





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


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THE
S P E E C H
OF
HENRY BROUGHAM, Esq.
BEFORE
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS,
FRIDAY, APRIL 1, 1808,
IN SUPPORT OF
THE PETITIONS
FROM
LONDON, LIVERPOOL AND MANCHESTER,
AGAINST
THE ORDERS IN COUNCIL.

TAKEN IN SHORT-HAND BY
MR. A. FRASER.

LONDON:
PRINTED BY J. M'CREERY,
FOR J. RIDGWAY, OPPOSITE BOND STREET, PICCADILLY.

1808.

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1870

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
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ADVERTISEMENT.

IN reporting this Speech, Mr. Fraser begs the Reader, as well as the Speaker, to excuse any inaccuracies which may have crept in. When they consider the difficulties and inconveniences which a short-hand writer has to encounter, when not authorised by the House itself, in reporting a Speech of three hours length, and aiming at the same time, at accuracy, he flatters himself they will be inclined to make all reasonable allowances. Those who heard the Speech can best estimate the difficulty of doing it justice in a Report. But if Mr. Fraser has not attained complete accuracy, he can at least pledge himself his Report has the advantage of perfect impartiality, which in every Report he presumes to make to the public, is always his first object.

2, Lyon's Inn,
April 13, 1808.



To the Honourable the Commons of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ire-
land, in Parliament assembled.

The Petition of the undersigned Merchants of Liverpool.

HUMBLY SHEWETH,

THAT certain Orders in Council have
been issued by his Majesty bearing date in the month of
November last, from the effect of which your Petitioners
apprehend consequences most injurious and fatal to their
interests.

Your Petitioners therefore pray that they may be
heard by themselves or council at the Bar of this
Honourable House, and be permitted to produce
evidence to shew the great hazard to which the
Interests of your Petitioners are exposed by the said
Orders in Council, and that this Honourable House
will proceed to examine into the nature and extent
of the grievances of which your Petitioners com-
plain in any other mode which may appear most
advisable with a view to afford such relief as to
this Honourable House in its wisdom may seem
meet.

To the Honourable the Commons of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ire-
land, in Parliament assembled.

The Petition of the undersigned Merchants, Manu-
facturers and others of the City of London interested in
the Trade with the United States of America.

HUMBLY SHEWETH,

THAT your Petitioners contemplate with the greatest anxiety and apprehension the alarming consequences with which they are threatened from certain Orders in Council purporting to be issued "For the Protection of the Trade and Navigation of Great Britain," but on which they are induced after mature consideration to believe that they must be productive of the most ruinous effects. Your Petitioners are duly sensible of the necessity of making every sacrifice of personal interest to promote the strength and resources of the country in the present extraordinary crisis of public affairs, and if the total change introduced into the whole Commercial System of this country and of the world by the Orders in Council, could be conducive to so desirable an object, your Petitioners, great as their losses must be, would submit without a murmur—but understanding

that these Orders are principally, if not wholly, recommended by an opinion that they will prove beneficial to the Commercial Interests of this country, they feel it to be their duty humbly to represent their conviction, that this opinion is founded in error, and that if the prayer of their petition be granted they shall be able to prove that they must be productive of the most fatal consequences to the interests, not only of your Petitioners, but of the Commerce and Manufactures of the Empire at large.

Your Petitioners will abstain from enforcing by any details their apprehension, that these measures are likely to interrupt our peace with the United States of America, our intercourse with which, at all times valuable, is infinitely more so since we are excluded from the Continent of Europe. To this only remaining branch of our foreign intercourse, we must now look for a demand for our manufactures, for many of the most important materials for their support, and for supplies of provisions and naval stores necessary for our subsistence and defence. Your petitioners feel assured, that they will be able to prove to the satisfaction of your honorable house, that the neutrality of America has been the means of circulating, to a large amount, articles of the produce and manufactures of this country, in the dominions of our numerous enemies to which we have no direct access.

That the annual value of British manufactures, exported to the United States of America, exceeds ten millions sterling, and

That as our consumption of produce of that country falls far short of that amount, the only means of paying us must arise from the consumption of the produce of America, in other countries, which the operation of the Orders in Council must interrupt, and in most instances totally destroy.

That the people of America, even if they remain at peace with us, must, by a want of demand for their produce, and by the general distress our measures must occasion, be disabled from paying their debts to this country, which may fairly be estimated to amount to the enormous sum of twelve millions sterling.

That the neutrality of America, so far from being injurious to the other Commercial Interests of Great Britain, has promoted materially their prosperity.

That the produce of our Colonies in the West Indies, of our Empire in the East, and of our Fisheries on the Banks of Newfoundland, has frequently found a foreign market by this means, and

That, by the destruction of the neutrality of the only remaining neutral state, all possibility of intercourse with the rest of the world being removed, trade cannot possibly be benefitted, but must necessarily be annihilated.


Your Petitioners feeling, as they do most sensibly, with their fellow subjects, the pressure of a war in which their Commerce has principally been aimed at by the enemy, would scorn to plead their distress in recom-

mentation of measures inconsistent with the honor and substantial interests of their country; but they humbly rely upon the wisdom of the Legislature, that this distress shall not be increased by our own errors, and they confidently believe, that if they are permitted to illustrate by evidence, the facts they here state, and to explain many others which they shall here refrain from enumerating, they cannot fail to establish the conviction with which they are so strongly impressed,

That the Orders in Council are founded on the most mistaken opinions of the Commercial Interests of the Empire, and must be particularly fatal to those of your Petitioners.

Your Petitioners therefore pray, that they may be heard by themselves or counsel, at the bar of this honorable house, and be permitted to produce evidence in support of the allegations of their Petition, or that this honorable house will examine into the nature and extent of their grievances, in any mode which may appear advisable, with a view of affording such relief as this honorable house in its wisdom may think proper.

And your Petitioners will ever pray,



THE SPEECH,

&c. &c.

SIR,

THE evidence for the Petitions being now closed, it remains for me, as shortly as the nature of the case will permit, to state its import to this House. But first of all, you will allow me to express, on the part of the petitioners as well as for myself, the gratitude we feel for the very attentive hearing with which we have been honoured. Whatever may be the fate of these petitions, thus much we have to comfort us, that we have been heard with the attention which the importance of our cause justified us in expecting; and even if we should be turned away from your bar without relief, at least we cannot complain that while standing before you, we have been hardly entreated.

Before entering upon the subject, I may be permitted further to notice certain aspersions which, out of doors, have been cast upon the promoters of these three Petitions. I may affirm once for all, that nothing can be more unfounded than any imputation of factious or discontented views having actuated the movers of this business. Those who best know the individuals who, in London, Liverpool, and Manchester, have promoted this appeal to the Parliament, will be easily satisfied that there is no class of men in the country more averse from impeding the measures of government in the present unparalleled crisis;—more anxious to accommodate their views to those of his Majesty's ministers—or more willing to postpone to a more quiet occasion, any resistance which they might be compelled to make to their proceedings. It is not now for the first time that the petitioners think themselves aggrieved by the measures of government; but until now that they have found those measures pressing upon them with an intolerable weight, they made it a rule to suffer in silence. The Order of the 7th of January 1807, was no light matter to them, either in its substantial effects or in the alarm which it created. Their apprehensions of its effects were great

and serious indeed. But confident that they could lose nothing in the estimation of their country, by delaying to urge any objection to it until they had first tried its operation, and experienced actual injury from it, they waited until, in common with others, they found that the inefficacy of that measure was one of its best recommendations. When these new Orders in Council were issued, it was their purpose to follow the same line of conduct; and after endeavouring to make themselves masters of the meaning of those decrees (an attempt which certainly demanded no trifling degree of attention, and occasioned a very considerable delay) it was much their wish to have found them as harmless as that of the 7th of January;—but, although they are very far from flattering themselves that they yet understand the nature of those Orders of November last, and although they can scarcely hope for the rare good fortune of ever attaining that knowledge, they are satisfied that they have discovered by the effects which they already have produced upon their own concerns, enough of their nature and import to feel that they are utterly ruinous to them. They are persuaded that if they had delayed any longer seeking that redress which they now pray for,

they would only have waited till instead of three petitions, a general clamour would have been raised all over the country, which, if successful, would neither have been convenient for this government, nor productive of a favourable impression upon foreign nations. For these reasons the petitioners have at length resolved to bring forward a statement of their grievances, and appeal to parliament, while yet it may both be safe to hear them, and possible to grant their request.

Sir, it is no doubt possible (although I am most unwilling to anticipate such a thing) that this appeal may be made in vain, and the petitioners sent away from your bar without obtaining redress. Nevertheless it will afford them much satisfaction to reflect, that they have been the means of bringing before you so great a body of important information, for elucidating a subject as difficult as it is momentous, and to know that whatever fate may await their petition they have done their best to enter a lasting protest upon the journals of the country, against measures more dangerous to its prosperity than any that were ever before attempted. Plans of this sort, sir, are not in their nature long-lived; and after these

Orders shall be known no more, or only remembered in the ruinous effects they may have produced; the mass of evidence which the petitioners have piled up at your bar, will remain, not perhaps to deter pernicious schemers from again meddling with the commerce of the country, but surely to warn the country from listening to their councils.

Sir, in proceeding to state the import of this body of evidence it is necessary that I should go back, in the first place, to the decrees of the French government which are stated to have given rise to the measures complained of; and between which and those measures there appears to be some dispute, as to the occasion of the calamities that have arisen.

Late in the year 1806 Bonaparte, in a moment, it should seem, of elation unhappily by no means unnatural in his situation, thought of issuing a decree which might affect the trade and navigation of this country, as extensively as those other decrees which he had issued upon the Continent, and had executed by half a million of armed men. This decree was not then for the first time tried, nor was it accounted by him an experiment of a very novel description, although received in this country.

as something wholly new. It had been repeatedly tried before, and had in every instance manifestly failed. Not to go back to the war of 1739, I may only observe that in the war of 1756, the principle was broadly laid down by the French government, that the seizure of any manufactures or produce of the British dominions should render the whole cargo among which they were found, liable to confiscation. Towards the end of the American war a similar principle was partially attempted to be introduced: but of these I need not say much; for in the course of the Revolution war two decrees similar to the former, though still more near the Berlin decree, were issued. Of these it may be necessary for me to mention the substance. The first of them was issued in 1796, and after a variety of other clauses, it subjects all ships carrying British goods to seizure and detension. We find not merely the detail of the Berlin decree introduced as to the goods, but also the provision requiring a *certificate of origin* (as this document has since been called), which was deemed a *sine qua non* for saving the ship and cargo from detension. A similar decree was issued in 1800, after Bonaparte's arrival in France. It was generally promulgated, and remains, as far as any such decrees can be, in force. In 1797

those belligerent principles were extended from the cargo to affect the ship; and I hold in my hand a decree issued by the council of Five Hundred, enacting that the characters of vessels shall be determined by their cargoes. In consequence of this enactment, every vessel loaded in whole or in part with English goods, was declared lawful prize. The second article declares that no foreign vessel, which in the course of her voyage shall have entered an English port, shall be permitted to enter any port in the French dominions.

It is surely needless for me to prove that, although *these* orders were thus promulgated, they never were executed. I need not bring evidence to shew that *these* commercial decrees were nugatory. After they were issued the progress of our exports proceeded not merely encreasing, but in a short period almost to double the amount of former times. It is notorious that France, in spite of all such prohibitions has been consuming daily more and more of the produce of this country, down to the period of the Berlin edict. But, however inefficacious these boasts may have proved, the enemy, it seems, determined once more to try their effect. He resolved to have another decree, at us and at our trade, expecting per-

haps to frighten, if he could not hurt us. Accordingly, in the month of November 1806, he issued that one which forms the pretext for our orders in council. This decree consists of three branches. It condemns all cargoes of British produce or manufacture; it threatens the seizure of all vessels going to or from England; and it shuts the ports of the enemy against all vessels which have last cleared out from British ports.—It may be asked what chance was there that such a decree as this should succeed? Was it that France had determined suddenly to assemble all her fleets, and venture to send them to sea, which she had not dared to do before? Was it that she then intended to engage all our blockading and cruizing squadrons, which till now she never durst look in the face? Was it that she purposed in this manner to beat us out of the water, and destroy, as it were, our naval superiority?—Or was it that without these preliminary steps, she was by her mere influence and great name upon the Continent of Europe, to stop all vessels sailing upon the sea to or from England, to seize every article of our produce which could be found floating on the ocean, to do that which we, even we, with all our naval superiority, are not able to effect?—Surely if France had not the power

to execute her design in some of these ways, it might have been calmly regarded as a mere empty menace—nay, a stale one too. We might really have hoped, that so vapid and spiritless a boast would not again have taken in those who had been so often before duped into a vain alarm by it. Nevertheless it should seem that the enemy knew us better, for we no sooner heard of it than we fell into our old error of supposing that, because it was a French manifesto, regularly drawn up, and enforced by Bonaparte's power on shore, (where it might produce some effect) therefore it was also to have similar effects by sea.

Sir, until our Orders in Council were issued, it appears clearly, without any reasoning, to any one who looks at the subject, that there was no possibility whatever of Bonaparte putting his threats into execution. But in order to show this more evidently than could possibly be effected by any arguments, we have brought witnesses to your bar, merchants engaged in trade with the Continent, who have been able to state distinctly by dates, names, and circumstances, the manner in which those decrees operated. Too much attention was bestowed upon this evidence to render it necessary for me to recapitulate it.

I shall merely refer shortly to some of those parts where the point in question is clearly made out.

In page 55 of the printed evidence, Mr. White, an Insurance-Broker of the City of London, in answer to a question, whether he had occasion to charter any vessels direct to the Continent after the Berlin decree, states to this house, that he did himself charter two American vessels for Amsterdam, the one in the month of January, and the other in March, 1807, which both arrived safe. From this it appears therefore that four months after the Berlin decree, two vessels were chartered to the Continent, and landed and sold their cargoes in safety at Amsterdam. He says that these vessels were chiefly laden with cotton, produced by America, and the West-Indies: he knew of their being discharged, and that "the ships were paid for their labor," and adds that he was paid his commission as Ship and Insurance-Broker. In short, these voyages were performed safely from one end to the other. In the next page (page 56) the same witness mentions, first, that American vessels prior to last November used to clear out regularly from this country to the Continent, and there land their cargoes; and se-

condly, that a considerable quantity of West-India produce had been taken over in American vessels, subsequent to the Berlin decree in November 1806. The same witness in page 57, mentions other instances of voyages having been performed since that decree, and some in which the cargoes of the vessels had gone to the ports of Spain in spite of the Spanish decree issued in terms of the Berlin decree, and with cargoes of British East-India produce on board. On being asked whether any considerable branch of trade was carried on in this way, he distinctly adds that other brokers as well as himself had transacted similar business, and that this sort of intercourse with the Continent has been considerable.

The evidence of Mr. Bell, whose distinct and full testimony must be in the recollection of this House, was very strong to the same points. I shall only refer to pages 52 and 53, in which Mr. Bell gives us two extracts from letters which he had received from his correspondents on the Continent. On being asked if he had lately received letters from his correspondents in Holland, touching the execution of the commercial decrees in that country, he stated that he had received a letter from his friends in Rotterdam, dated the 7th

of September, containing these words: " We
 " are able to assure you the late decree does
 " not effect Americans that may have called
 " in England, provided they have not loaded
 " in England, and that they declare the last
 " port they came from." The decree here
 alluded to was subsequent to the first Dutch
 edict, and was issued for the purpose of ef-
 fecting a more rigorous execution of it.—
 He was asked, "Have you received any
 " letter since from Holland?" To this he
 answered that he had one dated 22nd of Sep-
 tember, from the same house saying, "We re-
 " peat, ships touching in England are received
 " here as before." Subsequent even to this
 date it appears that he received one. It was
 dated 29th of October, only a fortnight be-
 fore our orders in council, and concluded by
 saying, "Prices meantime seem at their le-
 " vel without some new difficulty or broil,"
 meaning, as Mr. Bell said, "if nothing new
 " had occurred." From this it is obvious
 that since the writer's last letter, being the one
 just now quoted, no new execution of these
 decrees had been attempted, otherwise prices
 could never have kept at their former level.

So far as to the evidence of Mr. Bell. I
 come next to call the attention of this Com-

mittee to the testimony of Mr. Glennie. After mentioning a variety of cases, in which the Merchants had been deceived in their expectations or belief of the execution of the French decree, by the temporary detension of neutral vessels, and afterwards been undeceived by the subsequent release of those vessels at first supposed to have been condemned, Mr. Glennie said that he knew of no one instance wherein the Berlin decree had been carried into execution upon neutral vessels in France. It appears that this gentleman had various correspondents in various parts of the Continent, who wrote to him, not merely touching his own commercial concerns, but also upon matters in which he was indirectly or eventually interested. They gave him the political news of the day so far as they themselves were in possession of it; and so far as it bore upon the interests of trade. And notwithstanding this extensive correspondence, he never had received any one notice of a condemnation during the whole year that had elapsed between the Berlin and the English decrees. From Mr. Glennie's evidence then it appears that there was no intention in France to execute those edicts—for this was a branch of them which she had it in her power to enforce. The whole of

Mr. Glennie's evidence upon this point is to be found in pages 28, 31, 32, 65 and 67, but more particularly in pages 68 and 69, where it will be found that he gives those pointed excerpts which I have before alluded to. A decree had been issued in Holland, closing the Dutch ports and laying an embargo on their own trade for the better carrying those measures into execution—a measure framed in something of the spirit of our own Orders. In allusion to this decree, Mr. Glennie's correspondent says on the 26th of February, 1808, that “the sole object of this letter is “to inform you that all vessels arrived since “the promulgation of the decrees mentioned “in our foregoing, are now released, and even “several which have been for many months “detained in Flushing, on their way to Antwerp, have also got permission to proceed “thither and discharge their cargoes.” In page 68, there is another extract of a letter bearing still more directly on the point, and Mr. Glennie states that this information had been confirmed by letters dated on the 25th and 26th of February.

The whole of these witnesses, the House will remember, were not merely examined by me, but pretty fully *cross examined*; and

in regard to Mr. Glennie in particular, although it might have appeared at first that he was wavering from his original position, yet I defy any man to discover one single atom of contradiction to the broad general assertion with which he set out. He no less than four times in the course of his examination, read his extract from the letter which states that all the vessels arrived since the promulgation of the decrees had been released, and he rigidly adhered to his first interpretation of it, that it meant that many vessels which had been detained at Flushing, were allowed to proceed on their voyage previous to the orders in council, but long subsequent to the Berlin decree.—The evidence of Mr. Mullett and Mr. Mann, strongly confirms that of Mr. Bell and Mr. Glennie, containing, with a few trifling alterations, merely a repetition of what had been formerly said upon the same point. The testimony of these gentlemen is to be found at pages 92 and 60.

It thus appears, sir, by the evidence of some of the most respectable brokers and merchants of this country, that the Berlin decree was so little executed, that vessels under American colours cleared out to ports of the

enemy's country in spite of that, and all the other decrees. But there is other evidence of a less direct nature substantiating this important proposition. I should mention first as to the indirect evidence of the non-execution of the Berlin decree, that remittances came over from the Continent to merchants in this country, some of them Members of this House, during the year after that decree, in the same manner, and in at least as great abundance as at any former period. Mr. Glennie said that he was accustomed to receive in former years half a million in remittances from the Continent; and being asked, not by me, but in his cross-examination, if he had experienced a defalcation subsequent to that Berlin decree, answered distinctly, that on the contrary, he had never before received so much by a hundred thousand pounds as during the year after the Berlin decree was promulgated. The other witnesses state the same thing. But I only refer to Mr. Glennie's details which will be found in pages 23 and 65.

Mr. Glennie also stated to you in detail, the amount of the sums which he paid in different years for postages in the course of his extensive dealings as a merchant. In page 65, you

have it in evidence that his whole postage account for the year 1805 amounted to 455*l*. In the year 1806 (being the year before the Berlin decree) it amounted to 515*l*. and in the year 1807, to 640*l*. Now as the Berlin decree was supposed to put a stop to all neutral commerce between England and the Continent, and as this gentleman's postage is chiefly created by receiving remittances for goods arriving in the hostile countries, it was to be expected in consequence of that Berlin decree being executed so rigorously as the defenders of our orders contend, that Mr. Glennie's postage account would have suffered a serious defalcation. No such thing—on the contrary, in 1807, the year after this frightful and well-executed decree, he appears to have paid 640*l*. being about one-fourth more than he had paid the year before it was issued, and double the increase of his account in any former years.

Those merchants, sir, act in some sort, as bankers on account of American concerns, answering drafts made on them in favor of our manufacturers. When there is any interruption in the trade with the Continent, of course Mr. Glennie and others scruple to honour those drafts on American account, un-

less they be safe in doing so by having funds in their own hands. It is therefore a test of the execution of the enemy's decrees to enquire how these gentlemen answered the drafts subsequently presented to them. Mr. Glennie states that subsequent to the issuing of the Berlin decree, he continued to answer drafts on American account, although he had not the sums in his hands, trusting, not, as a speculative man, but with that sort of confidence belonging to a practical merchant—a confidence of whose practical nature he gave the best pledge by staking thousands of pounds daily upon it—trusting I say with this sort of confidence, that the Berlin decree was of no avail whatever against our trade. Had it been otherwise he would have altered his line of conduct in the same manner as I shall show you he afterwards did when you issued your famous Orders in Council.

The only other symptom, with which I shall trouble you, of the non-execution of this Berlin decree, is derived from the criterion of Insurance; and it is the more necessary to call your attention to this point, as in no one branch of the whole of a subject eminent for deception and fallacy of statement, has more gross misrepresentation been resorted

to, than on the question of insurance. With a view to meet these daring mis-statements, I have been influenced in the construction of the evidence as to the rates of insurance. Mr. Martin, page 45; Mr. Mullett, page 91; Mr. Hinckley, page 72; and Mr. White, page 55, of the printed statement, show by their evidence that on neither branch of the trade aimed at in the Berlin decree, did any permanent rise take place in the rate of insurance. It will be sufficient for me, in order to correct the misrepresentations to which I have alluded, if I call your attention to the testimony of any one of these gentlemen. I may take at random the first that occurs. In page 45 of the printed evidence, the house will perceive that questions were put to Mr. Martin with a view to bring to a determination, this point respecting the rate of insurance. He was asked, whether, in his knowledge and in the course of his practice as a merchant, shipping to America and chartering and insuring vessels, he had found that the rate of insurance rose after the Berlin decree, upon voyages in American ships from this country to America and back again; and this question was put to him because it was said that a rise from two to three guineas, or one half, had taken place upon this voyage—as if the power of the

French navy was so considerable in the Atlantic, that it could make a difference of fifty per cent. in the rate of insurance against French cruisers, employed in executing the Berlin decree—as if the bare promulgation of that decree had at once swept the sea clean of our ships, and given over into the enemy's hands, all the neutral trade that remained. Mr. Martin, as well as all the other witnesses, stated, that there is a rise every winter in consequence of sea risque, the summer rate being from two to two and a half, and that of the winter from three to three and a half per cent. But was there an additional or extraordinary rise in the year after the Berlin decree—in the year 1807? Mr. Martin says that there was not; but that the premiums were much the same as in 1806, that is, the summer two and a half, and the winter three and sometimes four guineas premium.

The news of the Berlin decree reached Liverpool on the 11th of December 1806, and on the 13th of that month Mr. Martin had occasion to effect an insurance on an American risque: it was from America to Liverpool, and was done at three guineas per cent.—Then had the *Berlin decree* raised the insurance? So far from it, the premium on the very same

voyage, as appears from the evidence, was exactly the sum of three guineas per cent. in the year before. Upon being further questioned whether any rise did at all take place, he says, some little rise was occasioned at first, after the knowledge of the Berlin decree came to Liverpool; but that was a temporary effect: thus he believed the premium would have been five guineas per cent. upon the same voyage outwards, but on the 13th of February the insurance was effected upon the same vessels at three guineas per cent, being the common winter premium. The same fact is fully established, not only by the evidence of Mr. Martin, but also by that of Mr. Shakespear Phillips, Mr. Alexander White, Mr. Henry Hinckley, and all the other gentlemen who have been interrogated upon the subject. It appears that most men were alarmed at first; and while the meaning and probable consequences of the decree were unknown, a somewhat higher premium for insuring to America was demanded accordingly; but in less than a fortnight, nay, in a week's time, Mr. Phillips tells you, the premium tumbled down to its former rate of two or two and a half in summer, and three or three and a half in winter:—and therefore I conclude that the statement is radically erroneous, however often

repeated, and with whatever confidence pressed upon you, for the purpose of bearing out that most incredible of all propositions, that the fears or alarms excited by the name of the French navy in the Atlantic, in defiance of our own navy as well as that of the neutrals, made a difference, at once, of fifty per cent upon the rate of insurance against its depredations. This is proved to be as radically false in point of fact, when those different rates of insurance are investigated, and the figures and dates appealed to, as it is monstrously absurd when looked at by itself, or attempted to be enforced by argument.

Now, sir, as to the other branch of the Berlin decree which precludes vessels that have touched at a British port from entering a Continental port, and condemns them when found any where with British manufactures or produce on board.—The evidence here in so far as regards insurances, although not equally distinct, still tends clearly to substantiate my arguments, and to shew that this branch of the decree was never enforced. I have no objection whatever to admit that there is a very considerable difference between that branch which attempted to intercept the direct communication between this

country and America, and that part which requires no navy to execute it, but may be carried into effect in the country subject to the enemy, by filling the ports with bodies of soldiers, and drawing a *cordon* round the coast. It was not, sir, to be expected that this threat should be as utterly incapable of execution as the other, had the enemy been so disposed: but I have only to refer to the evidence of Mr. Bell, Mr. Glennie, and others, to show you that the enemy were not inclined to enforce it. At least, it appears that whatever Bonaparte may have done in France, (although even there Mr. Glennie denies that he ever knew one instance of a condemnation) yet in the ports of Holland, to which our manufactures and our produce had been during many years past introduced to a great extent for the supply of the Continent, no steps were taken to enforce this decree. The evidence tends distinctly to prove that its provisions were not enforced. The proof drawn from the state of insurance has evinced this, although, as I said before, the correspondence has not been so frequent, and we have not been able to produce so many sums, dates, or transactions upon this point. The evidence from insurance, therefore, is not so much

multiplied upon this branch of the decree as upon the former; but that I conceive not to be of much importance when it is considered that all the effects as to remittances, postage, accepting of drafts, make out my proposition. Besides that the insurances themselves, in so far as we have produced evidence thereupon by witnesses who have been examined, aye, sir, and *cross-examined* too, by the house, show that the proof here also sets in strongly in the same direction. This being the case, I am entitled here to dismiss the subject of the Berlin and other decrees with this one remark, that there is not only no evidence of those measures having been enforced, but every argument and fact against the power of the enemy to urge them in some respects, and in others to show that he had no desire to do so. The evidence of former decrees never having been executed, is entirely of the same sort, and our past experience affords us every argument to show that they were incapable of execution. Our experience, I say, affords us evidence that neutrals will of themselves continue to evade those decrees as long as you yourselves facilitate that evasion. From the facts produced by the testimony of the witnesses who have been examined and *cross-examined*, a

consistent statement is made out, that those new decrees of the enemy have been nothing but as so much waste paper; in other words that they are a repetition of the ancient, unprofitable, and vapid gasconade of the French government. It shews us that these decrees had not and could not have had any effect, but to evince to the world that Bonaparte had some desires which he could not gratify; one scheme, at least, which he could not compass—and that with respect to this country, they were of no strength or avail whatever, until we ourselves lent our aid to them by our own vigorous measures.

I now come, sir, to the fatal part of the case set forth in the petitions now upon your table. I think I can prove, sir, that we ourselves, blinded and alarmed by the empty menaces of the enemy, which we had often before experienced to be ineffectual, terrified by vain fears which we could not describe, and arguing from the very uncertainty of the darkness in which we were, that some evil was impending, we knew not what, countersigned all the decrees of the enemy—backed their futile threats with our real and solid orders—carried them triumphantly into execution by our all powerful navy—

and reduced the commerce of the country, to that state, to that pitch of degradation, to which, he, our inveterate enemy, had wished, but in vain wished, by those decrees to reduce it, and to which by no other earthly power but our own could he have succeeded in bringing it. Sir, I am now to call the attention of the house to the orders in council that have been lately issued by the present government, as they affect the foreign trade of this country; and I have to lament exceedingly upon the part of the petitioners, to whom the truth of the statement I am about to make is a matter of most serious concern indeed, that you are now to contemplate the very reverse of the picture which I have hitherto brought before you. You have seen that attempts have frequently been made by the enemy to ruin our trade, but that they always proved abortive. You are now to exchange that for another prospect, and view the attacks made upon our commerce by our own force and by our own wisdom—that force, and that wisdom, which had in every former instance succeeded in frustrating all invasions of our country—repelling all attacks on our trade—turning the commerce of neutrals into the channels most beneficial to

our interests—and converting to our own purposes, the very bitterest decrees of the French themselves. You will find that in every quarter we have, by our Orders in Council, been crossing and striking in with the enemy's plans, and supplying those deficiencies, in their orders, which they in vain attempted to make up. You will see too what the result has been—that the commerce of this once flourishing country is now brought down to a state lower than it ever was expected to reach, even by the most gloomy prophets, in the worst times of our history.

If we now pursue that order which I before followed, and examine this point by the tests formerly applied to the execution of the Berlin decree, we shall first be led to the state of remittances from the Continent. Let me here refer the house to the general testimony of all the witnesses engaged in the American trade, for a knowledge of the particular course of commerce, which we carry on with America by means of the Continent. The manufactures of this country being bought up by the merchants, (in some few instances they are exported by the manufacturers themselves) are sent over to America, at two seasons in the year, in what are called by all the wit-

nesses, the *spring* and *fall*-shipments. I shall not attend to the latter, but shall take the instances of the spring shipments, in order to elucidate this subject. The orders for these are begun to be received and executed pretty early in the month of November. In December, and part of January, the transmission and preparation of the orders proceeds, and before the end of the month of January, each year, the orders for the spring shipments may be said to be almost completed. Sometimes, indeed, they encroach a little upon the month of February, but substantially you may take it, as proved by all the witnesses, that the orders are wholly received before the middle of the month of January. The goods that are thus sent to America are chiefly manufactures peculiar to this country; for example, those of Manchester, which, indeed, are shipped by no set of men to a greater extent, than by the petitioners now at your bar. The payment of the goods thus sent over is made in a comparatively small proportion in American produce, chiefly cotton and tobacco, shipped directly from America to this country. This proportion amounts in general to about one part in three, which I will show if the house will favor me with its attention, when I state for

one year the course of American trade with the British empire; for that will be a more satisfactory argument, and go a greater way in demonstrating the necessity of the continuance of such a trade, than if I were to attempt describing it in any other manner.

In 1804, according to the official accounts printed in America, by order of the houses of Congress, there were shipped from America to England, or I should rather say to the British dominions in Europe, American produce to the amount of nearly three millions sterling, viz. 2,971,462*l.* reckoning dollars at the usual rate of 4*s.* 6*d.* sterling. From the same part of our dominions there appear to have gone over to America, in that year, goods to the amount of 6,213,645*l.* The exports from America to the British East Indies amounted in the same year to 29,500*l.* and the imports to America from thence amounted to nearly one million sterling, being 979,488*l.* The exports from the United States to the British settlements in North America amounted to 253,627*l.* and the imports from the latter to 178,135*l.* This balance, however, in favor of America on the trade with our Northern colonies, is only an apparent one. The sums which I

have read are taken from the duties on importation, and Plaster of Paris, the chief article brought into the United States from our settlements, being absolutely necessary to the American farmer in the cultivation of his land, is not taxed, and of course, is omitted in the estimate. It amounts to greatly more than the rest of the imports from Canada, &c. and leaves the balance here, as in general, against America. The exports to the British West Indies, during the same year, amounted to 1,585,722*l.* and the imports from thence in return were 1,066,316*l.* On this head then there appears to be a balance to a considerable amount in favor of the United States. But from this must be deducted the real balance on the New Brunswick trade, at whatever it may be estimated, and even admitting the full balance as now stated, of nearly half a million on the West Indian branch of the account, the whole trade between America and our dominions gives a large excess of imports from us, over what we take in return. For even on this view of the account, the total amount of the exports from America to the British empire, in the year 1804, will be 4,840,058*l.* and the amount of the imports into the United States from the British Empire, 8,437,984*l.* being

about double the former sum. This great balance is moreover rapidly increasing; for, by taking the average of the years 1802, 1803, and 1804, we find that the excess of imports above exports was only three millions instead of four millions and a half, to which it had risen in 1804.

The accounts, sir, on the table of this house confirm these statements taken from the American official documents. I hold in my hand a paper ordered to be printed on the 15th of March, and giving the value of imports from the United States, and exports thither, for the years 1805, 1806, and 1807. It appears from this document, that in 1806, the imports from America to Great Britain amounted, to 4,360,743*l.* real value, and that the exports from Great Britain to the United States, in the same year, amounted to 12,865,551*l.* If it be asked why I do not take the statement in 1807, I have to mention that we in fact imported six millions and a half, during that year, but that two months of the operation of the orders in council fall to be computed in this calculation, and their operation raised the sum two millions above the preceding year. If, therefore, I were to take the year 1807, in order

to calculate the average, or usual importation, I should be adopting a very unfair criterion of this importation, because it is an unnatural, forced sum. But even if we take the average of those three years I have mentioned, viz. 1805, 1806, and 1807, we find the exports to the United States of America amount to upwards of twelve millions sterling, and the average of imports to upwards of four millions and a half; and as the disproportion is increasing, we may say in general, that this country now exports to America three times as much as she imports from thence.

Having gone through this essential part of the subject, sir, at much greater length than I could have wished, I have just to ask the house this one question—Are you willing to continue exporting to America, twelve millions and a half of British produce and manufacture, or are you not?—If you are, how are you to be paid for it? It is evident, that you only receive four millions direct from America; therefore there are no less than eight millions wanting, and America, we all know, can only pay you by trading with the Continent. If you wish to cut up that trade by the roots, you commit that old solecism

of power, as my Lord Bacon so well calls it;—you wish to command the end, but you refuse to submit to the means. You desire to trade with the United States of America; but you desire, at the same time, to lop off their trade, with the enemy, as you call it, which is in other words lopping off the very commerce which you carry on with your enemy, in spite of the war, and in spite of himself—by which you were getting eight millions sterling each year—by which you were enabled to continue a trading nation. You are destroying the only means by which America can pay that enormous amount to you. She must have the opportunity, not only of taking your goods, but of exporting her own, in order to pay you. She must not only export her own goods, she must also re-export yours with them, in order that you may still send them to your enemy, notwithstanding the hostilities you are engaged in—notwithstanding the decrees he is threatening your trade with.—So stands the matter in argument, or if you will in theory, and I now invite this house to say, whether it is possible for them to conceive any thing more precise and conclusive than the evidence which has been adduced at your bar, to shew that this is also

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the matter of fact, from the actual history of our trade with America.

The witnesses most largely engaged in this commerce told you repeatedly, (and it was so uniformly stated by each of them, in answer to the same question, that it is unnecessary for me to quote from the testimony of them all,) they all concurred in telling you that they received remittances in payment of goods sent to America, from merchants acting as bankers for Americans in this country. Beside this, we have called those bankers to your bar and have asked them how they came to be possessed of their remittances. They have told you that they have two ways of receiving the funds drawn upon by our manufacturers; that they get part, and but a small part, in goods, directly from the United States, and another part, which is by far the greatest part, in remittances from Europe, by bills arising from the sale of American produce on the Continent, made payable to manufacturers and exporters of manufactured goods here. Mr. Bell has stated these remittances as forming two parts in three of the whole account. Mr. Glennie has told you that they are ten times more than he receives in the direct way from America; and

Mr. Mann states them at three parts in five: They have said, that with these funds they sometimes answer bills drawn in favor of the manufacturers in this country, and at other times balance accounts with the United States. And being asked whether they only accepted those bills in consequence of the remittances in their hands—they said they freely accepted such bills, trusting to the continuance of the trade by which they had formerly received payment; and for the majority of their correspondents, they always accepted bills, whether they had goods already in their hands or not, when they knew consignments continued to be made as before to the Continent.

Now, sir, apply to the English decrees, those tests,—the amount of remittances, and the willingness of merchants to accept bills; which you have already applied to the execution of the Berlin decree, and then tell me what you think is the effect of the Orders in Council upon our Foreign trade. You will find it the very contrary of that which might have been expected by the sanguine projectors of the new system. Applicable to this subject, you will find among others the very distinct testimony of Mr. Glennie, in pages 24, 26, and 31. This gentleman told you, as I formerly observ-

ed, that the year after the Berlin decree, so far from having received less from the Continent on American account, he had received one-fifth more than in any former year. How much then did he receive since the Orders in Council? Compare the months January and February, 1807, with the same months in 1808, and this will be the test of the effect of the Orders in Council upon his trade. He answers, that in the months of January and February, 1807, the amount of the remittances he received was about 103,000*l.* In consequence of those boasted measures of wisdom and vigour which were to bring all the trade of America with the Continent through your ports, one would suppose he should have received 200,000*l.* in the same period of the subsequent year.—No such thing.—He received only 34,000*l.*! Does he expect even this pittance in the next two months?—Far from it. He tells you this is the last he shall receive; it is the arrears or balance of the former accounts, and no new one can be opened.—Such then is the effect of the Orders in Council upon Mr. Glennie's traffic; he receives instead of 103,000*l.* the sum of 34,000*l.* and in the next two months he cannot receive a shilling. In every cross-question that was put to him, he not only ad-

hered to the statement which he had made, but put it in a stronger and stronger light, if possible, as he proceeded. This plain fact, made out by his testimony, as well as that of all the other witnesses called to your bar, evinces to demonstration, that while the Orders in Council continue, you must continue to be cut off from receiving remittances, and that you are consequently with your own right-hand, cutting off, by two-thirds, your vast traffic with America.

Having stated the substance of Mr. Glenie's evidence, it would be in vain to go through that of the other witnesses. It was proved that bills were refused on account of the want of remittances. The particulars of those bills, and the sums for which they were drawn, were stated at your bar. In this unprecedented state of things, an unheard of practice appears to have crept into the course of commercial transactions. The statement of insolvency or no funds, is the usual ground of protesting or refusing bills; but the reason in this case is, not that the drawees are insolvent; not that they have any fears of the insolvency of the drawers—for they had an entire confidence in the solvency of their correspondents: but that they had

no funds in their hands, and expected to get none; and knowing well the cause of all this, they wrote down on the protest, that they could not accept these bills "*because of the Orders in Council!*" If the House wish to see the evidence upon these points, they have only to consult that of Mr. Glennie, in pages 24, 26, and 31, and that of Mr. Bell, pages 34 and 38; and for the evidence respecting the refusal of bills, they have only to consult the evidence of Mr. Mullett, in page 92, that of Mr. Glennie, in page 26, and that of Mr. Oxley, in page 86. You will find by their testimony, that they all concur in stating the fact I have mentioned, that from the Orders in Council have risen the stoppage of remittances, and the refusal of bills drawn upon the faith of them.

Now I may be allowed to allude on this branch of the case to the real and permanent variation that has, at length, taken place in the rate of insurance. It is *now* nothing extravagant, nor is it any misrepresentation, as it formerly was, to state that a great and steady rise has taken place in the premium. The witnesses, to whose evidence I formerly referred on this point, concur in stating that a permanent rise has *now* taken place in the

rate of insurance from this country to America and back again, although not a considerable one: but that a great rise has taken place upon the insurance of neutral vessels bound from this country to the Continent. Instead of doing it at six guineas, the premium demanded now is thirty-five guineas; and it appears from the evidence of Mr. White, (an insurance-broker, largely concerned in trade to the Continent—a smuggling trade of which his answers lead us to believe that this witness knows a good deal more than he is willing to tell you) that he goes upon the 'Change offering upwards of 35*l.* per cent. to insure American vessels to Amsterdam, but that it cannot be done; in short, that this trade is as good as finished. The British clause has shared the same fate. That clause which formerly used to be valued at two or three guineas, by which an American was accustomed to be insured against the effects of British capture, costs now more than ninety guineas; in short, no British clause can now be under-written. So different is an English naval decree from a French one in its execution and effects! It is only for the purpose of shewing this wide difference that I mention the fact. The French decree has been foolishly and falsely said to have raised the rate of insurance

from two to three guineas, while the English ones it is evident, have actually raised it from two to ninety guineas; and it is well known that at that rate nothing can be done. Although the trade to the Continent continued to go on in spite of the enemy's decrees, yet it would appear that the English Orders in Council are not of so little avail; they have at once cut up by the roots, the whole commerce of the country—they will not permit American vessels to go direct to France, nor to other parts of the Continent, for they have created a refusal to under-write the risque of such a voyage—and this proves that it is one and the same thing for us to issue and to enforce our edicts against our own trade—which France cannot touch a ton of by all her decrees.

Sir, I have shewn that the trade between America and the Continent, is quite as essential to this country as it is to America, inasmuch as we must lose two-thirds of our payments the moment it ceases. But I must now remark that it is impossible we should get even that third part of our payment which remains, if the Orders in Council and the measures arising out of them continue to be acted upon. Mr. Bell says that as long as those

Orders subsist he may ship goods to America to the amount of the direct payment which comes over in American produce, but that this produce will be deprived of nine-tenths of its value; and therefore instead of continuing to trade to the amount of even one third, we cannot trade to the amount of the thirtieth or the three hundredth part of what we formerly did; for, unless we chuse to be paid in tobacco which will lose nearly all its value, or cotton which will lose its whole value, or any thing else of no earthly use or worth, we have no prospect of continuing, even to the sorry amount of one third part, our former trade to America. Therefore, sir, I say that in every point of view in which we can look at this new system of commercial regulation, we see but one effect, namely, that of ruining and cutting off, root and branch, the whole of our traffic with the United States of America, or in other words, I may say, the whole of our foreign trade.

An attempt has been made to impute this stoppage of the trade with America, not to our Orders in Council, but to the American Embargo and Non-importation Act; and now I entreat the attention of the House while I endeavour to show that there is no reason

whatever for imputing this failure to the American Embargo. The evidence of Mr. Martin in pages 49, 50, 80, and 81, was directed to this purpose. After having explained that the orders for the spring-shipment were generally as good as finished before the middle of January each year, it is only necessary for me to state that the news of the Embargo did not reach those parts of the country likely to be affected by it before the middle of January ; so that the orders for the last spring shipments could never have been touched by it. Mr. Martin states that it was previous to the 26th of the month of January, that all shipments ought to have been prepared, or orders given, and that the defalcation for the last shipment had entirely taken place before that date. That defalcation amounted nearly to the whole extent ; and he leaves you to draw the inference, that it could have been owing solely to the Orders in Council.—This gentleman having visited the town of Birmingham since the Orders in Council had been issued, and having enquired how the shipments there had been affected by them, he found they were doing nothing and meant to do nothing in regard to spring shipments. He was at Birmingham a fortnight before the 26th of January, when he first heard of the American

Embargo, and of consequence long before it could be known in Warwickshire.—Mr. Oxley tells you that from fifty hands whom he formerly employed, he was under the necessity of reducing his number, and now only employed nine or ten; and latterly had reduced his finishers from twelve to three or four. He adds that such was the case with all his acquaintance and neighbours in the same employment; in short, that business was at a stand; that nothing could be done for the American market; and that no preparations for shipment could be made, which otherwise ought and would have been made previous to the 26th of January. The same gentleman also informs you that this branch of trade was entirely suspended, although the American Embargo was then utterly unknown in that part of the country; and that the whole work in the West riding, for the foreign market is at a dead stand.—The testimony of Mr. James Palmer informs you that instead of paying to his workmen 200*l.* per week, he was under the necessity of reducing it to 50*l.* from November, though he only learnt the news of the Embargo in January.—With this short statement of that part of the case, I leave it to you, sir, to answer the question whether it be possible to confound by reason or ingenuity, or even by assertion,

(which has been so much more lavishly used than any thing else on the other side) to confound the effects of the American measures and our own.

It would appear, sir, that without any evidence at all, one simple consideration is enough to show in what manner the Orders in Council, crossing, as Mr. Bell aptly expressed it, the French decrees, must have ruined our commerce with foreign parts, not only interrupting our trade with America, but also cutting off that great contraband trade which used formerly to be carried on through the Americans, between us and our enemies,—softening the hardships of war, and making them fall as lightly upon us as on the enemy,—on us to whom trade is every thing, as on him who, having little or none of his own, was most deeply interested in surrendering his share, could he but hope thereby to take from us ours.—What does the French decree enact? That no neutral vessels shall enter the ports of France which has cleared out from an English port. Now, let us suppose your Orders in Council had never been thought of, and that this decree had been left to its fate; an American vessel sailing from this country, say from Yarmouth, arrives, say at Bordeaux. She is

asked where she came from: but do you suppose that the captain, the *American* captain, would say he came from Yarmouth? Can we believe that the captain would tell a truth which he knew must have ruined him? Would a captain in that situation be so scrupulous in telling the truth, because a French prefect chose to ask the question for the purpose of seizing his ship and cargo. (*Here there was some murmur on the ministerial side of the house.*)—Sir, I am taking the very view of the American character which the authors of the Orders in Council are the first to support. —I am only presuming that the neutral flag may be guilty of covering some commercial frauds.—I repeat it, the American captain would speedily have found out or created some way of making the worthy prefect not quite so sharp in his enquiries, so unwilling to be deceived. He would have landed his cargo with the same facility as formerly, both during the whole of last war, and during the present, up to the period of these decrees.—But it is a very different thing indeed when there are English Orders in Council declaring that no American shall sail directly from America to any port in Europe, but shall come here first, and then continue the voyage. *Now* the French prefect need not even put the question, whence do you come? He knows that the captain of

the American vessel *must* have come from Yarmouth or some other British port; and were it possible for any one captain to deceive him, another American captain would be stopped short, as the prefect must soon be convinced that it was impossible any considerable number of ships should thus elude our cruisers. He would say, were such an attempt now made to deceive him, “There is a powerful British navy in existence,—we have proof of it every hour,—we know that it has scoured the seas of our vessels, and much more will it prevent your’s from sailing. There are Orders in Council issued by those who have this immense navy to back them. Such Orders are not waste paper like our good Berlin decree.—I know they are enforced.—I know you cannot evade them.”—Thus would the French prefect assure himself that the American captain could not by possibility have come over direct from the United States, and this assurance would necessarily become stronger and stronger every time that an American attempted to impose upon the worthy magistrate.—Is it not therefore self-evident that the Orders in Council, known as they have been by every French prefect, in every port of France, in every port under the influence of France, from Hamburg to Brest and from Brest to Carthage, nay, to Con-

stantinople, and understood to be rigorously executed by us, must have fully enabled those functionaries to do through you what they could not possibly without your aid have done,—to seize the American cargoes, and confiscate them and the vessels under the Berlin and other decrees? Sir, this short and summary view of the measure, even without the aid of the statement so satisfactorily set forth in the evidence before you, will, I trust, prove sufficiently decisive to entitle me to leave this branch of the argument without one further comment, and to affirm that I have completely demonstrated a proposition at first sight rather paradoxical, that England has, by her own measures, effectually, strictly, *vigorously*, countersigned the enemy's edict.

The house will do me the justice to recollect that I have uniformly been treating this question as it has been made out by the evidence at your bar, and have abstained from stating any argument unless grounded upon the supposition that the Americans acquiesced in the Orders in Council. I have indeed a large case before me, were I disposed to enquire into the probability of their resisting our measures, and to prove how much more likely they are to persist in their Embargo than acquiesce in your decrees, by calling wit-

nesses to show what the effects of that Embargo would be upon our trade.—But I have uniformly proceeded upon the supposition that the Embargo is to be revoked, and that the Americans have acquiesced in your decrees—I say, I have stuck to the proof of this proposition, that if that Embargo were revoked to-morrow, and the Orders in Council still continued in force, they must be the means of ruining the commerce of the country. Now, I am to show you more distinctly how merchants are affected by that Embargo, and how by the Orders in Council, independent of, and contrasted with, the Embargo. I am to set forth to you their apprehensions upon this supposition—to point out how it affects them in their mercantile transactions—and consequently to show you in the strictest possible mode, what effect your own measures *alone* will have on the trade of the country. The evidence of Mr. Bell, in pages 34 and 53, is what I particularly request the house may attend to on this point. I put the case to that gentleman: Suppose the American Embargo were removed as to the Continent, but not as to this country, and the Orders in Council to be revoked—and I then asked whether he would resume his exports to America? Mr. Bell, one of the greatest exporters to

America in this country, and a partner of the largest Virginia house in London, states in answer, that he certainly would begin again to export in such a case to America, and to a greater extent than if the embargo were removed as to this country and continued as to the Continent. On being asked his reason for saying so, he states, that he conceives the Americans could not pay us for more than one third of the manufactured goods exported from this country without the market of the Continent, as we consume very little of their produce ourselves. On being asked if he had written to his correspondents in America, respecting the shipments of the American produce to be sent to this country, he says that he has. To what effect has he written? He has desired that if America should think proper notwithstanding those Orders in Council to continue her trade with this country, his correspondents should nevertheless suspend for the present all business. The reasons he states are, that the produce they would send in return would not net any thing at all; he conceives that he must even get himself into debt by paying the necessary charges. Mr. Bell has been asked what would he do supposing the Embargo was wholly removed, and the Orders in Council continued; he answers,

E.

that he might ship in the expectation that the Embargo would be taken off; but he still desires his correspondents or customers to be ruled in their conduct solely by looking at the Orders in Council. "Never mind the Embargo," says he, "dont look to any American or French decree, but so long as you see our government persist in those Orders in Council, do nothing,—stir not a step while they continue in force: it is these that molest us—these that render all traffic impossible, although the Americans should be reconciled to us—allied to us—although they should become fond of this country." The reason for this being asked, it was repeated as formerly—it was the very reason which I have so often urged to you this night. In page 53 Mr. Bell was again questioned, but more particularly to this effect: "You told the house that you were a great shipper of goods to America, and were paid partly by consignments of American produce, and partly by remittances of bills to the Continent on American account; now suppose the Embargo were to continue in America with respect to this country, and further, that the Orders in Council in this country were revoked, would you under these circumstances resume the shipments

“from this country to America?” He answers that he should resume his shipments to a great extent were this country to permit the trade from America to the Continent. What! would you resume your shipments, whether the embargo were continued or not, provided the Orders in Council are revoked? Yes, because I should get the two thirds as before, although the remaining one-third should be wholly stopped, or as is most likely, brought here by a circuitous channel.—This intelligent witness was then questioned as follows, and I beg your attention, sir, most particularly to it.—Suppose that the embargo in America were removed altogether, both as it respects the Continent and as it affects this country, and suppose, that in this case the Orders in Council were continued, would you resume your shipments? “No,” says Mr. Bell, “I would not.”—What! although the embargo were removed, and although there were nothing to frighten you in America from trading freely to that country?—Certainly not, because the Orders in Council, by this supposition, are to be continued—those orders in council, which are established for the purpose of retaliation upon our enemy, of retorting upon him the evils of his own injustice, as the order of the 7th of January, called this sort of

operation—those very Orders in Council which are made for the protection of our trade—because they continue, I am cut out from all traffic. What! are you to tell us that such would be the consequences of what we, with fostering and jealous care have been enacting for the very purpose of making your commerce sprout and flourish? Are you to tell us that those Orders in Council actually stop your trade, suddenly put an end to your commerce, mercilessly stub it up, though sent down for its protection?—Most unquestionably, says this witness: if they continue, I can trade none. I may send my goods to Scotland, or to Ireland, or the Colonies, but while these Orders continue in force, I cannot possibly trade to America—I am locked out, by our own government, by those means which it has devised in its wisdom for my benefit; in its bounty, poured down upon me to the number of some dozen and a half, and is executing with its accustomed vigour, for the encouragement of my commerce and navigation.—To state what the other witnesses said upon this subject would be exactly repeating the same words; better to refer in general to those parts of the printed evidence where it is to be found, namely, the evidence of Mr. Phillips, in

pages 15, 10. Mr. Bell, 34, 53. Beside these, the testimonies of Mr. Glennie, Mr. Mullett, and Mr. Mann, may all be referred to for the purpose of confirming this incontrovertible proposition, that but for the Orders in Council the enemy's decrees could have had no effect whatever, but to excite our ridicule, and that if even the American embargo were to be taken off, your trade would not be revived, unless these orders are at the same time repealed.

Now, sir, having finished this part of the subject, I have to request your attention to another, which is by no means of small import, although it does not refer to that peculiar view, or supposition, upon which I have been arguing. I am to invite your attention to those parts of the evidence which show that the Orders in Council are really not unconnected with this same American embargo. Even if I could not have demonstrated that connection, it would have been competent for me, at least, to have stated the effects of the embargo. It is not enough that the petitioners prove the precise grievances stated in their petitions; they may enter into details of other circumstances in their situation, which making those grievances of which

they complain the more heavy, give them a better claim for relief. But I have so much to spare that I will avail myself of no such ground. I have merely now to call your attention to that part of the proof which shows that the Orders in Council may fairly bear their share of blame in having called down upon us the American embargo.

In the second examination of Mr. Glennie, in page 66, he states, that it was a perfectly well known fact, upon the Exchange of London, amongst mercantile men, a few days before the issuing of the Orders, that some strong measures would be taken by the government of the country to that effect; that this was matter of general and confident expectation; and particularly on the Saturday before many persons did pretend to give the details, which afterwards appeared in the gazette. So perfectly was he convinced of it, from all he heard, that on the 22d. of October he wrote to several of his correspondents in America, that a strong measure was to be adopted by the government of this country, which in all probability would, in some degree, affect the trade between America, this Country, and the Continent. He further states that these

orders, when they did come forth, appeared to be pretty much of the nature that was expected. He does not say they were accurately of the nature looked for; this he could not presume to say—for the petitioners themselves tell you that they do not yet fully understand them. They only know this, that as far as they possibly can judge of their effects they tend to ruin their trade. Neither they nor Mr. Glennie have as yet a precise and distinct knowledge of them, with all their various clashing enactments, and the multitude of alterations and retouches they have undergone. Therefore their anticipation of the measure itself could not be very distinct. It was however with safety pronounced by Mr. Glennie and other witnesses, to be much of the same nature with the measure as it eventually came out. Upon this subject, Mr. Mann, in page 58, concurs in corroborating what Mr. Glennie had stated; and mentions a set of cant phrase which was in people's mouths on the subject, disrespectful to the United States, and which I will not repeat. Mr. Mullett, in page 92, tells you that many mercantile men, within his own knowledge, regulated their transactions in their trade, by similar confident expectations generally entertained a few weeks before

the Orders came out, and communicated their feelings to him and to their correspondents according to those apprehensions.

Now sir, if this news was so generally and so confidently circulated in this country, it is not surprising that it should have found its way across the Atlantic while the intercourse still subsisted with America. Accordingly it appears from the evidence of Mr. Martin, in page 50, and Mr. Kinder, page 90, that it did so travel. Mr. Martin tells you, that on the 12th of November, he wrote a circular letter to his American correspondents, which letter was received on the 12th or 13th of December, but he believed the 12th; in this he stated, "it is strongly reported that it is the intention of our government to extend the system of blockade to France, and the respective States on the Continent under her influence, prohibiting from entrance into any of their ports, all vessels whatever, unless such as have last cleared from Great Britain and her dependencies." Mr. Martin has since received advice that one of the vessels by which the circular letter went, arrived on the 12th, or not later than the 13th of December. He tells you that the act of the embargo was issued on the 22d of De-

ember. Besides this, newspapers were produced and extracts read from them, particularly by Mr. Kinder, to shew the various copies circulated in America of the paragraphs which appeared in this country, stating the confident expectation of those measures in England, and describing pretty accurately what those measures were to be. One of these descriptions indeed is so accurate, that I believe there has not been, even to this hour, a much more correct general outline given to the public of the system in question, than this which thus appeared in a newspaper printed at New York, and dated the 15th of December.—Again, on the 14th of November, it appears that Mr. Munroe left this country, and he arrived at Philadelphia the 14th of December, on which day his secretary set out for Washington, and arrived there previous to the 17th. The New York paper to which I have alluded, stated that the “English government have not issued their proclamation declaring France and her dependencies in a state of siege, and prohibiting all intercourse with them, except directly from a British port, it not having received the signature of the king: a private letter from a Member of Parliament mentions that it would be published in the ga-

“zette of the 14th.” In like manner a Philadelphia newspaper says, “a proclamation is, we understand, in readiness for his Majesty’s signature, declaring France and all her vassal kingdoms in a state of siege, and prohibiting all intercourse with her or them; all entrance into her or their harbours, except such as had last cleared from a British port.” This is an extract from a London newspaper, dated November 10, and Mr. Bell has also one of the 18th, from New York, purporting to be an extract from a Liverpool paper of the 13th of November. It states, “an Order of Council is in the gazette of Tuesday last, declaring the whole of the ports of France, Italy and Holland, and all under the influence of France, in a state of blockade, and which will be rigorously enforced.” I have stated that Mr. Munroe’s Secretary arrived at Washington on the 16th or 17th of December, and upon the 10th, a message comes from the president to the Houses of Congress upon the subject of this strange intelligence. They sit for many hours and deliberate with closed doors.—Upon the 22d of December, late at night it was, and not till then, that the embargo upon American vessels was first issued as a legal measure.—Here then we see, sir, that the

Orders in Council, or something very nearly resembling them, (so near indeed that when we have got the Orders themselves, we have had nothing more illustrative given us as a sketch of the spirit of them) were accurately known by the president, and by the Congress of the United States of America, upon the 18th of December, being three days previous to the issuing of the embargo in the American ports. This is the plain matter of date and fact—If it be said that this measure of embargo was adopted suddenly (a charge which I think cannot be attributed to it) I answer that if it was to be done at all, it behove to be effected with vigor and promptitude, the very moment the government of that country perceived it was called for by the measures which we had adopted. As soon as this unexampled attack upon their navigation, and encroachment upon their privileges was known—nay, the instant that this unheard of aggression was suspected to be in our contemplation, the United States were obliged, not to resent it, indeed,—for it had not yet attacked them—but at least to provide against its certain effects, by some measure of precaution.—Therefore I say let it not be argued that the suddenness of this precautionary measure—a measure in its very nature sudden and ap-

plicable to an unexpected and pressing emergency—affords any ground for believing that the Orders in Council were not the occasion of it. It is needless for me to enter more particularly upon this part of the subject : I shall only refer the House further to the testimony of Mr. Kinder, page 90, and of Mr. Martin, page 92.

I have therefore some right, sir, to take it as proved that even if I had a deficiency of argument upon other points, and were obliged to found my case upon the Embargo, I have so connected that Embargo with the Orders in Council as to show that the loss sustained by our manufacturers previously to that measure was entirely owing to our own orders ; and, were I so disposed, I might now credit the long account of our calamities with the terrible effects of the American Embargo. But, sir, as I stated before, I have unhappily too many heads of evil to show you without this additional item. I shall here lay it down therefore, and take up another point grounded upon my former supposition that the Orders in Council are to be placed in contrast with the Embargo, not connected with it, and that no credit is to be given for any evil imputable

to the latter; unless it belongs separately and distinctly to the former.

I am next to call your attention then to the amount of the debt at present due from the United States of America to merchants here. The evidence of Mr. Wood and Mr. Philips is quite decisive on the subject. They tell you that in general about fifteen months credit is given for goods shipped to the American market from this country. Their testimony will be found in pages 1 and 9, and is corroborated by all the other merchants, uniting nearly in the same opinion, and stating the average credit usually given at from twelve to fifteen months. Now, I have before proved to you that the average exports from this country to the United States of America amounted in 1806, to 12,856,551*l.* sterling; and I have shewn that they were increasing yearly.—And now, if the Orders in Council have the effect of preventing payment for goods that might have been hereafter shipped, in the same manner will they prevent the payment of those goods which have been already shipped, and for which America is still indebted to us. I shall admit, for the sake of argument, that the sum of one third may still be received in payment, by means of consignments direct, that

is, about four millions of the sums so due; but even upon this favorable supposition you still remain creditors of America to the enormous amount of eight millions sterling, which by your own act and deed, you have prevented the Americans from all possibility of repaying you. You have cut off all other modes of payment, except by importation of their own produce, although America may be as willing to repay as you could be to receive. This effect arises too from measures which you say are intended for the protection of merchants and the encouragement of your trade. Be that as it may, such I say is evidently the fatal effect of them. You have prevented America from being able to do that justice towards you which she is inclined honestly, as well as prudently to do.

Let us look then to the consequences of this state of things. Your capital, to this amount of eight millions, must remain in the United States; but whether it is to remain there idle or not is another consideration. Will Congress, for the sake of giving encouragement to trade and manufactures, make some enactments in the nature of your Orders in Council? Will they, after the manner of those precious measures, prohibit manufactures; embargo

their towns, and stop the internal commerce of the country, by warnings and visitings? Will they as you would, I verily believe, in their place, issue some twenty orders to lock up the capital which I have stated England has made them a present of, and prevent its being employed until the intercourse with Europe is restored? No, no—they will not copy you so close—they will give their trade and manufactures every facility—they are rather better politicians than the wise framers of your decrees—they will foster this capital and make it conduce to truly beneficial ends, not by such Orders in Council as yours, but by measures really adapted to the encouragement of trade, aye, and let me tell you, sir, to the purpose of “retorting upon England the evils of her own injustice.” For you will see this capital producing new branches of agriculture and of internal trade; new banking and other monied schemes; new manufactures, which have never before been thought of for this plain and simple reason, because their capital was never adequate to the arduous task, and what little capital they had found other means of employment in purchasing the produce and manufactures of our country.

The contrary of all this, however, is confi-

dently expected by those great Statesmen, who framed the Orders in Council. They pretend that our manufactures never can be supplanted; that they must be had by all nations; that happen what will they must find their way to a market. And truly I must say that this would be a comfortable doctrine if it were not already falsified by much experience; not only by the effects of commercial blunders in other countries, but by the operation of our own navigation act, a produce of wiser and better times; a measure well deserving the title of encourager of trade. The effect of this celebrated system upon the trade of Holland and other states, should admonish you, that it is possible for the staple industry of a country to be taken from it, and to be forced into other channels. The carrying trade of the world, the money traffic, in all its branches, insurance, banking, loans, stock, in short every part of the large commerce which the Dutch had monopolized for ages, and with pretensions as superior to your's, as your present claims to a monopoly of manufacturing industry are above those of your neighbours; all this staple and exclusive commerce was, if not destroyed, at least shaken to pieces by an act of the really wise and effectual promoters of English trade,

who once sat in this house, and England became prematurely possessed of what Holland lost. The staple of Holland was thus suddenly forced into the channel of England, many years before the transference could have been effected in the natural course of things.— Let us then learn from that encouragement which it is the just boast of our own navigation system to have given to our commerce, this lesson of experience, that it is not impossible to counteract nature and shift the seat of arts, by the force of political arrangements. I might prove this still further by the effects of another boasted part of your commercial policy, the wool laws. I might illustrate it by referring to the whole histories of Spain, France, Italy, or to former periods of our own story. But, sir, not to go to other countries, upon the present occasion, it is sufficient for me to allude to the evidence which I have brought to your bar, bearing directly upon the case of America.

The testimony of Mr. Kinder and Mr. Pollock will, I think, be esteemed decisive upon this point. It has always been supposed that when hands are cheap and money plenty, commerce and trade will be encouraged, and

not till then; but let it be remembered that America has been both increasing in hands with an unexampled rapidity, and accumulating money by the beneficial effects of a long interval of peace, which she has wisely and happily enjoyed. The public institutions, the manufactories, and the plans for the general encouragement to trade, have in that country been for years past visibly upon the increase. Their banks at present amount to 73; their insurance companies to 43; the interest of money has fallen from 12 or 20, to 6 and 7 per cent.; capital is so heaped up, that it is common to meet thirty men possessed of 50,000*l.* on one Exchange. Four miles from any town, lands were two years ago sold at 500 dollars by the acre, a much higher price than is known in Middlesex itself. An emigration has been of late years perceived to take place from the Northern to the Western part of the country where the land is cheaper. Nay, they have even a considerable number of manufactories already established, they have, upon some occasions, been able to export to other countries, and have so evidently begun to supply their own market, that some of the witnesses at your bar found themselves cut out of it by the competition of home-made goods. The result of the whole is, that we

have given up a part of our capital for the purpose of enabling the Americans to establish trades and manufactures of their own, and that if we continue to force it into this employment, by our foolish measures, we shall soon find ourselves generally and permanently forestalled in the American market by their home-made goods.

I am far from saying, sir, that these unquestionable facts ought to alarm this country, if measures be taken really capable of fostering our own trade, or at least leaving our industry to itself, and letting that of others alone, instead of those schemes, whose only tendency is to stunt our commerce and make American manufactures emulate our own. I only prove that it is in vain to talk of this competition as a thing impossible.—I tell you that it is blind to say there is no such danger—it is foolish to say that the poverty and cheap land of America will prevent all rivalship from growing up, do what we will to force it.—I tell you it is an idle security to suppose that our preference in the American market, is of so steady a nature, and will be of such lasting duration, that no force or change of circumstances can wrest it from us. By the testi-

mony of those who have visited that part of the world, and but yesterday seen the most interesting spectacle of a growing nation that the eyes of man can behold, it appears that its manufactories are rising, and its capital accumulating. In addition to this it appears by the evidence now upon your table, that you have forced no less than eight millions of your capital into the same channel, in order, as it were, to secure—to perpetuate the rivalry of America, and while you exclude her from all intercourse with Europe, to render her more and more independant of yourselves. It is surely not unreasonable to suppose that under such circumstances she will turn the part of your capital which you have lent her, nay compelled her to keep in her hands, into channels which may subvert our traffic both with her and the rest of the world.

Again, I beseech you, sir, to recollect that I do not say America will do all this naturally; if left to herself she may for years and years confine herself to agricultural pursuits: but I have shewn you her capacities for other employments; I have proved that she is even on the brink of manufacturing in a good measure for herself; I say she will do so to any extent if you drive her to it; and I here again

warn you how you rashly do that against your own commerce, which no power on earth but yours can ever effect.—Nor let any one think that the rivalry, which I am anticipating, would terminate with the emergency that gave rise to it. Even after that peace should be restored, which some persons fondly dream of as a possible event, it is in vain that you will look for the reestablishment of those peaceful and prosperous employments which former treaties have brought back to the country. The whole Continent may be subdued by the arms of your allies, and its commerce destroyed by your fleets; you may cease to have a rival in power, or in wealth, from one extremity to the other of Europe.—After dictating a peace to the world, you will seek in vain for the restoration of the trade which your vigour shall have suspended; it is destroyed if it is suspended. You will find raised up by your jealousy and violence, a rival to your prosperity, on the other side of the Atlantic—a great nation, filled full of capital by your measures, and forced by them to be the first manufacturers in the world. You will then no doubt be immediately repaid those eight millions sterling which the Americans now owe you, for it is a common and a just remark, that successful traffic produces honest dealings. But what

will be the consequence of having allowed that capital to accumulate, at compound interest, by its employment in such channels? Let us think of this, sir, and look to all these things when we are confiding in our own folly, and blindly hoping that in wilfully cutting ourselves out of every one line of industry, which has made us a rich and powerful nation, we shall still, God knows how, preserve our influence and wealth!

Sir, it is not now for the first time that this topic has been broached in the House of Commons. The very same argument was once before put to you upon a memorable occasion. In the spot where I unworthily have now the honor to stand before you, there stood some forty years ago, one of the greatest men that this or any other country has ever produced. When the celebrated Dr. Franklin appeared in this place, by the desire of the house, during the discussions relating to the repeal of the stamp act, a variety of questions were put to him, touching the state of manufactures in the colonies of England. He was carefully asked his opinion upon all those points which I have feebly attempted to examine on the present occasion. It was put to him again and again.—
“ Do you think it possible that the Americans

“ can enter into a non-importation act? Is it possible for them to change their habits altogether and at once from political motives.”

—The answers of that great man were equally consistent and decisive, and if the house will permit me I shall take the liberty of reading them, as they are in fact good evidence upon the question now before you, the whole being entered on your journals.—And I call upon you to hear them with the attention due, not merely to the authority of him who spoke them, but to a prophecy despised and alas too fatally fulfilled. Therefore it is that I presume to repeat what was then told you, and to caution you against giving the cause of the petitioners now at your bar the same unhappy reception.

One of the questions put to Dr. Franklin was this, “ Is it the interest of the Americans to take those goods ?” (meaning the produce and manufactures of this country) He answered, “ The goods they take from Britain are either necessaries, meer conveniences, or superfluities. The first as cloth, &c. with a little industry they can make it at home; the second they can do without till they are able to provide them among themselves; and the last, which are much the greatest part, they

will strike off immediately. They are meer articles of fashion purchased and consumed, because the fashion, in a respected country, but will now be detested and rejected. The people have already struck off, by general agreement, the use of all goods fashionable in mournings, and many thousand pounds worth are sent back as unsaleable."—Again, "Is it their interest to make cloth at home?" "I think, said Dr. Franklin, they may at present get it cheaper from Britain, I mean of the same fineness and neatness of workmanship, but when one considers other circumstances, the restraints on their trade, and the difficulties of making remittances, it is their interest to make every thing."—In another part Dr. Franklin was asked, "What are the body of the people in the colonies?" *A.* "They are farmers, husbandmen, or planters."—*Q.* "Would they suffer the produce of their land to rot?" *A.* "No: but they would not raise so much. They would manufacture more and plough less."—

And so it is that *these petitioners* say the Americans will now do. They know that the Americans are chiefly occupied in pursuits of husbandry, because they are furnished by America with the produce which they manu-

facture for that country, for this country, and for all the world; they know that if you continue to stop the trade of the Americans with the Continent, and consequently with ourselves, so as to throw the produce back upon the hands of the growers, it will not rot any more than it would have done in Dr. Franklin's day; they tell you the Americans will keep their cotton if you prevent them from exporting it, and will work it up; they—these petitioners presume to repeat the language of that illustrious man, and tell you the Americans will manufacture more and plough less.—The concluding sentences of this memorable testimony is all that I shall now trouble the house with.

Q. “What used to be the pride of the Americans?”

A. “To indulge in the fashions and manufactures of Great Britain.”

Q. “What is now their pride?”

A. “To wear their old clothes again till they can make new ones.”

Sir, it is the fate of men, that they are

more prone to take lessons from their own experience than from precept, or even from the example of others, but I will venture to say that it is *the experience* of this country, to which I am now appealing—an experience too recent to be forgotten, too momentous—alas, that we should dare to neglect such lessons! This it is that has so powerfully backed the authority of the great name which I have quoted to you; and thus supported, I devoutly wish it may make you more cautious how you reject these petitioners than your predecessors were, within the same walls, when that gloomy prediction was first offered at your bar, and was by them, I tell you, despised because of its gloominess.

And now, sir, I think I have gone over all the particulars which the petitioners deem it necessary to adduce before you, in order to make good the statement of the grievances set forth in their petitions. I might no doubt, had I been disposed, have stated other things brought forward in the evidence. I have not argued for instance, about the state of the fisheries, or of the corn trade; the former was too trivial for a separate argument, and it came distinctly under the general position which I have been occupied in supporting;

and as to the latter, besides that the house seemed averse from it, I admit in candour, that the topic of scarcity is one which had better be left alone, from its invidious nature, unless the necessity of the case requires a precise discussion of it.—But, sir, before concluding, I have to make one remark still, upon the general nature of those details into which I have entered, although I regret having been already under the necessity of detaining you so long. I have to observe that there is a very marked difference between our evidence and any other that was ever before adduced at this bar. To explain this immediately I shall refer to the testimony of Mr. Glennie. You have here not a merchant coming to give you his fears and apprehensions of the measures in question; still less have you a mere sample, or small specimen of what those effects are likely to be upon the whole body of the trade. In the person of Mr. Glennie I bring before you one, who from his own experience can talk to you with authority and precise knowledge, upon the whole of one grand branch of the trade aimed at by the Orders in Council. Mr. Glennie has stated that he has received in one month, nearly a hundred thousand pounds sterling in remittances on American account. He further told you that another house, that of

Sir Francis Baring, received to a still greater amount. You have also the evidence of Mr. Bell, Mr. Philips, Mr. Mullett, and Mr. Mann, who are very largely concerned in the American trade. All of these put together make up a prodigious branch of that trade. I may even venture to say that the positive testimony now at your bar immediately embraces by far the greater part of the whole commerce between America and this country. But I am now confining my observation to Mr. Glennie in particular, and I must remind you that when he says he has had his whole American trade knocked off by a single blow, he proves to you—one individual witness alone proves to you—from the state of his single counting house, that an eighth or a ninth part of by far the most extensive branch of the foreign trade of the country has been swept away by the instantaneous effects of these fatal Orders in Council.—I do not remember that in other cases of evidence adduced at your bar, any thing of such extensive importance was ever before attempted to be shewn, even by all the witnesses and all the inferences to which their testimony could lead. I believe the Irish propositions were not opposed upon any thing like even this ground. I am mistaken if petitioners against the cot-

ton tax would not have been glad to shew by all the combined effects of their whole evidence, a loss like this. I well remember that when Liverpool petitioned against the Abolition of the Slave Trade, it only tried to shew by arguing from the evidence of all its witnesses, and all kinds of documents, that two sixteenths of its trade were involved in the abominable traffic of slaves. But here I bring one witness who tells you that he has in his own single case suffered by the new measures for encouraging commerce, a sudden loss of nearly two sixteenths of the American trade of England, merely for his own share. In other cases taxes have been repealed, laws prevented, and pernicious measures altered or abolished, on no better evidence, and backed by no better arguments than you here have against the Orders in Council, in the testimony of this single witness. I call upon you, therefore, sir, to pause, and look about you, when you find you are upon such ground as this. How greatly does it become you to move with circumspection when you see, that stir which way you will, you are surrounded on one side and another, with such brittle, yet such valuable things, that you may, by one touch of the hem of your garment, strike down.

before you are aware of it, objects of such enormous value.


In answer to all our arguments, and in order to quiet the fears that are manifestly spreading over the country, we are told that the operation of the Orders in Council will put an end to the unnatural state of things which the enemy has established upon the Continent, and will force open the channels of trade now stopped up by him. If any thing in the possible consequences of these measures could give your petitioners a shadow of expectation that the ports of the Continent would be opened, and that the direct trade with it would again be established, most unquestionably, as they would have been the last to trouble you had any such hopes remained to them, so they would even now leave your bar contented and cheerful, if you could, by any proof or argument, give a colour of truth to such pleasing prospects. But when they look to the history of the conquest of Europe, and to its present state, or view what is indeed, the same thing, the events of the French revolution, they can indulge in no such views.—After resisting so many violent shocks from without, and so many convulsions within—after passing through


every sort of revolution—all the varieties of situation—uniform in nothing except the constant encrease of calamity, public and domestic—after having suffered all this without attempting a complaint, or even breathing a murmur against the tyrant of the hour—when faction was raging in the West, and the enemy, not always beaten, in the East—after such scenes as these, and such incitements to rebellion utterly failed to create, during eighteen years of revolution, a whisper that could be heard from the people—I say, after all this, you desire us to expect that the scarcity of sugar, or a rise in the price of tobacco, or the difficulty of procuring cotton, should throw all France into a flame—bring out the seeds of lurking rebellion—draw forth the population of our enemies in array against their ruler—make them with one loud voice demand the revocation of the Berlin decree—and force the governor of France himself to sue for peace.—That such mighty things should arise from such little causes I am far from pronouncing to be impossible; but I lament that I have been quite unable to make my clients agree with me, or, by any such efforts, to comfort them under the ruin of their affairs, which they never cease proving to me by the dry

details of their ledgers and day-books, as often as I unfold to them the pleasing views to which I have been alluding; nor indeed can I find any one to back me in urging such consolation to them.—The petitioners have further been told by some persons of airy fancy and loud talk, that by this great act of self-denial, (a magnanimity considerably cheaper to those who preach it up, than to the poor petitioners who are desired to practice it) we shall assuredly make known in the most remote corners of the earth (even in places where the form of a ship has never yet been seen*) the power and the glories of the British Navy. It seems that in proportion as sugars become higher in price, or as the people on the Continent find their coffee becoming rougher, the gallant form of a vessel shall begin to dawn on their untutored minds. Growing by degrees more distinct, what ideas must it raise, as the sweets vanish. When at last the coffee too disappears, and the peasant wholly changes his



* This is supposed to allude to the eloquent speech of Mr. Secretary Canning, in which he recommended the Orders in Council as a great and promising experiment; and predicted that this curious effect would result from them.

breakfast of foreign luxuries into one of milk or wine, then indeed will he descry our whole fleets and navies, and tremble at the name of England—and thus shall the enslaved people of the Continent speedily revolt against the yoke of France.—This topic of consolation, sir, I have also tried with my clients. I have been again met with their plagy account books and dry details of profit and loss. They tell me bluntly enough, “ All these fine “ fancies are nothing to us if they do not give “ us back our American market, which has “ by the grand measures of government been “ taken away. We ask back our trafic—our “ buying and selling—our livelihood. We “ are plain men—merchants, manufacturers, “ and workmen—and we care not if one half “ of Europe never heard of the British Navy, “ nor knew there was such a thing as a ship, “ —nay, nor knew there was such a country “ as England—provided that half were consuming our produce and wearing our manufactures. Let the British Navy and name be “ as unknown in the heart of Poland as it is “ in the désarts of Kamptschatka—but, for “ pity’s sake, give us back that trade, the “ sole means of our subsistence—the sole object of our desires—the only thing our literal imaginations ever dream about.”





**IMAGE EVALUATION
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Sir, I greatly fear that dull as it may be, you must give these men some other answer to their complaints than the lively and elegant ones which I have been alluding to. I strongly suspect you must, in order to satisfy the people, make out some case for the new measures which shall be adapted to the grovelling capacities of the nine hundred and ninety-nine plain matter of fact men who inhabit the country, whatever flighty things you may hear from the thousandth wit.---For unhappily our customers on the Continent have fallen under the dominion of a matter of fact man, who works with stubborn tools, and wont suffer his vassals to rebel for the sake of a point. *He* does not rule them by the love of sugar and coffee, and indeed cares little, whether the interesting peasants ever see such things or no. *He* does not leave them to form ideas of a French soldier, by raising the prices of goods, "in places where a soldier was never seen."---He chains them with chains, and drives them on with bayonets---and sends half a million of strong men to execute his orders---and having done so, he troubles himself but little what his vassals say about colonial produce—or what orders you issue from your council, even if you should make them as intelligible as his own.

Sir, I have now to return my sincere thanks to this house for the very attentive hearing with which they have honored me, and to express my regret at having detained you so long. I am confident that if ever a case was made out by evidence, it is the one which I have feebly supported at your bar. Yet, after all, it may happen that we shall fail in attaining the object of these petitions—I am most unwilling to anticipate such an event, but even if we should be unsuccessful now, I know well that we cannot long go unrelieved. It is indeed a sad consolation, but we are confident that events will daily and hourly back our exertions, and compel this government either fairly to withdraw the Orders in Council, or if they are incapable of repairing the evil they have done in an open and manly way, silently to abandon their measure.—*Then*, sir, I do trust that this lesson which the wisdom of parliament, and, let me add, of the country, shall have given to its rulers, will be eternal, and frighten any rash projector from ever again presuming to take for the subject of his wild experiments, the edifice of British commerce which has grown up with the renowned character and free constitution of this country, and in spite of the ignorance of our ancestors, and in defiance of the rivalry of all our neighbours, and in

mockery of the utmost efforts of our enemies, has raised a name for England which, as it is the pride and glory of her inhabitants, is also the envy and the hatred of surrounding nations.

Mr. Brougham having retired, the Chancellor of the Exchequer besought the house not to come to any decision now. He deemed it necessary that a full inquiry should at length be gone into; and for this purpose he moved that certain witnesses be ordered to attend on Monday next.

FINIS.

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