GOVERNMENT OF CANADA

STATEMENTS AND SPEECHES

INFORMATION DIVISION
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OTTAWA - CANADA

No. 54/43 DISARMAMENT

Canadian statement on disarmament made by the Vice-Chairman of the Canadian Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly, Mr. Paul Martin made in the First Committee on October 13, 1954.

The speakers who have preceded me have already, I think, sufficiently outlined the earlier stages of disarmament negotiations. I do not, therefore, propose to take up the time of this Committee with any general exposition of this problem. Instead, I shall try to suggest, as briefly as I can, what seems to me to be the essential perspective of international relations and world politics in which the disarmament problem should be viewed. Within the particular field of disarmament problems I propose to address myself to those aspects which, in the view of the Canadian delegation, present the most important unresolved differences between the views enunciated by the Government of the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and the Governments of some of the Western Powers on the other. I shall also have a suggestion to make as to the procedure which, in my view, we can most usefully follow if we are to make further progress in this important field.

It is, I think, worth while reminding ourselves, as we discuss this item on our agenda, that armaments are a symptom rather than a cause of international tension. They are, as a great student of the art of diplomacy has recently pointed out, primarily the reflection of international difference and only secondarily the cause of them.

Any actions, however, which diminish international tensions and contribute to a real understanding in world politics are direct contributions to the solution of the problem of disarmament. Without such relaxation it is arguable, of course, that concentration on disarmament negotiations alone is unlikely to be productive. If the Soviet Union wishes to make a real contribution to disarmament, permitting progress on such matters as the conclusion of a peace treaty with Austria would be a major contribution to this end. So would actions to grant a real, rather than a spurious, national autonomy to those many European peoples the control over whose destinies has in the past fifteen years been forcefully assumed by Moscow. Now I have no desire to broaden our debate, and certainly no desire to initiate any controversy. However, I do feel that in a matter of this importance we should be realists as well as idealists. I have no doubt that Mr. Vyshinsky could point his finger at various Western actions which have been, in our view, defensive but which he might claim have caused concern in Moscow and

so contributed to tension. But it is well for all of us to bear in mind that in the world as it is the problem of disarmament must be seen against this real background of international tension. Polite unrealism or artificial abstractions are no service at this time to the cause of disarmament or, in the view of my Government, to the cause of the United Nations.

This is not, however, to say that no progress can be made in the disarmament field itself. Success, or even partial success, in negotiating a disarmament agreement would, in time, facilitate, of course, agreements in other fields.

Moreover, there are reasons to believe that progress under present conditions may be less difficult than it has been hitherto. For one thing, I think it quite possible that men in the governments principally concerned, on either side of the Iron Curtain, are beginning to fear the awful power that scientists are putting and have put at our disposal. Certainly, I am not ashamed to admit myself that I find the situation most disquieting. For the stakes are incomparably higher now than they were a few years ago. I think that only those associated with governments which have some direct experience of atomic processes and direct access to classified information of technicians working in this field can be aware how serious is the threat which contamination and other effects of nuclear explosions can pose to the very existence of organic life on this planet.

None of us should be ashamed or too proud to admit that we are concerned. I am the Minister of National Health and Welfare in my country, and I am sure that it will be appreciated that in that capacity alone I would have added reasons to be vitally concerned about the cataclysmic possibilities of the future and the great draining of resources which heavy levels of armament mean to countries which wish to improve their health and their social services. Humility before the awesome power which our scientists are placing in our hands is, I suggest, a becoming attitude for members of governments now in any part of the world.

We have barely begun to realize, still less to work out, the implications of the growing interdependence which technology is forcing on the human race. But in face of this interdependence, we dare not shut the door on any possibility of negotiations to bring nuclear powers under civilized control.

It may be that it is awareness of these growing dangers that, at least in part, has prompted the apparent advances in the Soviet position which the able Mr. Vyshinsky has outlined during the last few weeks. On the one hand, we of the democratic world dare not be naive. It would be foolish and dishonest to pretend that those who are most sceptical may not be right. Certainly, the timing of the Soviet Union's proposals suggests that the men in the Kremlin may have their eye rather on debates elsewhere -- in London, in Paris -- concerning the unity and the defence programmes of Western Europe than on the desirability of a disarmament programme in itself.

But though one cannot help being to some extent sceptical, my Government dares not, and suggests that none of us dare, write off as exclusively propaganda any advances

which promise even the possibility of progress in the important field of armament control.

At this early stage in our debate it is not, I think, necessary for this Committee or the General Assembly to come to any final conclusion regarding the substantive proposals of the Soviet Union or of the Western Powers as they stand before us at present. Our principal effort at this stage, as I see it, should be to seek to clarify and to understand, and above all to create the best conditions for further negotiation.

In taking stock of our position we can, however, recognize that, as a result principally of the efforts of the London Sub-Committee, where the Anglo-French proposals were worked out and presented, the gap between the two sides, though still formidable, is narrower than when the Assembly last debated this question over a year ago. Without wishing in any way to belittle the Soviet Union proposals of September 30, I hope that one of the direct results of our Committee proceedings this year will be the recognition of the true significance of the Anglo-French proposals of June 11 last.

If these proposals are carefully examined against the background of previous Western proposals, it is, to my mind, not surprising that they have now been accepted by the Soviet Union as a basis for negotiation or, as I think Mr. Vyshinsky put it, as a basis for discussion. They represent indeed a very serious and a very generous effort toward compromise and conciliation of previously irreconcilable positions.

Methods of diplomacy are not everywhere the same, and it may not be helpful to underscore the differences too heavily. However, I think it is worth noting that the Anglo-French proposals were first presented to the Soviet Union privately and informally, so that they might receive the serious and sympathetic consideration which we felt they deserved. No attempt was made to capitalize publicly on the step forward the Western Powers were then taking. Our object was not publicity but agreement. No extraneous conditions were attached to these proposals, and they dealt simply and solely with the question of disarmament. There has never at any time been the slightest suggestion that, if the foreign policy of the Soviet Union were not changed in one or other major respects, the Anglo-French proposals might be withdrawn. The fact is that any real agreement on a substantial measure of disarmament would so alter the international scene as to affect the course of foreign policy not only in one field but in every field, and not only in one country but in all countries.

One cannot help but recall the reception of the Anglo-French proposals by the Soviet Union in London. This reception, I think, was in contrast to the reception the Western Powers have accorded the Soviet counter-proposals which are now before us. On the very day that he received the Anglo-French memorandum in London, Mr. Malik accused the United Kingdom and French Governments of proposing merely to "legalize" the use of atomic weapons. Mr. Vyshinsky's counter-proposals, put forward a few weeks ago, have not only been welcomed by the Western Powers and other nations but were at once promised the most careful consideration. And I can say to Mr. Vyshinsky that my Government has given and is giving his proposals the most serious and careful study and consideration.

However much we might have wished for a quicker response, the important thing now is that there has been a response from the Government of the Soviet Union, and our task is therefore to study it with the care and objectivity which the importance of this subject requires. It is only human to admit, however -- and I am sure that Mr. Vyshinsky, great realist that he is, will understand why we feel it necessary to say these things, and I hope we say them in good temper that, in view of the long and unhappy experience which we have all had in negotiations on this subject, we cannot wholly remove from our minds the memory of past manoeuvres intended to play upon the hopes and fears of all peoples for the narrow national advantage of one country in the battle for the minds of men. In 1954, the ninth year of the atomic age and the third year in which all countries have coexisted in the fear of hydrogen weapons, it is already much too late for any of us to treat the subject of disarmament as an element in the cold war.

No disarmament proposal can be treated merely as bait to be pulled out of the water if it does not catch its fish. Nor can any of us afford, let it be added, to dismiss any proposal as mere propaganda, at least until the proposal has been thoroughly sifted, preferably in a small informal group.

At this stage, I would not want my colleagues in this Committee to think that, because we submitted a draft resolution yesterday, we believed that the time had come for termination of the general debate on this subject. We think it is important that there should be a full and unrestricted debate in this Committee. I am sure that all of us were greatly impressed yesterday by the interrogations and the replies of Mr. Vyshinsky and Mr. Belaunde, and even the smile of the representative of Thailand. Assembly debate and Committee debate have an essential place, and, in the process of arriving at a collective assessment of the merits of the two sets of proposals before us, every country around this table has an important role to play. My country does not regard itself, just because it has been a member of the Sub-Committee, as among the few countries in the world that have a stake or a responsibility in the solution of this problem. In the final analysis, I think, our experience over the years has shown that no country can indefinitely resist the moral judgment of the great majority of the Members of this Assembly. We saw at the Seventh Session, for instance, how an Indian proposal, adopted with the support of almost all countries outside the Soviet bloc, subsequently was accepted as the basis for the Korean Armistice Agreement that brought the fighting in that part of the world to an end. Though the representative of the Soviet Union in the Sub-Committee in London rejected the Anglo-French proposals as vigorously as his delegation in the Assembly had turned down the Indian resolution on Korea eighteen months before, the Soviet Union has now accepted the Anglo-French proposals as the basis for discussion, after approximately the same interval of time as had elapsed before the Assembly's Korean resolution was virtually accepted by the Communists.

As soon as we have covered the ground in a general way in this Committee, I believe that the Disarmament Commission should be requested to reconvene its Sub-Committee to continue its work in an effort to reconcile the proposals made by the Soviet Union, France, the United Kingdom, the

United States and other Governments, and to seek in private an acceptable solution and to report to the General Assembly and the Security Council as soon as sufficient progress has been made. But I wish to repeat that in no way would we be in favour of any move today or tomorrow that would restrict the generality of this debate.

Some abridgement of the gap between our respective points of view, I think, is possible, and agreement will, I submit, be easier to reach in private informal meetings of the Powers which the Disarmament Commission considered "principally involved": France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, and my country. Whatever views may be held as to the membership of the Sub-Committee, it will be conceded, I think, that the Sub-Committee, where the Anglo-French proposals were born, is competent to find out what the possibilities of making further progress now are. If headway cannot be made among those five countries, I very much doubt whether it can be made among any larger group of nations. But let us underrate neither the possibilities nor the difficulties.

The other day, when we were debating the inclusion of the Soviet Union item in our agenda, Mr. Vyshinsky complained of what he interpreted as a critical attitude adopted by the United Kingdom representative toward the new Soviet Union proposals, and on Monday he also referred to Mr. Moch's "inquisition". I suppose this is the danger which all of us run in any attempt to obtain a clearer understanding of what exactly the Soviet Union means by its proposals -- although I suppose that danger would exist with regard to any proposal, whether it was offered by the Soviet Union or not. Although one apparently runs the risk of having one's questions interpreted as criticisms, that risk exists both here and in the private Sub-Committee if we should decide to re-establish one. I shall therefore try, in a constructive spirit, to indicate some of the problems which the new Soviet Union proposals, as we understand them, present to my Government.

Let me acknowledge in advance that in several respects the new Soviet Union proposals appear to be an improvement on the Soviet Union's former position. I shall not make the mistake which Mr. Malik made, I think, in London when he rejected the Anglo-French proposals as being "indistinguishable" from the previous Western position. Other speakers who have preceded me have already analysed certain ambiguities and uncertainties in the Soviet Union draft resolution. They have asked Mr. Vyshinsky certain questions which also seem to my mind to require an answer if we are to understand one another and to make progress. I can well understand that there may be questions -- as indeed there are -- which Mr. Vyshinsky will want to take time to answer, although he has thus far, I think, been very generous in his readiness to participate in the debate and to answer questions. This matter is so important that one should not draw hasty conclusions from a refusal at a given moment to furnish a full reply to a particular question.

But, after examining the Soviet Union proposals with care and attention and having heard Mr. Vyshinsky's preliminary reply and further exposition yesterday and the day before, I am, I confess, left in some uncertainty as to how far the Soviet Union has really gone towards the Western position. Indeed, the Soviet Union's basic provisions,

as Mr. Vyshinsky calls them, appear in certain respects quite inconsistent with the Anglo-French proposals. Mr. Vyshinsky says that his Government has accepted the Anglo-French proposals as a basis. He has asked the General Assembly to instruct the Disarmament Commission to prepare a treaty on the basis of the Anglo-French proposals. The Soviet Union has made what is really a series of counter-proposals, which fully bear out the comment which Mr. Vyshinsky made here on Monday that his Government had not accepted our proposals "wholesale". The main outlines of the two sets of proposals, he told us, however, coverage. I hope he is right, but at the first glance which we have been able to give to this problem, some of the Soviet Union counter-proposals seem to diverge from those of the Anglo-French memorandum.

Mr. Vyshinsky complained on Monday that previous speakers had not made their questions sufficiently precise, had not framed them in such a way that he could answer "yes" or "no". I do admit that some of Mr. Moch's very able and, I think, very important questions did not perhaps encourage that kind of abbreviated reply. One way, however, of posing the problem in such a manner that a straight "yes" or "no" answer can be given is to attempt a brief exposition of the Soviet Union proposals regarding control, as I understand them, and to ask Mr. Vyshinsky to correct me if I in any way misrepresent his position.

The basic provisions specified in the new Soviet Union proposals regarding control fall into two stages or phases. In the first phase of reductions of armed forces and armaments, there is to be a temporary control organ set up under the Security Council. In the second phase of reductions and prohibition, as in the first phase, there is to be a control organ which would be totally unable to take the smallest enforcement action in case of violations or evasions without specific authority in each case from the Security Council, where the veto would apply. Mr. Vyshinsky said as much on Monday, and again yesterday, maintaining that only the Security Council was in a position to apply enforcement measures. This is a very important phase of the whole problem. In other words, there is no action which either the temporary or the permanent control organ could take covering either phase of the Soviet Union reductions and prohibition other than to report a violation to the Security Council. I do not think, by the way, that anyone is proposing to give the control organ arbitrary or unnecessary powers over the economic life of any State. But to say that the control organ could do nothing except report, could take no action to stop a violation on the spot, pending investigation and a reference to a higher authority, seems to my mind and to that of my Government to be wholly inadequate.

Still more important, the Soviet Union proposals give the temporary international control commission, which is to control the reductions of the first phase, only -- and here I quote from the Soviet Union draft resolution (A/C.1/750) -- "the right to require States to provide the necessary information on the measures taken by them to reduce armaments and armed forces...States shall periodically supply the commission at established intervals with information concerning the implementation of the measures provided for in the convention". I take it that this means that the temporary control commission for this first phase

would be empowered merely to receive information submitted to it by Member States in order to substantiate their own statements concerning the fulfilment of the reductions in the conventional field which they had undertaken. So far as I can see, there would be no "on-the-spot" inspection or control of any kind in this phase, unless that is what is intended by the phrase -- and again I quote from the Soviet Union draft resolution -- "The commission shall take the necessary steps to supervise the fulfilment by States of the obligations assumed by them in connexion with the reduction..."

If that is so, it means that the Soviet Union is proposing that all States should rely on each other's good faith, unsupported by any "on-the-spot" inspection, up to the commencement of the second stage, at which point the vital declaration would be made prohibiting atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction. I might elaborate on the implications of this situation, but I think they are sufficiently obvious to us all.

Passing on to the second phase of the Soviet Union proposals, we see that a permanent international control organ is to be established for the supervision of the implementation both of the prohibition of atomic weapons and of the reduction of other armaments and armed forces. "This international control organ", we are told in the Soviet Union proposals, "shall have full powers of supervision, including the power of inspection on a continuing basis to the extent necessary to ensure implementation of the convention by all States." This permanent international control organ could not be in existence, therefore, when the prohibition of nuclear weapons was declared. It could not be ready to discharge its functions for some time, probably many months, after the prohibition had come into force. My Government has asked me to underline this point, although it has already been mentioned at least once in this debate.

This concept is far removed from the simultaneity proposed during Sub-Committee talks in London by Mr. Selwyn Lloyd and Mr. Jules Moch. Their simultaneity -- that is to say, the simultaneity of the Anglo-French proposals -- is one in which prohibition would not be declared until the officials of the international control organ had been stationed in readiness to enforce the prohibition from the moment of its declaration. The same principle of real simultaneity is applied throughout the phasing of the Anglo-French proposals -- a phasing which, of course, differs in a number of other respects from that proposed by the Soviet Union.

On Monday, I think, Mr. Vyshinsky conceded that there could be no simultaneity between the declaration of a total prohibition of nuclear weapons -- which might take only five minutes -- and the establishment of effective controls to ensure the implementation of that prohibition -- which he suggested might take six months or a year. During that period of six months or a year I rather thought Mr. Vyshinsky was saying that we would be moving towards effective controls as the permanent control organization was established and trained but for most of that time a prohibition would be in force before effective control had been established. This is certainly a very important consideration in this problem, and that is why I am spending some time on it.

Apart from our worries over the timetable envisaged in the Soviet Union proposals, the point on which my Government feels the greatest uncertainty and uneasiness is whether the "necessary powers" which Mr. Vyshinsky says the permanent control organ would be given would include the power not only to verify information submitted by governments but to determine whether the information submitted was complete. Mr. Vyshinsky said on Monday that the Soviet position has always been that "to control is to verify". That is just the very problem. In the first phase of control, and apparently in the second, the Soviet proposals seem to conceive of control as a process of checking up on the correctness of information submitted by governments rather than of actively investigating, anywhere, at any time and by any means, whether the information submitted to the control authorities is not only correct but complete, or us, control is more than verification. For us, a control organ to be effective must have authority to go wherever it wishes, not in order to pry into the economic activities of any country, but because it must make sure that, to use Mr. Vyshinsky's own example, a button factory is not secretly making lethal weapons which have not been reported to the control organ. As Mr. Vyshinsky said, and I think said well, button factories can make things to kill people, and it is essential that the control authority be empowered to make a check at any time on any plant where weapons could be manufactured. This is not economic espionage, but it does involve a good deal more authority for the international control organ than mere verification of data submitted. I think it is in the interests of reaching agreement that this point should be clearly stated. This is the kind of question to which I think a simple "yes" or "no" answer can be given and I hope that Mr. Vyshinsky will find it possible to do so.

There is another aspect of the control problem which may be raised by the new Soviet proposals. It is proposed to take December 31, 1953 as the date fixing the levels of forces from which the reductions are to be made. This date was also suggested in the Anglo-French proposal. But I think we should be clear that this would not mean the exclusion from the disarmament programme, as understood by either side, of new weapons developed since that time, if there are any.

The question of the extent of the permanent control organ's powers is also raised in an acute form by the well-known Soviet reservation, which Mr. Vyshinsky mentioned earlier in his statement of September 30, that States must adhere to "the principle of sovereign equality and non-interference in the internal affairs of States". If inspection of a continuing basis means permanent inspection with the right to go anywhere at any time in the territory of all States who have signed the agreement, that is all to the good. We have yet to hear, however, from any Soviet Union spokesman that this is what they mean by "inspection on a continuing basis", and this is certainly what my Government means. If the Soviet Union Government has not modified its doctrine of so-called national sovereignty and adapted it, at least partially, to meet the exigencies of an interdependent world, agreement on effective safeguards -- and, therefore, on a disarmament treaty -- is virtually inconceivable, and it is not fair to public opinion to state the situation in any other terms.

I have tried to state some of the difficulties still inherent in the control problem, and to state them frankly, because I believe with Mr. Lloyd that this is the crux of our problem. When the Anglo-French and Soviet proposals are considered in greater detail, I think we shall find that if agreement on control can be achieved, the other aspects of the problem will all fall into place. I would, however, agree with Mr. Vyshinsky when he said that there was "no insuperable contradiction" between the two positions. I well remember that in the Korean debate, when we thought we had reached the end, Mr. Vyshinsky, in that amiable way which is his alone, said he did not think we should conclude that there was no hope in the matter. I felt yesterday, when he said there was no insuperable contradiction, that it may be that this debate will usher in a real and serious agreement on this important question.

The creation of adequate and authoritative machinery for inspection and control of disarmament is not -- let it be clear -- any more disturbing to Soviet interests than to the interests of any other country, because there are very unusual steps proposed in the kind of control we are talking about in so far as the integrity of national governments is concerned. The Governments of the Western Powers have proposed only what they themselves are prepared to accept in their own countries. Mistrust is not the exclusive property of one or the other side of the Iron Curtain. A prerequisite of any disarmament system is certainly that no State should have cause to fear that its security would be endangered by the operation of the control system or by any other feature of the programme, and this is indicated in the draft resolution which stands in the name of my country.

If we are to have serious and informal examination of the Anglo-French and the Soviet proposals, and all other proposals which may have been or may be submitted, then I think we must all agree that upon the conclusion of the disarmament debate in this Committee, which I think and would urge should be extensive and thorough, there should be an early opportunity for the further examination of the problem by a smaller group. For the reasons I have already given, my delegation believes that the most appropriate group for this purpose would be the Disarmament Commission's Sub-Committee where the Anglo-French proposals, now accepted by the Soviet Union as a basis were presented.

There is an obvious similarity between the procedure which I am suggesting and the suggestions made yesterday by the representative of the Philippines, and I want the representative of the Philippines to know that I tried to see him earlier this morning when I learned that his draft resolution had likewise been tabled. The essential point in common is that both of us see every advantage in providing a framework for detailed and confidential discussion between those Governments which have been principally involved in this topic, in order to see whether differences cannot be thrashed out in the quieter and more intimate atmosphere of small closed meetings. Small closed meetings have the advantage, in difficult and vital negotiations, that they take place away from the glare of publicity and free, therefore, from the constant temptation to speak at least as much for the benefit of public opinion in various key areas of the world as to clarify and persuade one's associates in negotiation.

But I think the differences in our two resolutions -- that is to say, the resolutions standing in the name of the Philippines and of Canada -- are significant. I should briefly like to enumerate them. First, it seems to me useful not to interrupt this general discussion on disarmament but to preserve, as I have indicated, the full opportunity which the existence of this item on our Committee's agenda provides for the representatives of all nations not only to express their concern -- for none of us could be exempt from the fateful consequences of ultimate failure in this field -- but also to put forward any views and proposals which any of us may have to contribute to the solution of the differences which still divide us.

Thus it seems to my delegation that it would be regrettable, prematurely or artificially, to interrupt the progress of this debate or to deprive the Sub-Committee, which I trust will be charged with the more detailed negotiations, of the advantage of any general views from whatever quarters which may be available.

The second point of difference is one of machinery. The question is whether this Assembly should seek in the matter of detailed and technical negotiations -- which obviously will be necessary if real progress is to be made in the field of disarmament -- to by-pass and ignore the machinery of the Disarmament Commission, which is the organ of the United Nations especially charged with detailed responsibilities in this field.

This question, that is to say, whether we should use or by-pass the machinery of the Disarmament Commission, is also closely bound up with the question of timing. The Philippine draft resolution, with whose basic objectives, as I have already said I am in harmony, would provide an arbitrary deadline -- specifically the deadline, I believe is 15 November -- for a report back to this Committee, whether or not real progress has by then been made and whether or not the interruption of intimate negotiations which such a deadline would involve would be desirable. Of course, it could be said that the 15 November report could be an interim one and need not necessarily preclude further negotiation among the same countries. But is it not our experience that -- and I think this is only to be expected -- on a topic as important and as potentially controversial as this one is, a restricted group, if charged with the unavoidable responsibility of issuing a public report within a few weeks of beginning its functions, is likely to spend a great deal of its time during those weeks in the process of drafting and discussing the terms of a report rather than concentrating on what is, after all, the more important business of substantive negotiation. There is also the advantage that the Disarmament Commission is in permanent session. On the highly technical question of disarmament it seems to me fairly unlikely -- although we would certainly not wish to rule out this possibility -- that substantial progress can be made within a few weeks. If our draft resolution is adopted -- I do not say today, but later on, during the course of our deliberations -- we should like to see the Sub-Committee set up a group of working parties which would try to come to grips with the essential problems in a few key aspects of the subject, to see whether agreed papers could not be worked out on the basis of which substantial and definitive progress could be made.

The sort of timing we envisage, therefore, is flexible as to its outcome. But what we have in mind is that if the procedure we suggest commends itself to this Committee, the general debate should be continued to give all countries which desire it an opportunity to express their views; and at the end of this period -- in a week or two -- the Committee, which after all need not now make final judgment on the various positions, should adopt the Canadian draft resolution to provide the appropriate machinery which we hope would lead to further progress. We would then anticipate that if enough delegations feel the matter is of sufficient importance, as we do, a plenary session of the General Assembly could be at once convened to consider and, I trust, to approve this draft resolution which this First Committee will have adopted.

Once this is done the Disarmament Commission could meet within a day or so to consider the recommendation and, I hope, to reconvene its Sub-Committee. The Sub-Committee should then meet without any unnecessary delay, and detailed discussions should begin among its members.

As to the date of the Sub-Committee's report, which would of course be submitted through the proper channel of the Disarmament Commission, this would depend on the progress realized. Certainly my delegation will do everything that it can, if it is on the Sub-Committee, to avoid any unnecessary delay. If there is sufficient progress to warrant it, it will of course be appropriate to have a report back to the General Assembly during this session. If, on the other hand, the detailed negotiations are such that more time is required, then the Disarmament Commission can consider the Sub-Committee's report as soon as it is ready.

I think that this resolution to which we have given a good bit of thought and which stands in our name is sufficiently simple and straightforward so that I need not take the time of the Committee to explain in greater detail what is proposed. We have tried in this draft resolution to avoid asking the Assembly to take up a substantive position on the specific proposals of either side on questions where detailed clarification is still needed and where many difficulties are still to be resolved. We have tried to provide what seems to us the most effective machinery for future progress -- that is, the same machinery to which we owe the substantial progress which we have made since the last session of the General Assembly. We should not forget, I think, that it was precisely in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission that there were worked out the significant advances in the Western position embodied in the Anglo-French memorandum, which the Soviet Union Government has now agreed to take as the basis for a convention.

I should point out that we take notice in our draft resolution not only of the Anglo-French proposals and of the report of the Disarmament Commission, but of the Soviet Union draft resolution.

I hope that the procedure we have been proposing will commend itself to the members of this Committee.

In particular, I hope that it will be possible for the four other delegations which are represented on the Disarmament Commission's Sub-Committee to join with my delegation in co-sponsoring this draft resolution. I appeal, in the name of my Government, most earnestly to my colleagues -- Mr. Moch, the representative of France; Mr. Selwyn Lloyd of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom; Mr. Wadsworth, the representative of the United States of America; and to Mr. Vyshinsky, the representative of the Soviet Union -- to each of whom I yesterday sent a copy of the text with an expression of this hope -- to consider whether they can co-sponsor with us this draft resolution which seeks to provide a workmanlike framework for further progress in this important matter of disarmament.

S/C