





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

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P A R T I.

THE making war and peace are the *ardua regni*; the most important matters in which a state can be engaged. The first ought not to be undertaken rashly, nor the other patched up indiscreetly. Though the end of war be peace, too eager a desire of concluding it, generally produces a bad peace, and invites fresh injuries: likewise too great an aversion to war causes the loss of friends, and incites the insults of enemies. A state that would preserve the esteem of its neighbours must take care, that it does not shew too much patience under national affronts, nor too great a promptitude to reconciliation upon easy terms. The motto of a respectable power ought to be, *nemo in impune laesse*. Severe chastisement ought to follow, yanton breach of faith, and petulant insult. Where it does not, contempt must succeed, and provocation tread closely on her heels. The drawn sword, if it returns into the scabbard without blushing with blood, will blush with shame.

It was observed by a politician at the beginning of this century, that the French court has always treated this nation, as if the genius of France had gained the ascendancy of the genius of England. If he had said, that French money has always gain'd the ascendancy of English probity, his maxim would have been much more *a propos*. The great *D^r War* somewhere observes, that the courts of sovereign princes are all corrupt; but that there is none upon the face of the earth so corrupt as the English. If he had lived now, how little cause would he have had for this reflection under our present philosophic minister, whose breast glows with nothing but patriotism! but may not philosophers and patriots be mistaken?

After providence hath blessed our arms with such a series of signal successes, that this nation never experienced before, to resign our conquests, and to put ourselves into the power of our most implacable enemies, would seem to vulgar capacities, and to common apprehensions, one of the most extraordinary

events, that ever will be recorded in history, and the most unaccountable policy: but to philosophical genii, who have studied principles of that modern Machiavel the *Abbé Mably*, it may appear, that the scourging an insolent, turbulent foe, gently, is the way, to acquire political respect, and security; and *that it is much better to be a weak state, than the most powerful and predominant; because being in a capacity, to chastise any insolent enemy, is the way to lose all your friends*: whereas all the politicians besides, since the days of Adam, have taught, that to acquire the power of punishing insults is the way to prevent them; and that he, who thinks to gain his enemy by lenity and condescension, will find himself the dupe as well as the victim of his moderation. But the French *fox* has had the confidence, to think, he may gull some English goose with his absurd system; for surely, he could never publish it, for the use of any other nation: hence this is the doctrine, which has been for some time past retailed to the public, by the advocates of the minister, and may be considered as his, or what he pretends to be his, to cover something worse.

From whomsoever received or by whomsoever dictated, it is pretty clear, that the preliminaries of peace have not met with the approbation of our minister, and have been published to the nation with his acquiescence. At the same time no one can doubt but the sanction they have met with in P——t is the consequence of his influence. However, as P——es and their ministers, are conscious to themselves, that they are liable to err; as P——ts and their resolutions are not infallible, some of those preliminaries have been communicated no doubt for public examination, observation and sentiment. If so such conduct is prudent, for, *nemo omnibus horis sapit*. At the same time several arguments have been advanced in support of those preliminaries, under the patronage, as generally supposed, of the minister; all which appear, to be an address, or appeal, to the people for their acquiescence with the propriety of them. If this be not the case, why such a multitude of *Auditors, Britons, &c.* published to the world? if the assent of the people to the propriety of them be not desired, why are arguments used, to obtain it? if the people be indulged so far by the executive power, as to be argued with upon this subject, it is implied, that they may freely offer their sentiments in answer to those arguments; in case it should appear to any individual concern'd, that the reasons, advanced in support of the political system recommended, are inconclusive: that is provided it be done with decency, sobriety and good manners. If disputation be admitted on one side and a prohibition of a reply enjoy'd on the other arguing with the people, and communicating the preliminaries

naries, would be the vilest insult on them, the greatest mockery, and like the proceedings of the most wicked of Popish priests.

Though some argue that our princes, as to peace and war may from their prerogative say, *sic volo, sic jubeo, stat pro ratione voluntas*; that their good pleasure is sufficient reason, yet we have been told by rank Tories, when such doctrines serve to cramp a whig king, that our princes formerly never used, nor ought now, to make either peace or war without consulting their people in parliament; and hence we conceive that all preliminaries of peace, when published, may be justly considered, as an appeal to the body of the people, as well as to the senate: for after their publication and deliberation had thereon, surely the people have a right to address and instruct their members with regard to them, and to request that they would address and advise his majesty according to the public sentiments: and still the more especially so, as Machiavel the prince of politicians observes, *that the people are seldom in the wrong in states matters, and the courts of princes scarce ever in the right*. Besides, we have known the time in this kingdom, when a majority in p—t has been under the corrupt influence of a treacherous court, and a foreign power, conspiring with them, to overturn the liberties, religion, commerce and constitution of this nation.

This right of the people to instruct their members has been the language of all the old whigs ever since the revolution; witness the famous Kentish petition to p—t in the reign of William the third; witness the language of all the pretended country party ever since the accession of the *Hanover* family to the throne: and though the Jacobites and Tories never inculcated this doctrine, but with intent to promote their evil designs, and to overturn and dethrone a whig-king, yet the reason of the practice is never the worse, any more than truth would lose its force by coming from the mouth of the d——l. If the people have not a right to signify their sentiments to their deputies to parliament, and their deputies to address the throne relative thereto, to what purpose, to appeal to the people for their sentiments with regard to any political transactions? There is no use in making them public, if this be not admitted; and how necessary this is, the observations on the mistakes, omissions, &c. of the preliminaries which have already appeared will fully evince.

In order that the people may be liable to form some judgment of the late negotiations relative to a peace; and to address their representatives in parliament accordingly, we are going to lay before them some observations on the arguments offered to the public in defence of those negotiations and the preliminaries

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naries of peace signed by the powers at war : Because we consider those preliminaries, as being only preparatory to a definitive treaty of peace, which may follow, or not, as the contracting powers or parties shall agree. We shall offer no more by way of introduction, but come immediately to the specification of the reasons which have been used for concluding a peace upon the terms laid down in the preliminaries. The principal arguments, which have been advanced, by the advccates for a peace on the conditions stipulated by the powers at war, are as follow :

- I. That the French would not make peace, unless we surrendered our conquests;
- II. That the French were in good circumstances, and well able to continue the war, notwithstanding their defeats and losses.
- III. That we were exhausted and impoverished by the war, our state debts become intolerable, our people burden'd more than the French; that the enemy would ruin us if the war continued, and that we could not raise the supplies.
- IV. That our successes were owing entirely to our good fortune, and neither to our strength nor good conduct.
- V. That our conquests, if we retained them, would become a burden and nuisance to us, by drawing off hands to garrison, defend and improve them.
- VI. That Spain was become our enemy, and that it was necessary to make peace in order to save our ally the king of Portugal.
- VII. That our trade would be ruined by the war, through high wages, so many people were taken from the plough, the loom, and the anvil.
- VIII. That our neighbours were growing jealous of our conquests, and of our increasing power and riches; and would not consent, that we should keep our acquisitions.
- IX. That settlements on the *Terra firma* of New Spain and in their isles would ruin us, by filling us too full of wealth and riches.
- X. That we ought to surrender our conquests, to shew that we are not inspired with ambitious views, and to prove our moderation.
- XI. That humanity requires us to make peace on the present terms offered by the French, to prevent the effusion of human blood.
- XII. That we ought to make peace, to free ourselves from continental connexions, and the German war.
- XIII. That we ought to embrace the terms of peace offered by

the

the French, because they are safe, advantageous, and honourable.

These are the principal arguments, which have been advanced by the advocates for an immature peace. When we compare all those maxims, principles and arguments together, we shall find, that they form such a hodge-podge, such a chaos of inconsistency, contradiction, incongruity, and nonsense, that a man of humanity and benevolence will be scarce able to reflect on them, without a sigh, over either the depravity and profligacy of mankind, or over their excessive ignorance and stupidity. Upon consideration from whence these contradictions have issued, and the circumstances relative to them; a man must be possessed of super-eminent charity, to believe, that such glaring absurdities can be merely the effect of the weakness of the human understanding, and a mistaken regard for the public welfare: and that neither passion, prejudice, interest, artifice, nor any other sinister views, have any share in such suggestions. However this be in the present case, we conceive, in general, false arguments are more the issue of corrupt hearts, than of weak heads; and acquiescence with them most commonly the consequence of indolence and sloth, that had rather blindly consent and adopt, than boldly doubt and examine; because this last costs some pains and trouble.

Besides, knaves have agreed to give the specious appellation of a virtue to such blind submission and implicit assent; and have called it modesty, and humility; and its contrary impudence, pride, conceit, arrogance, vanity, opposition to public wisdom, rebellion, disloyalty, and the like. All this has been done to deceive mankind, and to terrify or coax them into submission, as well as to deter them from inquiry, and to prevent doubt, which is the first step to knowledge.

However, the arguments advanced by ministerial advocates, and the French party, form a system of incompatibility, repugnance, and contradiction. Like the *Cadmean* crop of armed men, they combat with and destroy each other. No wonder, since they are the teeth of that dragon, that old serpent, false *Reason*, that seduced our grandmother Eve, sown among us by his agents, in order to support his interest and empire. The first six of the above arguments are clearly opposite and repugnant to the seven last, and consequently the seven last are an absolute contradiction to the spirit and tenor of the six first. To such wretched shifts are the French party, ministerial advocates, and the enemies of truth driven, to support a bad cause. We doubt not but we shall convince the reader of the truth of these suggestions in the sequel. Having said thus much upon the purport of the arguments in general, we come now to consider each particularly.

Argu. I. The first argument, which has been offered by the ministerial advocates for an immature peace, that I shall consider at present, is, *that the French would not make peace unless we surrendered our conquests; or that we must surrender our conquests, because the enemy will not make peace without it.* If there be any reason or argument in this, it proves too much; namely, that we ought never to go to war to preserve our rights and possessions: for if, in pursuing a just war, we make acquisitions, and it is at any time expedient to give them up to the enemy, in order to obtain peace, only, because he declares he will not make peace without them; then it will be still more expedient, at all times, to yield to him any territories he shall please to claim, in order to preserve peace; because, by such conduct, we shall save all the loss and expence of a war, and be in a better condition than we shall be at the end of such war, if the enemy shall please to insist on the terms for which he began it: For, by the argument, we must yield to him whatsoever he may require, because he declares he will not make peace without it.

2dly, Besides the most despicable cowardice and nigardliness are implied in the argument, For if there be a nation that will venture more, expend more, and suffer more distress, in order to destroy the religion, liberties, and commerce of its neighbours, to subdue them to its obedience, and to bring them under its yoke and dominion, than such neighbouring states will venture or undergo to vindicate, protect and secure such rights and blessings; certainly, politically considered, such proud ambitious and aspiring nation deserves empire, and to command such cowardly mean, paltrous states, who are afraid to expend their blood and treasure in defence of their independency, and hence, who are fit only to be hewers of wood, and drawers of water to such a brave and warlike people.

A reflection of this kind naturally brings to one's mind the story of *Perseus* king of *Macedon*. The Romans were preparing to make war upon this monarch, which caused him to enter into a treaty of subsidy and alliance with the king of *Illyricum*. He likewise contracted with the *Basternæ*, a warlike nation, for 10,000 cavalry, as mercenaries, at a certain stipend or price. As soon as he heard, that the *Illyrican* king had committed hostilities against the Romans, it was insinuated by his minions, "that this prince was necessitated to continue his firm ally," upon which he countermanded the waggon loads of money, he had lent to support him, and left him a prey to the enraged Romans. He likewise higgled with the *Basternæ* about their pay and wanted to abate them of what he had promised, upon which they returned to their own country. In this manner his minions and flatterers advised him, under the pretence of frugality, and

to save expences; but in reality, in order that there might be the more for those harpies to divide among themselves.

The consequence was, the Romans attacked, defeated and took this ill advised monarch prisoner, with all his treasures, which he had left; carried him and his family captives to Rome, where they were led in chains, to grace the victors triumph, and where the monarch died miserably in prison. The nobles and gentry were disarm'd, and summon'd by the victor to attend his pleasure: he ordered his soldiers to surround them and cut them to pieces; afterwards, plundered and stripped the country of all its money and rich movables; and then reduced it to a Roman province. God grant that no schemes offered by evil counsellors, to cover wicked, corrupt and treasonable designs, under the specious pretext of frugality and to save expences; may ever afford the French an opportunity of reducing our most gracious sovereign King George III. to such a lamentable fate, and wretched condition.

3dly, The question is not, whether the French will or will not make peace, without our surrendering our conquests; but whether political justice, equity and prudence require us to make such surrenders. *Machiavel*, *Grotius* and *Puffendorf* are all against such conduct: even the inconsistent *Mably* opposes it, who, like the rest of the superficial French writers, seldom scribbles many pages, without contradicting himself, and undermining the system, he seems to labour and professedly endeavours to establish.

With regard to the surrender of our conquests we should ask ourselves the following questions, 1st, whether political prudence does not require us to keep such conquests, as an indemnification for the expences of the war? 2dly, Whether, as war is an appeal to heaven, heaven has not declared, as well as earth, that we have justice of our side, by blessing our arms with success? 3dly, Whether this success, that ministerial advocates, and French agents, prophanely ascribe to accident, chance, and good fortune, has not been owing to a good Providence which has declared in our favour, pronounced our cause just, and blessed it accordingly; and hence, whether God has not himself declared our right to our conquests? 4thly, Whether the retention of our conquests is not necessary to secure our religion, liberties, and commerce, against the violence, spite, and superstition of the French? and hence, Whether it is not, in some degree, a renunciation of God and religion, to give them up to our enemies? 5thly, Whether the retention of our conquests will not diminish the naval power of France, and augment our own? 6thly, Whether, if we give up our conquests, France will not be superior to us in power? and whether we shall not be supe-

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ner to France in power and strength by retaining them? 7thly, We ought to ask ourselves this question too, *viz.* Whether we or France shall have the superiority, be not a dispute worth contending for during a seven years war? and whether it would not be worth while to expend a hundred millions more to acquire such superiority, and the security which would thence result? 8thly, Whether it is not improbable, that France should hold out much longer, as she is already reduced to make a defensive war, in which she is still a loser? and as she is become a bankrupt, and all her funds fail, and her navy is destroyed? 9thly, Whether, in one year's time, we should not have cut off the communication between *New Spain* and *Old*; and consequently have stop't up all the fountains of the French and Spanish war; destroyed the trade of both states, hav'z cut off intalibly all their resources and supplies, and have turned the stream of their riches into our own reservoirs? and hence have obliged them to come to what terms we should have thought reasonable? 10thly, Whether, as God has declared our cause to be just, by blessing our arms hitherto, we have not reason to expect the continuance of his favour? nay, whether we have not a moral certainty of it?

The answer to all these queries ought to be in the affirmative. This is as clear as the light, and this we shall endeavour to evince in the course of the following pages.

11thly, A nation, which is at war with another, is either superior, equal, or inferior, in power. If it be naturally inferior, we cannot suppose it would go to war, but is attacked; unless it can gain some considerable confederates, or has some advantage in circumstances which render it superior. We are in one of the three predicaments. To be sure in some respects, we are inferior to France; in others superior, in most, pretty nearly equal; and perhaps only inferior in the power of raising an equal number of troops, which deficiency may be compensated by hiring foreign troops, through our superior public credit. However, we will allow on the whole, that France was something superior in power to this nation, before the present war. But by our good conduct in attacking their fish-ships by the advice of my Lord *Anson*, and their own stupidity in marching into, and making a parade of, an army in Germany, we gained a superiority over them. If France before the war was superior to England, as 4 is to three, England by her conquests, has diminished the power of France at least one, and added so much to her own power, as she has taken from France. Hence it follows, that the present power of England is to that of France, as four to three: and if the war were to continue but one year longer; as we should take at least from her one sixth more of her

her power, by cutting off her supplies from New Spain, &c. the power of England, to that of France, would be as 18 to only 10. But, as we cannot raise any great land armies, the states on the continent would have no occasion to fear our increase of strength by the diminution of that of France, whom only they have reason to dread, and whose power still, by land, would be formidable to them, from their natural turbulency, and contiguity.

The seizure of the French fish ships was the foundation of all our success; which the spirited conduct of Mr. Pitt has improved to a degree this nation never experienced before. But as the power, we have gained, was acquired by accident originally; and as it has taught our enemies to use the same art against us, which we employed against them, this instructs us to preserve the predominancy, we have acquired, in order to preserve our security for the future.

As then we are now the predominant power in fact; by having detracted from the power of France, and added to our own; the bare question, whether we ought to keep our conquests, or to surrender them, and to give another power, our enemy, the predominancy, is a *Bull*. Conquests imply superiority in the possessor, who made them, and a power to keep as well as to acquire them; and an inferiority in the state from whom they were obtained. But a declaration of a power, from whom such conquests were made, *that it will not make peace, unless such conquests are surrendered*, is the language of conquerors, of victors, not of a broken, beggar'd enemy, and must be considered, as a ridiculous *Bully*, to intimidate a weak administration; and as the last effort of a state once formidable, which feels its impotence, and confides in the reputation it once had; and hence thinks that the opinion of its former power, will operate the same effects, as the real power did, when it was actually possessed of it. Hence too the French affect to treat us, as the *Romans* did the *Carthaginians*; that is, to dictate to us terms of peace; though they are vanquished. We know that from the intestine treachery of some of the principal *Carthaginians*, who clamoured for an infamous peace with Rome, and who impeded the supplies and the support of the war, what were the fatal consequences. We have great reason to fear, that some of the same consequences will soon betide this nation, if the preliminaries be improved into a peace.

There is such a repugnancy in making conquests, and in making voluntary surrenders, that nothing, but great superiority possessed or acquired by a conquering power, can justify its making any surrenders; no state should ever yield up any thing to another power, but what it does not want, cannot keep, would be useless to it, or the keeping of which would lessen its powers.

power. However this be, no power ever resigns useful conquests, but by compulsion, as all examples both in ancient and modern history testify. If none of our conquests were necessary to our security; if, after a surrender of our acquisitions to the French, we should continue still superior to them in political power and strength; and should have nothing to fear from their restless ambition, mischievous temper, or religious spite; I should have much less to say against a resignation of the *codfishery*, *Louisiana*, and their *Carribbee sugar islands*. But whilst our possession of all these appear, to be absolutely necessary, to give us a superiority over the French, and to secure to us our religion, liberty, commerce, and independency, every good Englishman must feel both grief and indignation at the thought of those surrenders.

If a state by accident has obtained a superiority over its natural and implacable enemy, such state ought to risque all to preserve it; because its success must naturally irritate an enemy; who has always conceived itself superior, and yet is vanquished; to meditate and seek sudden and severe revenge. We doubt not but we shall soon find this maxim verified in the conduct of the French to our cost: We may consider this to be the case with regard to powers at enmity, who have only civil and political rage, hatred, and revenge, to animate them: But, when a proud, vexatious, covetous, encroaching, turbulent, and unjust state has its civil animosity enflamed by superstitious spite and abhorrence, it becomes ten times more necessary for its opponent, to preserve any superiority it may have acquired; to strain every nerve, and to exert every faculty to keep its conquests, which alone can render its being secure. If we be superior, we can keep. if we surrender our conquests we shall be inferior. If we be but equal, we ought to keep them, in order to obtain a superiority; the nature of our government requires it.

5thly, The declaration of the French, *that they will not make peace, unless we surrender our conquests*, and the conclusion hence drawn, that for this reason, we ought to make such surrenders; if these things prove that we ought to make peace on such terms, they prove likewise not only, that we ought tamely to submit to any encroachments, and to comply with any claims to prevent war; but also, if the French shall please to require it, that we ought to surrender to them *Canada*, *Nova Scotia*, *Cape Breton*, *Placentia*, *Senegal*, half *St. Kir's*, and all the countries from the *Apalacian hills* to the *South Seas*: For all these countries were once in their possession; and if we are not able to resist an unjust, ridiculous, insolent, impertinent, and unreasonable claim in one case, how shall we in the other?

If the French were to proceed, and in the next place demand

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Newfoundland and its fishery, according to these gentlemen, we must comply. Further, if they require our *Sugar islands* for themselves, and *Gibraltar* and *Minorca* for their allies the Spaniards, we must conform to those severe injunctions likewise. Nay, if as soon as a peace is concluded, if the French should declare, that, in case we do not put *Portsmouth* and the *Tower* of London into their hands, they will forthwith denounce war against us; by this argument of the French party, and our ministerial advocates; we ought instantaneously to comply: Because otherwise, they will put us under a necessity of carrying on a war against them, whilst we are loaded with the enormous weight of 140 millions of national debt, and there is no more possibility of raising the supplies, to carry on such a war, any more, than there was in the year 1763. But pray how does such reasoning sound? May not this actually be the case? Nay, have we not accounts already, that the French are meditating a fresh war, and transporting near 25,000 troops to their colonies? If this should happen, with what an air would such arguments appear? What must the cause be, where its advocates are driven to such wretched shifts, to find arguments for its defence?

6thly, All the principal powers in Europe may insult us with impunity; for, according to these gentlemen, we are not able to make war with, or to defend our rights against, a bankrupt nation, that has lost three fourths of all its foreign trade, and two thirds of its navy to us; whose armies are flying before our victorious troops, and whose battalions have perished in the morassy camps of Germany during this war, like rotten sheep in a humid winter. What absurdity! It would be much nobler, and acting with more spirit and dignity to frankly tell us "My patrons have made a peace according to their inclinations, and value not a fig, whether the good people of England like it or not; for we have 319 to 65, who approve of it, and a party of 70,000 S——ts in the a——y and n——y, to support our will and pleasure." But to hum us with such arguments as above, is adding insult to abuse, and mockery to treachery.

Before a war begins, an enemy may with as much reason, demand any part of your territories, which may be convenient for his affairs, or agreeable to his caprices; as insist on any surrender of your conquests, when by your good fortune, or superior power, you have obtained any such. When you have been successful in war, it is seldom, that your conquests are worth the expence you have been at in acquiring them. If then you are forced into a war by an insolent, ambitious, and avaricious enemy, you have a right to an indemnification for all your expences, out of the spoils of your enemies, and ought to retain your conquests on that account.

Besides you bring contempt on yourselves and provoke Injuries by not punishing the insolent invader of your rights, by stripping him of part of his territories for his unjust attacks. Nothing can render a prince more contemptible, than resignations of his acquisitions in such cases; unless his power be so great, that he stands in no need of such acquisitions, either to render him superior to all his enemies, to preserve peace in futurity, or to ease the burdensome taxes, which his petulant enemies have brought on his subjects by their violation of justice and the law of nations. Neither honour, justice to his people, nor their security will permit such surrenders. Who would not buffet a cowardly prince and people who would receive affronts, and suffer invasions without obtaining satisfaction for the injuries offered them? Public and national injustice can never be atoned for, but by public reparation, and public chastisement and revenge. We do a wrong, not only to ourselves, but to mankind, to suffer an unjust violent people, to insult and abuse their neighbours with impunity, if we are capable of punishing them. In general, between nations, nothing, but the dread of a severe revenge, can restrain injustice and violence; but in a particular manner nothing can bound France but this fear. The taking a complete vengeance, when possible, is the only way to deter wicked princes from the violation of the peace of their neighbours: the omitting it a sure way of bringing a prince and his government into the greatest contempt.

7thly, If the French declare, they will not make peace with us, unless we surrender our conquests, it must either be from an opinion of our weakness, of our timidity, of our cowardice, of our corruption, or of our want of public spirit. As to our strength, we have proved our superiority for a course of seven years past; as to our timidity, our people have discovered none, unless any has been to be found in the purlieus of St. James's: Our *valour* has raised itself to the highest pinnacle of eminence; as to our *public spirit*, we have had no clamour of taxes, but what has been raised by the French party amongst us, and ministerial advocates; for the whole body of the people clamour for a continuance of the war. As to our corruption ——— among ——— and in ——— that is with ——— and through the advancement of ——— to ——— the ——— having been always the enemies of this nation formerly, and rebellious traitors, and Jacobites; and enemies in general to the revolution, and the protestant succession, and Hanover family, ever since the act of settlement took place; whose very presbyterians, we have seen die on the scaffold, for engaging in a rebellion, to advance to the throne their popish idol

idol the pretender, to support the pure doctrines of their *gudly Kirk*.

At such a crisis it is difficult to prevent reflections, on the secret influence of *Monf. Pouffin*, and upon the conduct of that body of patriots called *Poussineers*, from obsuding themselves. The 600,000 *Louis-d'ores* carried to the tower in 1712, to be coined into guineas; the offers made by *Torcy* to the duke of *Marlborough*; the negotiations of *Menager*, and *D'Aumont*: the declaration of *Torcy* over and over, that *Harley* and *Bolingbroke* had a personal interest in making peace; all these circumstances will occur to the mind, by virtue of the associating faculty, whether one will or no. What influence corruption has had in contriving, the *P—l—n—s*, and gaining certain approbation of them, or whether any has been employed, is not for me to determine; but the surrender of our conquests appears a most amazing event; and generally extraordinary events are imputed to extraordinary causes.

8thly, If you are at war, you have either the advantage, the disadvantage, or are upon an equality. If the war be unsuccessful, and you desire peace, you cannot expect to have it, but upon dishonourable and disadvantageous terms. At least this must be the case, with every nation, unless it happens, that any state has a war with the English; for their notions of generosity and moderation, the French say with a sneer, are romantic, and border on heroism in their negotiations of peace and war. But if a state has had vast advantages in war, where is the nation to be found in Europe, that ever surrendered such advantages unless it be England? I can find no such nation; but I can point out several states whose conduct has been the very *Reverse*. But suppose that in a war between two states the advantages on each side were only equal, would the state that was attacked surrender, to the other, all its claims and demands, though ever so unjust and wicked? One can scarce think there is any nation so stupid, upon the face of the earth, as to be guilty of such an absurdity; at least we conceive that a *Samoiede*, or *Hottentot*, would think so. However, there is as much reason for a surrender in this last case, as there is for surrendering your conquests, if you are superior to the enemy, because he declares, *he will not make peace without such surrender*.

In the last war we were neither gainers nor losers, excepting the loss of our honour, in that shameful affair of sending hostages to the French court. How can any one be so absurd as to ascribe civility and politeness to the French nation? They would not take our King's word for the surrender of *Cape-Breton*, but we have been so generous as to accept of only the security of the French King's royal word for the performance of impor-

important covenants. Now to whom does the character of politeness most justly belong? to the rude, unmannerly French, or to the genteel, generous English? But perhaps the French called to mind our perfidious treatment of our allies, at the peace of Utrecht; and hence imagined, that they could not prudently trust such a base treacherous people.

9thly, The last war was very unsuccessful by land; but tho' we gain'd no territory, yet we lost none. Now we are to an astonishing degree, victors and triumph in every quarter of the globe, (amazing!) yet we gain nothing; or at most nothing, but what is so clogged, or compensated for, as to be an acquisition render'd actually worth nothing, nay, much worse than nothing. The ministerial advocates themselves allow, that the French keep *Louisiana*, only to have an opportunity, to harrass our colonies. The *Auditor* and *Briton* by implication acknowledge, that the Fur trade will be all transfer'd to the French on the *Mississippi*; for one avers, "that nothing but the refuse Furs were ever carried by the Northern Indians to *fort Nelson*;" "and that the rest went to the French markets:" and the other says, "that the southern Indians used, to pass by *Albany*, to go with their Furs to the Montreal market." Whoever casts his eyes on the map of North America, will immediately perceive, that the Fur trade, for the very same reasons, will now, by the lakes and the rivers, be transfer'd to the French on the *Mississippi*. Thus we have given up *Louisiana*, for a south sea bubble, though worth more than all Canada with *Senegal* thrown into the Bargain. Fine Politics indeed. However at best out of twenty four parts acquired, we have at least surrender'd twenty three; though if we had kept all, it would scarce have indemnified us for our ninety millions expence extraordinary. But whatever we had surrender'd besides, we ought at least, to have considered the Cod-fishery, all North America, and the French sugar islands, we had conquered, as sacred, and as necessary to our very existence; as their bulky trades would prove a fruitful source of naval strength, as well as of permanent riches, that would pay us the expences of the war, and soon enable us, to discharge the bulk of the national debt. Hence we ought to have retained these with an inflexible obstinacy, and fortitude; with a resolution and courage untameable and invincible; what ever might have been the distresses, to which it would have reduced us. But now we have secured nothing, strange infatuation!

10thly, If the French declare, they will not make peace with us, unless we surrender the Cod-fishery, *Louisiana*, and their sugar islands to them; this amounts to the same thing as telling us, that they will have from us, what they shall think prudent, to claim,

claim. But let us consider, not only the insolence of the demand in itself, but also the circumstances, in which, they are at the time, they enter the claims; *viz.* when they are beaten, and we victors. If they have the impudence, to make such a demand, when they are beaten, what must we expect will be their claims, when they are superior? This language is the language of insolent victors, and implies a threat of destruction to us. If in a war, where they are beaten, they can with propriety claim surrenders, what must their demands be, when they are conquerors? If we must, in point of prudence, comply with their claims to *gain peace*, when they are vanquished, must we not; when they are freed from their present distresses, and restored to their pristine vigor and strength; comply with their unjust and unreasonable demands, to *preserve peace*? What is a cogent reason for one, is likewise a cogent reason for the other. By this conduct the French treat us, as the Romans did the Carthaginians; that is dictate terms of peace when vanquish'd; and this doctrine of surrenders may lead us, to give up one thing after another, as that corrupt people did, till we all become slaves.

Therefore this argument appears to be the most monstrous absurdity.

11thly, If after our obtaining such signal successes in the prosecution of the war; if after our having strengthened ourselves by the acquisitions of such valuable branches of trade as the whole Cod fishery, the trade of Senegal and Goree, the sugar and Indigo trades &c. of all the French-caribbee-sugar-islands, the trade to the east-Indies &c; and if after they have lost all those trades, all their home freight and navigation, and two thirds of their navy; I say if after such success we are unable to continue such a war, as long as they; it were a monstrous absurdity to begin it. But the absurdity is not here, which our success has sufficiently evinced; the absurdity lies in asserting, that they are able to continue it, and that we are not able to retain our possessions, nor to vindicate our conquests. But as our territories on the *Ohio* were invaded, our traders barbarously murdered there, and in other parts of North America, we had certainly sufficient reason and provocation to make reprisals, and commit hostilities against such a perfidious enemy: and the more so, as the French party, and ministerial advocates, tell us, may assure us, "that we want no continental connexions, that the *German* war has been a millstone about our necks, that we are an island severed from the continent by the sea, self sufficient, and able, to maintain our rights, and independency, against all the world, without any assistance, or any allies." But is this self sufficient doctrine consistent with the preachments of the

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French party, " that we want men ; that we are impoverished, " exhausted, and can't raise the supplies for another year's war ; " that we must yield up our most important conquests, because " the French are a more powerful nation than we ? how do these " things agree ?

To begin a war, and to run the risque of spending ninety millions, to save a small trade with the indians behind our back settlements at new York &c ; and after our amazing successes to end this war, without securing our northern colonies in general, is madness instead of prudence : and pray what is the plea for such wrong-headed conduct ? Why we are not able to raise men, furnish supplies, nor bear the national debt, which are necessary to maintain this war against the French and conclude it with advantage and honour ; by gaining the points, for which we contended, and the pledges necessary for preserving our security in futurity. This is in truth saying, that we cannot support our colonies, nor vindicate our foreign possessions and commerce, without ALLIES. But how does this agree with our self sufficiency and natural security ? We cannot keep what our power could acquire, and yet we want no allies, nor can contract any continental connexions, without exposing ourselves to ruin. Is not this palpable contradiction and absurdity, impudence in- read of argument, that merits nothing but the comment of a cudgel ?

If when we began the war, we were inferior in point of power to the French, we should have formed a confederacy to render us equal, before we had commenced such a war, and have been certain of their assistance. If we were neither naturally equal, nor rendered so by accident, nor could procure continental connexions, allies, nor confederates, to make us equal, we ought patiently and tamely, to have submitted to the encroachment of the French ; rather than have exposed ourselves to such an enormous expence, and at last, to give up shamefully our conquests, and that security of our northern colonies, to obtain which, we first began the war. Thus after bullying, blustering, and making a noise all over the world, the *Walpolean*, and *Foxonian* spirit of timidity has seized our councils, and we have surrendered all our conquests *re infecta*, the prize contended for unobtained.

7thly, If we have betrayed every state with whom we have allied ; if we have no hopes of the assistance of allies unless we buy such assistance ; it is certain then, that we must stand alone, and rely on our own power only for our existence. In this case, we have no necessity to exclaim against continental connexions, there is nobody will connect with us but as mercenaries. But if we want men, must we not seek the aid of such mercenaries ? If

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we must not seek such assistance, though we are weaker in men than France; nay, so poor and so weak, that we cannot maintain the war against the French, but must shamefully give up our conquests, why did we attempt a vindication of our rights? If we are weaker than France why did we go to war? If stronger, why did we conclude a peace, without vindicating our rights, revenging our injuries, recovering our expences, and retaining our conquests? If we yield up our conquests we are ninety millions weaker than when we began the war; whilst our ministerial advocates aver, that our enemy is not near so much weakened as we. It follows, that our enemy is bettered by the war, and we made worse. But the real truth is, if we keep our conquests, the enemy will be 100 millions weaker, and we stronger than when we began the war. Our enemies losses have rendered them so much weaker than they were, and we so much stronger that the continuance of the war, but a small time longer must inevitably ruin them; unless ignorance or treachery at home shall sacrifice all our attempts abroad. But ignorant and timid ministers hate war, because they know all miscarriages will be imputed to themselves; and all the scandal, and odium of the taxes necessary to support a war will be laid on their backs. In times of a war the general, the admiral, must possess a share of the princes confidence and favour: but in times of peace, the favourite minister may monopolize the princes confidence, and triumph in his power without a rival; and without the hazard of being displaced, for being foolish or unfortunat. We need not therefore wonder, if we should ever find a timid raw, unexperienced statesman sacrifice the dignity of the crown; and the prosperity of his country, to introduce a peace, that will secure his power, flatter his ambition, and gratify his avarice.

13thly; For the enemy tell us, "That they will make a peace only on such and such terms, or on their own conditions," is the same thing as if before the war, they had declared, that they would have the prosperity of all Nova Scotia, and of all the lands between the Apulacian Mountains and the South Seas granted to them; or that they would attack us. In this case, according to our ministerial advocates and the French party, we ought to have complied with their demands; for this reason, viz. that the French would not grant us peace without such surrenders; because they insist, that they are necessary, convenient and useful for them, but particularly for their navigation.

We ought then never to go to war; for if we must yield to the enemy his claims at one time, we must do it at all times, for the same reason: if then the enemy is weak, we must do it, certainly there is more reason for our doing it when he is strong.

If we fear expence in preserving our rights, we ought never to go to war; for war cannot be carried on without great expence and great taxes to defray it. If we are exhausted, and France stronger, in case we surrender our conquests, we must expect to be attacked again very soon; for what should prevent it? Instead of terrifying our enemy, by lopping off some of his trade and territories, and adding them to our own, we have only brought shame and ignominy upon him, in case we surrender our conquests; and hence we have only irritated him to wipe off the stain, to take revenge, and to punish us for tricking him in the attack of the *Fish-ships*: Thus we have discovered our timidity, imbecillity and poltroonery, and thereby enabled, provoked, and invited a second attack. After tricking and bringing shame upon a powerful enemy, we ought to put it out of his power to take revenge, or to expect destruction, and one vast ruin suddenly to overwhelm us in the sequel. As this must be the natural effect of our conduct and success, nothing but the last necessity and extremity, should induce us to surrender our acquisitions.

14thly, If, with our additional strength from our conquests, and the relative weakness of the enemy from his losses, we cannot keep our acquisitions, how shall we keep our own after our surrenders? That is after our enemy is rendered vastly superior and stronger, and we are become much weaker and inferior? Surely then, we shall be able to hold only at the pleasure of those lords paramount the French. If when we have gained six millions trade *per annum* for ourselves, and taken ten millions from the French, we remain still weaker and unable to maintain and preserve our acquisitions; what must our imbecillity be when we have enfeebled ourselves and strengthened our enemy by our surrenders? If we cannot now keep *Martinico, Guadaloupe, Goree*, and reserve our exclusive right to the Cod-Fishery, how shall we keep *Barbadoes, Jamaica, Canada, Newfoundland, Senegal, &c.* after we have weakened ourselves and strengthened our enemy by the surrender of our present possessions?

If we are not able to resist the first injunctions of our enemy, namely, the surrender of our conquests, when our enemy is so much weaker by the loss of them, as their value amount to, and we so much stronger by the acquisition of them; how is it possible we should be able to resist any demands they shall please to make of us, when we are weakened by our resignation, and they as much more strengthened in proportion by those surrenders as they are in value? If we were unable to retain our conquests when the enemy was weakened and we strengthened, how shall we be able to keep our own ancient possessions, when we are weakened, and the enemy has acquired additional strength?

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This argument is as clear as it is irrefragable: Therefore to tell us, that we are under a necessity of surrendering our conquests to the enemy, is to avér, that our *all* lies at the mercy of the French. What English breast does not feel indignation at the suggestion?

15thly, If our ministerial advocates, and the French party had declared, that it was in our power to keep our conquests, when we had them; and that the enemy was so weak, that we might re-assume them at pleasure, though we had resigned them; there would have been some congruity in their reasoning, though no truth. But, as to the argument, that the enemy would not make peace, unless we surrendered our conquests, and therefore we ought to surrender them, it is pregnant with absurdity, incongruity and destruction. If the French can reasonably make this claim, and are in a condition to support it, we are truly in a most miserable situation. Do we not then want allies and continental connexions, in order to divert the storm, and dissipate the thunder, they are fraught with, and ready to pour down upon us? Or must we resign, if they shall please to demand it, one Possession after another, for the sake of peace, as the Carthaginians did, till at last these Romans shall demand *Portsmouth*, the *Tower of London*, and then set the city of *London* on fire, destroy our merchant-men, carry off our men of war, prohibit our building any more, introduce their idolatry, impose a tribute on us, and having destroyed our navigation, carry off our wool to France to manufacture, and make us plough and sow our fields, and breed cattle to feed them? The resignation of our conquests imply, that all these evils must ensue in a succession of years, if it be fact, that we are under a necessity of making such resignations. But God be praised, that we are under no such necessity, though ministerial advocates, and the French party aver it, in order to pave the way, to introduce the above direful calamities. But will Britons suffer themselves to be seduced by enemies and traitors? No, I hope not; rather let those traitors and their schemes perish first; No, instead of paying only half a crown to the pound in taxes as we do now, let us rather condescend to bear the burden of paying three half crowns. No, let us continue the war one year longer till the French change their note, confess their imbecillity, sue for peace, offer to guaranty to us all our conquests, and make good their repudiation of the contraband to us, by leaving the *Havannah* in our possession; such a resolute conduct and prosecution of the war would deter them from future insults, which a contrary conduct must invite. Our timidity incite, if not our real importance.

If, in opposition to this reasoning, the ministerial and French party should insinuate, that we are able, at any time, as well to

re-assume our conquests, as to make them; how come these gentlemen to ascribe our success and conquests to good fortune and accident, as in argument the VI? How come they to decant on the French strength, as in argument II? How come they, to declaim on our imbecillity, as in argument III? How come they, to complain of our want of men, as in argument VII? Or how comes it about, that we are under a necessity of making surrenders, as in argument I? These are contradictions, and here they will be entangled in a dilemma.

16thly. If we vindicate our right to all North-America, and our exclusive right to the Newfoundland fishery: and likewise retain the French Caribbee sugar islands, it will put us into the possession of such a ballance of trade, as England will never be capable of obtaining by any other means. This will raise the value of lands to such a degree, as to compensate, ten times told, the land-holder for any extraordinary taxes, he may pay, for some small time; to continue the war, till we have reduced our enemies to reason, and fix'd ourselves in firm security against the turbulency of France. This will be a happy epoch, not only for us, but for all Europe.

17thly. Furthermore, the ministerial advocates, and French party, argue, that we ought to surrender our conquests, because that we are weaker than the French; and yet at the same time, urge that it is our duty, to avoid all continental connexions and confederacies; because we are able from our naval power and situation, as a sea girt isle, to preserve our commerce, and colonies abroad, and our religion, liberties and independency at home, both against France, and all other powers whatsoever. Perhaps there was never a more foolish maxim broached by stupidity, or impudence; nor a greater repugnancy form'd by the spirit of contradiction and deceit.

But if we are so powerful, through our naval force, that we can protect our country from invasions, defend our plantations, and colonies abroad, preserve our foreign commerce, and secure our trade on the continent, without any allies or foreign connexions; why may we not vindicate our exclusive right, to the Newfoundland fishery, to all north America and east India? surely, if we can, preserve our own sugar islands, by our superior naval power, we can preserve two or three sugar islands, which are well fortified, and are but just by. The defence of fisheries; the protection of islands, and colonies; and the security of our coasts from invasions, are the department of a naval force. These men argue, that our naval power can protect a coast of 2000 miles round Britain, and triumph over the ocean and yet that it cannot defend a few sugar islands, contiguous to our own; though so small, that in a days travel,
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they may be crossed from sea to sea. At the same time, as they boast of this naval power, may they have said, it is equal to all Europe; however this a foolish lie; they declare, that it is not able to exclude the French from the Newfoundland fishery. This is by implication declaring, that we can neither protect, nor defend ourselves, abroad nor at home. This is the amount of their boasted naval strength, which was, to protect our religion, liberties, commerce, &c. both abroad and at home without foreign alliances, or any continental connexion. Thus this naval mountain of power has brought forth a mouse, and they confess, that with all our strength, we are neither able to keep our conquests, vindicate our fisheries, nor preserve our own colonies or foreign settlements. But is not all this a heap of repugnancies and contradictions? surely it is.

But though the ministerial advocates, and French party, have so often, and so strongly asserted the omnipotence of our naval force, and inveighed against our entering into German alliances, and connexions for our defence; yet now their tale is turned, for a moment only, for the next moment they will assert the contrary; and now they affirm, that with all our naval force, *we cannot keep our acquisitions, abroad, unless we conquer all France in Europe.* Here we may ask them, whether we do not keep *Jamaica, Gibraltar and Minorca*, though we never conquered Spain? Whether we do not keep *Canada, Nova Scotia, Cape-Breton, Senegal, Guernsey and Jersey*, though we have not reconquered France? If so, why not keep their sugar islands, and the rest of our conquests; as they depend for protection only upon our naval power, and the French navy is destroyed? But to assert, that we cannot keep our acquisitions, without conquering all France, is near about, as wise, as it would be, to say, *that you cannot cut off a man's finger, unless that you first cut off his head.*

18thly, At the peace of *Utrecht*, to shew our moderation; or rather stupidity, folly, and treachery; we yielded up to France, Spain and the west Indies, and with them the Spanish trade and treasures. Our Tories too gave them a double line of fortresses in the Austrian Netherlands to serve them as a Barrier, and saved them from ruin by a separate and perfidious peace, in which, we betrayed all our allies. By this peace we yielded up to them likewise the dominion of the continent which they would then have been for ever deprived of, had it not been for our generosity to them, and treachery to our allies. Tho' we were thus bountiful to them, these ungrateful wretches refuse to their old friends the present Tories, to leave them the dominion of the sea, the possession of our Cod fishery, our territories in north *America*, and to throw a few sugar islands into
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the bargain ; tho' we want more for our home consumption, and in process of time, the French might raise, in St. Domingo, enough, to serve all Europe, ungrateful wretches to their old friends : but perhaps they are promised satisfaction another way when the scheme is ripe for execution.

But as we give up to them *Goree*, and all their settlements and trade in the East Indies, surely if they had any modesty, they might think themselves happy in losing no more, than those territories, and trades, which from their situation, bulk, and nature, are necessary to increase our naval force, and to leave us the dominion of the *sea*, for the empire of the *land*, which we have bestowed on them ; or at least the treachery of *Serres* yielded to them in the reign above mentioned.

But whether we are able to re-conquer France or not, surely, that power, which could wrest from France, by conquest, all her settlements in all parts of the earth, and destroy her naval force, when she was in the height of her power and strength, splendor and glory, trade and commerce, can most certainly retain those conquests, now France is weakened, beggared, her naval power destroyed, her trade ruined, her colonies in our possession, her navigation in the hands of the Dutch, 25,000 of her sailors in our prisons, and nothing left her, on the face of the globe abroad, but *St. Domingo*, *Cayenne*, and *Le Mauritanis* ; and the people overwhelmed with taxes, and the state oppressed with eleven bankrupt funds at *home*. If we could conquer from them when they were so much superior, why not keep those acquisitions, now they are so much weaker ? The objection is unanswerable. How shall that sickly power re-conquer, that in full health and vigour, could not hold its own ? It is absurd to suppose it can. It is avering, that tho' a champion in health be not able, to cope with his rival, yet that if he was worn out with sickness, and his rival had redoubled his strength ; in such case, he would be able to beat his antagonist, and triumph over him. A downright contradiction, and fulsome, ridiculous nonsense ! These disputants are conscious of it, and so in the 8th argument tell you, if you keep your conquests your neighbours will be jealous of you, &c.

19thly, Again ; if an enemy, in the zenith of its power, when it sent three squadrons out at once, filled with troops, for several parts of the globe, as France did in May 1757 ; and when it was in possession of its sugar isles, which the French author of the considerations says, brought in five or six millions *per annum*, and supplied the German war ; when the East India trade was in their possession, which brought in nett profit two millions *per annum* ; if when Canada, *Goree*, and *Senegal*, were likewise in their hands, they could neither keep these, nor their
sugar

sugar isles, nor their East India trade, how are they to reconquer them now they have lost all, and their navy is destroyed? Spain, it is manifest, can't defend her own: neither has she made any progress in Portugal, the French are, too, flying in Germany: now how, under all these misfortunes, could France re-conquer her lost territories? It is madness to suppose it. If they could not keep their trade and territories, when in their possession; and they had an army and navy, to cover, and protect them; how will they re-conquer them without either, and without money to raise or pay either? The French have been stripped of ten millions of trade *per annum*; we have gained near half of it. how then can they carry on a war, when thus divested of their resources, when their most important foreign territories are lopped off, their trade ruined, and the returns of their commerce from New Spain intercepted, and stopped up?

Let us suppose, that this trade was only lost to them, and not gained by us; what must their relative condition be? But when the case is, that half this lost trade is gained by us, and so much added to our former wealth and riches; it must make the difference so notable, that the impudence of those men is to be admired, who can say, that we are unable, to continue the war, so long as France; supposing we could not cut off the communication between new and old Spain, nor that of all their Indian territories. The men, who make such a partial estimate of things, cannot be Englishmen, they must be agents of the enemy.

The longer France carries on the war, the more ruinous will be her condition; the stronger and more prosperous our's. Our debts will be greater, 'tis true, but our abilities of discharging them will soon be vastly increased, by the increase of our trade and consumption. But if the state of the French nation be so vigorous, as represented by French agents and ministerial advocates, they will soon begin a fresh war; and hence it proves too much: For we can better combat with them now, than when they shall be in possession of all our surrenders, and we so much weakened.

One of their late writers says; "if the English are resolved to conquer North *America*, they will oblige the French to raise a naval force. They will waste themselves and their enemy, who by catheering her troops, will be no longer formidable by land, nor suspected of ill designs by her neighbours; and hence France will deprive England of most of her allies." Behold their system!

We shall add farther; that a prince, who is provoked by an unjust neighbour, to have recourse to war, to protect his just rights, and gains the superiority, is weak if he does not make

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the enemy indemnify him for the expence, he has been put to: Nay if he does not put it out of his power, if possible, to attack him any more, without dread of destruction and annihilation. A state that suffers another, to make war on it wantonly, and with impunity, will scarce ever be without enemies. A prince that will suffer depredations, to pass unrevenged, like the coward, must expect a kick from every petulant neighbour.

In the year 1722, the duke of *Montague* obtained a grant of the late neutral island *St. Lucia*, and spent 40,000 l. in settling it: As soon as the French heard of it, they ordered *Caylus* governour of *Martinico*, to go with an armed force, and expel the English. This gross violence, and affront was pocketted; and seems to have been the beginning of *whiggish* timidity, and French encroachment; and appears to have been the source of all their insolence ever since. The *Walpolean* timidity, from the Hanover treaty to 1740; and the same timorous conduct at the peace of *Aix*, quite established their insolence. What better will the preliminaries produce? The whigs assist French power by timidity, the Tories by treachery; the effects, tho' not the wickedness, are the same.

To go to war with a prince, who is easily prevailed on to surrender his conquests, and to strike up a peace without indemnification for his expences, is like a bankrupt's engaging in a lottery, if he gains a prize, he wins something; if a blank comes up, he loses nothing. Or it is like a clerk's playing at hazard with his master's money; if he wins, he gains for himself, if he loses another bears the burden. Surely such a disposition must invite affronts, and allure every coxcomb nation, to insult such a prince, and such a state; and hence such a monarch must become the scorn of Europe like James I. For many years, like that prince whiggish timidity negotiated, when it should have fought; and hence the dignity of the British crown became as contemptible to France and Spain by *Walpolean cowardice*, and pusillanimity; as to the rest of Europe, it became odious and contemptible by *Harleian Treachery*, and corruption. To surrender conquests is not the way to acquire reputation; and if *Tacitus's* maxim be true, that a state *majus famam potentia quam sua vi nixa*, what shall we not lose by our surrender of our conquests?

To contend, that we are weaker than the French; that therefore we must surrender our conquests in *North America*; is to assert, that we cannot possess any part of those settlements, which we were in possession of before the war. For if we can keep the *less*, after a surrender of our conquests, we can much more easily retain the *first*. Hence it appears, that if we can-

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not keep our conquests, we cannot keep our own possessions by our own strength, then we have need of allies and foreign connexions : since according to these disputants, our situation and naval power, will not secure our religion, liberties, colonies, commerce and independency, against the attacks of France.

If it be asserted, that our present power can secure all those blessings just mentioned ; for the same reason, it must be admitted, that we can keep all our acquisitions, in spite of all the power of France. If it be denied that we can do this, it must be denied likewise, that we shall make our neighbours jealous of our power and riches ; and that we can stand alone, without continental connexions, foreign confederacies, and the support of allies. Hence the futility and repugnancy of those ministerial advocates, fautors of French power and enemies to this kingdom, are as clear as the sun in meridian splendor.

If we cannot keep *Guadaloupe, Martinique, Marigalante, &c.* now they are in our possession, how are we to keep *Jamaica, Barbadoes, Antigua, St. Kitts, &c.* when we have weakened ourselves and strengthened our enemy by our surrenders of the former ? To suppose we shall be able to protect our own colonies, after the surrender of the French Caribbee Sugar islands, &c. which these French partizans argue we cannot keep, is downright infatuation or the most monstrous impudence. Hence to suppose that we cannot support ourselves without continental connexions, as in the 8th argument, and yet, that we are too weak to preserve our conquests as in the first, is repugnant and contradictory, and argues either weakness of head or wickedness of heart. To suppose that a good Englishman can be possessed of such ignorance, or such infatuation as is connected with the proposition, is impossible. Hence the pretence of thinking we are unable to hold our conquests, proceeds from something worse than ignorance. If we cannot keep our conquests, we stand in need of foreign connexions. If we can, we do not want a peace that must deprive us of them. Here then these agents of the enemy have entangled themselves in a *dilemma*.

But if we are so weak as to be unable to retain our conquests, and defend our own possessions and colonies against only the power of France, how comes it, that these men argue, that our neighbours are become jealous of our riches and power, and fear for themselves with respect to the consequences ? If we are weak, where is room for us to exert the virtue of moderation, which only belongs to predominant power ? Where is there room for humanity to call on us to make peace ? These are the functions of only superior states, who, can command and give law. The arguments therefore of these ministerial advocates are inconsistent, incompatible, and must flow from some other source besides concern for the interests of old England.

PART II. SECT. II.

Arg. It has been said by the ministerial Advocates, and the French party, who stickle for an immature Peace, that the French are in good Circumstances, and well able to continue the War, notwithstanding their Defeats and Losses.

1st. **I**F we are so much exhausted, and the French so strong, and able to continue the war, as these gentlemen suggest, it was folly in them to make peace on any conditions: Because hence they might go on longer, tire us out, quite exhaust us of men and money, and at last destroy us, or bring us to their own terms. Hence the French must have made peace with us purely to spare us, to defeat their own views, to preserve our interests, and to divest themselves of all the great advantages, which our wise heads have found in the possession of vast tracts of country, that are worth about one shilling a square mile; that will cost about 40 times as much the keeping as their revenues will amount to; and good part of the trade of which will, for various reasons, according to them, be transferred to Louisiana. Thus too it was out of charity and humanity, and to save us men and money, that they ceded to us *Senegal*; for they are so strong and powerful, that they might have kept it, if it had so pleased them.

Now, can any man in his senses believe, that if France, which is under an arbitrary government, found her circumstances superior to those of England; or that she was able to carry on the war to advantage, and by continuing it, that in the long run, she should gain all her ends, reconquer *Canada*, repossess herself of her *Caribbee* sugar islands, subdue our *Colonies*, and retake *Senegal*, and we unable to defend them, that she would let slip the opportunity?

It must be admitted, that France is able to continue the war or not. As her government is absolute, if she thought she could carry on the war to advantage; if she thought she could gain her ends, can any man be so stupid, as to think she would make peace? Her making peace then must be an acknowledgment of her incapacity of carrying on the war; that she wanted breath; and to recruit her strength; and hence it is an argument that we ought to pursue our blow, till we have crushed the whole house of *Bourbon* for ages to come. By the same rule that France was unable to carry on the war, we ought to have continued it, as long as we were able; in order to have preserved our conquests; or at least the most important part of them; and to have sell'd this

this *Goliath* to the earth, whilst he was reeling with the wound little *David* had given him.

adly, Ministerial advocates boast, that we shall gain great advantages by the peace; yet tell us *that we are inferior in point of strength; that the French affairs and Finances are in a better condition than ours; and that they can carry on the war till we are tired, ruined, and undone.* Is not this an absurdity? If they think themselves stronger than we; if they suppose we are in more distressed circumstances, and tottering on the verge of destruction, as our minister and his party have insinuated to them; is it to be imagined, that they would grant us advantageous terms of peace? No surely. Whatever speeches our minister and his advocates have given out of our distress, and of our inability to raise the supplies in order to find an apology for an infamous P——e, according to their own account the French do not believe them; for notwithstanding they have granted us an advantageous, safe, and honourable P——e.

But it is a contradiction to suppose, that the French are more powerful than we, and yet that they should grant us good terms of Peace. Is there any such example to be met with in history? Or did they ever want for inclination to oppress their neighbours, whenever they had the opportunity? Nay, have they not always discovered the inclination, tho' they had not the opportunity? and did they ever let an occasion slip, in which they could enrich themselves with the spoils of an impotent neighbour, though he had never given them any provocation?

Hence if the peace be honourable, the French must be conscious, that they are weaker than we, and unable to carry on the war. In this case then, we must act weakly in not pursuing our blow, even according to our ministerial advocates; for they do not pretend to say, that we have crushed either the power of *France* or *Spain*, but that the peace is honourable, because they have not crushed us, and have condescended to grant us one, upon the inf—— terms contained in the preliminaries; an epithet that every one must bestow on them, who is not under the direction and influence of the French party here. If we are superior to the enemy, we may continue the war; but if we cannot do this, can we suppose the French will grant us an advantageous peace? concessions are certain marks of imbecillity and impotence on one hand and of superior power on the other in case no fraud or treachery intervenes. We may have a bad peace, tho' we possess a superiority of power, and enjoy the means of making a good one; but it was never known, that we made an advantageous peace with *France*, when we were in feeble circumstances; or that ever *France* granted such a boon to any other nation. Hence if we have but the least advantage in the
peace

peace, it is a mark of distress in the French affairs, and of our superior power. And if we are superior, it must be acknowledged, that we might have continued the war, and ought to have done so.

3dly, But who, but an impudent *French* party, would dare to assert, that the *French* are more powerful, and in better circumstances, than we; when they have lost trade to the value of ten millions sterling per annum and we possess it? when they have lost two thirds of their naval force, and we possess their ships and hold 25,000 of their sailors? When they have lost 22 of their sugar islands and we possess them? When they have lost 300,000 negroes, and we possess them? when they have lost almost all the revenues of their colonies, and we possess them? And finally when they have lost all their freight and navigation, and the Dutch possess it?

Besides they have lost every year, since their crossing the *Rhine*, near 50,000 men in *Germany*, whilst our English army has not suffered one tenth of the mortality. They are beaten out of the *East Indies*, *Africa*, *Canada*, and the *sugar islands*; their troops fly before the allies in *Germany*, and have scarce a y footing left in their dominions. To this may be added, that eleven of their funds have stopt payment of interest; so that near two years ago, their stocks fell 30 per cent one post through the failure of payment of interest only. Their distresses likewise have been so great, that they have been incapable of advancing their subsidies, which they have engaged to pay by treaty, to the *empress queen*, the *Swedes*, and several princes of the empire. Are these marks of the political health and vigour of a state, of its strength, of the good condition of its Finances, and abilities, to carry on a vigorous war; or of imbecillity and distress? I shall leave it to the disinterested, and impartial to determine.

4thly, With regard to their *finances* the French seem to be in a much weaker state than we, and quite unable to carry on a war. In the first place the kings civil list and the expences of the civil government; supposing, the number of people the same, and allowing for the difference in the value of money; amount to four times, what they do in England. 2dly, The gains of the farmers of the revenues are so great, and their vexations so burdensome, and the charges of the officers of the finances so exorbitant, that it is computed for every million, that goes into the kings treasure, the people pay full two millions some aver three. 3dly The noblesse are exempt from the *taille*; as also 18 other classes of officers &c. 4thly, The clergy who possess great part of the land tax themselves and do not pay $\frac{1}{4}$ of what they ought; hence the burden falls extremely heavy on the

the bulk of the people. 5thly, The labour of the people is but about $\frac{1}{4}$ or $\frac{1}{5}$ of the value it is in England, so that ten shillings per annum raised on a family there, distress the people as much as 20 or 30 shillings raised in England. 6thly, Hence the interest of their state debt, if but 3 millions, affects them as 6 millions would the English *ceteris paribus*. 7thly, They must give near double the interest for state loans, as their public credit is at a low ebb.

8thly, To this may be added, that in times of war the taxes on the people are doubled, though in times of peace the mass of the people pay above double what the English do. With all these loads of oppression on them, we must submit to the candid reader, whether the French are better able to continue the war than we, as ministerial advocates and the French party here assert.

Here I might enter into particular calculations of their debts and taxes; and the loads the bulk of the people in France bear, and compare them with our burdens; but it would extend me beyond the limits I have prescribed to myself. However it is a matter of proof by calculation, that if we were to carry on a 10 years war, at the end, we should not bear half the burden nor suffer half the distress, which the French do at present. No wonder their parliaments have made such remonstrances of their ruinous condition; nor that the people are so rejoiced at the prospect of peace.

However this be, it appears, that the French are in much worse circumstances, than they were in, at the peace of *Utrecht*, and we in much better; though it is expected, that we shall patch up a peace less advantageous in every respect. This will appear pretty clearly from the following estimate of our acquisitions at that peace. viz. There were ceded to us by the treaty of *Utrecht*.

ACQUI-

ACQUISITIONS.

	Annual value of trade.
1. Nova Scotia, from Cape Breton to the river St. Laurence, with the city and fortrefs of Annapolis	£. 50,000
2. Plesentia, and half Newfoundland	250,000
3. Half St. Kit's, value	50,000
4. Damages allowed for Nevis, &c.	90,000
5. The Assiento ship	200,000
6. Assiento for negroes; the French sold 48,000 per ann. the trade in value per ann.	1,200,000
	<hr/>
	1,750,000

Total value of the trade per ann.

7. The fortrefs of Gibraltar

8. The island of Minorca

SURRENDERS.

9. Spain, and the trade of the West Indies, by which we lost in trade per ann.

2,000,000

10. Two lines of fortresses in the Netherlands lost only to the Dutch

N. B. Notwithstanding this was the case, Lord Bolingbroke acknowledged, in a letter to *Mat. Prior* at Paris, that *Robin and Harry* deserved to be hang'd for this peace. The application every one will make according to his sentiments.


But though we made a peace at that time, so much more advantageous to our commercial interests, than what is stipulated by the present preliminaries, yet we were in more distressed circumstances, than we are at present, as I am going to prove.

At the peace of Utrecht, when the French surrendered all the above advantages to us, what had they lost? Their barrier in the Netherlands. But what was this in comparison of their present losses? Their trade to Spain was entire; they received from the Spanish West Indies 206 millions of dollars for their commodities. Their trade to Newfoundland, their East India trade, and their sugar and African trades were untouched. But now they have lost all those trades, to near the amount of ten millions

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Sterling a year; at least, according to the computations of some, who seem to be no inadequate judges of those matters. Nay a late French author, who must be supposed to know, I mean the author of the considerations on the German war, allows that their sugar island trade amounts to six millions Sterling *per annum*. He agrees, it is said, with some others of his countrymen.

The minister's advocates agree that of Newfoundland is in value two millions, their trade to Gores and Senegal was worth 500,000 l.; their trade to Canada 140,000 l.; and that to the East-Indies three millions Sterling. What losses! not one of which they suffered in the confederate war. We are now the gainers, though we were then the losers. In a year's time more we should have cut off the Spanish treasures, and then the *Hou-ron* war would have been immediately starved, and expired of a violent death.



S E C T. III.

Arg. 3. It has been said by the French party here, *That we are impoverished and exhausted by the war; that our state debts are become intolerable; that our people are burdened with taxes more than the French; that we cannot raise the supplies; and that the French would ruin us, if we continued the war.*

1st, **G**OD be praised not one of these assertions is true. On the contrary, this is a gloomy picture drawn by our enemies, to deceive, frighten, and injure us; and to induce us to patch up an infamous peace, and to surrender our important conquests. They know the weakness of the unthinking part of mankind, and apply to their passions, with false glosses, artful misrepresentations, and bold assertions. If we continue the war we shall pay a few more taxes, 'tis true; but then we shall receive more than a compensation by the advantages we shall gain in trade, both at present and in futurity. We shall lay out our money, as a judicious husbandman does; when he is at great charge and expence to manure his lands; upon speculation, that in a succession of years he shall receive back his expences three times told.

2^dy, The custom-house entries will prove that we never had in time of war such a foreign trade before, all circumstances considered. Besides these disputants confute themselves; for, by their 7th argument, there is such a demand for labour, and such an excess of employment, that wages are enhanced, and people wanted

wanted for the plough, the loom, and the anvil*. Wars which used formerly here, and in France now, to turn the people out of
of

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* Since we wrote the above, extracts from the custom-house books, have been published by the French party here to confute their own arguments, which they had used before; and to invalidate the force of the above reasoning; we therefore seem obliged to take some notice of them. In the London Chronicle of January 29 1763, it is insinuated that the appearance of a great trade during the war is owing to the diminution of our manufactures, and hands, which are employed in the army and navy; and not to the real augmentation of our commerce; and for proof it is asserted, that our tonnage of shipping has decreased during the last six years of the war, compared with the six years preceeding; and the value of our exports has been less by 1,100,000 a year; and hence that the nation has lost so much by the war, the ballance of our trade being paid in bullion.

We must observe that this is a falacious, and fraudulent account cooked up, it seems, to promote some particular views, and sinister purposes; and with design to impose upon, abuse, and deceive the people, as will most clearly appear from the following observations. The first period of six years, from 1749 to 1754 inclusively, contains a year after peace, and a year before the beginning of a war; in each of which years, there usually is exported at least 25 per cent more, than in common years; and in the year before, and the year after, namely 1748, and 1755, there is usually 25 per cent less exported.

This difference arises from the prospect of greater and lesser prices of freight and insurance, as well as from some other causes. From hence it follows, if we would form a true judgment of the trade in the two periods, we must deduct from the total exports of the first period, the half of a common years exports namely 5,100,864 l for the years 1749, and 1754; and add half a years exports to the total of the exports of the second period, from 1755 to 1761 inclusively; on account of one of these being a year, in which a war was begun, and the other being a year, when it was apprehended a peace would take place. The account then stands thus. 5,100,864 l. subtracted from the total of the exports in the first period, there remains 56,109,513 l. for the natural total of the first period: and the like sum being added, to the total of the exports, in the last period

of work, and to starve by the obstruction of navigation, advance of freight, and rise of insurance; have so increased demands for our

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period, makes the whole trade, of exports for that period, amount to 60,202,764 l. ; which is 4,093,251 l. augmentation of our trade of exports in the last period during the war; notwithstanding freight and insurance raised the price of our commodities considerably in the foreign market, which must have lessened the consumption, which would have taken place at an usual price.

2dly. But this is only a part of the deception and fraud. The trade of exports to our colonies is artfully slipped over and left out of the account. Now, it appears that in 1748 the total amount of our exports to our *North-American* colonies was only 830,000 l. but in 1758, the total export was 1,832,000 l. The exports likewise to the West-Indian isles, it seems ought to have increased considerably, as we commanded those seas, as European goods were scarce at the French *Antilles*, and as hence the French contraband trade from *St. Domingo* to the *Terra firma*, &c. must have been greatly interrupted; all which must have increased our smuggling trade from Jamaica to the Spanish ports considerably. How many millions augmentation this trade may have received in the last period, I shall leave to the judicious reader to calculate from the premises.

3dly. But this is not the whole of the imposition. For, by artfully omitting an account of our trade to our colonies, and hence insinuating, that there had been no difference in this trade in the two periods, all the trade carried on between North-America and *St. Domingo*, *Hispaniola*, &c. by flags of truce; which I think has been calculated at several millions; is left out of the computation: This trade accounts for our vast exportation to N. America.

4thly; There seems to be another gross deception in this account, namely, the excluding the Newfoundland trade. Ships sail in ballast to this finery, and then carry their cargoes to *Spain*, *Portugal*, and the *Straits*, and unload; and from thence proceed in ballast, or with what freight they can get, to England. Hence it appears, that the annual balance and value arising from this trade are omitted, though it must amount to a great sum: as the French are now excluded, and in time of peace fished to near the value of two millions per annum, a million of which they exported.

our commodities, that wages are risen, and employment become so plentiful, that our people may and do receive, for every half-penny

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5thly. But what has been offered is not the whole of the misrepresentation. After the conquest of the islands of *Mariagallante*, *Guadaloupe*, &c. the produce of those islands, being exported from thence to the Amsterdam, and Hamburgh markets, by taking their clearance in England, neither the exports to those islands nor to those markets, nor the imports of those islands, come into the accounts delivered to the public in the London Chronicle. Hence it is manifest, that the whole of that account is a misrepresentation of our trade during the war, formed with a design to impose on, and to deceive the good people of England, in a matter of the last importance, to answer sinister views and private ends.

Here we may pertinently remark, that if false entries should be made, custom-house accounts forged and corrupted, and false estimates formed and delivered to the public; it would be no new thing; for in Charles II's reign Sir *Nicholas Butler*, of fraudulent and scandalous memory, who was at the head of the commissioners of the customs, had orders from the court, after the prohibition of the French trade, to give directions, to admit French wines, to be entered at *Ports*. Likewise, in 1712, the infamous Mercator, alias *Daniel De Foo*, was employed to cook up false accounts, and to make out false estimates of the French trade, by the then ministry, in order to deceive the people. However he was, tis true, detected and exposed by the care of lord *Hallifax* and lord *Stanbope*, under whose inspection, to their immortal honour, the *British Merchant* was at that time published, to undeceive the people and preserve our commerce. But if any particular set of men can at any time be guilty of frauds, impostures, and forgeries in public accounts, in order to support ministerial views and purposes, how shall we be certain, at any time, that the accounts taken and published by their order are genuine, if they may have any private ends to answer by corrupting them? This is a melancholy consideration to every patriot who has an unfeigned regard to the public welfare.

6thly. The war has not only increased our foreign trade, but also our domestic expence. For, if we raise and expend at home 12 $\frac{1}{2}$ millions more than in time of peace, which may be perhaps pretty near the case, this extraordinary consumption must increase

penny they pay more in taxes, four or six halfpence extraordinary. Hence it follows that the war furnishes trade, and trade supplies

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increase employment near $\frac{1}{2}$, and set a vast number of hands at work. Hence upon the whole, it is extremely manifest, that our trade and consumption have been increased prodigiously, both at home and abroad, during the war.

7thly, in the first period we exported a great deal of grain, in the last period for several years we had a scarcity, and exported but little, which must of course swell the exports of the first six years, though our exports of manufactures were less, and lessen the amount of the exports of the last six years, though our exports of manufactures, and employment of the people, were more.

8thly, These scarcities obliged our people to work more, which extraordinary labour more than supplied the deficiency of hands, by furnishing the army and navy with men, many of whom were drawn too from Scotland, where they had little employment; we are told, not less than 70,000. But if none had been drawn from thence, in case those left behind in husbandry and manufactures, from their increased taxes, had laboured only half an hour a day more than before such taxes were raised, the whole deficiency made by draughts into our army and navy, would have been fully supplied.

9thly, Our stock of commodities is lessened by our great demand for them, in which the very essence of a good trade consists; and this might have helped to supply the foreign market and extraordinary home consumption, though less labour in manufactures had been really exerted, by draining off hands for our military operations.

From all these considerations it is manifest, that our exports in the last period have been vastly greater than in the former; and that our stock of commodities and hands not drawn into the army and navy could furnish such a supply. He that cannot see this must be a fool, and he that will not a knave.

But however this be, our great increase of trade could not appear, till after our conquests, therefore we ought to have had the particular account of our trade since we made those conquests, with the West-India trade in particular likewise, in order to form a judgment of our advantages gained in trade by the war. In short, the scheme is nothing but quibble, fraud, and deceit. How honest the men who published it!

supplies the war without producing the least distress among the labouring people: on the contrary, it furnishes the industrious with the means of living more commodiously; so that, on the whole all ranks find the benefit of it. Our conquests made from our enemies supply us with extraordinary trade at their expence.

3dly, It has been aver'd with an air of truth and reason, and paid without contradiction, that the produce of the French caribbee sugar islands amounts to above three millions per annum.* The advocates, for an immature peace, allow, that the produce of the Newfoundland cod-fishery supplies the French consumption with green-fish, and that they export to the amount of one million sterling per annum of dry fish. This article then at the lowest computation cannot amount to less than two millions per annum. Their *Canada* trade, all allow, was not less than 140,000l. a year. The trade of *Goree* and *Senegal*, even from the concession of the ministerial advocates, and the French party must amount to full 3 or 400,000l. a year. Their *east India* trade produced them a great profit and could not amount to less than 3 millions per annum. Their navigation has suffered prodigiously by the loss of freight to the *Dutch*. If the tonnage of their shipping employed in their foreign trade, were only 400,000 tons, this at 5l. per ton per annum; amounts to full two millions a year. We cannot set all these articles at less than a loss of ten millions per annum. This diminution of the *French* trade, together with the obstruction and and failure of of the *Spanish*, and stoppage of payment from the Spanish merchants, by the capture of the *Hermione* and the conquest of the *Havannah*, must have produced great distress among all ranks and degrees of people in France; lessened trade, consumption and the revenues, and have introduced general poverty and beggary; as these misfortunes have been added, to the failure of their many national funds, and to the many state bankruptcies, they were reduced to before.

On the other hand, our trade must have been greatly augmented

N O T E.

* The author of the *considerations on the German war* says, that the annual produce of the French sugar islands amounts to five or six millions Sterling. But as that pamphlet is one of the most contradictory, inconsistent, superficial, and absurd productions this war has produced, I may be told my authority is bad, as that author has shewn no regard to truth or propriety.

mented by our possessing the exclusive right of the north American fisheries, the Canada trade, that of their sugar islands, *Goree*, *Senegal*, and by the stoppage of their Spanish contraband, and thereby increasing our own illicit trade to the *Spanish* main land &c. Moreover our capture of the *Hermione*; and conquest of the *Havannah* must have increased our riches, and have enabled us to raise the supplies much easier than last year. † Our great exports of manufactures to *Africa*, to purchase negroes for *Guadaloupe* &c. must have greatly increased employment. The memorial of the merchants of *Liverpool* will be an everlasting monument of the great wisdom, penetration, sagacity, patriotism, uncorruption, clear heads and clean hands of our ministers in their late negotiations of peace, who have given up all this trade to the *French*. All these fortunate events and circumstances for us, must have so greatly obstructed trade, circulation and consumption both in *France* and *Spain*; so lessened their revenues, and have introduced so great distress and misery among all ranks that it is not a little surprising, that any writers should have the front, to talk of the great strength and resources of our enemies, of their abilities of carrying on a war and of our comparative poverty and deplorable circumstances. These absurdities are so glaring, that whoever adopts them, must have some motive for his conduct, very different from the good and the prosperity of this country.

4thly. The taxes in France in time of war, are at least eight times as oppressive on the French poor, as on ours; and treble, nay four times, as high and burdensome on traders, and the lower ranks and all other degrees, excepting their *noblesse*, *clergy*, and the 18 classes of *exempts*, such as military and civil officers, &c. of whom there cannot be less than 100,000. Their state debts too, are much more burdensome, as every gentleman must know, who has been in France, and made the police, œconomics, finances, and political affairs of that kingdom their study, as much as I did, during my long residence in various parts of that state. Whoever therefore asserts, that the French are in a better condition, to support and continue a war, than this nation, he must have something in view, besides the good of his country, and the security of the protestant religion.

Our

N O T E.

† In contradiction to their own arguments, the ministerial advocates have lately avered that 35 millions have been lately subscribed towards raising the supplies for the present year.

Our state debts are great, and amount to 120 millions. But what is this sum to the debts of Holland? The Dutch are not above $\frac{1}{3}$ or $\frac{1}{2}$ of the people, and yet owe above 100 million sterling: Considering all things a debt of 600 millions sterling would not be so great a burthen upon us. I have before me the particulars of this enormous load the Dutch bear with patience, and which they contracted with spirit, animated with a resolution to maintain their just rights, and to support their liberties and independency, against *Spain* and *France*; which nations each, at sundry times, laboured to destroy their privileges, and to force upon them their arbitrary government, and ridiculous idolatry for religion. This curious account was communicated to me by one of their ministers during my stay at the *Hague*.

5thly. But it is averred too, that we cannot raise the *supplies* for the continuance of the war. This seems extremely ridiculous. If we could do it last year, how much more easily may we do it now, after the millions of treasures we have taken from the Spaniards shall arrive? It is surprising to hear such an objection. This will still appear more ridiculous, when we consider the cheapness of grain for two years past, our exports of that commodity, the saving of the king of Prussia's subsidy, the alteration of the course of exchange to *Hamburg* and *Holland*, our trade to *Guadaloupe* and *Martinico*, &c. Hence this argument seems rather *huming* us, than reasoning with us; and the advancing it is in truth shewing great contempt of, and offering great affront to, the understandings of the good people of England. We cannot help thinking, that such arguments can come from no quarter, but from the enemies of the commerce, religion, and liberty of this kingdom; and from the pens of those, or their agents, who labour and wish to crush all three. But notwithstanding the arts of those insidious, and designing men, there will never be wanting honest patriots I hope, to defeat their evil and malevolent intentions, and to expose the fallacy and deceit of their arguments.

In the latter part of queen Ann's war, we raised supplies, though it was done at great disadvantage, in comparison of what may be done at present. There is not the least reason to doubt, that money may be raised at $4\frac{1}{4}$ per cent, we gave in the latter part of the confederate war $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. For the last five years of that war, wheat on an average was at 31 2s a quarter. For the last five years of this war, wheat has been at an average, but at 11. 11s. od. a quarter. In 1712 we paid three million per annum in taxes only to discharge the interest of the national debt, and had no sinking fund. We now pay no more than three millions per annum, towards the discharge of the interest

interest of the national debt; the other two millions being appropriated to discharge the principal, which will free us from all our national debts in less than thirty years, or at least as far as we ought to diminish them. It was computed, that at that time our national expence did not amount to above 50 millions per annum, it is now thought, by good judges, to amount to above 80 millions. Hence the taxes are in no greater proportion to the expence of the state than at that time, and consequently our situation better, as we have a prospect by the sinking fund of being out of debt much sooner.

The amount of the revenue from Taxes on, home consumption and luxuries may be said to be the Barometer of the public felicity or misery. When the public felicity increases, those revenues rise high, when the public distress augments, those taxes sink low. In the year 1698 the excise upon beer at 4 s. a barrel amounted to but about 400,000 per annum. In the year 1712 it amounted to only 800,000 at 5 s. a barrel. But now the gross amount of the excise on beer at 5 s. a barrel is said not to be less than 1,600,000 per annum. We had in the last five years of queen Anne's war, spent above 18 millions on the continent: in the five last years of this war but 13 millions. We have, too, other advantages, namely, our foreign trade is almost double of what it was at that time, and our captures of treasure from the French and Spaniards amount to as much as all the money in the nation did at the latter end of the reign of James the first. The cheapness of wheat, &c. renders *living* to the poor, as much more easy, as the abolition of taxes to the amount of 15 millions. That is if every family in the kingdom take one with another paid 7 l. 10 s. 0 d. in taxes more than they do now, they would be able to live as comfortably, as they did in 1712, that is provided such taxes were spent in the kingdom: such is the difference made by the cheapness of wheat. Can any man then in his senses imagine, that we were unable to carry on the war, retain our conquests and raise the supplies? If there be any such, it is not his wisdom nor his love for his country, which influences his opinion.

They, Furthermore, if we examine the present situation of things both in France and England, we shall find the French nation all cry aloud for, and are rejoiced at, the prospect of a peace, however the British government may be disposed. On the other hand, we find that the English nation and people, in general, are averse to a peace, without the retention of our conquests in America; though their superiors, some of them, to save a trifle in taxes, rush into a treaty with an indiscreet precipitancy. This more clearly discovers the effects of the war, and the necessity each state is under of peace, than all the sophistry

phistry advanced by the partizans of the minister. This temper of each nation teaches, what are the abilities and distresses of both sides. Hence we may conclude, that on one hand there is a ruinous war, and on the other a pernicious peace operating, and producing their natural effects and consequences. We shall leave it to the reader to judge on which side a pernicious peace is working; for I shall not presume to determine.

7thly, Our poverty, great taxes, national debts, an almost general excise, &c. was the sophistry and cant of 1712; in order to pave the way to save France, when she was on the brink of destruction: And just as the prize, we contended for, viz. the Spanish trade, was going to drop into our mouths. It was said then, to save France from being ruin'd, that we were ruin'd; that we paid three millions per annum in taxes, that we spent annually four millions more than were necessary to ruin the people; that we were 50 millions in debt; that the French king would retire from Paris to Orleans, and from thence to Lions, &c. but would never make peace without the Spanish succession. So similar was the language of those times, and of the tory advocates, to the present cant of the necessity of a peace. We know the views of the *tories* then, and perhaps some people will think, there is no difficulty in judging of them at present.

My lord B——th observes, “ that at the accession of the Hannoverian family to the throne, the people remembered how the *tories* betrayed the faith of the nation and deserted their allies. That they made a separate, and infamous peace, by which they saved France from inevitable, and immediate ruin; and cast away, that immense treasure, which had been expended in the war, entailing a future expence, still greater than that they had so iniquitously thrown away; exposing us to greater danger, than we had even then escaped; laying a foundation for the advancement of France to a much higher point of power; and preventing at the same time, by their *perfidy* to the confederates, as far as in them lay, all probability of the same union, to obstruct her views again.” Perhaps some will observe, that our union with the protestant king of Prussia was not so firm, as to make our desertion of him, merit the same severe appellation bestowed above.

My lord continues, “ the people remembered too in what manner before the death of the queen the *tories* had deeply laid the plot of abusing her authority, to bring the pretender to the throne,——How, notwithstanding their pretended affection to their royal mistress, by which they had not only duped her, but deceived the nation, they basely meditated her ruin, to whose weakness they owed their advancement.—How, by their dark intrigues, they broke her declining constitution,

tion, and caused her death—The only service they ever did her; sending that unhappy princess, by this precipitation of her fate, to a better world, before she had experienced in this far worse calamities which they were preparing for her, the loss of her crown, and dignity, perhaps a violent end, at least imprisonment for life." Should not this picture be a lesson of instruction, to all princes, this good queen's successors, to avoid putting themselves into the hands of such an ungrateful vile set of men as the *tories* would have proved, and did prove to her? God grant that no prince of the house of Hanover may ever be duped in the same manner, under pretence of zeal for his service!

S E C T. IV.

ARG. 4. It has been said by ministerial advocates and the French party, *That our successes have been owing to our good Fortune; and neither to our strength nor good conduct; that this good Fortune may forsake us, and then we are ruined at once; and therefore it is prudent to make peace while we can.*

1st. **T**HIS implies that our victories are neither the consequences of our power nor of our riches, nor of our wisdom nor good management. Hence a good Christian would have imputed them to a good providence. But as our ministerial advocates and the French party have left God and Providence out of the question, we may discern, that these writers are no well-wishers either to our religion, our liberties or our commerce. They do not consider us under the protection of providence; but on the other hand God permits *Satan* to support our cause, and to defeat their attempts, because of their sins. This demonstrates the kidney of the ministerial advocates. When any incidents are favourable to their cause, no people *can* more profusely of the interposition of providence on their behalf; as may be seen in Monsieur Torcy's negotiations, even to a monkish affectation and nauseousness. But dropping this, I come to consider the argument in a political light only.

If our success was owing neither to our superior power, nor to our superior courage and military skill, but to our good fortune, it behoves us to strain every nerve to preserve the superiority we have accidentally acquired; since all those writers contend, that *France* is more rich, more populous, has greater resources, has been able to combat all her powers of Europe, and was a match for them all; and that the internal power and strength are at present as great as ever. If then Fortune has thrown great advantages into our hands, by which her power of *France* is depressed, and that of *England* exalted, and augmented

to a superiority, as we have proved is really the case; it would be infatuation to resign this accidentally acquired power; and to yield to France a superiority, after England had obtained the predominancy by some lucky hit, that can never more happen, or that there is no moral probability ever will. A conduct of such kind must be the offspring of something else besides English patriotism and policy. An influence of a very different kind from those virtues must give a sanction to such a system.

2dly, We were lately told by an advocate for an immature peace and the present preliminaries, that in the reign of king George I. "The treasury was employed to procure a vote to make that treason, which had been done by the queen's orders, with the advice of her council, and which had the sanction and repeated approbation of a British parliament. That a swarm of infamous and mercenary vermine were employed to abuse a set of men who could not defend themselves; for the evidence of a French spaniel dog was admitted to convict a man of treason before a British parliament." Most elegant! most polite! most gentlemanlike!

Here is a very severe charge brought by this ministerial advocate, against a gracious honest and worthy prince and a British parliament; namely, *first*, that the king employed his treasury to gain a corrupt parliament; *secondly*, that this parliament admitted mercenary vermine to abuse honest patriots; *thirdly*, that this honest parliament and representative of the nation, would convict honest upright statesmen and friends to their country, of high treason on the evidence of a French spaniel dog. Perhaps this is the most illiberal and the grossest abuse of the British government and senate that ever appeared in print, or that the most impudent slanderer ever uttered. How comes it about, that this writer has not been taken notice of, and has passed with impunity; whilst the bare relation of historical facts, without any application, has been selected for prosecution, and pursued with as violent strains of power, as graced the reign of the pious humane James the 2d of religious and merciful memory. We presume that this reviler of the best of kings and of the British senate, intended by the abuse of the first parliament of George the First, to vindicate the former parliament's approbation of the treaty of *Utrecht*.

But observe how this weak and abusive writer has overshot himself. He had forgotten, that if it was possible, there might be a British parliament so venal and corrupt, as, through the influence of the treasury, to vote upright ministers and honest patriots guilty of high-treason, upon the evidence of a French spaniel dog; it was likewise possible, that there might be a set of rascious and corrupt men, who might, by the influence of the queen's

queen's civil list, her own treasury and that of the king of France, procure a VOTE declaring that PEACE to be safe, advantageous and honourable, which in itself was precarious, pernicious, insidious, treacherous and infamous. If pecuniary influence might procure *one* ruinous, frenchified, and destructive VOTE, why might not the same pecuniary influence procure the *other*? If the treasury of England might be employed to procure one corrupt parliament, why not the treasury of France and England, to obtain the other? And if at that time, why not at any other, when the French have any point to carry? This writer has destroyed the whole Force of his argument, brought to justify the conduct of the *honest* administration, which so prudently and wisely conducted the glorious treaty of UTRECHT. Such slanderous insinuations are the means of unhinging the confidence that the good people of England ought to have in their representatives; and to render them suspicious that the approbation of ministerial measures may be procured by corrupt influence; and that our national interests and the good of the state, may be sacrificed to private interest and sinister views.

But farther, if a majority may be obtained by such corrupt interest, what certainty can the people have of the rectitude of any measures from their obtaining the sanction of parliament? If a prince may employ his treasury or civil list, to procure a corrupt parliament and a vote of high treason against honest patriots, why may not a foreign prince employ an influence of the same kind, to procure a sanction to measures, favourable to himself, and destructive and ruinous to this kingdom? This foreign prince may of course corrupt our ministers, who are at the head of the treasury, and the king's counsellors; and those turn our blood and treasure, squeezed from the people, against ourselves and our true interests? We know this was done in the reigns of Edward IV, Henry VIII, James I, Charles II, William III, and Queen Ann. We heartily wish the good people of England may never have occasion to add another reign.

Hence the consequences of such insinuations may be very pernicious, as they naturally tend to infuse jealousies, and raise suspicions among the people. When therefore a measure declares itself corrupt, from all external appearances, and nothing but an acquaintance with the *Arcana imperii*, or secrets of state; which are never to be unveiled to unhallowed and vulgar eyes, can justify its propriety, what must the people think? They are told, *that a P——— may be so corrupt as to vote an honest man a traitor, on the evidence of a French spaniel dog*: consequently 319 against 65 cannot prove any measure wise, honest, upright, safe, advantageous and honourable. Such are the natural deductions

ductions to made from the doctrines of this ministerial and court advocate.

His writer therefore should have laboured to prove the infallibility of a British parliament; and to have demonstrated, that a wrong measure never obtained the sanction of a majority in any important affair; nor that a right measure was ever left supported by only a minority of 65. He might then have done his patron some service, and have quieted the minds of a discontented and clamorous people; who, sometimes, are so audacious and impudent as to think they can see, or to imagine that a people may be blind. He should have proved, that the people ought always implicitly to submit; and that they have been always in the wrong, whenever they have clamoured against a court measure, supported by a majority in parliament. He should have demonstrated, that if a minister had pensions, offices, places, preferments and profits to the amount of 500,000l. per Annum, to distribute to 500 Senators, they would be unable to bias a majority, so far as to gain approbation of a measure, which would prove ruinous to the people; because it was adopted by a minister. He should have clearly proved to us, that tho' our Parliament sold us to France in the reigns of Charles II. King William and Queen Ann, yet that we had such a wise virtuous and disinterested minister at the head of affairs now, that no corrupt influence from any treasury either abroad or at home, could possibly gain footing here with his approbation; and that our present dissenters in Parliament were such a body of wise and disinterested patriots, that no pecuniary considerations could warp or bias them, or induce them to deviate from the true interest of their country. Had he done this, he would have silenced all popular clamour for ever. But what has he done now? Only fomented the people's jealousies and suspicions. Thus it is when bungling advocates undertake the defence of a cause for which they are unqualified. We beg the reader's pardon for this digression.

Whenever it can be proved that the wisdom and penetration of British kings are infallible; that they never made a bad peace, an imprudent war, or pernicious alliance; and whenever it can be proved, that a British parliament never voted an infamous peace, safe, advantageous and honourable, I will join with the present bell-weather of a certain man, to cry up the preliminaries of peace as safe and glorious, and a master-piece of policy.

S E C T.

S E C T. V.

ARG. 5. *That our conquests would be a burden and nuisance to us, by drawing off our hands from us, in order to plant, protect, defend and improve them.* We will examine this argument particularly.

1st, **T**HE retention of Newfoundland would not produce any such effect, because it is already stocked with inhabitants, as far as necessary. If we expelled the French out of *North America*, a small garrison would be sufficient there; but as the French are to possess the isles of *St. Pierre and Miquelon*, and to fish in those seas we must be at a great expence, to guard those parts, in order to protect our fishermen from French insults, and to prevent smuggling.

2^{dly}, If the French were expelled out of *Louisiana*, we should have nothing to fear from them in that quarter; nor from their intrigues with the Indians, nor from their incitements of those savages to make incursions upon our back frontiers as formerly, nor should we have any thing to fear from conspiracies, revolts, or insurrections in *Canada*. But now we have all these, to fear and to guard against; and hence we must pour out a vast number of troops, and a vast profusion of treasure, in order to defend ourselves against such probable calamities and unfortunate accidents.

3^{dly}, If we restrain the French *Carribee* sugar islands, and conquer *St. Domingo*, which we might complete in a year more, we shall possess all the French *Antilles* be in no fear of their power there, and consequently, we might defend our possessions there with half the guards and garrisons, we used, before, to station in those parts. But are we so weak in men, and are manufactures in the highlands of *Scotland*, and in the bogs of *Ireland*, so extensive, and the poor of those parts so well employed, that we can't spare any hands from thence to guard, strengthen, and plant our colonies? I have seen it computed by a very eminent man, that there are in the three kingdoms a million of persons out of employment in common. Those reasons are so very weak, that the gentlemen, who have made use of them, seem very unfortunate in their election, since the whole argument turns manifestly against them instead of supporting their cause. One can scarce help pitying such antagonists, and fighting for the frailties of human nature, when one reflects on such superficial conduct.

S E C T. VI.

Arg. 6. *That Spain was become our Enemy, and that it was necessary to make Peace, to save our Ally the King of Portugal.*

THIS Argument is far from being just or to the purpose; since that this accident was the most fortunate that could happen. We kept the enemy at bay there, he made but little progress; and with judicious conduct, by bringing the Russians, Danes, and Swedes into our interest; which might have been done, we should have carried the war into the heart of Spain, instead of standing on the defensive in Portugal. Besides this union of Spain and France, gave us an opportunity to cut off the flow of Spanish treasure from America, which enabled the French to carry on the war. After the supplies from the sugar isles were interrupted, and fell into our hands, the French had nothing to depend on, but the influx of Spanish treasure, for the goods sent to their West Indies by the galleons. But the capture of the *Hermione*, and the taking of the *Havanah*, dried up this source; and the taking a few settlements more, would have entirely cut off the communication between New and Old Spain, and the supplies of the war; so that it must have been starved, and as necessarily have died, as an animal body would expire, if it received no supply of food, nor of air.

PORTUGAL, formerly carried on a war with Spain from 1640 to 1662, gained its liberty, supported its independency against that power with great resolution; and as the Portuguese have a mortal aversion to the Spaniards, there is no doubt to be made, but they would have defended their country against the Spanish arms. But, what if they had not? What was it to us? These ministerial advocates, and the French party, exclaim against all continental connexions of all kinds. What then have we to do with Portugal? Our connexions with Germany and with Portugal are of the same kind, as to the balance of power, and our trade and commerce; and differ in those respects, but as more and less. Now, is it not strangely absurd and contradictory, to hear the same Partizans damn all connexions with Germany, as destructive and ruinous; and yet at the same time to hear these gentlemen advance, that our connexions with Portugal rendered it necessary to make peace on any terms? What must the stupidity or impudence of those men be, who can thus blow hot and cold out of the same mouth, and assert both, that things are, and are not at the same time? Astonishing prevarication!

But,

But, not only the balance of power, and the preservation of our commerce, obliged us to support the German war, and oppose the French in that region; but also the preservation of the Protestant Religion against the Popish league, found in the Empire to destroy it. We had also another motive, which was to exhaust the French troops and treasures in that country, and to divert them from being employed elsewhere; whilst we conquered their colonies and settlements in all parts of the globe. They foolishly thought, that the restoration of Hanover would have been deemed an equivalent for every thing we might gain in any other part of the world; and that all conquests would have been offered up a sacrifice for the redemption of that principality. Thus, though more advantages were to be obtained by assisting our *German* allies, than by assisting the king of Portugal; yet the saving the last is brought as an argument for our surrendering all our conquests, which are worth all the Portugal trade three times told; whilst the other is inveighed against, as a pernicious and destructive measure, and a continental connexion, which has swallowed up our troops and treasures, and ought always to be avoided as a gulph of ruin. But these are contradictions well worthy of the *French* party, which has adopted them; and which has ever since the Revolution had recourse to such ridiculous flimsy arguments, and inconsistencies for support of their traitorous measures. But, however, these things be, Portugal must soon have been relieved, for Spain and France would have been both ruined in one year more, as we had taken the Havanah, could have cut off all the West Indian treasure and trade from Spain and France, and turned both and their profits, into a channel, which would have safely conveyed them into our own pockets. This would have obliged the French to have quitted both Portugal and the Empire, though our arms, and those of our allies had been inferior, and obliged to keep on the defensive.

END OF PART FIRST.

P A R T II.

S E C T. VII.

A R G U M E N T VII.

THAT our trade would be ruined by the continuance of the war, through his wages, so many people have been taken from the loom, the plough, and the anvil.

Yet we have been told, by ministerial advocates, and the French party here, that our enemy is obstinate, his circumstances good, and our condition weak; and that we should be ruined, by the continuance of the war, or rather that we are already undone; as appear from arguments the first, second, and third. But here we are told, that we have such a trade, that wages are risen, and that we cannot procure goods to supply the market. If wages rise in price, is this a proof of poverty, and distress among the people; of the diminution of consumption; of the failure of the funds; and of a decrease of the revenues; or of the direct contrary of all these?

The drain of hands can affect the price of labour; but a small matter; for, as I remember, I saw it most clearly proved in one of the periodical prints, that an addition, of the labour of only three hours a week, in every labouring family, would compensate for all the loss of hands, occasioned by the war; perhaps only two hours, as it is said, we have near 70,000 Scots in our army and navy: and here we may ask, is the increase of our taxes, by the war, so light on consumption, that our people are not obliged, to work two hours in a week extraordinary, in order to be able, to purchase their usual consumption? By this argument, this is the real state of our poor. But is such a state of the poor, high wages, and want of hands in all branches of labour, a proof of poverty, distress, misery, and ruin brought on by our continental connexions, and the vast expences of the war?

On the contrary, all these are a full evidence, that our trade, consumption, and revenues are augmented by our conquests: that our revenues of excise must increase; that the sinking fund must swell; that the rents of lands must be well paid; that the price of their produce must be kept up, or from sinking; and hence that 18 s. in the pound well paid by the farmer, is a sum better than 20 s. promised, and ill paid or never; and that the advantages the landholders have received in this respect by the war, more than compensate for the extraordinary taxes they

have paid ; since it is very clear, that at 4 s. to the pound, the lands, one estate with another, do not pay above 16 d. to the pound, and some not even 8 d. to my knowledge *. As *Swift* has observed, in custom-house accounts, 2 and 2 make but 1 : so in the present case of *Rents*, two taken out of 18 s. leave 20 s. behind, instead of but 16 s. This is our case at present, and the political arithmetic by which we ought to compute.

Moreover, the increase of the balance of trade must enrich us very soon ; for very near the whole value, of the production of the French isles, must, and will be added to our former balance, from whence we seldom coined above 300,000 l. a year ; whereas this balance, in all probability, will be increased to ten times that value, in a few years. The good effects of such an augmentation, in the rise of lands and increase of consumption, if it be not ravished from us by an immature peace, formed on the basis of the preliminaries, will soon appear throughout the state.

Besides, high wages will drive manufactures into towns and villages, where employment is scarce, augment their consumption, increase the revenues, ease the poor rates, comfort the poor, raise the value of the lands, and augment the public felicity. At the same time, by furnishing the poor with more work and better pay ; the traders with more trade and a bet-

* A TABLE of Annual Taxes, and of what each class pays :

RANKS.	Annual Consum.	Sum per lb.		Total Amount.
		l.	s. d.	
Labourers	26,000,000 at	0	10 $\frac{1}{2}$	1,300,000
Traders	17,000,000 at	1	10 $\frac{1}{2}$	1,593,750
Landholders	18,000,000 at	3	6	3,111,111
Government	20,000,000 at	3	0	3,000,000
Total Consumpt.	80,000,000	2	3 $\frac{3}{4}$	9,004,861

N.B. But we pay but about eight millions per annum ; in time of peace about seven millions, but then the payment of the government is not so much by near two-thirds : hence the landholders, who have most to protect, have most to pay in war, or about 8 d. to the pound more than in time of peace. On the other hand, in time of peace, they and their dependants receive back, in places, posts, offices, and pensions near two millions per annum, and in war perhaps four. The great traders are generally both traders and landholders, and many of the lesser. In times of peace, the landholders consume more, and the government much less of the landholders income. Many more observations might be made, but they would lead me too far.

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ter incomes; and the landholders with their rents in a more certain manner, and by keeping up the value of their estates; it will enable all, to bear the burden of additional taxes without distress, till our enemies are reduced to reason; whilst, on the other hand, the French will be exposed to the very reverse, and suffer every calamity. This the bankruptcies of their government sufficiently evince.

Hence, if we keep our conquests, after the war is ended, our sailors will meet with full employment in our own merchant ships, our shipwrights will be fully employed at home, and not driven into foreign service to seek a support: and such a trade, and such a consumption will follow, that rents will rise; years purchase of lands and fines on leases augment; interest of money fall; the country and agriculture be improved; commerce increased; and hence the sinking fund will soon reduce the national debt to fifteen or twenty millions. But if we give up the *God-fishery* to the French, leave them in *Louisiana*, and restore to them their late *Sugar Islands*, all the above pleasing prospect will vanish like a golden dream, and look like a fruitful country, which has been blasted by the poisonous breath of some infernal demon. God grant! that this may not be the melancholy face left on our affairs by the preliminaries.

Thus we have fully proved, that the principles of these French babblers, who cry up the preliminaries, and clamour of our misery and distress, militate against themselves; and that one part of their absurd reasonings destroy the other. That want of hands, and high wages prove, that we have full employment for our people, that we have a great trade, and that our people can bear additional taxes; and hence, that if a poor labourer pays a half-penny a quart for his *Porter*, (which by the way is not necessary) if he can have employment to earn two pence more, he will be a gainer by the war and taxes. By this too it is evident, we may raise the supplies for the war easily*, and at a moderate interest; and consequently, that we ought not to make peace, unless it be on such conditions, as will

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secure

* Though the ministerial and French party have declared a hundred times, that we were necessitated to make a peace on the odious terms in the preliminaries, because we could not raise the supplies for another year; and though they hung on it as a cardinal argument, yet now we are told in the *Briton*, No. 36, that we could raise thirty-five millions for the year. Mercy on me! what is the contradiction of these men. Must not their impudence be formed of *Bronze* melted in the infernal pit, satanised, and then sent to these upper regions for the use of the footy monarch of that brimstone country? To prove the popularity of their own patron, they fly in the face of all the arguments they advanced before. But if we can raise thirty-five millions, for the current year, to carry on a war;

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secure to us all our conquests in America at least : and hence our religion, liberties, commerce, and the liberties of Europe, against our implacable enemies the French for the future.

Argum. VIII. It has been said, by ministerial advocates and the French party here, in order to intimidate us into an immature peace; That our neighbours were growing jealous of our conquests, and of our increasing power and riches, and would not consent, that we should keep our acquisitions.

Let us suppose, that we had kept to ourselves the *Cod Fishery*, *Louisiana*, and the French caribbea *Sugar Islands*, who would have been jealous of us? Would the *Dutch* have been jealous that their thirty five millions in our funds would have been too safe? Would they have been jealous, that we should join with France, to attack their barrier, and overrun and conquer their country, as we did in the reign of the foolish and wicked Charles the second. No : this could not be, unless they could have seen by a spirit of divination, that we should be soon under a *Tory* administration ; which in Charles II, James II, and queen Ann's reign, conspired with France, to destroy our natural friends, our bulwark on the continent, and the support of the protestant religion. They can never be jealous of us, unless, when we are under the government of *Tory* principles, and then in truth, they have always had reason enough to be jealous of us.

But these men tell us, that we cannot raise men enough, to defend our allies in Germany, and Portugal, against our enemies ; though they have added 60,000 men to our own troops ; and yet the French party aver, that we have made our neighbours jealous of us by our increase of power. But how is it possible, we should be obnoxious to the jealousy of our friends on the continent, when we cannot support our allies, nor defend our possessions there? This is a contradiction, a gross absurdity, that nothing but the spirit of falshood and impudence could dictate.

The ministerial advocates, and French party too, argue by the first maxim, that we cannot keep our conquests ; by the second, that the French will ruin us, if we continue the war ; by the third, that we are poor, exhausted and unable to continue the war, or raise the supplies ; by the fourth, that our successes were owing to our good fortune only, and not to our strength or conduct ;

war ; if we have such a plenty of money, and it would be intrusted under the conduct of a m—f—tr so generally odious ; what must these men be, who have laboured to frighten the people with our great poverty and distress, and to represent that we were not able, to carry on the war, whilst the French were in political strength and vigour? Good gods! what some men are capable of!

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by the fifth, that the retention of our conquests would be a burden and nuisance to us; by the sixth, that we could not defend our ally Portugal; by the seventh, that the war would ruin our trade for want of hands. Now, if we bear in our foreheads all these marks and characters of our poverty, weakness, incapacity of defending ourselves, or of supporting our allies; if our territories are so scanty, our people so few, our successes so accidental, and the power of our natural enemy so great; who is to be supposed would always join any power against us, and be glad of the opportunity; if I say this be the case, *how is it possible our friends on the continent should be jealous of us?* Can the Dutch, Danes, Swedes, &c. be jealous of such an impotent power, that is neither able, according to these men, to defend its own rights, to support its friends, or to annoy its enemies? Such flagrant contradiction and nonsense can issue from none, but the French party here, whose aims and views being always contrary to the interests of this country; and calculated to support the power of France, to compleat a particular design; must be supported by nonsense and contradiction; because truth and reason are as opposite to the cause they espouse, as light to darkness.

These logicians, of the French party, likewise tell us, that our neighbours are afraid that we shall keep our conquests *lest it would destroy the balance of power.* But if our neighbours could be jealous of any thing, according to these disputants, by the first six arguments, it should be, that we should ruin ourselves by continuing the war: and hence be unable to contribute any protection to them, in case the ambitious, avaricious and turbulent French should take it into their heads to attack them: that the French would grow so strong, by continuing the war, and by impoverishing us, that it would be necessary, that our neighbours should join us, to preserve our power; in order thereby to preserve the balance of power, and to prevent the French from becoming terrible to them by the increase of French power; and through our continuing to make a war on France, which would end in our ruin, as well as in that of our natural allies. The first six arguments tend naturally to prove, that all our neighbours ought, in point of prudence, to join us against the French, rather than that they should grow jealous of us. The French party declare, that we are so weak, that we can neither preserve our *Cod-Fishery*, nor protect our *Colonies*, nor keep the acquisition of a few *Sugar Islands*; the biggest of which a man may travel across in a day; and yet assert, that we are become formidable too, and have raised a jealousy of our power, in all the *States of Europe*. This is such superficial, puerile, futile, and vain argument, and flagrant contradiction, that one would wonder how any one could have the folly or impudence to advance such

such wretched trumpery. But what is there that French assurance and Popish impudence will not do, and say?

However, if it could possibly happen, that from the increase and augmentation of our riches and navigation by the retention of our conquests, that we should become an object of jealousy among our neighbours; which I do not think possible, there is a way of evading it. It is not necessary, that we should retain all our conquests; but the most mischievous disposition, that we can possibly make of them, is to surrender them to the French.

The head of a politician should be as fertile in expedients for the public welfare, as a poet's in images to grace his epodes: but then the most worthy and most noble only should be adopted, and woven into his system. A minister, who is only capable of going on in the beaten track, in the old cow path, is fitter for the conduct of a plough, than the cabinet of a prince. In arduous, doubtful and intricate cases, to snatch an opportunity, to lay hold of a lucky incident, and to turn a circumstance, or event, to such advantage, as a lubberly genius would never have thought of, is to appear an *Agathocles* on the African strand, a *Cæsar* at *Dyrrachium*, or the Prussian hero *Frederic* in Saxony. But genii, such as these, seldom appear in war, any more than your *Sullys*, *Richlieus*, *Mazarines*, *Colberts*, *Foreys*, *Reuilles*, *Choiseuls*, *Burleighs*, *Walsinghams*, *Cecils*, *Sommers's*, *Marlboroughs*, *Godolphins* and *Sunderlands*, do often appear in politics. What pity it is! we cannot in this reign find a statesman to place among these worthies, without having recourse to the name of P—tt!

Now let us take it for granted, that the powers on the continent were growing jealous of our conquests; though there is not the least reason to believe any such thing, as it is contrary to their natural interests, was their no alternative to be pursued? Was it absolutely necessary that we should restore France to its pristine trade, riches, power, and naval strength? And thereby make ourselves the object of the mockery, derision, scorn and contempt of all Europe? Was there no method, to be taken, to prevent jealousy of our neighbours on one hand, and France from becoming dangerous to our religion, liberties, commerce, the liberties of Europe, and our naval strength, on the other? Surely, there was. Could any states on the continent dread the increase of our naval strength as much as the land armies of France? It is impossible, one would think, for the impudence of a French faction, to assert they could: at least, one should be apt to think so, if the bold assertion of any falsehood, or any impudence could shock them.

We have acquired the French settlements in the East Indies; could we not have put, either *Swedes, Danes, Holsteiners, Russians* or *Prussians* into some of those *Comptoirs*, or all of them, or any other power, for an equivalent of troops, and assistance against the French? Was there no method to be taken, but to reinstate the enemy in this trade again? Had it not better been in the hands of the *Fleings*, the empress queen, or in any hands than in French? Could not offers of this kind have detached an ally, or a subsidiary from France, and have procured a friend to Britain, and its views? Could no such measure have enabled us, to have kept an important sugar island, to have asserted and vindicated our exclusive right to the cod fishery, and all Louisiana? Or was there never a head capable of suggesting such an expedient? If there were no head capable of suggesting any thing of this kind, what politicians have we? If there were, what sort of patriots are we blessed with? If such measures might have been useful, are not continental connexions necessary? If we are unequal to France in spare hands, from our great trade, are not continental connexions necessary, to protect our own dominions, trade, friends and allies? Even our French party acknowledge it as to Portugal.

But we had not only the French settlements in the East Indies, to tempt a subsidiary of France, &c. to lend us an aid, if we wanted it; but also Senegal, Goree, and twenty-two sugar islands, to dispose of for such purpose. But these were not all, we had also the dutchies of *Bremen* and *Verden*, and the electorate of *Hanover*, to offer to the *Danes* and *Swedes*; &c. for assistance.

It appears from the twelfth principle, or argument, that has been urged, by the ministerial advocates, and French party, that we ought to have no territories on, nor connexions with, the continent. Hence, they must of course consider the principality of *Hanover*, as a dead weight upon us. They have contended, that those connexions, caused by *Hanover*, have been a constant drain of our treasures; have prompted to destructive foolish measures; that the balance of power is a chimera, a phantom; *Hanover* a gulph of English wealth, an abyss, a vortex, that has drawn in, and swallowed up all our riches; a millstone about our necks, which has sunk us to perdition; the origin of all our political evils, and the source of all our miseries; and which has obliged us to enter into ruinous alliances, to the neglect of our own true interests, &c. &c. &c. In short, that it has been a fountain of all the political miseries, that a fertile imagination can conceive, or poetical eloquence paint.

For my own part, I am not able to recollect all the evils, distresses, miseries, calamities, disasters, and misfortunes, which have

have been drawn down upon us, and which the Tories, and *French party* among us, have imputed to our connexions with this *poor, lousy, despicable*, mean, contemptible species: it is scarce to be conceived, how much they have exclaimed against it, and how happy, they have declared, it would have been for us, if it had been sunk into a lake by an earthquake, or swallowed up in the ocean with all its appendages. Must we not think, that the party was sincere in all this declamation and invective? Can we think, that in drawing this picture they intended nothing but sham and mockery, and had not the least grain of sincerity? Surely, they could not be so base and wicked, as to say all this, and make such declarations, without believing them to be true: and is it possible such wise disinterested men should be mistaken?

Let us then take it for granted, that these *inweighers*, against Hanover, and continental connexions, were both *wise and honest*, with regard to the sentiments they expressed of this despicable *crab-orchard, this lousy electorate*; and that if we retain it under our dominion, it must always be a burden to this nation, and tend constantly to involve us in continental disputes and connexions, without affording us any advantage, any more than it would, if it was in other hands. In such case, in order to prove our *humility and moderation*, and to avert the jealousy of the other states of Europe; and to shew, that if we gained territory in one place, convenient for ourselves, we were willing, at the same time, to increase the strength of other nations in proportion, with a design to preserve the balance of power; and that we desired nothing, but to pull down the proud and violent, for our own security, and that of our neighbours; in such case, I ask, how comes it about, that we did not offer the dutchies of *Bremen and Verden* to the Swedes, for their assistance? They have long bore the dismemberment of those dominions, with great regret and ill-will to us. How comes it about, that we did not offer part of the electorate of *Hanover* to the duke of *Holstein*, in order to procure the aid of 50,000 *Russians*? And how comes it to pass, that we did not embrace the opportunity, and offer the *Danes* the dutchy of *Holstein*, and some part of *Hanover*, most convenient for them, in order to procure an aid from them of 20,000 or 30,000 men? By a scheme of this kind, there is no doubt to be made, but a vast assistance might have been procured, at no expence. Such a partition too, would have settled all the disputes between the king of Denmark, and the duke of *Holstein*, and the *Russians*. At present, their dominions are so intermixed, that the people

* I use the genteel flowery language of the party.

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scarce know whom to obey; but, by a shifting of territory, in the manner proposed, all their differences may be settled to the advantage of both parties.

Thus we might have gained troops and friends, freed ourselves from that curse *Hanover*, shewed our humility and moderation, kept our conquests without provoking jealousy, and have proved, that we desired in our wars, only security for ourselves, and for the liberties of *Europe*; and to preserve the balance of power against a turbulent, unjust and barbarous prince, who from his great power and strength, has been the plague of the western world, for more than a century past; and whose ambition has cost *Europe* millions of lives, and hundreds of millions of money in the interval specified.

By such an alienation, we should have turned *Hanover* to some account; and, in some measure, have indemnified ourselves for the losses, which we have sustained by the possession of it for fifty years past. We should, by such a system, have thrown off the dead corrupted carcase, that is now united to our living body, and have poisoned us so long with its stench. We should have sold, and divested ourselves of, this cumberous load, and had a valuable consideration for it; as we should have gained friends and assistance, at an important crisis. What must we think of the heads, or of the hearts of people, who never thought of, nor proposed such a measure?

To talk, that this is against the laws and constitutions of the Empire is false, and foolish to the highest degree. How came the Queen of *Hungary*, and the Emperor by their present dominions? How came the *Danes* and *Swedes* by their share of the Empire? And lastly, how came we by the dutchies of *Bremen* and *Verden*? This proves so weak an objection, that vanity herself could not appear lighter, if she were weighed in the balance. If such an event, or partition were to happen, what power in *Europe* could defeat it?

But what would it be to us, if some princes of the Empire, and the princes to whom we alienated and delivered it, should by-and-by differ about it? According to the French party, we ought to have no connexions with the continent, as appears in argument the twelfth. However, we might have stipulated for our commerce upon the treaty of alienation. But if we had lost all our trade extraordinary, that we have by the *Elb* and *Wiser*, through our possession of *Hanover*, we should have been recompensed twenty times told, by the retention of our conquests; nay, by the Cod-fishery, *Louisiana*, and the French Sugar Islands only. These acquisitions, and the depression of the French naval power, would have been an ample satisfaction. But suppose, we had even given the northern powers all the French

Sugar Islands amongst them? The depression of the French naval power, by such an alienation, would have been an event, as Shakespear says, *deviously to be wished*; especially if we could obtain an expulsion of the French out of *Louisiana*, and preserve our original *exclusive* right to the Cod-fishery, by such concessions to our friends for their aid. If this would not be the case, how comes the eighth argument to be advanced by the French and ministerial parties, *viz.* that the retention of our conquests would render our neighbours jealous of us? However, if this argument be false, the increase of our trade would be true. Here then the French party, anti-continentalists, and ministerial advocates, for an immature peace, are hemmed in with a dilemma. The alienation of the accursed spot Hanover would at worst free us from the inconveniencies, which it has brought to our affairs.

By this scheme, we might have drawn off our troops from Germany to Portugal, and many northern forces with them; and yet have left the Empire completely defended, and our faith kept inviolate with *Prussia*. By this system, *Denmark* and *Sweden*, &c. would have been detached from France, and have conspired, to drive out the French: and by this, the Protestant interest, in the Empire, might have been strengthened: by this, we might have been masters in one year more of all the communication between New Spain and Europe; have fully protected *Portugal*, and have obliged the king of Spain to have indemnified the *Portuguese* for their losses by his barbarous invasion.

But, what have our politicians been doing? What have they done! What have we got for an expence of ninety millions extraordinary, the loss of our brave men, and for the conquests they gained? According to the French party and ministerial advocates, we have been lavishing away six millions in Germany last year, when they themselves urge, that we ought not to have spent a sou there. Did the present ministry spend all this treasure, to keep that millstone Hanover still about our necks? And to necessitate us to have a perpetual ruinous connexion with the continent; the system they have railed and raved at, and damned for so many years past to the pit of hell, as the most pernicious of political evils and incumbrances? Why had not they drawn off our troops to Portugal, and left the Empire to take care of itself; since they tell us, we are to have no concern for it, if it were ravaged by the French from the *Rhine* to *Belgrade*. Yet these very men keep troops there at vast expence; though wanted in Portugal, and all to defend, that accursed spot *Hanover*, and our German allies; with whom they argue

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we ought to have broken two or three years ago. Astonishing stupidity and repugnancy!

Upon the whole, the alienation proposed, and its effects, were so practicable and feasible, that it will be in vain for any abandoned caviller, tool of power, or any of the French party, to pretend, to evade the force of the argument here advanced. However, I should not wonder to see disputants arise of this party, who would contend that *black is white*, and that twenty are more than thirty; or assert, that the three angles of a right-angled triangle are not equal to two right angles. Whatever Hanover may be in itself, the disposal of it, in the manner above hinted, and thereby depriving the French of the source of their naval strength, would have been a judicious alienation, that would have merited the blessings of the present age, and have averted the curses of posterity; as well as the jealousies, imputations of corruption, treachery, which are with too much air of justice thrown on —

By such an alienation, the *Swedes* might have been drawn out of Pomerania two years ago; the *Russians* induced to quit *Brandenburg*, and assist us; the king of *Prussia* eased, and we relieved from the burden of the subsidy, which we paid to him. By this system, *Denmark* might have been induced to have lent us all her troops, and to have united with *Sweden* and *Russia* to have drove the French out of the Empire, and to have pursued them across the Rhine into France.

But, if this bait would not have allured the *Swedes*, *Danes*, and *Russians*, might we not have thrown in an allotment of three or four small French Sugar Islands to each; nay, half a dozen, for they have twenty-four in all? And might not these been added as *sweetners*, if I may be allowed the pun, to make the other temptations go more glibly down? The *Swedes* have no Sugar Isles in the West Indies, nor the *Russians*. The *Danes* have only the barren rock *St. Thomas's*. Surely, some of the northern powers might have been detached from France, and drawn into our interests by such powerful temptations and allurements. We had also *Goree* and *Senegal* to dispose of: we might also have given that *Cerberus* the Dutch a sop, which would effectually have prevented any jealousies, even of the French party and Tory faction here, who mortally hate them; what I mean is, by a treaty of commerce we might have allowed them, the right of fishing on our coasts for half a century, or for ever. The keeping the Cod-fishery to ourselves would have been a recompence worth twice as much: for, if we were to deprive the Dutch of the Herring-fishery, they must turn their hands immediately to the woollen manufacture, and prohibit ours, as they did formerly; what then should we gain by

the bargain? Here is a large fund of temptations, and full scope for our present minister, to have displayed the fecundity of his vast genius!

But, out of this choice of expedients, what has been done? Some will perhaps say, every thing, but what we ought to have done; and out of all possible measures, that we have either foolishly, or erroneously chosen the worst, and most ruinous. They may say farther too, that we are going, to act in every respect, as we did in the year 1712, without the necessity; nay, that we are going to do ten times worse; that is, just as we are on the brink of reaping the fruits of a glorious, expensive, and successful war, we are going to terminate it, by a most infamous peace.

If the present generation forgive such politicians, certainly our posterity will plentifully bestow their curses on them, as the Carthaginians did on those who made peace with the Romans; at, what these last call, the end of the second Punic war, of which a modern author observes, "The citizens cursed their ancestors for not dying gloriously in defence of their country, rather than concluding such ignominious treaties of peace with their implacable enemies, which had been the cause of the deplorable condition to which their posterity was then reduced. They likewise condemned themselves in the strongest terms, for having so tamely, as well as stupidly, made peace, and delivered up their arms. Are not the Cod-fishery, the trade of North America, and the trade of the French Sugar Islands our arms?"

The surrender of the Cod-fishery, the tolerating the French in Louisiana, and the restoration of their Caribbee Sugar Islands to them, may be justly said, to be a surrender of our arms, to our most implacable enemies; whose maxim, in respect to us, is like that of Cato's, with regard to the Carthaginians, *we must be destroyed as heretics and as rivals*. How far our posterity may be induced, to curse the author of the preliminaries, does not require a spirit of prophecy, to determine. When party and faction are dead, things will appear in their true light. Even Bolingbroke himself damned his own treaty, and declared the French ought to have been reduced in the confederate war for ages to come.

If we had parted with three-fourths of our conquests at the Caribbees; nay, if we had admitted any powers, but those of the house of Bourbon, to possess the French Sugar Islands, Goree, Senegal, their Comptoirs in the East Indies, and all our conquests, rather than lest them as they are, we had acted judiciously; as thereby we should have depressed the naval power of France, and if not increased our own actually, we should

at least have augmented our maritime strength relatively, just as much as we diminished theirs; and should also have procured allies, attached them to us by their interest, and, by the same principle, rendered them natural enemies to France.

If we had acted in this manner, we had followed the political system of the glorious Queen *Elizabeth*, who said to the ambassador of France: "Tell your master, if he expect, to
 " make conquests from the king of Spain, and house of Au-
 " stria; and to enlarge his own dominions with his acquisitions,
 " that I will not suffer it. If he conquers the *Assacis*, and the
 " *French Compté*, those countries shall be yielded up to the
 " Swiss Cantons, to enable them to oppose the violence of
 " the Austrian family; for I intend to establish such a partition
 " of power and dominion, that no one shall dare to violate
 " justice towards his neighbour, and that all shall be restrained
 " within the bounds of their duty, by the dread of resentment
 " and revenge." How noble! After all our glorious successes, what a sneaking figure do we make. Just so we did then, as soon as queen James came to the throne. Whether that our conduct, after our successes, is brave and resolute, like that of queen Elizabeth, or timorous and mean, like that of queen James; we will leave to the reader to judge.

Argum. IX. That settlements on the TERRA FIRMA of New Spain, and in their Isles, would ruin us, by filling us too full of wealth and riches.

Those gentlemen, who have advanced this argument, seem to have forgotten, what they have said in the first argument, relative to the necessity we are under of surrendering our conquests; in the second, what they have said of the superior abilities of the French; in the third, their declamations and harangues upon our national debt, poverty, and imbecility; in the fourth, that even our success were not owing to our strength, and rather the child of accident, than the legitimate offspring of power; in the fifth, that we want people; in the sixth, that a peace was necessary to save *Portugal*, which implies our weakness. All these things are as opposite to the spirit of the above maxim as heaven to hell. But this is no wonder, for when writers unfortunately combat truth and reason, they generally entangle themselves in a maze of incongruity and contradiction.

A settlement at *Darien* was projected, and undertaken in 1701 by the Scots. This was highly approved of by that nation. They were so far from apprehending or dreading any pernicious effects from it, or a ruinous draft of people, that they highly resented our refusing to protect them. We all know

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the reason of this, and the handle the Tory, or French party here, made of it, to distress king William, and their country in favour of France, though this king just before *had taken off the proscription*; discharged his Whig ministers, and taken those vipers into his counsels; who, in return, betrayed all his affairs to France, though they gave out, there was *not a Jacobite left* in the nation. This was done to lull him into a profound security, that they might strike their blow more surely and certainly. God grant! that if any such designs and plots should be laid in futurity, to destroy any prince of the house of Hanover, under the mask of friendship, that they may be timely detected, and their authors brought to the block and the gallows. We leave this digression, and return to the subject.

But if the Scots, whose country is very thinly inhabited, and who are so poor, that they do not pay one fortieth part of the land-tax raised on both kingdoms, could project such a scheme, and push it with vigour, without fearing any disadvantageous loss, or emigration of people; what reason is there for us to dread it, who have the same useless hands to plant there; besides great numbers unemployed both in England and Ireland, who might be transplanted with good advantage? Nay, some writers, of good authority, aver, that we have a million of people, in the three kingdoms, who might be well spared for our Colonies, and the *state* receive riches from their transplantation.

When the Scots settled themselves at new *Caledonia*, the Spaniards were terribly alarmed. At that time, for obvious reasons, on the marquis *Canale's* remonstrance, the Scots were deserted, and the settlements soon came to nothing. The apprehensions of the Spaniards, from the success of the Scots, the example of our people in the Bay of Campeachy, and Honduras, and on the Muquito shore, prove the practicability of settling in those parts; since we can live even in their most unwholesome *lagunos* and morasses; and the use it would be to us. But what do I see! good gods! the fortresses our brave sailors built in the bay of Honduras moulder into dust, by the breath of a British minister, though we are surrounded with trophies of victories, obtained over this ungrateful and base people, whom, as sir *William Godolphin* remarks, nothing will keep within the bounds of justice, but the rod of chastisement, and dread of our revenge.

As to the waste of our people, I have just proved it, to be a phantom; but the ministerial advocates and the *French* party here assure us, that we should be ruined by a too great influx of riches from conquests and settlements on the Spanish *terra firma*. One cannot help asking these vile prevaricators, how this is possible,

possible, if what they have offered in the third argument be true? Are not these arguments as incompatible, as light and darkness, truth and falshood? Let us suppose, as these writers have suggested, to serve a turn, that we are 140 millions in debt, and that 35 millions are due to foreigners. Let us suppose next, that we could increase the balance of our trade two millions per annum, would it not be one of the most fortunate circumstances that could happen to this nation, as it would enable us to discharge the debts of the state without distress? And as it would free us from the burden of the annual interest, we pay for those debts to the Dutch, &c. ? It is very extraordinary, that any set of party writers should first represent us, as an impoverished, beggared, ruined nation, through our great load of debts, and then immediately assure us, that an influx of riches yearly, which would discharge all those debts, and would increase our industry, trade, and stock of cash, would prove our ruin, bane and destruction. This is playing fast and loose with a vengeance! and blowing hot and cold out of the same mouth, in such a manner, that, one would think, every man must most clearly perceive, that these *writers* and their *patrons* have something else in view, which actuates them, besides the love of truth, and prosperity of their country.

As we are in possession of the Havannah, and all the French Caribbee Sugar Islands, if we carry on the war one year longer, we may, by making a few settlements in proper situations, which we could point out, cut off the communication between *New* and *Old Spain*; the fatal consequences of which, to the French and Spaniards, and the incapacity they must be in from thence, to carry on the war, are so evident, that it would be an affront to the reader's understanding, to attempt an elucidation: or at least, till such a truth shall meet with assurance bold enough to deny it, which possibly may happen among ministerial advocates, and the French party.

But it has been objected, that no ridiculous absurdity might be wanting to support a bad cause, that the states of Europe have agreed on the indivisibility of the Spanish Indies, and that conquests shall be made on the Terra Firma by any nation. Nothing can be more notoriously false.

By the treaty made at the Hague with the Emperor in 1700, the English and Dutch were allowed to keep whatever conquests they could make from the Spaniards in the West Indies. By the South-sea act, the company was allowed to make conquests, and to keep them, and the queen's ships were to assist them. What folly, or front, must such writers have! But, why not keep Cuba, as well as Jamaica, and the French St. Domingo?

Argum. X. It is asserted, by ministerial advocates, and the French party, THAT we ought to surrender our conquests to show, that we are not inspired with ambitious views, and to prove our MODERATION.

This is *humming* us with a vengeance! Political moderation, it is true, in some circumstances, is a proof of humanity in conquerors, but in others cruelty and consummate stupidity. If I were combating with a bear or a wolf for my life, and a spectator should recommend it to me, to give him stabs with *moderation*, I should think him a conspirator to destroy me, and that he deserved some immoderate stabs himself.

After the Romans had subdued the Carthaginians, in the second Punic war, and obliged them to articles of peace, which put it out of their power to molest them with impunity, they might then have safely practised the virtue of moderation. But did they? No: on the contrary, by base artifices, they excited the African powers against them, began another unjust war, brought them to the brink of destruction, and then, by fraud and chicanery, entirely destroyed them. Here they had room for practising the virtue of moderation with safety. When *Paulus Emilius* subdued *Perseus*, conquered Greece, and disarmed its inhabitants, the Romans were not satisfied, till they had plundered them of their treasures, murdered their principal men, and carried the rest as hostages to *Rome*; nay, they imprisoned too their ambassadors, or at least retained them against their inclinations, of whom the famous *Polybius* was one. Here was place for them to have exercised the virtue of moderation, but they thought it imprudent; yet they were deemed great politicians and wise statesmen; and soon after, by their judicious and prudent conduct, acquired the dominion of the whole world.

But, when a lesser power, by the good providence of God, by accident, by a bold and lucky stroke, or by a series of good fortune and successes, arising from an extraordinary concurrence of circumstances, shall obtain the superiority over an implacable and cruel enemy, whose animosity is excited by religious spite and rage, as well as by civil hatred and enmity; in such case, not to struggle and contend, to preserve at any price, that superiority acquired, and that security necessary, is stupidity and infatuation, instead of humanity and *moderation*; it is cruelty to ourselves, to our friends, to our allies, to our neighbours, to our posterity, and to the human race. It is likewise a mark of disrespect, and contempt both of God and religion. It is giving the bear and wolf, with whom we fight, moderate stabs, for fear we should destroy them; and it is setting them loose,

loose, to destroy ourselves, after we have hampered them, and gotten them safe in our trammels, or toils. This doctrine of moderation must therefore surely come from the enemy, and his agents. It is their constant practice, to preach up moderation, when out of power, and to cut every one's throat, they can, when they gain the upper hand.

In the first, second and third arguments, we are told, that our enemies will not make peace with us, but on their own terms; that they are more powerful than we; that we are exhausted, beggared, loaded with debts, and ruined; and yet here we are advised to make a surrender of our conquests to make this enemy more powerful. But does not common sense teach us, that weakness, and conquests are a contradiction, an absurdity? We are richer, we are more powerful, we have wrested from the enemy ten millions sterling of its foreign trade; we can take all the rest, if we please, and sink its coadjutor as low as itself is. When, by our valour, at a vast expence, which must weaken us prodigiously, if not paid by the enemy; we have acquired a superiority, that we can keep, shall we be so foolish, as to surrender our conquests, give up our advantages, part with our superiority, weaken ourselves, lose the opportunity of paying off our national debts, and put it into the power of our rancorous enemies to destroy us? No: let us not do any such thing; rather let all *Scotland* sink in the ocean! The retention of our conquests will reverse both our own, and our enemy's fortune. But, shall we part with these dear-bought blessings, and expose ourselves to destruction, because some canting French Papists tell us, by such conduct we shall acquire the character of moderation? This is practising the same artifice with us, that the fox did with the raven, that had a piece of cheese in his mouth. Shall we be so stupid, as to suffer ourselves to be gulled, by French Papists, out of our cheese; and then out of our religion, lives, liberties and commerce? Heaven forbid it! We are advised to resign our arms, and to put our enemy into a condition, to cut our throats, in order, to shew our moderation. What must these men be, who can adopt this doctrine? What those who teach it?

If it be said, we cannot retain our conquests, then there can be no room for *moderation*. Moderation implies a power to command and compel, to the execution of what is cruel and unjust. But, by the first six arguments, this is not our condition, but the *reverse*: so far are we from being capable of doing what is cruel, or compelling our enemy to concede to any thing, that is cruel and unjust, that the French party aver, we cannot retain our possessions, nor carry on a war to assert our own rights: so contradictory are these deceivers of the people? If

our enemies are too strong for us; if they will not pay us the charges of the war, by a cession of what we have acquired, though they petulantly and wantonly forced us into such war; if we are beggared; if we owe our good success only to chance, &c. why do they recommend moderation to us? An inferior and feeble situation will not admit of the practice of the virtue; it being the part only of a superior and predominant power, to discover such a disposition.

But the great Florentine *Machiavel* was of a very different sentiment from the preachments of these deceivers; for he taught, that lenity was generally esteemed the effect of imbecility, cowardice, and pusillanimity; and that it provoked injuries and affronts, instead of procuring, and conciliating affection and esteem. This moderation was the capital fault and grand error of Walpole's weak, timid, and ignominious administration, from the year 1725, to the setting of his power in the year 1742; and by this moderation, the contempt of the Spaniards was excited, Jenkins lost his ear, and we drew on ourselves a war in 1740. When we demand of the Spaniards, it should not be with complaisance and cringing, but with the imperious voice of thunder and lightning. Hear all ye future ministers! the language of our ambassador at that court, viz. *Sir William Godolphin*, in his letter to my lord *Arlington*: "It is the Spanish humour, that they apply themselves heartily and seriously to conferre no friendship, but of such only whom they dread; and that the impressons of fear do more effectually negotiate with them than the offices of kinanes."

Moderation is, therefore, rather the virtue of monks in eating, than of inferior states and princes in acquiring and conserving power and dominion. None, but a prince vastly superior to each of his neighbours can practise such a virtue, with regard to the resignation of his power; when Providence has, from the approbation of his cause, thrown an addition of strength and territory into his hands; or, at least, he cannot do it, without becoming the hatred and contempt of his people, the scorn of his enemies, the sneer of his allies, and the mockery and derision of distant states. Thus queen *Ann* rendered herself the scorn of the king of *Morocco*, by the peace she made with the *French* in 1712, as appear from that prince's letter to her majesty. A little after he came to the throne, *James* the first made an infamous peace with *Spain*; and, by his spirit of moderation, acquired the title of *Rex pacificus*, and queen *James*. *Osborne* informs us, that this peace was procured, by bribing every one, of his ministers, attendants, and courtiers. From a pretended principle of humanity, he shunned war, and became the scorn of the whole earth, though his minions, and the

the sycophants about him, dignified him with the appellation of the *wise king Solomon*. The severe joke of Henry the fourth, on account of this title, is well known.

It seems, at last, that they had, by their fulsome flatteries, made this *poor creature* believe himself to be really, that wise king Solomon, they talked of; or he could never have said to his parliament; "*that I am the oldest king in christendom, and I throw the wisest too,*" When his flatterers had prevailed on him to adopt a scandalous measure, they cried up his wisdom, for concurring in their treachery; and for acquiescing with what injured his reputation, the dignity of the crown, and the prosperity of the kingdom. It was in this wise reign, the doctrine of anti continental connexions was first broached, and that the Protestants in Germany were left to be worried by the house of Austria. It was this wise king, who figured high as a wit, for saying; "He was ready to go to war, provided they, who advised him to it, would answer three questions; namely, *How much it would cost, how long last, and which side should get the better of it?*" Behold the wisdom of the king of moderation! Ought not these maxims to be worn as philacteries? Would not they well become the forehead of our present minister? Resolve me, ye adepts in science and politics, *Mef. Auditor and Briton!*

After having, therefore, by good Providence, obtained such an addition of power, as to equal, or surpass, an implacable, turbulent, and restless enemy, fired with civil rage, and religious animosity to lunacy; for a prince to give up this superiority into the hands of his enemy, and expose himself and people to destruction, seems to argue, that he must be under the influence of some gross delusion, and the most pernicious counsels, that work upon him like a sort of sorcery. God grant! that we may never have such a prince; and let us rejoice, that, under the wise counsels of our philosophic minister, it is impossible to apply the political observation to the present times; and therefore that it is meant only, to be considered as theoretic politics.

When Charles the twelfth of Sweden was a minor, the *Czar*, the *Danes*, the king of *Poland*, all fell upon several parts of his dominions; because their situation was necessary and convenient for them. The *Czar* conquered *Livonia, Carelia, Ingria*, and part of *Finland*, and kept them. The *Danes* conquered the dutchies of *Bremen* and *Verden*, and afterwards sold them: they likewise vindicated the tolls of the *Sound*, and excluded the *Swedes* from the freedom thereof; and afterwards stripped the duke of *Hollstein* of half of his dominions. The Dutch conquered *Java*, and kept it; the Turks *Belgrade* and all *Serbia*,

and retain both; the Spaniards part of Italy; the French, since the peace of the Pyrenees, have conquered the *Alsace*, the *French Comté*, *Flanders*, got *Lorraine*, &c. &c. the revenues of which conquered countries amount to one third of their annual income *. The duke of *Anjou* too has conquered *Spain* and the *Indies*, by the assistance of the French. These are all, except the acquisitions of the Turks, unjust conquests; and yet the victors retain them to this day. In the pursuit of a just and honest war, we have subdued a few islands in the West Indies, not equal to *Lorraine* in territory; and recovered a fishery, to which we had an exclusive original right, and our French politicians cry out: "We must give them up to prove our moderation;" though all the princes of Europe have taught us the reverse of this doctrine by their example. Most excellent politics truly! Surely, they are not as imported from France.

The power, God throws into the hands of a prince, is given him for the protection and security of the religion, liberties, and properties of his people; and hence he ought no more to part with it, by a cession of his conquests, than to give away or alienate his dominions, unless it be by the general consent and approbation of his people. A content obtained, by bribery and corruption of the nation, with French money, or English treasure, &c. as the present ministerial advocates insinuate, has been done formerly, is no justification of his conduct with the mass of the people. Such approbation has been often acquired, in order to sanctify the most pernicious measures; but the votes of their deputies left the sentiments of the people just the same. If dominion be acquired by the blood and treasure of the people, it is a robbery to sport it away wantonly, or without the most pressing necessity. Did our people, as the French, at the end of the confederate war, run after the king's coach, crying out: "*Peace and bread, Peace and bread?*" Did our people complain to parliament of their burden of taxes, and the distresses brought on them by the war? Did any, but ministerial agents, Jacobites, and the French party, or those who were hired here for the purpose, ever complain of the misery and distress, they were brought to by the additional taxes, incurred by the war? Nay, have not the hireling crew, and ministerial advocates, complained of high wages, of too much employment, and of want of hands? Hence they themselves argue, that there was no public misery, among the mass of the people, to drive us to

* My lord Bolingbroke observes, The dominions of France were by common consent, on every treaty, more and more extended; her barriers, on all sides, were more strengthened; those of her neighbours more and more weakened. *State of Europe*, p. 297.

any shameful resignation of our conquests. The great land-holders, it is true, might pay about eight pence to the pound for their taxes extraordinary, which was compensated by other circumstances. A mighty matter truly!

Argum. XI. It is pretended by ministerial advocates, and the French party here, that *humanity requires, that we should make peace on the present terms, offered by the French, in order to prevent the effusion of human blood.*

If this proves any thing, it proves too much; for it proves, that we ought to turn Quakers in politics, and to yield to our encroaching enemy, whatever his ambition and rapacity may dictate, to prevent the effusion of the blood of our countrymen. Such politics from an old woman, haranguing in a green apron and close coif in *Grace-church-street*, would be congruous enough. But to hear such stuff from the advocates of a prime minister, set at the head of a great kingdom, which is insulted by a rapacious and turbulent neighbour, is an object of the highest ridicule, scorn and contempt.

He, that is the cause of an unjust war, is the cruel cause of all the effusion of human blood, which is spilt in it; he is the cruel murderer of every person that falls by it; to him all the guilt ought to be imputed. To suffer inroads, invasions, murders and robberies of our countrymen, to pass without political revenge, is the greatest cruelty; and is the way not only to be murdered, and destroyed, with all the circumstances of inhumanity and barbarity, but also to be made slaves of and idolaters in the final issue. Our enemies fight against us, animated as much, with religious spite, as with rapacious ambition, political rancour, and commercial avarice. Not to resist them with the utmost fortitude and bravery, till we have put it out of their power to injure us, as far at least as possible, is to renounce our God, to desert our religion; and to expose our innocent babes to a most abominable worship and detestable idolatry; as well as to a most cruel slavery and odious existence. To spill our blood, against the cruel and savage French, is to fight the battles of heaven, of the interests of mankind, of liberty, of humanity. To lay down our arms, just as all those blessings are securing, is betraying all those interests, under the specious pretence and ridiculous notion of humanity; and of the prevention of the effusion of human blood. That is, we must suffer bears and wolves, to live at large, and destroy mankind at pleasure, for fear some lives might be lost, in securing them within their own forests and dens.

* See above, Argum. VII.

The ministerial advocates, who contend for an immature and unbound peace, know well enough, that this *curse* of the effusion of human blood, is all *human*, started to abuse the compassionate unthinking, who have weak heads and tender hearts; and are unable to combine a sufficient number of ideas, and relations, to perceive, from the result, that ill-timed humanity, tenderness and compassion, are, in certain cases, the most horrid barbarity and cruelty, as in truth they are in this case. The politician must sometimes act the surgeon, regardless of the patient's cries, make free with the lancet, probe, and incision knife, to prevent greater calamities.

There is another consideration likewise, namely, by your not vindicating your rights, and reassuming your trade; which have been ravished from you by the hands of rapacious *French* men, or betrayed by the wicked hearts of corrupt *Englishmen*; you will leave thousands in the three kingdoms to starve, or at least to waste their lives in a wretched uncomfortable existence, for want of the means of exerting themselves in honest industry.

To sum up the whole: Is the leaving your innocent babes exposed to the most detestable idolatry; is forsaking God, and your most holy religion, and exposing them to the contempt of prophane and impious men; is the exposing your posterity to slavery; is the suffering thousands to live in want and die in distress, for fear a few of your countrymen should fall in a just war; I ask are these humanity? Or, is such a conduct the basest cruelty? The most detestable barbarity? A common capacity can easily determine. Be not then, my countrymen, deceived by the sophistry of wicked and designing men, who would sacrifice every thing you enjoy, to establish their own dominion, and to their own caprice, pride, spirit of domineering, avarice, and other sinister views.

It is certain, no man would join in such a system, but one who is allured by present interest, corrupted by base passions, or dazzled with pecuniary considerations. Take away the profits of p—sts, pl—ces, off—ces, p—ns—ns, pr—m—ses, &c. and see, how many advocates, for such a system of humanity, will remain. Whilst the m—st—r can make his own panegyric, and argue with 500,000 l. per annum in his hands ready to bias 500 s—t—rs, and to be distributed as each shall merit by slavish submission to the *b. bar.*'s dictates; it would be no wonder, if he acquired 319 against 65. In the list of the p—t that sat from 1660 to 1678, by way of distinction from all others, called the pension p—t, we see a m—j—r—ty gained by a corrupt court, to do its drudgery, and to betray their country to Lewis the fourteenth, for much less considerations, than those mentioned above. Some condescended to the base

base task only for a dinner at court every day during the sessions. A catalogue of these honourable gentlemen, stubborn patriots, and virtuous state worthies, I have before me, with a list of their appointments. Among them I see my lord — footman cuts a high figure. If the same baseness, avarice, and corruption should descend to his posterity, who would be astonished? *Nobilitas sola atque unica virtus est.* But virtue obliterates meanness of birth, and raises the vulgar to real dignity; whilst baseness of heart, that lurks behind a star, sinks an exalted origin, to the lowest peg of contempt, and sets it beneath the level of the meanest and worst of the vulgar.

*What can enoble villains, fops and cowards,
Alas! not all the blood of all the Howards.*

Aristides shines in as high an orb as *Solon*, though one sprung from *Codrus*, and the other was a son of Earth. It is manners make the man.

But, let these things be as they will, it would be madness, to expose all to certain destruction, to save a few; as it would be folly to hazard the whole body, to preserve a mortified finger, or to retain a nail or an ear, without which the machine might remain in health and full vigour. I shall therefore leave this ridiculous argument, that “we ought to make an immature peace, to prevent the effusion of human blood,” to monks, mercenaries, women and children, having, I conceive, said enough, to satisfy the unprejudiced, and men of sense.

Argum. XII. That we ought to make peace to free ourselves from continental connexions, and the German war.

This implies two things, viz. first, that all continental connexions are ruinous; secondly, that it was necessary to preserve those, which we had formed, till we had a peace. The anti-continental doctrine was never thought of, till that weak and contemptible prince, James the first ascended the British throne; a scheme well worthy of such a prince and such a reign. By the first class or six arguments, these gentlemen exaggerate our poverty and weakness, and insinuate, that we even hold our Sugar Islands at French courtesy; for they assert, that we cannot keep our conquests; whence it is evident, that we cannot keep our own possessions, if their first argument be true. Surely this is an argument, that continental connexions and alliances are necessary to our existence. We are able, by our fleet to guard our coasts, preserve our colonies, and protect our continental commerce, or we are not. If we are able, to do all these, how comes it to pass, that we cannot keep our conquests, since nothing but our fleet is necessary for their protection? If we

cannot

cannot keep our conquests, we cannot preserve our own possessions.

But the truth is, we can preserve these by our fleet, provided we preserve our continental connexions: but as France has the art of dividing the powers of the continent by her money, she will gain a general ascendancy, unless we throw ourselves into the scale, and assist her opponents. If we leave her, to extend her power and influence without controul, on the continent, what will become of our trade in all Germany, Holland, Flanders, and Italy? Can we suppose, if France holds those powers in subjection, and under her controul, that she will suffer them to trade with us? It is absurdity to imagine it. That she would have been capable of doing this, we saw clearly in the years 1702 and 1703. What would have been the fate of the Empire, if the duke of Marlborough had not gained the battle of Blenheim in 1704? It is easy at least to guess, what would have been the consequence, if British troops and treasures had been withdrawn from that alliance. When this defection happened in 1712, the power of the confederates mouldered away, and came to nothing. All allow, that we were the soul of the confederacy.

Can the Dutch stand before the power of France, without our assistance? Can this possibly be, when, in the late war, the Dutch, the Empire and the English united, were constantly defeated in Flanders, and *Bergen-op-zoom* was taken, in sight of all their united force? If the French were masters of the Dutch sailors, and could command all the ports of Germany by her power at land, what would their fleet soon be? It is easy to perceive, since we have seen it once triumph in the channel over the united squadrons of the English and Dutch:

If we examine, how the French came by the exorbitant power they enjoyed, when in the zenith of their insolence, cruelty, pride, power, and splendor, we shall find, it was owing to our neglect of continental connexions with our natural allies, and to our uniting and conspiring with France in her views of conquest. My lord *Bolingbroke* * observes, " England engaged to act a part in the French conspiracy, against the peace and liberties of Europe: nay, against her own peace and her own liberty: I mention it with the utmost regret and indignation. She was a bubble, and a bubble's part is equally wicked and impolitic, p. 282. Charles II. exposed the ten provinces of the Netherlands to the mercy of France, abetted her designs on the continent, that she might abett his designs on his own kingdom, p. 283, 285. Whatever

* See his *History of Europe*, Vol. I.

his conduct meant, certain it is, his conduct established the superiority of France in Europe, p. 285. — England was now privately favourable to the interests of France; and the Ten Provinces were in a way to be subdued, p. 206. The iniquity of the councils of England, not only hindered the growth of France from being stopped in time, but nursed it up into strength almost insuperable by any future confederacy, p. 298. The court of England, in the reign of Charles the second, had submitted to abet the usurpations of France, and the king of England had stooped to be her pensioner, Vol. II. p. 3. But the crime was not national: on the contrary the nation cried out loudly against it, even whilst it was committing, p. 4. * England had been either an idle spectator of all that passed on the continent, or a faint and uncertain ally, against France, or a warm and sure ally of her side; or a partial mediator between her and the powers confederated in their common defence. By this he acquired such exorbitant power, as gave him at last well-grounded hopes of acquiring the Spanish monarchy for his family, p. 12, 13. By this the reduction of her power was become a difficult task, p. 15. Before the revolution, the general interest of Europe had been too much neglected by us; and *slavery, under the umbrage of prerogative*, had been well nigh established among us, p. 115. At the end of the confederate war, we ought to have reduced France, and strengthened her neighbours much more than we did: We ought to have reduced her power, for generations to come, p. 119. The folly of the neighbours of Lewis the fourteenth suffered him, to form a formidable frontier. She might have been obliged, at the treaty of *Utrecht*, to have demolished her fortresses, and to have sacrificed them to her own immediate relief, and to the future security of her neighbours, p. 123."

Again, the same author observes, in his state of the nation, that "France was left too powerful at the *treaty of Utrecht*: From the treaty of Westphalia, and from the Pyrenean to the accession of king William, the power and ambition of France had grown up together, and were become exorbitant, p. 327. No efforts had been made sufficient to reduce, scarce any sufficient to resist her *power*. No measures had been concerted, no preparations had been made, to disappoint her *ambition*, in that great object the acquisition of the Spanish monarchy to the house of Bourbon. From the revolution this alarm was taken, which should have been

* Yet the parliament approved thirteen years.

" taken sooner. The spirit of our court was changed, the
 " eyes of our people were opened, and all men saw how ne-
 " cessary it was, to preserve the succession of the Spanish mo-
 " narchy to the house of *Austria*; instead of suffering it to fall
 " into that of *Bourbon*, which was excluded from it by the most
 " solemn engagements, p. 328. The frontier of France has
 " been the great support of her power, as wise men saw eigh-
 " ty years ago; it is now more compact than ever by the ac-
 " quisition of *Lorain*, p. 384. The court of *Vienna* has over-
 " loaded her allies for more than half a century past.—Some
 " conclude from hence, *that we should neglect the interests of the*
 " *house of Austria*; and should be *regardless of all that passes on*
 " *the continent* for time to come. *But surely such conclusions are*
 " *very false*.—It was our neglect of the general interest of
 " Europe from 1660 to 1688, that gave to France the means
 " of raising an exorbitant power. The principle of *assisting the*
 " *powers on the continent* will continue, as long as the division
 " of power and property, in Europe, continues the same. We
 " are indeed an island: but if a superior power gives law to
 " the continent, I apprehend, it will give it to us.—Our fore-
 " fathers were *jealous* of the power of the house of *Austria*.—
 " The exorbitant power of the two branches of that of *Bour-*
 " *bon* give us the same cause of apprehension now; for this
 " reason we ought to assist the former against the latter, p. 416,
 " 417, 418.* A wise prince bears no regard to other states,
 " but what arises from the coincidence and repugnancy of their
 " several interests; and this regard must vary, as these interests
 " will do, p. 420."

To the same purport too lord B—th observes: " That we
 " can never recur too often to this point; that whoever knows
 " the history of this government, can judge of its interests and
 " its dangers, must know, that it has been and ought to be,
 " the constant principle of politics, by which this nation must
 " be ever governed, to keep down the power of the house of
 " *Bourbon*. That if she now acquires ever so little addition to
 " it, in its consequences, the religion, trade, liberty and in-
 " dependency of this nation will inevitably be undone.—That
 " to prevent this power from encrease, *we must support some*
 " *great power on the continent*, capable to stand for a time till
 " confederacies may be formed against her, p. 106 †."

Again: " Neither this nation, nor any other, can stand a-
 " lone, and without allies. By gaining power at land the Ro-
 " mans destroyed the Carthaginians. A little accession of

* For this same reason we ought now to assist the king of Prussia as far as we are able.

† Faction detected.

" power to France must put her in a condition, to compel the
 " while collected maritime power of Europe to contend with us.
 " It is certain, France may reduce half her armies, and em-
 " ploy her expence in fleets — Experience proves, that we may
 " be invaded ; — we must be mad men, to confide entirely in
 " our naval force, when the rest o' Europe shall be reduced to
 " a dread of, or dependance on France, which lies within
 " three hours sail of our coasts, and only ten of our capital,
 " p. 110."

We have cited the sentiments of two great politicians, with regard to continental connexions, which are diametrically opposite to the doctrine of our present ministerial advocates, and French party. We have no reason to suspect the sincerity or abilities of either; especially as the maxims of the first are a reproach upon his own treacherous conduct, and as the last was esteemed an oracle by the anti-continentalists, when he opposed the timorous, pusillanimous administration of *W. Pitt*.

But, if a nation can stand by itself, and preserve a respectable figure, why does France seek confederacies, buy neutralities, hire troops, purchase allies, subsidize all the powers of Europe, &c. in order to support her measures, and rise superior to her natural enemies; if we are inferior to France in men, as the French party here aver, how much more necessary to us, to supply our natural defects by these arts, which the French practise with all their power? Our public credit hinders us more than equal to the French in money affairs; and our fertility in natural riches sets us superior. The lands of England, with the same culture, produce above a third more than those of France, as we learn from their writers in husbandry, and as we observed from our long residence there. Hence we have more men to spare, relatively considered, for the arts of superfluity and war; and our superior credit and riches enable us to hire more from our neighbours. But, if we renounce all continental expences and connexions, how is this to be done?

We have seen above, that France acquired all her exorbitant power by our neglecting our natural allies on the continent, thro' the wickedness and corruption of our princes and their ministers. We lost the opportunity of pulling down this same exorbitant power, by the wickedness, treachery and corruption of queen Ann's ministers. And it seems, that we shall lose another opportunity of demolishing the same power, through the — of the — of — the third.

If all the nations in Europe were equal in power; if we had no foreign commerce on the continent, nor any colonies or settlements to protect, and all Europe was of one religion, it would be necessary to form alliances with the continent. But

how much more, as things stand at present? The *Carthaginians* neglected to support the *Sannites* against the Romans, and fell victims to the Roman power. We cannot preserve our religion, our liberties, our commerce, nor the balance of power, without continental connexions. He, who will not see this, must have something else to darken his understanding, besides truth and a regard to the welfare of Old England.

It was said by a Roman statesman, that there was no absurdity, but what some antient philosopher had defended. With equal truth, we may say, that there is no foolery in politics, but what some modern statesmen and politicians have adopted. If a weak prince, such as James the first, take a whim into his head that is ridiculous: or a corrupt minister infuse such an one, all things run to wreck, and ruin in the state. If a prince from a natural cowardice; from a mistaken humanity; from a wrong bias given to him by a preceptor; from ridiculous notions infused into him by his minister or favourite, who is under foreign influence; from a hatred to business, and a love of pleasure; from a heavy, gloomy, and inactive temper; I say, if a prince from any or either of these should take it into his head, that this kingdom is to avoid all continental connexions, as this isle is separated by the sea; and that we might see all Europe, from *Belgrade* to the *Pillars of Hercules*, involved in blood and slaughter, without any other emotion than those arising from compassion for the sufferers; in such circumstances, and under the influence of such a prince, we could not expect to enjoy our liberties long. We know the consequence of such conduct in Charles the second's reign, and the exorbitant power to which it raised France.

Thus, from the weakness of a prince who cannot see, or from the corruption, by foreign influence, of a minister who blinds him, and raises a dust by the falsehoods he infuses, the artifices he employs, and the pecuniary influences he directs; the basest measures may be adopted; a kingdom may be ruined, a prince become the scorn of foreigners, and contempt of his own subjects, and yet know nothing of the matter. Under such a prince, opposition to infamous and ruinous politics will be called ambition, disloyalty and faction; and patriotism will be denominated turbulency and discontent.

Argum: XIII. Ministerial advocates, and the French party argue, *That we ought to make peace, because the terms the French have offered, are safe, advantageous and honourable.* We shall observe a few things, with regard to each of the epithets bestowed on the preliminaries.

As to the safety of this peace, wherein does it consist? Is it in our colonies or fisheries in North America? These are as much exposed to be harrassed, by the cession of *Louisiana* to our enemies, as they were before the war. This the ministerial advocates themselves acknowledge: By the *Lakes*, by the *Onabachs*, by the *Ohio*, we may be invaded just as easily as before. The *Indians*, by French artifices, may be incited against us; nay, forced into a war with us, by their intrigues and hostilities, as they were before this present war began. Our coasts of Newfoundland may be insulted, as they were before the war, Our Sugar Isles, in the West Indies, have no more safety than before the war began. Nor has our trade any more security than it acquired by the treaty of *Dix*.

But suppose, as soon as we have evacuated all our conquests, France should march an army into *Westphalia*, and seize the territories of our allies again, what shall we have left for all our conquests? What security have we, that this shall not be done? Will you say, the king of France's royal word? Your reply would be laughed to scorn. Will you say, the imbecility of the French? We ask of you then, how you came to advance the first six arguments, setting forth the strength and resolution of France, our impotence, want of hands, want of troops, inability to raise the supplies, and to retain our conquests, &c.? We are well satisfied, that the peace, we shall make with France, is so far from bringing either safety or security to us, or our allies, that, on the contrary, it is made only with a view to break it, as soon as France and Spain can revive their naval force. These men cannot urge, that their weakness will prevent such a rupture, since they urge, that we are unable to contend any longer with them, or to vindicate our conquests, France is still in such political health and vigour. Here these disputants are entangled in a dilemma, and perplexed with the snares of a contradiction. But what is this one? The whole system is one mass, one chaos of absurdity and contradiction; where the jarring elements struggle against, and combat with each other. What a blessed state of safety we are in! This safety we have purchased at the expence of ninety millions.

By the sixth article of the treaty of *Utrecht*, the French renounce all advantages in trade, above what other nations enjoy; and the Spaniards engage, that we shall enjoy all the privileges, which are granted to the most favoured nation. It is well known, that this article is broke through by collusion between the two crowns; and that the French have a trade in this illicit way, which amounts to not less than two millions sterling per annum? Whilst, at the same time, we are harrassed and plundered by *guarda costas*; and have our ships confiscated, if they

they find any *logwood* on board, though cut in *Jamaica*, or any dollars, though received in the same island. What security have we obtained against these illicit and cruel practices? None at all.

To mend the matter, we have engaged to demolish our fortresses at *Honduras*, have renounced our allies the *Muskitos*, have exposed our *logwood* trade, worth 100,000 l. per annum, to be ravished from us every moment by the Spaniards; and have hung our safety on the *royal word*, of a king, who had but just before broke it, by giving our ambassador assurances of peace, whilst he was meditating and preparing for a war, in the basest and most treacherous manner. This is the safety we have procured by this glorious peace! Indignation where art thou? Hast thou lost thy fire? Or dost thou now rise and glow, with rolling, uncovered eye-balls, and flaming cheeks, in the face of every one who reads my sad tale?

Secondly, We shall next enquiry make, concerning the advantages we shall receive. As to the Cod-fishery, we have given up to them the very best in all the American seas, viz. at *St. Pierre* and *Micquelon*, where one man may annually catch as many fish as will sell for 3000 l. We have Canada ceded to us, and the French are left on the *Mississippi* to enjoy the profits. This the ministerial advocates have unawares confessed by implication. *Senegal* is left exposed to *Goree* fort, and hence it is likely will soon be worth nothing. *Florida* is a country of little use to the Spaniards, and will be of as little to us. But observe, *Augustine* did give refuge to our runaway negroes, and we received theirs. This exchange will be now prevented, a mighty acquisition! What pity it is, the panegyrists of our able minister could not have found out ten or a dozen more such advantages? What a figure he would have cut hereafter in history? As it is a sandy soil, why had he not told us, we might breed rabbits there, and carry the furs to a foreign market?

But when we set 300,000 l. a year charge of keeping Canada, the cession of *Louisiana*, of the isles of *St. Pierre* and *Micquelon*, with the fishery there, against *Senegal*, and the bare country of *Canada*, every man, skilled in these matters, must allow, when the *Granads* are put against *St. Lucia* so fertile in horses, that, instead of gaining, we are losers, besides our ninety millions expence.

But if we were in such a weak condition, as represented in the first arguments, and the French so powerful and strong, is it not a contradiction, to suppose the French would grant us a safe, advantageous and honourable peace? Can we find any such examples of their generosity in history? They could have carried on the war longer, but they were so moderate, humane,

and

and generous, forsooth ! that they made important sacrifices of large countries of forests worth about twelve pence a square mile, and gave us up *Canada*, provided they might have the trade ; and all this, that we might enjoy the blessings of peace. Good-natured creatures ! what a love they have for English heretics ! But, is there a man in his senses, upon the face of the earth, who believes, they would have made peace, if they could have carried on the war any longer, without great loss ? If so, what necessity of surrendering our conquests ? Here then is a contradiction, in supposing the French stronger than we, and yet that they should grant us an honourable peace. It is pity, a column was not erected, over-against the *monument*, with the preliminary articles deeply engraven on the *die* of the pedestal to perpetuate the glory of the great genius, who accomplished the arduous work ! and gained so many advantages to his country, by his great abilities in negotiation ! What would that, in Blenheim Park, be to such an inscription ! I am so great an admirer of the minister, that I promise to subscribe handsomely to such a proposal, if his grateful Scots shall set such a scheme on foot for the posts, places, and pensions he bestows on them.

Let the merit or demerit of a certain great man be what they will, we conceive he who is wicked enough to betray his country secretly, is impudent enough to justify his conduct openly, provided he can keep the temptation or bribe he has received secret. How can the minister, who gains approbation of his measures, by pecuniary considerations, ever expect the approbation of posterity ? But this is a glory, such ministers never concern themselves about. They are callous to principles of dignity, honour, reputation, virtue, and patriotism. They seek only to gratify their present passions and inclinations ; such as pride, avarice, ambition, luxury, lust or revenge ; regardless of future fame, or of what figure they may make in history ; and whether they appear as Mortimers, Gavestons, Spencers, Dudleys, Carrs, Buckingham, Cliffords, Harleys, Bolingbrokes ; or as Hallifax's, Somers's, Godolphins, Marlboroughs, Sunderlands, Craggs's, Pelhams, or Pitts.

Wicked ministers never trouble themselves about the glory of their conduct, but whether they can gain a majority in the house. Not considering or caring, how little justification arises from such approbation with the people. No one will say, that the pension parliament were good patriots, that the measures of the ministers and prince which they approved were right. Nay, they debauched the prince by their gross flatteries, their pernicious concessions, and fulsome compliments. They led our religion and liberties to the brink of a precipice ; so that it was almost

almost a miracle, they were saved on the verge of ruin: Do not the people in general damn all the ministers measures? Are all blind but he and his party? The answer is easy.

Thus, at last, we have gone through a chaos of argument, a mass of heterogeneous principles, diametrically opposite to each other, and as repugnant as the first principles of the universe, before they were called into order by Almighty Power. What must the designs of those men be, whose partizans are driven to such shifts to deceive the people, and support their cause? Truth is uniform, and the same; but error is infinite. She requires no artifices or disguises to support her; but falsehood stands in need of both, varies continually, and must be repugnant to herself. She is constantly doubling and shifting, and never steady in her opinions! As she is constantly at war with truth, so she is still opposing herself at particular turns. They who embrace false maxims, and would have them adopted by others; must disguise their principles and views; but they will, in a long course of argument, betray themselves, in spite of all their artifices. When they pretend one thing and design another, they must catch themselves in the long run. This we have fully proved in the above examination. Thus the disputants above, whose principles we have examined, pretend they have the interests of England in view; but it is manifest, from the repugnancy as well as the weakness of their arguments, that they have not truth in view, but the interests of France, or some sinister ends to answer which support her designs.

Argum. XIV. Having gone through all the arguments, we proposed, we intend to make a few *Remarks*, and conclude.

Let us suppose, that this Review was sent to every county, and borough town in the kingdom; that deputies members to parliament; and that, in consequence thereof, they were to address their several representatives, according to the following form, *mutatis mutandis*, viz.

To *Peter Placeman* and *Paul Pensioner*, Esqs. to be left at the Lobby of the House of Commons,
London.

Gentlemen,

HAVING done you the honour of electing you our representatives in parliament, and considering you as our delegates, attornies, and servants, whom we have a right to order, direct, and command, to execute such business, as we have to transact in the senate, we take this first opportunity, to remon-

strate

strate to you; that whereas his majesty has been pleased most graciously to communicate to you, to us, and to all the good people of England, the preliminary articles of peace, which he hath entered into, with the French king, and the king of Spain; as it should seem, with a design, that we should examine and deliberate on them, and give our opinion of them; and, in consequence thereof, reconstrate to, address, and instruct you, with respect to your conduct relative thereto: And whereas, after a mature and deliberate examination of the preliminary articles of peace aforesaid, we do humbly conceive, that they are neither *safe, advantageous, nor honourable* to this nation; nor adequate to what, we might justly expect from the vast successes and expences of the war; because, by the said preliminaries, a grant of the liberty of fishing on the banks of Newfoundland, &c. is made to the French, which is prohibited by an act of parliament of the tenth of king William the third, and the yielding up of which, in defiance of the said act, by a former ministry, was declared high treason, by a vote of the first parliament of George the first; as betraying to the French a valuable part of our rights and privileges, and our seminary of sailors. And whereas likewise, by the said preliminaries, that vast tract of fertile country, lying west of the Mississippi, called by the French *Louisiana*, is ceded to them, though the dominion thereof of right belongs to the crown of Great Britain, by discovery, priority of possession and conquest; by which cession, the back frontiers of our colonies will be always rendered insecure, and subject to the ravages of the French, and the Indians excited by their sly intrigues. And furthermore, whereas, by the said preliminaries, the French *Caribbee* Sugar Islands, and the *Havannab*, which we have conquered at a great expence of the blood and treasure of this nation, are to be restored to the enemy; and the fortifications in the bay of *Honduras*, which secure our cutting logwood; an important trade, necessary to our *woollen* manufactures, are to be demolished, and this valuable branch of commerce submitted to the caprice and treachery of the king of Spain. And finally, whereas we conceive, from the said preliminaries, that no care has been taken of the interests of the king of Prussia, which have been sacrificed to the ungrateful empress-queen, in direct violation of our solemn treaties, and to the great dishonour of the nation. All which conduct tends to raise the naval power of France, to depress that of England, and to deprive us of several important branches of trade and commerce, on which our security and our existence depend. For these reasons, we think we owe it, as a duty to God, our king, our country, our allies, and our posterity, to give you our instructions at such an impor-

tant crisis, and in so interesting an affair. We do therefore, by this remonstrance, not only acquaint you with our sentiments, but we do likewise order, direct, and command you, our deputies to, and servants in parliament, as far as possibly in you lies, to forward and promote, an address of your house to his majesty, setting forth; that it is necessary to the security of the religion, liberties, and commerce of his people, to the preservation of his crown and dignity, and to the retrieving of the honour of the nation, that our rights and conquests, made, acquired and obtained in *Africa* and *North America*, and the *West Indies*, be retained, and preserved, and the interests of the king of Prussia, so far taken care of, as is required by treaty; he being the bulwark of the Protestant religion in the empire, against the present Popish league formed to destroy it. And we do also direct and command you, to signify to our most gracious sovereign, that we will most chearfully contribute to whatever taxes are necessary, to carry on a war, till our implacable enemies shall agree to guaranty to us, and leave us in the peaceable possession of all our rights and privileges, and of all the countries and conquests above specified, and to renounce all right, title and claim to the same. As you conform or not, to these instructions, you may expect our future approbation or resentment.

Given under our hands and seals at the Guildhall of *Borough true English*, in the County of *Resolution*, Nov. 30. 1702.

Ordered to be sealed with the seal of our corporation.

Signed,

MAYOR.

John True-Blue.

ALDERMEN:

Timothy Stanch,

John Bold,

Thomas Antigallicus,

William Djefirst,

Henry Lovefur,

Richard Codfish,

Simon Sweetman.

On the behalf of the whole corporation.

I have such a good opinion of the knowledge, and of the understandings of my countrymen, as to think, nay so sanguine as to believe, that if a petition to this purport was to be presented to every corporation in England (of Scotland I say nothing) with this Review annexed, and the members were to read

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read them, and recalcit of their spirit, tenor and purport; And that then, they were to be left entirely to their inclinations, unbiassed by any corrupt influence; that nine tenths of the *boroughs, cities, and counties* would, on mature consideration, readily, cheerfully, and eagerly sign such an application to their representatives in parliament. But, that the conduct of the house of commons may deviate from the sense of the people, and the true interest of the nation, is manifest from the famous *Kentish petition* to that house, and the influence it had on the conduct thereof, and the affairs of the nation in the sequel.

XV. *Rem. II.* We most clearly perceive, that a feasible objection may be made to us here. *Viz. In your observations above, you applaud Mr Pitt, and inveigh against and condemn the conduct of my Lord Bute; though the ULTIMATUM of Mr. Pitt's is the basis of my Lord Bute's preliminaries; therefore, to exculpate the FIRST, and calumniate the LAST, savours more of partiality and passion, than of candour and patriotism.*

If there were nothing more implied in the premises, than what is laid down, we should readily concur, that the argument is just and conclusive; but the premises are not rightly nor fully stated, and therefore we cannot admit the conclusion. We must suggest, that from the beginning to the end of the negotiation, Mr. Pitt knew of the family-compact, and never had any design at all to make peace, nor any expectations of procuring peace, by the negotiation with France. He could not help observing, their shuffling about the *Epochs, Dunkirk, German war, important sacrifices, &c.* and hence would have had little confidence in the sincerity of the French, if he had been ignorant of the family-compact.

The assent of Mr. Pitt, to the surrendering of the Codfishery, could not have been obtained, till about the twenty-fifth or twenty-sixth of June; after he had declared against it. It is manifest, the family-compact was concluded before the fifteenth of July*. Now here were but fourteen days from the time, the French were acquainted with our conditions, to the time the private memorial relating to Spain was delivered; at which time, it is manifest, France and Spain knew each others mind, and were acting in concert. Hence it is clear, the family-compact was formed and agreed on long before, tho' perhaps not executed till the fifth of August. It is certain, it

* See French Memorials, p. 29 and 33, relating to the Spanish affair.

must have been settled before the British memorial of the seventeenth of June was drawn up. If so, why might not Mr. Pitt have intelligence of it, as well as gain such intelligence after? His enemies in the c——I laboured to gain as much for the French, as possible, that he might lose as much honour by the peace, as he reaped by the war. He opposed the giving up the Fishery, he stickled, he agreed, he knew what was on the carpet, he knew what he might safely do, and he knew what was necessary for him to do, to avoid the odium and clamour his enemies would have raised against him, as being the cause of the continuance of the war, and of the augmentation of the taxes, if he had acted otherwise. Thus he thought he might safely agree to what, he was sure, the French would not accept; and was the less sanguine in contending for what, he knew, we ought to retain; namely, all our *American* conquests; as he knew the French never designed any peace, unless we would resign all our acquisitions, and grant them a passage through our colonies to *Canada*.

But, though Mr. Pitt knew, from the beginning of the negotiation, the French had no design to make peace; and, consequently, that he could expect none, yet, for various obvious reasons, some of which we have suggested, he was obliged to dissemble his knowledge, and to make semblance of an inclination to peace, as well as to carry on the negotiation, in such manner, as if he knew nothing of the French and Spanish designs. His coldness towards the peace, and his shyness to the French minister, which must have flowed from a knowledge of their intentions, make the French complain in several places of his aversion to peace, of the insincerity of the British court, and that he never had any design to make peace, all which are indications, that Mr. Pitt knew their intention. Upon this account they affect to express a great hatred and animosity to him. As Mr. Pitt saw the French chicanery about the Epochs, &c. and knew of the family-compact, and the designs of France and Spain, before he joined in any concessions, he was certain, how far he might advance, without being caught; and hence formed a plan and system by which he might attain the character of moderation, as to himself and country, avoid the reproaches of his enemies here at home, who envied his glory, and waited to entrap and ensnare him; and yet preserve to his country all the advantages obtained by the war, and acquire more by the continuance of hostilities.

This policy is a master piece, a stroke of genius: and this being admitted, all Mr. Pitt's conduct appears congruous and uniform. Take away this suppositior, it is all incompatible and absurd, the resemblance of working *Pemlope's* web, and unravelling

unravelling and destroying with one hand, what he wrought with the other. How can we suppose, that he who had laboured to gain such advantages for his country in war, would be guilty of treason, by surrendering the Newfoundland Fishery, in defiance of an act of parliament, when his predecessors had been impeached for the same concession? How can we imagine, that he could freely cede the French *Louisiana*, that they might have an opportunity, to repeat their inroads and devastations on the back frontiers of our colonies; when the object of the war was the defence and security of those colonies? Or, how can we imagine, that he would freely consent and agree to the surrender of the French *Carribee Sugar Islands*, we had conquered, when the British dominions purchase, at least, fifteen thousand hogheads of sugar, value 300,000 l. annually of the French, to supply their own consumption? And the more especially so, as we were at ninety millions extraordinary expence, to make these acquisitions; and had a right to retain those conquests by way of indemnity? How too is it possible, that our patriot could freely give up those bulky trades, *Fish and Sugar*, which are the soul of navigation; and the loss of which, would so depress the French navy, and the retention of which would so exalt our own? Besides he would have resigned those expensive and important conquests, for baubles, trifles and rattles, in comparison of those capital objects, *Fish, North America*, and the French *Sugar Islands*; and have left us in a worse condition than we were in before the war; having added seventy millions to our national debt, and gained only some trifles, clogged with burdens which render them worse than nothing; or given equivalents for them, viz. *Louisiana, St. Pierre, and Micquelon, &c.*

Did ever Mr. P—t discover the least tinge of avarice or corruption? How then can we suppose, that he would freely consent to blast all his glories, and deprive his country of all the advantages, that would have resulted from our retention of our conquests? It is impossible, that he or any honest sensible man in the three kingdoms could have concurred in such measures. We must therefore necessarily conclude, that *burning* envy on one hand, and *base* avarice on the other, conspired, to force him into an acquiescence with measures, which he knew, he might comply with, and not endanger his country's welfare, because he knew the French would not accept them.

Upon the whole, we join with the French in their memorial, and are firmly persuaded, that Mr. P—t had an aversion to peace from the beginning, and never had any design, to make peace on any such dishonourable conditions, as are specified in any of the British memorials: we shall continue of this opinion, till

till he or some of his friends declare, that he desired and intended to have struck up a peace upon the conditions, expressed in the British *Ullimatum*, mentioned in the memorial above specified.

However this be, impartiality obliges me to confess, that if a peace had been concluded upon the terms contained in the British *Ullimatum*, it would have been so far from doing honour to those who proposed and contended for them, had the direction of affairs at that time, or by whose advice they were drawn up, that it would have stamped, and perpetuated an indelible mark of infamy on their conduct and memory; as the *Ullimatum* yielded up to France the three capital articles, upon which the depression of the French naval power, and the augmentation of our own depended; namely, the *Cod Fishery*, *Louisiana*, which exposes our North American territories, and the bulky trade of the French *Sugar Islands*; all the rest of our acquisitions, and the points insisted on being baubles, when put in competition with these three capital and essential articles.

XVI. *Rem. III.* But as Mr. P—t has been stigmatized as an apostate from his friends and party; in order to render the above reasonings with regard to his intentions in his negotiations of peace, the more probable; and to justify so great a friend to his country from the *opprobrium* cast on him by his enemies, and the enviers of his glory and success, which have been a reproach, and contrait to their own unfortunate, foolish, or treacherous management; we intend to trace the progress of his political conduct, and to make some reflections on it.

Before Mr. P—t entered into the administration and into power, there was an opposition composed of real *Tories* and *Jacobites* incited by principle; of pretended *Tories*, actuated by particular views; of discontented *Whigs*, chagrined by disregard; and of *men* of no principle; that is of *men*, who were ready to espouse any principle, or party, as their private interest should direct, or as should comport and coincide with their selfish views. These were led by Mr. P—t, who directed their clamour and vociferation, to raise a flame, in the same manner as the pipeman of a fire-engine does to extinguish one. The administration, at that time, was composed of real *Whigs*, friends to the Protestant *succession* and their country, directed by principle; of pretended *Whigs* guided by their particular views; and of *men* of no principle, that is of *men*, who were ready to coincide with any principle or party, as their private interests should instigate; all acting under a *Whig*, or *parliamentary* king, who many years had been *walpolized*, into timid and cautious measures, incompatible with the dignity of the crown of Great Britain,

tain, which these chicken-hearted politicians called *defensive* and *preventative*. This conduct Mr. P—t disapproved of, and thought those vigorous measures becoming, and would prove more advantageous to the state; and therefore he could not agree with them.

The attack of the French fish ships, they judged would have proved a *preventative* measure; but they were deceived, and led into a war. They were astonished, amazed, confounded, as timorous and pusillanimous souls generally are, when involved in any difficult affairs. They seemed distracted and confused, when they found themselves on the brink of a precipice, and knew not which course to take, or way to turn. The rashness of *Bradock*, and the cowardice of *Byng* seemed to augment their confusion, and to imply either weakness or treachery, of both in the ministers. This raised an universal clamour among all parties: among the Jacobites, to raise disaffection and discontent, with design to shake the government, and to get themselves in play, in order to promote the interest of their friend on the other side the water: among the Whigs, because they thought either weak or wicked men were in power. The administration sunk into exceeding great contempt, and the nation into great dread and despondency. The people were for an alternative, and turned their eyes to Mr. P—t, from whose integrity and great abilities, they hoped for better success; and all parties called upon him to take the helm.

The king himself seems to have been suspicious of the abilities of his ministers, from their ill success; and his majesty at last consented, to receive Mr. P—t into his counsels. Thus he was, as it were, forced not adopted into the administration, and leaped over the fence into the fold, instead of entering by the wicket. Though Mr. P—t professed himself a *Tory*, and led that party, he was certainly a Whig in disguise, for the criterion of a Whig conduct is, *to reduce and diminish the power of France*, and of a *Tory*, *to assist and augment the power of that kingdom*, as far as possible: because, upon that power, the *Tories* depend for the introduction of their favourite prince, who lives on the other side the water. He likewise hated and abhorred the *Walpolean* timidity and pusillanimity, and the *defensive* and *preventative* system of that timorous minister, which had always directed our counsels, even from the year 1725: for *Walpole* had left his spirit and cloak behind him, after he had lost his power, and quitted his post; nay, after he had quitted life. His pupil was thoroughly tinged with his principles; and perhaps will never free himself from the smatch, any more than a stinking cask can be cleansed from the taint, with which it is imbued.

Mr. P—t saw no way of setting aside this weak timorous ministry, whose conduct he detested, fighting over the prostituted honour, disgraces, and misfortunes of his country, but by setting himself at the head of the Tories, or opposite party, and by joining in crying down the conduct of this timorous administration. The ill success of this ministry, in carrying on the war, carried his scheme into execution, and exalted it to perfection.

When he entered into the administration, by degrees, under various pretences well founded, he embraced the continental system, and the true old Whig scheme, followed by all the friends of the revolution, and Protestant succession, ever since the abdication of James the second; and the only system by which the interests of this kingdom can be supported. By the solidity of his reasons, he brought the best and honestest of his old friends the Tories, to join in his sentiments, and in supporting his measures; who perhaps were only Whigs in disguise; and these were joined by some affected Tories, who were men of no principle, and ready to fall in with any party, which would advance their interest. Having obtained power, he pursued the most judicious, refined, artful, and politic measures. He allured the enemy, to exhaust their troops and treasures in combating windmills in Germany, whilst our forces were making substantial and glorious conquests in every quarter of the globe; and demolishing the French navy, commerce and navigation all over the world. Thus we may truly say, that England conquered North America in Germany, as well as Goree, Senegal, the French Sugar Islands, Pondicherry, and their other East-Indian settlements.

Now, let us reflect a little on the natural consequences, which must arise from this conduct. The Jacobites and red hot Tories expected, that when he came into power, he would betray the interests of England to France, advance her power and depress our own, in order that she might be the better able to promote the interests of the pretender; and that he would take them into place and power; and give them opportunity to co-operate with France in the same glorious work. But, instead of this, he adopted the true British system, and entered plumply into continental measures and connexions; and hence joined with the king of Prussia, to oppose the power and views of the French, who had formed a Popish league, to oppress the Protestant religion in the empire, to destroy the balance of power in Europe, and to ruin our commerce in Germany. In opposition to all the principles of gratitude, honour and probity, the empress-queen joined her ancient foe France, which had but a few years before laboured to strip her of her dominions, and

and had it not been for our assistance, and the placable temper of the king of *Prussia*, through our mediation. France would certainly have effected her purpose. Though to our money, to our troops, to our mediation with the king of *Prussia*, and his placability, this wicked queen was indebted for all her dignities; yet she turned this dignity, this money, this generosity, and all the power she acquired thereby, against her benefactors and natural ally, and joined in union with her hereditary and natural enemy. She not only united with the French against us, but she likewise incited the Popish princes of the empire to unite with her in the French Popish league, and to carry the French scheme into execution.



All this ingratitude this wicked queen was guilty of, in opposition to her most solemn oaths, by which she swore to observe the treaties of *Breslau* and *Dresden*. Such is the spirit of Popery, and the honesty and gratitude of Popish princes, whose consciences are under the direction of Romish priests, and deluded by the most vile and abominable superstition that ever cursed mankind. Nothing sacred among men can hold them, when it comes in competition with the interests of their absurd religion and ridiculous idolatry.

But Mr. P—t, by sending troops to Germany, and assisting our allies with subsidies, broke all the measures of the French scheme and Popish league; of the enemies of England abroad; and of the Jacobites and Tories at home; and extended our conquests of the French territories, till we became victors over them, in every quarter of the earth.





Hence the Jacobites and Tories, being entirely disappointed in their designs of raising the power of France, and of supporting the interests of the pretender, they poured out such a torrent of scurrility and illiberal abuse upon him, that the like was scarce ever known; unless in the infamous four last years of the reign of queen Ann, when the great duke of Marlborough experienced the same fate, together with his patriot coadjutors.

This behaviour to Mr. P—t was the effect of their resentment for his *disappointing all his friends*, as they phrased it. On the other hand, the Whigs were suspicious of him, envied his success, which was a reproach upon their own weak conduct; hated him for his great abilities, which eclipsed theirs; and loathed him for the means he employed to get into power, tho' he adopted their continental system, ran their lengths, and followed their German scheme. And hence the Whigs too opened the sluices of Billingsgate against him, and out-did the Tories. And hence he was finely buffeted, and between these thieves cruelly crucified. However they hoped, that his bold





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and spirited measures would fail, and ruin his popularity and interest, in the long-run, both with prince and people. In these infamous hopes they were defeated, and were distressed with our successes to a degree of madness. They sickened with our conquests, triumphs and glories; because acquired under the auspices of the man they hated; for supplanting them in their power, and extinguishing their reputation by the blaze of his glory.

At last, they took hold of a spirited proposal of his, to clamour against him, as a hot-headed minister; that would make the nation odious, ruin his country, and injure the Spanish merchants, by prompting the king, to send an armed fleet to demand satisfaction of Spain for her depredations, which, if refused, the admiral was immediately to make reprisals, and declare war.

This was the most judicious measure that could be pursued: yet hence, by artifices, they found means, with a young king, to rob him first of his influence, and by that to kick him out of his counsels and the administration. This pretence of the impropriety of sending a fleet to Spain, to demand a categorical answer, was a pretence embraced only to render him odious, and well calculated to affect a cowardly set of *Walpoleans*, whose system was, to take kicking rather than engage in fighting; however, the same measure was adopted in 1718, and in 1726, by sending out three fleets on the same errand; viz. one to Porto-bello, another to Spain, and a third to the Baltic. These fleets answered the design in 1726, and proves the justness of the measure advised by Mr. P—tt; which, in all probability, would have so disconcerted the house of *Bourbon*, by catching Spain, before she was prepared, and her treasures returned home, as to have prevented a Spanish war, and to have obliged the French to have complied with the terms proposed in our memorial of July 15, 1761. But if it had not done this, it must have thrown into our hands a mass of treasure, that would have spirited us in carrying on the war, and we might have sorely distressed the Spaniard by bombarding her towns, and plundering her coasts. It would have been better for the nation, to have paid the Spanish merchants their losses, than to have lost the opportunity. But thin-jawed *envy*, pale-faced *timidity*, and *cowardice* with her trembling hands and knocking knees, had diffused their poisons and their terrors into our c—cils.

Thus Mr. P—tt, having disappointed and disgusted the Jacobites and Tories, and the French party, by excluding them from office and power; and by traversing and disappointing all their views and expectations, raised the spleen of many of his party
of

of no principle, for not letting them into posts and places; roused the envy and hatred of the Whigs in their former administration, by the wisdom of his counsels and success, which reproached their weakness, or wickedness, and disgusted many pretended Whigs, men of no principle, who were displaced to make room for some of his friends; I ask, as this was the case, can we wonder that the floodgates of scurrility, slander, calumny and reproach were opened upon him, and poured out all their filth in order to overwhelm him. Besides, vice and cowardice as naturally hate virtue, and fortitude, as owls and bats do the light of the sun. But it is apparent, that his eminent wisdom and integrity; and the great success of our arms under his administration, together with his popularity, have been the source of the scurrility vented against him. Such have been the principles of Mr. P—t's conduct, and their consequences.

We cannot help observing here, the parity and disparity between Mr. P—t, and some other ministers his predecessors. My lord Marlborough and Godolphin were bred in High Church principles, came into the ministry as Tories, acted as enemies to France, as friends to their country, and were turned out as Whigs. Lord Harley and Bolingbroke were bred Dissenters, went into the ministry as Tories, acted as friends to France and enemies to their country, and went out as Jacobites and traitors. Mr. Pitt came into the administration as a Tory, acted as an enemy to France, and as a true Englishman, and friend to his country, but discarded by the artifices of his enemies, who hated his superior merit: and after the loss of his power was pursued with the same scurrility and baseness as attended my lord Marlborough and his coadjutors at their exit. Such is the fate of great and good men. No wonder, for they must be always hated by those who are their *contrast*.

XVII. *Rem. IV.* As we have seen above one of the most extraordinary mass of arguments, and chaos of contradictions, that ever were advanced in polemics; the next remark we shall make will be with regard to the source of this heap of repugnancy and inconsistency, in which we shall enquire from whence it arose. People never tell lies, nor write in vindication of falsehood; people never misrepresent, nor put false glosses upon things; nor use arts to mislead and deceive, but to answer some ends, and private views. No body lies to the public for lying's sake: that would be to stake character and reputation against nothing; the foolishlest bet a man can make.

The ministerial advocates pretend, that the present gentlemen in the administration are Tories, boast, that they are greater favourers of the crown, and more supple servants to the king,

than their predecessors the Whigs were to the late king and to his father. That those princes were held, as it were, in chains by their servants the Whigs, their ministers; but that the Tories, the ministers of his present majesty, will give full scope to the exertion of his prerogative, and emancipate him from the bondage, in which the late Mr. P—t and the Whigs held him, and his gracious progenitors.

We know not what these ministerial advocates mean, by giving scope to the king to enjoy all his prerogatives, to the full extent; and not to cramp him in the exercise of his royal power and dignities, as his royal grandfather of gracious memory was. The statute *de prerogativa* specifies the king's prerogatives, which are established by law. The king's prerogative extends no farther, than doing what the law allows and permits him, for the good of his subjects. Where our kings have been perverse, and have acted contrary to law, and the inclinations of their people, our history informs us, that the consequences have been very fatal to their peace, their honour, and their reputation; that it has ruined them whilst living, and stamped everlasting ignominy and reproach on their memories when dead; however gross flatterers have endeavoured by scandalous arts, to embalm their memory, and mitigate their shame. Their remembrance is had in detestation by all wise and good men, however they may be admired by fools; or knaves may pretend to reverence them for virtues, which may have been only advantageous to themselves.

But notwithstanding this profession of their great regard for royal prerogative, and complaint, that it is the spirit of Whiggism, to make a pageant of royalty, and lead it in chains; yet the late Mr. *Pelham* has been stigmatized, as contending, that the late king had a right of making peace and war; and that he might by his regal power conclude the peace of *Aix*. But have the Tories forgotten, the great clamours they made about the power given to the late kings, to visit their German dominions once, perhaps, in two years; about votes of credit; the disposal of posts and places; of the septennial bill; of the increase of the prerogatives of the crown by excise and custom-house laws, &c. ? But now they are become, all at once, advocates for the extension of the king's prerogative, by which, I neither understand, what they mean, nor, I believe, do they themselves. "The criterion of a Whig administration, my lord B—th says, is, to resist and reduce the power of France; and of a Tory administration, directly or indirectly, to assist, encourage and support the interests of France. These men, he observes, from their attachment to the interest of one man, and one family, in contempt of the national interest, were
" obliged

" obliged to assist the ambition, support the power, and abet
 " the views of France, by whose power alone, they could
 " hope, to bring their point to bear. — These men too, he
 " says, in order to bring their point to bear, will labour to
 " revive the false opinion, that the principles of their faction
 " are not to be apprehended; *it is*, says he, *the constant public*
 " *topic of discourse with Jacobites, that there is not a Jacobite*
 " *in England*; but it avails nothing for a man, to deny the
 " name, whilst he pursues the thing." Hence it is manifest,
 that the Tories and Jacobites are listed under one banner in
 their hearts and words; and that they are but two words,
 or names, for one and the same thing.

In order to support this assertion, I shall cite the words of a
 very late French author, who gives an account of our parties in
 the following manner: " The opponents, says he, to the measures
 " of the court of Charles the second, were, by way of reproach
 " and derision, called Whigs, and the courtiers Tories. These
 " last *had scarce any share in the revolution*, for the Whigs were
 " the principal actors in that scene. The interests of those two
 " parties are too opposite ever to produce a coalition; for the
 " principle of the Whigs was, to oblige the prince upon the
 " throne, to conform to the fundamental laws of the constitu-
 " tion; and to render elections to parliament free, according
 " to the unanimous desire of the nation.

" Queen Ann, he continues, turned out the Whigs, because
 " they were friends to the Dutch, had resolved to *destrone Phi-*
 " *lip king of Spain*, and to oblige the French to erase their bar-
 " rier, or fortified towns in the Netherlands. She was willing
 " to reduce the power of France, but not to crush it; to gratify
 " the pride of the house of Austria, and the Dutch; and hence
 " she turned out the Whigs, and took the Tories into her mi-
 " nistry, who soon concluded a peace.

" The Hanover family succeeded queen Ann, who were
 " fully satisfied the Tories had little esteem for them, though
 " they found the Whigs the minority. The only view of the
 " Whigs is, to support the Hanover succession, and to preserve
 " public credit. They are now in the administration, and de-
 " clare openly against the Tories, who have adopted the ap-
 " pellation of the *country party*, whilst the Whigs are called the
 " *court party*. The Whigs are warm and imprudent, and think
 " it meritorious, to entertain an inveterate hatred to France;
 " and will always join every turbulent, restless power against
 " France, that shall have an inclination to attack her. Nay,
 " if Great Britain was able, she would at once fall upon us,

“ in order to destroy our maritime force. But we should err, if we conceived the Whig party was so obsequious to the prince, as to coincide with all his views for the aggrandizement of *Hanover*.”

Farther, he observes : “ We dare assert it, that it is a misfortune for the English nation, to have the Whigs at the helm, because they are always for making war with France; whereas the Tories are for preserving peace with that kingdom. These Tories may be ranked under three classes : first, Those who have no more love for the Hanover succession, than for the Stuarts ; secondly, Those who join with the professed Jacobites ; and thirdly, The Jacobites, who have the courage and resolution to acknowledge and profess their sentiments. *The views of these three classes are the same, and unite in one point, though only the third class has courage enough to avow their designs.* The Whigs love war ; but if ever the Tories should gain the ascendant, these *last* would concern themselves very little about the affairs of the continent ; but would apply themselves to the reduction of the taxes ; which injure their trade by the inhancement of labour ; which reduction would in the issue ruin the public funds.—Though the nation is jealous of its public credit, a free Tory parliament would certainly cancel all the national debts, ease the trade of the kingdom, and ruin the *Whigs*. The court party (or Whigs) have nothing but interest at heart ; the country party are all patriots, but cowards, without resolution or firmness.

“ The empress-queen and the states of Holland were reduced and weak : and hence his most christian majesty would have nothing to fear from his neighbours, if he reduced his troops to one hundred thousand men : this may be prudently done, as soon as he has raised a navy capable of coping with the maritime power of Great Britain ; which would soon prevent their chicanery concerning our trade to *Guinea*, and our territories in *North America*, &c. If our naval power was greater, the British nation would soon be afraid of molesting us, lest we should place the pretender on the throne, who would soon cancel all the national debts. Great Britain is weak, but covers its imbecility under the mask of a confident outside, which hint our minister ought to make a proper use of : but Lewis the fourteenth was a match for all the powers of Europe, and conquered many provinces from the house of Austria, and last of all the kingdom of Spain and the Indies.”

This account of our French writer seems to be a pretty just description of our Whigs and Tories, and of the spirit by which they

they were actuated, from the restoration to the year 1712. But since that epoch, the French attacked the English at the island of St. Lucia, and expelled them from their settlements there : this was never relented ; hence since 1722, Whiggish *timidity* has almost been as conducive to the advancement of the power of France, as Tory *treachery* was from 1660 to the accession of the Hanover family.

As the ministerial advocates declare, that the gentlemen in the present administration are all Tories, and make it a point to enlarge the king's prerogative, I will take it for granted, that it is true. But, as from the revolution to the Hanover succession, they laboured to cramp the power of our princes, unless at the beginning of queen Ann's reign, when they made their court to her, and, at the end, when they were flattering her, in order to deprive her of all power ; and as ever since the accession of the Brunswick family to the throne, they have, as far as in them lay, opposed the power of the princes of that house, and have, stickled to limit it, how can they boast, with a good grace, of their complaisance to the crown, and its prerogatives ? If they were enemies to the two late kings from principle, where is their merit with the present ? If from their not being taken into places of profit and power, where their patriotism ? If they deny they acted from principle, they were the basest of profligates, and the most contemptible, ambitious and avaricious wretches ; who opposed the interests of their country and the government, and the ease and peace of their prince, from private views only. If they acted from principle, what sort of loyalty must their present professions be ? And what has his present majesty to expect from them ?

George the first, and George the second governed by their ministers, and the advice of their privy council, with the consent of parliament, and the general approbation of the people ; none excepted but Tories, professed Jacobites, and some discontented Whigs, who thought their administration too timid and irresolute. But as they paid a due reverence to the laws, and governed according to the principles of the constitution, they were loved and esteemed by their people, though their conduct with respect to some foreign powers was not the most politic. This gave the people peace, and a flourishing trade, though it rendered both France and Spain insolent and refractory.

GEORGE the third governs by his minister, and the advice of his privy council, and the consent of parliament. How far his government hath met with the approbation of the people becomes not me to determine ; the thing is recent, I leave every one to judge.

But the ministers of George the first and second were accused of having indulged the arbitrary views of those princes, contrary to the interests of the people, and for indulging and extending the power of the crown. If this were true, they were traitors to their country.

But, if these are the true characters of the ministers of the two classes of sovereigns; how as servants of the crown and favourers of the prerogative, can the ministers of George the third plead any merit with their master above the ministers of George the first and second, though they may with the people?

However, if the ministers of George the third should excite or indulge their master in any arbitrary views or extension of his prerogative, which is contrary to law, and contrary to the interests of his people, they must be traitors to their country, and enemies to the constitution. But even then, how can they plead any merit with prince or people any more than the ministers of George the first and second? according to themselves?

But it is said, that the ministers and council of George the first and second both indulged their arbitrary views, and held them and their prerogative in chains; which they call Whiggism, and which is a contradiction. However, if so, which class of ministers were most in the interests of the power of the prince, and which most in those of the people, I shall leave to the reader to judge. They who boast, that they will indulge and prompt the prince in the exertion of extraordinary power, under the notion of prerogative, which may disgust the people, are in fact enemies to both prince and people whatever they may pretend. Our history abundantly confirms this.

If the present administration be composed of Tories, as the ministerial advocates declare; and that his majesty's servants near his person are men of that stamp; I shall not dispute it, but argue from the premises, as if they were true; and draw some consequences from thence.

In the first place, I must insist, that a *Tory* cannot be a loyal subject to a parliamentary king, any more than darkness can be light, or lowering winter, glittering summer. In truth, they are contradictions, opposites in nature. The Tories, it is true allow, that there may be a king *de jure*, and a king *de facto*. But they believe, that they are bound in conscience to support the interests of a king *de jure*, against a king *de facto*, whenever they can discern any prospect of success; and that it is their duty to endeavour by all means, even at the hazard of their lives and fortunes to maintain his title, and to vindicate his rights and interests, when convenient opportunity offers. These are their principles *in foro conscientia*, their internal sentiments and feelings whatever they may pretend.

If two persons were set before them, one a parliamentary king, and the other a king by hereditary right, or divine right, as they phrase it, and excluded by the laws; and it was left to a Tory's option to elect one of them; can we be at a loss to determine on whom his choice would fall? Though under one, his liberties and properties, and religion would be secure; and under the other, they were to be left to the good pleasure and caprice of a Popish king? Did we not see, in Charles the second's reign, twenty-four bishops, out of twenty-six, vote for a Popish successor, to protect the pure and reformed doctrines of the church of England?

Torycism is a complex term, and includes a certain set of political principles, relative to the government of this kingdom, and excludes another set of principles relative to the same government. The Tories believe a divine, indefeasible hereditary right in princes: if so, how is it possible, that a Tory should be a loyal subject to a parliamentary king, to the exclusion of the right heir? For an act of parliament, which excludes a king *de jure*, must defeat what they hold indefeasible. They argue, that a king by divine right is a king made by God, and is the Lord's anointed, whom no one can oppose without incurring the guilt and sin of rebellion, and without opposing God's ordinance: and that no earthly right or power can defeat a heavenly one. Hence a Tory must think himself bound in conscience, to defeat the right of a parliamentary king; that is, to be guilty of rebellion according to our laws. How then is it possible, that a Tory should be a good and loyal subject, in his heart, and from principle, to a parliamentary king, though he be a king *de facto*? His inward sentiments and feelings must be always repugnant to such a king, and hence cannot admit any duty or obligation, or allegiance; nor bind him to any affection or loyalty.

If it be said, that a reputed Tory may be a loyal, good and affectionate subject to a parliamentary king, and renounce and abjure all affection, duty and allegiance to a king *jure divino*, or by divine hereditary right; then I assert, that he is no Tory, and that he passes under a wrong denomination, and is really a Whig. But to argue, that a Tory can be an affectionate, dutiful and loyal subject to a parliamentary king in his heart, in opposition to a king, whose title is *jure divino*, and by birth and from hereditary right, is a contradiction in terms. A Tory does not believe a parliamentary king, to be a king in reality, or a king, to whom he owes allegiance.

It is therefore stupidity in the ministerial advocates, to tell us, that the present administration is in the hands of Tories, and that they are all good and faithful subjects, and dutiful and af-

fectionate servants to king George the third, for we have demonstrated, that it is impossible and a contradiction. No man can serve two masters, for he must cleave to one and reject the other, or hold with one and despise the other. A man cannot serve both God and *mammon*. To be congruous, they should declare, that the present gentlemen in the administration were formerly, pretended Tories, but in reality honest and true Whigs in their hearts; or else, that they are regenerated, and have changed their footy principles; and abhor the king *jure divino*, they were wont to adore: and that they believe his present majesty king George the third is their true and lawful sovereign, to whom only they owe allegiance and fealty: and that no other person has any right, title, or just claim to the sovereignty, to the title of a king, or royal dignity of these realms. Now we conceive, that the mass of contradiction, we have above examined, under thirteen articles or heads of argument, can be the production only of *Toryism* in the administration; since the principles of this doctrine are nothing but one system of absurdity and nonsense.

As Tory principles are a collection of absurdities and nonsense, that would, as *Bolingbroke* observes, shock the understanding of a *Samoide*, or *Hottentot*; it is no wonder, that such an inconsistent and absurd mass of arguments should be advanced in defence of a Tory peace, that so completely favours the *power*, and *the interests of France*. Can we expect congruity, and common sense, in disputation with a set of people, whose principles both of government and religion, would astonish a *Hottentot*, or *Caffer*, on account of their monstrous absurdity? As well might you expect grapes from thorns, and figs from *thistles*. To deny toleration, to expect uniformity in principles of religion, or that all men should have the same reverence, for indifferent ceremonies in religion, are things as absurd, as the doctrines of hereditary and divine right, passive obedience, and non-resistance.

But, now the Tories are gotten into power, they pretend, that they desire only, that the king may enjoy his prerogatives, as well as the people their rights. They say, that Whig principles would deprive him of this privilege, and make him a slave, who is resolved to make all others free. May we not doubt of our freedom, if Tory principles prevail? that is, principles which indulge and flatter the extension of arbitrary will and power, the principles of passive obedience, non-resistance, and divine right of kingship? Can a king, acting agreeable to such prerogatives, be any thing but a tyrant? Or a people, in subjection to such a prince, be any thing but slaves? How then can

can these stupid creatures talk of freedom, among a people, under the government of such a prerogative king? Their arguments and their doctrines are equally absurd: one is shocking, the other ridiculous.

But sometimes the Tories, with their usual propriety and congruity, labour to make us believe, that when each are in power, the conduct of the Whigs and Tories, with regard to prerogative, is just the same: that the Whigs in power act upon Tory principles, and favour the arbitrary views of the prince regnant; and that the Tories, when out of power, act upon Whig principles, and oppose the power of the crown, and stickle for the rights and privileges of the people. Hence they insinuate, that the difference between the two parties is but *nominal*; and that all the Whigs contend for is power and profit for themselves, without any more regard to the interests of the people than the Tories entertain. That hence the Whigs by artifice have made the people their dupes, and have cheated and deceived them.

In answer to this, we shall observe, that if to support the interests and designs of Toryism, the Tories have occasionally adopted and embraced the principles and interests of Whiggism; and if, on the other hand, the Whigs have sometimes, in answer to Tories, argued on Tory principles, and played off the artillery of their own doctrines and principles against them; I ask, in this case, whether, that the conduct of either or both proves, that *Toryism* and *Whiggism* are the same; or that either party has renounced its principles? And whether, that their principles are not still specifically distinct? To deny this would be to assert, that there is no such thing, as a *Tory* or a *Whig*, whilst those writers are railing at one, and applauding the conduct and principles of the other; and recommending the Tories to the prince, by way of preference, as men best adapted, to make dutiful and obedient servants, and loyal and faithful subjects, by the passiveness of their principles, and thence by blind submission to his will. How much the good people of England ought to admire them, for attachment to their interests, and for the support they will afford to their liberties! How! they must glow with joy to see such a set of patriots in power!

The principles of the Tories were the same, as it appeared afterwards, though they clogged the act of settlement, with a load of clauses, restraining the sovereign power, and reducing a British king to a mere pageant of state, and to the limited authority of a king of Sweden, or of a king of Poland. But what did they mean by this? Only favour to their own views and designs; and thereby to acquire means to reinstate their own idol and favourite family, in unlimited sovereign power. Can they be such fools, as to imagine the people cannot see this? If they

are so weak; they are as great political enthusiasts as the *Whitefieldians* are religious.

I have always understood, that Tory principles and Toryism in *State*, are a *jus divinum*, or a divine, hereditary, indefeasible right in kings; passive obedience, and non-resistance, with respect to the exertion of the royal power; and an opinion of prerogative of course inconsistent with liberty and our constitution. In church, I have always looked on Toryism to be a rigid attachment to uniformity in ceremonies, church-government, doctrine and discipline, and to the propriety of subscriptions and creeds: likewise, at the same time, to bear a mortal hatred to toleration and dissenters; and to have a better opinion of and greater disposition to Popery, than to Calvinism and the doctrines of foreign Protestants of Calvinistical persuasion. These I take to be the distinguishing principles of the Tories, however in certain particular circumstances they may have deviated from them, and acted contrary to their own character, in the same manner as they have charged the Whigs to have done. Surely the Tories, who are under the influence of such a blind, absurd and ridiculous set of principles and politics, can never be any very great votaries to the *Hanover* succession, whatever they may pretend, to answer sinister views and designs. Such a set of men, with such principles, must be always either a set of knaves, or of fools, or a mixture of both.

Their pretences of obedience to the king is a sham; for as the king acts by the advice of his ministers; the obedience they inculcate towards his commands, is only recommending obedience and submission to their own dictates, under the notion of loyalty to the prince. Hence it appears, that a Tory is a man of boundless ambition, pride, and lust of dominion; and all that he means by obedience to the king, is obedience to himself, and by the extension of prerogative, only the enlargement of the circle of his own power. Though it is impossible to comprehend what is unlimited, yet perhaps this may be, what the Tories mean by prerogative. Upon all these accounts, it is impossible, that they should keep faith with, or observe any treaties with foreign powers, that tend to diminish and reduce the power of *France*.

Can we then wonder, to see the king of Prussia renounced, and left in the lurch, and to struggle alone against the Popish league in Germany? Can we wonder to read, in the French memorial, the following declarations of the kings of Great Britain and of France? viz. The King of France declares, "That he will rather sacrifice the power that God has given him, than conclude any thing with his enemies, that may be contrary to the engagements he has contracted, and that good
" faith

" faith in which he glories," p. 44. The king of England, on the other hand, declares, " *That after the conclusion of the separate peace, he will never desist from giving constant succour to the king of Prussia, with efficacy and good faith.*" p. 53. Now, whether the good faith of the king of France, or of the king of Great Britain, is most to be relied on, under a Tory administration, the world will easily judge from the preliminaries.

It seems, that British faith in the year 1762 made as glorious a figure, as she did in the year 1712, just half a century before. Every good Englishman will certainly wish, it may never make a worse appearance in Europe than it does at present; and desire, that it may always make as much better as our power and strength will admit. We see several respectable names in the preamble to the treaty of London in 1756, and the same at the head of the preliminaries in 1762. The figure they make there for *integrity*, and *good faith* will never be forgotten, as long as *history* preserves her *memorials*.

But, it should be observed by the curious reader, that the empress-queen is a natural ally of France; and that the king of *Prussia*, being a Protestant, is a power with whom we have no interesting connexions; for *Prussia* is at a great distance from us, and we want no troops *from*, allies *on*, nor connexions *with*, the continent. We are *nouns* substantives, and contented by ourselves. What is Portugal to us? Portugal is on the continent; but we want no connexions with the continent. We might see Portugal a deluge of blood, and one scene of carnage, without any other emotions, interest or concern, but what might arise from compassion to their sufferings, as being fellow creatures*. What a fine system of politics imported first from Scotland, in the reign of James the first, and at length adopted by a Statesman—ster for the welfare of Britain!

Now, let the reader judge, which is the chastest *nymph*, British *faith*, or French *faith*. Whether that our faith stinks over Europe, or French faith. He will be able to judge, without the wisdom of Solomon. By the end of the war, perhaps we may make as glorious a figure for good faith, as we did at the peace of Utrecht.

Before I conclude, I cannot help observing a notable difference, between the conduct of the French, and that of the English, in point of good faith. When the French break their treaties with their friends, it is to serve *themselves*. But whenever the English do it, it is to serve their *enemies*. When the French violate their

* See the Considerations on the German war, where this argument is advanced,

faith, it is generally with their *natural* enemies; whenever the English are guilty of such breach, it is generally with their *natural* friends and allies. I am sorry, that the times have been so corrupt, that I have no motive to bestow a better panegyric on our national faith formerly. If the French sacrifice their honour, it is to promote their political interests; if we sacrifice ours, it is with intent to destroy our national interests, and those of our allies. We can never expect it otherwise under a Tory administration. From which, good Lord deliver us. *Amen.*

XVIII. *Rem. V.* When we consider the family-compact, the coalition of the house of Austria with that of Bourbon, the proposed intermarriages between the Spanish branch of the last house, and the house of *Austria*, and the dominions and territories the parties are to be settled in, &c. When we take a view of the Popish league in Germany against our religion, and of the great defection of late years of many princes of the empire from the Protestant doctrine; when we ruminate on the ingratitude and baseness of the empress-queen, and upon the motives of her conduct. When we compare all these things with the joke the French politicians make of the balance of power, with the schemes they have formed to bring the house of Austria into their system, to ruin the *Dutch*, to destroy the balance of power, to possess themselves of the territories of several petty princes, and to make a partition of Europe according to their own good pleasure among themselves, and their allies; and how the English Tories coincide with their views, and co-operate with their measures. When we examine, how the king of Prussia has been forsaken, deceived, betrayed, and his interests neglected and despised; how anti continental systems have been preached up with all the enthusiasm of falsehood, or of stupidity; or, at least, of party zeal and blindness. When we consider, that the present administration avows themselves to be Tories, and that we cannot consistently consider the views of that species of politicians, but as leading to the Pr—t—nd—r. When we reflect, how much the interests and designs of France are favoured, and the English injured, by the present Tory peace, and surrender of all our important conquests. And finally, when we contemplate, how the Swedes, Danes, and many princes of the Empire, swayed by French money, or by bigotry, temporize and neglect their true interests; we think every good Englishman, upon such a retrospect, must shudder with horror for the consequences, with regard to our religion, our liberties, our king, our commerce, and our independency.

As we have betrayed all the powers of Europe, that we have allied with, excepting France and Portugal; and as we have

not one ally left, that will aid us, unless it be for our money: As the Tories have always deceived and betrayed our friends, to raise the power of France, and to favour the interests of the Pretender directly; and, on the other hand, as the Whigs have abused and deceived them, through weakness, envy, and timidity. As we have run ourselves ninety millions more in debt, without putting it out of the power of our inveterate enemy to injure us; have only irritated him without crushing him, when our foot was on his neck. I say, as this is the true state of our case, we must soon expect the enemy will attack us with advantage, and destroy us, without mercy. Into such a deplorable situation, have the base envy, and jealousy of the Whigs, and their hatred to one great and good man, together with the treachery of the Tories, brought us.

XIX. *Rem.* VI. The advocates for the present minister declare the government to be in the hands of the Tories, and that in the two last reigns, those Tories were under a proscription, and excluded from all places of honour, trust, and profit, which drove them into rebellion. Now, as we have proved above, that a Tory cannot possibly be a loyal subject or friend to a parliamentary king, or to the Protestant succession in the house of Hanover, whilst they believe there is a right heir in a lineal descent; it is astonishing, that the present minister should suffer his advocates to make such declarations of the principles of those in power, and about the person of the king. But, if the Tories, in the two last reigns, were proscribed from offices under the government, did not our kings do right, since those wise-acres are so honest as to declare, that their loyalty was so lukewarm, as to suffer them to run into rebellion, because they were excluded from the emoluments of government; and hence, that they must have been bribed by office even to the external appearance of loyalty? Does such conduct agree with the doctrines of passive obedience and non-resistance, or with the reverence they now profess for the prerogative; or with a principle of loyalty and affection for the Hanover family?

If, in the two last reigns, the Tories would have faithfully and zealously served the Hanover princes, in case they had been admitted into place, power, and profit, where were their principles? Where was their affection for the Stuart race, and for their country? Or, where was their integrity, that they could forsake *the first* and renounce the *last*, and hence shew, that they did not possess one patriotic virtue? Would they have abandoned all the Tory principles, they had sucked in with their religion, and their pap, if they had been obliged with places? Could they have divested themselves of all the prejudices

dices

dices and bigotry of education, and have underwent a thorough political regeneration merely by the powerful argument of a lucrative place? *Credat Judæus Apella, non ego.* We know their political bigotry, blindness and enthusiasm too well, to believe any conversion could have been wrought on them. They would have been glad to have been taken into service, that they might have more easily betrayed their master. It is a more difficult task to convert a bigot in politics, than in religion.

But, as the conduct of the *Tories*, in the two last reigns, by opposing the prince on the throne, was absolutely and diametrically opposite, to their principles of passive obedience, non-resistance, and reverence for royal prerogative; it is manifest, that they did not believe; the two last kings had any right to the crown, and consequently, that they did not owe any fealty or allegiance to them. If this were not the case, how could they oppose those princes, and take up arms against them consistent with their principles? However, the ministerial writers contend, that the *Tories* would have appeared loyal subjects to the princes of the house of *Hanover*, if they had been permitted to steer the government; though thereby they must have acted directly contrary to their principles, and have been guilty of supporting an usurper against the *Lord's anointed*. What honest men these writers represent them to be!

Notwithstanding these writers suggest, and the *Tories* avow themselves to be such prevaricators and r—g—es, we will not believe them to be such great r—f—ls, as they contend, that they are; for, if they had gotten into the administration, we are well satisfied, that they would have proved true to their real Tory principles, and have managed so, as soon to have kicked their Hanoverian master out, and to have introduced their Popish idol, to defend the pure Calvinistical doctrines of the church of England with the same zeal, as his father did before his abdication. It is impossible for a thinking man to believe, that their principles would have permitted them, to have renounced the *Stuart family*, or hung so loosely about them, as to have admitted of zealous allegiance to the house of *Hanover*, whatever they may pretend. We must pay them the compliment to believe, *they are too honest, and too steady to act such an inconsistent part.* Therefore, we must conclude, that a *Tory*, and, at the same time, a loyal subject to a *Hanoverian*, and *Brunswick king*, would be a greater monster, than *Afric* ever bore:

Nec Juba tellus generat, leonum arida nutrix.

Hor.

From

From these reflections and observations, it appears, that the declarations of the ministerial advocates amount virtually to this; that the present administration is in the hands of men, whose principles constitute them implacable enemies to his present majesty and his family. I am glad, they have made the confession. We know the better how to guard against their dark designs, and wicked intrigues and machinations. We thank them for their honest declarations; but we cannot admire either their prudence, or their policy. Such professions one would think should make their patrons blush, whatever their designs may be.

To have acted prudently, these writers should have followed the example of the Jacobites and Tories in the reign of king William the third; who when they got into the administration, and possessed themselves of places of power, and truits of consequence, declared there was not a Jacobite in the nation; on the contrary, that all those who were reproached with those odious appellations, were loyal and affectionate subjects to his Dutch majesty. However, notwithstanding all this pretended affection, and outward appearance of loyalty, these very men, at the same time, were forming a scheme to assassinate that prince, and for introducing their old Popish king to the throne. The present race of Tories more open and more honest declare what they are without disguise, give us warning, and hence leave us to guess what they are at, and to prepare a guard against them.

XX. *Rem.* VII. I shall now draw towards a conclusion with telling a story, which I lately found in some manuscript memoirs of the kingdom of Hungary, written in Latin; and which from its disparity to any thing, which has happened in the present times, cannot be applied, even as a contrary; and hence not, so much as suggested, to be libellous, even by Tories, who, through the assistance of law-alembics, in the reigns of Charles the second, and his brother, drew poison and treason out of every innocent discourse, and converted simple relations of historical facts into seditious libels by their venomous breath.

But, if this were the case then, *tempora mutantur*, the times are altered. Our present ministers have clear heads, clean hands, and honest hearts, and will not give directions to certain lawyers, or dare, like the libeller, who wrote the names of the principal inhabitants of his parish, to all the sins in the *Whole Duty of Man*; to convert an innocent story into an infamous libel, by changing the Hungarian into English names.

*Who draws a character, does not defame,
He makes the libel, who supplies the name.*

But how is it possible to supply an apt name, unless there be a similitude of characters? If so, how a libel, unless it be such to speak truth, and scourge vice? *Good* fame is the reward of virtue; *bad*, the punishment of vice. Now rewards and punishments are the hinges, the poles on which all government turns, both human and divine. Would you rob virtue of her arms? And ease vice of her terrors? Tell me not of the magistrate's office; his ends with a single act; a bad reputation is a constant punishment. The objection implies, the chastisement of the magistrate is ineffectual, and inferior to the constant reproach of the world. Wicked men are afraid of those reproaches, they are nettled with them. They are always stung with the charge of their old crimes, or present vices. What a contradiction is man! that he cannot bear, to hear himself charged with the guilt of those vices, which he dares constantly to practise.

*Video meliora proboque,
Et deteriora sequor.*

As the punishment, which the magistrate inflicts, is soon over, and a constant dread of reproach attends the guilty, to debar reproaching men with their crimes, is to take away one curb on vice, nay a principal one; and to rob virtue of one of the chief parts of her armour, with which she combats the monster. If a good name be an incitement to virtue, a bad name is a restraint on vice. Not to publish a man's wickedness is to expose the innocent to his snares. But, according to some, the bare relating a crime, a man has been guilty of, is a libel; such corrupt mean fools have been found in the law, to screen the guilty *great* from the punishment of reproach; but all has been offered under the specious pretext of protecting the innocent; whereas innocence soon cures the bite of slander by her own balm, and has in herself her own consolation under reproach. Thus much by way of prelude; we come now to the story.

In the kingdom of Hungary there lived two great lords, whose estates were parted only by the river *Drave*. The name of one was count *Grandarotsky*, and the name of the other was *Bullafinsky*. Count *Grandarotsky* had been a miner for many years, and had, by his success, very much enlarged his estate, his interest, and his power; which rendered him extremely vain, insolent and turbulent towards his neighbours. Count *Bullafinsky* was advised by his stewards and tenants in chief, to try his luck in mining likewise; in order, to be in a condition, to protect his neighbours, and to oppose by his riches any unjust attempt *Grandarotsky* might make on his property, by setting

setting up any pretended title, and going to law with him, for any part of his estate, as the count had done with some of his neighbours, which had proved their ruin.

Under the stewardship of one *Vulpokinfsky*, he began sinking a mine, which, through the unskilfulness of the steward and bailiffs, was very injudiciously conducted, and hence great injury accrued to the lands of the count's tenants. Upon this they raised a great clamour against his officers, and signified to him, that one *Pitanowfsky* would conduct the work to his and their advantage, if their lord would please to advance him to the stewardship, and give him the direction of the mine. The count was a most gracious lord to his tenants, pursued their desires, and proceeded in sinking the mine, and draining off the waters, with great success, under the direction of *Pitanowfsky*, who was a very honest, judicious, skilful man, and had the interest of the count and his tenants more at heart, than any steward he had employed for many years before. In pursuing the work, which he carefully examined himself, by consulting the various *clunches*, *bass*, veins, *marcasites*, &c. thro' which he passed, he often so directed the work, that they came to find veins of *copper*, *tin*, *cobalt*, *calmint*, *marble*, *coal* and *strata* of rich *marl*, which brought in the expence of mining and an overplus; and very much improved the estates of his tenants in chief, and the bargains and trades of their under-tenants: hence all seemed mightily delighted with their lord's mining, except a few ill-natured envious tenants in chief, who mortally hated his steward *Pitanowfsky*, and who chose rather, that their own estates, and their lord's should be injured, than *Pitanowfsky* should enjoy the honour of having advanced the prosperity of both. Thus, like *Sampfin*, they chose to bury themselves in the ruin of their enemy. Others were disgusted with paying a small tax, which the count had a right to raise on their estates, and which they were obliged to pay by their tenures, whenever he went to mining; not considering, that the advantages which arose from the *marl*; and the employment of the peasants, more than made good the tax they paid.

Notwithstanding the clamours of weakness and wickedness, *Pitanowfsky* prevailed on the count to continue the work. The miners proceeded for a considerable time, constantly meeting with many advantages, and obtaining certain prognosticks from the various *strata* they passed through, of great success and riches. By and-by old count *Bull-fnsky* dies, and the young count succeeds. There was a gentleman in the neighbourhood, who had been employed in working a German mine; and had made mining very much his study, yet knew very little of me-

talurgy; his name was *Butrowsky*. This man having gained an intimacy with some females in the family, they recommended him to the young count, as a very skilful miner, and advised him to consult him in the business of mining, which he did. The new miner soon insinuated, that *Pitanowsky* would ruin him by pursuing the work, and advised the count to discharge him from his stewardship, and turn him out of his service as a great knave. He followed his counsel; and then was prevailed on by him, to give off the work, for fear of expence; just as, in the opinion of all experienced miners, they were within a few fathom of a very rich vein of *silver ore*. The count lost all his expence, became the pity of the most honest of his tenants, and the sneer of the neighbourhood.— Every one ascribed his conduct to the intrigues of *Grandaritsky* with *Butrowsky*, and did not doubt, but a large sum was paid to the *l'st* for his own use, and to distribute among the tenants, in order to induce *one* to prevail on the count to blow up the *pit*, destroy the works, and cede the estate, on which they mined, to *Grandaritsky*; and to procure the approbation of the *other* to such an extraordinary measure.

The consequence was, *Grandaritsky* got *Butrowsky* to turn evidence against count *Bullfinsky*, and then commenced an action against him, on the behalf of one *Stuartskay*, the cousin of *Butrowsky*, who laid a claim to count *Bullfinsky's* estate. The suit was carried on with great warmth and vigour, and in the issue *Bullfinsky* was oulled, and *Stuartskay* held the estate, as a *hof* under *Grandaritsky*. Poor *Bullfinsky* retired to a little cot, and crab orchard, on the other side of the *Danube*, lived obscure, and fed hogs, by which he procured a wretched livelihood. *Butrowsky* obtained for himself the stewardship of the manor, and the grant of a large wood and common for himself and his heirs, as the wages of his perjury and treachery. But he lived and died hated by all the tenants, who grieved for the loss of their gracious lord, count *Bullfinsky*, and suffered a cruel tyranny under the authority of *Stuartskay*.

I shall conclude my account of this Tory-*farce* of argument, as other *farces* are concluded, with a tag of rhyme, which was put into my hands, a few days ago, in manuscript, by my bookseller. It follows:

Britannia's arms, earth, air, and seas disturb,
Bounce, sputter, roar, and bluster through the orb;

Like

Like small beer bottled, open with a crack,
Smoke, foam, but prove, they strength and spirit lack ;
The groaning mountains and the lab'ring earth,
Only produce a *fil' mouse's* birth : *
For bully-like *Britannia* spends her fires,
Sneaks off, and with a shameful peace retires ;
Just like the candle's glow, her glories sink,
Blaze for a while, and finish in a STINK.

* Parturiunt montes nascetur ridiculus mus.
Hox. de Arte Poetica;

F I N I S.

Advertisement to the READER.

THE Publisher could not prevail on the noble author to correct the press, but the first employed some other person, who has remarked the following ERRATA.

Part I. Introduction.

Page 2. line 3. for *principles*, read *the principles*; l. 21. for *have not met*, r. *have met*, and dele *n* ; l. 37. for *desired*, r. *desired*; p. 3. l. 41. for *liable*, r. *able*; p. 6. l. 42. for *lent*, r. *sent*; p. 8. l. 36. for *adice*, r. *advice*; p. 17. l. 34. for *prosperity*, r. *propriety*; p. 17. last line save one, for *if then*, r. *if when*; p. 19. last line save two, for *importance*, r. *impotence*; p. 21. l. 3. for *this a foolish*, r. *this is a foolish*; p. 24. l. 39. for *fama potentia*, r. *fama potentie*; p. 26. for *Part II.* r. *Part I.* for *Arg.* r. *Arg. II.* p. 29. l. 5. for *affects them as 6 millions*, r. *affects them as much as 6 millions*; p. 31. l. 8. for *that of Newfoundland*, r. *that the trade of Newfoundland*; p. 32. in the note, l. 7. for *manufactures*, r. *manufacturers*; p. 32. l. 15. for *falacious*, r. *fallacious*. p. 34. for *by taking*, r. *unless they take*; l. 22. for *at ports*, r. *as ports*; p. 36. note, r. *for that author*; p. 37. l. 31. for *as*, r. *all which*; p. 40. l. 35. r. *late union*; p. 41. l. 38. r. *the powers*; l. 59. r. *the internal*; l. 41. for *her power*, r. *the power*; p. 43. l. 5. dele *frenchified*; p. 44. l. 1. r. *to be made*; p. 45. l. 23. r. *If we retain*; p. 47. l. 4. for *found*, r. *formed*.

PART II.

P. 3. l. 00. r. *more for his porter*; p. 4. l. 25. r. *men enow*; p. 5. l. 42. r. *too formidable*; p. 6. l. 32. for *was their no*, r. *was there no*; p. 7. l. 23. dele *an*; p. 10. r. *that accursed*; p. 13. l. 32. r. *success was*; p. 15. l. 36. r. *no conquests*; p. 18. l. 2. for *by a caption*, r. *by a renunciation*; p. 20. l. 15. for *are not*, r. *they are nett*, as; p. 23. l. 5. for *cutt*, r. *cut*; l. 14. for *sprung*, r. *sprang*; p. 25. l. 17. for *he*, r. *Lewis XIV.* p. 27. l. 25. for *credit hinders*, r. *credit renders*; p. 35. l. 16. for *P-it's*, r. *P-it*; p. 39. l. 2. for *preventative*, r. *preventive*; p. 42. l. 35. for *Spaniard*, r. *Spain*; p. 43. l. 2. for *their former*, r. *the former*; p. 43. l. 26. r. *was discarded*; l. 33. r. *masses and chaos's*; p. 48. l. 1. r. *are accused*; p. 49. l. 12. r. *Toryism*. The reader will easily correct other mistakes himself.

