

**CIHM  
Microfiche  
Series  
(Monographs)**

**ICMH  
Collection de  
microfiches  
(monographies)**



**Canadian Institute for Historical Microreproductions / Institut canadien de microreproductions historiques**

**© 1996**

## Technical and Bibliographic Notes / Notes technique et bibliographiques

The Institute has attempted to obtain the best original copy available for filming. Features of this copy which may be bibliographically unique, which may alter any of the images in the reproduction, or which may significantly change the usual method of filming are checked below.

L'Institut a microfilmé le meilleur exemplaire qu'il lui a été possible de se procurer. Les détails de cet exemplaire qui sont peut-être uniques du point de vue bibliographique, qui peuvent modifier une image reproduite, ou qui peuvent exiger une modifications dans la méthode normale de filmage sont indiqués ci-dessous.

- Coloured covers / Couverture de couleur
- Covers damaged / Couverture endommagée
- Covers restored and/or laminated / Couverture restaurée et/ou pelliculée
- Cover title missing / Le titre de couverture manque
- Coloured maps / Cartes géographiques en couleur
- Coloured ink (i.e. other than blue or black) / Encre de couleur (i.e. autre que bleue ou noire)
- Coloured plates and/or illustrations / Planches et/ou illustrations en couleur
- Bound with other material / Relié avec d'autres documents
- Only edition available / Seule édition disponible
- Tight binding may cause shadows or distortion along interior margin / La reliure serrée peut causer de l'ombre ou de la distorsion le long de la marge intérieure.
- Blank leaves added during restorations may appear within the text. Whenever possible, these have been omitted from filming / Il se peut que certaines pages blanches ajoutées lors d'une restauration apparaissent dans le texte, mais, lorsque cela était possible, ces pages n'ont pas été filmées.
- Additional comments / Commentaires supplémentaires:

- Coloured pages / Pages de couleur
- Pages damaged / Pages endommagées
- Pages restored and/or laminated / Pages restaurées et/ou pelliculées
- Pages discoloured, stained or foxed / Pages décolorées, tachetées ou piquées
- Pages detached / Pages détachées
- Showthrough / Transparence
- Quality of print varies / Qualité inégale de l'impression
- Includes supplementary material / Comprend du matériel supplémentaire
- Pages wholly or partially obscured by errata slips, tissues, etc., have been refilmed to ensure the best possible image / Les pages totalement ou partiellement obscurcies par un feuillet d'errata, une pelure, etc., ont été filmées à nouveau de façon à obtenir la meilleure image possible.
- Opposing pages with varying colouration or discolourations are filmed twice to ensure the best possible image / Les pages s'opposent ayant des colorations variables ou des décolorations sont filmées deux fois afin d'obtenir la meilleure image possible.

This item is filmed at the reduction ratio checked below /  
Ce document est filmé au taux de réduction indiqué ci-dessous.

	10X	12X	14X	16X	18X	20X	22X	24X	26X	28X	30X	32X
						↓						

The copy filmed here has been reproduced thanks to the generosity of:



National Library of Canada

The images appearing here are the best quality possible considering the condition and legibility of the original copy and in keeping with the filming contract specifications.

Original copies in printed paper covers are filmed beginning with the front cover and ending on the last page with a printed or illustrated impression, or the back cover when appropriate. All other original copies are filmed beginning on the first page with a printed or illustrated impression, and ending on the last page with a printed or illustrated impression.

The last recorded frame on each microfiche shall contain the symbol  $\rightarrow$  (meaning "CONTINUED"), or the symbol  $\nabla$  (meaning "END"), whichever applies.

Maps, plates, charts, etc., may be filmed at different reduction ratios. Those too large to be entirely included in one exposure are filmed beginning in the upper left hand corner, left to right and top to bottom, as many frames as required. The following diagrams illustrate the method:



L'exemplaire filmé fut reproduit grâce à la générosité de:


Bibliothèque nationale du Canada

Les images suivantes ont été reproduites avec le plus grand soin, compte tenu de la condition et de la netteté de l'exemplaire filmé, et en conformité avec les conditions du contrat de filmage.

Les exemplaires originaux dont la couverture en papier est imprimée sont filmés en commençant par le premier plat et en terminant soit par la dernière page qui comporte une empreinte d'impression ou d'illustration, soit par le second plat, selon le cas. Tous les autres exemplaires originaux sont filmés en commençant par la première page qui comporte une empreinte d'impression ou d'illustration et en terminant par la dernière page qui comporte une telle empreinte.


Un des symboles suivants apparaîtra sur la dernière image de chaque microfiche, selon le cas: le symbole  $\rightarrow$  signifie "A SUIVRE", le symbole  $\nabla$  signifie "FIN".

Les cartes, planches, tableaux, etc., peuvent être filmés à des taux de réduction différents. Lorsque le document est trop grand pour être reproduit en un seul cliché, il est filmé à partir de l'angle supérieur gauche, de gauche à droite, et de haut en bas, en prenant le nombre d'images nécessaire. Les diagrammes suivants illustrent la méthode.



# MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART

(ANSI and ISO TEST CHART No. 2)



**APPLIED IMAGE Inc**

1653 East Main Street  
Rochester, New York 14609 USA  
(716) 482 - 0300 - Phone  
(716) 288 - 5989 - Fax

THE GERMAN GOSPEL  
OF BLOOD AND IRON

# GERMANY'S WAR MANIA

*The Teutonic Point of View as  
officially stated by her Leaders: A  
Collection of Speeches and Writings*

By

THE GERMAN EMPEROR  
THE GERMAN CROWN PRINCE  
DR. V. BETHMANN-HOLLWEG  
PRINCE VON BÜLOW  
GENERAL VON BERNHARDI  
GENERAL VON DER GOLTZ  
GENERAL VON CLAUSEWITZ  
PROFESSOR VON TREITSCHKE  
PROFESSOR DELBRÜCK

PRICE 2/- NET

180

...





**GERMANY'S  
WAR MANIA**



“ HAVE A CARE LEST IN THIS STATE WHICH HAS BEEN AT ONCE A POWER IN ARMS AND A POWER IN INTELLIGENCE, THE INTELLIGENCE SHOULD VANISH, AND NOTHING BUT THE PURE MILITARY STATE SHOULD REMAIN.”—*THEODOR MOMMSEN.*

PRINTED AT  
THE BALLANTYNE PRESS  
LONDON

*THE GERMAN GOSPEL  
OF BLOOD AND IRON*

# GERMANY'S WAR MANIA

*The Teutonic Point of View as officially  
stated by her Leaders. A Collection  
of Speeches and Writings*

BY

THE GERMAN EMPEROR  
THE GERMAN CROWN PRINCE  
DR. V. BETHMANN-HOLLWEG  
PRINCE VON BÜLOW  
GENERAL VON BERNHARDI  
GENERAL VON DER GÖLTZ  
GENERAL VON CLAUSEWITZ  
PROFESSOR VON TREITSCHKE  
PROFESSOR DELBRÜCK

TORONTO  
WILLIAM BRIGGS  
LONDON

A. W. SHAW CO. LTD. 34 NORFOLK ST., W.C.  
WM. DAWSON & SONS, LTD., ROLLS HOUSE, BREAMS BGS., E.C.

1914

## A SEA SONG

By WILLIAM II, GERMAN EMPEROR

O Ægir, lord of oceans,  
Whom nymphs and gnomes obey,  
When dawn brings war's commotions,  
All heroes hail the day !  
In grim fierce feud we hurry  
Towards the distant strand.  
Through rock-strewn sea and flurry  
Haste to the foeman's land !

If water-sprites, advancing,  
Break down our virgin shield,  
Lord, may thine eye, flame-glancing  
Defend us on the field !  
As Frithiof's "Dragon" galley  
Rode fearless through the sea ;  
So we, in war's fierce rally,  
Entrust our fate to thee !

Wherever in the battle  
'Gainst steel the steel is thrust,  
And foemen, in death's rattle,  
Are made to bite the dust,—  
Then shall we raise in conquest  
Our sword and shield to thee,  
Who, midst the storm and tempest  
Giv'st victory on the sea !

*Tr. by Dudley W. Walton*

# CONTENTS

	PAGE
PREFATORY NOTE	9
INTRODUCTION	15
<b>PART I: By THE GERMAN EMPEROR</b>	
Introduction	23
I. On Myself	27
II. My Empire	32
III. My Army	47
IV. My Navy	56
V. My Recruits	65
VI. My Friends and Foes	68
VII. On "Kultur"	77
VIII. On Peace and War	84
IX. On God	95
<b>PART II: By THE CROWN PRINCE</b>	
I. The Prince as a Peace Promoter	101
II. Under Junker Influence	107
III. The Crown Prince as a Jingo	113
<b>PART III: By Dr. VON BETHMANN-HOLLWEG</b>	
Introduction	117
I. The Impracticability of Disarmament	118
II. Prussia's Effective Control	125
III. The Scrap of Paper	
<b>PART IV: By PRINCE BERNHARD VON BÜLOW</b>	
Introduction	131
I. The Purposes of Germany	133
II. Germany's Right to World Power	137
III. Germany's World Interests	145
<b>PART V: By GENERAL VON BERNHARDI</b>	
Introduction	155
I. The True Value of War	157
II. Character of the next War	164
III. Germany's Intolerable Position	169

## CONTENTS

<b>PART VI: By BARON VON DER GOLTZ</b>	
Introduction	PAGE 173
I. War as a Natural Tendency	174
II. The Domination of German Officers	179
III. The Essence of Militarism	184
IV. Intellectual Supremacy Unavailing	188
<b>PART VII: By GENERAL CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ</b>	
Introduction	191
I. War as an Extensive Duel	194
II. End and Means in War	199
III. On the Character of Modern War	202
IV. War as an Instrument of Policy	208
V. General Principles	211
<b>PART VIII: By PROF. HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE</b>	
Introduction	215
I. The Purpose of the State	217
II. Place of Warfare in the State	221
III. The Empire an Extended Prussia	228
IV. The Unifying Force of the State	232
V. Motives behind European Politics	239
<b>PART IX: By PROF. HANS DELBRÜCK</b>	
Introduction	245
I. The War of the Future	247
II. Impossibility of Preventing War	250
III. Why Germany will not Disarm	256
<b>PART X: THE GERMAN WHITE BOOK</b>	
I. Germany's Reasons for War with Russia	261

# PREFATORY NOTE

By THE PUBLISHERS

IN PRESENTING THIS BOOK TO THE PUBLIC THE PUBLISHERS BELIEVE THAT IT SHOULD BE PREFACED BY AN ADEQUATE EXPRESSION OF THE BRITISH POINT OF VIEW AS OPPOSED TO THE GERMAN GOSPEL OF BLOOD AND IRON. NO MORE FITTING EPITOME OF THE BRITISH ATTITUDE COULD BE FOUND THAN A PRONOUNCEMENT MADE BY THE RIGHT HON. VISCOUNT BRYCE IN A RECENTLY PUBLISHED PAMPHLET, EXTRACTS FROM WHICH ARE HERE SUBJOINED.\*

FOR THIS STATEMENT BY THE EMINENT HISTORIAN AND PUBLICIST IS A SANE AND COMPREHENSIVE SUMMARY OF THE IDEALS OF GOVERNMENT AND RESPECT FOR INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS WHICH ANIMATE THE BRITISH NATION. LORD BRYCE HAS SUMMARIZED THE CONFLICTING POINTS OF VIEW AS FOLLOWS :

THE present war has had some unexpected consequences. It has called the attention of the world outside Germany to some amazing doctrines proclaimed there, which strike at the root of all international morality, as well as of all international law, and which threaten a return to the primitive savagery when every tribe was wont to plunder and massacre its neighbours.

These doctrines may be found set forth in the widely-circulated book of General von Bernhardi, entitled "Germany and the Next War," published in 1911, and professing to be mainly based on the teachings of the famous professor of history, Heinrich von Treitschke.

To readers in other countries, and, I trust, to most readers in Germany also, they will appear to be an outburst of militarism run mad, the product of a brain intoxicated by the love of war and by a super-heated national self-consciousness.

\* "Neutral Nations and the War," from which these extracts are taken by permission of Lord Bryce, is published by Messrs. Macmillan and Co. price 2d. for the benefit of the Prince of Wales's National Relief Fund.

They would have deserved little notice, much less refutation, but for one deplorable fact—viz., that action has recently been taken by the Government of a great nation (though, as we hope and trust, without the approval of that nation) which is consonant with them, and seems to imply a belief in their soundness.

This fact is the conduct of the German Imperial Government, in violating the neutrality of Belgium, which Prussia, as well as Great Britain and France, had solemnly guaranteed by a treaty (made in 1839 and renewed in 1870); in invading Belgium when she refused to allow her armies to pass, although France, the other belligerent, had explicitly promised not to enter Belgium; and in treating the Belgian cities and people, against whom she had no cause of quarrel, with a harshness unprecedented in the history of modern European warfare.

The doctrines set forth by General von Bernhardi, and apparently accepted by the military caste to which he belongs, are startling propositions, though propounded as practically axiomatic. They are not new, for twenty-two centuries ago the Sophist Thrasymachus in Plato's "Republic" argued (Socrates refuting him) that Justice is nothing more than the advantage of the Stronger, *i.e.*, Might is Right. Plato laid down that the end for which a State exists is Justice.

General Bernhardi refers approvingly to Machiavelli as "the first who declared that the keynote of every policy was the advancement of power." The Florentine statesman, however, was not the preacher of doctrines with which he sought, like the General, to edify his contemporaries. He merely took his Italian world as he saw it. He did not attempt to buttress his doctrines by false philosophy, false history, and false science.

The most startling among Bernhardi's doctrines are (1) the denial that there are any duties owed by the State to Humanity, except that of imposing its

own superior civilization upon as large a part of humanity as possible, and (2) the denial of the duty of observing treaties. Treaties are only so much paper.

To modern German writers the State is a much more tremendous entity than it is to Englishmen or Americans. It is a supreme power with a sort of mystic sanctity, a power conceived of, as it were, self-created, a force altogether distinct from, and superior to, the persons who compose it.

Let us see how these doctrines affect the smaller and weaker States which have hitherto lived in comparative security beside the Great Powers.

They will be absolutely at the mercy of the stronger. Even if protected by treaties guaranteeing their neutrality and independence they will not be safe, for treaty obligations are worthless "when they do not correspond to facts," *i.e.*, when the strong Power finds that they stand in its way. Its interests are paramount.

If a State has valuable minerals, as Sweden has iron, and Belgium coal, and Rumania oil, or if it has abundance of water-power, like Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland, or if it holds the mouth of a navigable river the upper course of which belongs to another nation, the great State may conquer and annex that small State as soon as it finds that it needs the minerals, or the water-power, or the river mouth.

It has the Power, and Power gives Right. The interests, the sentiments, the patriotism and love of independence of the small people go for nothing.

Civilization has turned back upon itself. Culture is to expand itself by barbaric force. Governments derive their authority not from the consent of the governed, but from the weapons of the conqueror.

Law and morality between nations have vanished. Herodotus tells us that the Scythians worshipped as their God a naked sword. That is the deity to be installed in the place once held by the God of Christianity, the God of righteousness and mercy.



States, mostly despotic States, have sometimes applied parts of this system of doctrine, but none has proclaimed it. The Romans, conquerors of the world, were not a scrupulous people, but even they stopped short of these principles. Certainly they never set them up as an ideal. Neither did those magnificent Teutonic Emperors of the Middle Ages whose fame General von Bernhardi is fond of recalling. They did not enter Italy as conquerors, claiming her by the right of the strongest. They came on the faith of a legal title, which, however fantastic it may seem to us to-day, the Italians themselves—and, indeed, the whole of Latin Christendom—admitted.

The doctrines above stated are (as I have tried to point out) well calculated to alarm the small States which prize their liberty and their individuality, and have been thriving under the safeguard of treaties. But there are other considerations affecting those States which ought to appeal to men in all countries, to strong nations as well as weak nations.

The small States, whose absorption is now threatened, have been potent and useful—perhaps the most potent and useful—factors in the advance of civilization. It is in them and by them that most of what is most precious in religion, in philosophy, in literature, in science, and in art has been produced.

No notion is more palpably contradicted by history than that relied on by the school to which General Bernhardi belongs, that "culture"—literary, scientific, and artistic—flourishes best in great military States. The decay of art and literature in the Roman World began just when Rome's military power had made that world one great and ordered State. The opposite view would be much nearer the truth; though one must admit that no general theory regarding the relations of art and letters to governments and political conditions has ever yet been proved to be sound.

General Bernhardi's knowledge of current history may be estimated by the fact that he assumes (1) that trade rivalry makes a war probable between Great Britain and the United States, (2) that he believes the Indian princes and peoples likely to revolt against Britain should she be involved in war, and (3) that he expects her self-governing Colonies to take such an opportunity of severing their connexion with her!

General Bernhardi invokes History, the ultimate court of appeal. He appeals to Cæsar. To Cæsar let him go. *Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht*—World-history is the World-tribune.

History declares that no nation, however great, is entitled to try to impose its type of civilization on others. No race, not even the Teutonic or the Anglo-Saxon, is entitled to claim the leadership of humanity. Each people has in its time contributed something that was distinctively its own, and the world is far richer thereby than if any one race, however gifted, had established a permanent ascendancy.

The world advances not, as the Bernhardi school suppose, only or even mainly by fighting. It advances mainly by Thinking and by a process of reciprocal teaching and learning, by a continuous and unconscious co-operation of all its strongest and finest minds.

Each race—Hellenic, Italic, Celtic, Teutonic, Iberian, Slavonic—has something to give, each something to learn; and when their blood is blent the mixed stock may combine the gifts of both.

The most progressive races have been those who combined willingness to learn with a strength which enabled them to receive without loss to their own quality, retaining their primal vigour, but entering into the labours of others, as the Teutons who settled within the dominions of Rome profited by the lessons of the old civilization.

Let me disclaim once more before I close any intention to attribute to the German people the principles

set forth by the school of Treitschke and Bernhardi, the school which teaches hatred of peace and arbitration, disregard of treaty obligations, scorn for the weaker peoples.

We in England would feel an even deeper sadness than weighs upon us now if we could suppose that such principles had been embraced by a nation whose thinkers have done so much for human progress and who have produced so many shining examples of Christian saintliness.

But when those principles have been ostentatiously proclaimed, when a peaceful neutral country which the other belligerent had solemnly and repeatedly undertaken to respect, has been invaded and treated as Belgium has been treated, and when attempts are made to justify these deeds as incidental to a campaign for civilization and culture, it becomes necessary to point out how untrue and how pernicious such principles are.

What are the teachings of history—history to which General Bernhardi is fond of appealing? That war has been the constant handmaid of tyranny and the source of more than half the miseries of man. That although some wars have been necessary and have given occasion for the display of splendid heroism—wars of defence against aggression, or to succour the oppressed—most wars have been needless or unjust. That the mark of an advancing civilization has been the substitution of friendship for hatred and of peaceful for warlike ideals. That small peoples have done and can do as much for the common good of humanity as large peoples. That treaties must be observed, for what are they but records of national faith solemnly pledged, and what could bring mankind more surely and swiftly back to that reign of violence and terror from which it has been slowly rising for the last ten centuries than the destruction of trust in the plighted faith of nations? The faith of treaties is the only solid foundation on which a Temple of Peace can be built up.

## INTRODUCTION

**THE** prevailing idea in Great Britain is that the sinister influence which brought on the present war has been the policy, secret and hidden, of a small group of militarists around the Kaiser, a policy to which the German people have been compelled to assent after its results were upon them.

Nothing can be more mistaken than this idea. Germany's plans for world conquest were not secretly conceived by a small clique. They were not concealed from the German people, and were not without the sympathy of the German nation.

Never, even under the extremest form of democracy, has the ruling class so taken the people into its confidence, so openly sought and aroused a favourable public opinion, so continuously bid for general support, so thoroughly explained its intentions and plans, as has Germany in developing her policy of Pan-Germanic conquest during the last quarter of a century. There has not been in the history of the world an educational campaign of such a size, of such thoroughness, and so completely organizing and utilizing all channels for arousing interest and gaining support.

German newspapers and periodicals, German government and military officials, German educators and authors, German leagues and associations have been preaching these ideas and aims and policies far and wide to the German millions every hour of the day, both before, and especially since, William II came to the throne in 1888.

The purpose of this book is to give to English readers an authoritative account of this war mania, a veritable German gospel of blood and iron, which has been deliberately brought into being by the artificial

stimulation of Teutonic sentiment for the last forty-three years.

Out of the mouths of the German leaders themselves the chapters of this book lay bare precisely what German ideals and aims, policies and plans, have been; from the Kaiser himself, from his highest governmental officials, from his military chiefs, from his foremost educators, from his leading moulders of opinion—from their own words this picture of Germany's world policy has been created. This book is not a commentary on Germany's ideas, not an outsider's deductions from her policies, not a study of what she might be driving at, but actual statements from her own political, military, and intellectual leaders as to what she wants and how she expects to get it.

An endeavour has been made to adopt the truly scientific method of presenting classified and sifted material to the reader so that he may come to his own personal, and at the same time a just, conclusion. But the documents here cited and the evidence here given support so overwhelmingly the general hypothesis—namely, that for forty years Germany has been preparing for war—that the temptation occasionally to point the moral, to underline the argument, to emphasize the point, has been irresistible in the introductory material to the various Parts. The opinions, however, so far as they are ventured upon, can be clearly distinguished from the evidence—the extracts which form the bulk of the book, and which are left to speak for themselves with the minimum of introduction.

Here in these pages it is shown that year after year, in season and out of season, responsible German leaders from the Kaiser downwards have sown the seeds of war—the metaphorical dragon's teeth of Eurystheus—in the minds of the German people. Ceaselessly, and with unexampled subtlety, they have inculcated the doctrine that the basis of the German State is the German army.

Germany's campaign for world-power has had four stages. First, the working out of a fundamental philosophic basis, chiefly concerned with the conception of the State; secondly, the elaboration in detail of the hope and ambitions of the nation; thirdly, the exploitation of these theories and ideas and aims among the people; and lastly, the working out of definite plans, diplomatic and military, for carrying out these plans and attaining these aims.

Until one has studied this entire campaign of Pan-Germanic exploitation, it is impossible to realize the infinite care with which these ideas and plans have been elaborated; and even more astounding is the thoroughness with which the work of educating the mass of the people to these ideas has been organized and carried out—to such an extent, in fact, that the whole life and thought and action of the nation is permeated and ruled by them.

To afford a basis of theoretical logic, so dear to the German mind, to their scheme, the moulders of opinion first worked out a conception of the State that would fit their plans. As Lord Bryce points out in the Preface, the Germans look upon the State as an *ultima ratio*, something almost divine, beyond law, beyond morality, capable of doing no wrong, with nothing above it, and to which the individual must always be unquestioningly subservient and serving. Further, the State is *might*. The cultivation of power is its chief concern. Its highest duty is self-preservation.

Our idea of the State has been that of an institution for the extension and preservation of personal liberty and freedom of action—the liberty of one man ending where that of another begins. Likewise our conception of a State among other States has been that its rights and activities may extend only so far as they do not transgress the just rights of another State.

For us, here in Britain, with our stolid and dogged

national character; for the Frenchman, with his vivacious and penetrating spirit; for the American with his newly developed consciousness of nationality; even for the Russian, with his poetical and often fatalist views of life—for the whole of the world in fact outside of Germany—civilization has had a moral basis, and civilized institutions a moral sanction.

Not so in modern Germany. There, for the last half century, the final basis of human society and of those outward forms of civilization which express a desire of all mankind to act together for common purposes, have been insistently stated to be nothing but brutal strength. To the modern German, as exhibited in the authoritative writings which are in this volume, moral qualities, mental achievement, and spiritual insight serve no useful purpose in the life of a State, unless they can be used to bolster up the doctrine of blood and iron, and the monstrous theory that human society rests on a foundation of force.

The first part of the volume, and necessarily the largest part, is occupied by extracts from speeches of the German Emperor. These are the most typical documents of the campaign and those most directly addressed to the German people.

The German Emperor's speeches visualize the ideas of the man who has the final power to say how this public sentiment and these plans shall be used; and very clearly they prove that the Kaiser feels no responsibility to any person, to any moral code, or to any ethical ideal. He is the final arbiter.

That the Emperor William II has always anticipated the world-war which is now waging is more than proved by the extracts from his Majesty's speeches. His very first official act upon coming to the throne was to issue an edict to the German army, and it was not until some days after that he issued a proclamation "To my people." To him the soldier

is far more important than the civilian. Votes at elections count for nothing.

The German Emperor's speeches are voluminous. They have appeared in Germany in various forms and run to several volumes. The selections here given have not been deliberately picked out for the purpose of showing that the Kaiser has assumed the leadership of the war mania movement. It would have been impossible to have made any selection which would not have pointed in the same direction.

The idea of war is ever in his Majesty's mind, even when he is addressing himself to purely pacific matters. The dove of peace is always mated with the German eagle. His Majesty cannot unveil a civic monument without referring to the military glory of his ancestors. He cannot address an educational conference without emphasizing that in his opinion the best kind of education is that which leads the youth of Germany to contemplate the military achievements of their forefathers. He cannot pay a compliment to the ruler of another State without at the same time referring to the bravery and chivalry of the other monarch's military forces. He cannot even preach a sermon without referring to the military exploits of the ancient Hebrews; and he cannot even pray without calling upon the Lord of Hosts to lead the German army to victory.

The German Crown Prince Frederick William is a young man and his influence on the life of Germans is no greater than that of any other man of his age. He represents the views of the young militarists, and of the army officer class—a class that is very influential in number and authority. With the enthusiasm and impetuosity of youth, the Kaiser's heir has, so to speak, "given away the game." His action in applauding the jingoistic speech of Herr von Heydebrand in the Reichstag, and his immediately ensuing popularity and booming in the "armour-plate" Press, revealed in a flash what long years of careful



inoculation of Cæsarism has accomplished for the German people. It is true that the Kaiser was compelled to go through the form of disciplining his son for his indiscretions, but there can be no doubt the Crown Prince, by his actions, truly reflected the mind of his father when he allied himself with the "opposition," after the manner of many other heirs-apparent who have written chapters in European history.

The selection of the material in this book is comprehensive. Merely to have confined the evidence to the utterances of Royalty might not have been conclusive, but here also are the words—*ipsissima verba*—of her leading statesmen, of her leading soldiers, and of her leading professors. Here are presented extracts from speeches and writings, many never before translated, sufficient to prove that for the last forty years, or longer, an organized campaign has been conducted to lead Germany up to war, quite apart from any statesmanlike direction of her legitimate political aspirations or economical necessities. It is true that one might prove, by a careful choice of parliamentary speeches, that Germany has always worked for peace, but it is a safe rule to regard political utterances with suspicion, and to assess only those of them which lead to a definite result. The definite result of the German political speeches which have been made in the Reichstag by men like von Bethmann-Hollweg and Prince von Bülow is the present war. Prince von Bülow and the present German Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg, typify the more subtle and tactful expressions made by responsible officials who, to the outside world, must wear a diplomatic cloak. But their war-inflaming speeches have been followed by war itself. No fault can be found with the argument which assumes this connexion between effect and cause.

The speeches and writings of Germany's military authorities are of a different order and are addressed

less to "the Man in the Street" than to the class from which the officers of the German army are drawn. The arguments of the German professors have been directed to the intellectual class. These two forces, appealing on the one hand to the martial spirit of the class of people whose only real occupation is the army, and on the other to the thoughtful students of German Universities, have led educated people in Germany into a position in which they could not see the validity of any other argument but the argument of the sword.

In the extracts from the works of General von Clausewitz, writing as he did a hundred years ago, one gets a glimpse of the foundations of Germany's military ideals and strategic policies. Field-Marshal von der Goltz brings these ideals up to date, and interprets them from the popular point of view. General von Bernhardt crosses the final bridge and brings all three together—the new conception of the State, the militaristic ideals, and the specific aims of the German nation for the future.

The writings of soldiers like General von der Goltz circulate thoroughly among army officers, and so this influence extends to the millions of soldiers, who really represent the nation's citizenship. Semi-popular books about the war of conquest and Pan-Germanism by writers like von Bernhardt and Frobenius and von Lookout have circulated not by thousands but by hundreds of thousands, through scores of editions. The publications of the German Navy League, jingoistic in the extreme, have a circulation of over a million.

Professor von Treitschke's role in all this education for war of the German peoples has been that of the man who has prostituted history in the interests of armament firms. One of his arguments is that political idealism is dependent on war, and that it is war alone that makes men realize that they belong to a definite political institution, to wit the German

nation ; and since the nation really lives on account of its heroes, war is the "terrible medicine" which prevents heroism disappearing from the ranks of humanity. In his view there can be no heroism in peace. It was Professor von Treitschke who really began, even before 1870, the educational campaign of the intellectual class, and he has been its most fanatic, as well as its most popular, exponent.

Hundreds of teachers, writers, historians, preachers, editors, have joined in his campaign, of whom Professor Delbrück is probably now the most prominent representative. As Professor of History at the University of Berlin, he has not made any notable original contributions to the theory of Prussian militarism, but he has been the most brilliant interpreter of the policy in the campaign of education for war. He is, so to speak, the official intellectual jingo, who has fallen into line, willingly or unwillingly, with the propaganda. His task has been to link up on the lecture platform the same ideas that Bernhardt has linked up in his popular writings.

The reader who goes through this book to its last pages will no longer be in ignorance as to who made the war, what were its causes, and what Germany expected to get out of it. Nor will he longer have need to doubt whether the German nation believes in and is supporting its leaders' policy ; the book answers that question in an overwhelming affirmative.

If the matter in this book had been available two years ago and read by even a hundred thousand Englishman, the outbreak of this war would have found the British people in a far different mood, and British military preparations in a far different state of readiness. Nothing can more surely arouse the nation to a realization that it *must* win, and organize itself for ultimate victory, than the careful study of these official speeches and writings of the German exponents of the German gospel of blood and iron.

## PART I

### By THE GERMAN EMPEROR

#### INTRODUCTION

IN the following pages, by means of classified extracts from the Kaiser's speeches and proclamations, we give a picture, from his Majesty's own recorded utterances, of the mind and personality of the man who is on all sides held to be mainly accountable for the greatest war of the ages.

"The German Emperor is a Somebody!" says M. François Ayme, a French admirer. "He is a record-breaker! He never lets go the sceptre! He paralyses the pen.

"Whether he appears in shining armour like the hero of a Wagnerian music-drama, whether he sounds the tocsin of war or chants a hymn of peace, he is always original and interesting. In everything that he does he exhibits exuberance and sincerity. Every dramatic situation has its appropriate scenery which goes home to the imagination of the German public!"

The German Emperor would have made a first-rate journalist. His shadow is everywhere. He interests himself with something more than a mere superficiality in everything. He knows, or rather, what is a greater merit in worldly wisdom, he appears to know as much about anything as any of the experts with whom he consults. He has mastered the great journalistic trick of elucidation. On analysis, however, the Emperor's ideas are those of the German middle classes. He does not seem to understand the real meaning of a European aristocracy rooted in historic chivalry. He has no sympathy for or understanding of the aims of either the

Lutheran or Catholic churches. He understands least of all the philosophical or poetical mind of Germany which produced such geniuses as Goethe, Schiller, Beethoven, Kant. The names which represent the highest German culture are never mentioned in the Emperor's speeches. But on matters affecting the military and commercial organization of Germany the Emperor speaks with a show of authority. Strip him of his imperial robes and military uniforms and his Majesty's manifold activities qualify him for a managing directorship.

The student of the Kaiser's speeches will be struck by the fact that William II, King of Prussia, is a very different person to William II the German Emperor. When his Majesty is speaking in Prussia, the talk is always of the greatness of Prussia, the greatness of the German Empire, and of its reflected glory on the German Emperor. But when his Majesty gives an address outside of Prussia, in Bavaria, in Saxony, or elsewhere, the emphasis is no longer placed upon the might of the Prussian army or on the importance of the German Emperor. But even on these occasions the military note is dominant, and the imperial speaker delves deeply into local history for the purpose of showing that the excellence of present-day Bavaria or Saxony is due to the fighting qualities of their forefathers. And his Majesty usually enforces the moral that no further progress will be possible for any federated German State unless it is identified with the progress of the German Empire.

For the most part the Kaiser's own speeches can be left to speak for themselves. The arrangement is such that the reader can pick out at a glance the matter that may interest him, but we counsel all to read the whole collection attentively. The picture these extracts present to the student of European politics is that of a strong-willed man who firmly believes in the antiquated doctrine of the Divine Right of Kings. The Kaiser seems to regard Prussia as his personal property and the rest of Germany as his entailed estate. Every German is regarded as an instrument put into his hands to work out a

divine purpose. That purpose is amply displayed in these pages.

We have here to acknowledge the kind co-operation of several publishers who have allowed us to quote in this part valuable material from works published by them. Messrs. Longmans, Green & Co. have accorded permission to quote freely from "The German Emperor's Speeches," which is the authorized translation made by Dr. Louis Elkind of the volume of "Kaiserreden," published at Leipzig. These extracts, covering a wide range of topics, are interspersed with other matter and appear on pages 29-34, 37-39, 41, 45-46, 49, 51-52, 58-63, 65-66, 68-73, 75, 78-88, 90-94, and 97. We also acknowledge permission of the proprietors of the *Times* to reproduce reports of the German Emperor's speeches, as given below, the specified occasion being followed by the date in the *Times* and the page in this volume on which the extract appears.

**Proclamations:** To the Army (June 18, 1888), 27; to the Nation (June 19, 1888), 28; (January 20, 1896), 41; Cabinet Orders (April 7, 1890), 52; (January 6, 1897) 55.

**Addresses:** At Heligoland (August 11, 1890), 63; on Education (December 19, 1890), 95; to the Reichstag (November 23, 1892), 49, 85; to Recruits (November 16, 1894), 65; (March 6, 1895) 66; (March 4, 1898) 67; at Stettin (September 24, 1898), 61; on China (July 4, 1900), 73; (July 28, 1900) 75; (June 20, 1901) 88; (September 5, 1901) 89; at Bielefeld (August 7, 1900), 92; at Saalburg (October 12, 1900), 81; at the Museum of Arts (January 27, 1902), 83.

**Speeches at Banquets:** At Athens (October 31, 1889), 59; at the Guildhall (July 11, 1891), 86; at Brandenburg Diet (February 25, 1892), 96; (March 2, 1893) 31, 38; (March 1, 1897) 35; on the Tsar (November 3, 1894), 72; on Sedan (September 3, 1895), 44; at Strasburg (September 6, 1899), 39; at Hamburg (October 19, 1899), 56.

**Letters and Telegrams:** To President Kruger (January 4,

1896), 70 ; to Count Bismarck (November 7, 1899), 62 ; on Education (January 26, 1901), 77.

Religious : Camp Service (January 2, 1900), 47, 57 ; Prayer (August 3, 1900), 99.

The proprietors of the *Christian World* have also allowed us to use their report of a sermon delivered by the Kaiser. A few other short extracts from other publications are duly acknowledged in their respective places.

## CHAPTER I

### ON MYSELF

His Majesty William II succeeded his father on June 15, 1888. One of his first official acts was to issue a long proclamation to the army. After announcing his father's death, the new Emperor proceeded :

“ The confidence with which I assume the position to which God's will has called me is firm and unshakable, for I am aware of that enthusiastic feeling for honour and duty which has been implanted in the army by my glorious predecessors, and of the elevation at which this sentiment has ever and at all times been maintained.

“ In the army a fixed, unswerving devotion to the sovereign is the inheritance which passes from father to son, from generation to generation ; and for my part I may call your attention to the figure of my grandfather, which stands in the sight of each one of you, the picture of a glorious and venerable sovereign. A picture more beautiful, or one which speaks more plainly to the heart, cannot be conceived. There is also my dear father, who as Crown Prince had already won for himself a place of honour in the annals of the army ; and finally there is a long line of illustrious ancestors whose names shine brightly in history and whose hearts beat warm for their soldiers.

“ Thus we belong to each other, I and the army ; thus were we born for one another and firmly and inseparably will we hold together, whether God's will give us peace or storm.

“ You are now about to swear the oath of fidelity and obedience to me ; and I vow ever to bear in mind that the eyes of my forefathers are upon me



from the other world, and that to them I must one day render account of your fame and honour."

### "I WILL PROTECT PEACE"

On June 18, three days after the proclamation to the army, the new Kaiser addressed his people :

"God's decree has once more plunged us into the most poignant sorrow. The tomb has scarcely closed over the mortal remains of my never-to-be-forgotten grandfather when his Majesty, my warmly loved father, has also been called from this life into everlasting peace. The heroic energy, prompted by Christian self-sacrifice, with which, despite his sufferings, he knew how to fulfil his kingly duties seemed to justify the hope that he would be preserved to the Fatherland still longer. God has willed differently.

"The royal sufferer, whose heart beat responsively to all that was great and beautiful, only had a few months granted him to display on the throne also the noble qualities of mind and heart which have won for him the love of the people. The virtues which adorned him, the victories which he achieved in the battlefield, will remain in grateful remembrance as long as German hearts shall beat, and imperishable glory will illumine his chivalrous figure in the history of the Fatherland.

"Called to the throne of my fathers, I have assumed the government, looking up to the King of Kings, and have vowed to God that, after the example of my fathers, I will be a just and clement prince to my people, that I will foster piety and the fear of God, and that I will protect peace, promote the welfare of the country, be a helper to the poor and distressed and a true guardian of the right.

"In praying God for strength to fulfil these kingly duties which His will imposes upon me, I am supported by the confidence in the Prussian people

which a glance at our past history gives me. In good and in evil days the Prussian people have always stood faithfully by their king. Upon the fidelity which my fathers have found to be an indissoluble bond in all times of difficulty and danger I, too, count, with the consciousness of returning it from the bottom of my heart, as a faithful prince of a faithful people, both equally strong in devotion to their common Fatherland.

“From the consciousness of the reciprocated love which unites me with my people I derive the confidence that God will vouchsafe to me strength and wisdom to exercise my kingly office for the welfare of the Fatherland.”

### THE KAISER'S NOBLEST DUTY

In his first speech from the throne on opening the Reichstag on June 25, 1888, the German Emperor said :

“The principal duties of the German Emperor consist in upholding by military and political measures the interests of the empire in relation to foreign countries, and in watching over the execution of the Imperial laws at home. The first of these laws is the Imperial Constitution, and it is one of the noblest privileges and duties of the German Emperor to preserve and protect all the rights which it confers on the two legislative bodies of the nation and on every German subject, and also those rights which it guarantees to the Emperor and to each of the federated States and its sovereign. In accordance with the Constitution, I have to co-operate in the legislation of the empire more in my capacity as King of Prussia than in that of German Emperor.

“I will continue my endeavours to make Imperial legislation render in the future to the working population that protection which, in accordance with the

principles of Christian morality, it is able to extend to the weak and oppressed in their struggle for existence. I hope that in this way it will be possible to effect an adjustment of unhealthy social contrasts, and I feel confident that my endeavours for our national welfare will meet with the unanimous support of all loyal subjects of the empire and of the allied Governments, and that they will not dissociate themselves from us to form separate factions of their own."

### THE KAISER DIVINELY CHOSEN

At a state banquet in commemoration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Peace of Frankfort, in reply to the Burgomaster, the Kaiser, referring to his grandfather, the Emperor William I, said :

"That scene at Königsberg rises vividly before the eyes of all of us when, speaking with emphasis of the kingdom by the grace of God, he took the sceptre in one hand and the sword of empire in the other and, giving the glory to God alone, received from Him his office. He accordingly became the chosen instrument, but not that only, for he also became an example for the rest of us, an example for all monarchs, who can only achieve good for their people and with their people when they are firm in the belief that their office is granted by Heaven, and that the day will come when Heaven will demand of them an account of their stewardship."

Speaking at Bremerhaven on April 1, 1890, the Kaiser revealed himself as a reader of the newspapers :

"I should therefore like to make a request to you, namely: When anything is mentioned in the Press or in public life which is somewhat obscure, for unfortunately it not rarely happens that my words and utterances are given meaning which they do not bear, remember what I have told you, and

remember the maxim of an old Emperor, who said, 'The Emperor's word must not be twisted or explained.' "

### "MY HIGHEST REWARD"

At the annual dinner of the Diet of Brandenburg in March 1893, the Kaiser said :

"My highest reward lies in this—to work day and night for my people and their welfare. I do not conceal from myself that I can never succeed in making all sections of my people equally happy and contented, but I do hope I will be able to bring about a condition of things with which all can be satisfied who have the will to be satisfied. That this will may grow daily stronger in my people is my most ardent wish. That all brave Germans, and, before all, my men of the Mark, may assist me to this end is what I ask. That our entire German Fatherland may through this attain stability at home and esteem and respect abroad is what I hope. Then I shall be able confidently to declare, 'We Germans fear God and nothing else in the world.' I raise my glass to the welfare of Brandenburg and our doughty men of the Mark."

## CHAPTER II

### MY EMPIRE

NEXT to the first personal pronoun singular, the word "empire" occurs most often in the Kaiser's speeches, and more especially in speeches delivered in Prussia. Indeed on analysis it appears that Prussia is the empire, and the empire Prussia. When speaking in Bavaria, Saxony, and other German kingdoms, principalities, or dukedoms, the Kaiser adopts a less imperious and less imperialistic tone, and it may be reasonably conjectured that the federal princes very seldom acknowledge the King of Prussia as "German Emperor" except in a formal and strictly official way.

This fact was clearly in the Kaiser's mind in one of his Majesty's speeches.

The Kaiser pretends to manifest a special interest in the affairs of the Imperial Territories (*i.e.* Alsace-Lorraine) which were always directly administered by authority of the King of Prussia. In May, 1900, it was thought wise to relax the administrative discipline, and the Kaiser made a speech in which he said :

"I had, on the one hand, first to win the love and loyalty of my subjects and to earn the appreciative confidence of my colleagues the federal princes. On the other hand, at the time of my accession I was regarded abroad with deep, though unfounded, mistrust, for it was presupposed that I was striving for the laurels of war. It was, therefore, my duty to show to the world at large that the new German Emperor and the empire were determined to devote their strength to the preservation of peace. These tasks required a long period of time for their realization. The German people now know along what path I am resolved to walk

for their benefit. Their princes stand loyally by me with their help and counsel. Foreign Powers, far from seeing in us a menace to peace, are accustomed to regard us as steadfast upholders of peace. Now that the empire is consolidated within and has obtained a universally respected position abroad, I consider, at the beginning of the twentieth century, that the moment has come at which I am able to grant the population of the Imperial Territories this proof of my Imperial goodwill and confidence."

### THE EMPIRE BORN IN BATTLE

On June 19, 1902, the Kaiser visited Aix-la-Chapelle and received an address from the Burgomaster. In reply his Majesty delivered a long speech, referring to the town as the cradle of German Imperial power, and he added :

"And now another empire has arisen. The German people again have an Emperor of their own making. Sword in hand, on the field of battle, the crown was won and the banner of the empire once more floats high in the air. With the same enthusiasm and love with which the German people clung to their ancient Imperial idea did the new empire come into existence, only with other problems to solve. It is shut off from the outer world and confined within the limits of our country, in order that we may gather strength by way of preparation for the tasks which lie before our people at home, and which in the Middle Ages could not be performed at all.

"And we see that the empire, although still young, grows in strength year by year, while on all sides ever-growing confidence is placed in it. The mighty German army, however, is the mainstay of the peace of Europe. True to the Teutonic character, we confine our empire within definite limits, that we may have unlimited scope for the development of our resources within. In ever-widening circles does our speech extend its influence even across the sea.

Into far-distant lands do our science and research wing their way. There is no work in the field of modern research which has not been published in our tongue, and no discovery in science which we are not the first to turn to account, to be subsequently adopted by other nations. Such is the World Power to which the German spirit aspires."

### IMPERIAL ACQUISITIONS TO BE KEPT

At a banquet in January 1896, in celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Franco-Prussian War, and the founding of the empire, the Kaiser said :

"At the same time, however, there rests upon us the solemn duty of retaining what the great rulers won for us in battle. The German Empire has become a world-empire. Everywhere in far-away parts of the globe live thousands of our compatriots. German goods, German science, German manufactures, cross the ocean. The value of that which Germany has on the sea amounts to thousands of millions. To you, gentlemen, falls the serious duty of aiding me firmly to unite this greater German Empire to our Fatherland at home. The vow which I made before you to-day can only be adequately fulfilled if your support, inspired with a unanimous and patriotic spirit, is given to me in the fullest measure. With the hope that in complete concord you will help me to fulfil my duty, not only to our compatriots at home but also to the many thousands of our countrymen abroad, which is to protect them when I am called upon to do so, and also with the exhortation which is applicable to us all, 'That which thou hast inherited from thy fathers, that thou must thyself acquire in order to keep it,' I raise my glass to the welfare of our beloved German Fatherland and exclaim: The German Empire! Hurrah! and again Hurrah! and yet once more Hurrah!"

At a dinner of the Diet of Brandenburg (February 26, 1897) the Emperor said, in response to the Governor of the Province :

“ With eminent justice, my dear Achenbach, you made special mention of my grandfather of exalted and blessed memory. Our festival to-day, and indeed the time as a whole, is bathed in the crescent roseate hues of the morn that is about to break, the centenary of the birthday of the exalted Monarch. In such circumstances the eyes of each one of you will turn to survey the past.

“ PROVIDENCE CREATED THE INSTRUMENT ”

“ Let us look back through history ; what was the old German Empire like ? How often have individual portions of it striven and toiled to amalgamate into one united whole, in part with the object of co-operating for the behalf of the whole, in part with the aim of rendering it possible to safeguard all Germany against foreign attack. These efforts failed. The old empire was molested from without by its neighbours, from within by its factions. The only one who succeeded to a certain extent in binding together the country was the Emperor Frederick Barbarossa. For that deed the German people thank him to this day. After his time our Fatherland fell asunder and it seemed as though the man would never arise again who could weld it together again. But Providence created the instrument she needed and selected him whom we hailed as the first great Emperor of the new German Empire. We can follow him as he slowly grew in fitness for his task from the hard times of trial until the moment when, every inch a man though on the threshold of old age, he was called to the labour of his life. We can see him preparing himself for years for his calling, those great ideas already ripe in his brain which were to enable him to bid the empire once more arise. We see how he first forms his army out of the toiling



peasants, sons of his provinces ; how he ranges their ranks into a powerful mass that glitters in the panoply of war. We behold his success in gradually, with the aid of the army, becoming a predominant power in Germany, and giving Brandenburg Prussia the hegemony. And when all this had been achieved, the moment came when he summoned the whole Fatherland and accomplished its union on the field of battle, in the land of the foe.

“Had this exalted sovereign lived in the Middle Ages he would have been canonized and pilgrimages from all lands would have come to offer up prayers at his relics. God be thanked, it is even so to-day. The door of his mausoleum stands open ; daily his faithful subjects fare thither, taking their children with them, and strangers come to rejoice at the sight of this glorious old hero and of his statues.

“But we may be especially proud of this mighty man, since he was a son of the Mark. That God chose a man of the Mark must have some special significance ; and I hope it will be the privilege of the Mark to continue and promote the weal of the empire. The House of the Hohenzollern and the Mark of Brandenburg are connected as though they were one ; in the Mark the fibres of our strength and of our influence have their source and root. So long as the farmer of the Mark stands by us, so long as we can count upon the support and help of the Mark in our work, no Hohenzollern will despair of his task. The task is hard enough, and it is made hard for me. I mean the task which is set all of us, whoever we may be or wherever our place.

“To this task the memory of the Emperor William the Great calls me, and in fulfilling it we will rally around him, around his memory, as the Spaniards of old rallied round the Cid. This task, which is laid on the shoulders of all of us, and which by our fealty to Emperor William the First we are bound to undertake, is the battle against revolution—a combat

to be waged by every means at our command. That party which ventures to attack the foundations of the State, which revolts against religion, and which does not even stop at the person of the most exalted sovereign of whom I have spoken—that party must be vanquished. I shall rejoice to know that the hand of any man is clasped in mine—be he workman, sovereign, or gentleman—if only he helps me in this combat.

“And we can only win the battle by constantly thinking of the man to whom we owe the Fatherland, the German Empire, by whose side there stood in providence of God so many brave, skilled counsellors—men who had the honour and privilege of executing his ideas, but who were all instruments of his sublime will, filled with the spirit of the exalted Emperor. Let us remember him, and then we shall work on the right lines and not weary in the struggle to rid our land of this disease, which not only infects our nation but also seeks to undermine the life of the family—yes, and to undermine the holiest thing we Germans know, the position of a woman. I trust to see my men of the Mark round me when the signals of flame are revealed, and in the spirit of this hope I cry : The Mark and the men of the Mark, Hurrah ! Hurrah ! Hurrah !”

### WHY THE OLD EMPIRE WENT DOWN

In 1901 the Kaiser was present at the introduction of the Crown Prince to the Bonn “Council of Elders” and at the “Kommers,” or beer party held in honour of the event. The Kaiser referred to the glory of Germany in the time of Barbarossa and said :

“But why was it that nothing came of this splendour ? Why did the German Empire sink to decay ? Because the old empire was not founded on a strictly national basis. The idea of universal rule that underlay the Holy Roman Empire precluded a

development on national German lines. The essence of nationality is demarcation from the outside world by definite boundary to correspond to the personal characteristics of a nation and its racial idiosyncrasies. Thus it was inevitable that the glory of Barbarossa should fade, and the stability of the old empire be destroyed; owing to its universalism the process of crystallization into a nation—I mean into a nation as a whole—was impeded. For smaller sections did crystallize in the shape of strong principalities, and laid the foundation on which new forms of constitution could subsequently be erected. Unfortunately however, in the process, they and their rulers came into conflict with Emperor and empire, the representatives of the idea of universalism. The empire became constantly weaker and weaker, and its internal peace was wrecked.

“Only too truly must the weighty words of Tacitus, that great student of Germany, be written of these pages in the development of our German nation: *Propter invidiam!* The princes were jealous of the power of the Emperors, as they were once of Arminius, in spite of his victory. The nobles were jealous of the newly acquired wealth of the cities, and the yeomen of the nobles. What deplorable consequences and what sore calamities has not our dear, beautiful Germany suffered *propter invidiam!* The banks of Father Rhine could tell us something of this! Well, the attempt which then failed God permitted one successfully to accomplish.”

### NURSING THE FIGHTING TRADITION

At the annual dinner of the Diet of Brandenburg in March 1893, the Kaiser said:

“People often like to look back from the present to the past and compare the past with the actual existing conditions, generally to the disparagement of the latter. Anyone who can glance back upon so

glorious a past as, thanks be to God, we can, does well in doing so, in order to profit by the lesson it teaches. This is what, in a monarchical state, is called tradition. But people must not look back to the past in order to indulge in useless complaints about men and things which are no more. Rather must we refresh ourselves in memory, and, in rising up from it with renewed vigour, find new joy in life and go about our business with a keener zest for work. For above all things we must prove ourselves worthy of our ancestors and their achievements. This we can only do by continuing our way without deviation along the paths which they have marked out for us.

"The august figure of our great Emperor William the First, who has passed from among us, is always present with us, together with his mighty deeds. How were these accomplished? Through the unshakable belief held by my grandfather in the mission intrusted to him by God, which he combined with an untiring zeal for duty. He was supported by the Mark and entire German Fatherland. Amid these traditions I have grown up and in them I was reared by him. I also have the same belief."

An edict issued in connexion with the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Franco-Prussian War, in acknowledgment of many messages and addresses received, contained the following paragraph :

"I have been heartily rejoiced at this, and am strengthened in the belief that the German nation will never allow the acquisitions of January 18, 1871, to be taken from them, but, trusting in God, will ever know how to defend their most precious possessions."

At a banquet at Strasburg on September 5, 1899, after the Emperor had received an address from the Burgomaster, his Majesty stated :

"I have had the opportunity in years past, even during the lifetime of my grandfather, to study the

Reichslande [*i.e.* Alsace and Lorraine] and so participate in the festivals and receptions which then took place. In the last ten years of my reign I have learned more and more from my observations, and I am now able with deep emotion and thankfulness to assert that the ever-growing warmth of the welcome extended to me here is a proof that the Reichslande have realized the benefits they have derived from incorporation in the German Empire. In whichever way one looks, one sees happy intercourse, active and diligent work, and advancing development. Gentlemen, I express to you my congratulations on the condition in which I have found the Reichslande. I honour the feelings of the old generation, which found it hard to conform to the new order of things. I am grateful for and touched by the enthusiasm of the young generation which has sprung up under the flag of the empire.

#### CHURCH TO STRENGTHEN THE EMPIRE

“ But, before all, I would impress upon the dignitaries of the Church, who have such a powerful influence on our people, to strive in their work and to use their personal influence so that regard for the crown and confidence in the Government may become ever and ever stronger, for in these agitated times when the spirit of unbelief is rampant the Church's only hold is the Imperial hand and the escutcheon of the German Empire. And I think, if I have read the hearts of the Strasburgers aright, that the enthusiastic reception accorded me to-day as well as yesterday at the opening of the parade was also in some measure due to the impression made upon the inhabitants of this beautiful old city by the splendid appearance of the armed sons of this country renewing their confidence that ‘sub umbra alarum’ of the German eagle, the Reichslande is secured against all dangers.

“Therefore I raise my glass and drink to the welfare of the Reichslande in the hope that they may long continue to enjoy unalloyed peace for their quiet and rapid development. What lies in my power to maintain and rule my country in peace, that will I do, and you may trust me that you shall reap some of the benefits. Long live Alsace-Lorraine! Hoch! Hoch! Hoch!”

Speaking at the jubilee of the Nuremberg Museum in July 1902, the Kaiser said :

“The festival that we have celebrated was German to the core, for everything that we Germans indicate with pride as Germanic civilization is embodied in the Museum, and this symbol of Germanic civilization embodying the idea of German unity has been taken under its care and protection by the House of Wittelsbach [the Bavarian Royal family] following its ancient tradition in loyalty to Emperor and empire.”

### CHERISHED MEMORIES OF CONQUEST

The twenty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the German Empire was celebrated in January 1896, when the Kaiser addressed the following message to the German nation.

“Five-and-twenty years have elapsed since the day on which his Majesty our grandfather, now resting in God, assumed the German Imperial dignity in answer to the appeal of the German Princes and Free Towns, and in accordance with the wishes of the nation. We have therefore determined solemnly to commemorate this great event which at last brought to a glorious fulfilment the long-cherished hopes of the German people, and secured to the restored German Empire the position to which its history and its achievements entitle it among the civilized nations of the world. We have invited for this purpose the representatives of our exalted allies,

and of the nation, as well as all those whose labours at the time conspicuously contributed to the unification of Germany.

“Surrounded by the colours and standards of our renowned regiments, immortal witnesses of the herosim of our armies which greeted on that day the first German Emperor, we wish to remember with deep emotion the sublime picture which the Fatherland, united in its princes and its peoples, then presented to the world. Looking back on the five-and-twenty years which have since elapsed, we are moved, in the first place, to express our gratitude to the Divine Providence which has so visibly blessed this empire and all its members.

#### ARMED STRENGTH DEVELOPED

“The oath taken by his Majesty my never-to-be-forgotten grandfather, and by his Imperial successors, to defend with German steadfastness the rights of the empire, to maintain peace, to preserve the independence of Germany, and to increase the strength of the nation has, with the help of God, until now been faithfully kept. Conscious that it is called upon to make its voice heard without fear or favour in the council of the nations for the cause of peace, the young empire has been able to devote itself undisturbed to the development of its internal institutions. Proudly rejoicing in its newly acquired and dearly bought unity and power, and confidently relying on the guidance of its great Emperor and the wise counsels of experienced statesmen, and especially of the first Chancellor, Prince Bismarck, all the constructive forces of the nation were able to cooperate loyally in the common task. By the sacrifice which it was at all times ready to make the empire tested its determination to maintain and secure that which it had gained, to find remedies for the evils of economic struggles, and to pave the way for the

promotion of contentment among the different classes of the population.

"Let us rejoice over what has already been accomplished in this direction. The armed strength of the country which it is our Imperial duty to maintain for the defence of the Fatherland's independence within the full measure of its resources, has been steadily developed. Legislative and administrative measures have promoted prosperity in every department of public life and of economic activity. Broad fields have been opened up for the intellectual and material energies of the nations, the public weal has been augmented, a unified code of jurisprudence has been established, and with it an impartial administration of justice, commanding the respect of all, and the education of the young in the fear of God and in loyalty to the Fatherland has been furthered and extended.

"Valuable as may be this record of the past achievements, we will not weary in further efforts. The institutions of the empire have still to be developed, the ties which connect the German race to be consolidated, the manifold dangers which threaten us to be permanently guarded against, and to these ends, as well as to keep pace with the rapid progress of human activity in all its branches, we must devote our unceasing and unflinching energies.

"As we here again solemnly swear to emulate, in the faithful fulfilment of our duties, the example of our immortal grandfather, so we address to all members of the nation our Imperial invitation to sink party differences and join with us and our exalted allies in concentrating every thought on the welfare of the empire, in order to promote with true German loyalty, by the subordination of the individual to the whole, the greatness and the happiness of our beloved Fatherland.

"Let this happen and we may look with confidence for the further blessing of Heaven, and united and



steadfast as in the mighty days which we are now commemorating, we shall ward off every attack upon our independence, and continue undisturbed to prosecute our own interests. The German Empire, far from being a danger to other States, will thus secure the respect and confidence of the nations, and remain hereafter, as heretofore, a bulwark of peace. God grant that it may be so."

### GERMANY'S TATTERED TROPHIES

The Kaiser celebrated the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Battle of Sedan. In the presence of the Kings of Saxony and Würtemberg, at a banquet, the Emperor said :

"I on this day I propose the toast of my Guards, I do so with a joyful heart, for this day is one of exceptional rejoicing and brilliancy. A whole people inflamed with enthusiasm provided the frame for to-day's review, and the reason of the enthusiasm was the remembrance of the figure of the personality of the Great Emperor, who is now dead. He who to-day and yesterday has gazed upon the colours bedecked with oak leaves cannot have done so without his heart being stirred by sorrow, for the spirit and the tongue which spoke to us in the rustling of these partly tattered trophies told of events of twenty-five years ago, of the first hour of the great day when the German Empire rose again.

"Great was the battle and hot the turmoil and mighty were the forces that clashed against each other. Bravely fought the enemy for his laurels, for his past, for his Emperor. With the courage of despair fought the French army. The Germans fought for their lands, their hearths and their future unity. Therefore our feelings are so deeply stirred that every one who has worn the Emperor's uniform or wears it still is in these days specially honoured by the people. Let one united burst of thanks ascend to the Emperor William I, and let it be our

task, especially for the younger among us, to maintain that which the Emperor founded.

“ Yet in the sublime and noble joy of celebration, a note has been struck which truly has no place there. A rabble, unworthy to bear the name of Germans, has dared to revile the German people, has dared to drag in the dust the person of the universally honoured Emperor, which is to us sacred. May the whole people find in themselves the strength to repel these monstrous attacks; if not, I now call upon you to resist the treasonable band, to wage a war which will free us from such elements. I cannot empty my glass to the health of my Guards without mentioning him under whom they fought twenty-five years ago to-day. The future commander of the army of the Meuse stands before you. For twenty-five years his Majesty the King of Saxony has faithfully shared with us all the joy and all the sorrow which has befallen our House and country. So, also, the King of Würtemberg, whose highest joy it is to have stood in the ranks of the regiment of Hussars of the Guard and served the Emperor William and who has hastened hither to celebrate the day in comradeship. We Germans have only one obligation, namely, to retain that which our leaders conquered for us, and I therefore include in the toast of the Guards corps the health of the two noble Princes, and especially of the Commander of the army of the Meuse, his Majesty the King of Saxony. Hurrah for his Majesty, and again Hurrah; for the third time Hurrah ! ”

### WATCHING THE TREE GROW

In a speech to the members of the Brandenburg Diet in February 1889, the Kaiser said :

“ It was after the great and glorious events of the years 1870-71. The troops had come back home, the rejoicing and enthusiasm had abated, and the

old occupations and the foundation and development of the newly won Fatherland were now to begin. The three paladins of the great old Emperor found themselves for the first time seated alone at dinner together—the great General, the mighty Chancellor, and the faithful Minister of War. As soon as the first glass had been emptied to the Sovereign and the Fatherland, the Chancellor spoke, and, turning to his two companions, said: ‘We have now accomplished all that we fought for, struggled for, and suffered for. We now stand at the summit of our highest hopes. What is there that can interest or inspire us, or kindle our enthusiasm after what we have experienced?’ There was a short pause, then suddenly the old strategist answered, ‘We can watch the tree grow.’ And then profound silence reigned in the room. Yes, gentlemen, the tree which we see growing, and which we have to foster, is the German Imperial oak.”

## CHAPTER III

### MY ARMY

GERMANY is a nation in arms. Every man is either a soldier or has been a soldier. The few who escape conscription never bulk very largely in any assembly. Every public speech of the Kaiser, therefore, is addressed to the man in uniform, and his Majesty can no more keep the word "army" out of his speeches than the unfortunate Mr. Richard Babley in "David Copperfield" could keep King Charles' head out of his memoirs. The only occasions where the German Emperor does not mention the German army is when he is talking about the German navy.

His Majesty, however, often addresses his troops, and makes specific speeches on army matters.

The commencement of the twentieth century was celebrated by the command of the Emperor in various ways. His Majesty attended a camp service on New Year's Day and delivered the following speech to the assembled army officers :

"The first day of the new century sees our army—in other words, our people in arms—gathered around their standards, kneeling before the Lord of Hosts. And verily, if anyone has especial reason for bowing down before God, it is our army. A glance at our standards suffices as an explanation, for they are the embodiment of our history. In what condition did the past century at its dawn find our enemy? The glorious army of Frederick the Great had slept on its laurels. Fossilized amid all the petty detail of pipe-clay, led by superannuated and inefficient generals, with its officers unaccustomed to useful work, lost in debauch, luxury and foolish arrogance, our army, in a word, was not equal to its mission,

which, indeed, it had forgotten. Heavy was the chastisement of Heaven which overtook it and which fell upon our people. It was cast into the dust. The glory of Frederick was extinguished, our standards were broken.

“In many long years of bitter servitude God taught our people to look to itself, and under the pressure of the foot of a proud conqueror our people engendered in itself that most sublime thought that it is the highest honour to dedicate one’s blood and purse to the Fatherland in her armed service—universal military service. Form and life were given to it by my great-grandfather, and new laurels crowned the newly created army and its youthful banners. But universal military service only attained its true significance through our great departed Emperor. In quiet work he evolved the reorganization of our army despite the opposition offered by ignorance. Glorious campaigns crowned his work in a way which had never been expected. His spirit filled the ranks of his army, even as his own trust in God bore his troops on to astonishing victories. With this, his own creation, he brought the German races together, and gave us back the long-desired German unity. If it is to him our thanks are due that by help of that army the German Empire, commanding respect, has again assumed the position assigned to it in the council of nations. It is for you, gentlemen, to preserve and employ in the new country the old qualities by which our forefathers made the army great, namely, simplicity and modesty in daily life, unconditional devotion to the royal service, the employment of one’s whole strength of body and mind in the ceaseless work of training and developing my troops.”

### THE ARMY A ROCK OF MIGHT

In commemoration of the beginning of the twentieth century, also, arrangements were made whereby the

colours of the Prussian and allied armies were decorated with a unifying and distinguishing cockade. In bestowing this symbol upon the German army, the Kaiser issued a proclamation, which read, in part :

“ I thank my army for all that it has accomplished for my House and for the Fatherland during this long period of time, for its devotion and spirit of self-sacrifice, for its bravery and loyalty. And when to-day its glorious colours, decked with laurels, are lowered before the altar of the Almighty to receive from my hands the commemorative token which, in accordance with the unanimous resolution of my exalted allies, is to be bestowed on the colours of the entire German army as a fresh pledge of its unity and solidarity, then shall it renew the oath at all times to emulate the deeds of our fathers and forefathers, with whose blood was cemented the bond which now and for all future time unites the princes and peoples of Germany.

“ And if ever again, by the will of Heaven, fresh storms shall burst over our Fatherland, and once more thrust the sword into the hands of its sons, they will but spend their force on my brave army, it will be and remain what it was and is—a rock on which rests the might and greatness of Germany. May God grant it.”

### **THE NEED FOR CONSCRIPTION**

In November 1892, on opening the Reichstag, the Emperor referred to the new Army Bill and said :

“ The development of the defensive power of other European States makes it not only a serious, but an imperative duty that we should look to the efficiency of our own defences and further them by every means in our power. In the face of such development it is only by thorough enforcement of the approved principle of universal liability to service that we can secure a continuance of the respect in which Germany

has hitherto been held by the other Powers, thanks to the character of this army.

“Under this unanimous conviction the Federal Government lay a measure before you for your acceptance which, whilst making new regulations for the peace footing of the army, enables us to make full use of our defensive resources. The Federal Governments fully appreciate the extent of the sacrifice required, but both they and I trust that its necessity will meet with more and more recognition, and that the patriotism of the people will be ready to bear the burdens which the safety of the country demands.

“To lighten these burdens as far as possible the duration of the service in the army will be confined to within the narrowest bounds admitted to be compatible with military efficiency. Thus a serious inequality in the present discharge of the duty to bear arms will be removed, and a more thorough training and employment of the younger men will at the same time lessen the economic and military disadvantages resulting from the requisition of the men of the older categories immediately upon mobilization. The latter also will be freed from onerous duties from which under existing arrangements they cannot be exempted.

“In order to avoid burdening the budgets of the various Federal States with the contribution of the sums necessary for strengthening the army, it is intended to supply these demands by opening up fresh sources of Imperial revenue. With this object measures have been submitted to the Federal Council which aim at a different regulation of the taxes on beer, spirits, and certain Stock Exchange operations.

“In spite of the fact that the Imperial Budget for next year has to take into account a considerable increase in expenditure, partly resulting from prior obligations, though not exceeding the limits laid down in the estimate, the Federal States will receive

from the empire sums more than sufficient to cover their matricular contributions.

"In consideration of the claims on your attention which will be made by the proposals for the development of our army and by the financial measures closely connected therewith, the Federal Governments will, with the exception of the Budget, only lay before you such Bills as appear to be especially urgent.

"Gentlemen, in inviting you to enter upon your duties, I know that it is unnecessary for me to request you to conduct your deliberations in a patriotic spirit. The nation's firm determination to preserve its ancestral inheritance, to maintain peace, and to secure to our beloved country its dearest treasures, will, I doubt not, lead you to an agreement upon the measures proposed by myself and my honoured allies. If this is attained the empire will be able without anxiety to look the future in the face, trusting in Heaven and its own strength."

### THE UNPATRIOTIC MAJORITY

When in 1893 the Reichstag refused to pass a Bill for increasing the army, the Kaiser dissolved the chamber and afterwards made an address to the staff officers of the army :

"Since we saw one another last, some changes have taken place with regard to the Army Bill. I could not have anticipated its rejection, and had hoped that it would have been passed unconditionally by the patriotic spirit of the Reichstag. I was, unfortunately, deceived in that expectation. A minority of patriotically minded men was unable to do anything against the majority. In the debates passionate words were spoken which are not heard with pleasure among educated men. I had to proceed to a dissolution, and I hope to obtain from a new Reichstag the approval of the Army Bill.



Should I, however, be disappointed in this hope too, I am determined to do all I can to attain my object, for I am strongly convinced of the necessity of general peace. There has been some talk of inciting the masses. I do not believe that the German people will allow itself to be stirred up by outsiders. On the contrary, I know that in these army proposals I am at one with the Federal Princes, with the people, and with the army. I thank you, gentlemen, I wanted merely to express my views in your presence as I did at the first inception of the Bill."

### MILITARY DISCIPLINE AND ECONOMY

A Cabinet order dated March 29, 1890, addressed to the Minister of War, related to the discipline of the army :

"I have already had occasion last New Year's Day to discuss with the generals commanding the various army corps the question of the recruiting of officers.

"Since then there has been brought under my notice information as to the allowance and private means required of officers in addition to their pay, as well as statistics regarding the number of candidates for commission. The particulars which I have received furnish a proof that the recruiting of officers does not proceed according to uniform regulations in all branches of the service. I am therefore under the obligation of making known to all whom it may concern the opinion at which I have arrived. The progressive increase of the 'cadres' of the army has to a sensible degree augmented the total number of officers' commissions. It appears to be indispensable to ensure as completely as possible the filling up of these commissions, especially in view of the requirements, and the field artillery are far from being fully equipped in this respect. Owing to this state of things, the task falling to commanders

of providing for the recruitment of officers becomes daily more serious and more important.

“The spread of education among the German people furnishes a possibility of widening the sphere in which officers should be recruited. At the present time the nobility cannot claim the right of alone supplying the army with officers. Nevertheless, the noble sentiments which at all times have animated the officers’ corps must remain unaltered. This can only be if the candidates for the rank of officer are recruited from a medium in which this nobility of sentiment prevails. The descendants of the noble families of the country and the sons of brave officers and civil servants, form the traditional nucleus of the officers’ corps, but concurrently with these the sons of honourable middle-class families, who cherish king and country, who love the profession of arms and who entertain Christian sentiments, appear to me as equally capable of furnishing in the future a valuable contingent for the army.

“It is unjust that many commanders adopt exclusive principles, personal to themselves in the recruitment of officers, when, for instance, they impose on candidates conditions so strict from the point of view of scientific attainments that the possession of a degree is a necessary preliminary to obtaining a commission. I cannot admit that the appointment of officers should be made dependent upon the allowance granted them by their families, so as to exclude young men belonging to families comparatively impecunious, but connected to the army by traditional sentiment and conception of life.

“In order to put an end to these advantages, it is my idea that as a rule the commander of the infantry corps, the rifle regiments, foot artillery and pioneers should not require from candidates a supplementary allowance of more than 45 marks [£2 5s.] a month, the commanders of field artillery not more than

70 marks [£8 10s.] and commanders of cavalry not more than 150 marks [£7 10s.]. I do not dispute that the position of officers in the largest garrisons, and particularly in the Guards, necessitates a small increase of income, but I consider it prejudicial to the interests of the army that the private allowance demanded should reach in infantry and rifle regiments 75 marks, 100, and in some cases more, and that in the cavalry and in the Guards these demands should reach such a figure as to render it almost impossible for landed proprietors to permit their sons to enter that branch of the service to which they are attracted.

“ These exorbitant requirements are prejudicial to the recruitment of officers from the point of view both of quantity and quality. I do not wish that in my army the regard to which officers are held should be measured by the figure of their private fortune ; I particularly esteem those regiments whose officers are satisfied with limited resources, but do not on that account perform their duties less satisfactorily. The Prussian officer has at all times been distinguished from this point of view. It is the duty of commanders of corps to work in this direction. They must remember at the present it is more than ever indispensable to awaken and educate the characters of officers and to develop a spirit of self-sacrifice. In this task personal example should play the chief part. While again admonishing commanders to put an end to luxury and to the extravagance which is the outcome of costly gifts, too frequent banquets, and exorbitant expenditure over military social gatherings, I also combat the impression that commanders are bound, by reason of their position, to incur considerable expense in representing the hospitality of their corps. Every officer can contribute to the development of social relations with his comrades, and in this way acquire a title to their gratitude. At the same time only the generals commanding army corps are by my wish expected

to keep up a certain amount of display. I do not desire that superior officers of great merit should regard with anxiety the approach of the day in which they are to be appointed to the command of a regiment on account of the pecuniary sacrifices they consider inherent to that position.

### DUELLING AND COUNCILS OF HONOUR

A Cabinet Order dated January 1, 1897, was directed against duelling amongst officers in the German army. This was addressed to the Minister of War and read :

“ It is my will that duels among my officers should be more effectively prevented than hitherto. Their occasion is often of a trifling character, such as private differences and insults where friendly compromise is attainable without prejudice to professional honour. An officer must recognize that it is wrong to injure the honour of another. If, however, he has erred through hastiness or excitement the chivalrous course to pursue is not to persist in his error but to be ready to agree to a friendly compromise. It is equally the duty of one who has been offended to accept that offer of reconciliation so far as professional honour and propriety of conduct permit. It is therefore my will that the council of honour shall henceforth, as a matter of principle, co-operate in the settlement of affairs of honour. The Council must undertake this duty with the conscientious endeavour to bring about an amicable settlement with the object of describing the method by which this result may be achieved.”

## CHAPTER IV

### MY NAVY

THE Kaiser displays an extraordinary interest in the affairs of the German Imperial navy. This branch of the German offensive and defensive forces, is, indeed, the only truly Imperial affair of the confederation, for the German army, though under the nominal control of the Kaiser, is largely controlled by the rulers of the various states. The navy, however, was a definite creation of the empire, and the German Emperor is its actual as well as nominal head, the only limit imposed on the Imperial will being the necessity of obtaining a vote of the Reichstag for supplies. The Kaiser can talk of "my navy" with a greater degree of confidence than of "my army," for the only part of the army which he effectively controls is that belonging to the Kingdom of Prussia. We give below some of his Majesty's characteristic utterances on navy matters :

#### GERMANY MUST WATCH THE WORLD

At the launch of the new warship, the *Kaiser Karl der Grosse* at Hamburg on October 18, 1899, the Emperor made the following speech at a banquet :

"Germany is in bitter need of a strong fleet. In this mighty commercial emporium of Hamburg it is recognized what the German people can do when they are united, and, on the other hand, how necessary a strengthening of our naval forces is for our interests abroad. If that reinforcement had not been refused me in the first eight years of my reign, in spite of my urgent requests and admonitions, while scorn and mockery even were not spared me, how differently we should be able to push our thriving trade and

our interests oversea. Yet a feeling for these things is only slowly gaining ground in the German Fatherland, which has, unfortunately, spent his strength only too much in the fruitless strife of factions.

“An understanding of questions of moment to the whole world has made but slow progress among Germans. The face of the world has changed very much in the last few years. What formerly required centuries is now accomplished in a few months. The task of Emperor and of Government has consequently grown beyond measure. A solution is only possible when the German people renounce party divisions and stand in serried ranks behind their Emperor. Proud of their great Fatherland, conscious of their real worth, Germans must watch the development of foreign States, make sacrifices for their position as a world Power, and, giving up party spirit, stand united behind their princes and Emperor.”

### THE SWORD MIGHTIER THAN THE PEN

At a religious service to celebrate the commencement of the twentieth century, the Emperor said :

“Even as my grandfather laboured for his army, so will I in like manner and unerringly carry on and carry through the work of reorganizing my navy, in order that it may be justified in standing by the side of my land forces, and by it the German Empire may also be in a position abroad to win a place which it has not yet attained. With the two united, I hope to be enabled with firm trust in the guidance of God to prove the truth of the saying of Frederick William I: ‘When one of this world wants to decide something, the pen will not do unless it is supported by the strength of the sword.’ ”

Entertaining his uncle, H.R.H. the Duke of Edinburgh, who was a British Admiral, at Berlin in January 1893, the Kaiser said :

“The British navy is for the German navy not only a model of technical and scientific perfection, but its heroes also—Nelson, for instance, and others—have ever been, and ever will be, the guiding stars of German naval officers and crews, who are not less filled with the spirit of patriotism than the leaders of that much-respected nation. Though the German navy is specially intended for the safeguarding and preservation of peace, it will, I am confident, do its duty if called into action.

“And should it ever happen that the British and German navies have to fight side by side against a common foe, then the famous signal, ‘England expects that every man will do his duty,’ which England’s greatest naval hero gave out before the battle of Trafalgar, will find an echo in the patriotic heart of the German navy.”

### ON THE BRITISH NAVY

In August 1889 the German Emperor visited England and was magnificently entertained, publicly and privately. Queen Victoria made him an Admiral of the British Fleet, and speaking of this honour at Sandown Regatta, his Majesty said :

“I appreciate very highly the great honour which the Queen has shown me in appointing me Admiral of the British Fleet. I rejoice greatly to have been present at a review of the navy, which I regard as the most magnificent in the world. Germany possesses an army commensurate with her needs, and if Great Britain has a navy corresponding to her requirements Europe in general cannot fail to regard it as a most important factor for the maintenance of peace.”

In October 1889 the German Emperor was at Athens for the marriage of his youngest sister to the Crown Prince of Greece. British men-of-war happened to be

in harbour and the admiral entertained the Emperor, who in reply to a toast, said :

“It might be supposed that my interest in the British navy dates from my appointment as Admiral of the Fleet, but it is not so. From a boy, even as an urchin running about Portsmouth Dockyard, I have taken the greatest interest in British ships. My inspection of the ships to-day has afforded me great pleasure, and I congratulate you on their appearance. Nelson’s famous signal is not necessary now ; you all do your duty, and we, as young naval nations, come to England to learn from the first navy in the world.”

### A GLIMPSE OF THE PACIFIC

At a banquet in February 1892 of the Provincial Diet of Brandenburg, the Emperor made a remarkable speech on a wide range of subjects. Referring to naval matters, his Majesty said :

“I should like to illustrate this stage of transition by a story which I once heard. Sir Francis Drake, the famous English admiral, had landed in Central America after a difficult and exceedingly stormy voyage across the Atlantic. He was endeavouring to find that other great ocean, of the existence of which he was convinced, though most of his companions held a contrary opinion. A native chief, struck by the searching questions and inquiries of the admiral, and greatly impressed by his personality, said to him, ‘You seek the great water ; follow me, and I will show it to you.’ And then the two, despite the warning cries of the companions of the admiral, ascended a lofty mountain. After fearful difficulties they arrived at the summit. The chief pointed to the sea which lay behind them, and Drake saw the wild, tossing waves of the ocean which he had crossed. Thereupon the chief turned round, guided the admiral round a small, rocky prominence, and suddenly, like



a mirror gleaming in the golden rays of the rising sun, the broad expanse of the Pacific Ocean revealed itself to his enraptured eyes majestically calm.

"So may it be with you also. The firm consciousness that your sympathy accompanies me in my work constantly inspires me with new strength to persevere in my task and to continue in the way which Heaven has marked out for me."

### POINTING TO THE SEA

At Kiel in June 1901, the Kaiser unveiled a monument to the Great Elector—the first King of Prussia, and "the first ruler who pointed to the sea." In the course of an eloquent speech, his Majesty said :

"The youths to whom the future belongs, the youths who will reap the fruit of our work, who will some day tend the seed we have sown and harvest its produce, should direct their eyes to the statue of this prince, and form themselves by his example to be God-fearing, strict, inexorably strict, towards themselves and others, and to rely firmly upon God, whose ways the Elector was anxious to learn, undismayed by any vicissitude, not discouraged by any disappointment—which, indeed, in his Christian spirit he regarded merely as a trial sent from above. Such was the life of the Great Elector, and such should be yours also. The main principle which enabled him, despite all reverses and disappointments, all hardships and trials, never to lose courage and hope, was the red thread running through his life, and which is well expressed in his motto 'Domine, fac me scire viam, quam ambulem' ['Lord, show Thou me the way, that I should walk in'].

"So let it be also with the officers and crews of my navy. So long as we work on this principle we, unconcerned, overcome every difficult stage in the development of the navy and our Fatherland which God, in His Providence, may perhaps have in store

for us. That is the way by which you should walk. Let that be the principle on which my navy is based. Let it enable you to be victorious in battle and bear up against all reverses until the sun breaks through the clouds. With these thoughts in my mind I present this monument to the Naval Academy, which will henceforth protect and keep it in honour. May this institution produce men who will equal the one whose statue now stands before you. Let the covering fall."

### "OUR FUTURE IS ON THE WATER"

At the opening of the new harbour at Stettin, in reply to the Burgomaster, the Kaiser said :

"I congratulate you with all my heart on the work which has been accomplished. You entered it in a spirit of daring adventure. You were able to begin, thanks to the fostering care of my lamented grandfather, the great Emperor, who caused the iron girdle, the old fortifications which encircled the town, to be removed. From the moment when that iron mantle fell you were able to look at things in a larger and broader light. You did not hesitate to do so, and you did it with a resolute disregard of opposition and with the obstinate determination of the Pomeranian. You have succeeded, and I rejoice that the old Pomeranian spirit has become alive in you and has driven you from the land to the water. Our future is on the water, and I am convinced that the enterprise which you, Herr Burgomaster, have promoted with far-seeing vision and with active industry and effort will in centuries to come be connected with your name by the grateful citizens of Stettin, who will realize its importance. I for my part, as Sovereign of the land and as King, express my thanks to you for having raised Stettin to its present flourishing state. I hope and expect—yes, I might say I demand—that the town shall continue

to develop at the same rate, undivided by faction and with its attention fixed on the greatest whole, so that it may reach a height of prosperity never yet attained. That is my wish."

### FOSTERING THE MILITANT NAVY LEAGUE

In November 1899, the organization of the Navy League was strengthened and the German Emperor was informed of the progress made. In reply to the telegram from Count William von Bismarck, the Emperor wrote :

"I learn with satisfaction and joy from the telegram I received to-day that a branch of the German Navy League, embracing the whole province, has to-day been constituted in Königsberg. While cordially thanking you for the assurance of fidelity and devotion to my person, I would express the hope that it may be possible with the aid of the Navy League, to convince the German nation more and more of the necessity of a strong fleet proportionate to its interests and able to protect them.

"It has been especially gratifying to me to find that the province of East Prussia, although a great portion of its agricultural population has to struggle with considerable difficulties, has nevertheless, with its traditional loyalty in all cases where the well-being of the whole Fatherland is concerned, shown itself ready to make sacrifices with a glad heart, even as the province was a model in trying times at the beginning of the century."

On the formation of branches of the German Navy League in Alsace-Lorraine in 1900, the Kaiser expressed his gratification :

"That Germany's need of a strong navy should meet with more and more recognition in the Imperial Territories speaks well for the growth of German national sentiments among the Alsace-Lorrainers, and that these views as regards the navy should

spread in an inland province shows that it is understood that a defensive fleet does not merely serve to protect the interests of the traders of our great commercial cities but that it is also needed, and bitterly needed, for the protection of the industry of our entire people and their success in the world."

By the treaty of July 1890 Heligoland was transferred from Great Britain to Germany. The ceremonies in connexion with the event took place on the island on August 10, when the Kaiser issued a proclamation and also addressed the crews of the assembled German war-ships. He said :

"Comrades of the navy, four days ago I celebrated the battle of Wörth, at which my revered grandfather and my father gave the first hammer-stroke towards the formation of the new German Empire. Now twenty years have gone by, and I, William II, German Emperor, King of Prussia, reincorporate this island with the German Fatherland without war and without bloodshed, as the last piece of German earth. The island is chosen as a bulwark in the sea, a protection to German fisheries, a central point for ships of war, a place and harbour of safety in the German Ocean against all enemies who may dare to show themselves upon it. I hereby take possession of this land, whose inhabitants I greet, and in token thereof I command that my standard be hoisted and by its side that of the navy."

### THE KAISER'S SEA SONG

The German Emperor's widespread activities have included an incursion into poetry. It goes without saying that anything from the Kaiser's pen is received with at least outward respect in Germany in general, and in Prussia in particular, though his Majesty's subjects may often smile in their sleeves at his achievements in arts.

With regard to the "Song of Ægir," the verses have

actual metrical merit and show a good deal of historical research in the folk-lore of the Germanic peoples. The Kaiser's song on Ægir is addressed to one of the old Norse divinities, who was the equivalent to the Neptune of Greek mythology. Prof. P. Tesch, of Berlin, in 1895, published a learned commentary and explanation of the hidden beauties of this poem. The free translation given below is printed by permission of the translator, Mr. Dudley W. Walton :

### A SONG TO ÆGIR

O Ægir, lord of oceans,  
 Whom nymphs and gnomes obey,  
 When dawn brings war's commotions,  
 All heroes hail the day !  
 In grim fierce feud we hurry  
 Towards the distant strand.  
 Through rock-strewn sea and flurry  
 Haste to the foeman's land !

If water-sprites, advancing,  
 Break down our virgin shield,  
 Lord, may thine eye, flame-glancing  
 Defend us on the field !  
 As Frithiof's " Dragon " galley  
 Rode fearless through the sea ;  
 So we, in war's fierce rally,  
 Entrust our fate to thee !

Wherever in the battle  
 'Gainst steel the steel is thrust,  
 And foemen, in death's rattle,  
 Are made to bite the dust,—  
 Then shall we raise in conquest  
 Our sword and shield to thee,  
 Who, midst the storm and tempest,  
 Giv'st victory on the sea !

## CHAPTER V

### MY RECRUITS

THE Kaiser often makes a point of attending the swearing in of recruits, and regards it as a solemn religious ceremony. Addressing a body of recruits on November 15, 1894, at Berlin, the Emperor said :

“ Remember that you are Christians, and that if you wish to be good soldiers you must also be good Christians. You are called to serve in my guard and to wear my uniform. Do honour to this uniform and perform the most sacred duty that a man can have—namely, to defend his Fatherland. But you must not forget you are also bound to protect your country from internal foes and to shield its religion, its social order, and its good morals. Go now, and do the duty in which you will be instructed in my name and in accordance with my will.”

#### “ OUR ENEMIES ABROAD ”

Addressing naval recruits at Kiel in January 1892, the Kaiser said :

“ Your oaths have been heard by the Almighty God and by myself. It will be your duty whilst on my ships to carry the honour of Germany to all parts of the world. Our navy is, of course, small compared with that of our enemies abroad, but the secret of your strength lies in good discipline and in the obedience of the crews to their supreme commander and their superior officers.

“ Wherever you may be, either at home or in foreign parts, whether protecting colonies or on a scientific expedition, conduct yourselves properly

## MY RECRUITS

and always be mindful of your duties as German sailors. Your ancestors before you won a good name abroad. Uphold it, and stand faithfully to Emperor and empire everywhere. And, further, do not forget what your parents taught you—religion and the fear of God. If you retain these, your life in the service will be happy.”

## “GIVE UP YOUR WHOLE LIFE TO ME!”

Another address to naval recruits delivered on March 5, 1895, was as follows :

“My men, you have come here to take the oath of allegiance. It was an old custom with our forefathers, and they held it a sacred duty to perform their oath loyally. Just as I, your Emperor and Sovereign, devote my every act and thought to the Fatherland, so are you bound to give up your whole life to me. For you have taken the oath as Christians and two servants of God have spoken to you in a Christian spirit. On your war flag you behold the eagle, the noblest creature in the universe. Strong in its youth, it soars high in the air beneath the rays of God’s sun, and knows neither fear nor danger. So also must be your thought and act. You are coming now to the time when, in the serious business of your service, demands will be made upon you which will be irksome, when many an hour will come in which you will think yourselves unequal to your task. Then remember that you are Christians, think of your parents and how your mother taught you to say ‘Our Father.’ When abroad your duty will be to represent the Fatherland by your worthiness and good behaviour. Our navy is outwardly indeed small, but what makes us stronger than other navies is discipline, unhesitating obedience to superiors. Thus will our navy prosper and grow great in the work of peace and for the benefit and good of the Fatherland, and thus, as we hope in God, shall we

destroy an enemy. May you be like the Brandenburgers of old."

THE TALONS OF THE GERMAN EAGLE

Still again addressing naval recruits at Wilhelmshaven in March 1898, the Kaiser said :

"I would call to your mind that brave seamen have found their death in the waves with their last thoughts fixed on the dear Fatherland and on the flag to which they had sworn to be true. Many of your comrades have gone forth to protect the interests of the Fatherland. For where the German eagle has taken possession and has implanted his talons in a land, that land is German and will remain German. Go and perform your duty even as you have just sworn in the name of God."



## CHAPTER VI

### MY FRIENDS AND FOES

THE German Emperor's speeches contain many references to the rulers and peoples of other nations. Generally speaking, one may gather from his Majesty's remarks that he regards the whole world as a possible enemy. While he speaks very courteously of other rulers as though they were his personal friends, he always speaks of other people as though they were potential foes of Germany. The extracts given in these pages have been selected in view of subsequent events—the outbreak of war—but it must be remembered they were words spoken in times of peace.

In the course of his first speech at the opening of the Reichstag on July 28, 1888, the Kaiser made a review of the historic policy of Germany and in regard to the Triple Alliance, that is, the offensive and defensive alliance engineered by Prince Bismarck between Austria, Italy and Germany. The Emperor said :

“ Our alliance with Austria-Hungary is a matter of public knowledge. I adhere to it with German sincerity, not merely because it happens to be concluded, but because I see in this defensive association the foundation of the balance of power in Europe as well as a legacy derived from German history, the terms of which are now approved of by the public opinion of the entire German Fatherland; and, moreover, it is also in accordance with the traditional international law of Europe as it was universally recognized down to 1866.

“ Again, historical relations and present national needs of a like character unite us to Italy. Both countries are anxious to hold fast to the blessings

of peace, so that they may be able to work undisturbed for the consolidation of their newly-won unity, the development of their international institutions, and the promotion of their welfare."

When celebrating the centenary of the birth of the Emperor William I in March 1897, the Kaiser announced that arrangements had been made whereby all the armies of his "august allies" would carry on their colours a common and unifying symbol.

"I will bestow a special honour on this day of rejoicing, inasmuch as my army is henceforth to wear the colours of their common Fatherland. The badge of unity achieved, the German cockade, which by the unanimous resolution of my august allies is at this very hour to be given to their troops also, shall for all time be to my army a visible exhortation to stand firm for the glory and greatness of Germany, and to protect it with blood and life."

In April 1894 the German Emperor was at Pola and saw the Austrian navy. At a dinner he said :

"After visiting the monument of the brave naval hero whose memory will never be forgotten, Admiral Tegetthoff, the victor of Lissa, whose spirit lives not only in the Austro-Hungarian but also in the German navy, I can best state my wishes and those of my comrades in these words : Wherever the call of the Emperor Francis Joseph, my best friend, with whom I am united in the most intimate friendship and the most cordial brotherhood in arms, may lead you, let your watchword ever be 'Full steam ahead.'"

### THE TELEGRAM TO PRESIDENT KRUGER

In January 1896 the British Empire was startled by the news of the Jameson Raid on the Transvaal Republic. The action of the Boers, at that time under the suzerainty of Great Britain, appealed strongly to the sentiments of

the Kaiser, who dispatched the following telegram to President Kruger :

“ I express to you my sincere congratulations that without appealing to the help of friendly Powers you and your people have succeeded in repelling with your own forces the armed bands which have broken into your country and in maintaining the independence of your country against foreign aggression.”

### “I AM THE FRIEND OF ENGLAND”

The Kaiser made a state visit to King Edward VII in 1907, but he was not received by the English people with any marked enthusiasm. In the following year the *Daily Telegraph* printed an interview with his Majesty, which was obviously designed to palliate popular prejudice :

“ I am the friend of England, but you make things difficult for me. My task is not of the easiest. The prevailing sentiment among large sections of the middle and lower classes of my own people is not friendly to England. I am, therefore, so to speak, in a minority in my own land, but it is a minority of the best elements, just as it is in England with respect to Germany. That is another reason why I resent your refusal to accept my pledged word that I am the friend of England. I strive without ceasing to improve relations, and you retort that I am your arch-enemy. You make it very hard for me. Why is it ? ”

A few days after the death of Queen Victoria in January 1901, whose funeral the Kaiser attended, King Edward VII created his nephew a British Field-Marshal. The Kaiser's thanks were thus expressed :

“ I thank his Majesty the King that he has conferred upon me the rank of Field-Marshal in the British Army. This honour enables me to wear the same uniform as that worn by the Duke of Wellington

and Lord Roberts, and this compliment will be very highly appreciated by my own army. I reciprocate in the heartiest manner the cordial feelings which your Majesty entertains with reference to the relations between both our empires."

In his first speech from the throne in 1888, the Kaiser, as already noted, spoke of the policy of Germany in regard to the Triple Alliance. Immediately afterwards he referred to Russia in the following words :

"The agreements which we entered into with Austria-Hungary and Italy permit me, much to my satisfaction, to continue the careful cultivation of my personal friendship with the Emperor of Russia, and of the peaceful relations which for a century have existed between us and the neighbouring Russian Empire, and which correspond with my own desires as well as with the interests of the Fatherland."

During October 1889 the Tsar of Russia (Alexander III) visited Berlin and was toasted by the German Emperor at a state banquet, when the Kaiser said :

"I drink to the health of my esteemed friend, his Majesty the Emperor of Russia, and to the continuance of the friendship which has existed between our Houses for more than a century, and which I am resolved to foster as an inheritance handed down by my forefathers."

#### "COMRADES OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY"

When the Tsar was entertained by the Prussian Grenadier Guards, the Kaiser recalled the fact that his lamented grandfather, William I, had fought with the Russian army, and he added :

" mention this in order that we may drink to the common glorious memories and traditions of the Russian and Prussian armies. I drink to the health

of those who fought so heroically in defence of their fatherland at Borodino, and who in alliance with us shed their blood in gaining victory at Acreis-on-the-Aube and at Brienne. I drink to the health of the brave defenders of Sebastopol and to those brave men who gained such glory at Plevna. I request you, gentlemen, to empty your glasses with me in drinking to the health of your comrades of the Russian army."

Nicolas II, Tsar of Russia, came to the throne on November 1, 1894, at a time when the Kaiser was at Stettin at lunch with his 2nd Grenadier Guards. The news was conveyed to him, and his Majesty rose and said :

"Nicholas II has ascended the throne of his forefathers, truly one of the most burdensome inheritances upon which a prince can enter. We who are assembled here and have just been carrying our thoughts back to the traditions of the past must think also of the relations which have united us in olden times in the comradeship of arms, and have again recently connected us, with the Imperial House of Russia. Let us give common expression to our feelings towards the Tsar who has just come to the throne, in the prayer that God may grant him strength to discharge the weighty duties upon which he is entering. Long live the Emperor Nicholas II. Hurrah !"

### CHEERS FOR THE FRENCH ARMY

At the direct invitation of the Kaiser, two French army officers were present at the brigade manoeuvres of the Foot Guards on May 29, 1901. At a ceremonial breakfast the Emperor spoke tactfully, and after referring to events in China where Germans and Frenchmen had fought side by side, the Kaiser said :

"A special honour is conferred on the brigade to-day, in that it is privileged to welcome in its midst

two officers of the French army. This is the first occasion in which it is thus honoured, as this is the first time also that German and French troops have fought shoulder to shoulder as good brothers and comrades in arms against a common enemy. Three cheers for the two French officers and the entire French army. Hurrah! Hurrah! Hurrah!"

The Kaiser once talked with M. Simon of the possibility of war between France and Germany, saying, *inter alia* :

"I have reflected a great deal since my accession, and I think that placed as I am it would be better to do good than to inspire men with fear. I tell you that your army has worked hard. It has made great progress. If what seems quite impossible, it should find itself in the field against the German army, no one could foretell the consequence of the conflict. That is why I regard as a fool and a criminal whoever would impel these two nations to go to war."—*Revue de Paris*.

In connexion with the troubles of China in the year 1900 (when the German Ambassador was murdered) the Emperor delivered several speeches which attracted world-wide attention. One of his most important utterances was delivered on the departure of a German Battalion of Marines, when his Majesty said :

"Into the midst of a time of the most profound peace—though, alas, it was no surprise to me—the firebrand of war has been hurled. My tried and trusted representative has been snatched away, the victim of a crime of unheard-of insolence and of horrid cruelty. The Ministers of the other Powers are in danger of their lives, and with them are your comrades who were sent to protect them. Perhaps they have even to-day fought their last fight. The German flag has been insulted and the German Empire has been set at defiance. That calls for exemplary punishment and for vengeance.

“The situation has developed with fearful rapidity into one of utmost gravity. It has become even more grave since I called you to arms for mobilization. The work of re-establishment which I hoped to carry out with the help of the marine infantry has now become a serious task which can only be accomplished by large bodies of troops belonging to civilized States. The commander of the cruiser squadron has already begged me to consider the advisability of sending out a whole army division.

“You will meet a foe who is not less valiant than yourselves. Trained by European officers, the Chinese have learned to use European weapons. Thank God, your comrades belonging to the marine infantry and to my navy have strengthened and maintained the ancient martial renown of Germany wherever they have met the foe. They have defended themselves gloriously and with success and have accomplished the tasks which were set them.

“I send you forth now to avenge the wrong, and I will not rest until the German flag, together with those of the other Powers, floats victoriously above the Chinese standards, and planted upon the walls of Peking, dictates peace to the Chinese.

#### CIVILIZATION A COMMON CAUSE

“You are to keep good fellowship with all the troops you meet in China. The Russians, the English, the French, or whoever they may be, they are all fighting for the same cause, which is that of civilization. We think, too, of something yet higher—of our religion and of the defence and the protection of our brethren in China, some of whom have risked their lives for their Saviour. Think too of our martial honour, think of those who have fought before you, and go forth with that verse in your thoughts which of old constituted the motto on the flag of Brandenburg:

“ ‘Vertrau’ auf Gott, dich tapfer wehr’,  
 Daraus besteht dein’ ganze Ehr’!  
 Denn wer’s auf Gott herzhaftig wagt,  
 Wird nimmer aus der Welt gejagt!’

[Trust in God and bravely fight, therein your honour lies; for he who in God’s name goes forth shall ne’er be put to shame.]

“The flags which float above you here will be under fire for the first time. See that you bring them back unspotted and unstained. My gratitude and my interest, my prayers and my solicitude will not fail nor desert you; I shall follow you with them wherever you go.”

### THE “NO QUARTER” SPEECH

In connexion also with the trouble in China on July 27, 1900, the Emperor addressed troops at Bremerhaven immediately before their departure. In his speech he pointed out:

“The Chinese have trampled on international law, they have, in a manner unheard of in the history of the world, hurled foul scorn at the sanctity of the Ambassador and the duties of hospitality. Such conduct is all the more revolting, because the crime was committed by a nation which is proud of its immemorial civilization. Maintain the old Prussian excellency; prove yourselves Christians in the cheerful endurance of suffering; may honour and glory attend your colours and your arms; set an example to all the world of discipline and obedience.”

The Kaiser, according to *The Times* report, continued:

“Remember when you meet the foe, that quarter will not be given, and that prisoners will not be taken. Wield your weapons so that for a thousand years to come no Chinaman will dare to look askance



at a German. Pave the way once for all for civilization.

“ May you all prove your German efficiency, devotion, and bravery, bear joyfully all discomfort, and uphold the honour and glory of our arms and colours. You must set an example of discipline, self-domination, self-control. You will fight against a well-armed and well-equipped foe, but you have to avenge not only the death of our Minister, but that of many Germans and Europeans. May the name of Germany make itself felt in China that for a thousand years to come China shall never dare even to look askance at a German.

“ The blessing of the Lord be with you. The prayers of the whole people accompany you in all your ways. My best wishes for yourselves, for the success of your arms, will ever follow you. Give proofs of your courage, no matter where. May the blessing of God rest on your banners, and may He vouchsafe to you to find a path for Christianity in that far-off country. For this you have pledged yourselves to me with your oath to the colours. I wish you God-speed. Adieu, comrades ! ”

It was in the course of this speech that the Kaiser is supposed to have made his reference to the Huns of Attila, but it has been impossible to verify the quotation. As commonly reported the reference was as follows :

“ When you meet the foe you will smash him. No quarter will be given, no prisoners will be taken. Let all who fall into your hands be at your mercy. Gain the reputation of the Huns of Attila ! ”

## CHAPTER VII

### ON "KULTUR"

**THE** word "culture" so familiar in its German equivalent "Kultur" in the Kaiser's dominions, has not for English readers any very vital meaning. We say, according to circumstance, "education," "good manners" or "taste," where the Germans use the more comprehensive word "Kultur." The characteristics implied by this word are much more widely diffused in Germany and specially in South Germany than in the United Kingdom. But a fundamental difference between the British and German is shown in comparing the acts of their respective sovereigns.

King George is not continually addressing speeches and proclamations to his army or navy. On the contrary, he is much more often called upon to lay a foundation stone of a hospital or open a town hall, but it is rare indeed that the Kaiser officiates at such ceremonies. The Kaiser's "Kultur" speeches, therefore, are rare. Nevertheless, his Majesty has shown an interest in the humaner sides of German life.

The Kaiser, as a youth, was sent to the Cassel Gymnasium, where he went through the ordinary course of study and college discipline, and passed his final examination in 1876. This educational experience appeared to have made a deep impression upon the Kaiser, for later in life he criticized the German, or rather Prussian educational system, as he had observed it at first hand, on several occasions. In a private letter to a magistrate who had sent him pamphlets on school reform the Kaiser said :

"Homer, that splendid man for whom I was very enthusiastic; Horace, Demosthenes, whose speeches no one could but admire, how were they studied?"

With any enthusiasm for fighting, for arms, or for descriptions of nature? Heaven forbid. Every sentence was cut up and dissected under the operating knife of the pedantic fanatical philologist until, with a feeling of satisfaction, the skeleton was discovered, and it was explained for the admiration of all in how many different ways and positions *ἄν* or *ἐπί* or some such thing had been used. 'Twas enough to make one cry. And then Latin and Greek compositions—mad folly that they were—how much time and trouble did they cost us, and what stuff it was that was produced; and it would have frightened Horace to death.

"Away with the rubbish! War to the knife against such teaching! The effect of the system is that the youths of our country know the syntax, the grammar, of the ancient languages better than 'those old Greeks' themselves, and that they know by heart all the generals, battles, and tactical operations of the Punic and Mithridatic wars. They are, however, very hazy with regard to the battles of the Seven Years' War, not to speak of those of the campaigns of 1866 and 1870, which are 'much too modern,' and which they 'have not yet come to.'"

### HISTORY AND HEROISM

With regard to the education of army officers, the German Emperor, in February 1890, laid down a number of principles in a Cabinet Order. Here are three important paragraphs of this document:

"The aim and end of all education, especially military education, is formation of character, based on the due co-ordination of physical, intellectual, and religious training and discipline. No side of education should be favoured at the expense of another. The present curriculum for cadets makes, according to my observations, too exacting demands on a large number of pupils.

“Simplified though it will be, the instructions must at the same time be rendered still more efficient, with a view to giving the cadets not only the grounding and accomplishments which are specially necessary for the military profession, but also an intellectual equipment which will enable them some day in the army, the great school of the nation, to exert a morally improving and educative influence, or should they later on adopt some other career than that of the army, to fill their place with credit.

“The instruction in history must aim more than hitherto at cultivating a proper comprehension of present-day affairs, and especially of the Fatherland’s share in them. Accordingly, greater stress is to be laid on German history, particularly that of modern and most recent times. Ancient and mediæval history should be so taught that, by means of examples drawn from those epochs, the scholars may be made more open to learn lessons of heroism and historical greatness, and also obtain a good perception of the origin and development of our civilization.”

A Cabinet Order for the reform of secondary education was made by the Emperor in November 1900, when it was laid down that quality and not quantity was to be the aim. The Kaiser dealt with various branches of study, and added :

#### MORE DETAIL WANTED

“In teaching history, too, lacunæ still make themselves felt; for example, the neglect of important sections of ancient history and the insufficient detail with which German history during the nineteenth century is treated, with special reference to its ennobling memories and the great achievements on behalf of our Fatherland.”

Speaking at a "Kommers" or students' beer, feast at Bonn University on May 7, 1891, the Emperor said :

### ENCOURAGEMENT OF DUELLING

"It is my firm conviction that every youth who enters a corps will receive the true direction of his life from the spirit which prevails in them. It is the best education which a young man can get for his future life, and he who scoffs at the German student corps does not grasp their real meaning. I hope that as long as there are German corps students the spirit which is fostered in their corps, and which is steeled by strength and courage, will be preserved, and that you will always take delight in handling the duelling blade. There are many people who do not understand what our duels really mean, but that must not lead us astray. You and I, who have been corps students, know better than that. As in the Middle Ages, manly strength and courage were steeled by the practice of jousting or tournaments, so the spirit and habits which are acquired from membership of a corps furnish us with that degree of fortitude which is necessary to us when we go out into the world."—"The Kaiser's Heir."

Late in 1890 the Kaiser summoned a conference of educational experts whose deliberations his Majesty followed with close attention. At the concluding meeting on December 17, the Kaiser said :

"If the schools had done what is expected of them—and I can speak to you from personal experience, for I attended a gymnasium and know how things are managed there—they would of their own accord have taken up the fight against Social Democracy. The teaching staff would have combined to take the matter firmly in hand and have instructed the rising generation in such a manner that young men who are now of the same age as

myself, say about thirty, would already have formed the material with which I could work in the state in order quickly to become master of the movement. That, however, has not been the case.

“The last occasion on which our schools had a decisive influence on the mind of our Fatherland and worked for our national development was in the years 1864 and 1886-70. In the Prussian schools the Prussian teachers were the apostles of the idea of unity, which they inculcated everywhere. Every scholar who left school with his certificate and joined the army as a one-year volunteer or entered on some other walk of life was agreed on the point that the German Empire should be re-established and Alsace-Lorraine regained.”

On laying the foundation stone of the Museum of the Antiquities at Saalburg, in October 1900, the Kaiser said :

“Just as an ancient knightly castle (Marienburg) has again risen in the distant East at my command, so now, like a phoenix from its ashes, arises this castle, an evidence of Roman power, a link in the mighty chain with which the legions of Rome encircled the German Empire, a token of how the will of Cæsar Augustus imprinted itself upon the world and carried Roman civilization into Germany. And so I dedicate the first blow of this hammer to the memory of my never-to-be-forgotten father ; the second to the youth of Germany, to the rising generation—may they learn here the meaning of a world-empire ; the third stroke I dedicate to our beloved German Fatherland, to the harmonious co-operation of its princes and its peoples. May the might of Germany become as firm and as powerful as was once that of the Roman world-empire, so that in the future ‘ I am a German citizen ’ may be uttered with the same pride as was the ancient ‘ Civis Romanus sum. ’ ”

In the year 1890 the Kaiser interested himself in the

lot of the working classes, and published Edicts outlining his plans. To the Minister of Public Works he gave directions as follows :

" Beside the further extension of legislation dealing with the insurance of workmen against accidents, the existing provisions of the Factory Acts with regard to the condition of workers in factories are to be submitted to a thorough investigation, in order to meet the complaints and wishes which have made themselves heard in this field, so far as they are found to have been justified. This investigation must proceed from the assumption that it is one of the functions of the State so to regulate the time, the length of hours, and the conditions of the work that the health of the workers may be maintained and the dictates of morality, the economic needs of the workers, and their claim to a position of equality in the eyes of the law may not be lost sight of."

### THE KAISER'S CLUB

In 1890, M. Jules Simon, a famous French statesman, attended the International Labour Conference at Berlin. He became personally acquainted with the Kaiser, and four years later, in the *Revue de Paris*, published his impressions of the monarch. Referring to a weekly gathering, the Kaiser stated :

" I receive about twenty friends at most, officers and professors. It is believed by the public that we meet to hold a kind of secret council. It is supposed that we occupy our time in talking of politics. Quite the contrary. We come together for a little recreation and to have a drink. We talk of art and literature."

### "FOSTER THE BEAUTIFUL"

In a visit to the Museum of Arts and Crafts in January 1902 to dedicate a memorial in memory of his parents

and to receive an address from the Minister of Public Worship, the Emperor said :

“ A blessing descended from an ideal figure like that of my father, who by the side of my lamented mother is cherished in the love of the nation—a splendid figure his, the very hem of whose garments was untouched by the dust of the street. And even so the glorious transfigured image of my mother, whose every thought was art, and for whom every single thing that was to be constructed for the service of daily life, however simple it might be, was impregnated with beauty. An atmosphere of poetry surrounded her. The son of these two stands before you as heir and executor. And, as I proclaimed on a former occasion, I, too, regard it as my mission, in conformity with the ideas of my parents, to stretch my hand over my German people and its rising generation, to foster the beautiful, to develop art in the life of the people, but only in fixed lines and within those strictly defined limits which are to be found in the sense of mankind for beauty and harmony.”

### GERMAN THE ONLY CULTURE

The Kaiser set on foot the decoration of the “Avenue of Victory” at Berlin, and himself drew up the general plan and personally selected the artists who sculptured the various groups. At a dinner to which these artists were invited, the Kaiser said :

“ The great ideals have become for us Germans a permanent possession, while other nations have more or less lost them. The German nation is now the only people left which is called upon in the first place to protect and cultivate and promote these great ideals, and one of these great ideals is that we should render it possible for our working and toiling classes to take pleasure in the beautiful, and to work up and out of their everyday range of thought.”



## CHAPTER VIII

### ON PEACE AND WAR

ON many occasions the German Emperor has explained in his speeches a personal desire for peace on earth, if not for goodwill amongst men. And in the same breath his Majesty has sought to glorify war. The Kaiser's remarks about peace bulk much more largely than those about war; but even when talking purely peaceful matters, he who has described himself as a "War Lord," will use strong military terms, so that in a sense, he fights for peace. His style of language is, of course, temperamentally hyperbolic, but it must be remembered that the German language is relatively poor in synonyms, and cannot fall back on words derived from Greek or Latin sources when it is desired to be particularly sonorous, emphatic or dignified.

In the course of his first speech from the throne on opening the Reichstag on June 25, 1888, the Kaiser said :

"As regards foreign politics, I am determined to keep peace with every one, so far as it lies in my power. My love for the German army and the position I occupy in regard to it, will never lead me into temptation to endanger the benefits which the country derives from peace, provided, of course, that war does not become a necessity forced upon us by an attack upon the empire or its allies. The object of the army is to secure peace for us, or, if peace is broken, to be in a position to fight for it with honour. And that, with God's help, the army will be able to accomplish, now that its strength has recently been supplemented by the Army Bill which you passed unanimously. But to make use of this strength for aggressive purposes is far from my

intention. Germany is in no need of fresh military glory, nor does she require any new conquests, for she has already obtained once for all, on the field of battle, the right to exist as a united and independent nation."

At the opening of the Reichstag in November 1892, the Emperor expressed similar sentiments :

"The friendly relations existing between us and all the other Powers and the consciousness that our intentions meet with the approval and support of our allies, justify me in hoping Germany will not be disturbed in her peaceful endeavour to promote her ideal and material interests."

### PROTECTOR OF EUROPEAN PEACE

In reply to the Burgomaster of Metz in September 1892, the Kaiser said :

"Metz and my army corps form the cornerstone of the military power of Germany, and are intended to protect the peace of Germany—indeed, of all Europe—that peace, which I am firmly determined to preserve."

In August 1889 the Kaiser was present at Cowes Regatta, and at the banquet given afterwards he delivered a speech in reply to the Prince of Wales (afterwards King Edward VII), the concluding words of which were :

"If the British nation possess a fleet commensurate with its requirements it will be regarded by Europe in general as a very important factor for the preservation of peace."

On June 21, 1895, the Kaiser laid the last stone of the Kiel Canal, connecting the Baltic and North Seas. He spoke strongly for peace on this occasion, and added :

"It was not only for our national interests that we worked. In accordance with the great civilizing

mission of the German people, we open the gates of the canal to the peaceful intercourse of the nations with one another; and it will be to us a matter for joyful satisfaction if an increasing use be made of the canal as evidence of the recognition of the motives which have actuated us, as well as a sign that it is helping to promote the welfare of nations.

"The participation in these festivities of the Powers, whose representatives we see amongst us and whose magnificent ships we have admired to-day, I welcome with all the greater satisfaction because I think I am right in inferring from it the complete satisfaction of our endeavours, the very object of which is to maintain peace. Germany dedicates the work inaugurated to-day to the service of peace."

At a banquet to members of the Reichstag in January 1896, in commemoration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the re-establishment of the German Empire, the Kaiser read a message to the nation in which he referred to its progress since the Franco-Prussian War. His Majesty's closing words were :

"The German Empire, far from being a danger to other States, will thus be respected and trusted by the nations, and will remain as heretofore a mainstay of peace. That this be so may God ordain !"

### THE KAISER'S ENGLISH BLOOD

In 1891 the Emperor and Empress again visited England and on July 10 his Majesty was entertained by the Lord Mayor of London at the Guildhall. His speech on this occasion was :

"My Lord, receive my most heartfelt thanks for the warm welcome from the citizens of this ancient and noble metropolis. I beg that your lordship will kindly transmit the expression of my feelings to those in whose name you have spoken. I have always felt at home in this lovely country, being the grandson

of a queen whose name will ever be remembered as a noble character and a lady great in the wisdom of her counsels, and whose reign has conferred lasting blessings on England. Moreover, the same blood runs in English and German veins. Following the example of my grandfather and my ever-lamented father, I shall always, as far as it is in my power, maintain the historical friendship between these our two nations, which, as your lordship mentioned, have so often been seen side by side in defence of liberty and justice. I feel encouraged in my task when I see that wise and capable men, such as are gathered here, do justice to the earnestness and honesty of my intentions.

“My aim is above all maintenance of peace. For peace alone can give the confidence that is necessary to the healthy development of science, of art, and of trade. Only so long as peace reigns are we at liberty to bestow our earnest thoughts upon the great problems, the solution of which, in fairness and equity, I consider the most prominent duty of our time. You may, therefore, rest assured that I shall continue to do my best to maintain and constantly increase the good relations between Germany and the other nations, and that I shall always be found ready to unite with you and them in the common labour for peaceful progress, friendly intercourse, and the advancement of civilization. I beg to propose the health of the Lord Mayor and the Corporation of the City of London.”

### THE ARMY TO WORK FOR PEACE


On the tenth anniversary of his accession, the Kaiser addressed the Prussian Life Guards at Berlin :

“With deep sorrow did I take up the crown ; on all sides men doubted me : on all sides did I encounter misconceptions. One thing alone had confidence in me, one thing alone believed me—it was the army,



# MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART

(ANSI and ISO TEST CHART No. 2)



APPLIED IMAGE Inc

1653 East Main Street  
Rochester, New York 14609 USA  
(716) 482-0300 - Phone  
(716) 288-5989 - Fax

and supported by it, and relying upon our God as of old, I undertook my heavy office, knowing well that the army was the main support of my country, the main pillar of the Prussian throne, to which God's decree had called me. So then I turn first of all to-day to you and express to you my congratulations and thanks, in which I, at the same time, include with you all your brothers in the army. I am firmly convinced that during the last ten years, by the self-sacrificing devotion of officers and men, by its loyal, devoted work in peace, the army has been maintained in that splendid condition in which I received it from the hands of my late grandfather. During the next ten years we will continue to work together in loyal association, with unquestioning fulfilment of our duty, with the old unwearied industry, and may the main pillars of our army ever be unassailed; these are bravery, sense of honour, and absolute, iron, blind obedience. That is my wish which I address to you and with you to the whole army."

Soon after the trouble in China, the Emperor attended a sailing regatta on the Lower Elbe, near Hamburg, and received an address of welcome from the Burgomaster. In the course of his speech in reply, the Emperor said :

"In the events which have taken place in China and which reach their conclusion in the return of the troops now in progress, I recognize a pledge for the maintenance of European peace for long years to come. The performance of the various contingents have created in them an estimate of each other which is based upon reciprocal esteem and upon a sense of comradeship, and this estimate can only tend to the performance of peace. Now I trust that during this peace our Hanseatic cities will flourish and that our new Hansa will fare forth and struggle for fresh markets and win them. As the supreme head of the empire I can only rejoice over every citizen of a Hanseatic town—be he from Hamburg, from Bremen,

or from Lübeck—who goes forth and with far-sighted vision looks for fresh points on which we can hang up our armour.”

### A CRIME AGAINST THE LAW OF NATIONS

On the restoration of order in China, Prince Chun arrived in Europe on a mission of apology. Visiting Potsdam in September 4, 1901, the Chinese Minister expressed his regret to the Emperor, who replied as follows :

“ It is not on a glad and festive occasion, nor to perform a simple act of courtesy, that your Imperial Highness has come to me. Your presence here is due to a sad event of the utmost gravity. My Minister at the Court of his Majesty the Emperor of China, Baron von Ketteler, has been slain in the Chinese capital by the murderous weapon of a soldier of the Imperial Chinese army, who acted on the orders of his superior officers—an abominable crime which is equally reprobated by the law of nations and by the usages of all countries. Out of the mouth of your Imperial Highness I have now heard the expression of the sincere and profound regret of his Majesty the Emperor of China. I am glad to believe that personally the Imperial brother of your Imperial Highness had no part in the crime or in the further acts of violence which were committed against inviolable Legations and against peaceful strangers. The guilt of his advisers and of his Government is all the greater. Let them not deceive themselves and think that they can effect atonement and gain forgiveness for their crime by the expiatory mission alone. That they can only do by regulating their future conduct in accordance with the dictates of international law and by the customs of civilized peoples.

“ If in future his Majesty the Emperor of China governs his great empire strictly in the spirit o



these dictates, his hope will be fulfilled; the sad consequences of the troubles of the past year will be overcome, and once again permanent relations of peace and friendship will be established between Germany and China, relations which will prove a blessing to both nations and to the whole of civilized mankind."

### CRUSHING THE OPPOSITION

At a Brandenburg banquet at the beginning of Lent 1890, the Kaiser spoke at length of the historical connexion between his family and Brandenburg, and added :

"The principles which I have already mentioned to you and which guided my ancestors and the House of Hohenzollern in general, in the view they took of their position towards the province of Brandenburg, were embodied in the highest degree by my late grandfather. He regarded his position as a task appointed him by God, to which he consecrated himself by devoting all his powers to its performance till the last moment of his life. His belief is also mine, and I deem the country and the people that they have passed into my care to be a talent entrusted to me by God, which, as it is expressed in the Bible, it is my duty to increase and multiply, and for which I shall some day be called upon to give a reckoning. I trust to the best of my power to be such a faithful steward with my talent that I may hope to gain many another talent besides. I welcome with all my heart those who wish to assist me in my work, no matter who they may be, but those who oppose me in this work I will crush."

### THE GERMAN PATH OF DUTY

At the review of the 14th Army Corps at Metz in September 1893, the Emperor paid high compliments to the Grand Duke Frederick of Baden, which were as follows :

“ Will our nation still be equal to its duties ? Will it ever deviate from the path which the Emperor William marked out for it ? Will it show itself unworthy of the great deeds of the Emperor Frederick ? When the critical moment approached and our people had to be again led along the right path, it was your Royal Highness who, with glowing and emphatic words of encouragement, first touched that chord which ever thrills through the nation. The military spirit was aroused ; and from one end of Baden to the other a new enthusiasm sprang into life among the warriors who had fought under the Emperor William and the Emperor Frederick, and whose breasts were decked with the badges won in past campaigns ; and our people recovered their senses. I thank your Royal Highness for your support, and I also thank my cousins of the German Empire. Every prince did what he could to lead his men out again and to rally them together once more round the banner of our Fatherland. Thanks to your united efforts, the German nation stands newly armed, a bulwark of defence, like the old hero of the gods, Heimdall, watching over the peace of the world at the gate of the Temple of Peace of not merely Europe, but of the whole earth.

#### GERMANY'S CIVILIZING MISSION

“ May it be granted to our German nation that it will never become unfaithful to this great civilizing mission, that task which God appointed for it to do and which my grandfather marked out. May such prizes as your Royal Highness and my cousins always be granted to us, and then shall we be able to say of ourselves and of the German Empire something similar to what was once said by my lamented great grandfather : ‘ You have harassed me from my youth up but you have never been able to overcome me.’ ”

A monument to the Great Elector was put up in the "Avenue of Victory" at Berlin. A replica of this was presented to Bielefeld, which was unveiled by the Emperor in August 1900. In the course of a long speech the Kaiser said :

### SOLDIERS FROM EVERY HAMLET

"To me it is perhaps granted to fulfil part of the Great Elector's dream, the accomplishment of which has for a time been placed in the background by other tasks away beyond the sea. What he could only point to we are now able to take up on a large scale because we have a united Fatherland. The marching forth of an army consisting of sons from every hamlet of Germany for a common struggle in support of the black, white, and red flag shows that the arm of the German Emperor reaches to the remotest parts of the world. Without the Great Elector this would have been impossible. If every one takes the same view of his task as he had then, I am convinced that great times are still in store for our great German Fatherland."

### BULLETS, NOT BALLOTS

In connexion with the laying of the foundation stone of a new Lutheran church at Berlin, and the simultaneous presentation of colours to new regiments, the Kaiser referred to Luther's famous saying, and the perilous path he followed. And he added :

"Many a similar path has our nation, our House, and with it the Prussian army, trodden. The 18th of April has always been for us a day of memories. On April 18, 1417, the Burgrave Frederick I was invested with the fief of the Mark of Brandenburg. On April 18, 1864, Prince Frederick Charles, after a long interval of peace, led the Prussian and the Austrian armies at Düppel against the brave enemy, and

afforded his troops an opportunity of storming the entrenchments of their brave adversaries. In memory of the importance of this anniversary, I have presented to the regiments new colours and standards. It is the soldier and the army, not Parliamentary majorities and votes, that have welded the German Empire together. My confidence rests upon the army."

### ALLIANCE SEALED ON THE BATTLEFIELD

On the centenary of the birth of the Emperor William I in March 1897, the Kaiser seized the opportunity to promulgate the Imperial idea in a long proclamation to the army, one of the paragraphs of which was :

"When a hostile attack threatened Germany's frontiers and assailed her honour and independence, the long-separated peoples of the North and the South again came together. Sealed on the battlefields of France with streams of the blood of heroes, the brotherhood in arms of the German armies became the corner-stone of the new empire and the bond which everlastingly unites the princes and the peoples of Germany. Of this unification the splendid monument which the love and veneration of the German people to-day dedicates to their great Emperor, the father of the Fatherland, is convincing evidence."

Speaking at Nuremberg (Bavaria) in July 1902, the Kaiser said :

"On the bloody field of battle, when the victory was won, the German princes, clasped hand in hand together and surrounded by their cheering regiments, their peoples in arms, restored the German Empire. Passed and gone for ever, if God wills it, is the awful time, the time when there was no Emperor. Once again is the proud banner of the empire reared aloft, the black eagle on the field of gold, surrounded by

the standards of the princely houses, and to guard it are encamped around it the legions of the warlike peoples of Germany flashing and gleaming with arms."

### CO-OPERATIVE BLOODSHED

The Kaiser in September 1899 was at Karlsruhe in the company of the Grand Duke of Baden, in reply to the Imperial toast at a banquet given at the castle, the Emperor said :

"The surcest bond to cement the unity of our Fatherland is loyal co-operation and bloodshed on the battlefield in a common cause. May the closing century find our young empire and our army in the same condition in which our great Emperor bequeathed it to us, and may we always be mindful that it is our duty to protect religion, which should be preserved for the nation, and to uphold morals and order."

### GOD AND OUR GERMAN SWORD !

In October 1895 the Kaiser unveiled a monument on the battlefield of Wörth, in memory of his father, Frederick III. His Majesty said :

"Our feelings here in the presence of this statue and in consideration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the great time of the regeneration of our Fatherland, in which, at this very spot, South and North German blood first united to cement the bond which helped to build up anew the German Empire—these emotions, I say, deeply stir the hearts of all of us.

"In the presence of the statue of the victorious and illustrious monarch, we, of the younger generation, solemnly vow to preserve what he won for us on the battlefield, to guard the Crown which he wrought, to defend the Imperial territories against all comers and to keep them German—so help us God and our German sword."

## CHAPTER IX

### ON GOD

MANY of the Kaiser's speeches might give the reader the impression that his Majesty is a profoundly religious man. He professes a sympathy with the aspirations of the Lutheran Church, and many of his phrases are directly or indirectly borrowed from the scriptures. But his Majesty does not show any broad or sympathetic understanding of the aims and discipline of the Roman Catholic hierarchy.

British critics, conversant with the Kaiser's religious attitude, are apt to view his Majesty's professions with suspicion. To his Prussian subjects, however, the Emperor's utterances on religious matters are accepted seriously and find an echo in the hearts of the people. In a word the Kaiser's religion is a German religion; his God is a German god; his Church is a German church. His Deity is a Lord of Hosts and a God of Battles—a conception taken almost literally out of the pages of the Old Testament, more or less amalgamated with the idealism of the Norse mythology. In the Emperor's mind the Israelitish idea of Javeh is quite indistinguishable from the Scandinavian idea of Thor.

At the concluding meeting of the conference of educational experts summoned by the German Emperor in December 1890, the Kaiser made a reference to the place of religion in the German national educational system:

“In my address at the opening of the deliberations I did not allude to religion, but my ideas on the subject are as clear as the noonday sun to every observer. As King and ‘*summus episcopus*’ of my Church, my duty is to foster and increase religious sentiment and a Christian spirit in the schools. The

schools and the Church must in this matter support each other for the education of youth up to the requirements of modern life in the State. We find ourselves at the turning-point of a general forward movement into the new century. My ancestors, with their finger on the pulse of time, have ever kept a look out for what might come to pass, and thus remained at the head of the movement which they had resolved to direct. I believe I have mastered the aims of the new spirit of the expiring century. As in the question of social reforms, so in this matter also I have decided not to oppose the new tendencies."

### GOD AS AN ALLY

Speaking at a banquet of the Provincial Diet of Brandenburg in February 1892, the Kaiser said :

"The firm conviction of your sympathy in my labours gives me renewed strength to persist in my work, and to press forward on the path which Heaven has laid out for me. I am helped thereto by my feeling of responsibility to the Ruler of all, and the firm conviction that He, our old ally of Rossbaeh and Dennewitz, will not leave me in the lurch. He has given Himself such endless trouble with our old Mark and with our House that we can assume that He has not done this for nothing. No, Brandenburgers, on the contrary, we are called to greatness, and to glorious days will I lead you. Do not let grumblings and the party speeches of discontented persons darken your future or lessen your pleasure in your co-operation with me. With winged words alone nothing can be done, and to the unending complaints about the new course and the men who direct it I answer confidently and decidedly, my course is the right one and I shall continue to steer it."

In 1898 the German Emperor visited Palestine, and

on October 31 attended the consecration of a church at Jerusalem. In an address which followed the ecclesiastical ceremony, the Kaiser said :

### “SERVING THE LORD”

“As almost two thousand years ago, so too to-day, shall that call ring through the world which sums up the longing hope of us all, ‘Peace on earth.’ Not splendour, not power, not glory, not honour, no earthly blessing is it that we seek here ; we pine, we pray, we strive alone after the sole, the highest blessing, the salvation of our souls. And as I on this solemn day repeat the vow made by my ancestors at rest in God, ‘I and my House will serve the Lord,’ so do I call upon all of you to make the same vow.

“Let every man, whatever his position in life, whatever his calling, take care that all who bear the name of the crucified Lord may so walk under the banner of His glorious name, that they may triumph over all the powers of darkness, that spring from sin and selfishness. May God grant that from this place rich streams of blessing may flow over all Christendom ; that on the throne and in the cottage, at home and abroad, trust in God, love for our neighbours, patience in suffering and unflagging industry may ever remain the noblest ornament of the German nation, that the spirit of peace may ever more and more permeate and sanctify the Evangelical Church.”

### THE KAISER'S SERMON

On July 29, 1900, the German Emperor was on board his yacht the *Hohenzollern*, and there being no chaplain on board, the Emperor conducted divine service. On this occasion he preached a sermon of his own composition, taking as a text Exodus xvii, 11. “And it came to pass, when Moses held up his hand, that Israel prevailed ; but when he let down his hand, Amalek prevailed.”



We are indebted to the courtesy of the proprietors of the *Christian World* to reproduce the following report of his Majesty's sermon :

"That is the sacred battle picture of our text. Who does not understand what it means for us to-day? The heathen spirit of the Amalekites is again astir in far-off Asia. With great might and much cunning, with fire and with slaughter is the attempt being made to bar the way of European commerce and of European intelligence, to check the triumphal progress of Christian morality and of the Christian faith. And once again has the word of God gone forth, 'Choose us out men, and go out and fight with Amalek.' A terrible and bloody struggle has begun. Many of our brethren are already under fire, many are on their way to the hostile shore. But we who are bound by sacred duties to remain behind at home, do we not hear the word of God which goes out to us and says, 'Climb up to the mountain-top. Raise thy hands to heaven.' The prayer of the good man is mighty when it is sincere. Thus let it be: away in the distant land the warrior hosts, here at home the host of supplicants. . . .

"Fellow Christians, in order that our brethren may remain of good cheer under the worst privations, faithful when their duty is most difficult, unwavering when the danger is the greatest, they need something more than ammunition and edged weapons, more even than youthful courage and the fire of enthusiasm. They need the blessing from above. Without this they cannot win or keep the victory. And this heavenly world is accessible to prayer alone. Prayer is the golden key to the treasury of our God. But who has the key has also the promise, 'Ask and ye shall receive.' . . . We will mobilize not only battalions of warriors, but also a holy foree of suplicants. And there is

much that we have to beg and pray for on behalf of our brethren who are going forth to fight. They are to be the strong arm that is to chastise the assassins. They are to be called the raised fist that is to strike into the midst of these wild deeds. They have to defend, sword in hand, all that we hold most sacred. . . .

"God has hung the prayer-bell in the sunshine and happiness. How often does it hang there mute? But when the storm-wind of necessity breaks out it begins to sound. May the earnest days that are upon us, the heavy clouds which gather over us, set the prayer-bells ringing. Let our prayers be as a wall of fire round the camp of our brethren. Eternity will show that the secret prayers of righteous men were a great power in these struggles, will reveal the fulfilment of the old promise, 'Call upon Me in trouble and I will deliver thee.' Therefore pray continuously."

### THE KAISER'S PRAYER

At the conclusion of the service his Majesty offered the following prayer:

"Almighty God, dear Heavenly Father, O Thou Lord of Hosts and Ruler of battles, we raise our hands to Thee in prayer. To Thy goodness we commend the thousands of our brothers in arms, whom Thou, Thyself has called forth to fight. Shield Thou the lives of our sons with Thy omnipotent protection. Lead Thou our soldiers to a mighty victory. To Thy goodness we commend the wounded and the sick. Be Thou their consolation and their strength. Heal Thou the wounds they have received for king and country. To Thy goodness we commend all those whom it is Thy will shall die upon the distant field of battle. Stand Thou by them in their last fight, and give them eternal peace. To

Thy goodness we commend our people. **Maintain** and sanctify and strengthen the exaltation which now inspires us. O Lord our God, we go forth relying upon Thy help. Lead Thou us on. We boast, O Lord, that Thou aidest us. In Thy name we raise our standard. O Lord, we will not let Thee go until Thou bless us. Amen."

## PART II

### By THE CROWN PRINCE

#### CHAPTER I

#### THE PRINCE AS A PEACE PROMOTER

FREDERICK WILLIAM, the Crown Prince of Prussia and eldest son of the Kaiser, is, by all accounts, a composite personality.

If it be possible morally, as well as biologically, to inherit mutually destructive traits of ancestry, then the Crown Prince has large potentialities for both the virtues and the defects of the Hohenzollerns.

He was born at the Marble Palace, Potsdam, on May 6, 1882. His early education was such as fitted a prince and a gentleman. He went to Bonn University and made extensive travels. All his recorded earlier utterances show him as modest and benevolent. Yet his later associations with the German army go far to verify the time-honoured adage: "Evil communications corrupt good manners."

The extracts in this part, unless otherwise stated, are taken, by special permission, from "The Kaiser's Heir," published 1914 by Messrs. Mills and Boon, Ltd., 49 Rupert Street, London, W. Price six shillings.

Soon after his wedding with the Duchess Cecilia of Mecklenburg-Schwerin on June 6, 1902, the Crown Prince found occasion to express his wishes for his future career. He said:

"I hope that God will preserve my father to me for a very long time to come. My wife and I have

## 102 THE PRINCE AS A PEACE PROMOTER

resolved to devote ourselves to the welfare of the people, to the care of the sick, to religion and education, and to science and the fine arts. We wish to learn and to extend our sphere of knowledge so that, later, we may be in a position to judge and give suggestions. We shall be grateful to anyone who will help us to attain our object."

### THE FATHER OF HIS COMPANY

After the honeymoon the Crown Prince resumed his military duties as Captain of the 1st Foot Guards at Potsdam. He was adored by all. This is how he once addressed his men :

"If ever you have any sorrow or care, or, if anything is the matter with your absent dear ones, and you are troubled about it, I shall expect you to come and confide in me ; for you are as my children, and as father of the company I shall feel it my duty to try and cheer you up and rid you of your worry. I tell you so most emphatically. Do not feel shy—as is so often done by the friendless soldier far from home, but come and tell me quite frankly when you are in any difficulty, either of a service or a social kind, and you will always find me full of sympathy. The company must be a second home to you.

"I do not believe that any one of you will ever be so wicked as to neglect his duty, and I hope that by your alacrity and punctuality you will all delight me and do me honour. To be a good soldier is not easy, as you know ; yet not only is much expected of you yourselves, but also of your superiors.

"Let us therefore all work together in a spirit of mutual trust and camaraderie—ever up to time in every respect. I shall then be satisfied with you, and you yourselves will also feel all the better for it. Then will I ease for you the burden of your duties."

In May 1911 the Crown Prince was appointed to the command of the 1st Life Hussars, known as the "Death's Heads" from the device on their busbies. In November 1918, H.I.H. intervened in the Zabern incident, and the Kaiser, it was supposed, by way of punishment, ordered him to Dantzig. The Crown Prince bade farewell to his regiment in the following words :

### FAREWELL TO THE "DEATH'S HEADS"

"Hussars of my regiment—For more than two years I have worn the same coat, and faithfully followed the same standard as you. His Majesty the Emperor and King has assigned me a fresh field of military work, and I must obey. It is cursedly difficult for me, and my heart is breaking at the thought that I shall no longer ride through life at your head. You will all feel that at this moment, I am sure.

"The two happiest years of my life I have spent in your ranks ; to-day I carry my youth to the grave. True, they can separate me from you, but my heart and my spirit remain with you. If some day the King calls and the signal 'March ! march !' is blown, then think of him whose most yearning wish it always was to experience at your side this moment of highest soldierly happiness.

"But the firm and deep bond that indissolubly unites you, my children of the regiment, with me will only be rent asunder when for me, too, the hour has struck for the march to the great army above. My old, dearly loved regiment, farewell ! hurrah !"

Writing in his hunting diary, relative to grouse-shooting in Scotland, the Crown Prince says :

"These English country mansions are, to my mind, the most elegant and at the same time the most comfortable places that can be imagined. In such a house every guest is looked after in a captivating

manner. And this care operates in a charming, quiet way, which never lets the object of it see that the host is in any way troubling about him.

"In this art of treating guests the English show positive genius and are exemplary. With us it is always thought necessary to amuse a guest; he is tormented to death with occupations, pleasures, and sight-seeing which generally possess much more attraction for all the others than for the victim in question. None of that in England.

"Meals take place at fixed hours, when the house-party assembles. If nothing particular, shooting, for instance, is going on, each one is then absolutely his own master. As these house-parties are generally composed of high-spirited young men and very pretty girls, the essential conditions of a pleasant sojourn are given. At the same time the house and grounds of the host are placed unreservedly at the disposal of the guests in the most daring interpretation of the term. If one wants to ride, he only need say so; motoring, fishing, shooting, sailing, tennis, golf, flirting—all are there.

"Such a home of perfect hospitality was this Scottish nobleman's seat. In the evening every guest received a gardenia as a buttonhole for his dress-coat. In the morning the party started off in four-in-hand coaches, while the amiable master of the house followed with me in a small American buggy. This he drove, as otherwise it bored him, at full gallop to the rendezvous. The springs were so constructed that there was no jolting. These drives, too, I found novel and delightful; for here (in Berlin) one only sees runaway cabs, and batteries getting into action at the gallop."

#### "WHY SHOULD WE FIGHT WITH ENGLAND?"

In the winter of 1910-11 the Crown Prince made a tour which included a good deal of sport in India. While

in camp at Kiliban, in the Mirzapur district, H.I.H. was reading a Reuter telegram which dealt with a speech regarding the possibility of war between Great Britain and Germany, delivered by Mr. T. Gibson Bowles. To a member of his suite the Crown Prince is reported to have said :

“Germany dreams less of war than those party leaders who always talk of it for purposes of their party warfare. The spirit of the German people is not bellicose, but peaceful; and war is the last thing we want. Why should we fight with England, which is closely allied to us by blood and sentiment, and is the only country with which we form friendship on a footing of equality? Personally I like England, and follow the policy of my father, who always thinks that the peace of the world can only be maintained by a close understanding between England and Germany.”

### THE DELIGHT OF THE FIGHT

“With all our hearts, we sportsmen pity other mortals to whom deer-stalking is either denied or unknown. And when I speak of hunting I really mean *deer-stalking*. For it seems to me that anyone who has pondered on the subject of hunting—this wonderful combination of combat, of enjoyment of Nature, and of self-contemplation—is only thinking of deer-stalking; to him the sport of the battue has no justification except as shooting practice, and none at all as sport.

“The personally-dangerous fight such as our ancestors indulged in, the hand-to-hand encounter with the wild animal, has now, more's the pity, been reduced by our ever-increasing culture almost to vanishing-point. Therefore the innate joy of the true sportsman must find an equivalent in the struggles of the physical exertion of stalking, of enduring the vagaries



106 THE PRINCE AS A PEACE PROMOTER

of the weather, of outwitting the game, and finally, in a good shot.

“But this pleasure in the struggle itself alone—in what we to-day may still call the fight—is really not what attracts us sportsmen out into the woods. The great book of beautiful Nature opens willingly and of itself before the real huntsman. In the glowing sunrise or in the weary noiseless midday sleep of Nature, in the mild evening which sheds its peace over wood and field, in the wild moaning south wind of the mountains, great, beautiful Nature speaks with ever-varying, ever-powerful voices to us lonely stalking huntsmen and sings to us the song of songs of the Creator.

“It is a difficult matter to speak of religious feelings and conceptions. I only know one thing: I, in whose innermost soul the saying of my great ancestors, ‘In my State every one may be happy according to his own way,’ re-echoes, I have never felt nearer to my God than when I sit with my rifle across my knees in the golden morning of the lonely mountain heights, or in the thrilling stillness of the evening forest.”

[Translated for this work from *Aus meinem Jagd-Tagebuch*, pp. 143-145.]

## CHAPTER II

### UNDER JUNKER INFLUENCE

THE Crown Prince entered in the political arena in November 1911, when he came, more or less surreptitiously, to Berlin and sat in the Royal Box at the Reichstag to listen to the debates on the Morocco question—a question which stirred Germany to its depths. The German Government was disposed to be reasonable, and as a matter of fact in the end left France a free hand in Morocco in return for concessions on the Congo. But there was a party of fire-eaters in Germany to whom the Kaiser's conciliatory policy was obnoxious.

#### THE PRINCE APPLAUDS IN THE REICHSTAG

Dr. von Heydebrand, the leader of the Prussian "Junkers," made a memorable speech against the backing-down policy of the Government during the Morocco crisis. To this the Crown Prince not only listened attentively, but even led the applause. The speech therefore may be regarded as expressing the true sentiments of the Kaiser's heir. We give the following substantial extracts, which have been specially translated for this work from the official Reichstag reports:

"Now I come to the AGREEMENT itself, and I must say that my political friends are not entirely satisfied with it. We had hoped that it would produce greater and better results. Gentlemen, what we abandon, what we concede, is certainly in our eyes enormous. The Chancellor has not denied—and he cannot do so—that until now, since the Algeciras treaty and on former occasions and again through the Treaty of 1909, we had in Morocco equal rights with France except for a few restrictions and certain reservations.

Morocco has now, politically speaking, been entirely surrendered to France. One cannot absolutely now speak of an independent Morocco. And that occurs with the sanction of the German Empire! Yes, gentlemen, that is an act having so great a political significance, it is a concession which may and will have such far-reaching results, that one had a right to expect that what we received in exchange for it would in itself be of great value. But we cannot first of all recognize this great value in that which we have won.

"Gentlemen, the economic rights which had until now been accorded to us or which we were entitled to claim in Morocco have been more clearly defined and stated in a fine series of paragraphs in which all kinds of assurances have been given. But, gentlemen, every one knows that such assurances, and more especially in administrative and economic domains, are things which, after all, are subject to alterations or which may have a different construction placed upon them hereafter. When the final security consists merely of an Arbitration Court, in the formation of which France has a preponderating influence, then one must feel that the rights involved, which were reserved by us not only for Germany but for the whole world, by no means carry with them that guarantee which might be assumed at first sight. Above all, one asks oneself, when the German Empire from its own point of view is making an extraordinary political concession, in what then consists the special position obtained, in consideration thereof, by the German Empire? Are we, then, merely to be the mandatory of Europe? Might we not, then, have expected that the German Empire would likewise have obtained special rights in an economic sense. The poet stands speechless entirely.

"With regard to the Congo concession, the Chancellor has himself pointed out the strong objections which exist in this connexion. According to the

information in the possession of my political friends, that which has been allotted to us is a very questionable objective in point of climate and of sanitary and economic conditions. We will not entirely deny that these deserts and swamps would not, after all, be worth developing, even if it may not be assumed that there will be many German colonists willing to settle there. But what the State Secretary of the Colonial Office here inferred when he stated that he did not think he could undertake the responsibility of these matters is quite comprehensible, and on that account we incline to the opinion that too little has been got out of this. I am quite aware that it is very easy to say this. The State Secretary will probably think so too, and he may perhaps once say: 'Pray, what do you think should have been done in the matter?'

"We do not draw the conclusion that we should have maintained the Algeciras Act, for the whole matter is torn to shreds. But we do consider that we had reserved to ourselves full freedom with regard to our future claims, and in addition also the will and the determination to realize them in a given situation and at the right time, that would be of more importance than what has been submitted to us. The Chancellor has especially emphasized the point that there was a great political significance attached to the fact that for the first time we had succeeded in coming to an arrangement with France.

#### "OUR GOOD GERMAN SWORD"

"Now, gentlemen, personally I cannot quite share that view. I can understand that France feels quite satisfied with the situation. But I do not allow myself to be under the illusion that on that account the hopes which are still high in France to-day will receive their death-blow. That which assures us peace is not these concessions, it is not these agree-

ments nor these understandings, hut only our good German sword, and at the same time the feeling that the French will certainly have that we anticipate a Government that is willing, at the proper time, to prevent this sword from rusting in its scabbard. But beyond that I abstain from associating myself with the reproaches which have been rained down like hail upon our German Imperial government.

“I must now in this connexion also touch upon the speeches which the Chancellor has described as after-dinner speeches, but to which not only my political friends but also the whole of the German nation must and does attach a far wider significance than they would to mere after-dinner speeches. The Chancellor stated that when the ship was sent to Agadir the fact was communicated to all the European nations and courts, together with the statement that we had no intention of seeking extension of territory in that direction—a statement concerning which there might be a difference of opinion.

“If that was communicated to the English Government, if it was said to the English Government that we were seeking nothing there, as a matter of fact but to protect a few rights which we had already acquired, one hears in that, not merely an after-dinner speech, but a declaration which was based upon the deliberations of the whole ministry. When we hear a speech which we may stigmatize as a menace and a challenge—as a humiliating challenge—one cannot so easily dismiss the matter as mere after-dinner speeches.

“The German nation will not stand such after-dinner speeches. That it should please the English to forget these things, and to know nothing after having just failed to involve France and Germany in a war which might possibly not have been to England's advantage—that this should be forgotten at such a moment may be well understood from the English point of view, but we Germans have not yet forgotten

it. Is it not true that an ambassador spoke about us at a European court and about our German politics in a manner that must send a blush of shame to our faces ?

### UNMASKING BRITAIN'S ANIMOSITY!

“ That such things did really come to pass is the difficulty in the situation, and it cannot be dismissed out of the world by merely ignoring it. We know it. Like a flash of lightning in the night, this has revealed to the whole German nation where her enemy is. The German nation knows now that if it wishes to expand in the world, *if it wishes to seek its place in the sun* which has been assigned to it by its rights and by its vocation, it now knows where stands the one who will speak the word of command, whether it is to be allowed or not. Gentlemen, we Germans are not accustomed to have to put up with this kind of thing, and the German nation will know what reply to give.

“ If the Imperial Government has given the reply—the German reply to this English question—I hope it has been given; but the German nation, when the hour strikes, knows what this reply has to be. For it is a question of its final existence, and no nation, and the German nation least of all, will allow itself to be deprived of that. And this I declare, that the decisive moment is the affair of those who govern. Those who govern have the right and also the duty to make this decision, and we expect that they will be upheld by the feeling of the honour of the German nation. But we Germans will be ready—and I declare this here—whenever and to whatever extent it may be necessary, to make sacrifices for it.

“ Gentlemen, it is my task to declare here, in the name of all my political friends, that when the hour and the country and our honour demand it, that we

shall be ready to offer sacrifices not only of blood but of possessions. Certainly, and if it be demanded of us, and the necessary sources of income be not available, we are also ready to lay the property of the landed proprietors on the altar of the Fatherland.

"But it is not advisable to start from a quarrel in proceeding to a national action which is to ensure the security of our honour, of our national existence. That is the reply which we have to give you, and I can only add one word to the leaders of the Empire: we, the German nation and the representatives of the German nation who sit here, are ready to face the consequences of the serious situation concerning which I have spoken. But we are also convinced, and we expect it after the words formerly pronounced by the Chancellor, that the Imperial Government will also allow itself to be guided by the clings. For it is not a question of a government, of a parliament, of a master, or of a servant. The nation which does not risk her all for her honour is unworthy."

Such are the views which the German Crown Prince has publically applauded. Privately and semi-privately he has done much more. On the appearance of a book breathing hatred of Great Britain from the pen of Col. H. Frobenius, the Kaiser's heir sent the author a congratulatory telegram; and by a similar message he endorsed a fiery speech delivered by Professor Buchholz, of Posen, in April 1914.

## CHAPTER III

### THE CROWN PRINCE AS A JINGO

THE speech of Dr. von Heydebrand was not the only thing that influenced the plastic mind of Prince Frederick William, the Kaiser's heir. At about the time when the Crown Prince was ordered to Dantzic a highly sensational shilling book entitled "The Human Slaughter-house," was selling by the hundred thousand. Its author was William Lamszus, and the sub-title "Scenes from the War that is sure to come."

Lamszus painted a truly lurid picture of blood-lust and savagery, and received the thanks of an international peace conference—the book being, indeed, a violent yet reasoned attack on the whole theory of militarism. Attempts were made to suppress the book in Germany, but one fine morning the Kaiser awoke to find his son more famous than himself. The Crown Prince had stepped into the breach and wrote what was a counterblast to the appeal of Lamszus. This took the form of a contribution to an illustrated book on the German army for which his Imperial Highness wrote an article on his old regiment. Amongst other things he said :

"For him who has once ridden in a charge in peace there is nothing better except another ride ending in a clash with the foe. How often in the midst of a charge have I caught the yearning cry of a comrade, '*Donnerwetter*, if it were only in earnest !' That is the cavalry spirit. Every true soldier must feel and know it. *Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori.*

"More than other countries, our Fatherland is compelled to trust to its good weapons. Badly protected by its unfavourable frontiers, situated in the centre of Europe, not regarded by all nations with



## 114 THE CROWN PRINCE AS A JINGO

love, the German Empire has, more than any other peoples of our old earth, the sacred duty to maintain the army and the fleet always at the highest degree of readiness to strike. Only thus supported by our good sword can we obtain the place in the sun which is our due, but is not voluntarily conceded to us.

### THE FOOLISH DREAM OF PEACE

"We live to-day in a time which emphasizes with special gratification the proud elevation of its culture, which only too eagerly glories in its international cosmopolitanism and indulges in foolish dreams of the possibility of a perpetual world-peace. This view of life is un-German and does not become us. A German who loves his nation, who believes in the greatness and future of our home, and will never agree to see its prestige diminished, must not close his eyes in such reveries, must not permit himself to be lulled into slothful slumber by the peace-lullaby of the Utopians.

"Since the last great war Germany has behind her a period of economic advancement which has something almost alarming about it. Prosperity has increased among all sections of our people to such an extent that the demands on the standard of life and luxury have developed rankly. Now it shall certainly not be thanklessly overlooked that great economic prosperity creates much that is good. But the shady sides of this all-too-rapid development appear in many directions in an unpleasant and menacing guise. Already the estimation of money has obtained amongst us an importance that can only be regarded with anxiety.

"The most able achievement, as such, is to-day, unfortunately, already valued less than the fortune that a man has inherited or scraped together. And often the question is no longer asked in what manner that fortune has been acquired. Things which

formerly were not regarded as 'fair' [the Prince used the English word, for which there is no exact German equivalent], or, to put it better, as respectable, are tacitly permitted—all is sacrificed to the frenzied pursuit of money. The old ideals, nay, even the prestige and honour of the nation, may suffer, for peace, peace at any price, is required for the undisturbed earning of money.

### NECESSITY OF WARLIKE CAPACITY

"We certainly do not want to breed saints of the type of Simon Stylites, who, resigning all the joys of our beautiful earth, choose wild honey for their food and camels' hair for their raiments. Let us regard the comfort and luxury of our age as an agreeable supplement to life, and as something which is without justification in itself, and which we cheerfully fling away when the Emperor calls us and our hands must be free for the sword. Then, though the world were full of devils in arms against us, we shall outmatch them, be the stress of the hour what it will.

"If we study the pages of history we find that they are traversed as with a red thread by the doctrine of the necessity of warlike capacity in a people—a view illustrated by recent events in the Balkans, with their interesting examples of a people, weaker in numbers, overcoming by unexhausted capacity for war and fresh *élan* an opponent once highly esteemed by experts but resting on his laurels.

### THE SWORD MUST ALWAYS DECIDE

"True, diplomatic skill can and must postpone conflicts for a time, and occasionally solve them. True, all in authority must and will be fully conscious in the hour of decision of their enormous responsibility. They will have to realize that the gigantic conflagration once ignited will not so easily and speedily be

## 116 THE CROWN PRINCE AS A JINGO

extinguished. But just as lightning equalizes the tension in two differently charged strata of the air, *so will the sword always be, and remain till the end of the world, the finally decisive factor.*"

In December 1913 the Crown Prince was recalled from Dantzig to Berlin to join the General Staff of the army, but the reason was not at once made public. Ugly rumours of friction between the Prince and the officers at Dantzig were set at rest by the following voluntary statement communicated to the Press :

"When I took over the command of the 1st Body Hussars at Dantzig, more than two years ago, my employment later in the General Staff was already in contemplation. After the manœuvres last autumn I ought to have come to Berlin, but begged to be allowed to remain another year. That was at first granted me. Then, in December, I was commanded to join the General Staff, as his Majesty considered it necessary, in view of the present position of affairs [in Europe and their grave possibilities] that I should already begin my training in the higher leading of troops. In the contingency referred to I should of course have a higher command than a regiment, and I must prepare myself accordingly by service at the General Staff.

## PART III

By DR. VON BETHMANN-HOLLWEG

CHANCELLOR OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE

### INTRODUCTION

DR. VON BETHMANN-HOLLWEG succeeded Prince von Bülow as German Chancellor because, as Bismarck once remarked, the Kaiser wanted to be his own Chancellor. And the Emperor has gained his desire.

It is therefore to be expected that the present Chancellor should merely reflect his master's ideas, and carry out his wishes. Personally he is mild and moderate, neither aggressive nor Chauvinistic a civil service official by career, without the world-wide view or the international experience of von Bülow. He was born in Brandenburg nearly sixty years ago, of an old banking family. He started his official career as a local assessor and gradually worked up through the bureaucratic grades. His support is the Conservative Party, the Prussian Junkers, the reactionaries.

Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg is therefore a type of the present German ruling class, and the following record of his words, taken from his speeches in the Reichstag, represents the attitude of that class. Softened by the speaker's own moderate personality and the necessities of his office, but with the sinister premise of might and war mania still their strongest element, his sarcastic and insincere speeches belittling arbitration and the peace movement, or voicing his cynical viewpoint on treaties as "scraps of paper" mark him as a preacher of the gospel of blood and iron.

## CHAPTER I

### IMPRACTICABILITY OF DISARMAMENT

*[Translation of a speech by Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg;  
from the Official Reichstag Reports, Vol. 266]*

THE question of disarmament is being continually broached by the Peace Party in Parliaments and Congresses. The first Peace Conference at The Hague also dealt with the subject, but was obliged finally to content itself with expressing the desire that Governments should continually study the question. Germany acceded to this proposition, but we have not found any practical formula. It has not been brought to my knowledge that other Governments have been more successful. The consideration of the question has up to the present, as far as my knowledge goes, not led to any practical result. At least, I have not yet come across anywhere any proposal which could in any way be adopted which entered to the slightest extent even into any detail, and which lent itself to earnest discussion.

I believe that you [the Peace Party] have set us a perhaps ideal task, but in practice it is not one that can be solved. These words are not intended to reflect on the value of the work of the party in favour of peace and of disarmament. The time when in Europe wars were made through Cabinets has passed. The keynotes from which wars might arise with us at present are to be found elsewhere. They have their foundation in the antagonisms which the national susceptibilities are called upon to bear. Every one is aware that these susceptibilities are very easily influenced and that unfortunately at the present day they are swayed irresolutely by irresponsible wire-pullings of the Press. A counter-weight for all such

and similar influences is only too desirable, and I shall be the first to greet it with gratitude, should the international labourers be successful in forging such counter-weights.

### GERMANY'S CONSTANT POLICY

But if I am to take to practical measures, if I am to circulate among the Powers proposals concerning disarmament, then general protestations and assertions about peace will not suffice. Germany is absolved from these by a constant policy of forty years, which shows that we do not seek to pick quarrels in the world. But I must be able to lay down a well-defined working proposal; then I must objectively test this programme, to find out whether such a programme could in any case be laid down, and in the event of its being laid down, whether it would be possible to carry it out. Anyone who brought forward uncertain and vague proposals might very well become a peace-breaker instead of a pacifier.

If the Great Powers should wish to reach a settlement concerning a general international disarmament, they must first agree amongst themselves as to the value that the individual nations claim in relation to one another. A sort of rank list must be drawn up in which each nation receives her number, together with a limitation of the sphere of influence accorded to her, and for which an analogy may be found in the procedure of industrial syndicates. I should be bound to refuse to draw up such a formula, and to present it to an international Areopagus.

In practice—one might perhaps say—that our claim to rank has already been announced. England is convinced—and has repeatedly declared it—that in spite of all her desires to reduce armament expenditure and allow her disputes to be settled by arbitration; her fleet must under any circumstances be equal to any combination of the navies of the

## 120 IMPRACTICABILITY OF DISARMAMENT

world, or rather slightly in excess. To uphold this condition is the good right of England; and considering how I stand with regard to the question of disarmament, I should be the last to call in question such a right.

But it is a somewhat different matter to make such a claim the basis of a settlement which is to be accepted by peaceful agreement by the other Powers. What if other counter-claims should be raised, if other Powers should not be satisfied with the contingent granted to them? It is only necessary to raise such questions in order to know what would happen at a World Congress—for a European Congress would not suffice—which had to pronounce a verdict upon such claims. And then, gentlemen, the armies! If, for instance, it should be demanded that Germany should reduce her army by, say, 100,000 men, by how much then would the armies of France, of Russia, and of Austria and Italy have to be reduced? If it be desired to arrive at any numerical ratio, it would be necessary first to fix the general ratio of power in which these nations were to stand to one another. Otherwise it would be impossible to determine any ratio of strength for the armies.

In spite of all assurances of peace, which God be thanked are being declared on all sides, each nation would reply to my preliminary inquiry that she claims that rank in the world, which corresponds to the aggregate of her national strength, and that her fighting strength must be determined in accordance with this claim. I should certainly give that reply for Germany and no other. And I should be offending the honour and the national feelings of that other nation if I were to give her any other reply.

The social democratic motion draws attention to the negotiations in the French Chamber of Deputies. But, in spite of these negotiations did not the new

French Ministry in introducing itself to the Chamber, make the programmatic declaration, received with lively applause, that France, like all the other Governments, regarded a strong defensive power as an essential guarantee of peace, and that she would, therefore, bestow her especial care upon her fighting strength on land and on sea.

You may rely upon it—no other reply would be given. And yet from such replies, a scheme for disarmament is to be drawn up! But even let us suppose that the nation would consent to allow an International Congress to dictate to them what rank they should take in the world, then we should still have to find a standard according to which we could weigh the strengths of the armies against one another. Such a standard has been sought with the greatest trouble, but up to now without result. I need not introduce to you in detail the absolute and relative formulæ which they have sought to draw up. All these things are known to you. But in these formulæ they have not yet discovered any practical standard, and this has been recognized likewise by the partisans of disarmament.

### MUTUAL INTERNATIONAL MISTRUST

Finally, and before all, any attempt to secure a general international disarmament, must, according to my opinion, always go to pieces on the question of control! I consider any kind of control to be absolutely impracticable, and every attempt at control would lead only to continual mutual distrust and lasting excitement.

Who would consent to the weakening of their means of defence, so long as they had not the absolute guarantee that none of their neighbours were strengthening their fighting strength in secrecy, beyond the limit allowed by the disarmament settlement? Remember the classical case in point of



## 122 IMPRACTICABILITY OF DISARMAMENT

Prussia's overthrow by Napoleon. Napoleon had allowed Prussia an army of 42,000 men, and he possessed real means of control which no other Power had ever wielded in respect of any other Power, or will ever wield. But in spite of the relentless use of this means of control, Prussian patriotism together with the great and gifted leaders of the Prussian nation, succeeded in raising an army of four times greater strength than the conqueror had authorized.

Whoever thinks over earnestly and objectively this question of a general disarmament, and considers it in its remotest contingencies, must come to the conviction that it is a question which cannot be solved so long as men are men, and States are States.

Several other members, who have spoken before me, have referred to the observations made on the subject of disarmament by the English Minister for Foreign Affairs. The English Minister expressed the thought on this occasion, that an exchange of information between England and Germany on their mutual shipbuilding would ensure them against surprises, and would strengthen the conviction in both countries that neither would secretly outdo the other. But through this exchange of information the other nations would also be enlightened concerning the relation which England bears to Germany, and that that also would conduce to a general peace.

We were able to agree to this idea all the more readily, since our programme of construction for the fleet has from the very beginning been open to the whole world, and we have, therefore, declared ourselves ready to have an understanding with England on this score, in the hope that the public mind in England would thereby be tranquillized.

The question of arbitration has in recent times been very warmly discussed, and more especially in

the direction of the possibility of arranging arbitration treaties without the inclusion of the so-called honour clause. This clause forms a part, as is well known, of all arbitration treaties concluded up to the present, and enacts that no arbitration decision may come into operation if the independence, the honour and the life conditions of one of the parties to the contract be thereby affected.

### ARE ARBITRATION TREATIES ALLIANCES ?

The possibility of such an unlimited arbitration treaty being concluded between America and England has, for instance, been discussed and in connexion with this subject, it has been urged in America more especially, that the effect of such an unlimited arbitration treaty upon the other nations would very closely resemble that of an alliance. It is not part of my office to discuss the chances of such a settlement between Great Britain and the United States of America. It is the business of each nation to arrange with her partner alone under what conditions she consents to conclude an arbitration treaty. I consider that international arbitration treaties, comprehending the whole world and approved by a world congress, are just as impossible as general international disarmaments.

Germany's position with regard to the arbitration treaties is not a negative one. We have in all our new commercial treaties taken the determination that all tariff disputes shall be submitted to a certain process of arbitration. We have concluded with two of the Great Powers general obligatory arbitration treaties of which the one is still valid. It is mainly due to Germany that an international Prize Court has been established at The Hague.

But as regards the honour clause, its excision I am convinced does not conduce to peace, but it merely emphasizes the fact that between the two

## 124 IMPRACTICABILITY OF DISARMAMENT

nations who have struck it out, a serious cause for a breach of the peace is unthinkable. An unlimited arbitration treaty merely places the seal upon conditions already *de facto* in existence. Should these conditions change and circumstances develop antagonism between the two nations, which affect their life conditions, which, as we say in common parlance, cut them to the quick, then I should like to see the arbitration treaty which does not fall to pieces like touch-wood.

One cannot quite strike out the *ultima ratio* from the life of nations. We can only strive to hinder its entrance and postpone it as long as possible. Arbitration treaties are of use for this purpose undoubtedly, and will be the better adapted to it the more they are restricted to judicial means.

When we act practically—and Germany does so—we are doing more effectual work than in introducing conditions which are foreign to the nature of men and of States. In order to cement peace, strength is necessary. The old proverb still holds good, that weakness will always be the booty of the stronger.

If a nation can or will no longer grant a sufficient expenditure on armaments to enable it to effect its purpose in the world, then it must pass into the second rank. It then sinks back into the position of *stasis*. There will always be another there, a stronger one, ready to take its place in the world. We Germans, on account of our exposed situation, are before all, bound to contemplate this rough necessity without flinching. Only then can we ensure to ourselves peace and secure our very existence.

## CHAPTER II

### PRUSSIA'S EFFECTIVE CONTROL

*[Translation of a speech by Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg  
before the Prussian Diet, January 10, 1914]*

THE relations of Prussia with the rest of the German Empire will always constitute a difficult problem. When the Empire was founded, it was feared that Prussia would abuse her superior strength, but as a matter of fact she has, I declare it, never overstepped the original restrictions she placed upon herself. Prussia, gentlemen, will never assail the rights reserved by the constitutional settlement to the other German States. For this reason all the German dynasties have been, and are, firm believers in imperial unity, and Prussia is heartily supported accordingly, in the Federal Council, and her plans and policies accepted in good faith.

The recent granting of a constitution to Alsace-Lorraine has been criticized and attacked, but its chief justification lies in the fact that effective control over the imperial provinces is reserved to, and will be maintained by Prussia. And as to criticisms generally and the passing, or attempt to pass resolutions condemning the policy of the government, I say that such manifestations are relatively unimportant. Even a vote of censure, in my view, is merely a method of establishing the fact that there is a difference of opinion, on some particular, and perhaps not very important matter, between the Reichstag and the Imperial Chancellor.

Like Count Yorck, gentlemen, I will not speak about Zabern. There too, as elsewhere in the German Empire, right will remain right. But I desire to say

## 126 PRUSSIA'S EFFECTIVE CONTROL

one thing on this opportune occasion. During the last few weeks it has been a great satisfaction to me personally to observe how the Prussian nation's whole heart is stirred whenever any question of the honour of the army arises. Such a manifestation of feeling is enough to warm even the coldness of the North Germany soul. I see that, and I am glad to see it, every day, in the enormous number of letters I get from all classes and especially from the simpler German people. All this shows us that the Prussian people perceives in the existence of its army the outward and visible manifestation of its might and strength, and regards the Prussian army as the strongest means of maintaining law and order. I assert, gentlemen, that the passionate aspiration of every Prussian is to protect against all attacks the Prussian army and its leadership by the Prussian King. We must prevent that army ever becoming, after the English model, "the army of Parliament," or under any other than the control of the King of Prussia. The strength of this national army, and its position under kingly leadership must be maintained against all assaults. We cannot forego the responsibility of diminishing one iota of the Prusso-German military system, which has been, and is, and will be the cornerstone of the strength both of the kingdom of Prussia and the German Empire.

The following is a translation of a speech delivered by the German Chancellor in the Reichstag, Jan. 28, 1914.

The military service orders as applied to the Zabern case have been described as monstrous and advanced as a proof that Germany is under the rule of Prussian swords. This is not true, inasmuch as the Zabern case is the only case to which the provisions of the order of 1820 have been applied. I hope that the German people will refrain from exaggeration, and will not generalize from a single instance. A great deal must be done in the Imperial

Territories to bring back conditions to the normal; but the Zabern case is merely a local incident arising out of merely personal differences.

Gentlemen, you are not justified to draw any other than the general conclusion or suppose that Alsace-Lorraine cannot flourish except under a moderate, just, uniform, and firm policy of government. All these recent attempts to foster or create differences between the north and the south must be nipped in the bud. No single one of the German federal states could exist if it were not a member of a united German Empire. That empire needs the best that each state can give, and must be maintained with the same enthusiasm, the same courage and the same devotion as were displayed by their fathers when they shed their blood loyally together. I am sure you will all agree with me, that we must not go on keeping open this wound.

## CHAPTER III

### THE SCRAP OF PAPER

[*Translation of a speech by Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg in the Reichstag, August 4, 1914*]

"GENTLEMEN, we are now in a state of necessity, and necessity knows no law! Our troops have occupied Luxemburg, and perhaps are already on Belgian soil. Gentlemen, that is contrary to the dictates of international law. It is true that the French Government has declared at Brussels that France is willing to respect the neutrality of Belgium as long as her opponents respect it. We know, however, that France stood ready for the invasion. France could wait, but we could not wait. A French movement upon our flank upon the Lower Rhine might have been disastrous. So we were compelled to override the just protest of the Luxemburg and Belgian Governments. The wrong—I speak openly—that we are committing we will endeavour to make good as soon as our military goal has been reached. Anybody who is threatened, as we are threatened, and is fighting for his highest possessions can have only one thought—how he is to hack his way through."  
—*The Times*.

### INTERVIEW WITH SIR E. GOSCHEN

[*Report of British Ambassador, August 8, 1914*]

I found the Chancellor [August 4] very agitated. His Excellency at once began a harangue which lasted for about twenty minutes. He said that the step taken by his Majesty's Government was terrible to a degree; just for a word—"neutrality," a word which in war time had so often been disregarded—

just for a scrap of paper Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her. All his efforts in that direction had been rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to which, as I knew, he had devoted himself since his accession to office had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we had done was unthinkable; it was like striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against two assailants. He held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible events that might happen. I protested strongly against that statement, and said that, in the same way as he and Herr von Jagow wished me to understand that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, so I would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of "life and death" for the honour of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could anyone have in engagements given by Great Britain in the future? The Chancellor said, "But at what price will that compact have been kept. Has the British Government thought of that?" I hinted to his Excellency as plainly as I could that fear of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn engagements, but his Excellency was so excited, so evidently overcome by the news of our action, and so little disposed to hear reason that I refrained from adding fuel to the flame by further argument. As I was leaving, he said that the blow of Great Britain joining Germany's enemies was all the greater that almost up to the last moment he and his Government had been working with us supporting our efforts to maintain peace between Austria and Russia. I said that this was part of the tragedy which saw the two nations fall apart just at the



moment when the relations between them had been more friendly and cordial than they had been for years. Unfortunately, notwithstanding our efforts to maintain peace between Russia and Austria, the war had spread and had brought us face to face with a situation which, if we held to our engagements, we could not possibly avoid, and which unfortunately entailed our separation from our late fellow-workers. He would readily understand that no one regretted this more than I.

## PART IV

BY PRINCE BERNHARD VON  
BÜLOW

### INTRODUCTION

GERMANY has had but five Prime Ministers or Chancellors of the German Empire as they are officially designated, in her history as a Great Power. The fourth in sequence, but without doubt the second in power and fame, to the great Bismarck is Prince von Bülow. His occupancy of the Chancellorship from 1900 to 1909 extended over a longer and more critical period in Germany's history than any other except Bismarck's.

It is, therefore, not surprising that inside and outside of Germany, von Bülow is looked upon as the German with the broadest vision and surest judgment in international affairs to-day. His long experience in the foreign service of the German Empire at the capitals of Europe, and his four years as Foreign Secretary preceding his nine years' Chancellorship, his deep learning and his acute judgment of men, have made him a powerful figure.

It is to be expected from the urbanity of the man that his outlook upon international affairs, and his attitude toward other nations, should be more conservative and tactful, less egotistical and arbitrary than that of men of smaller minds and narrower experience. But even in von Bülow's speeches and writings there creep in the stock phrases of German militarism and power-mania and presumption. There can be no stronger proof of the absolute hold these ideas have had upon the German intellect than the fact that they are thus shared by the keenest and broadest mind in the Empire. And it is not surprising, if a conservative and tactful leader expresses

## 132 PRINCE BERNHARD VON BÜLOW

this point of view mildly, that it should be put forward more boldly and less discriminately by lesser men.

But the fact that Prince von Bülow did not go to the lengths of the military class was finally his undoing. He had lost favour with the Emperor as a result of his attempts to impose upon him a more conservative and less jingoistic policy, and he took advantage of a snap-vote in the German Reichstag to retire from office.

The first chapter below is taken from his memoirs written since his retirement from office, and published under the title "Imperial Germany," by Cassell and Co., Ltd., London. In the extracts from this book which we quote with the permission of the publishers, Prince von Bülow reviews the development of the German Empire and his own connexion with it, and authoritatively proves the definite purpose of absolutely predominating world power which has been and is and will be the main thread of the German policy.

The second and third chapters are taken from addresses made by Prince von Bülow in the Reichstag—the first when he was Foreign Secretary, and second during the last period of his Chancellorship, when he was reviewing, in what he probably knew to be a farewell speech, the position of the German Empire in the world. These speeches have been specially translated for this work.

## CHAPTER I

### THE PURPOSES OF GERMANY

[From "Imperial Germany," by Prince von Bülow]

EVER since the end of the 'eighties in the nineteenth century the building of a fleet sufficient to defend our oversea interests had been a vital question for the German nation. It is greatly to the credit of the Emperor William II that he recognized this, and devoted all the power of the throne and all the strength of his own personality to the attainment of this end. It only adds to his merit that he, as head of the Empire, championed the building of the German fleet at the very moment when the German people had to come to a decision about their future, and when, as far as man can tell, Germany had the last chance of forging the sea weapons that she needed.

The fleet was to be built while we maintained our position on the Continent, without our coming into conflict with England, whom we could as yet not oppose at sea, but also while we preserved intact our national honour and dignity. Parliamentary opposition, which at that time was considerable, could only be overcome if steady pressure were brought to bear on Parliament by public opinion. This oppression could be lifted if the German Emperor could set before his people, who at that time were not united either by common hopes or demands, a new goal towards which to strive, and could indicate to them "a place in the sun" to which they had a right, and which they must try to attain. On the other hand, patriotic feeling must not be roused to such an extent as to damage irreparably our relations with England, against whom our sea power would

for years still be insufficient, and at whose mercy we lay in 1897, as a competent judge remarked at the time, like so much butter before the knife. To make it possible to build a sufficient fleet was the foremost and greatest task of German policy after Bismarck's retirement.

The building of the German fleet, like other great undertakings in the course of our national history, had to be carried out with an eye to foreign countries. It was only to be expected that this important strengthening of our national power would rouse uneasiness and suspicion in England.

The policy of no State in the world is so firmly bound by tradition as that of England; and it is in no small degree due to the unbroken continuity of her foreign policy, handed down from century to century, pursuing its aims on definite lines, independent of the changes of party government, that England has won such magnificent successes in international politics. The alpha and omega of English policy has always been the attainment and maintenance of English naval supremacy. To this aim all other considerations, friendship as well as enmities, have always been subordinated. It would be foolish to dismiss English policy with the hackneyed phrase "*perfidie Albion.*" In reality this supposed treachery is nothing but a sound and justifiable egoism, which, together with other great qualities of the English people, other nations would do well to imitate.

#### ENGLAND'S NATIONAL EGOISM

Our vigorous national development, mainly in the industrial sphere, forced us to cross the ocean. For the sake of our interests, as well as of our honour and dignity, we were obliged to see that we won for our international policy the same independence that we had secured for our European policy. The fulfilment of this national duty might eventually be

rendered more difficult by English opposition, but no opposition in the world could release us from it.

France would attack us if she thought she were strong enough; England would only do so if she thought she could not defend her vital economic and political interests against Germany except by force. The mainspring of English policy towards us is national egoism; that of French policy is national idealism. He who follows his interest will, however, mostly remain calmer than he who pursues an idea.

The friendship as well as the enmity of the German Empire, supported by a strong navy, are naturally matters of very much greater importance to England to-day than the friendship or enmity of Germany in the 'nineties, when she was unarmed at sea. The change in favour of Germany of the proportionate strength of the two countries, has relieved our foreign policy with regard to England of a great burden. We need no longer take such care to prevent England from injuring our safety and wounding our dignity; with our own unaided strength we are able, as is meet for Germans, to defend our dignity and our interests against England at sea, as we have for centuries defended them against the Continental Powers on land. We must look very far back in German history to find a like change in Germany's position in the world.

The German Empire to-day is a great World Power, not only by virtue of its industrial and commercial interests, but of its power in international politics; its power in the sense that its arm can reach to the farthest corners of the world, and that German interests can be injured nowhere with impunity. The sphere of German power has literally been extended over the whole world by the construction of our fleet, so that it can protect German interests scattered over the face of the earth. We built our navy as a means of national defence and to strengthen

our national safety, and we have never used it for any other purpose.

The problem of modern German international politics, to secure a foundation for our position as a Great Power, on the whole may be considered to be solved. When, at least, during the Bosnian crisis, the sky of international politics cleared, when German power on the Continent burst its encompassing bonds, we had already got beyond the stage of preparation in the construction of our fleet.

## CHAPTER II

### GERMANY'S RIGHT TO WORLD POWER

*[Translation of a speech by Prince von Bülow; from the Official Reichstag Reports, vol. iv.]*

**THE** necessity for the completion and extension of our Navy Bill of 1898 contemplated by the federated Governments has been created by the present world situation and by the needs of our oversea policy.

With regard to our oversea policy the position of the Government is by no means an easy one. On the one side we are being urged, and occasionally we are urged in a stormy fashion, to safeguard our oversea interests with greater zeal; on the other side we hear that we are already too heavily engaged and are entering upon adventurous paths. I will endeavour to demonstrate that we have not fallen into either extreme, nor do we intend to fall into either, but on the contrary, to confine ourselves to the peaceful middle line which is equidistant from the neglect and likewise from the overstraining of our oversea interests. Upon one point, indeed, there can be no doubt, namely, that matters have arisen in the world's affairs which could not have been predicted two years ago.

It has been said that in every century a great disintegration, a great liquidation, takes place in order that influence, power, and possessions may be divided up afresh. In the sixteenth century the Spaniards and Portuguese parcelled out the New World amongst themselves; in the seventeenth century the Dutch, the French, and the English entered into competition with them while we were at fist-cuffs with one another; in the eighteenth century the Dutch and the French lost most of what they had won to the English. In our nineteenth century England has continued to extend farther and ever farther her Colonial empire,



## 138 GERMANY'S RIGHT TO WORLD POWER

the greatest empire known in the world since the days of the Romans ; the French have firmly settled down in North Africa and East Africa and have founded for themselves a new empire in Farther India ; Russia has begun her powerful course of conquest, which has been carried to the boundaries of the high tableland of the Pamirs and to the coast of the Pacific Ocean. Four years ago the Chinese and Japanese War, and hardly eighteen months ago the Spanish-American War, have set things rolling that have brought about great, far-reaching, decisive effects—ancient empires being shaken, and new and vigorous ferments of effervescence introduced into the world's development. No one can overlook the consequences which will follow the war which has only a few weeks ago set South Africa aflame.

An English Prime Minister observed long ago that the strong States would grow ever stronger and the weak ones ever weaker. Everything that has happened since has proved the correctness of this saying. Are we once again at the threshold of a new partition of the world as the poet dreamed a hundred years ago ? I do not believe it, and moreover I would rather not believe it. But in any case we cannot allow any foreign Power, any foreign Jupiter, to say to us, "What is to be done ?" The world has already been given away. We do not wish to give offence to any foreign Power, but neither do we mean to allow any foreign Power to tread on our toes ; we will not allow ourselves to be pushed aside by any foreign Power either in a political or in an economic sense.

It is high time that we should clearly determine what position we mean to take up in the face of the world-situation which has so materially altered during the last two years, with regard to the outlook for the future which has become considerably modified, and with regard to the events taking place around us, which carry within them the germ of the future

configuration of the relative importance of the Powers, perhaps for an immeasurable period of time. To stand aside, inactive, as we have so often done before, either out of modesty or because we were absorbed in our own internal dissensions or from doctrinarianism, dreaming while other people divide up the cakes amongst themselves, that we cannot and will not do.

### DREAM OF GREATER GERMANY

We cannot do this for the simple reason that we now have interests in all parts of the world. The rapid growth of our population, the unexampled rise of our industries, the efficiency of our merchants, in short the powerful vitality of the German nation, all have contributed to entangle us into world economies and to draw us into world politics. If the English talk of a Great Britain and the French speak of a *nouvelle France*, if the Russians open up Asia, we also may lay claim to a Greater Germany—not in the sense of conquest, but in the sense of the peaceful expansion of our commerce and of its points of support.

With France we have always, in the isolated cases in which we had to settle colonial matters, come easily and willingly to an understanding. With Russia under similar circumstances we have also encountered a readiness to meet us, which we entirely reciprocate. The good relations between the United States and ourselves have, only a few days ago, been pointed out by the President of the United States with a warmth which fills us with a sincere satisfaction.

Japan we have as little intention of injuring, as we may assume that she would be inclined to act to our prejudice. As regards England, we are quite ready, on the basis of full reciprocity and mutual consideration, to live in peace and unity with her.

But just because our present foreign position is a

## 140 GERMANY'S RIGHT TO WORLD POWER

favourable one, we must make use of it in order to secure our future. That this future may be peaceful is my desire, and we all desire it. But whether this future will be peaceful, that no one can foretell. It is a peculiarity of our times in the domain of foreign affairs that new causes of friction might arise any day. In former days diplomacy lived from twenty-five to fifty years or even longer on a single cause of friction, and from father to son a thorough study was made all round the wound, and there was no thought of anything else. Now at every moment new questions crop up, which occasionally disappear again as quickly as they appeared; occasionally, however, they may in a trice be converted into very important and very acute frictions and complications.

We must be protected against surprises not only by land but also by water. We must create for ourselves a fleet strong enough to make an attack—I underline the word "attack"; with the absolute peacefulness of our policy it can never be a question of anything but defence—but a fleet strong enough to make impossible an attack, by every power we may possess. What we neglect now, if we were to allow three or more years to pass without building for ourselves such a fleet, we should never, we could never recover. It is certain, gentlemen, that just because we are no *quantité négligeable* in the world, and will not allow ourselves to be treated as such, we must all the more carefully avoid anything that could tarnish our fair repute that we have won for ourselves by the peacefulness, the honesty, the temperance, and the discretion of our foreign policy.

German foreign policy is neither greedy nor restless nor fantastic. If German foreign policy everywhere safeguards German interests, and safeguards these with quiet earnestness, then this same policy is very unlikely to wish to injure the rights and interests of others. What is imputed to us in this respect here and there in the foreign Press in the way of fantastic

plans is based on pure invention. When in the German Press here and there voices were raised which struck another key, these had not been inspired from any responsible place and were not accredited in any responsible place.

### THE RISING COLONIAL STAR

I should also like to point out that matters in reality do not arrange themselves so simply and plainly as they appear to a lively and exuberant fancy; that it is by no means difficult, in one's study, with a cigar between one's lips, to acquire new coaling stations, protectorates, and colonies—but that in practice this is a more complex matter; that to acquire Kiao-Chau, the Carolines, the Mariannes, and Samoa for Germany was no simple matter; in a word, that the thoughts dwell together with the greatest ease, but that things themselves in space give one another cursed hard blows. And above all I want to emphasize the fact that, however high the aims which our patriotism and our confidence set us *in the rising star of the German nation*—and in this connexion, in so far as the love of the Fatherland and confidence in our national strength are concerned, the conduct of the German foreign affairs is surpassed by none—yet we are reckoning with means of power which are actually available at the present moment or are procurable.

Like all States having maritime interests, we are on account of our need for a coal-supply—this need was demonstrated in the most obvious manner during the Spanish-American War, for in this, as in many other questions, the Spanish-American War has given us a piece of its mind—we are, I say, on account of our need of coal-supply, dependent on the acquisition of a maritime base. But on principle we are not thinking of giving these exertions the range which is attributed to us by the ill-will of certain foreign

## 142 GERMANY'S RIGHT TO WORLD POWER

newspapers, whereas, on the other hand, the condition of our means of power at sea confines us within very narrow limits and forces us to cut our coat according to our cloth. The sphere and the range of our overseas interests—therein lies the kernel of the whole matter—have developed much, very much more rapidly and with much greater intensity than has our material means of power adequately to protect and further those interests.

If in the past the course of the world's history has ever hastily granted an historical recipe, as I might put it, for any advance, this was clearly the case when, immediately after the passing of the Fleet Bill, first the Spanish-American War, then the disturbances in Samoa, and then the war in South Africa attracted our overseas interests to so many different points in deep sympathy. Fate demonstrated this before our eyes. You will understand that in my official and responsible position there is much that I cannot say and that I cannot dot all my "i's." But you will all understand me when I say that Fate has shown us at more than one point of the globe how urgent and burning a need there was for the strengthening of our fleet which was begun two years ago, how wise and patriotic it was for this august House to give its assent at the time to the Government Bill, and how indispensable it has become in consequence of the events which have occurred since to carry out the projected extension of the Fleet Act of 1898.

Gentlemen, a policy which should depart from this basis, from the basis defined by me just now, the basis of actuality, would no longer be a modern policy, and we can, will, and must only push forward a modern policy. But we do not, in consequence of all our zeal for the development of our overseas interests, forget that our central point is in Europe, and we do not neglect the duty of safeguarding the security of our European position, which is based on a Triple Alliance—the unshakable Triple Alliance—

and upon our good relations with Russia. The best safeguard that our overseas policy will always remain moderate and discreet lies in our actual necessity to maintain our forces in Europe ready and complete.

### PROTECTING GERMAN PROSPERITY

Why is it, then, that all the other States strengthen their fleets. Surely not for the mere pleasure of spending money? If we do not provide a fleet that suffices to protect . . . our commerce, our compatriots in foreign lands, our missions and the safety of our coasts, we should endanger the most vital interests of our country. . . . The last decades have brought much prosperity, power, and well-being to Germany. The prosperity and well-being of the one does not always fill the other with pure satisfaction; it may awaken envy. Envy plays a great part in the life of the individual, as also in that of nations. There is a great deal of envy of us in the world at the present—political envy and economic envy. There are individuals and there are groups of interested persons, and there are races and perhaps also nations, which find that the German was easier to manage and that the German was more agreeable to his neighbours in those earlier days when, in spite of our culture and in spite of our civilization, foreigners looked down upon us politically and economically as arrogant knights do upon the modest schoolmaster.

Those times of political powerlessness and of economic and political humility shall not return. We will never again, to quote Friedrich List, become the servants of humanity. But we shall only be able to maintain an exalted position when we understand that for us without power, without a strong army and a powerful fleet, there is no chance of success. For a nation of nearly sixty millions, that occupies the centre of Europe and at the same time stretches out

## 144 GERMANY'S RIGHT TO WORLD POWER

its feelers on all sides, no means has yet been discovered of maintaining the struggle for existence without strong armaments by land and sea.

In the coming century Germany will have to become either the hammer or the anvil. From the standpoint of my department, from the standpoint of foreign policy, in the name of the highest interests in the land, I adjure you: Give your support to the Supplementary Fleet Bill.

I will summarize: our policy, our oversea policy, our foreign policy, our general policy is a peaceful, a sincere, and a self-reliant policy. We give allegiance to none; we follow an exclusively German policy. How and when we might be forced to forsake our existing reserve in order to safeguard our world position and in pursuance of our world interests, that depends upon the general course of events, which no individual power can forecast, that depends upon circumstances which no one can calculate in detail beforehand. But we will cherish the hope that if we strive in a time of ferment and under difficult, often very difficult, conditions to safeguard the peace, the honour, and the well-being of the Empire, this our policy and these our exertions will bring with them the support of this exalted House and the approval of the nation.

## CHAPTER III

# GERMANY'S WORLD INTERESTS

[*Translation of a speech by Prince von Bülow; from the Official Reichstag Reports, vol. v.*]

As regards our relations with France, I think we must draw a distinction between what is desirable in itself and what under the circumstances is possible. The idea of a closer connexion or of an alliance with France, as is here and there suggested in the Press, is not realizable with France in her present mood. The fewer illusions we indulge in on this point the better. The causes lie in the events of the past, which are construed by us and by our French neighbours quite differently; they also lie in the vigour of French patriotism, which may be regarded either as exaggerated self-love or a national pride worthy of imitation. Personally I incline to the latter opinion. Some years ago in Paris I had the honour of being on an intimate footing with a very distinguished, a great Frenchman, and I have preserved a grateful memory of him. For he was very good to me, then a young secretary at the Embassy. That was Léon Gambetta, and I remember how, one evening, he described to me his procedure and position after Sedan as member of the Committee of the National Defence.

"France," he said to me, "had fallen on her knees. I said to her, 'Get up and go forward.'" [La France était tombée à genoux, je lui ai dit: debout et marche.] "Those who govern France at such a moment," added Gambetta, turning to me, "have the feeling of holding a thermometer in their hand: pressure by the hand makes the quicksilver rise or fall. At such moments, at times of great crisis they can do anything with France." When Gam-



beta said that to me I thought, as a young man, in my heart, "If such a fate ever should overtake Germany as has overtaken France, may the nation find men who, with the same unyielding patriotism, would fight until the bitter end."

I should like to add here that it is, just this vigorous French patriotism, the strong and highly strung national ambition of the French nation, those traditional brilliant qualities of our very temperamental neighbours, that oblige us in military parlance to remain on guard, in order that we may not only safeguard the lost possession on the Vosges, which was won back with streams of German blood, but also the unity of our nation, won at last so late and with so much pains, and our recovered position as a Power and our world position.

I shall never forget the words that a clever French diplomat and historian, Rothan, once said to me: "La paix de Westphalie, qui a fait la France et défait l'Allemagne" ("The peace of Westphalia which made France and unmade Germany"). I leave it to our historians, I leave it to every thinking German to draw their own conclusions from this. France was a kingdom, consolidated, self-contained, when Germany and Italy were still geographical conceptions, a solid piece of marble between two loosely fitting mosaic slabs. That France found herself stronger at every impact, or nearly every impact, from one or other of these two neighbours, so long as these did not receive assistance from a third party, was a kind of natural necessity. The leaders of French policy from Richelieu to Napoleon III did not remain in doubt concerning the causal cohesion which existed between this preponderance of France—*la prépondérance légitime de la France*, as the French called it—and the political raggedness of the two neighbours. That Napoleon III was not able to prevent the German and Italian process of unification was the heavy reproach levelled against him, and it was by combating

this aspect of the policy of the Second Empire that Thiers won fame.

### TERRIBLE MISERY OF WAR

I often hear that there are Frenchmen who wish for a closer connexion with us . . . but there is no deputy, no minister, no senator, who would publicly move in this matter. But what would be quite possible between us and France is peaceful, normal, and correct relations. I hope—and I believe I may say that we all hope without distinctions of party from left to right—that the number of intelligent Frenchmen who on principle oppose an offensive war against Germany will increase and the number of those Frenchmen who are only afraid of such a war because it might in the long run end unfavourably for France will decrease. We all hope that in both nations the conviction that neither of them has any interest in taking upon itself the enormous risk and the terrible misery of a war will grow stronger, and that it is in the interests of both nations not to disturb the reciprocal peace. What further appears possible is that both nations should meet in the economic sphere, the wide domain of industrial and commercial enterprises, and should work together, and should perhaps also here and there come to an understanding on Colonial questions.

I expressly state in this connexion that we are not thinking of forcing our way in between France and Russia or between France and England. More especially we are not thinking of making a disturbance of the Franco-English friendship the object of either open or secret exertions. The Franco-Russian Alliance from the time of its foundation has never been a menace to peace ; it has, on the contrary, proved to be a weight which contributed to the regular working of the world's-clock. We hope that the same will be said of the Anglo-French *entente cordiale*. Good relations between Germany and Russia have been

no detriment to the Franco-Russian Alliance. Good relations between Germany and England would in themselves be just as little in opposition to the *entente cordiale* providing that the aims of the latter are peaceful. The *entente cordiale* without good relations between the world Powers and England would constitute a danger to European peace. A policy whose object were to hem Germany in, to build up a ring of Powers round Germany in order to isolate her and to cripple her, would be a critical policy for European peace. Such a hemming-in process is not possible without the use of a certain pressure. Pressure creates counter-pressures, and from pressure and counter-pressure sometimes come explosions. Therefore it is especially pleasing that French papers have expressed the thought that good relations between Germany and England are necessary for the maintenance of European peace, and were therefore compatible with French interests.

#### “ WHY ALL THIS FUSS ? ”

Between Germany and England there is no unpleasant remembrance, between Germany and England there is no deeper political antagonism. There have been misunderstandings between the two nations, unpractical and unreasonable misunderstandings in which, as is usual in life, both parties were about equally to blame—but no unfriendly actions. In intellectual spheres, in art and science, the two nations are closely allied. Shakespeare and Darwin belong to us just as Goethe and Kant belong to the English. Intellectual kinship has been rightly claimed for the two nations. In economic spheres we are dependent upon each other. It is certainly true that there exist between Germany and England in the domain of economics competition and rivalry. But these need not cause political opposition, let alone war.

To my regret I am always coming across statements in the Press, and more especially in the Socialist Press, that our defensive measures at sea are responsible for the ill-feeling against us in Germany. I have also explained that the idea that the construction of the German fleet was directed against England is simply madness—I can find no other expression to characterize the thought—as though we entertained aggressive intentions against England, and that the anxiety in many English circles with regard to a non-existent big German fleet is simply incomprehensible. Just recently, at the banquet arranged in honour of our municipal representatives, or at any rate at that time, an English minister drew attention to the fact that England possesses at the present day the most efficient and warlike fleet she had ever had, and that she was willing to keep her fleet at its present strength. And only a few weeks ago the First Lord of the English Admiralty publicly asserted that England had never been so strong at sea as at the present, so that she could withstand every possible combination which the other Powers could bring against her. Therefore, I ask, why all this fuss? We are certainly not thinking of building a fleet as strong as the English. But we have the right and the duty to keep such a fleet as corresponds to the magnitude of our commercial interests and sufficient for the necessity of defending our overseas interests and of guarding our coasts. Why should we not have as good a right to build ourselves ships and to maintain a fleet as the Italians or the Russians or the Japanese or the Americans or the French or the English themselves?

So long as Italy stands fast and loyal to the Triple Alliance she contributes to the maintenance of peace for herself and for others. If Italy should sever herself from the alliance or should adopt a hesitating, ambiguous policy, that would enhance the danger of a great and general conflagration. The Triple

Alliance has not yet had the opportunity of a practical test. It has been spared this opportunity mainly on account of its very existence, because there was an alliance of Central European States. That has eminently contributed to ward off dangers to the security and independence of the allied States, and with these the principal danger to European peace. If it has been possible to ward off this danger without sanguinary encounters, without threats of war and fears of war which are so detrimental to commerce and traffic, this proves the value of the alliance, and possesses at the present time many important advantages over other imaginable combinations. The Triple Alliance also possesses the practical advantage of precluding conflicts between the Allies. If Italy and Austria were not allies the relations between the two might become strained.

#### GOING BEYOND BISMARCK

Therefore the Triple Alliance, in which the three parties are equally interested, and we ourselves not less nor more than the others, constitutes not only a political vent for Europe but also the main source of the present general economic prosperity, which is so closely connected with the maintenance of peace. And so we may say without arrogance or exaggeration that the continuance of the Triple Alliance also serves the purposes of European interests, because it is in the interests of peace. I feel it at the same time a necessity to state how reliable Austro-Hungary's support was to us at Algeciras; and I do not need to add that we, should occasion arise, would observe the same loyalty towards Austro-Hungary, supported by the agreement of this House and of the whole nation. It is to me quite incomprehensible that one should, more especially on the occasion of the visit of our Emperor to Vienna, have been able to imagine that we were trying to interfere in the

home affairs of the Habsburg monarchy. We do not interfere in other people's affairs, and give no advice unless it be asked.

If Bismarck had confined himself to specifically Prussian policy he would not have laid the foundation of German unity. . . . Should the development of events demand that we should proceed beyond the Bismarckian goals, we must do it, even if Prince Bismarck in his day under apparently similar conditions came to a different conclusion. Therefore I address to all whom it concerns the warning not to act as Lot's wife did, who, because she looked behind her, was turned into a pillar of salt. The success of a great man consists not in slavish imitation but in progressive movement, even if it should here and there lead to opposition. . . . We must, however, become reconciled to the fact that there is no longer a Prince Bismarck among us. The remembrance, however, of what he was will ever rise up before the German nation like the pillar of fire. . . . His name ever remains an exhortation, an example, a pride for our nation, a safeguard for the future, a comfort in days of depression. But the nation must find strength in itself to manage without such a Titan, for even if every great genius is mortal, the nation itself is immortal. Its existence did not cease with the death of the Great Chancellor. And as patriots we must all—each in his place—work together to bring it to pass that the work of the Great Chancellor is preserved.

It is the Pan-German League more especially that is pressing upon me the cuirassier boots and the broad sword of Prince Bismarck. I know very well that the exertions of the Pan-German League have the merit of keeping awake the national feeling and of counteracting the vague cosmopolitanism of the German Philistine or the narrow-mindedness of Church policy. . . . But I also know that in the domain of foreign politics a clear head is of more

importance than warmth and kindness of heart, and the heart of the patriot must not show itself only in indiscriminate grumbling against all foreigners, English and Russians, North Americans and Brazilians, Hungarians and Italians, and still less in bold dreams for the future which only increase the difficulties of the present and produce mistrust of us. But I recognize perfectly that one-sided advances, unsolicited attentions, are unsuitable methods of warding off unjustifiable attacks and of safeguarding the world-position of the nation.

The protection of the empire has been extended to-day to all Germans without distinction of position, religion, or party; even the German Social Democrats in doubtful cases have been supported by rights and law. . . . But I do not think that you would find anywhere such excessive criticism as in our country. Do you not think that elsewhere there are also occasional mistakes, grievances, and difficulties? But they are not brought forward and magnified or so indefatigably trodden to death as with us. I often recall Treitschke's words: "Would that the German might bring to bear upon home affairs, conditions, and institutions even a small part of the well-disposed understanding he so willingly bestows upon foreign events and institutions!"

Does anyone really earnestly believe that things are so much better in foreign countries than with us? In an important English newspaper I read recently: "To the uncritical and self-complacent German nation German pessimism was simply incomprehensible." According to English conceptions no one had less cause for pessimism than the Germans, and for that reason the German always figures in the English Press simultaneously as an example to be followed and as a dangerous rival. And it is certain that other nations, in our own day, have had difficulties to overcome which were harder than the problems

imposed upon us by Fate. Is not England used up by the South African War, France with grave internal tasks and crises, Italy and America with grave colonial issues? Does not Russia cherish the hope of hacking a way for herself through a veritable thicket of briars? We have no cause at all to be more dolorous than others.

### THE RUSSIAN DANGER

I believe that our situation to-day would be easier and more secure (than in the 'eighties) if we had not in the meanwhile inaugurated our overseas policy, not because I have the bad taste to compare myself with Prince Bismarck, but because conditions have changed in Europe in the meanwhile. The danger of a Russian attack is to-day, according to human reckoning, less imminent; there is less existing inclination for such action than in the days of General Skoboleff or of the Russian demonstrations in favour of M. Déroulède. In Austro-Hungary and in Italy in those days there was less public talk against the Triple Alliance, but in secret it counted perhaps more influential and cleverer antagonists. Above all, Germany was then materially less strong than she is to-day in comparison with her opponents as well as with her friends. What complicates and involves our situation is our oversea assertions and interests. If we were not engaged in this direction, if we were not vulnerable on this point, we should not on the Continent have much to complain of. Then it would be easier than it is to-day to avoid conflict and friction with England. But you are all aware that streams do not flow backwards, that a fifty-year-old cannot change back into a forty-year-old. You know what elemental forces the rapid increase of our population, the powerful development of our industry, the daring and enterprising spirit of our merchants, and the economic efficiency of the German nation have



introduced for us into world politics and what oversea interests they have created for us.

The task of our generation is to safeguard our continental position, to foster our oversea interests, and to follow such a discreet, reasonable, and wisely restrained world-policy that the security of the German nation should not be endangered and the future of the nation should not be prejudiced thereby. This task is no easy one; no one is better aware of that than I. We may be drawn into difficult situations; we may also find ourselves opposed to several opponents. But that is no reason for despair. Situations can be imagined in which we might be thrown back upon our own strength. Prince Bismarck and Count Moltke both pointed this out. "A strong State only stands secure, depending upon itself," said Count Moltke in this very House in the year 1888. A great nation must be prepared for every situation, and its spirit must be such that it can face any situation bravely and resolutely.

When I stood on the last occasion, on April 5 of this year, before this House I said, with reference to the Conference of Algeciras, which, after many vicissitudes which had nearly shattered it, reached two days later a satisfactory conclusion, that "the mountain which we had to climb was fairly difficult; several passes were not without danger. A time of trouble and of peace lies behind us; we can now look into the future with greater tranquillity." This hope has been realized: the situation in Europe and in the world has become more peaceable. It is true that there is still unrest here and there.

Let us see to it that our armaments on land and sea are sufficient for our defence. Let us, finally, not forget in our preoccupation over our home, economic, religious, and political disputes the interests, the well-being, and the rights of the whole, and then the German nation will know how to assert its position in the world.

## PART V

By GENERAL VON BERNHARDI

### INTRODUCTION

THE intellectual lineage of General Bernhardi can be definitely traced from Clausewitz through Treitschke and Bismarck. Bernhardi's writings are based upon his lectures delivered in Berlin which were attended by representatives of all classes, military and civil. Through his lectures and his books, General Bernhardi has profoundly influenced and stimulated the military spirit of the German people.

Clausewitz's speculations on the nature of war, and Treitschke's philosophic thesis of the supremacy of the State, have been given a modern interpretation through Bernhardi's utterances on the morality of war.

According to Bernhardi, the natural law of survival of the fittest applies to nations as well as to animal and plant life. The struggle for existence which is involved in this law imposes upon the State the supreme duty not only of protecting the national interests, but also of promoting those interests regardless of moral considerations. International treaties and agreements are binding only so far as they advance the interests of the State concerned, and may be violated if they stand in the way of what is deemed to be the highest interests of the State.

From these premises the theory that "might is right" is logically developed, and it is in the elucidation of this theory that Bernhardi has specially distinguished himself. "War," says Bernhardi, "is a biological necessity." Its decisions therefore are essentially just because they are based upon the nature of things. After having been

supreme only in the domain of intellect for so many generations, it is now Germany's duty to assert her political and cultural supremacy. If other nations and other interests stand in the way of this development they must be brushed aside, and if they resist they must be crushed.

The course of the present war shows very clearly that General Bernhardi's utterances are in harmony with the policy of the higher military command in Germany. In his book he has correctly forecasted every important development of the war, and has foreseen with striking accuracy the nature of the conflict. His views, therefore, are in a sense official, and because they are so frankly expressed they must be considered by every one who wishes to understand the aims and tendencies of modern Germany.

Friedrich A. J. von Bernhardi began to publish books on military matters in 1889, when his "Cavalry in the next War" appeared. This work was translated into English, and seven years later his most famous book "Germany and the next War" had been through six editions in the original, and was translated into English in 1911. It is from this work that the first two chapters which follow have been extracted, by the permission of the publisher, Mr. Edward Arnold. The third chapter following is taken from General Bernhardi's "How Germany makes War," by permission of the publishers, Messrs. Hodder and Stoughton. "How Germany makes War" is a condensed version of the original German treatise, and presents in a popular style for English readers the plans and methods on which the German General staff rely for their operations in the field.

## CHAPTER I

### THE TRUE VALUE OF WAR

[From "Germany and the Next War," by Gen. von Bernhardi]

THE value of war for the political and moral development of mankind has been criticized by large sections of the modern civilized world in a way which threatens to weaken the defensive powers of States by undermining the warlike spirit of the people. Such ideas are widely disseminated in Germany, and whole strata of our nation seem to have lost that ideal enthusiasm which constituted the greatness of its history. With the increase of wealth they live for the moment, they are incapable of sacrificing the enjoyment of the hour to the service of great conceptions, and close their eyes complacently to the duties of our future and to the pressing problems of international life which await a solution.

The Germans are born business men, more than any others in the world. Even before the beginning of the Thirty Years' War, Germany was perhaps the greatest trading Power in the world, and in the last forty years Germany's trade has made marvellous progress under the renewed expansion of her political power. Notwithstanding our small stretch of coastline, we have created in a few years the second largest merchant fleet in the world, and our young industries challenge competition with all the great industrial States of the earth. German trading-houses are established all over the world; German merchants traverse every quarter of the globe; a part, indeed, of English wholesale trade is in the hands of Germans, who are, of course, mostly lost to their own country. Under these conditions our national wealth has increased with rapid strides.

Our trade and our industries—owners no less than employés—do not want this development to be interrupted. They believe that peace is the essential condition of commerce. They assume that free competition will be conceded to us, and do not reflect that our victorious wars have never disturbed our business life, and that the political power regained by war rendered possible the vast progress of our trade and commerce.

Extreme tension exists between the Great Powers, notwithstanding all peaceful prospects for the moment, and it is hardly to be assumed that their aspirations, which conflict at so many points and are so often pressed forward with brutal energy, will always find a pacific settlement.

In this struggle of the most powerful nations, which employ peaceful methods at first until the differences between them grow irreconcilable, our German nation is beset on all sides. This is primarily a result of our geographical position in the midst of hostile rivals, but also because we have forced ourselves, though the last-comers, the virtual upstarts, between the States which have earlier gained their place, and now claim our share in the dominion of this world, after we have for centuries been paramount only in the realm of intellect.

We have thus injured a thousand interests and roused bitter hostilities. If a violent solution of existing difficulties is adopted, if the political crisis develops into military action, the Germans would have a dangerous situation in the midst of all the forces brought into play against them. On the other hand, the issue of this struggle will be decisive of Germany's whole future as State and nation. We have the most to win or lose by such a struggle. We shall be beset by the greatest perils, and we can only emerge victoriously from this struggle against a world of hostile elements, and successfully carry through a Seven Years' War for our position as a world Power,

if we gain a start on our probable enemy as *soldiers* ; if the army which will fight our battles is supported by all the material and spiritual forces of the nation ; if the resolve to conquer lives not only in our troops, but in the entire united people which sends these troops to fight for all their dearest possessions.

These were the considerations which induced me to regard war from the standpoint of civilization, and to study its relation to the great tasks of the present and the future which Providence has set before the German people as the greatest civilized people known to history.

### OUR HISTORICAL MISSION

The German Empire has suffered great losses of territory in the storms and struggles of the past. The Germany of to-day, considered geographically, is a mutilated torso of the old dominions of the Emperors ; it comprises only a fraction of the German peoples. A large number of German fellow-countrymen have been incorporated into other States, or live in political independence, like the Dutch, who have developed into a separate nationality, but in language and national customs cannot deny their German ancestry. Germany has been robbed of her natural boundaries ; even the source and mouth of the most characteristic-ally German stream, the much-lauded German Rhine, lie outside the German territory. On the eastern frontier, too, where the strength of the modern German Empire grew up in centuries of war against the Slavs, the possessions of Germany are menaced. The Slavonic waves are ever dashing more furiously against the coast of that Germanism, which seems to have lost its old victorious strength.

Signs of political weakness are visible here, while for centuries the overflow of the strength of the German nation has poured into foreign countries, and been lost to our Fatherland and to our nationality ;

it is absorbed by foreign nations and steeped with foreign sentiments. Even to-day the German Empire possesses no colonial territories where its increasing population may find remunerative work and a German way of living.

### THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE WORLD

This is obviously not a condition which can satisfy a powerful nation, or corresponds to the greatness of the German nation and its intellectual importance.

Even if we succeed in guarding our possessions in the East and West, and in preserving the German nationality in its present form throughout the world, we shall not be able to maintain our present position, powerful as it is, in the great competition with the other Powers, if we are contented to restrict ourselves to our present sphere of power, while the surrounding countries are busily extending their dominions. If we wish to compete further with them, a policy which our population and our civilization both entitle and compel us to adopt, we must not hold back in the hard struggle for the sovereignty of the world.

We not only require for the full material development of our nation, on a scale corresponding to its intellectual importance, an extended political basis, but, we are compelled to obtain space for our increasing population and markets for our industries. At every step which we take in this direction England will resolutely oppose us. English policy may not yet have made the definite decision to attack us; but it doubtless wishes, by all and every means, even the most extreme, to hinder every further expansion of German international influence and of German maritime power. The recognized political aims of England and the attitude of the English Government leave no doubt on this point. But if we were involved in a struggle with England, we can be quite sure that

France would not neglect the opportunity of attacking our flank. Italy, with her extensive coast-line, even if still a member of the Triple Alliance, will have to devote large forces to the defence of the coast to keep off the attacks of the Anglo-French Mediterranean Fleet, and would thus be only able to employ weaker forces against France. Austria would be paralysed by Russia; against the latter we should have to leave forces in the East. We should thus have to fight out the struggle against France and England practically alone with a part of our army, perhaps with some support from Italy. It is in this double menace by sea and on the mainland of Europe that the grave danger to our political position lies, since all freedom of action is taken from us and all expansion barred.

Since the struggle is, as appears on a thorough investigation of the international question, necessary and inevitable, we must fight it out, cost what it may. Indeed, we are carrying it on at the present moment, though not with drawn swords, and only by peaceful means so far. On the one hand it is being waged by the competition in trade, industries, and warlike preparations; on the other hand, by diplomatic methods with which the rival States are fighting each other in every region where their interests clash.

Our political position would be considerably consolidated if we could finally get rid of the standing danger that France will attack us on a favourable occasion, so soon as we find ourselves involved in complications elsewhere. In one way or another *we must square our account with France* if we wish for a free hand in our international policy. This is the first and foremost condition of a sound German policy, and since the hostility of France once for all cannot be removed by peaceful overtures, the matter must be settled by force of arms. France must be so completely crushed that she can never again come across our path.



Further, we must contrive every means of strengthening the political power of our allies. We have already followed such a policy in the case of Austria when we declared our readiness to protect, if necessary with armed intervention, the final annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by our ally on the Danube. Our policy towards Italy must follow the same lines, especially if in any Franco-German war an opportunity should be presented of doing her a really valuable service. It is equally good policy in every way to support Turkey.

A part of our surplus population, indeed—so far as present conditions point—will always be driven to seek a livelihood outside the borders of the German Empire. Measures must be taken to the extent at least of providing that the German element is not split up in the world, but remains united in compact blocks, and thus forms, even in foreign countries, political centres of gravity in our favour, markets for our exports, and centres for the diffusion of German culture.

A further question, suggested by the present political position, is whether all the political treaties which were concluded at the beginning of the last century under quite other conditions—in fact, under a different conception of what constitutes a State—can, or ought to be, permanently observed. When Belgium was proclaimed neutral, no one contemplated that she would lay claim to a large and valuable region of Africa. It may well be asked whether the acquisition of such territory is not *ipso facto* a breach of neutrality, for a State from which—theoretically at least—all danger of war has been removed, has no right to enter into political competition with the other States. This argument is the more justifiable because it may safely be assumed that, in event of a war of Germany against France and England, the two last-mentioned States would try to unite their forces in Belgium. Lastly, the neutrality of the

Congo State must be termed more than problematic, since Belgium claims the right to cede or sell it to a non-neutral country. The conception of a permanent neutrality is entirely contrary to the essential nature of the State, which can only attain its highest moral aims in competition with other States. Its complete development presupposes such competition.

We must rouse in our people the unanimous wish for power together with the determination to sacrifice on the altar of patriotism, not only life and property, but also private views and preferences in the interests of the common welfare. Then alone shall we discharge our great duties of the future, grow into a world Power, and stamp a great part of humanity with the impress of the German spirit. If, on the contrary, we persist in that dissipation of energy which now marks our political life, there is imminent fear that in the great contest of the nations, which we must inevitably face, we shall be dishonourably beaten.

[From Bernhardi's "Germany and the Next War" (London: Edward Arnold). By permission.]

## CHAPTER II

### CHARACTER OF THE NEXT WAR

[From "Germany and the Next War," by Gen. von Bernhardi]

If we look at our general political position, we cannot conceal the fact that we stand isolated, and cannot expect support from anyone in carrying out our positive political plans. England, France, and Russia have a common interest in breaking down our power. This interest will sooner or later be asserted by arms. It is not therefore the interest of any nation to increase Germany's power. If we wish to attain an extension of our power, as is natural in our position, we must win it by the sword against vastly superior foes. Our alliances are defensive, not merely in form, but essentially so. Neither Austria nor Italy are in any way bound to support by armed force a German policy directed towards an increase of power. We are not even sure of their diplomatic help, as the conduct of Italy at the conference of Algeciras sufficiently demonstrated. It even seems questionable at the present moment whether we can always reckon on the support of the members of the Triple Alliance in a defensive war. The recent *rapprochement* of Italy with France and England goes far beyond the idea of an "extra turn." If we consider how difficult Italy would find it to make her forces fit to cope with France, and to protect her coasts against hostile attacks, and if we think how the annexation of Tripoli has created a new possession, which is not easily defended against France and England, we may fairly doubt whether Italy would take part in a war in which England and France were allied against us. Austria is undoubtedly a loyal ally. Her interests are closely connected with our own, and her policy is dominated by the

same spirit of loyalty and integrity as ours towards Austria. Nevertheless, there is cause for anxiety, because in a conglomerate State like Austria, which contains numerous Slavonic elements, patriotism may not be strong enough to allow the Government to fight to the death with Russia, were the latter to defeat us. The occurrence of such an event is not improbable. When enumerating the possibilities that might affect our policy, we cannot leave this one out of consideration.

### GERMANY TO FIGHT ALONE

We shall therefore some day, perhaps, be faced with the necessity of standing isolated in a great war of the nations, as once Frederick the Great stood, when he was basely deserted by England in the middle of the struggle, and shall have to trust to our own strength and our own resolution for victory.

Such a war—for us more than for any other nation—must be a war for our political and national existence. This must be so, for our opponents can only attain their political aims by almost annihilating us by land and by sea. If the victory is only half won, they would have to expect continuous renewals of the contest, which would be contrary to their interests. They know that well enough, and therefore avoid the contest, since we shall certainly defend ourselves with the utmost bitterness and obstinacy. If, notwithstanding, circumstances make the war inevitable, then the intention of our enemies to crush us to the ground, and our own resolve to maintain our position victoriously, will make it a war of desperation. A war fought and lost under such circumstances would destroy our laboriously gained political importance, would jeopardize the whole future of our nation, would throw us back for centuries, would shake the influence of German thought in the civilized world, and thus check the general

progress of mankind in its healthy development, for which a flourishing Germany is the essential condition. Our next war will be fought for the highest interests of our country and of mankind. This will invest it with importance in the world's history. "World power or downfall!" will be our rallying cry.

It would be mere self-deception if we would see in the colonial arrangement which we have effected with France the paving of the way for a better understanding with this State generally. It certainly cannot be assumed that France will abandon the policy of *revanche*, which she has carried out for decades with energy and unflinching consistency, at a moment when she is sure of being supported by England, merely because she has from opportunist considerations come to terms with us about a desolate corner of Africa. No importance can be attached to this idea, in spite of the views expounded by the Imperial Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg, in his speech of November 9, 1911. We need not, therefore, regard this convention as definitive. It is as liable to revision as the Algeciras treaty, and indeed offers, in this respect, the advantage that it creates new opportunities of friction with France.

If the Imperial Government was of the opinion that it was necessary in the present circumstances to avoid war, still the situation in the world generally shows there can only be a short respite before we once more face the question whether we will draw the sword for our position in the world or renounce such position once and for all. We must not in any case wait until our opponents have completed their arming and decide that the hour of attack has come.

We must use the respite we still enjoy for the most energetic warlike preparation, according to the principles which I have already laid down. All national parties must rally round the Government, which has to represent our dearest interests abroad.

The willing devotion of the people must aid it in its bold determination and help to pave the way to military and political success, without carrying still further the disastrous consequences of the Morocco policy by unfruitful and frequently unjustified criticism and by thus widening the gulf between Government and people. We may expect from the Government that it will prosecute the military and political preparation for war with the energy which the situation demands, in clear knowledge of the dangers threatening us, but also in correct appreciation of our national needs and of the warlike strength of our people, and that it will not let any conventional scruples distract it from this object.

Repeal of the Five Years Act, reconstruction of the army on an enlarged basis, accelerated progress in our naval armaments, preparation of sufficient financial means—these are requirements which the situation calls for. New and creative ideas must fructify our policy, and lead it to the happy goal.

### THE TIME IS RIPENING

The political situation offers many points on which to rest our lever. England, too, is in a most difficult position. The conflict of her interests with Russia's in Persia and in the newly arisen Dardanelles question, as well as the power of Islam in the most important parts of her colonial Empire, are the subjects of permanent anxiety in Great Britain. Attention has already been called to the significance and difficulty of her relations with North America. France also has considerable obstacles still to surmount in her African Empire, before it can yield its full fruits. The disturbances in the Far East will probably fetter Russia's forces, and England's interests will suffer in sympathy. These are all conditions which an energetic and far-sighted German policy

168 CHARACTER OF THE NEXT WAR

can utilize in order to influence the general political situation in the interests of our Fatherland.

If people and Government stand together, resolved to guard the honour of Germany and make every sacrifice of blood and treasure to ensure the future of our country and our State, we can face approaching events with confidence in our rights and in our strength; then we need not fear to fight for our position in the world, but we may, with Ernst Moritz Arndt, raise our hands to heaven and cry to God :

*From the height of the starry sky  
May thy ringing sword flash bright ;  
Let every craven cry  
Be silenced by thy might !*

*[From Bernhardi's "Germany and the Next War" (London : Edward Arnold). By permission.]*

## CHAPTER III

### GERMANY'S INTOLERABLE POSITION

*[From "How Germany makes War," by Gen. von Bernhardi]*

I THINK that I am serving progress by my work, and that I am at the same time in harmony with the best traditions of our glorious past. It was always *timely* progress which has led us to victory, and has given us from the outset a certain amount of superiority over our adversaries. Such a superiority we must try to gain all the more in future as well, since it is only too likely that, with the present state of affairs in the world, we may be forced to fight against superior numbers, while, on the other hand, our most vital interest will be at stake. The political situation as it is to-day makes us look upon such a war even as a necessity, on which the future development of our people depends.

Germany supports to-day 65,000,000 inhabitants on an area about equal the size of France, whilst only 40,000,000 live in France. Germany's enormous population increases annually by about 1,000,000. There is no question, agriculture and industry of the home country cannot give permanently sufficient employment to such a steadily increasing mass of human beings. We therefore need to enlarge our colonial possessions so as to afford a home and work to our surplus population, unless we wish to run the risk of seeing again the strength and productive power of our rivals increased by German emigration as in former days. Partitioned as the surface of the globe is among the nations at the present time, such territorial acquisitions we can only realize at the cost of other States or in conjunction with them: and such results are possible only if we succeed in



## 170 GERMANY'S INTOLERABLE POSITION

securing our power in the centre of Europe better than hitherto. With every move of our foreign policy to-day we have to face a European war against superior enemies. This sort of thing is becoming intolerable. The freedom of action of our people is thereby hampered to an extraordinary degree. Such a state of affairs is highly dangerous, not only for the peace of Europe, which, after all, is only a secondary matter for us, but above all, is most dangerous to ourselves. It is we, whose economical, national, and political development is being obstructed and injured; it is we whose position in the world is being threatened after we have purchased it so dearly with the blood of our best. We must therefore strive to find out by all means who is for or who is against us. On this depends not only the possibility of carrying into execution the political aims befitting the greatness and the wants of our country, but also the very existence of our people.

Hand in hand with the increase of population and the growth of political power, resulting from our struggles for a united Germany, trade and industry rose to an extent hardly experienced by any nation before. Germany's output in brainwork is at the same time greater than that of any other people. Our prominent importance as a civilizing nation is plain to everybody since the German clans have joined hands to form one powerful State. We ourselves have become conscious of being a powerful, as well as a necessary, factor in the development of mankind. This knowledge imposes upon us the obligation of asserting our mental and moral influence as much as possible, and of paving the way everywhere in the world for German labour and German idealism. But we can only carry out successfully these supreme civilizing tasks if our humanizing efforts are accompanied and supported by increasing *political* power, international commerce, increased influence of Teutonic culture in all parts of the globe,

and above all, by a perfect safeguarding of our political power in Europe.

### COMPETITION IN ARMS

It is, therefore, not a question of competing with our likely enemies in all the various branches without distinction, such as raising huge armies, increasing artillery and ammunition, improving heavy artillery and siege trains, extending the railway system, and employing every modern technical appliance. A competition like this would be ultimately decided by financial superiority, which we scarcely possess. We must rather exert ourselves to prepare for war in a distinct direction, and to gain superiority not in every branch, but in the one we have recognized as decisive, whilst taking a correct view of all other important branches.

Much independence of thought and determination is required of him who acts in this spirit in a responsible position and stakes success in war, so to say, on one card. All depends, then, on whether a future war has been correctly estimated. Every error in decisive questions must prove fatal. Yet it is the only possible way for obtaining an unquestionable superiority, and almost every great captain has followed it.

All the more is it necessary to see perfectly clear in these matters by studying them thoroughly. We must resolutely get rid of the influence of conventional views and opinions, extend and thoroughly sift in every department the ideas we are forming about a future war, trace to their utmost limit the consequences of all that may be new in a coming war, and then try to discover with inexorable logic the weak and the decisive factors in the whole picture thus unfolded before our eyes. If we approach this task with an unbiassed mind, keep a tight rein on our imagination, and strictly adhere to realities, the investigating mind will see unveiled the mystery of a

## 172 GERMANY'S INTOLERABLE POSITION

future war ; the sphinx will speak and we shall descry the law of future superiority.

If, on the other hand, we only want to learn from the experience of former wars without working out the practical result of these experiences, if we only try to bring into line, more or less mechanically, the new phenomena of our time with the old views, we must resign all idea of mastering the situation and making the most of it to our advantage ; in that case the war of the future will continue to be something uncertain, a riddle, the solution of which is looked for and expected by the events of the future. But the task is to solve the riddle *in advance*. That kind of mental labour must bear rich fruit. It will best prepare victory. It must be done.

## PART VI

BY BARON VON DER GOLTZ

*Field-Marshal and Inspector-General of the German Army*

### INTRODUCTION

FIELD-MARSHAL Baron von der Goltz is looked upon as Germany's greatest soldier to-day. His reputation suffered a severe blow in the defeat of Turkey during the Balkan War, for he was the organizer of the modern Turkish army—a task which took twelve years of his time. But he is also the organizer of Germany's defences and armies in East Prussia, and has gained his position in the army, his standing at court, and his national reputation by his fifty years' career as a fighting soldier and an inspirer of militarism. To-day, at seventy-two years of age, he is the German Governor-General of Brussels.

Besides being a fighting soldier he is also the foremost authority and writer, with von Bernhardi, on military affairs in Germany. He is, in fact, to this period what General von Clausewitz was to the period following the fall of Napoleon, one hundred years ago. He has written half a dozen books on war, strategy, and military history, but his best known because most popularly written work is "A Nation in Arms," published in 1883. This book voices the point of view of the military man on modern militarism. Two of the chapters that follow are taken from "A Nation in Arms," by permission of the publishers, Messrs. Hodder and Stoughton. The remaining chapters are from "Jena to Eylau," published by Messrs. Kegan Paul, Trench, Truebner & Co., Ltd.

## CHAPTER I

### WAR AS A NATURAL TENDENCY

[From "A Nation in Arms," by Gen. von der Goltz]

WE frequently hear the complaint that all advances made by modern science are immediately employed to the abominable end of annihilating mankind. Instead of nations rising by such advances ever higher and higher, they by this means become only ruder and more cruel. But this assertion is only seemingly correct. The nobler and grander a nation has become by culture, the more it has to lose by war; and it will, consequently, be more careful to equip itself thoroughly for battle. We must not adduce, as a counterproof, decaying civilized nations which, though their position is, in other respects, brilliant, have proved their inaptitude for war. The internal decay of their political life has ever been proceeding, although it has not shown itself.

As a rule high culture and military power go hand in hand, as evidenced in the cases of Greece and Rome. We must not advance exceptions, like England, whose military system is out of all proportion to the development of the State in other respects. Protected by the sea, and with all its interests bound up with the sea, it has only colonial wars to wage, in which money plays the chief part. This latter is the sharpest weapon in England's hand. In addition to this, it maintains a fleet such as no other empire can boast. But, in spite of all the advantages of its position, it will soon enough find itself compelled to follow the lead of the times, and to strengthen the organization of its army, and it will gradually sink both in power and in its influence upon the Continent.

It is natural that the great civilized nations of the present should bring to ever greater perfection their military equipments, in order, when occasion requires, to be enabled to put forth all their strength. The day of Cabinet wars is over. It is no longer the weakness of a single man, at the head of affairs, or of a dominant party that is decisive, but only the exhaustion of the belligerent nations. The French nation asserts that it did not desire the war of 1870. But, when the empire which declared this war fell, the same nation was at once ready to carry it on to the bitter end. The man, who, in 1870, had been most earnest in his warnings not to declare war rashly, in September headed the nation, and took upon himself the leadership of the armies, only to become the most zealous instigator of the bloody struggle.

A collision of interests leads to war, but the passions of the nations decide independently of these, up to what point the war shall be carried. War aids politics in their attainment of their objects; yet for the sake of subordinate interests, it must be waged until the enemy has been completely subjected. This necessarily entails the decisive use of all means, intellectual and material alike, tending to subjugate the foe. It is right in time of peace to prepare all available resources with a view to their being employed in war.

### REASONS AGAINST DISARMAMENT

If from humanitarian principles, a nation decided not to resort to extremities, but to employ all its strength towards stopping at a preconcerted point, it would soon find itself hurried forward against its will. No enemy would consider itself bound to observe a similar limitation. So far from this being the case, each would immediately avail itself of the voluntary withdrawal of the other, to outstrip it at once in armaments

The fact that the sacrifices, which nations are called upon to make for the development of their military system, lie heavy upon the shoulders of the living generation cannot alter the case. That nation which first began to retrograde in this respect would at once lose its position. It would have to bear the expense of every conflict that arose, and taught by bitter experience would very soon prefer to begin to arm like others. All disarmament projects are framed in misconception of our present political life, which proceeds from the tribal consanguinity of nations. Owing to the community of interests which to-day prevails in every nation, the various peoples confront one another like persons among whom a natural inherent selfishness is the source of disputes. National egotism is inseparable from our ideas of national greatness. This egotism will always appeal to arms where other means fail.

The mutual distrust which nations bear towards each other, makes all proposals for disarmament exceedingly suspicious. The first was made in the winter of 1800-1801 by the Consul Bonaparte to the ambassadors of Austria and Prussia. "The Court of Vienna certainly cannot desire aught better, but the difficulty consists in persuading the Court of Berlin to accede to it," was the shrewd Austrian reply. Upon this standpoint the matter will ever rest. Each and every Power must demand that another takes the initiative, and owing to apprehensions entertained in others, none will be willing to take it; nay, each on the contrary will keep its swords sharp. Only that nation is secure which is prepared at any given moment to defend its independence sword in hand.

#### FUSION OF MILITARY AND NATIONAL SPIRIT

From the great expenditure entailed by a military system, an exhaustion may gradually arise which will sap the martial strength of the nation. The

enigma to be solved is how to completely fuse the military life into the life of the people, so that the former may impede the latter as little as possible, and that on the other hand, all the resources of the latter may find expression in the former. Universal military service has taken the most important step in this direction, for, since its introduction, those forming the standing army are no longer permanently, but only temporarily withdrawn from work, and all healthy men are placed at the disposition of the military system.

### CONSCRIPTION CHEAPER THAN ENLISTMENT

True it is that the sacrifices which this institution has demanded have increased in a manner that was formerly held to be impossible. Yet this circumstance also demands to be regarded in the right light. Compared with the older system, a diminution of them can be proved. If a great Continental Power in these days wished to organize an army in the old fashion, viz., by enlistment, an army strong enough to play a great part, the expenses of the undertaking would run into enormous figures.

But, as the fusion of the military system with the national and political life leads, when compared with the great results, to a diminution of the sacrifices demanded, so, despite all appearances, does the turning to account of the advance of civilization for the purpose of war likewise enhance the humanity of belligerent operations. The foe is conquered, not by the destruction of his existence, but by the annihilation of his hopes of victory.

"Fighting to the last man," as we may add to quiet uneasy minds, is only a strong figure of speech, expressing a determination to fight bravely. It would sound curious if an army were to vow, before battle, to fight until it lost twenty per cent., and yet this would be more, and much more, than sufficient.



As a rule a loss of half this number on either side is sufficient to decide the victory. The destruction of a part of the whole withholds the rest from further exertions, and ends the struggle. The more surprising and the more crushing the effects of the weapons are, the sooner do they produce a decisive result, and thus it is shown that the battles are, as a rule, less bloody in proportion as the engines of destruction have attained greater perfection.

A single modern artillery projectile slays at one blow ten or twenty men, and produces an effect such as was only, perhaps, attained in former days after double the number had fallen victims to single bullets. In like manner the effect of fire and small arms has also been increased.

The single engagements are far more terrible than formerly. But to counterbalance this, they produce a much greater moral impression, and this latter, again, makes the whole struggle less bloody. No battle of modern times, in spite of all the military energy displayed and the enhanced effect of weapons of war, has produced such carnage as did those of Eylau or Borodina. But most bloody of all were the battle of ancient times, in which the attack was made with a club or a short Roman sword.

## CHAPTER II

### THE DOMINATION OF GERMAN OFFICERS

[From "*A Nation in Arms*," by Gen. von der Goltz]

"THE soul of the Prussian army is in its officers." This saying of Rùchel may, at the time it was delivered, has been laughed at on account of its somewhat ludicrous form. But its sense is excellent. The corps of officers speaks for the condition of the whole army. Here is repeated what is universally observed in political life. So long as the educated leading classes maintain their position, the people is serviceable and strong. On the other hand, the decay of the ruling classes entails the decay of the whole nation. In the Turks of the present day we may perceive what is in store for an honourable people when deprived of the leadership of the upper classes. The best possible troops under bad officers are at most but a very deficient body.

The corps of officers must be chosen from the best classes of the people, who exercise even in ordinary life a natural authority over the masses. Frederick the Great, the founder of the Prussian officer-corps, selected it entirely from the hereditary nobility which at that time almost exclusively represented the educated part of the nation. When this became altered, the character of the corps of officers became changed. Though the officers are even to-day chosen from the aristocracy of the people, yet this means the aristocracy of education has taken the lead in social and political life. An especial value is rightly laid upon education, because it is the basis of noble and moral qualities. But we ought not to

## 180 DOMINATION OF GERMAN OFFICERS

cling exclusively to scientific education, but pay also proper regard to the qualities of heart and character. It is required of an officer, that in the interest of his service he should forego personal advantages, lucre and prosperity. Hence only such fractions of the population as are not, by reason of their vocation, compelled to prefer personal advantage to great and public ends, are fitting persons to recruit the corps of officers. It was, therefore, very practical to give the officer-corps the character of a class, each member of which is socially the equal of another, a class having common interests, and at the same time common duties, and of which the whole body is rendered responsible for each individual member. Thus the officer-corps ought to be a real chivalry.

Influence over the soldiers must be gained in time of peace by a proper application of superior qualities of intellect and character, in training and in leading them. This must also include care for the well-being of the soldier. A decay in the officer-corps and its influence arises so soon as officers begin no longer to trouble themselves about the private soldier, and to confine themselves merely to giving orders. When their authority over their troops can only be enforced by noise, it is as a rule but feeble. The worse the discipline in an army is, the more despotic a form it assumes. Besides this influence that has been gained, example is requisite. By showing himself unusually fearless and self-sacrificing he awakens noble impulses in the soldier's breast, for only by these can great deeds be done. He who is accustomed to regard himself as belonging to a special class will also, in war, consider himself bound to do something special. But he, who, on the other hand, always lives in an inferior and subordinate position, will only in few cases feel himself impelled suddenly to distinguish himself. Slaves are always cowards. But the slavery of an inferior state of life is no less depressing than any other.

The social advantages which are conceded to his class are a profitably invested capital. Even the prejudices which the officer sometimes entertains in his youthful years, owing to more honour being paid to him than to others of his age, bring in good interest on the field of battle to the profit of the Fatherland. His duty is to command and to lead, and he must therefore feel what he is, and be proud of his position; and there is no harm done even if he is puffed up with a sense of his own importance.

Now, if the officer must further forego the acquisition of a fortune or even domestic comfort, and risk the future welfare of his family, which is assured the landowner, the merchant, and the tradesman, it appears only right and fair that he should be compensated for foregoing these advantages by outward distinctions. And it is just these latter that most frequently earn for the officer class the envy of others.

### OFFICERS TO BE PRIVILEGED


The present day, especially in Germany, is favourable in this respect to the officer class. Successful wars have enhanced its renown. But there will come periods of peace, in which it may be necessary to remind the people that external favours may, without harm, be extended to the military, and especially to the officer class. An officer-class of inferior social position may consist of excellent, peaceable and industrious citizens, but it will be poor in bold and courageous soldiers. Without social privileges, the class must of necessity soon sink down to a very modest *niveau*; for in civil life it is property that determines social grades, and our officers are—thank God!—in the majority of cases, as poor as church mice.

The officer should, moreover, preserve his youthful vigour to a comparatively old age. It is his province



# MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART

(ANSI and ISO TEST CHART No. 2)



**APPLIED IMAGE Inc**

1653 East Main Street  
Rochester, New York 14609 USA  
(716) 482 - 0300 - Phone  
(716) 288 - 5989 - Fax

to stake in war, and upon its uncertain chances, woe and weal, life and reputation. And for this is essential, in addition to military qualities, a light heart that does not look at the black side of things. But this light-heartedness will be, but with difficulty, preserved by anyone who has been oppressed by a long life of care.

Officers who eke out a miserable existence in secret, and are always looking forward to the moment when, freed from the burden of splendid misery, they will be enabled to live in some quiet nook on a moderate pension—officers of this description are of no service to the army and their country.

How can such persons be animated by the fresh and courageous impulses indispensable to a leader in battle? The preservation of physical activity must also be considered.

A portion of youth's dashing recklessness must be preserved by the officer until the end of his career, and he will only be able to do this if his position guarantees him some freedom from the ordinary pressure of everyday life. An aristocratic trait must pervade the whole nature.

The Fatherland, in securing for its officers an honoured and self-sufficient position, obeys the dictates of shrewdness and self-preservation. More depends upon the energy and excellence of this class than of any other; to wit, the honour and liberty of the whole nation.

It is not every one who has the inclination and talent for being a professional officer in times of peace. Every capable man belonging to good society should, however, conceive it to be his duty so to prepare himself as to be able, when necessity demands, to enter the army as a substitute when professional officers are wanting. In time of war all the conditions of service are simpler. The duties of the active officer can, with a few exceptions, be undertaken by every educated man who is healthy and strong,

provided he has only a firm will. And this he will have, if he only estimate the gravity of the situation aright. The attainment of an officer's commission in the Reserve must not be regarded as an act which must take place *honoris causa*. The practical importance of the step, and the ideal value of it as well, deserve to be especially insisted upon.



## CHAPTER III

### THE ESSENCE OF MILITARISM

[From "Jena to Eylau," by Gen. von der Goltz]

GERMANY is experiencing another long period of peace. She has become rich, and her riches increase daily. She grows in culture, but this growth in culture, is unfavourable to the war-like development of the people. It compresses the army more and more into barracks and parade grounds. Ground is more valuable; unused stretches, once available for troops are rarer; the damage which may be inflicted by them is greater; the arrangement of industrial life by the soldier's period of service is felt more keenly in proportion to the strain created by the general competition and the increasing value of time.

All classes live in greater comfort than of old. The capacity of enduring privation and hardship disappears because it is no longer necessary, and in consequence compulsion and exertion appear to lose their point. To many, the careful distribution of the day's work rendered necessary by the short period of army service and by the many-sidedness of modern training which is the inevitable consequence of modern improvements in armament, seems merely a vexation inflicted on the soldier by the officers' military ambitions.

Some great danger visibly threatening us from abroad, as in the days before 1806, when the existing danger might have served as a useful corrective, is what we lack, and the lack of it lulls to sleep our sense of the practical utility of a strong army, and of the need of intense activity in the service itself.

The idea, or rather the shibboleth, expressed by the word "militarism" is a product of our time. We speak of it as thoughtlessly as if it were a parasitic thing that existed for its own sake, and fed upon the vitals of the people. This idea is dangerous, for it inevitably suggests that this excrescence of the body of the nation ought to be cut off, whereas in reality the question is rather, are we doing enough in view of the secret envy which Germany's rapid growth to maturity has aroused.

Present day philosophy teaches free development of personality. Everything which stands in its way should be put aside, the barriers imposed by the State reduced to a minimum, and in accordance with this tendency the authority of officials and superiors is becoming daily more restricted. The state of things on the one hand increases the difficulty of organization and directing the masses, and on the other renders them more resentful of superior influence.

Our milder-mannered time regards with distaste the application of force, and dislike the outbreak of a strong temperament. Those in command are required to execute their difficult task by methods of moderation, by imposing convictions, and not by exercising the full powers of authority. It is obvious that this tendency is not favourable to the rise of such strong characters as are essential to us in war. The integrity of the citizen, the principle of moderation which disposes him to resist all promptings to violence, is given a disproportionate value as compared with rugged worth of character.

But "the poor man" whose feeble shoulders are to be spared their load, the nursling of the public opinion whose "baeey" and "nip" have become inviolable, whose wages constantly increase while his hours of work are shortened, and who hears of nothing but his rights in the States and in Society, never of his duty towards either, can only become more and more unsuited to sacrifice his all for the

Fatherland in the hour of extreme need. Training is a necessary, a preliminary to devotion in a great cause as to courage and bodily strength. It is this sort of training, however, which our modern existence tends to eliminate, and the result will in the nature of things be felt at the moment when the mass of the nation is called upon to meet an exceptional strain for an exceptionally great effort. But at the same time, without the mass of people, there will be no great effort. The Empire's independence cannot be maintained by a handful of men of high rank.

Involuntary the question arises, Will the spoilt multitudes, after a course of unmixed flattery, be willing to respond to the stern call to sacrifice life and property in the defence of the Fatherland? That they should be so is an essential condition, if the fighting portion of the population is to go into the field in joyous confidence of victory. The war-like spirit must have its root in the nation if it is to flourish in the army.

### THE GERMANIC IDEAL

Then again, there are the false apostles of to-day who condemn war as in itself reprehensible. A universal peace in which wolf and lamb shall dwell together in unity is proved possible by means of a multitude of misleading and seductive arguments. Thus do the shadows deepen over the ancient Germanic ideal of a proud nation of warriors, an ideal which is bound to lose its power to attract, particularly in a prolonged peace, when even the most martial-minded see that all chances of testing their prowess are fading gradually away.

The trend of events with us, since our great victories in the middle of last century, is only too natural.

“Victory brings might, might riches, but prosperity luxury. It is a matter of experience that after any

war there sets in a fever of speculation, a tendency to corruption, a way of life that is, to say the least, lax. The more civilized the more wealthy a nation becomes, the greater the capacity for pleasure and indulgence. It shrinks from effort, and comes gradually to estimate property and ease more highly than the brutal pursuit of war."

The prevailing ideas of an age exercise a powerful influence upon military development. It behoves us, therefore, to have a sharp eye for, and to guard against half-heartedness in our military effort, the hidden working of heresies which hypnotize our common sense by a parade of pseudo-scientific arguments against any adulteration or dilution of the warlike spirit and of warlike passion, against diplomatic generals, against the interference of political considerations with strategical and tactical decisions, and above all against the tendency to value more highly the art of war and perfection of technical training than the soldierly virtues. And may the army never foster that timidity in the face of civil law which, in 1806, spared the country, to the great detriment of its own troops, only to have it unconsumed for the enemy to devour. Let us be spared also the false humanitarianism which would shrink from a desperate fight and give up the attempt to escape in order to save the King, his soldiers, or his fair cities. The warlike spirit must not be allowed to die out among people, neither must the love of peace get the upper hand, for all the greater would be the consternation at the moment of awakening. If the Fatherland is to remain victorious we must not let our old ideals of manly courage, fearless scorn of death, and knightly virtue be destroyed, but must cherish and uphold them to the utmost, both in this generation and in all that are to come.

**CHAPTER IV**  
**INTELLECTUAL SUPREMACY**  
**UNAVAILING**

*[From "Jena to Eylau," by Gen. von der Goltz]*

Too oft, too long, the Bard or Thinker praises  
Whilst others curse the Fatherland's dear people ;  
But now at length by deeds words must be followed—  
Followed by sword thrusts,

Not the keen mind, but only the keen weapon  
Gave to you all a nation re-established  
Your glory, might, your unity, and welfare  
Are due to steel-strength !

Forget the harp, forget the hymn of triumph !  
Or with the song be watchful. Bid the Sentry  
To-night, although he wears the Bay and Myrtle,  
Keep bright his weapons !

The age is brazen and the foe man threaten  
Just as they did in days of Niebelungen—  
E'en in the House of God in shining armour  
Our heroes worship !

In days to come the Superman arising  
Shall praise you for your valour. Children's children  
Shall thank you for your daring. Then they may turn  
Their swords to ploughshares.

**LEUTHOLD**

The verses which form the introduction to this chapter are written by no knight or warrior, no scion of ancient nobility, but a simple son of Switzerland with a heart for Germany and a clear eye for the

lessons of history. Born of his intimate sympathy with the revival of the German Empire, may his splendid song of the sword sound its grave warning note in every German province.

For that is what we need. Again, as before the war of 1806, do we enjoy the blessings of an apparently unmenaced peace, and the idea is becoming more and more insistent in the heart of the nation that mankind will now proceed undisturbed along the path of developing humanity. It was just the same then. What praise Prussia reaped for her policy of neutrality, which enabled the country, safe from the war's alarms, to advance steadily in wealth and comfort! What enthusiasm greeted the idea of the everlasting peace which one looked to, the greatest of all peace-breakers to establish! War itself seems likely to become milder in character. Art and science alloyed the brazen laws of its conduct. War was to be spiritualized. Henceforward not force was to decide its issue, but superior subtlety of intellect and more abstruse chess-moves. And how cruel was the awakening from these dreams!

One glance at the desolation of East Prussia is proof enough. The demon of war had waged over it in unchained savagery like a devastating hurricane, destroying all that human industry had for long centuries been laboriously building up.

"Every one living in the stretch of country through which both armies had passed, was ruined, if ruin means the loss of all worldly good. There was not one herd of cattle, no corn, no potatoes, no coin, no clothing, no linen left." A year of terrible mortality followed the battle. During 1807 there were five, six, and ten times as many people buried in the country round Eylau as was usual in one year.

These were the results of cosmopolitanism, the love of peace, humanitarian twaddle, and the deteriorated pre-Jena methods of warfare. Then, if ever, did history furnish proof of the fact that a nation which

## 190 INTELLECTUAL SUPREMACY UNAVAILING

desires happiness must also be powerful and skilled in arms. It must neither renounce its passionate love of the Fatherland nor lose its power to regard war as an earnest, bitter thing, and an historical necessity. As long as the process of reconstructing states proceeds with the changing seasons, as long as human development does not stand still, so long will there be war. But those who do not wish to be ruined by it must prepare in peace time to endure the stern armed contest with opponents and rivals. To this end we must spare no pains in educating the rising generation in the spirit of bravery, scorn of danger, and bodily vigour; and never again as of old before Jena, must we set a higher value upon the art of war than upon the soldierly virtues.

One thing is certain, we shall not be spared a fresh trial of our power of defence. The greater our well-being, the more refined our mode of living, the more extended our commerce, the more quickly do we arouse mistrust and envy, the more certainly will come the hour when we shall be asked whether we still have the will and the manliness to defend our all, sword in hand.

Therefore, German Fatherland, ponder well the poet's warning:

“ Bid the Sentry  
To-night, although he wears the Bay and Myrtle,  
Keep bright his weapons ! ”

## PART VII

By GENERAL CARL VON  
CLAUSEWITZ

### INTRODUCTION

MODERN military strategy began with Napoleon. It was he who, after several centuries of warfare where the plan was to fight as little as possible and manœuvre as much as possible, got back to the primary object of war, which is to fight the enemy and defeat him. This direct attitude toward war was carried by military leaders to every country after the Napoleonic era.

In Germany it was General Carl von Clausewitz who worked out these military principles into a science, and taught them and wrote about them for the guidance of his countrymen. It is for this reason that he is called the Father of the German military idea and modern strategy.

He was born in 1780. When only twelve years old he entered the army, and was serving in campaigns in his fourteenth year. Later he finished a thorough military education, and in the last decade of the Napoleonic wars he served in the armies of both Prussia and Russia, and rose to the position of Chief of Staff of an army corps. After peace he was appointed Director of the Military School at Berlin, and was made a Major-General. He died in 1831.

General Clausewitz's writings run to nine volumes, but his chief work is a three-volume work "On War," which was the most exhaustive work on every phase of warfare that had been published up to that time in Germany, and has served as a basis for all future writings



and education in military affairs, as well as much of the country's practical strategy and tactics in actual operation.

But after all the chief influence which this work of Clausewitz has had upon the German nation, is that it established the German idea and attitude toward war and the power of might. The chapters that follow are taken from the translation of General von Clausewitz's work "On War" published by George Routledge and Sons, Ltd., London. In the introduction to the translation by Colonel F. N. Maude, C.B., the following significant comments are made :

"The Germans interpret their new national colours—black, red, and white—by the saying, 'Durch Nacht und Blut zur licht' ('Through night and blood to light'), and no work yet written conveys to the thinker a clearer conception of all that the red streak in their flag stands for than this deep and philosophical analysis of 'War' by Clausewitz.

"It reveals war, stripped of all accessories, as the exercise of force for the attainment of a political object, unrestrained by any law save that of expediency, and thus gives the key to the interpretation of German political aims, past, present, and future, which is unconditionally necessary for every student of the modern conditions of Europe. Step by step, every event since Waterloo follows with logical consistency from the teachings of Napoleon, formulated for the first time, some twenty years afterwards, by this remarkable thinker.

### THE EQUILIBRIUM OF FORCES

"What Darwin accomplished for biology generally, Clausewitz did for the life-history of nations nearly half a century before him, for both have proved the existence of the same law in each case, viz., 'The survival of the fittest'—the 'fittest,' as Huxley long since pointed out, not being necessarily synonymous with the ethically 'best.' Neither of these

thinkers was concerned with the ethics of the struggle which each studied so exhaustively, but to both men the phase or condition presented itself neither as moral nor immoral, any more than are famine, disease, or other natural phenomena, but as emanating from a force inherent in all living organisms which can only be mastered by understanding its nature. It is in that spirit that, one after the other, all the nations of the Continent, taught by such drastic lessons as Königgratz and Sedan, have accepted the lesson, with the result that to-day Europe is an armed camp, and *peace is maintained by the equilibrium of forces, and will continue just as long as this equilibrium, and no longer.*

"As already pointed out, it is to the spread of Clausewitz's ideas that the present state of more or less immediate readiness for war of all European armies is due, and since the organization of these forces in uniform, this "more or less" of readiness exists in precise proportion to the sense of duty which animates the several armies. Where the spirit of duty and self-sacrifice is low the troops are unready and inefficient; where, as in Prussia, these qualities, by the training of a whole century, have become instinctive, troops really are ready to the last button, and might be poured down upon any one of her neighbours with such rapidity that the very first collision must suffice to ensure ultimate success—a success by no means certain if the enemy, whoever he may be, is allowed breathing-time in which to set his house in order."

Nothing more than Colonel Maude's accurate summary of von Clausewitz's military philosophy is necessary in order to show the tremendous influence which von Clausewitz has had upon not only the ideas of the German warrior class, but upon the minds of the entire German people. For this reason an understanding of the premises of von Clausewitz, even though he did write a century ago, is necessary in order to grasp the dangers of the German gospel of might to-day.

## CHAPTER I

### WAR AS AN EXTENSIVE DUEL

[From "On War," by Gen. C. von Clausewitz]

WE shall not enter into any of the abstruse definitions of war used by publicists. We shall keep to the element of the thing itself, to a duel. War is nothing but a duel on an extensive scale. If we would conceive as a unit the countless number of duels which make up war, we shall do so best by supposing to ourselves two wrestlers. Each strives by physical force to compel the other to submit to his will; each endeavours to throw his adversary, and thus render him incapable of further resistance.

War therefore is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will.

Violence arms itself with the inventions of Art and Science in order to contend against violence. Self-imposed restrictions, almost imperceptible and hardly worth mentioning, termed usages of International Law, accompany it without essentially impairing its power. Violence, that is to say, physical force (for there is no moral force without the conception of States and Law) is therefore the means; the compulsory submission of the enemy to our will is the ultimate object. In order to obtain this object fully, the enemy must be disarmed, and disarmament becomes therefore the immediate object of hostilities in theory. It takes the place of the final object, and puts it aside as something we can eliminate from our calculations.

Now, philanthropists may easily imagine there is a skilful method of disarming and overcoming an enemy without causing great bloodshed, and that this is the proper tendency of the art of war. How-

ever plausible this may appear, still it is an error which must be extirpated; for in such dangerous things as war, the errors which proceed from a spirit of benevolence are the worst. As the use of physical power to the utmost extent by no means excludes the co-operation of the intelligence, it follows that he who uses force unsparingly, without reference to the bloodshed involved, must obtain a superiority if his adversary uses less vigour in its application. The former then dictates the law to the latter, and both proceed to extremities to which the only limitations are those imposed by the amount of counter-acting force on each side.

This is the way in which the matter must be viewed; and it is to no purpose, it is even against one's own interest, to turn away from the consideration of the real nature of the affair, because the horror of its elements excites repugnance.

### WAR IS NEVER MODERATE

If the wars of civilized people are less cruel and destructive than those of savages, the difference arises from the social condition both of States in themselves and in their relations to each other. Out of this social condition and its relations war arises, and by it war is subjected to conditions, is controlled and modified. But these things do not belong to war itself; they are only given conditions; and to introduce into the philosophy of war itself a principle of moderation would be an absurdity.

Two motives lead men to war; instinctive hostility and hostile intention. In our definition of war, we have chosen as its characteristic the latter of these elements, because it is the most general. It is impossible to conceive the passion of hatred of the wildest description bordering on mere instinct, without combining with it the idea of a hostile intention. On the other hand, hostile intentions may often exist

without being accompanied by any, or at all events by any extreme, hostility of feeling. Amongst the savages views emanating from the feelings, amongst civilized nations those emanating from the understanding, have the predominance; but this difference arises from attendant circumstances, existing institutions, &c., and, therefore, is not to be found necessarily in all cases, although it prevails in the majority. In short, even the most civilized nations may burn with passionate hatred of each other.

We may see from this what a fallacy it would be to refer the war of a civilized nation entirely to an intelligent act on the part of the Government, and to imagine it as continually freeing itself more and more from all feeling of passion, in such a way that at last the physical masses of combatants would no longer be required; in reality their mere relations would suffice—a kind of algebraic action.

Theory was beginning to drift in this direction until the facts of the last war taught it better. If war is an act of force, it belongs necessarily also to the feelings. If it does not originate in the feelings, it reacts, more or less, upon them, and the extent of this reaction depends not on the degree of civilization, but upon the importance and duration of the interests involved.

Therefore, if we find civilized nations do not put their prisoners to death, do not devastate towns and countries, this is because their intelligence exercises greater influence on their mode of carrying on war, and has taught them more effectual means of applying force than these rude acts of mere instinct. The invention of gunpowder, the constant progress of improvements in the construction of fire-arms, are sufficient proofs that the tendency to destroy the adversary which lies at the bottom of the conception of war is in no way changed or modified through the progress of civilization.

We therefore repeat our proposition, that war is

an act of violence pushed to its utmost bounds ; as one decidedly dictates the law to the other, there arises a sort of reciprocal action, which logically must lead to an extreme. This is the first reciprocal action.

### THE AIM IS TO DISARM THE ENEMY

We have already said that the aim of all action in war is to disarm the enemy, and we shall now show that this, theoretically at least, is indispensable.

If our opponent is to be made to comply with our will, we must place him in a situation which is more oppressive to him than the sacrifice which we demand ; but the disadvantages of this position must naturally not be of a transitory nature, at least in appearance, otherwise the enemy, instead of yielding, will hold out, in the prospect of a change for the better. Every change in this position which is produced by a continuation of the war, should therefore be a change for the worse. The worst condition in which a belligerent can be placed is that of being completely disarmed. If, therefore, the enemy is to be reduced to submission by an act of war, he must either be positively disarmed or placed in such a position that he is threatened with it.

From this it follows that the disarming or overthrow of the enemy, whichever we call it, must always be the aim of warfare. Now war is always the shock of two hostile bodies in collision, not the action of a living power upon an inanimate mass, because an absolute state of endurance would not be making war ; therefore, what we have just said as to the aim of action in war applies to both parties. Here, then, is another case of reciprocal action : As long as the enemy is not defeated, he may defeat me ; then I shall be no longer my own master ; he will dictate the law to me as I did to him. This is the second reciprocal action, and leads to a second extreme.

If we desire to defeat the enemy, we must proportion our efforts to his powers of resistance. This is expressed by the product of two factors which cannot be separated, namely, the sum of available means and the strength of the will. The sum of the available means may be estimated in a measure, as it depends (although not entirely) upon numbers; but the strength of volition is more difficult to determine, and can only be estimated to a certain extent by the strength of the motives. Granted we have obtained in this way an approximation to the strength of the power to be contended with, we can then take a review of our own means, and either increase them so as to obtain a preponderance, or, in case we have not the resources to effect this, then do our best by increasing our means as far as possible. But the adversary does the same; therefore, there is a new mutual enhancement, which, in pure conception, must create a fresh effort towards an extreme. This is the third case of reciprocal action.

Lastly, even the final decision of a whole war is not always to be regarded as absolute. The conquered State often sees in it only a passing evil, which may be repaired in after times by means of political combinations. How much this must modify the degree of tension, and the vigour of the efforts made, is evident in itself.

## CHAPTER II

### END AND MEANS IN WAR

[From "On War," by Gen. C. von Clausewitz]

HAVING in the foregoing chapter ascertained the complicated and variable nature of war, we shall now occupy ourselves in examining into the influence which this nature has upon the end and means.

If we ask, first of all, for the object upon which the whole effort of war is to be directed, in order that it may suffice for the attainment of the political object, we shall find that it is just as variable as are the political objects and the particular circumstances of the war.

If, in the next place, we keep once more to the pure conception of war, then we must say that the political object properly lies out of its province, for if war is an act of violence to compel the enemy to fulfil our will, then in every case all depends on our overthrowing the enemy, that is, disarming him, and on that alone. This object, developed from abstract conceptions, but which is also the one aimed at in a great many cases in reality, we shall, in the first place, examine in this reality.

In connexion with the plan of a campaign we shall hereafter examine more closely into the meaning of disarming a nation, but here we must at once draw a distinction between three things, which, as three general objects, comprise everything else within them. They are the military power, the country and the will of the enemy.

The military power must be destroyed, that is, reduced to such a state as not to be able to prosecute the war. This is the sense in which we wish to be understood hereafter, whenever we use the



expression "destruction of the enemy's military power."

The country must be conquered, for out of the country a new military force may be formed.

### WAR NOT A FINAL SETTLEMENT

But when these things are done, still the war, that is the hostile feeling and action of hostile agencies, cannot be considered as at an end as long as the will of the enemy is not subdued also ; that is its government and its allies must be forced into signing a peace, or the people into submission ; for whilst we are in full occupation of the country, the war may break out afresh, either in the interior or through assistance given by allies. No doubt this may also take place after a peace, but that shows nothing more than that every war does not carry on itself the elements for a complete decision and final settlement.

But even if this is the case, still with the conclusion of peace a number of sparks are always extinguished which would have smouldered on quietly, and the excitement of the passions abates, because all those whose minds are disposed to peace, of which in all nations and under all circumstances there is always a great number, turn themselves away completely from the road to resistance. Whatever may take place subsequently, we must always look upon the object as attained, and the business of war ended, by a peace.

As a protection of the country is the primary object for which the military force exists, therefore the natural order is that first of all this force should be destroyed, then the country subdued ; and through the effect of these two results, as well as the position we then hold, the enemy should be forced to make peace. Generally the destruction of the enemy's force is done by degrees, and in just the same measure the conquest of the country follows immediately

The two likewise usually react upon each other, because the loss of provinces occasions a diminution of military force. But this order is by no means necessary, and on that account it also does not always take place. The enemy's army, before it is sensibly weakened, may retreat to the opposite side of the country, or even quite outside of it. In this case, therefore, the greater part or the whole of the country is conquered.

But this object of war in the abstract, this final means of attaining the political object in which all others are combined, the disarming the enemy, is rarely attained in practice and is not a condition necessary to peace. Therefore it can in no wise be set up in theory as a law. There are innumerable instances of treaties in which peace has been settled before either party could be looked upon as disarmed; indeed, even before the balance of power had undergone any sensible alteration. Nay, further, if we look at the case in the concrete, then we must say that in a whole class of cases, the idea of a complete defeat of the enemy would be a mere imaginative flight, especially when the enemy is considerably superior.

## CHAPTER III

### ON THE CHARACTER OF MODERN WAR

[From "On War," by Gen. C. von Clausewitz]

THE attention which must be paid to the character of war as it is now made, has a great influence upon all plans, especially on strategic ones.

Since all methods formerly usual were upset by Bonaparte's luck and boldness, and first-rate Powers almost wiped out by a blow; since the Spaniards by their stubborn resistance have shown what the general arming of a nation and insurgent measures on a great scale can effect; since Russia, by the campaign of 1812 has taught us, first, that an empire of great dimensions is not to be conquered (which might have been easily known before), secondly, that the probability of final success does not in all cases diminish in the same measure as battles, capitals, and provinces are lost (which was formerly an incontrovertible principle with all diplomatists, and therefore made them always ready to enter at once into some bad temporary peace) but that a nation is often strongest in the heart of its country, if the enemy's offensive power has exhausted itself, and with what enormous force the defensive then springs over to the offensive; further, since Prussia (1813) has shown that sudden efforts may add to an army sixfold by means of the militia, and that this militia is just as fit for service abroad as in its own country—since all these events have shown what an enormous factor the heart and sentiments of a nation may be in the product of its political and military strength, in fine, since Governments have found out all these additional aids, it is not to be expected that they will let them lie idle in future wars, whether it be

that danger threatens their own existence, or that restless ambition drives them on.

That war which is waged with the whole weight of the national power on each side must be organized differently in principle to those where everything is calculated according to the relations of standing armies to each other, it is easy to perceive. Standing armies once resembled fleets, the land force the sea force in their relations to the remainder of the State, and from that the art of war on shore had in it something of naval tactics which it has now quite lost.

### THE USE OF THE BATTLE

Whatever form the conduct of war may take in particular cases, and whatever we may have to admit in the sequel as necessary respecting it, we have only to refer to the conception of war to be convinced of what follows :

(1) The destruction of the enemy's military force is the leading principle of war, and for the whole chapter of positive action the direct way to the object.

(2) This destruction of the enemy's force must be principally effected by means of battle.

(3) Only great and general battles can produce great results.

(4) The results will be greatest when combats unite themselves in one great battle.

(5) It is only a great battle that the General-in-Chief commands in person, and it is in the nature of things that he should place more confidence in himself than in his subordinates.

From these truths a double law follows, the parts of which mutually support each other; namely, that the destruction of the enemy's military force is to be sought for principally by great battles, and their results; and that the chief object of great battles must be the destruction of the enemy's military force.

## 204 ON THE CHARACTER OF MODERN WAR

No doubt the annihilation principle is to be found more or less in other means—granted there are instances in which through favourable circumstances in a minor combat the destruction of the enemy's forces has been disproportionately great, and on the other hand in a battle the taking or holding a single post may be predominant in importance as an object—but as a general rule it remains a paramount truth that battles are only fought with a view to the destruction of the enemy's army, and that this destruction can only be effected by their means.

The battle is the bloodiest way of solution. True, it is not merely reciprocal slaughter, and its effect is more a killing of the enemy's courage than of the enemy's soldiers—but still blood is always its price, and slaughter its character as well as name; from this the humanity in the general's mind recoils with horror.

But the soul of the man trembles still more at the thought of the decision to be given with one single blow. In one point of space and time all action is here pressed together, and at such a moment there is stirred up within us a dim feeling as if in this narrow space all our forces could not develop themselves and come into activity, as if we had already gained much by mere time, although this time owes us nothing at all. This is all mere illusion, but even as illusion it is something, and the same weakness which seizes upon the man in every other momentous decision may well be felt more powerfully by the general when he must stake interests of such enormous weight upon one venture.

### WAR NEEDS BLOODSHED

Thus, then, statesmen and generals have at all times endeavoured to avoid the decisive battle seeking either to attain their aim without it, or dropping that aim unperceived. Writers on history

and theory have then busied themselves to discover in some other feature in these campaigns not only an equivalent for the decision by battle which has been avoided, but even a higher art. In this way, in the present age, it came very near to this, that a battle in the economy of war was looked upon as an evil, rendered necessary through some error committed, as a morbid paroxysm to which a regular prudent system of war would never lead; only those generals were to deserve laurels who knew how to carry on war without spilling blood, and the theory of war—a real business for Brahmins—was to be specially directed to teaching this.

Contemporary history has destroyed this illusion, but no one can guarantee that it will not sooner or later reproduce itself, and lead those at the head of affairs to perversities which please man's weakness, and therefore have greater affinity for his nature. Perhaps, by and by, Bonaparte's campaigns and battles will be looked upon as mere acts of barbarism and stupidity, and we shall once more turn with satisfaction and confidence to the dress-sword of obsolete and musty institutions and forms. If theory gives a caution against this, then it renders a real service to those who listen to its warning voice. May we succeed in lending a hand to those who in our dear native land are called upon to speak with authority on these matters, that we may be their guide into this field of inquiry, and excite them to make a candid examination of the subject.

Not only the conception of war but experience also leads us to look for a great decision only in a great battle. From time immemorial only great victories have led to great successes on the offensive side in the absolute form, on the defensive side in a manner more or less satisfactory. Even Bonaparte would not have seen the day of Ulm, unique in its kind, if he had shrunk from shedding blood; it is rather to be regarded as only a second crop from the

victorious events in his preceding campaigns. It is not only bold, rash, and presumptuous generals who have sought to complete their work by the great venture of a decisive battle, but also fortunate ones as well, and we may rest satisfied with the answer which they have thus given to this vast question.

Let us not hear of generals who conquer without bloodshed. If a bloody slaughter is a horrible sight, then that is a ground for paying more respect to war but not for making the sword we wear blunter and blunter by degrees from feelings of humanity, until some one steps in with one that is sharp and lops off the arm from our body.

#### DECISIVENESS OF A GREAT BATTLE

We look upon a great battle as a principal decision, but certainly not as the only one necessary for a war or a campaign. Instances of a great battle deciding a whole campaign have been frequent only in modern times; those which have decided a whole war belong to the class of rare exceptions.

A decision which is brought about by a great battle depends naturally not on the battle itself, that is on the mass of combatants engaged in it and on the intensity of the victory, but also on a number of other relations between the military forces opposed to each other, and between the States to which these forces belong. But at the same time that the principal mass of the force available is brought to the great duel, a great decision is also brought on, the extent of which may perhaps be foreseen in many respects, though not in all, and which although not the only one, still is the first decision, and as such has an influence on those which succeed. Therefore, a deliberately planned great battle, according to its relations, is more or less, but always in some degree, to be regarded as the leading means and central point of the whole system. The more a general

GENERAL CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ 207

takes the field in the true spirit of war as well as of every contest, with the feeling and the idea, that is the conviction, that he must and will conquer, the more he will strive to throw every weight into the scale in the first battle, hope and strive to win everything by it. Bonaparte hardly ever entered upon a war without thinking of conquering his enemy at once in the first battle, and Frederick the Great, although in a more limited sphere, and with interests of less magnitude at stake, thought the same when, at the head of a small army he sought to disengage his rear from the Russians or the Federal Imperial Army.



## CHAPTER IV

### WAR AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLICY

[From "On War," by Gen. C. von Clausewitz]

HAVING made the requisite examination on both sides of that state of antagonism in which the nature of war stands with relation to other interests of men individually, and of the bond of society, in order to neglect any of the opposing elements—an antagonism which is founded in our own nature, and which, therefore, no philosophy can unravel—we shall now look for that unity into which, in practical life, these antagonistic elements combine themselves by partly neutralizing each other. We should have brought forward this unity at the very commencement if it had not been necessary to bring out this contradiction very plainly, and also to look at the different elements separately. Now, this unity is the conception that war is only a part of political intercourse, and therefore by no means an independent thing in itself.

We know, certainly, that war is only called forth through the political intercourse of Governments and nations, but in general it is supposed that such intercourse is broken off by war, and that a totally different state of things ensues, subject to no laws but its own.

We maintain, on the contrary, that war is nothing but a continuation of political intercourse, with a mixture of other means. We say mixed with other means in order thereby to maintain at the same time that this political intercourse does not cease by the war itself, is not changed into something quite different, but that, in its essence, it continues to exist, whatever may be the form of the means which

it uses, and that the chief lines on which the events of the war progress, and to which they are attached, are only the general features of policy which run all through the war until peace takes place. How can we conceive it to be otherwise? Does the cessation of diplomatic Notes stop the political relations between different nations and Governments? Is not war merely another kind of writing and language for political thoughts? It has certainly a grammar of its own, but its logic is not peculiar to itself.

Accordingly, war can never be separated from political intercourse, and if, in the consideration of the matter, this is done in any way, all the threads of the different relations are to a certain extent broken, and we have before us a senseless thing without an object.

#### A POLITICAL CONTRADICTION

This kind of idea would be indispensable even if war was perfect war, the perfectly unbridled element of hostility for all the circumstances on which it rests, and which determine its leading features, viz., our own power, the enemy's power, allies on both sides, the characteristics of the people and their Governments respectively, &c. Are they not of a political nature, and are they not so intimately connected with the whole political intercourse that it is impossible to separate them? But this view is doubly indispensable if we reflect that real war is no such consistent effort tending to an extreme, as it should be according to the abstract idea, but a half and half thing, a contradiction in itself; that, as such, it cannot follow its own laws, but must be looked upon as a part of another whole—and this whole is policy.

Policy in making use of war avoids all those rigorous conclusions which proceed from its nature. It troubles itself little about final possibilities, confining

## 210 WAR AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLICY

its attention to immediate probabilities. If such uncertainty in the whole action ensues therefrom, if it thereby becomes a sort of game, the policy of each Cabinet places its confidence in the belief that in this game it will surpass its neighbour in skill and sharp-sightedness.

This policy makes out of the all-overpowering element of war a mere instrument, changes the tremendous battle-sword which should be lifted in both hands and the whole power of the body to strike once for all, into a light handy weapon, which is even sometimes nothing more than a rapier to exchange thrusts and feints and parries.

Thus the contradictions in which man, naturally timid, becomes involved by war may be solved if we choose to accept this as a solution.

If war belongs to policy, it will naturally take its character from thence. If policy is grand and powerful, so also will be the war, and this may be carried to the point at which war attains to its absolute form.

In this way of viewing the subject, therefore, we need not shut out of sight the absolute form of war. We rather keep it continually in view in the background.

Only through this kind of view war recovers unity ; only by it can we see all wars as things of one kind ; and it is only through it that the judgment can obtain true and perfect basis and point of view from which great plans may be traced out and determined upon.

It is true the political element does not sink deep into the details of war. Vedettes are not planted, patrols do not make their rounds from political considerations ; but small as is its influence in this respect, it is great in the formation of a plan for a whole war, or a campaign, and often even for a battle.

CY

such  
from,  
cy of  
that  
skill

ering  
the  
d in  
strike  
even  
ange

rally  
d if

e its  
wer-  
ried  
lute

we  
var.  
ck-

ty ;  
ud ;  
ain  
ieh  
on.  
eep  
ed,  
cal  
his  
r a  
a

## CHAPTER V

### GENERAL PRINCIPLES

[From "On War," by Gen. C. von Clausewitz]

THERE are three principal objects in carrying on war.

- (a) To conquer and destroy the enemy's force.
- (b) To get possession of the material elements of aggression and of the other sources of existence of the hostile army.
- (c) To gain public opinion.

To attain the first of these objects, the chief operation must be directed against the enemy's principal army, or at least against a very important portion of the hostile force ; for it must be beaten before we can follow up the other two objects with success.

In order to seize the material forces, operations are directed against those points at which those resources are chiefly concentrated ; principal towns, magazines, great fortresses. On the road to these, the enemy's principal force or a considerable part of his army will be encountered.

Public opinion is ultimately gained by the great victories, and by the possession of the enemy's capital.

The first and most important maxim which we can set before us for the attainment of these objects is : to employ all the forces which we can make available with the utmost energy. In every modification which manifests itself, in these respects, there is a shortcoming as respects the object. Even if the result is tolerably certain in itself, it is extremely unwise not to use the utmost efforts to make it perfectly certain ; for these efforts can never produce injurious effects. Let the country suffer ever so much by it, no disadvantage can arise from that, because the pressure is the sooner removed.

The second principle is to concentrate our force as much as is possible at the point where the decisive blows are to be struck, to run the risk even of being at a disadvantage at other points, in order to make sure of the result at the decisive point. The success at that point will compensate for all defeats at secondary points.

The third principle is: not to lose time. If no special and considerable advantage will arise by delay, it is important to commence work as quickly as possible. By rapidity many measures of the enemy's are nipped in the bud, and public opinion is gained in our favour.

Lastly, the fourth principle is: to follow up the success we gain with the utmost energy.

The first of these principles is the foundation of the three others. If we have followed the first principle we can venture any length with respect to the others, without risking our all. It gives the means of continually creating new forces behind us, and with fresh forces every disaster may be repaired.

### SMALL STATES CANNOT FIGHT

Small States, in the present day, cannot make any wars of conquest; but at the same time, for a defensive war, even their means are very great. Therefore I am perfectly convinced that whoever calls forth all his powers in order to appear incessantly with new masses, whoever adopts every imaginable means of preparation, whoever concentrates his force at the decisive point, whoever thus armed pursues a great object with resolution and energy, has done all that can be done in a general way for the strategical conduct of the war, and that unless he is altogether unfortunate in battle, he will undoubtedly be victorious in the same measure as his adversary has fallen short of this exertion and energy.

Due attention being paid to these principles, the

form in which the operations are carried on is in the end of little consequence. I shall, however, try to explain in a few words what is most important.

Beside this, the principle just stated, of concentrating as much as possible at the decisive point, is opposed to the idea of enveloping strategically, and the order of battle for our troops naturally springs from that principle of itself. On that account I said, with reason, that the form of the order of the battle is of little consequence. There is, however, one case in which the operating strategically against the enemy's flank leads to great results, similar to those of a battle; that is, when in a poor or impoverished country the enemy, by great exertions, has formed large magazines on the preservation of which his operations entirely depend. In such a case it may perhaps be advisable not to march with the mass of our forces against the enemy's principal force, but to push forward against his base. For this there are two conditions requisite :

(a) That the enemy is so far from his base that he will be forced by this means to make a long retreat ; and

(b) That with a few troops and the help of natural and artificial obstacles we shall be able to harass him in such a manner on the road which his principal force must take, that no conquests he can make in that direction will compensate for the loss of his base.

### IMPORTANCE OF COMMISSARIAT

The subsistence of troops being a condition which is indispensable in the conduct of war, it has a great influence on the operations of the war, particularly in this way, that it will allow of the concentration of troops to a certain degree ; and as it must be considered in the choice of the line of operations, therefore it has an influence in determining the theatre of war.

The subsistence for troops is provided, whenever the state of a country allows of it, at the cost of the country, by requisitions.

When important reasons (as for instance the position of the enemy's principal army) do not decide otherwise, one should choose the richest and most productive provinces to operate in, for facility of subsistence promotes rapidity of movement. There is nothing which in importance surpasses the subsistence, except the position of the enemy's principal army, which we are seeking, the situation of the capital city, or strong place which we wish to take. All other considerations, for instance, the advantageous form of drawing up the armed force are as a rule much less important.

In spite of this new method of subsisting, we are very far from being able to dispense with all magazines, and a wise commander, even if the resources of the province are quite sufficient, will not neglect to form magazines behind him as a provision against unforeseen events, and so as to be able the more readily to concentrate his strength at certain points. This is one of those measures of precaution which are no detriment to the main object.

## PART VIII

BY HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE

*Late Professor of History at the University of Berlin*

### INTRODUCTION

AN important part in the propaganda of the Prussian-military point of view among the German people has been played by the collegiate class—the educators of the lower grades, the university faculties, and especially the professors and writers of history. These men have taken the ideas of Hohenzollern absolutism, of the superiority of the State and the insignificance of the individual, of the power of might to make right, of the righteousness and necessity of war and the needful dominance of the military—and upon all these favourite precepts of the ruling military class this intellectual class has put the stamp of approval and strengthened them by twisting biology and history and philosophy to their support.

The foremost amongst these politico-historians has been Heinrich von Treitschke, an eminent German historian and publicist, who was born at Dresden, September 15, 1834. He studied at Bonn, Leipzig, Tübingen, and Heidelberg, and became professor at Freiberg in 1863. His ardent advocacy of German unity led him at the period of the Seven Weeks' War to resign his professorship and assume the editorship of the *Preussische Jahrbücher* at Berlin, a position which he retained until 1839. In 1886 he was made professor at Kiel, but in the following year accepted a call to Heidelberg, where he remained until his permanent removal to Berlin. Treitschke was a Member of the Reichstag from 1871 to 1888 and prominent in debate as a representative of the Liberal element. He succeeded Ranke as historiographer of Prussia in 1886, and lectured for many



years in the University of Berlin, impressing his strong personality and ardent patriotism upon thousands of the German youth. Treitschke's published works are numerous and relate wholly to epochs of the nineteenth century. His style is picturesque, spirited and graphic.

In Germany von Treitschke has been looked upon as a great historian. Fairly considered, he is not an historian at all, nor even a deep student of history, for he has made no original contributions to historical knowledge or method. He is rather a clever commentator, a popular lecturer who has followed the ruling point of view and made history fit it. But his influence on popular intellectual thought in Germany and on Berlin students has been tremendous. Bernhardt accepts him bodily—builds his whole argument of the right of war and the power of might upon von Treitschke's theory of the State. And with nearly all the leaders of Chauvinistic and super-militarist thought in Prussia, his name comes up repeatedly. An understanding of his point of view and writings is therefore important.

When intellects which are supposed to be so keenly logical as the Germans have not been able to see the fallacies in the arguments that von Treitschke brings up to support the militaristic theory of might, it is only a further evidence of the completeness with which these ideas have taken possession of the German mind. Von Treitschke himself and by the same token the followers who accept him, have not worked out a convincing argument; they have simply accepted an idea and twisted history and political economy and even biology to support it.

The following chapters have been specially translated for this work from Professor Treitschke's "Die Politik."

## CHAPTER I

### THE PURPOSE OF THE STATE

[Translated from "Die Politik," by Prof. H. von Treitschke]

LET us now apply this standard of a deeper and real Christian civilization to the State, and let us bear in mind that the existence of this great collective personality is power, and that therefore the highest moral duty of the State is to foster this power. The individual is bound to sacrifice himself for the next higher community of which he is a member; but the State itself is the highest among the communities of men, and therefore the duty of self-abnegation cannot apply to it. The Christian duty of self-sacrifice for something higher does not exist for the State, for the reason that there is nothing above and beyond it in the world's history, and consequently it cannot sacrifice itself for another. When the State sees its downfall approaching we praise it if it goes to its downfall sword in hand. A sacrifice for a foreign nation is not only non-moral, but it is contrary to the idea of self-assertion which is the highest law of the State.

Thus we find it necessary to distinguish between public and private morality. The rank of the various duties must necessarily be very different for the State and the individual man. There is a whole series of these duties which are imposed upon the individual which are absolutely out of the question for the State. The State's highest law is that of self-assertion; that is for it the absolute morality. Therefore, one must assert that of all political sins, the worst and most contemptible is weakness; it is the sin against the holy ghost of politics. In private life certain weaknesses of the soul are excusable. But

of these there is no question in the State; for the State is might, and if it should belie its very essence, there would be no judgment severe enough for it. Think of the reign of Frederick William IV. Magnanimity and gratitude are certainly political virtues, but only when they are not opposed to the main object of politics, the maintenance of its own power. In the year 1849 the thrones of every possible German principality were shaken. Frederick William took a step which in itself was justifiable; he sent Prussian troops into Saxony and Bavaria, and restored order therein. But now came the mortal sin. Were the Prussians there in order to shed their blood for the King of Saxony or of Bavaria? There must be some permanent advantage for Prussia to be derived therefrom. We had the little ones in our grip; we only needed to allow the troops to remain there until these princes had adapted themselves to the new German Empire. Instead of this, the King withdrew his troops and quite properly the little ones made a long nose behind their backs as they marched away. That was simply unthinkable weakness; the blood of the Prussian nation had been sacrificed for nothing.

In home politics power and the maintenance and execution of the will of the State is the essential likewise. A State that leaves the slightest doubt of the firmness of its will and of its laws destroys the constitutional feeling. Remember how sentimentally German princes long regarded the prerogative of mercy. Philanthropists had so long complained about the immorality of capital punishment, that the princes had become infested, and so it had come to pass that in Germany there was hardly any more capital punishment. Then came for our salvation the terrible attempt at assassination by Hödel, and now our princes took heart again. Was not this sentimental use of the prerogative of mercy quite immoral? This prerogative had been granted to

our princes in order to enable them to adjust the conflict between the hard objective rule of law and the subjective abnormal circumstances of individual criminal cases. But it had never been intended to abolish entirely the exercise of capital punishment.

### A STATE RECOGNISES NO SUPERIOR

It follows, further, from the nature of the State as sovereign power, that it can recognize no arbiter above itself, and that moreover constitutional obligations must be subject in a last resort to its jurisdiction. We have to bear that in mind in order that in times of crisis we may not judge like Philistines from the advocate's point of view. When Prussia broke the treaty of Tilsit she was from the standpoint of the civil procedure in the wrong. But who is there to-day who will have the brazen face to assert this? Even the French could not do so any longer. That also holds in the case of national treaties which are not quite so immoral as was that one enforced on Prussia by France. Thus every State reserves to itself the right to judge of its treaty obligations for itself, and the historian cannot here step in with his purely conventional standards. He must ask the deeper question as to whether the unconditional duty of self-preservation does not justify the State. It was thus in Italy in 1859. Piedmont was the virtual aggressor; and Austria and her servile dependents in Germany did not fail to complain of the disturbance of the everlasting peace. But in reality Italy had been for years in a state of siege. No noble nation will ever tolerate such a position, and in reality it was not Piedmont, but Austria which took the offensive, because she had for years shamefully sinned by helping herself to Italy's greatest treasures.

Thus it is the upholding of its own power that is the supreme moral duty of the State. But if we follow up the natural consequence of this truth, it

becomes clear that the State must only set itself moral aims, or else it would be contradicting itself.

Up to now the earnest thinker can hardly find any subject for disagreement, but now we come to a series of most difficult questions with the consideration of how far political aims, moral in themselves, may be allowed the use of means which in civil life would be considered reprehensible. The well-known jesuitical saying is in its unvarnished directness rough and radical, but no one can deny that it contains a certain amount of truth. There are in political life innumerable cases, as in the life of individuals in which the use of pure methods is quite impossible. If it be possible, if it be feasible to obtain an objective moral in itself by moral means, then these are to be preferred even though their action may be slower and more inconvenient.

We have already seen that the power of truth and frankness in politics is greater than is usually supposed. The newer conception is that there is no impulse of truth inherent in man, and that it has arisen conventionally from the political aims. But not so. An impulse towards truth is indeed inherent in man, but it varies according to times and nations. Even amongst the most mendacious of nations, the Orientals, we find this striving for truth. The elder brother of Wellington won for himself an enormous influence in India owing to the fact that the Nabobs knew that this man always said what he thought. On the whole, however, it is clear that political methods with nations on a lower grade of culture must be adapted to their powers of sensation and understanding. The historian who tried to judge European politics in Africa or in the East by the same standards as in Europe would be a fool. *He who cannot inspire fear over there is lost.*

## CHAPTER II

### PLACE OF WARFARE IN THE STATE

[Translated from "Die Politik," by Prof. H. von Treitschke]

ONE must certainly, when considering war, remember that it does not always appear as a judgment of God; there are also temporary results, but the life of a people is reckoned by centuries. The decisive verdict can only be obtained by the review of great epochs. A State like Prussia, which was freer and more rational than the French, might owing to momentary exhaustion be brought near annihilation, but it would then call to mind its inner life, and would thus regain its superiority. One must say with the greatest determination: War is for an afflicted people the only remedy. When the State exclaims: My very existence is at stake! then social self-seeking must disappear and all party hatred be silent. The individual must forget his own *ego* and feel himself a member of the whole, he must recognize how negligible is his life compared with the good of the whole. Therein lies the greatness of war that the little man completely vanishes before the great thought of the State. The sacrifice of nationalities for one another is nowhere invested with such beauty as in war. At such a time the corn is separated from the chaff. All who lived through 1870 will understand the saying of Niebuhr with regard to the year 1813, that he then experienced the "bliss of sharing with all his fellow citizens, with the scholar and the ignorant, the one common feeling—no man who enjoyed this experience will to his dying day forget how loving, friendly and strong he felt."

It is indeed political idealism which fosters war, whereas materialism rejects it. What a perversion

## 222 PLACE OF WARFARE IN THE STATE

of morality to want to banish heroism from human life. The heroes of a people are the personalities who fill the youthful souls with delight and enthusiasm. Amongst authors, we as boys and youths admire most those whose words sound like a flourish of trumpets. He who cannot take pleasure therein, is too cowardly to take up arms himself for his fatherland. All appeal to Christianity in this matter is perverted. The Bible states expressly that the man in authority shall wield the sword; it states likewise that: "Greater love hath no man than this that he giveth his life for his friend." Those who preach the nonsense about everlasting peace do not understand the life of the Aryan race, the Aryans are before all brave. They have always been men enough to protect by the sword what they had won by the intellect. Thus Goethe said: "The North Germans were always more civilized than the South Germans." Why certainly. Just consider the history of the princes of Lower Saxony; they have always fought and defended themselves, and it is that that makes the difference in history. There is undeniable partiality in Goethe's saying, but there is a kernel of truth therein. Our ancient empire was great under the Saxons; under the Suabians and the Salians it came to grief. Thus to a noble nation, heroism and the maintenance of physical strength and of moral courage are essential.

To the historian who lives in the realms of the Will, it is quite clear that the furtherance of an everlasting peace is fundamentally reactionary. He sees that to banish war from history would be to banish all progress and becoming. It is only the periods of exhaustion, weariness and mental stagnation that have dallied with the dream of everlasting peace.

We are now in the third epoch (and again after a great war) which seems to have destroyed all the idealism of Germany. For to-day an outburst of

loud and shameless laughter from the vulgar greets the destruction of anything which Germany has made great. The very foundations of our noble, ancient culture are now being destroyed. All that which has raised us into a veritable aristocracy among the nations is derided and trodden under foot. Truly it is the right time now to indulge in fantastic ravings of everlasting peace. It is not worth spending one's breath talking of such things. The living God will see to it that war returns again and again as a terrible medicine for humanity.

### WAR BECOMING RARER AND SHORTER

Yet it cannot be denied that with the progress of culture wars must become rarer and shorter. War which entails a complete break in our habitual life thus appears to us very terrible. The refined and cultured man, it is true, feels that he must kill adversaries of nations at enmity whose bravery he highly respects. He feels that the majesty of war consists precisely of this: that murder may be carried out without passion: for this reason this struggle costs him much more self-restraint than to the barbarian.

Then again the economic ravages of war are much greater among civilized nations than amongst barbarians, more especially in these days. War by destroying the artificial system of credit may bring about the most dire and fearful results. If it should come to pass that a conqueror ever entered London, the effect would be too dreadful. There the credit system involves a network of millions of threads—here a conqueror endowed with the recklessness of a Napoleon might bring about a destruction of which we can have no conception. From the natural horror man feels of bloodshed, and from the vastness and quality of modern armies, it follows of necessity that wars must grow rarer and shorter, for it is



inconceivable how the burdens of a great war could be borne under present conditions for any length of time. But it would be deceptive to conclude from this that wars could ever cease entirely. They cannot and must not cease so long as there is a sovereign State opposed by other sovereign States.

War and conquest are therefore the most important State builders. The rule of the founding of States by the Sword is preponderant; and we observe here in modern history the unceasing impetus towards a great national empire-building from a little centre, which at first arises merely from the bare instinct of force, but by degrees, becoming conscious, it finds in the recognition of a common nationality the requisite unifying force. Thus England's Unity began with Wessex. This united Anglo-Saxon kingdom then conquered Scotland and Ireland and endowed them with Anglo-Saxon culture. The development of France was similar. Here from Isle de France, in a similar manner, the microcosm of the ethnographical conditions of Gaul, arose the unity of the land. In Spain from Castile; and in Russia from the realm of Rurik grew by degrees the great Muscovite Empire.

It is thus a prime necessity for a great nation nowadays to show an intense desire to colonize. The first nation in history to recognize the majesty of a world commerce, the Phœnician, was a great colonizer. Then followed the colonization of the Greeks in the eastern and western basins of the Mediterranean; then the Romans; in the Middle Age the Germans, Spaniards, and Portuguese; finally Holland and England after the Germans had quite disappeared from among the maritime nations for many a long day.

The most prosperous from the point of view of national life are the agrarian colonies. In lands which possess similar climatic conditions to ours, and which allow of considerable emigration from

the Mother Country, one might find under favourable economic conditions as surprising a growth of population as in America. But in such colonies there is always the danger, if slight even, that they will rise up against the motherland and endeavour to free themselves. England, which has learnt from experience, has acquired the knowledge of how to avert this. The independence of the English colonies is carried so far that they even have a tariff of duties against the motherland.

### HOW ENGLAND MAY LOSE HER COLONIES

The reciprocal relationship between the colonies and the motherland belongs to the most delicate problems in history, and one should avoid trying to find natural laws in the historical world, that is to say in the world of freedom. No one will wish to assert to-day that colonies will necessarily wish to free themselves from the Mother Country. That Canada will one day do this is probable, more especially because the better part of Canada is French. Whether, on the other hand, Australia will ever free itself is more than doubtful; England's to some extent clever policy would probably be able to prevent this. It depends on the kind of men at the helm in England and Australia, and how they are able to read the signs of the times. But even should England see herself compelled to give up part of her colonies, she would nevertheless retain an immeasurable cultural and economic advantage, for the bond of the mother tongue is an eminently weighty factor in commerce. Thus North America still maintains its main commercial relations with England. A colony, which has been bound to the Mother Country by ties of language and culture is never entirely lost to the latter, even when it has been politically severed from her. That also is proved by the relations between America and England.

What a significance there is in the fact that there are at the present day nearly 800 millions of English-speaking people in the world.

We, on the other hand, are finding out to-day what opportunities we have neglected. The results of the last half century are frightful: during that period England has conquered the world. The Continent had no time in consequence of its continual restlessness to cast its eyes over the seas, where England was grasping everything for herself. Germany had to miss and sleep through that just because she was much too busy with her neighbours and with her own home struggles. Beyond a doubt a great colonial development is a great blessing to a nation. And that is the short sightedness of our opponents of colonial development, that they cannot see this. The whole position of Germany depends partly upon this factor—how many millions of men in the future will speak the German language.

When it is asserted that the emigration of Germans to America is an advantage to us, that is folly. What has Germany gained by the circumstance that thousands of the best of her sons who could not find sustenance in their own country have turned their backs on their fatherland? Even if the emigrant himself still retains a few natural ties that bind him to the fatherland, yet as a rule his children, and in any case his grandchildren, are no longer Germans; for only too easily does the German learn to deny his fatherland; and they are moreover no longer in a position in America to assert their nationality for any length of time. Just as certainly as the Huguenots, who when they emigrated into the Mark of Brandenburg, were on the average more cultured than the majority of the original inhabitants, nevertheless had to lose their nationality, so it has turned out with the Germans in America. Almost a third of the total population of North America is of German origin. How much of this most precious energy we

have lost through this emigration and are still daily losing without receiving the slightest compensation for it! The labour as well as the capital of the emigrants is lost to us. What measureless financial advantages these people would have provided for us as colonists!

Consequently, that colonization which retains a homogeneous nationality has become, for the future of the world, a factor of enormous significance. On it will depend the extent to which each nation will share in the domination of the world by the white races. It is quite thinkable that it might come to pass that a country possessing no colonies might cease to be numbered amongst the Great Powers in Europe, however powerful it might once have been. For this reason we dare not drift into that condition of torpor which is the result of a continental policy, and the issue of our next successful war must, if possible, be the acquisition of a colony of some sort.

## CHAPTER III

### THE EMPIRE AN EXTENDED PRUSSIA

*[Translated from "Die Politik," by Prof. H. von Treitschke]*

FINALLY the gifted men who recognized the signs of the times appeared, William, Bismarck, Roon; and now begins the critical war of 1866. What did this effect? Against the will of the whole of Germany the Prussian State created by means of its good sword a Constitution which naturally could be nothing else than the subjection of the smaller States—even if that subjection were concealed under lenient and friendly formalities—the conquered under the domination of the conqueror. What was dreamed in 1848 did not after all come to pass, that the German nation, namely, would, as it were against its will, exalt Prussia and force it to rise in Germany. That was the password of 1848. Prussia was regarded as a so-called German State much like Schwarzburg Sondershausen; and just as Schwarzburg sank out of sight in the future German Empire, thus would Prussia arise therein.

With such ideas in mind the Frankfort Constitution was drawn up. But Prussia was an entirely different State from the others, not only in size but in kind. It was living, did not merely keep itself alive by sharing the general German life, but had its own proud history. That Prussia was really an individual was to be demonstrated in 1866. It was not that Prussia arose in Germany. This phrase, which is still heard nowadays, expresses the exact contrary of what is now palpable: Prussia extended its own institutions over the whole of Germany.

What would become of Germany if the Prussian State ceased to be? The German Empire could no

longer subsist. Thus we find the truth, disagreeable as it may be to many—in which there is, however, nothing to offend a non-Prussian—that in this German Empire there is but one of the former States which saved its sovereignty, and that is Prussia. Prussia alone has remained a sovereign State, and none of the others. Prussia has not forfeited its military rights, nor does it need to allow its own sovereign prerogatives to be curtailed by other States. The German Emperor is at the same time King of Prussia; he leads the army for the nation, and one has to enter the deserts of hair-splitting if one would recall cases in which there was a conflict between the German Emperor and the King of Prussia. One must enter the domain of the poor wit with the saying, "I should not advise the German Emperor to begin to bargain with the King of Prussia."

### THE REAL WAR LORD

To speak of a *War suzerainty in Peace* (War Lordism), about which our little kings made a fuss, is the privilege of the theorizing German professors: foreigners make fun of it. In external formalities the greatest consideration was shown. The Prince of Reuss even can boast on paper that he has an army, and a courtly mythology asserts that this battalion constitutes the Reuss army. This forbearance has been carried too far. But that does not alter the facts that in reality and in spite of all political reservations neither the King of Bavaria nor the King of Saxony is in a position to mobilize a single man for purposes of war. In time of war the German Emperor is the War Lord; the military right has passed over to the Empire, and that is as regards the representative bearer identical with the State of Prussia.

Further, as regards the full extent of its sovereign prerogatives, Prussia alone among the States has preserved hers intact. As, according to the Constitu-

tion of the Empire, changes in the Constitution are considered to be rejected when in the Bundesrath fourteen votes are registered against them, Prussia's seventeen votes suffice amply to quash any attempt to reduce by constitutional means its sovereign prerogatives. Thirdly, moreover—and this is also a point which, curiously enough, is generally passed over in silence—obedience of the members is required in the Empire as in each separate State.

Hence we possess in the Imperial Constitution as an ultimate resource, *Execution*, a polished sword, which has never yet been really drawn but which has once or twice shaken in the scabbard. Fortunately, the spirit of loyalty is so firm amongst the confederates that it has not yet come into use. Yet it is available; the rebellious State can through the process of *Execution* (in a legal sense) be compelled to obey the laws of the Empire. But this power of execution is vested in the Kaiser, and he will not thrash the King of Prussia. That anyone would ever be found who would box his own ears cannot be accepted in science.

It is upon the fact that the Empire is "*an extended Prussia*," as Emperor William once said to Bismarck, with Prussia predominating in it both materially and formally, that the whole Empire is based both historically and politically. What is our German Imperial army? Undoubtedly the Prussian army, which in consequence of the Army Bill of 1814, was trained as a nation in arms, extended over the length and breadth of the Empire. The Imperial post and telegraphic system, the Imperial bank, are all old Prussian institutions extended over the Empire. There is nothing in any of this to complain of. Every Prussian will consider it to be quite in order that the best political institutions should be extended over the rest of Germany; and every reasonable non-Prussian must rejoice that Prussia should have retrieved the honour of the German name. Matters so stand that

the will of the Empire in its ultimate judgment can be none other than that of the Prussian State.

### PRUSSIA MUST LEAD GERMANY

Side by side with the Kaiserdom there is another formal bond that welds this leading State to the Empire, the office of Imperial Chancellor. I have already drawn attention to the not altogether accidental resemblance it bears to the office of Great Pensionary of Holland in the Republic of the United Netherlands. With us also a short experience has demonstrated that the office of Imperial Chancellor can only be borne by the Prussian Minister-President. When, soon after the war, Prince Bismarck retired from the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, only retaining his hold upon Imperial politics, and Roon was appointed Prussian Minister-President, it only needed a very short period to demonstrate that this separation was impossible. To our present complete confusion an attempt has once again been made, in spite of this experience, to separate the two offices. If it be really the case that the German Empire is directed by Prussia, then the person of the leading statesman in Prussia and in Germany must be identical. Through the Imperial Chancellor the monarchical will becomes manifest, which is at the same time the will of the Empire and of the Prussian State embodied in the same person.



## CHAPTER IV

### THE UNIFYING FORCE OF THE STATE

[Translated from "*Die Politik*," by Prof. H. von Treitschke]

It was an error in ancient statecraft that the army was only regarded as the instrument of diplomacy, and that it was given a subordinate position in the system in the department of foreign affairs. It was only regarded as the instrument of the latter. There can no longer be any question of the error of this practice in our age of universal military service. To-day every one feels that the army is no longer merely the weapon for the purposes of diplomacy but that the constitution of the State verily depends upon the distribution of arms among the nation. For the State is borne by the organized physical strength of the nation, which is in effect the army. If the system of the State consists in power at home and abroad, then the organization of the army must be one of the first constitutional questions of every State. The fact of the choice it makes between universal military service, or feudal militia or conscription with right of substitution, determines its innermost character.

From the fact that the army constitutes the aggregate physical power of a nation follows, moreover, that it is also interwoven in the most intimate fashion with the idea of the unity of the State. One may even assert that there is no institution which brings home to the thoughtful man so sharply the thought of the unity of the State and of the interdependence of the whole as an army organized in accordance with the real conditions of the nation. Commerce, art, and science are cosmopolitan and lead the way beyond the boundaries of the nation. The common activity of elections, of the judge and jury, certainly

strengthen the feeling of the State community; but parliamentary life does not only unite the citizens together in a common political labour, it also splits them up again and sets parties against one another and unavoidable hatred.

### POLITICAL UNITY IN THE ARMY

A really popularly organized army is the only one of all political institutions that unites the burghers with burghers; in the army alone do they feel themselves all united as sons of the Fatherland. After the experience we have had in the new German Empire this will hardly be disputed. The German army has become beyond all doubt the most supremely real and effective bond of national unity, and this most certainly cannot be claimed for the German Reichstag, as had formerly been hoped. That institution is rather responsible for the fact that Germans have once again begun mutually to hate and calumniate one another. But the army has trained us into practical unity.

For the reason that it embodies in the most striking manner for the masses of the people the idea of the unity of the State, the monarchy is therefore especially suited to take the direction of the army; the King is the natural Commander-in-Chief.

Those who regard the army as an evil must anyhow allow it to be a necessary evil. If the State itself be necessary and rational, it follows also that it must assert itself amongst the other States. We shall, however, see that an efficient and powerful equipment of the army forms the basis of political freedom, and that States are not at all to be pitied for possessing a strong, well-organized military system.

All the world that claims to be free-thinking talks of the ideal of seeing States hasten to adopt a general disarmament. But what does the history of the last century teach on this score? Exactly the

contrary : the armaments become even stronger and heavier, and this shows itself in all States without exception, and can therefore not be a purely accidental occurrence. The fact is that there is a radical error in this liberal conception. The State is no academy of arts, nor yet a stock exchange ; it is a power, and therefore it denies its very nature when it neglects its army.

It is an advantage to a nation to have a powerful and well-organized army, not only because the army affords reliable support for foreign politics, but also because a noble nation with a glorious history can for a long time make use of the army as a peaceful weapon in that it constitutes a school for the individual manly virtues of the people, which may so easily perish during a period of prosperity and enjoyment. It must be granted that there are certain delicately strung, refined, artistic natures which cannot bear the military discipline. Such people often give rise to a perverted conception of universal military service. But in these important matters judgments should not be formed from exceptional natures but from the ancient precept *mens sana in corpore sano*. The strength of the body is especially remarkable in times like our own.

It is a defect of English culture that universal military service is an unknown factor therein. This defect is neutralized to a certain extent by the circumstance that her navy is so powerfully developed, and also, on the other hand, by her continual little wars in her innumerable colonies, which keep the manly vigour of the nation occupied and fresh. That a great physical fitness is still to be found in England is partly due to these continual colonial wars.

But when one looks closely into the matter a grave defect is observable. The absence of chivalry in the English character, which forms such a sharp contrast to the naïve loyalty of the German, is partly due to the fact that in that country physical exercise is not

sought in the use of noble weapons but in the skill of boxing, swimming, and rowing. These exercises certainly have their value, but that this whole class of athletic sports also develops the spirit of the athlete in all its brutality and an objective habit of thought, which is only concerned with carrying off the first prize, strikes one at once.

### AN ARMY THE ESSENCE OF A STATE

After all, it is the normal and reasonable course for a great nation to embody and train the very essence of the State, which is in itself power, in its organized military system and by means of its physical strength. And since we have lived in a warlike age, the hyper-delicate, philanthropic way of looking at these things has more and more been pressed into the background, so that with Clausewitz we have once again come to regard war as the forceful continuation of politics. Not all the advocates of peace in the world will ever succeed in bringing about such a state of affairs that all the political powers will be of one mind; if they are not of one mind, then there is nothing but the sword that can decide their differences of opinion.

We have learnt to recognize as the civilizing majesty of war precisely what appears to the superficial observers to be brutality and inhumanity. That one should for the sake of the Fatherland overcome the natural feelings of humanity, that men should murder one another who have never wronged one another, who perhaps highly esteem one another as chivalrous foes, that appears at first sight to be the frightful side of war, but also at the same time its greatness. Man must not only be ready to sacrifice his life, but also the natural deeply rooted feelings of the human soul; he must devote his whole *ego* for the furtherance of a great patriotic idea: that is the moral sublimity of war.

In following out these ideas one comes to recognize how war with all its sternness and brutality also forms a bond of love between men and how here every class distinction disappears and the danger of death knits men together. Those who know history know also that it would be a curtailment of human nature to wish to banish war from the world. There is no freedom without a military power which is ready to sacrifice itself for freedom. One must again repeat that scholars, in considering these questions, proceed on the assumption that the State was only intended to be an academy of arts and sciences. That is in truth a purpose of the State but it is not its primary purpose. If a State neglect its physical strength in favour of its mental it comes to grief.

Above all we must recognize that the greatness of the historical life is based far more on character than on education; the driving powers of history are to be sought in those circles in which character is built up. Only brave nations have any real history. In the times of great crises in the life of nations we find warlike virtues are the decisive factors. An old saw rightly terms war the *examen rigorosum* (severe test) of States; in times of war States not only show what they can furnish in the way of physical strength, but also of moral strength and to a certain extent also of intelligence. In war what a nation has acquired in the quiet days of peace comes to light. It is not the nature of the army to be always fighting; the quiet work of equipment proceeds during peace.

If the army be the ordered political strength of the State, this order can only *become* power; it can have no will of its own, for it is destined to carry out the will of the head of the State in unconditional obedience. This subordination of the individual will to that of the head of the State is a very hard task—that cannot be denied. But it is obvious that upon this very claim, which all radical prattlers decry

as reactionary, depends the political freedom of a nation. If the army had a will of its own all political security would be at an end. No more terrible plague can be imagined than an army that argues and splits up into factions; the history of Spain affords a terrible example of this.

In this energy and security of obedience lie the honour of the soldiers. Consequently the unconditional obedience which is exacted by us and which develops almost into severity is a glory and a sign of the efficiency of our army system. The contempt with which some of the Radicals so often speak of the dog-like obedience is thus proved to be a pure illusion. The military training is of great value in the formation of character. Old tried officers have before all well-developed characters and are superior in this respect to the average scholar because scholars have less opportunity of developing their character. Silent obedience towards superiors and at the same time severe commands to inferiors demand a self-reliance of the character which is to be very highly prized. Our Prussian generals have never been anything but candid men.

These experiences are so clear that one is ever and again amazed at the obduracy of the doctrine which asserts that an army trained to unconditional obedience is an instrument of servility; it is, on the contrary, an instrument of freedom. He who believes that a national army thus bound by oath could be used for reactionary purposes does not know his history.

In a well-ordered State, therefore, dangers arising from the blind obedience of the troops are not to be feared. Danger rather lurks in the army which is allowed to have a will of its own. If such a condition of blind obedience were in fact unworthy of free men, it might really lead to a servile spirit if there were not present at all times in every healthy army a moral counter-weight, namely, a strong feeling of

chivalrous and personal honour. This feeling, which is as evident in the nature of the Roman soldier of the legion as in the chivalrous customs of the Middle Ages and in the proud military self-consciousness of the modern army, is no prejudice; it is innate in the very nature of the army and is to be regarded as a blessing. There must be a military honour; a brave man who has bound himself by oath to unconditional obedience would inwardly feel himself unworthy if he had not this certainty: "I am at any moment ready to sacrifice my life, and therefore I must always keep the shield of my honour bright and shining." Let anyone who doubts this offend the soldier in his individual self-esteem; every insult is considered as a profanation of the innermost spirit of the man.

Consequently the sensitiveness of the military feeling of honour is frequently excessive. One must not defend misuse of this feeling, but the thing itself is holy. Even in burgher circles one does not get away from the duel. The duel is in a democratized society the last buffer against the complete brutalization of the social morality. Men will be kept in a certain discipline by the thought that they have to risk their lives for an insult, and it is better that now and then a promising life should be sacrificed than that the morality of a whole nation should become brutalized. The officers would lose the respect of their subordinates if they did not show this sensitiveness concerning their feeling of honour.

## CHAPTER V

### MOTIVES BEHIND EUROPEAN POLITICS

[Translated from "Die Politik," by Prof. H. von Treitschke]

POLITICS must never be allowed to leave out of reckoning the moral strength of the national life. No State in the world is in a position to give up its sovereignty. If conditions are imposed upon it which cripple it and which it cannot fulfil, then the "breach is more honourable than the observance." And it is a fine feature in history that a State can more readily put up with material losses than with anything which affects its honour.

If a State recognizes that the treaties in force no longer constitute the expression of the real ratios of power, and it cannot by means of peaceful negotiations bring the other State to give way, then the international lawsuit—namely, war—steps in.

The declaration of war by a State under such circumstances then follows with a consciousness of a necessary duty performed. No personal greed is in question; the parties hold the opinion that the treaties at present in force no longer represent the real ratios of power. As a peaceful agreement cannot be reached, the great national tribunal must decide. The justice of a cause of war depends merely on the consciousness of a moral necessity. As there cannot and must not be any question of coercive power exercised over the great personalities of a nation, and as history must preserve its continual flow, war is consequently justified. One must regard it as law imposed by God. "War founds no rights which have not previously been in existence."

We have already recognized that war is justifiable and moral, that the idea of permanent peace is an



impracticable, impossible, and at the same time a non-moral ideal. It is unworthy of a man to allow himself to think of something that cannot be as a possibility; but only too frequently a purely intellectual life proves enervating to the thinker. So long as humanity remains as it is, with its sins and its passions, war cannot vanish from the earth. It is delightful to see how even amongst the apostles of everlasting peace the national feeling of honour breaks through the cosmopolitan phrase. One must always be repeating it: the powerful form of the national procedure develops out of the very nature of the State itself. As there is a plurality of States, the necessity for war becomes at once established. Frederick the Great said that the dream of an everlasting peace is a phantom that every one casts aside when necessity drives him. A balance of powers that could continue is unthinkable, he adds. It is, however, precisely in the domain of war that the triumph of human reason shows itself most clearly. All noble nations have felt that the unchaining of physical force in war needs special rights, and therefore an international code of law of warfare has been formed on the basis of reciprocity. The greatest triumph of the science of international law lies in a domain which by fools has been regarded as a barbaric one—in the international code of the laws of warfare. Gross breaches of this law are seldom to be found in more recent times. That is what is so especially fine in international law, that there is undoubtedly a constant progress and that by universal conscience alone a body of principles of international law has become so firmly fixed that one may say to-day that they are as securely based as any law in the civil jurisprudence of any State.

### RESPECT FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW

It is quite clear that international law must lag a few steps behind civil law, for certain principles

of law and culture must have first developed at home in the State before a determination is reached to recognize them likewise in international intercourse.

International law has developed during the course of centuries with the power of the consciousness of law, the formal part of which at least seems to be quite secure. A great many factors contribute at the present day to the publicity of political life. It is true that the days of the English Blue-books are over. These blue, yellow, green books, &c., are only intended to scatter incense for the Philistine, through the clouds of which he is unable to see; it is not at all difficult for a clever diplomat to hoodwink Parliaments in this way. But the whole character of the life of the State has to-day become to so large an extent a matter of publicity that a gross infraction of international law at once excites in all civilized nations the greatest indignation.

We will now consider some of the main principles which have developed into norms during times of peace, more especially in international intercourse. To all nations without distinction are granted in times of peace the activities which tend to bind nations together, such as those of commerce and traffic, of the sciences and arts. . . . In antiquity nearly all the nations claimed the monopoly of navigating certain seas. . . . At the present day the sea is only considered the property of the States on the coast-line in so far as the sea can be dominated by military power from the coast, or within the range of guns. The progress of technical knowledge has again necessitated a readjustment of these boundaries. In all such questions everything finally depends on the actual ratios of power; if a State is in a position to command a sea, not all the well-meaning theorists in the world will succeed in making that sea free. The Caspian Sea is nominally the sphere of two neighbouring States, Russia and Persia. But Russia is so powerful there that one may say

that the Caspian is a Russian sea. If a nation were settled securely in Constantinople which was in a position to prevent any fleet from entering the Bosphorus, all declarations against this State would be scornfully ignored.

No hard-and-fast principles can be laid down for international politics. But the fact that the States themselves at times, when brute force tears up signed treaties, will nevertheless submit to certain common agreements, shows plainly that a very unfinished and incomplete code of laws reigns over them.

As soon as a state of war actually exists the uppermost thought that dominates the conduct of the war is the bringing about of a new code of international law which will be adapted to the actual relative power of the combatants and which will have to be recognized by both of them. War will be conducted in the way best calculated to lead to the goal of peace. The most effectual weapons, providing they do not cause unnecessary suffering to the wounded, are allowed. . . . Explosive bullets for fire-arms have been prohibited through the representations of Russia.

The privilege of the nations at war to bring all their troops into action, whether they be barbarians or civilized, cannot be denied. One must remain unprejudiced upon this question in order not to judge others. How we Germans railed at the French in the last war because they engaged Turcos against a European civilized nation. One may be allowed to say such things in the heat of the war, but science must remain calm and temperate and declare that there was nothing in that that was contrary to international law. For it remains a fact that a nation at war is justified and in duty bound to make use of all physical means of power, of all troops, that it possesses in order to prosecute the war. What is the limit? Where shall Russia with her teeming populations draw the line? The physical force of a State

can and shall only come into full use in war in such knightly forms as have become fixed by a long series of experiences in war. Certainly the claim of France that she marches at the head of civilization is placed through the use of such troops in a strange light. Thus a whole series of clamours arise merely because demands are made on a State that it is not able to fulfil. In the modern national wars every brave subject is a spy. Thus the banishment of the eighty thousand Germans out of France in 1870 was as a matter of fact not contrary to international law. But that the French behaved in this case with a certain brutality cannot be approved.

#### STATUS OF COMBATANTS

The saying which is universally recognized in theory and in practice in war on land, that States and not the individual burghers are at war, holds good also of humanity in the conduct of war. There must consequently be certain formulæ by which those who are authorized to conduct war in the name of the State are to be treated as combatants. Every one is not yet agreed on this point, and this is a bad lacuna in international law. For on the feeling of the soldier that he has only to deal with soldiers of the enemy and need not fear to find the peasant with whom he has been indulging in peaceful intercourse in ambush half an hour later behind a tree—on this feeling depends all humanity during war. If the soldier does not know, when he is serving as a soldier in the country of the enemy, whom he has to consider as soldier, whom as robber and highwayman, he is forced to be cruel and hard-hearted. Only he who has taken the military oath, who has been enrolled under military regulations, and who is to be recognized by some sign that need not necessarily consist of a complete uniform, can be recognized as a soldier. A ruthless severity against the free

troops which swarm round the enemy without being subject to military regulations is an obvious necessity. It is urgently necessary to hold an international conference in order to determine the forms by which the actual membership of an armed inhabitant to the legitimate army may be recognized. There was a dispute on this subject in Brussels in 1874, and the difference of interests therein was demonstrated. Small States like Switzerland had no wish to agree to binding obligations on this point.

So far every State settles for itself on its own authority which of the enemy he regards as belonging to the army and which as simple marauders.

If it be once determined who belongs to the army and who may claim to be treated with chivalry as prisoner of war, then the sparing of the private property of the enemy may go a long way. But on this point it is necessary to be clear, in order that one may not in the name of humanity offend the feeling of honour of the nations. At the Brussels Congress Prussia wished to have incorporated also into international law the proposition that in a conquered province of the enemy, *ipso jure* the higher authority should devolve upon the military government of the enemy. That would be in many respects of great advantage for the material daily life. If a general knows that he may by virtue of international law depend upon the obedience of the foreign municipal authorities (or local boards), he will be able to hold his troops in stricter control and on the whole treat the country more humanely.

## PART IX

BY HANS DELBRÜCK

*Professor of Modern History at the University of Berlin*

### INTRODUCTION

IN no country in the world has the educational class the influence which it exercises in Germany. From the professors of its great universities the German intellectuals take much of their leadership in ideas.

In a country so ridden with militarism and materialism as Germany this seems surprising, until we consider whether this ascendancy of the professors is a cause or an effect. Are they given the hearing and acceptance they receive because they contribute an original influence to affairs, or simply as a result of the fact that they support the ruling ideas of the influential classes?

A study of the writings and activities of the German educators inclines to the latter conclusion. But this does not change the effect—that the teachings of the professors has been a large factor in inculcating into the mind of the average German, especially the educated and reading German, the idea of the superiority of everything German, of the future glory of the Empire, and the necessity of attaining this glory by exercise of might.

One of the most insinuating ways that the influence of the teaching class has been used by the militarists is in combating the ideas of international arbitration and disarmament. The peace movement, the German ruling class realized, was a danger to its ambitions. So long as the friends of peace merely talked in a semi-theological way no objection was raised; but when practical men and even statesmen began to work out practical plans to obtain international peace, such as arbitration and disarmament, then the Germans took heed. And, very

cleverly, upon the professors the task was laid of combating the movement. All possible arguments were brought to bear—arguments from history, from experience, from present conditions, and even from moral considerations.

The most influential of the anti-peace school of professors has been Professor Hans Delbrück, who succeeded Professor von Treitschke at the University at Berlin. Professor Delbrück has been able to exercise more than merely schoolroom influence; he delivers many popular addresses; he has been the Editor of the *Preussische Jahrbucher*; he was at one time tutor in the Emperor's family; for some years he was a member of the Prussian Diet and the Imperial Reichstag; and he comes from a family prominent and influential at Court.

It may be remembered that in an earlier day he was very nearly shelved into provincial obscurity. On one occasion he expressed in a Berlin lecture-room the view that Germany had not treated the Danes fairly in the matter of Schleswig-Holstein. In March 1899 he went so far as to refer to "the brutality which exhibits us to the abhorrence of the civilized world." These words, coming from a professor in the pay of the Prussian Government were hotly resented, and it was sought to transfer Professor Delbrück to some other university. Yet in the end honour was satisfied, and since then the professional and military minds have pulled together.

Professor Hans Delbrück is a fanatical believer in the power of might, in the superiority of the German people, in the God-given purpose which they have to fulfil, in the glory that is to be theirs, and in the legitimacy of any means to reach their great end. But in reading these extracts from his lectures and writings it must be remembered that he is looked upon as the chief intellectual spokesman of the Germanic world-power ideal; that he exercises more influence in Germany to-day than any other educator, and that he acknowledgingly expresses the views of the ruling classes.

The following chapters have been translated for this work from Prof. Delbrück's "Erinnerungen," Berlin, 1902.

## CHAPTER I

### THE WAR OF THE FUTURE

[Translated from "*Erinnerungen*," by Prof. H. Delbrück]

If the misery of the battlefield is so fearful that no human strength is sufficient to withstand it, then the economic misery of the war of the future would not be less intense, and for this very reason war is interdicted. In former centuries war was conducted with a relatively small sacrifice of men. Prussia had in 1866 and in 1870 about 8 per cent. of its inhabitants under arms; at Koeniggraetz and Gravelotte not over 200,000 men were engaged. In the future armies will be reckoned not by thousands but by millions.

What will become of the modern economic life, it is asked, if not only all the strong arms but also all the leading personalities, the merchants, technical craftsmen, and manufacturers, are taken and called to the battlefield? How are the families of those who are on the battlefield to be fed? Naval war destroys the whole commerce which by means of export and import regulates our economic life. Credit and banking systems fall to pieces. In the most vulnerable spot the nations will give way: they are exposed to immediate starvation. Not only England but Germany likewise needs large imports of provisions, corn, and meat in order to live. If war cuts off these means of supply, then starvation in all its horror rushes in.

If this description were correct, then the world-empire or domination of the grain-growing countries would be inevitable. Battles, we are told, bring no decision: a war of exhaustion could not be endured by Germany, as she would be brought to starvation. The Russians, therefore, who grow an excess of grain, could outlast us and therefore keep the upper hand.



But this latter part of the exposition not only misses the mark in single points, as in the military, but as a whole also. It is correct that the complicated modern economic life is much more sensitive than the more simple life of former days. Riches have increased; therefore we have more to lose. But these riches have also resources which are not so easy to exhaust. War exhausts, but war also produces a new stimulus and new material for economic life. War, as Cobden said, is the greatest consumer.

One must go back a little farther in order to find out of what an unbounded, resolute national will is capable. Even if the present German Empire were to arm 6 per cent of its population, that is three and a quarter millions of men, or even four millions, that is far below a third, perhaps a quarter only, of those capable of working. As long as England remains neutral our oversea commerce can hardly be entirely cut off. Economic life, therefore, would continue. By reason of the scarcity of workers, those left behind would get very good earnings and could without difficulty provide for the families of those at the front as well as for their own. Even if the sea should be blocked to us, then allied countries such as Austria and Italy, or neutrals such as Switzerland, Belgium, Holland or even Denmark, would provide doors which could hardly all be closed against us.

But even should the German Empire be once quite isolated it need not be at once a case of starvation. It is correct that we at the present day, according to Voigt and Ballod, obtain about one-fifth to one-fourth of our provisions from foreign countries. But Germany possesses very important distilleries, starch manufactories and breweries, all of which could be considerably restricted or for a time entirely stopped in order to use the potatoes and barley as food. Further, we export sugar to the value of about 250 millions of marks: the whole of the ground now under root cultivation for the foreign market might

be used for provision crops. Further, we could consume a large proportion of our stock of cattle; this would entail a great economy in fodder. According to the computations of the Ministry of Agriculture, 1,625,000 tons of rye are used yearly in Germany as provender for cattle.

### GERMANY CANNOT BE STARVED

German agriculture is therefore quite able alone to feed us in case of war, and would have the task, after the conclusion of peace, of restoring the interrupted industries and of replacing our stock of cattle. Nor will the increase of population in the near future make any difference, for the technical progress of agriculture has in recent times been such that it has even overtaken the increase in the population. The potato crops, which for the five years 1882-86 averaged 28,700,000 tons, have now reached the figure for 1892-96 of 29,500,000 tons, or an increase of quite 25 per cent.

Some of this growth is due to the increased area under cultivation, but the crops of cereals have not in consequence declined, but, on the contrary, have likewise increased since the middle of the seventies by about 20 per cent.

Our conclusion, therefore, is that in accord with the magnitude of future wars, the economic injury which will result from them, while certainly very great, will not be such as to force the nations to lay down their arms. And now Bloch's conclusions are entirely reversed: the economic prejudice will by no means prevent the war of the future, but, on the contrary, will prove an intensive means of carrying on war. If it should be true—what has by no means yet been proved—that great decisive battles will no longer be able to be fought, then the fettering of the economic life might bring about the downfall of the enemy.

## CHAPTER II

### IMPOSSIBILITY OF PREVENTING WAR

[Translated from "Erinnerungen," by Prof. H. Delbrück]

THE peace party recommend International Arbitration Courts, but the most far-seeing amongst them themselves recognize that not much could be achieved by such means. The advantage of an arbitration court consists in rendering by means of its verdict the process of giving in easier for the party that wishes to avoid war. But it fails necessarily in the case in which not merely the single question at issue, but with that of the status of power which lies behind it, is at stake. Small and second-class States could usually settle their disputes by means of arbitration, because the question of the rivalry in power between them scarcely exists. But the war of 1870 between Germany and France could not have been avoided, even if the question of the Spanish candidature to the throne had not sprung up or could have been entirely set aside. For the French regarded themselves as the *grande nation*, as the leading nation in Europe, and would not suffer the Germans to claim a place in the same rank—and the Germans refused to give up their pretensions to it. But even the loss of Alsace-Lorraine was not the decisive factor in the French defeat, but the loss of her prestige in the world.

For such questions there can be no arbitration for they are not questions of law, and still less is there any judge to decide such questions. And it remains a fact that there are questions which no nation would ever submit to any arbiter whomsoever. No court of arbitration would ever have succeeded in inducing the English to abandon Fashoda to the French. It is conceivable, although difficult to believe, that the French might possibly have relinquished Alsace-

Lorraine, but certainly not in obedience to any decree whatsoever of any court of arbitration. Would a decree of an arbiter without soldiers at his back have settled the domination of the Turks in Macedonia and Armenia, or the Triple Partition of Poland? Could it have been able to keep in existence the German Confederation?

By what right, then, do the States nowadays subsist? *War* has given Prussia Silesia, Schleswig-Holstein, and Hanover—where did rights leave off and where might begin? Did the German Confederation and the sovereign powers which formed it subsist by right? During the past twenty-five years [speaking in 1899] the European Powers have divided up Africa amongst themselves—by what right? In the next century they will partition Asia—by what right? What could a court of arbitration do in this case, since there is no law?

#### NO ARBITRATION FOR HUMAN WILL

What an extraordinary self-deception to imagine that the obscure questions of destiny which have been raised here could be solved by the decrees of a court of justice! They are not questions of right but questions of might, and the highest hope to which we can aspire is that questions of might may not be settled by the test of war but by mere valuation, and that thereafter this may be the process followed from case to case on disputed points. But this process of valuation can only be carried out by the parties themselves, and not by any court of arbitration, for the essential element of power is the individual will with its capacity for sacrifice, for which there is no standard but that of the will itself.

If the Powers were to follow the advice of the peace party and to begin to disarm, the valuation of power would in no sense be facilitated, but on the contrary impeded, and the likelihood of a war would

## 252 IMPOSSIBILITY OF PREVENTING WAR

not be lessened but magnified. For the negotiations concerning the degree of disarmament, the distrust as to whether this were being honourably carried out, mutual recriminations concerning evasions, disputes as to what constitutes equipment, would bring about irritation and arouse the passions which would hinder the course of the calm, diplomatic consideration of the questions. The number of pretexts for war and of causes of war would not be lessened but increased, the tension between the Powers not modified but strengthened.

This is the most serious point of the whole movement in favour of peace. Will this, as so often occurs in unskilful politics, only effect the contrary of what it is striving to bring about, and while preaching peace, only loosen the sword in the scabbard so that it may the more easily be drawn? Will it only precipitate us into the great World-war which might otherwise possibly be averted?

That this will be the logical result of peace movement, must be asserted with absolute decision, in order that no terrible disaster should result from well-intended exertions. If the peace movement were to restrict itself to an agitation in favour of international arbitration courts, it would be fairly harmless. But to the more or less theoretical demand for arbitration has been attached the practical plan of disarmament, and it is in the illusion that disarmament means peace that the danger lies. There is only one single cause that could keep war in the future from us, namely, the recognition that nothing is to be gained thereby; and it is Bloch's distinct merit to have been the first to point this out, in so far as it is correct, unequivocally and upon a technical basis. It is amazing that the author should not have noticed into what contradictions he has been led when he added the demand for disarmament. It is he, indeed, who has taught us that it is just the quantitative and qualitative rise of the power of war

which puts an end, or at least well-nigh puts an end, to the possibility of war. The old Hegelian saying, that the comprehension of a certain stage of self-development changes into the contrary has once again been proved.

If this be true though, it is obvious that with a reduction of armaments the very possibility of a war is again raised. The fearful small-calibre magazine rifle, the quick-firing gun, the arming of masses through the universal military service, the torpedo and the ramming by the colossal armoured ships, have been introduced to us in greater objectiveness in order to dispose us to peace. A few more such inventions, a further extension of universal military service, and it would appear that we shall have done with war.

Instead of this the friends of peace demand that we should not continue any farther on the path we have chosen, but should, if possible, take a few steps back. They mock at it themselves and do not know how it is to be done. "Arm yourselves," they ought to call out, "continue to arm yourselves, invent ever fresh weapons of greater destructive power, in order that the fearfulness of the means may with the greater certainty spare us the use of them." Instead of that, they complain of the progress and see salvation in inaction, or indeed in retrogression.

But, it is urged, in the increase of armaments there lurks a natural incitement to war. The nations that continue to provide weapons will certainly want to use them. The armies themselves will after a time want to show in earnest that they have not only been so much exercised only for manœuvres.

### GERMANY WILL NOT BEGIN WAR

This consideration is in itself quite correct, and might be demonstrated by means of historical examples. . . . If the Russian armaments were at

## 254 IMPOSSIBILITY OF PREVENTING WAR

the present day to reach a point at which the Pan-Slavists believed they could overwhelm Germany and Austria, the avalanche of war would very soon be set in motion. But we have already seen that armaments do not always and under all circumstances lead to this incitement to war. The Germany of to-day, let us imagine her ever so strong, would certainly never begin a war.

But is not Europe already fainting beneath the weight of armaments? Does not Bloch exclaim with every right: "*Another fifty years of armed peace and Europe is ruined!*"

But whether the European nations are retrograding in prosperity under the burden of military armaments, whether they would indeed be ruined by another peace of fifty years' duration, that is a question to which national economic and statistical researches could give a very definite reply. . . . Such a proof would be of the greatest importance, not only to the peace question but also to national economic science, and more especially also to the social question. For the present I am of the opinion—and I believe that I have the whole body of national economic science on my side—that European well-being in our nineteenth century has not retrograded but, on the contrary, made such progress as is unprecedented in universal history. There is plenty of poverty and misery left, but that is due to bad social organization, not to scarcity. All statistics of consumption of produce prove how enormously the consumption of the coarser, as well as of the more delicate and better kinds of articles of food and luxury, the use of dress materials, of articles of furniture and traffic, the yield of land and of industry, the deposits in savings banks and taxing capacity have increased per head of the population. The consumption of cereals has risen in Germany during the last twenty years at least 20 per cent. per head. And those who do not read statistical works may

observe in the very streets not only from decade to decade but one might almost say from year to year, in city and country how rapidly prosperity grows.

It is true that the outlay on many important culture projects is still too small with us. But why should the cause of this be put down to excess in expenditure on war equipment? Our taxation system is still far from perfect, and could with a little willing sacrifice in some directions be made much more productive without creating any sort of onerous pressure. The finer grades of tobacco are taxed very low; North Germany irrationally pays a considerably lower duty on beer than South Germany; the excise duty on brandy is ripe for reform; and an imperial death-duty would be by no means inopportune. In former years and generations relatively higher dues were undoubtedly paid than we do at the present day, when luxury has so greatly increased among all classes. According to a recent publication of the Swiss member of the Federal Council, Numa Droz, the burgher of the German Empire pays considerably less in taxes than the Swiss.

Many causes have contributed to this increase of prosperity, but the foremost of all is undoubtedly the long continuance of peace. A century counting so few years of war as the nineteenth, or even as in the last decades of the century, is unexampled in the history of the world. To what is this due? Again this is due to many circumstances, but most of all to the heavier war equipment (preparations), which make any prospect of war appear so terrible that it is but rarely that anyone can be found to assume the responsibility of engaging in war, and at the present, it would seem, there is no one so inclined.



## CHAPTER III

### WHY GERMANY WILL NOT DISARM

[Translated from "Erinnerungen," by Prof. H. Delbrück]

**I**n Germany any agitation in favour of disarmament is absolutely unpardonable.

Any actual disarmament, whether it be absolute or proportional, is, not seriously anticipated, but the proposal which is to be submitted to The Hague Conference is based on the maintenance of the present standard of armaments. But such a maintenance of the *status quo* would have a very different significance for the various States concerned. The United States of America, for instance, are only now beginning to set up their armaments and could not possibly submit to limitation. But let us leave this difficult point out of reckoning; let us assume that America has attained to a certain efficiency in armament; then we find that all the great Powers with the single exception of Germany have reached the point in tension when it would be extremely difficult for them to take any essential step farther.

The Americans have entered upon a new stage, but it is probable that there will soon be a reaction. The American people have not yet discovered what a real armament of war costs, and however rich the young nation is, it is a well-known fact that the Government is carried on at an incredible expenditure. Arms and approvisionnement (commissariat) for each soldier and invalid costs three-, six-, nay ten-fold more over there than it does with us. The eyes of the Americans will be opened when the tariff of duties is introduced, and in that moment the party which is fundamentally opposed to an Imperial policy will gain the ascendancy. It seems extremely question-

able that, under the prevailing loose political conditions and extraordinarily easy changes from one party to another, the United States should be in a position to attain to a permanent military status at all. Their momentary proud position need deceive no one. The Americans have not yet stood any really severe test.

### ENGLAND'S RESOURCES LIMITED

In England it is a different matter. There is no doubt of the willingness of the people to bear great armaments even at a great sacrifice. Innumerable millions are unhesitatingly granted when demanded by the Government, but the English armaments have reached a point where it is questionable whether with mere money any further progress can be made. Numerous warships can still be built, but where will the men come from to man them? Until now the English have experienced no difficulty in manning their powerful fleet, but there will come a time when recruiting alone will no longer provide sufficient material. The hard word of conscription will be pronounced. But whether the nation will, without a great crisis, without a previous catastrophe, be willing to slip this yoke upon its neck is very doubtful; nay, it is quite certain that they will not. The English are, therefore, assuredly not far from the terminal point in their armaments.

It is just the opposite in Russia. Here there is an abundance of men. But modern modes of warfare demand a technical equipment, and this is very expensive for poor Russia. Most of the Russian railways bring very low or entirely nominal returns, or they even require grants. The continual technical discoveries and improvements, the new and exceedingly expensive additions to the army, the extended fortification constructions on the frontier, are a greater burden to Russia than to the more wealthy

## 258 WHY GERMANY WILL NOT DISARM

civilized lands of the West. At the present moment Russian finances appear to be favourable. It is certain that Russia, with its favourable climatic and geographical conditions, its enormous stretches of land, its ignorant population and its low accumulation of capital, is hardly up to the demands of modern war technique.

It is therefore quite natural that the Tsar should desire to see the use of new technical discoveries, and more especially of new explosive substances prohibited by the Peace Conference. In his country there are but few capable of making such discoveries, and if they be imported the Treasury could not find the means of paying and, moreover, the rough masses would not know how to handle them. For modern war technique does not merely demand a healthy body and strong muscles, but also a certain dexterity of hand and alertness of mind in the common soldier, which the Muscovite cannot bring to the task.

With France the circumstances are again different. Prosperity and technique are at their height. The universal conscription makes all the young manhood available, but the young men themselves are coming to an end. The population of France stagnates, and all who have sound arms and legs are already enrolled. France of all the great Powers is the one which is nearest the end of its career.

Italy is on the verge of bankruptcy. Austro-Hungary seems to be nearer a dissolution of its strength than an increase.

The only great Power which could without the slightest difficulty develop a still greater power is the German Empire. Universal conscription has not yet been carried out, and year by year the people increase by more than eight hundred thousand souls and bring new contributions of troops. In spite of all expansion, there are still not enough workmen available to develop the amount of capital, and we are faced with the necessity of having to import

moment  
e. It is  
natic and  
tehes of  
mulation  
modern

r should  
coveries,  
stances  
country  
coveries,  
not find  
masses  
modern  
healthy  
dexterity  
soldier,  
sk.

ifferent.  
t. The  
manhood  
coming  
tes, and  
enrolled.  
which is

Austro-  
a of its

out the  
power is  
has not  
e people  
nd souls  
spite of  
orkmen  
and we  
import

foreign labour. All our industries prosper, riches increase, the finances of the German Empire and of the separate States are in exemplary order and show surpluses. A great reduction in taxes, decrease in the duty on cereals by almost a third, has been made possible without making any impression on the Treasury. Prosperity has also visibly increased within the last generation in England, France and Russia, but to all appearance most of all in Germany. Our export trade only grows slowly because we have grown prosperous enough to consume more and more of the fruits of our labour ourselves.

Germany, therefore, is among all the great Powers the only one which possesses not only sufficient men but also sufficient gold to increase armaments on land and sea to an extraordinary degree.

#### GERMANY'S NEED OF ARMAMENTS

Germany, however, is at the same time the nation that needs this increase of armaments the most. It is possible, in fact there is a certain probability, that the next great division or partition of land in Asiatic spheres of influence may be carried out without bloodshed, as in 1772, the year of the first partition of Poland. States no longer possessing vitality or incapable of culture will be dissolved or placed under the guardianship of stronger States. The comparisons amongst these States would be gauged by the strength of their armaments in war-time, without actually going to war. England, France, and Russia are already possessed of immense colonies. To them it does not so much signify whether they obtain another piece of land more or less, only they must preserve their positions as Powers in general. But for Germany, which does not, practically, possess any land of any value in other continents, every square mile, every little town, is of the highest importance. Within fifty years the whole world will

## 260 WHY GERMANY WILL NOT DISARM

have been allotted. To us it is a living question, if we wish to remain a great nation, to see to it that we obtain possessions of equal value side by side with the other Powers who have well-established colonies.

We can do this if we only show forethought at the right moment. The other nations will only grant us very meagre portions of their own free will. And why should they, indeed? Each country provides for itself. Only to the powerful does power accrue, and in this bid for power lies hidden a deep moral law. That nation which possesses the power of self-control to limit its daily pleasures in order to accumulate national sinews of war; which, to put it crudely, would rather drink a little less beer and smoke a few less cigars in order to procure more guns and ships, *that* nation at the same time acquires the right to assert its individuality and to bequeath the mental assets which it has won for itself in the course of centuries to its own people and to humanity.

There is no higher duty for the forthcoming generation than to see to it that the world be not partitioned between England and Russia only, but that Germany and France should also obtain their share and that among the great nations the little ones—when they possess culture-value—should be maintained. This without war if it is possible, but it is a possession that would not be too dearly bought by the shedding of much blood.

From this point we as a nation, may with confidence and hope look into the future, no matter how menacing the wild waves and dismal floods may appear in the present. A people that has won for itself on the one hand a strong national monarchy, on the other a State-citizenship through representation of the races—such a people can withstand all vicissitudes and will, moreover, certainly never again for any length of time be forced from its lawful path. We stand not at the end but at the beginning of a great development.

## PART X

# THE GERMAN WHITE BOOK

*[Authorized Translation as issued by the German Government]*

## CHAPTER I

### GERMANY'S REASONS FOR WAR WITH RUSSIA

### HOW RUSSIA AND HER RULER BETRAYED GERMANY'S CONFIDENCE AND THEREBY MADE THE EUROPEAN WAR

FOREIGN OFFICE, BERLIN,  
*August 1914.*

On June 28<sup>th</sup>, the Austro-Hungarian successor to the throne, Arch-Duke Franz Ferdinand, and his wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg, were assassinated by a member of a band of Servian conspirators. The investigation of the crime through the Austro-Hungarian authorities has yielded the fact that the conspiracy against the life of the Arch-Duke and successor to the throne was prepared and abetted in Belgrade with the cooperation of Servian officials, and executed with arms from the Servian State arsenal. This crime must have opened the eyes of the entire civilized world, not only in regard to the aims of the Servian policies directed against the conservation and integrity of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, but also concerning the criminal means which the pan-Serb propaganda in Servia had no hesitation in employing for the achievement of these aims.

The goal of these policies was the gradual revolutionizing and final separation of the south-easterly

## 262 REASONS FOR WAR WITH RUSSIA

districts from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and their union with Serbia. This direction of Serbia's policy has not been altered in the least in spite of the repeated and solemn declarations of Serbia in which it vouchsafed a change in these policies toward Austria-Hungary as well as the cultivation of good and neighborly relations.

In this manner for the third time in the course of the last 6 years Serbia has led Europe to the brink of a world-war.

It could only do this because it believed itself supported in its intentions by Russia.

Russia soon after the events brought about by the Turkish revolution of 1908, endeavored to found a union of the Balcan states under Russian patronage and directed against the existence of Turkey. This union which succeeded in 1911 in driving out Turkey from a greater part of her European possessions, collapsed over the question of the distribution of spoils. The Russian policies were not dismayed over this failure. According to the idea of the Russian statesmen, a new Balcan union under Russian patronage should be called into existence, headed no longer against Turkey, now dislodged from the Balcan, but against the existence of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. It was the idea that Serbia should cede to Bulgaria those parts of Macedonia which it had received during the last Balcan war, in exchange for Bosnia and the Herzegovina which were to be taken from Austria. To oblige Bulgaria to fall in with this plan it was to be isolated, Roumania attached to Russia with the aid of French propaganda, and Serbia promised Bosnia and the Herzegovina.

Under these circumstances it was clear to Austria that it was not compatible with the dignity and the spirit of self-preservation of the monarchy to view idly any longer this agitation across the border. The Imperial and Royal Government appraised Germany of this conception and asked for our opinion.

With all our heart we were able to agree with our ally's estimate of the situation, and assure him that any action considered necessary to end the movement in Serbia directed against the conservation of the monarchy would meet with our approval.

We were perfectly aware that a possible warlike attitude of Austria-Hungary against Serbia might bring Russia upon the field, and that it might therefore involve us in a war, in accordance with our duty as allies. We could not, however, in these vital interests of Austria-Hungary, which were at stake, advise our ally to take a yielding attitude not compatible with his dignity, nor deny him our assistance in these trying days. We could do this all the less as our own interests were menaced through the continued Serb agitation. If the Serbs continued with the aid of Russia and France to menace the existence of Austria-Hungary, the gradual collapse of Austria and the subjection of all the Slavs under one Russian sceptre would be the consequence, thus making untenable the position of the Teutonic race in Central Europe. A morally weakened Austria under the pressure of Russian pan-slavism would be no longer an ally on whom we could count and in whom we could have confidence, as we must be able to have, in view of the ever more menacing attitude of our easterly and westerly neighbours. We, therefore, permitted Austria a completely free hand in her action towards Serbia but have not participated in her preparations.

Austria chose the method of presenting to the Servian Government a note, in which the direct connection between the murder at Sarajevo and the pan-Serb movement, as not only countenanced but actively supported by the Servian Government, was explained, and in which a complete cessation of this agitation, as well as a punishment of the guilty, was requested. At the same time Austria-Hungary demanded as necessary guarantee for the accomplish-



ment of her desire the participation of some Austrian officials in the preliminary examination on Servian territory and the final dissolution of the pan-Serb societies agitating against Austria-Hungary. The Imperial and Royal Government gave a period of 48 hours for the unconditional acceptance of its demands.

The Servian Government started the mobilization of its army one day after the transmission of the Austro-Hungarian note.

As after the stipulated date the Servian Government rendered a reply which, though complying in some points with the conditions of Austria-Hungary, yet showed in all essentials the endeavor through procrastination and new negotiations to escape from the just demands of the monarchy, the latter discontinued her diplomatic relations with Servia without indulging in further negotiations or accepting further Servian assurances, whose value, to its loss, she had sufficiently experienced.

From this moment Austria was in fact in a state of war with Servia, which it proclaimed officially on the 28<sup>th</sup> of July by declaring war.

From the beginning of the conflict we assumed the position that there were here concerned the affairs of Austria alone, which it would have to settle with Servia. We therefore directed our efforts toward the localizing of the war, and toward convincing the other powers that Austria-Hungary had to appeal to arms in justifiable self-defence, forced upon her by the conditions. We emphatically took the position that no civilized country possessed the right to stay the arm of Austria in this struggle with barbarism and political crime, and to shield the Servians against their just punishment. In this sense we instructed our representatives with the foreign powers.

Simultaneously the Austro-Hungarian Government communicated to the Russian Government that the step undertaken against Servia implied merely a

defensive measure against the Serb agitation, but that Austria-Hungary must of necessity demand guarantees for a continued friendly behaviour of Servia towards the monarchy. Austria-Hungary had no intention whatsoever to shift the balance of power in the Balcan.

In answer to our declaration that the German Government desired, and aimed at, a localization of the conflict, both the French and the English Governments promised an action in the same direction. But these endeavors did not succeed in preventing the interposition of Russia in the Austro-Servian disagreement.

The Russian Government submitted an official communiqué on July 24<sup>th</sup>, according to which Russia could not possibly remain indifferent in the Servio-Austrian conflict. The same was declared by the Russian Secretary of Foreign Affairs, M. Sasonow, to the German Ambassador, Count Pourtalès, in the afternoon of July 26<sup>th</sup>. The German Government declared again, through its Ambassador at St. Petersburg, that Austria-Hungary had no desire for conquest and only wished peace at her frontiers. After the official explanation by Austria-Hungary to Russia that it did not claim territorial gain in Servia, the decision concerning the peace of the world rested exclusively with St. Petersburg.

The same day the first news of Russian mobilization reached Berlin in the evening.

The German Ambassadors at London, Paris, and St. Petersburg were instructed to energetically point out the danger of this Russian mobilization. The Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg was also directed to make the following declaration to the Russian Government:

"Preparatory military measures by Russia will force us to counter-measures which must consist in mobilizing the army.

"But mobilization means war.

"As we know the obligations of France towards Russia, this mobilization would be directed against both Russia and France.

## 266 REASONS FOR WAR WITH RUSSIA

We cannot assume that Russia desires to unchain such a European war. Since Austria-Hungary will not touch the existence of the Servian kingdom, we are of the opinion that Russia can afford to assume an attitude of waiting. We can all the more support the desire of Russia to protect the integrity of Servia as Austria-Hungary does not intend to question the latter. It will be easy in the further development of the affair to find a basis for an understanding."

On July 27<sup>th</sup> the Russian Secretary of War, M. Ssuchomlinow, gave the German military attaché his word of honor that no order to mobilize had been issued, merely preparations were being made, but not a horse mustered, nor reserves called in. If Austria-Hungary crossed the Servian frontier, the military districts directed towards Austria, i.e. Kiev, Odessa, Moscow, Kazan, would be mobilized, under no circumstances those situated on the German frontier, i.e. St. Petersburg, Vilna, and Warsaw. Upon inquiry into the object of the mobilization against Austria-Hungary, the Russian Minister of War replied by shrugging his shoulders and referring to the diplomats. The military attaché then pointed to these mobilization measures against Austria-Hungary as extremely menacing also for Germany.

In the succeeding days news concerning Russian mobilization came at a rapid rate. Among it was also news about preparations on the German-Russian frontier, as for instance the announcement of the state of war in Kovno, the departure of the Warsaw garrison, and the strengthening of the Alexandrovo garrison.

On July 27<sup>th</sup>, the first information was received concerning preparatory measures taken by France: the 14th Corps discontinued the manœuvres and returned to its garrison.

In the meantime we had endeavored to localize the conflict by most emphatic steps.

On July 26<sup>th</sup>, Sir Edward Grey had made the proposal to submit the differences between Austria-Hungary and Servia to a conference of the Ambassadors of

Germany, France, and Italy under his chairmanship. We declared in regard to this proposal that we could not, however much we approved the idea, participate in such a conference, as we could not call Austria in her dispute with Serbia before a European tribunal.

France consented to the proposal of Sir Edward Grey, but it foundered upon Austria's declining it, as was to be expected.

*Faithful to our principle that mediation should not extend to the Austro-Servian conflict, which is to be considered as a purely Austro-Hungarian affair, but merely to the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia, we continued our endeavors to bring about an understanding between these two powers.*

*We further declared ourselves ready, after failure of the conference idea, to transmit a second proposal of Sir Edward Grey's to Vienna in which he suggested Austria-Hungary should decide that either the Servian reply was sufficient, or that it be used as a basis for further negotiations. The Austro-Hungarian Government remarked with full appreciation of our action that it had come too late, the hostilities having already been opened.*

*In spite of this we continued our attempts to the utmost, and we advised Vienna to show every possible advance compatible with the dignity of the monarchy.*

Unfortunately, all these proposals were overtaken by the military preparations of Russia and France.

On July 29<sup>th</sup>, the Russian Government made the official notification in Berlin that four army districts had been mobilized. At the same time further news was received concerning rapidly progressing military preparations of France, both on water and on land.

On the same day the Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburg had an interview with the Russian Foreign Secretary, in regard to which he reported by telegraph, as follows :

"The Secretary tried to persuade me that I should urge my Government to participate in a quadruple conference to find means

## 268 REASONS FOR WAR WITH RUSSIA

to induce Austria-Hungary to give up those demands which touch upon the sovereignty of Serbia. I could merely promise to report the conversation and took the position that, after Russia had decided upon the haneul step of mobilization, every exchange of ideas appeared now extremely difficult, if not impossible. Besides, Russia now was demanding from us in regard to Austria-Hungary the same which Austria-Hungary was being blamed for with regard to Serbia, i.e. an infraction of sovereignty. Austria-Hungary having promised to consider the Russian interests by disclaiming any territorial aspiration—a great concession on the part of a state engaged in war—should therefore be permitted to attend to its affair with Serbia alone. There would be time at the peace conference to return to the matter of forbearance towards the sovereignty of Serbia.

“I added very solemnly that at this moment the entire Austro-Servian affair was eclipsed by the danger of a general European conflagration, and I endeavoured to present to the Secretary the magnitude of this danger.

“It was impossible to dissuade Sasonow from the idea that Serbia could not now be deserted by Russia.”

On July 29<sup>th</sup>, the German Military Attaché at St. Petersburg wired the following report on a conversation with the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian army :

“The Chief of the General Staff has asked me to call on him, and he has told me that he has just come from His Majesty. He has been requested by the Secretary of War to reiterate once more that everything had remained as the Secretary had informed me two days ago. He offered confirmation in writing and gave me his word of honor in the most solemn manner that nowhere there had been a mobilization, viz. calling in of a single man or horse up to the present time, i.e. 3 o'clock in the afternoon. He could not assume a guaranty for the future, but he could emphasize that in the fronts directed towards our frontiers His Majesty desired no mobilization.

“As, however, I had received here many pieces of news concerning the calling in of the reserves in different parts of the country also in Warsaw and in Vilna, I told the general that his statements placed me before a riddle. On his officers' word of honor he replied that such news was wrong, but that possibly here and there a false alarm might have been given.

“I must consider this conversation as an attempt to mislead us as to the extent of the measures hitherto taken in view of the abundant and positive information about the calling in of reserves.”

In reply to various inquiries concerning reasons

for its threatening attitude, the Russian Government repeatedly pointed out that Austria-Hungary had commenced no conversation in St. Petersburg. The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in St. Petersburg was therefore instructed on July 29<sup>th</sup>, at our suggestion, to enter into such conversation with Sasonow. Count Szapary was empowered to explain to the Russian minister the note to Servia, though it had been overtaken by the state of war, and to accept any suggestion on the part of Russia as well as to discuss with Sasonow all questions touching directly upon the Austro-Russian relations.

Shoulder to shoulder with England we labored incessantly and supported every proposal in Vienna from which we hoped to gain the possibility of a peaceable solution of the conflict. We even as late as the 30<sup>th</sup> of July forwarded the English proposal to Vienna, as basis for negotiations, that Austria-Hungary should dictate her conditions in Servia, i.e. after her march into Servia. We thought that Russia would accept this basis.

During the interval from July 29<sup>th</sup> to July 31<sup>st</sup> there appeared renewed and cumulative news concerning Russian measures of mobilization. Accumulation of troops on the East Prussian frontier and the declaration of the state of war over all important parts of the Russian west frontier allowed no further doubt that the Russian mobilization was in full swing against us, while simultaneously all such measures were denied to our representative in St. Petersburg on word of honor.

Nay, even before the reply from Vienna regarding the Anglo-German mediation, whose tendencies and basis must have been known in St. Petersburg, could possibly have been received in Berlin, Russia ordered a general mobilization.

During the same days there took place between His Majesty the Kaiser and Czar Nicolas an exchange of telegrams, in which His Majesty called the attention

## 270 REASONS FOR WAR WITH RUSSIA

of the Czar to the menacing character of the Russian mobilization during the continuance of his own mediating activities.

On July 31<sup>st</sup> the Czar directed the following telegram to His Majesty the Kaiser :

"I thank You cordially for Your mediation which permits the hope that everything may yet end peaceably. It is technically impossible to discontinue our military preparations which have been made necessary by the Austrian mobilization. It is far from us to want war. As long as the negotiations between Austria and Servia continue, my troops will undertake no provocative action. I give You my solemn word thereon. I confide with all my faith in the grace of God, and I hope for the success of Your mediation in Vienna for the welfare of our countries and the peace of Europe.

"Your cordially devoted

"NICOLAS."

This telegram of the Czar crossed with the following, sent by His Majesty the Kaiser, also on July 31<sup>st</sup>, at 2 p.m. :

"Upon Your appeal to my friendship and Your request for my aid, I have engaged in mediation between Your Government and the Government of Austria-Hungary. While this action was taking place, Your troops were being mobilized against my ally Austria-Hungary, whereby, as I have already communicated to You, my mediation has become almost illusory. In spite of this, I have continued it, and now I receive reliable news that serious preparations for war are going on on my eastern frontier. The responsibility for the security of my country forces me to measures of defence. I have gone to the extreme limit of the possible in my efforts for the preservation of the peace of the world. It is not I who bear the responsibility for the misfortune which now threatens the entire civilized world. It rests in Your hand to avert it. No one threatens the honor and peace of Russia which might well have awaited the success of my mediation. The friendship for You and Your country, bequeathed to me by my grandfather on his deathbed, has always been sacred to me, and I have stood faithfully by Russia while it was in serious affliction, especially during its last war. The peace of Europe can still be preserved by You if Russia decides to discontinue those military preparations which menace Germany and Austria-Hungary."

Before this telegram reached its destination, the mobilization of all the Russian forces, obviously directed against us and already ordered during the

afternoon of the 31<sup>st</sup> of July, was in full swing. Notwithstanding, the telegram of the Czar was sent at 2 o'clock that same afternoon.

After the Russian general mobilization became known in Berlin, the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg was instructed on the afternoon of July 31<sup>st</sup> to explain to the Russian Government that Germany declared the state of war as counter-measure against the general mobilization of the Russian army and navy, which must be followed by mobilization if Russia did not cease its military measures against Germany and Austria-Hungary within twelve hours, and notified Germany thereof.

At the same time the Imperial Ambassador in Paris was instructed to demand from the French Government a declaration within 18 hours, whether it would remain neutral in a Russo-German war.

The Russian Government destroyed through its mobilization, menacing the security of our country, the laborious action at mediation of the European cabinets. The Russian mobilization in regard to the seriousness of which the Russian Government was never allowed by us to entertain a doubt, in connection with its continued denial, shows clearly that Russia wanted war.

The Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg delivered his note to M. Sasonow on July 31<sup>st</sup> at 12 o'clock midnight.

The reply of the Russian Government has never reached us.

*Two hours after the expiration of the time limit the Czar telegraphed to H. M. the Kaiser, as follows :*

"I have received Your telegram. I comprehend that You are forced to mobilize, but I should like to have from You the same guaranty which I have given You, viz., that these measures do not mean war, and that we shall continue to negotiate for the welfare of our two countries and the universal peace which is so dear to our hearts. With the aid of God it must be possible to our long tried friendship to prevent the shedding of blood. I expect with full confidence, Your urgent reply."



To this H. M. the Kaiser replied :

"I thank You for Your telegram. I have shown yesterday to Your Government the way through which alone war may yet be averted. Although I asked for a reply by to-day noon, no telegram from my Ambassador has reached me with the reply of Your Government. I therefore have been forced to mobilize my army. An immediate, clear and unmistakable reply of Your Government is the sole way to avoid endless misery. Until I receive this reply I am unable, to my great grief, to enter upon the subject of Your telegram. I must ask most earnestly that You, without delay, order Your troops to commit, under no circumstances, the slightest violation of our frontiers."

As the time limit given to Russia had expired without the receipt of a reply to our inquiry, H. M. the Kaiser ordered the mobilization of the entire German Army and Navy on August 1<sup>st</sup> at 5 p.m.

The German Ambassador at St. Petersburg was instructed that, in the event of the Russian Government not giving a satisfactory reply within the stipulated time, he should declare that we considered ourselves in a state of war after the refusal of our demands. However, before a confirmation of the execution of this order had been received, that is to say, already in the afternoon of August 1<sup>st</sup>, i.e., the same afternoon on which the telegram of the Czar, cited above, was sent, Russian troops crossed our frontier and marched into German territory.

Thus Russia began the war against us.

Meanwhile the Imperial Ambassador in Paris put our question to the French Cabinet on July 31<sup>st</sup> at 7 p.m.

The French Prime Minister gave an equivocal and unsatisfactory reply on August 1<sup>st</sup> at 1 p.m., which gave no clear idea of the position of France, as he limited himself to the explanation that France would do that which her interests demanded. A few hours later, at 5 p.m., the mobilization of the entire French army and navy was ordered.

On the morning of the next day France opened hostilities.

y to  
t be  
ram  
ern-  
An  
t is  
eely  
our  
rder  
ntest

red  
ry,  
tire

was  
rn-  
the  
red  
our  
the  
to  
the  
zar,  
our


put  
at

and  
ich  
he  
ould  
ours  
nch

ned



# Most USEFUL Book about the WAR ::



Ever since the war broke out you have been waiting for a practical, *serviceable* book about the situation. A book that is full of *facts* about the many new war subjects, *concis* accurate, *complete*. The "WAR BOOK OF FACTS" is the *first* and *only* book prepared, especially about the present crisis, where you can find in *one* place all the *facts* and *figures* you want to know about the war. Prepared by a staff of expert editors, who have gathered the material from every country, it is absolutely up-to-date.

## Facts and Figures YOU want to Know

It tells you all about the armies and navies and forts; about the modern tactics on which the war will be conducted, the airships and submarines and high-power explosives that will be used for the first time; about military terms and customs and rules; and all about the countries where the war will be fought, the resources and strength of the nations fighting, and the men who are the leaders. And with it comes a *big complete special* map in four colours, of all Europe and the North Sea, showing fortifications, towns, rivers, and all other points of war interest, which will allow you to follow the operations of armies and navies in all war areas.

## Different from Any Other Book Published

With the "War Book of Facts" at your elbow you can inform yourself on every detail of the war or any subject it may bring up. You will *know* what is going on—you can understand instantly the news your daily paper brings—you can talk intelligently about *every phase* of the situation. This book is not a re-hash of newspaper items, it isn't a history of the war, which you get from the daily press. It is really a boiled-down encyclopædia for busy men—over 3000 *facts* and *figures* vital to your understanding of the situation; all compressed into a volume of handy size, and more interesting to read than a novel.

The "War Book of Facts" is a handsome and substantial book, 5½ x 8½ inches, printed in big readable type, on superior book paper, durably bound in stiff covered boards, cover in colours. And the price is only 2/6, including the special war map of all Europe. Secure your copy from your bookseller or direct from the publisher (3d extra for postage).

A. W. SHAW COMPANY LTD., 34 Norfolk St., London, W.C.

