





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

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THE
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AS much as I nauseate fulsome Encomiums and the Praises generally bestowed on Men great only by their Places, whose Power and Merit usually go Hand in Hand; I am heartily sorry to be rid of that Nuisance at so sad an Expence as the Calamity of my Country. It has puzzled the Wits of the Friends of this Administration to find what to commend, and we are reduced to so strange a State that Courtiers now are at a Loss to flatter. Yet how little soever I love high-flown Panegyrick, or a Time-serving Tongue, I am as little pleased to deal in Censure; but when Misfortunes rise to so great a Height, 'tis impossible for Patience to last, and People put to the Torture will exclaim. When we saw a Minister of confessed Abilities forced from the Helm of Government, his Royal Master's Favour and Protection not availing, we

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were

were told by the present Cabal that this Violence was done to M——y in order to bring back the Golden Age. A Golden Age indeed, it has been for them, fattening in Places; 'I cannot say of great Credit and Honour (I wish I could) yet of great Emolument; but to this Country an Age of Calamity and Ruin. The Date of this O——y is yet short, the Enumeration of the Services rendered to *Great Britain* during this Inter——e——um is still shorter, for it takes up no Point of Time; but the Effects of its Power strong in the S——e for Purposes best unattained, weak and impotent in every other Place have been severely felt by this Nation, and are long to enumerate. I shall confine myself, however, to the Conduct of the War, which has presented to us a very dismal Scene. The Glory of the *British* Arms was great thro' a long and uninterrupted Series of Time. A Curse on those Accidents, on those Councils which have given an Interruption, for I hope it will prove but an Interruption (if this War lasts) and that too of a short Continuance, that our Disgraces will not survive a weak Administration which cannot support itself long, and must fall by its own Inability, that our military Reputation will be carried to a greater Height under the Auspices of the present Illustrious and Royal Line, than at any other Period of Time; for it would be strange, if the personal Bravery of the Family should not add something to our ancient Renown. Yet now how are the Mighty fallen — I and, what is an Aggravation, while they are led by a Race of Warlike Princes. But I choose to draw a Veil over the Shame of my Country, rather than dwell on a Representation of Things so offensive to the Pride of an *Englishman*; for I hope we are not yet so humbled but a becoming Pride still remains in *British* Breasts, some Resentment for Misfortunes brought on them by ill Conduct,

duct, some Distinction between the Contempt and Esteem of the World. But the Causes of our Disasters are not so to be past over. I will not enter into a Disquisition whether a War upon the Trade of *France* might not have been carried on with more Advantage than upon the Continent; but whether the Measures which it has been judged proper to take, have been pursued with publick Spirit, with the Address and Ability becoming Ministers; nay, whether with common Prudence, or the least Regard to the Welfare of this Country. 'Tis strange! 'tis astonishing! that wiser Councils have not been followed by our Ministers even for their own Sakes, because the Glory would have redounded to them. But whether the Design is to h—m—the Spirits of *Englishmen*, and make them t—e for the Y—e, or our Ministers are really unable to raise themselves and the Nation above the low State to which they have brought both; it becomes us not to see our K— nor ourselves so served; not to see Violence done, Disgrace fix'd on M—, and at the same Time both on one and the other, and Misery into the Bargain on ourselves.

As for the Consideration of any concerted Plan, any fix'd Quota's, any Alliances formed, this Administration has saved me as well as themselves that Trouble. They are the fortuitous Events of Time alone during this War which I have to consider; for our Ministers seem to aim at nothing more than to be Retainers of Fortune by the Day, resolved to spend the last Shilling of *British* Money (which is paid away in all Parts of the World) in Support of undigested Schemes, and ill-calculated Measures. There was a Time when our Negotiations in fixing the Contingents to be finished by the Parties concerned in carrying on the War, did Credit to this Country. When the Emperor was to furnish 90,000 Men, 66,000 Foot, 24,000 Horse and Dragoons,

not reckoning what would remain in *Hungary* or other Parts of his hereditary Countries. The States General 102,000 Men, 82,000 Foot, 20,000 Horse and Dragoons. *England* 40,000 Men, 33,000 Foot, 7000 Horse and Dragoons. This was the grand Foundation, besides the Assistance given by other Powers during the War. Upon how different a Foot Things are carried on at present, I am ashamed to relate.

I will say little of what preceded that memorable *Æra*, *Christmas* 1745. The Action of *Dettingen*, as it is the last Taste, which *Britons*, heretofore glutted, have had of Victory will not easily be forgotten; nor the Field on which they took their last Farewell. The Conquest of *Cape Breton*; a Conquest, the most important, beyond all Comparison, that ever was made by this Country, has been sufficiently set forth by the Joy and Applause of the People of this Country; and pleased I am, that my feeble Voice would on this Occasion, should I attempt to say any Thing, be lost in the general Acclamation. I hope, as no Force can deprive us of this great Acquisition, as *France* can never take it by any other Means than of our own Ministry, that no Treaty will ever put her in Possession of it; tho' upon such Terms she would give up every Foot of conquered Country. For who will give us Security, that the next Day she will not reconquer that Country, and leave us divested of both, and the Jest of the World?

But without this Consideration, the inestimable Value of *Cape Breton* alone affords sufficient Reason why we should never part with it; for whatever *private Persons* may, the Publick can receive no Compensation for it. And, I hope, as this Administration had no Hand in taking it, they will have none in delivering it up, and that the only Concern which they shall have had in this important

tant Place, will not be that simply of severing it for ever from the *British* Dominions : For the taking it sprung from the Councils, tho' it was not completed till after the Resignation of the late Ministers. It is the same with some other great Events, for it cannot be doubted to what the surprizing Success of the Allied Arms on the Side of *Italy* is owing, or that, to trace out the Cause, it will be necessary to go farther back than the Date of the present Administration, who are saved from sinking by the Effects of the Wisdom and Prudence of the Man whom they have oppress'd, who like worthless Heirs live on the unimproved Stock of their great Predecessor : I wish, for my Country's Sake, that Stock would last longer ; for when one considers our ill Success in every other Part, except where the Influence of his Councils could reach, there is too great Reason to fear that Stock failing, Beggary, and the most abject State will ensue.

I disclaim any Attachment, any Connection with any Persons, but those who shall labour for the Good of their Country ; I will as heartily oppose one Minister as another, acting contrary thereto in what Respect soever. At the same Time I will render Justice to every Man, tho' unknown ; 'tis in vain to deny it : Time has shewn, that the late Minister's Plans were great, his Designs well concerted and efficacious ; so efficacious, that they have prevailed long after the Power has been cut off, in spite of the Clog, in spite of the want of Address in his Successors, which has discover'd itself in every one Thing without Exception, which they have undertaken ; that they have eclipsed his Glory, is true ; not however by superiour Brightness (would they had!) but by the Interposition of an opaque Body, which has struck a fatal Chilness on our vital Heat and Vigour. This short

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Retrospect I have taken, with this sole View of finding out some Incentive for our Ministers, willing to excite them, if possible, to make some Effort for their Sinking Country; for if they are not dead to all Sense of Shame for themselves, to all feeling for the Public, if they regard any Thing besides their own sordid Gain, if they have any Thoughts becoming Men, the Comparison, their Measures and the Success attending them, afford Matter for very pungent Reflections; but if the Object is too unpleasing for them to cast their Eyes on, it is worth our while, when Men have made such grand Professions of publick Spirit, and disinterested Zeal for the Welfare of their Fellow-Subjects, to compare their Conduct with the Conduct of those whom they have so vilified and abused on that very Head. Compare then the Measures, in what are they different? except that at present they are less effectual, and more expensive. Compare the Measures, and need one ask if such Opposition was any thing more than the Effect of the repining Envy of Men of inferiour Parts? This was sufficiently evinced in the very first Step taken by the Cabal, I mean with regard to the Hire of *Hanoverian Troops*. This Measure exclaimed against in Private, yet supported in Public by the same Persons, was at last made a Handle, for forcing from the Direction of Publick Affairs the Man who was the grand Obstacle to the Blessings which they had in Store for the Nation. And now the wish'd-for Time was come, the Great *Æra*, the *Augmentatio * Nascentia* of lasting Happiness.

Et magni incipiunt procedere menses.

Pardon me, they are not yet begun. It was only in the Imagination of the credulous, who were fed with

* Which have been disputed by Mathematicians, whether any thing or nothing.

with Assurances, that an honourable Peace would be obtained, or the War prudently, vigorously and frugally conducted; that a thorough Reformation would be wrought at Home, all Grievances redress'd, and we once more put on as good a Footing as the Revolution, or its Consequences, had at any Time put us. This Expectation was greedily entertained, nay, the Certainty of these Events reckoned on by some, because the Ministry was at this Time joined by a Set of Men, who had publickly declared they would never sit down contented, till they saw an entire Separation of the Electorate from *England*. Who not versed in Political Craft, would imagine that at this very Time the same Measure so condemned, so exploded, was carrying on, and indeed carried on truly to the Ruin of this Country? For if 16000 *Hanoverians* had been this Year taken into *British* Pay, as the preceding Year, and not 8000 only, the Victory at *Fontenoy*, tho' dear bought, had in all human Probability been ours. But instead of Victory, what happened on that Day an *Englishman* cannot without Grief and secret Compunction speak out. Our Enemies tell with Pleasure. I cannot let pass without Notice, the Manner of taking these Troops into *British* Pay.

A Subsidy was granted to the Queen of *Hungary* by the Parliament, but a Bargain previously made by the Ministry, that her Majesty should therewith pay eight thousand *Hanoverians*; and what was very drole, this Bargain was never denied at that Time, tho' it was designed purposely to screen the Blushes of the new Profelytes, and has been since owned, publickly owned, to have been made entirely in Complaisance to them. The Disadvantages of this Method were the Pretence it gave for new Levy-Money, as well as the Money generally paid for their Return to foreign Troops when

when dismiss'd, which was allowed by us, was I suppose allowed by the Queen of *Hungary*, and will I suppose be allowed again by us. Some People perhaps will laugh at my Wrong-headedness, and call these Things Advantages: I envy not their superiour Judgment, and the Light in which they see Things. Advantages I will allow there may have been; but to *Great Britain* I am sure they were not so. To these Disadvantages we are to add, that we paid these Troops, and the Queen of *Hungary* had the absolute Command of them, and might have ordered them on what Service she pleased, how contrary soever to the Inclination or Judgment of those who paid them. So that the only Difference between the Measures this Year, and the preceding Year was, that the Number of the Troops was lessened fatally for us, more Money was paid in Proportion to the Number, the absolute Command of them was lost, and an Abuse attempted to be put on the Understandings of the People, as if *Hanoverians* were no longer in *British* Pay, tho' paid with *British* Money. The Advantages were, the Preservation of a few Gentlemens Complexions, (I am a little ashamed to mention so slight an Affair on so serious an Occasion) but it is well known to have been the principal End proposed by this new Disposition of Affairs. Some pretended to descry this farther Advantage, that the *Hanoverians* being nominally discharged from our Pay, we were not so liable to have that State-Trick play'd on us, which we had experienced in the *Hessians*, who were continued so many Years in *British* Pay, and upon a Retrospect appear to have been of no Benefit to the State. Wise Projectors, who could so propose to hedge in the Cuckow! I hope they allow they have since had their Understandings enlarged by the Conduct of our Ministry.

But

But to proceed with the Transactions of the Year 1745; the Assurances given of the Disposition of the *Dutch*, who upon our taking vigorous Measures, were to heartily join in the War, the Certainty which some People pretended to have of their furnishing 40,000 Men for the Field, greatly contributed to accelerate our warlike Resolutions. The Number of Men which the *Dutch* really furnished for the Field, and their Behaviour in the Field, are indelible Monuments of the Discernment of our Ministry, and their great Insight into Mankind. If this Behaviour of the *Dutch* surpris'd our Ministry, they were the only People surpris'd by it, the whole World besides expected it. For was it not reasonable to suppose, that if the *Dutch* dreaded the Consequences of declaring War against *France*, they would equally dread whatever would be sure to draw from *France* a Declaration of War against them? And tho' in a late Action the foreign Troops in *Dutch* Pay did make some Stand, yet they were fallen upon by the *French*, and forced upon their own Defence; and I believe it will be allowed, that there is some Distinction to be made between acting on the offensive or defensive. I suppose too without waiting to see the *Dutch* desert the fortified Towns in the Low-Countries, with as much Readiness as if they had thereby got rid of some tiresome Burthen; it would not have been a very difficult Task for Men of so great Penetration as our Ministry is blest withal, to have learn'd their Way of thinking, with regard to their Barrier, the Value they set upon it, how much or little they had the Preservation of it at Heart; for from such Circumstances, it might have been possible to have formed some previous Judgment of their Cordiality and Affection to the Cause. Tho' I doubt they had too other Motives for their Conduct. For tho' the *Dutch* have been perhaps

the Dupes of the *French*, and we most certainly the Dupes of the *Dutch*, yet the Weakness of our Councils has been a great Cause of the whole.

For till more Honesty, more Wisdom, more Ability, more Discipline, particularly in our Navy shall appear, who less infatuated than ourselves, will expect Success in the Execution of our Affairs? And give me Leave here to ask, what is Rashness? Is it any other than a blind precipitate Undertaking of Ends, for which sufficient Means have not been provided. If this Rule is just, it is easy to perceive, that a Person may be at the same Time both rash and stupid. Nay, that there can be no Rashness without some Degree, some Mixture of Stupidity. For Dispatch in the Execution of well-concerted Measures is the highest Praise. So far is a Man's Stupidity from being a Security against rash Measures, that it is from this Root alone they spring, they can never happen without it.

But I am gone a little too far in Point of Time, it will be necessary to look back; for notwithstanding the intolerable Load of Debt which the Nation groaned under, and the sad Prospect of still adding Debts to Debts, to the great Surprise of all Men knowing in Money Affairs, a Bargain was unwarily and ignorantly made by our Ministry, by Means of which the Rate of publick Interest was unnecessarily raised, to the great Oppression of the Publick as Debtors, to the great Detriment of the old Creditors of the Publick, whose Capital was thereby lessened in Value, thro' the Fall of publick Stocks, which soon ensued, to the great Discouragement of Trade, which is generally carried on by some borrowed Stock, which must now advance its Interest, in Proportion to that of the Publick, and to the great Distress of the Means of carrying on the War. While I am on the Head of Money Affairs, it will be proper to observe on the extraordinary

ordinary Bills of Expences, of which not to tire the Reader, I will only give an Instance or two. Our Troops in the Year 1745, amounted on the Estimate to 5194 Cavalry, and 19,420 Foot, together 24,614.

In the Accounts of the War Office, there is annexed to this List of Forces to be employed in *Flanders*, an Estimate of 11,918*l.* 11*s.* for Forage and Waggon Money. Besides this there is in the Accounts of this Year, 100,000*l.* for the extraordinary Charge of Forage, Waggon Money, and other Expences incurred or to be incurred. It may perhaps be worth while to compare this with what was heretofore looked on as sufficient for this Service; for in the Year 1703, a Regulation of Forage and Waggon Money was made on the Footing of what the Troops received in the preceding War, according to which Forage and Waggon Money for the general Officers and Regiments of Foot and Dragoons, was fix'd at 16,259*l.* 15*s.* The Dragoons amounted to 1355, Foot to 15,008. And the Forage, Waggon Money, and Recruits for the Foreigners in *English* Pay, pursuant to Treaty are charged at 20,000*l.* The Foreigners amounted to 21,612 Men.

And again, in the Augmentation of 20,000 Men the same Year, to be paid one half by *England*, the other by the *Dutch*, the Reckoning upon this Article is nearly in the same Proportion, *viz.* 9260*l.* for the 10,000; whence this vast Disproportion between the present and former Times, I who am not skilled in making up military Accounts, am unable to say; for the great Loss of Magazines, for which an extraordinary Bill was afterwards brought in, could not at that Time be foreseen. There are I own tacked to the Article the Words "And other Expences;" but to ask what those other Expences were would certainly be very imper-

tinent, and to find Fault without asking would be equally or more impertinent, at least in me, who am but a private Man. But this is not all, for there is an After-charge for Forage of 92,861 *l.* 11 *s.* 4 *d.* (over and above the 100,000 *l.* and 11,918 *l.* 11 *s.*) Magazines taken by the Enemy included, which shews, notwithstanding what ignorant People may have thought, that the former Sums were insufficient. In order to view these Articles of Expence in their proper Lights, I will only observe, that they are exclusive of what ought to be deducted on this Head, from the established Pay of the Cavalry, exclusive of the Forage of the General and Staff-Officers of the Hospital, and exclusive of the extraordinary Charge of Forage for the foreign Troops in our Pay.

And that a Ration cost the Government 10 Pence, A Ration *per* Day is sufficient for a Horse, if the Forage be good, and consist of 16 Pounds of Hay, 6 Pounds of Straw, and about 3 Quarters of a Peck of Corn. For from these Articles one may form some Idea of this Charge. Some of the Means by which this great Expence was incurred were these: In Summer, the 6 *d.* deducted for Forage was not placed to the Account of Forage. In Winter, Forage was delivered out at the Magazine for 6 *d.* *per* Ration, for which the Government, however, when they bought in paid 10 *d.* But if any Officer was furnish'd any other Way than from the Magazine, he was allowed 4 *d.* upon every Ration, on a Supposition that he thereby expended more by 4 *d.* than he would have done at the Magazine for the same Quantities; tho' in Fact he bought at 8 *d.* $\frac{1}{2}$, whereby he became a Gainer (if the 4 *d.* was paid clear of Deductions) of 3 Half-pence on every Ration, which was an Encouragement to the Officer not to buy at the Magazine provided for that Purpose. Whether by this Practice any Loss arises to the Publick, or in what Manner, if any Thing

Thing remains at the End of the Year, it is accounted for, may be worth Enquiry. I am far from thinking that there were not other Means by which this great Charge was brought on the Nation, it could not have been by these alone. But I possibly am very much out of the Way in studying how Things are in the least to be accounted for, while others in a Manner more adapted to their Purpose study only how to avoid accounting for them at all.

Tho' every Body has heard of the Thinness of the Troops in General at the Battle of *Fontenoy*, I will not scrutinize on this Occasion the real Strength of our Army; for tho' it should appear that when publick Expences are on the one Hand immensely encreased, on the other publick Services are extremely lessened, what would be gained in the present Temper of Mankind, by the Discovery but the unavailing Knowledge that private People gain beyond Measure, and that the Publick is beyond Measure abused? There was a Time, "When paying the Army any otherwise than by the Musters of effective Men was look'd on as a great wasting of the publick Treasure." There is charged for Bread Waggons 29,960 *l. 1 s. 10 d.* for the 24,614 Men. Whereas, according to the Accounts abovementioned made up in the Year 1703, Bread Waggons for 40,000 are set at 20,000. For Mareshal *Konigseg*, being his Majesty's Proportion, of the Consideration for his Services, 7042 *l. 5 s. 1 d.* This by the Words seems to have been a free Gift and Act of Generosity. Mareshal *Konigseg*'s Services are so well known, that I need not say any Thing on that Head.

As to the eight Weeks Pay to the *Hanoverians* for their Return, amounting to 57,965 *l. 9 s. 2 d. ½.* I will say little, concerning the usual Custom on these Occasions, which is to allow sometimes a Month, sometimes a long Month of 42 Days; if there

there is an Instance to be found of eight Weeks allowed, tho' it may differ in particular Circumstances, yet it will without Doubt serve for the Justification of shewing this Favour to the *Hanoverians*. But if we had foreseen the Necessity which would arise for taking them again into our Pay, the Impossibility of going on without them, this Expence might have been spared. But our Administration has acted like a coy affected Mistress, whose Surrender is preceded by a thousand ridiculous Extravagancies.

*Excludit Revocat, &c.**

In the Navy too, the Difference of Expence between the last War with *France*, and the present is surprizing in many Particulars. If the People wonder, that when our annual Expences are so much greater, yet our Efforts are impotent, and the Event so disgraceful to us, tho' that of the last War was so glorious there is one and the same Reason, both for the Enormity of the Expence and the Success attending it. The like Influence produces the like Effect universally throughout, as well here at Home, as in every other Place where we are concerned. But as Accounts are too dry and unentertaining for the Generality of Mankind to enter into, I will reserve what Observations I have to make, for a separate Treatise, in which I propose when I have Leisure to shew with how little Economy this War is carried on. In the mean Time, I will just say a Word of the Remittances for paying the Troops Abroad. In the Year 1743, the Contract made with Mr. *Gore* for 10 Guilders, 13 Stivers for a Pound Sterling, was the Subject of great Complaint and severe Invectives against the Administration; it having appeared that M. *Mulman* and *Wilkinson*, had offered 10 Guilders 16 St. for a Pound Sterling. After this publick Notice
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* Teren. Eunuch.

who can doubt that all possible Care has been taken to procure the best Bargain which could be obtained ; I own I have no doubt. And tho' in the Pay of the *Hessians* for the Year 1745, a Pound Sterling is reckoned but at 10 Guilders 10 Stivers ; yet to suspect that the remaining six Stivers were divided fairly between our M——rs and the Remitter, or even to commend their square dealing with the Remitter, by such equal Apportionment would be downright Scandal and Malice. I said before, and I repeat it again, I have no doubt as to their having made the best Bargain they could. — It has been said, that the foreign Troops have a right
 “ * To a Pound Sterling, or the Produce of a
 “ Pound Sterling in *Dutch* Money, for every 10
 “ Guilders 10, we are obliged to pay them, and
 “ consequently our remitting their Money at a
 “ higher Rate, than 10 Guilders, 10 Stivers *per*
 “ Pound Sterling, can be of no Advantage to
 “ this Nation, nor can our remitting it at a
 “ lower Rate than 10 Guilders 16 or 18 Stivers
 “ be any Loss.” Was this the Case, there would have been a Merit, which I wonder was not insisted on, in remitting the Money for paying the foreign Troops at no higher Rate than 10 Guilders, 10 Stivers, because the Remitters being *Englishmen*, there would have less Money gone out of this Nation by 6 Stivers in every Pound Sterling. But without staying to make Observations on the Absurdity of this Position, which cannot fail at first Sight of coming across every Man of the least Reflection, I will go to Matter of Fact. The Treaty of 1745, by which the *Hessians* were taken into *British* Pay, says, that the Pay shall be settled on the Foot of the Treaty of 1702. Articles 5 and 6, and of the Treaty of 1726, and that of 1740. These two last Treaties refer,

* See the Debates in P. _____

refer, as well as that of 1745, to the Treaty of 1702, for the Regulation of their Pay. Upon consulting the Article 5 and 6, of the Treaty of 1702, there is not a Word of their Pay; the 5th says, that the Recruits shall be on the same Foot as those of the States-General; and the 6th, that the Waggon and other Equipage shall likewise be on the same Foot; the 3d Article, however, of the Treaty of 1702, says, that the *Hessians* shall be paid on the same Foot as the States-General pay their own Troops; and if these are not the present Conditions, I can find none at all. If then they are to be paid on the same Foot as the *Dutch* pay theirs, what have we to do but to purchase *Dutch* Money as cheap as we can? To get as many Guilders, or as many Stivers as we are able for a Pound Sterling of *English* Money to pay those Troops withal? Can any Thing be plainer? But to leave this Affair. On what Side soever one turns ones Eyes, except were the unrestrained, uninfluenced, uncorrupt Spirit of Parliament superintends and watches over the publick Good. Abuses of various Kinds so abound in almost all the Concerns of this Country, that one may venture to affirm, that no Opportunity is omitted of impoverishing the Nation, that every one who serves has his Province of Pl—, for the Preference of serving upon the lowest Terms is a poor Obligation. If then such Advantages are to be drawn from the Continuance of a War, one may expect to see an End of it, when Avarice, satiated with Gain, becomes moderate, and feels Compassion for a suffering Country.

But the Scene changing, let us turn our Eyes on the Rebellion; let us see if an intestine War has been managed with more Vigour and Circumspection than a Foreign one. Tho' we should be forced to allow, that our Ministers were asleep at
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That Time, when they received the first News from * Abroad of War levying in this Kingdom; yet such News could not but awaken their Vigilance, and the near Approach of Danger add a Goad to their Understanding, and call forth their latent Parts. And now after this Nod we may expect to see them, ready to run the Race; like a Giant refresh'd with Wine; nor is it possible to suppose, this Tempest not only impending but discovered that any Opportunity was omitted of giving the Subject Protection, which is the first Cause of the Institution of Government, and in all free Countries the only End of Allegiance. It was Mortification enough to see our Glory blasted Abroad; our former Credit now only serving to remind us of what we were, but to see too the Evil brought home to our very Doors, to see an Administration dilatory to extend the Protection of the Government against the Violence of Rebellion (if it is possible to imagine such a Case) must have been to the Sufferers a Heart-breaking; to their Fellow-Subjects, Matter of the highest Pity. Yet how under so vigilant a Ministry, the Rebellion rose to so great a Height, and lasted so long, how from so small a Beginning it over-run such a Tract of Country, and involved Multitudes in the utmost Calamity, I am at a Loss to say. That the Pretender's Eldest Son was a long Time unobserved in *Scotland*, personally fomenting Disturbances, and preparing War on the Crown of *Great Britain*, is now a Secret to none. When the Flame broke out that the Well-affected, if they could have obtained Leave, would have made Head against, and if not have crush'd the Rebellion in its Infancy, at least have greatly retarded its Progress, is pretty well known. Whereas the

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* The News was said to come from the King of *Prussia* by Way of *Hanover*.

Advantages obtained by the Pretender drew in Numbers, who probably would never have joined the Party without them; some perhaps for want of Protection, who were much to be pitied; and even for others, whose faltering Allegiance was completely seduced by an Appearance of Success, if no Regard or Compassion was to be had to them, yet some Regard, some Compassion ought to have been had for those, who by this Increase of Strength of the Rebels, became more exposed to their Oppression; and there was yet a greater Consideration, the Danger to the Crown, to the Liberty, Laws and Religion of this Country, for by this Delay, the Rebellion we all know, grew so formidable as to shake the very Throne. What other Care was taken, what Orders issued, and of what Date, I cannot say, I should be very glad to be informed. The Battle of *Preston-Pans* was fought on the 21st of *September*, some Months after the Pretender's Son landed in *Scotland*; which, tho' late in Time, was yet in one Sense precipitately engaged in, and ought to have been cautiously avoided, as the Rebels were grown so strong; till a sufficient Number of Forces had been drawn together; to have made the Blow sure. And tho' the Rebels attacked the King's Army at *Preston-Pans*; on the other Hand the Orders were said to be positive and absolute for bringing on an Action as soon as possible. If the Pretender's Son had profited of that Opportunity, had marched on directly to *England*, the Pannick it would have struck his Success and elated Fortune, might have had an extreme ill Effect. But his Stay in *Scotland* giving Time for more cool and serious Reflexions to take Place, he found very little Account by his Expedition into *England*. So that by great Luck and kind of Infatuation, the Advantages gained by the Enemy at that Time proved not fatal

fatal to us, as there was a Possibility of their doing, especially as a Set of Men, who had been long injuriously traduced, made no other use of that fair Opportunity which presented itself, but as in a sort of Purgatory to clear their Characters, and convince the World, that upon the most trying Occasion scarce a Man was to be found in *South Britain*, who was not a Friend to the present Family. But no Thanks for this to the Councils of our Ministry; this was owing to the Uprightness and Integrity of Men, whom they had on this very Head so calumniated, so often, so unjustly abused. But as these Gentlemen very probably meet with great Reproaches and Scandal, from those who were disappointed in their unjust Expectations of Assistance from them; let us on our Part do them Justice, and sound forth the Praises they have deserved.

To the Battle of *Preston Pans* succeeded that of *Falkirk*, where the same Troops which had behaved notoriously ill at *Preston Pans*, were employed again, and by a like Behaviour occasioned a like Misfortune. The first was entirely the Fault of the Troops, the second of those who employed them, for they might have sent others in their Stead. For it will not be pretended that the Government had no more Horse to spare for that Service, it was given as a Reason why more Horse was not sent, that the Country could not subsist them, but surely it could as well subsist Horse that had never failed in their Duty, as those who had given so sad an Instance of what was to be expected from them. But the great Master-piece of Politicks remains to be related. A Master-piece (I speak it in sober Seriousness) sufficient to astonish and puzzle the whole World; I mean with regard to the 6000 Men which the *Dutch* were obliged by Treaty to furnish for the Relief of this Country. The De-

signs of great Ministers are generally impenetrable till some Event discovers their Aim; but the Designs of our Ministers are so deeply laid, so great Masters are they in the Art of Sinking, that not even the Event lays their Meaning open to the View of the World. Of this Sort was that great Stroke in Politicks I was speaking of; for the World are even now at a Loss to devine why Six Thousand *Dutch* were called into our Aid, who could not possibly act at all, as being under the Capitulation of *Tournay*, by which they were restrained from bearing Arms against the King of *France* or his Allies for three Years. The *Dutch* indeed had the Caution to demand of the *Abbé Delaville*, the *French* Minister at the *Hague*, whether or no the King of *France* abetted the Undertakings of the Pretender, or held him as an Ally. The *French* Minister very readily denies that the Pretender is an Ally of the Crown of *France*. This Declaration sufficiently answered the Purposes of the *Dutch*, who had no need to make any farther Enquiries than as to the present Time, but being set at Liberty so far, were unwilling to shew themselves worse Friends, than all the rest of the World, who to do them Justice generally accept our Money with great Willingness, how little Advantage soever we are likely to draw from it; We accordingly take the 6000 *Dutch* into our Pay, and are at the Expence of transporting them into *England*, when the King of *France*, in a very unfriendly Manner, (tho' it must be owned, he was at open War with us, and a profess'd Enemy) without making his Intentions known before we had transported them, suffers us to put ourselves to that great Expence, after which he orders these Troops (before we had made the least use of them) back to *Holland*; and by speaking a Word obliges us to retransport them there. Such a Jest and Derision

Derision are we to those who are round about us. How then to replace these 6000 *Dutch* is the Question. Why? very properly, with 6000 *Hessians*. We have now bought Experience. The *Dutch* have given a sufficient Warning to us. Care is taken, we are clear, that the *Hessians* were never Prisoners to the *French*, or under any Articles of Capitulation. The *Hessians* arrive, what is the Difficulty now. Why? There is no Cartel for Exchange of Prisoners settled with the Enemy. I believe there never was at any Time a Cartel settled with Rebels; and People who fight *pro aris & focis*, are not to entertain any Consideration of that Kind, but that is not the Case of Foreign Troops; and the Cavi made by the *Hessians* on this Head, shews our great Want of a Man of Abilities to direct our Affairs, who would have stipulated express Conditions, and guarded against that Policy, so prevalent almost every where at present, of using every Art to preserve Troops. The *Hessians* however did, I believe, serve under one of our Officers in beating up some Parties, but this was said to be the Effect of that Officer's Prudence, and not of those who sent for those Troops over, and tho' the beating up a few Parties was of no great Consequence, if the Prince of *Hesse* in order to save Appearances had given Leave for so doing; yet it is affirmed, that Leave was not given, at least avowedly even for this. To have fallen on two such Plunders successively could not have happened but from an extreme little Share of Luck as well as of other Things.

When our own Troops were called Home, it was Matter of great Surprise to People of but common Understanding, to find them landed here in the South, when they might with equal Ease have been landed in the North, where the Rebellion at that Time raged, and where by their Presence

sence they would have discouraged the Growth of it. This some having observed a certain Degree of Heaviness in the Understandings of our Ministers, pretended to account for upon that Principle, as Bowls by the Power of the included Lead are carried in a Curve Line to their Mark ; others excused it by pretending it was done for the Security of the Capital. But the first Conjecture has since been confirmed by a late Event, which it will not be amiss to compare with the former, for by the Comparison and Concurrence of corroborating Circumstances the natural Awkwardness, and estrayed Understanding of our Ministers will appear, for in the late Expedition to Port *Lorient*, after Admiral *Lestock* had lain Wind-bound a long while at *Plymouth*, it was thought proper to send a farther Reinforcement to that Undertaking, which was ordered to embark on the River *Thames*, in order to Coast it round to *Plymouth*, for which purpose it was necessary, that the Reinforcemer should wait for such a Wind as would carry Mr. *Lestock* out of the Channel ; whereas had they marched by Land, the Roads and Weather good, they might have probably reached Mr. *Lestock* before he could have found an Opportunity of sailing. But this was during the Summer, in Winter by a strange Inversion of the order of Things, we unnecessarily seek the Fatigues and Loss of Time attending a March in bad Roads and bad Weather. However, one agreeable Reflexion occurs upon the whole, for if the Pretender could not succeed against such an Opposition, as made some People afraid the Government was be--ed ; our Security is very great ; he can have very little Chance for the future.

The infinite Loss sustained by our Merchants during the Time the *French* amused our Fleet by an Invasion, with which they threatened us from *Dunkirk*,

Dunkirk, will not soon be forgot by them ; their Misfortunes and distress'd Circumstances thereby brought on some of them, will not fail of reminding them perhaps as long as they live. Tho' most Men of any Reflection were persuaded, that the *French* never intended to make any considerable Effort in Favour of the Pretender ; that their Scheme was no more then to create Disturbances in *Great Britain*, by Means of her own Countrymen, at as little Expence of *French* Troops as possible, to destroy *Britons* by *Britons*, as she had before in *Germany*, *Germans* by *Germans*, and divert the Attention of our Fleet from the Protection of our Trade ; tho' this Opinion was founded on a great deal of Reason ; for whatever Benefits we enjoy under the present Royal Family, of which no Man can be more sensible than I am, in whatever Misfortunes a Revolution would involve us by a Change in our Religion or other Means : They very little regard the King of *France* : Nor can it be supposed he troubles himself with the Mode of Worship, which prevails in *Great Britain*, provided it be not that of the Roman Catholick ; for I believe it would be no very pleasing Prospect for him, to see the Power of the Court of *Rome* extended, and its ancient Tyranny beginning to revive ; nor would it be very agreeable News for him to hear, that those Shackles of our Trade and L——y (our immense publick Debt) were struck off and annihilated. Yet all this I say in Praise of our Administration, for I do not profess finding Fault ; on the contrary, I am glad for my Country's Sake, when there is a Possibility of commending their Measures. And they certainly did right in taking all the Precautions against the pretended Invasion, as if it was really intended ; for (as a famous General of old said) " I did not think this could have happened, " would have been a very poor Excuse." But
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what I blame, what the Merchant, and the Country who is a Sufferer thro' him has to complain of, is that, considering we had the Experience of the *French* playing that Game (I can call it nothing else) upon us from *Dunkirk*, when no Rebellion subsisted in this Country; a Rebellion raging, very little Share of Sagacity and Forecast was requisite to foresee that they would not fail of renewing the same Game, when they could do it to so great Advantage by striking a double Terror, and rendering the Rebellion more formidable at Home, by Dangers threatening from Abroad. And yet as little Forecast as was requisite, it was all wanting to our inexpressible Distress; for being surprized by a Shew of Preparations at *Dunkirk*, and obliged to collect almost all the Ships we could for this Service; in a very short Space of Time we lost a very great and surprizing Number of Merchant-Men. Whereas, if a Man of Abilities had had the Direction of our Affairs, he would have taken early Care so to have disposed our Fleet, that some Ships might have been spared for the Protection of our Trade near Home; and tho' by calling some Ships Home, he had lessened the Security in other Places, would not have left the most material one quite defenceless. Nor must I pass over in Silence the original Cause of this Disaster, as well as of many others, the unaccountable Delay of suppressing the Rebellion. But tho' our Ministers Genius doth not lie in Land or Naval Armaments, nor in the Management of Finances; perhaps we shall find it in the Affairs of the Cabinet, in improving at the different Courts of *Europe* all the favourable Opportunities, which offer themselves for the Advancement of the common Cause.

The Disposition of the Empress of *Russia*, in the Year 1745, towards the Elector of *Saxony*, and the strong Declarations which she publish'd of
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whose Schemes to baffle, and Expences to frustrate, he looks on his most essential Interest as well as Glory. No one surely can suspect, that those very People should now with a more than Christian Charity (which only requires to turn the other Cheek also) industriously confirm that Power in his Hands with which he was about to scourge them, should pull down with one Hand, what they build up with the other, should undermine the Queen of *Hungary* by their Councils, while they support her with their Purse. For from such inconsistent Conduct what could we expect? I would willingly set in the strongest Light, would give all the Force they are capable of to the Arguments which were said to prevail with —s, and were with great Earnestness press'd on the Court of *Petersbourg* for the Attainment of this End. It was said that the Treaty of *Breslaw* was renewed by the Courts of *London* and *Prussia*, to which nothing was wanting but the Accession of the Queen of *Hungary*, for whom reasonable Terms were already procured from the King of *Prussia*, that her Obstinacy protracted the War, that to give her Succour would be an Encouragement to that Obstinacy, would be kindling up and spreading farther that Flame, which ought to be extinguish'd, that if there was no other Remedy for her Obstinacy, she ought to suffer the Consequences of her own Folly, that the War ought to be reduced within narrower Limits, in order the more easily to put an End thereto.

Tho' the Authors of the Treaty of *Hanover* went upon the Plan of the Treaty of *Breslaw*, and expressly and avowedly copied after it, it doth not follow, because the Authors of the one Treaty were extremely justifiable, were highly commendable, that the Authors of the other were not highly blameable. It often happens to low
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Understandings to servilely imitate Men of great Genius, in what they think a similar Case, without sufficiently considering whether the Circumstance of one, and the other Case entirely correspond. That the Circumstances here widely differ, I need not mention. The first Time that a Trust or Confidence is placed in a Man, if that Person deceives those who Trust him, the Fault is generally placed to the Account of him who deceives, but the second Time of those who trust. What then are we to do? Wage eternal War? No certainly, but if an Opportunity offers to reduce such a Person to an Inability of doing Mischief, I would sooner trust to such Inability than his broken Faith. The Spirit which governs the King of *Prussia* is from Experience very well known; it is very well known that he is a *Proteus*, whom no Engagements but superiour Force can bind; what then has been done by the Renewal of the Treaty of *Breslaw*, and our wise Intrigues at the Court of *Petersbourg*? Why? — took the *Czarina* — took the Elector of *Saxony* out of our own Scale; and out of the Enemies Scale, what did — take? Nothing at all. If we made the King of *Prussia* an apparent Friend, it was easily seen, that he was still a secret Enemy; that he concealed himself only to gain Time, and disperse that Tempest which was gathering on the Side of *Russia*, that he would be ready to declare himself, as he had before done, whenever the Occasions of *France* should require, when we should not find it so easy to engage again the Elector of *Saxony* and *Czarina* in our Cause. Accordingly we find him (if any Credit is to be given to publick Accounts) making Preparations, no one (I believe) suspects with a Design of assisting the Queen of *Hungary*; but I fear if she finds it possible to push her Fortune in *Provence*, and the Necessities of *France*

urge, to nip (as he for ever will do) our Success in the Bud, and blast our rising Hopes.

And what has been the Consequences with regard to the Elector of *Saxony*, whom — drove, — forced out of our Interest, made him pay severely, nay, almost reduced to Ruin, for engaging in it. At present there is great Probability of his being as closely united to *France*, as the firmest of her Friends. We do our own Business, work our own Destruction by our ill-formed Councils and mistaken Conduct, more effectually than the Enemy. Give me Leave, while I am speaking of the Elector of *Saxony*, to make up the Account more compleatly, which I was stating above; for — have not only taken the Elector of *Saxony* out of our Scale, but placed in the Enemies Scale. If we are so adroit in the Cause of our Enemies, if we have an Administration so

Inclades ingeniosa suas,

Who can wonder at our abject State? But I must not so let pass that tinsel Reason, that Mockery of common Sense, that Impotency of Understanding, by which it is pretended, that keeping the *Russians* out of the War, was the ready Way to shorten it. A most excellent Method of shortening the War, by rejecting new Allies, and rendring our old ones so weak, as not to be able to carry it on! A most notable Way of procuring Peace! How could it possibly shorten the War, but by our Acceptance of a bad Peace? If refusing to increase the Number of our Allies, was a likely and proper Means of putting an End to the War, there is still a more likely, a more proper one by throwing down our Arms, and receiving the Law from the Conqueror. I believe I need not pursue this Point any farther. I hope the Nation will agree, that the most proper Means
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for *Britons* to have sought Peace, was by endeavouring at a Superiority over the Enemy. But we have so bilked and baffled the Designs of those who were well inclined to our Cause, so abused those who were engaged in it, so marred all Things, that if Heaven doth not do more for us, than we ourselves can do against us, we are irrecoverably lost. The Interest of the King of *Prussia*, or, what is more material, the Light in which he sees his own Interest, tho' so visible, so obvious, has been so little understood, or if understood, has been so little regarded (not I hope upon any Considerations which I shall immediately mention) by the Directors of our Affairs, that I will say a Word on this Head, tho' touch'd upon before. It is undeniably our Interest to raise the House of *Austria* to such a Height as to be a Balance to the Power of *France*, and that too as independently as possible of the other Princes of *Germany*. But from thence to imagine that it is the Interest too of the Princes of *Germany*, to fix such a Power in the House of *Austria*, is to reason for them upon the Footing of our own Interest; and not of theirs. It is the Interest perhaps of all the Princes in *Germany* (and I am afraid it is but too well understood by most of them) to depress the House of *Austria*, and lessen that Power which many of them have sensibly felt, and which is capable of being exerted on many more Occasions than that of *France*. It is more particularly and most certainly the Interest of those whose most considerable Territories are remote from *France*. For it is the Proximity of Power, which offends; it is the same in high as in common Life; a Person, tho' ever so opulent, at a Distance gives no Uneasiness. A rich Neighbour is often dreaded. Add to this that the King of *Prussia* is in Possession of the rich Province of *Silesia*; to which his original Title is no
more

more than a Conquest made by a lucky Opportunity on a Power, when at Liberty infinitely his superior. Looking on Things in this Light, can any Man doubt that the King of *Prussia* will place his Security any where but in the Power and Friendship of *France*, and Weakness of the House of *Austria*, while he has the probable Means of effecting it? From this appears the Folly of our Measures; our sole Aim is to gain the Superiority of *France*, and upon the least Prospect of Success the King of *Prussia* by his Interposition is sure to ruin the Whole; whereas we can never do any Thing effectual without becoming superior both to *France* and *Prussia*; of which the *Prussians* and *Saxons* afforded a glorious Opportunity; but it was a Pearl before Swine. If we have found Time for us wearing a Lock behind, and the *Czarina* again overawing the *Prussians* by her Declarations; I hope she will not be again discouraged, tho' Amends cannot be made to the Publick for the last false Step. A false Step which will cost this Nation great Troubles and many Millions of vain Expence.

*There is a Tide in the Affairs of Men
Which taken at the Flood, leads on to Fortune,
Omitted all the Voyage of their Life,
Is bound in Shallows and in Miseries.*—Shakesp.

The *Saxons* are no longer ours, and the Affairs of *Europe* are in many Respects very differently circumstanced from what they were at that Time; what the Event will be Time only can shew. I should not know where to find an End was I to enumerate all our Misfortunes in the Year 1745, *Picciol Giro ma largo Campo delle Disgracie*; but I must take Notice of the little Care taken to put *Ostend* in a proper State of Defence, the only Place capable of retarding the Rapidity of the Enemies Conquests.

quests. It will I suppose be said, we could not prevail with the Queen of *Hungary* to do it; I believe it; no more than upon any other Person in any Thing whatsoever, that regards the Advancement of the common Cause. I am sorry there is no more Ability, no more Address. With the Year 1746, we renew our insufficient Measures and tread again the old unavailing Tract, knowing no other Means of carrying on War, but by raising Money at an e ——— Rate at Home in order to pay Men to be knock'd on the Head, Abroad, and satiate the Sword of our Enemies with Slaughter. This indeed, upon the Principle laid down before, is one Way of putting a speedy End to the War; for it is impossible we can long support it.

Britons heretofore led on another Road, taught their Allies other Means of finishing their Wars; I am sorry now they are forced to learn these. I say forced, for all the World knows it is a Force, both on the S ——— and the P ———; of the former this Year furnishes a flagrant Instance, when upon the private Intrigues of the Cabal M ——— y, was threatned with P ——— r ——— Distress and the Menaces of *Exchange-Alley* assaulted the Palace. But I hope, notwithstanding their great Discoveries in Politicks, and new Methods of effecting a Peace, that these Gentlemen do not think that the bad Circumstances they have brought the Nation into will give a Sanction to a bad Peace, that Mischief preceding Mischief will excuse Mischief, or the Commission of an old Fault justify a recent one: If they entertain this Notion, or flatter themselves with this Security, I hope there will be Spirit enough rise in the People, to convince them of their Error.

But to proceed to the Administration of Affairs of the Year 1746. It is no Secret that the M ——— y
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Transactions at this Time afford a large Field for Observations. But some certain Abuses were of too great a Magnitude for me to pursue; common Prudence dictates to decline giving my Thoughts concerning those who received certain Proposals, who approved, who confirmed. But on one Hand, if the Greatness of the Evil, which imposes Silence gives me for my Country's Sake Concern; on the Hand, the Silence gives me very little, because the Enormity cannot be latent, and the People, cannot but be excited by their Distress to inform themselves if immense Sums have not been squandered away on the Dregs of Mankind in a Time of publick Want. 'Tis the greatest Degree of Servitude where the Senses are held in Slavery as well as the Persons, when People are forced to allow, to affirm, to deliberately determine, that Wrong is Right, and Right is Wrong, or Five a less Number than Four. There is something more manly, less shocking to human Nature, when the same Ends are attained by direct and arbitrary Command. How happy are we who are so free from any such State; amongst whom impartial Enquiries always prevail, and are as certain to be followed by impartial Judgments. But was it not astonishing that a Set of dirty Money Jobbers, those Harpies of the State, who were glutting themselves with the Blood of their almost expiring Country, would have the Assurance to dictate to the Nation, who should be the M——r, like Roman Legions, nominating him Emperor, with whom they could strike the most advantageous Bargain: What a miserable State is poor *England* reduced to, if a few Brokers have really this Power? What a Credit to our M——rs to hold from such Masters; and yet this was great Matter of Triumph, till Time exposed the Nakedness of our M——rs, and the Bargain of their Protectors.

The Profusion of publick Money so exceeds all Measure, that one would think the Conductors of our Affairs entire Strangers to that trite Maxim, that " Money is the Sinews of War." As indeed it is of every Thing else, in which last our M——rs seem to the Misfortune of their Country, to be pretty great Adepts. For Favour and Interest is purchased in every Part beginning from Places, which I will avoid naming, down, through all the Offices where the great Business is Jobs connived at by Superiors, down to the low unconfessionable Dealers of *Exchange-Alley*; and still lower, if any Thing can be more so, this is the extensive Bottom, is the so much boasted broad Bottom; this the Basis of the present happy Administration. I will mention an Instance not for its Particularity but for its Newness, as the Abuse, which I believe is not older than this War with *France*, is again renewed at this Instant of my Writing. The Commissioners for managing the Lottery used to receive a hundred Pounds for their Trouble; and this was I believe a pretty ample Recompence, at least, for some of them, who never attended at all. But now their Salaries are increased to 150*l.* for which I know no Reason but that too general one amongst Placemen, *L'appetit vient à manger*. This perhaps will be look'd upon as a Trifle and considered by itself, I own it is of no grand Importance; but when one reflects on the Multitude of Abuses with which this Nation is over-run, the Sum Total is not only considerable but amazing, nor to be parallel'd in any other Country.

If those who receive the publick Money make light of these Affairs, I am sure the Necessities of those who pay, will not suffer them so to do. The entire List would furnish large Volumes. This now mentioned is only distinguish'd as the Abuse of the Day; almost every Day producing

new. But to pass from the private to the publick Uses of publick Money. At this Time we took 18,000 *Hanoverians* into *British* Pay. On which Occasion I cannot refrain (how late soever my Congratulations come) from congratulating my Countrymen on their Reconciliation, on the Renewal of Friendship and Amity, on the entire Obliteration of some of the greatest Feuds and Animosities which have of late Years been raised in this Country. But general Compliments will not suffice on this great Occasion. I must in particular congratulate a certain Sett of Gentlemen, on that Dawn of Light which now opened on their Understandings, which shews us the Fallibility of human Preception, since we find ourselves sometimes mistaken in those very Points, in which we thought ourselves most clear. But *nunquam sera est ad bonos mores via*. And as is * declared in a publick Manner by a List of very honourable as well as very distinguishing Gentlemen. There is nothing more becoming a Gentleman, than to acknowledge himself to be in the wrong, as soon as he is sensible that he is so, &c. This great and grave Authority will I hope secure me against any malign Interpretation, and that it will be admitted our new Ministers have acquired Glory by the Change, and glorious before their Change, all the World allowed they were. From Beginning to End then glorious. What would one more? Some pretended there was a Distinction between *Hanoverian* Troops of the Year 1744, and the present Year. And it must be granted there was a Distinction, which was only this in the Year 1744, we paid 16,000 *Hanoverians*; and it was at the same Time agreed that the Elector of *Hanover* should furnish 6000 on his own Account. This Year we pay 18,000 exactly at the same Rate as
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* See the Letter of the Court Martial.

we did 16,000 in the Year 1744 ; but the Troops to be furnish'd on the Part of the Elector of *Hanover*, were this Year forgotten. In 1744 we had in Effect 22,000, this Year but 18,000 ; so that in Reality we pay more Money for fewer Men.

Under the same Directors our Success in *Flanders* this Year was much the same as the last. Great Expectations were rais'd here in *England*, mighty Threats were thrown out, of what would be done, if the *French* but dared to come out of their Intrenchments : They did come out : And what then ? Why ? they beat us out of our Intrenchments. In this Action, notwithstanding our Boasts of the Number of effective Men to be brought into the Field, the Sum Total of our Forces fell very short of 60,000. The *French* heretofore sung *Te Deum's* for our Victories : We are by one Degree more moderate ; we allow them the Victory and only Claim the Advantage. What mighty Consequences are we not to expect if Victory ever falls to our Lot when our Defeat has been so fatal to our Enemies ? If we do so great Things when Fortune crosses, what shall we not do when she smiles ? I wish my Countrymen would leave this trifling : There is no good in this palliating. No Man would contend with more Eagerness than myself, for what would be of real Use to my Country : But what boots it to deceive ourselves, we cannot deceive the World : We only add Ridicule to Misfortune by endeavouring to disguise it.

But it is pretended that our Defeat was attended with no ill Consequences. Good Gods ! A Defeat attended with no ill Consequences ! In what World do we live ? What new Ideas ! By what Means did this strange Event come to pass ? Is not the Action itself, the very Defeat inseparable from ill Consequences sufficient and too many ? Doth it not discredit us with our Allies, abate the

Spirit of the Soldiery, and lessen their Confidence in their Leaders: How difficult is it for Troops beat once, and again to face the Enemy with the same Expectation of Success, on which Bravery greatly depends. Had the Victory been ours, it might have procured us Friends, of which I think we have some want, and engaged those heartily in the Cause who are now afraid, and whose Fear is a dead Weight upon us. Is the Loss of this Advantage inconsiderable? But how came it attended with no more ill Consequences? The *French* had already done almost every Thing, had gone to the utmost Bounds, nor had where to pursue without Hostily entering the Territories of their good Friends the *Dutch*. For I think we retired there, and sought Protection in a neutral Country: Is then our Security that we have no more to lose, are fallen to the Ground, and are safe in the Lowness of our State? Till the *French* think fit to create new Enemies, by delaring War against the *Dutch*, or force them (if they think it for their Advantage) to a more abject Subserviency. I wish I could lessen in Fact the Advantage of the Enemy. But what will Words or false Colouring avail; the Mischief will still remain, and is not so to be removed. 'Tis more eligible that the People should be informed of their true State, should know that their "Power is delivered into Captivity, and their "Strength into the Enemies Hands;" that sensible of their Situation they may make some Effort for the Salvation of their Country. I have taken some Pains to Point out in this Treatise what appears to be the true Interest of this Country, and the only Means to obtain Success: I have no other View than the Good of my Country: No Attachment to any particular Man, nor will to any who shall not shew himself both capable and willing to serve his Country.

That

That at present our Councils and Measures are insufficient. Facts and a constant Train of ill Success give a melancholy Proof. For if our Misfortunes are not owing to our Councils, to what are they owing? If to want of Force and Supplies, why was 4—H— squander'd to maintain certain Persons in their Places at Home in spite of their P—, which ought to have been employed, if it could have been spared by the People, on our Operations Abroad? Or why is not more Care taken that the Numbers should be compleat? There is one principal Cause of our Calamities; there are those who know, who have experienced the Truth of what I am going to say; if a Man is forward to undertake whatever is proposed for want of Discernment of the Difficulties, such a Man is the Person for our Ministry's Purpose, but if the Ministry are told their Schemes will not execute, if Difficulties are started, the Person who starts them is judged *ipso facto* incapable of doing Service. Whereas it seldom happens that Difficulties are surmounted in Practice, which have not been previously raised, and well considered in Council. I hope there are Men of this Country able to render Service to it. that Spirit and Understanding is not totally decayed in this Nation, and lost from among us, that there are Men left, fit for military Operations, but the most nice, the most difficult Discernment is that of Mankind; and yet without that Discernment nothing is more evident, than that all Things will most likely go to Ruin, and the Unfitness of Persons and Things confound all Measures. But we are so far from discerning from having an Insight into the Abilities and Dispositions of Men, that we have seen the great Authors of our Misfortunes not only protected from Justice, but after fatal Experience of their Conduct, preferred to Dignity and

and high Trust. The Expedition to Port *Lorient* will be famous as long as *English* History shall last.

I am at a Loss to account for this Diversion as it was called, a Diversion it was (I am sorry to say it) to all who wish us ill. Some pretended that the Report universally credited the last Spring of an immense Damage done by a Conflagration, was look'd upon by our Ministers, as a certain Omen of a future Event, and that flush'd by this Hope alone, without knowing or enquiring whether Port *Lorient* was a Place of Defence, what Cannon was necessary, what was the Approach, without considering the well-known Dangers of the Bay of *Biscay*, undertook the Accomplishment of this kind of Prediction. Tho' I find great Difficulty in agreeing, that our Ministers could be infatuated to such a Degree, by this Superstition, I should be glad to hear any tolerable Reason assigned, for so precipitate, so rash an Undertaking, tho' the Thing is past, and has so miserably failed, because it would in some little Degree appease the Minds of People, and relieve them from their dreadful Apprehensions of future Conduct. We have done Damage to the Amount of some few thousands of Pounds to the *French*, at the Expence of $\frac{1}{2}$ a Million to ourselves, and ridiculously kick'd against the Pricks. It is said, that the first Project was to second some Attempts which the People of *New England* were to make on the *French* in those Parts, which is not improbable for (if I am not greatly misinformed) this *Secret* Expedition to *Canada* was expressly mentioned in the Commissions made out for some Officers, which were at that Time shewn about Town. How this Plan came to be laid aside, and the People of *New England* frustrated in their Hopes and Expences, I am totally ignorant. After this
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the Affair went thro' various Metamorphoses, and while our Ministers sat brooding on a vast Abyss of Ignorance, Orders were succeeded by Counter-Orders, till the World were tired with Laughing, when at length, by a kind of false Conception, this notable Scheme was produced. As to what regards the Naval Part of this Expedition, it is said, that the Admiral in his Voyage overshot his Port, having mistaken the Isle of *Belleisle* for *La Groie*, the Place of Rendezvous, to recover which he was obliged to beat a whole Day to Windward, and thereby alarmed the Coast. But upon Conclusion of this grand Enterprize, the Hurry was so great, that the Admiral sent Notice to the Land Forces, that if they did not reembark immediately, he should be obliged to sail without them, nor was there Time found to give the Ships a Place of Rendezvous, by which Means *Major B* — who was separated with some Transports from the Fleet by Stress of Weather, was forced to return to *England* to get Information concerning the Admiral. Upon the whole, one may venture to declare, that the Wisdom of the Directors of our Affairs is unfathomable, and their Understanding past finding out. But I am afraid this Affair will not so end, and I could wish that when our Forces could do nothing effectual, with regard to *Port Lorient*, they had not done what is ineffectual with regard to the War, had not pillaged the Coast, which piratical Kind of Warfare, is ruinous to particular Persons, and trifling as to the Whole. I heartily compassionate those who live near our own Coast, to the Lot of some whom it will probably fall to make Retaliation, to pay severely for this impotent unavailing Molestation of the Enemy. As I am expressly treating of the Conduct of the War, I must not let pass unnoticed the Discipline of the Navy. That Effeminacy which has unstrung the

the Nerves, unmanned the Vigour of our Marine; is a Prodigy, which I hope future Ages will wonder at as much as the present; for I hope it will never be parallel'd while Time endures. Whence this Disgrace, in that Part of our Strength which used to be our Glory and Pride, the Envy and Terror of the rest of the World? The Extinguishment of Liberty, usually extinguishes all Virtues together with it. Nay almost all Virtues must be extinguish'd before Liberty can be so, or the People made to bend to the Yoke; yet personal Bravery is generally the last. But in a Country where Virtue and Liberty go Hand in Hand, where National Probity and Freedom support each other, how came these abject Sentiments to prevail? Particular Instances other Times have afforded, but this general Defection is entirely new; in former Days the Evil was timely prevented, but since that unhappy *Æra. February 1743-4*, it has been nursed up and encouraged by Impunity. This has been the Root of that Evil which has so distress'd our Naval Affairs.

The Protection given by principal Men of the State, the Honours shewn immediately on his Arrival to an Officer of considerable Rank, sent Home under an Accusation of Crimes of the highest Nature, were enough to confound all Ideas of Right and Wrong. And what has since been done, has but * increased the Evil. But this is not the Sum Total. If on one Hand there are Complaints of Acquittals, on the other Hand there are Complaints of a quite different Nature. With how much Grounds let Captain *West's* Defence tell as well as the 19th Article of the fighting Instructions, which requires the Van of our Fleet to steer with the Van of the Enemy, and appoints no Signal, because it is always to be done, when the

Enemy

* See the Remarks on Mr. *Lescock's* Sentence. Printed for *W. Webb*, near *St. Paul's*.

Enemy steers to Windward, that very Act of the Enemy is in place of a Signal, is the Signal. As to a later Trial, I will just touch on some of the Resolutions, * to which the C— M— came previous to giving Sentence. They are curious, and so extraordinary, that I would fain flatter my self, that the like will never appear again. They come to a Resolution, “ That no Direction was given to the Fleet the Night of the 10th of February 1743, by the Night Signal then made to form the Line of Battle, and to bring and keeping the Line. And the Day Signal for forming the Line abreast, ceased to be a Signal by ceasing to be visible.” A Fog may render a Signal invisible, and yet no Officer I believe would think the Signal ceased to be a Signal because it ceased to be visible, but on the contrary would continue in the Execution till he was otherwise directed. Article 5th, 3d Paragraph. “ The Court are of Opinion, that after the *French* Admiral made more sail, and went ahead of his Majesty’s Fleet the 11th of February, the Admiral acted in Breach of his Duty, and brought his Majesty’s Fleet into improper Danger, by bearing down on the Rear of the Enemy’s Fleet, and engaging the *Spanish* Admiral; whereby the Van of his Majesty’s Fleet, and the Rear of the Enemy’s Fleet were respectively opposed at unequal Advantage.” Compare this Opinion with the Opinion delivered Article 7th, Paragraph 5th. “ The Court are of Opinion, that it was the Admiral’s Duty to have returned with the *Namur* to the Engagement with the *Real*, tho’ he had four Ships inactive in the Rear of his Division”. By the first of these Opinions, it is declared, that the Admiral opposed the Rear of the Enemy

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* See the Resolutions of the Court Martial, &c. Printed for *W. Webb, near St. Paul’s.*

with too many Ships, and their Van with too few. How consistent this is with the other Position, *viz.* That the Admiral after having retired out of the Line, to avoid being run foul of by the *Marlborough*, instead of advancing towards the Van of the Enemy (as he did in order to engage the *Hercules*, which was the Ship then ahead of the *Real*) ought to have returned to the Engagement of the *Real* in the Rear, I will leave to the Gentlemen who composed the Court Martial to reconsider, tho' their present Consideration can make very little amends to the unfortunate Admiral. Nor will it be any excuse to say, that the *Marlborough* being unassisted by the Ships astern, Mr. *M——ws*, ought in Consideration of their Default, to have returned to the Engagement of the *Real*, for if he could have seen, or had been informed of their Misbehaviour, this surely was not the Method to have been taken. No. The Admiral ought in such Case to have appointed other Commanders of those Ships. But was I to make Observations of this Sort, or Comparisons of the Disagreement of one Resolution with an another, a Volume would scarce suffice. How surprising so ever this may be in Matters of mere Judgment, something more strange still remains. For in Matters of Fact, one finds the Fact stated in one Resolution entirely different from what it is in another, and that too in very material Points. For Instance,

3d Resolution on the 13th Article says,

Resolved unanimously, that it has appeared to the Court, that the Vice-Admiral and his Division did Chace the Enemy on the 15th of *February* in the Morning, in Consequence of a Signal from the Admiral.

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This Fact as here stated effectually destroys Mr. *Mathews's* Defence, who says; he discontinued the Chace in Obedience to his Instructions. For here the Question arises, why then did you renew the Chace the next Morning? Was it not equally contrary to your Instructions on the Morning of the 13th, as the Night before? For a Signal to the Vice-Admiral to Chace with his Division could have been given with no other Design but to attack the Enemy, but the 10th Resolution on the 15th Article it is,

Resolved unanimously, that it has appeared to the Court, that the Signal made by the Admiral on the 10th of *February* in the Morning, was for the Admiral to send out Ships to Chace. How material, how essential is this Difference? For the Intention of sending out Ships to Chace, was only to descry what those Ships were, which the Vice-Admiral made the Signal for seeing. This single Instance, I think may stand in the Place of many. After this I think it is unnecessary to say any thing more on this Subject. I hope if there has been any Mistake, it has been a Mistake of the Head, and not of the Heart; that we shall never see the Time when a Minister's Will shall become the Rule of Judgment, his Favour or Resentment the Measure of Justice, his Word the Stamp which shall fix pretended Merit or Disgrace on Mens Characters; for such an Usurpation must soon create a Dependency, destructive of all Notions of Honour and Spirit, and fatal to the Welfare and Liberties of the Country wherever it shall prevail. Hanging out Terrors on one Hand to those who do right, giving Encouragement on the other to those who do wrong, cannot fail of sinking a State into the most despicable Condition. There is yet another Light, in which we ought to view the Proceedings of a certain C. M. for when I

consider the Attack made on a Court of Justice; and the Manner on which that Attack was supported, I cannot forbear extending my Views farther than that of a Martial. The Land Force kept up in this Kingdom, has introduced a Change which has long given great Apprehension to all those who have any Regard to our ancient Constitution. It has done more: It has given Terror to some lest the Military Power should grow too strong for the Civil Magistrate; and tho' the Navy has never been look'd on as carrying with it any Degree of Danger to our Constitution, for that very Reason in some Cases it may be the most proper Means to prepare the Way to begin the Prelude, to make the Experiment how far Things will bear. But happy it was for us that Things were not prepared on all Hands to compleat our Misfortunes, that a Person of Resolution and Spirit, able and willing to repulse the Insult, and withstand the Attempts of Men however great and powerful by their Party, or employs presided in that Court. But to return to the Discouragement and Hardships of our Seamen, who with too great Reason complain of the immense Navy Debt, and their uncome-at-able Arrears. With what Reluctance must they enter into the Service, with what Ill-will execute it when they know, that after all, in order to obtain what is indisputably their Due, their hardly earned Wages, they are obliged to use a tiresome Sollicitation of many Years, for which their Wages when obtained are sometimes scarce an Equivalent. This I readily believe gives great Concern to some of high Station in that Office, as I am persuaded every thing doth, which is afflictive of this Country, but in the present Disposition of Affairs it is unavoidable.

The Marines and the Nation are both abused, by the long Detention of their Pay in the Hands of Administration; and to make the Marines some Amends, the Nation is further abused, as their Victualling is not deducted out of their Subsistence Money. Their long Arrears, I own, are in some Measure, tho' not altogether, occasion'd by their original Establishment; but then, why were they first put? why are they now continued on such a Foot? Another Method by which this Debt has been carried to such a Height, is very extraordinary, when the Administration avowedly intend to employ 50000 Seamen, they ask a Provision for 40000 only. It is pretended in * Excuse for this proceeding, that it is impossible to find Funds, to raise Money for the remaining 10000.

Is it possible to imagine, that this Argument is made use of by the same individual Persons, who in several Instances as well of Contracts at Home as Abroad, on an infinite Number of Articles have been so lavish of *British* Money? Will their own particular avowed Distress as Ministers (for I would not willingly suppose that Character entirely forgot by them) never teach them more Wisdom? Is not this a very pretty Account of the State, into which they have confessedly brought the Nation, and into what still worse State they are bringing it? Is not this Acknowledgment of public Necessity, a most pressing Argument for OEconomy? Is it not a high Aggravation of those in-Bargains, by which the Publick has been so great a Loser? When the Public cannot pay its necessary Expences, must it wantonly and idly lavish away hundreds of thousands on the Dregs of Mankind,

* Tho' in the late War 8000 Marines went to making up the 40,000 Seamen: And the reasonable Way of reforming now, would be by making a better Use of fewer Men: Yet this very Excuse is evidently ill-founded, as new Funds have been established since this Practice began, and more I fear will be so.

kind, this Blood-letting to feed Leeches, was it not cruel in so low a State? Is it not too astonishing, that when we avowedly strain so much beyond our Strength, we have not the Address to engage our Neighbours to do more.

In the late War the *Dutch* furnish'd according to their own † Account, some Years 50, and never less than 40 Ships of the Line. To hear what Ships they have furnish'd (except a very few in the Time of the Rebellion, which too were withdrawn suddenly when most wanted) what Service they have done in the present War, what Ships of the Enemy taken, or even engaged, would give me a Pleasure, which I fear I shall not soon receive? Some alledge that leaving this Money to be paid at a future Time, is an Ease to the present. If it is an Ease, if Men can be satisfied while their Affairs go on in this Manner, 'tis an Ease that must necessarily be productive of great Uneasiness. For by these Means, if Things can be had, what is one Day or other to be paid for them, is little regarded, and it is with the Public in that Respect, as with a private Man.

If a private Man dreads or shuns the Inspection of Accounts, has no Attention to the Rates by which he Contracts, for what he wants Experience shews, that the most affluent Fortune is not equal to this Neglect, and how Gentleman-like soever it may be, no Man I believe will pretend it is prudent. If Affluence cannot support such Management, how shall we oppress'd with Poverty do it? It is well known, that the Want of Credit (nor can it be otherwise in the Nature of Things) greatly encreases the Price of Things, and this not upon the

† The Commissioners of the Admiralty in 1712 made the Number in one particular Year amount to 110 only, and in others always very small of the *Dutch* Account. But at the *Dutch* observed, the North Sea was quitted, the Care of which was for some Years left almost entirely to them.

the Supernumerary 10,000 only, but likewise upon the 20,000; so that, if there was an Establishment of 50,000, the very saving which might with proper Economy be made, would amount to near as much as the Charge of the additional 10,000. And the present augmented Account must in some little Time be made up if the Publick intend to maintain any Credit; and the Difference of To-day or To-morrow is not so considerable, for I suppose we don't imagine to find Credit given us to be accounted for in the next Age. So that we lazily sit Abroad to hatch Mischief for ourselves. But the Publick I think has a Right to be informed on this Head, by what Authority this is done? Unforeseen Accidents, Contingencies unexpected may plead the Excuse of Expenses incurred, tho' not provided for. But a Sett avowed and designed Purpose of running the Nation * in Debt without consent of Parliament, is a Measure that ought to be answered for, especially when it distresses and cramps the publick Service so much, as in the Case of the Navy. Add to this, that a strange Supineness or unfortunate Attention to establishing personal Interest by personal Gratifications, prevails in all our Affairs. For Instance, instead of supplying *Portmahon* with Sulphur directly from *Italy*, we purchase it here in *England* in order to send there, by which we unnecessarily pay the Profit of the Merchant here, and the Freight back to the *Mediterranean*. But Ministers have their Conveniency in the Increase of the publick Debts, in the same Proportion as the Publick its Inconveniency their Power encreases together with it, and a great many other Purposes are served, Discount on Navy Bills will sometimes produce more Interest in a few Days than

* This has been declared heretofore an illegal Practice, and dangerous Invasion of the Rights of Parliament, and an Attempt which differs very little from levying Money without Consent of Parliament.

than other Means in some Years: But this is not all the Seaman has to complain of; for during so great Delay, many Accidents may and no doubt do fall out. So that a great deal of Money must for Want of Claim be absolutely lost to the Seamen, and sunk in the Purse of the Government.

While I am writing I am pleased to catch at the News of intended Reformati^ons, which are said to be in Consequence of some Enquires made last Year. In the Enquiries, however, of last Year, I do not hear there was any Notice taken of the Difference of Expence between Horse and Dragoons, tho' that Evil has been otherwise often and much complained of. The Difference between the Establishments, for the Horse Dragoons and Foot for last Year, and former Establishments during all the last War, till after the Peace of *Utrecht* for the like Numbers, will appear upon Comparison to have amounted to 128,829 *l.* 15 *s.* (which is more than a seventh of the whole Expence) not including the encreased annual Charge of the Forces at *Portmahon*, *Gibraltar*, and the Plantations, the *Highland* Regiments, Invalids, and independent Companies; nor the 15 new raised Regiments. The like Difference upon the ten Regiments of *Marines* amounted to 15,086 *l.* 13 *s.* 4 *d.* and the Difference on the *Garrisons* to 13,077 *l.* 5 *d.* $\frac{1}{2}$, which is more than a Third of the whole Expence of the *Garrisons*. The present * saving upon breaking Part of the Horse and raising Dragoons in their Stead, as the

* The Difference between the Pay of the Number of Men contained in two Troops of Horse Guards, and *Wade's*, *Mountague's*, and *Honeywood's* Horse, according to their Establishments; and the Pay of the like Number of Dragoons, according to their Establishment, would amount to about 45,000 *per Annum*. which, if it was to take Place immediately, would be the saving. This I mention, because I am sure our Ministry do not stand in need of that fictitious Credit, which has been aimed at in a low Way, by giving in the publick Papers a false Account of this as well as some other Things.

the Money taken from the Establishment are many of them put upon Pensions; and the raising Dragoons will cost a considerable Sum in Levy Money, I cannot now compute any more than the saving which is talk'd of by taking away the Colonels and Lieutenants Colonels of *Marines*, till it shall be known, what Consideration they are to receive. Whenever it shall be thought proper to regulate the Dragoons or Foot in any Articles confirmable to former Establishments, such Reformation will be of constant Benefit to the Publick, till the Abuses are renewed, or other Innovations shall arise, because they are likely to be kept on Foot after the War: For I fear we shall never see those Times which our Forefathers have seen; when an Army in Time of Peace would have been look'd on with Amazement, would have been look'd on as an entire Dis—n of the C—n; but Circumstances are strangely altered. Many other Things have been represented as may be seen in the R—, but notwithstanding the great and undoubted Authority, upon which they have been made public, and spread thro' the Nation, what has been done? Amongst other Things, Complaints have been made of the want of Checks to prevent false Musters. But there can be no other Checks upon false Musters, but the Care of a Ministry; for let what Laws will be made against any Abuses, the Effect will be according to the Administration of those Laws, and in Proportion to the Spirit and public Zeal of those who are invested with Power. The single Power of Placing and Displacing is sufficient without particular Laws for this Purpose, and those who depend on the Favours or Frowns of Ministers will govern themselves thereby. They have indeed made one Example, and are just entitled to

say with *Gippius*, * *Non omnibus dormio*. Tho' they had probably slept in that Instance, if the C—— had not pulled them by the Ear, and awakened them by publishing that very Case to the World. I should be sorry to be too rigid; I would not knowingly commit myself to the Hazard of such Imputation; for, far from depriving our Ministry of any Praise, I would gladly cherish with Commendation, any Disposition to do Good to the People; but Facts, I think, will sufficiently secure me against any Appearance of too great Austerity, will amply justify what I say. There is no Proportion between the little Affec—n, which we shew on one Hand of OEconomy, and our vast Prodigality on the other; I will not now enter into Particulars, which would however be of great Consideration, was it not for Things of still much greater Consideration; I have touch'd on some Things already, and perhaps may do more some other Time, but, at present, a greater Care presseth for what is the whole Expence of each Year, the many Millions we annually lay out, but a lavish Profusion of the Public Money, while our Schemes are so inadequate to our Ends, that there is no human Probability of Success, and the People still from Time to Time become

Dedecrum pretiosus emptor.

There is wanting to this Country not a slight and delusory but a great and thorough Reformation, not only Reformation, but Address and Policy.
These

* *Gippius* was used to prostitute his Wife for Gain, and counterfeit Sleep during the Visits of her Gallants, but when a Person came whom he did not like, he would suddenly start up with these Words, *Non omnibus dormio*.

These are the only Means by which *Britain* or any other Nation can thrive. At present we are ill-grounded, we are wrong in Fundamentals. Good Gods! What probably will be the Consequence of either an inactive or an active Campaign. Inaction will be terrible to a People already exhausted. Action in the Situation we are unsupported by Allies, self-deceived in Numbers, will, I fear, but add to our Misfortunes. If those who command shall be able to surmount such Difficulties, it will greatly redound to their Honour; the Nation will be proportionably indebted for such Services, but the Task is hard upon them, and, I fear, Things have not been so prepared in the C—et, to give room for great Expectations in the Field. And yet it is upon this Hope, that we go on mortgaging every Thing that we are worth, and launch out such Lengths, that not only we ourselves, but latest Posterity will have occasion to curse our Folly. I would not that we should reckon too much on our Success in *Provence*; if it should occasion some Diversion of the *French* Arms from the *Low Countries*, will it not in some measure occasion a Diversion of the Queen of *Hungary's* Arms from the same Place, whose Numbers at other Times have been far from compleat? And I shall be glad if nothing else happens to distract and divide her Force.

But what can we do if the *Dutch* are averse to entering heartily into the War? Why? Convince them, that we have not, nor will have any other Object in View, but to humble the Power of *France*; this perhaps will be an Inducement, will give them a better Opinion of Affairs, and when we have done this, if we shall think fit to do less, they perhaps will do more. They see our Foible,

see us disposed to be the Knight-Errants of *Europe*, and while we are so employed, wait to see what Chance may produce for them. But if the Temper of the *Dutch* is not to be altered, shall we suffer them to become a Prey to the *French*? Without considering how reasonable or unreasonable it is for us to undertake their Defence, do we take the Way to save them, or if they are resolved not to be saved, shall we, or can we pretend to save them? What then, is the Queen of *Hungary* to perish, while we but look on. I agree it would be more eligible to support her: But if we have not the Option, it is better for us not to fall with her, and join our Fate to her's. If there is a Disposition in others to co-operate, if the Princes of *Germany*, the *Dutch* or other Potentates will afford us something to work with, it may be an Encouragement for us to attempt something, but without it we are as mad as if we would attempt to tread the Air, or walk on the Moon and Stars.

That the Chances of War are sometimes very surprizing, I own, and a Handful of Men do Wonders; but would any one in his Senses engage at such Odds? Our Ministry ought to be well informed of the Inclination of the *Dutch*. If it is not certain that it is very different from any thing which has hitherto appeared, we have nothing to do but to withdraw ourselves from the Continent, collect our Strength within ourselves, and make War on the Trade of *France*, where we should wound her in her tenderest Part. The Money already spent on a Land War, employed on annoying the Enemy by Sea (in a Manner different however from what has been hitherto practised, particularly with Respect to Spirit and Vigour) would have ere now reduced

reduced *France* to the lowest Ebb, drained her Treasure, and made her Glory wither.

But after all, it is necessary to make a Diversion in the *Low Countries*, to keep the Evil from Home, and prevent *France* from making *England* the Scene of the War. If *France*, when a Rebellion ravaged this Country, shewed no serious Intention of invading us in those Circumstances can we think she will ever dare undertake it at any other Time ?

But let *France* do her worst ; a much less Expence than we make at present in Subsidies and Armaments would provide for our Security at Home, would maintain 12 or 14,000 Men or more if necessary, to be ready at Hand during the War, to defend our Capital, and quiet the Fears and Apprehensions of the Pusillanimous, and thereby support Public Credit and the Funds, would enable us to make proper Dispositions in other Parts of the Country, and at the same Time keep a Force at Sea, which would be a farther Defence against any Attempts of *France* on this Country and strike Terror on her, not only strike Terror, but bring Calamity and Ruin home to her Doors ; by throwing our Expences into this Channel, our Money would circulate amongst ourselves, as is the Case of *France* at present, while we are now constantly letting the Blood out of our Body. All this I say upon a Supposition that Things really stand on the Footing which our Ministry represent, that there has been no Possibility of working on the inactive Temper of most of the States of *Europe*.

I believe, however the World is pretty well convinced of the contrary, if proper Attention had been had to the Interest of this Country, and the Means of carrying on the War effectually. I do not care if the Nation is saved, by whom it is done ;

done ; I shall be as glad, as heartily glad to see the important Service performed by these, as any other Men. Yet those surely are not the Means which have been taken ; nor the present Managers I fear the Persons. If Men try a Thing again, and again, and find after all, that they cannot succeed, in common Prudence, they will retire from the Laughter of the World, and that for which they are unfit.

But if such a strange Itch of Gaming prevails, that a loosing Gamester irretrievably dipt, is resolved to continue the Game at all Events ; I hope the Nation will consider, that it is at their Expence he plays at the Expence of their Treasure their Glory, their Interest and their Trade. In this corrupt Age it would be ridiculous to wonder at the strong Attachment of Placemen to Places. I wonder, however, that the Bulk of Placemen, who probably would be the same under one Minister or another, should choose to support a Sett of Men whose Councils are ineffectual in every Thing but in working the Misfortunes of their Country. That they should not endeavour to take to themselves a Head, whose Measures might do Credit to themselves and the Nation. No doubt there are who have Talents equal to this Purpose. But if there should be found Men resolved to uphold at all Events, an Administration precipitating the Nation into evident Ruin, both Abroad and at Home ; I hope there will be found those who will exert themselves to redeem their Country out of such Captivity, who will cast their Bonds from us, and set the Nation free ; in which Case it is no vain Hope to expect that it will recover its ancient Lustre and Glory. In some Countries Men have been capitally accused of undertaking Employments to which they were unequal ; but what do they deserve. who intrude themselves by Force,
who

who filling, with an Insufficiency fatal to their Country and shameful to themselves, the great Places of the State, support themselves by a Cabal, whose all-grasping Power, derogates from the Honour, tarnishes the Lustre of the C— n, and is destructive of the Constitution, whose Measures involve us in Disgrace Abroad, and encrease of Debts and Poverty at Home, together with a Train of Miseries always accompanying a corrupt Poverty? What is the Purpose of this anti—r—l Combination, this anti-constitutional Faction. Is their End a Gratification of their Ambition; is it for this they wrest the Reins of Government out of the Hands of M——y? If so, how well their Purpose is answered, let a constant Succession of Disgraces during the present Administration tell; I may keep Silence, where Facts speak. But if Avarice is the Motive, if the Enjoyment of their rich Pasture (excuse me that I use so groveling an Idea, while I speak of such exalted Spirits) is their grand Point of View; let not the Spirit of this Nation, tho' baffled by the Defection of pretended Friends be entirely extinct, nor she suffer herself motionless and senseless to be preyed on like a dead and corrupt Carcase, let not they who have been used not to be wanting to their Country's Cause, for ever thro' a Sullenness of Temper gratify those, of whom they most complain by a Despondency and servile Submission. Granting them in Consideration of having used them ill, and at the Persuasion perhaps of those who wish better to the Ministry than they profess the Privilege of using them now as ill as they please to the great De——n of the People, who look upon an Ac———e as an A———n of Measures, and are at Loss to find the meaning of such Proceedings, and account for such Conduct.

It

It is at length to be expected (if there is any) the
fullen Humour will be soon over, when those
who have a true Sense of the Sufferings of their
C—ry, will regard their Country as still entitled
to their Services, and that the Vainness of an
O—— will not be look'd upon as a stronger
Argument now than heretofore.

F I N I S.



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