



## STATEMENTS AND SPEECHES

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### NATO FACES THE CHALLENGE OF CHANGING TIMES

Text of a Press Conference Given by the  
Secretary of State for External Affairs, the  
Honourable Paul Martin, Ottawa, June 1, 1966.

Mr. Martin opened the interview with the following statement:

Gentlemen, as I have to leave this afternoon for an engagement and shall not be back before I leave for Brussels for the meeting of the 14 nations of NATO on Monday and of the 15 at the regular meeting of foreign ministers on Tuesday and Wednesday and possibly Thursday of next week, I thought that you might find it useful if I presented myself so that you might ask some questions in connection with this meeting. I have asked that a statement be circulated setting out in general terms the position of the Canadian Government in connection with this important meeting, which has been referred to as one of "critical importance". I purposely avoid that phrase, but nevertheless, in my judgment, the importance of this meeting extends beyond the alliance and the NATO organization.

This meeting will really be concerned with the future of Europe and of North America's relations with Europe.

NATO, in the opinion of the Government, has served the Atlantic countries well by providing the framework for the collective defence programme necessary for the security of the West and for the stability of Europe.

There are, of course, some unresolved political problems, of which the continued division of Germany is the most important and the most intractable. On March 18, I said in the House that, in spite of France's decision to withdraw from the integrated defence structure, we regard NATO's collective defence programme as one that must be maintained, particularly at a time when Europe continues to be divided.

But I hasten to point out that, while France has removed itself from the integrated force structure, it remains a party to the Treaty. As President de Gaulle has said, France continues to be among its allies, it continues to accept the automatic obligations, both military and otherwise, provided for in the Treaty.

So that our first and essential task at Brussels must be to find the means of adapting the collective efforts of all 15 NATO members, European and North American alike, to the new situation created by the decision of France. But this will not be enough. Already, over the last few years, the stability of Europe provided for by NATO -- stability and relative peace in the world -- has permitted a gradual but significant improvement in relations between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact powers. This desirable trend -- which, I must emphasize, is supported by all 15 NATO members -- must be maintained and, indeed, intensified. Only through the extension of the present détente, the present improvement in relations between the NATO powers, between East and West, can we bring about a situation in which real and substantial progress toward a settlement in Europe will become possible.

And so our second essential task at Brussels, as I see it - and I think I can speak for all 15 members -- is to find the means whereby the Atlantic countries can best provide the extension of the détente which must precede the solution of the political problems of the divided Europe.

Now this is not an easy task. The problem, in spite of the improvement in relations, continues to be a difficult one. I cannot precisely say how this improvement is to be furthered, but I will offer one last thought before hearing your questions. In tackling a task so important, there is opportunity -- indeed, there is need -- to take advantage both of bilateral and multilateral exchanges with Eastern European Communist countries. But whatever initiatives may be undertaken, they are most likely to be fruitful if they are co-ordinated through continuing consultation in the alliance and inspired by the common objective of a solid and lasting settlement in Europe.

We have improved very considerably, in trade and other relations, our contacts with the Soviet Union and with Eastern European countries. This we have done on an individual basis, as some of the NATO countries have done, including -- particularly during the last year -- the United States; but it is important that we endeavour to make this improvement in East-West relations through consultations with our NATO partners, and not seek only to do it alone.

I have not dealt with any of the specific problems that will be dealt with when we meet as a group of 14 and when we meet with regard to the French decision on Tuesday next, but I shall be glad to entertain some questions for a few minutes.

Mr. Marcel Gingras: Sir, do you already have the agenda of the meeting?

Mr. Martin: Yes, we have the agenda.

Mr. Gingras: May we know what are the main topics, please?

Mr. Martin: The agenda has not been given out as yet, but there is no real secret to this. First of all, the first item will be the state of the alliance, and, under this item, we shall be

discussing the consequences of the French decision. Then we shall have a general review of the international situation, which is the main item on the agenda of every foreign ministers' meeting. There will be also a discussion of the situation arising out of the Cyprus problem and its involvement for two of our NATO members.

Those are the general headings that will form the basis of the meeting on Tuesday and Wednesday.

Mr. Gingras: Is there any specific question, like the NATO building in Paris, for example?

Mr. Martin: On Monday, the 14 will meet. The Government of France has concurred in this separate meeting of the 14. I must underline the importance, as I have said, that the Government of France, through its Foreign Minister, has agreed that prior to the meeting of the 15 there should be a meeting of the 14 countries. For the past two months now, the representatives of the 14 in the NATO Council, pursuant to instructions from governments, have been considering the practical consequences of the French decision, and we have set up through them a number of working groups who will be reporting to the 14, and through the 14 to the 15 on Tuesday, on matters that flow from the French decision. Now there will be some matters that will have to be resolved at the meeting on Monday and discussed with the Government of France on Tuesday. The French Government has said that the NATO military headquarters will have to move and, since that decision is final, we shall have to consider among ourselves where the military headquarters known as SHAPE will be located. This decision will take place, in all probability, next week. There will likewise have to be a decision as to where the Defence College is to be located, and we shall give consideration to whether or not the military committee will move from Washington to another locale. We shall also have to give consideration to what happens to the standing military group.

As to the location of the Council itself, which is the political deliberative organ, that, in the judgment of Canada at the present time, is not a matter that has to be decided forthwith. I am not saying that there will not be a decision about this question, but, as I see this matter at the moment, it would seem to me that this is one of the questions about which we need not make undue haste. We must make sure that the decision with regard to the location of the Council is made only after a full assessment of all that is involved. The reason why we take this position is that, while we regret the decision of the Government of France to ask two of its allies to vacate bases in France, and while we regret their decision to withdraw from the integrated force structure, we are encouraged by the decision of the Government of France to continue in the alliance, and I have noted very particularly the words of the French Foreign Minister, when he spoke to the Chamber of Deputies five weeks ago and outlined the importance, and the reason for the importance, that France attributed to its participation in the alliance as distinguished from the military organization, and I should hope, by the attitude that I am at present taking with regard

to the location of the Council, that we shall be serving notice to France of our high regard for her and of the part which we believe she can continue to play in the Western community and in the alliance.

What happens to French forces in Germany, the two divisions there, I do not know. It could be that the agreement, or the failure to agree, on a desired formula for the continuation of the forces of France in Germany could have a very important bearing on the question as to where the Council is to be located. But we shall have to wait until some of these matters are decided before the decision on that is made.

I should like to say this: there was a story yesterday... about a report that France was withdrawing not only its military but its political support from the NATO organization. I can say that the story seems to be wholly unfounded, and likewise there is no basis for suggesting that the Government of France proposes to ask that the Council be not maintained in Paris. The latest information I have is that the story to that effect yesterday, and about which there was also a question, has no basis in fact.

This is a very important meeting for the future integrity of the Organization, and it has a very definite bearing on the improvement of international relations in the next period.

Mr. Ben Malkin: Sir, has General de Gaulle consulted with the NATO alliance about what he is going to talk about in Moscow immediately after the Brussels meeting?

Mr. Martin: The opportunity will be afforded to the French Foreign Minister of indicating the talks that he has had in Roumania and, more recently, in Poland. I am sure that, following NATO practice, he will make a report of conversations that do have a very great interest to all NATO members. And I should hope that he would find it desirable to give us some indication of the objectives of the important visit which General de Gaulle will be making to Moscow.

Mr. Peter Stursberg: Is Brussels likely to be the new location for SHAPE?

Mr. Martin: I should think that is a fairly good guess, but there is no decision. There have been consultations among the member states. Directly, I have had some discussions here in Ottawa and our Ambassador in NATO has, but we have a number of matters to decide before that question can be finalized. But I believe there will be a decision as to the location of SHAPE itself.

Mr. Paul Akehurst: Where does Canada think that SHAPE should be located, sir?

Mr. Martin: Well, if the Belgian Government is prepared to have SHAPE located there, this would be agreeable to Canada.

Mr. David McIntosh: Sir, do you think there can be any improvement in relations between the NATO countries and the Warsaw Pact countries so long as the Vietnam war continues?

Mr. Martin: There is no doubt that the war in Vietnam is a beclouding fact but, notwithstanding that, I believe a great improvement in our relations can be reached. We have been ourselves in very close touch with the Government of Poland over the role of the Commission in Vietnam. These have been useful and helpful discussions. The Minister of Trade and Commerce will shortly be going to Poland on a trade mission. We ourselves are engaged in preliminary trade talks with other Eastern European countries. Mr. Winters will shortly be going to the Soviet Union to discuss trade matters. We hope to have a delegation of parliamentarians from Czechoslovakia here this summer; we are anticipating the visit of a group of parliamentarians -- I hope under the leadership of Mr. Polyansky, one of the important members in the establishment of Government in the Soviet Union -- in the month of July. It is possible that I may myself be going to the Soviet Union between now and the next three or four months. We are now trying to work out a satisfactory and mutually convenient date. We have all noted the developments in Roumania. I think it is true to say that, notwithstanding the situation in Asia, there has been a considerable improvement in relations between the countries which are in NATO and the Warsaw Pact powers in their individual contexts.

Mr. Anthony Wright: You have said in the House, I think, Mr. Martin, that you are seeing Mr. Couve de Murville on Monday. Who else are you seeing?

Mr. Martin: Yes, our meeting of the 14 will take place on Monday and he and I have agreed to meet Monday night. On Sunday I shall be seeing Mr. Rusk and the Italian Foreign Minister, Mr. Fanfani. On Saturday I will be lunching in Amsterdam with Mr. Luns, the Dutch Foreign Minister. Mr. Luns, as the senior foreign minister -- that is, the foreign minister who has been in office in that portfolio longest -- will preside on Monday over the meeting of the 14. That is not a NATO meeting. That is a meeting of practically all of the NATO countries. I shall preside as President at the meeting on Tuesday and Wednesday, which is a formal NATO meeting, at which France will be present.

Mr. McIntosh: Sir, you said in the beginning that improvement in East-West relations should be done in consultation rather than alone.

Mr. Martin: Essentially in consultation.

Mr. McIntosh: Does this imply a criticism of General de Gaulle?

Mr. Martin: It is a fact that we believe that the strength of any alliance depends on the effectiveness of the consultative arrangement, and, while any head of government has the right, and, indeed, all of them at some time or other have exercised the right, of going to other capitals, including the Soviet Union, we shall hope that whatever positions are taken would be positions that were not inconsistent with the general interests of NATO itself.

And I shall hope that one of the conclusions of our discussions on Tuesday and Wednesday, prior to the visit of General de Gaulle, would be that we could agree on a formulation that represents the collective position of all of the NATO countries in our efforts to improve East-West relations.

Mr. Anthony Westell: In your statement, Mr. Martin, I note that you have emphasized that France is continuing to subscribe to the Treaty.

Mr. Martin: To the alliance.

Mr. Westell: To the alliance. And you have said that there is no foundation to the story that she is going to withdraw her political support. Where does the problem arise there?

Mr. Martin: Well, the difficulty arises out of the fact that General de Gaulle is going to Moscow at a time when France has taken a very vital decision with regard to the NATO force structure, and it is naturally asked what is the purpose of this visit. Are there going to be arrangements made at that meeting that will be inconsistent with the general purpose pursued by NATO collectively and by its individual members acting in their own national right. That is what we mean. I do not say that there will be. I take General de Gaulle's decision not to denounce the Treaty -- to be obligated by its automatic military provision -- as an indication that France does not share in the concept of military organization, but that it does share in the basic political purposes of the NATO alliance.

Mr. J.M. Poliquin: Sir, what about the bases?

Mr. Martin: We shall have to vacate our two bases, as the United States will have to vacate its five. We have until April 1, 1967, to decide where we shall relocate. But this is a decision which we shall have to make fairly soon. It will not be made at this meeting, but it will have to be made fairly soon, because the Department of National Defence will have to make arrangements so that we can be relocated by the target date.

The United States feels that it has the right to go on for another two years. There is a difference in the terminal date provision in the contract that the United States has with France, as compared with the contractual arrangements that Canada has with France. We have only one year. They argue that they have two. There are many problems, of course, arising out of the relocation-- for example, whether or not there will be any compensation. We shall be very much interested in such questions as to whether or not France will continue to contribute to the costs of infrastructure, which could represent a very great sum of money. If France decided not to continue to support infrastructure, this would mean that the 14 countries would have to bear a pretty important financial burden.

These or other questions will not be decided now but will be decided on the basis of some of the decisions that will be taking place on Tuesday and Wednesday and particularly on what happens to the French forces -- air and ground forces -- in Germany.

Mr. John Walker: Sir, you mentioned that some sort of decision was possible on the removal of the NATO Council next week. If the American view were to prevail, do you think that this might influence General de Gaulle in his talks with Russia?

Mr. Martin: I do not think that that would be a factor. The American position on this has been reported to the press. I think it is too early yet to say what the final positions on this question really are, but I have indicated how we feel. I think that, if it has been possible for the Military Committee to be in Washington all these years and for the Council to be in Paris, there should be no great military inconvenience in having SHAPE separated from the Council. However, I could be wrong in this but this is my present view, and it would seem to me that France might feel that it would have a closer contact with the alliance, if the political organ of NATO were to stay in Paris. This is a matter that some countries feel as strongly about, as I do, but it is not an irrevocable position. It is a question we shall have to decide one way or the other, I am sure, at this next meeting -- either to stay in France or to go wherever SHAPE goes. It could be that the new host country might insist that it is not prepared to accept one without the other. This would be a very important consideration, if that position were taken by any of the potential host countries.

Mr. Hillary Brigstocke: Could you see London as a possible location for SHAPE?

Mr. Martin: London is, of course, a very agreeable place for most things as far as Canada is concerned. I should think that, in the context of NATO, London was not a satisfactory place.

Mr. Walker: Have you anything special to put forward in these discussions between Greece and Turkey on Cyprus?

Mr. Martin: Yes. We shall have some discussions with Greece and Turkey, particularly with regard to the matter of mutual aid, and also with regard to some developments in Cyprus. The Cyprus force will terminate, or rather its mandate will conclude on June 26 next, unless renewed. There is to be a meeting of the Security Council on June 16, and we shall naturally be giving consideration to this matter, and it is in this context that I shall be having some discussions with representatives of the Greek and Turkish Governments, and it is rather helpful that it has been announced that the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey are going to carry on discussions with regard to Cyprus in Brussels on June 9 next, following the discussions that the Government of Cyprus has had with the Government of Greece on the same matter only within the past few days.

Mr. McIntosh: Mr. Martin, would you care to comment on the possible use of your role as President of the Council at this session as a sort of mediator or go-between, as, for instance, between the French and the American positions?

Mr. Martin: Well, I shall endeavour, as any country would try, to minimize the differences. And, if it is thought that that there is any role for us to play, we shall gladly assume this, as other countries would. But I am not going there with the idea that there is a particular role for me to play in this area. If it should arise, I should certainly do my best, because I believe that it is desirable for the Atlantic Community, for the Western world, to have as close an association with France as possible, and we take comfort in the view that the Government of France, within the context of an organization of sovereign powers, takes a similar view.

I only hope that the differences on the question of military organization will not defeat that purpose.

I also hope, in reaffirming our belief in NATO and its indispensability at this time for our security, that this will not stand in the way of our taking measures, and being determined to take measures, to try to improve relations between the East and West, and it is because we believe that, in the face of the present military might of the Soviet Union in particular, the best way to do this is by being equally strong. Canada and the 14 believe that there can be no let-up in the combined military organization that has been established during the past 14 years in NATO itself. But no one should conclude, because we believe NATO to be necessary, no one should conclude because we propose to strengthen it, that we are on that account less interested in trying to improve relations between the European powers on both sides, in the Warsaw Pact and in the NATO group. This remains an objective that we believe is essential, and we shall pursue it with as much vigour as we can.

I hope that out of this meeting will come an agreement on the part of all 15 as to the best courses to promote a further détente.

Mr. Vladimir Mikhailov: Mr. Martin, would you care to comment on this statement by Walter Lippmann in today's paper entitled "United States and Europe"?

Mr. Martin: I did not read Mr. Lippmann this morning; I read Arthur Blakeley instead.

Mr. Mikhailov: At any rate, in his story Mr. Lippmann says that the real undertone of the French decision was that the Europe of today would end the "cold war", while the United States, for a number of reasons, is not ready to do so. The second part of my question is that there were some statements made recently that the time had come for NATO and for the Warsaw Pact powers to reach a pact or agreement, whatever it is. What do you say to that?

Mr. Martin: I have not read Mr. Lippmann's article and I prefer, on that account, not to comment on it. But I have sought to indicate twice in what I have said today that we are anxious to promote as much improvement in the relations between the Warsaw Pact powers and the NATO powers as is possible. And we believe that the most effective way to do that will be through consultations with members of the alliance, and we shall be giving consideration to a specific proposal that will involve the whole question of European unity. This is an objective and we shall be enabled, I believe, to make some progress in this area as a result of our determination at the present time to continue as members of a strengthened, a re-strengthened, NATO.

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