




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


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
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ON THE
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And on the
NEGOCIATIONS
OF
Mons. BUSSY.

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1918

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
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CONSIDERATIONS
ON THE
EXPEDIENCY
OF A
SPANISH WAR, &c.



***HERE has not been any political report since the beginning of the present war, that has occasioned more conversation or surprize, than the late rumour, that we are on the brink of having one with *Spain* ; it is now the subject

subject of debate in every coffee-house in
London : politicians harangue on it, and
 even the ministers themselves *drop very*
broad hints. * * * * *

* * * Perhaps it will not be thought
 either impertinent or unseasonable to
 make a few enquiries on a point at once
 so inviting and important.

It cannot be supposed that a nation,
 which has hitherto preserved a great cha-
 racter for the justness of its politics, will
 rush into a war without some view in so
 doing ; it may be false—and under the
 present circumstances of affairs, it is my
 intention to shew that it really is so. Some
 people, either from disaffection to our go-
 vernment, or from a love of singularity,
 pretend to pronounce this nation ruined if
 the *Spaniards* undertake a war against us :
 they tell us, that prolonging the war
 alone, even though it might prove succes-
 ful, must, in the end, beggar us ; and
 that this is the view of the court of *Spain* ;
 and its motive they ascribe to a jealousy
 of

of our present formidable situation in *America*. It must be owned, that when the balance of power is in danger, it is the wisest precaution for neutral nations to throw their weight into the sinking scale ; but this maxim can then only be defended in point of prudence, when such neutral nations have some prospect of succeeding in their intention.

Great Britain may at present be truly esteemed the most powerful monarchy in *Europe* ; and her power is of that kind which must be the most formidable to *Spain*. A war therefore between these two kingdoms will necessarily be a naval one, in which we have every thing to expect to gain, and the *Spaniards* every thing to lose. Our marine was never so powerful, and has very little to do. In the *East Indies*, our enemies the *French* are demolished ; so that a small squadron is sufficient for that station. In the *West Indies*, our only view is to protect our own trade, and destroy that of the *French*, who have no
fleet

fleet to oppose us. In *Europe*, their marine is ruined; and if we now and then hear of a little parade of a naval equipment at *Brest* or *Toulon*, we very well know it is all puff, and that they have no sailors to man the few rotten ships which have escaped our men of war. As the *French* have therefore no force to oppose to ours, we can with little or no addition of expence employ it against the *Spaniards*. It is very well known that much the greatest part of the revenue of that crown arises from the King's share of the gold and silver which is dug in their mines of *South America*; and that these treasures are brought home in squadrons they call their Flota of galleons. These have a long voyage to make before they reach *Old Spain*; and consequently are liable to the chance of being intercepted and seized by any nation superior to themselves at sea. That we possess this superiority is well known; for although the *Spanish* navy is considerable amongst the other maritime powers

powers of *Europe*, yet it is nothing when compared with the fleets of *Great Britain*.

Another plain reason against their entering into a war with us, is the weakness of their most valuable settlements in *America*. Their islands are almost open to our fleets; and expeditions against them at present would be much easier to us than at the opening of a war: as we have a vast force in *North America* ready to be transported on any new service, and a fleet ready to co-operate. The expedition in the last war under Lord *Anson*, to the *South Seas*, is a proof how weak the *Spaniards* are in that quarter, and with how much ease a squadron of enemy's ships would there throw them into the greatest disorder. It may perhaps be replied that commodore *Anson* did not find that voyage so very practicable: but it is very well known that the calamities which attended it were meerly owing to the not timing it properly; a misfortune of which we should now reap

an advantage; as the very ingenious writer of the account of that voyage, has laid down particular directions for conducting a fleet the same way; directions founded on dear-bought experience in that memorable expedition. When once they had passed those fatal streights, all obstacles were removed, and nothing gave them less trouble than the resistance of the enemy.

As to the *Spanish* trade in *Europe* it would be very soon destroyed by our privateers; and the wealthy part of that nation thereby soon involved in poverty. It may be said that we should experience the same inconveniences from a war; but in answer to that; we may be very well assured, that we should have greatly the advantage, and for this reason; we have at present a multitude of privateers ready fitted out for the sea; not only those built by ourselves, but a vast number that we have taken from the *French*; whereas the enemy would have all those preparations to make
which

which we already possess : and must greatly damage their trade themselves in converting merchants ships into privateers. Being before-hand is a very great point in such undertakings as these ; and all this advantage would be entirely on our side. In respect to the destroying each other's trade, both nations would certainly suffer greatly, but surely there would be no sort of proportion between them : Our navy so immensely superior to that of the enemy ; ready for action on a day's warning ; our privateers in the same readiness, would certainly give us a vast advantage. But if success in this respect was to be equal, a supposition which can hardly be allowed, yet we could much better carry on a naval war, equal in its circumstances, than the enemy.

Great Britain is a kingdom that does not only subsist on an immense foreign trade, but, in a very great measure, on the landed interest of the nation, in its

manufactures, and inland trade ; which is not the case with *Spain*. Manufactures they have few or none : no inland trade ; and the landed interest in *Spain* is very poor ; but few of their taxes being laid on that body of the people. The wealth of that kingdom depends almost entirely on its *American* colonies, and on its trade to *Great Britain*. Under these circumstances, it is very evident, which nation must feel most the loss of its trade. But to wave a supposition which my argument has no sort of reason to allow, as it is founded on impossibility ; how will the *Spaniards* be able to carry on a naval war with us, without this proportion in the losses of the two nations ? Our vast marine is too formidable for their's to hazard an engagement ; and when that is the case, their fleets must keep their ports, and their endeavours must be directed to protect their trade ; a task which will be utterly impossible, when they have to contend with such a force as ours,

In

In the present state of affairs in *Italy*, it is more than possible, that the court of *Spain* may be in fear for the establishments she has there procured for her young Princes. The Empress Queen has an undoubted right to the dutchies of *Parma*, *Placentia*, and *Guaftalla* ; and when she has got clear of the present war in *Germany*, she may very possibly assert that right, and attack the present possessor : in such a war, the king of *Sardinia*, it is to be supposed, would not assist the cause of *Spain*, for reasons which must be evident to every one ; and when the *British* fleets are masters of the *Mediterranean*, and his *Sardinian* Majesty of the passage into *Italy* by land, in what manner can the court of *Spain* assist her allies in that country.

If we consider the present situation of affairs in *Italy*, there will appear great reason to expect a war soon in that quarter. When one power keeps possession of territories, which, by right, belong to another,
and

and that other power strong enough to dispute the usurpation, we may depend upon it, that a war is not at a great distance; particular circumstances may prevent any monarch from asserting his rights, the moment they are invaded; but when those circumstances no longer subsist, we generally find, that Princes seldom give up their pretensions, when they are founded in justice. But, not to insist on general maxims, is the Empress Queen a likely princess to prove so tame in this affair, when she has finished her present war with his *Prussian* Majesty? is she not rather very ambitious, and jealous to the last degree of her rights, even if they are dubious! How improbable, therefore, is it, that she should overlook this manifest invasion of them! so very unlikely, that it is not to be expected: and the natural consequence of her asserting them, is an *Italian* war. The King of *Sardinia* has been some time making such preparations as have been noised about all *Europe*. He has not only completed all his old regiments,

ments, but raised many new ones; so that at this time he has above sixty thousand men in arms, and which are ready to march at a very short warning. That monarch, in thus strengthening himself, shews his political forecast, and the depth of his views: he knows very well, that in case an *Italian* war should happen, his friendship is of equal importance to either party; and that such a war as this is likely to be, cannot but turn out to his advantage, if he is prepared for it.

As an *Italian* war seems so very probable; nay, so very certain; it is almost impossible for the court of *Spain* to keep clear of it, as it certainly is not for her interest that the present system of affairs there should be overturned. Now the evident disadvantages she must labour under in such a war, with *Great Britain* for her enemy, are immense! Every embarkation of troops which she makes, will be subject to attacks from the *British* fleets. The whole kingdom of *Naples* would be
under

under the command of a few *English* bomb vessels ; as they would at any time have it in their power to lay the fine city of *Naples* in ashes : an instance of which actually happened when Commodore *Martin* obtained a neutrality for that whole kingdom in less than four hours, with so small a force as three ships. Are not these circumstances of the most important nature in a war between *Spain* and *Great Britain* ?

It may perhaps be said that I have not given a fair state of the case ; for that *Spain* would have the assistance of *France* in such a war, which proved of so much consequence to them in the former. Let us now enquire into the advantages that would accrue to *Spain* from an alliance with *France*.

It is certainly very true, that such an alliance in the last war was of very great service to them both ; but would
the

the case be the same now? is *France*, at present, the power she was twenty years ago; is she, in her present distressed condition, able to protect the extensive, but unweildy monarchy of *Spain* against the formidable power of *Great Britain*? in the last war, *France* had by much the best side of the question; but in this she has met with nothing but a succession of misfortunes. When *Spain* joined *France* before, she was in possession of a flourishing marine; but now she has not ten ships manned! then her armies were powerful, and her generals successful; and moreover she was in possession of a flourishing trade. But none of these circumstances now subsist. Her armies had never worse success; her generals less credit; or her subjects less trade. Her power in the *West Indies*, in the neighbourhood of the *Spanish* colonies, was then very considerable; all her colonies in general were in a prosperous situation; in a word, she was a formidable power. At present, her

C

trade

trade in general is utterly ruined, and so little of her navy remains, that she could not lend the *Spaniards* a single man of war to convoy their galleons. In the *West Indies*, we are in possession of the most considerable sugari-land she had, and our fleet keeps the rest in awe, and ruins the remains of her commerce ; so that what sugars she has, are disadvantageously brought home in foreign bottoms. In *North America* she is undone, as much so as conquest can make her ; and in the *East Indies*, the most important of her fortresses are all in our possession ; so that nothing but the name of her *India Company* remains. Her trade in *Europe* is reduced to nothing ; even her very coasting trade is almost destroyed. The immense expence she has been at to prosecute the war in *Germany*, and in paying subsidies to the *Austrians*, *Russians*, *Swedes*, and other *German* Princes, have quite impoverished her ; there cannot be stronger proof of this poverty than the general languor

languor which appears in every branch of their administration: the Duke de *Belleisle*, in his letters to Marshal *Contades*, expresses how excessively in want of money his department was two years ago, and their sending even their plate to the mint is very expressive of this poverty. What perhaps is as fatal as any part of these misfortunes, is the unsteadiness and uncertainty of their government. When the government of a nation lies in the hands of a weak capricious woman, who makes every thing of the greatest importance give way to her own humour, caprice, and interest; that nation, if an arbitrary monarchy, must be in the greatest danger of ruin. This is the case in *France*; and while the people lie under the most oppressive burden, and the lands in general lie uncultivated, their armies are attended with the worst success, and the spirits of their soldiery so depressed, that their great superiority of numbers can give them little advantage.

This is the state of that nation, to join whom *Spain* is to renounce her present happy condition, and involve herself in a war that *must* prove destructive. Sure at first sight the difference between an alliance in the *last* war and *now* must be evident. *France* is no longer the power that she was ; and besides, there were several other circumstances in respect to the rest of the powers of *Europe*, at that time, which are now changed, and all conspire to render it infinitely impolitic in the court of *Spain* to enter into so disadvantageous an alliance. In the last war *France* assisted *Spain*, but in this *Spain* must support *France*.

It has been further said, that *France* is to yield up the island of *Minorca* to the *Spaniards*, in consideration of the assistance she is to receive from that nation. This is a pretty equivalent truly for giving away their trade, and perhaps bringing themselves to the brink of ruin ! *Minorca*

norca is not worth the keeping to *Spain*, if she could sink it to the bottom of the sea; and the only reason for her to wish to be repossessed of it, is to prevent any body else having it. Sure this paltry island can never be deemed an equivalent for the losses she would sustain in a ruinous war.

Another reason which is urged by some for the court of *Spain's* taking this step, is the present flourishing state of our colonies in *America*, from which they may take umbrage, as fearing the balance of power destroyed *there*, and their own settlements in danger. It will be a very easy matter to answer this. In some cases it certainly is the best policy in neutral nations to assist the weaker power; for instance, it was very ill judged in *Oliver Cromwell* to make an alliance with *France* against *Spain*, because only the name remained of the latter power, and he was frightened at the idea of the vast power *Spain* had so lately exerted to the terror of the
the

the greatest part of *Europe*. *France* was then a rising power, and the penetrating politicians of those days predicted the ill consequences of that alliance. Had *Cromwell* joined *Spain*, his power would have been such an accession as would more than have balanced the two belligerent nations, and might in its consequences have stopped the fast growth of the *French* monarchy. But the Protector was obliged as it were to take one part in the quarrel, for he knew the turbulent spirit of the people he governed, and perceived the necessity of engaging them in a foreign war, that they might not be at leisure to form conspiracies against his own government ; so that he found himself obliged to enter into a war, and the point was only what power to join.

But in the case before us, the *Spaniards* have no reasonable pretext to go to war at all. The notion of the balance of power being destroyed, is meerly ideal.

Was

Was this nation an absolute monarchy, and an ambitious King on the throne, they might perhaps have some cause for such a fear ; but considering our government, and the known character which this nation has over all *Europe* for an honourable and faithful observation of treaties, can they have any fears of this kind, supposing this balance *was* destroyed ? But how can any such fact be proved ? This notion was never thought of before the late conquest of *Canada* ; and has that event been of such immense importance to the *Spaniards* as to endanger their colonies ? So far from it, the *Spanish* settlements are infinitely more rich than ours ; perhaps they are not of such advantage to a commercial nation, but yet the revenue which the King of *Spain* draws from their mines, might give us much more reason for fear of this kind than they can have on our account. Such fear must arise from a notion of ambitious designs in the court of *England*, and not from the flourishing state of our trade ; now in the
first

first case, it is the King's revenue which they would have the greatest reason to fear, which cannot be the case with us, by reason of the government which subsists in *England*; for let our trade be ever so extensive, it will not give our Sovereign the least addition of extraordinary power. But how can it be said that there is any balance at all destroyed? The cultivated part of *North America* is not of near the extent that the *Spanish* part of *South America* is; and surely the riches of it will not bear a comparison. How then can the balance be destroyed? for what *North America* may be to us some centuries hence, cannot be deemed a reasonable pretence for going to war with us at present. As I just now observed, had this balance been in danger, there certainly would have been a great deal to apprehend from the character and government of this nation. This is a point of more importance than at first it may appear to be. Is there not, in such a case, more danger from a monarchy

narchy like that of *France*, than from such a republic as *Holland*, supposing at the same time the latter to be as powerful as the former ?

I think therefore I have pretty fully proved how extremely empty and ridiculous any reasons are, that might be given by the partisans of *Spain*, for entering into a war with us. No step could possibly be more absurd, as none can by any means prove so ruinous to *Spain* ; every advantage that any nation can enjoy from peace, the *Spaniards* are at present in possession of ; and what is it that she would have in exchange for this greatest of all blessings ? nothing that is by any means an equivalent. During a naval war with so powerful a nation as we are by sea, they would be one of the poorest and weakest nations in *Europe*. The arrival of their galleons would be rendered very uncertain ; and in the nature of things would now and then be intercepted. Their whole trade would

D

very

very soon be ruined, and a vastly important branch of it, that with us, which is the best part of their *European* commerce, entirely lost at once, which would greatly distress them ; add to this, their inability to interfere in the affairs of *Italy*, if we were their enemies ; and their having a ruined nation, such as *France*, to protect.

The court of *Spain*, it seems, thought the terms on which the *French* in the late negociation offered to agree to a peace, reasonable ; and, in a *memorial*, which they presented by their Ambassador, *threatened us with a WAR if we did not comply with them* ; they further demanded for *themselves* a share in the *Newfoundland fishery*, and to have the whole *Logwood trade* secured to them !

For the *Spaniards* thus insolently to interfere in our contest with *France*, is an insult we *ought not* to bear. Can they
 imagine

imagine that we should fling away the conquests we have made, to oblige them? *Monf. Buffy* in his late negociation, with regard to the affairs of *North America*, offered to give up *Canada*, on condition that the bounds of *Louisiana* should be enlarged and ceded to *France*; and as a security for our colonies, they agreed to give us a barrier to them. They further insisted on having the isle *Sable* for the conveniency of drying their fish. These articles were the hinges on which the negociation turned, and which the *Spanish* ministry think so very reasonable.

The original motive of our going to war with *France*, was, the danger our *North American colonies* were in from the incroachments of the *French*. The value of our settlements was well known, and it was very clearly perceived, that we must either go into a war with our perfidious neighbours, or yeild them up a considerable share of our maritime colonies. The

fortune of the war has thrown the whole advantage into our hands, and we have secured our colonies by the conquest of those which the *French* possessed there ; and her very neighbourhood was what endangered ours before.—And shall we now be so mad as to lay the foundations of a future war by yielding up our conquests at a peace ? Our settlements cannot possibly be of half the value to us while another nation is in possession of the back country. Their situation will always enable them to command the inland trade of all *North America* ; and what is of more consequence, they will command the *Indians* of the whole country : by their means they will at any time be able to make war on us without appearing in it themselves, and consequently without apparently breaking any treaties. An *Indian* war immediately desolates all our back-settlements, and the produce of many hundred miles of territory is lost at once. It is a stroke of policy in our government,
and

and it is also just, to prevent the colonies raising manufactures that may interfere with those of their mother country. Now no restrictions will so thoroughly prevent this, as keeping possession of all *North America*; and for a very evident reason. Manufactures require a great number of hands, collected in a small compass; and universally thrive best in kingdoms of small extent. In *North America*, adjoining to our settlements, are immense uncultivated tracts of land, very proper for producing the same articles, as those we already cultivate: if there was no enemy to stop the planters progress, these lands would very soon be overspread with planters from our settlements; and when every man might have as much land as he pleased for nothing, it would be an absolute impossibility to raise a single manufacture. All mankind, when the choice is before them, prefer freedom to servitude; every man, as soon as he had raised a trifling sum, would turn planter. The workmen
of

of a manufacture must necessarily have good wages. The amount of these alone, would soon ruin the work, as the men would continually be turning planters. It is unknown, but easily conjectured, what a vast quantity of our manufactures would be expended throughout these immense regions, if they were once begun to be planted. This advantage will be entirely lost, if we yield them up to the *French*.

The advocates for this fatal measure, give, as a reason for their opinion, the danger there would be of our *North American* colonies throwing off the yoke of their mother country, if such an immense accession of territory was to be added to what they already possess. But the insufficiency of this argument is answered in a moment. I may safely venture an assertion, which, upon consideration, will be found true; that there is more danger of this happening now, than if all *North America* was to be added to them at a peace;

peace ; and for the same reason that they would not be able to raise manufactures. To throw off the yoke, if it can be called one, would require a very deep laid conspiracy, and an union among all the governments there. Now it is very well known, how difficult it would be, to form a conspiracy in a country that has no towns, except a few sea ports ; and where all, or at least, much the greatest part of the inhabitants, are scattered over such an immense continent ; is not the very idea of such a revolt absurd to the last degree ? And the danger, if there was any, is greater *now* ; because the inhabitants are more collected. Another thing which would make such an affair impossible, is the nature of the different governments of our colonies ; all of them jealous, and envious of one another to the greatest degree. We have the strongest proofs which experience can give, how little they could be united at the beginning of this war against a common enemy that was at their very doors.

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We know that they all cast the most jealous eye on their governors, and in short are, in their own policy, quite divided into tribes of separate people ; yet these are all to unite at once against their mother country, to bring down forces from the moon, to form conspiracies by the force of magic, in order to revolt from the first maritime power in the universe.

Is there not much greater danger of the *Spanish colonies* revolting, than of ours ? Do not their's abound with gold and silver, which will purchase every thing else ? Are not all their immense dominions united under one government ? is not the treatment they receive from their mother country, much more severe, than any thing of that kind felt by ours ? Why, therefore, do not they revolt ? Because the court of *Spain* puts it entirely out of their power, by taking a few plain and simple precautions ; they change their viceroys every three years ; they change the troops they
employ

employ there frequently, and seldom let them remain long at one place. Does not this clearly prove that we may very easily ensure the fidelity of our colonies, by changing our governors, or, in fact, by letting the several governments remain on their present footing? I think, therefore, that the notion of letting the *French* remain in *North America*, on this pretence, is founded on no reason that has even the appearance of truth.

The next article which the court of *Spain* is so *modest* as to expect we should agree to, is letting the *French* continue to possess a share in the *Newfoundland fishery*, to which they have no sort of right, and all which they would be sure to usurp. It is very plain that the true interest of *Great Britain* is to prevent the *French* from ever becoming a maritime power. We cannot possibly hinder their building ships, but we have it now in our power to prevent their raising sailors. The great
E nursery

nursery for them is this fishery, which constantly, before the war, maintained *France* 20,000 annually, besides their gaining a million and a half of our money. The prodigious importance of this fishery must therefore appear at once towards raising a naval power. The *French*, by treaty, had only a right to a share of it; but by means of the near neighbourhood of *Louisburg* they usurped very near the whole, and by that means gained all the principal markets in *Europe* from us. A naval power depends entirely on trade, and that trade is the most advantageous which employs the most seamen. The advantage of the possession of this fishery therefore will very clearly appear; and the bad policy of yielding again to *France* a share in it, is so evident, that no consideration whatever should induce us to such a concession.

As to the demand of the court of *Spain*, for a share of this fishery for *themselves*, it
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is a demand not founded on any right ; for the *English* were in possession of the southern parts of this island long before the *Spaniards* ever thought of fishing there. In the treaty of 1713, they endeavoured to establish their pretended right, but could only get this clause inserted, which left the right just where it was before : “ And as on the part of *Spain*, “ it is insisted, that the *Biscayners*, and other “ subjects of his Catholic Majesty, have “ an undoubted right of fishing on the “ banks of *Newfoundland*, her Majesty of “ *Great Britain* consents and agrees, that “ all privileges *which can justly be claimed*, “ be preserved inviolable to the *Biscayners*, “ and other inhabitants of *Spain*.” The *Spaniards* since that time have never prosecuted a *cod-fishery*, nor have their pretended rights ever been more solidly established by treaty. The granting them their demands now, would therefore only raise up *two* rivals in this valuable commerce against ourselves, which would be of

much worse consequence than could possibly result from a war with *Spain*. I shall not enquire into their right to the *logwood-trade*, as I make very little doubt but that point might be settled with great ease; but the others are of a more important nature, and which we cannot give up while we retain the least regard for our own interest.

The advocates for our agreeing to the terms required by the court of *Spain*, tell us, that the *Spanish* ministry delaying a war with us, till we were on the verge of a peace with *France*, acted very politically, as their view was to reduce our overgrown power;—for now, by entering into the war, they will, in all probability, protract it till we, by our great expences, shall be undone; and the end which must be answered will, in a very great measure, pay them for their losses. This politic scheme, which we credit them with, has been urged more than
once,

once, and it is amazing that any people, not absolute enemies to their country, can endeavour at turning and twisting an argument about till it gain an appearance of reason, only to delude us into puffball measures.

Taxes and expences can only be called great and oppressive, when they are out of proportion to the general riches of a nation. To say a government raises twenty millions every year, is proving nothing, till the state of the national strength and riches is explained. With the possession of some particular branches of trade, this kingdom is more able to bear a national debt of 100,000,000 £. than it is to bear half that debt without such trade. If we encrease our national debt considerably, and by so doing gain a proportional increase of trade, we shall, at the end, be as rich, or perhaps richer, than we were with a smaller debt. The case, indeed, would be somewhat different if the money
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we spent was to circulate into foreign countries, like our subsidies to *German* Princes; but when *all of it* is spent among ourselves, this objection vanishes. A *Spanish* war cannot impoverish this nation, because it must be a *naval* one; and all the charge of our navy is paid *to ourselves*. The nation will be as rich at the end as at the beginning of such a war, as all the expence of it alternately circulates from the government to the people, and back again. This therefore is a clear proof that a naval war is, in its consequences to us, extremely different from a land one, and much less detrimental in its effects.

But what can be said against entering into such a war, when we have the greatest prospect of success that is possible? When we do it merely to preserve some important branches of our commerce that are of more worth to us than the mines of *Peru* are to the *Spaniards*? When we must either give up all the advantages we have gained in a
bloody

bloody war, or tamely agree to the dictates of the court of *Madrid*?

I must be permitted to call the possession of *North America* an article of the utmost importance, with regard to our commerce; since the consumption of our manufactures in those regions is already immense; much more so than could be conceived in so short a time from their conquest; but which will not appear wonderful if we consider the vast tribes of *Indians*, which are now entirely supplied from us. There is nothing which can enrich us more than a great demand for our manufactures; and consequently our increase of trade arising from the possession of all *North America*, will very well repay us for any expence we can be at in reserving it to ourselves.

Considering the vast force we have on foot ready to employ against the *Spaniards* if they go to war with us, we may very reasonably

reasonably hope not only to preserve the acquisitions we have already made from *France*, but in that case to add more to them. The *Spaniards* are in possession of the island of *Cuba*, and half of *Hispaniola*; these islands, I am credibly informed, are very accessible; much more so than *Guadaloupe*; and it is not very presumptuous to say, that our arms would probably be crowned with some conquest in this part of the world that would extremely well help to reimburse us for the expences of the war. The *Philippines* islands in the *East-Indies* at present yield the *Spaniards* little or no profit; but it is well known that this is their own fault: for their value, if well managed, is prodigious. They are weak and exposed to a degree that is surprizing, considering their importance. A strong *British* squadron would hardly fail of making some impression here, that might be of the greatest advantage to this kingdom. In short, the dominions of *Spain* are so scattered, so unweildy, and yet so valuable,

luable, that we could not possibly quarrel with any power, with a greater probability of advantage.

A *Spanish* war at this period, would be attended with fewer ill consequences than at any other time. At present it would involve us with no other nation; but were we at peace with *France*, we should in all probability see her join the *Spaniards*; and such a power coming fresh into a war with us, in the situation which *France* was in before the present troubles, would be extremely different from *Spain's* joining *France* at present. The court of *Madrid* could not have chosen a more impolitic, a more unfavorable moment to attack us: she can now have no assistance that will be of any service to her. In the last war the *French* were in a very different situation from what they are in at present. Then their fleets in a great measure protected the coasts of *Spain*; but how are the times changed! Now the fleets of

F *Spain*

Spain must protect the coasts of *France* : a task which I believe they will find much too arduous for their power to effect.

That the maintaining the present peace in the strictest and most honourable manner, is the true interest of the *Spanish* nation, no body, I believe, will deny. What an ingenious politician says of the subject, will still be the case if the court of *Madrid* thinks of acting so contrary to their real interests. “ But after all, says he, the
 “ capital and most dangerous inconvenience
 “ is, their court’s not being governed by
 “ *Spanish* counsels ; for all true politicians
 “ will agree, that no curse can be so heavy
 “ upon a people, as to be made tools and
 “ beasts of burthen to any other people.
 “ For the first twenty years after the accession of the late king Philip, *Spain*
 “ was in effect no better than a province
 “ to *France* ; and her condition for more
 “ than twenty years since that, has been
 “ much worse ; she is become a province to
 “ those

“ those which she takes for her own pro-
 “ vinces, I mean the *Italian* dominions,
 “ for which she has already paid ten times
 “ more than they are worth, and has also
 “ remained under a dependance on *France*
 “ for the greatest part of that time. In
 “ short, the Queen Dowager governed the
 “ King, and by so doing, governed *Spain*,
 “ with a view only to the interest of *Italy* ;
 “ and this passion was so strong in her, that
 “ all the kingdoms and provinces of the
 “ *Spanish* monarchy have been exhausted,
 “ beggared, and sacrificed to the love she
 “ has to her own little duchies of *Parma*
 “ and *Placentia*.—In short, we affirm,
 “ that the accessions of territory made by
 “ the two last wars, can be rendered be-
 “ neficial only by pursuing the principles
 “ before laid down ; and that the real
 “ strength, grandeur, and prosperity of
 “ the *Spanish* crown must be the work of
 “ peace, and of that mild, just, and equi-
 “ table government, to which his present
 “ Catholic Majesty, King *Ferdinand* the
 “ Sixth,

"Sixth, is naturally inclined : and for the
 "truth of this, we appeal to time and the
 "judgment of posterity."

It will not, I believe, require any
 more arguments to prove, how impolitic
 a part the *Spanish* ministry will act? to in-
 volve their country in so pernicious a dis-
 pute ; nor to set forth, in any higher
 colours, how utterly imprudent it would
 be in *Great Britain*, to give up any of
 the important advantages she has gained
 in the present glorious war, through fear
 of a rupture with *Spain* ; as such an event
 must turn out, in all human probability,
 very much to the disadvantage of the
 latter, and be productive of an infinite
 train of misfortunes, which she can only
 shun by maintaining a good understanding
 with her best friend, the government of
Great Britain.

F I N I S.

