






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

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
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His Excellency ^{For 2/6} The Earl of Durham.

THE
RESOURCES
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PHYSICAL AND MORAL MEANS,

Which Great Britain and her Colonial Authorities will successfully employ in securing those valuable Provinces from open invasion and insidious aggression, on the part of the Government of the United States of America.

BY A QUERIST.

Tisi perpetuâ pace frui liceret, hisi hostes opportuni et scelestissimi.—Frag. Sallast,

Mihi quidem quæ meas suppetit, eloqui non dubitabo. Ceterum tui erit logenli probare, quæ vera, atque utilia factu putes.—Id.

QUEBEC:

PRINTED AT THE NEW PRINTING OFFICE, No. 19, BUADE STREET.

1813.

ADVERTISEMENT.

THE following papers were begun at a moment, when a considerable degree of alarm prevailed, particularly among the timid and least informed part of our population. The very din of preparation is sufficient to confound weak minds; and those means which are employed to insure their safety have the immediate effect of increasing their alarm.

It appeared to the author that something might be done to quiet those apprehensions, which often become contagious; and he resolved to employ, for that purpose, the share of leisure and information which he possessed. He is not vain enough to imagine that any of his writings should, from intrinsic merit, have a powerful influence on the public mind; but the tone of confidence, in which he began, was so happily sanctioned by the brilliant events of the last campaign, that his Sketches seem gradually to have acquired some interest, from the association of ideas; and he conceives, that it would not be presumptuous in him to hope that, having thus obtained an adventitious attraction, they were favored with some degree of attention.

But the advantage of appearing in a Gazette surrounded by General Orders, Military Dispatches and "the pomp and circumstance of war," seemed more than counterbalanced by being thus exhibited to the public at different times and in scattered fragments. As a temporary reparation of the evil, the author designed his General Recapitulation; but he was fully aware that justice to his subject, to the public and to himself, required that the different Numbers should be collected and brought forward, in one view, for the favorable consideration of all who may interest themselves in such speculations. Though extensive utility was his aim, he does not expect a great number of readers, and he only hopes that the discerning few, will devote a short time to the perusal of his lucubrations.

Whatever may be the fate of this publication, the author will ever claim some consideration for his good intention; and if any one is inclined to depreciate his performance, he is only disposed, in perfect good humour, to invite that person, to favor his fellow subjects with something more worthy of their notice, and better adapted to the circumstances of the times. None will ever be found more eager to receive instruction, nor more ready to praise his instructor, than the **QUERIST**.

MONTREAL, 16th APRIL, 1813.

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N^o I.

INTRODUCTION.

MONTREAL, 12th AUGUST, 1812.

AT the present moment, when our Country is menaced with invasion, every thinking man reflects with solicitude on our means of defence, and eagerly seizes every idea of strength and resistance, which the circumstances of the Canadas suggest. After meditating on the subject, he naturally wishes to talk it over with his friends, and lastly to communicate his thoughts to the public.

This inclination is laudable, and, in a certain degree, ought to be indulged; for, though an eagerness to appear in print may bring forward much useless matter or impertinent remark, it will, at least, have the effect of exciting a spirit of enquiry, into a subject particularly interesting to the community. Better informed writers may be expected to succeed those who first led the way, to avoid the errors incident to first attempts, supply their deficiencies, and thus gradually enlighten and rectify public opinion.

At the first appearance of difficulty and danger, the people are subject to alarm; they look anxiously around for information and direction, from their superiors in station, experience or knowledge: let them not be disappointed, nor let such information and direction be confined to verbal remark; the press is assuredly a fit and approved medium of instruction. It may be said that the bulk of the community cannot read, and that the influence of the press, particularly in the Lower Province, is comparatively insignificant. But even the most ignorant inhabitants can hear; and I will venture to affirm that, if half the pains had been taken to read good, that have been too often taken to read bad publications to them, the effects of their loyalty, zeal and docility would have overawed our enemies, and almost prevented the threat of invasion, so hurtful to a Country, beginning to advance in the arts of peace.

The people err, for lack of knowledge; for to what but ignorance could we charitably ascribe the many difficulties, which we have recently experienced, in improving and executing our Militia Laws? It is not, however, my inclination to reproach any class of my fellow-subjects, for want of foresight and preparation:—the most prudent and wary have, in some measure, been taken by surprise, and

experience all the inconveniencies of an unexpected emergency, arising from the insanity of an unprincipled foe,—an emergency which ought to call forth the exertions, bodily and mental, of all to whom life, property, and kindred are dear.

In such circumstances, I deem it my duty to offer to the public the imperfect ideas, which my reflection upon the Resources of the Canadas has produced, and thus to contribute my mite to the common stock.

For the sake of perspicuity, it will be proper to subjoin the plan of my intended discussion. The succeeding Numbers will contain observations upon the following or upon similar topics.

The powerful protection of Great Britain,—her inexhaustible means of carrying on a defensive war in the Canadas, and retaliating, on the coast of the United States, any enormities committed by that enemy here.

The internal resources of the Canadas, arising from the character of their population and institutions, their local situation and other circumstances.

The reputation and talents of our Governor General;—his extensive authority, in times of danger;—his knowledge of the Country and of the genius of its inhabitants;—and his sagacity, in selecting fit characters, to execute his designs.

The goodness of our cause, rendering us unanimous and strong against an enemy weakened by disunion.—A brief Recapitulation, and a few general remarks, adapted to the existing circumstances of the Country, will conclude the discussion.

N° II.

MONTREAL, 9th SEPTEMBER, 1812.

The powerful protection of Great Britain—her inexhaustible means of carrying on a defensive war in the Canadas, and retaliating, on the coast of the United States, any enormities committed by that enemy here.

So strong are the foundations, and so extensive the influence of British power, that the very name of Briton is a kind of title to respect, in every quarter of the globe; hence that peculiar dignity

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of character and nice sense of national honor in the people of Britain, which, in cases of emergency, have produced a wonderful energy and steadiness of conduct in supporting patriotic measures. No sooner are they convinced that the welfare and glory of their king and country are at stake, than they come forward, as one man, to pledge the last drop of their blood, the last guinea of their wealth, to uphold the common cause.

Those fixed characteristics of Britons, forced upon the attention of other nations, by a long train of events, influencing the whole civilized world, have induced all wise governments to pause and reflect, before an appeal to arms. *Experienced* nations have considered a long and painful preparation requisite for a contest with Britain: *well disciplined forces, by sea and land; well replenished magazines and arsenals; well ordered finances, not to mention powerful allies, have been thought absolutely necessary to cope with her.* It remained for the short-sighted government of the United States, to furnish to the world an instance of conduct diametrically opposite to such cautious policy, and to risk the ruin of their Country, by unprecedented folly. With a handful of men they have dared to invade a Province belonging to an Empire whose naval and military power has hitherto set every external force at defiance; whose fleets can, at the same time, bring every aid to its violated territories, and prevent any European ally of the United States from rendering them any material assistance. They have arrayed themselves against a power, that can sweep their commerce from the ocean; while they talk of supporting the contest by a revenue chiefly to be drawn from trade.

But we have too much at stake, to allow us to spend time in reprobating the folly and criticising the conduct of our opponents; weak and impolitic as they are, there is still a chance of their doing us infinite mischief, if we are not upon our guard; and if we can but manfully ward off the impending blow, we shall serve ourselves better, than by any revenge which we might eventually obtain.

In the present case, we are happily not reduced to conjecture; but we have facts and experience to strengthen our confidence in the most decisive measures of the Parent State for our assistance; and we are thus enabled to meet the exigencies of the Country with becoming spirit. Many of us have even a *personal* recollection of the circumstances of the former invasion. The same enemy, at that time, took the opportunity which the defenceless and unsettled condition of Canada afforded, in order to endeavour to surprise or starve us into submission; but, even with advantages physical, moral and political, which he would now look for in vain, he was driven from our soil with disgrace. The watchful guardians of the British Empire soon landed on our shores a powerful army, *preventing even the threat of invasion during the rest of the war.*

The inclination and the ability of Britain to support us are equally certain :—the protection of the Canadas will assuredly be considered a national object, by all parties, and will, of course, be promoted with unanimity and vigour, proportioned to its importance.

Let us therefore rely upon the combined efforts of the British navy and army, to render the present a short, though brilliant contest; let us view its progress with firmness, nor doubt its favorable end. Thank Heaven! no earthly power can impede the progress to our aid of her,

“ Whose march is o'er the mountain wave.”

Great Britain, in the present contest, will exert her physical force with far greater advantage than in the former American war. She then put not forth half her strength against her rebellious colonists; for the combined navies of France, Spain and Holland were superior to hers, and she could not reckon upon the safe arrival of troops and supplies. But *times are now changed*; and having little dread of capture, we may even, indulge the hope that every requisite exertion may be made upon this new theatre, without lessening her efforts in the cause of humanity and European independence, in the Peninsula. Out of her vast military establishment would hardly be missed the few additional thousands necessary to place us in a complete posture of defiance, and to prevent the further interruption of our progress, in wealth and colonial importance.

I shall conclude this number with expressing my confidence that we shall quickly receive a reinforcement of ten thousand regular troops, which will enable us to keep the field with fifty thousand men, well appointed, and supplied by a Commissariat and subsidiary departments, directed agreeably to systematic arrangements, resulting from the long experience of the Parent State.—We may farther expect the powerful influence of a strong fleet, and many diversions in our favor on the American coast, with various expedients worthy of Britain, and well calculated to give full employment to hypocritical democrats, who may soon bitterly curse the hour, when they vowed to march into Canada, in quest of *balm for their wounded honor*.

N° III.

MONTREAL, 23rd SEPTEMBER, 1812.

The internal resources of the Canadas, arising from the character of their population and institutions; their local situation and other circumstances.

In discussing this part of my subject, I shall begin with the

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French Canadians, the majority of our population; and I shall first observe, that, *with the usual discipline, they would form a most efficient regular force, and, that, with the smallest degree of tuition, they would become fit for partisan warfare.*

Their military spirit, so frequently signalised before their connection with Britain, has burst forth anew, on every return of danger; and that same devotion to King and Country, which animated the fathers to deeds of glory, cannot be found wanting in their sons. The genius, manners and employment of the French Canadian prepare him for the ready adoption of a military life. He is fond of movement, pomp and show; he subsists on little; and, when engaged in arduous pursuits, he submits, with admirable fortitude, to the greatest fatigue.

Thus, cheered by their social boat songs, the North-West Voyageurs have navigated the majestic Saint Lawrence, for ages, securing to their employers and to their Country the envied benefits of the Fur Trade. The philosophical observer, viewing these exertions of the French Canadians, naturally considers that, in military pursuits, such favorable habits and dispositions might be turned to the best advantage, by skilful leaders.

But, viewing the majority as engaged in husbandry, we may farther remark, that the cultivators of the soil have always been selected, in preference, to defend it. Men who practise the arts in towns, though, in fully peopled countries, often the readiest, are not the best materials for an army; and nations, like the Swiss, chiefly agricultural, have invariably produced, in proportion to their population, the greatest number of serviceable troops.

On such grounds, I ascribe to the French Canadians an aptitude for military enterprise; and know with much deference, beg leave to suggest, that, of the great body of their militia, it may, in no probable circumstances, be advantageous to incorporate more than one sixth, for co-operation with British troops, in *regular warfare*. Though forming my opinions from general views and observations alone, I will venture here to express my hopes, that our expected campaign may be planned, in such a manner, as to give a fair opportunity to a Canadian levy *en masse*, to distinguish itself, in partisan warfare. I should then anticipate many brilliant attempts on the part of our peasantry, employed to harrass the foe on his march,—to cut off his supplies, and finally thus to force him, half furnished and exhausted, to retire or fall before our regular army.

Extraordinary circumstances naturally produce corresponding characters; and we need fear no want of gallant leaders to the de-

fenders of their Country. I hope to behold some partisan leader, at the head of a band emulous of the fame of the Spanish Guerillas, sometimes on foot, sometimes mounted on hardy Canadian horses, ranging the Country, and harrassing at all points, the invading force,—one moment surprising an advanced guard,—the next falling on the baggage escort, and seizing the enemy's military chest,—a loss which he would keenly feel, and more heavily bewail than loss of honor, in the field.

I trust that I shall not be censured for such sanguine expectations from the services of a Canadiun levy *en masse*; for a similar force has often been the principal means of saving a country. Victory will eventually ever attend that side, to which the inhabitants of the theatre of the war may be favorable; and, in the present case, particularly, every rational and laudable motive stimulates the French Canadians to resist the invaders. They well know the honorable origin of Canadian population, which has likewise been ever uniformly distinguished for attachment to King and Country; and, in its gradual encrease, has received no external additions, of a doubtful character. The fact is, that the United States' Government have monopolised the importation of the outcasts of European society. Jefferson, *the incomparable statesman*, from fellow feeling, loved not only the treason but also *the traitors*; and, as the Irish rebels said, God bless his honor! he made *natives* of them all. How fortunate that such firebrands never found an asylum here! At the present moment, a population less congenial than ours, would prove a source of weakness to the Canadas, and might possibly enable an invading army, *a hundred thousand strong*, "to look down all opposition."

But of all our internal sources of resistance, none appears to me of greater importance than the firm attachment of the French Canadians to the Religion of their fathers, and to its sacred ministers. That bulwark of their spiritual and temporal welfare they will rally round in the day of danger; the voice of those Pastors, who have watched night and day, with unceasing solicitude over their flocks, will not be heard in vain;—it will inspire all with that heavenly ardour, which, in the virtuous cause, "smiles at the drawn dagger, and defies its point."

If our beloved Country be invaded, and we, for a moment, be forced to give way, let our rallying points be our sacred temples, and the tombs of our brave ancestors yet unprofaned:—there, at the least, shall our cry be Death or Victory!—nor can we hesitate an instant in making our election, to die and mix with kindred dust, rather than live the victims of *the oppressor's scorn*.

In considering the existing institutions of Canada, we cannot

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help perceiving the marked intention of Britain, to make herself beloved, rather than feared, by her new associates in freedom. The rights of conquest have never been exercised here in the usual manner; the feelings and interests of the conquered have never been sacrificed to those of the conquering nation; no irritating changes have taken place; the happiness, interest and duty of the Canadians have been gradually blended together; and the grateful opinion pervades the people, that their condition has long been more respectable and happy than that of any other Colonists ancient or modern.

When European conquerors meditate an attack upon an enemy's Province, their emissaries precede them, and commonly find disaffection and discontent pervading the devoted land:—Grievances to be redressed; insults and injuries to be avenged; extortion to be punished, have always been the means of exciting emotions friendly to the invading power. In Canada however no such causes of weakness prevail. All those intelligent and respectable characters, who deservedly lead the public opinion, are averse to innovation as being fraught with danger; and, while they unanimously ascribe the present prosperity and respectability of the Country to its connection with the British Empire, they look forward to the like inviolable attachment, as the ark of safety to all they hold dear.

But our internal strength and our attachment to Britain will not entirely depend on our sense of the superior security and privileges, which we enjoy in respect of Religion. A political constitution, formed upon the model of that of the Parent State, is the object of increasing affection to us all. With honest pride, we regard it as a mark of the love and confidence of a magnanimous, powerful and *experienced* people, who have raised us to the rank of brothers and sharers in the precious political inheritance of their fathers. And can it then be supposed that the Canadas, the touch of whose very soil is destruction to slavery, will sink into the arms of American Slaveholders? Sooner will the Canadians sink lifeless into the lap of earth, than submit to such degradation. They have long listened, with silent indignation, to the contemptuous sallies of Fredonian petulance; and they can put the proper construction upon offers of civilisation and freedom from the self-styled *most civilised nation in the universe*. The character of the present overweening factious administration of the United States is fully appreciated here; and the *lamentable situation of the remaining French and Spanish population of Louisiana and East Florida, has deeply impressed the Canadians with a horror at the very idea of fraternisation or communion with unprincipled landjobbers, and hungry dependents of a rapacious government.*

MONTREAL, 7th OCTOBER, 1812.

Same Subject continued.

Leaving the French Canadians, I now return to review the remaining inhabitants of these Provinces, distinguishing them into the following classes :

Worthy descendants of tried loyalists, enjoying the honorable rewards of their fathers' fidelity:—High-spirited emigrants from the United Kingdoms, anxious to maintain the honor of their native land : And lastly, Men, who, by deliberate choice, have become the Subjects of the British Crown, and are bound by every tie of interest and duty, to defend the Country of their adoption.

When we consult the annals of Great Britain, we have the satisfaction to find, that she has ever stood foremost among the powers of the world, as the faithful performer of all her engagements, both to foreign nations and to her own subjects.

To every people worthy of her alliance or support, she has generously furnished assistance; and in cases, when all other expedients employed in their favor have eventually failed, she has finally offered to the victims of loyalty of every clime, an honorable asylum and means of subsistence, in her own dominions.

The chances of war, and a combination of circumstances hostile to British prosperity, having accomplished the independence of the British Colonies, now forming the United States of America, the British legislature and people, readily perceived and generously allowed, the claims of those determined loyalists who had lost their property and their homes, by adhering to the sacred cause of their King and country. Never were justice and true policy more strikingly displayed before an admiring world, than when Great Britain expended many millions of her wealth, in proving to her sons, that unshaken loyalty, deserving of success, though unable to command it, would inevitably obtain conspicuous acknowledgment and reward. She thus prepared the attachment, gratitude and admiration of succeeding generations, and added more to the stability of her reputation and power, by that single act of enlightened legislation, than by countless successes in war.

To those loyalists, whose habits and manners were accommodated to the new world, the Parent State offered an asylum and every encouragement to industrious exertion, in her remaining North Ameri-

can Provinces; and not less than Ten Thousand of those meritorious individuals, most of whom had fought for their king, were reckoned in Canada, in 1784. Those venerable settlers, who still live to guide the efforts of their sons, in defence of the honorable rewards of determined loyalty and persevering industry, ought to be considered, on the present occasion, as capable of rendering essential service to the common cause. Their clear recollection of past sufferings; their lively sense of present enjoyments; their gratitude, under Providence, to that benevolent monarch, the father of his people, who patronised their claims,—all tend, in a peculiar manner, to stimulate the exertions of this class of our population in the defence of a Country endeared to them and to their children by the tenderest ties. The familiar story of their lives has served to cherish a military spirit and a detestation of rebels, among their children and friends; and their experience in war will prove a source of confidence, in the hour of danger. How gratifying to all good subjects must be the spectacle exhibited by these brave veterans, when they come forth surrounded by their sons, preparing and exhorting them to defend all that Heaven and their own merits have bestowed! Can we doubt of success to the efforts of veteran loyalists, directing the energies of their patriotic descendants?

But the hopes of the Country have other stays in times of difficulty. Let us take an exhilarating view of those *high-spirited emigrants from the United Kingdoms, anxious to maintain the honor of their native land*;—who, braving the dangers and inconveniencies of a long voyage and removal from the scenes of their early exertions, have boldly sought in these favored Colonies, a wider field to persevering industry, and a new theatre, calculated for the display of all that is valuable in the British character. Laudable motives may surely be ascribed to the youthful votary of fortune, who directs his steps to a distant dependency of his native country, in preference to the territory of a foreign power; and we may safely expect unequivocal proof of his patriotic attachments, in case of emergency. That vigour of mind requisite to induce a virtuous young man, of the above description, to seek the new world, points him out, to the skilful observer, as formed to engage in arduous enterprise and to pursue the objects of his choice with invincible energy. If we farther reflect, that British emigrants have generally their natural talents improved by useful knowledge, and that they actually compose many thousands of our most active population, we shall readily view them as an important part of internal strength. Let me likewise remark that they are powerful means of preserving these Colonies and the Mother Country, in the strictest bonds of union; for a circulation of population, maintained between the Parent State and her Colonies, has always been considered absolutely necessary to their mutual happiness and prosperity. *By such individuals, information regarding the existing cir-*

circumstances of Great Britain and of these Provinces is disseminated in a thousand modes, and the readiest and most effectual means of reciprocal aid become familiar on both sides of the Atlantic.

But it is now time to say a few words respecting that portion of Canadian population, which I have above described as *men, who, by deliberate choice, have become subjects of the British Crown, and are bound by every tie of interest and duty, to defend the Country of their adoption.* The moderate proportion of inhabitants, which forms the last mentioned class, have excited greater uneasiness in the bosoms of some well-meaning, natural born British subjects, than, I humbly conceive, was required. When men, in general, have deliberately taken up their residence in a State, to which no fears of *condign* punishment, but hopes of ameliorating their condition, have induced them to repair;—when they have invested their money or the fruits of their industry in the soil, they naturally become *interested* in the improvement and welfare of their adopted Country. Besides, the influence of habit upon the human mind is universally acknowledged; and hard and unfeeling must be that individual, who acquires no sympathy with surrounding objects. At all events, we know that such uncommon characters are viewed, by their neighbours, with salutary jealousy; and, in times of difficulty, are so narrowly watched, that they rarely dare to avow disaffection or even indifference. But, farther, the clearest convictions of the understanding and the best feelings of the heart will induce most men to preserve their allegiance and to perform its duties to a government, like ours, so admirably exerted in affording to every subject security of person and property, and every encouragement to the employment of those talents which distinguish the useful Member of Society. I shall therefore continue confident that a vigorous inspection on the part of our police, and the skilful application of the powerful principles of emulation, fear and hope, will cause disaffection to hide its head, or show itself only to be extirpated.

Let me here subjoin some remarks upon a part of our population, which, from its anticipated importance, as a means of defence, particularly in Upper Canada, ought not to have been omitted in my enumeration. I allude to the Indians, that much injured race, whose character seems of late to have been as unjustly traduced, as it was unreasonably applauded half a century ago.—Instead of endeavouring to conciliate and improve them, the United States' Government wink at measures calculated for their utter extermination. In the present state of our relations with that unprincipled administration, we should take advantage of the natural disaffection of the Indian tribes, and adopt some plan for their organisation, in such a manner as would render them truly formidable to their rapacious foes. Their first approach to a civilized state, compatible with their natural independence, must arise from the combination of several Tribes under

some able leader; and is it not probable that the Chief, called the Prophet, may be enabled to begin that great work? It is well known that when the confederate Tribes were partly extirpated, partly driven from their Country, by General Sullivan, during the American war, they had made very material advances in the arts of life, particularly in husbandry. If Great Britain should generously afford an asylum, in her territories, to the oppressed Indians, she might not merely be enabled, in the meantime, to form a necessary barrier against the rapacity of American Land-jobbers; but she might eventually have the glory of promoting the civilization of an interesting portion of the human race.

Since hostilities have commenced, we have had recent experience of the invaluable service which the Indians are capable of performing. Their peculiar dexterity, in bodily exercises; their presence of mind and ready invention, in time of danger; their perfect knowledge of the forest paths and defiles, fitting them for being partisans, messengers and guides,—those and many minor qualifications render them no mean acquisition in the present contest.

As to the hypocritical exclamations of our enemies against our associating the Indians with ourselves in mutual defence, the best answer is found in the nervous language of the brave General Brock, in reply to General Hull's exterminating proclamation: "By what new principle are they (the Indians) to be prevented from defending their property? If their warfare, from being different from that of the white people is more terrific to the enemy, let him retrace his steps; *they seek him not.*"

N° V.

MONTREAL, 21st OCTOBER, 1812.

Same subject continued.

In every consideration of our internal means of resisting threatened invasion, the local situation of our Country is worthy of particular regard.

I must here, at the outset, confess my want of a personal knowledge of Canadian topography; but, having paid the strictest attention to the casual remarks of others upon that important subject, I will venture to make a few general observations.

Let me however, in the first place, premise, that, while Great Britain is mistress of the ocean, the United States' government can

only attack us upon one side ; consequently, the reduction of the Canadas, by their present sovereign, affords little encouragement to the expected attempt. As to the overrunning of the territory which now forms Lower Canada, during the former American war, it was evidently facilitated by causes entirely temporary, and unlikely ever to return. At that deplorable period, when this valuable Colony was, for some months, exposed to the ungovernable rapacity and brutal licentiousness of a turbulent foe, Governor Carleton was unable to occupy those important posts on our frontier ; of which the respectable body of regulars and armed population now at command, will enable our present Chief to take advantage. The Isle aux Noix, now rendered a complete bar to invasion, by the way of Lake Champlain, was then quietly pitched on, by the rebels, as their place of rendezvous ; whence Proclamations and Circulars, models for those of all future invaders, upon similar principles, were spread through the Country. None of the common precautions of breaking down bridges, destroying roads and blocking up passes could be taken ; nor had there been time to enjoin and facilitate the removal of any part of the grain, cattle and effects of the Colonists, out of the reach of the enemy, who devoured the wealth of his *friends*, and wasted the property of the rest.

Very different will be our circumstances and exertions, in the expected invasion. *We have every reason to believe that the whole extent of our frontier has been carefully explored ; that, in the proper departments, are deposited numerous and correct Maps, Plans, and Memoirs, so essentially requisite for the skilful planning and conducting of a campaign ; that, as far as can be done, without weakening the main body, detachments will be sent to occupy and defend the most important stations and defiles ; and, in short, that every expedient will be employed to increase the local impediments to invasion.*

Aware of my want of official information, I tremble at the thought of descending to particulars ; but I still feel an irresistible impulse to communicate a few ideas, which have insensibly crowded upon me, since I took up my pen.

I mean to confine my view to what might possibly take place on our frontier, and to what seems practicable in case the enemy, contrary to expectation, should reach the southern bank of the Saint Lawrence, in the Lower Province.

Giving therefore, for a moment, my fancy the rein ; I will suppose, that, no sooner shall we have intelligence that the enemy is advancing to menace our lines, than strong detachments for observation, chiefly composed of Militia and Indians, will appear, fully prepared to impede the progress of the foe :—every bridge and road will be destroyed ; and every footpath rendered impracticable by trees

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felled and lying with their boughs interweaved. Should the enemy attempt to cut his way through the woods, the same scouring parties will continually harrass his working detachments and their guard:— lurking behind every bush will lie a wily Indian or Rifleman, taking sure aim undisturbed; and, after killing his man, bounding swiftly and unperceived to another post, in pursuit of his game. A few active leaders, inspiring such parties with enthusiasm, will quickly enable the whole Country to appear, night and day, in unceasing hostility.

While the invaders will be thus kept at bay, the faithful inhabitants, fully aware of the character of their foes, will be employing every minute which they can spare from defence, in removing or concealing their effects; the distance of the place of deposit being always proportioned to their expectations of the ability of the enemy to advance into the Country. For such deposits, in case no fortified posts are at hand, some of the parish-churches must eventually be employed; and, if the unprincipled invaders, in pursuit of plunder, dare to violate those sanctuaries of the national faith, the surrounding population will unanimously urge to be led to instant revenge.

Harassed in the manner above described, the enemy must issue from the woods, weakened with loss and fatigue, a fit object of immediate attack to a strong detachment of fresh troops, from the main body; and it would not be extraordinary, if such an attack should, at once, prostrate his hopes, make him abandon his ground entirely and endeavour to escape. At all events, our chief cares will be, to make use of all our knowledge of local advantages, in order to preclude his commanding any more of our Country, than that on which he may be encamped, and to surprise or cut off every detachment from his main body, for plunder or forage.

Among the various chances of war, it frequently happens that an invading army advancing into a Country, with which their General is not familiar, will fall into an ambuscade; and, in such a case, we can readily imagine the dreadful confusion and probable destruction, which a daring attempt on the part of our Militia and Indians would produce. Nothing but long habit could prevent the enemy from being appalled at the horrid yells of the Indians; and these being followed by a spirited charge of the bayonet and tomahawk, must complete their confusion, rout and destruction.

It seems of the utmost importance, on a first aggression, to take every advantage of our situation, and to strike a terror into our adversary, at once; for, if the first opportunity be neglected of attacking the foe, after his harassed and fatiguing march, through our marshes, woods and defiles, we shall not, for some time, have such a superiority of circumstances over him. He will then have time to look around and take precautions; and we shall be obliged to

employ new expedients to break his spirit and prepare him for defeat,

But, though from such a celebrated Chief as commands us, we may expect every display of dexterity in taking all those advantages which time and place may afford; though we may hope, that every stroke of generalship, every manœuvre of tactics will be employed, to keep the enemy from the interior, it will still be proper to prepare our minds for something more arduous, and to consider what seems practicable, against him, in case, contrary to expectation, he should reach the southern bank of the Saint Lawrence, in the Lower Province. In such a case, how could we prevent his crossing the river? It is obvious, that this could chiefly be done by armed boats, floating batteries, and such means of annoyance. Indeed I shall hardly consider our Government seriously alarmed, until I perceive the most vigorous exertions, to equip a flotilla, for river-service; and, when I consider the number of men in the Country, habituated to the navigation of the Saint Lawrence, I look forward to their labours, under skilful leaders, as an invaluable resource to the Canadas, in the day of danger.

In no situation do I expect more certain destruction to an American army, than in an attempt to force the passage of our noble river, which, I trust, as it is a natural ornament, may likewise be rendered a means of defence to our beloved Country. Let the enemy only be kept upon the farther side of the Saint Lawrence, and he will be able to do us comparatively little harm; for such is the existing spirit of the Province, that the inhabitants would remove, with all their substance, to the hither side of the river, leaving the enemy alone in a desert, 'till opportunity offered to drive him entirely from our soil.

While reflecting upon the advantages to be derived from the local situation of the Canadas, we are led to advert to the character and conduct of its first European masters:—they might be called the natural rivals and enemies of the neighbouring Colonists; and they were accordingly unwearied in devising means to annoy them. What our predecessors did from views of ambition and conquest, we may be reasonably expected to do, in self-defence. Let us not therefore disdain to imitate the conduct of the skilful officers of the greatest monarchs of the Bourbon race. Let us take for granted, till experience contradict it, that all those posts and positions which history or tradition informs us were chosen and fortified by French Engineers are not unworthy of attention. Making allowance for the change of circumstances, the history of all the French campaigns in this Country, and, particularly, that of their last, might furnish the most important lessons to the defenders.

MONTREAL, 6th NOVEMBER, 1812.

Same Subject continued.

Having now reviewed the character of the population and institutions, as well as the local advantages of the Canadas, I shall briefly advert to those articles of their produce which are necessary for the subsistence of the inhabitants, and likewise to those which may be rendered subservient to their defence, during the war.

Though the United States' government have failed in their *scheme* of overrunning this Country or reducing it by a *coup de main*; and, though the chances of war have been hitherto favorable to our sacred cause, let not success lull us asleep, but rather rouse us to act with double energy, in making every preparation for vigorous resistance. *After the late base conduct of our enemy to the friendly Province of East Florida, we should, both in peace and in war, consider him as ever on the watch for an opportunity to subdue us, by force or intrigue.*

Impressed with such ideas of the necessity of unceasing vigilance and jealousy, I consider the slightest allusion to the resources derivable from our Agriculture, our Fisheries, Forests and Mines, as worthy of the attention of all good subjects. But, upon this important topic, few private individuals can be expected to be minutely informed. The eminent task of investigating, encouraging, directing and extending the industry, trade and resources of this Country is worthy of the labours and patronage of its enlightened administration. For my part, I confess that I am particularly unprepared to discuss this subject in the manner I could wish; and I feel myself obliged to confine my remarks to a very narrow range.

I shall begin by observing that our enemy will happily be disappointed in his expectation of *quickly starving us into submission*. Were Great Britain indeed under the necessity of supplying her colonists and soldiers, in the Canadas, with imported provisions entirely, as she has done the inhabitants and armies in Portugal, starvation might eventually stare us in the face and, backed with a large army, might "*look down all opposition.*" But if we continue true to ourselves, we can hardly fail to prevent our Country from being overrun and the enemy's being "*fed from its resources.*" The spirit which pervades the whole population will preclude the invaders from commanding more of our ground than "*the extent of their bayonets.*" and, while our *disposable population* seems amply sufficient for all the purposes of co-operation in defence, the rest may, by the judicious

Arrangements of the Commander in Chief, be enabled to continue, with casual interruption, the cultivation of the soil and the avocations connected with the subsistence and defence of the community.

In examining a subject like the present, it seems proper to allude to the general course of things and to pass by casual deviations. Our late defective crop is a misfortune which we have reason to trust will not be again experienced for several years; and my observations will be more useful when adapted to the average and ordinary produce of our bountiful soil, leaving it to the judgment of my readers to make the allowance for casualties.

Considering accordingly that our usual crops have frequently enabled us to export half a million of bushels of grain, exclusive of large quantities of flour, we may surely hope, that, though even ten thousand men were withdrawn from agricultural pursuits, and embodied for service during the war, a sufficient number would still remain to raise subsistence for the whole. I trust that it will excite the most strenuous exertions of the Canadas to raise abundance of provisions for the provincial corps, at the least; and that, if importations must take place, they may be chiefly for the supply of the British regular troops; this would be a striking proof of the spirit of the whole population; and *the accomplishment of such an important object seems likely to be promoted by local attachments and partialities, influencing the bulk of mankind, as well as by that enlarged patriotism which distinguishes the more enlightened members of society.* The desultory service of the country people will seldom require a regular supply of provisions: those hardy fellows will carry many days' nourishment in their haversacks, prepared at their homes, with a care and economy elsewhere impracticable.

I shall next observe, that the present circumstances of the Country seem to require some changes in the agricultural routine of the inhabitants. It being now of the greatest consequence to raise a sufficiency of vegetable food, for our internal supply, and to guard against casualties, we ought to diversify our crops, and particularly to appropriate an extraordinary extent of soil to the raising of potatoes, the most serviceable of all the farinaceous roots. It is a well known fact, that *the produce of an acre, planted with potatoes, will nourish four times the number of men that the crop of an acre sown with wheat would do, and I therefore believe that it would only be common prudence to increase the cultivation of potatoes two-fold during this war.* The attention of the peasantry should likewise be directed to the raising of animal food, particularly pork, a favorite aliment, in this country, habitually used among our troops; and, by the smallness of its bulk, peculiarly fitted for transport, either by land or water. If our inhabitants could only be persuaded of the importance attached to potatoes and pork, in many Countries, particularly in Ireland,

they would view those valuable articles of provision in their true light, rendering us independent of our neighbours, with respect to subsistence, and affording a new object of export to the West Indies.

But, farther, when we look around we must be struck with the spontaneous bounties of nature in this new Country, in which many sources of supply have been almost neglected. Without the aid of the Sister Provinces, we might assuredly draw one fourth of our subsistence from the waters, which, at different seasons of the year, swarm with salmon, shad, trout, bass, white-fish, &c. all excellent of their kinds; and, if we extend our view to the Labrador coast and to the Gulph of the St. Lawrence, we shall find reason to expect an inexhaustible supply of cheap nutritious food, in every emergency. Nor, in peaceable times, does the game of our forests contribute subsistence to its utmost ability:—our Voyageur corps and partisans may be expected to avail themselves of that resource, in its proper season. All persons who have resided in the North West Country have been often reduced to live chiefly upon the game and fish which they might obtain by their personal exertions; and, being thus habituated to providing food for themselves, we may therefore anticipate their easy subsistence, great part of the year. In like manner, the Indians will kill and catch in abundance, requiring very little food from us, except perhaps on a march.

After the above glance at our internal means of subsistence, I trust that my readers will allow that starvation may be kept at bay; I shall therefore, now add a few observations upon the important supplies of Timber which our forests will contribute; these along with our iron and hemp being the articles most subservient to our defence.

In the first place we might, in case of necessity, build a river flotilla from such indigenous sources, having every requisite except canvass which is not indispensable. Timber is likewise of great importance in fortification; and the refuse of our forests will heat the furnaces, employed in our camps and forts for military purposes, as well as defend our fire-sides from the rigours of the climate. In short, with the wood, iron and hemp produced by this Country alone, we might prove formidable to our foe; for in the hands of the ingenious and brave, those would assume a thousand shapes of annoyance. But, thank heaven! we are not reduced to depend upon Canadian resources for munitions of war. Our Parent State has been gradually forming depots at Quebec and other posts, upon the most respectable scale; and it is probable that the exertions of the Provincial founderies will be confined to the making of a few unimportant military articles, in addition to their accustomed operations.

To conclude, all those internal resources must be gradually developed and employed, according to circumstances; and the full advantages derivable from them can only arise from the constant encouragement and protection of the internal trade of the Country. If the circulation and the exchange of produce between both Provinces, or between different parts of each Province be impeded, the inhabitants will experience much inconvenience and loss. A free circulation of produce is the general advantage of a Country; and as the principal means of procuring that blessing we look forward to a powerful protection of the intercourse between both Provinces by the Saint Lawrence.*

N° VII.

MONTREAL, 25th NOVEMBER, 1812.

The reputation and talents of our Governor General;—his extensive authority in times of danger; his knowledge of the Country and of the genius of its inhabitants; and his sagacity in selecting fit characters, to execute his designs.

The immediate cause of the superiority of one country over another is frequently found in the reputation and talents of him who commands its resources; and history furnishes abundance of proof that the power and glory of a people have been often entirely owing to the merits of their Chief. At all events, I may safely affirm, that the subjugation of most countries, particularly in the present age, has arisen more from the weakness, folly and misconduct of their rulers, than from any want of such means of resistance as he who is truly great in the cabinet and in the field will successfully employ.

The romantic Country of Swisserland, long the object of admiration and delight to the philosophical observer and friend of humanity, fell, from its high estate, into the gulph of French vassallage, by the cowardice and incapacity of its rulers. In worthier hands, the bravery of its inhabitants and the many advantages of its local situation would have formed an effectual barrier against sudden invasion; and the generous aid of friendly powers, particularly of Britain, would have eventually secured the existence of the state, with all its ancient and endeared connections.

In reflecting therefore upon our means of resistance, we cannot rest satisfied with contemplating the passive resources of our Country;

* See note A at the end.

but we anxiously turn our eyes upon him, who is authorised to call them all into action :—we dwell upon the preceding events of his life, and eagerly anticipate from the past and the present the future effects of his invaluable qualities.

With what inexpressible pleasure do we now peruse the history of his military career, commencing with his youth, and increasing in brightness with his years! With what satisfaction do we read the accounts of his recent administration in Nova Scotia; the shortness of which can never prevent its forming an æra in the history of the improvement of that rising Country! But his present high station has unfolded still farther the resources of his mind, and seems destined to give full play to the energies of his character.

We witnessed his unwearied anxiety, before the war, to promote every laudable enterprise; and we then looked forward to years of rapid advancement in wealth and colonial importance. But, on his part, that sagacity peculiar to genius, and that foresight and vigilance, which distinguish the practised statesman and warrior, were quickly exerted in gradual preparation for defence. His equity and impartiality gained the confidence, while his affability and attention acquired the love of the Colonists; and his whole influence was successfully employed in proving to the inhabitants of every description, that he was resolved to practise the benevolent policy of his royal master, to whom all his faithful subjects are equally dear, and alike the objects of his paternal solicitude.

The consequences that invariably result from such conduct are now present to our view; we behold all full of confidence and strength arising immediately from a well understood union of interest in the defence of the Country. Those internal jealousies which encouraged our adversary to attempt our ruin have gradually disappeared; the combined effects of an enlightened policy and the danger of a foreign yoke, intolerable to all who have tasted of British rights, have suddenly made us a military people,

“ *With hearts resolv'd, and hands prepar'd*
“ *The blessings, we enjoy, to guard.*”

When the actual invasion of the Lower Province shall take place, and, in consequence military law be proclaimed, our vigorous government will be advantageously contrasted with that of our enemy. Then indeed will the whole powers of our Governor's mind find exertion in a field as extensive as a British subject can desire. The whole weight and responsibility of government will be upon him; nor will they prove too heavy a burthen.

This *extensive authority, in times of danger*, is both the touchstone of transcendent merit, in its possessor, and the means of bringing for-

ward, with the greatest effect, the whole strength and resources of a Country. In such cases however the fate of the people is necessarily involved in the fortune of their chief; and their whole movements are impressed with his character:—obedient to his will and example, prudence or rashness will prevail; vigilance or remissness will exist. Raised to the pinnacle of power, if a Chief waste the spirit of the Country, in operations of momentary splendour, he must find it deficient when the grand work of defence should be performed; if he forget that his glory should consist in the result of the operations of a whole campaign, not in some partial interrupted gleams of success, which may only serve to lure him to his doom,—he will justly be considered as trifling with fortune and needlessly multiplying the chances of war. Such is the conduct of inexperienced commanders, aspiring to premature fame.

But I feel happy at the idea, that, when invested with all the authority which the existing circumstances of time and place can require, our Governor General will uniformly display all that self-control, which should distinguish him who is entrusted with the defence of a valuable population, slowly accumulated under all the difficulties of colonisation in a Country whose rigorous climate debars them from commerce and almost from every advantage of agricultural exertion during half the year. Though authorised to call forth every man capable of bearing arms, and to employ him, as he may choose, in military operations, he will reflect, with the solicitude of a parent, upon the peculiar circumstances of different members of his immense family, and will never make their burthens heavier than they can bear. The best blood in the Country, flowing at his command, will be sparingly drawn; and he will not despise the counsel of the warlike king of Morven, to a son worthy of his sire :

“ Seek not the battle, nor shun it when it comes.”

N° VIII.

MONTREAL, 9th. DECEMBER, 1812.

Same Subject continued.

“ Success in war chiefly depends upon the abilities of the general ; on his knowledge of the situations which he occupies, and on the art which he displays in taking advantage of the ground, either by preventing the enemy from obtaining favorable posts, or by securing to himself the spots best adapted for his own designs.”

Such are the terms in which Frederic the Great speaks of the

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inestimable importance of the knowledge of a Country, in the General entrusted with its defence, I may therefore be suffered to avow the great consolation which I draw, in these times of danger, from my conviction, that our Governor has a perfect *knowledge of this Country*, as well as of the genius of its inhabitants.

Possessed of all that previous acquaintance with our situation and our wants, which his early recollections and habitual studies supplied, he came to our Country, solicitous to illustrate, by personal experience, the ideas which he had formed of our local and political circumstances. Traversing our extensive domains, with the eye of a general and a statesman, he has viewed every part, *enquiring and examining for himself*. What our invaders can only have read or heard of, he personally knows; while they must throw themselves, at first, in a great measure, upon fortune, he will play a surer game, and have many advantages in his favor. Ignorance of the Country will divest the enemy of half his courage; he will tremble at every step, and, particularly during night, will be haunted with imaginary dangers.

What advantage will not our accomplished Chief draw from all those causes of debility in our foes! He will harass them, and increase their perplexities, by unceasing attacks upon every side, and fatigue the whole with a fourth of their number. Whenever an American General, in the accustomed mode, may renew the attempt upon our frontiers, the least he can expect is the fate of Braddock or Saint Clair; whose history might deter any prudent officer from rashly advancing to violate our territory. Indeed nothing but the scheming character of our foes could account for their conduct, during the present war. That same temerity which marked the conduct of many American individuals, in commercial pursuits, while residing in Canada, has likewise displayed itself in their military enterprises. In both instances, their imaginations out-ran their judgments; the trader found bankruptcy instead of fortune; the general, instead of conquest, found defeat. In both instances likewise, their wily opponents stood by, in comparative security, waiting events, having little more to do, than to take advantage of their blunders, and dextrously entangle the intruders in their own snares. Canada has doubtless been a dangerous field to American enterprise, both in commerce and in war; and experience, in both cases, must be dearly purchased:—fortunes half made, and *laurels half won*, are all that they could ever boast of.

Those military characters alone, who shall fight and bleed upon our soil or pass through our Country, as captives, can acquire even a superficial acquaintance with our local circumstances; and even when such men shall grow romantic enough to undertake to traverse, as conquerors, that ground which they have already trodden as pri-

soners, they will still labour under great disadvantages. The face of this Country, the nature of its roads and the state of its rivers are subject to sudden and important changes, from its peculiar climate, with the effects of which our Governor is quite familiar. Roads, rivers and marshes, which are passable at one season of the year, become impassable at another; and this alteration happens often to them all, in a single night.

Many a fool-hardy American has been frozen to death or drowned in this Country, while the sagacious natives invariably escape such "moving accidents by flood and field." We may rest assured that our intelligent Chief will reap every benefit from our formidable ally, the Canadian climate, which will (particularly in a winter campaign) dispatch as many foes as regular warfare. The Indians and the Voyageurs will likewise be ordered out upon snow-shoes, to catch them in their flight, as they catch the swiftest animals entangled in the snow; and nothing but remissness on our part can possibly, in such circumstances, allow a single enemy to escape.

The more I reflect upon the unconquerable obstacles to the "victorious progress" of any invader of this formidable Country, the more deeply am I impressed with the idea, that a fatality attends the American schemers of conquest;—defeat and disgrace seem destined for them upon our plains; and our soil seems appointed to fatten on their blood! A periodical evacuation of that kind may be absolutely necessary, in a feverish democracy, in order to prolong its permitted existence; and Canadians will not disobey the apparent mandate of Heaven, to apply the lancet and mitigate a disease, for which no remedy could be found elsewhere. Canada, though furnishing no *balm for wound and honour*, may, by a little blood-letting, and a short cooling regimen, relieve the *fantastics of the brain*, before the ice break up and the roads become unpropitious for exploratory adventurers.

Great however as are the acknowledged advantages of that perfect knowledge of the Country, which I have ascribed to our Governor General, I consider them inferior to those which will accrue from his *knowledge of the genius of its inhabitants*. The military *coup-d'œil*, the merely physical knowledge is more easily obtained, and requires less natural talent, than the more difficult science of national character; and, when both are combined in any Chief, we may truly say, "*he is himself an host.*"

Without pretending to explain by what means SIR GEORGE PREVOST has acquired his knowledge of the French Canadian character, we can all perceive the fact. It is obvious that he is no ignorant pretender, and that he perfectly knows their habits, and how they should be treated. Their hereditary peculiarities are not yet ef-

faced by a change of circumstances and of government; and the dignified but paternal condescendence of the Bourbons is, by him, successfully imitated, and found congenial to the feelings of the children of Normandy. That marked solicitude of the Bourbon race, to be loved by their subjects and feared by their neighbours, is evidently a characteristic, which the French Canadians are rejoiced to perceive in their government; and, as they have always been united to powerful nations, they have invariably cherished a corresponding self-esteem. On such grounds, I have often ventured to assert, that no part of the King's subjects, in Canada, would more powerfully second the efforts of the Provincial Administration to strengthen the Country, than the French Canadians, provided it could gain their confidence. Now that point seems happily gained; and accordingly, at the present moment, none seems more prompt to hurl defiance at our foes, than the sprightly Canadian. In the Militia-service, he has, to be sure, been a good deal humored and suffered to talk, sing and dance, in his usual way; the endearing modes of address: "*Mon enfant, mon frere, mon uni,*" &c. are scrupulously preserved; his native officers and habitual patrons are approved in treating him with all that mildness and winning solicitude for his welfare, which his character, formed generally by extraordinary parental indulgence, requires. The Canadian, however, now obeys the word of command given in English; he marches and dances to British music; and, in short, he gradually acquires all those qualities which are calculated to render him useful and agreeable to his associates in British freedom.

But a secondary advantage, as to the great cause of defence, arising from the Governor's knowledge of the genius of the French Canadians, is the useful information, which he is thus enabled to obtain from that important part of our population. A sense of duty, or of interest alone, is hardly sufficient to bring them readily forward: much address may be required; and nothing but that indescribable attention and interesting manner, the attributes of few, will succeed in securing the ind-fatigable efforts of the Canadian observer. Indeed the quick sensibility and natural fire of the Canadian render nice observation and much experience absolutely necessary in his successful leader; whose presence of mind and fertility of invention will be continually employed in turning to advantage the disposition of his men.

Our veteran loyalists, British Settlers and their descendants, though differently, seem no less sagaciously treated by our Chief. Viewing them as deservedly proud of the name of Britons and defenders of British rights, he enters into no explanations; but, significantly pointing to the front of battle, he accompanies the gesture with a few emphatic words, suitable to the occasion.

But that same knowledge of the human heart, and of national character, which modifies his conduct and regulates his confidence, with regard to the French Canadians, Loyalists, British Settlers and their descendants, enabling him to employ, with success, their unconquerable efforts in defence of their Country, makes him probably view the individuals, recently emigrated from the United States, with painful anxiety. The most that the liberal-minded can say in favor of that portion of our population must be of a negative description : —our enemies have avowedly depended so much upon assistance to be received from their countrymen established among us, that it seems almost impossible to discard suspicion and to view them as contributing, in any degree, to the strength of the Canadas, in the present contest.*

N° IX.

MONTREAL, 23rd DECEMBER, 1812.

Same Subject continued.

In reflecting upon the important qualities of our Governor General, so intimately connected with our means of resisting the threatened invasion, we are naturally led to estimate highly "his sagacity in selecting fit characters, to execute his designs." The Governor's possession of this talent, is readily inferred from that knowledge of the genius of the inhabitants, which we have already proved his Excellency to possess ; but its exercise is materially modified by the local and political circumstances of every British colony, and particularly by those of the Canadas.

The necessary dependence of every Colony upon the Parent State renders the government of the former essentially subordinate ; and the whole of its measures must necessarily be influenced and actuated by the general policy and interests of the supreme administration. From the clearest maxims of Political Economy, as illustrated by the practice of the wisest nations, the principal officers, civil and military, particularly in the executive branch, are appointed or approved by the administration of the Mother Country. Thus the immediate organs of communication between the chief and the subordinate governments are rendered as congenial as possible ; and the best means are systematically employed to insure reciprocal confidence and utility.

* See Note B at the end.

But the peculiar circumstances of the rising Colonies of the Canadas, situated in the immediate vicinity of independent States, have been a farther inducement to the British Government, to employ every expedient in order to secure that important portion of its dominions and to attach it strongly to the Parent State. The intended effects of such wise policy will be completely obtained, by the appointment of men of distinguished talents and reputation to colonial situations.

Notwithstanding all such restrictions and controlling forms, the powers of our Governor General in appointments to offices, civil and military, are really extensive, particularly in cases of emergency, when unlimited confidence, for a certain time, is necessarily placed in all his nominations and recommendations.

Without pretending to share in the confidence of the executive, let me here be permitted to hazard a few observations upon the apparent and probable course of our Governor's policy, in his appointments to civil and military employments.

Passing by what had been done by his predecessors (which he would not lightly undo) it seems obvious, that natural born British Subjects have been the merited but not the exclusive objects of his confidence and patronage. When he found naturalised subjects long possessed of places of trust and reputed worthy of their situations, those men of merit and talents readily acquired his confidence and esteem; and the history of the Country would fully evince to his unprejudiced mind that eminent abilities of foreign growth had, in various circumstances, been employed with success in its preservation and improvement.—Every foreigner who has fought in the service of the British Government is, of course, an object of its protection; and, along with his descendants, has a legitimate claim to the confidence of our Chief.

In peaceable times likewise, the circumstances of these Colonies rendered places of profit rare and comparatively unimportant, while merely honorary though active situations in the magistracy, were rather avoided than sought, by enterprising Colonists. Thus many difficulties accrued in the appointment of persons completely qualified for certain employments; and we have accordingly experienced an inconvenience common to all new Countries. But although, at the present peculiar crisis, the imperfections of various incumbents may strike observers more forcibly than before, they will doubtless, upon reflection, be led to confess, that it would often be distressing to supersede them. Indeed we have frequently occasion to remark, that our generous Chief bears with the infirmities of those ancient servants of their Country, sometimes allowing them deputies, and always

accepting with sincere regret the resignations of those who may be found more willing than able to render active service.

But every necessary sacrifice to justice and generosity, as well as to circumstances of local situation and family connection, can never obstruct the claims of real talents and unassuming merit to the countenance and encouragement of the Provincial Administration. What a field for the exercise of the greatest and most amiable qualities is now before our Governor General! How many experiments will occur to him, worthy of a benevolent and superior mind!

To be more particular, let us consider the real advantages, which will arise from exciting a laudable emulation among the young French Canadians, hitherto removed from situations calculated to rouse the latent energies of their minds. Besides providing for immediate defence, the plans of our Chief seem wisely calculated for the perpetual security of the Country. A number of young men of family, introduced as officers into the proposed increase of select incorporated Militia, will be quickly formed to the service, and gradually prepared to shine in the superior military ranks. It seems particularly proper that an opportunity should be afforded for embracing the profession of arms, at an early period of life; for we have daily experience to prove that many individuals whose situations and fortune are the acknowledged passports to Militia-rank, are rendered very unfit by age or by confirmed habits of civil life, to perform the requisite duty with satisfaction to themselves or advantage to their Country.

But let us not confine our view to the French Canadians, the majority of our population: let us consider the room for discrimination and sagacity, among the youth of the rest of the community. At a time when commerce is nearly annihilated, and when the youths attached to the liberal professions are unoccupied, the defence of the Country is the principal field of honorable exertion. In such circumstances, let the eye of the Governor be only deemed watchful, and his ear always open, and then the emulation of our generous youths will perform wonders. All who may be peculiarly fitted for a military life will irrevocably adopt it, while the rest will, for the prescribed period, energetically perform their duty, retiring afterwards, with honor, to their civil pursuits, though ready to resume the sword, at their Country's call.

But besides military promotion, properly so called, the various appointments in the Commissariat and in other departments peculiar to a war-establishment, will furnish many opportunities to our Governor, to encourage modest merit, to reward fidelity, and liberally to extend, to all good subjects, their share of public benefits. When the people perceive the public expenditure wisely applied, and rewards conferred with impartiality upon the truly deserving, they bear all bur-

thens without a murmur, and heartily acquiesce in every measure necessary for the support of what they thus clearly perceive to be a common cause.

But farther, the present Governor General appears inclined to act a bolder part, than some of his predecessors. Though doubtless, succeeding, along with his office, to a certain mass of information and practical precepts, sufficient to limit a less intrepid and original genius, to the beaten tract of preceding administrations, *he has opened a new route; he has viewed the Country and its diversified population in a new light, and has most probably judged for himself, divested of prejudice and untrammelled by routine.* Upon this principle, I will suppose that many men, formerly treated with studied neglect, have appeared to him deserving of notice; many, represented as bad subjects, have seemed worthy of at least, one effort to reclaim them. To his enlarged mind, replete with resource, it may have appeared as possible as it was desirable to conciliate all those characters, who had been proved to possess considerable influence in the community, and to strengthen his administration with what had unfortunately served but to weaken that of his predecessors. Such experiments, at the present crisis, when the efforts of an undivided people are required to save them from destruction, ought, in my humble opinion, to be viewed with candour: and the most jealous among us should stifle their complaints at sight of necessary sacrifices to internal union and tranquillity, and, (for aught they know) in some particular cases, to *justice.* While an insidious enemy lurks upon our frontiers, eager to profit by the oversights and blunders of self-sufficient administrations, we have no time to waste on punctilios; and it will often be only common prudence to give a patient ear to imaginary grievances.

To conclude, much of the sagacity employed by our Chief, in selecting fit characters to execute his designs, must remain unknown to the public, they will have to judge of the whole of his exertions, by some peculiar traits; and, if they find increasing satisfaction in contemplating the ostensible agents of his will, they may safely give him equal credit for those who are unseen. We have all however already perceived and acknowledged the propriety with which the great landholders, the mercantile bodies, and generally all leading characters, in both Provinces, have been called upon to rouse the energies of the Country. We have seen, with joy, that they have justified our Governor's confidence in their efforts; and we look forward to the effects of the unabated zeal of the whole population, properly directed, as the principal means, under Providence, of obtaining a successful issue to a contest, all important to ourselves, and involving the interest and honor of the powerful Empire to which we belong.

MONTREAL, 9th. JANUARY, 1819.

The Goodness of our Cause, rendering us unanimous and strong against an Enemy weakened by disunion.

I now beg leave to call the attention of my readers to a few observations and facts regarding "*the goodness of our cause, rendering us unanimous and strong, against an enemy weakened by disunion.*"

The well known sagacity of *experienced* nations and particularly of Britain, pointing out to her the importance of not increasing the number of her enemies, in the tremendous struggle which she is making against Napoleon, for the preservation of her deserved rank among the powers of the world, affords a strong presumption to unprejudiced minds, that she would instinctively avoid provoking the hostility of the United States. But we are not reduced to such an appeal to the feelings of the candid and confiding; for we have the direct evidence of recorded facts, evincing to the most sceptical mind, that long continued provocation, as well as final hostility has been the object systematically pursued by the present administration of the United States, *that creature of the democratic faction, uniformly subservient to monarchical, republican and imperial France.*

The many unworthy characters who were brought into power and notice during that successful rebellion, which severed the British Colonies from the Parent State, remained embodied after the peace, and secretly enlisted under the power of France. The infatuated government of that Country, which had encouraged rebels and cherished a spirit destined eventually to destroy itself, incessantly intrigued, in order to prevent the United States from performing the solemn engagement expressed in their Declaration of Independence,—to hold the British nation, as the rest of mankind, "*enemies in war, in peace, friends.*"

In the slight review proposed to be taken of the conduct of the French faction, in the United States, headed by Jefferson, Madison and Gerry, the first striking fact is the use which they made of the injudicious articles inserted in the definitive treaty of 1783, forming a fallacious arrangement respecting the debts due, and the property belonging to British Subjects and loyalists. Those articles, the fulfilment of which depended upon the honorable dispositions of particular States, not upon the efficient and authoritative measures of the general government, were successfully employed by the French faction, then in the minority, to excite the worst passions of the American people.

But the feelings of dishonest debtors and unprincipled holders of property not their own, were rendered still more effectual in defeating every endeavor of Washington's administration, to do justice to Britain, by the jealousy of many well-meaning citizens, misled by faction. In consequence of dishonorable delay in fulfilling the articles in question, the British government rightfully retained a number of military posts, upon the American frontier; and that circumstance was unblushingly represented to the American people as a proof that Britain was secretly resolved to seize the first opportunity of reducing the United States to perpetual vassalage.

While such base expedients were daily increasing sentiments unfriendly to Britain, Jefferson was preparing an experiment of commercial hostility against her. A Report, which, as Secretary of State, he had framed upon the Commerce and Navigation of the United States (falsely representing the Regulations of Great Britain as inimical to their trade, and vainly endeavouring to prove that liberality was the attribute of France alone) developed his views to the world. Founded upon this notable State Paper (full of glaring inconsistencies which even shamed their author into temporary retirement from office), his political subordinate and friend, Mr. Madison, introduced into the House of Representatives, in Congress, in 1794, a string of Resolutions, calculated, under the veil of Municipal Regulations, to supplant the British, in favor of French Commerce. Their spirit breathed the most malignant hostility to the trade and manufactures of Britain; and his speech upon the occasion contained the most atrocious sentiments. Speaking of the British manufactures, he said: "*There are three hundred thousand souls, who live by our custom: let them be driven to poverty and despair, and what will be the consequence? Most probably an accession of so many useful citizens to the United States.*" The encouragement which they recommended to domestic manufactures, in defiance of the prudent means laid down in Jefferson's Notes on Virginia, was only a lure to the artisans in the United States, who were daily increasing by emigration from Europe, and were then considered worthy of enlistment, under the banners of the French faction.

But the sagacity and firmness of Washington's administration prevented the triumph of Jeffersonian policy upon that occasion; and the liberality of Britain powerfully seconded the American government, in its efforts to preserve neutrality and peace. The commercial treaty, concluded by Lord Grenville and Mr. Jay, in 1794, after a negotiation which removed every cause of irritation between both nations, secured to the United States *the way to wealth*, in spite of the machinations of *the tools of France*.

At length, the vessel of state "*in the full tide of successful experiment*" was left by Washington and his immediate successor, to

the care of Jefferson, who assumed the helm, in 1801. Then began that dereliction of the manly conduct of his predecessors in office, which marked the baseness of his soul. A mysterious declining of the responsibility attached to patronising important measures, under the deceptive appearance of false modesty and humility concealed the dark design of making a deluded people the destroyers of their honor, respectability and pence.

Among the first acts of Jefferson's administration, affecting Great Britain in particular, was such an application of the principle of American naturalization (always equivocal) as discovered his rooted hostility. The election of Jefferson to the Presidency has, with much reason, been ascribed to the machinations of malcontent refugees from the British Islands; and, as the means of increasing and rendering stable that power which he had obtained, he procured an almost immediate and unconditional naturalization and share of legislation to foreign interlopers, the well known supporters of France and of French principles.

Having thus established his own power and that of his faction, by the deterioration of the national character of America, he was prepared to take every opportunity of indulging his depraved political propensities,—his predilection in favor of France, and his prejudice against Great Britain. During his administration, Bonaparte might trifle with the safety, interest and honor of the United States, with impunity. He might wrest Louisiana from vassal Spain, in order to hang upon their skirts, though ostensibly for the purpose of supplying the French West Indies; and when the power of Great Britain seemed likely to render his open and concealed designs nugatory, he could find in the object of his encroachments, a complaisant purchaser of the ill-gotten and, to him, useless territory. The rebellious and disaffected subjects of Ireland were allured to the United States, and there cherished at the expense of the ruling faction; while the casual supply of provisions to the revolted French Slaves in Saint Domingo, was branded by the hypocrite as dishonorable to the American name. During his administration, American commerce was left unprotected, and every means studiously withdrawn, which could enable the United States to support the law of nations and to preserve their previous rank among the civilized powers. They thus appeared to the world fit tools for that belligerent whose only mode of revenge and hostility against Britain, for her naval superiority and resistance to his insatiable ambition, was reduced to a vain attempt to destroy her commerce and to enslave the Continent of Europe. And soon did Napoleon resolve to make them drink deep of the cup of humiliation, which he perfectly knew their dastardly unprincipled government could not, or would not remove. While the Ministers of America, Monroe and Pinckney, are negotiating a favorable Commercial Treaty, at London, Napoleon tells

her, that he will suffer no neutrals ; and, shortly after, intoxicated with his success against Prussia, he issues his barbarous decrees, making it a public crime, in any nation, to trade with Britain. From that principle of self-preservation which is essential to the existence of every State, Britain, at length, warns the United States of their duty, and claims their exertions in support of the ancient and acknowledged rights of nations, the foundation of all commerce and civilization. But Britain called in vain ; and she was eventually obliged to do herself justice, by declaring the dominions of France in a state of blockade, thus retaliating with such mildness as showed her reluctance to injure Neutrals, but at the same time with such dignity as her rank required. The unavoidable pressure of those measures upon America was calculated to awaken her to a sense of honor and true interest, and consequently to stimulate her to assist in forcing the Tyrant to repeal his Decrees and thus remove the British Orders in Council. But such manly policy was far from the thoughts of Jefferson. Rejecting the British Commercial Treaty, and unable or unwilling to draw forth the united resources of his Country, in defence of the rights of nations, he thinks to blind his fellow citizens and the world by a dereliction of all commerce with foreign climes, pretending that his Embargo was the only means of preserving the essential resources of America, from the rapacity of France and Great Britain. But the equivocal guise of that measure was marked by the world ; and its injurious effects were perceived to be levelled at England, though the cowardly blow recoiled upon the hand which gave it.

At last, the people of America could no longer endure "*that cutting off of their commerce from all parts of the world.*" The Northern States particularly exerted themselves for emancipation ; and, after much tergiversation, the general government repealed the Embargo Act, replacing it with a law taking effect 15th March, 1809, which enacted non-intercourse with France and Great Britain, as the means of obtaining, by commercial restrictions, the repeal of the French Decrees and British Orders in Council.

Here ended the administration of Jefferson, who was succeeded by his political son Mr. Madison ; and hitherto the policy of both has, in like circumstances, been peculiarly resembling. The same war in disguise against England, and abject submission to the wrongs and robberies of France ; the same " cunningly devised fables," to delude the unthinking multitude, distinguished both. But increasing pretensions to neutral rights (without the least efforts to perform neutral duties, or to resume that respectability which a federal navy and federal policy, under Washington and Adams procured,) have been most remarkable during Madison's reign.

Passing by Erskine's unwarrantable arrangement and the mission of Mr. Jackson, both which afforded fresh causes of irritation, in the hands of the ruling faction, we may advert to the many subtilities of a protracted negotiation between the American minister, Mr. Pinckney, and the Marquis Wellesley; into which was officiously mingled a perplexing variety of grievances unavoidably incident to a Neutral, unprotected by its miserable government, during a long and embittered contest between the rival nations of Europe. The Minister of France had only to write a letter promising a repeal of the Berlin and Milan Decrees on vague, impracticable, and inadmissible conditions, in order to procure from the American Government, a renewal of commercial intercourse and farther demonstrations of hostile intentions towards Britain. During the whole of the discussion respecting the pretended repeal of the Berlin and Milan Decrees, we perceive on the part of Madison an unbounded confidence, in the assertions of Bonaparte; and such proofs occur of partiality to the tyrant as must reduce every candid observer to the alternative of believing the American Government, either really acting in collusion with France, or at least as considering Great Britain capable of being intimidated by manœuvres, indicating an intention to take an undisguised part in the European contest.

At length, in the course of 1811, we early suspected that the mission of Mr. Foster would produce no satisfactory arrangement: we saw nothing but a display of diplomatic dexterity on the part of the American cabinet; and we have now found, that, while they were amusing us with negotiation, they were secretly preparing those unworthy expedients intended to excite the alarm against Great Britain, by ascribing to her views incompatible with the union and independence of the States.

For many months however before the declaration of war, the constituted authorities of the Canadas, so nearly interested in the state of relations between both powers, were gradually preparing for the result; though their inclinations at times induced them to cherish the hopes of peace. Their confidence in the peaceable professions of the United States' Government entirely failed, when they heard of their base attempts upon the friendly Province of East Florida: while the unjust war begun against the oppressed Indian Tribes, induced them to view the administration of Madison as resolved to bring into action those principles of unjustifiable aggrandisement which had been gradually developed, in the debates of Congress. It likewise readily occurred, that the conquest of the Canadas, must enter into any plan of the ruling faction, to humble England; for those Provinces had become gradually important to her; and they were besides considered as the best lure to the cupidity of some of the neighboring States, particularly Vermont, which had often vainly boasted of its ability and inclination to conquer this Country, even at its own expense.

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MONTREAL, 30th JANUARY, 1813.

Same Subject continued.

From the facts and observations contained in my Number, dated 9th inst., descriptive of the course of policy pursued by the ruling faction in the United States, it might naturally be concluded, that their avowed causes of war against Great Britain would be false and frivolous. That upon which Madison placed the greatest emphasis, and which he painted in the most glaring colours, in his warlike message to Congress, was, the Orders in Council, issued by England in retaliation of Napoleon's barbarous decrees; while the Impressment of Seamen figured only as a secondary ground of hostility. The conciliatory spirit of our Country, however, having produced a repeal of the Orders in Council, as far as they affected the United States, our base opponents now pretend to discover all the evils of Pandora's Box, in our exercise of *the ancient and acknowledged right of impressing British seamen, found on board of neutral merchant vessels in time of war.*

The nature of this *perfect* right, its primary importance to our Parent State, and the mode in which it has been exercised by her, have been lately so well discussed in the Quebec Gazette,* that I shall here introduce only a few general remarks upon the subject, in order to connect it with my plan, referring, for particulars, to that Paper.

From all that I have been able to learn on the subject of our right of impressment, I am fully convinced that the United States' Government have no real cause of complaint. In fact, this appears to be one of their favourite means of deceiving and inflaming the American people, affording frequent occasions to misrepresent and exaggerate the character and numbers of the individuals taken out of their trading vessels. The ruling faction in the United States may, at all events, be safely challenged to prove to the world, that, during their *nominal* neutrality, any native American was retained, by force, on board of our vessels of war, by the orders or with the connivance of our Government. The contrary practice of dismissing all such individuals from British ships of war, is so notorious, that it would be an insult to the memories and to the understandings of my readers, after recent discussions, to dilate upon the subject.

It certainly requires much courtesy and temper, to discuss, without

* See the Quebec Gazette for December and January last: "Question of Impressment."

obliquy and passion, the unworthy policy of our enemy, and to trace, without giving full play to natural feelings, the insidious approaches of *that wolf in sheep's clothing*, towards our harmless folds. Thank God! the shepherds were vigilant; and their decisive conduct quickly forced *the beast of prey* to throw off all disguise, and to appear in his native character of cowardice and cruel rapacity.

Prepared as we now are to view the foe in his true colours, and to appreciate the real cause of quarrel, we have but little to fear. Facts and experience have clearly proved to the Canadians, that in the present war, they must continue to defend all that makes life desirable, against a foe deficient in civil and military virtues. When we go forth to the battle against such an enemy, devoid of that magnanimity and that moderation in victory, which habits of success and strict discipline alone can produce, we ought to resolve to prefer death to defeat,—extermination, to the idea of dragging out a remnant of existence, exposed to the tyranny and scorn of numberless upstarts. When we reflect upon the avowed policy and conduct of the rulers and generals of the United States, and upon the genius and circumstances of the subordinate agents of their will, we become convinced that the expected contest will be very similar to that of a peaceable householder against a band of nocturnal robbers. I will maintain, that our feelings, upon the occasion, should resemble those of an honest man attacked, in the dwellings of his fathers, by a banditti, as poor, rapacious and insatiable as any “band of fierce barbarians from the hills, *rushing* like a torrent down upon the vales, sweeping flocks and herds.”

But let us endeavour calmly to consider what we shall be called upon to defend: First, the honour of our Country;—our enemy has, for years, employed every insulting epithet which language could furnish against Great Britain: his venal presses, conducted by renegades, in defiance of history and experience, continually accuse her of bad faith and boundless oppression;—and shall our Country's honor not rouse us to action? This however will only be a collateral cause. American demagogues bring the war, after long vilifying our Parent State, and degrading our own character into that of disaffected subjects, they advance to inflict the last outrage upon honorable feeling, by offering to protect us as British rebels! Yes, they will kindly conquer our Country from Britain, and make us pay the expense of winning and preserving it. They will deign to suffer one part of us to fight by their side; another to make their roads and canals, or to drain their marshes and clear their lands; a third to hew wood and draw water for them. Yes, Countrymen, the above is but a faint picture of what we might expect from that weak, cowardly, cruel and suspicious faction, which threatens to reduce us to the wretched situation of the remnant of the ancient population of Louisiana.

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When their base myrsmidons therefore dare to violate the asylum of loyalty, virtue and true courage, let them be met with those feelings and energies which a sacred cause should inspire. Let every man think, that his individual efforts may happily contribute to maintain the honor of the King whom he loves, and to preserve from pollution all those blessings, which the God whom he adores has bestowed : —Let him think, that, in no circumstances, can his person be more meritoriously exposed, than in defending the Religion, the Laws, the Property,—the common benefits of Britons.

Impressed with such ideas, we shall form a sacred band, capable of contending against far greater numbers of men, who cannot possibly have motives of equal power to stimulate them to deeds of valour. The man who fights in defensive war seems inspired by Heaven, with a peculiar energy and firmness, which love of plunder and desire of revenge, the ordinary motives of assailants, can never produce. We shall individually act from a lasting conviction of necessity; the national cause will be felt as personal, by each of us. Our invaders, on the contrary, supposing them regular troops, will act mostly in obedience to the temporary impulse of a leader's command. But, farther, what are those mercenaries? Are they not chiefly emigrants from all countries, trepanned into the service? and can such men, in military virtues, ever become equal to British Subjects and Soldiers, defending their families, their lives, their property and their Country's honor?

But the men with whom we are commonly menaced are raw volunteers;—vain youngsters generally, who talk of a battle as they would of some frolic,—who all wish to command, but have never learned to obey, and whom the slightest disaster will force to reflect upon the folly and wickedness of an enterprise, for which not one rational or laudable motive can be alledged. It is indeed no trivial advantage on our side, that the more we consider the nature of our cause, the more shall we prize it; while reflection must disgust our enemy with his. Though vain-glory may dazzle his soldiers at first, time and experience will soon dissipate its false lustre, changing their eagerness into apathy; and, instead of fighting desperately for Canadian plunder, they may possibly pillage their employers.

To conclude, in every contest, our enemies' weakness constitutes a part of our strength; and, when we reflect upon the various and conflicting opinions and interests which prevail among the people of the United States, we may be allowed to doubt whether any cause except that of defending their friends could heartily unite them. No such cause characterises on their part the present war; and accordingly in its declaration and prosecution I have hitherto viewed them as necessarily a divided people. But let us be prepared for *the worst that can be feared from the malignity of the American Government; and let us thank God, that, if we must shed human blood, it shall not*

be for vain-glory, but in defence of the dearest rights of humanity,—
in a cause, which, appearing in every light, to deserve success, may,
without presumption, be expected to obtain it.

N° XII.

MONTREAL, 11th FEBRUARY, 1813.

General Recapitulation and Conclusion.

The present Number will serv to recapitulate the leading ideas which my own meditations, and an attention to public feeling and to passing events have produced, since I began to assist in exciting enquiry into our means of resisting menaced invasion.

Till ascertained by facts, the vigorous efforts of Britain in order to protect us, must be inferred from her transcendent reputation for enlightened policy and national honor ; from her powerful exertions in our behalf during the American rebellion ; and from the apparent facility with which her vast resources and naval superiority, enable her to perform the important duty of defending her distant dependencies.

The means likely to be employed have been suggested, such as a reinforcement of at least Ten Thousand regular troops, with the usual accompaniments and supplies, and a formidable fleet, to blockade the enemy's principal sea-ports, and to keep his whole coast in alarm. In addition to those, we have a right to expect, that numerous expedients will be adopted by such a powerful and experienced nation as Britain, when called upon, by her dearest interests and sacred honor, to a vigorous prosecution of the war ; and, in short, that her whole course of measures will be eminently calculated to paralise the efforts and destroy the resources, of the present weak and worthless administration of the United States.

After thus laying the proper stress upon the powerful protection of the Parent State, the attention of my Readers was called to a view of "*the internal resources of the Canadas, arising from the character of their population and institutions, their local situations and other circumstances.*"

Patriotism and military spirit were ascribed to the French Canadians, as proved by a reference to the history of their Country, and to the acknowledged characteristics of every people in similar

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circumstances. It was suggested with deference that the principal advantage to be drawn from that important part of our population, would be found in their aptitude for partisan warfare; and that, in no probable circumstances, might it be proper to employ above one sixth of such as are subject to militia-service, in regular hostility. The religious and civil institutions of the Lower Province were asserted to be admirably calculated to call forth the whole energies of the French Canadians, in defence of their Country; and the sources of their well-founded antipathy to the American Government, were carefully explored.

The character of the rest of the population of both Provinces was afterwards reviewed; and their feelings and interests were considered as promising what has strikingly appeared during the late campaign; an invincible energy in rallying round the government and in promoting its measures. The loyalists, British settlers and their descendants, in Upper Canada, have had glorious opportunities of contributing to defend their country and the honor of their King, against the worst enemies of both.

The advantages derivable from the local situation of the Canadas were next adverted to. A knowledge of the best military posts and positions was ascribed to the Provincial Government; and anticipations are hazarded of various precautions and expedients, commonly employed against an invading force. An attention to all such posts and positions as had once been chosen and fortified by French Engineers was humbly recommended, as well as a careful study of the conduct and events of the French and English campaigns in this Country.

The internal resources of the Canadas, with respect to provisions were slightly inspected; and inferences were drawn favorable to their ability, with a reasonable degree of aid from Britain, to furnish subsistence, during a long war. Our native supplies of timber, iron and hemp, all necessary for the building of a river-flotilla, were justly considered of great importance.

After a passing remark upon the necessity of unceasing protection and encouragement to the internal trade of the Country, I began, with a trembling hand, to sketch my expectations from the personal character and influence of our Governor General, in doing which I attempted, though in vain, by glowing colours, to display the enthusiasm of the whole population, as manifested on every occasion, by addresses and other publications, as well as by oral expression. While performing this interesting part of my task, a variety of opinions fell insensibly from my pen, which marked the spirit of the times, and were found congenial to the general feeling.

Then came a selection of facts, illustrative of "*the goodness of our cause, rendering us unanimous and strong against an enemy weakened by disunion.*" The provoking policy of the democratic faction, in the United States, was traced from the peace of 1783, to the late declaration of war; and its invariable subserviency to France, under every form of government, was attempted to be pourtrayed. And now, after my late display of the peculiar feelings which the goodness of our cause seems calculated to inspire, let me hasten to the conclusion of the whole speculation.

From all that has been brought forward upon the present occasion, I shall take upon myself to submit to my Readers the following inferences, facts and opinions :

1st—Great Britain is more capable of defending distant dependencies, than any other nation mentioned in history; and we have every reason to believe, that she is as willing as she is able to protect this Country.

2nd—The Canadas, containing a patriotic population of four hundred and fifty thousand souls, and possessing many advantages in soil, agriculture, commerce and local situation, have consequently internal resources and means of resistance superior to most of the other British Colonies.

3rd—The resources drawn from the Parent State, on the scale of a peace establishment, and those derived from this Country, have, by skilful management, been found adequate to render abortive repeated attempts to invade these Provinces; and, particularly in Lower Canada, the late campaign was "*honorably terminated, without effusion of blood, without loss of territory, and without interruption to the most important habits of peace, by a recourse to martial law.*"

4th—As a contrast to the zeal, docility and confidence, displayed by our soldiers and armed population, the armies of the United States, during the present contest have frequently shown a spirit of insubordination; and, while the talents and judicious arrangements of our Governor General and his officers have been fully evinced, incapacity has been seen to prevail in the land-service of our enemy, through every department.

5th—Projects of unjustifiable aggrandizement being now completely developed on the part of the United States' Government, a salutary jealousy and vigilance will be henceforth cherished by the administration of the Parent State; and they will doubtless never expose this Country again to the possibility of being at least partially occupied by an enemy that could bring an army of 50,000 men.

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6th—From such considerations, it may be fairly supposed, that even were the people of the United States unanimously resolved to attack the Canadas, the conquest must be purchased at a rate far beyond its value to them. It is indeed more than probable that Britain is both able and willing to defend these Provinces, for ever, against the united strength of all her foes. The possession of this Country even as a military post, would be worthy of the ambition of a great maritime power; and, after the case of Gibraltar, we may prognosticate the fate of Quebec, and, in general, reckon upon a firm adherence to the policy of defending to the last extremity, every distant establishment, associated in the minds of Britons, with national glory and commercial greatness.

7th—The Canadas should be always viewed in conjunction with the whole of the Transatlantic dominions of Britain; in which light they assume a much higher degree of importance than if otherwise considered. Particularly during hostilities with the United States, the supplies generally furnished to the British West Indies and Newfoundland fisheries, by the Canadas and by the other British North-America Colonies, become doubly valuable; and consequently the efforts of the Parent State should be vigorously and promptly applied, in order to prevent that interruption to agriculture, commerce and inland navigation, which the mere apprehension of invasion is sufficient to produce.

8th—The British North-American Colonies and particularly the Canadas, by the enlightened policy of the Mother Country, have been gradually raised to importance,—affording a growing market to British manufactures, extensive employment to British Shipping, Seamen and Capital,—furnishing likewise valuable supplies of naval stores;—and, in short, by their general industry and commerce, materially contributing to the national power, revenue and splendor of the Parent State,

9th—From the above view of the colonial importance of this Country, it may be reasonably expected, that the Government of the British Empire will not confine their exertions to the mere prevention of its conquest; but that they will extend such powerful protection as may enable the industry of the male population to preserve the habits and exercise the arts of peace,

10th—The most likely means of obtaining those ends, are, such an establishment of regular troops as would preclude any fears of a temporary occupation of any part of our territory;—such a defence of the navigation of the Saint Lawrence as would render the lumber and provision trade practicable;—such a navy upon the lakes as would insure the superiority to Britain;—and, lastly, such a vigorous prosecution of

the war, upon the enemy's coast, as, by destroying his trade, interrupting his industry, exhausting his resources, and harassing his troops, must inevitably reduce him to reasonable terms, in a few months, or, at least, give him full employment in defending his own, instead of attacking another Country.

A QUERIST.

NOTE A. Page 20.

APRIL 10, 1813.

It is therefore with the utmost satisfaction, that the Querist has seen the Campaign of 1813, opened by the destruction of the important fortress of Ogdensburg. This measure was equally politic in its plan; and brilliant in its issue. The fortunate result, for which we are indebted to a handful of brave men, promises to secure, during the remainder of the campaign, the free and uninterrupted communication of the two provinces; rendering the conveyance of all sorts of stores, ammunition, troops, and even commerce, almost as safe as before the commencement of hostilities.—The free and unmolested navigation of the Saint Lawrence below Quebec, we may depend on, as a necessary consequence of the superior naval armament on the coast, and of that part of it which we may reasonably expect to extend to the gulf.

NOTE B. Page 26.

APRIL 10, 1813.

To these reasons for confidence in the Chief under whom we have the good fortune to be placed, I cannot omit this opportunity of adding another.

Nothing affords a stronger proof of the true greatness of a character, than a liberal and magnanimous line of conduct towards those who are necessarily to be considered as enemies, and against whose hostile encroachments the most vigorous measures must be pursued. The illiberal treatment of an enemy in those circumstances in which it can neither add to our own strength, nor to his weakness, has always been justly esteemed a feature of inferior characters. The talents that are fitted to govern with wisdom, to defend a country from foreign aggression, and to secure the approbation of posterity, are never known, even while they repel every attack with judgment and decision, either to injure the defenceless, or insult the conquered.

In this respect, I cannot too strongly express my approbation of the conduct which Sir George Prevost has uniformly pursued towards the private subjects of the United States. The treatment shown to those who happened, in pursuit of commercial purposes, or otherwise, without any ill design, to be in the Province at the time of the declaration of war, was liberal and even indulgent. In proof of this, I need only refer to the different Proclamations, which extended, time after time, the period fixed for their removal; evincing a solicitous attention to their circumstances; and to the friendly purposes for which they had entered the Province; and finally leaving it in their power to remain on the most easy conditions possible in the present state of affairs.

The treatment experienced, in like manner; by the numerous prisoners who have been taken, has been worthy of a great and an enlightened power. The polite attention shown to the American officers, and the humane treatment experienced by the prisoners, are well known; and, notwithstanding some unworthy returns, it is hoped, will never be discontinued. Although this liberality has, in some cases, been ungenerously returned, and, in one instance, shamefully denied,* and the contrary charge set up; such an accusation falls light on the brazen shield of conscious integrity and unsullied honor:

It is curious to observe how generally the Americans have branded our fighting in concert with the Indians, as an alliance shocking to humanity; while nothing can be more certain, than that the sole effect of this connection, is to save the lives of our enemies. As the Indians, as well as *we*, must defend themselves; the only consequence of their fighting in a different field from us, would be, that, according to their received customs, they would tomahawk all who might come in their way, sparing neither age, sex, nor condition, nor listening to any terms of surrender. As things are, the presence and authority of a British force, secures the lives of all who are defenceless, and all who surrender. For thus saving the lives of our enemies, we are branded as unchristian; and threatened with EXTERMINATION.

Such humane endeavors, on the part of our Commander; on the part of his officers and men, to soften the furious rage of war, and of a war into which we were forced in spite of every effort to preserve peace, can never be too highly admired, nor too confidently praised:

* See the Montreal Herald for April 10, on "American generosity."

