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

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
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
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
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CANADIAN DEFENCE

— AND —

THE NAVY QUESTION

ISSUED BY THE
CENTRAL INFORMATION OFFICE
OF THE
CANADIAN LIBERAL PARTY
OTTAWA, CANADA
1915

Publication No. 31

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Canadian Defence—The Naval Question

The main object of this article is to discuss the naval question which has become such an important issue in the politics of the country, and we consider it desirable for a proper study of it that we should at the outset review briefly the various steps taken in building up the land defences of the country which preceded and led up to the other.

Land Defences.

The process of building our land defences has been gradual, at times slow, but always cautiously sure. Before the scattered Provinces had been brought in to Confederation, and, indeed for long afterwards, the question of defence was a secondary consideration with us. We were, and still are, a peace loving people. We do not know what war is, and in our hearts we do not like, or want it. We preferred then to go about our natural business which, as we thought, was the opening up and development of our enormous heritage. We felt that we needed all the money we could raise ourselves, and borrow abroad, to build railways, canals, wharves, piers, to improve rivers, etc., so as to provide for the transportation of our products to market. The country was in its infancy, and the first problem was to supply it with the facilities and conveniences for trading and marketing which the older countries of the World had supplied themselves with, many years, and in some instances, centuries ago.

As the years went on, however, as our population increased and we grew in wealth and development, as we began to emerge from the status of a people struggling with more or less primitive conditions towards Nationhood, our outlook widened and became more comprehensive. We commenced to realize the responsibilities and obligations that follow in the wake of a growing over-seas commerce. We sensed that while we had done our full duty in developing this most important and great portion of the Empire, the time was coming, when being grown up members of the family of Empire, we would, as loyal subjects, have to keep our place in the rank, by taking over as far as possible from the Mother Country the defences she had provided for us during our period of colonial and national infancy.

The question of defence first came up for consideration in a positive way when the Provinces of Canada were being confederated in 1867. The point to be decided then was whether Canada would make contribution to the British War Office for the purpose of land defence. The Fathers of Confederation, in their wisdom, strong believers in local autonomy as they were, agreed that Canada should spend about one million dollars annually for military purposes, and Great Britain agreed to station and maintain in addition troops in the Dominion at her own expense.

In 1884, Great Britain was at war in the Soudan, and the question of sending Canadian troops to her assistance became a live one. The

Conservative Government of that day, under Sir John MacDonald, as Prime Minister, declined to send troops, but allowed recruiting in Canada, on condition that the entire cost must fall on the Imperial Exchequer. As a result, 600 Canadian recruits formed part of an expeditionary force sent up the Nile at the expense of the Imperial Government.

The very next year, 1885, the North West Rebellion broke out and was subdued by Canadian volunteers led by General Middleton and staff officers loaned from the Imperial service.

In 1899, Great Britain was at war with the South African Republic, and Canada sent nearly 6,000 of its fighting men to help her.

A few years later, in 1905, the Liberal Government then in Office took over from the British Government the task of garrisoning Halifax and Esquimalt, the Imperial troops at these important stations being replaced by officers and men of the Canadian permanent force.

Year by year the expenditures on Canadian military defence were increased as the following figures show:

1902-3.....	\$2,503,639
1903-4.....	3,544,580
1904-5.....	3,945,141
1905-6.....	5,593,518
1906-7.....	4,320,967
(nine months only.)	
1907-8.....	6,795,678
1908-9.....	6,484,806
1909-10.....	5,921,314
1910-11.....	6,909,211
1911-12.....	7,579,884
1912-13.....	9,114,533

We will not burden this narrative by examining into the details of these expenditures. Suffice it to say that, generally speaking, they have been approved by both political parties.

In 1909, at a Conference of an Imperial Defence Committee, which had been formed a few years previously, and on which Canada was represented by its Minister of Militia, a plan was arranged of so organizing the forces of the Crown that, to quote the words of Prime Minister Asquith:

"While preserving the complete autonomy of each Dominion, should the Dominions desire to assist in the defence of the Empire in a real emergency, their forces could be rapidly combined into one homogeneous Imperial army."

At this Conference general concurrence was expressed to the proposition,

"That each part of the Empire, if willing to make its preparations on such lines as will enable each, should it so desire, to take its share in the general defence of the Empire."

It was well understood at that Conference, as expressed by Lord Haldane, the British Minister of War, that

"The representatives of the Over-Seas Dominions cannot at the Conference pledge their Governments or undertake in any way to combine the officers and men composing Over-Sea Dominion

forces, to engagements beyond the shores and boundaries of their own countries," and that "whatever is done must be done spontaneously and with due regard to the circumstances in which each one of them is situated."

Here we have clearly established the principle of each Dominion of the Empire being mistress of its own house, yet ready and willing to work together along the same military lines so as to present to the enemy an efficient, homogeneous Imperial fighting force in times of war.

As these lines are penned, the Empire is engaged in the most terrible war in the history of the World, and Canada from Coast to Coast is a unit in supporting the Mother Country. Already 30,000 of our troops, equipped and paid by ourselves, are on the fighting line, and as many more will shortly follow. Parliament, which was called to approve the sending of these troops gave its approval without a dissenting voice and voted \$50,000,000 for the purpose. More will be given cheerfully, if needed. The Leaders of the two great political parties have vied with each other in their manifestations of the highest patriotism and loyalty. Summed up, their attitude is: Canada, a part of the Empire, is wholeheartedly with the Empire in this fight and will give her last dollar and her last man if necessary in defence of the Empire and its rights.

The progressive steps taken towards building our military or land defence as hereinbefore briefly described, met with little serious opposition from the people, notwithstanding the fact that the population is composed of different races. Growls were occasionally heard and at election times politicians were known to argue against increased military expenditures, but it can, we think, be fairly stated that no great national political question ever arose. The question of naval defence, however, we are sorry to say, is another and different story, which we shall now proceed to deal with.

Naval Defences.

In the days of good Queen Victoria of revered memory, Great Britain, keeping pace with the development of the Empire, deemed it necessary that the Colonies and Dominions should be brought into closer touch than by correspondence with the Throne, so a system of holding Conference between the British Government and representatives of the Dominions was established. The first of these was held in 1887, Canada being represented by members of the then Conservative Government. One of the important questions dealt with then was that of the colonies making cash contributions to the British navy. Canada declined to contribute and took the same position in 1897, when the Liberal party was in Office here.

At the Conference in 1902, the subject was again brought up, when the Canadian Liberal Ministers declared inter alia:

"Canada expresses appreciation of the duty of the Dominion as it advances in population and wealth to make necessary outlays for the necessary preparations of defence."

"Canadian Ministers regret that they are not able at present to assent to the suggestions respecting a navy, but are prepared to consider a naval system of defence.

"On the sea coast of Canada there is a large number of men who are admirably qualified to form a naval reserve and it is hoped that at an early date a system may be devised which will lead to the training of these men, and to the making of their services available for defence in time of need.

"In conclusion, the Ministers repeat that while the Canadian Government are obliged to dissent from the measures proposed, they fully appreciate the obligation of the Dominion to make expenditures for the purpose of defence in proportion to the increasing population and wealth of the country. They are willing that these expenditures shall be so directed as to relieve the taxpayer of the Mother Country from some of the burdens which he now bears, and they have the strongest desire to carry out their defence schemes in co-operation with the Imperial authorities and under the advice of experienced Imperial officers so far as is consistent with the principle of local self-government which has proved so great a factor in the promotion of Imperial unity."

In 1906, the Imperial dockyard and plant with buildings at Halifax were taken over by the Canadian Government under an agreement with the British Government, that they would be properly kept up in equipment and stores, so as to render them available at all times for the British fleet, while British vessels were at all times to have precedence over other ships. On the same conditions, the naval station at Esquimalt was taken over by the Canadian Government in 1910.

Up to 1909 the question of naval defence had not seriously entered Canadian politics. The action of the Conservative Government at the Imperial Conference, 1887, and of the Canadian Liberal Ministers at subsequent Imperial Conferences were, of course, duly observed and commented upon, but it appeared to be the general opinion of the Canadian people that the time was not ripe for any important action. At all events there was no agitation and no political issues were raised on the subject.

Foster's Motion.

In March, 1909, the subject was first seriously mooted in the Parliament of Canada, when the Honourable Sir George E. Foster, a pronounced Imperialist, moved the following resolution in a speech of great power, which commanded the close attention of the House of Commons.

"That in the opinion of this house, in view of her great and varied resources, of her geographical position and natural environments, and of that spirit of self-help and self-respect which alone befits a strong and growing people, Canada should no longer delay in assuming her proper share of the responsibility and financial burden incident to the suitable protection of her exposed coast line and great seaports."

Unanimity of Parliament.

Sir Wilfrid Laurier in behalf of the Government accepted the principle of this resolution and with the consent of Mr. Foster and Mr. Borden

introduced the following more positive and practical motion, which was unanimously passed by the House of Commons:

"This House fully recognizes the duty of the people of Canada, as they increase in numbers and wealth, to assume in larger measure the responsibilities of national defence.

"The House is of opinion that under the present constitutional relations between the mother country and the self-governing Dominions, the payment of regular and periodical contributions to the Imperial treasury for naval and military purposes would not, so far as Canada is concerned, be the most satisfactory solution of the question of defence.

"The House will cordially approve of any necessary expenditure designed to promote the speedy organization of a Canadian naval service in co-operation with and in close relation to the Imperial Navy, along the lines suggested by the Admiralty at the last Imperial Conference, and in full sympathy with the view that the naval supremacy of Britain is essential to the security of commerce, the safety of the Empire, and the peace of the world.

"The House expresses its firm conviction that whenever the need arises, the Canadian people will be found ready and willing to make any sacrifice that is required to give the Imperial authorities the most loyal and hearty co-operation in every movement for the maintenance of the integrity and honour of the Empire."

Before submission to the House this resolution of Sir Wilfrid's was amended by Sir Robert Borden by the insertion of the word "speedy" before the word "organization" in the third paragraph.

Foster Opposes Contribution.

The debate which arose on the resolution covered all phases of the question, and especially the idea of making a fixed money contribution to the British Government in support of the Imperial Navy. Speaking on this point Sir George E. Foster said: (Page 3495, Vol. II., Hansard 1909.)

"The first and greatest objection which I have to a fixed money contribution is that it bears the aspect of hiring somebody else to do what we ourselves ought to do; as though a man, the father of a family, in lusty health and strength, should pay his neighbour something per month for looking after the welfare and safety of his home instead of doing that duty himself. That seems to me, when you work it out, to be a basic objection to this form of aid. It goes still further than that. Suppose we contribute this year your sum, and next year your equal sum, and thereafter year for year, after ten or twelve or twenty or thirty years you will have paid out an immense amount of money.

"In Canada itself there will be no roots struck, there will be no residue left, there will be no preparation of the soil or beginning of the growth of the product.

"It disjoins what has been joined together from the earliest days of the world's existence—commerce and the protection of commerce.

"That method ignores the necessities and the aspirations, and prospects of a great people, such as the Canadian people are destined to become.

"However humble the beginning, we must have something in which Canada has some of her body, her bone, her blood, her mental power and her national pride."

Borden Also Opposes Contribution.

Sir Robert Borden unequivocally supported the policy laid down by Sir Wilfrid and he was most emphatic in opposing the cash contribution. This is what he said: (Page 3517, Vol. II., Hansard 1909.)

"In so far as my right hon. friend the Prime Minister to-day outlined the lines of naval defence, I am entirely at one with him. I am entirely of opinion, in the first place, that the proper line upon which we should proceed in that regard is the line of having a naval force of our own.

"The other experiment has been tried as between Australia and the Mother country, and it has not worked satisfactorily in any respect. In Great Britain, the contribution has perhaps been regarded as rather unsatisfactory, in Australia it failed, in the end, to meet with the approval of the people.

"So I am at one with the Prime Minister in so far as this is concerned. I am at one with him in this respect also that I think an expenditure of money designed for that purpose ought, in the main at least, to be under the control of our own parliament; and that by making an appropriation of that kind, and attending to the defence, and to co-ordination with the Imperial navy forces, we would be rendering a real service to the defence of the Empire, and we would be doing our duty not only to Canada, but to the Empire as a whole.

"What suggestions I have to make I make with the sincere desire that we may shape a resolution of which we can all approve and which shall go forth to the world as a ringing declaration that if the mother of nations has to fight the battle of her life, the people of Canada, without distinction of party or of creed, will stand by her side in that fight. This is too great a question for the introduction of party strategy. It is a question in respect to which we should all rise superior to party motives, and so I propose making to my right hon. friend one or two suggestions which I know he will receive in the spirit in which I make them.

"It has been suggested that instead of the organization of a Canadian naval force there should be a system of annual contributions from this country to the Mother Country; and I am free to admit that, from the strategical point of view, I would be inclined to agree with the view of the admiralty that this would be the best way for the great self-governing dominions of the empire to make their contributions. But Sir, from a constitutional and political standpoint, I am opposed to it, for many reasons. In the first place, I do not believe that it would endure. In the second place, it would be a source of friction. It would become a bone of partisan contention.

"It would be subject to criticism as to the character and the amount of the contribution in both parliaments. It would not be permanent or continuous. It would conduce, if anything, to severing the present connection between Canada and the Empire.

"Permanent co-operation in defence, in my opinion, can only be accomplished by the use of our own material, the employment of our own people, the development and utilization of our own skill and resourcefulness, and, above all, by impressing upon the people a sense of responsibility for their share in international affairs."

An Analysis of Resolution.

Permit us to analyze the operative paragraph of the resolution. A Canadian naval service was to be organized, instead of a cash contribution being given, thereby appealing to the highest and best aspirations of the people. A service in which, as Mr. Foster aptly expressed it, Canada would have some of her body, her bones, her blood, her mental power and national pride. It was to be speedily organized, that is to say, the resolution was not to be treated as an academic one, it was intensely practical and it had to be followed by prompt action. The new navy was also to be in close co-operation and relation with and to the imperial navy, and in full sympathy with the view that the naval supremacy of Britain is essential to the security of commerce, the safety of the Empire and the peace of the world. Could language be clearer to express the intent and purpose of the House of Commons to build up a naval service of our own, which would be modelled on British lines, and would work together with Great Britain's navy in the defence of the Empire?

Unanimity Destroyed

The fact that the resolution was passed unanimously by the House of Commons is worthy of special note. Rarely if ever has a big question like this in a country like Canada with people sprung from different races been so happily and so harmoniously solved as apparently it was by the unanimity of the approval. It appeared to be a revelation of the inherent loyalty of the whole people. Bearing in mind the history of the bitter racial disputes in the country, with their accompanying discord and bad feeling, it seemed as if a new era had dawned and that the old passions had been buried forever. But alas for the frailty of human nature and professional politicians! The ink was scarcely dry upon that unanimously approved resolution of the House, before it was assailed from the ranks of the Conservative party in most divergent and contradictory ways. One section contended that the duty of Canada towards the Empire would not be properly discharged by the creation of a Canadian navy and that the only manner in which such a duty could be performed was by contribution from the Canadian to the Imperial Treasury. The other section, in the Province of Quebec, contended strongly against either contribution or the creation of a Canadian navy. In this way, notwithstanding the attitude of the Conservative party in Parliament, the navy question was thrown into the political arena with a vengeance. From then on the history of the question is one of political intrigue,

discreditable tactics and political caballing most injurious, not only to internal peaceful relations but to the interests of the Empire.

Conservative Tactics

Before proceeding with our narrative, we deem it important to make a reference to time worn tactics of the Conservative party in all questions of this character. We mean their favourite method of warfare which consists in assailing the Liberals as disloyal. The great Dr. Johnson once said that the last refuge of a scoundrel was patriotism. We do not go so far as to say that the last resort of the Conservative party is to wave the flag, but we do state that it has been their constant practice in all delicate subjects into which the question of loyalty might enter, to make an unholy use of the sacred emblem of Empire and slander their political opponents by accusing them of being disloyal. Instead of helping to weld the two great races of the Canadian people by conciliation, by toleration, forbearance and equality of treatment, methods which have made Great Britain the greatest colonizing force of all times, their attitude has always been one of force, of exercise of dominancy, and, what is far worse, of pandering to and inciting racial discord. Then when they have set the heather on fire they wave the flag. These are not wild or exaggerated statements. They are absolutely true; as every Liberal knows. Indeed, the profession of loyalty is the stock in trade of the average Conservative politician.

These comments are drawn from us, because the disgraceful tactics about which we write were never more in evidence than in connection with this naval question. The thoughtful student must eliminate these factors, and treat them as mere party dodges if he wishes to arrive at an accurate knowledge of the merits of the question pro and con. We do not conceive it to be necessary to assert the loyalty of Liberals; loyalty is inherent in every son of the British Empire; it manifests itself when occasion arises with no uncertain sound, and because it is inherent and based upon a love for the principles of liberty and justice which are the pride of the Empire, it is worse than criminal on the part of any one political party to try to appropriate it to itself. We think before we close this narrative we shall be able to prove that there is a high and sincere quality of loyalty as yet unknown to the Conservative party.

Borden's Attitude

Mr. Borden, notwithstanding the attitude of some of his followers, kept the faith of Parliament by adhering to the terms of the resolution of March, 1909, for a time, though later he fell most deplorably from grace by a volte-face the like of which is unparalleled in Canadian political history. As we proceed with our narrative, we shall trace the steps in his devious course. At a luncheon to him by the Constitutional Club, at London, England, on July 1st, 1909, he gave reasons for preferring a Canadian Naval service as follows, as reported in the London Times, on July 2nd:

"He was aware that some feeling was created in the British Isle owing to the fact that Canada did not by resolution or by speech from the Prime Minister, vouchsafe to offer one, two or three

Dreadnoughts. He thought the resolution in the form in which it was based, while its promises might not upon their surface seem to some as significant at the moment as the offer of one or two Dreadnoughts would have been, laid down a permanent policy for the Dominion of Canada upon which both parties united and which would serve a more practical purpose than any such offer of Dreadnoughts."

Later in October of that year he went to Halifax, his own constituency, where he made a speech which the Conservative press declared lifted the question of Naval Defence above petty partisanship. This is what he is reported to have said there:

"The House of Commons last session laid down a certain policy touching naval defence in which both political parties united. It may not have satisfied the aspirations of all Conservatives, but it seemed our bounden duty to place, if possible, above the limits of partisan strife, a question so vital and far-reaching and to attain the standard which has for many years governed both political parties in Great Britain with respect to foreign relations.

"One governing principle at least should control, namely, that out of our own materials, by our own labour, and by the instructed skill of our own people, any necessary provision for organizing naval defence should be made so far as may be reasonably possible.

"In this connection may we not hope that there shall be given a stimulus and encouragement to the ship-building industry of Canada which has long been lacking.

"To-day should be Nova Scotia's opportunity. Providence has endowed this province with the material, with the men and with the maritime situation, which are essential not only for developing a scheme of naval defence and protection, but also, for the resuscitation of that ship-building industry, which once made Nova Scotia famous throughout the world."

"By the use of our own material, the employment of our own people, the development and utilization of our own skill and resourcefulness, and above all by impressing upon the people a sense of responsibility for their share in international affairs, I regard the resolution of last March as the most important step towards co-operation that has been made in this country for twenty-five years."

It is a long way to Toronto from Halifax, but thither must we go for Mr. Borden's next public declarations. Speaking before the Centre and South Toronto Conservative Clubs, November 1st, 1909, he is reported by his own Press as follows:

"Mr. Borden spoke with great deliberation and evidently weighed his words carefully. He unhesitatingly re-affirmed his adherence to the Naval Defence policy outlined in the House of Commons passed last March."

"Mr. Borden scouted the idea of Canada relying upon the United States in time of danger and characterized as absurd the belief that we were incapable of building a navy in this country."

"I also think that in any such undertaking our own natural resources and raw material and best of all, our labouring population

ought to be considered and employed as far as may be reasonably possible."

"After referring to the insinuation that the construction of a Canadian Naval Service might lead to reckless expenditure of public moneys, he said: 'The remedy is not to be found in any abnegation or abandonment of the functions of self-government, otherwise we should hand over to Great Britain all our great spending Departments for better administration. That would be a council of despair and a shameful confession of our incapacity for decent self-government.'"

"It is my humble belief that a Canadian unit of the Imperial Navy may be made powerful and effective."

Imperial Conference

In July and August, 1910, a Conference was held in London, England, between representatives of the self-governing Dominions of the Empire and the Imperial Government, when the question of the relations of the Dominions in regard to Imperial defence was seriously considered. A Memorandum prepared by the British Admiralty formed the basis of discussion. We quote the following pertinent paragraphs of that Memorandum:

"If the problem of Imperial naval defence were considered merely as a problem of naval strategy, it would be found that the greatest output of strength for a given expenditure is obtained by the maintenance of a single navy with the concomitant unity of training and unity of command. In furtherance, then, of the simple strategical ideal, the maximum of power would be gained if all parts of the Empire contributed according to their needs and resources, to the maintenance of the British Navy."

"It has, however, long been recognized that in defining the conditions under which the Naval Forces of the Empire should be developed, other considerations than those of strategy alone must be taken into account. The various circumstances of the Oversea Dominions have to be borne in mind. Though all have in them the seeds of a great advance in population, wealth, and power, they have at the present time attained to different stages in their growth. Their geographical position has subjected them to internal and external strains, varying in kind and intensity. Their history and physical environment have given rise to individual national sentiment, for the expression of which room must be found. A simple contribution of money or material may be to one Dominion the most acceptable form in which to assist in Imperial defence. Another, while ready to provide local naval forces, and to place them at the disposal of the Crown in the event of war, may wish to lay the foundations upon which a future navy of its own could be raised. A third may think that the best manner in which it can assist in promoting the interests of the Empire is in undertaking certain local services not directly of a naval character, but which may relieve the Imperial Government from expenses which would otherwise fall on the British Exchequer."

"The main duty of the forthcoming Conferences as regards naval defence will be, therefore, to determine the form in which the various Dominion Governments can best participate in the burden of Imperial defence with due regard to varying political and geographical conditions. Looking to the difficulties involved, it is not to be expected that the discussions with the several Defence Ministers will result in a complete and final scheme of Naval defence, but it is hoped that it will be found possible to formulate the broad principles upon which the growth of Colonial naval forces should be fostered. While laying the foundations of future Dominion navies to be maintained in different parts of the Empire, these forces would contribute immediately and materially to the requirement of Imperial defence."

"In the opinion of the Admiralty, a Dominion Government desirous of creating a navy should aim at forming a distinct fleet unit; and the smallest unit is one which, while manageable in time of peace, is capable of being used in its component parts in time of war."

"The fleet unit to be aimed at should, therefore, in the opinion of the Admiralty, consist of at least the following:

- 1 Armoured cruiser (new 'Indomitable' class), which is of the Dreadnought type.
- 3 Unarmoured cruisers ('Bristol' Class).
- 6 Destroyers.
- 3 Submarines.

with the necessary auxiliaries, such as depot and store ships, etc., which are not here specified.

"Such a fleet unit would be capable of action not only in the defence of coasts, but also of the trade routes, and would be sufficiently powerful to deal with small hostile squadrons should they ever attempt to act in its waters."

Canada's Attitude.

The position taken by the Canadian representative was that they desired the advice of the Admiralty, in regard to the measure of naval defence which might be considered consistent with the resolution adopted by the Canadian parliament in March, 1909.

That while they thought a fleet unit on the Pacific, as suggested and outlined by the Admiralty, might for naval strategical considerations in the future, form an acceptable system of naval defence, it was recognized that the Canadian double sea-board rendered the provision of such a fleet unsuitable for the present.

That, after consultation with the Admiralty, they proposed that Canada should make a start with (as ultimately decided by the Canadian Government) 4 unarmoured, but protected cruisers, of the Bristol type. 1 cruiser of the Boadicea type and 6 destroyers of an Improved River Class, at a total cost estimated on the basis of British construction prices of about \$11,000,000 and with an annual maintenance cost of \$2,500,000.

The Bristol type of cruiser is a protected cruiser of 4,800 tons with

a speed of 25 knots, and carries 8 guns. The Boadicea is an unarmed cruiser of 3,300 tons, carrying 6 four inch guns.

Part of the fleet would be stationed on the Atlantic and part on the Pacific.

That Canada, in addition would undertake the maintenance of the dockyards at Halifax and Esquimalt.

What Australia and New Zealand Did.

Australia agreed to supply a fleet unit consisting of 1 armoured cruiser, 3 unarmoured cruisers (Bristol type), 6 destroyers and 3 submarines, at an estimated cost of \$18,500,000 with an annual maintenance cost of \$3,750,000, but it was arranged that the British Government would contribute \$1,250,000 towards such annual maintenance cost.

It is important to note at this point that Australia has previously given cash contributions towards the navy, but having found that policy to be unsatisfactory, they abandoned it in favour of the creation of a navy of their own.

New Zealand felt itself unable to undertake the building of a local naval service and preferred to give their aid in the form of a contribution. What they proposed was the gift of a dreadnought.

The Naval Service Bill.

The next step was the introduction in the House of Commons of Canada by Sir Wilfrid Laurier, on January 12th, 1910, of the Naval Service Bill. The full text of which as passed, forms an appendix to this article.

Briefly stated that Bill provides for:

1. A Naval service and force.
2. The Command in chief of the naval forces was declared to be vested in the King, to be exercised and administered by His Majesty or by the Governor-General in Council as his representative.
3. The Governor-in-Council may place the naval forces or any part thereof on active service at any time when it appears advisable so to do by reason of "emergency." The term "emergency" was defined by the Bill to mean, "war, invasion or insurrection, real or apprehended."

In introducing the Bill, Sir Wilfrid was asked, "Is the war referred to war in any part of the Empire or in Canada only?" To which he replied, "War everywhere. When Britain is at war, Canada is at war. There is no distinction. If Great Britain, to which we are subject, is at war with any nation, Canada becomes liable to invasion and so Canada is at war." Vide pages 1734 and 1735, Hansard, 1909-10.

4. The Bill further provides that in case of an emergency (as above defined) the Governor-in-Council may place at the disposal of His Majesty for general service in the Royal Navy, the Naval service or any part thereof, including ships and men. In the event of such action being taken by the Governor-in-Council, Parliament, if not then sitting, is to meet in 15 days."

5. Provisions were made for a naval college.

Sir Wilfrid, after explaining the provisions of the Bill, said it was the intention to start at the earliest possible moment with the construction of a fleet consisting of 4 Bristol cruisers, 1 Boadicea cruiser, and 6 destroyers and if possible to have the construction done in Canada.

Borden Tells Laurier To Go Ahead.

Sir Robert Borden, the Leader of the Opposition, in reply to Sir Wilfrid made a speech of some importance, which indicated a change of front. He approved the resolution of 1909 and described it as the most important step towards co-operation that had taken place in Canada in twenty-five years. He declared that it was desirable to keep the naval question out of politics, but mildly criticized the proposed arrangement for a local navy and said that the resolution of 1909 was phrased so as to permit of an emergency contribution which he would be disposed to favour. He fully agreed if Canada is to take part in the permanent defence of the Empire it must have some control and some voice in such matters. He disapproved of aid to the Empire by annual contributions to the British navy, stating that he did not believe such a policy would endure. "It would," he said, "be a source of friction, would become a bone of partisan contention, and would conduce to severing the present connection between Canada and the Empire." At great length, he argued that the Empire was in serious danger from Germany and he concluded with the following serious and important language:

"I say to my Right Honourable friend, the Prime Minister, so far as my words have weight with him: go on with your naval service. **Proceed slowly, cautiously and surely.** Lay your proposals before the people and give them, if **necessary**, opportunity to be heard, but do not forget that we are confronted with an emergency which may rend this Empire asunder before the proposed service is worthy of the name. In the face of such a situation, immediate, vigorous, earnest action is necessary. We have no Dreadnoughts ready; we have no fleet unit at hand: But we have the resources and I trust the patriotism to provide a fleet unit or at least a Dreadnought without one moment's unnecessary delay. Or, and in my opinion this would be the better course, we can place the equivalent in cash at the disposal of the admiralty, to be used for naval defence under such conditions as we may prescribe." Vide page 1761, Hansard, 1909-10.

Sir Wilfrid's Speech.

The real fight commenced on the second reading of the Bill. Sir Wilfrid Laurier in moving the second reading reviewed the whole situation in a strong and clear light. He reaffirmed the position taken by the Liberal Government at successive Imperial Conferences that as Canada increased in population and wealth it would recognize its obligation to relieve the British taxpayer of some of the burdens incident to naval defence, and would undertake naval defence in co-operation with the Imperial authorities, but always under the control and responsibility of the Canadian authorities in accordance with our right to self-government in that as in all other matters which has proved so great a factor in

Imperial unity. That that policy was embodied in the Bill under discussion, which was also a fulfilment of the resolution adopted unanimously by the Parliament of Canada in March, 1909, and in conformation with the true spirit upon which the British Empire was founded. He attacked the Conservatives for throwing the question into politics, after they and Parliament unanimously approved the course to be pursued. He showed that one wing of the Conservative party, that led by Mr. Monk in Quebec, violently protested against either the creation of a Canadian navy or contribution to the British navy, and that another section championed contribution to the Imperial Treasury. In Quebec, the Conservative cry was "Not a man, not a dollar" for the navy. In Ontario, the assertion was that Laurier was not British enough. This was a repetition of the old Tory tactics of setting race against race.

Dealing with the contribution idea, he said it seemed to be repugnant to the genius of our British institutions. It smacked too much of tribute to be acceptable by British communities. "The true conception of the Empire," he declared, "is the conception of growing strong and wealthy nations, each one developing itself on the line of its own needs and conditions, but all joining in the face of common danger and from all points of the earth rushing upon the common enemy." "The creation of a Canadian navy was," he said, "the only solution of the question consonant with the dignity and self-respect and pride of Canadian people, and further it was the best way to help the Empire." In this connection, he quoted Lord Milner, the great British pro-consul who spoke in Toronto as follows: Vide page 2963, Hansard, 1909-10.

"But no doubt the general position would be much stronger if all the self-governing states were to adopt the course which Australia seems disposed to adopt of creating a national militia, and laying the foundations of a fleet. And I, for one, should welcome such a policy, wherever adopted, not as affording relief to the United Kingdom, but as adding to the strength and dignity of the Empire as a whole, its influence in peace as well as to its security in case of war.

"It is not a question of shifting burdens, but of developing fresh centres of strength. For this reason, I have never been a great advocate of contributions from the self-governing states to the army and navy of the United Kingdom, though as evidence of a sense of the solidarity of the Empire such contributions are welcome, and valuable, pending the substitution of something better. But I am sure that the form which Imperial co-operation in this field will ultimately take, and ought to take, the form at once most consistent with the dignity of the individual States and most conducive to their collective strength and organic union, is the development of their several defensive resources, in material and in manhood. I know that it may be argued—it has been argued—that individual strength would make for separation. But I have no sympathy whatever with that point of view.

"The profession and technical, not to say the strategic argument for a single big navy of the Empire are enormously strong, so strong that they might conceivably overcome, as they have to some extent

overcome in the past, the political objection. But without wishing to be dogmatic on a subject which requires a great deal more careful study on all hands than it has yet received, I must say that, speaking as an Imperialist, I feel the political objection very strongly.

"If the self-governing States were going, under our present constitutional arrangements, merely to contribute to a central navy, whether in money or better still, in men and ships, I do not think they would take that interest and pride in the matter which it is essential they should take. They would continue, as now, absorbed in their local affairs, and, even if they felt their obligation to the Empire, as a whole, they would rest content to have discharged it by such a contribution. The contribution, under these circumstances, would probably not be large, but that is not really the weakest point in such a system. Its fatal weakness is that the participation of the self-governing states in imperial affairs would begin and end with the contribution.

Sir Wilfrid stoutly and resolutely combatted the contention that in matters of naval defence we should abdicate the principle of self-government. "We are told," he said, "that we can have responsible government in everything else, that we can make our own laws, administer our own affairs and even have the control of our land forces, but in any matters of naval defence we should have no powers of our own. I need not say," he declared, "that that is a principle to which we, on this side of the House, cannot agree."

Dealing with the criticism that the Government was blameworthy for not agreeing to provide a Dreadnought for the Canadian fleet unit, he said the Government thought it prudent to commence moderately and work up steadily to something bigger and stronger. He also quoted Lord Charles Beresford in support of the idea that cruisers were better for colonial naval defence purposes than battle ships. Lord Charles wrote in the London Times as follows: (Vide page 2970, Hansard, 1909-10).

"His view of the situation was that our great Dominions could best help us, not by spending two millions on battleships to serve in British waters, but by making proposals for defending themselves.

"But he questioned the wisdom of their putting money into torpedo vessels and submarines and sending a large amount over here to build a battleship, the life of which was only twenty years, with luck, and might be only twenty months. If they invested two millions in home defence, and in having cruisers which could go out and protect their trade routes, he thought it would be a better investment than in helping to defend the shores of this country.

"For the Colonies, cruisers are much better, as the idea of protecting Britain and weakening the defence of the colonies is all wrong."

Continuing, the Prime Minister could not then see any danger to Great Britain. "Let me say, however, that if Great Britain were engaged in a contest with Germany a wave of enthusiasm to assist her would sweep over this country and all other British countries. He felt satisfied that if Great Britain did apprehend danger she would have the situation well in hand and would be prepared for it. Moreover, Great Britain has

not asked for a money contribution for naval defence and had approved of the idea of Canada building its own navy. If Britain had taken the position strongly, that a cash contribution was necessary and had served, he contended that the building of local navies would not be of service in view of apprehended immediate danger, the case would be different. If it ever happened that the security of the Empire was threatened and that Canada would help by making a money contribution, there would be no lack of enthusiasm in the response that Canada would make."

Dealing with the Tory wing which claimed that the Liberal Government by their policy was sacrificing the interests of our native land to the interests of the Empire, Sir Wilfrid was unsparing in his denunciation. We quote his remarks in extenso: (Vide pages 2975, 2976 and 2977, Hansard, 1909-10.)

"We are told in the province of Quebec that we are not to risk one dollar or one man in order to carry out this object. Sir, I have only to say this, that this service will not be compulsory. No one on the other side of the House, no one in any part of the country, will be bound to serve in this navy of ours. It will be the free will of any body who wishes to risk his life for his King—it is his privilege, and who will deny it to him? Those who object will not have to lift a finger if that fleet is called out. Their part will be simply to enjoy the security, the ease, the comfort, gained for them by the sacrifice of other and better men.

"There will be Canadians of French descent in that fleet. And if, which God forbid, this fleet should ever engage in war, my hope is—nay my certainty is—that these men will fight for the King of England, as their ancestors fought against the King of England. To-day the sun in his daily career does not shed its light upon any people on the face of the earth enjoying more liberty than my fellow countrymen of French extraction. And my last words to the doubters, to the scoffers, is that freedom is worth fighting for and worth dying for.

"But, Sir, these men will not be reached by any noble sentiment; perhaps we can reach them by appealing to their selfish interests; perhaps they will be found sensitive in their pockets if they are not sensitive otherwise. What would be the condition of Canada to-day, and of the province of Quebec in particular, if England were to lose the supremacy of the seas? Canada to-day is a prosperous country. Quebec is a very prosperous province; but is not that prosperity due to our trade with England? Let the market of Great Britain be lost—and it would be lost if the British supremacy on the sea were lost—and the prosperity of Canada and the prosperity of Quebec would be affected for years, if not for ever."

Mr. Borden's Reply

Sir Robert Borden occupied the first half hour of his speech in reply, with a torrent of abuse of Sir Wilfrid, designed to create the impression that Sir Wilfrid was disloyal. Coming to the merits of the question, he professed to be greatly alarmed at the provision of the Bill that it was within the discretion of the Governor-in-Council in case of an emergency

to place the naval forces at the disposal of His Majesty for general service in the Royal navy. Speaking on this point he said: (Vide page 2985, Hansard, 1909-10.)

"The plain and direct meaning is that the Governor-in-Council may refrain from exercising the discretion which is there provided for. If the government should so refrain, what will be the result? Are we to be face to face with the condition which the hon. gentleman says is demanded by our autonomy—that Great Britain being at war we shall declare that we are not at war and that our fleet shall not take any part in it. If the clause does not mean that, I would like to know what it does mean. So far as I can understand the English language, it means just what I have said. I have just this to add, that when Great Britain being at war, the Governor-in-Council shall declare that our fleet shall take no part in it—and they may do that simply by inaction, by standing still, by making no order in council—I say that when that occasion comes then, such inaction or declaration will amount virtually to a declaration of independence."

He criticized the Government for not agreeing to create a full fleet unit as described by the Admiralty and contended that it would take 15 to 20 years to build up an effective naval force in Canada. He ridiculed the Government proposals, said the navy would not be effective as a fighting force and that at the best the cruisers would be only commerce protectors. He strongly contended that the Government's proposals ought to be submitted to the judgment of the people. On this he said: (Vide page 2989, Hansard, 1909-10.)

"I think there is a great deal to be said in favour of that course. I am as strong as any man in this country in the belief that it is the duty of Canada to participate upon a permanent basis in the defence of this Empire and to do our reasonable share in that regard. But I say that to attempt to force a policy of this kind upon the people of this country without giving them an opportunity to say yea or nay with regard to it, would be one of the worst mistakes that could be made by any man who really favoured that policy."

He concluded by moving the following amendment: (Vide page 2991, Hansard, 1909-10.)

"That all the words after the word 'that' be left out and the following substituted therefor:

"The proposals of the government do not follow the suggestions and the recommendations of the Admiralty and, in so far as they empower the government to withhold the naval forces of Canada from those of the Empire in time of war, are ill-advised and dangerous.

"That no such proposals can safely be accepted unless they thoroughly ensure unity of organization and of action, without which there can be no effective co-operation in any common scheme of empire defence.

"That the said proposals, while necessitating heavy outlay for construction and maintenance, will give no immediate or effective aid to the Empire and no adequate or satisfactory results to Canada.

"That no permanent policy should be entered upon involving large future expenditures of this character until it has been submitted to the people and has received their approval.

"That in the meantime the immediate duty of Canada and the impending necessities of the Empire can best be discharged and met by placing without delay at the disposal of the Imperial authorities, as a free and loyal contribution from the people of Canada, such an amount as may be sufficient to purchase or construct two battle-ships or armoured cruisers of the latest Dreadnought type, giving to the Admiralty full discretion to expend the said sum at such time and for such purposes of naval defence as in their judgment may best serve to increase the united strength of the Empire and thus assure its peace and security.

The reader will note that at the first reading of the bill, Mr. Borden suggested giving one Dreadnought and that he now raised his proposal to two Dreadnoughts. Later, we will see he became more generous and proposed three battleships of that type.

Mr. Monk, the Conservative leader from Quebec, followed Mr. Borden with a long and badly laboured speech in which he adopted the Tallyrand method of using language to disguise his thoughts. He finished his speech by moving the following sub-amendment: (Page 3022, Hansard, 1909-10.)

"That this House, while declaring its unalterable devotion to the British Crown, is of opinion that the Bill now submitted for its consideration changes the relations of Canada with the Empire and ought in consequence to be submitted to the Canadian people in order to obtain at once the nation's opinion by means of a plebiscite."

Notes of the Debate

In the debate that followed, Mr. Borden's argument relative to the control of the Canadian navy was completely destroyed. It was clearly shown:

1. That the provisions of the Naval Bill were practically identical with the provisions of the Militia Act of Canada which they had never questioned.

2. That such provisions in the Naval Bill were identical with the provisions of the Australian Defence Act, which were quoted as follows:

"SECTION 53. In time of war the Governor-General may subject to the provisions of this Act, place the defence force or any part thereof, under the orders of the commander of any portion of the King's regular forces or the King's regular naval force as the case may be.

"SECTION 54. The Governor-General may in time of war—for the defence and protection of the commonwealth and of the several states thereof—place the naval forces or any part thereof on board any ship of the King's navy on the Australian station, and during the time they are so placed they shall be under the command of the officer commanding the ship upon which they are placed and be subject to all laws and regulations to which the King's naval forces are subject."

To make the situation on this point absolutely clear, Sir Frederick Borden, then Minister of Militia, had Admiral Kingsmill, of the Canadian navy, send the following telegram to Australia: (Vide page 3311, Hansard, 1909-10.)

February 5, 1910.

"Captain in charge,
Sydney,
Australia.

"Please inform me by telegraph, as soon as possible, whether in the event of war, vessels of Australian navy pass automatically without any action under control of Admiralty.

(Sgd.) Kingsmill.

To which the following reply was received.

"Kingsmill, Ottawa.

"With reference to your telegram, transfer control to the Admiralty is not to be automatic but subject to approval of Commonwealth government on declaration of war."

3. That while His Majesty, the King, on the advice of his Ministers, may declare Great Britain to be at war, the Parliament of Great Britain has to be consulted before the necessary supplies can be voted.

Todd, the recognized authority on Parliamentary practice and procedure, was quoted as follows: (Page 3596, Hansard, 1909-10.)

"The previous consent of Parliament, either to the commencement of a war or the conclusion of a peace, is not formally required by the constitution. The necessity of obtaining adequate supplies for the prosecution of a contest with any foreign power, and the control possessed by Parliament over the army and navy by means of the annual Mutiny Acts, coupled with the existence of Ministerial responsibility, constitute a sufficiently powerful check against the improper use of the prerogative. Nevertheless, if the hostilities about to be entered into are likely to involve serious consequences, it would be the duty of the Ministers, before engaging therein, to summon Parliament to communicate to it the reason for resorting to arms and to ask for its advice and co-operation in carrying on the war."

Mr. Borden was reminded of his declarations that Canada could not properly take a permanent part in the naval defence of the whole Empire unless it had some voice as to the wars in which Great Britain might engage, and he was asked how, in the name of common sense he could, in view of this utterance, seriously complain of the clause in the Naval Bill reserving the control of the navy to the Parliament of Canada and thereby anticipating conference and consultation in regard to Imperial wars.

In short, it was clearly established that Mr. Borden's argument about control of the navy was more that of a clever lawyer preparing the defence in a bad case than the serious attitude of a serious statesman.

Needless to say, Mr. Borden's volte face on the whole question was strongly censured. His professions of the desirability of keeping the subject free from party politics were contrasted with the action of himself and his party in throwing it into the political arena with a vengeance. His strong defence in England, Halifax and Toronto of the policy laid down in the unanimous resolution of Parliament to create a Canadian Navy was cited, and he was asked why he changed his view point unless it were for the purpose of making "fraudulent" capital for his political party. It was shown to him that the policy he had taken up was abandoned by Australia and the policy of building up a local navy adopted instead.

Liberal Attitude Summarized

The position the Liberals took steadfastly throughout the debate was that the granting as proposed by Mr. Borden of a sum sufficient to purchase two Dreadnoughts which could be expended as the Admiralty wished, was merely playing with the question; that it was the duty of Canada to proceed with the creation of its own navy as approved by Parliament; that the only contribution which would be acceptable to the Canadian mind and in harmony with Canadian pride and ambition would be such a navy composed not only of Canadian vessels but manned by Canadian flesh and blood; that the Borden plan meant that Canada would be paying England to do its fighting—a most humiliating position for proud Canadians to take; that the time for an emergency contribution was when war broke out, when Canada would vote all the money Great Britain might want to safeguard the security of the Empire; that if the precedent of giving Dreadnoughts was established the English people would expect a continuation of it and its discontinuance would be sure to lead to friction; that the Borden policy was a make-shift to placate the nationalist wing of the Conservative party and to shelve the question; that England, out of the mouth of its own Prime Minister, had said not later than a month before:

"Let me say once for all, and I speak with full deliberation and after careful inquiry—that the navy to-day is able to maintain not only this year but in the years that lie before us our supremacy at sea, and should the necessity arise—which God forbid—to guarantee the integrity of our commerce and the inviolability of our Empire."

That the \$25,000,000 proposed to be contributed could be more usefully employed in creating a Canadian navy; that loyalty was inherent in the Canadian people and that it was not necessary to emphasize it by a contribution; that it was necessary for us as a growing nation to defend our own shores and that in doing so we would strengthen the Empire better than in any other way; and that the creation of a Canadian navy would be the commencement of the development of a ship-building industry which is one of the greatest wants of Canada to-day.

Sir Charles Tupper Favors Canadian Navy.

An interesting contribution to the debate was the reading of the following letter addressed by Sir Charles Tupper, the old Conservative war-horse to Sir Robert Borden: (See page 3590, Hansard, 1909-10.)

"I am glad to learn that you have resolved to maintain the patriotic attitude that the Conservative party assumed last session.

"A few years ago, when Canada was struggling to open up for British settlement the great granary of the world, a few gentlemen here raised the question of a Canadian contribution to the Imperial navy. I joined issue with them and was sustained by the press and public opinion.

"The demand will soon be made by some that Canada should contribute to the Imperial navy in proportion to population, I regard as preposterous and dangerous. I read with pleasure the resolution passed unanimously by the House of Commons which pledged Parliament to proceed vigorously with the construction of the Canadian navy and to support England in every emergency.... I cannot understand the demand for Dreadnoughts in the face of the fact that the Admiralty and the British government have determined that it was not the best mode of maintaining the security of the Empire, and arranged with Canada and Australia (the latter of whom had offered one or two Dreadnoughts) for the construction of local navies to keep open the trade routes in case of war.

"I cannot avoid thinking that a fearful responsibility will rest upon those who disturb or destroy the compact entered into on this vitally important question."

The Naval Bill passed through both Houses of Parliament and duly became law. It is interesting to note that Mr. Borden voted for Mr. Monk's sub-amendment, but Mr. Monk voted against Mr. Borden's amendment. These amendments were in harmony as respects submitting the question to the decision of the people, but Mr. Borden's had tacked on to it a contribution of two Dreadnoughts, which Mr. Monk, with his eye on the Nationalists, would not approve.

Liberal Action Under Naval Act.

Within a few days after the Naval Service Act became law, a Department of Naval Service was created and in July of 1910 tenders were called for the construction in Canada of the proposed Canadian navy, both Canadian and British firms being invited to tender. The following was the notice calling for tenders.

Notice Concerning Construction of Vessels for Canadian Navy.

The vessels will be built according to the plans and specifications of the British Admiralty, which, being of a confidential nature, will only be exhibited to approved firms. The Department of Naval Service will, therefore, be glad to hear from any Canadian or British firm who would wish to tender for BUILDING IN CANADA ALL THESE WARSHIPS.

It would be necessary for such firms to show that they have or propose to put in a ship-building plant that would be considered sufficient for the building of cruisers of the Bristol class and that

they have had such experience as will enable them to guarantee the building of such ships according to the Admiralty specifications.

It should be borne in mind that the Rush-Bagot Convention provides that no warships should be built on the Great Lakes and therefore shipbuilding firms should arrange for establishment elsewhere than on these Lakes.

Further information can be obtained by parties who propose to tender on application to the undersigned.

(Signed) G. J. DESBARATS,

Deputy Minister of the Naval Service.

Late in October, 1910, the first-class cruiser Niobe, and the second-class cruiser Rainbow, which had previously been purchased from the British Government to be used as training vessels, arrived at Esquimalt and Halifax respectively, and recruiting for both vessels was actively commenced. By the end of March, 1911, the Deputy Minister of Naval Affairs reported that recruiting had been satisfactory, the full complement of men required for both ships having practically been obtained.

In November of 1910, the dockyards at Halifax and Esquimalt were taken over by the Canadian Naval Department.

A Naval College at Halifax was formally opened on January 10th, 1911.

On May 1st, 1911, tenders in accordance with the advertisement of the Government were received as follows:

William Beardmore & Co., Dalmuir, Scotland.....	\$13,055,804
Armstrong Whitworth & Co., Newcastle-on-Tyne.....	12,842,000
Vickers Sons & Maxim, Barrow-on-Furness.....	12,712,152
The British and Canadian Shipbuilding and Dockyard Co., Sydney, C.B.....	12,464,518
Swan, Hunter & Wigham Richardson, Newcastle-on Tyne..	12,174,000
Camel Laird & Co., Birkenhead.....	11,280,000

All these tenders were for building the whole number of ships entirely in Canada.

These tenders did not include armour plate, armament or certain fittings usually supplied by the Admiralty, but included the fitting of these articles on board the vessels, mounting the armour and guns, and putting anchors and chains on board, etc.

At that time the reciprocity question had become the dominant issue in Canadian politics and it was evident that a general election was impending or would become necessary. As a matter of fact, by blocking progress the Conservatives compelled an election. In these circumstances and considering the magnitude of the expense involved, the Liberal Government did not deem it advisable to take action on the tenders pending the result of the election. There are many precedents for this in Canadian political history. Quite frequently Governments have declined to commit themselves to large expenditures in controversial matters on the eve of an election and properly so. When the Conservative party went out of Office in 1896 they left behind them to be dealt with by their successors, tenders for a fast steamship service. The Liberal Government, too, when retiring from power in September, 1911, left

their successors to deal with the matter of a contract for the construction of a drydock and harbour works at St. John, N.B., which involved large expense.

It should be mentioned also that the Liberal Minister of Marine and Fisheries left for England a few days after the tenders for vessels were received to consult the British Admiralty in regard to them, and in particular as to the responsibility of the parties tendering. The Minister returned to Canada on the 10th of July and Parliament dissolved on the 29th of July.

Drummond Arthabaska Election

In the meantime—in November, 1910—a by-election took place in Drummondville and Arthabaska which had a most important bearing on subsequent developments inasmuch as it marked the beginning of an unholy alliance between the Nationalists of Quebec and the Conservative party. That constituency had long been looked upon as a Liberal stronghold and it was naturally expected to return a supporter of the Government, but a big surprise was in store. When the Liberal Party placed its candidate in the field, instead of being opposed by a Conservative, he had to meet the opposition of a Nationalist backed and supported by the Conservative party, openly, secretly and financially. The only issue at the election was the Naval question. The Nationalists denounced the Government policy and took a pronounced stand against granting any assistance whatever to Great Britain. Appeals of the most extravagant and poisonous character were made to racial prejudices. It was charged that the Laurier policy meant that thousands of French-Canadians would be sent as sailors to be disembowelled in far off seas, and the officers of the law would compel them to serve. Under circumstances such as these one would have supposed that the Conservative party,—the professed champions of loyalty and patriotism,—would have seen fit to enter the field with a candidate of their own, in support of Mr. Borden's idea of a contribution of two Dreadnoughts. But no!—They preferred to support the Nationalist candidate who denounced aid of any kind to Great Britain, and as a result the Nationalist candidate gained the victory largely by Conservative votes. Can you imagine any baser form of political trickery than to prostitute patriotism to such despicable ends?

During the campaign, Sir George Eulas Foster, in reply to an enquiry from a Montreal Conservative newspaper as to what Conservatives should do in the election, replied "Defeat Laurier by all means." The Leader of the "nest of traitors" can usually be depended upon to sound the lowest political note when an election is pending.

Mr. Geo. E. Taylor, M.P., the whip of the Conservative party, telegraphed to Mr. Monk, the Quebec Conservative leader, "Accept heartiest congratulations on your great fight and success."

Tory Alliance With Nationalists

Encouraged by that unexpected and unholy victory, the Conservatives dreamed visions of restoration to Office. From that time forward, they were in open and unashamed alliance with the Nationalists. No more shameful compact was ever formed in the history of Canadian

politics. The "nest of traitors" episode smelled sweet compared with it. The English language is not rich enough in condemnatory words to express properly the detestation every patriot must feel for men who, while styling themselves the custodians of the true loyalty of Canadians, took to their political bosoms men who flaunted the British flag and advocated a policy of no support to the Empire in case of war.

The action of the Tory party in that alliance will go down on the pages of history as subject to the condemnation of all fair minded men, because Quebec, of all Provinces, was the one where such tactics should have been avoided. Every statesmanlike consideration for the unity of the Empire and the harmony of all classes in Canada should have restrained public men from making Quebec the cockpit of party battle.

The Tories may try to deny these charges, but "facts are chieftains that winna ding, and duarna be disputed," and in this case, they are overwhelming. We will now cite some of them so that there will be no misunderstanding.

The Platform of the Nationalists

Look at the platform of the Nationalists. It was, as laid down in Resolutions adopted at St. Eustache, Quebec, in July, 1910: (Vide page 4875, Hansard, 1912-13.)

"We, citizens of Canada, faithful subjects of His Majesty, King George V, declare ourselves ready to defend, at the sacrifice of our lives, our own territory and the rights of the British Crown in Canada, as our fathers have done in 1776, against the English speaking subjects of His Majesty; in 1812, against the armies of the American republic, and in 1885, against our own fellow-citizens who had revolted.

But relying on the greatness and effectiveness of the principles of decentralization and autonomy, solemnly proclaimed and recognized for more than half a century by the British as well as by the Canadian authorities, we are opposed to any new scheme likely to involve us in warfare in distant and foreign lands, especially as long as the autonomous colonies of the Empire are not admitted to participate, on a footing of equality, in administering the Imperial army and navy, in concluding treaties of peace and alliance, and in looking after foreign affairs, the Government of India and that of the Crown colonies.

We sincerely believe that such a policy of concentration and apparent Imperial unity, of which the recent Naval Bill is only a first instalment, would as regards the Empire itself, be a source of misunderstanding, rivalry and conflict which would endanger the peace and union of numerous countries and of the peoples of all nationalities who to-day are glad to live under British rule.

Never having been for Great Britain and for the Empire the occasion of any conflict, we believe that a policy of peace and of moral and material development is necessary to Canada, its growth and its cohesion, and, as a result, to the glory and security of the Empire.

Free citizens of a democratic country, we claim the right to express openly our opinion on this question as well as on any other

which has a bearing on the destiny and interests of Canada. We recognize to the majority of the Canadian people the right to effect a re-arrangement of our relations with the other parts of the Empire, provided they do it with a full knowledge of the facts. But we protest against all attempts to deprive the Canadian people or any section of it of the right to freely consider this important question.

We repudiate the statements made in Toronto, in December last, by Mr. Alexandre Taschereau, Provincial Minister of Public Works, who falsely contended that the people of Quebec were ready to accept with closed eyes any policy for the naval defence of the Empire, and we blame the members of the Provincial Government and Legislature who approved of those statements by their vote of June 2nd, last.

We blame the Dominion Cabinet and the majority of Parliament who imposed on Canada that new naval legislation, launched the country into the vortex of Militarism (in recent times so strongly denounced by Sir Wilfrid Laurier) who have endangered the peace of Canada, and diverted towards the building of murderous war machinery and the preparing of bloody wars, millions which were destined to the development of our agriculture and of our transportation facilities.

We condemn at the same time the stand taken by Mr. Borden and those members of the Opposition, who, following in his lead, have insisted on the adoption of a policy just as sinister.

We contend that Parliament had no right to thus engage the future of Canada in regard to a policy that has never been submitted to the people who are expected to supply the men to do the fighting as well as the funds to meet the war expenditure.

We approve unreservedly the courageous and loyal stand, taken by Mr. Monk and the few representatives of the people who, true to their mandate, pointed out the dangers of such a policy and claimed for the Canadian people the right to make known their will previous to their representatives imposing on them this heavy burden".

We shall now quote some of the utterances of prominent Nationalists.

Some of the Utterances of Prominent Nationalists

(From Canadian Annual Review, 1910, pages 195-196, published by Castell Hopkins, a prominent Conservative.)

Mr. Monk: Denounced the Naval policy as involving Canada in wars of no interest to her people, and charged the Governor-General with mixing up in party politics.

Mr. Bourassa: "I continue to believe," he added, "that Canada owes nothing to England, that Canada has paid all her debt to England; that if Canada were separated from Great Britain to-morrow the British taxpayers could not cut down a farthing of their taxes, could not dispense with one of their warships and could not retrench in their expenditure for defence."

"A day will come when draft officers will be scouring the country and compelling young men to enlist either in the Navy or the Army, to go to foreign lands and fight the battles of Great Britain, to co-operate with Downing Street in the oppression of weak countries, and to maintain, at the price of their blood, the supremacy of the British flag in Asia or Africa."

Mr. Alfred Seigny: (now Deputy Speaker of the House of Commons) "The Laurier Cabinet is a cabinet of Imperialists who want to sacrifice Canada's interests and plunge us into wars with which we have nothing to do. The Navy Bill is an attempt by Ontario and the Provinces of the West to coerce Quebec and enslave our people forever. What has England ever done for you? She has no need of your help. She is strong enough to defend herself. Laurier's ideal is to make you the vassals of the majority in the West. You must protest by your votes against this slave traffic. You must protest against helping England in her wars; unless you do conscription will come next."

Mr. Tancrede Marcil: "I come from a parish where the Church yet bears the mark of British bullets."

Mr. Lavergne: "On three occasions, French-Canadians have fought for British supremacy in Canada. I declare now that it is England which is indebted to us and not we who are indebted to England."

"It will be you who will have to send your husband, your lovers or your sons to fight on foreign seas. I appeal to you, Ladies, for I feel, if I may make the remark without sacrilege, that the sacrifice of Calvary would not have been so complete had there not been a woman to mingle her tears with those shed by the Crucified."

We also quote other inflammable speeches by Bourassa and others, notably Mr. Blondin, now Minister of Inland Revenue in the Borden Cabinet. The quotations which follow were placed on the official record of the House of Commons and have not been challenged. (Vide Hansard, page 140, Nov. 22, 1910.

Mr. Bourassa: at St. Eustache, July 17, 1910:

"Then, again, when big ships will have replaced small ships, and when we will have gone in that disastrous policy of which Laurier and Borden are the prophets, when this policy will have fully developed, one day conscription will be enforced, and this little lad here that you send to school to study the law of God as well as that of man, so that he may take your place to continue to fecundate the old farm where you were born, where you have learned, in the furrows made by your forefathers, to be Catholics, to be Canadians, to respect law and to nobly accomplish your duty, then this little child, if you should continue to listen to Mr. Laurier, this little child taken away and put under arms, embarked on the fleet on which you will shed his blood on a foreign land, disembowelled by a Chinese or a Japanese cannon ball, he will have a right to curse you, if you were to sacrifice to the partisanship which binds you to one man, your duty as a citizen and as a free man. (Hansard, 1910, page 139.)

Mr. Bourassa: 15 years hence, you heads of families will not be any longer here—but your wives may still be here—when 15 years hence your wives will see the agent of the Government, having in his hands this accursed Act, and addressing each one of them he will say: "Good mother, thou must give thy sons not to defend their native soil but to fight on all the lands and seas of the world on behalf of the English flag." Then, when your wives will learn, some months later, that an Austrian shell, a Japanese cannon ball, or a German bullet, will have disembowelled their children, and that they have fallen over precipices, or collapsed on the deck of a ship, do you think they will then say: 'Very well, my husband was rouge, and it is Mr. Laurier who passed the Act. He did well.' No, they will curse you, and it will be only right." (Hansard, 1910, page 142.)

Mr. Paquet, M.P., for L'Islet: "I accuse the Government of outrageously deceiving the people in estimating at \$15,000,000 an enterprise which will swallow up your flesh and your children. I accuse the Government further of disposing of our flesh and our blood without consulting us." (Hansard 1910, page 142.)

Mr. Lavergne: "We are French-Canadians, not English. French-Canadians would not go down on their knees before the English. They will not have their backbone smashed for them. Vote against Sir Wilfrid Laurier who wants to buy \$15,000,000 worth of guns and ships." (Hansard 1910, page 144.)

Mr. Blondin: (on the 25th October, 1910, at St. Louis de Blandford). (Hansard 1910, page 145-146.)

"You are intimidating the people in waving the English flag, and adding that we must contribute always and everywhere to the defence of that protector of our constitutional liberties; but we will not be made to forget that in 1837 it was necessary to bore holes in it in order to breathe the atmosphere of liberty."

"The English have never done anything for the French-Canadians. We do not owe them anything. French-Canadians have nothing to care about the opinion of the other provinces upon this naval question. They can and must settle the questions which concern them without consulting others. Those very ones who disembowelled their forefathers on the Plains of Abraham ask of you to-day to be slaughtered for their sake."

"England has gone so far as to grind down the colonies as did Imperial Rome of old."

"The only liberties which we enjoy have been snatched. England has not conquered Canada for love or to plant the cross of Christ as did France, but to establish trading posts and make money. She has so wed the world with hatred, quarrels and wars. We have had enough of England and the English."

"Those who butchered your forefathers on the Plains of Abraham ask to-day that you sacrifice your lives for their sake. We have had enough of England and the British."

"Our liberties, we have wrested them from England, and we owe her nothing."

"Canada owes nothing to England. The British did not conquer us for love, not to plant the cross of Christ as did France, and we are kept under her flag for the advantage of the trade. She benefitted by her colony of Canada. What do we owe her?"

In passing, we would remark that this is the Mr. Blondin who is now in Sir Robert Borden's Cabinet as Minister of Inland Revenue, to which position he was promoted since the great war broke out.

Bourassa Makes Disclosures.

The alliance between the Conservatives and Nationalists was disclosed by Mr. Bourassa, the Leader of the Nationalist party, in his paper *Le Devoir*, in May and June, 1913, when he wrote as follows:

"During the session of 1910-11, two leaders of the Conservative party requested that I meet them at the house of a mutual friend of ours.

"Here is an exact summary of the interview. The envoys opened as follows:

"The Nationalists say they are fighting, as we do, the Liberal Government, but their stand upon Reciprocity embarrasses us to a great extent. Were we to unite our efforts primarily against Reciprocity, it is quite possible that an understanding, satisfactory to both parties, could be arrived at on the naval question, since we are one on the point of popular consultation. If you press the naval question in Quebec, it may provoke a display of loyalism on the extremist wing of our party. If Reciprocity be but a subordinate issue with you, the difference between us might broaden still more, for the sole benefit of the Common foe. At the time of a general election, candidates will come forward who, while opposing the naval law will support Reciprocity; yet, others indifferent about Reciprocity will come out against the naval policy of both parties. This would be a puzzling situation for us. If we support the independent candidates, we shall be open to the charge of playing a double game. On the other hand, if we bring forward a third man—a straight Conservative—the government candidate will get in between.

"Mine was a decisive answer," says Mr. Bourassa. 'The Tories and Nationalists,' said I, 'can have nothing in common. Mr. Monk and his group have had our support because of their pledge to oppose the naval policy of both parties until submitted for the people's verdict. Since Drummond-Arthabaska, Mr. Borden has come nearer Mr. Monk; he has practically endorsed his plan of a plebiscite. This is the only ground upon which we can meet. Should you be returned to power, you must consult the people apart from a general election, and the complex questions which always arise at such times. It would only remain for us to accept the verdict of the majority should it endorse the naval law or any other plan of contribution to Imperial defence. Always retaining, of course, the right to advocate our views in order to induce the country to reverse its decision? The Naval question will always be to the front. Not being a party, we will not bring forward any candidate, but we

will heartily support any man, whether Liberal or Conservative, Pro-Reciprocityist or Anti-Reciprocityist, provided he pledges himself to resist any plan of direct or indirect participation in Imperial wars, outside of Canada, or at least opposes such measure until submitted for popular verdict by way of a plebiscite; the welfare of either party is for us of no moment. It is up to Mr. Borden and his lieutenants to decide whether to secure the seat for a ministerial candidate by entering a three-cornered fight, or suffer the election of the candidate whom we shall support."

"I have no doubt," concluded Mr. Bourassa, "that Mr. Borden accepted the situation since the fight was carried on according to our terms."

When the general election took place in September, 1911, the Conservatives were ranged up alongside the Nationalists against the Liberals in the Province of Quebec. By mutual consent the constituencies were divided between them in the way that was thought most likely to produce the best results against the common enemy. On this point we again quote Mr. Bourassa:

"As elections drew nearer," says Mr. Bourassa, "we had ample proof that the Conservative leaders were quite satisfied with the situation which the Nationalist campaign had forced upon them. The Monk group came out as the 'Autonomist' party with its complete organization, headquarters and committees distinct from the Conservative party proper."

"The Tory General Committee allotted the autonomist party most of the ridings in the Province of Quebec, retaining for themselves the English-speaking counties of the Eastern Townships, besides Pontiac, Argenteuil and Three Montreal divisions; St. Antoine, Ste. Anne and St. Laurent."

"It was distinctly agreed that with these exceptions Mr. Monk had exclusive charge of the whole Province, with the right to accept or refuse prospective candidates; with the understanding that such candidates as were approved of must fight as best they could the Naval Law and the 'no less nefarious' policy of Mr. Borden; that on Reciprocity they could take whatever stand they chose, and that they should nevertheless receive from the Conservative party their whole-hearted support."

"The most obvious proof," he says, "that the Conservative party had surrendered to Nationalist sentiment was to be found in the Eastern Townships. Through that district, with the exception of Drummond-Arthabaska, no Nationalist or 'autonomist' candidates had been brought out. We took no part in the fight. Local committees and the electors generally took upon themselves to spread our principles. Such favour had Nationalism gained in public opinion that Conservative candidates, both English and French, had seen fit, willingly or not, to grant our doctrine considerable way."

"Mr. James Davidson, Conservative candidate in Shefford, issued a manifesto which contained the following paragraphs:

"I declare that, if elected on the 21st of September, I shall oppose and vote against any Prime Minister, of whatever party,

who will endeavour to maintain the Naval Law as adopted in 1910, without, beforehand, giving the people of Canada an opportunity to express their opinion thereon by means of a special referendum.

"I shall, if elected, see to it that the rights of the French-speaking Catholic minority are recognized and respected everywhere, as are the rights of the English-speaking minority in the Province of Quebec. I endorse separate schools, recognition of the French language, etc., etc.

"Mr. Davidson asked for my personal support. Similar declarations were made by Mr. Pickel in Mississquoi. All the others eventually did the same."

"On the occasion of that memorable meeting at St. Hyacinthe, on the 13th of August," continues Mr. Bourassa, "I had met a number of the most important Conservatives and Nationalists from Northern Ontario. They had come especially for the purpose of inviting me to deliver two or three speeches in their district. If I remember well, they had a letter from Mr. Cochrane, the present Minister of Railways and Canals. At any rate, the invitation was conveyed on his behalf.

"Soon after, I received a renewed invitation, enclosing the following message:

Chas. McCrea,
Sudbury, Ont.

Mattawa, Ont., Sept. 8, 1911

I certainly am opposed to Reciprocity pact and will support request for repeal of Navy Policy, and a Referendum to the people, no matter who is Premier.

GEORGE GORDON.

Chas. McCrea,
Sudbury, Ont.

Providence Lay, Sept. 8, 1911.

I am opposed to Reciprocity pact. I am opposed to Naval Policy of Liberal Government. I will support request for repeal of same, and Referendum to the people on Naval Question, no matter who is Premier.

W. R. SMYTH.

"Mr. Gordon was former Conservative member for Nipissing and Mr. Smyth, Conservative, for East Algoma. Both were in the field once more.

"On the strength of these explicit pledges, I promised to support their candidatures with two speeches, one in French, the other in English. On the 18th of September, I spoke at Sudbury.

"Mr. Cochrane, usually very shy of his compliments, has since done me the honour of telling me that my arguments had made a deep impression, deeper still among English-speaking than French-speaking people.

"Both Mr. Gordon and Mr. Smyth were returned. A few weeks later, Mr. Gordon became a Senator, and Mr. Cochrane took his constituency, to become Minister of Railways and Canals in the Borden Government. I do not know that Mr. Cochrane accepted the legacy without its liabilities. He never repudiated the pledges entered into by Mr. Gordon with his (Mr. Cochrane's) knowledge and approval.....

To the clamouring candidates who were praying that Mr. Bourassa speak at a big local rally at Sherbrooke, the Conservative Organizer suggested that Mr. Borden should come alone, since it might create a bad impression in English-speaking provinces to see Borden and Bourassa on the same platform. Here is the answer he received, according to Mr. Bourassa: "The trouble is, as one said, that we do not need Borden to win, but we do need Bourassa."

"A few days later," he continued, "there came to our office one of the most prominent members of the Conservative party, carrying under his arm the Voters' lists of all the Eastern ridings. He paid into our hands subscription to "Le Devoir" for thousands and thousands of electors. We asked nothing but the regular subscription price, deducting therefrom the ordinary commission paid to agents. We thus enjoyed the satisfaction of using Tory money to circulate the good Nationalist gospel everywhere."

Borden Plays to the Nationalist Tune.

During the campaign, Mr. Borden published two important manifestos, in neither of which did he have the courage to advocate his own naval policy of contribution. His manifesto published on the 29th of July, the day Parliament dissolved, was absolutely silent on the question. The second manifesto issued from Ottawa on August 14th is worthy of very special attention for the reason that as published in two different parts of the country, namely, Halifax and Montreal, it varied materially, evidently with a deliberate purpose, as we shall shortly show.

As published in Halifax Herald, Mr. Borden's pronouncement on the naval question was as follows:

"Since the last general election the Government has entered upon a new line of policy in regard to the naval affairs which is of far-reaching importance. The policy adopted was not debated before the people during that election, and it bears all the ear marks of the hasty and ill-considered scheme.

The plan of the Government contemplates the creation of a naval force that will be absolutely useless in time of war, and, therefore, of no practical benefit to Canada or to the Empire."

As published in the Montreal Gazette and other papers, the following words were added which do not appear in the Halifax Herald report, namely:

"It (the Liberal navy) will cost immense sums of money to build, equip and maintain and it will probably result in time of war in the useless sacrifice of many lives.

The reason for the important variation in these publications is manifest. The Nationalists were telling the mothers of Quebec that their sons would be compelled to join the navy, and that their lives would be sacrificed in distant seas. High-minded Mr. Borden joined in this insidious appeal by expressing the opinion, **for Quebec consumption alone**, that the Laurier navy would probably result in time of war in the useless sacrifice of many lives.

There is no denying the fact that that statement was made designedly to ensure the support of Bourassa and the Nationalists who were violently anti-British and were doing all they could to destroy the naval programme of the Liberal Government. It was, moreover, the unqualified adoption by Borden of the most effective election cry used by the Nationalists to frighten the electorate, and, therefore, it constitutes the strongest possible evidence that he was directly an assenting party to the infamous alliance.

Sir Charles Hibbert Tupper made no bones about the matter. Speaking in behalf of Mr. Borden at the Arena in Halifax, during the general election, he said in an attempt to justify the Alliance: "He would co-operate with the vilest and would accept the help of the scum of the earth. We want all the Monks and Bourassas and others of their ilk."

Mr. George Gordon, Conservative candidate for Nipissing, in welcoming Mr. Bourassa to the riding, said:

"The Liberals are blaming us for bringing the Nationalist leader here. I am willing to take full responsibility and to express my full admiration for Bourassa. I have no use for the navy and I think Reciprocity is a baneful policy. **I give Monsieur Bourassa the keys of the district.**"

Election Result.

The result of the general election was that the Nationalists came out of the struggle in the Province of Quebec with twenty seats, of which they wrested sixteen from the Liberals. It is generally conceded that these sixteen seats were won by the Nationalists largely because of the adherence of the Liberal party to a policy which recognized Canada's obligation in the matter of national defence, and **because of pledges given in the name and upon the alleged authority of Mr. Borden that if returned to power he would repeal the Naval Service Act and would adopt no policy as respects naval service without first submitting it to the people. The latter undertaking was undoubtedly taken to mean an appeal to the country before anything at all would be done, and was intended to be construed that way.**

In the Province of Ontario and the other English-speaking Provinces, Sir Wilfrid Laurier was denounced as anti-British; on the side lines it was whispered that he was disloyal; the navy was described as a tin pot one; and the old flag was waved for "the only true and loyal party." Yet we talk of British fair play and justice.

Borden Insincere.

In his personal relations, Sir Robert Borden may be a high-minded gentleman. We do not question that, but we do say that his alliance

with the Nationalists stamps him as a political trickster. We hate to use such a coarse word but none other is compatible with the facts. What was his manifest duty if belief be placed in the sincerity of his high sounding professions of loyalty to the Empire and of his repeated utterances that an emergency stared the whole British race in the face? Was it not boldly to throw his policy of contribution as a *ainst* the creation of a Canadian Navy into the election fight, and champion it to the last before every race in every Province? That would have been the stand of an honest and high-minded gentleman. The position he took was unfortunately the very antithesis of it. Can you imagine any British statesman gathering into his fold men who scorned the idea of Empire and who scoffed at the flag.

True as all the foregoing statements of fact undoubtedly are, the crowning evidence of the Conservative-Nationalist alliance was exhibited in the formation of Mr. Borden's Cabinet. The entire French-Canadian representation in the Cabinet consisted of pronounced Nationalists in the persons of Hon. Mr. Monk, Minister of Public Works; Hon. Mr. Nantel, Minister of Inland Revenue, and Hon. Mr. Pelletier, Postmaster-General. In addition to these appointments, Mr. Blondin, perhaps the most rabid of all the Nationalists, who in the fervency of his zeal for the Nationalist cause, once declared that in 1837 the French-Canadians found it necessary to bore holes through the British Flag in order to breathe the atmosphere of liberty, was made Deputy Speaker of the House of Commons and later Minister of Inland Revenue in succession to Mr. Nantel.

The writer can well remember how old time staunch Conservatives gnashed their teeth and uttered curses loud and deep when they learned that their Leader had, as they expressed it, "surrendered to the Nationalists." They were wrong, however; it was not a surrender, it was payment of a purchase price, and a scandalous and immoral violation of the rules of British Parliamentary Government, which require that a cabinet shall not be composed of men with diametrically opposite views on a question of vital importance. If Mr. Borden had not been compelled by the terms of his alliance with the Nationalists do you think it at all likely that he would have included gentry (God save the mark) like Pelletier, Nantel and Blondin in his cabinet.

The comments of the Conservative press were unpleasant reading for Mr. Borden. The Montreal Star of October 10th, 1911, had the following:

"Sinister forces have been granted admission to the Privy Council Chamber at a time when they might easily have been rigidly excluded, and this fact alone does not make for reassurance."

The Toronto Evening Telegram, October 11th, 1911:

"Monk 1, Cochrane 2, R. L. Borden also ran" is the apparent result of the first heat in the race for the mastery of the administration.

"and Hon. Frank Cochrane," the man who brought Bourassa to Sudbury," is the sort of leader who leads only to slaughter, Hon. Frank's first act of leadership at Ottawa having signed the death warrant of at least 20 Conservative M.P.'s for this Province.

Dealing at greater length with the inclusion of the Nationalists in the Cabinet, the Toronto Telegram told the story thus:

"The story of how the Nationalists 'bluffed Hon. R. L. Borden right off the lot' is being noised abroad in the gloating of the victors. The process of Cabinet making was in the final stages of its completion when the Nationalists proceeded to tell Canada's Premier 'who's who and what's what.'

"The Nationalists' demand, with all the weight of Henri Bourassa's authority behind it, was briefly:

Department of Public Works for F. D. Monk.

Department of Inland Revenue for W. B. Nantel.

Portfolio of Postmaster-General for L. P. Pelletier.

No Quebec protestant to hold a portfolio in the Cabinet.

The Ultimatum failed to bend R. L. Borden to the purposes of the Nationalists. The Premier suggested that he would complete the making of his Cabinet in a spirit of justice to everybody. Whereupon the Nationalists departed supplementing their ultimatum with words to this effect:

"You will either meet the demands of our ultimatum, or you will meet Parliament with a majority of eight to nine, the reduction being due to the nineteen Nationalists voting with Laurier."

"The saddest lot of politicians in the Province of Quebec would have been the Nationalists if Hon. R. L. Borden had said:

"Very well I will meet Parliament with such majority as the country has given me, independent of the Nationalists. And with that majority I will put through a re-distribution bill, and go to the country on the one issue as to whether F. D. Monk or R. L. Borden is to be Premier of Canada."

"A great strong bluff would have chased the Nationalists to the tall timbers. The Nationalists want the help of the Conservatives to carry Quebec for Bourassa in the Provincial elections. If they offended Borden they ruined their chances in the province and Quebec would not enjoy the prospect of the isolation which must follow the Borden Government's appeal to the country on the straight issue as to whether the chosen Premier of Canada or the chosen leader of the Quebec Nationalists was to be supreme in the Government at Ottawa."

"The Nationalist gloating betrays the truth that the Nationalists were sent for on behalf of Hon. R. L. Borden, and they got everything they asked for in the allotment of portfolios, because the Premier of Canada weakened under the pressure of a pale bluff that the Quebec Nationalists would have never dared to make good."

Borden Takes Office

October 10th, 1911, was a fateful day for Sir Robert Borden. It was the day he became Prime Minister of Canada and for the first time assumed serious political responsibility. From that moment the duty devolved upon him to implement his solemn pledges of assistance to ensure the safety of the Empire. Bearing in mind his words uttered as far back as January, 1910, that the Empire was confronted with an

emergency which might rend it asunder, and having in view his resolution of March, 1910, that the immediate duty of Canada could be best discharged by placing two Dreadnoughts at the disposal of the British Admiralty, the country naturally expected he would take advantage of the first opportunity to give legislative effect to these proposals. It was never for an instant even dreamed that so doughty a champion of loyalty to Britain, so strenuous an Imperialist would recant his solemn promises. What happened? Parliament met in November, 1911, and sat until April 1st, 1912, yet nothing creative was accomplished. All the glittering phrases about emergency and help to save the Empire turned out to be just so much political froth. Hang the Empire! It could wait. The Conservatives were at their old congenial occupation of enjoying the sweets of office and were not in a hurry to stir up any trouble. Placing the most charitable construction on Mr. Borden's attitude, the truth is he was handicapped by the Nationalist representation in the Cabinet and the pledges he had made to them to submit his naval policy to the people. The idea of going to the country immediately after being put in office was not to be thought of. Better far a thousand times that he should stand convicted of being a political scaremonger and an insincere patriot, than to take the chance of losing the reins of power.

It was, of course, perfectly alright for Mr. Borden, when in Opposition, to insist upon the voice of the people on the Liberal Naval Bill, but to go before the people on his own naval policy as he had pledged himself to the Nationalists to do, was, as Mr. Kipling would say, "quite another story."

It was evident though that he had practically made up his mind to abandon the policy of the construction of a Canadian navy, and that he intended to repeal the Navy Act. This was brought out by the following questions propounded in Parliament by Mr. Mondou and answered by the Hon. Mr. Hazen. See Hansard, March 4, 1912, page 4242.

Mr. Mondou:

1. Does the Government intend to propose the repeal of the Naval Act?
2. If so, does the Government intend in case of such repeal to propose another Act containing the policy of the Government in this matter?
3. If such other Act is proposed it is the intention of the Government to submit the same for the approval of the people before being put into force?

Mr. Hazen:

The answer to these three questions is 'Yes.' After such consideration and inquiry as may be necessary, the Government will present its policy in Parliament and to the people. That policy will undoubtedly require legislation which will involve the repeal of the present Naval Service Act. In the meantime, that Act will remain on the Statute Books for purposes in connection with the Fisheries protection Service and otherwise. Before any permanent naval policy is put into force the people will be given an opportunity to pronounce upon it.

The Government also discouraged recruiting for the Canadian navy with the result that recruiting practically stopped and the good work of the Liberal Government was thereby nullified.

Borden Proposes Contribution

After the close of the Session of 1911-12, at which nothing creative was accomplished relative to the question of Naval Service, Sir Robert Borden hied himself to England where he consulted with the Government and its experts and reached the conclusion that an emergency existed which called for a contribution of Dreadnoughts from Canada.

On the 5th of December, 1912—fifteen months after he took Office—he introduced a Bill in Parliament to give three of the largest and strongest ships that money could build, at an estimate of \$35,000,000 to the British navy. In introducing the measure, Sir Robert said the burden of the defence of the Empire on the High Seas, which was the only effective guarantee of its existence, had become so great that either the existence of the Empire would be imperilled or the young and mighty nations must join with the Mother Land to make secure the common safety and common heritage of all. "When Great Britain no longer assumes sole responsibility for defence on the High Seas," he said, "she can no longer undertake to assume sole responsibility for and sole control of foreign policy which is closely, vitally and constantly associated with that defence in which the Dominions participate."

He quoted the following statement made by him in Parliament two years before. (Vide page 677, Hansard, 1912-13.):

"It may be fairly asked what we would do if we were in power to-day with regard to a great question of this kind. It seems to me that our plain course and duty would be this: The Government of this country are able to ascertain and to know, if they take the proper action for that purpose, whether the conditions which face the Empire at this time in respect of naval defence are grave. If we were in power we would endeavour to find that out, to get a plain, unvarnished answer to that question, and if the answer to that question, based upon the assurance of the Government of the Mother Country and the report of the naval experts of the Admiralty were such—and I think it would be such—as to demand instant and effective action by this country, then I would appeal to Parliament for immediate and effective aid, and if Parliament did not give immediate and effective aid, I would appeal from Parliament to the people of the country.

"Then, Sir, as to the permanent policy, I think the people have a right to be consulted. I do not know whether I have made my position clear but I have done so according to my humble capacity. I think the question of Canada's co-operation upon a permanent basis in Imperial defence involves very large and wide consideration. If Canada and the other dominions of the Empire are to take their part as nations of this Empire in the defence of the Empire as a whole, shall it be that we, contributing to that defence of the whole Empire, shall have absolutely, as citizens of this country, no voice whatever in the councils of the Empire. I do not think that such

would be a tolerable condition. I do not believe the people of Canada would for one moment submit to such a condition. Shall members of this House, representative men, representing 221 constituencies of this country from the Atlantic to the Pacific, shall no one of them have the same voice with regard to those vast Imperial issues that the humblest taxpayer in the British Isles has at this moment? It does not seem that such a condition would make for the integrity of the Empire, for the closer co-operation of the Empire. Regard must be had to these far-reaching considerations, a permanent policy would have to be worked out, and when that permanent policy has been worked out and explained to the people of Canada, to every citizen in this country, then it would be the duty of any government to go to the people of Canada to receive their mandate and accept and act upon their approval or disapproval of that policy."

Next he read a memorandum from the British Admiralty on the general naval situation which had been prepared especially for the Government of Canada and which read as follows: (See page 679, Hansard, 1912-13.)

British Admiralty Memorandum.

"Prepared by the Board of Admiralty on the General Naval Situation and communicated to the Government of Canada by His Majesty's Government.

1. The Prime Minister of the Dominion of Canada has invited His Majesty's Government through the Board of Admiralty to prepare a statement of the present and immediate prospective requirements of the naval defence of the Empire for presentation to the Canadian Parliament if the Dominion Cabinet deem it necessary.

The Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty are prepared to comply and to supplement, in a form which can be made public, the confidential communications and conversations which have passed between the Admiralty and Ministers of the Dominion Parliament during the recent visit to the United Kingdom.

The Admiralty set the greatest store by the important material, and still more important moral, assistance which it is within the power of Canada to give to maintaining British naval supremacy on the high seas, but they think it necessary to disclaim any intention, however indirect, of putting pressure upon Canadian public opinion, or of seeking to influence the Dominion Parliament in a decision which clearly belongs solely to Canada.

The Admiralty therefore confine themselves in this statement exclusively to facts, and it is for the Dominion Government and Parliament to draw their own conclusions therefrom.

2. The power of the British Empire to maintain the superiority on the seas, which is essential to its security must obviously be measured from time to time by reference to the other naval forces of the world, and such a comparison does not imply anything unfriendly in intention or in spirit to any other power or group of powers.

From this point of view, the development of the German fleet during the last fifteen years is the most striking feature of the naval situation to-day. That development has been authorized by five successive legislative enactments, viz:—the Fleet Laws of 1898, 1900, 1906, 1908 and 1912. These laws cover the period up to 1920.

Whereas in 1898 the German Fleet consisted of:

- 9 battleships (excluding coast defence vessels).
- 3 large cruisers,
- 28 small cruisers,
- 113 torpedo boats, and
- 25,000 men,

maintained at an annual cost of £6,000,000.

The full fleet of 1920 will consist of:

- 41 battleships,
- 20 large cruisers,
- 40 small cruisers,
- 144 torpedo boats,
- 72 submarines, and
- 101,500 men,

estimated to be maintained at an annual cost of 23,000,000. These figures, however, give no real idea of the advance, for the size and cost of ships has risen continually during the period, and, apart from increasing their total numbers, Germany has systematically replaced old and small ships, which counted as units in her earlier fleet, by the most powerful and costly modern vessels. Neither does the money provided by the estimates for the completed law represent the increase in cost properly attributable to the German navy, for many charges borne on British naval funds are otherwise defrayed in Germany; and the German navy comprises such a large proportion of new ships that the cost of maintenance and repair is considerably less than in navies which have been longer established.

3. The naval expansion of Germany has not been provoked by British naval increases. The German Government have repeatedly declared that their naval policy has not been influenced by British action, and the following figures speak for themselves:

In 1905, Great Britain was building 4 capital ships, and Germany

2.

In 1906, Great Britain reduced to 3 capital ships, and Germany increased to 3.

In 1907, Great Britain built 3 capital ships and Germany built 3.

In 1908, Great Britain further reduced to 2 capital ships, and Germany further increased to 4.

It was not until the efforts of Great Britain to procure the abatement or retardation of naval rivalry had failed for 3 successive years that the Admiralty were forced, in 1909, upon a general review of the naval situation, to ask Parliament to take exceptional measures to secure against all possible hazards the safety of the Empire. In that year, 8 capital ships were laid down in Great

Britain, and 2 others were provided by the Commonwealth of Australia and the Dominion of New Zealand respectively—a total of 10.

4. In the spring of the present year the fifth German navy law was assented to by the Reichstag. The main feature of that law is not the increase in the new construction of capital ships, though that is important, but rather the increase in the striking force of ships of all classes which will be immediately available at all seasons of the year.

A third squadron of 8 battleships will be created and maintained in full commission as part of the active battle fleet. Whereas, according to the unamended law, the active battle fleet consisted of 17 battleships, 4 battle or large armoured cruisers and 12 small cruisers, it will, in the near future, consist of 25 battleships, 8 battle or large armoured cruisers, and 18 small cruisers, and whereas at present, owing to the system of recruitment which prevails in Germany, the German fleet is less fully mobile during the winter than during the summer months, it will, through the operation of this law, not only be increased in strength, but rendered much more readily available. Ninety-nine torpedo boat destroyers, instead of 66, will be maintained in full commission out of a total of 144; 72 new submarines will be built within the currency of the new law, and of these it is apparently proposed to maintain 54 with full permanent crews. Taking a general view, the effect of the law will be that nearly four-fifths of the entire German navy will be maintained in full permanent commission; that is to say, instantly and constantly ready for war.

So great a change and development in the German fleet involves, of course, important additions to their personnel. In 1898, the officers and men of the German navy amounted to 25,000. To-day, that figure has reached 66,000. The new law adds 15,000 officers and men, and makes a total in 1920 of 101,500.

The new construction under the law prescribes the building of 3 additional battleships—1 to be begun next year, in 1916, and 2 small cruisers, of which the date has not yet been fixed. The date of the third battleship has not been fixed. It has been presumed to be later than the six years which are in view. The cost of these increases in men and in material during the next six years is estimated at £10,500,000 spread over that period above the previous estimates.

The facts set forth above were laid before the House of Commons on the 22nd of July, 1912, by the First Lord of the Admiralty.

5. The effect of the new German navy law is to produce a remarkable expansion of strength and readiness. The number of battleships and large armoured cruisers that will be kept constantly ready and in full commission will be raised by the law from 21, the present figure, to 33—an addition of 12, or an increase of about 57 per cent.

The new fleet will, in the beginning, include about 20 battleships and large cruisers of the older type, but gradually, as new vessels are built, the fighting power of the fleet will rise until in the end it will consist completely of modern vessels.

The complete organization of the German fleet, as described by the latest law, will be 5 battle squadrons and a fleet flagship, comprising 41 battleships in all, each attended by a battle or armoured cruiser squadron, complete with small cruisers and auxiliaries of all kinds and accompanied by numerous flotillas of destroyers and submarines.

This full development will only be realized step by step; but already, in 1912, 2 squadrons will, according to Admiralty information, be entirely composed of what are called dreadnoughts, and the third will be made up of good ships like the "Deutschlands" and the "Braunschweig," together with 5 dreadnought battle cruisers.

This great fleet is not dispersed all over the world for duties of commerce protection or in discharge of Colonial responsibilities; nor are its composition and character adapted to those purposes. It is concentrated and kept concentrated in close proximity to the German and British coasts.

Attention must be drawn to the explicit declaration of the tactical objects for which the German fleet exists as set forth in the preamble to the naval law of 1900 as follows:

"In order to protect German trade and commerce under existing conditions, only one thing will suffice, namely, Germany must possess a battle fleet of such strength that, even for the most powerful naval adversary, a war would involve such risks as to make that power's own supremacy doubtful. For the purpose it is not absolutely necessary that the German fleet should be as strong as that of the greatest naval power, for, as a rule, a great naval power will not be in a position to concentrate all its forces against us."

6. It is now necessary to look forward to the situation in 1915.

In Home Waters.

In the spring of the year 1915:

Great Britain will have 25 dreadnought battleships and 2 "Lord Nelsons."

Germany will have 17 dreadnought battleships.

Great Britain will have 6 battle cruisers.

Germany will have 6 battle cruisers.

These margins in new ships are sober and moderate. They do not err on the side of excess. The reason they suffice for the present is that Great Britain possesses a good superiority in battleships, and especially armoured cruisers, of the pre-dreadnought era.

The reserve of strength will steadily diminish every year, actually, because the ships of which it is composed grow old, and relatively, because the new ships are more powerful. It will diminish more rapidly if new construction in Germany is increased or accelerated. As this process continues, greater exertions will be required by the British Empire.

Mediterranean Station.

Four battle cruisers and four armoured cruisers will be required to support British interests in the Mediterranean during the years 1913 and 1914. During those years, the navies of Austria and Italy will gradually increase in strength, until, in 1915, they will each possess a formidable fleet of 4 and 6 dreadnought battleships respectively, together with strong battleships of the pre-dreadnought types and other units, such as cruisers, torpedo-craft, etc. It is evident, therefore, that in the year 1915 our squadron of 4 battle cruisers and 4 armoured cruisers will not suffice to fulfill our requirements, and its whole composition must be re-considered.

Overseas.

It has been necessary within the past decade to concentrate the fleet mainly in home waters.

In 1902, there were 160 British vessels on the overseas stations against 76 to-day.

7. Naval supremacy is of two kinds: general and local. General naval supremacy consists in the power to defeat in battle and drive from the seas the strongest hostile navy or combination of hostile navies, wherever they may be found. Local superiority consists in the power to send in good time to, or maintain permanently in some distant theatre forces adequate to defeat the enemy or hold him in check until the main decision has been obtained in the decisive theatre. It is the general naval supremacy of Great Britain which is the primary safeguard of the security and interests of the great dominions of the Crown, and which for all these years has been the deterrent upon any possible designs prejudicial to or inconsiderate of their policy and safety.

The rapid expansion of Canadian sea-borne trade, and the immense value of Canadian cargoes always afloat in British and Canadian bottoms, here require consideration. On the basis of the figures supplied by the Board of Trade to the Imperial Conference of 1911, the annual value of the overseas trade of the Dominion of Canada in 1909-10 was not less than £72,000,000 and the tonnage of Canadian vessels was 718,000 tons, and these proportions have already increased and are still increasing. For the whole of this trade, wherever it may be about the distant waters of the world, as well as for the maintenance of her communications, both with Europe and Asia, Canada is dependent, and has always depended upon the Imperial navy, without corresponding contribution or cost.

Further, at the present time and in immediate future, Great Britain still has the power, by making special arrangements and mobilizing a portion of the reserves, to send, without courting disaster at home, an effective fleet of battleships and cruisers to unite with the Royal Australian navy and the British squadrons in China and the Pacific for the defence of British Columbia, Australia and New Zealand. And these communities are also protected and their interests safeguarded by the power and authority of Great Britain so long as her naval strength is unbroken.

8. This power, both specific and general, will be diminished with the growth not only of the German navy, but by the simultaneous building by many powers of great modern ships of war.

Whereas, in the present year, Great Britain possesses 18 battle-ships, and battle-cruisers of the dreadnought class against 19 of that class possessed by the other powers of Europe, and will possess, in 1913, 24 to 21, the figures in 14 will be 31 to 33; and in the year 1915, 35 to 51.

The existence of a number of navies all comprising ships of high quality must be considered in so far as it affects the possibilities of adverse combinations being suddenly formed. Larger margins of superiority at home would, among other things, restore a greater freedom to the movements of the British squadrons in every sea, and directly promote the security of the Dominions.

Anything which increases our margin in the newest ships diminishes the strain and augments our security and our chances of being left unmolested.

9. Whatever may be the decision of Canada at the present juncture, Great Britain will not, in any circumstances, fail in her duty to the overseas Dominions of the Crown.

She has before now successfully made head alone and unaided against the most formidable combinations, and she has not lost her capacity by a wise policy and strenuous exertions to watch over and preserve the vital interests of the Empire.

The Admiralty are assured that His Majesty's Government will not hesitate to ask the House of Commons for whatever provision the circumstances of each year may require. But the aid which Canada could give at the present time is not to be measured only in ships or money. Any action on the part of Canada to increase the power and mobility of the Imperial navy, and thus widen the margin of our common safety, would be recognized everywhere as a most significant witness to the united strength of the Empire, and to the renewed resolve of the overseas dominions to take their part in maintaining its integrity.

10. The Prime Minister of the Dominion having inquired in what form any immediate aid that Canada might give would be most effective, we have no hesitation in answering, after a prolonged consideration of all the circumstances, that it is desirable that such aid, should include the provision of a certain number of the largest and strongest ships of war which science can build or money supply.

Contradictory Arguments.

Basing his judgment on that memorandum, Sir Robert Borden insisted that the trade routes vital to the Empire's continued existence were inadequately defended and protected and that it was the duty of Canada to give assistance to the British navy so as to provide a larger margin of safety. He wished it clearly understood that his Government were not undertaking or beginning a system of regular and periodical contributions. He agreed with the resolution of the House of Commons of 1909 that the

payment of such regular and periodical contributions would not be the most satisfactory solution of the question of defence. But almost in the very next breath he said:

"Is there really any need that we should undertake the hazardous and costly experiment of building up a naval organization especially restricted to this Dominion, when upon just and self-respecting terms we can take such part as we desire in naval defence through the existing naval organization of the Empire, and in that way fully and effectively avail ourselves of the men and the resources at the command of Canada?" (Vide page 688, Hansard, 1912-13.)

The contradiction there is self-evident, and it may be fairly argued from the language employed as to contribution and as to a Canadian navy that he expects the contribution of three Dreadnoughts to be a complete fulfilment of Canada's duty for all time to come. He surely is not so foolish as to believe that that would be a satisfactory solution of the problem. There are only two courses of action, one to rely entirely on the British navy and make periodical contributions thereto, the other to construct and maintain a navy of our own. Sir Robert has to choose between the two, and the people of Canada will not tolerate his negative to both courses as appears from his language above recorded.

Borden Says Building Canadian Navy Would Take 50 Years.

In his speech Sir Robert dismissed the idea of creating a Canadian navy almost with a wave of his hand. This is all he said: (Vide page 688, Hansard, 1912-13.)

"There have been proposals to which I shall no more than allude that we should build up a great naval organization in Canada. In my humble opinion, nothing of an efficient character could be built up within a quarter or perhaps half a century. Even then it would be but a poor and weak substitute for that splendid organization which the Empire already possess, and which has been evolved and built up through centuries of the most searching experience and of the highest endeavour."

Was ever a greater insult offered the Canadian intelligence? We, the Canadian people who have brought about the present great development of our country, who have built three railways right across the continent, who stand well up in the ranks of manufacturing and producing in all important spheres, and whose educational facilities are second to none, are calmly told by the Prime Minister of the country that we can accomplish all these things but that we could not build ships in twenty-five years. We rather fancy that the Premier's pronouncement in this regard will not be received with very much favour.

On the second reading of the Bill, Sir Robert was very brief in his remarks. The most important feature disclosed thereby was that he thought he had secured a favour for Canada from the British Admiralty. The Admiralty, he said, had agreed to encourage shipbuilding in Canada by giving them some of the smaller classes of naval vessels, such as small cruisers, oil tank vessels, and small craft for auxiliary service, to build.

Sir Wilfrid Laurier's Reply.

Sir Wilfrid Laurier replied to Mr. Borden in a speech of great power and clarity. The British Admiralty document, he said, served to remove any apprehension that might exist as to the ability of England to meet her foes. "England is always England," he said, "she bows the knee to no one; she asks no favour from anybody, she does not come here as a suppliant, still less as a mendicant, but to the enquiry of our ministers, she answered: Here are the facts set forth in this paper, judge for yourselves and act as you please. This is the language, and it is no other than what we might expect from English statesmen and the English people."

The document in other respects, Sir Wilfrid said, gave cause for rejoicing, as it showed there was no emergency, that England is in no danger, whether imminent or prospective. The memorandum further showed that the increased armaments of the great powers had compelled England, in order to maintain her security in her own waters, to withdraw some of her naval forces from the distant seas. In Sir Wilfrid's judgment, the remedy is that wherever in the distant seas or in the distant countries—in Australia, Canada or elsewhere—a British ship has been removed to allow of concentration in European waters, that ship should be replaced by a ship equipped and maintained and manned by the young nations immediately concerned.

Continuing he said: (Vide page 1028, Hansard, 1912-13.)

"I insist once more upon what is stated in the memorandum: There is no emergency, there is no immediate danger, there is no prospective danger. If there were an emergency, if England were in danger—no, I will not use that expression; I will not say if England were in danger, but simply if England were on trial with one or two or more of the great powers of Europe, my right hon. friend might come and ask, not \$35,000,000, but twice, three times, four times \$35,000,000. We would put at the disposal of England all the resources of Canada; there would not be a single dissentient voice."

He characterized the Borden policy as a hybrid one, a cross between jingoism and Nationalism. Three ships were to be given, but Canada was not to supply any of the bone and sinew and strength to man them. In other words, Canada was to hire others to do her work. The Conservatives were ready to do anything except the fighting.

"Mr. Speaker," said Sir Wilfrid, "it is not money that England wants at this moment. England never was wealthier than she is at the present time; her coffers are overflowing. What she wants is the hearts, the brains, and the brawn of her subjects all over the world."

"It has been stated—and I hope it will prove true—that this generous contribution of \$35,000,000, to the Imperial Treasury, will create a deep impression in Europe amongst the great powers. I hope it is true, but would not the impression be much greater yet if, instead of this money contribution, the nations of Europe were to see the young daughters of the Empire, the young nations scattered over the whole world, building fleets of their own, to use the language

of the resolution of 1909—in co-operation with and in close relation to the Imperial navy, along the lines suggested by the Admiralty at the last Imperial Conference, and in full sympathy with the view that the naval supremacy of Great Britain is essential to the security of commerce, the safety of the Empire, and the peace of the world.

(Vide page 1031, Hansard, 1912-13.)

Replying to attacks on himself he said in refutation of the charge that in case of war the Canadian navy would be neutral he had only this to observe: (Vide page 1035, Hansard, 1912-13.)

"Some objections have been made to our Naval Act, because it was said that the British Admiralty could not count at all times upon the support of the Canadian navy. I simply say that the Admiralty can count at all times upon the Canadian navy, because last year we passed an agreement with the Admiralty, whereby naval stations were created for the Canadian navy. The Canadian Atlantic station would include north of 30° north latitude and west of the meridian of 40° west longitude. The Canadian Pacific station would include north of 30° north latitude and east of the meridian of 180° west longitude. So the Admiralty knew that at all times in those bodies of water there were Canadian ships to guard the waters; and the moment the ships of an enemy of England appeared in those waters it was the duty of our navy to pounce upon them, to grapple with them and to sink them, in the same manner as if they had been in the harbour of Halifax. That is the interpretation placed upon that Act. My hon. friends, however, have to-day the administration of the Act; they can interpret it themselves, but surely they will not interpret it in the way it is said they could. They can amend it as they please, but whatever they do, if they are sincere, as I hope they are, they cannot put any other construction than the construction I put upon this Act."

The Conservative policy, Sir Wilfrid declared, settles nothing and is an attempt to side-track the issue. The problem to be dealt with demands a permanent policy. It was idle for Mr. Borden to take the position that before we have a permanent policy we must have a voice in all questions of peace or war. The question of defence had to be dealt with at once. The question of having a voice in Imperial Conferences was a very important one and he did not minimize it in any way, but it must be discussed separately and not in conjunction with defence questions or we would be at a stand still.

In conclusion, Sir Wilfrid moved the following resolution in amendment: (Vide page 1038, Hansard, 1912-13.)

Liberal Proposals—Two Fleet Units

"That all the words after the word 'That' be struck out, and the following be substituted therefor:

"This House declines to concur in the said resolution and orders that the same be referred back to the committee with instructions to amend the same in the following particulars, namely, to strike

out all the words after clause (a) and substitute therefor the following:

"The memorandum prepared by the Board of Admiralty of the general naval situation of the Empire and communicated to this House by the right Hon. the Prime Minister on December 5th shows that several of the most important of the foreign powers have adopted a definite policy of rapidly increasing their naval strength."

"That this condition has compelled the United Kingdom to concentrate its naval forces in home waters, involving the withdrawal of ships from the outlying portions of the Empire."

"That such withdrawal renders it necessary that Canada, without further delay, should enter actively upon a permanent policy of naval defence."

"That any measure of Canadian aid to Imperial naval defence which does not employ a permanent policy of participation by ships owned, manned and maintained by Canada, and contemplating construction as soon as possible in Canada, is not an adequate or satisfactory expression of the aspirations of the Canadian people in regard to naval defence, and is not an assumption by Canada of her fair share in the maintenance of the naval strength of the Empire."

"This House regrets to learn the intention of the Government to indefinitely postpone the carrying out by Canada of a permanent naval policy."

"It is the opinion of this House that measures should be taken at the present session to give effect actively and speedily to the permanent naval policy embodied in the Naval Service Act of 1910 passed pursuant to the resolution unanimously approved by this House in March, 1909."

"This House is further of the opinion that to increase the power and mobility of the Imperial navy by the addition by Canada under the above Act of two fleet units, to be stationed on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of Canada, respectively, rather than by a contribution of money or ships, is the policy best calculated to afford relief to the United Kingdom in respect to the burden of Imperial naval defence, and, in the words of the Admiralty memorandum, to restore greater freedom to the movements of the British squadrons in every sea and directly promote the security of the dominions; and that the Government of Canada should take such steps as shall lead to the accomplishment of this purpose as speedily as possible."

Each fleet unit would consist of:

- 1 battle cruiser.
- 3 cruisers, town class.
- 6 destroyers.
- 3 submarines.

The total cost of the two units was later estimated by officials of the Canadian naval service as follows:

(a) If built in Great Britain.....	\$40,186,000
(b) If built in Canada.....	53,345,000

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The British Admiralty further revised these figures and estimated that the cost if built in Great Britain would be \$50,218,156.

The annual cost of maintenance of Canadian rates for pay and material was estimated by the Admiralty at \$5,659,310, and by the Canadian officials at \$5,616,000.

The Great Debate

In the debate which followed and which lasted for months, the whole question was thoroughly threshed out and the alignment of the two parties was made clear and definite. To summarize all the speeches would be too great a task. We shall deal only with the main features.

It was made manifest that the British Government had made the necessary provisions for the naval requirements of the Empire for a number of years without relying upon contributions from Canada vide the Right Honourable Sir Winston Churchill's speech on the introducing of the naval estimates in the House of Commons, March 18th, 1912, when he said: (Vide Debates, British House of Commons, March 18, 1912.)

"The Admiralty are prepared to guarantee absolutely the main security of the country and of the Empire day by day for the next few years and if the House will grant us what we ask for the future, that prospect may be indefinitely extended.

"I am glad to be able to assure the House that no difficulty will be experienced in making arrangements to retain our relative position in the near future and to secure as nearly as we need them adequate margin of safety. I am glad also that these measures of safety will not involve any excessive or disproportionate expense."

Mr. Asquith, too, speaking in July of 1912, (just about the time Sir Robert Borden was in England) said: (vide London Times, July 23, 1912.)

"There never has been a moiment and there is not one now that we have not been overwhelmingly superior in naval forces against any combination which could reasonably be anticipated.

Again, speaking at the Lord Mayor's banquet at the Guild Hall on November 11th, 1912, Mr. Churchill said: (Vide London Times.)

"It is with a greater authority than the last time I was here that I invite you to place your full confidence in the solid efficiency of our naval organization. The Germans are a nation with robust minds. They like to have the facts placed securely and plainly before them. The relations have steadily improved between the two countries during the year and they have steadily improved side by side with every evidence of our determination to maintain our naval supremacy. The best way to make these relations thoroughly healthy is to go right on and put an end to this naval rivalry by proving that we cannot be overtaken."

"It would be a poor thing to depreciate or belittle the undoubted resources of the British Naval power in serious times like these and there is no reason whatever to do so for that power has not often stood upon a firmer basis than it does to-night."

At about the time Sir Robert Borden was in England, important speeches were made by leading statesmen, the purport of which was that the relations between England and Germany had greatly improved, and that so far as could be seen, there was no danger of a rupture. We quote them as follows:

On July 10th, 1912, Sir Edward Grey, speaking in the House of Commons, said: (Vide London Times, July 11, 1912.)

"Our relations with the German Government at the present moment are excellent. We are perfectly frank with each other about all questions of mutual interest, and I believe that when questions come up, whether they be for instance, in connection with our respective interests in South Africa, or whether they be in connection eventually with the Baghdad railway, both governments are convinced that their mutual interests can be perfectly reconciled."

Shortly thereafter Mr. Asquith also speaking in the House of Commons said: (Vide London Times, July 26, 1912.)

"Our relations with the great German Empire are, I am glad to say, at this moment—and I feel sure are likely to remain—relations of amity and good-will. My noble friend, Lord Haldane, the present Lord Chancellor, paid a visit to Berlin early in the year. He entered upon conversations and an interchange of views there which have been continued since in a spirit of perfect frankness and friendship, both on one side and the other, the advantage of participation of a very distinguished diplomatist in the person of the German Ambassador."

On the same occasion, Mr. Bonar Law is reported to have used the following language: (Vide London Times, July 26, 1912.)

"But in spite of all that has been said, does the country, do the House of Commons, do any of us, really believe that there is danger and vital danger? I confess that I have the greatest difficulty in believing it myself."

It was further established that Sir Robert Borden's political necessities served to change the point of view of the First Lord of the Admiralty, Mr. Churchill, as to the main naval development of the next ten years. Speaking before the Company of Shipwrights in London on May 16th, 1912, Mr. Churchill clearly foreshadowed the growth of naval forces in the great Dominions over the Seas and made no reference whatever to contributions by the colonies in aid of the Home Fleet. Here is his exact language:

"If the main developments of the past ten years have been the concentration of the British fleet in decisive theatres, it seems to me, and I dare say to you, not unlikely that the main naval development of the next ten years will be the growth of the effective naval forces in the great Dominions overseas. Then we shall be able to make what I think will be found to be the true division of labour between the Mother Country and her daughter states—that we should maintain a sea supremacy against all-comers at the decisive point, and that they should guard and patrol all the rest of the British Empire."

"I am certainly not going to attempt to forecast or to prescribe the exact form which these developments should take but the march of opinion appears to be proceeding along thoroughly practicable lines.

"This, however, I will venture to say. The Admiralty see no reason why arrangement should not be made to give the Dominions a full measure of control over the movements in peace of any naval forces which, without help, they may bring into efficient existence. We know that in war our Countrymen over the seas will have only one wish, and that will be to encounter the enemy wherever the need and the danger is most severe. The important thing is that the gap shall be filled so that while we, in the Old Country guard the decisive theatre, our comrades and brothers across the seas shall keep the flag flying on the oceans of the world.

"That is the principle which I have come here to-night to expound, and if the observations which I have ventured to make should contribute in any way to its furtherance, should contribute in any way to the achievement of such a result, then I think we shall be found to have done more to-night for the British Empire and the British Navy than merely respond to the toast which Sir William White has so happily proposed."

In the light of that speech is it not fair to assume that the subsequent suggestion of the Admiralty that Canada should contribute dreadnoughts was made in accordance with the request of Sir Robert Borden. Apart from that, the evidence is clear that the Borden Government had abandoned the idea of having a Canadian navy and consequently the policy of contribution was the only one he could agree to. As a matter of fact, before he saw the British Admiralty at all on the subject, he made the following declaration in a speech to the Royal Colonial Institute:

"I have always had the conviction and I hold it to-day, and I am saying no new thing to you, when I declare that it is my opinion that the defence of the Empire can best be secured by one Navy."

Mr. Bourassa, the leader of the Nationalists, who knew the terms of the alliance with the Conservative party, says Mr. Borden said, in so many words, when he approached Mr. Winston Churchill; "I am committed to the Nationalist wing of my party to repeal the naval law and unless you accept a contribution from me, I can do nothing else."

It was shown also that from the financial standpoint England never was in a stronger position to bear the cost of naval defence. In the last 13 years, the public debt of Great Britain was reduced by no less a sum than \$350,000,000.

It was obvious of course that Canada had not \$35,000,000 in cash to pay for the Dreadnoughts proposed to be given and that the money would have to be raised in England by the issue of Dominion Government securities.

An interesting contribution to the debate was that Canada's interest payments to capitalists and investors of Great Britain were about \$80,000,000 a year.

The Liberals strongly contended that the Conservative party had no mandate from the people in favour of their Naval policy, and that,

as a matter of fact, their policy of contribution was not before the people at the last election at all. It was emphasized that the various manifestos issued by the Leader of the Conservative party during the election were absolutely silent as to what the Conservative naval policy was.

Shipbuilding in Canada

One of the most important questions raised through the naval question was that of establishing a shipbuilding industry on our coasts. That there is great industrial need for it is undeniable. The lack of it is perhaps Canada's greatest want industrially to-day. With our inexhaustible stores of nickel, iron and coal, we are equipped by nature in a very exceptional way to produce armour plate and steel of all kinds. The shipbuilding industry would be the very making, nay, the salvation, of our large steel industries in Nova Scotia, which, in spite of the enjoyment of Government bounties for years and years, decades even, are not yet in as healthy a position as they might be. A well established shipbuilding industry in the East, and one in the West, would develop our Coast Provinces in a wonderful way; scores of industries would follow in their wake and share in the benefits to be derived from them. In short, it would give a powerful impetus to agriculture and every other development in the country. Canada could have no more natural ambition. In the days of wooden ships, we took second place to none in the world as builders. In every harbour and in almost every inlet in the Maritime Provinces, wooden ships were constructed, and at one time Canada was the fourth nation in the world as a shipbuilder and owner. The spirit, enterprise and pluck of these days is not dead, and, with proper encouragement, there is no reason why we should not be successful in building steel ships both for the Navy and merchant service.

But the Prime Minister of the country claims to know more than the people he governs, and his dictum is that we cannot build effective ships for the navy in twenty-five or perhaps fifty years. Other countries, some of them not so high as we think in the scale of civilization, have built such ships, but we are branded by our Prime Minister as incapable of the task. He says, we might be able to build small craft but not the big cruisers and battleships. There is nothing occult in the construction of a large naval vessel, nothing that Canada could not accomplish. No less than six British shipbuilding firms of large experience in constructing ships for the British navy submitted bona fide tenders, one of the conditions of which was that a plant would be established in Canada sufficient for the building of cruisers of the Bristol class according to the British Admiralty's specifications. If these tenders had been acted upon by the Conservative Government instead of being pigeon holed, the likelihood is that some cruisers made in Canada would by this time be in the service of the Empire. It must be assumed that these firms know their business, and that they would not rashly enter upon any undertaking which they could not see their way to finish, and still more unlikely that they would agree to establish a shipbuilding plant in Canada if they did not see their way clear to make it a permanent success. They no doubt had in mind the construction of merchant vessels as well as naval.

Dealing with this subject in Parliament in 1909, Mr. Currie, the Conservative member of Parliament for North Simcoe, said:

"Now, carrying out the idea first involved in naval defence for Canada, I do not see any reasons why we should not immediately institute some system of naval defence along the lines of torpedo boats, or torpedo destroyers, and destroyer cruisers, which would be invaluable to us in case of war. A great many members suggest or imply that it would be impossible for us to build these at home. Now, I do not wish to be considered local in any way, I have always taken a national or Canadian view of every subject; nevertheless, I may be permitted to say that within the riding which I have the honour to represent there is a shipyard wherein they have launched ships over 500 feet in length, which is said to be the length of the Dreadnought. They have built ships, and laid down the keel of one ship on the 26th of June last and launched her on the 1st of November all complete, 375 feet long, 7,000 horse power, a 22 knot ship, with complete equipment in that short time. If it was necessary for this government to ask them to supply four speedy cruisers, 250 feet long, which could go through the canal, with a speed of 26 knots, I can assure you that I have it on the word of the men who designed these ships, and have built 22 steel ships in the last four years, that it would be only a small matter for them to assemble the material, provide four ships and have them in the water by the 1st of October. The dock they use is 550 feet long, and would accommodate the Dreadnought.

"I regret very much that as Canadians we have not fostered more this spirit of shipbuilding on the Atlantic and the Pacific coasts. We are now manufacturing steel, the best steel in the world. We have two large steel plants, the steel plant at Sydney is a greater plant than any they have in Great Britain, with larger and better furnaces, and in every respect a greater and larger steel plant. They have had there, for four or five years, a plate rolling plant to roll plates for ships, which they have housed away and never placed on the foundation, because nothing has been done to encourage this most important industry. I feel that we should seriously, as a House of Commons, consider the advisability of adopting some system whereby shipbuilding would be encouraged in the Maritime Provinces, and also on the St. Lawrence and on the Pacific coast. We find that Germany, whom we have heard mentioned to-night, up till seven or eight years ago when she began to build her own ships, purchased her ships in England. Now there are in Germany eight ship yards where ships are built, and we are assured by a no less naval authority than the 'Naval Annual' that they can lay the keels for 12 Dreadnoughts at once and complete them inside of 24 months, if necessary. We find that Japan at one time purchased her warships from Great Britain, but she realized the importance of carrying on this industry in her own land, and she has established shipbuilding yards in Japan where she builds her own cruisers and her own commercial ships. Shipbuilding is a splendid enterprise, an enterprise that gives employment to a great number of men, and it is the greatest national enterprise that a country can have;

greater than the manufacture of guns and weapons of defence. We should undertake the work of building carriers because the money that is paid to foreign carriers to convey our products from Canada to Great Britain and other countries is a large sum which we should retain in our own country. As I pointed out, we should immediately assume the position of establishing a local defence of our own."

Speaking as far back as 1902 before the Chambers of Commerce of the Empire at their annual meeting in Montreal, Mr. George E. Drummond of that city, one of the foremost men in Canada in the iron and steel business, said: (Vide page 2801, Hansard, 1912-13.)

"The Canadian Government should at once enter into negotiations with one of the great British shipyards, to induce them to establish a branch at one or other of our Dominion ports. It is almost certain that with such a contract as our Government would have to give, supplemented by the business to be secured in the building of merchant vessels, and possibly additional aid from the Imperial Government in the way of contracts, there would be little difficulty in persuading one of the great British shipbuilding firms to establish works on Canadian soil, bringing with them naval architects and expert shipbuilders and founding an enterprise of vast importance to Canada, and probably of very great service to the Empire. While these warships must be built in Canada, the specifications should be made by the British Admiralty Board, and the ships, when completed, should be satisfactory to that Board.

"I am convinced, sir, that our contribution to Imperial defence should be based upon the idea of relieving the central authority of all cost of defending Canada, and I hold that in undertaking this duty a magnificent opportunity will be afforded our Government and people to establish in Canada the enterprise of shipbuilding to foster the production of armour plate, for which, with our wealth of nickel and iron, we are equipped by nature in a very exceptional way. In establishing and developing such enterprises, we will at the same time be making Canada, in the matter of appliances and munitions of war, a base of supplies on this North American Continent which, in time of war on either the Atlantic or the Pacific, would be of incalculable value to the whole Empire."

Admiral Sir John Colomb and Sir William White, who were designers of the Imperial navy for years, are on record as saying that it was a serious mistake for the Empire to concentrate its construction and repair shops in one part, and that the Empire would not be preserved if there did not exist means whereby in case of difficulty or distress, the naval armament of the Empire could be put into fighting shape in the different overseas Dominions.

How Other Countries Build Navies.

Criticizing Sir Robert Borden's remark that we would not build effective fighting ships in Canada in twenty-five or fifty years, Mr. E. M. Macdonald, M.P., spoke as follows: (See page 2797, Hansard, 1912-13.)

"Is Canada a hermit nation that cannot do anything? Let us take Austria-Hungary; there they have 22 armoured ships all of which have been built since 1895, 14 of which were built in Trieste

not very long ago. Take China, still in barbarism, 14 cruisers, all built since 1895 and 1900, twelve years ago. They originated in China two shipyards of their own where they have been building all their ships. Take Denmark, a small country; they have 5 armoured ships and 3 cruisers, all built at Copenhagen within twenty years. Why cannot we do it in Canada? Take Italy; 27 armoured ships and 16 cruisers, all built in their own country in less than twenty years at Genoa, at Speria, at Venice, and at Castellannunare. Japan emerged from barbarism a little earlier than China. What about Japan? They have to-day four shipyards in that country. They have built 27 armoured ships and cruisers in their own country since 1897. They only began to build ships in Japan in 1897, and yet the Prime Minister of Canada practically insults the people of this country when he tells them that they cannot do it inside of fifty years. Mark you farther—we talk about our English shipbuilding. To-day, they are building in England the Iron Duke of 25,000 tons and the King George V. of 25,000 tons. These are the biggest ships they are building in England. Out in Japan, where they never built a ship until 1897, they have five huge yards in which they are building the Kobe, 27,500 tons and two other vessels each of 27,500 tons. They are building these three vessels, bigger than the biggest vessels which are being built in England at their shipyards over there. What they can do in Japan surely we can do in Canada. Take the Netherlands, a small country; they have their own yard at Amsterdam and, since 1892, they have built 18 armoured ships, cruisers and smaller vessels. Take Norway; they have their own yards at Horten and Christiania where they have built ships for twenty years. Take Portugal; is there any Canadian who is willing to say that we will take second place to Portugal, that a Canadian citizen has not as much brains, intelligence, capacity, and our artisans are no good, that we cannot produce ships here as well as in Portugal. The Prime Minister says that when he tells us that we cannot do it within fifty years. In Portugal, they have been building ships since 1895 at Lisbon, and their new yard is started there. Take Spain; they only began to build ships in 1892. They have three shipyards and they have built 17 armoured ships and cruisers. Take Sweden; they only began to build twenty years ago and they have 17 armoured ships and cruisers. They have three big shipyards at Stockholm, Gothenberg and Maleno. Take Turkey, the sick man of Europe, the nation that may be wiped off the map in Europe whatever she may do in Asia; there they have been building cruisers in their own shipyards since 1893. We cannot do that in Canada according to this great Government, this Government that asserts it is the lineal descendant, and inherits all the traditions, of the men, who twenty-five years ago, promulgated the gospel of Canada for the Canadians."

Manning The Ships.

On the question of manning the ships, Mr. Macdonald made the following interesting observations: (Vide page 2801, Hansard, 1912-13.)

"The manning of the ships was the greatest dread of the Postmaster General, and I have something to say on that point. Along our

seacoast, down through Quebec, in Nova Scotia, in New Brunswick, in Prince Edward Island, there grew up in the olden days a race of men who manned Canadian merchant ships and carried the flag of England to every port of the world. To-day, you will find Canadians commanding and manning the best steamers that sail the ocean. Start from New York to the West Indies on a winter trip, and you will find these great passenger ships commanded by sons of the Maritime Provinces. The ship-building industry decayed in the Maritime Provinces, there was no local interest and no local owner-ship in vessels, and in the course of years there was no interest for the sea-faring people to seek employment in these large sea-going vessels. True, you will find them to-day navigating their small boats and schooners and amongst that hardy race are numbers of men, who, were the incentive offered, would be ready to respond to the call of the navy."

The Conservatives attempted to score on their opponents by trying to establish that it would cost from 25 to 33½% more to build ships in Canada than in England. To this end they produced figures prepared by their naval experts and substantially corroborated by British experts. They might as well have saved themselves the trouble, because everyone admits that it costs more to build almost anything in Canada due to higher cost of labour and living and the effects of our tariff policy. The Conservatives, however, over-looked the fact that to the extent that we might build in Canada, the money would be spent here, whereas, under their plan, the whole \$35,000,000 would be spent in England. At this point it might be observed that the fact that England builds all its navy inside its own country is one of its strongest assets, because the money goes to pay for material produced and labour performed in England. So long as the English people can stand the necessary taxation for naval purposes, the aggregate national wealth of the country is not impaired by the naval expenditure.

Viewing the Tory argument in this respect in the abstract, it strikes at the root of protection which they profess to champion, because, undoubtedly protection to Canadian manufacturers increases the selling prices of the protected articles.

Realizing that the higher cost argument did not withstand the wash, the Conservatives tried another "cover." Sir Robert Borden wrote Mr. Winston Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty as follows: (Vide page 5208, Hansard, 1912-13.)

"My Dear Mr. Churchill:

"It has been suggested to me that the construction of large warships of the most modern type has been attended with great difficulties in its earlier stages and that the cost has been excessive. If I am not trespassing too much upon your good nature, I would be glad to receive any information along that line so that it would be available, if necessary.

"Yours faithfully,

"(Sgd.) R. L. BORDEN."

Note the careful phrasing which in effect means:

"I would be glad to receive information from you showing the great difficulties and expense attending the construction of large warships."

The better and fairer way would have been to ask for all the facts in regard to building of ships of all kinds instead of practically stating that he only wanted information adverse to the idea of construction in Canada.

Mr. Churchill, of course, followed the lead given him by writing two memoranda which Sir Robert and the whole Conservative party exulted and gloated over. Here is the full text of them: (Vide page 5208. Hansard, 1912-13.)

Churchill's Letters.

"The suggestion that the proposed battleships could be expeditiously built in Canada cannot be based on full knowledge of the question.

"The battleship of to-day has gradually been evolved from years of experiments and experience. She is a mass of intricate machines, and the armour, guns, gun mountings, and machinery, all require separate and extensive plants of a very costly nature, to cope with the constant changes in designs and composition. In addition to this the actual construction of a battleship, where high tensile and mild steel are largely used, requires the employment of special riveters and steel workers. These men are difficult to obtain in Great Britain and it is thought it would be a long time before a sufficient number of efficient workmen of this nature could be obtained in Canada.

"For the manufacture of armour plates, large steel furnaces, heavy rolling mills, planing machines, carburising plant, &c., capable of dealing with weights of 150 tons at a time, have to be provided—besides which the special treatment to obtain the correct quality of plate requires special experts who have been brought up to nothing else. Such men could not be obtained in Canada.

"For the manufacture of guns, plant consisting of heavy lathes, boring and trepanning machines, wire winding machines, as well as a heavy forging plant and oil tempering baths with heavy cranes, all capable of dealing with weights up to and over 100 tons, are required. The men for this class of work are specially trained and could not be obtained in Canada. For the manufacture of gun mountings, which involves the use of castings of irregular shape from eighty to one hundred tons, and which require special armour treatment, a special armour plate plant is required. The hydraulic and electric machinery for these mountings are all of an intricate and special design, requiring special knowledge, and can only be undertaken by a firm having years of experience of work of this nature.

"The manufacture of engines, although requiring special treatment, does not present such great difficulties as that of armour, gun and gun mountings. But in starting a new business of this kind it would be difficult at this stage to know what plant machinery to put

down, as the possible introduction of internal combustion engines may revolutionize the whole of the engine construction of warships. The above does not include specialties, such as bilge pumps, steering gear, and numbers of other details which have to be sub-contracted for all over the country and only with people on the Admiralty list. The expense of fitting these up, sending them out, and carrying out trials, would become very onerous.

"For the building yard itself, the installation of heavy cranes and appliances for building a vessel of say 27,000 tons is a very heavy item; and the fitting of the blocks and slips to take this weight would require considerable care in selection of site, in regard to nature of soil for the blocks and launching facilities, so the existing shipyards might not be adapted for this purpose.

"As an example of the cost of a shipyard it may be mentioned that Elswick, in order to cope with increased work, have lately put down a new shipyard, which is costing approximately three-quarters of a million pounds. This yard has already been two years in preparation and will not be ready for laying down a ship for another six months.

"With regard to foreign shipbuilding, Austria-Hungary has largely extended her resources by laying down two large ships at Fiume. This scheme was projected in 1909. It is understood that these ships were put down in 1911 and the first battleship commenced in January, 1912. The Austrian press states that the contract date for completion is July, 1914, but that it is probable there will be a delay of some months in the realization of this. In this instance, however, they have other large yards and all the necessary plant in the country. The cost of this undertaking is not known.

"The Japanese have taken twenty years in working up their warship building and now take over three years to build a battleship; and, although anxious to build all ships in their own country, they still find it necessary to have some of them built in Great Britain.

"Spain has developed a shipyard in Ferrol and at Cartagena. They have only found it possible to put down second class battleships of about 15,000 tons at Ferrol (the bulk of the material coming from Great Britain) and the yards are being financed and worked up by English firms (Armstrong, Brown and Vickers).

"Taking the above points into consideration, it is clear that it would be wholly unwise for Canada to attempt to undertake the building of a battleship at the present moment. The cost of laying down the plant, alone, would, at a rough estimate, be approximately £15,000,000 and it could not be ready for four years. Such an outlay could only be justified on the assumption that Canada is to keep up a continuous naval building programme to turn out a succession of ships after the fashion of the largest shipyards in Great Britain and Europe."

Admiralty, London,
January 24, 1913.

My dear Mr. Borden:—

"I have now had an examination made of the figures which you sent me in your letter of December 18, and I find that they are not quite in agreement with those which have been worked out here, particularly in regard to the first cost of the Town class cruisers.

"I enclose a table showing the cost of a fleet unit such as is proposed, if constructed in this country (a) on the types and at the prices which were current in 1909-10, when the Australian agreement was made; and (b) at the present time. The considerable increases shown are due partly to the rise in prices and partly to the increased power of the modern battle-cruiser or fast battleship.

"I think I may assume that the arguments used in the memorandum sent you on the 23rd instant will have convinced you that the idea of building the capital ships in Canada is impracticable; and I have therefore not attempted to obtain an estimate on that basis; it would indeed be almost impossible to frame one. But I am safe in saying that the increase in cost could not be prudently calculated at less than 25 per cent. or 30 per cent.

"I also send a table showing similarly the difference in the cost of maintenance of such a fleet unit between 1909-10 and 1913, at British rates of pay; and, as it is to be presumed that Canadians would not be attracted to enlist in a Canadian navy except by rates of pay effectively competing with the general rates of Canadian wages, I have added a third column showing the increase which would be involved by granting the rates of pay now drawn by officers and men serving in the Rainbow and the Niobe which, taken as a whole, are about two-thirds higher than in the Imperial navy.

"Apart from the reply to your immediate question, it seems desirable to comment on another point. The Admiralty will of course loyally endeavour to facilitate the development of any practicable naval policy which may commend itself to Canada; but the prospect of their being able to co-operate to any great extent in manning the units is now much less than it would have been at the time of the Imperial Conference of 1909.

"It must be remembered that the new German Navy Law has necessitated a large increase in the number of ships which His Majesty's Government must keep in commission, and all our manning resources are now strained to their utmost limits, more especially as regards lieutenants, specialist officers (gunnery, torpedo and navigation), and the numerous skilled professional ratings which cannot be improvised or obtained except by years of careful training.

"In 1909, the question turned upon the provision by Canada in the Pacific of a fleet corresponding to the Australian fleet unit, involving an initial expenditure estimated at £3,700,000, and maintenance at an estimated cost of £600,000 per annum. The Canadian Government did not think this compatible with their arrangements and suggested that they should provide a limited number of cruisers and destroyers which were to be stationed in the Pacific and Atlantic.

The Admiralty agreed to help in the organization and manning so far as possible. Between that time and 1912 a commencement was made with the establishment of a Canadian naval force, but in those three years only small progress was made with the training of recruits and cadets and it would have been impossible for the Canadian Government to man a single cruiser. The provision of two fleet units consisting of the most modern ships would divert from their necessary stations large numbers of very efficient officers and men which would have to be lent by the Admiralty. The case of the Australian unit stands on a different footing, for its establishment directly relieves the British ships hitherto maintained on the Australian stations, thus ultimately setting free a considerable number of men. Looking to the far greater manning difficulties which now exist than formerly in 1909, the establishment of two such units would place a strain upon the resources of the Admiralty which, with all the will in the world, they could not undertake to meet.

"It must further be borne in mind that the rapidity with which modern ships deteriorate, unless maintained in the highest state of efficiency by unremitting care and attention, is very marked. The recent experience of certain South American States in regard to vessels of the Highest quality has been most painful, and has led to deplorable waste of money, most of which would probably have been avoided if care had been taken to supply at the time the ships were commissioned, adequate refitting establishments and staffs of skilled and experienced personnel both afloat and ashore.

"Yours very sincerely,

"(Sgd.) WINSTON S. CHURCHILL."

Churchill and Borden

Before proceeding to analyze these memoranda permit us to look at the matter through Mr. Churchill's spectacles. It is generally admitted that he is one of the brainiest men in British public life, and that his heart and soul are in his great work as head of the Admiralty. The good of the Navy, from his point of view, is in his creed, and naturally he would welcome any help towards it. Along this line he approved the proposal of the Canadian Liberal Government for the construction of a Canadian navy and judged by his speeches quoted elsewhere in this pamphlet (see page 49), he evidently was strongly of opinion that the naval development of the next ten years would be along the line of the growth of effective naval forces in the Dominions over the seas, so that, as he graphically expressed it:

"While we in the Old Country guard the decisive theatre, our comrades and brothers across the seas shall keep the flag floating on the oceans of the world."

So far so good. But the Liberal party which proposed that Canadian navy policy went out of office and Mr. Borden became Prime Minister, as a result of which Mr. Churchill had another proposition to consider. In the face of the record it is perfectly clear that Mr. Borden did not

propose to Mr. Churchill that the Canadian navy as proposed by the Liberals would be proceeded with, or that the Liberal proposals in that respect would be enlarged by the addition of Dreadnoughts and submarines to the proposed unit. It was established that he (Borden) had decided to repeal the Liberal Naval Act, the Niobe and Rainbow had been put out of commission and the engines and machinery dismantled, and all recruiting stopped. In these circumstances, the only proposition he could, and no doubt did, make to Mr. Churchill was to give a special contribution. What could you expect Mr. Churchill to do? Reject it on the ground that it was only temporary and was not a solution of the great problem of over-seas defence? Not at all. He took what was offered and gladly welcomed it. He could not be expected to be much concerned as to the political consequences in Canada because, naturally, his primary object was the success of his own administration. It has not always been easy for him to get his colleagues in the British Government to consent to his naval construction programme and so, irrespective of the effect in Canada, it was pleasant to him to have Canada help him out of some of his troubles.

Adverting to the Churchill memorandum, dated January 23rd, we would observe, first, that it had reference only to the building of battleships, and not to cruisers and other naval craft.

The Liberal resolution in favour of providing two fleet units was worded so as to provide for the building of these units in Canada so far as practicable. Even if deemed advisable to get Dreadnoughts built in England, the cruisers, submarines and destroyers, which comprised about one-half of the proposed naval expenditures, could be built in Canada, and thereby a first class start would be made in the creation of a shipbuilding yard and industry which would be capable in time of turning out the largest ships. But the Tories could not see that. They presented the Admiralty memoranda to Parliament with a great flourish of trumpets and said, in effect:

"There you see the Admiralty says it would be unwise for us to build a navy."

The criticism of the Admiralty in regard to our building battleships was improperly treated by the Tories as applying to the whole of the two fleet units proposed. Mr. Borden himself in his speech in the House of Commons introducing the Bill for a contribution of \$35,000,000, said: (Vide page 688, Hansard, 1912-13.)

"Is there really any need that we should undertake the hazardous and costly experiment of building up a naval organization especially restricted to this Dominion when upon just and self-respecting terms we can take such part as we desire in naval defence through the existing naval organization of the Empire and in that way fully and effectively avail ourselves of the men and the resources at the command of Canada."

The only reasonable interpretation of this language is that he disapproved of our constructing our own navy or any part of it. In contradiction to this, however, he was willing to see that anyone in Canada who wanted to build smaller cruisers, oil tank vessels and auxiliary navy

craft could get orders from the British Government. He evidently did not think Canada should give such orders itself. Funny but true!

Analysis of Admiralty Memorandum

Critically analyzed, the Admiralty memorandum of January 23, 1912, is not convincing and in some respects contradictory. To illustrate: It is stated that a new yard capable of building big ships was laid down at Elswick, England, at a cost of \$3,750,000 and later on in the memorandum the total cost of laying down a plant is put at £15,000,000. When this discrepancy was pointed out, Sir Robert Borden came forward with the explanation that the £15,000,000 estimate included cost of plants to build guns and armoury equipment, the construction of which in Canada at present, had not been advocated by anyone.

Stress was laid on the difficulty in making armour plate and the necessity for the employment of special riveters and steel workers. These men, it was stated, could not be obtained in Canada. True it is that workmen with these qualifications may not be in Canada to-day, but it is absolute nonsense to state that they could not be obtained. If Great Britain, United States, Germany, France, Spain, Japan, Russia and many other countries can obtain these workmen why not Canada? It is largely a question of remuneration. Canadian workmen of all classes are as a rule paid better than similar workmen in England and rarely is it difficult to get workmen to come to Canada, where he is paid better wages.

A point was made too that strong cranes capable of dealing with weights up to 150 tons were required. In this connection, it was pointed out in the debate that there were a number of cranes of such capacity in use in Canada to-day.

Generally speaking, the memorandum showed great ignorance of Canadian conditions and our accomplishments in the industrial field. Considering what we have accomplished in manufacturing and construction work in such a marvellously short time, Canadians feel that there is nothing they cannot do if given proper opportunity, and the construction of battleships, apart from guns and armoury generally, is by no means an insuperable problem.

The Admiralty documents might have been dictated by British ship builders who naturally would not view with great pleasure the idea of the colonies encouraging the establishment of a shipbuilding industry as that means the taking of work away from them.

Business men in Canada engaged in the iron and steel and allied industries reading the Admiralty document know full well that none of the objections raised could not be overcome in Canada, and have so advised.

We direct special attention to the following paragraph of the second Admiralty memorandum:

"Looking to the far greater manning difficulties which now exist than formerly in 1909, the establishment of two such units would place a strain upon the resources of the Admiralty which, with all the will in the world, they could not undertake to meet."

Mr. Carvell, Liberal M.P., made a very effective reply as follows:
(Vide page 5222, Hansard, 1912-13.)

"The Admiralty memorandum went further and said that on account of the new German naval law they were going to increase the British navy and they said they could not possibly undertake to man two fleet units. I want my hon. friends to follow this because it shows the absolute nonsense of the whole transaction. They assumed, of course, that if we were to build two fleet units they would have to man them. We do not admit that at all, but, if they could not man two fleet units built in Canada, how on earth are they going to man the three dreadnoughts which this Government is giving them to be built in England?

Britain's Naval Supremacy

Honourable Dr. Beland dealt specially with the question of Britain's naval programme and her supremacy, and made the following statement based upon official records: (See page 2556, Hansard, 1912-13.)

"So much has been said about the risk that Great Britain would be running in the near future on account of the relative weakness of her navy, as compared with that of Germany, that it will be my duty now to give you some figures.

"In 1913, Great Britain will have twenty-six all big gun ships, dreadnoughts and ships that are fit to lie in the line with dreadnoughts. Germany will have seventeen and France six; Germany and France together twenty-three. In 1913, Great Britain will have twenty-six as against the two strongest European powers' twenty-three. The two-power standard is maintained.

"In 1914, Great Britain will have thirty-three all big gun ships, Germany twenty-one, France eight; Germany and France combined twenty-nine. Great Britain will have thirty-three as against twenty-nine belonging to the two strongest European powers. The two-power standard is maintained.

"In 1915, Great Britain will have thirty-seven all big gun ships, Germany twenty-three, France ten; total for Germany and France, thirty-three. In 1915, the two-power standard of Great Britain is maintained against the two strongest European powers.

But it is claimed that the two-power standard of Great Britain is gone in so far as the United States is concerned. I have here figures that I think will carry conviction to my hon. colleagues in this House.

"In 1913, Great Britain will have twenty-six all big gun ships as against Germany and the United States combined, twenty-five.

"In 1914, Great Britain will have thirty-three as against Germany and the United States, combined, thirty-one.

"In 1915, Great Britain will have thirty-seven as against Germany and the United States combined, thirty-five. That leaves out the two Lord Nelsons, which are counted by many powers as dreadnoughts. The two-power standard is maintained against the two next strongest naval powers in the world. The memorandum

makes a reference to the naval forces of Great Britain as against the combined naval forces of all European powers. It states that by the year 1915 whilst Great Britain will have thirty-five, all big gun ships, the rest of the European powers will have fifty-one. Well, that is all right, but I have been looking in vain in the memorandum to find a comparison of the forces of the triple alliance and the triple entente. I remember that Lord Crewe said that if you counted all the powers of the world as your possible enemies and none of them as your probable friends, you could not on that score discuss the situation at all. Let us take the triple alliance and the triple entente.

"In 1913, the triple entente will have twenty-six and the triple alliance seventeen. France and Russia are not counted here. I will begin counting them in 1914.

"In 1914, the triple entente, Great Britain, France and Russia, will have forty-seven all big gun ships. The triple alliance in that same year will have twenty-seven all big gun ships—forty-seven to twenty-seven.

"In 1915, the triple entente will have fifty-six all big gun ships and the triple alliance thirty-three.

"This preponderance seems to be overwhelming. When Mr. Asquith said in the House of Commons that they had an overwhelming superiority over all possible combinations that could be anticipated, he stated the truth. The figures bear him out. These figures are official and they cannot be contradicted. Now, take the cruiser classes. Great Britain has one hundred and seventeen, Germany fifty-three, the United States thirty-two, or a total for Germany and the United States of eighty-five. Great Britain has in the cruiser class one hundred and seventeen ships as against eighty-five for the next two strongest naval powers. In the cruiser class, Great Britain maintains the three-power standard. Great Britain, in battleships, battle cruisers, and cruisers of all classes, has 189 warships, as against 165 for Germany and the United States combined.

"I am not going to deal any further with these figures, but I believe they are quite conclusive to show that the claim that there is an emergency is indeed preposterous. The statesmen of Great Britain declare most emphatically that the situation is perfectly secure; they say they have the situation well in hand, and that they have an overwhelming superiority over all possible combinations. Well, I think we should rely on what the British statesmen say in that regard."

British Government Rebukes Borden.

One of the most piquant features of the debate was a discussion and inquiry into the much heralded alleged achievement of Sir Robert Borden in getting representation for Canada in the Councils of the Empire. Speaking in the House of Commons, Sir Robert said that by an arrangement with the British Government a Canadian Minister would be in London during the whole or a portion of each year, would be regularly summoned to all meetings of the committee of Imperial Defence, would

be regarded as one of its members, and no important step in foreign policy would be undertaken without consultation with such representative of Canada.

In order that there may be no misunderstanding we quote his exact language: (See page 692, Hansard, 1912-13.)

"I am assured by His Majesty's Government that, pending a final solution of the question of voice and influence, they would welcome the presence in London of a Canadian minister during the whole or a portion of each year. Such minister would be regularly summoned to all meetings of the committee of Imperial Defence, and would be regarded as one of its permanent members. No important step in foreign policy would be undertaken without consultation with such a representative of Canada. This seems a very marked advance—this seems a very marked advance both from our standpoint and from that of the United Kingdom. It would give to us an opportunity of consultation, and therefore an influence which hitherto we have not possessed.

"The conclusions and declarations of Great Britain in respect to foreign relations could not fail to be strengthened by the knowledge that such consultation and co-operation with the overseas dominions had become an accomplished fact."

These remarks were evidently noticed by the British Secretary of State, who promptly wrote a State paper correcting the erroneous impression conveyed by Mr. Borden and pointing out that the Imperial Committee of Defence on which Canada would be represented was a purely advisory body, and is not, and cannot, under any circumstances, become a body to decide upon policy which is and must remain the sole prerogative of the British Cabinet, subject to the support of the House of Commons. The full text of the State paper is as follows:

My Lord,—

Downing Street, December 10, 1912.

"I am forwarding by post for the confidential information of your ministers, a record of the proceedings of the Committee of Imperial Defence of May 30, 1911, during the Imperial Conference, and of August 1, 1912 (during the visit of the Canadian Ministers to London).

"This record deals solely with the question of the representation of the dominions on the Committee of Imperial Defence.

"Your ministers, who were present on the first occasion, will remember that the matter arose out of a resolution of Sir Jos. Ward on the Agenda of the Imperial Conference, asking that the High Commissioners of the dominions should be summoned to the Committee of Imperial Defence when naval and military matters affecting the overseas dominions were under consideration. The unanimous view of all those present on May 30, 1911, was that the representation of the dominions should be not by the High Commissioner but by ministers who would be responsible to their own colleagues and Parliament and at the same time it was decided that a defence committee should be established in each dominion which would be

kept in close touch with the Committee of Imperial Defence at home. The resolutions ultimately put forward by His Majesty's Government and accepted unanimously by the members of the Imperial Conference at the Committee of Imperial Defence were as follows: (1) That one or more representatives appointed by the respective governments of the dominions, should be invited to attend meetings of the Committee of Imperial Defence when questions of naval and military defence affecting the overseas dominions are under consideration. (2) The proposal that a defence committee should be established in each dominion is accepted in principle. The constitution of the defence committee is a matter for each dominion to decide.

"The Canadian Government having changed in the Autumn of 1911, it was necessary, when Mr. Borden and his colleagues visited England this summer, to put these proposals before them, as of course they were unaware of the previous proceedings. Subject to consultation with his colleagues in Canada, Mr. Borden provisionally accepted the resolutions as passed and stated that he saw no difficulty in one of his ministers, either with or without portfolio, spending some months of every year in London in order to carry out this intention. Mr. Asquith and I had, subsequently, several private conversations with him, at which he expressed the desire that the Canadian and other dominion ministers who might be in London as members of the Committee of Imperial Defence should receive in confidence, knowledge of the policy and proceedings of the Imperial Government in foreign and other affairs.

"We pointed out to him that the Committee of Imperial Defence is a purely advisory body and is not, and cannot under any circumstances become a body deciding on policy, which is and must remain the sole prerogative of the Cabinet, subject to the support of the House of Commons. But, at the same time we assured him that any dominions minister resident here would at all times have free and full access to the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary and the Colonial Secretary for information on all questions of Imperial policy."

The reader cannot fail to notice that the achievement was brought about at the Colonial Conference in 1911 when Sir Wilfrid Laurier represented Canada.

Thus we see another of the Prime Minister's pretensions completely shattered.

What Australia Did.

The attitude of Australia on naval defence was the subject of frequent comment during the naval debate and the facts in regard to her action were cited as follows:

In 1902, at the Imperial Conference, Sir Edmund Barton, Premier of Australia committed his country to a contribution of £200,000 per annum towards the Imperial navy. For this he was subjected to the greatest criticism in Australia with the ultimate result that he was compelled to resign his position as Premier of the Commonwealth and take the position of Chief Justice. Bear in mind that this happened in a colony where

95% of the population is of pure British extraction. The agitation against contribution was kept up, and finally, in 1909, Australia deliberately gave it up and adopted instead a policy of constructing and maintaining its own navy, a policy which was fully approved by the British Admiralty, as was that of building the Canadian navy. It will be remembered that the Conservative politicians and the Conservative press in Ontario characterized the naval proposals of the Liberal Government as a separatist navy, because, forsooth, the Parliament of Canada would have the say whether the navy would go to the aid of the Mother Country in time of war or not. It was a horrible thought, they said, to contemplate that Parliament, representing the free people of Canada, should have a voice in the disposition of their own navy.

Let us see what views were held in Australia with its almost purely English population against whom surely even the merest whisper of disloyalty could not be breathed. The attitude of the Australian Government was clearly evidenced by the following question and answer in their Parliament.

Mr. Ryrie:

"I am not clear on the point whether, under the naval agreement, our fleet unit in time of war is to be subject absolutely to the British Admiralty or only so subject with the consent of this Parliament."

The Prime Minister in reply said:

"Only with the consent of this Parliament."

The point taken by the Conservatives against the Liberal party in Canada was at the best a slanderously picaune one intended to mislead the uninformed.

To continue, the Australian Government borrowed £3,500,000 in England to build ships there for the Australian navy. The measure bringing this about was carried by only a very small majority in the House and it led to the speedy downfall of the Government which proposed it. The new Government which came into power repealed the law and inaugurated a policy for the construction of ships in Australia along the following lines, which is the policy in force in Australia to-day.

Australian defence should be:

- (A) Paid for by Australian money.
- (B) Built by Australian labour and skilled workmen, out of Australian material as far as possible.
- (C) Manned by Australian men animated with Australian patriotism.
- (D) An Australian fleet under Australian supervision and control up to the point when the Empire needs united action in central control.

This, with the substitution of the word "Canadian" for "Australian" is an admirable statement of Canadian Liberal policy to-day.

There is now at Sydney an immense dockyard and shipyard where vessels for the Australian navy are being built. These shipyards were inaugurated only four years ago and they provide all that is necessary for the mercantile interests of Australia, right within their own doors as a result of the policy inaugurated by their Government.

Summary of Objections To Conservative Policy.

The objections to the Conservative policy of contribution as registered during the debate may be summarized as follows:

1. It was not a solution of the problem of naval defence but merely a temporary makeshift without lasting result to the Mother Land or the Dominion of Canada.
2. It declared Canadians to be hucksters who would rather pay money than fight.
3. It postponed indefinitely the commencement of a Canadian navy.
4. It was the introduction of a system subversive of the principle of local self-government and was therefore a "retrograde step in the constitutional relations existing between the Mother Land and Canada.
5. It was at best an expedient humiliating to both the Empire and Canada and made no provision for a policy of permanent benefit to both.
6. It ignored the true test of devotion, the sacrifice of ourselves if necessary as well as our money in the defence of the common cause.
7. It did not appear that there was an emergency in the proper sense of the term, and the proposal of the Government was no relief to Great Britain as there were in addition to the stated programme imposed upon home authorities the expense of manning and maintaining the ships.

Liberal Contentions.

On the other hand the Liberals contended:

1. That their policy was a real and permanent one, commensurate at once with the needs of the Empire and the dignity of the Canadian people.
2. That it would tend to strengthen the tie that binds Canada to the Mother Land and would intensify, if that were possible, the strong feeling of loyalty and patriotism which now exists in Canada, and would afford full opportunity to the rising generation to show their devotion to King and country by being prepared should duty call to fight on sea as well as on land.
3. That it meant the creation of a Maritime spirit in Canada which was the most virile force in Empire defence.
4. That it would establish and develop a large ship-building industry in Canada which was a great necessity.

Bill Thrown Out By Senate.

The Bill finally passed the House of Commons but it was thrown out by the Senate, who took the position that:

"This House is not justified in giving the assent to this Bill until it is submitted to the judgment of the country."

This is identical, word for word, with the motion made by the Conservative leader in the Senate in 1910 in respect to the Naval Service Bill of the Liberal Government.

The reasons given by the Senate were enumerated by Sir George Ross as follows:

"Where does the Senate of Canada stand?

It stands for the defence of the Empire, from Australia to the Pole. Not on the North sea alone, but on every sea where the British flag floats in time of danger. I hope we are all agreed on that.

Secondly, we stand for as many battleships of the most modern type as are required; at any rate to the limit of our resources. The Bill does not do that.

Thirdly, we stand for a permanent Canadian navy to guard our coast and trade routes and commerce with Great Britain, and all other nations at peace with the Empire.

Fourthly, we stand for the construction of a navy and shipyards, using for that purpose the product of Canadian industry and building it by the industry of our people.

Fifthly, we stand for the training of our own seamen in naval schools and colleges, and on board training ships, so that when our ships go out to sea they will represent Canadian blood and bone and flesh and sentiment. The Bill does not provide for that.

Sixthly, we stand for placing our ships at the disposal of the King in case of emergency, or at any time, at the expense of Canada, and not at the expense of the British taxpayer. Our hearts, hopes and money to go with the ships wherever they are called to fight for the integrity of the Empire.

Seventhly, we stand for co-operation with His Majesty's dominions beyond the sea in forming one solid phalanx if need be, with all the powers they represent, in the defence of Britain for the peace of the world.

Eighthly, we stand for unity and defence if the emergency arises, and we do not propose to question the wisdom of the Admiralty as to how or where that emergency has arisen, or with whom or why we are called upon to fight for the Empire. If you can get any better foundation, I will go with you, and I will stand on a stronger platform than my own if you build me one."

Sir George Ross Points The Way Out.

Sir George Ross went further. He showed that the Borden Government could, by making provision in the estimates under and by virtue of the Naval Act of 1910, provide for the speedy construction of battleships wherever they can be built without going to the trouble of passing a special Bill for the purpose. Here is his exact language.

"Now that leads me to consider my first objection to this Bill, namely, that it is unnecessary as under the Laurier Act of 1910, all that is proposed to be done under the Bill before us and much more can be done for the defence of the Empire. In the first place, the Naval Bill provides for a contribution of only thirty-five millions (\$35,000,000), a very generous contribution which we would cheerfully vote if no other consideration were involved. Under the Laurier Act of 1910, now in force, any number of millions could be contributed

by Parliament if so disposed. Why then harass Parliament with a Bill which is not required for emergency purposes and which is not as effective as the Act of 1910. If the hon. gentlemen are sincere in their efforts to meet an emergency, let them withdraw the Bill now before us, and submit to the House a supplementary estimate for ten or fifteen millions for the speedy construction of battleships, wherever they can be built, and then, from year to year, ask Parliament for such additional sums as may be necessary for their completion, according to the practice of Parliament in regard to all larger appropriations. We built the Canadian Pacific Railway, put \$100,000,000 into it, but we did not vote one hundred millions when we entered into the contract for its construction. We voted the money from year to year as it was required. That is the constitutional way. That is the principle involved in the resolution in which the House concurred in 1909. We stand now where the House of Commons stood then, and we consider ourselves bound by that resolution. I do not know that a single senator would object if it was proposed, in the regular and parliamentary way, to do that. May I say more, the Bill provides that this money shall be applied in the construction of a certain number of ships. That could be done under the Act of 1910. I am informed that it is the intention to construct three battleships under this Bill. If hon. gentlemen or the government of the day wanted four or five, they could build them wherever they pleased under the Act of 1910.

"If there be an emergency hon. gentlemen can meet it without this Bill just as well as with it. If this Bill should be rejected by the Senate, next day they can bring down a supply Bill appropriating every dollar which this emergency Bill provides, and much more; and we who supported the Act of 1910 and believe in it, would be bound to support any reasonable grant so provided. I do not say any extravagant grant. All that is necessary is the permission of His Royal Highness, concurrence in Committee of Supply, and presentation of the Bill to the Senate."

Later on in his speech he said:

"Suppose there is an emergency and this Bill is rejected to-day; to-morrow morning, hon. gentlemen can provide for that emergency just as easily as they could if we passed the Bill and the Governor-General signed it.

"The Bill does not help the emergency one iota. It is utterly useless for that purpose. The old Act of 1910 is fully capable of meeting an emergency or any other condition of things—war, insurrection, invasion or anything. So when we ask the Bill to stand over, we are hurting nobody. Let me say, too, if there was no other way of helping the Empire—if there was an emergency—I am afraid I would have to vote for this Bill, for we cannot allow the Empire to fall, no matter what happens.

"I do not think it is in danger, but if Parliament had no other authority than the present Naval Bill to help it, then I would have to consider seriously whether I should reject such a Bill."

Too much importance cannot be attached to these statements of the Leader of the (Liberal) majority of the Senate. They virtually constituted proposals to the Government which if adopted would have enabled it to provide against a real emergency and danger to the Empire. What did they mean? Simply that under the powers contained in the Naval Act of 1910 any number or kinds of ships could be built, not necessarily in Canada, and paid for in the usual way by Parliamentary appropriation. The ships, of course, would belong to the Canadian navy and be maintained under the Navy Act. That Act provides that in case of an emergency which is defined to mean war, invasion or insurrection real or apprehended, the navy may, by order of the Governor-in-Council be placed at the disposal of His Majesty. The sections of the Act on this point read as follows:

(d) "Emergency" means, war, invasion or insurrection, real or apprehended.

"In case of an emergency the Governor-in-Council may place to the disposal of His Majesty for general service in the Royal Navy, the Naval Service or any part thereof, any ships or vessels of the Naval Service, and the officers and seamen serving in such ships or vessels, or any officers or seamen belonging to the Naval Service.

"Whenever the Governor-in-Council places the Naval Service or any part thereof on active service, as provided in the two preceding sections, if Parliament is then separated by such adjournment or prorogation as will not expire within ten days, a proclamation shall issue for a meeting of Parliament within fifteen days, and Parliament shall accordingly meet and sit upon the day appointed by such proclamation, and shall continue to sit in like manner as if it had stood adjourned or prorogued to the same day."

The Borden plan provided for getting three Dreadnoughts built in Britain to be kept over there and used by His Majesty. The Senate plan provided for the ships being built in Britain, if they could not be built in Canada, and be under the control of the Dominion Government, with the exception that in case of emergency they would be at the disposal of the King as provided in the Act above quoted.

Under the Borden plan, empty ships were all that was to be given, no men and no maintenance costs being provided by Canada. The Senate suggestion, however, went further by providing for Canada bearing the responsibility of manning and the cost of maintenance. On the question of manning the ships we would observe that the Admiralty would have to man them under the Borden scheme, and therefore it was no additional burden to man them, or help to man them, as part of the Canadian navy. The result would be the same in each case—additional security to the Empire.

Moreover, the Senate plan could have been adopted almost at once and additional security to the Empire thereby promptly guaranteed, whereas the Borden plan, under the ruling of the Senate, had to be referred to the people.

The Test of Borden's Sincerity

Now we come to the test of the sincerity and patriotism of the Leader of the Conservative party. In 1910, he made the following solemn declaration in Parliament: (Vide his quotation, Hansard, page 677, 1912-13).

"It may be fairly asked what we would do if we were in power to-day in regard to a great question of this kind. It seems to me that our plain course and duty would be this. The Government of this country are able to ascertain and to know if they take the proper action for that purpose, whether the conditions which face the Empire at this time in respect to naval defence are grave. If we were in power we would endeavour to find that out to get a plain unvarnished answer to that question, and if the answer based upon the assurance of the Mother Country and the report of the naval experts of the Admiralty were such, and I think it would be such, as to demand instant and effective action by this country, then **I would appeal to Parliament for immediate and effective aid, and if Parliament did not give immediate and effective aid, I would appeal from Parliament to the people of the country.**"

Speaking in Montreal on September 21st, 1912, shortly after his return from England, he said: (Vide Montreal Gazette.)

"I went to the United Kingdom, having in mind what I said in November, 1910, when asked what we would do in regard to questions of this kind. I said it would be our plain duty, that the Government of this country could ascertain, if they took proper action for that purpose, to find whether the naval issues were grave. That if we were in power we would find this, and get an unvarnished answer, and if the answer to that question by the Government of the Mother Country, and the reports of the Admiralty experts were such as to demand immediate action, then we would appeal to Parliament for immediate effective aid, and if Parliament did not give that aid, that I would appeal from Parliament to the people of Canada."

Well then, he made the inquiry; he satisfied himself that instant and effective action was necessary; he proposed that such action be taken, but Parliament, through the Senate, declined to acquiesce in it without first submitting the question to the people.

The Senate, however, pointed a way out of the difficulty as herein-before explained.

Sir Robert had therefore two courses to consider. One to appeal from Parliament to the country as he had pledged himself to do, the other to adopt the suggestion of the Senate which would result in provision being made for the proposed capital ships under the Naval Service Act of Canada. What did he do? Nothing! He preferred to go back on his word,—to renounce his promises. Ever since 1909, when the Naval question first entered politics, he had preached the gospel of assistance to the Empire, had harrowed the feelings of the multitude, by declaring in the most serious and solemn manner that the Empire was in the greatest possible danger, that the thunder already boomed on the horizon, yet when the time came when he had the power to help the Empire he flunked

most miserably. At the time of trial he was found wanting. He told the people that it was their duty to give three Dreadnoughts to the Empire and that unless they did the Empire was in danger, but he refused, out of fear for his own political fortunes, to go before the people and ask them to back him up. Instead of playing the part of a man, of a real statesman and of a true patriot, he contented himself with throwing the blame on the Senate and threatening all sorts of dire punishment to them, threats, however, he failed to carry into action. He refused, moreover, to adopt the suggestion of the Senate which was a clear and sure way out of the difficulty and would have provided the Empire with the Dreadnoughts which he claimed were greatly needed. Lacking the initiative of his Government, the matter practically dropped out of sight. Another Session of Parliament was held yet not a move was made.

The facts undoubtedly stamp Sir Robert Borden and the Conservative party as guilty in the gravest degree of insincerity and lack of patriotism. Considering their high sounding professions, much was expected of them, but though the mountain laboured, it did not bring forth even a mouse.

If, in this crisis of the world's history, any charge lies against Canada for not participating in the naval defence of the Empire, it can properly be laid at the Conservative door. They nullified the policy adopted by Parliament bringing about the creation of the Canadian navy, declined to adopt a reasonable suggestion to provide as part of the Canadian navy the capital ships the Admiralty suggested, and declined to trust the people to express their opinion on their own policy of contribution, the whole of which was tantamount to declining to let the people help the Empire if they wished to do so.

Borden and the Nationalists.

Let us apply another test to Sir Robert Borden. How did he deal with the Nationalists? At the outset he kept the faith of the alliance by appointing the entire French-Canadian representation in his Cabinet from the Nationalist ranks, to wit, Monk, Minister of Public Works; Pelletier, Postmaster-General, and Nantel, Minister of Inland Revenue. In addition to that, Mr. Blondin was appointed Deputy Speaker and Mr. Paquet, Deputy Whip. These appointments were practically dictated by Bourassa and Lavergne, the two leaders in the Nationalist movement. They were reported as definite in Mr. Bourassa's paper, *Le Devoir*, two days before the Cabinet was finally completed. It was a hard, bitter pill for the old-time Conservatives to swallow. They knew that politics makes strange bed-fellows, but it galled them to think that their leader had unmistakeably tied himself to men who, openly and without shame, advocated a policy of no support to the Empire.

But this action of Sir Robert Borden was not without its bright side. If rumour speaks true, it actually was direct cause of the greatest military commander since Hannibal, the Honourable Major-General Sam Hughes being made Minister of Militia. The story is told by good authority that the redoubtable Sam's name was not on the Cabinet slate, and this knowledge coming to his ears, he proceeded to the Borden residence with

blood in his eye. Shaking his fist right under Sir Robert's nose, he said "What do you mean by taking these d—Nationalists in and leaving me out. Remember, unless you give me the Militia Department, I will raise the Orangemen of the whole country against you and I am the boy that can do it."

Borden frowned, protested, faltered and finally Sam, fortunately for the world, won out. We say fortunately for the world because no one has contributed more to the gayety of nations than the Honourable Samuel. Without him the Borden Government would be like Hamlet without the ghost, like Macbeth without the witches, or what is a better simile, like a Pantomime without the Harlequin.

When the three Nationalists joined the Cabinet, they well knew and Borden well knew that they had pledged themselves to the people of Quebec, that so far as they were concerned they would advocate the repeal of the Naval Act, and that no naval policy of any kind would be adopted by the Government without first submitting it to the people. That was their stand first, last and all the time during the general election. Is it not fair to assume, therefore, that when they entered the Cabinet they had assurances from Borden that their pledges would be respected? Does not the evidence point clearly that way? Mr. Bourassa strongly affirmed this, writing in his paper, *Le Devoir*, when he charged Borden with treachery in refusing to submit his policy of contribution to the people.

"Pledges which these people have now broken," he wrote, "had been given with the full knowledge of the Tories, who used it as a stepping stone to power."

Mr. Pelletier is reported in *La Patrie* of Montreal as making the following public utterance shortly before he entered the Cabinet: (Vide page 4877, *Hansard*, 1913.)

"The report is that I shall be a minister. I know nothing about it, not having yet been invited by Mr. Borden to enter his Cabinet. In any case, I shall not be a minister unless I am allowed to follow the course which has been pointed out to me by Mr. Monk.

"There will be a navy only in case the majority of the people so desire; we have promised a plebiscite. We have been elected for that object. We shall live up to our pledges. There will be a plebiscite. I am satisfied that plank of our platform will be carried out. At any rate, you may be sure that we will exact its carrying out." (Mr. Pelletier at Montmagny, as reported in *L'Evenement*, October 3, 1911).

Mr. Monk, in retiring from the Cabinet when the conclusion was reached to contribute \$35,000,000 towards the British navy, wrote that to do so without giving the Canadian people an opportunity of expressing their approval would be at variance with his pledges.

The letter was addressed to the Right Hon. R. L. Borden, is dated October 18, 1912, and was as follows:—

"I regret to find I cannot concur in the decision, arrived at the Cabinet yesterday, to place on behalf of Canada an emergency contribution of \$35,000,000 at the disposal of the British Government for naval purposes, with the sanction of Parliament but with-

out giving the Canadian people an opportunity of expressing their approval of this important step before it is taken. Such a concurrence would be at variance with my pledges and the Act proposed is of sufficient gravity to justify my insistence. It goes beyond the scope of the Constitutional Act of 1867.

Holding this in view, as a member of your Cabinet, I feel it my duty to place my resignation in your hands. Permit me to add my decision has been reached with regret on account of my agreeable relation at all times with yourself."

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) F. D. MONK.

The others, Pelletier, Nantel and Coderre, held on, tied and riveted to their seats. They had given the same pledges as Mr. Monk but considered it easier to swallow them than to give up the sweets of office which they found so pleasant. Gradually, however, public opinion in Quebec made it uncomfortable for Mr. Pelletier and in course of time it happened that the newspapers reported him to be a very sick man, the result of over work. This report was quickly followed by his resignation, which was accompanied by the most disquieting statements as to the condition of his health. But the age of miracles is not past. Within six weeks after his retirement he was appointed Judge of the Superior Court of Quebec and was quite well enough to assume his judicial duties.

At the same time as Pelletier dropped out of public life, Mr. Nantel, the Minister of Inland Revenue, was quietly removed from office and appointed on the Board of Railway Commissioners. The truth in regard to this change was that Nantel weakened under the criticism of his electors, and Borden knew that as an administrator he was a nonentity. As a matter of fact, he was the butt of the wits of the House of Commons. The influence of the Nationalists was, however, evidently still powerful, as it is impossible otherwise to conceive of the Prime Minister appointing such a weak man to the Railway Commission, one of the most important executive and administrative bodies in the country.

These two changes gave the Prime Minister the opportunity to rid himself of the Nationalist representation in the Cabinet, except Mr. Coderre, who is comparatively harmless and innocuous, but horrors upon horrors, to quote the language of the irate Conservatives, he appointed as Minister of Inland Revenue, Mr. Blondin, the most incendiary and slanderous of all the Nationalists, the man who on the Hustings declared that England had gone so far as to grind down the Colonies as did Imperial Rome of old, and further stated that the French-Canadians in 1837 had to shoot holes through the British flag before they could breathe the air of liberty. It is almost inconceivable, is it not, but there it is.

The Rainbow and Niobe in Active Service.

What was the situation from the naval standpoint when the war broke out early in August, 1914? Where did we stand? Our two ships, the Rainbow and Niobe were out of commission, their crews had been dismissed and their engines and machinery partly dismantled. Though they

had been sold by the British Government and purchased by us as good serviceable boats, the Tories said they were of the "tin pot" type and so they practically discarded them. When the time of trial came, and politics were dropped, the alleged "tin pots" were considered good enough to be immediately ordered into active service. It was a difficult job manning them on such short notice, but with the help of the British Government, it was done, officers and men being sent from England, British reservists being picked up in Canada and a large number of reservists in training in Newfoundland being obtained. As is well known, the Rainbow did splendid service on the Pacific coasts. No official reports have been published so far regarding the Niobe.

The following specifications of the two vessels, taken from the Navy Department report show that they are no mean craft.

	"Niobe"	"Rainbow"
Length.....	435 feet.	300 feet.
Breadth.....	69 "	43½ "
Draught.....	26 "	17½ "
Displacement.....	11,000 tons.	3,600 tons.
Horsepower.....	16,500.	9,681.
Armament.....	16-6" Q.F. 12-12 pdr. Q.F. 3-3 pdr. Q.F. 2 Maxims.	9-6" Q.F. 8-6 pdr. Q.F. 1-3 pdr. Q.F. 4 Maxims.
Torpedo Tubes.....	2-12 pdr. Field guns 2 submerged.	1-12 pdr. Field gun. 2 above water.
Coal storage.....	1000 tons.	400 tons.
Speed.....	20.5 knots.	19.7 knots.
Complement.....	705.	273.

Two submarines were also purchased by our Government in the United States from the Government of Chili after hostilities commenced, no doubt at the dictation of the British Government. Sir Robert Borden had it in his power for nearly three years, by virtue of the Naval Act passed by Parliament under the Liberals, to provide Canada not only with a considerable number of submarines, but also with cruisers and destroyers for service both on the Atlantic and the Pacific. But he was against our having a Canadian navy. He would have no policy but contribution. Believing, as he said he did, that the Empire was in danger, he could have proposed on the ground of extreme emergency the speedy construction of necessary cruisers, submarines, etc., in Great Britain for the protection of our shores and our commerce in co-operation with the British Government under the provisions of the Naval Act. But he did not. His political affiliations with the Nationalists prevented him.

Exploits of Australian Navy.

On the other hand, our sister Dominion, Australia, through its own navy, which it persisted in creating, covered itself with glory. Actually, the cruiser "Sydney" of the Australian fleet, which is similar to the Bristol cruiser proposed by the Liberals to be built for the Canadian navy, rid the seas of its greatest terror, the German cruiser "Emden," which

had taken more toll in merchant ships and naval craft than all other German ships put together.

The Morning Post, of London, the newspaper bible of British Conservatives, commenting on the work of the Australian navy, wrote on December 10th, 1914, as follows:

"Even where the Central Authority and the Dominions were in conflict, it is the Dominion Judgment that is proving to be right. Thus, for example; Australia insisted against a great deal of opposition at this end on having her own navy, and this Australian Navy when war broke out was found to be the right thing in the right place. The battle cruiser Australia was strong enough to defend the Antipodes against the heaviest metal Germany possessed outside European waters, and the Sydney was the instrument, under Providence, of putting an end to the pernicious activities of the Emden, and not only did Australia achieve this work of commerce protection and cruiser destruction on the sea, but she also, with the co-operation of New Zealand, swept that part of the world clean of German Colonies. And if only Australia had not been so long in the leading-strings of Whitehall and had developed this independent policy somewhat earlier, we might not have been under the necessity of applying for the good offices of our loyal and obliging ally in the East.

Mr. Richard Jebb, an accepted authority on military affairs in a letter to the same Morning Post, wrote:

"By no Englishman can the part played by the Australian navy be more heartily appreciated than by those who for years have tried to uphold the Dominions in their policy of creating a navy of their own, and in which the Australians have so splendidly persevered, against persistent official and unofficial attempts to substitute a system of contribution to a centralized navy. Ten years ago, I wrote 'In the days of Armageddon their ships shall range with ours.' Little did I then imagine how soon or how strikingly that prophecy would be fulfilled."

Mr. Richard Hurd, a distinguished authority on Imperial matters, writing in the Quarterly Review under the caption, "The First Two Months of War," declared that the lesson which may be deducted from the experience of war on the sea may be expressed in modern terms, "more cruisers more cruisers—and swift ones."

Hon. Winston Churchill cabled Australia:

"Warmest congratulations on the brilliant entry of the Australian Navy into the War and the signal service rendered to the Allies cause and to peaceful commerce by the destruction of the Emden." London Daily Mail, November 11th, 1914:

"That the Emden should have been disposed of by a vessel of the Australian Navy makes the good news of her destruction doubly welcome. The achievement is a feather in the cap of our Australian fellow-subjects that all the rest of the Empire will frankly envy them; and together with the very useful work in the Pacific already standing to their credit, it overwhelmingly justifies the prescience and patriotism that led them, in 1909, to start a naval unit of their

own. The sacrifices which they have gladly borne are now triumphantly proved not to have been in vain."

The London Standard, November 11th, 1914:

"The hearty congratulations of the whole Empire will go forth to the Royal Australian Navy on the signal service performed by the Sydney in defeating the German cruiser Emden. This particular enemy vessel has occupied a prominent place in the news owing to its single-handed exploits against our merchant marine in the Bay of Bengall, and it is gratifying that the work of laying him by the heels should have fallen to a cruiser of a Dominion navy brought into being for the defence of British interests in the outer seas. The Royal Australian Navy thus claims a victory in action in the third year of its existence, and justifies, if justification were needed, the patriotic determination of the people of Australia, to take on their own shoulders the burden of local defence."

The Westminster Gazette, November 11th, 1914:

"The morals, are, first, the quite familiar ones that one armoured ship skilfully handled can do unlimited damage among defenceless merchantmen, so long as she is at large; and, second, that she can remain longer at large than was generally anticipated. Clearly, we must have more fast cruisers of the same type, and when we come to reconsider the problem of the Dominion navies in the light of this war, that lesson will no doubt be remembered."

The New York Herald, November 11th, 1914:

"It was a Colonial that did it, the Sydney, a ship built by colonial money, manned by colonial forces, and officered as far as possible by Colonials, educated in the Imperial service of Great Britain. Such was the ship which to date has struck the most important blow of the war in England. The real satisfaction which the British fleet has is the knowledge that the Sydney has upheld the best traditions of that service in battery control."

The Ottawa Citizen:

"The prevailing opinion would seem to be that the Australian Navy has justified its existence by the events culminating in the Sydney's victory. Australia is thoroughly loyal to the Motherland. But along with the loyal imperial sentiment there is a very pronounced spirit of nationalism; when the naval question of imperial defence came up a few years ago, the Australians had the audacity to propose the building of a fleet of their own."

"An Australian writer in the London Citizen, Mr. W. O. Pitt, says that the naval experts to a man opposed the Commonwealth's policy, considering it a piece of ignorant wrongheadedness, the folly of which would be exposed as soon as its practical value was tested."

"But the Labour Government went ahead and ordered a fleet unit of one battleship, three cruisers, six destroyers and two submarines. They ordered the ships in Britain, and proceeded to make plans for building subsequent units in Australia. The Liberal party (there is no Conservative party in Australia) tried a flag-flapping campaign in favour of the battleship contribution policy. New Zealand actually made a contribution of one battleship. But now, accord-

ing to Mr. W. O. Pitt, the Emden menace to trade and its removal by the Sydney had vindicated Andrew Fisher, the carpenter premier of Australia, and the Labour Government. And New Zealand, with its battleship in the North Sea, is acknowledging its indebtedness to Australia for home defence; and the New Zealanders are preparing to follow or merge with the Australian plan. The Emden's active career seems to have settled it."

Where did Britain stand in the matter of naval defence when the war broke out? The figures show that her Navy was overwhelmingly superior to that of Germany's. Here are the figures:

	British	German
Dreadnought and Super-Dreadnought battleships and cruisers.....	33	18
Pre-Dreadnoughts.....	40	22
Armoured cruisers.....	34	9
Protected cruisers.....	15	6
Small cruisers.....	72	37
Destroyers.....	225	152
Torpedo boats.....	109	45
Submarines.....	75	30

We think it may be fairly argued from these statistics that Great Britain knew what she was doing and had the situation well in hand all the time, during the race between the two countries in naval construction.

As everybody knows, the German navy, realizing its inferiority, promptly took to shelter in the Kiel Canal, and up to the time of writing has, except for sporadic efforts, practically made no attempt to fight. The British Navy in itself, as will be seen, is tremendously superior and when we consider that it has the assistance of the navies of France, Russia and Japan, the question of complete supremacy of the sea is absolutely undoubted.

Not only was Britain's naval power greatly in advance of Germany's at the opening of the war but it has become more so since. Speaking in the British House of Commons on November 28th, the First Lord of the Admiralty stated that between then and the end of '15 the Germans would and could only add three capital ships to their navy, whereas Great Britain would add fifteen ships of the greatest power of any vessels that have ever been constructed in naval history. He added that it was no exaggeration to say that they could afford to lose a super-dreadnought every month for twelve months without any loss occurring to the enemy and yet be in approximately as good a position of superiority as they were on the declaration of war.

Conclusion

To conclude, we assert that the record proves Sir Robert Borden, and through him the Conservative party, guilty of the grossest kind of political insincerity. We charge against him and his party that they have prostituted patriotism to unholy and despicable ends and that their loud voiced professions of loyalty were merely dodges in their political game. They allied themselves with the Nationalists who advocated no support to the Empire, and by refusing to submit their policy of contribution to

the people, they refused the people the right to assist the Empire. The Parliament of Canada had unanimously spoken declaring in favour of a Canadian navy. Borden declined to proceed with that navy and proposed instead a contribution. The Senate told him to consult the people, but said without doing so, he could build ships under the Naval Act of 1910. He refused to adopt either course, and so the interests of the Empire and of Canada fell between the stools, notwithstanding Borden's portentous and solemn statements to Parliament, reiterated over two years, that the thunder was already booming on the horizon and that the Empire might be rent asunder. Taking his warning language at its face value, he was content to let Canada rest silently and slothfully under the impending danger of dismemberment of the Empire, rather than trust the people who would speedily have settled the question one way or the other? We leave the noble knight of the noble and illustrious order of St. Michael and St. George to reflect upon these evidences of his almost criminal political weakness and his manifest insincerity. God save the Empire from such leaders!

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