



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


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REFUTATION

OF

ASPERSIONS

ON

“STUART’S THREE YEARS

IN

NORTH AMERICA.”

BY

JAMES STUART, ESQ.

Oh! who shall say what heroes feel,
When all but life and honour's lost?

MOORE.

LONDON:

PRINTED FOR WHITTAKER & CO. AVE MARIA LANE,
& ROBERT CADELL, EDINBURGH.

1834.

LONDON:
GILBERT AND RIVINGTON, PRINTERS,
ST. JOHN'S SQUARE.

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PREFACE.

IN the Edinburgh Evening Courant, a long established and respectable Journal, conducted by a literary gentleman of known prudence and experience, there appeared on the 31st of October last a letter from Major Pringle, containing a general denial of the truth of the statements in my work on North America, "in almost every instance where the operations of the British Army were described." Knowing certainly that such an assertion was unfounded, and in the face of the British official despatches, I should probably have left it uncontradicted, but for the prefatory notice with which the Editor of the Courant ushered the letter into his columns, and which, by declaring it to be distinguished by its moderation, and conclusive in its details, gave it a degree of credit which it would not otherwise have obtained from the public. As soon as I received a copy of the Courant containing Major Pringle's letter, I intimated to the Editor that it was

my intention to send him a complete and convincing vindication of those parts of my work which he and Major Pringle had impugned; but before I had leisure to do this, Major Pringle, on the 13th and the 30th of November, published two additional letters, in the same Journal, even more objectionable in manner, and more at variance with correct narration than the first. Circumstances, to which it is unnecessary to allude, have for some weeks prevented me from devoting my time to the collection of the evidence necessary for the refutation of the calumnies which have thus been circulated on the authority of the Newspaper and of Major Pringle. The following letter to the Editor of the Courant, which contains my vindication, is necessarily, I find, of so great length, that I have no reason to expect that the whole of it could at once be conveniently introduced into the columns of a Newspaper; and I have therefore preferred publishing it as a pamphlet, together with the remarks of the Editor of the Courant and Major Pringle's letters, to which I have referred, and also my correspondence with Sir John Lambert, of which the Editor of the Courant takes notice. Sir John Lambert did me the honour to wait upon me to thank me for the effectual steps I had taken to carry the object of his correspondence with

me into effect, and to put in my hands the last letter, which forms a part of that correspondence. Upon that occasion, he communicated to me many interesting details of the battle of New Orleans. I beg, however, that it may be distinctly understood, that no fact is stated on his authority, unless so far as corroborated by his official despatches.

I presume that such Editors of public Journals as have transferred Major Pringle's letters into their columns, will consider it due to me to publish my refutation, although it may not be in their power to insert the whole of my letter to the Editor of the Edinburgh Evening Courant in one Paper. If they cannot do this conveniently, they are at least bound to examine the evidence submitted in the following pages, and finding it (as I flatter myself they will find it) satisfactory on every point, to pronounce the refutation *complete*.

J. S.

London, January, 1834.

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REFUTATION,

&c.

*Letter to the Editor of the Edinburgh Evening
Courant.*

SIR,

I INTIMATED to you in my letter of the 5th of November, that it was my intention to send you a Vindication of those parts of my book, entitled "Three Years in North America," on which you and Major Pringle had founded the erroneous charges against me, contained in your Journal of the 31st of October, and in Major Pringle's letter of the 29th of October. I have subsequently seen in your Journal Major Pringle's letters of the 13th and 29th of November, in which he repeats his charges and adds to their number.

Presuming from the concluding part of his last letter, in which he expresses his submission to the verdict

of the public, to whose judgment he appeals, that he has now brought his catalogue of accusations to a close; I propose replying to them, and to your strictures, in the following pages; which, though addressed to you alone, will, I cannot doubt, find their way into the columns of those Journals published at Edinburgh in which Major Pringle's letters have appeared.

Major Pringle in his first letter declares that his object for engaging in this correspondence was "to put the character of his fellow soldiers in a true light before the eyes of their countrymen;" and in his last letter, he states, that "he had no motive to commence this correspondence but that of doing justice to his fellow soldiers *in every point of view.*" His championship of the British Army is therefore of the most extensive description. Whether his fitness for the honorable office he has undertaken be equal to his zeal, may be doubted by those who peruse the following facts and considerations with a desire to form an impartial conclusion.

The proceedings of the British Army on its expedition to Washington form the subject of Major Pringle's first letter. If the gallant Major had allowed my book to speak for itself, instead of giving his readers partial extracts from my narrative, it would have been hardly requisite for me to say a word in vindication of the accuracy of this part of it. But the quotations are so obviously extracted with a view to serve a purpose, that I must call upon you to peruse the whole

of the following passage in the 21st Chapter of the third Edition of my book. For the sake of reference, I have numbered the paragraphs; and have marked in *Italics* the only part of the passage which Major Pringle has thought fit to quote.

“1. By far the greatest part of the present library belonged to President Jefferson, and was sold by him to Congress, after the destruction of the library and of the public buildings at Washington by the British, under Sir George Cockburn and General Ross, in the year 1814. This expedition, to the merit or demerit of which Sir George Cockburn is fully entitled, as the official despatch from General Ross expressly states that Sir George suggested it, was, and is at this moment, viewed by all parties in the United States with disgust, and united all the American people, especially the New Englanders, who had previously been averse to the war, in decided hostility to the British. If the dock-yard and public stores at Washington had been alone destroyed, the transaction would have been justifiable,—but the destruction of the Capitol, including the Senate-House and the House of Representatives,—of the Treasury and the War-Office, and of the President’s palace, and *the great bridge across the Potomac*, nearly two miles broad, all of which it was admitted in the official despatch were set fire to and consumed, was an act unworthy a great nation, and contrary to the received usages of war.

2. “Almost all the great capitals of Europe had, within the dozen years previous to the capture of the seat of

legislature of the United States, beer in the possession of the French army ; Paris was soon after occupied by the allied armies, yet in no case was any unmilitary building destroyed, far less any valuable state papers or books. Even Louis the Fourteenth acted very differently.

3. " During his war with England, instead of returning thanks to his officers, as the British did to those who commanded at Washington for destroying a building not devoted to military purposes, he sent them to gaol. The Frenchmen had landed on the Eddystone rocks, on which the lighthouse was then erecting, and carried the workmen to France, together with their tools. While the captives lay in prison, the transaction came to the knowledge of the French monarch, who immediately ordered the prisoners to be released, and the captors, who were expecting a reward for the achievement, to be confined in their stead, declaring, that, though he was at war with England, he was not at war with mankind. He therefore directed the men to be sent back to their work with presents.

4. " The library, and a great part of the state papers of the nation, were destroyed with the public buildings. *I heard many anecdotes of this much to be regretted incursion. The commanders had directed private property to be respected, but it was impossible to restrain the soldiery. Much private property was destroyed. Mr. Elliot was with the army. His house was sacked. The destruction of Mr. Gales' printing establishment was the most pitiful of all the proceedings.* His father

had emigrated from Britain above twenty years previously, and Mr. Gales himself conducted a newspaper at Washington, devoted to the American cause. For this reason, as it was supposed, an order was issued for destroying his property by fire; but a lady, who lived in the neighbourhood, entreated that it might be recalled, because it was but too probable that her property, which adjoined, would fall a prey to the flames. Sir George Cockburn, who had issued the order, was so far moved by her entreaties, as to limit the destruction to the printing-presses, and to the establishment within the walls. It is asserted in the American history of the war, that Sir George himself overlooked this part of the work.

5. "Although the Americans had suffered much from Sir George Cockburn's piratical expeditions on the Chesapeake, and his destruction of French Town, as well as from the establishment of a rendezvous for runaway negroes, on an island of the Chesapeake, who had been armed by him and again put on shore, they were not at the time aware, that it was to Sir George Cockburn they were indebted for the visit of the British to Washington; and it was upon the brave and amiable General Ross, who afterwards fell in the attack upon Baltimore, that they intended to retaliate for the devastation at Washington. To send a fleet and an army to any part of the British isles was impossible; but it was resolved to send a fast-sailing armed vessel to the coast of Ireland, to destroy Cross Trevor, the beautiful property belonging to General Ross. A party were to land in the

night at the entrance of Carlingford Bay; one division of which was to burn the house upon the mountain; and the other the village below, before the troops at Newry could have got intelligence, or have come near them. The peace, which immediately followed, put an end to this design, which was, however, seriously entertained. The Gazette despatches, afterwards published, established the fact, that Sir George Cockburn suggested the attack on Washington."

Major Pringle neither defends the proceedings at Washington, nor calls in question the propriety of my remarks, except in so far as concerns the private property destroyed by the soldiery, and the destruction of the bridge over the Potomac. He has not impugned the correctness of my account further than I have now stated; and yet, upon this very slender foundation, he accuses me of having allowed myself to be imposed on by American mis-statements, in almost every instance, where the operations of the British army are described; and you inform your readers that the ample and conclusive details which Major Pringle's letter contains, must convey complete conviction to every unprejudiced mind.

Of what materials, let me ask you, Sir, are those details composed? 1st. Of Major Pringle's own testimony; and 2ndly, of two quotations from two newspapers published at Washington,—which prove *my* statements, and not Major Pringle's, to be correct. Let me, however, here notice, that I did not, as you

have thought proper to assert, generally accuse the British army of plundering at Washington; I only said, that although the commanders had directed that private property was to be respected, it was impossible to restrain the soldiery.

1st. Major Pringle's testimony to the contrary is founded upon his having executed General Ross's order, given him at eight o'clock in the evening of the 24th August, 1814, when two miles from Washington, to preserve the peace in Washington, and to prevent any soldier or seaman from entering the city during the twelve hours they held possession of it; and on his having, at eight o'clock in the morning of the 25th August, when ordered to return to the bivouac of the army, two miles from Washington, received the thanks of a barber in Washington, and other inhabitants, for the protection afforded them.

It thus appears, that Major Pringle had a hundred men under his charge, with a view to protect private property at Washington, for between eleven and twelve hours, part of the time during which it was occupied by the British; and he would have us believe that he was omnipresent, in a city above four miles long and of very considerable breadth; so that his evidence that private property was perfectly secure, is to be received in opposition to facts, which are as well established as that Washington was in the possession of the British from the evening of the 24th till the evening of the 25th August. But his evidence is of no weight, for the following reasons. 1st. Because it

was absolutely impossible that, during the twelve hours he was at Washington, he could, with one hundred men, completely protect private property. 2dly. Because his evidence only relates to a period of little more than eleven hours. He was two miles from Washington when he received the order at eight o'clock in the evening, and he left it at eight o'clock next morning. It is however proved, by the official despatches, published in the London Gazette Extraordinary of the 27th September 1814, that the army "reached Washington at eight o'clock at night." General Ross, after mentioning this fact, proceeds thus: "The object of the expedition being accomplished, I determined, before any greater force of the enemy could be assembled, to withdraw the troops, and accordingly commenced retiring on the *night of the 25th.*" But Major Pringle's testimony comes no further down than to eight o'clock in the morning of the 25th. It is therefore good for nothing; every house in Washington might have been plundered between eight o'clock in the morning of the 25th and the night of the 25th, when General Ross "commenced retiring."

Admiral Cockburn's despatch, published in the same Gazette, is far more specific than that of General Ross, as to the entry of the army into Washington, as to what passed there during its occupation, and as to the time when it was evacuated by the British. This despatch demonstrates, that not the slightest value attaches to Major Pringle's authority on this occasion. The

Admiral thus writes—"The contest being completely ended, and the enemy having retired from the field, the General gave the army about two hours' rest, when he again moved forward on Washington. It was however dark before we reached that city; and on the General, myself, and some Officers advancing a short way past the first houses of the town, without being accompanied by the troops, the enemy opened upon us a heavy fire of musquetry, from the Capitol, and two other houses; these were therefore almost immediately stormed by our people, taken possession of, and set on fire; after which the town submitted without further resistance.

"The enemy himself, on our entering the town, set fire to the navy yard (filled with naval stores,) a frigate of the largest class, almost ready for launching, and a sloop of war laying off it; as he also did to the fort which protected the sea approach to Washington.

"On taking possession of the city, we also set fire to the President's Palace, the Treasury, and the War Office; and in the morning, Captain Wainwright went with a party to see that the destruction in the navy yard was complete; when he destroyed whatever stores and buildings had escaped the flames of the preceding night; a large quantity of ammunition and Ordnance stores were likewise destroyed by us in the Arsenal, as were about two hundred pieces of artillery of different calibres, as well as a vast quantity of small arms. Two rope walks, of a very extensive nature,

full of tar-rope, &c., situated at a considerable distance from the yard, were likewise set fire to, and consumed: in short, Sir, I do not believe a vestige of public property, or a store of any kind, which could be converted to the use of the government, escaped destruction; the bridges across the eastern branch and the Potomac were likewise destroyed.

“ This general destruction being completed *during the day of the 25th*, we marched again, *at nine that night*, on our return, by Bladensburg, to Upper Marlborough.”

Major Pringle, it is thus clear, was absent from Washington during the general destruction on the day of the 25th; having left it at eight in the morning, while the British army did not march again from that city until nine at night.

But this is not all. Major Pringle would have us to believe that no part of the British army entered Washington; that his party of one hundred men were employed as sentries at the different entrances into the city, and that no soldier or seaman was to enter it. Now it is as well established as any fact in history can be, that the Capitol and two houses were stormed by a part of the British army on the evening of the 24th; and that on the 25th the general destruction was carried on and completed. Who destroyed the Treasury, and the War Office, and the President's palace? Was it not part of the British army that was employed in this work of devastation? Does Major Pringle deny that Sir George Cockburn himself superintended and

gave directions for the destruction of Mr. Gales' printing establishment? Was this proceeding consistent with the respect which was directed to be paid to private property?—I apprehend there cannot be two opinions upon the subject.

Major Pringle has attempted to support his assertions, by appealing to American authorities, and to American authorities alone, much as he vituperates them when he supposes that I depended upon them. My reliance, however, as I am now showing, has chiefly been placed on the official despatches published in the London Gazettes, and on British accounts which appeared in English newspapers at the time.

The Washington newspapers, from which Major Pringle has made quotations in support of his statement, are the Columbian Sentinel, the National Intelligencer, and the George-town Paper, all published at Washington or in its neighbourhood; and which describe the inhabitants of Washington as well treated by the British, and "greater respect paid to private property than had usually been exhibited by the enemy in his marauding parties: no houses half as much plundered by the enemy as by the knavish rogues about the town, who profited by the general distress." Here closes the quotation from the National Intelligencer, given by Major Pringle. On turning to that Paper, however, I find that the following passage is to be found immediately after the word "distress," which ends Major Pringle's quotation; and it has been omitted with a degree of unfairness,

probably without example, in such a controversy as the present. "*There were, however, several private buildings wantonly destroyed; and some of those persons who remained in the city, were scandalously maltreated.* Among the private buildings destroyed, were the dwelling house occupied by Mr. Robert Sewall (formerly rented by M. Gallatin), from behind which, a gun was fired at General Ross, which killed the horse he rode; the houses built for General Washington on the brow of Capitol-hill, the large hotel belonging to Daniel Carol of Dudo, and others, and recently occupied by Mr. Tomlinson, the rope-walks of Tench, Ringold, Heath and Co., and John Chalmers, *were destroyed by fire, without any pretence being assigned therefor, that we know of.* The enemy was conducted through the city by a former resident, who with other detached traitors is now in confinement."

"Cockburn was quite a mountebank in the city, exhibiting in the streets a gross levity of manner, displaying sundry articles of trifling value, of which he had robbed the President's house, and repeating many of the coarse jests and vulgar slang of the Federal Republican respecting the chief magistrate and others, in a strain of eloquence which could only have been acquired by a constant perusal of that disgrace to the country."

The whole extract from the National Intelligencer, will be found in the London Courier Newspaper of the 15th of October, and in the London Examiner

Newspaper, of the 16th October (the only files to which I have immediate access). The Courier, then the known organ of the British Government, on the 1st of October, contains two letters from British Naval Officers employed in the expedition to Washington, from one of which I quote what follows:—

“ Every thing was found ready for a regale at the Palace, and even the ice prepared for cooling their wine, all of which our incendiaries availed themselves of before they fired the house. The half printed paper you find enclosed, I took myself from the press of the famous Republican Printer, Mr. Joe Gales. He will launch no more thunders at us, for we broke his establishment up, and scattered his type and sheets to the wide winds. Gales' occupation's gone.”

Here, however, it is material that you and Major Pringle should recollect, that I did not in my narrative describe the violation of private property at Washington as contrary to the usages of war. I applied that expression solely to the destruction of the Capitol, including the Library, the other public buildings, the President's palace, and the great bridge across the Potomac; and that Major Pringle has not ventured to deny the correctness of this opinion excepting so far as relates to the bridge (of which hereafter). I admitted, in the narrative, that the commanders had directed private property to be respected; but stated that the soldiery could not be restrained. This has happened on many occasions, such as the retreat of Sir John Moore, and of the army

under the Duke of Wellington in Spain, in November 1812; when he wrote a letter to the commanding officers of battalions in the army under his command, containing these memorable expressions, "It must be obvious, however, to every officer, that from the moment the troops commenced their retreat from the neighbourhood of Burgos on the one hand, and from Madrid on the other, the officers lost all command over their men. Irregularities and outrages of all descriptions were committed with impunity, and losses have been sustained which ought never to have occurred."

It is now proved, by the details which I have given on unquestionable authority, that I am guiltless of the slightest error in point of fact. I might further appeal, were it necessary, to the speech of the American President of the 20th of September, where, in allusion to the recent enterprize of the British against Washington and the neighbouring town of Alexandria, he says, "However deeply to be regretted on our part is his transient success, which interrupted for a moment only the ordinary public business at the seat of government, no compensation can accrue for the loss of character with the world by this violation of *private property*, and this destruction of public edifices protected as monuments of the arts by the laws of civilized warfare." Here is an authority of far more value than the quotations from American newspapers, to which Major Pringle has resorted,—the speech of the President, delivered within a month, in the very city where the destruction of

private property took place. Major Pringle will also find an authoritative statement in the London Courier of the 28th September, containing a detailed account of Admiral Cockburn's halting part of his troops in order to destroy Mr. Gales' office, and at last consenting, on account of the danger to other buildings which would arise from setting fire to it, to send a file of men to destroy the types. This statement contains these words: "About 900 men were marched in three detachments, followed by about thirty negroes, carrying powder, rockets, &c. up to the Secretary of State's office, and that office was soon on fire." Yet, in the face of all this mass of evidence, proving that many hundred troops were in the city, Major Pringle boldly affirms that he placed sentries at the different entrances into the city, to prevent any soldier or seaman belonging to the expedition from entering it, and that he held possession of the Capital of the United States for twelve hours, and preserved its peace!

It is not, as already noticed, denied by Major Pringle, that I was justified in the opinion I have expressed, that the destruction of the Capitol, library, president's palace, &c. was an act unworthy of a great nation and contrary to the received usages of war; but he objects to my viewing the destruction of the great bridge across the Potomac River in the same light. His words are these: "In adverting to what is said about the destruction of the great bridge across the Potomac, I have yet to learn that a prudent mili-

tary measure is contrary to the usages of war, particularly as the Americans themselves had destroyed the two bridges crossing the eastern branch."

The Americans had, it is true, destroyed two bridges, by doing which they hoped to defend themselves, and retard the operations of the British; but it would puzzle Major Pringle to show in what way the wanton destruction of one of the greatest bridges in the world, which was not in the way of the British army in the slightest degree, was justified by the Americans themselves having rendered impassable two bridges by which they thought the approach of the British might be facilitated. The bridge across the Potomac is upon that part of the river *above* the city; but the operations of the British were confined to the city, and that part of the river *below* it.

The question here lies in a nut-shell, depending upon the opinion, which every man may form for himself, whether it be consistent with national honor to commit devastation in an enemy's country, which can be *of no use to the successful army*, or to the nation which employs it.

In Parliament, and out of Parliament, men almost universally deprecated the way in which the attack on Washington was conducted. Mr. Duncan, in his very unassuming and interesting "Travels in North America," thus speaks of it,—“Of all the errors committed on our part during the war with America, this was undoubtedly one of the greatest; setting aside the question as to its abstract defensibility on

the ground of retaliation, or otherwise, it is obvious that it was in the highest degree impolitic; because its immediate effect, as might have been anticipated, was to break down party spirit among the Americans, and to unite them as one man in support of the measures of their government. The firebrand was no sooner applied to their Chief Magistrate's palace, and the National Senate-house, than thousands, who had from the beginning maintained a systematic opposition to the contest, at once came forward and took up arms to maintain it; their national feelings were roused into powerful excitement, and they joined in one loud voice of execration at the destruction of their national edifices. Our ministers, had such been their object, could not have devised a more effectual way of strengthening Mr. Madison's hands. Had our troops recorded their triumph upon the front of the buildings, and left them uninjured, the indignant feeling of humiliation would have wreaked itself on those by whose imbecility the capture of the city had been occasioned, and who escaped so nimbly when it fell into the enemy's hands. But the burning of the buildings saved Mr. Madison; a thirst for revenge of the insult overcame every other feeling, and the war became henceforward, what it had not been before, decidedly popular and national."

At the period of the attack on Washington, the British gave the Americans too much reason to believe that their object was to do them all the mischief they could, without considering whether they were in this

way at all benefiting themselves. Major Pringle would have the world to believe that the British on all occasions respected private property; but it is hardly possible that he can be ignorant of all that was taking place around him at the very period when he was himself employed at Washington, and in the invasion of America in different quarters. The city of Alexandria, five miles from Washington, on the Potomac, is the port of that city. The plan was to attack it at the same time as Washington, but the ships of war could not get up the river so soon as expected. Sir George Cockburn sent a detachment of his fleet there, under the command of Captain Gordon, of the *Sea-horse*. It is said that a deputation from the city, before it was resolved not to defend the place, had reason to believe, by a communication which they received from the British Admiral, that if no molestation were given, private property should be respected. In consequence of this understanding, no opposition was given to the British squadron, which was drawn up so as to command the city. I certainly do not mean to attest the truth of the fact, that the Americans had got an authoritative assurance that private property was to be respected, though it is asserted in all the American accounts of what passed at the period of the capture of Washington; but this I know, that Captain Gordon, the senior Naval Officer of the British fleet off Alexandria, on the 29th of August 1814, only allowed one hour to the corporation to decide whether they would ac-

cede to his terms of surrender, two of which were as follows:—"4th, Merchandize of every description must be instantly delivered up; and to prevent any irregularity that might be committed in its embarkation, the merchants have it at their option to load the vessels generally employed for that purpose, when they would be towed off by us. 5th. All merchandize that has been removed from Alexandria, since the 19th instant, is to be included in the above Articles." The Corporation stated to the British Officer, that they had no power to compel the return of merchandize carried into the country, and that Article was modified; but the 4th Article was insisted on; and the British then commenced their indiscriminate work of plunder: they carried off from 15,000 to 18,000 barrels of flour, 800 hogsheads of tobacco, 150 bales of cotton, with a quantity of sugar, and other commodities. Captain Gordon's official despatch to Sir George Cockburn, containing his summons and the Articles before mentioned, together with their acceptance by the Common Council of Alexandria, are to be found in the London Gazette Extraordinary of the 17th October, 1814, in which Captain Gordon states, that "the whole of the vessels mentioned in the Capitulation, which were sea-worthy, amounting to 71 in number, were fitted *and loaded* by the 31st of August." Upon this occasion it is undeniable that we plundered upon a great scale. But no other injury than plunder was committed upon the inhabitants. On the Chesapeake, however, into which the waters of the Potomac flow, the war-

fare carried on by the British, it is melancholy to reflect, was not confined to the mere plundering of the inhabitants. Attacks for a long period were made by the squadron, under Sir George Cockburn, on defenceless towns along the coast, especially on the villages of French-town, Havre de Grace, George-town, Frederick-town, and Hampton: and the inhabitants were subjected not only to the loss of their property, but to treatment and privations of the most horrible description. The London Gazettes of July and August 1813, are filled with accounts of this distressing warfare. . From the documents contained in these Gazettes it appears, that at French-town much flour was set fire to and consumed; that at Havre de Grace, at the entrance of the Susquehannah river, some of the houses were burned, "in order that the proprietary who deserted them, and formed a part of the Militia who had fled to the woods, might understand and feel what they were liable to bring upon themselves by building batteries," &c. We also learn from those Gazettes, that a small division of boats was detached up the Susquehannah river, *to take and destroy whatever they might meet with in it*; that the troops on board had been on shore in the heart of the enemy's country, and had destroyed a flour store; that at George-town and Frederick-town they had landed and destroyed stores of sugar, lumber, and leather; and that at Hampton they landed and took the place. These are British accounts; but the American details of the excesses committed by the troops are well

known to have been of the most heart-rending description, owing to its having been impossible for the officers to restrain the troops. Few of the American official accounts at this period found their way into the British Newspapers; but the despatch of Major Crutchfield, the officer commanding at Hampton, is published verbatim in the London Courier of the 14th of August 1813; and contains the following shocking detail:—"The unfortunate females at Hampton who could not leave the town were suffered to be abused in the most shameful manner, not only by them, but the venal savage blacks, who were encouraged in their excesses. They piloted and encouraged every act of rapine and murder, killing a poor man by the name of Kirby, who had been lying on his bed at the point of death for more than six weeks; shooting his wife in the hip at the same time, and killing his faithful dog lying under his feet: the murdered Kirby was lying last night weltering in his blood." It would be easy to produce a great many more instances from the London Gazettes, of incursions upon the American coast merely for the sake of plunder. Take for example the Gazette of October 1st, 1814, containing official accounts from Sir George Cockburn of his having on the 22d June landed, and destroyed two tobacco stores on the 15th of November; of having burnt 2500 hogsheads of tobacco on the 6th July; of having destroyed a large tobacco store on the 19th July; of having brought away a quantity of tobacco, flour, provisions, and other articles,—“not a musket

being fired nor an armed enemy seen: the town was accordingly spared,"—such are the words of Sir George Cockburn's despatch; and do they not afford the strongest presumptive evidence in the world, that if the enemy had fired on the British, or if an armed enemy had been seen, the town would not have been spared? At all events, this despatch proves incontestably, that even where there was no opposition on the part of the inhabitants, they were plundered of their tobacco, flour, and provisions, by marines in the British service, commanded by a field officer in the British army. Major Pringle needed not to have been so very sensitive as to my notice, that "the British commanders at Washington had directed private property to be respected, but that it was impossible to restrain the soldiery." It was hardly required of him upon so slight a foundation to arraign me before the public as imposed on by American misstatements, which rendered it imperative for *him to put the character of his fellow soldiers in a true light before their countrymen*. Let him reperuse that part of the Duke of Wellington's letter, declaring that the officers in his army had lost all command over their men, and that they had with impunity committed irregularities and outrages of all descriptions; let him reflect on the words last quoted from Sir George Cockburn's despatch, which prove that he and the force under his command plundered the unresisting inhabitants of the towns on the American coast; and then he may perhaps feel that his time might have been better employed

than in attempting to weaken the authority of a book, no part of the details in which was written without ample consideration and the most minute, scrupulous, and painstaking examination of documents.

My opponent has surely forgotten, that the style of warfare resorted to by the British government, and by the officers employed by them in the United States, in the attack on Washington, and in the other incursions on the American territory, became the subject of repeated discussions in both Houses of Parliament, in the end of the year 1814 and beginning of 1815; and that facts were admitted in the course of the debates, which leave no room for doubt as to the conduct of the British commanders towards America at the period to which I have been alluding, being decidedly dictated by a desire to plunder and destroy. The attack on Washington was the act of Sir George Cockburn; for General Ross, in his despatch, expressly says, "To Rear Admiral Cockburn, *who suggested the attack upon Washington*, and who accompanied the army, I confess the greatest obligation for his cordial co-operation and advice." Major Pringle cannot be ignorant that Admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane's celebrated communication to the American Government, announcing that it was his purpose to employ the force under his direction "in destroying and laying waste such towns and districts upon the coast as may be found assailable," became the subject of a proclamation by the American President, on the 1st of September 1814, and that when that communication was

known to the British Government, it was not approved of. The Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. Vansittart) stated in Parliament, that orders had been sent out to avoid a repetition of such conduct, if possible. The opinion of the most respectable men in Parliament, even of such of them as joined in approving of the expedition to Washington, was quite decided, that "the destruction of public edifices having no possible relation to military purposes, the house of the representative body and the residence of the executive magistrate, was a departure from all principles of national law, for which, in the course of the previous twenty years, during which time almost every Capital in Europe had been occupied by an enemy, no example was to be found." Such were the terms in which Lord Grenville, in the Upper House, and many of the leaders in the House of Commons, even of those who had most zealously approved of our going to war with the United States, characterized the conduct of the British at Washington, in the debates in November 1814. But Mr. Alexander Baring, a warm advocate for the war with America, and whose connexion and commercial relations with the United States are well known, most especially arraigned the Government and our Commanders "for having formed an establishment on an island of the Chesapeake, as a rendezvous for runaway negroes, who were armed and again put on shore, to lay waste the property of their former owners," as highly reprehensible. (Nothing was more complained of by the Americans, as a departure from the established rules of

war, than this establishment in the Chesapeake, from which the negroes, whenever they were protected by our shipping, made piratical incursions upon the defenceless inhabitants of the coast, plundering and carrying off every sort of property.) Mr. Baring added this, "Ministers, dazzled with the glory of success, seemed blind to the disgraces of defeat, and were often triumphing when they ought to mourn. Although he thought that no naval enterprise had ever been conducted with more gallantry and skill than the attack of Alexandria, yet he believed it was carrying hostilities beyond all the established rules of warfare, to take the merchandize out of the private warehouses. By the established rules of war, all merchandize that is afloat becomes prize to the captors ; but it had never before been considered that all private property in a defenceless town could legally be seized by the conquerors."

Mr. Ponsonby declared, that "we had pursued measures at Washington which civilized nations must abhor."

Sir James Mackintosh, a great authority on points of international law, declared, on the 11th of April 1815, "That our attack on Washington, was a success which gave the hearts of the American people to every enemy who might rise against England. It was an enterprise which most exasperated a people, and least weakened a government, of any recorded in the annals of war ; principally directed against palaces of government, halls of legislation, tribunals of justice, repositories of the muniments of property, and of the

records of history—objects among civilized nations exempted from the ravages of war, and secured, as far as possible, even from its accidental operation, because they contribute nothing to the means of hostility, but are consecrated to purposes of peace, and minister to the common and perpetual interest of all human society.”

I now proceed, Sir, to show, that all my statements respecting the British army at New Orleans, which form the subject of Major Pringle's second letter in your Journal, are substantially true.

It is not, however, by the perusal of garbled and partial extracts from my work, or the documentary evidence which supports it, that my statements are to be judged of. Major Pringle has not only omitted the material parts of my description of the battle of New Orleans, and (as I have already shown) of the proceedings at Washington, which he has impugned, but, in his quotation from American documents, has omitted such portions of them as prove his own statements to be erroneous. This is not the course of proceeding which I conceive I had a right to expect from a British officer, who “publishes,” as he writes to you, “simply as far as in him lies to put the character of his fellow soldiers in a true light before the eyes of their countrymen.”

I call upon you, Sir, to read the whole of the following passage in the 26th Chapter of my book, which contains the details of the battle, and of the circumstances which preceded and followed it, and the opinion

expressed by me generally of the American army and of its officers. The paragraphs are numbered, and the expressions which Major Pringle animadverts upon are printed in italics.

1. "Every stranger who is led to New Orleans, must of course visit the battle-ground, which was so fatal to the British in January, 1815. I was on the spot on the 28th March, and had the ground very correctly, I believe, pointed out to me. The plain on which the battle took place is at the distance of between four and five miles from the city, is quite level, and of considerable extent. At the period of the battle, the sugar cane was cultivated upon it. It is now in pasture-grass, with a great many cattle upon it. It is bounded by the Mississippi on its west side, and by a cypress swamp, almost impenetrable, upon its east side. There are still remains of the ditch in front of the straight line which General Jackson formed across this field, from the river to the swamp. The ditch was necessarily a very shallow one, because the water would have risen and filled it, had the ground been opened, even to the depth of twenty inches. The breast-work was raised and strengthened by bales of cotton, which were brought in great quantities, and which, when placed along the line, formed an impenetrable bulwark. Behind these cotton-bags, *General Jackson placed his riflemen, each of whom had one, two, or three men behind him* to reload the rifles, or to hand him those already loaded.

2. "Previously to the great engagement, some skir-

mishing took place for two or three weeks from the time that Sir Edward Pakenham landed, but the forces on both sides were unbroken when Sir Edward commenced storming the line on the 8th January. The field in front of the line was perfectly smooth,—not a bush to be found, when Sir Edward Pakenham led his army to the attack. The British were forced to advance without shelter, and were first exposed to a terrible fire of artillery, within half cannon shot, and afterwards to the fire of the rifles and small arms of the Americans, which broke their columns and forced them to seek for shelter. *The fire of the American militia was unintermitting and destructive; the men, in some places, ranged six deep,* loaded the arms, and rapidly passed them to the front rank, all composed of picked marksmen. Sir Edward Pakenham, with the greatest gallantry, after the disorder into which the precision of the fire had at first thrown them, attempted to lead on his men a second time, but a cannon shot wounded him in both legs, and he was killed by some rifle shots while the soldiers were carrying him off. His body was placed in the first instance under four splendid evergreen oaks, one of them nearly twenty feet in circumference, at some distance in front of the line.

3. “General Gibbs and General Keane, who succeeded to the command, attempted to rally the troops, who pressed forward in a new column, but the precision and exactness with which the Americans fired, was overpowering and murderous. *The British never*

reached the ditch. General Keane was mortally wounded, and General Gibbs dangerously. General Lambert, who succeeded to the command, made a last attempt to force the line ; but it was unsuccessful, and the English retreated to their entrenchments and re-embarked.

4. " *The British are understood to have had between 10,000 and 12,000 men in this engagement, and the Americans between 3000 and 4000. The British lost between 2000 and 3000 men ; the Americans six killed and seven wounded. Such a result could not have taken place without great military faults on the part of the assailant, who had his choice of time and place, and also had to decide whether, in the circumstances in which he was at last placed, it was prudent to make the attack at all. Accordingly, the British commander-in-chief has been severely blamed for delaying his attack for several weeks after he landed, and thus giving the Americans an opportunity to collect troops and to recover from their panic, and for his overweening confidence in the bravery of his own troops, and the want of discipline on the part of the Americans. It is admitted on all hands that British bravery was never put to a severer test, nor ever was more conspicuous. The generals, officers, and men, marched steadily to the mouths of the guns. The account which General Jackson has given of the engagement on the 8th of January, in his farewell address to his troops, contains some information which the prejudices of Englishmen make them slow to believe,*

without the unfortunate proof of its reality, which was given on the spot.

5. "On the 8th January (General Jackson writes,) the final effort was made. At the dawn of day the batteries opened, and the columns advanced. Knowing that the volunteers from Tennessee and the militia from Kentucky were stationed on our left, it was there the enemy directed their chief attack.

6. "Reasoning always from false principles, they expected little opposition from men whose officers even were not in uniform,—who were ignorant of the rules of dress,—and who had never been caned into discipline:—fatal mistake! a fire incessantly kept up, directed with calmness, and with unerring aim, strewed the field with the brave officers and men of the column which slowly advanced, according to the most approved rules of European tactics, and was cut down by the untutored courage of the American militia. Unable to sustain this galling and unceasing fire, some hundreds nearest the entrenchments called for quarter, which was granted,—the rest, retreating, were rallied at some distance, but only to make them a surer mark for the grape and canister shot of our artillery, which, without exaggeration, mowed down whole ranks at every discharge, and at length they precipitately retired from the field.

7. "Our right had only a short contest to sustain with a few rash men, who fatally for themselves, forced their entrance into the unfinished redoubt on the river. They were quickly dispossessed, and this

glorious day terminated with the loss to the enemy of their commander-in-chief, and one major-general killed, another major-general wounded, the most experienced and bravest of their officers,—and more than 3000 men killed and wounded, and missing; while our ranks were thinned only by the loss of *six* of our brave companions killed, and *seven* disabled by wounds.

8. “General Jackson’s great merit in this short campaign, apart from his bravery, which is unquestionable, consisted in the confidence which he restored at New Orleans as soon as he arrived there, and in the energy of character which he uniformly displayed. The legislature of Louisiana had been wavering until his arrival, and the inhabitants, afraid of the consequences of making a stand, had showed symptoms of a desire to save the city by treating with the enemy. As soon as he reached New Orleans, all vacillation was put an end to. In an address to the governor, he said, ‘Whoever is not for us is against us,—those who are drafted, must be compelled to the ranks for punishment. We have more to dread from intestine, than open and avowed enemies. Our country must, and shall be defended.’ At this time the General was absolutely without troops. The apprehensions and distress of mothers, wives, children, and pusillanimous citizens, in the view of the approaching contest, may easily be imagined. When he left the city with but a handful of men, he directed Mr. Livingstone (author of the Louisianian code of laws, and now (1832) General

Jackson's Secretary of State) to address the people in the French language. 'Say to them,' said he, 'not to be alarmed, the enemy shall never reach the city.' But in the critical situation in which he was placed, he found it indispensably necessary to assume almost the powers of a dictator. He subjected the city to martial law. He punished some deserters capitally. He removed 120 miles into the interior some of the French citizens who claimed exemption from military duty. He arrested the French consul for resisting martial law after it was proclaimed; and confined a judge, and removed him without the lines of defence, because he had issued a writ of *habeas corpus* to compel the enlargement of the consul. The emergency of the case called for a man of his decided character, and the people of New Orleans, aware of the escape which the energy of his measures procured for them, received him after the victory in triumph, as the saviour of the city and country.

9. "It is a curious fact, that a very large sum of money was made of the cotton contained in the bags which were employed in the defence of General Jackson's line. It was sold by auction, bought at a low price, and turned out to be very little, if at all, damaged!

10. "It has been said, and never contradicted, so far as I could learn at New Orleans, that the British commander-in-chief had promised the plunder of the city to his army. This is a matter which even now

concerns the honour of the British name, for the statement is founded on no light authority.

11. " Mr. Eaton, holding one of the highest offices in the general government of the United States, the present (1830) secretary of war to the American government at Washington, and the author of a life of General Jackson, expressly asserts, in that work, that ' Booty and Beauty,' was the watchword of Sir Edward Pakenham's army in the battle of the 8th. He thus writes: ' Let it be remembered of that gallant but misguided general, who has been so much deplored by the British nation, that to the cupidity of his soldiers he promised the wealth of the city as a recompense for their gallantry and desperation, while, with brutal licentiousness, they were to revel in lawless indulgence, and triumph uncontrolled over female innocence. Scenes like these, our nation dishonoured and insulted, had already witnessed at Hampton and Havre de Grace, (alluding to Sir G. Cockburn's expedition,) but it was reserved for her yet to learn, that an officer of high standing, polished, generous, and brave, should, to induce his soldiers to acts of daring valour, permit them, as a reward, to insult, injure, and debase those whom all mankind, even savages, reverence and respect. The history of Europe, since civilized warfare began, is challenged to afford an instance of such gross depravity, such wanton outrage on the morals and dignity of society. English writers may deny the correctness of the charge; it certainly interests them

to do so, but its authenticity is too well established to admit a doubt, while its criminality is increased, from being the act of a people who hold themselves up to surrounding nations as examples of everything that is correct and proper.

12. "This charge does not rest upon Mr. Eaton's authority alone. It is mentioned in all the American statements relative to this battle down to the present day. Mr. Timothy Flint, who has given a detailed account of the campaign, repeats it in his geography and history of the Western States,—and it also appears in the travels of Bernhard, Duke of Saxe Weimar, brother-in-law to the Duke of Clarence, (now King of Great Britain,) published so late as 1828.

13. "It would not be fair, considering the extraordinary degree of order which prevailed in the newly raised American levies which defended New Orleans, not to give the praise which is due generally to the officers of the American army. Small as that army is, consisting of only 6000 men, it is not too much to say, that there is not an officer belonging to it who is not qualified to do his duty. Their education is admirable. Upon this subject, I am unable to refer to more competent evidence than that of the Duke of Saxe Weimar, who thus writes of some of the officers whom he met at a party at Washington: 'The gentlemen I found here are mostly officers of the army. There is scarcely an army in Europe in which the corps of officers is better composed than in the small American army;

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since in the United States no one can, on any account, be an officer if he is not well educated. The officers are exclusively taken from the Military Academy at West Point. No subaltern officer is promoted. Therefore, if a young man is seen in the uniform of an American officer, it may with confidence be inferred, that he is in every respect fit to maintain his place in the best society.'

14. " Prince Paul of Wirtemberg travelled in the United States in 1829. His account of the American army, from which the following extracts are made, is extremely favourable. ' There exists,' he writes, ' no country where soldiers are so usefully employed. In Europe, a soldier often spends the whole day in drills, parades, dressing, or idleness. The American soldier is constantly employed in agricultural labour. The strict discipline, to which he is subject, keeps him on a level with the dispositions which are endeavoured to be produced in other countries by continual parades and drills: the effect of which is perhaps to destroy, in a time of perfect peace, as many warriors as would perish in an active campaign of the same duration. No soldiers in the world are as well fed, as well clothed, and as well paid, as those of the United States.'

15. " 'The American Government has ingrafted its military institutions on its civil administration, and the result it has obtained is not only an improvement, but a masterpiece of military system.'

16. " The terms of engagement with recruits are contained in the following advertisement, which is

common in the newspapers of the United States:—
 ‘Wanted, for the United States’ land service, a number of active young men, between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five years, and about five feet six inches in height. They will receive five dollars bounty-money, and an abundant supply of food and clothing, and five dollars per month. Apply, &c.’ ”

It is altogether in relation to the preceding narrative, for I have not written another word respecting the battle of New Orleans or the British army at New Orleans, that you have made the accusation already noticed against me, and that Major Pringle has charged me generally, in his two last letters, “with allowing myself to be imposed on by American mis-statements,” and “with having had bad information respecting the British troops employed in the United States.” Moreover, he has not scrupled to make it a public complaint, “that men who are willing to suffer every privation, and to shed the last drop of their blood in the defence or for the honour of their country, should have their good name filched from them by those who are equally unwilling to allow and unable to appreciate their worth.”

These are heavy charges; affecting, as they do, not only the credit of the work, but the character of the writer, in point of veracity, intelligence, and good feeling. I therefore make no apology for the length of my vindication, whether on this or the other accusations preferred against me; but proceed to refute

that part of them connected with the battle of New Orleans, in which you, Sir, act a prominent part, and in which you introduce Major Pringle to your readers by depreciating the work, the authority of which it was his object to destroy. I rest my refutation of your charge on the extract which I have inserted above. Where do you find that I have accused the British army at New Orleans, or any part of it, with plundering private property, or with other proceedings not justifiable by the laws of modern warfare? You cannot find your accusation justified by any part of my narrative; it does not in fact contain a word on the subject. I am therefore entitled to maintain, that the charge is a wanton violation of that correctness, in regard to facts, which is expected, above all, from those whose profession it is to write for the public press.

If I had been inclined to accuse the British army of plundering, without well considering the evidence on which such charges rested, I might have stated, that the Duke of Saxe Weimar expressly mentions that the English carried off the cattle and above sixty negroes from General Villaret, whose house was near the point where they landed on the Mississippi, a few miles from New Orleans; but as I did not find this fact stated in the American official accounts, I omitted all notice of it. Major Pringle may now contradict that statement, if he can; but let him remember, that my authority is not pledged for its correctness: that it is plausible, however, may be safely admitted, as the Duke states, that when he was at General

Villaret's house in the year 1826, the General told him, "that the removal of the negroes was a severe stroke for him, from which it cost him much trouble gradually to recover."

But your second accusation is as completely unfounded as your first. Where do you find that I have made any charge against the British army, which was "lately refuted by Sir John Lambert and his brother officers?" Have the goodness, Sir! to read that part of my narrative which relates to my recent correspondence with Sir John Lambert, and the other general officers who served with him on the Expedition to New Orleans: and you will at once perceive, that it contains no charge against the British army, and that my authority is not at all pledged for the accuracy of the fact stated relating to Sir Edward Pakenham, the commander-in-chief, alone. I have only mentioned, that I was told at New Orleans that the British commander-in-chief "had promised the plunder of the city to his army." I added, that "this was a matter which even yet concerned the honor of the British name"—I did not say of the British *army*, because the charge related to the single individual who was implicated. If I had known that the statement made to me was true, or if I had given implicit credit to it, I should not have conceived myself called upon to specify the authorities which led me to publish this, any more than the other details respecting the battle. The authorities which I produced are undoubtedly of the most respectable description; two of them Ame-

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rican, and one of them European ; the European authority being that of the distinguished officer Bernhard, Duke of Saxe Weimar, brother-in-law of the King of Great Britain, who now, I believe, commands the Dutch army under the Prince of Orange. It certainly did appear to me at the time, as it still does, that those authorities, not exclusively American, coupled with the information given to me on the spot, rendered it imperative on me to mention that this statement was made to me at New Orleans, and that I had not heard it contradicted ; but I might, had I thought it necessary in order to screen myself from the accusation of trusting to American authority, have confirmed it by even further evidence, which proves its general belief in Europe at the period when I was at New Orleans. Count Marbois, President of the Council of Ancients before the French Revolution, and who was afterwards one of the Ministers of Louis XVIII. has, in his admirable History of Louisiana, (published in 1828, I believe), expressly declared (at page 380), that "the pillage of New Orleans was announced to the army as a magnificent recompense for its dangers and toils. In fact, the crops of cotton and other rich productions of these vast countries, were stowed at this city, it being the limit and entrepôt of the navigation of the Mississippi and Missouri."

The expressions used by Marbois, and the other writers to whom I formerly appealed, are unqualified. It appears from them, as well as from the notices which have appeared in the American newspapers of

my correspondence with Sir John Lambert, that the report of the plunder of New Orleans having been promised by the commander-in-chief to the army, was implicitly believed, as well in Europe as in America, until it was authoritatively contradicted by Sir John Lambert, in consequence of the notice which appeared in my book. My publication, therefore, has been most useful in eliciting the complete refutation of the calumny, which otherwise might have remained unknown in this country, until the death of the other general officers who were with the army had rendered a complete contradiction impossible. Mr. Eaton, who was lately one of the Secretaries of State at Washington, seems first of all to have published it to the world ; but he is quite incapable of inventing such a story, which may at the time have been believed on the authority of some deserter or worthless person attached to the army.

Upon the whole, I have not seen occasion to retract or cancel a single word that I have written in consequence of my correspondence with Sir John Lambert ; and neither Sir John Lambert, nor any one of his companions in arms, has ever applied to me to do so ; on the contrary, Sir John (as appears from the appended documents) has conveyed to me his acknowledgments for the steps I adopted to carry his object into effect, by making public an authoritative denial of a charge affecting the character of a deceased officer of high rank, of which, but for the notice I took of it, Sir John would have remained in ignorance. His

attestation, and that of the other general officers, is now allowed to be complete, and decisive of the point, not only in this country, but all over America; nor did it require any confirmation in the remarks made upon it by yourself, more especially considering the errors into which you have fallen.

I have now to deal with Major Pringle's strictures, contained in his second letter; in which he declares his wish to break fresh ground with me,—that the field shall be New Orleans,—and that he is to call in question the correctness of my information, come from what source it may. It is, however, by patient examination of evidence in such a case as this, and not by bold assumptions, that the truth is to be ascertained. I join issue with him upon every fact which he has attempted to dispute. He has forced me to re-examine the evidence on which I had relied; and I find that it supports me in every part of my statement.

The errors with which Major Pringle charges me relate,—first, to the relative numbers of the British and American armies; and second, to the details of the attack of the British on the American line.

On re-perusing my narrative, it will be observed that the whole information communicated by me respecting the numbers, is contained in three lines, and is by no means conveyed in positive terms. "The British *are understood* to have had between ten thousand and twelve thousand men *in this engagement*,

and the Americans between three thousand and four thousand."

Major Pringle commences his remarks on this head by asking, "Is it no material error to state that the British force at New Orleans was twelve thousand, and the American only three thousand or four thousand, when the *reverse is much nearer the truth, as official documents can show?*" and he afterwards gives a specification of the forces employed, in the following words: "As I happen to have an official return of every regiment of the British army employed on that expedition, I shall give the list, and Mr. Stuart can refer to the Horse Guards to know if I am correct. The list is of British infantry employed in the attack on the lines of New Orleans on the 8th of January, 1815; 4th foot, seven hundred and forty-seven; 7th do. seven hundred and fifty; 21st do. eight hundred; 43rd do. eight hundred and twenty; 44th do. four hundred and twenty-seven; 85th do. two hundred and ninety-three; 93rd do. seven hundred and seventy-five; 95th do. two hundred and ninety-six; making in all four thousand eight hundred and ninety-three rank and file British: there remains to be added to this two hundred seamen and four hundred marines."

I confess, that the first perusal of the very distinct testimony thus afforded by a gentleman who, upon the occasion to which his evidence relates, was himself acting as a field officer, startled me, and led me to think that I must have relied on defective information;

but upon again consulting the official despatches and the other documents to which I had recourse in writing this part of my book, I am glad to be able to prove that it is Major Pringle who is in error, and that my information was not only correct, but is supported by a mass of authorities. It would have been well for Major Pringle if he had followed the course which he has recommended to me, by referring to the Horse Guards, to know if the information he was about to give to the public was well founded: most especially it was his duty to have compared his details as to the forces employed on the 8th of January with those which are stated in the official despatches to have been engaged on that fatal day. It appears from other parts of Major Pringle's letter, that those despatches were in his hands at the time when he was writing it. He is therefore, as I shall show, altogether without excuse for publishing the above as a correct return of the numbers employed on the day of the engagement.

I appeal in support of my own statement, first to the British official accounts of the battle; secondly, to the American account of it; and thirdly, to the accounts given in French and Dutch works of authority. I rely in no part of it on American information alone.

1st. The official despatches published in the London Gazette, are silent as to the number of men of which the British army consisted. This is conformable to the usual practice. But the despatches from Sir John

Lambert, Sir Alexander Cochrane, Sir John Keane, Colonel Thornton, and Quarter-master General Forrest, all appeared in the Gazette of the 10th of March, 1815; and Sir John Lambert's letter specifies the regiments employed in the usual way, omitting all particulars of the numbers in each regiment; so that the amount of the force could not even be guessed at from this specification. Major Pringle's return itself proves that one regiment consisted of eight hundred, and another of only two hundred and seventy rank and file. I have no reason to doubt, that Major Pringle has correctly marked the number of rank and file in the regiments, which he mentions at four thousand eight hundred and ninety-three. But I have the greatest reason to find fault with his having coupled this information with these words:—"There remains to be added to this two hundred seamen and four hundred marines,"—so as to lead to the conclusion, that the British army on the 8th of January was composed of five thousand four hundred and ninety-three men, in contradiction of my statement, that "the British are understood to have had between ten thousand and twelve thousand men in this engagement."

Nothing is better known to a military man, than that the rank and file of a regiment, or of an army, comprehend merely the men armed with the bayonet, and that the whole of the officers, non-commissioned officers, the staff of the army, military as well as medical, the drum-majors, drummers, fifers, &c. are not compre-

hended under that description. This is a serious objection to Major Pringle's detailed and conclusive information, as it is termed by you; but it is a slight objection compared with those which are to follow.

2d. Let me now refer you to the despatches published in the London Gazette of the 10th of March, 1815.

In the seventh paragraph of Sir John Lambert's despatch of the 10th of January, 1815, he states, in reference to the battle of the 8th, "that the disposition for the attack was as follows:—A corps, consisting of the 85th Light Infantry, two hundred seamen, and four hundred marines, the 5th West India regiment, and four pieces of artillery, under the command of Colonel Thornton of the 85th, was to pass over during the night, and move along the right bank towards New Orleans." I also learn from the despatch of Colonel Thornton himself, published in the same London Gazette of the 10th of March, 1815, that a party of the Royal Engineers must have accompanied him to the right bank of the river; for he expressly mentions, that he should be wanting in justice and in gratitude, "were he not to request particular notice of the officers whose names he had mentioned, as well as of Major Blanchard of the Royal Engineers." Here then is one palpable and gross omission in Major Pringle's boasted return. In what part of it shall we find the 5th West India Regiment, or the officers and men belonging to the

Artillery or Royal Engineers, under the command of Colonel Thornton? I do not know the exact numbers of which the 5th West India Regiment was composed; but I now learn, upon authority of no questionable description, that it was a very strong regiment in point of numbers, I believe the strongest that landed on the shores of Louisiana.

3d. The eighth paragraph of Sir John Lambert's despatch states, that "the assailing of the enemy's line in front of us was to be made by the brigade composed of the 4th, 21st, and 44th regiments, with three companies of the 95th, and two companies of the Fusileers and the 43d, under Major-general Keane: some black troops were destined to skirmish in the wood on the right."

Here, then, is another palpable omission in Major Pringle's return. In what part of it shall we find the black troops destined to skirmish in the wood on the right? I presume that the black troops here mentioned were composed of the 1st West India Regiment, also; for I know that they were under Sir Edward Fakenham's command, and suffered severely. Captain Isles was severely wounded, as well as four other officers of that regiment. This appears from the returns published in the London Gazette.

4th. I have already mentioned that a party of artillery and engineers were sent to the right bank of the river. But in what part of Major Pringle's return do we find any mention of the Royal Artillery and

Engineers, who remained on the left bank of the river with Sir Edward Pakenham himself? I cannot tell their numbers, but I know how part of them were employed in the night preceding, and the night following the battle; for it is stated in the eighth paragraph of Sir John Lambert's despatch, that "an advanced battery in our front of six eighteen pounders was thrown up during the night, about eight hundred yards from the enemy's line;" and in the twelfth paragraph, "that it was destroyed on the following night."

I also know, that Colonel Dickson was the officer commanding the artillery under Sir Edward Pakenham, on the left bank of the river; for Sir John Lambert has stated that such was the fact, in the fourth paragraph of his despatch. I also know that Sir John Lambert, in the sixth and seventh paragraphs of his concluding despatch, after the re-embarkation on the 28th of January, published in the same Gazette of the 10th of March, expressly thanks the officers of the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers in the following terms: "Lieutenant-colonel Dickson, Royal Artillery, has displayed his usual abilities and assiduity; he reports to me his general satisfaction of all the officers under his command, especially Major Munro, senior officer of the Royal Artillery previous to his arrival, and of the officers commanding companies. Lieutenant-colonel Burgoyne, Royal Engineers, afforded me every assistance that could be expected from his known talents and experience.

The service lost a very valuable and much esteemed officer in Lieutenant Wright, who was killed on reconnoitering."

Here, then, is another palpable and gross omission in Major Pringle's return. His return, forsooth (as he states), applies to every regiment in the British army. Did the two West India regiments, and the regiments of Artillery and Engineers not belong to the British army? After Major Pringle has answered this question, I have still other inquiries, which will puzzle him quite as much.

5th. The eleventh paragraph of Sir John Lambert's concluding despatch is in these terms:—"The conduct of the two squadrons of the 14th Light Dragoons, latterly under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Baker, previously of Major Mills, has been the admiration of every one, from the cheerfulness with which they have performed all description of service. I must also mention the exertions of the Royal Staff Corps, under Major Todd, so reported by the Deputy Quarter-master General." I know from the very best authority, that Sir Edward Pakenham had cavalry at his disposal in the battle of the 8th January; but I neither know their numbers, nor those of the Royal Staff corps. Here, then, is another gross omission.

I presume the 14th Light Dragoons and the Royal Staff Corps belonged to the British army.

6th. It is hardly necessary to pursue the catalogue of Major Pringle's omissions further. There were

Sappers and Miners attached to the army; and there were many more sailors employed upon the 8th of January, than the two hundred seamen, for whom Major Pringle is willing to make allowance. Sir John Lambert expressly states, that Sir Thomas Trowbridge commanded a battalion of seamen, who acted with the troops, and rendered the greatest services. But I have already produced sufficient evidence to satisfy every candid person, that not the slightest reliance can be placed upon Major Pringle's return; which, whether correct or defective, so far as respects the numbers composing the different corps which he specifies, most obviously omits all notice of many of the corps engaged, and of course omits their numbers.

In forming my estimate of the numbers which the British were understood to have had in the engagement, I did not trust to American authorities, by whom they were generally stated at twelve thousand. The British accounts, as I have already mentioned, are silent as to numbers. But I had access to the work of Marbois, one of the French Ministers of State, and one of the fairest and most liberal writers of the age, and to that of the Duke of Saxe Weimar, one of the most experienced Generals alive, as well as to the account in La Fayette's Travels in America, published by his Secretary Levasseur. Marbois sums up his account of the battle in these words:—"The Americans experienced scarcely any loss. The defeat of an army of fourteen thousand brave men, well disciplined and exercised in a long European war, was

the work of four thousand militia, hastily levied and armed with fowling-pieces, which till that day had never been used for the purposes of war." The Duke of Saxe Weimar says, "that the unfortunate English, whose force in the field was reckoned at from eight thousand to ten thousand men, were obliged to advance without any shelter, and remain a long time first under the fire of the well-directed cannon, afterwards under the fire of the rifles and small arms of the Americans, without being able to effect any thing in return against them." Levasseur's statement with respect to numbers is contained in the following sentences:—"General Jackson was unable to collect for the defence of his entrenchments more than three thousand two hundred men, and fourteen pieces of cannon of different calibres." "Pressed for time, he had been obliged to form the upper part of his works with bales of cotton, brought down from the city." "He remained twenty-four hours in this position, expecting an attack every instant, when on the 8th of January, at break of day, he perceived the English army, twelve thousand strong, advancing on him in three columns, the most formidable of which menaced that part of his left wing defended by the Tennessee and Kentucky militia."

These extracts fully justified me in the statement I have made respecting the number of troops which the British were understood to have had in the engagement at New Orleans; but since Major Pringle's letter was published, I have completely ascertained, on authority

which no man alive can contradict, that Sir Edward Pakenham, on the morning of the 8th of January, had at his disposal, and under his command, upwards of nine thousand five hundred men.

So much for the numbers of the British army. With respect to the numbers of the American army, it would appear that in stating them at between three thousand and four thousand men, I had taken an average between the two European authorities of Marbois and Levasseur; Marbois reckoning them at four thousand, and Levasseur at three thousand two hundred. But upon perusing the American official account, which I have now got, I find the exact number, including marines, was four thousand six hundred and ninety-eight, a great part of whom, however, were without arms.

I might here leave this part of the subject; but Major Pringle has made an attempt to raise the American force to seven thousand and forty, by a calculation so ridiculous, that I should be blameable were I not to expose it.

It will be perceived, on referring to my brief account of the battle, that bales of cotton were placed along General Jackson's line, and that behind the bags were his riflemen, each of whom, it is mentioned in one part of my narrative, had one, two, or three men behind him, and in another, that the men in some positions ranged six deep. Major Pringle seizes hold of this fact, and, assuming that the Americans all over the line stood

four feet deep, and each file at the distance of a yard from the other, and further assuming, on one American authority, opposed to four British official accounts, that the line was a mile instead of one thousand yards in length,—he arrives at the notable conclusion, that the American army must have amounted to seven thousand and forty. This is a specimen of those powers of imagination which Major Pringle displays throughout his letters. But the authority of the American Major Latour is good for nothing, for the purpose to which Major Pringle applies it, when weighed against the following testimony:—

1st. The British Government, as soon as they received intelligence of the disaster at New Orleans, published on the 8th of March 1815, a bulletin, dated from the War Department, in which it is expressly stated, “that the main body of the enemy was posted behind a breastwork extending about 1000 yards.”

2d. The fifth paragraph of Sir John Lambert’s first despatch, in the London Gazette of the 10th of March, expressly says: “In order to give as clear a view as I can, I shall state the position of the enemy. On the left bank of the river it was simply a straight line of about a front of one thousand yards, with a parapet, the right resting upon the river and the left in a wood, which had been made impracticable for any body of troops to pass.”

3d. Quarter-master General Forrest, in his journal of the movements of the army, contained in the

same Gazette, describes the "extent of the breast-work in front of the enemy, from right to left, to be about one thousand yards."

4th. Sir Alexander Cochrane, in his despatch of the 18th of January, published in the same Gazette, states that "the entrenchment which the enemy had newly thrown up, extended across the cultivated ground, from the Mississippi to an impassable swampy wood on his left, a distance of about one thousand yards."

Major Pringle may rest assured that his fanciful calculation, when weighed against the statements in the official despatches of three British commanders, will meet with no credit in this country. Latour's calculation of the length of his line, may perhaps be explained by a statement of Levasseur, though, if his explanation be correct, it will not redound to the candour of Major Pringle, who, having accompanied the army, could not fail to know the real state of the case. Levasseur's information, however, is probably correct, for he mentions that the details were given to him on the spot, and that he was possessed of Latour's Memoirs. "The position (he writes) chosen by the American General to wait for reinforcements, and to arrest the advance of so formidable an enemy, appeared to me to be judicious. He threw up entrenchments about five miles below the city, along an old canal, the left of which was lost in the depths of a swampy wood, whilst the right rested on the river. The total length of this line was about eight hundred

toises; but as three hundred toises of the left were unassailable, the enemy was confined in his attack to a front of about five hundred toises, and obliged to advance in full view, over a perfectly level plain." This explanation seems to be, in a great measure, confirmed by Quarter-master General Forrest's despatch already alluded to; for, after mentioning the break to be about one thousand yards, he states that the wood upon the left was, in general, distant from the river about one thousand five hundred yards, but that the intermediate space was intersected by strong horizontal railings, and a wide ditch or drain, and was principally planted with sugar-canés. A toise is equal to two yards; so that five hundred toises are equal to one thousand yards.

Having thus completely established the general accuracy of my own statement, as to the relative numbers of the armies, and demonstrated that Major Pringle's account is unworthy of the slightest attention, it now rests with me to maintain, that there is no material error in any part of my details of the battle itself. I have no doubt of my being able to do so, after again looking at the British official accounts, and the European authorities upon which I relied.

The second paragraph in my narrative contains the particulars of the attack made by Sir Edward Pakenham himself, and of his death; the third, of the continuation of the attack after the death of Sir Edward Pakenham, by General Gibbs and General Keane, and of Sir John Lambert's last attempt to force the

line. The fourth paragraph states the result of the action, with brief remarks.

Upon the details which these paragraphs contain, Major Pringle founds his assertion, that I have said "that the British never reached the ditch;" and feels himself entitled to bestow upon all who do not write of the British army in the same boastful language which he himself uses, terms of vituperation, which it is unnecessary to repeat.

It is obvious to every one who reads my narrative with attention, that it is only by a forced construction, that it can be held to maintain that the British, in no part of the action, reached the ditch. The second paragraph, detailing Sir Edward Pakenham's attack, contains no such expression. It is in the third, which relates to the continuation of the attack by Generals Gibbs and Keane, that the assertion is contained, that the British did not reach the ditch. It is quite obvious, from my having published, in the sixth and seventh paragraphs, General Jackson's official account, in which he positively states that a few rash men had even forced their entrance into the unfinished redoubt on the river, that it was impossible for me to have meant that the British troops at no part of the attack reached the ditch. My impression on reading the account in Sir John Lambert's despatch certainly was, that it was during the first part of the attack alluded to in the second paragraph of my narrative, that the British reached the ditch, and for a short period had a footing in the enemy's line. His

words, immediately after describing the death of Sir Edward Pakenham, are these:—"The effect of this in the sight of the troops, together with Major-general Gibbs and Major-general Keane being both borne off wounded at the same time with many other commanding officers, and further, the preparations to aid in crossing the ditch not being so forward as they ought to have been, from the men, perhaps, being wounded who were carrying them, caused a wavering in the column, which, in such a situation, became irreparable; and as I advanced with the reserve, at about two hundred and fifty yards from the line, *I had the mortification to observe 'the whole' falling back upon me in the greatest confusion.*

"In this situation, finding that no impression had been made; that though many men had reached the ditch, and were either drowned or obliged to surrender; *and that it was impossible to restore order in the regiments where they were,*—I placed the reserve in position, until I could obtain such information as to determine me how to act to the best of my judgment, and whether or not I should resume the attack; and if so, I felt it could be done only with the reserve."

I now know, from Major Pringle's letter, as well as from information upon which I can depend, from another quarter, that part of the British army did reach the ditch during the attack made by Generals Gibbs and Sir John Keane; and that that part of the 21st regiment which got within the lines, showed all the gallantry and resolution for which Major Pringle

gives them credit; but it mattered not at all to the result, whether this partial success took place during the first part of the attack, when Sir Edward Pakenham headed the troops in person, or during the short period which afterwards occurred before General Gibbs was killed and Sir John Keane was wounded. Did it ever occur to Major Pringle, that in all he has written in eulogy of the army at New Orleans, he has made no addition of the slightest value to the testimony borne by myself to their transcendent merits?—"that British bravery was never put to a severer test, nor ever was more conspicuous: the generals, officers, and men, marched steadily to the mouths of the guns." If I had particularly alluded to Colonel Thornton's success, I could not have written of his merits or of those of his detachment in stronger language. But my object was merely to give a general view of the action and of its result.

Major Pringle can hardly be ignorant, that where a great and appalling misfortune happens to an army, unqualified praise to *all* cannot be merited. He can scarcely be ignorant, that the signal discomfiture of the British army, on the occasion alluded to, has been mainly ascribed to Sir Edward Pakenham's persisting in the attack, after he knew that the scaling-ladders and fascines necessary for the assault were wanting at the moment when they were required. He cannot be ignorant, that part of the 44th regiment, to whom was assigned the duty of being ready with the scaling-ladders and fascines, were not found at the appointed

place. He cannot be ignorant of the great dissatisfaction that prevailed in the army after the engagement; nor that a field-officer was brought to trial on account of that mismanagement, which, it is said, most of all contributed to the deplorable result.

These occurrences, to which I merely allude, are quite well known, and ought to lead Major Pringle not to be quite so indiscriminate in the praise he lavishes on the British army, nor so absurd as to deny to those who have not served for years in the army, the possibility of knowing the true character of a British soldier. I quote the following passage from Major Pringle's last letter, not for the purpose of commenting upon it, but to hold it forth as an example to what a laughable length the *esprit de corps* will carry a man. "It is very easy," he says, "for gentlemen either in books, or in House of Commons' harangues, to send forth to the world systems hypothetically got up for the proper management of British soldiers, to tell us that this punishment is right and that wrong. I will take leave to tell those gentlemen, they do not, they cannot know the true character of a British soldier. They must have served with him for years—they must have studied the dispositions of individuals of the three countries from whence the British ranks are recruited—they must have feasted with him to-day, and fasted with him to-morrow—they must have dwelt with him in palaces and couched with him in hovels—they must have stretched their limbs on the sands of Egypt, or in

the swamps of Louisiana—they must have witnessed his utter contempt of all danger and hardship, his perfect devotedness to the cause in which he is embarked—they must have shared with him the triumph of victory or the mortification of defeat! Then, and not till then, can I admit them to be proper judges of the character of a British soldier."

The reputation of the British army, both for the skill and gallantry of its commanders, and the discipline and bravery of the soldiery, probably never stood so high with the world as during the last war; but that reputation will not be increased either by overrating the merits of the army as superhuman, or underrating the merits of the enemy it met.

It is a striking fact, that after all Major Pringle has written of my being misled and "imposed on by American mis-statements" respecting my details of the battle of New Orleans, he not only has not pointed out one instance of American mis-statement, but has himself appealed to the evidence of an American field-officer, although not at all bearing him out in the inference he deduces from it, in opposition to the official despatches of the British Commanders-in-chief and Quarter-master General; and has devoted a considerable part (and, as I think, the best part) of his second letter to a merited encomium on General Jackson, the commander of the United States army at New Orleans; whom he declares to have been "an honourable and a courteous enemy," and ready to comply with his request to return to him the property belonging to

his friend, the gallant Colonel Rennie, and to take care to protect his remains, and to order for them an honourable grave. Sir John Lambert, in his official despatch, bore equally fair testimony to the merits of the enemy. "An exchange of prisoners (such are his words) has been effected with the enemy upon very fair terms; and their attention to the brave prisoners and wounded that have fallen into their hands has been kind and humane, I have every reason to believe."

I find myself charged, in Major Pringle's last letter, with not having thought it necessary, in noticing the failure of the attack on the lines of New Orleans, to give any description of other incidents connected with the expedition,—such as the action fought by Captain Lockyear; the capture of the American flotilla; and the action fought by Sir John Keane, with five thousand Americans, whom he repulsed.

This is one of those most groundless accusations, in which I regret to be obliged again to repeat that Major Pringle's letters abound. It was his duty, according to the received rules of criticism, to have read my book, and the preface to it, before he ventured to become the reviewer of any part of it. If he had perused the Preface, he must have perceived that it formed no part of my design to write a history of the events of the late war between Great Britain and the United States (which of itself, in its most abridged form, could hardly have been comprised in two octavo

volumes); and that I merely professed my intention to convey to my readers such brief information, geographical and historical, as travellers might wish to possess respecting the districts *through which I passed*. It was impossible for a stranger to be at New Orleans without visiting the field of one of the most extraordinary battles fought in modern times, situated within five miles of the city. But although some account of such a battle was indisputably required from me, a narrative of the campaign, of the great hardships which the troops had to encounter from the period of their first landing on the coast, about seventy miles from New Orleans, above a month before the battle, and of the partial actions which followed, was obviously not within my province.

The details of the Canada warfare, in which four severe and important battles were fought in July, August, and September, 1814, with a loss of above a third part of the armies engaged, only occupy about four pages (146, 147, 148, and 149, 1st vol.) of my work—quite as much space as I could with propriety devote to them, although, in the course in which I travelled, I personally saw all the fields of battle. Yet these four pages were not written without a minute comparison of the British and American official accounts, nor until I was satisfied of their general accuracy. I have therefore no other explanation to give of my limiting myself to a general account of the result of the battle of the 15th January, which decided the campaign, without giving details of all the inci-

dents of the battle—of the successes on the right, and of the disasters on the left,—than that I treated this subject in the only way I could do consistently with the plan of my book, and in the way I treated all such subjects relative to the war of 1813, 1814, and 1815. I may be permitted too to doubt, after perusing the official despatches of Sir John Lambert, Sir John Keane, Colonel Thornton, Quarter-master General Forrest, Admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane, Captain Lockyear, and Sir Thomas Trowbridge, all published in the London Gazette, to which I have so often referred, whether the plain, officer-like terms of their letters, are not to be preferred to the inflated and rhetorical style which Major Pringle has had recourse to. Success in some degree justifies the use of high-sounding words; but in the moment of such a defeat as that which there is no denying that the British experienced at New Orleans, it does appear to me that Sir John Lambert showed good taste and sound judgment in refraining from compliments to the army, great as their sufferings and exertions had been, of such a description as the whole world would not sympathize in. That gallant officer contented himself with expressing his confidence, “that notwithstanding the failure, the army had not suffered the military character to be tarnished; and that, had he thought it right to renew the attack, the troops would have advanced with cheerfulness.”

Sir John Keane’s action with General Jackson, to which Major Pringle particularly alludes, was fought

during the night of the 22d of December, when Sir John effected a landing about two leagues below New Orleans. Major Pringle, it will be seen, describes the British as suddenly attacked, in the darkness of the night, by five thousand Americans, who were repulsed at every point, the British taking up a position in advance of the one originally held. Sir John Keane's account of this action, however, is of a very different description. The following extracts from his despatch prove that he was not disposed to withhold the praise due to the gallant army, small in numbers, opposed to him, composed chiefly of militia, called out at a moment's notice to defend their country and their homes from foreign invasion. After mentioning that a heavy fire was opened about eight o'clock in the evening, when a most vigorous attack was made, he declares, that "a more extraordinary conflict has perhaps never occurred, absolutely hand to hand, both officers and men. It terminated in the repulse of the enemy, with the capture of thirty prisoners." In the sequel, he mentions, that "when it was now 12 o'clock, the firing ceased on both sides, the enemy thought it prudent to retire, and did not dare again to advance;" and that, "from the best information he could obtain, the enemy's force amounted to five thousand men." Sir John Keane says not a word of the army taking up a position in advance, which Major Pringle asserts they did. General Jackson's words in his official despatch are these: —"I contented myself with lying on the field that

night, and at four in the morning assumed a stronger position about two miles nearer the city. At this position I remain encamped, waiting the arrival of the Kentucky militia and other reinforcements. As the safety of the city will depend on the fate of this army, it must not be incautiously exposed." General Jackson, in his despatch of the 27th of December, asserts that his force, of which he furnishes a specification, did "not exceed in all fifteen hundred men." And it was afterwards well known, that at the period in question, he had no such force as Sir John Keane, from the information he had got, presumed him to possess. But it was General Jackson's policy, with a view to gain time for the arrival of his troops, to magnify the numbers of his little army, which retreated on the morning of the 23d to the lines two miles nearer the city, which they fortified, and which the British attacked in vain on the 8th of January. Major Pringle would have shown more prudence had he left the action of the 22d of December unnoticed. There is no doubt that the British showed their accustomed bravery and discipline in the conflict; but it has been very generally believed, that General Jackson, by this night attack, when the amount of his force could not be distinctly seen, impressed his adversary with a belief, that it was far greater in point of numbers and better disciplined than the fact warranted, and thus prevented an immediate attack on New Orleans before the lines were fortified, and before he had an adequate force to meet his enemy in

the field. How far this belief is well founded, I cannot decide; but that it very generally prevails, I know well. Count Marbois expressly says, "that the English were warned by this lesson of the necessity of awaiting the re-union of their forces; and that the delay afforded time for the Kentucky militia to arrive on the 4th of January, 1815, four days before the battle, two-thirds of them however without arms." No authority at all to be relied on has ever rated the army under Jackson, when he attacked Sir John Keane, at more than two thousand men. But here it must be borne in mind, that I am replying to Major Pringle on a point as to which the evidence of my book cannot be called in question, for the statement does not occur in it. The European authorities agree as to the numbers with the American accounts. The Duke of Saxe Weimar writes, that "as soon as the alarm guns were fired, the General marched with the few troops and militia under his command, not two thousand in number."

Major Pringle shows very little judgment in the following passage of his last letter:—"I shall now speak (he writes) of the retreat of our troops from the American shores. It will be naturally supposed that we were harassed to a degree by the enemy; that he followed up his victory in the lines by driving us before him, and sweeping us from the face of the earth. No; General Jackson knew better than to leave his stronghold: it was the prayer of every soldier that he would do so. The British lion had indeed

been sorely stricken, but he was the lion still." The best answer to such gasconading language is to be found in General Jackson's official despatches of the 9th and 19th of January, 1815. In the first, written on the day after the great battle, he says:—"It has not been in my power to impede the operations of the enemy by a general attack. Added to other reasons, the nature of the troops under my command, mostly militia, rendered it too hazardous to attempt extensive movements in an open country, against a numerous and well disciplined army. Although my forces, as to number, had been increased by the arrival of the Kentucky division, my strength had received very little addition, *a small portion only of that detachment being provided with arms.* Compelled thus to wait the attack of the enemy, I took every measure to repel it when it should be made, and to defeat the object he had in view."

In the second letter, on the day after the British had commenced their retreat, he writes:—"Such was the situation of the ground which the enemy abandoned, and of that through which he retired, protected by canals, redoubts, intrenchments, and swamps on his right, and the river on his left, that I could not, without encountering a risk which true policy did not seem to require or to authorize, attempt to annoy him much on his retreat."

It would have been an act of insanity in General Jackson, especially considering his immense inferiority in numbers, to have attacked a well-disciplined and

brave British army in the field—his discomfiture must have been certain.

I have now bestowed some notice, perhaps more than many may think necessary, upon all the observations, serious or sarcastic, which Major Pringle has thought fit to make on that part of my book which relates to the battle of New Orleans; and I do not think I have left unnoticed any part of his strictures, warranted or unwarranted by what I have written, on the subject of the British military expedition to Louisiana. I have no anxiety about the opinion of the public, because I feel assured that the facts stated by me are founded on evidence which is altogether incontrovertible.

The praise bestowed on the American army and on its officers, in the last part of my narrative, relative to the battle of New Orleans, was certainly not founded on my own observation of the army, no considerable part of which I had seen; but I had enjoyed the good fortune of becoming acquainted with many of its officers of all ranks, and had every reason to believe, before adopting the sentiments of Duke Bernhard of Saxe Weimar, that he had very sufficient reasons for entertaining the favourable opinion of it which he expressed. The Duke of Saxe Weimar is no American, but a soldier of reputation, who fought first under Buonaparte, and afterwards under the Duke of Wellington at Waterloo, and whose services were publicly acknowledged by both. I have not, however,

written in terms of greater commendation of the American army and navy, than other late British writers, themselves officers in the navy and army, and whose testimony is therefore of far greater weight. I allude to Captain Basil Hall, and to the author of *Cyril Thornton*, and of *Men and Manners in America*, formerly a captain in the British army, and who served in it in Canada as well as in the United States. The latter mentions, that "there is this difference between the British army and that of the United States,—no one can enter the latter for pleasure, or to enjoy the enviable privilege of wearing an epaulet and an embroidered coat. The service is one of real and almost constant privation. The troops are scattered about in forts and garrisons in remote and unhealthy situations, and are never quartered, as with us, in the great cities. The principal stations are on the Canadian and Indian frontiers, and on the Mississippi; and I imagine the sort of life they lead there would not be greatly relished by his Majesty's Coldstream Guards or the Blues." And again, upon meeting a detachment of the United States army, at Fort Mitchell in Alabama, he observes, that "the officers of the garrison took pleasure in showing kindness to a stranger; that he rode with them through the neighbouring forest, and was indebted to them for much valuable information relative to the Indians."

With respect to the navy, Captain Hall's *Travels in North America* contain a great variety of notices. In one passage he observes, "that as the Americans

neglect nothing, as far as he could see, to give themselves the fairest chance for success in the event of a contest, it behoves us to keep our eyes open likewise. *Above all, we ought not to expose ourselves a second time to the hazards which are incident to an undue depreciation of an enemy's prowess.*" And in another part of his work, he notices his having visited the Delaware of seventy-four guns, which he examined, going over the decks and into all parts of the ship. Every thing was in good man-of-war-like order, clean and well arranged. The discipline, from all he could see or hear on board this ship, and in other quarters, from naval officers and persons who had opportunities of knowing, was effective, but somewhat rigid.

Having now disposed of the specific charges advanced against me in Major Pringle's letters, relative to the affairs at Washington and New Orleans, it remains for me to refute those which apply generally to the tone and character of my work on America. And here I cannot refrain from expressing the extreme astonishment, and the indignant feelings, with which I have read part of his last communication, which at once requires the most explicit contradiction. The passage I chiefly complain of, is the following, and especially that part of it relative to the battle of New Orleans. Major Pringle, writing of my book, avers (I quote his own words), "I am sorry to say, there is no page allotted to praise of the British seaman or British soldier in that work—Censure alone

finds ample room." Now, Sir, I beg you to turn to the 218th, 219th, and 220th pages of the work in question. There you will find these expressions relative to the unfortunate British army at New Orleans, to which Major Pringle's last letter almost entirely relates.—“ Sir Edward Pakenham, with the greatest gallantry, after the disorder into which the precision of the fire had at first thrown them, attempted to lead on his men a second time; but a cannon-shot wounded him.” And again, “ *It is admitted on all hands, that British bravery was never put to a severer test, nor ever was more conspicuous. The generals, officers, and men, marched steadily to the mouths of the guns.*”

These quotations are to be found in every edition of my book; and I may well ask, looking as I at present am, on the official despatch of Lieutenant general Sir John Lambert, who succeeded to the command of the army after Sir Edward Pakenham's death, and also having at my hand Major Pringle's letters, whether terms more laudatory of the prowess and discipline of the whole British army on the day of the battle of New Orleans, have been used, or could have been used, by these gallant officers, than those in which I conveyed my opinion.

Let any man acquainted with the English language compare them with the string of commonplace encomiums bestowed by Major Pringle on the British army in his last letter; “ their unparalleled exertions;” “ the gallant action;” “ the action fought

under every disadvantage;" "a British army gleaned but not reaped;" "the rarely equalled hardships undergone;" "all animated by enthusiasm;" "British seamen and soldiers the same on the shores of the Mediterranean as on the banks of the Mississippi;" "the British Lion stricken, but the British Lion still;" and other vaunting expressions;—and, bearing in mind that the one is the simple tribute of a civilian, on visiting a disastrous battle-field; while the other is the eloquence of an old campaigner, who had figured on the scene,—say which of the two is the more appropriate and becoming.

I now proceed to show, and it cannot be done otherwise than by reference to every part of my book which bears allusion to British officers or to the British army, that Major Pringle's general assertions, that I have allowed myself "to be imposed on by American mis-statements in almost every instance where the operations of the British army are described;" that I have "cast aspersions upon the British army;" and that I have "been misled;" are not less groundless than his details, the fallacy of which has been already exposed.

The first notice of a British officer is to be found in the fifth chapter of the first volume; and relates to General Sir Isaac Brock, who was killed during the late war in Canada. It is there mentioned, that in a conversation in a canal-boat on the Erie Canal, "the canal agent spoke of Sir Isaac Brock in terms of great

respect, as the best commander the British had ever sent to Canada, equally regretted on both sides of the St. Lawrence." Here I admit that I have trusted to American authority alone; but I know well that the opinion of the canal agent is that received by all who knew Sir Isaac Brock's merits in America, as well as in England.

2d. The eighth chapter of the first volume contains an account of the four desperate actions fought on the Canada frontier, in the summer and autumn of 1814. Not a word of censure of the British occurs in any part of it. I have given credit to the talent displayed by the American commanders, and to the gallantry of their army; mentioning at the same time, that the British commander, General Drummond, in his official despatch admitted, that "in so determined a manner were the repeated attacks of the enemy directed against our guns, that our artillerymen were bayoneted by the enemy in the act of loading, and the muzzles of the enemy's guns were advanced within a few yards of ours." General Drummond is not an American authority.

3d. The next notice occurs in the ninth chapter of the first volume. "About thirty-five miles from the Isle Aux Noix, Plattsburg, a considerable village in New York State is situated, in the neighbourhood of which the American and British flotillas on the lake had a severe engagement in 1814, which was attended with disastrous consequences to the British; their commander, Captain Downie, being killed, their

fleet captured, and Sir George Prevost, with a large army, invading the United States from Canada, forced precipitately to retreat. This expedition, in which we sustained such great loss, was even more rashly determined on than that of Burgoyne, in 1777. The object of both expeditions was the same, viz. to cut off the New England States from the Confederacy: but the population of New England, which consisted comparatively of a handful of men in the time of the revolutionary war, was, in 1814, greater than that of half the States at the period of Burgoyne's invasion. We were deceived, on the last occasion, by stories of the unpopularity of the war at Boston, and in other parts of New England, and were presumptuous enough to suppose that we might detach this valuable part of the American republic from the Union. In this vain attempt we made prodigious sacrifices of blood and treasure."

It is plain that the reflection here applies to the policy of the expedition, rather than to its military conduct. The correctness of the facts, so briefly stated, is proved by the official despatches published in the London Gazette. To those who wish to obtain further information respecting this fatal campaign, I recommend for perusal the following passage, to be found at page 366 of the work lately published, entitled "Men and Manners in America." The author of that work was himself an officer in Sir George Prevost's army. The details which he communicates will show, that there was no disposition on my part, on

this occasion, to exaggerate the case against the British:—“ We passed Plattsburg, the scene of the unfortunate naval action in 1814. I was then serving in the colonies, and had a good deal of correspondence with Commodore Sir James Yeo, relative to the charges he afterwards exhibited against Sir George Prevost. The historian who would illustrate by facts the almost incredible amount of folly, ignorance, and imbecility by which the arms of England may be tarnished, and her resources wasted with impunity, should bestow a careful examination on the details of the Plattsburg expedition; he will then precisely understand how war can be turned into child's play, and its operations regulated, as in the royal game of goose, by the twirl of a teetotum.

“ When the order for retreat was given, Sir Manly Power, who commanded a brigade, rode up to Sir George Prevost, and thus addressed him:—‘ What is it I hear, Sir George? Can it be possible that you have issued an order to retreat, before this miserable body of undisciplined militia? With one battalion I pledge myself to drive them from the fort in ten minutes. For God's sake, spare the army this disgrace. For your own sake—for the sake of us all, I implore you not to tarnish the honour of the British arms, by persisting in this order.’ Sir George simply answered, ‘ I have issued the order, and expect it to be obeyed.’

“ In addition, it is only necessary to add, that the fort was of mud; that its garrison was only *three*

thousand militia, while the retreating army consisted of *ten thousand* of the finest troops in the world. To heighten the disgrace, there was considerable sacrifice of stores and ammunition! It is deeply to be lamented, that the death of Sir George Prevost, shortly after his recall, prevented the investigation of his conduct before a court-martial."

I may well ask, in what part of my volumes any statement is to be found so derogatory to the character of the British army, as is to be found in the work to which I have now alluded, attested by an officer of reputation, who himself served in the expedition of which he gives an account?

The same chapter contains details of the war on the American Lakes, in 1756 and 1757; but these details do not contain one word of any kind which can be construed into censure of the British army.

4th. Twenty pages of the tenth chapter are occupied with an account of General Burgoyne's most disastrous, but very interesting campaign. I have not, in any part of it, trusted to American authority alone. It is abridged, almost entirely, from the well-known work of Baroness Reidesdel, the wife of one of the British Generals, who accompanied him on the expedition; and from General Burgoyne's published narrative of the campaign, compared with that of General Wilkinson of the American army.

I do not see, on reperusing my narrative, that it contains one word to subject me to Major Pringle's censure. The terms of commendation applied to the

American army are, on all occasions, given in the words used by General Burgoyne himself, by the Earl of Balcarras, who had a command in the army, and by Baroness Reidesdel.

I have freely commented upon the absurdity of General Burgoyne's vaunting proclamation at the commencement of his campaign; but I have inserted the proclamation itself, so that all who read may judge. I have not, however, notwithstanding the unfortunate conclusion of the campaign, withheld the praise which was due to the British officers. Of General Burgoyne I write, that "he was certainly as brave a soldier as ever lived; and that, although the termination of his military career was so unfortunate, he was, indisputably, a man of talent, and had previously acquired considerable reputation as a soldier in Spain and Portugal, and was a good speaker in Parliament," &c.

Of General Fraser, I mention, "that he was all activity, courage, and vigilance, animating the troops by his example. Wherever he was present, every thing prospered; and when confusion appeared in any part of the line, order and energy were restored by his arrival."

5th. In the 13th chapter, written at Boston, are the details of the circumstances which led to the first skirmish between the British and the Americans in 1775, of the skirmish at Lexington, of the engagement at Bunker's-hill, and of the battle of Dorchester Heights, which forced the British to evacuate Boston.

There is not an expression in the slightest degree derogatory to the honour of the British troops in any part of the chapter.

6th. There is some notice, in the 16th chapter, of Commodore Bainbridge, who commanded the naval yard at Philadelphia when I was there; of his civility to myself, and of his liberality to the officers and passengers of the Java frigate, which he captured at the very beginning of the late war, in the end of December 1812. But my report was not founded on American authority. The official account of the loss of the Java received from Lieutenant Chads, Captain Lambert having been desperately wounded in the action, contains this passage:—"I cannot conclude this letter, without expressing my grateful acknowledgments thus publicly, for the generous treatment Captain Lambert and his officers have experienced from our gallant enemy, Commodore Bainbridge, and his officers." Being induced, on the circumstance of visiting the naval yard, to write on the subject of naval affairs, I have subsequently, in the same chapter, inserted notices respecting the late Commodore Stephen Decatur, and the very handsome treatment which some American prisoners received from Admiral Sir Philip Durham, and other British naval officers; and I make Major Pringle welcome to the admission, that the acknowledgment of that handsome treatment rests on American authority alone—that of a gentleman who was formerly consul from the United States to Tunis.

The same chapter communicates details relative to

General Washington's successful surprise of the British army at Trenton, in the beginning of the first American war. But facts are only mentioned: there is not a word of censure or comment.

7th. The 17th chapter contains some account of the Military Academy of the United States; as to which, instead of giving any opinion myself, I referred not to an American authority, but to that of the Duke of Saxe Weimar. I may now also appeal to the testimony of the author of "Men and Manners in America." The whole of it is favourable. I only extract the following sentence from page 288 of the second volume. "I had letters to Colonel Thayer the commandant, a clever and intelligent officer, who has made it his pleasure, as well as his business, to acquire an intimate knowledge of tactic in all its branches. By him I was conducted over the establishment, and in the system of discipline and education found much to approve."

8th. The 18th chapter contains details respecting the capture and execution of Major André, and General Arnold's treason; but not the slightest imputation is thrown on the British army, or a British officer, throughout the whole.

9th. The execution of Colonel Hayne at Charleston, during the Revolutionary war, an act which cannot be palliated or justified, is detailed in the 23d chapter; but credit is at the same time given to Lord Rawdon, afterwards Marquis of Hastings, for having "lived long enough to establish a character for humanity and

benevolence, founded on very different principles from those which influenced his conduct in early life in South Carolina." I am bound, however, to mention, that the facts relative to Colonel Hayne's execution, as stated in my book, are to be found in the British journals of the period alluded to; and were the subject of a motion in the House of Peers, when the Duke of Richmond "called the attention of the house to the inhuman execution of Colonel Hayne, the particulars of which had been forwarded to him by Mr. John Bowman."

But it is impossible for any man to attempt to justify the conduct of Lord Rawdon at this period. Does Major Pringle think that the honour of the British army is concerned in upholding such an order as the following, issued by his Lordship to one of his commanding officers?—"I will give 10 guineas for the head of any deserter belonging to the Volunteers of Ireland, and 5 guineas only if he be brought alive."

10th. The 24th chapter contains a short narrative of the late treatment of the Cherokees and other Indian tribes; in which a proclamation, issued by Major Wager of the United States army, and his joining in a mischievous plot to get rid of Mr. Rhodes, a useful missionary with the Indians, are freely canvassed, and noticed in terms of disapprobation.

11th. The 35th chapter specifies the handsome conduct of a late well-known British general, Sir William Erskine, in protecting American property on Long Island during the war of the Revolution.

Is this, Major Pringle, censure, or is it praise? In the following part of the same chapter, there are ample extracts from Captain Hall's works, respecting the right of search, claimed by the British; but there is not in the whole of my work, so far as I can discover, any other notice of the slightest importance respecting the British army, or its officers, than those now alluded to.

I have now, Sir, shown, by referring to a mass of evidence, especially to official documents, more to be depended upon than the testimony of a single individual, whatever his rank in the army may have been, how entirely erroneous are Major Pringle's statements in every essential particular; and that the grievous accusation against me, of having preferred unfounded charges against my countrymen, and upon American authority—is itself the most baseless of unfounded calumnies. With respect to yourself, (whom I freely acquit of all *intention* to injure me, though I cannot exempt you from the blame of rashness), I hope the lesson, which this exposure has given you, will lead you in future to adhere to that system of cautious management, for which your journal has hitherto been remarkable.

I am, Sir,
Your most obedient Servant,
JA. STUART.

APPENDIX.

No. I.

MAJOR PRINGLE'S LETTERS.

1. *Letter from Major Pringle to the Editor of the Edinburgh Evening Courant, 29th October, 1833, with Prefatory Notice by the Editor.*

CHARACTER OF THE BRITISH ARMY VINDICATED.

It is well known that the British army, which was employed at the close of the last war, in disembarking at various points of the American coast, for the purpose of advancing into the country, was charged by the Americans with plundering private property, and other proceedings not justifiable by the laws of modern war. Serious charges of this nature against the army which landed near New Orleans, were circulated in America, and generally believed, which is deeply to be regretted, as such misconceptions tend to mar that friendly alliance, which ought, on every account, to subsist between the two nations. It was not known to the gallant officers who conducted that campaign, that such charges existed, until they were repeated in Mr. Stuart's late work on America, when they all joined in a solemn declaration of their being entirely unfounded, and cleared away, by a plain statement of facts, this heavy and unmerited stain on the character of the British army. The charge, with its refutation by General Lambert and his brother officers, was duly inserted in one of our late papers.

It appears that the same charges have been made against that portion of our army which captured Washington, and have been circulated also in the late work of Mr. Stuart, on American authority. Major Pringle, who was with the army in all these operations, and to whom the special charge was assigned by the deceased General Ross of protecting private property in Washington, after it was captured by the British, has sent for insertion in our paper, an answer to those unfounded charges. The letter of this gallant officer, to which we willingly give publicity, considering the honour of our brave army as the common cause of all their countrymen, and which is distinguished not more by its extreme moderation than by the ample and conclusive details which it contains, must convey complete conviction to every unprejudiced mind.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE COURANT.

SIR,

Edinburgh, 29th October, 1833.

Having within these few days read Mr. Stuart's work on America, I was particularly struck with the manner in which the conduct of the British troops, serving under General Ross at the attack on Washington, is described. In vol. ii. p. 85, after commenting upon the merits of the expedition, and lamenting the destruction of the Capitol, War Office, and the *great bridge across the Potomac*, Mr. Stuart proceeds to say, pp. 86, 87, that the library, and a great part of the state papers were destroyed. I shall here quote the author's own words:—"I heard many anecdotes of this much-to-be-regretted incursion. The Commanders had directed private property to be respected, but it was impossible to *restrain the soldiery*. Much private property was destroyed. Mr. Elliot was with the army; his house was sacked. The destruction of Mr. Gales' printing establishment was the most pitiful of all the proceedings." Now, Sir, I am desirous of putting the public in possession of a few facts, which, I trust, will be the means of rescuing the character of the *British soldiery* from the imputation cast upon it. Subsequent to the defeat of the Americans at Bladensburg, General Ross advanced towards Washington with 1000 men,

and about eight o'clock in the evening arrived at an open piece of ground *two miles* from the Federal city. Soon after our arrival I was informed by the adjutant of the regiment that General Ross wished to see me immediately. On coming to the General, I was informed by him that he had ordered the grenadier company of the 21st regiment to parade for a particular service, and that I was to command them, and about 39 men more, making in all 100 rank and file. The General stated to me that he was about to advance into Washington, accompanied by this body of men only, who were to act as his advanced guard in approaching the city. That, on my arrival, I was to take up a position with my men, to place sentries at the different entrances into the city, to send patrols round every half hour, to *prevent any soldier or seaman belonging to the expedition from entering the city*, and on no account whatever to permit *my men to go into any house*. These orders were most punctually attended to. I went round with every patrol myself, I paraded my men every hour, to see that none were absent, and for *twelve hours* held possession of the capital of the United States, with that handful of British soldiers, and *preserved its peace*.

To one species of plunder I and many of my comrades must indeed plead guilty. The inhabitants of Washington, with becoming consideration, had provided an ample repast in every house for the conquering army, which was to return from Bladensburg with the British in chains, but, in its hurry to cross the Potomac, they swept past like its torrent, and left all the good things behind them. Then indeed there was a sad destruction of private property; ducks, geese, hams, turkeys, buffalos' tongues, and buffalos' bumps were devoured by wholesale; nor was Mr. Maddison's health forgotten, in his own best claret, for being so good a fellow as to leave us such a capital supper. This fell to the share of those who were employed in destroying the Capitol, &c. For myself and men, we were most kindly treated by an honest barber, who came to me, in great distress, saying, that he had provided an excellent supper, but that he had no one to eat it. He accordingly brought us out ham and fowls, and various other good things, and he gave the men a quantity of bread and very good cider; and what remu-

neration did this excellent citizen demand for his kindness? Why, that I would allow one of my soldiers to remain in his house, *to protect him* against a set of rascals, who were prowling about the city, taking advantage of its distress. At eight o'clock, in the morning of the 25th, I was ordered to return to the bivouac of the army, two miles distant from Washington; and, previous to our marching off, the men, under my command, had not only the satisfaction to receive the thanks of the ever-to-be-lamented General Ross, for the manner they had preserved the peace of the city, but my friend the barber, and a great many other inhabitants of Washington, thanked the General and the soldiers, *for the protection they had afforded them* from the marauding attacks of *their own countrymen*. In adverting to what is said about the destruction of the great bridge across the Potomac, I have yet to learn, that a prudent *military measure* is contrary to the usages of war, particularly as the *Americans* themselves had *destroyed the two bridges* crossing the eastern branch.

I shall now, in corroboration of the facts which came under my own observation, quote one or two remarks from American publications. The *Columbian Centinel* says, "The British officers pay inviolable respect to private property, and no peaceable citizen is molested." A writer from Baltimore, under date of 27th August, 1814, says, "The enemy, I learn, treated the inhabitants of Washington well;" and what says Mr. Gales, the mouth-piece of the Government and the bitter enemy of the British? "When we remarked," says he, "in our paper of yesterday, that private property had, in general, been respected by the enemy, we spoke what we believed; greater respect was certainly paid to private property than has usually been exhibited by the enemy in his marauding parties; *no houses* were half *as much plundered* by the enemy as by the *knavish rogues about the town*, who profited by the *general distress*." (*National Intelligencer*, 31st August.) I shall close my quotations with one from the George Town paper, 8th September—"The list of plunder and destruction, copied from a vile and libellous print of that city (Washington) into several Federal papers, is a gross and abominable fabrication, *known to be such by every inhabitant* ;

most of the plunder was committed by rabble *of the place*, fostered among the citizens, and *subsequent to the departure* of the British troops ; it is but justice to say, that the British army preserved moderation and discipline, with respect to private property, unexampled in the annals of war."

I have not, Sir, the honour of a personal acquaintance with Mr. Stuart, the author of "Three Years in North America." I trust, he will forgive me for saying, that I think he has allowed himself to be imposed on by American mis-statements, in almost every instance, where the operations of the British army are described ; and that he will believe, I publish the above in no spirit of hostility towards him, but simply, as far as in me lies, to put the character of my fellow-soldiers in a true light before the eyes of their countrymen, in justice to the memory of many brave men and valued friends, and in justice to that army, of which I was a member for nine and twenty years, and with which I served in almost every quarter of the globe.

I have the honour to be,

SIR,


Your obedient servant,



NORMAN PRINGLE.

Late Major 21st Royal Scots Fusiliers.





2. *Notice from the Edinburgh Evening Courant,*
9th November, 1833.

In the Courant of the 31st October we inserted, along with a few introductory remarks, a letter from Major Pringle, vindicating the British army from the charge of plundering private property at Washington, contained in Mr. Stuart's late work on America. We have in consequence received a letter from Mr. Stuart, complaining of our remarks, and defending the accuracy of his statements. He denies that he advanced any thing on American authority merely, and he adds, "I have only now to request, that you will open your columns to my defence, as you have opened them to the accusation ; that you will insert my present denial of the charge, and caution the public not to decide






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betwixt us, till I have brought forward the evidence for the statements which you and Major Pringle impugn."

We shall most readily insert Mr. Stuart's statement in reply to Major Pringle. This in fairness is due to him; and we have only to add, that it was very far from our intention, in the remarks which we made, to do him any injustice. But after receiving Major Pringle's letter, containing the most minute details of the conduct of the British troops during their occupation of Washington, and stating facts of which he was himself an eye-witness, we naturally imagined, as we knew Mr. Stuart to be incapable of deceiving, that he was himself deceived by the Americans, who, where the honour of their army or navy is concerned, are thorough-going partisans; and might be too ready to give credit to, and circulate, any stories reflecting on their enemies. This was the most charitable conclusion, indeed it was the only conclusion, we could come to, in the face of the positive averments of Major Pringle.

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3. *Letter from Mr. Stuart to the Editor of the Edinburgh Evening Courant, London, 5th November 1833, referred to in the notice No. 2.*

SIR,

My attention has only now been called to an article in the *Courant* of 31st October, entitled "Character of the British Army Vindicated," which I at once perceive to be of such a description as to require immediate notice from me.

The book, on certain statements in which you found your erroneous charges, has been received by the public with so much more favour than it deserved, that I should be most unreasonably sensitive were I to object to any remarks consistent with accuracy. But the article to which I have alluded contains a direct attack on the authenticity of an important part of the work, and cannot therefore be passed over without a tacit acknowledgment of error on my part. In fact you rather assert, than insinuate, that I have made my work a vehicle for unjustly, and on American authority alone, accusing the British army of pro-

ceedings during the late American war, not justifiable by the laws of modern warfare. Now, Sir, as the merits of the book, if it have any, depend altogether on its rigid adherence to correctness of narration, and as I am confident that to that extent its merits cannot be overrated, I feel myself bound thus publicly to declare, that no part of the information communicated by me respecting the first or last American war depends merely on American authority. On the contrary, none of the facts were committed to paper until after a careful and diligent, and I believe, most impartial comparison of the American official accounts with the *London Gazettes*, and the debates in the British Houses of Parliament, to all of which, as mentioned in the work itself, I had access, even when I was residing in the United States of America. No part of the book was written with so much caution, nor after so much deliberation, as that which relates to the British and American armies, and their discipline. I am therefore most culpable, if even a single material error in this part of my work can be pointed out. But assertion is not proof, and I only now write to draw your attention to my positive denial of your statement, that I have circulated charges against our army on American authority. I feel with you, Sir, that the reputation of our army is the common cause of all our countrymen; but that reputation stands too high to be injured by the subtraction of what in justice does not belong to it. It is therefore my intention, Sir, to send you, as soon as I can prepare it, a vindication of those parts of my work which you and Major Pringle accuse. To make this vindication complete and convincing, many documents must be reconsulted and compared; and I have only now to request, that you will open your columns to my defence, as you have opened them to the accusation; that you will insert my present denial of the charge, and caution the public not to decide betwixt us till I have brought forward the evidence for the statements which you and Major Pringle impugn.—I am, Sir, your most obedient servant,

(Signed)

JA. STUART.

4. *Letter from Major Pringle to the Editor of the Edinburgh Evening Courant, 13th Nov. 1833.*

SIR,

In addressing this letter to you, I trust it will be found that I am actuated by no motive but that which I declared in my letter published in your paper of the 31st ultimo, namely, the strong desire of doing justice, in every point of view, to the character of the British troops employed during the last American War. Mr. Stuart says, in his letter to you, "I am therefore most culpable if even a single material error in this part of my work can be pointed out." Is it no material error to state that the British soldiery could not be restrained from plundering private property, when there is direct evidence, both British and American, to show that such an accusation is not correct? Is it no material error to state that the British force at New Orleans was 12,000, and the American only 3000 or 4000, when the *reverse* is much nearer the truth, as official documents can show? Is it no material error roundly to assert that the British never *reached the ditch*, when there are many living witnesses to testify that they did, and when even American authority can be produced to show that the British not only reached the ditch but got *into* their lines?

I hope Mr. Stuart will have the kindness to excuse me if I repeat, what, in charity to him, I continue to think, that he has allowed himself to be imposed on by American mis-statements; and if any reliance is to be placed on official documents, I believe I shall be enabled to show that Mr. Stuart has had bad information respecting the British troops employed in the United States.

Mr. Stuart in his letter to the Editors of the Courant and Caledonian Mercury says, that I have impugned his statement regarding the behaviour of the British troops at Washington. I shall now beg leave again to call in question the correctness of his information, come from what source it may, and in military phrase break fresh ground with him, and the field shall be New Orleans.

In vol. ii. page 253, of Mr. Stuart's work, the author says,

“ the British are understood to have had between 10,000 and 12,000 men in this engagement, and the Americans between 3000 and 4000.” Now, Sir, as I happen to have an official return of every regiment of the British army employed on that expedition, I shall give the list; Mr. Stuart can refer to the Horse Guards to know if I am correct. The list is of British infantry employed in the attack on the lines of New Orleans, on the morning of the 8th January, 1815 :—4th foot, 747; 7th do., 750; 21st do., 800; 43d do., 820; 44th do., 427; 85th do., 298; 93d do., 775; 95th do., 276—making in all 4893 rank and file British; there remains to be added to this 200 seamen and 400 marines. For the amount of the American force, I shall leave the public to draw the inference from Mr. Stuart’s own words, merely stating, that I have now before me a very beautiful plan of the operations, and of the American lines before New Orleans executed by Major Lacarriere Latour, principal engineer, 7th military district, U. S. army, which lines, to use the Major’s own expression, “ were a mile in length, and filled with men.” In vol. ii. page 252, Mr. Stuart says, “ General Jackson placed his riflemen, each of whom had one, two, or three men behind him;” and, again, he says, “ the fire of the American militia was most unintermitting—(no wonder)—the men in some places ranged six deep.” Now, Sir, taking for granted that Major Latour’s plan is most perfectly correct, and that Mr. Stuart’s information is in this instance good, I shall split the difference with him, and allow the Americans to have stood four deep, and each file at one yard distance from the other (good elbow room, as every soldier will allow,) there being 1760 yards in a mile, will make the American force, by Mr. Stuart’s own account amount to 7040. That the Americans had many more men is my firm belief, as General Jackson was much too skilful an officer to throw up lines a mile long, unless he had masses of men to fill them; and I am sure I shall be borne out by my brother officers in saying, that such a torrent of fire (if I may so express it) as poured on the British troops that day along the whole extent of the line, was, perhaps, never witnessed, not even at St. Sebastian. In page 253, Mr. Stuart says, “ the British never reached the ditch.” I think, I can easily disprove

this assertion, and by American authority too. In consequence of an unfortunate mistake, the fascines and ladders had never reached the head of our column. Major-General Gibbs, leading on the attack at the head of the 21st regiment, finding that the fascines were not forthcoming, ordered the two leading companies of the 21st regiment to move forward in double quick time under Major Whitaker, the senior Major of the regiment, for the purpose of making a lodgement in the ditch. Almost immediately on giving this order General Gibbs was mortally wounded, and at the same instant, the enemy commencing a destructive fire, our column was absolutely mowed down. The smoke was so great that we could not see our two companies which had been sent in advance: but those brave men under their gallant leader pressed on, *got into the ditch*, made *steps with their bayonets* in the parapet, and *succeeded in getting into the American lines*, where, from want of support, they were made prisoners. There are many of the officers still alive who can vouch for this fact. Major Whitaker was killed in climbing up the parapet. At the first burst of the fire from the American lines, Colonel, now Sir William Paterson of the 21st, was badly wounded; Major Alexander James Ross was also most severely wounded, from the effects of which he never recovered, and died in Edinburgh some years after.

The command of the 21st regiment devolved on the junior field officer. From the effects of the tremendous fire, the advancing column was for a moment thrown into confusion. The commanding officer of the regiment ordered a bugle to sound the advance, called to the men to follow him, which they did with cheers. They advanced to the ditch; some of the men were already *in it*; the present Lieutenant-General Sir John Keane, with that gallantry for which he is conspicuous, arrived, and, in the act of leading on and cheering the men, was badly wounded, and carried off the field; at the same instant, a staff officer came up, and ordered the officer commanding the 21st regiment to collect the remnant of his corps, and retreat to a wood in the rear. General Jackson in his despatch says, "Yet the columns of the enemy continued to advance with a firmness which reflects upon them the highest credit. Twice the column which ap-

proached my left was repulsed, and twice they formed again and renewed the *assault*." (Assault of what? why of the ditch and parapet). And now, Sir, from my heart I thank Mr. Stuart for giving me an opportunity of paying a tardy but just tribute to the memory of one of my earliest and most esteemed friends—to one of the bravest soldiers that ever drew a sword—I mean the late Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel Rennie of the 21st Scots Fusileers, nephew of the late Sir David Baird.—This officer had been wounded severely in the knee at the attack on Washington, still more severely on landing at the attack on Baltimore. Neither of these wounds were as yet healed, but nothing could prevent Rennie from performing his duty. Sir Edward Pakenham had given Colonel Rennie a separate command, for the purpose of acting on the American right flank, and, as I am unwilling to make the public trust to the partial testimony of a friend, I shall forego the privilege, and recount the gallantry of Colonel Rennie in the words of his enemy; and I shall quote them from General Jackson's biographer (Mr. Eaton):—"Colonel Rennie, of the fusileers, was ordered to storm a redoubt on the American right. Rennie executed his orders with great bravery, and urging forward, arrived at the ditch, and reaching the works and *passing the ditch*, Rennie, sword in hand, leaped on the wall, and calling to his troops, bade them follow him. He had scarcely spoken, when he fell by the fatal aim of one of our riflemen. Pressed by the impetuosity of superior numbers, who were *mounting the walls*, and *entering at the embrasures*, our troops had retired to the line in rear of the redoubt. To advance, or maintain the point gained, was equally impracticable for the enemy. The situation of these brave fellows may be easily conceived. They were nearly all killed or taken prisoners."

There is another circumstance connected with my gallant friend's death, which I cannot refrain from relating, as it gave me then, and does now give me the greatest pleasure, to think that he was not only regretted by his friends, but that he, in his death, was honoured by his foes. The night previous to the action of the 8th of January, Rennie said to me, "I am always hit, and in case I should fall to-morrow, I beg you will use every

endeavour to recover this ring, this brooch with some hair in it, and my watch, and if you survive, deliver them to my sister." After the attack on the lines of New Orleans had failed, a flag of truce was sent from Sir John Lambert to General Jackson. I wrote a few lines by the officer who carried it to the American General, mentioning my friendship for Colonel Rennie, and his request to me. On the return of the flag of truce, I received a polite message from General Jackson, saying that it gave him the greatest pleasure to comply with any request made by the friend of such a gallant soldier as Colonel Rennie; that he had taken care to protect his remains, and to order for them an honourable grave. The watch, ring, and brooch were all returned to me.

Accustomed as we had been for years to oppose an honourable and a courteous enemy, it was a green spot in the wilderness of American campaigning, to find one of the same stamp in the present President of the United States.

If, Sir, I have expressed myself strongly, I have felt deeply. In that expedition I lost three of my earliest and most intimate friends, and there is a bond of affection between those who have stood by each other in many a well-fought field, which men in ordinary life can hardly know. I have now to apologize to you and to the public for trespassing so long upon your time, but I hope you will both admit that it is a little too hard that men who are willing to suffer every privation, and to shed the last drop of their blood in the defence, or for the honour of their country, should have their "good name filched from them" by those who are (no disrespect to Mr. Stuart) equally unwilling to allow, and unable to appreciate their worth.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

NORMAN PRINGLE,

Late Major 21st Royal Scots Fusileers.

5. *Letter from Major Pringle to the Editor of the Edinburgh Evening Courant, 29th November, 1833.*

SIR,

In addressing the following remarks to the public, I do not now come before it as merely wishing to defend the character of the British army from aspersions which have been cast upon it, and trust I have not infringed the rules of courtesy in not waiting *longer* for Mr. Stuart's documents, but I wish to claim for that portion of the combined British forces employed in the expedition to New Orleans the merit they so well deserve. In the work already alluded to in letters published by me in the Edinburgh newspapers, where the author has thought it necessary to mention the failure of our attack on the lines of New Orleans, I was in hopes I might have found some description of other circumstances connected with that expedition; but I am sorry to say there is no page allotted to praise of the British seaman or British soldier in that work. Censure alone finds ample room. Why are the unparalleled exertions of our seamen and our soldiers withheld? Why is the gallant action fought by Captain Lockyer near the pass of the Rigolets with the enemy's gun-boats? Why is the capture of the whole of the American flotilla by that officer, with the boats of the British fleet, withheld? Why is the action fought by our troops under Sir John Keane (under every disadvantage) withheld? After being exposed to the most severe weather in open boats for nearly *twenty-four hours*, the troops landed on a shore unknown to them; they had lain down to rest in their bivouac, when, in the darkness of the night, they were suddenly attacked by 5000 Americans under General Jackson himself. (See Sir John Keane's despatch, Dec. 28, 1814.) The British stood to their arms, repulsed the enemy at every point! and took up a position in advance of the one originally held! The action fought by the troops and seamen under Colonel (now General) Thornton, and which action was completely successful, on the right bank of the Mississippi—why is this not mentioned? I shall take the liberty of doing so in General Jackson's own words, given in his despatch of 9th January 1815. The General says, "These, (meaning the British) having landed were *hardy*

enough to advance against the works of General Morgan; and what is strange and difficult to account for, at the very moment when their entire discomfiture was looked for, the Kentucky reinforcements in whom so much reliance had been placed, ingloriously fled, drawing after them, by their example, the remainder of the forces (about 1600), and thus yielding to the enemy *that most formidable* position." Well might the late Sir Alexander Cochrane say in his despatch to the Admiralty, dated January 18, 1815, "That the hardships undergone by the seamen and the troops had rarely been equalled." I will venture to assert, that in the whole annals of his own glorious service, that respected Admiral never knew the combined energies of British seamen and British soldiers more severely put to the test. All were animated by the same enthusiasm. Officers and soldiers, Admirals and seamen, were seen hauling on the same rope, and dragging at the same gun. It is not for British soldiers nor British sailors, any more than other mortals to command success; but in this expedition they did deserve it.

I shall now speak of the retreat of our troops from the American shores. It will be naturally supposed that we were harassed to a degree by the enemy; that he followed up his victory in the lines by driving us before him, and sweeping us from the face of the earth. No, General Jackson knew better than to leave his strong-hold; it was the prayer of every soldier that he would do so. The British lion had, indeed, been sorely stricken, but he was the lion still. Well has it been said by the eloquent author of the Peninsular war, "A British army may be gleaned, but it cannot be reaped." We remained until the 18th in our original position, and commenced our retreat on the evening of that day,—a retreat equally honourable to the General commanding (Lieutenant-General Sir John Lambert), and to the soldiers under him.

It is easy for gentlemen to sit at home and criticize the operations of an army, or the movements of a fleet; they little know the ordeal to be passed ere that victory is won which may bring sorrow or rejoicing to their fireside. But the British public may rest assured, that its seamen and its soldiers are ever the same on the shores of the Mediterranean as on the banks of the

Mississippi—one feeling alone animates them—the faithful discharge of their duty: “England expects every man to do his duty;” or the simple but characteristic appeal of the greatest Captain of ANY AGE—“What will they say in England?” These are signals British seamen and British soldiers will fly to answer. THESE ARE watch-words they will cheer to! Look on the deck of the Victory! look on the field of Corunna! or on the green turf, the humble death-bed of the humblest soldier—one sentiment pervades them all. Listen to the last sob of the dying man, and in it you will find a whispered hope that he has done his duty! It is also very easy for gentlemen either in books, or in House of Commons harangues, to send forth to the world systems hypothetically got up for the proper management of British soldiers, to tell us that this punishment is right and that wrong. I will take leave to tell those gentlemen they do not, they cannot know, the true character of a British soldier. They must have served with him for years—they must have studied the dispositions of individuals of the three countries from whence the British ranks are recruited—they must have feasted with him to-day, and fasted with him to-morrow—they must have dwelt with him in palaces, and couched with him in hovels—they must have stretched their limbs with him on the sands of Egypt, or in the swamps of Louisiana—they must have witnessed his utter contempt of all danger and hardship, his perfect devotedness to the cause in which he is embarked—they must have shared with him the triumph of victory, or the mortification of defeat! Then, and not till then, can I admit them to be proper judges of the character of a British soldier.

I shall conclude this communication, as I commenced my correspondence, by stating, that I have no motive but that of doing justice to my fellow soldiers in every point of view. With whatever spirit of hostility I might have *fought* in 1815, in 1833 I *write* with none. As I have before stated, we ever found in General Jackson an honourable and a courteous enemy—and all our prisoners were treated with kindness and generosity. I shall venture again to assure the author of “Three Years in North America,” that he has been misled, and I would fain flatter myself that one day he will admit it. In the mean time our

cause is before the public ; to it I look for judgment, and with submission will await the verdict, whether for those who have made the charges, or for him who very humbly has offered the defence. I have the honour to be your obedient Servant,

NORMAN PRINGLE,

Late Major 21st Scots Fusileers.

No. II.

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN LIEUTENANT-GENERAL
SIR JOHN LAMBERT, K. C. B. AND MR. STUART, WITH
RELATIVE DOCUMENTS.

Letter from Sir John Lambert to Mr. Stuart.

Stanmore, Aug. 16, 1833.

SIR,

As second in command of the army serving at New Orleans in the year 1815, I beg to inclose to you a declaration signed by several officers, which has reference to your work, entitled "Three Years in North America," and I entertain no doubt you will on the perusal, in justice to the honour of the British army, and to the memory of the brave and gallant officer who commanded in chief, give it all the publicity in your power ; and should your popular book be extended to a third edition, this formal denial of the truth of the points referred to, will find a place therein.

I have the honour to remain, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

JOHN LAMBERT, L.G.

James Stuart, Esq.

Declaration inclosed in the preceding letter.

The two following paragraphs, extracted from a work recently published, entitled "Three Years in North America," by James Stuart, Esq., when speaking of the expedition to New Orleans in 1815, expresses—

1. " It has been said, and never contradicted, so far as I could learn at New Orleans, that the British commander-in-chief had promised the plunder of the city to his army. This is a matter which even now concerns the honor of the British name, for the statement is founded on no light authority."

2. " Mr. Eaton, holding one of the highest offices in the general government of the United States, the present (1830) Secretary at War to the American Government at Washington, and the author of a life of General Jackson, expressly asserts, in that work, that 'booty and beauty' was the watchword of Sir Edward Pakenham's army in the battle of the 8th. He thus writes—' Let it be remembered of that gallant, but misguided general, who has been so much deplored by the British nation, that to the cupidity of his soldiers he promised the wealth of the city as a recompense for their gallantry and desperation, while, with brutal licentiousness, they were to revel in lawless indulgence, and triumph uncontrolled over female innocence. Scenes like these our nation, dishonored and insulted, had already witnessed at Hampton and Havre de Grace (alluding to Sir G. Cockburn's expedition;) but it was reserved for her yet to learn that an officer of high standing, polished, generous, and brave, should, to induce his soldiers to acts of daring valour, permit them, as a reward, to insult, injure, and debase those whom all mankind, even savages, reverence and respect. The history of Europe, since civilized warfare began, is challenged to afford an instance of such gross depravity, such wanton outrage on the morals and dignity of society. English writers may deny the correctness of the charge: it certainly interests them to do so; but its authenticity is too well established to admit a doubt, while its criminality is increased from being the act of a people who hold themselves up to surrounding nations as examples of every thing that is correct and proper. This charge does not rest upon Mr. Eaton's authority alone.' It is mentioned in all the American statements relative to this battle down to the present day. Mr. Timothy Flint, who has given a detailed account of the campaign, repeats it in his 'Geography and History of the Western States;' and it also appears in the Travels of Bernhard, Duke of Saxe Weimar, brother-in-law to the Duke

of Clarence (now King of Great Britain), published so late as 1828."

"Now we, the undersigned, serving in that army, and actually present, and through whom all orders to the troops were promulgated, do, in justice to the memory of that distinguished officer, who commanded, and led the attack, the whole tenor of whose life was marked by manliness of purpose, and integrity of view, most unequivocally deny that any such promise was ever held out to the army, or that the watchword asserted to have been given out, was ever issued, and further, that such motives could never have actuated the man, who in the discharge of his duty to his King and country so eminently upheld the character of a true British soldier.

That a refutation of the above calumnies not having before appeared, is solely to be attributed to their not having come to the knowledge of the undersigned, that they existed, until the work from which they are taken was given to the public in the present year 1833.

(Signed)

JOHN LAMBERT, Lt.-General.
JOHN KEANE, Lieut.-General,
W. THORNTON, Major-General.
EDW. BLAKENEY, Major-Gen.
ALEX. DICKSON, Colonel.
Deputy Adjt.-Gen., Royal Artillery.

Letter from Mr. Stuart to Sir John Lambert.

1, Park Row, Knightsbridge, Aug. 24, 1833.

SIR,

I yesterday had the honour to receive your letter of 16th August, inclosing most satisfactory evidence, in refutation of the statement, that the British Commander-in-Chief had, previously to the battle of New Orleans, promised the plunder of the city to his army. That statement is mentioned in the 26th chapter of the second volume of my late book on North America, and is founded on documents, to which I have there referred.

The third edition of my book having been some time published, I have no other way of making the important information contained in your communication generally known, than by sending it for insertion in the public journals, and by requesting one of my friends at New York to have it inserted in newspapers published there and at Washington. You may depend on my taking the necessary steps for those purposes without delay.

You will, I am persuaded, do me the justice to believe that I perused your letter with great pleasure. I published the statement made to me at New Orleans, as you will perceive on turning to the passage in the book, where it is to be found, because it appeared to me, that the statement "even now concerns the honour of the British name, being founded on no light authority." It could not have received a more convincing or more complete contradiction, than that which you have been so obliging as to forward to me.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your very obedient humble servant,

JA. STUART.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir John Lambert, K.C.B. &c.

Letter from Sir John Lambert to Mr. Stuart.

Stanmore, August 26, 1833.

SIR,

I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 24th inst. and to return to you many thanks for the ready compliance with, and efficient steps you propose taking for carrying into effect the object the General Officers and myself had in forwarding to you my letter of the 16th inst., together with the inclosure.

I have the honour to remain, Sir,

Your very obedient humble servant,

JOHN LAMBERT, L.G.

To James Stuart, Esq.

No. III.

Six Extracts from North American Newspapers, proving that the statement made by Mr. Stuart respecting the Watchword at the Battle of New Orleans, had been universally believed in the United States of America for eighteen years ; and also shewing the good spirit with which the complete refutation of the statement had been received in America.

(From the New York Journal of Commerce.)

October 10, 1833.

“**BEAUTY AND BOOTY**”.—Six of the principal officers in the British army who were in the battle of New Orleans, on seeing Stewart’s “Three Years in the United States,” and observing by his notice of Eaton’s “Life of Jackson,” that it was unhesitatingly stated, and generally believed, that the watch-words among them on the 8th of January, 1815, were *Beauty and Booty*, have distinctly denied any knowledge of the fact. If it had been so, they must unquestionably have known it. This statement has often been made to awaken the indignation of the American people, and with great effect. It is never too late to correct an error.

(From the New York Gazette and General Advertiser.)

October 18, 1833.

We find in our London papers the following contradiction to the old story, that the watchword to the British army at New Orleans was *Beauty and Booty*.

The correspondence between Sir John Lambert and Mr. Stuart here follows.

(From the Philadelphia Commercial Herald.)

October 12, 1833.

“**BEAUTY AND BOOTY**.”—It has been now about eighteen

years since the public has received and credited the statement, that the watch-word of the British army, in the memorable attack on New Orleans, was "Beauty and Booty." The following correspondence will relieve the British Commander and his officers from the odium which has for so many years attached to their name and character, and through them to the whole British nation.

(From the New York Commercial Advertiser).

"BEAUTY AND BOOTY."—Six of the principal officers in the British army, who were in the battle of New Orleans, on seeing Stewart's "Three Years in the United States," and observing by his notice of Eaton's "Life of Jackson," that it was unhesitatingly stated, and generally believed, that the watch-words among them on the 8th of January, 1815, were "Beauty and Booty," have distinctly denied any knowledge of the fact.—If it had been so, they must unquestionably have known it. This statement has often been made to awake the indignation of the American people, and with great effect. It is never too late to correct an error.

(From the New York American.)

"BEAUTY AND BOOTY."—Among our extracts from London papers to-day, will be found one refuting, on the highest authority, the truth of the statement universally current and universally believed in this country, that the words at the head of this paragraph constituted the encouraging cry of assault of the British army at New Orleans on the 8th of January, 1815. It is now nearly eighteen years since the dishonor of these words and the purpose they imply, was laid to the charge of General Pakenham and his troops. It is singular that in all that time, no refutation should have been before attempted; the more so, as British functionaries in the United States could not but have seen the use to which they have been put at elections and

other political occasions. Yet certainly the refutation of the charge as stated in Major Eaton's Book is, though tardy, complete.

(From the New York Albion.)

We have much satisfaction in copying the following article from the New York American. Major Eaton was doubtless misinformed when he made the statement which has called forth the denial of the principal officers in command on the unfortunate occasion alluded to.

Letter from Sir John Lambert to Mr. Stuart.

Stanmore, Nov. 26, 1833.

SIR,

I received on the 24th instant three newspapers of the Courier of the date of the preceding day, for which I feel I am indebted to your attention. It was very satisfactory to me to read, how well the object of our correspondence was received in the United States.—I cannot terminate it without renewing to you the assurance of the high respect with which I have the honour to remain,

SIR,

Your obedient Servant,

JOHN LAMBERT,

Lieutenant-General.

James Stuart, Esq.

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