

stor
CA1
EA71
C16
ENG
1977



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

**CANADA AT THE
31ST REGULAR SESSION
OF THE UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL ASSEMBLY**

PREPARED BY THE BUREAU OF UNITED NATIONS AFFAIRS

OTTAWA, AUGUST, 1977

Dept. of Foreign Affairs
Min. des Affaires étrangères

SEP 29 2006

Return to Departmental Library
Retourner à la bibliothèque du Ministère

This booklet has been prepared to provide the public with a compact reference work which outlines some of the more significant features of the procedure and work of the United Nations and of the Canadian Delegation to the Thirty-First UN General Assembly.

The Canadian Delegation participated actively in the Thirty-First Regular Session of the General Assembly. The following statements reflect those issues which were of major concern to Canada. Statements were also delivered on a number of minor items, but only the highlights of the major interventions are included in this booklet. The full texts of all statements delivered at UNGA XXXI and further information about Canada's role in the UN may be obtained by writing the Public Relations Division, Department of External Affairs, Lester B. Pearson Building, Ottawa, Ontario.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
FOREWORD	
I CANADA AT UNGA XXXI	
A. GENERAL DEBATE	1
B. POLITICAL AND SECURITY QUESTIONS	5
1. Southern Africa	5
2. Middle East	13
3. Cyprus	16
4. Disarmament	18
5. Peacekeeping	23
6. Atomic Energy	25
7. Outer Space	27
C. ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL	29
1. General Debate	29
2. Habitat	32
3. Food Problems	35
4. UNCTAD IV	37
D. HUMAN RIGHTS	39
1. Decade for Action Against Racism	39
2. Human Rights in Southern Africa	40
3. UN High Commissioner for Refugees	41
4. Human Rights in Chile	42
5. Torture	43
E. ADMINISTRATIVE AND BUDGETARY	44
1. Scale of Assessment	44
2. Relocation to Vienna, Austria	46
F. LEGAL QUESTIONS	47
1. Convention Against Hostage-Taking	47
2. Treaty on Non-Use of Force	49
3. Charter Review	51
G. CANADA'S VOTING RECORD AT THE THIRTY-FIRST GENERAL ASSEMBLY	52

II APPENDICES	
A. THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS	73
B. THE INSTRUMENTS OF OFFICIAL CANADIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SESSION	74
1. The Bureau of United Nations Affairs	74
2. The Canadian Permanent Mission	74
3. The Canadian Delegation	75
4. Observers on the Canadian Delegation	75
C. THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM	76
1. Membership	76
2. United Nations Groupings	78
a) Regional Groups	78
b) Non-aligned Countries	80
c) Commonwealth Countries	80
d) "Group of 77"	81
3. Chart of the United Nations System	82
4. The General Assembly	84
a) Function	84
b) The President of the General Assembly	84
c) The Vice-Presidents	84
d) The Main Committees	85
e) Other Bodies	85
f) Voting	87
g) The General Assembly Session	87
h) The Security Council	88
5. Senior Officials of the United Nations Secretariat	88
D. CANADA IN THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM	90
1. Canada's Policies and Goals in the United Nations	90
2. Canada's Contributions to the United Nations System	90
a) Canadian Contributions (1960-1976)	90
b) The UN Regular Budget	91
c) Percentage Scale of Assessments	91
d) Agencies Related to the United Nations	91
e) Canada's Financial Contribution to the UN System	93
f) Canadian Participation in the Organizations of the UN System	94
g) Acronyms and Short Forms	96

FOREWORD

On October 24 of each year, the world commemorates United Nations Day. In his 1976 message to the Secretary-General, D. Kurt Waldheim, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Don Jamieson, expressed Canada's best wishes and pledged renewed support for the organization. His words, written just before Canada was elected to the Security Council for the fourth time (1948-49, 58-59, 67-68, 77-78), will serve as a fitting introduction to the following review of Canada's participation at the Thirty-first Session of the UN General Assembly. Mr. Jamieson wrote:

On behalf of the Government and people of Canada, I wish to convey to you, and all the staff members of the United Nations and its affiliated organizations, our warmest wishes on the occasion of the thirty-first anniversary of the founding of the United Nations. I would particularly like to express to you our pleasure at having as Secretary-General someone of your experience, ability and humanity.

In the past year, the United Nations has taken significant steps in the areas of human rights, economic justice and human settlements.

The coming into force this year of the Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and on Civil and Political Rights is a major step forward for the United Nations. These long-sought agreements on standards and principles of human rights must now be matched by an equal determination to apply them without discrimination. Canada, as a member of the Commission on Human Rights, will spare no effort in working for the full and effective implementation of the Covenants.

The decisions taken at UNCTAD IV mark an important stage in our common efforts to reduce disparities between developed and developing countries. To carry on dialogue in a world divided between wealth and poverty, better understanding and mutual confidence are essential. The outcome of UNCTAD IV augurs well for such dialogue — which is now being continued at the Conference on International Economic Co-operation, of which Canada is Co-Chairman. The process of negotiation aimed at narrowing the gap between rich and poor is both permanent and complex. In the pursuit of a more equitable international economic system, Canada is prepared to commit its efforts and its resources.

The United Nations' commitment to improving the quality of life found further expression at the Habitat Conference in Vancouver, of which Canada had the honour of being host. At Habitat, enormous progress was made in improving the understanding of human settlements issues throughout the world. Important recommendations were adopted. Now these must be translated into national and international actions.

This has been a time of adjustment and occasional frustration for the United Nations. During a difficult period, these accomplishments have constituted concrete proof, not only of the validity of the principles embodied in the Charter but also of the progress being made in their implementation.

I can assure you that Canada attaches importance to the work of the United Nations and will continue to be a loyal and constructive member.

GENERAL DEBATE

The General Assembly of the United Nations is the world's most universal forum, it holds virtually all members of the world's population, large and small, under an equal opportunity to be heard. The 122 member states of the United Nations are the Assembly's constituent elements and their views on the major international issues of the day are reflected in its resolutions. On September 23, 1976, the 122 member states adopted a resolution on the basis of which the following are the highlights of that debate.

The Assembly will have a special session in 1977 to discuss the implementation of the resolution on the basis of which the following are the highlights of that debate.

Efforts to adapt the procedures and structure of the UN to an increasingly complex world are being made. The Assembly will have a special session in 1977 to discuss the implementation of the resolution on the basis of which the following are the highlights of that debate.

Agreement on standards and principles of human rights is not hindered by an equal opportunity to be heard. The Assembly will have a special session in 1977 to discuss the implementation of the resolution on the basis of which the following are the highlights of that debate.

PART I

The General Assembly of the United Nations is the world's most universal forum, it holds virtually all members of the world's population, large and small, under an equal opportunity to be heard. The 122 member states of the United Nations are the Assembly's constituent elements and their views on the major international issues of the day are reflected in its resolutions. On September 23, 1976, the 122 member states adopted a resolution on the basis of which the following are the highlights of that debate.

Efforts to adapt the procedures and structure of the UN to an increasingly complex world are being made. The Assembly will have a special session in 1977 to discuss the implementation of the resolution on the basis of which the following are the highlights of that debate.

CANADA AT UNGA XXXI

The General Assembly of the United Nations is the world's most universal forum, it holds virtually all members of the world's population, large and small, under an equal opportunity to be heard. The 122 member states of the United Nations are the Assembly's constituent elements and their views on the major international issues of the day are reflected in its resolutions. On September 23, 1976, the 122 member states adopted a resolution on the basis of which the following are the highlights of that debate.

Efforts to adapt the procedures and structure of the UN to an increasingly complex world are being made. The Assembly will have a special session in 1977 to discuss the implementation of the resolution on the basis of which the following are the highlights of that debate.

Agreement on standards and principles of human rights is not hindered by an equal opportunity to be heard. The Assembly will have a special session in 1977 to discuss the implementation of the resolution on the basis of which the following are the highlights of that debate.

The General Assembly of the United Nations is the world's most universal forum, it holds virtually all members of the world's population, large and small, under an equal opportunity to be heard. The 122 member states of the United Nations are the Assembly's constituent elements and their views on the major international issues of the day are reflected in its resolutions. On September 23, 1976, the 122 member states adopted a resolution on the basis of which the following are the highlights of that debate.

Efforts to adapt the procedures and structure of the UN to an increasingly complex world are being made. The Assembly will have a special session in 1977 to discuss the implementation of the resolution on the basis of which the following are the highlights of that debate.

Agreement on standards and principles of human rights is not hindered by an equal opportunity to be heard. The Assembly will have a special session in 1977 to discuss the implementation of the resolution on the basis of which the following are the highlights of that debate.

The General Assembly of the United Nations is the world's most universal forum, it holds virtually all members of the world's population, large and small, under an equal opportunity to be heard. The 122 member states of the United Nations are the Assembly's constituent elements and their views on the major international issues of the day are reflected in its resolutions. On September 23, 1976, the 122 member states adopted a resolution on the basis of which the following are the highlights of that debate.

Efforts to adapt the procedures and structure of the UN to an increasingly complex world are being made. The Assembly will have a special session in 1977 to discuss the implementation of the resolution on the basis of which the following are the highlights of that debate.

GENERAL DEBATE

The General Assembly of the United Nations is the world's most universal forum, in which virtually all members of the international community, large and small, have an equal opportunity to be heard. The 147 member states take the opportunity given by the Assembly sessions to present their views on the major international issues of the day. In a wide-ranging statement delivered September 29, 1976, the Honourable Don Jamieson, Secretary of State for External Affairs, expressed the views of Canada. The following are the highlights of that speech:

Our membership, with some notable exceptions, is virtually complete, yet there are pressures to define more strictly the obligations of membership.

Efforts to adapt the procedures and structure of the UN to accommodate new policy priorities introduce new tensions in some traditional bodies and activities.

Agreement on standards and principles of human rights is not matched by an equal determination to implement these standards without discrimination.

The Security Council meets more frequently than before, but there is no comparable increase in the number of agreed resolutions.

Acts of piracy and terror, both within and between states, undermine the principles of international law and behaviour on which the UN Charter is based.

The ideal of greater economic and social equality between nations is still far from translation into practice.

And, finally, the choice between anarchy or order on the oceans stands out before us in unmistakable clarity.

Universality

Canada supports the objective of universality of membership. The Charter, it is true, speaks of certain conditions for membership, but my government takes the view that all states which apply for membership ought to be given the benefit of the doubt if such exists. Any question about the degree of independence of such states should be resolved on the basis of the opinion and practice of the majority of member states.

But Canada also believes that a member once admitted to membership should remain a member. We hold that it would be a dangerous precedent to recommend expulsion of a member state on the grounds of violation of the principles of the Charter, unless this is the consensus of the whole membership. To purge this organization of "unpopular" members could lead to the withdrawal of support by others and the paralysis of our activities. That is too high a price for us to pay.

We also hear threats from time to time to suspend the right of Israel to participate in the General Assembly. Canada would oppose such action. To deprive members of their rights in the General Assembly on grounds not justified by the Charter makes a mockery of the Assembly. Our purpose is to debate the issues, not to stifle them.

Institutional Change

One implication of universality of membership must be a willing acceptance of the obligations of membership, especially by those states which play a major role in the organization. A responsible measure of participation in UN activities, especially those voluntary programs which relieve suffering or help to maintain the peace, is a sign of such willingness. As a matter of principle Canada will maintain its full and complete support for all UN organs of which it is a member. We would regret any trend towards the boycotting of UN institutions, or the unilateral reduction of assessed contributions to UN agencies, even though certain of their activities may be regarded by some states as harmful or irregular.

Nevertheless, we believe it is unwise to press resolutions to a vote on issues which deeply divide the membership. Canada regrets for example that the campaign against racial discrimination, on which there is wide consensus, should be associated with Zionism, about which there is profound disagreement. If this link is maintained, my Government will not participate in the conference to be held in 1978 on racial discrimination.

The structure of our organization and the priorities which it follows, from time to time must reflect change in the

world situation and in the membership. The shift over the years towards economic and social priorities is therefore desirable and understandable. We hope that some restructuring of the economic and social sector of the UN will take place as a result. We see merit in proposals to give a more central role to the Economic and Social Council and for arrangements in the Secretariat designed to support this role. It is not too soon to envisage the Economic and Social Council in permanent session, taking up groups of issues in some orderly fashion and giving close attention to the implementation of decisions taken at UN special conferences. The recommendations of the Habitat conference, for example, of which Canada had the honour to act as host, require thorough and expert scrutiny.

We recognize as well that many members believe the Charter reflects better the world of 1945 than the world of today. We agree that useful changes might be made. But here, as in other matters, the best may be the enemy of the good. Canada takes the view that the present balance of power between the General Assembly and the Security Council, which is the central issue of the Charter reform, is preferable to any alternative. The question of the Council's membership may be debatable, but its powers and structure will serve us well. So too does the principle of equal rights in the General Assembly. If the UN is to evolve gradually into a body capable of making decisions which affect the vital interests of all states, it must follow procedures which give confidence to its members that these interests are secure.

Human Rights

The coming into force this year of the Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and on Civil and Political Rights is a major step forward for the UN. As a member of the Commission on Human Rights, Canada will now direct her efforts principally towards the protection of the rights defined in the Covenants and in the Declaration. One obvious means is to make effective the investigative and appeal mechanisms that are now established. These mechanisms require that states be willing to accept impartial examination of any alleged failures to abide by their commitments. A Court of Human Rights, as proposed by my German colleague, is a step we should consider. None of us have perfect records. To fall short of the aspirations inscribed in the Covenants and the Declaration on Human Rights is not a matter for partisan polemics but for sober assessment.

The obstacles ahead are formidable. Appeals against violations of human rights can be a threat to the legitimacy of some governments and an embarrassment to others. No state is immune to criticism in this regard, although some manage to deflect attention while others become the centre of attraction. Canada will speak out to the best of her knowledge without regard for power or favour. We attach particular importance to the full implementation of the terms of the Declaration on Torture which the General Assembly adopted in 1976.

Peace and Security

Our experience with peacekeeping has been different from our experience with human rights. The concepts and principles of UN peacekeeping have been the subject of strong disagreement, whereas the practice has been modestly successful.

Threats to peace and security vary from year to year but we are rarely able to claim that none exist. This year we have been shocked by the continuing loss of life in the Lebanon. The United Nations has not been able to contribute to peacemaking efforts there but should remain ready to respond if the situation so requires.

My Government agrees that the early independence of both Namibia and Rhodesia on the basis of majority rule and racial harmony is essential to the peace of Africa. It believes as well that South Africa must meet the legitimate political, social and economic demands of the majority of South Africans, supported by the virtually unanimous opinion of this Assembly, if such peace is to endure.

In the Middle East the UN has no choice but to continue the peacekeeping duties authorized by the Security Council. We were encouraged at this time last year by the interim agreement reached between Egypt and Israel on the withdrawal of their forces from Sinai. We look forward to further negotiations which could lead eventually to a peace settlement on the basis of the principles agreed by the Security Council in its Resolution 242, and which would take into account the legitimate concerns and interests of the Palestinian people. Whether negotiations are resumed bilaterally with the help of third party mediation or whether they take place multilaterally in the presence of all the parties directly affected is less important than a joint determination by the states concerned to accept the necessity of establishing and maintaining peaceful relations between them. Pending the achievement of this objective, Canada will continue to contribute to UN peacekeeping operations and will oppose actions or initiatives which

imperil the security and independence of states in the area, or make it more difficult for the UN to help in achieving a settlement.

In Cyprus the United Nations Force still faces a difficult situation. The parties to the dispute are no closer to agreement now than before. The situation on the ground remains tense and dangerous. It is generally agreed that the UN force plays a vital role but the costs of the Force are running \$40 million over the contributions collected. We believe strongly that all member states, in particular the permanent members, should make appropriate contributions to duly authorized UN peacekeeping operations. The fact that only a dozen or so governments have made payments to the UN Special Account for the first six months of this year is not a record of which we can be proud. I can only conclude, Mr. President, that unless the dispute moves toward settlement soon my Government will have to review its position as a troop contributor in Cyprus.

We are concerned as well about continuing acts of terrorism throughout the world and about innocent people who have been threatened or killed.

The General Assembly established a committee four years ago to study both terrorism itself and its underlying causes. The committee came to no conclusions, and the Assembly has not even studied its report. We believe the Assembly should now concentrate on a single aspect of the problem in an effort to achieve concrete results.

I therefore support the proposal of my colleague from the Federal Republic of Germany that priority should be given to action against taking hostages, and that international agreement be reached to ensure the punishment of those who engage in such acts wherever they seek refuge. But we must not forget that conventions against aerial hijacking already exist. If all states were to ratify them we could be more confident that such hijackings would stop.

My predecessor spoke last year of the "totally unsatisfactory rate of progress in achieving disarmament measures" and said that the General Assembly must continue "as a spur to action in the field of disarmament". A year later the record is little better. In the words of our distinguished Secretary-General "the problem of armaments continues to present the most serious threat to a peaceful and orderly future for the world community". We should be ready to explore new avenues, and in this spirit my Government is prepared to consider sympathetically a proposal to convene a special session of the General Assembly on disarmament in 1978.

We must not delude ourselves however that the principal obstacles to progress on disarmament will be removed by discussion in this Assembly. These obstacles are the differences of view among states as to the best ways of ensuring their security. Our examination of ways of improving the role of the United Nations in the field of arms control and disarmament will have achieved little unless member countries redouble their efforts to overcome these differences.

At this mid-point in the Disarmament Decade the responsibility to address the real obstacles to progress is shared by all members of this organization. But this responsibility falls most heavily on the nuclear-weapon states and other states of military significance. Progress will be meagre unless we re-examine traditional assumptions, take adequate account of the security concerns of others, and seize all opportunities for concrete action.

Economic and Social Development

All of us acknowledge that the money spent on weapons might be put to better use. Few of us reduce our defence budgets. To do so requires better understanding and mutual confidence. Such understanding and mutual confidence is difficult to achieve in the best of cases and not least in a world divided between wealth and poverty. That is why a common effort to accelerate the process of development and to reduce disparities is in the interest of all states.

Yet, our difficulties should not obscure the fact that we have made significant progress towards agreement on the nature of our agenda and priorities, despite the apparent lack of concrete achievement. If our preparation is thorough, and our approach to it sincere, achievement will be more likely to follow, provided that the requisite political will exists on all sides. It is now my earnest hope that the present phase of the Paris Conference will bear fruit.

The work of the Paris Conference is proceeding in parallel with work in the larger international bodies associated with the UN system. Its participants are aware they must retain a global perspective on the problems before them if non-participants in the Conference are to have confidence in its results, and if these are to influence the actions of governments in the longer term.

The Conference is part of a continuing process of negotiation aimed at narrowing the gap between rich and poor.

The process is complex and it is permanent. Old problems will not disappear quickly and new problems will emerge. In the pursuit of a more equitable international economic system Canada is prepared to commit its efforts and its resources.

Law of the Sea

The fifth session of the Law of the Sea Conference ended here in New York a few weeks ago without agreement, except to meet again for a further session in the spring of next year. Significant progress has been made on many issues but the Conference remains deeply divided on other issues, to a point where a strong sense of impatience and even despair has set in about the seemingly endless nature of these negotiations.

Canada is strongly committed to the objective of the Conference — a new legal order for the oceans based on equity and sound management principles. As a major coastal state Canada is acutely conscious of the inadequacy of the old order, based largely on the concept of freedom of the seas which developed 300 years ago but which has become, with the force of modern technology, licence to foul the shores and ravage the fisheries of the oceans. As a Canadian from an Atlantic province — Newfoundland — which is heavily dependent upon the resources of the sea, I wish to leave this Assembly in no doubt about the strength of Canadian concerns on this matter.

Gravely depleted fisheries resources off our coasts led to a decision by Canada to extend our fisheries jurisdiction out to 200 miles, as of January 1, 1977. This action is being taken within the framework of a system of sound conservation and rational management which we have negotiated on a bilateral and regional level with major fishing states operating off the Canadian coast. This action is also consistent with a growing consensus among nations reflected in the provisions of the Single Negotiating Text that emerged from the Law of the Sea Conference last year and that has been confirmed in this year's revised text. Other states, including our immediate neighbours, have taken or announced similar action.

There are positive features and areas of progress in the work of the conference which, I must add, Mr. Chairman [H. Shirley Amerasinghe (Sri Lanka)], are in significant measure due to your own skilful and tireless efforts as President of the Conference. Although unduly protracted because of differences on a narrowing list of unresolved, hard core issues, the Conference process has seen the emergence of a growing international consensus on a variety of important matters, in addition to the fisheries provisions I have just mentioned. The concept of a 200-mile exclusive economic zone with important coastal state powers has achieved broad acceptance. There is general recognition of the need for special controls against marine pollution in ice-covered areas such as the Canadian Arctic. The rights of states in respect of the mineral resources of their continental shelves extending out to the continental margin are widely accepted in the Conference, although differences remain on the definition of the margin and on proposals for revenue-sharing in areas beyond 200 miles.

A major remaining obstacle to further progress has been the deadlock on the question of mining the rich resources of the deep seabed, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. On this and other unfinished business we must find internationally agreed solutions to avert a serious risk of conflict, and for the benefit of all mankind. The process may be long and many are weary but we must not flag in the oceans at the moment when, finally, success might be within our grasp.

I have spoken about our hopes and disappointments as members of the United Nations. I conclude with the pledge that Canada will continue to be a loyal and, I trust, constructive member. The United Nations suits Canada. We are a country of many peoples and cultures. We understand the meaning of compromise and consensus. We prize the opportunity to cultivate relations with near and distant friends. We remain committed to the purposes and principles of the Charter.

POLITICAL AND SECURITY QUESTIONS

SOUTHERN AFRICA

Policies of Apartheid of the Government of South Africa

The Canadian Government firmly believes that the time remaining to effect peaceful change in South Africa is growing shorter and that individual and collective efforts must be intensified to resolve the central issues before armed struggle and violence become the principal instruments of change.

The Canadian position on this question was elaborated in the following statement delivered by the Honourable Robert Stanbury, P.C., M.P., on November 1, 1976 in plenary:

During the past year we have witnessed momentous developments in Southern Africa. As never before, the attention of the international community has been focused on the course of events in this region as, one after another, its various problems have dominated the international scene. Most recently, Rhodesia (the future Zimbabwe) and Namibia have preoccupied us and some important steps have been taken towards the resolution of these problems. But the subject which we are discussing today is perhaps the most difficult and intractable of those which afflict Southern Africa, and a measure of its fundamental importance is that this year we should be discussing the issue in this plenary forum rather than, as has been customary, in the Special Political Committee.

Even at this stage some question the attention devoted by the United Nations to efforts to bring about change in South Africa. Why, they ask, among all the abuses of human rights in the world, why, do we here fasten so firmly on *apartheid*? The reasons merit repetition.

The United Nations must indeed develop and put into operation effective mechanisms for the protection of human rights everywhere. It must be the advocate of minority groups whenever they are denied equal rights, and of individuals in any country which as a general policy denies to its people basic human rights. But the United Nations is so intensely preoccupied with the situation in South Africa because the institutionalized policies of racial discrimination in South Africa have troubled the international community since the formation of the United Nations in 1945. From its earliest sessions the General Assembly has found cause to appeal to the Government of South Africa to comply with the spirit and provisions of the UN Charter by guaranteeing to all its citizens an equitable share in the political, economic, social and cultural aspects of their country's life. The Government of South Africa has remained deaf to these pleas; instead it has continued to develop and extend year by year *apartheid* legislation in a direction which denies, by law, to four out of five South Africans any opportunity of realizing their inherent human rights.

A complex web of legislation constrains the daily life of 18 million non-white South Africans. It denies to them the right to live in the cities in which they work; it denies to them the right to gain full title to their homes and businesses in the sub-standard African cities in which they are obliged to live. It obliges African workers to commute long distances each day to their place of employment. It relegates tens of thousands of South African contract labourers to life in all-male barracks — separated for 51 weeks of the year from their wives and families; it prohibits them from bringing their families to the areas in which they work, areas in which their labour is essential to the South African economy. The laws of the land deny to them the opportunity to advance, in accordance with their capabilities, to jobs of greater interest and responsibility — those are reserved for the minority. Similarly, the laws establish wages for the African majority at levels which are tremendously lower than those for whites who are doing essentially the same work. This is *apartheid*.

In the last several months the victims of this demeaning and iniquitous system have risen up and confronted the Government of South Africa, and the world, with the appalling circumstances they have been required to endure for so long. On the last occasion when the reality of South Africa was put so forcefully to us, following the Sharpeville Massacre in 1960, the international community responded with one voice in efforts to impress upon the South African Government the need to abandon its *apartheid* policies. It is our task during this session of the General Assembly to re-examine the situation in the light of the recent events in South Africa, and to decide what further steps should be taken to foster rapid and fundamental change for the oppressed majority there by peaceful means as long as that possibility exists.

Last year, my Government, through its representative on the Special Political Committee, presented a full exposition of its views on the *apartheid* policies and practices of the South African Government, and set forth in detail its own policies in response to the unacceptable panoply of regulations, practices and attitudes prevailing in that country. We

emphasized our firm belief in the inevitability of self-determination for those people who comprise the majority of South Africans, and in the need for all reasonable means to be taken to advance the development of this process.

Events in South Africa since then, and particularly in the last several months, have dramatically underlined the fact that the time available for achieving peaceful change in the situation is rapidly running out. It is clear to my Government that the continuing disturbances in Soweto and elsewhere in South Africa are not the results of outside instigation, as the Government of South Africa contends, but reflect the profound discontent and frustration of the majority of South Africans. The causes of this state of affairs and the need to bring about fundamental changes are self-evident. There are some signs that this truth may now be recognized by an increasing number of people within the white minority itself.

However, the Government of South Africa continues to be blind to reality. In October 1974, in the Security Council, the South African representative announced his Government's intention to do away with any discrimination based on race. Instead of taking steps to eliminate progressively its racially discriminatory laws and practices (as some observers had hoped it would last year), that Government instead last spring deemed it necessary to introduce even more restrictive legislation to counteract dissent. Seemingly oblivious to the continuing deterioration of its domestic as well as international position it has obstinately proceeded with its policy of "Bantustanization".

The most dismaying indication of the extent of the Government of South Africa's inability to understand the forces in motion in South Africa today is its handling of the disturbances which began last June and which have continued almost without break. It is difficult for us to comprehend the severity of the measures it has taken against its own people. My Government was appalled by the violence that led to the deaths of over 170 persons (including many children) in three days. My Government can far more easily understand the frustrations and discontent which underlay this expression of massive dissent than it can ever hope to understand the cruel and insensitive reaction of the South African Government, which quite properly earned the condemnation of the United Nations Security Council and the international community. Canada considered it necessary to inform the South African Government directly of its shock at the severity of that Government's reprisals and of Canada's conviction that such developments were clearly the result of the repressive *apartheid* policies.

Since June, the situation has deteriorated even further. Discontent has been manifested in more violent, more frequent and more widespread demonstrations. Over 300 protesters have been killed and many hundreds more have been wounded by the agents of that Government. Paralleling this misuse of the civil power, that Government also has utilized massive political repression by arresting thousands of "potential" dissenters, some on very flimsy grounds indeed. The South African Government has even found it necessary to arrest several newspapermen both black and white, whose "crime", it would appear, was to report the reality of the troubled South African racial situation.

It is clear that the recent course of events in South Africa has ominous implications for the prospects of peace in that country. For those of us still anxious to encourage peaceful change in South Africa, there yet remains some hope that the situation may not degenerate progressively into outright civil war. Increasingly, reports from that unhappy country indicate that important elements of the ruling minority are profoundly in disagreement with their Government's policies and are calling for improvement. Despite the heavy cost in lives, the African majority is courageously refusing to submit any longer. Even those of their spokesmen to whom that Government consents to listen, the "Bantustan" leaders, have clearly expressed their total rejection of the government's policies. The growing weight of international censure is increasingly being felt.

We recognize that our hope for peaceful solutions is a tenuous one. It is quite simply founded upon the belief that the present Government of South Africa and its supporters cannot, in their own long-term interests, continue to be blind to the need to face reality. Nevertheless, we are not encouraged by statements such as that delivered by Prime Minister Vorster on October 13, 1976, rejecting calls for changes. We must intensify our pressures on the South African Government to head the cries for justice within and without its borders.

We have heard during the past few weeks appeals for the true friends of Africa, and of the majority people of Southern Africa, to stand up and be counted. Canadians count themselves among the true friends of Africa.

We show our friendship and concern for Southern Africa in a very tangible way. Canada is one of the most important supporters of, and contributors to, United Nations and other multilateral funds which have been established to assist the African peoples of Southern Africa. Our contribution to these funds in the present year amount to more than \$800,000. Our bilateral programs of development assistance to the countries of Southern Africa, namely Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland, Zambia, Tanzania and Mozambique, are now in the order of \$54,000,000

each year and they continue to grow. In addition, Canada is one of the five or six major contributors to all United Nations, Commonwealth and other multilateral programs which also assist the independent countries of Southern Africa. We engage in this development co-operation in order to contribute to the development of these countries and to assist in their task of building societies with social and economic justice for all their citizens. These societies will stand as an affront to the racist theories of minority regimes which suggest that stability, justice and civilization will be undermined should the majority African peoples of their countries be permitted a full and equal voice in the government of those countries.

Canada has also shown its support for efforts to bring about change in Southern Africa by voluntarily placing, in 1963, an embargo on the sale of military equipment to the Government of South Africa, and by extending this embargo to the export of spare parts for such equipment in 1970, in accordance with the relevant Security Council resolutions.

We also support the sports boycott of South Africa as a further mechanism to encourage change. My Government refuses any moral or financial support to Canadian individuals or teams which decided to compete in South Africa and to any sporting event held in Canada in which South African teams participate. We support the boycott because sport in South Africa, by law, is organized on a racial basis contrary to the Olympic principle. Equally important, we support the boycott as a means to bring the international rejection of the *apartheid* system to the attention of individual white South Africans.

The South African Government seeks to counter these pressures by making superficial changes to give the appearance of integration in sports, in the hope that sporting organizations will come to believe that fundamental change is taking place. An example of the confusion which can be generated was the Olympiad for the Physically Disabled which was held in Toronto, Canada, this summer. For this occasion, the South African Government gave specific permission for the sending of an integrated team to Toronto in the obvious hope that South African participation would thus be acceptable to Canada and the international community. It was clear to my Government, however, that this unique exception to that Government's general policy was only a further refinement of that Government's cosmetic and highly selective approach to effecting changes in its sports policy, and that this isolated example was in no way indicative of any fundamental change in that policy. My Government urged the organizers of the Disabled Games to understand the importance of the international sporting boycott of South Africa and to recognize that the boycott's goal was not to have the occasional multi-coloured team from South Africa show up for such events, but to obtain those fundamental changes that Canada and the international community consider so necessary. Regrettably, the Olympiad organizers did not agree with my Government's position and persisted in permitting this team to participate. Hence, my Government reluctantly decided that it was obliged to withdraw its support for the Disabled Games and, instead, directed these funds into sports programs for the physically disabled people of Canada. It is noteworthy that, in the event, many delegations to the Disabled Games felt obliged to withdraw from those Games when it was clear that a South African team was to be permitted to participate.

Since that time, the South African Government has made further concessions in this area of its *apartheid* policies. However, it is very obvious that these concessions are much like those of the past, largely cosmetic and still far from adequate. Anyone with any doubts about this has only to look to the arrest this month of eight white South African sportsmen who dared to defy their Government's segregationist sports policies by playing on the same team with black sportsmen.

At the thirtieth session of the General Assembly the Canadian Government co-sponsored the resolution relating to the sporting boycott of South Africa. It would hope to be able to continue to support United Nations initiatives on this subject. We have taken note of the suggestion that the Special Committee against *Apartheid* explore the possibility of the development of a convention against sporting contacts with South Africa. We would recommend that any working group appointed by that Committee explore all options, including that of a declaration which might be designed to draw the widest possible support while not entailing the delays, complexities and pitfalls of an international legal instrument.

In the same spirit the Canadian Government has made clear its firm rejection of the Bantustan policy of the Government of South Africa. We cannot accept a system which allocates to 80 per cent of the population of South Africa rights in only 13 per cent of that territory, and which spuriously represents this as "self-determination". For this reason, my Government does not recognize the independence of the Transkei. To do so would legitimize the perverse policy of *apartheid* and separate development. My Government adheres to the position that all South Africans have the right to share equally in the political, social and economic development of their country.

My Government has noted that the leaders of nearly all of the other "Bantustans" in South Africa have also rejected

the independence of the Transkei. We welcome this action as we welcome their further rejection of the whole concept of *apartheid*. In the face of such complete opposition, we believe that the South African Government will have no other choice but to recognize that its policy of "separate development" is bankrupt.

The Canadian Government has urged the minority in South Africa and their Government to accept the fact that fundamental change in South Africa is inevitable and that the time period in which such change can be brought about by peaceful means is very restricted. The events of the past year demonstrate visibly that the time remaining for effective peaceful change is growing shorter day by day. We believe that our individual and collective efforts must be intensified and harmonized; we believe that no opportunity should be missed to expose the Government of South Africa and its electorate to unanimous and relentless international pressures which demand action and change. Change is bound to come. South Africans of all races must face up to that fact and develop a new relationship. If conditions of chronic turbulence which risk deterioration into civil war, with its attendant toll of human tragedy are to be avoided, change must take place, not ten years hence, not five years hence, but now.

Question of Namibia

Canada intervened in the Fourth Committee debate on the question of Namibia to express its deep regret at the lack of progress towards bringing to an end the illegal South African presence in this territory, a feeling that was shared by the 78 speakers who took part. The Canadian statement was delivered on November 24, 1976 by Ambassador Jacques Gignac, Canadian representative in the Fourth Committee:

It is with deep regret that the Canadian delegation has noted that the situation in Namibia has evolved little in substantive terms since our last debate on this question. It has been ten years since the General Assembly terminated the South African mandate over Namibia; it has been five years since the International Court of Justice, in its important advisory opinion, concluded that the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia was illegal and that the South African Government was indeed obligated to withdraw its administration from Namibia immediately, thus putting to an end its occupation of the territory. That opinion also affirmed the obligation of all member states of the United Nations to recognize the illegality of the South African presence in Namibia and to refrain from any acts implying recognition of the legality of, or lending support to, the administration of that territory by the Republic of South Africa.

Thirteen resolutions of the United Nations Security Council adopted between 1960 and the present time have required South Africa to put an end to the extension to Namibia of the odious institutionalized practices of racial discrimination of *apartheid*, and to cease carving up that international territory into so-called homelands or Bantustans. Those resolutions have demanded that South Africa comply with the provisions of the International Declaration of Human Rights; that it abolish politically repressive laws and practices; that it release political prisoners; and that it facilitate the return to their country of Namibians in exile without risk of arrest, detention, intimidation or imprisonment. The Security Council has deplored the militarization of Namibia and its use as a base for attacks on neighbouring countries. Most importantly, it has enjoined South Africa to withdraw its illegal administration from Namibia. In its most recent resolution on the subject, No. 385, adopted unanimously on January 30, 1976, the Security Council declared itself in support of a reasonable and pragmatic means of enabling the people of Namibia to determine their own future, and, we would comment, to facilitate the early transition to independence — namely, free elections in Namibia under United Nations supervision and control.

Canada entirely supported the termination of South Africa's mandate over Namibia and we continue to insist, as we did then, that the population of Namibia must be accorded at the earliest possible time the right of self-determination and independence, recognizing the territorial integrity and unity of Namibia as a nation. Following the issuance of the International Court of Justice's opinion, the Canadian Government advised the Government of South Africa that Canada did not recognize any authority of the Republic of South Africa over Namibia. My Government has taken a number of measures to ensure that no recognition is given by it to the illegal administration of Namibia. Canada maintains no diplomatic, consular or commercial representation in Namibia. Canadian companies which propose to invest there, and Canadian citizens who plan to travel there, are informed that they do so at their own risk. Canadians who are travelling on official business and, therefore, on diplomatic or official passports, are prohibited from travelling to Namibia. It is well known, in addition, that the Canadian Government has effectively prohibited the sale of arms to South Africa — thus doing what it can to avoid assisting that country in maintaining its military hold on Namibia.

Canada views with deepening concern the course of developments in Namibia. This concern derives from the continuing lack of success in bringing about a rapid and peaceful solution of the present illegal situation. We support

the actions taken by the United Nations Security Council to promote a peaceful solution, and in particular the most recent resolutions unanimously adopted by the Security Council of December 13, 1974, (366) and January 30, 1976, (385). We urge the Government of South Africa to accept that a solution must be found in the context of the terms laid down in these resolutions. This stand is consistent with our support for, and encouragement of, the eminent role of the United Nations in world affairs generally and its function as a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations.

With respect to the constitutional discussions being held in Windhoek, we note they are being conducted by representatives of various ethnic groups in Namibia. There has been no provision to permit the participation of all concerned Namibian political elements, notably many Africans who are better educated and more conscious politically and who have organized in such bodies as SWAPO, for which we consider there is substantial evidence of popular support. Bearing these factors in mind, and as well the fact that the discussions are being held without reference to the United Nations' actions, the Canadian Government considers that these discussions cannot be representative of all Namibian interests and cannot adequately provide for the constitutional development of an independent and united Namibia through the fully democratic process required by the UN Security Council. We believe that the Turnhalle discussions will ultimately fail to achieve the objective of an internationally acceptable and truly independent and united Namibia.

My Government has watched with increasing concern the growing number of incidents of violence aimed at the South African presence in Namibia. These outbreaks are undoubtedly the end result of South Africa's continued presence and actions in Namibia and are ominous indicators that the prospects for a peaceful resolution of the Namibian issue are becoming increasingly remote. The deterioration in the situation is exemplified by the sentences handed down by the South West Africa Division of the Spring Court of South Africa on four Namibians at Swakopmund in April/May 1976. In our view they were invalid in law, in view of the illegality of the continued South African presence in Namibia. We believe that the sentences can only have a negative effect on the prospects for a peaceful resolution of the Namibian issue and have urged that the sentences not be carried out.

The Canadian Government brought these views to the attention of the South African Government in a *démarche* made in Pretoria on August 9, 1976. We appealed to that Government to reach an accommodation in the shortest possible time with the United Nations on the future of Namibia and indicated that if this accommodation should prove to be unattainable the situation might deteriorate into one which could be justly considered to constitute a threat to international peace and security.

The response which we received to this *démarche* was disappointing. It showed that the insufficient positions which have been revealed to us by the Government of South Africa each time the subject of Namibia has been discussed in the Security Council remain in essence unchanged. Nonetheless, there have been some developments in Southern Africa in recent months which have raised the level of activity at the political and diplomatic level both in regard to Rhodesia and in regard to Namibia. In the first case, while the results are still difficult to predict, we do have in progress a conference whose mandate it is to arrange the transfer of power to the majority by the end of 1978 at the latest. In the case of Namibia, parallel efforts have been undertaken by the American Secretary of State, Mr. Kissinger, to seek a resolution of the question. The efforts have not yet, it appears, evoked a satisfactory response from the South African regime. It is our belief, however, that the situation of Namibia is not one which need remain impervious to efforts towards settlement. If the declarations of the "interested and concerned parties" are taken at full face value and indeed if the international community holds them to declarations which meet with or begin to approach Security Council stipulations, it should not prove impossible through determined diplomacy to bridge the gap and to bring about the objective of fully democratic elections under United Nations supervision.

In the meantime, the United Nations should continue to pursue its collective efforts in favour of Namibian independence and to support in particular those programs designed to prepare Namibians to cope with the challenges of independence. Of particular importance in this sense, we believe, are the UN Educational and Training Program for Southern Africa (UNETPSA) and the Institute for Namibia. On an earlier occasion we have drawn attention to our support for UNETPSA. The declared objectives of the Institute for Namibia militate greatly in favour of a Canadian decision to assist in its financing — namely, the training of young Namibians, preferably by Namibians, in areas which would equip them to contribute to the future of their country. During the difficult period which will follow independence, Namibians with administrative and civil service training will demonstrate the value of the Institute's programs. Thus, even before the budget of the Institute had been finalized, the Canadian representative in this Committee announced, on October 23 of last year, the intention of the Canadian Government to contribute \$100,000 for the establishment of the Institute for Namibia in Lusaka. That contribution was delivered to the Secretary General two weeks later. The Canadian decision was facilitated by the constructive role played by the Commissioner for Namibia in the conversations concerning the role and planning for the Institute which took place during his visit to Ottawa in Spring 1975.

When announcing the Canadian contribution my Government indicated the hope that other countries would also be able to make contributions to the Institute for its establishment and initial operations. In March of this year, at the time of the pledging conference for all programs for Southern Africa, the Canadian government indicated that a further Canadian contribution to the Institute for Namibia would be subject to assessments of the operations and programs of the Institute, its overall budget, the future of its financial resources, and its ability to secure a broad base of support.

Unfortunately, our efforts since March to obtain details of the Institute's budget and operations have met with little success and we have, therefore, been unable, so far, to commit further funds to it. Other actual or potential donors have experienced similar problems. We understand that the budget had to be considered by the Director of the Institute, by the Ad Hoc Committee of the Fund for Namibia and by the Council for Namibia in turn, a detailed process which is no doubt justified. We trust, however, that the budget-review process can be speeded up, possibly through the development of a clearer understanding as to the role of the Senate in relation to the General Assembly and its subsidiary bodies and vice versa. In the absence of an authoritative document on programs and financing it is not surprising that voluntary contributions earmarked for the Institute in 1976 have not reached the original target levels. Nonetheless, the Institute is now in operation and is performing creditably. We expect that its budget estimates and supporting documents concerning program development will be revised in a pragmatic form to show its progressive development from year to year. We hope that, as in the case of the Trust Fund for South Africa and UNETPSA, there will continue to exist an Ad Hoc Committee for the Fund to Namibia of seven or eight diplomats who will maintain a keen interest in the Institute's development.

In respect to the organization of UN activities relative to Namibia, we have noted that within the Secretariat there are many competent officials working to forward the cause of Namibia. Unfortunately they appear sometimes to be working in parallel and it is time, we believe, for the Secretary-General to effect better co-ordination between, or perhaps amalgamation of, all sections dealing with Namibia. In this fashion the effectiveness of our joint efforts might be maximized.

We note that the present Commissioner for Namibia, Mr. Sean MacBride, does not plan to seek a further term of office. We wish, therefore, before concluding, to express our warmest appreciation to Mr. MacBride for his personal commitment to the cause of Namibia and for the time and energy he has devoted to this important position. He is a political person and his term of office has seen its controversial moments. But he has brought to this job a prestige and experience in the field of human rights that have attracted illustrious personalities in all corners of the world to concentrate attention on the human, international legal, and political problems presented by the situation in Namibia. We feel certain that his devotion to the cause of a united and independent Namibia will continue even as he returns to his home, family and friends in Ireland.

Question of Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe)

This matter has been debated in the General Assembly since 1962. Over 11 years have elapsed since the illegal unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) from Britain, and eight since the Security Council imposed mandatory economic sanctions against Rhodesia.

Initiatives by the then United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger culminated in the convening of the Geneva Conference in October of 1976. This, together with the September 24, 1976, announcement by Mr. Smith that his Government was committed to majority rule within two years, gave rise to a degree of optimism that the transition could be achieved through negotiation at Geneva. The purpose of the conference, chaired by Britain and including Prime Minister Ian Smith and nationalist leaders, was to set a date for majority rule and to decide on the structure of a transitional government. During the UN debate, with the possibility of a peacefully-negotiated settlement then in view, delegations were anxious to avoid any initiative which might jeopardize those discussions. The debate accordingly assumed a considerably milder tone than in the past.

The Canadian statement was delivered on December 8, 1976, by Mr. Jacques Gignac:

We have come once again to consider the question of Rhodesia. The Canadian representative in this Committee made an extensive intervention on this subject last year. At that time the outlook for meaningful negotiations looked bleak and unpromising. Nevertheless, the Geneva Conference has begun. While we are not yet in a position to applaud a successful outcome at Geneva we can take satisfaction that the parties concerned are at least still talking and we can give all encouragement to their efforts to achieve a peaceful solution to this thorny and perplexing problem.

Largely as a result of the efforts of the American Secretary of State, Mr. Kissinger, the Smith regime announced on September 24 its acceptance of the joint Anglo-American proposals for a settlement of the Rhodesian crisis. All the principals representing the various interests in Rhodesia, including a delegation from the illegal regime, are at this moment assembled in Geneva. The conference, it is true, has already been adjourned a number of times and in addition it remains to be demonstrated that the illegal regime is really prepared to negotiate meaningfully and to make the necessary concessions. Nevertheless, we remain hopeful and cautiously optimistic that it will continue, and that the necessary compromises will in the end be made to ensure a successful outcome which can be the basis for a peaceful settlement.

In this regard we urge the nationalist delegations to maintain a united front, putting aside personal, factional, political and ideological differences with the common objective of establishing an interim government leading to majority rule. The alternative would be to admit failure and would result in the escalation of the use of force, with its incumbent destruction and suffering for all concerned. Canada has for its part consistently opposed recourse to the use of force while any possibility for a peaceful solution remains. We deeply regret therefore the continuance of violence and repression, whether in Rhodesia or in neighbouring countries, during the conference and the transitional period leading to Zimbabwe independence.

Canada has no very direct involvement in Rhodesia. We are nonetheless following the Geneva discussions closely and are prepared to give careful consideration to any request for assistance which the parties involved may agree to put to us.

The mandatory economic sanctions against Rhodesia imposed by the Security Council remain an important economic and psychological tool of the international community to bring pressure on the illegal regime to negotiate an acceptable settlement. Canada has scrupulously observed the Sanctions Regulations adopted pursuant to Security Council resolutions. We intend to continue to enforce those regulations until such time as the mandatory sanctions may be revoked by the Security Council. We can do no less.

In concluding I should like to express the hope that the Canadian delegation will be able to join in supporting a consensus resolution at the end of this debate which will reiterate our unanimous demand for independence and majority rule for Zimbabwe and which will urge and encourage all participants in the Geneva conference to deploy their talents and resources to the utmost to achieve that end.

United Nations Educational and Training Program for Southern Africa (UNETPSA)

UNETPSA has been in existence since 1968 and provides students from Southern African countries with fellowships to study – mainly at the university level – primarily in African, but also in European, North American and Indian, educational institutions. Voluntary contributions to the program are in the form of either financial contributions or school facilities. Canada has been a major contributor in both areas since the program began.

The Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations, Mr. William H. Barton, in his capacity as Chairman of the Advisory Committee of UNETPSA, introduced Resolution 31/31 on UNETPSA on November 12, 1976:

The United Nations Educational and Training Program for Southern Africa (UNETPSA, as it is generally known) has since 1968 provided educational and training awards for young people living under colonial or minority regimes in Southern Africa. The participants in the program have included students from Namibia, Rhodesia and South Africa, and also from the newly-independent countries of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique and Sao Tome and Principe. Contributions to the program from member states have totalled \$9,700,000. More than 1,400 young people have completed their education with the support of this United Nations program, and during the 11-month period from November 1975 to September 1976 scholarship holders numbered 1,222.

It will be recalled that the Advisory Committee of the program, of which I have recently been given the honour of being elected Chairman, appointed an Expert Group to carry out an evaluation of the program during the spring of 1975. The Advisory Committee, having considered the report of the Evaluation Group, agreed on a number of conclusions, the most essential of which was that the program has been a significant and worthwhile humanitarian effort by the international community and that an extension of the program was desirable at this stage to meet the increased needs arising from recent developments in the territories concerned. The General Assembly in its Resolution 3422 (XXX) endorsed that conclusion and a number of recommendations relating to the further development of the program and strengthening of its administration. During the past year, these recommendations have been put increasingly into effect, entailing essentially the transfer of administrative responsibilities, to the extent possible, to the

local offices of the UNDP in countries where there are a substantial number of students studying under the program. This has the effect of reducing the time required to respond to a given inquiry. For example, the responsibility for the renewal of scholarships (where the renewal is for the course for which the award was granted, and where the student has satisfactorily completed his year of study) has been transferred to these local offices. Also, the selection of new candidates has been facilitated by more on-the-spot interviews by these offices. In addition, while taking into account the individual interests and aspirations of students, greater priority has been accorded to the manpower needs of the countries concerned as they become independent or achieve majority rule. In this connection the local UNDP offices have been encouraged to assist fellowship-holders in their efforts to obtain employment and to maintain contact with them after graduation.

In examining the report of the Secretary-General, member states will note that the program was able in the period 1975/76 to make only 126 new awards, as opposed to 634 in the previous year. The Advisory Board considers this a matter which should be of great concern to members, as it concerns the future development of the program. While a small percentage of this decline can be attributed to the exceptional awards made late in the previous year, as detailed in Paragraph 9 of the Secretary-General's report, the key factor resides in the tremendously increased costs of the program. For example, in 1973/74 the average cost per fellowship amounted to \$1,300. The average cost per fellowship in 1975/76 rose to \$1,750 and the estimate for 1976/77, based on our present experience, is \$2,000. Inflation, of course, is a major factor in the increase in educational and training costs. Equally significant is the fact that the program is no longer able to make a significant proportion of awards in countries, such as Zaire, where the cost of study was heavily subsidized by the government concerned. As the program increasingly bears the real cost of awards, the average cost can be expected to continue to rise markedly.

Member states will recall that at the twenty-ninth session in 1974, following the independence of Guinea Bissau and anticipating the independence of the other countries under Portuguese administration in Africa, the General Assembly decided to continue — as a transitional measure — assistance to students of those countries. My predecessor suggested at that time that the resolution's provisions might entail continued assistance to those students already studying under the program to the conclusion of their studies and new awards to students of those territories, for a period, to permit the coming into effect of bilateral and multilateral technical-assistance programs. It has transpired, in fact, that the transitional period for new awards to these students has been approximately one year after independence. The Advisory Committee recommended in March 1976 that the program should accord priority to individuals from those three countries which had not yet achieved independence or majority rule — that is, South Africa, Rhodesia and Namibia. Subsequently, the tremendous financial strain on the program required that the small number of new awards be devoted exclusively to applicants from those three groups.

The program is at present receiving voluntary contributions in the order of \$1.6 million a year. Thus, when we consider prospects for 1976/77, it becomes evident that the total number of fellowship-holders will in the next reporting period decrease very substantially if additional voluntary contributions are not received. I do not wish to suggest that it is possible to establish precisely what the optimum level of the program in a given year should be. What is evident is that the situation existing in Southern Africa at the present time puts tremendous and valid demands on us to which we should find a means of responding. This year, several hundred well-qualified students had to be refused. They were invited to reapply next year, when, it is hoped, more awards would be available.

I am pleased to introduce on behalf of 39 member states the resolution which is traditionally adopted on this item. In doing so I would underline our thanks for the generosity of those member states which have made contributions to the program, in terms of cash contributions, or in terms of places offered in their national universities. I would also wish to extend our appreciation to the governments of countries in Africa and elsewhere which are acting as hosts to these young people. Their support for the program and their attention to the needs of the students is of immeasurable worth. I wish to underline our thanks to the devoted personnel of the United Nations Secretariat here in New York and as well to those of the UNDP local offices and of others in Europe and elsewhere, whose service has greatly enhanced the program's effectiveness.

The resolution before us differs little in substance from those adopted in recent years, there is, however, one substantive difference. In accordance with the decision of the Advisory Committee taken in September 1975, and drawn to your attention by my predecessor at this time last year, the resolution no longer seeks a transitional allocation from the United Nations budget. This decision was based on the belief that the program has matured through the development of a significant level of voluntary contributions, and that future fund raising efforts would benefit from the fully voluntary funding mechanism originally envisaged. Indeed a number of countries which made generous increases in their contributions last year kept this factor, as well as greatly-increased costs, in mind when presenting their requests to their respective treasuries. We appeal to those governments now considering the future level of their contributions in relation to levels established two or three years ago to bear this factor in mind.

In conclusion, I wish to commend to the member states this resolution, which we hope will be adopted by consensus as in previous years. I wish also to urge their continuing support for this useful and productive program.

MIDDLE EAST

The Situation in the Middle East

Canada's desire to assist in finding a just solution to the conflict in the Middle East, based on the framework for negotiations set out in Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, together with our dual recognition of Israel's right to an independent existence and of the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people, has been amply illustrated by our contribution to peacekeeping efforts in the area. The following speech, delivered in plenary on December 6, 1976, by Mr. Robert Stanbury, is a concise statement of the Canadian position with respect to the points to be negotiated in an eventual overall settlement of the problem:

Canada's desire for a Middle East peace settlement is real and steadfast. It has led us to make and to continue our peacekeeping contribution there. Beyond the short term such a contribution can be fully justified only if it helps to provide the time and regional stability for negotiation of a settlement. A year or two ago, it was possible to perceive a link between Middle East peacekeeping and progress in the process of peace negotiations put in train by the mediation efforts of the United States. Since then, unfortunately, that process has lain moribund. Now, with renewed hopes for Lebanon and therefore for the entire region, the time seems opportune for the reactivation of comprehensive negotiations towards a final settlement.

In the view of the Canadian Government, it is of the utmost urgency that a new start be made. There exists now agreement on the framework for negotiations. First, Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 have obtained general agreement. Secondly, all parties have agreed that the Palestinians should be heard and participate in any discussion affecting their future. What then are the remaining obstacles? We know that they are procedural in form.

It would, of course, be naive to deny that the existing procedural difficulties cloak deeply-felt aspirations and apprehensions. But this fact simply confirms the necessity for particular efforts by the key parties to clear away procedural obstacles and permit negotiations to be resumed. We all know that the most important obstacles are at the present time: the difficulty of arranging for the effective representation of the Palestinian people in discussions and negotiations that will play a central role in determining their future, on the one hand; on the other, the need for unequivocal acceptance by all parties of the existence of the state of Israel as a sovereign and independent state in the Middle East.

The task of overcoming these obstacles ought not to be beyond human ingenuity. It will require imagination, flexibility, determination. It will demand the wisdom, on the part of all concerned, to refrain from making it impossible to begin constructive negotiations by insisting on procedural considerations that would tend to predetermine their conclusions.

For negotiations to be successful they must begin, and they must begin with clear indications from both sides of the will to make necessary concessions. To save, as "bargaining points" for use at a later stage, concessions that both sides know to be inevitable can only make it impossible for the bargaining ever to get started. There is no basis for serious negotiations without a clear understanding of two points: the reality of Israel as an independent state consistent with Security Council Resolution 242 and the need for the Palestinian people to participate in the process of developing an appropriate structure for their political self-expression, within a suitable territorial framework.

Except for Palestinian participation, Security Council Resolution 242 provides all the necessary elements of a basis for negotiations. Israel must withdraw from territories occupied in 1967, but only as part of a process that establishes secure and recognized borders for all states in the region and that provides effective recognition for the right of all these states, including Israel, to live in peace. Resolution 242 was a landmark of general agreement on the essential framework for a just and lasting peace. It should be neither tampered with nor distorted. It should be used as the basis for moving ahead towards a negotiated solution.

The Geneva Conference, while not the only conceivable forum for negotiations, is the only one in being. Rather than try to reconstruct it, we urge the parties to make use of it with all the urgency that the situation demands.

Let the parties and the international community, therefore, do what is necessary in order to permit the launching of the negotiating process and to seize now an opportunity which, if it is not grasped, will surely pass, just as surely to be followed by the outbreak of renewed hostilities and destruction which it is our common responsibility to prevent.

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) was established in 1949 to assist those refugees who were displaced as a result of the Arab/Israeli conflict in 1948. Since that time Canada has been a strong and consistent supporter of the Agency. As a major contributor to UNRWA, Canada is particularly interested in ensuring that the Agency remains a viable institution. During 1976 UNRWA faced severe financial problems and many countries, Canada among them, made supplementary donations. On November 26, 1976, Canada announced its 1977 cash contribution to the Agency, which amounted to \$1.5 million. In addition, it is expected that Canada's contribution in flour aid will equal or surpass the 1976 gift of some \$2 million.

In his November 3, 1976, statement to the Special Political Committee, Mr. Robert Stanbury paid tribute to the accomplishments of the Agency and outlined Canada's views on UNRWA as well as the general problem of the Palestinian refugees:

War wreaks human havoc, wherever it occurs, in whatever cause. Few victims of war, however, have suffered so long and so much as have the Palestinian refugees who are served by UNRWA. For 27 years now this Agency has provided food, shelter, welfare, health and education services to families whose lives have been disrupted, some repeatedly, by the failure of men to settle disputes peacefully. There are now more than one and a half million registered refugees, some 70 per cent more today than when the Agency was established in 1949. Hundreds of thousands, tragically, are living out their lives in camps, many dying there and many more long born there, in conditions which none of us would choose for our own people and which UNRWA cannot transform. But UNRWA has helped to alleviate the intolerable.

UNRWA is a tangible expression of global concern for these families trapped in a state of chronic despair. We pray that reason and goodwill may soon free them from their fate, but in the meantime they cannot be ignored by any peoples who feel a bond of brotherhood with all their fellow-men.

As a practical vehicle for the concern of the international community, UNRWA has long had the support of many countries. Others have come to its aid recently. Some have not shared in its cause. It is clear that more must be expected from us all if the need is to be met — more from those who have contributed in the past and more countries contributing. There should be no political boundaries to our humanitarian commitment, and concern is of no practical effect without action. Therefore, we appeal to all nations to join in this humanitarian cause and to demonstrate in practice the brotherhood which we all claim.

Since UNRWA was established Canada has consistently supported its work through financial contributions and food aid. Canadian non-governmental organizations have also made significant donations to the Agency. My Government pledges to continue and increase its support.

That we are again discussing the problem of the Palestinians as refugees and of UNRWA and its necessary humanitarian tasks is a reflection of our failure over the past 27 years to undertake those "constructive measures...with a view to the termination of international assistance for relief" called for in the resolution of this Assembly establishing UNRWA in the first place. The failure is a political one because the root of the problem is a political one.

It is recognized by everyone that a crucial aspect of the Middle East problem, and an essential element that any solution must have if it is to endure, is the finding by the Palestinian people of a means for self-expression — including political self-expression — consistent with the principle of self-determination. It is surely also clear that the Palestinian people must participate in the process of developing an appropriate structure for such self-expression. If this process is ever to begin, moreover, the parties concerned must be prepared to abandon extreme positions and to examine all reasonable solutions that imagination and goodwill can devise to this most dangerous and potentially explosive issue in the Middle East conflict.

At the same time, we cannot help but be concerned at efforts to predetermine the nature of a solution, whether in the form of demographic changes, or by insistence, as the precondition of any negotiations, that only one form of political self-expression could be acceptable. Whatever the solution, it must, on the one hand, recognize the existence and legitimacy of the state of Israel and permit all states in the area to live in security, and, on the other, provide a territorial foundation for the political self-expression of the Palestinian people that can open the way for the winding up of this Agency which has received and deserved our support for so long.

Our major concern during this debate, however, is to assure that the basic needs of the Palestinians can be met by the international community through the essential services which UNRWA provides. This demands assurance of an

adequate timely supply of financial resources, an assurance sadly lacking until now. For too long UNRWA has had to operate on a hand-to-mouth basis. Canada places high priority on ending UNRWA's recurring financial crises and giving it a secure financial base. We note with appreciation the recent generous donations made by several Arab countries despite their well-known reservations. We sincerely hope that this support will continue and that other members will follow their example, without reduction in the support given by the Agency's traditional supporters.

Certain major contributors to the United Nations have never donated to UNRWA and we urge them to consider their approach now. As Sir John Rennie has pointed out, UNRWA has been able to cope with its recurring deficits only by postponing essential building and by cutting back on relief services. The report which we have before us shows clearly the harsh realities of the financial crisis and it is incumbent upon us all this session of the General Assembly to find an adequate solution. If we do not confront this issue now or if we postpone action, we will be failing in our responsibilities.

The Commissioner-General and his staff, in the face of formidable difficulties, continue to perform these difficult tasks with a high degree of commitment and effectiveness.

The Commissioner-General's report reveals the effects of the Lebanese civil war on UNRWA's operations generally and particularly within Lebanon. It has been a struggle to keep schools open, provide adequate medical care and distribute rations. We note with deep concern the loss of life, personal injury and destruction of property, particularly shelters, suffered by innocent people who once again have become victims of human conflict. It is our hope that this conflict will be soon resolved, that peace will return to Lebanon and that UNRWA will be able to resume its normal activities there.

Member states will have noted in the Secretary-General's report the concern expressed over the destruction of shelters, and also in the response of the Commissioner-General to the Secretary-General's inquiry that shelters have been demolished as a punitive measure by Israel and that not all of the shelters destroyed since 1971 have been replaced nor have all of the families displaced by that destruction been adequately housed. We note with concern that shelters destroyed are not being more promptly replaced.

Canada is basically satisfied that UNRWA is operating effectively within the financial constraints and difficult environment within which it has been forced to work. That it does so well is a credit to the Agency. That it receives such inadequate financial support is no credit to the international community. From the report before us and from the appeals of the Secretary-General and Commissioner-General during the past year, it is only too clear that UNRWA has barely survived yet another financial crisis. It seems to us that the situation has now developed to a point where these crises are becoming institutionalized. My Government considers it to be completely unsatisfactory that the Commissioner-General of this important humanitarian agency of the UN should be placed in the position of a beggar, trying to achieve adequate financing for it. His precious time and energy could be more productively employed if all of us respond as the need demands.

While we emphasize the need for an immediate solution to the problem of financing, we realize that it will not be easy. Although it has had a distressing longevity, UNRWA is intended to be a temporary organization, not lending itself by nature to long range planning. Consequently, the only alternative is for member states to be more responsive than in the past. Although the views of our governments regarding the political conflicts in the Middle East may differ, we must all agree that the plight of the Palestinian refugees remains a humanitarian problem on a tragic scale and as such a responsibility no government can in conscience ignore.

The international community must ensure that the basic humanitarian needs of food, health care, education and shelter are provided to the Palestinians, while we await a solution to the problem. We cannot allow political differences to dictate intolerable living conditions for any fellow human beings.

The Government of Canada believes that the proper means to meet these basic humanitarian needs of the Palestinians is through the established United Nations Agency. We reiterate our plea to all members to participate generously in this humanitarian responsibility we all share.

THE QUESTION OF CYPRUS

Canadians are justifiably proud of their country's role as a peacekeeper. Canada has been a contributor to every major peacekeeping endeavour undertaken by the UN since the organization was created in the shadow of the Second World War. One such operation which has now endured some 12 years is the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). For some time, Canada, along with several other countries, has been concerned of the lack of substantial progress towards a settlement of the Cyprus question, as well as the evident lack of support for UNFICYP within the UN membership itself. On November 11, 1976, Mr. William H. Barton voiced these concerns during the debate on Cyprus in plenary:

Canada joined with the great majority of member states in supporting the resolutions adopted by this Assembly on the question of Cyprus in 1974 and in 1975. We have supported as well the mandate of the Secretary-General to provide his good offices to the two communities in Cyprus. We have contributed to and supported the work of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees on the island, but, other than the central concern of peace and security in the region, the principal focus of Canada's direct interest in the situation in Cyprus has been the presence on the island for the past 12 years of Canadian soldiers as part of the United Nations force in Cyprus. Over 18,000 Canadians have served in Cyprus during this period. We are proud of the contribution these men have made along with their comrades from Britain, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Austria, Ireland and Australia. Service to the United Nations in the capacity of peacekeepers has become a significant role for the Canadian Armed Forces which the Government values highly and which it formally reaffirmed in 1975. In this context, I am sure that the troop-contributing states I have just mentioned would join with Canada in reiterating the call, expressed in operative Paragraph 9 of Resolution 3395 (XXX), for all parties to the dispute in Cyprus to co-operate fully with UNFICYP.

My Government has never concealed its reservations about certain aspects of the United Nations role in Cyprus. Canadian representatives on the Security Council in 1967-68 emphasized the need to arrive at a situation in which the Force was no longer required in Cyprus and, in the meantime, they called for a larger number of voluntary financial contributions. Despite the continued efforts of the Secretary-General and of the Security Council scant progress has been made towards these goals over the last ten years. Indeed one cannot but wonder whether, in the past two years, the prospects of an equitable political settlement may not have declined. The mandate of the Force has become increasingly difficult to reconcile with the situation on the ground and its finances have remained precarious. Only 16 member states as of July have contributed to its financing in 1976, not including three permanent members of the Security Council.

The peacekeeping role of UNFICYP is generally acknowledged in this Assembly to be essential in the search for an enduring settlement, and yet its continuation at this moment is dependent on the willingness of troop-contributors to maintain their participation notwithstanding serious arrears in the settlement of amounts owing to them and indeed, in the present circumstances, owing to the shortfall of voluntary contributions, it is the troop-contributors who are financing the deficit. This cannot go on indefinitely. All member governments, and particularly those in the European region, have a responsibility to demonstrate their political support for the operation by sharing in the costs. It is not too soon for them to face up to the responsibility they will carry if the Force should have to be withdrawn for the lack of funds.

The situation in Cyprus should be of direct and substantial concern to the international community as a whole. It was because of this that the Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada, the Honourable Don Jamieson, noted in his address to plenary on September 29, 1976, that it is important that member states give tangible and effective expression to their concern, by providing an adequate level of financial support to UNFICYP, which is carrying out a meaningful role on the island. We are continually assured that there is little prospect for more than temporary peace without the continued presence of this peacekeeping force. In this it is important to recall, Mr. President, the firm stand of Canada over the years that peacekeeping can but be a step — albeit significant — *en route* to peacemaking.

Canada's involvement in Cyprus stems primarily from our membership in the United Nations and our readiness to assist the organization to maintain peace and security. It also stems from concern for the national integrity of a fellow Commonwealth member and for the harsh fate that has befallen countless individual Cypriots. In this connection, further attention still needs to be focused on the matter of individuals who have been unaccounted for since the conflict of 1974; their families have already experienced immeasurable grief, which should not be allowed to continue. This matter is considered in last year's plenary Resolution 3395. Yet the situation persists and we must again urge that "the tracing and accounting for missing persons" be conducted as effectively as possible on an urgent basis.

In concluding, we cannot help but underline our justifiable concern, shared by several member states, that the past year has witnessed not only a lack of progress in Cyprus but also a gradual process of entrenchment. We view with grave concern and apprehension what this may mean for prospects for a negotiated solution. Resolution 3212 and 3395 remain unimplemented. It is an understatement to say Canada is disappointed at this. Nonetheless, we remain convinced that these resolutions continue to be appropriate. We also continue to support the essential proposition they reflect – namely, that an effective, fair and enduring settlement can best be achieved by negotiations between the two communities directly concerned. This organization must stand ready to encourage and to assist the process where it can. The parties to the dispute must be prepared to set long-standing difficulties aside to open the way for substantive negotiations towards a just and lasting peace on the island. We are heartened that in his latest report to the Security Council the Secretary-General echoes this sentiment and has pledged his best efforts “to bring about a resumption of meaningful negotiations and to assist the parties in making the urgently-required progress towards a settlement of the Cyprus problem”.

DISARMAMENT

The United Nations role in the search for a solution to the complex problems of disarmament continued at the thirty-first session. The growing frustration at the lack of progress on this range of issues was reflected in the more than 100 statements of national position and the adoption of 22 resolutions. It was against this background that Mr. Harry Jay, Permanent Representative of Canada to the Office of the United Nations in Geneva, intervened in the general debate on disarmament in the First Committee. Mr. Jay's statement was delivered on November 5, 1976:

My predecessors in this committee have repeatedly spoken of the growing impatience, frustration and deep disappointment felt by most countries — and certainly by Canada — at the continuing failure of the international community to face up more concretely and rapidly to the awesome problems that confront us in the field of disarmament. Despite some modest steps, the record of achievement in the past 12 months has provided no cause for comfort.

Will we have to voice the same harsh judgment at the end of the Disarmament Decade as we do at its mid-point? Will we be forced to admit in five years that the declaration of the 1970s as the Disarmament Decade was a half-hearted gesture? I fear that international security will be in even greater peril if, in those next five-years, we do not come to grips with the tasks set out for the Decade. We must reach early agreement on the most pressing arms-control problems and follow through with the most vigorous possible action to resolve them. All states of military significance must share in this important task, but the primary responsibility to ensure that the Disarmament Decade is not a failure rests with the nuclear-weapon states.

Of all the problems we face in the arms-control and disarmament field none is greater or deserves higher priority than the need for limitations and reductions in nuclear arms, for an effective ban on all nuclear-weapons testing and for further strengthening of the nuclear-non-proliferation system.

As valuable as they have been, the strategic arms limitation talks between the United States and the Soviet Union have not yet slowed the nuclear arms race, much less led to any reduction in nuclear arms. Canada welcomed the SALT I (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) agreement and the establishment at Vladivostok in 1974 of the principle of numerical equality in central strategic systems. Four years have passed since the SALT I agreement and the Vladivostok principles still remain to be confirmed in a definitive SALT II agreement. Over those years new developments in strategic weaponry have further complicated the task of achieving measures to curtail competition in nuclear weapons. All of us in the international community must be fully conscious of the complexity of the problems the United States and the Soviet Union confront in undertaking even gradual and partial measures of nuclear disarmament, but we strongly believe they must make a more determined effort to surmount these problems. We appeal to the two principal nuclear powers again to move with greater speed towards the conclusion of SALT II and to move on to SALT III — that is, from limitations to effective reductions — at the earliest possible date.

Despite the appeals made year after year for almost three decades in resolutions of this Assembly, progress in recent years towards a ban on all nuclear-weapons testing has been almost imperceptible. The Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 has not yet been signed by two nuclear-weapon states and one of them is still engaging in atmospheric testing.

The achievement of a comprehensive test ban, like strategic arms limitation, involves difficult security, political and technical problems and perceptions. In the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) many countries, including my own, have tried to contribute to the solution of some of those problems, particularly those that would have to be faced in verifying compliance with such a treaty. We hope the search for solutions will be advanced by the group of scientific experts established by the CCD this year to investigate the possibilities for international co-operation in detecting and identifying seismic events, but the work of that group will be more useful if it has the active support of all nuclear-weapon state members of the CCD.

Although the CCD continues to grapple with the question of nuclear testing, it is difficult to accept that more resolute efforts have not been made by the nuclear-weapon states themselves to overcome the obstacles to a nuclear test ban. We fail to understand why, as at least one nuclear-weapon state has argued, movement towards a CTB (Complete Test Ban) is impossible unless all five nuclear-weapon states participate from the outset. Ultimately — and sooner rather than later — all nuclear-weapon states must stop their weapons testing in all environments. But what insurmountable obstacles prevent at least the two superpowers, and as many other nuclear-weapon states as possible, from entering into a formal interim agreement to end their nuclear-weapon testing for a defined trial period? When the two superpowers already have nuclear-weapon arsenals of such enormous magnitude and when their own capacity for destruction so greatly exceeds that of any other nuclear-weapon state, how can it be argued with any credibility that an interim testing halt by the two of them would threaten their security unless all of the remaining

nuclear-weapon states immediately followed suit? If we are ever to have a comprehensive test ban someone must take the first step and the two superpowers are the ones who should take it.

If such an agreement were reached for a fixed trial period it could, at the end of that time, be reviewed by its adherents to determine whether it might be further extended or be transformed into a permanent agreement including all nuclear-weapon states. One thing, however, must be stressed. In proposing an interim agreement, we are not calling for an unverified moratorium. On the contrary, we envisage an agreement open to all states, containing measures to ensure first that its terms are fully honoured and second that any nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes do not confer weapons-related benefits.

We can welcome the achievement by the United States and the Soviet Union of their Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974 and their related agreement on peaceful nuclear explosions to the extent that they constitute mutual restraints and contain provisions for verification. But we consider these measures to be initial steps only. Agreements that permit the yield of individual explosions to remain as high as 150 kilotons are very modest indeed. In Canada's view a much more far-reaching demonstration of the superpowers' determination to secure a CTB is required most urgently.

Although existing nuclear-weapon arsenals pose the most immediate threat to world security, all of us continue to be haunted by the danger that nuclear weapons will spread to more states. If more resolute efforts are not made to avert this danger, we shall have frittered away completely whatever chance there still may be of eliminating the threat of nuclear destruction.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty and its associated system of IAEA safeguards continue to be the basic instruments of the non-proliferation system and the most appropriate framework for international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. One of the important tasks of this committee this year will be to assess the progress that has been made since the NPT Review Conference of May 1975. Canada is encouraged that some positive steps have been taken since the Review Conference but we are convinced that much that should have been done in support of the non-proliferation objective has not been done. As we all know, the treaty's obligations apply to all of its parties — to nuclear-weapon states as well as non-nuclear-weapon states.

While non-nuclear-weapon states parties undertook not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear-explosive devices, the nuclear-weapon states parties undertook, in return, to pursue negotiations in good faith and at an early date towards nuclear disarmament. We regret that the nuclear-weapon states have not done more to fulfil their part of the NPT bargain. An effective non-proliferation system is in the interest of all states. But to be fully effective and to serve the interests of all states, the non-proliferation system must entail restraints on vertical as well as horizontal nuclear proliferation.

An important achievement has been the growth in the number of the treaty's adherents from just over 80 at the time of the Review Conference to about one hundred. Parties to the treaty now include almost all of the most highly industrialized countries and the great majority of developing countries. By forswearing the acquisition of nuclear-explosive devices and by placing all of their nuclear activities under IAEA-administered safeguards to verify this commitment, this impressive group of states from all regions of the world has clearly rejected the mistaken notion that either the possession of nuclear weapons or the retention of an option to acquire them is a guarantee of security in some way essential to national sovereignty and the reinforcement of national prestige. It is cause for the deepest concern, however, that this encouraging perspective is not yet shared by certain other states advanced in nuclear technology or in the process of acquiring that technology. We appeal to those states to reassess their reasons for not making a firm commitment to the non-proliferation objective either by adhering to the NPT or in some other equally binding and verifiable way.

In its Final Declaration the NPT Review Conference urged that "in all achievable ways" steps be taken to strengthen the application of nuclear safeguards as the reasonable and necessary condition for international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Canada has taken this appeal very seriously indeed. We have made it clear in the negotiation of new bilateral nuclear co-operation agreements and in the renegotiation of others that we are determined to ensure that Canadian nuclear assistance will be used solely for peaceful, non-explosive purposes.

We have been gratified by the measures that have been taken in the IAEA and among suppliers since the NPT Review Conference to reinforce and broaden the application of nuclear safeguards. Important steps have been taken in safeguards agreements concluded by a number of countries with the IAEA in the past year, especially their explicit exclusion of any explosive use and strengthened provisions for the application of safeguards to technology transfers. We very much welcome the detailed study being given in the IAEA and elsewhere to the need for exercising greater

care and for applying more stringent controls in the use of the most sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle. Canada will continue to press in its bilateral nuclear relations and in all appropriate forums for the further strengthening and broadening of the scope of nuclear safeguards. In our view, safeguards will not be fully effective until they cover all peaceful nuclear activities in all states. As a country which has willingly accepted the application of safeguards to all of its own nuclear industry, Canada firmly believes that universal acceptance of such safeguards would provide the soundest basis for international nuclear co-operation.

The NPT Review Conference called for intensified study of the application of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. It strongly reaffirmed the provisions of Article V of the Treaty whereby any potential benefits from the application of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes will be available to non-nuclear weapon states party to the treaty on a non-discriminatory basis, under appropriate international observation and procedures, through an appropriate international body and pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements. It confirmed that any such benefits could be made available to non-nuclear-weapon states not party to the treaty by way of nuclear-explosive services provided by nuclear-weapon states and conducted under the appropriate international observation and procedures called for in Article V. It concluded that the IAEA was the international body through which potential benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear explosions could be made available by nuclear-weapon states to non-nuclear-weapon states.

Canada fully supported these conclusions. Nonetheless we remain to be convinced that there are significant potential benefits in so-called peaceful nuclear explosions. We doubt that any benefits that may exist would outweigh the inherent risks. Certainly there can be no question that such explosions would have crucial arms-control implications. It has been clearly recognized in resolutions of this Assembly in 1974 and 1975 that no distinction can be made between the technology for nuclear weapons and for nuclear-explosive devices for peaceful purposes and that it is not possible to develop such devices for peaceful application without at the same time acquiring nuclear-weapons capability. It is for this reason that we are participating fully in the detailed study being conducted in the IAEA of the economic, technical, safety, environmental and legal aspects of peaceful nuclear explosions. The IAEA studies will require more time but we hope they will lead not only to broad consensus on the economic, technical and legal aspects of peaceful nuclear explosions but also to international arrangements for the provision of PNE services that are fully consistent with the requirements of the NPT and other international legal instruments, including the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963. We do not minimize the difficulties involved in devising such arrangements. But it could be much harder to reach agreement on international arrangements to govern PNE services if we wait until whatever economic value they may have, has been demonstrated.

The NPT Review Conference confirmed that internationally-recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones can be an effective means of curbing the spread of nuclear weapons and of strengthening the security of states which become fully bound by their provisions. The nuclear-weapon-free zone concept and the possibility of establishing such zones in various parts of the world have been the subjects of numerous resolutions of this Assembly in recent years and will be addressed again this year. Yet, apart from the Antarctic, Latin America is the only area of the world which has been established as a nuclear-weapon-free zone by treaty and that treaty is still not in force for some important countries of the region. Moreover, its protocols have yet to be adopted by all of the states to which they were designed to apply.

In principle Canada supports the nuclear-weapon-free zone concept. Our understanding of this concept has been deepened by the thorough study undertaken in the CCD and presented to the Assembly last year. I wish to stress, however, that, in Canada's view, the value of any specific nuclear-weapon-free zone proposal or arrangement will depend on whether it has or is likely to have the support of most countries of the area concerned including of necessity the major military powers of the region. It will also depend on a clear definition of the geographic area covered, on assurance that the arrangement would not confer additional military advantage to any state or to any group of states and on the provisions made for ensuring that all component countries comply fully with the commitments involved and forswear the independent acquisition of nuclear-explosive capability. It is also essential that supplementary arrangements applicable to states outside the region concerned be realistic and fully consistent with generally-recognized principles of international law. Moreover, it is important to recognize that there can be no all-purpose blueprint for nuclear-weapon-free zone arrangements. Obviously, when requested, the United Nations has a responsibility to assist in the establishment of such arrangements but the terms of such arrangements cannot be imposed.

Before leaving the question of nuclear proliferation I want to emphasize the need for a constructive approach to the assessment of the progress achieved since the NPT Review Conference. Canada recognizes that the NPT is not a perfect instrument. Nevertheless, it must be borne firmly in mind that, whatever its weaknesses, the treaty's objectives are as valid today as they were when it was concluded. We agree with the many states which deeply regret that more has not been done to reinforce it.

It cannot be emphasized too strongly that the non-proliferation system is as much in the interest of non-nuclear-weapon states as of nuclear-weapon states. It is as much in the interest of developing countries as of developed countries. The non-proliferation system has the cardinal value of sparing non-nuclear-weapon states the diversion of economic and human resources to non-productive and potentially destructive ends.

Although first priority must be given to checking the growth and averting the spread of nuclear arms, we must seek and exploit every opportunity to curb the growth and use of other weapons. For three decades we have been spared a nuclear war but conventional arms have continued to exact an appalling toll in life, suffering and material destruction. The international arms trade has reached mammoth proportions and continues to devour vast resources urgently needed for productive economic and social purposes throughout the world. The need to check the growth and spread of conventional arms has been largely ignored in disarmament forums. Concerted international action is urgently required among both suppliers and recipients to check the growth in the arms trade. As other members of this Assembly have already suggested, it might be particularly fruitful to approach this problem at the regional level.

The Vienna negotiations for mutual and balanced force reductions in Central Europe offer prospect of significant steps in disarmament and the reduction of the danger of confrontation at the regional level. Unfortunately, progress has been slow and the negotiations are now about to enter their fourth year with little measurable achievement yet in sight. Canada attaches high priority to MBFR and, in that forum as in others, will continue to work for the achievement of meaningful measures of disarmament and the improvement of mutual confidence.

It is particularly timely that in the middle of the Disarmament Decade we are reviewing the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. Canada fully supports the search for ways of enabling the UN to carry out this role more effectively. We have participated in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee established last year to undertake this review and we are prepared to endorse its report. The United Nations remains the principal forum in which to focus world attention on the need to limit and reduce the levels of military forces and armaments, for the exchange of views among member states on multilateral disarmament issues and for encouraging the examination of disarmament-related questions in other international forums.

At the same time it has been repeatedly recognized in resolutions of this Assembly that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament continues to be the most appropriate forum for the negotiation of arms-control agreements intended to have universal application. Canada deeply regrets that, except for the draft environmental-modification convention, no arms-control treaty has emerged from the CCD in recent years. Nevertheless the CCD remains well suited to the negotiation of international arms-control agreements whenever fundamental political and other obstacles can be overcome. The value of the CCD would be greatly enhanced by the inclusion of those nuclear-weapon states which have not yet participated in its work. The CCD has decided to undertake a comprehensive review of its procedures early in 1977. Canada supports efforts to improve the effectiveness of the CCD and will, in particular, be prepared to give sympathetic consideration to changes in the structure or procedures of the CCD that would make possible the participation of more than three of the nuclear-weapon states.

The CCD's utility as a negotiating forum has been again well demonstrated this year by the elaboration of a draft convention to prohibit the military or any other hostile use of environmental-modification techniques. We are well aware of the reservations some countries have about the draft convention, particularly about the scope of its prohibition. We do not consider the draft convention to be a faultless document nor, given the other and more pressing priorities in the arms-control field, do we regard it as a major landmark. Canada is nevertheless prepared to join in recommending to governments that they sign the draft convention in its present form in the hope that it will inhibit whatever plans some states might otherwise make or contemplate for the hostile use of environmental-modification techniques. Its provision for periodic review is particularly important in dealing with techniques so little understood as those the convention seeks to regulate. We also support fully the provision in Article III of the draft convention for the fullest possible exchange of scientific and technological information in the use of environmental-modification techniques for peaceful purposes which, we hope, will help to foster greater international co-operation in a field of vital importance to us all.

Canada sincerely hopes that the value of the CCD will be further demonstrated in the continuing consideration it is expected to give to a convention to prohibit the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. Discussion of this question in the CCD and elsewhere this year has provided some glimmer of hope for at least a modest breakthrough toward resolving the problems, particularly the problems of verification that have so long stood in the way of achieving such a convention. This Assembly should give further encouragement to the CCD to press ahead with this task.

We also look for progress in the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International

Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts. At this stage all of us must redouble our efforts to ensure that agreements will be reached on certain prohibitions or restrictions on the use of specific conventional weapons that may cause unnecessary suffering or have indiscriminate effects.

Many members of the Assembly have expressed the view that the cause of disarmament could be significantly advanced by the convening of a special session on disarmament. Canada stands ready to support a call for such a special session and to participate fully and constructively in it and in the careful preparations that it will require. It must not be a dialogue of the deaf. Our objective for the session must be to infuse a new sense of purpose into the quest for peace and security.

I have sought to underline the arms-control problems which Canada considers most pressing. It should be clear to this committee that Canadians firmly believe that no more time must be lost in seeking resolutions to those problems. We must all, as the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs said in this Assembly on September 29, "re-examine our traditional assumptions, take adequate account of the security concerns of others and seize all opportunities for concrete action".

PEACEKEEPING

As a major contributor to peacekeeping operations, Canada has been an active participant in the deliberations of the Committee of 33, the special committee charged by the UN with elaborating guidelines for the establishment and control of peacekeeping operations in the field. The Committee of 33 reports annually to the UN Special Political Committee, in which Mr. Fernand Leblanc, M.P., Parliamentary Secretary to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, delivered the following statement on December 7, 1976:

Canada, as a country which has participated in all but the very earliest UN peacekeeping operations, has a direct and continuing interest in ensuring that such operations are mounted and maintained in the most effective and efficient manner. From the outset, we have been aware of the fundamental differences which have interfered with the attainment of this objective.

We have participated in the Committee of 33, since it was created in 1965, in the hope that it could help resolve at least some of these fundamental differences of opinion among member states on the role of the UN in keeping the peace. Unfortunately, these differences remain. For example, the report of the Special Committee reveals that on just four articles in relation to peacekeeping guidelines has even tentative agreement been reached, on the understanding that the guidelines must be deemed a "package" which may be formally approved only if and when all the various articles have been agreed upon.

Permit me to comment on certain of the draft formulas prepared by the Working Group. The tentative agreement reached on the aim of the draft guidelines merits particular attention in that it enjoins the committee to agree upon principles and methods to ensure that all peacekeeping operations shall be used in the future as in the past in the common interests of the United Nations. It might be said that this is a truism, but of course it is an essential precondition for further progress. The draft articles will, if pursued at the time any new peacekeeping operation is established, provide useful and necessary guidance to supplement the background experience this organization already has. This will be important for the Security Council when called upon, on short notice, to get such a presence into the field.

In light of remarks made by my delegation during earlier discussions of the matter, I also wish to comment upon the provision in the draft guidelines dealing with the subsidiary organ of the Council which may be established under Article 29 of the Charter. Members will be aware of our reservations regarding the feasibility of a proposal that might have made it mandatory for such a body to provide the mechanism for direct operational control of a force in the field. At the same time, while such an organ has not yet in UN peacekeeping history performed these tasks, Canada has never wished to rule out the possibility that bodies of this nature could have a useful role to play in future peacekeeping and peace-observation activities, especially in an advisory capacity. In this connection, it is noteworthy that provision has been made in Article 4 of the draft guidelines for the participation of representatives of host countries and of those countries providing voluntarily on a substantial scale financial and other material contributions such as facilities, services and equipment. In this light, the Canadian delegation is especially satisfied that the draft guidelines propose the establishment of such a body, conditional upon the circumstances surrounding the setting-up of the operation.

With due regard to the importance of the matters the committee has dealt with to date, it must be admitted that, measured in relation to the achievement of agreement on the guidelines as a whole, one could certainly not describe the work of the Special Committee on peacekeeping as a resounding success. Were tentative agreement on a title, three guidelines and a portion of a fourth after 11 years' work all we had to gauge our achievement, one might be tempted to dismiss the work of the committee as irrelevant.

Fortunately, there are other indirect benefits to the organization which have accrued from the committee's work. We believe that it has been at least in part due to the efforts of the committee that peacekeeping operations have continued over the years. This in itself, in our view, justifies the existence of the committee. Today, two UN peacekeeping operations — UNEF, set up in 1973, and UNDOF, set up in 1974 — stand as very useful and precedent-setting models. There can be no doubt concerning the legal basis on which they were founded and continue to operate. Financially, they are operating on an agreed assessment to be shared by all members of the United Nations. That they were organized in this way was largely, we believe, due to the experience gained from studies which originated in the Special Committee.

Peacekeeping is a noble and vital venture of the international community. But it must never become an end in itself. Canada is concerned that peacekeeping be accompanied by active, concurrent peacemaking. There are, unfortun-

ately, examples where the process of peacemaking virtually ceased once a peacekeeping force was in position. This is a tendency to be deplored, for, if the conditions which led to the interposition of the UN Force continue to fester and no political solution is found, violence inevitably will recur. Agreed guidelines cannot eliminate this problem, but we must ensure that the parties to a dispute are constantly reminded of their responsibility to press on with meaningful negotiations.

Last year my Government, recognizing that scant progress was likely on guidelines if the atmosphere which prevailed during 1975 continued, proposed that the committee address itself to some of the practical operational aspects of peacekeeping. We did so, in part, because we wanted to keep the committee engaged in meaningful work until some of the doctrinal differences which had impeded progress might be resolved and the committee could again direct its attention to its primary task, the achievement of agreed guidelines. We feel that it would be useful if the committee were to continue to address these practical aspects of peacekeeping as a secondary task. We note from the report that suggestions on practical aspects have been advanced not only by members of the committee and its working group but also by other nations with an interest in peacekeeping. We believe that certain of these suggestions merit serious study by the committee. Where appropriate, action to give substance to useful suggestions — for example, on training for peacekeeping — should be proposed to the General Assembly next year.

I do not believe it is necessary for me to reiterate Canada's commitment to peacekeeping. At the same time, Canada, following the note struck here by our Secretary of State for External Affairs a few weeks ago, will continue to remind those with primary responsibilities for peace negotiations that our attitude to particular peacekeeping operations will be very much influenced by the vigour with which peacemaking efforts are pursued and by the degree of support which these operations receive from the membership as a whole.

In this connection I should like to refer for a moment to the role of the UN Force in Cyprus, which cannot be described as being completely satisfactory. When Canada was last on the Security Council in 1967-68 we stressed the need to arrive at a situation in which the Force was no longer required in Cyprus, but in the meantime called for a larger number of voluntary financial contributions. A decade later, as we prepare to join the Council again, we find that the prospects for an equitable political settlement may actually have declined. The mandate of the force is increasingly difficult to reconcile with the situation on the ground. Only a handful of member states contribute, not including three permanent members of the Security Council, leaving the troop-contributors to finance their own costs. We know that the Force remains essential to the peace of Cyprus. Other countries share this view. We believe, however, that peacekeeping must be a shared responsibility, taking into account the differing capacities of member states to make a contribution, either of troops or of funds. If the Force is essential to the peace of Cyprus and perhaps to the peace of the Eastern Mediterranean, it must be given the necessary support and co-operation.

In the light of the foregoing remarks, you will be aware of my delegation's belief that there are a number of problems connected with the peacekeeping operations of the United Nations which remain to be resolved. Accordingly, my delegation will support a resolution calling for the continuation of the work of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping in the conviction that the committee can and must make a serious endeavour to complete its work by the thirty-second session of this Assembly.

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

Canada's position as a country with a highly-advanced nuclear technology and a long-standing commitment to the peaceful use of nuclear power gives force to its strong support for the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Canadian concerns about the dangers of nuclear technology and the need for guaranteeing its peaceful application were articulated by Mr. William H. Barton in the following statement delivered in plenary on November 10, 1976:

The Agency's programs and responsibility to promote adequate planning for nuclear energy through advice, training and information exchange, to develop safety and environmental protection standards, and to enhance international security through the most effective exercise of its growing safeguards responsibilities and the development of standards for physical security of nuclear material are becoming evermore important with the expansion of nuclear-power generation programs throughout the world. Canada considers these particular areas of activity as being vital to ensure that nuclear power is safe for man and his environment and that the peaceful uses of nuclear energy contribute to world progress and not be allowed to become a destabilizing factor through diversion to nuclear arms.

Canada continues to support the expansion of the world's nuclear-power programs where these are decided upon as the most appropriate option for a country — for example, in diversifying its energy base from a generalized reliance on fossil fuels. Some of the factors which must be considered in choosing the nuclear-energy option, for instance the need for economics of scale, of course, apply to any energy decision involving massive capital outlays. The decision to adopt or expand the nuclear-power alternative, however, involves additional consequences which require thorough analysis and planning. It is essential that decisions to enter or expand nuclear-power programs also take into account these additional issues. Nuclear programs require secure sources of fuel and more uranium, now in short supply, will be necessary to satisfy increased demand. Skilled specialist technical personnel must be trained to operate the plants, regulatory mechanism must be in place to ensure their safety, and long-term waste-management systems must be demonstrated to safely store irradiated materials.

I mention these general considerations in no sense in a negative way. Rather they are challenges to our societies as they seek to ensure adequate energy for economic development. The introduction of any new technology implies the introduction of new problems and challenges. International pooling of effort is essential because of the complexity of the energy choices we are all forced to make. In the analysis and the solution of these problems, Canada looks to the Agency for leadership in its area of special competence.

Canada has been pleased to note in the Agency's Annual Report for 1975 the attention given to training personnel and providing assistance and advisory services to nuclear states, particularly developing countries.

Total resources available for technical assistance continue to be considerably expanded and the Annual Report takes note of the corresponding increase in large-scale, i.e. UNDP, projects executed by the Agency. It has become apparent that as more nations make long-term commitments to nuclear power, the Agency is called upon to provide assistance with training programs needed to ensure adequate and efficient management of their nuclear programs. Canada supports these efforts and will continue to contribute in the future. In the context of technical assistance I am pleased to be able to pledge that the Canadian Government will contribute to the voluntary fund at its assessed level again this year.

As an integral part of our long-standing support of the IAEA and the NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty), Canada has always placed great emphasis on increased levels of assistance to developing countries through the Agency in the peaceful application of nuclear technology. We look with favour on the encouragement given by the IAEA to developments in the concrete application of nuclear science to world problems. Accordingly, to assist the Agency in its valuable developmental work, Canada has decided to establish in co-operation with the IAEA, a special cash contribution of \$300,000 in the form of a fund-in-trust. This fund will be wholly administered and managed by the IAEA and restricted to parties to the NPT. It is intended that this contribution by Canada will be additional to the amount of development assistance regularly provided by the IAEA to NPT countries.

The interest shown by the Agency in the exploration, mining and development of uranium resources is also an area of particular interest to Canada, not only because we are a major uranium-producer but also because of the importance of uranium to all countries with nuclear-power programs. Canada has always sought to make our expert knowledge and experience in uranium production available to the Agency and will continue to do so.

We are pleased again to see this year the intensified activity by the Agency in the area of nuclear safety. The Agency

will be required to send an increasing number of missions to member states to advise on licensing, siting and other control and regulatory functions in the safety and environmental-protection fields. We are happy to see that the initial draft codes and guides on power-reactor safety are progressing satisfactorily and we hope that in due course a comprehensive set of codes and guides, with sufficient flexibility to be applied to all reactor systems, will be available for application. We believe that internationally-acceptable safety standards are imperative if national nuclear programs are to be consistent with the development needs of a nation and are to grow within safe parameters.

Canada actively supports the continuing Agency study of regional fuel-cycle centres. The dangers inherent in the unrestricted and uncontrolled availability of excess plutonium stocks are obvious, as are the benefits to world energy supply and international security if well-managed and internationally-controlled stocks of fuel are available as needed by the world community. Clearly many questions now raised remain to be resolved, but it is Canada's belief that work in this area must continue at full speed. We are impressed with the thoroughness of the experts' work under Agency auspices on the question of regional centres and will examine their report with great care and will also wish to explore fully the various concepts of international plutonium or spent-fuel management.

The fear that diversion of nuclear materials will contribute to international confrontations has been a critical element of the "nuclear debate" in many countries and, in some instances, threatens the public acceptability of nuclear-power programs and international co-operation. A basic concern in this respect, as the Director-General has noted, is that the Agency's safeguards mandate and its resources always be adequate to the task. This is essential. The growth in the Agency safeguards functions has reflected the growth in international nuclear-power programs. Advances in safeguards standards and techniques have been and continue to be significant and impressive. The safeguards inspectorate continues to grow and must do so to meet the need. We are pleased to see the establishment of a second Division of Safeguards Operations which has already been provided for.

The concept of regional field offices is welcome and will contribute markedly to the efficiency of safeguards administration. We agree with the Director-General that the work of SACS is vital and Canada is looking to that group to play an important role in advising the Director-General on a wide range of issues relating to the effectiveness of safeguards and the availability of information about their administration. Canada is actively participating with the Agency in the further development of safeguards techniques and will continue to do so. We wish to congratulate the Director-General for drawing attention to a shortcoming in the present international safeguards system in terms of the limitations on the scope of safeguards in certain countries. We believe that the international community should review means open for members of the Agency working together to move towards a comprehensive, universal and effective international safeguards structure.

I would like to express my hopes for the work of the Agency in the coming years. It goes without saying that the task of international collaboration involving many nations in such a complex field is indeed a difficult one. Nevertheless, the Agency has been able to achieve a consensus, often under difficult circumstances. Its effectiveness has been a result of the commitment of all member states to finding solutions to difficult, technical problems. International co-operation is indispensable in solving the problems associated with the application of the atom. In this regard, the Agency has been a most effective international mechanism; yet, to remain effective, it must have the same co-operation from its member states that it has had since its inception.

In closing I should like to congratulate the Director-General of the Agency for the leadership which he has displayed and the vigour, ability and good judgment which have characterized that leadership. I pledge the full support of Canada for the activities of the Agency and its program for the future.

OUTER SPACE

As a member of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and a nation actively involved in space programs, Canada is particularly interested in the work of the United Nations with respect to outer-space matters.

Canada's contribution to the elaboration of principles governing space technology has been important, especially in the field of direct broadcasting by satellites and remote-sensing of the earth from space. The delegation has made specific proposals to resolve the problems that are still facing the committee.

In Canada's view there is an urgent need for the United Nations to reach agreement on a legal framework regulating a fast-growing technology in order to avoid possible conflicts or controversies that could arise from its misuse.

The following statement was delivered by Mr. William H. Barton in the First Committee on October 18, 1976:

Discussion in the General Assembly of issues relating to outer space began 19 years ago. Since then, we have witnessed some spectacular achievements, including the first manned space flight, the landing by man on the moon and, most recently, the successful landings on the planet of Mars. Those have been the achievements which have captured the headlines and caught the imagination of people around the world. It is, however, advances in related but less spectacular areas which have not captured the same headlines but which might prove to be equally important not only in promoting peace and co-operation among the peoples of the world but also contribute in a concrete way to world-wide economic and social development.

During the last 19 years, space technology has been applied with increasing effectiveness to communications and to the solution of environmental, agricultural and resource problems. My delegation believes that advances in the last few years in these practical applications of space technology have reached the point where our discussions can and should be constructive and fruitful. The note Canada wishes to interject in this debate is one of urgency; if we do not make greater progress than we have in the past, technological developments and the expectations of people around the world will together render our debate irrelevant. Technological progress, particularly in the fields of remote-sensing and direct broadcasting from satellites, has been so rapid that it will become increasingly difficult to impose an internationally-agreed legal framework, which at the same time is also technically feasible, on the systems of satellites which are now operational or are about to become so.

I shall comment in a moment on the areas in which we believe there is a particular need to make more progress. However, I would first like to mention something of the development of Canada's space program since last we reported to this Committee. Our primary area of concentration continues to be communications by satellite and there are now three Anik satellites providing communications services to remote Canadian communities. In June of this year, Canada launched the Communications Technology Satellite. The CTS, which was built in co-operation with the United States in association with the European Space Agency, is an experimental satellite. Besides advancing the state of the art as one of the first generations of direct-broadcast satellites, it will carry out socially-oriented experiments in education, long-distance medical diagnosis and health-care and community cultural programs. This is a concrete example of the application of space technology to social as well as technological problems.

During the past year, Canada also embarked on a major program, in the order of about \$70 million, for the design, development and construction of the remote-manipulator system which is to be a component of the NASA Space Shuttle. The remote manipulator is a mechanical arm which astronauts aboard the space shuttle will use for deploying, retrieving and repairing satellites in orbit.

The development of the technology relating to remote-sensing from space of the earth's resources is another area in which Canada has been a pioneer. During the past year, a mobile ground receiving-station has been built and is being installed on the east coast of Canada. This is a complete preprocessing and disseminating facility, which has been developed at low cost. In fact, the total development cost will be in the order of \$2 million, a sum which should be within the budget expectations of most countries contemplating a role in the peaceful uses of outer space. Accordingly, it is our hope that the adaptability of this facility will be of interest to other countries concerned with the development of a remote-sensing capability.

Canada continues to participate in the experimental aeronautical-satellite program which is intended to improve oceanic air-traffic control. We are also taking part in the negotiations for the establishment of an international maritime-satellite system.

I would now like to refer to the report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space which is before this committee. My delegation has been encouraged by the progress which has been made during the last year but remains concerned about the number of important issues yet to be resolved.

We are pleased to note that agreement has been reached on the formulation of nine principles to govern direct television broadcasting by means of satellites. There is, nevertheless, a great deal of work to be done soon. As we pointed out at the nineteenth session of Outer Space Committee in June, there is a danger that our efforts to establish a coherent and practical set of principles will be overtaken by the rapid development of the technology in this field. The danger exists that we will still be debating when television transmissions by means of satellites will be received directly by individual home or community receivers. If such broadcasting is not brought within an agreed international legal regime, and if it is carried out without the consent of the state concerned and without the regard or consideration for its social and cultural needs, there will be a new source of controversy and potential conflict to add to those we already have on earth.

In order to identify positive action which can be taken by the United Nations General Assembly prior to the establishment of operational broadcast systems, it is important that we move as expeditiously as possible to reach agreement on a full set of principles, including principles concerning the outstanding but central issues of co-operation, participation and mutual agreement or consent. It is our opinion that the Canada-Sweden proposals, first tabled in 1973, are a sound basis for a legal framework which will both give states the means to regulate their communications systems and ensure the freest possible exchange of information.

The draft resolution Canada is co-sponsoring directs the Legal Sub-Committee to consider as a matter of high priority the establishment of a set of principles to govern direct television broadcasting and Canada will play a constructive role in those considerations.

I would like to turn to a second area of major Canadian interest: remote-sensing. At the last sessions of the Legal Sub-Committee, five common elements identified earlier were converted into draft principles and three further common elements were agreed upon. This work provides a solid basis for further drafting in the Legal Sub-Committee.

At the last session of the Outer Space Committee, the Canadian delegation referred to a number of draft principles which Canada had tabled in the Legal Sub-Committee. It is our view that these principles include the concepts necessary for the adoption of a legal framework which safeguards national interests without creating obstacles in the way of maximum co-operative utilization of remote-sensing technology — in short, for a balanced regime which would be cautionary without being stifling.

My delegation is pleased to note that progress is being made in the general recognition of the need to consider carefully the question of holding a United Nations conference on outer space. We are convinced that a thorough and balanced study by the Secretariat of all the issues involved in the convening of such a conference will allow the Science and Technical Sub-Committee at the next session to give proper and adequate consideration to this question.

ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL

GENERAL DEBATE

Canada, seriously concerned with the growing gap between the developed and developing nations of the world, has taken a leading role in the "North/South dialogue" intended to lead to a New International Economic Order. In 1976, in addition to Canada's active participation in the Fourth United Nations Trade and Development Conference (UNCTAD IV), held in Nairobi in May, the Honourable Allan MacEachen, former Secretary of State for External Affairs, served as Co-Chairman of the Paris Conference on International Economic Co-operation (CIEC). Canada's position on the very complex problems involved was outlined in a statement delivered by Mr. Geoffrey Bruce, Canadian representative in the Assembly's (Economic) Second Committee, on October 15, 1976:

The fundamental facts reflecting North/South economic relations do not need to be debated. It is clear enough that there are many countries represented in this assembly whose peoples are farther from the attainment of greater global economic equality than they were ten years ago.

It has been maintained that the purchasing power of many developing countries, and of virtually all oil-importing developing countries, has deteriorated in real terms since the beginning of the decade. The overall terms of trade of oil-importing developing countries have probably deteriorated from 1970 to 1975. The fact that there was a simultaneous deterioration of approximately the same order in the terms of trade of industrialized countries is little consolation.

Improvements in the positions of developing nations which export primary commodities must be a basic objective of the international community. If we exclude oil from our calculations, 12 major primary commodities account for about 80 per cent of the total export earnings of developing countries. While the possibility of general recovery in world economic circumstances is becoming more and more real, the vulnerability of developing-country economies to future fluctuation remains of potentially very damaging dimensions. It is our continuing hope that the follow-up of UNCTAD IV in implementing the integrated commodity program will make a concrete contribution to dealing with commodity-trade problems important to developing countries.

In the Canadian view, measures aimed at reducing violent fluctuations in primary commodity prices constitute a central objective of the international commodity action. Canada, as a major commodity trader, considers the instability of commodity markets as a major weakness of the world's trading system, requiring urgent remedy. We welcomed the adoption by consensus of the UNCTAD resolution on this, and as the Secretary of State for External Affairs, reporting on UNCTAD IV, said to the House of Commons in June:

"We shall continue to support the principle of joint producer/consumer financial responsibility, on a mandatory basis, for buffer-stock financing within commodity agreements containing such stocks. We shall be actively involved in consultations and negotiations on individual commodities and on the common fund. We shall devote efforts to see that the developing countries achieve additional benefits in the course of the multilateral trade negotiations in Geneva."

An important problem of trade in primary commodities is that, in many cases, the bulk of exports is made in relatively unprocessed form. There would be considerable advantages to the economies of commodity-exporting countries and a better allocation of productive resources internationally if commodities could be further processed prior to export where this is economically feasible. A major constraint to further processing in the country of export is the existence of trade barriers in importing countries which bear more heavily on processed rather than unprocessed commodities. For this reason Canada, which has identified further processing as an important Canadian policy objective, attaches great importance to the GATT Multilateral Trade Negotiations. Significant trade liberalization in this area will make an important contribution to the resolution of commodity trade problem.

Basically our purpose is to work on reform in the international trading and payments system to contribute to securing economic growth on a continuing basis and to that end to assist the generation of sufficient resources for meaningful progress to be made. Because of the economic circumstances of recent years in particular, many developing countries are now facing severe balance of payments problems and external debt in particular has received considerable attention. Practical solutions to the problems of such countries are necessary. We very much hope that the Conference on International Economic Co-operation will reach some useful understandings in this regard.

While the problems may seem to be fairly clear, solutions remain considerably more evasive. The international economic system is complicated and interrelationships are deep and complex. Structural, multi-disciplinary reform of

the international system needs to be undertaken carefully. At the same time, the very real need for careful preparation should not be misused as an excuse to delay or avoid required reform. Reform is urgently and vitally necessary. As a principle, we agree. The elements of the systems we adopt, however, still need to be worked out.

We believe that, in the last year and a half, we have made some progress in this regard. UNCTAD IV did not achieve all that Canada or other developed and developing countries might have wished. But it represented, without question, an important stage in the process of reform. The decision there to work out the lines of an integrated program for commodity-price stabilization is of central importance.

Other decisions of similar importance are needed. First, they must be well prepared and well documented. It is for this reason that the Paris Conference concentrated during its first phase on the analysis of the problems involved. Some countries have regretted that this six-month phase of analysis and preparation has prevented CIEC from realizing concrete achievements to date which would fully and visibly justify the hopes we had for CIEC a year ago. However, it remains a common objective that developments in coming months might vindicate those hopes, provided that the requisite political will is forthcoming on all sides.

The participants in the Paris Conference are constantly mindful of their responsibilities. The problems they are discussing are global. Agreements, however, will only be reached if they correspond to global interests. Those who are at the conference are obviously acutely mindful of the fact that they represent the interests of those who are not. This is in large part due to the effective communication between participants and non-participants.

The role of the General Assembly is to oversee developments in these varied forums and to provide general leadership and assessment. As the Ad Hoc Committee on Re-Structuring is concluding, a central aspect of this role is the relationship of the General Assembly to the various Specialized Agencies and organizations. In our view, this relationship is a delicate one which should be made more productive than at present. The General Assembly has particular responsibilities in this regard.

With particular respect to specialized matters of substance which in primary discussion and negotiation are the responsibilities of specialized forums, care must be taken not to oversimplify the obstacles to complete agreement. These obstacles are not, as some used to suggest, invented for tactical reasons by reluctant governments of industrialized nations. They are inherent in the complexity of a world trade and payments system which has evolved over time to shape itself to the infinitely varied demands which are placed upon it. The ramifications of this system are therefore as complex as the world community itself. In dealing with specialized aspects of the world system, we must be careful not to let ourselves be compelled by our agreement on the harshness of the problems to believe that it will be an easy matter to work out speedy solutions. Our world is pluralistic and the framework for co-operation and regulation is highly complex. We must in this Assembly set the framework within which specialized forums can work towards specialized solutions. We recognize that the system is not responding adequately to all requirements, and particularly those of developing countries, but in this Assembly we cannot solve all the problems ourselves. This involves a process of building the level of agreement and international co-operation, sector by sector, across the whole range of international economic and social interactions. Only a step-by-step approach will be effective in reducing the unacceptable disparities among nations. What we can do in the General Assembly is to maintain the overview of the system, for purposes of its effective co-ordination and in order to ensure that the whole body of organizations and agencies is proceeding in phase and that each of these organs is aware of the world community's overriding priorities.

This decade has perhaps made us wiser in underlining the extent to which even the little progress we have made in the last 20 years can be neutralized in the wake of adverse economic developments within the world system. From now on we must concentrate on approaches which are more resilient. However, these are necessarily more complex. In the next few years we shall be going to the heart of many dimensions of the basic problems which affect developing countries and their place in the world economic system. Our own responsibilities for keeping these various explorations in focus will be demanding.

One effective way to provide a coherent frame of reference might be to devise an International Development Strategy for the Third Development Decade which would be thorough, and which can stand as a blueprint for progress towards a New International Economic Order to which all points of the world system can refer for overall guidance in North/South relations.

This task will be a major challenge. It is our belief that it should be undertaken well before this present decade is over. We should begin to organize our approach for this task at this session of the General Assembly. In the view of this delegation, the Third Development Decade exercise is in itself sufficiently demanding, and is obviously urgent

enough, to persuade member states that it should become a central priority for the next few years. The strategy of the Second Decade has been overtaken. Whether or not we revise it is in our view not particularly material. We all know where it is deficient. We also know where developed countries have been deficient in some of their obligations, as well as areas where developing countries have been unable to meet their own goals and objectives, under that strategy. We wish to suggest that, instead of revising an existing document, we turn our attention to devising a wholly up-to-date strategy which will then apply from the moment it is adopted, and which will be flexible enough and pertinent enough to be used on a continuing basis over time.

We are aware here that we are dealing with the world's most compelling and enduring problems. This is the view of the Canadian Government, which outlined its preoccupations in the speech from the Throne, made at the opening of Parliament this week. This address, which sets forth Government policy, referred to international affairs in the following way:

"Canadians are becoming increasingly sensitive to the fact that Canada cannot live in dignity as a nation while other people, in less fortunate lands, live in a state of deprivation and hopelessness.

"It is not in Canada's economic, political or moral interest to allow the gap to widen between the wealth of the few and the poverty of the many. Therefore, the Government will continue to participate in the task of shaping a new international economic order, designed to provide a greater measure of hope to nations seeking the opportunity to help themselves.

"The world is now confronted with a broad range of problems of such complexity and widespread scope that no single nation or group of nations is able to apply effective solutions. Only global solutions will do.

"Increasingly, therefore, Canada's international activities are being directed towards broad-scale co-operative activities. Human settlements, the law of the sea, environmental protection, food and resources production, terrorism, population growth, control of nuclear armaments, economic development — all demand shared responsibility and universal involvement."

HABITAT

As part of its efforts to improve living conditions for the world's population, the United Nations Environment Program selected Vancouver as the site of Habitat, the world conference on human settlements. The Honourable Barnett Danson, then Minister of State for Urban Affairs, served as President of the Conference. At Habitat, substantial progress was made in improving the understanding of human settlements issues throughout the world. In the post-Conference period, Canada has been active in the efforts to ensure that the important recommendations made at Habitat are translated into concrete action. This concern to maintain the momentum generated at Vancouver was reflected in Mr. Danson's address to the Second Committee on October 25, 1976:

Distinguished delegates, before you now rest the resolutions passed by *Habitat*, the United Nations Conference on Human Settlements — important resolutions that commit to paper principles dealing with human settlements. The fact that these resolutions were worked out in my country — Canada — is a source of pride to me and to all Canadians. As you know, we are a country in change. We are a young country in terms of rapid urban growth and are currently struggling to digest the social and economic upheaval that is partner and mate to urbanization.

At the same time we are an ancient land, drawing our roots from native civilizations that settled and prospered in the dim memory of time. Because of the disparity and diversity of races and cultures within the vastness of Canada, the inaccessibility of northern reaches and the adversity of climate, we are often brothers with the Third World nations in terms of human settlements.

Habitat has been a stimulating experience for Canadians — stimulating because many of the problems discussed affect us in the broadest sense.

We are, after all, not only producers of technology affecting human settlements but also both beneficiary and victim. Where once the word ecology was known only by academics and where, in times past, the social implications of our common tenancy of this world were of little concern to the vast majority of its people, we are now awakening to our shared responsibility.

But recognizing a moral obligation and letting our actions be guided by that obligation are elements as different as oil and water. It is my hope that the path identified by *Habitat* will be followed, that we take those first steps that mark the beginning of this long journey and that we will not falter or be deterred.

Habitat, because of its focus, has become a crucial element in terms of human settlements, and when I speak of human settlements I mean that in the broadest sense.

The fact that the nations of the world should agree to turn their collective attention to the condition of human settlements is a watershed in the history of our life on this earth. It is my belief that shelter is a collective responsibility. Collective in terms of the relationships between government and man, government and government and man and man. No single partner bears the full weight. Each has his own share of responsibility.

As I see it — as I define the delicate partnership between government and the individual — governments, both singly and collectively, must strive to provide the elements that promote adequate shelter.

It is our job to create the elements of tenure for the individual — and those elements will differ from nation to nation, from place to place.

In some nations this will mean the simple basics of human settlement — first water, a cornerstone of life in any community, and then an adequate system for the disposal of wastes. As simply as those two goals may seem to some individuals and, even to some governments, they are of critical importance to many of us.

It is difficult for citizens of industrialized nations to envisage settlements without water-supply or sewage-disposal systems. It is a thought as foreign to them as the experience of true poverty.

If *Habitat* achieved any single function I believe that it served to enlighten the world about the true condition of human settlements on this planet.

Habitat was a catalyst for discussion and decision-making on both an international and national level. It follows in the best traditions of this body and dealt with an area of basic concern to every member of this United Nations. Now, however, we are faced with the problem of how best to implement and utilize the benefits of *Habitat*. It is my

earnest wish that the advances we have made should not be left to wither on the vines of indifference.

The nations of the world must individually and collectively develop effective programs to improve the human condition. Like the members of a far-flung family we must rally in mutual support, lending each other both the benefits of our individual experiences and the strength that always accompanies the recognition of bonds of the heart.

We can look with satisfaction on the quick response of the regional economic commissions of Europe and Latin America, which have already convened meetings to discuss *Habitat* follow-up action and have advanced proposals for regional co-operation on human settlement problems. We look forward to similar meetings in the other regions and to other world conferences which will deal with issues raised at *Habitat*.

The United Nations world water conference to be held in Argentina in March is a prime example. As you know, it will give effective consideration to the problems of potable water. If it can develop an international program ensuring drinkable water in all communities of the world by 1990, it will be an important step in achieving this objective established by governments at *Habitat*.

There can be no greater goal for mankind than improving the condition of his fellow man and there can be no greater achievement for man than having made a contribution to mankind.

But how best to implement the lessons learned at *Habitat*?

Shortly, a proposed general resolution on the report of the *Habitat* conference will be tabled in this committee. We very much hope that this general resolution will be adopted by member states in the spirit of consensus which we believe is appropriate to a text concerned with human problems of the dimension of those discussed at *Habitat*. This general resolution has been drafted with such a consensus in mind.

A draft resolution on post-*Habitat* use of audio-visual material will also be tabled later. As you know, the audio-visual program was a unique and important part of the preparations and proceedings of the conference. We are indebted to the United Nations environment program for the support it gave to the audio-visual program and indeed for its support for and contribution to the conference as a whole.

At the conference, all countries agreed that the extensive audio-visual material represented an invaluable resource for education, training and public information on human settlements, and that steps should be taken to ensure their continued and active use after the conference. The resolution to be tabled will propose the establishment of a United Nations audio-visual information centre to serve these purposes.

On the institutional question, as has been the case for previous conferences, the institutional follow-up to *Habitat* should reasonably be the subject of a separate resolution. There was detailed and thorough discussion at Vancouver on the question of global and regional mechanisms and institutions for human settlements. These discussions yielded a draft resolution which provides in our view an excellent framework for a decision at this session of the General Assembly on the two remaining questions in Section X of the unit. It is important that a decision be taken on these two questions at this session.

The momentum of *Habitat* must be maintained. It should not be allowed to slow. This resolution provides a way for the United Nations to respond to these human problems. A decision is also needed to demonstrate to those living in human settlements around the world that we are able and willing to respond quickly and effectively to their needs and concerns. Too often in the past, we have been accused as nations of failing to unite and to respond effectively to urgent needs. In the view of my Government, there is a need now for a strong and representative intergovernmental committee at the global level, served by a small but effective secretariat, and improved intergovernmental and secretariat arrangements at the regional level.

During this session, we must demonstrate to those millions of men, women and children whose lives will be dramatically affected by this resolution that we, as a world community, are both able and willing, to respond to their needs, their concerns, their pleas for help.

There is nothing lonelier, there is nothing to fire bitterness more or to encourage withdrawal from the common community of man than an ignored call for help. On behalf of those who make this call, I urge you, to act on this resolution and its spirit.

In conclusion, I can only stress once again the importance of the work initiated at *Habitat*. Human settlements con-

tain not only the problems of the world, often reflected through the magnifying effects of concentrated population, but also the solutions to these problems.

Like a doctor seeking out the causes of disease we must continue to identify the symptoms of human settlement problems in the hope of finding a way to deal with the true cause of our collective maladies. Along the way we will attempt to treat those symptoms, providing temporary relief, but we must never lose sight of our original goal — to cure the illness. The world that we inherited — our sometimes shabby patrimony — is not entirely of our making. It is, however, within our power to change it and change it for the better as a magnificent inheritance for our children and our children's children.

What gift could be greater than an improvement in the condition of their life? Expressions of concern can be acceptable but action, based on that concern, is the only truly admirable course.

We can no longer pretend to be isolated by the islands of self-concern. We are a part of every man and every man is truly "a part of the main".

FOOD PROBLEMS

Canada, as a principal producer and exporter of food, had a particular interest in the discussion of world food problems at the thirty-first session of the General Assembly. Indeed, Canada is at present the largest single contributor to the World Food Program, giving over \$200 million in the 1975-76 period. In spite of the efforts of Canada and like-minded countries, it is obvious that adequacy of food supply, temporarily assured because of the abundant harvest in 1976, could deteriorate in the near future if population growth far outstrips increases in production. The following statement, delivered by Mr. Geoffrey Bruce on November 8, 1976, gave the Canadian viewpoint on this problem and suggestions for its solution:

Of all our problems, the adequacy of food supply is the most far-reaching in its effect. Surely the world must be able to feed its inhabitants. Yet, there are pessimistic predictions that the world's population might now increase more slowly than anticipated — not because of more effective approaches to birth-control, but because it is apparently assumed by some that millions of people could starve to death in the next quarter-century. This represents a horrible hypothesis but one whose realization we can still avoid.

The apparent facts are stark in their awful simplicity. For the last five years, world food production has slowed. To some extent this has been the result of severe climatic developments. It suggests, however, that renewed efforts must be made, particularly by developing countries, to improve food-resource capabilities. It is clear that in the Third World at the present time population increase is outstripping food-production increase. Without drastic action, the trend is expected to accelerate; were present trends to continue, mass starvation could occur in certain regions of the world by 1985.

The World Food Conference addressed these questions. The World Food Council has since discussed them at its two first sessions. Yet, the world public has the impression nothing is being done. Can anything be done to redress the situation? Our impression is that the potential for redress is there. Many of our decisions in the last two or three years have been good ones in the sense that they are directed primarily towards developing food-production potential in the developing countries themselves. It has been argued that every nation could be self-sufficient in food if the right choices were made and if national resources and efforts were organized for that purpose. We are not sure if that is a valid assertion within the limits of comparative economic advantage; we are sure, however, that many food importers, particularly in developing countries, have considerably greater potential for food autonomy than present circumstances would indicate.

The realization of this potential is the only reasonable overriding goal we should have. Direct food aid is essentially a stop-gap measure. We in Canada are pleased, as one of the world's great food-producers, to make vast amounts of food available for the struggle against hunger. For example, Canadians are proud their country is contributing this year over \$100 million to the World Food Program. But we don't pretend that direct food aid is doing much more than treating the symptoms of inadequate food production elsewhere, in the hope that this is helping to buy time to enable us to work together to avert catastrophe by enhancing food production in the recipient countries. In this regard, the role of the FAO will be critical. Under the leadership of Dr. Saouma, the FAO's contribution is a dynamic one which helps to reinforce our confidence.

There is no single cause of the world food problem. There is a lack of effective infrastructure in developing countries for the application of sound technology, the transport of produce, and the distribution of food. These conditions are related to the fundamental reasons of underdevelopment itself. Moreover, there has been inadequate policy emphasis in many countries on the overriding need to enhance agricultural production and on some occasions inappropriate choices have been made in favour of some cash crops rather than on basic and traditional food resources. Also, the international policy framework can be strengthened by improving international mechanisms for stabilizing commodity prices in order to permit sound investment planning. Canada is actively pursuing solutions to real problems in grain markets in negotiations under the International Wheat Council in London and in the Multilateral Tariff Negotiations. Any real solution in this sector will have to take into account basic problems in international trading in grains, including the access to markets. However, food supply is vastly too important to be governed by speculation and by speculative market forces. The people of the world have the right to demand a system which provides food security.

These questions — food aid, food production and supply, and food security — have been the object of intense international discussion in recent years. Indeed, in his able introduction of the report of the second session of the World Food Council, Dr. Hannah mentioned these as being the three major areas of concern to the Council, and indeed to the world. Along with nutrition and world trade, they are the priority items in the WFC's work program. They are, of course, all interrelated. Food security can obviously only be attained by enhancing food supply in the long run

and by maintaining adequate levels of food aid in the meantime. However, increasing agricultural production in developing countries has to be our principal goal. Nationally, Canada has made this a major focus of our development-assistance strategy. As a counterpart to Canadian food aid, Canadian experience is being applied to agricultural development projects undertaken with many of our co-operation partners. Internationally, in policy terms, constraints to the increased production of food must be removed. In practical terms, IFAD [the International Fund for Agricultural Development] must be triggered, since this fund, whose purpose is precisely to increase food production in developing countries, could be of major significance in influencing the global picture in ten years' time. We agree with Dr. Hannah that IFAD is thus far a signal achievement of the UN.

Unfortunately, the World Food Council has not in our view been the success we hoped for, despite the efforts of its Executive Director, and it is the responsibility of the member countries to improve its effectiveness. We believe the Council will be able to fulfil its mandate. The adoption at this General Assembly of agreed rules of procedure will help, but our approach must also be modified. Members must abandon the sterile exchange of set-piece speeches attempting to cover the whole range of food problems. Instead, the Council should be encouraged to concentrate its potential energies on the examination in depth of one or two key issues each year pertaining to the fundamental need to increase food production.

Above all, the Council should take seriously its mandate as the highest international political forum addressing itself specifically to world food problems. The Council should not try to duplicate the work of other institutions in the UN system such as the world food program or the FAO Council. The Council should take advantage of the ministerial level of its representation to generate the political will necessary to solve specific elements of the world food strategy. The Council should also provide and use to advantage an overview of all relevant international activities, including those proposed by international conferences such as the UN Water Conference, or the Conference on Science and Technology.

Canada will make every effort to assist the World Food Council to realize its potential for leadership foreseen in the mandate the General Assembly awarded the Council at the time of its creation in 1974. We should take this opportunity to extend to Dr. Hannah our warmest appreciation for his efforts to make the Council a success from the very start.

We are also pledged to make the World Food Program a success. As you know, at the World Food Conference, we pledged to give one million tons of grain per year. Forty per cent of this pledge is being channelled multilaterally and for this purpose, we, in Canada, are using the World Food Program. Indeed, as a result of further supplementary pledges, Canada is the largest single contributor to the program. In 1975 and 1976, we gave over \$200 million in this two-year pledging period. We are particularly interested in the management of the programs. For these reasons, the Canadian Government was pleased — some time ago — to propose one of its most distinguished citizens to be the Executive Director of that program. Mr. Gerry Vogel has for several years been chairman of the Canadian Wheat Board, which is the Canadian public corporation responsible for all marketing of all Canadian grains, at home and abroad. Mr. Vogel has been responsible for running a food organization whose responsibilities each year are of the order of several billion dollars. We should hope his talents and knowledge can be placed at the disposal of the world community at the head of the World Food Program.

We wish to place our own knowledge as food-producers at the disposal of the world community and we are attempting to do so. We have also been trying to provide as much food as possible for those in need. Fortunately the crop year has been good in many countries, including my own, particularly for food grains, including rice, and the situation is correspondingly brighter for the moment.

Yet, we are still obliged to recognize that, quite apart from bulk food supply, there is the issue of inadequate nutrition which is only now beginning to receive the attention it deserves.

The Rio Report prepared for the Club of Rome meeting last month by Jan Tinbergen of the Netherlands points out that: "Estimates of the number of people currently suffering from hunger and undernourishment vary from close to half a billion to one and a half billion". As I said at the outset, this is an appalling fact in itself but, compared to what some have predicted for a decade from now, it is relatively modest in its dimensions. Yet, we can avert catastrophe if we put our minds to it and act. Because of the good cereal crops this year in both developed and developing countries, the world has begun to rebuild its stocks. It is too early to say whether this represents a reversal of recent trends. The effect of the renewed emphasis given to agriculture and food production since the World Food Conference, is, however, becoming apparent. Drastic action must continue.

FOURTH UN CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT

Canada considers the issues covered in the "North/South" dialogue the most critical facing the international community and was particularly conscious of the importance of the Fourth United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD IV). UNCTAD IV, as the first major international trade and development conference following the seventh special session of the UN General Assembly in 1975, was regarded by its participants as the first fundamental test of the willingness of the international community to make concerted efforts towards changing the trade and payments system in a way that would give developing countries a greater share in the world economy and close the widening gap between rich and poor. Canada considered the conference a success. Mr. Geoffrey Bruce gave the Canadian assessment of the conference and the prospects for further progress in the following statement delivered on November 24, 1976:

At this General Assembly we have devoted much of our attention to the North/South (N/S) dialogue – a dialogue which covers the work of the Conference on International Economic Co-operation (CIEC), the Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTNs), the World Bank, International Development Agency (IDA) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) – to name only the most important. Because my delegation considers all these negotiations and consultations comprise the most critical challenge before the international community, I should like to say a few words on one of the most important – indeed probably the most important – of these: UNCTAD IV and the program of work flowing from it.

UNCTAD IV was the first major international trade and development conference following the sixth special session of the UNGA, and because of the central role of UNCTAD in the UN, and the critical issues on its agenda, it was regarded therefore as the first fundamental test of the willingness of member states to respond to the political commitments they had made to move towards major changes in the international trade and payments system – changes that would give developing countries a greater share in the world economy, changes that would reverse the widening of the gap between rich and poor, changes that would assist Third World countries in their efforts to give their people not only hope but the reality of a greater measure of economic and social justice.

In assessing the results of UNCTAD IV, I would like, initially, to express the deep gratitude of my delegation to the Secretary-General of UNCTAD for the comprehensive, constructive evaluation of the conference that he gave us at the opening of this debate. Taken together with the excellent assessment he gave to the Economic and Social Council in July, I think we can have no better guide to UNCTAD's successes and failures.

My delegation believes that UNCTAD IV made a large and important step forward in the on-going discussion and debate on problems between developed and developing countries. In that light we believe that UNCTAD IV must be considered a success. That is not to say, however, that important – indeed, critical – problems do not lie before us awaiting solution. We are aware that many of the proposals of the Group of 77 were not accepted, or, in modified form, fell short of expectations.

Since its achievements and shortcomings have already been well reviewed by Dr. Corea and by the other delegations, I wish only to list them briefly in order to indicate to the Assembly the assessment which my delegation has made of the conference.

First, three general points:

- (a) The conference carried forward the dialogue between developed and developing countries.
- (b) It reconfirmed the commitment of developed and developing countries to work towards fundamental changes in the international trade and payments system.
- (c) It set out the priority problems and issues which were of greatest concern to the Third World.

In this setting what were the most substantive results of UNCTAD IV?

1. It approved a number of important resolutions committing the international community to work towards possible negotiations on the whole range of trade, finance and development problems facing the international community, not only in UNCTAD but in other UN and international forums.
2. It adopted an integrated program for commodities, and in this connection it approved a program and schedule of preparatory meetings for international negotiations on individual products which are of direct concern to both producing and consuming countries.

As Dr. Corea has pointed out, the commitment to constructive negotiations which we approved at UNCTAD IV will be among the critical tests in measuring the success of the conference.

3. UNCTAD IV renewed the insistence of the international community that the work in the MTNs should be carried forward with greater urgency, including serious efforts to identify those areas of the negotiations where special and differential treatment might be applied to developing countries to facilitate the development of their industry and the expansion of their international trade.
4. Although UNCTAD IV failed to reach agreement on a wide range of serious problems facing developing countries in the field of transfer of resources, the sixteenth session of the Trade and Development Board adopted an important resolution on this subject. In that the debt situation gives rise to serious concern, an important decision was taken to give these interrelated and fundamental issues immediate and high-priority attention in the North/South dialogue and at a ministerial meeting in 1977.
5. At the same time the conference took a number of other important decisions which are well known to all of us, in the fields of transfer of technology, the need for formulating a code of conduct for the transfer of technology, the development of the technological capacity of Third World countries, and for providing special assistance to those in particularly difficult situations.
6. My delegation also considered that the conference took an important decision concerning the need to bring the socialist countries of Eastern Europe more actively into the trade and development dialogue, to encourage them to intensify their contribution to the development of the Third World, and to enlist their commitment to the International Development Strategy for the Second UN Development Decade.
7. I would like particularly to record here the importance which my delegation attaches to the decision of UNCTAD IV in calling for an expansion and intensification of economic co-operation among Third World countries. In this connection we noted with interest that, soon after UNCTAD IV, the Mexican Government served as host to a very important conference on economic co-operation among developing countries. Since that time the Trade and Development Board has created a committee for economic co-operation among developing countries. We consider this an important step forward which will further open the way to the more productive co-operation among developing countries. We look forward to the meeting of the new committee in the near future.

In summary, those of us who were in Nairobi felt, I think, that UNCTAD IV was a conference of the greatest importance, that we had achieved substantial, constructive results; that if the commitments made at it are fulfilled, it will, as the Secretary-General has rightly said, be a landmark of historic importance in reshaping the international economic order. As these remarks suggest, UNCTAD IV cannot be viewed as an end in itself, but, rather, one step (and a very significant one in my mind) along the road of greater international co-operation. It will be a difficult road and there will be disappointments and delays, but I am certain that we shall succeed.

At the same time there were, as I have already noted, some failures and disappointments at UNCTAD IV. While we must not be led into judging our performance against standards of perfection, it must be admitted that in some important areas it fell short of some of our expectations. We must now recommit ourselves to work intensively towards the successful solution of all these critical and complex problems. It will take time, and it will be difficult, but we must persist.

Let me now mention one area — in the field of finance — to which too little consideration was, perhaps, given in Nairobi, and that is the importance of private capital in financing development. I do not want to take time to discuss this problem here, other than to add that the UNCTAD Secretariat, the World Bank and IMF and the Commission on Transnationals have done, and are doing, a great deal of excellent research on official and private financing, and we hope they will work effectively together to help developing countries.

We have given ourselves and the UNCTAD Secretariat a challenging heavy burden of work. We must do what we can to help it meet these responsibilities. We urge the UNCTAD Secretariat to work in closest co-operation with other UN institutions which carry responsibilities in the same general areas. UNIDO, FAO, the Bank and Fund are four obvious ones which come to mind.

In summary, UNCTAD was an important step forward, even though it had its disappointments and failures. Let us hope and let us work to fulfil the commitments we made in Nairobi and make UNCTAD an historic conference.

HUMAN RIGHTS

DECADE FOR ACTION TO COMBAT RACISM AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

Canada has long been a supporter of United Nations efforts to eradicate racism and racial discrimination. In 1973, as part of these efforts, the UN declared the period 1973-83 a Decade for Action against Racism. The program of action for the Decade called for a world conference on racism and racial discrimination to be held in 1978. Canada, along with the overwhelming majority of member states, welcomed this initiative and extended its full support to the program.

In 1975, Western support for the Decade was seriously undermined by the adoption of a resolution the thrust of which was to condemn Zionism as a form of racism and racial discrimination. Resolution 3379 (XXX) was unacceptable to all Western countries, including Canada, and, in their opinion, distorted the original character of the Decade. Because of this extraneous distortion, Canada was obliged to vote against the otherwise supportable resolutions concerning the program of action and the world conference, as well as Resolution 3379.

Since it was generally felt that Western participation was essential to the success of the program for action and the world conference, efforts were made at the thirty-first session to restore the original character of the Decade. Although these were not entirely successful, sufficient progress was made to allow Western delegations to take a more positive attitude, and Canada was able to abstain on the resolution concerning the implementation of the program for action. In the resolution concerning the world conference, however, the implied link with Resolution 3379 remained, and Canada maintained its negative vote.

The statement in explanation of these votes was delivered on October 9, 1976, by Miss Sylva Gelber, Canadian representative on the Third Committee:

It is with utmost care that my Government has further considered the two draft resolutions transmitted by ECOSOC to the General Assembly under the item concerning the Decade against racism and racial discrimination and on which our committee will now have to vote.

My delegation wishes to say that we see these two texts as evolving solely from Resolution 3057 (XVIII) unanimously adopted on November 2, 1973, the provisions of which are in keeping with the terms of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racism and Racial Discrimination. Article I of the Convention defines racism and racial discrimination as (and I quote) "any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin". This is the only interpretation that Canada gives to these terms. It was on this basis that we have actively supported the Decade and it is in this spirit that at the last General Assembly my delegation strongly opposed the inclusion of an alien and totally unacceptable element that in our view threatens the success of the Decade.

Important efforts were made to revive the universal acclaim that surrounded the adoption of the Decade. My Government recognized these efforts, the spirit of conciliation they reflect and the hopes they offer. My delegation is anxious to respond to any effort towards the achievement of the goal that we desire. The progress accomplished seems to us a step in meeting the concerns expressed by the Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada, the Honourable Donald C. Jamieson, in his statement of September 29, 1976 before the General Assembly.

Although the elements which we had found objectionable in ECOSOC Resolution 1989, and in particular operative Paragraph 3, have now been removed from this resolution, we still feel obliged to oppose the resolution on the world conference because there has been no change in the language of that resolution, which we opposed in the ECOSOC. We look upon these resolutions as two parts of a whole and, because of that, we shall abstain on the resolution on the Decade.

HUMAN RIGHTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Member states of the United Nations have expressed grave concern about the denial of human rights to the vast majority of South Africans. In 1974, the Economic and Social Council declared that states giving any assistance to regimes in Southern Africa were accomplices of the regimes and therefore accomplices in the denial of human rights. There was no agreement, however, among member states, as to what activities constituted assistance and how such activities contributed to the denial of human rights. Therefore the Economic and Social Council also approved the appointment of a special rapporteur whose task it was to evaluate urgently the importance and source of political, military, economic and other assistance given by certain states and to estimate the direct or indirect effects of such assistance.

The Third Committee had before it this year an interim report of the special rapporteur. While not contesting specific facts presented in the report, Canada took issue with it on two fundamental points. Firstly, the report assumes that all links with such regimes, even normal diplomatic and commercial relations, constitute assistance. Canada does not accept such a position. Secondly, the report limits itself to determining that such links do exist, without attempting to establish whether such links contribute to the denial of human rights.

Canada is a strong opponent of any system that denies fundamental human rights to individuals. However, because of its disagreement with the basic premise of the report, Canada abstained on the resolution on this question. Miss Sylva Gelber outlined the policy of the Government of Canada in an explanation of vote made in the Third Committee on November 4, 1976:

The Canadian Government, with the full support of the Canadian people, has rejected and continues to reiterate its utter rejection of the institutionalized policies and practices of racial discrimination of the Government of South Africa and described by them as a policy of *Apartheid*. In addition to its moral revulsion at such a policy, Canada has given tangible evidence of its support for the majority people of South Africa.

Some of these measures were enumerated a few days ago in another forum of this Assembly by the Canadian representative, the Honourable Robert Stanbury. Canadians, he pointed out, are appalled by a system which denies to the vast majority of South African people such basic rights as the right to live in the cities in which they work and the right to gain full title to their homes and businesses in the substandard South African cities in which they are obliged to live. Canadians reject such laws as those set out in the complex web of South African legislation which constrains the daily life of 18 million non-white South Africans. Canadians find it incomprehensible that tens of thousands of South African labourers are relegated to barrack life, separated for 51 weeks of the year from their wives and families, while prohibited from bringing their families to areas in which they work. It should be noted in this regard that the labour of these same workers is absolutely essential to the South African economy. Canadians have contempt for the policies of a Government which denies to the vast majority of its workers, solely on grounds of race, the opportunity to advance in accordance with their capabilities.

The Canadian Government has urged the minority in South Africa and their Government to accept the fact that fundamental change in South Africa is crucial. The time remaining for effective peaceful change, we believe, is growing shorter day by day. Change must take place now if peace is to be the means by which it occurs. This is where Canada stands on the question of *apartheid* and on the policy of the South African Government.

The Canadian Government has scrupulously enforced an embargo of arms sales since 1963, and extended it to spare parts in 1970, in accordance with resolutions of the Security Council. We believe that other states should consider themselves obliged to take similar steps. Normal economic relations with South Africa are quite another question.

The Canadian Government is prepared to enter into commercial relations with all countries without regard to their internal political practices, with the exception of the illegal government of Rhodesia, on which a mandatory trade embargo has been imposed by the Security Council. Dozens of UN members have policies similar to ours.

It is precisely because of the importance that Canadians attach to the enjoyment of human rights that my delegation will have no other choice but to abstain on a draft resolution which does not seem to have human rights as its central concern.

THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES

This office, created by the General Assembly in 1950, has the task of alleviating the immediate hardships suffered by refugees while seeking long-term solutions to their problems. The High Commissioner reports annually to the General Assembly through the Economic and Social Council, and the mandate of the Office of the High Commissioner is periodically renewed by the General Assembly. Canada has traditionally accorded strong support to the High Commissioner's work. Canada's 1977 contribution to the regular program of the High Commissioner has been increased to \$850,000. In a statement delivered on November 16, 1976, Miss Sylva Gelber expressed the views of the Government of Canada on the 1976 report:

Both in his introductory statement to our committee and in his report, the High Commissioner pointed to his rising concern about repeated violations of the principles of asylum and non-refoulement. Human rights are degraded and people are uprooted in prodigious numbers. Indeed, in some cases the very physical security of the refugees is threatened. It has been hoped that the international community would develop a body of international law that would ensure recognition and protection of the fundamental rights of refugees. The 1951 convention relating to the status of refugees and the 1967 protocol to the convention were seen as the beginning of such a body of law. The High Commissioner's activities have amply demonstrated that this, unfortunately, is not the case. His concern is fully shared by my Government and the people of Canada, who find it difficult to understand and accept the inability of the international community to develop means to defend individuals unable to protect themselves.

Because of these concerns, the Canadian Government has followed with interest the activities of the body of experts that have been working on a draft convention on territorial asylum. The Conference of Plenipotentiaries will provide a valuable opportunity to further codify means that will provide the protection all refugees are entitled to. My delegation was pleased to learn from the High Commissioner that a solution to the problem of financing the conference has been found.

At the last meeting of the Executive Committee, it was suggested that relevant non-governmental organizations be invited to participate as observers in the conference. My delegation is in full agreement with this proposal and hopes that these organizations will be given an opportunity to contribute to the Conference their valuable experience in the field of refugee protection.

I referred earlier to the need for elaborating legal instruments designed to ensure protection for the refugees. It is, however, obvious that the mere accession to these instruments is not sufficient to guarantee their implementation. Member states must be prepared to honour faithfully the obligations they freely assumed.

Canada believes that each member of the international community must share in the responsibility for the solution to the problems of refugees and displaced persons. Canada traditionally has been a principal country of resettlement. Within the last decade we have received refugees from Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America. We have tried through a variety of programs to ensure the well-being of those refugees who have settled in Canada. Canada has and will continue to accept refugees for resettlement and assist in funding both the regular programs and special operations that the High Commissioner directs.

The establishment this year of a resident representative of the UNHCR in Canada will, no doubt, further the close working partnership between the Government of Canada and the UNHCR.

My delegation is pleased to mention that the Government in the near future proposes to bring before Parliament revisions to Canada's immigration laws which will reflect more precisely our long tradition as a refugee-receiving country. Details will be announced at the current session of Parliament, but we can say now that the new legislation is expected to anchor more firmly in Canadian statutory law the obligations which Canada has respected since acceding to the convention and protocol on the status of refugees.

The ultimate solution to the refugee problem lies with the individual states rather than with the international community. However, as this problem is likely to be with us for some time to come, we must be grateful that we have in the UNHCR an organization which can, with the co-operation and support of the international community, provide immediate and effective assistance to persons who find themselves adversely affected by events over which they have no control.

HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHILE

The protection and promotion of human rights has always been a prime concern of the United Nations. To this end various bodies, such as the Commission on Human Rights and the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, have been established, and various international legal instruments have been ratified. Human rights in general is a very broad topic, and the General Assembly tends to concentrate its attention on particular problems. Since the 1973 overthrow of the Allende Government in Chile, the question of human rights in that country has been a focus of concern in the United Nations.

During its twenty-eighth session, in 1973, the General Assembly endorsed the recommendations of the Sub-Commission that the Commission should study the report of violations of human rights in Chile. In 1975, the Commission established an ad hoc working group to investigate the situation in Chile. The Working Group arranged with the Government of Chile to visit that country as part of its investigation, but at the last moment the Chilean Government refused to admit it.

The report prepared without the benefit of a visit to Chile was received at the thirty-first session. The Canadian Government's position on the question of human rights in general and the situation in Chile in particular was given by Miss Sylva Gelber on November 12, 1976:

If we look at the number of issues considered by the Economic and Social Council and particularly by the Commission on Human Rights, and at the attention devoted to these issues, we must realize that violations of human rights are of growing concern to citizens everywhere. Much progress has been gained in recent years, especially in the past few months, with the entry into force of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Optional Protocol to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. As international interest grows, it becomes more and more imperative that we adopt appropriate mechanisms designed to rationalize and co-ordinate efforts in the human rights field. In this respect my delegation is pleased that the Economic and Social Council has adopted a resolution concerning the long-term program of work of the Commission of Human Rights. We believe that the arrangements contained in the text, whereby the bureau will meet three days prior to the session to study and organize the agenda, will eventually enable the Commission to accomplish its work in a more orderly and rational way. The grouping of similar agenda items and more frequent recourse to the establishment of small working groups should also permit a more thorough examination of human rights issues.

My delegation welcomes the creation of new standards of international conduct in the human rights field, but it fears that such standards will be of little avail without appropriate complementary machinery to monitor the obligations which states have assumed. It would be desirable that ECOSOC establish, at an early date, generally agreed guidelines on the conduct of investigations by working groups broadly representative of the international community. It would also be desirable to make the procedures for dealing with allegations of violations of internationally agreed standards less cumbersome and less time-consuming.

The recent initiative taken by the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities in identifying persistent patterns of violations provide some hope that such procedures can be effective.

My delegation also wishes to thank the working group responsible for investigating the situation on human rights in Chile. Such working groups are one of the few means at the disposal of the international community to defend human rights, despite the fact that some governments have tried to hinder their efforts by insisting upon the twin principles of state sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs. It would be useful to expand this type of mechanism into one having universal application to all situations in which there are allegations of gross and persistent violations of human rights. My delegation, for its part, will support all efforts to extend if necessary the mandate of the current working group.

In reading the report of the chairman-*rapporteur* of the working group, my delegation was forcibly struck by the lack of progress in reinstating those fundamental rights which have been violated in Chile, despite the repeated appeals of the international community.

The recent request of three Canadian Parliamentarians representing the three major political parties to meet with Chilean authorities illustrates the concern of the Canadian people and Parliament for the situation of human rights in Chile. The fact that this request was denied is a great disappointment and cannot help but further harm Chile's reputation in the international community.

Canada must reiterate its regret that the Government of Chile found it necessary to go back on its decision to allow the entry of the working group and to postpone the visit to a later but as yet unspecified date.

The Government of Chile has frequently reiterated its desire to co-operate with the working group, and has indicated that its refusal to allow entry to the group of experts until a more convenient date does not reflect a change in its attitude towards the international bodies responsible for conducting such investigations. The Canadian delegation believes that the best means of demonstrating this continuing spirit of co-operation would be a renewed commitment by the Government of Chile to reverse its decision and to allow the entry of the working group.

TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT

As an expression of Canada's deep concern for the protection of human rights, Mr. Robert Stanbury, delivered the following statement in the Third Committee on December 2, 1976:

The Canadian delegation welcomes the opportunity to speak on an issue of fundamental importance in the struggle to secure a basic standard of social justice throughout the world. The existence of a separate agenda item on "Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment" is evidence of increasing concern for the widespread practice of torture, a concern which we hope will continue at subsequent sessions of the General Assembly, of the Economic and Social Council, the Commission on Human Rights, and other international organizations concerned with human rights.

Several delegations have expressed satisfaction that the adoption, last year, of the Declaration on the Protection of all Persons from being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment constituted a landmark in the progressive attainment of our universal objective: the recognition of fundamental human rights. We, too, applaud the work of last year's session, and endorse the provisions of the declaration as a humane response to the harsh realities of current times. But, at the same time, we must emphasize that the essential prohibitions against cruelty to our fellow man as contained in the Declaration are not new. They are in essence a comprehensive expression of standards of conduct contained in other instruments, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (which has recently entered into force), and in resolutions and declarations of other international bodies, including the International Labour Organization and the World Health Organization. The standards of behaviour which prohibit cruel and inhuman punishment have been in place for some time. Now these standards have been enshrined in a single declaration as a sign of our resolve to secure the recognition of human rights which have all too frequently been ignored in too many quarters of the world.

It seems that the international community is caught in a strange contradiction. More and more voices are raised in denunciation of the practice of torture, yet press reports clearly indicate that the number of countries resorting to torture is increasing. This deplorable situation is further evidenced by the growing number of individual complaints reported to the Division of Human Rights. The Canadian Government believes that the standards of humane and ethical behaviour among men are sufficiently well established. The international community should now turn its attention towards the creation of more effective mechanisms to encourage states to comply with their existing moral and legal obligations. The force of world public opinion should be brought to bear on all states which continue to carry out gross and persistent violations of human rights.

We believe that the essential objective of our efforts should be the rationalization of existing definitions and standards of inhuman treatment into a new international legal instrument with appropriate enforcement mechanisms. We need not be discouraged by the length of time required to prepare such an instrument. In the meantime, other steps can be taken to create enforcement mechanisms in the absence of binding legal instruments. We suggest that the Commission on Human Rights undertake to monitor, through an appropriate body, compliance with the provisions of the Declaration on Torture. This could be done in much the same way that the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination monitors compliance with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination by non-signatories. We suggest, as well, that the concept of working groups to investigate violations be examined more fully, with a view to creating a set of guidelines to govern their creation, their terms of reference, and their reporting to the Commission on Human Rights and to the Economic and Social Council. An established set of guidelines would serve to eliminate the procedural difficulties encountered by the most recent working group, and to ensure fair and impartial investigation.

My delegation is convinced that the necessary legal instruments exist to control the practice of torture. What is needed is a rationalization of these instruments and of the procedures they call for. We have noted with interest the decision taken by the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities to develop a body of principles for the protection of the human rights of all persons under any form of detention or imprisonment. We consider that this initiative is a valuable step towards such rationalization.

It is often argued, incredibly, that torture is tolerable in certain circumstances, that cruel and inhuman treatment is an inevitable and even justifiable concomitant of strife between and within nations, that inhumanity can be condoned during times of war and insurrection. Canada cannot accept this proposition.

My Government recognizes that extraordinary circumstances sometimes demand extraordinary measures, and that the ideals of peace cannot always be maintained during the realities of war. It understands efforts to provide, in international legal instruments, for temporary derogation from certain rights normally guaranteed in law. But it cannot agree that torture can ever be excused on any grounds. Canada absolutely rejects the doctrine that respect for fundamental human rights is an ideal to be reserved for times of peace and national tranquility.

On the contrary, the test of a society's respect for human rights is its tenacity in defending them in times of its greatest stress. If none of us has always passed this test with perfect marks, it must surely remain our common measure of humanity.

ADMINISTRATIVE AND BUDGETARY

SCALE OF ASSESSMENT

The scale of assessment was one of the most important items before the Fifth (Administrative and Budgetary) Committee. The scale itself is recommended by the Committee on Contributions, but is ultimately voted on by all member states, first in the Fifth Committee and then in the General Assembly. The scale apportions a share of United Nations expenses to each member, according to a complicated formula which incorporates several criteria, the major one being national income. Since the inception of the United Nations 30 years ago, the organization has undergone a considerable change in membership — from a body of predominantly developed nations to one in which the developed states are a numerical minority. Although the scale recommended by the Committee on Contributions has been subjected to considerable scrutiny and debate in the past, it has always been accepted in the best interests of the organization.

The scale is normally revised every three years by the Committee on Contributions, a special body charged with this task by the UN Charter. The guiding principle behind the work of the Committee is "capacity to pay" — that is, wealthier members bear a proportionately larger share of the organization's expenses. The inevitable problem of comparability and timeliness of statistics has rendered the Committee's task a difficult one, and recent international monetary disturbances and economic instability have added to this complexity. At the thirty-first session, for example, a number of states whose national incomes have recently risen dramatically from increased oil revenues were opposed to the size of the proposed increases in their assessments. Many other countries, including Canada, supported the Committee's proposed revision. In the end, late in the session, the Assembly adopted the new scale by consensus for a one-year period, during which a study of criteria of assessment would be made and the minimum level of assessment for those with the lowest "capacity to pay" would be reduced to .01 per cent from the present .02 per cent. Canada's financial contribution under the new scale declines from 3.08 per cent to 2.96 per cent, although Canada will remain the ninth-largest single contributor.

Canada considered that the 1975 Committee report represented an exhaustive effort to assess members fairly and objectively. In the following statement, delivered November 1, 1976, in the Fifth Committee, the Canadian representative, Mr. Charles Lapointe, M.P., outlined the Canadian position:

The importance of the work of the Committee on Contributions cannot be overestimated. Since the first scale of assessment, adopted in 1946, debates on 29 new scales for apportioning the expenses of the organization among member states have illustrated the extraordinary delicacy of the compromise that underlies the scale. It is well known that views on how to apportion expenses differ markedly among members. It is equally well known — and the debates on the scale of contribution amply demonstrate this fact — that, despite reservations, members have accepted scales in the spirit of compromise and in the interest of an orderly method of assessment and sound financial management.

Another fact — no less remarkable — is that the UN method of determining the scale has withstood the test of time. It has survived a change in membership from predominantly developed to predominantly developing countries. There have also been major economic changes and political challenges. Over some 30 years the basic principles adopted in 1946 have proved themselves capable of producing, year after year, scales which, after thorough debate, have received the overwhelming support of the membership. It is also noteworthy that over the years the majority of the Specialized Agencies have come to accept the UN scale as the fairest and most equitable basis for determining their own scales. This situation further underlines the great importance of the UN scale, the durability and validity of the principles upon which it is based, and the unquestioned success of the Committee on Contributions in implementing these principles.

If one examines the underlying reason for the remarkable durability of the present method of assessment, it is undoubtedly to be found in the guiding principle that the expenses should be apportioned broadly according to the capacity to pay. It is this principle that in Fifth Committee debates over the years has found the broadest support.

On instructions from the General Assembly, several factors and considerations have been taken into account in applying the principle. They are listed in Paragraph 4 of the report of the Committee on Contributions. They have provided a measure of relief to many countries and have helped to prevent anomalies due to unexpected economic dislocations from being incorporated in the scale. In retrospect these Assembly directives have added to the strength and the acceptability of the scale; vigilance and prudence are, however, required not to overemphasize these factors, thereby reducing the basic fairness and hence the political support for the scale.

It may be useful at this time to illustrate the importance Canada continues to attach to the capacity-to-pay principle: at the twenty-seventh session my delegation announced that Canada had decided to forego the benefits it would have derived from the *per capita* ceiling principle as a result of the introduction of the 25 percent ceiling. Although in the past Canada and other countries have believed strongly that the *per capita* ceiling principle was necessary to ensure that some countries did not carry an inequitable share of the cost of the UN, Canada at that time found it necessary to reaffirm in a convincing manner its faith in the capacity-to-pay principle. A subsequent examination requested from the Committee on Contributions fully justified the Canadian position. Acting on the Committee on Contributions report, the General Assembly decided to abolish the *per capita* ceiling principle in order to avoid substantial deviations from the basic principle of the capacity to pay.

My delegation recognizes that, in the absence of data on better statistical indicators, the single aggregate measure of national income must continue as the principal criterion to determine the capacity to pay. National income should remain the basic indicator until such time as a universally-acceptable single comprehensive indicator encompassing indicators of income, health, education, employment, industry, trade, technology, infrastructure, etc., can be developed as a substitute. We are advised that an indicator taking into account the factors mentioned cannot be developed at this time. We also note the view of the Committee on Contributions that, despite certain imperfections, national income is the only single indicator which for the present can be statistically compiled for all countries.

The other factors used in determining the scale, including *per capita* income, were basically approved by the General Assembly to avoid maladjustments. An allowance formula has been used to achieve particular adjustments for countries with low *per capita* income. The maximum reduction factor in the allowance formula has been increased from 50 to 60 and now to 70 per cent. The 70 percent level should, in the view of my delegation, certainly not be exceeded (perhaps even reduced) and, in the absence of precise data, it is conceivable that the change from \$1500 to \$1800 in the *per capita* income used in the allowances formula may be too large in the interest of an equitable scale.

Let me now turn to the drastic economic changes noted by the Committee in its two previous reports, which have had a profound impact on the scale. As forecast, the changes have given rise to steep increases as well as steep decrease in several assessments, which, however, reflect economic reality as measured by the capacity to pay. My delegation appreciates the conscientious and exhaustive effort of the Committee to reflect in the assessments fairly and objectively the effects of currency instability and price instability as well as actual change in output. The Committee has had an extremely difficult task. However, given the criteria and the major economic changes in recent years, it is more than doubtful that a better, more equitable assessment could have been devised with the existing ground-rules. My delegation therefore wishes to express its deep appreciation for the thorough and exhaustive work of the Committee on Contributions in devising the new triennial scale. Canada will support the new triennial scale.

Moreover, in the interest of an orderly conduct of financial affairs, my delegation joins with other member states in expressing its full confidence in the Committee on Contributions for having worked diligently and with competence and integrity in applying criteria laid down by the General Assembly. My delegation is also persuaded by the Committee's arguments in favour of a triennial as opposed to a biennial scale. While it appears unrealistic at this point to envisage a more permanent scale, the Committee on Contributions should keep in mind the desirability of extending the life of future scales when the world economic climate stabilizes.

RELOCATION OF CERTAIN UN AGENCIES TO VIENNA, AUSTRIA

In 1974, at the twenty-ninth session, the Government of Austria formally offered to provide office accommodation to the United Nations. The available space was to be located in the Donaupark Centre in Vienna, to be completed in 1978-79, and was offered at a token rent. The Donaupark Centre is being built to house the United Nations International Development Organization and the International Atomic Energy Agency, two UN bodies already located in temporary headquarters in Vienna. The Austrian offer was made when it was discovered that UNIDO and the IAEA would not be making use of all the facilities in the new Centre. The Fifth Committee welcomed the offer without committing itself to relocating any particular units of the Secretariat.

At the following session, in 1975, the Secretary-General was requested to prepare a report on the financial, functional and social implications of any specific transfers of personnel from New York or Geneva to new accommodation in Vienna. This report, which proposed a plan of action for a certain number of these moves, was presented to the General Assembly at the thirty-first session. After some negotiation in the Fifth Committee, a consensus was reached which accepted most of the Secretary-General's recommendations.

Canada joined the consensus, but expressed reservations about fully implementing the plan of action without careful review, as well as about the wisdom of transferring some of the particular units slated to move. Canada's point of view was expressed in the following statement, delivered to the Fifth Committee on December 20, 1976, by Mr. Brian Hunter, adviser to the Canadian delegation:

My delegation joins others in expressing its appreciation to the Government of Austria for offering to the United Nations the facilities in the Donaupark Centre in Vienna, which is not only the site of two major organizations of the United Nations system but has also been the host city to many important, historic international conferences. Its capacity to serve as host to agencies and activities of the United Nations system is, therefore, well established. Against this background and in the light of the report of the Secretary-General, my delegation was able to join the consensus on the resolution before us, but would like to make the following observations (which, I hope, will appear reasonable to members of this Committee, to the Austrian Government, and to the Secretary-General). First, let me say that my delegation is willing to support Phase One of the report of the Secretary-General. However, my delegation still has reservations on the specific units designated to move in Phase II and believes that the Committee does not have sufficient information to take a decision in this regard. For that reason, my delegation would have preferred the wording contained in the French and Belgian amendment, and had that amendment not been withdrawn, we would have voted in favour of it. We are also concerned about the timing and the implementation of the subsequent phases for making use of the facilities in the Centre in Vienna. Our concerns are these:

- a) While we can appreciate the need to specify the precise number of personnel to be transferred to Vienna each year over a period of years, we think the important point is that the formula should be regarded as a guide-line and that the determining factor should be that the selection of those units to be moved clearly fits into a rational, efficient, economic organization of the United Nations system. (To put it in another way, we would be reluctant to see units or offices and personnel moved to Vienna merely for the sake of filling the office space.) The goal should be, indeed must be, to contribute to the more effective management of the United Nations system.
- b) While we have acknowledged, (as I have mentioned), the desirability of filling the Donaupark Centre in Vienna, my delegation considers it important for the reason I have just given, not to tie ourselves so rigidly to a timetable that we create dislocation and disorganization within the system at a time when we are, in fact, attempting to rationalize and streamline the United Nations structure and operations.
- c) The Second Committee has just approved an extension of the mandate of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Restructuring of the Economic and Social Sector of the United Nations System, and on the assumption that the plenary approves the resolution, the recommendations of the Committee will be submitted to the General Assembly next fall. It seems to us that we should at any time be prepared to consider modifications in the proposed pattern for moving United Nations offices to Vienna in the light of the recommendations of the *Ad Hoc* Committee regarding the reallocation of responsibilities and the possible reallocation of functions and offices within the economic and social sector of the system.

It is for these three reasons that, in supporting this resolution, we do so on the understanding that it should serve: (a) to authorize the Secretary-General to implement Phase One; and (b) to provide guide-lines for further consideration on the subsequent phases and the timetable for its implementation. Inasmuch as the facilities in Vienna for Phase One will not be available until the end of 1978, it should be possible to avoid taking hurried decisions but rather to move forward with the deliberation in the context of our review of the reorganization of the operations of the United Nations system.

In the light of these considerations, we believe that we should now take the necessary steps to implement Phase One of this report but that no further irreversible decision regarding subsequent phases should be taken until we are in a position to reconsider the entire question in the General Assembly. Such reconsideration we believe should take place at the thirty-second session of the General Assembly.

LEGAL QUESTIONS

DRAFTING OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION AGAINST THE TAKING OF HOSTAGES

The debate on legal questions at the thirty-first session was highlighted by a West German initiative on the serious international problem of hostage-taking.

On September 28, 1976, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. Hans Genscher, requested the General Assembly to include an item entitled "The Drafting of an International Convention against the Taking of Hostages" on the agenda of the thirty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly. The West German initiative attracted wide support, including that of Canada, and the question was referred for consideration to the Sixth Committee, which is responsible for legal questions. A resolution establishing an ad hoc committee on the drafting of such a convention was adopted by consensus.

The Canadian statement on this question was delivered on November 29, 1976, by Mr. Erik B. Wang, Director, Legal Operations Division, Department of External Affairs:

My delegation fully supports the initiative of the Federal Republic of Germany for the drafting of an international convention against the taking of hostages. It is timely for members of the UN to take further steps to combat unlawful acts which have become of pressing concern to the world community. Increasing numbers of innocent people, including men, women and children, have been forcibly detained as hostages in many different parts of the world. Many episodes have ended in violence, injury and death.

Any recitation or listing of hostage-taking incidents around the world in recent years will serve to underline a point which has become increasingly evident: not one of us is out of the reach of the perpetrators of such acts. In fact, it can be said that no continent, no country, no region and no community is immune from the indiscriminate reach of those who, with blatant disregard for human life, callously seek to extort concessions.

In his statement before the General Assembly on September 29 of this year, the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Don Jamieson, addressing himself to problems of peace and world security, supported the view that we should take further measures in this direction. He stated:

"I therefore support the proposal of my colleague from the Federal Republic of Germany that priority should be given to action against taking hostages, and that international agreement be reached to ensure the punishment of those who engage in such acts wherever they seek refuge."

Perpetrators of acts of hostage-taking are subject to severe penalties under the criminal laws of each and every member state of the United Nations. Unlawful and forcible detention of innocent persons accompanied by the threat or act of murder in order to coerce others is intolerable under each of our respective criminal law systems. Hostage-taking should be equally intolerable and punishable under international law, particularly since the criminal laws of each country are not adequate to deal with situations becoming increasingly prevalent where the perpetrator seizes or kills hostages in one country and seeks refuge in another.

I am not suggesting that international law has been silent on this matter. The laws of war have long since reflected a universal condemnation and prohibition of hostage-taking. Under Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, persons taking no active part in the hostilities are protected persons with respect to whom acts of hostage-taking are prohibited. This prohibition is reiterated in various forms through the convention and particularly in Article 34, which states simply: "The taking of hostages is prohibited." If hostage-taking is prohibited in times of war, is it not evident a fortiori that it should be similar and without qualification prohibited in times of peace?

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights proclaim fundamental rights of the individual, including the right of everyone to life, liberty and security. The taking of hostages is in each case a gross infringement of these rights.

The protections and prohibitions set out in these international agreements are not accompanied by any provisions designed to ensure the prosecution and punishment of the individual who violates these norms. Such provisions are to be found in the three conventions which were adopted successively in 1963, 1970 and 1971 against offences in relation to the safety of civil aviation — the so-called aerial-hijacking conventions. These conventions embody the

principle *aut dedere aut punire* (prosecute or extradite) — whereby the offender will be taken into custody and either prosecuted or extradited by the contracting state in whose territory he is found, regardless of where the offence was originally committed. The obligations of contracting states in this regard are set out with particular clarity and force in the two latter conventions, the 1970 Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft and the 1971 Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation.

It is worth recalling that, just prior to the convening of the Hague Conference in December 1970, the UN General Assembly adopted by overwhelming majority resolution 2645 (XXV) of November 25, 1970 calling for the prosecution or extradition of persons who perpetrate acts of aerial hijacking and declaring "that the exploitation of unlawful seizure of aircraft for the purpose of taking hostages is to be condemned".

Since most offences under these conventions can also be regarded as acts of hostage-taking in relation to the passengers and crew — in effect, aerial hostage-taking —, the provisions of these conventions are of particular interest and relevance to the present proposal for the drafting of a further convention. I do not at this stage wish to anticipate any future detailed consideration of the drafting of a new convention, but I would like to point to two provisions to be found in virtually identical terms in the Hague and Montreal Conventions. Article 2 of the Hague Convention states:

"Each Contracting State undertakes to make the offence punishable by severe penalties."

Article 7 provides:

"The Contracting State in the territory of which the alleged offender is found shall, if it does not extradite him, be obliged without exception whatsoever and whether or not the offence was committed in its territory, to submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution. Those authorities shall take their decision in the same manner as in the case of any ordinary offence of a serious nature under the law of that State."

These provisions are similarly to be found in Articles 3 and 7 of the Montreal Convention. They lie at the heart of the legal framework established by these two conventions and would, in the view of my delegation, merit careful attention in the elaboration of any further measures for punishment of offenders in respect of related offences.

The same principle, that all states party to the convention either prosecute offenders for their crime or extradite them to other states, is to be found in the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents.

The point I wish to underline is that these conventions have come into effect with wide, although not universal, acceptance of states in all regions of the world and with varying political orientations. We would hope that further states will ratify these conventions to further extend their respective areas of application to all parts of the globe. But we believe that these conventions have already laid the groundwork or foundations for combating the taking of hostages.

They do, however, leave gaps in categories of cases of hostage-taking not covered under the existing conventions. It is these gaps which we should now seek to fill.

Canada supports the proposal embodied in the draft resolution tabled by the Federal Republic of Germany and co-sponsored by 19 other delegations calling for the establishment of an *ad hoc* committee on the drafting of an international convention against the taking of hostages. Such a convention, if it is to be effective and if it is to build on the foundations already laid, must be drafted on the basis that persons who perpetrate acts of hostage-taking should be prosecuted or extradited for the purpose of prosecution.

My delegation is unable to accept the amendments proposed by the Libyan Arab Republic. Since hostages are by definition innocent parties caught up in a contest or conflict between the hostage-taker and the other persons upon whom the hostage-taker is pressing his demands, the addition of the word "innocent" before "hostages" is either redundant or, if it adds anything, it creates an unacceptable implication that some hostages may be in some manner "non-innocent".

As regards the proposal to amend operative Paragraph 3 by deleting the reference to prosecution or extradition we believe this raises very serious questions. The principle that offenders must be brought to justice, either by prosecution in the state where they are found or by extradition to another state for the purpose of prosecution is the essence of the resolution, and it should be clearly stated as the essence of the task of the proposed committee. To delete the reference to this principle would be tantamount to diverting the committee from its main purpose, as we see it or at least, creating considerable uncertainty as to what should be the mandate of the Committee. If there is no agreement on this indispensable ingredient in the mandate of the Committee then, in the view of my delegation, questions would arise as to the utility of proceeding any further. We would therefore urge delegations to support the proposed resolution as tabled.

CONCLUSION OF A WORLD TREATY ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

At the thirty-first session, the Soviet Union's initiative on the non-use of force in international relations took the form of draft treaty, which, in the view of the sponsors, confirmed those principles of the Charter which oblige member states to refrain from the threat or use of force, without narrowing or broadening those principles. Other delegations, including that of Canada, argued that the text contained highly-selective and significant variations and departures from the provisions set out with such clarity and authority in the Charter. The draft treaty therefore failed to draw a consensus, and the item will be re-examined at the thirty-second session.

Mr. Erik Wang delivered the following statement on the legal aspects of the proposed draft treaty to the Sixth Committee on November 23, 1976:

We welcome this opportunity to comment on the legal aspects of the proposal made by the Soviet Union for the conclusion of a "World Treaty on the Non-use of Force in International Relations".

My delegation, along with 35 others, abstained on the resolution proposed by the Soviet Union and adopted by the General Assembly on November 8. We abstained because, as we stated in the First Committee on October 28, we had serious reservations about the utility of such a treaty as a means of strengthening the maintenance of international peace and the prevention of war. As we indicated at that time, there should be no question of the commitment of Canada to the maintenance of peace and the peaceful settlement of disputes. This commitment has been expressed and confirmed by Canada in many ways, including a long record of active service in UN peacekeeping forces. The question we have asked ourselves is whether the proposed treaty holds out any prospect of contributing to that goal.

After a careful examination of the draft treaty tabled by the Soviet delegation and published in Document A/31/243 of September 28, 1976, my delegation must state at the outset that our earlier reservations have not been reduced. On the contrary, a legal study of the draft has deepened and strengthened our reservations. These reservations have been further confirmed by statements made by various delegations in the course of the present debate.

Every member state in the UN is committed to the provisions of the UN Charter, which sets the standard of obligations which govern the non-use of force in international relations. Article 2(3) calls upon all members to settle their international disputes by peaceful means, and Article 2(4) sets out the obligations upon members to "refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the UN". The Charter is the standard against which any proposal for reaffirmation or development of international law in this area must be judged.

The sponsors of the present proposal have spoken of their proposal as a confirmation of Charter principles, as a text which neither narrows nor broadens those principles. A close examination of the draft treaty reveals, however, that the text contains significant variations and departures from the provisions set out with such clarity and authority in the Charter. I do not propose to lead the Committee through a detailed textual scrutiny of the draft treaty, particularly since we had yesterday the benefit of the close analysis of the draft by the distinguished representative of Australia. I will only point to a few examples of such variation which raise serious questions and difficulties for my delegation.

The norms contained in Article 2 and other articles of the Charter must be seen as a comprehensive and interrelated legal framework. The present draft offers a restatement or paraphrase of certain of these norms, in a highly selective way. There is no reference in the draft to the principle contained in Article 51 of the Charter concerning the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence. Article I(3) of the draft provides that: "No consideration may be adduced to justify resort to the threat or use of force in violation of the obligations assured under this Treaty". Not only does this provision depart from the Charter, but it appears to be wholly inconsistent with, and indeed contrary to, Article 51.

Another notable omission from the Soviet draft relates to the Security Council which is not mentioned, but which under Chapter VII of the Charter plays an important role in relation to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression. As another example of serious weaknesses in the draft, we would point to Article V, which, apart from other problems, appears to be inconsistent with Article 26 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which reflects the rule *pacta sunt servanda* and states: "Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith". Moreover, the primacy of the obligations of the Charter is established by Article 103.

These and other defects, ambiguities and omissions raise serious questions when a text is tabled in the form of a draft treaty. They would raise serious questions if they were advanced in a less formal instrument, as a resolution or declaration. My delegation has noted the expressed willingness of the sponsors to consider comments and textual suggestions by other delegations. We are bound to ask ourselves, however, what would be the purpose of the end-product which might theoretically emerge from an extensive process of revision? It is essential to avoid any steps which would have the effect of weakening the full authority of the obligations imposed by the UN Charter. If, as the sponsors suggest, we are dealing here with a proposal for "confirmation" of existing principles, it is difficult to see how the terms of the Charter can be improved upon. The real risk is that in restatement or reformulation, these terms will be called into question or eroded; differing interpretations could be placed on similar but divergent language, and opportunities for disputes would be increased. This is not the route my delegation wishes to follow.

In sum, my delegation believes that to the extent that this draft is a restatement of existing principles of international law we consider it redundant. To the extent that it departs from existing norms and breaks new ground, intentionally or not, we would have grave reservations about any weakening of the framework of the UN Charter and other rules of international law binding upon member states.

There already exists a body of international law governing the prohibition of recourse to force in international relations. There is no lack of clarity or authority in these rules, as embodied in the UN Charter. The problem lies in the lack of willingness on the part of the states to honour these rules and contribute to the strengthening of international peace and security in their conduct, and not merely in words and exhortations.

REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON CHARTER REVIEW AND ON STRENGTHENING THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The United Nations Charter, which was written in 1945, has proved to be a flexible instrument and has been altered only slightly over the years. Where amendments have been made, they have been technical in nature. Changes include an increase in the membership of the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council in response to the greatly increased membership of the UN itself.

In 1975 the General Assembly set up the Special Committee on Charter Review and on the Strengthening of the Role of the United Nations. During 1976 the Special Committee studied an analytical report on this topic prepared by the Secretary-General, and, at the thirty-first session, the Special Committee's comments on this report were submitted for consideration by the Sixth Committee, which renewed the mandate of the Special Committee. On November 17, 1976, Mr. Maurice Copithorne, Director-General of the Bureau of Legal Affairs of the Department of External Affairs, delivered the following statement to the Sixth Committee:

The debate on Charter review has in many respects reflected the pace of changes that, since the drafting of the Charter, has radically altered relations among states. It is a fact that there has been a shift of focus within this organization towards economic and social issues of pressing international concern. We think, Mr. Chairman, that no one could deny that, during this period of change and ferment, the Charter has proved to be a resilient and forward-looking document. Its flexibility and adaptability has allowed the organization to accommodate itself to a system differing in many key respects from the one which prevailed 30 years ago. It seems very clear to my delegation that the Charter has provided a framework which has allowed and, to a large degree, fostered a significant measure of progress on the fundamental issues for the future of mankind.

However, none of this suggests that an international constitutive instrument such as the Charter should not be susceptible of revision, still less of review. As a living instrument, and a practical document, the Charter should reflect, to the maximum degree possible, the interests of all members large and small. We therefore believe that Charter review is a healthy, indeed an important, process.

I turn now to the current review — that is, the work of the Special Committee whose report is before us. We have studied carefully the great variety of proposals. We believe that we are sensitive to the considerations that have motivated the great majority of these proposals and respect those that have submitted them. However, we are disappointed to note that so little progress was made in identifying areas of consensus that might serve as a basis for the further work of the Committee. Perhaps this should not be surprising, for even a cursory examination of the subject reveals its complexity. It also raises fundamental questions concerning the objectives and the basic role of the organization, as well as the distribution of powers to manage that role. If the Committee is to expedite its work, we would suggest that it single out and study only those proposals which are likely to command widespread support among member states. In our view, the Committee should also make sure that it does not duplicate the work of other committees, such as the Committee of Experts on a New UN Structure for Global Economic Co-operation, the Ad Hoc Committee on the Restructuring of the Economic and Social Sectors of the United Nations, and the report of the Special Committee of 31, which have made a number of recommendations which have been already implemented.

For our part, the Canadian delegation believes that, while the Charter is clearly in need of updating in some respects, revisions of such a nature as to constitute a redrafting of the Charter may not be appropriate at this time. While recognizing that its architecture is by no means perfect, we believe the Charter is undeniably working and we would not support efforts that could endanger the basic framework of this organization and impair its effectiveness. We hold the view, therefore, that, at this point in time, the best prospect is to work within the basic structure of the Charter in such a manner that we, the members of the UN, can best enhance its authority and strengthen its ability to adapt to the changing realities of the international community.

In conclusion I wish to reaffirm Canada's commitment to participate in continuing efforts to enhance the role of the United Nations. We shall continue to seek realistic methods to strengthen the foundations of this organization.

For an analysis of the first 30 years of the UN, see John W. Holmes, "Sadder but Wiser: the UN at Thirty," International Perspectives, November/December 1975, Pp. 19-23. Other recent International Perspectives articles of interest are C.V. Svoboda, "Recap of 30th General Assembly: a demonstration of resilience", May/June 1976, Pp. 15-21; "Canada at the United Nations", a series of five articles by various authors, September/October, 1976, Pp. 3-26; and Geoffrey Pearson, "Recap of 31st General Assembly: relative tranquility at last", May/June 1977, Pp. 3-9.

CANADA'S VOTING RECORD AT THE THIRTY-FIRST GENERAL ASSEMBLY

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED WITHOUT REFERENCE TO A MAIN COMMITTEE

Resolution No.	Title	Date of Adoption in the General Assembly	Votes in the General Assembly		
			For	Against	Abstention
31/1**	Admission of the Republic of Seychelles to membership in the United Nations	21 September 1976	A.W.V.	(Adopted without vote)	
31/3	Observer status for the Commonwealth Secretariat at the UN	18 October 1976	A.W.V.		
31/4	Question of the Comorian Island of Mayotte	21 October 1976	102	1	28*
31/6	Policies of <i>Apartheid</i> of the Government of South Africa				
	a) The so-called independent Transkei and other Bantustans	26 October 1976	134*	0	1
	b) United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa	9 November 1976	A.W.V.		
	c) Solidarity with South African political prisoners	9 November 1976	A.W.V.		
	d) Arms embargo against South Africa	9 November 1976	110	8	20*
	e) Relations between Israel and South Africa	9 November 1976	91	20*	28
	f) <i>Apartheid</i> in Sports	9 November 1976	128*	0	12
	g) Program of work of the Special Committee Against <i>Apartheid</i>	9 November 1976	133*	0	8
	h) Economic collaboration with South Africa	9 November 1976	110	6	24*
	i) Situation in South Africa	9 November 1976	106	11*	22
	j) Program of action against <i>apartheid</i>	9 November 1976	105	8	27*
k) Investments in South Africa	9 November 1976	124	0	16*	
31/11	Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency	10 November 1976	A.W.V.		
31/12	Question of Cyprus	12 November 1976	94	1	27*
31/13	Co-operation between the UN and the Organization of African Unity	16 November 1976	A.W.V.		
31/16	Credentials of representatives to the thirty-first session of the General Assembly				
	Resolution A	23 November 1976	A.W.V.		
	Resolution B	20 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/20	Question of Palestine	24 November 1976	90	16*	30

* Indicates Canada's vote.

** Until 1976, General Assembly resolutions were numbered consecutively, beginning at the first session in 1945. After three decades, the system had become unwieldy, and a new numbering system was adopted for the thirty-first session. Resolutions are still numbered consecutively, but for one session only, and that number is preceded by the session number. Thus, the first resolution adopted at the thirty-first session was 31/1.

Resolution No.	Title	Date of Adoption in the General Assembly	Votes in the General Assembly		
			For	Against	Abstention
31/21	Admission of new members to the United Nations	26 November 1976	124*	1	3
31/44	Admission of the People's Republic of Angola to membership in the UN	1 December 1976	116*	0	1
31/60	Appointment of the Secretary-General of the UN	8 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/61	The Situation in the Middle East	9 December 1976	91	11*	29
31/62	Peace Conference on the Middle East	9 December 1976	122*	2	8
31/63	Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea	10 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/104	Admission of the independent state of Western Samoa to membership in the UN	15 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/142	One hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the Amphictyonic Congress of Panama	17 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/143	Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence in Colonial Countries and Peoples	17 December 1976	121*	2	8
31/144	Dissemination of Information on Decolonization	17 December 1976	132*	0	2
31/145	International Conference in Support of the Peoples of Zimbabwe and Namibia	17 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/155	Report of the Security Council	20 December 1976	A.W.V.		
No. of resolutions adopted without a vote		14			
No. of resolutions adopted in recorded vote		18			
Total		32			
Recorded Votes		Yes	No	Abstention	
Canada		8	4	6	
Negative votes	31/6 I	Situation in South Africa		108-11(Cda)-22	
	31/20	Question of Palestine		90-16(Cda)-30	
	31/61	Situation in Middle East		91-11(Cda)-29	
	31/6E	Relations between Israel and South Africa		91-20(Cda)-28	

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED ON THE REPORTS OF THE FIRST COMMITTEE

Resolution No.	Title	Date of Adoption in the General Assembly	Votes in the General Assembly		
			For	Against	Abstention
31/8	International Co-Operation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space	8 November 1976	A.W.V.		
31/9	Conclusion of a World Treaty on the Non-Use of Force in International Relations	8 November 1976	88	2	31*
31/64	Incendiary and Other Specific Conventional Weapons which may be the Subject of Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use for Humanitarian Reasons	10 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/65	Chemical and Bacteriological (biological) weapons	10 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/66	Urgent Need for Cessation of Nuclear and Thermonuclear Tests and Conclusion of a Treaty designed to Achieve a Comprehensive Test Ban	10 December 1976	105*	2	27
31/67	Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 3467 (XXX) Concerning the Signature and Ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)	10 December 1976	119*	0	14
31/68	Effective Measures to Implement the Purposes and Objectives of the Disarmament Decade	10 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/69	Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa	10 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/70	Comprehensive Study of the Question of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in all its Aspects	10 December 1976	132*	0	0
31/71	Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone in the Region of the Middle East	10 December 1976	130*	0	1
31/72	Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques	10 December 1976	96*	8	30
31/73	Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in South Asia	10 December 1976	91*	2	43

Resolution No.	Title	Date of Adoption in the General Assembly	Votes in the General Assembly		
			For	Against	Abstention
31/74	Prohibition of the Development and Manufacture of New Types of Weapons of Mass Destruction and New Systems of Such Weapons	10 December 1976	120*	1	15
31/75	Implementation of the Conclusion of the First Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons	10 December 1976	115*	2	19
31/87	Reduction of Military Budgets	14 December 1976	120*	2	11
31/88	Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace	14 December 1976	106	0	27*
31/89	Conclusion of a Treaty on the Complete and General Prohibition of Nuclear-Weapon Tests	14 December 1976	95	2	36*
31/90	Strengthening of the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Disarmament	14 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/91	Non-Interference in Internal Affairs of States	14 December 1976	99	1	11*
31/92	Implementation of the Declaration of the Strengthening of International Security	14 December 1976	95	0	17*
31/189	General and Complete Disarmament Resolution A Resolution B Resolution C Resolution D	21 December 1976	107*	10	11
			A.W.V.		
			95	0	33*
			106*	2	22
31/190	World Disarmament Conference	21 December 1976	A.W.V.		
No. of resolutions adopted without a vote		8			
No. of resolutions in recorded vote		17			
Total		25			
Recorded Votes		Yes	No	Abstention	
Canada		11	0	6	

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED ON THE REPORTS OF THE SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE

Resolution No.	Title	Date of Adoption in the General Assembly	Votes in the General Assembly		
			For	Against	Abstention
31/10	Effects of Atomic Radiation	8 November 1976	A.W.V.		
31/15	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East	23 November 1976			
	a) Assistance to Palestine Refugees		115*	0	2
	b) Assistance to Persons Displaced as a Result of the June 1967 Hostilities		A.W.V.		
	c) Working Group on the Financing of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East		A.W.V.		
	d) Population and Refugees Displaced Since 1967		118*	2	2
	e) Palestine Refugees in the Gaza Strip		118*	2	3
31/105	Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peacekeeping Operations in All Their Aspects	15 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/106	Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories	16 December 1976			
	Resolution A		129*	3	4
	Resolution B		134*	0	2
	Resolution C		100	5	30*
	Resolution D		97	3	36*
No. of resolutions adopted without a vote		4			
No. of resolutions adopted in recorded vote		7			
Total		11			
Recorded Votes		Yes	No	Abstention	
Canada		5	0	2	

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED ON THE REPORTS OF THE SECOND COMMITTEE

Resolution No.	Title	Date of Adoption in the General Assembly	Votes in the General Assembly		
			For	Against	Abstention
31/2	Amendments to General Assembly Resolution 1995 (XIX) as amended by Assembly Resolution 2904 (XXVII)				
	Resolution A	29 September 1976	A.W.V.		
	Resolution B	21 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/14	Conference on International Economic Co-operation	19 November 1976	99	0	30*
31/17	Assistance to Cape Verde	24 November 1976	A.W.V.		
31/42	Assistance to the Comoros	1 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/43	Assistance to Mozambique	1 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/107	United Nations Institute for Training and Research	16 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/108	United Nations Conference on Decertification	16 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/109	Habitat: UN Conference on Human Settlements	16 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/110	Living Conditions of the Palestinian People	16 December 1976	107	2	26*
31/111	Report of the Governing Council of the UN Environment Program on the Work of its Fourth Session	16 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/112	Institutional Arrangements for International Environmental Co-operation	16 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/113	Specific Measures to Meet the Need for a Decent Living Environment for the Most Vulnerable Groups of Society	16 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/114	Collaboration Between the UN and Non-governmental Organizations with Regard to World-wide Inter-communal Co-operation	16 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/115	UN Audio-visual Information Centre on Human Settlements	16 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/116	Institutional Arrangements for International Co-operation in the Field of Human Settlements	16 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/117	United Nations University	16 December 1976	A.W.V.		

Resolution No.	Title	Date of Adoption in the General Assembly	Votes in the General Assembly		
			For	Against	Abstention
31/118	Chair on Non-alignment Within the UN University	16 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/119	Economic Co-operation Among Developing Countries	16 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/120	Secretariat of the World Food Council	16 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/121	Report of the World Food Council	16 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/122	International Fund for Agricultural Development	16 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/156	Action Program in Favour of Developing Island Countries	21 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/157	Specific Action in Favour of Land-locked Developing Countries	21 December 1976	120*	0	7
31/158	Debt Problems of Developing Countries	21 December 1976	99	1	31*
31/159	Report of the UN Conference on Trade and Development on its Fourth Session	21 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/160	Revision of the Lists of States Eligible for Membership in the Industrial Development Board	21 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/161	Committee on the Drafting of a Constitution for the UN Industrial Development Organization	21 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/162	Strengthening of Operational Activities in the Field of Industrial Development	21 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/163	Industrial Redeployment in Favour of Developing Countries	21 December 1976	104	1	27*
31/164	Report of the Industrial Development Board	21 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/165	Borrowing Authority of the Administrator of the UN Development Program	21 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/166	United Nations Volunteers	21 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/167	Expansion of Basic Services Provided by the UN Children's Fund in Developing Countries	21 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/168	UN Children's Fund	21 December 1976	A.W.V.		

Resolution No.	Title	Date of Adoption in the General Assembly	Votes in the General Assembly		
			For	Against	Abstention
31/169	International Year of the Child	21 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/170	United Nations Fund for Population Activities	21 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/171	Operational Activities for Development	21 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/172	Assistance to the Drought-stricken Areas of Ethiopia	21 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/173	Office of the UN Disaster Relief Co-ordinator	21 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/174	Ways and Means of Accelerating the Transfer of Real Resources to Developing Countries on a Predictable, Assured and Continuous Basis	21 December 1976	117*	1	18
31/175	Effective Mobilization of Women in Development	21 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/176	Tripartite World Conference on Employment, Income Distribution, Social Progress and the International Division of Labour	21 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/177	UN Special Fund for Land-locked Developing Countries	21 December 1976	115	0	19*
31/178	Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 2626 (XXV) Entitled "International Development Strategy for the Second UN Development Decade", 3202 (S-VI) Entitled "Program of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order", 3281 (XXIX) Entitled "Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States" and 3362 (S-VII) Entitled "Development and International Economic Co-operation"	21 December 1976	128*	1	8
31/179	UN Conference on Technical Co-operation Among Developing Countries	21 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/180	Implementation of the Medium-term and Long-term Recovery and Rehabilitation Program in the Sudano-Sahelian Region	21 December 1976	A.W.V.		

Resolution No.	Title	Date of Adoption in the General Assembly	Votes in the General Assembly		
			For	Against	Abstention
31/181	Recapitalization of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and Replenishment of the International Development Association	21 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/182	Preparations for a New International Development Strategy	21 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/183	Establishment of a Network for the Exchange of Technological Information	21 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/184	UN Conference on Science and Technology for Development	21 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/185	UN Water Conference	21 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/186	Permanent Sovereignty Over National Resources in the Occupied Arab Territories	21 December 1976	107	2	26*
31/187	Assistance to Sao Tome and Principe	21 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/188	Assistance to Angola	21 December 1976	A.W.V.		
No. of Resolutions adopted without a vote		46			
No. of resolutions adopted in recorded vote		9			
Total		55			
Recorded Votes		Yes	No	Abstention	
Canada		3	0	6	

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED ON THE REPORTS OF THE THIRD COMMITTEE

Resolution No.	Title	Date of Adoption in the General Assembly	Votes in the General Assembly		
			For	Against	Abstention
31/33	Adverse Consequences for the Enjoyment of Human Rights of Political, Military, Economic and Other Forms of Assistance Given to Colonial and Racist Regimes in Southern Africa	30 November 1976	97	11	28*
31/34	Importance of the Universal Realization of the Right of Peoples to Self-determination and of the Speedy Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples for the Effective Guarantee and Observance of Human Rights	30 November 1976	109	4	24*

Resolution No.	Title	Date of Adoption in the General Assembly	Votes in the General Assembly		
			For	Against	Abstention
31/35	Report of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees	30 November 1976	A.W.V.		
31/36	Question of the Establishment, in Accordance with the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, of a Body to which Persons Claiming the Benefit of the Convention may Apply	30 November 1976	117*	9	8
31/37	National Experience in Promoting the Co-operative Movement	30 November 1976	A.W.V.		
31/38	National Experience in Achieving Far-reaching Social and Economic Changes for the Purpose of Social Progress	30 November 1976	125	0	9*
31/39	Preservation and Further Development of Cultural Values	30 November 1976	A.W.V.		
31/40	Protection and Restitution of Works of Art as Part of the Preservation and Further Development of Cultural Values	30 November 1976	125*	0	12
31/41	Second World Black and African Festival of Arts and Culture	30 November 1976	A.W.V.		
31/77	Implementation of the Program for the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination	13 December 1976	113	1	14*
31/78	World Conference to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination	13 December 1976	110	2*	16
31/79	Status of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination	13 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/80	Status of the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of <i>Apartheid</i>	13 December 1976	99	0	30*
31/81	Reports of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination	13 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/82	Implementation of the Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons	13 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/83	Report on the World Social Situation	13 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/84	World Social Situation	13 December 1976	120*	0	12
31/85	Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in Relation to Detention and Imprisonment	13 December 1976	A.W.V.		

Resolution No.	Title	Date of Adoption in the General Assembly	Votes in the General Assembly		
			For	Against	Abstention
31/86	Status of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights	13 December 1976	129*	0	0
31/123	International Year for Disabled Persons	16 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/124	Protection of Human Rights in Chile	16 December 1976	95*	12	25
31/125	Accession to and Implementation of the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances	16 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/126	Emergency Assistance for South African Refugee Students	16 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/127	Measures to Improve the Situation and Ensure the Human Rights and Dignity of all Migrant Workers	16 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/128	Human Rights and Scientific and Technological Developments	16 December 1976	126*	0	8
31/129	Policies and Programs Relating to Youth	16 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/130	Role of Youth	16 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/131	UN Volunteers Program	16 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/132	Channels of Communication with Youth and Youth Organizations	16 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/133	Voluntary Fund for the UN Decade for Women	16 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/134	Improvement of the Status and Role of Women in Education	16 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/135	International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women	16 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/136	UN Decade for Women	16 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/137	Pledging Conference for the UN Decade for Women	16 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/138	Elimination of all Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief	16 December 1976	A.W.V.		

Resolution No.	Title	Date of Adoption in the General Assembly	Votes in the General Assembly		
			For	Against	Abstention
31/139	Co-operation and Assistance in the Application and Improvement of Mass Communications for Social Progress and Development	16 December 1976	A.W.V.		
OTHER DECISIONS	Postponement of Consideration of Draft Resolution on Protection of Detained Persons	16 December 1976	A.W.V.		
	Freedom of Information	16 December 1976	A.W.V.		
	United Nations Conference for an International Convention on Adoption Law	16 December 1976	A.W.V.		
No. of resolutions adopted without a vote		24			
No. of resolutions adopted by vote		12			
Total		36			
Recorded Votes		Yes	No	Abstention	
Canada		6	1	5	
Negative Vote	31/78	World Conference to Combat Racism		110-2(Cda)-16	

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED ON THE REPORTS OF THE FOURTH COMMITTEE

Resolution No.	Title	Date of Adoption in the General Assembly	Votes in the General Assembly		
			For	Against	Abstention
31/7	Activities of Foreign Economic and other Interests which are Impeding the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Southern Rhodesia and Namibia and in all other Territories under Colonial Domination and Efforts to Eliminate Colonialism, <i>Apartheid</i> and Racial Discrimination in Southern Africa	5 November 1976	93	9	19*
31/29	Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories Transmitted under Article 73e of the Charter of the UN	29 November 1976	124*	0	3
31/30	Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by the Specialized Agencies and the International Institutions Associated with the UN	29 November 1976	120*	0	5

Resolution No.	Title	Date of Adoption in the General Assembly	Votes in the General Assembly		
			For	Against	Abstention
31/31	United Nations Educational and Training Program for Southern Africa	29 November 1976	A.W.V.		
31/32	Offers by Member States of Study and Training Facilities for Inhabitants of Non-Self-Covering Territories	29 November 1976	A.W.V.		
31/45	Question of Western Sahara	1 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/46	Question of the Solomon Islands	1 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/47	Question of the Gilbert Islands	1 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/48	Question of Tokelau	1 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/49	Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)	1 December 1976	102	1	32*
31/50	Question of Belize	1 December 1976	115*	8	15
31/51	Question of the New Hebrides	1 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/52	Question of Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Montserrat, and Turks and Caicos Islands	1 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/53	Question of Timor	1 December 1976	68	20	49*
31/54	Question of the British Virgin Islands	1 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/55	Question of American Samoa	1 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/56	Question of Brunei	1 December 1976	120	0	14*
31/57	Question of the United States Virgin Islands	1 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/58	Question of Guam	1 December 1976	61	22*	42
31/59	Question of French Somaliland	1 December 1976	117	0	19*
31/146	Situation in Namibia Resulting from the Illegal Occupation of the Territory by South Africa	20 December 1976	107	6	12*
31/147	Program of Work of the UN Council for Namibia	20 December 1976	119*	0	4
31/148	Intensification and Co-ordination of UN Actions in Support of Namibia	20 December 1976	118*	0	7
31/149	Action by Intergovernmental and Non-governmental Organizations with Respect to Namibia	20 December 1976	120*	0	7

Resolution No.	Title	Date of Adoption in the General Assembly	Votes in the General Assembly		
			For	Against	Abstention
31/150	Dissemination of Information on Namibia	20 December 1976	123*	0	4
31/151	UN Fund for Namibia	20 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/152	Observer Status for the South West Africa People's Organization	20 December 1976	113	0	13*
31/153	Nationhood Program	20 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/154	Question of Southern Rhodesia	20 December 1976			
	Resolution A		A.W.V.		
	Resolution B		124*	0	7
OTHER DECISIONS					
	Question of St. Helena	1 December 1976	A.W.V.		
	Question of Tuvalu	1 December 1976	A.W.V.		
	Question of Gibraltar	1 December 1976	A.W.V.		
	Question of the Cocos (Keeling) Islands	1 December 1976	A.W.V.		
	Questions of Pitcairn and of Antigua, Dominica, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia and St. Vincent	1 December 1976	A.W.V.		
	No. of resolutions adopted without a vote	14			
	No. of resolutions adopted in recorded vote	16			
	Total	30			
Recorded Votes		Yes	No	Abstention	
Canada		8	1	7	
Negative Vote	31/38	Question of Guam	61-22(Cda)-42		

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED ON THE REPORTS OF THE FIFTH COMMITTEE

Resolution No.	Title	Date of Adoption in the General Assembly	Votes in the General Assembly		
			For	Against	Abstention
31/5	Financing of the UN Emergency Force and the UN Disengagement Observer Force				
	Resolution A	26 October 1976	A.W.V.		
	Resolution B	1 December 1976	112*	2	0
	Resolution C	22 December 1976	113*	2	12
	Resolution D	22 December 1976	112*	2	12
31/22	Financial Reports and Accounts, and Reports of the Board of Auditors	29 November 1976	A.W.V.		

Resolution No.	Title	Date of Adoption in the General Assembly	Votes in the General Assembly		
			For	Against	Abstention
31/23	Appointments to Fill Vacancies in the Membership of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions	29 November 1976	A.W.V.		
31/24	Appointment to Fill Vacancy in the Membership of the Board of Auditors	29 November 1976	A.W.V.		
31/25	Appointments to Fill Vacancies in the Membership of the UN Administrative Tribunal	29 November 1976	A.W.V.		
31/26	Composition of the Secretariat	29 November 1976	102*	0	5
31/27	Implementation of Personnel Policy Reforms	29 November 1976	A.W.V.		
31/93	Medium-term Plan	14 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/94	Administrative and Budgetary Co-ordination of the UN with the Specialized Agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency	14-December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/95	Scale of Assessments for the Apportionment of the Expenses of the United Nations	14 December 1976			
	Resolution A		122*	0	4
	Resolution B		A.W.V.		
31/96	Enlargement of the Committee on Contributions: Amendment to Rule 158 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly	14 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/140	Pattern of Conferences	17 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/141	Report of the International Civil Service Commission	17 December 1976	119*	11	2
31/191	Financial Emergency of the UN	22 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/192	Statute of the Joint Inspection Unit	22 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/193	Joint Inspection Unit	22 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/194	Utilization of Office Accommodation and Conference Facilities at the Donaupark Centre in Vienna	22 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/195	Expansion of Meeting Rooms and Improvement of Conference Servicing and Delegate Facilities at United Nations Headquarters	22 December 1976	121*	10	0

Resolution No.	Title	Date of Adoption in the General Assembly	Votes in the General Assembly		
			For	Against	Abstention
31/196	Report of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Board	22 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/197	Investments of the UN Joint Staff Pension Fund	22 December 1976	106	1	24*
31/198	Appointments to Fill Vacancies in the Membership of the Committee on Contributions	22 December 1976			
	Resolution A		A.W.V.		
	Resolution B		119*	12	0
31/199	Confirmation of the Appointments Made by the Secretary-General to Fill Vacancies in the Membership of the Investments Committee	22 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/200	Appointments to Fill Vacancies in the Membership of the International Civil Service Commission	22 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/201	Appointments to Fill Vacancies in the Membership of the UN Staff Pension Committee	22 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/202	Establishment of the UN Industrial Development Fund	22 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/203	General Procedures Governing the Operations of the UN Industrial Development Fund	22 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/204	Emoluments of the Members of the International Court of Justice	22 December 1976	114*	11	3
31/205	Use of Experts and Consultants in the UN	22 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/206	Revised Estimate Resulting from the Decisions of the Trade and Development Board Arising from the Conference on Trade and Development at its Fourth Session, Nairobi	22 December 1976	114*	9	8
31/207	Program Budget for the Biennium 1976-1977	22 December 1976			
	Resolution A		119*	10	1
	Resolution B		131*	0	0
	Resolution C		119*	10	1
31/208	Questions Relating to the Program Budget for the Biennium 1976-77	22 December 1976			
	Section I		117*	10	3

Resolution No.	Title	Date of Adoption in the General Assembly	Votes in the General Assembly		
			For	Against	Abstention
	Section II		A.W.V.		
	Section III		119*	10	1
	Section IV		A.W.V.		
	Section V		A.W.V.		
	Section VI		A.W.V.		
	Section VII		A.W.V.		
	Section VIII		A.W.V.		
	Section IX		A.W.V.		

OTHER DECISIONS

Amendments to the Staff Rules	29 November 1976	A.W.V.		
Assessment of Non-member States Participating in the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea	10 December 1976	A.W.V.		
Review of the Intergovernmental and Expert Machinery Dealing with the Formulation, Review and Approval of Programs and Budgets	22 December 1976	A.W.V.		
Joint Inspection Unit	22 December 1976	A.W.V.		
United Nations Accommodation	22 December 1976	A.W.V.		
United Nations Industrial Development Fund	22 December 1976	A.W.V.		

No. of resolutions adopted without a vote 29
 No. of resolutions adopted in recorded vote 16

Total 45

Recorded Votes	Yes	No	Abstention
Canada	15	0	1

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED OF THE REPORTS OF THE SIXTH COMMITTEE

Resolution No.	Title	Date of Adoption in the General Assembly	Votes in the General Assembly		
			For	Against	Abstention
31/18	United Nations Conference on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties	24 November 1976	A.W.V.		
31/19	Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts	24 November 1976	A.W.V.		
31/28	Report of the Special Committee on the Charter of the UN and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization	29 November 1976	A.W.V.		
31/76	Implementation by States of the Provisions of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961	13 December 1976	92	0	25*

Resolution No.	Title	Date of Adoption in the General Assembly	Votes in the General Assembly		
			For	Against	Abstention
31/97	Report of the International Law Commission	15 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/98	Arbitration Rules of the UN Commission on International Trade Law	15 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/99	Report of the UN Commission on International Trade Law	15 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/100	UN Conference on the Carriage of Goods by Sea	15 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/101	Report of the Committee on Relations with the Host Country	15 December 1976	A.W.V.		
31/102	Measures to Prevent International Terrorism which Endangers or Takes Innocent Human Lives or Jeopardizes Fundamental Freedoms, and Study of the Underlying Causes of those Forms of Terrorism and Acts of Violence which Lie in Misery, Frustration, Grievance and Despair and which Cause some People to Sacrifice Human Lives, Including their Own, in an Attempt to Effect Radical Changes	15 December 1976	100	9*	27
31/103	Drafting of an International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages	15 December 1976	A.W.V.		
OTHER DECISIONS	Resolutions Adopted by the UN Conference on the Representation of States in their Relation with International Organizations	13 December 1976	A.W.V.		
	Consolidation and Progressive Evolution of the Norms and Principles of International Economic Development Law	13 December 1976	A.W.V.		
	Conclusion of a World Treaty on the Non-use of Force in International Relations	13 December 1976	A.W.V.		
No. of resolutions adopted without a vote		9			
No. of resolutions adopted in recorded vote		2			
Total		11			
Recorded Votes		Yes	No	Abstention	
Canada		0	1	1	
Negative Vote	31/102	Mesures to Prevent Terrorism		100-9(Cda)-27	

SUMMARY: In total, 245 resolutions were adopted by the thirty-first regular session of the UNGA. Of these, 148 resolutions (60 per cent) were adopted by consensus or acclamation, and 97 resolutions (40 per cent) were adopted after recorded votes. In the 97 recorded votes, Canada voted "yes" 56 times (57.73 per cent), "no" seven times (7.22 per cent) and abstained 34 times (35.05 per cent). Canada was obliged to vote against only 2.85 per cent of the 245 resolutions adopted and abstained 13.88 per cent of the time.

THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Following two months of discussion in San Francisco at the United Nations Conference on International Organization, the representatives of 51 states, including Canada, signed the Charter of the United Nations on June 26, 1945. The Canadian role during the Conference has been an extremely active one and many Canadian proposals were incorporated in the Charter, which came into effect on October 24, 1945.

The Assembly of the Charter expresses the fundamental aims of the 51 original members and those which have since acceded to the Charter, which came into effect on October 24, 1945.

We the peoples of the United Nations, determined

- To affirm the principles which should govern the conduct of all states, which shall bring into force the Charter and shall be the basis of the relations between them;
- To establish a system of collective security, which shall prevent and remove the causes of international friction and conflict and shall suppress international terrorism;
- To promote social progress and to be the nucleus of the economic system.

PART II

and for that end

APPENDICES

- To accept the Charter and to bring it into force;
- To ensure the observance of principles and the institution of methods, that a more effective system of international cooperation may be established for the promotion of the economic and social well-being of all peoples.

have resolved to put their efforts to accomplishing these aims.

THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Following two months of discussions in San Francisco at the United Nations Conference on International Organization, the representatives of 50 states, including Canada, signed the Charter of the United Nations on June 26, 1945. The Canadian role during the Conference had been an extremely active one and many Canadian proposals were incorporated in the Charter, which came into effect on October 24, 1945.

The Preamble to the Charter expresses the fundamental aims of the 51 original members and those which have been admitted to the United Nations since October, 1945:

We the peoples of the United Nations determined

To save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and

To reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and

To establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and

To promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom.

and for these ends

To practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours, and

To unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and

To ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and

To employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples.

have resolved to combine our efforts to accomplish these aims.

THE INSTRUMENTS OF OFFICIAL CANADIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SESSION

THE BUREAU OF UNITED NATIONS AFFAIRS

The Department of External Affairs – Ottawa

The Bureau of United Nations Affairs (UNP) is charged primarily with the management of Canadian policy with respect to the activities of the United Nations system of organizations. It is a basic premise of Canadian policy to continue actively to strengthen the United Nations system as an effective instrument for international co-operation and, in particular, to improve the capacity of the United Nations to discharge its Charter responsibilities. In pursuing these objectives, the Bureau consults clearly with other bureaux and government departments and agencies.

The United Nations Institutional and Social Affairs Division (UNS) has as its field of responsibility the co-ordination of Canadian policy and activity as regards ECOSOC and its subsidiary organs, the special bodies of the United Nations, and the Specialized Agencies. Human rights matters and United Nations issues related to social development fall within the purview of this division. In addition, the division is responsible for examining administrative, financial and procedural questions.

The United Nations Political Affairs Division (UNO) is responsible for assessing the political implications of developments in the Security Council, the General Assembly, and other United Nations organizations, and co-ordinating Canadian policy and activity in these areas. The division is also responsible for the placement of Canadians in international organizations.

Through direction, co-ordination and liaison, both divisions attempt to maximize the opportunities offered in the United Nations and related institutions for the advancement of a broad range of Canadian national goals.

THE CANADIAN PERMANENT MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

New York

Almost all members of the UN, including Canada, have found it necessary to maintain continuing representation at the seat of the United Nations.

The first Canadian Permanent Mission in New York was established in January 1948, with the appointment of General McNaughton as the first Canadian Permanent Representative to the United Nations. The following individuals have served in the capacity of Permanent Representative:

Permanent Representatives:	Period
General McNaughton	January 48 – December 49
(Acting) J.W. Holmes	January 50 – June 50
R.G. Riddell	June 50 – June 51
David M. Johnson	November 51 – August 55
R.A. MacKay	August 55 – November 57
C.S.A. Ritchie	January 58 – February 62
P. Tremblay	July 62 – June 66
G. Ignatieff	July 66 – February 69
Yvon Beaulne	February 69 – June 72
Saul F. Rae	July 72 – July 76
William H. Barton	August 76 –

THE CANADIAN DELEGATION TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

The delegation of a Member shall consist of not more than five representatives, and as many advisers, technical advisers, experts and persons of similar status as may be required by the delegation (Rule 25 of the General Assembly Rules of Procedure).

An alternate representative may act as a representative upon designation by the Chairman of the delegation (Rule 26 of the General Assembly Rules of Procedure).

In practice, no distinction is made between a delegate and alternate delegate (representative).

The Canadian delegation to any session of the United Nations General Assembly is appointed by Cabinet upon the recommendation of the Secretary of State for External Affairs. Normally, the delegation will consist of ten members: five representatives and five alternates. The chairman of the delegation is usually the SSEA and the vice-chairman the Canadian Permanent Representative to the United Nations. Individual members of the delegation are assigned responsibilities for one or other of the seven main committees. Invariably, the SSEA will return to Ottawa for protracted periods in the course of the session, during which time direction of the delegation devolves upon the vice-chairman.

In addition to the delegates themselves, a number of advisers are named, at least one for each of the seven main committees. The Permanent Mission in New York and the Bureau of United Nations Affairs in Ottawa provide most of the advisers assigned to the delegation but officers from other missions, other divisions in Ottawa, and other government departments may also be appointed (often for short periods to cope with specific agenda items).

OBSERVERS ON THE CANADIAN DELEGATION

For a number of years, it has been the practice of the Canadian Government to appoint representatives from the various national political parties as parliamentary observers to sessions of the General Assembly. Senators and Members of Parliament have been selected in rough accordance with the number of seats held by each party in the respective legislative chambers.

On occasion, private citizens with a professional concern for United Nations affairs have also been appointed as observers in one or another capacity.

It is believed that as an individual becomes more aware of the potentialities and limitations of the United Nations system, so his ability to identify and evaluate possible courses of action for the resolution of international problems is enhanced. Also, while most Parliamentarians will be familiar with the problems under discussion in the United Nations, experience as an observer may contribute to a deeper understanding of specific issues troubling the world community and the way in which these issues can affect Canada.

THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

MEMBERSHIP

The General Assembly is composed of all 147 member states of the United Nations, each of which is entitled to have five representatives seated in the Assembly Chamber.

Member states

	Date of admission to the UN		Date of admission to the UN
Afghanistan	19/11/46	* Ecuador	
Albania	14/12/55	Egypt	24/10/45
Algeria	8/10/62	* El Salvador	
Angola	1/12/76	Equatorial Guinea	12/11/68
* Argentina		* Ethiopia	
* Australia		Fiji	13/10/70
Austria	14/12/55	Finland	14/12/55
Bahamas	18/9/73	* France	
Bahrain	21/9/71	Gabon	20/9/60
Bangladesh	17/9/74	Gambia	21/9/65
Barbados	9/12/66	German Democratic Republic	18/9/73
* Belgium		Germany, Federal Republic of	18/9/73
Benin	20/9/66	Ghana	8/3/57
Bhutan	21/9/71	* Greece	
* Bolivia		Grenada	17/9/74
Botswana	17/10/66	* Guatemala	
* Brazil		Guinea	12/12/58
Bulgaria	14/12/55	Guinea-Bissau	17/9/74
Burma	19/4/48	Guyana	20/9/66
Burundi	18/9/72		
* Byelorussian S.S.R.		* Haiti	
* Canada		* Honduras	
Cape Verde	16/9/75	Hungary	14/12/55
Central African Republic	20/9/60	Iceland	19/11/46
Chad	20/9/60	* India	
* Chile		Indonesia	28/9/50
* China		* Iran	
* Colombia		* Iraq	
Comoros	12/11/75	Ireland	14/12/55
Congo	20/9/60	Israel	11/5/49
* Costa Rica		Italy	14/12/55
* Cuba		Ivory Coast	20/9/60
Cyprus	20/9/60		
* Czechoslovakia		Jamaica	18/9/62
Democratic Kampuchea	14/12/55	Japan	18/12/56
Democratic Yemen	14/12/55	Jordan	14/12/55
* Denmark		Kenya	16/8/63
* Dominican Republic		Kuwait	14/4/63

* Original members, e.g. members which participated in the United Nations Conference on International Organization in San Francisco in 1945 or had previously signed the United Nations Declaration of January 1, 1942, and which signed and ratified the Charter on June 26, 1945.

Member states

	Date of admission to the UN		Date of admission to the UN
Lao People's Democratic Republic	14/12/55	Spain	14/12/55
* Lebanon		Sri Lanka	14/12/55
Lesotho	17/10/70	Sudan	12/11/56
* Liberia		Surinam	4/12/75
Libyan Arab Republic	14/12/55	Swaziland	24/9/58
* Luxembourg		Sweden	19/11/46
		* Syrian Arab Republic	
Madagascar	20/9/60		
Malawi	1/12/64	Thailand	16/12/46
Malaysia	17/9/57	Togo	20/9/60
Maldives	21/9/65	Trinidad and Tobago	18/9/62
Mali	28/9/60	Tunisia	12/11/56
Malta	1/12/64	* Turkey	
Mauritania	27/10/61		
Mauritius	24/4/68	Uganda	19/10/62
* Mexico		* Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic	
Mongolia	27/10/61	* Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	
Morocco	12/11/56	United Arab Emirates	9/12/72
Mozambique	16/9/75	* United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	
		United Republic of Cameroon	20/9/60
Nepal	14/12/55	* United Republic of Tanzania	
* Netherlands		* United States of America	
* New Zealand		Upper Volta	20/9/60
* Nicaragua		* Uruguay	
Niger	20/9/60		
Nigeria	7/10/60	* Venezuela	
* Norway			
		Yemen	30/9/47
Oman	30/9/71	* Yugoslavia	
Pakistan	30/9/60	Zaire	39/9/60
* Panama		Zambia	1/12/64
Papua New Guinea	10/10/75		
* Paraguay			
* Peru			
* Philippines			
* Poland			
Portugal	14/12/55		
Qatar	21/9/71		
Romania	14/12/55		
Rwanda	18/9/62		
Samoa	15/12/76		
Sao Tome and Principe	16/9/75		
* Saudi Arabia			
Senegal	28/9/60		
Seychelles	21/9/76		
Sierra Leone	27/9/61		
Singapore	21/9/65		
Somalia	20/9/60		
* South Africa			

Observers

Observer status is not provided for in the UN Charter. Over the years, however, the Secretary-General has granted such a status to non-member states which have had some form of association with the UN system, e.g. membership in the Specialized Agencies. Seven countries currently maintain observer missions in New York: Switzerland, Monaco, the Holy See, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Through special resolutions, the General Assembly has also granted observer status to six associations of states: the OAS, the Arab League, the OAU, the EEC, the COMECON and the Islamic Conference. The Palestine Liberation Organization was also granted observer status by the General Assembly in 1974. At the thirty-first session, the General Assembly agreed to the application of the Commonwealth Secretariat for observer status, which Canada co-sponsored. Observer status was also granted to the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO).

UNITED NATIONS GROUPINGS

Regional groups*

PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Britain	France	United States
China	U.S.S.R.	

WESTERN EUROPE (and other States)**

Australia	Greece	New Zealand
Austria	Iceland	Norway
Belgium	Ireland	Portugal
Canada	Italy	Spain
Denmark	Luxembourg	Sweden
Finland	Malta	Turkey
Germany, Federal Republic of	Netherlands	

EASTERN EUROPE

Albania	German Democratic Republic	Ukrainian S.S.R.
Bulgaria	Hungary	Yugoslavia
Byelorussian S.S.R.	Poland	
Czechoslovakia	Romania	

AFRICA AND ASIA

AFRICA

Algeria	Botswana	Central African Republic
Angola	Burundi	Chad
Benin	Cape Verde	Comoros

* These groups are unofficial and have been established to take account of the purposes of resolutions 1990 and 1991 of the XVIIIth session of the General Assembly.

** France and Britain are members of the WEO group but the United States does not participate. In regional meetings of various committees, particularly the Second and Fifth Committee, both the U.S. and Japan attend WEO meetings. For electoral purposes to subsidiary bodies (mostly economic and social) observers are considered part of WEO group and occupy seats allocated to WEO.

AFRICA AND ASIA

AFRICA (continued)

Congo	Madagascar	Sierra Leone
Egypt	Malawi	Somalia
Ethiopia	Mali	South Africa
Equatorial Guinea	Mauritania	Sudan
Gabon	Mauritius	Swaziland
Gambia	Morocco	Togo
Ghana	Mozambique	Tunisia
Guinea	Niger	Uganda
Guinea-Bissau	Nigeria	United Republic of Cameroon
Ivory Coast	Rwanda	United Republic of Tanzania
Kenya	Sao Tome and Principe	Upper Volta
Lesotho	Senegal	Zaire
Liberia	Seychelles	Zambia
Libya		

ASIA

Afghanistan	Israel	Papua New Guinea
Bahrain	Japan	Philippines
Bangladesh	Jordan	Qatar
Burma	Kuwait	Samoa
Bhutan	Lao People's Democratic Republic	Saudi Arabia
Cyprus	Lebanon	Singapore
Democratic Kampuchea	Malaysia	Sri Lanka
Democratic Yemen	Maldives	Syrian Arab Republic
Fiji	Mongolia	Thailand
India	Nepal	United Arab Emirates
Indonesia	Oman	Yemen
Iran	Pakistan	
Iraq		

LATIN AMERICA

Argentina	Dominican Republic	Mexico
Bahamas	Ecuador	Nicaragua
Barbados	El Salvador	Panama
Bolivia	Guatemala	Paraguay
Brazil	Grenada	Peru
Chile	Guyana	Surinam
Colombia	Haiti	Trinidad and Tobago
Costa Rica	Honduras	Uruguay
Cuba	Jamaica	Venezuela

Non-aligned countries

The following participated at the Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries held in Colombo, Sri Lanka in August 1976:

Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Botswana, Burma, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic Kampuchea, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Korea (Democratic People's Republic of), Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Republic, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, PLO, Panama, Peru, Qatar, Republic of Maldives, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sao Tome and Principe, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tanzania, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Upper Volta, Vietnam (Socialist Republic of), Yemen Arab Republic, Yemen (PDR), Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Observers:

Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Mexico, Uruguay, Venezuela, South Africa (ANC and PAC), Namibia (SWAPO), Djibouti (FLCS and MLD), Puerto Rico (Socialist Party of), United Nations Organization, OAU, Arab League, Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization, Islamic Conference, Zimbabwe (ANC).

Guests:

Austria, Finland, Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland.

The Conference granted a special status to Belize, including the right to address the summit.

Commonwealth countries

Australia (1901)*, Bahamas (1973), Bangladesh (1972), Barbados (1966), Botswana (1966), Britain, Canada (1867), Cyprus (1961), Fiji (1970), Gambia (1965), Ghana (1957), Grenada (1974), Guyana (1966), India (1947), Jamaica (1962), Kenya (1963), Lesotho (1966), Malawi (1964), Malaysia (1957), Malta (1964), Mauritius (1968), Nauru (1968)**, New Zealand (1907), Nigeria (1960), Papua-New Guinea (1975), Seychelles (1976), Sierra Leone (1961), Singapore (1965), Sri Lanka (1948), Swaziland (1968), Tanzania (1961), Tonga (1970), Trinidad and Tobago (1962), Uganda (1962), Western Samoa (1970), Zambia (1964).

* *Date of membership*

** *Nauru is an associated member of the Commonwealth.*

"Group of 77"


Below are listed those generally considered to be members of the "Group of 77" including those governments which signed the Joint Declaration of Developing Countries at the conclusion of the First United Nations Conference on Trade and Development held in Geneva in 1964:


Afghanistan*, Algeria*, Angola, Argentina*, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia*, Botswana, Brazil*, Burma*, Burundi*, Cameroon*, Cape Verde, Central African Republic*, Chad*, Chile*, Colombia*, Comoros, Congo*, Costa Rica*, Cuba, Cyprus*, Democratic Kampuchea, Dominican Republic*, Ecuador*, Egypt*, El Salvador*, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia*, Fiji, Gabon*, Gambia, Ghana*, Grenada, Guatemala*, Guinea*, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti*, Honduras*, India*, Indonesia*, Iran*, Iraq*, Ivory Coast, Jamaica*, Jordan*, Kenya*, Kuwait*, Laos*, Lebanon*, Lesotho, Liberia*, Libyan Arab Republic*, Madagascar*, Malawi, Malaysia*, Maldives, Mali*, Malta, Mauritania*, Mauritius, Mexico*, Morocco*, Mozambique, Nepal*, Nicaragua*, Niger*, Nigeria*, Oman, Pakistan*, Panama*, Paraguay*, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Peru*, Philippines*, PLO, Qatar, Republic of Korea*, Romania, Rwanda*, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia*, Senegal*, Seychelles, Sierra Leone*, Singapore, Somalia*, Sudan*, Sri Lanka*, Syrian Arab Republic*, Swaziland, Thailand*, Togo*, Trinidad and Tobago*, Tunisia*, Uganda*, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania*, Upper Volta*, Uruguay*, Venezuela*, Vietnam (Socialist Republic of)*, Yemen*, Yugoslavia*, Zaire*, Zambia.

* Original signers of the Declaration

** There are now 112 developing countries in the "Group of 77" whose name arose from the fact that 77 Governments signed the Declaration.

THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM





* Indicates that Canada is a member of the Governing Council or Board.

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Its function

The General Assembly is the plenary organ of the United Nations and comprises representatives of all member countries.

The Assembly's formal functions are:

To consider and make recommendations on the principles of international co-operation in the maintenance of peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments;

To discuss any problem affecting peace and security and, except where a dispute or situation is currently being discussed by the Security Council, to make recommendations on it;

To discuss and, with the same exception, to make recommendations on any question within the scope of the Charter or affecting the powers and functions of any organ of the United Nations;

To initiate studies and make recommendations to promote international political co-operation, the development of international law and its codification, the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, and international collaboration in economic, social, cultural, educational and health fields;

To receive and consider reports from the Security Council and other organs of the United Nations;

To make recommendations for the peaceful settlement of any situations regardless of origin, which might impair friendly relations among nations;

To supervise, through the Trusteeship Council, the execution of the trusteeship agreements for all areas not designated as strategic;

To elect the ten non-permanent members of the Security Council, those members of the Trusteeship Council that are elected; to take part with the Security Council in the election of judges of the International Court of Justice; and, on the recommendation of the Security Council, to appoint the Secretary-General; to elect members of the Economic and Social Council. At present, the Council comprises 54 members.

The President of the General Assembly

The General Assembly is presided over by the President, who is elected at the start of each session and holds office until its close. His general powers are to declare the opening and closing of each plenary meeting of the session, direct discussions in plenary meeting, ensure observance of the rules, accord the right to speak, put questions and announce decisions. In the election of the President, due regard is had for equitable geographical rotation of the office.*

The Vice-Presidents of the General Assembly

The General Assembly also elects seventeen Vice-Presidents. If the President finds it necessary to be absent during the whole or part of a meeting, he appoints one of the Vice-Presidents to take his place.

In 1963, the General Assembly decided that the Vice-Presidents would be elected according to the following pattern:

- (a) Seven from the Afro-Asian group
- (b) One from the East European group
- (c) Three from the Latin American group
- (d) Two from the Western European and Other Group (which includes Canada)
- (e) Five from the permanent members of the Security Council.

* The election of the President has the effect of reducing by one the number of Vice-Presidents from the region from which the President is elected.

The main committees

The General Assembly deals with most of its work through seven main committees on which all members have the right to be represented. Though each member may be represented by only one person on each committee, each may assign advisers and experts to these committees. Upon the designation of the chairman of each delegation, such advisers and experts may act as members of the committee. Quorum is one-quarter of the members of each committee, but the presence of a majority of the members is required for a question to be put to the vote. Decision is by majority.

(See Rules 98-134 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly)

The seven chairmen of the main committees are elected on the following pattern:

- (a) three from the Afro-Asian group
- (b) one from the East European group
- (c) one from the Latin American group
- (d) one from the Western European and Other Group
- (e) one to rotate every alternate year among representatives of groups (c) and (d).

The main committees are as follows:

FIRST COMMITTEE	– Political and Security Committee (including the regulation of armaments)
SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE	– Special Political Committee (political questions not discussed by the First Committee)
SECOND COMMITTEE	– Economic and Financial Committee
THIRD COMMITTEE	– Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Committee
FOURTH COMMITTEE	– Trusteeship Committee (including non-self governing territories)
FIFTH COMMITTEE	– Administrative and Budgetary Committee
SIXTH COMMITTEE	– Legal Committee

The General Assembly, as a rule, refers all questions on its agenda to one of the main committees, to a joint committee, or to an *ad hoc* committee established to consider the question. These committees then submit proposals for approval to a plenary meeting of the Assembly. Questions not referred to a main committee are dealt with by the Assembly itself in plenary meetings.

Other bodies

In addition to the main committees, the General Assembly is assisted mainly by the following bodies:

- (1) *The General Committee*, which is composed of the President, 17 Vice-Presidents of the Assembly, and the chairmen of the seven main committees, is a kind of steering group which meets during the first week of the session to recommend the inclusion of items in the agenda, the allocation of an agenda item to committee, and to supervise the smooth running of the Assembly's work.
- (2) *The Credentials Committee*, appointed by the President at each session, verifies the credentials of the representatives (both the U.S.S.R. and U.S.A. traditionally have been members).
- (3) *The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions* provides expert examination of the UN budget.
- (4) *The Committee on Contributions* advises the General Assembly on the apportionment of the expenses of the organization among the members.
- (5) *The Committee on Conferences* advises the General Assembly on the program of conference and acts on behalf of the General Assembly between sessions.

Subsidiary and *ad hoc* bodies are set up as necessary.

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY: ITS PRIMARY ORGANS

MAIN COMMITTEES

- FIRST COMMITTEE
- SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE
- SECOND COMMITTEE
- THIRD COMMITTEE
- FOURTH COMMITTEE
- FIFTH COMMITTEE
- SIXTH COMMITTEE

PROCEDURAL COMMITTEES

- GENERAL COMMITTEE
- CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

- ACABQ – ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND BUDGETARY QUESTIONS
- COMMITTEE ON CONTRIBUTIONS
- COMMITTEE ON CONFERENCES

Voting

Voting on *important questions*, such as recommendations on peace and security, election of members to the main organs, admission, suspension and expulsion of members, trusteeship questions and budgetary matters, is by two-thirds majority.

Voting on *other questions* is by simple majority.

Each member of the General Assembly has one vote.

In determining two-thirds or simple majorities, only "yes" and "no" votes are counted, not abstentions. However, in UN practice an abstention has come to be a respected and widely-used method of indicating a government's position on issues on which a variety of conflicting factors come into play and where a simple "yes" or "no" vote would not be an accurate reflection of the attitude of a government. Quite often explanations of a vote are made before or after the vote.

The General Assembly session

The General Assembly meets once a year in regular session for about three months, commencing on the third Tuesday in September. Special sessions may also be convened at the request of the Security Council, a majority of the UN members, or one member if the majority of members concur. An emergency special session may also be called within 24 hours of a request by the Security Council on the vote of any nine members of the Council, by a majority of the UN members, or by one member if the majority concur.

Sessions are opened by the President of the previous session (or the chairman of his country's delegation) and the first task on the agenda, after the appointment of the Credentials Committee, is the election of a new President for the next 12 months. The convention is firmly established that he should not be a representative of a great power. The President is elected by secret ballot, but normally private arrangements are made before the session opens to find a candidate for whom an impressive majority of the votes can be mustered.

The President's powers are limited, but able officials have done a good deal through their personal influence to smooth the work of a session and maintain the interests of the organization against the sectional pressures of the membership.

At the side of the new President will sit the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Under-Secretary General for Assembly Affairs who, in his capacity as Secretary of the General Assembly, will act as would a parliamentary clerk to the Speaker of the House of Commons.

Following the election of Vice-Presidents and committee chairmen (which are the next items on the agenda), the Secretary-General proceeds to "notify" the General Assembly of "any matters relative to the maintenance of international peace and security which are being dealt with by the Security Council".

After the adoption of the agenda itself, there follows the general debate. This "debate" will often last more than three weeks, and it is the occasion for nearly all member states to present the principle policy objectives of their governments in the form of a *tour d'horizon* of significant world affairs.

The general debate is followed by reports from the Secretary-General, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). These are followed in turn by the elections of members to various UN councils, boards and commissions whenever such elections are due.

All the remaining agenda items are related to specific issues. Some have become very familiar over the years, and are carried over from one year to the next. Others evidence the UN's continuing concern for tackling current problems and are added to the agenda at the request of the Secretary-General, a principal organ of the UN, or a member state.

The Security Council

The Security Council is the main UN organ responsible for enforcement of peace and security. It is composed of 15 members; five of them are permanent members each with a veto power. The ten non-permanent members are elected for a term of two years and, according to the Charter, the criteria for election are based on "due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution".

Canada was a member of the Security Council in 1948-49, 1958-59 and 1967-68. Canada was elected once again to the Council for 1977 and 1978 at the elections held during the thirty-first UN General Assembly. The membership picture for the next biennium, so far as it can be determined now, is as follows:

	1977	1978
Permanent members	USA USSR Britain France China	USA USSR Britain France China
Africa	Benin Mauritius Libya	— Mauritius —
Asia	Pakistan India	— India
Latin America	Panama Venezuela	— Venezuela
Western Europe and others	Canada West Germany	Canada West Germany
Eastern Europeans	Romania	—

LIST OF SENIOR OFFICIALS OF SPECIAL BODIES AND SPECIALIZED AGENCIES

Waldheim, Kurt (Austria)	Secretary-General of the UN
Equivalent ranks — special bodies of the United Nations	
Corea, Gamani (Sri Lanka)	Secretary-General of Conference on Trade and Development
Labouisse, Henry R. (U.S.A.)	Executive Director of UNICEF
Khan, Prince Sadruddin Aga (Iran)	High Commissioner for Refugees
Rennie, Sir John (Britain)	Commissioner General for UNRWA
Morse, Bradford (U.S.A.)	Administrator of UNDP
Nicol, Davidson (Sierra Leone)	Executive Director for UNITAR
Khane, Abderrahmane (Algeria)	Executive Director for UNIDO
Tolba, Dr. Mostafa (Egypt)	Executive Director, United Nations Environment Program

Specialized Agencies, IAEA and GATT

Blanchard, Francis (France)	Director-General of ILO
Saouma, Edouard (Lebanon)	Director-General of FAO
M'Bow, Amadou M. (Senegal)	Director-General of UNESCO
Mahler, Halfdan (Denmark)	Director-General of WHO
McNamara Robt. S. (U.S.A.)	President of IBRD and IFC
Witteveen, H. Johannes (Netherlands)	Chairman of the Executive Board and Managing Director of IMF
Lambert, Mr. Yves (France)	Secretary-General of ICAO
Sobhi, Mohamed Ibrahim (Egypt)	Director-General of UPU
Mili, Mohamed (Tunisia)	Secretary-General of ITU
Davies, David A. (Britain)	Secretary-General of WMO
Srivastava, C.P. (India)	Secretary-General of IMCO
Bogsch, Arpad (U.S.A.)	Director-General of WIPO

IAEA

The statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) entered into force on July 29, 1957. It is not a Specialized Agency, but is an independent intergovernmental organization under the aegis of the United Nations. The purpose of the Agency, as defined in its statute, is "to seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health, and prosperity throughout the world". Its Director-General is Sigvard Eklund (Sweden).

GATT

Formally, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is an interim step on the road to a more comprehensive International Trade Organization. In practice, however, it has existed for almost 30 years as a virtually autonomous body, administered by separate secretariat and governed by the contracting parties to the Agreement, of which Canada is one. At present, 84 states are members of the GATT and major multilateral trade negotiations have traditionally taken place under its auspices. Its Director-General is Olivier Long (Switzerland).

CANADA IN THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

CANADA'S POLICIES AND GOALS IN THE UNITED NATIONS

As the activities of the UN touch many if not all of Canada's national objectives and policies, Canada regards the UN as an important instrument in trying to achieve these objectives and policies in their international context. Since the foreign policy review, Canadian activities in the UN system have emphasized the themes of economic growth, social justice, quality of life and peace and security.

Central to the Canadian approach is the belief that Canada should actively work to help make the UN an effective means of developing international co-operation. Equally, Canada thinks it important to help improve the capacity of the UN to carry out its Charter responsibilities.

Within the UN, Canada has focused on the following objectives, a detailed description of which is found in *Foreign Policy for Canadians: United Nations* (published in 1970):

- (1) contributing to social and economic development;
- (2) working to stop the arms race;
- (3) promoting peacekeeping and peace-making through the United Nations;
- (4) reconciling Canadian objectives in Southern Africa;
- (5) taking measures to prevent further deterioration in the human environment;
- (6) promoting international co-operation in the peaceful uses of satellite systems;
- (7) promoting international co-operation in the use of the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction;
- (8) promoting observance of human rights, including adherence to and respect for various UN conventions;
- (9) contributing to the progressive development and codification of international law;
- (10) projecting Canada as a bilingual country within the United Nations context;
- (11) contributing to the institutional development of the UN as a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations.

Since these objectives were formulated, progress has been made towards achieving many of them, and Canadian goals have become more clearly defined with respect, for example, to the achievement of racial equality in Southern Africa and the negotiations for a revised law of the sea.

CANADA'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM – 1960-1976

Year*	Canada's contribution to UN regular budget (\$000 Cdn)	Percent assessment
1960	1,536	3.11
1961	1,860	3.11
1962	2,181	3.12
1963	2,356	3.12
1964	3,115	3.12
1965	2,774	3.17
1966	3,481	3.17
1967	3,588	3.17
1968	3,795	3.02
1969	4,049	3.02
1970	4,557	3.02
1971	4,891	3.08
1972	5,490	3.08
1973	5,770	3.08
1974	7,169	3.18
1975	8,838	3.18
1976	9,856	3.18
1977	9,593	2.96

* Fiscal year ends on March 31.

Regular budget of the United Nations

The thirtieth session of the General Assembly voted appropriation totalling \$745,813,000 (U.S.) for the biennial fiscal period 1976-1977. The anticipated income for the biennium, apart from member country contributions, is \$118,292,000 (U.S.). The General Assembly assessed member states an amount totalling \$338,035,100 (U.S.) to finance expenses to be incurred during 1977.

Scale of assessment for the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations

The new scale of assessments for 1977 results from a decision taken at the thirty-first General Assembly to adopt a new scale for one year only, during which time a review of criteria for payment would take place, and a new scale would be drawn up with the minimum assessment reduced to .01 per cent. The scale of assessments of the member states' contributions to the UN budget for the financial year are as follows (listed in order of magnitude):

U.S.A.	25.00 per cent
U.S.S.R.	11.33 per cent
Japan	8.66 per cent
Federal Republic of Germany	7.74 per cent
France	5.66 per cent
China	5.50 per cent
Britain	4.44 per cent
Italy	3.30 per cent
Canada	2.96 per cent
10 member states	1.00 to 2.00 per cent each
41 member states	0.03 to 1.00 per cent each
81 member states	0.02 (floor)

Agencies related to the United Nations

		1976 Budget (\$U.S.)	Canada's assessment (per cent)	Approx. No. of Staff
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency * Vienna	37,002,000	3.29	1,000
ILO	International Labour Organization * Geneva	90,603,000	3.36	3,000
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization * Rome	87,174,000	4.05	6,000
UNESCO	United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization * Paris	104,144,000	3.15	3,500
WHO	World Health Organization * Geneva	153,436,000	2.67	5,000

		1976 Budget (\$U.S.)	Canada's assessment (per cent)	Approx. no. of staff
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development * Washington, D.C.	185,500,000**		4,350
IFC	International Finance Corporation * Washington, D.C.	11,600,000**		236
IDA	International Development Association * Washington, D.C.	(Same officers and staff as IBRD)		
IMF	International Monetary Fund * Washington, D.C.	52,100,000**		1,500
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization * Montreal	18,101,000	3.31	900
UPU	Universal Postal Union * Bern	5,287,000	2.46	200
ITU	International Telecommuni- cation Union * Geneva	23,695,000	4.32	850
WMO	World Meteorological Organization * Geneva	11,304,000	2.56	350
IMCO	Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization * London	4,648,000	.89	150
GATT	General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade * Geneva	13,678,160**		200
WIPO	World Intellectual Property Organization * Geneva	7,591,000	4.35	185

* Headquarters location

** Budget for FY 1975-76.

Canada's financial contributions to the United Nations system (\$000 Canadian)*

	Financial Year ending March 31/76	Financial Year ending March 31/75	Total 1945-1976
A. UN regular budget	9,856	8,838	91,857
B. Peacekeeping			
UNFICYP	1,930	3,853	27,812
UNEF II	4,620	2,803	8,377
C. Social and economic programs			
UNDP	24,500	22,200	161,071
UNHCR	600	550	39,332
UNICEF	3,500	2,500	33,875
UNRWA**	1,350	1,150	32,753
UNITAR	60	60	660
UNETPSA	175	175	649
WFP**	10,000	3,739	141,252
UNFPA	3,500	2,500	13,052
Committee on Racial Discrimination	3	2	13
Trust Fund for South Africa	10	10	60
Fund for Drug Abuse Control	200	200	950
UN Voluntary Fund for Environment	—	—	1,004
D. Specialized Agencies and IAEA			
ILO	2,761	1,497	19,567
FAO	3,321	2,141	25,678
WHO	3,676	1,395	33,149
UNESCO	2,491	2,690	22,617
ICAO	443	424	6,599
IMCO	42	27	299
ITU	690	503	4,791
WMO	243	178	1,389
UPU	130	132	1,006
IAEA (Regular and operational budgets)	1,155	881	7,220
GATT	651	557	3,898
WIPO	117	141	258
E. UN Association in Canada	35	35	470

* Canada ranks as sixth- to eighth-largest contributor to the budget of the United Nations and its related agencies.

** Contributions to UNRWA and the World Food Program include only the cash portion of the Canadian donation. There are also contributions in kind, consisting primarily of food grains.

Canadian participation in the United Nations and its system of organizations

1. On January 1, 1977, Canada became a member of the Security Council for the fourth time. The present term expires on December 31, 1978.

By virtue of this seat, Canada has become a member of the following Security Council bodies:

Committee of Experts on Rules of Procedure
Committee on the Admission of New Members
Committee on Southern Rhodesia

2. *As a member of the United Nations, Canada is, of course, represented at each session of the United Nations General Assembly, including the seven main committees:*

First Committee (political and security)
Special Political Committee (political questions not discussed by First Committee)
Second Committee (economic and financial)
Third Committee (social, humanitarian and cultural)
Fourth Committee (trusteeship, including non-self-governing territories)
Fifth Committee (administrative and budgetary)
Sixth Committee (legal)

3. *Canada participates in the following subsidiary or ad hoc bodies of the United Nations General Assembly:*

Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (Committee of 33)
Special Committee on the Financial Situation of the United Nations
Special Committee on Relations with the Host Country
Board of Auditors
Committee on Conferences
Committee on Contributions
Collective Measures Committee (has not functioned in recent years)
Disarmament Commission
United Nations Scientific Advisory Committee
UNSCEAR – United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation
Advisory Committee for the United Nations Memorial Cemetery in Korea
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD)
Ad Hoc Committee on Extra-Budgetary Funds
Special Committee on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States
Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction
Advisory Committee on the United Nations Educational and Training Program for Southern Africa

4. *Canada contributes personnel to the following peacekeeping operations established by the Security Council:*

UNMOGIP – United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNTSO – United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
UNFICYP – United Nations Force in Cyprus
UNEF – United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East
UNDOF – United Nations Desengagement Force in the Middle East

5. *Until the end of 1977, Canada is a member of ECOSOC (the Economic and Social Council and of the following ECOSOC bodies:*

A. Functional Commissions –

Statistical Commission
Commission on Human Rights
Commission on Narcotic Drugs
Commission of the Status of Women
Commission on Trans-National Corporations

B. Regional Commissions –

ECLA – Economic Commission for Latin America
ECE – Economic Commission for Europe

C. Standing Committee –

Advisory Committee on Application of Science and Technology to Development (ACAST)
Committee on Survey Program for the Development of Natural Resources
Member of the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Program for Refugees
The Committee on Science and Technology for Development
The Committee on Review and Appraisal
The Committee on Natural Resources
The Committee on Housing, Building and Planning
The Human Rights Committee

6. *Canada is a member of the following special bodies:*

UNICEF – United Nations Children's Fund (member of the Executive Board)
UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNCTAD – United Nations Conference on Trade and Development including:
The Trade and Development Board
The Committee on Manufactures
The Committee on Invisibles and Financing Relating to Trade
Committee on Shipping
The Committee on Commodities
Committee on the Transfer of Technology
UNDP – United Nations Development Program
UNEP – United Nations Environment Program (member of Governing Council)
UNIDO – United Nations Industrial Development Organization

7. *Canada is a member of the following Specialized Agencies and intergovernmental organizations:*

IAEA – International Atomic Energy Association (member of Board of Governors)
GATT – General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade
Asian Development Bank (non-regional member)
Inter-American Development Bank
ILO – International Labour Organization (member of the Governing Body)
FAO – Food and Agriculture Organization (member of the Council)
United Nations FAO/World Food Program – WFP (member of the Council)
UNESCO – United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (member of the Executive Board)
WHO – World Health Organization (member of the Executive Board)
IBRD – International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (member of the Board of Governors)
IFC – International Finance Corporation (member of the Board of Governors)
IDA – International Development Association (member of the Board of Governors)
IMF – International Monetary Fund (member of the Board of Governors)
ICAO – International Civil Aviation Organization (member of the Council)
UPU – Universal Postal Union (member of Executive Council)
ITU – International Telecommunication Union (member of Administrative Council)
WMO – World Meteorological Organization (member of Executive Committee)
IMCO – Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization
WIPO – World Intellectual Property Organization

Acronyms and Short Forms

AECL	– Atomic Energy of Canada Limited
ACABQ	– Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions
ACC	– Administrative Committee on Co-ordination
Committee of 24	– Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples
CCD	– Conference of the Committee on Disarmament
CIDA	– Canadian International Development Agency
EEC	– European Economic Community
ECA	– Economic Commission for Africa
ECE	– Economic Commission for Europe
ECLA	– Economic Commission for Latin America
ECOSOC	– Economic and Social Council
ECWA	– Economic Commission for Western Asia
EDC	– Export Development Corporation
ESCAP	– Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
FAO	– Food and Agriculture Organization
GATT	– General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
IAEA	– International Atomic Energy Agency
IBRD	– International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICAO	– International Civil Aviation Organization
IDA	– International Development Association
ILO	– International Labour Organization
IMCO	– Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization
IMF	– International Monetary Fund
ITU	– International Telecommunication Union
NATO	– North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OAS	– Organization of American States
OUA	– Organization of African Unity
OECD	– Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
PLO	– Palestine Liberation Organization
UNCITRAL	– UN Commission on International Trade Law
UNCTAD	– UN Conference on Trade and Development
UNDOF	– UN Disengagement Observer Force
UNDP	– UN Development Program
UNEF	– UN Emergency Force
UNEP	– UN Environment Program
UNESCO	– UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFICYP	– UN Force in Cyprus
UNHCR	– Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	– UN Children's Fund
UNIDO	– UN Industrial Development Organization
UNITAR	– UN Institute for Training and Research
UNRWA	– UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
UNSCEAR	– UN Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation
UPU	– Universal Postal Union
WFP	– World Food Program
WHO	– World Health Organization
WIPO	– World Intellectual Property Organization
WMO	– World Meteorological Organization

LIBRARY E A / BIBLIOTHÈQUE A E



3 5036 01029228 5

Storage

CA1 EA71 C16 ENG

1977

Canada at the ... regular session
of the United Nations General
Assembly. --

43277023

