radicalizing utopia. As a tool for democracy, they were not needed; as a tool against it, they were late and insufficient. Instead, elections were knowingly used to legitimize after the fact, and even with some delay, a democratic choice that had already been made by and through the revival of civil society and of state/institutional autonomy. 37

Elections, according to DiPalma, are democratic not because they are about democracy, but because they are within democracy. 38 Put it in a different way, elections and other democratic mechanisms for conflict resolution are functional only when they deal with conflict resolution within the regime. They are effective as long as their legal and formal application is sustained by a legitimized (and consequently socially accepted) view of the fundamental nature of the regime. Dahl explains:

In a sense, what we ordinarily describe as democratic "politics" is merely the chaff. It is the surface manifestation, representing superficial conflicts. Prior to politics, beneath it, enveloping it, restricting it, conditioning it, is the underlying consensus on policy that usually exists in the society among a predominant portion of the politically active members. Without such a consensus no democratic system would long survive the endless irritations and frustrations of elections and party competition. With such a consensus the disputes over policy alternatives are nearly always disputes over a set of alternatives that have already been winnowed down to those within the broad area of basic agreement. 39

In many if not most developing countries, political instability and turmoil express the absence of a consensus regarding the political organization and orientation of society. Terry Karl explains that achieving this consensus requires agreement among social forces and political actors at least in regard to "the permanent rules governing the competition for public office; the resolution of conflict; the reproduction of capital; and the appropriate role of the state, particularly the military and the bureaucracy." 40

Conclusions

The purpose of this paper was to assess the concept of Political Development. This assessment had a practical and concrete objective: to contribute to the identification of the potential limitations, possibilities, and opportunities for the promotion of democratic institutions by the newly created International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development.

It has been argued that Political Development represents an ahistorical, reductionist, voluntaristic and conservative approach to politics in developing countries. The practical limitations of this approach are evident: while it is possible to create and transfer the legal mechanism for the articulation of democratic processes and institutions, it is virtually impossible to provide these processes and institutions with the legitimacy they need to effectively regulate and control social conflict.

It is possible to argue that attempts to externally induce the political development of developing countries can result in the establishment of elections and other democratic processes within illegitimate and socially unacceptable political regimes. In other words, it is possible to establish democratic processes and practices that have a legal rather than a legitimate value and meaning. Hebert Adam explains in his analysis of legitimacy and ethnicity in South Africa that legality can become a substitute for legitimacy and an effective guideline for the enforcement of order. In South Africa, for example, "the

separation of legality from legitimacy makes it possible to rule illegitimately with the aid of the law."⁴¹

To avoid the limitations of the Political Development approach the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development should transcend the formalistic and technical treatment of political institutions that have characterized many of the post World War II efforts to promote democracy in developing countries. A rich, intellectually and politically relevant research agenda could be designed to study the possibilities and limitations for the articulation of political consensus in developing countries. Knowledge of these possibilities and limitations is essential to identify, design and implement formal mechanisms of conflict resolution in these societies. Needless to say a research agenda of this type should grow out of the developing countries themselves, and, more specifically, they should be produced and implemented by the political and the academic communities of those countries.

Organizations are always pressed to produce clear and concrete results and organizations working in the field of international cooperation are not exempt from this requirement. The temptation will be strong to take the easy path of promoting and diffusing the political technology of liberal democracy in a new organization like the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development. It is a safe modus operandi and moreover,

the product is visible, well known and it enjoys legitimacy at home. The production of knowledge of the potential and obstacles for democratic consensus in developing countries, on the other hand, can be a long, difficult, and frustrating process, the results of which might never be evident to many politicians and bureaucrats looking for quick and visible results.

The way the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development balances its own domestic pressures and constraints with the need for imagination, creativity, and long-term involvement that the understanding of the difficult political conditions of developing countries requires, will undoubtedly determine the future relevance of this new organization.

NOTES

1. Gisele Cote-Harper and John Courtney, Report to The Right Honorable Joe Clark and the Honorable Maurice Landry: International Cooperation for the Development of Human Rights and Democratic Institutions, June 30, 1987.
2. Ibid., p. 1.
3. Ibid., p. 21.
4. Ibid., p. 24.
5. Report of the Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations, 1987, p. 104.
6. See the definition and conceptualization of democracy presented in Ibid., p. 25. The report insists on the need to avoid the temptation to try to impose Canadian values and institutions on other countries. At the same time it insists on the universal value of democracy and in the possibility to promote it through technical inducements. See Ibid., pp. 21-23, 34-35.
7. See Ibid., Appendix A, p. 37.
8. Report of the Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations, p. 1987, pp. 103-105.
9. The concept of liberal democracy is used here to refer to:
a political system in which (1) virtually all adult citizens are entitled to vote; (2) major policy making officials are selected by the votes of citizens in elections in which more than one candidate has a reasonable chance of victory; and (3) there is substantial freedom for citizens to organize or join political parties and interest groups and to act individually or collectively to influence public policy.
John A. Peeler, Latin American Democracies (Chapel

- Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1935), p. 5.
10. Gisela Cote-Harper and John Courtney, *Ibid.*, p. 24.
 11. Richard A. Higgott, *Political Development Theory* (London: Croom Helm, 1983), p. 16.
 12. See Giovanni Sartori, "Concept Misinformation in Comparative Politics", in Roy C. Macridis and Bernard Brown, eds., *Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings* (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1977), pp. 24-49.
 13. James Ronald Hope, *The Dynamics of Development and Development Administration* (London: Greenwood Press, 1984), p. 9.
 14. For definitions of development see Tony Barnett, *Sociology and Development* (London: Hutchinson, 1988), pp. 8-9.
 15. Alberto Guerreiro Ramos, "Modernization: Towards a Possibility Model", in W.A. Belling and G. O. Totten, eds., *Developing Nations: Quest for a Model* (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1970), p. 22.
 16. For a good review of the Political Development literature see Richard A. Higgott, *op.cit.*
 17. For an in-depth analysis of this issue see Alvin Gouldner, *The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1970).
 18. J.B. Nugent and P.A. Yotopoulos, "What Has Orthodox Development Economics Learned from Recent Experience", *World Development*, Vol. 7, No. 6, 1979, p. 542, in Bjorn Hettne, *Development Theory and the Third World*, SAREC Report R 2: 1982, Swedish Agency for Research Cooperation with Developing Countries, p. 19.
 19. See Bjorn Hettne, *op.cit.*, p. 24.
 20. Joseph La Palombara, *op.cit.*, p. x.
 21. S.N. Eisenstadt, "Bureaucracy and Political Development", in Joseph La Palombara, *op.cit.*, p. 98.
 22. A. D. Smith, *The Concept of Social Change, A Critique*

of the Functionalist Theory of Social Change (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), p. 81 in Bjorn Hettne, *op.cit.*, p. 29.

23. See Ralph Braibanti, "External Inducements of Political Administrative Development: An Institutional Strategy", in Ralph Braibanti, ed., *op. cit.*, pp. 77-106.

24. Charles Tilly has pointed out that

the European experience suggests that most of the transformations European states accomplished until late in their histories were by-products of the consolidation of central-control; that the forms of government themselves resulted largely from the way the coercion and extraction were carried out; that most members of the populations over which the managers of states were trying to extend their control resisted the state making efforts (often with sword and pitchfork) and that the major forms of political participation which westerners now complacently refer to as "modern" are for the most part unintended outcomes of the efforts of European state-makers to build their armies, keep taxes coming in, form effective coalitions against their rivals, hold their nominal subordinates and allies in line, and fend off the threat of rebellion on the part of ordinary people.

Charles Tilly, "Western State-Making and Theories of Political Transformation", in Charles Tilly, (ed.), *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 633.

25. S.N. Eisenstadt, "Bureaucracy and Political Development", in Joseph La Palombara, *op. cit.*, p. 96.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 103.
27. For an excellent explanation of the concept see Ferdinand de Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics*, (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1986), p. 80.
28. Ellis Cashmore and Bob Mullan, *Approaching Social Theory* (London: Heinemann Books, 1983), p. 49.
29. Alberto Guerreiro Ramos, *op. cit.*, p. 22.
30. E. Ellis Cashmore and Bob Mullan, *op. cit.*, p. xii.

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31. Julius Gould and William L. Fobb, op.cit., s.v. "Voluntarism".
 32. Examples of these institutions are, The Centre for Democracy and The National Endowment for Democracy.
 33. For in-depth analyses of these two dimensions see among others, Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1956); Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy, Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971); Dankwart A. Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model", Comparative Politics, April 1970, pp. 337-366; Terry Lynn Karl, "Democracy by Design: The Christian Democratic Party in El Salvador", in Giuseppe Di Palma and Laurence Whitehead, eds., The Central American Impasse (London: Croom Helm, 1985), pp. 195-217; C.B. MacPherson, The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980); Jose Nun, "La Teoria Política y la Transición Democrática", in Jose Nun and Juan Carlos Portantiero, eds., Ensayos sobre la Transición Democrática en Argentina (Buenos Aires: Funesur, 1987), pp. 15-56.
 34. For an analysis of the concept of legitimacy see Max Weber, Economy and Society (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), Vol. III, p. 946.
 35. See Maurice Duverger, The Study of Politics (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1972), pp. 207-211.
 36. *Ibid.*, p. 207.
 37. Giuseppe DiPalma, "The European and the Central American Experience", in Giuseppe DiPalma and Laurence Whitehead, eds., op. cit., p.35.
 38. *Ibid.*, p. 36.
 39. Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory, op.cit., pp. 132-133.
 40. Terry Karl, "Imposing Consent? Electoralism vs. Democratization in El Salvador", in Paul U. Drake and Eduardo Silva, eds., Elections and Democratization in Latin America, 1980-1985, (San Diego: University of California: 1986), p. 10.
 41. Hebert Adam, "Legitimacy and the Institutionalization of Ethnicity: Comparing South Africa", in Ethnic Groups and the State, Paul Brass, ed. (London: Croom Helm, 1985), p. 265.

Toward Strategic Management

December 1990



One of a series of initiatives of
the U.S. Agency for International Development:

The Democracy Initiative

The Partnership for Business and Development

Family and Development

plus

Toward Strategic Management

Setting a New Course: Toward Strategic Management in A.I.D.

Executive Summary

A.I.D.'s environment is changing. Accordingly, the organization must change. This calls for strategic management that affects all facets, from the Agency's mission to its policies, procedures, work force, structure and information systems. A.I.D. is intensely re-examining its organizational direction, operations and structure. We are proud of the Agency's accomplishments during the last 30 years and of the staff who have made them happen. We also acknowledge that there are operational problems to be corrected. Any strategic scenario will show that A.I.D. in five years will be a different organization than it is now. Our approach to management requires immediate steps to put our house in order and a broader agenda that begins with adjustment of A.I.D.'s purpose and strategy so that our goals are clear to all who have a stake in our success.

Clarity of purpose is the first requirement for effective management, and A.I.D. has issued an updated mission statement.

Within that mission, our program strategy will emphasize three major initiatives: (1) Democracy; (2) Partnership for Business and Development; and (3) Family and Development. These initiatives are discussed in more detail elsewhere. They respect continuity in areas of success and call for innovation.

To meet this program agenda, *our strategic management goal as an organization is to do fewer things, and do them very well.* We will concentrate our energies in order to assure quality — of programs, of services and of operations.

As A.I.D. moves to achieve this goal, we will ensure high-quality program results and a commitment to excellence in stewardship of resources.

This management Initiative focuses on near-term and long-term changes. Immediate management targets are to evaluate the program, tighten controls on funds and develop and reward the work force. We will also work toward streamlining the portfolio and structure of the Agency and obtaining and using the best information technology.

Over the longer term, we will further focus the program strategy, establish values and rewards as driving forces for the staff and install a corporate management system that emphasizes quality programs and services. In each of these areas, we will draw from the best management concepts and practices in contemporary government and business.

A.I.D.'s Changing Environment

The environment of the 1990s promises to be a complex and changing one for A.I.D. The winds of change are blowing around the world, and nations are experiencing dramatic transformations that have both economic and political dimensions. Economic and political freedoms are on the rise — yet the specters of poverty, instability, authoritarianism and environmental degradation still cast long shadows. The 1990s will be a time of great challenges for our organization.

In the United States the overall economic climate, budget deficit and scarcity of funds will influence A.I.D.'s operations in the 1990s. A.I.D. will pursue close collaboration and cooperation among the Administration, Congress, the American people and other donors to chart a course to meet the needs of a rapidly changing world and the strategic role that U.S. foreign assistance will play.

A.I.D.'s world is now filled with additional opportunities and responsibilities in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Asia, Africa and Latin America. Millions of men, women and children depend on A.I.D.'s programs for their very existence. Economic relations among nations are going through deep changes. A.I.D. managers appreciate these realities. We acknowledge that, now more than ever, strong leadership and effective management are necessary prerequisites for maximizing the total impact of U.S. foreign assistance.

We take pride in what we have done. The Agency for International Development, as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy, has had worldwide success over the last 30 years. Copied and applauded, A.I.D. has made notable contributions to primary education; health and child survival; administering Food for Peace programs; promoting food self-reliance; providing civilians with relief and stability during natural disasters, wars and civil strife; creating economic infrastructure; and building democratic institutions, among many other achievements. We know that these accomplishments are due to the skill and dedication of a talented, caring and conscientious work force.

Assessing and Defining A.I.D.'s Role for the Future

Against this backdrop, the Agency for International Development has been undergoing intense, critical self-assessment of its role, operations and management processes. Initially, the assessment addressed the operational issues. With the arrival of new leadership, and to meet our need to chart a direct course, management has also been approached in broader terms. The overall purpose and direction of the Agency are under review. A.I.D.'s existing policies, structure and practices are being revisited. This effort looks at A.I.D. as an organizational whole, to comprehend better the interactions among the strategic (policy formulation and priorities), tactical (implementation) and support (operational) environments. The Administrator and the entire senior management team have been active in this assessment.

Basic factors stand out. First, the much-amended Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, with its 30-plus objectives for U.S. assistance, should be recast. It is simply too diverse in its directions to provide a manageable framework for assistance in the current and future environment. Second, in recent years, Congress and others have been concerned about the effectiveness of the Agency. These concerns arise in several Inspector General and General Accounting Office (GAO) reports. Recurring operational problems with contracting methods, financial management and aspects of project implementation have fueled the perception of A.I.D.'s inability to execute effectively and efficiently the delivery of U.S. economic assistance.

It is clear that A.I.D. can strengthen its management in order to fulfill our mandate as the principal instrument of U.S. foreign assistance implementation. The Administrator and the Agency's executive team are fully committed to management excellence, both short- and long-term. The A.I.D. mission statement, which communicates a clear vision of the Agency's long-term goals and direction, is central to this mandate. This transcending vision is the basis for all A.I.D. programs and is the overall framework within which the Agency will conduct its business.

Mission Statement

The mission of the Agency for International Development is to administer economic assistance programs that combine an American tradition of international concern and generosity with the active promotion of America's national interests. A.I.D. assists developing countries to realize their full national potential through the development of open and democratic societies and the dynamism of free markets and individual initiative. A.I.D. assists nations throughout the world to improve the quality of human life and to expand the range of individual opportunities by reducing poverty, ignorance and malnutrition.

A.I.D. meets these objectives through a worldwide network of country missions which develop and implement programs guided by six principles:

- support for free markets and broad-based economic growth;
- concern for individuals and the development of their economic and social well-being;
- support for democracy;
- responsible environmental policies and prudent management of natural resources;
- support for lasting solutions to transnational problems; and,
- humanitarian assistance to those who suffer from natural or man-made disasters.

A.I.D.'s mission as a foreign affairs agency of the U.S. government is to translate into action the conviction of our nation that continued American economic and moral leadership is vital to a peaceful and prosperous world.

The mission statement encompasses the full range of A.I.D.'s present involvement in international development. Within this framework the Agency is launching the three program initiatives: (1) Democracy, with emphasis on strengthening democratic institutions to build equitable societies; (2) Partnership for Business and Development, intended to engage private sector participation in sustaining free-market principles and broad-based economic growth in developing countries; and (3) Family and Development, which focuses on the family as a fundamental element in social and economic development.

The rest of the strategic management initiative is companion to and supportive of the program initiatives but also cuts across all of the Agency's programs.

Management Improvement Near- and Long-Term

A.I.D. is working on its ship of state in two ways: one will repair and remove the barnacles from the hull and tighten the rigging, revitalize the crew and polish the brass, while the other will adjust the navigational instruments and set the course for the right place on the horizon. Given the pace of change, we are doing both things at once. This agenda will be a starting point for our partnership with the recently enacted President's Commission on Foreign Assistance Management, the GAO's General Management Review and our ongoing work with the Inspector General.

Scenario of Change

By the year 1996, the Agency for International Development will show better program impact, stewardship of resources and operational efficiency. Some planning assumptions being explored are that A.I.D. will be a smaller bureaucracy, with most of its staff overseas, running the same-sized or larger program in dollar terms. A.I.D. may move toward "wholesaling" a set of tested development approaches in certain areas, through private, non-profit or university organizations. We must still retain the capacity to innovate and respond to new needs. A.I.D.'s staff will be more diverse culturally and in gender. There may be two main groups: highly skilled managers with a clear career path and technical specialists employed as their skills are required. Larger blocks of work may be run under contracts and grants. There will be greater autonomy for field operations within a system of evaluation and operational/financial auditing to assure accountability. Promotion, incentives and awards will flow to those individuals and teams who can show program impact, account for resources and find a productive balance between innovation and prudence.

The central goal of the management initiative is to do fewer things — and do them very well. We believe that only by clearing the deck of some of the clutter can we also achieve two operational objectives that guide our daily work: (1) showing high-quality program results and (2) demonstrating excellence in stewardship of resources.

Getting Shipshape: Near-Term Management Improvements

Within the framework we have set, the immediate management targets are to evaluate the program, tighten controls on funds and develop and reward the work force. We will also work toward streamlining the portfolio and structure of the Agency and obtaining and using the best information technology to improve productivity. The Administrator has charged the executive team to take action on each of these under his direct supervision. While of immediate concern, some of them will require sustained efforts before they show results. A brief picture of each of these follows.

A strengthened evaluation function in the Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination and in our overseas missions will assure that A.I.D.'s story gets told fully and honestly, and that we more purposefully learn from and apply our experience as new programs are funded and designed. By better measuring and reporting on our program, we expect to gain both internal and external benefits. With a clearer purpose and strategy for evaluation that is tied to our mission statement, A.I.D. managers will be able to channel funds and staff to key areas where analysis and reporting are most crucial. With more and better evaluation information, the same managers can then more readily replicate success. With more frequent and reliable reporting on program outcomes, we can work collaboratively with the Congress and with cooperating countries to assure that A.I.D. builds on its strengths and adapts its programs to changing needs overseas.

A.I.D.'s ability to control adequately the use of its funds in the developing country context has improved steadily over the years, but vulnerabilities remain. The Administrator is determined that continuing top-level attention will be given to this matter, both in terms of prevention and in taking action on problems that may arise or persist. He has charged the Deputy Administrator with chairing a senior team on a continuous basis to oversee audit results, make needed changes in systems and policies (for contracting, audit programs and follow-up, and other actions as needed) and to report frequently to him and through him to the President, the Department of State, the Office of Management and Budget and the Congress. In a related area, the Agency's primary accounting system is being replaced. Increased efficiency, security and reliability are expected. Billings, payments and reports needed by executives and external cooperating entities will be improved. The plan includes related staff training and better management and regular assessment of controllers' offices.

The men and women who work for A.I.D. are its primary resource for achieving the Agency's mission to meet the goal of excellent performance. The Administrator recognizes and reinforces the widely held values of dedication to service, to quality and to integrity that exist among our skilled personnel. In addition, he supports the career staff's growing commitment to open communications, two-way feedback, anticipating and managing change and productivity improvement. He has charged his executives with articulating and behaving according to these values. The personnel office is charged with better planning of the deployment and professional growth of the staff and with adjusting the rewards and incentives to strengthen accountability and to recognize program and management accomplishments of successful teams. Recruitment will be more focused on both present and anticipated needs and will seek to tap the rich diversity of the American work force of the 1990s. Human resource management will be more integrated and directly linked to achieving the Agency's strategic goals.

Another product of senior staff working groups is to be a streamlined A.I.D. This is expected to affect a number of dimensions: a leaner structure; simplified procedures and paperwork; clearer roles and functions for Washington support offices; more focused programs at the country or regional level; and better use of information technology.

The information system of the Agency is being upgraded to meet program and efficiency objectives, as well as to reduce vulnerability to misuse. The information resource strategy encompasses new hardware, software, user skills and user-friendliness. In these ways, and through standardization of data management, all personnel will have accurate and reliable information. These actions are essential to meet other management objectives such as program tracking, accountability and productivity at all levels.

With this agenda, the A.I.D. Administrator and his executive team intend to demonstrate that we have the capacity to fix what needs fixing, to strengthen our administrative credibility and, over the longer term, to become one of the best-managed international agencies in the federal government.

Longer-Term Transformation: Navigating the Next Decade

The actions described above are occurring or planned largely within past and current policy and statutory contexts. They will result in concrete improvements and build a new environment of trust for the Agency.

But we must go beyond that. We must set bolder targets for transforming A.I.D. during this decade. If A.I.D. is to be truly relevant, to take a clear leadership role that builds on the Agency's successes and to become purposeful, flexible and innovative — more powerful actions may have to be taken. In 1996 we will be a different Agency — more focused, leaner, more effective, with better development results.

The Agency's program strategy will be more sharply focused in concert with Congress. Our mission and our intention to do fewer things and do them better will be understood by all staff, and by all of our cooperating countries and entities. The organizational values are to be translated into higher productivity and quality programs and backed up by appropriate financial and other rewards for units and individuals whose performance warrants them. We will work toward a unifying management system that gets the program results, the stewardship and the flexible responses we seek — setting a new standard that makes the people of the United States proud supporters of this institution.

Redirecting the organizational culture or climate through attention to values is essential, but not sufficient. A.I.D. will reach out to the best management concepts and practices of contemporary business and government to apply those that are most suited. As an example, the work of the Federal Quality Institute, now being employed in several agencies, has potential merit for A.I.D. Known as Total Quality Management (TQM) or under other labels, it incorporates top management support, broad employee involvement, effective communications and measurement, continuous learning, and rewards and recognition.

Whatever management system A.I.D. adopts, it will be "corporate," encouraging A.I.D. staff to see themselves as part of the whole Agency, not as merely part of some organization within A.I.D.

Conclusion

The seas that the Agency must navigate during the 1990s are likely to be stormy. The leadership is committed to overhauling our ship of state to meet this challenge. With a well-charted course, a skilled and productive crew and a sleeker profile, we are confident that we can arrive at the right ports with programs and services that meet the needs of cooperating countries and our supporters in the United States.

REGIONAL WORKSHOP I: ASIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST/MAGHREB

DEMOCRACY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

VOL. 3 ASIA

EDS. LARRY DIAMOND, JUAN J. LINZ AND
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• CHAPTER ONE •

Introduction:
Persistence, Erosion, Breakdown,
and Renewal

LARRY DIAMOND

The countries in this volume represent a wide range of experiences with democratic government. India, despite the steady erosion of democratic institutions and the two years of authoritarian emergency rule under Indira Gandhi, and the continuing political strains under her son and successor Rajiv Gandhi, continues to stand as the most surprising and important case of democratic endurance in the developing world. In its much briefer life as an independent nation, Papua New Guinea has manifested a remarkably vibrant and resilient democratic system, albeit highly factionalized and patronage-based.

No other Asian countries—neither in our study nor in that wide, expansive region of the globe—have been as continuously successful in maintaining a democratic system as India and Papua New Guinea. However, Turkey has sustained a liberal democracy through most of the four decades since World War II, and after its second (or more correctly, “second-and-a-half”) military intervention, it has revived a competitive (though less liberal) democratic system. Today, Turkey appears on the way to democratic consolidation. Far less certain are the fates of the recent democratic transitions in the Philippines and South Korea. In each case, however, authoritarian rule has been decisively rejected through broad-based mobilization, and popular and elite commitment to democracy has been reaffirmed through recent elections. Facing different challenges to democratic consolidation—(among others) a lack of political order in the one case, and an excess of bureaucratic authoritarian control in the other—these two countries will be important tests of the democratic prospect in Asia.

Although its recent path of democratic transition has been more gradual and controlled, and more vulnerable to interruption by its military president, Pakistan has been moving toward the transfer of power from military rule to elected, civilian politicians. Elsewhere in Asia, outside our ten cases, other movements toward democracy proceed at slower paces or earlier stages, with greater control and

institutionalized direction from above in Taiwan, and greater popular mobilization, political polarization, and government resistance and oppression in Bangladesh.

Our four remaining cases present sharply differing profiles of the semidemocratic and authoritarian regimes in Asia. Sri Lanka and Malaysia are an interesting contrast in civilian regimes whose democratic character has been battered, eroded, and diminished by profound ethnic divisions and the reality or potential of ethnic violence. The brief experience and haunting fear of a violent ethnic convulsion led in Malaysia to a political restructuring in which competition was limited and fixed to produce a firm parliamentary majority for the Malays and the broad party alliance they control, and freedom of expression was constricted to rule out the explosive issues of ethnic conflict and hegemony. While this restructuring has leveled parliamentary democracy down to a semidemocratic status, it has also brought considerable ethnic peace, political stability, and socioeconomic prosperity (although these now appear less secure). In Sri Lanka, by contrast, the deterioration of one of the developing world's most successful democracies has occurred amidst a tragic slide into civil war, tearing apart the polity and society and ravaging the economy in ways that will take years, if not decades, to resolve and repair.

Thailand and Indonesia may both be considered centralized, bureaucratic polities, in which the military continues to exercise the dominant authority and to penetrate virtually every significant institutional sector of government and society. But here, too, one finds important contrasts with obvious implications for democracy and democratization. In Thailand, a multiparty, parliamentary system (weakly institutionalized though it is) offers some degree of representation, competition, and check on military-bureaucratic authority, with considerable potential for (gradual) evolution toward fuller democracy. In Indonesia, political parties and electoral competition are much more rigidly controlled, parliamentary institutions appear to be more of a facade for military rule, civil and political liberties are more severely repressed, and the prospect for democratization appears much slimmer and more distant. And yet, Indonesia is hardly comparable to China or Vietnam. There are some real niches of pluralism, and as the economy develops and state control loosens, these will mature and perhaps press for political liberalization.

This enormous variation in democratic statuses and experiences stems in part from the breadth of our grouping of countries (by far the broadest of the three regional volumes in this series). It would perhaps be challenging enough to seek to generalize across the countries of East or Southeast Asia, with their varying Buddhist, Confucian, Muslim, Hindu, and Christian traditions, not to mention the many religious

mixes and divisions within these countries. In South Asia, particularly India, we find different cultural and colonial legacies, and for the most part poorer economies and less developed societies. Turkey, of course, can only in the very loosest conception be classified as Asian, and is included in this volume only because we have (as yet) no volume on the Middle East or Southern Europe.

The list of other differences among these ten countries is indeed a very long one, extending also to their structure of ethnicity, class, economy, and state, and to their international threats and insecurities. And yet, this tremendous variation presents us with a great challenge and opportunity of scholarship. For it offers a wealth of data with which to explore (though hardly to resolve) the question with which we began this study: What explains the differing outcomes of democratic experiences in Asia, and throughout the developing world?

• BREAKDOWNS OF DEMOCRACY IN ASIA •

All ten of the countries in this volume have had some experience with liberal democratic government, meeting (at least in a very rough and broad sense) the definitional criteria in our preface. Indeed, this one common historical feature was an important criterion in our selection of cases. Of these ten, only Papua New Guinea has not experienced some interruption or breakdown of democracy. A look at the contexts and processes of democratic breakdown or suspension should give pause to those who take a deterministic view of democratic failures in Asia.

Whether we classify the loss of democracy by the gravity of the phenomenon—from the reduction of civil and political liberties, to the temporary interruption of democratic processes, to the complete displacement of the democratic system—or by its agent, the military or the civilian executive, one thing is clear. As a preceding four-volume study of democratic breakdowns has demonstrated in compelling fashion for Europe and Latin America,¹ the breakdowns of democracy in Asia have not been inevitable occurrences. Rather, the choices, decisions, values, and actions of political and institutional leaders have figured prominently—and in many cases, quite clearly decisively—in the decline or fall of democracy. Moreover, the decisive choices, actions, and decisions have primarily been those of civilian politicians—even when the military was the agent displacing the democratic system.

One should not neglect to begin with the obvious. As has been the case throughout the ages and around the world, the onset of authoritarianism in post-World War II Asia can sometimes be traced to the simple desire of a ruler to remain in power indefinitely, at all costs. Many interpretations can and have been offered for Indira Gandhi's

declaration of emergency rule on June 26, 1975. But whatever the credibility of her dubious claims of threat to civil order and developmental progress, or of her call for political discipline and a strong state as the price for rapid development, the threat to her own political power by a judicial decision on her 1971 election and by recent opposition electoral gains must have figured largely. As Jyotirindra Das Gupta argues in his contribution to this volume, she opted for the seemingly sure path of seizing upon the constitution's emergency provisions to repress her opposition, rather than "a patiently drawn institutional strategy to utilize her populist appeal in a manner that would strengthen both her party and her democratic authority." Ironically, her choice backfired resoundingly twenty-one months later.

Perhaps because she did not need to, given the broad emergency powers in the Indian constitution, Indira Gandhi bent and abused but did not overthrow the constitutional system that brought her to power. Similarly, the less dramatic but more enduring erosion of democracy in Sri Lanka has come via the actions and choices of political party leaders, using the letter while violating the spirit of the constitutional process. In her chapter on Sri Lanka, Urmila Phadnis makes clear that the key turning point in the deterioration of democracy in Sri Lanka came with the landslide 1970 election victory of the left-leaning United Front, which then used its overwhelming parliamentary majority to ram through a new constitution in 1972, while conveniently (and undemocratically) extending its term of office two years. At the same time, Mrs. Bandaranaike's UF government was freely invoking emergency regulations to suspend the Bill of Rights and to limit the capacity of the legislature and judiciary to check the executive branch.

This flouting of a previously longstanding democratic tradition—which had seen a regular alternation in power between the two major parties since 1952 (theretofore a unique phenomenon in Asia and Africa)—set a dangerous precedent. When J. R. Jayewardene's United National Party (UNP) swept into power with an even greater landslide in 1977, it returned the favor, pushing through a new constitution of its own (equally unacceptable to the opposition), which again extended the ruling party's parliamentary term (this time by five years) while switching to a presidential system and further eroding the independent power of the legislature and judiciary. As we will see, structural problems and opportunities contributed to these abuses of the democratic system. But to those who would or did argue that such actions were compelled by the imperatives of the situation, in particular the crisis of national integration, it is worth noting that the sense of grievance by the minority Tamil community did not crystallize into antisystemic, separatist sentiment until five years *after* the 1970 election of the UF government,

whose sweeping policies of "affirmative action" for the majority Sinhalese pressed the Tamils to the wall.

Malaysia's descent toward semidemocracy contrasts with Sri Lanka's experience in several respects. For one thing, it happened in a single period of deliberate restructuring, through the pursuit (heavy-handed though it was) of consensus, rather than in a piecemeal and intensely partisan fashion over many years. Although deep communal divisions provide an important backdrop in each case, in Malaysia the constriction of the democratic system came more visibly in response to the problem of ethnic polarization and violence, following serious ethnic rioting, and was undertaken in order to preserve the hegemony of an ethnic group—the Malays—rather than a political party *per se*. However, as Zakaria Haji Ahmad notes in these pages, in a system of ethnic parties, the issues of party and ethnic hegemony are inseparable. It was not just the ethnic rioting that led Malay leaders to change the rules of the game, but the fact that the showing of the ruling party Alliance (dominated by their own United Malays National Organization, or UMNO) in the 1969 elections "served notice that [they] might have to one day face the prospect of an electoral defeat."

Looking back in time from the present, it may seem that no instance of democratic breakdown better illustrates the personal desire to retain and expand power at all costs than the executive coup by Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos. As Karl Jackson indicates here, it was Marcos' inability to win constitutional changes permitting him to remain in office beyond his second term that led him to declare martial law on September 23, 1972. Marcos, too, had all sorts of rationales for his action, wrapped up in his promise of a New Society. Authoritarian rule, he said, was needed to "democratize wealth" and "revolutionize society"; to break the political culture of the corrupt status quo and the crippling power of the landed oligarchs; to defeat the renewed communist insurgency; and to inculcate a new discipline that would foster rapid development. But in contrast to India and Sri Lanka, Marcos' action came in response to a widespread sense—not only in the Philippines, but throughout Southeast Asia—that western-style democratic institutions were not working. As Jackson also demonstrates, the declaration of martial law came at a time when the corrupt, oligarchic Philippine democracy did in fact seem to be breaking down (in part because of Marcos' own abuses), and initially his martial law regime achieved popular support and success.

The Philippine case thus reflects two of the underlying causes of democratic breakdown in Asia: overwhelming personal (or in this case family) ambition, and manifest malfunctioning of the democratic system, particularly with regard to the performance of the politicians. This dual

causation has also been apparent in South Korea, though at different points in time. The failure of the First Korean Republic—endowed with high hopes and a democratic constitution in 1948—came through the familiar instrument of a creeping executive coup. As Sung-Joo Han writes in this volume, “Rhee was determined to remain in power—for life—which required several constitutional changes, election rigging, and repression of the opposition.” By contrast, the failure of the brief attempt at full liberal democracy in the Second Republic was a failure of democratic functioning. As Han shows, this breakdown was fed by deep divisions and difficulties in the social and political structure, but it was advanced and sealed by the weak, indecisive, ineffectual leadership of Prime Minister Chang Myon and by the rigid, uncompromising, and often undemocratic behavior of civilian politicians and parties. The turn of the subsequent authoritarian regime of Park Chung Hee away from limited political competition and potential democratic evolution, toward a much more authoritarian and repressive structure, owed heavily to Park’s determination to remain in power indefinitely, no matter how the constitution had to be rewritten and the opposition crushed.

The repeated failure of democratic experiments in Pakistan merits especially close attention, for Pakistan shared the same colonial administration and heritage as democratically successful India, of which it was a part until the bloody partition of August 1947. From the beginning, democratic politics in Pakistan suffered from major structural problems, but as Leo Rose explains in this volume, Pakistan’s political elite was no less culturally committed to democracy than India’s, and as Myron Weiner has noted, in its first decade Pakistan did operate a “Westminster parliamentary government characterized by competitive political parties, elections, a free press, an independent judiciary and freedom of association.”² The breakdown of that system in 1958 revealed major institutional flaws and weaknesses, but it also reflected the failure of democratic leadership to resolve political differences and deliver stable, effective government. It is important to remember that the Army intervened only after President Iskandar Mirza had won his struggle for power with the prime minister through an executive coup that ended democracy. The failure of the second chance at civilian democracy under Zulfikar Bhutto was preordained only in the sense that, in his determination to consolidate, centralize, and perpetuate power in his own hands, Bhutto never gave the system a chance to operate and develop democratically. Again, when the military struck in 1977, it displaced a regime that no longer appeared democratic or legitimate.

The latter point is of great theoretical significance, for it recurs across a number of the Asian cases in this volume. Indeed, in all five of our cases where the military has intervened (sometimes repeatedly) to

overthrow civilian regime, democratic malfunctioning was painfully evident and regime legitimacy severely eroded by the time the military struck. In addition to the 1961 coup in South Korea and the 1958 and 1977 coups in Pakistan, this generalization applies to all three military interventions in Turkey (1960, 1971, and 1980), to the 1976 military coup in Thailand, and to the Indonesian army’s support of martial law in 1957 and its displacement of Sukarno in 1966. Interestingly, it also explains the unsuccessful military coup plot in Sri Lanka in 1962, when “upheaval seemed to be coming from every quarter,” in the form of communal violence, labor strikes, mass protests, militant policies, and emergency provisions that the military was given the distasteful task of enforcing.¹

As Ulf Sundhaussen writes here in his analysis of the Indonesian case, “The army has not increased its political power by coups against legitimate governments, but rather has stepped in whenever vacuums needed to be filled, especially in 1957 and 1966. It has come to see itself as the savior of the nation from rapacious and incompetent politicians. . . .” As Sundhaussen shows, the military supported or at least tolerated parliamentary democracy through seven years of extremely unstable coalitions, revolving and ineffective governments, recurrent ethnic conflict and revolts, and generally corrupt, inept, and selfish politics. It was only when the parliamentary system finally ceased functioning altogether, unable to piece together one more fragile coalition, that the military acted against it. Hence, it was not the personal, institutional, or ideological ambitions of the military that defeated democracy in Indonesia, nor the lack of mass democratic commitment, but, as Sundhaussen puts it, “the actions and attitudes” of the political elite, “and especially those sections of the elite which purportedly stood for democracy.” Ironically, among the most ill-advised of these civilian actions was the attempt by politicians to use the military for their own ends, a lesson reinforced by the experience of Bhutto in Pakistan and the Sri Lankan coup plot as well.

It is not simply public disorder, government immobilism, and political polarization that the military (not to mention society in general) find distasteful, but more especially the need or decision of weak, embattled civilian governments to use the military to restore order. When the military is dragged into the turmoil of civilian politics in this way, its total intervention is often not long in coming. Thus, as Ergun Özbudun observes in his chapter on Turkey, “a harmful side effect of martial law is the seemingly inevitable politicization of the armed forces, or the ‘militarization’ of political conflict, which may pave the way for full-scale military intervention. Indeed, all three military interventions in recent Turkish history were preceded by martial law regimes instituted by civilian governments.”

While there may be alternatives in such periods of crisis, the decision to turn to the military often reflects not so much the wrong choice on the part of political leaders but their mismanagement of political conflict, mobilizing it or permitting it to be mobilized out of control. Underlying each cycle of martial law and military intervention in Turkey has been a precipitous rise in political polarization, intolerance, and violence. Other failures of government performance have compounded the sense of crisis: inept and authoritarian handling of opposition and protest; conflict between the politicians and the bureaucrats; serious economic problems; and by 1980, an alarming growth of terrorism. One can point, as Özbudun does, to a number of social, cultural, and structural factors that fostered the polarization, but in none of these breakdowns can one deny the large measure of responsibility of the civilian political leaders, who proved unwilling and unable to bridge their partisan and ideological differences in order to rescue democracy from the polarization and immobilism that were destroying it.

Chai-Anan Samudavanija's analysis of the breakdown of Thailand's democratic experiment in 1974-76 shows a similar failure of political leadership. To be sure, the flood of pent-up demands and the absence of mature political institutions imposed a difficult challenge on party leaders. But it is far from clear that these challenges could not have been met, and democratic institutions and patterns gradually developed, if political leaders had been able to establish some basis of consensus, or at least stable and effective patterns of interaction, amongst themselves. Instead, distrustful of one another and preoccupied with their short-term and narrow interests, they produced a series of ineffectual and unstable governments that could not manage the underlying tensions in the society. The context of growing political polarization, violence, and indecision provided the familiar, fertile ground for military intervention.

The Role of Leadership

None of the contributors to this volume would advance a "great man" theory of history to explain the fate of the democratic experiments they analyze. Nevertheless, the role of political leadership emerges in each case as an important factor. By leadership we have in mind the actions, values, choices, and skills of both a country's political elite and its one or few top government and party leaders. We have already mentioned the self-aggrandizing ambitions and authoritarian styles of putatively democratic leaders such as Marcos, Rhee, Bhutto, Bandaranaike, Jayewardene, Sukarno, and Indira Gandhi, all of whom used the democratic process to erode or destroy democracy. Without denying the cultural and structural factors underlying their different behaviors, it is worth noting that Prime Minister Michael Somare, and his successor Julius

Chan, did not attempt to twist the political rules or structures of democracy in Papua New Guinea in order to remain in power indefinitely. When their parliamentary coalitions fell or were defeated, they did something unusual in Asian politics: They simply left office.

As David Lipset demonstrates in his chapter, this difference in the politics of Papua New Guinea is heavily shaped by the traditional culture, which has also given rise to a more consensual and accommodating style of politics among party elites. This pragmatic, compromising leadership style contrasts markedly with the intransigence of the major party leaders, Demirel and Ecevit, that hastened Turkey's democratic breakdown in 1980, and with the fragmentation and inability to forge consensus of Thai political leaders during 1974-76. In this respect, the stubborn unwillingness of South Korea's major opposition leaders, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung, to compromise with one another or the regime in the electoral transition to democracy was seen by many as unfortunate. Despite its deep ethnic divisions, the more consensual style of political leadership in Malaysia has been a factor in its relative political stability from 1971 until the late 1980s, when a new prime minister upset the balance with his intolerance and drive to accumulate personal power.

Malaysia also stands in contrast to countries such as South Korea and Indonesia for the clear democratic commitment of its founding post-independence leaders. As Zakaria writes, Malaysia's first prime minister at independence, Tunku Abdul Rahman, was committed to parliamentary democracy as a "priority principle," and the workability of democracy in those tense early years had much to do with his consensual style and stance "above communal chauvinism." The democratic orientation of Malaysia's early leaders kept the system from plunging into full authoritarianism during the period of democratic suspension in 1969-71, and helped ensure a return to some kind of competitive, constitutional polity. By contrast, the much less tolerant, more confrontational style of Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammed in recent years has subjected Malaysia's semidemocratic system to the greatest stress it has experienced since 1971 (see below).

India (in the first two decades following independence) may be seen as a classic case of the contribution to democratic consolidation made by forceful but accommodating leaders, who embarked upon a conscious and deliberate strategy of political incorporation and expansion of access to previously excluded groups. Pakistan's leaders, Rose maintains, were no less democratically committed in principle, but circumstances led them to a greater sense of political insecurity, and early choices had a large impact. In particular, the decision of the "Father of Pakistan," Mohammad Ali Jinnah, "to retain the position of Governor-General, with the broad powers concentrated in that office . . .

set the basic trend toward an authoritarian system (just as Jawaharlal Nehru's decision to serve as prime minister in India's first postindependence government set a trend toward democracy)."

No less important is the contrast (though it can be overstated, in that the fatal flaws of the latter were not wholly absent from the former) between the leadership style and choices of Nehru and those of his daughter, Indira Gandhi, who followed him into the prime ministership in 1966, only two years after his death. It is important to appreciate that the emergency she declared in 1975 was only an escalation of a decade-long trend toward the centralization and personalization of political power, which resumed and even quickened with her return to power in 1980. Most contemporary analysts of Indian democracy heavily attribute the decay of the Congress party and of the Indian party system, the spread of mass protest and of ethnic separatism and violence, and the diffuse sense of crisis and strain in which India's political institutions find themselves today to the manipulative, coercive, suspicious, and self-serving character of Indira Gandhi's rule from 1966 to 1977 and again from 1980 until her assassination in 1984.⁴ Paul Brass argues that the "relentless centralization and ruthless, unprincipled intervention by the center in state politics have been the primary causes of the troubles in the Punjab and elsewhere in India since Mrs. Gandhi's rise to power."⁵ But the trouble also involves the larger circle of political leaders who have been chosen and promoted by Mrs. Gandhi, or at least have taken their cue and borrowed in style from her. Kohli thus suggests that institutional decay in India has resulted "not only from increasing social pressures on the state" but from "the destructive and self-serving actions of leaders who find institutions a constraint on personal power."⁶ Indeed, that conclusion is a fitting and valid one for most of the cases in this volume.

• EXPLAINING DEMOCRATIC PROGRESS AND FAILURE •

Historical and Colonial Legacies

To say that leadership, behavior, and choice has contributed to the success or failure of Asian experiments with democracy is not to say that all political elites in Asia inherited equally favorable or imposing challenges. Across our cases, the democratic prospect has varied significantly with the historical and cultural legacies and the structural inducements and constraints these leaders have inherited and passed on to their successors.

Perhaps the most salient historical variable is the nature of the colonial experience. Among our ten Asian countries are four former

British colonies (India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Malaysia), two more (the Philippines and Papua New Guinea) whose preindependence colonial rulers (the United States and Australia) shared in the Anglo-Saxon democratic tradition, one former Dutch colony (Indonesia), and two that were never colonized (Thailand and Turkey).

Several students of democracy have observed recently that the developing countries with the most successful democratic experience since independence are, by and large, former British colonies.⁷ Weiner attributes this to "two components of the British model of tutelage": the establishment of the rule of law through effective (and increasingly indigenous) bureaucratic and judicial institutions, and the "provision for some system of representation and election" that gave educated elites some opportunity for and experience with limited governance.⁸ The resulting legacy, he (and others) maintains, was not simply the presence of more effective political institutions at independence (both in terms of government administration and political party mobilization and competition), but also an enduring *cultural* orientation: a consensus on and commitment to the procedures of politics and governance, and a "concern with the rule of law as a constraint upon arbitrary government."⁹

India represents the most striking case of institutional development under British colonial rule. Despite the very inadequate and often superficial nature of successive colonial political reforms, the British did begin to draw Indian politicians into the process of electoral competition and democratic organization well in advance of independence, especially at the local and provincial level. Electoral success before independence gave the Congress party valuable experience in democratic competition and governance and advanced the process of its early institutionalization as a nationwide political force. Because of certain accidents of geography and history (see below), this process failed to occur in Pakistan, and had much to do with its democratic failure. But in Malaysia and Sri Lanka as well, and in Papua New Guinea under the Australians, preindependence electoral competition permitted the development of political parties and coalitions and the acquisition of democratic experience, which clearly enhanced the capacity of democratic institutions after independence.

Culturally, indigenous traditions and values may have been the more profound influence, but the British colonial legacy should not be underestimated as a source of popular and especially elite democratic commitments. As Weiner notes, even when democratic leaders have acted in an authoritarian fashion, as with Indira Gandhi's emergency rule, they have felt the need to keep their actions within the letter (however distorted in spirit) of legal and constitutional procedures. Thus the erosion of democracy in Sri Lanka has been, strangely, a constitutional one, and if this concern for constitutionalism has not

saved democracy, it may at least have blocked the descent into full authoritarianism. A similar observation could be made for the period of "suspended democracy" in Malaysia, in which the National Operations Council supplanted Parliament "under the rule of law, with the appropriate proclamations by the king as stipulated by the Constitution," and during which the NOC "concentrated its efforts on the restoration of parliamentary democracy."¹⁰ Even in the least democratically successful of our four former British colonies, Pakistan, Rose observes that "the advocacy of democratic principles by most of the political and general public has never wavered." Pakistani authoritarian regimes have generally permitted some considerable space for political, social, and regional organizations with differing views, and have not attempted to "project alternatives to a democratic political system as their ultimate objective."

The reason, Rose suggests, for this enduring cultural legacy of British rule is the powerful and diffuse socialization in democratic values that began under British rule and continued to a considerable extent after independence. The educational system of the British Raj was elitist, but it taught and praised British democratic concepts and values of representative government and popular sovereignty. In all four of the former British colonies studied here, this yielded independence elites with a clear philosophical commitment to democracy, and socialization agents—schools, the media, and democratic political organizations—poised to continue the process of democratic enculturation.

Six decades of Australian colonial rule had a similar effect in Papua New Guinea. Like the British, the Australians permitted some experience with electoral competition (in fact, three general elections) before independence, and avoided the radical deculturation policies of some European powers like the French. Indeed, David Lipset maintains, perhaps Australia's greatest contribution was that it allowed "the democratic features of traditional Melanesian polities to perdure into the postcolonial context." Like the British, and even more explicitly and extensively, American colonial rule in the Philippines schooled the people in democratic citizenship. This left behind some important developmental and institutional legacies—universal education, a high literacy rate, a politically active elite, a feisty press—but the cultural commitment it conveyed had to contend with the longer and more structurally rooted legacy of Spanish colonial rule that preceded it. This, Karl Jackson suggests, may help us to understand the persistence of oligarchical control and corrupt, clientelistic politics beneath the veneer of commitment to democracy. In addition, Lucian Pye argues, because the party politics introduced by the Americans was based on personalities rather than principles, it reinforced "traditional Philippine

attitudes of power as patron-client relationships, and hence did not produce so great a change in Filipino thinking as might have been expected."¹¹

If the commitment of democratic principles remains strong in Pakistan, the contrast between its democratic experience and India's nevertheless stands as one of the critical comparative issues in this volume. After all, both countries experienced the same British colonial administration. Obviously their different paths cannot be explained by reference to their common colonial legacies—or can they? Here we must appreciate the dualistic nature of the British colonial legacy. British rule—like all colonial rule in the developing world—was highly authoritarian. If it educated elites in democratic values and ways, while permitting quite limited but gradually expanding indigenous representation and competition, its first and most important goal was the preservation of its own authority, which was that of a martial law regime. Indeed, as Rose notes, Pakistan's first martial law regime (1958–1962), like subsequent ones, "borrowed extensively from the British martial law system." Thus, Pakistan and Bangladesh on the one hand, and India on the other, have both built upon the institutional legacy of British colonialism, but on different aspects of it: the former "on those institutions that sustained the imperial state" (the "viceregal" tradition) and India on the competitive and representative institutions "that the British either nurtured or tolerated."¹²

It should therefore not surprise us that those countries whose colonial histories were more uniformly authoritarian fared even more poorly with democracy after independence. Here one may cite the former French colonies, and still more so the former Spanish and Belgian, or in this volume, the former Dutch colony, Indonesia, and the former Japanese colony, Korea. Japanese rule in the twentieth century heightened the highly centralized, autocratic features of traditional authority in Korea, leaving it after World War II with no institutions for checking and countervailing executive power. This helps to explain not only the ease with which Rhee overran democracy but also the persistent "underdevelopment" of political input institutions such as parties and interest groups. In marked contrast to Sri Lanka, Malaysia, and Papua New Guinea, Indonesia's transition to independence was riddled with intense conflict, violence, insurgency, and radical mass mobilization, with relatively little preparation for democracy. Its postindependence politics reflected these features of its colonial experience.

Obviously, where there has been no conquest or colonization, traditional values and political legacies tend to perdure into the present with greater force. In this sense, the centralizing, statist tradition of the Ottoman empire has been an obstacle to stable democracy in Turkey, and centralized state authority has similarly persisted in Thailand with

fewer institutional checks and popular demands and interest groups than developed in many former European colonies. One could therefore argue that where traditional sociopolitical structures were not only autocratic but centralized (in contrast to the feudal arrangements of Europe and Japan), and where these structures were not disrupted and reorganized by colonial intervention, civil society has remained weak in relation to the state. And yet, continuity and gradual evolution have their advantages. In the case of Thailand, they have helped to ensure a greater measure of political order and societal coherence than elsewhere in Southeast Asia, partly by preserving the most precious source of political legitimacy and mediation in the country, the monarchy. These factors hardly predestine democratization, but they can facilitate it. In Turkey, the democratic, secularizing reforms of Mustafa Kemal probably had more immediate and enduring legitimacy than any that might have been imposed by a colonial power.

Distinctive though their histories have been, the lack of a colonial experience has not entirely insulated Turkey and Thailand from the influence of global political trends and ideologies. The political development of both countries in this century has been markedly affected by their elites' awareness of and fascination with democratic developments in other countries. The Kemalist regime, for example, was born in the prodemocratic spirit of the post-World War I era. The 1932 coup that ended the system of absolute monarchy in Thailand was executed by young military and civilian commoners, many of whom were "educated in England and France, and inspired with ideas of democracy and progress."¹ Ironically, in the contemporary era of independent states, the power of international ideological diffusion and demonstration effects has significantly increased.

Political Culture

While the concept of political culture has been a controversial one in comparative politics and sociology, our Asian cases demonstrate its utility and salience for the study of democratic experiences and outcomes. In each of the countries examined here, one can discern certain distinctive ways of thinking and feeling about politics, power, authority, and legitimacy as they relate to the modern political system, and the role of the individual citizen in it.² These beliefs, ideals, attitudes, values, evaluations, and behavioral orientations have sometimes been heavily influenced by foreign rule and international contact, but typically spring even more profoundly from the political and cultural traditions of each country. We are not inclined to think these elements of political culture are as broadly generalizable across Asia (or even within individual countries) as some have argued, but we are comfortable with

Pye's broad assertion that the generally paternalistic nature of Asian political cultures—with their psychology of dependency, distaste for open criticism of authority, and deep fear of disunity—make fully democratic government an unlikely prospect.³ Nevertheless, if one political leader after another is abusing and usurping constitutional authority in a country, it suggests a pattern that is hardly satisfactorily explained by reference to the values and ambitions of the individual leaders alone. It is hard to deny that many of the difficulties with democracy in Asian countries emanate from their political cultures. At the same time, it is clear that democratic progress in Asia also has cultural roots and supports, and that political culture is subject to influence and evolution over time.

To begin with the positive, Das Gupta attributes India's democratic success since 1947 in part to the consensual, tolerant, and accommodating political style and strategy that evolved during the early phase of Indian nationalism. This feature of political culture owed heavily to the decisive influence of Gandhi in mobilizing mass support through a philosophy of *satyagraha*, emphasizing tolerant, non-violent political activism and the peaceful resolution of conflicts. But as Weiner observes, it also has a significant traditional root, in the pervasive belief in and reliance on arbitration as the appropriate method for the resolution of conflict.⁴ And even before Gandhi was born, it was fostered by a long tradition of liberal political thought, which spawned numerous associations devoted to extending political freedom and defending popular interests. After Gandhi's death, the democratic, accommodating culture of elite politics was perpetuated, suggests Das Gupta, by a broad consensus not only on the procedures of political competition and conflict resolution but also on the substance of developmental policies and goals.

In Papua New Guinea, we may find the clearest congruence between democratic success and democratic features of traditional culture. The latter, Lipset argues, include an egalitarian, factionalized, exchange-based traditional ethic; a natural hostility to centralized authority and arbitrary rule; and the "relentless" rise and fall of political leaders, whose authority was limited by a high level of individual autonomy and the "conditional and voluntary" nature of political support. If these traditions have produced a highly factionalized polity dominated by primordial, ethnic appeals and the politics of patronage and personality, they have also checked the concentration of power in individual leaders or the state. In democratic Papua New Guinea, the culturally entrenched "insubordination" of the electorate has produced a striking rate of circulation of elites.

Many of the authors in this volume call attention to the cultural roots of democratic difficulties and success. Although these cultural

leaders since World War II have agreed on the legitimacy of electoral democracy and a secular, republican state, they have been ambivalent if not actively hostile to the notion of political opposition. In fact, Özbudun argues, this intolerance dates back to the Ottoman empire and is reflected as well in excessive fear of a national split. Thus, he writes: "The line separating opposition from treason is still rather thin. . . . The tendency to see politics in absolutist terms also explains the low capacity of political leaders for compromise and accommodation." Cultural obstacles to political accommodation are even more strikingly apparent in South Korea, where compromise is seen as "a signal of weakness and lack of resolve, not only by one's adversaries but by one's allies as well."¹⁷ The resulting zero-sum nature of the political game makes democratic politics highly unstable, and very nearly derailed the recent transition to democracy there. In addition, the insistence on ideological uniformity, stemming from the traditional Confucian preoccupation with order, respect, and harmony as well as the modern preoccupation with security in divided Korea, has robbed the party system of meaningful debate and choice.

In the case of Malaysia, Zakaria agrees with Pye that the strong curbs placed on political conflict and dissent may be seen as reflective of Malay cultural values, which appreciate strong authority and fear conflict and dissention. But the tremendous fear of opposition and division has also been shaped by the country's deep ethnic cleavages, and their traumatic explosion into violence in 1969. In Thailand, the powerful concern for stability and consensus has been the particular preoccupation of military and bureaucratic elites, whose narrow conception of democracy excludes political conflict and independent interest groups. But these illiberal views have not been static. While they have followed from the autocratic nature of traditional authority in Thailand and the historical weakness of democratic values, they have also been deepened by the chaotic nature of multiparty competition in Thailand (itself partly the result of bureaucratic and military dominance of the polity) and by a threat comparable to the ethnic one in Malaysia, that of communist mobilization and subversion. In the case of Indonesia, it is easy to point to features of Javanese culture and society (e.g., the intolerance of opposition to central authority, the lack of moral basis for authority) that are not conducive to democracy. But there was, at least on the village level, "a developed sense of equality, social justice, and accountability," and, at independence, broad appreciation among political elites (especially of ethnic minorities) of the need for democratic mechanisms to manage ethnic divisions.¹⁸

Indonesia also raises the question of whether Islam is an obstacle to democratic development. This depends to some extent on the way Islam is interpreted and politically mobilized. While our evidence is

hardly generalizable to the Islamic countries of the Middle East, we find in our four predominantly Muslim countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Turkey) little evidence of Islam directly obstructing democratic development. In Turkey, this may be due in part to the separation of Islam from politics and the state in the twentieth century. In Indonesia it may owe to the heterogeneity within the predominant Islamic community, which is divided between the fully devout *santri* (who themselves are split into traditional and modernizing wings) and the syncretic *abangan*, who mix Islam with pre-Islamic beliefs but nevertheless identify as Muslims. Moreover, in Indonesia, as well as our other three cases, Islamic parties have not fared well in electoral competition (partly because the political system has been structured to their disadvantage). Pakistan might be considered a particularly crucial test, in that it was founded in 1947 as an Islamic state, with the expectation that Islam would be an integrating force, after the trauma of the partition. And yet, Rose finds that Islam has been largely incidental to politics and policy making in Pakistan over the past four decades, neither helping nor hindering democracy. Again, the separation of religion and politics, along with religious subcleavage, appears significant. Pakistan's founders were modernists who conceded no role in governance to Islamic organizations, and subsequent governments have continued to marginalize them politically. Islamic religious leaders and groups have themselves been divided between "purists" and "populists."

The evidence from our various Asian cases thus cautions against drawing any deterministic linkage between political culture and democratic outcomes. That the latter have multiple and complex sources of causation is beyond question, as we further demonstrate below. And political culture itself is determined not only by the past but by the present, through experience with the political system and socialization by it, so that culture also acts as an intervening and dependent variable in relation to political structure." Thus, during its six decades of nationalist mobilization and political functioning prior to independence, the Indian National Congress played a crucial role in socializing a growing political public in India to democratic values, rules, and norms. Similarly, the experience of operating a democratic system, even with interruptions, through most of the past four decades, has served to socialize new generations of Turks into democratic values, while military and bureaucratic control over the instruments of mobilization and socialization have had something of the reverse effect in Thailand, in Chai-Anan's view. Han finds that the extensive, deliberate efforts at mass "education in democracy" increased democratic consciousness among the Korean public after the Korean War, and rapid urbanization and modernization, with the growth of the mass media and the middle class, has accelerated this trend.

Another complication for cultural explanations of democratic outcomes is that all political cultures are to some degree mixed, and many if not most of those represented in this volume have some significant values and orientations that press in a democratic direction and others that press in an authoritarian one. Thus, the traditional clientelistic, opportunistic style of Philippine politics—which views public service as a means for private gain and pursues the struggle for power with violence, fraud, and procedural abandon—has clearly undermined democracy; and yet, the widespread popular and elite value commitment to democratic participation made it much more difficult to institutionalize an authoritarian regime in the Philippines than in Thailand or Indonesia. India's substantial democratic values and norms coexist with certain traditional values that are not particularly conducive to democracy, such as "a passion for harmony and synthesis" that devalues competition and conflict and has bred some intellectual cynicism about multiparty, parliamentary democracy.²⁰ Political cultures are also mixed in that the subcultures of some groups in a country may be less democratic than others (compare, for example, the beliefs of military and party elites in Thailand). Finally, there is the mixture that comes from the ongoing process of change. Our cases tend to confirm Gabriel Almond's observation that "all political systems . . . are transitional systems, or systems in which cultural change is taking place."²¹

Given this substantial "plasticity" of political culture, we are not inclined to think that it must necessarily stand in the way of democratic development in Asia. As Almond has written recently, "Political culture affects political and government structure and performance—constrains it, but surely does not determine it."²² Cultural values and beliefs complicate the task of democratic development and consolidation in many of our cases, but they do not foreclose the prospect of full democracy, as we have defined it in this study. As democracy is assimilated in different cultures, it inevitably is going to look and function differently, but it does not inevitably have to be less democratic.

Ethnic Cleavage and Conflict

There is no shortage of evidence from our Asian cases to demonstrate the negative effects for democracy of deep ethnic cleavage. In Sri Lanka, it has been a primary factor in the deterioration of democracy, and its explosion into violent insurgency and repression has ravaged the economy, polarized the polity, embittered all groups, and provided an excuse for increasingly authoritarian measures. In Malaysia, it has provided the overriding rationale for setting firm limits to democratic expression and competition. In Pakistan and Indonesia, it has played a

significant role in the instability and failure of previous attempts at democracy.

But the conclusion that democracy therefore is inconsistent with deep ethnic divisions is a specious one. India has one of the most complex ethnic structures in the world, and its politics have been relentlessly divided by and preoccupied with ethnic and linguistic conflicts and demands. Papua New Guinea is an utterly fragmented country ethnically, and, like India, has had to contend with repeated secessionist movements. Yet both of these democracies have survived intact. Indeed, one could argue, as does Rose in this volume, that the tremendous social and ethnic complexity of a country like India makes it "difficult to conceive of any system of government other than participatory democracy that could work for such a heterogeneous society." Moreover, relative national homogeneity has not prevented political polarization and democratic breakdown in Turkey and Thailand. Clearly, what matters is not simply the degree of ethnic division, but how it is structured and managed.

With respect to structure, one of the great advantages of Indian society is the cross-cutting nature of its complexity. As Das Gupta explains, "major religious communities are split into many language communities which in turn are stratified into caste and class formations." As a result of these multiple and cross-cutting identities, various levels of cleavage are in competition with one another, shifting in salience across conflicts and over time. By contrast, in the most ethnically troubled countries in this volume, Sri Lanka and Malaysia, ethnic, religious, regional, and linguistic cleavages cumulate, and the majority group in each country, the Sinhalese and the Malays, also feels disadvantaged socioeconomically. This coincidence of cleavages makes it likely that the same broad ethnic division will be tapped, no matter what the specific issue.

This polarizing tendency is further enhanced by the centralized character of the ethnic structure, a situation in which "a few groups are so large that their interaction is a constant theme of politics at the center."²³ In Sri Lanka, the Sinhalese and Tamils together constitute most of the population (with the Tamils in a distinct minority), while the Malays and Chinese are the main groups in Malaysia, with roughly a half and a third of the population respectively. Thus, any issue regarding the allocation of power and resources, or the status of cultural symbols and media, invokes not only the same line of cleavage but the same division between cleavage groups. By contrast, in a more dispersed or decentralized ethnic system, ethnic alignments are much more fluid. For example, beyond the Hindi speakers, who are about 30 percent of the population, no linguistic group in India accounts for as

much as 10 percent. "Because of the large number of scattered groups, it would be preposterous to suggest that politics at the center in India revolves around the rivalry of, say, Gujaratis, Bengalis, Oriyas, and Telugus."¹⁴ The situation in Papua New Guinea represents perhaps the extreme of ethnic fragmentation, with roughly 700 languages (in a population of three and a half million) and "many, many more polities than that," in that the village, lineage, or clan has been the more salient unit of political identity. This incredible ethnic dispersion has had much to do with the fluidity of parliamentary coalitions and the relative absence of polarized conflict in Papua New Guinea.

But India and Papua New Guinea also call attention to the importance of political structures and creative, flexible leadership in managing ethnic conflict. Both countries have been plagued with intense ethnic rivalries and serious secessionist movements. To the extent these have been subdued or managed, it has been not with ethnic chauvinism, resistance, and repression, but through negotiation and substantive accommodation that gave aggrieved groups some sense of cultural/political security and socioeconomic stake in the system. When the issue of the national language polarized into bitter conflict and violence in the 1960s, Indian political leaders forged a compromise that backed away from the imposition of Hindi as the effective national language. When the fears and aspirations of India's smaller ethnic groups have crystallized into separatist and militant regionalist agitation, these have generally been allayed through the creation of new states, which, Das Gupta observes, has not only given groups significant autonomy but has transferred the target of political mobilization from the national to the state centers. It is also noteworthy that Papua New Guinea's most serious secessionist conflict was eventually resolved through the decentralization of power, and, ultimately, the establishment of nineteen provincial governments.

These examples of accommodation and relatively successful ethnic management contrast sharply with the tragic experience of Sri Lanka, where the repeated rejection of moderate Tamil interests and demands in the 1960s and early 1970s transformed the Tamil sense of grievance into a militant and ultimately violent separatist movement. In particular contrast to the Indian experience were the refusal of the Sinhalese ruling parties to enact satisfactory guarantees regarding the use of Tamil language and the refusal to give the minority Tamils regional autonomy. Also telling has been the difference within India between the uncompromising, exclusionary, narrowly and ruthlessly self-serving response of Indira Gandhi to the Assam and Punjab regional movements, which drove them "to explosive proportions" of appalling violence, and the more accommodating strategy of her successor Rajiv, who reached accords that have at least relieved the ethnic crises

(especially in Assam).¹⁵ Similarly, the refusal of the majority Javanese politicians to recognize minority ethnic concerns, and to accommodate them within a federal order rather than forcing them into submission, "led to protracted internal warfare for more than a decade" and seriously eroded the potential basis for democracy, Sundhaussen concludes.

Accommodation has also restored ethnic peace in Malaysia, but through the very different framework of a semiconsociational grand alliance in which Malay political hegemony is entrenched beyond challenge. The heavy dependence of this formula on the continued cooperation of ethnic elites and on continued rapid economic growth to soften the impact of educational and economic preferences for Malays are important elements of vulnerability. But the fact that the Malays have sought to secure their dominance not through outright hegemony but within an accommodative, coalitional framework, and through an ethnic division of political rewards, has brought an important degree of ethnic peace.

The Malaysian situation calls attention to the important role of political parties and party systems in structuring ethnic conflict. The early failure of noncommunal parties, and the presence of a dominant party within each ethnic group—along with the inability (at least in the early days) of the leading Malay party (UMNO) to secure a stable parliamentary majority on its own—were conducive to the formation of a broad, multiethnic party alliance. By contrast, the presence of two major Sinhalese parties, each outbidding the other in its appeals to the majority electorate, precluded formation of an enduring multiethnic party alliance in Sri Lanka, and has repeatedly undermined the willingness and/or capacity of the ruling Sinhalese party to reach an ethnic accommodation with the Tamils.¹⁶

No doubt, one reason why the Congress party has generally been willing and able to accommodate ethnic demands is that its political dominance nationally has (usually) been relatively secure, and through most of its life it has not faced a serious challenger in the Hindi heartland that might force it to fall back upon ethnic chauvinism and intransigence. Moreover, even were that the case, the Hindi speakers are not sufficiently numerous in themselves to provide any party with a national majority. In neighboring Pakistan, the Muslim League lacked the secure electoral base of the Congress in India, in large measure because its leadership and much of its cadre were *muhajirs* (refugees) from sections of the British Raj that became part of India after the partition. Rather than seek to build a broad base of support across all ethnic, social, and regional groups (as the Indian Congress had done, albeit under the more favorable circumstances of decades of nationalist mobilization), the leaders of the Muslim League pursued "antiintegrationist" policies that alienated several major regional groups. In the

ensuing years, the continuing failure of a highly fractionalized political leadership to effect the integration of ethnic communities into the national polity led to political instability, the failure of democratic experiments and the disintegration of Pakistan into two countries in 1971.

In brief, then, the cases in this volume point to a powerful generalization, rich with policy implications. As Das Gupta has argued from India's recent history, where the state responds to ethnic mobilization with strategies of inclusion and incorporation, often involving only modest concessions that are "more symbolic than substantial," social peace and political stability can be maintained or restored. But where the state responds with exclusion and repression, violence festers. Underlying this is a simple but profound insight: "When ethnic leaders are allowed to share power, they generally act according to the rules of the regime. . . . Although access and mobility do not necessarily decrease inequality, they can make it more tolerable."²⁷

State and Society

The evidence from our Asian cases illuminates in varied and distinctive ways the importance for democracy of the relationship between the state and civil society. As with many other factors, this involves something of a dilemma. If the state is too strong, centralized, and domineering, there will be little to prevent its incumbents from exercising power in an authoritarian and abusive fashion. This is why many theories of democracy emphasize the need for a dense, pluralistic structure of economic, social, and political organizations outside the state. On the other hand, if the state is too weak, it may be unable to deliver the social and economic goods that groups are expecting and demanding, and to maintain order in the face of conflicting group demands. Thus, democracy would seem to require some kind of balance between the "output" institutions of the state—most notably the bureaucracy and the security apparatus—and the "input" institutions (political parties, interest groups, associations) that are competing for state control, attention, and resources. More generally, there is a need for some kind of balance between the state and civil society.

For many Asian countries, the supremacy of the state over civil society has been a major source of difficulty for democracy. The inability of Thailand to develop a stable democracy over the past half century must be understood in light of entrenched bureaucratic domination of the polity and society, with the military in an increasingly ascendant role. The dominance of these central, and highly centralized, state institutions has precluded the development of strong and autonomous interest groups, village associations, and political parties. When these

have begun to emerge, they have been coopted or overrun by the military and bureaucracy. Over time, this has become a self-perpetuating cycle. Nascent, weak, and ineffective, emergent civil institutions have been unable to check the consolidation of centralized state power or to resist military-bureaucratic cooptation and repression. This failure only reinforces the institutional gap between state and society, enabling the state to expand its role further and to impose a certain vision of development from above. Similarly, the weakness of political parties has fed upon itself in a vicious cycle: Parties (and the ultimate input institution, the elected legislature) have been weak because repeated military intervention has robbed them of the continuity and experience necessary for institutionalization. A quite similar historical process has been at work in South Korea as well. The failure of civic institutions to perform effectively has heightened both the propensity and the legitimacy of military-bureaucratic intervention, to the point where these elites have come to see it not only as their right but their duty to guard and guide the political process. As the Thai military, in its growing suspicion of democratic pluralism, has expanded its influence over far reaches of civil society—the mass media, rural development, civic education—the challenge of developing truly democratic government has been further complicated. The same authoritarian corporatist impulse of state elites to manage and contain the autonomy of interest groups and the press is now an obstacle to the consolidation of a fully democratic system in South Korea.

Of course, the highly centralized and militarized nature of the state in South Korea did not prevent the recent transition to democracy. But the preceding failures of attempts at democracy, the ensuing decades of authoritarian domination, and the current steep challenges to democratic consolidation have all been shaped by the supremacy of the state and the militarized nature of South Korean society. As in Thailand, historical and cultural factors (including the absence of autonomous social organizations), and external threats, contributed to the formidable power of the state and especially its coercive apparatus. Especially during the Park years, the increasing "militarization" of society and politicization of the military generated a climate conducive to authoritarian rule. Now that they have been so politicized, it is not clear how the military and state security services will be weaned away from their compulsion to dominate and control domestic politics. But few can doubt that their power must be circumscribed and firmly subjected to civilian control if democracy is to take root in South Korea.

The difficulty of reversing military role expansion is especially apparent in Indonesia, where Sundhaussen sees no civilian elites who are ready and willing to assume power, and hence no alternative to the military at present. With the coming of Suharto's New Order to the

mid-1960s and the "Dual Function" doctrine, the military has pervasively penetrated the state bureaucracy and, to quote Sundhaussen, "the life of autonomous social, occupational, and cultural organizations, trade unions and business associations has been gradually strangled." This pattern becomes resistant to change, because military officers develop an ideological stake in and financial appetite for political and administrative roles, and because the very civic associations and movements that might retrench this military state dominance have instead been enervated and preempted by it. Even where the process has not gone nearly so far, as in Pakistan, the lure of lucrative government positions for incumbent or aspiring military bureaucrats presents an obstacle to military withdrawal from government.

That the movement for redemocratization in Pakistan has gone so far is due in part to the space that the Pakistani military continued to allow for independent organization and expression in civil society. Similar space for associational life and independent organization played a critical role in undermining and ultimately bringing down the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos early in 1986, after broad popular mobilization by associations of lawyers, intellectuals, students, businessmen, human rights organizations, and the National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL), supported by the Catholic Church.

While military role expansion has been a critical problem for democracy in Asia, it should not be equated with the problem of statism. For the domination of the central state over civil society can impede or occlude democracy even when the state is essentially a civilian, bureaucratic one. In Turkey, this highly centralized, bureaucratic state dominance has prevented democracy from acquiring depth, in that intermediate structures (including those of the state, i.e. local governments) have been weak and lacking in autonomy. But beyond this, statism has contributed heavily to the polarization and violence that have plagued Turkish politics in the past. The enormous power of the Turkish state, including its substantial ownership and extensive control over the economy, has made "the costs of being out of power . . . extremely high," Özbudun argues, thus making opposing parties unwilling to contemplate defeat.

Here again, Papua New Guinea provides a significant contrast with many of our other Asian cases. The traditional value of individual autonomy has served to limit state power in Papua New Guinea. The stakes in controlling the central government have remained limited, as power has been decentralized through provincial governments and private enterprise has continued to provide considerable scope for individuals to accumulate wealth outside the state. Moreover, the bureaucracy has developed a certain autonomy from politics, rather than being

manipulated and controlled for the benefit of whichever party might be in power.

In India, the bureaucracy has often been referred to as the "steel frame" of democratic rule, and we have already noted that the presence at independence of such an elaborate, largely indigenized administrative framework—which developed alongside, rather than to the exclusion of, participatory institutions—was a major contribution of the British colonial legacy (although its independence and integrity have seriously eroded over the last two decades). A similarly balanced presence of effective output and input institutions served the early democratic development of Malaysia and Sri Lanka as well.

Beyond this, democracy in India has been fortified by the early development and vigorous presence of a rich array of voluntary associations directed to language reform, legal reform, educational modernization, defense of press freedom, and women's rights. These associations began under colonial rule in the nineteenth century and developed dramatically in strength and sophistication during the the Gandhian phase of nationalist mobilization, with its philosophy of "*satyagraha*," or nonviolent resistance. While strong trade unions, peasant, student, and business associations today often align with political parties, they also act autonomously to pursue their own interests, and this political autonomy has increased as new leadership groups have arisen within them giving greater emphasis to economic issues. Moreover, as Das Gupta observes in this volume, India's sociopolitical scene is also replete with a vast array of issue-oriented movements, "bringing together various parties, groups, and concerned publics" in aggressive campaigns for social and political reform.

A good many of these movements have been ethnic in nature, seeking to advance or defend cultural and symbolic interests such as language and land, along with political interests of autonomy and control, often mixed with or superseded by economic interests of resource allocation, employment, and education.²⁴ Others (often overlapping with ethnicity) have been caste- or class-based, mobilizing disadvantaged, "backward," or "scheduled" groups to fight oppression by landlords and the state, to raise class or group consciousness, and to struggle for land reform, minimum wages, and other elementary social and economic rights.²⁵ A more recent and particularly important form of civic movement, which has arisen since the emergency in the 1970s, has been the civil liberties movement. It comprises several non-partisan organizations which struggle to expose and combat human rights violations concerning land, labor, urban housing, suppression of free expression, academic protest, and the mistreatment of women. Such autonomous, nonpartisan movements and organizations serve

continually to check the relentless tendency of the state to centralize and expand its power and to evade civic accountability and control. At the same time, they broaden popular participation in the political process by adding to the formal arena a number of informal channels, and they may also through their action strengthen certain formal institutions of democracy, such as the courts. Moreover, by combatting abuses of power and violations of civil liberties, the human rights organizations directly improve the (deteriorating) quality of democracy in India.¹⁰ Thus, if one effect of these various groups and movements is to expose the superficiality of democracy in many areas of India's social and economic life, another is "to open alternative political space outside the usual arenas of party and government, though not outside the state," through which the struggle to deepen and rejuvenate democracy may proceed.¹¹

Political Parties and Party Systems

The ten countries analyzed in this volume have had markedly different types of parties and party systems. And while caution is certainly advised in generalizing from their experiences, certain patterns of association emerge with rather striking clarity. In particular, three of those countries which have had the least success with multiparty politics—Pakistan, Thailand, and Indonesia—were all plagued by extremely fragmented and weak party systems. Indonesia had more than 100 parties in the late 1950s; forty-two parties contested the crucial 1975 elections in Thailand, and between 1946 and 1981, 143 parties came and went across the Thai political stage. Pakistan began with a single dominant party, the Muslim League, but as we have noted, the ML leaders, being refugees from India, lacked a strong political base among local and especially rural elites. In pointed contrast to the Congress party of India, the ML failed to incorporate the key elites of the differing social, ethnic, and regional groups, and after the assassination of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951, the party slowly disintegrated. The resultant factionalization of Pakistani politics produced the same fleeting and weak parliamentary coalitions, and the same lack of strong, stable, and effective government, that heralded the failure of democracy in Thailand and Indonesia as well.

Such extreme multipartyism was perhaps the overriding but not the only common feature of these failed party systems. In addition, most of the parties in these cases failed to articulate and aggregate clear interests. Moreover, they suffered from extremely weak organization, discipline, and coherence, which brought upon them serious problems of internal factionalism. As a result, these parties (with a very few exceptions) were unable to mobilize a significant mass base. In these senses, they were more the

electoral vehicles of individuals or narrow, shifting cliques than political parties. And in each case, the fragility and instability of extreme multipartyism was compounded by the inability of these "parties" to cooperate and work with one another.

One indication of the costs of such political fragmentation is the movement currently under way in all three countries toward a much more streamlined party system. Pakistan's ongoing political transition has revealed an emphasis of both government and opposition on party consolidation. Of course, the task is always easier for a governing group, which has the resources at its disposal to build a party base. But Rose sees Benazir Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party emerging as the major opposition force, with other parties having to coalesce around it or the governing Pakistan Muslim League in what could be becoming a two-party-dominant system. In Thailand and Indonesia, the ruling regimes are seeking to encourage such party consolidation as a matter of deliberate strategy. While the Thai political scene remains fragmented, electoral provisions in the present constitution exert a bias against small parties and a good chance of eliminating many of them over time. In Indonesia, consolidation was accomplished by government mandate, reducing the number of parties to ten in 1960 and to only three (including the government-controlled GOLKAR) in 1973. But as Sundhussen writes, "Party politicians have been unable to grasp the opportunities a unification of weak parties may afford, and have preferred to continue with the bickering and infighting which had been the hallmark of coalition politics in the 1950s." This has undermined the possibility for evolution of a more genuinely open political system.

A different model of democratic failure in the party system is provided by the case of Turkey. There, the problem (especially in the most recent democratic breakdown) was the extreme polarization of national political life, which was reflected in and exacerbated by the strategic position of small radical right parties in Parliament, and the activism of the extraparliamentary left, which dragged the two major parties toward the extremes. Again it is revealing that, in restructuring the democratic system after the September 1980 coup, the Turkish military adopted several measures (a 10 percent electoral threshold for representation in Parliament, and banning of communist, fascist, religious, and separatist parties) to try to produce a two- or three-party system that would yield stable parliamentary majorities.

With its one-party-dominant but nevertheless democratically competitive system, India has been seen as providing an important model for developing countries. But as Das Gupta makes clear, a key factor in the early consolidation of democracy in India was not simply the electoral dominance of the Congress party, but its continuing strategy of

preemptively coopting numerous popular movements into a broad, multiclass, multiethnic, multiregional political front.

But this is not the whole story of the party system in India, and increasingly since 1967, it has not been the story at all. Democratic incorporation has also been served by a partially decentralized federal system that has enabled both regional party challengers, such as the AIADMK in Tamil Nadu and the Akali Dal in Punjab, and ideological ones, such as the Communist Party (Marxist) in Kerala and West Bengal, to gain a share of power and a stake in the system by winning control of individual states, most of which are larger than the typical Third World nation (e.g., Tamil Nadu, with its roughly fifty million people). But democratic incorporation in India has been undermined, and decades of laborious institution-building seriously eroded, by the transformation of the party system since the coming to power of Indira Gandhi in 1967.

Although the continuing electoral victories of Mrs. Gandhi's Congress (with the brief interruption of the Janata landslide in the massive 1977 rejection of her emergency rule) may have fostered the superficial perception of continuing one-party dominance in India, virtually all close observers of the Indian party system emphasize the institutional decay that set in after 1967. Mrs. Gandhi's response to the Congress's precipitous decline in the 1967 elections (from 73 to 55 percent of seats in the national parliament, despite a drop of only 4 percent in popular vote) was a growing personalization and centralization of the party (as well as the state), which fractured its unity, eroded its breadth, and undermined its organizational vitality and depth down to the grassroots. As voters became more assertive and new interest groups increasingly demanding, party politics became more competitive. Unfortunately, Mrs. Gandhi continued to respond—even after returning to power in 1980 supposedly chastened by her 1977 defeat—with a still more determined and manipulative concentration of power, rather than creative institutional adaptation. This only reinforced what Das Gupta terms the "plebiscitarian transformation" from a party-based state to a state-based party. No less disturbing, the post-1980 phase of this plebiscitarian decay has seen the Congress campaign on a fiercely confrontational and intolerant stance toward opposition parties (somewhat but not entirely abated under Rajiv after 1984) and a cynical turn toward mobilization of Hindu chauvinism as the only electoral strategy for an organizationally decrepit party. This institutional decay of the ruling party has been accompanied by a general disintegration of the party system into fragmentation and instability, as not only the Congress-I but other parties as well have become more porous, ill-defined, and yet mutually hostile. It is this general deterioration of the party system, probably more than any other single development, that

has experienced students worried about the long-term future of Indian democracy—and with good reason, given the experience of other Asian countries.¹²

The importance of party institutionalization is also underscored, in the negative, by the cases of Thailand and South Korea. As we have already indicated, neither country has been able to develop a coherent and autonomous party system because of repeated and prolonged military intervention. Parties in each country have been weak in their internal organization, shallow in their bases of popular support, and disappointing if not disillusioning in their performance. Thus, military-bureaucratic dominance and party underdevelopment have become intertwined in a vicious cycle. With the emergence of new democratic opportunities (dramatically in South Korea, more subtly and gradually in Thailand), the construction of broad-based, coherent parties—mobilizing and incorporating emerging popular interests, organized effectively down to the local level, and penetrating particularly through the countryside—looms as one of the preeminent challenges of democratization.

The turn of the Congress party toward Hindu chauvinist mobilization may be seen as especially alarming in light of Sri Lanka's experience of two major parties outbidding one another for the electoral support of the majority ethnic community. Malaysia, by contrast, indicates the gains for ethnic peace that can be achieved when a single party is able to maintain electoral dominance within the majority community, while using that base to forge a broad, multiethnic, multiparty alliance. Such a party system is highly dependent on party elites skilled in and committed to the necessary bargaining and accommodation at the top. Much of this semiconsociational function was accomplished within the Congress party during the first two decades of India's independence. But with the emergence of a more competitive electorate and a more fragmented party system, it is not clear that it can ever be reconstructed again.

India, Sri Lanka, and Malaysia also demonstrate the strong link between electoral and party systems. In each case, the dominance of one or two parties has been encouraged, and the strength of the victorious party in each election dramatically magnified, by a single-member-district, "first-past-the-post" electoral system for parliament. It is too often forgotten that in all its years of electoral dominance, the Congress party has *never* won an absolute majority of the vote. With the exception of the 1977 debacle, its share of the national popular vote has ranged from 41 to 49 percent, which has always been sufficient to give it majority control of the Lok Sabha (national parliament), often by two-thirds or three-quarters (see Table 2.1 in the following chapter). The electoral data for Sri Lanka and Malaysia shows a similar pattern:

modest pluralities or majorities of the vote producing massive parliamentary majorities. In Malaysia, this tendency has been reinforced by the rural weighting of the constituencies, which has benefitted the major Malay Party, UMNO.

Since India, Malaysia and Sri Lanka all had, at least for many years, three of the most stable and democratic regimes in Asia, one might argue that such an electoral system, in favoring the dominance of one or two parties or party alliances, favors democracy. But there is a fine line between firm and stable parliamentary majorities on the one hand, and the abuse of power that often follows on the other (particularly with two-thirds or three-quarters majorities). In each of the above three countries, democracy has been diminished by governments endowed with landslide parliamentary majorities, which left the opposition too weak to check the expansion and misuse of state power. Thus, it is not clear if the presumed advantages of the single-member-district system in terms of stability and simplification of the party system are not outweighed by this disadvantage of conduciveness to abusive majorities. In the coming years, Sri Lanka's recent switch to a system of proportional representation (not yet employed in an election) will provide an interesting test. Certainly, if the goal is a streamlined party system, the case of Turkey suggests this can be accomplished with proportional representation and a high minimum threshold for representation.

Political Institutions

What is true for parties is true more generally of the institutional landscape of democracy: There is a need throughout Asia to develop and reinforce those institutions that articulate and aggregate popular interests and that check the power of the state and its tendency to concentrate in the national executive. The chapters in this volume attest to the importance for democracy of vigorous legislatures and judiciaries, as well as such informal institutions as the press and popular interest groups (see above). The problem of Asian legislatures has been, in one sense, similar to that faced by parties: In countries such as Thailand, South Korea, and Pakistan, frequent military intervention has interrupted any sense of institutional continuity, and hence the capacity to gather strength and depth through experience. In addition, in countries such as India and Sri Lanka, and even more so in Pakistan under Bhutto and the Philippines under Marcos, the autonomy and power of legislatures has been deliberately eroded by executives hungry to amass unaccountable power. Thus it is not surprising that Chai-Anan Samudavanija sees the gradual enhancement of the organizational infrastructure, capacity, and authority of the legislature as a crucial dimension of the process of democratic development.

institutionalization that must lie at the heart of developing democracy in Thailand.

It is interesting that in Asia, as elsewhere in the world, the strength and autonomy of the judiciary is roughly proportional to the condition of democracy. Of course, authoritarian regimes typically do not allow independent and vigorously assertive courts. But those of our cases that seem to have the strongest judiciaries, with the greatest legal and real authority to guard liberty, constitutionalism, and due process, have also had the greatest overall success with democracy. One would cite here India, Turkey, and Papua New Guinea, although our cases do not provide the data to substantiate this generalization. The key, as Özbudun notes for Turkey, is both the constitutional capacity of the judiciary to declare an act of Parliament unconstitutional, and the protection of judicial personnel from pressure or intimidation from the other branches of government. In India, the Supreme Court has used its authority over the years to hold more than 100 center and state acts invalid, even striking down part of a constitutional amendment that sought to bar the Supreme Court from reviewing any constitutional amendment! While the autonomy and credibility of the Court eroded during the 1975-1977 emergency, and have suffered further from the general politicization and deterioration of state institutions in the past two decades, the Court has "taken important steps in public interest litigation and in supporting citizens' rights against arbitrary encroachment by the state."³ A classic case of judicial enfeeblement accompanying and enabling democratic decay has been Sri Lanka, where the constitution does not permit judicial review of enacted legislation, and even an advance judicial ruling on the constitutionality of a pending bill can be waived by a two-thirds vote of Parliament. This inability of the judiciary to overturn antidemocratic legislation, along with the concerted efforts of the executive to erode judicial autonomy, have been important factors in the deterioration of democracy in Sri Lanka.

Federalism and Decentralization

As we have already repeatedly suggested, democracy does not fit well with a highly centralized structure of power. Not only is centralization inherently in conflict with principles of democratic control, but it appears to be at odds empirically with strong and stable democracy. The experience of India underscores the value, indeed perhaps the necessity, of federalism for managing deep and intensely mobilized ethnic divisions. Real autonomy and devolution of power have been indispensable in the resolution of successive waves of ethnic and separatist agitation in India, just as Indira Gandhi's relentless violation of these principles influenced ethnic divisions and political violence.

peace in the Punjab and elsewhere. At a minimum, peaceful ethnic coexistence would seem to require at least the scale of devolution of power of Papua New Guinea's system of provincial governments.

As Urmila Phadnis argues in her chapter on Sri Lanka, the scale of the largest unit to which power will be devolved is crucial. In Sri Lanka, the local district will not suffice, and the violent insurgency of Tamil separatists will probably not be ended (certainly not peacefully) until they are offered at least some form of autonomous provincial government—short of the fully federal system that would be ideal in principle but unacceptable to the Sinhalese majority. In Indonesia as well, Sundhaussen observes that federalism “would have been the most promising constitutional arrangement to contain the evident anxieties of the ethnic minorities,” but it was discredited early on because it was seen to be a Dutch design for weakening and dividing the country, and so is now as unacceptable to the majority group in Indonesia as it is in Sri Lanka. Nevertheless, even within Indonesia's current system of provincial government, there is scope for greater decentralization, by loosening central government control over appointments and finance. Similarly, even within a formal structure of federalism, the degree of autonomy allowed individual states may affect the intensity of ethnic protest and separatist movements. This would appear to be the case now in Pakistan, where the traumatic memory of the Bangladesh secession heightens the fear of further “Balkanization” of the country. In a situation where (as in India) the central government provides about two-thirds of the funding for state budgets, a key issue now is broader state autonomy on revenue collection. It is this type of real power that Pakistani “separatist” movements are seeking, writes Rose, and that would be most likely to assure the integrity of the federation.

But there is more at stake than ethnic peace in decentralizing power. The high degree of centralization of power in Thailand and South Korea was not only a concomitant but also a facilitating factor in the perpetuation of authoritarian, military-bureaucratic domination, and the development of meaningful and autonomous local government—both in the cities and in the villages—will be an important factor in whether democracy can be successfully developed and consolidated in those two countries. Similarly, as we have noted, a primary instrument of the erosion of democracy in India and its destruction in the Philippines under Marcos was the assault on autonomous points of power outside the center. Plural sources of power act as a check on the whims or impulses of power at the center. Local participation and control is an important means for socializing people into democratic values. And, as the case of India attests, the opportunity for parties who lose out at the center to gain a share of power at lower levels strengthens their overall commitment to the democratic system and reduces the stakes in winning

national elections. It is for these reasons of the quality of democratic life that Özbudun calls for the strengthening of local governments in Turkey by giving them a greater share of public revenue and effective power.

Socioeconomic Development

Generations of theory have grappled with the relationship between democracy and both the level and the process of socioeconomic development. The evidence from our ten cases cannot settle the spirited theoretical controversies that remain with us. Nevertheless, some important insights do emerge. The most obvious of these is the simple static observation that democracy is not incompatible with a low level of development. India has been a living anomaly in this regard for four decades now, and even if one sees the quality or stability of its democracy to be diminishing, the sources of that regression have been heavily political rather than socioeconomic. Sri Lanka also maintained full democracy at a low level of development for many years (and still has a democratic constitution in place), while Papua New Guinea—the least urbanized, industrialized, and educated of our ten Asian cases—remains a democracy today, thirteen years after independence. Among the countries in this volume, one would be hard-pressed to find any clear pattern of association between the degree of democracy and the level of economic development. In fact, the rank order correlation for our ten cases between (1985) per capita GNP and Gastil's summary measure of civil and political liberties in 1987 shows literally no association between the two measures (or more precisely, an inconsequential $-.04$)⁴

This is not to deny the general positive correlation between democracy and development in the larger world. Nor is it to ignore the pressures and props for democracy that derive from a higher level of socioeconomic development, with the expansion it yields in income and education, and thus political participation. Particularly instructive in this regard is the recent experience of South Korea, whose extraordinary economic growth rate of the past two decades (averaging 7 per cent annually) has brought profound social changes that have facilitated and hastened the transition to democracy. Among the most important of these changes, writes Sung-joo Han, have been an increase in the size and political consciousness of the middle class; the growth of a more pluralistic, organized, and autonomous civil society; increasing circulation of people, information, and ideas; greater economic involvement with the industrialized democracies, and with it, the recognition that a newly industrializing country cannot win full admittance to their “club” unless it, too, is or becomes democratic.

Although its socioeconomic development has been at a much slower

pace, Rose sees the significant socioeconomic changes in Pakistan in the past decade—the emergence (as in northern India) of rural and small-town entrepreneurs, the general improvement of the rural economy, diminishing power of the traditional rural landed elite, rapid urbanization, a better organized and more active trade union movement—exerting a similar type of pressure for democratic transition in the late 1980s. In particular, he anticipates that the movement of a new generation of educated men from rural elite families (replacing the older, narrower, urban elite) will broaden the social and economic base of political parties.

And yet, our cases also attest to the destabilizing consequences—for political order in general, and democracy more specifically—that the process of modernization can have for a country moving from poverty to an intermediate state of development." The key problem is that socioeconomic development tends to loosen or sever traditional ties of deference and obedience to authority. New interests are generated, new consciousness is kindled, and new political and organizational capacities are acquired at the individual and group level. Demands multiply—both for the right to participate and for tangible and symbolic benefits—and political institutions must expand to make room for these new entrants, or risk breaking down. Moreover, with the proliferation of demands and interests, social and ideological cleavages may also multiply or deepen, taxing the conflict-mediating capacities of state institutions. If the institutions are authoritarian, as they have been for the last three decades in South Korea, these changes may profoundly erode the legitimacy of authoritarian rule and press powerfully from below for transition to democracy—while also presenting a new democracy with a daunting agenda of pent-up demands, conflicts, and frustrations. However, if the institutions that are having trouble adapting and incorporating are formally democratic ones, as they have been in Sri Lanka and India, then it may be constitutional democracy that becomes strained and even delegitimated. The Thai experience indicates the special difficulty awaiting a new democracy with weak, fragmented participant institutions and exponentially increasing social demands. As Chai-Anan explains, the lack of effective, coherent, and adaptable party institutions meant that there was no channel in Thailand's short-lived democracy (1974–76) for aggregating and expressing the demands of rapidly enlarging and newly mobilizing student, labor, and farmer groups. "As a result, political participation under the full-fledged democratic rule in the mid-1970s was close to anarchy."

Sri Lanka demonstrates some of the ambivalent consequences of development for democracy. On the one hand, its extraordinary early achievements in improving the physical quality of life—as reflected in its impressive adult literacy and life expectancy rates in the early 1960s

(the highest of any of our cases then; see Table 1.1)—gave the democratic system considerable legitimacy and international prestige. And yet, the dramatic improvements in public health also gave birth to a population explosion (given the typical lag between the decline in death rates and that in birth rates). Combined with the high rates of literacy and education, this produced a huge bulk of politicized youth, who were reaching maturity, with high expectations, just as the economy was stagnating. That their frustration exploded violently—in the "JVP" insurgency of extremist, rural, Sinhalese Buddhist youth in 1971, and then in the Tamil separatist insurgency—should not be surprising. As Phadnis writes of that first insurgency and Sri Lankan democracy's subsequent tribulations, "with the processes of social transformation, the more the realization of the socioeconomic assumptions of democracy, the greater is the pressure on the ruling regimes to aggregate popular demands. And the less is the capability of the leadership to aggregate them, the more is the tendency to have recourse to populist slogans and to assume the traits of emergency regimes."

Something of the same process has been occurring in India over the past two decades as well. While the contributors to an important new study of Indian democracy give fresh and welcome emphasis to the autonomous role of political leadership in corroding democratic institutions, it is clear that India's very success in achieving "democratically guided economic development," unleashing as it has "growing political demands by both the privileged and the underprivileged," has also been a major source of democratic strain.⁶ Growing political demands and organization by the less advantaged in society may nevertheless on balance be a good thing for democracy, in pressing for both a more just society and a more accountable and responsive state. But such popular mobilization forces the issue of democratic evolution: political leaders must either make institutional room for these new entrants—which, as Kohli notes, requires some sacrifice of their own immediate power—or the whole edifice of democracy could, as a result of the accumulated wear of unaccommodated demands, eventually fall down.

Economic Performance and Legitimacy

It is commonly assumed that a brisk and steady pace of economic development is an important source of regime legitimacy. From the evidence in this volume, there is much to support that assumption, but also much that qualifies it. Democracies do develop popular commitment and legitimacy as a consequence of delivering the goods of development. But we have seen that the process of development may also produce new challenges to legitimacy, and that successful development may spawn expectations difficult to fulfill. Moreover, what is true for

Table 1.1 Selected Development Indicators, 1965-1985

	India		Papua New Guinea		Turkey		Philippines	
	1965	1985	1965	1985	1965	1985	1965	1985
Civil and Political Liberties, 1975 & 1987 ^a	5	5	5	4	5	6	10	4
Population in Millions	483.0	765.1	—	3.5	31.0	50.2	32.3	54.7
Population Growth Rate 1973-1984		2.3		2.6		2.2		2.7
Projected Rate of Population Growth 1985-2000		1.8		2.2		1.9		2.2
GNP per Capita in U.S. Dollars, 1985 ^b		270		680		1080		580
Average Annual Growth Rate, GNP per Capita, in Percent, 1965-1985		1.7		0.4		2.6		2.3
Average Annual Rate of Inflation 1965-1981, 1981-1985	7.4	7.8	8.1	5.5	20.8	37.1	11.8	19.3
Average Annual Growth Rate of Agricultural Production 1965-1981, 1981-1985	2.8	2.7	—	—	3.2	2.6	4.6	1.7
Percent of Labor Force in Agriculture (1965-1980)	73	70	87	76	75	58	58	52
Life Expectancy at Birth								
Male	46	57	44	51	52	62	54	61
Female	44	56	44	54	55	67	57	65
Infant Mortality Rate per 1000 Births	151	89	140	68	152	84	72	48
Adult Literacy Rate 1960-1980	28	36	29	32	38	61	72	75
Percent Enrolled in Primary School 1965 & 1984 ^c	74	90	44	61	101	113	113	107
Percent Enrolled in Secondary School 1965 & 1984	27	34	4	11	16	38	41	68
Urban Population as Percent of Total	19	25	5	14	32	46	32	39

Sources: World Bank, *World Development Report 1983, 1986, 1987* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983, 1986, 1987); *U.N. Statistical Yearbook, 1986*; and for civil and political liberties, *Freedom at Issue*, January-February 1976, and Raymond D. Gastil, *Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 1987-88* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1988).

^a Combined score of civil and political liberties, each rated on a 1 to 7 scale with 1 being freest and 7 least free. A score of 5 or less (with a 2 on political rights) is regarded as "free," 6 to 11 as partly free, and 12 to 14 as "not free."

^b

^b 1985 GNP per capita is expressed in constant 1981 U.S. dollars.

^c The percentages may exceed 100 because of the enrollment of students outside the standard age group.

Sri Lanka		South Korea		Malaysia		Thailand		Pakistan		Indonesia	
1965	1985	1965	1985	1965	1985	1965	1985	1965	1985	1965	1985
5	7	11	8	6	8	8	6	8	9	10	11
11.2	15.8	28.4	41.1	8.0	15.6	30.5	51.7	—	96.2	104.5	162.2
	1.8		1.5		2.4		2.2		2.9		2.3
	1.6		1.2		1.9		1.6		2.7		1.8
	380		2150		2000		800		380		530
	2.9		6.6		4.4		4.0		2.6		4.8
9.5	14.7	18.7	6.0	4.9	3.1	6.8	3.2	10.2	8.1	34.3	10.7
2.7	4.0	3.0	6.3	—	3.0	4.9	3.4	3.3	2.1	4.3	3.1
56	53	55	36	59	42	82	71	60	55	71	57
63	68	55	65	56	66	54	62	46	52	43	53
64	72	58	72	60	70	58	66	44	50	45	57
63	36	63	27	55	28	88	43	149	115	138	96
75	85	71	93	53	60	68	86	15	24	39	62
93	103	101	99	90	97	78	97	40	42	72	118
35	61	35	91	28	53	14	30	12	15	12	39
20	21	32	64	26	38	13	18	24	29	16	25

democracies may not be true for authoritarian regimes, which may be undone by their economic successes as much as by their failures.

An important theme of Das Gupta's contribution to this volume is the insufficiently appreciated success of India in pursuing and achieving what he terms "combined development." As a result of democratic planning and relatively effective administration, India has made quiet but impressive gains in agricultural production, eliminating famine and dependence on foreign food within a generation. Although statist inefficiency is an urgent economic and political problem, industrialization in India has reached the point where the country produces most of what it needs and ranks among the top five industrial producers in the developing world. Most importantly, steady and substantial improvements have been made in the physical quality of life, so that on such measures as the infant mortality rate, the child death rate, life expectancy, and primary, secondary, and university enrollment ratios, India ranks today with the average for lower-middle-income developing countries, even though its per capita national income places it among the twenty poorest countries in the world." These gains have come through steady, prudent investment, avoiding the economic crisis and crippling international indebtedness that gripped many Third World countries which sought shortcuts to development.

If these achievements have unleashed new expectations, and if some of them have been less dramatic than in China or Sri Lanka, they have nevertheless purchased some considerable popular commitment to the system. Overall, the experience of combined development—what Das Gupta calls the "simultaneous treatment of multiple issues like national cohesion, economic development, social justice, citizen efficacy, and human development"—has done much to legitimate the democratic system, or at least to neutralize challenges to it. While poverty and inequality remain, despite the progress, humiliating in degree and haunting in scale, it is significant that the movements against these are primarily working through rather than challenging the legitimacy of the democratic system.¹⁴

Something of a similar argument could be made for the early social and economic progress of Sri Lanka. But there is also another lesson to be learned from that case, which is catching up with India as well. This is the costs to economic performance, and ultimately to democratic vitality, of statist economic policies. The sharp economic downturn under the socialist-leaning United Front government (1970–1977) was traceable not only to exogenous shocks (rising oil prices, declining tea prices, fertilizer shortages, drought) but to increasing state control over the economy that was often ill advised (with quotas and controls leading to scarcities and long queues) and badly administered. And while increasing social welfare spending helped improve the quality of life, it

also contributed to recurrent balance of payments deficits. We have already noted how the consequent economic travails have contributed to Sri Lanka's acute political difficulties since 1970. Unfortunately, the combined effects of internal war and plunging commodity prices appear to obscure now the initially tonic effects of the post-1978 economic liberalization policies.

The delegitimizing consequences for democracy of prolonged development stagnation may be seen in the case with which Ferdinand Marcos was able to sweep aside democratic institutions in the Philippines in 1972. Although it was he himself who had failed, in his second presidential term, to come to grips with the enduring and seemingly unsolvable problems of economic stagnation, agrarian oligarchy and inequality, corruption and dependency, Marcos struck a resonant chord among many (if not most) Filipinos with his call for a revolution from above to inculcate discipline, "democratize wealth," and impose technocratic designs for rapid modernization. While he seemed to deliver the goods in the early years of his dictatorship, the progressive narrowing of his base through years of gross corruption, neglect, stagnation, mounting indebtedness, and finally capital flight and impending economic collapse showed the inherent vulnerability of authoritarian rule. Still, Jackson argues, while declining real income for the population may have eroded Marcos' mass support and fed the communist insurgency, it alone did not undo him. The economic decay only became fatal for Marcos when it began to affect the economic fortunes of the Manila business elite, who finally joined the middle class in actively opposing him. It was in this politically strategic sense that economic crisis "supplied the backdrop for a legitimacy crisis which terminated the Marcos regime."

In his review of regime succession in Pakistan, Rose cautions against the temptation to generalize about the relationship between performance and legitimacy. The lesson of Pakistani history seems to be that a government can suffer from a bad economy but gets little credit for a flourishing one. But this may also speak of the inherent difficulties military regimes face in legitimating themselves. If they do not perform, they lose legitimacy, since performance is their only justification for holding power. But as South Korea has shown, if they do perform socioeconomically, they tend to refocus popular aspirations around political goals for voice and participation that they cannot satisfy without terminating their existence. "Thus, no matter whether they perform well or badly, they, in time, face demands for change."¹⁵

The "inevitable legitimacy crisis" for military regimes appears to be coming in Indonesia as well, Sundhaussen argues. Although the economic stability, reduction in poverty, and significant improvements in per capita income, life expectancy, and education (see Table 1.1) under

Soeharto's New Order contrast pointedly with the economic failures and chaos of civilian rule (which, in fact, was a major reason for the loss of legitimacy of parliamentary democracy and the demise of Sukarno in the mid-1960s). Indonesia's military regime will, under a new generation of leadership, have to find some way to come to grips with popular restlessness about its legitimacy.

The International Environment

Economic dependence and vulnerability represent only one type of international influence on the democratic prospect in Asia. To the extent these factors complicate the quest for vibrant, balanced, and consistent economic growth, they may exacerbate the problem of performance for a democratic regime. However, a more direct international impact upon democracy in Asia appears to come through threats (perceived or real) to national security.

A perception of serious threat to the country's military security, from either external invasion or external support for subversion or insurgency, tends to strengthen the hand of military-bureaucratic forces. In particular, it legitimates the augmentation and centralization of state power, the militarization of society, and the restriction of civil and political liberties as matters of necessity for national security. From the days of the first Korean Republic under Syngman Rhee, through the authoritarian regimes of Park and Chun Doo Hwan, this effect has been most strikingly apparent in South Korea, as one might expect of any divided country in which military tension and readiness remain acute on both sides of the border. But it has been visible in Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Pakistan as well.

In Thailand, communist insurgency during the 1970s heightened right-wing anxiety about mass political movements, and military-bureaucratic dominance was further legitimized by the subsequent expansionist and threatening posture of Vietnam in the region. More recently, Pakistani politics have felt the pressure of the Soviet war in neighboring Afghanistan and the disrupting flow of millions of refugees into Pakistan. While this has not prevented a partial and gradual transition to democracy, it has complicated and perhaps slowed it. Given Pakistan's vital geostrategic location, historic vulnerability to invading forces from the west and northwest, and legacy of previous wars with India, one might expect the issue of military security to remain a challenge to the democratic transition, a ready excuse for failing to complete it, and a serious problem for any future democratic regime.

Pakistan's experience suggests two other lessons about the political effects of security problems. First, palpable threats can have a unifying effect on a country's political elite. Rose contends that the Soviet

invasion of Afghanistan may have saved President Zia-ul-Huq from a coup that was planned but then suspended. The external military threat from Indonesia submerged ethnic divisions during Malaysia's general elections in 1964, and the threat from expansionist Vietnam again induced greater internal political consensus and a stronger intercommunal coalition in Malaysia during the mid-1970s (while also inducing greater restrictions on democracy).

Secondly, national security is a preeminent dimension of regime performance. Few things can shake the foundation of a regime more violently than defeat or perceived failure in war, as Pakistan's Ayub Khan discovered after his unsuccessful 1965 war with India. The rapid growth of the communist insurgency in the Philippines contributed to the growing disillusionment with Ferdinand Marcos even within the ranks of the military. By contrast, the success of a previous Philippine president, Ramon Magsaysay, in defeating the even graver challenge of the Huk rebellion in the early 1950s gave vigor and legitimacy to the democratic system.

Of course, that military success was aided with considerable support from the U.S., and ever since Philippine independence the U.S. has had a significant influence on the politics of that country. But external political and military influence can cut both ways. In light of the aggressive U.S. role in pressing Marcos to leave—both officially (finally, at the time of the Enrile/Ramos rebellion, through the threat to cut off all military aid) and unofficially (through media attention, Congressional visitors, electoral observers, etc.)—it is useful to recall that Marcos enjoyed warm (often effusive) and substantial American support during the bulk of his authoritarian rule, as well as tens of billions of dollars in international loans that gave his regime symbolic legitimacy and immense, unprecedented powers of patronage. And even now, as the United States aids the democratic government of Corazon Aquino while she appeals for more economic assistance, some sympathetic and sober observers question whether the (gradual) withdrawal of American military bases from the Philippines might not produce a stronger, more confident, less politically ambivalent and polarized democracy. At least, there may be a case for changes in the structure of the bases agreement "that would make the bases, both symbolically and actually, a manifestation of a more equal Filipino-American partnership."¹⁴ In the same vein, democrats on both sides of the U.S.-South Korean relationship worry that excessive international dependence tends to breed radical, nationalist sentiment in South Korea, and thus to deepen problems of political polarization. And despite the obvious contribution to Papua New Guinea's economic (and democratic) prosperity of unconditional aid from Australia (which still accounts for nearly a third of its annual budget), this dependence may also have, over the long run, certain psychological and political effects.

One can find conflicting effects over time in the close U.S. relationship with South Korea. Years of support for authoritarian rulers yielded more recently to pressure for democracy, and U.S. diplomatic pressure may have played a critical role in dissuading President Chun from ruthlessly repressing the mass mobilization of opposition groups demanding democracy. But the greatest international pressure for democracy may have come from the more diffuse and subtle global pressure to be democratic in order to be accepted by the major capitalist industrialized powers as one of them. Diffusion and demonstration effects also play a role, as the Philippine lesson of "people power" was not lost on those very groups that were mobilizing to demand democracy in Korea (just as the Philippine and especially the Korean transitions affect the more gradual political opening now under way in Taiwan). But diffusion, too, can work both ways, as was indicated in 1972 when Marcos seemed to be promising the same path of authoritarian stability-cum-economic progress that many other bureaucratic polities of Southeast Asia were embracing.

To the extent it is possible to generalize across such diverse effects, one might begin with two tentative but relatively safe conclusions. First, international effects on democracy (positive and negative) tend to be greater the smaller and more vulnerable the country. Thus, the determinants of democracy in India appear to be overwhelmingly internal (at least since the end of colonialism), but less so in Sri Lanka or Malaysia. Second, international influence, such as it may exist, is more prodemocratic when the regional or global trend is toward democracy, and when the powerful external actors make the promotion of democracy a more explicit foreign policy goal.

• TOWARD DEMOCRACY IN ASIA •

It is beyond our scope here to offer general conclusions about the prospects or conditions for democracy in Asia, much less some overarching formula for achieving or maintaining democratic government. As the above review indicates, there are many factors at work in shaping political development in Asia, and many possible generalizations, but the weight one would give to different factors varies across the markedly different circumstances of our various cases. We leave to Volume One of this study any effort at grander theoretical synthesis, drawing upon all twenty-six of the cases covered.

Nevertheless, we cannot ignore the question with which we are inevitably left at the end of such a study: How can the pursuit of democratic government be advanced and strengthened in Asia? It is useful to divide this question into the three types of challenges Asian

countries now face: the transition to democracy, the consolidation of new or unstable democracies, and the renewal or reequilibration of democracies that have weakened or partially broken down.

The Transition to Democracy

Of our ten cases, the transition to democracy is currently an issue (to one degree or another) in three. In Pakistan the issue is how to complete it; in Thailand, how to advance it; and in Indonesia, how to begin it.

Of course, it always helps to have a leader who is firmly committed to democratization, such as Mustafa Kemal and later President Inonu in Turkey. Failing that, if there is a strong democratic movement from below, it may help to have an authoritarian ruler who is politically inept and unpopular, like Chun of South Korea, or manifestly unable to manage political and economic problems, as became the case with Marcos near the end. At a strategic moment, carefully focused international pressure may serve to hasten the exit of a dictator like Marcos, or at least to limit his options, as may have happened with Chun.

Without question, the political choices and tactics of regime and opposition leaders are of great consequence, as may be their own internal divisions and maneuverings, particularly once the momentum for a transition has begun. Pakistan's transition would not have come this far, Rose argues, were it not for the "careful, sensible tactics adopted by both the government and the opposition parties to avoid violent clashes." The Philippine and especially the South Korean cases would also seem to confirm the general emphasis of O'Donnell and Schmitter on the importance of elite strategies and choices, and of avoiding "widespread and recurrent violence" while seeking a negotiated solution. Moreover, our case studies of Thailand and Indonesia also support their emphasis on "a sequence of piecemeal reforms" as the most likely path of democratic transition, and on the need for democratic oppositions to be willing to play within the initially very restricted games allowed them by authoritarian regimes early in the sequence of democratization.⁴

However, the Philippine and South Korean cases also call attention to the importance for the transition of what O'Donnell and Schmitter call the "resurrection of civil society" through an explosion of autonomous interest group expression and activity, and ultimately its convergence from many points into a "popular upsurge" of mobilization for democratization.⁴ In addition, these and other Asian cases suggest the importance of a more enduring expansion of autonomous, vigorous associational life, independent of the state. Such a pluralistic infrastructure not only creates a more promising foundation for democracy,

but the resulting organization, political consciousness, and vigilance of the citizenry make the democratic transition much more irreversible, and no less importantly, reduce the prospect that authoritarian forces (old or new) may overthrow or somehow capture the new democracy in its vulnerable early days. All of this is vividly illustrated by the Philippine experience, with the striking success of the citizen-based NAMFREL in increasing the integrity of the electoral process during and after the transition, the crucial role of the Catholic Church and its affiliated organizations and press during Marcos' final years, and the proliferation of diverse forms of democratic popular organization since the fall of Marcos. In a sense, the effect is also visible in the determination of military elites in Thailand and Indonesia who oppose democratization to preempt, coopt, manage, license, and permanently control potentially autonomous forms of popular organization and interest expression.

It would seem that one clue to advancing democracy in Asia lies in the wisdom to discern what is possible and press forward within those constraints. In Pakistan, a transition to full democracy, by the end of President Zia's term in 1990, now appears possible, but probably only within the framework of the system and timetable he has crafted. Political developments—the increasing independence, skill, and assertiveness of the civilian prime minister, Mohammad Khan Junejo, and the heavy popular participation in the November 1987 Local Bodies elections—showed the miscalculation of the opposition in boycotting the 1985 legislative elections and the wisdom of their belated decision to take full advantage of the ongoing political opening. Continuing popular mobilization, party development, and prudent political gamesmanship (including credible guarantees of Zia's freedom from prosecution in exchange for his exit) now seem likely to achieve a full military withdrawal from politics.⁴⁴

But no such development seems plausible in the near term in Thailand or Indonesia, and democratic forces must therefore have a longer-term strategy that takes advantage of the possibilities that exist in the near term. For Thailand, Chai-Anan argues that the major hope for democratic progress lies in political institutionalization of participant structures—civilian political parties and the elected parliament—through the gradual development of their organizational depth, mastery of information, policy innovativeness, and linkages with popular interest groups and support bases. Until and unless parties and legislators improve their capacity, performance, image, and credibility, they will have little hope of reducing, much less eliminating, the current military dominance of political life. However, by pragmatically conceding for a time military preeminence in security matters and participation in politics, committed democrats may find the space to build the infrastructural base for future democratization. In Indonesia, which is

considerably less democratic, less appears possible. But Sundhaussen implies that some significant opening of the political system may be achievable, under an emerging new generation of military leadership, if democratic politicians in the opposition are able to forge a more coherent and effective front while giving the military no cause to fear an outbreak of unrest or a surge to the left.

Consolidating New Democracies

Three of our cases face the challenge of consolidating new democratic systems. In each case, the outcome will depend on the capacity of the new political leaders to make the democratic system work in two senses: first, to make it function democratically, in a procedural sense; and second, to make it function effectively in coming to grips with the economic, social, and security problems facing these countries.

The prospects for success are probably most favorable in Turkey, because of its considerable prior experience with democracy, and the fact that it has now operated the new system without crisis for several years. Moreover, the new constitution seems so far to be achieving its aim of producing a more stable, less polarized pattern of politics by eliminating small, extremist parties and pressing toward party consolidation. Its legitimacy—and the overall democratic character of the system—would be increased, however, if the remaining limits on free political activity (e.g. by trade unions) were lifted, civil liberties were strengthened, and military influence on government further reduced. Özbudun argues that the foundation of democracy must be deepened by "establishing a healthier balance between the state and the society." This involves not only the reduction of centralized bureaucratic control over the economy, but also the strengthening of local governments (which now receive more revenue) and the growth of autonomous voluntary associations. At the same time, he warns, the pursuit of a new, export-oriented basis of economic growth must not neglect the need for a more equitable distribution of income.

South Korea and the Philippines face more difficult challenges, but at least South Korea begins its new democracy with a healthy and dynamic economy. However, success in development, as we have noted, breeds its own troubles, and the fate of the new democracy will turn significantly on the ability of democratic leaders to lower the pitch of popular mobilization by groups—in particular the large and growing working class, but also its ideological sympathizers among students and intellectuals—who feel deprived or excluded by the years of military rule. Defusing and preempting such militant popular mobilization—which could unleash a new, destructive cycle of political polarization—will require both the institutionalization of effective channels of interest

expression inside the political system, primarily through political parties, and the substantive satisfaction over time of aggrieved popular interests. That is to say, the system must become more inclusive, both politically and socioeconomically. It must also develop, as Sung-joo Han repeatedly argues in his chapter, more effective political parties, which, through their skill in mobilizing and governing and their improving relations with one another, give the military no excuse to intervene anew but rather gradually trim back its influence in government and society.

By contrast with Turkey and South Korea, the gravity and multiplicity of challenges that have faced the new government of Corazon Aquino since its accession to power in February 1986 lead many to marvel that it has survived even two years. The most menacing problems facing the new system were the persistence of armed insurgency, not only by the communist New Peoples Army but by the secessionist Moro National Liberation Front, based in Mindanao; the insubordination of dissident elements within the military, which launched three coup attempts in 1987 (one of which appeared to come close to success); the ravaged and severely indebted state of the economy; enormous inequality (especially in land ownership) and social injustice, with roughly 60 percent of the population below the poverty line; and the lack of adequate democratic institutions. The latter problem has been the least intractable: A new constitution that limits executive power has been drafted and ratified, and elections have been successfully conducted for the national legislature and local governments (a particularly crucial level of authority in the geographically dispersed archipelago). But the party system remains unsettled, Mrs. Aquino's government remains politically divided, and the new constitution will not have been put to the real test until the next presidential election, in 1992. Before then, Mrs. Aquino's government must revive the economy, firmly establish civilian supremacy over the military, and turn the tide against the armed insurgencies.

At this writing, there are signs of progress on all three fronts: the first real growth in per capita income in four years during 1987; a tougher stance toward military indiscipline, coupled with tangible reforms (higher military pay, more professional officers); and a more aggressive military response to insurgency by better trained and equipped units, complemented by a program to rehabilitate returning rebels. On the social agenda—labor, housing, health, education, and the acute demand for land reform—progress has been more elusive, but is no less essential. As Jackson notes, the communist insurgency is not likely to be defeated without coordinated social, economic, and political reforms that address the manifest needs for access to land, social justice, and effective local government, so recreating the bonds of loyalty between

the people and their political system. Precisely the same is true for the legitimation of the new democratic system. More than any of our cases, the Philippines illustrates the laborious, painstaking, and often treacherous nature of democratic consolidation."

Renewing, Reviving and Reequilibrating Democracy

Of the four long-standing civilian, constitutional systems examined in this volume, none is free of serious, even grave, challenges to its future viability. This may be seen as a rather sad and telling statement on the difficulty of maintaining democracy in the circumstances of developing countries, but it is not a hopeless one.

The most important test is being played out in India, in the sense that its success with democracy has been to date the longest and most influential in Asia. But as we have seen, India's democratic institutions have been steadily deteriorating for twenty years, and it seems apparent to a growing number of Indians that Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi has neither the determination nor the vision to rejuvenate them. Little has been done to rebuild the grassroots strength and organizational depth, complexity, and autonomy of the Congress-I party, as was reflected in its electoral defeats during 1987 in Kerala, West Bengal and especially Haryana, which is part of the party's electoral base in the northern Hindi belt. Rather than use the prestige of critics and reformers and the investigative vigor of an autonomous press to begin to purge the government of the spreading cancer of corruption—with all its disillusioning and delegitimizing consequences—the prime minister has turned vengefully against these forces of renewal, talking of foreigners and traitors trying to "destabilize" the country, raiding the offices of the crusading daily, *The Indian Express*, and forcing his most effective and respected reforming minister, V. P. Singh, out of government when he moved too aggressively to expose and punish corruption. As Bharat Wariavwalla explains, the problem Singh was attacking goes to the heart of India's decay: It is "the 'license-permit Raj,' an alliance of businessmen, politicians, and bureaucrats which, for the past two decades, had cheated the consumer, stifled incentives and production, kept the economy from growing, and above all, subverted democratic processes."⁴ More than ever, democratic renewal in India appears to require political leadership with the skill and commitment to cleanse the system, rebuild political institutions down to the grassroots, and resolve festering ethnic violence (especially in the Punjab) democratically. But increasingly, it appears as well that such leadership will result only from the kind of mass-based, democratic movement of citizens that helped reclaim the country from the vise of Indira Gandhi's authoritarianism in the mid-1970s.

A similar type of decay has been evident more recently in Malaysia, where the divisive and abusive administration of the country by Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammed illustrates again the (potentially lasting) damage that can be done to democratic institutions by undemocratic political leadership. As the decline deepened during 1987, the dominant party in the ruling alliance, UMNO, split amid a turbulent struggle for party control, which Mahathir won only narrowly (and, his opponents alleged, fraudulently). Ethnic relations between the Malays and Chinese also precipitously deteriorated as the tolerance, civility, and striving for consensus that have characterized the political culture visibly declined. These escalating tensions served (even, some believe, were encouraged) to justify an authoritarian crackdown, which began in October 1987 with the arrests of government critics, closure of three newspapers, and a ban on public meetings and rallies. Denounced as "undemocratic" and deplorable by the revered founding father of the country, Tunku Abdul Rahman, these and subsequent actions destroyed the vitality of the party structure and weakened the (already constrained) infrastructure of democracy. In this light, the arrests of several interest and reform group leaders and Mahathir's warning to the judiciary—which has issued a series of recent decisions against the government—to stay out of politics were also significant. With the scope for criticism and opposition increasingly constrained, it is difficult to see the source for reinvigoration of the substantial democratic institutions that existed before Mahathir."

Even much graver is the situation in which semidemocratic Sri Lanka finds itself after several years of ethnic bloodletting, terrorism, and civil war. As the violent struggle has continued, despite the intervention of over 20,000 Indian troops, the problem of Tamil insurgency has been compounded by a resurgence of violent Sinhalese ethnic chauvinism, as reflected in the revival of the extremist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP). The assassination of moderate Sinhalese politicians by the JVP (emulating the tactic of Tamil extremists), the attempted assassination of President Jayewardene in August 1987, and the latter's warning that he might cancel the 1989 elections if the war did not end soon are only some of the signs of the damage that the civil war is doing to the country's political institutions, economy, and social fabric. Its resolution through some kind of compromise agreement—if that is still possible—is the *sine qua non* for any kind of reequilibration of democracy in Sri Lanka. But in a political climate in which the MPs of Jayewardene's ruling UNP "fear for their lives and do not dare return to their homes, many of which have . . . been burned to the ground by angry mobs," it is not likely that a democratic election, even if it is held, will produce a solution. The way out would seem to require some sort of temporary and historic united front of the two major Sinhalese

parties that would negotiate and sell to the Sinhalese majority a peaceful ethnic accommodation, before the formal structures of democracy come crashing down in an extremist takeover or military coup."

Nothing like the same degree of crisis and danger is apparent in Papua New Guinea today, but there as well the 1987 election revealed a serious erosion of the party system into a state of more severe fractionalization. Collectively, the four largest parties lost twenty parliamentary seats, of the 106 contested, as independents increased their seats from eight to twenty-two, while winning a stunning 40 percent of the vote. A local political scientist has observed, "the election results constitute a recipe for delicate coalition politics that could easily border on governmental immobility, instability or both." The problem was not eased by the increased incidence of fraud and violence in the election and the "unprincipled political opportunism" that dominated the subsequent maneuvers to form a coalition government." Although Papua New Guinea is in many respects unique, the experience of party fractionalization and government immobilism in dragging down democracy elsewhere in Asia is certainly cause for concern. With public disenchantment with political corruption and opportunism growing, and public confidence in the political system declining, the pressure is increasing on political leaders to produce effective, accountable government and to rejuvenate political parties.

Conclusion

If there is any common thread running through the democratic prospects of all ten of the countries we examine in this volume, it is the crucial importance of effective and democratically committed leadership. To the extent that democracy is consolidated and deeply legitimated, it can survive corrupt, abusive, and woefully incompetent leaders. In time, they will be replaced. But when a prolonged period of undemocratic or inept leadership is experienced, the system itself may begin to decay, along with popular commitment to it. And when democratic institutions do not enjoy deep, unquestioned legitimacy, and the protection of complex and variegated checks and balances (both formal and informal), the damage that can be done by even a few years of abuse may be severe and lasting. Although the leadership variable tends to convey an emphasis on the head of government or the few top leaders of the party system, one should not ignore the damage that can be done by the spread among political elites more generally of behavior and attitudes that are corrupt, opportunistic, and contemptuous of democratic rules and norms. While the structural constraints and possibilities vary enormously among our ten cases, the scope for innovation or immobility, cooperation or confrontation, responsibility or greed, on the part

of the politicians is substantial, and will substantially affect the prospects for democracy in every one of them.

At the same time, it is useful to reiterate once more that while the truism that people get the leaders they deserve is overly simplistic, people, if they organize, can eventually get rid of leaders they do not want and achieve the kind of leadership they do. Deference to leadership has long been regarded as a quintessential feature of Asian political culture. But power that is too much deferred to can too easily be abused. From the evidence of our Asian cases, it would seem that the organization of the citizenry—autonomously, pluralistically, from the grassroots—both inside and outside the formal polity is an indispensable condition for the development and maintenance of a secure democracy.

• NOTES •

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3. Donald L. Horowitz, *Coup Theories and Officers' Motives: Sri Lanka in Comparative Perspective* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 150.
4. For some characteristic and cogent interpretations, in addition to Das Gupta's in this volume, see Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr. and Stanley A. Kochanek, *India: Government and Politics in a Developing Nation*, 4th ed. (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986), especially pages 121-22; James Manor, "Parties and the Party System," and Atul Kohli, "State-Society Relations in India's Changing Democracy," in Atul Kohli, ed., *India's Democracy: An Analysis of Changing State-Society Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 62-98 and 305-18.
5. Paul Brass, "The Punjab Crisis and the Unity of India," in *India's Democracy*, p. 212.
6. Kohli, "State-Society Relations," p. 309.
7. Myron Weiner, "Empirical Democratic Theory," in Myron Weiner and Ergun Ozbudun, eds., *Competitive Elections in Developing Countries* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1987), pp. 18-20; Samuel P. Huntington, "Will More Countries Become Democratic?," *Political Science Quarterly* 99, no. 2 (Summer 1984): pp. 205-6; Richard L. Sklar, "Developmental Democracy," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 29, no. 4 (October 1987): p. 695.
8. Weiner, "Empirical Democratic Theory," p. 18.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
10. Zakaria Haji Ahmad, "Malaysia," in this volume.
11. Lucian W. Pye, with Mary W. Pye, *Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 52-3.
12. Weiner, "Institution Building in South Asia," p. 290.
13. John L. S. Girling, *Thailand: Society and Politics* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1981), p. 104.
14. For an early elaboration of the concept of political culture which influences its treatment here, see Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), especially pages 11-16. See also Lucian W. Pye, "Introduction: Political Culture and Political Development," and Sidney Verba, "Comparative Perspective: Political Culture," in Pye and Verba, eds., *Political Culture and Democracy: Comparative Political Culture*, in Pye and Verba, eds., *Political Culture and Democracy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 1-16.

- and Gabriel A. Almond, "The Intellectual History of the Civic Culture Concept," in Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, eds., *The Civic Culture Revisited* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1980).
15. Pye, *Asian Power and Politics*, especially pp. 339-41.
 16. Myron Weiner, "India: Two Political Cultures," in Pye and Verba, *Political Culture and Political Development*, p. 214.
 17. Sung-joo Han, "South Korea," in this volume.
 18. Ulf Sundhaussen, "Indonesia," in this volume.
 19. The misrepresentation of political culture theory as asserting only a unidirectional relationship between political culture and political structure has been effectively rebutted by Gabriel A. Almond. See "The Intellectual History of the Civic Culture Concept," in Almond and Verba, eds., *The Civic Culture Revisited*, especially page 29, and "The Study of Political Culture," published in German as "Politische Kultur-Forschung—Rückblick und Ausblick," special number 18 of the *Politische Vierteljahresschrift, Politische Kultur in Deutschland*, Dirk Berg-Schlösser and Jakob Schissler, eds., (Westdeutscher Verlag, 1987), pp. 27-39.
 20. Myron Weiner, "India: Two Political Cultures," pp. 235-37, and "Ancient Indian Political Theory and Contemporary Indian Politics," in S. N. Eisenstadt, Reuven Kahane, and David Shulman, eds., *Orthodoxy, Heterodoxy and Dissent in India* (New York: Mouton, 1984), pp. 123-24.
 21. Gabriel A. Almond, "Introduction: A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics," in Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 23.
 22. Almond, "The Study of Political Culture," (manuscript), p. 4.
 23. Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 39.
 24. *Ibid.*, p. 37.
 25. Quoted from Das Gupta in this volume. See also the two essays in Kohli, ed., *India's Democracy*: Jyotirindra Das Gupta, "Ethnicity, Democracy and Development in India: Assam in a General Perspective," pp. 144-68, and Paul Brass, "The Punjab Crisis and the Unity of India," pp. 169-213.
 26. For a fuller analysis of the role of electoral incentives in forming and maintaining multiethnic alliances, and a comparison of Malaysia and Sri Lanka, see Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, especially pages 424-27.
 27. Das Gupta, "Ethnicity, Democracy and Development in India," pp. 165, 167.
 28. For a good overview with a case study of Assam, see Das Gupta, "Ethnicity, Democracy and Development in India."
 29. Ghanshyam Shah, "Grass-Roots Mobilization in Indian Politics," in Kohli, ed., *India's Democracy*, pp. 262-304.
 30. Barnett R. Rubin, "The Civil Liberties Movement in India: New Approaches to the State and Social Change," *Asian Survey* 27, no. 3 (March 1987): pp. 371-92.
 31. Rajni Kothari, quoted in G. Shah, "Grassroots Mobilization," p. 302.
 32. For a penetrating and detailed exposition of this thesis of development and decay in the party system, see James Manor, "Parties and the Party System," in Kohli, *India's Democracy*, pp. 62-98. Written just a year after Rajiv Gandhi's electoral triumph at the end of 1984, Manor's account could not definitely assess the prospect for institutional renewal of the Congress and the party system under the new prime minister. But the subsequent two years have done little to shake Manor's tentative conclusion that the young Mr. Gandhi had spurned and lost "a clear opportunity to make radical changes in the party" and to effect "a cleansing of corrupt, criminal or contentious elements" (pp. 93, 94).
 33. Hardgrave and Kochanek, *India: Government and Politics*, pp. 94-95.
 34. The formula used was Spearman's coefficient of rank-order correlation. For a description of the liberty measure and its source, see the notes to Table 1.1, in this volume.
 35. For classic theoretical statements of this problem, see Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), and Samuel P. Huntington and Juan José Linz, eds., *Democracy and Its Critics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975), pp. 1-16.

36. Kohli, "State-Society Relations in India's Changing Democracy," pp. 309, 315; see also the other essays in his edited volume, *India's Democracy*.

37. In addition to the figures in Table 1.1, see also the data in The World Bank, *World Development Report 1987* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), Tables 1, 29, and 31.

38. To be sure, this is not to ignore the violence and repression that have surrounded these struggles. But much of the mobilization of the poor occurs within the political system, and even that by nonparty groups appears directed mainly to winning concessions from the democratic state and to enhancing the political capacities of the poor to pressure, compete for, and use democratic power. See, again, G. Shah, "Grass-Roots Mobilization in Indian Politics."

39. Sundhaussen, "Indonesia," in this volume.

40. See for example James Fallows, "The Bases Dilemma," *The Atlantic*, February 1988, pp. 18-30; for the contending views on this subject and broader issues surrounding Philippine-American relations, see Carl H. Landé, ed., *Rebuilding a Nation: Philippine Challenges and American Policy* (Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute Press, 1987). On the other hand, termination of the U.S. bases might require a doubling of Philippine military expenditures while destabilizing aid and investment flows. From this perspective, the bases serve the security interests of the Philippines as much as those of the United States.

41. William J. Barnds, "Political and Security Relations," in John Bresnan, ed., *Crisis in the Philippines: the Marcos Era and Beyond* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 257.

42. Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); the quoted passages are from pages 11 and 43.

43. *Ibid.*, pp. 48-56.

44. On these recent developments, see Rasul B. Rais, "Pakistan in 1987: Transition to Democracy," *Asian Survey* 28, no. 2 (February 1988): pp. 126-36. This section was written before the assassination of President Zia on August 17, 1988, and the electoral success of Benazir Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party in the subsequent mid-November National Assembly elections. However, the analysis remains essentially valid.

45. On recent developments and future prospects in the Philippines, see also Carolina G. Hernandez, "The Philippines in 1987: Challenges of Redemocratization," *Asian Survey* 28, no. 2 (February 1988): pp. 229-41; and Carl H. Landé, "Introduction: Retrospect and Prospect," in Landé, ed., *Rebuilding a Nation*, pp. 24-38.

46. Bharat Wariawalla, "India in 1987: Democracy on Trial," *Asian Survey* 28, no. 2 (February 1988), p. 120.

47. Diane K. Mauzy, "Malaysia in 1987: Decline of 'The Malay Way,'" *Asian Survey* 28, no. 2, (February 1988): pp. 213-22. The most unwelcome of these court decisions was a High Court declaration early in 1988 that UMNO was illegal because some of its branches were improperly registered. As intra-party and intra-ethnic infighting intensified, the longstanding "Malay hegemony" in the polity was thrown into doubt, along with the capacity of the now-ravaged party system to contain future conflict.

48. Bryan Pfaffenberger, "Sri Lanka in 1987: Indian Intervention and Resurgence of the JVP," *Asian Survey* 28, no. 2 (February 1988): pp. 137-47.

49. Yaw Saffu, "Papua New Guinea in 1987: Wingti's Coalition in a Disabled System," *Asian Survey* 28, no. 2 (February 1988): pp. 244-45.

• CHAPTER TWO •

India:
Democratic Becoming and
Combined Development

JYOTIRINDRA DAS GUPTA

Developing countries are not supposed to offer conducive settings for democratic political systems. India's choice of democracy in a setting of poverty, ethnic diversity, and immense complexity of developmental problems must utterly puzzle any theorist of democratic politics. Anyone can imagine how precarious was the prospect of Indian democracy at the moment of its beginning. Four decades of continuous development of constitutional democratic government in India may then call for two kinds of interpretation. Either democracy in India is a misnomer and the pessimistic expectation did not go wrong, or the theorists of democracy were wrong in writing off the possibility of democracy's compatibility with the most stringent tasks of both economic development and political integration in developing countries.


Before we settle for one or the other interpretation, it would be more appropriate to examine the nature of the last four decades' development of democratic politics in India. This will call for, in the first place, an understanding of some of the basic ideas permeating the nationalist movement. The unfolding of these ideas through organizational practice in preindependence days covers a fairly long period. Indeed, the fact that the national ruling party is now more than a hundred years old may offer some solace to those theorists who worry about immature players taking chances with a sophisticated game like democratic politics in developing countries. For our purpose it is important to consider the inheritance of ideas and institutions that prepared the foundation of the new state. We will examine how a set of imported ideas were progressively indigenized to serve large-scale movements and enduring organizations that contributed to the subsequent development of democratic institutions. The second part of our discussion will examine the evolution of the major democratic institutions after independence. This will be followed by an examination of the performance of these institutions with respect to economic development, political participation, and national cohesion. Finally, an attempt will

Le monde arabe et la démocratie

PAR ODILE FELGINE

A l'IMA, on a beaucoup parlé de la contagion de la liberté.

ULF ANDERSEN/GAMMA



Tahar Ben Jelloun.

Deux ans après son inauguration et alors que son succès auprès du public va croissant, l'Institut du monde arabe s'est doté d'un Comité culturel consultatif rassemblant une cinquantaine de personnalités arabes et européennes. Artistes, éditeurs, hommes de presse ou d'affaires, universitaires, hauts fonctionnaires, parmi lesquels figurent les écrivains Tahar Ben Jelloun, Mahmud Darwish, Jean-Claude Carrière, Franco Maria Ricci, les chercheurs Maxime Rodinson, Mohamed Arkoun. Marc Augé, les journalistes Jean Lacouture et Hervé Bourges, ont été invités à entamer pour la première fois en ces lieux le dialogue euro-arabe et à débattre des orientations de l'Institut.

Cette première session du Comité s'est achevée par une journée d'étude sur le thème « Etat, société et individu dans le monde arabe ». Abordant le délicat problème de la démocratie dans le monde arabe, le rapporteur libanais Ghasan Salamé, directeur de recherche au CNRS s'était exclamé : « Nous revendiquons le développement et la démocratie. Beaucoup d'Arabes croient, à tort, que les régimes autoritaires ont été imposés de l'extérieur. Avec l'explosion démographique actuelle et les difficultés économiques, des frémissements populaires se manifestent qui dissimulent timidement une revendication antitotalitaire. »

Plus optimiste, l'historien tunisien Hichem Djait, considérant la démocratie comme « un miracle européen universalisable » rappela que le colonialisme occidental, porté par des appétits mercantiles, avait détruit des équilibres internes mais aussi fait évoluer certains pays vers « la monarchie constitutionnelle et le système représentatif » (Egypte, Irak à un certain moment). Ainsi, l'Egypte était semi-libérale lorsque l'Allemagne était nazie. « La démocratie est dans l'air du temps, en raison d'exigences internes et de pressions externes. Elle a existé et existe au niveau des élites ac-

tivistes », affirme ainsi Hichem Djait.

Propos contestés lors du court débat qui suivit. Les élites sont les premières à s'autocensurer car elles sont devenues « les conseillers du prince » en beaucoup d'Etats.

Contrairement à ce qu'elles furent dans les années 30, 40 et 50, elles ne sont plus issues de familles fortunées et ne disposent pas d'une véritable autonomie économique, estimerent certains intervenants. D'autre part, la démocratie est-elle une invention occidentale ? Les structures politiques arabes ne sont-elles pas en grande partie héritées de l'organisation tribale et clanique qui fut à la base des divisions régionales et du pouvoir califal ?

Cela n'a pourtant guère contribué à l'instauration d'authentiques structures démocratiques. Les régimes révolutionnaires ont emprunté au monde « européen de l'Est » leur modèle, en pleine faillite aujourd'hui. Eux aussi ont occulté la demande démocratique, au profit d'un crypto-marxisme autoritaire. Mais si ces pays se sont ouverts aux idéaux extérieurs de révolution marxiste, pourquoi ne succomberaient-ils pas à l'attrait d'idées plus humanistes ? Surtout si un mouvement mondial et durable les y aidait...

De nouvelles solidarités

Débat qui dut être éprouvant pour certains des ambassadeurs des 22 Etats arabes présents alors dans la salle, en raison de la visite du président de la République française, François Mitterrand. Le chef de l'Etat français souligna dans son allocution l'intérêt qu'il prenait aux projets et aux travers de l'IMA en raison de la nécessité d'un véritable dialogue entre les cultures et les civilisations arabes et européennes. « Les reculs de la connaissance correspondent toujours aux débâcles de l'action. » Bien des ignorances constituent des barrières entre nos peuples. Il faut, dit-il, donner une chance à de nouvelles solidarités. Il en va de l'avenir du monde et de notre vie quotidienne. Nous sommes dépendants les uns des autres. L'Europe, après tout, doit beaucoup aux philosophes, mathématiciens et autres savants arabes qui permirent jusqu'à la sauvegarde de la mémoire de la Grèce antique, si capitale pour l'Occident. L'originalité et la force de l'IMA est, et doit rester, de contribuer à cette approche « sensible » des cultures arabes. ●

THE POLITICAL STATUS OF WOMEN IN THE ARAB GULF STATES

J.E. Peterson

POLITICS in the Arab Gulf states appears, on the surface, to be the exclusive domain of men. According to one observer, "In the formal political system of the Arabian peninsula women do not exist. They are not judges, police officers, army commanders, ministers, tribal leaders or heads of state. They do not sit on tribal councils . . . municipal councils, or legislative or consultative assemblies."¹ The absence of overt status does not mean that women lack political importance now nor did they in the past. Traditionally, Arab women have been a strong, decision-making force within the family. Politics and family appear to be separate domains in part because this is the way people of the Gulf present themselves to outsiders. In a society that emphasizes the collective identity of the family and the tribe over the individual, family and politics cannot, however, be separated on the local or national level. Despite appearances, women and their networks play an essential—if often *sub rosa*—political role.

In the few short decades since the beginning of oil's political and socioeconomic impact in the late 1940s on the peninsula region, the Arab Gulf states have undergone unprecedented transformation. Regimes have actively promoted and

1. Christine Eickelman, "Women and Politics in an Arabian Oasis," in Farhad Kazemi and R.D. McChesney, eds., *A Way Prepared: Essays on Islamic Culture in Honor of Richard Bayly Winder* (New York: New York University Press, 1988), p. 199.

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instituted a wide-ranging process of economic development while simultaneously seeking to preserve the traditional nature of society and, by implication, the traditional structure of politics. Traditionally, public roles and activities of women in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) societies have been severely restricted and remain so even today. With the onset of the economics of oil, some social and political change was inescapable and women's traditional roles, although certainly not abandoned, have been modified significantly.

A requisite first step to increasing political participation by women in the Gulf is extending (or breaking through) the traditional boundaries of the "women's domain." Widespread direct political participation may not be attained until this has occurred and more equality between the sexes has been achieved in the public arena. The nature and extent of that participation will be determined, for men as well as for women, by the structure of GCC political systems prevailing in the next few decades.

The extent of change in individual political systems will differ markedly from one Gulf country to the next because of their varying degrees of urbanization, past British and other external influences, the quality of leadership, the strength of existing religious influences, and the "staggered" effect of change according to the length of time the communities have been exposed to oil income and socioeconomic development. Because Kuwait and Bahrain have had the longest exposure to development and social change, women there are more likely to experience relatively more participation sooner than elsewhere in the Gulf. At the same time, barriers to increased women's participation are also determined by the degree and strength of traditions historically present in each Gulf society. Increased public activity by women, in Saudi Arabia and Qatar in particular, is likely to lag behind the other states as a consequence of this factor.

There are reasons to assume that the future course of social and political change will find women playing broader and less restricted public roles in society and wielding considerably more influence on the political systems of the Gulf. The vast expansion of education has broadened the horizons of women as well as men, and various employment opportunities for female nationals have sprung into existence. Direct political participation, particularly in newly created institutions such as national consultative bodies, has been marginal, but then Kuwait's suspension of the last remaining elected national assembly in the Gulf in July 1986 places obstacles in the way of more effective participation by either sex. Future developments might well see greater proportions of female nationals in workforces, occupying senior government and public-sector positions, and exhibiting a more influential presence in educational institutions as undergraduates, graduates, and faculty.

The scope of women's public and political roles is dependent on the future balance between opposing social trends. On the one hand, development-oriented governments have been eager to provide for, educate, and utilize the skills of their people—both male and female. For example, every female national who is

educated and employed conceivably means that the service of one less expatriate is required. This is no small consideration in states where the proportions of foreigners in the population range from 25 percent to 80 percent. On the other hand, traditionalists are hostile to any change in relationships between the sexes and their opposition is bolstered by a growing tide of neoconservatism, which seeks to make order out of the chaos and aimlessness of the oil-boom years with a return to traditional values. The Islamic resurgence felt in all these states, particularly in Kuwait and Bahrain, gives additional force to the impact of social neoconservatism on women's participation in the public sector.

CURRENT FACTORS INFLUENCING WOMEN'S POLITICAL STATUS

Although the political power of women has traditionally been very limited, it has not been entirely negligible. In the past, mothers and wives of rulers have on occasion exerted great influence. Shaykha Salama bint Buti, the mother of Shakhbut and Zayid, the past and present rulers of Abu Dhabi, was responsible for forcing her sons to swear to end the bloody tradition of regicide in Abu Dhabi and was regarded as an important "eminence grise" in Abu Dhabi politics.² In the absence of shaykhs, decision-making and extending hospitality to male guests occasionally fell to wives and some are said even to have attended and played active roles in otherwise all-male meetings.

Changes in Traditional Roles

Rather than a complete break between past and present, the modification of women's roles is most clearly seen in attitudinal changes between still largely traditional generations. Subtle changes are evident in such situations as marriage arrangements, conjugal relations and household roles, divorce, control of personal property, and daily socialization.³ At the heart of these traditional societies' view of women is their role as bearers of family honor. While women have benefited in many cases from liberalized attitudes on the part of much of society, ultimate authority over women's lives tends to remain in the hands of their husbands, fathers, and brothers.

The impact of changing economic circumstances and variable social attitudes can be devastating. The conveniences of urban life and the prevalence of domestic servants have robbed women of a role at home, which the state has not replaced by other forms of work. Avenues of work after education are largely limited to

teaching and nursing, where contact with men is restricted. The few who have made it through university face other problems in addition to finding a job. Marriage for women often becomes more difficult after receiving a university education. Many educated men hesitate to take on an intellectual equal as a wife and educated women are more selective about prospective husbands. An unmarried woman must obtain permission to work from her father and brother. The result is an educated female elite, frequently bored to the point of depression.

The problem is further complicated by the emergence of the social neoconservatism of recent years. This has persuaded the state and society to introduce constraints on expanding women's opportunities, which the family or husband is then forced to implement. Many women have also been resisting movement toward nontraditional roles although this phenomenon is certainly diminishing.⁴ Even now, the passivity of trained and educated women is being eroded by the public activism of some. Women activists in Kuwait publicly protested their treatment as long ago as the 1960s when a demonstration was organized in a downtown square and the women present burned their 'abayas.

Closely related to the traditional roles of shaykhly wives is what might be called the "first lady" function, somewhat comparable to the role played by presidents' wives in the United States although far more restricted. As in the past, some spouses of rulers and heirs apparent are capable of exercising considerable influence on their husbands and thereby on state policy. A few have even taken up relatively prominent public postures and have spoken out on government policy, although only on such "safe" issues as family and women's concerns. In Kuwait, Shaykha Latifa, wife of Heir Apparent Shaykh Sa'd al-'Abdullah, is well known for her support of social causes. Farther south, Shaykha Fatima bint Mubarak, wife of UAE President Shaykh Zayid, plays a visible role as head of the UAE Women's Federation. She regularly holds an open *majlis* for women in the UAE and her public appearances are echoed by several other women from UAE ruling families such as Shaykha Nura bint Sultan al-Qasimi, wife of a former Sharjah ruler.

Women's Organizations

Wives of ruling family members in nearly all GCC states are active in centers for women and children. For example, Shaykha Nura al-Qasimi established a literacy program for older women in Sharjah and helped to form the Women's

2. Frauke Heard-Bey, *From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates: A Society in Transition* (London: Longman, 1982), p. 130.

3. For a thorough discussion of these changes in one milieu, see Soraya Alhorki, *Women in Saudi Arabia: Ideology and Behavior Among the Elite* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986). One scholar contends that "urbanization and modernization have had little or no effect on family-kin ties." Fahed Y. al-Thaqeb, "The Arab Family and Modernity: Evidence from Kuwait," *Current Anthropology*, Vol. 23, No. 1, (1982), p. 10.

4. It should also be noted that urban middle-class women have been affected by social change to a far greater degree than rural, small-town, or bedouin women. Thus, anthropological studies of women in the Gulf may have greatly different subjects. The observations of Altorki, *Women in Saudi Arabia*, and Linda Usta Sufan, *The Women of the United Arab Emirates* (London: Croom Helm and New York: Barnes & Noble, 1980) apply most accurately to women of the Gulf elites, while Christine Eickelman, *Women and Community in Oman* (New York: New York University Press, 1984) and Unni Wæver, *Behind the Veil in Arabia: Women in Oman* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982) deal with women of the lower middle class.

Society of Sharjah in 1973.⁵ In 1962, the wife and several daughters of Saudi Arabian King Faysal founded al-Nahda Philanthropic Society for Women in Riyadh. Comparable women's associations in other Saudi cities soon followed.

Women's clubs in all the GCC states play a prominent role in addressing issues involving women's concerns and social activities although it can be contended that their functions and influence are often limited. The Women's Welfare Associations in Saudi Arabia are involved in establishing women's libraries, collecting for the needy, training women in household tasks, sponsoring cultural events and lectures, and combatting female illiteracy. They are also instrumental in questioning traditional ideas about women's education and work.⁶

The first women's society in Bahrain (and apparently in the entire Gulf), *Jam'iyat Nahdat Fatat al-Bahrain* (Bahraini Women's Awakening), was formed in 1955 to provide a channel for the wealthier and better-educated women, mainly from well-established merchant families, to provide volunteer services to assist poor families.⁷ Politically, the group supported women's suffrage for the constitutional and national assemblies of the early 1970s. The next oldest and probably most active group has been *Jam'iyat Ri'ayat al-Tafala wal-Umuma* (Motherhood and Children's Welfare Center), founded in 1960 by wives, daughters, and sisters of the Al Khalifa ruling family, and high-level civil servants and by middle-class women who wanted to play a more active role in community affairs by providing nursery school facilities. This is still the society's primary function. This group tends to be conservative politically, even to the point of accepting the government's decision in the early 1970s to deny women the vote.

The *Jam'iyat Awal al-Nisa'iya* (Awal Women's Society) was founded in Muharraq in 1969 and is composed largely of young, unmarried women, many of them teachers. This society has been particularly active on political issues and supporting women's rights, especially the right to vote, and other efforts toward building democratic institutions. In 1970, the 'Awali Association and the Rifa' Women's Association were founded. The latter, with many graduates and intellectuals among its members, frequently sponsors lectures and seminars. Ties are close between these groups and their Kuwaiti counterparts.

The UAE Women's Federation, under the leadership of Shaykha Fatima, has publicly voiced concern over working conditions for women and the opposition by husbands to working wives. It has organized occupational courses for women and

lobbied the Ministry of Justice for changes in personal law.⁸ Various other women's organizations promote the intellectual, artistic, and social interests of women. Television, radio, and the press carry serious discussions of women's affairs, and two journals, both with female editors-in-chief, are published for a wholly female audience. The UAE Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor has provided aid to needy families and divorced, widowed, and never-married women since its establishment in 1972.⁹

Not surprisingly, the most important stimuli to changing roles for women have been the impact of development and modern conceptions of the state's purpose and functions. All the GCC states officially encourage broader and more productive roles for women, even though they may cavil at carrying out their own rhetoric. Although the governments support women's centers and programs and hire far more local women than does the private sector, they remain reluctant to advocate women's rights forcefully or to appoint women to senior positions.

Education

Education has been at the center of change. In recent decades, education in all the Gulf states has been transformed from the prerogative of shaykhly families and others of high status to a right increasingly enjoyed by nearly all sectors of the citizenry. The first girls' primary schools in the area were opened in Bahrain in 1928 and in Kuwait in 1937; the first secondary schools for girls in both countries were opened in 1951. Qatar's first girls' school opened in 1955 and girls' education in Saudi Arabia began in 1960.¹⁰ Despite initial opposition in all these countries, the numbers of schools and female students today is commensurate with that of boys. Less than 4 percent of Bahraini women have no education, compared to 60 percent in the Third World generally.¹¹ An added factor is the considerable influence of expatriate Arab teachers in shaping the outlook and attitudes of local women.

Female students are admitted to universities in all GCC states. In all but Kuwait and Bahrain, the potential problems arising from contact between the sexes is precluded by the building of expensive duplicate campuses. Several faculties in Kuwait's university are coeducational. In Bahrain, where education generally is segregated by sex, the University College of Bahrain (UCB), now part of Bahrain University, is coeducational. Many Bahrainis apparently do not

5. Soffan, *Women of the UAE*, pp. 95-96.

6. Louay Bahry, "The New Saudi Woman: Modernizing in an Islamic Framework," *Middle East Journal*, vol. 36, no. 4 (Autumn 1982), p. 504. See also Catherine Parssinen, "The Changing Role of Women" in Willard A. Beling, ed., *King Faisal and the Modernization of Saudi Arabia* (London: Croom Helm and Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 143-170. Princess Sarah bint Faysal, president of al-Nahda Society, recently pointed out that al-Nahda had established health clinics 20 years ago in areas where the Ministry of Health had not begun to operate. *Arab News* (Jiddah), April 5, 1988.

7. On Bahraini women's societies, see Emile A. Nakhleh, *Bahrain: Political Development in a Modernizing Society* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books/D.C. Heath, 1976), pp. 53-55; and John Whelan, ed., *Bahrain: A MEED Practical Guide* (London: Middle East Economic Digest, 1983), p. 42.

8. *Khalaj Times* (Dubai), March 4, 1986.

9. Malcolm Peck, *The United Arab Emirates: A Venture in Unity* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press and London: Croom Helm, 1986), pp. 86-87; Soffan, *Women of the UAE*, pp. 85-88.

10. Sheikha al-Misnad, *The Development of Modern Education in the Gulf* (London: Ithaca Press, 1985), p. 37; Fadwa El Guindi, "The Status of Women in Bahrain: Social and Cultural Considerations" in Jeffrey B. Nugent and Theodore H. Thomas, eds., *Bahrain and the Gulf: Past Perspectives and Alternative Futures* (London: Croom Helm, 1985), p. 85; and Abeer Abu Saud, *Qatari Women: Past and Present* (Burnt Mill, Harlow, Essex: Longman, 1984), p. 173.

11. Al-Misnad, *Development of Modern Education*, p. 126; Whelan, *Bahrain*, p. 40.

oppose mingling among university students but do oppose it among younger children. The newer Arabian Gulf University, however, will be strictly segregated, presumably because most of the funding has come from conservative Saudi Arabia. Although female education in Saudi Arabia is under the supervision of the traditionalist General Presidency for Girls' Education (which operates a dozen colleges of education around the kingdom), women's centers have been attached to men's universities (under the supervision of the Ministry of Higher Education). Students are strictly segregated in Qatar, but faculty members of both sexes teach men's and women's classes.

It is not unusual for female university students to outnumber male students. Since Kuwait University was founded, 57 percent of its local students has been women. Over the past decade, 64 percent of the graduates has been women, and by the early 1980s, more than 4,000 Kuwaiti women had received university degrees.¹² Women constitute 56 percent of the university students in Bahrain and in Qatar 68 percent.¹³ More than half of all Qatari university students, whether at home or abroad, are women. The number of female graduate assistants at Qatar University is roughly double that of men. More than 500 Qatari women have earned university degrees.¹⁴ When the UAE University opened in November 1977, there were 185 female students compared to 300 males, and UAE women comprise nearly a third of its graduates.¹⁵ Female students form the majority at the new Sultan Qabus University, which opened in autumn 1986 in Oman.

Various reasons have been advanced for the high proportion of women students in local universities. Conservative families refuse to allow their daughters to move from segregated secondary schools to mixed education abroad; it is much easier for males to study abroad. Teen-age girls, having fewer permissible activities and outlets, as well as fewer distractions from school work, tend to study more and receive better grades and therefore are better qualified for university admission. There is a tendency for boys to begin working directly after secondary school, and thus a smaller proportion of boys eventually attend university (which also means that male university students are often older than female students). Attending university is one of the few socially acceptable activities outside the home for young unmarried women. It is generally impossible for married women to study abroad unless accompanied by their husbands. Additionally, female students may attend universities at home because of better educational opportunities, such as admittance to the medical school of Kuwait

University where more than half of the first graduating class was female. The importance of a university as a social venue should not be underestimated.¹⁶

Nevertheless, serious barriers to further advancement remain. While the establishment of national universities undoubtedly has improved the scope of higher education for women, it simultaneously has hampered the opportunities for women to study abroad. Qatar has introduced restrictions on unaccompanied women on scholarship going abroad for education; even in Kuwait, postgraduate study abroad is made difficult by adverse family reactions and shrinking government scholarships for women. Because not all of these universities offer study beyond the bachelor's degree, opportunities for women to continue their post-graduate education are diminishing as well.

For Saudi women from smaller towns, it is often not possible to board at universities far from home because of social traditions. Furthermore, in all the Gulf states, options for women to pursue technical education in such fields as commerce and business studies are restricted because there are few opportunities for employment in commercial establishments, banks, or offices. An increasing number of female students at Kuwait University are said to be "retreating," envisioning their future as staying at home.

Employment

The small size of Gulf populations inevitably has meant dependence on expatriate labor. It is obvious to these states that this dependence can be lessened only by full employment of the female half of the indigenous work force. Nevertheless, the governments have largely refrained from following this course of action except when economics absolutely require it, as in Bahrain where both male and female nationals must be employed alongside expatriates. The proportion of local women among citizens in the work force ranges from 1.1 percent in the UAE (1975) to 18.8 percent in Bahrain (1981).¹⁷

Social attitudes still prevent local women from occupying many positions in the private sector. Businesses prefer to employ expatriate men to indigenous women for skilled positions and, in such jobs as private secretaries, where women are preferred, the tendency is to hire expatriate women before locals. In some states, few local women have the financial need to seek such employment. When women are needed to provide unskilled or semi-skilled labor, expatriate women are hired. Local women may, of course, inherit wealth and be small property owners of, for example, shops, apartment buildings, or taxis.

Consequently, the employment of indigenous women is limited essentially to government. Most GCC governments theoretically are sex-blind in employment

12. Al-Misnad, *Development of Modern Education*, pp. 263-267; *The Middle East*, no. 132 (October 1985), pp. 7-9; John Whelan, ed., *Kuwait: A MEED Practical Guide* (London: Middle East Economic Digest, 1985), p. 53.

13. State of Bahrain, Council of Ministers, *Statistical Abstract, 1984* (Manama: Central Statistics Organization, December 1985); State of Qatar, Presidency of the Council of Ministers, *Annual Statistical Abstract, July 1985* (Doha: Central Statistical Organization, July 1985).

14. Abu Sa'ud, *Qatari Women*, p. 177.

15. *Women of the UAE*, p. 102.

16. See the comments of Bahry, "The New Saudi Woman," p. 514.

17. Muhammed Rumayh, *Beyond Oil: Unity and Development in the Gulf* (London: Al Saqi Books, 1986), p. 120; Bahrain, *Statistical Abstract, 1984*.

practices and pay. In line with offering benefits to all citizens, benefits for women can be generous, often including maternity and "motherhood" leave. Nearly 10,000 Kuwaiti women are employed by the Kuwaiti government. Female citizens account for 22.5 percent and 8.9 percent of the Qatari and Omani civil services respectively.¹⁸

Public sector employment throughout the Gulf is still fraught with problems. Even in the government, most women work in traditionally female fields, such as nursing, teaching, social services, and, in recent years, clerical jobs. Numbers are low, and there is little prospect for advancement. Women who apply for "men's positions" either fail to receive an answer or are flatly turned down, and foreigners rather than local women are hired even in sensitive security and foreign affairs areas. In addition, the dedication of some women to careers is questionable. Kuwaiti statistics suggest that the average woman works only for three to four years.¹⁹ For some middle- and upper-class women, working may be a diversion, an acceptable way to get out of the house.

Direct Political Participation

Despite the authoritarian nature of GCC political systems with their narrow bases of decision-making and the low public profile of women, some activism regarding women's legal, educational, and employment rights does exist. This is especially true in Kuwait. Kuwait's only voluntary legal advice office for women was set up in March 1985 by Su'ad al-Tarawa, a Kuwaiti lawyer, at the Kuwaiti Women's Cultural Society and it has been highly successful in dealing with women's family problems, especially divorce.²⁰

Women's suffrage has long been debated in Kuwait.²¹ Lu'lu'a al-Qattami,

head of the Women's Cultural and Social Society since 1966, has been at the forefront of the right-to-vote campaign. She has noted that Kuwaiti women participate in voting for the councils that head the cooperative societies in Kuwait City's 57 districts as well as for the councils of the country's 42 social or cultural societies. Furthermore, women students at Kuwait University are active in student politics, and even vote and hold office, but are then unable to vote once they leave the university.

Opinions run strongly on both sides of the issue, and there is considerable resistance to women's voting rights. In October 1984, leaflets containing a *fatwa* by a Saudi *alim* against coeducation in Kuwait were distributed outside mosques. The incident set off a furor in Kuwait and pitted liberals against Islamists (*al-Islamiyun*, or Islamic ideologues). The latter would be expected to oppose the issue, as they indeed did in blocking a 1982 bill, but a Kuwaiti *fatwa* against women voting was opposed in the 1985 National Assembly by a combination of Islamists, including the Social Reform Society (Muslim Brotherhood), and liberals. A 1985 poll of men eligible to vote showed that opposition might be broader: 58 percent opposed electoral rights for women and only 27 percent favored them. Similar attitudes are widespread among male and even female university students.

The voting-rights campaign was given an enormous boost by Heir Apparent and Prime Minister Shaykh Sa'd al-'Abdullah's statement in 1980 that the "time has come to take note of the position of the Kuwaiti woman and her effective role in society and to put forward the matter of the vote for study and discussion." The amir is also said to be on record favoring women's voting rights, but, typical of divisions in Kuwaiti society, the heir apparent's wife, Shaykha Latifa, has come out against it, saying that few of the women involved in political activities "have the necessary understanding in this regard."

A majority of women is still either indifferent or actively against the idea. When al-Qattami led a group of women to the National Assembly in January 1982 to push for the inclusion of the issue on its agenda, a better-organized counter-movement sprang up among Kuwaiti women opposing their right to vote. Women's groups have stopped pushing the issue, in part perhaps because of the circulation of a petition signed by a thousand women at the time of the 1985 election contending that female suffrage was incompatible with Islam.

Attempts have been made to lobby the National Assembly to take action ever since 1971 when the Society for the Advancement of the Family, Kuwait's first women's association, presented a petition to the assembly. Assembly consideration that year and again in 1973 went no further than discussion. A bill that would give women the vote but exclude them from office was introduced in the 1981

18. State of Kuwait, Ministry of Planning, *Annual Statistical Abstract, 1985* (Kuwait: Central Statistics Office, October 1985); Qatar, *Annual Statistical Abstract, July 1985*; Sultanate of Oman, Development Council, Technical Secretariat, *Statistical Year Book, 1405 A.H., 1984 A.D.* (Muscat: Directorate General of National Statistics, November 1985). A recent survey by Bahrain's Center for Studies and Research indicates that women graduates outnumber their male counterparts in government ministries and that women form 53 percent of the public-sector work force. *Middle East Economic Digest*, March 28, 1987.

19. Whelan, *Kuwait*, p. 53. As one observer notes, "The trend towards women working was purely formal in some Gulf societies, and was not based on any real economic need. Indeed, the richer these societies became, the less need there was. At a time when the state is providing substantial financial aid to widows and divorced women, and the neo-traditionalists are trying to promote the idea that a woman's work is in the home, there is less interest among women in the idea of work as a constructive socioeconomic activity." Rumaihi, *Beyond Oil*, p. 121. He goes on to note that, "The claim made by neo-traditionalists in other countries (such as Egypt) that working women deprive men of jobs has no credibility in the Gulf, for jobs there are both easy to come by and unproductive. Such people have therefore had to fall back on older ideas of modesty, seclusion, and the avoidance of 'un-Islamic' practices, even in those countries [such as Bahrain] in which the socioeconomic climate is favourable to women working." *Ibid.* Altorki, in *Women in Saudi Arabia*, (p. 23), points out that "women's seclusion varies, inter alia, with the extent to which they participate in the economy."

20. *Arab Times* (Kuwait), December 8, 1985.

21. The information in this section is based on *Arab Times*, February 20 and 21, 1984; *Washington Post*, April 14, 1984; *New York Times*, December 17, 1984; *al-Safir* (Beirut), February 18,

1985; *The Middle East*, no. 132 (October 1985), pp. 7-9; Nadia Hijab, *Womanpower: The Arab Debate on Women at Work* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 150-151; and interviews in Kuwait. Nasta Ramazani discusses some of the same points as this article in her "Islamic Fundamentalism and the Women of Kuwait," *Middle East Insight*, vol. 5, no. 5 (January-February 1988), pp. 21-26.

assembly and blocked by Islamists the following year. On February 11, 1984, Kuwaiti women activists initiated a legal battle against the government, charging that the denial of their right to vote was a violation of the constitutional guarantees of democracy as well as the equality of all citizens and represented sexual discrimination, which is forbidden under the constitution. At that time, three leading members of the women's movement attempted to get their names included on the electoral roll but were rejected by officials at election registration offices. Another 13 women tried a similar move soon thereafter. Although all 13 were rejected, 8 did manage to report the rejection to the police.

During the election campaign, women's groups persuaded several candidates of the liberal Democratic Bloc to declare their intention to work for female suffrage if elected (though there was grumbling later that some of the elected candidates were ignoring their campaign promises). Nevertheless, after the election, a group of deputies brought forward a bill to grant women the vote. The assembly's Internal Affairs Committee, three of whose five members were implacable foes of women's suffrage, called on the Ministry of *Awqaf* and Islamic Affairs to rule on its validity. The ministry issued a fatwa declaring that "the nature of the electoral process befits men, who are endowed with ability and expertise; it is not permissible that women recommend or nominate other women or men." The committee consistently tabled the measure until the assembly was suspended in July 1986.

The potential impact of women voters is considerable. Women could possibly form a majority of voters because they constitute about 52 percent of Kuwaiti citizens. Liberal women voters probably would be in the minority. Most women voters from tribes or conservative backgrounds undoubtedly would support tribalists or Islamists for election, and the argument could be made to conservative assembly members that giving women the vote would serve their own electoral interests.

If the assembly had not been suspended, a plausible scenario might have had the issue of women's suffrage brought up again in the seventh session (to have been elected in 1989), possibly with a more favorably constituted committee that could have gotten a bill onto the floor. Even if rejected in that session, the resulting debate and attention conceivably could spur the subsequent eighth session to pass a women's-right-to-vote bill, thereby giving women the right to vote in the elections for the ninth session (1997).

Bahrain's short-lived National Assembly was also the focus of unsuccessful attempts to secure women's suffrage. Active protests over exclusion from voting were directed by Bahraini women's clubs, which organized pre-election meetings in August and September 1972. These resulted in the circulation of a petition signed by supporting groups (the government would not allow individual signatures), which was presented to the ruler on November 20, 1972. The petition demanded that women be given the right to participate in the political life of the

country and rejected the reasons advanced for denying them the vote.²² The assembly was dissolved in 1975 without the question of women's voting being seriously considered.

The issue of women's suffrage loses much of its immediate importance if men do not even have the opportunity to vote. This is the case in all six GCC states since Kuwait's National Assembly was suspended in 1986. Despite the setbacks in prospects for democratic institutions in the Gulf, it may be argued that the foundations are being laid now for a more equal claim alongside men for voting rights and political participation when the demand for elected representation emerges.

FUTURE FACTORS INFLUENCING WOMEN'S POLITICAL STATUS

The foundations for significant and wide-reaching changes in the status of women are being laid now although the full impact of these changes still lies in the future. Women's attitudes toward assuming new roles are changing, particularly among "middle-class" and "progressive" families, leading to a more strongly articulated demand for equality. Men's attitudes toward the equality of the sexes is also changing in middle-class and progressive families. Some husbands, educated abroad and occupying responsible positions in business or government, want educated and socially sophisticated wives. Similarly, some husbands accept working wives, and a few men speak and write in favor of equal rights for women.

Penetration of Traditionally Closed Arenas

In a superficial sense, the increased acceptance of female penetration into arenas that were traditionally closed to them can be seen in women's expanded public mobility. To varying degrees, depending on the country, women work in offices, shops, banks, stroll with children, drive cars, travel, and attend mixed-sex social functions. Often they do so in the company of men but increasingly by themselves.

Politically more important indications of present and future change lie in such areas as higher education. Women are close to forming the majority of local students in most GCC universities, and a small but significant number are pursuing postgraduate degrees. Most of these are in relatively liberal Kuwait and much larger Saudi Arabia but examples can be found elsewhere. A growing number of Qatari women have obtained master's degrees, the number of female graduate assistants at Qatar University is nearly double that of males, and 12

22. The rationale for denial centered on the assumptions that (1) a woman is veiled and thus it is difficult to ascertain her identity and (2) a woman is uneducated and has no independent opinion so that a man can influence her vote. See Nakhleh, *Bahrain*, pp. 142-143; he reproduces the text of the petition on pp. 143-144.

Qatari women had earned doctorates by early 1987.²³ By the beginning of 1986, 15 Omani women had received higher educational degrees, including two doctorates. Of these, at least 10 were "Zanzibari" Omanis who benefited from their headstart in education.²⁴ All 15 were employed by the government in 7 different agencies. These figures do not include female medical doctors in the Ministry of Health.²⁵

The trend for women to constitute an ever-growing proportion of university-educated citizens, if it continues, is likely to cause enormous strains in the Gulf's traditional societies. The sociopolitical implications go beyond simple numbers. The abundance of Kuwaiti women with advanced degrees, combined with a shortage of academic positions, has led to the appointment of women to a number of senior administrative positions at Kuwait University. There are several female deans, and a woman has chaired the 16-member political science department even though both her former professor and her husband were in the same department.

The channeling of women university students into a few traditional fields of endeavor paradoxically is producing some surpluses in the acutely labor-starved countries. Teaching is a prime example. In 1980, Bahrain took the unprecedented step in the Gulf of employing female teachers in boys' schools to ease a dependence on expatriate teachers.²⁶ In Qatar, the number of female teachers already is in surplus of requirements for the country's girls' schools. At the same time, Qatar is heavily dependent on expatriate teachers for boys. A short-term palliative has appeared with the creation of five experimental boys' schools (up to the age of 10) whose teachers are female Qataris. But the shortage, in the future, is likely to worsen, particularly as few Qatari males go into teaching.²⁷ Saudi Arabia will soon find itself in a similar, though reverse, predicament. Saudi male teachers can replace expatriates throughout the country, but it is extremely difficult for Saudi women teachers to work at any distance from home.²⁸

The crossover of women into nontraditional specializations is a controversial but real possibility. The Gulf states already decry the reluctance of male students to enter a number of fields essential for development plans. There is likely to be

23. Of the 12, 7 had been graduate assistants at Qatar University during the 1973-1974 year and subsequently went on to complete their Ph.D. degrees. All 12 continued to be associated with Qatar University. Three have specializations in the liberal arts (English literature, linguistics, and sociology), two in education, one in *sharia* and Islamic studies, and the rest in the sciences, including chemistry, biology, and physics. Interviews in Qatar, 1986.

24. "Zanzibari" Omanis are a result of the Omani colonization of Zanzibar and other points along the East African littoral in past centuries. Their educational levels are considerably higher than most Omanis of their generation because of the near-total absence of education in Oman prior to 1970. Following Oman's change of government in 1970, a sizeable number of Omanis from Zanzibar and other East African states returned to Oman where their education and skills were in considerable demand.

25. Five of these women were employed by the Ministry of Education, three by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, two by Sultan Qabus University, two by Petroleum Development (Oman), and one each by the Ministry of Post, Telephone and Telegraphs, the Ministry of National Heritage and Culture, and the Institute of Public Administration. Interviews in Oman, 1986.

26. Whelan, *Bahrain*, p. 41.

27. Interviews in Qatar in 1986.

28. Interviews in Saudi Arabia in 1988.

considerable temptation to allow female students to move into such disciplines as engineering or the sciences. Given the desire of all the governments to train nationals to replace expatriates in as many jobs as possible, the state then would be faced with a dilemma: whether to place a female national in a nontraditional position or to retain an expatriate male in that position.

A subtly growing toleration of female government employees in nontraditional fields is already beginning to appear. Policewomen are required in all six states for such duties as searching women at airports, and they have been used for administrative, hospital, and clerical duties as well.²⁹ Several states, including Oman and Bahrain, allow women to join the armed forces; women have served in the Bahrain Defense Forces (BDF) since 1979. As of 1983, there were 136 women in the BDF, all but a few of whom served at the BDF hospital. Each went through combat training and learned how to handle a gun. The highest-ranking woman in the armed forces, a captain, has been matron of the BDF hospital since 1982.³⁰

In the UAE, the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company hired the first native UAE female petroleum engineer in 1977. At the same time the Ministry of Foreign Affairs employed two local women, stationing one in Kuwait. Other UAE women have followed in the ministries of education, labor and social affairs, information, and in public health services and the police. The country's first female law graduate was not allowed to join the Ministry of Justice, however, for fear of dishonoring her prominent family.³¹

Advancement to Higher Levels

A few women in government and public-sector employment are beginning to display the necessary qualifications and experience for promotion to senior positions. Until recently, Dr. Ma'suma al-Mubarak chaired the political science department at Kuwait University. When she first wanted to take a graduate course abroad, her parents refused to allow her to go—a typical reaction for a traditional middle-class family. Instead, she got a job at the Ministry of Planning and while working succeeded in obtaining a diploma in social and economic planning. In 1973, at the age of 24, she married a Bahraini who insisted that she go abroad to finish her studies, and shortly thereafter, with a newborn baby, they left for the United States. She received her Ph.D. in 1982 and in September 1984, at the age of 34, was appointed head of the department—the only woman to chair a department in the Faculty of Commerce.³²

29. Difficulties still remain. Women in the Royal Oman Police number only in the hundreds, out of a total force of about 11,000, because they cannot engage in combat or normal police work. Interviews in Oman in 1986.

30. *Gulf Daily News* (Manama), July 28, 1984.

31. Soffan, *Women of the UAE*, p. 75.

32. *Arab Times*, December 8, 1985; and interview with Dr. Mubarak in 1985.

Shaykha Haya Al Khalifa became the first woman to reach the rank of assistant undersecretary in the Bahrain government when she was appointed assistant undersecretary of archaeology and museums in the Ministry of Information in October 1985. She received her primary education at the American Mission School, followed by two years of intermediate school before being married at the age of fifteen. After bearing five children, she continued her studies with a private tutor and passed the examinations for a high school diploma. Later, she received a bachelor's degree in general history from Beirut Arab University, followed by a year in the master's program in archaeology and ancient history at Alexandria University. She joined a training program in archaeology in the Department of Antiquities in 1972 and worked her way up to the post of superintendent of archaeology (with responsibilities in the field supervising Bahraini digs and inspecting foreign digs), assistant director of archaeology, and finally director of antiquities and museums before receiving her current appointment.³³

In addition to Shaykha Haya, there are four female directors in the Bahraini government. The Ministry of Education employs two of these, as well as a number of section heads, and may appoint several female assistant undersecretaries in the near future. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor has five women as section chiefs but none as directors. There are only five male employees in the Directorate of Social Affairs (including the director) out of a staff of 180-200.³⁴ In Kuwait, four women serve as assistant undersecretaries: Su'ad al-Sayyid Rajab al-Rifa'i (General Education, Ministry of Education), Fadda Ahmad Sa'ud al-Khalid (Social Services Affairs, Ministry of Education), Latifa 'Isa al-Rujayb (Social Welfare Affairs, Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor), and Suham 'Abd al-Razzaq Ruzuqi (Economic Affairs, Ministry of Oil and Industry).³⁵

Despite the conservatism of Qatari society, professional women in Qatar include a pediatrician at Hamad Hospital, a civil engineer working in the computer department of Hamad Hospital, a geologist in the Industrial Development Technical Center, and the head of the women's program of Qatar Broadcasting Service.³⁶ In addition, 12 Qatari women with doctorates have taught at the university and two have published scholarly books on Qatari society and the development of education in the Gulf.³⁷ In the UAE, Dr. 'A'isha al-Sayyar was

appointed assistant undersecretary for social and educational affairs in the Ministry of Education in the early 1980s.³⁸

The highest-ranking woman in the Omani government is Rajiha 'Abd al-Amir, undersecretary for planning in the Development Council. During the oppressive rule of Sultan Sa'id b. Taymur, her family left Oman for Baghdad, where she received her education. She returned to Oman only after Sultan Sa'id was overthrown and has been associated with the Development Council since early 1973.³⁹ In March 1988, she became the first Gulf woman to be appointed undersecretary. Other examples include a former female director-general in the Ministry of Posts, Telephones and Telegraphs, who has been promoted to the special grade of adviser, presumably because there were no assistant undersecretary slots available for her; the Ministry of Social Affairs has a female director-general (for women's and children's affairs); and there are several women in the Ministry of Education with the rank of director-general but not the job.⁴⁰

Increasingly, women are also assuming positions that might be classifiable as public role models. Conspicuous examples are television and radio announcers. Newspapers frequently publish articles and television and radio programs feature stories on prominent or newsworthy women who are often "career women," and more women voice their views on domestic politics and international affairs in the press. A book was recently published on Qatari women, based on the female author's interviews of Qatari women on the English program of Qatar Radio.⁴¹

FUTURE DIRECTIONS

In part, the growth of women's rights and opportunities is a function of the speed and extent of social change throughout the society, in a sort of "push" effect. This is complemented by a "pull" effect derived from the unmistakable need for women's full participation in the developing economy and polity. It is also a function of changing attitudes of men (tolerance to broader roles for women) and women (insistence on broadening their roles).

A positive scenario posits advances in this field progressing through three phases. The first involves steadily increasing government employment over the next 5 to 15 years. This could be followed over the next 15 to 25 years by the gradual percolation of a growing cadre of women into senior positions as the present generation of male officials (still relatively young) reaches retirement age. Eventually, dramatically changed sociopolitical attitudes may lead to more insistence on constitutional monarchies, incorporating representative democratic institutions, in 25 to 50 years. Such a development is likely to include widespread acceptance of relatively equitable roles for women.

33. *Gulf Daily News*, December 31, 1985; and interview with Shaykha Haya in 1986.

34. Interviews in Bahrain in 1986.

35. State of Kuwait, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Department of Protocol, *Prominent Personalities of the State and Official National Corporations* (Kuwait, April 1985).

36. Abu Saud, *Qatari Women*, pp. 185-190.

37. The two authors are Juhaina Sultan Saif al-Easa, *Al-tahdith fi al-mujtama' al-Qatari al-mu'asir* (Modernization in Contemporary Qatari Society) (Kuwait: Dar Kazima lil-Nashr wal-Tawzi' wal-Tarjima, 1979); *idem*, *Al-mujtama' al-Qatari: dirasa tahtiliva li-milatunih al-taghayyur al-ijtima'i al-mu'asir* (Qatari Society: An Analytical Study on Aspects of Contemporary Social Change) (n.p., 1982); and al-Misnad, *Development of Modern Education*.

38. Peck, *United Arab Emirates*, pp. 86-87.

39. Interview with Mrs. Rajiha 'Abd al-Amir in 1986.

40. Interviews in Oman in 1986.

41. Abu Saud, *Qatari Women*.

Nevertheless, strong caution must be introduced against any implication of determinism in the above scenario. It is generally assumed that socioeconomic development and modernization will lead to increased equality of rights and opportunities between the sexes. Several reservations regarding the inevitability of such a positive scenario for the GCC states must be mentioned. Social change has lagged far behind the physical transformation of GCC cities and the modification of citizens' lifestyles. These societies remain staunchly traditional and strongly oriented toward the family.

One consequence of the oil boom of the 1970s, coinciding with, if not prompted by, the economic recession of the 1980s, is a renewed social conservatism. This trend bolsters traditional attitudes toward the restriction of women to the "women's domain." Such neoconservatism is reinforced by the renewed emphasis on Islam by some Gulf citizens, as in Kuwait or Bahrain where social change has been strongest. Whether this Islamic resurgence is limited to a reemphasis on faith or embraces the utilization of Islam as a political ideology, the implications for freer roles and activities for women are the same.

The tendency toward neoconservatism among many women is clearly displayed in the return to the *hijab*, or traditional confining dress. This return to traditionalism occasionally produces an ironic effect, as when a liberal minister in the Kuwaiti government was introduced to a prospective female employee in his ministry and reached out to shake hands—she refused to touch him. The consequences of neoconservatism, however, are far more serious. The emergence of a modern role for women alongside men in the developing countries of the GCC is in danger of being terminated prematurely. Women would not be the only ones to suffer in such a situation; the entire development of the states would be victimized as well.



AFTER THE GUNS FELL SILENT: IRAQ IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Laurie A. Myroie

THE Middle East generally welcomed the cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq war, if only because the bloody conflict threatened to engulf neighboring states. There are also other benefits from the cease-fire that are not widely recognized. On the regional level, Iraq has now moderated its position. It has strengthened ties with its friends, Egypt and Jordan, and has moved to weaken Syria in part by backing anti-Syrian elements in Lebanon. Moreover, Syria lost the card it long used to blackmail the Arab Gulf states—its presumed ability to mediate with Iran on their behalf. The weakening of Syria, the most rejectionist of Israel's neighbors, and the promotion of an Egyptian-Jordanian-Iraqi triangle enhances prospects for Arab-Israeli negotiations.

These developments contravene the notion that the continuation of the Persian Gulf war was somehow good for Israel or for the "peace process." Indeed, verbal hostilities between Iraq and Israel actually declined as the cease-fire took effect. Few, however, are aware of this development because the US press fixated on the most alarmist statements from Israel, ignoring the calm response of the highest Israeli authorities to the war's apparent end.¹

Israel and Iraq, each for its own reasons, are reassessing their old attitudes toward one another. Even before Khomeini's surprise acceptance of United Nations Resolution 598, Israel's government had quietly ended its eight-year

1. See for example, Joel Brinkley, *New York Times*, July 24, 1988, p. E-2; George Moffett, *Christian Science Monitor*, July 20, 1988, p. 7; Robert Greenburger, *Wall Street Journal*, July 22, 1988, p. 1; and Geraldine Brooks, *Wall Street Journal*, August 10, 1988. Major US publications asked about Israel's position and were given an official statement welcoming the cease-fire. None mentioned it. Baruch Binah, Israeli consul for press affairs, New York, to author, August 1988.

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Structuralist Perspective on Intimate Relationships," paper presented at the American Sociology Association Meetings, Washington, D.C., 1985.

91. Ketchum, note 39, p. 153.

92. Bernard, note 12, p. 21.

93. R. L. Smith and D. M. Valenze, "Mutuality and Marginality," p. 4.

Unpublished ms.

94. R. L. Smith, note 84, p. 217.

95. Smith and Valenze, note 93, p. 3.

96. Smith and Valenze, note 93, p. 28.

97. Whitbeck, note 83, p. 75.

98. D. Smith, "A Sociology for Women," in *The Prism of Sex: Essays in the Sociology of Knowledge* (J. A. Sherman and E. T. Beck, eds., note 47), Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1979, p. 152. In acknowledging this attentiveness to others as an aspect of women's experience, I do not wish to uncritically accept it as the basis for an alternative ethics. Such "caring" activities may simply reflect "a survival mechanism for women or others who are dealing with oppressive conditions" (J. Tronto, "Women and Caring," in A. Jaggar and S. Bordo, eds., *Gender/Body/Knowledge* [New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1989], p. 184). On feminist approaches to an ethic of care, see also Gilligan, note 66; J. Tronto, "Beyond Gender Difference to a Theory of Care," *Signs* 12 (Summer 1987); B. Fisher and J. Tronto, "Toward a Feminist Theory of Caring," in E. Abel and M. Nelson, eds., *Circles of Caring* (Albany: State University of New York Press, forthcoming); and S. Ruddick, *Maternal Thinking* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1989).

99. Whitbeck, note 83, p. 77.

100. Whitbeck, note 83, p. 79. See also J. F. Smith, note 64, for a discussion of the male, property model of parenting (emphasizing rights) and the female model emphasizing responsibilities.

101. Smith, note 84, p. 216.

102. Whitbeck, note 83, p. 82.

103. Benhabib, note 70, p. 81.

Initiatives for Deepening Democracy in the Middle East

Mohamed Sid-Ahmed*

The effects of the changes now sweeping through Eastern Europe are bound to spill over beyond the region. In fact, they will probably prove to be the farthest-reaching since the end of World War II. It is imperative therefore to try to visualize what the world will look like after things settle down, with the aim not so much to forecast the future as to probe the extent to which our project on the Coming Global Civilization¹ can offer relevant options for a preferred new world order.

One of the most critical conceptual difficulties facing the project is to ensure that it articulates not only the opportunities now existing to improve East-West relations but also (so that it may be genuinely universal) whatever opportunities may exist to improve North-South relations. Obviously, one cannot claim to adopt a universal approach when that approach does not take account of the South as a distinct actor, if only because it represents over two-thirds of humanity. But how to avoid excluding the South in a world based on "decoupling," where the process of development in the world is becoming more and more uneven? How to ensure that not only the economic but also the social, institutional, and cultural dimensions are taken into consideration in trying to institute balance and evenness in development and progress worldwide?

One critical challenge is to determine the minimum the South is to be offered to ensure its participation in the establishment of this new world order. I shall focus on a particularly sensitive area of critical strategic importance, the Middle East.

General Principles

I shall investigate the problematic of democracy in the Middle East, that is, the specificity of this issue in a region of unparalleled historical depth

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living at the crossroads between North and South. During the golden age of Arab and Islamic civilization, the region played a central role in preserving and developing the legacy of the ancient world, which was later transferred to Europe (hence, the Middle East's designation as the cradle of Western civilization). Ever since the Renaissance, the Southern Mediterranean shore has been identified with the civilizations of the Mediterranean basin, which by then included a significant portion of Europe. After the Industrial Revolution, the leading industrial powers in Europe realized that their economic, geopolitical, and cultural expansion necessitated the "neutralization" of the Middle East, notably Egypt, as a potential rival in a particularly sensitive area lying on the trade routes to India and the wider, soon-to-be-colonized world beyond.

Egypt's degree of development under Mohamed Ali in the first decades of the nineteenth century was commensurate with that of many European nations. But with the Meiji reforms a few decades later, Japan, not Egypt, succeeded in making the breakthrough into becoming a great power. In 1839, following Mohamed Ali's defeat at the battle of Navarin (a defeat no less important, in historical terms, than that of Nasser's during the Six Day War in 1967), Great Britain's foreign minister, Palmerston, declared that a European state should be established in Palestine to thwart the threat of Egypt's growing power in the Middle East. This remarkable declaration preceded Herzl's "Der Judenstaat" and the birth of political Zionism by several decades.

Since Bonaparte's expedition to Egypt, Egyptian rulers have oscillated between two antipodal perceptions of Egypt's identity and vocation: challenger to the European expansionist project (drawing its power from its Arab environment) or part of the project (disconnecting from its environment). This was the strategic debate that placed the Khedive Ismail in opposition to Mohamed Ali in the nineteenth century and Sadat to Nasser in the twentieth. But the creation of Israel clinched the matter, at least in terms of a broad, historical time frame. Sadat's dream that Egypt, through the Camp David process, could come to replace Israel as Washington's main strategic asset in the Middle East never materialized, if only because Israel's total assimilation to the North forced the Arabs to retrench into their identity as part of the South. Egypt can therefore not become a second Israel by putting itself forward as an alternative outpost of Western interests and values in the Middle East. In fact, Egypt's real identity cannot take shape outside the "three circles" that Nasser mentioned in his 1953 "Philosophy of the Revolution": the Arab, the African, and the Islamic. At least two of these apply to all the Arab parties. Israel's identity as part of the Judeo-Christian North and the Arabs' as part of the Arab-Islamic South goes far toward explaining the intractability of the confrontation between Pan-Arab nationalism and Zionism, where

both sides perceive their claims as mutually exclusive. This is bound to affect the issue of democracy in the Middle East.

Recent world developments are compelling everybody to critically reappraise previous assumptions, including the very basic issue of democracy. But before probing the new dimensions of democracy, it is important to remember that participatory politics cannot be artificially boosted and that form (as represented in the creation of democratic institutions) follows content and cannot replace it. People must be ready and equipped to actively take part in public life. Outbursts of popular participation due to frustration, alienation, and repression need not necessarily lead to genuine democratic conduct but can, on the contrary, breed populism, demagoguery, and fascism.

To what extent is democracy possible in underdeveloped societies? Are there objective limits on its implementation? There is, of course, the classical argument that democracy can only be an illusion—mere cosmetics—as long as there is not enough cake to go round. A case in point is Nicaragua, where democracy worked against the Sandinistas because of the US economic blockade. In addition to the economic aspect, there is the cultural one: how can genuine mass participation in politics be made compatible with high illiteracy rates or with tribal allegiances and sectarian loyalties that still exist in spite of the globalizing effect of the mass media? (The case of Lebanon is typical.) Actually, democracy needs a certain level of social maturity to be genuinely implemented. Democracy is always a conquest, not a grant. It is implemented through a process. A distinction should be made between democracy and democratization.

The Experiment of Liberal Democracy Imported from the Colonial Power

Democratic traditions have been established in a number of nondeveloped societies in countries that have suffered from colonial rule. They seem to be firmly established in India; but this has not been the case of Egypt or, for that matter, of most of the Arab world, despite the fact that respect for the constitution has been a basic demand of the Egyptian and other Arab national movements in their earlier stages.

A form of "liberal democracy" prevailed under the monarchy in Egypt. Modeled along the lines of Western democratic institutions, it proved to be inadequate, precisely because it was more a grant than a conquest. It fit the requirements of the palace and an upper bourgeoisie that had come to terms with the imperial power. One main characteristic of this so-called democracy was that minority parties—breakaways from the

Actually, the negative aspects of limited democracy are many. Predicated on the assumption that democracy, let loose (as it were), can lead to anarchy in one form or another and leave the door open to "imperialist plots" and "counterrevolutionary activities," this form of democracy aims at containing, rather than unleashing, mass participation in political life. Limited democracy carries within it distrust in the people and a paternalistic attitude toward them.

In retrospect, it would now seem that much of the national liberation process as it actually unfolded in contemporary history made the assumption that democracy was *not* an essential factor for national and social emancipation. This is true at least as far as radical trends in the Arab national liberation movement are concerned. Democracy was accepted only because its outright rejection could hardly be made compatible with the basic freedoms enshrined since the end of World War II in the United Nations Charter and won by the peoples of the world in their struggle against fascism. One-party systems were instituted on the grounds that they embodied the will of the masses in the struggle for national liberation and represented the "correct" ideology for achieving such aims. Of course, it was up to the rulers in each specific country to determine what that "correct" ideology was. But in actual fact, the guided type of democracy represented in the one-party system left very little room for a plurality of views. These regimes, which described themselves as progressive, drew their legitimacy from the fact that they identified themselves with the cause of revolution, not from their adherence to the principles of democracy. Revolutionary feats, such as Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal, gave his regime legitimacy not only in the eyes of his own people or of the Arab world but of the Third World at large. This popularity, however, did not endow the regime with a democratic character.

It is true that many of the revolutionary regimes in the Arab world seized state power through military coups and started the revolutionary process with no specific ideology of their own but only a trial-and-error approach inspired by genuine nationalism and a craving for Arab unity. But gradually the revolutionary experiment, as it acquired a specific character of its own, was given theoretical expression. In Egypt, the National Charter that Nasser had the Constituent Assembly of the Arab Socialist Union consecrate in 1962, which, as such, became the ideological pride of that one-party organization, proclaimed its method to be authentic socialism, though it was made clear that the charter's socialism was not Marxist-Leninist. Gradually, the regime built its legitimacy on the brand of national and socialist ideology it attributed to itself instead of deriving it from democratically run free elections. This was very much inspired by the self-proclaimed legitimacy of socialist regimes elsewhere,

namely, the communist regimes, and indeed was considered to be legitimate for that reason.

The Impact of Eastern Europe on the Middle East

The year 1989 brought dramatic changes to the communist world that call into question the very legitimacy of the communist regimes and, with them, of a wider range of political enterprises that developed thanks to their support. It might appear paradoxical that the Soviet leadership has condoned demonstrations in Eastern Europe calling for the downfall of communism. But the underlying concept of perestroika is that not everything that has attributed itself to the cause of socialism has had a liberating effect. Communist parties that have set themselves up as the embodiment of a "scientific doctrine" and as representative of "the movement of history" have often been unable to prove that assertion true. Moreover, the postulated scientific truth contained in Marxist-Leninist ideology has often been used to justify building an institutional system that because its doctrinal soundness is beyond question, breeds a process in which the need to consult the people and verify the "correctness of the political line" gradually becomes superfluous and is neglected in practice. This dissociation between ruling parties that portray themselves as representing the people and the actual implementation of any form of representative democracy has been at the origin of mistakes, crimes, and even acts of genocide committed by some Communist parties. In many cases, such parties have become in the eyes of their peoples the incarnation of the very opposite of "historical truth." Liberty has now come to be perceived as embodied in social movements that have arisen against regimes created by these parties. A similar phenomenon has not yet extended to liberation movements in the Third World, but it is likely to happen sooner or later.

What is now happening in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is a glaring example of the people themselves assuming power directly in a violent reaction against self-proclaimed representatives of the will of the people. With the exception of the Palestinian Intifada, "people power" has not manifested itself in the Arab world. In the new global context, this anomaly cannot continue indefinitely.

Changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are bound to have repercussions throughout the world, including the Middle East. National liberation in the Arab world cannot be at total variance with the movement for liberty now sweeping across Eastern Europe. One-party regimes, once assumed to embody socialist principles, have proved in Eastern Europe to represent a system that far from ensuring the commu-

icipation of the masses, is basically repressive in nature. Sooner or later, similar regimes in the Middle East are bound to appear in their true colors for the peoples of that region as well. Attempts to distinguish between the East European and Arab regimes on the grounds that the ideology of the former is communist and of the latter a national liberation brand of socialism, are not convincing. The similarity we are talking about lies in the logic of the one-party structure, not in the ideological content of the regimes. The rapprochement now underway between the Arab states (notably Egypt's recent reconciliations with Libya and Syria) can be seen as beneficial to the Arab cause as some renewed expression of Arab solidarity. However, it could also be interpreted as the closing of ranks in the face of a common "threat," not only from Israel (which has long been there) but also from the possibility of popular uprisings now that the breakdown of the East European regimes has deprived their Arab counterparts of the type of argument by which they justified their legitimacy.

It is no accident that recent months have witnessed the introduction in a number of Arab countries of some form of multiparty system to stand up to the growing threat from the street. Jordan, Algeria, Tunisia, and even Iraq are following the path Mubarak established in Egypt after Sadat's assassination. Recent events in Kuwait prove that even the conservative Islamic states of the Arab peninsula no longer consider themselves immune to the need for some form of liberalization. Mubarak deliberately encouraged secular opposition, both on the left (the Tagammu') and center-right (the Wafd) in order to prevent the radical religious opposition from becoming the exclusive force in the political arena. Pluralism in the Arab world is an instrument aimed at containing the street, rather than unleashing it. So far, ensuring the diversification of the opposition has been a means to divide and weaken it, not enrich it.

A basic difference between Eastern Europe and the Arab world is that the alternative for the existing Arab regimes is not liberalism but fundamentalism. Uprisings aimed at renewing the Arab world are expected to acquire a fundamentalist, rather than a liberal, character. They are expected to be still more radical in their opposition to the liberal values of the West than the Arab regimes now in power. That is why it can be assumed that the eventual downfall of the current regimes will bring about regimes more, not less, opposed to peace with Israel. This will remain so as long as the game of politics in the Arab world is discredited and has failed to deliver on its promises (whether along socialist or liberal-capitalist lines) in all areas, notably in the confrontation with Israel. As long as politics is identified with "imported values" (liberalism, socialism, etc.) assumed to be manipulated by alien forces abroad, the issue of self-assertion remains acute and the deep identity crisis finds expression

in extremism with a religious face.

Fundamentalism in its sectarian, exclusivist, fanatical expression can only be overcome if movements incarnating freedom (and therefore diversification, pluralism, and democracy) can prove to be effective and genuinely represent new forms of grassroots (as opposed to "guided") democracy, where the aspirations of the masses are unleashed, not contained or manipulated. In this way the lessons of the uprisings now sweeping across Eastern Europe can be precious for the Middle East.

In the short run, however, and with the activation of Jewish emigration to Israel, changes in Eastern Europe appear to favor Israel rather than the Arabs. This is likely to deepen the North-South divide in the Middle East rather than help develop a *modus vivendi* between the chief characters in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Shamir's arguments in opposing an Israeli-Palestinian settlement based on peace in exchange for land are reinforced by this massive influx of Soviet and East European Jews. It gives more credence, within Israel, to his argument that Israel cannot afford to abandon land that will be needed to accommodate the new immigrants.

East European developments are therefore likely to have two contradictory effects on the Arab world: on the level of the regimes, such developments appear to favor Israel; but on the level of societies, they encourage new, grassroots forms of democratic action likely to drive the people to stand up to the passivity and lack of initiative of the regimes. In all likelihood, these two contradictory trends will interact to make conflict more acute in Arab societies and throughout the region. It is hard to see how the Middle East can avoid being affected by the winds of change sweeping through all parts of the world.

Much has been said about Israeli democracy. But the harshness with which Israel has dealt with the Intifada has proved that Israeli democracy is limited to the Jewish population and does not extend to the Arabs of Palestine. On the contrary, it makes it all the more difficult to find a common denominator between the two forms of democracy. Attempts by radical pro-Palestinian Israeli activists to fraternize with the Palestinian Intifada are repressed by the authorities with the same degree of violence used against the Intifada. The discrepancy between the two forms of democracy signals how deep the North-South divide still runs between the two.

The acuteness of the Arab-Israeli confrontation still jeopardizes the democratization process on either side of the dividing line. Grassroots initiatives on either side are required to overcome the impasse. At what pace and to what extent can changes sweeping the rest of the world be effective in achieving that result?

Note

1. "Global Civilization: Challenges for Sovereignty, Democracy, and Security" is a project initiated in 1987 by the World Wonder Models Project.

An Independent Society: Poland Under Martial Law

Konstanty Gebert*

On December 13, 1981, after sixteen months of an uneasy coexistence between the communist state and the Eastern bloc's first-ever independent trade union, Solidarity, General Jaruzelski, as head of a self-appointed Military Council of National Salvation, imposed martial law on Poland. Thousands of militants and intellectuals were placed in administrative detention without a warrant; and thousands more were to be interned, arrested, and sentenced. All trade unions—and almost all student and professional associations—were suspended and later banned, newspapers were seized, and military censorship was imposed. A curfew was enforced, telephones switched off, and the borders sealed. Protest was met with violence and the first dead (although the coup itself was bloodless) fell several days later. In all, martial law was to claim over the years a hundred dead and thousands wounded, over ten thousand jailed and a yet-undetermined number harassed, fired, and forced into emigration. For the Poles, martial law meant a brutal reimposition of the communist system the country had been resisting ever since the outcome of World War II had brought it under Soviet control.

I shall relate the story of Polish civil resistance to military rule. Political opposition, under conditions of martial law, was not an option; and armed opposition had never been one. On these grounds, the authorities had presumably surmised that, once their rule was firmly reestablished, the Poles would have no alternative but submission—and official propaganda said as much. What happened, in fact, was the exact opposite to their expectations: an entire society tried to go underground, as it were, there to continue its activity not so much against the regime as in spite of its presence and goals. One could see in this the realization of a slogan invented by leading oppositionist Jacek Kuron, who, mindful of the final defeat of the bloody riots of 1970, warned resisters, "Do not burn down [party] committees; set up your own."

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1 Elections and Democracy
in Central America
A Framework for Analysis

John A. Booth

Many observers regarded Marco Vinicio Cerezo Arévalo's assumption of the presidency of Guatemala in January 1986 as a signal moment in the history of Central America because it meant that, for the first time in memory, all five isthmic nations had elected governments. This remarkable "outbreak" of elected regimes in the region was part of a larger process underway throughout the hemisphere, as many South American states had also replaced military with elected civilian governments in the last decade (Drake and Silva, 1986; Malloy and Seligson, 1987; *Contemporary Marxism*, 1986).

Political scientists have long ignored the elections of Central America, except those of Costa Rica, because they have so often been either fraudulently manipulated or, if properly carried out, later overturned by military coups. It is widely assumed that elections may promote democracy, but for decades dictatorial regimes in Nicaragua, Guatemala, and El Salvador have periodically held elections that merely reinforced of justified authoritarian rule. Indeed three of the most brutal regimes in Central American history came to power through elections: those of Nicaragua's Anastasio Somoza Debayle (1967-79), Guatemala's Romeo Lucas García (1978-82), and El Salvador's Gen. Carlos Humberto Romero (1977-79).

Given the region's checkered electoral past, Central American elections in the 1980s have attracted considerable and sometimes almost astonished international attention. Many nations and nongovernmental organizations, for example, sent delegations to witness the elections in El Salvador in 1982 and 1984, Nicaragua in 1984, and Guatemala in 1985. Several nations and various international political party organizations contributed financial support and technical advice to Central American election agencies and parties.

Among countries outside the region, the United States has taken the liveliest interest in recent Central American elections. The Reagan administration has encouraged and supported—using diplomatic, financial, and political

means—the holding of elections and the transition from military to civilian regimes in Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala. President Reagan has also taken some credit for what he calls the “democratization” of Central America and has sought to take advantage of this process of return to civilian rule to win support in the U.S. Congress for his Central American policies (U.S. Department of State, 1987:12–17). The Reagan administration has also worked hard to block and discredit the Nicaraguan election of 1984 (LASA, 1984:28–32).

The remarkable coincidence of so many elected regimes in Central America and the United States’ active promotion of some of these elections and opposition to others—all in the name of democracy—requires that Central American elections be the subject of serious scholarly study. Opinions diverge widely among policymakers, political theorists, and students of politics, however, about the essence of democracy and the role of elections in democratic governance. Key issues we must consider, then, are what constitutes political democracy and what elections have to do with democracy.

The Problem of Defining Democracy

One problem with the relationship of elections to democracy is a chronic imprecision of terminology. Political scientists either sloppily or conflictingly define and use the term “democracy” almost as frequently as politicians distort its meaning for political purposes. It is instructive to examine three common misuses of the word before attempting to define it more precisely.

First, the term “democracy” often carries immense ideological freight. In common political parlance the word has become so broad as to be virtually meaningless. Politicians, ideologues, the media, and scholars apply it to political systems as diverse as the United States, Mexico, the Soviet Union, and El Salvador. Democracy has become a word like those used by Humpty Dumpty—employed to mean precisely what the speaker of the moment intends it to mean, no more and no less.

Second, many persons tend to equate democracy with elections alone. In this very narrow approach, the label “democratic” is applied to any political system in which citizens may take part in electing their leaders. In this understanding, democracy is akin to a state of political grace that may be attained solely by holding elections. Overlooked in this approach are the key facts of

political power and the ability of citizens to influence decisions. Central America has such a long history of militaries overthrowing elected regimes and dictators manipulating elections that no one should give credence to such a simpleminded equation.

Two personal experiences help illustrate how vexing these problems can be to one trying to understand or explain the real political world of contemporary Central America. I served on election observation delegations to the national elections of Nicaragua (1984) and Guatemala (1985). By my estimation, those of the observer teams, and the assessments of other election observers, both the Nicaraguan and Guatemalan elections were technically and administratively very similar and virtually without significant fraud (LASA, 1984; Booth et al., 1985). Nevertheless, President Reagan described the election in Nicaragua as a “Soviet-style sham” (*New York Times*, 20 July 1984), while the U.S. Department of State described the election in Guatemala as the “final step in the reestablishment of democracy there” (U.S. Department of State, 1985:2). Thus, the U.S. government, pursuing different policy ends in each circumstance, displayed astounding disregard for both fact and the electoral context of each case in order to describe apparently very similar events in radically different ways. Such political distortions by the influential and powerful badly obscure the meaning of these particular elections and their possible contribution to democracy in Central America.

In a similarly confounding way, the 1982 and 1984 Salvadoran elections are always described by the U.S. government as very “democratic,” even though others regard them as deeply flawed (Herman and Brodhead, 1984:93–153). To further confuse things, some observers contend that Nicaragua’s 1984 election consolidated democracy there, while Guatemala’s 1985 and El Salvador’s 1982 and 1984 elections were merely manipulated from outside to permit the United States to send military aid to their governments (Herman and Brodhead, 1984; Jonas, 1986:i–v; Petras, 1986:1–15; Rabine, 1986:59–64). Indeed, in the Salvadoran and Guatemalan cases, some critics contend that their recent elections actually solidified antidemocratic rule and undermined progress toward democracy. This contention cannot be easily disregarded, given the number of Central American dictatorships that have come to power or retained power through elections.

The virtual equation of democracy with elections is a posture that has become common in post-World War II political science in the United States. Schumpeter (1943), Berelson (1954), and Dahl (1956), among others, have

argued that allegedly inherent tendencies of mass publics to be authoritarian, irrational, antidemocratic, intolerant of civil liberties, and ill informed about political issues require that mass participation in decision making be confined mainly to leadership choice in elections that are carefully managed by plural, competing elites. Thus, for many contemporary pluralist-elitist theorists, elections constitute the central element of democracy; they are the main and preferred vehicle for the participation of mass publics in politics.

Third, some would equate democracy with particular types of regime or constitutional arrangements, especially ones in which some emphasis is placed on the people. This equation occurs at two levels.

In the vernacular of the nationalist, one's own system is "democratic." In the United States, for example, most of us view our own liberal, republican, constitutional regime with its periodic public election of leaders as the world's best example of democracy. Supporters of the revolutionary socialist government of Cuba, in contrast, with equal fervor regard their own unelected government as democratic because it promotes popular participation in some decision making and administration and works toward distributive equity among the people.

Some contemporary political theorists describe particular types of regimes or particular constitutions as "democracies," although they are sometimes more precise than the man on the street. But because it is the nature of political theorists to disagree with one another, they have produced not one but a plethora of contending typologies and models of democracy. Macpherson (1977, 1966) traces liberalism through various stages of historical evolution—protective (or Lockean) democracy, developmental democracy, and equilibrium (pluralist) democracy—and contrasts them with utopian, participatory, Communist, and Third World variants. Cohen (1982) identifies individualist and socialist democracies, but describes Communism as nondemocratic. Przeworski (1985) describes social democracy as a liberal constitutional regime that would reform rather than replace capitalism, as would revolutionary socialism.

Lijphart (1984, 1977) has studied both consociational democracies in plural societies and constitutional, electoral governments. In the latter category he identifies two ideal types of democracy: majoritarian (parliamentary, fused executive and legislative authority, two-party dominance) and consensus (presidential, separation of powers, bicameral legislatures, multiparty). He finds, however, that real systems range across four actual types, two of which combine certain elements of each ideal type. Yates (1982) describes the mod-

ern U.S. system as a bureaucratic democracy, a bureaucratized twentieth-century outgrowth of the pluralist system created by the framers of the U.S. Constitution. O'Donnell et al. (1986) examine transitions from authoritarian rule to liberal, constitutional regimes in Europe and Latin America. Diamond et al. (1988) explore democracy in the Third World, focusing on sociocultural, economic, and political factors that may foster liberal, pluralist, constitutional regimes. All of these studies treat democracy in general within the pluralist-elitist approach that has constituted the mainstream of U.S. political science in recent decades and is perhaps best epitomized in Dahl's *Polyarchy* (1971).

Classical Definitions

This pluralist-elitist conception of democracy has been sharply criticized as too narrow by Bachrach (1966), Pateman (1970), and others, who charge that it "distorts the original meaning of the term democracy." "Classical" democratic theorists,¹ who have had a clearer vision of democracy than most of the approaches just mentioned, may offer us a way out of this definitional thicket.

Theorists over three millennia have identified the main characteristics of democratic governance. The key elements may be discerned quickly in the root of the word itself: *demos* means the people, *kratin* means rule—rule by the people. Until obfuscation by the pluralist-elitist revisionists in the wake of World War II, the essential characteristic of democracy had generally been defined as the participation in rule of a society by its general populace. One convenient formulation of this idea treats democracy as *participation by the mass of people in a community in its governance (making and carrying out decisions)*. Political participation lies at the heart of democracy (Pateman, 1970:1-44). Such participation generally has been viewed as requiring equality of the right to participate for all sane, noncriminal adults.

Aristotle, for example, defined democracy as that constitution in which those who are both poor and free form a sovereign majority and therefore exercise some decision-making power in ruling and in judging in disputes (Aristotle, 1962:74-81). Thomas Jefferson described the version of democracy that he most preferred as a "government by its citizens in mass, acting directly and personally, according to rules established by the majority" (Jefferson, 1935a:83). John Stuart Mill described the "ideally best form of government" as one in which every citizen is "at least occasionally, called on to take an actual

part in the government by the personal discharge of some public function, local or general" (Mill, 1958:42).

The classical theorists of democracy strongly emphasized the educative effect produced in the citizenry by participation. Mill, for example, argued that "among the foremost benefits of free government is that education of the intelligence and of the sentiments which is carried down to the very lowest ranks of the people when they are called on to take a part in acts which directly affect the great interests of their country" (Mill, 1958:128). The political ability and civic values of the individual citizen are believed to develop through participation in politics. Similarly, the political culture of the society becomes more amenable to democracy and more attentive to the collective good as citizens participate in public affairs.

The classical approach to defining democracy has several implications. First, democracy involves public participation in decision making and administration, and this participation can vary in amount and quality. Democracy, therefore, is *not a constant*—not a condition defined by the possession of certain traits, be they holding elections or having a particular sort of constitution or having a regime of the correct ideology. Rather, democracy is a *variable*. There may be more or less democracy, depending upon the amount and quality of public participation in decision making and rule in any particular system.

Because democracy is variable, it is theoretically (and at least partly practically) possible to measure how much or how little of it there is in a particular society at a given moment. This can be done by measuring and evaluating the amount and quality of political participation going on. One useful approach to evaluating the amount and nature of democracy has been formulated by Carl Cohen (1971:8–37), who identifies three dimensions of democracy. The first is the *breadth of democracy*, or the fraction of the citizenry participating in making and carrying out decisions. Breadth may vary according to the type of participation, from wide in the case of voting, for example, to rather narrow (few participating) in holding public office in most representative systems.

The second dimension is the *range of democracy*, the array of issues and decisions over which the public exercises decisions (for example, leader selection, areas subject to legislation, dispute resolution). Classical liberal polities have relatively small ranges of participation because much economic decision making is reserved for the private sector. Socialist regimes, in contrast, have a much wider range of economic activity subject to public decisions because the economy is subject to public ownership and regulation.

Cohen's third dimension is the *depth of democracy*, or the potential for efficacy and the autonomy of popular participation. Participation is deep when it truly has the potential to influence public decisions, and when it is autonomous (that is, not manipulated or controlled by others than those participating). The person or group taking part need not be efficacious (achieve his/their goals) to have deep participation, but merely have had the potential to have prevailed. One need not win in every contest or achieve every political goal, but one must have a chance to influence policy.

One critical problem of democracy is the size of the community being governed. A small community (such as a Swiss commune, a New England town, or a Central American cooperative) may be effectively ruled by direct popular action (Aristotle, 1962; Mill, 1958:213–14), but the larger the community, the more unwieldy direct participation becomes. Larger systems require representative government in order to function efficiently (Madison, 1961a:81–84, 1961b:100; Jefferson, 1935a:83; Mill, 1958:212–28). Jefferson argued that where it was impossible because of size for all to take part in governance, in order to conserve the most democracy "the powers of government, being divided, should be exercised each by representatives" (Jefferson, 1935a:83). There is a necessary loss in the breadth of democracy, however, when a small number of representatives and administrative specialists make and carry out decisions on behalf of the mass of citizens. There is a necessary loss in the depth of democracy when citizens must delegate to leaders the determination of public decisions instead of making decisions as a whole. Depth of democracy is also sacrificed when political parties and other elites mediate between specialized institutions of representative government and the mass of citizens by selecting candidates for public office and setting the agendas and terms of public debate.

For the purposes of discussion in this chapter, democracy is treated in the broader, classical sense of popular participation in rule, rather than the narrower, electoral focus associated with the position of the pluralist-elitists.

Rights and Democracy

Certain rights are essential to democracy. First, the most obvious and important, regardless of the type of political system in question, is the right to participate in public decisions. Citizens must have the effective freedom to participate in leadership choice (elections), policy decisions, and the

implementation of decisions. Second, it follows that the principal condition under which the rights of one individual to participate in rule might be limited should be only to protect the fundamental right of other citizens to so participate.² Third, a constitution, an agreed-upon contract among citizens specifying the rules for political intercourse, is of fundamental importance to protect citizens' rights. To promote democracy, a constitution must establish the right to participate and protect that right for both majorities and minorities (whether major subgroups within the community or winners and losers on particular decisions) from encroachment by each other.

In practical terms, essential democratic rights would include the right to speak freely and to publish political opinion, the right to oppose incumbents in office and to remain safe and free, the right to associate and assemble freely for political ends, the right to petition the government, and the right to seek and win redress from abuses of authority by incumbents in power.

Regime Consolidation

The political culture of elites and masses can be critical factors conditioning democracy: the greater the proportion of a citizenry supporting and participating in public affairs, supporting key civil liberties, and agreeing on the same participatory regime (rules governing participation), the better sustained will be democracy. This same proposition is particularly true for sociopolitical elites: the greater the proportion of a society's top political, social, and economic leaders supporting citizen participation, civil liberties, and a participatory polity, the stronger and more stable will be democracy.

Peeler (1985) correctly notes that the emergence of Latin America's three long-standing liberal democracies (Colombia, Venezuela, and Costa Rica) depended upon the consolidation of a "regime," an agreement among key elites to abide by a particular set of political rules.³ Particularly in situations of great economic inequality or in times of societal stress, elite commitment to and support for popular participation and for a participatory regime (the constitutional rules of the game) are essential. This is so because elites' control of key economic, institutional, and coercive resources would in times of stress or disagreement tempt them to restrict or suspend the participatory rights of majorities or of other minorities. To so restrict or suspend such participation, of course, would diminish both democracy and stability.

A special sort of election, which may be called "democratizing,"⁴ can help

consolidate a stable and lasting "regime" or constitutional system. Such a regime is a pattern of systematic expectations among groups—key elite and mass factions—that interact within a particular set of consensual political rules, both constitutional and informal. As Karl (1986:10) points out, "An enduring political democracy must rest upon a consensus which does not require that contending forces have similar programs or visions of society. Such consensus is founded on a historic compromise among major political actors and social forces." In or around a democratizing election such a regime is forged, largely among important minorities (key political and economic elites) in the polity, when they agree to accommodate each other. The forging of a regime among political and economic elites requires them to embrace and thereafter play by a set of rules of the game that includes respect for legitimate competitors' rights, acceptance of a certain amount of mass involvement in politics, a definition of the role of the state, and agreement upon means for resolution of conflict. The specific type of electoral system adopted may affect the prospects for the stability of the regime (Nohlen, 1987:17–41).

Because a truly democratizing election itself is only one small aspect of the forging of a regime, Karl (1986:9) stresses that "elections themselves do not constitute democracy," and may actually impede the creation of a regime if unfairly manipulated or if imposed by forces from outside a society. Arguing along similar lines, Herman and Brodhead (1984:5) see externally manipulated elections as barriers to democratization. They define "demonstration elections" as "organized and staged by a foreign power primarily to pacify its own restive home population, reassuring it that ongoing interventionary processes are legitimate and appreciated by their foreign objects." Their demonstration election concept can be extended to include elections held not under the aegis of an external power, but staged by a government for its own symbolic purposes (Booth, 1986:38–40). Both externally and internally managed demonstration elections would typically lack freedoms to organize, to campaign and speak freely, and to vote without coercion. An election may also liberalize without democratizing. That is, an authoritarian regime may relax its usual repression during an election for the purpose of legitimizing itself or refurbishing its image, but without truly adopting lasting participatory norms (Middlebrook, 1986; Drake and Silva, 1986; Dillon Soares, 1986; Cornelius, 1986).

Political Culture

The extent to which elections build or consolidate a political culture favorable toward popular participation in rule is also central to their importance for democracy. In a polity in which tyranny has suppressed popular and elite familiarity with participation in politics, a fair and free election can encourage public commitment to participation in leadership choice, mobilize interests, inform opinion, and educate the public. A series of fair and free elections can, over time, nurture cultural commitment (among both key political and economic elites and among masses) to participation, civil liberties, and an electoral regime, as evidence from Costa Rica, Venezuela, and Colombia demonstrates (Peeler, 1985). Citizens' commitment to democratic practice and civil liberties can grow through civic education and political experience (Booth and Seligson, 1984:106-8). The greater the proportion of a nation's citizens committed to democratic practices and values, the less likely they would be to resort to undemocratic political means or to accept the blandishments of antidemocratic ideologues. Political culture evolves gradually, however, and will not change merely because of a single election (Paz, 1985:20).

Elections and Democracy

Against this theoretical background, we may begin to assess more systematically the importance of elections for democracy. The previous discussion can be summarized as a series of six questions that may help us to assess the contribution of elections to democratic governance.

1. *What is the effect of the election(s) on the range of political participation?*

Elections in modern nation states afford a rather circumscribed range of opportunities for popular participation. An election provides a relatively brief and occasional opportunity to discuss politics, campaign, electioneer, and vote. Despite the sporadic nature of electoral activity, some partisan participation—militancy within a party, proselytizing, and so forth—may well continue after the election has ended among the minority of any populace that engages in partisan activism, particularly if there are prospects for future fair elections. Especially where elections and partisan activity have been barred or where elections have been fraudulently manipulated, the holding of an open election campaign and fair balloting offers a marked expansion of the range of political

participation available to citizens. Moreover, taking part in choosing a leader, ruling party, or representative can provide a significant opportunity for protecting one's self-interest or for promoting one's political goals.

Despite their potential to increase the array of participatory opportunities, however, elections and partisan activity constitute but a fraction of the political activity of any nation. The actual making of policy decisions, the execution of those decisions, and the adjudication of disputes constitute vast arenas of ongoing public activity. In most countries, elections, party activity, and voting—even if highly efficacious—influence these arenas only tangentially if at all. In some nations, the use of citizen initiative and referendum elections for making public decisions offers the public greater opportunities to decide policy matters directly (Magleby, 1984; Barber, 1974), but such practices are relatively rare in Latin America.

2. *What is the effect of the election(s) on the breadth of participation?*

The breadth of participation (fraction of the citizenry participating) in elections is typically greatest for the actual casting of the ballot: voting in national elections by up to three-quarters of those eligible is common in many countries. Participation is customarily much narrower for campaigning and partisan activism (usually less than a quarter of the populace). Because citizens who have been forced to participate in consistently manipulated or fraudulent elections often become politically inactive, the introduction of open campaigns and fair elections can encourage a large increase in electoral participation and therefore broaden democracy.

It should be noted, however, that many other forms of political participation—voluntary group activity, contacting public officials, discussing public affairs—may involve more of the populace more of the time than most forms of electoral participation. Citizen involvement in such other, nonelectoral activities may not be significantly altered by the presence or absence of elections; they appear to go on in many types of regimes. It should also be noted that, with few exceptions, citizen participation in formal governmental arenas tends to be consistently higher among those who are more prosperous and better educated. Overall, then, elections and campaigns may broaden citizen political participation substantially, but only within certain arenas, only for certain social strata, and typically only for limited periods.

3. *What is the effect of the election(s) on the depth of participation?*

The depth of participation involves its quality, the extent to which it has real potential for influence, and the autonomy of participation. In an open cam-

campaign and free election, the outcome would depend upon the actual distribution of votes cast, and neither parties nor individual voters would be subject to coercion during the campaign or balloting. In such an open electoral environment, the mobilization of support by parties could educate citizens on issues and permit them to join the coalition that appears to offer the most advantageous package of policies.

However, electoral participation is shallow in most elections in modern nation states for several reasons. First, the choice open to the voter is typically very small (for example, between Party A and Party B, or Candidate X and Candidate Y), and the issues to be decided or choices to be made have almost always been framed beforehand by elites. Such limitations are particularly true in proportional representation systems (the norm in Latin America), in which candidates are typically selected by national party elites rather than by voters in primaries. Second, elections usually convey limited information to candidates because secret ballots do not reveal how any individual voted or why. Therefore, a conscientious winning candidate might study election results with care, yet discern only with difficulty any trace of a mandate to guide postelection behavior. On the other hand, participation as a party activist or officeholder may bring a citizen closer to shaping these decisions. Such participation would thus convey deeper influence than the average voter would ever exercise, but normally only a minority of even activists actually authoritatively shape decisions.

4. *Did the election(s) occur in an environment conducive to the free exercise of full participatory rights, and was the conduct of the election(s) fair?*

Such questions about the setting, procedures, and technical conduct of elections are the sort of issues typically examined by careful election observers to determine the quality of particular elections. By most contemporary standards, the central issue at stake is fundamental fairness, measured mainly in terms of equality of opportunity, so that each citizen's vote weighs equally with those of all others (Garcla Laguardia, 1986:8-9).⁵ Ideally under this principle of "one person, one vote," the context of the election and its procedures and implementation should afford the following conditions to each citizen:

—free and equal opportunity to receive information about issues, parties, and candidates;

—free and equal opportunity to speak on political issues;

—free and equal opportunity to register to vote;

—free and equal opportunity to vote;

- ballot secrecy, including the right to deposit secretly a null or blank ballot;
- freedom from intimidation or coercion as to how to vote;
- equal weight of the counted vote.

The obtaining of these conditions for individual citizens requires other structural and contextual conditions for the polity as a whole.

—freedom for parties to organize, electioneer, campaign, and distribute propaganda;

—absence of unfair advantage for particular minorities, especially for incumbents;

—mechanisms to adjudicate and redress grievances among contenders;

—fair and free systems of registration and election administration and an honest count of the votes;

—losers' respect for the winners' right to rule; respect for the right of losers and other minorities to continued participation.

The evaluation of such conditions by observers and participants is a fairly straightforward matter in an open electoral environment. There has arisen in Central America and Latin America overall a small legal-scholarly-technical industry that studies, advises on, and promotes fair elections, including the Association of Electoral Organizations of Central America and the Caribbean and the Inter-American Center for Electoral Advice and Promotion, a subsidiary of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Many human rights and special interest organizations monitor and observe elections in Central America.

5. *Did the election(s) consolidate or help consolidate a stable regime under democratic rules?*

The establishment of an electoral, constitutional regime can be judged only superficially by the criteria mentioned in the previous section. Such procedural standards are necessary but not sufficient conditions for democratization. While the absence of open and fair campaigning and a free and fairly counted election would surely signal that a procedurally democratic regime was lacking, the mere presence of such conditions might not mean movement toward democracy. As noted above, authoritarian regimes can—without relinquishing a tight grip on power, accommodating other political forces, or accepting democratic norms—liberalize election procedures. External pressures can temporarily coerce warring elite factions into temporary and unstable cooperation around democratic procedural norms.

A sufficient condition for the consolidation of a regime may be reached by the establishment of a consensus among key elites to (1) accommodate each

other in the political game, (2) continue playing within democratic procedural norms, and (3) accept popular participation in politics. Unfortunately for our purposes here, such an interelite consensus may not be easy to identify in practical terms, especially at the time in which a particular election is held. Unless forged through an overt pact at a particular historical moment, those involved may not be fully conscious of the emergence of consensus on those criteria, so that evidence about consensus on a new regime may be available only through hindsight.

Sometimes regime-defining consensus is established through an overt pact by negotiations among rival elites. Colombia's historic National Front pact of 1957 between warring Liberals and Conservatives was such an overt agreement. Liberal-Conservative negotiations led to a national referendum on the accord and national presidential-congressional elections. The new regime had strong support from powerful national economic interests from the beginning because the bourgeoisie was well represented among the parties' leaders. The consolidation of Venezuela's democratic regime took longer and was more tenuous. After sectarian conflict undermined an interlude of civilian rule in the late 1940s, Venezuela's three major parties reached an accord in the late 1950s to play by liberal democratic rules if the dictator Pérez Jiménez could be toppled. Support for the liberal regime by the national bourgeoisie developed slowly in Venezuela, and forbearance from intervention by the armed forces was tenuous at first.

6. *Did the election(s) contribute toward a political culture of support for participation and democratic rules?*

The growth of elite and popular support for participatory politics and democratic rules and liberties is likely to be fitful and to require the passage of many years, if not decades. Indeed, some commentators argue that Latin American political culture begins from historical roots in Catholic Spain and has been so shaped by centuries of political history that the region's culture is generally antithetical to democratic beliefs. Others have argued that these traditions have recently led major Latin American elite and middle-sector groups to forge antidemocratic alliances with military authoritarians in defense of their class interests (Wiarda, 1974; O'Donnell, 1979). Despite such pessimistic readings, there is a democratic tradition in Latin American culture (Paz, 1985). Moreover, survey research has uncovered strong commitment to democratic values and practices in countries as diverse as liberal-democratic Costa Rica and authoritarian Mexico.⁶

Democratic values and support for civil liberties develop among populations through participation. A series of fair and free elections could increase popular confidence in elections per se, in participatory norms, and in a regime. It is also true, however, that other types of political participation, particularly those that are more continuous or relevant to ongoing and immediately important activities in the everyday lives of citizens, may be more likely than electoral participation to build participatory norms and support for civil liberties. It has been forcefully argued by Pateman (1970:45-111), for example, that workplace and community participation offer greater potential for building democratic political culture than do sporadic voting, campaigning, and party activism.

Elections and Democracy in Central America

Based on the foregoing, one should obviously not conclude that the mere election of civilian governments in Central American nations means that democratization is sweeping the isthmus. On the other hand, if democracy means participation in rule, the holding of elections in Central America could well mean that there is more democracy, albeit perhaps not a great deal more.

In order to understand the contribution of elections to democracy in Central America, one must examine each nation in the region individually. It is not sufficient merely to look at each case at this particular historical moment; one must evaluate overall trends in popular participation. It is necessary to go beyond the particular technical aspects of elections and election systems to the developing sociopolitical contexts within which they have been held. One must consider over time how, if at all, elections may contribute to the development of political culture among elites and masses, as well as to regime formation.

Costa Rica

All observers agree that Costa Rica is a classical liberal, representative, constitutional polity with a high degree of electoral honesty. The contemporary Costa Rican political system has its roots in a colonial system marked by (for Central America) relative economic equality and an absence of both mineral wealth and an indigenous populace with which to exploit it.

Costa Ricans developed an egalitarian social culture that was reinforced by

the need of agricultural elites to co-opt workers as the modern coffee export economy developed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Concessions to workers that gradually extended political rights and a low level of civil conflict contributed to the emergence of a prototypical liberal regime in the early twentieth century (Booth, 1988).

After growing economic and political unrest and intralite conflict shattered that regime in the 1940s, an attempt by the incumbent government to fraudulently manipulate the 1948 election led to a brief civil war led by José Figueres and the National Liberation Movement. The insurgents defeated the regime and armed forces, and the National Liberation junta ruled for a year by decree.

In 1949 an elected constituent assembly rewrote the Costa Rican constitution; it abolished the armed forces, established a fourth branch of government to guarantee electoral honesty, curtailed executive power with extensive checks and balances, restricted the Communist party, weakened labor unions as well as certain privileges of the coffee bourgeoisie, and rejected many of the National Liberation Movement's own pet projects. The junta then relinquished power to the real winner of the 1948 election, politically consecrating the principle of electoral honesty. The National Liberation Movement constituted itself into a political party (the PLN), contested and won the 1953 election, then relinquished power after losing in 1958.

The regime consolidated in the 1948-58 period has been characterized by the mutual accommodation and alternation in power of the social democratic PLN and its more conservative opponents, the preservation of a mixed economy and social welfare policies that have modestly attenuated the effects of poverty for many Costa Ricans, extensive civil liberties, and governmental promotion of certain types of popular participation through the formation of community development, health, nutrition, and economic cooperative organizations.

Honest elections in a climate of extensive political freedom for individuals, parties, most voluntary associations, and the press have been the jewels in Costa Rica's crown for three decades. There clearly exist both an elite and a mass consensus about the regime that have weathered unscathed some difficult periods of economic strife, as Seligson and Gómez reveal in their contribution to this work.⁷

It appears likely that several decades of honest, competitive elections, a good human and civil rights climate, and social democratic policies have combined to nurture the commitment of most Costa Ricans to participatory rules and

fundamental civil liberties. In comparative terms, the breadth of Costa Rican political participation appears extensive and the range of participation is moderate (due to the mixed economy and government mobilization of interest groups), but overall the depth of participation is rather modest.

Recent trends of growing external pressures have raised some alarm about the future evolution of the Costa Rican regime. Because of Reagan administration policies and Costa Rica's own, as well as its post-1981 debt crisis, the country has been heavily pressured to curtail its social welfare policies and reduce the participation of the state in the economy. Such policies have modestly reduced the range of political participation (that is, areas of national life subject to influence by public pressure) by expanding the Costa Rican private sector at the cost of the public sector. Despite expectations to the contrary, curtailment of social welfare policies since 1982 apparently has not seriously eroded support for the regime. Successful U.S. pressure to increase the size and strength of Costa Rica's security forces in cooperation with American policies against Nicaragua has aroused fears of possible military intervention in politics. External pressures that have undercut constitutional norms and international neutrality, the presence of large numbers of anti-Sandinista rebels, increased paramilitary activity, and increased antileftist propaganda in Costa Rica have all contributed to some erosion of the government's respect for human rights in recent years (*Mesoamerica*, 1987:1; *El Día*, 1987:13; *Miami Herald*, 1985:14A).

El Salvador

Centuries of profound economic inequality and racist exploitation of Indian and mestizo poor by a socioeconomic elite descended from the conquerors have bequeathed densely populated, modern El Salvador severe problems of economic and social inequity. Popular demands for redress of various problems have periodically surfaced, but have been regularly and often violently repressed by the national bourgeoisie and the government. A brief reformist experiment in 1931 was quickly overthrown by the dictatorial General Hernández Martínez. When labor, peasant, and student groups assayed an abortive revolt in 1932, the dictator massacred thirty thousand people, mostly innocent peasants, and thus snuffed out for decades any inclination toward popular participation.

Hernández Martínez ruled tyrannically until the 1940s, when he was replaced by a more modern regime of military officers who ruled through their

own party, fraudulently manipulated elections, and repressed opposition. Economic policies of the 1960s and 1970s led to industrialization and urbanization and the growth of demands for change from labor and middle-class groups. Growing labor and opposition party pressures placed increasing strains on the military regime in the 1970s as an armed insurgency developed. The government of General Carlos Humberto Romero (1977-79) mobilized anti-Communist paramilitary forces and death squads within the armed forces to terrorize the populace out of opposition, but this strategy merely further inflamed and multiplied opponents.

In 1979 reformist military, party, and business elements collaborated in the October 15 coup that toppled Romero; their goal was to bring about reform before the opposition could erupt into rebellion, as had just happened in neighboring Nicaragua. This reformism was strongly supported by the Carter administration, which provided economic assistance and restored military aid to the Salvadoran government. Rightist elements, however, took over the Junta, blocked its reforms, and accelerated repression. This drove moderates off the Junta and unified the opposition—many parties, unions, peasant leagues, and other forces—into a political coalition, the Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR). The FDR joined forces in late 1980 with five Marxist guerrilla groups known as the Farabundo Martí Liberation Front (FMLN) in a revolutionary challenge to the Junta. Armed rebellion gained force rapidly, and rebels had soon captured significant areas of Salvadoran territory that the U.S.-financed but inept armed forces could not recapture.

By 1982 it appeared to an alarmed Reagan administration that continued human rights atrocities by the military and far right endangered the by then extensive U.S. military and economic aid going to El Salvador. Pressure was thus exerted on the Junta to call elections for a constituent assembly. The 1982 campaign for election to that body took place in a climate of extreme human rights violations and intimidation of citizens, parties, and the press. Observers concurred that there were many procedural irregularities (e.g., Baloyra, 1982: 169-75; Herman and Brodhead, 1984:119-34), but some disagreed about whether the count itself was distorted.

The resultant assembly was dominated by parties of the right, which blocked most significant economic reforms proposed for the new constitution. U.S. aid continued to flow to the armed forces in a feverish, and ultimately successful, effort to strengthen the government's military posture. Christian Democrat José Napoleón Duarte won presidential elections held in 1984. These elections,

again conducted under U.S. pressure and with U.S. technical assistance, were reported to have been procedurally better than those of 1982, but the human rights climate remained abysmal, and intimidation of participants, restrictions on the press, and campaigning remained serious problems.

Did a new regime committed to democratic rules, mutual accommodation of major elite elements, and mass participation emerge from the 1982 and 1984 elections? As Baloyra (1982:167-84) and García in his contribution here demonstrate, the answer is no. A very uneasy and unstable government involving the Christian Democrats, radical right, bourgeoisie, and armed forces was arranged with benefit of strong external pressure by the United States. From 1982 to 1984 the radical right, led by the ARENA party, dominated the Assembly; in 1984 the Christian Democrats won the presidency, to the great chagrin of the right. The situation of stalemated mutual tolerance between these highly antagonistic forces developed and persisted under the necessity of helping persuade the U.S. Congress to continue economic support for the government and the military in its struggle against the rebel FMLN-FDR. Most observers believe that this marriage of convenience would fly apart the instant U.S. pressure for continued mutual tolerance among its elements was removed. García, however, in his chapter seems optimistic that a new and potentially stable government can gradually be developed by the Christian Democrats.

In my opinion, however, the challenge of consolidating a regime with mutual elite accommodation among the radical right, the bourgeoisie, the PDC, and the armed factions of right and left is enormous. Moreover, it seems even less likely that all these groups would tolerate popular participation. Economic problems and the 1986 earthquake have apparently eroded the political support for the Christian Democrats and brought a renewal of some labor conflict and other protests. The return to El Salvador of FDR political leaders under the terms of the 1987 Guatemalan peace accord has spawned renewed rightist terror and introduced great new uncertainties into the polity.

Have Salvadoran elections since 1982 contributed to the emergence or reinforcement of a political culture of democracy? It seems extremely unlikely, given the continuous abuse of human rights by public authorities and the inability of the Duarte government to control the armed forces or restore any semblance of the rule of law. Peaceful, legal political participation in the 1960s and 1970s contributed to the mobilization and rebellion of the late 1970s and early 1980s. Frustrated elites and masses turned to confrontational and violent means against a recalcitrant regime, which lashed back with vicious intemper-

ance. Procedurally flawed elections conducted under external pressure have largely failed to address most of the grievances that led to popular mobilization to begin with. If some Salvadorans may have miraculously learned values of democratic fair play in that chaotic and murderous environment, no doubt just as many learned the culture of intimidation and terror, while hundreds of thousands of others fled abroad to escape the political madness of El Salvador.

The overall breadth of political participation in El Salvador is very limited for the bulk of the populace, recent elections notwithstanding. Mobilization of popular demands through unions, peasant leagues, and parties involved a large part of the population in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The use of terror by the state and far right to curtail such demands has had two effects: to convert many of those demanding reforms into revolutionaries collaborating with the FMLN-FDR and to alienate many Salvadorans from participation in politics because of simple fear or disgust at the daily brutality of the nation's politics. Ultimately the civil conflict, in many ways a struggle over who may participate and under what terms, has made participation more narrow and shallow for most Salvadorans. It has also led thousands of others to intensify and deepen their participation by violent means.

Guatemala

Guatemala, the northernmost and most populous Central American state, is roughly half Indian. Guatemala's socioeconomic history has been marked by exploitation of the indigenous populace's labor to benefit the creole and mestizo politico-economic elite. The national political culture early developed profoundly racist traits and a penchant for brutality in the political arena. From Independence into the mid-twentieth century, Guatemala had several long and brutal dictatorships.

In 1944 a movement based in the middle sectors and labor succeeded in toppling the Ubico regime. The 1944-54 "democratic revolution" saw the installation of a constitutionally elected civilian regime, considerable mobilization of working-class and Indian groups into the political arena, and both a broadening and deepening of political participation. But the elected government lacked vital consensual accommodation of many key economic and political actors. When President Jacobo Arbenz's government sought to expand the public sector through agrarian reform that would have redistributed land held by national and foreign owners, the armed forces permitted, and the

Guatemalan bourgeoisie applauded, a CIA-backed revolt by Guatemalan exiles. The 1954 National Liberation Movement (MLN) shattered the democratizing experiment as the new Castillo Armas regime and army moved to curtail the political participation encouraged by the revolution. Thousands of labor, party, and Indian leaders were killed, imprisoned, or driven into exile.

In the late 1950s the armed forces wrested political power away from the MLN and began to rule Guatemala outright. An abortive reformist coup from within the army in 1960 eventually led to the establishment of Guatemala's first Marxist guerrilla insurgency. A fairly elected civilian government from 1966 to 1970 provided a figurehead for rapid escalation of military control over the polity, a violent counterinsurgency program, and intensive use of state terror against perceived "subversives." During the 1970s the armed forces-dominated regime aggressively promoted industrialization and economic growth in collaboration with the national bourgeoisie. During that era "death squads" run by the regime killed thousands of labor unionists, students, development workers, and political party activists. The reign of terror decimated the leadership cadres of most parties and heavily suppressed political participation. Voting in Guatemala's fraudulently manipulated elections dropped to very low levels.

Under the regime of General Romeo Lucas García (1978-82), state terror reached horrific new heights when economic difficulties and the effects of the 1976 earthquake spawned economic unrest and labor mobilization, and reorganized insurgents began to step up their struggle. Younger army officers overthrew Lucas when he manipulated the results of the 1982 presidential election; they installed General Efraín Ríos Montt to begin a process of tightly managed reform. Under Ríos the army conducted a brutal counterinsurgency campaign in the Indian highlands that took tens of thousands of civilian lives but did little damage to the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union (UNRG) insurgent coalition.

Ríos's failure to progress toward return of power to civilians led to his ouster in 1983 by the same younger officers, who replaced him with General Oscar Humberto Mejía Victores. As the Guatemalan economy declined rapidly, and with the example of the Argentine military regime, which was embarrassed by trials for its human rights abuses after the Malvinas war, General Mejía moved to preempt such problems for the Guatemalan armed forces by returning formal power to civilians.

The armed forces conducted relatively clean elections (albeit in a highly

repressive climate) for a constituent assembly that rewrote the constitution. The assembly then convened and held the 1985 national election for congress and the presidency. Observers judged the 1985 election to have been procedurally fair and accurately counted, but conducted in an atmosphere of crushing fear of political repression that badly impeded communication. The Christian Democratic government of Vinicio Cerezo today rules with the advice and counsel of the military, which was exempted from prosecution for its past human rights abuses by the outgoing Mejía government and which retains virtually absolute control over military affairs.

Recent evidence reveals that as of early 1987 in Guatemala City and other major cities parties, unions, private associations, and development workers—once targets of fierce repression—enjoyed considerable latitude for participation, expression of their opinions, and organization.⁸ Politically motivated human rights abuses had declined markedly, but no official human rights organizations had been formed nor had any effort been made to prosecute human rights violators. The massive military presence and control over the population and the counterinsurgency war against the URNG continued in rural areas, severely depressing opportunities for participation.

Has Guatemala "taken the final step to democracy," as the State Department rhapsodized in 1985? Political participation has increased in breadth and range under the new civilian government, but evidence as to its depth, efficacy, and staying power remains to be seen. No lasting consensus on a regime has yet been forged, although there is evidence that key elements of the national capitalist class, some political parties, and some military elements are committed to the civilian representative government for the time being. Labor and peasant organizations are mobilizing rapidly in the freer climate and intend to test the range of their freedom. All observers agree that the tolerance of the armed forces for such participation is the key to the survival of the civilian government. Most Guatemalan political activists and professionals and some business leaders appear to prefer participatory rules and increased political freedom to the three-decade reign of terror, but public experience with and commitment to such rules and participation will likely grow only very slowly, and then only if the civilian government and more open political environment persist.

Jonas's contribution advances one very important interpretation of the Guatemalan situation. She argues that, though driven by deep contradictions in Guatemalan society, the new regime is unlikely to promote true democratiza-

tion and the development of a system that will promote the interests of the majority of Guatemalans. The new civilian government will permit the armed forces and bourgeoisie increased legitimacy and will attract badly needed economic aid. Even President Cerezo does not believe that a new regime has been consolidated; he refers to his own administration as one of "transition." Given the popular expectations and demands for economic reform that appear to be developing in Guatemala today, severe strains could soon be placed on the commitment to civilian government of that pivotal institution in the Guatemalan polity—the armed forces.

There is clearly broader and wider-ranging popular political participation in Guatemala today than there has been in decades. One effect of the 1987 Central American peace accord was a brief dialogue between the URNG and government and to bring some exiled politicians back to the country to chance the new political opening. We may nevertheless not know for many years whether the 1985 election truly contributed to a process of democratization, or merely to a liberalization of the old regime.

Honduras

Honduras has shared several traits with most of its Central American neighbors—high levels of internal conflict, dictatorship, and dependence on export agriculture—conditions aggravated by its weak resource base and generally poor soils. Honduran national elites failed to consolidate and integrate the nation politically and economically to the degree of neighboring states, and Honduras remained the poorest Central American nation even as it developed a flourishing banana industry under foreign ownership in the twentieth century. An ancient feud between liberal and conservative elements was marked by great turbulence in the nineteenth century, followed by Liberal party preeminence between the 1890s and 1932, and then by National party dominion until 1949. The Liberals were resurgent in the 1950s, but in 1956–57 the military stepped in to resolve a political crisis. In 1963 a military coup led by Colonel Oswaldo López Arellano and backed by the National party seized power, intending to stay in control.

Modernization and industrial development characterized the 1960s, raising demands for change among the emergent middle sector. Honduras's disastrous 1969 war with El Salvador aggravated unrest. Although López's early years in power were marked by conservative policies, in the early 1970s he assumed a

developmentalist posture and implemented a number of populist policies, including a sweeping agrarian reform law. The officer corps replaced López with Colonel Juan Melgar Castro in 1975, and then in 1978 replaced Castro with Colonel Policarpo Paz García. Each successive military president was more development oriented and placed less emphasis on social reform and populism. Despite efforts to promote economic development, Honduran economic problems grew, and economic and party leaders became progressively more critical of military rule.

The Nicaraguan Revolution and burgeoning domestic discontent eventually convinced top military leaders to return power to civilians. General Paz convened constituent assembly elections in 1980; while the constitution was being rewritten, a presidential election was held in 1981. Liberal Roberto Suazo Córdoba won that relatively clean and fair election and assumed the presidency in 1982. Liberal José Azcona Hoyo succeeded Suazo after another clean and fair election in 1986.

Had Honduras experienced a regime-consolidating and truly democratizing election in 1981? As Rosenberg points out in his contribution to this work, evidence so far suggests that major political elites still lack commitment to accommodating each other and playing by democratic rules. President Suazo himself provoked a constitutional crisis in 1986 by attempting to impose a successor on his party and the country by manipulating the Congress and electoral system. National party leaders still speak wistfully of the López Arellano military regime and what they remember as days of "real national progress" during the 1970s. National party leaders often seem far more interested in narrow and short-run sectarian advantage than in accommodating each other for the sake of maintaining constitutional processes. In the ultimate irony, the Honduran armed forces and the United States may have kept the constitutional processes from being overturned in the 1986 crisis.

Honduran mass political culture could well be developing increased commitment to electoral and participatory rules under the Honduran civilian regimes of the 1980s, but this would probably also be partly due to the extensive peasant and labor organization present in the country. There can be no doubt that the elections since 1980 have provided renewed opportunities for political participation that had been repressed in the previous decade. However, the period has also seen a marked rise in political terror by public security forces. Although the death toll from political repression in Honduras since 1980 probably numbers only in the low hundreds, in comparison to the

tens of thousands in El Salvador and Guatemala, it could well have had a chilling effect on participation.

Nicaragua

Nicaragua has suffered more civil war and foreign intervention in its affairs than almost any country in the hemisphere. The nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw frequent conflict between the Liberal and Conservative parties, aggravated periodically by outside interference. Though small in population and relatively rich in land and other natural resources, Nicaragua, with its great lake and river system, has always attracted foreign meddling. American filibusterer William Walker exploited Nicaraguan Liberals' desires to take over the Conservative-dominated government and a struggle for control of Vanderbilt's trans-isthmian transit company. He invaded in 1855 and seized control of Nicaragua for himself. His ouster by Central American conservatives in the National War of 1857 established a three-decade period of Conservative party rule.

In the 1890s the Liberals returned to power under the leadership of nationalistic, development-oriented Benjamín Zelaya. When Zelaya sought foreign suitors to build a canal in Nicaragua to compete with the U.S.-owned Panama Canal, the United States in 1909 helped topple Zelaya and install a more cooperative regime. In order to protect its canal monopoly, the United States sent marines into Nicaragua to help the conservatives, who dutifully produced a treaty giving the United States canal rights in Nicaragua. However, the United States then had to keep marines in Nicaragua for most of the next two decades to keep the conservatives in power. When the United States attempted to settle yet another civil war in 1927 by switching sides to the liberals, an anti-intervention resistance movement arose, led by A. C. Sandino. The United States escalated its military presence in Nicaragua and established a National Guard to help fight Sandino, but eventually withdrew in frustration in 1933.

The principal legacy of twenty-four years of U.S. military intervention in Nicaragua was the National Guard, headed by Anastasio Somoza García, who used it to depose the president and rule as a dictator until his assassination in 1956. Control of the National Guard and the government passed to his sons Luis and Anastasio Somoza Debayle, who continued the family dynasty while promoting industrialization and economic growth. Increasing social diversity and political frustration at four decades of dictatorship, combined with

Anastasio Somoza Debayle's heavy-handed repressiveness and corruption, resulted in a destabilized country in the early 1970s. The 1972 Managua earthquake and its aftermath intensified hostility toward the government, which became rapidly more repressive. A growing opposition gradually united and demanded an end to the Somoza dynasty. Most opponents of the regime joined forces with the Marxist-Leninist rebel group the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) as the National Guard made war on Nicaragua's population in 1978 and 1979. In July 1979 the FSLN-led coalition defeated Somoza's guard after a fight that featured, on the rebel side, widespread participation and support by much of the Nicaraguan populace.

The Sandinistas dominated the coalition government, but permitted more moderate groups to organize and participate in ruling. As Sandinista control over the revolutionary government grew in 1979 and 1980, other political groups began to break with and criticize the FSLN so that elite consensus on the regime broke down. The Sandinistas set out to establish in Nicaragua a unique program for a Marxist-Leninist government; rather than full socialism and a single-party regime as in Cuba, they promoted a mixed economy and "political pluralism."⁹ A broad array of programs and services was developed to benefit the poor majority of Nicaraguans. Many of these programs sought public input on policies and required citizen participation in administration, particularly the literacy drive and health and neighborhood security programs. The FSLN also built support for itself by establishing neighborhood, youth, women's, labor, peasant, small farmer, and professional organizations (Walker, 1985). Opposition to Sandinista rule from former allies grew as the FSLN continued to gain political power.

The advent of the Reagan administration led to U.S. efforts to oust the FSLN from power. The United States encouraged former National Guard elements, some Somoza allies, and opposition elements that had broken with the revolutionary government to form a political-military counterrevolutionary ("contra") movement. With overt and covert U.S. aid, the contra movement grew to a peak of about 15,000 rebel troops based in Honduras and Costa Rica. Contra forces conducted guerrilla operations in Nicaragua and sabotaged economic and political targets in hopes of fomenting economic chaos and mobilizing an internal resistance to the revolutionary government. The United States also placed a trade embargo on Nicaragua and conducted an energetic campaign designed to isolate Nicaragua from the West, prevent a negotiated settlement of the war, and cut off trade and aid.

The principal effects of these U.S. policies and the development of the armed opposition to the revolution have been several. Nicaragua has turned increasingly to the Soviet bloc for military and economic assistance and has massively built up its armed forces for a counterinsurgency war and a feared U.S. invasion. It has curtailed civil liberties and restricted press and opposition party freedoms, deferred many social programs, and accelerated agrarian reform to build its political base. In 1984 Nicaragua restored most civil liberties and held a national election under rules that the opposition parties had helped draft. Virtually all observers characterized the election as procedurally fair and free.

The United States sought to prevent the consolidation of a new consensus on a regime by successfully pressuring certain groups to refuse to take part, by denouncing the election as a sham, and by continuing its aid to the contra war. The Sandinista regime won a substantial majority of the vote, but U.S. pressure and the regime's own policies have continued to fan opposition to the revolution. With considerable public and opposition input, the new Nicaraguan National Assembly wrote a constitution (accepted in 1987) that embodies extensive civil liberties and democratic procedural norms. Despite this the government of the victorious FSLN candidate Daniel Ortega Saavedra in 1985 and 1986 restored numerous restrictions on civil liberties, closed the principal opposition newspaper, and continued to defend the revolution militarily.

The contra war presently bars Nicaragua from promoting its own, potentially quite distinctive, model of democracy. The Sandinista Revolution's effort to promote a broader, deeper, and wider range of democracy through mass participation in policymaking and implementation has achieved some notable successes, as Jonas points out in her contribution. As is common in revolution, however, popular mobilization and some regime elements have often been intolerant of and intimidated opposition. The 1984 election created opportunities for participation that had not existed for many decades, and the new constitution promised Nicaraguans a continuation of these opportunities. The suspension of civil liberties because of the war, however, called into doubt the permanence of such participatory opportunities and their potential for nurturing commitment, to electoral rights and procedures. The war, U.S. efforts to disrupt the election and encourage the FSLN's domestic opponents, and the deep ideological differences between the various contending factions in Nicaragua have so far prevented the emergence of a consensus that would permit us to label the 1984 election as democratizing.

Until peace can be achieved, Nicaragua seems unlikely to move forward toward achieving the potential of its participatory goals or establishing a climate of respect for civil liberties. Slow and painful progress toward settlement of the war and restoration of civil liberties began in late 1987 under the terms of the Central American peace accord, but Nicaragua remained far from an emergent consensus on a new regime. Many observers believed that the Central American accord provided at least a framework under which the government, the contras, the Church, and the domestic opposition parties and groups in Nicaragua could begin to negotiate about their differences. As of early 1988, however, despite having commenced indirect negotiations with the contras, the Nicaraguan government remained adamant that it would not fully restore civil liberties until foreign assistance to the contras had been ended.

Conclusions

Although Central America's five major nations now have civilian governments and constitutions providing for representative government, extensive participatory rights, and civil liberties, one must not conclude that democracy has been enthroned in the region. Defining democracy as citizen participation in rule permits one to conclude, however, that recent elections have brought modest increases in the breadth and range of political participation in several countries. This cursory review and the following chapters, however, raise numerous questions about the procedures of recent Central American elections and of their contributions to democratic political culture and the establishment of stable regimes committed to participatory rules of the game.

As a general proposition, the advancement of democracy in Central America is obviously better served by fairly elected civilian governments than by dictatorial military governments. Nevertheless, progress in the 1980s toward fulfilling the specific requisites of effective and lasting systems of democratic rule in Central America—systems potentially vastly different in structure and style—has been uneven and halting.

The Central American peace accords signed on 7 August 1987 at Esquipulas, Guatemala, required that all the Central American countries negotiate with armed rebels who will accept amnesty and undertake a dialogue with domestic opponents, fully restore civil liberties, and hold democratic elections

for a Central American Parliament by mid-1988. The Esquipulas accord thus created both internal and international pressures upon the Central American governments to take steps that could move each nation toward greater democracy. The construction of both peace and more democracy in Central America remained highly complex processes, however, each beset by powerful enemies both within and outside Central America.

Notes

1. Pateman (1970) notes that "classical" democratic theory is a somewhat inaccurate designation because the theorists she includes in the category span three millennia from Aristotle to J. S. Mill. I am using the term classical very loosely here, as did she, for the sake of convenience.

2. This provision notwithstanding, almost all democratic models exclude from participation persons incapacitated by youth, lunacy, or criminality.

3. See also Rosenber (1985:23-33).

4. I am using this term as Paul Drake and Eduardo Silva do in "Introduction: Elections and Democratization in Latin America, 1980-1985," (1986:2-3) rather than as Peiras (1986:1-15) and Rabine (1986:59-64) do. The latter approach suggests that the election of civilian regimes in Latin America can mean nothing more than a more effective mechanism by which an old regime continues to exploit the poor and block popular democracy. I would argue that if such occurred, no true "democratization" as intended here would have taken place.

5. Note that not all democratic theories would weight votes equally. J. S. Mill, for instance, preferred a system of unequal votes based on political knowledge and experience. Pluralist-elitists celebrate elite dominance of most choices because of distrust for the mass public's capabilities. The U.S. Constitution gave electors, not citizens, the right to elect the president; state legislators chose U.S. senators; and the principle of "one-person, one-vote" was violated by giving the votes of senators from small states a weight equal to that of senators from more populous states.

6. See Seligson and Gómez chapter in this volume. Also see Carvahal Herrera (1978) and Booth and Seligson (1984).

7. See also Carvahal Herrera (1978).

8. I participated in an observer mission to Guatemala in April-May of 1987, sponsored by the Washington Office on Latin America and the International Human Rights Law Group, to examine political conditions after the election. The team interviewed dozens of party, human rights, and labor activists, as well as social workers, lawyers, and government officials. See also Booth et al. (1985) and Carliner et al. (1988).

9. Their model has most of the traits of Macpherson's "underdeveloped variant" of democracy: a heavy emphasis on popular participation and distributive justice issues (Macpherson, 1966:23-34).

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MANUEL ANTONIO GARRETÓN

Problems of democracy in Latin America: on the processes of transition and consolidation

This article attempts to develop a basic theoretical framework for the study of both the general question of democracy in Latin America and the current process of transition from authoritarian or military régimes to democratic ones. The emphasis is on the clarification and definition of an analytical perspective rather than on the theoretical argument underlying it. Hence the rather schematic character of what follows.'

THE QUESTION OF DEMOCRACY AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE

The importance that the question of democracy has assumed throughout all of Latin America in the past decade shows that

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The countries with which I am mainly concerned in this article are those which lived under a specific type of military dictatorship in the 1960s and 1970s: Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile. There is an abundant literature on these régimes: see, for example, David Collier, ed., *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1979). On the theme of democracy, see the periodicals *Revista Crítica y Utopía* (Buenos Aires) or *Pensamiento Iberoamericano* (Madrid). On the question of transition from dictatorship to democracy, see Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule* (Baltimore MD: Johns Hopkins University Press 1986). I have found Alain Touraine's works on Latin America, including *Actores sociales y sistemas políticos en América Latina* (Santiago: PREALC 1987) and some unpublished chapters, very useful.

it is not a passing phenomenon; on the contrary, we are witnessing a historic cultural change of profound significance.

The decades of the 1950s and 1960s were generally characterized by an emphasis on development and modernization. In that context, transition meant the evolution from a 'dual' society that was half modern and half traditional towards a society which might be variously described as modern, advanced, developed, or industrialized, bearing in mind that the meaning of each of those terms can vary significantly. Beginning in the 1960s, the theme of development began to be accompanied or replaced by the theme of revolution or fundamental structural change, and in that context transition meant the movement from capitalism to socialism. Both themes possessed their own analyses of the existing situation and their own theoretical concepts and structures. Both brought to the fore certain social actors which were thought of as embodying or directing their respective processes. Each case offered its own comprehensive design for social change. In the first case, though it was not made explicit, the model was Western capitalist society; in the second it was one of the variants of socialist society. In such far-reaching visions of societal transformation, ethical principles and future utopias co-exist with more concrete strategic and programmatic proposals. What is highly significant for our discussion, however, is that in both cases – development or modernization and revolution or the transition to socialism – the question of political régime appeared to be a subordinate concern, as if it were merely a reflection of the deeper societal transformation.

The question of political democracy undoubtedly flows from these two themes, as we shall see, but it is also significantly different from them. First of all, the question of the political régime – that is, the institutional nexus between state and society – is now given pre-eminence. This means the abandonment of overly deterministic structural laws that purport to account for the evolution of a society and their replacement with the less predictable and more fluid elements of politics, political creativity,

and collective action. In addition, the abandonment of such comprehensive societal designs leads to a conception of society as a field in which diverse interests battle with one another and in which there is no single directing social actor but a variety of social actors interacting with each other.

The term *political democracy*, or *democracy* pure and simple, is used in this article to describe a type of political régime and not a type of society. A political régime is designed to resolve the problem that every society faces, namely, the institutional relations between the state and its subjects. More specifically, it deals with how society is represented, how it is governed, and what types of relationships are to exist between the people and the state, that is, the definition of citizenship. Democracy is one kind of political régime, and it seeks to resolve these problems through certain specific features such as the enforcement of the rule of law which guarantees public liberties, the division of the powers of the state, and the principles of popular sovereignty, universal suffrage, competitive elections, alternation of power, and political pluralism.

In the Latin American historical experience, however, the question of political democracy is more ambiguous because it is contaminated by the question of *democratization*. Democratization may be defined as increasing social participation and the equalization of opportunities and benefits. The concept of democratization is used in two senses. On the one hand, it refers to what has been called 'fundamental democratization,' that is, the integration of the people into collective life through what can be termed 'social citizenship' (as opposed to political citizenship) or access to the social benefits of a modern welfare state. On the other hand, democratization also refers to organized participation in the decisions that affect collective life, leading in the end to self-determination or self-government. Both senses of democratization embody an implication of far-reaching structural and social change.

It is useful to point out, at this stage, the difference between the concept of *democratization* and that of *political transition*, or

simply *transition*. While the former is a process of deep social change leading towards what could be called a 'democratic society,' the latter is only a change of régime, a shift from one type of régime to another which need not be accompanied by any substantive social changes. In this article we are discussing the transition from a dictatorship or military régime to a democratic régime, which has been common in Latin America during the past decade; the broader problems of democratization are not our concern. Thus, transition in this context refers to a movement towards political democracy or a democratic régime and not necessarily towards a 'democratic society.' These two kinds of transition may or may not coincide, depending on historical circumstances, but their relationship should not be taken to be either structural or causal.

Thus, despite the current importance of the question of political democracy in Latin America and the present priority being placed on the political dimension of these societies, it must not be forgotten that the question of democratization in these countries remains in the background. The ideal of democracy in this region is permeated by the question of democratization at every level, and it is only with difficulty that the two could be disentangled.

Even though democracy is only a form of political régime and does not claim to resolve all of a society's problems or provide an all-encompassing vision of society and even though it is by no means an ineluctable historical necessity – which leads some to suggest that it is more often than not 'a second priority' – the establishment and development of democracy always rests on a specific ethical foundation and arises in certain conducive social conditions. Both the basic ethical principles and the social conditions that favour democracy vary from society to society and from one historical period to another. Yet it can be said that in the Latin American countries democratization is at once the ethical principle and one condition for the development of political democracy although, as we shall see later, the two must be clearly distinguished. In these countries, political democracy

escapes 'post-modern' disenchantment, and it is always beset by questions about its 'meaning' and its content which transcend the classical definition of it.

The mutual contamination of democratization and democracy has its roots not only in the intellectual evolution to which we have referred but also in the complex historical relationship between the two processes. In a way, the recognition that political democracy is a legitimate objective in itself has emerged from a long and slow process of collective learning in which this type of régime came to be understood as the condition or framework within which democratization can flourish.

The experience of the dictatorial military régimes of the last two decades has been decisive – at least for the countries of the Southern Cone – in bringing about a reconsideration of the problems of the political régime and in particular the recognition of democracy as a primary objective of historical struggle. It was in also in response to these régimes that the dual process of contamination and differentiation of the problems of democracy and democratization came to be acknowledged.

Without analysing these military régimes in depth – something which I have done elsewhere² – it is useful to recall that these coups d'état (beginning with Brazil in 1964, continuing with Argentina in 1966, Chile and Uruguay in 1973, and Argentina again in 1976) were, in varying degrees, generated by political crises characterized to some extent by popular activation and mobilization. The popular sectors of society were confronted, in turn, by the dominant sectors of society and by the armed forces acting as an institution. The dominant sectors succeeded in drawing the middle sectors of society into their camp by persuading them that the crisis was a terminal one and that their continued existence was also definitively threatened. Moreover, along with this essentially reactive response to crisis – the military coup – the opportunity arose for the dominant

² *El proceso político chileno* (Santiago: EL CASO 1983) and *Dictadura y democratización* (Santiago: EL CASO 1984).

sectors to join with the military sector to resolve the prolonged crisis of leadership that had characterized Latin America since the collapse of the 'oligarchic state' and which had persisted throughout the entire period of the 'compromise state.'³ Reacting as they did against the previous society and to a particular crisis, these military régimes also provided the opportunity for the 're-foundation' of national capitalism, its re-entry into the world economy, and the creation of a new social order which could be embodied in a long-lasting authoritarian political model.

The military régimes failed on both counts. They were not able to create a new economic order accompanied by a new social structure and a new political institutional order. Nor were they able to resolve their societies' most pressing problems – indeed, they made them graver and more acute. However, this does not mean that there were no changes in these societies or that they have simply regressed.⁴ In fact – and this is perhaps a key concept – these régimes possessed a certain capacity to dislocate the previous structure of society. What these military régimes achieved was not the annulment or replacement of the previous socio-economic and political order, but its fragmentation. In some cases, partial modernization occurred which allowed one segment of society to participate in the contemporary capitalist world in a meaningful way. In these instances, however, this very modernization was accompanied by the increasing marginalization of most of the rest of the society. Political democracy must thus confront the challenge of bringing about democratization in the face of a perverse and exclusionary modernizing process. In other countries the social transformations that occurred led in a sense to a shrinking of society

³ The 'compromise state' succeeded the oligarchic state and in various ways drew diverse social actors together in a compromise centred around the issue of industrialization. Some sectors of society were excluded from this arrangement and in these régimes no one sector was able to attain the clear hegemony that had occurred in the oligarchic period. See J. Graciarana and R. Franco, *Formas sociales y estructuras de poder en América Latina* (Madrid: C.I.S. 1981).

⁴ M.A. Garretón, 'The failure of the dictatorships in the Southern Cone,' *Telos* 68 (summer 1986), 71-8.

as seen in the decreasing role of the state as an agent of social welfare and the emergence of a sort of savage capitalism which destroyed old social relations without creating new ones in their place and in which the actors tended to be the same although their capacity to organize and exert pressure was greatly reduced and weakened. In these situations, the challenge that political democracy must confront is that of national reconstruction. In both cases, political democracy and democratization meet once again; as we shall see, the former is the fundamental task in the process of transition while the latter comes to the forefront during the consolidation of the democratic régime.

Thus the current concept of democracy in Latin America is coloured by the experience with the military régimes and is opposed to the repression and the re-creation of the capitalist order which were typical of them. This means that in the struggle against the military régime, in the changes that are brought about, and in the minds of the actors who carry out those changes, there are two distinct processes at work. The first is the transformation of society, the creation of a new social order which is designed to end exploitation and oppression and to bring about greater equality and the participation of greater numbers of people in the collective life of the society. This is what we have defined as global democratization. The second process is the limited or restricted one relating solely to the political régime, the passage from a dictatorship to a democratic régime as previously defined. In the recent termination of military dictatorships, these two processes have been dissociated in time: political transitions or changes of régime are occurring but the question of democratization has been left pending in the belief that that is a task to be undertaken once the democratic régime is in place. Nevertheless, not all struggles against military régimes or dictatorships can be explained from the perspective of a political transition or the building of political democracy. Many of these struggles are simply reactions of self-defence or self-affirmation; others are revolutionary in character; still others

reflect a drive for broad democratization. These various dimensions are reflected in the diversity of the opposition to these dictatorships depending on which dimension is emphasized by the social or political actors involved.

In the past decade political democracy has been particularly important in providing a unifying principle for these very heterogeneous struggles against dictatorship, especially during the moments of crisis in the military régimes. This would seem to imply that in the consciousness and practice of the actors, this dimension of the struggle is given priority. Otherwise the processes of transition would be delayed or paralysed.

In summary, the historical experience of democratization, the problems of development and revolution in previous decades, and the recent experience with military dictatorships have led the democratic ideal to be associated in these countries with three objectives. The first is the creation of proper political institutions (state, régimes, parties, and so on) which resolve the questions of government, citizenship, and representation. The second is the re-creation of a civil society in which a variety of autonomous social actors participate. The third is the formulation of a model of development which differs from those of the military régimes or their predecessors and which will therefore require substantive structural changes in society. All these goals are always associated with democracy and sought by the various actors in various ways, but the termination of the military régimes and the process of transition which follows require that priority be given to the first of these objectives. Political democracy appears to be a historical precondition for the pursuit of the other two goals which must therefore remain subordinate to it in the first instance; unfortunately that creates enormous future problems for the new democracy.

This takes us, then, first to the question of transition and later to the question of consolidation.

THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY

Political transition is the process of régime change, in this particular instance the change from a military dictatorial régime

to a democratic régime.⁵ As I have argued elsewhere,⁶ the concept of transition carries with it a certain ambiguity because although the point of departure is known (a military régime or dictatorship or authoritarian régime), the point of arrival is not historically pre-ordained. The outcome of any transition is uncertain, and to attribute a particular outcome or meaning to it when it is still unfolding may lead to a complete misunderstanding of the significance of the process. For the end of a dictatorship or military régime can lead not only to a democratic régime but to other types of régime as well.

Moreover, when we talk of political democratization or the return to political democratization, that is, of a transition from dictatorship to democratic régime, it is sometimes difficult to determine empirically when the transition begins and ends. In general, then, officially prescribed deadlines and mechanisms should not necessarily define what constitutes a true process of transition. It is better to view a transition simply as the phase which extends from terminal crisis of the military régime until the first democratic elections are held, even though some aspects of political democratization may remain to be completed.

A distinction also needs to be made between the process of transition which ends when democracy is inaugurated and the process of consolidation of the new régime. These two processes have distinctive problems and dynamics and often involve different actors who may be supportive of the one process but not of the other. While it is true that the problems of consolidation may well be in the actors' minds, it is also a fact that if a transition is to unfold and develop properly, these problems of consolidation must be kept in the background in the short term.

Finally, a transition defined as a change of political régime is clearly different from that of a revolution defined as a 'seizure of power'; nor does such a change necessarily coincide with the overthrow of an *ancien régime* and the building of a new social order by those who have seized power. In complex societies

⁵ See O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, eds. *Transitions*, especially 'Tentative conclusions about uncertain democracies,' by O'Donnell and Schmitter.

⁶ Gavett, *El proceso político cubano*, chap. 2.

with strong and cohesive modern armies and large and diverse middle classes, however, the likelihood of a revolution is significantly diminished.

Transitions can unfold in various ways. They can originate 'from above,' either as the result of an initiative by a régime which considers its task to be successfully completed or as the result of a crisis within the leadership. They can originate 'from below' through the actions of an opposition which may be either insurrectional or purely political. Or they can be precipitated by factors 'external' to both the régime and the opposition – a war, a death, foreign pressure, or a third-party intercession between the régime and the opposition. In truth, transitions have historically tended to combine all three elements, although one is usually more important than the others.

One factor which is crucial in the study of a transition is whether the end of the military régime or dictatorship is provoked by a collapse or military defeat arising from national or international developments or is in some way administered by the military holders of power. In the first situation there is no decision to retreat or depart on the part of those in power; on the contrary, they are expelled or eliminated. With armed forces such as those which installed the military régimes in the states of the Southern Cone, the likelihood of collapse, military defeat, or overthrow is low, save for an incident such as the Falklands/Malvinas affair which involves war with an external power. In the second situation, in which the régime could be said to suffer a political defeat, the transition is a strictly political one. If the holders of power in such cases are the armed forces, there is an institutional decision to retreat or withdraw. Strictly speaking, there is no overthrow, but the decision to withdraw from power is not a voluntary one; on the contrary, it is usually forced upon the régime by society at large, by the opposition, or by other types of pressure. Such an institutional decision presupposes a perception of isolation from society, the implicit acknowledgment of a failure (due to an external war, an economic crisis, or an inability to govern), or the perception of a threat to the institution's integrity were the armed forces to cling to

power. Thus, in this type of transition, which tends to be the dominant one among the recent military régimes in Latin America and which differs from the classical insurrectional model, there is no institutional vacuum and the opposition's problem is how to provoke the armed forces to take the decision to retire by co-ordinating the mobilization of the various elements of society with the pressures that are being exerted from outside.

In the transition from military dictatorial régimes to democratic ones, such as those in the countries of the Southern Cone, there are two converging dynamics. The first is the internal crisis or disintegration of the régime which is often linked to problems with succession or institutionalization. The second is the reaction or mobilization of society, especially the middle class and the popular sectors, against the régime. This mass mobilization, which has been called the 'resurrection of civil society,'⁷ is facilitated in these cases by the relatively strong consensus that democracy is the only solution to the crisis because other non-democratic alternatives are seen to lack legitimacy.

These two convergent dynamics can unfold into four processes: one relating to the régime, a second to the opposition or to society as a whole, and the remaining two to the relation between the régime and the opposition. Together they constitute the basic components of this type of transition. These four components are the internal disintegration of the régime or the isolation of the governing élite from its internal and external supporters; the mobilization of society against the régime; the negotiations between the titular holders of power and the opposition; and the mediating role of institutions or third parties. The successful co-ordination of these four components of a transition is the main task of the opposition.

Internal crisis and popular mobilization

The type of political transition we are describing begins with an internal crisis or disintegration within the incumbent régime which is often associated with the question of institutionalizing

⁷ O'Donnell and Schmitter, 'Tentative conclusions.'

the dictatorship or with issues of succession. This development is characterized by the disengagement of those sectors of society which had hitherto supported the régime and by the consequent growing isolation of the governing élite. In the case of military régimes this leads, as we have noted, to a rational calculation by the armed forces about the preservation of their institutional integrity. This problem is more complex if the military régime is fused with a personal dictatorship.

This growing isolation of the governing nucleus is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the transition. It involves a loss of support both from the domestic civilian sectors which had originally supported the military régime and from external actors. The loss of their civilian support is directly related to the latter's ability to overcome the traumatic memories of the crisis which brought the military to power in the first instance, to its perception that an opportunity to further its own interests will become available under a new régime, and to the linkage of economic and political class interests. The military régime also loses the support of external actors, specifically American ones. United States support for the dictatorships – based though it may be on long-run geopolitical considerations – tends to diminish once the high visibility of the crimes committed by the dictatorship makes it difficult to continue to lend support, once the situation is perceived to be threatening to divide the armed forces of the country under scrutiny, and once a legitimate alternative leadership or institutional order begins to emerge.

In the movement towards a transition, the internal disintegration of the régime both affects and is affected by the process of popular mobilization, which I have described elsewhere as the 'invisible transition.'⁸

In any discussion of the social mobilization under a military régime or during a transition in Latin America, two particular points must be kept in mind. On the one hand, the various types of mobilization must be clearly distinguished, while

keeping in mind that each one has a specific role to play and that favouring one over the others can delay the transition, particularly if a specific type of mobilization should come to be identified with a specific socio-political actor. Thus, one can identify an 'expressive-symbolic' type of mobilization – generally defensive and communitarian in character – which seeks to affirm identity and express rebelliousness and which is imbued with a strong ethical and emotional content. There is, as well, a type of instrumental-revindicative mobilization oriented towards specific objectives – whether sectoral or political – which will improve the economic, social, or political condition of an actor. This type of mobilization depends for its success largely on the institutional framework and on the autonomy and organizational capacity of the actor concerned. There is, finally, what I would call a proper political mobilization whose goals and methods of action are tied to the termination and replacement of the military régime. It is important to note that not just any kind of mobilization at any time will lead to a successful political transition. One of the greatest problems which any opposition faces is to bind these three types of mobilization together in such a way as to overcome the centrifugal tendency of any movement to break down into its constituent parts, to prevent the fragmentation which allows its demands to be co-opted by the régime, and to avoid the excessive politicization which reduces the breadth of the movement's appeal.

The second point to keep in mind about social mobilization in this type of political transition is that it cannot bring an end to the military régime on its own. It is an indispensable component of an opposition's strategy but it is not, properly speaking, a strategy. If this social mobilization is not channelled towards a concrete institutional alternative, the opposition may not be able to control it and its actions may reinforce the 'bunker' mentality of the régime. Thus, a situation of ungovernability provoked by social mobilization may lead to the end of one régime and the beginning of another if a link has already been forged between the social and political forces, but if that has

⁸ Gavvetow, *El proceso político chileno*, Chap. 2.

not occurred such a situation may well lead only to the entrenchment of the military régime.

Negotiation and mediation

If there is no evident collapse or military defeat of the incumbent régime, any process of transition will require an element of negotiation or concertation between the holders of power and the opposition (or some parts of it). The nature (explicit or implicit) of that negotiation will vary according to historical circumstances. It is however important to emphasize once again the indissoluble relationship between mobilization and negotiation which requires that the dynamics of the two be regulated so that they work in harmony rather than in contradiction.

The two central problems in the negotiation of a transition are who negotiates and what is to be negotiated. In the case of the Latin American countries with which we are concerned, the real negotiators are the holders of power – the armed forces as an institution – and the significant forces in the opposition. I say 'real' because it is possible that there may be formal negotiators who represent the armed forces. This tends to occur when the military does not wish to negotiate with some sectors of the opposition or when a section of the opposition abstains from the negotiation for reasons of principle. At any rate, the closer the link between the real and the formal negotiators, the more viable an agreement on the transition is likely to be. Moreover, independently of who is sitting around the negotiating table or who is implicitly involved in the negotiation, the demands and interests of all relevant social or political forces (present or not) must be taken into account in the negotiation.

Concerning the question of what is to be negotiated, the agreement on transition must be centred on the terms of the transition. There are three crucial issues. First, an institutional framework for political democratization must be worked out, involving an agreement on a timetable and on the mechanisms for democratic elections and the future constitutional order

of the country. Second, agreement must be reached on the re-subordination of the armed forces to civilian political control. Third, the inclusiveness of participation of all political sectors in the new democratic system must be settled. The dominant sectors in society normally press for some guarantee that the current economic model will remain and that they will retain a dominant position in any future political system. The opposition seeks the satisfaction of a multiplicity of demands and aspirations that have been postponed or repressed under the military régime and a commitment to a profound social transformation. The armed forces are guided principally by a desire to preserve their interests and institutional privileges and, above all, to avoid any retroactive judgment on their actions while in power. The more the negotiation is burdened by issues beyond the three crucial ones cited above, the more the transition is delayed and the more restricted becomes the autonomy of the popular and opposition sectors which are already negotiating from a subordinate position. This can lead to formal agreements that will be abandoned once the immediate transition has occurred – on the ground of the new democratic legitimacy. This confirms the basic distinction we have made between the processes of transition and consolidation.

Finally, the confrontation between the military régime and the opposition beyond the immediate crisis will not be resolved in a political transition unless there are independent actors (for example, the king of Spain, a foreign government, the Church) who are able to exert pressure for such a far-reaching agreement and unless institutional settings (plebiscites, elections, constitutional reforms) are established through which that conflict can be mediated. One of the immediate objectives of any opposition, therefore, is to create such settings for the resolution of this conflict between régime and opposition by the use of both political mobilization and available third parties.

Dependent countries are always subject to external pressures and influences. It is therefore useful to note some of the

effects of such external influences on political transitions. The main criterion in assessing them is to judge the extent to which they strengthen the autonomy and capacity for self-determination of the country concerned. These influences are most useful if they can be linked both to internal factors and to multilateral actions which can minimize the interventionist weight of any state whose relation of power with the country under scrutiny is overly asymmetric. The principle that should guide those exercising such influence, inevitable as such pressures are in the contemporary world, is the degree of support they provide to the internal actors and forces seeking an autonomous determination of the national will. It is this principle, for example, which underlies the common acceptance today of external pressure in support of basic human rights, regardless of a country's political régime. An external influence is generally accepted as legitimate if it respects and supports the internal dynamics which favour the emergence or strengthening of régimes founded upon a respect for human rights and for the national will as expressed in collectively defined values and institutions (regardless of ideology).

Historical experience shows that external influences and pressures more often than not have ambiguous effects which were not always anticipated by their promoters. For example, symbolic acts of punishment, censorship, or isolation which the international community believes it is necessary to impose on dictatorial régimes at certain times may in fact strengthen those régimes and allow them to remain in power. Thus, the ethical, political, and psychological reasons for these types of actions must be tempered by an awareness that perverse outcomes may occur.

At the same time, it is important to distinguish between the actions of external actors whose purpose is to denounce and end violations of human rights from those which aim to bring about a more profound change in the status of the dictatorial régime. Actions on behalf of human rights can lead to the

amelioration of some very grave situations and contribute to the actual survival of persons, groups, and social actors. However, more often than not the changes accepted by the military régime or dictatorship are only tactical shifts, an adaptation to changing circumstances which allows the régime to survive or to wait for a time when it will be possible to restore things to the way they were.

This is a dilemma from which it is difficult, if not impossible, to escape. It makes it necessary to consider the use of external influence, within the parameters previously indicated, in bringing about a change of régime. Whether or not this is possible will depend on the internal situation of the dictatorship, but in any case such external influence, if it is to be successful, must be linked to some aspect of the domestic situation, to some current or potential action which is supported by the internal actors. It should be pointed out that to the extent that the actions of external forces have an instrumental and not a solely symbolic character, they may require a symbolic price. Sometimes actions which merely negate or ignore the incumbent régime may not be the best way to influence or eliminate it, and external forces may find it necessary to grant some degree of recognition to the régime whose conduct they are trying to influence. This complex balance between the symbolic and the instrumental, between mere denunciation or isolation of a régime and the potential to influence it, cannot be resolved in the abstract; each instance must be judged according to historical circumstances. If isolation or denunciation is not to produce the opposite effect to that intended, it must take place in the context of a situation which appears likely to allow change to occur and which has been created and promoted by internal democratic forces.

THE CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY

The transition to democracy does not solve the many deep-seated and long-standing problems of a society, although it may provide the framework and conditions for their resolution.

The new democratic régime inherits an enormous crisis which goes far beyond the purely economic to the overall organization of society. As well as the problems arising from the past, it also faces a large number of completely new problems which almost all contemporary societies now confront.⁹ The one positive factor is the general recognition within society that political democracy should not be subordinated to economic success. Nonetheless it is in an atmosphere of continuing crisis that political democracies, once established, face the question of consolidation.

The consolidation of a democratic régime presents an important analytical difficulty.¹⁰ It is not easy to determine when a democracy has been consolidated. There is general rule about this. It is not sufficient that the imminent risk of a new coup d'état be absent, for the problem of which conditions will promote the stability of the democracy remains. Indeed, the theories put forward about the conditions for democratic stability suffer from an enormous weakness because they rely on a single explanation which is held to be valid for all situations. In fact, the great diversity of historical situations makes it clear that there is no such unique explanation; on the contrary, what can be deduced about one case is contradicted by the evidence in other cases.

How then should one approach the problem of democratic consolidation, particularly in countries which have recently moved beyond a dictatorial régime? Without attempting to develop a general theory, it may nonetheless be possible to develop a general framework of analysis for the specific group of nations with which we are concerned, based on the knowledge that all were governed by a similar type of authoritarian régime. Such an analysis can be approached from three perspectives. First of

⁹ Carreton, 'The failure of dictatorships in the Southern Cone.'

¹⁰ On this, see a preliminary work by Guillermo O'Donnell, 'Notes for the study of democratic consolidation in contemporary Latin America' (mimeo, December 1985).

all, what were the conditions which permitted or prevented the existence of stable democratic régimes in these countries in the past? Second, what caused the crises which overturned these earlier democratic régimes? And, third, what were the dynamics underlying the social and political transformations which occurred under the military régimes and what brought about their demise?

Approaching the consolidation and stability of democratic régimes from these three perspectives – and limiting our analysis to the purely political realm – it is possible to tie this objective to three factors: the development model, the relationship between the state and civil society, and the party system. It should be noted, however, that all three factors may not be necessary; one may suffice or a combination of two or more. None is, by definition, indispensable.

The first factor is the old theme of which structural conditions or which model of development is compatible with a régime of political democracy. The conditions inherited from the previous authoritarian régime and the position of these economies – already in a state of crisis – in the international economy make it unlikely that the new régime can promise a great economic performance which might thus provide the necessary stability. Indeed, it is likely that these democracies may have to subsist in the midst of prolonged crisis, without the prospect of economic growth and with little redistribution of increasing wealth. In consequence the other two factors may become relatively more important. At any rate, the key element may be not so much structural conditions or a successful model of development as evidence of a progressive equalization of the costs of the crisis. And this should be mediated by the other two factors that we will discuss.

The second factor to which the consolidation of a stable democratic régime appears linked is the relationship between the state, the political system, and the civil society. This relationship differs both from the one which the military régime

established and from the one which was in place at the time the military régime came to power. Democracy is tied not so much to a specific economic model of development as to the autonomy and full development of these three levels: to the capacity of the state for action, to the capacity of the party system to provide effective representation, and to the constitution of autonomous social actors such that their strength and autonomy is effectively expressed to the state through the party system. This participation implies the existence of distinct spheres of power at the level of local and intermediate institutions. Thus the issue would seem to be how to overcome the populist tendency to blend all three levels (national, intermediate, and local), the class-oriented view which polarizes the political system, and the matrix in which the partisan political level and the social actors overlap, making social actors dependent on the party system – all problems which occur in some of the societies under examination.

The third factor, which appears to be crucial once economic determinism has been abandoned, is the organization of the party system. Here, there are three interrelated elements. The first is the degree to which the whole political spectrum of the nation is included, so that no political or ideological group which possesses support within the society feels excluded from political life. This means that the political system must offer a place to both the political right and the 'orthodox' left. The second is the legitimacy and priority given to political democracy by the élites of every party, which must not be related to a particular performance or result. The third is construction of political majorities, composed basically of those key sectors whose confrontations in the past led to polarization of the system and internal crisis and allowed the armed forces to take power. Ideally, such a political majority should be capable of combining political democracy and democratization as that appears to be the only possible way of ensuring that the military actors remain subordinate to the political power.

These factors of consolidation suggest a hypothesis – which is still not certain – that the political democracy blossoming in Latin America today is no longer simply part of the traditional cycle of authoritarianism and democracy, but instead represents a new phase in the political history of these countries.¹¹

11 An extensive discussion of this issue appears in Alain Touraine's *La parole et le sang: politique et société en Amérique latine* (Paris: Editions Odile Jacob, 1988).

he worked as a civil servant from 1927 on. This explains where the nickname originated.

2. By 1946, Somoza was owner of forty-six coffee plantations and fifty-one cattle ranches (both breeding and fattening for market), all of them geared to exports.

3. The anti-Somoza demonstrations provoked state intervention in, and eventually the closing down of, the National University, as well as the Conservative newspaper *La Prensa*. Those actions were timely evidence of the National Guard's capacity for repression. Conservative merchants, industrialists, and farmers ceased all of their activities, calling for Somoza's resignation. These were perhaps the forerunners of company work stoppages—also directed by the Conservative bourgeoisie—in 1978, after the assassination of Pedro Joaquín Chamorro.

4. According to some analysts, Luis Somoza—an engineer—was converted into the "political animal" within the family's division of labor. He rose to become deputy and soon thereafter, by the age of thirty, had been elected president of the Chamber of Deputies—while his father held the same position in the executive branch.

5. Anastasio Junior began his studies at the age of eleven at the Military Academy of La Salle in the United States before moving on to West Point. At twenty-one he was granted the rank of major and named inspector general of the army; at twenty-three—by then a colonel—he became director of the Military Academy of Nicaragua; at thirty-two he was appointed commander-in-chief of the National Guard. It should be noted that the career trajectory of Anastasio III was even more rapid, though interrupted definitively by the FSLN.

6. Jaime Wheelock Román, *Imperialismo y Dictadura: crisis de una formación social* (Editorial Siglo Veintiuno, Mexico City, 1978), p. 82.

7. In 1972, cotton amounted to 25 percent of total Nicaraguan exports; meat, 15 percent; and coffee, only 13 percent. See *Informe Banco Central*, 1972.

8. One might recall, as an example, that Somoza III's rise to become director of the Military Academy broke all the rules of army promotion, bypassing the authority, prestige, and seniority of twelve generals. How does one explain that Anastasio III, *El Chigüín* (the little kid), at the age of twenty-seven was a major in the National Guard, with two generals as his assistants? Hundreds of examples of this strange military loyalty could be recounted, and it is within such a framework that the National Guard's enduring loyalty to "the chief" must be examined.

9. Heinz Sonntag, "Hacia una Teoría del Capitalismo Periférico," in *El Estado en el capitalismo contemporáneo* (Editorial Siglo Veintiuno, Mexico City, 1977), p. 67.

REPRESSION AND RESISTANCE: THE STRUGGLE

FOR DEMOCRACY IN CENTRAL AMERICA

ROSELBERTO TORRES-RIVAS (LONDON:
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6

The Possible Democracy

Introduction

These reflections originated in the new course of political evolution recently under way in the various societies of Central America, for an urgent desire to establish electoral systems has appeared there. That urgency has arisen not so much from an extensive popular demand for substantive democracy as from the need to legalize the leadership role of new authorities in place of ossified political regimes.

An entire set of phenomena—each connected in one way or another with the causes and development of the regional political crisis—has made the problem of democracy the primary subject of both theoretical debate and civic practice. The particular development of the Nicaraguan revolution is at the center of that debate, with highly polarized forces producing contradictory definitions of that process.

There is a paradoxical coincidence in this concern of both warring factions for the trappings of democracy. It is a deceiving coincidence because, on the one hand, among conservative and counterinsurgency strategies, there exists an interest in a simple identification of democracy with elections; whereas, on the other hand, among some ultra-left-wing sectors, a neglect of electoral practice has revealed a lack of comprehension.

Throughout their struggles and in all of their programs, popular forces have always demanded the establishment of democratic forms of government. For their part, the bourgeois groups—who have never practiced democracy—nevertheless continue preaching it in programmatic fashion.

There once existed, in one of many evagellc visions of Marxism, the belief that democracy is bourgeois because the bourgeoisie depends on a democratic constituency. That fallacy must be discarded. At the same time, it must be recognized that the starting point of any analysis on

the subject of democracy is to consider it as a historical process. That democratic process evolves in order to establish some form of consensus between those who constitute the majority—occupying a subordinate position in society—and that minority that exercises leadership functions. I will therefore begin these reflections on Central America by recognizing that the democratization processes of any society are historical processes. In other words, social struggles to attain democracy can only be understood within their historical context.

No universal model of political democracy has ever existed. There have only been democratic experiences, which have occurred throughout history. What must be referred to as a predecessor to current political culture is bourgeois democracy, which has also been labeled "liberal" democracy. Both epithets refer to a specific historical period: that marked by the evolution of Western bourgeois society, the confirmation of the capitalist economy, and the predominance of a secular global vision.

In the context of its historical development, liberal democracy was able to appear only in the last phase of the contemporary period. That is, democracy emerged once the modernization of economic life and social relations had become generalized. That societywide evolution was based upon the appearance of a class—the bourgeoisie—capable of establishing an ideological vision of its economic and material interests, thereby endowing private management with a universal dimension.

For the capitalist political order to be legitimate, it must be able to obscure economic exploitation through the free exchange of the market, for that order is based on the exploitation of the dispossessed classes. That legitimacy also depends on the possibility provided by the economic system of transforming the political sphere into one based on free participation and democratic elections. Here it should be remembered that in bourgeois democracies the organization and political participation of the subordinated classes was the result of long and bloody struggles and that the incorporation of the majority was a gradual, cautious process.

Once that incorporation was achieved, however, the political system did not approve the permanent plunder of the exploited classes. Rather, it concealed that exploitation behind the guises of a free labor market and political participation. In addition, ideological and cultural control had the notable advantage of being able to mask existing inequalities. That control thereby veiled conflicts inherent to class relations—relations that by their very nature are opposing and contradictory.

Obviously, liberal democracy has not always functioned so well, even in those democratic societies where capitalism originated. Important works exist on the supposed causal relationship between industrial capitalism and democracy, as well as that between the establishment of bourgeois political systems and the exercise of democratic principles.¹

But particular conditions were necessary—some of them unrepeatable—in order to attain the levels of popular participation, ideological pluralism, and tolerance of political adversaries exhibited by the major democracies of the postwar period.

There is a theoretical explanation for the emergence of democracy that views that process in relation to exploitation—defined as the extraction of the surplus from some people by others—and that can be expressed in the form of a universal law. That law states that when exploitation takes the form of an exchange of merchandise, assuring freedom and formal equality for all members of the political community, the "class dictatorship" tends to take the form of democracy. That is, democracy serves as the political vestments of a market structure.

The development of capitalism has clearly been associated with the appearance of liberal democracy. To put it somewhat more precisely, the history of Western societies shows that the consolidation of liberal democracy was associated in various ways with the expansion of an urban industrial economy and with the parallel weakening of the landowning nobility.

The bourgeoisie succeeded in making the principles of (economic) freedom and (juridical) equality their own through the market. But, as Pierre Vilar recalled, of all economic freedoms, the first were those of enterprise and exchange. They were strongly advocated by the bourgeoisie at the time as a means of arriving at "the truth of prices."² Juridical equality, in its turn, represented a "dissolution" of inherited privilege, thereby making everyone equal in the sphere of competition. Or at least, it enabled and encouraged people to perceive their true condition in that fictitious way. It is in relation to the above that democracy appears as the political consecration of economic equality and freedom—of principles first practiced within the framework of the market, within the fertile kingdom of merchandise.

However, the preceding reflections do not provide the grounds to assert that capitalism is necessarily associated with the triumph of democracy. There are a sufficient number of events from European history to illustrate clearly that the foundations of modern democratic nations were only the product of lengthy struggles, occurring in the midst of societies whose economic development had advanced well into the nineteenth century. The existence of democracy is not only recent, it is also geographically limited.

Finally, within this set of introductory considerations, it would be useful to lay out an additional series of general propositions of lesser theoretical scope. Though they may seem obvious, the presentation of these propositions is worthwhile as a cornerstone to the discussion that follows. From the historical context of contemporary democratic societies

it becomes clear that they passed through a stage marked by conditions favorable to political change. Those conditions also favored the gradual establishment of more equal relations and the extension of both a participatory culture and of more tolerant behavior—in other words, the emergence of a democratic authority.

According to some scholars, this had to do with the manner in which the question of the peasant farmer and the problem of agricultural modernization were resolved. They maintain that the resolution of those dilemmas was directly connected to the way in which the social and economic bases of traditional power had been modified. Others stress the character of the social forces that led or opposed political change, focusing on the effective strength of the absolutist tradition as well as the manner in which it could be either broken or modified depending on the relative strength of the new economic interests. Finally, there are those who underline the importance of ethnic, religious, and linguistic homogeneity, identifying the construction of the nation with that of democracy beneath a rubric in which the two results converge and interact.

The problems of liberal democracy—so often used as either a paradigm or a goal—are useful as tools to explore the democratic experiences of Central America. Here references to the great European and/or North American democracies are inevitable, though it is necessary to clarify two points before concluding this introduction.

The first point is that, given a specific level of capitalist development, there are certainly moments in which democratic political relations can be established. Those democratic relations are in each case supported by generalized participation, the search for citizen consensus, and the peaceful resolution of social contradictions. Less "asymmetrical" relations come to the fore, as political subordination and economic exploitation are either confounded or concealed, depending on the hegemonic character of the dominant culture.

The second point is that this historical possibility is inscribed within a wide margin of national variables, of diverse local traditions, and of the nature of particular social struggles. The history of a given movement is ultimately determined by the actions of men and women, limited only by the state of development reached by the forces of production. Multiple variations are possible and, in fact, each experience is unique.

The Conditions for Democracy in Central America

As a consequence of the preceding reflections, those that follow will be informed by the conviction that no historical experience can be used

as a model to judge or suggest goals for Central American development. At the same time, however, it is important to consider the conditions under which political democracy can be a historical possibility.

Today, the political structures that distinguish Costa Rica from Guatemala and El Salvador, for example, correspond to processes that have not been easy to identify other than by their results. The objective here, then, will be to analyze how those societies—from relatively homogeneous points of departure—went on to differentiate themselves from one another over the passage of time.

In a generic way, the implantation of capital in the capitalist periphery clearly facilitated the repetition of the historical experiences of those societies with which economic, cultural, and political relations had been established. However, the transfer of economic structures and functions was more successful and profound—via various levels of articulation with the international market—than was the transfer of political institutions and practices. An exception to that rule was the formation of the national state, which emerged parallel to the consolidation of those countries' dependent economic condition.

In any case, the reproduction of previous experiences borrowed from other social orders constitutes a problematic aspect of the region's history. For example, the institutions of the "liberal state" and the ideologies that accompanied them were imitated in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. That duplication was in general unfortunate. The fate of Central American liberalism was such that it did not succeed in developing local ideals of democracy; in fact—and quite to the contrary—it reinforced a number of despotic practices.

The above discussion is only meant to suggest the hypothesis that, with the implantation of capitalism and its primary-export-led development, specific modes and forms marked the establishment of an agrarian bourgeoisie, and of a national state program. The accompanying political structure was based exclusively on a game in which only those who satisfied the prerequisites of citizenship could take part, that is, those who owned land and/or commercial capital. Contradictory advances were made, to a greater or lesser degree, in different Central American countries, and today the results are obviously unequal.

"Real" history, as we know, is not determined merely by underlying economic relations, like an inexorable blueprint. Rather, it is the product of the specific, concrete relations that occur at different moments between groups and social forces over a long period. In order to understand the particularities of that process in its current stage, then, the totality of those social relations must be reconstructed.

In terms of this approach, then, the experiences of Central America—despite its limited physical dimensions—include diverse examples of

how "real" history has unraveled through a series of simultaneous and contradictory processes. But those processes—at the general level of universal laws guiding the system—have always had a specific character.

The preceding methodological excursion, then, might serve as a good starting point in order to understand the problems of democracy in Central America. The chapter's main focus will be the persistent questions of why democratic political systems could not be established in four countries of the region and in what ways Costa Rica constitutes an exception.

The best-known explanation of the Costa Rican case revolves around a series of phenomena stemming from the fact that small farms existed in the countryside, producing a supposed rural equality. The present liberal democracy is said to have been built upon that base. The other side of that explanatory coin maintains that the authoritarian tradition and the various dictatorial solutions in the rest of the region have their roots in the early establishment of the large estates (*latifundia*) and the corresponding social behavior of the landowners.

That explanation maintains that, in a society based on ingrained class privileges, the rigidity of the system converted landownership into a monopolistic source of influence, prestige, and opportunity. Those privileges were sufficient to assure control over those who worked the land. The simplicity of that explanation assigns ontological qualities to the various actors: the small landowners, who possess nascent democratic virtues, and the large landowners, whose structural position in society makes them the bearers of a malevolent, authoritarian upbringing.

The previous reflections have a certain fundamental heuristic value that is not contradicted by their concomitant superficiality. Costa Rican democracy, like that of its authoritarian counterparts in the rest of Central America, was founded through a complex series of factors that were indeed related to the way in which agrarian economies in general are established and develop. That process is particularly relevant in agrarian societies that consolidate themselves as commercial systems oriented almost exclusively toward foreign markets.

Land, as the principal factor of production, also played an important role in that process. That importance was due, above all, to a relative abundance and availability of land in relation especially to investment capital, but also to labor. The diverse combinations of these productive factors were established—not always in accordance with economic rationality—during the course of the implantation of commercial capital in agriculture throughout the region.

In Costa Rica the particular configuration of productive factors determined that control of the *beneficio*—that is, the center for processing

coffee before export—would be crucial to the formation of the dominant class. That was so because control of the *beneficio* implied effective control over the channels of intermediation with the mass of small producers, thereby assuring elite regulation of the links between the domestic market and foreign demand. The result was a bourgeoisie formed via control of capital, in the strict sense, more so than land.

This kind of analysis has been made with varying degrees of success⁷ and hardly needs further elaboration here. It is enough to remember that, in the rest of Central America, extensive landownership had long been the only available resource that could ensure accumulation; large estates had become "land banks" whose assets represented potential capital. Initially, however, land simply meant wealth and was not hoarded with an eye to financial gain. Control of land meant little more than control of the work force and the reconstitution of social relations, within which personal servitude had been confused with a minimal salary.

In various ways, of course, the establishment of commercial agriculture in Guatemala, in El Salvador, and (partially) in Nicaragua prohibited some forms of extraeconomic compulsion. However, other means of coercion were present in the powers of the state, which arose and strengthened itself by taking up the role of "gendarmarie" in defense of coffee-grower interests.

In Costa Rica, an agrarian bourgeoisie was formed free of conflicts with the Catholic church or indigenous communities, and without the colonial legacies of either land grants for life from the Spanish crown (*enfiteusis*) or common lands (*tierras ejidales*). This in turn facilitated the gradual creation of stable conditions that allowed politics to become a game between contenders who tolerated one another.

But this did not take place because everyone was socially equal, as if the campesino utopia of equality for all had materialized in Costa Rica's Central Plateau. Rather, it was possible because the social classes were able to sustain their conflicts and relations within the confines of a nascent communal identity and because mechanisms were gradually developed for the settlement of their differences.

The various classes, as they formed, were thereby integrated into the emerging nation. Those exercising an as yet inchoate power did not have to resort to the constant use of force and repression in order to maintain control. Other significant factors in the Costa Rican process included the limited demographic and physical size of the society, its common ethnic origins, its relative isolation, and the absence of a colonial bureaucratic tradition.

An interpretation of the history experienced by the rest of Central America is not easy, because the evolutionary process was not homo-

geneous from one country to the next, despite apparent similarities. The focus will therefore be on the particular conditions that fed the use of force and the overall virulence of each conflict. The essential factor to be analyzed will be the difficulties involved in the creation of a permissive and tolerant culture.

In Guatemala and El Salvador the victory over the past was almost Pyrrhic, given the human suffering that resulted from the reduction of the power of the Catholic church, an essential step toward the consolidation of the liberal state. That suffering was due primarily to the economic dimensions of the conflict.

And in those countries the coffee plantation did not expand by moving into empty spaces, but rather by displacing precapitalist forms of land tenure. That process entailed the disruption of indigenous communities—local societies based on common landownership where campesinos practiced pure forms of subsistence agriculture. Here, the state gradually consolidated itself through the creation and deployment of forces relying on coercion and violence. In the face of social conflict, that state always responded with contempt, castigation, and brutal treatment.

Under these circumstances a paradox appears that has received little analysis. The agrarian-export economy formed and grew slowly in Costa Rica, but extraordinarily rapidly in El Salvador. Guatemala occupied an intermediate position, while Nicaragua was well behind in terms of coffee production. If the bourgeois state of affairs were to be judged by levels of accumulation, the Salvadoran coffee-growing elite (followed by the Guatemalan) would easily have overtaken the Costa Ricans.

However, what makes a producer more bourgeois, in the sense of being more modern—independent of traditional bonds such as the rental of small plots or obligatory worker loans—is not the quantity produced but rather the means used to achieve those levels of production. Equally important is the way in which the value of the product is converted into monetary form and later distributed. In other words, it is not merely a question of what is produced, but of how, and for whom.

At this point it becomes clear that explanations that focus on forms of land tenure are insufficient in order to understand the bases of a functioning democratic society. Other aspects must be considered, such as the degree to which social classes take on modern bourgeois traits and the extent to which the society is capable of integrating those classes, the latter implying some form of ideological management.

Obviously, this has been little more than a sketchy attempt to contribute to an explanation of the socioeconomic dimension of the subject at hand. That dimension clearly lies at the base of the differing results that mark the national histories of each Central American society.

Process and Structure: Authoritarianism Versus Democracy

Democracy, according to what has been said thus far, is a result of history. If that is indeed true, the following tasks become necessary: first, to determine at what historical moments democracy appears as a possibility; and second, to elaborate what meaning democracy might have for societies like those of Central America. As far as the former is concerned, it is only possible to offer a hypothesis. As for the latter, it is worthwhile proposing a definition. Let us begin with the latter.

In order to avoid confusion about what is meant by democracy in this chapter, we will use a commonsense concept. That concept is based on historical regularities observed in a variety of countries at different times and that are present, to a greater or lesser extent, in what C. B. McPherson has called "liberal democracy" (in order to situate that form of democracy historically).⁴

From that approach, democracy can be recognized as much by the form of its executive branch of government as by its legislative bodies, both of which are directly or indirectly voted into power through periodic elections with universal suffrage. Electors are normally granted the possibility of opting for different political parties. And all of this is carried out within a framework of civil liberties—freedom of speech, of the press, of association, and so on—sufficient to ensure that the right to choose will be effective, that is, relatively free. There also exists a formal, legal equality and some form of protection for minorities, as well as general acceptance of the principle of maximum individual freedom for all.

The previously mentioned hypothesis suggests that democracy as a political regime or as a form of political relations appears as a possibility only when social forces exist that are capable of proposing it as a program, in the sense of an elaborated, collective desire. The nature of democracy as a historical possibility is determined by the concrete combination of at least two key elements: on the one hand, the presence of a political program that is supported by and expresses class interests; and on the other, structural conditions, which are an indication of both the level and the general state of societal development.

A society's democratic possibilities become gradually defined by increasing levels of social differentiation and integration. A minimum degree of political equality combined with wide citizen participation and organization must be practiced regularly and in a genuine fashion. In such a society democracy itself will be held up as an aim of great political or ideological value. It will be appealed to in moments when alliances or opposition movements form—or when conflicts occur—at

a political level, whenever the question of political power is posed in either real or symbolic terms.

This hypothesis supposes, more specifically, that the problem of democracy in Central America is a contemporary problem and that the oligarchic period cannot be included in the analysis. That is because the possibilities for democracy did not emerge until after a period in which a transition of state power—from a traditional, exalted oligarchic character into a more modern, bourgeois one—had taken place, and the need for a consolidated authoritarianism had become manifest. For the hypothesis assumes that a political structure is authoritarian only once democratic conditions exist, though that early stage may be nothing more than a preliminary challenge. The long period of oligarchic rule that precedes this stage of nascent democratic yearnings is nothing more than the despotism that accompanies agrarian societies deemed backward in terms of their social development. The preliminary conditions mentioned above are associated with the appearance of social forces capable of pressing for democracy as an interest of the society itself as well as a class interest, as an inherent aspect of their own development.

Some important questions and an initial clarification are pertinent here. In this perspective, could the campesino masses, mobilized by force as actors in an economic process, demand democratic rights such as freedom of organization and free labor? Was the political game necessary in order to mask class exploitation? Which forces had the capacity to choose periodically between various alternatives or to act within a sphere of relatively free political competition?

In Central America, democratic practices such as formal equality, group organization, and the competitive vote began to exist only within social forces or groups enjoying similar levels of economic and cultural privilege. For that reason rivalries and alliances developed almost exclusively within the same class and oligarchical "democracy" was nothing but the initial stage of a process dominated by the authoritarian actors inherent to all forms of class domination.

A second clarification is called for in order to explain the relevance of McPherson's proposal on liberal democracy to a discussion of democracy in Central America. For we do not intend to use the proposal as either a definition or a model. It can be useful, however, as a point of reference, in order to judge when and to what degree those rules of democratic behavior, public or private, have been followed and respected, or whether, perhaps, they have merely been demanded and proclaimed.

Indeed McPherson's hypothesis can serve a double purpose within the framework of this analysis. First of all, elements thereof may be proposed for comparison in order to better describe the functioning of political structures. Second, it can serve to establish, via concrete ex-

amples, the various levels of a possible democracy, that is, to historically condition that possibility.

The risk that one runs using this approach is that of referring to those descriptive elements as integral parts of an ideal normative model—implicitly, morally superior—a tendency related to the Eurocentric need of drawing comparisons. The risk, in other words, is that of creating paradigms for Central America composed of Western experiences.

A third clarification refers to the terms *authoritarian* and *despotic*. Authoritarianism can be understood as any exacerbation of power beyond normal limits of control. Those extremes lead to the use of forms and instruments of compulsion; the regime invariably lacks both legal and consensual support. Authoritarianism is thus an intrinsic component of any system of domination. Despotism, in contrast, refers to those earlier stages of Central American history during which popular access to, participation in, or regulation of power—that is, the control and exercise of authority—were neither imaginable nor possible.

When society "grows" vis-à-vis the state and questions it in such a way that the state ceases to be accepted as the primary and sole organizer of that society, forces arise and organize themselves within a new concept of social relations—a concept that presents a potential or real challenge to the existing system of domination and control. That opportunity to challenge the system's capacity for order and coercion—which had appeared to be a "natural" attribute of political or state power—is what gives body to the idea of a possible democracy. However, from the opposite perspective, that opportunity also stimulates the further growth of authoritarian elements within the structure of domination itself.

The previous considerations have been preliminary forms of theorizing about Central American history. But clearly it is insufficient and mistaken to qualify the mid-nineteenth-century political systems and regimes (which arose in the wake of the civil war that broke the Central American Federation) as *authoritarian*, or the period of the "Conservative party peace" in Nicaragua (which followed the defeat of William Walker) as *democratic*.

The authoritarian element is a dynamic, structural component of the preservation and defense of power, but only when the stability and permanence of that power is defied by political forces and when there exists the real possibility of a (democratic) alternative. In this way, democracy is not a stage superior to authoritarianism. Rather, the two together form a political structure that differs from the despotic manner of exercising power.

This mode of reasoning is of the same argumentative nature as that which makes it possible to distinguish between a "primitive" and an underdeveloped society. This reasoning would not permit one, for example,

to qualify the socioeconomic conditions of an isolated tribe—exhausting its energies in food gathering, fishing, or itinerant agriculture—as underdeveloped. In that type of society there are no foreseeable options for change; the movement of history has a circular, repetitive nature that serves to guarantee tradition. It is a backward, a primitive society. By contrast, underdevelopment, judged in a historical sense, implies the establishment of various kinds of articulation between societies with different levels of growth. More specifically, that growth means a constant alteration of productive forces. Thus in the latter case constant change is a condition of existence to the extent that capital is expansive by nature.

Central American authoritarian structures and conduct are frequently discussed. Those aspects of the system of domination must be understood, however, in relation to the possibility of another structure and of a different behavior—that is, the democratic possibility. These two theoretical categories, then, will be used to analyze Central American history and to propose an appropriate interpretation of contemporary events in the region.

A final problem is to figure out how and when the preconditions for the establishment of a democratic society began to take root in Central America. That question is as valid as the one that asks about the origins of authoritarianism in the region.

No society is "born" authoritarian, as many Guatemalans imagine, considering the horror of the current counterinsurgency as an extension of Jorge Ubico, Manuel Estrada Cabrera, Gerardo Barrios, and Rafael Carrera; that is, of a long century of dictatorships that succeeded one another almost without pause. Nor is any society democratic—as an extended Costa Rican myth maintains—that feigns amnesia when interpreting various stretches of its own history.

The dichotomy is only valid when presented as a simultaneous contradictory process, and not as two separate, replaceable models. Along those same lines, it is hardly a useful exercise to contrast the two definitions themselves, or to hold up the historical description produced by one perspective in order to judge that produced by the other.

The Democracy Possible Today

The last point goes back to an essential, two-sided proposition: to consider the question of authoritarianism and democracy not only in terms of an institutional power structure, but also as social process, as collective historical action. From that viewpoint, democracy is a form of organizing consensus, much as authoritarianism is a particular form of organizing that consensus by force.

In the history of Central America, the authoritarian perspective as well as the democratic one has its roots in the stage of the liberal revolutions, which were in many ways the region's most important processes of change during the course of the nineteenth century.

There is probably nothing more in line with the tenets of liberal democracy than liberal Central American constitutions, all of which were drawn up during the last fifteen years of the nineteenth century. During that era lines of economic exchange with the exterior, integrated by commercial-export agriculture, were already functioning amid an extended campesino subsistence economy. Between those two economies were areas that produced primarily for the domestic market. The domestic picture of the early primary-export economy was completed by an evolving transportation infrastructure and an elementary system of credit and financing that served to mediate foreign interests.⁵ In addition, the presence of foreign capital was already strong at all levels: in agricultural production, in land and sea transport ventures, in the financing of harvests and their sale abroad.

In any case, that economic and social base formed the foundations of the emerging national state, which in turn sought to institutionally encourage and incorporate those characteristics of the changing society that promoted conformity with the concept of nationality. It was a difficult, complex, and contradictory process that produced a system of classes and a power structure most unsuitable to the establishment of peaceful, democratic coexistence. Nonetheless, the importance of the period just described lay with the possibilities that arose for the first time: the possibilities for a democratic organization of both society and the state. That potential only became consolidated—gradually—in Costa Rica, making brief appearances but suffering repeated failures in the rest of the region. Costa Rica's experience was different from that of its northern Central American neighbors as much in terms of democratizing processes—the surfacing of democratic traits—as in terms of the strength of authoritarian behavior and culture. It was at that stage, then, that the region entered the twentieth century.

It should also be recalled at this point that the example presented by the American Revolution and its aftermath—the struggle against colonialism, the construction of political institutions from below, democratic communities integrating popular participation, the U.S. Constitution and free elections—was the model that most inspired the idea of imitating a republican, egalitarian, and liberal society. That influence helps explain the nature of Central American constitutions of the era: the symbolic flowering of an accentuated presidentialism, accompanied by a congress or parliament, an independent judiciary, and elections (initially based on patrimony, then direct, and finally universal). In

general, those constitutions took into account both citizens' rights and the duties of the state.

The international moment was also favorable, for in previous years the influence of emerging ideologies and of the French Revolution had taken on a widely endorsed, coherent form in the positivist philosophy of Auguste Comte; the U.S. Civil War had defeated the backward, traditional slave states of the South; and in Mexico the Liberals had defeated French imperialism, followed by the unprecedented successful spread of Benito Juárez's reforms.

Thus the antidictatorial, democratic spirit and faith in popular sovereignty were engrained in every constitution written during the liberal epoch. It is unclear to what extent the coffee-owning bourgeoisie was itself conscious—through its intellectuals and constituent bodies—of the program it wished to undertake. In any case, that bourgeoisie was stimulated by the ties it had established with the expanding international market.

In the final analysis, the bourgeois elite possessed neither the political strength nor the nationalist/statist conviction necessary to create a socially and politically integrated society. The societies that arose were therefore geographically and culturally fragmented—at once separated from and alien to one another—with horizons of political power limited only by the outskirts of the nearest plantation.

In the context of these contradictory circumstances, conditions for the unfolding of democracy were insufficient and unsuccessful, save a few exceptions that ought to be mentioned. This was the period in which that enduring paradox of Central American history appeared: In the very moment that liberal constitutions were passed into law, decidedly authoritarian practices raged beyond control. In effect, state power placed the entirety of its arbitrary and repressive capacity at the service of new opportunities for economic development. Authoritarian features, then, continued to gain strength. They became consistent and organic with the establishment of the political regimes that accompanied the implantation of commercial-export agriculture. Whether Liberal or Conservative, the landowning oligarchy had only a legal conscience of the advantages of democracy; in reality they practiced dictatorship and intolerance with cynical ease.

That historical failure of democracy—an ever-present constitutional objective—originated perhaps in the recurrent, insurmountable conflicts that divided regional factions (agrarian/commercial, Liberal/Conservative) of the bourgeoisie. The dominant class never achieved a sense of unity within its exercise of power.

"Class struggles" were predemocratic at this stage, for they excluded any participation of the dominated. The members of the elite coffee-

growing class, conserving backward agrarian values, did not cultivate any conscious respect for the law, which they considered to be little more than a higher form of their own particular designs, a matter of individual will. They had a private vision of the exercise of authority, whose primary function was to prolong their personal management of the plantation. Consequently they tended to lack any real concern for the realm of "public and national affairs." The lack of an effective means of distinguishing between the public and the private was as flagrant as bourgeois blindness vis-à-vis societal contradictions between written law and arbitrary practice.

As a result, the authoritarianism that accompanied the period of liberal revolutions—considered by many the most important stage of the Central American process of economic development—was based upon permanent political and cultural exclusion of the majority. It was a contradictory period of positive law that was not in force, a period marked by an absence of a tolerant political culture, that is, a culture that would permit some changes without necessarily embracing them. In fact, the essential characteristic of the authoritarian regime was that those in command—the dictator, the governing team, the political party—had the effective capacity to avoid political consequences contrary to their own interests in any and all sectors of society.⁶

The Central American practice of authoritarian liberalism was built upon a number of temporarily important factors that together form a collective tradition. First of all, at that time there was a strong desire to leave behind the old Spanish colonial order, for by the end of the nineteenth century a new era seemed at hand.

Second, the leading figures of the day enthusiastically adhered to a rationalist social philosophy that substituted ideas about progress and change for an outmoded social order and traditional values. Finally, the rigid, aristocratic, vision was decisive, justifying the maintenance of old attitudes toward the societal role of the popular masses, and particularly of the campesinos. That elitist conception of politics—fundamental to the liberal way of thinking—supposes, in its everyday expression, that common people are like children: inexperienced and incapable of participating in the game of democracy and freedom.

Why did the postwar era in Central America constitute the end of a historical cycle? In fact, the popular movements that emerged between 1945 and 1948 did not constitute revenge against the past but rather the initial moment of a new cycle that attempted to overcome the most perverse political effects of nineteenth-century liberalism by denying their existence.

It was during that period that the authoritarian features of the system became visible and, moreover, unfavorable for important middle class

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their existence.
It was during that period that the authoritarian features of the system became visible and, moreover, intolerable for the oppressed middle class

groups. Their opposition in turn rendered that system vulnerable, as the downfall of several military caudillos—Ubico, Carias and Hernández Martínez—demonstrated. One might describe that preceding period as an extension of the nineteenth century halfway into the twentieth.

The authoritarian tradition of Central American political life has found its contrast in the gradual, persistent establishment and evolution of democracy in Costa Rica. But fleeting sparks of democracy have also marked the experiences of the other countries in the region. It is worthwhile recalling them here, by order of appearance, because they illustrate both the possibilities and the limitations of democracy conceived within an oligarchical context.

The mechanisms of Salvadoran oligarchic democracy were never especially clear; however, they were highly effective in ensuring elitist forms of participation. The internal power game took place among a small group of the major coffee growers. That period began with the government of Francisco Meléndez, from 1885 to 1890, which was followed by those of Carlos Ezeta from 1890 to 1894, Raphael Antonio Gutiérrez from 1894 to 1898, and Tomás Regalada from 1898 to 1903—all of whom came to power via predictable, but tolerated, coups d'état.

From then on, the mechanisms of self-regulation within a single family group permitted a long period of electoral predominance by the Meléndez-Quiñónez family: Carlos Meléndez from February 1913 to August 1914; next his brother-in-law Alfonso Quiñónez, from August 1914 to February 1915; then Carlos Meléndez again from March 1915 to December 1918; followed once more by Alfonso Quiñónez from December 1918 to February 1919; then Carlos's brother Jorge Meléndez, from February 1919 to March 1923; he was succeeded by Alfonso Quiñónez, in his third term, from March 1923 to February 1927; and last, Pío Romero Bosque, the family's lawyer, from March 1927 to February 1931.

Salvadoran democracy was finally put to the test by the election of Arturo Araujo, an aristocrat educated in England and considered an enemy of the traditional oligarchy for his ideas about the working class. Araujo's association with urban trade unions and campesino organizations helped him obtain over 60 percent of the vote in the elections of February 1931. Ten months later, compelled by the dominant groups, General Hernández Martínez headed a military coup that initiated the most authoritarian period in the history of El Salvador. In this case as in various others, the only limitation to democratic theory was its practice.

Democratic possibilities in Guatemala first appeared with the fall of the dictator Manuel Estrada Cabrera and the election of a civilian, Carlos Herrera, who presided from April 1920 to December 1921. But a more extended opportunity came halfway through the century, with the

successive free elections of Juan José Arévalo, in 1944, and Jacobo Arbenz, in 1950. This was an important period because of its possibilities for beginning a new stage in the political life of the country. That period, of course, was violently interrupted in July 1954. But Guatemala had yet another opportunity to undertake the democratic path with the government of General Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes. That government was overthrown by another coup d'état in March 1963 when the second electoral victory of Arévalo appeared imminent. In the ensuing period the authoritarian forces—represented by the army as an institution as well as by business groups—prevented all attempts to renew democratic political activity.

The irregularity and unfinished nature of attempts at democracy in Honduras make the possibility of building a deeply rooted democratic tradition seem rather remote. The first important period began with the government of Ramón Villeda Morales, of the Liberal party, from 1957 to 1963. That bipartisan attempt to form a national, civil, and stable power failed, opening the way to a stage of military reformism that lasted until 1972. The results of the latter period were modest and its duration intermediate. In November 1981, in a nonfraudulent election—but within a feeble Honduran voting process—Roberto Suazo Córdova won. The event itself was nothing more than an attempt to return to a traditional elective system; meanwhile, the Honduran military responded by undertaking the task of discrediting those elections as inefficient.

The example of Costa Rica is different. Higher levels of both tolerance for opponents and respect for the law served as the parameters within which a small elite furiously disputed control of executive power. It is clear that fundamental formalities were increasingly respected and that Costa Rican democracy offers a notable example of gradual "perfecting." Indeed that experience was of the sort that can be qualified as a historical construction of a democratic tradition. It would be worthwhile here to recall some examples from the earliest presidential elections. In 1886, President Próspero Fernández handpicked his successor, Bernardo Soto; in 1890 popular mobilization prevented a fraud in favor of Ascensión Esquivel, thereby making possible the victory of José Joaquín Rodríguez, candidate of the opposition. In 1894, only the resort to an electoral college produced the triumph of Rafael Iglesias.

Despite an indirect vote that only became public after 1913, the participation of an important group of intellectuals and liberal politicians managed to reinforce the Costa Rican democratic process. A number of elections, such as the first election of Cleto González Víquez and the last election of Ricardo Jiménez Oreamuno, were by no means free expressions of the will of the entire citizenry. But between 1925 and 1926, Jiménez Oreamuno introduced the secret ballot, voter registration,

and an electoral tribunal. Nevertheless, only after 1948 did Costa Rican democracy solidify, in the form of a consensual system, behind elections that had become a vigorous mechanism of legitimation.

In Nicaragua, the possibilities of a democratic course were substantially reduced with the direct military and political intervention of the United States between 1911 and 1933, despite the latter's efforts to carry out and "supervise" free elections. From almost any perspective, Somoza—a direct continuation of the U.S. Marines—from then on constituted the negation of democracy in its most elementary sense.

Only after 1979 were paths opened toward the first real experiences of democracy, in a nation that at the time was hardly enjoying ideal circumstances for the successful implantation of democratic forms of peaceful coexistence. The triumphant popular revolution created conditions for the direct participation of the masses, for moving beyond the mediated forms of representation of the past. That is the contradiction that separates the democratization processes that began after 1979 from those that conservative forces have demanded from abroad.

The Central American political crisis, from this general perspective, is the crisis of an authoritarian system. That system relied on the use of repressive means and failed in the search for both democratic consensus and integration through popular organization. During the postwar period there was a rupture within the context of a continuing antidemocratic tradition, as violence only exacerbated arbitrary, authoritarian practice. Those repressive means were thus put to the test, defied, and—in the case of Nicaragua—overcome. It was that defiance, in the end, that produced rupture.

The political crisis of Central America, then—but particularly of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua—has a democratic dimension in a double sense: on the one hand, because it defies the continuation of a persistent, vigorous authoritarianism; on the other, because it proposes a new organization of political life. That latter point is important and will therefore be emphasized in my concluding reflections on the possibilities for democracy in the region.

The problem in building a democracy during this critical stage is that of establishing democratic regimes, that is, a democratic method of government. This would be the first step toward a possible democracy. Central American societies have suffered not only from a limited tradition of law-abiding states but also from an almost total lack of pluralist practice. Public opinion has atrophied without the regular calisthenics of dialogue between rivals. There has been no enduring organizational experience, only that of the great masses, who after years of propriety have finally begun to mobilize themselves from nonpolitical positions.

The difficulty of creating democratic political systems is even greater, because societal heterogeneity has been based on the reproduction of cultural, racial, and even geographic inequalities. Social segmentation has left little room for citizen participation in public life, and therefore formal equality has not had an adequate opportunity to express itself.

The prominence of social hierarchies and their corresponding cultural specificities has been in slow decline, but it is difficult to know how strongly the old forms of consciousness linger on. This uncertainty pertains particularly to Guatemalan and Nicaraguan indigenous groups, but also to subsistence campesino farmers in general—such as those of Honduras—who are isolated or effectively "cornered" in a subpolitical solitude. It also refers to those crushed by poverty, who maintain an untempered distrust for political machinations, those who lost, or never had, confidence in either organized militancy or in the arena of urban politics—long held to be a den of cunning and deceit.

Authoritarian structures in Central America did not destroy democratic institutions, nor did they corrupt the cultural values inherent to that tradition. At times, those institutions simply could not be established. For that reason, the essence of the possible democracy in Central America does not reside in conditions of "the transition to . . ." but rather "the foundation of. . ." But that idea is a problematic one. There are no previous experiences that can offer guidelines, nor is there one single type of society capable of giving life and content to democratic ideals. It is a problematic idea because it is posed at the practical level—of action and pursuit—in societies wounded and impoverished by crisis.

The intention in airing these problems is not to abandon a normative vision within the bounds of theoretical analysis, nor to downplay the necessity of strengthening the utopian dimension of praxis. Rather, it is to recognize the need to plant the seeds of an enduring democracy in the firm ground of reality. Here a return to preliminary propositions is worthwhile in order to highlight some of the common operational aspects of authoritarianism in the region:

1. The absence of reliable processes to elect rulers, and in particular of the most elementary form: the appeal to an electoral process
2. The relative difficulty of clearly delineating between the public and the private dimensions of civil society, much less of rendering public conduct coherent and predictable
3. The undefined, and therefore exaggerated, margins for arbitrary action, that is, the impossibility of setting legal standards of discretion for public officials
4. A generalized intolerance, whose nature must also be explained through psychological analysis, whose practice becomes a product of

of dialogue between rivals. There has been no enduring organizational experience, only that of the great masses, who after years of propriety have finally begun to mobilize themselves from nonpolitical positions.

4. A generalized intolerance, whose nature must also be explained through psychoanalytical analysis, whose practice has been organized by public officials

the collective memory, and whose implicit "valor" is a by-product of social inequality.

Within such a context, the parameters of political life have moved closer and closer to the laws of war, fed by a kind of ideological and political intolerance closely related to religious fanaticism. The former could indeed be considered a mundane version of the latter, the Central American strain of a "virus" whose spread can in no way be attributed solely to those in command, for it has been contagious and endemic.

A political environment in which some of these failings were not quite so prevalent would clearly be desirable. If the elimination of all of them is desirable, then it is possible, because nothing in the political sphere can ever be achieved unless it is fought for.

Democracy does not advance hand in hand with indicators of industrial growth, nor is it an inevitable product of the modernization of agriculture. Those economic changes only introduce a new set of conditions that make democratic struggle possible. Those struggles for democracy, in turn, carve out a political space whose dimensions are ultimately determined by the distance between the desirable and the possible.

That political space has been created in Central America amid a "diastolic-systolic" cycle of dictatorships that organize fraudulent elections, of civil and military governments that assassinate their opposition, and of political forces that strengthen themselves via the negation of all dialogue. Democracy, then, has been both a historical process and a political space whose durability and perseverance have sustained its possibilities.

The possibility of democracy is in itself the achievement of a possible democracy. The word *possible* is used here in its limited sense of the *attainable*. The political crisis, since 1975 but especially from 1979 on, has accentuated the contradiction between possibility and necessity. That is, what was once posed as an alternative (to traditional authoritarianism) has recently been posed in terms of the ability to take advantage of it. What is necessary here is nothing more or less than the political will to attain the desired changes.

In effect, and contrary to logical analysis, conditions of crisis and war are not the most favorable ones for the successful pressing of democratic demands. Remember that the social forces that suffered the effects of authoritarian policies did not always oppose them with conviction. Though this is another story, the passion for democracy was full of highs and lows, produced perhaps by the modernization hypothesis linked to economic growth.

Expanding a bit on the above propositions, and without going to the opposite extreme, if democracy is not considered to be necessary, the

desirable will not be transformed into the possible. The democracy that is possible today in Central America has been produced from the multiform experience of the crisis and resides in the consciousnesses of its actors, culled from their political experiences of subordination, injustice, arbitrariness, exclusion, fear, and death. For within the exceptional context of the Central American crisis, democracy has come to mean the right to defend life.

With the preceding discussion in mind, it is possible to delineate three forms of democracy in Central America today. The first is the Costa Rican, which due to its depth and durability remains exemplary. At the same time it is important to point out that country's "original virtues," which make it a unique and unrepeatable national experience.

A second democratic form is the Nicaraguan, result of a successful revolutionary process. Democracy and revolution are not mutually exclusive, but neither can their compatibility be assumed. The political life of that country has not been built upon the ashes of the Somoza regime, but rather atop its roots. Sandinismo is not democratic merely because it denies the dictatorship's authoritarianism, but because it has achieved where the latter failed: the organization, in a variety of ways, of different social interest groups, their direct participation in a number of civil functions, and other experiences of social mobilization.

The third form is that of Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador, which are suitable to be joined in a single category because in all three societies a military withdrawal has taken place, ceding terrain to newly organized political parties. Since 1982, presidential and parliamentary elections have been held and new constitutions have been drawn up. Moreover, diverse conflicts have materialized that, in their development, have intimated the beginnings of a tolerated dissidence vis-à-vis an opposition that has refused to perish.

Such is the meaning of the possible democracy in Central America. Important factors, of course, effectively mitigate that passion for democracy in the region: Unfavorable political forces are many and powerful; economic and social conditions are hardly ideal. Who will be the guarantors of the process? Which forces will be willing to enter into constructive negotiation? Is the present juncture but a fleeting one? There are more questions, but there is also room for optimism.

Notes

1. See Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions* (Cambridge University Press, New York, 1979); Charles Tilly (ed.), *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1975); Reinhard Bendix, *Estado Nacional y Ciudadanía* (Amarrotu, Buenos Aires, 1976); Barrington

Moore, *Los Orígenes Sociales de la Dictadura y la Democracia* (Ed. Península, Barcelona, 1973).

2. Pierre Vilar, *Iniciación al vocabulario del análisis histórico* (CRITICA, Grupo Edit. Grijalbo, Barcelona, 1980), pp. 209-210.

3. Numerous explications have been proposed, more or less, in this sense, and an ample bibliography exists. See the recent work of José Luis Vega in *Anuario Centroamericano*, no. 9, and the essay by Héctor Pérez Brignoli, "Crecimiento agroexportador y regímenes políticos en Centroamérica: un ensayo de historia comparada" (mimeograph, San José, 1985).

4. C. B. McPherson, *La democracia liberal y su época* (Alianza Editorial, Madrid, 1981), p. 16.

5. The primary-export period varied from country to country. It lasted from 1850 to 1878 in Costa Rica, 1860 to 1885 in Guatemala, 1865 to 1885 in El Salvador, and 1890 to 1910 in Nicaragua.

6. Adam Preworski, "Democracy as a Contingent Outcome of Conflict" (mimeograph, Chicago, 1984), p. 1.

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
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Roads to Freedom: Democratization and Its Problems in East Central Europe

By Sir Ralf Gustav Dahrendorf

Sir Ralf Gustav Dahrendorf was director of the London School of Economics from 1974 to 1984 and is presently warden at St. Antony's College, Oxford University. His books include Class and Class Conflict, Essays in the Theory of Society, The New Liberty, and Society and Democracy in Germany. The following essay was prepared for a meeting of the Institute for East-West Security Studies (IEWSS) in March 1990, and will be published by Peter Volten and Magarditsch Hatschikjan, eds., Uncertain Futures: Eastern Europe and Democracy (New York: Institute for East-West Security Studies, Manhattan Papers 16, 1990). It appears here by permission of the IEWSS.

I. The Collapse of the Center

The road to serfdom has been mapped by many, but the road to freedom leads through largely uncharted territory. To be sure, the language of such statements is not uncontested. What Friedrich von Hayek called the "road to serfdom" would have been described as emancipation by the followers of Marx, who would also denounce as capitalist exploitation and bourgeois rule the freedom of democratic government and market economies. But one of the results of the events of 1989 is the "reunification of language." Few today employ the rhetoric of Marxism. Most admit that socialism, or at least communism, has turned out to be a form of serfdom rather than freedom, at worst a personal dictatorship, Stalinism, at best the leaden hand of an increasingly corrupt *nomenklatura*, Brezhnevism. Thus it is understood that the road to freedom is the path from administrative centralism to more open patterns of government and society.

This is what "we, the people" sought in East Central Europe in 1989; it was often given the name "democratization." The immediate effect of the revolution of 1989 was, in all countries that were swept by its winds, the collapse of the center. This meant two things. First, the party lost its political monopoly. Secondly, the economic planning mechanism lost its nerve center. (It is important to recognize that neither process has as yet occurred in the Soviet Union, which remains, for

this reason as well as for several others, largely outside the scope of this paper.) The vocabulary used here is important: existing structures were lost, they collapsed. The process was in the first instance a process of dismantling and destruction.

The consequences were and are serious. In the political sphere, the changes left a curious combination of a crumbling local, and to some extent also central, *nomenklatura* with governments that desperately try, and often fail, to get a grip on events. The East German case is extreme, largely because it emerges that there never was an East German state that deserves the name. In Poland, the reverse is true; a strong national culture seems to sustain a government which has set out on a courageous course of reform. But everywhere postrevolutionary governments find it hard to retain control. They are thwarted by problems of legitimacy, by the absence of a new institutional infrastructure, and by the continued presence of many agencies of the old regime.

The weakness of the political center is one of the causes of the return of old regional, ethnic, religious rivalries. (This is true in the Soviet Union as well, despite the fact that the central machinery of party and government has not collapsed to the same extent.) Impatience with the process of reform, a sense of relief about the removal of physical threats by the internal security forces as well as the Soviet army, and the absence of authoritative signals from the central government combine to encourage groups to try and go their own way. Sadly, one has to conclude that the more homogeneous countries are, the more likely they are to succeed in the process of democratization. Countries with an ethnically or otherwise divided population will probably be preoccupied for some time to come with their territorial integrity, and with the maintenance of law and order.

The collapse of the center is equally serious for economic developments. In an article in *The Wall Street Journal* (December 7, 1989), the financier-philanthropist George Soros has described a condition (in the Soviet Union) in which the planning machinery is still in place, but has lost its brains, as it were. The heavy hand of bureaucracy prevents initiative, and is at the same time incapable of doing its old job of central direction, however ineffectually, so that nothing moves anymore. The lesson is not a happy one. Removal of tyranny does not by itself release the energies of freedom. At any rate it

does not guarantee a constructive process of economic — or for that matter political — reform. In the first instance, it creates uncertainty, contradictions between remnants of the old and hopes for the new, and once the euphoria fades, misery and dissatisfaction.

Democracy is not just about giving expression to a wide variety of views, and creating a forum where all of them have their say. Democracy is a system of government.

This is, as it were, the starting point of the journey along the road to freedom in countries which have shed the yoke of really existing socialism. It sets the scene for formulating the main problems, and for giving some indications of possible solutions.

II. The Democratic Deception

One of the words that have returned to their old glamour in 1989 is democracy. Democracy was not only the goddess of Tiananmen Square but the hope of the people of Gdańsk and Leipzig and Timisoara. It still is their aspiration. While it is not always entirely clear what is meant by democracy, certain features are generally recognized to be a part of the concept. Self-appointed leaders must be removed, the monopoly of one party broken. Instead there has to be a plurality of political groupings; there must be elections, and parliaments. Even these things, obvious as they may seem to many, are more easily said than done. It is therefore understandable that reformers tend to concentrate on the conditions for the first free elections. 1990 will see a number of such, in East Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and probably Romania. But what happens after the magic dates?

The first point to be made here is trivial yet important; it is Churchill's familiar adage that democracy is a pretty bad system, except that all others are worse. Democracy is messy. Elections create as many problems as they solve, and sometimes more. Benevolent reformers in particular are likely to find that they do not command as much support as they think they deserve. "We, the people" may well wish to sweep away not only all those who are tainted by the old regime, but also the advocates of a third or middle way. On the morning after, a dreadful hangover may envelop not just the electorate but also the fledgling new political class. Coalitions may have to be cobbled together which have the seeds of their breakup built into their very construction. Some may even wonder — newspapers report that Lech Wałęsa has already made such noises — whether it would be better to keep, for a while, a tighter rein than is possible once one has had free elections.

It would not, I think. The force of democracy is unstoppable. But there is one critical point to be made about it which has practical consequences. Many spokesmen of countries which have embarked on the road to freedom seem to believe that democracy — that is, parties, elections and parliaments — will give them signals about the future course to follow. Even activists think that it is sufficient to listen, and to listen to all who want to say something. In a number of countries, a confusing number of parties, including some self-declared non-parties (usually calling themselves "forum"), compete for popular support. All this is understandable, and laudable if one seeks to replace administrative centralism by representative government. But there is an attitude about which overlooks the second half of this phrase, government. Democracy is not just about giving expression to a wide variety of views, and creating a forum where all of them have their say. Democracy is a system of government. It is intended to make sure that those who govern have the support of the people, at least when they start; but by the same token it is about enabling people to govern. Parliaments are political institutions rather than mere fora for free expression. They must respond to proposals for change made by governments, or initiate such changes themselves.

I have heard a leading Hungarian politician reply to a question about his party's economic policy with the statement: "That is not for us to say but for the people." Such an approach will destroy democracy almost as quickly as it is created. Parties must provide the lead and try to persuade voters of their platform. If they win a majority, they must pursue what they promised until the electorate removes them from office and replaces them by another party. If there are constellations of parties, coalitions, they too must be clear about their intentions. Contrary to the literal meaning of the word, a functioning democracy is not the "rule of the people"; indeed there is no such thing. It is government put in place by the people and if necessary removed by the people, but it is government with a sense of direction.

Postrevolutionary governments...are thwarted by problems of legitimacy, by the absence of a new institutional infrastructure, and by the continued presence of many agencies of the old regime.

The institutional consequences of this general comment are considerable. It is not surprising that a number of the new democracies are now introducing electoral laws which promise as much representation as possible. After one-party rule, people want to allow expression for every view, however small the minority may be which it represents. Thus there is a tendency towards total proportional representation without a

threshold that keeps groups with less than 5% support out. (The additional question of giving voters the chance to reorder party lists is also relevant.) For the first free elections, this may be inevitable; but such electoral laws should not be entrenched in any way, for soon after the first election it will be necessary to consider the question of effective government. This probably requires either a threshold, or some form of electoral system which introduces a bias in favor of larger parties.

Removal of tyranny does not by itself release the energies of freedom... it does not guarantee a constructive process of economic — or for that matter political — reform.

The other institutional consequence of regarding democracy as a form of government rather than mere representation has to do with the power of governments. Again, it would be understandable if there was an initial tendency to check and balance governmental power in every possible way. Again, however, it will soon become evident that unless governments are able to take the lead, stagnation and disenchantment will follow. There are several ways of strengthening government without endangering democracy. The German or British and the French or American methods are both viable; in one case, the head of government has certain constitutional prerogatives (Richtlinienkompetenz, or the right to dissolve parliament), but emerges from parliament; in the other, the president is independently elected to an office which entails real powers. There may be other methods.

The important point in this connection is not just the need to recognize that democracy is a system of government. There are also the special requirements of countries that are passing through a difficult period of transition. They may feel that they have just shed hated leaders and now want a rather less personal rule; they may distrust all leaders. But while such comparisons are misleading in part, it is worth pointing out that Germany's postwar transition owes much to the twin leadership of Konrad Adenauer and Ludwig Erhard, or that Spain after Franco would hardly have had such spectacular success without the combination of King Juan Carlos and to begin with Adolfo Suarez, later Felipe Gonzales. Transitions are immensely precarious processes in which the vision and the nerve of leaders can make a lot of difference, and constitutional arrangements must not prevent such leaders from doing what needs to be done.

III. The Economic Valley of Tears

The first substantive task of governments on the road to freedom is often economic. It is also extremely difficult and indeed painful. As we look at economic reform, it is even harder

to generalize than in other fields. Each country has its own history, institutional structure and current condition, its own resources and realistic opportunities. One crucial point needs to be made at the outset for this very reason. Timothy Garton Ash mentioned in one of his brilliant descriptions of East European developments (he really is the great chronicler of 1989!) that the main economic policy debate is one between Hayekians and Friedmanites. This is amusing but not funny. For one thing, the difference is important: Hayek is about economic systems, Friedman about economic policies. Both may be wrong, but it is easier to change policies than systems if one discovers that mistakes have been made. For another thing, it is critical to recognize that transition does not and must not mean a journey from one system to another. It is even misleading to speak of a transition from socialism to capitalism. The whole point of the road to freedom is that it leads from a closed to an open society. An open society is not a system, but a mechanism for exploring alternatives. It does not predetermine economic structures and policies but allows trial and error, mistakes and their correction. The first warning is therefore: please do not look for an alternative system!

To be sure, this does not mean that anything goes. Any central planning system which claims total control is incompatible with an open society. It is also, as we know, and as those who suffered from it have experienced at an enormous cost, ineffective. Elements of the market, of individual initiative, of incentives, of private property, are an indispensable prerequisite of a working modern economy. For East European countries, this involves major changes. Minister Balcerowicz in Poland has tackled them with great courage and a clear sense of direction. Perhaps, the group around Minister Klaus in Czechoslovakia will follow suit. Hungary of course has embarked on this route some years ago, though a lot remains to be done. Once again, the East German case is special in that the option of economic and monetary union with West Germany is now almost declared policy.

An open society is not a system, but a mechanism for exploring alternatives.

In all these cases, however, including East Germany, one feature of the economic transition deserves attention: it will inevitably lead through a valley of tears. The transformation of ill-functioning planned economies into growing market economies is not an immediate positive-sum game. At the very least, it requires a period in which wages remain constant if they are not falling, whereas hitherto political prices rise as subsidies are reduced or removed altogether. Goods begin to get into the shops but people cannot afford them. The probability is high that this process will be accompanied by unemployment, and also by the discovery that the much-praised net of social

security in socialist countries is in fact very flimsy. Thus, things are getting worse, in some cases much worse, before they get better.

This is one of the points where Western cooperation is critical. Indeed, the postwar Marshall Plan did exactly what is needed today; it filled in the deepest thought [sic] of the valley of tears and made the transition more bearable. If one wonders how long it is likely to take to get out of this valley, or at least to reach the upward slope where people begin to sense an improvement, it is once again doubtful whether there is a general rule. Ludwig Erhard was under tremendous pressure in West Germany three and even four years after the currency reform, when many argued that the rich were getting richer and the poor poorer. Felipe Gonzales took Spain through a period of over 20% unemployment and considerable suffering on the part of those voters who had put him into office, the workers; but in the end he just managed to win the second election after four years because things began to get better. If the objective is pursued with determination, four years may well be the period which it takes to pass through the valley of tears — and it is easy to see the conflict between this time span and the electoral cycle.

An implicit, and sometimes explicit assumption... is that once market forces are allowed their sway, democracy is bound to follow. This too has turned out to be wrong, or at least overoptimistic.

The critical conclusion from the two observations on economic reform offered here is probably that each country has to identify certain strategic changes on which it concentrates in the first instance. Changing everything at once — the currency, the system of ownership, external commercial relations, etc. — is likely to be too disruptive to be effective. It may make a valley of tears too deep for a country ever to reach the upward slope. On the other hand, making only minor adjustments is not good enough. Drastic changes are needed in particular respects. In the case of East Germany, this probably means monetary union with West Germany. In the Soviet Union, the key might well have been agriculture, with a combination of a price shock and private property; though the moment of change has probably been missed. I do not feel competent to judge where the critical changes should be applied in the other countries of East Central Europe, but would insist that strategic reform rather than system change or mere piecemeal engineering is needed.

IV. Politics and Economics

One of the discoveries of the revolution of 1989 is that all accepted assumptions about the relationship between poli-

tics and economics are wrong. Curiously, Marxists and capitalists were agreed in their belief in the primacy of economics. Marx of course elevated this belief into a theory. He claimed that political revolutions would happen only if and when productive forces were held back by existing relations of production; revolutionary classes would draw their strength from suppressed economic opportunities. "We, the people" certainly wanted economic improvements in 1989, but the momentum of change was largely political. An implicit, and sometimes explicit assumption of defenders of capitalism is that once market forces are allowed their sway, democracy is bound to follow. This too has turned out to be wrong, or at least overoptimistic. Perhaps the students on Tiananmen Square drew some of their strength from the fact that there had been a certain amount of encouragement of economic initiative in China; but then the clampdown was sadly effective. The process of democratization in the newly industrializing countries of South East and East Asia is very slow and painful. At the very least there is a time lag between economic and political reform, and as long as it lasts, unforeseen factors can intervene.

This is true for East Central European developments as well. The initial changes were political. Some leaders — possibly including President Gorbachev — may have hoped that political liberalization would by itself release economic forces of entrepreneurship and initiative; but clearly this was not the case. (It certainly did not happen in the Soviet Union.) A separate set of policies was, and is, required to set the sleeping forces of centrally planned economies in motion. I have argued in a lecture on "transitions" (in Gothenburg on August 31, 1989) that in fact all countries which have undergone successful transformations needed two leaders, one political and one economic. "Economic reformers need the protection of political leadership, and political reformers will only keep their open flank protected if they have a champion of economic policy by their side." Thus, it was Adenauer and Erhard, Gonzales and Boyer who accounted for the success of their countries, and we must hope that Mazowiecki and Balcerowicz, perhaps Havel and Klaus can one day be added to this list.

The issue is not just that two different impulses are needed to set the two processes of reform in motion. The deeper issue is that their time scales are different. New political institutions can be put in place within months, but economic reform takes years. The difference in time scales is significant. New political institutions need to establish their legitimacy; they have to be accepted and gradually anchored in the firm ground of a lasting political culture. Yet their first test is very tough. It is the test of the valley of tears. People are asked to accept that democracy begins with government policies which make their daily lives harder. Now that they are able to voice their grievances, they are asked to hold back and wait until the new institutions deliver the goods.

Even mature democracies would find it difficult to cope with such a condition. Indeed, if one follows the Arrow-Downs line of democratic theory, frequent changes of government

would be a necessary consequence of the demand for long-deferred gratification. Thus, we must hope that Arrow and Downs, and Schumpeter before them, were wrong, and that political democracy is more than a quasi-economic process of maximizing support. There can be leaders, and objectives, which compensate for the temporary misery of economic circumstances. Clearly, this is a tall order. The incompatible time scales of economic and political reform are indeed one of the reasons why democratic institutions are likely to be shaky on the road to freedom. Only the second, and perhaps the third election will tell whether the new order has taken root.

V. Prospects of Civil Society

From one point of view then, the road to freedom is a race against the clock. It may take one year or less to introduce certain democratic procedures; it takes four years or more to grow the first fruits of economic reform; and until ten years have passed, we will not know whether apparent changes have become real. The French Revolution turned violent after two years and ended in a military dictatorship after seven. Those who prefer comparisons with 1848 do not have much more evidence for comfort; the reaction set in almost immediately, and it lasted for decades. Perhaps the American Revolution offers the most hope, and of all the historical documents which one would wish to recommend as travel reading on the road to freedom, the Federalist Papers may well be the most relevant.

One concern which Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay had when they wrote their papers was the rule of law. They could see their way to a sensible structure for the legislative and executive powers, but they were wondering how one could establish the third great power of the judiciary, without delivering it into the hands of the others. "The want of a judiciary power" was above all Alexander Hamilton's concern (Federalist No. 22). How can its independence be safeguarded? And how can it be given the power to make its rulings effective? There are two obvious dangers. One is that newly democratic countries begin their course with acts of revenge on those responsible for the tyranny of the past, and the other is that the judiciary remains prey to political bias and control. In Latin America, several elected governments have made both mistakes; indeed the inability of establishing the rule of law is the greatest single weakness of most transitions to democracy on that continent. There are signs that Romania, and even East Germany, are making similar mistakes. I can but allude to the subject here; but perhaps we have written too much about democratic procedures and economic reforms, and too little about the rule of law and its preconditions. East Central Europe may have had too many visits by politicians and businessmen, and too few by lawyers.

The second lesson from the Federalist Papers has to do with James Madison's preoccupation with the real guarantees of individual liberty (notably in Federalist No. 10). Democratic procedures are all very well (says Madison) but as such they cannot protect minorities and individuals against the tyranny

of the majority. What then can? Either a general acceptance of certain values — which however is too rosy an expectation considering the strength of self-interest — or the presence of numerous intermediate groups and agencies, the interplay of which prevents the ascendancy of anyone, even of political majorities. What is needed, in other words, in order to give effect to the intentions of democracy, is the pluralism of civil society.

Perhaps we have written too much about democratic procedures and economic reforms, and too little about the rule of law and its preconditions.

The word has become fashionable in Latin America, and now in East Central Europe too. This is to be welcomed. In order to do more than just write constitutions, and to build institutions, what is needed above all is the creative chaos of civil society. Indeed, civil society is the common denominator of a functioning democracy and an effective market economy. It is only if and when a civil society has been created that political and economic reform can be said to have credence.

But the task is daunting. Ideally, civil societies grow rather than being built. Someone sets up Harvard College, someone else establishes the Republican Party, someone different again starts publishing the New York Herald, and so on. In the emerging democracies there is neither the time nor the wherewithal to wait until this happens. A degree of deliberateness is needed to build autonomous organizations and institutions which mediate between government and the individual. Foundations have a role to play in this process, and it is pleasing to see that some are emerging in East Central Europe with the help of their equivalents elsewhere. Small businesses are of course a part of civil society; it is therefore critical to provide the legal and financial space for their creation. Media are important features of civil society, and one must hope that the new monopolists of the Western media can be prevented from establishing their regime in the new democracies.

It is naturally pleasing for Western intellectuals to see their East Central European friends play such a prominent part in launching their countries on the road of freedom. What could be better than a professor of medieval history as the leading parliamentarian in Poland, a playwright as the President of Czechoslovakia, a conductor as the hope of many in East Germany? Yet it is not sour grapes which lead me to sound a note of caution. Independent intellectuals are also an indispensable element of civil society. In order to work, a free country needs critics who are not tied into the structures of power. During the process of transition, intellectuals may have to hold office; but only when they can return to their desks are we able to conclude that the institutions of civil society have been safely established.

One further concept needs to be introduced at this point, namely, citizenship. The rediscovery of citizenship in the revolution of 1989 links the new democracies with the old ones in the OECD world. Without the basic equality of citizenship, modern democracies cannot work. Moreover, this means not just equality before the law. Civil rights and political rights of citizenship have to be backed up by certain social rights. There has to be a common floor of chances of participation, and a clear limit to the ability of those in exalted positions to control the life chances of others. Citizenship means the abolition of privilege as well as the creation and maintenance of universal entitlements.

As one listens to people in Eastern Europe, one hears nothing so often as the statement that "we have not left the East in order to join the West, but in order to join Europe."

Civil society is not perfect anywhere, nor is it ever secure. Its creative chaos will forever annoy governments that will therefore try to impose a false sense of order on it or to destroy it. The rule of law is frequently under threat. Ironically, in view of the fears of the authors of the Federalist Papers, it is not the importance of the law but its abuse for private gain which threatens the rule of law in the United States. Citizenship rights have suffered in a decade which has placed all the emphasis on economic growth and neglected those who did not benefit from its gains. In any case, civil society will forever remain an unfinished task, as is right and proper under the conditions of openness which mark the road to freedom. But a start has to be made; and if there is a central thesis to this paper, it is that the single most strategic need for the new democracies is to back up both political and economic reform by the creation of the conditions of civil societies.

VI. The European Challenge

It would be wrong to conclude this brief analysis of some of the problems of democratization in East Central Europe without at least a reference to the international conditions in which the process takes place. In the beginning there is the "Sinatra Doctrine": the Soviet Union has said (through President Gorbachev's spokesman, Gerasimov) that the former communist satellite countries of Eastern Europe must be allowed to "do it their way." The Brezhnev Doctrine is dead. As one listens to people in Eastern Europe, one hears nothing so often as the statement that "we have not left the East in order to join the West, but in order to join Europe." Thus the challenge of creating conditions that allow the process of democratization to continue is to no small extent one for Europe.

In one respect, that diverse and somewhat amorphous entity, Europe, has already taken up the challenge. One may surmise that the way in which the European Community has got its act together in the 1980s has contributed to the plausibility if not the possibility of the revolution of 1989. Even Europe 1992, the project of the Single Market, was and is important, because it embodies the prospect of an alternative to the military and political blocs of yesterday.

It is particularly pleasing that the President of the European Commission and his colleagues, as well as most heads of government in the Community, have recognized that under the changed circumstances of 1989, the project of the single market by 1992 can be no more than a beginning. A door has to be opened wide first to the remaining EFTA countries and then to the countries of East Central Europe. It is too early to tell how exactly the invitation to come through that door and join the party will and even should be couched, but the fact that there will be such an invitation is clear.

This is only the beginning. Two subjects are likely to dominate the European agenda in the years to come: one is money, and the other, security. I have assumed that monetary union between the two Germanies will come about at an early date. The process of monetary integration in the European Community is moving forward. Convertibility is likely to be high on the agenda of every single East Central European country. One can foresee a European monetary space of considerable economic and political significance. Some envisage similar developments in the field of security. At a recent symposium which I chaired (organized by *Die Zeit* in Hamburg on December 2, 1989), Henry Kissinger put forward ideas which seemed to amount to the notion of a "Central European Treaty Organization," no less. This is probably some way away. But the factual dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and the evident need to reconsider the objectives of NATO, may generate ideas which contribute further to the construction of a common European home.

This will be a home without superpowers. It will not extend to the Soviet Union, let alone from San Francisco to Vladivostok. Yet it will have to define its place in a new international structure. There are moments when one feels that we have once again reached a point at which there is a chance to reconstruct a world order. But as soon as one begins to embrace that idea, one also remembers the seriousness of the threats to this opportunity. The Soviet Union may well be too preoccupied with its internal problems to have much time for the world. The United States has already developed a curious mixture of presence and remoteness so far as the events of 1989 are concerned. And within Europe, much still needs to be accomplished, not least the completion of the map of, and above all the march along, the road to freedom. □

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Djilas's argument is that the revolutions in Eastern Europe are vital for Western Europe in order to release the energies and creative powers of Europe as a whole. Consequently it is in the interests of the West to support these revolutions unconditionally, albeit they are taking place because the existing system of power is bankrupt. The revolution in Eastern Europe, by organizing itself around democracy, will put an end to the sterile controversy between the significance of capitalism and communism. The Soviet Union too is undergoing a democratic revolution: democratic freedom in Russia will only be possible with the independence of the non-Russian nations.

The changes of the last months in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union have already altered the course of history, and not for the East European nations alone. These changes will have a profound effect on the attitudes and policies of the West, and of Western Europe in particular.

The transformation of the political and social order in Eastern Europe cannot now be halted, though it will occur in different forms and at a different pace from one state to another. This is my own feeling and conviction. And though I am aware that my feelings and convictions have matured in restricted and one-sided conditions, as I am aware that my personal tendency is to be categorical in my stands, my convictions are firm and reliable for all that. I have lived my life driven by a powerful revolutionary energy, repelled by seeing erstwhile revolutionaries grow intoxicated with absolute power; I have personally observed the king drawn out, painful and shameful disintegration of the communist Utopia—a Utopia excessive and brutal in its pragmatism.

Communism's revolutionary crisis

The character and final outcome of the changes in Eastern Europe can be understood and evaluated only if they are conceived of as revolutions. For the very foundations of the systems there—the structures of power and

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ownership—are changing. In some countries—Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and by all indications East Germany and Bulgaria in the near future—there has already been a turnabout in the way the power structure is formed. The Communist Party bureaucratic order in these countries was alien to them, imposed with the advance of the Red Army after the Second World War: the present sweeping changes occurred there through the more or less spontaneous movements of entire nations.

That democratic change in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia is lagging behind in relative terms is largely attributable to the fact that the authority and order in these two countries are the result of domestic revolutions, which gave rise to a self-styled Party bureaucratic class that itself carried out industrial revolutions and entrenched the state's autonomy. There are however essential differences between these two states: though both are multinational, the Soviet Union is an empire with a major role in world affairs, with the position of the Russian nation still dominant within it, which cannot be said of Yugoslavia. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that it is the multinational structure of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia that stands in the way of democratic transformation. True, ethnic disputes, which are assiduously fostered by national communist oligarchies, do disrupt the course of democratic developments, but at the same time they also tend to break up the centralized Party state and contribute to the dissolution of ideology.

The explosion of discontent

Not even the most superficial observer could fail to note the dissatisfaction of all strata in the East European countries—of rulers and ruled alike. This is a true reflection of revolutionary reality. There is not a single group, not a single nation, party or reasoning individual that could be satisfied with this political order. Those in power can no longer rule in the old ways, while those who are ruled no longer consent to be governed as they once were. This is just how Lenin described the revolutionary situation, and one certainly cannot question his knowledge of such matters. The fact that, with some exceptions in ethnically mixed areas, the revolutionary situations have been relatively free of major violence or armed uprising¹ is a clear indication of the timeliness of these revolutionary changes and of the preclusion of any return to the pre-revolutionary order.

Revolutions are predominantly the work of young people—in the case of these newest ones, of young people eagerly waiting for the fires to spread through the relatively few and badly organized political groups. In these revolutions the communists ultimately lost the battle with a future they had been so sure of. The tempest of popular fury easily topples the ruling towers

¹ The term was completed on 2 December 1960, just before the Romanian Revolution.

of bureaucratic ideological improvisation: the ruling classes penitently surrender, relegated to the ranks of yesterday's opponents, withdrawing only in turn to furtive and desperate plotting, thus merely proving their lack of integration with the spiritual, material and existential values of the nation. At the time of writing it appeared that Ceausescu's communist dynasty, which built up its tyranny over Romania by playing the card of independence from the Soviet Union, would manage to delay similar changes in Romania. But it was holding on by massacring its own people on a scale and using methods for which it is difficult to find a precedent in history, by means of a brutal, totalitarian cult of state and Party power. The next popular wave will inevitably wipe out these last bloodstained vestiges of Stalinist Leninism in Eastern Europe.

It is beyond question that national discontent is the prime cause—the most powerful motive force—of the present revolutionary changes in the countries which had been subordinate to the Soviet Union. To be more precise, there was a gradual accumulation and then a final explosion of popular discontent with the structures of power and ownership imposed by the ruling parties with the encouragement and support of Moscow, which had been restricting the strength of the nation and obstructing both its internal and its external potential.

The roots of the crisis and discontent are the same in Yugoslavia, notwithstanding its status as an independent state, and equally in the Soviet Union, although it is a superpower. The root causes of crisis are the same everywhere, just as the essence of the system is the same everywhere—a system that consists of the Party's monopoly over the state, over the economy, and over ideas. Political subordination to the Soviet Union intensified the crisis and made discontent natural and justified.

The fatal flaw of communist systems

As long as the transformation from an agricultural to an industrial system was still in progress in the Soviet Union, and to a lesser degree in Yugoslavia, the ruling Party bureaucracies could to some extent justify their dominant role and 'historic mission'. But all this was over some time ago under Stalin and Tito. Monopolism changed from privilege into parasitism and senseless, ineffectual violence. Just as Marx had envisaged, the contradiction between the forces of production and production relations—between violent, profligate, inefficient management and real development potential—emerged and intensified. The contradiction has emerged all the more sharply in that, because of its rivalry with a superior and more dynamic West, the Soviet Union now can and must move from an industrial into the so-called post-industrial society: into electronics and computer technology and the way of life they engender. This, however, is impossible under a Party bureaucratic monopoly and its state and social isolation.

In this situation ideology has lost its meaning—disintegrated—and cir-

cumstances have imposed a policy of appeasement with the West, perhaps even with external material and political support, while political and economic pluralism have emerged as a constant, even a vital, inevitability. And paradoxically the most evident and incontrovertible proof of this is the disintegration, the fading, of the ideology itself. Though ideology served the communists when they assumed power primarily as a means to an end, without a coherent ideology no totalitarian system—and the communist is the most totalitarian of all—has sufficient inspirational, rationalizational or other preconditions for survival. However much 'Western' capitalism may have contributed to its downfall, it would not be justified to take this as a basis to conclude that 'Western' capitalism has defeated 'Eastern' socialism: the communist, 'real socialist' system has broken down primarily because of its own internal contradictions and weaknesses.

The issue of ownership

As in all revolutions, the essential issues in the democratic revolution taking place in Eastern Europe are the structures of power and ownership; though in this revolution the question of ownership is less crucial and even less complex politically than in earlier ones. Everything, including ownership, has been controlled and held by the Party state.

I do not mean to imply that this order can be removed without changes, without abolishing so-called 'socialist ownership', which the Party oligarchies manipulated according to their own power-broking interests and ideological preference. 'Socialist ownership' is the source and foundation both of totalitarian ideology and of monopolistic power. Once monopolistic power is overthrown the question of ownership, in both political and economic terms, becomes acute practically overnight. It is at that point that it takes on an extreme complexity, primarily as an organizational and economic issue. How is property which has no owners, and thus in this specific sense is not property at all, to be invested with the varied forms of actual ownership? How is this to be achieved under conditions of 'socialist' illusions, and deep-rooted fear and hatred of the rich and of 'capitalism'? Most importantly, how is it to be done in the absence of sufficient resources for the establishment and effective revival of genuine formal and real ownership?

But I leave the detailed examination of this issue to one side, all the more so as I lack sufficient knowledge of the purely economic aspects of this question. I do, however, wish to point out the following: the question of achieving genuine ownership has become a burning issue facing the East European democracies, and Yugoslavia. For their economies—the forms of ownership and management—are structurally such that they cannot absorb any significant injections of capital, either domestic or external, geared towards their restructuring. The Soviet Union is the furthest behind in this regard, because its top leadership remains obsessed with 'socialist ownership' as a

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'higher form'—with the bureaucratic/ideological illusion that the system can be made efficient through 'reforms' which, in practice, boil down to retreating before the still-powerful Party bureaucratic apparatus.

Where will the transformation lead?

The question arises of how far and into what kind of societies 'real socialism'—that is, the East European countries undergoing democratic revolutions—will be transformed.

To add clarity and conviction to my answer, I would like to touch upon my own characterization of the East European 'socialist' countries, one which I have given many times before. As far as I am aware, this characterization has not thus far been accepted. Only Mikhail Voslensky, the author of *Nomenklatura* (1980),² indicated to me on one occasion during a conversation that he held somewhat similar views on this matter. I would agree with those who contend that it would have been better both for Russia and for the world had the ideas and tendencies of the Russian democratic February revolution of 1917 survived into the present. But we must draw our conclusions from what has happened, and from what is. The political and social order which emerged in Russia under Lenin and was 'built up' under Stalin is, then, essentially a unique form of industrial feudalism. This order is common to all communist, 'real socialist' states—equally those born out of revolutions and those imposed by the Soviet Union—and shows non-essential, specific variations from one state to another. Admittedly, this order is not completely 'pure' in itself, just as feudalism itself was never pure and varied from state to state. It is true in all communist states, however, that the entire power structure is largely feudal and that everything is subordinated to it. It is also true that this particular structure of power prevailed, underwent 'improvements', and moved towards a singular form of 'enlightened' absolutism. The Soviet Union is still striving to shed this feudal and enlightened absolutist armour.

In my interpretation the very nature of such industrial/feudal orders, in which even property has not been established and legalized, generates the explanation as to why they are so easily toppled under the onslaught of the people. Of their nature these orders are such that they are beyond either salvation or reform. Any reforms that do not touch the essence—that do not lead to free forms of ownership and a pluralist, multi-party state administration—only serve to prolong the agony. Communism—'real socialism'—is not capable of reform. It is disintegrating, and will and must be replaced.

The East European democratic revolutions are opening up prospects for creating societies similar to the democratic societies of the West. Communism's 'enlightened absolutism' has a short lifespan. It is in effect a mere hiatus giving

² Mikhail Voslensky, *Nomenklatura* (Varna: Mladost, 1980).

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space for the democratic movements to finalize their programmes and to prepare for new onslaughts. There can be no other road. There is no question of 'socialism' versus 'capitalism'; merely of the necessity of moving from Party bureaucratic monopolism into a pluralist, post-industrial society.

I must refer here, if only briefly, to the Soviet Union: both because of its role and significance, and because of the specific features of its political and state structure.

Democracy and the transformation of the Soviet empire

The revolution under Lenin and the 'development of socialism' under Stalin transformed the tsarist bureaucratic empire into a Party centralist empire. Unlike the European empires, whose colonies were legally and administratively separate from the metropolis, the Russian empire developed through the expansion of the Russian state, that is, through the absorption into itself of the non-Russian peoples, some of whom were relatively highly culturally developed and had long-standing traditions of statehood. Because of the different structure of the European empires compared to the tsarist/Bolshevik one, the separation of the colonies from the metropolises of Europe generally took place without long drawn out and bloody struggles. That Algeria acquired its independence only after long and heavy fighting was partly due to the fact that it had been part of the French state.

It cannot be denied that upon seizing power the Bolsheviks granted cultural and administrative autonomy to many relatively more 'backward' nations, even in some cases inaugurating this. Those who fared worst under totalitarian power were the peoples with an already developed state and cultural heritage—the Ukrainians, the Georgians, the Armenians, and in particular the Baltic nations after Stalin's occupational annexation. Subsequently, however, thanks to a monolithic ideological Party and a monotypical 'socialist' economy, the empire in effect became incomparably more centralist than had been the case under the tsars, in spite of the cultural/administrative autonomy of the non-Russian nations. This feature is largely the source of the problems that block the transformation of the Soviet empire into a community akin to the British Commonwealth or the French Community of Nations. The Soviet republics are merely parts of a politically centralized state in which the Party and the other bureaucracies of the largest, Russian, nation play a dominant role.

Every step in the direction of democracy will revive the striving of the non-Russian nations for true state autonomy, even independence. This dynamic will become the more pronounced the more the ideological, unitary Party by means of which the nations were politically oppressed ceases to exist, not just at the general level of the state, but also at the national level. It is certainly true that inter-ethnic relations in the Soviet Union cannot be regulated without democracy. But it is even more true, and more crucial, that without unequivocal recognition of the independence of the non-Russian nations there

is not, and cannot be, any democratic freedom within the Russian nation itself. The continued existence of life within a single entity is possible only on a voluntary basis—on the basis of the democratic, multi-party self-expression of the non-Russian nations.

The problem is complicated further by the fact that in the non-Russian and especially the 'Muslim' nations there has been an upsurge of intolerance and discrimination towards the Russian minorities living on their territories. The greatest danger to the democratic Russian and other reformers—and to Gorbachev himself—stems from the centralist, statist Russian bureaucracy, for which the conservative Party apparatus is still the ideologue and protector. To put it in simple terms: the future of Russian democracy depends primarily upon the suppression of statism, coupled with the growing independence of the non-Russian nations. These are also the conditions for drawing the Russian nation closer to Europe, and for its participation in the common trends of a modern democratic civilization.

Relations with the West

In the world at large and in the West in particular, the awareness is growing that the East—Eastern Europe—is undergoing a deep-rooted revolutionary democratic change, a change different in terms of its forms and its rate of development from state to state. But precisely because such a revolution is in question, it would be inadequate and counterproductive to formulate attitudes towards the East European countries in terms of the classical formulas of 'relations of forces' and 'spheres of influence'. Such formulas, admittedly, are part and parcel of every policy, especially the policies of the great powers. But they are not sufficient. They are inadequate when applied to revolutions: those who have adhered only to such formulas in their analysis of revolutions inevitably have met with failure and disappointment—for just as it is impossible to invent revolutions, it is impossible to control them or to foresee their consequences. The present East European revolutions are perhaps the first case in which a degree of predictability has been even approximately possible. And that is because the revolutions are an integral part of democratic achievements and democratic forms such as exist primarily in the West.

That is why I find not just unrealistic, but counterproductive and lacking in vision those views according to which, for the price of economic and other aid, the East European states which until recently were subordinated to it should be coaxed away from the Soviet Union. This is more or less applicable also to the idea of forming a Central European grouping of states as some form of buffer between the Soviet Union and the West. Such views obstruct the momentum of revolution, primarily in the Soviet Union, upon which a great deal depends, not the least the course and momentum of the democratic revolution as a whole.

For all its variations from country to country, communism is essentially the same everywhere in Eastern Europe; hence the revolution is the same

everywhere. Consequently the ways in which the revolutions relate to the West, and Western Europe in particular, are the same in their essentials.

Other factors

The revolutions in Eastern Europe are developing in the direction of rapprochement with Western Europe and the United States, and the Soviet Union is no exception. Democratic trends in the Soviet Union are moving in this direction. The forms and pace of this rapprochement will largely depend upon the course—the victory—of the democratic revolution inside the Soviet Union, as well as on the understanding and support given to this revolution by the West.

The direction and tendency of the East European revolutions has been demonstrated with greatest emphasis in the case of the East German revolution, as much in its unexpectedness as in its initial results. The German nation has effectively reunited itself through the freedoms won in Eastern Europe and above all in East Germany. Contrary to the expectations and standpoints of the victorious Allied powers whose assumptions were formed after the Second World War, revolutions wait for no man: they do not calculate, but simply follow their own course. True, the formal state unification of the Germans must wait upon the approval of the Allied powers, who seek insurance against the German threat, regardless of the fact that this threat is not (nor could it be) as great as is portrayed in the tragic recollections of history and in inherited attitudes to German imperialism. Any undue haste in the formal state unification of Germany could complicate East-West relations, could slow down the course of democratic revolutions everywhere. And what is most significant and most crucial, it could even do so in relation to the Soviet Union.

There is a realistic prospect for the victory of the revolution. In any case, Russia is no longer 'Stalinist'; nor will it be Leninist, no matter how strongly the bureaucrats may struggle. Furthermore, Russia will be different from, and less aggressive than, the Leninist/Stalinist Soviet Union of the past.

No one can remain indifferent in the face of the democratic revolution in Eastern Europe. Everyone, in one way or another, will be affected by it. Not, at least as far as the developed democratic West is concerned, to the point of changing the incumbent order: this revolution does not force others to follow; it, but is developing in the direction of values, ideas and forms akin to those of the democratic West. But with the victory of this revolution, new and hitherto inconceivable possibilities are opened up for economic cooperation and economic advancement, for the intermingling of peoples and cultures; and also for a new understanding for everyone of peoples and nations under long-term dictatorships, of the irresistible forces and illusions of revolution.

The democratic revolution in its Eastern sector is of particular and vital importance to Europe. It has the potential to establish its unity, to inspire it with new energy, to revitalize its creative powers.

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Western Europe is a power unto itself. But without cooperation and links with Russia, as well as with the United States, Europe is without wings, without its full strength and momentum.

The foreseeable future is not, and need not be, either bitter or gloomy. The foreseeable future? The destiny even of individual nations cannot be deemed foreseeable, nor is it set and predetermined for all time. But the age-old dream of the most creative and most profound thinkers—of the emergence of a community of Europe—can be made reality through the democratic revolution of Eastern Europe.

15-21 December 1989
Translated by Maja Samolov

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Démocraties sans courage

Par CLAUDE JULIEN

PRISES au dépourvu, les capitales occidentales manifestent une extraordinaire perplexité devant l'effervescence de l'Europe orientale (1). L'attente sceptique, elles ont finalement cessé de s'interroger sur les réelles de M. Gorbatchev. Mais l'empire des mouvements à mis en branle, elles ne peuvent s'écarter, mais ne savent que faire. Expriment bien l'incertitude générale, l'un des meilleurs commentateurs américains (2) écrit : « Je pose des questions. Il est évident que je n'ai pas de réponse. » Le gouvernement de Washington n'en a pas davantage.

Directeur de l'Institut français de relations internationales, M. Thierry de Montbrial estime de son côté : « Nous devons aider de toutes nos forces la démocratisation des peuples de l'Europe » de l'Est (3). Comment mettre en œuvre une aussi belle intention, par quels moyens concrets faciliter une aussi délicate évolution ?

Les premiers éléments de réponse ont été fournis par le discours que M. François Mitterrand a prononcé devant le Parlement européen de Strasbourg le 25 octobre : mais ce commun des aides que les Douze peuvent apporter à l'Europe de l'Est, lancement d'un grand emprunt de solidarité euro-polonaise, création d'une banque pour l'Europe (à la gestion de laquelle pourraient participer la Pologne, la Hongrie ou l'URSS) et d'une fondation pour contribuer à la formation de cadres est-européens, plan d'urgence pour certaines villes ou régions.


De telles propositions ont-elles des chances d'être approuvées par l'ensemble de la Communauté ? Le gouvernement de Bonn n'a-t-il pas quelque raison de vouloir jouer sa propre carte non seulement en Allemagne de l'Est mais aussi dans quelques autres pays (4) ? Avec ou sans réaffectation formelle, peut-on croire que l'existence, au cœur du Vieux Continent, d'une vaste zone soumise à la triple influence de la culture germanique, d'un marché fort et de dynamisme des entreprises d'outre-Rhin trait sans problèmes pour la CEE du grand « marché » unique et pour ses relations avec l'URSS comme avec l'ensemble du monde slave ?

Confirmant l'absence de projet,

M. Henry Kissinger se borne à émettre un vœu : « Les Etats-Unis doivent prendre position (...) ». Nous devons trouver un (nouveau) concept politique pour l'Europe de l'Est (5). « Plus facile à dire qu'à faire... Car c'est toute une manière de voir le monde qui doit être remise en cause.

Des propositions précises ont été avancées par un journaliste américain, Anthony Lewis (6), qui souhaite que l'Occident « aide Gorbatchev ». A cette fin, il suggère que M. Bush suspende l'application de l'amendement Jackson-Vanik (qui subordonne le développement du commerce avec l'URSS à la liberté d'émigration des juifs soviétiques), accélère les négociations sur la réduction des armes nucléaires et conventionnelles, etc.

Parce que le problème concerne en priorité l'Europe, c'est la Communauté elle-même qui doit prendre l'initiative, dans toutes les directions : désarmement et diminution des crédits ainsi épargnés pour améliorer les conditions de vie de toutes les populations, actions concertées entre l'Est et l'Ouest du continent pour intensifier les coopérations (culture, environnement, développement social, etc.). Si souvent commentés avec jubilation, les échecs



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économiques à l'Est font souffler un vent de liberté. Les réponses ne peuvent pas être seulement économiques : la libération de la production et des échanges ne suffira pas à favoriser l'éclatement de démocraties.

Quelle action entreprendre ? S'il souhaite que l'Occident, tout en restant prudent, fasse preuve d'imagination, M. Kissinger ne peut que se mouvoir sceptique. Sans la moindre illusion, il note : « Les industriels ouest-allemands veulent utiliser l'Europe de l'Est pour manufacturer à bas prix la technologie allemande (7) ». « L'ancien secrétaire d'Etat déplore : « Notre pensée est tellement militarisée que notre diplomatie l'est aussi. » Une politique ainsi obsédée par ses calculs économiques et militaires se trouve à court d'idées neuves devant une situation qui, d'évidence, requiert un tant soit peu d'inventivité.

(Lire la suite page 16.)

(1) Cf. Piero Levi, « The West, les vœux Ungeoprad », *International Herald Tribune*, 9 octobre 1989.
 (2) William Pfaff, *International Herald Tribune*, 5 octobre 1989.
 (3) Dans le *Figaro* du 5 octobre 1989. L'auteur ajoute qu'il faut « favoriser leur franchissement de l'impasse soviétique », mais avec prudence. « nous devons préserver l'équilibre européen, car nous ne serons certainement pas prêts à en assumer les risques ». C'est la quadrature du cercle. La démocratisation à l'Est modifie en profondeur l'équilibre européen, à la fois politiquement et économiquement, mais aussi

militairement, ce ressortant en question la structure actuelle des alliances.
 (4) L'aide de la RFA à la RDA (17 milliards d'habitants) sera officiellement de l'ordre de 2,5 milliards de dollars. Le chiffre réel est très supérieur. La RFA appuie aussi les réformes économiques en Hongrie.
 (5) *New York*, 16 octobre 1989.
 (6) Anthony Lewis, « Helping Gorbatchev. What is Bush Waiting For », *International Herald Tribune*, 22 septembre 1989.
 (7) *New York*, 16 octobre 1989.

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DANS CE NUMERO :

Le meilleur des mondes

Inaugurable capitale de l'orthodoxie marxiste, la République démocratique allemande est à son tour en proie au vent de réforme page 31. A mesure que s'affirme à l'Est la volonté de changement, l'empuissance des démocrates à saisir cette occasion apparaît avec plus de force. écrit Claude Julien, car elles sont enfermées dans une vision mercantile du monde et de l'histoire (pages 1, 16 et 17).

ARDEUR DE NÉOPHYTES

Pourtant avec un ardeur de néophytes, nombre de responsables, en Hongrie, en Pologne ou en URSS, se rallient aux dogmes du libéralisme le plus achevé. Avec la Pologne engagée-elle aujourd'hui son économie sans la voie déjà empruntée sans succès par le Brésil (pages 6 et 7). Tous oublient les échecs des politiques imposées au tiers-monde par la Banque mondiale et le FMI. Sous l'effet des mécanismes du marché libre, la planète, loin d'être en voie d'unification, est plus « désarticulée » que jamais par les inéga-

« sans filet de sécurité » (pages 26 et 27). Sous les plus forts sont, sont indomés.

DES PETITES GUERRES

Si la richesse est concentrée au sein de quelques pays, escarpée par une minorité de privilégiés, la paix et la sécurité ne sont pas mieux partagées, la violence continue à faire des ravages et une grande dose d'inconscience fait se précipiter les guerres. L'Europe n'est cependant pas épargnée. En Irlande du Nord, à Dungannon, la population est brisée « dans le tourmente ordinaire » (pages 12 et 13), tandis que au Kosovo des Albanais sont victimes de ce qu'on appelle la « différenciation » (page 51). L'Asie méridionale ne peut connaître qu'une médiocre détente tant que « perdure le conflit afghan » (pages 24 et 25). Et même si les efforts diplomatiques pour régler le conflit du Proche-Orient étaient un jour couronnés de succès, il en faudrait bien plus pour assurer « les conditions d'une paix durable » (pages 22 et 23).

Le meilleur des mondes, à la fin de l'histoire, ne sont pas si proches. Pour le moins, usant de leurs droits, les croyants dans les dém-



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Le défi de la démocratie en Europe de l'Est

János Kis*

La naissance des mouvements démocratiques en Europe de l'Est, il y a quinze ans, a été concomitante du début ou de l'achèvement de la transition démocratique des régimes autoritaires d'Europe du Sud ou d'Amérique latine. Toutefois, jusqu'à présent, les mouvements d'Europe de l'Est se sont arrêtés juste avant d'entamer une transformation du système politique lui-même. Leur stratégie s'est invariablement limitée à la reconstruction d'une société civile dans le cadre d'un contrôle inchangé du parti communiste sur le gouvernement et les appareils de coercition. L'ère d'une telle auto-limitation apparaît désormais close. En Pologne et en Hongrie, le partage du pouvoir et la dissociation entre l'État et le parti communiste sont maintenant d'actualité. La Tchécoslovaquie pourrait suivre très bientôt ces deux exemples.

Tant en Pologne qu'en Hongrie, c'est le pouvoir communiste lui-même qui a proposé aux mouvements d'opposition d'être juridiquement reconnus et d'entrer au gouvernement. Je pense qu'il est crucial d'analyser les motifs et le sens de cette attitude. Ce serait mal l'interpréter que de la comprendre comme une répétition des négociations de Gdansk de 1980. A ce moment-là, les chefs communistes polonais furent acculés, par un mouvement de grève vigoureux, à accepter de négocier car ils ne se sentaient pas prêts à exclure l'opposition de la

* L'auteur de l'opposition démocratique hongroise et philosophe, vient de publier *L'égalité digne, essai sur les fondements des droits de l'homme*, Seuil, collection « Esprit », (préface de Paul Thibaud). Ce texte est la traduction d'une conférence prononcée en mai 1989 devant le National Endowment for Democracy, Washington DC.

scène politique par la force. Aujourd'hui, en revanche, ils proposent de négocier sous une pression bien moindre, car ils souhaitent inclure l'opposition dans la structure du pouvoir. Avec la fin de cette décennie, dont le commencement fut marqué par la reconnaissance officielle puis par la mise hors-la-loi de Solidarité, les communistes polonais comme les Hongrois ont dû reconnaître qu'ils n'avaient pas d'autre issue à la stabilisation de leur régime, en proie à une crise économique grandissante et à la corruption sociale, que de partager les responsabilités avec des partenaires réellement indépendants. Pour la première fois depuis la soviétisation de l'Europe de l'Est, les partis gouvernants ont besoin d'une opposition légale, en la cooptant dans la structure de pouvoir, pour user de son autorité afin de légitimer les mesures d'austérité et démobiler la résistance sociale.

Mais jouer ce jeu en commençant par l'offre de négociations comporte des risques majeurs pour les deux parties. Pour le leadership communiste, le danger réside dans la possibilité tout à fait envisageable que le processus engagé par leur initiative conduise beaucoup plus loin qu'ils n'ont l'intention d'aller. La brèche ouverte dans le mur de l'État-parti monocentrique pourrait s'élargir progressivement, jusqu'à ce que le processus trouve son équilibre dans la compétition ouverte d'une véritable démocratie parlementaire. Cette chance est par ailleurs la seule justification que puisse invoquer l'opposition démocratique pour accepter le marché. Mais elle doit aussi considérer le risque de stabiliser par cet accord le pouvoir communiste ou au moins de priver la société de toute force d'opposition crédible, au lieu d'engager une transition relativement ordonnée à la démocratie.

Mais d'être ainsi manipulées et d'endosser le rôle de fournisseurs d'une légitimité à la domination communiste ne sont toutefois pas les seuls dangers auxquels les oppositions polonaise et hongroise doivent faire face. La transition, même si elle est engagée, ne sera pas un processus stable. De part et d'autre, le contrôle exercé par chacune des parties sur sa base sera sans doute soumis à de sévères tensions. Des *apparatchiks communistes en position stratégique* pourraient tenter de ruiner l'accord en le sabotant ou en organisant des provocations délibérées. De l'autre côté, les opposants radicaux pourraient engager une campagne visant à ôter toute légitimité à un compromis passé avec les communistes. Le contrat social pourrait bien se dissoudre avant d'avoir produit quelque résultat tangible.

Un autre danger menaçant le processus de transition est lié à la crise économique. Les inévitables mesures d'austérité et la permanence de la corruption pourraient convaincre ce qu'on appelle la majorité silencieuse que la démocratisation ne fait qu'empirer la situation. L'opposition pourrait être perçue comme coresponsable des difficultés accumu-

lées. Un tel développement, qui discréditerait toute alternative politique, pourrait être envisagé comme bénéfique du point de vue communiste. Il pourrait en résulter un désir d'ordre et de discipline de plus en plus largement répandu, dont pourrait profiter un « homme providentiel », se proposant de sauver la patrie du chaos politique et économique. Une réaction en chaîne d'explosions de violence de masse peut aussi découler d'une délégitimation générale de toute politique, qu'elle soit officielle ou oppositionnelle.

D'autres risques sont cachés dans l'environnement international. Si une nouvelle stabilisation conservatrice en Union soviétique, analogue à celle que Hoxha fut capable d'instaurer après Krouchtchev, n'est guère probable; en revanche de fortes oscillations dans la politique soviétique ne sont pas à exclure, qui pourraient aisément déstabiliser le processus interne de changement en Europe de l'Est. Les conflits ethniques et nationaux pourraient détourner l'attention du public de la question de la démocratie et encourager des leaders autoritaires à mobiliser les forces nationalistes pour consolider leur pouvoir, comme en Serbie.

Ces quelques remarques cursives peuvent donner l'impression que les chances d'une transition ordonnée et pacifique à la démocratie en Europe de l'Est sont en fait très minces. Il faut toutefois noter que la situation présente en Pologne et en Hongrie ne résulte pas seulement d'une conjoncture favorable. L'empire soviétique est entré dans l'ère du déclin et de la dissolution. L'État soviétique a certes clairement la puissance militaire de restaurer sa domination sur la région par la force. Mais il a épuisé la possibilité de consolider économiquement un ordre restauré par la force des armes. C'est la principale raison d'une intervention militaire soviétique en Europe de l'Est de moins en moins probable. Et c'est la principale raison expliquant que le déclin économique et les remous politiques s'étendent irréversiblement en Europe de l'Est. Il n'y a pas d'autre moyen de stabiliser cette région que d'établir des économies de marché et des régimes politiques démocratiques. Il y a donc un espoir raisonnable que les dangers menaçant le processus de transition soient vaincus; mais afin de réussir, il nous faut les anticiper. Tous les acteurs, tant internes qu'externes, intéressés à une transition démocratique, devraient avoir pour visée stratégique de stabiliser ce processus.

Dans un souci de brièveté, et pour user du privilège de parler à Washington, permettez-moi de concentrer mon propos sur ce que pourraient faire, à mon avis, les gouvernements occidentaux. D'abord, ils ont en main le levier qui peut accélérer la transition économique et en diminuer les coûts sociaux. Une réduction du fardeau de la dette qui étouffe autant l'économie polonaise que l'économie hongroise, ainsi

que le maintien (dans le cas de la Hongrie), ou la reprise (dans celui de la Pologne) des facilités de crédit semblent être absolument nécessaires. Je ne propose toutefois pas de continuer à verser de l'argent facile dans le panier percé de nos économies, qui produisent à perte. Les dettes ne devraient pas être annulées mais transformées en actifs industriels pouvant être re négociés. Des privatisations devraient être encouragées, des consortiums de créanciers pouvant prétendre à les superviser directement. L'attribution de nouveaux crédits pourrait être liée à la condition que les privatisations dépassent une certaine vitesse. Comme garantie de changements significatifs dans la sphère de l'économie, la pluralisation politique pourrait être liée à ces questions.

En second lieu, l'*Ostpolitik* qui consisterait à ne coopérer qu'avec des gouvernements doit être rejetée. Mais dans les cas où il y a une chance significative de transition négociée, l'attitude de guerre froide qui implique le rejet total de discussions sérieuses avec les gouvernements devra aussi être abandonnée. Les gouvernements occidentaux ne doivent pas soutenir un côté contre l'autre, mais favoriser un contrat social entre les deux parties. Ce qui, cependant, ne veut pas dire qu'il faille abandonner l'opposition au bon vouloir de la soi-disant aile réformiste du parti communiste. En reconnaissant *de facto* le pluralisme de la scène politique, les gouvernements occidentaux contribueront à ce qu'il se développe.

Troisièmement, les temps sont mûrs pour que change la perspective selon laquelle l'Ouest envisage la question de la paix et de la stabilité en Europe. On a l'habitude de considérer cette question comme si elle ne posait pas d'autre problème que celui des armements. En fait, l'asymétrie entre l'Otan et le pacte de Varsovie n'est pas purement un problème de balance des forces militaires stationnées sur leurs territoires respectifs. Il y a aussi une balance organisationnelle. Les gouvernements Est-européens doivent, dans une très large mesure, abandonner le contrôle de leurs propres armées au haut commandement soviétique; les troupes soviétiques d'occupation se déplacent sans contrôle sur les territoires alliés; rien ne permet d'entrevoir entre les pays membres du pacte de Varsovie des relations excluant la menace militaire ou l'intervention. Jusqu'à ce que cette situation change, le pacte de Varsovie demeurera un facteur de pouvoir dangereux et imprévisible en Europe. Il est donc nécessaire de demander que le retrait des troupes soviétiques s'accompagne d'une réaffirmation de la souveraineté nationale sur les armées nationales et sur les territoires au sein du pacte de Varsovie, ainsi que du renforcement explicite de l'URSS à l'usage de la force ou à la menace pour influer sur le devenir intérieur de ses alliés. Plus tôt cela arrivera, meilleure sera la protection qui assurera la transition à la démocratie contre les oscillations de la politique soviétique.

Le défi de la démocratie en Europe de l'Est

En dernier lieu, l'Ouest devrait fermement soutenir les minorités nationales opprimées en Europe de l'Est. Des actions comme l'empêchement serbe sur l'autonomie du Kosovo ne devraient pas rester sans réponse. Ceausescu devrait être isolé; ses successeurs potentiels devraient être avertis que la Roumanie ne pourra pas rejoindre le concert des nations civilisées sans démocratisation, qui devra inclure la sauvegarde et la protection des droits des minorités. L'alternative à une telle politique de fermeté est une balkanisation, qui, à son tour, justifierait les tentatives de rétablir la *Pax sovietica* dans la région. Mais il n'y a plus de moyen de revenir à la *Pax sovietica*, tandis que la balkanisation n'est pas la seule alternative.

János Kis

LA BIOÉTHIQUE EN PANNE ?

Un débat dérobé

Une forte dépression semble actuellement affecter le débat bioéthique. Il n'y a pourtant pas si longtemps, au début du printemps 1989, tout s'éclaircissait : l'ancien projet de loi sur les *Sciences de la vie et les droits de l'homme* (dit *projet Braibant* du nom de son rapporteur, conseiller d'État), réclamé par Michel Rocard, œuvre de juristes et scientifiques travaillant sous l'autorité de Claude Evin et de Pierre Apollon, était rendu public. Ce texte très complet inquiétait par certaines de ses dispositions mais, privilégiant notamment les *droits de l'enfant* sur les *droits à l'enfant*, il s'opposait radicalement aux positions dominantes en vogue sous le premier septennat et développées par Robert Badinter dans son célèbre *discours de Vienne* pronant le *droit individuel* à la procréation, même en dehors du couple. Il semblait donc annoncer un vrai débat. Michel Rocard souhaitait d'ailleurs que la contribution de la France au Bicentenaire de la Déclaration des droits de l'homme soit marquée par l'adoption solennelle d'une loi inspirée de ce texte, faisant ainsi de la France le premier pays au monde à se doter d'une législation couvrant l'ensemble des grandes questions de bioéthique et introduisant dans le droit français le concept inédit de « genre humain ».

Il n'en fut rien : le débat a tourné court, le Parlement n'a rien voté et aujourd'hui le projet Braibant n'est soudainement plus d'actualité : non seulement il n'est pas prévu à l'actuelle session d'automne du Parlement, mais son inscription à la session de printemps ne fait l'objet que d'une molle assurance de la part des pouvoirs publics. Plus grave, sa discussion publique, tant sur le principe d'un texte unique (certains recommandent plutôt des textes spécialisés et séparés) que sur le

22. The situation reported by Orlando Fals Borda in Puerto Tejada (and the People's Civic Movement of Northern Cauca, which grew into a political front as a result of the local PAR experiences in 1978) is worth mentioning. Here, the dogmas carried by the change agents were those of the "vanguard left from which most of the cadres were drawn." The movement, which started as a popular one, suffered greatly "from the unexpected self-sufficiency of some of the founding cadres who, perhaps overacting, began to create difficulties and impose their views at all costs on the meetings. The movement no longer belonged to the people and became an arena for Byzantine conflicts at the individual and group levels. The movement became a vested interest created from above and from outside the people's base organizations" (Fals Borda, note 16, p. 42). Anisur Rahman makes interesting comments on the "new forms of domination over the masses" by the vanguard party approach. See his thoughtful article, "The Theory and Practice of Participatory Action Research," in Orlando Fals Borda, *The Challenge of Social Change* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1985), pp. 107-133.

23. Short of a better word, "spiritual" has been used, here, to express the qualities described in the last part of this article: sensitivity, the art of seeing and listening to the world (the inner and the outer), without the "me" constantly interfering in the process; the ability to relate to others and to do and act, without any particular "plan" or ulterior motive; and indeed those basic qualities of love, compassion, and goodness, now so rare in monetized societies. It matters little whether one has a religious, an atheistic, or a scientific mind. For a spiritual person, human beings, in their relations both with each other and with nature, are not instigated by only material, economic, and worldly interests. There is a "sacred" dimension to their lives which transcends those, giving a meaning to such awesome phenomena as life, death, love, beauty, and perhaps the gods or *the* god in which they believe. As such, the spiritual person fully understands and empathizes with people's sufferings and concern for material or worldly things. Yet, he does not believe that the answer to such problems can be provided only through outward interventions of a material and fragmented nature. Individuals and groups who are aware of the spiritual and sacred dimension in them are in a much better position to find more intelligent and holistic answers. Free from the limitations of the egocentric mind, they can go to the heart of problems and take the right action without chattering and philosophizing. A religious mind has generally that spiritual quality, incompatible with the ritualistic or fanatical belief in a particular religion as against another. The spiritual quality cannot coexist with the arrogant scientific belief that the world is nothing but matter, that all human affairs can be understood and properly managed through science, and that no phenomenon is of interest that cannot be scientifically validated.

Special Feature

The Constitutional Promotion of Human Rights in Eastern Europe

Radmila Nakarada*

Society is infinitely more complex than we can express through our theories, educated pessimism, and romantic hopes. Life often challenges our theoretical confidence, based on elaborate analyses, and confirms our half-thought, cautiously articulated intuition. Life demonstrates the limits of our knowledge, the relativity of even undeniable values, and the play of forces from the past that incomprehensibly undermine the intentions of the present.

Against the background of scientific breakthroughs—almost unimaginable accumulations of knowledge—a strong feeling prevails that basic, fundamental questions remain unanswered. Furthermore, in spite of all our knowledge, there seems to be an insurmountable discrepancy between our insights and the results of our actions. Unintended consequences transform even the best intentions into their opposites.

Just when we explain to ourselves that a more rational direction of development is evolving in a society, an unpredicted regression, an involution, occurs. Just when we convince ourselves that some societies are hopelessly static and irreversibly petrified, unprecedented changes and radical reforms are initiated.

In one moment the character of the political system is the obstacle to change; in another the economic crisis is a grave hindrance to political democratization. In one moment constitutionalism is of no relevance for the functioning of reality due to the type of political power, in another its irrelevance stems from the type of *powerlessness* of the society. In the first case, it is suspended by the arbitrary interpretations in the function of political domination; in the second, by disintegrative tendencies, the unresolvable conflicts life produces.

We assume that dramatic economic/political problems are directly and exclusively the result of an existing political system, only to witness

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that after its radical dismantling, the same problems are reproduced. Some societies seem to be dramatically confronted with problems of modernization no matter what political system is installed.

Social forces and structures of domination, homogenization, and automation generate a feeling of human helplessness. And yet, individual human action, forms of solidarity, and dramatic sacrifices can unexplainably become sudden energies of change intervening into the coldest and harshest reality.

In other words, social change is as much a mystery as it is a rational project. In spite of a number of established regularities related to social development, change is uncontrollable. Once initiated, it has a logic of its own, producing unpredictable consequences. As desirable as it may be, change always entails unevenly distributed social costs and creates paradoxes that do not fit existing theoretical codes. The problematic of socialism—the fate of its utopian project, the attempts of implementing reforms, the status of human rights—in many aspects reflects these ambivalences.

Old Theories

Just a year or two ago, a discussion of the possible contribution of constitutionalism to the development of human rights in Eastern Europe could easily and coldly be absolved in a few sentences. Within the theory of totalitarianism, the answer would be negative, based on its interpretation of the inherent nature of the socialist societies. In short, the real existing socialist societies are totalitarian—the party state has captivated the whole of society and turned it into a monolithic entity. The party is the one and only arbiter in *all* spheres of life, from economic, political, and legal to the sphere of art. The rule of the party has been enacted in place of the rule of law. In such a situation, constitutionalism is a voluntaristic force, an instrument of control and subjugation of the individual in accordance with the power interest of the party. Therefore, human rights are incompatible with the nature of the system, and they cannot become a determining constitutional principle of reality without eradicating the system itself. In other words, these societies are petrified and unreformable. Any idea of evolutionary change, which would breathe life into rhetorical constitutional norms pertaining to human rights, is an agonizing illusion. The road to human rights is the collapse of the existing system.

The understanding of these societies as unmoving, monolithic systems, thriving only on a combination of naked and subtle violence, with collapse being the only viable form of "social transformation," is to its extremist form an oversimplification but not a complete misleading

of reality.¹ The totalitarian description corresponds to a phase of social development (for example, Stalinist) and to some aspects of social life.² But it remains insensitive to evolutionary changes of reality and the development of its pluralistic features. The theory itself is petrified within one image of these societies. Furthermore, the anticipated collapse may become a reality for some of these societies in the future, but not necessarily for all. Due to imposed ideological homogenization, insufficient distinction is made between socialist countries, their different cultures, and transformational potential.

A more subtle analysis would grant the possibility of constitutional promotion of human rights, providing radical changes come about within the ruling party and in the society itself. This viewpoint would be based on the ambivalent nature of the constitutional order and its internal contradictions.³ Such an analysis would not deny the domination of the party, which has ascribed to itself the historical mission of creating "New Man" and "New Society" (an insane utopia, according to Leszek Kolakowski). In the name of this, it has suspended the rule of law, identifying the principles of party rule with principles of justice and legality, but in fact depriving the citizens of elemental civil rights.

Such an analysis would not disregard the discrepancy between general principles of the constitution and those applied in reality. Nor would it ignore the internal inconsistencies of the constitution. For instance, the constitution proclaims some of the universal democratic norms ("all power belongs to the people") and individual rights (freedom of expression, thought, association), but in their elaboration severely limits or suspends them. It does so in accompanying articles of the same constitution, or in articles of the penal code in the name of protecting collective rights, defining obligations to the state, and building communism. As an illustration, freedom of expression is severely restricted by Article 133 of the Yugoslav Penal Code, dealing with hostile propaganda, and Article 190 of the Soviet Penal Code, dealing with the dissemination of slander. Freedom of association is severely limited by Article 100 of the Czechoslovakian Penal Code, dealing with incitement against the Republic. Furthermore, these restrictive articles are usually vague, allowing totally arbitrary interpretations. Under Article 62 of the Soviet Penal Code, dealing with treason and espionage, many have in fact become prisoners of conscience.

However, while not losing sight of all these features, a more subtle analysis would at the same time recognize the *evolution in the degree of consistency* between the constitutional order and reality. It would distinguish total discrepancy, symbolized in the coexistence of universalistic, humanistic norms in the constitution and the Gulag system in reality, from partial discrepancy, symbolized in constitutional guarantees of *social* rights under state tutelage and severe restrictions of *political* rights.

Furthermore, such an analysis would perceive that the constitutional order, besides its repressive function, contains ingredients that can be utilized for social transformation. The fact that all Eastern European constitutions pay some tribute, albeit rhetorical, to universal, humanistic, libertarian principles makes possible (1) the constitutional legitimization of protagonists of democratic changes, and (2) the initiation of substantial social changes by demanding the consistent implementation of these articles.

With new social energies—pressures from below and reforms from above—articles that are at present a mere decoration can come to life. Until recently the appearance of effective social energies and reforms from above was not considered likely. The following quote illustrates the degree of disbelief in the reforms from above:

On the one hand, the party leadership rejects every demand for reform, no matter how clearly formulated it may be (and often supported by street demonstrations); it resists all pressure from radical groups; it clings desperately to its absolute power. Its main fear is the emergence of a reformist caucus inside the party that might sweep away the old gang; nothing is farther from the thinking of the New Kadarists than the idea of Political reform.⁴

New Realities

Reality has again proceeded contrary to our theoretical assessments. The current ferment in some of the socialist societies is making new demands on our conception of their nature and the role of constitutionalism in promoting human rights. It is demanding unambiguous acknowledgment that socialist countries are not monolithic as individual societies, nor as a bloc. Under the frozen surface, tradition and historical memory were actively surviving. Under political captivity, an immensely transformed social and professional class structure emerged, accompanied by the pluralization of interests and conflicts. Under the iron curtain, communication with the world was established and nurtured. Under the veil of an ideologically homogeneous bloc, the existence of different civilizations and cultures—that is, historical identities and linkages—are being “discovered,” such as Central East European, Euro-Asian, and Balkan.

Furthermore, the potential for change, the degree of commitment to change, as well as its direction and content differ among the existing socialist countries. One can distinguish frozen countries, which are straining themselves to remain unchanged (East Germany and Albania); those that are interested in very limited changes, primarily

economic ones (Czechoslovakia); those that are moving step by step in a retrograde direction (Romania and China); and those that are attempting radical political and economic changes (Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, and Yugoslavia).

A broad range of orientations exists within the reform-oriented countries. In the economic sphere, orientations range from shy, moderate corrections of the command economy to those demanding the complete adoption of the mechanisms and institutions of the market economy. In the sphere of politics, they range from limited democratization to a full transition from a party state to a state of law and parliamentary democracy, from restricted pluralization to a full multiparty system, and from securing the leading role of the Communist party in spite of political pluralism and competition to allowing the possibility of its stepping down from the throne of power and becoming an oppositional party.

A particular feature of the present situation is the increasing importance attached to the constitutional factor by the reformers from above and the democratic movements from below. This importance is expressed in forceful demands for amending the existing constitution, modifying the bylaws, or even completely rewriting the existing constitution. These demands are articulated within the framework of political reforms. To substantiate this, we will extensively quote original sources: “All communist countries are moving toward democratization, free expression and individual rights. These processes are painful, but they are necessary.”⁵ A year before, in the Resolution of the 19 Conference of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, distinct separation of party and state organs, constitutional reform and strict respect of laws and the constitution, and the independence of the judiciary were proclaimed as the principles of political reform.⁶

On the other hand, the Moscow Trust Group has formulated its demands in the following manner:

In our country we consider the following to be essential:

- irreproachable adherence to the constitutional rights and freedom;
- changes in the legislative and judicial-executive practices in the USSR with the objective of preventing opportunities for persecution of people for their convictions;
- guarantee of the “right to pacifism,” that is establishment of alternative civilian service for persons who are unable, for reasons of conscience, to serve in the army.⁷

In Poland, Adam Michnik voices these demands in the following manner:

The point is that as citizens, we in the democratic opposition don't want to be treated any longer as children or slaves. The basic principle of the anti-

feudal movement was human rights, the idea that everyone has rights equal to those of the monarch. That's what we also want. We want everybody to enjoy the same rights as Jaruzelski, secured by the rule of law.⁸

At the same time, during a Central Committee session of the PUWP (Polish United Workers' Party), Jaruzelski expounded the transformation of the Polish system into "socialist parliamentary democracy and civil society," introducing in April 1989 the constitutional division of legislative, executive, and judiciary power.⁹ Similarly, the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers party had in March 1989 formulated its program of political reform: establishing a truly legal state, introducing representative democracy, placing the decisions concerning armed forces beyond everyday political struggles, reinforcing constitutionally a multiparty system, extending human rights, and guaranteeing the rights of minorities.¹⁰

An independent group, the Interim Council of the Network of Free Initiative, defined its political demands in the following manner:

1. The republic needs a new constitution guaranteeing civil and political rights;
2. Parliament should be renewed,... and it must regain its legislative powers;
3. The party cannot be above the law.¹¹

The demands of the democratic opposition in countries lagging in reforms are of similar nature. In the GDR, the Peace and Human Rights Initiative states: "We see two major sets of tasks in society: 1. the establishment of constitutionalism, 2. democratization,"¹² and in Czechoslovakia, a leading Chapter 77 activist, Jaroslav Sabata, underlines: "I am convinced that the primary aim of the struggle for human rights in our circumstances must be the reintroduction of civil liberties and political democracy with all its classic attributes, and that we will only be able to achieve political democracy if we manage to defeat the bureaucrats."¹³

The constitutional factor is gaining credibility and becoming one of the determining instruments of change, a lever that enables civilizational transformation without destructive confrontations. It is providing space for organic links by translating decrees from above and demands from below into a transideological institutional order. This is due to several reasons: (1) the type of crises these societies are confronted with, (2) the new type of social actors that have surfaced, (3) the general consciousness concerning the importance of human rights and the rule of law, and (4) international pressure.

The acute crisis of the real existing socialist societies is general, permeating all spheres of social life. It does not belong to the natural economic

cycles of prosperity and recession, but threatens the very existence of societies. The old Bolshevik formula of development is exhausted. It is unable to secure the conditions of self-reproduction nor address the new challenges and imperatives of modern development. The crisis is simply unsolvable on the basis of statist and repressive collectivism. The economic crisis is particularly severe (shortages, impoverishment of masses, and foreign debts), endangering the dominant principle of social consensus, the authoritarian social compromise—that is, the satisfaction of some existential and social needs in exchange for relinquishing civic rights.

The existing political institutions are also in a crisis. Being institutions of the party and not the society, they are unable to rationally channel social energies and enable the articulation and resolution of conflicts.

The roots of the crisis lie, in part, in the captivity of those crucial driving forces of development—the creative potential of the society and individual initiative.

The major therapy for the crisis is sought in the economic realm, in a manner that presupposes a radical change in the individual motivation, creativity, and initiative—that is, the parallel introduction of principles of entrepreneurship, economic autonomy, and self-management. However, the fruitful implementation of these principles is difficult without the democratization of the political system and without a consistent recognition and legal protection of human rights. In this situation the interdependence of economy and politics is coming to life in a rational manner, replacing the previous irrational denomination of politics over economy. Also, the evolution of this rational interdependence brings together the reformist forces from above and from below in a common endeavor: to reform and strengthen the constitutional order. This leads us to the explication of the second factor contributing to the growing credibility of constitutionalism.

The dramatic crisis has, among all else, led to the revitalization of the civil society. This revitalization is the result of a combination of factors. First and foremost, it is the result of new social movements, parties, clubs, and groups, appearing in such numbers that their repressive neutralization seems highly impossible. As autonomous social forces they are able to exert some control over the state apparatus, limiting its arbitrary interpretation of the law, breathing life into the unapplied constitutional acts pertinent to human rights, demanding the elimination of existing articles that undermine them, and seeking the introduction of new provisions that enlarge the scope of rights.

The Moscow Trust Group has striven to revitalize to the fullest the constitutional right to freedom of movement and choice of residence.¹⁴ The Czechoslovakian Independent Peace Association has demanded that "those articles of the Czechoslovak Legal Code which can be abused for political ends should no longer be used to prosecute Czechoslovak citizens. These are the articles dealing with subversion of the republic, incitement

and damaging the interest of the republic abroad, obstructing state surveillance of the churches and others."¹⁵

Various independent groups in Yugoslavia have also campaigned for the abolishment of Article 133 of the Yugoslav Penal Code, dealing with the "verbal delict." They have succeeded in gaining official support, and the article is now undergoing legal procedures of change. In Poland, the Freedom and Peace movement and the Orange Alternative have succeeded in 1988 in legalizing the civil military service for conscientious objectors and changing the text of the military oath (leaving out mention of the Soviet Union). Civil military service has also been allowed in Hungary, and recently in Yugoslavia as the result of peace movements activities.

However, novelty on the social scene entails not only new movements, groups, citizen associations, and forces of civil society, but also a new type of reformer within the ruling elite. Among the party reformers, usual features are noticeable: elements of the self-limiting principle, initiation of political competition, demonopolization, creation of democratic institutions and procedures of control over the police and army, and promotion of the rule of law.¹⁶ The party reformists in Poland and Hungary are responding to the crisis in a manner that seems to put the future of the society, the gate of the country, above the absolute security of their power. This is not only the result of pressure and the bankruptcy of legitimation, but also of will and consciousness. Pacifications of society by massacres, à la Tiananmen Square, the introduction of martial law, or the outbreak of civil war are all realistic, although tragic, options. The reason the party reformers currently attach importance to constitutionalism is that they see their prolonged political existence in its democratic revitalization. As such, it is a means of countering and neutralizing the conservative, dogmatic factions within the establishment. By promoting the rule of law, the reformists are gaining support of social movements, large numbers of intellectuals, and the working class—support that cannot be erased easily by a conservative coup. Also, the constitutional promotion of human rights is their chance for renewed legitimation.

Being universal values, the problematic of human rights has its own self-propelling force. By this we mean that their renaissance in the reform-oriented socialist countries is the result not only of crises (deprivations) but also of social and cultural development (achievements). The crises gave vent to the accumulated resentment of the negation of elemental human rights, but they also gave vent to the accumulated *aspirations* in this realm, which resulted from the development, refinement, and growth of peoples' needs for political and general consciousness. These aspirations are a social pressure in themselves, independent of the crisis. In accordance with this, the struggle for the recognition of human rights is not only focused on the immediate, most acute political deprivations, but also takes up the problems all modern nations are facing—those of ecology, peace, gender, and youth.

The growing importance of constitutionalism stems not only from the character of the internal and external problems—behind the backs of hostile ideological systems an interdependence has been created that, among all else, allows for mutual influences and pressures. In the internal recognition of human rights, the international (external) factor has gained unprecedented strength in reform-oriented socialist societies.¹⁷ Forms of pressure differ, from political pressure of individual governments and nongovernmental organizations on the basis of the Helsinki accords, to economic pressure of supranational institutions, such as the EEC or European Parliament. The EEC severed economic negotiations with Rumania because of the deplorable state of human rights in that country. Pressure is also exerted by the Western European movements and their support for the Eastern European human rights movements, as well as the mutual support of Eastern European movements.¹⁸

These pressures are today rendering results because the improvements in the realm of human rights have become a condition for gaining badly needed economic support and aid. At the same time, pressures are an additional instrument for combating internally the conservative factions of the establishment.

The international factor is also activated from within, by all those who legitimately demand the compliance of the national laws with the international human rights agreements, pacts, covenants, and charters that the state has signed.

Uncertainties

All of the indicated circumstances are creating promising tendencies and evident improvements in the realm of human rights. However, in spite of improvements, in spite of the fact that the desired and needed democratization is beginning to be introduced, the future is uncertain. This uncertainty is entailed by a series of already visible contradictions and paradoxes. Speaking in the most general manner, the core of the contradictions is in the fact that although individuals are gaining more rights, the existence of societies (Soviet Union, Poland, Yugoslavia) is threatened. Instead of repressive, voluntaristic political power, now life itself may override the significance of constitutionalism and the rule of law, due to the upsurge of unsolvable conflicts and problems, the most important being the failure to resolve the economic crisis and ethnic conflicts in spite of all the political reforms. In such a situation the self-evident positive connotation of human rights, democratization, is tarnished, at least in the eyes of the victims of change—those impoverished and deprived. According to some estimates, this is already 30 percent of the population in the Soviet Union and 60 percent in Yugoslavia.

An "overload" of problems is created by the combination of the uncorrectable defects and injustices from the past, irrationalities embedded in people's minds and relations, and the space for regressive energies and reforms unintentionally created. It opens up space to nationalist, separatist, and various extremist political tendencies, and to a disintegrative type of pluralism where instead of energies for change being enlarged they are mutually extinguishing each other and eroding the very meaning of constitutional promotion of human rights. These tendencies threaten the very existence of society. In such a situation democratization may appear as a self-defeating tendency. Whether the constitutional promotion of human rights will gain an irreversible character amidst all these complex circumstances depends in part on the following.

Political and economic reforms are necessary, but if implemented without careful consideration and a conscious decision to combat their possible ill effects, they may in the end rejuvenate forces of restoration. For instance, the solution to the economic crisis is sought in the introduction of market mechanisms. However, the introduction of market mechanisms can be realized in a rational manner, with careful plans for reduction, requalification, and social policy, or in a brutal, Darwinist manner. Brutality would have as a consequence mass unemployment, astronomic price increases, and an existential massacre of a large segment of the working population,¹⁹ as well as new social polarizations. All this would lead to social unrest and the strengthening of antireformist forces.

The economic crisis is dangerous because it cannot be solved quickly under any circumstances, and at the same time, the viability of the whole reform rationale depends on its efficient recovery. Since Gorbachev came to power, the economic crisis in the Soviet Union, for instance, has become worse in terms of shortages and market deficiencies. Poland is experiencing a similar situation, and Yugoslavia, although not suffering so much from shortages in consumer goods, is suffocating under hyperinflation comparable to that in some of the Latin American countries (officially it is 800 percent, unofficially 1500–2000 percent). Judging from some of the letters quoted in the Soviet press, an almost unsolvable drama is taking place. For those spending endless hours in queues for all essential consumer goods, the present time of reform is experienced as being worse than any period in the past, including Stalin's era. The society has just so much strength for revolution and reforms, and it may die just like individuals from exhaustion, warns a desperate reader.²⁰

The will for reform and the understanding that the present must be changed is confronted with the lack of knowledge of how to go about it. Perhaps the drama of these societies has become too complex, the destruction of the social tissue too deep, and the conflicts too pathological for fruitful understanding and intervention. (The economic situation in the Soviet Union, Poland, and Yugoslavia is worse from day to day, as

are the national conflicts in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Only the situation in Hungary is less dramatic.) How to change individual behavior, how to transcend disbelief and apathy (in the recent Polish elections, 38 percent of the population did not vote, which was interpreted as mistrust both in the PURP and the opposition), how to quickly solve the existential desperation and humiliation of citizens, how to pacify extremists, how to gain the support of the *nomenklatura*, how to work out viable social and political compromises, how to neutralize the repressive apparatus, and how to transcend the existing order and not end up in "totalitarian anti-communism" or nationalist explosions are questions not only of power and will, but also of knowledge.

With the renouncement of the "insane utopian" dimensions of the socialist project, many of the civilizational achievements previously nullified as bourgeois have become ideologically legitimate. First and foremost among these are democracy and market. However, the solution to the acute crisis in the socialist countries cannot be found in the simple transplantation of the formula "democracy + market." The problem is how to translate this formula into concrete political steps, institutions, and relations. The translation demands a synthesis of one's own experiences and the experiences of Western democracy; a combining of grassroots democracy and parliamentary democracy; social justice and economic efficiency; economic, social, and political rights; and new, original solutions based on the cultural and historical specificity of each country. Whether this will be attained by the current reforms, providing they are not already too late, depends on many elements, but not the least on the knowledge, insight, and wisdom of the actors.

Constitutional promotion of human rights is also endangered in multinational countries (the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in particular) by the upsurge of national conflicts that have become intensive to the point of bloodshed. A number of old national conflicts and ethnic hostilities are arising, and the spirit of revenge and uncivilized intolerance is in the air. The justified demands for national autonomy and independence are speedily becoming chauvinistic and separatist movements, disintegrating the whole of society. To illustrate how far these irrational tendencies may go, we will mention only a recent example in Latvia. As one of the Baltic republics, Latvia has demanded greater autonomy from the center, in the direction of secession. Latvia is now internally confronted with the demands of 40,000 Poles, living in the town of Shalchiyski, for Polish administrative autonomy and possible future secession!

Every nationality in these Eastern European countries feels in one way or the other victimized by the past, and all seek a solution for themselves. The integrity of the country as a whole is at this moment an abstract problem for which no one feels responsible. In such a situation a phe-

phenomenon of national democracy is created. A democratic framework is sought only for one's own nation in mind. In several cases, for instance, the Soviet Union (in the Baltic republics and Ukraine) the equality for one's own language was sought on the level of the whole country, whereas the same principle was not respected in one's own republic.²¹ Nationalist conflicts and separatist movements are at the moment, the most efficient instrument of mobilizing and legitimizing antireform forces, particularly since they are disruptive not only for the countries involved, but also, according to Western analysts, for the global security of Europe. "Higher state interests" would again suspend the whole problem of human rights and their constitutional promotion.²²

The irreversibility of the democratic reform, constitutional promotion of human rights being a part of it, depends also on how consistently the ruling elite and the opposition uphold the principle of self-limitation in practice. The principle of self-limitation is a mode of securing time, this precious condition for transformation, so as to allow the seeds of constitutionalism to firmly root themselves. It is a means of preventing a conservative coup before some major social institutions of transideological character are enacted. This could prevent tragic setbacks and enable the survival of any future crisis in a nonthreatening manner.

Upholding the principle of self-limitation means, on the part of the opposition, the following: renouncing political revenge, moderation in demands vis-à-vis the dethroning of the ruling party, and consistent evolutionism in place of the idea of dismantling the existing system overnight. On the part of the ruling elite, self-limitation demands a higher degree of tolerance vis-à-vis civil society, readiness to share power, and consistent reform orientation. On the part of both, this demands compromise and dialogue, neutralizing the extremist faction on both sides, and a consensus concerning the reform program. Upholding the principle of self-limitation would be based on the awareness of the rulers that the majority of the society is supporting the opposition. The victory via violence would be equally uncertain for both sides, and most probably bloody.

The transformation from authoritarianism to democracy is an immensely difficult task involving many self-evident and hidden determinants both internally and externally. The transformation demands bold compromises, sincere tolerance, practical efficiency, and courageous patience. Constitutionalism is but one determinant, but a particularly significant space of rational emancipation, social intervention, compromise, transideological dialogue, and consciousness. It is a firm demarcation line between the ills of the past, isolation from the world, and the irreversible conquering of presuppositions of modern development, where the dignity of the individual is upheld as a principle and strategy.

Notes

1. For a developed critique of the totalitarian theory, see S. Cohen, *Rethinking the Soviet Experience* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980).
2. According to an interview with Adam Michnik ("Towards a New Democratic Compromise," *East European Reporter* 3 (May 1988): 27).

The classical analysis of the totalitarian order presented by Hannah Arendt no longer describes our situation accurately; it applies only to state institutions themselves. The Polish system consists of a totalitarian state coexisting with a society which cannot be controlled through totalitarian methods. The state wants to exercise totalitarian power, but is unable to do so. It is forced to compromise with life.

3. Where not specified, my analysis represents a generalization of shared, common features concerning the problem of constitutionalism and human rights in socialist societies attempting reform.
4. Gabor Demszky, "Initiatives for Hungary," *East European Reporter* 3 (No. 3, 1988):49; Eugene Fortinbras, "Kadar Packed his Bags...and Stayed Put," *East European Reporter* 3, (No. 2, 1988):59.
5. M. Gorbachev, quoted in *Newsweek* (May 29, 1989):14.
6. Resolution of the 19 Conference of the Communist party of the Soviet Union, Yugoslav daily, *Politika* (July 1988):3.
7. "Moscow Trust Group News," in *Ukrainian Peace News* 1 (No. 3/4, 1987):8.
8. Interview with Adam Michnik, note 2, p. 27.
9. The position of PURP is quoted according to N. Burzau, "Polish totalitarian society is becoming civil society," Yugoslav daily, *Doza* 6/7 (May 1989):3.
10. On the Hungarian Socialist Workers party, we used the article of D. Rancic, "Multiparty Pluralism," *Politika* 3 (February 1989):4.
11. "A Way Out of Crisis," statement of the Interim Council of the Network of Free Initiative, *East European Reporter* 3 (May 1988):55.
12. "Self-portrayal of the Initiative Peace and Human Rights," *Bulletin of the European Network for East-West Dialogue* 1-2 (1988):32.
13. "Invasion Our Own Goal?" (interview with Jaroslav Sabata), *East European Reporter* 3 (May 1988):6.
14. "Moscow Trust Group News," note 7.
15. "Leave Us Alone," a joint letter from the Independent Peace Association and the Democratic Initiative Group to Milos Jakes, General Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, *East European Reporter* 3 (May 1988):24.
16. To illustrate this, PURP has been the first Communist party in history to voluntarily renounce its power monopoly. The Hungarian party is going in the same direction. For the first time in seven decades, the head of KGB, V. Krychkov, had to undergo a parliamentary hearing. At the end, he stated that the KGB should be under the control of the government. At the Congress of the Supreme Soviet, Gorbachev strongly supported the idea that citizens should voice their opinions concerning all major laws in the country by referendum.
17. There is, of course, a degree of hypocrisy and double standards present in Western pressure, concerning the Western support of oppressive regimes in South Africa or Central America, covert operations of Western secret service, problems of Ireland and Spain, or the question of economic rights in their own societies.

18. To illustrate the Eastern European solidarity we will quote the Border Declaration issued following a clandestine meeting of members of Polish-Czechoslovak Solidarity on July 10, 1988 (*East European Reporter* 3 (March 1988):61):

Even in the present circumstance we can work towards the implementation of basic human and civil rights, which include... 3. The right to a truly lawful legal system, freedom of association and freedom of speech. The present legal system sanctions lawlessness, allows for harassment of political adversaries and repression of all examples of independent political, social and economic activity. This system is just a tool in the hands of the governing elite; a new one must be created.

19. The failure to recognize that the working class is still a key social force in the Eastern European societies, suppressing the principle of self-management by supporting a coalition of technocrats and fractions of bureaucracy, is also an undermining factor of reform. The recent miners' strikes in the Soviet Union revealed their social strength and the maturity of their demands.

20. Letter from Ogyanok, quoted in *Politika* (May 14, 1989):3.

21. Another example of the inconsistency is the demand of the Baltic republics for economic autonomy, and requiring at the same time that the Gosplan secures for them all the necessary raw materials.

22. Here we disagree with the analyses of Catherine Fitzpatrick ("The Independent Scene in the USSR," *Peace and Democracy News* 3 (No. 2, 1988-1989):21-23), who states that the nationalist fault is that they only took perestroika too seriously, that the change of territorial borders is potentially only a bold movement, and that national struggles are all about people managing their own lives and making their own decisions. The problem is that the nationalists did not take perestroika seriously enough to incorporate the self-limiting principle, that the change of borders is potentially a dangerous movement and managing one's own life is an unclear definition when almost every region in the Soviet Union is multiethnic. Parallel with just demands, retrograde tendencies—anti-Slavism, anti-Semitism, Neo-Stalinism, and religious fundamentalism—are activated.

Document

Towards Comprehensive Security Through the Enhancement of the Role of the United Nations (Aide-Mémoire)

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The purpose of the discussion within the United Nations of the item "Comprehensive system of international peace and security" is to launch a broad international dialogue, above all within the United Nations, on the ways and means of ensuring comprehensive security in military, political, economic, ecological, humanitarian, including human rights, and other fields on the basis of strict compliance with the Charter of the United Nations and the enhanced role and effectiveness of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and in the solution of global problems.

The fundamental position of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on this subject is contained in the article by M. S. Gorbachev "Reality and safeguards for a secure world" (see A/42/574S/19143, annex). On the eve of the forty-third session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Soviet Union is stating its approach to certain specific aspects of ensuring comprehensive security, namely: enhancing the effectiveness of the United Nations and of its main bodies, more extensive use of United Nations peace-keeping operations and the affirmation of the primacy of international law in inter-State relations. At the same time the USSR is also prepared to discuss other aspects of international security as may be proposed by other States.

I

In the opinion of the Soviet Union the search by all States for ways and means to enhance the effectiveness of the United Nations should be aimed at the full and unselective implementation of the provisions of the Charter, active use of its machinery and procedures, and promotion of the ability of the United

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Elite-Mass Relations in Communist Systems

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3 Women in Local Communist Politics in Romania and Poland

INTRODUCTION

Studies of women's political roles in many societies have concluded that women are less politically active than men.¹ Although higher educational levels close the gap between the sexes regarding their concern for and interest in politics, it remains generally true that women are less likely than men to enter 'fully into the political realm'.² Such an assessment is valid as well in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Notwithstanding encouragement of female participation in principle by ruling Communist parties, data at the national level indicate that women are not politically emancipated in Eastern Europe; they constitute, at most, 30% of Communist party membership, while one in four or five Central Committee members or governmental ministers may be a woman. Even after the purposeful recruitment of women into the Romanian Central Committee during the 1970s, for example, a six-fold increase brought their presence in the Central Committee to just 24.5%.³

To let our judgements rest on such aggregate portraits of communist systems would be inadequate because, despite limitations on the entry of women into the national political élite, women in communist countries, as well as in other political systems, appear to be more active at lower levels of politics.⁴ In both community politics and workplace governance in communist states, women are believed to have greater participatory roles. Because women appear to play a larger role at lower levels of the political system and because the forms and extent of local activity can enlarge our knowledge of the relationship between regimes and citizens, I examine the political roles of women at sub-national levels. My data and examples are drawn from Poland and Romania - cases with historical, cultural, and socio-economic distinctions such that one can regard generalizations drawn from their experience with some confidence. In the pages to follow I discuss both how and to what extent women are active in

the local political life of communist states, as well as what explains that degree and kind of activity.

THE FORMS AND EXTENT OF WOMEN'S POLITICAL ACTIVITY AT THE LOCAL LEVEL IN COMMUNIST STATES

Before examining women's political activities, it is important to understand the nature of citizen involvement in general in communist states. Political behavior can be autonomous, brought about by coercion or produced by means of deception. When someone engages in political activity such as voting, or attending a rally, one might, as I will in this volume, distinguish among such behavior following a typology proposed by Aspaturian. Arguing that a generic term such as 'involvement' avoids biases of the West toward autonomy of action, Aspaturian suggests that mobilized involvement and manipulated involvement are most characteristic of communist states. Participatory involvement, while not excluded from communist systems, is less frequent.⁵

Participatory activity⁶ thus denotes autonomous behavior - i.e. that which is not produced by environmental pressures - being performed by highly involved citizens. Participants, following such a denotation, have entered the political realm of their own volition and with a sense of efficacy. Manipulated activity is deceived behavior being performed by a citizen artificially involved whose autonomy has been comprised by falsely being convinced that his or her behavior has systemic importance. Mobilized activity is coerced behavior performed by citizens who are involved little or not at all in such behavior but who nevertheless obey when told to vote, join organizations, or attend meetings because of actual or threatened coercion.

It is thus accurate but too simple to say that men dominate political activity in Eastern Europe and the USSR, since the kinds of political behavior women engage in will vary. If one can identify a higher proportion of involved, autonomous behavior among politically active women in some areas or times than others, we need to account for these differences.

Between 1973 and 1979 I had several opportunities to conduct in-depth interviews with local-level political actors in Romania and Poland. In previous reports on this research, I have referred to samples without distinguishing subjects by gender.⁷ For the purposes

Table 3.1 Distribution of interviews with politically active women in Poland and Romania

Level ^a	1973 Romania ^b	1977 Poland ^c	1978 Romania ^d	Totals By Level
Județ/Wojewodztwo (country/province)	14	3	12	29
Municipiu and Oraș/ Miast (city and towns)	25	11	13	49
Comună/gmina (commune)	14	5	7	26
Totals (by year)	53	19	32	104

Source: Author's interview, 1973, 1977, 1978.

Notes

- Some individuals hold posts at more than one level, of course.
- Interviews conducted in Timiș, Cluj, Brașov, and Iași județe.
- These interviews did not consist solely of deputies but also individuals in local administration; they were conducted in and near Warsaw, Kraków, and Poznań.
- Some of the 32 individuals in the 1978 Romanian sample were individuals interviewed in 1973. In this table, therefore, they are counted twice.

of this chapter, I have tabulated the number of women in local politics with whom I spoke during three periods of research (see Table 3.1). Most of these individuals were selected because of their status as deputies to a people's council (*consiliul popular or rada narodowe*). Although randomness was compromised by many factors, I am satisfied that I spoke with women who were distributed over a wide range of educational, career, age, and other variables.⁸

The presence of women in local communist politics has increased substantially since the early post-World War II period in both Romania and Poland. As late as 1958 in Poland, for example, women held fewer than 6% of all people's council seats and fewer than 2% of the sub-national leadership posts. At that time the most advantageous environments for women's political activity appeared to be in urban settlements or quarters and urban districts (the former typically constituting new suburban apartment developments). A decade later those figures had changed considerably, such that almost 19% of council seats and about one in twenty presidia posts were filled by women. The rural communes (*gromady*), however, brought

the mean down, whereas urban settings continued to exhibit higher levels of female political activity (e.g. 28.5% of members of councils in cities with provincial status, such as Łódź, Kraków, etc. were women.⁹ By 1977, one *osiedle* (urban settlement) outside Poznań had a council in which women constituted 40% of the membership,¹⁰ and more than a quarter of all people's councils members in Poland were women.

Still, in Poland, the distribution continues to be skewed in two principal directions. Women's political activity (as indicated in people's council data) is higher in cities and suburbs; it is also higher in less important roles (outside leadership positions). Female political activity does not, therefore, vary merely with how local the setting, since Polish communes exhibited the smallest proportion of council seats and leadership roles filled by women. Within the narrow confines of urban neighborhoods women were not active.

Romania also shows an increase in the proportion of council seats held by women but does not exhibit such a dramatic urban-rural cleavage in women's political activity. As with Romanian Communist Party (RCP) membership, central decisions mandated an increase in seats held by women during the 1970s. Each election raised somewhat the percent of women in councils at all levels. In Județul Timiș, for example, the 1977 elections uniformly raised by several percentage points the proportion of women in councils throughout the country *vis-à-vis* the 1975 election (overall from a mean of about 29.8% to just above 32%).¹¹ Nevertheless, Romanian rural communes do not exhibit lower percentages of council seats held by women, in contrast to Poland. A highly urbanized county such as Cluj, for example, had slightly *lower* proportions of council seats in 1969 held by women in municipalities and towns than in communes (about 30% to 31%, respectively).¹² The județ-level council – the highest level of local assembly – was 25.6% female. Almost a decade, and several local elections later, women occupied 27% of județ seats and about a third of urban-based constituencies, while over 38% of commune deputies were women.

These contrasts between Romania and Poland may be attributable to the predominant authority of Catholicism in the Polish countryside, which may encourage women to remain outside the political realm due to familial values. Perhaps the demand for additional labor sources in Romania, drawing heavily on rural women, necessitates greater presence in communal organs. Put simply, however, women have more opportunities to become politically

active in Polish urban environments but slightly less in Romanian cities and towns than in rural areas. In both cases the proportion of council seats held by women has increased over time (a change beginning somewhat earlier in Poland than in Romania), but such an increase is not uniform cross-nationally or internally.

As Tables 3.2 and 3.3 illustrate, women in local politics in Romania are well-educated and rather young relative to men.¹³ Overall, male deputies more often have only elementary (through eighth grade) education, but about the same proportion have university training as women. The ages of women in people's councils are also generally lower – or were, at least, in past years. The experience and educational levels of Romanian women in national-level roles has also risen.¹⁴

Table 3.2 Education levels of politically active Romanian women and men in people's councils (%)

	1973 Sample		1978 Sample		Cumulative	
	Men N = 145	Women N = 53	Men N = 57	Women N = 32	Men N = 202	Women N = 85
University degree or some university	34	30	35	47	35	36
Complete secondary or some secondary (lyceum)	44	58	46	50	44	55
Complete primary (școala generală)	22	11	19	3	21	8

Source: Author's interviews, 1973 and 1978.

These Romanian data parallel the American finding that women active in local politics are well-educated, differentiated from the general population in that regard much more so than are male political activists.¹⁵ In the smaller Polish sample, women were likewise well-educated, as almost half had university degrees. (These interviews, however, included local administrators as well and are therefore not directly comparable.)

Such political actors among women are not, by any means, less qualified as a group in educational terms than men. With the advantages of relative youth and high educational levels, there appear few reasons for women not to have an equal chance for leadership posts and broad responsibilities. But the roles women fill in local politics remain, in several crucial respects, unequal.

Women in political life also clearly tend to be recruited for different reasons than men. While men are recruited due to their important socioeconomic roles, women are much more likely than men to have socioeconomic backgrounds outside the bureaucratic-managerial élite. One Polish sociologist has identified two categories among people's council members (*radni*): the *specjalisci* (specialists) and the *posrednicy* (intermediaries). Specialists are defined as:

deputies whose professional skills ... have been confirmed by holding managerial posts (at the time of election). These managerial posts include ... director (*kierownik*) of an independent unit, vice director of a powiat-level institution or director of a wojewode two-level institution. Also included are members of professions, scientific workers, officers of the Polish Army and citizen's militia. Completed higher education (*wykształcenie wyższe*) was an additional condition for deputies' inclusion in this category.¹⁶

Table 3.3 Ages of politically active Romanian women and men in people's councils (%)

Age (years)	1973 Sample		1978 Sample		Cumulative	
	Men N = 145	Women N = 53	Men N = 57	Women N = 32	Men N = 202	Women N = 85
65 and over	5	0	7	3	6	1
46-64	42	30	47	31	44	31
31-45	45	58	37	53	43	57
30 and under	8	11	9	13	8	12

Source: Author's interviews, 1973 and 1978.

Intermediaries are defined as:

individuals who do not hold any managerial posts, and those who hold managerial posts at a level not higher than basic (e.g. foreman in a factory) ... these deputies usually are not highly competent, and by their presence in the council assure the desired configuration of characteristics ...¹⁷

In the research that led to such typologies, almost 2200 deputies were surveyed of whom 74% were men and about 26% women (which was very close to the national mean among councils in urban *powiats* -

the pre-1972 subdivision of provinces).¹⁸ As Table 3.4 indicates, women are under-represented among specialists (only 15%) relative to the proportion of deputies sampled who were female and over-represented in a category of 'intermediaries' (32%).

Another way to consider the same data, of course, is to look at the percentage of both men and women deputies who fall into the specialist and intermediary categories. As Table 3.5 illustrates, 19% of male deputies are specialists following the above-cited definitions, whereas only 10% of women in councils can be so classified. Once again, women are seen to be under-represented. This perspective, which controls for the proportion of women among all deputies, suggests that the rate of specialists among female deputies is about one in ten, whereas for men the rate is doubled (almost two in ten). As discussed below, these data also point to the much higher proportion of men than women in councils who enter the top leadership at the local level.

Table 3.4 Specialists and intermediaries among Polish deputies by sex (%)

Sex	Specialists N = 371	Intermediaries N = 893	All Deputies N = 2195
Male	85	68	74
Female	15	32	26

Source: Krzysztof Jasiewicz, *Role Społeczne Radnych Wojewodzkich Rad Narodowych* (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolinski, 1979) p. 67.

For the Romanian case, I had noted a similar dichotomy on the basis of 1973 research on people's council deputies, referring to categories of deputies who were 'the needed' and 'fillers'. The former constitute, in my view, people who are in the councils 'primarily as a recognition of their positions in state organs or in their careers. ... These are the educated, the expert and the loyal; managing and directing developmental/modernization efforts, their integration into local political institutions is essential'.¹⁹ Fillers, by contrast, are 'needed by the local political élite as a group but not as individuals. Abstractly, they partly fulfill a requirement of governments everywhere - to legitimize rule through representation of a broad popular base'.²⁰ Of the women deputies interviewed, who constituted 28% of the sample, I found that about a fourth could be

classified as needed or élites by my definition (see Table 3.6), although the proportion varied considerably among județe. A much higher proportion of male deputies interviewed were élites or needed. Both men and women in this sample, of course, were drawn disproportionately from these upper echelons since the sample was skewed toward municipalities. At first glance, this might suggest that there are more opportunities for entry into political activity by professional and managerial women in Romania than in Poland (compared to the 10 to 11% of female deputies who are specialists and leaders in the Jasiewicz sample). Again, however, these results may be biased due to an urban over-representation in the sample. I think that the differences between Poland and Romania are, in fact, not as large as these samples would indicate; if Romanian people's councils are an arena for more activity by professional women than are Polish councils, the difference is likely to be marginal at best.

Table 3.5 Men and women among specialists and intermediaries (Poland) (%)

Category	Men N = 1,630	Women N = 565	All deputies N = 2,195
Leaders ^a	5	1	4
Specialists	19	10	17
Intermediaries	37	50	41
Others ^b	39	39	39

Source: Adapted by the author from Jasiewicz, p. 67.

Notes

^aMembers, People's Council presidium.

^bSee Jasiewicz's comments (p. 64) regarding deputies who fit into neither specialist nor intermediary category.

Women, then, are less often than men political activists because of their prior demonstration of competence or managerial experience. This seems to imply a pervasive, unstated expectation that women in political life are there, as Jasiewicz said, to 'assure the desired configuration of characteristics' and, hence, to 'legitimize rule through representation of a broad popular base'.²¹ Despite relatively high educational levels, women who enter local political life have not had the same degree of managerial and professional experience as have men. In the 1973 Romanian sample, for instance, 30% of the female deputies interviewed had university education (incomplete or

complete), but only a fourth could be called needed by virtue of their previous or current careers. That both of these percentages are probably higher than the population of deputies, of course, does not alter their relationship – that high educational achievement has not translated into socioeconomic roles similar to those of men or equal types of activity in local politics. Such a fundamental inequality *vis-à-vis* men is as persistent and pervasive in Romania as in Poland. It is, moreover, an inequality apparent also in the United States where women in political life typically have differed from their male colleagues in terms of social background characteristics and, therefore, fill lesser roles in legislatures, etc. and at higher levels of politics in Eastern Europe.²²

Table 3.6 Elites, needed, and fillers among male and female Romanian, people's council deputies (%)

	Men		Women	
	Elites + needed	Fillers	Elites + needed	Fillers
N = 37 Timiș	44	N = 27 56	20	N = 10 80
N = 47 Cluj	33	N = 33 67	21	N = 14 79
N = 50 Brașov	37	N = 40 63	20	N = 10 80
N = 64 Iași	36	N = 45 64	32	N = 19 68
Cumulative	37	63	25	75

Source: Author's judgments based upon interviews, 1973.

That women, more than men, tend to be fillers in local councils does not mean that they *cannot* be participatory activists, but it will be distinctly harder. People whom I identified as fillers were recruited because their presence was useful, not because their participation was needed. But the performance of certain tasks as a deputy – committee work, constituency services, for example – offers the potential for a filler (in the eyes of those in whose jurisdiction that post is found) to be a participant. Recruitment in the status of a filler does not condemn a woman solely to manipulated or mobilized forms of political activism – but those are precisely the expectations of persons (most likely males) who control recruitment for local assembly seats.

Politically aware women in communist states, however, may utilize such expectations of males in order to conceal the forms and extent of their participatory activism. A female deputy in Brasov who was a persuasive and efficient advocate for her constituency, for example, had held no managerial post and was given no high-level responsibility in the local council or party. She had been, I am certain, recruited because the people's council composition required a younger woman who had completed higher education and who had taught at a school. As a deputy, however, she took initiatives to improve her constituency's neighborhood and utilized intelligence mixed with savvy to get quick action on requests by citizens in her district. In general, however, once they have entered into the political life of their community, town, or province, the roles played by women in local Polish and Romanian politics are limited vertically and horizontally. As in other political systems, women have proportionately fewer opportunities to rise in the local political hierarchy; they also are concentrated in a more narrow spectrum of duties.²³

Among the roles in people's councils, a deputy can be a member of a standing commission, a chairman of a standing commission, a member of the executive committee, or a member of the permanent bureau. The latter role (member, permanent bureau) is reserved for local party élites, who are also in the executive committee, and some of the needed (specialist) deputies. Those specialists and others of similar background typically will chair standing commissions. All ordinary deputies are in a standing commission, membership in which connotes no special status. Of forty-two local members of permanent bureaus (the highest local government organ in Romania) interviewed in 1973, however, only two were women. Among other female activists interviewed (those in Table 3.1), only five were members of council executive committees and only a few were either presidents or vice-presidents of standing commissions.²⁴ As noted earlier, electoral law changes reduced the number of deputies overall in Romania, and greater emphasis was placed on increasing the proportion of women on state and party bodies. After the elections of 1975 and 1977, the proportion of women among people's council executive committee and local party committee members apparently rose to about 25% nationwide.²⁵ In 1979 women became first secretaries in two județe, and the Ceaușescu regime's efforts to raise women's representation at upper echelons of national government were generally mirrored at the local level.

However, it does not appear that top local leadership roles

(members of party bureaus and permanent bureaus of people's councils) are filled by women proportionately more often now than a decade ago. Indeed, one negative way in which to view such changes is exemplified by a hypothetical case based on the Romanian system. If there are more activist women now than there were ten years ago in local political life, the proportion of those activists who are tapped for leadership posts will have improved little and could actually have declined, given the smaller size of the councils and the continued over-representation of males generally. A male deputy in the late 1970s was slightly more likely to have an opportunity for leadership duties than earlier, notwithstanding the greater proportion of women in the council as a whole. Local organs can be expected to exhibit similar trends. Were this circumstance to persist, the vertical mobility of female activists would have increased little or not at all as the result of or despite the greater proportion of women in local political life.

Perhaps more noteworthy, however, are horizontal restrictions on the breadth of responsibilities for women. In this respect, the experiences of women as local-level élites in Romania and Poland resemble those of women leaders in the United States and Western Europe.²⁶ As at the national level in Romania and other East European countries, women are most frequently assigned roles in one of several arenas – education, culture, or light industry. That women in Eastern Europe (and the Soviet Union) constitute the vast majority of those employed in such fields as education and textile manufacturing, for example, is an official rationale for such assignments. The uniformity with which such responsibilities are given to women, however, is striking. In the Romanian and Polish samples cited earlier, for instance, almost half of over one hundred individuals had primary responsibilities in education, culture, or local commerce.²⁷ This horizontal limitation on female political activity is also evident in the standing commission assignments for people's council deputies that appear to exhibit the same tendency. Recalling that women constituted perhaps 30% of most of Romanian people's councils, women deputies are heavily over-represented (more than 50% of the members) in commissions concerning education, culture, and sport and somewhat over-represented (31 to 50%) on commissions dealing with local industry and community services, health, work, and social insurance. Women were under-represented (fewer than 30%) in standing commissions such as budgeting and finance, construction, planning and roads, juridical-administrative, and agriculture and animal husbandry.²⁸

Fully developed explanations for differences between women's political activity in Romania and Poland are, for now, beyond the reach of available data. I think it warranted, however, to expect that urban-rural differences in the political activity of Polish women could be explained in large part on the basis of cultural variables (the church) and economic necessity (the private ownership of agriculture in Poland, which means that more women in rural areas must contend full-time with household tasks, childrearing, and agricultural labor). That a județ such as Iași may exhibit a higher degree of needed (or specialist) backgrounds among women who are political activists perhaps can be explained on the basis of that region's rapid socio-economic change.²⁹ It is at least plausible to expect that high rates of socioeconomic change would relate to needs for greater activity in local government by the professional and managerial stratum, regardless of gender. Simply put, rapidly escalating needs for expertise in regions where relatively little of it has existed in the past may increase the opportunity for and the necessity of recruitment of specialist women.

The forms and extent of women's political activity in local communist politics nevertheless have some generalizable characteristics. Despite rising educational levels, women were denied for many years even a modest presence in local political life. In Poland during the 1960s, and in Romania during the following decade, the proportion of people's council deputy and local party committee posts held by women increased, trends evident in central party and state organs as well. Yet women who enter local political life in both systems continue, to a greater extent than men, to be intermediaries or fillers (not specialist/needed). Furthermore, once active, women enter into the local leadership stratum relatively less frequently (although this, too, has changed to the benefit of women during the 1960s in Poland and the 1970s in Romania). Responsibilities assigned to women, whether in the leadership stratum or not, have been weighted toward arenas traditionally defined as women's issues such as education and culture or economic concerns related to industries in which female employees dominate.

INVOLVEMENT AND AUTONOMY IN THE POLITICAL ACTIVITY OF WOMEN

Thus far, I have not discussed either the psychological or environmental dimensions of women's political activity. To what degree is

local-level political activity among women in communist systems autonomous? To what degree, that is, is women's behavior in local political life characterized by the psychological involvement of those who are active?

Answers to these difficult questions must be indirect and tentative – indirect because data are not available with which to test the subjective orientations of women regarding their political roles *per se* and tentative because the longitudinal and cross-national inferences that we *can* make are very restricted. As noted above, women who enter local politics in Poland and Romania are, more often than men, regarded by those who control recruitment as fillers or intermediaries. This finding raises the suspicion that those who determine who will be nominees for local political roles do not seek women who will be motivated to participate autonomously. Neither do such data mean that other women who enter as manipulated activists could not, once in the political realm, undertake other roles of their own volition with deeply felt convictions. The recruitment to and replenishment of local political roles simply reveals systemic biases across nations likely to be most capable of participating fully, i.e. women who have already demonstrated such capacity in professional or managerial roles.

Some women have entered political life without enthusiasm, primarily because environmental circumstances left them little choice. Even women with specialist backgrounds can be mobilized into political activity – the school director, enterprise accountant, or physician who because of her professional or managerial post in a community is nominated by the party's front organization to be a deputy, is elected, and is then made chairperson of a people's council standing commission. But in the same years I have interviewed such individuals, I have also met women for whom political activity is a long-term concern entered into out of deep personal commitment.³⁰ Although I cannot be precise about such judgements, it seems likely that a higher proportion of the needed women deputies have such commitments and exhibit more lengthy involvement in politics, while very few of the fillers are likely to view political activity as a long-term concern.

A recitation of individual cases, however, is less persuasive than are data regarding women's participation in enterprise governance. Studies of this issue in Eastern Europe indicate that women are much less likely than men to make complaints in the workplace; they also less often express dissatisfaction, have a greater inclination to

conform, and are more concerned than men about relations with colleagues and bosses.³¹ As in the United States, it seems likely that the explanation for such findings must combine socialization and structural variables.

Deferential attitudes regarding governance at the workplace appear to be related to stronger commitments among women than men to familial and parental obligations. Although women are motivated by material rewards at the workplace as are men, many East European women regard the primary duty or obligation of women as that of motherhood and wife, with obligations of one's profession and of citizenship lower.³² Such attitudes may reflect the impact of socialization to women's roles and the view that the exercise of authority is primarily a male prerogative.

Socialization to more general female roles also appears to be a strong impediment to autonomous political action on the part of women in Eastern Europe as well as in the United States, for it may lead women to defer to men in political life as well as in the workplace. Given the stress in East European cultures that politics and, particularly, the exercise of authority are unfeminine activities, East European women are less likely than men to have obtained the necessary skills to be efficacious political actors. The impact of socialization is further reinforced in Eastern Europe by the recruitment patterns already discussed that channel women, more than men, into filler roles in local politics.

Deference is not, of course, a quality simply measured. There may be several types of deference tapped by questions addressing women in the community or workplace - deference that deceives superiors (usually men) and thereby manipulates them, deference that is task, time, or locale-specific (outside of which, the subject will evince little or no deference), and deference that exhibits subservience. I label these, respectively, as (1) offensive deference, (2) defensive deference, and (3) submissive deference.

In all cases, deference is an attitude whereby decisions and choices are left to others, for example, superiors. Translated into the political arena, offensive deference could be invoked by a woman who in local politics is a participatory activist. The mobilized activist might utilize defensive deference; brought into an environment where she is uncertain because of coercion, she defers to authorities while in that activity but in no other behavior. A manipulated activist might not, because of the deception that brought her into the political realm, recognize the utility of offensive

or defensive deference and may, indeed, submit entirely to prevailing authority.

The relationship of East European women to authority found in studies at the workplace may well be linked to the distribution of their political activity among participatory, manipulated, and mobilized types. Were such defensive and submissive attitudes of deference and familial orientations transferred directly into the political realm, one could expect women more than men to be susceptible to mobilization and/or manipulation. The transfer is not, of course, direct since the subset of women engaged in political life is substantially better educated than the entire population of women (as are the male political activists). Education will mitigate any views and values prevalent among women in the workforce that might lead them to be less participatory in enterprise governance, although data reported by Jerry Hough imply that this effect of education is not as great for women as it is for men in the Soviet case.³³ It would be erroneous, in any case, to presume that such deferential attitudes can be erased entirely by education or political activity itself. The socialization of women, which insists that they defer to men in political life, is mitigated but not eliminated by education and training. As in the United States, an important barrier to women engaging in political activity 'is their own perceptions about what they should and should not be doing in politics'.³⁴

ISSUE ORIENTATIONS

In Eastern Europe women and men seem to give different priorities to public issues. Neither gender exhibits (at least as expressed to researchers) broadly distributed concerns. Romanian and Polish activists (people's council deputies) interviewed during the 1970s were asked, for example, 'What are the most important problems facing your community in the next one to three years?' (see Table 3.7). Women most frequently cited education, housing, and provisioning. Although men also frequently cited such problem areas, they outscored women in responses focused on industrial development, transportation, the pursuit of developmental plans, agriculture mechanization, and a few other items. Women were almost always the only activists to mention childcare and community aesthetics.³⁵

Evidence from other communist countries also leads one to suspect that political concerns vary by gender. Years ago, for example,

Table 3.7 Views on 'What are the most important problems in your community - Next 1-3 years?' (%)

	N = 232 ^a N = 104 ^a	
	Men	Women
Economic ^b	22	13
Quality of life ^c	34	46
Education	23	28
General development/modernization ^d	18	10
Others ^e	2	3
TOTAL	99	100

Notes

^aRomanian samples from 1973 and 1978 combined with 1977 Polish interviews.

^bEconomic answers included those focused on agriculture or industry.

^cQuality of life answers included those focused on public services, housing, provisioning, health and sanitation, roads and transportation, and urban planning.

^dGeneral development/modernization answers were those that used such terms without offering a specific substantive area.

^eOther includes finance, parks, democratization, day care centers, etc.

Inkeles and Geiger found that only a small proportion (5%) of signed letters published in Soviet newspapers were signed by women exclusively, while men (alone or with male co-signers) were responsible for 89% of letters. Moreover, a majority of the female-signed letters pertained to consumer items and public services 'with which women are most intimately involved in their daily lives'.³⁶ By the mid-1970s, women were somewhat more frequent writers, but they still concentrated on a narrow band of socio-economic topics.³⁷

From such results, one cannot infer necessarily that the issue orientations of all politically active people differ by gender, or that the male and female populations as a whole would reflect those priorities. One could argue, for example, that women leaders are assigned responsibilities at the local level in part on the basis of their ability or willingness to fit into the expectations of those having the *nomenklatura* (the power of assignments and dismissal) for the post. The restrictions on women's free time *because* of domestic responsibilities also have been found to restrict the breadth and intensity of their political concerns.³⁸

There is a rich literature debating the genesis of such differences between the political interest and activism of men and women in the United States.³⁹ There are also several possible explanations of these differences in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. These indicators may suggest that women are more concerned with the most immediate social and economic problems - where one works, where one shops, and where one lives - whereas men tend to have a different set of priorities. Such a portrait might be construed as a kind of parochialism among women who are engaged in local political activity in communist states arising from socialization or the continued differences in men's and women's domestic roles. Alternatively, it is possible that women chose to place emphasis on issues in which they think their individual and collective influence can be maximized.

The same kind of data also suggests that there are certain structural explanations for these differences. There appears to be a concerted bias against women entering local state organs compared to workers' councils and against women writing about certain topics to newspapers. Similarly, responses by women to questions about problem areas can also be a reflection of systemic biases institutionalized by the procedures of recruitment into local politics. Until more data allow testing of these explanations, we must remain uncertain about these inferences. Whether one explains these data by socialization or situational/structural model, however, it is clear that men and women play different roles in communist political life.

CONCLUSION

The presence of women has increased in the local political life of communist states, although there are differences across nations in the timing of this increase and within nations in its extent at different levels. But a rising proportion of well-educated and youthful women in local state and party organs has not meant increased access to leadership posts relative to male activists, equal recruitment from managerial and professional career backgrounds, or broadly distributed responsibilities. Although women's participation in mobilized and/or manipulated political activity increasingly has been sought during the past decade and a half in Poland and Romania, women in local communist politics apparently face continued systemic obstacles to autonomous or participatory activism. These systemic biases,

including lesser recruitment of professional women, limited committee specialization in people's councils, and lower rates of entry into local leadership posts, may help to produce the lower involvement and autonomy of politically active women. At the very least, the perpetuation of systemic obstacles to equal political participatory activity by women is reinforced by what appears to be greater deference towards authority among women and issue orientations among women that differ considerably from those of men who are activists.

Women in Poland and Romania, then, have a higher rate of political activity than they did fifteen or twenty years ago. But, as at the national level, being a woman in local communist politics appears not to imply equal participation. Surely, neither Poland nor Romania are, themselves, typical of all communist states in that regard. The fact that women's political activities at the local level are similar in these two countries, however, despite the important differences in their histories, culture, levels of socio-economic development, and linkage to Soviet foreign policy, suggests that women's roles in local politics may be similar in other East European countries.

4 Charisma, Control and Coercion: the Dilemma of Leadership

INTRODUCTION

The authority to lead does not necessarily accrue to those with power. Nowhere is this proposition more evident than among nation-states ruled by communist parties. The drama with which such distinctions became evident in Poland, culminating in 1980-81, bears witness to the dilemma communist parties face as they seek the authority to lead rather than just the power to rule. The former is sought, of course, because it is more efficient to govern when most citizens obey willingly, and best when some are enthusiastic supporters of those who govern and their policies.

In this chapter, I offer a typology of communist leadership, i.e. differentiating among four types according to the means by which leadership authority is sought. As ideal types, the four categories – autocrat, oligarch, expert and populist – are not likely to be found in a 'pure' form; instead, variation in the means by which leadership authority is sought in communist systems is evident between states, over time, from issue to issue, and among levels or structures of government. As in foregoing chapters, my analysis is thus general rather than specific. Here and in subsequent chapters, however, I extend the discussion to elite-mass relations beyond the institutions of local politics. I endeavor to make comparative observations about the need for leadership authority in regimes of Leninist parties, the strategies used by such parties (from national to local levels) in pursuit of the authority to lead, and the outcomes of such efforts.

COMMUNIST ELITES AND THE PURSUIT OF LEADERSHIP AUTHORITY

That power and authority are not coincident in communist systems was visible in Poland on 13 December 1981. A regime which had lost

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John A. Ayoade

The African Search for Democracy: Hopes and Reality

Recent political developments in Africa have led a good number of observers to wonder whether democratic experiments can survive there.¹ This feeling summarizes the disappointment with the process of political leadership change and with tenure of political office-holders. By April 1985, twenty-four countries were under military rule and twenty-one under civilian administration (Table 3.1). However, among the twenty-one countries under civilian administration, two, Sierra Leone and Uganda, had previously experienced military rule. Sierra Leone was under various military administrations from 1964 to 1968, while Uganda experienced one of the most notorious military administrations from 1971 to 1979. Furthermore, two countries, Cape Verde and Chad, are under militarized civilian administrations. In the case of Cape Verde, the administration is under Aristides Pereira, who was a prominent member of the Party for the Liberation of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) and a member of the liberation forces, although he is not a regular soldier. Similarly, Hissène Habré of Chad is not a soldier by profession although he toppled General Félix Malloum from power in August 1978.² Habré was only a member of the National Front for the Liberation of Chad (FROLINAT) but, since 1982, has been president of an embattled Chad, whose government is military except in name.

Apart from direct military administrations in the twenty-five countries and the two militarized civilian governments, there are also two civilianized military governments, in Algeria and Egypt. These are countries in which the military has held political power for a long time and has transformed the military office-holders into civilians; therefore, they also enjoy military traditions. Thus a total of thirty countries, including Sierra Leone and Uganda, have military traditions; this makes up about sixty percent of all the African countries.

Among the remaining nineteen civilian administrations that have not

TABLE 3.1 Regime Types in Africa

Military	Militarized Civilian	Civilianized Military	Civilian
1. Angola	1. Cape Verde	1. Algeria	1. Botswana
2. Benin (Dahomey)	2. Chad	2. Egypt	2. Cameroon
3. Burundi			3. Comoros
4. Central African Republic			4. Djibouti
5. Congo-Brazzaville			5. Gabon
6. Equatorial Guinea			6. Gambia
7. Ethiopia			7. Ivory Coast
8. Ghana			8. Kenya
9. Guinea			9. Lesotho
10. Guinea-Bissau			10. Malawi
11. Liberia			11. Mauritius
12. Libya			12. Morocco
13. Malagasy Republic			13. St. Thomas & Prince Islands
14. Mali			14. Senegal
15. Mauritania			15. Sierra Leone
16. Mozambique			16. Swaziland
17. Niger			17. Tanzania
18. Nigeria			18. Uganda
19. Rwanda			19. Zambia
20. Somalia			20. Zanzibar
21. Sudan			21. Zimbabwe
22. Togo			
23. Tunisia			
24. Burkina Faso (Upper Volta)			
25. Zaire			

experienced military rule only Botswana, Gambia, Mauritius, Senegal, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe have competitive party systems; these nations compose only twelve percent of the African countries that offer electoral choice of some kind to the people. In the single-party states, periodic elections are held, but they are supposed to confirm the views of the political leaders rather than offer policy or political alternatives. Thus both military governments and a majority of civilian governments offer little electoral choice to the people. In specific terms, using 1981 projected population figures, only 16,180,000 Africans (0.03%) out of a total population of 493,720,000 exercise a democratic choice in the selection of their governments.¹

In addition to the denial of political choice, or perhaps because of it, the African countries experience a large turnover in government in the countries under military rule and a near permanence of governments under some military and civilian administrations. Some of the countries that had the most frequent changes of government were Benin (1963, 1965, 1967, 1969, and 1972); Burundi with two coups in 1966; Chad with three coups in 1979; and Ethiopia, two coups in 1974 and another in 1977. The Malagasy Republic had three coups in 1975, while Mauritania had a coup each year from 1978 to 1980. These frequent changes of government mean a low political stability index (psi).² The psi for Benin is 0.51, including the thirteen-year rule of Matthew Kerekou, without which it would be 0.3. Similarly, the psi of Chad is 0.51; but, discounting the fifteen-year rule of François Tombalbaye, it would only be 0.25. Ghana, since independence, has a psi of 0.39 but only 0.3 since the coup that unseated Kwame Nkrumah in 1966.

By contrast, the psi of the single-party states and monarchies tends to exceed unity, thus resulting in a high/low political departicipation index (pdi).³ The Ivory Coast has the highest pdi at 2.1, followed by Tanzania at 2.0, Malawi at 1.6, Zambia 1.6, and Gambia at 1.5. The tenure of office of some individual leaders shows the level of departicipation more glaringly than the political departicipation index itself. For example, William Tubman was president of Liberia for twenty-eight years, the same length of time that Habib Bourguiba has been president of Tunisia (Table 3.2). Sékou Touré was president of Guinea-Conakry for twenty-six years and Félix Houphouët-Boigny president of the Ivory Coast for twenty-five. Although all these leaders can claim to have "constitutionally" held these positions in their respective countries, the constitutions, more often than not, were choreographed to suit the wishes of the leaders.

The two factors of political instability and political departicipation have combined to threaten democracy in Africa. They have also been responsible for the initiation of a search for the means of achieving a more democratic political process. The search has been complicated by the fact that the leaders of the various countries accept the privileges conferred by the Western political systems without the corresponding obligations. At other times, they

TABLE 3.2 Rate of Political Turnover in Africa Since Independence

Country	Average Tenure per Leader (years)	Leader with Longest Tenure	Number of Years
1. Algeria	7.7		
2. Angola	5.0	Houari Boumediene	14
3. Benin	4.1	Eduardo dos Santos	6
4. Botswana	9.5	Matthew Kerekou	13
5. Burundi	5.8	Seretse Khama	14
6. Cameroon	12.5	Jean-Baptiste Bagaza	9
7. Cape Verde	10.0	Ahmadou Ahidjo	22
8. Central African Republic	6.3	Aristides Pereira	10
9. Chad	4.1	Jean Bedel Bokassa	14
10. Comoros	5.0	François Tombalbaye	15
11. Congo-Brazzaville	5.0	Ahmed Abdallah Abderemane	7
12. Djibouti	8.0	Marien Ngouabi	9
13. Egypt	10.0	Hassan Gouled Aptidon	8
14. Equatorial Guinea	8.5	Gamal Abdel Nasser	16
15. Ethiopia ^a	3.8	Francisco Macías Nguema	11
16. Gabon	12.5	Mengistu Mariam	8
17. Gambia	20.0	Omar Bongo	18
18. Ghana	3.1	Duada Jawara	20
19. Guinea	13.5	Kwame Nkrumah	9
20. Guinea-Bissau	5.5	Sékou Touré	26
21. Ivory Coast	25.0	Luiz Cabral	6
22. Kenya	11.0	Félix Houphouët-Boigny	25
23. Lesotho	19.0	Jomo Kenyatta	15
24. Liberia ^c	13.7	Lebua Jonathan	19
25. Libya	17.0	William Tubman	28
26. Malagasy Republic	5.0	King Idris	18
27. Malawi	21.0	Philibert Tsiranana	12
28. Mali	12.5	Kamuzu Banda	21
29. Mauritania	6.3	Moussa Traore	17
30. Mauritius	8.5	Ould Daddah	18
31. Morocco	14.5	Seewoosagur Ramgoolam	14
32. Mozambique	10.0	King Hassan II	24
33. Niger	12.5	Samora Machel	10
34. Nigeria	3.6	Hamani Diori	14
		Yakubu Gowon	9
35. Rwanda	11.5		
36. St. Thomas & Prince Islands	10.0	Grégoire Kayibanda	11
37. Senegal	12.5	Manuel Pinto Da Costa	10
38. Seychelles	4.5	Léopold S. Senghor	21
39. Sierra Leone	6.0	Frances Albert René	8
40. Somalia	6.3	Siaka Stevens	16
41. Sudan	4.1	Siad Barre	15
42. Swaziland ^e	8.0	Jafaar El Niemiery	16
43. Tanzania	24.0	King Sobhuza II	14
44. Togo	8.3	Julius K. Nyerere	24
45. Tunisia	14.5	Gnassingbe Eyadema	18
46. Uganda	3.8	Habib Bourguiba	28
47. Burkina Faso (Upper Volta)	5.0	Milton Obote	9
48. Zaire	5.0	Sangoulé Lamizana	14
49. Zambia	21.0	Mobutu Sese Seko	20
50. Zimbabwe	5.0	Kenneth Kaunda	21
		Robert Mugabe	5

Notes

^aEgypt became independent in 1922, but 1952 is used as the base year for this calculation because 1952 is the year of the Naguib coup.

^bEthiopia was not really colonized, and was a monarchy till 1974. 1974 is used as base for the calculation of the rate of political turnover.

^cLiberia, like Ethiopia, was not really colonized, so 1944 is used as the base year for calculating political turnover.

^dMorocco is still a monarchy. This explains why it enjoys long tenure of office.

^eSwaziland is also still a monarchy.

have also indicated interest in a return to precolonial African political traditions.

These precolonial traditions have themselves undergone change because of colonial influence. The changes vary according to either the resilience of the traditional systems or the impact of the colonial administrations, which were of many varieties. Africa minus South Africa, which is under African minority rule, has seven main colonial traditions. These are British, French, Portuguese, Belgian, Spanish, Italian, and German. Liberia and Ethiopia did not have any significant colonial tradition except for the Americo-Liberian presence in Liberia and the Italian occupation of Ethiopia. Among the remaining seven political traditions, German political influence was of a very short duration, lasting from 1884 to 1919. After World War I, German territories were turned over to the League of Nations as trust territories and administered by Britain, France, and South Africa. German contributions to the political development of Africa were therefore limited, but assessment is complicated by the fact that these colonies underwent a double colonial experience *seriatim*. In this regard, the experiences of Cameroon may be the most interesting. Eastern Cameroon was part of the German colony of Cameroon and was later governed as a trust territory by France. On the other hand, western Cameroon, also part of the German colony, was governed by Britain. Both now form the Republic of the Cameroon, bringing with them differing colonial traditions. While eastern Cameroon has a colonial legacy of French republicanism, western Cameroon brought into the union the experiences of a parliamentary monarchy, thus creating problems of how to forge a mutually acceptable political system.

Italian colonialism lasted longer than the German, but Italy also lost some of her colonies after World War II. Eritrea, which for all practical purposes was administered by the Italians as a republic, was merged with the monarchy of Ethiopia to form a federation. It is no surprise that the two systems, which are opposed in principle, have not worked too well together since 1962.

The situation in Libya was very similar. In 1943, Libya was split between the French and the British to be administered under a United Nations trusteeship. The provinces of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were administered by the British, while Fezzan was administered by the French till the independence of Libya in 1951. This meant that Libya, in addition to her varied precolonial tradition, at different stages and in different parts, experienced Italian, British, and French colonialism. Similarly, independent Somalia also has a bicolonial tradition, having been made up of British and Italian Somaliland.

Former German and Italian colonies, therefore, experienced multiple political traditions by having been transferred from one colonial power to another, or even split between them. These countries emerged from colonialism with a babel of political traditions that resulted in conflict. In postcolonial Libya and Cameroon, the dangers of conflicting political traditions were

minimized through the adoption of federal political systems. These were based on the implicit assumption of the equivalence of anglophone and francophone political traditions. In both cases, federalism has been abandoned; Libya appears relatively quiet, but Cameroon still has problems securing her unity. Similarly, in the case of Ethiopia and Eritrea, the mistaken assumption of the equivalence and compatibility of political traditions resulted in the failure of the federal experiment and in fratricidal war.

It is not only in the colonial experiences that the African countries differ; their precolonial political traditions also demonstrate wide differences. In the search for viable political systems, therefore, the African countries now have to focus attention on political traditions that cut across the multiplicity of ethnic groups. The selection of appropriate political institutional arrangements must be based on widely accepted political philosophies with which the ethnic groups can identify. This is surely neither an easy task nor a panacea because there may not even be political consensus within single ethnic units.

Colonialism retarded the growth of traditional political institutions in order to prevent them from competing with the colonial institutions for the allegiance of the people. By undermining these traditional institutions, the philosophical bases of duties and obligations regulating the relationship between the governing and the governed were destroyed. Furthermore, the denigration of African traditional religions undermined political duties and obligations by neutralizing religion, which had provided effective cultic support for traditional political authority. Traditional deities were believed to punish swiftly and sternly; Protestantism taught that salvation can be gained through faith alone, and Roman Catholicism preached forgiveness of sin through confession.⁶

The secular religions that were substituted in the form of national flags, anthems, and pledges did not have the same depth of appeal and compulsion evoked by the traditional religions. These modern-day constitutional incantations are hardly established and do not fully inspire the people as effective substitutes. Perhaps it is because these secular religions are alien methodologies for mobilizing the people. Culture is a complex whole, and the recognition of the delicate balance between its parts is essential for the maintenance of cultural equilibrium. The eclecticism that characterizes secular religions in the African countries today only makes them discordant ritual elements in the political system.

In this connection, it must be pointed out that the colonial apparatus also succeeded because it was not, by and large, a consensual hegemonic administration; it was, in most cases, a military government and, at best, a single-party system. Until shortly before their departure (and that was true only in the case of Britain), the colonial rulers had never tried to exemplify the practice of democracy; they were perfectly content with ruling in a strictly authoritarian manner.⁷ While it is true that the colonial administra-

tions created no foundations for government by consent, it is also true that most of them had not experienced democracy for long either. Full democracy dates back to only 1918 in Britain, while Germany had it for only fourteen years before World War II. France has enjoyed democracy longest, while Spain and Portugal smarted, until recently, under authoritarian regimes.

To varying degrees, the colonial administrations toned down autocracy by establishing local legislatures in the colonies. In the early stages, this took the form of a harmless dose of participation that ultimately resulted in legislative and executive independence. This approach to colonial development was taken by the British and appeared to have ensured a peaceful transition, except in Kenya and Zimbabwe.

The French and the Portuguese adopted the ambitious and visionary approach of incorporating what they saw as their overseas provinces into the "metropolis." This geographical illusion created operational problems that, for instance, forced the French to change their policy to one of union, without unity, with their African colonies. Guinea, however, signalled that even the relationship of union was unacceptable, and France was persuaded to concede independence, albeit grudgingly. All in all, the relatively peaceful transition in the French colonies south of the Sahara can perhaps be explained by the failure of her intransigence in Algeria and Indo-China. The Portuguese, on the other hand, were not persuaded against their visionary Lusitanian empire until, after two decades, attritional war threatened to rip apart even the metropolitan sociopolitical traditions.

It should be noted that independence obtained through wars of liberation often produced radical regimes. This is not because of an ideological conviction; it is because the nationalists believed that colonial capitalism could not be confronted by any variant of capitalism, but only by an equal and opposite ideology. The consequence of this is that the unassimilated democratic ideology is replaced by an equally unassimilated socialist ideology. The physical revolt against colonial rule is accompanied by an intellectual revolt that destroys faith in the learned political traditions of the colonial period. Examples of such places include Algeria, Guinea-Bissau, Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe. The survival of radical regimes in those places depends on a combination of factors, including the kind of political leadership and whether or not the problems that necessitated the radical choice persist. In the case of the leadership, it is possible to assume that, when the generation which saw military action expires, the succeeding generation will be less committed to the *raison d'être* for the radical option. Also, the frustrations of operating a system in which the succeeding generation did not receive any practical training may force a retreat. But, whatever choice is made, political instability is the result.

The general picture of most of the African countries can be interpreted in terms of administrative experiments through which they have gone. First,

there is the traditional political arrangement that the colonial system disrupted in varying degrees. In some places the colonial powers protected traditional cultures, as the British did with the system of indirect rule. Similarly, the French practiced indirect rule in strong centralized states like Morocco. The Portuguese did the same among the Fula of Guinea-Bissau, while the Belgians played the Tutsi against the Hutu in Rwanda and Burundi. The effect of this was an uneven spread of colonial administrative education. This was complicated by the fact that, where the traditional rulers were incorporated into the administration, the educated elites were excluded. But, at independence, it was the educated elites that inherited political power; this created tension between them and the traditional rulers, who felt disempowered. This perceived status reversal generated conflicts in the postcolonial period. Such conflicts were often within the same ethnic group. Among ethnic groups the conflict was often between those accorded *ad valorem* treatment by the colonial powers and those that were less favored. The best example of this is Uganda, where the Kabaka sought to modernize their traditions in order to participate in competitive party politics.

Apart from the open conflicts resulting from the colonial experience, the perhaps farther-reaching effect is the mental ambivalence of the emergent African political class. At the individual level, there is a duality of values that results in an asymmetrical relationship between the normative and the legal order. This is the result of alienation from the state because most Africans have come to perceive government as distinct and different from society. The negative attitudes of the nationalist era toward government have persisted and, for a large number of the people, government remains the "enemy" of the people. Similarly, at the societal level, there is a cultural dualism because traditional political cultures remain side by side with the Western political cultures. The process of widening the political horizon only produced a moral disorientation, and people oscillated between incompatible patterns of behavior. This is principally because the dissolution of the old ethics and ethnic solidarity was not accompanied by the emergence of new norms, and thus it produced an anomie.

The Western political cultures have not been able to absorb the traditional cultures perhaps because of the existence of the duality of values at the individual level. This often results in a syncretic articulation of values by political leaders, usually to camouflage their desire to remain in power. Solutions prescribed by the people and their leaders in these circumstances have varied widely, and have included: (1) integrative processes that recognize but deemphasize ethnic differences; (2) a return to a hierarchic but autochthonous hegemonic control; (3) authenticity; and (4) institutional integration or monolithization.

The different variants of integrative proposals recognize the disintegrative potential of ethnic differences. More often than not, they accord recognition to all ethnic groups by recognizing their right to participate in govern-

ment. This was the underlying principle of the union government proposals of the late Colonel Acheampong of Ghana. It was believed that the arrangement would erase the feeling of departicipation among minorities, and among professionals, and therefore reduce unhealthy criticism of government; this was also the hope of the proposal of "election by selection through representation" by Siaka Stevens of Sierra Leone. The suggestions were admissions of problems, but they did not receive mass approval because they were seen as strategies for perpetuating the political leadership in office.

By contrast, proposals for hegemonic control often emphasize the right of the majority to rule. It develops an ethnic hierarchy that subordinates the minority to the majority and may, in the short run, produce an enforced ethnic harmony. Such systems are usually repressive because they tend to establish a vertical relationship between the ethnic groups dominated by the majority ethnic group. Chad provides a very good example of this under François Tombalbaye (1960–1975). Chad, with a population of about 4.5 million, has 192 ethnic groups "of which the most homogeneous are the 1,300,000 Sara and related groups living in the five southern prefectures. . . ." In the precolonial period, the northern ethnic groups raided the Sara country for slaves; but, during the colonial period, the Sara welcomed the French and quickly acquired Western education of which the people of the north did not avail themselves. In the postcolonial period, power devolved on the Saras, who took that opportunity to avenge themselves on the northern ethnic groups. The people of the north, particularly the Toubou Arabs, saw Sara hegemony as a form of internal colonialism against which they then had to revolt.¹⁰

In order to achieve domination, institutional pluralism is abandoned in favor of institutional monism. Institutional checks and balances are neutralized and power is concentrated in the hands of the leader and his nominees. The rationale is that, in postcolonial plural societies, it is only institutional monoliths that produce national integration, while institutional pluralism in plural societies simply confirms social pluralism, which adversely affects the integrity of the postcolonial state. Consequently, single parties are established and people's political choices limited. Strangely enough, these are often claimed to accord with traditional political cultures and are usually accompanied by a deliberate creation of both the mystique of authority and charisma for the leaders. These messiah attributes develop into personality cults that usually isolate the heads of states from the people and produce a high political departicipation index (dpi). There is an inverse relationship between the personalization of office and the participation of the people in the political process: the spheres of political participation narrow as the spheres of government activities widen. The progressive shrinkage of citizen initiative (normally a countervailing force and a refuge against government) results in a monopolistic government. The most outstanding

example of such a phenomenon was Francisco Macías Nguema, who appointed himself "President for Life, Major General of the Army, Chief Educator of the Nation, Supreme Scientist, Master of Traditional Culture, Chairman of the Parti Unique National des Travailleurs," as well as the "only miracle that Equatorial Guinea ever produced."¹¹

By definition, monopolistic governments often close all options to the people. Party membership counts as collateral for the enjoyment of civic rights, and governments become big and ubiquitous. It is therefore not possible to opt for Candide's option of aloofness because the wielders of power invade every citizen's privacy. Paradoxically, it is the impossibility of opting out that aggravates political competition because the stakes of defeat and victory are inordinately high. "The consequent further deflection of ambitions into politics aggravates strife and reinforces the predatory propensities of the rules and their henchmen."¹² This undemocratic situation seals all hopes of democratic development as long as privileges obtained through political influence are indispensable for decent living. Political speechifying replaces political action, and leaders emit political solutions that camouflage their Jacobin concept of power, in which an ultracentralized state makes all decisions.

The policy of *authenticité*, which lays claim to equality with traditional culture, has equally restricted political participation. This experimental policy was coined by Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire as part of his effort to come to grips with the problem of building a virile, united country. In the 1970s, François Tombalbaye of Chad adopted the same policy of inculcating respect for tradition and obedience to elders.¹³ More recently, Captain Thomas Sankara of Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso, "Land of Dignity") adopted the same policy in 1984.¹⁴ In both Zaire and Burkina Faso, the adoption of the policy was accompanied by the adoption of a local name for the countries. Except for Burkina Faso, where it is too early to pass judgment, these changes in Chad and Zaire are no more than cosmetic; the governments are in no way better informed by traditions. The substantive problems in Chad under Tombalbaye and in Zaire under Mobutu are left unattended to. It is perhaps no coincidence that both states have a high dpi because of the long tenure in office of the protagonists of this policy.

It is true that all these approaches have failed, but each of them, in varying degrees, accepts that the solution to the African problems of governance perhaps lies somewhere in the cultures of the people. The main problem, however, is that, with the exception of Somalia and Basutoland, there is no monocultural African state in which culture means the same thing to all. A return to the cultures and traditions of the people therefore raises the problem of selecting the common aspects of those cultures. Perhaps, though, the cultural scene is not as complex as it may at first appear. Generally speaking, all traditional African governments were of two types—centralized vertical and noncentralized horizontal.¹⁵ These two types often coexisted in almost

all the African countries and have analogous social mechanisms through which their integration could be approached.

What are these principal common elements? They are unity of church and state, institutional pluralism, gerontocratic leadership with mass participation, and life tenure in office. These are the factors that characterize traditional democratic practice in Africa. In essence, the systems guarantee the accountability of the rulers as well as the governability of the people. I shall briefly discuss each of them to show how they collectively guarantee a participatory democratic process and political responsibility and responsiveness.

In precolonial Africa, there was no separation of church and state. The church was an instrument of administration. The political leader was, in theory, also the chief priest, and he determined the religious calendar of the society. The close tie between church and state produced a spiritual element that governed the actions of governors and subjects alike. The transcendence of the spiritual in all activities—social, political, and economic—had the significant effect of producing only a single moral code for all relations. Consequently, economic, political, and social relations, as well as private and public lives, were regulated by the same moral code. This avoided the pernicious duality of values that characterizes the contemporary African scene. Government was shrouded in mysticism, and the fear of sanctions elicited probity from leaders and obedience from subjects. There can be no complete return to that condition, but it brings attention to a vacuum that has not been filled by the alternative of Western secular religion.

The second characteristic of traditional African governments was institutional pluralism. Different political institutions performing different functions were established and guaranteed by the system. Each institution checked the powers of the other institutions so that a delicate balance was established between all of them. Excesses were checked because each institution served as the constitutional watchdog of the rights of the people. This arrangement therefore reinforced the mystique of government and the mystery surrounding traditional political leaders. The postcolonial phenomenon of single parties destroyed the traditional pluralism of political institutions and eliminated the usual check-and-balance role that these institutions had performed since time immemorial. The effect was an unusual inflation of the power of the leaders and a corresponding diminution of the people's control over their rulers. Rulers now often justify the narrowing of people's participation by arguing that institutional pluralism in the form of political parties is alien to Africa. However, legitimate dissent and participation were always present.

The third characteristic of traditional African governments was gerontocratic leadership balanced by mass participation. Africans have great respect for age, which is used interchangeably with authority; but, leaders had to continue to earn and deserve the respect of their subjects, failing which

the traditional process of recall and impeachment were invoked. Respect for leaders and obedience to the laws were not forced; they evolved in response to the performance of the leaders and, subject to good behavior, leaders held offices for life.

Conclusion

Colonial political formulas are inappropriate to the postcolonial situations because the objectives of governments have changed. While the primary objective of colonial governments was the maintenance of law and order, the purpose of postcolonial governments is development and the consolidation of independence. But the leaders of the various states have failed to keep the promises of independence, which they have replaced with new promises. They first excited the people and then incited them. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that a group of Zambians complained "Those blokes from the Party came to see us and told us to 'vote the right way.' They made us all sorts of promises, but they haven't been back once since the elections." This is representative of reactions in many African states. The mystique and credibility of governments are thus gradually being eroded.

It is true that the manipulation of the system resulted from the inordinate ambitions of the leaders, but the vulnerability of ill-understood systems also made it possible. The leaders themselves have, strangely enough, confirmed the problems with foreign political systems by suggesting the import of optional political systems. However, they make no proposals for containing their own ambitions.

There are ways of curtailing the ambitions of the leaders by situating political systems within the mental horizon of the people; thus, manipulating the systems can no longer be seen as just honest mistakes. A widely understood system tends to narrow the power gap between leaders and followers. This will obstruct the growth of political monoliths by not only ensuring a division of authority, but also by what Mosca calls "the balance of social forces." Big and all-pervading governments have an inverse relationship to efficiency; they give the people the impression that they do not have to do anything because the government will do it all. The people are thus mobilized without their political participation, and the leadership is not accountable because checks and balances are neutralized. Only small-scale governments can restore political participation and bind the society to the state by recognizing the functions of both.

Notes

1. Stanislaw Andreski, *The African Predicament: A Study in the Pathology of Modernization* (New York: Atherton Press, 1968), 123.

2. Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, *Conflict in Chad* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1981), 91.

3. Teuan L. L. Griffiths, *Atlas of African Affairs* (New York: Methuen, 1984), 191-2

4. The political stability index (psi) is an indicator of the rate of change in government. It is calculated on the widely accepted convention that a head of state like the American president serves only two terms of four years each in office, making a total of eight years. Thus eight years or two terms is taken as the maximum for the calculation of the psi. The psi is therefore a continuum from low (i.e., zero) to high (i.e., one). It is calculated with the year of independence as base. Thus the total number of years since independence is divided by the total number of governments to give the average per government. That average is divided by eight to obtain the psi. For example, Ghana, which became independent in 1957, and has had nine governments since, has a psi of

$$\{(1985 - 1957) + 9\} + 8 = \frac{28}{1} \times \frac{1}{9} \times \frac{1}{8} = \frac{28}{72} = 0.39$$

The general formula is $\frac{ys}{ng} \times \frac{1}{2t}$

where ys = years of sovereignty

ng = number of governments in years

and $2t$ = two terms

5. The political departicipation index (*dpi*) is the indicator of the lack of participation of the people in the political process. There are different forms of departicipation. These include military rule, and one-party regimes with or without elections. The frequency of change of such governments does not increase the political participation of people. The rate of political departicipation of these regimes is not quantifiable but absolute. The practice of mixed civilian-military executives under military regimes does not confer any participation on the people. Neither does the frequency of change of such governments increase political participation. In fact, in some cases it reduces political participation because it sometimes postpones the return to democratic civilian governments.

It is easy to calculate the *dpi* of governments only by longevity. The *dpi* of a government is the excess of tenure (et) over two terms ($2t$) divided by two terms: i.e., $(et - 2t)/2t$ where

et = excess of tenure over two terms

and $2t$ = two terms

Thus by 1985, since Dr. Kamuzu Banda has been president of Malawi since 1964, Malawi's *dpi* = $(21 - 8)/8 = 1.6$

6. Stanislaw Andreski, *op. cit.* 42.

7. Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, eds., *Political Parties and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 8. Cf. Stanislaw Andreski, *op. cit.* 111.

8. Stanislaw Andreski, *ibid.* 13.

9. Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, *op. cit.* 3.

10. Benjamin Neuberger, *Involvement, Invasion and Withdrawal: Qaddafi's Libya and Chad 1969-1981* (Tel Aviv: Shiloam Centre for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 1982), 15.

11. Lucimé Sylla, "Succession of the Charismatic Leader: The Gordian Knot of African Politics," *Daedalus* 3 (1982): 18.

12. Stanislaw Andreski, *op. cit.* 119.

13. Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, *op. cit.* 26.

14. Yemi Ogunbiyi, "Burkina Faso: The Visions of a Future Country," *The Guardian Supplement*, 24 March 1985.

15. Lucy Mair, *Primitive Government* (Penguin Books, 1982); T. O. Elias, *Government and Politics in Africa* (New Delhi: Asia Publishing House, 1961); M. Fortes and E. E. Evans Pritchard, eds., *African Political Systems* (Oxford University Press, 1948); and Lucy D. Mair, *African Kingdoms* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977).

ÉLECTIONS Afrique : le pluralisme est mal parti

Pressés par la France de démocratiser leurs régimes, les chefs d'Etat africains n'entendent pas mettre le pouvoir en jeu.

Afin de complaire à leurs « riches » protecteurs, devenus soudain plus exigeants sur le respect des principes démocratiques, certains chefs d'Etat africains ont dû se lancer, voilà six mois, dans l'aventure du multipartisme. Dirigeants usés de pays qui ne font même plus semblant d'être en voie de développement, ils ont un besoin vital d'aide. François Mitterrand les a clairement mis en garde, en juin, lors du sommet francophone de La Baule : « La France liera tout son effort de contribution aux efforts qui seront accomplis pour aller vers plus de liberté. » Mais comment exiger l'assainissement des mœurs politiques sans mettre en péril des chefs d'Etat amis ? Tout s'y oppose : à commencer par les rapports trop personnels entretenus avec des présidents qui ont parfois plus de poids à l'Elysée que les ministres français. La disgrâce de Jean-Pierre Cot, en décembre 1982, en est l'illustration. Le ministre de la Coopération ayant eu l'outrecuidance d'exiger d'eux un peu plus de moralité, plusieurs chefs d'Etat africains ont réclamé — et obtenu — sa tête.

La chute des régimes communistes a mis la démocratie à la mode. Mais on ne se débarrasse pas comme ça des mauvaises habitudes. Ni en Afrique ni en France. Neuf jours après le sommet de La Baule, Michel Lévêque, directeur d'Afrique au Quai d'Orsay, remet au président un document confidentiel, intitulé « Scénarios de crise en Afrique ». « Le Canard



Lors d'une manifestation en Côte-d'Ivoire.

enchaîné » en publie des extraits. Jugement terrible porté sur la plupart des pays francophones. Et condamnation implicite de la politique française. On peut y lire que, au Zaïre, le président Mobutu — selon une étrange conception du pluralisme — « tente de créer des partis à sa dévotion par le biais de la corruption » ; que, au Cameroun, « la contrebande, la fraude, la prévarication et autres comportements déviants, déjà sensibles ou patents, y compris au plus haut niveau des pouvoirs publics », continuent à se développer. Même le Togo, en raison de l'« attitude ultraconservatrice » du président Eyadéma et des « pratiques gouvernementales (clientélisme, préférence ethnique, corruption) », risque une révolte tribale.

Autre sonnette d'alarme : celle de Stéphane Hessel, ambassadeur de France à la retraite. Dans un rapport commandé par Michel Rocard et très diplomatiquement intitulé « Les Relations de la France avec les pays en

développement », il écrit que la politique française devrait être « revue dans le sens d'une plus grande rigueur et du rejet de toute complaisance clientéliste ». Et de critiquer la conception des rapports avec les chefs d'Etat africains, le gaspillage des crédits et des aides depuis trente ans. Résultat : le rapport Hessel est retiré de la circulation. Enterré, comme toutes les études sur la coopération rédigées depuis les indépendances. Le sujet est tabou : en France, on ne touche pas à la politique africaine sans l'autorisation de l'Elysée.

Les dirigeants africains croient avoir trouvé le sens caché du message envoyé par l'ancienne métropole : s'il ne s'agit que de changer de discours, ils sont prêts à tolérer le pluralisme. Et même à organiser des élections. A condition que leurs résultats soient sans surprise. Après tout, elles peuvent aider à calmer des populations dont les conditions de vie se dégradent sans cesse et à donner le change aux opposants.

Ainsi, le Gabon vient d'inviter les élections législatives à trois tours. Le premier, dimanche 16 septembre, s'étant déroulé dans la fraude et la confusion les plus totales, le scrutin a été annulé. Mais en partie seulement. Et deux nouveaux tours sont prévus pour le 21 et le 28 octobre. En Côte-d'Ivoire, le président Félix Houphouët-Boigny, qui, à 85 ans, brigue un septième mandat, affrontera pour la première fois des concurrents. Qu'il accuse déjà d'avoir voulu faire assassiner le pape. Il ne leur a annoncé la date du scrutin — le 28 octobre — qu'un mois à l'avance... Le Cameroun n'en est même pas là : le président, Paul Biya, s'est contenté d'avertir son parti qu'il devait « se préparer à affronter une éventuelle concurrence ». Quant au général-président togolais, Gnassingbé Eyadéma, il ne tolère aucune critique. Mais les récents troubles, qui ont fait au moins 4 morts et 34 blessés à Lomé, laissent à penser que le pays « le plus stable d'Afrique de l'Ouest » vient d'entrer, lui aussi, dans une ère de turbulences.

Car les guerres tribales, telles celles qui ont ensanglanté le Burundi, qui ravagent aujourd'hui le Liberia et déstabilisent le Rwanda, ne sont que l'expression de la révolte d'un ou de plusieurs clans contre celui qui monopolise le pouvoir. Aucun pays d'Afrique noire n'est à l'abri de cette violence. En République centrafricaine, sous contrôle de la famille du président Kolingba, la tension monte. Comme au temps de Bokassa, quelques hommes — dont l'impitoyable ministre de la Défense, Christophe Grelombe — bloquent toute ouverture. Du jour au lendemain, la situation peut devenir explosive.

Dans ces conditions, le multipartisme, même manipulé, et les élections, même trafiquées, constituent un moindre mal, qui réduit les risques d'affrontements meurtriers. Et l'on peut espérer que, à force de jouer à la démocratie, certains pays la connaîtront un jour.

Jacques Girardon ■

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7. There is extensive literature on military rule in Africa. See Samuel Decalo, *Coups and Army Rule in Africa: Studies in Military Style* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976); Victor Olorunsola, *Soldiers and Power* (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1977); and Olatunde Odetola, *Military Regimes and Development* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1982).
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18

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Democracy in Africa: Hope and Trends

Africa is very widely perceived in the Western democracies as a continent of virtually unrelieved tyranny, dictatorship, corruption, economic bankruptcy, administrative incompetence, and violence. Some of those more closely engaged in following African developments will usually qualify this stereotype of present-day Africa by citing exceptions to this overall gloomy assessment—such as Ivory Coast, Kenya, Morocco, Botswana, and Nigeria (except when it falls under military rule). If that is the image, what is the reality?

No meaningful discussion about the present-day condition of Africa or about the future prospects of democratic government is possible without reference to the major political and economic trends since the onset of independence less than a generation ago. These are summarized below.

- First is the widespread breakdown of the institutions inherited from colonial rule, and energetic experimentation with new political systems—mostly adaptive rather than innovative. Despite claims about instituting a peculiarly "African form of government," there have actually been very few attempts at creating unique political systems. On the whole, the response to institutional breakdown has been adaptation of the institutions that had failed, usually by an increase in the centralization of power, and often by increasing the coercive nature of this power.
- Constitutional adaptation and experimentation have been characterized by eclecticism, reflective of and inspired by all the known types of modern political systems: free enterprise capitalism (Ivory Coast, Kenya, Senegal, Gabon, Cameroon, Botswana, etc.); state capitalism masquerading as socialism (in the majority of African countries); evolutionary democratic socialism (Tanzania is the best, and perhaps only, model); Marxist-Leninist systems (Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique); constitutional monarchy (Lesotho); Tudor or Hanoverian monarchy (Morocco and Swaziland).
- There has been a breakdown of law and order, widespread security problems and abuses of human rights in many of the new states. Mostly, these have been the direct result of (1) institutional breakdown; (2) the raw

tensions produced by the process of merging clans, tribes, subnational and national communities into new nations within a modernizing development system; (3) power struggles among competing elites; (4) economic failure to meet the heightened expectancy aroused by the end of colonialism.

- Contrary to earlier predictions, there have been remarkably few major security problems over borders: a brief skirmish between Algeria and Morocco in 1963; a short conflict between Niger and Mali; quarrels of low military intensity between Nigeria and Cameroon and between Zaire and Zambia. The major border conflicts have been over Somali claims on Ethiopia and Kenya; over Morocco's stand on the western Sahara; and over the conflicts in southern Africa.

- Economic failure in most sub-Saharan countries is a phenomenon more remarkable because the first two decades after independence witnessed an average growth rate of 6 to 8 percent, declining after the mid-1970s to 2.3 percent, and then declining further to zero, or even to negative, growth rates in the early 1980s. The most alarming aspect of this economic failure has been the increasing failure of Africa to feed itself, with all that this means in terms of human misery, political disillusionment, and great burdens on foreign exchange reserves to pay for imported food. This failure is brilliantly described in the seminal OAU document embodied in the Lagos Economic Declaration.

- At the same time, population has continued to grow at an average of about 2.6 percent. In common with other Third World countries, most African countries have experienced a gargantuan urban population explosion. Both these developments make demands on limited resources that are impossible to fulfill, and so grow progressively more menacing year by year. (Population growth can be healthy in some African countries, provided only that their human and economic resources have been effectively mobilized.)

- A continuous but, as yet, elusive search for continental and regional security and economic answers is exemplified by the creation of the Organization of African Unity, the African Development Bank, the Economic Community of West African States, the Southern African Development Cooperation Conference, etc.

- Finally, and crucially, there have been the liberation struggles to complete the "unfinished African revolution," and the increasingly violent conflict situation in southern Africa.

The broad developments described above have had five major consequences: an unhealthy build-up of arms and armies, with expensive modern weapons of warfare; militarization of political systems; a huge refugee problem, with over 5 million seeking succor abroad, and millions more internally displaced; economic disruption and misdirection of resources; instability of governments and the perpetual threat of political and military coups.

Table 18.1 provides a useful way of looking at the process of breakdown and experimentation, of fission and fusion, as described above.

Some Myths About Democracy in Africa

Myth: Democracy Has Collapsed in Africa Since Independence.

No single African country was a democracy at its independence. While most had a semblance of democratic forms of government, all lacked the content, or even a skeletal framework of a true political democracy. The outward appearance of a democratic structure was simply alien flesh covering old bones; when the bones were rattled hard, the flesh proved to be only a flimsy covering lacking the muscle, fiber, and blood of a viable indigenous political system.

All the institutions of independence had been artificially created, and were not rooted in the indigenous society. Most were simply adaptations (or distortions) of metropolitan systems introduced to serve the needs and interests of colonial rule, which was itself heavily centralized. (Compare the role and power of the old colonial governor with that of his successor, the executive president.) What existed at independence, therefore, was a mixture of representative and authoritarian institutions. Local government was mostly nonexistent. There were seldom enough trained or experienced administrators and technicians to operate government institutions—other than the legal system. A new political class took over from the colonial ruler, with little or no experience of functioning alongside an independent civil service, which, in any event, was not itself independent under the colonial system; nor, on the whole, was the legal system. There were few internal checks and balances because the institutions were themselves in a state of imbalance. Some of the early postindependence consequences of this hybrid political system were: (1) institutional breakdown, e.g., removal of the chief justice in Ghana and, later, of other judges; but not yet a total breakdown of the judicial or legal system; the official requirement that civil servants should be loyal not to the government, but to the ruling party. In some cases, civil servants were required to become members of the ruling party; (2) increasing distortions within the institutions themselves while they remained outwardly democratic, in form, they were intrinsically undemocratic.

Myth: The Westminster or French Models of Parliamentary Democracy Were Imposed on the Colonial Peoples at Independence.

It is true that the colonial powers sought to bequeath their own democratic values and systems (or version of it) to their former colonies; but, the almost

TABLE 18.1 Major Trends in the Political Process in Africa Since Independence

STAGE 1	A Multiparty Political System with Formal Trappings of Democratic Institutions ^a The movement that emerged strongest out of the anticolonial struggle is the new ruling party, confronted by one or more opposition parties. The army is still nonpolitical.
STAGE 2	The Ruling Party Splits ^b In the ensuing power struggle, opposition politics intensify and, on occasion, turn violent. Institutions become weaker, more distorted, and less efficient.
STAGE 3	Period of Growing Political Instability. Outbreaks of Violence (Often Tribal or Regional) Signs of weakening political authority; the ruling party loses its popular, mobilization role, and usually resorts to greater coercion.
STAGE 4	Three Different Trends a) emergence of single-party states; b) survival of some multiparty states; c) military regimes emerge
STAGE 5	A) Single-Party State Consolidates Its Power, or B) Military Regimes Take Over They adapt the old institutions and rule in partnership with civil service elites.
STAGE 6	A) Many ruling parties lose all claim to popular support and react in one of two ways: 1. Some become more openly coercive or manipulative, relying increasingly on patronage and preventive detention; 2. Others become more responsive and engage in liberalization of the political system and reform the ruling party. B) Some military regimes hand back power to civilians, but mostly only for brief periods. The army has become more politicized, and its role changes within the political society. C) The older established military regimes become increasingly dominated by a single charismatic army officer, or a small clique of officers; the government is increasingly civilianized, but the army remains the defender of the regime.

^aIn a few cases (Algeria, Egypt, Tanzania, and Mozambique), the ruling party had established its total domination by the time power had passed from the old system.
^bThere are a few exceptions, e.g., Botswana Democratic Party, Tanganyikan African National Union, Neo-Destour of Tunisia.

universal nationalist demand during their struggle for independence was for the transfer of Western institutions, they rejected any proposed changes or limitations as a sign of conferring something inferior on them: wigs and red gowns and high tables in universities were a feature of the practice of Nkrumah's Ghana and of the majority of sub-Saharan African states. Since the modernizing elite—the nationalists of independence—had as their first priority the establishment of modern institutions, they initially adopted the only ones they knew—Western models.

The reality is that none of the European systems of democracy had ever been developed under colonial rule, despite the claims made about their virtues. Nor were they introduced by the new political class (with a few isolated exceptions). However, some tried to incorporate aspects of European democratic institutions within fundamentally undemocratic political systems.

Myth: Traditional African Societies Were Democratic, Communalistic, and Operated on a Basis of Consensus. Hence the Justification for the Single-Party State.

This is a generalization; there are examples of both authoritarian and democratic systems in premodern times.

Moreover, systems appropriate to premodern and often shifting societies, comprising mostly small numbers of people, are wholly inappropriate to modern economic societies, especially since these new societies are heterogeneous and are only at an early stage of nation-formation.

Myth: Liberation from Colonial Rule Meant Democratic Freedom for the Former Colonial Subjects.

This view, propagated by the anti-colonial movement during the liberation struggle, confused two different aspects of liberty and freedom: freedom from alien rule (the *raison d'être* of the liberation struggle), and political freedom after independence. Because the nationalist leaders and their supporters in the West were waging their struggle against democratic nations, it was only natural that they should have based their case on achieving democratic rights for colonial subjects. In fact, though, the central argument in favor of ending colonialism was that, apart from the right of self-determination, the ending of alien rule was an essential prerequisite to the building of new democratic societies; but it was only the first step towards creating new democratic societies. Disappointment in the early failure to build and expand democratic states (as it is understood in Western societies) caused disillusionment both in the West and in Africa; but this disillusionment is due to a lack of historical understanding and perspective about the process of creating new nation-states.

What Went Wrong?

Virtually all the nationalist forces that emerged as the dominant political group at independence were coalitions of widely disparate ideological, economic, tribal, and regional interests. Almost without exception the ruling parties split soon after independence. Thus, central political power was threatened at a crucial, early stage. The breakup resulted in fierce internal power struggles, which frequently took as one of its forms tribal and/or regional rivalries. At times, it spilled over into violence and, if not to breakdown, then to a weakening of central political authority. A frequent response was to resort to coercive measures (arrests, preventive detention, and interference with the judicial process) in an attempt to restore political control and authority. Civil servants often took sides in these power struggles, resulting in their dismissal and, in other ways, weakening and demoralizing the public service.

This first postindependence political crisis, not infrequently, resulted in the outlawing of one or more opposition parties, and marked the start of the evolution of the single-party state.

In those situations where the dominant wing of the ruling party failed to rally effective support, or where its coercive measures produced violent political and/or tribal reactions, one outcome was army coups and military rule. This phenomenon usually occurred in situations of violence and institutional collapse and, especially, where economic hardship was an additional factor.

African Political Systems

The Single-Party State

Such states vary considerably in terms of their democratic content, aspirations, and the levels of coercion, tolerance, and respect for human rights within each of them. It is therefore important to distinguish between such states, and not to regard them all as fitting into a single political category. Examples:

<i>More Democratic</i>	<i>Less Democratic</i>	<i>Authoritarian</i>
Tanzania	Kenya	Zaire
Algeria	Ivory Coast	Gabon
	Cameroon	Guinea (under Sékou Touré)
	Somalia	Malawi

Hybrid Political Systems

In appearance these are pluralist systems but, in practice, they are single-party states. While they permit opposition political groups and political centers to exist in open opposition to the ruling party (and even to contest elections), these opposition groups are subject to differing degrees of constraints. It is therefore necessary to differentiate between: (a) Those that are engaged in experiments with *expanding* the right of parties to operate independently—e.g., Egypt and Morocco. (Senegal has gone farthest along this road of cautious experiment in legitimating a multiparty system.); (b) Those that are engaged in *contracting* the existing rights of opposition parties—e.g., Madagascar and probably also Zimbabwe.

Military Regimes

Africa's military regimes are usually a coalition between the army and civil servants, who have generally become alienated from the political class.

Unlike the earlier situation in many Latin American countries, there is no evidence yet of a tendency to develop a new military political class. The army is, in fact, closely allied to the supplanted political class (through familial relations), and these two classes mostly have similar interests and values. Only in a few exceptional cases (where the senior officer class has been replaced by junior officers or privates) have there been attempts by soldiers to make structural changes. When this has happened, it only began mostly with a commitment to improving the moral and disciplinary climate of the nation. (Ethiopia is currently an outstanding exception. Burkina Faso [Upper Volta] may be engaged in making radical changes. The efforts of Rawlings in Ghana have not, as yet, brought about any significant structural changes.)

The army rulers in Africa have, so far, seen their role as a transient one. Army rule has evolved in two directions: (a) after a period, the army itself suffers from internal divisions, corruption, popular discontent with its rule (reflecting the same kind of problems as those of the political parties they overthrew), and have voluntarily decided to withdraw to their barracks—usually returning at a later stage to restore discipline and order, once again. This has already happened three times in Nigeria and Ghana, twice in Benin (Dahomey), Sudan, and Upper Volta; (b) The army gradually loosens its hold on power, leaving a small military group (often in civvies) to control an increasingly civilianized government (e.g., Egypt under Nasser and Sadat, Sudan, Niger, Mali, Zaire, Algeria, Burundi, and Benin).

Some military regimes are decidedly less undemocratic than others; again, it is necessary to identify these differences in order to clarify the nature of military regimes and the possibilities of their acting as agents in a democratizing process.

Multiparty Parliamentary Democratic Systems

There are now a few more multiparty systems in Africa than five years ago. Even defenders and theorists of the single-party state are now more ready to adopt more flexible attitudes. A notable exception is Prime Minister Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, who appears to be determined to swim against this changing tide, while still accepting the democratic constraint of observing legal treaty obligations and the need for consensus. Other developments sympathetic to democratic ideas are the growing tendency to divide the role and responsibilities of the executive president and a prime minister; fewer restrictions are imposed on opposition parties in elections, and there is the offer of a more democratic choice of candidates. There is also a greater tendency to allow the growth of new political parties.

The following three categories of democratic parliamentary states observe the criteria of continuity and regularity of elections, a degree of freedom for opposition parties, and some fairness in the conduct of the elections themselves:

<i>More Democratic</i>	<i>More or Less Democratic</i>	<i>Controlled Democracy</i>
Botswana	Uganda	Egypt
Gambia	Tunisia	Morocco
Mauritius		
Zimbabwe (to date)		

Revolutionary Regimes

Despite all the political rhetoric, Africa has so far spawned only five revolutionary regimes, i.e., regimes that have violently destroyed the old political system and made some progress towards fundamentally restructuring social, economic, and political institutions and relations.

In Guinea, Sékou Touré used state terror to impose his own authoritarian rule, but failed in the end to create a durable, alternative society. After effectively destroying the economic, political, and social structures of the colonial regime, Angola and Mozambique are still at a relatively early stage of creating viable new institutions. Libya, under Qaddafi, has radically transformed the old monarchical system and transformed class relations, as well as establishing a new Islamic-culture value system in the country; but, how far this goes is still hard to say. Ethiopia is currently engaged in what might turn out to be the first fully structured Marxist-Leninist revolution on the continent. Swaziland is the single exception of an African country that has resorted to the monarchical institutions of premodern times.

Not all regimes that came to power by violence subsequently pursued their revolutionary methods or proclaimed objectives. For one reason or

another (particular to each) the revolutionary momentum was arrested and diverted, e.g., Egypt under Nasser; Sudan before Nimeiry embarked on his new Islamicization program; Guinea-Bissau; Algeria, after the coup against Ben Bella.

Tyrannical Regimes

Strictly defined, there are no tyrannies left in Africa, since the overthrow of Amin in Uganda, Maclás Nguema in Equatorial Guinea, and Bokassa in the Central African Republic. Except for Mobutu of Zaire and Nimeiry (until his overthrow) in Sudan, there have been no other leaders who can accurately be described as dictators.

Future of the Democratic Process in Africa

Africa's postindependence political institutions have been shaped largely by five major preoccupations of the postcolonial regimes: maintaining and consolidating the power of the ruling party; defending the unity of the nascent nation-state against fissiparous tribal and/or regional forces; safeguarding borders; promoting rapid economic and social development; lessening economic and political dependence on the former colonial powers.

These concerns still remain at the top of the agenda of most present-day African governments; but, there is now a much greater preoccupation with economic development, particularly in the rural sector. The political system throughout the continent is still characterized by fairly rapid changes in state institutions. Virtually none of the states has yet reached the stage where it is possible to define their political systems in terms of permanent state institutions. Experimentation in constitution-making remains the order of the day, reflecting the frequent failure of earlier institutional reforms to overcome the problems for which they were designed.

The political debate over appropriate structures to achieve stable government and economic growth remains a lively feature of most African societies. This debate revolves largely around three cardinal issues: the need to establish and defend basic freedoms and human rights; the nature of democracy in Africa; and how to achieve a better balance between the demands of an expanding modern economic sector and its modernizing elite and the demands of the peasant rural economy. There is a much greater readiness than in the past to question the central assumptions underlying the imperative need for, and the efficacy of, the single-party state.

The current African debate reflects fairly general agreement that, while Western institutions and forms of government are not relevant to the conditions of evolving nation-states, the principles and aspirations of democracy are universal and not peculiarly Western.

It is possible to extrapolate from contemporary African political statements a fairly general consensus about the requirements of a modern democratic society:

1. A form of representative government that allows for participation of all adult citizens.
2. A system of accountability by the elected representatives to the electorate; this requires regular elections, a method of nominating candidates for parliament through the popular choice of voters, full voting rights for all, and freedom to exercise the vote in secret.
3. Accountability by the elected government to the elected representatives through a parliamentary institution.
4. Accountability by the president and/or prime minister to a cabinet of ministers and to a parliament.
5. Accountability within political parties to their members.
6. Checks and balances between state institutions.
7. Separation of functions between the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary.

Although the major emphasis in the political debate is placed on the question of institutions, there is also a growing tendency to focus on the ideological aspects of democracy. Ideology is held to be especially important in nascent democratic political societies because of the importance of establishing aspirational goals for the evolving political culture, and of providing criteria by which to judge leaders—not just the politicians, but also others in responsible positions. Insistence on observing such criteria is held to be crucial to the promotion of democratic thought and practice. President Julius Nyerere has defined democracy as a "habit," which, like all habits, takes years to form. Thus, he argues, it is necessary to lay down rules of what is acceptable and what is reprehensible, which, in time, will produce an etiquette of democratic behavior, provided that the leadership itself sets a consistent example of such behavior. This concern over establishing rules of public behavior is reflected in the growing practice of drawing up codes of conduct. Even though these are not generally applied, at least they establish criteria which make it possible (and legitimate) to criticize the behavior of those in responsible positions.

The creation of single-party states in Africa is generally justified on three different grounds: that the multiparty system encourages tribal, sectional, or

regional parties, which impede the process of national integration; that it is necessary for maintaining political stability, which is a prerequisite for sound economic development; and, that it reflects the traditional African pattern of decision-making by consensus. How valid are these three assumptions?

It is unarguably true that in multiparty states opposition political parties frequently resort to exploiting tribal or regional grievances to build up electoral support; but, it is also true that in single-party states the ruling party has used its power to promote the interests of particular tribes at the expense of others. Nor is there much evidence to support the claim that the single-party state has been more successful than multiparty states in promoting national unity. Nigeria is an outstanding example of a country where the process of national integration has made progress under a multiparty federal constitution, even though the party system has been disrupted for periods by military rule. Tanzania, on the other hand, is an example of a single-party state where tribal politics have played only a very minor role. But, then again, there is no evidence to show that, since becoming a single-party state, Kenya has made any more progress towards ending the alienation of the Luo—the second largest community in the country—than when it was still a multiparty state.

The second argument—that the single-party state helps to create political stability—is hard to sustain. One has only to look at the political instability in many of the single-party states to see that they are not more stable than the surviving multiparty states. Nor have the single-party states been significantly more successful than the multiparty states in promoting economic development. The case against those who seek to justify strong, even authoritarian, regimes in Africa as being necessary for political stability and economic development has been forcibly stated by Hilary Ng'weno, the editor in chief of the *Weekly Review of Nairobi*:

This is no time for niceties of parliamentary democracy in Africa, we are told, and those who tell us so are not confined to leaders of repressive African regimes. We hear the same view from Western commentators and from international aid donors whose emphasis is for the so-called 'basic needs' approach. Governments in Africa are judged these days not on the basis of the status of human rights and individual liberties that they accord their citizens, but on the economic well-being that they can assure their people.

Just how far this criterion is removed from the question of democracy can be seen by the fact that it would place South Africa—with its abhorrent record of human rights—at the top of the scale of acceptability. Black African leaders as well as their sympathizers abroad often say that it really makes no difference what government is in power as long as the people benefit materially. From this kind of view it is only a short step to the dangerous prescription that what Africa needs is a system of benevolent dictators. These dictators, so the argument goes, should be free to order

affairs in their countries in such a way that material well being can be secured. Then, and only then, should the people of Africa worry about such luxuries as human rights and individual liberties.

The trouble with such views, whether expressed by African leaders or by foreigners, is that they are blatantly paternalistic. Whereas the rest of mankind will not settle for less than economic well-being and individual liberty, the African people are expected to seek no more than material wealth. This, of course, is not the way the people of Africa—as opposed to their leaders—see things today. Time and again they have shown, in South Africa as well as in other areas of the continent—that their idea of democracy goes far beyond the desire to be materially well off.¹

The third argument—that traditional African societies operated through a system of consensus—is a distorting generalization. An examination of historical evidence shows that premodern African societies were governed under a multiplicity of political systems, of which the practice of decision-making by consensus was only one type and, possibly, the least numerous. Besides, consensus was practiced mainly by small, homogeneous communities, and not by the larger heterogeneous societies. On the other hand, a country like Botswana—which is made up of a collection of small communities, who traditionally governed themselves through the *kgotla* system of consensus—has maintained a lively multiparty system since independence. There is the additional fact that, in olden times, an option was open to a minority group that refused to agree to a consensus view: they could express their opposition by moving away to new lands, where they were able to pursue their own ideas and way of life; in modern Africa this form of "voting by one's feet" is no longer practical.

Beyond all these arguments lies one inescapable reality: the existence of organized opposition political forces in every country in the continent. Despite every effort by the ruling parties of single-party states to eliminate them, opposition movements keep alive and some even manage to flourish.

One incontestable accomplishment of single-party states is that they spawn as much organized opposition as can be found in any of the multiparty states. The only difference is that in the latter they are, mostly, formally recognized whereas, in the former, they exist "informally"—either in exile or as clandestine movements.

At the first opportunity presenting itself, the sub rosa political parties sprout forth like flowers after rain in the Kalahari desert. When, after a decade of single-party rule in Senegal, President Diouf finally lifted the ban on all political parties (Senghor having only partially lifted the ban), no fewer than seventeen active parties appeared in the political arena, including seven different brands of Marxist parties. When the dictatorship of "Emperor" Bokassa was ended in 1979, nine political parties lined up to offer themselves for the new parliamentary elections. In Sudan, after the overthrow of General Nimeiry in early 1985, a dozen political parties stepped

into the arena—most of them having maintained active organizations despite seventeen years of single-party and, latterly, dictatorial rule.

Needless to say, by no means all the opposition parties are themselves likely to behave more democratically than those they seek to supplant; but the experience of living under nondemocratic systems does appear to have strengthened the democratic spirit among many African political leaders, while, at all levels of African society, there is evidence of support for liberalizing the political system, and, above all, for greater protection of human rights.

The turbulence and diversity of political ideas and the numerous movements of dissent in the continent constitute possibly the most striking evidence that democracy in Africa (in the sense of multiparty systems) is potentially the wave of the future—in whatever form such systems finally take.

Note

1. *Newsweek*, Washington, D.C., 8 August 1984.

social inspiré des principes égalitaires de justice sociale, et apte à constituer le cadre dans lequel les individus, assurés de jouir de leur dignité et de leur liberté personnelles, pourront concourir à la vie morale, intellectuelle, artistique et matérielle de leur communauté.

La justice sociale est ainsi indispensable à la reconstruction de toute société en Afrique. Les individus appartiennent à leur communauté en tant que membres constitutifs, et non comme des marchandises. Dans un Etat moderne, trop de menaces pèsent sur la justice sociale si la communauté est en grande partie analphabète ; car seul un peuple conscient et vigilant peut imposer la justice sociale et se faire le gardien de sa propre destinée. Or, sans la liberté individuelle — aujourd'hui assaillie de toutes parts en Afrique —, il ne saurait y avoir de justice sociale.

Peter ANYANG' NYONG'O *

Instabilité politique et perspectives de démocratie en Afrique

Il ne fait aucun doute que l'on assiste aujourd'hui à un regain d'intérêt pour l'étude de la démocratie et des perspectives de démocratisation en Afrique. Cette fois, l'initiative n'en revient pas à des universitaires expatriés cherchant là de nouveaux terrains d'essai pour leurs recherches, mais à des spécialistes africains qui essayent, chez eux, d'apporter des solutions à la crise actuelle [1].

La démocratie, peut-on lire dans une étude déjà parue [2], est importante *en soi* pour le développement de l'Afrique. Si les Etats africains n'ont pas réussi à tracer des voies de développement (ou d'industrialisation) viables, c'est avant tout en raison de l'absence de toute responsabilité politique, et donc de démocratie. Depuis l'indépendance, le rôle du citoyen dans les affaires publiques a été systématiquement réduit. L'arène politique s'est rétrécie, la démobilisation politique est devenue la norme plutôt que l'exception dans le comportement des régimes, et la manipulation des structures sociales pour justifier et maintenir la répression politique a constitué la préoccupation majeure de la plupart des gouvernements. Tout ceci est venu renforcer une caractéristique notoire que partagent presque tous les gouvernements africains : le mauvais emploi des ressources publiques et leur utilisation à des fins privées, toute possibilité de voir s'épanouir un processus viable de développement autochtone étant écartée ou délibérément étouffée. C'est ainsi qu'est apparue une corrélation bien nette entre l'absence de démocratie dans les régimes politiques africains et la détérioration des conditions socio-économiques [3].

De temps à autre, à la suite soit de rivalités pour les postes de direction de l'Etat, soit d'une pression populaire s'exerçant par le bas pour revendiquer un quelconque changement, les militaires sont intervenus dans la politique africaine pour essayer d'améliorer un peu les choses [4]. Dans tous les cas ou presque, cependant, les militaires n'ont rien pu améliorer. Bien au contraire, les coups d'Etat militaires n'ont réussi qu'à rendre les changements de gouvernement plus fréquents et imprévisibles, compliquant ainsi encore davantage le problème de la responsabilité politique devant les citoyens [5]. En dernière analyse, les citoyens ordinaires, si mécontents du

*African Academy of Sciences, Nairobi (Kenya).

status quo qu'ils puissent être, ont rarement l'occasion de décider s'ils ont besoin ou non d'un gouvernement militaire pour les sortir du pétrin. L'instabilité due à la répétition des coups d'Etat militaires n'est ainsi que le résultat de systèmes politiques antidémocratiques et non point d'une tentative populaire visant à remédier à cette situation.

Pourtant, le contrôle exercé par l'Etat est très important en Afrique, car c'est de l'action de l'Etat et de la politique des pouvoirs publics que dépend beaucoup la vie de la population aujourd'hui et demain. Dans les pays en développement, encore plus que dans les pays industrialisés, l'Etat joue en effet un rôle crucial dans le développement socio-économique, ainsi que dans la vie quotidienne de la société. Vu la faiblesse du secteur privé, seul l'Etat, agissant au nom de la collectivité, peut en principe procurer à la société toute l'infrastructure moderne dont elle a généralement besoin. Si tel n'est pas le cas, les investisseurs étrangers peuvent alors jouer ce rôle.

Il est cependant certaines formes d'investissement en Afrique qui risquent de ne pas susciter l'enthousiasme des capitaux étrangers. La construction et l'entretien des routes, par exemple, ne peuvent être assurés que par l'Etat. Mais, pour y parvenir, l'Etat est obligé de mobiliser les ressources nécessaires en levant des impôts. Il s'ensuit alors que les citoyens doivent non seulement être en mesure d'acquitter ces impôts, mais aussi de pouvoir s'assurer de l'emploi efficace et approprié de leurs maigres ressources. *Cela n'est pas possible si le processus politique n'est pas fondé sur une culture de participation et de responsabilité devant la société.* Autrement dit, la question de la démocratie se situe non seulement au cœur même des affaires courantes de l'exercice du pouvoir, mais influe aussi sur la capacité du secteur public de créer des excédents en vue d'une certaine accumulation.

L'optimisme déplacé des théories de la modernisation

A l'époque de l'indépendance, la question de la démocratie, du développement et de la stabilité politique n'était déjà pas considérée sous cet angle, à supposer qu'elle ait jamais été posée. Au cours de la première décennie d'indépendance, théoriciens et hommes politiques s'accordaient dans l'ensemble à reconnaître que les « nouvelles nations » africaines se devaient d'être modernes. Edward Shils se montrait quant à lui plus catégorique : « *Les nouvelles élites africaines* », affirmait-il, « *aspirent à la modernisation* » [6]. D'après lui, cela signifiait qu'elles voulaient des choses modernes comme celles que l'on trouve en Occident. La modernisation était, pour ainsi dire, assimilée à l'occidentalisation.

Le concept de modernisation n'avait en lui-même rien de nouveau ; il était déjà à l'ordre du jour des missionnaires. En revanche, l'idée que cette modernisation avait besoin d'élites et d'Etats modernisants en Afrique était une invention à la fois des sciences du comportement et de l'idéologie développementaliste qui a prévalu après l'indépendance. Ainsi que la littérature des sciences sociales a essayé de le montrer par la suite, dans les années 70, les Etats étaient considérés comme quelque chose de salutaire et de nécessaire pour le bien commun et non comme des institutions de pouvoir politique dont certaines forces sociales pouvaient s'emparer pour servir leurs propres intérêts sectaires. Les nations, disait-on, certainement par opposition aux colonies, « *représentent le moyen le plus efficace et le*

plus tangible de mobiliser des ressources humaines en une unité sociale suffisamment vaste pour pouvoir combiner les avantages d'une division généralisée du travail avec une conception universaliste des objectifs à atteindre » [7].

La formation des nations était donc devenue le mot d'ordre du politique comme du théoricien. Le politique cherchait à la mettre en œuvre au moyen d'orientations et d'idéologies d'« unité nationale », alors que le théoricien s'attachait à créer les modèles et les conditions structuro-fonctionnelles de l'« intégration nationale ». En tant que processus de changement social, la modernisation contenait à la fois les paramètres de modélisation des théoriciens des sciences sociales et les objectifs des nationalistes aujourd'hui au pouvoir. Quand les objectifs n'étaient pas réalisés, les analyses finissaient toujours par rechercher les « variables manquantes » en supposant qu'un « arrangement adéquat » donnerait forcément lieu aux résultats escomptés. On distinguait alors les Etats qui avaient les capacités d'entreprendre des tâches de modernisation (par exemple, ceux dotés de capitaux et d'élites modernisantes) de ceux qui en étaient dépourvus. Dans ce dernier cas, il était toujours possible d'instaurer des programmes appropriés pour remédier à la situation. Au niveau de l'appareil d'Etat, on recommandait notamment des programmes de formation pour les administrateurs, ainsi qu'un ordre politique fort comme cadre adéquat dans lequel l'administration serait elle-même mieux en mesure de mener à bien sa tâche de modernisation.

Pour qu'un gouvernement puisse être jugé sur ses actes, encore fallait-il, cependant, qu'il ait la capacité d'atteindre les objectifs visés. Dans *Political Order in Changing Societies* [8], Samuel Huntington présente de solides arguments « contre la démocratie » dans ces sociétés. D'après lui, un gouvernement qui s'attache à atteindre certains objectifs de développement ne peut s'offrir le luxe d'être en même temps stable et démocratique. La démocratie exige que les citoyens participent ouvertement au processus de gouvernement, que leurs préférences en matière de politique publique soient prises en compte par ceux qui gouvernent, que les gouvernants tiennent leur pouvoir des gouvernés, qu'ils maintiennent des rapports de communication avec les gouvernés et qu'ils soient périodiquement prêts à répondre de leurs actes politiques et à être soit destitués soit confirmés dans leurs fonctions selon la volonté des gouvernés. Cela suppose que les gouvernants ont à la fois le pouvoir et les moyens de traduire les aspirations des gouvernés dans des politiques de nature à satisfaire ces aspirations. Si tel n'est pas le cas, cela implique aussi que les gouvernants peuvent encore expliquer et justifier leurs décisions, et que ces explications et justifications seront acceptées par les gouvernés.

Or, Samuel Huntington fait remarquer que les régimes politiques des sociétés en développement opèrent dans des environnements très fragiles où la légitimité des décisions et la légitimité des non-décisions du gouvernement sont perçues comme dans un jeu « à somme nulle ». Ainsi, lorsqu'une demande existe et qu'elle n'est pas satisfaite, peu importe l'explication que fournit le gouvernement : ceux qui sont concernés ne vont tout simplement pas s'en contenter. En outre, étant donné que les principaux objectifs de développement nécessitent des ressources considérables et que ces ressources sont rares, le gouvernement doit limiter l'éventail des demandes

dont il fait l'objet, de manière à éviter le risque de perdre sa légitimité en ne réussissant pas à répondre à un grand nombre d'exigences. Plus il perd de son autorité et de sa légitimité, plus son pouvoir risque d'être contesté par des contre-élites dans le pays. Comme l'objectif de tout gouvernement est de survivre avant de satisfaire aux aspirations de la société, les gouvernements des pays en développement se voient contraints de fuir la démocratie ; dans le contexte d'une société en mutation, la démocratie est donc source de désintégration politique plutôt que de développement politique.

C'est en s'appuyant sur ce type de thèses que les gouvernements des pays en développement ont donné leur préférence aux structures politiques de contrôle plutôt qu'à la promotion de systèmes de participation. En perfectionnant les instruments de contrôle, ces gouvernements se rendent compte qu'ils font bien plus que sélectionner avec soin le genre de revendications qui leur sont présentées : ils définissent eux-mêmes les critères de légitimation sans courir le risque d'une contestation publique ouverte. De la sorte, toute forme de participation populaire au processus de gouvernement prend généralement l'aspect d'une approbation des actions et des programmes des dirigeants au lieu d'être l'expression des divers intérêts qui attendent les décisions et les mesures de ces dirigeants.

Certains ont toutefois fait valoir que, si ce type de culture politique se développe, ce n'est pas parce que les élites au pouvoir veulent atteindre certains objectifs en matière de développement ; bien au contraire, le choix du contrôle social plutôt que de la participation, en tant que culture politique, s'impose lorsque les élites dirigeantes ont décidé de privatiser l'Etat et de personnaliser le pouvoir politique de façon à faire passer leurs intérêts strictement privés avant le bien commun. Si tel n'était pas le cas, d'ailleurs, le bilan du développement en Afrique ne serait pas si pitoyable un quart de siècle après l'indépendance. Les prémisses que semble invoquer Samuel Huntington pour justifier la fuite devant la démocratie dans les pays en développement manquent donc de consistance.

Frantz Fanon [9] a été le premier à en faire la remarque. A son avis, les gouvernements africains ont commencé à mettre la démocratie sur la touche au lendemain de l'indépendance, car les élites dirigeantes ne pouvaient se permettre de répondre politiquement de leurs actes tout en agissant comme elles le faisaient avec le pouvoir. L'Etat est alors devenu un moyen d'accumulation privée à la fois de richesse et de pouvoir, et cela bien souvent sans tenir compte du préjudice causé à l'intérêt général. Dans son célèbre chapitre sur « Les mésaventures de la conscience nationale », Frantz Fanon donne une description socio-politique détaillée de cette nouvelle classe dirigeante en Afrique, et la condamne pour son égoïsme, son côté inhumain, son manque d'imagination, son inaptitude à gouverner et parce qu'elle fait en définitive partie du problème du sous-développement et non de sa solution. Ainsi, comme les institutions étatiques — notamment les partis politiques monolithiques — maintenaient les citoyens à l'écart de l'arène politique, rien n'était fait pour promouvoir le développement politique, c'est-à-dire l'institutionnalisation de processus de gouvernement susceptibles de bien gérer et de résoudre les conflits sociaux. Au mieux, la politique de contrôle ne faisait qu'enfouir sous terre ces conflits, au risque de les voir éclater ensuite de façon incontrôlable et anémique. De tels systèmes de gouvernement, caractérisés par l'absence de participation et un

parti unique ou pas de parti du tout, étaient donc *instables* de par leur nature même.

Une autre thèse intéressante a été avancée plus tard par Abdulrahman Mohammed Babu dans la postface de *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* [10] de Walter Rodney. Babu y fait remarquer que la politique de contrôle conduit de nombreux gouvernements civils africains à « être autoritaires », c'est-à-dire à préférer émettre des ordres pour être obéis plutôt que de chercher à convaincre par le dialogue. Très vite, une culture de peur domine le système politique de sorte que, même quand les choses vont mal, personne n'ose le faire remarquer puisque seul le chef a qualité et compétence pour dire ce qui va mal. A ce propos, le « chef » est généralement à la tête de l'Etat. Un problème se pose, cependant, lorsque ceux qui sont les plus qualifiés pour commander — les militaires — estiment qu'ils ne peuvent plus laisser le chef de l'Etat usurper leur rôle, et décident alors de prendre sa place. Pour Babu, la politique de contrôle — ou politique autoritaire — est, plus que tout autre facteur, la cause première des coups d'Etat militaires en Afrique. Encore une fois, c'est l'absence d'une culture politique reposant sur la participation qui, au lieu de favoriser la stabilité politique, nourrit l'instabilité politique.

Nous avons nous-même soutenu que l'une des principales causes des coups d'Etat militaires en Afrique tient au « mécontentement politique dans une atmosphère de répression politique » [11]. Lorsque les masses populaires, après avoir été fortement mobilisées durant la période de la lutte pour l'indépendance politique, se retrouvent soudain démobilisées après qu'on leur a fermé les portes de la participation ; lorsque, à la suite de cette démobilisation, la responsabilité publique devient de plus en plus difficile à maintenir et que les détenteurs du pouvoir profitent de la situation en continuant, de manière flagrante, à utiliser les fonctions officielles pour servir leurs intérêts privés ; lorsque tout ceci survient, il arrive tôt ou tard qu'une partie de l'élite, se sentant exclue du pouvoir politique et donc de l'enrichissement personnel, exploite ce mécontentement ambiant pour précipiter un coup d'Etat militaire. Et cela lui est particulièrement facile, puisque l'épine dorsale du gouvernement, à savoir les instruments de contrôle, se trouve, en fin de compte, entre les mains des militaires.

Les hommes en uniforme, tout comme les civils qui occupent les postes de direction de l'Etat, font partie intégrante de l'élite politique moderne des Etats africains. Lorsque les structures politiques commencent à être organisées selon des critères ethniques, dans la logique du mécanisme de contrôle, elles ne peuvent que sombrer dans les conflits ethniques qu'elles ont elles-mêmes suscités. Lorsqu'un régime en place se met à contrôler sévèrement l'accès aux postes de commande, les militaires sont tout autant touchés que les autres ou bien ils commencent à éprouver de la sympathie pour ceux qui, parmi eux, sont victimes de cette mesure. Lorsqu'un président ne fait plus confiance qu'à sa famille, son clan ou sa tribu afin de garder la haute main sur le régime, il ne peut manquer de mécontenter, tôt ou tard, certaines fractions de l'armée et de les rendre hostiles au système. Lorsqu'enfin il n'existe plus de moyens légaux permettant d'accéder aux postes de commande et de changer le gouvernement, et que l'armée elle-même ne bénéficie pas de la confiance du régime, il est alors très probable que les militaires se regrouperont pour défendre leurs intérêts communs et tenter de

s'emparer eux-mêmes du pouvoir politique. Mais une telle prise du pouvoir dans l'intérêt de l'armée « en tant que caste » ne peut réussir que si elle est synchronisée avec l'attente populaire ou avec le soutien populaire éventuellement apporté au coup d'Etat militaire.

Nous pouvons donc postuler que, lorsqu'un régime s'aliène le soutien de la population et ferme les voies légales du changement, que l'armée voit un intérêt corporatiste dans la prise du pouvoir ou qu'une partie de cette armée nourrit un tel projet, le coup d'Etat devient inévitable dès que le mécontentement est suffisamment étendu pour que les militaires pensent pouvoir y trouver un soutien immédiat et spontané. Si elle bénéficie d'un tel appui, l'armée est alors assurée de pouvoir élargir la coalition mise en place pour gouverner en se tournant vers la population civile. En revanche, si, après avoir pris le pouvoir, l'armée se rend compte qu'elle ne bénéficie pas de l'appui populaire et qu'il existe des différends dans ses rangs quant aux intérêts à défendre, il est alors probable que les auteurs du coup d'Etat vont se replier sur eux-mêmes, prendre une orientation militaire et chercher à résoudre leurs problèmes par la coercition et l'institution d'une dictature personnelle et prétorienne. Une fois de plus, c'est le contrôle, et non la participation, qui va devenir la culture politique dominante du régime militaire, le vouant à son tour à la fragilité et à une instabilité fondamentale.

Qu'il soit populaire ou non lorsqu'il a lieu, le coup d'Etat a généralement tendance à engendrer une culture politique qui fait que les élites rivalisant pour les postes de commande le considèrent toujours comme un moyen de résoudre leurs conflits. Même lorsque le gouvernement civil est rétabli, comme cela s'est produit au Ghana, au Nigéria et en Ouganda, les crises politiques ont toutes les chances de se dénouer plus par un nouveau coup d'Etat que par des moyens légaux et rationnels. Il ne faut cependant pas en rejeter la responsabilité sur les auteurs des coups d'Etat : la faute en revient principalement aux premiers gouvernements qui ont détruit la culture de la participation politique pluraliste, c'est-à-dire la démocratie.

Démocratie et stabilité

Nous voyons donc que les arguments invoqués contre la démocratie de participation n'ont pas été corroborés par les faits. On a pensé qu'en réduisant les exigences à satisfaire pour soulager le régime de certaines pressions, on atteindrait davantage d'objectifs en matière de développement. Mais l'histoire de l'Afrique au cours des vingt-cinq dernières années montre que le sous-développement ne fait que gagner du terrain, notamment là où la participation est faible. Il suffit d'un bref tour d'horizon pour se rendre compte que les régimes favorables à la participation ont obtenu de meilleurs résultats que les autres, en termes de croissance économique : le Kenya sous Kenyatta par rapport au Soudan de Nemeiry ; la Côte-d'Ivoire sous Houphouët Bouigny par rapport au Zaïre de Mobutu. Toutefois, cette comparaison n'est pas valable dans tous les cas : que faire, par exemple, du Malawi dans une telle analyse ? Cela dit, il est quand même loin d'être prouvé que l'Afrique a mieux réussi en termes de croissance économique et de développement parce que les gouvernements n'ont pas eu à se préoccu-

per de la pression populaire. Tout indiquerait plutôt que ces gouvernements ont agi à leur guise et anéanti l'économie de leurs pays précisément parce qu'ils n'ont eu de comptes à rendre à personne.

Mahmoud Mamdani [12] a récemment observé que, même lorsque la bourgeoisie porte la question de la démocratie à l'ordre du jour des régimes africains et soutient qu'une culture politique démocratique est la seule source sûre de stabilité politique, elle ne le fait que de façon très restrictive. Elle voit la démocratie purement et simplement en terme libéral — au sens occidental du terme, avec son insistance sur les libertés formelles — de régime concurrentiel, c'est-à-dire sous la forme d'*élections libres et démocratiques*. Mais qui, en Afrique, peut participer librement et démocratiquement au système électoral ? Ne s'agit-il pas ici essentiellement de ces classes sociales affranchies des contraintes extra-économiques que l'Etat impose de façon à perpétuer certaines formes d'exploitation qui ne sont pas nécessairement touchées par le jeu des « élections libres et démocratiques » ?

Si l'on veut que la démocratie soit un exercice qui ait un sens pour toutes les classes sociales, soutient Mahmood Mamdani, et notamment pour les classes populaires, sa forme et sa portée doivent nécessairement être liées de façon significative aux conditions de vie de ces mêmes classes [13]. A quoi veut en venir en fait Mahmood Mamdani ?

Tout le monde sait que la majorité des Africains sont des paysans qui vivent de petites exploitations agricoles. Très souvent, c'est l'Etat qui fixe les prix des produits agricoles commercialisés localement et des produits exportés. Lorsqu'il n'achète pas ces produits aux paysans directement par l'intermédiaire d'offices de commercialisation, il le fait alors en passant par les marchands, qui font partie intégrante de la bourgeoisie. De plus, le commerce d'autres produits de base, comme les biens de consommation courante vendus aux paysans dans les zones rurales, est aussi assuré par cette bourgeoisie grâce aux licences que lui concède l'Etat. Là encore, c'est l'Etat qui contrôle les prix et détermine les relations commerciales entre consommateurs et marchands.

Mais la question des prix est secondaire par rapport à un autre problème beaucoup plus fondamental : celui de la production et des conditions de vie des paysans. Or, on s'attend rarement à ce que ces questions, cruciales pour les intérêts des masses populaires, puissent être soulevées dans le cadre du débat démocratique. La bourgeoisie, *imposant son système politique par le haut*, voit uniquement la démocratie sous la forme d'une rivalité intra-bourgeoise pour le pouvoir politique. C'est pourquoi les systèmes politiques multipartites — la forme — et non les politiques populaires — le contenu — représentent généralement la démocratie telle que la perçoit la bourgeoisie lorsqu'elle conteste un régime militaire.

La démocratie, considérée sous forme d'« élections libres et démocratiques » au sens traditionnel de la démocratie libérale, n'est donc pas une réponse aux problèmes d'instabilité politique de l'Afrique. L'histoire du Nigéria depuis l'indépendance en est une preuve éclatante. Après les nombreux bouleversements qui ont imposé tour à tour un gouvernement militaire, puis civil, puis de nouveau militaire, la bourgeoisie nigérienne n'a en effet à aucun moment pensé qu'il était nécessaire de donner un peu plus de

consistance au processus démocratique et d'impliquer par le bas les masses populaires dans le jeu politique.

En contrepoint des arguments invoqués par Mahmood Mamdani, Samir Amin [14] note qu'il est peut-être vain de penser que les classes actuellement au pouvoir en Afrique pourront un jour s'ouvrir à la démocratie. « L'absence de toute vie économique autonome par rapport au pouvoir étatique, ainsi que l'absence concomitante de toute liberté d'expression pour les forces sociales vis-à-vis du pouvoir, prive de sens tout discours sur la démocratie, car la démocratie est réellement impossible dans ces conditions » [15].

Là encore, on pense à Frantz Fanon : si l'Etat est avant tout considéré en termes d'accession au pouvoir et à la richesse, si le fait d'occuper un quelconque poste de direction au sein de l'appareil d'Etat garantit cette accession, et s'il y a une rivalité intense parmi l'élite pour arriver à ces fonctions, un processus démocratique ne peut que mettre en danger la sécurité de ceux qui détiennent déjà le pouvoir politique. Ceux qui ont les moyens de défier ce pouvoir, par exemple par l'intermédiaire d'entreprises privées, ne seront pas non plus tolérés. Si un individu veut réussir dans les affaires, il doit alors se placer sous le patronage de ceux qui occupent de hautes positions au sein du pouvoir politique ou conclure une alliance avec eux. Telle est la raison pour laquelle les gouvernements africains ne tolèrent pas du tout l'« entreprise privée » nationale : ils voient dans l'enrichissement en dehors de leur contrôle une menace à leur propre stabilité [16].

Pourtant, le fait de refuser toute initiative privée aux nationaux ne conduit pas vraiment à la stabilité de ces régimes. Au mieux, il donne lieu à un faux sentiment de sécurité à ceux qui gouvernent. Peu à peu, le pouvoir doit en effet faire de la place dans le secteur économique aux « communautés d'affaires immigrantes » et aux capitaux étrangers, dans un climat où les hommes d'affaires locaux savent très bien ce qu'ils peuvent accomplir et partant ce qui leur fait défaut. Au Sénégal et au Sierra Leone, les « communautés d'affaires immigrantes » seraient libanaises ; en Afrique de l'Est, elles seraient asiatiques. Dans un cas comme dans l'autre, même si le gouvernement peut leur ménager une place dans le secteur privé « car elles ne représentent pas une menace politique », ces communautés d'affaires immigrantes se rendent très vite compte que leurs investissements pourraient ne pas être en sécurité dans le cas où un bouleversement d'ordre politique se produirait et porterait au pouvoir la fraction de la bourgeoisie dont les intérêts ont souffert du fait de leur présence dans l'économie.

Elles ont alors tendance à investir à l'étranger ou à monter des opérations commerciales qui ne font pas d'elles des prisonnières. De toute façon, elles finissent toujours par se voir accusées d'exploitation, de comportement mercenaire, etc. Elles détournent ainsi les masses populaires des problèmes réels de sous-développement et des contradictions politiques majeures de la société. Et lorsque les crises éclatent, l'Etat est bien souvent incapable d'y apporter une solution qui favoriserait la bourgeoisie dans son ensemble, puisque celle-ci est si divisée dans ses relations avec l'Etat qu'il n'est pas inconcevable que certaines de ses composantes voient dans la désintégration de l'Etat une condition de leur réapparition dans un nouvel Etat qu'elles domineraient elles-mêmes.

L'Etat et les mouvements populaires : l'avenir de la démocratie en Afrique

Quoi qu'il se passe au niveau de la politique de la bourgeoisie en Afrique, on peut observer une autre tendance : les diverses tentatives des masses populaires pour contester les Etats postcoloniaux par le bas. Nzongola-Ntalaja [17] et Wamba-dia-Wamba [18] caractérisent tous deux ces tentatives de « mouvements pour une seconde indépendance de l'Afrique ». Ayant compris que l'indépendance n'avait pas vraiment apporté d'amélioration à leur condition, et ayant remarqué que le pouvoir politique représentait une menace quotidienne pour leur vie, les masses populaires, dans certaines sociétés, ont pris leur sort entre leurs mains en essayant de conquérir leur propre indépendance. Toutefois, il nous faut tenir compte de certaines remarques formulées par Wamba et Nzongola dans leur analyse des mouvements pour une seconde indépendance, si nous voulons être en mesure de suivre l'évolution probable de ces mouvements.

Premièrement, ces mouvements prennent généralement naissance dans des zones situées à l'écart des centres du pouvoir et difficiles d'accès pour les forces gouvernementales. Ils sont pour la plupart dirigés par des individus instruits, capables de convertir clairement les aspirations des masses en programmes politiques communicables au monde extérieur. Comme les masses sont tellement coupées du gouvernement et qu'elles recherchent, en réalité, un cadre social différent « pour se sentir à l'aise », elles sont tout à fait prêtes à adhérer aux idées, aux principes et aux mythes de ces leaders. Mais si les leaders ne sont pas eux-mêmes des partisans ardents du système démocratique, ou ne sont pas prêts, pendant la lutte, à laisser se développer une culture démocratique par le bas, ces mouvements peuvent, bien souvent, finir par ne plus être populaires que par leur forme et non par leur contenu. Le culte du leader peut alors facilement supplanter le développement d'une culture démocratique de lutte dans la société. C'est pourtant par cette culture, si elle se développait pleinement, que se distinguerait la forme de gouvernement que le mouvement mettrait en place lorsqu'il arriverait finalement à « s'emparer du pouvoir ».

Deuxièmement, ces mouvements peuvent bien souvent se trouver confrontés à des risques ou à des tâches qu'ils ne peuvent pas vraiment éviter ou accomplir. Pourtant, pour survivre en tant que mouvements, ils doivent essayer de créer et de perpétuer le mythe de l'invincibilité. Très souvent, un tel mythe conduit à des pertes considérables en vies humaines dans la lutte contre des forces plus puissantes. Le fait de défendre une cause populaire ne dispense pas d'une véritable préparation avant d'aller combattre des forces militaires armées jusqu'aux dents. Pourtant, il arrive très fréquemment que les mouvements populaires fassent des morts et en rejettent la responsabilité sur les armées régulières, alors qu'ils avaient eux aussi manifestement choisi l'aventurisme.

Troisièmement, il semblerait que la vénération de la lutte armée soit en train de prendre valeur de libération. Lorsque les gens sont vraiment mécontents de leur gouvernement, le fait — de plus en plus populaire « au sein de la gauche » africaine — de prendre les armes et de s'engager dans la lutte armée (ou tout simplement de se battre dans la brousse) est considéré comme l'attitude la plus progressiste à adopter. Il est pourtant bien clair avec ce que l'on a connu sous la présidence de Ronald Reagan,

que même la droite peut armer et financer ses propres « libérateurs » : la gauche n'a plus le monopole de la lutte armée. Le fond de cet argument est que le simple fait de prendre les armes ne signifie nullement qu'un mouvement soit populaire ou qu'il mène la lutte pour faire triompher une cause morale supérieure à celle des dirigeants en place. Ce n'est pas l'acte de la lutte armée qui est important : il y a beaucoup plus vital pour les intérêts des masses populaires et la cause de la démocratie en Afrique : c'est la ligne politique de la lutte armée.

Enfin, comme la crise politique est en train de s'aggraver en Afrique, il faut s'attendre à ce que la rébellion populaire contre les régimes en place prenne des formes multiples. Les mouvements populaires ou les alliances pour la démocratie se manifesteront ainsi sous diverses formes d'organisation : mouvements d'étudiants, syndicats, Eglises, sociétés secrètes, etc. [19]. Il est important de prêter attention à ces mouvements populaires si l'on veut essayer de comprendre la lutte pour la démocratie en Afrique et les stratégies que les masses populaires appliquent, en différentes circonstances, pour contester l'Etat postcolonial depuis la base. Et du moment que ces mouvements viennent d'en bas, du « ventre de la société » pour ainsi dire, leurs buts et leurs exigences doivent nécessairement exprimer le contenu de la démocratie du point de vue des masses populaires. C'est-à-dire l'avenir tel que ces masses le voient : et l'avenir que l'Etat, tel qu'il est constitué, essaiera soit de leur éviter soit de leur offrir d'une façon ou d'une autre.

Etat, démocratie et puissances étrangères

Nous ne pouvons conclure cet examen des perspectives de démocratie en Afrique sans parler des puissances étrangères. Notre démarche n'est pas de pure forme, elle se justifie essentiellement par le fait que la situation difficile que vit actuellement l'Afrique est étroitement liée aux intérêts et aux machinations des puissances étrangères. Certains prétendent parfois que les Etats indépendants disposent d'une grande marge de manœuvre vis-à-vis des puissances étrangères et que, sur de nombreuses questions d'ordre national, telle l'organisation de la politique intérieure, les puissances étrangères n'ont guère voix au chapitre. D'autres soutiennent avec autant de force que, de par leur nature même de sociétés dépendantes, les gouvernements ou les Etats africains ne peuvent être tout à fait indépendants de leurs « maîtres étrangers ». Sur de nombreuses questions d'ordre intérieur, telles que le type de système politique à adopter, ils sont obligés de tenir compte des souhaits des puissances étrangères auxquelles ils sont subordonnés.

Il ne faut pas que le pour et le contre de ces deux écoles de pensée nous retiennent trop longtemps. Acceptons, comme le veut le bon sens, que l'une et l'autre aient raison dans leurs observations générales mais tort si l'on prend ces affirmations pour définitives et mutuellement exclusives. Dans la gestion quotidienne de leurs affaires politiques, les Etats indépendants d'Afrique possèdent en effet une certaine marge d'autonomie par rapport aux puissances étrangères. Mais, quand il s'agit de questions touchant aux intérêts à long terme des dites puissances, ces mêmes Etats perdent alors pratiquement toute liberté de manœuvre.

Le rôle des puissances étrangères dans le processus de démocratisation

Les puissances étrangères, qui ont des intérêts dans certains pays du Tiers-Monde, peuvent exercer des influences déterminantes sur la formation ou l'évolution des processus politiques dans ces sociétés. A des moments cruciaux, ces puissances étrangères peuvent en effet intervenir, en jouant sur les contradictions internes ou la géopolitique régionale de tel ou tel pays, pour infléchir le cours de son histoire politique. Cela n'implique pas cependant que les forces politiques de ces sociétés doivent toujours se laisser manipuler, menacer ou forcer la main pour prendre certaines initiatives favorisant les intérêts des puissances étrangères au détriment de leurs propres intérêts. Dans le cas du Chili, par exemple, on peut dire que le gouvernement de l'Unité populaire a fait de son mieux pour organiser une force démocratique populaire de soutien à sa politique de transition vers le socialisme. C'est tout simplement la puissance du dollar, la crédulité des militaires chiliens et l'opportunisme des partis d'opposition qui ont entraîné la perte d'Allende. Parallèlement, Allende a été accusé de n'avoir pas pris soin de changer les chefs militaires afin de s'assurer le soutien de l'armée nationale. Il s'agit peut-être là d'une critique justifiée ; elle souligne en tout cas le fait capital que toute action visant à démocratiser la société, si elle n'implique pas la démocratisation des organes de l'Etat, compromet son propre succès.

La différence entre le Nicaragua et le Chili saute donc aux yeux. Au Nicaragua, les sandinistes ont pris le pouvoir après avoir vaincu la garde nationale et s'être complètement débarrassés de l'appareil militaire de l'ancien régime. L'Etat sandiniste, de Masaya à Managua en passant par d'autres grands centres du pouvoir, était bel et bien un Etat sandiniste. Allende, quant à lui, s'attaquait à une tâche autrement difficile : essayer de démocratiser un Etat qui, de par sa nature même, faisait encore partie de l'ancien régime et soutenait celui-ci et ses partisans étrangers.

Cela dit, les sandinistes avaient un autre problème qu'ils partagent, d'une certaine façon, avec la *Zimbabwe African National Union* (ZANU) : celui d'un mouvement populaire qui prend le pouvoir alors que plusieurs composantes des masses populaires ne font pas encore, pour diverses raisons historiques, partie intégrante du mouvement. Et c'est justement parce qu'elles ne font pas partie du mouvement que ces composantes peuvent être amenées par les forces sociales d'opposition à rejeter toute tentative d'intégration. L'exemple des indiens Mosquitos au Nicaragua et des Ndébélés du Matabeleland au Zimbabwe en est une bonne illustration. Ni les sandinistes, ni la ZANU n'ont suivi, en effet, une ligne démocratique constructive et cohérente pour vaincre la résistance des Mosquitos et des Ndébélés. Plutôt que de chercher à comprendre « de l'intérieur » les points de vue des deux groupes, les sandinistes et la ZANU ont adopté l'attitude qui veut que le leadership révolutionnaire s'apparente à une œuvre missionnaire : les leaders sont infailibles et ceux qui ne suivent pas doivent être convertis, même s'il faut — en plus de la menace d'aller en enfer — les contraindre à abandonner leurs pratiques coupables. Une approche beaucoup plus constructive aurait consisté à former un large front démocratique au sein des masses populaires. Ce front aurait, sans aucun doute, accepté et toléré les différences politiques, sans pour autant sacrifier son engagement envers la

démocratie ni se couper de la société traditionnelle. C'est cette approche, plus difficile à mettre en œuvre que celle de la révolution à la mode missionnaire, qui a fait défaut à la plupart des soi-disant mouvements politiques progressistes en Afrique et en Amérique latine — les transformant bien souvent en dictatures de « gauche » et en régimes antidémocratiques.

Conclusion

Toute puissance étrangère décidée à faire avorter un mouvement progressiste qui a pris le pouvoir en vue de révolutionner la société, aurait davantage intérêt à exploiter les contradictions internes de ce mouvement non démocratiques constituent le moyen le plus sûr pour créer des poches de mécontentement et des tentations d'alliance avec des forces extérieures afin de briser les tentatives d'instauration d'un nouvel ordre social démocratique. Il est donc contraire aux objectifs d'un mouvement progressiste de prôner un régime autoritaire de préférence à un régime de participation. On ne peut pas lutter pour construire une société démocratique sans pratiquer la démocratie dans son propre système. Autrement dit, on n'instaure pas la démocratie comme on prépare une tasse de café instantané : pour que le mélange prenne, il faut qu'il soit lié par des coutumes et des traditions sociales profondément ancrées dans la vie de la société civile.

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
POLITICAL DOMINATION IN AFRICA

Reflections on the limits of power

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1

Democracy in Africa

RICHARD SKLAR

I am often asked to explain what possessed me, a white American political scientist, to undertake African studies. Usually, I reflect upon my state of mind in the mid 1950s and mention the allure of a new horizon for democracy, limned by the doctrine of self-determination for subject peoples. Even then, however, realists warned that democracy in Africa, as in Asia, would bleed and die on the altars of national consolidation and social reconstruction.¹ But democracy dies hard. Its vital force is the accountability of rulers to their subjects. Democracy stirs and awakens from the deepest slumber whenever the principle of accountability is asserted by members of a community or conceded by those who rule. Democracy cannot be destroyed by a coup d'état; it will survive every legal assault upon political liberty. The true executioner of democracy has neither sword nor sceptre, but a baneful idea. Ironically, the deadly agent is an idea about freedom.

In Africa today, freedom from want is a universal goal. Millions of lives are blighted by the effects of poverty, unemployment, malnutrition, untended illness, and inadequate education. In all countries, political leaders dedicate themselves to the cause of economic and social development. Most leaders also claim to respect the principle of accountability to the people. However, the imperatives of development are far more demanding than the claims of democracy. Appalled by the human condition and waste of resources in Africa and other non-industrial regions, many intellectuals proclaim the validity of an anti-democratic idea, to which the term (developmental dictatorship) is aptly applied.

According to A. James Gregor, the principles of developmental dictatorship were first formulated by Italian Marxists during the course of intense theoretical debates before the outbreak of World War I.² Eventually, they came to understand that orthodox Marxism was not relevant to the social realities of their underdeveloped country. Left to itself, they reasoned, the feeble Italian bourgeoisie, fettered by its dependence upon foreign capitalists, would not create an industrial society. Fatefully, they forsook the ideal

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of proletarian internationalism and embraced statist nationalism in order to mobilise all talents and resources for a programme of forced and rapid industrialisation. With heretical abandon, they entrusted responsibility for the direction of events to an 'audacious minority' or 'vanguard elite'.³ Faced with a similar predicament in the 1920s, the post-capitalist regime in Moscow adopted a similar nationalist and statist strategy. Ever since, national struggles to overcome economic backwardness in many parts of the world have been intensified if not actually led by proponents of developmental dictatorship.

The hardships of developmental dictatorship are well known: liberty is suppressed; labour is regimented and exploited; freedom of movement is curtailed; personal choice is severely restricted. From his pre-revolutionary vantage point, Karl Marx advised his readers to anticipate painful transitions or 'birth-pangs' during the creation of new social orders. 'The country that is more developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future.'⁴ Must we, now, believe that Africa, rid of external rule but bowed down in social and economic agony, with burgeoning populations and a dearth of jobs, should or will resort *en masse* and *in extremis* to developmental dictatorship? Shall we avert our eyes from an unforeseen alternative and disregard an abundance of evidence for the thesis that Africa today is a veritable workshop of democracy?

Democracy in Africa is as varied as the ever-changing forms of government in more than fifty sovereign states. Democracy in Africa is an experimental process in a new generation of countries.⁵ We should study this process not only to learn about Africa, but also to refresh our knowledge about the meaning of democracy itself. As the African philosopher, Edward Wilmot Blyden, might have said, in our time, these experiments in democracy constitute 'Africa's service to the world'.⁶

For this assessment of democracy in Africa, I have distinguished four existing types at the level of national government and one other which has been proposed. The first type is liberal democracy, wherein the powers of government are limited by law and citizens enjoy freedom of association to compete for office in free elections at regular intervals. Numerous liberal democracies were bequeathed to Africa by the former colonial rulers; all but a few of them, however, were rudely swept away by military coups, political usurpations, and constitutional changes shortly after (or within a decade of) independence.⁷ A few hardier breeds of liberal democracy have been planted and nurtured by African statesmen themselves.

At the present time, one person in five on the continent of Africa lives in a truly liberal democracy with genuine freedom of expression and freedom of political association. (Among Black Africans the percentage is higher: one in four.) The citizens of liberal democracies include an estimated one hundred million Nigerians plus the citizens of five other states, namely, Botswana, the Gambia, Mauritius, Senegal, and Zimbabwe.

However, the serious qualifications to which this observation is liable underscore the experimental and highly contingent nature of liberal democracy in Africa.

During 1980-2, ventures in liberal democracy have been aborted by paternalistic military guardians in Upper Volta, (arguably) the Central African Republic, and Ghana. At present, liberal democracy lingers in Zimbabwe, but the political leaders of that country have expressed their strong preference for a democracy without party competition. Until the electoral victory of Mauritian socialists in June 1982, no national government in an independent African state had ever been transferred to an opposition by electoral means. Confirming the historic importance of this event, the Mauritian socialists have pledged to strengthen a constitutional guarantee of free elections at regular intervals. In the Gambia, liberal democracy nearly succumbed to an insurrection in July 1981. It has since been fortified by the establishment of a confederation with a protective sister-republic, Senegal. Since the retirement of President Léopold Sédar Senghor in January 1981, Senegal has emerged as a full-fledged liberal democracy. President Abdou Diouf leads a moderate socialist party which enjoys a commanding majority in the national assembly. The party is also a haven for conservative and parasitical interest groups. To rejuvenate this party for the urgent tasks of economic reconstruction, and to defuse a potentially revolutionary opposition, President Diouf has opened the door of legality to all political parties. Inevitably, the opposition parties sparkle, like the fragments of a Roman candle, in splendid sectarian isolation. Diouf's open-air treatment of illiberal dissent is a milestone for democratic socialists in Africa.

Given the large number of sovereign entities in today's Africa, and the preponderance of illiberal governments, the crucial accounting for African liberal democracy must be rendered in populous Nigeria.* Scholars have pondered and variously explained the remarkable resilience of constitutional liberty in Nigerian government. Without prejudice to the importance of other explanations, notably the influence of indigenous constitutional traditions, I am particularly impressed by the impact of federalism upon Nigerian political thought. While the number of states in Nigeria's federation has varied and remains contentious, federalism *per se* is an article of national faith, the virtually unquestioned premise of national unity. It is instructive to recall that federalism was a shared value for rival nationalists during the colonial era;⁸ it was the indispensable basis for Nigerian unity under military rule, when the threat of national disintegration loomed large. At present, nineteen states accommodate a richly textured and wondrously complex tapestry of democratic political life.

Truly federal governments are necessarily liberal governments.

* The argument given here still holds, despite the two military coups taking place (in December 1983 and August 1985) since this paper was originally written.

predicated on the division and restraint of power. In Nigeria, the rights of citizens and constituent states alike are protected by a staunchly independent judiciary. In fact, Nigeria is an exceptionally legalistic society; many political issues of great moment are finally resolved in the courts; for example, the outcome of the 1979 presidential election. Nor did the courts lose their vitality under military rule. Shorn, temporarily, of their formal constitutional independence, the judges still retained their authority in the states, where, in the words of a legal scholar, they performed 'prodigious feats of courage' defending the rights of citizens.⁹ Should constitutional government in Nigeria be suppressed once again, the potential for its early revival would be preserved by federalism, the legal profession, and the determined practice of judicial independence.

Despite its apparent vigour, liberal democracy in Nigeria is debilitated by the effects of economic anarchy and social distemper. A small minority of the population is conspicuously wealthy and privileged while the vast majority seethes with discontent. Keepers of the national conscience frequently deplore the plunder and waste of Nigeria's wealth by corrupt officials in collusion with unscrupulous businessmen.¹⁰ Scholars discern the portents of revolutionary mass action, particularly in the northern states, where class conflict is pronounced.¹¹ Disillusioned intellectuals renounce democracy and urge the merits of developmental dictatorship in one form or another. Both the Leninist and the corporatist, or Brazilian, versions have their advocates. In Nigeria, as in Senegal, liberal democracy is democracy with tears and many reservations.

A second type of democracy in Africa accepts the principle that rulers should be accountable to their subjects but dispenses with the political method of multi-party electoral competition. I shall adopt the term 'guided democracy' for this type of government by guardians of the public weal who insist upon political uniformity. Guided democracy is, to be sure, a form of developmental dictatorship; it is classified separately because the other forms of developmental dictatorship make little or no pretence of accountability to the people on the part of exalted persons or national saviours.

The late President Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya was one of a number of African presidents who have ruled beyond the reach of accountability. When he died, in 1978, the barons of Kenyan politics and society could not imagine, nor would they have tolerated another episode of such highly personal rule. Kenya had become a *de facto* one-party state in 1969, when the sole opposition party was banned. Yet the one-party political process in that country has been highly competitive; the triumphal party itself has been described as a 'confederation of arenas' where the bosses of rural factions 'collide' and 'collude' in their 'perennial struggle' for power.¹² Survey research on the electoral process tells of a well-informed electorate which imposes the norm of accountability upon its representatives; for example, in

* Formal constitutional democracy was abolished in the coup of December 1983.

1979, 45 per cent of the incumbent members of parliament were defeated at the polls.¹³ When, in 1982, Kenya became a one-party state *de jure*, her commitment to guided rather than liberal democracy was decisively confirmed.

During the course of a purely formal parliamentary debate on the establishment of a one-party state, the vice-president, Mwai Kibaki, explained that constitutional change was needed to preclude the election of persons who would favour economic experiments based upon Marxist theories. Such theories, he argued, have been disproved by the poor economic performances of communist systems.¹⁴ This kind of reasoning, from a different ideological perspective, is used by the leaders of those authoritarian regimes which have socialist orientations to preclude the practical advocacy of capitalist ideas. In such cases, political monopolies are justified by persons who assert the moral necessity or scientific truth of an official doctrine, for example, 'humanism' in Zambia, the 'Third Universal Theory' in Libya, and Marxism-Leninism in several countries.

The touchstone of guided democracy is the existence and operation of a political mechanism which can be expected to ensure the accountability of rulers to the people. Various developmental dictatorships in Africa, both capitalist and socialist, do not pass muster as guided democracies because their leaders rule without regard to the principle of accountability. Those which do qualify as guided democracies include a variety of political forms and ideological orientations. Some, such as Guinea-Bissau, Tanzania, and (arguably) Zambia, have mass-mobilising parties with open memberships. Others, including Congo People's Republic, Angola, and Mozambique, have created Leninist parties with doctrinal restrictions on membership and statutes on the required accountability of leaders. In these and other instances of one-party or, as in Libya, no-party rule, the degree of democracy varies with the intensity of passion for political accountability and its effective enforcement.

In socialist thought, the concept of democracy extends beyond the precept of accountability to the idea of social justice. From that perspective, democracy implies the effective pursuit of an egalitarian social order in addition to a government which is accountable to the people. For the principal instance of social democracy (my third type for this survey) in Africa I turn, necessarily, to Tanzania.

Ever since the famous Arusha Declaration of 1967, the Tanzanian government has endeavoured to minimise social inequality and to counteract various tendencies toward class division. In the commentaries of President Julius K. Nyerere, two aspects of the quest for social equality are strongly emphasized: first, the problem of privilege, or differentials in both personal consuming power and access to public services; second, the importance of popular participation in the decision-making processes of both political and economic organisations.¹⁵ On the first count, impressive achievements have been recorded in reducing income differentials and

providing economic, educational, health, and other essential services to the public at large. Furthermore, the conversion of public trust into personal wealth has been checked by progressive taxation, lean salary scales for the administrators of public agencies, and the enforcement of a socialist code of conduct for leaders and officials.

On the second count, that of progress towards popular and democratic participation in governmental and economic decision making, Tanzania's record is more difficult to assess. In 1967, the sole legal party accepted an historic challenge: to build socialism in an agrarian country without resort to coercive methods of collectivisation. At the same time, every effort would be made to raise the standard of living and enhance the quality of life in peasant and working-class communities. However, the vast majority of rural dwellers did not respond favourably to the party's call for collectivisation on a voluntary basis. Finally, at the end of its patience, the government used compulsion to move and resettle millions of peasants from their dispersed homes and farms into clustered villages between 1974 and 1976. That process, known as 'villagisation', has made it possible for the government to reach the entire rural population with basic services. However, the related aim of socialist farming – the collectivisation of production – was, at first, de-emphasised and then virtually abandoned in the face of peasant resistance, a food crisis, and the critical views of potential donors, notably the World Bank, at a time of dire need for foreign aid.¹⁶

Suddenly, the socialist venture in Tanzania was awash in a sea of academic and intellectual doubt.¹⁷ Could rural socialism be reconciled with an acceptable level of agricultural efficiency? Had the socialist venture been sabotaged by non- or pseudo-socialist officials and their class allies in concert with anti-socialist foreign powers? Those who seek honest answers to these hard questions and still believe in the viability of socialist policies in Tanzania have set great store by the party's avowed commitment to popular and democratic participation in economic and political life. They also view with concern the lack of evidence to show that workers and peasants participate effectively in the formulation and adoption of public policies. At the centre of power, the ruling party itself sets a decisive example for all other institutions. In his empathetic assessment of party life, Cranford Pratt finds an 'oligarchic' and 'profound bias against any opposition to the leadership'.¹⁸

If, as Nyerere maintains, democratic participation is a cornerstone of social equality,¹⁹ sincere socialists cannot disregard the inevitably repressive effects of legal barriers to freedom of association. Socialists of participative conviction cannot sidestep a pluralist question: is democratic participation viable in a one-party state, where political competition is severely restricted by the virtual elimination of group rights to pursue self-determined political aims? This question, which reflects the liberal critique of guided democracy, has engaged the attention of intellectuals in several

other African countries where the search for social democracy is less resolute than it has been in Tanzania. An illuminating example is the constitutional declaration of a 'One-Party Participatory Democracy' in Zambia. It signifies experimentation with a fourth, familiar but elusive type of democracy, namely, participatory democracy.

The theory of participatory democracy is a product of the current era. It affirms the existence of a reciprocal relationship between democratic political institutions and participative social institutions, with particular emphasis upon the educative effects of democratic participation in the workplace.²⁰ In Zambia, the concept of participatory democracy was introduced as a national goal by President Kenneth D. Kaunda in 1968.²¹ Subsequently, Kaunda construed the concept to connote democratic participation in all spheres of life, so that 'no single individual or group of individuals shall have a monopoly of political, economic, social or military power'.²² To his mind, the public interest suffers when politicians monopolise political power, or soldiers monopolise military power, or intellectuals and technocrats monopolise knowledge, or publishers and writers monopolise the power of the pen, or workers monopolise power through strikes, or chiefs monopolise the power of tradition.²³ In the near future, he forecast, participatory democracy would be practised in all Zambian institutions, including the civil service and the army.²⁴

Objectively considered, however, the record of participatory democracy in Zambia has fallen far short of Kaunda's expectations. Careful studies attest to the very low levels of popular attachment to, or involvement in, participatory institutions in rural Zambia.²⁵ The sole legal party has not become a truly popular institution. Membership in the party has dwindled to fewer than 5 per cent of the population despite its availability to Zambians without restriction.²⁶ A 'commandist' and 'paternalistic' style of administration at the local level²⁷ is magnified at the national level by the domineering office of the president. As William Tordoff observes, 'Ironically, no one emphasizes the virtues of participatory democracy more than the president himself, yet his own style of increasingly personalized decision-making renders its realization difficult'.²⁸ As in Tanzania, the party-state in Zambia abhors the very idea of political pluralism. Yet the Zambian government, unlike the Tanzanian, must contend with a formidable and resourceful labour movement; indeed the Mineworkers' Union of Zambia, 60,000 strong, has never accepted the hegemony of the party in the sphere of industrial relations. Its long-term struggle for autonomy from an imperious government lies at the very heart of conflict in Zambian politics.

Truly democratic participation is self-motivated and self-determined; it is not coerced. In Africa, participatory democracy implies a commitment to the self-motivated assertion of peasant and working-class interests in political affairs. But the Zambian leadership has tried to induce popular participation into channels which would be controlled by a monopolistic

political party. From a democratic standpoint, however, induced participation comes close to being a contradiction in terms; indeed it is a form of coercion. And it has been rejected by the Zambian workers and peasants.

In 1981, following a spate of wildcat strikes, four leaders of the labour movement, including the chairman and secretary-general of the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions, and an eventually successful aspirant for the presidency of the Mineworkers' Union, were detained for nearly three months on charges of plotting against the government. Announcing this action, Kaunda accused the labour leadership of capitalist deviations.²⁹ In 1982, Kaunda turned a corner in his personal ideology. Much to the amazement of Kaunda-watchers, most of whom were confident of his apparently unshakeable commitment to non-doctrinaire 'humanist' socialism, he decided that Zambia's official ideology should be Marxist (or 'scientific') socialism. But this is not, after all, an arbitrary choice. Scientific socialism marks a strictly logical progression in ideology for a ruling group of socialist inclination which intends to control the working class. It also signifies the maturation of basic tendencies towards an undiluted developmental dictatorship in Zambia.³⁰

As a result of Kaunda's ideological demarche, the beleaguered labour movement has acquired a powerful ally in its bid for autonomy, namely the interdenominational Christian Council of Zambia. Following his release from detention, Frederick Chiluba, chairman of the Congress of Trade Unions, is reported to have 'made a point of going to church almost every day'.³¹ As in Poland, the struggle for participatory democracy in Zambia has forged an alliance between two social institutions which are second to none other in popularity, namely the labour movement and the churches. Like his Polish counterpart, Lech Walesa, Chiluba stands for participatory democracy from without, rather than from within, the party.

In Zambia, as in Tanzania, the acid test for participatory democracy is the attitude of the national leadership towards self-assertion by the working class and the peasantry. Neither regime has passed that test; each has chosen to promote induced, rather than spontaneous, participation. It may be instructive to contrast these instances with the noteworthy practice of worker self-management in Algeria, inaugurated spontaneously by urban and rural workers at the end of the war for independence. For twenty years, this genuine expression of working-class democracy has survived the rigours of interaction with an authoritarian government. The vitality and lasting effect of this participatory institution in Algeria is attributable to its spontaneous, as opposed to induced, genesis.³² By contrast, a memorable episode of induced participatory democracy under revolutionary conditions in Guinea-Bissau, called by Amílcar Cabral 'revolutionary democracy', appears to have faded in the post-revolutionary, one-party state.³³

A fifth type of democracy has no legal guardian in Africa, but its adoption is often contemplated. Its name is consociational democracy, so christened by a Dutch political scientist, Arend Lijphart, and widely celebrated by

like-minded scholars. This type of democracy is prescribed by its advocates as a long- or short-term solution to the problem of cultural, that is, ethnic, racial, or religious, group conflict in deeply divided societies. In fact, it is a version of liberal democracy with the addition of special arrangements to protect the vital interests of cultural groups. In culturally plural societies, such as Switzerland, federalism and cantonal autonomy are exemplary consociational devices; the principle of proportionality for both political representation and the distribution of benefits is also important. In Nigeria, the constitutional requirement that political parties must reflect the 'federal character' of the country in order to qualify for registration is one of several consociational devices which have been designed to prevent sectional domination. Consociational mechanisms and techniques are routinely used by the governments of plural societies. According to Lijphart, however, the hallmark of specifically consociational democracy, as a distinct type, is effective and voluntary political cooperation among the elites and truly representative leaders of the main cultural groups.³⁴

In South Africa, the banner of consociationalism has been unfurled by legal opponents of the ruling National Party, principally the white Progressive Federal party³⁵ and Inkatha, a Zulu-based mass organisation, acting through a multi-racial commission appointed by Gatsha Buthelezi, chief minister of Kwazulu, in 1980. Drawing upon the ideas of Professor Lijphart, who served as a member, the commission has proposed a consociational constitution for the Province of Natal as an example for the country as a whole. The key features of this proposal include universal adult suffrage, a legislative assembly elected by means of proportional representation in electoral districts, and an executive body chosen in accordance with consociational principles.³⁶ These recommendations have been rejected by the government. Meanwhile proposals for consociational democracy in South Africa have also been criticised by rigorously democratic thinkers. Heribert Adam, for one, notes that group identities and their ethnic labels in South Africa have been imposed upon subject groups by the dominant group. 'For example,' he observes, 'there are no enthusiastic Coloureds in the self-perceptions of those classified as Coloureds.'³⁷ Furthermore, a growing number of black liberation leaders are social revolutionaries with little or no interest in consociational compromising. Increasingly, the liberation struggle involves collective demands for 'redistributive' or social and, in the workplace, participatory democracy.³⁸

In divided societies, like South Africa, where revolutionary action involves a large and increasing measure of class struggle, consociational democracy cannot fulfil its promise of stabilising social satisfaction. Yet it would be mistaken to believe that the consociational idea of self-determination for self-regarding communities is counter-revolutionary *per se*. In so far as subnational group rights command general respect, democratic movements which disregard consociational precepts do so at their own peril. In Africa, the value of consociational democracy would be more

clearly apparent in countries, such as the Democratic Republic of the Sudan, where the nature of cultural cleavage is less ambiguous than it is in the *apartheid* republic.³⁹ This type of democracy should not be underappreciated because of its current association with moderate reform in South Africa.

Democracy in Africa is widely approved but everywhere in doubt. Democratic dreams are the incandescent particles of current history which gleam brightly in the sunlight of liberation only to fade beneath the lengthening shadow of grim economic realities. This survey of types may help to sort some of the problems of democracy in Africa. Liberal democracy founders in a rising tide of tears and social despair. Reflecting on two recent setbacks for liberal democracy in West Africa, an acute observer offered this judgement: 'It was only the appalling economic situations in Ghana and Upper Volta, and the impotence of the respective governments faced with this situation that led to the collapse of their parliamentary systems.'⁴⁰

Social democracy introduces a standard for the just distribution of wealth and material benefits; but its success and survival cannot be ensured by redistributive policies alone. In an age of social optimism, people will not settle for the redistribution of misery and poverty. Everything depends upon the timely creation of national wealth, and wealth-producing assets by means of public and collective, rather than private, enterprise. In many African countries, however, statist economic policies, espoused in the name of socialism, have discouraged or prevented the release of creative, wealth-generating energies. In Guinea, for example, the regime outlawed all private markets in 1975; private trading was made a criminal offence. State agencies were supposed to fill the void, but they were riddled with corruption and proved to be hopelessly inefficient. Economic collapse and starvation were avoided only because the law was erratically enforced and eventually allowed to lapse.⁴¹ In this and many other cases, statism has been mistaken for socialism.

For reasons that are, in the main, historical and contingent rather than theoretical or necessary, socialism has often been identified with statism by friends and foes alike. Increasingly that identification discredits socialism as a mode of development in the eyes of the world on the grounds that statist strategies are plainly impractical and unrealistic apart from their troubling political aspects. In the past, a few countries, notably the Soviet Union and China, have constructed socialist economies with capital extracted from the countryside and appropriated by the state for purposes of investment and essential purchases abroad. That classic strategy is plainly unsuited to conditions in the agrarian countries of Africa for several reasons, among them rural resistance to collectivisation, exponential population growth, the high cost of critical imports, and endemic problems of statist economic management. Furthermore, socialism is supposed to signify the democratisation of economic life. Coercion is contrary to the spirit of socialism.

Statism, the most general form of coercion, is the graveyard of socialism as well as democracy.

Participatory democracy is a logical response to the challenge of statism. Its appearance and reappearance in Africa should be a source of inspiration to democrats and, in particular, democratic socialists. However, the practice of participatory democracy cannot be regimented by the state without detriment to its integrity. Where participatory institutions have been created in factories and farms by self-motivated, and self-directed workers, as in the case of Algeria, they countervail the power of the one-party state. By contrast, where participative decision-making is narrowly restricted and subject to close supervision by a party-state, as in Tanzania and Zambia, participatory democracy succumbs to the assault of guided democracy and developmental dictatorship.

Shall we conclude, with Gregor, that developmental dictatorship is the wave of the future for Africa?⁴² The empirical support for that viewpoint is weak. Its sole rationale — the presumed power to produce rapid economic development — is scarcely tenable. Democracy is a far more popular alternative, but democracy must take up the challenge of development where dictatorship has failed. Africa needs a developmental democracy, a democracy without tears. Developmental democracy could represent a synthesis of all that has been learned from the many experiments with simpler types. It would probably be liberal and social, participatory and consociational all at once. From guided democracy it could inherit an appreciation for the function of leadership. The core of guided democracy could even be refined and transformed into preceptorial democracy, or leadership without political power.⁴³ In a complex, developmental democracy, intellectual guidance would operate by means of persuasion alone; its efficacy in Africa would be ensured by that immense respect for learning and scholarship which is a characteristic quality of modern African societies.

Developmental democracy does not imply a specific formulation of democratic principles based upon distinctive core values, such as political liberty for liberal democracy, social equality for social democracy, popular participation for participatory democracy, or group rights for consociational democracy. The content of developmental democracy would vary with the views of democratic theorists. One such theorist, the Canadian, C. B. Macpherson, has introduced the term to designate a stage in the evolution of liberal democracy, marked by the emergence, in theory and practice, of equal opportunity for 'individual self-development'.⁴⁴ This advance was promoted by the political doctrines of John Stuart Mill and his early-twentieth-century successors. In our time, it is surely appropriate to broaden the meaning of developmental democracy so that it will accommodate the goals of social reconstruction in the non-industrial countries. Developmental democracy today should, I believe, be enlarged to encompass the core values of social, participatory, and consociational democracy.

as well as the specifically liberal elements of limited government and individual self-development.

Broadly conceived, developmental democracy would evoke fresh and original responses to the problems of economic underdevelopment, social stagnation and political drift. Original thought is the heart of the matter. Gregor has shown, convincingly, that the essential ideas of developmental dictatorship were formulated during the first decade of this century by revolutionary syndicalists in Italy. By the ninth decade these ideas have surely run their course. There is no good economic reason for Africans today to propitiate the European gods of developmental dictatorship.

From the early stirrings of modern African nationalism to the onset and consolidation of political independence, Africa has resisted foreign intellectual domination. In all but a few countries, African governments conduct their foreign relations on the basis of a deep and abiding commitment to the principle of non-alignment in world politics.⁴⁵ African statecraft reflects a determination to formulate the challenges of international relations from a self-defined standpoint. In the social thought of twentieth-century Africa, intellectual self-reliance is a paramount theme; it spans the ideological spectrum as indicated by its prominence in the francophonic philosophy of *Négritude*, the Africanist tradition of Anton Lembede and his followers in South Africa,⁴⁶ the 'African' and democratic socialism of Nyerere, and the revolutionary socialism of Amílcar Cabral.⁴⁷ Students of social thought should recognise the quest for an intellectual synthesis and transcendence of capitalism and socialism in their classical and contemporary, or neoclassical, forms. In an essay entitled 'The emancipation of democracy', W. E. B. Du Bois assessed the contribution of black people in America to democracy thus:

It was the black man that raised a vision of democracy in America such as neither Americans nor Europeans conceived in the eighteenth century and such as they have not even accepted in the twentieth century; and yet a conception which every clear sighted man knows is true and inevitable.⁴⁸

Might this not be written of Africa's contribution to democracy in our time?⁴⁹

Where shall we look for the signs of intellectual and political synthesis which would signify the emergence of a new democracy? Where have the forms of developmental democracy begun to take shape? Every national workshop bears inspection, for each, in its own way, contributes to the aggregate of democratic knowledge and practice. Consider Zimbabwe, where revolutionary socialists in power prepare to terminate a transitional period of liberal government in favour of a more restrictive, one-party political formula. Their long-term objective has been described in an official document as 'a truly socialist, egalitarian and democratic society'.⁵⁰ Zimbabwean leaders and theorists will be challenged by the fact that there are no models for this kind of social construction on the face of the earth.

In pace-setting Zambia, where wage labour constitutes a comparatively large component of the total work force (more than one-third), the struggle for trade-union autonomy is fundamental to the cause of developmental democracy. But for the democratic vitality of the labour movement, developmental dictatorship in the guise of 'scientific socialism' could not be counteracted by other popular groups in Zambia. While clergymen, businessmen, intellectuals and professional people are, in the main, opposed to the adoption of 'scientific socialism' as an official doctrine, they could not resist it effectively without the firm support of democratic labour. In this matter of ideological choice, the principal restraining force on Zambia's political leadership is neither foreign capital nor the Zambian bourgeoisie; it is the Zambian labour movement.⁵¹

In the Sahelian nation of Niger, a military government has proclaimed the institution of a new political order, known as 'the development society'. Founded upon the twin pillars of traditional youth organisations and village-based agricultural cooperatives, the new system of government functions through a series of elected councils, culminating in a National Development Council, which has been directed to frame an 'original' and 'authentically Nigerien' constitution.⁵² Here, too, the spirit of developmental democracy is abroad.

In neighbouring Nigeria, the prospects for developmental democracy are enhanced by a federal system of government which provides a multiplicity of arenas for social and political experimentation. Federalism is also the essential foundation of Nigerian national unity. The relevance of that example to pan-African thought merits attention. Dictatorship may be the most formidable barrier to pan-African unity. Pan-African federalism would foster democracy at the expense of dictatorship in many countries. As a pan-African principle, federalism would also facilitate the exchange of democratic discoveries among African polities and thereby promote the growth of developmental democracy. Increasingly, African freedom would radiate African power.

Metaphorically speaking, most Africans today live under the dictatorship of material poverty. The poverty of dictatorship in Africa is equally apparent. It offends the renowned African tradition of community-wide participation in decision making.⁵³ By contrast with dictatorship, democracy is a developing idea and an increasingly sophisticated form of political organisation. The development of democracy in Africa has become a major determinant of its progress in the world.

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