CANADIAN MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

PRESS RELEASE NO. 71

November 9, 1967

Press Office
866 United Nations Plaza
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New York, N.Y. 10017

MIDDLE EAST

Text of Statement made by the Canadian Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Mr. George Ignatieff, in the Security Council, on November 9, 1967.

Even at this late hour, Mr. President, I must associate my delegation with the deserved tributes and offers of co-operation to you in the very onerous task you have undertaken. You may certainly count on the full support of my delegation, and I should say that you have already won our respect in the way that you have conducted the consultations among the ten members. I should also wish to associate myself with the well-merited thanks to your predecessor, the representative of Japan.

When we last met I said that there were three types of action that were essential for the United Nations to take in regard to the Middle East: first, to see that the cease-fire was observed by the parties; second, to help the Secretary-General to strengthen the machinery of observance of the cease-fire; and third, to proceed as soon as possible, through a representative of the Secretary-General, to the beginning of the establishment of peaceful conditions in the area.

We have been wrestling for many days with the third phase, and as the representative of Nigeria, in his remarkable, frank and helpful speech rightly pointed out, we have so far been unable to reach agreement. But there is, as the representative of the United Kingdom has said, common ground among us that the United Nations can and must assist in bringing about peaceful conditions in the Middle East. It is already acting as a peace-keeper, and the willingness to strengthen peace-keeping arrangements in the area has indicated the clear recognition by the parties directly concerned that the United Nations is helpful to them. In the same way it seems to be generally recognized that the appointment of a special representative would also be helpful, and that the United Nations can and should act as a useful intermediary in the situation confronting the parties.

The Canadian delegation has supported this approach consistently - there has been a good deal of reference to consistence tonight - since the end of the fighting in June. Indeed, we circulated informally on 14 June, before the Council adjourned to enable the General Assembly to

meet in emergency session, a draft of a resolution which proposed that the Secretary-General be asked to appoint a special representative to go out to the area to help establish and maintain contacts among the parties in order to reduce tensions and bring about peaceful conditions in the area.

We were hopeful that action of this kind might be taken by the Council earlier rather than later. It is understandable that the countries in the area wished fully to record their views both at the emergency session and in the general debate at this session. But sooner or later the questions arise: How can the recurrence of hostilities in the Middle East be prevented? How can tensions be reduced? How can peaceful conditions be established?

There has been a great deal of talk before the Council on principles: the principle particularly of withdrawal, the principle of non-acquisition of territory by force. There are differences of interpretation among us as to the language of the Charter on these points. But one thing is certain, that under Article 2 of the Charter all Members have undertaken solemnly to:

> "...settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice" -- I repeat, justice -- "are not endangered."

Likewise, all Members have assumed the obligation to refrain in their international relations "from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State". That is common ground among us because we are all committed to the Charter.

In the lengthy private consultations -- to which a number of my colleagues have referred-- we have found common ground also, I believe, on the necessity of a peaceful settlement, or, as it is sometimes called, a political solution, and of the Security Council recommending procedures for the settlement of all aspects of the dispute, including the question of withdrawal, the guaranteeing of freedom of navigation through international waterways, and, of course, the just settlement of the all important refugee question, under Chapter VI of the Charter.

What we have not been able to agree upon completely is the mandate under which a special representative should operate. The important consideration for the Canadian delegation is that the special representative must be able to help bring about the agreement of the parties. We suggested earlier that the special representative might wish to start discussion under a broad mandate which would avoid contentious issues. But if it is easier for him to start these discussions on the basis of precise guidelines or principles of action, we would be perfectly happy to agree on condition that such guidelines or principles are balanced and equitable.

I do not mean by this that the parties must approve what we do. Clearly the members of the Council have to accept their responsibilities under the Charter to take practical steps leading to a just solution. But in the context of what is admittedly a diplomatic initiative, not an imposed solution, this means that the acquiescence of the States directly concerned is essential. The mandate given to the special representative therefore requires that it entail an equitable balance of obligations on all parties.

In our discussions emphasis has been placed on withdrawal and on the context in which it should take place. This indeed, I suggest, is the main question dividing us at the present time. Some have argued that withdrawal is the prior condition required for a settlement: that we should resurrect a situation which existed before hostilities broke out in June. We believe this is both unrealistic and undesirable. Withdrawal is indeed a crucial element, but it cannot stand in isolation and we must at all costs avoid re-creating the circumstances which led to the outbreak of hostilities last June; and we must ensure that those circumstances do not recur.

In brief, our aim should be to move from a state of war to a state of peace - a just peace. If our aim is to bring about a settlement or a political solution, there must be withdrawal to secure and recognized borders, or borders which are respected and acknowledged, as we said in working drafts which Canada and Denmark discussed with other Council members in recent days in our informal consultations. These drafts have all included a provision for withdrawal. Our contribution to the negotiating process of the past several weeks has been to try to suggest the definition of the nature of the equilibrium required in order to bring the process of peaceful settlement into operation.

We regret that the draft resolution offered in the name of India, Nigeria and Mali does not seem to us likely to have the effect that we desire of beginning the process of peaceful settlement. We prefer the United States draft because it more fully meets the criteria of equilibrium which I have mentioned. Our aim, however, is not -- and I agree in this with the representative of Ethiopia -- to enter into competition and contention but to seek agreement among us and the earliest possible action by the Council that would be of help to the parties in the dispute and the suffering peoples of the Middle East.

Canada is for withdrawal -- yes, withdrawal which leads to peaceful conditions and not to a return to the state of affairs which led to the recent conflict and which was brought to this Council by Denmark and ourselves on 24 May last.

The time for moving to a peaceful settlement or political solution is long overdue and we urge the Council not to lose heart but to continue all efforts to try to reach agreement on a text which will achieve this goal.

In conclusion, I would say -- and I agree entirely with the representative of the United Kingdom on this -- that the Council should not -- it dare not -- let this opportunity slip to bring the healing influence of a United Nations intermediary to bear upon the troubled scene in the Middle East, and thus begin the process of reconciliation, reconciliation among the States of the Middle East.